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The United States and India's struggle for nonalignment: 1947–1956

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University of Hawaii, 1990
THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA'S STRUGGLE FOR NONALIGNMENT: 1947-1956

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ABSTRACT

World War II devastated most of the world in general; Europe, East and Southeast Asia in particular. West Europe looked to the United States for reconstruction and received generous assistance, thereby went under American sphere of influence. For its part, the Soviet Union, twice invaded from the west, began to build a defense along its western border and therefore established a total control over East Europe. Thus began an era of heightened tension between the two super powers—an era that came to be known as the Cold War.

In Asia, after World War II, Japan went under American occupation, and European colonial regimes returned to East and Southeast Asia.

Against this background, India emerged from colonial rule in 1947. Mindful of their domestic concerns, India's leaders emphasized internal consolidation and development and refused to follow either super power in its Cold War planning. Anxious to consolidate their respective positions, both Washington and Moscow viewed such a policy of nonalignment as against their interests.

This difference had a profound impact upon India's relations with America and the Soviet Union. Moscow under Joseph Stalin regarded even an independent India as a tool of Western imperialism. Although India's leaders, particularly Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, emphasized their commitment to democracy and close association with the West, America did not appreciate nonalignment and try to understand New Delhi's policy priorities. As the Cold War unfolded, more and more international events widened the gulf between the two countries. The task of diplomacy is to bridge these differences, or
failing which, to downplay them. But underscoring their respective priorities, each nation held on to their positions and spoke vehemently against the other. Insensitivity and misunderstanding complicated the problem.

A few events that took place in 1955 changed that situation. In that year, the Soviet Union abandoned its covert activities in most of the Third World countries and tried to win them over by extending economic assistance. The United States did not have a large economic assistance program for these countries. Caught unawares for a moment by the new Soviet drive, Washington soon looked for ways to counter it. The result was increased American economic assistance to the developing nations in general, and India in particular. New Delhi's development efforts, carried out through democratic methods, became a model for the "free world" as opposed to Chinese totalitarian methods. Similarity of American and Indian responses to the Suez War of 1956 and the Hungarian uprising in the same year also brought the two countries closer than before. The years, 1955-1956, therefore marked a turning point in Indo-American relations.

This work studies the course of Indo-American relations during the tortuous decade between 1947 and 1956. It is also one of the first ones of its kind based on archival and government documents in India and the United States.
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World War II caused untold devastation to most countries of the world, especially those in Europe and East and Southeast Asia. Some of the pre-war superpowers, especially Britain and France, were devastated by the war. After 1945 these two countries, and others as well, looked to the United States for aid, and through the Marshall Plan and other programs, eventually received generous assistance from Washington. One consequence of this was that Western Europe became a sphere of American influence.

As this occurred, the Soviet Union, the other superpower in the aftermath of World War II, which had been twice invaded from the west in recent history, built its own security system in Eastern Europe. The results were Soviet supremacy throughout Eastern Europe and confrontation between East and West, which faced each other across an "Iron Curtain" that split the European continent in two.

As this stalemate emerged, a communist insurgency in Greece, which lay outside the Soviet sphere of influence, convinced Washington that the Soviets had new, or continued, expansionist ambitions. Though the United States had emerged as the strongest nation in the world in 1945, and thus championed peace through maintenance of the status quo, the Soviet Union was a threat, actual or potential, to the realization of a Pax Americana. Accordingly, President Harry S. Truman responded to the perceived Soviet threat in Greece, and to a related threat in Turkey too, with a substantial commitment of economic and military assistance. More important, Truman's pledge of support to the two countries included a commitment
to "contain" all threats then and in the future, from international communism. This "containment" pledge became at once the cornerstone of American foreign policy.

These European developments had repercussions in Asia. There, the situation was even more complicated than it was in Europe. While Japan came under American occupation, most of the territory its forces had conquered during the war were reclaimed by European colonialists. Thus Indochina was reclaimed by France, the East Indies (Indonesia) by Holland, Malaya and Singapore by the British, and the Philippines by the United States. At the same time, China, whom Franklin D. Roosevelt had designated as one of the Big Four during the war, experienced a rapid transition in which the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek gave way to the Communists under Mao Tse-tung. As this occurred, post-colonial regimes emerged in South Asia, first in India and Pakistan and soon thereafter in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). 2

Excluding China, which was never a European colony, India was in the post-war era the largest of the newly independent nations in size, and manpower and potentially the richest in resources. Yet centuries of internal strife, inefficient administration, and colonial domination made India one of the poorest countries of the world. Its economy had therefore to be developed if its independence was to have any meaning for its people. Economics, however, was only half the problem. At the time of independence, the subcontinent was partitioned into two countries, a predominantly Hindu India and an overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistan, and this division created pressing problems of boundaries and refugees, for it exacerbated age-old
problems of ethnicity and territoriality. Moreover India's very heterogeneity--some 550 princely states were incorporated into a national union--threatened its consolidation and unity. The immediate concerns of Indian leaders were therefore national consolidation and economic survival. Under such circumstances, foreign policy had to take a back seat.

Having fought colonial rule throughout their lives, India's leaders were understandably nationalists who viewed Western imperialism as the most serious threat to India and to the well being of what came later to be known as the Third World. Proud of their nation's history and culture, Indian leaders were determined to prove their own worth and that of their nation as well, and not to subordinate Indian interests to those of any other nation or cause. More or less innocent of the realpolitik of international communism, they perceived little reason to consider the Soviet Union a threat to world stability, to their own political position, or to India's role in the world. The world, they insisted, was more than Europe or the West, and purely European or Western rivalries were not necessarily controlling in the rest of the world.

This assessment of regional and world politics pulled Indian leaders toward foreign policies very different from those of the United States. India's chief foreign policy architect in the years after 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, repeatedly spoke of his country's need to stay out of superpower rivalries and to concentrate instead on its own domestic problems. Sensitive about India's newly won nationhood, Nehru was determined to uphold its independence. Alignment with either one of the superpowers, he feared, would
subordinate India's interests to external concerns. India under Nehru therefore charted a nonaligned course in foreign policy.  

In this as in other matters Indian foreign policy was very much the doing of Nehru, who was his own External Affairs Minister. Nehru's education, first under an English governess and then in England itself, brought him in contact with British liberals who prejudiced his thinking about America and Americans encouraging him to consider the one an upstart and the other a crass people. This stereotyped thinking dominated his policy toward the United States during his tenure as prime minister of India.

But as a poor and impotent country and one remote from the Soviet as well as the American sphere of interest, India did not immediately attract attention from either of the superpowers in the postwar era. It was only after the Cold War enlarged the area of superpower rivalry that New Delhi became important to the superpowers and its foreign policy an object of concern in Washington and Moscow. As the Cold War evolved and suspicions increased, each of the superpowers sought to consolidate its own interests and to contain those of the other. Each combined military alliances with economic efforts for these purposes. In the alliance systems they created, Washington and Moscow pressed other nations to join their respective causes. There was, to them, no middle position between the two poles. The citadel of world communism, the Soviet Union regarded Nehru as a tool of Western imperialism, and America in turn viewed India's nonalignment with distrust. And yet, committed to democratic methods of government, Nehru was closer to the West than to the Soviet Union, and he repeatedly said so. Preoccupied with the Cold War, and
unfamiliar with India's culture and tradition, Washington failed to appreciate this point.

Assessing the world situation from an entirely different perspective from India's, America did not understand the policy priorities and aspirations of this Third World nation until 1955. That year witnessed a new Soviet offensive, in which economic aid replaced covert activities as the chief means of winning the allegiance of developing nations. Most Soviet aid now went to nonaligned countries—India, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. The amount of the aid was not large, but the Soviets took care to invest in highly publicized projects. Washington did not have a large economic assistance program for these nations at this time. The Soviet drive therefore caused American leaders to pay more attention to developing countries in general and to India in particular. Washington hoped to make New Delhi's economic development a model for the "free world" and thereby reduce the appeal of Soviet methods. The Cold War thus entered a new phase, and America shifted its tactics accordingly. It downplayed its political differences with India and even reconciled itself to the existence of Nehru's nonaligned policy. The Suez and the Hungarian crises of 1956 also brought the two nations closer together than they had been before. The years 1955–1956 therefore marked a sharp turning point in Indo-American relations.

This dissertation examines the history of Indo-American relations between 1947 and 1956. A background chapter traces the origin of Indo-American relations to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, immediately before American independence, and
develops the main currents of those relations until India's independence in 1947. Throughout this period India remained under British rule, which had the effect of insulating the country from external contacts. Even the spurs of commercial activity generated in the United States after its independence produced little political awareness of India, and the distance between the two countries precluded close associations of other sorts. The outbreak of World War II demonstrated the diverging interests of America and Indian nationalists. While the British India joined the war, Indian nationalists insisted that only an independent India could effectively participate in the war. For its part, America's top priority was winning the war, and Indian independence or autonomy was desirable only if it contributed to that objective. The British convinced Washington that a British India would contribute to the Allied cause while an independent India would make victory more difficult. Preoccupied with the war, the United States never tried to understand the dynamics of Indian politics. It considered British rule in India legitimate and any effort to undermine that rule while the war was going on as necessarily hostile to American interests. America and the Indian nationalists thus had diverging purposes.

The United States was already involved in the Cold War with the Soviet Union when India became independent in 1947. The major theaters of that war—Europe, the Mediterranean, and East Asia—logically drew the chief attention of American policymakers. South Asia, as a consequence, was of slight importance to Washington, which treated the region as still within the British sphere of influence. India's reluctance to open its economy to foreign
investment also precluded close association with the United States. Thus American global and economic objectives, which were very different from those of India, led to a policy of aloofness from New Delhi until 1949. Chapter two examines this theme through the end of 1948.

By that time, the Asian political landscape was becoming more complicated. In Southeast Asia, two of Washington's allies—the Netherlands, and France—were fighting losing battles against nationalist insurgencies. Then in late 1949, the Kuomintang was ousted by the communists from power in China, causing a severe reversal to America's strategic interests. Under these circumstances India seemed to the United States as the only stable nation in Asia. As these events unfolded, Nehru took more interest in foreign affairs, influenced primarily by his desire to end colonialism in Asia. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and the subsequent American and Chinese interventions, caused Nehru to take a prominent role in trying to re-establish peace in the continent. Lacking a strong ally in Asia, the United States endeavored to bring India into its fold by enlisting New Delhi as a member of its global alliance system. Ignoring India's repeated assertion of a policy of nonalignment, in December 1950 Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee broached the subject of an alliance between the two countries to Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit when she approached the State Department for a loan to purchase food grains from the United States. Nehru refused. The story of America's failed expectations with regard to India is the subject of the third chapter which runs through the end of 1950.
Although the United States did send food to India, New Delhi's continued insistence on nonalignment discouraged further initiatives. Its envoy to India, Chester Bowles, tried to sustain American interest in India, but failed. By the end of 1952, Washington was preoccupied with building an alliance system in West Asia, where Turkey was already an American ally. India refused to join the proposed regional alliance, but its chief adversary, Pakistan, was eager to do so. In addition, American elections, held in the fall of 1952, returned a Republican majority to Congress and a Republican to the White House. The Truman administration's interest in India therefore diminished. These developments are the subject of the fourth chapter, which covers the years 1951-1952.

The fifth chapter examines American policy toward India under the first two years of the Eisenhower administration, 1953-1954. Trying to fulfill a campaign pledge, Eisenhower endeavored to improve America's relations with Asia. In the spring of 1953 the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visited several Asian capitals, including New Delhi. His meeting with Nehru failed to bring the two countries any closer than they had been during the Truman years; in fact, it confirmed the two leaders' suspicions of each other. Dulles liked countries that embraced his anti-Soviet policy, and India would not. This had an unfavorable impact upon Indo-American relations during the first months of the new administration. Neither of the countries tried to downplay this difference, and insensitive statements from both sides worsened the situation. Meanwhile news of the Soviet hydrogen bomb caused Washington to accelerate its effort to form a regional alliance.
system in West Asia. Pakistan had long sought American military assistance; now Washington responded favorably to its request. Turkey and Pakistan concluded a military pact in early 1954, and America followed by committing military assistance to Karachi. Nothing could embitter Indo-American relations more than this. It increased Indo-Pakistani tension and halted the process of reconciliation between the two countries which, ironically, had begun at America's initiative.

Nehru regarded American military assistance to Pakistan as bringing the Cold War to South Asia. He therefore responded by enlarging his international contacts. Taking the lead with Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon, India organized the Afro-Asian conference that met at Bandung in spring 1955. America suspected that the conference was an attempt to build opposition to its strategic policies. However the outcome of the conference, which reiterated the participating nations' faith in the United Nations, assured Washington. But both India and the United States continued to suspicion each other's foreign policies. The climax of Nehru's bid to play a major international role was his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and the return visit of Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin to India the following December. The new Soviet economic offensive designed to win Third World support also left Washington looking for a counter measure. Although Nehru resisted the Soviet initiatives, Moscow's offensive caused Washington to endeavor to improve its relations with India. Against this backdrop, two events in 1956—the Suez War, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary, brought the two countries closer together. Washington realized that India's
nonalignment was non-negotiable, and Nehru reconciled himself to the need to seek American assistance for India's economic development. Both sides began to exercise moderation in their dealings with each other, which led to a better mutual relationship and larger American assistance to India. The sixth chapter covers this positive trend between 1955-1956, and a concluding chapter summarizes Indo-American relations since 1956.

This study is the first book length study of this subject based on archives in India and the United States. On the American side, I have used the documents available at the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas; the National Archives at Washington, D.C.; and the Seeley G. Mudd Library at Princeton University. I have also used American government documents available at the Hamilton Library at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

The Nehru papers from 1946 and the Krishna Menon papers are still closed to researchers. However, some important documents that deal with Nehru's worldview, such as his major speeches and some of his letters, including those he wrote to India's Chief Ministers, have been published by the government of India. These have provided useful sources for this study. Some of the relevant papers of India's Ministry of External Affairs have been deposited in the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, and these have been used. For the rest of the documents on the Indian side, I have had to depend on published secondary sources, primarily the works by Sarvepalli Gopal, an eminent Indian historian, who had privileged access to the Nehru papers for his biography of the Indian leader.
ENDNOTES FOR PREFACE


3. For a history of the integration of these princely states into
the Indian union, see V.P. Menon, Integration of the Indian States (Madras: Orient Longman, 1985).


The United States and India are the two largest democracies in the world, and they have much in common. Their commitment to the rule of law, freedom of thought and expression, and government by consent as expressed through free elections based on universal suffrage has stood the test of time. An independent judiciary, a free press, and a strong public opinion zealously guard against encroachment upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens in their respective constitutions. The two nations also share a common legacy—both were ruled by the British Crown for a considerable length of time.

The two nations' modern histories, nevertheless, are very different. The United States attained its independence from Britain in 1783. At that time, on the other side of the globe, India was gradually coming under British rule. While the United States grew in all spheres over the next century and a half, India degenerated into a weak and impoverished colony. For the entire period of colonization, India was kept in isolation from the rest of the world. There was, as a consequence, few opportunities for direct contacts between the United States and India. Then, in the turbulent 1940's, when India accelerated her struggle for independence, the United States was involved in a war against fascist expansionism. When India won her independence in 1947, the two countries were strangers to one another. The leaders of one could not comprehend what drove the policies of the other. They were unable to appreciate each other's positions and
objectives in international affairs. In addition, different historical experiences gave rise to different national interests and the two countries had different international priorities. Unfamiliarity and differing national interests were to feature immediately in Indo-American relations.

Before discussing the story of those relations between 1947 and 1956, it is necessary to survey briefly their background. It was a fortuitous error on the part of Christopher Columbus in his search for a new route to India that led him to America. Thereafter, other adventurous Europeans began to sail to the New World. As settlements on America's northeastern seaboard increased, demands for European goods increased commensurately. The initial settlers in the New World did not have direct trade with so distant a land as India. But Britain did, and British traders began to carry goods between India and the New World.

The first contacts between Britain's American colonies and India were, therefore, negligible. British merchants sold Indian china, pearls, baskets, and jewelry in American markets, and advertised them in colonial newspapers. These newspapers also carried reports, albeit infrequently, of political events in India. "It was reported this day," read one such report in the Virginia Gazette, "August 30, 1739, in London upon the exchange, that Goa, a rich settlement belonging to the Portuguese, was besieged by 150,000 Indians." ¹

The Colonists knew little about India, and Indians even less about the Colonies. What news about India that did reach the colonies came from British sources, but it generated increasing interest after the 1750's, as relations between the Colonies and Britain became more
and more strained. Colonists began to look upon the activities of the East India Company in India with suspicion, perhaps in order to reinforce their own dislike for British methods in their own area. "It is said," read an item in a Virginia Newspaper in 1767, "that the great riches acquired in the East Indies are not obtained by mere trade, but chiefly by rapine, plundering of the poor innocent natives."²

In 1771 there was a great famine in India, and some of the officials of the East India Company made personal profits from the resulting shortage of foodgrains. Knowledge of this scandal was one among the many things that disenchanted the Colonists with British attempts to uphold imperial authority in North America. Thus, in 1777, one member of the Continental Congress cautioned his fellow countrymen to be careful of British policies and actions in America, lest America share the fate of India.³

America did not suffer that fate. She fought and won her independence from Britain, by which time the East India Company under Robert Clive had established British political suzerainty over the Indian provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. In the course of the next century, the entire subcontinent came under British rule.

Before independence, few colonists ventured to sail the thousands of miles to India. The most renowned American to do so in the 17th century was Elihu Yale. Born in Massachusetts, Yale moved to England and then to India in the service of the East India Company.⁴ Later, he generously contributed to the Connecticut Collegiate School, and grateful trustees renamed the school after him in 1718. Then there was William Duer, who served as aide-de-camp to Robert Clive in 1764 but
later returned to North America and became one of the financial backers of the American Revolution and a member of Congress. Still later he directed American interest in the Indian market. Yet neither Yale, Duer, nor any other of the early travelers to India had much interest in the people and culture there. If any of them brought any knowledge of India to America, they did not disseminate it. To Americans, India was a far away land somewhere in the exotic Orient.

Contact between the two peoples remained minimal until well into the 20th century. At first, their economies were primarily agricultural and the demand for foreign goods in both was small, and Britain discouraged the development of commercial links. American trade with India began as early as 1794 when the first American ship to enter an Indian port, the United States, arrived at Pondicherry, then a French possession. Ten years later, under the provisions of the Jay Treaty, the United States obtained most-favored-nation status in the India trade, but restrictions remained. The treaty required Americans to carry all the goods they took from India to the United States. If they wanted to sell the goods elsewhere, the American shippers had to unload them at an American port, and pay import duties on them before reloading them and exporting them to a third country.

Despite such restrictions, American trade with British India gradually grew, albeit slowly. The East India Company welcomed American traders because the influx of dollars compensated for the shortage of silver. Privately officials of the Company also had reasons for welcoming the trade. Despite a legal prohibition against private trade, most officials of the Company made their fortunes from that practice. In 1793, when the monopoly of the Company was renewed,
the British government stipulated that only Company ships could carry specie—money and gold—from India to Britain. Company officials therefore could not transfer their illegal wealth to Britain in English vessels for fear of confiscation. To avoid this, they used foreign, especially American, vessels engaged in the India trade. 6

America's trade with India continued to increase but remained at a moderate level. In 1800 American imports from India were valued at three million dollars, 7 a figure that reflected increases brought about during the Napoleonic wars, when American traders took advantage of the drop in the direct trade between Europe and India. Once these wars ended, however, and trade patterns returned to normal, the British again effectively excluded Americans from Indian markets and trade for the remainder of the 19th century.

In the first decade of the 20th century, American entrepreneurs began to make significant headway in contacts with local Indian principalities. At that time American engineers were employed as advisors to local rulers in Mysore and Baroda, for example, and the General Electric Company constructed a hydro-electric unit in Mysore. The most notable American investment was a multi-million dollar project called the Tata Iron and Steel Works. World War I expanded those contacts, and American trade with India was larger than that of any nation except Britain. America's share of the import trade to India rose from 3 per cent of the total in 1909-14 to 7 per cent in 1914-19, while its share of India's exports rose from 8 to 12 per cent. 8

India also began to attract increased American investment. American financial institutions such as American Express and the
International Banking Corporation established outlets in India, and Ford and General Motors opened automobile assembly plants there in the 1920's.

Indo-American relations became much more direct and involved during World War II. Due to the war, Britain was unable to carry on normal trade with India, and American businessmen quickly took up the slack. The United States also poured mountains of war materials, petroleum products, industrial goods, and agricultural products into India under the lend-lease program.

These increased economic contacts did not extend into other areas. Culturally, the two remained virtually unknown to each other. That was partly due to the British policy of insulating India from the outside world, but part of it was also to cultural differences. Hinduism, for example, decreed that anyone who crossed the kala rani—the ocean, anyone that is who went abroad—would be unable to observe the strict rituals he had to follow in his homeland. He would therefore lose his place in his caste. Before World War II, only a very few educated Hindus dared to break this rule, and they went mostly to Britain for higher learning. As a consequence, contacts with foreign lands were not developed.

Official links between the countries were also limited. At various times since the 1790's Washington appointed consuls to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In November 1792, President George Washington appointed the first of these, Benjamin Joy of Boston, to be United States Consul at Calcutta and other ports on the coast of India. Calcutta was then under the direct rule of the East India Company, which refused to recognize Joy or any other representative of any
foreign country as having diplomatic status. Joy was, however, allowed to remain as a Commercial Agent subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of British India. As such he was responsible for the conduct of American trade, but after about a year in India, he returned to the United States in 1795. 11

The first American Consul to have diplomatic status was Edward Ely, who arrived at Bombay on May 6, 1852. According to Ely's dispatches, the principal Indian exports to America included wool, oil-seeds, hides, medicinal drugs, spices, indigo, and ivory, and amounted to $5,378,321. America exported to India tobacco, naval stores, ice, copper, pitch, rosin, and pine boards amounting to $636,432. 12 Although there were other American consuls or commercial agents in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, from time to time, there was no American diplomat accredited to New Delhi until 1941, despite the fact that that city had become India's capital in 1912. This suggests that the only official concern of the United States in India before 1941 was commercial. India was still under British rule and neither the British nor the Americans felt the need for an official American presence in the nation's political capital. Only the exigencies of World War II changed that.

Although American consuls and ships' captains who visited India had instructions to report on political, economic, and social conditions there, very few of them did so. The consuls were concerned with trade, their salaries were small, and they were not accorded diplomatic status. In their correspondence with the State Department, they dwelt chiefly on the refusal of the British to treat them as
diplomats and the difficulty of living in India on their small salaries. 13

American traders also had little to say about India. They too were largely concerned with trade, and since their contacts with India were limited to port cities and to a few Indian businessmen, they never learned much about the Indian people and their culture. They, like missionaries, sailors, and other Americans who found themselves for one reason or another in India, limited their written records to commonplace matters of personal experience.

These factors precluded close cultural ties between the two peoples. The men who generated the first awareness of Indian culture in the United States were Sir William Jones of Britain and Raja Ram Mohan Roy of India. It was largely through the efforts of Jones, in the last decade of the 18th and the early years of the 19th century, that American intellectuals were introduced to classical Indian literature. Jones was a renowned linguist and the founder-President of the Asiatic Society (1784). Several of his translations of classical Indian literary works were available at selected American libraries, including the Harvard College library, the Cleveland Public Library, and the Library Company of Philadelphia. How widely these works were read or how they were understood is unknown. Jones' writings conveyed a false image of India. He thought of the Orient as a homogeneous whole, thus lumping together Hindu, Persian, Egyptian, and other cultural traditions without regard to the essential differences between them. 14 His readers must have viewed India as part of a larger Orient without a distinctive culture of its own.

The first Indian to have any impact on American thinking was Raja
Rammohan Roy (1772-1833). Partly influenced by Unitarianism, Roy came to understand and appreciate the similarities between Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. He took what he regarded as the best principles from each of these religions and fashioned them into his own synthesis, known as the Brahmo Sharami.\textsuperscript{15} Roy's works were published and widely circulated in the United States, and attracted the attention of intellectuals there as well as in Europe.\textsuperscript{16} Besides being a religious thinker, Roy was a significant social and educational reformer who urged Indians to adopt some of the elements of Western education. In America he came to be regarded as a religious reformer working to eliminate India's "barbarous sacrifices and idol worship".\textsuperscript{17} There is no doubt that Hinduism included some objectionable practices such as the sati dahan, whereby a Hindu widow burned herself in the same pyre with her dead husband. But highlighting the ills of Hinduism while ignoring its ideals created an unfavorable and distorted impression about India in the United States. These negative images colored the developing American interest in India.

It was in the 1830's, with the emergence of the Transcendentalists, that a serious interest in India's culture and philosophy developed in the United States. The historian Perry Miller describes Transcendentalism as "a protest of the human spirit against emotional starvation" and a reaction to the materialism of the time.\textsuperscript{18} The Transcendentalists turned to Indian philosophy in search of spiritual idealism. More and more books on Indian religion and philosophy became available in the United States. The two most important Transcendentalists were Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862). Emerson read a number of important
Indian works, including the *Code of Manu*, the *Bhagavat Gita*, the *Puranas*, and the *Upanishads*. The titles of some of his poems—Maya, Brahma, *Kathopanishad*—suggest how deeply he was influenced by these works.

Thoreau also read Indian literature and was deeply influenced by it. He frequently contrasted America's materialism with India's spiritualism, and his most important works, including *Walden, A Week,* and his *Journal* reflect this theme. Mohandas K. Gandhi, the leader of India's independence movement in the 20th century was influenced by Thoreau's essay on *Civil Disobedience*. In fact, Gandhi borrowed the term from Thoreau. None of these luminaries—Roy, Emerson or Thoreau—however, had any personal experience with the cultures from which they borrowed, and their understanding was not deep. Personal visits and experiences might have developed better mutual understanding.

The academic study of India began in the United States with a Sanskrit program at the City College of New York in 1836 and a similar program at Yale College in 1841. The St. Louis School of Philosophy and the Concord School of Philosophy also initiated studies on Indian philosophy, in the 1860's and 1870's respectively. This development of systematic studies of aspects of Indian culture continued during the rest of the 19th century. The effects of such studies were of course confined to a few intellectuals. On the popular level, negative or distorted images of India were continually reinforced by the accounts of missionaries and travelers. Thus an anonymous clergyman remarked in the *St. Louis Republic* of September 17, 1893, "Ignorance and slavery and immorality compose the real trinity of Hindustan."
In India British education policy was geared toward turning out students who were sympathetic to British rule and qualified to fill the lower levels of the government bureaucracy. In addition, American books were difficult to get in India, and as a consequence Indians had virtually no opportunity to learn about America or to know what Americans thought about India. Not until the last years of the 19th century did educated Indians begin to visit America. Once they did they encountered the distorted image Americans had of India, and they sought to do something to correct it.

The religious teacher, Swami Vivekananda, well-known in India, was one of these travelers. He came to America in 1893 primarily to attend the Parliament of Religions held at Chicago on September 11, of that year. He remained in America until April 1896, and while there became fully aware of America's distorted image of India. In the United States, he traveled widely and spoke at many places, including Harvard University, explaining Indian philosophy and the Hindu religion. In the aftermath of his efforts, a number of centers devoted to the study of Indian religion sprang up in the United States. Around these centers, there "developed rapidly a periphery of spiritualists, astrologers, clairvoyants, and magicians whose activities helped deepen the old stereotypes about the 'mysterious' East." Rabindranath Tagore, a renowned Bengali poet and Nobel laureate, visited America on five different occasions between 1912 and 1930. During these visits he lectured widely on Indian literature and philosophy, but with little positive result. Tagore was a literateur and musician who excelled in drama, poetry, and short stories, as well as music. Unfortunately, Americans knew him primarily as a religious
teacher, for in his lectures he emphasized the devotional aspects of his writings rather than the social and political concerns he worked for in India. 26

Tagore was fascinated by what he saw in the United States, but he thought in terms of East-West contradiction, and thus contributed to the stereotyping of Indian thinking about America. "These Western people have made their money but killed their poetry of life," he said on one occasion. "How to convince them of the utter vanity of their pursuits!" That, he added, was the problem. "They do not have the time to realize that they are not happy." 27

The popular writings of Katherine Mayo reinforced the distorted beliefs Americans had about India. Mayo's Mother India, which was published in 1927 and widely read by Americans, was notable for its one-sided criticism of Indian customs. Mayo had gone to India to write on sanitation and health, and she returned characterizing Indians as inert and helpless and lacking in originality, loyalty, and enthusiasm. Apparently oblivious of India's contributions to world civilization, Mayo wrote that these characteristics were rooted in India's antiquity. Indian men, she wrote in passages that were sure to evoke visceral response in America, were so sexually immoral as to assault their own daughters. 28

Whatever her motives, Mayo's book was a masterpiece of grotesque revelation. In Bengal, she wrote typically, women exposed their babies to mosquitoes because they feel that to protect their babies will offend the gods they worship. Because she had no comprehension of Indian culture, Mayo was fulsome in the praise of the British in

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India. Indians, she wrote, would perish without the benign care of the British.  

Mayo's book was widely and favorably reviewed in the American press. On June 10, 1927, for example, the Chicago Evening Post editorialized, "With the facts in Mother India available, there will henceforth be no excuse for criticism of the administration of the British or even of their presence in India." Similarly, the Boston Independent declared in the same month that "India lacked independence because she is incapable of [it]."  

Some of Mayo's criticisms of India were valid, and her works helped expose some of the ills of Indian life. But she exaggerated or otherwise distorted most of what she had seen, and her book provoked negative responses from almost all Indians. The late 1920's was a time when Indian nationalism was rising noticeably and Indians were demanding a participatory role in the administration of their government. Educated Indians who read Mayo's book found it especially offensive, and their reaction to it intensified the negative images of American life in India. The book's reception was therefore one of the catalysts for India's anti-Americanism before and after 1947. Gandhi himself dismissed the book as "A Drain Inspector's Report".  

Motion pictures reinforced the distorted views Americans had of India. Between 1902 and 1941, about thirty-five films made in the United States had "Indian themes, locales, and characters." In these films, individual Indians "emerged as one of several stock characters: the rebellious primitive tribesmen; the good raja loyal to the British; the evil raja plotting with tribesmen against the British; [or] the Bengali soldiers loyal to the British."
American education gave little attention to India, and when it did it frequently reinforced such stereotyping. Geography text books portrayed India as full of snakes and tigers, while history books treated India mainly in terms of her contact with the West. Thus, Alexander the Great, Vasco da Gama, and Robert Clive became principal characters of Indian history, while Hindu civilization and the Muslim intrusion were ignored.33

American Christian missionaries, who appeared in India as early as 1810, had opportunities to make positive contributions to Indo-American understanding. Unlike their British counterparts, American missionaries did not go to India to buttress empire-building. They aimed instead at religious proselitizing, and their impact was sometimes positive. At a time when the British did little to improve the education and the health of the Indian people, American missionaries established schools and hospitals and otherwise worked to improve the quality of Indian life. These efforts were compromised, however, because most missionaries demonstrated an air of superiority over all Indians, and they were oblivious to both the and significance of India's civilization. They were inclined to explain America's material achievements in terms of her religion, by which terms Indian religions were backward and antithetical to development of any kind.34 If Americans had inaccurate ideas about India, Indians were no better informed about America. They had little opportunity to learn about America before the 20th century, and then what they learned came largely through popular American literature, films, music, and magazines. In literature, the unlikely trio of Walt Whitman, T.S. Eliot, and Mark Twain fascinated Indians and influenced a host of
Indian writers. But it was American films that most influenced Indian audiences. Although these films were viewed mostly by English-speaking audiences, they drew large crowds in India, and had a tremendous impact upon speech, dress, and manners, especially among young Indians. For the most part, the audiences ignored the technical finesse of American cinema and concentrated their attention on such things as sex, violence, and fashion. The idea these films generated among Indians was that Americans were obsessed with making money and with displaying their wealth ostentatiously. Most Indians considered America a young nation without a past, and Americans as crude and without morals or ideals. The one positive image the Indians had was that Americans were democratic.

Despite the absence of any close relations between the two countries, leaders of the Indian independence movement drew much of their inspiration from America’s war for independence. Educated Indians looked to the people and the government of the United States for support in their struggle against Britain. They had reasons to do so. America was the largest democratic country, and during World War I its leaders had proclaimed that they stood for a world safe for democracy and freedom. No other country, the Indians thought, was in a better position than the United States to appreciate India’s demand for independence. Subsequent events proved that the Indians expected much more than the Americans could or would do for them.

In the last two decades of the 19th century, a re-awakening of Indian learning had led to a new national self-consciousness. Indians became aware of their civilization and began to re-think their state of political subordination. Coupled with this was the influence of
Western education for a small elite, which brought with it ideas of nationalism and democracy. Educated Indians began to organize and demand more participation in government. The first of their organizations, the Indian National Congress, was formed in 1885. Soon Muslim elites began to think that their interests would be better served by an organization of their own, and the result was the All India Muslim League, formed in 1906. In the 1910's both organizations began to demand constitutional and administrative reforms giving Indians more participation in government.

This movement had no immediate impact upon Americans or their government. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, believed the white races were infinitely superior to the colored ones, and that it was the duty of the former to civilize the latter. In December 1914, Roosevelt wrote of the benefits he thought had accrued to the Sudan from the French conquest, to Turkistan from the Russian conquest, and to the Lower California from the American take over. A speech made a few years earlier at the end of his presidential term demonstrated how Roosevelt's thinking on racial matters affected his attitude toward India. The speech was meant to express his friendship for Britain, and his defense of British rule in India was more lavish than the British themselves were accustomed to making. "In India we encounter the most colossal example history affords of the successful administration by men of European blood of a thickly populated region in another continent," Roosevelt said. "The successful administration of the Indian Empire by the English has been one of the most notable and most admirable achievements of the white race during the past two centuries.... The mass of the Indian people have been, and are, far
better off than they would now be if the English control was overwhelmed and withdrawn. Indeed, if the English control were now withdrawn from India, the whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violence; all the weaker peoples and the most industrious and law-abiding would be plundered and forced to submit to indescribable wrong and oppression; and the only beneficiary among the natives would be the lawless, the violent and the bloodthirsty. 39

This was the nearest thing to an official American statement on the Indian freedom movement before World War I, for Roosevelt spoke while he was still president. It is therefore testimony to what Indian independence leaders could expect in the way of support from the American government.

During World War I, supporters in America of Indian freedom were persecuted as enemies of an allied power. A group of Indians in California organized the Ghadar Party—the Party of the Revolutionaries. Members of this party planned to cooperate with their India-based counterparts in support of Indian independence. Their activities attracted the attention of the British government, which lodged complaints against them with the United States government. Some leaders of the party, fearing official wrath, fled to Germany, where they continued their anti-British mission. The party in the United States continued to exist, but early in 1917, when America’s relations with Germany began to deteriorate, Washington initiated a campaign against the Ghadars in California. The leaders of the party were arrested and prosecuted. 40 The Wilson administration did not want to antagonize an ally or encourage an organization that appeared to have the active support of Germany.
But Indians continued to have faith in America. This faith was encouraged by Wilson's wartime rhetoric and by passage of the Jones Act in May 1916. This Act enlarged the participation of Filipinos in the Philippine government and began the process that eventuated in independence in 1946. Not long after the Act passed, Wilson spoke of a "Peace Without Victory" to end World War I. No peace could or should last, he said, which does not accept the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. 41

Declarations like these reverberated in distant India. Dalip Singh Saund, who was later to move to the United States and become a United States Congressman, recollected that while he was a student in India in 1919 one of the topics of discussion in his college debating group was: "Would Wilson succeed with his 14 points?" 42 But Wilson did not extend his Fourteen Points to India. Sir Subrahmany Iyer, an Indian judge, wrote to Wilson seeking his support for India's Home Rule or autonomy. The president sent the letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. 43 Meanwhile, his administration continued to persecute activists in Indian freedom movement. Because he wrote a letter to Wilson on behalf of Indian independence, Shailendra Nath Ghosh was imprisoned on a charge of being an agent of a foreign government. Agnes Smedley, one of the organizers of Friends of Freedom for India, was also put in jail. 44

Nor did the American government welcome Indian immigration to the United States. Indians had begun to come to the United States in the 19th century, mostly as students and businessmen. Later, in the 1910's, some 6000 Indian laborers settled on the Pacific coast, where they soon encountered the kinds of discrimination other Asians had
already experienced. The 1917 law prohibiting further labor migration to the United States thus affected prospective Indian immigrants. In 1923, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a case involving Bhagat Singh Thind that Indians like other Asians were ineligible for American citizenship. In 1924, the Johnson Act made permanent the ban on Indian immigration. 45

Meanwhile, the Indian National Congress, in its Madras session in 1927, raised the demand for complete independence from Britain. Later it scaled down this demand to dominion status within the British Empire provided it was granted before 31 December 1929, a deadline that was arbitrarily set. When the deadline passed, the Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership raised an Indian "National Flag," and celebrated 26 January 1930 as India's independence day. None of these actions altered British attitudes, so on April 6, 1930, Mohandas K. Gandhi launched his civil disobedience movement. 46

By the 1930's Americans, disillusioned with the results of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, were in their most isolationist mood. Events in India, therefore, generated little interest in the United States. Even the civil disobedience movement, which created upheaval in India, was largely ignored. Gandhi was aware of this, but declined several invitations to visit the United States to publicize his movement. In a press conference on 16 May 1942, he explained his thinking on this point. "I had no faith that I would be able to do any good to India," he said. "The soul of America is untouched by spiritual teachings because of her worship of 'the golden calf'. As a people [Americans] are, after all is said and done, worshippers of
Gandhi's image of America was hardly more sophisticated than that of other Indians.

By the time Gandhi launched his movement, some Indians, not associated with the moderates in the Indian Congress and the Muslim League, had begun a terrorist campaign against the British. To counter the growing threat, the British decided to make constitutional concessions to the moderates and in 1935 Parliament granted more autonomy to the provinces. Elections held pursuant to this grant in 1937 returned Congress party majorities in seven of the eleven provinces, and the resulting ministries were working quite well when World War II began. With the outbreak of war, the Viceroy, without consulting Indian opinion, declared India to be at war. The largest political party in the country, the National Congress, rejected the Viceroy's declaration and insisted that it would join the war effort only after its demand for independence was honored. Without a pledge of independence, the war would be a contest between imperialists, the Congress leaders argued, and if the British won, the Indians would have fought on behalf of their own continued subjugation.

A period of political deadlock followed. Indian leaders were aware of the dangers of an Axis victory, and wanted to join the British war effort. But how, they asked, could they assist the cause of liberty abroad without obtaining independence at home? They were frustrated at India's inability to control her own destiny. They therefore urged the British government to state its war aims and whether those aims included Indian independence and the end of British imperialism everywhere.

Political rivalries within India complicated this situation. The
Congress party claimed to represent the whole country, a claim based on the results of the 1937 elections. But there were large sections of the population, specially the Muslims and the Hindu scheduled castes, who felt that their interests would not be safe under a government based on majority rule alone. They therefore insisted that their demands be incorporated in any future constitution despite objection to them by the majority. Since all of these groups counted in Indian politics, no settlement that ignored their concerns could be expected to work.

In the face of increasing tensions, the British affirmed on 17 October 1939, that they would grant dominion status to India after the war but would do so with due regard for the country's various minorities. The Congress, not surprisingly, rejected the idea that the British should separately negotiate with the minorities. On the other hand, the Muslim League, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, made its support of the war effort contingent upon a guarantee that no constitution would be implemented without its approval. Both the Congress and the League therefore regarded the British offer as inadequate, and in protest the Congress party ministries resigned in late 1939.52

As the German army won sweeping victories in eastern Europe in the fall of 1939, the Congress party offered to cooperate with the British war effort once a Provisional National Government controlled by Indians was established in New Delhi. The Viceroy rejected this condition, and countered on 8 August 1940 with a set of proposals which largely restated his previous offer of dominion status after the war. The Congress Party termed these proposals unsatisfactory, and in
October Gandhi launched another civil disobedience movement. 53

At this point, the American government became concerned over the developing impasse, though the concern grew out of the implications of the impasse for the war effort, not the dynamics of Indian politics. Simply put, American interests in the matter were very different from those of Indian nationalists. The nationalists insisted that only an independent India would or could effectively join the Allied war effort. American leaders regarded British rule in India as legitimate and any effort to disturb that authority as hampering the war effort. American policy was to win the war first and then to address the colonial issue. These differences precluded the development of close Indo-American relations.

Robert I. Crane was the desk officer for South Asia in the State Department's Division of Cultural Affairs for most of the time between 1941 and 1945. In a recent article, Crane recollected that the official United States policy toward India at that time rested on the view that the British-backed government was the legitimate government of India and therefore an ally against the Nazis and the Japanese. The British maintained law and order in India, and provided the United States with a secure base for assistance to the Kuomintang government of China. The Roosevelt administration would thus do nothing to undermine the British presence in India, a fact that precluded support for Indian nationalists. Crane disagreed with this policy, he said, and argued instead that India would do much more to support the war effort if the legitimate demands of Indian nationalists were heeded. 54

The future of India now awaited the outcome of the war. By the end of 1940, India was a major base for the English effort to hold
onto its colonies in South and Southeast Asia, and the United States was providing lend-lease aid for this effort. The situation called for active, official contacts between the United States and India, which developed as a result of British initiatives. On 17 April 1941, the British government informed the State Department that London proposed to attach to the British Embassy in Washington an Indian official with the rank of Minister. This official would be designated the Agent General for India, and his function would be to advise the Embassy on Indian affairs. Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed to the proposal, and suggested that the chief American diplomat in New Delhi be designated the Commissioner or Diplomatic Agent of the United States in India. "When India is assuming a position of increasing importance as a source of materials essential to the implementation of coordinated programs of the Government of the United States for national defense and the extension of aid to the British Empire," Hull wrote, "it is considered a matter of regret that delays [in implementing the British proposal] should occur."56

American policymakers had little knowledge of what was going on in India, nor were they aware of the complexities and nuances of Indian politics. This limited their willingness to take policy initiatives concerning India. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles told Hull in November 1941 that no one in the United States government was sufficiently familiar with Indian affairs to advise Washington on a proper course of action.57

Opinion in the State Department was therefore divided. As a compromise, officials urged the British to meet the chief demands of Indian nationalists in order to win their support for the war effort.
Beginning in 1941, therefore, State Department officials pressed the British to find solutions to the Indian situation. The effort, however, reflected American self-interest, not commitment to Indian independence. A memorandum written on May 5, by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., highlighted India's war potential in terms of manpower, strategic materials, and other resources. Berle suggested that these assets could be utilized only if India was made a full, active partner in the Allied war effort. He also suggested that Britain give independence to India, and that the United States then establish full diplomatic relations with the nation. 58

On 7 May 1941, Hull asked the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, whether liberalization of British rule in India was possible. He received a straightforwardly negative reply. 59 Welles was probably aware of this exchange, for in his response to Berle's memorandum he observed that it would be undesirable to do anything to "upset the Indian apple cart at that time". 60

In July, the governments of the United States and Britain agreed on the exchange of diplomatic representatives between India and the United States. The American representative in New Delhi would bear the title Commissioner, and the Indian representative in Washington would be designated Agent General. 61 On 24 July 1941, Thomas M. Wilson, a foreign service officer who was then the American consul at Calcutta was appointed Commissioner to India with the rank of Minister, and Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, an Indian civil service officer, was named India's Agent General in Washington. This establishment of diplomatic relations with a nation that was still a colony was a unique arrangement and one dictated by the exigencies of war.
The next month President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, where they promulgated the Atlantic Charter, a general statement of Anglo-American war aims. Despite its vagueness, the Charter raised the hopes of colonial peoples around the world. Among other things, the Charter acknowledged "the right of all peoples to choose [their] form of Government" and the desire of the allied powers "to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to [all] those who have been forcefully deprived of them." But the Charter had no immediate impact on India, for in private Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that its key provisions would not apply to Asia and Africa. As Churchill told Parliament on September 9, 1941, the provisions quoted above were directed only at countries and peoples under Nazi domination. Self-government in India or elsewhere in the empires of the European powers had not yet been addressed by the Western allies.

Roosevelt's acquiescence to the British position on India was in sharp contrast to his negative response toward the future of the French in Indochina. The collapse of the French there in 1940 and their subsequent submission to the Japanese convinced Roosevelt that France was no longer a major power. Moreover, he believed that in the century of their rule in Indochina, the French had done nothing to improve the conditions of the Indochinese people. He therefore toyed with an idea of a postwar trusteeship to govern Indochina and prepare its people for independence within 20 or 30 years. On the other hand, Roosevelt believed the British had done a good job in India, and should remain there at least for the duration of the war. After the war, the British would gradually grant independence to India,
Roosevelt hoped, but that would be a subject dealt with by the British alone. Except for a few instances in letters, all of them written in 1942, Roosevelt was reluctant to raise the subject of postwar India with Churchill, who was ever ready to defend the British empire with unflagging zeal.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 brought the United States into the war. Thereafter, events moved rapidly in East and Southeast Asia. Japan overran Malaya and Thailand, and advanced into Burma. In January 1942, the Congress party agreed to support the war effort if the British took steps toward establishing self-government in India. In February Chiang Kai-shek visited New Delhi, apparently to enlist Indian support for the war effort. He also asked his Ambassador in Washington, T.V. Soong, to urge Roosevelt to persuade the British to find a solution to the Indian political deadlock. Soong met the President on February 25, 1942, and delivered Chiang's letter. If the British government did not "fundamentally change its policy toward India," Chiang told Roosevelt, "it would be like presenting India to the enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy India."

On the same day Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told Welles that virtually all members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations urged Washington to encourage Britain to settle with Gandhi. The senators believed, Long wrote, that "the only way to get the people of India to fight was to get them to fight for India." Welles must have reported this to Roosevelt, for immediately the President cabled the American Ambassador to Britain, John G. Winant, asking him or W. Averell Harriman, then in London, to ask Churchill
about possible changes in Britain's relations with India. 70

Harriman met with Churchill, who told him he was against any further change in India's status. Churchill explained to Harriman that there were 100 million Muslims in India, who supplied 75% of the soldiers of the Indian army. In addition, only half the non-Muslim soldiers—12.5% of the entire army—were sympathetic to the Congress party's cause. So, the Prime Minister concluded, any step toward independence would cause as many problems as it would solve. 71

Shrewd politician that he was, Churchill knew the pulse of the president. He well understood that Roosevelt's top priority was the war effort. What is more, taking advantage of Roosevelt's ignorance of India, he, no doubt deliberately, misrepresented the facts. He led Harriman to understand that Muslims were the mainstay of India's war effort. In fact that was not the case at all. The British had taken power in India from Muslims whom they considered disgruntled and therefore potentially vindictive, and consequently they purposely excluded Muslims from the administration and the army. Under these circumstances, Muslims could have comprised only a small fraction of the army, certainly not the percentage that Churchill claimed. Moreover, the Muslim League was also demanding independence, and in any case the war effort did not depend on the army alone. It also depended on the nationalists, both Hindus and Muslims, who alone could rally the Indian people around the war effort.

Roosevelt was not convinced anyway. In the face of the British failure to secure support for their war effort from the peoples of Malaya and Burma, and in view of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's disquiet over the emerging situation, the president could
not remain inactive. On March 8, 1942, Rangoon fell to the Japanese, who inflicted damaging blows on the British navy in the Bay of Bengal. India was now a war zone itself, and its support for the allied war effort was therefore imperative.

Two days after Rangoon fell, the president wrote a lengthy letter to Churchill giving his view of the Indian problem and its possible solution. Roosevelt drew an analogy between America's early attempts at establishing independence and India's present situation. During the early years of the American Revolution, he reminded Churchill, the thirteen colonies set themselves up as separate sovereignties with a temporary central government under the Continental Congress. During the war they ratified the Articles of Confederation, which continued as the basis for their government until a more solid union was achieved under the Constitution in 1789. Roosevelt suggested a somewhat similar process for India: establishing a temporary central government representing different castes, occupations, religions, and regions, while continuing the existing provincial governments and the Council of Princes. The new central government would be charged among other things with creating a permanent government for the whole country. "This might cause Indians to forget hard feelings, become more loyal to Britain and stress the danger of Japanese domination," Roosevelt urged. "For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making."72

The president's letter illustrates how little he knew about India. The two dominant communities there, the Hindus and the Muslims,
had taken positions on matters relating to the future of India that were irreconcilable. The Congress party wanted to retain India's unity under a Western-type parliamentary democracy. The Muslim League, on the other hand, was convinced that partitioning the country into separate Muslim and Hindu states was the only way to safeguard the Muslim minority. Given these differences, it was unthinkable that representatives of the two communities would work together in the same government.

There is no record that Churchill replied to Roosevelt's cable. As Robert E. Sherwood has observed, the only part of the cable Churchill agreed with was Roosevelt's admission that it is none of his business. The military situation nevertheless called for action by the British. Apparently independent of Roosevelt's proddings, Churchill on 11 March announced plans to send a member of his cabinet, Sir Stafford Cripps, to India to negotiate with the nationalist leaders. Plans for this had been in the works for some time, but it is possible that Roosevelt's letter served as a catalyst for implementing them at this time. In any case, Indian nationalists were quick to give Roosevelt credit for the British move, and he was only too glad to take it.

At this time Washington also sent an advisory mission to India headed by Colonel Louis Johnson, formerly Assistant Secretary of War. The dispatch of the Johnson mission shortly after the arrival of Cripps and Johnson's subsequent role in the negotiations between Cripps and Congress party leaders seemed to suggest that the two missions were coordinated. In reality, they were not. An advisory mission had been talked about at the State Department for some time.
and when the Johnson mission was dispatched the part of India contiguous to Burma had become an active war zone, American troops had arrived in India, and the United States was giving lend-lease support to the British in India. This increased involvement warranted a stronger American presence to oversee the war effort in the subcontinent, as both the British and the Americans realized. 77

However, Johnson brought with him a letter from Roosevelt to Congress party president Maulana Abul Kalam Azad urging him to accept Cripps' proposals and join the war effort. Hence, Johnson's mission did have a political as well as a military purpose. Winning the war was Roosevelt's top priority. Indian independence could wait for the time being.

The Cripps mission arrived in India on March 22 and immediately opened talks with government and political leaders. The essence of Cripps' proposals was to entrust Indians with self-government at once in preparation for independence after the war. At the conclusion of the war, Cripps proposed, a new constitution would be drafted by a legislature representing British India and the princely states, and any province could secede from the resulting national union. During the war, the British would retain control of Indian defense. 79 Not surprisingly, Congress leaders, mindful of their present role in India's defense and the war effort and concerned about the nation's geographical integrity in the future, rejected the secession and defense proposals. The Muslim League also did likewise. But at Cripps' request the rejections were not made public, and Cripps sought to develop new proposals for resolving the impasse.

It was at this point that Johnson arrived as Roosevelt's special
representative with the rank of minister plenipotentiary. He at once became involved in the political negotiations at the request of both Cripps and Nehru. He indicated in a dispatch to Washington that Cripps had indirectly asked Roosevelt to intercede with Churchill to get the original proposals modified. "Unless the President feels that he can intercede with Churchill, it would seem that Cripps' efforts are doomed to failure," Johnson added, "Such failure will adversely affect [the] war effort." Welles, then Acting Secretary of State, discussed the dispatch with the President. The next day he informed Johnson that Roosevelt was unwilling to intervene because that would further complicate the Indian political situation. Welles asked Johnson to "continue to telegraph fully all developments."

Johnson continued to work toward a new formula that would be acceptable to all parties. On April 9 he and Cripps proposed that an Indian head the defense ministry and oversee India's participation in the war. Congress party leaders were willing to discuss this proposal and despite his own reservations, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow forwarded the proposal to Churchill. The prime minister rejected it, and told Harry Hopkins that the British Cabinet would likely reject the Cripps-Johnson plan. If that occurred, he added, Roosevelt "would be in the embarrassing position of having ostensibly made a proposal which the British Government rejected." He was obviously signalling Washington that Johnson should stick to military matters.

Churchill's rejection of the new formula put an end to the negotiations. A disappointed Johnson wrote the President, "London wanted a Congress refusal. Why? Does England prefer to lose India to enemy retaining claim of title at peace table rather than lose it by
giving freedom now?" He continued, "the hour has arrived when we
[Americans] should consider a repploting of our policy in this part of
the world." Roosevelt would not go that far, but he did write
another letter to Churchill urging him to postpone Cripps' departure
from India and to find a solution to the Indian problem in line with
his letter of March 10. Churchill replied that he considered
discussion on India's political situation closed for the time being,
but added that he would not like to see a major difference on the
subject between himself and Roosevelt. Anxious not to hamper British
war efforts, the President decided not to annoy Churchill further. He
did not raise the issue again.

After the failure of Cripps' mission, Nehru wrote to Roosevelt
directly to seek his support for India's cause. The Indian leader
assured the president that he understood the need to organize popular
resistance to the Japanese aggressor, but the only way to do that was
to give the Indians independence and then ask them to defend it. If
full independence was not possible right now, Nehru suggested, let the
Indians have national self-government with control of the war
effort. Mindful of the military situation in India and of
Churchill's exposition of the multipolarity of India's politics,
Roosevelt replied only that the Indians should make every possible
effort to resist Japanese aggression.

Gandhi also wrote to Roosevelt trying to enlist his sympathy. He
proposed that India be granted independence at once, following which
the government would obligate itself by a formal treaty with the
United States and Britain to cooperate fully in the Allied war
effort. Roosevelt's response was unambiguous. The United States
hoped for harmonious relations with all nations, he told Gandhi. But now that war had been initiated by the Axis Powers, "who wish to destroy any hope of freedom", winning the war must take precedence over political matters. The President hoped therefore that "our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy." 92

This correspondence between Roosevelt and the Indian leaders reveals the fundamental differences that separated them. Nehru and Gandhi placed Indian independence ahead of the threat of Japanese aggression, while Roosevelt reversed these priorities. But Roosevelt's stance might still be changed. William Phillips, who succeeded Johnson as Roosevelt's personal representative in India on January 8, 1943, was more vocal than any other American official at the time in his support for a change in India's political status that would be satisfactory to Indians. In a letter to the President on 14 May 1943, he pointed out that because the United States had to bear most of the cost of the defense of India, the British should not insist that India was none of America's business. Indians, he told Roosevelt, "feel they have nothing to fight for as they are convinced that the professed war aims of the United Nations do not apply to them. The British Prime Minister, in fact, has stated that provisions of the Atlantic Charter are not applicable to India, and it is not unnatural therefore that the Indian leaders are beginning to wonder whether the Charter is only for the benefit of the white races." Observing that the present Indian Army was purely a mercenary force, Phillips added to his own concerns those of General Joseph W. Stilwell, who commanded America's Forces in India, about this situation and "in particular in regard to the poor
morale of the Indian officers." The British, he suggested must make some declaration that would satisfy Indian leaders. 93

There is no record of Roosevelt's reaction to this letter. But its contents were leaked to the press, and the Washington Post published its contents on July 25, 1944. Washington immediately informed London that the publication of the letter was unauthorized and was made without the prior knowledge of the State Department. 94 Phillips, who had returned to the United States on May 13, 1943, did not return to India. George Merrell, the Officer in Charge in New Delhi, was appointed Commissioner on 28 February 1945 with the rank of minister. 95

Roosevelt took no further steps to settle the Indian question. Instead, he left India in the hands of the British. American officials in India, however, did sometimes raise the issue with British officials there. P.J. Patrick, the British undersecretary of state for India, once told Ambassador Winant that those responsible for policy making in India had frequently been "admonished" by their American friends regarding the necessity for "doing something" to settle the issue. Patrick did not name these American officials nor spell out how they proposed to resolve the problem. 96

The Labor Party, which came to power in England in 1945, was determined to break the political deadlock in India. The new British government announced that elections would be held for the Indian Legislative Councils, both central and provincial, the Viceroy's Executive Council would be reconstituted, and a constitution-making body would be assembled as soon as possible. The elections were held in early 1946, and resulted in overwhelming victories for the Congress.
party among Hindu voters and the Muslim League for those seats reserved for Muslims.

On February 19, 1946, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that he would soon dispatch a Cabinet mission to India "to promote, in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion, the early realization of full self-government in India." On 15 March he said complete independence was an option if the Indians so chose. The Cabinet mission arrived in New Delhi in March and immediately began negotiations with Indian leaders. It recommended a federal system of government and that individual states be given the choice of opting out of the Indian union. The Congress party rejected these proposals, but joined the interim government. Thereafter events moved swiftly. Internal dissention between Hindus and Muslims produced tension and then violence, and law and order broke down in large areas of the country. This hastened the British desire to leave India to the Indians as quickly as possible. On 20 February 1947, the British announced they would quit India by June 1948, and appointed Lord Mountbatten Viceroy for the specific purpose of arranging the transfer of power to the Indians.  

Even at this stage American support for Indian independence was lukewarm. Harry S. Truman, who succeeded to the presidency upon Roosevelt's death in April 1945, continued his predecessor's policy toward India. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who became Deputy Prime Minister of India after independence, once complained to Merrell in New Delhi that the United States had allowed the British to dictate its policy toward India. This impression was widespread among Indians, though it is by no means the full truth. In order to uphold
its military interests during the war, the American government had found it easier to allow the British a free hand in India's domestic situation. That policy was not disturbed after the war.

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson articulated American policy toward India in a press release on December 3, 1946. The United States was sympathetic to India's "progressive realization" of independence, he said, and hoped the transition from colonial to self-rule would be peaceful and constitutional. Clearly, he foresaw no division of India into separate Hindu and Muslim states. But in 1947, when it was clear that the Muslim League would accept nothing short of an independent Pakistan and that the British would be obliged to concur, Washington raised no objection. However, it did express hope that there would be no further Balkanization of the subcontinent.

The India Independence Bill passed the British Parliament in July 1947 and fixed August 15, 1947 as the date for the transfer of power. On August 14, Pakistan proclaimed its independence, and that midnight the Constituent Assembly did likewise for India.

The long and tortuous history of India's fight for independence shows that although Indians expected encouragement and active support from Americans, they did not receive it. Although some mid-level and junior officials at the State Department at times spoke favorably of independence, the government itself was always prepared to acquiesce in British wishes. This was especially apparent during the war. Hence, when India became independent, Indians had no reason to feel kindly toward the United States, which was just then assuming the strategic burdens of the Cold War. Relative ignorance about each other and the
lack of an identity of interests precluded close cooperation between the two countries in foreign affairs for the immediate future.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER I


2. Quoted in ibid., p. 23.


4. Ibid., pp. 19-21.


9. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

10. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

11. Kamath, The United States and India, pp. 73-75.

12. Ibid., p. 78.

13. Ibid., p. 82.


31. Ibid., p. 141.
33. Ibid., p. 4.
38. Raymond A. Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries*


40. Kamath, The United States and India, p. 106.


51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Majumdar, Dutt and Roychoudhuri, An Advanced History of India, pp. 989-990.


56. The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax), May 28, 1941, ibid., p. 171.

57. Welles to the Secretary of State, November 15, 1941, ibid. pp. 186-187.

58. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), May 5, 1941, for the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State Welles, ibid., p. 176-178.

59. Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with the British Ambassador (Halifax) May 7 1941, ibid., p. 178.

60. n. 58.


64. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, November 4, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941:III:181-182.


69. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Breckenridge Long) to the Undersecretary of State (Welles), February 25, 1942, ibid., pp. 606-607.

70. The Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), February 25, 1942, ibid., p. 604.

71. The Charge in the United Kingdom (Mathews) to the Secretary of State, "Personal for the President from Harriman," February 26, 1942, ibid., p. 608.

72. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill), March 10, 1942, ibid., pp. 615-616.


76. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State, December 20 1941, *FRUS*, 1941:III: 593-595.
77. The Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to the Commissioner at New Delhi, March 11, 1942, FRUS, 1942:1: 617-618.


79. Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 122.

80. n. 83.

81. The Personal representative of the President in India (Louis A. Johnson) to the President, "For the President and Acting Secretary," April 4, 1942, FRUS, 1942:1: 626-627.

82. The Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to the Officer-in-Charge at New Delhi (Merrell), personal for Johnson, April 5, ibid., pp. 627-628.

83. The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, April 9, 1942, ibid., p. 630.


85. The Charge in the United Kingdom (Mathews) to the Secretary of State, personal for the President from Hopkins, April 9, 1942, FRUS, 1942:1: 629-630.

86. The Personal representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, for the President and Acting Secretary, April 11, 1942, FRUS, 1942:1: 631-632.

87. The Acting Secretary to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), 'for Harry Hopkins from the President, with instruction to give it to Churchill', April 11, 1942, ibid., p. 633.

88. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to the President (Roosevelt), April 12, 1942, ibid., pp. 634-635.

89. The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to
the Acting Secretary of State, April 13, 1942, for the President and
the Acting Secretary of State, with enclosed Nehru to the President
FRUS, 1942:1: 635-637.

90. The Acting Secretary of state to the Personal representative of the
President in India (Johnson), with instruction to communicate the
message to Jawaharlal Nehru, April 15, ibid., p. 637.

91. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi to President Roosevelt, July, 1942, by
hand of Louis Fischer, ibid., pp. 677-678.

92. The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi
(Merrell), with enclosed "President Roosevelt to Mr. Mohandas

93. Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative to India, to the
President, May 14, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV, "Near East and Africa",

94. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant), July 25, FRUS, 1944, vol. V, "The Near East, South Asia,
Africa, The Far East," (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 239; Memorandum of
conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State Berle, with Sir
Ronald Campbell, July 27, 1944, ibid., p.239,. Robert Crane in Asian
Affairs, p. 191, calms that the letter "had come routinely across
[his] desk in the Division of Cultural Relations. Impressed and
pleased by its contents, [he] subsequently showed it to two of [his]
close Indian friends in Washington. Though [he] was not aware of it
then, one of them copied the [letter] verbatim and later gave it to
Drew Pearson, who published it."

95. FRUS, 1944, V:247, note.

96. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of
State, July 14, FRUS, 1945, vol. VI, "The British Commonwealth, the

97. Majumdar, Dutt and Roychoudhuri, An Advanced History of India, pp.
992-924.

98. The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State, December 11,
1946, FRUS, 1946, vol. V, "The British Commonwealth Western and

99. Press Release by the Acting secretary of State, December 3 The

100. The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Madras, July 16, FRUS,
1947, III "The British Commonwealth, Europe," (Washington, D.C.,

101. Majumdar, Dutt and Roychoudhuri, An Advanced History of India, p.
995.
The first American Ambassador to India, Dr. Henry F. Grady, presented his credentials to Governor General Lord Mountbatten in July 1947 on the eve of Indian independence. The two countries had never had a systematic relationship, but the juxtaposition of Indian independence and America's emergence as the strongest and wealthiest nation after World War II at once increased the significance of each country for the other. As the Cold War unfolded, America pursued an increasingly active role in all parts of the world, while India's preoccupation with domestic problems precluded a dynamic foreign policy. Indeed, it encouraged the neutralism that became the hallmark of Indian policy. At the same time, India desperately needed economic assistance which only the United States could provide. Unwilling to extend the assistance New Delhi required, Washington insisted that India open its economy and encourage American private investors. But eager to exercise central supervision of its economy, India hesitated. These diverse factors and different interests formed the background in which the two nations fashioned policies toward one another.

Those policies emerged only slowly. American policy makers were preoccupied with rebuilding Western Europe and Japan, while Indian leaders busied themselves with the myriad problems that accompanied the transition from colonialism to independence. Americans were unaware of India's manpower and mineral resources, and still regarded India as within the British sphere of influence. India's long
association with Britain and the Indian leaders' faith in Western-style democracy, Washington believed, were sufficient safeguards against Soviet influence in the sub-continent. In addition, Washington believed that Moscow had no immediate designs in India, a conviction validated by subsequent developments. Therefore, as India remained "safe" in Nehru's hands, it called for little attention from American policymakers in 1947-48, and no close or even clear relationship between the two nations emerged. In fact, during this transition period, the United States resisted Indian overtures for a closer relationship and made conscious efforts to resist involvement with India.

To understand this period of Indo-American relations, it is necessary to understand the international context in which it occurred. World War II transformed the political, economic, and strategic situation in the world. The major powers of the pre-war era—Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy—were a spent force. The United States was now the most powerful country, and the Soviet Union its only rival for international hegemony.

With troops in Asia and Europe, the world's largest navy and air force, a monopoly of the atomic bomb, and a strong economy, the United States came to play a larger international role than ever before. In contrast to the retreat after World War I, American leaders were determined to reshape the world according to their prescriptions. Economic and political as well as strategic considerations guided them in this endeavor. Poverty and economic degradation encouraged totalitarianism and revolution, they believed, and these problems had to be addressed. To them, free trade was the way to ensure peace and
prosperity and to advance American interests. Access to markets and resources was, therefore, essential to the nation's economic strength, just as a global military watch was to its security. Because atomic weapons put an end to traditional defensive barriers, the Americans believed it necessary to secure outlying bases.2

Soviet foreign policy was also guided by ideology, security, and economic interest. Marxist ideology taught the Soviets that capitalism was expansionist in nature, conducive to wars among capitalist countries, and contained the seeds of its own destruction. There could, it followed, be no co-existence between socialism and capitalism.3

The Soviet Union suffered terrible economic and manpower losses during World War II. After that war, the Soviets tried to make up for those losses by imposing unilateral reparations on the East European countries their armies had occupied. In addition, two invasions from the West in recent history convinced the Soviets of the need to establish a security ring on their western border. Thus, they not only annexed the Baltic states but also built a sphere of influence and control over East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The American goal of free trade clashed with this Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe.

Two international events crystallized the emerging distrust between Soviets and Americans. These involved Turkey and Greece. The United States viewed Soviet attempts in 1946 to control the Dardanelle Straits in Turkey with suspicion; and communist participation in the insurgency in Greece led to American assistance to contain the potential threat there in 1947.

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After the war, the United States extended rehabilitation loans to Western Europe of $9 billion. When this proved to be insufficient, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced a more coordinated plan for economic assistance to the countries of Western Europe on June 5, 1947. This was the European Recovery Program, popularly known as the Marshall Plan. 4

Postwar Southeast Asia was in turmoil, too. There, the old colonial regimes were incapable of handling nationalist resistance to their continued presence. France and the Netherlands reestablished control over Indochina and Indonesia respectively, but it was obvious they would soon have to relinquish that control, voluntarily or as the result of force. Likewise in China, the Communist Party was gaining control over the country, and the Kuomintang regime was showing signs of defeatism.

It was against this international backdrop that Britain acceded to the demands of nationalists in South Asia, and in August 1947 granted independence to India and Pakistan. In addition, constitutional reforms instituted in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in October 1947 led, four months later, to independence there. Although the transition to self-rule on the sub-continent appeared to be peaceful, major problems surfaced immediately. Both India and Pakistan suffered from numerous domestic problems as well as the strains in their bi-lateral relations. Both lacked indigenous bureaucracies experienced in self-government, and the relocation of millions of human beings across their respective borders created problems that defied immediate solution. But leaders in both countries commanded popular support, and there was no immediate threat to the government or social order in
either nation. Compared to Europe, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia, the international situation in South Asia looked relatively stable.

It is therefore not surprising that President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Marshall attached little importance to India and Pakistan in 1947. Preoccupied primarily with Europe, these men had little time for other areas of the world including India, a country they knew little about. This meant that area specialists, chiefly the American ambassadors to India and Pakistan, were left to formulate American policy toward the region. In New Delhi, Ambassador Grady's overriding objective was to orient India's policies toward the West through economic assistance. His dispatches to the State Department, however, received little consideration at high levels, a response that the Indian Government did little to change.

Grady was not new to India. In 1942, he headed an American technical mission that prepared a master plan for harnessing India's industries to war production. Although his plan was never implemented, Grady acquired a vast knowledge of India's economy and its usefulness to the West. Thus, when he presented his credentials to Governor General Mountbatten in 1947, no other American seemed more qualified for the job. And yet, he adopted a patronizing attitude toward India, lectured extensively on the benefits of capitalism, showed no understanding of the circumstances that led India to favor central planning, and always held that only American loans or investments could keep New Delhi in the Western orbit.

India, nevertheless, was to have a foreign policy of its own. Long before independence, the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru began to formulate a foreign policy that, although still vague and sketchy as
late as 1947, ran counter to America's global thinking. Nehru held that India had neither the resources nor the interests to get involved in world-power politics. He indicated that India should stay out of all power blocs, whether American or Soviet. In his first broadcast to the nation as Foreign Minister in the Interim Government set up by Britain in September 1946 to oversee the transition to independence, Nehru declared, "We [Indians] propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale." India, he added, would evaluate international events in light of its national interests, and make no prior commitment of support or opposition to any nation or group of nations. It would work with every country including Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, in maintaining world peace and stability. ⑥

Indian foreign policy was thus to be independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Like the superpowers, India would follow its own priorities. While both the United States and the Soviet Union attached top priority to reshaping the world according to their perceived strategic interests, India's imperatives were, in Nehru's words, the "elimination of colonial countries and peoples" and the "recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races." India had lived a long time under colonial rule, and nothing seemed dearer to its people than freedom and equal opportunity. ⑦

These goals would, however, be modestly and peacefully pursued. General utterances like "developing friendly relations with all the countries of the world" dominated Nehru's speeches at this time. ⑧ The
United Nations had sufficient mechanisms to handle threats to international peace, Nehru declared, and international cooperation could better be achieved under the auspices of the United Nations than through the old ways of power politics. Joining either of the power blocs would infringe upon Indian sovereignty, something an independent India would never tolerate.

Indian foreign policy was entirely Nehru's making. His colleagues in the cabinet lacked interest in foreign affairs and the officials in the Ministry of External Affairs who had loyally assisted Britain in perpetuating its colonial rule in India now depended mostly upon Nehru's goodwill for their careers. They would therefore hardly argue with the Prime Minister. Nehru was free to formulate India's foreign policy. His attitude toward the United States, which had been shaped over the years therefore demands discussion. Nehru had no first hand knowledge of America until he visited the country in 1949. His acquaintances and readings therefore conditioned his opinion. His association with such Americans as Roger Baldwin, founder of the American Civil Liberties Union—the two men met at Brussels in 1927 session of "Congress against Imperialism"—and his reading of radical American literature had convinced him in the 1920's that "the great problem of the near future will be American imperialism, even more than British imperialism." President Roosevelt's sympathy for the Indian nationalist movement during World War II modified that skepticism a little and Nehru held that Asian and African nationalists rightly looked up to the United States for support in their struggle for self-government because "America is free from the burden of an imperialist past." But because these expectations were not matched
by performance, Nehru suspected American initiatives on anti-colonialism. American reluctance to support Indonesian independence annoyed him further. When Washington insisted that lend-lease equipments used by the Dutch against the Indonesians must have the American labels removed, Nehru sarcastically remarked, "That is poor consolation, indeed, for the Indonesians. They will be shot down by guns whether the guns bear this or that label." His suspicion of American motives continued in 1944 when he wrote from a British jail that "the economy of the [United States of America] after the [World War II] will be powerfully expansionist and almost explosive," and wondered whether it would "lead to some kind of imperialism." 

Nehru had no contact with American officials who could explain American priorities to him from American perspectives. Therefore his suspicions of American motives continued when he joined the government in the fall of 1946, and they precluded close cooperation with the United States. On the other hand, his faith in democracy precluded alignment with the Soviet Union, despite his approval of what he considered the positive Soviet role in the United Nations concerning colonialism.

Overwhelming internal problems also precluded an active role in foreign policy by New Delhi. In addition to building political and bureaucratic infrastructures, the government of India was confronted with millions of refugees who had to be assimilated. This influx, coupled with religious violence that lay behind it, led to a widespread breakdown of law and order. The economy of the country, too, was in shambles, and many Indians faced the prospect of famine.
The immediate concerns of the government were thus to restore law and order, assimilate the refugees, and revitalize the economy, even while writing a national constitution. Since the nation lacked the resources even to contain its problems, foreign aid was indispensable. Foreign policy, therefore, meant looking for assistance from any country on reasonable terms. This further encouraged the policy of non-alignment.

While Indian leaders realized the need for foreign assistance, their foreign as well as domestic policies discouraged American aid. These policies were formulated by the National Congress Party before it came to power in 1946. Arguing that British control of the economy was the cause of the nation's economic retardation, the Party's Planning Committee under Nehru's chairmanship advocated central economic planning as the best means of achieving maximum benefit in minimum time. Since private investors, the Committee believed, were not always concerned with public welfare, their participation in the economy should be limited. After Nehru and his Congress Party formed a government, the national Planning Board reiterated these principles.

But once the effects of the principles became clear, the commitment to them weakened. As a result of the dislocations caused by partition, India suffered a major decline in industrial production, and investment funds were needed immediately to reverse the trend. Since domestic capital was lacking, responsible elements in and out of government began advocating policies that would attract foreign capital. It was here that Ambassador Grady played a pivotal role. Underscoring the importance of foreign collaboration in India's economic development, he set himself the task of convincing Indian
officials to reduce their commitment to centralized planning and public ownership and to align India's economy with that of the capitalist West. In April 1947, he called for liberalizing India's economy and the removal of all obstacles to foreign investment. Preoccupied with the transition to self-rule, the government could not immediately address this issue.

Although Nehru kept his options open, he recognized that World War II had left the economies of all countries except the United States in disarray. He likewise realized that only the United States had sufficient resources, both public and private, to help India meaningfully. But India had no comprehensive economic plan at this time, so the Prime Minister had no specific projects in mind when he met with Grady to discuss his economic problems in June 1947. In this meeting, Nehru stressed the need for American aid and told Grady his government would soon come up with a list of projects for which American assistance would be necessary and helpful. As this conversation was exploratory from Nehru's side and as Grady was aware of the Congress Party's socialistic bent, Grady showed little enthusiasm either for Nehru or for his superiors in the State Department. He reported his conversation to the Department without any comments of his own.

Nehru kept trying to convince Grady that India was prepared to use American aid wisely. In his next meeting with Grady on July 7, Nehru emphasized India's need for close economic relations with the United States. His plans for India's economic development were still vague; yet he gave Grady a broad outline of them. He dropped his earlier emphasis on central planning, and told Grady that he preferred
the British Labor Party model of a mixed economy in which the private and the public sectors complemented each other in the development process. Lest his support for a mixed economy give the impression that he had in mind anything like the Soviet five-year plans, the Prime Minister categorically expressed his disapproval of Soviet totalitarian methods of planning and development. At the same time he expressed his apprehensions in detail. Although Nehru was still uncertain about his ultimate economic policy he made it clear to Grady that "[the] US was the only country from which [the] quantities [of capital goods] needed could be obtained." Aware of America's commitment to capitalism and private enterprise, he also tried to assure the ambassador that a large proportion of business and industrial activity in India would remain in private hands.

Grady was not convinced. Aware of the Congress Party's economic manifesto, he concluded that Nehru still preferred socialist planning for India. He was therefore disappointed that the Indian leader's economic plans appeared to discourage the growth of a market economy. But liberalizing India's economy was only one of Grady's objectives. The other, to reiterate, was to reorient India's foreign policy toward the West, and regarding the latter Grady found room for optimism in his talk with Nehru. He was encouraged by Nehru's frankness and expression of friendliness toward the United States and his antipathy toward the Soviet Union. "[Nehru's] references to [the] USSR," he told the State Department, "seemed [to] indicate a wary attitude - no whole-hearted admiration. Remarks [regarding the] US seemed genuinely friendly."\(^7\)

But the perceived dilemma that lay behind Nehru's hesitation
remained. While Nehru recognized the need for foreign assistance, he was at the same time apprehensive of the consequences of such assistance. Aware of the history of how a private enterprise, the British East India Company, had gradually assumed political as well as economic control in India, he was reticent to press for foreign investment or economic assistance his government did not control. Grady later noted that Mountbatten probably added to Nehru's suspicion about "economic imperialism," particularly his fear of "dollar imperialism." 18

Grady was aware of Nehru's dilemma but unsympathetic to it. In August 1947 he told an Indian audience, "Speaking for the capitalists of my own country, I can say that while under proper terms and conditions they are willing to lend money to this country and to other countries, they are not prepared to beg that their capital be received." Nehru's apprehension about foreign capital must have been on Grady's mind when the ambassador declared that there was no basis for "the suspicion on the part of [those] who would like to be our [America's] friends, that America is seeking control over other countries through the extension of capital assistance to them." 19

Grady believed that despite Indo-American differences over foreign policy and suspicions of American capitalist investments, Nehru was America's best hope in India. If Nehru's government collapsed, Grady predicted, India would degenerate into chaos and fall prey to Soviet expansionism. Several events in 1946 and 1947 indicated a gradual weakening of the government. A food crisis resulted in widespread unrest that grew in part because the shipment of grain that India had already purchased from the United States was too slow to
meet the demand. On 2 September 1947, the secretary general of India's External Affairs Ministry, the number two official there after Nehru, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, together with India's food secretary met with Grady and requested that the deliveries be expedited. In this meeting Bajpai observed that India's two major problems were food shortages and the refugee situation, and he worried that together they could endanger the very foundations of the new state. Expeditious shipment of grain from the United States, he emphasized, would appease the hungry millions and improve the overall situation. Grady was convinced of the urgency of the situation, and conveyed the request to the Department of State with a favorable recommendation. 20

The next day Bajpai asked Grady about the prospects of American government loan to India without specifying what kinds of investments he had in mind. Still wary of India's economic planning and aware of its mounting domestic problems, Grady replied that India would not attract private American investment for the time being. Once stability returned, Grady assured Bajpai, Indian industrialists might approach American banks for loans. But knowing that American capital would not be interested in large scale public enterprises, Grady suggested that for such projects the government of India might approach the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) or the Export-Import Bank. 21

During all this time, Nehru's foreign and economic policies evoked no reaction from high-level American officials, whose concerns lay elsewhere during the formative years of the Cold War. After the emergency assistance to Greece and Turkey began, American officials drew up a comprehensive plan for financial, technical, and military aid
to various nations of the world in order of their priority for American strategic interests. A State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was entrusted with this task in March 1947, which in its turn delegated to an ad hoc group. The resulting report acknowledged the limits of American resources, and recommended that American security interests be the chief criterion for allocating assistance to foreign countries. Arguing that the security of the United States was threatened whenever a totalitarian regime came to power, the report recommended that the objective of all aid programs be to prevent totalitarianism. Rehabilitation of the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe and Japan was more important than economic development elsewhere, and those economies should receive the bulk of American assistance. This recommendation became the guiding principle behind American aid for the next several years. India is conspicuous only by its exclusion from the areas targeted for aid.

Meanwhile the situation in India worsened as the result of a new wave of refugees. About 250,000 people from the Punjab poured into New Delhi alone, where militant Sikhs and fundamentalist Hindus incited communal hatred against them. This led to a deterioration of law and order in the capital as well as the usual problems of protecting, feeding, and rehabilitating the refugees. So stupendous was the task that the government appointed a Cabinet member to handle it.

The refugee problem and the attendant instability drew a great deal of attention in the international press. The government was disturbed at this emphasis on Indian problems, for the greater part of India was stable and peaceful and its problems were localized. In September the charge d'affaires at the Indian Embassy in Washington,
B.R. Sen, held a press conference in which he expressed his government's resentment over the distorted press coverage of India. At a time when Indians needed encouragement in their efforts to stabilize the nation, Sen said, such coverage was not welcome.

Under these circumstances Bajpai turned to the United States government for moral support. He asked Grady if the Secretary of State could make a statement supporting India's efforts to handle its problems. The State Department obliged, but in doing so felt obliged to commend the efforts of Pakistan as well as Indian to solve its problems, lest the gesture be misunderstood in Karachi. Thus in a press release on September 24, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett lauded the efforts of both governments in maintaining law and order in difficult situations. Indian Ambassador Asaf Ali relayed his government's gratitude to Lovett, reminding him that unfriendly and distorted press reports highlighting internal disorders were only one of the threats to Indian stability, which he tried to associate with America's Cold War concerns. The Soviet Union aimed at an ultimate take-over of India, Ali told Lovett, but to do so was necessary to weaken it weak internally, toward which the Soviets used among other things food policy. When India had recently asked Moscow for food assistance, Ali noted, the Soviets turned down the request. These remarks had no impact upon Lovett, perhaps because Ali had no evidence to back up his charges against the Soviets.

The State Department's continuing indifference toward India was apparent once again when Grady transmitted India's request for ten airplanes to help in the relocation of refugees. The refugees were deep inside Pakistan and had to be airlifted to India or face the
wrath of Muslim activists. In passing the request on to Washington, Grady noted that the refugee problem might, if allowed to increase unabated, endanger the Nehru government, and if Nehru fell India could disintegrate or fall under Soviet influence. This time Marshall discussed India's request with Truman, but Grady's concern was not shared by either man. In his reply to Grady, Marshall argued that relations between India and Pakistan had deteriorated to such a point that the United States could not risk involvement in anything touching their disputes. Sending the requested planes to India would inevitably antagonize Pakistan, Marshall reasoned, and he rejected the request.

It is surprising perhaps that Washington was so impervious to Cold War threats in India. India was strategically situated between the oil fields of the Middle East and the political turbulence of Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union was looking for ice free ports of which India had many, and Soviet adventurism there could not be ruled out. On the other hand, India had a well-trained army which had fought on the side of the Allies in World War II, and this army was by far the largest in the subcontinent. India's mineral reserves were likewise enormous, and Soviet control of India's manpower and resources would be a significant setback for the United States. But neither Truman nor Marshall was concerned with these considerations, and there is no evidence that the State Department took note of them. But the primary factor in American policy was probably the view that India was simply unimportant in the foreign policy calculus. Certainly this was consonant with the report prepared by the State-War-Navy coordinating committee, which had ruled out active involvement with countries not immediately threatened by communism.
Despite the State Department's "evenhanded" non-involvement in South Asia, Grady continued his interest in India's economic development. He was especially determined that the Indian economy prepare itself to receive and effectively utilize foreign capital. In November 1947, Grady observed that American businessmen were anxious to have a clear picture of New Delhi's policy toward labor and private capital. Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy, Prime Minister of the Indian state of West Bengal, corroborated Grady's observation after a tour of America. Grady's persuasions and Roy's report helped convince Nehru to take a more positive attitude toward foreign capital. On December 15, 1947, he told a gathering of Indian businessmen in Calcutta that his government encouraged and would welcome foreign capital and technical assistance. The United States Department of Commerce, probably acting on assurances from India, tried to convince American businessmen that despite talk of nationalization, India was a safe place for foreign capital. 29

Although Indian economic policy was tilting toward market forces, its foreign policy remained unchanged. In December 1947, Nehru reiterated his intention to stay clear of the two power blocs. He also repeated his conviction that his economic and foreign policies were interrelated. "Until India has properly evolved her economic policy," he said, "her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping." 30

American policy makers apparently took little note of Nehru's speeches on foreign policy, even as the Soviet Union revised its stance toward world revolution and capitalism. The American charge in Moscow, Elbridge Durbow, sent a telegram to Marshall on 1 December
1947, in which he summarized the new Soviet thinking as expressed by Eugene S. Varga, the influential Director of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and World Politics, in the October 27 issue of *World Economics and World Politics*. Varga reiterated the Soviet faith in the ultimate collapse of capitalism, but acknowledged that American efforts, particularly the Marshall Plan, had revitalized the capitalist world and the collapse of that world was not imminent. Therefore, the Soviet Union should concentrate its economic efforts on colonial and newly independent areas, which now "liberated from imperialist domination will be able to bypass completely the development of capitalism" and enter directly into the Communist stage of development. Varga's specific mention of India in this context seems especially noteworthy. Durbow concluded his summary of Varga's views by adding, "If Europe can be held firm, [the] Kremlin may turn to direct development and exploitation of what Stalin terms the great 'reserves of the revolution in the colonies and dependent countries'." 31

Soviet authorities hardly ever spoke on their policies in public; instead, they publicized their policies indirectly through spokesmen such as Varga. Durbow's December 1 dispatch must have been known to officials of the State Department's South Asian and Near Eastern Division when they met with Grady on December 16. Yet, strikingly, no one mentioned it at the meeting. Given the climate of suspicion that was building between America and the Soviet Union, one can only conclude that this fact is further evidence of American indifference toward India.

In that meeting, only Grady showed any interest in or
understanding of Indian issues. Raymond A. Hare of South Asian Affairs still wondered if India and Pakistan would reunite. Grady did not believe they would, and advised the Department to frame its policies accordingly. He underscored the need for cooperation between India and Pakistan and between the United States and both of those countries as essential for peace and stability in the region. Regarding India's non-aligned foreign policy, Grady said he had told Nehru, "This is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately." Grady still pinned his hopes on Nehru as America's best hope in India. Convinced that India must be brought under American influence, Grady recommended economic assistance as the only thing that could bring that about. But neither Grady nor anyone else had anything specific to say on the subject of economic assistance to India, whose pressing problems, poverty, underdevelopment, refugees, and law and order, were not even mentioned at the meeting.

While Grady was thus advocating American aid to India, Nehru was working for the same objective. Although a committee of the Congress party endorsed ceilings on income and profits and urged widespread nationalization of economic resources in early 1948, it soon became apparent that this was a political statement meant only for domestic consumption. In private, Nehru spoke in more cautious tones. He was now convinced that the higher priority must be increased production rather than more equitable distribution of available resources. In mid-February in parliamentary debate, he assured Indian industrialists that "there will not be any change in the economic structure. As far as possible, there will be no nationalization of existing
Nehru justified this policy shift in a letter to India's Chief Ministers (the provincial prime ministers) on March 3, 1948. Nationalization was not advisable, he explained, because the country's resources were limited. Substantial nationalization, he thought, might lead to a breakdown of the economic system and a worsening of economic problems.

Nehru's shift evoked sharp denunciations from Moscow. Believing his non-aligned foreign policy concealed a hidden collaboration with British imperialism, the Soviets resisted India's efforts to achieve better bilateral understanding of such issues as India's problems with Pakistan, including the Kashmir dispute. Stalin expressed his general displeasure for Indian policies by refusing to grant an audience to the Indian Ambassador in Moscow, Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru's sister. But as the Cold War commenced, the Soviets began to pressure India to join their alliance against the Western "imperialists". Grady reported to Washington that no less a person than Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov told Madame Pandit on several occasions that India must make up its mind which side it was on in the Cold War. He had also, according to Grady, urged India to open diplomatic representations with the countries of Eastern Europe. At the same time, Soviet Ambassador Kiril Vasilevich Novikov made no effort to establish meaningful contacts with responsible leaders in New Delhi; instead he directed the clandestine activities of Indian communists working to subvert Nehru's government. In Moscow, Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith was asked by the State Department to corroborate Grady's statement, and after meeting Madame Pandit and others, he told Washington the statement was true.
Anxious to receive American economic assistance and annoyed at Soviet policies, Nehru resisted Moscow's pressures. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly, he again ruled out alignment with either power bloc, and repeated that India's economic weakness made its foreign policy necessarily modest. "We want the help of other countries," he said of these matters. "Even in accepting economic help, or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket.... Therefore, purely from the point of view of opportunism...a straightforward, honest policy, an independent policy is the best." 37

Lest the general nature of this statement raise suspicion in Washington, Nehru directed the Acting Secretary General of India's External Affairs Ministry, H.V.R. Iengar, to meet Grady and reassure him. Accordingly, Iengar told Grady that Nehru's remarks were directed at the Soviet Union, but since Nehru thought that a specific rejoinder to Molotov's overtures would antagonize the USSR, he had made his statement in general terms. Iengar reiterated the Indian position that India would side with the United States in case of war between the superpowers.

Nehru's search for American economic assistance continued. His deputy Bajpai, who was in the United States in the spring of 1948, met with State Department officials, including Lovett, to explain India's foreign policy and to explore the possibilities of American assistance. He repeated what Iengar had told Grady in New Delhi, and suggested that the United States had too little interest in India. In response, Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, explained that at that moment the United States found it necessary to concentrate its efforts and limited resources in those
parts of the world where the danger of aggression was most pressing. Bajpai acknowledged that there could be no Marshall Plan for India or Asia, but asked for American assistance in developing India's hydro-electric capabilities, reminding Henderson that a similar request some time ago was never answered. Raymond A. Hare advised Bajpai to take up the new request with Ambassador Grady. "In view of the Ambassador's wide experience in economic matters," Hare said, "it would be advisable for the Government of India to continue to work with the United States Embassy in New Delhi on this question." Later, Bajpai raised the subject of American assistance with Lovett, who responded with silence.39

The Indian government now faced a new outburst of criticism from the Indian Communist Party because of its shifting economic policy. Encouraged by the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, the party launched a coordinated campaign against the new economic policy. Soviet communists had begun attending meetings of the Indian Communist Party in late 1947, where they heard vehement criticism of Nehru's government and speeches advocating seizure of power by forceful means. Only the latter could end India's "slave-controlled independence," said a leading Indian communist.40

Notwithstanding these criticisms, India's Parliament legislated a new economic policy, one giving greater play to market forces. On 7 April 1948, Parliament approved a resolution concerning industrial policy that sought to reassure prospective foreign investors. The resolution acknowledged that a redistribution of India's existing wealth would be more like a distribution of poverty. What was needed was economic development, and an increase in the nation's wealth. 67
Declaring private initiative a necessary precondition for such development, the new policy restricted government ownership to railways, and enterprises producing munitions, atomic research, and electricity. All other industries were to be left to private enterprise, and further nationalization was prohibited out for ten years. In addition, future government investment in economic enterprise would be limited to coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufactures, ship-building, telephone and telegraph materials, and minerals.

Indian communists responded to the policies with accelerated violence. The government had proof of Soviet connivance in the resulting disturbances, and Nehru vented his annoyance in a letter to V.K. Krishna Menon, then his Ambassador to Britain. "We want friendship and cooperation with Russia in many fields," he wrote, "but we are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being cursed at and run down. The whole basis of Russian policy appears to be that no essential change has taken place in India and that we still continue to be camp-followers of the British. That of course is complete nonsense and if a policy is based on nonsensical premises it is apt to go wrong." In another letter to Mountbatten, Nehru wrote, "The way the communists are carrying on in India in the shape of the most violent activity and writing is enough to disgust anyone. There is a complete lack of integrity and decency." 43

Communist attempts to destabilize the government affected production and transportation and discouraged foreign investors. Nehru therefore reacted sharply, and his government took a firm stand against the growing violence and labor unrest. Leading communists and
trade unionists were arrested, and striking labor unions were disbanded. The effect of these measures caused the Soviets, in late 1948, to change their way of dealing with India. Subversion having failed, they turned to diplomacy and began to woo Nehru's government. In September, the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi told an Indian Cabinet member that his government would be willing to help India in its disputes with Pakistan if the Indian government asked for such help. He also hinted that the price of the help would be Indian alignment with the Soviet Union. Nehru rejected this overture.

The American government probably thought the disturbances in India were caused by local Communists, and when they subsided the danger was over. Because of the absence of a perceived Soviet threat in India, America continued to pay little attention to the region. By mid-1948, that began, however slowly to change. Major policy statements that originated in the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency in May and September respectively emphasized India's importance in the Cold War, but held that British influence was sufficient to counter any Soviet move there. These statements recommended that America endeavor to orient the governments and peoples of the subcontinent toward the United States and the West, encourage development of the region's resources and economic potentials, and foster the growth of democratic political institutions. India's commercial links with Britain, these statements noted, were essential for the latter's economy, the revival of which was of especial concern at the time.

The State Department paper acknowledged that the policy of "studied non-interference" in the internal affairs of India was
correct, and resisted the idea that the United States assume responsibility for solving India's economic problems. In the main this posture was sound. For the time being at least, America's interests in India could best be served by the maintenance of Indo-British links, which encouraged a continued friendly influence there and fostered economic growth and national unity. The Department also acknowledged that its formulation of policy toward India was hampered by the absence of a formal statement by the armed forces of America's strategic interest in South Asia. 46

The Central Intelligence Agency report emphasized India's manpower and mineral resources, and for the first time in an official document of the American government took note of India's strategic importance. Located between two areas of great importance to the United States, the Near East and Souttheast Asia, India, the paper stated, must be ruled by a government friendly to the United States. The paper recognized the existing government as friendly and expected it to side with the West in the event of war between the superpowers. The paper also explained the lack of importance Washington had attached heretofore to India: the Soviets were believed to have no designs on the subcontinent. 47 Durbow's dispatch of December 1 had still made no impact on policy calculations in Washington because subsequent events in India did not substantiate the alarm it sounded.

While the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency were assessing American interests in the subcontinent, Nehru's foreign policy tilted toward the West, thanks to Soviet pressure and India's need for assistance. In mid-September, Nehru let Britain and the United States know that there was no chance of India lining up with
the Soviet Union in war or peace. This was significant in part because the Indian Communist Party had succeeded in spreading the idea that American aid and investment were forerunners of American imperialism. When Nehru met Secretary Marshall in Paris in October, Marshall raised this matter, noting that where politicians use the imperialist bogey, investors are likely to disappear. Because government loans were more inviting targets for radical critics, Marshall added, the activities of Indian radicals were likely to affect future considerations of Indian requests for American assistance. Nehru sought to assure Marshall on all of these points; and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference a few days later, he pointedly dissociated his nonalignment from Soviet expansionism.

By this time, American policy toward the subcontinent was dominated by the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir, commonly known collectively as Kashmir, was the largest of the 562 principalities in British India. In 1941, it had a population of about 4 million, 77 per cent of which was Muslim. In view of the fact that India was partitioned on the basis of religion and that Kashmir was better linked by communications with Pakistan than with India, the area should logically have joined Pakistan. Logic, however, did not prevail. The India Independence Act of 1947 provided that at the termination of British rule on 15 August 1947, each of the princely state in India would be free to join either India or Pakistan. Geographical and cultural factors dictated the decision of most states. Hindu areas joined India; Muslim areas joined Pakistan. Only three states—Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh—postponed their decisions.
On the day of independence, Kashmir's ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, negotiated an agreement with Pakistan to operate Kashmir's surface and telecommunications systems and ensure its supply of essential commodities. He offered to sign a similar agreement with India, but India wanted to negotiate the matter. The Maharaja, for no apparent reason, took unduly long time to respond to the Indian proposal for negotiation, and no agreement was signed.

The tranquility of this mountainous region was broken when armed bands began to attack Muslims and loot their properties. Pakistan alleged that the Maharaja instigated the bands to drive Muslim Kashmiris into Pakistan and reduce their majority in the state. The Prime Minister of Kashmir countered these allegations by charging that Muslim infiltrators were pouring into Kashmir in an effort to force a merger with Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister charged Pakistan with withholding essential goods and services from Kashmir, in violation of the recently-signed agreement. Pakistan's Governor General, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, promptly denied these charges.

Amid this atmosphere of charge and countercharge, the Prime Minister of Kashmir requested armed assistance from India, on October 22. The Indian government was willing to oblige, but only after Kashmir joined the Indian federation. The Maharaja agreed to that condition on October 26, and the next day Lord Mountbatten approved the merger of Kashmir with India. Organically, Kashmir was now a part of India, but what turned Kashmir into a disputed area was Mountbatten's declaration that Kashmir's accession to India was conditional on the holding of a plebiscite upon the restoration of law and order there. On the same day, October 26, India air-dropped
troops into Kashmir to protect the Maharaja.

Pakistan endorsed the idea of the plebiscite, but demanded that Indian troops be withdrawn from Kashmir before the plebiscite was held. India rejected this condition on grounds that its troops were necessary to maintain law and order. Pakistan then proposed that the issue be referred to the United Nations, a proposal India at first resisted, but agreed to on 1 January 1948.57

American diplomats in India and Pakistan reported these developments to the State Department.58 Washington received them with no visible expression of concern.

On 3 November Bajpai discussed the Kashmir issue with Grady. Because of its common border with the Soviet Union, China, and India, Kashmir was of intrinsic strategic importance, Bajpai noted, and not just to India and Pakistan. The government of India was especially concerned about Kashmir's border on the Soviet Union, he added, no doubt playing upon American Cold War concerns. The Indian government, Bajpai told Grady, desired an early solution to the problem.59

While Washington took these developments rather casually, London reacted to them with alarm. The threat of armed conflict in the subcontinent disturbed London for economic as well as strategic reasons. Having only recently withdrawn from the area politically, Britain had no desire to get involved in a cultural dispute in which neither side had any trust in British motives. The Foreign Office therefore urged Washington to take the lead in diffusing the growing conflict.

But Americans were reluctant to act. In November, a Foreign Office official sought to impress on the American embassy in London
the view that India was doing its best to "smother Pakistan in its crib". This official asserted that he would not be surprised if Indian acted to kill the Pakistani leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Meanwhile, Indian hardliners, including Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, nurtured hopes of Pakistan's imminent collapse and return to the Indian union. While Patel might have indeed been guilty as charged, India certainly nurtured no ambition to kill Jinnah.

These warnings triggered no alarm in Washington. The State Department's policy toward the Kashmir dispute was one of detachment. A position paper on Kashmir prepared in the State Department reflected a desire for a negotiated settlement, and promised Washington's support in getting the dispute referred to the United Nations. However, the United States would support a plebiscite under United Nations supervision only if Britain concurred. If Britain did not concur, the United States would not commit itself to a course of action until the issue was further reviewed. The subcontinent was still, in Washington's eyes, primarily a British concern.

On 29 December, Sir Paul Patrick of the British Commonwealth Relations Office conferred with the American charge in London, Waldemar J. Gallman. Patrick emphasized the importance of Anglo-American cooperation in the Kashmir dispute, for if war broke out between India and Pakistan, he speculated, Afghanistan might come to Pakistan's assistance, in which case the Soviet Union might also champion Pakistan's cause because "more trouble could be created that way." Such speculation obviously had no basis in fact.

On the same day an urgent message from New Delhi informed the State Department that Bajpai had told American charge Howard Donovan...
that Indian armed forces might enter Pakistani territory in defensive pursuit of raiders from across the border. The following day in London, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Sir Archibald Carter, invited Gallman to his office, where he showed him copies of secret communications between Nehru and Attlee. In these communications, Nehru said that India would refer the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations, but reserved the right to send forces into Pakistan if Pakistan failed to restrain the raiders. Carter told Gallman Attlee had tried to dissuade Nehru from this course, and he asked Gallman if Washington would be willing to advise Nehru immediately to desist from such "rash action".

Washington's concern was to see the dispute settled peacefully, whereas Nehru and Bajpai seemed bent on a military solution. Admonishing Nehru alone seemed unpromising, however, so the State Department decided to send urgent but separate messages to both New Delhi and Karachi urging restraint and expressing hope that the dispute would be contained and settled amicably and equitably. This was the first time the United States acted at Britain's request in the Kashmir dispute, and the British government was gratified. Alerted at last to the gravity of the situation, the State Department decided to do some fact finding of its own on the Kashmir dispute. Accordingly, the American Charge in New Delhi, Howard Donovan, met with General Francis R. Bucher, commander-in-chief of the Indian Army. Bucher told Donovan there was no possibility of an immediate Indian intrusion into Pakistan because logistical problems, would necessitate at least a month of lead time. Donovan then met with Nehru, who was equally reassuring. "I consider Nehru's verbal
assurances entirely adequate," he cabled his superiors in Washington."68

American concern over Kashmir thus subsided. In a directive to the American representative at the United Nations, Warren R. Austin, Secretary Marshall reiterated his desire to see the dispute settled amicably. Marshall added, however, that in view of its historic links with the subcontinent, Britain, not the United States, was the interested third party in the dispute. The United States would be helpful in whatever way it could to resolve the dispute, Marshall said, but only within the limits of its traditional role in the subcontinent. 69

However, the British High Commission in New Delhi continued to try to involve the United States more intimately in the dispute. When the Maharaja of Kashmir installed a new government under Sheikh Abdullah, Britain feared Abdullah's government would sabotage the impending plebiscite. London therefore wanted Abdullah removed from office, and sought American support toward that end. 70 There is no evidence of Washington's reaction to the initiative. It is unlikely that Washington wanted to get involved in the matter because of its often-expressed wish not to be drawn into subcontinental affairs.

Having failed to draw Washington into its effort against Abdullah, London dispatched a delegation to Washington led by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker. In a meeting with Undersecretary of State Lovett on January 10, Noel-Baker suggested that Kashmir be placed under United Nations' control pending the plebiscite, and that the United States take the lead in getting UN approval of this plan. The British could not sponsor the plan,
Noel-Baker said, because to do so would give the impression of "a re-imposition of the British Raj." Lovett's reaction was cool. Referring to Britain's stake in the pending European Recovery Program, Lovett said the Department's top priority just then was to get that program approved by Congress; Kashmir might become more than a mere distraction. Lovett also acknowledged that the Soviets had showed no interest in Kashmir, but that might change if the Americans undertook a significant policy initiative in the area.\footnote{71} Four days later Noel-Baker met again with Marshall, and made several recommendations concerning Kashmir. He suggested that the Security Council appoint a neutral military commander to head an interim administration in Kashmir, oversee an international police force to maintain law and order, and supervise the upcoming plebiscite. Marshall found these suggestions "complex" and problematic. In a dispatch to the American delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, he therefore reiterated his desire for a peaceful solution to the issue, a solution the UN could only assist but not dictate.\footnote{72}

Undeterred, the British High Commission in New Delhi continued its efforts to enlist American efforts in behalf of British initiatives. The High Commission tried to convince the American embassy that Abdullah and his deputies were communists who would eventually strike a deal with the Soviet Union in return for Moscow's guarantee of an independent Kashmir under Abdullah's control. These calculations, especially as they concerned Abdullah, were not correct, as the American embassy in New Delhi knew. Reporting the British overtures to Washington, Donovan warned that the \textit{demarche} suggested by
his British counterpart would adversely affect American interests in
the subcontinent.  

When the United Nations began debate on the Kashmir dispute in
early 1948, Marshall reiterated American support for a peaceful
solution through a plebiscite under UN supervision. Pending such a
plebiscite, the United States would discourage independence for
Kashmir as well as its partition between India and Pakistan, because
Balkanization of the subcontinent would contribute to destabilization
of the region. In a directive to Warren Austin at the UN, Marshall
insisted that the United States was preoccupied elsewhere and was
therefore uninterested in participating in a Plebiscite Commission for
Kashmir. He added, however, that the Plebiscite Administrator should
be a Briton if the British government desired; otherwise, Washington
would name an American as Administrator.

As the Kashmir dispute intensified, both India and Pakistan
sought arms from the United States. Desiring to encourage a peaceful
settlement of the dispute, Washington refused the requests of both
nations. As Marshall told Truman, "In view of the tense situation
prevailing in the Indian sub-continent as a result of disputes over
Kashmir and other issues, which each party has declared to constitute
threats to international peace, licenses should not be issued for the
export of military material to either India or Pakistan until the
situation becomes more clarified." Truman approved Marshall's
recommendation, and the arms embargo was effective immediately.

Britain continued in its efforts to enlist American support for
its policies in the subcontinent. In London, Patrick asked Ambassador
Lewis Douglas if the United States would be willing to nominate one of
its citizens as chairman of the proposed UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). He suggested the name of Army General Raymond A. Wheeler because of Wheeler's combat experience in Southeast Asia in World War II. Nothing came of this request, but later that year after the Indo-Pakistani war began and the UNCIP failed to solve the dispute, Sir Alexander Cadogan of the British delegation at the United Nations proposed to Marshall that the UN arrange a cease-fire and appoint General Dwight D. Eisenhower to mediate the dispute. Marshall's reply was not reassuring. There would be difficulties in administering a cease-fire, Marshall told Cadogan, since both India and Pakistan would fail to recognize it, and in any case Eisenhower was not interested in an assignment the United States government had so little interest in. Evidently, Marshall had no desire to expand the American presence where he had no strategic imperative for doing so.

The United States maintained its embargo of arms to the subcontinent through 1948 despite the attempts of both India and Pakistan to circumvent it. Both nations possessed American arms, most of them procured through lend-lease during World War II, and each now needed spare parts for the maintenance of these weapons. The American arms embargo applied to spare parts as well as new weapons for both nations, and this caused pressing problems for both of them. The United States acknowledged these problems, and in November authorized the export of spare parts for arms of American origin to any nation that possessed American-made munitions.

These policy decisions had to be recalculated in the winter of 1948-1949, when Indian forces made small, localized intrusions into
Pakistan-held Kashmir, and Pakistan protested these intrusions as all out war. In the resulting dispute, Britain sided with Pakistan, but Washington saw the dispute in less clear-cut terms. Thus, when Cadogan suggested to Philip C. Jessup of the American delegation at the United Nations that the Security Council take up the issue immediately, Jessup refused. In the meanwhile, in New Delhi, Ambassador Loy W. Henderson met with Indian military leader who assured him that the intrusions into Pakistan-held Kashmir were localized and defensive in nature. Marshall accepted these assurances, and told Jessup to inform Cadogan that for the time being at least the United States regarded the activities of the UNIP as an adequate response to the crisis in the subcontinent.

At this point, another episode showed Washington's commitment to the geographical integrity of India. In late 1948, the United States refused to recognize the action of the princely state of Hyderabad when it declared its independence from New Delhi. Hyderabad was located in the mid-South of India proper, and its adherence to the Indian union was logical in geographic, ethnic, and economic terms. But the ruler of Hyderabad declared its independence and tried to procure arms from abroad to support that declaration. India feared that other territories in its fragile union might follow Hyderabad's lead, so when Hyderabad's ruler made a show of military force, India threatened retaliation. The ruler then appealed to the United States, and then to the United Nations, but found no sympathy from either. When India annexed Hyderabad by force, the United States accepted the action as a fait accompli.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER II


2. Ibid., pp. 69-80.

3. Ibid., pp. 143-144.


7. Ibid.


to as the SWJN. For further reading on the development of Nehru's attitude toward the United States, see Kenton J. Clymer, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the United States: The Preindependence Years," *Diplomatic History* (Spring 1990), pp. 143-161.


17. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 7 July, ibid.: 160-161.

18. Grady said this to State Department's officials in December 1947, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, December 26, 1947, ibid., p. 177.


20. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, for Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture, 2 September, 1947, *FRUS, 1947, III*: 164-165.

21. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 3 September, 1947, ibid., 165-166.
22. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hildring) to the Secretary of War (Patterson), 5 March, 1947, ibid., pp. 197-198; and Memorandum by the State Department Member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Hildring), 17 March, 1947, ibid., pp. 198-199.


26. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State, with the Indian Ambassador Mr. Asaf Ali, 7 October, 1947, FRUS, 1947, III: 167-168.

27. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 10 November, ibid.: 171.

28. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 14 November, ibid.: 171-172.


30. Speech of December 4, in Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 24.


33. Quoted in Natarajan, American Shadow, p. 57.


35. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 18 March, 1948, FRUS, V:1, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa," (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 497-498.

36. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, 20 March, ibid., pp. 499-500.

37. Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 8 March, 1948, in Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 35.

38. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 20 March, FRUS, 1948, V:1: 498-499.

39. Memoranda of Conversation with Bajpai by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), 2 April, and by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), 2 April, ibid., pp. 501-508.


41. To Chief Ministers, April 1, 1948, in Nehru, Letters:1: 99.

42. Gopal, Nehru:II: 34.

43. Quoted in ibid., pp. 45, and 71.

44. Natarajan, American Shadow, p. 57.

45. Gopal, Nehru:II: 45.

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47. Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "India-Pakistan," 16 September, 1948, Special Estimate No. 1-9 folder, President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Library, hereinafter referred to as the HSTL.


49. The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 16 October, FRUS, 1948: V: I: 516-519.

50. Gopal, Nehru: II: 45.


54. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents, pp. 45-46.

55. Ibid., pp. 50, 57, 53, 54.

56. Ibid., pp. 47, 57.

57. Ibid., pp. 73-74, 77-78, 80-81, and 96.

58. The Charge in Pakistan (Lewis) to the Secretary of State, 28 October, 1947, FRUS, 1947, III: 179-180; and The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 3 November, 1947, ibid., pp. 180-181.

59. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, 3 November, ibid., pp. 180-181.

60. Cited in M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 85

61. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 2

62. The Charge in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of

63. The Charge in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State, 29
   December, ibid., pp. 187-188.

64. The Charge d'Affaires in London (Gallman) to the Secretary of
   State, 30 December, 1947, ibid., pp. 188-192.

65. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, for Nehru,

66. The Embassy in London to the Secretary of State, 1 January 1948,
   ibid., p. 193, n. 1.

67. The Charge in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State, 2
   January, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. V, "The Near East, South Asia,

68. The Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi (Donovan) to the Secretary of

69. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the

70. Cited in Venkataramani, American Role, p. 40.

71. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the
   Division of South Asian Affairs (Ray Thurston), 10, January,
   FRUS, 1948: V: I: 276-278.

72. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the

73. Cited in Venkataramani, American Role, pp. 40-41.
74. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 17 February, FRUS, 1948: V: I: 299–300.
75. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 4 March, ibid., pp. 310–312.
76. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin), 26 April, 1948, ibid., p. 338.
77. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, 11 March, 1948, ibid., pp. 496-497; and 497, n. 1.
78. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 13 May, 1948, ibid., p. 342.
79. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 10 November, 1948, ibid., pp. 445-448.
80. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews) among Bajpai, Henderson, and Hare, 2 April; and Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, with Mr. R.K. Nehru and Brigadier D. Choudhuri of the Indian Embassy, July 29, 1948, ibid., pp. 501-506, and pp. 513-514.
81. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near East and African Affairs (Satterthwite) to the Acting Secretary of State, 10 November, 1948, ibid., pp. 519-520.
82. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 20 November, 1948, ibid., pp. 453-455.
83. The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 20 November, ibid., pp. 455-456.
84. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 29 March, ibid., pp. 321-322.
85. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W.L.S. Williams of the Division of South Asian Affairs, 6 August, 1948, ibid., pp. 360-362; and The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin), 1 September, 1948, ibid., pp. 372-373; and the Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 14 September, ibid., pp. 386-387.

86. The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly at Paris, 27 September, ibid., p. 411.
American reluctance to take an active interest in the subcontinent continued in early 1949. Truman and Acheson remained for most part indifferent to India's needs. Preoccupied with the Cold War, they still regarded India as a low priority for American policy. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee reminisced later that while important issues of foreign policy reached the president and the secretary of state, those concerning the subcontinent hardly went beyond the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.\(^1\) Even at that level, there was little interest in the region. In early 1949, for example, acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett expressed dissatisfaction with the idea of appointing an American as Plebiscite Administrator in Kashmir. He complained to Jerome K. Huddle of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) that the countries of the United Nations were pressuring the United States to take a more active role than it desired in Palestine, Indonesia, and Kashmir. Even ostensibly simple requests for American cooperation with the UN in the area, Lovett added, were facades behind which lay hidden and unwanted entanglements. America was determined to limit its commitments in the area.\(^2\)

While Indo-American political relations remained at a low level, economic cooperation showed no promise either. Indian leaders remained suspicious of American aid and capital investments. Ambassador Loy W. Henderson thought Nehru's anti-American bias a legacy of his education.
in England, where the prime minister had been imbued with the idea that the United States was "an overgrown, blundering, uncultured, and somewhat crass nation" and Americans in general were ill-mannered and immature. While Nehru's attitude toward the United States was conditioned by factors that Henderson possibly did not know of, the Ambassador correctly summarized that attitude. 3

Nehru, it seems, liked Americans personally, but he despaired at their lack of imagination, specifically their difficulty in understanding why other peoples preferred their own ways of life. Capitalism, he said, had undoubtedly brought great blessings to America, for it well suited the circumstances of American history and life. But Indian circumstances were vastly different, and Indian problems could not await the leisurely workings of laissez faire. Private enterprise and foreign capital could and would contribute greatly to Indian development, Nehru believed, but to facilitate economic growth and channel it to where the needs were most pressing, state direction and central planning were necessary. Nehru thought American investors and at times the American government itself had attempted to influence Indian economic policy in undesirable ways. But he also realized that he and his economic advisors could not ignore the political and economic power of the United States. Therefore, he tried to assure Washington that India would not set up a socialist economy but would in fact respect the rights of private property and of foreign investors. 4

Yet Henderson's insistence on opening Indian economy to foreign investors annoyed Nehru. Representing a country practicing private enterprise, Henderson failed to sympathise with Indian planning. This
clash of views precluded economic cooperation between the two countries.

Although 1949 began with no promise of improved Indo-American relations, events were underway that would widen the Cold War and cause Washington to take a closer look at its policies toward New Delhi. Nonetheless, circumstances in Asia again ruled out close cooperation between the two countries, at least in the short run.

By 1949 much of Asia was fighting colonial rule, and it was already apparent that American policy would have to be recast to deal with new governments whose independence grew out of armed insurgency against America's British, French, and Dutch allies. In China, the Communist party stood poised for victory against the American-supported Kuomintang.

American policymakers viewed these Asian dramas within the context of the Cold War. They traced the source of revolution in French Indochina to Moscow, for example, and were not prepared to see, as Secretary of State George C. Marshall put it, "colonial empires and administrators supplanted by philosophies and political organizations emanating from the Kremlin." In addition, they feared that American interference in colonial disputes would risk the friendship of European allies, whose cooperation in European security policy they considered more vital than the interests of colonial peoples. Thus, the United States adopted a policy of limited support of Asian decolonization, a policy that generally pleased its imperialist allies.

Indian leaders viewed these Asian developments quite differently. Their own experience generated sympathy for all colonized people and
support for their independence movements. Pragmatic considerations
also played a role. To his chief ministers, Nehru wrote on 16 November
1948, that the impending victory of the Communist party in China would
have little significance for the rest of Asia, except insofar as it
encouraged communists generally. But "if colonialism continues
anywhere in Southeast Asia," he added, "the natural result will be a
growth of Communism" for the simple reason that communists everywhere
supported decolonization while the Western democracies did not. 6 He
also anticipated no immediate problems with a Communist China. 7

American and Indian policies were therefore on a collision
course. The immediate problem in early 1949 involved the Dutch East
Indies. There, in late 1948 the United Nations Security Council had
arranged a truce between Dutch and independence forces. In
mid-December, however, Dutch troops swept across the cease-fire line
and arrested many leaders of the Indonesian Republican Army. This
action enraged Asian opinion, and Nehru took the lead in denouncing
it. On 31 December he invited leaders of all states bordering the
Indian Ocean to New Delhi to confer on the crisis.

This move was consistent with his policy throughout the episode.
Nehru kept American and British officials informed of his actions
regarding Indonesia, which conformed to his overall anti-colonialism.
"India has stood up before the world for the rights of Asian people
and Asian countries," he said in December, "and against a continuation
of colonialism and imperialism." 9 Throughout the Indonesian crisis,
Nehru maintained that the Dutch would take no military measures
opposed by the United States and Britain, for they were using Marshall
Plan aid to maintain themselves in Indonesia. Part of the blame for
the Netherlands' action in breaking the truce, in Nehru's view, thus fell on the United States and Britain, and thereby hurt the anti-communist cause throughout Asia.

The American position was more complex than Nehru realized. American officials were displeased with their Dutch allies, and in fact were quietly working to bring about a Dutch withdrawal. They were, therefore, upset when Nehru hastily called the conference on Indonesia, and feared the Indian leader sought to forge an anti-Western "Asiatic Association." Henderson contributed to these misgivings by reminding Washington, without citing evidence to support his view, of Nehru's "lack of stability," and characterizing Nehru's disapproval of American policy as "animosity" toward the United States. The concern in the State Department was sufficient to prompt the first in-depth review of India's overall foreign policy, an exercise that demonstrated an over reaction to and lack of understanding of Nehru. While the prime minister desired no more than a general discussion of the Indonesian issue and the formulation of a common opinion against Western colonialism, George F. Kennan, then head of the Policy Planning Staff, feared that the conference would lead to a "possible polarization between the Atlantic Community and Asia." "This would not be such a serious trend for us were we only an Atlantic power," Kennan told Henderson, "but as we are [a] world power with vital interests and therefore responsibilities on all the globe we must regard recent developments in southern Asia with deep concern." 

American apprehensions about Nehru turned out to be unfounded. When the conference met in New Delhi, the presence of delegates from
Australia and New Zealand attested to the primacy of regional over political or ideological issues. The conference was not the first step toward building an Asian bloc hostile to the West. On the contrary, Nehru told the conference of his desire to work for a solution to the Indonesian problem within the framework of the United Nations and to assist rather than undermine the efforts of the world body concerning the problem. "Believing as we do that the United Nations must be strengthened," he said in his opening address, "we were reluctant to take any steps which might appear to weaken its authority." The primary purpose of the conferees, he continued, was to consider how best they could help the Security Council to bring about a rapid and peaceful solution of the Indonesian problem. They meet to supplement the efforts of the Security Council, "not to supplant that body." 14

The conference, which met January 20-23, accordingly took no anti-American or anti-Western stand. In fact, even before the conference convened, the prime minister privately assured Henderson that he had acted in response to the Dutch violation of the truce, and not in any spirit of hostility toward the United States. Nehru told Henderson that he sought no position of Asian leadership, but the anti-colonial cause forced him to play an active international role. Had India made no response to the situation in Indonesia, he believed, the Soviet Union would have done so at greater risk to Western interests. 15 But suspicious of Nehru's ambition for leadership and not sure of his motives, Henderson quietly met with conference participants from friendly countries such as Egypt and Thailand, and encouraged them to urge caution upon the conference. 16

Nehru's demarche to Henderson had two aspects. Although the prime
minister tried to assure the ambassador of his lack of interest in international leadership, at the same time he said circumstances compelled him to take the initiative regarding Indonesia. Therefore although Nehru denied it, there could be no doubt about his ambition for world leadership and in this venture, his intense anti-colonialism, and not the desire to form an anti-Western bloc, had guided him.

Although Nehru did not attempt to organize an Asian bloc at the conference, he did discuss, in general terms, his views concerning India's role in Asian affairs, views that indicate a desire for world leadership. Pointing to such regional groups as the Organization of American States and the Western European Union, he asked, "Is it not natural that the free countries of Asia should begin to think of some more permanent arrangement than this Conference for effective mutual consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims?" Speaking in the Constituent Assembly after the conference, Nehru noted India's strategic location between West Asia, rich in oil, and Southeast Asia, already troubled by the Indochina war. This strategic location dictated a large role for India in maintaining stability and freedom in Asia. Nehru spoke also of building regional cooperation in Asia within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Later, elaborating on these points, he said, "India is very curiously placed in Asia; whichever problem in Asia you may take up, somehow or other India comes into the picture. Whether you think in terms of China or the Middle East or South East Asia, India immediately comes into the picture. It is so situated that because of past history, traditions, etc., in regard to any major problem of a country or a group of
countries of Asia, India has to be considered. Whether it is a problem of defence or trade or industry or economic policy, India cannot be ignored. He therefore foresaw a time when Asian nations would look to India for leadership in international affairs.

Although he anticipated an important role for India in the world, Nehru realized that economic realities limited Indian leadership, even in Asia. For the moment, New Delhi could not, by itself, take any effective action in the Indonesian crisis. Therefore, he advocated close consultation among interested nations in seeking solutions to the crisis.

This search for closer cooperation among Asian nations did not rule out India's cooperation with the United States on matters of mutual interest. Nehru continually sought American advice on issues concerning China, for example, as the Communist Party won control of the government there. While that transition was occurring, the Indian ambassador to China urged Nehru to call upon both sides in the Chinese civil war to negotiate their differences and reach a "realistic settlement." But Nehru believed the situation in China was so intricate and confusing that he refused to urge any course of action on his own. Instead he asked his deputy Girija Shankar Bajpai to seek American advice on the desirability of his making a public statement on China. Bajpai told Henderson that "in view of the intricacies of the Chinese situation, [Nehru] could not decide what to do and would appreciate the informal opinion of the US Government whether such a statement might help or might merely add to the general confusion." Henderson opposed any talk of a "realistic settlement" through negotiation because any settlement under present circumstances
would inevitably lead to a Communist-dominated government. Nonetheless, he relayed Bajpai's message to Washington. In his reply, Acheson agreed with the ambassador, and asked him to advise Indian leaders against issuing any statement.

The results of the Asian Conference and Nehru's consultation with Washington concerning China generated goodwill between New Delhi and Washington. These moves, coupled with a truce in Kashmir in late 1948 which promised peace in the subcontinent, led Henderson to suggest that the arms embargo against India and Pakistan be lifted. The State Department endorsed his recommendations, the president approved it, and on 29 March, the embassies of India and Pakistan were informed accordingly. However, Acheson cautioned Henderson that the United States would only supplement the arms supplies India and Pakistan were receiving from Britain, and the two countries should not expect significant quantities of arms from the United States.

Differing national agendas and interests marred this spell of goodwill. Nehru continued to criticize American and Western policy. Though reiterating his faith in the United Nations, the prime minister told the Constituent Assembly on 8 March that in the world body the Western powers considered issues not on their merits but with a view of protecting their own strategic interests. In an obvious reference to Western military strength, he said the symbol of the West was the atom bomb, whereas that of India was the wheel, "which symbolized the idea of peace." Surprised by the tone of these remarks, Henderson took them up with Bajpai. He asked for clarification of what he termed "uncomplimentary references to the United Nations and the West." Bajpai discussed the matter with Nehru, who asked him to assure
Henderson that he intended to cast no slurs upon the United States or its Western allies. In fact, he insisted, India was moving toward the West as a result of Soviet policies toward New Delhi. The latter was a new factor in the equation. In spite of Nehru's efforts at even-handedness in matters relating to the superpowers, recent Soviet pressures to compel India to choose sides in the Cold War encouraged the Indian communists and created a widening gulf between India and the Soviet Union. Nehru assured Henderson through Bajpai that regardless of Soviet reaction, his government would not permit the communists to attain a position in India from which they could undermine law and order or national security. Indeed, Nehru's anti-communist policies had already incurred the wrath of the Soviet Union to such a degree that the Moscow press and radio had been repeatedly attacking the prime minister and his colleagues for two months. Still, Nehru was dissatisfied that so much time at the United Nations was taken up in "senseless strife between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc." As to his reference to the atom bomb as the symbol of the West, Nehru lamely said he meant the "West" to include the Soviet Union. 26

Nehru's explanations of his speech were thus ambiguous. While he had overreacted in the heat of parliamentary debate, he now looked for a way to limit the meaning of his remarks. Unconvinced with these explanations, and determined, like his predecessor, Henry F. Grady, to see India align itself publicly with the West, Henderson did not understand how Nehru could acknowledge Soviet aggression and still remain neutral. "It seemed to me," Henderson wrote in reporting his conversation with Bajpai to Acheson, "that it was rather difficult for
India to remain neutral if it should really consider various world problems which were arising on their merits." He had suggested to Bajpai that India validate its anti-aggression rhetoric by aligning itself with the West. Bajpai responded that India would not pursue a policy of neutrality between forces of aggression and those endeavoring to resist it, adding that, like Henderson, he was distressed at Nehru's public remarks. He informed Henderson that at Nehru's request, the Ministry of External Affairs had prepared a number of memoranda regarding aspects of Indian foreign policy that Nehru was to discuss in his speech. Unfortunately, he added, the prime minister had used some of the memoranda and ignored others, and in the heat of the debate, had made statements without reflecting on their implications. Bajpai assured the ambassador that such pronouncements would be fewer in number in the future and less antagonistic toward America and its policies. 27

Henderson hoped Bajpai's attempts would mould Nehru's views in a "constructive way." But thus far, he conceded, Nehru's impulsiveness and unwillingness to admit that the policy of neutrality he had advocated so long was bankrupt had frustrated the effort. It would therefore be some time, he told Acheson, before India would cooperate with the democratic countries in opposing aggression. 28 The ambassador was aware that it was Nehru, not Bajpai, who was in total control of Indian foreign policy. But anxious to reorient India's policy toward the West, Henderson exaggerated the prospects of that occurring, and by accepting Bajpai's assurances, was indulging in wishful thinking.

Henderson's remonstrance had some effect, but Nehru was unwilling publicly to criticize Soviet actions lest that cause problems of its
own. In a speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs he
nevertheless softened his criticism of the West. Acknowledging India's
traditional ties with the West, he emphasized the common ground this
gave his government and the Western democracies. His failure to
mention the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then being fashioned
by the Western allies, and his emphasis on colonialism and racial
discrimination indicated a conscious effort to focus attention on
Asian problems. Henderson rightly interpreted the speech as friendly
to the West without being hostile to the Soviet Union.

While Henderson was trying to orient Indian policy toward the
West, American defense planners were formulating new policies toward
South Asia. In a memorandum to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force
Coordinating Committee in March, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
acknowledged that America's strategic objectives in South Asia had not
been clearly defined, and that the United States had yet to make a
decision on the desirability and practicability of military
cooperation with countries in the area. Noting the resources of the
area, the JCS cautioned that Soviet domination of the region would be
disastrous for the West. Militarily, however, only Pakistan was
important, because the other countries of South Asia were remote from
the Soviet Union, and difficult terrain and lack of communications
facilities imposed significant logistical problems which limited the
area's strategic significance.

The memorandum noted, however, the potential strategic importance
of the Karachi-Lahore area of Pakistan. This area was sufficiently
near the Soviet Union to be used as a base for air operations against
Soviet Central Asia and for the defense of the oil fields in West
Asia. The United States should therefore try to prevent Soviet
encroachment into the subcontinent, and without incurring military
obligations, cultivate a cooperative attitude toward American
strategic interests on the part of countries in the area. The JCS also
recommended that Washington explore the possibility of establishing
American military base in the Karachi-Lahore area.\(^{32}\)

The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee generally
accepted the recommendations in the JCS memorandum, but recommended a
regional policy in South Asia rather than reliance on Pakistan alone.
It acknowledged that recent developments in China had serious
implications for American interests in South Asia. The countries there
could not defend themselves against aggression from China, and would
obviously look for outside support. If the United States did not help
them, the Committee cautioned, they would turn to the Soviet Union.
For the first time, an official paper of the American government took
note of Eugene S. Varga's article in the 27 October issue of World
Economics and World Politics,\(^{33}\) and acknowledged that recent
developments in the subcontinent attested to a shift in Soviet
strategy regarding global expansion. The Soviet embassy in New Delhi
had become a center for subversive communist elements in India, the
Committee noted, and the Soviet Union had established diplomatic
relations with Pakistan and Burma. Soviet trade with India and
Pakistan had also increased, and with Soviet encouragement, a
Czechoslovakian technical mission had recently visited India,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan to arrange for industrial development. The
Committee also noted that continued political disturbances and
economic distress in South Asia, in combination with weak military
establishments, made South Asia particularly susceptible to Communist penetration.

Therefore, the Committee recommended that the United States undertake to help develop the economic and military potential of the South Asian nations so that governments there could exert stronger influence against communism not only in their own region but in West and Southeast Asia as well. It also endorsed the recommendation for establishing American military bases in the Karachi-Lahore area. Because American resources were limited and already committed to areas of higher strategic priority, the Committee recommended that the economic initiatives be financed by loans from the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank. As for the military initiatives, these should be met by direct but limited assistance for military training and arms supplies. In a way, this was the forerunner of the subsequent dual policy of extending military aid to Pakistan and economic assistance to both India and Pakistan.

Although these reports attached no special importance to India in the context of the Cold War, events in Asia drew increased attention toward New Delhi. In China, Communist armies continued their victorious march against government forces, and in Indochina, the French faced a determined challenge from Ho Chi Minh, whom Acheson as Acting Secretary in December 1946 had called an "agent [of] international Communist". These developments were part of the background to the program of economic assistance to needy countries that President Truman announced in his inaugural address in January 1949. This program, which came to be known as Point Four, embodied Truman's belief that economic
assistance would counter the communist threat and create a base for capitalist development. A week after Truman announced the program, Acheson named India as one of the prospective beneficiaries.  

Ever since Indian independence, a section of the American press had advocated closer ties with India, and it now encouraged formal cooperation between the two countries. Walter Lippmann, appreciative of India's problems and prospects, hailed Nehru as "the greatest figure in Asia," and advised the American government to consult him on policies concerning China and Southeast Asia. Probably encouraged by the anticolonial spirit generated by the Atlantic Charter and the need to bolster a non-communist country that had very recently freed itself from colonial rule, many newspapers and journals agreed with Lippmann and in early 1949 carried feature articles on Nehru, all of them sympathetic to India and Nehru, and urged close cooperation with Nehru and his government.  

Ironically, however, the Indian press did not share this American enthusiasm, because it was not accustomed to look to Washington for any assistance or cooperation. Events in the United States, and its policies, received little coverage in Indian newspapers at this time. London still held sway in New Delhi.  

As Nehru received better coverage in the American press, the situation in Southeast Asia, from the American point of view, deteriorated. In June, W. Walter Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, wrote to Ambassador David K.E. Bruce in Paris that the progress of Chinese Communist armies toward northern Indochina threatened to transform a serious situation into an emergency. A few days later, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson recommended that the National Security Council (NSC)
make a new study of American policy toward Asia. "I am becoming increasingly concerned at the course of events in Asia," Johnson wrote. "The advance of Communists in large areas of the world and particularly the success of Communists in China seriously affect the future of the United States."42

Nehru was also concerned about the situation in Asia and used it to again stress India's important role in Asian affairs. "India, with all her problems and difficulties," he had told his chief ministers in early March, "is the only State in all these vast regions of Eastern, South-Eastern and Western Asia which can be looked upon not only as a firmly established state but also one that is advancing towards greater strength, both political and economic."43

Despite such rhetoric India lacked the economic and military strength necessary to assume a leadership role, and Nehru realized that Western, particularly American, assistance was essential to building a strong India. In April, accordingly, his government made a series of decisions aimed at improving ties with the West. First, it declared its intention to join the British Commonwealth,44 a decision that testified to Nehru's fundamental commitment to the West. Secondly, Nehru appointed his sister, Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, ambassador to the United States. At the same time, he accepted an invitation from President Truman to visit the United States in the fall. His motives for these moves were reflected in the query he addressed to his trusted lieutenant in foreign affairs and his High Commissioner in London, V.K. Krishna Menon. "Why not align with the United States somewhat," he asked Menon, "and build up [India's] economic and military strength?"45
If Nehru intended these gestures to create an atmosphere of goodwill between India and the United States, he did not make that clear to Washington. American policymakers received these Indian initiatives routinely and with customary coolness. They were still doubtful about India's foreign policy, particularly vis-a-vis American objectives in Asia. Therefore, meeting on 22 April to review Indian affairs, State Department officials found no reason to change established policy. 46

At this point, the British government attempted to reorient America's India policy due to its own economic concerns. British investors had substantial investments in India, and hoped to benefit if India became the center of a newly expanding Asian economy. They realized, however, that Britain could not invigorate the Indian economy alone. Like the Indians themselves, they had to encourage American investment and aid. 47

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin raised this subject with Acheson on 4 April only to find Acheson discouraging. India's economic and foreign policies were not sufficiently clear for Washington to make any significant gesture to New Delhi. Regarding American aid to India, Acheson said, "so far our thinking had only been along vague lines." Obviously referring to Nehru's nonaligned foreign policy, Acheson confided to Bevin that the American government was "doubtful about India." 48

Bevin thus made no headway in improving Indo-American relations; in fact relations deteriorated. The problem again was Kashmir. A cease-fire in December 1948 had brightened prospects for peace in the subcontinent, and in its aftermath the UNCIP encouraged a plebiscite.
to settle the perplexing problem. In May 1949, the Commission submitted proposals for simultaneous withdrawals of the armies of India and Pakistan from the disputed area. India rejected the proposals, however, insisting that they equated Pakistan, the aggressor, and India, the victim. Bajpai told Henderson that India wanted withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from Kashmir before reducing its own forces to the level proposed by the Commission. The presence of Indian troops was required, he insisted, to maintain law and order in the otherwise chaotic situation.49

This stance disappointed Washington. Policymakers showed little concern with the merits of India's response. Rather, they were chiefly interested in seeing the UN proposals accepted by the belligerents. Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb suggested that American aid be linked to good conduct by India on affairs America considered vital. He wrote Henderson that prospects of aid to India under Point Four, the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, which had brightened after the 1948 cease-fire, might be jeopardized by Indian refusal to agree to the UNCIP proposals.50

Ambassador Henderson took a more realistic position. Aware of the divisions within the Indian government over Kashmir, he advised Acheson to exercise caution in pressuring Nehru. On the one hand, he told Washington, there were people like Bajpai who believed the issue should be settled by plebiscite. On the other hand, hardliners opposed any concession in Kashmir, even those approved by people in the disputed area. Henderson believed the latter group was gaining strength and policymakers had to move with great caution. Nehru

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himself seemed to vacillate between a desire for world acclaim as a political figure committed to peace and nonalignment, and an equally strong desire for popularity at home as a vigorous defender of Indian national interests.

To be sure, Nehru's position was more complicated than Henderson reported. Himself a Kashmiri by descent though not by residence, Nehru was obviously sensitive to the issue and probably desired that the state remain in the Indian union rather than opt for merger with Pakistan or independence. He also held that Pakistan was clearly the aggressor in Kashmir and was occupying a sizable territory there as a result of that aggression. In his view the United Nations should ask Karachi to withdraw its forces, and then negotiate a plebiscite. As long as the world body refrained from taking action along these lines, the prime minister would not abide by its decisions. Domestic politics reinforced these convictions. For political reasons Nehru could not accept what amounted to foreign occupation of Indian territory.

While Nehru vacillated and Henderson counselled caution, British officials renewed their efforts to generate interest in India's economic development. In London, Bevin invited Ambassador Douglas to his office on 20 July and suggested the formation of a Western-backed Asian economic association under Indian leadership.

Against this background, British and American interests in India varied. While Britain had primarily economic motives, Washington was more concerned with stability in South Asia. Recognizing American priority with regard to Asia and its own influence in the subcontinent, London set out to resolve the Kashmir dispute so that it could then involve Washington economically in South Asia. Bevin
therefore urged joint Anglo-American political intervention in the Kashmir dispute. Worried about other areas of the continent, Acheson saw no wisdom in getting involved in Kashmir on the scale suggested by the British. He therefore recommended that Truman and Prime Minister Attlee send personal messages to the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers urging them to accept the terms of the proposed truce agreements. 53

There is no evidence that Acheson understood the complexities of the Kashmir dispute or of the respective positions of India and Pakistan in the dispute. India claimed the state as its own, and urged the UN to brand Pakistan as an aggressor because Pakistani soldiers and irregulars had intruded into Kashmir. India wanted those troops ousted before it consented to a plebiscite, but Pakistan was unwilling to remove its troops from the area they occupied in Kashmir until the plebiscite was held. The UN truce proposals called for maintaining the status quo pending the outcome of the plebiscite, which meant Pakistani troops would remain for the time being. These factors plus Henderson's analysis of Nehru's domestic political concerns vis-a-vis Kashmir led Acheson to conclude that the Indian government would never accept the UNCIP recommendations and that India's position was in fact hampering a settlement of the dispute. Henderson conveyed this to Bajpai, who evidently was not pleased with it. 54

Washington's assessment of the Indian attitude toward the UNCIP recommendations was not correct. While India's concerns for security and order in Kashmir led to the maintenance of Indian troops there, New Delhi's larger concern was Pakistani "aggression" into the state. In their bid to get a quick and peaceful settlement of the dispute,
American policymakers did not appreciate this concern, which in turn produced further misunderstandings between the two countries.

Having failed to solve the problem, UNCIP referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council, which suggested that the issue be arbitrated by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz of the United States Navy, who had been appointed Plebiscite Administrator in March. At this point, Truman sent similar messages to Nehru and Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, requesting them to accept truce proposals that had not yet been finalized. What disappointed Nehru in this message was the suggestion that the failure to resolve the dispute was the responsibility equally of India and Pakistan. Pakistan was the aggressor, Nehru insisted again, and its forces must withdraw from Kashmir before India would reduce its forces or agree to a plebiscite.

Encouraged by their success in getting Washington to pressure India on Kashmir, the British again pressed the matter of economic cooperation with India. On 12 September, British High Commissioner Sir Archibald Nye tried to convince Henderson of the urgency of the need for American economic assistance to India. Nye told Henderson that due to its own precarious economy Britain was unable to help India, and it would be necessary for the United States to provide greater assistance to India and elsewhere to halt the rising tide of communism in Asia. M.E. Denning of the British Foreign Office met with State Department officials on the same day and delivered a written proposal for a multi-national economic conference on South and Southeast Asia. Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, W. Walton Butterworth, who led the American team in the talks, expressed reservations over
the proposal that India be assigned a central role in Asian affairs. "India should recognize the character of the Communist menace," Butterworth told the British conferees, "not only to [India itself] but to the other states of Southeast Asia and India should be moved to impress upon her neighbors the fact that the great enemy to their independence and political and economic welfare was not colonialism but Communism." Economic assistance was therefore contingent upon India's willingness to join some kind of anticommmunist arrangement in the region.

Indo-American differences over the nature and extent of the communist threat in South Asia were clearly apparent at this time. While Washington considered international communism an aggressive force everywhere, Nehru saw little danger from communism, particularly in India. An ardent believer in the values of democracy and enjoying the respect and allegiance of all segments of the Indian people, the prime minister was confident of his ability to stem the red tide in India. On the other hand, his bitter memories of colonialism were too fresh not to influence his policy calculations on these matters.

Aware of these factors, Henderson continued to take a more realistic attitude toward the Cold War issues in Asia and India than his colleagues in the State Department. He told Nye that India's survival as a democratic state amenable to Western influence was so important that the West could not "content itself with platitudinous expressions of interest in India's welfare." Something more concrete was required. In a dispatch to the State Department Henderson wrote of Bevin's recent proposal, "We believe that the [United Kingdom's] initiative represents [a] genuine modification, possibly of
far-reaching economic and political importance, in [the] traditional attitude [of the United Kingdom's] regarding this area as [a] private British economic preserve. Although not so drastic it recalls [the] [United Kingdom] shift regarding Greece in 1947."60

About this time, the news of the Soviet Union's first atomic explosion shook the Western world and seemed to threaten America's military superiority over the Soviets. A paper prepared by the State Department in mid-August noted that many nations had acquiesced in American hegemony because of the American monopoly of atomic weapons. Without that monopoly, the paper cautioned, some of these countries might be inclined toward neutrality between the two superpowers, a position Washington despised.

The news of the Soviet success in atomic weaponry combined with British persuasions and Henderson's representations to cause the Truman administration to take another closer look at India. Nehru's upcoming visit provided an occasion for reassessing American policy toward the subcontinent. Despite his suspicions about nonalignment, Acheson realized that India was the only country in Asia with a stable, democratic government. However reluctantly, he came to see it as a bulwark against communist expansion in Asia. In a memorandum to the president, Acheson called Nehru not only "the idol of the [Indian] masses and the mainstay of the government," but "the dominant political figure in Asia." He recommended that during his upcoming visit to the United States, Nehru, who was the head of government and not the chief of state of India, should nevertheless be accorded the kind of welcome normally accorded to chiefs of states.62 At the same time, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson recommended a comprehensive
review of America's Indian policy. Noting his own personal friendship with Nehru, Johnson underscored Nehru's potential value as one of the strongest friends of the United States in Asia. 63

The State Department also acknowledged India's importance in terms of its human and natural resources and political stability, and underscored the need for making India a bulwark against communist expansion in Asia. In a background paper prepared on the eve of Nehru's visit, the State Department echoed Acheson's description of Nehru as the "idol of the Indian masses." But the prime minister had never visited the United States, which he viewed with suspicion and distrust. Therefore, the State Department hoped, the visit would create in the prime minister a friendlier disposition toward the United States and its foreign policy. 64

Despite these promising features, the report demonstrated the continuing lack of understanding of Indian attitudes toward the United States. Those attitudes, the report suggested, resulted from an unstable mixture of fear, jealousy, and admiration that resulted in a determined effort to compensate for a strong feeling of inferiority. The United States should help India overcome these prejudices, the report recommended, and persuade India "to associate itself with those nations including the [United States] which...have acted together within the framework of the [United Nations] to avert the threat of Communist imperialism." The United States should also explore the possibility of forming a regional association of Asian governments under Indian leadership. 65

The assessment of the situation in South Asia in this report was only partially accurate. Indian attitudes toward the United States
were influenced by some unfathomable combination of admiration and jealousy, though the former seem much more important than the latter. Certainly Indians had no reason to fear the United States, for the United States had no military ambitions and only the most modest political hopes in the subcontinent. The State Department had no use for Nehru's understanding of Asian affairs even as it miscalculated the amenability of the Indian leader to American blandishments. Even at this late date, State Department calculations did not take India's perspectives into consideration, and policy recommendations based on its misperception were bound to be unrealistic.

Still, Ambassador Henderson tried to make Nehru's visit to Washington a success. In his dispatches from New Delhi, he sought to familiarize American officials with Nehru's sensitivities. Acknowledging Nehru's anti-American proclivities, Henderson nonetheless wrote, "[Nehru] is a man of a warm heart, of genuine idealism, of shrewd discernment, and of considerable intellectual capacity. He is also an expert politician and a natural leader. If the United States could capture his imagination instead of getting on his English-strung nerves or of stirring his jealousy, his visit would be more than worthwhile."66

Henderson could not have been more correct in characterizing Nehru. While the prime minister was suspicious of America, he was also an open-minded person. In addition, Indian economic needs encouraged him to look to the United States for assistance. If nothing untoward happened to annoy him in the United States, the visit would indeed serve to allay his misgivings concerning America, and thus help improve Indo-American relations.
The press treatment of Nehru's upcoming visit was candid. A diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times reported that officials preparing for Nehru's visit were conscious that the visit might very well open a new chapter in Asian-American relations. Nehru was, this correspondent noted, the most influential political figure in a rapidly changing part of the world. Baffled about how to deal with rising nationalism in Asia, American officials were particularly eager that Nehru's visit be a success. But the correspondent sounded notes of caution. Nehru was a man of fierce convictions, he noted, cultured, outspoken, sensitive, and critical of American capitalist society. While he had taken a stern line against the activities of communists in India, the correspondent continued, Nehru also tended to stand aloof from the political conflicts between the communist and non-communist worlds. "It is not easy," the Times correspondent concluded, "to fit Nehru into [the] ordinary pattern of official visit[or]s." Indeed, while proclaiming his equidistance from Washington and Moscow, Nehru took stern actions against Indian communists. Others noting the trip favorably included the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Newsweek, Time, and Life. All of these newspapers and journals underscored the importance of India and of Nehru in fighting Communism in Asia.

Nehru's expectations were modest. He wanted to explain India's foreign policy to Washington and to the American people, and to raise the aid issue to both. But he would do so with dignity and without leaving the impression that he was begging. Economic assistance, he said, should benefit both donor and recipient. As he pointed out to his chief ministers on the eve of his visit, "If it is to India's
advantage to have [assistance] from the [United States], it is [to] the United States' advantage to help India in this way. The [United States] cannot maintain its position," he added, "unless it trades with the rest of the world and unless standards go up in the underdeveloped countries." He would try to create friendlier relations between India and the United States, and if he did so assistance would automatically follow. 69

Whatever its surface appeal, Nehru's approach aimed chiefly at people-to-people relations, and such relations were not decisive factors in the foreign policies of nations. By creating a favorable impression upon the American public, Nehru would not necessarily change Washington's attitude toward India. His visit thus evidenced not only his naivete, but his lack of understanding of American priorities in the Cold War as well.

To his sister who was also his ambassador in Washington, Madame Pandit, Nehru pragmatically confessed his lack of knowledge of the United States but wondered how he should deal with the government, a people, and an economic elite he did not understand. "I want to be friendly with the Americans," he told Madame Pandit, "but always making it clear what we stand for." He would be friendly to Americans and receptive to their overtures, but he would make no commitments that compromised India's basic interests as he understood them. 70

Coming in the wake of rising expectations, Nehru's visit was a disappointment for all concerned. Although President Truman described the visit as Nehru's "discovery of America", Nehru's hectic three-week tour, which was marked by endless speeches, receptions, and sight-seeing, and punctuated by a brief visit to Canada, was more
tiring than educational for Nehru himself. It was also marked by occasional gaffes which wise counsel might have avoided. The wealth and material prosperity of the United States were too frequently flaunted before the abstemious Nehru. When at a luncheon of bankers in New York, the guests were introduced in terms of the millions each possessed, Nehru was visibly upset. In similar circumstances, an Indian, whatever his resources, would acknowledge not his wealth but his need for assistance, and would never talk publicly of his money in the manner of Nehru's hosts at this unfortunate luncheon. The Indian leader took the luncheon not as a friendly gesture but as a flaunting of wealth. Much later, Madame Pandit observed of the occasion in her autobiography, "I saw [Nehru] literally shrinking into himself." So embarrassed was he that he did not mention India's need for financial assistance for which the luncheon had been arranged. Some of the businessmen present therefore wondered about the prime minister's conduct. Obviously, Nehru and American businessmen had problems of communication.

A similar embarrassment occurred during Acheson's official dinner for Nehru. Among the guests was an India expert, Elbert G. Mathews. Having previously served as Consul in Calcutta (1946-1947) and Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs in the State Department (1947-1948), Mathews was now the Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs. At the dinner, Mathews later recalled, Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder talked loudly and offensively about foreigners coming to the United States and asking for American money. Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who was sitting near Snyder,
must have heard his offensive remarks and reported them to Nehru, but 72
the effects are unknown.

The official discussions between Nehru and Washington officials concluded with no significant accomplishments. Nehru met with Acheson on 12 October, and with Truman and State Department officials on 13 October. These meetings were limited to general discussions, and no significant decisions were made. In fact, the differences of opinion were so great that diplomatic niceties could do nothing to narrow them.

In his meeting with Acheson, Nehru urged immediate withdrawal of the Dutch from Indonesia, while Acheson expressed satisfaction with the phased withdrawal the Dutch were then implementing. Describing Indochinese resistance to the French as nationalistic, Nehru expressed pessimism about the Bao Dai experiment; Acheson, on the other hand, thought the Bao Dai regime necessary to contain communism in the region. Similarly, Nehru's desire for an early recognition of the communist government in China was countered by the American policy of wait and see. Acheson lost his patience when Nehru began to talk in detail about Kashmir. He later recorded, "At this point either due to the lateness of the hour or the complexity of the subject, I found myself becoming confused and suggested that we adjourn the discussion." 73

It is not difficult to understand Acheson's disappointment with Nehru. The secretary expected much more from his visitor than Nehru
was willing to concede, and their conversation therefore was fruitless.

The next day, Nehru met with Truman, and the conversation turned to the same subjects. He described Chinese communism as an "agrarian revolution" that had begun generations ago and had been so mishandled by the Kuomintang that power had fallen by default to the communists. Truman disagreed with this analysis, but did not say so. By this time Indo-American differences were so apparent that Truman preferred silence to debate, but he did urge Nehru to consult the United States before he recognized the communist government of China.

Nehru's meeting with State Department's officials was no more satisfactory. At the meeting, Kennan sketched the development of American attitudes toward foreign relations generally and its responsibilities as a major power specifically; the Indians listened but made no response beyond asking a few questions. It is hard to believe that this meeting was confined to such general matters, but that was indeed the case. However, it did demonstrate that by that time the two governments had become so well aware of the other's views that it was useless to expect anything substantial from further discussion.

Still, Nehru proceeded to explain Indian foreign policy. In a speech to Congress, he tried to dispel American suspicion about India's non-alignment, emphasizing that India's chief concerns in foreign policy were to preserve and promote world peace and human freedom. "We have to achieve freedom and to defend it. We have to meet aggression and to resist it and the force employed must be adequate to the purpose," he told Congress. "We are neither blind to reality nor
do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom, from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral."

If that was reassuring to Americans, Nehru's speech at Columbia University was not. Invited there by the university's president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to receive an honorary doctorate of law, Nehru said with obvious reference to the power blocs, "The very process of marshalling of the world into two hostile camps precipitates the conflicts which it has sought to avoid. It produces a sense of terrible fear, and that fear darkens men's minds and leads them into wrong courses."

American policymakers, McGhee for example, described Nehru's public speeches as attempts to "appeal to the American people over the heads of their government." This was a misreading of Nehru's purpose, which was to explain his policies to both the American government and the American public. In addition, there was nothing unusual about a foreign leader speaking directly to the American people.

American officials found Nehru to be stiff and unbending, even in private. Acheson noted that Nehru talked to him "as Queen Victoria said of Mr. Gladstone, as though I were a public meeting." Expressing his disappointment over their talks, Acheson later wrote, "I was convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship." But the secretary did not lose interest in India, however. "[Nehru] was so important to India," he wrote, "and India's survival so important to all of us, that if he did not exist——
as Voltaire said of God—he would have to be invented. Nevertheless, he was one of the most difficult men with whom I have had to deal." McGhee later recorded in his memoirs that "Nehru came to America with an apparent chip on his shoulder toward American high officials, [whom] he believed could not possibly understand someone with his background." In view of Nehru's expectations concerning the visit to Washington, McGhee's assessment was off the mark. Perhaps McGhee expected the leader of an underdeveloped country to come to Washington with a list of requests for aid. The primary purpose of Nehru's visit was to acquaint himself with American priorities and to explain his views to Washington. Economic assistance was a secondary consideration. His meetings in Washington demonstrated the gulf between the two governments, and convinced him of the futility of requesting economic aid. His silence on economic matters and insistence on nonalignment were no doubt major factors in McGhee's assessment. The basic fact, however, was that McGhee and his colleagues found Nehru's attitude difficult to sympathize with.

Much later, Truman was even less charitable in his assessment of Nehru. In the summer of 1950, Truman asked Justice William Douglas, who was going to India on a personal visit, to spend as much time with Nehru as possible and find out if he was a communist. Probably influenced by Nehru's inclination to recognize the communist government of China, the president added, "I can smell Communists a mile away. And this man Nehru sure looks like a Communist to me." This characterization is a reflection of just how little Truman knew of Nehru. When Douglas came back and told the president that Nehru was "about as much of a Communist as [Truman]" it "was like shouting into
the hurricane." Truman was inclined to brand anyone a communist who disagreed with him on the issue of international communism, and Nehru believed in a policy of accommodation and negotiation. Douglas therefore correctly reminisced, "there was no possibility of any kind of a bridge or access or understanding at all between Truman and Nehru." 82

Nehru was also unimpressed with his American counterparts. On the eve of the visit, Henderson had informed Nehru's financial adviser C.D. Deshmukh that Truman would give Nehru anything he asked for 83 the prime minister refused to make any specific request for assistance. Later Nehru wrote to India's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, "[Americans] had gone all-out to welcome me and I am very grateful to them for it and expressed myself so. But they expected something more than gratitude and goodwill and that more I could not supply them." 84 Nehru did not spell out what he thought the Americans wanted from him, but it is not difficult to guess: America wanted India to align itself with the West, and Nehru refused to do so.

At the National Pres Club during his visit, Nehru acknowledged America's technological and material advancements but noted that such things meant little without cultural, philosophical, and social progress. A Central Intelligence Agency source close to the visitor summarized the prime minister's disappointment with high officials in Washington. Nehru, according to this source, found Truman to be "a mediocre man who, as a result of unexpected circumstances, had been placed in a role far superior to his capacities." The hardline anticomunist stand and Washington's inability to listen to dissident

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views convinced Nehru that the State Department was "uncertain, confused, superficial," and "at the same time pretentious and arrogant." Nehru's overall assessment was that Washington's policies toward India were "fundamentally those of taking over the position which Great Britain had held in the 19th Century." 85

Notwithstanding his differences with the Truman administration, the Indian leader continued to realize the importance of American economic assistance. But if the short term cost of that aid—adherence to America's global policies—was too high, Nehru was prepared to wait. He had only casually mentioned economic assistance, he said later, because he realized "that what was of more fundamental importance was the general reaction of the American people towards India and towards Asia. If that was friendly and cooperative, other things would follow." 86

Personal acquaintances, so essential in the successful conduct of diplomacy, thus worked to widen the gulf between India and the United States. The two governments still defined their basic interests in different ways, and neither made any attempt to narrow the differences, or to downplay them in bilateral relations.

These things made a deep impression on American officials, who now abandoned the idea of extending economic assistance to India. In early November, Acheson informed Henderson that it was not possible for the United States to help India economically. India, he said, would have to develop its economic programs with its own resources and those of the World Bank. 87

Nehru's visit so disappointed the State Department that Acheson recommended that Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan be invited
to Washington. It was, he said, highly desirable to match an invitation to Nehru with one to Khan. "An official visit would afford an opportunity for discussion on subjects of mutual interest," the secretary held, "and also create a favorable impression throughout the Muslim world." Although the evidences are not conclusive, Acheson probably thought that as an Islamic state, Pakistan could serve as a bridge between the United States and oil-rich Muslim West Asia. The disappointment with Nehru certainly encouraged that line of thinking.

If Nehru's foreign policy frustrated the United States, a speech by B.V. Keskar, India's Deputy Minister for External Affairs, infuriated them. India would not only stay out of the power blocs, Keskar said, it would also act to organize a group of nonaligned nations into a third force in international relations. Such a force, he said, would be comprised of neutral nations "believing sincerely in peace". Reporting the substance of this speech to Washington, Howard Donovan, the American charge in New Delhi, remarked, "While Prime Minister Nehru...declared that India is not interested in assuming a role of leadership even in South Asian affairs the possibility cannot be discounted completely that he will step forward at some time which he considers propitious as the champion of a group of smaller nations which have as their objective mediation between the [Soviet Union] and the United States." 89

Nehru neither endorsed nor rejected his deputy's statement. But Donovan was right. Domestic concerns kept Nehru's hands tied for the time being, but once freed from these, the prime minister would if possible play a larger role in international affairs. In the meantime, his silence over Keskar's remarks did not bode well for Indo-American
relations. McGhee reiterated that America could provide no economic assistance to India for the present. During a visit to India in mid-December, McGhee told Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel that American investors did not consider the investment climate favorable in India. Speaking off the record to American journalists later that day, he added that "the extension of direct American financial aid to India, in the form of grants or credits, would not be of political benefit to the United States." India should, McGhee said, look to the World Bank and private investors for credit and assistance.

McGhee's meeting with Nehru during this visit reinforced his opinion. McGhee told Nehru that the United States looked to India for cooperation with other democratic countries in discouraging aggression. Elaborating the terms and conditions under which American investors might invest in India, McGhee said only that his government "would like to see American private investors contribute to Indian development." Nehru was equally evasive, and in McGhee's words, said nothing of "substance." "Whether it was preoccupation [or] straight evasion," McGhee later noted, "I will never know. In any event, it was a very unsatisfactory experience for me." McGhee now feared that Washington would never be able to establish any real basis of understanding with Nehru. But McGhee was as much a part of this problem as Nehru. Educated in Britain as a Rhodes scholar, the thirty-eight year old diplomat in his own words had immense faith in the "white man's burden", and "regretted being too late to be a part of the colonial era." Although practical politics led him to support economic assistance to India, his over-all view of history colored his opinion about that country and clashed with the views of the
sensitive, nationalistic Nehru. For his part, Nehru probably thought it was not worthwhile to reopen the aid and related issues with the assistant secretary so soon after the failure of his own visit to Washington. The fact remains, however, that McGhee's visit was an opportunity to narrow the differences between Washington and New Delhi, and Nehru wasted it.

Within this context of Indo-American discord, the NSC formulated American policy toward Asia in late December 1949. Trying to explain the current situation in Asia, NSC paper 48/1, entitled "The Position of the United States with respect to Asia," totally disregarded internal factors and held Moscow responsible for the instability there. Underscoring Soviet links with communists in China, North Korea, and Southeast Asia, the paper concluded, "The [Soviet Union] is now an Asiatic power of the first magnitude with expanding influence and interests throughout continental Asia and the Pacific." 93

NSC 48/1 ruled out India as the mainstay of American policy in Asia. Noting India's refusal to join either power bloc, its eagerness to form a third force of nonaligned nations, and Nehru's naivete toward the red tide, the paper concluded, "It would be unwise for [the United States] to regard South Asia, more particularly India, as the bulwark against the extension of Communist control in Asia." 94 Evidently, this meant that Southeast Asia must become that bulwark.

Meanwhile events in Southeast Asia widened the gulf between Washington and New Delhi. On 18 January 1950, China recognized Ho Chi Minh's government in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union did likewise on 30 January. On 3 February, Acheson responded to these moves by recommending to Truman that Washington recognize the French-sponsored
governments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in order to demonstrate its displeasure with communist tactics which he thought were aimed at eventual domination of Asia.  

The Department of Defense was likewise concerned. The JCS cautioned that the "fall" of Indochina to the communists would lead to the "fall" of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. They further noted, "Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian peninsula. The security of the three major non-communist base areas in this quarter of the world—Japan, India, and Australia—depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists." The Chiefs therefore recommended early military aid to Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma.  

Earlier, the threat of instability in Asia had encouraged the State Department to think of India as the centerpiece of its anticommunist effort in Asia. Now, however, the growing instability in Asia led the Department to abandon that idea. A nonaligned India was, in Washington's view, an unreliable ally militarily as well as politically. The mainstay of the continent's defense against communist expansion would thus be Southeast Asia. 

This left India to defend itself. Like other countries of Asia, India was vulnerable to both super powers, each of which was capable of devastating its territory and wrecking its economy. For India to build a military force strong enough to defend itself against communist aggression would require the diversion of scarce resources from economic development. That in turn would weaken the very foundations of the state and make it an easy target for communist
subversion. Given such considerations, nonalignment seemed a lesser evil than containment.

This again precluded improvement in Indo-American relations, which in fact deteriorated again as a result of Kashmir. On 4 January 1950, Sardar Patel publicly predicted in Bombay war between India and Pakistan over the disputed province. Alarmed by this statement, Acheson asked his British counterpart Bevin to urge restraint upon Indian leaders, who were presently due to meet Bevin at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Colombo.97

Acheson's request came to nothing, but his next step, which was an obvious overreaction to Patel's statement, made matters worse between India and the United States. Noting Pakistan's acceptance of the Security Council resolutions on Kashmir with satisfaction and India's rejection of them with disapproval, the secretary instructed the American representative to the United Nations, Warren Austin, to warn the Indian delegation that the United States would support any proposal that the Security Council adopted on Kashmir regardless of the Indian position.98

A bit of drama ensued when Austin delivered this message to Bajpai and Madame Pandit. While Austin read the secretary's letter, the Indians listened with "stone" faces, and "without saying a word," prepared to leave. Before leaving, however, Bajpai inquired if the message was intended as a threat. Austin replied in the negative.99 Nehru's sharp reaction to this incident reached Washington the next day. He complained that Acheson's message was not only unfriendly but an apparent effort to threaten India. Noting that the message was thus unhelpful, he reiterated his government's refusal to accept
intervention of this kind. He also voiced his personal resentment at Acheson's action. "I would like to add," he wrote, "that it is a matter of great personal regret to me that Mr. Secretary Acheson should have sent us a message of this kind." To India's representative in the United Nations, B.N. Rau, Nehru confided, "I am sick and tired of the attitude that the British and the American Governments have been taking in this matter." "The people who run the Government of India have a record in the past of standing for what they consider to be right," he told the press on 6 February 1950, "and they propose to do that in regard to Kashmir or any other matter." Actually, even Henderson found the American position on the Kashmir dispute unclear. He wrote the State Department asking:

a. whether it disagreed with the Indian contention that Pakistan committed aggression in Kashmir;
b. whether it disagreed with India that Pakistan should not be permitted to profit from its forceful entry into Kashmir by remaining in control of various regions during plebiscite;
c. whether it took the view that Pakistani control of these regions would not be advantageous to Pakistan during plebiscite.

In his reply, Acheson responded not to these questions; instead, he laid out American policy concerning the dispute and emphasized his commitment to a balanced position between India and Pakistan. Noting that the Kashmiri Maharaja's accession of the province to India was not final, he held that the dispute must be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir expressed through a fair plebiscite. Demilitarization, he insisted, was a necessary precondition for a fair plebiscite. Acheson's response illustrated his ignorance of the complexities of the dispute as well as the relative merits of the Indian and Pakistani positions. Needless to
say, his proposals for a negotiated settlement were not acceptable to India.

Henderson tried to salvage some goodwill between India and America. Underscoring the "steadily strengthening" anti-American feeling in India, he reported from New Delhi in April 1950 that the American position on Kashmir and the failure to extend economic assistance to India had particularly angered Indians. Indian goodwill could only be retrieved, he told Acheson, by altering American policy on these two issues.105 Henderson's assessment was no doubt incorrect. Indo-American differences at this time were fundamental, and it is doubtful that any amount of money could have narrowed them.

In response to Henderson's assessment, Acheson again dismissed the idea of extending direct economic assistance to India. "As in the past, so in the future," he wrote Henderson, "economic assistance to India and other countries can only be forthcoming when there is coincident Indian receptivity and our own ability, and constructive purpose to be served." Regarding Kashmir, Acheson observed that while America's intention was to see a negotiated settlement, both India and Pakistan had charged Washington with [a] partisan attitude. He dismissed these accusations "as possible tactic[s] designed [to] influence [the United States] to cease [following] a strictly impartial line."106

Concerned officials of the State Department, under McGhee's leadership, took a different view of India in the context of the Cold War. In a 7 June memorandum to Acheson, McGhee noted that India, Pakistan and Afghanistan were the only countries bordering the Soviet Union in which the United States had no economic assistance programs.
These countries, he added, had non-communist governments which were increasingly faced with instability. Although McGhee probably thought these governments faced no immediate problem of subversion, he nevertheless recommended substantial economic assistance to strengthen them. Assistance through Point Four, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Export Import Bank, McGhee noted, were not adequate. Washington should therefore plan a program of direct economic assistance beginning in 1952 to enable these countries to carry out development projects. Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor as Director of the Policy Planning Staff, strongly endorsed McGhee's recommendations. In his memorandum to Acheson, Nitze suggested that the sphere of economic assistance be widened to include the countries of West and Southeast Asia as well.

While these recommendations were being discussed at the State Department, one of the most important events of the Cold War occurred. On June 25, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Within a matter of hours the United Nations Security Council, then being boycotted by the Soviet representative, adopted a resolution condemning the invasion and asking North Korea to withdraw its troops immediately.

Having no time to consult his government, the Indian representative on the Security Council, B.N. Rau, voted for the resolution. The Indian government agreed that North Korea was the aggressor but subsequently advised him not to commit himself in the future before consulting New Delhi. Therefore, when the Security Council adopted another resolution on 27 June calling upon all UN members to furnish assistance to South Korea to repel the
aggression, Rau, unable to reach New Delhi, abstained from voting.

In the meantime, American policymakers decided that the invasion by North Korea illustrated that "Communist Imperialism has passed beyond subversion in seeking [to] conquer independent nations and [is] now resorting to armed aggression and war." The United States, therefore, could not sit idly by and watch aggression triumph. Accordingly President Truman ordered American air and sea forces into combat in Korea, directed them to prevent any attack on Taiwan, and began military assistance to the Philippines and the French in Indochina.

Henderson lobbied both Bajpai and Nehru to get India to join the other democratic countries in UN action in Korea. He tried to impress upon them that the "Soviet-inspired North Korean action made it clear that international communism was now embarking on [a] policy of using undisguised force in order [to] achieve its objectives." Nehru explained that the second resolution on Korea was passed in such haste that his representative at the United Nations did not have the time to consult New Delhi. But he considered the resolution to be fair, and said his government would soon make a statement supporting it. The Indian Cabinet issued a statement supporting this resolution. India's support for the UN action in Korea enhanced Nehru's status in Washington, and Nehru's three-week tour of Southeast Asia, which came shortly thereafter, added to it. During his tour of Burma and Indonesia, Nehru spoke vehemently against communism and warned his audiences to be aware of the "new imperialism" that it posed. More importantly, he advised Indonesians to forget their past animosity toward the Dutch and look to the future. During Nehru's absence from
New Delhi, Bajpai informed Henderson that he was preparing a memorandum for the prime minister urging him to adopt a more "positive" foreign policy. Although Bajpai did not explain further, Henderson predicted more vocal support by India for the West. In the State Department, Raymond Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, construed Indian action in the United Nations and Nehru's recent speeches as "manifestation[s] of this more positive foreign policy". 117

But the assessments turned out to be too optimistic. Nehru did not give full support to American action concerning Taiwan and Indochina. Although his suspicions of the Soviet Union remained unchanged, he thought Washington had reacted in a "hysterical" manner in extending its military commitments in Southeast and East Asia. Writing to India's chief ministers on 15 July 1950, he again criticized both power blocs. "We face today a vast and powerful Soviet group of nations," he told the chief ministers, "which tends to become a monolithic bloc, not only pursuing a similar internal economic policy but a common foreign policy. That policy is an expansionist one and thus there is a tendency for it to come into conflict with others." On the other hand, he continued, the Western power bloc tended to encourage "reactionary and military elements" in various countries, especially in Asia. "By the logic of events," he added, "it supports the relics of colonial rule." 118 Thus, Nehru feared both communist expansion and the efforts of the Western powers to maintain their colonial presence in Asia. The Indian government therefore initiated moves to settle the Korean dispute. The Indian ambassador to Moscow, Radhakrishnan, sought secretly to mediate between the Soviets
and the Americans over Korea. On 7 July he met with Alan G. Kirk, the American ambassador, and urged the United States to recognize the communist government of China and support its admission to the United Nations and to the Chinese seat in the Security Council. In that way China could be weaned away from its dependence on the Soviet Union and begin to behave in a responsible manner. A few days later, the Indian counselor in Moscow, R.P. Kapur, gave Kirk another message from his ambassador. This message, which urged North Korean withdrawal beyond 38th parallel, had also been delivered to the Soviets, who rejected it, and to the Chinese, who accepted it. Emphasizing his government's desire to wean China from the Soviet Union, Kapur claimed that this difference between the Soviet Union and China was significant, and he hoped the American government would act to exploit it. The result, he said, might be a split between the Kremlin and Peking "which is one of important objectives of [the government of India] in its present effort."

The Indian proposal was not favorably received in Washington, though Washington had its own reasons for desiring to wean China from the Soviet union. American policymakers privately acknowledged the differences between China and the Soviet Union but were unwilling to do so publicly for they feared that would encourage communist parties all over the world and generate unfavorable public reaction at home. In addition, most policymakers possibly were disinclined to entrust a nonaligned India with so sensitive a task as the Indians were proposing to undertake. The American ambassador in London, Lewis Douglas held that while India's position in Asia was very important, its policy of recognizing China and urging its admission to the United
Nations would aggravate the threat to independent states in the East. Acheson thus instructed Kirk to discourage the Indian effort.

Nehru then decided to involve himself personally in the effort, dispatching similar messages to Acheson and Stalin. He appealed to the two superpowers to localize the conflict in Korea and to support China's admission to United Nations as a step toward resolving the conflict. Stalin agreed to Nehru's proposals but Washington did not. While agreeing with Nehru that the dispute should be settled peacefully, Acheson replied that the admission of China to the United Nations should not be dictated by an "unlawful aggression." In New Delhi, Henderson expressed surprise at the Indian policy. "How," he asked a Cabinet member, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, "could anyone seriously believe that at a time when American lives were being sacrificed in supporting [the United Nations] opposition to aggression, [the United States] Government would be expected to...support admission into [the Security Council] of [the] regime that was lauding [the] aggressor and condemning [the United States] and [the United Nations] for opposing aggression?"

Nehru had no sympathy for such concerns. Considering the American strategy as one that dismissed India's opinion on Asian matters, he posed a question in Parliament, "Are we [Indians] to push away our special knowledge, our special position and special opportunities and function as a nation saying 'ditto' to others without any special knowledge?" From his long experience in opposing colonial rule, Nehru understood the roots of insurgency in Southeast Asia better than American policymakers, who equated insurgent nationalism with
communism. Whether or not Washington agreed with Nehru, American policymakers should have consulted him on the insurgencies. They did not and missed an opportunity to better understand what they regarded as an implacable problem.

At this point, Acheson seemed to see some merit in Nehru's suggestion for consultation. Noting the increasingly skeptical response of Asian opinion to the UN action in Korea, Acheson pointed out to Henderson that most Asian governments were not convinced of America's devotion to peace. Washington, he continued, should establish an Asian network for consultation on Asian and other world problems comparable to that already in place in Europe. Henderson replied that unless the United States extended substantial economic assistance to India or the communist powers engaged in fresh adventures that frightened Indian leaders, it would be difficult to bring about close cooperation between Washington and New Delhi in international affairs. It is instructive that Henderson considered the Indian stance on world problems chiefly in terms of money. India doubtless needed assistance, but its position on international issues was much more a matter of conviction than of narrow economic interest.

Acheson therefore abandoned the idea of consultation, and sought to improve relations with India by providing the assistance McGhee had earlier recommended. On 28 August, McGhee wrote a memorandum reiterating the views he had expressed on 7 June. Acheson discussed the substance of this memorandum with Truman. Both men now thought it was important to extend aid to the countries of South Asia, but both thought it would be difficult to get the necessary measures through Congress in view of American commitments.
elsewhere. They therefore asked State Department officials to raise the matter privately with congressional leaders. 132 Aid to India was still a long-range policy objective.

Thus free to act, McGhee immediately arranged two meetings with congressional leaders. On 1 September, he met with seven members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and later that day with three senators. Noting the significance of South Asia for American interests, McGhee emphasized the necessity of saving the region from anarchy or communist aggression. India and Pakistan, he said, were a nucleus of strength, having stable governments and large armies. The economic situation in the region was deteriorating, however, and McGhee used this fact to underscore the communist threat there. The Korean war, he said, might well mean that the focus of the Cold War had shifted to Asia. McGhee also stressed the importance of Nehru's role in any effort to wean China away from the Soviet Union. The response to McGhee's discussion was generally favorable, but nothing came of his effort immediately.

In fact, at Truman's direction, the effort to secure aid for South Asia was placed on hold for the rest of the year. 134 For the time being, India had access only to loans from the International Monetary Fund and to $4.5 million appropriated for fiscal 1951 under the Point Four Program. 135

One reason for shelving the issue of economic assistance to India was the turn of events in the Korean war. As long as America's performance in that war was satisfactory, and by this time it was, Washington did not seek Indian help against aggression in Asia.

After the initial setbacks in Korea, in which American forces
were pushed to the southern corner of the peninsula, American fortunes were reversed by the landing of forces at Inchon behind the North Korean lines on 15 September. As American forces began rapidly marching northward, Chinese officials began to warn of the consequences of an American invasion into North Korea. At this time, the United States had no diplomatic representation in Peking and the chief British representative was only a charge d'affaires who had no diplomatic standing. The Indian ambassador, K.M. Panikkar, therefore, became the link between China and the United States. On 25 September, General Nieh Yen-jung, the chief of staff of the Chinese army, warned Panikkar that China would not sit back with folded hands while the American army came up to its borders. At midnight of 2 October, Chou En-lai pointedly told Panikkar that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel China would intervene in the war. Chou however assured Panikkar that no such action would be taken if only South Korean forces entered North Korea. Panikkar sent these messages to Nehru, who appealed to Chou to exercise patience, while he communicated Chou's warning to Washington.

The warning was ignored in Washington. Encouraged by their successes on the battlefield, American policymakers dismissed Chou's statement as a "warning" and "not an authoritative statement of policy." President Truman also regarded it as another effort at communist propaganda.

But the Chinese meant what they said. As American forces marched toward the Yalu River on the border of China, thousands of Chinese "volunteers" poured into Korea to resist them. On 3 November, the United States succeeded in getting the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
passed by the UN General Assembly. This resolution endorsed the
collective security measures then in effect, including the use of force
in Korea. Disappointed at the American refusal to heed its advice
against crossing the 38th parallel, India abstained from voting on the
resolution. Meanwhile the entry of the Chinese had once again reversed
the military tide. After 26 November, when Chinese regular army units
crossed the Yalu, the American forces began to retreat southward. On
30 November, Truman publicly hinted that he might use the atom bomb
against the North Korean and Chinese forces. Nehru feared that both
Peking and Washington were behaving recklessly, and on 30 November, he
reiterated his position that India would stay out of military
involvement in Korea no matter what happened there. 140

Ruling out military participation did not mean a slowing of
India's political efforts to end the war. On the contrary, Nehru
accelerated those efforts. He proposed a cease-fire and creation of a
demilitarized zone between the opposing armies, followed by
multi-national negotiations, including China, to settle the future of
Korea and Taiwan. Chou showed interest in these proposals, but the
Truman administration refused to negotiate with an "aggressor".
Annoyed at Nehru's mediation efforts, Truman told a congressman on 18
December, "Nehru has sold us down the Hudson. His attitude has been
responsible for our losing the war in Korea." 141 The truth was more
nearly the reverse. Had the United States heeded Nehru's advice and
stopped its forces at the 38th parallel, Washington might have averted
further losses in the war. Besides, a cease-fire at that point would
have afforded the United States a strong negotiating position. But
confident of its military strength, the administration missed this opportunity.

Despite Truman's complaints against Nehru, India's importance to Washington soared after the Chinese intervention. In a policy statement on 1 December, the State Department underscored the need for India to "voluntarily" associate itself with the United States in opposing communism. Expressing its desire to strengthen the present pro-Western government in New Delhi, the statement emphasized the need to help India develop its economy so that its people could resist subversion. 142

Therefore, when India faced a serious food crisis and approached the United States for assistance, the request received sympathetic consideration. With his people facing the prospect of famine, the Indian Minister for Agriculture, K.M. Munshi, met with Henderson in New Delhi on 6 November and apprised him of the situation. The Indian public, the minister noted, was not yet aware of the magnitude of the danger, and the government had to procure grains before it was too late. If the United States had any intention of extending economic assistance to India, Munshi added, now was the appropriate moment to do so. Such a gesture might also influence the direction of India's foreign policy, Munshi hinted. 143

Munshi, considered by Henderson to be sympathetic to America's foreign policy objectives, made a profound impact upon the ambassador. His approach was soon followed by a series of sympathetic gestures from other members of the Indian government. On 1 November, Finance Minister Deshmukh informed Henderson that Nehru had finally accepted the necessity for American food assistance. In Washington, Madame
Pandit likewise told McGhee that Nehru would be willing to accept American economic assistance provided it had no political strings attached to it. 144

Acheson and McGhee were not surprised when, on 16 December, Ambassador Pandit formally requested assistance. Outlining the magnitude of India's needs, she told Acheson that the nation's total deficit in grains would be six million tons, four million of which India would buy on the world market, but the remainder must come from the United States on credit for India could not pay or it. Acheson noted that such a large request would require congressional approval and he could make no promises. However, he assured Pandit that he and the United States government would like to be helpful. 145

During the conversation, Acheson tried to link American aid to foreign policy. Expressing sympathy for India's predicament, he cautioned Pandit that "it would be unwise to approach congress without a reasonable assurance that congress would act favorably," and that reasonable assurance depended on Indian foreign policy. Congress, he said, would want to know that India appreciated American policy in Korea and that New Delhi agreed that intra-regional differences, including Kashmir, must be settled peacefully. The food request would have an easy passage through Congress, Acheson assured Pandit, if the Congress could have assurances on these two points. Pandit responded by detailing the negotiations then underway between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Regarding Korea, she replied that India realized the threat of communist expansionism but could not align itself against the Soviet Union for fear of Soviet reprisals. Although Acheson was not satisfied with Pandit's replies, McGhee concluded the discussion.

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by saying an all out alignment was not necessary. 146

McGhee then escorted Pandit to his office where the two resumed the discussion. There, McGhee was more candid about American objectives concerning India. Emphasizing the communist threat in South and Southeast Asia, McGhee suggested that it could be met only by some sort of a collective security arrangement between India and Pakistan. The United States would be willing to grant active assistance, particularly arms assistance, if such an arrangement could be worked out, McGhee said. 147

McGhee was serious, but his proposal was far from being practical. India and Pakistan considered each other implacable enemies, as border skirmishes between their armies only recently attested anew. To think of them forming a military alliance was out of the question for anyone who understood the situation.

Shortly thereafter, Pandit left Washington for London to meet with Nehru who was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. There she conveyed to Nehru the substance of her recent talks with Acheson and McGhee. The prime minister's reactions were far from reassuring for the Americans. With regard to Korea, Nehru took the lead in proposing a four-power meeting between representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of their differences in Asia. 148 Meanwhile, Nehru and Liaquat, who also attended the London conference, failed to come to an agreement on Kashmir. 149

To turn down McGhee's proposal of 29 December through diplomatic channel would have been much better than speaking against it publicly. Yet Nehru did just that. To be sure, his speech emphasized the
resurgence of a new and independent Asia and the need to understand this phenomenon when dealing with Asian governments and issues. "Great nations have arisen in Asia with long memories of the past," he said in London, "with their eyes fixed on a future of promise. If we desire peace, we must develop the temper of peace and try to win over those who may be suspicious of us....We have to try to understand others just as we expect them to understand us. We cannot seek peace in the language of war or of threats." Back in India, he repeated these statements in Parliament. These were certainly not the words of a prospective leader of an anti-Communist alliance. Both India and the United States desired peace, but that common goal took them down different roads.

Nehru's statements were unfavorably received in Washington, particularly by McGhee. Acknowledging that "honest differences of opinion are one thing," McGhee wondered "whether the manner in which Mr. Nehru has publicly expressed his views on Far Eastern problems does not indicate a growing lack of friendliness on the part of India." Nehru's speech, McGhee believed, precluded further cooperation with India. Noting the unfavorable reaction in Congress to Nehru's policies, McGhee concluded that while emergency food assistance might be granted, there was no prospect of long-term program of economic assistance.

Acheson vented his disappointment to Madame Pandit when she met him on 27 January to convey Nehru's "objective of friendship of the United States." Noting Nehru's desire for peace, Acheson told Pandit "that it was not so much his objectives as the way in which he said and did things which caused us a lot of trouble." For her part, Pandit
hoped the United States and India could "find common ground on which to obtain a foothold." A military alliance was not such ground.

The years 1949 and 1950, therefore, witnessed no significant departure in Indo-American relationship. In the initial months of this period, America's Cold War preoccupations in Europe led to a neglecting of India. As that war unfolded in Asia, Washington began to take a closer look at the subcontinent, and hoped for a while to make India a bulwark against communist expansion. But the two countries had pronounced differences over international issues which neither was unwilling to give up. On the economic front, India did not press for American assistance despite its needs, and India's refusal to acquiesce in American foreign policy objectives encouraged Washington to withhold aid. Indo-American relations, therefore, remained at a low level.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER III


3. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1949, 711.45/1-849, Record Group 59, Box 3323, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as NA).

4. Ibid.


7. Nehru to chief ministers, 6 December 1949, ibid., p. 232.


11. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 251-303.


15. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1949, 711.45/1-849, RG 59, NA.


17. Inaugural address at the Conference on Indonesia, 20 January 1949, in Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 410-411.

18. Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 8 March 1949, ibid., p. 22.

19. Speech at the India Council of World Affairs, 22 March 1949, ibid., p. 49.

20. Ibid., p. 44.


22. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 1 February 1949, 711.45/2-149, RG 59, NA.
23. Acheson to American Ambassador in New Delhi, 2 February 1949, 711.45/2-149, ibid.
24. The Ambassador to India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 24 January 1949, FRUS, VI: 1690-1691.
25. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 31 March, ibid., p. 1696.
26. Henderson to the Secretary of State, with enclosed Conversation with Bajpai, 18 March 1949, 745.00/3-1849, RG 59, NA.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 45.
30. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 30 March 1949, 745.00/3-3049, RG 59, NA.
32. Ibid.
33. Chapter II, note 29.
35. Ibid.
37. For Acheson's news conference, see The Hindu (Madras, India), 28 January 1948.
39. See for example, Baltimore Sun, 28 January 1949; Life, 29 January
1949; and *Time*, 30 January 1949.

40. For example, see *The Hindu, The Statesman*, of the same period.


42. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (Johnson) to the National Security Council (Sidney W. Souers), 10 June 1949, cited in ibid., pp. 90-91.


45. Krishna Menon's account of conversation with Nehru, cited in ibid., 59.

46. Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting on India Policy Statement," 22 April 1949, 711.45/4-2249, RG 59, NA.


48. Memorandum of Conversation with British Foreign Secretary (Bevin), by the Secretary of State (Acheson), 4 April 1949, *FRUS, 1949*: VI: 50-54.

49. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1949, ibid., 1707.

50. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 29 May 1949, ibid., pp. 1713-1714.

51. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 11 June, ibid., pp. 1719-1720.

52. Douglas to Secretary of State, 29 July 1949, cited in Merrill, "Bread and the Ballot," p. 70.
53. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 30 July, FRUS, 1949: VI: 1728-1729.

54. Ibid., p. 1731, n. 2.

55. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 25 August 1949, with enclosed Truman to Nehru, ibid., pp. 1733-1734.

56. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, with enclosed Nehru to Truman, 8 September 1949, ibid., pp. 1736-1738.

57. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1949, cited in Merrill, "Bread and the Ballot," p. 70.


59. Ibid.

60. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1949, ibid., p. 71.

61. Report by the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 16 August, 1949, FRUS, 1949: VI: 814-815.

62. Memorandum for the President, by Acheson, 18 August 1949, President's Secretary's File, India-Nehru PSF Subject file folder, Box 180, HSTL.


64. "Importance of Prime Minister Nehru's Visit," undated, President's Secretary's File, India-Nehru PSF Subject file folder, Box 180, HSTL.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
73. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State with Nehru, 12 October 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64, Memorandum of Conversation October-November 1949 folder, HSTL.
75. Memorandum of Conversation, among Nehru, Pandit, Bajpai, Acheson, Jessup, Thorp, McGhee, Kennan, Battle, Mathews, 13 October 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64, Memorandum of Conversation October-November 1949 folder, HSTL.
77. Speech at the Columbia University, 17 October, ibid., p. 30.
78. McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World*, p. 47.

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80. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, p. 47.


82. Ibid.

83. Deshmukh's interview with S. Gopal, cited in Gopal, Nehru: II: 60.

84. Nehru to Radhakrishnan, 6 February 1950, quoted in ibid., pp. 60-61.

85. Nehru quoted in Brands, Jr., The Specter of neutralism, p. 35.

86. Nehru to chief ministers, 1 December, Letters: I: 483-484.


88. The Secretary of State (Acheson) to the President (Truman), 4 November, quoted in Venkataramani, American Role, p. 93.

89. Donovan to the Secretary of State, 23 November 1949, 745.00/11-2349, RG 59, Box 3996, NA.

90. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, pp. 100-101.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., p. 8.

93. NSC 48/1, Draft, 23 December 1949, PSF Subject File, Box 211, Truman Papers, HSTL. This document was approved at a meeting of the NSC on 29 December 1949 and by the president on 30 December as NSC 48/1.

94. Ibid.

96. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defence (Johnson), 10 April 1950, cited in ibid., p. 111.


98. The Secretary of State to the United States' Representative at the United Nations (Austin), 13 January 1950, ibid., pp. 1367-1368.

99. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, 13 January 1950, ibid., pp. 1368-1369.

100. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, with enclosed Nehru to Acheson, 16 January 1950, ibid., pp. 1369-1372.


103. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 16 January, *FRUS, 1950*: V: 1372-1373.

104. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 11 February 1950, ibid., p. 1384; and The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 11 February 1950, ibid., pp. 1382-1383.

105. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 12 April 1950, *FRUS, 1950*: V: 1461-1463.
106. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 21 April, ibid., pp. 1464-1466.

107. India still was not receiving any amount under the Point Four Program.

108. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, 7 June 1950, FRUS, 1950: V: 169-171.

109. Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State, 13 June 1950, ibid., pp. 172-173.


113. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 27 June 1950, repeated to New Delhi, ibid., pp. 186-187. For an


115. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 29 June, *ibid.*, pp. 230-231.


117. Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State, 3 July 1950, *FRUS, 1950: V*: 1466-1468.


119. Kirk to the Secretary of State, 8 July, "Selected Records Relating to the Korean War," Box 4, Indian efforts to mediate folder, HSTL.

120. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, 10 July, *FRUS, 1950: VII*: 340-342.

121. For example, see David Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy*


123. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 11 July, ibid., pp. 359-360.

124. American Embassy in New Delhi to the Department of State, with enclosed Nehru to Acheson, 14 July 1950, "Selected Records Relating to the Korean War," Box 4, Indian efforts to mediate folder, HSTL.

125. The Indian Ambassador (Pandit) to the Secretary of State, 17 July, with enclosed Stalin to Nehru of 16 July, FRUS, 1950: VII: 408.

126. Exchange of messages between Secretary of State Acheson and Prime Minister Nehru, undated, "Selected Records Relating to the Korean War," Box 4, Indian efforts to mediate folder, HSTL.

127. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 21 July, ibid.

128. Henderson to the Secretary of State, 4 August 1950, ibid.

129. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 15 August, FRUS, 1950: V: 1468-1469.

130. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 23 August 1950, ibid., pp. 1469-1470.

131. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the President, 28 August, ibid., pp. 178-180.

132. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, by Acheson, 28 August, Acheson Papers, Box 65, HSTL.

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134. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, p. 218.


138. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 452.


143. Henderson to the State Department, 6 November 1950, 891.231/11-650, RG 59, NA.

144. Henderson to the State Department, 17 December 1950, 891.231/12-1450, RG 59, NA.

145. Memorandum of Conversation with Madame Pandit, 16 December 1950, Acheson Papers, HSTL.

146. Memorandum of Conversation among Pandit, Acheson, and McGhee, by
Mr. Weil (Office of South Asian Affairs), 29 December 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 65, memorandum of Conversation December 1950 folder, HSTL.


149. Ibid., pp. 114-115.

150. Broadcast from London, 12 January 1951, in Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 185.


152. McGhee to the Secretary, 25 January 1951, 611.91/1-2552, RG 59, Box 2852, NA.

Although India's refusal to join the Western alliance jeopardized its chances of obtaining emergency food assistance from the United States, Washington's Cold War objectives once again raised New Delhi's hopes for that assistance in late 1950 and early 1951. During this time, policy papers of the American government on South Asia emphasized the importance of a non-communist India and the role economic assistance could play in New Delhi's efforts to resist internal subversion. Following the State Department's policy statement of 1 December 1950, the NSC made its own assessment of India's role in Cold War in Asia. "With China under Communist domination, Soviet power now encroaches along the perimeter of the Indian sub-continent," NSC 98/1 noted. "India has become the pivotal state in non-Communist Asia by virtue of its relative power, stability and influence." Yet its grinding poverty invited social and political unrest, and its democratic government, the paper cautioned, might lose power if no progress is made in improving social and economic conditions. American security interests in South Asia were thus at stake. "The loss of China, the immediate threat to Indochina and the balance of Southeast Asia...and the reverses in Korea have greatly increased the significance to the United States of the political, strategic, manpower, and resource potential of South Asia," the paper continued, "and made it more important that this potential be marshalled on the side of the United States." Therefore, the United States should do
whatever was necessary to maintain the present government in India, including the development of friendly relations with it. ¹

The United States should, the NSC paper also recommended, begin exploring the possibility of establishing air and naval bases in South Asia, and make certain that the Soviets were excluded from the area. Meanwhile, the existing practice of coordinating South Asian policy with Britain should continue, but the United States should initiate policies independently of the British wherever that would further American objectives. Specifically, Washington should seek closer relations with India and Pakistan, and encourage those nations to integrate their economies and strategic interests with those of the West.²

While the paper pointed to increased economic assistance to both India and Pakistan, what made it significant was that for the first time a major statement of American policy raised the possibility of military assistance to both countries and American involvement in regional defense. This suggests that Washington had not given up the hope of enlisting India on its side in the Cold War, and regarded New Delhi's earlier refusal to do that as a reversible position. Such emphasis on the benefits of closer ties with India set the stage for favorable action on India's request for grain.

The NSC assessment again represented wishful thinking, because it ignored the deep hatreds and bitterness that separated the peoples of India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, public support for emergency food aid to India nevertheless developed independently of the government's strategic calculations. On 4 January, the American Emergency Food Committee for India was formed with the support of such notables as
Dorothy Norman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Pearl S. Buck, and the endorsement of such groups as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Young Men's Christian Association. In the same month, leading newspapers, including the New York Times, the Atlanta Constitution, the Christian Science Monitor, and Washington Post, endorsed the Indian request, mainly on humanitarian grounds.

The Indian request received support in Congress too. On 8 January, 1951, Representative Jacob Javits of New York introduced a resolution urging assistance for India, and in the Senate, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey took the lead in pressing the administration for swift approval of India's request. On 30 January, a bipartisan group of twenty-five senators and representatives signed a letter to Truman repeating the plea for rapid approval.

Policymakers at the State Department also supported the Indian request. Their inquiries to the Department of Commerce confirmed that the grain was available as was the shipping space necessary to move it to India. Meanwhile, from New Delhi, Ambassador Henderson urged expeditious approval of the request. Noting the unfavorable reaction, particularly in Congress, to Nehru's policy of nonalignment, the envoy nevertheless warned that failure to provide aid promptly would strengthen anti-American elements in the Indian cabinet and weaken elements friendly to the United States. "Procrastination of [a] character which might give [the] impression [that] we are approaching [the] problem in [a] calculating or haggling spirit," Henderson cabled, "will tend [to] dim [the] generosity [of] our decision and
prevent [the] grant from having [an] impact on [the] Indian public as beneficial to [the] US as prompt and ungrudging action would be. On 30 January, McGhee summarized the case for expeditious approval of the request on humanitarian and political grounds. "If we do not assist India in its present crisis, elements inimical to the United States and the Western world generally will be strengthened," McGhee wrote Acheson. "If, as is probable, millions die of starvation, we shall find it difficult to live with our own consciences, and our dwindling credit in much of Asia will be further reduced." On the other hand, McGhee continued, favorable action on the request "could mitigate much of the anti-western bitterness which enabled Nehru to maintain his present posture in foreign affairs." Humanitarian consideration were thus linked to political objectives such as McGhee's desire to bolster India's democratic government as an Asian alternative to communist China. This combination did much to lessen the burden of anti-Indian criticism in Congress.

Although the growing support from within and without the administration seemed to suggest an easy approval of the Indian request, there was formidable opposition too. Some leading members of the administration as well as Congress were not enthusiastic about assisting a country that remained outside the nation's Cold War alliance system. For example, Economic Cooperation Administrator William C. Foster wrote McGhee, "I am not quite clear that [Nehru] is 'on the side of the Angels.'" Acknowledging that the United States should do whatever it could in the interest of humanity, Foster added, "With our resources strained to the utmost, aid should be given in [160]
fullest measure to those who are demonstrably on our side and willing to fight for it." 

Some key congressmen also opposed the Indian request. India's opposition in the United Nations to an American-sponsored resolution condemning China as an "aggressor" in Korea annoyed many in Congress. Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, publicly hinted that India's uncooperative attitude might cause his committee to defer a decision on the request.

The State Department therefore proceeded with caution, and not until more than a month after the initial request was made did McGhee appear before Congressional committees to testify in favor of it. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 January, McGhee faced considerable opposition. Noting India's nonaligned policy and Nehru's criticisms of the United States, some committee members doubted the wisdom of aiding that country. Connally complained that "Nehru is out giving us hell at the time, working against us and voting against us. Is this a proposition to buy him? He [will not] stay bought, if you buy him." McGhee made it clear he was not defending Nehru's foreign policy but speaking only in respect to India's request for grain. When Senator Wiley asked for a quid pro quo, perhaps a defense arrangement with India, McGhee noted that Nehru asked for the aid without conditions. Nehru was, McGhee said, the only leader in Asia commanding wide popularity in his country and the only leader there of a relatively stable nation who had a basic orientation to the West. A favorable response to his request would not only save millions of lives but also create goodwill in New Delhi. Only Senator Alexander Smith was favorable to the administration's request. Senator
J. William Fulbright voiced opposition, and predicted the request would not be approved by the Congress. It was therefore in his view a mistake to introduce a bill in Congress to grant the request. India could, instead, Fulbright suggested, buy wheat from the United States. Unimpressed by McGhee's arguments, Senator Guy M. Gillette said, "There is a lack of enthusiasm on my part for this proposal, and that is an understatement." In the end, Connally bluntly warned McGhee, "You are going to have one hell of a time getting this thing through the Congress or through this committee or through the full committee."\(^\text{11}\)

This opposition embarrassed Indian cabinet officials sympathetic toward American foreign policy. These officials had insisted, against Nehru's characteristic hesitation, on requesting the assistance, and the delay was therefore doubly embarrassing. Pointing to Connally's statement, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, a leading member of Nehru's cabinet, hinted to Henderson that the delay in approving the request played into the hands of America's enemies in the cabinet.\(^\text{12}\)

While leading Indians followed the congressional debate closely, State Department spokesmen endeavored to put the aid issue in the broader perspective of American security interests. Henderson, who kept a vigilant watch on developments, emphasized the American interests involved in the issue in his cables to Washington. Pointing out the widespread impression in India that America lacked interest in Asia, he recommended approval of the aid request as a means of refuting that impression. Rejecting the request would undermine any effort to nudge India closer to the West, the ambassador warned.\(^\text{13}\) McGhee echoed Henderson's views. Failure to assist India in its
present crisis, he cautioned, would strengthen elements inimical to the United States and the Western world. Besides, America's dwindling credit in Asia would be further reduced if millions die of starvation. Noting that South Asia was the only region in the continent not already dominated or imminently threatened by communism, McGhee recommended a quick response to the Indian request as the most effective means of counteracting communist subversion in India. In obvious reference to the congressional opposition, he added, "We can not afford to allow Nehru's declarations to blind us to the vital importance of not losing India and South Asia to communism by default." 14

As the policymakers debated, public support for the grain assistance increased. Pressed from within the State Department, Acheson endorsed McGhee's recommendations and took a sympathetic view of the matter. The bipartisan letter from a group of congressmen to the president, mentioned earlier, was a part of the coordinated campaign to win early approval for the aid. 15 On 1 February, Acheson sent his formal recommendation to the president. Warning that refusal to grant the assistance would strengthen anti-Western forces in India, the secretary told Truman that "US assistance will increase the influence of pro-Western elements with the masses and with Nehru and his Government." To accelerate congressional action, he recommended Truman meet personally with leading members of Congress and send a special message to Congress on the matter. 16

Accordingly, on 5 February, Truman met with the bipartisan congressional group who had written the 30 January letter. Indicating his own support for the aid request, the president outlined the
problems hindering its approval and urged the congressmen to overcome them. The conference probably increased prospects for approval of the measure.

The president followed up the conference with a message to Congress on 12 February urging approval of the aid request. Noting the serious situation caused by the food shortage in India, Truman urged Congress to authorize promptly the shipment of a million tons of grain, half the amount the Indians requested. The remaining half, he said, could be deferred until the situation had been further clarified. While there were "important political differences between our own Government and the Government of India with regard to the course of action which would effectively curb aggression and establish peace in Asia," the president counseled, "these differences should not blind us to the needs of the Indian people." This was a marked departure from Truman's earlier position on India and was probably caused by pressure from the State Department.

Responding to the president's request, on 15 February twenty-nine senators and eleven representatives introduced a bill for approval of grain shipments to India. Five days later, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held public hearings on the bill at which Acheson, Assistant Secretary Williard Thorp, and others urged speedy approval. By this time Acheson was fully reconciled to the need for assistance, but recognizing congressional opposition to the bill, he couched his arguments for it in humanitarian terms.

Although it would take another three and a half months to legislate the food assistance, Indians, particularly Nehru, were pleased with the administration's efforts. In his meeting with
Henderson on 20 February, the prime minister "displayed more friendliness and seemed to speak with more frankness than [in] any [of the] previous talks." Nehru was obviously interested in the food aid, but he was still, in Henderson's view, "without any appreciation of the efforts on India's behalf of the [American] government." This was characteristic of Nehru. While he appreciated the need for aid, he was reticent to ask for it and diffident in expressing his gratitude at receiving it.

Still, Henderson was pleased with Nehru's response. He wrote the secretary, "[Nehru] made use of his great personal charm and was evidently anxious to persuade. It is easy to understand how, when the Prime Minister is in such a mood, he is so frequently able to win over so many persons."  

Nehru's evident goodwill, the need to bolster his government, and the influence of public opinion combined to undercut opposition to the measure. On 1 March, the House Committee on Foreign Relations approved legislation authorizing the transfer of two million tons of food grains to India, half of which was to be provided immediately and the other half subject to need as determined by administrative review of the situation.

While the emergency food assistance was still pending before Congress, American representatives in South Asia under McGhee's chairmanship met in Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka, with political, economic, and diplomatic representatives stationed in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. Also present for the week-long conference were officials from the Departments of State, Agriculture, and
Commerce, the CIA, and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). 22

"The loss of China, the immediate threat to Indochina and [to] the balance of Southeast Asia," McGhee noted in his speech opening the conference, "and the reverses in Korea have greatly increased the significance to the US of the political, strategic and resource potential of the countries of [South Asia]." Acknowledging the political and strategic significance of both India and Pakistan, McGhee underscored the necessity of maintaining free, non-communist governments there. But the United States attached low priority to the region. That, McGhee admitted, was a serious contradiction, and one made worse by such things as congressional opposition to Indian assistance and criticism of Nehru's nonalignment policies. 23

McGhee then outlined American objectives in the region. The United States desired, he said, the development of enduring friendly relations with all countries in the region, the continuance of non-communist governments there, and the voluntary association of those governments with the United States. The United States also wanted air and naval bases in the region and access to markets and resources, and the exclusion of the Soviets both strategically and economically. 24

McGhee proposed to achieve these objectives through more active consultation with India as well as Pakistan, expanded information and educational programs in those countries, and possibly economic and military assistance to help them stabilize internally and enlarge their defense capabilities. But he was not optimistic about achieving these goals. The limited nature of American resources, the
anti-Western attitude in the region, misunderstanding there of the nature of communist aggression, and the presence of a "highly emotional, stubborn and seemingly anti-United States Prime Minister in India," McGhee said, all operated to frustrate American interests.  

In contrast to McGhee, Henderson was optimistic about establishing friendlier relations with India. He disagreed with McGhee's assessment of anti-Americanism in India, and insisted that underneath the crust of criticism there was a hard core of friendliness for the United States and an understanding of its motives and of the American people. It would be a grave blunder, he cautioned, to consider friendship with India out of the question. The United States should continue its endeavors to win the confidence of Indian leaders and of the Indian people as well. 

Suggesting ways of doing this, Henderson displayed an understanding of India's world attitude that few Americans had. Dismissing both flattery and hostility as counterproductive, he suggested that Washington act as though it took for granted that India's sense of international morality was similar to that of America, and that India was on the side of those who opposed aggression. He urged Washington to take active interest in whatever India might do to strengthen its defenses, taking care that its interest not be misinterpreted as siding with India against Pakistan. Noting the damage India's opposition had caused to various American initiatives, he suggested that the United States not be apologetic about its policies but vigorously defend them, though not in a manner to give India offense. 

Herein lay the difference between a young diplomat, McGhee, who
was confident he knew how to deal with India, and an older career official, Henderson, who had a much better understanding of the region and its people. Both men accepted India's importance in international affairs, but while McGhee despaired of Indo-American cooperation, Henderson thought that if handled carefully Nehru would be an important ally. He was convinced that India's nonalignment was permanent, and nothing that the United States did would substantially alter that fact. But that did not preclude active cooperation in matters of common interest. There is not much evidence that Henderson's pragmatism was shared by his colleagues in the State Department. It seems probable his years in India had heightened his appreciation of Indian views and interests, but even he had no clear conception of what American policy should be in the subcontinent. Taking his cue more from McGhee than from Henderson, Navy Captain E.M. Eller, who commanded American forces in West Asia, surveyed America's strategic options in South Asia. Noting that the entire region from Suez to Saigon was vulnerable to communist aggression, Eller suggested that the key to the defense of the area lay in strengthening its flanks. Satisfied with the "encouraging reversal of the tide of defeatism in Indo-China" and with the political leadership there, Eller believed that the defense of West Asia lay in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. If a 'Middle East' alliance were established, he added, Pakistan would have to be included in it for it to be effective.29

The conference produced no major shifts in American policy in the subcontinent. But the American military's preference for Pakistan was evident, and McGhee's support for that preference indicated that the State Department too was leaning in that direction. American policy
toward South Asia would be formulated within the context of its Cold War objectives. A nonaligned India would thus be bypassed if it stood in the way of larger American objectives.

Eller's recommendations were not immediately implemented, but they demonstrated the continuity of American military thinking. In American strategic thinking Pakistan, not India, was still the key to the defense of the subcontinent. Pakistani persuasions to this effect were finally bearing fruit. Only two months after independence, Pakistan's Governor General Mohammed Ali Jinnah had approached Washington for military aid in his nation's contest with India within the subcontinent. In return for such aid, he assured Washington that Pakistan would align itself with the West in the Cold War. Soon thereafter, both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the Karachi-Lahore in Pakistan was the most suitable area in the subcontinent for American military bases rimming the Soviet Union. Aware that a strategic alliance with Pakistan would antagonize India, Washington resisted the Pakistani importunities in favor of continuing the status quo for the time being.

The outbreak of the Korean war caused America to reconsider Karachi's request. Convinced now that the Soviet Union was more aggressive and dangerous, American officials began emphasizing the need to fortify all strategically important points around the Soviet Union, and the rich oil deposits in West Asia underscored the significance of that area. Washington therefore agreed with London that the West must keep West Asia within the sphere of Western influence.

The meeting of American policymakers in West Asia that preceded
the Nuwara Eliya conference had acknowledged Pakistan's military potential for the Western alliance. Participants in this meeting came away convinced that the United States should encourage Pakistan and Turkey to form an axis of cooperation in West Asian affairs. The problem this presented to American policymakers was how to increase Pakistani military strength without raising Indian apprehensions. By this time McGhee was convinced that Pakistan and not India was the willing partner in American security arrangements in the region. Other officials in the State Department and Pentagon, even those concerned with South Asia, seemed to have taken little note of the direction McGhee was giving to Indo-American relations. Despite his frustrations with New Delhi, McGhee had not given up the hope of enlisting Nehru's government in the Western alliance. From Nuwara Eliya he went to New Delhi, where against Henderson's advice, he endeavored to reshape Nehru's views on fundamental strategic matters. For example, he suggested to Nehru that his greatest contribution to world peace would be to lead a collection of the wavering nations of Asia into a collective security system against communist aggression. Nehru rejected McGhee's suggestion, insisting instead that those who reacted to communism by arming themselves would themselves provoke war. As an alternative, Nehru proposed that India and the United States seek the kind of equitable cooperation on matters of common interest in international affairs that Britain and the United States already enjoyed. Recollecting this conversation, McGhee later noted that, "Nehru seemed to be hiding his head in the sand." 

The crux of the differences between McGhee and Nehru was their differing assessments of the nature of international communism. McGhee
viewed communism as an intrinsically expansionist force, while Nehru viewed it as something conditioned by forces specific to time and place, and circumstance. Nehru insisted, no doubt rightly, that communism and communists could not per se destabilize his or any other government unless other factors were operative. So, while containment was the cornerstone of American foreign policy at this time, Nehru had an altogether different set of concerns. And if foreign policy is a manifestation of national interests, Nehru was not "hiding his head in the sand." He was instead firmly supporting his assessment of India's national interest in an especially turbulent world.

Although McGhee was influenced by his own as well as Washington's assessments of the situation in South Asia, he could not rid himself of his view that India was the key to the future of the subcontinent. Even though New Delhi would not align itself militarily with the West, he concluded, Washington should endeavor to retain India in the Western orbit. Increased economic assistance, McGhee thought, might accomplish this. Cabling the State Department from Amman after his meeting with Nehru, McGhee urged swift approval of India's request for food aid, which was still pending before Congress. "Action too late, if not too little," he cautioned, "will deny us the benefits we should otherwise expect from our response." 36

Congress seemed willing, eventually, to approve the request for food assistance, but problems remained. In the House Rules Committee, where the matter now rested, Representatives James R. Richards and John M. Vorys generated support for their proposal that American grains for India be balanced by a quid pro quo, in this case
strategic materials from India. In the Senate, Tom Connally was even more adamant. Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he scheduled no early hearings on the aid request.  

Indian officials were disillusioned by these delays. Hardliners within the government demanded that the aid request be withdrawn, while officials in the Ministry of Agriculture informed Henderson of Soviet and Chinese offers of grains to India on a barter basis. Although there was no condition attached to these offers, Nehru's government was unwilling to accept them lest they carry hidden conditions. Indeed, the Indian ambassador in Moscow, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, told his American counterpart, Alan G. Kirk, that India would not accept the Soviet offer for fear of "getting mixed up with the Russians in a deal of this kind."  

While Nehru's American critics insisted that the prime minister fall in line with American policies before receiving any aid, India acted like a fallen giant, a once affluent and cultured nation that found itself compelled to seek help from a nouvelle riche and upstart people. Yet Nehru would not beg. Thus, criticisms of his foreign policy in the context of his request for emergency food assistance to keep his fellow Indians from starving were especially galling. The insensitive nature of some of the congressional debate concerning the request was thus doubly humiliating. On the same day that Munshi addressed Parliament, Nehru complained to the chief ministers, "I wish we were in a position to stand on our own feet, even though that meant a measure of privation. Indeed if we can stand on our feet, we can get better terms from other countries." "We too have our pride," he told Edgar Mowrer, a visiting American writer, "[The] way [in] which you
[are] handling our request for grain [is] insulting and outrageous. If we go through centuries [of] poverty and millions [of] our people die [of] hunger we shall never submit [to] outside pressure." Reporting this conversation to the State Department, Henderson cautioned, "further delay may well eliminate much of [the] good will for [the United States] which still persists in India and damage our good name for years to come." 42

Thus pressured, primarily by Nehru's reaction and then by Henderson's counsel, the State Department intensified its efforts to get the grain bill through Congress. Noting the snail's pace at which the aid request was moving, Undersecretary of State James E. Webb asked President Truman to make a statement urging prompt congressional action. 43 On 29 March the president issued a statement to the press reiterating his request to Congress to grant India's request expeditiously. 44

Truman's request had the desired effect. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings on the food grain bill on 16 April at which Acheson noted the threat of famine in India and urged approval of the aid request. 45 On 20 April, the Senate drafted a bill that provided for a grant of $95 million and a loan of an equal amount. The ECA would determine the terms of repayment and oversee disbursement of the loan. 46 On 24 April the House Rules Committee approved a draft bill that provided for the entire amount as a loan to be partially repaid in strategic materials.

Nehru objected to the Senate bill, about which he was informed before it reached the floor of the upper chamber. Ever suspicious of foreign intervention, he asked Bajpai on 11 April to inform Henderson
that rather than receive a gift which involved foreign supervision of India's distribution system, he would prefer loans to be repaid in installments. The prime minister interpreted the congressional actions as attempts to "convert India into some kind of a semi-colonial country or at least a satellite in the economic sense."

Aware of the potentially disastrous consequences of his refusal of American aid, he wrote, "Nevertheless I cannot bring myself to agree to this final humiliation." Congressional opposition was ill-advised; but the prime minister overreacted to it. No one in the United States had the slightest intention of placing India in any kind of semi-colonial or dependent status. Nehru wanted loans and not grants and apparently expected them to come without conditions attached to them. By attaching conditions, Congress annoyed the overly sensitive Nehru.

When Madame Pandit broached the subject of the conditions with McGhee, the latter insisted that these were standard provisions in such legislation. Some of the conditions, McGhee told her, were inserted in order to insure an easy passage through Congress. Noting that the bill was in the final stages of congressional action, he urged the ambassador not to make an issue of the conditions. Madame Pandit conveyed this to New Delhi, where eventually pragmatism prevailed. On 17 April, Bajpai informed Henderson that the Indian government would not complicate the situation by pressing for changes in the bill, and Madame Pandit also gave similar assurances to McGhee.

Although Nehru retreated on foreign supervision of the grain distribution, he soon spoke out on another matter: the repayment of
the loan in strategic materials. India had been exporting such strategic minerals as manganese, mica, and beryl to the United States. However, in 1946 it embargoed export of monazite sand, which was used in the production of atomic energy. During congressional debates on the food bill, several members suggested that India repay the food loan in monazite sand. The Indian government was unwilling to do this. Publicly the prime minister fumed, "India was not so down and out as to accept any conditions dictated by any foreign country in matter of importing food that sullies our honour." By tying monazite sand to food assistance, Congress meant no dishonor to India, it merely thought this a mutually beneficial quid pro quo. But Nehru again overreacted.

A few days later Nehru was even more categorical in a speech broadcast over India's state-owned radio network. "While we welcome all the help we can get from foreign countries," he said, "we have made it clear that such help must not have any political strings attached to it, any conditions which are unbecoming for a self-respecting nation to accept, any pressure to change our domestic or international policy." Nehru's annoyance was now such that he authorized negotiations with the Soviet Union to procure wheat on a barter basis. He had concluded that the grain affair has done no good to either India or the United States. This reaction grew no doubt out of Nehru's misunderstanding of Washington. To be sure, he and Washington had different opinions on the world situation. Still, Nehru did not anticipate that his differences with Washington would constitute a serious barrier to smooth flow of food assistance from the United States. Nor did he
anticipate that his request for food assistance would lead Congress to put his foreign policy on trial. The insensitive utterances by some congressmen only complicated the situation.

Congress reacted to Nehru's tirades by postponing further action on the bill on 2 May, and a number of congressmen launched another round of attacks on India's role in the Korean War. On 22 May, Representative E.E. Cox fumed, "India to all intents and purposes has already embraced the doctrine of Communism." Two days later, his colleague John E. Rankin called Nehru "the Communist leader of India."56

Although such criticism represented a minority opinion and was entirely uninformed, it caused anxiety in the State Department. Having worked hard to bring the aid bill to a point of near passage, the Department felt let down by Nehru's reactions. Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, informed Indian diplomat B.K. Nehru that Congress thought India would not accept aid under the terms of the present bill, and would take no further action on the measure until the Indian government clarified its position on that matter. In New Delhi, Henderson met with Deshmukh on 6 May and urged New Delhi to take a "reasonable view" on the bill.58

Nehru realized his overreaction jeopardized the lives of millions of Indians. Yet, having taken a public stand, he could not make a volte face overnight. That would violate his sense of dignity and mean a loss of face among his people. Henderson realized that Nehru understood the gravity of the situation and was looking for ways out of it.59

In response to Mathews' and Henderson's persuasions, Nehru
mellowed. On 10 May he told Parliament that he preferred the loan envisaged by the House bill to the half-grant, half-loan envisioned by the Senate. With regard to the provision requiring partial repayment of the loan in strategic materials, Nehru stated that India would gladly supply the materials that were available and could be spared, but asserted that "it is a fundamental part of our foreign policy that such material as is particularly related to the production of atomic or like weapons should not be supplied by us to foreign countries." Thus while he softened his stance, Nehru still excluded the export of monazite sand to the United States.

Despite this, Nehru's new tone had the desired effect, and Congress reopened proceedings on the grain bill. The two chambers formed a joint committee to thrash out the differences between the two bills, and the result, completed in early June, was a bill that envisaged a loan to India of $190 million to be provided by the ECA and to be repaid with strategic materials. This bill passed the House on 6 June and the Senate on 11 June, and four days later President Truman signed it into law. The next day, Nehru expressed his gratitude to the United States.

While signing the bill, Truman extended the "heartfelt best wishes of the American people to the people of India." But in fact much of the goodwill between the two countries had been lost because of the delay and the inflamed rhetoric on both sides. Educated Indians, particularly those in the government, noted the effort the world's strongest nation made to extract concessions from a starving people. Even when Congress finally passed the bill, many Indians were convinced that political, not humanitarian, considerations were behind
the act. The kinds of views Nehru had expressed in public are normally expressed through diplomatic channels; by making them publicly, the Indian leader might have enhanced his popularity at home, but he did so at the cost of goodwill between the two countries. Another factor influencing Indian reaction was that months before the American grain began to reach India, a million tons had arrived from China, along with 50,000 tons from the Soviet Union. These quantities were small compared to the American totals, but the promptness with which these reached the affected areas contrasted favorably with the obvious lukewarmness of American assistance. The readiness with which the Soviets and the Chinese extended help convinced Indians that Moscow and Peking were acting out of concerns for India's needs.

The wheat loan was the first direct American assistance to India. Shortly after it was approved, Washington took up the matter of general economic assistance. In considering this subject, America gave little attention to India's needs, and focused instead on its own interests, economic and political. General assistance would not be an act of charity but rather a quid pro quo. "The underdeveloped countries in Asia," Truman declared in a message to Congress on 24 May 1951, "produced strategic materials which are essential to the defense and economic health of the free world. Production of these materials must be encouraged." Toward this end, the countries needed American assistance to harness those materials. The administration, including McGhee, took no note of McGhee's recommendation of the previous year for a generous program of general assistance to South Asia, and began instead to consider a much smaller program. As a result, the administration soon asked Congress for $7 billion for Western Europe.
and a lesser but still substantial amounts for East and Southeast Asia. In contrast, the total requested for South Asia was only $78 million, of which $65 million was for India and $12.5 million for Pakistan.

It is easy to explain this division of aid funds. The bulk of American aid had always gone to Western Europe, but the outbreak of the Korean War had prompted increased support for non-communist areas of East and Southeast Asia not directly threatened by communism. South Asia merited far less aid. Besides, India's refusal to fall in line with American global objectives reduced its significance in America's strategic calculation.

Except for military assistance, Congress cut the administration's request for all economic aid, and the allocation for South Asia shrunk accordingly. Eventually India was allocated $54 million in fiscal 1952, a figure that reflected NSC 114's characterization of America's aid program in South Asia and the Pacific as "essentially ameliorative in character, designed in the first instance to arrest the progressive deterioration in conditions and therefore to establish a solid basis for sustained and prolonged development." "The amount, form, and timing of our aid programs," this memorandum continued, "approach the minimum needed to maintain the situation in our favor." 67

The food loan and the economic assistance that followed it failed appreciably to improve relations between India and the United States. The Japanese Peace Treaty, which the United States and Japan signed at this time, destroyed even that modest improvement. Once again, differing national interests were the cause. The new treaty was a legacy of World War II. After the war, American forces occupied Japan.
and excluded the Soviet Union from any role in that nation. When the United States government appointed a thirteen-member Far Eastern Commission to draft a permanent peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union insisted that the "Big Four" have a veto power over the treaty. The administration rejected this, and on 8 September 1950 Truman appointed John Foster Dulles to oversee the preparation of a draft treaty. But soon differences surfaced within the administration over the treaty. The State Department wanted to end the occupation, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared the loss of American bases. These views were eventually reconciled, and on 12 July 1951 a draft treaty was completed which provided for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Japan but stipulated that foreign (i.e., American) troops could be stationed in Japan under separate bilateral or multilateral agreements with Japan. Japan was to pay no war reparations, but Japanese assets abroad could be retained by the Allied nations. Japan's sovereignty was to be restored, the independence of Korea recognized, and Japan renounced all rights to Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Kurile islands, the occupied parts of the Sakhalin islands, and the Pacific islands Japan had governed under the League of Nations. On 26 October the United States circulated copies of this draft to all nations still technically at war with Japan.

The Soviet Union and China summarily rejected the treaty, and Nehru had strong objections to some of its key provisions. Anxious to restore Japan's independence, Nehru supported a settlement of the problems in East Asia left over from the war. The permanent presence of American troops in Japan, he thought, would be a constant irritant to neighboring countries, and in any case no durable settlement in
East Asia could be achieved unless all parties involved, including the Soviet Union and China, agreed to it. Communicating his opposition to the treaty to Washington, Nehru also criticized the American trusteeship over the Bonin and Ryukyus Islands, the failure to restore Taiwan to China, and the presence of American troops in Japan after the occupation ended.

American policymakers failed to recognize that the terms of the treaty did in fact violate Nehru's conception of foreign policy and his ideas concerning the future of Asia. More concerned with freeing Asia of foreign troops than with the possibility of a resurgent Japan, Nehru was anxious to see American troops out of Asia, including Japan. The presence of American troops in the Bonin and Ryukus Islands was, to the prime minister, a form of colonialism. In addition, Indian approval of a settlement depriving China of Taiwan and the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands would complicate New Delhi's relations with two countries Nehru was striving hard to build friendly relations with.

The manner in which the treaty was drafted also annoyed Nehru. He resented the failure of the United States to heed India's counsel. "The old practice of deciding about Asian questions in Europe and America," he wrote to his chief ministers, "and not thinking too much of the opinion of Asian countries, still holds." That policy had not succeeded in the past and was not likely to succeed in the future, he added. On 23 August India informed the United States it would not attend the upcoming San Francisco Conference in September at which the
treaty would be discussed, and would make its own separate treaty with Japan. 71

American reaction to Nehru's stance was prompt. Washington regretted that the Indian government considered the draft treaty so imperfect as to make a separate treaty with Japan. "There can never be united action for peace," it noted, "unless the nations are willing to accept what, to each, may seem imperfections." Madame Pandit later recalled the reaction of Dulles when she informed him of the Indian position. Dulles, she said, "walked up and down the room with bent head and his hands behind his back while I waited to leave. Then he swung around and said, 'I cannot accept this. Does your Prime Minister realize that I have prayed at every stage of this treaty?'" 72

The American press also reacted sharply and critically. "Jawaharlal Nehru is fast becoming one of the great disappointments of the post-war era," the New York Times editorialized. "Instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for its good, Nehru turned aside from the responsibilities, proclaimed India's disinterestedness, and tried to set up an "independent", third force, suspended in midair between the two decisive movements of our day...the communism that Russia leads and the democracy of which the United States is the chief champion." The newspaper continued, "[Nehru's] statesmanship is not inspiring people and nations to do things but only to leave them undone. How the mighty have fallen!" 73

Henderson, who felt he understood Nehru, explained Nehru's rejection of the Japanese treaty as part of a larger plan to clear Asia of foreign domination and make India the focal point of the continent. The ambassador thought that by opposing the treaty, Nehru
would gain the support of nationalistic elements in Japan who would eventually take over power and insist on the withdrawal of American troops. Once Asia was rid of foreign troops, Henderson suspected, Nehru hoped to form an Asian bloc consisting of India, Japan, and China, with himself the leader.74

Henderson was right. Although Nehru publicly denied his ambition for leadership, his concern with events outside India indicated a long-range ambition to play a primary role in international affairs. Moreover, he made no secrets of his attempts to wean China away from the Soviet bloc. It was consistent with these purposes that he do his best to eliminate American influence in Japan.

Responding to Bajpai's suspicion that Japan's approval of the treaty might have come under pressure, Henderson sarcastically quipped that the government of India seemed to understand the "minds and hearts" of the Japanese people better than the United States, and considered itself in a better position to speak for Japan than the Japanese government itself. Reporting his conversation to the State Department, Henderson fumed, "[the government of India] has become rather accustomed [to America] turning [the] other cheek. Strong criticism in [the United States], although irritating to both, Nehru and Bajpai, may have salutary effect. Nehru, who does not like [to] have [United States] opinion lined up solidly against him, may feel he has gone too far and may be more cautious for at least some time in [the] future in saying or doing anything which might give further offense."75

Bajpai, known in Washington as sympathetic to the West, also expressed dissatisfaction over the treaty. Referring to the
trusteeship clause, he told a group of journalists in New Delhi in September that while India did not regard America as an imperialist country, it felt that America's "crude method" of bringing about a defense arrangement with Japan was likely to give an appearance of expansionism. He also resented the fact that the itinerary for Dulles' Asian tour for advance consultation on the treaty had not included India.

America and India were thus at cross purposes. Washington regarded New Delhi's foreign policy as antagonistic. Noting that Nehru's brand of "neutralism" militated against the collective security of the non-communist world, the Bureau of Near East, South Asia, and African Affairs concluded that an Asian bloc under Nehru's influence would work against American interests. Therefore, the Bureau concluded, the United States should seek "to convince India that neutralism is a danger to India's existence as an independent country." The United States should also, the bureau added, combat Indian "neutralism" by increasing the capacity of other non-Communist Asian states to exert leadership in building the collective security of Asia. At the same time, the United States should seek publicly to expose the "error" of Nehru's foreign policy. Success in this endeavor would limit Nehru's ability to maintain a pivotal place in international relations between the Soviet Union and America. While the State Department recommended active measures to combat Nehru's nonalignment, the CIA, better informed than any other agency of the government, took a more accommodating position toward India. Acknowledging India's predominant economic and cultural ties with the West and its opposition to internal communism, the Agency held that
Nehru's nonalignment was permanent. Washington should therefore frame its India policy accordingly. But the Agency undercut this appraisal by judging Nehru's policy as being closer to that of the communist bloc than to the Western world. It acknowledged, however, that India was not altogether lost to the free world. Noting that the economic decline in India was conducive to a communist takeover, the Agency warned that in such an event the whole of West and Southeast Asia would also fall. Therefore, without appearing to appease India, America should encourage outside economic assistance to that country. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air-Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 30 August and concurred with this assessment.

This constituted the background against which Henderson completed his tenure in India on 21 September. Notwithstanding his long diplomatic career, the envoy did not succeed in improving relations between America and India. Truman replaced Henderson with Chester Bowles of Connecticut. Although Truman intended the appointment as a reward to Bowles for his political support, he could not have chosen a more appropriate person for the post in New Delhi. A liberal Democrat, Bowles had recently completed a term as governor of Connecticut. Asked by Truman what he would like to do, Bowles replied that he would like an assignment in India. He was driven by an admiration for India and an active interest in Asia, where India, he felt, was a leading nation because of its size, population, and political leadership. Also, as a liberal democrat, Bowles wanted to devote himself to improving the lot of the Indian people in order to save India and the region for democracy. Believing that "India was the key to Asia," he told the
president that, "both India's own course and America's policies toward India were in a state of flux. If a solid relationship could be built between the two countries, India might find it easier to succeed in establishing a stable and effective democracy in South Asia, and America might unite on an Asian policy behind which our people could stand with assurance."\(^79\)

Bowles' understanding of India's importance foreshadowed a deep interest in that country's culture and problems. For the first time an American ambassador to New Delhi would try to appreciate India's policies and priorities, sympathise with them, and contribute toward improving Indo-American relations.

Troubled by Nehru's assertion that Americans did not understand the "mind and heart of Asia," Bowles was determined to do just that and thereby project a friendlier American image in India. He would therefore dig deep into India's culture, its sensitivities, and its problems. On his first trip to India he thought, "Actually, [Americans] had not tried very seriously to understand the new Asia." No American secretary of state had ever visited South Asia. "Yet India more than any other nation," he thought, "was looked to as spokesman by the 700 million South Asians."\(^80\)

Acknowledging the shortcoming of most Americans who thought of Asia in terms of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, Bowles believed that "the heart of Asia and the key to her future lies in the billion or more peoples who live in the largely uncommitted nations, which stretch along the periphery of Communist China and the Soviet Union from Cairo to Tokyo." The strategic, geographic, and political center
of this area, he held, was India, and its chief spokesman was Jawaharlal Nehru.

From the very beginning of his tenure in India, Bowles made every effort to win the admiration of Indians and their prime minister. It seemed to him desperately important to understand India and to convey to the Indian people some of the inherent good will of the American people. As opposed to Henderson's strictly official and formal methods in conducting himself in India, Bowles sought to accomplish his ends informally. The ambassador's wife and children wore Indian dress, his children went to Indian schools on bicycles. They patronized Indian music and invited Indian artists to perform at the embassy. During his tenure, Bowles criss-crossed the country many times, traveling several thousand miles by automobile, camel, and bullock cart to reach the distant corners of the country, where his official assignments would not otherwise take him. He met and made friends with so many people from a cross-section of the society that some Indians fondly recalled him as an "honorary Indian".

On 1 November 1951, within a few days of his arrival in New Delhi, Bowles met with Nehru. A formal affair that lasted only twenty minutes, the meeting disappointed the enthusiastic envoy. "The Prime Minister was not in an articulate mood and at times it was difficult to keep the conversation going," he later recollected. "Even when I started on a new tack, he would answer with a polite sentence or two and lapse into silence." Although discouraged by the meeting, Bowles did not lose heart and soon his hope of improving personal relations with Nehru materialised. Meeting the ambassador on 6 November in an informal
setting, Nehru talked of world affairs—of India, the Soviet Union, China, and the United Nations, and of the Cold War and Korea—and he endeavored to make sure that Bowles understood his reasoning and his viewpoints. Describing the Soviet Union as an expansionist power in the old Russian imperialist pattern but invigorated by the new force of communism, the prime minister expressed his appreciation for Western armament. But he had a different assessment of China. The Soviets exercised substantial control over Chinese Communist Party officials, he observed, but other Chinese officials would place the cause of China above that of the Soviet Union. The next ten or fifteen years would be important because during that period China could go either way. The free world should therefore endeavor to wean China away from the Soviet Union. Bowles showed a sophisticated understanding of Nehru’s mind when he later remarked, ”[Nehru’s] deep devotion to Western concepts of democracy was as obvious as his determination to be an Asian, to think and act independently, and above all not to be dominated by his Western training and his Western friends.”

The ambassador’s admiration for Nehru increased as he saw more of him, ”sometimes two or three or even four times a week.” Nehru was essential to India as that country’s survival was essential to America’s interests, Bowles held. Nehru’s commitment to democracy convinced Bowles that as long as the prime minister lived and kept his health, a revolutionary upheaval was impossible in India. Therefore America must place its hope in Nehru and his associates, and do everything in order to win their confidence. The United States should make the most of Indian ”neutrality” by encouraging India ”to
remain in a position which will enable her to exert an effective modifying influence upon Communist China." Perhaps influenced by preconceived views of India and Nehru, Bowles probably saw what he wanted to see. Still, during his tenure he tried to help build the Indian economy through democratic methods.

His enthusiasm for India soon caused Bowles trouble with influential members of Congress. Back in the United States in the second fortnight of January 1952, Bowles sat through a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on India, answering a barrage of unfriendly questions from Chairman Connally, among others. When Bowles recounted his travels through the cities and villages of India, Connally snapped that the ambassador's job was to represent his country and not to meddle in Indian politics. To Bowles' reply that his assignment required him to get to know "something about the [Indian] people," Connally quipped that his job was not to "electioneer". When Bowles recommended increased assistance to India, he asked for $125 million a year for four years. Connally interrupted: "We cannot finance the whole world, and we cannot finance India. You know good and well that the more money we give them the more they want." When the ambassador sought to justify his position on aid by noting that he was "trying to beat Communism so [that] you people in Texas can live decently," Connally fumed, "We live decently enough," then added, "You are spreading your jurisdiction a little far, are you not?"

Congressional hearings could not deter Bowles. Surveying Asian problems, he reiterated his thesis that America's best hope in that continent was India, and the best opportunity to save India from
communism was to back Nehru's economic development plan. He articulated his justifications for that plan in almost all his official correspondence to Washington. India was, he held, and will always be the most important free nation in Asia. It was potentially one of the richest countries in the world because of its natural resources, which included iron ore, manganese, mica, and coal. Geographically, it was of great strategic importance. Its southern tip lay astride the trade routes between Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean, and Africa, and its flanks pointed to both Southeast and West Asia. For these reasons, a communist victory in India would be of more far-reaching importance than the communist triumph in China. If India fell to communism, he predicted, all other nations of Asia would inevitably follow. On the other hand, if India gained stability, America would benefit greatly.

A sure way of retaining India in the free world was to have the Nehru government achieve meaningful success in its comprehensive Five Year Plan, a plan that Bowles called realistic. Initiated in mid-1951, the plan placed highest priority on food production, rural development, and the generation of electric power. The challenge to democracy in India would be, Bowles argued, the ability of the government to raise the living standards of the people under this Plan. There were, he noted, four years left of the plan. Unless real, visible progress was made by 1956, there would be serious discontent in India. It was evident that India would not be able to achieve these goals without substantial assistance from the United States. Therefore, Bowles reasoned, America should tie its assistance programs to India's development plan in order to ensure Nehru's success.
American aid could do for India what the Marshall Plan did for Europe. Bowles proposed that Washington provide $250 million dollars, a small but realistic sum, to India in the 1953 fiscal year, half of which would go for technical assistance and supplies, including tube wells, fertilizers, and agricultural implements. The other half should constitute a grant to ease India's foreign exchange constraint. To Bowles, here was the "one best chance" to save India, the largest nation in free Asia. The Republican "Asia-firsters" could not, he added, afford to turn their backs on this. 91

Bowles' battle-cry was not heard in Washington. With the intelligence reports before it, which did not echo the ambassador's enthusiasm, the State Department was not willing to pay the price Bowles asked. Acheson endorsed the need for substantial assistance, but claimed America's world-wide commitments precluded such heavy investments in India. He suggested to the Director of Mutual Security, W. Averell Harriman, that the United States provide India with $115 million in assistance in fiscal 1953. 92

Acheson and other State Department officials questioned Bowles' estimate of India's need for commodity grants. They thought "the Indians may be leading [Bowles] around by the nose a bit." The Indians could, they held, draw upon their sterling balances in Britain to pay for imports from sterling areas instead of importing from the United States, Europe, or Japan. Proceeds from the sale in local markets of wheat supplied to India the previous year would bring local currency into the treasury and should suffice to fund the development programs, they argued. Moreover, increasing money for India would also generate opposition from other countries in the region, especially Pakistan,
for which Acheson recommended only $33.5 million in aid. Also, assistance to India had to be justified under Point Four, which the Department equated with technical assistance and self-help. To go beyond this the State Department felt, would be to get wholly out of the realm of Point Four or the TCA assistance.

These were the arguments officials at the State Department put forth. In truth, American priorities lay outside India. Out of the $7.9 billion foreign aid request submitted to Congress in March 1952, only $227 million was earmarked for Point Four assistance for West and South Asia, Africa, and South America. Besides, the bulk of the aid would again go for military assistance to Western Europe, South Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. Mindful of America's finite capabilities in the face of global demand, the administration requested only $115 million for India, less than half of the $250 suggested by Bowles.

Despite the rebuff from Washington, Bowles continued his efforts to get a special allocation of funds for India. He underscored the need for bolstering Nehru's government and building India as a bulwark against communism. But Washington considered military assistance more effective than economic assistance toward that end. Yet Bowles kept trying. To impress upon Washington Nehru's Western orientation, the ambassador noted Nehru's Western learning and dislike for communism. "I believe," he told Washington, "[Nehru] will come still closer toward us in the future if we handle ourselves with skill and tact."

Referring to the difference between the embassy and the State Department on the aid issue, Bowles cautioned that "the understanding and close personal relationship which develop here in New Delhi between our [the Embassy] and [the Prime Minister] will be empty and
worthless indeed unless Nehru and [the Congress] Party are able to demonstrate to [the Indian] people in [the] next four years that democracy really works. The biggest test for long haul still remains in [India's] 600,000 villages."

Bowles returned to Washington in June to plead his case. Reiterating India's needs, the ambassador again urged the allocation of the entire $250 million. His audience was, however, unreceptive. Acheson and Harriman argued, and Budget Director Frederick J. Lawton later concurred, that American interests in India did not warrant such a large aid program. Truman did not challenge this judgment. Bowles' urgings had no effect on Congress either. The Mutual Security Act passed in June 1952 reduced the administration's total aid request from $7.9 to $6.5 billion, and India's allocation from $115 million to $45.

America's reluctance to help India caused some members of its Parliament to ask why India was leaning more and more toward the Anglo-American bloc. Referring to the volume of American assistance to its European allies, particularly France, which helped the latter maintain its colonial presence in Indochina and Africa, they suggested that India reorient its foreign policy and look for new friends. These critics, representing a minority opinion, were probably guided by a desire to link India's foreign policy exclusively to economic assistance. Responding to these critics, Nehru criticized American policies but underscored India's need for closer economic and political ties with Washington. The prime minister noted that the United States and Britain were the only countries in a position to help India significantly. "We wanted certain things that we could not
get from elsewhere," he explained. However, India should not "join the
crowd of excited people who are shouting at the top of their voices.
If you are shouting, it does not matter if it is peace you are
shouting about. Your job is to try [to] make people less excited." In
other words, India should remain nonaligned; but it needed American
assistance for economic development.

Bowles continued to champion India's case before Washington.
While Harriman was absent from Washington, Bowles wrote directly to
Harriman's deputy, Lincoln Gordon, urging Gordon's support for a
special allocation for India. Two days later he cabled Truman, "Our
program for stopping Communism at front door in Europe [is] wholly
sound and courageous, but [we] must not leave [the] back door
unlatched." Warning of the effect of a communist takeover in India, he
cautioned, "600,000,000 people live in South Asia. If India goes
under, this entire area will become untenable and repercussions [in
the] East will be explosive." He urged Truman to ask Congress for a
special grant of $125 million for India.

The president was nonplussed. Talking to Acting Secretary of
State David K.E. Bruce, Truman said that he too "was very concerned at
the big slash made in funds for India but that there was no way to
reopen the question with Congress at this time." Unwilling to fight
for a nonaligned country, the president showed little concern for a
possible communist takeover of India. However, he tried to soothe
Bowles. "I particularly regret," Truman told Bowles, "that in carrying
out [your] magnificent job in India you must cope with this
discouraging situation."

Despite the lack of success in Washington, India's development
efforts continued. The government began to emphasize small schemes such as cottage industries and community development programs in order to increase production and create employment. Inaugurating one such project with Point Four assistance in Hyderabad in late September, Nehru endeavored to silence the critics of American assistance when he noted, "Aid from America has been given us from very best of motives and without strings of any kind. For this reason we welcome this assistance."  

Nehru's enthusiasm for community development schemes did not stop here. Acknowledging that the main problem in India was the lack of food and purchasing power, he urged more programs aimed at addressing that problem. "The beginning is a small one," he said, "but there is something really big in the conception behind these community projects. That idea is to change the whole face of rural India and to raise the level of the vast majority of our population." Such small-scale projects preoccupied Nehru's thinking at this time.  

These community development projects seemed to produce the desired results. In addition to raising standards of living, they helped stem the growing strength of the Indian Communist Party in the south, particularly in Hyderabad. Meeting Bowles on 1 October, the prime minister expressed satisfaction that communists were weaker in the south than they had been six months earlier. To be sure, India did have a growing communist party, and if it continued to grow unchallenged, the party would soon pose a threat to Nehru. With adequate assistance, Nehru hoped to be able to stem the red tide.  

Again Bowles' efforts were undercut in Washington by intelligence reports. A Special Estimate produced by the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) took a casual view of American responsibility toward South Asia. Noting the serious consequences of a communist takeover there, the Estimate concluded that such an eventuality would not immediately strengthen the communists or jeopardize Western interests. The most serious effects of the loss of South Asia to the West would be psychological and political. It would add to the Soviet bloc five countries and extend communist control to half the world's population. Southeast Asia would then quickly follow. The markets, and resources of the region would also be denied to the West. On the other hand, a communist South Asia would not immediately add to the strength of the Soviet bloc. It would be hard for the Soviets to develop an industrial complex there due to the difficulties of harnessing the area's resources. Although the Soviet bloc would get control over military base sites in the region, these would be useful mainly for the maintenance of internal security and the defense of South Asia rather than for attacking the West. The Estimate saw no need for costly anti-communist policy in the region.

The Estimate demonstrated the continuity in the thinking of the American intelligence community regarding the communist threat to South Asia. The intelligence agencies were well enough informed to know that there was no threat of an immediate communist takeover in the region in contrast to other areas of Asia which were directly threatened by communists. South Asia still did not merit important consideration in Washington.

American interests in India therefore continued to ebb, a trend buttressed by a development which the IAC Estimate did not mention, possibly purposefully. By October 1952 the United States had advanced
far toward building a West Asian military alliance system anchored by Turkey and Pakistan. A year earlier, Pakistan renewed its requests for American military assistance, and Washington sought London's opinion on the matter. The British were apprehensive that honoring the request would antagonize India; but Washington concluded that Pakistan could make valuable contributions to the defense of West Asia, and opened negotiations nevertheless. Pakistan, not India emerged as the important nation in the region in America's calculations.

Official policy statements were slow to reflect this change. An NSC paper, approved by the president in April 1952, observed that "the danger in [West Asia] to the security of the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism that could lead to disorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union could come to power." If the administration was more concerned with internal instability in the region than with external attack, American military assistance should be designed to suppress internal dissent, not to fight external enemies. Accordingly, Washington's proposed military assistance to Pakistan can not be called meaningful, at least not at this time.

This was the background against which Bowles made another attempt in October to increase India's share of American assistance for the next fiscal year. Writing a long letter to Acheson on 28 October, the ambassador castigated Washington's reluctance to provide adequate assistance to India. Rejecting the State Department's evaluation that the Indian economic problem could be solved by technical assistance alone, he asked the Department to respond to two queries:
was he correct in his assumption that a free India was vitally important to world stability and to America's future security? and was he correct in his assumption that steady economic progress in the next few years was essential to the survival of a free India? Over a period of several months, he had put forth his views on these subjects, and at no time had the substance of his analysis been seriously challenged. Why then did the administration not agree with his conclusions?

So he stated his case once more. Noting the success of the Indian Communist Party in the general elections of the previous spring, he cautioned that the choice in India was between the present government and communism. Playing upon the miseries of the peasants, the Indian communists were spreading propaganda about the alleged successes of the communist regime in China, including its "alleged reforms and accomplishments." India's political integrity by itself was not adequate, in Bowles' view, to combat communism. In order to survive, the government would have to deliver on its promises of economic achievement. The government was badly in need of assistance to do this, and only the United States was in a position to help.

Equating India's condition with that of Europe of 1947, Bowles emphasized that "what India needs is what Europe and Turkey needed in 1947, a guarantee that American resources will be available in sufficient quantities to give the Indian government the opportunity to reach its Five Year Plan objectives." Otherwise India would, he feared, "disappear behind the Iron Curtain in the next few years." The administration should therefore ask Congress for $250 million dollars for fiscal 1953. "The total cost of helping France and Viet Nam to stop Communist aggression in a shooting war in French Indo-China approaches $500 million annually," Bowles noted, "or double my estimate of India's needs for the next fiscal year. If we wait until
the Indian situation really begins to fall apart, Congress will undoubtedly vote any sum that we request. But by that time it will be too late for effective action. 113

The Truman administration did not listen to Bowles, but anxious to keep an important political ally in good humor, the president did not argue with him. He simply ignored his envoy. Besides, Bowles was doing a good job pacifying India without providing much aid. In formulating Washington's India policy, Bowles clearly was not a major actor.

While Bowles was advocating India's case, news of America's scheme to include Pakistan in a new Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) circulated in India. In November Nehru protested to Bowles that Pakistan would use any arms it received from the United States against India, not against the Soviet Union, a concern that grew out of the still unsettled Kashmir issue. Reporting this conversation to the State Department, Bowles cautioned that the proposed alliance with Pakistan would worsen relations with India, while Indo-Pakistani relations would become more explosive and a solution to the Kashmir problem would be made more difficult. 114 The resort to military means to check communist aggression seemed to Nehru ill-advised. "As far as I can see, the position of the United States and the United Kingdom has tremendously deteriorated," he wrote to his officials, "from the political point of view. The result is that they rely more and more on the military aspect. That is a bad foundation to build in distant countries." 115 It would mean that "the cold war had come right to [India's] north-western frontiers. If a shooting war started," Nehru cautioned his chief ministers, "it would also mean its very near

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approach to India, because then Pakistan would be involved in it."\textsuperscript{116} Washington had no intention of retreating on the military commitment to Pakistan. But having reached its closing days, the Truman administration was disinclined to make such an important policy decision. To be sure its drift toward military commitment to Pakistan contributed toward its continuing disinterest in India. New Delhi's aid prospects declined accordingly.

Acheson therefore considered Bowles' letter of 28 October of little importance. But unwilling to annoy Bowles, he conveyed to him his agreement with the envoy's general thesis and with the necessity of providing more aid to India. But he shifted the blame to Congress, which, he said, did not appreciate his concerns. Bowles should realize that he had made a good beginning which, Acheson hoped, would be continued by the next Administration. India's share of Mutual Security Program funds for fiscal 1954 might be as much as $200 million, he continued, "thus going far toward meeting (Bowles') suggestions" of how much was actually needed.\textsuperscript{117}

But that was for the future. Acheson made no further effort to plead India's case. Weary of congressional hearings and lacking enthusiasm for a nonaligned India, he did not push legislation to authorize additional aid. In addition, the November election gave the Republicans control of both houses of Congress and of the White House as well. India's case would be dealt with by another administration.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

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35. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, pp. 294-295.
36. McGhee to the State Department, 26 March 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI: II: 2132; and McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, p. 298.
38. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt, for McGhee from Berry, 28 March 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI: II: 2132-2133.
39. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 24 March, ibid., pp. 2130-2132.

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47. Gopal, Nehru, II: 137.

48. Nehru to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, 11 April, quoted in ibid., p. 137.

49. Memorandum of Conversation between McGhee and Pandit, by Mr. J. Robert Fluker of the Office of South Asian Affairs, 1 April, FRUS, 1951, VI: II: 2143-2146.

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51. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 22 April, ibid., pp. 2150-2151.

52. Ibid., p. 2152, n. 2.
53. Ibid., p. 2153, n. 1.

54. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, 23 April, ibid., p. 2151.


57. Memorandum of Conversation with B.K. Nehru, by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), 2 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI: II: 2153-2155.

58. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, 6 May, ibid., pp. 2157-2158.

59. Ibid., p. 2158, n. 2.

60. Ibid., p. 2161, n. 2.


62. Statement by the President, 15 June 1951, legislation: 82nd Congress, 1st session file, George M. Elsey papers, HSTL.

63. Nehru to chief ministers, 2 and 17 May, in Nehru, Letters, II: 384, and 395.


papers, Box 212, HSTL.


70. Nehru to chief ministers, 19 August, ibid., p. 484.


74. New Delhi to the State Department, 6 September 1951, 611.91/9-651, RG 59, NA.

75. New Delhi to the Secretary of State, 14 September, 611.91/9-1451, RG 59, Box 2858, NA.
76. American Embassy in New Delhi to the Department of State, 4 October 1951, 611.91/10-451, RG 59, Box 2858, NA.


78. Memorandum by the C.I.A., 4 September 1951, NIE-23, ibid., pp. 2174-2179.


80. Ibid., p. 3.

81. Ibid., p. 99.

82. Ibid., p. 4.

83. For an account of the life the Bowles family lived in India, see Bowles, Ambassador's Report; and Vijayalakshmi Pandit, The Scope of Happiness, p. 261.


85. The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State, 7 November, FRUS, 1951, VI: II: 2186-2191; and Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 27.


87. Memorandum by the Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State, 6 December, FRUS, 1951, VI: II: 2191-2202.

88. Bowles to Austin, 29 December 1951, quoted in Brands, Jr., The Specter of Neutralism, p. 79.

89. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical
Draft Speech for Mr. Bowles, "The Partnership Which Must Not Fail," 18 January 1952, Connecticut, Truman papers, Official file, Box 1583, Chester Bowles folder 1134, Speech by Chester Bowles, HSTL; Chester Bowles to the President, "Suggested Statement on TCA and particularly India for the President," 31 January, President's Secretary's file, Box 180, India-Chester Bowles/ PSF Subject file folder, HSTL; Bowles to Charles Murphy, Special Assistant to the President, 4 February, President's Secretary's file, Box 180, India-Chester Bowles/ PSF Subject file folder, HSTL; Bowles to George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 4 February, 611.91/2-452, RG 59, Box 2858, NA; and Bowles to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "The Crucial Problem of India," 611.91/2-52, RG 59, Box 2858, NA.

Ibid.

Acheson to Harriman, 8 February, President's Secretary's file, Box 180, India-Chester Bowles/ PSF Subject file folder, HSTL.

Richard E. Neustadt, Special Assistant in the White House Office to Charles Murphy, Special Counsel to the President, 25 February, Murphy files, India folder, HSTL.


New Delhi to the Secretary of State, 20 May, 611.91/5-2052, RG 59, Box 2858, NA.
96. Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security (Harriman) to the President, 5 June, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI: II: 1646-1648; and Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State with Bowles, 9 June, ibid., pp. 1648-1653.

97. The President to the Ambassador in India (Bowles), 1 July, with enclosed Lawton to the President, 30 June, ibid., pp. 1653.


100. Chester Bowles to Lincoln Gordon, 3 July, Clarence Decker papers, Box 1, Decker papers MSA 1952 folder, HSTL.

101. New Delhi to the Secretary of State, for President Truman from Bowles, 5 July, President's Secretary's file, Box 180, PSF Subject file folder, HSTL.


103. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, enclosing the President's 24 July, ibid., p. 1657.

104. The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State, 2 October, ibid., p. 1666.


106. The Communist Party won 26 seats as against Nehru's 364 in the central legislature. In the provincial legislatures, the Communist Party won 173 as against 2200 of the Congress Party. Although their numbers were not significant compared to the Congress Party, the Communist Party emerged as the second most
important party in both the center and the states.

107. The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State, 2 October, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI: II: 1666.


112. The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State, 28 October, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI: II: 1668-1677.

113. Ibid.


115. Quoted in Gopal, Nehru, II: 183.


117. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in India (Bowles), 8 January 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI: II: 1682-1684.
CHAPTER V

THE COLD WAR IN SOUTH ASIA: 1953–1954

The inauguration of Eisenhower brought no immediate change in American policy toward India. A wing of the Republican party was, however, Asia oriented and had raised an uproar over the "loss" of China. This assured that the new administration would pay increased attention to Asia. The new president and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, both realized the need for better understanding of the Asian situation in Washington, including the imperatives behind Nehru's foreign policy.

Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, who resigned her ambassadorship in mid-September 1952 to assume the presidency of the UN General Assembly, met with Dulles in November and expressed hope that the new administration would improve relations with India. As a gesture in this direction, she recommended that Washington send a top-level representative to India. Dulles replied that the neglect of Asia was one of his "indictments" of the Truman administration. Since World War II American secretaries of state had taken nineteen trips to Europe, he noted, while never setting foot on Asian soil. "Such neglect," Dulles realized, "hurts the pride and dignity of the Asians." The new administration, he assured Madame Pandit, would promptly correct the imbalance.

Eisenhower seconded Dulles' feelings about Asia. Urging the incoming secretary of state to continue his personal association with Madame Pandit, he asked Dulles to assure Nehru of...
his—Eisenhower's—"great and continuing" respect for the prime minister's leadership in encouraging peace and understanding in the world. America must work hard, Eisenhower continued, to overcome "the damage that has been done to [its] friendship with the Arab and Indian world."3

Despite these remarks, neither Eisenhower nor Dulles was prepared to make Asia the equal of Europe in strategic considerations. Lacking experience with the Asian dynamic except for Dulles's contact with Japan, neither man demonstrated any greater sensitivity to or understanding of India. However, both did understand that Asia was now more important to American interests than it had heretofore been. It remained to be seen how India would be affected by this understanding.

No sooner had the new administration taken office than the embassy in New Delhi began to "bombard" Washington with familiar warnings. Reiterating the potential consequences of a communist takeover of Southeast Asia, Ambassador Chester Bowles suggested that only "a moderate but steady flow of American aid without political strings" could enable the Indian government to stabilize its position nationally and internationally over the next few years. If India's economic development continued, if Nehru's government maintained a firm hold, and if the superpowers avoided conflict, the envoy held, India might become the free world's most solid bulwark between Japan and Turkey. Regretting that the fears and hopes of India were alien to policymakers in Washington, Bowles warned that if the country fell to communism, much of Asia and Africa would soon follow suit. Noting that no political officer of the State Department had visited India in the last two years, he observed that the lack of first-hand contact with
and understanding of India on the part of policymakers in Washington had led to an unawareness of what he believed to be the danger and the opportunities in Asia.

Bowles was making an important point. Preoccupied with the seemingly overwhelming issues of Europe and East Asia and lacking personal knowledge of India, the president, the secretary of state, and most concerned officials at the State Department neglected the subcontinental giant and its problems. As a consequence, these officials were unable to formulate a coherent, realistic policy toward India specifically and the subcontinent generally.

Dulles appeared convinced by Bowles' reasoning but was unwilling to pay the price it entailed. Although he appreciated the need to bolster the Indian economy as a check against communism, he disagreed with Bowles and his own deputies in the State Department on the amount of aid necessary to achieve American objectives in India. Although he did not explicitly say so, Dulles did not believe that a communist takeover of India was imminent. American intelligence agencies had prepared sufficient assessments to make such a conclusion. Accordingly, Dulles did not favor a large amount of economic assistance for India. Moreover, he was not prepared to risk a political battle over a large sum of money for a nonaligned India. Therefore, when the Office of the Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs recommended, in its Mutual Security Program, a sum of $200 million a year in aid for India, he wrote, "I do not wish to sign this as long as it carries the sum of $200 million for India. I doubt that this amount is justified by the facts or could be justified to Congress." Accordingly, the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff reduced the request for India aid to $140 million.⁶

As the aid issue was being discussed in Washington, Dulles made a tour of several Asian countries including India, where he met Nehru for the first time. Dulles was not, as Ambassador George Allen later reminisced, very enthusiastic about Nehru, and the feeling was mutual. Nehru stood for nonalignment, and Dulles liked nations that were willing to stand up and be counted. This difference alone precluded any positive outcome of this meeting.⁷

Although the "atmosphere [of the talks with Nehru] was intimate and [Dulles and Nehru] talked with great frankness," the secretary and the prime minister disagreed on many pressing issues. Regarding Egypt, then engaged in a conflict with Britain over base rights, Dulles told Nehru that Washington and London wanted guarantees that Cairo would make facilities available to the West whenever necessary after British withdrawal. Egypt was unwilling to give such guarantees, and Nehru expressed concern that this difference between London and Cairo might lead to war between Egypt and Britain. He cautioned, "Bayonets are no good to sit on." In conformity with his policy of clearing Asia of foreign presence, the prime minister emphasized that the British should evacuate the base as soon as possible. Referring to Dulles' statement of the previous day that hostilities might spread in Korea if an armistice was not arranged, Nehru cautioned against renewed threats.⁸ Clearly Nehru and Dulles differed on critical international issues and could not work closely toward a common goal: establishing peace in the world.

Their differences manifested themselves on colonial matters as
well. Nehru desired an expeditious end to colonialism. Dulles observed that while the United States was faithful to its tradition of anti-colonialism, it was not in a position to break with its allies, chiefly Britain and France, over this issue. Appreciating America's dilemma, Nehru hoped American influence would continue to be exerted in favor of nationalism. If the communists were able to monopolize that issue, "they would surely win in Africa and Asia." Responding to India's concern over Pakistan's prospective membership in the proposed Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), Dulles told Nehru that it was unlikely that MEDO would come into being soon. In any case, he added, "the [United States] had no present plans that would bring it into military relationship with Pakistan which could responsibly be looked upon as unneutral as regards India." 9

Nehru was apparently satisfied with this assurance. But Dulles was misleading him. The Eisenhower administration had inherited its predecessor's concern for the maintenance of Western influence in North Africa and West Asia, while Pakistan sought to join a Western defense organization. Events in West Asia led subsequently to a military pact between Turkey and Pakistan with America committing military assistance to Pakistan. Concerned with maintaining Western influence in the oil-rich region, the administration soon confronted a new development there. A group of army officers under General Muhammad Naguib expelled King Farouq from Egypt and installed a new government which adopted an intensely nationalistic posture toward the West, particularly Britain. London had a large military base at Suez, and the new leaders of Egypt began to question its future. Negotiations concerning the base soon stalemated amid increasing indications that
the new leaders of Egypt would withdraw that nation from its Western military allegiance. This was the reason the MEDO initiative stalled.

Dulles learned first-hand of this situation when he visited Cairo in mid-May. General Naguib's closest lieutenants, including Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, were eager to get the British out of Suez, and they told Dulles so. Dulles tried to convince them that the canal had "a great international importance and could not be looked upon purely as an Egyptian asset." The Egyptian leaders were unimpressed.

Alarmed at the prospect of a renegade Egypt, Dulles wrote to Eisenhower, "Bitterness toward [the] West, including [the] United States [is] such that while Arab good will may still be restored, time is short before [the] loss becomes irretrievable. This uncertainty regarding Egypt enhanced Pakistan's importance for American policymakers.

Back in Washington, on 1 June Dulles told the NSC that Egypt was so preoccupied with internal problems that MEDO would have to be carried out without Egyptian participation. The United States should, therefore, endeavor to get the so-called "northern tier" states—Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq—to form a regional association friendly to the West. During his visit to Pakistan in late May, Dulles had been "immensely impressed by the martial and religious characteristics of the Pakistanis." Pakistan potentially represented, he concluded, a strong point for America in any regional defense planning.

The Eisenhower administration thus proceeded toward a military arrangement with Pakistan even as Dulles was telling Nehru the
contrary. American intelligence agencies, including those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which had always favored Pakistan over India for a defense association with the United States, endorsed that policy. The key to America's strategic interests in the region, they reiterated, lay in Pakistan, which unlike India, showed a willingness to enter into defense arrangements with the West. Military assistance to Pakistan might cause some bitterness in India, the intelligence officials noted, but the advantages of such assistance far outweighed the disadvantages. Emphasizing Egypt's growing unreliability in view of its increasingly anti-British attitude, Eisenhower's special assistant for military security affairs, Robert Cutler, suggested that Washington encourage Turkey and Pakistan to form a military agreement which could later be expanded to include Iran and Iraq. Since the original proposal for MEDO appeared orchestrated by the West, the new approach, Cutler argued, could be presented as arising spontaneously from within the region. The United States would, at a convenient time, extend assistance to a group ostensibly formed on its own initiative. At the same time, although India would not align itself with the West it would not enter any kind of defense arrangement with the Communist bloc. Besides, American influence in New Delhi could be maintained by continuing economic assistance.

Thus emerged the dual policy of military assistance to Pakistan and economic assistance to India. That policy, the NSC believed, would enhance American influence throughout South Asia. Lacking an appreciation of the depth of subcontinental feuds, advocates of this policy failed to realize that nothing would embitter Indo-American
relations more than Washington's military assistance to Pakistan. India and Pakistan looked upon each other as enemies, and history bore testimony to their enduring enmity. New Delhi would naturally resist and resent any policy that promised to bolster Karachi's military strength.

While Washington was preoccupied with the prospective Turco-Pakistani military pact, a seemingly minor incident inflamed Indo-American relations. The incident grew out of India's export to China of the strategic mineral thorium nitrate. On 24 July the American Embassy in Colombo told Washington a Polish vessel carrying two tons of thorium nitrate from India to China had berthed at Colombo. Dulles immediately asked the embassy in New Delhi to confirm this report. If the report was true, he said, the embassy should ask New Delhi to cancel the shipment and off-load the cargo in Ceylon. Once again, the United States and India were at odds over an issue involving American strategic interests and Indian sensitivities.

The reason for Washington's alarm over the shipment lay in a provision of Public Law 213, popularly known as the Battle Act, which had been enacted in 1951 and stipulated that any nation exporting specified strategic materials to the Communist bloc would have all American military, economic, and financial assistance terminated. Among the embargoed materials was thorium nitrate, used in the production of atomic bombs.

When contacted by the new American ambassador, George Allen, Indian officials, including Finance Minister C.D. Deshmukh and Foreign Secretary R.K. Nehru, said they were unaware of the relevant provision of the Battle Act. The shipment might have been a mistake in view of
India's desire for American aid, they acknowledged, but blocking it now would adversely affect India's relations with China. Nehru perceived the request to block the shipment from a more complicated perspective. He did not want to be seen accepting American aid with strings attached to it. Off-loading the cargo would not only affect Indo-Chinese relations, he believed, but would also have important domestic political repercussions. Elements hostile to the West would exploit the off-loading as evidence of Nehru's weakness in dealing with Washington. Therefore he was much more forthright than his deputies when he stated that "India had never and would never submit to derogation of its national sovereignty in permitting United States law to determine with whom and in what commodities India could trade."

Allen responded to Nehru's forthrightness by pointing out that Washington had supplied his government with a copy of the Battle Act and that the two governments had signed a technical cooperation agreement on the basis of that act in January 1952. On several occasions, he also noted, embassy officials had discussed the provisions of the act with their Indian counterparts, and as late as February 1953 had reminded them that the act was still in force. Nehru replied that India would never agree to conditional aid. The Battle Act was domestic legislation of the United States, he argued, and not binding on India. Allen responded that all countries that received American aid had accepted the terms of the Act, and none regarded its terms as infringements upon their sovereignty. Nehru did, however, and categorically refused to recall the protested shipment.

India was a newly independent country and any act by a foreign
power that seemed to limit its freedom of action was anathema to its leader. It was difficult for Allen, the representative of the strongest nation on earth, to appreciate Nehru's sensitivity. Besides, Allen was not Bowles. Unlike his predecessor, as Narayana Raghavan Pillai, India's secretary general for external affairs, told Canadian Ambassador Escott Reid, Allen gave Indians the impression that he was "too sure of himself, too inclined to lay down the law, and to throw his weight around as the representative of the greatest power in the world."24

Referring to American opposition to India's export of thorium nitrate to China, Pillai told Reid that American officials seemed to think that because they gave India $35 million a year in economic assistance they could direct India's commercial relations with the Communist bloc. If that was indeed the case, he suggested, India would likely tell America it did not want further aid. He would talk to Allen further about these matters, he said, when he got to know him better.25

Despite this rhetoric, Pillai and his colleagues in the Ministry of External Affairs soon realized that American aid to India was likely to be terminated because of the thorium nitrate issue. They therefore toned down their rhetoric, and reiterated to Allen that they had been ignorant of the Battle Act provisions at the time of the shipment and that India would in the future abide by those provisions.26 Although the records do not say so, these officials could not have given these assurances without Nehru's approval.

In Washington, Dulles had his own political problems. If the news of India's shipment of thorium nitrate to China became known, the
administration would find it difficult to continue aid to India. On the other hand, India now chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which was arranging the repatriation of prisoners in Korea. In that role, New Delhi could do a lot of good or harm to Western interests, and the termination of aid might affect its attitudes on sensitive matters relating to Korea. Hence Washington was "exploring all possible means," Dulles wrote to Allen, "[of] avoiding aid termination [on the basis of] this single transaction [concerning the shipment of thorium nitrate to China]. 27

Concerned officials at the State Department continued to search for a solution. Acknowledging the importance of thorium nitrate in the production of atomic weapons, they noted its commercial uses as well, in for example the production of mantles used in emergency lights. In 1948, China used approximately 5000 pounds of thorium nitrate for this purpose, and as for atomic research, the quantity in the disputed shipment was relatively insignificant. Therefore, the State Department concluded, "present shipment is not in violation of the provisions of the Battle Act." This obviously strained interpretation was the result of a welcomed pragmatism. Terminating aid would deal a severe blow to India's Five-Year Plan while also jeopardizing vital American objectives in Korea. Rather than risk either of these consequences, Washington decided to insist only that India institute strict controls to prevent future shipments of strategic materials to the communist bloc. Recognizing that India needed all the foreign exchange it could get, State Department officials also recommended that the United States purchase all of India's surplus thorium nitrate "at a reasonable premium if necessary." 28

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Allen seconded this recommendation. Otherwise it would be difficult, he argued, to prevent Indian exports to the Communist bloc, the only other important consumer of thorium nitrate. Point Four funds were available to purchase India's entire production of this strategic material. 29

This resolution should not obscure the genuine dilemma the issue presented to Dulles and his undersecretary, Walter Bedell Smith. Neither Dulles nor Smith wanted to terminate aid to India, for reasons stated earlier, but both were also anxious to enforce the Battle Act. Accordingly, Smith suggested that Allen encourage Pillai to state officially that the recent shipment of thorium nitrate to China was intended for commercial purposes, and that Indian officials had been unaware that thorium was on the list of materials embargoed by the Battle Act. India should also give private assurances that future exports of thorium nitrate to the Communist bloc were prohibited. In return, the United States would keep secret the recent shipment and open negotiations for the purchase of India's entire production of thorium nitrate. Smith assured the Indians that he and Dulles would do their best to avoid a cessation of aid should knowledge of the shipment become known, and should cessation become unavoidable, they would work to reestablish aid as soon as possible. 30

If these assurances satisfied American sensibilities, they still had to be sold to New Delhi. Allen and Pillai thus began discussing ways India could give assurances to Washington concerning its trade in strategic goods without violating its sovereignty in commercial matters. Toward this end, Allen prepared a written statement for Pillai to sign. 31 Because the government of India was young and
sensitive about its sovereignty, Pillai was unwilling to commit himself in writing. He worried that if Nehru learned of a written commitment, he might disavow it altogether. Pillai would, he said, very much like to give oral rather than written assurances on so touchy an issue. Allen's silence on Pillai's proposal indicates that he might have favored it.

During this period, Nehru remained willing to discuss mutual concerns with other countries. But he was not prepared to consult with anyone regarding each and every export application "among hundreds which might bear in some way on items named in [the] embracive provisions of [the] Battle Act." When Allen importuned that he would like to report to Washington that India would notify the United States in advance of any export of strategic materials, Nehru abruptly ended the conversation. Nehru no doubt realized the risk this stance involved, but he remained unwilling to make a commitment he thought infringed on Indian sovereignty.

Dulles was willing to be more flexible, but the domestic implications of the issue in the United States could not be ignored. Washington quietly stopped the flow of aid to New Delhi as the date neared for the president's report to Congress on the Battle Act. Before aid could be resumed and while the president's report went to Congress, India would have to give assurances concerning future shipments of strategic goods to communist countries. Noting that the present impasse precluded the resumption of American aid, Dulles told New Delhi, "We would find ourselves in [the] rather untenable position of believing [in the] increased stability in India as very much to our interest but not being able to do anything about it. The boost to the
communist propaganda line in India and the rest of Asia would certainly be very great if India were destabilized or a wedge driven between it and the United States." Dulles therefore directed Allen to do whatever possible to persuade Indian officials to take a more reasonable attitude on the subject. He acknowledged that the recent shipment of thorium nitrate was the result of ignorance of the Battle Act, but he insisted that Pillai give at least oral assurance that India would permit no future shipments. The reward for such an assurance would be an American commitment to buy all of India's surplus thorium nitrate.34

Allen communicated these instructions to Pillai who, in turn, discussed them with Nehru. Strongly egotistical, highly sensitive about Indian sovereignty, and ever suspicious of foreign interference in India's domestic affairs, Nehru found it difficult to give the requested assurance, notwithstanding the logic of doing so. He therefore asked Pillai to inform Allen that while India had no desire to carry on trade "behind [America's] back, he was concerned over the length of items which might be listed in the Battle Act." He was reluctant to assure the Americans concerning scores of items, some of which Indian officials might innocently approve for export. The prime minister could, however, "assure [the United States] that no marked change would be made in India's trade policy without advance notification to [the United States]." This grudging assurance was far short of what Washington wanted, but Allen appreciated Nehru's difficulties. The prime minister "now desires to meet our wishes in this matter," the ambassador told Washington, "and hopes [that a] satisfactory formula can be reached."35
Washington accepted Allen's interpretation of Nehru's assurances, and in July 1954 the two governments agreed that the United States would purchase all thorium nitrate India sold on the world market. As these negotiations proceeded, Washington explored its prospective military commitment to Pakistan. As a precondition to receiving American arms, Pakistan should, Washington suggested, settle its outstanding disputes with India. The most important of these disputes involved Kashmir, the only predominantly Muslim area that opted to remain in India after partition. At American insistence, Pakistan sought to defuse the issue. In late July 1953, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan discussed their outstanding differences in Karachi. The discussions did not produce an agreement, but both parties appeared to be encouraged. The reception Nehru received in Pakistan convinced him and his Pakistani counterpart, Mohammed Ali Bogra, that despite continuing differences a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem was possible.

The following month, Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra visited India. On the eve of Ali's arrival in New Delhi, Nehru told Parliament he was ready to settle peacefully every problem that embittered relations between the two countries. Ali was virtually unknown in India at the time of his visit. The only significant position he had held prior to his appointment as prime minister was ambassador to the United States. Nevertheless, he was accorded a reception no less friendly than that given to Nehru in Karachi a month earlier. Nehru convinced himself again that a peaceful solution to the Indo-Pakistani dispute was possible. After talking with Indian officials, Ali declared that "a solution was now in sight". The
future of Indo-Pakistani relations seemed promising.

While India and Pakistan were thus negotiating, the Cold War entered a new phase. The American government learned that the Soviet Union had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb on 12 August 1953, and thus broken America's monopoly on superweapons. This news caused considerable alarm in Washington, which reacted by accelerating the consolidation of its global defense system. One result was to reinvigorate discussions concerning the defense of West Asia. The chief of Pakistan's army, General Mohammed Ayub Khan, was invited to Washington, and Governor General Ghulam Mohammed soon followed. Rumors of an American military alliance with Pakistan surfaced. The New York Times reported from Karachi in early November that the United States was planning to extend military assistance to Pakistan. Newspapers in Pakistan immediately repeated these reports.

On hearing the reports, Nehru was indignant. Reiterating his readiness to discuss a plebiscite in Kashmir, he told Prime minister Ali of Pakistan that Karachi would have to choose between the plebiscite and the prospective military partnership with the United States. If Pakistan chose the latter, Nehru cautioned, "All our problems will have to be seen in a new light". "In effect Pakistan becomes practically a colony of the United States," he wrote K.M. Panikkar, a close confidante. "The United States imagine that by this policy they have completely outflanked India's so-called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees. Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen." Dulles sought to allay Indian apprehensions. On 17 November he summoned the Indian ambassador, Gaganvihari Lallubhai Mehta, and told
him that American military aid to Pakistan would not be used against India. The arms would be used, he said, only to strengthen the free world. Nehru was not convinced. He believed that Karachi would feel itself strong enough to use the arms to settle its problems with New Delhi. He therefore insisted that the military pact between Pakistan and America would have serious consequences in the subcontinent. He told his chief ministers on 1 December and Parliament on 23 December that the Pakistani-American military alliance would increase tension in the subcontinent and sabotage all attempts at friendliness between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, he thought, by aligning with the West would become a part of the Cold War now and of a hot war later. "Behind Pakistan," he told his chief ministers on 1 December, "will stand a great and powerful country, the [United States]. In fact the giving of military aid to Pakistan is an unfriendly act to India." Pillai echoed his chief when he told Reid that American arms aid to Pakistan would bring the Cold War to India's borders, and any strengthening of Pakistan's armed forces would encourage 'hotheads' in Karachi to seek a military solution to their problems with India. Meeting Reid on 1 December, Nehru elaborated his positions. Given present conditions, a third world war would be fought, he noted, in Europe and West Asia. The Soviet Union would not attack India or Pakistan, even though neither country was militarily strong enough to withstand Soviet aggression. But if New Delhi or Karachi became members of a Western military alliance, the West would have to come to their rescue in case of aggression. That, Nehru told Reid, would be a liability rather than an asset for the West.

Pakistan needed a massive infusion of aid to bolster its
military. If, as American officials noted, Washington extended only limited assistance to Pakistan, how could it expect Karachi to become a bulwark against communism? Indians therefore had reason to fear Karachi would begin to receive sizable amounts of military assistance from Washington. But if Karachi had no need to defend itself against the Communist bloc, then whom was it arming against? And who could guarantee that Pakistan would not use its newly acquired arms against India, its arch enemy? Washington never directly addressed these apprehensions. Convinced that Pakistan's membership in a Western-sponsored alliance would be a deterrent to communist advances in West Asia, Washington never questioned the implications of that alliance for the subcontinent. To New Delhi, Washington's only assurance was that if Pakistan attacked India, America would stand by India.

Nehru did not respond to the rumors of American military assistance to Pakistan by trying to move closer to either of the superpowers. He denied a story published in the London Observer on 29 December "that India had made a secret pact in the event of war, with China and Russia." The United States and Soviet Union, he told his chief ministers on 31 December, "have got so used to imposing their will on others that they cannot understand how any country can refuse to submit." India deliberately chose nonalignment, he said, and would continue to do so. Military pacts and alignment, he added, would increase tension in the world, whereas India needed peace to pursue its development objectives. Alignment would mean militarization, which
would divert scarce resources to military rather than economic objectives.

Washington followed these Indian reactions carefully. Policymakers had resigned themselves to the idea that American military assistance to Pakistan would evoke angry reaction in India. Still, they decided to subordinate Indian reaction to what they regarded as the larger interests of world peace and stability. Acknowledging the adverse Indian response to the new alliance system in West Asia, Dulles told his British counterpart Anthony Eden on 7 December, "India might choose to remain neutral, but could not claim the right to prevent other nations from lining up with the West." Recommending military aid to Pakistan, Dulles told Eisenhower, "We must expect quite a storm from India if we go ahead with a military program for Pakistan." He hoped, nevertheless, that, "we can ride out the storm without fatal effect on [United States-India] relations." Failure to follow through on Pakistani aid, Dulles noted, would be detrimental to American prestige in Asia, which might conclude that "we backed down in the face of Indian threats." The president met with high level officials on 5 January 1954 to make a final decision on the matter. He told those present—Dulles, Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, and Foreign Operations Administrator Harold Stassen—that he agreed in principle to proceed with military aid to Pakistan subject to "our capacity to present this in a reasonable way, which would allay the apprehensions of reasonable people that we were trying to help Pakistan against India." The United States would emphasize that its military assistance to Pakistan was part of a regional security program initiated by Turkey and Pakistan, and other
countries would be free to join that program. Washington would be willing, he emphasized, to extend arms assistance to India under similar arrangements. A few days later Eisenhower affirmed his decision to proceed with the arms deal with Pakistan, with the caveat that "every possible public and private means at our disposal be used to ease the effects of our action on India." 52

Events moved rapidly thereafter. Eisenhower decided to inform Nehru of the arms deal before it was made public. In late February 1954, he asked Allen to deliver a conciliatory letter to the Indian prime minister on the subject. In the letter, the president reiterated that the arms deal was part of a broader arrangement of West Asian security. Should any country including Pakistan use American arms against India, he pledged, the United States would use all possible means in and out of the United Nations to thwart the usage. As for India, it would continue to receive American economic assistance, and would receive military aid too whenever New Delhi requested it. 53

Allen met with Nehru on 24 February to deliver Eisenhower's message. Expressing his appreciation of the contents of the letter, Nehru emphasized that his concern was not over American motives but over the possible consequences of the military aid to Pakistan. In addition to increasing tension between the two countries, he said, the American move would also generate communal tension within India. Indian Muslims believed American military aid would enable Pakistan to extend its control over India. This, Nehru noted, would arouse Hindu extremists, who might demand that India arm itself against Pakistan. However, at the end of the conversation, Nehru reiterated his conviction that the United States under Eisenhower would not knowingly
harm India. Encouraged by this, Allen reported to Washington that public agitation over the issue in India would diminish within a few days.

Allen took Nehru's concluding remarks too literally. Nothing could affect India's attitude toward America more directly and adversely than military assistance to Pakistan. New Delhi and Karachi had a number of outstanding problems, and American military aid to Pakistan could only be seen in New Delhi as strengthening Pakistan against India. The assistance to Pakistan, Nehru told Parliament on 1 March, was a form of American intervention in Indo-Pakistan affairs which would have a direct effect on the Kashmir dispute. Accordingly, the Indian government would no longer regard American observers in Kashmir as neutral. Addressing his chief ministers a few days later, Nehru was critical of American foreign policy in general. American efforts to establish military bases all over the world, he told the chief ministers on 15 March, testify to its attempts to solve international issues only through military strength. America claimed to be the champion of the free world, he continued, but by supporting the French in North Africa and Indochina, Washington helped maintain a colonial presence in two continents, and justified its position as being necessary to contain communism. But so far as Pakistan was concerned, Nehru emphasized, American aid would be used not against the Soviet Union or China as there was no threat to Pakistan from these countries, but against India. Washington, Nehru concluded, was no longer neutral in Indo-Pakistani disputes.

The impact of the military deal upon the subcontinent was enormous. It could be argued, as did Allen and Donald Kennedy—the
latter the official overseeing the Kashmir dispute at the State Department—that Nehru never wanted a reasonable solution of the Kashmir dispute and was using the Pakistani-American arms deal as a pretext to continue that dispute. This argument, however, is overly simplistic. Nehru did desire a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem; but only on his own terms. Holding that Pakistan was an aggressor who forcibly occupied a part of Kashmir, Nehru insisted that Karachi evacuate its occupying forces before a plebiscite could take place. The UN had never addressed this demand, and insisted instead that the status quo in Kashmir, which included Pakistani occupation of a position of the principality, was a satisfactory precondition for the plebiscite. Washington had no overarching need to publicize the fact of its military alliance with Pakistan, which was finalized in February, when negotiations between Pakistan and India over Kashmir were still going on. If Washington delayed announcement of its alliance with Pakistan for a couple of months, India and Pakistan might use the interval to progress toward an amicable settlement of the Kashmir problem. But by hurriedly publicizing the deal with Karachi, Washington denied itself a legitimate defense against subsequent Indian criticisms. In any case, the American-Pakistani alliance caused Nehru to put off his efforts to solve his problems with Pakistan.

Immediately after Eisenhower decided to grant military aid to Pakistan in February, the Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammed, urged Washington to pressure India to settle the Kashmir dispute and other Indo-Pakistani problems in favor of Pakistan. Sending this letter to Dulles, Henry Byroade of the State Department
acknowledged that "the Pakistanis will" now "attempt to obtain undue support from [the United States] in their relations with India." But, he added, "It should be made quite clear to the Governor General that [American] military assistance does not mean any change of our policy of impartiality between India and Pakistan." 58 In his reply to Ghulam, Dulles assured him that America would continue to lend friendly and impartial support to all efforts to solve peacefully all regional problems in the subcontinent. But, he added, "Agreements, to be lasting, must be arrived at by mutual [understanding] and not by the intrusion of extraneous forces." 59 In the West Asian alliance, American motives might have been to strengthen regional defense, but Pakistan's purposes were to enhance its position in the subcontinent vis-a-vis India.

American military assistance to Pakistan was therefore ill-conceived as well as ill-timed. However, subsequent policy assessments concerning the subcontinent began to rectify the damage. In fact, Washington began almost at once to demonstrate more realism than ever in its dealings with India. Acknowledging Indian nonalignment as a reality, the administration accepted the necessity of dealing with it accordingly. Washington thus accepted the fact that although Nehru would not publicly align India with the West, he was nonetheless a useful friend in the effort to contain communism.

The administration embodied this new assessment in a number of policy statements regarding South Asia. Acknowledging the region's importance in the Cold War, the NSC reiterated the need to retain American influence in the region. A draft policy paper, NSC 5409, noted the "serious restraints" on "close association with the United
States," on the part of every nation in the area except Pakistan. "India," the paper noted, "is committed to a policy of non-alignment in the East-West struggle which often leads it to oppose Western policies." Yet the United States was at fault too. Its close cooperation with the former colonial powers, NSC 5409 noted, has "become associated in South Asian minds with memories of European colonialism, with what they regard as 'economic imperialism.'" But India, Pakistan, and Ceylon were members of the British Commonwealth, and despite serious economic problems had not altered their Western orientation. The threat to the area, according to the NSC, arose not so much from the danger of communist aggression as from internal disintegration, subversion, or communist pressure. These countries would therefore have to achieve considerable economic progress in order to satisfy domestic demands.

NSC concern for the success of India's democratic experiment remained. "If India does not achieve substantial economic and social progress through democratic processes, and on the other hand, Communist China appears to be moving forward through totalitarian methods," the paper cautioned, "peoples of South Asia may turn to communist leadership and methods for a solution of their own problems." But to deal with India was to deal with Nehru, whose foreign policy centered on his desire for peace. Therefore while strengthening America's strategic position in the region by providing arms to Pakistan, Washington should help the government of India remain in power, encourage mutual consultation between Washington and New Delhi, and support the geographical unity of the Indian union. Noting that nonalignment would continue to be the cornerstone of New
Delhi's foreign policy, the paper recognized India as a major power in Asia, and emphasized its role as a mediator in East-West conflict. In sum, the United States should help build an India strong economically and deal with her politically as a major Asian power.

While the United States was thus taking a more pragmatic attitude toward India's nonalignment, the attention of the world was drawn to Indochina. It was becoming increasingly apparent that France would not be able to sustain its colonial presence there. In July 1953 French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel announced his government's readiness to loosen its grip over the Associated States of Indochina in phases leading to their independence. The Vietminh—the military wing of the Vietnamese Communist Party—responded to this announcement in November by expressing its willingness to negotiate an armistice if the French agreed to concede independence to Vietnam. But French opposition to conceding independence was too strong, and a military solution seemed the only way out of the dilemma. Fighting therefore intensified in Indochina, despite the increasingly poor prospects of the French imperialists.

The Eisenhower Administration believed the Soviet Union was behind the communist successes in Indochina, and responded to the threat of French defeat by additional military assistance to French efforts against the Viet Minh. Since 1950, American military assistance to the French in Indochina had totaled $500 million, and in 1954, the United States was paying about 80% of the cost of maintaining the French in Indochina.

In January 1954, Eisenhower approved NSC 5405. Entitled "Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States
Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to Southeast Asia," the paper detailed actions to be taken by the United States to meet the crisis in Southeast Asia. Warning that communist domination of the resource-rich area would threaten American interests in West Asia and Japan, the paper stated that American assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia should continue, and Washington should "take measures to promote the co-ordinated defense of Southeast Asia." American efforts would yield better results if coordinated with Britain and France, the paper continued, but in the event of British and French unwillingness to share responsibilities for the defense of the region, the United States should be prepared to take unilateral action. The fear of falling dominoes clearly alarmed Washington.

Meanwhile, the accelerated fighting in Indochina brightened the prospects of peace. France was tired of the war, and unable to sustain it; Britain was unwilling to support the French presence in so remote a place. Further, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had died in March 1953, and the new Soviet leaders, Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, endeavored to present a peaceful image. All of these things encouraged a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war. In February, the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States met in Berlin, and agreed to convene a conference in Geneva in April to discuss, among other issues, the peaceful transition from colonialism to independence in Indochina. India was not invited to this conference because of American opposition, and the Soviet Union did not insist upon, Indian participation. The State Department thought Indian participation would make the conference unduly large and complicate its proceedings with "neutralists." No
sooner had the Berlin conference ended than American policymakers began to express misgivings about a negotiated settlement, and to reiterate their belief in the need for a military solution to the Indochinese conflict. All American policy statements, whether emanating from military or civilian sources, echoed this theme. The United States had underwritten the Navarre Plan and had invested a large amount of money to make it succeed. The investments were made to enable France to win a decisive victory, not merely to "improve [America's and France's] bargaining position." Any talk of a negotiated settlement, one statement noted, would only inhibit the French army in Indochina. The majority of the population in Indochina, the statements noted, were against colonial rule, while the communists there, riding the "wave of the future," were determined to bring the whole of Vietnam under their control. Should that happen, all South East Asia would go under communist rule, and the West would be denied the resources of the region. America should therefore insist on a military solution, despite its public endorsement of the conference.

When Dulles called for "united action" to contain communism in Indochina he was giving public expression to these recommendations. He was doing the same thing when, a few days later, he explained that the Associated States of Indochina, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, as well as the United States might join France in "united action." Dulles and Eden followed this up with a public proposal made in London on 13 April for a collective security agreement in Southeast Asia. The world seemed posed for another war. Coming on the eve of the Geneva conference, this alarmed Nehru. "Only the incurable optimist
can expect any good to come out of [the conference]," he told his chief ministers on 14 April, "because everything has been done to make it infructuous." He thought the West, particularly the United States, was making special efforts to undermine the Geneva conference so its collective scheme for the defense of Southeast Asia could come into effect. The alternative, he predicted, was that the Soviet Union and China would agree to major concessions or the Indochina war would become a major conflict. The possibility of using nuclear weapons in such a conflict also alarmed the prime minister. Equating American support for the French-installed government of Bao Dai in Vietnam with traditional Western support for colonialism, Nehru said scornfully, "All this is done in the name of peace, security and freedom." Nehru regretted that a conference of such momentous character should be preceded by declarations that amounted to a lack of faith in its outcome. Viewing Vietnamese resistance as nationalist opposition to colonial rule, the prime minister addressed Parliament on 24 April urging peaceful solution to the dispute. He then offered his own peace proposals for Indochina:

All concerned nations should create a climate of peace and negotiations by desisting from threats and refraining from stepping up the tempo of the war;
The Geneva Conference on Indochina should facilitate the actual belligerents to arrive at a cease-fire;

Non-intervention by any outside power on behalf of any combatant;
Direct negotiation between the parties immediately and principally concerned leading to total independence to the states of Indochina; and

The United Nations should be kept informed of the developments.

Nehru's quest for a speedy peaceful solution to Vietnam grew out of a combination of factors. He opposed war, he said, not only on
principle but because peace was essential for India's economic development. "Peace to [India] is not just a fervent hope," Nehru insisted, "it is an emergent necessity." Continued war in Indochina carried with it prospects of its internationalizing the conflict, and thus violating Nehru's policy of nonalignment. To all this was added an ideological consideration. Nehru stood against colonialism and for independence for all nations. "The maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Asian countries, as well as the end of colonial and foreign rule," he insisted, "are essential for the prosperity of Asian peoples and for the peace of the world."74

Domestic political concerns also influenced Nehru's stance. His statement on Indochina, Nehru told Allen, would have had no appeal to the Indian masses had he not come out solidly in support of independence. After all India still had to its annoying foreign enclaves on its coasts—Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Goa, Daman, and Diu. At the same time, Nehru opposed Chinese domination of Indochina and the extension of communist control over Laos and Cambodia. Imperialism was imperialism, he insisted, whether practiced by the Western powers or someone else. The Indochinese felt, he said, accepted Chinese help just as the "Western Powers had been glad to have [communist] help in fighting Hitler." In fact, Nehru reminded Allen, "You were hand in glove with [Communists] when I despised them as traitors." Allen was not impressed. The same day, he told Pillai that was was necessary to keep Indochina free from communism.75

Nehru carried his brief to Colombo, where the prime ministers of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia met from 28 April to May 1 to discuss the world situation. When they considered Nehru's peace
package, Mohammed Ali Bogra of Pakistan objected to the provision for non-intervention by outside powers in the Indochina conflict. His objection was voted down, however, and the conference unanimously passed a resolution calling for a settlement by the two Vietnams without outside intervention. 76

Despite their interest in the conflict, the South Asian countries were not represented either at the Korean or at the Indochinese phase of the Geneva conference, which opened on 26 April. Britain tried unsuccessfully to include India in the conference and in the defense arrangements to be made for Southeast Asia. Eden argued that India should not be left out of any arrangement that so immediately concerned its interests. Dulles was not moved by the argument. 77 He argued instead that if the proposed defense association was extended to include India, he would be unable to resist demands to include Formosa and Japan. Later events proved this was only an excuse to keep India out. Ultimately the defense grouping included Pakistan.

Although India was not invited to Geneva, its influence there was palpable. That was partly because of Eden's insistence on considering the viewpoints of Commonwealth countries, particularly India, and partly because of the presence of Nehru's personal representative, V.K. Krishna Menon. Thanks to Eden, American opposition to hearing Indian concerns weakened. India remained uninvited, but it was heard.

The American and Indian positions on the future of Indochina could not have been more different. Nehru wanted a negotiated settlement of the war; the Americans saw no wisdom in that. The prime minister called for a cease-fire; Washington believed a truce would lead to rapid weakening of the French position and eventual takeover.
of power by the Vietminh. Nehru conceded that prospects for a communist victory in a free election were bright. Discredited by its dependence on colonial rulers, the Bao Dai government, he was sure, had no chance of success. Ho and his comrades, playing on popular national aspirations, would win any fair elections. Washington knew that as well as New Delhi. But whereas Nehru felt a communist Vietnam was tolerable, Washington did not. In short, as the Eisenhower administration saw things, Nehru's recommendations played directly into the communists' hand. As State's advisor to the American delegation, Charles Stelle, wrote, "The Indian proposal picks up those items of the Communist position—direct negotiation, cease-fire, and non-intervention—which have a dangerous appeal to the French public, and which in themselves would be damaging to the Western position, and neglects any of the safeguards—political settlement, and controls—which might be calculated to make the non-Communist position in Indochina tenable." 78

American opposition to Nehru's proposals illustrates the divergent methods the two countries employed in solving international crises, particularly those involving communist expansion. The United States publicly proclaimed its support for the idea that every country was free to choose its own ideology. Privately, however, it was determined to counteract Soviet and China influence everywhere. To Americans, the nationalist movement in Vietnam was by definition communist dominated, and it had to be dealt with according to that analysis. Although opposed to external communist threats, Nehru was not so averse to the idea of a country might choose communism. Each country, he thought, had the right to follow its own imperatives.
Defining the non-communist resistance in Indochina as opponents of a colonial war, he urged direct negotiations between the French and the Vietminh. In short, Nehru regarded the war in Indochina as essentially an Asian problem. If India could oppose and win independence from Britain without outside interference, he reasoned, the Indochinese were surely able to solve their problem directly with the French. Interference with that process, however innocent, was tantamount to endorsing the views of Western imperialism.

Meanwhile fighting in Indochina escalated and the French military situation deteriorated. The United States continued to send supplies to bolster the French war effort. Washington asked India to provide landing and refuelling facilities for its planes en route to Indochina. Predictably Nehru refused. Further, he opposed an American-sponsored Thai appeal to the United Nations for despatch of a team from the Peace Observation Commission to the area, fearing that such a move would divert attention from Geneva and make a settlement there more difficult to achieve.

In Geneva, where there was no direct communication between the Americans and the Chinese, the role of intermediary was important, and here Menon stepped in. After a few weeks at the conference, Dulles left Geneva, and the American delegation was headed by Undersecretary Walter Bedell Smith. Meeting Smith in late May, Menon reiterated Nehru's ideas for settlement in Indochina. Replying to Smith's enquiry regarding membership of a supervisory authority, Menon said any such body should consist of neutral nations approved by the five major powers. Ruling out members of NATO and the Latin American nations and Canada because of their close relationship with the "American bloc", I
Menon suggested that India and Norway be asked to perform the function.

Menon's proposal raised India's standing with some of the conference participants, particularly Chou En-lai, who decided to visit India and talk directly with Nehru. In India from 25 to 28 June, the Chinese prime minister demonstrated his skills in flattery as well as diplomacy and won the confidence of the Indian leader. Practical calculations were behind Chou's seduction of Nehru. Rumors were afloat in Geneva that India would be a member of the international supervisory commission to oversee the transition in Indochina from colonial to self-rule. In that case Nehru's friendship was essential if China was to have any influence during the period of transition. Seeking Nehru's advice on a wide range of international issues, Chou said, "Your Excellency has more knowledge about the world and Asia than I have. I am not being modest. Your Excellency has participated much more in International affairs than I have. We have been shut up in our own country dealing with our own human problems." India was, Chou told Nehru more than once, economically and industrially more advanced than China. It could also, he suggested, help China establish good relations with countries like Burma and Indonesia.

Chou's remarks fell on receptive ears. Nehru had for a long time considered India and China the two giants of Asia. Only mutual cooperation and a spirit of goodwill between them could ensure peace and stability in the continent. China's domestic ideology could not be allowed to come in the way of this objective. Peking's rightful demands, including a seat in the United Nations and the Security Council had to be met, and its genuine fears had to be dispelled. Only
then, Nehru held, would China be able to play a constructive role in Asia.

It is not known whether Nehru understood Chou's motive. But for a moment, flattered by Chou's comments and anxious to develop good relations with China, Nehru preferred to trust his guest. He was convinced that Chou had an "extreme desire to develop friendly relations with [Asian countries] and to remove all apprehensions from their minds." Nehru was aware that this could "be clever strategy looking to the distant future," but for the moment he decided to go with Chou. The bond of friendship that was gradually developing between the two countries must also have influenced the Indian leader's judgment.

In the midst of these discussions, a change of government in France brightened prospects for a settlement. Pierre Mendes-France, the new prime minister, pledged to reach an agreement on French withdrawal from Indochina by 20 July or to resign his office. Partition of Vietnam now seemed inevitable, but there was no consensus on a line of division. The French insisted on the eighteenth parallel, while the Vietminh pressed for the fourteenth. Ultimately, an Indian proposal of the seventeenth parallel was accepted, and Vietnam was thus divided. Elections, to be held before 20 July 1956, would determine the future of the country. In the meantime, French and the Vietminh troops were to leave Laos and Cambodia, thus guaranteeing their eventual independence. An international commission consisting of members from Canada, Poland, and India—with India presiding—was to supervise the armistice.

The United States did not approve this accord, but publicly
promised to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" it. The disapproval disappointed Nehru, who revived his old stereotypes of the United States. "No one knows what [American policy] is," he wrote to one of his confidantes in early July, "except strong language and powerful emotions." Approving the visit to the United States of a group of Indian scholars in mid-July, he observed, "I am all for broadening the outlook of the person. But mere breadth is not enough; there must be some depth also. As far as I can see, there is neither breadth nor depth about the average American. The United States is hardly a place where one could go at present in search of the higher culture." 85

Still, Nehru was not so critical of America as to refuse American aid. Eisenhower, like Truman, believed economic assistance to developing countries could check the expansion of communist ideology. Thus he supported increased aid for India, which might also offset India's anger over his administration's military alliance with Pakistan. Consequently, India figured prominently in the proposed Mutual Security Program for fiscal 1955. Although a large part of the total program of $3.5 billion was earmarked for Western Europe's defense, exigencies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific increased the volume of aid to those areas to $1 billion. The administration also recommended $256 million in economic assistance for developing countries. The largest single allocation, $104 million, was intended for India. 86

Defending this request before Congress, Dulles noted the differences between America and India but emphasized India's commitment to democracy and the need for building that country as a
bulwark against communism. Although he did not sympathize with Indian foreign policy, Dulles understood that country's predicament better than had his predecessor, Acheson. By this time, more Americans had visited India, and their reports might have influenced Dulles' judgment. Moreover, the secretary himself had visited New Delhi twice, and his testimony in favor of Indian aid might have been written by Bowles, for he cautioned that economic failure by the democratically elected Nehru government would strengthen Indian communists and reflect unfavorably on the ability of democratic nations in Asia to compete with China. In the end the Congress appropriated $85.7 million dollars for India for 1955.87

Nehru appreciated the administration's generosity. But relations between the two governments soon foundered once more when the United States orchestrated another military pact in which Pakistan was an active member. Washington had long considered forming a defense association for South and Southeast Asia but its progress had been stalled because of the negotiations in Geneva. Following the conclusion of those negotiations, Washington immediately resumed action on the proposed pact.

The foreign ministers of Britain, France, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines met in the Philippines in early September to consider the formation of a defense organization for Southeast Asia. Foreign Minister Choudhury Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan was wary of the proposed organization. His government remained unsure of its interests in such an arrangement. However, he ultimately decided that Pakistan did have an interest in obliging the United States. On 9 September, the participants signed
the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty which created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

The birth of SEATO greatly upset Nehru. He wondered what the special need was for such an alliance. Noting that "for the first time" after Geneva "there was no national war in the world", he asked, "What was the sudden fear that brought these countries together?" Regarding the treaty as an example of the concept of the sphere of influence in Asia, he noted, "It is the big and powerful countries [in SEATO] that will decide matters and not the two or three weak and small Asian countries that may be allied to them." The treaty, then, was another manifestation of superpower influence in the region. The provision which entitled members of SEATO to intervene in this region seemed to Nehru not only to permit external invasion but interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. That was, he stressed, an infringement upon the sovereignty, integrity, and independence of the countries in the region. The fact that Pakistan had joined the pact inflamed Nehru further.

Earlier, American military assistance to Pakistan had brought the Cold War in South Asia; now the formation of the SEATO had extended South Asian involvement in that war. Thus, although Washington had come to accept India's nonalignment as permanent, New Delhi was still deeply apprehensive of Washington's military intrusions into South and Southeast Asia. This did not bode well for bilateral relations, at least in the short run.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

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4. Chester Bowles to Dulles, 5 February 1953, 611.91/2-533, RG 59,
Box 2858, NA.

5. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Undersecretary of
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6. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern,
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1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar
Imperialism (New York: Clarendon press, 1984); and Hugh Thomas,


12. Quoted in Verkataramani, American Role, p. 207.

13. The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State, for the President from the Secretary, 17 May, FRUS, 1952-1954, IX: I: 87-88.


18. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, ibid., p. 1697.

19. Ibid., n. 4.

20. Bowles left the post in March 1953, and Allen took over in May.

21. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 26 July 1953, ibid., pp. 1697-1700.

22. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 28
July 1953, ibid., 1700-1702.

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p. 49-50.


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28. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Waugh) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith), 31 July 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI: II: 1703-1705.

29. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 1 August 1953, ibid., pp. 1705-1706.

30. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 3 August, ibid., pp. 1706-1708.

31. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 10 August 1953, ibid., pp. 1708-1709.

32. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 13 August, ibid., p. 1709.

33. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, for the Secretary, 25 August, ibid., pp. 1714-1715.

34. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, personal for Ambassador Allen, 3 September 1953, ibid., pp. 1717-1718.

35. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 9
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36. Ibid., pp. 1747-1770.


38. Nehru to chief ministers, 1 August 1953, in Nehru, Letters, III: 348.


40. Quoted in Venkataramani, American Role, p. 213.

41. Ibid., p. 223.


43. Quoted in Gopal, Nehru, II: 184-185.

44. Reid, Envoy, p. 108.


46. Nehru to chief ministers, 31 December, ibid., p. 472.

47. Reid, Envoy, pp. 102 and 107.


50. Dulles, Memorandum to Eisenhower, undated, meetings with the President folder, White House Memoranda series, Dulles papers, DDEL.


52. Memorandum of Conversation, by the assistant Secretary of State

53. The Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to the Embassy in India, from the President to Nehru, 18 February 1954, ibid., pp. 1735-1736.

54. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Secretary of State, 24 February 1954, ibid., pp. 1737-1739.


56. Allen and Kennedy told Reid so. See Reid, Envoy, pp. 122-123.

57. Ghulam Mohammed to the Secretary of State, 27 February 1954, 611.90 D/2-2754, RG 59, Box 2857, NA.

58. Byroade to the Secretary of State, 16 March 1954, 611.90 D/3-1654, RG 59, Box 2857, NA.

59. Byroade to the Ambassador in Pakistan (Horace) with enclosed Dulles to Ghulam, 23 March 1954, 611.90 D/2-2754, RG 59, Box 2857, NA.


61. Ibid.


67. The Navarre Plan, named after General Henri Navarre of France, called for adopting a defensive strategy north of the 18th parallel throughout 1953-1954 and for attempting to clear the zones held by the Vietminh south of that parallel during spring and summer of 1954. In the fall of 1954, Navarre would launch a general offensive north of the 18th parallel in an effort to exert sufficient pressure whereby France and the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam could obtain, through negotiations, a settlement on the best possible terms. For further discussion, see Hammer, *The Struggle*, pp. 313-314.
68. Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Bowie), 24 February 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, XVI: 417-428; Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal), 8 March, ibid., pp. 437-442; The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, with enclosed Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense, 23 March, ibid., pp. 471-479; and Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director (Bowie), 10 March, ibid., pp. 446-448.


71. For the background of the formation of a collective defense arrangement in East Asia later called the SEATO, see FRUS, 1952-1954, XII: I, ff.

72. Nehru to chief ministers, 14 April, in Nehru, Letters, III: 517-519.

73. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 396-398.

74. Ibid.

75. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 25 April, FRUS, 1952-1954, XIII: I: 1406-1408.

76. The Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) to the Department of State, 6 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI: II: 1130-1136.


79. Inaugural address at the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, 23 March 1947, in Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 251; Speech at the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, 3 October 1950, ibid., p. 267.

80. Department of State to the missions at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and New Delhi, entitled, "Quarterly Review of United States-India Relations," 13 July 1954, 611.91/7-1354, RG 59, Box 2857, NA.


87. Ibid., pp. 5-12, 191.


CHAPTER VI

AGREEING TO DISAGREE: 1954–1956

Military assistance to Pakistan, the American role in Geneva, and the formation of SEATO produced a deteriorating relationship between Washington and New Delhi. At the same time, the Sino-Indian treaty of April 1954 and the Nehru-Chou meeting in June, and the highly-publicized joint statements these events produced, pointed toward a closer understanding between India and China. Nehru's basic policy now was to avoid displeasing China while getting Chinese leaders on record endorsing the normal rules of international conduct. To the extent the Chinese did that, Nehru was apparently convinced, it was in the interest of world peace and of India's leadership of the nonaligned bloc to cultivate Chinese friendship. Nehru's China policy and the calculations on which it rested were obstacles to the achievement of American objectives with regard to India. Washington feared that under Indian leadership Asia would thwart American interests in Southeast and South Asia.

Although resentful of India's resistance to American foreign policy, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his advisors recognized that America's relations with India had to be improved. Consequently, they felt it necessary to replace Ambassador George Allen with some one who could do the job better. Although Allen was an effective career diplomat, he did not get along well with Indian officials. Eisenhower thought for a moment of re-appointing Chester Bowles, but dropped the idea and instead considered Paul Hoffman, who
had been the Marshall Plan administrator and was currently president of the Ford Foundation. Emphasizing the need to "clear up the misapprehensions on both sides, which seem to create antagonism between two countries which ought to be sympathetic and going forward hand in hand," Dulles told Hoffman that "there is no more important task that faces us internationally than to develop good relations with India." Despite this plea, Hoffman rejected the position on personal grounds, leaving the administration to look for other candidates. Meanwhile Allen, who bore the responsibility for explaining America policy to Nehru, remained in his post. The search continued until Eisenhower and Dulles agreed upon John Sherman Cooper, a recently defeated senator from Kentucky, who reached New Delhi in February 1955.

Meanwhile, the American charge, Donald D. Kennedy, met with his counterparts in other embassies in New Delhi to find out if there had been any change in Nehru's policy toward other nations as a result of his disenchantment with American foreign policy. Most of the envoys told Kennedy that Nehru was fundamentally a democrat devoted to building a democratic India rather than an authoritarian state. Nehru was apprehensive of the Soviet Union, they added, and did not trust the Chinese leaders, and was much closer to the West than to the Communist bloc.

While Kennedy was conveying these optimistic assessments to Washington, Nehru's tour of Indochina and China, in October 1954, caused some alarm in the State Department. Sino-Indian friendship, to say nothing of alliance, was not what Washington wanted, and officials pondered ways to reach out to India. Detailing the adverse effects of
recent American moves on Indo-American relations, Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade held that because Washington was not going to change its policies toward the subcontinent, it should try to make those policies more acceptable to India. Nehru, he noted, had repeatedly complained that Washington did not consult him on Asian matters, even those of immediate concern to India. Because Nehru favored personal diplomacy, Byroade suggested that the president invite him to Washington and explain American policies and objectives to him. 3 Ambassador Allen endorsed this suggestion. 4 Yet whatever the merits of an Eisenhower-Nehru meeting, neither Byroade, Allen, nor anyone else suggested that Washington try to compromise with Nehru's views on world politics. Apparently no one thought this a viable policy option.

While Allen and Byroade considered the invitation to Nehru, the prime minister held wide-ranging talks with Chinese leaders, including Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in which the two sides demonstrated fundamental disagreement on many things important to Washington. Replying to Chou's query as to why America was "so aggressive," Nehru argued that Washington did not want war but feared communist aggression and was determined to protect its interests and those of its allies. Deflecting Chou's allegation that America wanted to "bully weaker nations and rule the world," Nehru quipped that this was exactly the Western nations' concern about communist expansionism. The Indian leader disagreed completely with Mao's forecast that a third World War would result in the defeat of capitalist "aggressors" and the triumph of communist revolution, and he cautioned Mao about the disastrous consequences of such a war in an atomic age. 5 True to his
promise that he would try to exercise a moderating influence between
the rival world-power blocs and work to build an atmosphere of trust
between them, Nehru used his China visit to do just that.

While the Indian leader endeavored to build good relations with
China and commented favorably on Chinese discipline and economic
progress, he would not subscribe to its authoritarian methods of
development. Noting his own commitment to democracy, he nonetheless
underscored the need for rapid economic progress. India, he hoped,
would use the former to achieve the latter. India and China differed,
he told his chief ministers, on political and economic matters of the
most fundamental sort. It was for the future to demonstrate, he added,
which country had made the better choice.6

Impressed to some degree by China's recent economic progress,
Nehru was anxious that India's economic development outstrip that of
the communist giant. Its failure to do so would discredit democracy
and "thus tip the balance of power in Asia, with serious and even
grave consequences for India and the rest of Southeast Asia."7 He
therefore urged all members of his Congress Party to commit themselves
and their constituencies to accelerating the pace of economic
development.8

Apprehensions about Nehru's China visit encouraged Byroade and
Allen to recommend that Nehru be invited to Washington, but the
outcome of Nehru's trip to Peking removed those apprehensions. Nehru's
reiteration of his commitment to democracy assured Dulles and
Undersecretary Walter Bedell Smith. Reports reaching America of
Nehru's visit to China were also encouraging. Washington had always
believed that Nehru's China policy was based on equal parts of
admiration and fear. As a result of the recent visit to Peking, Nehru was, Dulles thought, more than ever concerned by the implications for India of Chinese policies and strength. Despite the close relations with China, Nehru remained, as Dulles probably realized, a committed democrat. On the other hand, the prime minister would also not join an anti-communist alliance. Therefore inviting him to Washington would not fundamentally alter his position or serve any other useful purpose for the United States. Probably for this reason the secretary suggested that the president send Nehru a personal letter of commendation and thus make an invitation to Washington unnecessary. Eisenhower could use the occasion of a recent visit to Washington by India's Vice-president Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan to write a "warm personal letter" to Nehru reassuring New Delhi of Washington's good intentions.

Eisenhower endorsed Dulles' proposal and wrote Nehru assuring him that despite their political differences, the United States shared mutual concerns for peace and cooperation. Although the letter was no substitute for an invitation, Nehru, who did not know an invitation had been considered and rejected, reacted favorably to the letter. He reciprocated Eisenhower's gesture by sending an equally warm reply. Eisenhower's eagerness to befriend Nehru was a calculated response to larger considerations. While Indo-American relations were being assessed at the highest levels, Nehru was building personal rapport with other world leaders, especially those of the nonaligned and developing countries. Soon after his China tour, he hosted President Joseph Broz Tito of Yugoslavia in December 1954, at which time the two leaders expressed their faith in peaceful co-existence and
international co-operation as well as their faith in the "Panch Sheel". Some Asian countries had already accepted Nehru's leadership in these principles, and Yugoslavia now became the first European country to do so. Yugoslavia's situation was unique in other respects too; despite an alliance with Greece and Turkey, Tito did not join NATO. Moreover, despite being a communist country, Yugoslavia did not subordinate itself to the Soviet Union. Acceptance of the "Panch Sheel" by Tito was, therefore, a major achievement for Nehru, and a significant setback for Washington.

In February 1955, Nehru went to London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference while the world's attention was absorbed by the crisis over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. All the participants to the London Conference favored a peaceful solution to the crisis, but some, including those from Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, were unwilling to commit themselves concerning the conflicting claims of China and Taiwan to the disputed islands. Nehru, however, supported China's claim not only to the offshore islands but to Taiwan itself. He told his chief ministers after the conference that any nation that recognized the new China was obliged to recognize Taiwan as part of China. The reason so many nations did not do so, Nehru added, was America's strenuous objection. Criticizing Eisenhower's statement of 24 January that Taiwan was the spearhead of America's strategic defense in East Asia, Nehru objected that such a formulation only encouraged Chinese emphasis on the importance of that island.

From London, Nehru travelled to Cairo, where he met with Egyptian leaders, particularly Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his aide,
Colonel Anwar Sadaat. Nehru had met both men before, but never when circumstances dictated such urgent consideration of their mutual strategic interests. Worried that a military rapprochement between Turkey and Iraq was in the works, Nehru and Nasser joined most Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, in denouncing the rapprochement and predicted that its implementation would destroy the Arab League.  

India was now the scene of intense political maneuverings. Ex-King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia was in New Delhi in March 1955, as was the foreign minister of North Vietnam in April. The foreign minister of South Vietnam was scheduled to be there, also in April, but was detained at home by domestic troubles.  

Nehru took care to keep Washington informed of his diplomatic moves, and sent his lieutenant Krishna Menon to brief Eisenhower on them. But the meeting yielded no positive result. Menon wasted the occasion by dwelling not on foreign policy but on generalities about Indian philosophy and life, including his travels and the president's contacts with Nehru. It is not known why Menon took this tack, but Eisenhower did not raise the subject of Nehru's diplomatic maneuvering. Surprised at the general nature of Menon's remarks, the president decided "perhaps this was a preliminary to some future conversation the Indians might have in mind." The meeting, Eisenhower concluded, was for "fattening him up for the kill."  

The president, however, remained convinced that Nehru was amenable to personal diplomacy. "In the Indian situation," he wrote Dulles, "I am struck by the amount of evidence we have that Nehru seems to be often more swayed by personality than by logical
argument." A personal meeting between the two leaders being off the agenda for the time being, the American ambassador in New Delhi should, therefore, do everything possible to win the personal confidence and friendship of Nehru. 19 The assessment is revealing for its imperfect understanding of Nehru. It is true that Nehru preferred personal diplomacy. Yet he also judged international events on their merits and as they affected India's interests. Personal diplomacy, in his view, did not override logical argument, though it could at times reinforce the latter. But satisfied with his "discovery" of Nehru's psychology, Eisenhower might have missed this point.

While Nehru was thus trying to build his image and explain his policies to the world, the situation in Asia continued to trouble him and widen his differences with Washington. Besides Vietnam, the question of the Chinese offshore islands remained insoluble and constituted a potential cause of war. Dulles stated on 12 April his desire to refer that question to the United Nations. Nehru suspected that America's motive was to bring the world body into the picture as it had during the Korean crisis. Because America's Western allies, including Britain and Canada, had clearly stated their opposition to war in East Asia over the offshore islands, Nehru believed that Washington wanted to use the UN to endorse its position on the issue. The United States was allied with Chiang Kai-shek and any aggressive action by Chiang might draw Washington and its allies into the conflict, especially if the UN endorsed Washington's position on the offshore islands. And it would not be difficult for the United States with all its influence and power to win such an endorsement, which, once made, would neutralize Western opposition to American initiatives.
concerning the islands. Nehru was again overly suspicious of America's motives in East Asia. Lack of close understanding of American policies on his part precluded a more realistic appreciation of them. So much more the pity that Menon's talks with Eisenhower had paid so few dividends.

If the American attitude seemed dangerous to Nehru, the Chinese position seemed stubborn. Acknowledging the Chinese right to the islands, he feared that the Chinese too might be willing to risk war. In view of the many other points of East-West conflict, a general conflagration might then ensue. In addition, Indochina remained, despite the Geneva agreement, a potential area of conflict, as did West Asia and North Africa, where Egypt and Israel fought border skirmishes in early April. The Turco-Iraqi pact, finalized in February, had divided the Arab League and exacerbated regional tensions. "The world thus continues to stand at the edge of a precipice," an apprehensive Nehru told his chief ministers on 14 April. "Only the fear of an all-out atomic war keeps it from toppling over." India could not ignore these dangers, nor the possible extension of the influence of the great powers in Asia.

Against this background Nehru prepared to attend the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April. Indonesia had suggested at the Colombo conference a year earlier that a general meeting of Asian and African nations be convened. Nehru had opposed the suggestion at the time. Such a conference, he thought, might do more to reveal Afro-Asian rivalries than to cement their loyalties and agreements. But as the American policy of collective security appeared to encircle India and the Asian situation to become more
disturbing, he withdrew his objection. Moreover because he considered the West outsiders in Asia, India, along with Burma and Indonesia, might unite the Asian and African nations in a policy of nonalignment apart from the superpowers. "The mere fact of a large number of Asian countries as also some African countries meeting together this way," he wrote his chief ministers on 13 January 1955, "indicates that Asia has opinions of her own and intends to make them heard. Thus far there has been too much of a tendency in Europe and America to take things for granted in Asia and to dispose of Asian questions without too much reference to what people in Asia think. There is not enough awareness of the fact that Asia has changed and is continually changing." The five Colombo nations met in Bogor, Indonesia, in December 1954, to make final arrangements for the Asian-African conference. Their prime ministers jointly stated that the objectives of the conference would be to promote goodwill and co-operation among the nations of Asia and Africa; to consider their social, cultural and economic problems, including the problems of racism and colonialism; and to review the position of Asia and Africa in the world and the contribution they might make to peace and international co-operation.

Viewing these developments with suspicion, American policymakers feared that the conference was directed against their policy of collective security. The invitation to China to attend the conference so soon after the onset of the offshore islands crisis increased American suspicions. Washington therefore endeavored to counter in advance any attempt at the conference to undermine its collective security policy. Getting SEATO members to agree to oppose any anti-West action was the first step. Meeting in Bangkok in February
In 1955, representatives from all SEATO nations stressed the need for "combatting the subversive activities of international communism" while publicly welcoming the conference and expressing the hope that it would strengthen the goal of ensuring the freedom of all nations. From Bangkok Dulles wrote Eisenhower that the policy of welcoming the Afro-Asian conference was "a good touch which, if properly played, can have an excellent propaganda value, and to some extent put that conference on the spot." Back in Washington Dulles counselled the president to make a public statement wishing the conference success. Such a statement, he suggested, might raise America's prestige among the participants. The White House accordingly released a statement by Dulles that noted Eisenhower's hope that the conference would heed the universal longing of the peoples of the world for peace, and seek a renunciation of the use of force to achieve national ambitions. The president, the statement noted, "hailed the Bandung Conference as providing an opportunity, at a critical hour, to voice the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of the world and thus exert a practical influence for peace." On the day the conference opened, the New York Times headlined a statement from Dulles warning that a new danger to peace in East Asia had arisen from the build-up of Chinese military strength. In fact, there was nothing to prove that there had been any recent change in Chinese military strength. The statement is therefore best understood as part of a psychological offensive intended to focus the conference's attention upon the possibilities of Chinese aggression. Dulles spoke on the assumption that a large number of the governments
represented at Bandung opposed all military alliances and build-ups.

While American wishes for the conference's success were thus compromised by warnings about Chinese aggression, the Soviet position was unequivocal. "The people of the Soviet Union," a foreign ministry spokesman declared, "have complete understanding for the struggle of the Asian and African countries against all forms of colonial rule, for political and economic independence." Like that from the United States, this rhetoric was probably mere propaganda directed toward winning the confidence of the countries represented at Bandung. Nonetheless it struck a responsive chord in the minds of Asians and Africans, and improved Moscow's standing in the nonaligned world.

Opening on 18 April 1955, the Bandung conference was in many ways a landmark event in the post-World War II era. For the first time, representatives of twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa met to discuss the common issues facing them. President Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia caught the mood of the participants when he said in his opening remarks that "the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of poverty, the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for long stunted the development of humanity." Past bitterness with colonial powers should be forgotten, he added, and new methods of cooperation worked out for the benefit of all.

Notwithstanding the surface cordiality, the delegations immediately divided into two camps, one comprising members of Western military alliances and the other those outside such alliances and generally opposed to them. Delegates from Turkey, the Philippines, and Pakistan vigorously defended their alliances, while Nehru
characteristically spoke against them. When Chou and Nehru
introduced the "Panch Sheel," Mohammed Ali Bogra of Pakistan, with
Turkish support, countered by stressing the need for collective
security. Nasser of Egypt called for a general reduction of armaments
and elimination of those that could destroy mankind.

In this atmosphere of discord, Chou stepped in as mediator. He
was remarkably successful in convincing the delegates to adopt a more
sympathetic view of each other's position. This was the first time
since 1949 that a Chinese delegation took part in such a
widely-attended international meeting, and Chou was anxious to create
a favorable image for China in the third world. His manners and
conduct earned him recognition as the central figure in the
conference. "Chou En-lai attracted the most attention," Nehru
recollected. "This was natural as he was not only playing a great part
in the crisis of the Far East but was a rather mysterious figure whom
people had not seen. He conducted himself with ability and
moderation." Chou was sophisticated, accomodative, and calm despite
provocative statements made by delegates from Turkey, Pakistan,
Ceylon, and Iraq against communism, the Soviet Union, and China.34
Behind a genial countenance, however, Chou's behaviour was shrewdly
calculated to win international acceptance for China.35

Despite their differences the participating nations at Bandung
adopted a joint communique underscoring economic and cultural
cooperation, and emphasizing human rights, self-determination, and
world peace. These goals, they added, could be best pursued within the
framework of the United Nations.36

Despite Chou's personal triumph, Washington was pleased with the
outcome of the conference. There had been no attempt there to form an anti-American bloc, and the final communique laid strong emphasis upon the UN charter as the basis for solving international disputes. Addressing a press conference after Bandung, Dulles expressed hope that because the communique was accepted by Chinese leaders, "perhaps they do not have such a repugnance to the United Nations as seemed to be the case." Dulles was also pleased with Nehru's failure to steal the limelight in Bandung. The conference was, the secretary believed, a severe reverse for the Indian prime minister. He had failed to gain a new following for his nonaligned policy or for his personal leadership of Asia.

Nehru however did not see his role that way. Taking an overall view of the conference, he held that it "was a remarkable success." It represented, he told his chief ministers, "the coming together of all [the] varied and differing nations." He was not so much interested in personal image-building as in generating a "feeling of common purposes among the Asian and African countries," a fact that became more evident during the conference. Personally Nehru was satisfied with the communique issued at the end of the conference, which included, among other things, his Panch Sheel.

After the conference, Nehru called Ambassador John Sherman Cooper to assure Washington that his government remained friendly to the United States despite the fundamental policy differences that separated the two nations. Nevertheless, he remained suspicious of American activities in India. The United States, he believed, encouraged newspapers and periodicals that carried feature articles undermining his government. Indeed one such article written by his
younger sister, Krishna Hutheesing, who was politically estranged from Nehru, and which was published in *Ladies Home Journal* (January 1955), was distributed, Nehru was told, with the help of the USIS in and out of India. Nehru was also told by subordinates he trusted that American representatives in India also subsidized other journals, including *Pratap* and *The People*, that published articles critical of his government. When Cooper expressed ignorance of such subsidies, Narayana Raghavana Pillai, secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs, hinted to him that the American government had policies of which the ambassador was not aware. Recalling his experience under colonial rule, Pillai told Cooper that the British regularly used secret organizations about which official British representatives had no knowledge, and the Indian government knew that the British still did this. Reporting this conversation to Washington, Cooper asked for assurances which he could transmit to the government of India that the United States had no such clandestine operations in India.

Both the State Department and the CIA assured Cooper that no agency of the American government was engaged in undermining the Nehru government. Regrettting that the Indian embassy in Washington, through its bulletin, *Indiagram*, regularly disseminated Indian criticism of American foreign policy in the United States, Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., nonetheless reminded Cooper that there was nothing wrong with the USIS explaining American foreign policy from its own perspective to the Indian public.

If the USIS was not engaged in trying to undermine Nehru, and the evidence suggests it was not, Cooper's assurances did not allay
Nehru's suspicions. In fact, Nehru's continued allegations of American impropriety came to grate on Washington. Talking to journalist Malcolm Muir, who had recently visited India, President Eisenhower noted that Nehru's psychology was conditioned by the Indian experience with British domination and a consequent suspicion of white people generally. Nehru, the president said, did not differentiate between Britons and Americans, and refused to recognize the change in relationship between whites and other peoples in the world since the eclipse of colonialism. Recollecting his conversation with Nehru during the latter's visit to America in 1949, Eisenhower thought that the prime minister was as unaware of American thinking as "[Americans] may be unaware of their [Indians'] thinking." It is significant that the president thought this. For the first time an American president admitted that the misunderstanding between Washington and New Delhi was mutual.

The president's admissions were not, however, based on the whole truth. Despite his anticolonialism Nehru had developed satisfactory working relationships with such British leaders as Anthony Eden, Clement Attlee, and even Winston Churchill, and with Canadian leaders too, and it was misleading to characterize him psychologically on the basis of a few events. Nehru was trying to find a rightful place for India and Asia in the world, and Eisenhower was oversimplifying when he blamed the prime minister's foreign policy on an "inferiority complex".

As Indo-American relations cooled, New Delhi's relations with Moscow improved. Stalin had regarded India as a country that was ostensibly independent but "bound hand and foot to the chariot of
predatory Western imperialism." Therefore, the Soviet press had traditionally highlighted India's poverty and "subservience" to the West. With Stalin gone, the Soviet press now began to laud India's efforts at development; and cultural exchanges between the two countries grew rapidly. Nehru's name became a household word in the Soviet Union, and his autobiography was translated into Russian and widely circulated. The Soviets had already reacted favorably to Nehru's peace proposals on Indochina, and in this atmosphere of growing rapprochement, they invited Nehru to visit Moscow in June 1955.

Nehru received a tumultuous welcome there. Although overwhelmed by the reception, he did not like the regimented atmosphere of Soviet society. With the large, highly disciplined crowd that received Nehru at the Dynamo stadium in Moscow in mind, a foreign correspondent asked Nehru if he was impressed by the discipline. Nehru's reply was lukewarm at best. "Perhaps," he paused; and then added, "but you cannot organize men's hearts." 47

Although Nehru despised the suppression of civil liberty, he gave due consideration to Soviet history. The Soviet Union had, he noted, had never experienced democracy, and ever since the Bolshevik revolution the Soviet Union had lived in a perpetual state of war or tension, and now it was encircled by nations committed to the American alliance system. This, Nehru believed, created a war psychology in the Soviet Union. In such a situation, he said, any country would subordinate individual freedom to its security requirements. 48 Although civil liberties were lacking in the Soviet Union, Nehru thought most people there did not miss them. "The general impression I
got," he wrote later, "was one of contentment, as practically everyone is occupied and busy and no one seems to get much time for complaining, or if there are complaints, they are about relatively minor matters." Everyone under fifty in the Soviet Union had grown up in the climate of regimentation and indoctrination, and was unlikely to complain about the absence of civil liberties. The new society in the Soviet Union was vital and growing, he concluded, and if the fear of war disappeared would normalize itself and permit a measure of individual freedom.49

But his appreciation of Soviet history did not commit Nehru to Soviet foreign and domestic policies. He noted, for example, that "a well-read and well-trained society is not likely to submit for long to many restrictions on individual freedom."50 Moreover, the curtailment of civil liberties in the Soviet Union in his view exceeded the limits of any rationale based on legitimate security concerns or fears of Western hostility. To be overly anxious about security is one thing; to suppress all dissent on security grounds is quite another.

For all these exercises in amateur psychology, Nehru was naive in thinking that the Soviet people were reconciled to communism. A few days in the Soviet Union did not make the prime minister's judgments definitive. But the avowed sympathy of the Soviets for his policies caused him to tolerate things he would not have tolerated in a different setting.

Nehru's discussion with Soviet leaders occasioned more disagreement than agreement. Responding to Bulganin's pessimism concerning the upcoming Geneva summit, Nehru emphasized Eisenhower's desire for peace and coexistence, and added that Prime Minister
Anthony Eden of Britain had written him a letter expressing positive hopes about the summit. It would not be productive, Nehru advised, for the Soviets to be prematurely pessimistic. Reacting to the Kremlin's assertion that American businesses and arms manufacturers would continue to escalate tensions in the world, Nehru suggested that big business desired peace for the sake of profit, and even arms manufacturers realized that war in the nuclear age would destroy the world. He therefore expressed hope that the summit would succeed.

Bulganin replied, "It would be a good thing for the world if the West would understand you as much as we do." In saying this, the Soviet leader was no doubt simply cultivating Nehru. If so, he succeeded, for that kind of appreciation of Nehru was not usually forthcoming from the United States.

After Moscow, the prime minister undertook a month-long trek that took him to Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, Britain, and Egypt. While travelling, Nehru tried to assure Washington of the "peaceful" intent of Soviet leaders. A marked change had come about in Soviet policy, Nehru wrote Eisenhower, that was not merely a passing phenomenon. The chances for peaceful resolution of international disputes had therefore substantially improved.

Nehru then sought to expand his international role by mediating between the United States and China on the issue of American prisoners in China. China held a group of Americans who had been shot near the Chinese coast, and whom the Chinese had condemned as spies. This was a highly emotional issue in the United States, and the UN had passed a resolution on 10 December 1954 condemning Peking's threats against the prisoners. The Chinese had an opportunity to demonstrate their
humanitarianism or at least their adherence to the conventions of warfare by releasing the prisoners to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold of the United Nations, who went to Peking to secure their release. They did not.

Nehru stepped into the matter. In Geneva as well as in Bandung, his emissary Krishna Menon had developed a good rapport with Chou En-lai. The two men had spent long hours discussing not only Indochina but the long-term problems of Asia as well. In the discussions, Menon stressed that goodwill and mutual respect should govern relations between nations. For Chou, who was shrewdly trying to build Chinese prestige in the world and counter American-sponsored ostracism of his government, the issue of the American prisoners afforded him an immediate opportunity to exert Chinese influence.

Responding to Nehru on the American prisoners at Bandung, Chou suggested that Menon go to Peking for further discussion. Accordingly Menon went to Peking on 7 May, and upon his return to New Delhi declared that Peking would release four American airmen shortly. This announcement was in sharp contrast to the press conference by Hammarskjold held upon his return from Peking to New York in January, at which he could only say that "the door has been opened and can be kept open, given restraint on all sides." After Menon's announcement, China notified the UN that four American prisoners would be released at once.

There was no recognition by the Eisenhower administration of the role Menon and Nehru played in this outcome. When Menon went to Washington soon thereafter and urged Eisenhower to reciprocate the Chinese gesture, perhaps by supporting China's admission to the United
Nations, which would facilitate solution of outstanding problems between Peking and Washington, the president was unpersuaded. "Here is a nation," Eisenhower told Menon of China, "that on honest terms has broken its word and not returned visitors it has captured in uniform." While America had released all the Chinese prisoners it held, he regretted that Peking still held many Americans as captives.

The president had a domestic problem too. How could anyone expect him, he asked, to negotiate with the life of an American citizen? To do so would repudiate everything he had even done in his career. He therefore advised Menon to discuss with Secretary Dulles specific proposals for settling the dispute rather than general observations about creating an atmosphere of peace.

Besides, Eisenhower could not regard China as a responsible member of the international community unless it released the prisoners unconditionally. Menon did not, the president thought, agree with him on this. Menon's emphasis upon negotiations with China without preconditions must therefore have irritated the president. "Krishna Menon is a menace and a boor. He is a boor because he conceives himself to be intellectually superior," Eisenhower wrote later. "He is a menace because he is a master at twisting words and meanings of others and is governed by an ambition to prove himself the master international manipulator and politician of the age." 56

There is no available record of Menon's side of this conversation. But it may be inferred that Menon asked for a gesture from the United States to facilitate direct talks with China. The president of course had his own political problems; but secret
negotiations might have produced the atmosphere Menon was working for. Indeed, the differences between Eisenhower and Menon over China might have been cultural. While the president considered the communists uncivilized and rejected any proposal to do of business with them, Menon believed the "free world" and the communists could negotiate their differences. For the present both men were held their respective grounds, and the objectives of neither could be achieved.

Washington's relations with New Delhi continued to suffer as a result of the lack of progress in negotiating a proposed Indo-American Treaty of Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce. In 1949, the United States had tabled a draft treaty intended to facilitate trade between the two countries and American investment in India, and Indian suspicions of foreign capital had prevented meaningful revision of the draft treaty. By the end of 1953, it was apparent that no agreement could be reached on clauses concerning American investment in India. America's military commitment to Pakistan in 1954 further slowed the negotiations. Talks resumed in June 1954, but by December Indian officials had concluded that no treaty was possible unless they were prepared to forego some of the basic principles of their government.

The change in those principles was apparent when Parliament, in December 1954, passed a resolution that called for building a "socialistic" society. India's first Five-Year Plan had emphasized increased food production, and though commendable increases had been achieved, other declared goals such as raising living standards, increasing employment, and reducing economic and social inequalities had not. These shortcomings provided Indian communists an opportunity to attack the Nehru government and, for a moment they
forced Nehru on the defense. To forestall communist victories in the upcoming general elections, the Congress Party passed a resolution in December 1954 to build a socialistic economy. In accepting the resolution, Nehru was not agreeing to a rigid or doctrinaire pattern of development but to a more egalitarian society. He did not, however, elaborate on how he intended to accomplish this goal without stifling individual liberty.

The Congress Party's resolution paid immediate dividends when the Party routed the communist in the general elections in Andhra province. This victory surprised many observers, including British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, then on a state visit to India. "I [do not] believe [communism] is at all a threat to [India]," a confident and jubilant Nehru told an interviewer in mid-March. "I think I [am] quite good enough to prevent that."59

It became apparent that the Congress Party resolution was more than political rhetoric. Immediately, it began to influence the national planning commission, just then beginning to draft India's second Five Year Plan and to do so on a "socialistic" pattern. "A rising standard of life, or material welfare as it is sometimes called, is of course not an end in itself," the planners believed. "Essentially, it is a means to a better intellectual and cultural life."60 "[E]conomic development is intended to expand the country's productive power and to provide the environment in which there is scope for the expression and application of diverse faculties and urges." To achieve these goals, the Second Five Year Plan stressed such socialist aims as expanding government ownership of industries, higher taxation to generate funds for economic development, and

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creation of a National Labor Force.

The Indian government had employed a number of local and foreign experts to draft this plan. Two Americans, Neil Jacoby, an expert on industrial policy, and Milton Friedman, an expert on monetary and fiscal policy, had advised the Indian government. The thrust of their advice was that India should liberalize its currency and get rid of foreign exchange controls, which they said distorted the allocation of resources. The government of India, Jacoby suggested, should remove all unproductive controls over commerce and industry and leave greater initiative to individual entrepreneurs. New Delhi rejected the advice of both Jacoby and Friedman. Instead it opted for a middle position which, though statist oriented, deprived India of the advantages of communist absolutism as well as American laissez-faire capitalism.

The thrust of Indian economic policy was in sharp conflict to provisions concerning foreign investment in the proposed Treaty of Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce. A cabinet subcommittee decided on May 31, 1955, that it would be "suicidal" for India to bind itself for ten years to provisions regarding compensation in the event of nationalization, non-discrimination between Indian and non-Indian enterprises, and competitive equality between private and state-owned enterprises.

The Indian negotiator for the proposed treaty, B.K. Nehru of the Ministry of Finance, told American officials in New Delhi that except for Finance Minister C.D. Deshmukh, no one in the cabinet was willing to accept the emphasis on private enterprise that underlay the investment clauses of the draft treaty. Deshmukh advised that the draft treaty would facilitate the flow of American capital to India,
but Nehru believed it might complicate India's relations with the Soviet Union. India might, for example, be asked by the Soviet Union to negotiate a similar treaty with Moscow, and would find it difficult to refuse to do so. Nehru, as well as most of his colleagues, also felt the draft treaty would restrict India's freedom of action in implementing the socialist pattern outlined in the new five-year plan.

Despite India's reluctance to sign the draft treaty, American officials in New Delhi believed that India's need for American investment might still enable Washington to salvage the treaty, at least in truncated form. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had, in February 1955, pledged the financial assistance necessary to build a steel plant in India. And though American assistance to India was greater than that of the Soviets, the concentration of Soviet assistance in one large, tangible facility would generate much favorable publicity. These things left American policy planners in Washington as well as New Delhi in a quandry.

While the embassy in New Delhi pondered ways to retain American economic influence in India, the United States Congress debated the Mutual Security Program for 1956. The administration asked for $70 million for India under the Program for 1956 and an additional $20 million under the proposed Asian Development Fund. Again, India's proportion of total American aid was small. 80% of the $3.5 billion Mutual Security request was for military expenditures, and of that total the request for India was less than 3%. Of the development and technical assistance programs, the bulk of the funds proposed was earmarked for countries which aligned themselves with the American
Despite the smallness of this sum, Indo-American relations showed signs of improvement. Eisenhower impressed Nehru at the Geneva summit as a "man of peace," and on 28 July, 1955, he invited Eisenhower to visit India. Ambassador Cooper emphasized the importance of the proposed visit, and urged the president to accept the invitation. "[The visit]," he told Eisenhower, "would give you the opportunity to destroy in this important part of the world the Communist slogan, which has many believers, that the [United States] wants war. It would give new strength and determination to those who are standing up against Communism." Eisenhower himself was inclined to accept the invitation. He told Dulles "he was particularly anxious that [America] should have wise policies and good relations" with India. India, Eisenhower reminisced later, had long been a source of fascination to him, even though he had never visited the country, and he had closely followed India's development since independence. But Dulles advised against accepting the invitation. It would set a bad precedent, Dulles told Eisenhower, for such good will tours would unbearably increase presidential responsibilities. Evidently accepting Dulles' logic, Eisenhower acquiesced. But he invited Nehru to visit Washington in November. Nehru would be glad to come, he told Eisenhower, but parliamentary sessions would demand his presence in New Delhi in November; and a wider purpose would be served, he noted, by Eisenhower coming to India.

Nehru calculated his political advantages in inviting Eisenhower to New Delhi. The prime minister had recently been to the Soviet Union,
and Soviet leaders were due to visit India in December 1955. Anxious to demonstrate to the world, and particularly the Soviet Union and his critics that his relations with the Soviet Union did not mean a shift in his policy of nonalignment, Nehru urged the president to come to India. The visit would not only dispel mutual suspicion between Washington and New Delhi but also consolidate Nehru's position as a nonaligned leader. Neither leader visited the other, however, and the reciprocal invitations did little to improve Indo-American relations.

Although Nehru did not get to see Eisenhower in 1955, he nonetheless adopted a new policy of restraint in his public attitude toward the Western world. The Geneva spirit, for a moment, seemed to lessen tension in the world, and Nehru did not want to waste it by needlessly criticising a great power. He instructed Krishna Menon to follow suit. The change was marked in their public speeches, particularly Menon's, which showed "a much warmer and vocal sympathy toward [the United States government] and [its] policies." Before the Geneva summit, Menon had refrained from any comment that would jeopardize America's position there. Now he praised America's democratic institutions and peaceful intentions, and despite provocation by Indian reporters, refused to comment on America's role in Taiwan. He also described President Eisenhower "as a man of peace". Reporting this to Washington, the consul general in Madras, Henry C. Ramsey, thought there had been a "new orientation" in Indian foreign policy. His source told him that despite the courtesy shown to Nehru by Soviet leaders, Nehru had returned from Moscow "disillusioned" with Soviet policies and convinced that India must "unobtrusively but surely" bring its foreign policy in line with America's. This would
be easier to achieve now that Washington understood that India's friendship with China and the Soviet Union were guided by security concerns and border problems and not by sympathy for communism.

Menon met with Ramsey and explained India's new policy. Noting New Delhi's differences with the United States, Menon confided that Nehru and he would not discuss them publicly. If they could not say anything good about the United States, Menon said, they would keep silent. Insisting that Indo-American differences could be reconciled, Menon told Ramsay that each government should refrain from public criticism of the other.

Menon also carefully explained this policy to Ambassador Cooper, and hoped Americans would refrain from calling him names like "crypto communist". Although Cooper interpreted this as part of Menon's ambition to be known as a world statesman, he urged Washington to reciprocate his current "volte-face".

But just when Indo-American relations appeared to be improving, two events undercut the appearance. The first was the visit to India by Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin in December, and the second was a joint American-Portuguese statement on Lisbon's colonial possessions on the Indian coast.

Khrushchev and Bulganin received a warm welcome from the Indian public, but Nehru rejected a suggestion that he ask for Soviet assistance for India's second Five Year Plan. It was for the government of India, Nehru argued, to decide which particular projects needed foreign assistance and how to go about securing that assistance. The two sides did however discuss ongoing Soviet projects in India.
Not only did Nehru refuse to discuss broader Indo-Soviet economic collaboration; he utilized the occasion to point out his disapproval of Soviet encouragement and financing of communists all over the world, particularly in India. Khrushchev tried to assure Nehru that the Soviet Communist Party had no connection with Indian communists. The Cominform, he said, was no more than a voluntary organization that brought the world's communists together periodically to discuss theoretical questions. Khrushchev pleaded ignorance of Nehru's contention that international communist journals like For a Lasting Peace and For a People's Democracy, and the New Times propagated hatred and communist philosophies. The Soviet leaders held that they had no desire to influence communists outside the Soviet Union. Nehru had enough evidence to convince himself of Soviet support for Indian communists, but he refrained from arguing the point.

Nehru also utilized the occasion to ask Soviet leaders to withdraw their veto of the admission of thirteen countries to the UN. The Security Council, then in session in New York, had before it applications for admission from eighteen countries. The big powers had reached an informal understanding that all eighteen would be admitted, but Taiwan had vetoed the admission of Mongolia. In retaliation, the Soviet Union vetoed the admission of the thirteen non-Communist countries. Menon cabled Nehru from New York to request the Soviet leaders to withdraw their veto. The prime minister raised the issue with Bulganin and Khrushchev, who promised to yield. The next day the Soviet representative at the Security Council withdrew his veto of all of the countries except Japan, which Moscow vetoed in retaliation against the American and Taiwanese vetoes of Mongolia. The
other sixteen countries were then admitted. Nehru believed that this was a result of his persuasion, and he took obvious satisfaction in the result, which he thought showed that the Soviets had demonstrated flexibility in their diplomacy. 82

Although fearful that the development of Indo-Soviet friendship might work to Washington's disadvantage, the American embassy in New Delhi told the State Department not to write off India. Khrushchev and Bulganin were "openly challenging [the] West to "compete for India's friendship," the embassy reported, and they might use the occasion to try to realize their objectives in India, particularly if Washington reduced its economic assistance to New Delhi. Responsible Indians had assured embassy officials that the warm hospitality accorded the Soviet visitors was typical of India's culture, and the West had nothing to fear from it. Nehru remained committed to democracy. The embassy itself was convinced that no Indian outside the Communist Party would subordinate the country's interests to those of the Soviet Union. American experts were working throughout India, even in the central ministries, for India's development, and any significant reduction in American aid would undercut their effort to play into the hands of communist propagandists.

Indian ambassador Gaganvihari Lallubhai Mehta called at the State Department on 1 December to ascertain American reaction to the Soviet leaders' visit to India. Although George V. Allen, who was now assistant secretary of state, told Mehta that the Department was not worried about the Soviets using public platforms in India to criticize the United States, 84 the visit must have caused some worry in Washington. Indo-American relations were just then complicated by the
signing of the Baghdad Pact, which included Pakistan.

While the Soviet leaders' visit to India raised eyebrows in Washington, the joint communique Dulles signed with Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo A.V. Cunha in the fall of 1955 indicating Goa as a Portuguese province cooled Indo-American relations notably. During their earlier visit to India, the Soviet leaders had recognized India's rights to Kashmir and Goa. Although Nehru later said that the recognition was made without his prior knowledge, it was nonetheless welcome in India. Obviously annoyed at the Soviet statement on Goa, Dulles met Cunha, and the two men issued a joint statement on 2 December criticizing the Soviet stand and referring to Goa as one of the "Portuguese provinces in the Far East." Ambassador Cooper, who had been trying for months to convince the Indian government that Washington had not taken any stand on the Goa controversy, thus found himself in a difficult position. Explaining to Indian officials that Dulles was responding to attacks on American policies by Bulganin and Khruschev, and his remarks did not commit the United States on the Goa issue. Dulles also said at a press conference on 6 December that the joint statement expressed the mutual concern of America and Portugal at the Soviet leaders' attempts to "whip up prejudice and hate in a situation that needs to be dealt with in a spirit of calm." But he compounded the problem by adding that Goa was indeed a Portuguese province, since it has been so for about four hundred years.

There is no doubt that the Soviet leaders used their visit to India to embarrass the West. However Soviet rhetoric should not have prompted Dulles to respond in a manner that touched the core of Indian sensitivity. India had long been working to free all colonial
possessions in general and those in India in particular. The Portuguese still maintained colonial enclaves in India, and New Delhi was unsuccessfully negotiating their evacuation. Until Dulles spoke, no American official had taken a position on the issue. Naturally Indian leaders interpreted the Dulles-Cunha communiqué as American recognition of the Portuguese colonies on the Indian coast, and contrasted it with the Soviet leaders' public support of India's stand on Goa. Commenting on Dulles' assertion that Goa had been a Portuguese province for four hundred years, Khrushchev told a cheering Calcutta crowd, "However many years might have passed, what is stolen remains stolen and must be returned to whom it belongs by right."  

Nehru was outraged by the Dulles-Cunha communiqué. "People in England and America are very courteous to us and friendly," he wrote to his sister Vijayalakshmi on 2 December, "but in the final analysis, they treat India as a country to be humoured but not as an equal."  

In contrast, the Soviets treated India as an equal partner, at least publicly, and their attack on colonialism in general pleased Indian public. However, Nehru was restrained in his reaction to the Soviet demarche. Unlike Western support for colonial possessions and military alliances, Nehru told his chief ministers, the Soviet Union realized the sensitivity of Third World countries and tried to accommodate to it. While this was pleasing to India, he added, New Delhi would remain committed to its policy of nonalignment.  

Ambassador Cooper appreciated India's sensitivity to the issue raised by the Dulles-Cunha communiqué. Realizing the importance of personal diplomacy, he suggested that the secretary of state write a letter to Nehru before the prime minister protested to Washington,
explaining that the United States took no stand on the Goa issue and stood for a peaceful settlement of the controversy concerning it. Dulles preferred not to backtrack on the issue, for to do so would antagonize a European ally. Nevertheless, he realized the communique had aroused Indian sensitivities, so Washington responded by finally inviting Nehru to Washington. Dulles raised the subject with Ambassador Mehta on December 30, but Mehta argued against the proposed invitation. Because the prime minister was considered a "controversial character" in the United States, he explained, a visit in June or July, 1956, before the American general elections, would be inappropriate. Dulles did not agree, and advised Eisenhower to invite the prime minister to visit Washington in June or July, 1956. Despite Dulles' remarks on Goa, the administration had in fact never formulated a position on the future of the Portuguese enclave. Indeed the subject was never discussed in Washington before the Dulles-Cunha communique. It was only after India protested that communique that Washington began to grapple with the issue. Dulles wondered if the Indian government favored a plebiscite in Goa, and Allen suggested direct negotiations between Portugal and India on the issue.

While Washington considered its relations with India, Dulles left for a meeting of SEATO members in Karachi in March, 1956. After the meeting, he went to New Delhi, arriving on March 9. Nehru believed that the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit had given the impression that he leaned toward the Soviets, and he was eager to correct that impression and mend his fences with America. He therefore attached top priority to the visit by Dulles. He cleared his calendar for the two days and, breaking normal protocol, personally met the secretary at the
airport. His eagerness was not reciprocated by Dulles. Although the two leaders talked privately for a total of five and a half hours, they could not conceal their basic differences on various issues. Nehru regarded SEATO's recent statement on Kashmir as going beyond the military objectives of the alliance, and he described Dulles's reference the previous year to Goa as unfriendly. With regard to Pakistan, Nehru told Dulles it was essentially a military state run by the military officials who might decide to attack India or try to take all or parts of Kashmir by force. Dulles disagreed with this assessment, and dismissed Nehru's apprehension as "pathological." He did not argue directly with the prime minister, but reported to the State Department that India's fear was "accentuated by somewhat of a guilty conscience in that they have themselves in effect taken over Kashmir by force and ignore the [United Nations] requirement of a plebiscite." In his view, Pakistan's friendship was much more important than Indian reactions to American military aid to Karachi. Regarding Goa, the secretary said only that Cunha "wanted him to go much further and he had restrained" his Portuguese counterpart. Nehru remained unconvinced; but Dulles apparently did not consider it necessary to provide a more satisfactory explanation of his stand on Goa.

Although Dulles was aware of Nehru's opposition to military alliances, he annoyed the prime minister by asking, "Why [do you not] join SEATO?" Nehru looked startled, and replied that the secretary could hardly expect him to join an organization which he not only disapproved of but thought "mischievous." The question was another illustration of Dulles' insensitivity to India's nonaligned foreign
policy, and it did not bode well for improved Indo-American relations. The Dulles-Nehru differences also manifested themselves with regard to recent changes in Soviet policy. While Nehru believed Moscow had wanted to normalize its relations with the United States and lessen world tensions, Dulles thought that assessment unduly optimistic. Nehru lacked Dulles' experience with the Soviet Union, and his recent meetings with Soviet leaders had ended happily. Therefore, he felt optimistic about Soviet intentions. But always suspicious of communist intentions and Soviet motives, Dulles disagreed with the prime minister.

Dulles was equally intolerant of India's proposal to buy fighter planes from the Soviet Union. He pointedly told Nehru that if India bought such planes "the consequences would be very bad indeed". India could buy whatever planes it needed from Britain or the United States, but such a purchase from the Soviet Union, he told Nehru, would make it impossible for Washington to make further contribution to India's economic development. Dulles' remarks, with their threatening overtones, further annoyed the Indian leader. The prime minister therefore was noncommittal when Dulles extended the president's invitation to visit Washington.

It is obvious that different perceptions of the world situation caused Dulles and Nehru to disagree. Although Nehru did abandon the idea of buying Soviet aircraft, his decision resulted not from Dulles' pressure but from British assurances that they would sell advanced planes to India at reasonable cost. In overall terms, then, Dulles' visit only irritated the prime minister. Of all the guests Nehru received at this time Nehru thought his "area of disagreement was
largest with Mr. Dulles". To one of his confidants he was even more blunt: "The most that we can expect out of this visit here is that [Dulles] has got some idea into his rather closed head as to what we feel about various things." 108

Dulles attached much less importance to his visit to New Delhi. The primary purpose of his trip to the subcontinent was to attend the SEATO meeting in Karachi. He visited India after visiting Pakistan, simply to placate New Delhi. The visit did not strengthen bilateral relations. Neither Nehru nor Dulles made any attempt to understand the other's position, and the two leaders remained deeply suspicious of each other.

While Dulles was being tough with Nehru in New Delhi, the Soviets were reading a new economic offensive in the third world. Beginning in late 1955, the Soviets concluded a number of bilateral economic agreements with countries in Latin America, North Africa, West Asia, and South Asia, including India and Afghanistan. Between January 1954 and April 1956, Moscow provided loans totaling $115 million to India, $100 million to Afghanistan, $19 million to Argentina, and $299 million to Yugoslavia. 109

This Soviet economic offensive placed American policymakers in an uncomfortable position. Eisenhower held that so long as the Soviets were threatening militarily, America commanded the world's admiration, but a Soviet economic offensive was not so easy to deal with. 110 "We could be witnessing the beginning of economic piracy on a scale never before practiced," Dulles confided in early 1956, "and we frankly do not know what to do about it." 111

Administration officials thus locked for a way to reach out to
India. New Delhi's economic situation provided it. India's second Five Year Plan envisaged a gap of $1.7 in foreign exchange to pay for imports. Even after the anticipated assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, India would still need $1 billion. Nehru had already accepted American economic assistance, and despite his recent courtship of the Soviets was still suspicious of the Kremlin's policies. He had therefore refused to ask the Kremlin for more assistance. Together, these circumstances provided an excellent opportunity for Washington to come to India's aid and check Soviet influence there. A long list of policy papers on India emanating from administration officials at this time echoed this theme. Noting the impact of the new Soviet economic drive in India and the need to preserve and strengthen India's democratic institutions, Ambassador Cooper urged the administration to provide India a five-year total of $375 million in development loan and $300 million in surplus agricultural commodities. Cooper presented these proposals to Dulles when the secretary was in India. Back in Washington, Dulles set up an ad hoc committee headed by Deputy Under Secretary Herbert V. Ponchnow to study Cooper's proposals. The group endorsed most of the ambassador's proposals, including the request for $375 million in development assistance for the five-year period, and $300 million in food assistance as well as a long term moratorium on the repayment of $120 million in lend-lease funds borrowed during World War II. NSC deliberations also reflected apprehensions about the effects of the Soviet economic offensive upon India. Moscow, one NSC report acknowledged, had mounted an effort of unprecedented proportions to
win India's political sympathies and diplomatic support. While India would likely continue to maintain its policy of nonalignment, the report continued, it might identify itself more and more with Communist bloc positions on current world problems. For the first time India was giving serious consideration to the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. It might also turn to Moscow to fill the gap in its foreign exchange needs if the West did not do so. 114

On 31 March, 1956, T. Eliot Weil, the departing American counselor for political affairs in New Delhi, wrote the State Department a long letter in which he emphasized India's need for American economic assistance, and showed remarkable understanding of the Indian situation. Despite poverty, he noted, India was striving to maintain democratic institutions. While the Cold War was in considerable measure a conflict between two antithetical ideologies, it would be a mistake to assume that political philosophies were inherently of overriding importance in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of South Asia. The Indian peasant subsisting on a fraction of an acre, the untouchable collecting refuse, the unemployed university graduate, the half-starved industrial worker—these and other Indians could not eat ideologies. Their interest in the Indian government was in what it did to provide them with better living conditions than they knew during the British administration. In his struggle for existence, the Indian judges his government and its ideology by results, and if the Five-Year Plan set up by the democratic government brings tangible benefits, he will support democracy. If it does not, he was not likely to be impressed by lectures, however subtle, on the virtues of freedom, especially if the

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lectures are delivered by a foreigner. Therefore, it was fallacious to think that what was good for the United States was good for India. Indian leaders subscribed to the same democratic principles as Americans, but their task was much harder. In a very short time, they would need to produce more positive results under their democratic system, or they would give away to others advocating more authoritarian methods.

The administration did not appreciate these problems, Weil complained, and needlessly antagonized India by unfriendly references to Goa and Kashmir. Yet Indian leaders of late had downplayed their annoyance with the United States. India did not like certain American policies, especially the formation of military alliances. But it did not criticize them unless they led to attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Third World nations. For example, although India did not like SEATO, its reaction to it was muted. But when the SEATO powers spoke about the Kashmir dispute, India was annoyed and said so publicly. Similarly, India maintained that Taiwan should be returned to China, but had never said that the issue had to be resolved immediately. Despite differences, Weil noted, India remained closer to the West than to the Communist bloc. After his visit to the Soviet Union and China, Nehru made public and private statements praising some of the achievements of those countries, but he never praised the political system under which the progress was made. Indeed, the prime minister always emphasized India's need for rapid development in order to contain its own communist movement.

America had the capability, Weil continued, to make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of India's independence. Washington
should, he suggested, extend enough economic assistance to India to enable its leaders to hold their own against communist infiltration. Noting that the problems of Indo-American relations would never be solved to America's complete satisfaction, Weil concluded that it was in Washington's interest not to write off India as a bad risk. "Nothing" he added, "would please Moscow and Peking more." 117

Events as well as administration analyses had a cumulative impact on Eisenhower, who began to appreciate India's economic need. He was impressed with the abject poverty and demographic problems in the subcontinent, and came to recognize the magnitude of the task of raising India's living standards, modernizing the economy, and improving education and health standards. He was optimistic that these things could be accomplished despite the complications that grew out of India's geographic, social, and political divisions. Trying to make a unified nation out of India, he knew, was a challenging problem indeed. 118 Because the previous administration had wooed India only as a military counter to the communist threat in Asia, the Eisenhower presidency now initiated a marked change in American policy.

The president expressed his concern for India on many occasions. On one such occasion, when the NSC was considering economic assistance to India, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey objected to aid on the ground that India was going in a socialist direction. The United States should not, Humphrey held, tax its citizens and raise money from a free-enterprise society for the purpose of subsidizing a socialist economy. Interrupting Humphrey, Eisenhower said, "George, you do not understand the Indian problem. Their situation [is not] like our situation. We can operate a free enterprise economy, and
[that is] doubtless the best one for us. But it depends on a whole lot of factors, a whole lot components, a whole lot of underpinning that the Indians simply [do not] have. If I were the Prime Minister of India, I feel confident that I would have to resort to many measures which you would call socialistic.... So [it is] quite a mistaken idea that we should judge the Indian situation or the Indian needs or the Indian policies by [the] criteria which may be relevant for us." In the end, these arguments, and not Humphrey's, prevailed. Dulles also came to share the president's concern for India after the Soviet Union began its economic offensive in the Third World.

The stage was set therefore for a more sympathetic consideration of India's economic needs by the United States. Accordingly the administration's Mutual Security requests in 1956 included $70 million in development assistance loans and $10 million in technical assistance for India. Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 30 April that it was essential to help the developing countries in order to strengthen their resistance to Soviet influence. The Kremlin's policies and doctrines had changed, he asserted. There was less emphasis on violence, largely because of America's successful economic policies and mutual defense arrangements. Therefore, although the Soviets now emphasized less overt threats than before, economic assistance to needy countries had to continue, Dulles emphasized.

Defending the administration's request for India, Allen told the same committee on May 8 that India was committed to democracy and would continue to demonstrate that a free Asian nation could meet the needs of its people for progress under a democratic system.

As was always the case, Congress appropriated less than the
president requested for foreign aid, this year $1 billion less. India received $65 million for development assistance and $10 million for technical assistance, sums not substantially larger than those of previous years. Yet Washington now demonstrated more awareness of the needs of the Third World, including India, in light of the new Soviet economic offensive. It did not, however, reveal a better understanding of the Third World or of India. The Cold War had entered a new phase and Washington was adjusting its policies accordingly.

The Mutual Security Bill passed Congress without criticism of the Indian foreign policy. The leaders of the two countries had learned to refrain from criticizing each other in public. This contributed to some improvement in Indo-American relations. Even India's nonaligned policy ceased to be perceived as the evil it once was. Writing to his brother Edgar Eisenhower in February 1956, the president noted that although he opposed a neutral position between communism and the free world, some countries tended to occupy that position because they did not subscribe to the idea of military alliances. America in its early stage, he recollected, had also followed neutrality. However, a war broke out between the Western democracies and the Communist bloc, he believed the "neutral" nations would invariably side with the West. This was the West's moral, although not military, defense against communist aggression.

Even Vice President Richard Nixon, who despised nonalignment, became reconciled to its existence. Speaking in Manila on July 4, he said that some countries preferred to remain neutral because of their own assessment of the international situation. Although America preferred countries to stand up and be counted, it was nevertheless
eager to make friends with others who shared its common goal of freedom and democracy. A decade of nonalignment in the height of Cold War had convinced the administration of the durability of that policy.

But Dulles again complicated matters by a negative reference to nonalignment. Speaking at the Iowa State College commencement exercises, he said that military alliances, like the earlier Monroe Doctrine, had worked effectively to prevent aggression. Indifference or "neutrality" was thus an "immoral and shortsighted conception". Nehru reacted sharply to this statement, saying that the secretary's opinion served no useful purpose.

Dulles quickly realized the impact of his statement and qualified it by saying "the kind of neutralism which is indifferent to the fate of others and which believes security can best be sought in isolation and without concern for others" was immoral. Any country that showed concern for the security of others, and was a member of the United Nations, which committed all members to the principle of standing together as against aggression, was not neutral and therefore not immoral. It appeared that there was hardly any nonaligned country Dulles would consider immoral.

Dulles' rejoinder did not satisfy Nehru, who responded, "The United States] expects others to follow its will. If they do not, [the United States] feel hurt and think that there is something wrong with the other man's thinking. If carried to its logical conclusion, this kind of thinking divides the world into hostile camps." Nehru had been assiduously advocating nonalignment, and nothing hurt him more than criticism aimed at the very basis of that policy. Dulles
certainly could have refrained from attacking nonalign ment, as the
president and the vice president had done, but anxious to gain support
for his policy of containment, the secretary ignored the sensitivities
of the nonaligned world.

This was the state of Indo-American relations when a momentous
event occurred, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt
on 26 July 1956. Angered by his failure to obtain Anglo-American
assistance to build the Aswan Dam that he hoped would meet his
country's irrigation needs, Nasser decided to nationalize the canal in
order to generate revenue for the construction of the dam. His
action provoked angry reactions from the West, particularly Britain
and France, who owned most of the shares of the canal company. The
State Department warned that Cairo's action had far-reaching
implications for all nations whose economies depended upon products
moved through this international waterway. Dulles thought Egypt's
action struck a grievous blow at international confidence. Twenty-four
nations, including the United States, Britain, France, and
India, sent representatives to London to confer on what might be done
to insure stable operation of the Suez waterway as guaranteed by the
Convention of 1888. Even before this conference met, the British
government had responded to the seizure of the canal by calling up
specialized forces units for emergency duty in the eastern
Mediterranean.

New Delhi was surprised by Nasser's seizure of the canal, but
reacted calmly. Nehru had met Nasser in Yugoslavia as recently as 21
July, but the Egyptian leader gave no hint of the upcoming seizure.
Nehru did not question Egypt's right to nationalize the canal. But,
he told Parliament, he did not approve of the manner in which the seizure was accomplished. Noting that the concession of the canal to the Company would expire 1968, Nehru felt Egypt should not have acted so hastily. To his sister Vijayalakshmi, now his ambassador in London, Nehru confided on 27 July that Egypt was probably "undertaking more than it can manage and is being pushed by some extremist elements." It was because India was an important user of the canal that Nehru accepted the invitation to attend the London conference on the seizure, which convened on 16 August. India's chief delegate was Krishna Menon.

Washington and New Delhi supported different solutions to the Suez crisis, but the two governments were in constant touch with each other over the crisis, and both urged moderation on all concerned. Still, their differences on fundamental matters of foreign policy prevented their cooperation. When Dulles proposed a settlement of the crisis based on the Constantinople Treaty of 1888, Menon criticized the proposal as an effort to deny Egypt's sovereign right to the canal.

The conference failed to agree on a solution to the issue, and referred the dispute to the United Nations, where the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt had begun direct negotiations on the matter. These negotiations were in progress when on 29 October, Israeli forces, joined presently by forces from France and Britain, invaded Egypt to recover control of the canal.

Nehru's anger knew no bounds at this development. Here was the United Nations negotiating a peaceful settlement of the issue when suddenly a few countries took matters in their own hands. What was the
necessity of this military effort? Nehru asked. "This is a reversal of history," he wrote Nasser, "which none of us can tolerate." He urged Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to work for a peaceful solution to the crisis, and implored Washington to use its good offices with London, Paris and Tel Aviv to stop the invasion. "I can not imagine a worse case of aggression," he told Dulles. If the aggression continued and succeeded, everyone affected by the invasion would lose faith in international law and the United Nations. At this crucial point, both the United States and India reposed their faith in the United Nations. Nehru dismissed a suggestion by Egypt, China, and the Soviet Union to convene a meeting of the Bandung nations as well as a Soviet suggestion that Moscow and Washington jointly intervene to stop the aggression. As a result of these complicated correspondences, the Suez crisis brought India and the United States closer together than they had ever been on an international crisis. When a proposal emerged at the United Nations that the United States and India make joint efforts to reaching a settlement, Eisenhower endorsed the proposal. Since he and Nehru together came, he thought, "[close] to commanding the respect of the world [,] it would [be] difficult for the world to turn down [a] proposal," the two men endorsed. But Dulles still resisted American involvement in the dispute, and urged instead that the matter be settled by the disputants.

As the world watched the Suez crisis unfold, Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary to crush a general revolt there against Soviet occupation. Moscow, a strong champion of Egypt in the Suez crisis, found itself hoist on its own petard of championship for the rights of
Washington took no more forceful action against the Soviet action in Hungary than did India. Eisenhower and Dulles rejected Anglo-French suggestions for a joint resolution in support of the Hungarian uprising. But while Washington was prompt to denounce the Soviet invasion, New Delhi vacillated. India had only a mid-level diplomat in Budapest, and Nehru was not prepared to take action on the basis of his reports. Moreover he was too preoccupied with Suez to pay attention to the Hungarian crisis. As the secretary of India's external affairs ministry later recalled, "In the Foreign Office at New Delhi events in Hungary took a second place to those in Egypt." Besides, Nehru was not willing to antagonize Soviet leaders by making against human dignity and freedom committed by Soviet forces, and the use of force to gain political ends. At the United Nations, however, Krishna Menon, having had no time to consult New Delhi, voted against a resolution condemning Soviet aggression in Hungary. Nehru stood by Menon in public when this vote was criticised, but expressed his unhappiness over the vote in private. He had his reservations about the resolution condemning the Soviets, he told his Congress party, and would have abstained rather than voted against it. Nehru took a firm stand, however, against a Pakistani resolution calling for UN-supervised elections in Hungary. Such elections were not acceptable because New Delhi had repeatedly rejected a United Nations resolution calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir.

However, writing to his chief ministers on 8 December Nehru condemned the Soviet Union for its suppression of the Hungarian freedom fighter, and emphasized his belief that militant communism could not be forcefully imposed for long over unwilling people. Indeed
he told his chief ministers, the Soviet action in Hungary had exposed the inner weakness of international communism. He also authorized Menon to state publicly at the United Nations that India disapproved of the arrest of the Hungarian leader Imre Nagy and of the refusal of the communist government of Hungary to permit Dag Hammarskjold to conduct an on-the-spot inquiry into the Hungarian invasion.

Nehru had been slow to react to the Hungarian crisis, but once he did so he spoke unambiguously against the Soviet action. Even Washington appreciated this. In a background paper prepared on the eve of Nehru's visit to the United States in December, the State Department acknowledged that India agreed with American objectives in Hungary. If India had reacted vehemently to the Soviet aggression, the paper pointed out, it would have lost its ability to influence the Kremlin. Under the circumstances, India could, the paper concluded, exercise a moderating influence upon the Soviets. Although there is no specific evidence on this point, Eisenhower and Dulles seemed to be convinced by this assessment. A new era of Indo-American relations was dawning.

Nehru's arrival in the United States on December 16 for a four-day state visit provided an opportunity to begin the new era. Even before the prime minister's arrival, Eisenhower received much advice about how to deal with Nehru. His advisors generally noted the new Soviet drive for India's friendship, and underscored the need for Washington to counter it. India was at a crossroads, the advisors reiterated, and the Nehru government needed to be strengthened to counter Soviet influence. The president could build personal rapport with the prime minister by raising the matter of India's economic
needs. To do so would represent a marked departure in American policy, but successful negotiations on economic issues would highlight Nehru's and India's importance in the bi-polar Cold War world. Nehru now appreciated Washington's understanding of the importance to India's economic development. Significantly, Eisenhower now sought to cultivate that understanding.

Norman Cousins, the editor of *Saturday Review*, knew Nehru well. "The Prime Minister is not a difficult man with whom to have rapport," Cousins told Eisenhower. "He likes and responds to friendliness," Cousins continued, and would be touched in political negotiations by such personal gestures as references to his daughter and grandchildren. On the political side, the prime minister, far from being sympathetic to Communist China, fully recognized the rivalry in Asia between China and India. 157

Henry Wallace, the former Democratic vice president and now a supporter of the Republican president, wrote a commentary on Nehru at this time that stressed the need for American assistance to India. Although not an expert on India, Wallace described the prime minister as an intelligent person who was responsible for a country in which 15 million people were unemployed, per capita income was less than 3% that in the United States, many different languages and divergent minorities coexisted, and grave political problems like Goa and Kashmir threatened to destroy it. In short, Wallace told Eisenhower, Nehru was carrying one of the heaviest burdens of any head of government in the world. And evidence of Eisenhower's understanding of those burdens would be an immense boost to the prime minister. Wallace's concern was prompted by two considerations. If India went
communist, the rest of Asia would likely follow. The Soviet Union was exploiting the miseries of Third World countries, and Eisenhower and Nehru together might find a formula which would cause the Kremlin "to pull back from the abyss." Nehru could also be of immense value, Wallace added, in Eisenhower's quest for lasting world peace.158

Although Washington had no official position on the subject of large scale economic aid to India, a State Department paper noted, the President could, if Nehru did not, broach the subject. At the same time the President should make it clear to Nehru that the administration could not make any commitment, aid increases required congressional approval. While the United States and India differed on many aspects of their policy, including China and American military aid to Pakistan, recent events in Hungary and Suez had brought the two countries closer than ever before. The prime minister was aware that the Soviet Union had flagrantly violated the principles of the Panch Sheel by invading Hungary, the paper noted, and the United States had in the Suez crisis found itself on the basis of principle in opposition to its Western allies on a major issue. In both cases, Indian and American policies had converged on major international issues as they had not since the early phase of the Korean War. Moreover, "The United States is without an ally or close friend among the three giant powers of Asia - China, the [Soviet Union] and India. To secure its interests there, in the long run, it needs the close friendship of at least one of these three. India is obviously the only present possibility." Informal and friendly talks between the prime minister and the president might lead to mutual understanding and closer personal relations between the two leaders. There would be
disagreements but these should not be allowed to breach the understanding established at the Washington meeting.

It is not surprising that it took the State Department so long to reach this position. The lack of understanding and of a direct Soviet threat to India had led Washington to attach less importance to that country. India was, as it had always been, an important country in terms of size, location, manpower and natural resources. Washington had always noted these but never underscored the necessity of establishing closer relations with New Delhi. But now India had become a test case for the comparative ability of democratic and totalitarian systems to achieve economic development. The Soviets realized this and had begun a new economic offensive. If that offensive succeeded, it would deal a severe blow to the free world in general and America in particular. Hence it was important for Washington to help India build itself as an economic bastion against communism.

The president tried to make Nehru's visit a success. He "liked" Nehru's "thoughtful, studious, soft-spoken,... even shy" nature. The President sent Cooper to New Delhi to ascertain in advance the subjects Nehru might wish to raise with the president. Cooper stayed in India for a week and met a host of Indian officials, including Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari and Secretary General Pillai. Communicating his findings to the State Department, he noted India's economic needs as well as the fact Soviet actions in Hungary and India's political and economic rivalries with China had increased America's standing in India. If India did not achieve substantial economic growth under the present government, Nehru's prestige would suffer, but if the aid program was successful, Nehru might even be
willing to accept American moral and political leadership. In Cooper's opinion, Nehru had all along looked to Washington for assistance. America should, therefore, endeavor to anchor India more firmly to the West and to orient Indian foreign policy in directions which will, in turn, permit American public opinion to support substantial economic assistance to New Delhi.

Pillai and Krishnamachari, aware of the importance of American economic assistance and of Nehru's reticence toward asking for it, advised Cooper that the president should raise the subject. India's financial needs were foremost in Nehru's mind, they told Cooper, but the prime minister was too proud to raise the subject directly. No definite commitment on the part of the president concerning specific amounts of aid would be necessary. General assurances would be sufficient at the Eisenhower-Nehru meeting, for Nehru understood the need for Congressional approval of all aid funds. On the broader issues of international relations—the American alliance system, arms assistance to Pakistan, and China policy—Cooper suggested that the president categorically but tactfully "agree to disagree" with the prime minister.

Frank Moraes, editor of the Times of India and a biographer of Nehru, met with the prime minister, and discussed the upcoming visit. Nehru told him that India's economic problem was the key item he hoped to discuss with the president. The embassy in New Delhi learned of this conversation and cabled news of it to Washington.

Armed with this information and advice, Eisenhower and Dulles received Nehru on 16 December. Dulles met first with Nehru at the Blair House. This time their meeting was cordial. During the course of
the talks, Nehru and Dulles discussed a number of international issues. They did not always agree, but they were determined not to mar the discussions unnecessary arguments. Nehru thought that the Baghdad Pact had divided the Arab world, and cost America the esteem of many Arabs. Dulles blanched, but did not argue. Moving to the question of Hungary, Nehru noted that the Soviet reaction had betrayed the basic weakness of international communism, its inability to hold a people under control for long without generating protest. "Nationalism," he said, was "stronger than Communism." Dulles listened, but did not respond.

The next day Eisenhower and Nehru left for Eisenhower's farm at Gettysberg, and stayed overnight. Convinced that personal diplomacy worked best with his guest, Eisenhower held talks on a one to one basis. The United States and India would agree to disagree, and each would respect the other's opinions while holding on to its own.

Discussion of the Suez and the Hungarian crises went especially well. The prime minister agreed with his host on the need for moderation on all sides. While America would urge restraint on London and Paris concerning Suez, the president hoped India would do the same with Egypt.

But they broke their silence when the prime minister began to discuss China and Laos. Agreeing with Nehru that a government controlling six hundred million people could not be permanently barred from the United Nations, Dulles at the Blair House and Eisenhower at Gettysberg suggested that Peking had forfeited its position there by its aggressive policies in Korea and Indochina. The American public's negative opinion of China would continue as long as the Chinese held
American prisoners of war. Nehru then raised the Laotian situation. America, he indicated, was making a mistake by demanding that the government there exclude communists and communist-sympathizers as a precondition for American economic assistance; Laos might be driven to the Communist bloc for help. Eisenhower's temper flared, but only for a moment. "Of course we have no money to help them," he told Nehru, "so they will go to one place only, the Communists." Nehru caught himself. Determined not to enlarge the areas of disagreement, he did not pursue the matter further.

Instead, Nehru spoke at length on his policy of nonalignment and its relevance to India. At the same time, he underscored India's preference for government based on the dignity of man, not on dictatorship. Nonalignment was, he told Eisenhower, the only logical policy for New Delhi. If India were to attempt the defense of its 1,800-mile long border with China by armed force the expense would destroy its efforts to raise the standard of living and prevent internal collapse. Any alignment with the free world would provoke the Chinese and serve only to weaken rather than to strengthen India's ability to resist communism. Noting the natural defense provided by the Himalayas, he held that the Soviet Union and China would attack India only if India seemed to threaten them, and India did not pose any threat to these countries. Eisenhower did not respond to this assessment.

Nehru next turned to India's Second Five-Year Plan. Giving the president a detailed background of India's achievements under the first Plan, Nehru emphasized the shortage of capital as the great difficulty in achieving the objectives of the second Plan. But,
characteristically, he did not mention that he was looking to the United States or to any other country for help. By this time Eisenhower understood Nehru’s hesitancy in asking for money, so he volunteered that "[Nehru] would not be disappointed to have long-term, low interest loans." Nehru’s reticence discouraged enthusiasm even at this suggestion.

Another of Nehru’s concerns was the Pakistani military build-up. India and Pakistan had a host of problems, he said, and a militarily strong Pakistan might use force to settle them. The president reiterated that America would never allow Pakistan or any country to use American arms for aggression. 172 Nehru’s response is not known.

The talks did not bridge the gap between Indo-American viewpoints on world issues. But then, neither side expected them to do so. Nehru expressed hope that his meeting with Eisenhower would open channels of communication which would make misunderstanding and suspicion less common than heretofore. Eisenhower reciprocated the prime minister’s feelings, noting in his memorandum of the talks that as a result of this visit, understanding between the two peoples would improve. He asked Nehru not to be unduly excited by the statements "of irresponsible people who pose as statesmen." Nehru in turn noted that he recognized the divisions of authority in the American form of government. 173 Eisenhower even provided Nehru with an "excuse" for India’s tolerance of communism. It stemmed, he noted in his diary, from India’s immaturity, and was characteristic of many Asian and African governments who bore too many scars from their colonial experience to appreciate the dangers of international communism. 174
Eisenhower was still ethnocentric, but he may have been correct in his assessment as well.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1. John Foster Dulles to Paul Hoffman, 23 July 1954, ann whitman file: Dulles_herter series, Box 3, Dulles, J.F. May 1954 (1) folder, DDEL.

2. Donald D. Kennedy to the Department of State, 28 September, RG 59, Box 2859, 611.91/9-2854, NA.


4. The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State, 12 November, ibid., pp. 1778-1779.


6. Ibid., p. 72-73.

7. Mr. Key to Robertson, Byroade, and Bowie, 12 November, 611.91/11-1254, RG 59, Box 2859, NA.


10. Dulles' suggestion in Memorandum by the Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade), 18 November, ibid., pp. 1779-1780.

11. President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nehru, 30 November, ibid., pp. 1786-1787.
12. Prime Minister Nehru to President Eisenhower, 13 December, ibid., 1794-1795.


15. Ibid., p. 133.


17. Nehru to chief ministers, 14 April, ibid., p. 150.

18. "Memorandum for Record" of discussion among Eisenhower, Dulles, Menon, and Mehta, 15 March 1955, Ann Whitman file: Eisenhower papers as President; Ann Whitman Diary series, Box 4, AWC Diary, March 1955 (5) folder, DDEL.


20. Nehru to chief ministers, 14 April, in Nehru, Letters: IV: 151-152.

21. Ibid., p. 152.


25. Ibid., p. 117, n. 1.


27. Dulles to Eisenhower, from Rangoon to State Department, 26 February, Dulles-Herter series, Eisenhower papers, DDEL.


31. For the text of Sukarno's speech, see Asia-Africa Speaks From Bandung (Government of Indonesia, 1985), p. 15.

32. For the speeches of these delegates, see ibid., pp. 118 ff, 92 ff, 97 ff, and 163 ff.

33. For Chou's speeches, see ibid., pp. 41 ff, and 160 ff.


35. Ibid., p. 165.

36. For the joint communique, see Asia-Africa Speaks, pp. 141-149.


38. Cabinet minutes, 29 April 1955, cabinet series, Eisenhower papers, DDEL


40. Ibid., p. 170.

41. Nehru's note on talk with John Sherman Cooper, 5 May 1955, in Gopal, Nehru: II: 243-244.

42. Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, 23 May, FRUS, 1955-1957: VIII: 279-281.

43. Smith left the post in the preceding fall and Hoover succeeded
him. telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in
India, 28 May, ibid., pp. 284-286.
44. "Conversation with Malcolm Muir on about colonialism," undated,
An Whitman file, Box 5, AWC Diary, May 1955 (2) folder, DDEL.
46. The Indian ambassador to Moscow K.P.S. menon's telegram to the
Indian foreign secretary, 31 August 1954, in Gopal, Nehru: II:
246.
47. Quoted in Menon, Many Worlds, p. 287.
48. Nehru's notes on the visit to the Soviet Union, 19 July 1955, in
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
52. Nehru's notes to Eisenhower, 27 June 1955, cited in Gopal, Nehru:
II: 249.
53. Quoted in T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon: A Biography (London:
54. "Interview with V.K. Krishna Menon, Indian Representative to the
series; Box 26, India-Miscellaneous 1953-1956 (2) folder, DDEL.
55. Ibid.
56. Diary entry, undated, Ann Whitman file, DDE Diary series, Box 11,
DDE Diary, July 1955 (1) folder, DDEL.
57. Government of India, Planning Commission, Approach to the Second
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Five Year Plan (1957), pp. 3, 5.


60. Note 57, pp. 21-22.


62. Oral History interview with Dean N. Jacoby, pp. 112-114, DDEL.

63. American Embassy to the department of State, 11 June, 611.914/6-1155, RG 59, Box 2563, NA; and New Delhi to the Secretary of State, 7 June 1955, 611.914/6-755, RG 59, Box 2563, NA.

64. B.K. Nehru was not a relative of the prime minister. Having worked in the Indian Civil Service before independence, Nehru served as India's Economic Minister in Washington, D.C., and was now the secretary in the Ministry of Finance.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.


69. Supplementary Notes: legislative Leadership Meeting, 28 June 1955, Legislative Meeting series, Box 1, Ann Whitman file, DDEL.


71. Cooper to Eisenhower, 30 July, Dulles-Herter series, Eisenhower papers, DDEL.


73. For Eisenhower's fascination for and interest in India, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 106; and Oral History interview with Andrew J. Goodpaster, p. 106, DDEL.


75. Ramsey to the Secretary of State, 30 August 1955, 611.91/8-3055, RG 59, Box 2562, NA.

76. Ramsey to the Department of State, with enclosed Memorandum of Conversation among Menon, Ramsey and Mrs. Ramsey, 20 September, RG 59, Box 2562, NA.

77. T. Eliot Weil, counselor, for the Ambassador to the Department of State, 9 September 1955, 611.91/9-955, RG 59, Box 1562, NA.


81. These eighteen countries were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Eire, Italy, Jordan, Laos,
Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Japan, and Mongolia.

82. Nehru's notes on the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev, 20 September, in Nehru, Letters: IV: 323; Dutt, With Nehru, pp. 198-199; and Nehru, Letters: 323.


84. Ibid., p. 300, n. 5.


87. Ibid., p. 316, n. 13.

88. Dutt, With Nehru, p. 235.

89. Note 86, p. 317, n. 16.

90. Quoted in Dutt, With Nehru, p. 200.

91. Nehru to Vijayalakshmi, 2 December, quoted in Gopal, Nehru: II: 252.


93. Cooper to the Secretary of State, 11 December 1955, Ann Whitman file; International series, Box 26, India-Miscellaneous 1953-1956 (2) folder, DDEL.


95. "Discussion on United States-Indian Relations with Indian Ambassador," by Secretary Dulles, 30 December, 611.91/12-3055, RG 59, Box 2562, NA.

96. Dulles to the president, 2 February 1956, Ann Whitman file: 318
Dulles-Herter series, Box 5, Dulles, J.F. 1956 (2) folder, DDEL.

97. Memorandum of Conversation among Dulles, Mehta, William Macomber, and Jefferson Jones, at the State Department, 10 February 1956, 611.91/2-1056.

98. The Secretary of State to the President, 12 March 1956, Ann Whitman file, Box 5, Dulles-Herter series, Dulles, J.F. March 1956 folder, DDEL; and Dutt, With Nehru, p. 236.

99. The SEATO statement noted that Kashmir should be settled through the UN or by direct negotiations. See also Nehru to chief ministers, 14 March 1956, in Nehru, Letters: IV: 352.

100. Secretary of State to the President, 12 March 1956, Ann Whitman file, Dulles-Herter series, Box 5, Dulles, J.F. March 1956 folder, DDEL.

101. Ibid.


105. telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, 11 March 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957: VIII: 310.

106. Gopal, Nehru: II: 274.


108. Nehru to Padma Naïdu, 10 March in Gopal, Nehru: II: 274.

109. United States Congress, Senate, 84th Congress, 2nd session, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, on Mutual

110. Eisenhower to Dulles, 5 December 1955, Dulles-Herter series, Box 5, Ann Whitman file, DDEL.

111. Quoted in Merrill, "Bread and the Ballot," p. 214.


113. Department of State, "Summary Minutes of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Ambassador Cooper's India Aid Proposals," 3 May 1956, ibid., pp. 317-318. For Cooper's proposals, see Fisher Howe to Goodpastor, with enclosed Cooper to Goodpastor, 24 March 1956, DDE Records: Confidential file-Subject subseries; Box 71, State Department (April 1956) (1) folder, DDEL; Dulles to Cooper, 30 April 1956, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject subseries, State Department Subseries, Box 1, White House Office, DDEL.


115. Weil to the Department of State, 31 March 1956, 611.91/3-3156, RG 59, Box 2562, NA.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Oral History interview with Goodpastor, pp. 107-108, DDEL.

119. Oral History interview with Bowie, pp. 8-9, DDEL.

120. Oral History interview with Cooper, pp. 15-22, Princeton University library.

121. The United States Congress, 84th Congress, 2nd session, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, on Mutual

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122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.


126. Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, 27 February 1956, DDE Diary series, Box 13, Ann Whitman file, DDEL.


128. Dulles, Address at Iowa State College Commencement Exercises, 9 June 1956, Dulles papers, Princeton University library.


133. *Department of State Bulletin*, (6 August 1956), pp. 221-222; and Dulles' statement of July 29, in ibid., p. 221.


139. Quoted in Gopal, *Nehru*: II: 278.

140. Nehru to Eisenhower, 11 September, 611.91/9-1350, RG 59, Box 2563, NA.


143. Nehru to Dulles, 31 October, in ibid.

144. Bulganin to Nehru, 2 November, and Nehru to Bulganin of the same date; and Bulganin to Nehru, 5 November, and Eisenhower to Nehru of the same date, in Gopal, ibid., pp. 286-287.

145. Herbert Hoover, Jr., "Memorandum for the Secretary, 2 November 1956, Dulles papers, White House memo series, Box 4, Meeting with the President August through December 1956 (3) folder, DDEL.

146. Memorandum of conference, 3 November 1956, White House Memoranda series, Dulles papers, DDEL.

147. For the Hungarian revolt of 1956, see Janos Radvanyi, *Hungary and
the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolt and Realpolitik (Stanford, 1971).

148. memorandum of conference with the president, 3 November, Dulles papers, White House memoranda series, Box 4, Meetings with the President August through December 1956 (3) folder, DDEL.

149. Dutt, With Nehru, p. 171.


152. Cited in Gopal, Nehru: II: 293.


155. Nehru to Krishna Menon, 2 December, in Gopal, Nehru: II: 297.

156. "Position paper on Events in Eastern Europe," 11 December, Nehru Visit, December 16-20, 1956, DDE Records: Confidential file, Subject subseries, Box 72, State department 1956 Nehru Material (1) folder, DDEL.

157. Excerpts from Cousins' letter to Eisenhower in Ann Whitman's Memorandum for the Secretary, 30 August 1956, Dulles papers, White House Memoranda series, Box 3, White House Correspondence General 1956 (2) folder, DDEL.

158. Henry Wallace to the president, 27 November, Dulles papers, White House Memoranda series, Box 3, White House Correspondence general 1956 (1) folder, DDEL.

159. Position Paper, December 11, Nehru Visit, December 16-20, 1956, DDE Records, Confidential file: Subject subseries, Box 72, State

162. Cooper left the post in New Delhi in April and won election to the United States Senate from Kentucky. He was succeeded by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Also see FRUS, 1955-1957: VIII: 319, n. 3.

163. Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, 7 December 1956, ibid., pp. 319-325.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. New Delhi to the Secretary of State, 11 December, 611.91/12-1156, RG 59, Box 2563, NA.

167. Dulles, memorandum of conversation with Prime Minister Nehru at Blair House, 16 December, Dulles papers, general correspondence and memoranda series, Box 1, memorandum of conversation: general n through r (1) folder, DDEL.

168. Memorandum of conversation with Prime Minister Nehru of India, 17-18 December 1956, Ann Whitman file, International series, Box 28, Nehru visit December 16-20 (1) folder, DDEL.

169. Notes 167 and 168.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

series, Box 28, Nehru Visit December 16-20 (1) folder, DDEL.

173. Note 168.

CHAPTER VII

AFTERWORD

Indo-American relations between 1947 and 1956 went through two phases. The first phase, before 1954, was a period of uneasy and equivocal relations, the second, from 1954 to 1956, was a time of growing understanding on the part of both nations.

While differing national interests produced the misunderstandings in the first phase, the misunderstandings fueled the intolerance and insensitivity that worsened relations further. Washington considered communist aggression the most serious threat to its national interests and to world peace. Anxious to thwart that aggression, America allied itself with such colonial powers as Britain, France, and Portugal in an effort to build a ring of collective security around the Soviet bloc; and it expected all "free" nations to join its efforts. Any nation unwilling to do so automatically lost Washington's sympathy.

Lacking experience in international affairs, New Delhi had pressing concerns of its own and refused to join Washington's efforts to contain communist expansion. Having only recently freed itself from two centuries of colonial rule, India considered foreign domination by the West, not some communist conspiracy, to be the gravest threat to world peace. The foreign policies of the two countries thus clashed with each other. New Delhi's insistence on nonalignment contravened Washington's insistence that all nations take sides in the Cold War.
India's policy was dictated by a combination of domestic factors that had nothing to do with the Cold War. Abject poverty caused Indian leaders to concentrate their attention and resources on economic development, and to link their foreign policy with that domestic objective. The rapidly growing population made economic development impossible without massive infusions of foreign capital. Obtaining economic assistance, which only the United States could provide, was therefore a major policy objective of the Indian government.

These domestic concerns dictated India's refusal to build a strong military, another decision that the American and Indian governments viewed in different lights. Certainly India's vast area and long border with China were vulnerable to aggression from the north, but India could hardly afford to play the part of a cold warrior. In any case, Nehru's government did not fear China, even after Mao's accession to power in 1949.

Domestic problems were much more pressing in the minds of New Delhi's policymakers. For the first time in 1947, India became a single administrative unit. Never before, not even under the British rule, had its extended territory and polyglot people been administered by a single government. There were three hundred and fifty or so princely states incorporated in the Indian union, and Hindu-Muslim partition had led to problems of an unanticipated and unprecedented sort. Millions of refugees flowed into and out of India and Pakistan. They had to be rehabilitated. Communal harmony throughout the sub-continent had been disturbed during the years of British rule, and now it had to be restored. During and after
partition, law and order deteriorated. To the Nehru government, these problems far outweighed Washington's concerns about the Cold War, the Chinese "menace," or the Soviet threat to world security.

To New Delhi, therefore, foreign policy was a primary concern only insofar as it offered hopes for economic assistance. India needed assistance on a scale that only America could supply, but for reasons of its own, Washington was not eager to listen to India's requests for help. Indian policymakers emphasized central economic planning as the way to achieve maximum results from limited economic resources. This clash of state planning with the principles of private enterprise and individual initiative also precluded close economic cooperation between the United States and India.

Knowledge of international events, on both the individual and societal levels, were likewise important influences on policy formulation in both capitals. American policymakers, especially President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, had little understanding of India. The Americans were primarily concerned with Europe and the Mediterranean, and secondarily with East and West Asia. South Asia was at best a tertiary concern. There, Pakistan was the country that mattered most to American policymakers, but only insofar as it aligned itself with the Western security system. Because India refused to do that, it received little consideration in Washington. Later, John Foster Dulles' intense anti-communism led to a similar attitude toward India. President Eisenhower also had little concern initially with India.

It was only in 1954 after the American military commitment to Pakistan, that Eisenhower, Dulles, and other policymakers in
Washington began to appreciate that India's nonalignment was permanent. While New Delhi would not align itself with the Western bloc, they came to realize, it would also refrain from joining the Communist bloc. India was an important country and Nehru was its unquestioned leader. Recognizing New Delhi's formidable problems, Washington now realized that the prime minister was shouldering one of the world's heaviest burdens. His success in alleviating the miseries of the Indian masses would not only enhance democracy's prestige, but also serve as a model for economic development in other undeveloped areas. Therefore, America decided to assist his efforts to develop India's economy.

The Soviet economic drive in 1955 confirmed this new policy toward India and the Third World. Eisenhower and Dulles quickly realized that Washington must counter the Soviet initiatives, and that meant increased economic assistance to developing countries. They began to appreciate India's domestic problems, and thereafter omitted the kinds of insensitive and irresponsible statements that had embittered relations between the two countries. Indo-American agreement over Suez and Hungary also contributed to this rapprochement. Never before had the two governments demonstrated such convergence of views.

While the international situation provided the opportunity to bring the two countries closer, Eisenhower's and Dulles' new appreciation of India's economic needs consolidated the friendship. Dulles, especially, continued to harbor strong convictions about the communist threat that encouraged him to continue to view that threat in terms of black and white. Although he came to share the
The president's concern for India, his insensitivity to Indian priorities remained a problem. The best illustration of this was his continued characterization of nonalignment as immoral. Although he traveled a lot, Dulles was never properly sensitive to some of the deeper currents of Asian thinking, and he never fully appreciated the concerns and aspirations of the Asian people. He was always disappointed with India's and Nehru's attitudes. He thought Indians did not appreciate what the United States had done to help them economically, and he was certain they did not recognize the nature of the communist threat. And in the Eisenhower administration, it was Dulles who was primarily responsible for policy toward Asia.

Ambassador John Sherman Cooper recalled that he repeatedly argued with Dulles and other State Department officials that the United States should accept Indian nonalignment because that policy was not going to change. If New Delhi was nonaligned with the United States, he added, it was equally independent of the communist bloc. If the American goal was to keep India independent politically and economically, nonalignment was in line with American objectives. 1 Dulles came to that position only after the Soviet Union began its economic offensive in the Third World. The change led him to support increased aid for India's economic development. In January 1956, for example, despite objection from the Treasury Department, Dulles supported a special sale of American grain to India. "We [have] made many exceptions for India. We [have] done very much for [that country]," Dulles later told Cooper, "I am going to approve the grain transaction for India." 2

India's foreign policy was the product of one man. Nehru was
the foreign minister as well as the prime minister. His chief confidante and advisor, V.K. Krishna Menon, was always willing to follow Nehru's lead. Other men, including Girija Bajpai, Raghavan Pillai, and Subimal Dutt, were able officials, but they had begun their careers under British rule and had helped the British in dealing with the Indian nationalist movement. They had therefore earned the suspicion of the nationalists, who were now in power. Nehru would have dispensed with them if he could, but the lack of experienced officers outside the Indian Civil Service (ICS) caused him to retain them in high positions. Grateful to the prime minister for their survival, they loyally followed his policies. Most of the political leaders lacked adequate knowledge of and experience in foreign affairs, so they also were in no position to challenge the prime minister.

Nehru was an intense nationalist. His anti-American bias, cultivated through his association with British liberals, caused him to suspect American motives, at least until 1956. Although he realized that the United States was the only country which could effectively assist India in its economic development, he was reluctant to ask for assistance. Menon complicated this matter by taking every possible opportunity in and out of the United Nations to criticize the United States.

Although he denied it, Nehru's nationalism and pride indeed led him to aim at Third World leadership. But domestic problems precluded such a role for the present. At the same time, the pressing nature of India's economic problems forced Nehru to ask the United States for
substantial assistance, which Washington for reasons of its own was eventually prepared to provide.

1957 therefore began with promise. NSC 5701 noted the Soviet economic drive in the Third World and emphasized the need to respond to the challenge it represented. South Asia had 500 million people and India had emerged as the foremost representative of the Asian-African, or "Bandung" movement. It was also the leading contender, with China, for leadership in Asia. Nonalignment was not merely a philosophical attitude; many nations considered that their national interests best served by independent international policy. Should India fall significantly short of projected development goals during the next five years and lose the economic momentum it had gained under Nehru's leadership, the NSC document continued, its government would be unlikely to continue in its present form. That would have international political ramifications. The outcome of the competition between China and India as models of development for the people of Asia would have profound effect throughout Asia and the rest of the world. The ability of the United States to shape events in South Asia was, however, severely limited. It could not not bring the countries there, except Pakistan, into its collective security system, nor could it fully satisfy their needs for economic development. But it could help South Asian countries build themselves, and thus stem the red tide. Therefore, the NSC analysts continued, the United States should employ its limited resources as effectively as possible. It should assist in supplying the foreign exchange needed for successful implementation of India's Second Five Year Plan. While respecting India's nonalignment, Washington should
also seek to prevent Indian policy from serving communist interests, and, when it served American interests, the United States should make use of India's mediation efforts and moderating influence in international disputes. Aid to the Third World, and especially to India, was therefore now a Cold War tactic.

Eisenhower began his second term in 1957 with an appeal for more sympathetic attention to the needs of the Third World. "We must use our skills and knowledge," he said in his inaugural address, "to help others rise from misery, however far the scene of suffering may be from our shores... or there will surely rise at last the flames of conflict." 5

While the President spoke generally of the Third World on this occasion, he was soon talking specifically about India. Eisenhower resigned himself to the idea that the United States was better off with a nonaligned India than it would be if India joined actively on the American side. The consequence of the latter would be an added burden on American taxpayers and 2000 more miles of frontier to defend. 6

For its part, India made efforts to obtain further American assistance in 1957. In May and September respectively, Finance Secretary B.K. Nehru and Minister T.T. Krishnamachari approached the administration for aid. 7 The negotiations which this prompted soon bore fruit, and in January 1958 Washington announced a loan of $225 million to India. This was indeed a significant departure from the policies of previous years. 8

Indo-American relations were further strengthened by Eisenhower's trip to New Delhi in 1959. He was impressed by Nehru's
efforts, and he left convinced that understanding between America and India had deepened as a result of his visit.9 This assessment might have been unduly optimistic, but a good beginning had been made by this time.

This new understanding continued under the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations. As a senator, John F. Kennedy with John Sherman Cooper, then a senator from Kentucky, had introduced resolutions calling for increased aid to India.10 India, Kennedy had repeatedly said, was a test case of Third World development through democratic methods. If India failed and China succeeded, he added, democracy's prestige would greatly suffer.

Kennedy carried those views with him to the White House. In his inaugural address, he made a strong pledge to help "those people in the huts and villages of half of the globe struggling to break the binds of mass misery."11 India, where a great deal of this misery existed, would receive especially sympathetic attention during Kennedy's presidency.

Yet Kennedy's interest was not inspired by humanitarian consideration. An ardent cold warrior, Kennedy was to clash with Nehru, who continued his policy of nonalignment. Indeed when the prime minister visited the United States in 1961, the two leaders differed on almost all aspects of the international situation including disarmament, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Nehru's visit was "a disaster," Kennedy later noted, "the worst head of state visit I have had."12

In the fight against international communism, nevertheless, Kennedy realized India's importance and was prepared to deal with
Nehru accordingly. He substantially increased economic assistance to India, and in 1962 American capital assistance to India totaled a record $465.5 million. Moreover, Kennedy demonstrated his interest in India's economic development by appointing the renowned economist John K. Galbraith as his ambassador to New Delhi. Galbraith remained in the position until 1963, when Chester Bowles, an ardent advocate of American assistance to India, was reappointed to it. When the Sino-Indian war broke out in 1962 over a border dispute, America and Britain promptly responded to India's request for arms, rushing large quantities of military supplies to the country. President Kennedy, despite strong protest from allied Pakistan, also appointed a special committee headed by Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman to survey India's long-term military needs.

Nehru died in 1964 and was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was little known outside India. India's foreign policy continued on the course set by Nehru. After Shastri's death in 1966, Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, became prime minister. Following in her father's footsteps, Mrs. Gandhi cultivated good relations with Washington, and over the next five years America continued to provide substantial economic assistance to India.

In 1971 however Indo-American relations suffered a major reversal. The reason was the Bangladesh crisis, and India's involvement in it. In 1970 Pakistan had held its first ever general elections, which gave the Awami League, an overwhelmingly Bengali-dominated political party, a majority in the country's proposed National Assembly. The existing government in Islamabad refused to acquiesce in a government controlled by Bengalis, and this
refusal led to a crisis in East Pakistan. Negotiations for a compromise settlement with the Awami League failed, and in March 1971 a savage war broke out between Bengalis and troops loyal to the Islamabad government. Three million Bengalis were killed and ten million took refuge in India, thereby causing heavy strain on India's resources. Out of necessity, therefore, New Delhi became a party to a conflict Washington regarded as a Pakistani civil war. 14

Both the American consul general at Dacca, in East Pakistan, and Ambassador Kenneth Keating, in New Delhi, reported their shock at the massacre perpetrated by Pakistani army. President Richard Nixon, however, for reasons that cannot be described here, found it outrageous that his envoys were sending him "petitions, rather than reports" on what was happening. Further, far from restraining Islamabad, the Nixon administration responded to events by charging India with interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. This strained, one-sided response was due not only to the military alliance between America and Nixon's personal relationship with Pakistani leaders, whom he liked, and with Indian leaders too, whom he did not like. It was also due to the fact that Islamabad was serving as the channel for the contacts then underway that led to the Nixon-Mao summit meeting. Eager to open a dialogue with Peking, Washington was willing to ignore the activities of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan and to disregard both the suffering of the Bengali people and the legitimate concerns of India in a crisis on its borders. 16

Meanwhile Bengali resistance to the Pakistan army reached its peak in December 1971, when India intervened in its behalf. The Nixon
administration retaliated by suspending $87 million worth of economic assistance to India on the ground that such loans could be used in the war against Pakistan. Washington continued its military aid to Pakistan, however.

While the subcontinent experienced one of the worst moments of its history, Washington was anxious to pursue detente with the Soviet Union. It, therefore, desired peace in the subcontinent and elsewhere in the world. India also needed peace to rebuild its war-torn economy. President Jimmy Carter's visit to India in 1978 and Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai's visit to America in the same year promised new beginnings in Indo-American relations. Following these visits, the Carter administration resumed economic aid to India by extending $60 million in development assistance.

But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American attempts to strengthen Pakistan's defense as a consequence soon strained Indo-American relations once again. Although India did not approve of the Soviet action, it did not support Western efforts to counter it through bolstering the military might of Pakistan. The Industries Minister of the new coalition Janata government, who was a socialist, terminated the contract of two multinational companies, IBM and Coca-Cola, thereby complicating New Delhi's relations with Washington.

Despite its efforts at economic development, India remains a poor nation today. While American economic assistance to New Delhi could not alleviate that condition, it certainly helped New Delhi stem the communist tide. But insensitivity remains a major stumbling bloc to cordial relations.

Despite its poverty, India has a large manufacturing sector and
produces almost everything the country requires. Its export trade has also surpassed that of some of the more industrialized nations of the world. Even the United States now has an unfavorable balance of trade with India, a fact that has come under severe criticism recently by President George Bush. Washington's repeated requests to India to lower its tariff barriers so American goods could compete in Indian markets have not yet borne any positive results.

India has also emerged as the strongest regional power in South Asia. New Delhi now possesses sophisticated military equipment, including the atomic bomb, and unlike Pakistan, which depends on the United States for military supplies, manufactures most of its defense equipment. Despite its alliance with the United States, Pakistan is no match for India's military. India's recent intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war, although criticized by many nations including those of South Asia, and its support of the government of the Maldives against a coup attempt, received approval from the United States. Washington probably would like to leave the subcontinent to the care of New Delhi as long as its vital interests are not compromised. Now, with the recession of the Cold War in the late 1980's, Washington's global commitments will probably shrink, India's nonalignment will lose much of its meaning, and New Delhi's importance to Washington will likely be assessed in light of economic and regional policies.

On the strategic front, with the recession of the Cold War, the superpowers will have to re-evaluate their commitments to smaller nations. Regional rivalries may re-emerge, and the United States may have to reassess its policy in South Asia where India is the strongest nation, both politically and militarily.
On the cultural side, as more and more Indians visit or migrate to America and more Americans visit India, cultural understanding improves. That promises a gradual, long-term improvement in relations between the two countries.
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4. Ibid.


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