INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of “sectioning” the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.
REALITY SET, SOCIALIZATION
AND
LINGUISTIC CONVERGENCE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN LINGUISTICS
DECEMBER 1982

By
Suzanne Bau Kam Scollon

Dissertation Committee:
George W. Grace, Chairman
Michael L. Forman
Patricia Lee
Ann Peters
Stephen Boggs
Fang Kuei Li
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work developed in conjunction with research reported in
Linguistic Convergence: An Ethnography of Speaking at Fort Chipewyan,
Alberta (Scollon and Scollon 1979) and Narrative, Literacy and Face in
Interethnic Communication (Scollon and Scollon in press). I would
like to acknowledge the many people who contributed to those works.

The Alaska Native Language Center supported my research on this
dissertation from September 1978 to June 1980. I benefited especially
from discussions with Eliza Jones and Katherine Peter. Hundreds of
people from Fort Chipewyan, Alberta to Holy Cross, Alaska aided in my
understanding of socialization.

Michael Forman encouraged me to pursue inquiry into
socialization, and George Grace challenged me to relate it to
ethnolinguistic concerns. Carol Odo, Sue Iwamura, and Pat Lee
provided sympathetic and critical feedback on an earlier version.

I am indebted to Ron Scollon for jointly creating with me the
worlds alluded to in this dissertation, and for making it possible for
me to write it. Without Rachel and Tommy I would not have had access
to or the background to understand information on the socialization of
Athabaskan children.
This dissertation in ethnolinguistics is an attempt to show how values can persist when the language of a social group is replaced, and can have an effect on the linguistic structure of that group's language. Where the values are not adequately reflected already in the new language, that language may change in order to better express the values of the community. Methods of socialization, while employing a new language, may reflect traditional processes of communication. Thus culture, which consists mainly of patterns of social interaction by which values are transmitted in socialization, may indirectly effect linguistic change. Data from one group of people, whom I refer to as Athabaskans, suggest that looking at the functions of language in social interaction and socialization may help us understand linguistic change and the relationships among language, thought, and reality.

In subarctic Alaska and Western Canada, people speak a variety of English characterized by such features as subject deletion, frequent hedges, and the declarative word order in question formation. Differences between this variety and Standard English have often been attributed to calques on the native languages of speakers. Since the number of people in this area who speak native languages is rapidly decreasing but the features which characterize this variety of English persist, the divergent features of this variety cannot be due to
direct interference of the native languages on this generation of speakers.

In previous work Ron Scollon and I (1979) documented linguistic convergence in the community of Fort Chipewyan, Alberta, and explained it in terms of the reality set of the community, the bush consciousness. Because of the integrative aspect, which is its mode of cognition, speakers tend to integrate knowledge of the different languages spoken in the community into one grammatical system. This explanation emphasizes the cognitive economy of linguistic convergence resulting from habitual calquing. The approach to language as a pragmatic means of communication has convergence as a natural consequence.

In this study I explore more fully the role of nonintervention, the aspect of the bush consciousness that governs social relations. The value placed on individuality implies nonintervening patterns of interaction, manifest as linguistic strategies of deference. On the basis of tape recordings, observations, and published texts of people representative of the region, socialization practices are described in order to show how children are socialized to nonintervening interaction, which result in the cognitive orientation of "thematic abstraction." Linguistic forms which are the structural outcome of these socialization practices are presented. The structures, which reflect deference politeness and are the linguistic manifestation of nonintervention, are in some cases used in variation with Standard English forms, which are functionally specialized for use in modern contexts. The use of linguistic forms reflecting deference politeness

vi
in contexts requiring nonintervening patterns of social interaction warrants the claim that the linguistic structures have been shaped by social pressures, the socialization practices of the social group.

The interaction between social relationship and linguistic change is preliminary to an investigation of linguistic relativity, or the relationship between language and cognition. If there is a relationship between social interaction and linguistic form, a link between language and thought cannot be direct, but must be seen as mediated by patterns of social interaction. If language is an instrument of enculturation for the child, and the content form of language is shaped to some extent by patterns of socialization, then the child's reality can be said to be at least in part socially constructed. The linguistic discussion of the social construction of reality may enable us to begin to talk about the relationships among language, thought, and reality in more productive ways than has been done in the past.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT  ....................................... iv
ABSTRACT  .............................................. v
LIST OF FIGURES  ........................................ x
LIST OF SYMBOLS  ....................................... xi
PREFACE  ................................................ xii

SECTION I. BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

  I.1 Goal  ............................................. 2
  I.2 Linguistic relativity  .............................. 14
  I.3 Functions of language  ............................. 24
  I.4 Social interaction  ................................ 29
  I.5 Content form  ...................................... 33
  I.6 Socialization  ..................................... 36
  I.7 Summary  .......................................... 43
  NOTE  .................................................. 47

CHAPTER II. BUSH CONSCIOUSNESS: REALITY SET
IN THE SUBARCTIC BUSH

  II.0 Introduction  ................................... 48
  II.1 Reality set  ...................................... 49
  II.2 Bush consciousness  ............................... 53
  II.3 Cognitive orientation: thematic abstraction  .... 62
  II.4 Deference  ....................................... 67
  II.5 Conclusion  ....................................... 68

SECTION II. DATA

CHAPTER III. LINGUISTIC SOCIALIZATION TO DEERENCE:
LEARNING NON-INTERVENING PATTERNS OF
INTERACTION

  III.0 Introduction  ................................ 71
  III.1 Data and method  ................................. 73
  III.2 Nonintervening teaching and learning  .......... 75
  III.3 Training in the decontextualization of self  .... 83
III.4 Nonattribution .................................. 91
III.5 Summary ........................................ 105
NOTE .................................................. 107

CHAPTER IV. QUESTIONS AND INTERVENTION

IV.0 Introduction .................................... 108
IV.1 Questions as intervention ...................... 110
IV.2 Yes-no questions: form and function ........ 117
IV.3 The structure of questions in Chipewyan
      and English calques .............................. 120
IV.4 Functions of questions .......................... 128
IV.5 Conclusion ....................................... 142
NOTES .................................................. 144

CHAPTER V. DEFERENCE

V.0 Introduction .................................... 145
V.1 Quotation and intervention ...................... 146
V.2 Indirectness ...................................... 153
V.3 Hedges ............................................ 161
V.4 Other strategies of deference .................... 175
NOTE .................................................. 192

SECTION III. CONCLUSION

CHAPTER VI. SOCIALIZATION AND LINGUISTIC CHANGE:
             EXPLANATIONS OF CONVERGENCE ............ 195

APPENDIX A. BROWN AND LEVINSON'S POSITIVE
              POLITENESS STRATEGIES ...................... 206

APPENDIX B. BROWN AND LEVINSON'S NEGATIVE
              POLITENESS STRATEGIES ...................... 209

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 216


LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Bush Consciousness</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Modern Consciousness</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partial View of Language and Cognition</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF SYMBOLS

The following conventions have been used in preparing the transcriptions. These have been adapted from Tannen (1979) and from Scollon and Scollon (1981a).

A new line indicates a pause.
A slash (/) indicates non-final intonation.
Double slashes (//) indicate final, falling intonation.
A question mark indicates rising intonation.
A question mark within slashes /?/ indicates incomprehensible talk.
Brackets ([ ]) linking lines of the transcription indicate overlapping talk.
Brackets ([]) linking lines of the transcription where the second line continues after the completion of the first indicate that the second utterance was latched to the first without pause.
Parentheses enclose comments on such phenomena as laughter.
PREFACE

The thinking that led to this dissertation began in 1972, when I was working with Ron Scollon on a study of context: its effects on the syntax of a one year-old in Honolulu and on linguistic elicitation of Gwich'in Athabaskan in Arctic Village, Alaska. When Bateson's *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* was released that year, I bought a copy that resulted in a seminar on structure and context in linguistic inquiry. Paul Kay, Ron Scollon, Mike Forman, Greg Lee, Ann Peters, and others were involved, and publications on child language by Ron Scollon and Ann Peters grew out of it.

This dissertation, which grew out of the atmosphere of that seminar, will partly explain why I didn't have much to say in the seminar itself. In the process of doing fieldwork in Arctic Village for two months, my patterns of social interaction had changed to such an extent that I could not talk with people in Honolulu in a way that was intelligible to them. I was experiencing a conflict in what we later described as reality set.

In Arctic Village, our attempt to record the speech of a one year-old led to a study of the context of the speech and communication of a young child. I continued this study with Ron Scollon and with Ann Peters and, after the birth of our daughter, began an ethnographic study of her socialization into Hawaiian Chinese and Cantonese communicative patterns. All of this became background for the ethnography of speaking conducted with Ron Scollon in Fort Chipewyan,
Alberta in 1976-1977. One might say that he was studying the social context of narratives while I was investigating the social context of children's language, but that would be an obvious oversimplification, as the two overlapped a good deal.

On returning from the field I wrote a preliminary report (S. Scollon 1977), in which I further pursued the discussion of structuralism in relation to children's language, ethnolinguistics, and linguistic change.

Our move to Alaska in 1978 enabled me to further pursue inquiry into reality set, the social setting of children's language among Athabaskans, and the use of the interactive narrative for developing the cognitive orientation of thematic abstraction. Interweaving threads from Fort Chipewyan and Alaska, we related modes of cognition associated with oral narrative and essayist literacy to differing face relations (Scollon and Scollon 1981a,b).

What remained was to tie face relations to linguistic structure, which is what this dissertation attempts to do. I see this as a central aim of the ethnography of speaking. I have tried, at the risk of boring repetition, to present the material from our two books (Scollon and Scollon 1979, 1981a) necessary for the reader to follow my argument. This has not been easy, and I can only refer the reader to the other sources for the remaining gaps.
SECTION I
BACKGROUND
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Goal

This is a dissertation in ethnolinguistics. It is an attempt to show how values, which are at the heart of culture, can persist when the language of a social group is replaced, and can have an effect on the linguistic structure of the language that comes to be spoken by the members of the group. Thus, the shift from one language to another may reflect shifts in social and demographic factors, i.e., living in settlements instead of following the game, but not necessarily change in the heart of culture. Where the values are not adequately reflected already in the new language, that language may change in order to better express the values of the community. Methods of socialization, while employing a new language, may reflect traditional processes of communication. Thus culture, which consists mainly of patterns of social interaction by which values are transmitted in socialization, may indirectly affect linguistic structure. I use data from one group of people, whom I refer to as Athabaskans, to make this argument that looking at the functions of language in social interaction and socialization may help us understand linguistic adaptation and the relationships among language, thought, and reality. By "Athabaskan" I mean "Northern Athabaskan."

Many natives of the subarctic interior regions of Alaska and Western Canada speak a variety of English known in Alaska as "Village
English," "Indian English," or "Alaska Native English." This variety is characterized by such features as subject deletion, frequent hedges, and the declarative word order in question formation. Differences between this variety and Standard English have often been attributed to calques on the native language of speakers. Though Athabaskan has been historically spoken in this area, most people no longer learn to speak Athabaskan. The divergent features of English which continue to be learned, then, cannot be due to direct interference from Athabaskan. Though they may be passed on from generation to generation, their persistence under the pressures of Standard English from the educational system and the media needs to be accounted for.¹

In research in the community of Fort Chipewyan in northern Alberta, Ron Scollon and I found that the four languages spoken there had converged in phonology, syntax, and lexicon. The convergence of Chipewyan, Cree, French, and English, we argue, is a cognitive outcome of the worldview or, to use a term we have introduced, reality set of the members of the speech community (Scollon and Scollon 1979). The integrative aspect of the reality set we call the "bush consciousness" implies a mode of cognition that treats language as a pragmatic means of communication rather than as a discrete entity or system with a particular history. Because people have had to communicate with speakers of other languages, and because for the bush consciousness all knowledge is integrated within the reality set of the individual,
they have integrated the structures of different languages into a single system with different realizations in each language.

The habitual calquing that has facilitated convergence is related to the nonintervening aspect of the bush consciousness. That is, people accommodate to other speakers by allowing them to speak in their own language, thus respecting the individuality of each speaker. Though the changes in the languages have been fostered by the social milieu in which speakers interact, we consider the convergence itself to be the result of cognitive pressures, an adaptation to the cognitive demands of communicating in more than one language. The variety of English spoken at Fort Chipewyan, according to this view, has been shaped by the adaptation of speakers to the other languages in the community. This adaptation has been in the interest of simplifying cognitive processing.

In this study I explore more fully the role of nonintervention, the aspect of the bush consciousness that governs social relations. Values shared by a society imply patterns of social interaction such as the linguistic strategies of politeness described by Brown and Levinson (1978). Although they generally emphasize universals, they allow for different societies to favor one or the other type of politeness. Among Athabaskans, the value placed on individuality implies nonintervening patterns of interaction, manifest as linguistic strategies of deference. Socialization practices are described in order to show how children are socialized to nonintervening patterns of interaction, which result in the cognitive orientation of "thematic
abstraction." Linguistic forms which are the structural outcome of these socialization practices are presented.

In order to advance this claim, I will first need to discuss the linguistic field which provides the context for this work. My claim that languages undergo convergent change not only because of cognitive pressures on speakers but also because of social pressures is developed under the general rubric of the issue of linguistic relativity. While the work of Sapir and Whorf treated linguistic relativity largely as a cognitive issue, more recently Hymes has argued that social factors are of central importance to this issue.

While not directly presenting their work as part of the discourse on linguistic relativity, Brown and Levinson (1978) have provided an important theoretical impetus and descriptive apparatus for dealing more directly with the connections between social factors and linguistic structure. My work relies heavily on the theoretical work of Brown and Levinson (1978).

Grace (1981) argues that language has not been described in a way that facilitates statements about linguistic change or the relation of language to culture, thought, or reality. He proposes that "content form" might be the component of language that responds to selective pressures from extralinguistic sources such as culture. He suggests that "content form" might characterize the part of languages, aside from phonetic realizations, that converge when speakers have prolonged contact with speakers of other languages. He speculates that as a result of continual calquing in anticipation of and recollection of conversations with speakers of other languages,
the content form of languages spoken in the same community would tend to converge. He suggests that attitudes and reality constructs might also have an effect on content form. I consider the linguistic strategies of politeness identified by Brown and Levinson (1978) to be a part of the content form that Grace proposes as the part of language that provides a link to culture, or the specific manifestation in particular languages of these strategies required by the culture of the speakers of those languages.

The work of Grace was a significant influence on our work in linguistic convergence. Since our work in Fort Chipewyan we have continued to pursue the issue of the cognitive and social pressures on linguistic structure. In that work we argued that the four languages spoken in the community had converged as a cognitive outcome of the reality set we call the "bush consciousness." We exemplified the convergence by looking at Chipewyan and English, whose phonologies had become more like that of Cree. Phonological reduction had the effect of making Chipewyan morphology resemble English, and English clause structures had converged on Chipewyan. The semantic structure of words had also converged. This convergence had taken place in the context of the reality set of members of the speech community. This reality set, the bush consciousness, consists of four aspects. The individualistic aspect places a high value on individual autonomy. The nonintervening aspect governs social relations, supporting individuality by restricting interference in the lives of others. The integrative aspect relates to cognitive structure, modes of learning.
Finally, the entropic aspect resists the imposition of foreign structures that cannot be integrated into the knowledge of the individual. Because the integrative aspect of the bush consciousness implies a holistic mode of cognition, language is not separated into langues or discrete systems, but rather all languages are integrated into a single system within the knowledge of each individual. In this view, convergence takes place as a kind of cognitive economy. This present work is an extension of this discussion of linguistic convergence, now looking at the social factors involved in convergent change.

After presenting the theoretical background of this work, I will treat the body of data on which this study is founded. While using the primary data base of the material collected concurrently with our earlier convergence work I have extended this base to include material collected throughout interior Alaska. This material includes published texts as well as notebook observations and tape recordings.

Having presented the theoretical context of this work and the background of our own work in this area I will then begin the substance of the argument. First I will present a description of the socialization practices of northern Athabaskans in order to show how children are socialized to nonintervening patterns of interaction. Here I also describe the cognitive orientation we call "thematic abstraction" (Scollon and Scollon 1981a), which develops together with nonintervention in social relations. As shown in Figure 1a, thematic abstraction is the cognitive result of socialization to nonintervention.
Following the presentation of the socialization practices I will then present a discussion of the linguistic forms themselves which I argue are the structural outcome of these socialization practices. These structures reflect deference politeness, and are the linguistic manifestation of nonintervention. In some cases they are used in variation with Standard English forms. Since the social context that will predict the use of one structure rather than another can be specified, I argue that the variation cannot be attributed to the cognitive constraints of calquing. Since the use of these structures in specifiable contexts is consistent with nonintervening norms of social interaction, it warrants the claim that the linguistic structures have been shaped by social pressures, the socialization practices of northern Athabaskans.

The discussion will be concluded by placing the argument that social factors have an effect on linguistic convergence in the context of discussions of linguistic adaptation. Since the structures used to conform to norms of nonintervention represent adaptations, this further warrants the claim that social factors are significant in the adaptation of the English language in this setting. I argue that while the neogrammariian position that languages change as a result of internal structural pressures accounts for some cases, and while as we have argued earlier cognitive considerations form a significant selective pressure, neither of these explanations is sufficient in itself. At least a third factor of social pressures such as those provided by socialization to particular values and norms must be considered in discussions of linguistic adaptation.
In speaking of linguistic adaptation, we need to distinguish
between the "langue" and the language of the speech community (S.
Scollon 1977). The language of the speech community is continually
undergoing change, as speakers of Athabaskan are introduced to
English, their children learn English, and their children in turn
learn their variety of English. Most children are now learning at
least two varieties of English—the variety spoken in the community
and the standard variety taught at school. In the first stages of
contact, much of the change was due to convergence on local languages.
Later, as schooling was introduced, the two varieties of English
became functionally specialized. I will try to show that local forms,
both calques on Athabaskan and innovations, represent adaptations of
the English language in this setting to serve communicative needs of
non-intervention in social interaction.

In the next section, I discuss the trends in linguistics,
anthropology, and sociology that led to this work. Beginning with the
ideas of Sapir and Whorf, I try to present the theoretical bases for
investigating how aspects of the social context of language such as
socialization practices might affect the content form of language.

In dealing with complex loops of language, culture, reality set,
cognition, social interaction, and socialization, and the dynamics of
how these interact to produce change, it is not possible to specify at
each point just where and how it fits into the whole picture. Figure
1 is an attempt to show the interrelationships.
VALUES
REALITY SET
  Individuality
  Integration
  Nonintervention (entropic resistance)

CогNITION
  Thematic Abstraction

LANGUAGE
  Athabaskan English
  Convergence

CONTENT FORM
  Linguistic strategies of deference
  Outside English, reality set, etc.

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
DISCOURSE
  Narrative

FACE RELATIONS
  Deference

SOCIALIZATION

OBJECTIVE OF TRAINING
  Decontextualization of Self

PRACTICES
  Teasing
  Accommodation

Bush Consciousness

Figure 1a
Modern Consciousness

Figure 1b
We start with the values of the reality set, here the bush consciousness. The prime value of individual autonomy implies integration of knowledge at the level of the individual. This integration requires nonintervention in social relations so that the individual can make his own sense of the world. The entropic aspect of the bush consciousness results from individuality, integration, and nonintervention. Any order that places restrictions on the individual's autonomy by interfering with his thought or action is resisted.

The values of the bush consciousness imply patterns of social interaction such as narrative discourse and face relations of deference. Narratives allow listeners to draw their own conclusions and are used for instruction as well as entertainment. Face relations of deference also follow from the value placed on nonintervention.

Nonintervening patterns of social interaction imply patterns of socialization that will inculcate deference in the young. The objective of socialization is training in the decontextualization of self, by which the child develops autonomy. He learns by accommodation to the activities of his elders, balanced by assimilation in which he tries things out by himself. In this he intervenes as little as possible in the lives of others, and they in turn leave him pretty much to himself. In contrast to the general pattern of nonintervention, children are frequently teased so that they learn how to respond to intervention.

These methods of socialization result in the cognitive orientation of thematic abstraction and convergence in the content.
form of language, specifically linguistic strategies of deference. Some of these strategies are innovations.

To complete the circle, language and cognition perpetuate the values of the reality set.

The modern consciousness, as shown in Figure 1b, values componentiality and bureaucracy, which requires decontextualization. These values lead to face relations of solidarity and conversation as the preferred form of discourse. These patterns of social interaction require socialization patterns such as the use of training questions and expansion of small children's utterances, which encourage an intersubjectivity between caregivers and children from an early age. An objective of socialization is learning to fictionalize the self. This entails learning to take distance from oneself by talking about the self in the third person, as an observer. The child learns to talk about things out of context. These socialization practices result in the literate orientation and the use of English, in this case, which embodies in its content form linguistic strategies of solidarity. In modern families, the values of componentiality and bureaucracy are transmitted by means of English and the literate orientation. In bush children, English is modified to convey deference.

The order of presentation of the material in what follows is that of the argument outlined above. The theoretical context of this work is presented in the next section of this chapter. Here, I attempt to show the need for looking at the social context of language use as a preliminary to discussing linguistic relativity. I also discuss the
study of socialization as a key to linguistic change. Chapter 2 presents the reality set, the bush consciousness, with its values of individuality, integration, and nonintervention, as an example of values which might affect language by filtering through the process of communication. It also introduces the cognitive orientation of the bush consciousness, thematic abstraction, and contrasts it with the cognitive orientation of the modern consciousness toward literacy. Thematic abstraction relates to the integrative approach to knowledge, as deference in social relations relates to the nonintervening aspect of the bush consciousness. I present two kinds of data. The first displays nonintervention in social relations and describes socialization practices which enhance the development of nonintervening patterns of social interaction. The second constitute examples of linguistic structures which I claim have been shaped by these social factors. Chapter 3 presents the data on nonintervention and socialization to patterns of deference in face relations. Chapters 4 and 5 present the linguistic strategies of deference which I am claiming have been shaped by the socialization practices described in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 is the conclusion, which relates socialization and reality set to linguistic adaptation, opening up the ethnolinguistic discussion of language, thought, and reality.

I.2 Linguistic relativity

Linguistic relativity, brought to the attention of American linguists by Sapir and Whorf, has not frequently been taken seriously
as an issue in modern linguistics. Whorf states the principle as follows:

We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated (Whorf 1956:214).

The separation of linguistics from anthropology has effectively prevented investigation of this issue (Hymes 1977).

Whorf suggested connections between cultural norms and linguistic patterns.

These connections are to be found not so much by focusing attention on the typical rubrics of linguistic, ethnographic, or sociological description as by examining the culture and the languages (always and only when the two have been together historically for a considerable time) as a whole in which concatenations that run across these departmental lines may be expected to exist, and if they do exist, eventually to be discoverable by study (Whorf 1956:159).

More recently, Hymes (1966) has advocated the ethnography of speaking as a preliminary to the study of the effects of differences in linguistic structure on thought and reality. He calls for an increased emphasis on the study of variation of function across languages.

As Hymes points out, the functional role of a language may differ for each individual speaker. A language learned at a mature age and used only for reading materials of a particular type will have a different effect in shaping cognition than a language learned in the process of primary socialization. Also, a language is likely to have a different role for a bilingual than for a monolingual.
Another consideration is what Hymes calls the "direction of dependence" in the relationship between language and culture. It is not at all obvious which is primary. Hymes suggests that Sapir took the position in his later writings that culture determines language at the level of whole societies, but language shapes culture for the individual child being socialized. The direction of dependence may depend on the age at which a language is learned.

Hymes contends that the role of language may differ from community to community. As we have argued (Scollon and Scollon 1979), language is a different entity for members of the speech community of Fort Chipewyan than it is for modern Western speakers of European languages or even modern Japanese speakers. English would thus be expected to have a different role in shaping cognition for speakers who learn a variety that has been shaped by converging with other languages to meet the needs of the reality set of Fort Chipewyan than for modern speakers who learn English as their mother tongue. The cognitive significance of a language, Hymes argues, is dependent not only on its structure but on its functional role in contexts of use. This leads him to the position that a study of functional variation across languages is logically prior to a study of structural variation. This he proposes as a second type of linguistic relativity which puts the study of social factors before that of cognitive ones. Hymes' paper suggests that a productive inquiry into the use and functional role of languages would involve looking at multilinguals and their worldview(s). Grace (1981) speaks of the integration of languages in the idiolects of individual speakers. Activities such as
code-switching and translation might provide important windows on the relationships between language and culture.

When speakers of different languages share a worldview or way of life, the languages may converge, as they have at Kupwar Village in India (Gumperz and Wilson 1971), Fort Chipewyan, Alberta (Scollon and Scollon 1979), and Tlaxcala and Puebla, Mexico (Hill and Hill 1980). The convergence of Chipewyan, Cree, French, and English at Fort Chipewyan may be viewed as a byproduct of the reality set of the community, which views language as a pragmatic means of communication rather than a discrete structural entity.

Grace (1981) suggests that what converges in situations such as those mentioned above can be described in terms of "content form." He defines content form as "everything concerned in the conceptualization of the message." He proposes that looking at such aspects of content form as idiomatic ways of saying things might shed some light on the problem of linguistic relativity. Content form is another term for what Whorf calls the patterns or pattern-system of a language. Grace contends that our ordinary descriptions of language have not enabled us to deal with the patterns which shape culture and cognition. The content form is the abstract aspect of language which is integrated into culture and evolves along with it.

The concept of content form, however, may itself be subject to relativistic argument. That is, it may carry assumptions about the way language functions. One aspect of content form is metalanguage, or expressions for talking about language and communication. Reddy
demonstrates how what he calls the "conduit metaphor" pervades our thinking in English about how communication takes place. He notes numerous examples which imply that thoughts are objectified and then transferred as physical objects would be transferred from speaker to hearer. The following examples are from Reddy (1979):

(1) Try to get your thoughts across better.
(2) None of Mary's feelings came through to me with any clarity.
(3) You still haven't given me any idea of what you mean.
(4) Whenever you have a good idea practice capturing it in words.

He argues that the English language encourages us to think of communication in terms of putting things (ideas) into words, or objectifying them, as if language were a pipe through which ideas and feelings could be pumped.

A conservative estimate would (thus) be that, of the entire metalingual apparatus of the English language, at least seventy percent is directly, visibly, and graphically based on the conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979:298).

Reddy suggests that one can avoid these expressions but that the result would not be idiomatic English.

We will see later that the idiom of Athabaskan speakers of English is not based on the conduit metaphor. Listeners are expected to make inferences about what speakers say, rather than get the meaning directly from the words.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) considerably extend Reddy's discussion of the conduit metaphor. They give examples of sentences that have no meaning without context or mean different things to different people,
and point out that the conduit metaphor, with its assumption that meaning is contained in words and sentences, does not fit these cases.

These examples show that the metaphorical concepts we have looked at provides us with a partial understanding of what communication, argument, and time are and that, in doing this, they hide other aspects of these concepts. It is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total (1980:12-13).

In suggesting that "content form" may itself be subject to relativistic argument, I am saying that the conduit metaphor on which it is based may provide us with only a partial understanding of how language works. As Lakoff and Johnson go on to say, "So when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, we mean that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others" (1980:13).

As a way of proposing an alternative way of understanding communication, Reddy offers a hypothetical example which he calls the "toolmakers paradigm" to "draw out ... the deeper implications of the conduit metaphor by means of contrast" (Reddy 1979:292). In this paradigm, which I will not elaborate in much detail here, "radical subjectivity" is assumed. Persons live in different environments and can exchange only written instructions for tools they have invented. They cannot assume knowledge of each others' working materials or conditions. They know about each others' lives only by constructing inferences through expending much effort at verbal interaction. the contexts of sender and receiver are so different that messages are difficult to interpret. Whereas the conduit metaphor assumes communication should flow smoothly, Reddy's hypothetical toolmakers
paradigm and radical subjectivity lead to the expectation that, "Human communication will almost always go astray unless real energy is expended" (1979:295). Reddy's hypothetical case shows that it is possible at least to have a metaphor which fits better with the entropy expression of the second law of thermodynamics than does the conduit metaphor. "Successful human communication involves an increase in organization, which cannot happen spontaneously or of its own accord" (Reddy 1979:296). He suggests that there was much confusion in information theory associated with the second law of thermodynamics and the expression of information as negative entropy, which can be attributed to a conflict with the conduit metaphor which pervades ordinary English.

R. Scollon (1980) reports a metaphor for communication which resembles Reddy's radical subjectivity. In the Chipewyan of Francois Mandeville, recorded by Fang-Kuei Li, the same verb stem (underlined in the example below) is used to talk about a person understanding speech, a dog chewing meat off a bone, and a woman picking berries.

done yat'ayé ná - ho - s - zás
person speech I-am-following
(continuative-abstract-1st person-stem)
'I am following closely his talk', 'I understand thoroughly'

tí ná - ho - de - (Ø) - l - zás
dog it-picks-food
(continuative-abstract-gender-3rd person=Ø-classifier-stem)
'The dog is picking out all that is edible'

djíye hîk'á ho - de - (Ø) - l - zás
berries for she-is-looking
(abstract-gender-3rd person=Ø-classifier-stem)
'She is looking for all the berries she can get'
This metaphor, like Reddy's hypothetical toolmakers paradigm, places responsibility for communication on the listener, not on the speaker, as the conduit metaphor does. Making sense out of someone's talk is more like roving the countryside picking berries out of leaves and stems than buying a can of berries at the store.

In Chipewyan and other Athabaskan languages, there appear to be no expressions equivalent to what Reddy terms the "repertoire members" of the conduit set, nouns constituting a "'repertoire' of mental and emotional material, such as 'ideas', 'thoughts', 'meanings', or 'feeling'" (Reddy 1979:289).

Speakers whose languages do not constrain them with the conduit metaphor would not be likely to think of a primary function of language as the storage of information for future use by others. As Reddy says of his hypothetical example,

> From this point of view, there are of course no ideas in the words, and therefore none in any books, nor on any tapes or records. There are no ideas whatsoever in any libraries (1979:309).

That is, the ideas are not in these sources, but in the decoding abilities of people.

Here it is important to reiterate Lakoff and Johnson's point that metaphors partially structure our understanding. While the conduit metaphor may be the prevailing metaphor regarding the nature of language in English, this structuring of our understanding of the nature of language is only partial. Reddy's hypothetical example shows that other views are possible, even in English. Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, in their work *Communication in Organizations* (1976),
express the view that communication is a process relying heavily on
the work of the listener. "The most important single element in the
communication process is the receiver (1976:12). Though they write in
the English language and much of their discussion of communication is
structured in terms of the conduit metaphor, they are not constrained
by it.

Reddy's hypothetical example and Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers' work
show that it is possible to take a view that is not constrained by the
conduit metaphor. This alternative view fits with the reality set we
have described for people at Fort Chipewyan (Scollon and Scollon
1979), for whom knowledge that is decontextualized or not integrated
into one's life is viewed as being of little value. This is also
consistent with what I call "process orientation" in Athabaskan (S.
Scollon, to appear). Speakers of two Athabaskan languages telling the
same stories in Athabaskan and English tend to prefer verbal statement
in Athabaskan and nominal statement in English. I relate this
tendency to the literate tradition of English. The habit of talking
about communication in terms of conduits is part of a more general
tendency of the English language to objectify abstract notions as
"things" expressed by nouns.

Thus it appears that speakers' views of the nature of language
and communication may be reflected in the content form of the language
they speak. If this is the case, then a discussion of "content form"
itself may be biased toward the view of the language of the
discussion, in this case English. Reddy says that someone who sought
to overcome the bias of the conduit metaphor "would clearly have to
create new language as he restructured his thought" (Reddy 1979:302).

He goes on to say,

So far as I know, none of the thinkers who have tried to present alternate theories of language and the nature of meaning have had this awareness (of the biasing power of the conduit metaphor) (1979:302).

Reddy illustrates the confusion caused by the conduit metaphor in the development of mathematical information theory.

Information is defined as the ability to make nonrandom selections from some set of alternatives. . . . The whole notion of information as 'the power to make selections' rules out the idea that signals contain message (1979:303).

According to Reddy, numerous attempts to extend information theory to include human language and behavior failed.

I think that the reason for these failures was the interaction of the conduit metaphor with the conceptual foundations of information theory. As soon as people ventured away from the original, well-defined area of mathematics, and were forced to rely more on ordinary language, the essential insight of information theory was muddled beyond repair (1979:304).

This account is reminiscent of Whorf's view that Einstein had to break away from ordinary language to conceive of relativity. "What we call 'scientific thought' is a specialization of the western Indo-European type of language" (Whorf 1956:256). There is good reason for the fit between laws of classical physics and common sense. "Newtonian space, time, and matter are no intuitions. They are recepts from culture and language. That is where Newton got them" (Whorf 1956:153).

Before Whorf, Sapir wrote of the need for linguists to be aware of the ways in which we are affected by our language.

Linguists should be in an excellent position to assist in the process of making clear to ourselves the implications of
our terms and linguistic procedures. Of all students of human nature, the linguist should by the very nature of his subject matter be the most relativist in feeling, the least taken in by the forms of his own speech (Sapir 1949:74).

Given the absence of the conduit metaphor in Athabaskan, we might speculate that Athabaskan speakers would have less trouble with the second law of thermodynamics than English speakers, if Sapir, Whorf, and Reddy are right. We might also speculate that Athabaskans speaking English would modify its content form to better suit their worldview.

Another metaphor about communication comes from Basso (1979). In the view of the Western Apache, human communication is like working buckskin. Like buckskin, human relationships are stiff at first. After a good deal of work, they become soft and can be used.

1.3 Functions of language

The buckskin metaphor implies that the primary function of language is to establish human relationship. For Western Apaches and many northern Athabaskans, the way one speaks is more important than what one says.

Go easy when you start out. Don't talk smart. Don't ask for anything. Just talk good. That's the right way. Then, after a while you can start to fool around. Then it don't matter too much. It's like puttering on some buckskin—you do that and you just make it softer (Basso 1979:69).

While Hymes (1966) has argued that relativity in the use of language is theoretically prior to relativity in the structure of language, Reddy's work indicates that assumptions about the nature and function of language are built into the content form of English. Until quite recently, linguists have not inquired into the functions of language,
but have assumed the primary function to be referential or what Halliday calls ideational. Grace (1981) attempts to restrict his attention to this function.

Nevertheless, it does seem natural to regard langues as communication systems. Halliday, for example, remarks (1973:35) that "The adult tends to be sceptical if it is suggested to him that language has other uses than that of conveying information." In fact, people concerned with the ways in which languages are used spend a great deal of space in warning us that they are not used just for the straightforward communication of facts. There is something noteworthy, I suggest, in this proclivity of ours to persist in the same error in the face of repeated warnings (and of the evidence of our own experience). To what is it due? (Grace 1981:98).

He goes on to say that the nature of langues (presumably all langues) is to highlight the propositional content of human utterances. "The culprit, I believe, is the nature of langues. They look like something designed for exposition" (Grace 1981:98). I think the culprit may be the English language and its European cousins and their conduit metaphor, with which we conduct linguistic inquiry.

There is now developing some evidence that the view of languages as being ideational may not be as widely held as we had at first supposed. The Kaluli of New Guinea take the view that language is for the expression of relationship (Hood and Schieffelin 1978). Small children who use words to refer to objects and animals are not considered to have begun to speak until they use the words for 'mother' and 'breast'.

This establishes the essentially social view of language taken by the Kaluli, as it emphasizes not the learning and using of words per se but learning and using only those words that express the particular first social relationship a person has, which is with the mother mediated by food from
her breast. Clearly, the notion here is that language use is not merely a verbal skill in and of itself, but a social skill pertaining to and part of relationships between people (1978: 9).

It is important to recognize that language simultaneously serves at least the two main functions of cognition and social expression.

Halliday (1967, 1970, 1973) argues that three functions are built into the grammar of language: ideational, interpersonal, and textual. The ideational function is the expression of 'content'; the interpersonal establishes and maintains social relations, and the textual makes links with language and with features of the situation in which it is used. "Speech acts involve planning that is continuous and simultaneous in respect of all the functions of language" (1970: 145). Halliday's functional approach involves more than describing how language is used. He seeks to explain how the form of language has been shaped by its functions.

The child comes to school with a rich and complex model of language which is developed as a result of his/her primary socialization. According to Halliday, most adults have a far narrower conception of language (1973). The adult's model of language according to Halliday comes from years of schooling in what Grace would call "cultivated language." Olson (1977) has said that the primary function of schooling is to teach an orientation to the written text. Cook-Gumperz (1978, Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz 1978) shows that this orientation to decontextualized language begins in preschool, and we have described how a two-year-old uses patterns of language that manifest a preparation for literacy (Scollon and
This orientation consists in an emphasis on the ideational content of language in isolation from contexts of use. This orientation I would argue is guided by the conduit metaphor and supported by schools and libraries.

In a paper titled "Ideas about Language" (1977), Halliday discusses two contrasting conceptions of what language is for. One position, stemming from Aristotle, holds that language is for the expression of form or rule. The other, rhetorical position, emphasizes language as action or resource.

We can identify, broadly, two images of language: a philosophical-logical view, and a descriptive-ethnographic view. In the former, linguistics is part of philosophy, and grammar is part of logic; in the latter, linguistics is part of anthropology, and grammar is part of culture. The former stresses analogy; is prescriptive, or normative, in orientation; and concerned with meaning in relation to truth. The later stresses anomaly; is descriptive in orientation; and concerned with meaning in relation to rhetorical function. The former sees language as thought, the latter sees language as action. The former represents language as rules; it stresses the formal analysis of sentences, and uses for purposes of idealization (for deciding what falls within or outside its scope) the criterion of grammaticality (what is, or is not, according to the rule). The latter represents language as choices, or as a resource; it stresses the semantic interpretation of discourse, and uses for idealization purposes the criterion of acceptability or usage (what occurs or could be envisaged to occur) (p. 11).

Halliday suggests that these positions are in an asymmetrical relationship in that the persons who hold the ethnographic position recognize that language has multiple functions, while those who view language in Aristotelian terms do not acknowledge that language has any function other than the ideational. Thus any discussion of pragmatic, rhetorical, or interpersonal functions runs the danger of being
misinterpreted as suggesting exclusion of the ideational or referential function to those who assume the philosophical-logical tradition of language study.

Philosophers of language tend to have a very explicit view of the nature of a theory, and of what constitute valid modes of reasoning; they tend to dismiss the ethnographers as non-theoretical, because their theories are not of the right kind (p. 12).

Hymes' view of functions in speech advocates that linguists treat language in terms of "stylistic" as well as "referential" function. "A general study of language comprises both, and even a study seeking to limit itself to what is referentially based cannot escape being involved with what is not" (1974:146). A study of language as social life, or an ethnographic approach to language, ties in with his earlier discussion of relativity of linguistic use (Hymes 1966).

We started with the notion of linguistic relativity, the idea that there are connections between language and the rest of culture. In order to study these connections, we have to understand how language functions in real contexts of use in different societies. Emphasis on one function over another might be expected to manifest itself in different patterns of social interaction. These patterns of interaction might then be found to show connections with patterns of grammar. Grammatical patterns must be translatable into patterns of action or behavior, as Sapir said. In other words, content form must reflect patterns of social interaction. Sapir, as an anthropologist, viewed language as a resource for action as well as rules of grammar for expressing logical thought.
I think few cultural disciplines are as exact, as rigorously configurated, as self-contained as grammar, but if it is desired to have grammar contribute a significant share to our understanding of human behavior, its definitions, meanings, and classifications must be capable of a significant restatement in terms of a social psychology which transcends the best that we have yet been able to offer in this perilous field of investigation (1949:199).

Now somewhat more than forty years after Sapir's original publication we have, perhaps, the basis for making the connections Sapir sought to make in the work of Brown and Levinson (1978). Since 1959, we have had Edward T. Hall's definition of culture as communication to work with. The aspect of culture I am isolating in this work is patterns of social interaction. The key to linking language and culture may be social interaction.

1.4 Social interaction

Following R. Lakoff (1974), Brown and Levinson "promote the view that social functions are a prime candidate for the motivation of the great mass of superficial derivational machinery that characterizes a particular language" (1978:262). They find that in unrelated languages and cultures, persons choose very parallel linguistic means to depart from Grice's "cooperative principle." They provide evidence from Tzeltal, Tamil, and English, demonstrating putatively universal rational principles of politeness in language usage. In identifying universal principles of social interaction, they "provide a possible social candidate for deep functional pressures on the shape of grammars in general" (p. 61). They "identify strategic message construction as the key locus of the interface of language and society" (p. 61). They construct a formal model that not only
accounts for crosscultural similarities in the abstract principles of
politeness, but provides a model for describing culture-specific
usages. They are interested in being able to characterize what
Bateson calls the "ethos" or affective configuration, of a culture.

I will make use of Brown and Levinson's model in Chapters 4 and
5, where I show how it predicts one set of linguistic strategies
rather than another. Readers who are not familiar with Brown and
Levinson (1978) will find a summary of their paper in the Appendix.

Although Brown and Levinson talk in terms of single speech acts,
they point out that FTA's (face threatening acts) must be looked at in
terms of overall conversational structure. They suggest that "the
concept might be better labelled 'face-threatening intention'" (p.
238). They emphasize that "strategic language usage cross-cuts
linguistic units from the allophone to the discourse chunk" (p. 238).

Their theory provides a way of being more specific about 'ethos',
the affective character of a society (Bateson 1958). Interactional
quality can be described in terms of culture-specific dimensions of
social relationships, P (perceived relative power), D (perceived
social distance), and R (absolute ranking of impositions in the
particular culture). The model allows description of cross-cultural
variation in the general level of imposition, the particular kinds of
FTA's, the relative values of P, D, and R, and the assignment of
persons to classes.

The argument, then, is "that face redress is a powerful
functional pressure on any linguistic system, and that a particular
mechanism is discernible whereby such pressures leave their imprint on language structure" (Brown and Levinson 1978:260). The mechanism is patterns of social interaction which mediate between cultural values and grammatical structure. "We would expect there to be correlations between overall levels and kinds of face redress in a culture and the special elaboration of grammatical devices for achieving that redress" (1978:262). Patterns of usage interact with structural properties, effecting language change. "On this view, the relationship between structure and usage is a fluid one, and this fluidity is reflected in the state of language at any one point in time" (1978:266).

Brown and Levinson describe the interaction between usage and structure of indirect speech acts, hedges, impersonalization mechanisms like the passive and impersonal modals, and honorifics, making a case that "attention to face is an important functional pressure on language" (p. 284). They point to parallels in many languages of many linguistic realizations of their face strategies as evidence of underlying universal pressures of social interaction. Aside from their contribution to sociological theory, they provide "a useful ethnographic tool for the fine-grained analysis of the quality of social relations" (p. 289).

Doing a fine-grained analysis of conversational style, Tannen (1979) found that certain linguistic and nonlinguistic means of guarding the participants' "face" are employed by people who value nonintervention more often than by people who place a higher value on rapport, camaraderie, or solidarity. She recorded a dinner conversation and made detailed transcriptions of not only the words
but intonation, pauses, and overlapping speech. She found that she could characterize speakers in terms of placing a higher value on either camaraderie or deference, using grammatical, semantic, and rhythmic and intonational data. For example, speakers who value camaraderie tend to prefer personal topics and to interrupt frequently by asking questions which are meant to express interest and not necessarily to command a reply. She found that people from New York city tended to use strategies of camaraderie, while people from the West Coast preferred strategies of distance.

Sociolinguists have expended considerable research effort in making structural descriptions of different varieties or dialects of a particular language and are going beyond the descriptions to seek functional explanations of these structural differences. Where people speak a divergent variety of English, it is my hypothesis that at least some of the differences can be traced to a different emphasis in considerations of face. In a society that values deference and nonintervention, indirectness may be reflected in certain uses of hedges and questions, for example, which I hypothesize would have ramifications on the grammar of the local English. Thus properties of the English spoken in a community such as Fort Chipewyan may be due not simply to convergence on the other languages spoken but more indirectly to the effect of characteristic patterns of social interaction. That is, patterns of social interaction may shape linguistic convergence through a process of selection of variants from
a contact language which best express the reality set and norms of politeness of the speakers of the original language.

1.5 Content form

In An Essay on Language, Grace calls into question the usefulness of current methods of linguistic description, in particular the separation of language into grammar and vocabulary, for investigating relationships between language and thought or between particular languages and their associated cultures. He believes this separation is motivated by the dominance of what he calls the "scientific aesthetic" in linguistic description. This refers to a distinction drawn by Boas between "the 'affective' impulse—the impulse to seek understanding of reality—and the 'aesthetic' impulse—the impulse to impose order on phenomena" (Grace 1981:16). Traditional linguistic descriptions thus omit much information about correct usage that do not fit into the aesthetic patterns of grammar. This information which resists orderly patterns of description he calls "idiomatology."

Assuming that the idiomatology of a language encodes much cultural information, Grace proposes that we take this as a strategic site for finding out how extralinguistic facts affect language. Since, as Saussure wrote, what is encoded in the grammar of one language may be done lexically in another, Grace contends that the distinction between grammar and lexicon may not reflect the way language is used for saying things. Instead, he divides language into two parts, "content form" and "lexification."
Borrowing the term from Hjelmslev, Grace defines "content form" as "everything concerned in the conceptualization of the message" (p. 24). He includes grammar, lexicon, and wording. Struck by the convergence of content form in the languages of Kupwar Village, he observes that it is a development analogous to biological adaptation. He argues that the content form of a language is subject to functional pressures of an extralinguistic sort, and that "the most important thing to be learned from language" (p. 32) is how content form relates to extralinguistic facts such as what is said.

The other component of language, lexification, consists of what can actually be pronounced or written. The two components, content form and lexification, evolve independently, serving different functions and responding to different selective pressures. Lexification serves the emblematic function, marking speakers as members of a social group, while content form serves the communicative function.

The linguistic realizations of face strategies outlined by Brown and Levinson are reflections in the grammatical form of languages of contents required by norms of politeness. We can view face redress, then, as one of the extralinguistic factors affecting content form. Many of the outputs fall in the category of cliches or idioms, but the grammar and vocabulary of languages are affected as well.

Grace includes point-of-view operations in his typology of idiomatological phenomena. These are R. Lakoff's observations on the use of tenses, Fillmore's example of the use of "come" in English, and marking relations of control in Polynesian possessives. He also notes
that French often uses nouns where English uses a verb. There are others, but these seem to relate to relationships of distance and power. Social interaction is just one of the factors which affect content form. Others may have to do with cognitive processing or the construction of reality.

The major obstacle to the study of content form, in Grace's view, is the necessity of doing the analysis in a particular language. That is, there is no neutral way of specifying what is said. One way to get around the problem would be to talk about differences in content form or ways of saying things in different languages. This would amount to comparing literal and free translations of one language into another.

Situations of language contact and convergence provide evidence for the interaction of languages with their environment, that is for the effects of extralinguistic factors on language. For adaptation to take place, languages must change to meet the communicative needs of their speakers. When people must communicate with speakers of other languages, they tend to calque, with the result that the content form of their utterances closely matches the content form of the language of their interlocutors. Over time, habitual calquing results in convergence of content form. This is one type of selective pressure on content form. One motivation for change may be the need to talk about a certain kind of content. Another may be the need to maintain certain norms of social interaction.

To the extent that the members of a multilingual speech community share values and norms, we might expect their languages to converge.
To the extent that the speakers of any particular language set themselves apart from the rest of the community, we would expect that language to remain distinct. We would look to patterns of socialization, then, for attitudes toward the role of language in general and toward particular languages (see Grace 1981, Chapter 10). We would investigate the teaching of content and form and see how they relate to each other.

I.6 Socialization

Thus far I have been talking about the values and communicative patterns which make up culture and their relation to the content form of language in a relatively static manner. This is the view represented in the illustration below, which is Figure 2 without the element of socialization. It ignores the change that occurs when languages come into contact and children learn a different language than their elders. It ignores the possibility that different languages may be learned in different ways, and that the differences in the same language used by persons of different cultures may be due to the ways the language is learned or the ways the children are socialized.

The study of children's language development is a current focus of research in linguistics and anthropology, in particular the ethnography of communication (Ochs 1980a,b; Schieffelin 1979a,b; Iwamura 1979). Hymes (1974) has been concerned with ways in which the linguistic socialization of children can reveal adult norms of language use as well as beliefs about language. The values and norms
Partial View of Language and Cognition

Figure 2
held by members of a society are transmitted through interaction which is characteristically patterned. Patterns of interaction are not arbitrary, but are determined by cultural norms and values. If relations are sought between language and thought, reality and culture, it would seem that one could look at how the reality set of a group of people might affect their language. The vehicle for affecting language would be patterns of linguistic socialization.

A persistent concern in linguistics is the problem of linguistic change. Attributing linguistic change to cultural change is merely to displace the problem or, as Fillmore (1977) put it, is merely indulging in "exchanging mysteries." As Sapir wrote, "I have come to feel that it is precisely the supposed 'givenness' of culture that is the most serious obstacle to our real understanding of the nature of culture and cultural change" (1949:205). He felt that anthropology had been "victimized" by a metaphor that

is always persuading us that culture is a neatly packed up assemblage of forms of behavior handed over piecemeal, but without serious breakage, to the passively inquiring child (1949:205).

This metaphor, like the conduit metaphor, reifies culture as an object. We speak, for example, of "cultural transmission." He suggested that anthropologists study how a child acquires culture.

If we take the purely genetic point of view, all the problems which appear in the study of culture reappear with a startling freshness which cannot but mean much for the rephrasing of these problems (p. 206).

Sapir was concerned with the nature of culture and culture change. My concern here is somewhat more narrowly focused on the problem of social interaction, which I will ultimately relate to
linguistic change. Sapir's concerns about enculturation are, however, closely paralleled in this case of socialization. By "socialization" here I mean the procedures which members of a social group use to shape behavior in accordance with group norms. I apply the term primarily to interaction with children, but also include patterns of interaction with outsiders to a community. By "linguistic socialization," I mean socialization by means of language.

Using Hall's definition of culture as communication, patterns of linguistic socialization are at the heart of culture. If we can show how these patterns affect language, we are a step closer to making sense of the problem of language and culture. The reality set, as we have described it, is a set of abstractions. The bush consciousness is manifest in nonintervening patterns of social interaction, transmitted through linguistic and nonverbal socialization to deference. When the language resources of the culture change, e.g., English replaces Athabaskan, and the patterns of socialization remain the same, the result is linguistic change. In other words, to some extent there may be linguistic change without cultural change.

Forty years after Sapir, Hymes suggests that an ethnography of communication might entail description and comparative analysis of talk to babies.

Again, attention to the interpretation put upon infant speech may reveal much of the adult culture. . . . Interpretations of the intent of first utterances--e.g., as an attempt to name kin (Wogo), to ask for food (Alorese), to manipulate (Chaga)--may indeed be something of a projective test for a culture, as regards adult practices and the valuation placed on speech itself (1974:109).
Focus on socialization may highlight values and norms of adult interaction. For example, nonintervention is prominent in Athabaskan socialization.

Bernstein (1972) describes the role of linguistic codes in socialization. He argues that patterns of social interaction may be associated with "linguistic codes" that maintain distinct orientations toward social reality. He dissociates himself from Whorf but he believes,

that there are distillations or precipitations from the general system of meanings which inhere in linguistic codes which exert a diffuse and generalized effect upon the behavior of speakers (1972:494).

Halliday, following Bernstein, describes the development of language in early childhood in its social context (1975). Socialization is integrated into a coherent system which relates the grammar of English to the functions it has to serve in communication and cognition. In Halliday's system language learning consists of socialization to the "mother tongue."

By Phase II, when the child is building a lexicogrammatical system, things and the relations between them are entirely interpreted through the mother tongue; this is an inevitable consequence of having a lexicogrammar—the child is no longer free to code as he likes. (In case this appears as a Whorfian conception, let it be said at once that it is—but in terms of what Whorf said, not of what he is often assumed to have said. We are not the prisoners of our cultural semiotic; we can all learn to move outside it. But this requires a positive act of semiotic reconstruction. We are socialized within it, and our meaning potential is derived from it.) (1975:108).

Both Bernstein and Halliday view socialization as a bridge between language and thought or social reality. Halliday distinguishes two general functions of a child's language at the stage of transition
into the adult language, the function of talking about things
(mathetic) and the function of doing things (pragmatic). He shows how
language evolves into a system that can act on as well as reflect on
the environment. He emphasizes the parallel development of these
components and says,

The real interest lies in seeing how these functions
determine the ontogeny of the system, and how they
interpenetrate at various key points in the developmental

Coming to the issue of socialization from a different direction,
Honigmann (1949) and Bateson (1958) emphasize the importance of
investigating the ontogenetic development of ethos. If global face
strategies are a significant part of ethos, we need to study how face
strategies are learned. Piaget, who detailed the ontogenetic
development of intelligence, views cognition as an interaction between
the individual and his environment. Vygotsky (1978) shares the view
of the importance of interaction with an environment, taking as
primary the social environment of individuals speaking to one another.
For Vygotsky, language mediates between thought and action. Thought
is inner speech or internalized social interaction. Development
reflects the process of socialization as reality becomes patterned or
structured through language. Among the cognitive psychologists who
have dealt with socialization, Vygotsky comes closest to my position.

Recently, Ochs (1980a,b) and Schieffelin (1979a,b) have done
studies in non-Western societies of how culturally appropriate thought
and action are shaped through the mediation of language.
Schieffelin's basic theme is that children acquire their language and
culture together. Working with the Kaluli of New Guinea, she found that language has an important role in socialization and social control. "Thus the emphasis on the interactional and social use of language contrasts with the importance placed on naming by white middle-class American mothers" (1979:320). Both cultural and immediate situational contexts affected the language used by children.

What a child says and does is influenced by what society selects as significant, as a social or cultural priority. It is evident from this study that the learning of culturally preferred conventions of interaction helps guide the acquisition of linguistic forms (1979a:321).

Both Schieffelin and Ochs look at the acquisition of ergative case marking, finding different patterns in Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa resulting from different sociological distribution.

Ochs proposes that "how a Samoan child speaks—both form and content—is strongly influenced by social norms for using language in Samoan households and by certain attitudes and beliefs concerning individuality, knowledge and human competence" (1980:2). She gives the example of how social norms influence the acquisition of case marking by Samoan children. Ergative case marking, associated with situations of deference in public contexts, develops late because children are not exposed to it, unlike the Kaluli, who learn it at an earlier age. This lends support to the idea that the content form of language may be related to social considerations.

These studies continue the tradition begun by Sapir and Whorf of investigating the interrelationships among language, culture, thought, and action. They respond to Hymes' call for studies of relativity of
linguistic function and socialization of children. They relate aspects of content form to cultural content, to the functions served by language in contexts of use. My work is intended to extend this study of linguistic relativity and to broaden the comparative base of studies of socialization practices as a pressure on the structure of languages.

I.7 Summary

I started my review of the theoretical context of this work with the problem of linguistic relativity, as initially formulated for American linguists by Sapir and Whorf. The principle is that different languages represent different codifications of reality, not just the same reality with different labels. Speakers of different languages do not just speak differently, to a certain extent they think differently.

Hymes pointed out that people do not only speak different languages, they use language to do different things. Before we can specify in what ways aspects of linguistic structure affect cognition, we need to know to what extent language is the same kind of entity, i.e., functions in the same ways, from speech community to speech community, and to what extent it differs. If it is conceived differently, it will play a different role in the enculturation of children, for example. This second type of relativity, relativity of function, became a cornerstone of the ethnography of communication, which resulted in studies of social interaction and socialization.
An aspect of relativity of function is the view of language held by members of a speech community and reflected in the structure of their language. The conduit metaphor, which is embedded in the English language, affects our thinking in profound ways. It is reflected not only in the content form of English but in the way we think about language. I suggest that any difficulties experienced in reading the section on linguistic relativity may be due to the effects of the conduit metaphor on the thinking of the English reader. In presenting the toolmakers paradigm and the buckskin metaphor, I lay the groundwork for the discussion of the bush consciousness and nonintervention that follows. This may not be easy to follow for the readers who are not familiar with these ways of thinking. As Reddy said in writing about the conduit metaphor, when he tried to avoid it, his mind went to sleep. It took years before he could think in ways that were not constrained by the metaphor. For these readers, I can only beg indulgence and remind them of Sapir's statement, quoted above (pp. 23-24).

The section on functions of language continues to remind the reader that language is for doing things, not just for saying things. That is, language is a means of social interaction, not just a container for ideas, as the conduit metaphor would have us believe. This is also a view that fits more closely with that of the bush consciousness. The question of linguistic relativity, then, becomes one of how the English language can be used to express such different views of language and reality. The English language in the bush areas of the Northern subarctic has undergone some change, apparently.
This is the issue raised by Grace (1981), who says that our methods of linguistic description are not amenable to relating content to form. According to the prevailing view, English is English, and before we did our work on linguistic convergence at Fort Chipewyan, few attempts had been made to relate the structure of varieties of English to what had to be communicated by the speakers of those varieties. As Grace says, a description of content form that includes idiomatic usage would come closer to enabling us to relate language to its environment of speakers, other languages, and situational contexts.

The idiomatic usage I have chosen to focus on is the strategies of politeness employed by people in ordinary social interaction and in the socialization of children. I present Brown and Levinson's framework for linking grammatical structures to universal needs of social interaction. While their emphasis is on sociological universals, their descriptive apparatus is amenable to crosscultural comparisons of idiomatology. I make heavy use of their politeness strategies in Chapter 5.

The study of socialization is critical to the understanding of change, as Sapir pointed out 40 years ago. If the variety of English spoken in the northern subarctic were to be the last survivor of the English language, linguists would want to understand how it came to be the way it is. That would require an understanding of the reality set and patterns of social interaction of speakers, and the process by which they pass these on to the next generation of speakers.
In the next chapter I will attempt to explain the concept of reality set and the bush consciousness as an example of a reality set. This will give us an idea of how differently a group of people can experience reality than those accustomed to bureaucratic society. As part of my argument that values imply norms of social interaction which filter grammatical forms, I will then try to show how values that form part of a reality set can be transmitted through social interaction in enculturation.
NOTE TO CHAPTER I

1. I do not mean to imply any incompatibility between calquing and the adaptation that allows language to express cultural values. I would argue that speakers calque when the source language provides a means of expression that is translatable into the other language. When what they need to say does not readily translate, they invent means that meet their needs.
CHAPTER II

BUSH CONSCIOUSNESS: REALITY SET IN THE SUBARCTIC BUSH

II.0 Introduction

In the first chapter, we saw that, as Hymes has shown, knowledge about the way language functions in face-to-face interaction and socialization may be an important key to the investigation of the problem of linguistic relativity. One effect it may have is that assumptions about the functions of language may be embedded in the content form of a language. In other words, the language of the investigator may introduce a bias. This might, without our conscious awareness, affect the way we do our work as linguists.

It is my hypothesis that cultural values may affect linguistic form through the mediation of face-to-face interaction and patterns of socialization. Values as well as patterns of interaction and socialization are manifestations of what I will call "reality set" (see below). In order to understand how differences in content form come into being, we need to understand the reality set of the speakers in question. Here we are concerned with the "bush consciousness," which is what we call the reality set of inhabitants of the subarctic forest. It implies a set of socialization patterns.

In this chapter I will present the background of our work at Fort Chipewyan (Scollon and Scollon 1979), explain what we mean by "reality set," describe the bush consciousness—who it applies to, how it is experienced by the modern consciousness, its cognitive orientation of
thematic abstraction, which contrasts with the literate orientation of the modern consciousness, and its relation to strategies of deference politeness.

II.1 Reality set

In our previous work (Scollon and Scollon 1979), we introduced the term "reality set" to account for the linguistic convergence that had taken place at Fort Chipewyan. Our analysis of the bush consciousness developed as a result of trying to understand a group of people whose everyday reality differed greatly from ours. Our own reality set, the modern consciousness, is assumed to be shared by our readers and has been described by Berger, Berger and Kellner (1973). Therefore, we do not ourselves describe it as such, but our description of the bush consciousness is really a description of those aspects of it which contrast with the modern consciousness and which became apparent when the two came into contact. As modern persons, we experience the bush consciousness in ways which are reflected in our description. My remarks about the modern consciousness in this chapter also come out of the conflict experienced when the bush consciousness encounters modern institutions. This discussion, as well as some of what I say about the bush consciousness, though consistent with what we wrote earlier, comes out of more recent work in Alaska. That is, I have had discussions with Alaska Natives who present the conflict between reality sets from their point of view. Their perceptions support, from another perspective, what we experienced at Fort Chipewyan.

49
The term "reality set" derives from two separate traditions. We take "reality" from the "social construction of reality," an orientation of the sociology of knowledge which takes as problematic the ways in which individuals arrive at a mutually agreed upon experience of everyday reality. The major recent work in the field is titled *The Social Construction of Reality* by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967). This work extends the ideas of Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and others. It is a basic assumption of this school that by means of conversation in face-to-face interaction, members of social groups jointly establish and maintain a social world.

Schutz (1962) raised the notions of "reality" and "social world" as phenomena that need to be accounted for.

The world of everyday life into which we are born is from the outset an intersubjective world. This implies on the one hand that this world is not my private one but common to all of us; on the other hand, that within this world there exists fellow men with whom I am connected by manifold social relationships (1962:218).

Mannheim, writing at the same time as Whorf, sought to gain insight into the object of thought by examining it from as many different viewpoints as possible. Gaining different perspectives lends a relativity to the perception of reality. Ordinary situations are typified through language, and everyday life is maintained by language. "An understanding of language is thus essential for any understanding of the reality of everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann 1967:37). From linguistics, Grace (n.d.) maintains that an understanding of how language functions to create worlds or realities is essential to an understanding of language.
The word "set" here is analogous to its meaning in what has been called "learning set" (Harlow 1949) or "Learning II" (Bateson 1972). These are two ways of talking about learning to learn. Bateson defines "Learning II" as "change in the process of Learning I" (1972:293). Edward T. Hall also makes use of this concept in his work on culture. "What complicates matters, however, is that people reared in different cultures learn to learn differently" (1973:48).

As Bateson puts it,

Briefly, I believe that the phenomena of Learning II can all be included under the rubric of changes in the manner in which the stream of action and experience is segmented or punctuated into contexts together with changes in the use of context markers (1972:293).

"Reality set," then, is a learned tendency to respond to contexts of everyday experience in typical ways. "Context" for Bateson includes the individual's behavior as well as external events. This behavior is governed by previous learning and tends to be self-validating, set in infancy and unconscious (Bateson 1972:301). Thus, the way in which youngsters learn to learn becomes their "reality set," which conditions their response to external reality. According to sociologists of knowledge, the meaning given by a society to human experience "appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world" (Berger and Luckmann 1967:8). Bateson and sociologists of knowledge are interested in ordinary contexts and everyday situations, rather than in ideas or ideology.

Only a very limited group of people in any society engages in theorizing, in the business of "ideas," and the construction of Weltanschauungen. But everyone in society
participates in its "knowledge" in one way or another. (Berger and Luckmann 1967:15).

We have used "reality set" in preference to "weltanschauung" or "worldview," which are tied too closely to history and civilization. Everybody has a reality set, but only philosophers make it a practice to relate their everyday experience to Weltanschauungen. Bateson's "ethos" comes closer to a feeling of everyday reality, but is specific to particular cultures and even groups within a culture. Reality set, on the other hand, is intended to be more general than culture and is held in common by members of different cultures. Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973) have suggested that the modern consciousness is relatively undifferentiated among Japanese, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States to the extent that members of those nations participate in the modern, bureaucratic, technological world and similarly we have argued that the cultural differences between Northern Athabaskans and Crees do not stand in the way of their participation in the pan-subarctic forest bush consciousness.

For Berger and Luckmann, as well as for Bateson, reality is internalized in the process of primary socialization. Through interaction with significant others, the individual comes to accept the social world into which he is born as objective reality. This implies that an understanding of socialization is inherent in the study of reality set. By looking at how a child internalizes reality, one comes to realize how the things one takes for granted are not inherent in the real world but rather carefully taught constructs of the social world. Like Halliday and Bernstein, Berger and Luckmann
believe that "language constitutes both the most important content and
the most important instrument of socialization" (Berger and Luckmann
1967:133).

II.2 Bush consciousness

The bush consciousness is the reality set of people who live in
the subarctic forest regions of Alaska and northwestern Canada.
"Bush" as it is used in these areas refers to the sparsely populated
areas of forest. This area is the homeland of Athabaskan languages
and cultures and is largely inhabited today by Athabaskans. We do not
mean, however, that the bush consciousness is characteristic of all
Athabaskans nor that it is characteristic of exclusively Athabaskans.
Many Crees, Inuit ('Eskimos' in Alaska), and non-Natives who live in
the bush also share this reality set. Many Athabaskans who live in
cities and have become modernized do not view the world in terms of
the bush consciousness. Thus the reality set is associated with the
bush way of life, and is not held except in rare cases by people who
regularly live in urban areas or have been socialized to urban
patterns of living. If Whorf is correct, we can assume that it has
evolved in response to ecological conditions and is encoded in the
Athabaskan languages, though many people who are socialized to the
bush consciousness do not speak these languages. The homogeneity of
this reality set from Hudson's Bay to the lower Yukon as can be seen
from the ethnographic literature as well as in our own observations
can be traced to three probable sources. First, the ecology of the
area is nearly homogeneous. Second, the Athabaskan culture has been
present historically throughout the area. Finally, the conditions of contact have not varied except in relatively minor ways from one region to another. I shall sometimes use "Athabaskan" to refer to persons socialized to the bush consciousness, though they may not be of Athabaskan ancestry or speak any Athabaskan language.

In my discussion of the modern consciousness and the bush consciousness, I follow the model of Bateson in his discussion of national character (Bateson 1972). Bateson counters arguments against describing national character, justifying the approach in terms of learned behavior and habitual responses to experience. He argues that the enterprise is justified "provided we describe common character in terms of the themes of relationship between groups and individuals within the community" (p. 94). He describes national character in terms of bipolar opposites. That is, groups and individuals are differentiated along such dimensions as dominant-submissive, having different degrees of interest in and orientation to such polarities. The habit systems of individuals and groups living in mutual contact are complementary with respect to these dimensions.

It is, to me, inconceivable that two differing groups could exist side by side in a community without some sort of mutual relevance between the special characteristics of one group and those of the other (Bateson 1972:91).

Bateson's work suggests that at least some of the characteristics of the bush consciousness are not only experienced in interaction with the modern consciousness, they develop in the context of contact. The entropic aspect, for example, seemed only natural until it came into conflict with the construction and maintenance of high-order
structures. That is, the people for whom the bush consciousness is the characteristic way of experiencing reality do not perceive themselves as being individualistic, nonintervening, integrative, or entropic. They regard themselves simply as people and do not seem to label their behavior in these ways.

The central view of the bush consciousness is individuality, i.e., respect for individual autonomy. I surmise that because of ecological adaptation to an extreme environment, people have evolved patterns of self-reliance that prepare them for survival when game is scarce and they must travel on foot in subzero temperatures. One manifestation of this aspect of individuality is taciturnity and a reluctance to enter into social relations. This relative taciturnity is set in relief against the volubility of the modern consciousness, for which individualism means displaying the contribution an individual makes to society. The modern individual, rather than being autonomous, is self-sufficient in terms of having something to trade on as a member of society. The individual is a component part of the social machine, interchangeable with other components who share the same characteristics and are capable of playing the same roles (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973). Alvin Toffler (1970), extrapolating from the existing modern consciousness, foresees a future in which a person can travel to another city to do business, living with the family of a counterpart. A modernized person cannot feel like a true individual without continual interaction with others who confirm his individualism. We have noted the importance of talk as a mechanism by which our reality set, the modern consciousness, is
maintained (Scollon and Scollon 1979). By means of conversation, according to Goffman, "Individuals come together and sustain matters having a ratified, joint, current, and running claim upon attention, a claim which lodges them together in some sort of intersubjective mental world" (1976:308). Berger and Luckmann (1976) also discuss the importance of conversation with significant others for the ongoing confirmation of that crucial element of reality we call identity. To retain confidence that he is indeed who he thinks he is, the individual requires not only the implicit confirmation of this identity that even casual everyday contacts will supply, but the explicit and emotionally charged confirmation that his significant others bestow on him (p. 150).

The bush individual, on the other hand, can survive for days alone with nothing but what he can carry. When he is among other people, he does not need constant conversation to affirm his individualism. Rather, his individuality is threatened by too much of what Goffman (1976) calls the "negotiation of intersubjective reality."

Individuality is the central value of the reality set, the bush consciousness. As we have argued (Scollon and Scollon 1979) the bush consciousness consists of four aspects which interrelate and form a consistent whole. From the central aspect, individuality, follow nonintervening patterns of social interaction. The integrative aspect governs learning and knowledge on the level of the individual, allowing only nonintervening patterns of teaching and learning. The entropic aspect is a response to any perceived threat to individuality, integration, or to intervention in the coherent world of the individual.
In the work that follows the aspect of nonintervention will figure importantly. Individuals maintain their autonomy by agreeing to grant freedom to each other. They seldom intervene in each other's affairs to the extent of telling someone what to do or what not to do. As Darnell says of the Cree of northern Alberta, "Deniable strategies are favored over those which require greater commitment from the individual" (1980:4). Even talking a great deal infringes on others' freedom to maintain their own view of the world. And, as Darnell points out, a speaker will be listened to and taken seriously, but perhaps not responded to until some time in the future. The nonintervening aspect governs the orientation of the bush consciousness to social relations. Though there is some differentiation within Athabaskan society, with persons in dominant roles talking more than those in submissive roles, even children are not interfered with by too many direct orders. Nonintervention will be discussed more fully in the next chapter in connection with socialization.

The integrative aspect of the bush consciousness is its orientation to knowledge. In keeping with the emphasis on individual survival, people do not rely on experts but integrate all knowledge on a personal level. The individual orders knowledge gained from personal experience into a holistic and relatively undifferentiated view of reality. Decontextualized forms of knowledge that cannot be immediately assimilated to the individual's existing knowledge are felt as foreign and rejected as irrelevant.
The integrative aspect implies a holistic mode of learning. Tasks are not broken into components and taught one at a time, as the modern consciousness is accustomed to. Rather, people are expected to observe continually and try things out when they feel they are ready. If something does not work they start over or try something else.

For example, a young man turns his dog sled over to his wife, who has no idea how to brake the sled and finally jumps off, leaving him with the task of rounding up his dogs. No attempt was made to teach the wife how to control the sled. Such occurrences appear to the modern consciousness as recklessness or lack of planning, while periods of observation are regarded as passive inactivity. When things go right, it looks to the modern observer like luck or intuition.

The contrast between bush and modern notions of useful work and relevant knowledge is highlighted by a man who says, "They say the Indian doesn't work. They fire the Indians but when they hunt they go the wrong way." Everyone needs to know how to survive, and someone who loses his way places a burden on the others to locate him. The man quoted above spent a whole day "busy" because a Whiteman hurt himself through incompetence. Of this person, who held college degrees, it was said, "Some people he don't know nothing, you know." A Metis girl who did well in school was also said to know nothing, meaning she did not know how to do things. The distinction is between procedural knowledge, knowing how, and representational knowledge, or knowing that something is true. Knowledge is not compartmentalized and trusted to experts, and only first-hand knowledge is valued.

58
From the point of view of the modern consciousness, the distrust of expertise and disinterest in literate, decontextualized modes expressed in the practice of randomly selecting from frequently dialed numbers rather than keeping a list of names and numbers may appear to be laziness or perversity. From the point of view of the bush consciousness, however, a person is no more likely to be found at home or office than at the pay phone in front of the movie hall or the home of a friend or relative. This is because the entropic aspect of the bush consciousness values flexibility and unpredictability. There is no expectation that one should be available to receive a telephone call. The annoyance felt by a modern person answering a call to the wrong number is not fully appreciated, since a bush person may feel that if one were involved in an important activity, one would not answer the phone. Indeed, many elders refuse to speak into telephones or tape recorders. As an old grandmother used to say, "When you separate the voice from the body, that's death." Another grandmother burned her granddaughter's school books so that she would not learn to do "lazy work."

I have been speaking of the conflict between the bureaucratic, compartmentalized structures of the modern consciousness and the integrative aspect of the bush consciousness. In its extreme manifestations this conflict shows up as the entropic aspect, the aspect of the bush consciousness which rejects the intrusion of higher order levels of structure on the individuality of the person. From the point of view of the bush consciousness, integrating one's experience of the natural and social environment into a holistic
framework that makes sense at an individual level is incompatible with maintaining structures that exist independent of any particular individuals. The term "entropic" was chosen to indicate what appears to the modern consciousness as a positive love of disorder. It is a rare word in English in that it does not treat disorder as a negative quality and we chose it for that reason. The term "entropy," however, should not suggest a further development of an analogy with the Second Law of Thermodynamics. What is intended is a term which can be used to speak of this aspect of the bush consciousness without introducing negative connotations.

The entropic aspect of the bush consciousness, then, is a result of contact with the modern consciousness. It is the response of the individualistic, integrative, and nonintervening aspects of the bush consciousness to bureaucracy, compartmentalization, or intervention. To the modern consciousness, it appears as a love of chaos or disorder, a fondness for disrupting plans or existing structures. The conflict between reality sets can appear equally chaotic from the point of view of the bush consciousness. Whenever the order of things is rigid enough to constrain the individual's autonomy or his ability to integrate information into a consistent worldview, the entropic aspect comes into play.

As an example of the entropic aspect we can look at attitudes toward residence. Freedom of movement is impeded by a permanent residence, so even where people have houses they travel often, flying to town to attend meetings or moving to fish camp. If they must stay in town, they put up tents and remodel their houses. Sidewalks and
roads impose constraints on where one can walk, and people prefer to follow their own paths. Placing a chair implies a decision about where one will sit, and people often move chairs before sitting in them.

A woman tells a story that highlights the value placed on disruption of schedules and expectations. She tells of going on a trip in which the train goes off the track and the children get off and play. A bus comes to take them the rest of the way, but it breaks down. She goes on in this vein, ending with, "it was the best trip I ever took!" An anthropologist hearing the ending of the story was incredulous.

The entropic aspect is often manifest in the form of a practical joke. A girl in a crowded hotel lobby threatens to set off the fire alarm. A college student delivering Christmas packages for a relative threatens to mix them all up so that no one receives what was earmarked for him or her.

Anything that upsets the structure of one's plans is highly valued. Appointments are made but not kept unless it happens to be convenient to do so. Plans are made and changed frequently. A meeting on the calendar is ignored if the time is good for hunting. The entropic aspect of the bush consciousness is experienced negatively by the modern consciousness as non-cooperation or even malicious interference. In the form of broken glass, torn down fences, and broken-down machinery it might be viewed as vandalism by the modern consciousness. Even when the researcher becomes accustomed to the general atmosphere of disrepair, it can be disconcerting to
find spilled ink, broken guitar strings and a broken radio antenna in her own home and even to have her guitar untuned before her eyes. Persons living at the interface between bush and modern consciousness often feel a need to go out to the bush or into town to escape the entropic forces for a while.

II.3 Cognitive orientation: thematic abstraction

The modern consciousness is internalized largely through literacy (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). This is implied by its spread by means of bureaucratic institutions. That is, the cognitive orientation or approach to knowledge as decontextualized and compartmentalized is shaped by literacy. We use "thematic abstraction" to refer to the cognitive orientation of the bush consciousness, which we believe we have shown is holistic and integrative. We argue that this approach to knowledge is parallel to literacy for the modern consciousness, and is taught by a careful process of socialization. Just as literacy is decontextualized and componential, thematic abstraction is integrative and holistic. Thematic abstraction is described in Chapter 6 of Scollon and Scollon (1981a), and the cognitive orientation it represents is exemplified in Chapter 5 of that work as well as in Scollon and Scollon (1981b). The narrative ability it leads to is outlined in 3.5. Examples of situational themes are the use of "see-saw" to refer to playing outside and the use of "ka hidais" to refer to the motion of any motor vehicle.
By "thematic abstraction" I mean referring to typical situations in terms of abstract themes. In modern communities we are familiar with what Schank and Abelson (1977) have described as the "restaurant script." Part of our socialization includes learning what counts as "going to a restaurant." Schank and Abelson define a script as "a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation" (1977:41). While our cognitive training for literacy would teach us to explicitly describe the restaurant script, our ordinary experience enables us simply to refer to it. Similarly, Athabaskans refer abstractly to themes such as going hunting, sighting game, shooting, butchering, and distributing the meat. The difference between this orientation and that of literacy is that Athabaskan youngsters are trained to pay attention to the cultural scripts or themes, while training for literacy entails assuming these as background knowledge and teaching youngsters to concentrate on description of visual details. Western youngsters are taught in first grade sharing time to describe objects in a decontextualized manner and discouraged from talking about the personal meaning of objects or the place of the objects in the context of their own lives (Michaels 1981). The teacher elicits these accounts by asking questions. Athabaskans are trained to narrate abstract themes and omit unnecessary detail. Their percentile scores on the descriptive portions of story retellings are lower in the middle than the early grades (Goodman and Page 1978). This probably reflects a greater disparity between the expectations of home and school as children grow older (cf. Philips in press).
In contrast to learning by means of training questions, the cognitive orientation we call thematic abstraction is the result of nonintervening patterns of social interaction. By means of narrative, cultural themes are modeled for youngsters. Children learn to abstract from everyday situations themes they hear about in narratives. They organize information around these abstract themes. Many events told about in narratives involve familiar action sequences in familiar places. Because of their familiarity, these do not need to be described in detail but can be referred to parsimoniously. Distinctive features of the landscape might be mentioned so that listeners who have not been there will recognize the place when they see it years later. Something akin to thematic abstraction is found in Western society among poets, who highlight things the rest of us take for granted while ignoring things most of us deem important.

It is an essential point that training for thematic abstraction assumes to a great extent a shared context. That is, people are not socialized to be able to explain things out of context to those who do not share their reality set. They are not trained to talk with strangers. Outsiders must develop the ability to wait for insight and understanding. Thus training for thematic abstraction is to a certain extent preparation for social relations of in-group solidarity.

In contrast to the contextualized discourse of the bush consciousness and the cognitive orientation of thematic abstraction, for the modern consciousness the cognitive orientation is toward literacy. Olson (1977) has argued that in the Western world language has become reoriented toward the text, especially following Luther.
For Luther the text was supreme and God's word was to be approached only through the text, not through the institution of the church. In this literate orientation, the text stands alone. Writing is decontextualized, and is ideally interpretable without reference to a larger context. As Olson describes such autonomous text, it is to be written so that the sentence itself will be an explicit representation of the meaning which requires no further reliance on personal interpretation (Olson 1977).

The essayist prose style that developed with the Enlightenment assumes a public, an unknown and even unknowable reader. The author must imagine this unknown audience. Thus the audience is a fiction (Ong 1977). The reader is not an ordinary human being but an idealization, an abstract entity in relation to the separate reality created by the text.

The author of a text is equally fictionalized (Foucault 1977). He exists in relation to the text, which mediates between him and his readers. In order to capture this distinction between the roles implied by the text and the person of the reader or writer, Chatman (1978) distinguishes between the real and implied author and the real and implied reader. This assumption of multiple literary roles is also shared by Uspensky (1973), and Goffman (1974) further subdivides these roles into animator, strategist, figure, and character arguing that these are found not just in writing but also in ordinary conversation.

The point that concerns me here is not how many roles there are, but the existence of a text that stands apart from any context. In
the essayist prose tradition which is our idealization of literacy (Scollon and Scollon 1981a), text is idealized as decontextualized. To the extent text is decontextualized the persona of the author and reader are fictionalized. This fictionalization of the self is one of the central social and cognitive correlates of Western literacy.

We have shown that our daughter, Rachel, before she was three fictionalized herself in stories as character, author, and audience, displaying her orientation to literacy. This was indicated among other means with the regular use of third person references to herself (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). That this is characteristic of children from mainstream American society but not of all children is argued by Sutton-Smith (1980) who compares different types of oral narratives. He contrasts his collection of stories told by middle class White children from New York with Heath's sample of Black children in the Carolinas. "Whereas over 95% of the New York stories are in the third person voice, only 30% or so of Heath's collection are" (p. 10).

For the bush consciousness, the cognitive orientation is not literacy but thematic abstraction. Instead of being fictionalized in relationship to an autonomous, decontextualized text, it is the self which is autonomous and decontextualized. It is the individual, not the text, who is autonomous and stands alone to be interpreted without reference to the context. Thus Daddy is a hunter no matter where he is or what he is doing.
II.4 Deference

The nonintervening aspect of the bush consciousness implies strategies of deference in social interaction. By deference I mean Brown and Levinson's (1978) negative politeness and off-record strategies, discussed in Chapter 1 and outlined in Appendix B. Since Athabaskans value individual autonomy, they do not presume common interest with other individuals, but rather prefer to leave others alone wherever possible. Chapter 3 discusses socialization to patterns of deference politeness such as hedging. Chapter 4 provides data relating nonintervention in asking questions and deferential forms of questions, and Chapter 5 documents other strategies of deference.

Nonintervention is another way of saying that individuals assume distance in social interaction. Brown and Levinson associate deference with social distance or asymmetrical power relations. Thus nonintervention implies discourse patterns consonant with the expression of deference. The structure of the interactive narrative, explained in the next chapter, is an example of nonintervening patterns of discourse (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). Narratives allow persons to express their view of the world without imposing it on others.

If members of a society value nonintervention, I would argue that strategies of deference politeness will be prominent in their speech. Nonintervention may also be expressed by careful use and avoidance of eye contact and body movement (Darnell 1980).
II.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have laid out the background of the work Ron Scollon and I have done together on reality set, in particular the bush consciousness as it contrasts with the modern consciousness. I have attempted to show how individuality, the central value of the bush consciousness, is manifest in the integrative aspect of cognitive functioning as well as the nonintervening aspect of social relations.

In the next chapter, I expand on the themes of nonintervention and socialization to nonintervening patterns of interaction and discourse which lead to the cognitive orientation of thematic abstraction.
SECTION II

DATA
I present two types of data in this section. The first, found in Chapter 3, is evidence for the norm of nonintervention in the form of narratives, themselves a nonintervening form of discourse. Here I show how nonintervention in social relations is valued and how it is expressed, how it is taught to youngsters by adults and older siblings, as well as to outsiders and by playmates and younger siblings. Though socialization is carried out nonverbally as well as verbally, I focus on the linguistic aspects, i.e., the ways language functions in socialization.

The narrower linguistic aspect of content form is dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5, where I document the linguistic strategies of deference which I claim are the outcome of socialization to nonintervening patterns of interaction. They are the result of the interaction between patterns of social interaction and discourse, which are shaped by the values of the reality set, and the linguistic resources of the community, in this case Athabaskan and English. The linguistic patterns which are used to express deference are characteristic of the English spoken by Athabaskans. They are the strategies Brown and Levinson identify as universal whenever people want to preserve social distance among themselves. They have the general aim of making minimal assumptions about the addressee's desires, showing that the speaker does not intend to coerce the hearer, and showing that the speaker intends to avoid impinging on the hearer's personal preserves.
CHAPTER III
LINGUISTIC SOCIALIZATION TO DEFERENCE: LEARNING
NONINTERVENING PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

III.0 Introduction

I argued in Chapter 1 that in order to understand linguistic change, we need to understand how language is learned and taught in the process of socialization. In Chapter 2, I described the reality set of Athabaskans and contrasted it with our own, the modern consciousness. I also described the cognitive orientation of the bush consciousness, thematic abstraction, and showed how it differs from the cognitive orientation toward literacy of the modern consciousness. I discussed the relation between nonintervention and deference. In this chapter, I focus on the nonintervening aspect of the bush consciousness. I suggest that there are patterns which may be seen in the interaction of Athabaskans that may be attributed to the value placed on nonintervention. This aspect of the bush consciousness manifests itself in socialization, linguistic as well as nonverbal, which includes nonintervening patterns of social interaction such as the use of narrative. Nonintervening patterns of social interaction are the social outcome of socialization, from which come cognitive patterns of thematic abstraction as well as linguistic strategies of deference in social interaction. To learn strategies of deference politeness is important to Athabaskans because any interaction is a risk to their central value of individuality. Since interaction is
necessary to learn language, the learning of language is a risk to the central value. Nonintervention, characteristically patterned in interaction, models certain linguistic strategies for children that may affect the structure of the language they use. I present data from Athabaskans to show how they express the social norm of nonintervention, how they teach it to children, and how children teach it to each other. I show how the socialization of Athabaskans differs from that of middle-class Americans, both through an abstract, theoretical discussion and actual examples of what I will call teasing narratives.

I first discuss the data and methods of gathering data. I include this discussion here because I was socialized to nonintervening patterns of interaction as I conducted my research. I then use passages from narratives told by Athabaskans as examples of nonintervening ways of teaching nonintervention. I follow this with a discussion of nonintervening teaching and learning. In addition to teaching by narrative and example, teasing is used as an extreme form of intervention to teach the decontextualization of self or stoicism. The child learns to see situations in terms of roles, and thus to abstract themes appropriate to social roles and typical situations. This is part of his training in pragmatic indirectness, which allows him to interact without imposing his own wishes or views on others. He learns not to react when things go wrong, and not to blame others. This is good training in self-reliance for people who have to be prepared to survive alone without becoming mentally unstable. After a discussion of training in the decontextualization of self, then, I
describe how Athabaskans learn not to make attributions.
Nonintervention implies not making assumptions about others' motives or intentions, or attributing personality traits. I present a teasing narrative to show how children are taught not to speak about the feelings or actions of others.

III.1 Data and method

The data in this study come from a number of sources, the primary ones of which are field observations in Arctic Village, Alaska in the summer of 1972 and Fort Chipewyan, Alberta for a year beginning Summer, 1976. These observations have been supported by a survey of the following villages in Alaska from 1978 to 1980: Anvik, Copper Center, Fort Yukon, Grayling, Holy Cross, McGrath, Nenana, Shageluk, and Tanacross as well as Fairbanks, Anchorage, and Sitka. Discussions with Eliza Jones and Katherine Peter at the Alaska Native Language Center in Fairbanks during this period have also been rich sources of information. Speakers of the following Athabaskan languages are represented by the survey: Ahtna, Deg Hut'san, Denaina, Gwich'in, Holikachuk, Koyukon, Upper Kushokwim, and Tanacross in Alaska, and Chipewyan in Canada.

Because of the value placed on nonintervention and deference in social interaction, nonintervening methods of inquiry were required (Scollon 1980). Participant observation was more appropriate than formal interviewing or elicitation. This is because it involves nonfocused interaction (Scollon and Scollon 1980), which entails allowing negotiation with community members in the process of
gathering data. Rather than requiring people to answer questions, one listens to whatever people have to say and says what is necessary for people to become aware of what one knows and what one needs to know. Because of the distrust of distancing media associated with the integrative aspect of the bush consciousness, it was often difficult to make tape recordings. Anything that takes words out of context is distrusted. Many people consider it stealing. Thus anything tape recorded, published, or broadcast must be treated with extreme caution.

To protect the confidentiality of individuals with whom I have worked, persons are not identified by village. Published sources have proved useful as illustrative data which recapitulate my corpus of materials but do not violate the privacy of the individuals involved. Wherever something from my field data is said in a publication, I use the published account to illustrate more convincingly than my own paraphrase people's expression of nonintervention. The problem of studying children makes confidentiality all the more important. Observing children is considered by Athabaskans and perhaps by others including Hawaiians a serious intrusion into their autonomy (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). Most of the data we were able to tape record were gathered in our home or in public settings, where we intervened in children's activities at the risk of causing them to leave. These observations, however, were corroborated by unrecorded observations in children's homes and by discussions with parents and grandparents.
The passages I quote in the following sections are from published narratives told by Athabaskans to non-Natives who wrote them down.

III.2 Nonintervening teaching and learning

We might think of nonintervention as a system of values and behavior patterns governing social relations and ecological adaptation among northern Athabaskans. It involves respect not only for each individual human being, but for everything in the natural order. Showing respect includes being careful in speaking. David Paul of Tanacross, Alaska discusses verbal taboos.

My grandfather say, "In-chee'!", he mean, not right, like don't brag! Boy say, "I kill moose today!" Man say, "In-chee'! Don't say that! Say, instead, maybe today I see moose." Boy say, "I cross river now." My grandfather say "In-chee! Maybe you fall in river drown you say that. Say, instead, maybe I try cross river today" (1957:3).

The instruction to qualify one's statements, to avoid sounding too certain about future events, is used by a ten-year-old girl to her two-year-old brother at the end of a visit: "After I'll come back. Maybe. 'Maybe', say that."

One has to be careful with what one says, even to animals. One takes animals only if they are willing. Moses Henzie, a Koyukon Athabaskan, tells of a medicine man who intervened too strongly in the life of a moose, including a comment on the value of taking great care in speaking.

This guy . . . was having hard time in winter. No meat. So he run after a moose, but that moose was just keep running away all the time. Can't caught it up. Not enough snow, too. Just running all the time. So what this man do, he holler at this moose. Says something like, "I wish you fall off somewhere." Not too long after that the moose run over
the cliff. Big cliff. Moose get killed that way. So he get his meat.

Pretty soon that medicine man start to think about it. Just like he was against moose. He know that's wrong for the near future. He's scared that if he work against animal, pretty soon no moose would be around.

If medicine man get mad at anything, even rabbits, there be no rabbits around the country. That's the way it is. He knows he made mistake. And once he make mistake on his mouth he can't help himself back again. Even if he feel sorry, nothing he can do. He needs help (1979:12).

Everyone, not only medicine men, has to be careful with speech. One does not tempt fate even by making simple assertions about one's plans. Henzie tells about some men on a hunt who were going to float moose meat downriver in a moose skin boat.

Edward say, "I'm sure going to have easy time going down, maybe."

He thought it was going to be easy running or something. But when he pull on the paddles like this, it move alright one way, but it move right back again. He pull one way and that meat jerk him back. Never go nowhere. All he did was go around and around. Everytime he pull on those paddles that meat jerk him other way. He sure work hard to go down oldman (Henzie 1979:24-25).

The nonintervening aspect of the bush consciousness makes it inappropriate to make promises or appointments. One never knows if he can count on plans working out, so he hedges statements about the future with words like "maybe" or "I guess."

Nonintervention also implies saying things indirectly. One would not presume to tell anyone, even a child, what to do or not to do. Instead, one tells stories.

Training kids used to be really important thing.... Mostly what parents did, they told their kids, "Everytime somebody tell story, try listen. Everytime older person tell story, stay listen to them." Because they might run into the same thing as that story. That's the way they raise up (Henzie 1979:32).
Failure to pay attention to what one is told might result in inconvenience, injury, or even death. People rarely speak without a reason, but it is up to the listener to make sense of what he hears (R. Scollon 1980). Francois Mandeville, a Chipewyan speaker, also tells about how children were taught.

Those who were old men and old women taught the children. . . . He told the children stories about those people who could do anything and what they did that made them unlike all other people. He thought that by telling the children now about what people had done in the past, and if they would act like those who could do anything, then it would be possible for these children to become like them, so that is why the old man taught the children (Li and Scollon 1976:2).

Henzie tells how his grandmother got him to try making snowshoes, not by telling him directly or showing him how:

That's just like me with snowshoes. I had hard time making snowshoes. But Grandma Annie Koyukuk, Jim Koyukuk's wife would tell me story of long ago. She tell me the first year Grandpa Jim Koyukuk start make snowshoes. He cut down ten birch before he bent one. She keep telling me that. This woman was pretty nice woman. That was how she make me try to make snowshoes (Henzie 1979:18).

Piaget treats learning as a process of adaptation of an individual to the environment. Adaptation consists of two indissociable components, assimilation and accommodation. In all learning or development there is simultaneously assimilation, or change in the structure of what is learned, and accommodation, or change in the cognitive structures of the learner. Accommodation is associated with imitation, observation, learning by watching and listening. Assimilation is manifest as play or trying things out to see how they work (Piaget 1962).
In describing the bush consciousness, we characterize nonintervening learning as involving a dissociation of assimilation and accommodation (Scollon and Scollon 1979:202). There is a contrast with the modern consciousness in the balance between the two aspects of adaptation. For the modern consciousness, there is the assumption that learning occurs in increments and that knowledge can be broken down into components. Typical of this reality set, learning language is characterized by Halliday as a process of interaction. That is, there is a constant equilibration of assimilation and accommodation.

For Athabaskans, the period of equilibrium can be described as longer. We might think in terms of long swings of a pendulum from one end of the continuum of adaptation to the other. Though all adaptation involves both assimilation and accommodation at the same time, there are individuals who bite off more than they can chew and structures that take a long time to digest.

In Athabaskan society, children are expected to accommodate by paying active attention when adults are talking. They are also left alone a good deal of the time and allowed to assimilate the structures of their environment. They seek their own equilibrium rather than being guided every step of the way. They are allowed to make their own sense of things. When told stories, they are not questioned about details. Rather, they are asked to tell the story themselves, and become very skilled at abstracting plot structures (Scollon and Scollon 1981b).

The separation of accommodation and assimilation in learning is reflected in the words of Henry Beatus, Sr.:
Well, I see my grandmother cut fish so I use my little knife. Pretend that I'm cutting and drying it. Maybe I took a few backbone out but not every one. I just copy her. Put the fish out on my little bitty drying rack.

She didn't help me. I just watch and get an idea to follow. Like what kind of fish rack they're using. What kind of smokehouse. Not when I was seven, but later, I had small smokehouse, I remember I built that.

Grandma used to put eggs in the little balloon-like thing from whitefish stomach. Just the salmon eggs that were loose. She put them inside that to dry. I try to help but not very much.

Grandma used to tell stories in the evening after fishing. I believe I learned more in the stories she told me than I learned by myself. At the time she was telling me stories I really couldn't understand. But right now when I got older, I remember the words she told me. That's where I learn. I get to understand it more twenty or thirty years afterwards (Beatus 1980:16-17).

The last paragraph underscores the importance of accommodation. One pays attention to teachings but does not expect them to make sense until decades later.

Among the Beaver, neighbors of the Chipewyan, youth go out alone to contact spirit helpers and thereby acquire what are known as medicine powers, but they do not directly tell anyone what their medicine powers are (Ridington 1979). They allow people to discover these through the course of their lives, until by the time they become elders the visions of their youth are known to everyone. We can see in this a sudden burst of assimilation of animal spirits, followed by a lifetime of accommodation on the part of self and others to the visions of one's youth. People gradually learn that certain habits peculiar to the individual are determined by spirit helpers, and come to respect the medicine of elders.

We see as the ideal a long period of accommodation followed by almost instantaneous assimilation. An example of this is supplied by
the anecdote of a man who grew up in the woods with his grandfather who spoke only Athabaskan but listened to English on the radio throughout his youth. Since they lived in the wilderness he had no opportunity to try out his English until he was grown, but he was then able to speak good, fluent English. He accommodated by listening and imitating, but had nobody to interact with in English. While this anecdote is somewhat apocryphal, it illustrates the attitude toward learning of many Athabaskans.

Overall there is a long period of accommodation in youth. One imitates and accommodates to the wishes of his elders. Then one tries things out for oneself and becomes capable of doing things. In old age one advises younger people and jokes with older ones. In potlatch speeches elders compete with each other in highly assimilative playing with words and meanings.

Though elders command more respect than youth and can speak more freely in their presence, accommodation to the rights of others is highly valued. Respect for others' view of the world is shown by taciturnity or a preference for avoiding the negotiation of intersubjective reality through conversation (Scollon and Scollon 1979, 1981a).

For Athabaskans, linguistic socialization amounts to training in linguistic accommodation. While children are not often encouraged to

In Piagetian theory, assimilation has a meaning almost opposite its meaning in phonological theory. Piaget looks at assimilation from the point of view of the individual, while phonologists look at it from the point of view of the environment. For Piaget, the child assimilates the structures of his environment by playing with them, adapting them to his own cognitive structure.
speak, in some cases with very young children they are encouraged to imitate a phrase at a time. For example, when a baby cries, a two-year-old boy says, "Kai" ('cry'). His older sister says, "Don't cry, he ni" ('Say, 'Don't cry''). Don't cry, Baby." The boy then imitates, "Don't cry, Baby." In this way he learns an appropriate remark to make in this situation. He also learns to pay attention to what others say.

Even infants are told stories and taught to listen. They thus internalize the rhythms of the language and learn to time verbal responses. We have on tape an eight-year-old boy listening to a tape recorded oral narrative and repeating the last word of each line in the pause that comes at the end of the line. He does this without any great effort, at the same time monitoring the other speech and activity going on in the room.

Elsewhere we have described the ways in which a child is trained in what we have called thematic abstraction (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). This is the cognitive orientation of the bush consciousness. By narrative and other means the child is taught role expectations, role relationships, and other themes it is necessary for him to know to become a member of society. These themes involve hunting and the proper treatment of game animals, training for swiftness, appropriate behavior for women, and the like. Youngsters will listen intently to narratives, whether a live performance, a tape recording, or someone reading from a book. They learn to relate linguistic themes to behavioral schemata, to abstract themes from a narrative and formally structure themes in telling stories themselves
(Scollon and Scollon 1981b), and to characterize everyday events in terms of narrative themes.

The learning of themes begins in infancy, before a child can really be expected to understand language. Grandparents hold infants and tell stories on behalf of the infants about how they made their mothers pregnant and fought off siblings with charcoal axes in order to be born first, or about how they stole their baby teeth from rabbits. The verb that means to impregnate a mother from the child's point of view reflects profound respect for individual autonomy or self-determination, manifest in the content form of Koyukon as grammatical agency for a fetus before conception. The Chipewyan phrase for being born which translates as "to arrive on Earth" also assumes the existence of an individual before birth. Consistent with this assumption is the question asked parents about newborn babies, "Who came?" The newborn baby is not assigned to a category of gender, boy or girl, as in Western society ("What was it, boy or girl?") but treated as an individual.

In addition to telling infants these stories which may have the effect of training them in listening, caregivers pretend to listen to infants, responding to their noises as if they had meaning. They thus model listening for the infant (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). It is important to note, however, that in this modeling of listening they do not appear to be encouraging the child to begin speaking. We see in these socialization practices a careful guarding of the spontaneous individuality of the child in the process of interaction.
When the child is a little older a grandparent may make up a song that he sings on the child's behalf while the child dances. The song is sung as if to the grandparent, thus modeling for the child how to act with respect to his grandparent. At the end of the song, the child is rewarded with a sweet as if he himself had sung the song. The rhythm and style of the song represents the child's personality as perceived by the grandparent, fast paced for a lively child and slower for a quiet one, and thus shows respect for the spontaneous individuality of the child.

III.3 Training in the decontextualization of self

I have described nonintervening socialization in cognitive terms. The cognitive orientation of thematic abstraction is nurtured by means of training in the decontextualization of self. By this I mean that for Athabaskans the self or the person is relatively independent of the context in which the individual is found. Unlike the Westerner who defines himself in terms of the roles he plays as professional, spouse, lover, parent, etc., the Athabaskan man conceives of himself primarily as a hunter. This is true whether he is hunting or shopping. Much of the social disorganization found in present-day Athabaskans can be attributed to the fact that this conception of the self no longer matches reality to any great extent.

Training in the decontextualization of self consists of three aspects. The cognitive aspect is learning to abstract themes by listening to narratives. This can be described as metonymical indexing, a process by which reality is referred to and cognitively
stored. Metonymy has been defined (OED) as "a figure in which the name of an attribute or adjunct is substituted for that of the thing meant." In contrast to the alphabetical indexing of the modern consciousness, the bush consciousness indexes phenomena by referring to classes of related activities, places, or situations with a few themes. An example of metonymy is provided by the village elder who said, "(Alaskan) Natives need a government like Egan (then governor). But make our own flag is danger." Here he uses "flag" as a symbol for a separate government. Another is describing a boy as having a "dirty mouth," with the explanation, "says all kinds of things if you make him mad." Another example of referring to a part of the body to describe behavior is the admonition "Watch your hands" by a woman to someone who was reaching for the puppy she was holding. The practice of nicknaming is another manifestation of metonymy. "Ball" describes a fat woman who loves to eat. "CBC" is a man who talks all the time, and "Smoocher" is a young man who steals from the store.

The linguistic aspect of training in the decontextualization of self is discourse patterns of glossing what a child says rather than expanding it and modeling by eliciting imitation. In this way caregivers model for the child culturally appropriate themes of the sort that occur in narratives. The social aspect is general non-interference which provides freedom to observe social roles, contrasting with teasing whenever a child steps out of the approved social role.

We have characterized the difference between thematic abstraction and the literate orientation, the cognitive orientation of the modern
consciousness, by saying that for the former the social role is fictionalized while for the latter it is the individual which is fictionalized, that is, an entity is constructed and then treated as the central reality (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). While both the individual and society are essential to human life, the two receive different emphases in different societies. Athabaskans assume that the individual is primary and cooperatively construct a social reality, while Westerners assume a complex society and collaborate in creating individuals who can maintain a sense of self in the face of the bureaucratization of life. Thus the Athabaskan conceives of social roles as real, while Westerners consider the self to be real.

Learning to think in terms of social roles and cultural themes is the objective of one part of the process of training in the decontextualization of self, i.e., training by which children are taught to step out of the current situation and take a more impersonal, decontextualized view of their own involvement in social contexts. That is, they learn to view themselves in terms of an abstract social role rather than as an ego with personal feelings. By ignoring a child's spontaneous speech, eliciting imitation, and calling attention to social roles, one trains the child to accommodate to cultural expectation. Discouraging egocentrism in children is necessary in a society where dominance is linked with display (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). That is, in contrast to American society the person in a superordinate role such as a parent or elder is expected to model or display speech or behavior for subordinates. As Bateson (1972) and Mead (1977) have observed, American parents tend to
encourage their children to exhibit their abilities in speech or action. Athabaskan children, on the other hand, are admonished not to show off. The Chipewyan boy in our study, in order to initiate interaction so that he could elicit talk, would hand an adult something and wait for that adult to speak. With this strategy he could initiate interaction without the risk of violating the adult's individuality by introducing a topic and thereby restricting what the adult could say. This nonintervening strategy contrasts sharply with the strategy employed by the two-year-old studied by R. Scollon (1976a), who would hand him something and introduce her own topic, even while he was trying to summon her by asking a question.

Consistent with the linkage of submission and display, children in American middle-class society are treated as persons who have a right to be heard, even when their speech is unclear. This contrasts with the treatment of Athabaskan children whose speech is normally ignored. Although infants are treated as if their noises are meaningful, this does not usually apply to toddlers who have actually begun to speak. Ochs (1980a) shows how the assumption of intentions governing behavior, even on the part of immature children, results in expansion of children's utterances by mainstream American caregivers. Taking the child's point of view can be seen as encouraging and helping the child to assimilate, or modify the structure of the language. This contrasts with modeling for the child the appropriate cultural stance and expecting him to imitate, or accommodate. Assuming motives on the part of the child can also be viewed as maintaining a relationship of solidarity (Brown and Levinson 1978,
Scollon and Scollon 1981a) with the child. Ochs (1980a) observes that Samoan caregivers do not expand the utterances of young children or attribute meaning to unclear utterances. Heath (1980) reports that members of a black working class community in the Piedmont Carolinas pay no attention to the chatter of little children. In these two communities, as among Athabaskans, children are not oriented toward literacy before they enter school.

In one of the rare examples of expansion of a child's utterance by Athabaskans, our daughter Rachel (2) said "ejere" ('buffalo') and an older woman responded, "Ejere. Daddy ejere kaya?" ('Buffalo. Did Daddy go hunting for buffalo?') The woman knew very well that Rachel had no intention of saying her father had gone hunting for buffalo. Not only was buffalo hunting illegal, her father had never been known to hunt anything. She was simply taking the child's utterance and modeling a culturally appropriate theme or role, much as the little boy who was asked whether his new toy had been bought by his father replied, "Daddy moose kaya." ('Daddy hunts moose.') He was not literally saying that his father was hunting moose at the time the toy was bought. Rather, he was saying, "Daddy is a man and a moose hunter, not a woman who buys toys for children" (Scollon and Scollon 1981a:141).

The practice we have called "glossing after the fact" (Scollon and Scollon 1981a,b) is the only form of direct response to the child's speech in Athabaskan interactions with children. The child's utterance is paraphrased, translated, or explained, but not expanded. We argue that this prepares the child for adult patterns of negotiated
interaction. Elicited imitation models for the child what kinds of things can legitimately be said. The child is free much of the time to play with language, to practice and assimilate structures without interference. Thus children in the same family develop individual ways of saying things. We can compare these interaction patterns with those of the black community in the Piedmont Carolinas studied by Heath (1980), Trackton, where similar patterns present similar individualizing influences. Heath contrasts the storytelling of these children with the expectations of mainstream educators. "They express their personal responses, recreate corresponding situations with often only a minimal adherence to the germ of truth of a story. The individual asserts himself in the stories of Trackton" (1980:43).

According to Hood and Schieffelin (1978), elicited imitation is rare among Americans. The widespread practice of expansion instead assumes that a child has something to say. Expansion calls for the introduction of new information by what Scollon (1976a) terms the "vertical construction." This prepares the child for the discourse patterns characteristic of literacy (Scollon and Scollon 1981a,b).

By treating the child's utterance as a text that can be taken out of context and commented on metalinguistically, the groundwork is laid for the fictionalization of the self.

In contrast to the general noninterference and indulgence of children, another aspect of training in the decontextualization of self is teasing children in order to develop stoicism. Children are frequently abused with names like "ts'ekwaze sîhni," ('no good girl') or "tcilekuyi gan yaze," ('little skinny brave'). Adults take
children's possessions, saying "Mine," or threaten to take home Baby Brother. Children are expected to remain silent or at least maintain their composure.

While children are indulged, they are schooled in stoicism. A child who falls down and cries is told, "Don't cry. Be tough." We can compare this with what typically happens in middle-class society. For example, when our daughter Rachel fell down her father said, "What happened? Did you get hurt?" We have argued that in doing so he is asking for an account, calling for her to step outside of herself, to fictionalize herself as an observer and speak as if she were someone watching herself fall (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). He is calling for a text that will stand apart from her own involvement in the action. The Fort Chipewyan child, on the other hand, is taught to act as if nothing happened, to remove himself from the context of the situation, or to fictionalize a situation in which little boys fall, hurt themselves, and think nothing of it. The role of the brave little boy is more important than the self that might have been hurt.

Teasing functions differently among Athabaskans than among Anglos. Anglo children might be thought of as fictionalizing a self that, rather than being teased into submission, recontextualizes the situation so that the one who has teased becomes the victim of teasing. By teasing children we provoke them into providing a comeback. Children are praised for being quick on the draw. Teasing has the effect of promoting solidarity. Words become a vehicle for interaction. Athabaskans, when teased, rarely try to defend
themselves. Rather, they distance themselves from the situation, either by remaining silent or by leaving.

In a story written by a ten-year-old, children going for a walk are instructed by their mother not to fight even if they are teased. The children do get into a fight, but manage to withdraw from the fighting and return home. With some effort, they are able to remove themselves from the ongoing situation of the fight.

In the next section, I present an example of what I call a teasing narrative to illustrate teasing among children. I also present an argument and show how it differs from typical arguments among middle-class Whites. These provide specific examples of patterns of interaction I discuss more generally in this chapter.

In summary, training for the cognitive orientation we call thematic abstraction involves training in the decontextualization of self. This is accomplished in two complementary ways. By ignoring children, adults model indifference to the ongoing situation. In this way they maintain their own privacy and autonomy while allowing children the freedom to develop in their own way. In contrast to the general nonintervention in children's affairs, adults occasionally tease children and admonish them to develop stoicism. A third element is training in metonymical indexing, by which we mean referring to situations with abstract themes which evoke whole situations by naming parts of them. While metonymy is also an important part of our Western conceptual system (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), it is much more central to the organization of thematic abstraction for the bush consciousness.
Discourse patterns are important in this training process. By glossing a little child's utterances after they are said, an older sibling models alternate ways of referring to the same theme. The exact wording is not required to convey the same theme. This glossing differs from expansion in that the caregiver does not ask for confirmation of what the child intended to say, attributing intentionality to the child, but rather offers interpretations based on her own sense of the situation. By metonymically referring to situations, that is, by abstracting themes, the child practices verbal indirectness. If he says, "see-saw," it may be taken as a request to go out and play or a statement that he has already been out. He does not intervene in the affairs of others by making his remarks, but they are available as suggestions in case anyone should choose to respond. He learns that it is not what he originally has in mind that matters, but whatever happens as a consequence of what he says.

III.4 Nonattribution

Since one cannot interfere with another's plans if people are not taught to make plans and follow through with them, nonintervention implies not attributing intentions to other people. This does not mean that Athabaskans do not have goals or intentions, but that they do not assume they can determine what these may be for other individuals. It is natural to make inferences, and children frequently attribute emotions to nature. For example, Piaget reports that children say that it rains because the sky is sad. However, Athabaskan children are trained not to accept their own inferences as valid. They develop
a critical attitude toward inferences, and become quite behaviorist in orientation, accepting as evidence what they can see or hear. This training in skepticism is necessary to develop individual autonomy. It is developed through constant teasing and putting people on. As part of this training in the decontextualization of self, an analytical attitude develops and personal feelings are played down. The expression of feelings, whether one's own or other people's, is proscribed. Children learn to be cautious in speaking about other people's feelings or affairs.

Much work has been done in the last few decades on attribution theory (Wyer and Carlston 1979). People in modern bureaucratic society make sense of the actions of other persons by attributing intentions or personality traits to the actors in situations that are problematic. In organizations people cannot function without attributing motives to others and acting on the basis of their attributions, whether or not they are justified (Argyris and Schon 1974). As Selby points out (Selby 1975), science has assumed the crosscultural validity of attribution theory on the basis of the folk belief of Western society. He describes a different epistemology for the Zapotec, who like other members of small-scale societies such as the Fox and we can add the Athabaskan (Scollon 1980), think of a person's actions primarily in terms of how they fulfill culturally prescribed social roles. Ochs (1980) relates attribution of intentionality to expansion of children's utterances, and says that Western Samoans differ in this respect from Western Europeans and Americans. As I have said, Athabaskans do not habitually expand
children's utterances, and this may result in a low level of attribution by modeling nonattribution for young children.

Where social roles are relatively stable, they can be used to rationalize behavior. However, when they become overly differentiated and subject to change on the whim of persons fulfilling the roles, people can only act by attributing motives to individuals. They cannot rationally predict behavior on the basis of social role.

Wyer and Carlson suggest that individuals are not likely to ascribe behavioral characteristics to someone unless they anticipate interacting with them (1979:49). Athabaskans do not seem to often be ready for interaction, especially with strangers. One woman tells of how after moving into town she made herself practice saying, "Hi, how you doing?" alone in her cabin in order to be able to greet people. This suggests that Athabaskans would not be likely to attribute traits to people.

Although individual autonomy is highly valued among Athabaskans it is not at all obvious that the ego exists. Foucault (1963, 1976) has argued that the concept of the ego evolved along with that of mental illness. According to Foucault, the concept of mental illness is very much an artifact of the discourse within which is it discussed.

For a long time now, one fact has become the commonplace of sociology and mental pathology: mental illness has its reality and its value qua illness only within a culture that recognizes it as such (1976:60).

Western concepts such as mental illness and practices such as psychoanalysis may be wholly irrelevant and inappropriate within
Athabaskan epistemology. This may be indicated by the general absence of attributions.

It is considered by Athabaskans ridiculous for one person to presume knowledge of another's inner life. A woman who was told to write down her dreams to be analyzed by a Sister at church thought it preposterous that there should be a standard way to analyze dreams. She said that everyone had his own way of interpreting his dreams, and no one could do it for someone else.

Though people frequently report on things other people say or do, they seldom try to account for people's actions in terms of personality traits. Nonintervention involves not assuming you understand someone else's motives and not making assertions about others' feelings or intentions. Examples of people hedging such statements will be found in Chapter 5. In court testimony for an assault case, the defense attorney tried to establish motives for fighting such as the victim or his girlfriend arguing with the defendant, but no witnesses would testify to any alleged motives, beyond quoting the defendant saying, "I'm gonna slit your neck," and "Tell E... I'm gonna slit him to pieces."

Since adults do not make attributions but children do, we might ask: How do children learn not to make attributions? One way is by listening to adults who avoid attributive statements. The principal context in which this happens is the narrative. Elsewhere we have described the tradition of Athabaskan oral narrative (Scollon and Scollon 1981a,b). We have emphasized the role of the audience and the role of the formal structure of texts in facilitating
interaction. I will present only highlights of this discussion here, to show how the patterns of communicative interaction in oral narrative are used by children as part of their socialization. These patterns foster negotiation and mutual sense-making, based on the assumption that the individual has the right to make his own sense of situations while carefully attending to the sense of others and avoiding attributing meanings to them.

Athabaskan narratives are carefully structured around the line to produce a hierarchy of line, verse, stanza, and scene. The line is determined by pauses, not by grammar. Consisting of all that is said between pauses, a line may be a single word, a phrase, a clause, a sentence, or even several sentences. The line is the unit of discourse that reflects the rhythm of the interaction, paced by pauses.

The verse is the unit of grounding, produced by the interaction of the grammar and the rhythm of pauses. When the end of a line coincides with the end of a sentence, the last clause is foregrounded. The listener is expected to respond with at least 'yes' at the end of each verse. In the ideal storytelling, the narrator provides the background, leaving the listener to supply the foregrounded material. This is usually the verb, which comes at the end of the clause.

The stanza consists of a group of verses sharing a common perspective of character, location, or point of view. It is formally marked with words translated by 'ard', 'and then', and the like, and with pausing. The stanza is controlled by audience interaction, expanding according to the audience response.
The scene is the highest level of organization, and is based on cultural themes. There are generally four scenes in a narrative. For example, a story about hunting would include scenes of starting out, sighting game, killing, and returning to distribute the meat.

As we have shown (Scollon and Scollon 1981b), Athabaskan children become skilled in telling formally structured, thematically abstract stories. They learn this skill by listening to their elders telling stories and by telling stories among themselves. These they characterize as "just lies." In doing this they refuse to take responsibility for authorship. In retelling stories they have read, they often leave out the evaluation, leaving the listener to make his own sense of the story.

In the narrative presented below, the storyteller (M) attributes fear to her younger sister, who denies the attribution. She starts out using the third person to refer to her sister (A), who resists this fictionalization. She teases A by telling a story about her getting scared. A denies the story every step of the way. M is fictionalizing her sister in the role of the scared little girl and A is distancing herself from that role. She refuses to accept M's characterization of her actions or feelings. This teasing narrative is an example of how children keep each other from making attributions, thus learning to avoid solidarity in social relations. The narrator is not allowed to impose her view of the narrated events on her audience. Instead, they negotiate. (The notation used in transcription is explained in the List of Abbreviations and Symbols.)
(1) M Oh, I'll tell a story/
(2) L Where?
(3) S K.
(4) L Where?
(5) R Just, just tell a story/
(6) M K.
(7) A Once upon a time/
(8) L Once upon a time/
(9) R Yeah/
(10) See you tell a story/
(11) and then we write down the story/
(12) then we type it on the typewriter/
(13) and you [draw the pictures/
(14) M There was a girl name L_______/
(15) A /?/
(16) M No, there was a girl name A_______/
(17) She was home alone yesterday/
(18) with this baby/
(19) He was
(20) he he both not even much
(21) not even
(22) A Big liar!
(23) M Just little small baby/
(24) and then um
(25) A got scared/
(26) [no way!}
Of course
Big, he's just lying // Don't believe him.

He's a big liar.

She got scared

She went to my house

He's just lying //

Don't believe him don't believe him

She ran to my granny's

Don't believe 'em

And, and she said, um

Where's Dave?

Tell him to come home right now //

(laughs)

Don't believe um he just lying //

He just scared and that baby was about

ready to fall off

Don't believe um, just lying //

Just lying boy

And then A was just scared boy

Big liar!

Of course, and I was babysitting
you, you got scared

No way!

(laughs)

Of course, you didn't even go far

No way!

Wanna prove it? (laughter)
A begins contradicting M from the beginning, as soon as M gives the orientation by mentioning A's name and the time and place. We don't know whether M is recounting something that really happened, and A is embarrassed about it, or whether A is discounting the story on principle. The effect is the same. It's like calling somebody a little skunk or a skinny dog. As the argument begins to escalate, M introduces a line that is incompatible with what she has just said. She first tells about A being home alone, then says that she, M, was babysitting her. A does not argue with the logic of this accusation, but simply denies it strongly. Again, M might be referring to another occasion on which A got scared, but it is more likely that she is just trying to provoke her sister.

Among adults, narratives are told about legendary characters or about one's own personal experience, but not about the affairs of others that one does not witness directly.
By cooperating in the telling and denying of this story, these girls are enacting the norm of granting each other the right to personal autonomy. With one portraying the other as an easily frightened, helpless little girl and that one in turn calling her sister a liar, they are maintaining distance between themselves.

When M starts to tell a story at (14), A is still talking. She stops when she hears her name, and interjects "Big liar" at the first pause. M then says A got scared, which A emphatically denies. M counters with "of course," then has to speak simultaneously with A to get the floor back. Now A interrupts, repeats herself, allows M one more line then repeats her line again, which M has to break into to finish her verse.

As I have said above, Athabaskan narratives are structured around lines, verses, stanzas, and scenes. A exploits her knowledge of this structure to disrupt the storytelling. She begins by filling in a pause (22), then latches her comments on to M's for two exchanges (26), (29). By this time she has sidetracked the narrator by getting her to respond to her contradiction. She interrupts M until the narrative turns into a series of allegations that A rhythmically denies. At (43) A anticipates the last stressed syllable of M's line. M lets a beat pass without saying anything. Now A repeats with an intensifier for emphasis (44), and M echoes A's intensifiers in the following pattern:
A he just lying
M he just scared
A just lying boy
M just scared boy

This exchange is exactly timed, with no pause or overlap. The audience laughs and the volume increases. M challenges A to "prove it," presumably by telling her story into the microphone, but refuses to let her have the mike and starts another narrative to tease L.

It is interesting that in this last section, where M echoes A, the timing is perfectly coordinated. M shifts from third person reference to the second person "you" and introduces herself as first person "I." The content is clearly incidental, and A continues countering M when she is only saying "and then" to introduce the next topic. A finally desists when M names L as the character to be ridiculed next.

(62) M And L____ _____/
(63) you went show/
(64) L [Yah
(65) M And um
(66) after you you you went with his boyfriend/
(67) L Bullshitter, ah?
(68) M He went with his boyfriend, no?
(69) His boyfriend walk him home all the time//
(70) I seen um?
(71) And L was still holding on to him, boy//
In this section M starts out with second person "you," and L signals her to go ahead by saying "yah." M then shifts into third person reference. L simply calls M a "bullshitter," but does not get into a contradicting routine. M tries to get a rise out of her, repeating, increasing the pace, making taunting noises. It ends with someone getting pinched, but it is not clear who pinches whom.

These stories do not fictionalize an audience (Ong 1977) but are aimed at a real audience that is present in the situation. While the narratives are contextualized in the situation of the telling, they
require the audience to decontextualize the self by tolerating teasing and abuse.

Perhaps because she is older than A, L does not get baited into arguing with M. In fact, in the following argument between M and A, ostensibly about her (L), she remains completely silent. I ask A whether L is her cousin. I know that they have the same last name and live next to each other. This argument precedes the previous stories on the same tape. The girls go through ten rounds of disagreement, slowing down and decreasing in volume, and finally ending with, "Oh, shut up," and laughter. (S is the author.)

(1) S She's your cousin?
(2) A Who?
(3) S /?/ [That girl
(4) A L____, you're my cousin dae?
(5) M No.
(6) A Yeah.
(7) M No.
(8) A Yeah.
(9) M She's not.
(10) A She is.
(11) M She's not.
(12) A She is. (Faintly; slowing down and lowering volume)
(13) M She's not.
(14) A She is.
(15) M She's not.
A: She is.
M: She's not.
A: She is.
M: She's not.
A: She is.
M: She's not.
A: She is.
M: She's not.
A: Oh, shut up. (laughs)

This argument is striking because of its de-escalation. In this respect it resembles some of the disputes recorded by Watson and Boggs (1977). There is no appeal to logic or authority, as there is in many Hawaiian disputes, as well as in those reported on by Brenneis and Lein (1977), who found three basic patterns of argumentative sequences. The first, repetition, is exemplified here and also in Watson and Boggs. The second, escalation, occurs in A's contradiction of M above. The third, inversion, where the disputer turns accusations into counter-accusations by directing them at the accuser, are absent from my data and perhaps this relates to the prohibition on attribution. I could easily have resolved the dispute, but she chooses not to. By disagreeing with each other, these girls not only create distance between themselves, but also between themselves and myself. By completely neutralizing my questions, they teach me not to intervene by asking direct questions. As in the previous example, they cooperate in disagreeing, thus preserving interpersonal distance.
III.5 Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to show how Athabaskans are socialized to the social values of individuality and nonintervention through patterns of deference in social interaction. Nonintervention implies respecting not only the individuality of other persons but also the feelings of animals. It requires indirectness in speaking and other strategies of deference politeness. Speaking confidently about the future or about one's abilities is proscribed.

The quality of nonintervention is carefully taught. Moreover, because of this value everything is taught by nonintervening means. Adults model nonintervention for children by not interfering in their affairs. Children are expected to learn by watching what adults do and by listening to stories told by adults.

This mode of teaching and learning can be described in Piagetian terms as a long period of accommodation followed by rapid assimilation whenever the occasion arises. In terms of language learning it means listening and imitating, not being required to produce unless one is ready.

Nonintervening teaching results in the cognitive orientation we have called "thematic abstraction." The child learns to abstract appropriate social roles from situations. This requires training in what we have called the "decontextualization of self." The child is teased to develop stoicism. He learns to suppress his own feelings in order to develop a self that fits the role model provided by Athabaskan society. He becomes an individual who is autonomous and stands apart from any particular context in which he might be found.
Just as the individual learns to submerge his own feelings and intentions as he develops a decontextualized self, he learns not to attribute feelings or motives to others. He learns to speak only from his own experience unless he qualifies his statements.

Narrative is an important part of the socialization process. It not only teaches cultural knowledge and values as content, it reflects in its formal structure interactive patterns that allow for negotiation and mutual sense-making. Its discourse is less intervening than that of conversation, which assumes an intersubjectivity.
NOTE TO CHAPTER III

1. While we use speech by and to this boy as primary data, our data was not restricted to this one source. Rather, we use this boy to exemplify more general patterns of interaction.
CHAPTER IV

QUESTIONS AND INTERVENTION

Once upon a time there was a Big Mouth Mother Goose and she was name Rachel and she like to ask lot of question. Once she was very sad because the children and ladies and men don't like her because she had a big mouth and ask question. Once there was a man hunting for a goose to eat. Then the man saw one goose flying up the sky. He put up the gun and Bang Bang went the gun and Big Mouth Mother Goose Rachel die. The end. (Ten-year-old Chipewyan)

IV.0 Introduction

I now turn to specifics of form in Athabaskan English which seem to be affected by the value placed by the bush consciousness on non-intervention and seem to be introduced and maintained in the socialization process. In this chapter, I show how the form of questions can vary with the display of deference or solidarity, and how the same form can have different meaning depending on the social relationship between speaker and addressee. Athabaskan children know two kinds of question forms: Athabaskan English and Standard English. The former are calqued on Athabaskan and are used to elicit information in friendly conversation. The latter is restricted to special contexts of use. Standard English may be used to reprimand someone for stepping out of line or to politely request goods or permission. The chapter will discuss the form and function of the two varieties of questions, showing how the calqued form arises and why it persists.
You might say that Athabaskans have a different theory of what questions are for than middle class Americans. The underlying assumption of Athabaskans that questions are means of intervention results in the use of different question forms to fulfill social and cognitive functions than is true among middle class Westerners. Questions are used less than one would expect when the objective is to obtain information and more than one would expect for other purposes. The question formed in the grammar of Standard English is used by Athabaskans for indirect directives and for display questions. This "grammatical" question is that in which the declarative word order is inverted. I will also refer to this as the "marked" question form. As I will show in IV.3, this form is often used in directives and is thus ordinarily proscribed for children. Since they are not in the social position to direct the activities of others or require them to display knowledge, their use of this form serves different functions. When they want something, they may use the marked question form to make polite requests, or they may directly state their needs, leaving others free to either provide for their needs or to ignore them. The preferred way of asking questions, making a statement with rising intonation and perhaps an interrogative, resembles the declarative and is less risky for children to use. They sound rhetorical and are in fact often ignored.

In what follows, I first discuss the control function of questions and ways of mitigating this form of intervention by people who value deference. I discuss the interaction between structure and usage. I then describe the grammatical structure of questions both in
Athabaskan and in English calqued on Athabaskan. Finally, I describe
the contexts of use of the two forms of questions in the English used
by Athabaskans, and explain the content form of the calque in terms of
the function of the linguistic expression of deference. Thus, I show
that the calqued form has evolved in response to the need to maintain
the value of nonintervention and is preserved in the content form of
Athabaskan English as a linguistic manifestation of deference.

IV.1 Questions as intervention

Before discussing the form and function of questions among
Athabaskans, we need to discuss the nature of questions from an
anthropological and phenomenological viewpoint. In this section I
borrow from E. Goody (1978), who investigated the use of questions
among the Gonja and inquired into the nature of questions as a kind of
speech act. She found that questions were differentiated into those
that requested information and those that required action. The use of
both types of question was constrained by the relationship between
questioner and questioned. It also contrasted strikingly with the
questioning practices of the middle class British society of which she
was a part. Since this closely resembles the background of my
readers, I need to elaborate somewhat on the difference in
socialization pattern that maintains the different usage patterns.

Middle class mothers are constantly asking their young children
what Goody calls "training questions". Labov has called these
"display questions", questions to which the answer is known by the
questioner. The behavior of the teacher in the classroom is a
continuation of this pattern of socialization, by which the modern consciousness is transmitted. These questions function to break knowledge down into increments that can be easily accessed. Beginning with a steady stream of questions like "What's that?" from the time a child begins to speak, the individual comes to accept the inevitability of the componential aspect of the modern consciousness. He comes to believe that everything in the universe can be categorized. Even speech can be broken down into questions and answers.

The literature on children's linguistic socialization, which has largely been restricted to members of the Western middle class, confirms the folk belief that all children from the time they begin speaking endlessly ask questions. It was thus striking to Goody that Gonja children do not go through a period of continually asking questions.

Why should young children's questions be so ubiquitous among one group and so rare among another? Like the expansion of children's utterances by caregivers I discussed in the last chapter, questions assume a relationship of solidarity between questioner and questioned. They are often used in Western society as conversational openers. As we have seen, people such as the Athabaskans who value deference do not encourage young children to speak by asking questions or any other means.

The training question models for young children in Western middle class families the act of asking questions. While ostensibly used to
gain information, they often elicit information already known to the inquirer. They serve more often to create an intersubjectivity between caregiver and child than to exchange information. As I said in Chapter 2, it is by means of this intersubjectivity that the child jointly constructs reality with his caregivers.

Following Schutz the problem of intersubjectivity has figured centrally in studies of social interaction and recently in the social interaction of children in school settings (Mehan 1979; Streeck 1980; Hood, McDermott, and Cole 1980). A question presupposes knowledge or belief of a particular kind, or the existence of certain felicity conditions. When presuppositions are not shared, a person who is asked a question can be at a loss for an answer. As one Athabaskan says, "Whenever I'm asked a question, my mind goes blank."

Goody in her paper "Towards a theory of questions" is "concerned with the effect of social status . . . on the meaning assigned to the act of asking a question" (1978:5). She uses the cybernetic distinction between the 'report' and 'command' functions of a message. Questions can thus be seen as functioning either to gain information or to control behavior. Because this control function of questions places such a heavy pragmatic load on the question structure, where nonintervention is valued other means of acquiring information are needed. Goody describes what she calls the "deference mode" of questioning, used by Gonja of low status in making requests of their superiors. Because they are not in a position to ask someone to do something, they instead ask whether the person is going to do whatever it is they want them to do. The addressee must infer that they are
deferently being requested to do something. The deferent question is also used by parents with young children. In discussions between teacher and student, questions for information are proscribed, according to Goody. This is because questions from the teacher may be taken as control and questions from the student may be taken as a challenge.

What we have done in modern society, according to Goody, is to institutionalize questioning in such a way that the information channel is separated from the control mode of questioning. Unlike the Gonja, the child in middle class society is able to learn from elders by asking them questions.

Asking questions can thus be thought of as a kind of intervention. The idea of asking questions to obtain information is taken so much for granted in modern society, especially among academics, that we frequently lose sight of the controlling aspects of questions. Asking a question of someone interferes with his right to determine his own affairs, either by requiring him to do something or by constraining what he might say. Because telling someone to do something is an even more serious breach of nonintervention, questions are often used instead among Athabaskans as a form of mitigation. Use of the rhetorical question, in which no answer is expected or required of the listener, is widespread because it allows the questioner to voice his concern without demanding that someone respond.
The author of the story with which this chapter began, in her nonintervening way, is telling our three-year-old daughter that she asks too many questions, or intervenes too strongly in the affairs of those around her. This girl, as the sibling caregiver of a two-year-old brother, rarely asks him questions, and children in the community of Fort Chipewyan do not go through a period of asking questions endlessly (cf. Goody 1978). Our daughter was amazing to people in the community for her willingness to respond to display questions, and we have described how she was even taken to be attending school for responding to cross-examination (Scollon and Scollon 1981). When her father asked her how many mice some boys were playing with and she correctly answered "two," one of the boys asked what school she went to, though they knew there was no school for children her age. Heath (1980) has pointed out that these cross-examination sequences of "initiation-reply-evaluation" correspond to those frequently described as the critical component of classroom lessons (e.g., Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Griffin and Humphry 1978; Mehan 1979).

Alaskan Athabaskans are quite articulate about the use of questions in relation to role relationships. Children are asked, "Why are you doing that?" as a reprimand for bad behavior. They are expected to respond by thinking about what they are doing and changing their behavior. Verbal replies to such questions are considered "talking back." Questions beginning with "Why don't you ..." or "Do you want to ..." or "Are you going to ..." are used as deferent commands. This parallels what Goody (1978) calls the "deference mode" commonly used by the Gonja.
The control function of questions among Athabaskans can be seen in the following example where the girl who wrote the story above about Big Mouth Mother Goose uses questions to control her little brother:


(The form "ogoneca" is unfamiliar to the author. It is probably based on the stem "ca" 'to cause one to be ashamed', and used as a form of baby talk to mean 'shame on you'.)

Goody (1978) observes that in Gonja information questions are addressed by children to each other but not to adults. Similarly, Boggs reports that Hawaiian children, except in nonthreatening situations, do not ask questions or respond to questioning by adults, though they freely ask questions of each other (Boggs 1972). Goody suggests that the separation of the information and control functions of questions may be related to literacy.

These societies contrast sharply with mainstream America, where it is assumed that asking questions is central to learning. Even the British differ somewhat in this respect, as Bateson (1972) and Mead (1977) describe in their discussion of 'end linkage'. The following quote of Margaret Mead reveals the extent to which Americans, including Mead herself, expect children to ask questions of adults. Two teenage girls from England were staying with the Bateson-Mead family.

They had no idea of the kind of initiative that American children do... They had no idea of what to do at a dinner table with adults. I made a rule that if we
mentioned anything they didn't understand and they didn't ask, they paid a fine, and if we challenged (them) and they knew, we paid a fine.

(Quoted in Lipset 1980:163)

In the United States, rapid fire questioning is characteristic not only of ordinary conversation but also of classroom teaching. Rowe (1974) for example has found in studies of science instruction in many classrooms that teachers continually ask questions, allowing students an average 'wait-time' of only one second to respond. Students were sampled from grades one through five being taught by professors and teachers in both small and large groups with both identical and differing science curriculums in many regions of the United States. Throughout Rowe's sample of a few thousand classrooms the same pattern of questioning was found. While the teachers in her sample tended to conceive of persistent questioning as central to the exchange of information, when they were trained by Rowe to a criterion 'wait-time' of three seconds to respond to their students, the level of what Rowe called 'scientific inquiry' and exchange of information in the classroom was significantly raised. Rowe defines 'scientific inquiry' as "speculation, sustained conversational sequences, alternative explanations, and arguments over the interpretation of data" (1974:84). Values on ten student variables were increased. These included length of response, number of unsolicited but appropriate responses, incidence of speculative responses, incidence of child-child comparisons of data, incidence of evidence-inference statements, and frequency of student questions. From Rowe's evidence
it appears that teachers' attempts to generate instruction by fast-paced questioning may in fact inhibit the flow of ideas among students. In other words, the control function of questions in the classroom may interfere with the function of eliciting information. Teachers who were trained to wait for responses were in effect relinquishing control of the discourse to some extent, with the effect that more information was exchanged among students. The pace and style of delivery of questions seems to have more effect than the content of the questions.

IV.2 Yes-no questions: form and function

Because of the sanctions against intervening or "bossing," directives are often phrased as questions. This convention of indirectness means that questions are marked as impolite. Questions formed in the grammar of Standard English are likely to be polite requests, so another form is needed for information questions. The yes-no question, formed as a statement with a rise in intonation at the end, as in the Athabaskan languages, seems to fill this need.

Another tradition, that of speech act theory, attempts to deal with the interaction between the form and function of utterances. Questions can be differentiated either according to illocutionary force, by which Austin (1962) means the intended consequence of a speech act, or according to grammatical form. There is no direct correspondence between grammatical form and illocutionary force. For example, Searle (1969) has distinguished on the basis of grammatical form between yes-no questions and those which require new information,
what Robinson and Rackstraw (1972) call "open" questions. Questions from either of these grammatical categories, however, may perform the same illocutionary act or as Streeck (1980) has argued, a single form may have multiple illocutionary forces. Different social groups may assign different meaning to the same linguistic form. Once a structure is conventionalized by usage, it may then become open to reinterpretation. For example, "Why are you painting your house purple?" can be either a direct question asked out of curiosity or an indirect challenge (Brown and Levinson 1978:138). While this has a literal reading of a request for information, with appropriate intonation it is conventionalized as a criticism. Thus exclamatory intonation may force a reinterpretation from the literal to the indirect.

As Brown and Levinson have argued, "the relationship between structure and usage is a fluid one, and this fluidity is reflected in the state of a language at any one point in time" (1978:266). Thus, yes-no questions are often responded to by clarification or elaboration, though they do not compel anything beyond "yes" or "no."

In one instance a girl mentioned that her aunt was having a baby shower. Assuming that people have showers for expectant mothers, I asked if her aunt was expecting. Rather than answering "no" she said that her aunt had already had the child. Only years later did I learn that people believe that it is tempting fate to prepare for the birth of a child before it occurs. Therefore, her aunt would not have had a shower if she was still expecting. In this case the girl was able to
correct my understanding without an overt contradiction of the
assumption behind my question.

It is this property of not compelling anything beyond "yes" or
"no" that makes these questions so exploitable as a nonintervening
means of obtaining information. The listener is given an opportunity
to respond in whatever way he chooses. The speaker can phrase the
question according to his own assumptions about the world, making
hypotheses which may or may not be confirmed. The hearer can state a
divergent view without overtly disagreeing by saying "No." In the
following exchange the child forms what is from his point of view a
reasonable hypothesis, phrases it as a yes-no question, and obtains
some surprising information. The child, a boy of seven, had picked
Goffman's Asylums off the shelf, and was astounded to learn that it
was not a hymn book but something we read (Scollon and Scollon
1981a):

A: You guys sing from this?
B: No, we read it.
A: You read from it?
B: Yeah.

The yes-no question, then, can be used as a nonintervening mode
of requesting information as well as a nonintervening directive. The
illocutionary force depends not only on the grammatical form but on
the social content. We will return to this point after looking at the
structure of questions in Athabaskan and Athabaskan English and at the
functions of questions in Athabaskan society.
IV.3 The structure of questions in Chipewyan and English calques

Questions in Chipewyan are simple in structure. Neither the question particle which occurs sentence-finally nor the interrogatives that occur in initial position modify the basic declarative structure of the rest of the sentence.

The question particle ḥusā appears at the end of the sentence as in the following examples:

?cyi tēeba dîTE'ay -husā, hēni.
that rapids you-hear Ques. he said
'Do you hear that rapids?' (Li and Scollon 1976:254-255)

In conversation the particle ḥusā is sometimes reduced to -ū as in dēne dîTE aū, 'Do you understand people (Chipewyan)?' Furthermore, these questions may be quite long, especially in narratives (Li and Scollon 1976).

nāzēnā'$āhdi'ti t'asī. céθ-goze tu-ts'ēn
you are going somewhere hills-between lake-to hunting-Rel.

horǐģeɾi yuh?i -husā hēni.
it is steep-Rel. you have seen Ques. he said

'Have you who were hunting seen anywhere a steep place that goes down to a lake between hills? he asked.' (pp. 430-431)

des-k'$ē t'asī. taldēli hōD?q
river-in somewhere open water-Rel. it lies

yuh?i hulī- husā hēni.
you have seen there is ques. he said

'Have you seen open water in the river somewhere? he asked.' (pp. 420-421)
In sentence-initial position there are the following interrogatives as listed by Li (1946:421):

?edlāye 'what?'
?edlāyi 'who?'
?edlāyska 'why, what for?'
?edlāú 'when?'
?edlāni 'where?'
?edlāśi, ?edlisí 'where to?'
?edlā·t'ū, ?edlā·t'c 'how?'

The use of these interrogatives is exemplified in Mandeville's texts (Li and Scollon 1976).

?edlāye hika huh?az -hit'á hěni
What for you(2) start out because he said

'What did you start out to get? he asked.' (pp. 284-285)

nen ?edlāye-dene nešli, hěni
you what people you are he said

'What people are you? he asked.'

who those the ones enemy tracks have seen

'Who is it that has seen the enemy tracks?' (pp. 420-421)

?erkū· hyuñi ?adi, t'at'ū· ?ená-kevέ hoye?i-sī.
then wiseman he said how enemy tracks you see

?oteye hoye hulni hěni
well about it you tell us he said

'Then the wiseman said, "How did you see the enemy tracks? Tell (us) exactly the story about it," he said.' (pp. 420-421)

?edlāʔat'z dją natønhéʔedli
how come here again-meat-it-is

'How come his meat is here again?' (pp. 264-265)
Where have I seen good kidney sticks?' (This is said to himself while he stands there thinking.) (pp. 238-239)

These questions are quoted with "hêni," 'he said'. There is no separate way of saying, 'he asked'. Rhetorical questions as well as questions requiring answers are formed with these interrogatives. When the speaker wishes to make it clear that he wants an answer, he says something like, "You tell me." For example, a man says to another that he thinks it would be good for him to become his partner. Then he says,

'Now what do you think, he asked.' (Li and Scollon 1976:272-273)

But the other person did not speak to him for a good while. Then the story goes on to say,

'Suddenly he said, "You tell me what you are going around after, for which I'll be your partner. Tell me what you are doing," he said.' (pp. 274-275)
The question formation exemplified here is characteristic of question formation throughout Athabaskan languages. The internal declarative ordering of the sentence is not affected by either the sentence-initial interrogatives or by the sentence-final particle.

The Chipewyan grammatical forms and the forms that children at Fort Chipewyan use in English are closely parallel. The English forms appear to be calques of the Chipewyan forms, even though most of these children do not speak Chipewyan themselves. Questions that can be answered "yes" or "no" have the same patterns as the Chipewyan questions with the reduced question particle -ú. They are simple declarative statements with question intonation, or statements with a tag and a question intonation.

About one-third of the questions used by children were yes-no questions of this form.

**Statement + ? (question intonation)**

He wrote it? He drawed it?
You went in our school already?
I could make one?
You got one more elastic?
You got a what you call? Ruler.

**Statement + tag?**

You guys don't have any comics, ae?
It's supposed to go down, ae?
I going write my name, O.K.?

It is clear, however, that this pattern was not restricted to children but was characteristic of speech of all ages in English.
Below are some examples from a woman who worked as a teacher aide in
the school and was visiting in our home.

You don't like boys?
She read in Chinese?
She found it on her own?
You like the Baby?
They're scaring you?
You're scared of them?
You got some beer?
She froze?
It's light out, ae?

In the corpus of children's questions the remainder of their
questions, about two-thirds, begin with question words as in the
following examples:

How come + statement?

How come this thing stuck, right there it don't go down?

How come it's lighter?

How come this tape says Roy Campbell?

Which + X?

Which one?

Which town is this here, look that?

Which side you went?

When + statement?

When you're gonna come visit me?
What ('s) + X?

What's that word says?
Hey, what's this here?
What you want me to draw?

Where (')s + X?

Where's your garbage can?
And where you guys gonna stay?

Who ('s) + X?

Who's whistling?
Who did that?

How + X?

How you spell your name?
How you draw these?

How much + X?

How much that?

These questions differ from such open questions in Standard English in that the word order of Subject-(Auxiliary)-Verb often remains unchanged, even when preceded by a question word, as in "When you're gonna come visit me?" Where the auxiliary is deleted it is a moot point whether the word order is changed. As in Chipewyan, these elements seem to be analyzed as lexical units with fixed internal order. Thus auxiliaries rarely come before the subject, except in the case of demonstratives, as in "Which town is this here?" quoted above.

The auxiliary "did," "is," or "was" or "were," if present often appears in contracted form:
Where'd you get your little puppy from?

Hey, where's those books you was gonna read us?

The phrase "do you" may also be used as an attention getter:

A: L____, Do you believe me? Or what? Do you believe me?
L: (no response)
A: (whistles)
L: Who's whistling?
A: Me. Do you ah

L: Were you whistling?

L____, who otherwise does not invert word order in questioning, uses this strategy here to reprimand A for interrupting her.

In our previous work (Scollon and Scollon 1979) we argued that the convergence of linguistic structures at Fort Chipewyan could be explained in terms of reality set. We argued that the integrative aspect of the bush consciousness favors one underlying grammatical system in speakers who speak two or more languages. This argument, however, may be somewhat weaker for the speech of children in the community who speak only English. In spite of regular instruction in Standard English, they persist in using structures that diverge from Standard English. Although adults also use these apparently calqued structures, the questions typical of the English of school teachers from Southern Canada have no equivalent in Chipewyan. The following questions with the Standard English inverted word order were used by the Chipewyan teacher aide whose other questions appear just above.

What did you make here?

Where did you find that book now?
Ron, then, could you read in Chinese?
Is that right?
What are they doing to you?
When did you go to Smith?
How was that hospital?
Was it a Beaulieu?

It is clear that this woman is able to form questions in either pattern and so we must assume some form of code switching. I observed that when she addressed these standard-form questions to Rachel (age 3) and received no response, she shifted into the other form. In one case there was a simple change in wording:

W: What did you make here?
R: (silence)
W: What you're making?
R: A stew.

While it may be that the child just had more time to think up an answer, it is clear that the speaker was drawing the inference that a change in form rather than a direct repetition was in order. In another case, the question involved a change from an open to a yes-no question.

W: What are they doing to you?
R: (silence)
W: They're scaring you?
R: Yeah.

The yes-no question may have been easier for the three-year-old to answer. Nevertheless, we see again a parallel switch and in the same
direction. In this informal situation of visiting, this woman uses both standard-form and calqued form question types.

IV.4 Functions of questions

We have seen that while questions can function either to exert control or request information, these two functions are separated to any extent only in modern society. The development of literacy and schooling has provided contexts where questioning can take place independent of the status relationships of ordinary social interaction. In fact, modernization has created contexts in which questioning for information is institutionalized.

In Athabaskan communities, the intrusion of modern institutions has been accompanied by the introduction of the English language. The separation of questioning into information and control is carried out in the English language. The Standard English form of questions seems to have been adopted for display questions in the classroom and for speaking with English-speaking adults outside of school. The calqued form is used in informal interaction among in-group members, as a nonintervening way of eliciting information.

In this section, I present evidence to support my argument that the separation of the information and control functions of questions was concomitant with the development of modernization. I give lexical evidence from Athabaskan languages that suggests that Athabaskan did not separate the information and control functions of questions. I give examples from traditional Athabaskan texts of questions being used as indirect directives, a nonintervening means of controlling
behavior. I also give examples of rhetorical questions, which are nonintervening in that they do not require a response. They function as indirect requests for information and also in teasing, which is an indirect way of influencing people. I then give examples of questions used by and to children, both to elicit information and as indirect directives, in a visiting situation and in the classroom. In these modern settings, questions seem to be functionally specialized, with calqued forms serving traditional functions and standard forms serving modern functions.

Questions assume a relationship between questioner and questioned, whether what is called for is action or speech. We might ask whether Athabaskan lexically separates the information function from the control function of questioning since the control function makes this relationship between questioner and questioned a more salient aspect of the question. For Chipewyan, Li (1933) lists separately the stems -kar, -kər, -kər (in the order: imperfective, perfective, future) 'to ask a question', and -k̂r, -k̂r, -k̂r 'to ask for something or beg'. Li generally was careful not to treat as the same stem anything for which he could not clearly show the derivation, but it appears that they might derive from the same morpheme. His field notes expand these lexical entries as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{dayuriikər} & \quad \text{'he asked him' (a question)} \\
\text{yurəkər} & \quad \text{'he asked him for something'}
\end{align*}
\]

Comparing these forms with Koyukon (Jones 1978) we find the cognate forms,
The cognate of Chipewyan dayuri'kær (information question) in Koyukon, doyoodi'kkat, means to ask for advice or permission, which points to a control function in Koyukon. In Koyukon, the stems have the same phonological shape, -kkat, but are used in two different verb themes, which are configurations of prefixes, classifier, and stem with a particular meaning associated with a fixed set of cooccurrences (Kari 1980). Since the distinction in meaning is not the same as that for Chipewyan, it seems that the difference is either a spurious effect of elicitation and glossing or a recent development. We find in Dena'ina (Tanaina) only one form, k'idi'qet, glossed as 'ask' (Wassillie 1979) as in "He went to the store to ask." Gwich'in has two forms (Peter 1979):

- ch'oaakat 'she is asking'
- ch'oodiikwat 'he's begging'

These forms suggest that in proto-Athabaskan there was no separation of the information and control functions of questioning.

It is difficult to determine appropriate glosses for these words, as people when questioned are likely to say, "It means to ask," with a meaning different from what the questioner has in mind. A detailed analysis of lexical sets for named speech acts would be required to clarify this further, but that would be beyond the scope of this study. As an example of the differences in the meanings of speech acts, Athabaskans often refuse to enter a plea in court, with the
result that they receive higher sentences. One woman explained, "We don't plead." She was using the word in the sense of "beg" or "implore," in the context of a discussion of court trials, where the word has a technical meaning. This may provide some evidence that Athabaskans are using these English named speech acts but with an implicit Athabaskan meaning. This would easily lead to spurious glosses of these forms in linguistic elicitation.

In another case when I mentioned asking questions, a woman told about visiting her aunt and saying, "Aunty, you know what I saw on the porch? Frozen fish!" The aunt went and got some for her and a companion said, "I didn't even know you were asking!" Although the utterance was grammatically a question, at least as reported in translation, it was offered to me as an example of complying with the proscription on asking. It is an example of making a request without having the appearance of doing so.

In another story about a man who turns into a wolf (Li and Scollon 1976), his grandmother wolf says, "I am hungry. Have you killed something?" The wolf replies that he has and takes her to the kill. Here the indirect request for food takes the form of a request for information that questions a felicity condition (Gordon and Lakoff 1971).

In another story from the same collection, a stranger approaches a camp and says, "We are very hungry. Here people are staying. It seems you have meat." The leader of the band immediately orders people to bring the best cuts on hand. Such indirect requests are
made in every society, but among Athabaskans they are typical and preferred.

Another example of an information question being used indirectly to suggest that another person take some action comes from the stories of the late Chief Henry of Huslia (Jones 1979). Chief Henry's uncle asks him on a nomadic hunt, "My child, is your friend going back by himself?" He answers his uncle, "Oh, it's O.K., (I'll go) down there with him, so that I can spend a night with my parents." "Yes, that's the right thing," says the uncle, who intended that he accompany his friend but merely asks a question ostensibly for information to avoid the appearance of interfering.

In hunting, Chief Henry's hunting partner, who is older and more experienced, tells him to take a shot at a moose. He phrases this suggestion as a question. "Why don't you try it?" he said to me so I shot and it dropped instantly, hit in the neck."

Moses Henzie (1979), an elder of Allakaket, also uses this type of ostensible information question as a form of directive: When his Grandfather Linus says to him, "Why don't you go with me?" he doesn't report any answer but just does what his grandfather has requested (p. 30).

In another place action is reported in response but without speech. A young man is told, "Why don't you go over there and check that place those kids are talking about?" The kids had seen a bear in its den, but when the young man went to check he couldn't see it (p. 29).
Even in cases where there is a verbal reply to these directives in the form of an information question the reply amounts to assent rather than information:

Walter: Why don't you go over to our camp? We'll give you a little meat.
Moses: Yeah.
But who I'm going to go with?
Walter: You could just go alone.
Moses: Yeah. (p. 34)

I do not mean to suggest that this type of indirect directive in the form of an information question is used exclusively by Athabaskans. This particular form may be used in "mainstream" society, but its range of illocutionary force varies from community to community. My own children, for example, take propositions phrased in this way as suggestions which they are free to reject. They also feel free to make suggestions of their own.

Although in the speech quoted above Henzie is telling in English what was originally said in Koyukon Athabaskan, people use the same patterns when speaking in English. Directives in the form of questions are one of the strategies of deference politeness (Scollon and Scollon 1981a; see also Appendix B). Asking a question apparently for information but with a directive force minimizes the imposition of requiring someone to do something.

Even requiring someone to say something may also be considered an imposition, and so we find Athabaskans sometimes accounting for their asking a question:
My nephew, are you guys all right: he asked me.

No, this winter we're having a hard time. But down here on
Kk'eehy dli:l we finally caught two calves, I told him.

Yes, it looks like you're having a hard time and that's why I
asked, he told me. (Jones 1979)

Parallel to the indirect directive in the form of an information
question, the rhetorical question is often used as an indirect means
of eliciting information. We have argued that for Athabaskans there
is a general restriction on talking in many contexts where there is a
threat to too strong a negotiation of intersubjective reality (Schutz
1962, Goffman 1976, Scollon and Scollon 1979, 1981a). Because of
this restriction on the negotiation of intersubjective reality carried
out by means of conversation, especially question and answer series,
the rhetorical question is common. This use of rhetorical questions
is a form of what Brown and Levinson call an off-record strategy. It
is off-record in the sense that it gives the hearer the option of
responding or not.

Rhetorical questions are a form of wondering out loud.
Sometimes, more deferent yet, they are left unsaid. For example,
Moses Henzie was watching a man mine gold with a sluice box. It was
something he had never seen before.

I just keep thinking, "What he try to wash that gravel off
for?" After while I find out what he was doing.

Rather than ask the man what he was doing, he just waited until he
found out (p. 17).
Similarly, a person was heard to say, "Oh, that's why you said that. I was wondering why you said that." The pattern of waiting for things to make sense, rather than demanding explanations by asking questions, relates to the pattern of nonattribution. It relates as well to the pattern of glossing after the fact which we have described as a method of training in pragmatic indirectness (Scollon and Scollon 1981a). In glossing after the fact the caregiver comments on what a child says but does not ask questions that require a verbal response.

Rhetorical questions may sometimes be addressed to youngsters by elders. For example, when a one-year-old fell down her grandmother asked her, "You drunk?"

As the next case may illustrate, another function of the rhetorical question is teasing:

As soon as he see my sleigh, he laugh. "Who tell you to make this kind of sleigh?" he tell me. "I don't know... How I learned to make sleigh was I take one apart" (Henzie 1979:41-42).

As a youth Henzie had improvised a sled which did not resemble any other sled. Instead of stating the obvious, that no one had told him to make it that way but that he had had to figure it out himself, he says, "I don't know." That is, he takes it as a rhetorical question used for the effect of ridicule and not as a request for information.

The rhetorical question also serves as a stylistic device in narration:

Broken sleigh. What'll I do now? (Henzie 1979:36)

Pretty soon we start to think about those guys back at camp. What if they leave us? (1979:48)
The rhetorical question gives the narrator a way of anticipating the questions of his audience, as when Chief Henry tells of events of long ago.

Why didn't they just cut it up and leave it there? But in those days that's what they did (Jones 1979:90). 

But then I didn't have anything. Where would I get anything? (1979:4)

Without a gun. How could I even have a gun? (1979:6)

I was driving dogs at that time, why didn't I use them when I went trapping? I wasn't lazy but I don't know why I didn't drive dogs (1979:24).

So then with what? Maybe I had an old knife or a piece of tin. With that I cut down a stick and peeled it and skewered the wings with it (1979:26).

Direct requests for information are quite rare. In ten or so questions that show up in Henzie's narrative of over 63 pages in length, only a couple are requests for information. For example, in the following story there is a request for information which is answered. Some boys spotted a bear and were sent to tell the men who were out hunting.

The men walked over the big mountain and sat down to make tea. Pretty soon they see those boys following their track way up the hill. They come out of the timber and head right for the men.

"What happened?"

"We find that bear."

Then all the men come back and they take that bear out of the hole. (Henzie 1979:30)

In telling this the narrator does not mention who asked the question. It is obvious, not only from the situation, but because children do not normally ask questions of adults.
In the Henzie stories the other direct request for information is made by Henzie's blind grandfather who asks him, "What is in the trap?" His blindness makes the question a genuine request for information.

In the Chief Henry stories which fill sixty pages of continuous text there are also about ten questions, at least half of which are rhetorical. Two are directives, one is a request for permission followed by a rhetorical question.

Older sister, let me go up that way.
Older sister, may I go there?
Are you able to camp out by yourself? That's what you're asking to do. (Jones 1979:4)

The only information question in the text is the one in which his uncle asks if they are all right. Because they looked terrible, he asked how they were but did not say directly that they looked awful.

In Fort Chipewyan children usually maintain a respectful silence in the presence of adults, but they became quite vocal in our home when they found we were interested in talking with them. We tape recorded many questions when children were playing and talking. Most of these were requests for information. Where deference or respect for adults is valued, children must learn ways of gaining information without directly questioning adults. Adults do not test knowledge or call for display of knowledge by asking children questions (Scollon and Scollon 1981a,b). Calling for displays of knowledge would threaten the superordinate role of adults by presuming that children know more than adults. Like the British, Athabaskan adults are expected to display knowledge for children (Bateson 1972).
In the few cases where children do ask questions of adults these are used as indirect ways to obtain permission or to request things. The following are a few examples from Fort Chipewyan:

Where's your papers?
I could make one?
You got one more elastic?
You got a what you call? Ruler.
Where's your staplers, I'll put some in here.
Where's your Scotch tape?
I going write my name, O.K.?

These requests for objects and permission are indirect in that they question the existence or location of the objects required. In virtually every case both the existence and location of the objects are known. They are usually directly present in front of both the child and the adult. Children rarely use questions to request things from each other.

In the Fort Chipewyan children's data, questions with word order inversion, the "standard-form" questions, were used only nine times out of more than a hundred, virtually all of these in speaking to adults. This indicates that while the children have the cognitive control of these forms, the forms themselves are socially marked. Children use them to show deference to adults. They are used as polite requests for permission or requests for objects as in the examples below.

Can I type it out now?
Yeah, do you have any hard paper?
Can I use the phone?

Hey, can we have any scissors, please?

It may be of some importance that all of these polite requests were used by girls but not by boys.

In one instance a girl shifts from speaking to her friend to one of us in mid-sentence:

Well what time—Do you have time?

This same shifting of question types occurred when a boy was not understood.

Whose, whose that?

Huh?

Who did that? (pointing to a picture)

In another case a polite tag is added as an afterthought in speaking to me during a game of Crazy Eights:

You don't got no more cards, do you?

Since Athabaskans have been in contact with Americans and Southern Canadians, especially in the classroom, they have been exposed to the display or test questions of teachers. These questions are a critical element of ordinary classroom management and control (Heath 1980, Mehan 1979, Rowe 1974) and are marked as requests for compliance or display by their Standard English form, which is seldom used by children at Fort Chipewyan. In the few instances in which children do use these marked forms in questions to adults, they cannot be interpreted as control because Athabaskan children are not in a
position to control adults, and so the questions can only be polite requests for permission or information.

If we look at questions used by an Athabaskan teacher in a classroom, we can see how questions are used for control. These were recorded and transcribed by Van Ness (1977) in Allakaket, Alaska.

C, where's your book like this?

O.K. What page are we on? (repeats)

O.K. What do you see in the first picture?

Where's your pencil?

In these examples the questions serve to orient the students to the lesson. Step by step, the teacher directs the students through the workbook.

Can you eat meat? Apple? Candy? Plate?

What do we see in the next picture?

Well, can you ride on a hammer?

Which one doesn't belong? Why?

Why doesn't it belong?

Does the dog fly?

Can you wear a coat? Dog? Socks? Hat?

These questions are all known-answer questions. They take the standard form of the inverted word order and are preceded with an interrogative. In marked contrast to these known-answer questions, questions in informal conversation which is interwoven throughout the same lesson take the non-inverted form.

You wear your Daddy's socks? (laughs)
The form and the laughter indicate that this is a question in response to the student's remark, and not an official part of the lesson. Here the variation between the standard-form and the non-inverted form is used to mark the official space of the lesson as distinct from the interwoven conversational and informal space of the interaction between the child and the teacher. This yes-no question is taken as indicating interest and elicits the further comment, "When I go out to recess."

A student asking a yes-no question also receives a reply that gives further information:

S: We'll play that cards tomorrow?
T: No, you'll do something else. You're going to draw tomorrow.

Students ask questions to check out their hypotheses about the lesson:

Three things that could fly you trace out?

They also use questions beginning with "do":

Do you remember Miss ______ took it?

This was in response to the teacher's question, "Where's your book like this?" The student did not have the book and had to politely remind the teacher that it wasn't there and thus inform the teacher that he could not comply with her indirect request. He had to be careful to be polite. Again, deference was the key to his choice of grammatical form.
IV.5 Conclusion

We have looked at how questions are used to control the speech and action of those to whom they are addressed. Because questions are by nature a form of intervention, they have to be treated with delicacy in a society that values nonintervention. Yet they cannot be avoided altogether, as society cannot function in the absence of verbal control and direction. Thus questions are used to mitigate potentially face-threatening acts of commanding or prohibiting action or calling for verbal display.

The grammatical structures available for questions in Fort Chipewyan come from two primary sources, Chipewyan and English. People in speaking English use both forms calqued on Chipewyan and Standard English forms.

The presence of English in the community is closely associated with literacy and schooling. A frequent use of English is in training questions used to draw small children into a relationship of solidarity and a common intersubjectivity. These training questions shape the verbal behavior of the child and prepare her for the questions asked by teachers which require students to display knowledge. The presence of people whose culture values solidarity provides natives of the community with opportunities and perhaps the necessity of using strategies of solidarity as well as to practice Standard English. That is, in order to become educated they must learn new patterns of interaction. They also seem to preserve their value of nonintervention by maintaining strategies of deference in forms calqued on Athabaskan.
Thus, the questions used by English speakers at Fort Chipewyan fall into two categories, calqued and standard. The calqued forms are used among familiars for informal conversation. They are unmarked in the usage of children. Since they resemble declarative statements and are often used rhetorically, they may easily be ignored. Thus their use is consistent with the value placed on deference or nonintervention. Standard questions are marked, and are typically what Goody (1978) has called deference questions, used by adults to control children. Children use these marked forms rarely—to make polite requests for permission or materials to adults, and to get the attention of or reprimand other children.

The fact that children do use the standard form of question rules out any cognitive explanation for the low frequency of these forms. The explanation for this aspect of content form can be found in patterns of fact-to-face interaction, reflecting values of deference and nonintervention. Children who do not speak Chipewyan are nevertheless socialized to patterns of interaction consonant with Chipewyan values, and maintain in their English distinctions which enable them to speak in socially appropriate ways. As long as these values and patterns of socialization continue to exist, we can expect the calqued forms to persist.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. It is not the case, as people will often assert, that children in the community do not know how to speak Standard English. They use it frequently in mocking their teachers.

2. The calqued forms can be explained as the cognitive result of linguistic convergence. Like the phonological convergence of s-series consonants (Scollon and Scollon 1979), usage is different among holders of the bush consciousness and the modernized members of bush communities. The former more consistently use the calqued forms, while the latter use the calqued forms in bush settings but also use the Standard English forms in modern settings.
CHAPTER V
DEFERENCE

V.0 Introduction

We have seen how the form of questions can vary with the display of deference or solidarity, and how the same form can have different meaning depending on the social relationship between speaker and addressee. In this chapter I will look further at the ties between nonintervention and content form, documenting the use among Athabaskans of strategies of deference politeness, or Brown and Levinson's "negative politeness" (See Appendix B for their examples). These include conventional indirectness, hedges, pessimism, nominalization, and ellipsis.

As I have said in Chapter 1, Brown and Levinson characterize negative politeness as "the heart of respect behavior" (1978:134). They define it as "redressive action addressed to the addressee's negative face: his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded" (1978:134). They outline negative face wants, but stress that a speaker may have more general motivation for using these strategies. "The outputs are all forms useful in general for social 'distancing' . . . they are therefore likely to be used whenever a speaker wants to put a social brake on to the course of his interaction" (1978:135). Their first set of strategies of negative politeness or deference is based on the want of the speaker to show
his desire not to coerce the hearer. This want has as one of its outputs indirectness, which when it clashes with the want to be direct produces the strategy of conventional indirectness. Questioning and hedging arise from the desire to make minimal assumptions about the hearer's wants. Questioning, which is sometimes used as a means of verbal indirectness, was discussed in the last chapter. Hedges are discussed in V.3. (These strategies are charted in Brown and Levinson 1978:136). If, as Brown and Levinson say, "negative politeness is the most elaborate and the most conventionalized set of linguistic strategies for FTA (face-threatening act) redress" (p. 135), we might expect to find some grammatical complexity traceable to deference politeness.

I will first discuss two types of indirectness, grammatical and pragmatic. The first is the absence of indirect quotation in Athabaskan, and the second is the use of indirect speech acts. Other strategies of deference, in which the speaker shows his intention not to coerce or impinge on the hearer, are found in V.4.

V.1 Quotation and intervention

When you quote someone's speech, you take liberties with it. Even if you quote the words exactly, you may alter the intonation, or the context might give the words a meaning different than that intended by the original speaker. As speakers of English, we are accustomed to reporting what someone says and changing the wording in indirect quotation. This practice risks even greater misinterpretation.
There is no grammatical means of indirect quotation in Athabaskan. Even in speaking English, Athabaskans often do not quote indirectly. In keeping with nonintervention, they quote directly, not even interpreting what is said as exclaiming, asking, reporting, or the like, but simply as saying. That is, they do not say the equivalent of "he exclaimed," "he asked," or "he reported," but only the equivalent of "he said." This relates to the pattern of nonattribution, in that they do not attribute feelings to the speaker being quoted but simply report what was said.

In this section I exemplify quotation in Athabaskan in detail because these patterns appear to be carried over into Athabaskan English.

It is interesting, however, that direct quotation does not necessarily imply using the exact original wording. Variation in the wording of quotations is evidenced in the stories told in Koyukon by Chief Henry and transcribed, edited and translated by Eliza Jones (1979), who recounted the same events of 50 years before to two different listeners on two different occasions and quoted himself saying different things. In the first version, told to an older woman who understands Koyukon, he says to a man who has a .22 rifle,

---Kku~ bik'oonlakkaat ts'a h'ukk'aada zo go d'eeniinee?---beesnee
---Do you want to sell this thing here?---I asked him.

Huyi~ hun ---Oh'o'--- siinee.
And he said ---Yes ---

(Jones 1979:33-34)

Narrating the same encounter to a young native man who does not understand Koyukon, he says,
To the Koyukon speaker, he reports asking if the gun is for sale, while to the nonspeaker, he asks for the price, presupposing the man wants to sell it. According to the editor, Jones, the first version is more polite. We can see that it is more indirect than the second version in three ways. First, it refers to the gun indirectly as "this thing," while the second mentions the gun directly. Second, it questions the felicity condition of availability or the willingness of the owner to part with it, while the second version assumes it is for sale. A felicity condition, according to Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) is a condition which must hold in order for a speech act to be successful. Third, he does not detail the transaction by telling how much he paid, while he does in the second version. The original conversation, which we can only surmise, may have gone something like,

H: Do you want to sell this thing here?
M: Yes.
H: How much is it?
M: Five dollars.

It is not just that different words are used, but different parts of the script are played back. The part told to the young man focuses on the actual transaction, while the part told to the older woman looks at the context, or the conditions on the interaction. The
passage told to the two different listeners, which contains this episode is ten pages in length. In these ten pages several quotations occur. Though the action reported is the same in both versions, the exact wordings are not repeated, and different parts of the original script are performed. Even when he does not repeat exactly what was said, he takes the point of view of the original speakers, using first person pronouns. The structure, or content form, preserves the viewpoint of the original speaker even though the actual words may be altered.

Thus the value of nonintervention, or not presuming to speak for another, is reflected in the grammar of direct quotation, not in the actual words used, which reflect face relations between speaker and audience. This is a manifestation of the conflict between being direct and being indirect.

In a Chipewyan story from Li and Scollon (1976) a character called Scabby tells his grandmother to take some leather to a young girl and have her make moccasins for him.

Scabby: sætsũnî, k̓e-k̓áxe n̓eł̓sʔ̓j̓-hũs̓q̓, h̓ení grandmother leather you have-question he said 'Grandmother, do you have some leather?'

GM: b̓ešt̓s̓č̓n̓e ḥ̓eʔ, y̓eʔ̓n̓i his grandmother yes she said 'His grandmother said, "Yes."'
kú·dé huyani beli 't'ahi deqzi
so if wise man his daughter the one most
\(\?\text{axe nēt'ī t'ini}\)
beautiful copula

'If so, tell the wise man's most beautiful daughter'
\(\?\text{yi sā kē ywačsi nēkwātini}\)
that one me-for moccasins she'll make thus say
'to make moccasins for me.'
kē-xa kē-kātē beya nini'tcuθ hini
moccasins-for leather her-to take he said
'Take the moccasin leather to her.'

(Li and Scollon 1976:172-173)

The grandmother relays the message with an apology. She quotes him
directly, but does not use the same words. She conveys the
information content of the message while distancing herself from the
sender. The translator, taking some liberties, renders this as an
indirect quotation.

sężyyni. sūnaya-yaze t'ahi ?ayaśniθen
My old sister-in-law my grandson-little whatever he thinks
'My sister-in-law, I do not know what my grandson thinks'
hit'á ?ađi-si· bekóresy-q-hila. nuyi sary yaze
thereby he says I do not know she there my granddaughter
'by what he says. He said that my granddaughter'
she sits me-for shoes she'll make he said so 'sitting there must make moccasins for him' here leather I have brought 'I have brought the leather here.'

Scabby's grandmother addresses her remarks not to the beautiful granddaughter, but to the wise man's wife. Since Scabby is just a young man of no distinction aside from the scabs that cover his body, he mitigates the force of his demand by interposing two persons between himself and the object of his demand, who says nothing but lets her grandfather respond, "Yes, my daughter, make moccasins for him in the most beautiful way you can" (1976:174). While it might be thought that this indirectness is caused by Scabby's youth and low status, the wise man uses the same means to make demands on Scabby. He says, "Wife, take these rabbit snares to Scabby. He'll set rabbit snares for me" (1976:160). The wise man's wife also apologizes and then rephrases what he said in the form of a direct quotation.
The direct form of quotation is conventionalized in Athabaskan as an expression in content form of nonintervention. While appearing to remain faithful to the wording of the original speaker, a spokesman can preface a message with a disapproving remark, leaving the hearer the option of refusing to comply. The actual wording reflects not the face relations between the original speaker and hearer but the face relations between the actual speaker and the present hearer.

In speaking English, people also tend to use direct quotation. In the following example, a girl uses first person singular for reporting the speech of two other girls.

P_____ and C_____ say I don't like Suzie cause Rachel's a crybaby.

That is, P and C say that they don't like Suzie because her daughter Rachel is a crybaby. This was said to Suzie, but the speaker used a name rather than "you," which would have been too direct. She is not responsible for what her friends said. She is simply reporting it. This is a form of off-record strategy on the part of P and C, since they cannot be held accountable for criticizing Suzie's child rearing, whether or not they meant what they said to be passed on. The
quotation is in the first person singular even though it is quite unlikely that both girls would have said exactly the same thing.

Another example of grammatically direct quotation in English is, "My mom says maybe I'm going to have a baby," said by a ten-year-old whose mother had become pregnant.

If there appears to be a paradox in claiming that direct quotation and indirectness in speaking are both aspects of nonintervention, it should be remembered that "direct" quotation has the status of a technical term. "Indirectness" as a face strategy bears no necessary relationship to grammatical indirectness.

V.2 Indirectness

Indirectness refers to any form of strategy in which the speaker does not go on record as making an imposition. The conflict of the desire to go on record, thereby paying respect to the hearer's negative face, with the desire to go off record to avoid imposing leads to what Brown and Levinson call conventional indirectness (1978:75), which they regard as a compromise. In conventional indirectness, the imposition is clear not from the wording but from the context. For example, "Could you pass the salt?" would not normally be taken as a questioning of the hearer's ability to pass the salt but as a request to do so. Any indirect utterance can become conventionalized so that its use is no longer off record, resulting in conventional indirectness. I suggest that conventional indirectness as well as off-record strategies are frequently used among Athabaskans because of the value placed on deference or nonintervention.
In this section I will try to show how strategies of indirectness reflect deference or nonintervention and look at how content form may be affected by indirectness.

The quotations from Scabby above illustrate a strategy of speaking for or on behalf of someone else. This is a form of off-record indirectness commonly used by people at Fort Chipewyan. In these cases grammatically indirect quotation may also be used in speaking English even though Athabaskan has no grammatical means of indirect quotation.

For example, a group of boys come to visit and talk about going to the dump where they picked up pop cans for recycling. After a few minutes, one of them says,

These guys were gonna ask you to take them to the dump or Doree Lake.

By using the third person, the speaker excludes himself, though he of course intends to go along. The past tense "were" also gives distance to the request. No one in particular needs to feel responsible for going on record.

In the next example, there is actual physical distance between the spokesman and the source of the request. Two women stood 20 feet away from our car, looking away, when a boy approached and, pointing to the women, said,

They want to ask you for a ride.

By speaking for someone else, these boys are able to use "you" without risking too much directness. People may also take distance by denying any part in the request. A boy, asking for peanuts, began, "He
said . . .," referring to his older brother, who immediately said, "No." The boy did not refuse the peanuts, however.

The person ostensibly making a request need not even be present except in name, as when a teenager says,

My mom asks if she can wash my pants cause I'm gonna go Smith tomorrow.

Here the teenager wants to wash her own pants and mentions her mother to gain distance and perhaps make permission more likely. The town has no laundromat and few of the homes have automatic washing machines.

A common way of making requests was to write a note and send it with a child. In the note below, V____ gains distance by having her mother write a note carried by her little sister.

I was wondering if I could borrow $20 to buy a rick of wood for tonight. P.S. V____ asks if she could have the maternity tops—blue with flowers and red and white checks.

Again, the past tense was wondering gives distance. Also, the maternity tops, one of which she had given me and another which I had bought, are referred to not as "your" or "my" but with the impersonal the.

In making requests through a spokesman, people use various means of taking distance or remaining off record, ranging from having a spokesman speak for a group to denial to physical distance.

Another way to go off record is to state a need in the presence of someone, who can choose to ignore the statement.

RM (to L): I need to get a ride to the airport Monday.

L: Why don't you get a taxi?
RS: We'll give you a ride.
   (to CF, his daughter) Do you want to give R____ a ride to
   the airport?

CF: (age 2:4) Yes.

RM (to CF): Will you give me a ride?

CF: Yes.

RM was indirect in asserting a need to establish a felicity condition.
RS offers a ride, then goes off record by speaking to his little
daughter, which allows RM to use the same strategy. RM and RS do not
address each other directly at all.

I found that my asking questions of babies was responded to as
requests. On a visit, I asked a baby girl a question.

SS: You wanna go outside?

M: After I change her, O.K.?

Her mother took the question as asking her to take the baby out. On
another occasion, a ten-year-old girl and her little charge met me
downtown. I said to the baby, "You gonna come home with us?" The
girl responded, "I'll bring her after."

In messages conveyed by a spokesman, the first person hides
behind third person pronouns and verb forms. This same strategy is
also used where a person is speaking on his own behalf. For example,
third person reference to one's own relatives may be used instead of
first person.

There was no wood, even though their* grandfather, now
deceased, was there.
When talking about one's own relatives, one may talk about them indirectly by saying 'their grandfather', for example, rather than 'my grandfather'. (Jones 1979:14)

Another form of indirectness, the deferent substitution of third person for second person, is found in languages such as Tzeltal (Brown and Levinson 1978). In one case an Athabaskan man said,

I knocked on his door but he wasn't there.
The meaning was "I knocked on your door but you weren't here." This was said by a man who had come to do linguistic work and found no one at home.

The use of the third person to refer to the second person may have come out of the convention of direct quotation. For example, a child might say to a neighbor, "My Dad say he can take you to movie," meaning "My Dad said you can take us to the movie." We can speculate that this sort of form has its origins when people began quoting what they said to themselves: (I thought to myself), he can take me to the movie.

The avoidance of the second person is paralleled by respectful avoidance of names and nouns. A girl who came to visit and found our daughter in the care of her father asked, "Where's her mother?" A woman complaining about drunken behavior referred to "my neighbor," whose name we mentioned but could not get her to acknowledge.

Similarly, important animals are also treated with great deference. A bear den is referred to as "you know what kind of place" (Jones 1979:10). A moose is mentioned (1979:80) then referred to as "it" for several pages (cf. Scollon 1977). A woman flying over Mt. McKinley says in awe, "There it is."
People might also be indirect by being vague, making general statements that avoid the second person. A woman whose mother wants a ride to Fort Smith where caribou meat can be purchased says, "Most people are afraid to bring it without a permit." Thus she finds that the person she is speaking to is in agreement with "most people" in being unwilling to carry caribou meat illegally and makes no further attempt to get a ride for her mother.

Brown and Levinson argue that indirect speech acts are universal and constructed in similar ways in all languages to serve functions of politeness. Though they generally translate across unrelated languages and cultures, there may be translation gaps due to social or linguistic factors. They differentiate between possible indirect speech acts, idiomtic indirect speech acts, and syntactically marked indirect speech acts.

With the resources of the English language to draw on, we might expect that differences in conventionalized or idiomatic speech acts between the Fort Chipewyan speech community and other English speaking communities would stem from different politeness values.

Gordon and Lakoff (1971) showed how indirect speech acts can be formed in English by stating or questioning a felicity condition. One can assert that a certain condition holds which makes it impossible to do what one has agreed to do. For example, an Athabaskan girl who has agreed to babysit telephones at the time she would be leaving on foot to arrive at the appointed time and says, "I can't babysit cause I'm babysitting my little nephew." The parent can either take the
statement at face value or follow out the line of reasoning. In this case she questions an ability condition.

Parent: Can you bring him here?

Girl: He's only one years old.

She then offers a ride, which the timing of the call indicates is the reason for calling.

Parent: Can you bring him if we give you a ride?

Girl: Yeah.

This is done by questioning a willingness condition, though phrased as a question of ability. The girl has indirectly asked for a ride, and the chain of inferences could have been short-circuited.

In the next example, a group of girls is doing laundry at our home. One of them hints, "We're not gonna eat supper till 10, we have so many clothes." When that does not achieve the desired result, another girl says, "I'll wash dishes?" Then, in the next breath, "We'll eat here?" The first girl indirectly requests to be fed by asserting a condition of need, and when that does not work her cousin asks directly. As outsiders, she did not assume that we would take, "I'll wash dishes?" as an indirect request to be fed, which I suspect it was.

We saw in the chapter on questions that requests are made by questioning a felicity condition of existence. The same pattern is used in Chipewyan.

\[ \text{ts'yan}\hat{1} \quad \text{tē'ē} \quad \text{nets'ē-hūsē} \quad \text{ga-biē} \]

old wife sinew you have-ques. rabbit-snares
'Old wife, do you have sinew? I'm going to make rabbit snares.'

(Li and Scollon 1976:160)

The wife gives the wise man sinew without speaking. Above, when Scabby asked his grandmother if she had leather, she answered "yes."

Whether this linguistic form is taken literally or as a request to be given something depends on the context. As Brown and Levinson say, "The point here is that 'on record' and 'off record' are categories that do not precisely coincide with categories of linguistic forms, but only with linguistic forms in context" (1978:139).

Questioning a felicity condition provides an effective means for performing an indirect speech act, and can become conventionalized as an idiomatic way of doing it. The context can make a literal reading untenable, as when a woman walks up to us in our car in a section of town with no telephone service and asks, "Can you phone me a cab?"

When the driver plays dumb, saying our phone doesn't work, she says, "Well, in that case, can you give me a ride?" When asked where she says vaguely, "Up the road."

People had used the same formula with us before in places where there were phones, leaving us wondering why they didn't make the phone call themselves. We would sometimes offer rides. It didn't really strike us as unusual until this woman said it a mile from a phone. Talking with someone who lived next to the taxi stand, we found that people would knock on their door and say the same thing. Thus, while
this expression may have started as an indirect way of asking for a ride, it has become conventionalized so that it is now on record.

A more indirect way of asking for a ride is, "Are you going across (the bay)?" The woman who asked us to phone for a cab was going on record with conventional indirectness because it was apparent that we were going across and to question it would seem strange.

In a community where asking for a ride directly would be too rude, but where it is necessary or convenient to ride and few people have their own cars or even telephones, the phrase "phone me a cab" has come to mean "give me a ride." This meaning could not be predicted from the grammar of language but only from social environment and interaction.

The process of conventionalization can be thought of as 'short-circuiting' inferences, so that where A may be inferred from B (especially by practical reasoning), stating B with the intent to convey A can become, by routine association, an 'idiom' for A (Brown and Levinson 1978:300).

We see then that nonintervention can affect content form through the mechanism of conventional indirectness, where the conveyed meaning of an utterance differs from the literal meaning, the literal meaning cannot be assumed in the context, and the conveyed meaning is unambiguous.

V.3 Hedges

Hedges are a strategy of deference frequently used by Athabaskans in speaking. As I will suggest, these hedges cannot be regarded as calques, since they have no equivalent in Athabaskan. Further, as
they are not directly modeled on the English of Anglos, they seem to
be an adaptation of content form based on values of nonintervention.

Hedging is a way of taking distance from what one says, of
avoiding commitment to a course of action or responsibility for the
truth value of a statement or performance of a narrative. Any speech
act which risks violating a rule of speaking or infringing on the
freedom of the speaker or hearer(s) can be hedged.

Brown and Levinson (1978) list hedging as a strategy of negative
politeness (see Appendix B). They say that it
derives from the want not to presume and the want not to
coerce H (hearer)...

In the literature, a 'hedge' is a particle, word, or
phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate
or noun phrase in a set; it says of that membership that it
is partial, or true only in certain respects, or that it is
more true and complete than perhaps might be expected
(1978:150).

Prince (1979) in a paper titled "Hedging in Physicians'Discourse," divides hedges into "approximators" and "shields," giving
numerous examples of hedges. The question that arises is: how
central a part of content form are hedges? Lakoff (1972) argues that
hedges cannot be considered outside of grammar because their use
depends on knowledge of grammar. They cannot be placed just anywhere.
They do not, however, modify the grammar of a sentence in any
significant way. And so, a study of hedges may not be directly
relevant to a study of the effects of face-to-face interaction on
content form. Still, their frequency in the English of Athabaskans
needs to be accounted for, especially since as I suggest they cannot
be regarded as calques.
Chipewyan has only a handful of hedging particles and words, much of the hedging being done grammatically. There is a verb which translates as "it seems" and can be inflected for person (though rarely does one encounter such instances in actual use).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{?ahunédí} & \quad \text{'she seems to be so'} \\
\text{?ahunésdí} & \quad \text{'I . . . '}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{?ahunídí} & \quad \text{'you . . . '}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{?ahunídí} & \quad \text{'we (two) or more. . . .'}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{?ahunévesdí} & \quad \text{'I have. . . '}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{?ahunédí} & \quad \text{'he (she, it) . . . '}
\end{align*}
\]

(Li, field notes)

Li (1946) gives lęsę, lęsę 'probably' and sə̓ni 'probably', 'presumably' and -sə̓ 'to be sure' (1946:421). In the verb prefix system there are at least remnants of what appears to be a cognate of the "conative" prefix which appears throughout Northern Athabaskan (Kari 1980). The prefix means something like 'to try without succeeding'. On the whole, though, hedging with sentence-internal words or particles of the sort Brown and Levinson document does not seem to be very prominent in Athabaskan.

Why, then, should hedges be so frequently used in the English of Athabaskans? One reason they stand out, I suggest, is that Athabaskans are making extensive use of this one resource of the English language for hedging. A relatively small number of hedges all of which require little grammatical complexity are used repeatedly. I suggest that this can be accounted for by the need to express deference, on the one hand, and the somewhat limited models of
strategies of deference available to many Athabaskans in the English they hear. Until very recently with the advent of public school education in English in 1954 at Fort Chipewyan and much more recently radio and now television (1976), the English models heard came from trappers, traders and itinerant prospectors. Whatever else may be said of the English of these travelers, it is not noted for lavish shows of deference to Native Americans or Native Canadians, especially in bush communities such as Fort Chipewyan. It is fair to say that Indians have rarely been treated with respect and deference by non-Indians and one linguistic consequence is that they have rarely heard how these are commonly expressed in more idiomatic standard English.

In this section I will exemplify two types of hedging, the first qualifying or emphasizing the truth value of a proposition, giving clues as to how it is to be interpreted, and the second modifying the illocutionary force of a speech act. In practice these general types are not easy to separate, especially in statements about the future. Hedges by Athabaskans are often taken to be uncertainty or hedges on truth value, when they are intended as hedges on illocutionary force in order to display deference.

The first type of hedges I will exemplify are those that show respect for game animals. Next are hedges on memory and performance, followed by hedges on statements based on hearsay. They are followed by hedges on expressions of feeling or violations of someone's individuality. I then discuss hedges on statements about the future. I end with hedges on illocutionary force.
In Chapter 3 we saw that in speaking of game animals care is taken not to presume to be able to kill them or otherwise show disrespect. One strategy for showing them deference is indirectness of reference, avoiding their names. Another is hedging. Athabaskans are careful not to presume upon or coerce either animals or their audience.

Our stories when I was small, they tell me not to make fun of bear. If I make fun, then they'll make me scared. That's the kind animal they are. And they used to tell us not to make fun of anything. Especially when you going hunting. Like rabbits, I'll just put rabbits in there. If I'm going to hunt rabbits, I got to watch my words before I take off. I wouldn't even try to say that I'll try to kill rabbits today. Because, if I say that, I wouldn't even see anything. That's why they used to tell us not to make fun of anything, anytime.

Now, what I would say is, I was going to look around. That's all. . . . All Native used to be that way. Right now is different, you know. Some people can say anything I guess (Henzie 1979:13).

In telling about a beaver hunt during which he was forced to shoot a bear and then to kill her cubs with an axe, a narrator uses some sixty hedges in a text which fills three and a half pages (Scollon and Scollon 1979:48-51). For example, hearing the bear make noise from the bush, he says,

Well, maybe I hit 'em I guess, I thought.

He reports what he thought at the time, some fifty years in the past, showing respect for the bear as well as his audience by not being too assertive. After shooting at the bear again, he says,

I didn't miss don't think not very far?

The three negatives can be thought of as a kind of hedge.
"Think" and "guess" are what we call "laminating verbs" (Scollon and Scollon 1979:151), after Goffman (1974). These are a form of hedge that frame propositions as being said, thought, or known.

Quotation is a form of hedge, whether one is quoting what one thinks, what one has heard from ancestors or tradition bearers, or gossip. Narratives are framed in performance as characterizing events of a certain kind, whether legendary or from personal experience. In what we call the "performance frame" (Scollon and Scollon 1979), the narrator tells the audience what kind of story will unfold. In closing this frame the narrator typically says something like "that's all I know" or the equivalent in Chipewyan, ṇ̃er hots’en ṇ̃ marking the close also with pausing, breathing, and intonation. The narrative frame with which the narrative itself begins often contains hedges such as "well," "ah," or "you know" preceding the formal initial "once" or ṇ̃. One story told by the Chipewyan chief is framed with hedges on the narrator's memory (Scollon and Scollon 1979:52-53).

1. Oh, just to try, eh.
   You're testing, right?
   (Yeah, right.)
   Um.
   O.K., eh.

2. Since you asked me to tell you my story about my life
   I'll I can only tell you
   as I remember. And. I can't remember always. In my young
   days I can't remember some parts then the other parts they'll
   be skipping because I don't remember them.

3. So

4. Well I'll try eh as well as I remember. I'll try me
tell my story about myself.
   (O.K.)
6. Well, Ron
Since you asked me to tell you
story about myself

When he gets into the story itself, he hedges events that he does not
actually remember with "I guess," "apparently," and "according to."

. . . so we live place they call Jackfish Lake. I was born
around that area I guess that's on our reserve.
My dad's apparently my dad was born in that area as
well. . . . Apparently before my time, according to the old
people (they) were telling my dad he was telling me. They
had, fairly good time under my dad's eh, days. (Unpublished
transcription, R. Scollon)

Similarly, Henzie (1979), telling about his grandfather's youth,
hedges with "I guess" and "I think."

Henzie, he used to raise up down there with his sister
Louise and pretty soon it got kind of too many people I
guess. . . .

I guess Grandpa Henzie learn pretty good after that.

They make their living good I think.

I don't know why. He liked that country up there I guess
(Henzie 1979:14).

Hedges clearly mark what one says as hearsay or speculation
rather than direct experience. In Chipewyan, traditional narratives
normally end with the form "sni" 'they say' (Scollon 1976b). The
narrative final "sni" was used frequently by Mandeville in the first
narratives he dictated to Fang Kuei Li (Li and Scollon 1976, Scollon
1976b). It even occurs internal to the texts. That is, the frame or
hedge is reinforced even within the actual performance of the
narrative. After the first two texts Mandeville restricted its use to
closing the narratives. This suggests that it is used not only to
frame content but also to show deference to a stranger. This interpretation is supported by the use of the Navaho equivalent "shini" thirty-nine times in a single tale in Sapir and Hoijer (1942), in what Toelken (1959) considers a very condensed version. The narrator may have been hedging to avoid taking responsibility for performance if it happened to be the wrong season for coyote tales. People paraphrasing stories frequently hedge with "they say," "the way my aunty used to tell it," or "I don't know." In this way they assume no responsibility for performance.

A woman was telling stories in Chipewyan about ᖃᓄᒃᓱᓂ, a man who turns into a wolf. Her daughter, translating, says, "It's true you know." Saying "He's coming back at the end of the world," she hedges, "It's true, I guess." The character ᖃᓄᒃᓱᓂ himself apparently hedges on principle. She says, "He never says yes. He can't promise. He always forgets. He never tells stories to wolves, only people."

People seemed to show concern for saying whether they believed stories to be true. One woman, looking at a story about a man who hibernated with a bear, said, "I think I heard it. It must be true--so many old people were telling about it." Her daughter, asked if she told stories to her little brother, said, "just lies."

An account of a friend's two-year-old boy is liberally sprinkled with hedges.

That little boy there doesn't ah eats, they said, ah? Just yesterday they took a bottle away from him. Maybe said--they too much milk. But now ah he broke a nipple or something, yeah. (Oh) So he doesn't gets a bottle anymore. (He's gotta learn to eat, huh?) Yeah, he said maybe now
she'll—he'll start eating right, right, you know. He eats you know wild meat and that (Oh) things from the Bay I guess he won't eat she said. Buy meat from the Bay and that.

The speaker quotes the source of her information with "they said," "he said," "she said." She uses tags "ah" and "yeah." She quotes their explanatory hypothesis, hedging with "maybe." She qualifies the kind of object with "or something" and kinds of food with "and that." "You know" is another hedge, taking the audience into consideration.

Another way of hedging is to anticipate disbelief, as a girl does in talking about the sighting of whales in Lake Athabaska, a thousand miles and four rapids upriver from the Arctic Ocean.

M____, that's right, these guys won't believe us . . .
What you call it?

Asked how many whales there were, she hedges, "I think three."

Narrating a story into a tape recorder to be made into a "book," she says,

Once these guys they say . . .
Some guys say they seen whales, ah?
They seen whales and they m
xxx they seen them down the beach.

The same girl, when I mentioned typewriters and a darkroom in the school without marking it as hearsay, asked, "You went in our school already?" Apparently I did not hedge in the way she would have thought appropriate.

Feelings and motives or others are rarely expressed without hedging. This is in keeping with nonintervention, as discussed in Chapter 3, and contrasts with the practice in Western societies of freely attributing feelings and motives of others (Selby 1975, Argyris and Schon 1974). One woman says, "My kids hate to miss school. They
want to learn something, I guess." Commenting on our little girl's fussing, a visitor says, "She's having a rough time, I think." A girl recounts how she beat up a Cree girl who said, "Chips are no good."

After that she was nice to me. She let me ride her bicycle and she had to walk. Her mom gave me things to eat at her house. She was scared of me, I guess.

People are generally careful not to use names for ethnic groups. Designating someone ethnically is almost insulting. A woman, accounting for why her two-year-old did not talk much, said it was because she heard too many languages, then added, "Because she's Indian, I guess." Because individuality is highly valued, people hesitate to use ethnic identity as an explanatory principle, which might help account for the hedge. Also, because it was said to a non-Indian who places different values on talking and silence.

A young boy tells a story about fighting with cowboys and Indians. He ends by hedging.

Ron Campbell
A big, big stone
Some Indians - are - um
get knocking down
Cowboys are comin'
Ambulance are comin'
Cops comin'
Hidin' away
Maybe I'll knock them out
(Have war now, pretty soon.)
I think right now.
I'll get in my machine, I guess.

Taught not to be too assertive about his ability, he boasts he'll knock them out, but hedges with "maybe."

Another common use of hedges is in speaking of the future. Steiner expresses
wonder, a tensed delight at the bare fact, that there are future forms of verbs, that human beings have developed rules of grammar which allow coherent utterances about tomorrow, about the last midnight of the century, about the position and luminosity of the star Vega half a billion years hence (1975:139).

He recalls the shock he felt as a young boy when he first realized that statements could be made about the distant future. He found it incredible that future tenses could be used indiscriminately.

*I nursed the belief that there must be republics more prudent than ours, more attentive to the cross-weave of language and life, in which our lavish consumption of predictive, hypothetical counter-factual forms was prohibited (p. 139).*

I suggest that Athabaskans constitute such a prudent society. Above we have seen the care taken by people in speaking of going hunting and other future activities. Linguists such as R. Scollon at Arctic Village, Alaska and R. Collins at Nikolai, Alaska have had difficulty eliciting future forms. One man said, "I don't know the future. Only White man know the future." Proto-Athabaskan seems to have had optative forms but no future. Modern languages have borrowed the optative for future use. People at Fort Chipewyan use English future tense in the sense of the optative, saying, for example, "I'm going to move to Fort McMurray," and never leaving. It means something like, "I'm thinking of" or "I might" or "I would like to."

After arranging regular hours for informant work, a woman departs, saying, "I'll see you Monday, maybe." When pressed for a commitment, people might agree to do something but they prefer to hedge. She did not actually appear on the following Monday. When we encountered her shopping Monday and asked if she was coming the next
day, she replied, "Yeah, I'm coming. My little girl was sick. That's why I couldn't come today." The next day after she had not come she said, "My little girl's still sick. I'll come tomorrow if she's better." Here she hedges with an if-clause. The next time we saw her and asked how her daughter was, she answered, "About the same."

Months later, discussing plane departure schedules, she said, "Leaving at eight, I think." Since the plane was already delayed, there was no reason to be sure it would depart on schedule.

Steiner discusses the effect of Christian and Hebrew belief on the use of future tenses: "From a sociolinguistic point of view, it would be of extreme interest to know the extent to which such convictions actually reshape speech habits" (Steiner 1975:152). He says that Galilean and Newtonian physics gave time a "new linearity and open-endedness." However, the formulation of the entropy principle soon demonstrated that thermodynamic processes at work in the universe would make it approach equilibrium or inertness. "Given a statistical framework of sufficient comprehensiveness, it can be shown that the grammar of the future is end-stopped, that entropy reaches a maximum at which the future ends" (1975:152).

We characterize entropy as one of the aspects of the bush consciousness (Scollon and Scollon 1979). It should not be surprising that placing a positive value on entropy would accompany a proscription on use of future tenses. We do not of course know which came first. As Steiner says, "It is banal but necessary to insist on a manifold reciprocity between grammar and concept, between speech form and cultural pressure" (1975:158).
It is Brown and Levinson's (1978) argument that "ordinary communicative intentions are often potential threats to cooperative interaction" (p. 150). The sources of threat lie in the assumptions associated with the conditions on felicitous use of speech acts.

For to ask someone to do something is to presuppose that they can and are willing to do it, and have not already done it; to promise to do something is to admit that one hasn't already done it; to assume that the addressee wants it done and would prefer you to do it, and so on (p. 151).

I have argued above that in speaking to a woman to whom he wishes to show deference, Chief Henry has selected from the script of an interaction just those sections that address these assumptions. He says, "Do you want to sell this thing here?" addressing the man's willingness to sell his rifle. He does not presuppose that the gun is for sale and ask, "How much is the gun?"

Hedging is a routine way of avoiding commitment to assumptions about felicity conditions on speech acts. We have seen in the section on indirectness how people avoid asking someone to do something, and above how they avoid making promises, hedge if they cannot avoid making them, and moreover how one of their cultural heroes does not believe in promising. Making an offer assumes one has something of potential value to someone else. In order to avoid making the other person feel indebted, one must act as if the goods in question are of no use to the speaker.

But if you want all the receiving blankets we got whole stack at our house. (Oh) Just sitting there for nothing. . . . This one here has enough things. She's got ten pair of shoes, I guess.
The speaker is offering to bring receiving blankets a few days after we had returned from the hospital with a newborn baby. As mentioned in the chapter on questions, expectant mothers do not presume babies will be born alive and healthy by preparing in advance. Thus when a baby is born, friends and relatives are quick to provide what is necessary.

Refusing offers of food or drink may also threaten smooth interaction and give rise to hedging. When we offered coffee to two women visitors, the younger explained that her mother should not have it because of her heart trouble.

Cause, you know, like ah, I guess, when she drank coffee yesterday she started feeling her heart again. (Yeah) So today she said she never drinks it, you know.

She also politely refused a banana for her little girl.

No, she shouldn't have. (Hm?) She'll eat it but you know. (Oh) Not properly eat supper, her, if she eats too much.

We started with the question of the significance of hedges as an aspect of content form. As a strategy of negative politeness, though not only used for that, hedges are employed very frequently by Athabaskans. These hedges tend to break up speech and make it sound choppy or hesitant. They do not directly alter the syntax of sentences. This might make it seem that they are of no linguistic consequence, but the very fact that only simple hedges are used needs to be accounted for, since English does have other means for hedging. An example is the choice of verbs for reporting on the work of colleagues in academic articles. One might choose "finds" for a close colleague whose work one would have no reservations about, "reports"
for a more neutral contribution, "suggests" or "claims" to hedge. Athabaskan has grammatical means for qualifying the status of statements, but these means are not available in English. Thus, the effect of frequent hedges in making speech sound like broken English is due not to ignorance but to the desire to show deference.

We have seen that hedges are used to frame narratives as performances or as paraphrases, to frame statements as oral tradition, hearsay, or speculation, and to mitigate the illocutionary force of potentially face threatening speech acts, including statements regarding events in the future. Since most English speakers are not nearly so careful to hedge many of these types of speech acts, and in general do not display deference to native people, Athabaskans are not exposed to complex or very subtle ways of hedging in English. Yet their values of nonintervention and entropy require that they hedge frequently. Therefore they make relatively extensive use of this basic means of hedging which is at their disposal to show the deference they feel is necessary in social interaction.

V.4 Other strategies of deference

We have looked at indirectness, questioning, and hedging, which are deference strategies based on the desire of the speaker to show that he is making minimal assumptions about what the hearer wants (Brown and Levinson, Fig. 8, p. 136). The desire to show the hearer that the speaker does not intend to coerce the hearer produces another set of strategies in addition to the ones already discussed.
The first strategy of noncoercion I will look at here is 'be pessimistic'. Pessimism is a strategy that expresses doubt that the felicity conditions for a speech act obtain (Brown and Levinson 1978). Like hedging, pessimism for Athabaskans is associated with the future in general, with hunting or trapping, or with infringing on others' preserves.

I don't really know what life is going to be like. It might even get worse, who knows? (Henzie 1979:62)

Older sister, I'm going to check my trap even though there may be nothing in it—I said to her.*

(The editor explains,

*When people talk about hunting or trapping they often say "I am going to hunt for nothing," that is, "even though I may see or catch nothing." It is not right to sound too confident about the future. It is right always to sound humble. Here Uncle is showing respect for the game. Being too confident would be like saying the game are easy to catch. If you have the right respect, game will be willing to be caught in your trap. (Jones 1979:16)

Pessimism is a way of showing concern for the hearer's negative face by not saying anything that people consider "not right." Athabaskans speak as if they believe animals can hear, and are careful not to offend them. Therefore pessimism is appropriate when speaking of hunting or trapping, and any optimism is hedged, as we saw above.

Another strategy of deference, nominalization, is often used in statements of pessimism. This linking of nominalization with pessimism is not mentioned by Brown and Levinson, but both are ways of showing respect. The man who turned into a wolf, ?erɛkali, tracking down a moose while weak with hunger, thought to himself,
He misses the moose's throat because it is running too fast, but his grandmother bites its throat and hangs on, bringing it to a stop, and ?err?kali bites through its belly, causing its intestines to drop out and the moose to fall. It seems that the nominal "oiye" is more respectful than the verb "?ev?n?k?er," 'to kill', which implies much more active killing. In addition to showing respect for the one whose death is in question, the nominal may also be used to hedge against any miscalculation. Mandeville, telling about one who is capable in hunting, says,

t?i 1es? -hile yeoiye he?tsi
again doubt not its death he makes

'Again, there would be no doubt that he would kill it.'

(Li and Scollon 1976:15)

Here again, "oiye" 'death' is nominalized. As Brown and Levinson suggest, nominalization is a strategy of negative politeness that gives more distance between the actor and predicate than a verb would. Even when tormenting what seems to be a child by throwing sticks at him before they kill him, the enemy people nominalize, saying,

child! sun look at! right now at last sun

(Li and Scollon 1976:136)
you're seeing

'Child, look at the sun. Right now you're seeing the sun for the last time.'

djë neşiye-ixa  hecyélédíu  k'ai-t'a

here your death it'll be they told him willow with nahcyút'út.

they keep throwing at him

'Here will be your death, they told him, throwing willow sticks at him.' (1976:106)

While the "child" lures the enemy away from the lake where they are approaching in canoes, they laugh at him and tell him again,

sekuyi', ñújú ñesdiriñiyé  varídi-híle.

child now for nothing we are saying not

'Child, we are not saying that for nothing.'

?ekú· sa niği· neşiye  hotë'c  ?ékút'a náde
then sun look at your death before for the last time

'Now look at the sun. Look at the sun for the last time before'

sa niği-ixa-sí,  ?ayëdi.

sun you shall look at they told him

'your death, they told him.'

It turns out that the "child" is the trickster Ravenhead, who clubs down all the Dogrib enemies. They were right to distance themselves from Ravenhead's death, after all. Thus the narrator's use of deference in speaking to a child clues the audience that all is not as it might appear. Here deference is used for narrative effect. The
use of deference to a child is abnormal. It is not to be taken at face value as deferential, but rather as a foreshadowing of things to come.

In another story, a man meets a bear who talks to him and tells him to go with him. He is afraid the bear will kill him, but the bear reassures him.

sas bêt thiya-dêsêyâsêništêr-γwâlî yêništên.
bear with him I go if he kills me it will be he thought

"He thought, "If I go with the bear, he will kill me."

dednë sas ?adi, neôiûë hastsi-ixa -hišë.
immediately bear said your death I make future not

"Immediately the bear said, "I won't kill you."

The man in thinking to himself uses the verb "âyâsêništêr," which is derived from a noun "âyâ" which is now frozen as a thematic prefix. The bear, to show respect for the man, nominalizes with "neôiûë," 'your death'.

The above examples are all from Athabaskan. According to Brown and Levinson, English and Tamil use nominalization for formality, to minimize face threats. In a previous paper (S. Scollon to appear), I compared stories told in English and in Athabaskan by the same speakers and found a tendency to use more nominals in English. While I attributed this to stylistic properties of the English language, the examples below could have been said more verbally, closer to a literal translation of the Athabaskan. It is plausible that some of the nominalization was a strategy of formality, a way of showing respect
for the listener. These sentences come from a story told by Gaither Paul (1980):

During their recovery out there in brush, they accidentally come to each other.

And whatever on this tree is my gift to you.

They're just good friend.

But guq he make motion with his hand.

Brushman had meeting with his Indian friend.

He even make potlatch.

So they got into a fight.

They were friends then.

Nominalization can be considered one way of making a future event less certain and can thus be indirectly associated with pessimism. Other linguistic markers of pessimism are the subjunctive, hedges, and negatives.

A girl says, to no one in particular, "I want comics." Her friend, who has every reason to be pessimistic, say, "You guys don't have comics, ae?"

Some boys are playing with the tape recorder, recording stories. Testing the conditions for picking up the microphone and talking, or being given a turn, one of them asks, "He can't talk, ae?" Children seem to expect to be told at any time to leave things alone, and anticipate this with the strategy of pessimism. Some girls are playing house with dolls, claiming territory, when one of them says to another,

Well, ah, well I guess I can't play with your baby's toys, ae?
The next strategy associated with the want not to coerce, "Minimize the imposition" (Strategy 4) gives deference by decreasing the weight of the imposition, thereby increasing the power differential or the social distance. Examples are "phone me a cab" for "give me a ride," "lend me twenty dollars" for "give me twenty dollars," "after" in the sense of "maybe never." The latter two lessen the imposition from the point of view of the one being asked a favor, saying in effect, "that's a little thing I'd be glad to do for you if I weren't so busy at the moment." Another way to minimize an imposition is to literally call it little, as a girl did trying to borrow a toy accordion, calling it a "little organ."

In the realization of deference (strategy 5), Athabaskans tend to humble themselves rather than to raise their hearers. For example, Chief Henry diminishes the size of his kill by saying,

We finally caught two calves*

(editor's comment)
*When giving the first report of their catching a bull and a cow he says this so as not to sound as if he is bragging (Jones 1979:72).

Now that we're finished hunting, we're struggling* back home with a little caribou meat our son has gotten for us.

(editor's comment)
*Rather than saying that they had enough meat then, in fact all they could pull, he said they had enough. In our way it is important not to sound as if you are bragging when you are talking about accomplishments (Jones 1979:76).

... over there where my child said he caught two calves--*

(editor's comment)
*These are the cow and calf that his son-in-law Moses Henry caught the day before. He diminishes them out of respect.
Without the editor's footnotes we might be inclined to take Chief Henry's and his uncle's statements at face value and think they were being inconsistent.

Deference is a strategy used to minimize threat, according to Brown and Levinson. Since bragging is potentially threatening to the hearer, people diminish their accomplishments to give deference.

At first glance, the following might not seem very deferent.

AP: She wants to see, you.
NC: O.K. Leave that talk now, you, ah--(i.e., leave the tape recorder on.)
JP: Make books now, you.
JP: You, typewrite it now.
RK: Sometimes you ride allover town, you, ae?
RK: You came here for dog race already, you?

As persons to whom these remarks were directed, we took them as normally friendly and polite. In listening to them on tape, they sound polite. The intonation and stress show no hint of rudeness. It is perhaps only in print that they may look rude, as the reader might associate the words with paralinguistic features with which he is familiar rather than with the quiet tone and lowered pitch with which they were delivered.

Initial "you" might appear to be a vocative as in "Hey, you." A model for this might be looked for in the speech of teachers, perhaps. However, these forms are used by children not to address other children but to my husband or myself. "You" is not preceded by "hey,"
and in both cases the speaker already has the attention of the addressee.

"you" in final position might be thought to be a minced oath, perhaps a shortened form of "You S.O.B." However, if this were the case, "you" would receive stress, and in these examples it is unstressed. RK is making friendly conversation, as the tone of voice indicates. JP is a quiet, shy boy who had to be coaxed into telling his story to the tape recorder and is now anxious to have it typed into a "book." Therefore it seems more likely that "you" here is a marker of politeness used to mitigate the face threat of ordering an adult to do something, or, in the case of RK, asking questions.

Brown and Levinson suggest that with negative politeness the speaker tries to increase the metaphorical size of the hearer. They contrast this with ellipsis used to mark an utterance as being positively polite, for example (1978:116-117):

Mind if I smoke?
Got any spare cash?
How about a drink?

The children may be using "you" and "ae" to increase the metaphorical size of the addressee by increasing the length of the utterance. Since it is rude to use the names of adults but they freely use each other's names, they mark speech to adults with "you."

Forms such as 'sir' and 'ma'am' are rarely used, so it is all the more striking when they do occur. They may be used strategically to soften FTA's, as Brown and Levinson point out (1978:187). For example, the woman who asked us to "phone a cab," a stranger, when we
introduced ourselves, said, "Glad to meet you, mam" aa "Glad to meet you, sir." "Mam" and "sir" were both preceded by pauses and received emphatic stress. She seemed to be exaggerating, almost feigning, politeness, perhaps at a loss as to how to deal with people who would call attention to the literal content of a conventionally indirect speech act.

As Brown and Levinson state, the strategies exemplified above stem from the speaker's (or writer's) desire to show that he does not want to coerce his addressee.

Another set of strategies, according to Brown and Levinson, communicates the speaker's want to avoid impinging on the hearer. He may do this by apologizing or by dissociating speaker and hearer from the particular infringement.

Apologies (Strategy 6) are rare in the speech of Athabaskans, perhaps because they are generally careful not to infringe on people. One apology occurs in the narrative about the beaver hunt mentioned before (Scollon and Scollon 1979:48-51). After being forced to kill a bear in his path, Marcel apologizes to her cubs.

I'm sorry, I guess I know you was stay here I didn't shoot 'em that one.

Not wanting to leave the cubs without a mother, he then kills them too, being careful to pack all of the meat.

A speaker may dissociate himself and the hearer from a face threatening act, or achieve general social distancing, by impersonalizing speaker and hearer by avoiding the pronouns 'I' and
'you' (Strategy 7) by stating the FTA as a general rule (Strategy 8), or by nominalizing (Strategy 9), according to Brown and Levinson.

For example, a child says, "Where put this?" instead of "Where do you want me to put this?" or "Where shall I put this?" or "Where do you put this?" This can be described as subject deletion or as subject demotion. The speaker shows deference by avoiding the self-assertive "I."

Another means of demoting the subject is topicalization as in Diamond, she change it to.

Here, in a game of crazy eights, a player had changed the suit to diamonds, saying "darts," which was not understood by all the players. Perhaps not wanting to embarrass the speaker but wanting to clarify the matter another speaker topicalizes, demoting the subject.

In Athabaskan, subject pronouns are not normally used except for emphasis. Subjects and objects are marked with verb prefixes. Thus, subjects may be mentioned once and then omitted if there is no change in focus or perspective.

In speaking English, people also use subjects sparingly, especially in first person narratives where the subject remains the same over several clauses. In the beaver hunt narrative mentioned above in connection with hedges, the narrator omits the subject about ten times in three and a half pages of text. With one exception, these are all first person references. Typically, he starts out the breath group using "I" and then omits it for the remainder of the breath group. In some cases phonetic reduction may be involved, for example,
Once he omits the subject in referring to the bear.

Going back in the bush?

In another narrative about killing a moose, he says,

At this one and well go out from there, come back the same place.

That's a winter time didn't see him then the springtime there's a no snow? Anyway didn't see him.

Well, I yell my dogs and I stop and then took the axe. I'm pull up stick I'm shove it stick in there. And shove it down the bear, eh, the hole.

Another narrator focuses on his uncle rather than himself.

My uncle I didn't see myself.

He also uses "me" to humble himself, speaking of when he was a boy.

Children often do this to indicate dependency.

And all I was doing, I guess, me, it's cutting wood, look after the dogs for my mother. I was not very good enough. For anything me, I guess I was still young yet so I stay home and cut wood.

The whole tone of the passage is to minimize the speaker's importance.

He also omits subjects:

So get ready now for trapping again. Then had enough.

In these narratives, since the speaker is asking only to be heard, we can infer that subjects are demoted not to gain distance from a particular face threatening act, but in general to give deference to the audience of the narrative.

As I have argued in Chapter 3, this norm of diminishing the importance of oneself is quite actively taught in the process of socialization. As Henry Beatus puts it,
I try to think like that. Try to say better things about somebody else. That's just the way Grandpa Beatus was. I tell my kids the same thing. I try to explain to them that it's just not our way to show our greatest side. It's not the way our old people used to be (Beatus 1980:23).

There are in Chipewyan impersonal verbs which may be used to dissociate speakers and hearers from potentially face threatening acts, as another means of impersonalization. For example, the verb mentioned before "nahunédi," 'it seems', can be used instead of 'I think' to make impersonal statements. "súywa γwalí," 'it would be good', is used instead of "you must" or "you should." In speaking English, children say, "you gotta" to indicate that it is not the speaker but someone else issuing a command. "You gotta" can also be used to state a general rule. There is also a pronominal prefix in Chipewyan that can be used to impersonalize statements. For example, Mandeville tells Li,

deñe xanunelten-hílt hubéts'ádi
people they teach not they say

'Indians were said not to teach each other.'

(Li and Scollon 1976)

He uses the indefinite pronominal prefix "ts'è" to gain distance from those who are ignorant enough to say Indians did not teach each other, then proceeds to tell how they did. The use of the indefinite to soften criticism is so widespread that one person, saying, "some people . . .," was careful to add, "I don't mean you."

Brown and Levinson mention the pluralization of the pronoun 'you' to show deference as another example of impersonalization, the
motivation being to speak as if the 'you' only included the hearer rather than referring solely to him, thus giving him an out.

Athabaskan has a second person plural pronoun, sometimes used to soften an FTA. For example, Chief Henry enters his uncle's place alone. The uncle asks,

Sizaa hoonhts'a dut'aa hee?
My nephew, are you guys all right? (Jones 1979:71-72)

He explains that he must have looked terrible.

It must be because of traveling around and even down to the Yukon and because in the spring you don't look the same (because of windburn and exposure) that I looked like that, and I must have looked like I lost weight too (1979:74).

He looked so bad that his sister asked when seeing him,

What happened to you guys? (1979:56)

A literal interpretation is available in that his sister may be including his hunting partner, although it was dark and she said it "as I was walking up to the door." Though he was alone when he entered his uncle's, his uncle might have been using "you guys" to refer to the other people in his camp. Even so, his choice of the plural can be seen as a strategy of deference, mitigating the face threat of inquiring about his state. He answers in the plural, not focusing on himself.

In asking for a ride for a friend, a woman pluralizes not by saying "you guys," which would involve more than one, but by giving an alternative,

Is you or Ron busy?
Presumably, one or the other being busy would discourage her from asking what she had called to ask.

Using the same strategy, a girl addresses an envelope to "Ron or Suzie (Scollon)," giving either one the option of opening it and reading the letter.

Another strategy of dissociation is to phrase statements as a general rule. Chief Henry, in recounting a nomadic hunt of his youth, tells how he and his partner traveled farther than necessary through inattention to signs.

When we're young we really don't have any sense.

When we're young we sure don't have any sense. (Jones 1979:54)

So, up the hill we went. And there was the old trail. We must have traveled around there before but when we're young we're no good (we don't notice things). (1979:58)

Rather than saying he himself was unobservant, he generalizes to include all young people. In this way he can indirectly give advice to his young listeners. The statement of many Athabaskans that they learn by listening to elders (see Chapter 3) and that they will speak because someone may learn something from them makes it likely that they consider virtually everything they say as potential advice to younger people.

The last of the set of strategies for dissociation, nominalization (Strategy 9), was discussed above in connection with pessimism. In a comparison of the same narratives told in both Athabaskan and English (S. Scollon to appear), I found that the English versions employed more nominalization, while the Athabaskan
ones were more verbal or "process oriented." I attributed these differences to the content forms of English and Athabaskan, with English being affected by a history of literacy. Both languages have the resources of either nominal or verbal statement. It now seems likely that the greater degree of nominalization in English may be due to the fact that the audience understood English but not Athabaskan. We saw above that Chief Henry was more deferent in quoting himself to a listener who understood Koyukon than to one who did not. Whether the languages used in different versions are the same or different, we can expect more deferential strategies to be chosen when the audience understands the language of narration than when it does not. It thus appears that content form may not be a property of a language per se but of language in context.

The final strategy of negative politeness listed by Brown and Levinson is to go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H(earer) (Strategy 10). Athabaskans frequently go on record as not obliging someone to feel like they are imposing by saying, when asked to do a favor, "(I'm) not doing nothing anyway." This strategy is also exemplified by the woman who offered to give me receiving blankets which were "just sitting there for nothing."

What I have attempted to do in this section is to exemplify the use of deference politeness strategies among Athabaskans. Although these strategies are found in all languages and cultures, arising, as Brown and Levinson argue, out of universals of social interaction, they are not manifest in quite the same form among all groups. An American English speaker would not expect, for example, to find "you"
being used to mark deference. Other aspects of content form that mark
the English of Athabaskans as different from Standard English include
the frequent use of "you guys" for the second person plural, the
different use of third person for second person, the avoidance of
names, and the frequent omission of first person pronouns, especially
where they are understood in the context. These differences arise
largely out of the need to show deference in ordinary social
interaction. Often the overall effect of these differences in content
form is to make the English of Athabaskans sound to speakers of more
standard varieties broken and unclear. Some of these linguistic
strategies of deference are borrowed from Athabaskan, and others are
improvised to meet the needs of speakers.
NOTE TO CHAPTER V

1. I use the term "script" in a more specific sense than Schank and Abelson (1977) but not in the literal sense of a theater script. By script I mean something like the general sequence of speech acts in the scene being replayed.
DAUGHTER: I think it's gloomy. What's the point of it all?

Father: No, no...

But again, no. I was saying no to your question, not answering it... This whole book is about the wrongness of that question.

DAUGHTER: You never said that in the book.

FATHER: There are a million things I never said. But I'll answer your question. It has a million—an infinite number—of points, as you call them.

DAUGHTER: But that's like having no point—Daddy, is it a sphere?

FATHER: Ah, all right. That will do for a metaphor. A multidimensional sphere, perhaps.

DAUGHTER: Hmm—a self-healing tautology, which is also a sphere, a multidimensional sphere.

DAUGHTER: So what?

FATHER: But I keep telling you: There is no "what." A million points or none.

DAUGHTER: Then why write this book?

FATHER: That's different. This book, or you and me talking, and so on—these are only little pieces of the bigger universe. The total self-healing tautology has no "points" that you can enumerate. But when you break it up into little pieces, that's another story. "Purpose" appears as the universe is dissected. What Paley called "design" and Darwin called "adaptation."

DAUGHTER: Just an artifact of dissection? But what's dissection for? This whole book is a dissection. What's it for?

FATHER: Yes, it's partly dissection and partly synthesis. And I suppose that under a big enough macroscope, no idea can be wrong, no purpose destructive, no dissection misleading.

DAUGHTER: You said that we only make the parts of any whole.

FATHER: No, I said that parts are useful when we want to describe wholes.

(Bateson 1979:207)
By now the reader should have a feeling for the way Athabaskans talk and think, but may be wondering what is the point of it all. In concluding this dissection of the universe, I would like to show how the parts of the multidimensional sphere fit together. To do this I have to discuss the assumptions behind the various parts of this dissertation and the nature of explanation and proof.

In Chapter 1, I quoted Sapir as saying that we as linguists should be aware of the bias of our language on our science. The work of Reddy (1979) and of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) has suggested ways in which the metaphors inherent in our use of English condition the way we think. Bateson also cautions us that our language is not precise enough for science or epistemology:

Language continually asserts by the syntax of subject and predicate that "things" somehow "have" different qualities and attributes. A more precise way of talking would insist that the "things" are produced, are seen as separate from other "things," and are made "real" by their internal relations and by their behavior in relationship with other things and with the speaker. (1979:61)

If this is true of stones, potatoes, and eggs, as Bateson asserts, it is even more true of abstractions such as language and culture, which have no existence outside of the minds of those who talk about them.

I have laid out in Figure 1a a set of relationships among language, cognition, and the manifestations of culture I call values,
patterns of social interaction, and socialization. For the sake of
dissection, and because this is written by a linguist for linguists,
we start with language. For manageability, I narrow this set of
relationships to content form, in particular to linguistic strategies
of deference. I trace these to adaptations which have been caused not
only by convergence of English on Athabaskan, but also by processes of
language contact and socialization leaving their imprint on local
English.

Note that in that figure the arrows suggest causality. The
values of the bush consciousness—individuality, integration,
nonintervention—produce nonintervening patterns of social
interaction. These include face relations of deference and a
preference for taciturnity. Narrative discourse is preferred over
question and answer sequences. The listener can choose his own
participation in interactive narrative. He is not constrained by
questions to which he must respond. Silence is valued, and talk is
quiet and slow in pace. Consensus is sought whenever actions involve
others.

These nonintervening patterns of social interaction in turn set
constraints on socialization, which must be carried out by means of
interaction. In order to be prepared for individual autonomy and
nonintervention, which entails granting autonomy to others,
individuals must develop stoicism and self-reliance. Deference
implies not bothering people, which has implications for teaching and
learning. Watching and listening, trying to do things on one's own,
are the ways one learns. In order to teach nonintervention even when
people are bothering them, children are teased and made to tolerate abuse. They learn not to attribute motives and behavior characteristics to others.

This socialization of Athabaskans in turn results in the cognitive orientation of thematic abstraction and linguistic strategies of deference in the content form of their English. The linguistic structures outlined in the preceding chapter are the outcome of the means of socialization. They reflect training in pragmatic indirectness, or thematic abstraction.

This way of thinking parsimoniously in terms of themes and expressing things indirectly in turn inculcates the values of individuality, integration, and nonintervention. Expressions like "stay quiet" and "don't bother it" are repeated frequently toward this end.

We have thus completed the circle of causation. In case the reader might object that this is a circular argument, it is intended to be. While lineal arguments might work for explanation in classical physics, in dealing with biological and social phenomena, explanation must account for circular systems. According to Bateson,

Lineal thinking will always generate either the teleological fallacy (that end determines process) or the myth of some supernatural controlling agency.

What is the case is that when causal systems become circular . . . , a change in any part of the circle can be regarded as cause for change at a later time in any variable anywhere in the circle. It thus appears that a rise in the temperature of the room can be regarded as the cause of the change in the switch of the thermostat and, alternatively, that the action of the thermostat can be regarded as controlling the temperature of the room. (1979:60)
Just as the thermostat controls the temperature of a room and a change in the temperature causes a change in the thermostat switch, we can see that language controls values and values cause change in language.

The explanation for a particular phenomenon is to be found by going backward around the circle. Thus the explanation for both language and cognition is to be found in socialization practices, which are the logical outcome of patterns of social interaction. These preferred discourse patterns and face relations are determined by the values and reality set of the group, which are taught by means of language and the style of cognition associated with it.

While there are individual differences in values, language, and communicative patterns, the power of the circular system of causality is such that it assimilates these individual differences. Outsiders to the community either adapt to the norms of the community or live in isolation. Each part of the system is determined by factors besides the one at the source of the arrow. For example, values come not only from language and cognitive style but also to some extent from ecological factors. Patterns of social interaction are determined not only by values but also by personal experience and the history of the social group. Socialization may be conditioned not only by patterns of social interaction within the family but also by the teachings of missionaries. Finally, language and cognition are determined not only by socialization patterns stemming from the values of the reality set, but also by contact with another language and reality set.

In a circular system such as this, change cannot be introduced in any lineal fashion. Any change has to be considered with respect to
the whole system. For example, English cannot be standardized without changing socialization, face relations, and values. This is what schools attempt to do. Teachers are not always aware of this, however, and often act as if they can simply change children's grammar by instruction. Failure to do so is often attributed to stupidity on the part of the children or the bad influence of parents.

Linguists have also tended to limit their focus in accounting for change. As Grace says, "The ascendancy of drift theory has kept the attention of most linguists who are interested in change focused mainly on language internal selective factors" (1981:143). The Neogrammarians explained change in terms of mechanical, language-internal laws affecting sounds. As Watkins points out, "the importance of morphological change, of change in grammatical categories, has been consistently underestimated" (1973:106). Historical linguistics has been limited not only by its focus on sound change but by its neglect of social context.

The work of Labov ties the process of linguistic change to synchronic variation. To understand why "historical linguists have adopted and vigorously defended a thoroughly asocial policy in the past half-century" (1973:260), he reviews linguistic views of language as a social phenomenon. He traces two general approaches to social context.

We can generally predict from an author's definition of language how much he will be concerned with the social factors in linguistic change. Furthermore, those who focus upon the communication of cognitive or referential information will deal more with the individual, those who
become involved with affective and phatic uses of language, with social matters (1973:261).

He then reviews cases of change which could not be satisfactorily explained without considering social factors, showing that expressive functions are an important determinant of change.

What Grace (1981) terms lexification may change not only as a result of internal, mechanical sound laws, but also to serve emblematic needs, as Labov has shown. In our own work we have argued that phonological variation served the emblematic function of marking the speaker's position in a continuum of reality set (Scollon and Scollon 1979). The variation was governed by a rule that applied across the speech community and not to a particular language, though it can be traced to the influence of Cree.

Content form according to Grace, may be subject to a different set of extralinguistic pressures toward change. While change in content form has not been widely investigated, he speculates that it may be affected by a change in the subjective experience of speakers. This experience may involve communicating with speakers of different languages. The possibility of convergence of content form was suggested by the work of Gumperz and Wilson (1971) at Kupwar Village. Our work on linguistic convergence (Scollon and Scollon 1979) provided additional support for the idea that content form could change because of cognitive habits of wording ideas in certain ways to make them more intelligible to speakers of other languages. Frequent calquing and translating would provide a mechanism for convergence. The assumption behind this explanation is that content form is primarily a mechanism.
of cognition or the representation of ideas. It explains convergence of language toward the grammar of another language, but does not account for innovative changes that do not have a model in another language.

Hill and Hill (1980) have pointed to social factors in linguistic convergence. Content form can be susceptible to change on the basis of such factors as the desire to maintain group solidarity.

The hypothesis I have been testing is that language is a reflection of the values and cognitive style of its speakers. The difference between the English spoken by Athabaskans and that spoken by Anglos, I argue, is to some extent due to the difference between the reality sets of the bush consciousness and the modern consciousness.

The differences under consideration are in content form, or the way things are said. Wording might be slightly different for the same content, or the same wording might be used in a different context to convey a different meaning.

Some of the characteristics of content form of the English spoken by Athabaskans suggest characteristics of Athabaskan languages. They can be described as calques, but that does not explain how they are passed on from one generation to the next. Most children learning to speak this variety of English are not learning to speak an Athabaskan language. Thus calquing is not taking place within each speaker, but forms resembling calques are maintained in use through interaction.
The hypothesis, then, is that the distinctive aspects of content form reflect the bush consciousness reality set. I did not undertake the task of demonstrating that the Athabaskan languages reflect the values of the bush consciousness, though I give examples of non-intervention from Athabaskan. These values are inculcated in the socialization process. If this is the case, the aspects of content form necessary to preserve these values are likely to continue to be introduced in socialization even if the model of the original Athabaskan languages is no longer directly available to youngsters. Calques would serve functions carried out by Athabaskan but not available in English. Where meanings could not readily be calqued, the resources of English would be adapted to perform functions valued by the speakers.

The hypothesis is tested by examining socialization practices among Athabaskans in contrast with socialization to the modern consciousness. Socialization to nonintervention entails training in pragmatic indirectness. This is manifest in content form as linguistic strategies of deference. I document the expression of deference, which is important in preserving the values of individuality and nonintervention of the bush consciousness. Brown and Levinson have outlined various strategies for the linguistic expression of deference. I document the use by Athabaskans of most of these strategies, including questions, indirectness, pessimism, nominalization, subject deletion, hedges, and pluralization of the second person pronoun. Many of these strategies are used in ways that differ from speakers of more standard varieties of English, confirming
the hypothesis that the content form of the English spoken by Athabaskans has been influenced by the values of the bush consciousness transmitted through social interaction in the process of socialization.

In the case of questions, I found that speakers who are in the process of modernization use the Standard English form to perform modern functions of calling for display, fulfilling more traditional functions with forms calqued on Athabaskan. Less modern speakers use the calqued forms almost exclusively. This is in keeping with the componentiality of the modern consciousness and the holistic integration of the bush consciousness.

Some of the strategies, such as questions and indirectness, result in utterances that resemble Standard English in form but are used in a different context with a different meaning. Some strategies are calqued from Athabaskan, while others are innovations that serve to convey deference. Hedging particles have no counterpart in Athabaskan, but are used in careful avoidance of claiming too much. I conclude that socialization to the values of the bush consciousness does have an effect on the content form of the English spoken by Athabaskans. This suggests that convergence takes place partly as a result of speakers adopting the values of speakers of other languages in the process of learning to communicate with them. It also accounts for variations in English that are not attributable to convergence on Athabaskan.

I believe I have shown that socialization patterns affect content form through the mechanism of linguistic strategies of politeness.
Thus, English has been adapted by Athabaskans for the expression of
deferece in social interaction. Though calques on Athabaskan account
for many of the adaptations of the English language, some of them
appear to have evolved in the service of politeness. Athabaskans who
do not learn Athabaskan nevertheless internalize norms and values
which, it appears, aid in the maintenance of a characteristic variety
of English.

This study might be phrased as an examination of the role of
culture in linguistic adaptation. Grace (1981) has called for
investigation of cultural conditioning of change in content form:
"Surely, the explanation for a major part of linguistic change is
ultimately to be found in the adaptation of content form as the
cultural perceptions of reality change" (p. 145). This is an attempt
to begin discussion in more specific terms of culture and reality. At
the center of this discussion is discourse, which, according to
Gumperz, is the key to historical process.

This finally brings us into the position to ask about the
relationship between content form and cognition. Hymes (1966) has
cautioned us that the relationship is not simple. One might cause the
other, or they might both be caused by some other factor. Culture
might shape language and cognition through the mediation of
socialization. If language is the instrument of enculturation for the
child, and the content form of the language is shaped to some extent
by patterns of socialization, then the child's reality can be said to
be at least in part socially constructed. We now have the means of
talking linguistically about the social construction of reality.
While our previous work has shown that reality set affects the structure of language by means of cognition, cognition is itself shaped through the mediation of social interaction. Perhaps this brings us a step closer to looking at the social foundations of language, thought, and reality.
APPENDIX A

BROWN AND LEVINSON'S POSITIVE POLITENESS STRATEGIES

The following is a list of Brown and Levinson's (1978) strategies of positive politeness with examples from English given for each strategy.

**Strategy one** is to notice and attend to H's interests, wants, needs, or goods.

Goodness, you cut your hair! (. . .) By the way, I came to borrow some flour.

**Strategy two** is to exaggerate interest, approval, or sympathy with H.

What a fantastic garden you have!

**Strategy three** is to intensify interest to H.

I come down the stairs, and what do you think I see? — a huge mess all over the place, the phone's off the hook and clothes are scattered all over . . .

**Strategy four** is to use in-group identity markers.

honey.

darling.

Johnny.

Bring me your dirty clothes to wash, { darling.}

**Strategy five** is to seek agreement by choosing safe topics and repeating what the preceding speaker has said.

A: John went to London this weekend.

B: To London!
Strategy six is the converse of the preceding one—to avoid disagreement with token agreement, pseudo-agreement, white lies, or hedges.

A: That's where you live, Florida?
B: That's where I was born.

Strategy seven is to presuppose, raise, or assert common ground, through gossip and small talk, by assuming H's point of view, or by speaking as if S were H.

Oh dear, we've lost our little ball, haven't we, Johnny?
I really had a hard time learning to drive, you know.

Often "you know" is used when the listener can hardly be expected to be familiar with the specific instance referred to.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Do you want to} \quad & \begin{cases} 
\text{come} & \\
\text{go} & 
\end{cases} \\
& \text{with me to the movies?}
\end{align*}
\]

Here "come" connotes closeness, while "go" conveys distance.

Strategy eight is to joke. Jokes serve to put H at ease, being based on shared background knowledge and values.

OK if I tackle those cookies now?

Strategy nine is to indicate that S and H are "in this together" by asserting or presupposing knowledge of and concern for H's wants.

Look, I know you want the car back by 5:00, so shouldn't I go to town now? (request)

Strategy ten, offer or promise, is so common as to need no exemplification. Offers and promises demonstrate that S wants to satisfy H's positive face wants.
Strategy eleven is to be optimistic that S can assume that H wants what S wants for himself. In assuming H's cooperation he tacitly acknowledges that he will also cooperate with H's wishes.

You'll lend me your lawnmower for the weekend, I hope.

I imagine. won't you.

Strategy twelve includes both S and H in an activity by using an inclusive 'we' form.

Let's have a cookie, then, (i.e., we)

Strategy thirteen is to give reasons why H should cooperate, or make an indirect suggestion by asking for reasons.

Why not lend me your cottage for the weekend?

Strategy fourteen is to assume or assert reciprocity.

I'll do X for you if you do Y for me.

Strategy fifteen fulfills some of H's wants by S giving gifts and liking, admiring, caring for, and listening to H.
APPENDIX B

BROWN AND LEVINSON'S NEGATIVE POLITENESS STRATEGIES

The following is a list of Brown and Levinson's (1978) strategies of negative politeness with examples from English given for each strategy.

**Strategy one** is to be conventionally indirect. This is a compromise between going on record and giving H an 'out' by being indirect. Conventional indirectness is "the use of utterances that have contextually unambiguous meanings (by virtue of conventionalization) which are different from their literal meanings" (1978:137). Indirect speech acts have received much attention from linguists. These are speech acts whose illocutionary force is not evident in the surface structure. As Brown and Levinson point out, "rhetorical questions can be used to make assertions, imperatives to make offers, assertions to command" (1978:137). A systematic way of making indirect speech acts in English is by stating or questioning a felicity condition (Gordon and Lakoff 1971).

Can you please pass the salt?

**Strategy two** is to question or hedge. Questioning relates to conventional indirectness and, like hedging, derives from the want not to presume or coerce H. "A 'hedge' is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set" (Brown and Levinson 1978:150).

A swing is sort of a toy.
Hedges may also modify the force of a speech act (G. Lakoff 1972:213).

\begin{align*}
\text{I} & \{ \text{suppose} \\
\text{I} & \{ \text{guess} \quad \text{that Harry is coming.} \\
\text{I} & \{ \text{think} \\
\end{align*}

Adverbial clauses and 'if' clauses may hedge illocutionary force.

\begin{align*}
\text{in fact.} & \quad \text{in a way.} \\
\text{That's just how it is} & \quad \text{in a sense.} \\
\text{in a sense.} & \quad \text{as it were.} \\
\text{in all probability.} & \quad \text{I shouldn't be surprised.} \\
\text{it seems to me.} & \quad \text{don't you agree.} \\
\end{align*}

The use of 'if' clauses to suspend felicity conditions is illustrated by Heringer (1972).

\begin{align*}
\text{if you can.} & \quad \text{if it closes.} \\
\text{Close the window,} & \quad \text{if it isn't already closed.} \\
\text{if you want.} & \quad \text{if S might later ask H to do it.} \\
\text{*if I want you to (but note that this is OK} & \quad \text{if S might later ask H to do it.} \\
\end{align*}

Hedges to Grice's maxims may be made with modals.

\begin{align*}
\text{I can say . . .} & \quad \text{. . . you might say . . .} \\
\text{(so) I would say . . .} & \quad \end{align*}
In hedges on relevance, "The use of now interacts with the use of tense deixis, now making a claim for relevance (because it is a proximal deictic marker, like here) and past tense hedging a bit on the relevance:

Now, I was wondering if . . ." (Brown and Levinson 1978:174).

Verbal hedges can be accompanied by or replaced by prosodic or kinesic cues that indicate the speaker's attitude toward what he is saying. Hesitations, pitch changes, and facial expressions fall in this category.

**Strategy three** is to be pessimistic. Parallel to the positive politeness strategy of being optimistic, this strategy expresses doubt that the conditions for S's speech act obtain. The English subjunctive may convey this doubt.

\[
\text{Might} \\
\text{Could} \quad \text{you do X?} \\
\text{Would}
\]

Pessimism may be coded in the negative.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{I don't} & \quad \text{there'd be any} \quad \text{chance} \\
\text{imagine} & \quad \text{possibility} \quad \text{of you} \quad . . . \\
\text{hope}
\end{align*}
\]

**Strategy four** is to minimize the imposition. This may indirectly pay deference by suggesting that since R, the seriousness of the imposition, is not great, the weight of the FTA must be due to distance or power.
Strategy five is to give deference, either by humbling S or by elevating H, thereby granting H higher social status than S. By conceding H status, S reassures H that he does not wish to impose on H any more than is necessary, and that he is in no position to coerce H.

Deference phenomena represent perhaps the most conspicuous intrusion of social factors into language structure, in the form of honorifics. By 'honorifics' in an extended sense we understand direct grammatical encodings of relative social status between participants, or between participants and persons or things referred to in the communicative event (Brown and Levinson 1978:184).

In English referent honorifics can indirectly give respect to the addressee. Brown and Levinson list pairs like Snuggs/Dr. Snuggs, eat/dine, man/gentleman, give/bestow, whose second member conveys greater respect for H or something associated with H.

We look forward very much to
eating
with you.
dining

Another common form of deference is forms of address, used to mitigate FTA's by reassuring H that S means him no harm.

A: Did you move my luggage?

B: Yes, sir, I thought perhaps you wouldn't mind and . . .

Excuse me, sir, but would you mind if I close the window?

I don't think you ought to do that, Mr. President.
T/V pronoun alternation and bilingual code-switching are also FTA-sensitive. Hesitation may also signal deference.

I think you should, uh, attend to your files.

**Strategy six** is to apologize, communicating reluctance to impose on the addressee. One can do this in one of four ways. S can admit the infringement:

I'm sure you must be very busy, but . . .

S can attempt to show reluctance with hedges or expressions like:

I normally wouldn't ask you this, but . . .

S can give overwhelming reasons for doing the FTA:

I can think of nobody else who could . . .

Finally, S may beg H's forgiveness:

I'm sorry to bother you . . .

**Strategy seven** is to impersonalize S and H, avoiding the pronouns 'I' and 'you'. This can be done in performatives and imperatives, with impersonal verbs, passive and circumstantial voices, indefinites, pluralization of 'you' and 'I', reference terms like 'you Majesty', or point-of-view distancing.

It is so. (instead of "I tell you that it is so."")

Take that out!

seems

It { (to me) that . . .

appears

It is regretted that . . .

Someone finished the cookies.

213
We feel obliged to warn you that . . .

But the President should not become involved in any part of this case (said by Nixon).

Point-of-view operations such as switching tense can distance S from H.

\[
\{ \text{have been} \}
\]

\[
\{ \text{I was wondering whether you could do me a little favor.} \}
\]

Deictic place switches can also convey social distance, anger, or avoidance.

Get that cat out of my house.

Proximal demonstratives may also convey comfort through emotionally distancing the source of distress.

There, there, it'll be all right.

They may also be used for the distancing of departure.

There, we'll be seeing each other.

Another form of distancing is to adjust reports to H's point of view through indirect reported speech. Thus the first of the next pair would be considered negatively polite.

I'm sorry to bother you, but the Chancellor advised me to come and see you.

I'm sorry to bother you, but the Chancellor said to me,

"Mr. Jones, I'd go and see the Dean if I were you."

**Strategy eight** is to state the FTA as a general rule. S can dissociate himself as well as H from the particular imposition by
avoiding pronouns, stating the FTA as a general rule or regulation. This gives outputs like the first of the following pair:

International regulations require that the fuselage be sprayed with DDT.

I am going to spray you with DDT to follow international regulations.

**Strategy nine** is to nominalize. Nouns are more formal or negatively polite than adjectives, which are more formal than verbs.

You performed well on the examinations and we were favorably impressed.

Your performing well on the examinations impressed us favorably.

Your good performance on the examinations impressed us favorably.

**Strategy ten** is to go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H.

I'd be eternally grateful if you would . . .

It wouldn't be any trouble; I have to go right by there anyway.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Goodman, Kenneth and William Page. 1978. Reading comprehension programs: Theoretical bases of reading comprehension instruction in the middle grades. Revised final report. Center for the Expansion of Language and Thinking, Education Resources Information Center, Tucson, Arizona,


