WANG, James C.F., 1926-
THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN COMMUNIST
CHINA'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A CONTINGENCY
ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S PERCEPTION AND
VERBAL SYMBOLIZATION DURING THE CULTURAL

University of Hawaii, Ph.D., 1971
Political Science, international law and
relations

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
IN COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
A CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S PERCEPTION
AND VERBAL SYMBOLIZATION DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION,
1966-1969

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AUGUST 1971

By
James C. F. Wang

Dissertation Committee:
Robert B. Stauffer, Chairman
Yasumasa Kuroda
Harry J. Lamely
PLEASE NOTE:

Some Pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
ABSTRACT

This study on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Communist China's political development investigates the following: The PLA's perception of its political role and participation in the Cultural Revolution; ideological conformity as enunciated by the PLA; measurement of the PLA influence at the central and provincial levels of government; and the role of the PLA in the revolutionary committees during the Cultural Revolution. The methodology employed is that of contingency content analysis of primary material related to the PLA, i.e., editorials of the military's journal and testimonials of its cadres.

The findings in this study suggest that the PLA has been a loyal instrument to the party under the leadership of its mentor, Mao Tze-tung. The PLA's active and direct participation in the Cultural Revolution has added a new dimension to its well-established politico-economic roles in that it has employed coercive measures to consolidate the different elements within the party and society on policies and methods of implementation. The findings also suggest that in a crisis situation where there is disruption in the established authority, there is a need for the military, being the only effective organization, to maintain law and order. Finally, this study reveals that the spiritual transformation in Communist China has involved the projection of the PLA as a model or paradigm for a new communist life. Under the direction of the military, political and ideological consolidation began via verbal material disseminated for the purpose of reshaping societal values and attitudes. Thus analysis of verbal material, if scientifically conducted, can have predicative value in interpreting political development in a closed
society such as Communist China.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Problem and Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Modes of Analysis: Review of Literature on the Military's Role in Politics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Questions for Study and Inventory of Propositions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Plan of Presentation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Data Collection</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Methodology: Contingency Content Analysis</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Data Presentation and Qualitative Analysis</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PLA'S INTERVENTION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: PERCEPTION OF ROLE, TECHNIQUES OF INTERVENTION AND DIFFICULTIES</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Stages of Participation</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Findings and Analysis of the PLA's Perception of Its Role in the Cultural Revolution</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Findings on the PLA's Perception of Its Difficulties in Intervention</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Techniques of Intervention: Military Control and Central Elite Corps</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE MEANING AND IMPLICATION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cultural Revolution as Manifestation of Basic Policy Cleavage on the Regime's Goals</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Value Transmission in the Development Process</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mao Tze-tung's Vision of a Communist Man as Perceived by the PLA</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. PLA AND THE NEW POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN PARTY REBUILDING</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Question of PLA's Loyalty to Party</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PLA's Participation in the Revolutionary Committees in the Provinces</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PLA’s Influence and Dominance in the Provincial and Basic-Level Revolutionary Committees</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PLA and the Cadres Question</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VI. TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CHINESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>178</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Summary of Findings</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relevance of Findings to Study of Military's Role in Politics</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOOTNOTES | 191 |
APPENDIX A | 216 |
APPENDIX B | 227 |
APPENDIX C | 237 |
APPENDIX D | 244 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 261 |
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MODES OF ANALYSIS IN THE STUDY OF MILITARY ROLE IN CHINESE COMMUNIST SOCIETY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>FREQUENCIES OF ROLE CATEGORIES SHOWING STAGES OF PARTICIPATION</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE PLA IN ITS INTERVENTION</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO REGIONAL DEFIANCE WITHIN THE MILITARY--WUHAN</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO PLA'S DILEMMA IN COPING WITH Factional Rivalry AND DISPUTE WITHIN AND AMONG REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO MILITARY CONTROL AND SUPERVISION</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO DISSENSION WITHIN THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON POLICY ISSUES</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO POLICY DEBATE</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE 1959 LUSHAN CONFERENCE AND POLICY DEBATE</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO EMULATION OF PLA HEROES</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO SELF-SACRIFICE, DETERMINATION AND HONESTY</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO PLA'S VALUE PERCEPTION</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE PLA'S LOYALTY TO THE PARTY AND THE LEFT</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO INTERNAL DISSENSION OF THE PLA</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>STATISTICS SHOWING THE EXTENT OF PURGES INFlicted ON THE PLA REGIONAL AND DISTRICT COMMANDS</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO PLA AND THE FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP (CORE GROUP) REPRESENTATION IN THE PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES BASED ON THE &quot;THREE-WAY ALLIANCE&quot;</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP DISTRIBUTION BY AFFILIATION WITH PLA, PARTY AND MASS ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN SERVING ON NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>PLA MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL COMMISSARS ON THE NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE CADRES QUESTION</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS: MESSAGES PRODUCED BY SOURCE A</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE PLA IN ITS INTERVENTION</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO MILITARY CONTROL AND SUPERVISION</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO LEADERSHIP DISSENSION ON POLICY ISSUES</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO POLICY DEBATE</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO EMULATION OF PLA HEROES</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO SELF-SACRIFICE, DETERMINATION AND HONESTY</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE PLA'S LOYALTY TO THE PARTY AND THE LEFT</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE CADRES QUESTION</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION


Romanization for the titles of the three primary sources mentioned above is that used by the English edition of *Peking Review*. 
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study on the People's Liberation Army's perception of its political role and on its participation in the Cultural Revolution, a profound crisis in the Chinese political system. The study is concerned with the role of the military in political development, a subject of great interest to students in comparative and development politics.

1. The Problem and Purpose

The purpose of this study is three-fold. First, there is a need to develop a set of theories in the subject area of the military's role in closed societies such as that of Communist China. For instance, the concepts of power and politics as applied to the Soviet Union or Communist China need interpretation or reformulation to fit reality. But a conceptual formulation of the military's role in a closed society must be dependent upon studies on the functions, roles and behavior of the military. A study of the military's role in Communist China during the Cultural Revolution, focusing on the direct intervention by the army in party and governmental affairs, can provide an understanding of what is taking place in a closed society. Second, the few studies which have been done on the People's Liberation Army, hereafter referred to as the PLA, have been mainly descriptive and historical analysis. The need is for students of political science who are interested in Chinese political development to engage in systematic studies to complement the historical
and qualitative analysis and to demonstrate the usefulness of quantitative
treatment of documentary material. Third, analysis of contemporary China
inevitably raises questions which are relevant to the concepts and
theories in the field of political development. It is important for
students of political science to examine Communist China in terms of
political development and revolutionary change in order to bridge the
gap that exists between area specialists, who view China as a unique
case, and scholars engaged in studies on political development, who
rarely treat the Chinese communist regime as a developing nation.

The present unsatisfactory state of analysis of the role of the
military in the Chinese communist system requires that a fresh approach
be made utilizing concepts and methods developed within the social
sciences, particularly in the area of development politics. Several
projects are now underway to experiment with quantitative analysis in
the study of contemporary Communist China. This paper represents only
a limited investigation. It is concerned mainly with the participation
of the military in a political and social upheaval, the Cultural
Revolution, and its behavior and role in it. The direct intervention by
the military component of the Chinese communist system in the Cultural
Revolution affords us an opportunity for a systematic approach to the
role of the military in a closed society. By concentrating on this one
aspect of the subject, one may gain some perspective and move toward a
more sophisticated examination of the role and behavior of the military
in its political involvement in the hope that some conceptual formulation
may be constructed which will serve to explain military intervention and
the effect of such intervention on revolutionary political and social
change in Communist China.
2. Modes of Analysis: Review of Literature on the Military's Role in Politics

If one were to take a survey of the literature which deals with the subject of the military's role in politics, one would be struck by the fact that much of the literature deals with the military's role in western societies, in the former dictatorships of wartime Germany, Japan and Italy, and in the developing nations. Comparatively little has been written on the military's role in politics in communist societies such as the Soviet Union or Communist China. Even within the existing literature, there seems to be a need for more precise conceptualization and less generalization in explaining the military's role in politics in all societies. What conceptualization there is tends to fall into the following modes of analysis: 1) grand generalizations, 2) party-army conflict, and 3) military as modernizing agent.

a. Grand Generalizations

One of the first concepts developed in the field is the one formulated by Lasswell some thirty years ago: the garrison-state hypothesis. Lasswell offered the hypothesis as a "development construct" for an analysis of international politics with the prediction that continued international warfare would result in the emergence of a garrison or police state. Central to a garrison state is the predominant role of the "specialists in violence" whose technical skills are required for a modern civilian management of the state. In a garrison state technology, industry, science, and labor are all regimented for the purposes of war. A garrison state will, according to Lasswell, eventually become totalitarian. Lasswell felt the only alternative to
a garrison state was formation of a world commonwealth.\textsuperscript{7}

Another important contribution to conceptualization was David Rapoport's concept of praetorian state. The praetorian state typically has a small wealthy oligarchy and a large poverty stricken mass. In this society the loyalty of the soldiers is not fixed, and often the army is the source of political intrigue.\textsuperscript{8} Rapoport's concept of praetorianism was modified by Perlmutter who offers three types of situation whereby praetorianism exists: 1) the political system favors the army as the ruling group; 2) the political leadership is mainly recruited from the military; and 3) the army serves as reservoir for recruitment of political leadership.\textsuperscript{9} Parallel to Perlmutter's concept of praetorianism is Huntington's "praetorian society" which refers to the active participation in politics not only of the military but also of other social forces in a society in which political institutions tend to be unstable.\textsuperscript{10}

Huntington also made a significant contribution when he proposed a theoretical definition for the civilian control of the military. What he has proposed are two distinct concepts on civilian control of the military: the subjective control and the objective control. In the subjective control model, the military forces are an integral part of the society and its members typically perform many social roles for the society, share the dominant values, and participate actively in governmental affairs. Under this model it is assumed that no sharp difference exist between civilian and military leadership in politics. The objective model presupposes distinct and separate roles and values for the civilian and the military within a given society. The objective
model emphasizes the aspects of military professionalism and its abstention from politics. Obvious in Huntington's definition is the implication that in the absence of a professional officer corps, the subjective control model is the only form possible of civilian control.¹¹

b. Party-Army Conflict Model

This model of analysis is based on the premise that in a totalitarian one-party system the military cannot be permitted to develop a distinct identity of its own and that no institution under the system can escape the party's scrutiny and interference by becoming professionalized.¹² The model becomes useful in analyzing the relationship between the Communist Party and the military establishment in the Soviet Union by focusing on the areas of common interests as well as the areas of conflict over ideas and objectives. Analyses under the conflict model usually include discussion of the party's control system in the military, the military's professionalism as opposed to political integration, and the effect of the new technology on the military elite and on its relationship with the party.¹³

c. Military as Modernizing Agent Concept

In recent years a number of studies have been developed to explain the widespread military intervention in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A basic concept underlying many of these studies is the military's potential for promoting the development process. The leading scholars who embrace the concept of the military as modernizing agent are Shils, Pye, and Janowitz. Shils, for instance, articulates the thesis that military rule in most emerging Asian and
African countries represents one of the few practical alternatives when experiments with democratic and parliamentary institutions have failed to achieve the desired results of nation-building. Recruits of these armies, Shils points out, have been trained in technical skills; they have established the outlook of professional military technicians. Coupled with this technical orientation is the young officer's intense patriotism and impatience with the slovenliness of the traditional regime. The result is a military take-over of the old regime in the name of national progress.\textsuperscript{14} Pye points out that with the acquisition of advanced military technology, the soldier is practically near the top of the social scale in many developing nations. The armies have become the most modernized authoritative agencies of government. In some cases the military is the only effective political entity in a disrupted society.\textsuperscript{15}

In an important work on building comparative models for the military's role in the new nations, Janowitz not only postulates the thesis of the military as an agent of social and political change, but presents the proposition that the military is also concerned with legitimate authority and with historical and national traditions. His real contribution lies in the identification of five types of civil-military relations for analyzing the military in the political development of new nations.\textsuperscript{16}

During the last decade studies on military intervention in developing nations, particularly in Latin America, have yielded a number of specific hypotheses for explaining military intervention in politics. These propositions range from Finer's linkage of military intervention
with social mobilization\textsuperscript{17} to John Johnson's hypothesis of direct relationship between the degree of public participation in politics to the likelihood of military intervention,\textsuperscript{16} and to Huntington's relating the degree of political decay of institutions to military's propensity to intervene.\textsuperscript{19} Recently these propositions were tested empirically by Robert Putnam for the purpose of verifying their validity when applied to military intervention in Latin American politics.\textsuperscript{20}

While sophisticated techniques have been used in the explanation of military intervention in Latin-America to test a number of hypotheses, analysis on the military's role in Chinese communist politics has been limited, to a large extent, to one single theme. And there has been no attempt made to test the validity of the frequently employed singular theme. The section below summarizes briefly the mode of analysis on the military's role in Chinese communist politics.


While more precise conceptualization is needed in the general field of the military's role in politics, much of the literature on the military's role in Chinese politics indicates "conceptual under-development."\textsuperscript{21} Table 1 illustrates how the current literature on the military's role in Chinese politics can be classified into the various modes of analysis.

The model of analysis most widely employed by leading scholars studying the military's role in Chinese politics has been the party-army conflict model, developed by Brzezinski, Garthoff, and Kolkowicz for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Grand Generalization</th>
<th>Party-Army Conflict Model</th>
<th>Modernizing Agent/Army-in-Society Model</th>
<th>Hypothesis Testing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Gittings</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel B. Griffith</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Morton Halperin-John W. Lewis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice L. Hsieh</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellis Joffe</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalmers A. Johnson</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Powell</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William N. Whitson</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 0 7 1 1

Source: See the Bibliography for a list of works by these authors on the military's role in Chinese communist society.
analysis of the Soviet Union. The works of Joffe, Powell, Hsieh, Halperin and Lewis, Gittings, and Chalmers Johnson all adhere to this model. Chalmers Johnson, in addition to using the party-army conflict model, has conceptualized the army's role in society by analyzing the use of Mao's revolutionary guerrilla strategy in implementing his theory of mass mobilization for rapid economic development. Johnson points out that under this strategy of guerrillaism the whole Chinese society is constantly at war and the army is the potent military-political instrument for mobilizing the masses to achieve various economic and social objectives. Colonel Whitson's work has been centered around the study of Chinese communist military elites. Using a combination of historical and statistical data on some 300 military elites and sub-elites, he was able to generate several hypotheses on elite factionalism within the field army system.

4. Questions for Study and Inventory of Propositions

This research investigation seeks empirical answers to questions such as: 1) What are the military's perception and attitude with regard to its political role during the Cultural Revolution? 2) What predominant political symbols are being verbalized by the military at the various stages of development in the Cultural Revolution which may serve as a guide to interpretation of politics in Communist China? 3) To what extent do the symbols verbalized by the military reveal important issues in the political crisis in Communist China? 4) To what extent have verbal symbols, prevalent during the Cultural Revolution, been employed by the military for ideological transformation of society in Communist
China's political development? and 5) To what extent do verbal symbols of the military reveal the problems and difficulties in its active participation and intervention in the Cultural Revolution which represents a profound crisis in the Chinese political system?

These questions of focal concern in this dissertation research are related to several working hypotheses which are formulated below as a guide to the study:

**Working hypothesis No. 1**

That a basic policy cleavage on correct development strategy existed within the top leadership of the party and that, as a corollary, debate on policy issues became intertwined with power struggle.

**Working hypothesis No. 2**

That there is a serious structural crisis in the revolutionary one-party system as evidenced by routinization of party bureaucracy and fear of erosion of revolutionary fervor among party cadres. It is hypothesized here that: a) The greater the effort to prevent routinization of the party through purges and ideological remolding, the more disruption of party organization is likely to occur. Disruption in party organization may lead to the weakening of the party structure and authority, which in turn may pave the way for the appearance of the military as a major political force in the one-party system or, b) The more the party bureaucracy becomes rigidified, the greater the emphasis on the primacy of politics and the greater the reliance on some extra party apparatus--secret
police or the military—to prevent ossification of the party bureaucracy by bringing it under political control.

**Working hypothesis No. 3**

That in a crisis situation where there is disruption in established institutional structure and authority, there is the desire and disposition on the part of the military, being the only effective organization, to maintain order and stability to prevent total disintegration of the system.

It is also very possible for the military in a crisis situation to increasingly assume as its political role agent for rapid political change in terms of actively advocating value transformation for the society as a whole and serving as a model (paradigm) of a new life-style.

**Working hypothesis No. 4**

That for a revolutionary one-party system coercive power (force and terror) may become in the final analysis the acceptable instrument for sustaining continued political development and growth and for the eventual maintenance of one-party rule.

In addition several explanatory propositions have also been generated by this study through the use of the quantitative content analysis technique. These explanatory propositions will be discussed in detail in the concluding portion of this dissertation.
5. Plan of Presentation

In Chapter II is a detailed discussion on the method of analysis for the research, the contingency analysis. An elaborate research design is presented as a separate chapter simply because of the nature of the methodology employed and the objective to be achieved.

In Chapter III the findings and analysis of data generated from editorials of the Liberation Army Daily, hereafter referred to as Jiefangjun Bao, on the PLA's perception of its political role in the Cultural Revolution, as well as the problems and difficulties the military encountered in its active participation in the upheaval, as perceived in the editorials of the People's Daily, hereafter referred to as Renmin Ribao, are presented. An analysis of the techniques employed by the PLA in its intervention and participation in the Cultural Revolution is also given. Techniques or devices used by the military for the control of a society in disarray are unique in the communist one-party system of rule in China. It is for this reason that a section in Chapter III has been devoted to these techniques of control.

The meaning and implication of the Cultural Revolution and the PLA's role in it cannot be fully understood unless we have some idea of the interrelationship of policy dissension, power struggle and purges, and the fear of erosion of revolutionary fervor. The first section of Chapter IV gives an overview of the meaning and implication of the Cultural Revolution. Evidence in the verbal expressions of the PLA on the need to transform societal values in order to avoid inertia and maintain revolutionary momentum are examined, and the hypothesis that the PLA is a model or a paradigm for a new communist life is tested.
Related to the subject of the PLA's role in the ideological transformation of society is the military's verbal symbolization on development strategy which will also be a major concern in this chapter. Chapter IV concludes with an analysis of the essential elements in Mao's vision for a good society.

The Cultural Revolution in many respects represents a profound crisis in the Chinese Communist Party structure. The reasons or causes for the almost total disintegration of the party machine and apparatus are important areas of study if we are to understand fully the crisis in the Chinese political system. To what extent the problem of the bureaucratization of the cadres has affected the revolutionary nature of the party and in what way the military, in filling in the vacuum created by the disintegration of the party structure and authority has undertaken the task of rebuilding the party machinery are the subject matter for Chapter V. It is in this chapter that the subject of the PLA's influence and power is examined. Questions such as the ability and the extent of the PLA's governance and relationship with the regular party and the bureaucracy (cadres) are discussed.

The concluding chapter of this study, Chapter VI, summarizes the various propositions suggested for or generated by this research. Chapter VI also discusses the conceptual framework for an analysis of the military's role in the political development in Communist China. Political development is defined as a development process in which a political system attempts to cope with new issues and solve problems. Embodied in the definition are these ingredients: the primacy of politics, the ability of the system to develop new institutions and
values and symbols that sanction the regulations enacted by the institutions, and the capacity of the system to mobilize and coerce.
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Students of contemporary Chinese politics are confronted with special problems in obtaining source materials—the linguistic barrier, inaccessibility for field work and interviews, and lack of systematic data derived from documentary material. In order to circumvent these obstacles, students of Chinese politics must of necessity rely on available documentary sources for research. Occasionally interviews with refugees who have left mainland China have been used to augment the documentary materials in conducting research on the Chinese communist regime. But the bulk of the raw material for research must come from documentary sources in the form of newspaper and journal articles or editorials published by the government controlled press. Contrary to the popularly held belief in the West, there has always been open rather than secret mass communications in Communist China. In fact, the very success of Peking's daily operation rests on the establishment of a network of mass media. The problem for the researcher studying Chinese communist politics is not the scarcity of the raw material but the under-utilization of it. The raw material, one might add, is not mere propaganda but rich in detailed information about what has happened or is happening in China. The methodological question, therefore, is the adoption of an appropriate approach in the utilization of the raw material that is available to students of Chinese communist affairs. A popular approach employed by the scholars on China has been the normative analysis relying on the specialist's intuition and insight. For instance Franz Schurmann states in the introduction of his book that
the intuitional approach is his main methodology:

It was not possible to start with an *a priori* framework of analysis. There was almost no secondary literature to be used as a guide, in the sense that such literature often points out major problems, introduces concepts, and does the spade work by organizing a confused mass of material.... The only initial approach then, as it seemed to me, was to put one's fingers on the major problem areas and immerse oneself in the documentary and human material.²

The question which has to be raised here is: whether traditional and normative analysis is an adequate means for providing interpretation of contemporary Chinese politics? The researcher who employes the intuitional approach may be easily swayed by the content of one, two, or several pieces of documentary material available to him. It is very likely that someone else who goes through the same material may come out with a different set of conclusions. Thus the matter of subjectivity is present in such an approach. Furthermore, one of the basic criteria involved in the intuitional approach is that one must sense what is right. The rational process itself is too haphazard to be objective and systematic in the utilization of the sources. Schurmann's book, like many other descriptive analysis on contemporary Chinese politics, seems to indicate the immediate need for transforming raw material, such as published press articles or editorials from Communist China, into data which can then be used for scientific investigation.³

In the sections below I shall discuss in detail: the rationale for selecting contingency analysis, selection of content categories, and the coding procedure.
1. Data Collection

In this section I shall discuss briefly the collection of data for this study. In later sections the use of the data collected will be presented in more detail when the question of methodology is also discussed. Since it is not possible for the foreseeable future to conduct interviews or survey research on any aspects of the Chinese communist society, the source for any analysis of Communist China will have to be limited to available documentary material in the form of government controlled mass media such as the Renmin Ribao, the Jiefangjun Bao, or radio broadcasts monitored outside of mainland China. These documentary materials are in essence raw material for research. They can be transformed into data by some scheme of categorization. Therefore, it is important to distinguish here the documentary material defined above and the data generated from the raw material. Data, thus transformed, represent abstractions which can be processed for systematic analysis.

This study will use three sources of documentary material to generate data using systematic content analysis for three separate investigations: (1) 136 editorials of Jiefangjun Bao, covering the period from April 1966 to December 1969, the military's perception of its political role and its active participation in the Cultural Revolution; (2) 115 editorials of Renmin Ribao, covering the period from April 1966 to July 1967, military's perception of its political role; and (3) 260 testimonials or "behavioral protocols" of military cadres as printed in Renmin Ribao, covering the period from March 1967 to November 1968, transformation of societal values and implications of development.
strategy of verbal symbolization of the army cadres. Rationale for selecting these documentary materials as basic data will be discussed in the section on methodology.

2. Methodology: Contingency Content Analysis

Since empirical data on Communist China is necessarily limited, selection of appropriate methodology for research was restricted. The most fruitful quantitative method available is systematic content analysis. It is being used because the procedure can yield systematic objective data.

Since 1952 when Berelson codified the procedure of content analysis in communications research, many new techniques have been developed by researchers in the social sciences. A specific technique selected for this study is the contingency method, a form of multivariate analysis, developed and elaborated by Osgood:

If there is any content analysis technique which has a defensible psychological rationale it is the contingency method. It is anchored to the principles of association which were noted by Aristotle, elaborated by the British Empiricists, and made an integral part of most modern learning theories. On such grounds it seems reasonable to assume that greater-than-chance contingencies of items in messages would be indicative of experience of the source, events A and B (e.g., references to Food Supply and to Occupied Countries in the experience of Joseph Goebbels) have often occurred together, the subsequent occurrence of one of them should be a condition facilitating the occurrences of the other: The writing or speaking of one should tend to call forth thinking about and hence producing the other. It also seems reasonable to assume that less-than-chance contingencies of items in messages would be indicative of dissociations in the thinking of the source.
The above elaboration by Osgood can also be demonstrated by North in his visual explanation of the concept underlying the contingency analysis as shown in Figure 1.9

FIGURE 1. MESSAGES PRODUCED BY SOURCE A

Content variable X

\[ \rightarrow \]

Relationship of content variables to each other

Content variable Y

\[ \rightarrow \]

In summarizing the trends in content analysis, de Sola Pool states that:

Contingency analysis is a quantitative procedure. It involves counting. But the form of the hypothesis and of the critical observations is different from that in a simple frequency analysis. Contingency analysis asks not how often a given symbolic form appears in each of several bodies of texts, but how often it appears in conjunction with other symbolic units. The difference can be expressed both most rigorously and most clearly as the difference between a simple probability statement and a conditional probability statement. Traditional frequency analysis sought to determine the probability that specified symbol would be drawn in each unit trial as one examined a particular set of texts. Contingency analysis seeks to determine the probability that a specified symbol will be drawn, given that other specified symbols are in that or related units.10

A basic methodological assumption in this proposed investigation is that a newspaper article or editorial may be treated as though it were a
human respondent in a survey research study. This assumption has now been generally accepted by researchers in social sciences who employ content analysis as a technique in data collection.

There are several important differences which exist between a personal interview or questionnaire survey and content analysis. First, as Robert Mitchell has pointed out, the data used in content analysis are not responses to "structured stimuli uniformly presented so as to elicit information on a number of predetermined dimensions." While this criticism points up the limitation in controlling the scope of information for study, the data available is that which the authors feel is most important, either for themselves or for propaganda purposes. Within the scope of information available, the contingency method which is being used in this study seems to have avoided the drawback of the criticism. The contingency method is a representational model of communication—that is, the source says what it means. Osgood argues that in the contingency method, it would be extremely difficult for the source to "manufacture" bias or exercise control over the message for the simple reason that if two ideas are in fact associated in the sources thinking, a co-occurrence will appear in the form of producing either positive contingencies by making some remarks or negative contingencies by suppressing such remarks. Thus significant disassociation, or negative association, also becomes an important inference for analysis.

The statistical basis for contingency analysis is the well developed theory and mathematics of probability. The theory of probability implies that if none of the categories, or variables, are associated, they will occur by random chance in the units selected for
analysis, and the co-occurrence of any two will fall under a normal probability distribution. By comparing the chance association of a pair of categories with their actual association in the sample, the probability that the difference between the two would occur by chance may be obtained. Association at the 5 percent level or less is generally accepted as evidence of association or disassociation.

Traditionally content analysis has been employed by scholars to produce data mainly for descriptive purpose rather than hypothesis testing. For instance, Berelson listed a dozen such techniques for research in communications. It is only very recently that data generated by procedures of content analysis have been used for explanatory and hypothesis-testing purposes. Typically those scholars who employ procedures of content analysis often maintain that one must first formulate specific hypothesis which will then serve as a basis for data collection. Some scholars, on the other hand, take the position that we can discover hypotheses, or that hypotheses will emerge, after an inspection of statistical findings is made. It is thus possible for the data generated, if statistically valid, to help formulate new hypotheses and to prove or disprove existing propositions formulated by intuitive reasoning.

a. Source of Data and Unit of Analysis

i. Jiefangjun Bao editorials. Since one of the objectives in this research is the identification of the military's perception of its political role, the best source available is the official organ of the army, Jiefangjun Bao. The unit selected for analysis is the Chinese language text of editorials in the Jiefangjun Bao. Editorials are
particularly important in a closed society such as Communist China for a number of reasons. First, communists generally have had faith in the potency of the political word for agitation and indoctrination. The Chinese communists have used this means of communication effectively for mass mobilization. Second, editorials of the controlled press in Communist China generally set forth politics and views of the party; moreover, Chinese communist editorials often communicate changes in policy. In this sense editorials of leading newspapers do reflect not only the conditions as they occur within the society but the thinking of the ruling hierarchy as well. Third, since editorials of leading newspapers do reveal policy or changes in policies, they are read and discussed by political cadres at various levels for transmission to the masses. It should be noted that the Jiefangjun Bao not only is the official organ of the military but has also been a prominent spokesman for the party in recent years, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. The fact that the Cultural Revolution began with criticism which appeared in the form of editorials and special commentaries in the Jiefangjun Bao is illustrative of the special place it has in Chinese politics today.

All of the 136 editorials from the Jiefangjun Bao in the original Chinese for the four-year period from 1966-1969 were used as units of analysis. The time dimension is selected to represent the most turbulent period of the regime. It is within this time span that one finds the major turning points in Communist China's political development: from the rectification campaign aimed at the intellectuals through the PLA's active intervention to the establishment of the Revolutionary Committees
on the provincial and local-unit levels. Thus the quantity selected represents every editorial in the Jiefangjun Bao reprinted in the Renmin Ribao and joint editorials by the Renmin Ribao, Jiefangjun Bao and the Red Flag, hereafter referred to as Hongqi. In a pilot study which I conducted recently, it seems that the size of these units (editorials) does not appear to vary significantly in the sense that they are neither too small (no contingency exists in the message) nor too large (everything becomes contingent upon everything else).

   ii. Renmin Ribao editorials. For purpose of comparison and also as a supplement to the Jiefangjun Bao in terms of the military's perception of its political role and its participation in the Cultural Revolution, a contingency content analysis was made of 115 editorials of the Renmin Ribao for 1966 and 1967. I am interested in discovering similarities as well as differences in the military's perception of its political role as revealed by the editorials of the Jiefangjun Bao and the Renmin Ribao, particularly during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution.

   iii. Testimonials or "Behavioral Protocols" of military cadres. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, when there was widespread chaos and confusion everywhere throughout the society, the military assumed the responsibility for the activities of agitation and reeducation of the masses. A basic technique used by the military to mold the thought of the masses has been the struggle meeting conducted by the military cadres at schools, factories, and government offices. At these meetings individuals who were formerly connected with the party apparatus are criticized for their ideological deviations. More often
than not, military cadres psychoanalyze themselves at these meetings by
 testifying how they struggled with themselves to maintain ideological
 purity. These testimonials or "behavioral protocols," to use a
 psychoanalytical term, usually autobiographical in nature, are presented
 by members of the military from various rank levels as examples for
 ideological reeducation. They contain inferences indicative of
 developmental strategy preferred by the radical revolutionaries who are
 currently in control of the country. The Renmin Ribao has published
 many of the testimonials for mass dissemination. Two hundred and sixty
 articles, representing all verbal material bearing the signatures of
 military cadres printed in the Renmin Ribao from 1967 to 1968, were used
 in this study. The time dimension was selected in terms of the
 development of the Cultural Revolution. January 1967 marked the
 beginning of the height of direct involvement by the military in the
 upheaval, and 1968 was the year during which the military was the only
 organization in effective control of the country.

b. Selection of Content Categories

Two possible alternatives are open to the analyst selecting
 specific content categories for coding. One is to construct specific
categories to suit the desired purpose of the analyst. This manner of
selecting content categories is not by all means objective even though
the purpose of the investigation may be served. The other option is to
select those categories which are most frequently referred to by the
source using a simple frequency count of a word, or theme or some other
self-contained unit. I prefer the second alternative because it gives
more objectivity and less bias.
i. Jiefangjun Bao editorials. In order to discover the pattern of consistency or variation in the military's perception of its political role, the four year period has been broken into three segments for analysis. The first segment covers 1966-1967, the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution; the second segment covers 1968, a year when the upheaval reached its height—the regular party machinery collapsed and the PLA was called to maintain law and order; the third segment covers 1969, a year of consolidation and the military rise to power in politics in the provinces. A frequency count was made of potential content categories in the source covering each time-segment to determine specific content categories for coding. The final list of categories for coding combines categories obtained from the three time-segments. This manner of selecting content categories is based on the assumption that while the military's perception of its political role contains certain fundamental elements which are constant throughout each of the three time-segments, there probably will be significant differences in terms of issues, emphasis in ideology, and concern for appropriate developmental strategy between the three component periods. Thus a series of three "still pictures" will emerge and be analyzed separately showing the pattern of change or consistency of the military's perception of its political role from 1966 through 1969.

Specific content categories used for coding were determined by a simple frequency count of potential categories in the source material, the editorials. In this study using 136 editorials of the Jiefangjun Bao covering the period from April 1966 to December 1969, a period of four years during the Cultural Revolution, a frequency count yielded 50
specific categories. These were used in coding a total population of 136 units. The contingency matrix contained a total of 1,225 separate contingencies or cells. The study resulted in 148, or 12 percent, statistically significant associations or co-occurrences. Appendix A contains a list of these content categories and their operational definitions.

A majority of these 50 categories can be classified as verbal expressions or symbols which can serve as reliable indicators of social, political and economic developments in Communist China. Furthermore, I believe that verbal symbols are effective tools being used by the party and military cadres for directing mass mobilization in Communist China. The categories are in Chinese, and they are presented with the approximate meaning in English. An ideological and linguistic explanation should be entered here to indicate the general nature of these categories as a symbol terminology system.

The language or symbol system which constitutes the content categories is characterized by these features: (1) It is highly reductive—complex issues and thoughts are reduced into their simplest brevity; (2) It is usually coined into easily memorized and expressed phrases in the traditional clusters of four characters; (3) It is often repetitious jargon—most of the time highly abstract, but frequently quite descriptive and to the point.

ii. *Renmin Ribao* editorials. A frequency count was made of potential categories in the *Renmin Ribao* to determine the specific content categories for coding. The contingency matrix for this study contains 48 categories taken from a total sample of 115 units. This
means that there are potentially 1,128 cells or contingencies in the contingency matrix, of which 124 are statistically significant. These 124 represent 11 percent of the total contingencies. Appendix B contains a list of these contingency categories and their operational definitions.

iii. Testimonials or "Behavioral Protocols" of military cadres. Symbols are images which define rhythms of life and death, group loyalties, and shared attitudes of norms. They can be both verbal and artistic: folk tales, street ballads, or vase design. They can be studied as mirroring a society. Lifton in his psychological study of thought control, points out that symbolization can reach deeply into individual mental make-up and can affect collective efforts of all kinds. A great deal of the communist success on the mainland China has been due to effective use of verbal and artistic symbols for mass mobilization and for instituting social change via mass communication in the development process. Lifton has pointed out in a recent study that the military in Communist China has become a model of revolutionary purity and material power. Content analysis of May Day slogans of the Soviet Union as indicators of political trends by Yakobson and Lasswell and terminological study of the Hsia-Fang Movement in the communes as general indicators of social, political, and economic developments by Hsia are two examples of the value in studying the linkage between verbal symbolization and development trends. As I pointed out earlier, the symbol system used for this investigation consists of organized verbal material emanating from the military during the height of the Cultural Revolution. In this study 33 specific categories, based on the frequency of usage, were coded against the 260 units. A list of these
categories is found in Appendix C. The contingency matrix in the study contains 528 possible contingencies or cells which yielded 47, or 9 percent, statistically significant associations or co-occurrences.

c. **Reliability of Coding Categories**

Next to the selection of categories, coding reliability is perhaps the most difficult problem in content analysis. Normally the reliability of coding is established by checks on the coding consistency: several coders should obtain the same results when the same set of categories are applied to the same textual units.

In addition to this analyst as the first coder, a second coder who is able to read the documentary material in original Chinese was used for this study. The second coder was briefed to observe the procedure and to satisfy the requirements set by the first coder: (1) The second coder understood the meaning of the content categories; (2) He was familiar with the procedure in recording the presence and absence of content categories in the Raw Data Matrix; (3) A pretest was performed by the second coder. This was done in order to find out whether the discrepancy would be too large.

The two-coder formula below is used to test reliability:\(^\text{30}\)

\[
R = \frac{2(C_{1,2})}{C_1 + C_2}
\]

\(C_{1,2}\) is the number of category assignments both coders agree on, and \(C_1 + C_2\) is the total of category assignments made by both coders.

The selection of a second coder presented some problems. First, it is not easy to find a person with the necessary proficiency in
reading the Chinese material, particularly one who has the familiarity with and comprehension of the Chinese communist phraseology and jargon. Second, the second coder must also be able to decipher the simplified Chinese characters used extensively in all Chinese communist material. The person finally selected to be the second coder is a student from Hong Kong now doing graduate work in history at the University of Hawaii. He performed two separate codings for the first coder and the results of these are as follows:

In the first operation which involved some 86 units of PLA testimonials or "behavioral protocols" coded against a total of 40 categories, the number of categories on which the two coders agree was 29, and the sum of all category assignments by the two coders was 80. By using the two-coder formula, the reliability is established at 72.5 percent.

The second operation involved 115 units of editorials of the Renmin Ribao coded against 48 categories. The number of categories on which the two coders agree was 30, and the sum of all category assignments by the two coders was 96. By using the two-coder formula, the reliability for the second operation is established at 62.5 percent.

Holsti points out that a high reliability may be required for simple forms of content analysis, but in complex content analysis in which coding is less than mechanical, stress may have to be given to relevance of categories and units of analysis. In other words, the coefficient of reliability cannot always be the sole criterion. Since the categories used in this contingency analysis involve complex issues and thoughts, an intercoder agreement of at least 60 percent
represents, in my view, more than an acceptable level of reliability.

d. Coding Procedure: Raw Data and Contingency Matrix

Documentary material from the three sources for this study—the Jiefangjun Bao, the Renmin Ribao and the testimonials or "behavioral protocols" of the military cadres—were transformed into data by using the procedure developed by Osgood.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
1 & + & + & + & etc. & & & & & & & & \\
2 & - & - & - & & & & & & & & & \\
3 & - & + & - & & & & & & & & & \\
\vdots & & & & & & & & & & & & \\
115 & etc. & & & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
Total & 30 & 48 & 25 & & & & & & & & & \\
Percent & .26 & .42 & .22 & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

First a raw data matrix was constructed by simply recording the presence (+) and absence (-) of textual reference to each content category for each unit of analysis. The number of times category A is referred in unit 1 is irrelevant.

In order to compare the obtained association of categories in the sample units with chance association, a contingency matrix was
To the left of the diagonal the obtained associations are recorded in terms of their proportion of the total number of units. For example, categories A and B occur together in 16 of the 115 units, so the obtained association is .14. To the right of the diagonal the means of the chance association is recorded. This is merely the product of any two categories frequency of occurrence in the units expressed as a proportion of the total number of units. For example, category A occurs in 30 units, or .26 of the 115 total units and category B occurs in 48 units, or .42 of the 115 total units; therefore the mean of their chance association is .11.

### Test of Significance of Contingencies

Because of the large number of categories and units, the significance test will be the standard error of a percentage instead of the chi-square test. The formula is as follows:
\[ \sigma_P = \sqrt{\frac{P(1-P)}{N}} \]

Where \( P \) is the mean of the chance association, \( N \) is the number of units coded, and \( \sigma_P \) is the standard deviation of the probability curve.\(^{33} \)

Use of this formula contains two assumptions: first, that the sample size is large, a minimum of 50, and the population is infinite or large relative to the sample size; second, that the probability distribution of the sample proportion is approximately normal.\(^{34} \)

Because this test is being applied to an assumed random or chance distribution, these assumptions are valid.

The criterion for significance generally accepted is .05 or less probability of occurrence, or plus or minus two standard deviations. The exact probability of actual co-occurrence for the pairs of categories was calculated by using this formula:

\[ z = \frac{X - \mu}{\sigma_P} \]

Where \( X \) is the proportion of actual association in the total number of units, \( \mu \) is the mean of the chance association, \( \sigma_P \) is the standard deviation, and \( z \) is the standardized value of \( X \). The probability of the actual association or occurrence was then obtained by subtracting from 1.00 the area representing two times (plus and minus) \( z \).

The statistical computation for the contingency matrix and significant tests has been carried out by the computer (see Appendix D for Tables of Statistically Significant Associations of Content Categories).
3. Data Presentation and Qualitative Analysis

The coding procedure as described above yields two basic sets of data: (1) statistically significant paired categories or co-occurrences of categories and (2) the formation of clusters of these paired categories which serve as indicators or inferences for analysis and interpretation.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the following steps are being adopted, as guides for presentation. First, statistical tables indicating the significance of those paired categories or co-occurrences of categories are presented. Second, graphic presentations will be made showing the clustering of these statistically significant pair categories or co-occurrences. Third, the analyst will then explain and interpret the inferences derived from the statistically significant category-clusters. And, lastly, these explanations of inferences will be further supplemented by qualitative in-depth analysis.
CHAPTER III

PLA'S INTERVENTION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: PERCEPTION OF ROLE, TECHNIQUES OF INTERVENTION AND DIFFICULTIES

The PLA's perception of its role in the upheaval and difficulties encountered for its active participation and intervention in the Cultural Revolution will be examined in this chapter. Quantitative data presentations will be developed to show the thinking of the military in terms of its political role. These presentations will be used as indicators for a detailed analysis of the PLA's activities during the Cultural Revolution.

1. Stages of Participation

This analysis of the PLA's perception of its role during the Cultural Revolution begins with an overview of the military's participation for the period under study, April 1966 to December 1969. Examination of this overview reveals the stages of the PLA's intervention. Table 2, constructed for coding the content of editorials in the Jiefangjun Bao, presents the frequencies of presence of the 12 role categories (A-L) for the 136 units by year. It will be noted that the number of the editorials, or units, varies markedly over this period, indicating the intensity of the Cultural Revolution. While this data is not valid for statistical analysis it does reveal a general pattern of PLA participation. It should be noted here that it is basic to the contingency analysis technique not to ask how often a content category appears in the units, but how often it appears in association with other content categories.
TABLE 2. FREQUENCIES OF ROLE CATEGORIES SHOWING STAGES OF PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content Categorya</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>Total Units with References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A PLA'S SUPPORT LEFT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B PLA'S CONTROL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C GUNS IN HANDS OF THOSE LOYAL TO MAO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D PLA AS THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG SCHOOL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E PLA AS MAJOR PILLAR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G GRASP THE REVOLUTION AND PROTECT PRODUCTION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H PLA IS THE PROPAGANDA TEAM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I PLA HERO EMULATION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K PLA'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL UNITS</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>136b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aFor a detailed definition of these role categories see Appendix A.

bBecause one unit may contain more than one content category, the total units with references column if added will exceed the total number of units.

Source: Row data matrix from the 136 Jiefangjun Bao editorial.
If we take April to December 1966 as the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution, then it seems clear that the military did not engage in actual armed intervention during this period. No reference was made during 1966 to (1) PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE LEFT (A), (2) GRASP THE REVOLUTION AND PROTECT PRODUCTION (G), (3) PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (B), and (4) PLA 3 LAW AND ORDER POLE (L). However, references were made to the effect that the GUNS MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO ARE LOYAL TO MAO TZE-TUNG AND THE PARTY CENTRAL (C). References also reiterated the theme that the PLA AS A MAJOR PILLAR IN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (E). Other references indicated the PLA IS THE PROPAGANDA TEAM FOR THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG (H).

The above frequencies showing the appearance of role of categories indicate that initially it was not intended to have the PLA, as a coercive instrument, directly involved in the Cultural Revolution. The validity of this thesis is reinforced by the recent publication of Mao's speech at an enlarged meeting of the Military Affairs Committee in early January, 1969.\(^1\) It seems that during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution Mao Tze-tung had only invoked the PLA's power, prestige and authority to provide a powerful backing on the side of the revolutionary rebels against the established party apparatus. The role of the PLA was essentially that of verbal pace-setter in terms of setting-forth guidelines and identifying targets for the attack to come. In fact that role as a verbal pace-setter was chiefly relegated to the editors of the Jiefangjun Bao in providing the necessary verbal salvos. The following pages illustrate the substance of the army journal's verbal attack in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution.
The Cultural Revolution began with criticism which appeared in the form of editorials and special commentaries in leading party controlled newspapers and the theoretical journal. The Jiefangjun Bao, mouthpiece of the PLA, was the most outspoken and critical newspaper inside Communist China. During the critical months from March to June 1966, it was the Jiefangjun Bao which provided the issues and targets for attack; other leading papers merely picked up the cue and repeated what the Jiefangjun Bao had said. It is significant to note that the Renmin Ribao, the official organ of the party and government, failed for the first time since 1950 to take the lead in firing the first round of verbal salvo against the so-called "enemies of the party." In short the PLA, through the Jiefangjun Bao, called the tune for the entire country to follow and echo.

On April 18, 1966, the Jiefangjun Bao indicated the main issue in the Cultural Revolution and the role of the PLA in the struggle:

Ever since the founding of New China more than ten years ago, an anti-party line has existed in literary and art circles, a black anti-socialist thread that runs counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking. It is a conglomeration of bourgeois and modern revisionist conceptions of literature and art, and of what is presumed to have been the literature and art of the 1930's.

The struggle between the two roads on the literary and art front in society in general is inevitably reflected within the army. For the army does not exist in a vacuum and is certainly no exception. Our army is the chief instruments of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without a people's army led by the Communist Party, there would be no victorious revolution, no proletarian dictatorship, no socialism, and the people would have nothing. Therefore, by hook and by crook the enemy try to undermine our army in all respects and will certainly use the weapon of literature and art to corrupt it. We must maintain keen vigilance in this connection.
The issue of preserving ideological purity and the danger of revisionist erosion is clearly spelled out in the May 4 editorial of the Jiefangjun Bao:

The wanton attack staged at present by a handful of revisionist and bourgeois elements in our country against the party and socialism constitutes a vain attempt to make their dream of restoring capitalism come true. If we are not vigilant against the enemies without guns, do not firmly counterattack them, but permit bourgeois ideas free rein and allow plots to be carried out, there will be danger of our socialism being undermined and our country changing color.

The Jiefangjun Bao, as early as May 1966, had clearly identified those groups of individuals within the party as targets for attack:

What deserves attention is that in the present new situation of class struggle, the offensive launched against us by the handful of anti-party, anti-socialist elements has new characteristics. They are waving 'red banners' to oppose the Thought of Mao Tze-tung, to oppose Marxism-Leninism, taking advantage of the position and powers given them by the party and the government, they seize and control some departments and units and disobey the party's leadership. By means of the tools under their control, they plot against the party and socialism.

These people are generally 'authorities' and enjoy a certain 'reputation' in society. They are still being trusted by some people who do not know the real situation. Looking on themselves as possessing the capital to bargain with the proletariat, they are desperately clinging to the citadel of the bourgeois ideology.

Their anti-party, anti-socialist activities are not isolated, accidental phenomena. They are in tune with the international anti-Chinese chorus of the imperialists, modern revisionists and reactionaries of all countries, in conformity with the activities of the overthrown reactionary classes within the country to attempt a come-back, and in accordance with the anti-party activities of the right opportunist elements within the party. Their anti-party, anti-socialist activities are deceitful to a certain degree and are seriously dangerous.

By June it was quite clear that Mao Tze-tung had conferred the leading role in directing the Cultural Revolution on the PLA. The
Hongqi, the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the party, stated in an editorial on June 1:

The great success of the Liberation Army in its creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works has played a great stimulating role in our entire revolutionary cause. To learn vigorously from the Liberation Army has become a common slogan of action among all the people and trades throughout the nation. The most basic thing to learn vigorously from the Liberation Army is to learn its persistence in letting Mao Tze-tung's thinking lead the way in all work and to learn the extremely important instruction from Comrade Lin Piao for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works.6

On June 6, the Jiefangjun Bao published an editorial which for the first time gave a detailed account to the country on the origin and purpose of the Cultural Revolution: (1) There has always been an acute class struggle on China's ideological front waged by Chairman Mao against the anti-party and anti-socialist "black line," (2) the Cultural Revolution is a complicated life-and-death struggle, (3) it is necessary to study and apply Mao Tze-tung's works and to consider his books as the highest directives in all kinds of work, and (4) "if a person acts against the Thought of Mao Tze-tung, regardless of how high his position is and what kind of 'authority' he may be, we must expose him, bring him to light and refute him until he stinks."7

The relative frequencies of role categories, as revealed in Table 2, also suggest a second stage of development of PLA's participation in the Cultural Revolution. This stage of development encompasses 1967 and 1968. The themes of PLA's participation for this stage dwelled in four areas: (1) PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE LEFT (A), (2) PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (B), (3) PLA IS THE PROPAGANDA TEAM FOR THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG (H), and (4) PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F).
Throughout this stage references were made that GUNS MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO ARE LOYAL TO MAO TZE-TUNG AND THE PARTY CENTRAL (C). The marked decline in the number of editorials, units, in 1969 is perhaps the most important aspect of the third phase—a decline in intensity of the revolution or restoration of order. GRASP THE REVOLUTION AND PROTECT PRODUCTION (G) appears in five of the nine units, a larger proportion than for other years. Emphasis on economic activity may indicate a return of interest to more normal activities.

2. Findings and Analysis of the PLA's Perception of Its Role in the Cultural Revolution

In a contingency analysis of 136 editorials of the *Jiefangjun Bao* from April 1966 to December 1969, using a rough frequency-of-usage analysis, 50 categories were selected for analysis (see Appendix A). The result yields at least three separate roles for the PLA in its participation in the Cultural Revolution: (1) the restoration of law and order, (2) military control and supervision, and (3) its dominance in provincial politics and difficulties in handling factional rivalry among the revolutionary groups.

In this chapter we will analyze these three sets of data. First, we will examine the PLA's role in law and order maintenance and evaluate its success and failure in that regard. Second, we will analyze the PLA's role in placing the country under military control and supervision and the techniques used by the PLA in its intervention. Finally, the data presented here reveal certain problems and difficulties which the PLA encountered in discharging these roles—we
need to examine specifically the nature of these difficulties.

a. **PLA's Law and Order Role**

Janowitz points out in his comparative analysis of the military in new nations that the armed forces, usually the only coercive instrument available, often serve the alternative function as the constabulary for internal security as institutions of law and order became weak. Frequently the politically reliable elite troops are assigned to stations in strategic areas for maintenance of internal security against threats to the political order. Traditionally the function of force in the Chinese imperial system has been mainly that of a police force for the suppression of banditry or insurrection. The PLA's constabulary role, that is the insurance of law and order for a disrupted society, was clearly perceived by the military during the Cultural Revolution, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 2.

PLA'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (K), co-occurred with PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L) at the .03 level and with STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH) also at the .03 level and with ANARCHISM (OO) at .04 level. The thinking of L brings forth the ideas of ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG) at the .04 level and the PLA PROPER TREATMENT OF NEW REVOLUTIONARY CADRES (II) at the .03 level. The thought of PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L) is also contingent upon the concept of DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS AND FOSTER COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS (Q) at less than .01 level. Q in turn is contingent upon ANARCHISM (OO) at the .04 level. OO has occurred with INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL) at less than .01 level. LL is also contingent upon L at less than .01 level.
### Table 3. Content Categories Related to PLA's Law and Order Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance test of probability of actual association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION (K)/PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION (K)/ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION (K)/ANARCHISM (00)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L)/ACHIEVING REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L)/PLA TREATMENT OF NEW REVOLUTIONARY CADRES (II)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L)/DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (Q)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (Q)/ANARCHISM (00)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL)/ANARCHISM (00)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL)/PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE (L)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: aLess than .01.

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
The association structure as presented in Table 3 and Figure 2 seems to imply the following: (1) While recognizing its own contribution to the Cultural Revolution, the PLA is concerned about its strained relationship with the masses—the co-occurrence of symbol-categories K and HH, the need to strengthening the unity between the soldiers and the masses; (2) The thought of the PLA's contribution to the Cultural Revolution also brings forth the thought of its relationship with the masses and the various contending Red Guard groups whose undisciplined and anarchistic behavior became PLA's concern; (3) The association of the PLA's contribution to the Cultural Revolution (K) and the PLA's responsibility for maintaining revolutionary discipline (L) indicates the heavy reliance on the PLA to restore order, the rationale for the military's intervention in the upheaval; (4) The thought of its constabulary role, represented by L, brings forth two other related ideas in the source's thinking: the control and subordination of the revolutionary groups, i.e., Red Guards, in order to achieve great revolutionary unity and its own warning on the proper treatment of the new cadres drawn from the ranks of the Red Guard groups, implying that the PLA may have dealt harshly whenever these groups misbehaved or became disorderly; (5) The thought about the PLA's law and order role (L) is also contingent upon the ideas of foster collective thoughts (Q), the Red Guard groups' insistence on their individual actions (LL). PLA's contribution to the Cultural Revolution (K) is also contingent upon anarchistic behavior (OO), which is in turn contingent upon foster collective thought (Q) and Red Guard groups' insistence on their individual actions (LL), indicating the reason for the PLA's intervention.
in order to restore order.

b. Factors Which Influenced the Order for the PLA Intervention

There were some soul-searching debates within the PLA during December 1966 and January 1967 on the question of PLA intervention on the side of the revolutionary rebels. The existence of these debates was revealed in the Jiefangjun Bao in its January 14 editorial: The editorial asked the crucial question: how should the PLA treat the revolutionary left groups in the Cultural Revolution? Its answer revealed clearly its impatience with the then existing PLA policy of non-interference. The editorial on January 25 showed that a general order had been given by the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee to intervene in the Cultural Revolution by lending the military's support to the revolutionary Left organizations:

...Under the present conditions of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the PLA has to interfere. There are persons who under the cover of non-interference oppress the masses. This is definitely not permissible. Their pretended non-interference is fake. The question is not whether to interfere but on which side. There is no neutral position.

The January 25 editorial made clear that the PLA must now send troops to aid any genuine revolutionary "faction" which sought help. Both the January 25 editorial and another on January 26 not only called for direct intervention by the PLA but also offered the following as justification for this intervention: (1) It is absolutely essential to take away the power and authority of a small clique within the party who are leading the country toward a path of revisionist capitalism; (2) The PLA, cultivated personally by Chairman Mao, is the major pillar of the
proletarian dictatorship. The army must stand on the side of those who represent Chairman Mao in the proletarian revolution; (3) Political power was seized by the gun barrels of the people's army; it must be preserved and guaranteed in the same manner. That means armed suppression of those persons and groups who oppose the revolution; (4) The PLA must make a major contribution in the political struggle by wrestling the political, party, and financial power out of the hands of the anti-revolutionary groups in order to preserve the proletarian revolution.  

Samuel Finer makes the observation that for the military to intervene in politics, it must have not only the rationale or motive but the disposition and occasion as well. The disposition and occasion for the PLA to intervene in the Cultural Revolution can be seen from the extent of breakdown of authority of the party and state in the early part of 1967. Violent overthrow of party and government authorities first appeared in the municipality of Shanghai and then it spread country-wide, resulting in bloodshed and disorder. For in January 1967 the Cultural Revolution had transformed itself into a gigantic onslaught on the party's power structure. As the editorial of Hongqi has so aptly put it, "the January Revolution" was an uprising engineered from the bottom up against the established party and government authority on the provincial level.

The call for the PLA to intervene in the Cultural Revolution was made primarily as the result of rising resistance to the seizure of established party and government apparatus by revolutionary rebel groups. In many instances the struggle for power involved rival groups and contending factions within the rank of the revolutionary masses. The
intervention of the PLA thus served two interrelated purposes: the restoration of law and order and the throwing of the army's weight behind the Maoist faction in order to make the outcome of the power seizure more discernible. The latter meant in essence the PLA's entry into a factional struggle within the party. Once the local PLA commander made the decision to intervene, the action of the PLA in the form of armed suppression was swift and decisive. In cases where the opposition—usually workers, peasants in alliance with the established party authorities—took counter offensive action against the revolutionary groups, such as the surrounding of the Cultural Revolution headquarters, the arrest of pro-Mao supporters by local security force, or the arrest of the local security force by the counter-revolutionary groups, the PLA troops were dispatched to crush the opposition. In the case of Shansi Province, the PLA troops took over broadcasting stations, police, and factories after suppressing the counter-revolutionary groups by force.

Incidents of brutal suppression of the masses as well as counter-revolutionary groups became common occurrences and prompted editorials in two leading newspapers to express concern and to plea for restraint.

From February to May 1967 was a period of bloody armed struggle in all parts of Communist China. PLA's intervention in Harbin and Shansi Province represented typical pattern of PLA's initiative and assertiveness during the early phase of its intervention.

ii. The Harbin Case

On the evening of January 23, the date the PLA was ordered to intervene on the side of the revolutionary Left groups, some
300 members of the opposition to the revolutionary Left group in the City of Harbin in the north-east province of Heilungkiang armed with sticks, iron bars and knives, marched to the headquarters of revolutionary Left groups and placed it under siege. PLA troops stationed in the Harbin area were immediately dispatched to render assistance to the revolutionary Left. Armed columns of PLA troops arrived at the scene and immediately disarmed the opposition and held the group in custody. The local public security authorities came to the scene only after having been notified by the PLA. Close surveillance was imposed on the movement of the opposition held in PLA custody. Leading PLA cadres on the scene estimated property damages caused by the opposition, demanded release of leaders of the revolutionary Left groups held by the opposition, and held the entire group in incommunicado by cutting the telephone wires. The PLA troops who took part in the suppression of the opposition group made clear the following points as revealed in Hongqi: (1) The PLA was created personally by Chairman Mao and is a major instrument for the dictatorship of the proletariat; the PLA is determined to suppress all counter-revolutionary groups and resolutely support the revolutionary Left; (2) The PLA declared the opposition to the revolutionary Left illegal and anti-revolutionary and it must be demolished; (3) The ring-leaders of the opposition must be dealt with summarily and punished. 

The manner by which the PLA intervened in the factional
strife in Harbin demonstrated that the local commanders could
tip the scale in the factional struggle by lending its support
to the revolutionary Left who had been encouraged to overthrow
the established party authorities.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{ii. The Shansi Case}\textsuperscript{25}

The PLA's role in restoring order in the midst of rivalry
and clashes between various contending Red Guard groups was
vividly demonstrated in Shansi province in early 1967. The
provincial military command took the initiative in imposing
military control for the province. It justified such measure,
so reported by the PLA political commissar for the province,
in terms of safeguarding the "normal functioning of economic
activities" and the "protection of those organs and agencies
affecting the people's livelihood."\textsuperscript{26} Thus, in the name of
maintaining revolutionary discipline, provincial organs such as
public security bureau and courts were placed under military
control.\textsuperscript{27} Its armed troops were dispatched whenever there
was a struggle for power. It forcibly disbanded all mass
organizations opposed to the revolutionary Left groups and
either punished or put on close surveillance their leaders.\textsuperscript{28}

3. Findings on the PLA's Perception of Its
Difficulties in Intervention

The illustration of Harbin and Shansi provinces seems to indicate
the decisiveness and determination of the PLA commanders in carrying out
the January 25 order to intervene on the side of the revolutionary Left
in these two areas. As it has been pointed out, the thought of K (PLA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION) brings forth immediately the ideas of HH (STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY) and O0 (ANARCHISM) indicating that the PLA experienced difficulties in carrying out this order. For HH and O0 infer that there was on the one hand a wide-spread breakdown of discipline on the part of the contending Red Guard groups and the need for improved relations between the PLA and these organizations on the other. This inference is further explained by the following association of ideas shown in Table 4 and Figure 3.

The co-occurrences of STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY with PLA'S PROPER TREATMENT OF THE MASSES (KK) at .01 level and with HUMILITY AND NON-ARROGANCE (UU) at .01 level imply antagonism and hostility in the relationship between the PLA and the masses. The association of content category STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH) with UNITING WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ) at .03 level reveals PLA's perception of its dilemma in the cadres question. The fact that PLA'S PROPER TREATMENT OF NEW REVOLUTIONARY CADRES (II) is contingent upon QQ at .05 level implies some degree of preferential treatment of the old party cadres by the PLA in "Three-Way Alliance." The thought of II brings forth also the thought of UU at .02 level.

This association structure then indicates clearly two basic but inter-related problems or difficulties resulting from the PLA direct intervention. These problems were: its relationship with the Red Guard groups formed during the Cultural Revolution and the PLA's
TABLE 4. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE PLA IN ITS INTERVENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance test of probability of actual association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)/PLA CORRECT TREAT. MASSES (KK)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)/HUMILITY AND NON-ARROGANCE (UU)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)/UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMILITY AND NON-ARROGANCE (UU)/PLA TREAT NEW CADRES (II)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/PLA CORRECT TREAT. MASSES (KK)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/PLA TREAT NEW CADRES (II)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/SECRETARIANISM (JJ)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARIANISM (JJ)/PROTECT STATE PROPERTY (TT)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARIANISM (JJ)/INDIVIDUALISM (MM)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALISM (MM)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTECT STATE PROPERTY (TT)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)/INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
reliance on the veteran cadres for carrying out the normal administrative functions at the local levels.

a. PLA and Its Relation with the Red Guard Groups

The thinking of the PLA, as revealed in the association of ideas such as HH with KK, UU and QQ, reflects events which took place in 1967 and 1968. From the outset, the PLA acted too swiftly and decisively alienating a large segment of the Red Guard groups. The PLA commands in many localities certainly demonstrated strength as well as a large amount of arrogance (UU) in carrying out their role. The arrogance of the PLA gave the various contending factions a pretext for organized resistance. Less than a week following the general order for the PLA to intervene in local power struggle, the Military Affairs Committee on January 28, 1967, had to issue orders to restrain the assertiveness and initiative of the PLA. The Military Affairs Committee urged the troops to resolutely support the "genuine" revolutionary rebel groups, the Red Guards, without giving specific instruction as how to identify a "genuine" revolutionary rebel group. It warned the troops not to arrest anyone without specific orders, not to confiscate properties or mete out physical punishment indiscriminately. The Military Affairs Committee directive also revealed the existence of open attacks by the Red Guard groups upon PLA units. These attacks on military organizations and public security agencies were widespread in February and March 1967. One of the most serious involved the Canton Military Region, where the Red Guard groups instigated a massive attack upon the Rear Services Department of the Canton Military Region. They damaged the telecommunication system installed there and kidnapped several PLA
soldiers as hostages. Similar incidents of attack on PLA units and installations occurred in Tsinan, Chinghai and Heilangkiang. In many of these incidents the PLA, in the name of maintaining law and order, opened fire on the unruly groups and made arrests. In Tsinan, the PLA declared some ten Red Guard organizations made up of workers as counter-revolutionary and thus disbanded them. When the workers who belong to these organizations resisted, they were arrested or beaten up by the PLA troops. Thousands more were imprisoned in buildings commandeered by the PLA in many cities.

A great deal of the PLA's problem with the Red Guard groups stemmed from the failure of these groups to establish a coherent unity (GG) in their attempt to overthrow the established party and government authority. Instead they splintered into many factions, each claiming itself as loyal to the Thought of Mao Tze-tung. The PLA commands in these local situations were unable to distinguish which faction was the "genuine" revolutionary Left. The moment the PLA recognized one faction in the power seizure, it was immediately attacked by the other faction or factions. In self-defense PLA in many of these situations used force to suppress other factions. This was what happened in the Canton Military Region. From the spring of 1967 to the latter part of 1968, this was the crux of the problem all over mainland China. In each instance the image and the prestige of the PLA was damaged. At first the Central Committee in Peking adopted the formula used in the Anhwei provincial power struggle as a solution to the problem in other provinces.

The Anhwei question illustrates the complexities involved in the provincial power seizure and the reliance placed on the military for
stability and for bringing order out of chaos.\textsuperscript{34}

Factional strife had been endemic in Anhwei province since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. There had been clashes between the Red Guard groups and workers group organized in opposition to the established party apparatus. After deposing of the party provincial authorities, four major factional groups emerged in January 1967: The Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters, the August 27 Revolution-to-the-End Liaison Group, Red Revolutionary Committee, and the Workers Rebel United Committee.\textsuperscript{35} Because of the continuous dissension and rivalry among these rebel groups, chaos and confusion reigned in the province. In March the Central Committee called for a series of consultative conferences in Peking by the responsible officers of the PLA stationed in Anhwei and delegates representing the warring factions. The final outcome of these negotiation sessions was the Central Committee's decision on the Anhwei question.\textsuperscript{36} On April 1, the Central Committee extended the decision to all provinces.

In its decision on Anhwei, the Central Committee reprimanded the PLA local command and the Red Guard groups for failure to achieve unity (GG), their inability to direct the conflict toward "a small handful who take the capitalist road" within the provincial party structure, and the erroneous action on the part of the revolutionary Left groups, supported by the PLA, in suppressing by force those Red Guard groups who disagreed. The Central Committee then forbade: a) support of one Red Guard group but not others by the PLA, b) unilateral declaration of any Red Guard group as counter-revolutionary by the PLA without specific authorization from Peking, and c) use of the military for suppressing the masses by
"bad elements." In addition, the Military Affairs Committee ordered that the province be placed under complete military control by designating the vice-commander for the Naking Military Region as head of the military control commission for Anhwei.

The decision discussed above contained several elements of contradiction. First, the Central Committee asked the PLA to lend its support to the revolutionary Left groups without any precise guidance as how a genuine revolutionary Left group was to be identified. At the same time, the PLA in the provinces were prohibited from declaring which contending factional groups were counter-revolutionary. Without such authority the PLA could not possibly act in any situation where factional strife became open armed struggle. Lastly, with these restrictive measures ordered by the Central Committee, the PLA was also asked to place the province under military control which in essence meant that all public security organs and authority normally responsible for law and order were to be exercised by the military. And the military was further asked to "resolutely correct its wrong doings in erroneously making arrests" of the Red Guard groups who disagreed.

The Anhwei decision was incorporated into an April 6, 1967, order to the PLA by the Military Affairs Committee. The essence of the Military Affairs Committee order was to curb and restrict the authority of the local military commanders in their effort to lend support to the revolutionary Left groups. The Military Affairs Committee order specifically prohibited the PLA commands from: 1) using force in dealing with the Red Guard groups, 2) making arrests at random, 3) declaring arbitrarily any Red Guard groups counter-revolutionary without specific approval from the Central Committee in Peking, 4) forcing people to make
confessions, and 5) meting out physical punishment including parading people through the streets in dunce caps.  

Criticism by the Military Affairs Committee of the behavior of the local military commands in the provinces can be found in the editorials of the Jiefangjun Bao published on April 6 and April 10. The central theme in the April 6 editorial was an appeal to the PLA to stop being "arrogant" and resolutely adopt the attitude of "humility" (UU). The editorial asked the PLA to "trust and respect" the masses and to be the "students" of the masses. It warned that it was easy to be "rude" and "crass" in dealing with the masses. It made the admission that the PLA lacked the necessary experience in meeting new problems and thus frequently committed errors in its actions. Under these conditions, the editorial stated it would be best for the PLA to learn to investigate the source of its mistakes and make the necessary corrections.  

The April 10 editorial of the Jiefangjun Bao, which revealed the content of the April 6 Military Affairs Committee directives, urged the PLA to refrain from turning its guns on the masses under any conditions and warned the PLA to be constantly alert to avoid any measures of suppressing the Red Guard groups. Rather than arrogantly suppressing one faction, the PLA was to help settle any differences of opinion among the mass organizations by self-criticism, discussion and debate.  

The curbing of PLA's authority in the face of continued factional struggle in the provinces merely increased the frequency of violent struggles among the Red Guard groups. Since the PLA now were forbidden to use force to restore order, anarchy reigned.
Violent behavior of the contending Red Guard groups reached such an uncontrollable state, abetted by the restrictive April 6 order to the PLA local commanders, that a new order had to be issued on June 6 to restore law and order in the provinces. The June 6 order issued jointly by the Military Affairs Committee, State Council and the Cultural Revolution Group revealed the extent of chaos that prevailed throughout the country. PLA troops stationed in the provinces were authorized 1) to arrest and punish according to law any individual or group that committed actions of looting, pillaging or destroying of public documents or property and 2) to prevent any unauthorized arrests of persons and assaults. No where in the text of the directive was the PLA specifically given authority to use force to compel the violators to comply with the directive.  

The June 6 order placed the PLA in an extremely vulnerable position. On the one hand there was the national-wide appeal for "struggle by reason and persuasion" reinforced by the April 6 order which restricted PLA action in cases of in-fighting between and among the factions. On the other hand, armed clashes and other disorderly conduct must be controlled if not suppressed by force. The responsibility for restoring order and maintaining discipline among the Red Guard groups rested on the PLA's shoulders, the only effective coercive instrument available. Any action taken by the PLA for the explicit purpose of carrying out the June 6 directives would have meant the use of force which would instantly arouse hostility and resentment among the groups being suppressed. Many PLA commands simply refused to take any action under these circumstances for fear of being criticized and reprimanded. PLA's
failure to act in maintaining law and order led to an upsurge in lawlessness carried on by the various contending factions of Red Guard groups. These anarchical activities included seizure of arms and equipment from PLA troops and arsenals. In many of these incidents of seizure of PLA arms and equipment, the PLA troops simply remained passive.

Confronted with contradictory directives, some PLA commands simply acted on their own, guided by their respective regional predilections. The July 20 Wuhan incident was a good case in point. The incident represented in some ways an open revolt led by a powerful PLA commander in defiance of Mao Tze-tung and Lin Piao. It also reflected, in retrospect, two basic difficulties in PLA's intervention in local power seizure struggle: the problem of identifying "genuine" revolutionary faction among the contending Red Guard groups and the close identification of provincial and district military commands with the established local power structure. It is from this standpoint that the Wuhan Incident deserves a brief analysis.

b. The Wuhan Incident

Two clusters of revolutionary mass organizations were formed for the purpose of power seizure in the city of Wuhan. One, the "General Headquarters for Proletarian Revolution for the Wuhan Area," was made up largely of university students and steel workers. The other, the "One Million Heroes," was composed mainly of regular government and party cadres, elements of militia, and factory workers. The latter group had the support and blessing of the Wuhan Military District Command under Chen Tsai-tao and the Wuhan party apparatus. The leadership of the
"One Million Heroes" was under the leading cadres from the public security agencies which had a close working relationship with the PLA #8201 Division stationed in Wuhan city (PLA #8201 Division had its genealogical origin as a public security force for the province of Hupeh). It was obvious that the "One Million Heroes" had dominated power seizure activities in the Wuhan area not only because of its numerical strength but also because of the support it received from the military command and the party apparatus. It frequently employed force to suppress the opposing Red Guard groups in the Wuhan area. In the first few days of July, the "One Million Heroes" forcefully occupied the staging centers of its rival group and thus nullified the latter's activities altogether. Peking then appealed to the Wuhan Regional Military Command for cessation of these suppressive activities to no avail. On July 14, two emissaries, Hsieh Fu-chieh and Wang Li of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, were flown to Wuhan with the specific instruction from Premier Chou to settle the factional struggle on the spot. On July 19, the Wuhan Regional Military Command called a meeting, attended by representatives of the two rival mass organizations, where Wang Li presented Chou En-lai's four-point directive: (1) giving recognition to the "General Headquarters for the Proletarian Revolution in the Wuhan Area" as the genuine revolutionary group, (2) calling for an investigation of the Wuhan Military District Command's mistaken activities in its support to the left, (3) restoring the good reputation of the steel workers union and (4) branding the "One Million Heroes" as reactionary.
The reception to these demands was that of anger and resentment. A protest rally was organized on July 20 by the "One Million Heroes." That evening, elements of the PLA #8201 Division, with the aid of the "One Million Heroes" house arrested the two emissaries from Peking. Peking's response was to dispatch PLA Paratroop #8191 stationed in the vicinity of the City of Wuhan and the 15th Army Corps into the city proper for a showdown. In addition, five destroyers of the PLA Navy were ordered to Wuhan to provide naval support to the 15th Army Corps. The result was the release of the two emissaries and the disbandment of the "One Million Heroes." Chen Tsai-tao, the PLA commander in Wuhan and the political commissar were relieved of their command and flown to Peking for re-education. A public announcement was made by the newly organized Wuhan Military District Command in which it confessed its error and pledged its loyalty to Peking.

To what extent the defiance of the regional military commanders such as General Chen Tsai-tao of Wuhan was motivated by personal loyalty and ties with Marshals Ho Lung and Hsu Hsieng-chien has been a subject of speculation by a number of experts in Taiwan and the West. These experts argue that the unrest and disturbances in central and southwest regions which engulfed the regional and provincial military commanders and political commissars was inspired by loyalties and ties that these powerful local military officers had established at one time or another with Marshals Ho and Hsu. For example, they point out that General Chen Tsai-tao of the Wuhan military region was at one time a key cadre of Marshal Hsu, commander of the Fourth Red Front Army. The Fourth Red Front Army was subsequently merged with Marshal Ho Lung's forces to
become the Second Field Army.\textsuperscript{57}

The findings of the contingency analysis in the 115 editorials of the \textit{Renmin Ribao}, however, do not seem to support the thesis as described above.

Significant association occurred between references to the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) and references to the PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISSENSION (L) at the .01 level. Both content categories K and L have co-occurred with references to WUHAN MILITARY SITUATION (NN) at the .01 level and less than .01 level, respectively. NN is also associated with "Chinese Khrushchev" or TOP PARTY PERSON TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD (P) at the .03 level. Content category with references to CALL FOR UNITY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE MASSES AND THE SOLDIERS (X) associated with L at the .05 level and with NN at the .01 level. This seems to indicate that the Wuhan military revolt and the internal disunity of the military were related to the PLA's relationship with the Red Guard groups during the Cultural Revolution.

Peking's assessment of the Wuhan incident was that the responsible military leaders in the area had committed a serious error in lending support to the wrong faction. Implied in this criticism was the assertion that such mistake could have been avoided had the local responsible PLA personnel clearly grasped "the meaning of the proletarian revolution" and thus provided "correct direction" in the power seizure.\textsuperscript{58} In the aftermath of the Wuhan incident, Lin Piao urged PLA cadres to maintain close contact with Peking at all times.\textsuperscript{59} He advised: "Don't get panicky or make hasty decisions. Be sure to understand the situation clearly and then take action only if the Peking has given approval."\textsuperscript{60}
### TABLE 5. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO REGIONAL DEFIANCE WITHIN THE MILITARY—WUHAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Categories</th>
<th>Significance test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/PLA DISUNITY (L)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/WUHAN MILITARY SITUATION (NN)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/UNITY OF MASSES-SOLDIERS (X)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/WUHAN MILITARY SITUATION (NN)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CHINESE KRUSHCHEV&quot; (P)/WUHAN MILITARY SITUATION (NN)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY OF MASSES-SOLDIERS (X)/WUHAN MILITARY SITUATION (NN)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Less than .01.

As a preventive measure, PLA cadres and their commanders were ordered to go through intensive re-educational process to insure their ideological correctness and loyalty.

c. The Campaign to "Support the Army and Cherish the People"

A direct consequence of the Wuhan Incident was an increased attack on and contempt for the PLA by the revolutionary groups. In the midst of strong criticism of the PLA and the frenzied cry for "dragging out the small handful in the army," a campaign for restoring the PLA prestige was launched under the slogan "support the army and cherish the people." In the contingency analysis this was represented by the content category STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH) and its association with other symbol-categories.

The campaign for strengthening the army-people relations began in earnest in August 1967, the 40th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. The slogan first appeared in the Renmin Ribao and editorials of the Jiefangjun Bao as early as April 1967. Solidarity of the people and army was regarded as a question of "fundamental attitude" which required support by all. These editorials seemed to express some fear that the relationship could easily be exploited by "bad elements"—referring to entrenched supporters of Liu Shao-chi—to the detriment of the revolution. The appeal in April was for the PLA to be humble enough to accept the criticism of the masses and to admit its own mistakes in carrying out its role in lending support to the revolutionary Left groups. The stress in the appeal was for less arrogance and more friendly attitude toward the masses. This concern for army-people relations became more evident after the July Wuhan Incident.
"Strengthening army–people solidarity" was a major theme in the public proclamation made by the vindicated "genuine" revolutionary Left group.⁶⁹

Other themes in the campaign were "PLA's clear and unwavering support of the proletarian revolutionary faction is to cherish the people" and "solidarity of the people and the army can conquer all."⁷⁰

A joint rally by the Wuhan revolutionary Left groups and the elements of PLA troops stationed in Wuhan was a major event.⁷¹ On August 28, in two separate editorials, the Renmin Ribao⁷² and Jiefangjun Bao⁷³ called all PLA fighters and the revolutionary masses to conduct rallies and formulate "Kung-you" (public pledges) in support of strengthening the people–army unity. The PLA confessed that it was largely its major responsibility to make improvements in the army–people relations, and that if the relations were not regulated properly, the PLA must be the first to institute self-criticism as a sincere demonstration for solidarity.⁷⁴

The PLA further pledged that it would resolutely lend support and protection to the revolutionary Left groups, that it would not unconditionally support one faction and suppress others, and that it would not adopt a crass and crude attitude in dealing with the masses.⁷⁵

A rally of 100,000 revolutionary masses, Red Guard contingents, and leading cadres of PLA elements stationed in Peking was held on September 1 to dramatize the call for strengthening army–people solidarity.⁷⁶ Similar rallies were held in other parts of the country.⁷⁷ Public pledges for strengthening army–people solidarity were made at these rallies.⁷⁸

An example of a pledge, which probably was quite representative, reached between the student Red Guards and the faculty of a high school in the city of Peking and the PLA troops assigned to it includes these points:
(1) trust, rely on and render aid to the PLA in its tasks, (2) trust, rely and have fraternal affection for the revolutionary Left groups, (3) unite the PLA and the Red Guards by giving each other support and by learning from each other, (4) resolve problems which might arise between the army and the people by means of consultation and self-criticism, (5) be ever vigilant against "bad elements" whose sole aim is to create divisiveness, and (6) reinforce the army-people solidarity.

The above findings from data generated from the Jiefangjun Bao editorials seem to be in agreement with the contingency analysis of 115 editorials of the Renmin Ribao on the PLA's dilemma in coping with factional rivalry among the revolutionary Left groups, as shown in Table 6.

The problem of factional rivalry and disputes within and between the revolutionary Left groups can be seen from the significant association at less than .01 level of references to MASSES FIGHTING AGAINST MASSES, STUDENTS FIGHTING AGAINST STUDENTS (BB) and references to WORKERS AND FARMERS OPPOSED TO REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS (CC). BB in turn is contingent upon INTELLECTUALS UNITE WITH THE WORKERS AND FARMERS (JJ) at the .03 level.

The military's intervention to restore order can be seen from the association of references to the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) and references to THE EXISTENCE OF ANARCHICAL CONDITION (II) at the .01 level and from II's co-occurrences with references to RESOLUTELY TRUST AND SUPPORT THE PLA (KK) at the .01 level. References to MASSES FIGHTING AGAINST MASSES, STUDENTS FIGHTING AGAINST STUDENTS (BB) are contingent on references to MAKING THE REVOLUTION ECONOMICALLY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/UNITY OF MASSES-SOLDIERS (X)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS (II)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/TRUST, SUPPORT PLA (KK)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY OF MASSES-SOLDIERS (X)/TRUST, SUPPORT PLA (KK)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSES VS. MASSES (BB)/WORKERS VS. STUDENTS (CC)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSES VS. MASSES (BB)/PLA NOT SUPPRESS MASSES (DD)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSES VS. MASSES (BB)/INTELLECTUALS-WORKERS UNITE (JJ)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSES VS. MASSES (BB)/ECONOMICAL REVOLUTION (LL)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS (II)/TRUST, SUPPORT PLA (KK)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aLess than .01.

at the .03 level. The above association indicates the PLA's difficult task in protecting the state's property from the undisciplined students.

The strained relationship between the PLA and the masses is revealed by the association of content categories which make references to MASSES FIGHTING AGAINST THE MASSES, STUDENTS FIGHTING AGAINST THE STUDENTS (BB) and references to GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PLA NOT TO SUPPRESS THE MASSES (DD) at the .03 level. The appearance of significant associations of references to the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) with those references to CALL FOR UNITY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE MASSES AND THE SOLDIERS (X) at less than the .01 level and with references to RESOLUTELY TRUST AND SUPPORT THE PLA (KK) also at less than .01 level as well as X's contingent upon KK at less than .01 level reflect the campaign to restore support for the army.

From the foregoing summary of events and the findings in the contingency analysis of editorials in the Jiefangjun Bao (see Table 4) and Renmin Ribao (see Table 6), we may now determine with a degree of certainty some underlying reasons for the grave concern for strengthening relations between the army and the people.

The most compelling reason underlying the campaign to strengthen army-people solidarity was concern over the continuous bloodshed between and among the contending factions within the Red Guard groups. Peking's desire to restore order and impose discipline among the Red Guard groups was clearly presented in a Renmin Ribao editorial: "The evil behavior" of armed struggle practiced by the Red Guard groups in a number of localities was doing immeasurable damage to the economy and disrupting
revolutionary discipline. The PLA troops must trust the masses and respect the cadres. The Red Guard groups, on the other hand, must cement good relations with the PLA and together they must "restore and stabilize social discipline."

The admonishments for the PLA to "cherish the people" was a device to restrict some of the harsh coercive action employed by the local PLA commanders in dealing with the in-fighting by rival Red Guard groups. Beneath this slogan was also an attempt by adherents of Mao Tze-tung in Peking to maintain closer supervision of the PLA local leaders in view of these PLA leaders' regional predilections and associations with establishment cadres, as reflected by the Wuhan Incident. This is clearly shown by Lin Piao's advice to the military leaders: Investigate and study the situation first and then consult Peking for approval of any action.

Support for the PLA was, of course, a necessary step to restore order. It also had further implications. The attack and criticisms levelled at the PLA by various Red Guard groups had undermined the prestige of the PLA as a people's army nourished and nurtured by revolution and by armed struggle. Since the PLA is the only effective disciplined organization available it was relied upon as a major instrument for accomplishing the objectives of the Cultural Revolution. Damage to its prestige would have a serious effect on the outcome of the entire struggle. The call for the masses to support the PLA would facilitate the implementation of changes desired by those loyal to Mao Tze-tung's ideals, for in the final analysis, as we will demonstrate in subsequent chapters in this study, it is through the reliance on the revolutionary elan, the organizational technique, and the coercive force
4. Techniques of Intervention: Military Control and Central Elite Corps

This section is an attempt to analyze the manner by which the PLA carried out the order of the Military Affairs Committee to intervene by lending its support to the revolutionary Left. The analysis presented in this section is guided by the findings of the contingency analysis on the 136 editorials of the *Jiefangjun Bao*. Details on the substance are drawn mainly from the published material in their original form in *Hongqi*, the *Renmin Ribao*, and the editorials themselves.

Table 7 and Figure 4 indicate the PLA's perception of its role in providing military control and supervision over the entire country. In the source's thinking these related ideas occurred: PLA'S SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F) is contingent upon PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE LEFT (A) at .04 level and upon PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (B) at .01 level. In other words, the thinking of lending its support to the Revolutionary Committees as a temporary power structure to replace the regular party establishment brings forth immediately PLA's effort in supporting the Red Guard groups and its control and supervision over the country. The association structure of ideas expressed in Figure 4 seems to imply that its ability to carry out the task indicated in

of the PLA that whatever changes, be they in the structure or in the formulation of new proletarian attitudes, the Cultural Revolution has set out to achieve will be accomplished. The leadership close to Mao Tse-tung has been very candid when it declares that "without the PLA there would be nothing for the people."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)/PLA SUPPORT LEFT (A)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)/PLA CONTROL (B)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA CONTROL (B)/REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA CONTROL (B)/UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/PLA TREAT NEW CADRES (II)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 4. CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO MILITARY CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F) is conditioned upon the PLA's activities in related areas such as PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE LEFT (A) and PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (B) in turn co-occurred with ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG) at .01 level and UNITY WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ) at .04 level. The inference here seems to be that the PLA's exercise of control and supervision over the country is dependent on efforts made in achieving solidarity with all contending groups and factions and on reliance upon and re-employment of old party bureaucrats whose ideological impurity has been cleansed or who have "redeemed" their past mistakes.

We shall analyze below the techniques employed by the PLA in exercising its military control and supervision--one of the major roles the PLA undertook during the course of the Cultural Revolution.

a. The Military Control Commission

The Military Control Commission, as a device for the military to exercise martial law rule over the administration and control of the regime, was not an innovation for the Cultural Revolution. A similar device with identical power and jurisdiction had been introduced successfully during the five year period from 1949 to 1954. The military control was a device used for providing a gradual transition from civil war to normalcy and for the take-over of administrative functions from the defeated Nationalists (Article 14, Common Programme):

The duration of military control shall be determined by the Chinese People's Government in accordance with military and political conditions of the locality. In all places where military operations have ended, agrarian reform has been thoroughly completed, and peoples of all circles have been fully organized, elections through universal suffrage shall immediately be held to convene local people's congresses.
Each liberated town, county and city was placed under military control exercised through a Military Control Commission, established by the commanders of the newly-arrived PLA unit. The ranking military officer for a particular locality concurrently held the chairmanship of the Military Control Commission and the top political administrative post for the local government. Local administrative machinery, schools, factories, economic enterprises, and communications were placed under the jurisdiction of the Military Control Commission. On the regional level, congruent with the six major administrative regions, were the six military regions under the control of the field armies. The highest organ of government in these regions was the Military Control Commission. The chairmanship for the regional Military Control Commission was held by the same senior PLA officer, who was in charge of the military region and the Field Army Headquarters. Dissolution of military control began in 1953 and was completed in 1954.°

The Military Control Commission was reinstituted after the PLA was ordered to intervene in the Cultural Revolution.° At first some major metropolitan cities were placed under military control. The City of Peking, the nation's capitol, was put under partial military control on February 11, 1967.° Ministry of Public Security and Peking Garrison Command made a joint proclamation that in accordance with the directive of the State Council and Military Affairs Committee, the Peking Garrison Command was to take over the Public Security Bureau of Peking Municipality and place it under military control.° The Military Control Commission for the Peking Public Security Bureau was responsible for: (1) maintaining revolutionary discipline and the protection of
proletarian revolutionary groups; (2) supporting revolutionary faction within the Public Security Bureau; and (3) purging the old public security bureau of its anti-revolutionary elements. 90

The city of Canton was placed under PLA military control on March 15, 1967, by the military district troops, with public security organ, the city's newspaper, and many major means of production, the first to be placed under the PLA's supervision. 91

The first province ordered under military control was Anhwei, 92 following a prolonged period of in-fighting between and among the various Red Guard groups. The action was subsequently followed in all of the twenty-eight provinces. 93 The Military Control Commission directive on March 16, 1967, placing the entire Anhwei Province under military control sheds some light as to the reasons for and the functions of the Military Control Commission. The first and foremost function of the Military Control Commission was to maintain order and discipline by reducing armed in-fighting between and among the contending factions. Once this objective was achieved, it was the task of the Military Control Commission to bring the factions together in the name of "Great Unity" of the proletariat. 94

The final objective was to supervise preparation for formation of the revolutionary "Three-Way Alliance" of the PLA, party cadres loyal to Mao Tze-tung, and the Red Guard groups. The temporary power structure known as the Revolutionary Committee was formed to replace the former party apparatus (this will be discussed in Chapter V).

The directive on the establishment of Military Control Commission over the Anhwei province also specifically charged the PLA with the
responsibilities of exercising supervision over the economic, financial and relief activities of the province. The PLA troops stationed in the province were placed under the jurisdiction and command of the Vice-Commander for the Nanking Military Region who in turn was designated as the Chairman for the Military Control Commission for the province. One of the PLA's first actions in placing the province under martial law was to take over the existing public security agencies and the local police and to screen out those officers or cadres considered unreliable or disloyal to the proletarian left and Chairman Mao. Simultaneously the Military Control Commission took over the provincial party newspaper and the provincial broadcasting station. Military control and supervision were also imposed on the nation's communication system. All major communication networks in and between cities were placed directly under the military control. In addition all transportation organizations were placed under the military in order to maintain the regular flow of traffic which frequently had been disrupted by the various factions in the revolutionary mass groups. There was evidence that the PLA officers were assigned to a number of ministries in the State Council at the central government level. PLA senior officers with managerial expertise were identified as directors or deputy directors in State Planning Commission and ministries of finance, commerce, food supply and foreign trade.

Military control and supervisory activities of the PLA seem to follow a definite pattern throughout the country. The pattern calls for (1) taking over the public security and police functions in a given locale, (2) the control of major means of mass communication, and (3)
managing or monitoring major economic-production units.

b. Central Support—the-Left Forces Dispatched to the Provinces

By May 1968, with the active support of the PLA, 24 out of a total of 28 provinces and autonomous regions had established the Revolutionary Committees based on the principle of the "Three-way Alliance" in place of the old party apparatus. The five provinces and autonomous regions which had experienced a great deal of difficulty in getting themselves re-established as loyal to Mao Tze-tung were: Fakien, Yunan, Kwangsi, Tibet and Singkiang. Chief among these difficulties was the inability on the part of contending factions to reconcile their viewpoints and form the "Great Unity." In all instances in these provinces and autonomous regions, the locally stationed PLA troops had given their support to the entrenched establishment. There seemed to be hints that these were "diehards" in the provincial party, aided by the "demons and ghosts," who had deliberately prevented the formation of alliance of the factions and thrown obstacles at every turn: "...They have tried to annoy our revolutionary lines, split the revolutionary ranks, destroy unity, advocate the rightist movement of verdict reversal and pressure Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party from the right or the extreme left or both." Even in those 24 provinces where the Revolutionary Committees were established, not all was well. The factions had not stopped armed struggle and disregard for discipline was so extensive that normal activities in economic production were adversely affected. Evidently the repeated orders from the Central Committee and its Military Affairs Committee had not been carried out. In many instances local PLA commands had committed "mistakes" by giving support
to the wrong Red Guard groups or the conservative party bureaucracy in the provinces.\textsuperscript{103}

It was against this background that on June 10, 1968, a major effort was mounted by Peking for the expressed purpose of "consolidating" the established Revolutionary Committees and "accelerating" the rapid establishment of such committees in regions where the "great unity" had not been achieved.\textsuperscript{104} This effort was the formation of special PLA units, the "Central Support-the-Left Forces," under the exclusive direction of the Military Affairs Committee at the Central Committee level. What troops actually constituted these "Central Support-the-Left Forces" is difficult to determine. Several versions of the PLA elements which made up the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" have been identified. The Hongkong version identified units of the 38th Army Corps, normally stationed in the northeast or the Manchurian area, as the key source of strength for the special forces. The 38th Army Corps has always been the mainstay of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army.\textsuperscript{105} This view is shared by Chien Yu-shen, a defected PLA officer now retired in Hongkong, in his recent account of the military dissent.\textsuperscript{106} Chinese Nationalists source provide another version by identifying the elements of the 55th Army Corps and the 21st Army Corps as the key components of the "Central Support-the-Left Forces."\textsuperscript{107}

It would seem to me that the PLA #8341 unit of the 38th Army Corps was active in the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" from the frequent appearance of articles contributed by the cadres of this unit in the \textit{Hongqi}\textsuperscript{108} and the \textit{Renmin Ribao}.\textsuperscript{109}
It is obvious that many other units of the PLA normally stationed in different military regions were dispatched by the Military Affairs Committee as "Central Support-the-Left Forces" into other military districts or provinces to aid the locally stationed PLA rendering aid to the revolutionary Left groups in their struggle for power in the provinces.\textsuperscript{110}

The jurisdiction, and by implication the relationship, between the PLA troops already stationed in the military region or district into which the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" were dispatched, was spelled out in the directive: The central forces so designated act as the "representative in full authority" of the Military Affairs Committee and as such they have the power to supervise the local PLA units in implementing the directives of Peking. Any resistance on the part of local PLA units to the orders or refusal to cooperate with the "Central Support-the-Left-Forces" could mean the arrest of their commanders and the disarming of their units as fighting forces. The directive was also very explicit in the authority given the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" in dealing with the revolutionary mass organizations to curb further armed struggle: arrest and punish those leaders of the contending factions who resist the return of seized weapons and ammunition, punish severely those who continue to incite armed bloodshed, return fire on those who continue to incite the masses to attack the PLA, bring the conflicting leaders together for negotiation in order to achieve "Great Unity," and finally perform educational and propaganda work among these Red Guard groups.\textsuperscript{111}

Ostensibly the primary purpose of the "Central Support-the-Left
Forces" was to "consolidate" and "accelerate" the formation of the Revolutionary Committees in the provinces and the autonomous regions. Its two other major objectives are equally apparent. First, the presence of the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" in the local scene seemed to serve notice to the local military commanders to cut their ties and regional predilection by lending their support to the revolutionary Left groups. The "Central Support-the-Left Forces" could now instruct or compel the locally stationed PLA forces as to whom the "spearhead" should be directed against in the power struggle. Second, Peking had by now realized that in-fighting among the contending factions often was triggered by the alliance between the locally stationed PLA commands and the "conservative" party apparatus. The momentum for the speedy establishment of unity of all revolutionary Left groups was retarded by the incessant fighting. The dispatch of the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" into the regional and provincial military districts could ensure not only the speedy formation of a united stand of the revolutionary Left group but could provide protection to the already hard pressed groups loyal to Peking. The dispatch of the "Central Support-the-Left Forces" must be viewed as an indication of Peking's lack of trust in the ability of the regional and district military commands to carry out their tasks in lending support to the revolutionary Left groups in overthrowing the entrenched party apparatus.

Two immediate consequences resulted from the dispatch of the "Central Support-the-Left Forces." One was the speedy establishment of the revolutionary committees in the remaining provinces and autonomous region in the southwest. In rapid succession the establishment of the
Revolutionary Committees were publicly proclaimed in these provinces: Yunan,\textsuperscript{113} Fukien,\textsuperscript{114} Kwangsi,\textsuperscript{115} and the autonomous region of Tibet.\textsuperscript{116} The other was renewed hostility and resentment against the PLA which was reflected in the intensification of the campaign theme of "Support the Army and Cherish the People."\textsuperscript{117}
For some time it has been the contention of scholars and China-watchers in the West that two inter-related issues are basic in the Cultural Revolution: 1) the fear of emergence of Krushchev-type revisionism as practiced in the Soviet Union and 2) the conflict between ideologue and technocrat known as the red vs. expert controversy.\(^1\) In supporting their thesis that Mao Tze-tung and his close associates are concerned about the erosion of revolutionary fervor and discipline within the various levels of the Chinese Communist Party, the ninth polemic delivered to the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet dispute has been cited as the evidence.\(^2\) This document, reportedly written by Mao Tze-tung,\(^3\) accuses the Soviet Union of wrecking the Socialist revolution and undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat by abandoning the class struggle in favor of peaceful competition and coexistence. It gives a detailed diagnosis of how the Soviet Union has degenerated into a "variant of bourgeois socialism."\(^4\) Some of the pertinent passages are quoted below:

\[\text{Since Khrushchev usurped the leadership of the Soviet Party and state, there has been a fundamental change in the state of the class struggle in the Soviet Union.}\]

\[\text{Khrushchev has carried out a series of revisionist policies} \]

\[\text{ser} \]

\[\text{v} \]

\[\text{ing} \]

\[\text{the} \]

\[\text{forces} \]

\[\text{capitalism} \]

\[\text{in} \]

\[\text{the} \]

\[\text{Soviet} \]

\[\text{Union.} \]

Khrushchev has substituted "material incentive" for the socialist principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." He has widened, and not narrowed, the gap between the incomes of a small minority and those of the workers, peasants and ordinary intellectuals...

Khrushchev sabotages the socialist planned economy, supplies the capitalist principle of profit, develops capitalist free competition and undermines socialist ownership by the whole people.

Khrushchev's "communism" takes the United States for its model. Imitation of the methods of management of United States' capitalism and the bourgeois way of life has been raised by Khrushchev to the level of state policy... He wants to copy the United States in the sphere of industry as well as that of agriculture and, in particular, to imitate the profit motive of U.S. capitalist enterprises...

The development of socialist society is a process of uninterrupted revolution.

To ensure the success of socialist construction and to prevent the restoration of capitalism, it is necessary to carry the socialist revolution through to the end on the political, economic, ideological and cultural fronts. The complete victory of socialism cannot be brought about in one or two generations; to resolve this question thoroughly requires five or ten generations or even longer.  

In substantiating their contention that the red vs. experts controversy has been a basic issue for the current upheaval, scholars on Chinese communist affairs often refer to the 1959 disagreement within the party in which Mao Tze-tung's own leadership and thinking were seriously challenged by some of his most trusted comrades. Some of these scholars have also pointed out that there have been signs of growing power of an entrenched bureaucracy which tends to threaten the vitality and initiative of the revolutionary spirit among the party cadres. The conclusion one draws from a reading of these analyses is that these developments must have created anxiety in the minds of Mao Tze-tung and his loyal supporters within the party about the future
course of the regime: that if the proletariat revolution is not to "change its original color" the leadership at the Party Central must provide the correct line and policy for continuance of the revolution.

We begin the analysis with the hypothesis that there existed within the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party a basic policy cleavage with regard to the ways and means of carrying out the goals of the regime and that at some stage of the debate policy issues became intertwined with a power struggle to such an extent that the latter obscured the importance of the former.

One of the primary tasks in this investigation, therefore, is to determine, first of all, the existence of policy debate or dissension within the top leadership of the Central Committee. After providing evidence for the existence of such dissension, it may be possible to validate the hypothesis that the policy debate is intertwined with a power struggle and that the latter merely reflects the former. A contingency analysis of 115 editorials of the Renmin Ribao produced the following findings.

a. Existence of Faction for Moderate Approach

Inferences to the existence of a moderate faction within the Chinese communist hierarchy, in contrast to the unwavering orthodox faction which insists on continued class struggle, may be drawn from the significant association in Table 8 of content categories SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY (FF) and PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM (D) at less than .01 level, PROTRACTED AND COMPLEX CLASS STRUGGLE (A) and RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00) at the .02 level, and ADHERENCE TO MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE (E) and THOSE
TABLE 8. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO DISSENSION WITHIN THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON POLICY ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROTRACTED CLASS STRUGGLE (A)/RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR (B)/PREVENT REVOLUTIONISM (D)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR (B)/LEFT SIZE POWER (F)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT REVOLUTIONISM (D)/LEFT SIZE POWER (F)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT REVOLUTIONISM (D)/SOVIET CLIQUE IN PARTY (FF)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT REVOLUTIONISM (D)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S LINE (E)/CAPITALISTS IN POWER (G)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT SEIZE POWER (F)/CAPITALISTS IN POWER (G)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT SEIZE POWER (F)/LANDLORDS AND KULAKS (EE)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDLORDS AND KULAKS (EE)/RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDLORDS AND KULAKS (EE)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT SEIZE POWER (F)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVIET CLIQUE IN PARTY (FF)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aLess than .01

IN POWER WHO TAKE THE CAPITALIST ROAD (G) at the .01 level. G in turn has co-occurred with SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) at the .04 level. Specific identification of those who are RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00) is revealed by the co-occurrence of that content category and REACTIONARY ELEMENTS OF LANDLORDS, KULAKS, COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES, AND BAD ELEMENTS (EE) at the .05 level. EE in turn is contingent upon references to SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) at the .02 level.

These significant contingency associations seem to reveal the thinking of the source, in this case the editorials of the Renmin Ribao, which reflect the views of the Maoists, that there is a faction within the top leadership which advocates a pragmatic or moderate approach. The term RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00) has been traditionally employed in the Chinese communist jargon to label, in a general way, all those who oppose Mao Tze-tung's leadership or policies. Content category G makes quite specific to whom the opposition refers—the faction which is following the Khrushchev revisionist path.

The existence of a factional dispute within the party leadership may also be indicated by the significant association of content categories NEW REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR (B) and SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) at the .03 level. B is also contingent upon references to PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM (D) at the .04 level. References to SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) are also associated significantly with references to D at the .02 level. A picture of these relationships may be seen in Figure 5.
A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
b. **Red (Political Ideology) Vs. Expert (Technological Expertise) as a Major Issue**

Table 8 reveals significant association at less than .01 level between references to PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM (D) and references to AUTHORITIES–SCHOLARS–SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE THE KNOW–HOW AS REACTIONARIES (HH). HH is also contingent upon references to SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) at the .01 level and upon references to SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY (FF) at the .03 level, and upon references to REACTIONARY ELEMENTS OF LANDLORDS, KULAKS, COUNTER–REVOLUTIONARIES, AND BAD ELEMENTS (EE) at the .03 level. The significance of these associations seems to be relevant in the interpretation of one of the underlying causes of the Cultural Revolution—the issue of politics-in-command or the "red" vs. "expert" dichotomy. The co-occurrences of these categories seem to strengthen the previous contention that there exists within the top leadership a faction for moderate or pragmatic or revisionist approach in policy implementation.

Findings of the association of the pertinent content categories seem to point out one other important aspect in the policy debate—China's relationship with the Soviet Union. If references to SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY (FF) are contingent upon references to AUTHORITIES–SCHOLARS–SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE THE KNOW–HOW AS REACTIONARIES (HH) at the .03 level and upon references to PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM (D) at less than .01 level, the inference can be drawn that the revisionist clique within the party, which advocates moderation and which relies on expertise and technological knowledge to solve pressing economic problems, is actually agitating for
some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

c. Relationship between the Downfall of Top Leaders, Policy Debate and the Question of Succession

The Cultural Revolution began on November 15, 1965, with an attack by the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao on Wu Han, a dramatist, historian, and a former deputy mayor of Peking. From mid-November 1965 until August 1966 when the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened, a number of prominent leaders were attacked and purged. At first the purge seemed to center around Mayor Peng Chen, First Secretary of the Party and the 8th ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Poliburo, and those who belong to his entourage:

Wu Han                  Deputy Mayor of Peking
Chou Yang               Chief of Propaganda and literary "czar"
Lu Ting-I               Deputy Chief for Propaganda

Then a dramatic reshuffle took place at the 11th Plenum. The 8th Central Committee convened on August 1 and concluded its session on August 12. On August 8 the Sixteen Point Decision for the Cultural Revolution was made public and a gigantic rally followed with a new line-up of the Standing Committee of the Poliburo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-August 1966 Standing Committee</th>
<th>Post-August 1966 Standing Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mao Tze-tung*</td>
<td>1. Mao Tze-tung*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Liu Shao-chi</td>
<td>2. Lin Piao*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chou En-lai*</td>
<td>3. Chou En-lai*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chu Teh</td>
<td>4. Tao Chu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Teng Shao-ping</td>
<td>5. Chen Pao-tai*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tung Pi-wu</td>
<td>7. Kang Shen*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Peng Chen</td>
<td>8. Liu Shao-chi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Li Fu-chuan*</td>
<td>10. Li Fu-chuan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Liu Pao-cheng</td>
<td>11. Chen Yun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The asterisks indicate members of the faction which support Mao Tze-tung, based on reports of public appearances with Mao Tze-tung which appeared in the Renmin Ribao from the August 1-15, 1966.

Mao Tze-tung and his revolutionary line and strategy prevailed. The most striking changes in the hierarchical order in the Standing Committee of the Poliburo were the ascendancy of Lin Piao from the sixth position to the second, and the demotion of President Liu Shao-chi from the second position to the eighth. Clearly the established line for succession to Mao Tze-tung became an issue in the policy debate.

If our hypothesis, which is offered here to explain at least partially the interrelationship between the power struggle, the policy debate and the question of succession within the top leadership, has some validity, then significant association should occur between content categories which make references to (1) the purged individuals and (2) the issues in the policy debate at the highest level within the party.

Findings in Table 9 and Figure 6 reveal that references to PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM (D) is contingent upon PENG CHEN (Q) at less than .01 level. Q co-occurred with references to SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY (FF) at less than .01 level, to AUTHORITIES-SCHOLARS-SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE THE KNOW-HOW AS REACTIONARIES (HH) at less than .01 level, and to SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) at the .01 level. References to "CHINESE KHURSHCHEV" OR TOP PARTY PERSON TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD or Liu Shao-chi (P) are contingent upon references to FF at the .02 level, to HH at the .01 level, and to RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (OO) at the .03 level. Finally, references to PENG CHEN (Q) and "CHINESE KHURSHCHEV" OR TOP
TABLE 9. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO POLICY DEBATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT REVISIONISM (D)/PENG CHEN (Q)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT SEIZE POWER (P)/PENG CHEN (Q)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CHINESE KRUSHCHEV&quot; (P)/PENG CHEN (Q)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CHINESE KRUSHCHEV&quot; (P)/SOVIET CLIQUE IN PARTY (FF)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CHINESE KRUSHCHEV&quot; (P)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CHINESE KRUSHCHEV&quot; (P)/RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (OO)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENG CHEN (Q)/SOVIET CLIQUE IN PARTY (FF)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENG CHEN (Q)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Less than .01.

A line connecting two categories indicate a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
PARTY PERSON TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD (P) co-occurred significantly at the .03 level.

Thus two inferences can be made from the above findings. First, the downfall of top leaders such as Peng Chen and President Liu Shao-chi, the one-time heir-apparent to Chairman Mao, is closely related to major policy debate. There is under the framework of this study significant co-occurrence of references to Mayor Peng Chen and President Liu Shao-chi with references to the issue of "red vs. expert." This association can only indicate the existence of a pragmatic faction within the hierarchy. Second, there also is some evidence in the findings to suggest that the purged pre-August 1966 Standing Committee members of the Poliburo might have allied themselves in a common cause: the advocacy of a pragmatic approach and possibly rapprochement with the revisionist Soviet Union. The association of these content categories in Table 9 also implies the question of succession as a central issue intertwined with the power struggle within the top leadership.

d. 1959 Lushan Conference: The Root of the Policy Debate and Its Implications

One of the most striking findings of this study is the constant reference in numerous editorials to the 8th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which convened from August 2-16 in 1959 at Lushan, a mountain resort in central China. One does not realize the meaning and implication of these references to the Lushan Conference until one discovers their statistical association with a number of other references which relate to some of the basic issues confronting the leadership then and now. These are presented in Table 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROTRACTED CLASS STRUGGLE (A)/LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVENT REVISIONISM (D)/LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CHINESE KRUSCHEV&quot; (P)/LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)/UNITY OF MASSES-SOLDIERS (X)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)/SPECIALISTS AS REACTIONARIES (HH)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)/SOVIET CLIQUE IN PARTY (FF)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (T)/RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (OO)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Less than .01.

First, the findings reveal significant association of references to PROTRACTED AND COMPLEX CLASS STRUGGLE (A) with references to the LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959 (T) at the .01 level. The inference here is that whatever happened at the Central Committee's 8th Plenum at Lushan in 1959 had significant bearing upon the Cultural Revolution. It has been indicated elsewhere in this study that the Cultural Revolution originated from an inner party dispute over policy and strategy for achieving the goals and objectives of the regime. That this policy dispute goes back to the 1959 Party conference at Lushan seems to be an important link in our search for an adequate explanation for the causes of the current upheaval. Second, if the party dispute over major policies at the Lushan Conference in 1959 is looked upon as a basic cause for the onset of the Cultural Revolution, then what specific issues were disputed at Lushan?

One is struck by the significant association of references to LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959 (T) with reference to AUTHORITIES-SCHOLARS-SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE THE KNOW-HOW AS REACTIONARIES (HH) at less than .01 level and with references to PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM (D) at the .05 level. There seems to be little doubt that the question of strategy, moderate or radical, for accelerated economic development and rapid social change was a key disputed issue at the Lushan party conference when the commune program and the Great Leap were under severe criticism, largely because of the disruptive effect these radical programs had on the established economic base. It is probable that the existence of opposition to Mao Tze-tung's strategy was reported at the conference as evidenced the
co-occurrence of RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00) and the LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959 (T) at less than .01 level. "Right opportunists" is the collective term used to categorize all those who are opposed to Mao Tze-tung's policy. That this had occurred at the Lushal Conference is significant.

The Lushan Conference resolution, as revealed in excerpts released by the authorities in Peking and printed in the party's theoretical journal, the Hongqi, listed the following charges against the critics within the top leadership at Lushan who were led by Marshal Peng Teh-huai: (1) They denied the accomplishment of the Great Leap Forward Program; (2) They opposed the speedy advancement of the economy; (3) They were against the iron-steel production by the masses (use of backyard furnaces during the Great Leap); (4) They were against the People's Commune movement; and (5) They were opposed to the party's leadership in building socialism by politics-in-command (the red vs. expert issue).10

e. Lushan Conference and Military Modernization

But what puzzled most China watchers and this analyst is the timing of the released of the excerpts of the Lushan Conference resolutions. Perhaps the primary purpose of the public release of portions of the document after an elapse of some eight years was to center criticism on Marshal Peng who had gone on record criticizing Mao Tze-tung's policies at Lushan. The released portion of the document was dated August 16, 1959, the date the conference officially ended. But in August 1967 we were told that Marshal Peng was actually dismissed not by the Central Committee meeting at Lushan, but by the enlarged meeting of the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee held after the Lushan
Why is there such an inconsistency? The answers to the puzzle seem to lie in the inference to be drawn from references to PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISSENSION (L) which is contingent upon references to the LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959 (T) at the .01 level; T in turn co-occurred with CALL FOR UNITY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE MASSES AND THE SOLDIERS (X) at the .05 level. It would appear that something other than criticism of the radical economic and social programs, as embodied in the Great Leap and the Commune system, was involved at the Lushan Conference. It is possible that the debate then involved the question of military modernization and preparedness which in turn touched on the general question of the desirability of a closer alliance with the Soviet Union, a position which was taken by a number of top military leaders, including Marshal Peng Teh-huai. Until there is a full disclosure of what exactly took place at the Lushan Conference, we may have to rely on inferences such as the ones listed below as a way of probing the thinking of the source.

First, the co-occurrences of T (LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959) with L (PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISSENSION) at the .01 level and HH (AUTHORITIES-SCHOLARS-SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE THE KNOW-HOW AS REACTIONARIES) at less than .01 level, seem to give credence to the hypothesis that Marshal Peng, then speaking as the Defense Minister and former commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean War, was really concerned about the effect of economic disruption and confusion resulting from the failure of the Great Leap upon the modernization and professionalization program of the military. It is conceivable for the former Defense Minister to stress professionalism in training and
weaponry rather to tolerate waste on the part of the PLA in political and economic activities which were essentially non-military. In other words, Marshal Peng's "right opportunism" was conditioned by military considerations. Second, there is a significant association between T and FF (SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY) at the .03 level. Alice Langley Hsieh of the Rand Corporation has documented her contention that Marshal Peng was very much interested in securing the aid of the Soviet Union in the military modernization program. We know that three months prior to the convening of the 1959 Lushan Conference, Marshal Peng led a military goodwill mission to Moscow and other capitals of the Warsaw Pact Powers. He had a meeting with Khrushchev in Tirana on May 25, 1959, at which time Marshal Peng, without the knowledge of the Poliburo of his own party, delivered a letter to the Soviet leader, outlining his criticism of the Great Leap and the Commune Program which formed the basis of Marshal Peng's subsequent memorandum to Mao at the Lushan Conference. It was the substance of that memorandum and his secret contact with Khrushchev that finally brought the wrath of Mao Tze-tung upon Marshal Peng at the Lushan meeting. It was this incident and the repeated refusal of Khrushchev to apologize to the Chinese party for interfering in the internal affairs of China that caused Sino-Soviet relations to deteriorate.

The hypothesis that the policy debate within the Chinese Communist Party top leadership at the Lushan Conference had serious military implications and affected Sino-Soviet relations is further strengthened by the fact that the dismissal did not affect any of the leading economic planners who were also opposed to Mao Tze-tung's radical strategy but
did involve Marshal Peng, General Huang K'o-cheng, the Chief of Staff of the PLA, and two Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Chang Wen-tien and Wang Chia-hsiang), both of whom had been considered Soviet affairs experts and both of whom had been with Marshal Peng during his visits to Moscow and the Warsaw Pact capitols in the spring of 1959. If we accept the basic assumption of this investigation that the source says what it means, then we must conclude that a serious policy debate with military implications took place at the Lushan Conference, and the debate affected Sino-Soviet relations. But to speak of the Lushan Conference as comparable to a "revolt of the generals" is perhaps an over-exaggeration and simplification.

The one remaining question of importance to be explored is the role President Liu Shao-chi, China's Khrushchev, at the Lushan Conference. It was not until August 16, 1967, that we were told that Liu and Marshal Peng were "co-conspirators." An editorial of the Hongqi revealed that it was Liu who urged Marshal Peng to present a second memorandum at the January 1962 Enlarged Working Session of the Central Committee to seek Marshal Peng's rehabilitation by the party. On that occasion Liu Shao-chi made a plea for Marshal Peng's rehabilitation by pointing out that Marshal Peng's 1959 criticism of the economic conditions was an accurate assessment at the time. But this does not answer the question of Liu's role at the 1959 Lushan Conference. Was he sympathetic to and a supporter of Marshal Peng?

Findings of this study reveal that references to LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959 (T) are contingent upon references to CHINA'S KHRUSHCHEV OR TOP PARTY PERSON TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD (P) at the
level. The implicit meaning of words such as "China's Khrushchev" indicates something about (1) the presence of revisionistic influences and (2) the question of Sino-Soviet relations at the Lushan meeting. If we accept the inference from the association of these two content categories, it is quite plausible that Liu Shao-chi was involved in the policy debate at Lushan in 1959 and most likely he was leaning toward the position taken by Marshal Peng.

In the following two sections I propose the thesis that the concern of the Cultural Revolution was about something more basic than policy differences among the top leaders. I maintain that the Cultural Revolution was an attempt by the Maoists, who have faith in voluntarism which, among many other things, stresses the human will and the transformation of values, to resolve the central question of the nature of the Chinese communist society. The Cultural Revolution seen in this light was a struggle over a choice of priorities, a choice between economic growth which places heavy reliance upon technological and productive capacity of the society and the Maoist vision of a good society. The study in these sections, therefore, is an attempt to determine systematically the meaning of Mao Tze-tung's vision of a new socialist man and the issue of societal value transformation in the Chinese development process. In other words, this is a study of one important aspect of the development process--the acceptance and transmission of new social values and changing preferences. In addition, this section attempts to identify shifts in development strategy in Communist China from the meaning and inferences obtained from content analysis of verbal material which represents an organized symbol system in a culture.
The questions to be investigated in this section are: can social values, or Mao Tze-tung's vision of a socialist man, be determined by inferences derived from content analysis of verbal symbol systems emanating from the PLA? Can verbal material thus analyzed serve as a reliable indicator of Communist China's development strategy—how the Chinese see their own future in terms of Mao Tze-tung's vision of a good society.

2. Value Transmission in the Development Process

We often speak of values as "ideology," "political attitudes," "belief system," "paradigms" and a host of other definitions. But, as Gabriel Almond has so aptly pointed out, the meanings of these terms are "unstable and overlapping." From Almond's formulation of the concept of "political culture," Pye and Verba have developed a more precise and clearer definition which relates "the psychological dimensions of cultural change to the larger issues of political development." Lucien Pye defines political culture as:

...the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and that provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system.

The action theorist Talcot Parsons defines value as:

The commitments of individual persons to pursue and support certain directions or types of actions for the collectivity as a system and hence derivatively for their own roles in the collectivity.

The term social values and attitudes used here is very close to the
concepts of Parsons and Pye because these concepts relate the psychological dimensions of cultural change to the issues of political development.

Since Max Weber's classic thesis on the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism which described the development of a culture as a process of constantly increasing rationalization, contemporary scholars interested in political development and social change have stressed the importance of attitudes and values in the development process. For instance, Edward and Laura Banfield point out the importance of acquiring "the associational sentiments" of trust and cooperativeness among the people in southern Italy for economic development. Everett Hagen identifies the typical innovating personality necessary for sustained economic growth in a developing society. In The Achieving Society, a cross-cultural study of motivation and achievement based on content analysis of children's readers, David McClelland stressed the importance for economic progress of the internalization of the need for achievement. Spangler believes that economic development would not take place unless the elites of the society are "animated by values."

Most of these writers, as cited above, have been concerned mainly with the appropriate attitude or value necessarily for economic development. What Banfield, Hagen and McClelland are advocating is the acquisition of "modernizing" values similar to that of Weber's Protestant ethic on the part of the people in developing countries to spur rapid economic development and growth. The theme in their studies is the classic thesis that without a value transformation such as the Protestant ethic, economic development comparable to the rise of
capitalism in Western Europe would not have been possible. In a similar
vein, Jacob and Toscano believe that there is a close relationship
between values and initiative for social change. 29 People's values
might undergo transformation as a result of a breakdown or inadequacy in
the institutional mechanisms. Values and symbols which evoke attitudes
are necessary for societal transformation in the developmental process.
S. N. Eisenstadt, in analyzing the conditions of sustained growth and
modernization, hypothesizes that the development of continued growth
lies in the "development of adequate regulative mechanisms capable of
dealing with continuous changing and newly emerging problems and
conflicts." 30 Eisenstadt says two conditions are necessary: "the
establishment of efficient institutional framework and organization
capable of regulating conflicts, and the development of values and
symbols for the ideological transformation of society." 31

The succeeding sections are devoted to a study of the symbols used
during the Cultural Revolution for the ideological transformation of
society. The symbol system used for this investigation consists of
organized verbal material emanating from the Jiefangjun Bao and the PLA
testimonials published in the Renmin Ribao during the Cultural
Revolution.

3. Mao Tze-tung's Vision of a Communist Man as Perceived by the PLA

The contingency analysis of the 136 units of the Jiefangjun Bao
editorials and the 260 PLA testimonials, behavioral protocols, yielded
several sets of data on PLA's perception as to what ought to be the
essential ingredients in the social value system. In many respects,
these verbal symbols represent "planned behavior" for a Maoist vision of a good society. Basic to this vision is the need for the "world outlook"—emphasis on social consciousness of the new proletarianism rather than industrialization.

a. Ingredients of Social Values as Perceived in the Editorials of Jiefangjun Bao

i. The emulation of PLA Heroes. One cluster of key symbol-categories shows the central position that the meaning of emulation of PLA heroes occupies in relation to other symbols or ideas. Table 11 and the corresponding graphic representation in Figure 7 show the cluster relationship of these ideas.

References to PLA HERO EMULATION (I) are contingent upon references to: HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION (FF) at the .01 level, SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (WW) at the .01 level, PLA AS A SCHOOL FOR THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG (D) at the .02 level, POLITICS IN COMMAND (V) at the .05 level, to LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES OF NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES (J) at the .02 level, and SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (Z) at the .05 level. In addition, references to PLA AS A SCHOOL FOR THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG (D) are contingent upon references to LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES OF NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES (J) at less than .01 level and to POLITICS IN COMMAND (V) at the .02 level. J in turn has co-occurred with SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (Z) at the .03 level. References to SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (WW) are also contingent upon HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION (FF) at the .01 level and upon SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (Z) at less than .01 level.

What do all these associations mean? What inferences can we draw
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA HERO EMULATION (I)/HUMAN WILL (FF)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA HERO EMULATION (I)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (WW)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA HERO EMULATION (I)/PLA AS THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG SCHOOL (D)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA HERO EMULATION (I)/POLITICS IN COMMAND (V)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA HERO EMULATION (I)/LIN'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA HERO EMULATION (I)/SELF-SACRIFICE (Z)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AS THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG SCHOOL (D)/LIN'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AS THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG SCHOOL (D)/POLITICS IN COMMAND (V)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)/SELF-SACRIFICE (Z)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN WILL (FF)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (WW)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE TO PEOPLE (WW)/SELF-SACRIFICE (Z)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Less than .01.

FIGURE 7. CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO EMULATION OF PLA HEROES

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
from these contingency-associations?

First, since 1963 when the PLA produced its first hero in the person of Lei Feng, there have been many such instant heroes held up as models for nation-wide emulation.\(^{32}\) The characterizations of these heroes contain deep ideological messages. The emulation campaign involves the repetitious rendition of diaries, stories and songs about these heroes. During the Cultural Revolution the presentation of the PLA heroes has relied on the use of diaries. It is through these didactic and personal diaries that one detects social values or preferences. The emulation campaign of these heroes on a nation-wide scale is intended to transform the whole society by changing the character and behavior of its people. It involves skillful manipulation in the use of an ideal image or examplar (pang-yang) for inculcating attitudinal and behavioral change. Preferred values of these examplars are: self-sacrifice, self-negation, disdain for wastefulness, and modesty. In these diaries, the practical application of Mao Tze-tung's thought in daily tasks is stressed and illustrated. Since all of the PLA heroes are in their early twenties, they serve particularly as models for the young who will have to be the successors of Mao Tze-tung's revolution—thus the association of these two ideas: PLA HERO EMULATION (I) and PLA AS A SCHOOL FOR THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG (D).

Second, the association of references to PLA HERO EMULATION (I) with references to SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (WW) indicated the need for inculcating a deep sense of mission and purpose for the collective good rather than for private gains or incentives. Here again the PLA heroes serve as models for such high ideal for all to emulate. The thinking of
SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (WW) brings forth the ideas of HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION (FF) and SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (Z).

Third, the thought of PLA HERO EMULATION (I) brings forth the thought of HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION (FF), inferring clearly a basic societal value for Mao Tze-tung's vision of a good society. Human will and determination literally mean that "once one makes up one's mind and is determined, one can always accomplish any task at hand." In almost every case, the folklore of the model of faith and preserverance of an old foolish man who did succeed in moving the mountains is employed with the verbal symbol of human will. It conveys the thought that it is necessary to rely on one's own strength and to have faith in one's own ability to accomplish revolutionary tasks in building a socialistic society. This verbal symbol alone more than anything else reflects Mao Tze-tung's own deep faith in voluntarism--the humanistic intellectual tradition of human will to overcome all obstacles.

Fourth, the association of verbal symbols such as PLA HERO EMULATION (I) with ideas which stress the importance of proper political attitudes over technology and expertise, or POLITICS IN COMMAND (V), and of LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES OF NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES (J) constitute by themselves a paradigm for a good society in which recognition is given to being a human with a definite value-orientation and a deep sense of mission and purpose for the collective good rather than for individual material gains.

b. Principle Elements in the Thought of Mao Tze-tung

If we accept the premise that the one objective of the Cultural Revolution is to propagate and perpetuate the Thought of Mao Tze-tung,33
then it is necessary to delineate the principal elements in Mao Tze-tung's thought which may also be indicative of Mao Tze-tung's vision of a good society. The contingency analysis of the editorials of *Jiefangjun Bao* produced the data in Table 12 and Figure 8.

References to MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS (O) bring forth these related ideas: OPPOSE BUREAUCRATICISM (P) at the .05 level, SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (WW) at the .04 level, INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL) at the .02 level, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN) at .02 level, DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS AND FOSTER COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS (Q) at less than .01 level, and HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION (FF) at less than .01 level. P also co-occurred with INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN) at less than .01 level.

References to MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS (O) are also contingent upon references to LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES OF NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES (J) at the .05 level. And references to J in turn have co-occurred with references to SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (WW) at the .02 level. References to J are also contingent upon references to POLITICS IN COMMAND (V) at less than .01 level; V in turn has also appeared with reference to THE MASS LINE (U) at the .03 level.

We also find that references of POLITICS IN COMMAND (V) are contingent upon KUTIEN AND LUSHAN RESOLUTIONS (Y) at the .03 level and EXPERTISE AND SPECIALIZATION AS ANTI-PARTY AND ANTI-SOCIALISM (X) at the .01 level. Thus proper political attitude referred to in the symbol POLITICS IN COMMAND does include one of the Mao Tze-tung's long standing tenets, the "man over technology." The 1929 Kutien resolution\(^34\) and the 1959 Lushan resolution\(^35\) represented the two occasions in which
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (Q)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/HUMAN WILL (FF)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (WW)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/LIVING MAO'S THOUGHT (VV)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (O)/OPPOSE BUREAUCRATICISM (P)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSE BUREAUCRATICISM (P)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (WW)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)/LIVING MAO'S THOUGHT (VV)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J)/POLITICS IN COMMAND (V)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICS IN COMMAND (V)/THE MASS LINE (U)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICS IN COMMAND (V)/EXPERTISE AS ANTI-PARTY (X)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICS IN COMMAND (V)/KUTIEN AND LUSHAN RES. (Y)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERTISE AS ANTI-PARTY (X)/KUTIEN AND LUSHAN RES. (Y)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aLess than .01.

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
Mao Tze-tung's basic views were officially endorsed by the party after lengthy debate within the Central Committee.

References to MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS (0) are also contingent upon LIVING MAO'S THOUGHT (VV) at the .03 level; VV in turn has associated with references to LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES (J) at the .02 level.

MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS (0) as seen from the graphic presentation in Figure 8 contains the following elements: (1) a deep sense of mission and purpose for the collective good (WW), (2) stress on the priorities of non-material incentives (J). These two elements also infer (3) the basic virtues as characterized by the PLA heroes (I) and (4) human will and determination (diligence, hardwork and self-reliance (FF), (5) self-sacrifice (Z), (6) politics in command (V), and, finally (7) the mass-line doctrine (U), mass participation in decision-making.

The graphic presentation of ideas associated with the Thought of Mao Tze-tung also shows what his thought is opposed to: (1) the evils of bureaucratic rigidity which often stifle revolutionary initiative (P), (2) individualism (LL), and (3) special and entrenched interest groups (NN).

c. Ingredients of Social Values as Perceived by the PLA in Its Cadres Testimonials

Table 13 and Figure 9 indicate four basic social values which are all significantly contingent upon each other; SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (A), ENDURE SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP (D), HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION (F), and SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (M). Content categories A
TABLE 13. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO SELF-SACRIFICE, DETERMINATION AND HONESTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SELF-SACRIFICE (A)/ENDURE SUFFERING (D)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-SACRIFICE (A)/HUMAN WILL (F)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-SACRIFICE (A)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (M)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-SACRIFICE (A)/DARE TO BE BRAVE (S)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN WILL (F)/ENDURE SUFFERING (D)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN WILL (F)/DARE TO BE BRAVE (S)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN WILL (F)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (M)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDURE SUFFERING (D)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (M)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE TO PEOPLE (M)/HONESTY HIGHEST VIRTUE (FF)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONESTY HIGHEST VIRTUE (FF)/REVOL. SUCCESSORS (EE)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (B)/SELF-SACRIFICE (A)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (B)/ENDURE SUFFERING (D)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY-CRITICISM-UNITY (C)/SELF-SACRIFICE (A)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K)/SELF-SACRIFICE (A)</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K)/SERVICE TO PEOPLE (M)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOLLOW MAO'S LEADERSHIP (CC)/ENDURE SUFFERING (D)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aLess than .01.

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships. Broken lines indicate negative associations.
and F are significantly contingent upon DARE TO BE BRAVE (S). SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE is contingent upon HONESTY AS THE HIGHEST VIRTUE (FF); FF in turn is contingent upon REVOLUTIONARY SUCCESSORS (EE).

These verbal symbols and their interrelationships shown in Table 13 indicate that the value of self-negation and self-sacrifice for the collective good is a desired social preference of the Maoist leadership. The moral value of truthfulness and honesty is also stressed as a part of the new social value system, one to be internalized by the revolutionary successors. The implication of the association of symbols such as human will and determination with self-sacrifice and their association in the contingency analysis with service for the collective good and endure suffering seem to imply that the Maoist development strategy calls for development by labor intensive methods—human determination will overcome all obstacles—and a possible return to the 1958-1959 crash program of economic development with their attendant low level of consumption. Thus, self-sacrifice can be equated with the "poverty and blankness" advocated by Mao Tze-tung in 1958 on the eve of launching the commune and Great Leap programs. It was the crash program of 1958-1959 which brought disastrous consequences to the stability of the regime. That development strategy eventually gave cause for dissension within the top hierarchy on the future course of the regime. Basic to that development strategy, the labor-intensive method, is the requirement for a reorientation and conformity in social values and attitudes to govern behavior; foremost among these social values are selfless dedication, a willingness to make tremendous sacrifice and to forego private material gains and comforts before a truly communist society is to be created.
Thus in the mind of Mao Tze-tung, as perceived and verbalized by the PLA cadres' testimonials, the social consciousness and values of the present must be linked with the communist goals of the future. The significant co-occurrence of DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS AND FOSTER COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS (B) with SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (A) and with ENDURE SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP (D) indicate a perceived requirement to achieve these values, and the association of UNITY-CRITICISM-UNITY (C) with SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (A) suggests a means to accomplish them.

Table 13 also yields an interesting set of data. Negative contingencies below .05 level occurred between UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K) and SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (A), UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K) and SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE (M), and between FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO (CC) and ENDURE SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP (D). The analyst is faced with two possible alternative interpretations: one is to treat the above negative contingencies as significant disassociation deliberately suppressed by the source as something highly distasteful or unpleasant; the other is to view these negative contingencies as not associated with each other and therefore not significant. From the point of view of the methodology employed by this study, it is logical to imply that these negative contingencies express unconsciously the "hidden" feeling of the source. As discussed earlier in this paper a major difference between the traditional personal interview and the contingency method of analysis is that the latter attaches high saliency to significant negative contingencies or disassociations. In pointing out the advantages of the contingency analysis as a method of content analysis, Osgood argues that
As a matter of fact, we may define a method of content analysis as allowing for "instrumental" analysis if it taps message evidence that is beyond the voluntary control of the source and hence yields valid inferences despite the strategies of the source.... One of its chief advantages, it seems to me, is that a speaker or writer will have great difficulty preventing a contingency from appearing between two ideas that in fact are associated in his thinking.... I think we must assume that a significant contingency, whether positive or negative, is evidence for an underlying association between such content categories. If the contingency is negative (i.e., a significant disassociation), it presumably means that these ideas are associated with some kind of unpleasant effect. If such an undesired association is consciously available to the source, he may deliberately inhibit expressing the associated idea, whereas if repressive mechanisms are operating, he will not be consciously aware of the association yet will show a negative contingency. 39

If we accept the above methodological assumption, it is not too far fetched to imply that the source, the PLA cadres who prepared these testimonials, may have deliberately suppressed the ideas contained in these significant negative associations as unpopular or unpleasant.

The categories with significant associations in Table 14 appear along with categories from Table 13 in Figure 9. While the central focus in Table 13 was on internalized "planned behavior" such as self-sacrifice, endure suffering, human will, service to the people, bravery and honesty, those in Table 14 are more political in nature. The first three—UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K) with INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (N), UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K) with "SLAVISHNESS" (GG) and "SLAVISHNESS" (GG) with FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO (CC)—call for the various revolutionary Left groups to stop infighting and curtail their individual activities in order to follow the unified leadership under Mao Tze-tung and for opposition to the old party machinery under Liu Shao-chi. Interestingly MILITARY MODERNIZATION (BB) has a negative contingency with UNITY-CRITICISM-UNITY (C), or the use of self-criticism for correcting erroneous
TABLE 14. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO PLA'S VALUE PERCEPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K)/INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (N)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (K)/&quot;SLAVISHNESS&quot; (GG)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;SLAVISHNESS&quot; (GG)/FOLLOW MAO'S LEADERSHIP (CC)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY MODERNIZATION (BB)/UNITY-CRITICISM-UNITY (C)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOLLOW MAO'S LEADERSHIP (CC)/PLA AS MAJOR PILLAR (DD)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AS MAJOR PILLAR (DD)/PLA SUFFER ON LONG MARCH (E)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AS MAJOR PILLAR (DD)/DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (B)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS (B)/MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK (X)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Less than .01.

thoughts. The presence of this negative contingency implies that these two ideas, self-criticism and military modernization, are associated with some kind of unpleasant effect in the source's thinking consciously and unconsciously. As we have noted before is positively contingent upon SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION (A). PLA AS A MAJOR PILLAR IN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (DD) is significantly associated with both FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO (CC) and LONG SUFFERING ENDURED BY THE PLA DURING THE LONG MARCH (E). However, PLA AS A MAJOR PILLAR IN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (DD) is negatively associated with DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS AND FOSTER COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS (B) again raising the question of suppressed ideas. B is also positively associated with MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS (X).

In summary, the verbal symbolization by the PLA analyzed here certainly indicates the influence of Mao Tse-tung's concept of voluntarism in the thinking of the military. For voluntarism, as Oksenberg has stated in his comments on John Lewis's analysis of the origin of policy rift among the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party:

...emphasizes that human will, when properly organized, can overcome all obstacles and achieve all goals...for the voluntarists, old customs, habits, and beliefs are what prevent mankind from realizing its potential. Transformation of a human's beliefs, a liberation of the human mind from the myths and superstitions which shackle it, will enable man to transform his material environment.  

To the Maoist--certainly the PLA must now be counted as a strong supporter to the group--it is, in the final analysis, ideological commitment and the rising social consciousness of the proletariat that will make development serve the interests of the collectivised society.
The central issue for the Maoist, as well as for all the people in the developing world, is how men should relate to technology and to each other in building a new society.
CHAPTER V

PLA AND THE NEW POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN PARTY REBUILDING

Until the Cultural Revolution, it generally had been accepted as a valid assumption by scholars in Chinese communist affairs that the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party had, on the whole, maintained a harmonious relationship. Gittings, the first to opt for a "reversal of verdict," listed the following common features frequently commented on in connection with the assumed high degree of unity and harmony in the PLA-party relationship: (1) The overall continuity of military leadership and a low level of discord between it and the party leadership; (2) At the local levels (i.e., regional and below) a lack of separation and autonomism of the kind associated with the "warlord" period, and even with the period under Kuomintang rule, and a low incidence of friction between military and party-government organs; (3) The successful imposition of official policies upon the PLA by means of the system of political indoctrination and control—a great variety of conflicting opinions between the military and political viewpoints is admitted, but it is usually thought to have been kept within tolerable limits.²

It is the purpose of this chapter to re-examine the relationship between the party and the PLA in the light of what has taken place during the Cultural Revolution. In other words to what extent has the participation of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution altered that assumption of a harmonious PLA-party relationship. Specifically we are looking for answers to the following questions: (1) What evidence is
there to show that the PLA has been disloyal to the party or the leadership? (2) To what extent has there been internal disunity and dissension in the PLA high command? (3) What is the extent of the PLA's political influence at the national and regional or local levels in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution? (4) What sort of relationship has emerged between the PLA and the new power structure as a result of the PLA's involvement in the Cultural Revolution?

1. The Question of PLA's Loyalty to the Party

It is interesting to note that there is no significant association of the category which deals with the question of the PLA's loyalty or disloyalty to the party in the contingency analysis of the 136 editorials of the Jiefangjun Bao. For instance, the theme that GUNS MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO ARE LOYAL TO MAO TZE-TUNG AND THE PARTY CENTRAL (C) appeared in 89 of the 136 units (editorials) but is not significantly associated with any of the other 49 content categories. However, in the contingency analysis of the 115 editorials of the Renmin Ribao, we find clusters of significant association of those content categories which deal with the PLA's loyalty to the party and other verbal symbolization with regard to PLA internal disunity and dissension. These are presented in Table 15.

References to the PLA AS A MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE REVOLUTION (H) are contingent upon references to PLA'S LOYALTY TO MAO AND LIN (J) at the less than .01 level. H also co-occurred with the ARMY MUST BE LED BY THE PARTY (I) at less than .01 level and with the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) at the .01 level.
TABLE 15. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE PLA'S LOYALTY TO THE PARTY AND THE LEFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA PROPAGATE REVOLUTION (H)/ARMY LED BY PARTY (I)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA PROPAGATE REVOLUTION (H)/PLA LOYAL TO MAO (J)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA PROPAGATE REVOLUTION (H)/PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY LED BY PARTY (I)/PLA LOYAL TO MAO (J)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY LED BY PARTY (I)/PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA LOYAL TO MAO (J)/PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA LOYAL TO MAO (J)/TRUST, SUPPORT PLA (KK)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^a \)Less than .01.

FIGURE 10. CLUSTER PATTERN OF CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE PLA'S LOYALTY TO THE PARTY AND THE LEFT

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
There is a strong inference that the army's direct intervention in the Cultural Revolution is in support of the Mao-Lin leadership in the Central Committee of the party. In this cluster of associations co-occurrence appeared between the ARMY MUST BE LED BY THE PARTY (I) and the PLA'S LOYALTY TO MAO AND LIN (J) at the less than .01 level, between J and the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) at the .01 level, and between K and I at the less than .01 level.

It must be pointed out at the outset that even though there was unprecedented disruption in the party organization even among the top party leadership—from the Spring of 1966 to the Spring of 1969, 99 out of the total 136 Central Committee members and no less than 23 of the 28 provincial party leaders either were purged or vilified—the party as an institution remained intact within the PLA.3

It was the party within the PLA which spearheaded the ideological rectification in 1959 when Lin Piao took over control of the armed forces. It was the PLA which popularized the intensive study of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. One is reminded of the fact that it was the PLA which compiled and printed in 1964 the Quotations from Chairman Mao. In one sense the party has functioned, as Stuart Schram has pointed out, as "the ideological mentor" of the army. Schram carried the argument even further by reinterpreting Mao Tse-tung's postulate, the party must command the gun, to mean:

...he was thinking less of control by a flesh and blood entity than of subordination to a correct ideological line considered as the emanation of the party. From this it was clearly only a step to define ideological correctness as fidelity to 'Mao Tze-tung's thought,' and obedience to the party as obedience to Mao.5
Mao Tze-tung as the titular head of the party had been bestowed with the loyalty of the PLA long before the advent of the Cultural Revolution. The association of verbal symbols such as PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) with ARMY MUST BE LED BY THE PARTY (I) and PLA AS A MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE REVOLUTION (H) as well as I and H with PLA'S LOYALTY TO MAO AND LIN (J) merely reinforce the above assertion. In addition the co-occurrences of these significant verbal symbols, their attendant meaning indicate that when the PLA speaks of the party it is actually referring to that segment or faction of the party which adheres to the ideological correctness of Mao Tze-tung's thought.

But if there is a general expression of PLA's loyalty to Mao Tze-tung's party as the verbal symbolizations so far have demonstrated, does this imply that the PLA command is united internally? The degree of solidarity and cohesion within the military command has been the subject of extensive speculation among scholars on Chinese communist affairs. The investigation presented in Table 16 is designed to find some clues to the above question. The data presented here are those generated from the contingency analysis of the 115 editorials of the Renmin Ribao, 1966-1967.

There is evidence of significant association of content categories related to the military internal conflict. References to PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISSENSION (L) are contingent upon references to THE "CHINESE KRUSCHEV" OR TOP PARTY PERSON TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD (P) at the less than .01 level and upon references to PENG CHEN (Q) at the .04 level. These co-occurrences seem to indicate a probable split
TABLE 16. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO
INTERNAL DISSENSION OF THE PLA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY LED BY PARTY (I)/PLA DISUNITY (L)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA LOYAL TO MAO (J)/PLA DISUNITY (L)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/&quot;CHINESE KRUSHCHEV&quot; (P)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/PENG CHEN (Q)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/SOVIET CLIQUE IN PARTY (FF)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA DISUNITY (L)/RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (OO)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Less than .01.

within the PLA which includes some elements leaning toward a pragmatic approach as represented by references to Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen.

This inference is reinforced by the significant association of references to PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISSENSION (L) with references to SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY (FF) at the less than .01 level and with references to the RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00) at the .03 level. References to THE ARMY MUST BE LED BY THE PARTY (I) and the PLA'S LOYALTY TO MAO AND LIN (J) are contingent upon references to L at .01 level and the .02 level, respectively.

Several events which took place during the period of the Cultural Revolution under study can be used to corroborate the existence of dissension and disunity within the military. These events are the reshuffling of the Cultural Revolution Committee for the PLA and the purge of the political commissars, the party's representatives in the military, at the regional and provincial district levels.

a. Reshuffle of the Military's Cultural Revolution Committee

The Sixteen Point Decision of the Cultural Revolution, made public by the Central Committee at its August 1966 session, stated that the PLA was to conduct its own ideological purification without interference from the Cultural Revolution Committee of the Central Committee as was the case with the other sub-systems of the Chinese communist society. The outside world did not know the existence of a special Cultural Revolution Committee for the military until its reorganization was announced in January 1967. Even though the tasks of the committee was not publicized, it is safe to assume that its primary task was to direct an ideological rectification campaign within the military and to ensure
the military's loyalty to Mao Tze-tung. The mere fact that this committee underwent two major reorganizations within a year and completed a third at the end of 1967 is proof that not all was well within the military. There seems to be little doubt that those who were responsible for the implementation of the Cultural Revolution in the military were not completely in accord on the methods and approaches for achieving ideological purity for the military. The background of the individuals who occupied important positions on the Cultural Revolution Committee within the PLA at various times seem to indicate a gradual gravitation from reliance on the General Political Department of the PLA to the command level of the military services: 8

Composition and Background of Members of the Military's Cultural Revolution Committee

**August-December 1966**

Chairman: Liu Chih-chien
Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department

Adviser: (Unknown)

Vice-chairman: (Unknown)

**January-April 1967**

Chairman: Marshal Chu Hsien-ching
Member of Poliburo
Member of the Military Affairs Committee
Vice-chairman of the Commission for National Defense

Adviser: Chiang Ching (Mrs. Mao Tze-tung)
Member of the Cultural Revolution Committee

Vice-chairmen:

(1) General Hsiao Hua
Director of the PLA General Political Department
Acting Secretary of the Military Affairs Committee
(2) General Yang Cheng-fu  
PLA Acting Chief of Staff

(3) General Wang Hsin-ting  
PLA Deputy Chief of Staff

(4) General Chu Li-ching  
Deputy Director of PLA General Political Department

(5) Kwan Feng  
Professor of National Peking University  
Assistant Editor of Hongqi

(6) General Li Man-tsun  
Deputy Chief for Propaganda of PLA General Political Department

(7) General Hsiea Teng-tsun  
Deputy Chief for Cultural of PLA General Political Department

April-August 1967

Chairman: General Hsiao Hua  
Director of the PLA General Political Department

Adviser: Chiang Ching (Mrs. Mao Tze-tung)

Vice-chairmen:

(1) General Yang Cheng-fu  
PLA Acting Chief of Staff

(2) General Wang Hsin-ting  
PLA Deputy Chief of Staff

(3) Kwan Feng  
Assistant Editor of Hongqi

September 1967

Chairman: General Wu Fa-shuan  
Commander of the Air Force

Adviser: (Unknown)

Vice-chairmen:

(1) General Chu Huai-tsu  
Director of the PLA Rear Service Department

(2) Madame Yeh Chun (Mrs. Lin Piao)
Admiral Chang Chu-chien  
Director of Political Department for the Navy

In July and August 1967 the General Political Department of the PLA was in troubled waters. First, there was the defiance by Gen. Cheng Tsai-tao of the Wuhan Military Region, whose refusal to lend support to the revolutionary Left spread discontent over the direction of the Cultural Revolution to PLA commanders in various regions. Soon Gen. Hsiao Hua was attacked by the Red Guards. By September or October a third re-organization of the PLA Cultural Revolution Committee was under way. The position of Chiang Ching (Mrs. Mao Tze-tung) as the adviser because uncertain, and Mrs. Lin Piao emerged as one of the vice-chairmen of the military's Cultural Revolution Committee.

The significant association of content categories PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISSENSION (L) with reference to THE RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS (00) and SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY (FF) is more than a mere inference. There was now open admission by the Hongqi, the party's theoretical journal, that some basic differences in approach existed within the high command with respect to the building of the armed forces. Two purged members of the high command were selected for attack. Former Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai, dismissed in 1959, and former Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching, dismissed in 1965, were charged as follows: (1) That the senior PLA officers had objected to the use of Mao Tze-tung's works as a manual for training and combat; (2) That both officers had rejected Mao Tze-tung's 'men-over-weapon' thesis and insisted on the professionalization and upgrading of military skills as paramount; (3) That Marshal Peng and General Lo had formed anti-revolutionary 'military clubs' for
the purpose of rallying around them other officers to promote their personal aggrandizement and to emphasize the military skill first; (4) That the two high ranking officers had established 'contact abroad' and were in close alliance with the revisionists Peng Chen, Liu Shao-chi, and Kao Kang, the deposed and executed overlord for the northeast.\textsuperscript{10}

b. \textbf{Purges Inflicted on the PLA Commanders and Political Commissars During the Cultural Revolution}

In contrast to wide-spread purges at the Central Committee level, only a handful of PLA commanders at the regional and the provincial levels were subject to purge. Table 17 shows that of the thirteen regional military commands, three, or 23 percent of the total, lost their commands during the course of the upheaval. Even with normal transfers, five regional military commanders, or 38 percent of the total, held the same command posts both prior to as well as during the Cultural Revolution. The same picture applied to the provincial military commands. Of a total of twenty-six military district commanders, only three, or 12 percent, were purged. Seven provincial military commanders, or 27 percent, held the same posts both prior to and during the Cultural Revolution.

The purge seemed to have been inflicted more on the PLA political commissars, the party's representatives in the military, than on the military commanders. At the regional military command level, nine political commissars, or 65 percent, were purged. Three of the political commissars at the regional level, or 23 percent, held their posts intact. One should also mention here that two of the three regional political commissars unaffected by the purge were old party bureaucrats. At the
TABLE 17. STATISTICS SHOWING THE EXTENT OF PURGES INFLECTED ON THE PLA REGIONAL AND DISTRICT COMMANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLA Commands</th>
<th>Purged Number</th>
<th>Purged Percent</th>
<th>Intact Number</th>
<th>Intact Percent</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Military Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Commissars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Military Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Commissars</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See footnotes 18 & 22 of this chapter.
provincial military district level, eight, or 31 percent, of the political commissars were purged. But five of the total, or 17 percent, were unaffected by the Cultural Revolution. Of the five political commissars unaffected on the provincial level, two were old time party bureaucrats. In short, the purge was directed mainly at the political commissars at the regional military command level. The purge affected only a small number of military commanders at the regional and provincial levels.

2. PLA Participation in the Revolutionary Committees in the Provinces

There is no evidence that a deliberate plan was envisaged by the revolutionary groups under Mao Tze-tung to provide some sort of "temporary power structure" after the seizure of power had taken place. It is even highly doubtful that the "temporary power structure" was a part of Mao Tze-tung's grand design for the Cultural Revolution. The mere fact that there was no uniform term for the temporary power structures formed after the power seizure in a number of localities in January 1967 demonstrates the spontaneous and confused state of the development. For example, the "January Revolution" in Shanghai brought into being the "Shanghai Commune" after overthrowing the regular Shanghai Municipal Party Committee on January 22. The City of Tsingtao in northern China established the Tsingtao Municipal Political and Legal Commune on February 9. The model here was the proletarian revolution from below patterned on the Paris Commune. On January 14, the province of Shansi organized its Shansi Provincial Rebel General Headquarters.
The term Revolutionary Committee appeared first in the January 31 announcement made by the Heilungkiang Provincial Red Rebel Revolutionary Committee. The announcement stated that the Revolutionary Committee was organized by the responsible persons for the general united headquarters of the rebel organizations, the PLA military district, and the provincial party cadres loyal to Chairman Mao. Subsequently, the Renmin Ribao editorial on February 10 and the article published in No. 4 issue of Hongqi written by the members of the Heilungkiang committee summarized the experience of the take-over of the regular party authority as "Three-in-One united power seizure" by representatives of the leading party cadres loyal to Mao Tze-tung, the PLA and the rebel organizations.

The Revolutionary Committee model for power seizure demonstrated in Heilungkiang was followed by two other provinces (Shansi and Kweichow) and the municipality of Shanghai which by then had already abandoned the Paris Commune model for revolution from below.

The essence of this new structure was that in seizing power from the regular party apparatus, a provisional power structure was to be established. This new revolutionary authority was to be made up of representatives of the following groups: (1) mass revolutionary rebel groups (Red Guards and other rebel organizations of the peasant and workers); (2) military district command of the PLA and the militia; and (3) Maoist revolutionary cadres (including of course officials and bureaucrats from the former party or government administration who had become repentant and were now acceptable to the PLA). Representatives of all three groups must be included in order to organize any provisional revolutionary authority in provinces, cities, factories, commerce and
industry, and education (universities, middle schools and primary schools). The "Three-way Alliance" is workable, these editorials insist, because the masses trust the PLA.  

While the lead editorials in Hongqi and the Jiefangjun Bao urged that the Revolutionary Committees as "provisional organs of power" must have "proletarian authority" by accepting, not discriminating against the representatives of the rebel mass organizations, the key element in the formation of the Revolutionary Committees was the PLA. The role of the PLA in the formation of these temporary power structures became the focal point of its perception as revealed in the editorials of the Jiefangjun Bao and as shown in Table 18.

References to PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F) is contingent, at the .04 level, upon references to PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE LEFT (A). F is also contingent upon references to PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (B) at the .01 level. The thought of F also brings forth the thought of UNITING WITH REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ) at the .05 level. QQ has also co-occurred with B at .04 level.

References to F have also co-occurred with references to SECRETARIANISM (JJ) at the .04 level, with SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN) at the .01 level, and with ANTI-MAO TZE-TUNG AND ANTI-PARTY RIGHTISTS (S) at the .05 level.

Several inferences emerge from the above association of ideas in the source's thinking: (1) the PLA's role in the Revolutionary Committees is dependent on its military control and supervision in the various sectors of the country in disarray and (2) the problem of treating rehabilitated old cadres and the thorny problem of handling
TABLE 18. CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO PLA AND THE FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM JIEFANGJUN BAO:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AID REVOLUTIONARY COMM. (F)/PLA SUPPORT LEFT (A)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AID REVOLUTIONARY COMM. (F)/PLA CONTROL (B)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AID REVOLUTIONARY COMM. (F)/UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AID REVOLUTIONARY COMM. (F)/SECRETARIANISM (JJ)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AID REVOLUTIONARY COMM. (F)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA AID REVOLUTIONARY COMM. (F)/ANTI-MAO RIGHTISTS (S)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA CONTROL (B)/UNITY WITH REHABILITATED CADRES (QQ)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM RENMIN RIBAO:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/SUPPORT &quot;THREE-WAY ALLIANCE&quot; (Z)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)/PLA PROPAGATE REVOLUTION (H)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT &quot;THREE-WAY ALLIANCE&quot; (Z)/ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS (II)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS (II)/PLA INTERVENE ON LEFT (K)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT &quot;THREE-WAY ALLIANCE&quot; (Z)/PLA PROPAGATE REVOLUTION (H)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT ANARCHICAL CONDITIONS (Z)/LEFT SEIZURE OF POWER (F)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aLess than .01.

factionalism within the Red Guard groups are all bound up with the PLA's role in the formation of the Revolutionary Committees.

Interestingly enough the contingency analysis of the 115 editorials in the Renmin Ribao yielded similar associations of ideas with respect to the PLA's role in the formation of the new power structure, the Revolutionary Committees or the "Three-way Alliance." A picture of the PLA in its active participation in the "Three-way Alliance" emerges in the association of a cluster of content categories. For instance, references to the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) is contingent, at the less than .01 level, upon references to SUPPORT FOR THE TEMPORARILY ESTABLISHED REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE UNDER THE "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE" (Z). K also occurred with PLA AS MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE REVOLUTION (H) at the less than .01 level. Content category Z is in turn contingent upon references to the EXISTENCE OF ANARCHICAL CONDITION (II) at the less than .01 level, that existed in cities where workers and purged regular party cadres had abandoned their factories and posts. II is also contingent upon references to the PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT (K) at the .01 level. It is also significant to note that the SUPPORT FOR THE TEMPORARILY ESTABLISHED REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE UNDER THE "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE" (Z) is contingent upon references to the PLA AS MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE REVOLUTION (H) at the .02 level and to references to the SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (F) at the less than .01 level.
3. **PLA's Influence and Dominance in the Provincial and Basic-Level Revolutionary Committees**

a. **PLA Influence in Provincial and Municipal Level Revolutionary Committees**

The ascendency to dominant position by the PLA commanders and political commissars in the provinces and military regions is illustrated in Table 19 on leadership representation in the provincial and municipal Revolutionary Committees. Leadership representation in the 29 Revolutionary Committees is indicated by the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship distributed among members of the "Three-way Alliance": PLA representatives (commanders and/or political commissars assigned to each military region or district), the revolutionary party cadres, and representatives of Red Guard groups.

Of the 29 chairmen appointed to the provincial or autonomous regional and municipal level Revolutionary Committees, 20, or 68 percent, are identified with the PLA either as commanders or as political commissars for the provincial and regional military districts. Nine, or 32 percent, of the chairmanship positions were occupied by revolutionary party cadres loyal to Mao Tze-tung but, nevertheless, representing the old guard party bureaucratic power in the provinces. Despite the repeated plea made by the leadership in Peking that the PLA and the regular party cadres not discriminate against the leaders of Red Guard groups, not one leader representing these organizations has ever been appointed chairman to a provincial level Revolutionary Committee. The chairmanship seems to be firmly in the hands of the PLA and the regular party cadres. However, leaders of the Red Guard groups made a much better showing in the vice-chairmanship distribution. Of the 181 known
**TABLE 19. LEADERSHIP (CORE GROUP) REPRESENTATION IN THE PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES BASED ON THE "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Provinces and Municipalities</th>
<th>Military Regions</th>
<th>Chairmanship PLA Cadres</th>
<th>Chairmanship Party Cadres</th>
<th>Chairmanship Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Chairmanship Total</th>
<th>Vice-chairmanship PLA Cadres</th>
<th>Vice-chairmanship Party Cadres</th>
<th>Vice-chairmanship Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Vice-chairmanship Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/21/68</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td></td>
<td>1^a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/26/68</td>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/68</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/31/68</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>Chengtu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/19/68</td>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>Foochow^a</td>
<td>1^a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5/68</td>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/13/68</td>
<td>Yunan</td>
<td>Kumming</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/14/67</td>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1/68</td>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/10/68</td>
<td>Vingshsia</td>
<td>Lanchow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/24/68</td>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/12/67</td>
<td>Tsinghai</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/10/68</td>
<td>Lianoning</td>
<td></td>
<td>1^a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/6/68</td>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>Shengyang^a</td>
<td>1^a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/31/67</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23/68</td>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td></td>
<td>1^a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/24/68</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>Nanking^a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/18/68</td>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3/68</td>
<td>Hopeh</td>
<td>Peking</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/67</td>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 19. (Continued) LEADERSHIP (CORE GROUP) REPRESENTATION IN THE PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES BASED ON THE "THREE-WAY ALLIANCE"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Provinces and Municipalities</th>
<th>Military Regions</th>
<th>Chairmanship PLA Party Cadres</th>
<th>Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Vice-chairmanship PLA Party Cadres</th>
<th>Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/5/68</td>
<td>21. Hupeh Wuhan</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/27/68</td>
<td>22. Honan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/23/67</td>
<td>23. Shangtung Tsinan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/68</td>
<td>24. Sinkiang&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/68</td>
<td>25. Tibet&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1/67</td>
<td>26. Inner Mongolia&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Provinces and Municipalities</th>
<th>Military Regions</th>
<th>Chairmanship PLA Party Cadres</th>
<th>Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Vice-chairmanship PLA Party Cadres</th>
<th>Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/20/67</td>
<td>1. Peking City</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5/67</td>
<td>2. Shanghai</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6/67</td>
<td>3. Tientsin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairmanship PLA Party Cadres</th>
<th>Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairmanship PLA Party Cadres</th>
<th>Red Guard Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Concurrently chairman of the provincial Revolutionary Committee and commander of the military region or garrison command.

Source: See footnotes 18 & 22 of this chapter.
vice-chairmen for the 29 Revolutionary Committees for the administrative units, 66, or 36 percent, we identified as leaders representing the Red Guard groups. Sixty-three, or 34 percent, are PLA commanders and political commissars, and 52, or 29 percent, are regular party cadres loyal to Mao Tze-tung. Again the combined strength of the PLA and the regular party cadres occupying the vice-chairmanship in the Revolutionary Committees for the administrative units overwhelms those who represent the Red Guard groups.

The association of content categories, PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F) and SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN) as verbalized in the Jiefangjun Bao editorials presented earlier (see Table 18) certainly refers to the overwhelming dominance by the PLA and the regular party cadres in the Revolutionary Committees by excluding other groups such as the Red Guard groups from leadership. One other fact points out even more vividly the influence of the PLA in the provincial Revolutionary Committee; this is that 8 out of 13 PLA regional commanders (military regions of Canton, Foochow, Shengyang, Nanking, Wuhan, Sinkiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia) are concurrently serving as chairmen for the provincial Revolutionary Committees under their military jurisdiction. This alone demonstrates the ascendency of regional military influence in Communist China's political development.

Of the nine regular party cadres who were designated as chairmen of the provincial Revolutionary Committees, two (Wei Kuo-ching of Kwangsi Province and Pan Fu-shen of Heilungkiang) have had closer identification with the PLA. Wei of Kwangsi Revolutionary Committee in 1964 served as a political commissar for the 10th Army Corp and for the Kwangsi
Military District. He was also a member of the National Defense Council and recognized leader in the Public Security Force, a service arm controlled by the PLA. Pan of the Heilungkiang Revolutionary Committee was political commissar for the Honan Military District in 1956.

Seven of the nine party cadres were at one time or other regular party secretaries for various provincial party committees and two of the nine had no extensive party administrative experience prior to their appointment. Chang Chun-chiao of Shanghai was a journalist and writer by profession and Wang Hsiao-yu of Shangtung was a minor functionary for the City of Tsiangtao.

b. PLA Regional Influence on the National Level

The influence and dominance of the PLA are also reflected in the membership composition of the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, as shown in Table 20.

Of the 170 full members of the Ninth Central Committee, 74, or 43 percent, are representatives of the PLA, either as commanders or political commissars for the greater military regions and provincial military districts. Regular party cadres are represented by 59 members, or 35 percent of the total membership. The Red Guard groups fared poorly with 32 members, or 19 percent of the total. In the alternate membership category, PLA maintains the largest representation with 49, or 45 percent of a total of 109 members. The Red Guard groups have 23, or 21 percent, as against 20, or 18 percent, for the regular party cadres.

The rise of regional military power is also reflected in the Revolutionary Committee leadership distribution in the Ninth Central
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliated with</th>
<th>Full Membership</th>
<th></th>
<th>Alternate Membership</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Cadre</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Guard Groups</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>170</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See footnote 22.
Committee membership published in April 1969 at the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress. 23

Table 21 shows that chairmen for twenty-five of the twenty-eight provincial level Revolutionary Committees were elected as full members to the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the remaining four were elected as alternate members. Thirty-three vicechairmen of the provincial level Revolutionary Committees were elected to full membership of the Central Committee, and twenty-five, as alternates.

Not only is the leadership of the provincial level Revolutionary Committees adequately represented in the membership of the Ninth Central Committee, but PLA commanders and political commissars of the thirteen military regions are well represented in the Ninth Central Committee membership as shown in Table 22.

Table 22 showing membership of leaders in the Ninth Central Committee from the military regions reveals several significant points related to the rise of regional military power. First, with the exception of Tibet, at least one PLA commander from each of the thirteen military regions was elected to full membership of the party's Ninth Central Committee. Second, there were 74 PLA representatives elected to full membership of the Ninth Central Committee (see Table 20); 38, or 51 percent, of them are PLA commanders and political commissars from regional military command posts. In contrast, there are 49 PLA alternate members on the Ninth Central Committee (see Table 20), but only 12, or 24 percent, of them represent the military regional commands (see Table 22). In other words, more than half of the full members of the Ninth
TABLE 21. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN SERVING ON NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position with Revolutionary Committee</th>
<th>Full Members</th>
<th>Alternative Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-chairman</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See footnote 23.
TABLE 22. PLA MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL
COMMISSARS ON THE NINTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Region</th>
<th>Commanders&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; as Full Members</th>
<th>Alternates</th>
<th>Political Commissars&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; as Full Members</th>
<th>Alternates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Canton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chengtu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Foochow</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kumming</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lanchow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Shengyang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nanking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Peking</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Wuhan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Sinkiang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Tibet</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Tsinan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>This does not include provincial military district commanders and political commissars.
<sup>b</sup>Senior and deputy commanders.
<sup>c</sup>First and second political commissars.

Source: See footnotes 22 and 23.
Central Committee from the PLA are from the military regional commands but the provincial military district commanders and political commissars seem to dominate the total PLA representation or the alternate membership of the Central Committee.

c. PLA Influence in Basic-level Revolutionary Committees

Basic-level Revolutionary Committees refer to all administrative units below the provincial and municipal level. They also refer to economic production units such as factories or plants. PLA's participation in these basic units was widely publicized in the *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi* in 1968: From January 1967 to approximately the end of 1969 coverage in the *Renmin Ribao* on basic-level Revolutionary Committees seemed to reveal the following pattern of organization: (1) the formation of the Revolutionary Committee based on the "Three-way Alliance" of PLA representatives, party cadres and representatives of Red Guard groups; (2) when there was no Revolutionary Committee organized, a "preparatory group," generally instigated and supported by the PLA troops stationed in the locality, would be formed for the eventual establishment of a Revolutionary Committee; and (3) in cases where neither a Revolutionary Committee nor a "preparatory group" was organized, the military control commission for the locality would organize the provisional "leading core group" to replace the party and government authority. It is perhaps superfluous to state here that these "leading core groups" were controlled and dominated by the PLA.

By the end of 1968 a majority of the counties (hsien) and cities had formed Revolutionary Committees to take over the regular party apparatus and power. Of a total of 2,505 administrative units below the
provincial level, Revolutionary Committees were found to be in evidence in 2,166, or 86 percent of the total, at the end of 1968. The same source provides the following distribution of chairmanships held by some 95 known persons on the county-level Revolutionary Committees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent of 95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party cadres</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Guard Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of vice-chairmanships of 134 known persons on the county-level Revolutionary Committees is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent of 134</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party cadres</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Guard Groups</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>134</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above tabulations it is obvious that the PLA exercised a tremendous amount of control over the hsien, or county-level, Revolutionary Committees with PLA members holding 77 percent of the known chairmanships. The vice-chairmanships are distributed fairly equally among the three organizations represented in the "Three-way Alliance."

PLA influence and control at the basic-level Revolutionary Committees not only have been exerted through its dominant representation in the leadership level, but also by means of study groups formed within each
basic-level unit. The study groups, or "hsueh-hsih-pan," are PLA organized sessions for the study of the Thought of Mao Tze-tung. This is an important aspect of the PLA support the Left activities. It has been an effective device through which disagreements and personality conflicts among the basic-level Revolutionary Committee members have been resolved. From time to time policies and directives from Peking are interpreted, clarified and implemented at the basic-level through the study groups. It is also a device through which recalcitrant extremist Red Guard representatives on the Revolutionary Committees are made to comply with the wishes of the local PLA commands. In addition, it is one way in which the reluctant but rehabilitated party bureaucrats are "persuaded" to conform with predominant views in a particular administrative unit, be it a factory or a governmental agency. In a sense the PLA study groups serve as an effective extra-party monitoring device by which ideological conformity is enforced through self-criticism and self-examination of one's own behavior and thinking during the study sessions. The major focus in these study sessions has been on the ability of the group, led and manipulated by the PLA cadres, to persuade or convince any member of the correctness of one's thought on a given issue. While physical coercion has not been condoned as the standard practice, thought remolding by means of constant self-criticism in a group situation often has been employed to achieve the desired objective.

To a large extent the PLA study groups in the basic-level Revolutionary Committees are aimed primarily at the re-education of rehabilitated party cadres. (This aspect will be discussed more fully in the following section.) This point was clearly outlined in an editorial of the
Jiefangjun Bao:

Through studying together, the cadres have deepened "understanding" of Mao Tze-tung's thought and are better able to take a correct attitude towards themselves and the masses, discard their bureaucratic airs and enhance their class feelings for the fighters.... By studying with the fighters, the cadres are able, by revealing their thoughts to the masses, to get help and draw fresh strength and wisdom from them. This is an important guarantee for the ideological revolutionization of the cadres. 27

Revisionist thought, habits and tendencies can be corrected by joining the PLA sponsored study groups, urged one editorial. 28 PLA study groups are often employed as an effective way to keep the basic-level Revolutionary Committees from drifting back into the old bureaucratic habits. When Revolutionary Committee members in an electrical plant gradually drifted into the business-as-usual routine, PLA support the Left members stationed in the plant immediately organized study groups involving more than 80 percent of the workers in the plant by criticizing those who still seemed to embrace the revisionist line. 29

Or, as in the case of Ssi Chai-chuan Township, PLA sponsored study group sessions were used to correct the extravagant habits of its Revolutionary Committee members. 30 An automotive plant in the city of Tsiangtao in Shangtung Province completed twelve sessions of a study group organized under the sponsorship of its Revolutionary Committee and assisted by the PLA troops stationed in the plant during a twelve month period which included part of 1967 and part of 1968. The plant's report stated that at least 1,000 of its 1,100 workers had participated in these sessions to study the Thought of Mao Tze-tung with about 100 of them taking part two or three times within the twelve months. The report
on the automotive plant in Tsiangtao is most instructive in that it revealed three key problem areas facing each basic-level Revolutionary Committee: (1) factionalism among Red Guard groups, (2) mistrust exhibited by the Red Guard groups toward the rehabilitated veteran cadres, and (3) reluctance on the part of rehabilitated veteran cadres to resume leadership positions following re-education. 31

In summary the extent of the PLA's influence has been considerable; it permeates and makes its presence felt at all levels of the new power structure.

4. PLA and the Cadres Question

Recent studies on the political development which took place prior to and on the eve of the Cultural Revolution stress the erosion of revolutionary elan among the party cadres as one of the underlying causes of the Cultural Revolution. Vogel, for instance, points out in his study that as the regime becomes more established, it tends to attract administrators, scientists, technicians and other careerists who for the most part are functionaries rather than revolutionaries: "the cadre is basically an administrator in a bureaucratic setting." 32 On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the cadres functioned in large organizations, their responsibilities were functionally differentiated, and their status was supported by a detailed salary system with standardized career lines. 33 Oksenberg describes the cadre system as marked by its concern for status, seniority, and security. An informal operational code developed in the 1960's among the cadres for political advancement and survival. 34 Added to the increased institutionalization of the
cadres system was the large percentage of party cadres who had been recruited hastily after 1950—they accounted for 80 percent of a total of over 20 million party members for the 1960's, according to Neuhauser. A considerable number of these new recruits were careerists whose revolutionary elan was highly questionable in the first place and whose daily concerns were mainly complex managerial problems rather than revolutionary causes. It was not really surprising that the brunt of attacks launched by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution were on the party's basic-level cadres.

By the end of 1966, the rapid dismantling of the regular party apparatus at the provincial, hsien, and municipal levels by the Red Guard groups and the purging and vilification of regular party cadres had resulted in a serious vacuum in the management of party and governmental affairs. Provincial and hsien party committees which normally perform many state functions simply ceased to exist in any meaningful sense. What remained after the power seizure were "vacant offices and stamps." This fact alone played a decisive role in the order, on January 25, 1967, for the PLA to intervene.

If we accept the proposition that the PLA dominated Revolutionary Committees serve primarily as a vehicle through which veteran party and new revolutionary cadres are to be reconciled and consolidated, then the contingency analysis of key categories related to the cadres question should provide evidence that the question of the ideological reliability of the cadres, particularly at the basic-level, is one of the key issues of the Cultural Revolution. Adherents to the above view often advance the explanation that the aim of the Cultural Revolution was the desire on the part of the Maoists to shake up the party by means of a gigantic
rectification campaign. The data we have here indeed show that the cadres question is related to these ideas in the source's thinking: The consolidation and reconciliation of the old and new cadres by the re-education process for ideological correctness, the training and screening of new cadres, and reliance on the PLA to implement these programs under the framework of the Revolutionary Committees.

a. The Consolidation and Reconciliation of Old and New Cadres

Figure 11 and Table 23 show the categories related to the question of achieving unity of cadres by a constant re-education process.

The focal point of the cluster of co-occurred symbols in Figure 11 and Table 23 is UNITING WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ). This is the heart of the association structure under examination. Thinking about QQ, hence the treatment of the mistaken cadres, brings forth the interrelated thoughts of the PLA's support for the Left, the Revolutionary Committee as a new temporary party organ, the unified leadership, and thought remolding. Specifically, QQ is contingent upon PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F), at .05 level; F in turn has co-occurred with PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (B), at .01 level. The thought of B brings forth the idea of QQ, and they co-occurred at .04 level. Reference to B are also contingent upon references to ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNIT (GG) at the .01 level. GG has co-occurred with QQ at the .01 level. The thought of GG also brings forth the idea of STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX) at the .02 level. QQ at the same time is contingent upon STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH) at the .03 level. HH and XX co-occurred at the .03
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA CONTROL (B)/REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA CONTROL (B)/UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)/PLA CONTROL (B)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)/REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)/SECRETARIANISM (JJ)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)/UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (W)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)/STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARIANISM (JJ)/OPPOSE BUREAUCRATICISM (P)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSE BUREAUCRATICISM (P)/INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARIANISM (JJ)/ANARCHISM (OO)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARIANISM (JJ)/INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL)/ANARCHISM (OO)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/PLA SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/PLA TREAT NEW CADRES (II)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/SECRETARIANISM (JJ)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/PLA CORRECT TREAT. MASSES (KK)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITY WITH VETERAN CADRES (QQ)/STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 23. (Continued) CONTENT CATEGORIES RELATED TO THE CADRES QUESTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Significance Test of Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA CORRECT TREAT. MASSES (KK)/ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX)/UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (W)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX)/ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Less than .01

A line connecting two categories indicates a significant association between them, or one category's contingency upon the other. The location of the categories in the diagram has no significance; the only consideration is clear presentation of the pattern of relationships.
level. GG is also contingent upon UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (W) at .04 level.

Since the association of key categories in the contingency analysis does focus on QQ, UNITING WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES, it validates the thesis that the PLA's central concern in forming the Revolutionary Committees was the question of employment of the rehabilitated veteran party cadres.

The concern for the proper treatment of the veteran party cadres was originally outlined by the Central Committee directives on the Cultural Revolution issued on August 8, 1966. The directive classified the party cadres into four categories: those who were "good", those who were "comparatively good", those who "made serious mistakes", and those who were "anti-party rightists." According to the directives, the first two categories--"good" and "comparatively good"--constituted the great majority. It is proposed here that a major objective in calling for "power seizure" by the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution was to organize a new revolutionary corps of leading cadres to replace the old. Thus the criticism, struggle, and re-education of the cadres became a major concern throughout the Cultural Revolution.

Soon after the PLA intervened in January 1967, an editorial in Hongqi appealed to the Red Guard groups to make accommodations for those veteran party cadres who had committed ideological errors. It specifically asked the revolutionary Left groups to adopt the "policy of unity to win over the majority" by not excluding those who have held erroneous views at one time. The PLA cadres who went into the countryside and in the communes were ordered to do propaganda work among the poor and middle peasants so that they could accept and
reinstate the rehabilitated veteran cadres at the critical spring harvest season. The editorial admitted the fact that not only most cadres were good but that "they are more mature politically and are noted for their superior organizing ability and richer struggle experience; they have the ability to exercise power and carry out administrative work." These ideas were reiterated endlessly throughout the Cultural Revolution. The plea was to treat the mistaken veteran cadres with leniency and adopt a policy of "cure the sickness in order to save the patient." Since the ability and the experience of the mistaken veteran cadres were needed in the daily administration of the state and in the management of the economy, their "sickness" must be "cured" by a process of screening and re-education before they could be re-employed by the Revolutionary Committees. In a consecutive series of editorials in October 1967, the Jiefangjun Bao discussed the relationship between cadres re-education, the "great alliance" under the Revolutionary Committees and party building. For instance, the October 20 editorial of the Jiefangjun Bao on "Resolve the Question of Cadres by Education" urged that the majority of cadres be educated and united with the revolutionary groups. Those cadres who made mistakes, including those who had made serious mistakes, should be treated leniently and be given a chance for re-education. The editorial gave the 1942 Yenan rectification campaign as an example of how party cadres were mobilized to rectify their erroneous line by adopting the method of criticism and struggle. The end result of that rectification was the transformation of a new united party which led the people to final victory.
i. **PLA propaganda work among cadres**

The re-education of the mistaken veteran cadres took many forms. A close study of the articles which appeared in the *Renmin Ribao* for the period under study reveals at least two basic forms applied in the re-education of the cadres.

One familiar device used was the study groups on the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, generally organized by the PLA. Participants at these study sessions were the veteran party cadres, representatives of Red Guard groups, and PLA personnel. Generally the first item for discussion was the policy of lenient treatment of cadres, representing Mao Tse-tung's latest instructions. Then self-criticism was introduced and urged as a necessary step in finding out each participant's shortcomings and mistakes. The objective at this stage in the study session was (1) to enable the repentant cadres to acquire some understanding about the nature of the Cultural Revolution and (2) to build mutual trust between those cadres who had made mistakes and the masses. Here units of the PLA Support the Left Troop No. 8341 stationed in practically all economic units in the Peking area seemed to be most successful. Repentant cadres were shepherded by PLA personnel to the masses for advice and consultation on problems. Meetings of the mass organizations were also open to the rehabilitated cadres so that they all could learn about Mao Tse-tung's thought. In some instances, a provincial wide study group would be organized by the provincial Revolution Committee for cadres from all
administrative units under its jurisdiction. For instance, the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee study session on the cadres question had over 1,000 leading cadres as participants. 49

Disclosure in the Renmin Ribao indicates that most of the repentant party cadres had been criticized severely during the course of the Cultural Revolution. 50 Thus, prior to their attendance at these study sessions, some of these veteran cadres had built up hostility and resentment. Some felt that their errors were not serious enough to warrant intensive investigation. This meant the task at these study sessions was to correct these erroneous attitudes. The veteran cadres usually exhibited three main fears. First was the fear of shame, stemming from the fact that in the past they were the ones who had the responsibility of educating others, but now they must admit mistakes before the masses. Then, there was the fear of prolonged vilification by the revolutionary masses. Lastly, they feared losing their official position and the bureaucratic status. A hsien Revolutionary Committee in Shansi Province adopted the practice of compulsory participation for all cadres in collective manual labor. This was used to train cadres in revolutionary thinking and to test whether their attitudes had been transformed. 51

The study sessions thus organized performed the dual purpose of placing the veteran cadres under the close supervision of the masses for re-education and at the same time of enabling
the PLA propaganda teams to explain to the masses the policy for leniency in the treatment of the rehabilitated cadres. The end objective here was to "liberate" a large segment of the cadres from their ideological impurity so that they could be reinstated for administrative work again.

Another device utilized in the re-education of veteran cadres who made mistakes was the downward transfer to the countryside for manual labor. On October 5, 1968, the Renmin Ribao on the front page published an article on the experience of the Liuho May 7th Cadres School in Heilungkiang. Masses of cadres were dispatched by the Heilungkiang Revolutionary Committee to the countryside to do manual labor as a way of remolding the mistaken cadres by bringing them close to the masses. The article revealed the fact that some veteran cadres who had been criticized in the Cultural Revolution wanted to take an easy way out by refusing to take on any more responsibilities. Attendance at the Liuho May 7th Cadres School, where there was fierce self-criticism and intense manual labor, transformed their attitudes and behavior to the point where they were willing to resume their administrative tasks. Since the disclosure about the Liuho Cadres School, mass exodus of office workers to the countryside for re-education in similar cadres schools has become common place. While there have been no reports of the size of this movement of cadres in the official press, the China Quarterly reported that from November 1968 to March 1969, 400,000 cadres were transferred downward to the
countryside to cadres schools in Kiangsi, and 80,000, to cadres schools in Kwangtung. It was publicized that at least 300 of the 500 engineer-technicians in a large modernized crude oil machinery plant in Lanchow had been transferred downward for manual labor by the plant's Revolutionary Committee. A hsien Revolutionary Committee in Shansi even prescribed a regulation which demanded that all cadres at the hsien level do manual labor no less than 60 days per year and that cadres at the commune level do at least 100 days per year. The objective of this downward transfer of cadres is to bring the cadres closer to the masses and thereby remove the tendency of bureaucraticism, one of the evils against which the Cultural Revolution was supposed to be waged.

ii. Struggle-criticism-transformation

The co-occurrences of ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG) with UNITING WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ) and with STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX) as presented in Table 23 and Figure 11 are indicative in the source's thinking that revolutionary solidarity is contingent upon the proper treatment and utilization of experienced cadres who, together with the new revolutionary cadres, must undergo ideological transformation so that, as Lin Piao remarked to the 9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969, the proletarian class always holds the power of leadership. The revival in 1968 of Mao Tze-tung's 1959 formula, struggle-criticism-transformation, for resolving
antagonistic contradictions between the people and their enemies and its intensified application in 1969 merely revealed the antagonistic contradiction between the old and new cadres and the former's relationship with the masses. The co-occurrences of these key symbols raises the fundamental questions of (1) how are the mistaken cadres to be truly "liberated" from their sins and (2) how are the behavior and attitudes of the inexperienced and immature new revolutionary cadres to be molded so that they are eventually the true "successors of the revolution"? Mao's simple prescription is struggle-criticism-transformation:

Struggle-criticism-transformation in a factory, on the whole, goes through the following stages: Establishing a three-in-one revolutionary committee; carrying out mass criticism and repudiation; purifying the class ranks; consolidating the party organization; and simplifying the administrative structure, changing irrational rules and regulations and sending office workers to the workshops.58

This formula, as Lin Piao has implied in his report to the 9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, is a device to purify ideologically the cadres in order to unite them for building a new vibrant party.59

The co-occurrences of these symbols (GG, QQ, XX) to form a cluster pattern also seem to confirm that there are still dissidents among the cadres and that the formula for resolving antagonistic contradictions must be diligently applied.60 The mistaken cadre must be given a chance to become a new man or "a way out."61 The implementation of the formula of struggle-criticism-transformation was urged as a matter of policy for
every single unit, despite the doubts expressed by some that the process was too time-consuming, tedious and wasteful.62

iii. Unified leadership

Table 23 and Figure 11 indicate that while the thought of ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG) brings forth UNITING WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ) at the .01 level and with STRUGGLE-CRITICISM-TRANSFORMATION (XX) at the .02 level, GG is also contingent upon the thought of UNIFIED LEADERSHIP (W) at the .04 level.

That the question of unified leadership within the Revolutionary Committees has been associated with the objective of new revolutionary solidarity under the banner of Thought of Mao Tze-tung is in itself a striking revelation. Soon after the appearance in our data of this significant association, a thorough reading of the Renmin Ribao and Hongqi was made to find out the real significance of the co-occurrence of these two content categories. We found that discussion in the official media on the subject appeared more frequently just prior to and after the convening of the Ninth Party Congress, culminating in Lin Piao's political report to the party congress on April 1, 1969. Lin Piao's instruction to the party congress was to continue using Mao Tze-tung's thought to criticize revisionism and other kinds of "erroneous ideas" that run counter to Mao Tze-tung's revolutionary line. He pointed out that the theory of "many centers" actually means "no center" at all—thus "unified leadership" must be carried out within the Revolutionary Committees.63 "Unified leadership" means essentially the leadership of Mao Tze-tung's thought.64
It was found that discussion on the subject of unified leadership within the Revolutionary Committees revolved around the question of who among the elements of the triumvirate had the decisive say—whose judgment was to be final. Articles in the Renmin Ribao provided many samples of this sort of argument that often was carried on within the Revolutionary Committees. A popular theme was that no one group could make decisions alone; only the combined judgment of the leadership with the masses could truly represent centralism. In another example, it was said that the locus for decision-making was no where: the question for solution to a particular problem was passed on from a member of the Revolutionary Committee in a plant to the chairman of the committee, to the responsible person from the PLA stationed in the plant and back to members of the Revolutionary Committee.

A study of the feature articles on the unified leadership question in the Renmin Ribao and the Hongqi for the two year period from 1968 to 1969 point to the inescapable fact that the PLA representatives on the Revolutionary Committees are the sole source of judgment and power. Its decisive voice on matters affecting the Revolutionary Committee stems from the PLA's dominant control of the leadership of these Revolutionary Committees. As pointed out earlier, 68 percent of the chairmen for the provincial level Revolutionary Committees are persons identified with the PLA, and 77 percent of the known chairmen for the county (hsien) level Revolutionary Committees are responsible members of the PLA. It is obvious that the PLA representatives, because of their dominant leadership position in the Revolutionary Committee triumvirate, tend to impose their opinions and judgment upon representatives of the Red Guard
groups and the veteran cadres. The other elements of the triumvirate have frequently lodged the complaint that whatever the PLA representative says goes.\(^6\) In a decision-making process other members of the Revolutionary Committee often defer their own opinion until the PLA representative has taken a position. Not infrequently the position taken by the PLA representative in the Revolutionary Committee has been adopted by the whole: "Let the PLA speak and then make a decision" accordingly became a standard practice.\(^6\)\(^8\)

While the PLA representatives frequently make decisions for the Revolutionary Committees without consulting the other two elements of the triumvirate,\(^6\)\(^9\) this is not always the case. PLA representatives often undertake the thankless task of assisting members of the Revolutionary Committees in resolving their differences of opinion by study sessions.\(^7\)\(^0\) They frequently serve as arbitrators in conflicts among the cadres and the masses.\(^7\)\(^1\) It is not uncommon for the PLA representative, for the sake of unity, to set an example by admitting his own mistakes in order to induce harmony within the Revolutionary Committee.\(^7\)\(^2\)

b. Dissension, Factionalism and the PLA within the Revolutionary Committees

Significant associations of key symbols shown in Figure 11 also indicate political in-fighting and factionalism within the Revolutionary Committees.

Since the rehabilitated veteran party cadres are the backbone of the Revolutionary Committee triumvirate, the thought of UNITING WITH REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ) brings forth a number
of related ideas. For instance, QQ is contingent upon the references to PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (F) at the .05 level. References to F are contingent upon references to SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN) at the .01 level. References to QQ have also co-occurrences with references to SECRETARIANISM (JJ) at the .05 level. References to content category F are contingent upon JJ at the .04 level. References to JJ co-occur with references to OPPOSITION TO BUREAUCRATICISM (P) at the .03 level, and P in turn is contingent upon NN at less than .01 level. The thinking of JJ brings forth the ideas of ANARCHISM (OO) and INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY (LL), both at less than .01 level. LL and OO also have co-occurred at less than .01 level. References to QQ are associated significantly with PLA'S PROPER TREATMENT OF THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY CADRES (II) and STRENGTHEN ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY (HH) at .05 and .03 level, respectively. QQ has also co-occurred with PLA'S CORRECT TREATMENT OF THE MASSES (KK) at .04 level; KK in turn is contingent upon references to HH at the .01 level.

These significant associations of the above mentioned content categories imply three related areas of concern to the PLA: (1) the in-fighting and factionalism among the new revolutionary cadres; (2) the continued strained relationship between the PLA and the masses in terms of PLA's attitude toward new revolutionary cadres; and (3) curbing bureaucratic growth.

i. Political in-fighting and factionalism

There was a great deal of resistance to the inclusion of the repentant veteran cadres in the Revolutionary Committees. For the most part, the resistance came from the representatives
of the Red Guard groups on the triumvirate. Generally they considered the veteran cadres to be "rightists" and "in favor of restoring the old ways." Some feared that the veteran cadres might take revenge once they were back in power. The veteran cadres, despite re-education and thought remolding, were reluctant to participate in decision-making again for fear of criticism and vilification by the masses. Thus, in carrying out their tasks, their typical attitude tended to be that of "hesitancy" and deferment of initiative either to the PLA leadership or to the masses. Many veteran cadres, realizing the suspicion and mistrust on the part of the masses, simply went through the motions in their daily activities, scrupulously keeping to the routine and procedures.

The co-occurrences of SECRETARIANISM (JJ) with UNITING WITH REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES (QQ), PLA'S SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (F) and PLA'S PROPER TREATMENT OF THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY CADRES (II) are indicative of the concern expressed by the Jiefangjun Bao on the difficult problem of factionalism besetting the Revolutionary Committees. The situation that existed for most of 1967 and all of 1968 was that of "civil war" between contending factions of the Red Guard groups. Their antagonistic attitude and behavior toward each other and toward the old cadre was certainly a major problem throughout the Cultural Revolution. The crimes of factionalism were said to be: making enemies of those who disagree and adopting status consciousness, arrogance and other
"bourgeois attitudes." Instead of letting the contending Red Guard groups resolve their internecine "civil war," the PLA was ordered to discipline these groups. The call for the cessation of the factional strife was issued on the occasion of the first anniversary of the PLA's intervention in the Cultural Revolution. A Jiefangjun Bao editorial announced that the armed forces were to "support the left but not any particular faction" in accordance with Mao's instructions. It stated that factional strife among the Red Guard groups must be resisted. Bourgeois behavior, if allowed to persist, would nullify all the PLA efforts to support the left and, consequently, endanger the unity between the PLA and the people. Three days prior to the January 28 editorial by the Jiefangjun Bao, a full-page account was published which described in detail how the Red Guard groups were disciplined for their anarchic factionalism by the PLA Air Force Troop #7350, stationed in Chekiang province. Long compulsory thought remolding sessions for members of the Red Guard groups in Chekiang province were held by the PLA. The main objective of these sessions, which were eventually conducted throughout all of the provinces, was to facilitate the rapid formation of Revolutionary Committees at the basic-level. This factional bickering among the representatives of the Red Guard groups and their antagonistic attitude became the major obstacle in the formation of the "Three-Way Alliance" structure of power for the greater part of three year period from 1967-1969.
Frequently it was very difficult for the PLA to handle the representatives of the Red Guard groups who served on the Revolutionary Committees. They were generally young revolutionary rebels who had emerged during the Cultural Revolution as "new leaders." Many, claiming they were "old rebels," adopted the attitude that they need not listen to criticism by others. Because of their lack of experience and discipline, they were excluded from important assignments by the PLA and the veteran cadres.

ii. Continued strained relations between the PLA and the masses

As we have seen above, the efforts of the PLA to restore order and improve discipline among the militant organizations generated hostility among members of these organizations toward the PLA. The PLA for its part had shown considerable disdain for the masses. In a remarkably candid article, the PLA Troop #8341, stationed in an automobile machinery plant in Nankuo, stated that to improve relations between the PLA Support the Left Troops and the masses and to avoid factionalism the following attitudes must be changes: (1) "mutual cold shoulder" resulting from the PLA's inability to explain adequately to the masses the reasons for its actions; (2) intolerance on the part of members of the Red Guard groups toward "those who have made mistakes," which tends to further alienate the PLA from the members of these groups; (3) self righteousness of members of the Red Guard groups--"we are the Left, they are the conservatives"--and their irreconciliability toward the veteran cadres and the PLA.
While a joint editorial of the Renmin Ribao, the Hongqi and the Jiefangjun Bao appealed on the one hand that the new Revolutionary Committees should be "cherished and supported by all revolutionary comrades," it also stated that every effort must be made to accommodate these "new leaders" who are revolutionary rebels in the Revolutionary Committees. By accommodation, it meant giving the "new leaders" who represented the revolutionary rebel groups responsibilities and power in the Revolutionary Committees. It was urged that those revolutionary cadres who had gone through the trials of class struggle be placed in key positions in the "Three-way Alliance" power structure.91

The statistics on the distribution of leadership at the central, provincial and local levels show that representatives of the Red Guard groups do not occupy significant dominant leadership positions. On the contrary, beginning in the summer of 1968, Worker-Peasant Propaganda Teams led and supported by the PLA cadres had been employed as an effective device through which re-education of the Red Guard groups was conducted. These groups were bitterly attacked as advocating "anarchism" and the "theory of many centers" which endangered the "unified leadership" in the Revolutionary Committees92 as also shown in the co-occurrence content categories of ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNITY (GG) and UNIFIED-LEADERSHIP (W). A concerted effort was made beginning in the fall of 1968, to "purify the class ranks" not only by sending the Red
Guard type "new leaders" to the countryside for manual labor and thought-remolding but by purging the militant and radical elements of these groups through the PLA dominated leadership in the various levels of the Revolutionary Committees. While the militant Red Guard type revolutionary "new leaders" were being purged and disciplined by the PLA, those veteran cadres who had committed errors were being rehabilitated for work within the Revolutionary Committees, as we have pointed out earlier. What then emerged in the new power structure, the Revolutionary Committees at all levels, was the increasingly dominant military-bureaucratic complex.

iii. PLA curbing bureaucratic growth

The association of content categories of OPPOSITION TO BUREAUCRATICISM (P) with SECRETARIANISM (JJ) and SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY (NN) mentioned earlier implies that the PLA has a role in curbing the growth in bureaucratic, factional and special interest mentality. There is a clear indication here that factionalism (secretarianism) is somehow related to bureaucraticism. The "purification" of the faction-ridden Red Guard groups within the Revolutionary Committees had two basic objectives. One was to discipline the militant, "extreme left" elements so that "great revolutionary unity" could be achieved. The other objective was aimed at "curbing bureaucratic growth." Though the old bureaucratic structures were almost completely dismantled during the Cultural Revolution, the new Revolutionary Committee structures at various levels revived some of the old
bureaucratic practices and habits. For instance, it was admitted that Parkinson's Law was in operation in the basic-level Revolutionary Committees, reflected by the rapid increase in personnel in the Revolutionary Committee structure. Weberian division of labor seems to have been a widespread practice in the new Revolutionary Committees. As the administrative tasks became regularized, the administrative apparatus tended to become bureaucratic with a more complex administrative structure and increased personnel.

In a widely publicized example of a basic-level Revolutionary Committee's attempt to streamline its administrative structure, four major bureaucratic abuses were given: (1) an increase in unnecessary personnel; (2) the cultivation of "bureaucratic airs" by office workers; (3) a tendency to become divorced from the masses and reality; and (4) the development of a cumbersome administrative structure, which easily could develop into a highly bureaucratic structure and a hot bed of revisionism.

A campaign was then launched to encourage the greatest effort to simplify the bureaucratic structure in the Revolutionary Committees at all levels. A few successful ones were then singled out as models for the rest to emulate. A much publicized example was that of the Ling Pao Hsien Revolutionary Committee in Honan. The committee had originally organized itself along the line of the old party structure for the hsien with more than eight separate departments, each with a specific
function such as political work, finance and trade, communication, etc. It was pointed out that a simple matter, which normally only would require a quick decision, now must go through many layers of bureaucratic redtape. Complaints of the cumbersome bureaucratic decision-making process by the poor and middle peasants in Ling Pao led to a reorganization of the six-month old Revolutionary Committee. The reorganization resulted in consolidation and reduction in administrative structure from eight departments to four and in personnel from 100 to only 30, including the twelve representatives of the PLA. With the streamlining of administrative structure came a change in work-style of the leading cadres. The cadres now performed their duties as they mingled with the masses in the countryside.

Earlier the Shangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee had promulgated a set of work-style regulations for its members to prohibit those bureaucratic abuse and inertia so prevalent prior to the Cultural Revolution. These regulations, aimed specifically at members of the Revolutionary Committee, fall into four general categories: (1) prohibitions against setting themselves above the people—no special praise; receptions or fanfare; (2) open communication with the people—personal visits, personal answers to all mail, consultation for collective decision on all issues; (3) no official privileges, no private use of public goods, no exchanging of gifts, frugality in use of state property; (4) learn from the
people—listen and accept criticism, rectification of committee members every two months, prescribed manual labor.\textsuperscript{102}

At times the efforts made by the basic-level Revolutionary Committees to simplify the administrative structure and reduce personnel became counter-productive. With the reduction of personnel, the workload increased. In addition there were also more meetings to attend for the members of the Revolutionary Committee, many of whom concurrently held several assignments. Cadres in one commune-level Revolutionary Committee had to participate in no less than ten different meetings and conferences at the hsien and provincial level and were not able to leave even a skeleton staff at the commune-level Revolutionary Committee. It was estimated that for the first ten months in 1969, these mass organizations representatives spent the equivalent of half-year's time in meetings.\textsuperscript{103}

At the beginning of this chapter we asked about the relationships that have emerged between the PLA and the new power structure, the Revolutionary Committees at various levels. We have seen in this chapter the extent of the PLA's domination in the leadership of the new power structure. But the single most important role of the PLA in its deep involvement in the Cultural Revolution has been to serve as a vehicle through which veteran party cadres have been rehabilitated and reinstated and the new young leaders of the rebel organizations have been brought into the power structure.
In the process, the PLA by being in the leadership position at the various levels of the Revolutionary Committees has been able to screen and select those cadres whom it considered reliable and who would, along with the PLA, serve as the backbone for the reconstituted party. Party rebuilding involves, in the final analysis, reshaping party structure and engendering revolutionary elan among the cadres. Party rebuilding then involves not only structural (form) adjustment but a change in attitude (content).
CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CHINESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Summary of Findings

(a) The gigantic political upheavals and amazing disarray on display inside Communist China for the period under study were but the latest manifestations of the top leadership's frustration and its inability to solve the fundamental question: What is the correct approach and strategy to promote sustained development toward the regime's ultimate goal? The Great Leap Forward and the subsequent recovery sharpened the divergence between adherents of a radical revolutionary strategy and those of a pragmatic approach. The conflict was fought under the title, the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. Underlying this struggle is the obsession of Mao Tse-tung and his close associates with the universal application of the revolutionary fervor and approach from the Yenan years.

The data in this study indicate that the PLA perceives the Cultural Revolution as a matter of the preservation of the original revolutionary fervor and impetus. In the minds of the PLA, as the contingency, or association, structure of this study has shown, the issues of functional differentiation and specialization are the most important issues in the Cultural Revolution. The association between individuals under attack and the issue of revisionism seems to have revealed the overall concern about the question of preservation of the original revolutionary fervor. The data presented in this study seem to validate the hypothesis that a basic policy cleavage on development strategy did exist within the top
leadership and that, as we have shown in Chapter IV, debate on policy issues became intertwined with a power struggle and the question of succession.

(b) The findings of this study reveal that on the whole the PLA has been loyal to Mao Tze-tung and the party. The contingency analysis of the editorials of both the Jiefangjun Bao and the Renmin Ribao does not indicate signs of disloyalty to Mao Tze-tung. On the contrary, the verbal symbolization of the PLA has provided evidence of loyalty to Mao Tze-tung and the party under his leadership. The data we have presented and the analysis which was based on these data indicate that the PLA has been a loyal instrument on the side of Mao Tze-tung in the struggle for power seizure.

(c) The PLA's active and direct participation in the Cultural Revolution has added a new dimension to its well-established politico-economic roles in that it has employed coercive measures rather than persuasion or reason to consolidate the different elements and groups within the party and society on policies and methods of implementation. In this sense the PLA serves, and will probably continue to serve in the future, as an important stabilizing element in an otherwise fluid and complex society. As these significant differences on policies become increasingly important, especially after the death of Mao Tze-tung and the passing from the scene of the present top leadership, the PLA's stabilizing role will become even more necessary. The "Three-way Alliance," a convenient and effective device which has been employed in mainland China where the revolutionary groups have seized political power, will probably be one of the many ingenious methods that the PLA
can readily use to unite and consolidate different elements for the purpose of providing a new revolutionary government structure, in an otherwise strife torn country which needs first of all some semblance of order and stability.

The data and analysis presented in Chapters III and IV support the hypothesis that in a crisis situation where there is disruption in the established authority, there is the need for the military, being the only effective organization, to maintain law and order. In this sense the PLA may be said to have performed the traditional role of the military everywhere to be the guarantor for law and order.

(d) The findings of this study also reveal an interesting phenomenon--the PLA, in directly and actively intervening in the Cultural Revolution, has been placed in an extremely complex, if not difficult, position. In the first place, to render support to the revolutionary Left organized among the masses, the PLA had to make a distinction as to which mass organizations were Maoist and which were not. Data presented in this study seem to indicate the existence of this dilemma on the part of the PLA in handling the factional rivalry and disputes within and between the revolutionary groups. Secondly, the findings suggest a lack of solidarity within the PLA. Significant association of those content categories which are related to the internal disunity of the PLA indicate the presence of doubt in the thinking of the source that there is unity and cohesion among the top military leaders. The crucial question which must be raised here is: what effect would the disruptive consequences of internal factionalism and disunity within the PLA have on its political role in the future?
The trust and reliance on the ability of the PLA to maintain order in an otherwise strife-torn society certainly is a subject warranting further investigation. The findings of this study merely indicate the presence of the phenomenon.

(e) The evidence of statistically significant association of verbal material by the military cadres in the Cultural Revolution presented above, suggests several general conclusions:

One, verbal symbolization, like any other symbol system in a culture, apparently reflects the preferred attitudes and behavior of a dominant group in a society. By means of contingency analysis, this study has established that to the Maoists reliance on "man" rather than technology, or the application of labor intensivity to the tasks of building socialism, still represents a basic model for China's development.

The desire on the part of the Maoists to control and restrict functional differentiation and specialization by placing greater emphasis on the element of human resources and energies rather than on technical expertise is not necessarily an antithesis to development.¹ Many of the accomplishments of the regime, notably in public works (roads and bridges), flood control, public health, and social control progress can be attributed, in large measure, to the ability of the regime to effectively mobilize the massive labor force. Since many of these developmental tasks do depend on the use of intensive labor, they lend themselves to the Maoist strategy of "man" over technology.
Second, verbal symbols which embody value formulation can be used for ideological transformation of society in the development process. This spiritual transformation in China involved, first of all, the projection of the PLA as a model for society as a whole—a sort of paradigm of a new communist life. Then, under the direction of the military as the most effective organizational unit, political and ideological consolidation began via verbal material disseminated for the purpose of reshaping societal values and attitudes. Thus, developmental strategy becomes merged in this case with Maoist ideology. Verbal symbols such as "self-sacrifice," "determination will prevail," and "primacy of politics" indicate the direction of development policies. Or, to put it another way, economic policies or developmental strategy such as labor intensivity, continued low level of personal consumption, and the employment of massive assault in the form of a crash program by human resources must be preceded by the "revolutionization of people's ideology." Thus the proper ideological and psychological environment must be created by the constant and repetitious reiteration of the verbal symbols which are indicative of the development strategy to come. If this summation has any validity, then an analysis of verbal materials, scientifically conducted, can have certain predictive value in interpreting political development in a closed society such as Communist China.

However, the data we have do not suggest that the PLA has assumed the political role as agent for social change by actively advocating values for the society as a whole. The PLA, as our
analysis in Chapter IV has shown, merely serves as a reliable vehicle through which the vision of Mao Tze-tung for a good society is popularized. In this sense we can validate only partially the hypothesis that the military in a crisis situation assumes its political role as agent for political and social change.

(f) The participation in and the dominance of the PLA in rebuilding the party structure, one important objective of the Cultural Revolution, is strong evidence in itself that there is a serious structural crisis in the revolutionary one-party system, the Chinese Communist Party. Our data suggest that the structural crisis was caused by two developments within the communist system: the appearance of instrumentalism, the substitution of apolitical managerial values for the values of a revolutionary movement, and the trend toward bureaucratization. If bureaucratization and the ethics of instrumentalism represent revisionism, as Mao Tze-tung has said they do, then revisionism is a "latent function" of the development process. The inevitable result at this phase of the development process perhaps is the gradual erosion of ideology or its irrelevance. Huntington and Moore thus offer the explanation that it is at this stage when the party becomes highly bureaucraticized and institutionalized that the charismatic leader and his ideology are no longer considered source of legitimacy. The alternative, both in the case of Communist China during the Cultural Revolution and in Russia during the Stalinist era in the 1930's, was to prevent routinization of the party bureaucracy by purges or rectification campaigns. When this occurs there inevitably will be disruption in the party structure which in turn may weaken its authority. Whereas Stalin
employed an extra party instrument, the secret police, to restore the legitimate role of the charismatic leader and the ideology, Mao Tze-tung has used the Red Guards and the PLA, the only effective coercive instrument available, to re-structure the party and remold the cadres ideologically.

(g) The Chinese Communist regime traditionally rests on the tripartite structure of the party, government and army. But it is the PLA, as an instrument for revolution, which possesses the indispensable ingredients of a revolutionary force: coercive power and an acceptable public image. These potentials will always give the PLA the choice of roles in any crisis situation.

Its future role as a stabilizing influence may involve one of the following. The military could continue to give its full support to the ideologically purified revolutionary groups, heir to Mao Tze-tung's thought and practice. It could throw its backing behind another faction within the party and be subservient to that group. One can also visualize a situation under which the PLA may have to be courted and cultivated by one faction or the other. In this sense, the PLA could well play the balancing role in the final determination of policy outcome.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communist society may be so torn apart by internal dissension and rift that the whole country may be fragmentized to the extent of threatening the existence of the central authority in Peking. If that happens, one must bear in mind the events of recent Chinese history: regionalism or regional warlordism may eventually prevail. Signs of regionalism have already appeared in the current struggle, witness the rise in influence and stature of the
regional military commanders in the newly built Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the final analysis, the present and future role of the PLA will in large measure be determined by its own internal unity and cohesion. The disruptive consequences of internal factionalism and disunity within the PLA will not only limit, if not diminish, its political role in crisis situations but could pave the way for the rise of regional warlordism. If internal unity and cohesion do prevail in the military in the long run, the PLA, serving as either a stabilizing or balancing influence, will probably undergo some transformation of its own by becoming perhaps more moderate and professionally oriented in its approaches.

2. Relevance of Findings to Study of Military's Role in Politics

First, throughout the analysis of a single empirical case, the verbal symbolization and participation of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution, I have attempted to demonstrate that militarism, as one of the major problems facing the Chinese in the first half of this century, continues to play an important if not decisive role in Chinese politics. The presence of militarism and its relation to social and political organizations and its effect upon the process of social and political transformation in the Chinese communist society can be a useful framework for analysis of military's role in politics. Martin Wilbur defined militarism in the Chinese political development as "a system of organizing political power in which force is the normal arbiter in the distribution
of power and in the establishment of policy." Modern Chinese political development is, to a large extent, influenced by the power of armies on the one hand and the technique in the use of armies and in military organization on the other.

For decades prior to the unification effort undertaken by the Chinese Nationalists, a system of "regional military separatism" dominated the political scene of China. Under the system, independent military-political groupings, each occupying one or more provinces, functioned as separate political entities, and engaged in internecine warfare with each other in order to preserve their own separate regions and to prevent their rivals from establishing a unified and centralized political system. That contemporary China has been plagued by the problem of control of armies is really an understatement. It is largely by military means and through military organization and technique that the Chinese Nationalists tried and the Chinese Communists succeeded in re-establishing a "unified hierarchical and centralized political system." The military thus constitutes a dominant group in society, and the military institution has played a dominant role in political development. The military has always occupied a special position in the Chinese communist society. The Chinese Communist Party for a long time was the army. The party membership grew from the 40,000 Long March survivors in 1937 to over 1.2 million in 1945. Over one million of the total membership in 1945 constituted the "military supply system." These people were either regular members of the army or the party working without salary and under military type of discipline. Robert Tucker has labelled this unique system of militarizing the party as "military communism" to distinguish
it from all other forms of communism. It is more evident now than at any other time since the regime has been in power that party leadership has depended upon party members in the army: (a) to do political work, (b) to maintain party unity, (c) to impose discipline, and (d) to serve as a reservoir for cadres recruitment.

At a very early stage of the Chinese communist movement, the basic concept of the political role of the army was formulated. For instance at the Kutien Conference in 1929 Mao Tze-tung stated:

The purely military viewpoint is very highly developed among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows: 1. These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say, "If you are good militarily, naturally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily, you cannot be any good politically"—this is to go a step further and give military affairs a leading position over politics. 2. ...They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution...it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary organizations.

The idea propounded by Mao Tze-tung at Kutien is important for several reasons: (1) it emphasized the army's political and ideological work as paramount; (2) through the controversy is a recurring one, it placed the military under political or party control to insure that policies of the party's central authority will be carried out by the military; and (3) it pinpointed the army's crucial task of preserving ideological purity by political education and propaganda first within its own units and then throughout the entire party and society. Findings in this study merely reinforce the tradition of the PLA as a political instrument for revolution.
Second, militarism in Chinese political development has also led the military to function as a "policy group," closely akin to the Almond's concept of institutional interest group.

Almond and Powell define an interest group as "a group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds." An institutional interest group is a formally organized body made up of professionally oriented personnel which may articulate its own interests or represent the interests of other groups in the society. An institutional interest group may occupy a powerful or strategic position in society. The military in the developing countries and in some developed countries, including the communist ones, has been regarded as such.

The concept of the military as an institutional interest group, although recognized in the literature of comparative politics and interest group studies, has not been widely applied in the analysis of the military's role in politics. Even in the recent literature on communist studies, which increasingly gives recognition to the "parallelogram of conflicting forces and interests" that exert an influence on the policy-making process of the single party, few attempts have been made to treat the military as a powerful or strategic institutional interest group in communist politics.

I have attempted to demonstrate in this study that the PLA has become a strategic "policy group" in Chinese communist society. In their comparative analysis of power and policy in the Soviet Union and United States, Brzezinski and Huntington define "policy group" as:
Groups whose scope of activity is directly dependent on the allocation of national resources and which are directly affected by any shift in the institutional distribution of power (for example, the 1957 economic and administrative reorganization) come the closest to participating in the policy-making process, as both claimants and advisers. The military, the heavy-industry and light-industry managers, the agricultural experts, and finally the state bureaucrats may be called the policy groups. They advocate to the political leadership certain courses of action; they have their own professional or specialized newspapers which, at times and subject to overall party controls, can become important vehicle for expressing specific points of view. 12

Our findings have shown clearly that the PLA has emerged as a dominant force in the party and government. For instance, 43 percent of the total regular members on the Ninth Central Committee of the party are representatives of the PLA. Of the 74 PLA representatives on the Ninth Central Committee, 38, or 51 percent, are active PLA commanders and political commissars from the regional military commands. On the provincial level, 77 percent of the 95 known persons selected as chairmen of the provincial Revolutionary Committees are representatives of the PLA. There can be no question that the PLA is playing the role of a "strategic policy group" in Communist China's political development now and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Finally, the findings, as summarized in the first section of this chapter, enable us to re-emphasize the element of a political system's capacity to mobilize and coerce.

Mass mobilization and participation in political activities can serve a number of functions for a political system. For instance, a regime--more particularly a totalitarian one--may rely on mass political participation for political control of the masses. It may also use the mass participation process for recruitment of new members for the
dominant party. Mass mobilization may serve as a channel by which popular demands or moods are communicated to the regime. An ideologically inspired mass movement can be an effective tool for preventing the further spread of influence of the entrenched bureaucracy which has blocked the process of development. The Cultural Revolution is a case in point. Yet a political system which is in the throes of development process cannot offer sufficient incentives for voluntary compliance in its capacity to exercise control. Too often force must be used instead of persuasion. And not too infrequently the armed forces are called upon to help implement government policies. Political development, therefore, involves the process of a system's capacity to coerce. Karl Von Vorys has defined political development as a process of a government's capacity to direct social and economic changes by persuasion and coercion:

...It is a process which includes social and economic changes, but whose focus is the development of the governmental capacity to direct the course and the rate of social and economic change. It is a process which will rest largely upon social and economic accomplishments, but whose progress is measured by increments in the government's capacities to coerce and persuade. Above all, it is a political process which, in fact, will accomplish its political goal. It is a process which may well be described as political development.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I


4. Major social sciences content analysis projects now exist on three campuses: the Berkeley project of basic social sciences research on enclaved societies, the Stanford project under Holsti and North, and the Yale project under the direction of Lasswell. Author of this paper is most familiar with the Berkeley project, having had personal contact with one of the project's research analysts—see Paul Wong, Content Analysis of Documentary and Biographic Materials: Methodology (Berkeley: Survey Research Center, University of California, September, 1967).

5. I have deliberately avoided using the term "civil-military relations" in this dissertation for the simple reason that the term is too broad and imprecise in any analysis of the military's role or activity in a given society.


18 John Johnson, op. cit., p. 127.


21 Chalmers A. Johnson, "The Role of Social Sciences in China Scholarship," World Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (January, 1965), pp. 256-277. In addition to Chalmers Johnson, the following scholars have also voiced their concern about contemporary China as a problem for political science: Howard L. Boorman, "The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics,"


24Ibid.
CHAPTER II


4Ibid., p. 198.

5Ibid., pp. 198-200.


9Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, op. cit., p. 30.


12For a detailed discussion on representational and instrumental model of communication, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, op. cit., pp. 2-6.


16 Robert Merritt in "The Representational Model in Cross-National Content Analysis" in Hayward Alker, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II*, Arnold Foundation Monographs (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1966). Also see G. William Skinner, "Compliance and Leadership in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," paper presented at the 1965 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. (The author kindly gave me a copy of the revised version of the paper.) In this paper Skinner argued that content analysis is the appropriate technique to be used for testing his cyclical theory.


18 Franz Schurmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.


31 Ole Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, op. cit., p. 142.

32 Charles Osgood, op. cit., p. 63.

33 Ibid., pp. 64-65.

34 Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, op. cit., p. 106.
CHAPTER III


5Ibid.


26 *Hongqi*, ibid., p. 32.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

Ibid.


"Chiang Ching tung chih ti chiang hua," ("Comrade Chiang Ching's Speech on April 20 to the Peking Revolutionary Committee"), Hongqi, No. 6 (May 8, 1967), pp. 16-18.

"Hsieh Fu-tsi tung chih ti chiang hua" ("Comrade Hsieh Fu-tsi's Speech on April 20 to the Peking Revolutionary Committee"), Hongqi, ibid., pp. 19-20.


Ibid.

"Chiu yueh wu jih Chiang Ching tung chih tsai Anhwei lai ching tai piao hui i shang ti chung yao ti chiang hua," ("Text of Comrade Chiang Ching's Important September 5 Talk to the Anhwei Representatives in Peking"), Tsu Kuo (China Monthly), Vol. XI, No. 47 (February, 1968), pp. 48-51, published by the Union Research Institute, Hongkong. Also, for a brief summary of Chiang Ching's talk on September 5, 1967 to the representatives of the mass organizations from Anhwei, see Renmin Ribao, September 17, 1967, p. 1.

"Text of Decision by the Central Committee on the Anhwei Question," op. cit.

Ibid., p. 94.


Ibid.

Ibid.


"Text of Comrade Chiang Ching's Important Speech September 5 Talk to the Anhwei Representatives in Peking," op. cit., p. 49.


Feng chuan kua, ibid., p. 6, Hsing Tao Jih Pao, ibid., and China Quarterly, ibid., p. 186.


Ibid.

Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.


60 Ibid., p. 102.


63 Renmin Ribao, August 4, 1967, p. 1


65 Renmin Ribao, April 21, 1967, p. 2.


67 Hongqi editorial, "Enthusiastically Respond to the Call for Cherish the People and Support the Army," No. 6 (May 8, 1967), pp. 30-31.


69 Renmin Ribao, August 2, 1967, p. 2.


71 Renmin Ribao, August 20, 1967, p. 2.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Chiang Ching's September 5 (1967) speech on support the army briefly summarized in Renmin Ribao, September 17, 1967, p. 1.

"Text of Important Speech by Lin Piao to the Conference of Top Leading Military Cadres on August 9, 1967," op. cit.

Ibid.

John Gitting's, The Role of the Chinese Army, op. cit.

Ibid., p. 253.

Ibid., pp. 271-272.


Ibid.

Ibid.

"Text of Decision by the Central Committee on the Anhwei Question," op. cit.


"Text of Decision by the Central Committee on the Anhwei Question," op. cit.


Renmin Ribao, July 15, 1969, p. 3.


Ibid., p. 110.

Ibid.


Renmin Ribao, October 6, 1969, p. 4.

Hsing Tao Jih Pao (Hongkong), October 1, 1968, p. 3.


See the following issues of Hongqi: No. 5 (May 1, 1969), pp. 77-82; No. 8 (August 1, 1969), pp. 22-31; No. 1 (January 1, 1970), pp. 61-67.
See the following issues of *Renmin Ribao*: December 19, 1967, p. 2; December 28, 1967, p. 1; February 14, 1968, p. 3.

*Hongqi*, No. 5 (May 1, 1969), pp. 77-82.

"Directive of the Central Committee, State Council, Military Affairs Committee, and the Cultural Revolutionary Group Concerning the Dispatch of Central Support-the-Left Units...," *op. cit.*


*Renmin Ribao, Hongqi* and *Jiefangjun Bao* joint editorial, "Forward March Along the Path of Victory" from *Renmin Ribao*, October 1, 1968, p. 1.
CHAPTER IV


4 Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 50.

5 Ibid., pp. 148-150.

6 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 18.


18 Ibid., pp. 19-20.


22 Ibid.


27 David McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit., p. 94.


29 Philip Jacob and James Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: T. B. Lippincott Co., 1964).


31 Ibid., p. 584.


35Hongqi editorial, "From the Down-fall of Peng Teh-huai to the Bankruptcy of the Chinese Khrushchev," op. cit.


39Ibid., p. 75.

CHAPTER V


10 Ibid., pp. 45-46.


Regional military commanders purged were: 1) Ulanfu of Inner Mongolia, 2) Cheng Tsai-tao of Wuhan and 3) Huang Hsin-ting of Chengtu.

Provincial military district commanders purged were: 1) Chen Chin-yu of Shansi, 2) Ho Ching-chi of Liaoning and 3) Chu Sung-ta of Ninghsia.


20 Ibid., p. 5.

21 Ibid., pp. 19-20 and p. 22.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


29 Renmin Ribao, April 6, 1968, p. 2.

30 Renmin Ribao, June 24, 1968, p. 2.


33 Ibid., pp. 48-54.


36 Ibid., p. 5.

37 Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," op. cit., p. 11.


39 Ibid.


43 Ibid.

45Ibid.


50Renmin Ribao, March 12, 1968, p. 2.

51Renmin Ribao, November 18, 1968, p. 2.


55Renmin Ribao, November 18, 1967, p. 2.

56Ibid.


58Ibid.

59Ibid., p. 19.

60Renmin Ribao, Hongqi and Jiefangjun Bao joint editorial, "Use the Thought of Mao Tze-tung to Control All Things," printed in Hongqi, No. 1 (January 1, 1969), pp. 5-11.

61Ibid., p. 10.

62Ya Hsin, "I ko i ko tan wei ti kao hao tu pi kai" ("Every Unit Must Implement Struggle-Criticism-Transformation"), Hongqi, No. 8 (August 1, 1969), pp. 36-39.


65 Renmin Ribao, February 6, 1969, p. 2.
72 Renmin Ribao, June 2, 1969, p. 1 and June 4, 1969, p. 3.
73 Renmin Ribao, January 18, 1969, p. 3.
74 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Renmin Ribao, March 6, 1968, p. 2.
81 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
87 Renmin Ribao, March 6, 1968, p. 2.
89 Ibid.
213

90 Chung Hai and Wei Tung, "Yung Mao Tze-tung shih hsiang tsu chih ho tiao tung kuo kao tang tang ti ke ming ta chun" ("Use the Thought of Mao to Organize and Mobilize Customary Forces"), Hongqi, No. 5 (May 1, 1969), pp. 77-82.


95 Ibid.

96 Chin Ping, "Tsu yi kang ku ching ping chien cheng ti cheng kou" ("Pay Attention to the Results of Simplified Administration"), Hongqi, No. 12 (November 29, 1969), pp. 20-23.

97 Renmin Ribao, August 10, 1969, p. 2.

98 Chin Ping, "Pay Attention to the Results of Simplified Administration," op. cit., p. 22.


101 Renmin Ribao, July 12-17, 1968; September 9, 1969; and December 11 and 15, 1969.

102 "Shangtung sheng ke ming wei yuan hui kwan yu jen chen tso feng ti kuli ting" ("Regarding Work-Style Regulations by the Shangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee"), Hongqi, No. 10 (June 21, 1967), p. 65.

CHAPTER VI


6Ibid.


10Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Development Approach (Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1966), pp. 75-77.


APPENDIX A

CONTENT CATEGORIES FOR CODING 136 JIEFANGJUN BAO EDITORIALS

A PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE LEFT

Reference to any statement which denotes the PLA's support and assistance on the side of the Left revolutionaries in the struggle for power seizure. Or the statements which refer to the PLA's intervention to give aid to the revolutionary Left loyal to Mao Tze-tung.

B PLA'S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

Any statement which expresses the idea contained in the slogan of "Three-Support and Two-Military"—aid the revolutionary Left, assist in industry and agriculture, exercise military control and give military training. References to any statement which denotes the PLA's tasks in its intervention by exercising military control and supervision over the country.

C GUNS MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO ARE LOYAL TO MAO TZE-TUNG AND THE PARTY CENTRAL

This statement refers to any expression which affirms the loyalty of the PLA to Mao Tze-tung or the revolutionary line led by Mao Tze-tung. This statement also denotes PLA's obedience to the instructions of the Military Affairs Committee under the leadership of Mao Tze-tung and Lin Piao.

D PLA AS A SCHOOL FOR THE-THOUGHT-OF-MAO TZE-TUNG

Any statement or reference to indicate that the PLA serves as a model of revolutionary virtue and elan that the entire country must emulate.
E  PLA AS A MAJOR PILLAR IN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Statements which proclaim or profess that the PLA is an important instrument in the revolution of the proletariat. It also refers to the historic role of the PLA in the armed struggle for power.

F  PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

Any reference or statement which denotes the active participation of the PLA in the formation of the new power structure known as the Revolutionary Committees at the provincial and basic unit level. It also refers to any idea related to the formula for the alliance on a tripartite coalition basis of the representatives of the PLA, mass organizations, and the rehabilitated cadres.

G  GRASP THE REVOLUTION AND PROTECT PRODUCTION

Specific reference in the form of slogan which urges everyone to simultaneously carry on with the revolution and maintain normal economic activities. This statement also refers to the PLA's task in not only the management of the industries but the prevention of the normal economic activities from being disrupted by the upheaval.

H  PLA IS THE PROPAGANDA TEAM FOR THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG

Any reference or statement which denotes the PLA's involvement in doing ideological propaganda work among the revolutionary masses. The statement also refers to the PLA organized study sessions for ideological remolding or re-education.

I  PLA HERO EMULATION

Any statement in this content category refers specifically to the values and attitudes espoused by the PLA soldiers who were made national heroes by proclamation. The lives of these PLA heroes were exemplars for all to emulate.
J  LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES OF NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES

四要第一
This refers to Lin Piao's concept on the relationship between men and weapons, political and other work, ideological work and other work, and learning and living ideas. Lin's oft-quoted dictum, "Human element is first, political work first, ideological work first and living ideas first," serves as priorities or guides in daily living.

K  THE PLA'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

「文革」作了巨大貢獻
The statement refers to the PLA's self-perception that its participation in the Cultural Revolution has been decisive and it denotes the idea that without the PLA's support, the Cultural Revolution would not have been successful.

L  THE PLA'S LAW AND ORDER ROLE

維持社會紀律
Any statement or reference which contains the idea that the task of the PLA is to maintain law and order and discipline the masses. The reference denotes the police function of the PLA in keeping law and order.

M  PROTRACTED STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONARY LINES

兩條路線長期斗争
References to any statement which expresses the long term nature of the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. It denotes the existence of different revolutionary lines within the Party.

N  PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM

防止資本主義復辟
This refers to any expression of fear of restoration of capitalism and concern about revisionism. This content category includes statements which express the concern for the loss of revolutionary elan.
O MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Expression which denotes cultivation of a new revolutionary spirit in that the Thought of Mao Tze-tung can transform man's old thoughts and habits. The statement refers to the idea that social revolution can be achieved only after the intensive ideological transformation so as to raise the social consciousness of the masses through the study and application of the Thought of Mao Tze-tung.

P OPPOSITION TO BUREAUCRATICISM

This reference denotes Mao Tze-tung's disdain for those party members who often put on "official air" or who jointed the party in order to become "an official mandarin." The statement refers to the existence of a rigidified bureaucracy within the party structure.

Q DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS AND FOSTER COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS

The statement denotes the concept of "destroy old first in order to foster the new, implying a total commitment to egalitarian life.

R FIGHT SELF AND REPUDIATE REVISIONISM

This statement is defined as any references which appeal to groups and factions to subordinate their personal or group interest to the public good.

S ANTI-MAO TZE-TUNG AND ANTI-PARTY RIGHTISTS

General reference to any group or faction which does not adhere to Mao Tze-tung's revolutionary line.
T  MILITARY MODERNIZATION

軍事現代化

Reference and expression which denotes professionalism and modernization of the military establishment as revisionistic.

U  THE MASS LINE

從群眾中來到群眾中去

The content category here refers to Mao Tze-tung's technique of organization of "from the people and to the people." It denotes the preference for mass mobilization and participation in political activities.

V  POLITICS IN COMMAND

政治掛帥

Reference or expression which calls for primacy of politics. Any statement or reference under this content category tends to emphasize the importance of the Thought of Mao Tze-tung.

W  UNIFIED LEADERSHIP

集中統一 - 一元化領導

The reference here denotes unified thinking, policies, command and action. The term is used to describe the prevalent situation in which each rebel group or faction claimed for itself the legitimate revolutionary group. It thus refers to the turmoil and factional strife within the Revolutionary Committees. The slogan refers to the need for a unified stand of the various elements in the Revolutionary Committees to get on with the task at hand and cease bickering.

X  EXPERTISE AND SPECIALIZATION AS ANTI-PARTY AND ANTI-SOCIALISM

反對學術权威

Reference to any statement which expresses contempt for those who are the authorities, scholars, and specialists.
Y KUTIEN AND LUSHAN RESOLUTIONS

The Kutien Resolution of 1929 represented Mao Tze-tung's earlier success in placing the military under the party's control. Mao Tze-tung argued and won the implementation of the principle that when it comes to military matters and political matters, the political matters take precedent over the purely military matters. Mao Tze-tung again faced inner party criticism in 1959 when the 6th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened. He again won the approval from the party to continue the commune program with certain modifications. The category therefore denotes strong dissension within the top elite on development policies and strategy.

Z SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION

Any reference which denotes the communist virtue of self-sacrifice for the collectivity.

AA MAKING THE REVOLUTION ECONOMICALLY

Specific reference to any statement which denotes the wide spread practice of waste and infringement of the economic rights of the state by the mass revolutionaries, particularly the young rebels. For instance, it refers to waste in the paper or flour (from which paste for all posters is made) for making propaganda and requisitioning of public vehicles and gasoline for personal use by the revolutionary groups.

BB ECONOMISM

The term refers to the pursuit of individual interests at the expense of the state. Specifically it denotes the use of material incentives such as wage increases and cash bonuses to induce the workers and peasants to abandon their jobs during the Cultural Revolution.
CC SUPPORT COLLECTIVIZED SOCIALISM

支持社会集体化

References which denote expression of support for Mao Tze-tung's policies of Great Leap and the Commune programs as opposed to revisionistic tendencies of early 1960's under Liu Shao-chi.

DD MATERIAL INCENTIVES

三自一包黑风

Any reference to the practice introduced by Liu Shao-chi such as private plot, wage incentive, and the free market. These are the evil wind of revisionism.

EE SELF-RELIANCE

自力更生

Any reference or statement which expresses the idea of do-it-alone or struggle hard by itself. In terms of economic development the reference means independent development without outside help.

FF HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION

一下决心克服困难

Any reference which denotes the idea that it is the human will or determination that in the end accomplishes all things. It stresses the human element as the main source for building socialism.

GG ACHIEVING GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UNITY

巩固革命大联合

Any statement which calls for the solidarity of all the elements within the Revolutionary Committee. The reference also includes statement which appeals to the revolutionary Left factions to cease their infighting.
HH  **STRENGTH ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY**

Reference to any statement which expresses the idea of "cherish-the-people and love-the-army." It denotes in essence strained relationship between the masses and the PLA troops in their activities of restoring law and order.

II  **PLA'S PROPER TREATMENT OF NEW REVOLUTIONARY CADRES**

Any verbal expression which denotes appeal in the editorials to the PLA for patience and understanding with the inexperienced young rebels who were brought into the Revolutionary Committees under the Three-Way Alliance arrangement. It also denotes the harsh treatment the revolutionary young rebels received from the PLA for undisciplined behavior.

JJ  **SECRETARIANISM**

Any reference to political infighting among the revolutionary factions which disrupted the formation of the Revolutionary Committees. Often the term is synonymous with factionalism.

KK  **PLA'S CORRECT TREATMENT OF THE MASSES**

The term makes reference to any idea which indicates the PLA's sometimes heavy-handedness in its treatment of unruly and undisciplined masses who form revolutionary groups for the purpose of seizing power from the established party.

LL  **INDIVIDUAL GROUP MENTALITY**

The term refers to groups of mass organizations which disregarded the appeals of the revolutionary Left movement for the curtailment of its individual actions. It denotes disunity among the revolutionary Left as directed by Peking.
MM  **INDIVIDUALISM**

个人主义

Any reference which denotes those individual Red Guards whose behavior was not sanctioned by their own groups or whose action was considered by Peking as not in conformity with revolutionary discipline.

NN  **SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP MENTALITY**

山头主义

The term "mountain stronghold" generally refers to regional predilection often found in the provincial and district commands. It also refers to the military's imposing its will on others in the Revolutionary Committee.

OO  **ANARCHISM**

先政府主义

Any reference or statement which expresses ideas of lack of discipline and disobedience of directives of Peking which undermine the efforts of the revolutionary Left to seize power from the party apparatus.

PP  **PLA INTERNAL DISUNITY**

军内矛盾

Any reference which expresses the following ideas: strengthen the unity within the troops, the presence of revisionistic tendencies within the PLA, and contradictions within the PLA.

QQ  **UNITING WITH THE REHABILITATED AND REINSTATED VETERAN CADRES**

团结一切犯错但改正干部

Reference in the editorials which denotes the question of re-employment of the veteran cadres in the new power structure. It also refers to appeals for the representatives of the masses in the Revolutionary Committees to seek reconciliation with the veteran cadres who have repented or are redeemed through the process of re-education in cadres schools.
RR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE MASSES AND PLA WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

部隊和群眾意見不同

Any reference which expresses the thought of disagreement between the PLA and the mass organization representatives in the PLA dominated Revolutionary Committee.

SS UNITY-CRITICISM-UNITY

团结—批评—团结

The terms denote the use of self-criticism for correcting erroneous thoughts. It refers to the technique of conducting ideological struggle among the cadres.

TT PROTECT STATE PROPERTY

爱护国家财产

Any statement which makes reference to the need for the attempts of Mao Tse-tung's enemies to sabotage the state economy by stoppage of work in factories.

UU HUMILITY AND NONARROGANCE

谦虚 不骄

Any reference to the PLA's assertiveness in efficiently carrying its task of disciplining the factions for their anarchical activities. Any reference which makes an appeal to the PLA for humility means the antagonism it created among the masses.

VV LIVING MAO'S THOUGHT

活学活用毛泽东思想

Any reference or statement which expresses the thought that it is not enough to study the Thought of Mao Tze-tung, but it is essential to practice in one's daily activities. It also implies learning from the PLA's way of doing things.
References and statements which denote Mao Tze-tung's formula for resolving the contradictions. It generally refers to the campaign of putting those dissidents through struggle and repudiation sessions in line with an over-all reorganization of the party's administrative structure. It also refers to the screening process aimed at those who oppose to the Revolutionary Committee set-up at the local levels.
APPENDIX B

CONTENT CATEGORIES FOR CODING 115 RENMIN RIBAO EDITORIALS

A  PROTRACTED AND COMPLEX CLASS STRUGGLE

長期階級争

Reference to any statement which expresses the long term and complex nature of the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. It also includes admission of the complexity and acuteness of the class struggle.

B  THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR

建立新精神

Expression which denotes abolition of old thoughts and habits and cultivation of selflessness. This category also includes expressions of thought remolding, service for the people, and fearless devotion to the "public good."

C  POLITICS IN COMMAND BY UPHOLDING THE RED BANNER OF THE THOUGHT OF MAO TZE-TUNG

突出政治

Reference or expression which calls for politics in command. Statement which tends to emphasize the importance of the thought of Mao Tze-tung.

D  PREVENTION OF REVISIONISM AND FEAR OF RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM

避免修正资本主义复辟

This refers to any expression of fear of restoration of capitalism or concern about revisionism. This category includes statements which express the concern for possible change of the original revolutionary color.
E  ADHERENCE TO MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE

Expressions which indicate the choice of two directions or lines for the revolution: Mao Tze-tung's, or the left line, as the correct one and the other as the anti-party and anti-socialism reactionary line.

F  SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT

This is defined as any statement which advocates the seizure of power by the Maoist revolutionary Left group away from those in power who are taking the revisionist road. Appeals to the Left to seize political power.

G  THOSE IN POWER WHO TAKE THE CAPITALIST ROAD

Specific group single out for attack: Anti-Mao elements are referred to as ones who are in power position within the party but who have taken "the capitalist" road.

H  PLA AS MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE REVOLUTION

Image of PLA's role as defined by Mao Tze-tung: that it has the political responsibility for the propagation of the revolution. Reference which describes the role of the PLA as the major instrument for revolution.

I  ARMY MUST BE LED BY THE PARTY

Statements which either appeal or give assurance that it is the party which must lead the gun. Or, to put it in reverse: the guns must be in the hands of those who are reliable.
J  PLA'S LOYALTY TO MAO AND LIN

Any reference which denotes the feeling that the PLA was created personally by Mao Tze-tung and is now directed and rebuilt by Lin Piao. Purpose of such statement is to leave the impression that the PLA is closely associated with the Mao-Lin faction and is therefore loyal to their ideology or approach.

K  PLA'S DIRECT INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF THE LEFT

Statement of appeal to the army to intervene in the struggle on the side of the Left. Or statements which serve as a strong argument in favor of the need for direct intervention to give aid to the left revolutionaries.

L  PLA'S INTERNAL DISUNITY AND DISENSSION

General or specific reference which indicates disunity or dissension within the PLA.

M  PLA'S ASSISTANCE TO PRODUCTION

Statements which describe the PLA's economic role in rendering assistance to the harvest or in the factories.

N  PLA'S PROPAGANDA WORK IN AROUSING AND GIVING SUPPORT TO THE MASSES

Reference to the PLA's role in making or carrying out revolutionary propaganda among the masses. This category also includes any statement which refers to the importance of the military's task in arousing and giving support to the masses.
O  PLA AS A REVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL FOR THE ENTIRE NATION TO EMULATE

解放军是一所学校
Any statement or reference to indicate that the PLA has revolutionary virtue and elan and the correct line for the entire nation to emulate.

P  THE "CHINESE KRUSHCHEV" OR TOP PARTY PERSON TAKING THE CAPITALIST ROAD

“中国的赫鲁晓夫”
Reference to President Liu Shao-chi as the primary target and archrival of Mao Tze-tung during the Cultural Revolution. The category also refers to statement that the "Chinese Krushchev" is the head of revisionist clique in the party.

Q  PENG CHEN

彭真
Direct reference to the former mayor of Peking and No. 6 member of the Polibureau of the 8th Central Committee who was purged in June 1966 as an accomplice of the "Chinese Krushchev."

R  PEN TEH-HUAI

彭德怀
Direct reference to Marshal Peng Teh-huai who was dismissed as the Defense Minister in 1959 for his open criticism of Mao Tze-tung's commune program.

S  KUTIEN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1929

古田会议建军
Any reference which indicates Mao Tze-tung's original revolutionary strategy of emphasizing politics over purely military matters.


LUSHAN CONFERENCE RESOLUTION OF 1959

Reference to the decision of 1959 Lushan party session of the 6th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee which approved Mao Tze-tung's daring programs of the Great Leap and the communes. The category also denotes strong dissension from other leading party members to the program, including primarily the dissenting views of Marshal Peng Teh-huai.

FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP AND BE AT THE CALL OF THE PARTY CENTRAL

This category denotes any reference to appeal for the need to follow the leadership of the Party Central. It also includes reference to the 16-Point Guideline issued by the Central Committee on Aug. 12, 1966, for the Cultural Revolution.

MASSES BEING LED ASTRAY BY THE REACTIONARY ELEMENTS

The category refers to any statement which appeared in the editorials condemning those reactionary elements in the party who have wormed their way into the party and are leading the masses astray.

CALL FOR UNITY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE MASSES AND THE SOLDIERS

Any reference which denotes appeal or call for the unity or alliance or togetherness of the masses and the PLA.

STRUGGLE WITH CIVILITY BUT REFRAIN FROM VIOLENCE

Reference to appeal for exercising restraint in the use of physical force by the various revolutionary groups in the Cultural Revolution.
Z SUPPORT FOR THE TEMPORARILY ESTABLISHED REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE UNDER THE "THREE WAY ALLIANCE"

Reference to appeals for the masses to support the "Three Way Alliance" formula under which representatives of the revolutionary masses, repentant party cadres, and the PLA form the Revolutionary Committee to replace regular party and government machinery during the Cultural Revolution.

AA THE CADRES PROBLEM: UNITING THE REPENTANT AND NEWLY LIBERATED PARTY CADRES WHO HAD TAKEN THE INCORRECT LINE

Reference to concern for the veteran party cadres who have taken the incorrect line (opposing Mao) in the current upheaval and to appeals to bring the repentant ones back into the fold.

BB MASSES FIGHTING AGAINST MASSES, STUDENTS FIGHTING AGAINST STUDENTS

Specific reference and phraseology denoting open fighting and factional rivalry among the revolutionary groups and the Red Guard movement. The category also denotes the existence of pro-Mao as well as anti-Mao factions among the masses and students.

CC WORKERS AND FARMERS OPPOSED TO REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS

Reference to opposition by the workers in the factories and farmers against the irresponsible activities of the students, particularly Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.

DD GENERAL INSTRUCTION TO THE PLA NOT TO SUPPRESS THE MASSES

Specific reference to the appeal and directive to the PLA to refrain from suppressing the masses during the Cultural Revolution. The category also denotes the predicament of the PLA in distinguishing between pro-Mao and anti-Mao revolutionary masses.
EE  **TI-FU-FAN-HUAI-YU**

Specific reference to reactionary elements such as the landlords, kulaks, counter revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists.

FF  **SOVIET REVOLUTIONIST CLIQUE WITHIN THE PARTY**

Reference which denotes admission of the presence of Soviet revisionist clique in the party. It denotes existence of policy difference within the party. "Revisionist Clique" refers to those who adopt moderate approach.

GG  **YOUTH AS SUCCESSORS TO THE REVOLUTION**

Specific reference to the need for cultivating the young students or Red Guards as successors to the Chinese Communist revolution.

HH  **AUTHORITIES—SCHOLARS—SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE THE KNOW-HOW AS REACTIONARIES**

Reference to any statement which expresses condescension toward those in the party who considered themselves authorities or experts by labeling them as reactionaries.

II  **EXISTENCE OF ANARCHICAL CONDITION**

Reference which denotes situation whereby workers in cities abandoned their factories so as to paralyze the production or cadres walked out of their posts when Red Guards began their revolutionary activities. Forces loyal to Mao Tse-tung condemn these activities as anarchism.
JJ INTELLECTURALS UNITE WITH THE WORKERS AND FARMERS

Reference to the appeal for united front of intellectuals (students in particular) and the proletariat.

KK RESOLUTELY TRUST AND SUPPORT THE PLA

Specific reference to any statement or appeal which urges full support and trust of PLA in carrying out its task in the revolution. This category also denotes criticism and attack by anti-Mao forces on the PLA.

LL MAKING THE REVOLUTION ECONOMICALLY

Specific reference to any statement which denotes the wide spread practice of waste and disorder and infringement of the economic rights of the state. For instance, it refers to waste in the use of paper or flour (from which paste for wall posters is made) for making propaganda and requisitioning of public vehicles and gasoline for personal use by the revolutionary groups.

MM CALL FOR GETTING HOLD OF THE REVOLUTION AND GET ON WITH THE PRODUCTION

Specific reference in the form of a slogan which urges everyone to simultaneously carry on with the revolution and maintain production of normal economic activities.

NN WUHAN MILITARY SITUATION

Specific reference to the July (1967) incident when the regional military command in Wuhan in Central China refused to abide by Mao Tse-tung's directive to engage in Cultural Revolution by lending support to the pro-Maoist revolutionary Left groups in that area. When Peking dispatched two emissaries to Wuhan to set matters straight, the Wuhan military command had them arrested. Subsequently the Peking emissaries were released only after Lin Piao had dispatched paratroops to demand a showdown.
RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS

Reference to any one who is opposed to Mao-Lin faction or any group within the party which is not in full agreement with either Mao Tze-tung's policies or goings on in the Cultural Revolution.

PLA'S ENTRY INTO REGIONAL AND LOCAL SITUATIONS

Reference which denotes the PLA's direct intervention or participation on the local level on behalf of the Left revolutionary groups in the Cultural Revolution. The category particularly refers to situations whereby army troops were sent to any given unit of production which needed protection against disruption.

NEED FOR RAISING HIGHER THE POLITICAL REALIZATION OF THE MASSES

Reference to the chaotic state of affairs which existed in many parts of China where opposing forces were formed with each trying to annihilate the other in the name of the Cultural Revolution. The category refers to any expression in the editorials for restoring order and for recognizing who is the real enemy of the revolution.

DOWN WITH ECONOMISM

This category refers to any statement which employs the term coined by Lenin and practiced by Krushchev, according to the Chinese communists. In the usage of the Chinese communist language, it denotes the pursuit of individual interests at the expense of socialism. Often the term is synonymous with another Chinese communist term "individualism." It also denotes the use of material incentives such as wage increases and cash bonuses to induce the workers and peasants to abandon their jobs during the Cultural Revolution.
SS ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR BY THE U.S.

Reference to the introduction of U.S. troops into the Vietnam conflict as enlarging the scope of the war. The reference also has the connotation of a warning that the conflict has been escalated or extended to beyond the original confine.

TT ASSISTANCE AND AID BY LAND TO THE NLF IN SOUTH VIETNAM

This category refers to any editorial statement which is made as a warning or hint that the Chinese communists might intervene in the conflict by rendering assistance by the land route to the "Northern Sector" of South Vietnam. Statement of this kind is usually made as a reaction to the escalation of the conflict by the arrival of U.S. troops.

UU PEACE TALK BY THE IMPERIALIST U.S. IS A TRICK

This category refers to any statement which charges the overtures for a negotiated peace by the U.S. as merely trickery. Statement of this kind must be treated as a policy statement of Communist China vis-à-vis a negotiated settlement on the Vietnam conflict.

VV U.S.-SOVIET POLITICAL COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION

The category denotes the displeasure of frequent U.S.-Soviet political consultation on certain political problems confronting the world. In the eyes of Peking, or the faction which advocates continued strained Sino-Soviet relations, any political cooperation or consultation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union represents further evidence of revisionism.

XX AMERICAN AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM HAS REACHED A NEW CRITICAL STAGE

This category refers to any statement which makes a charge against the U.S. escalation and bombing of North Vietnam as representing a new stage of aggression. The category denotes a certain amount of apprehension about deep involvement of the U.S. in the conflict, particularly the bombing aspect.
APPENDIX C
CONTENT CATEGORIES FOR CODING 260 PLA TESTIMONIALS

A  SELF-SACRIFICE AND SELF-NEGATION
不光牺牲
Any reference which denotes the communist virtue of self-sacrifice for the collectivity.

B  DESTROY PRIVATE THOUGHTS AND FOSTER COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS
破私立公
The statement denotes the concept of "destroy old first in order to foster the new," implying a total commitment to egalitarian life.

C  UNITY-CRITICISM-UNITY
批评—团结—批评
The terms denote the use of self-criticism for correcting erroneous thoughts. It refers to the technique of conducting ideological struggle among the cadres.

D  ENDURE SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP
以苦多荣
Any reference or statement which implies cultivation of hard work as a virtue. It also refers to the mystical appeal in development by intensive employment of labor.

E  LONG SUFFERING ENDURED BY THE PLA DURING THE LONG MARCH
长征艰苦锻炼
Any reference which denotes the PLA accomplishment by long period of hardship and suffering as an experience to be emulated. The statement also denotes the need to instill revolutionary experience into the young revolutionaries.
F  HUMAN WILL AND DETERMINATION

一下决心 克服困难

Any reference which denotes the idea that it is the human will or determination that in the end accomplishes all things. It stresses the human element as the main source for building socialism.

G  EXPERTISE AND SPECIALIZATION AS ANTI-PARTY AND ANTI-SOCIALISM

松木权威谬论

Reference to any statement which expresses contempt for those who are the authorities, scholars, and specialists.

H  SELF-RELIANCE

自力更生

Any reference or statement which expresses the idea of do-it-alone or struggle hard by itself. In terms of economic development the reference means independent development without outside help.

I  POLITICS IN COMMAND

突出政治

Reference or expression which calls for primacy of politics. Any statement or reference under this content category tends to emphasize the importance of the Thought of Mao.

J  ADHERENCE TO MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE

对毛泽东革命路线忠诚

Expressions which indicate the choice of two directions or lines for the revolution: Mao Tze-tung's, or the Left line, as the correct one to follow and the other as the anti-party line.
K Unified Leadership

The reference here denotes unified thinking, policies, command and action. The term is used to describe the prevalent situation in which each rebel group or faction claimed for itself the legitimate revolutionary group. It thus refers to the turmoil and factional strife within the Revolutionary Committees. The slogan refers to the need for a unified stand of the various elements in the Revolutionary Committees to get on with the task at hand and cease bickering.

L Support Collectivized Socialism

References which denote expression of support for the Mao Tse-tung's policies of Great Leap and the Commune programs as opposed to revisionistic tendencies of early 1960's under Liu Shao-chi.

M Service to the People

Reference or statement which denotes total commitment to the collectivity with a mission and purpose.

N Individual Group Mentality

The term refers to groups of mass organizations which disregarded the appeals of the revolutionary Left movement for the curtailment of its individual actions. It denotes disunity among the revolutionary Left as directed by Peking.

O The Mass Line

The content category here refers to Mao Tse-tung's technique of organization of "from the people and to the people." It denotes the preference for mass mobilization and participation in political activities.
P **STRENGTH ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY**

军民团结

Reference to any statement which expresses the idea of "cherish-the-people and love-the-army." It denotes in essence strained relationship between the masses and the PLA troops in their activities of restoring law and order.

Q **REVOLUTION IS RATIONAL**

敢造反

Any reference which denotes justification of attack on the established party apparatus as legitimate.

R **DARE TO REVOLT**

大革命

Any reference which denotes the idea of not being afraid of making revolution. The reference implies the cultivation of the concept of permanent revolution as a virtue.

S **DARE TO BE BRAVE**


g
d

Any statement which denotes encouragement to dare and be brave in overthrowing the party apparatus and old thinking and habits.

T **SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES**

自结合

Any reference to appeals for the masses to support the alliance of PLA, veteran cadres, and mass revolutionary groups to form the temporary power structure during the Cultural Revolution.
U  PLA'S SUPPORT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

Any reference or statement which denotes the active participation of the PLA in the formation of the new power structure known as the Revolutionary Committees at the provincial and basic unit level. It also refers to any idea related to the formula for the alliance on a tripartite coalition basis of the representatives of the PLA, mass organizations, and the rehabilitated cadres.

V  BE HUMBLE AND STOP BEING "I KNOW IT ALL"

Any reference which denotes an attitude of humbleness and willingness to accept new and different ways of doing things.

W  OPPOSITION TO BUREAUCRATISM

This reference denotes Mao Tze-tung's disdain for those party members who often put on "official air" or who joined the party in order to become "an official mandarin." The statement refers to the existence of a rigidified bureaucracy within the party structure.

X  MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK OR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Expression which denotes cultivation of a new revolutionary spirit in that the Thought of Mao Tze-tung can transform man's old thoughts and habits. The statement refers to the idea that social revolution can be achieved only after the intensive ideological transformation so as to raise the social consciousness of the masses through the study and application of the Thought of Mao Tze-tung.

Y  MATERIAL INCENTIVES

Any reference to the practice introduced by Liu Shao-chi such as private plot, wage incentive, and the free market. These are the evil wind of revisionism.
ECONOMISM

The term refers to the pursuit of individual interests at the expense of the state. Specifically it denotes the use of material incentives such as wage increases and cash bonuses to induce the workers and peasants to abandon their jobs during the Cultural Revolution.

LIN PIAO'S FOUR PRIORITIES OF NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES

This refers to Lin Piao's concept on the relationship between men and weapons, political and other work, ideological work and other work, and learning and living ideas. Lin's oft-quoted dictum, "Human element is first, political work first, ideological work first and living ideas first," serves as priorities or guides in daily living.

MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Reference and expression which denotes professionalism and modernization of the military establishment as revisionistic.

FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO

This category denotes any reference to appeal for the need to follow the leadership under Mao Tze-tung at the Party Central. It also includes reference to the 16-Point Guideline issued by the Central Committee on August 12, 1966, for the Cultural Revolution.

PLA AS A MAJOR PILLAR IN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Statements which proclaim or profess that the PLA is an important instrument in the revolution of the proletariat. It also refers to the historic role of the PLA in the armed struggle for power.
EE  REVOLUTIONARY SUCCESSORS

接班人培养
Any reference which denotes the need for cultivating the young as revolutionary successors by instilling in them the ideological elan and virtues.

FF  HONESTY AS HIGHEST VIRTUE

~

Any reference which denotes honesty or truthfulness as highly regarded virtue of the proletariat.

GG  "SLAVISHNESS"

反对"服之具"
Any reference which denotes expression in opposition to complete obedience to the established old party apparatus. The statement generally refers to opposition to the party machinery under the domination of Liu Shao-chi.
APPENDIX D

STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS OF CONTENT CATEGORIES

TABLE D-1. SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 136 EDITORIALS OF JIEFANGJUN BAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>Actual Association, $X$</th>
<th>Chance Association, $\mu$</th>
<th>$X - \mu^a$</th>
<th>$Z$</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/G</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/K</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/GG</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/HH</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/KK</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/UU</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/F</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/G</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/K</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/GG</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/HH</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/QQ</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/UU</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/I</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/J</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/V</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair of Categories</td>
<td>Actual Association Number</td>
<td>% Association, X</td>
<td>Chance Association, µ</td>
<td>X - µ&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Probability of Actual Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/UU</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/M</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/G</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/K</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/S</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/GG</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/JJ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/NN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/QQ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/H</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/K</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/W</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/GG</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/NN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/QQ</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/XX</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/U</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/UU</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/J</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/V</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/Z</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-1. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 136 EDITORIALS OF JIEFANGJUN BAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ (a)</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I/FF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/WW</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/O</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/V</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>.01b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/Z</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/VV</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/WW</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/L</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/HH</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/OO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Q</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>.01b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/GG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/LL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>.01b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/DD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/P</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/Q</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>.01b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/FF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>.01b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/JJ</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>.01b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/LL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/NN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-1. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 136 EDITORIALS OF JIEFANGJUN BAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O/VV</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/WW</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/W</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/AA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/JJ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/NN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/XX</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/BB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/FF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/LL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/MM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/OO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/AA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/BB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/JJ</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/NN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/XX</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/Y</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/DD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/GG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-2.24</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair of Categories</td>
<td>Actual Association Number</td>
<td>% X</td>
<td>Chance Association, μ</td>
<td>$X - μ^a$</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Probability of Actual Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/V</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/W</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/Y</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/QQ</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/X</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/Y</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/GG</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/JJ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/NN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/QQ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/SS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/XX</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X/Y</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X/PP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z/FF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z/WW</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA/BB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA/FF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA/TT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/CC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/DD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-1. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 136 EDITORIALS OF JIEFANGJUN BAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Chance Association, $\mu$</th>
<th>$X - \mu^a$</th>
<th>$Z$</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB/EE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/LL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/TT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/VV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/EE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD/EE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/LL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/MM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/WW</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG/QQ</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG/XX</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH/KK</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH/QQ</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH/SS</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH/UU</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH/XX</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/QQ</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/uu</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/LL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/MM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/00</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-1. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 136 EDITORIALS OF JIEFANGJUN BAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X</th>
<th>Chance Association, $\mu$</th>
<th>$X - \mu^a$</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/QQ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/TT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/XX</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK/QQ</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK/RR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK/SS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK/UU</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL/MM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL/NN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL/OO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM/NN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM/OO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN/OO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN/QQ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN/RR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN/TT</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN/XX</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QQ/RR</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QQ/SS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QQ/XX</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR/SS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-1. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 136 EDITORIALS OF JIEFANGJUN BAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association</th>
<th>Chance Association, ( \mu )</th>
<th>( X - \mu )</th>
<th>( Z )</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RR/UU</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR/XX</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/UU</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/XX</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( a \)Difference of \( X - \mu \) may not subtract exactly due to rounding.

\( b \)Less than .01.


TABLE D-2. SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 115 EDITORIALS OF RENMIN RIBAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% Association, X</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/T</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/II</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/BO</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/D</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/F</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/O</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/GG</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/O</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/F</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Q</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/T</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/FF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/HH</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-2.28</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/G</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/AA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/G</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/Q</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-2. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 115 EDITORIALS OF RENMIN RIBAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X Association</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F/Z</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/EE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/HH</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>- .04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-2.11</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/V</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/Z</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/AA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/BB</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/II</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/QQ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-2.68</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/I</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/J</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/K</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/M</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/O</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/X</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/Z</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/KK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/J</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-2. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 115 EDITORIALS OF RENMIN RIBAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X Association</th>
<th>Chance Association, µ</th>
<th>X - μ&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I/K</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/L</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/N</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/Y</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/KK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/K</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/L</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/O</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/X</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J/KK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/L</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/X</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/Z</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/II</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/KK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/NN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/P</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/O</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pair of Categories</td>
<td>Actual Association Number</td>
<td>% X</td>
<td>Chance Association, μ</td>
<td>X - μ^a</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Probability of Actual Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/T</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/V</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/FF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/NN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/OO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/NN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/QQ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/O</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/GG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/Q</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/T</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/X</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/FF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/HH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/KK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/NN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/GO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/FF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/HH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE D-2. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 115 EDITORIALS OF RENMIN RIBAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>$X - \mu^a$</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q/KK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/FF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/HH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/CC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/EE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/VV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-2.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/AA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/BB</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/QQ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X/KK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X/NN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y/BB</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y/QQ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z/AA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z/II</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/CC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/DD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB/JJ</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-2. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 115 EDITORIALS OF RENMIN RIBAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB/LL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/DD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/GG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/MM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE/HH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE/MM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE/OO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/HH</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/KK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ/MM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL/MM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL/RR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM/RR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/UU</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/VV</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/XX</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UU/VV</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UU/XX</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VV/XX</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Difference of X - μ may not subtract exactly due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup>Less than .01.
TABLE D-3. SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 260 PLA CADRES' TESTIMONIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>Actual Association % X</th>
<th>Chance Association, $\mu$</th>
<th>$X - \mu^a$</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-3.02</td>
<td>-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/D</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/K</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/M</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/S</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/D</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/X</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/DD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-2.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/D</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/T</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/V</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/BB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-2.24</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/F</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/M</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/CC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-2.50</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/DD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/R</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/S</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-3. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 260 PLA CADRES' TESTIMONIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/U</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/AA</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/BB</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/AA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/M</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/GG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Y</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Z</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/FF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/T</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/V</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/W</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/T</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/Y</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q/EE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/Z</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/U</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/V</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/Z</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE D-3. (Continued) SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM 260 PLA CADRES' TESTIMONIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair of Categories</th>
<th>Actual Association Number</th>
<th>% X</th>
<th>Chance Association, μ</th>
<th>X - μ&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>Probability of Actual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V/W</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y/Z</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/DD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/GG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE/FF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Difference of X - μ may not subtract exactly due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup>Less than .01.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Serials


(Superseded by Chung Kung Yen Chiu.)


2. Monographs and Special Studies


Lung, Fei. "Chang kung ke ming wei yuan hui ze tiao tsai feng tsi" ("Analysis of Revolutionary Committees"). Chung Kung Yen Chiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 30, 1968), pp. 4-23.


"Military and Civil Societies: The Contemporary Significance of a Traditional Subject in Political Theory."
Political Studies, Vol. XII, No. 2 (June, 1964), pp. 178-201.

"The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation."


Spitz, Allan A. Contemporary China. Washington State University
World Affairs Institute on Contemporary China. Pullman: Washington

Tang Tsou. "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political

Tanter, Raymond. "Toward a Theory of Political Development." 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Spring, 1967),
pp. 145-172.

Taylor, John J. "The Maoist Revolutionary Model in Asia." Current

Townsend, James R. Political Participation in Communist China.

Trabant, Raymond. "Towan:~

Taylor, John J. "The Maoist Revolutionary Model in Asia." Current

Townsend, James R. Political Participation in Communist China.

Treadgold, Donald, ed. Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities

Tucker, Robert C. "On the Contemporary Study of Communism." World

Uhally, Stephen, Jr. "The Cultural Revolution and the Attack on the
'Three Family Village". The China Quarterly, No. 27 (July-
September, 1966), pp. 149-165.

U. S. Congress, Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations on U. S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, 89th

Order Defines PLA Activities in the Cultural Revolution." Sample of

Van Doorn, Jaques, ed. Armed Forces and Society: Sociological

Vogel, Ezra. Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a
1969.

"From Revolutionary to Semi-bureaucrat: The
'Regularization' of Cadres." The China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-
March, 1967), pp. 36-60.


---
