INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the original text directly from the copy submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from a computer printer.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" × 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 6" × 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI
Accessing the World's Information since 1938

300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
The making of a Sino-Marxist world view: Writing world history in the People's Republic of China

Martin, Dorothea Ann Loflin, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii, 1985

Copyright ©1985 by Martin, Dorothea Ann Loflin. All rights reserved.
PLEASE NOTE:

In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark.

1. Glossy photographs or pages
2. Colored illustrations, paper or print
3. Photographs with dark background
4. Illustrations are poor copy
5. Pages with black marks, not original copy
6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page
7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages
8. Print exceeds margin requirements
9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine
10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print
11. Page(s) lacking when material received, and not available from school or author.
12. Page(s) seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows.
13. Two pages numbered. Text follows.
14. Curling and wrinkled pages

15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received

16. Other

University Microfilms International
The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View,
Writing World History in the People's Republic of China

A Dissertation Submitted To The Graduate Division Of The
University Of Hawaii In Partial Fulfillment
Of The Requirements Of The Degree Of
Doctor Of Philosophy
In History
May 1985

By
Dorothea A.L. Martin

Dissertation Committee:
Stephen Uhalley, Jr., Chairman
Brian McKnight
Robert Sakai
Rex Wade
Sendou Chang
Acknowledgements

This dissertation, like most others, required the help of many people. I would like to acknowledge especially my advisor, Dr. Stephen Uhalley, Jr., for suggesting a topic that combined many of my interests in a single subject. I am also grateful to the other Committee members for their careful reading and helpful editing suggestions.

I would also like to acknowledge the assistance and support of the staff of the Universities Service Center in Hong Kong who helped me in so many ways during the year and a half of field research there. Also, I benefited greatly from the Graduate Research Fellowship from the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies of the University of Hawaii in the Spring of 1984 which allowed me to make steady progress for the next two semesters.

I am much indebted to the Chinese scholars in the world history field who I interviewed while traveling in China in 1982-83. The interviews were unofficial and off the record but I hope one day to give proper credit to the individuals who helped clarify much of the written materials and offered their own insight into central questions of this study.

Special thanks go to Patricia Polansky the Russian bibliographer at Hamilton Library for her help in tracking down the proper Russian form of names transliterated into Chinese from the Russian. I am also indebted to Dr. Jonathan Unger for the loan of several textbooks from the 1950s that were invaluable sources for this study.
The final preparation of this dissertation owes much to several people. I am most grateful for the technical assistance of Helen Carey, Dr. Herbert Ziegler, and Jane Yanai for helping me merge and convert different word processing systems to suit my writing needs. I would also like to express my gratitude to Nancy Kanyuk for the final proof reading and to Ms. Yanai for doing the calligraphy in the Chinese language section of the bibliography. The gift of their time when their own schedules were pressing is greatly appreciated.

While appreciative of the help these and others have given me, it goes without saying that any errors of fact or interpretation are my own responsibility.
Abstract

Serious study of world history is a twentieth century phenomenon that began to grow more rapidly in the post-World War II period. World history, as with other types of history, has a political bias, purpose, or potential political impact whether it is written in Little Rock, Kazan, or Chengdu. The importance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the global community makes knowing their world view and how that view alters and evolves of great interest. This study investigates the origins and evolution of a Sino-Marxist world view by examining the impact of domestic and foreign policy changes on the writing, research, and interpretation of world history in the PRC since 1949.

The sources for this study are world history textbooks from secondary and post-secondary school levels and Chinese educational and history journals. These were augmented by interviews with several Chinese scholars in the world history field.

The study is in two parts. Part one establishes the background of attempts to write world history mentioning briefly the problems faced in Western (mainly American) and Soviet historiography in adequately conceptualizing and writing world history. Chapter Two looks at the impact of Soviet sources on Chinese world history, how political campaigns affected the careers of historians in the world history field, and exposes some of the major interpretative themes and problem areas in Chinese modern world history including the importance of revolution and the role of the masses in revolution, the
threat of class restoration, the issue of a Eurocentric focus and the problem of properly incorporating Chinese history into world history.

In light of the themes brought out in Chapter Two, the second part is devoted to an analysis of changing treatment and interpretations as reflected in three case studies: the 17th century English Bourgeois Revolution (1640-1688), the Paris Commune (1871) and the position of the Third World in Chinese modern world history.

The main conclusion is that the revolutionist conceptualization that sees modern world history as a progression of revolutionary movements may prove unsuitable to legitimize the rule of the current Chinese leadership who stress the development of the productive forces as the motive force of history.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................ iii
Abstract ............................................................. v
List of Abbreviations ........................................... viii
Notes on Romanization ........................................... ix
Chapter One Introduction ........................................ 1
Chapter Two Writing World History in the PRC ............... 24
Chapter Three The English Bourgeois Revolution and
    Modern World History ........................................ 56
Chapter Four The Experience of the Paris Commune .......... 92
Chapter Five Reflections in the Third World ................. 123
Chapter Six Conclusions and Perspectives on
    New Directions ............................................... 149

Bibliography

Western Language .............................................. 158
Chinese Language .............................................. 167
List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMRB</td>
<td>Guangming Ribao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Hong Qi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFJB</td>
<td>Jiefang Junbao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMRB</td>
<td>Renmin Ribao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes on Romanization

The Pinyin system of romanization is used throughout this dissertation in the text as well as in the bibliography. This applies also to Chinese journals in English which previously were Romanized using other systems. For example, all references to the *Beijing Review* are written as such even though prior to 1979 this journal's title was romanized as *Peking Review*. 
Chapter One

Introduction

The genre of historical writing which attempts to encompass the world is a relatively new development and, even today, is in its nascent stages. "The simple truth," wrote G. Barraclough, "is that the study of world history is still only in its beginnings; only our realization of the inadequacy of our traditional approach to the past in the conditions which confront us today has compelled us to give it serious attention." Most historians, aware of the difficulties and problems they face within their own special areas, shy away from a "big picture" which takes into account the plurality of states, cultures, economies, etc., in human history. Some fundamentally question the benefits or even the possibility of global history. Others, however, perceiving global or universal history as something more than a compilation of national histories, are beginning to raise questions which attempt to reinterpret the past from a global point of view.

This new approach has its roots in the European Enlightenment. It was radically different from the universal view of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which allowed Europeans to begin all human history with the creation (calculated to have occurred on October 23, 4004 B.C.) or, for that matter,
from the Confucian view of the central kingdom and its barbarian periphery.

The first Western movement toward a new global view came after nearly two hundred years of increasing contact with the non-European world, in the eighteenth century Age of Reason. In the century prior to Voltaire's time, the infusion of information into Europe on China's ancient past helped create an awareness that the traditional structure and methodology of universal history, based on the sacred and profane history of mankind, could not absorb the ancient history of the far East without seriously straining both its premises and established historical accounts. As Van Kley succinctly put it,

European historians in Voltaire's day confronted an impressively large and sophisticated body of information about ancient China and its past. A mid-eighteenth century historian might question or reject parts of ancient Chinese history and chronology; he might doubt the virtues and wonders of Chinese civilization described by the Jesuits; but it had become exceedingly difficult for him to ignore Chinese history. (Van Kley, 1971:385)

Although the first debates on the methods of writing world history occurred at this time, like many other aspects of the Enlightenment, the historiography of world history writing was more successful in conception than in practice. (Barraclough, 1962:85) The shift of attention to the national level which came with the French Revolution and the national unification of Germany and Italy coupled with the technical problems of sources and the lack of trained scholars to use them, dispelled the initial interest in writing
global history. This disinterest continued until the shattering events of World War I refocused attention on questions beyond the national state.

The wider range of source materials available to historians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did, however, give rise to ambitious projects such as The Cambridge Modern History planned by Lord Acton. The nineteenth century had no shortage of political and social theories which implied universal application, such as, relativism, Marxism, and Darwinism, but it was only after World War I and the success of the Bolshevik Revolution that a new attempt was made at writing world history. The Outline of History (1920) by H.G. Wells, regardless of flaws, captured the imagination and seriously faced the challenge of writing a truly global history for the first time. Wells's aim went far beyond those usually associated with textbooks. He believed, said one biographer, "that he was laying the foundation stone of an educational movement that would teach humanely and in the spirit of collectivism." (Kagarlit-ski, 1966: 165) Similar to other members of the European intelligentsia, Wells was disillusioned by the failures to build peace in post-World War I Europe, especially the failure of the League of Nations. His earlier concerns with political solutions involved him in the activities of the Fabian Society and later the Labor Party. Turning away from politics, he aimed to solve the problems of human social
development through educational means. In this respect, Wells reflected the current faith in history, as Lord Acton put it, "as an instrument of action and a power that goes to the making of the future." (Barraclough, 1979: 3)

The Outline of History was Wells's main pedagogical tool, stressing the commonality of mankind. Wells accepted an invitation to visit Russia in September, 1920 and there met with Lenin and other revolutionary leaders as well as historians and educators. When The Outline of History came out in Russian translation, one Soviet reviewer recalled Wells's feelings at the time of the 1920 visit. "I would like, Wells is reported to have said, "(for) all the old textbooks to be destroyed and burnt, and new ones be written along the lines of my scheme." (Kagarlitski, 1966: 189)

Wells, who was sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause and especially outspoken against the isolation forced on the new Communist regime in 1920, may seem to be proposing a radical approach. Nevertheless, he feared revolution and hoped for an awakening among intellectuals that would bring about changes in attitudes that would spare the West the necessity of bloody revolution. This hope contrasted greatly with those of his hosts, who in 1920 had not yet given up the vision of proletarian revolution in all of Europe.

Prior to the success of the October Revolution, Marxism had little impact on the ideas of working historians. It was only after the Bolshevik victory that historians outside
of Russia were compelled to take Marxism seriously. Revolutionary leaders in Russia, like Wells and Acton before them, saw history as a powerful weapon, but for them the objective was communist education. Indeed, the major need was to educate a substantial number of Marxist historians and this often meant lowering the quality of both the education and the ideology. It also meant a decline in fundamental research and a concentration on general histories, usually written collectively, which did little more than reinterpret known facts from the point of view of Marxism. (Barracough, 1979: 24-25)

In 1920 Wells's work as an historian had a better reception in Russia than it did among historians in Britain. But the stimulus which Marxism gave to the application of social science theories and methods had a lasting effect on Western historiography. Wells's hope to spare the West bloody revolution was partially realized, but Western intellectuals failed to awaken or to affect the desired changes in political attitude; Europe was not spared the bloody devastation of a second world war. In other parts of the world, however, revolution fermented and along with it an intellectual quickening.

Similar to their European and American counterparts, members of the Chinese intelligentsia were also disillusioned by World War I, especially by the treatment China received at the Paris Peace Conference. Unlike Wells, some of these
intellectuals were attracted to the revolutionary success which had overthrown the Czarist autocracy in Russia and established a government in spite of foreign interference. Furthermore, Soviet achievements gleamed brighter in contrast to the recent failures in republican government in China after Yuan Shikai's regime collapsed and local military leaders, frequently allied with foreign powers, ruled a divided China.

Among the first group of Chinese intellectuals attracted to Marxism as a result of the Bolshevik victory was the Beijing University historian, Li Dazhao. Li's first exposure to Marxism while a student in Japan (1913-1916) does not seem to have made much of an impression on him. Returning home after Japan imposed the humiliating "Twenty-one Demands," Li became more active and vocal on current political issues in contrast to the anti-political stance of most intellectuals prior to the May Fourth Incident. Stimulated in his study of Marxism by the victory of the October Revolution, Li's article, "My Marxist Views", appeared on May 1, 1919 in New Youth magazine. Just three days before the events of May Fourth, this article was by far the most systematic treatment of Marxism to be published in China up to that time.

Li saw the immediate relevance of the new world view offered by Marxism-Leninism to the study of Chinese history and, by extension, to the placement of revolutionary events
Li's analysis attempted to use dialectical materialism to give new perspectives on history, not to use it as a fixed ideology or to formulate ironclad periodization schemes. Li's bold assessment of China's position vis-a-vis the course of modern world history marks the beginning of the Sino-Marxist world view. His conviction that Marxist theory should be promoted among students and young intellectuals led to the founding of the Marxist Study Society in 1920. Most notable among those exposed to Li's ideas and to Marxism through the Society was a young library assistant from Hunan province, Mao Zedong.
Under the influence of Marxism and aware of some of the new developments in historiography in Europe and America, Li asserted that since the proper object of history is all human activity over time, then history itself is a social science. Just as sociology, economics, political science, etc., examine aspects of "horizontal" slices of human activity, so history can and should look at these same aspects "vertically" over time. (Li, 1959:287) Li was not alone in his praise of the social sciences, but different points of view regarding the course of the Chinese Revolution emerged in the late 1920s. Radical and liberal intellectuals divided over the choice of issues to be stressed, resulting in the "social history controversy" of the 1930s. (Dirlik, 1978) The two main points of view in this controversy took root in the debate between Li Dazhao and Hu Shi over the questions of "isms." (Meisner, 1967: 105-114) Li advocated revolution to create fundamental resolutions to problems. Hu Shi, a gradualist, felt that the problems could be solved within the existing structure and that fundamental changes were not possible through political means.

Li was more a philosopher of history and a political activist than a working historian; he was eager to account for China's current position in the world order but never systematically applied the general theories of materialism to either Chinese or world history. His liberal contemporary and sometimes academic adversary Dr. Hu Shi, while not
venturing into the field of world history himself, did reflect on the problems confronting historians who do. In his introduction to G. Sokolsky's *An Outline of Universal History* (Shanghai, 1928), Hu Shi recalled that his first history lesson in English came from P. Parly's *History of the World*, which barely mentions Asia. He noted the mutual irony of books like Parly's and others which go under the rubric of "general world history" but in fact deal only with Europe, "which," according to Hu,

> did not make much of a show until the last three hundred years and which has no more justification to call itself 'The World' than our forefathers who were often laughed at for having the audacity to consider China as 'The World'!" (Sokolsky, 1928:xi)

Such one-sided world history, said Hu, failed to take into account the interest and feelings of Oriental readers. He pointed out that it was the close relationship among the nations of the modern world that gave rise to the demand for a new type of universal history. Hu cites the popularity of Wells's *The Outline of History*, not criticism from professional historians, as proof of this demand.

Hu praised Wells's efforts at a "truly international point of view" and also pointed out that the difficulties facing Western scholars in rectifying their "Eurocentric" perspective were partly due to the fact that "we orientals are only beginning to study our own history from a critical point of view and with modern methods of historical research." He was enthusiastic over Sokolsky's choice to
view the world from the East, "standing on the Asiatic shore of the Pacific and peer(ing) upon the world from that vantage point." But, he added, "this...Copernican revolution in universal history, has naturally enhanced the difficulty of the task. To begin with, there is no satisfactory 'general history' of China herself." (Sokolsky, 1928:XI)

The problem of sources also continued to be a serious issue for European scholars in the inter-war years. The surfeit of sources which began to surface after the mid-nineteenth century created new barriers to the writing of world history, especially when the majority of trained historians were busily attempting to deal with the archival materials on European history. They were also occupied with incorporating the influences of the social sciences' methods and theories into the history of the national or cultural units of their specialty. This inability to deal with the wide range of primary materials, the lack of reliable secondary works, and the growing importance of national political and economic questions during the depression and World War II, combined to limit developments in the theory of world history to notions more rightly called meta-history, as seen in the works of O. Spengler and A. Toynbee. Advances in the writing of world history did not go much beyond the narrative recounting of Western civilization with slightly longer sections devoted to non-European cultures and, even then, often only in the context of contact with the West.
The awareness of the need for a history which transcends national and regional boundaries is one of the most significant post-World War II trends in historiography. This trend, contends Barraclough, resulted from a new phase of global integration and "the demand for a history which reflects this new situation has become more insistent." (Barraclough, 1978:153) To meet this new demand, historians have relied with greater certainty on the methods and insights of the social sciences as well as on computers which have facilitated the quantification of history. In spite of these advances, however, the volume of materials and the complexity of the subject matter have given rise to a tendency toward multivolume, collective histories, written by teams of specialists. The Historia Mundi, edited by F. Kern and F. Valjaver (1952-61), the Vesmirnaja istoriji, general editor, E.M. Zhukov (1955-65), The New Cambridge Modern History, edited by G. Clark, and the six-volume UNESCO History of Mankind begun in 1963 are the best examples of this group style of writing. The major drawback to this collective approach is that they tend to not hang together; even when the writers share a common world view, their emphasis and focus differs, making for loosely linked chapters. Collective authorship of less academic textbook materials is also common. This is especially true for works that originally began as Western Civilizations texts and by adding a chapter or two on the non-European world ballooned into a world history book.
Exceptions to this trend of collective scholarship in the world history field are the writings of L.S. Stavrianos and William McNeill. Both of these historians wrote world history textbooks for high school or freshman level college use. (Stavrianos, 1970,1982) (McNeill, 1979) In addition, both men have done stimulating works which use a global scale and perspective. (McNeill, The Rise of the West, 1963; Stavrianos, Global Rift, 1981) Both scholars have also written shorter, more narrowly focused works, which were simultaneously global in scope. (McNeill, Plagues and People, 1976; The Pursuit of Power, 1982; and Stavrianos, The Promise of the Coming Dark Age, 1976)²

Other works by single scholars focus on particular regions, states, or shorter time periods with the major distinction that the questions dealt with are related to the global context. Especially prominent in this area of world history writing are the works of I. Wallerstein and his colleagues at the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems, and Civilizations at the State University of New York, Binghamton. Most of these last-

---

¹ Most of the popular world history textbooks in use today are published by major textbook companies and are collectively authored. See, (MacKay, Hill, and Buckler, 1984); (Burns and Ralph, 1983) for examples.

² These two men are still very active in the world history field: Dr. McNeill is currently serving on the Board of Governors of the recently organized World History Association. Dr. Stavrianos is now writing a new world history series at the request of the Greek Government for use as a high school text.
mentioned works employ a neo-Marxist analysis and often rely heavily on secondary research done by area specialists.

From this brief overview of developments in the field of world history, it is evident that historians have only begun to scratch the surface of the vast reservoir of global history. It is also clear that the awareness of the need to approach history from a world perspective grew out of the political and economic conditions of the contemporary world. These conditions, however, shape not only the topics for consideration, but also their content. The controversy over the rewriting of Japanese world history textbooks is a recent case in point. The Japanese government's support for rewriting textbooks to present Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s in a less sordid light evoked demands for rewriting the offending passages from Chinese leaders, as well as from other nations who had suffered from Japanese aggression. The Japanese finally yielded. Soviet critics interpreted the soft peddling of Japanese militarism as an effort to prepare Japanese citizens politically and psychologically for rearmament, a policy encouraged by the United States since the late 1970s.

The validity of such criticisms or the original motives of the Japanese notwithstanding, the textbook issue is used here to make the point that all history has a political bias, purpose, or potential impact, some more obviously so than others. Observers of "totalitarian" regimes often
point to the "doctored truth" and the political propaganda value of the content of their history works, but fail to see the political influences on the uses of history in the "free world."

The impact of political ideology, for example, on historical studies was clearly acknowledged and encouraged in the early years of the Cold War by C. Read, then president of the American Historical Association. He wrote,

Total war, whether hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to do his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist.... If historians, in their examination of the past, represent the evolution of civilization as haphazard, without direction and without progress, offering no assurance that mankind's present position is on the highway and not on some dead end, then mankind will seek for assurance in a more positive alternative, whether it be offered from Rome or from Moscow.... This sounds like the advocacy of one form of social control over another. In short, it is. ...The important thing is that we shall accept and endorse such controls as are essential for the preservation of our way of life. (Read, 1950:285)

Under such controls as advocated by Read in this statement, the principle of free academic inquiry would surely suffer. The product of this approach, when combined with the equally pragmatic goals of education, is equally troublesome. Some of the pitfalls of this approach are pointed out in the study of the rewriting of American history in twentieth century textbooks, done by F. Fitzgerald. One of the dominant features of American history textbooks up to the 1960s, observes Fitzgerald, was their "astonishing dullness." But this dullness, she concludes,
is the product of a coherent world view, a philosophy of history. And this world view emerges if you examine the particular quality of their dullness. At first glance, the educators and administrators who run the secondary-school system across the country... would seem too vast and too disparate a collection of people to act as an establishment. Yet they do make up a system and a fairly coherent one at that." (Fitzgerald, 1979: 149, 167)

Under the cloak of usefulness, American history, says Fitzgerald, turned into "civics" and civics into propaganda for their vision of the social good. "Their history is a catechism, except that it deals with institutions not individuals. In its flatness and its uncritical conformism, it is a kind of American socialist realism." (Fitzgerald, 1979: 162). This reductive style of history writing improved somewhat under the domestic and foreign pressures of the 1960s and 1970s in the form of civil rights movements for blacks, women, and other minority groups and the escalation of American involvement in the war in Vietnam.

Political and social pressures on historians in our "free" society, however, are seldom so direct or consequential to the individual as the conditions and restraints under which historians in "not so free" societies labor. For example, although conditions improved in the post-Stalin era in the Soviet Union, the situation in the late 1920s and early 1930s was very different. This difference is perhaps best illustrated by the career of M. N. Pokrovsky, dean of Marxist historians from 1917 until his death in 1932.
Pokrovsky was founder of the Society of Marxist Historians, deputy Commissar of Education, Rector of the Institute of Red Professors and held leading positions in the Communist Academy and the Russian Association of Social Science Research Institutes. The "scholar-bureaucrat," as G. Enteen referred to him, was central to the process of orchestrating the relationship of scholarship to politics. (Enteen, 1978) In the ideological political struggle of 1928 that resulted in the defeat of Trotsky and the victory of Stalin, politics shifted. After the 1928 silencing of non-Marxist historians, Stalin began to tighten further the ideological reins on Marxist historians. Even Pokrovsky's modified view of pre-revolutionary Russia as being dominated by merchant capitalism was considered inadequate for the purpose of justifying the success of socialist revolution in a single nation. It also lacked the corresponding nationalism and patriotic content seen as necessary for launching the first five year plan. As C. Black pointed out, "the motive that led first to the establishment of Pokrovsky as the dean of Soviet historians and later to his posthumous liquidation, should be sought... in the needs of the Party and the state." (Black, 1962: 12)

Pokrovsky's death in 1932 saved him from personal humiliation but his detractors immediately launched a campaign to stamp out his influence. Stalin's plans required pliant followers of the new party line; Pokrovsky was too independent
minded to fit this criterion. For Pokrovsky, Russian history was not isolated. In the introduction to a volume of selected essays by Pokrovsky entitled Russia and the World, translator R. Szporluk notes that the dispute among historians of this time was between Pokrovsky and his generation, who placed the revolution firmly in the mainstream of world history, and the ideologists who attacked him. These latter, says Szporlik, were "perhaps under the influence of the doctrine of socialism in one country.... In short, they began to view the past in terms of a "history in one country." (Pokrovsky, 1970: 45)

The 1934 party guidelines for teaching "civic" history in schools complained that textbooks and instruction in history were too abstract and schematic. To remedy this situation, the party decreed the preparation of new textbooks and designated their editors. New works on the history of the ancient world, the middle ages, modern history, history of dependent and colonial countries, and a history of the USSR were called for. The history faculties of Moscow and Leningrad Universities were reopened in 1935 with specific orders to train, "qualified specialists in history." (USSR, 1934) Pokrovsky and other Marxist scholars of his generation were no longer "qualified" to meet this task.

In China, history as the handmaiden of political ideology has often reached the point of fine art and the careers of many scholar-bureaucrats were affected by more subtle
changes than Stalin's rise to power. A simple juxtaposition of traditional and contemporary historiography with regard to certain aspects of the utility and production of historical writings registers some interesting continuities rather than revolutionary changes. (Levenson, 1968:32) The Communist victory in 1949, however, posed significant problems for both Marxists and non-Marxists alike. By the mid-twentieth century, most Chinese intellectuals had rejected the traditional view which regarded China, Zhongguo, the central kingdom. It was much harder for historians to reject the cultural heritage of China's past. In fact, leading Chinese revolutionaries, especially Mao, frequently appealed to the uniqueness of China and its position as a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society to oppose the mechanical application of the Soviet Union's revolutionary experience on the particular circumstances of China. But, as A. Feuerwerker has aptly pointed out, this self-serving side of history as a booster to nationalism is fraught with problems when mixed with a Marxist ideology which jealously demands universality of historians. "To court both cultural uniqueness and universal applicability is a task few historians savor, yet it is one that Chinese writers today are forced to perform." (Feuerwerker, 1968: 1)

The secondary research on post-1949 Chinese historiography has focused mainly on the writing, or should one say the rewriting of Chinese history from perspectives drawn from
Marxism-Leninism and increasingly Mao Zedong Thought. Several works edited by A. Feuerwerker (1961, 1967, 1968) contain articles illustrating the interplay between ideology and the rewriting of Chinese history. Case studies on the historiographical treatment of peasants by J. Harrison (1969), A. Hulsewe's work on variations in the interpretations of the origins and the founding of the Chinese empire (1965), and J. Israel's study of the historiography of the December 9th Movement (1965), all give interesting insight and depth to the correlation between scholarship in Chinese history and shifts in political policy. Studies by R. Macfarquhar (1960, 1974, 1983), J. Charbonnier (1978), and M. Goldman (1981) have done much to reveal the experiences of scholars and the political context in which Chinese intellectuals do their work.

This literature, because it restricts itself to the political uses and reinterpretations of Chinese history, gives little attention to the area of world history writing in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Questions regarding the reinterpretation of Chinese history in a Marxist framework will continue to be of great interest and significance. But, as China asserts its position within the global community the importance of understanding the writing and uses of world history in the PRC becomes increasingly evident. Any hope of comprehending the nature of the state which governs one-quarter of the world's population clearly
requires an understanding of how they view the world and their place in it as well as the conditions under which that view is altered and evolves.

The goal of this study, therefore, is to gain insight into the origins and evolution of the Sino-Marxist world view by examining in Chapter Two such factors as the influence of Soviet scholarship and resource materials, the impact of domestic political and economic policies, and shifts in international pressures on the research, writing, teaching, and interpretation of world history in post-1949 China.

Using some of the themes which emerge from the investigation in Chapter Two, the next three chapters are devoted to case studies aimed at illustrating the application of the interpretative themes on events and subjects within the world history field. Two of the case studies focus on specific historical events, i.e., the 17th century English Bourgeois Revolution and the 19th century Paris Commune. The last case study is more topical in nature, dealing with the treatment and attention given to Third World history. Although the content of Chapter Two will make it clearer why these three subjects were chosen for case studies, given the scope of world history, some justification for their use in this study seems in order.

It should be evident at the start that this study is mainly concerned with Chinese interpretations and uses of
world history and is, therefore, about China and not world history per se. Thus, the case studies reflect issues and questions as they relate to the study of world history in the PRC. In post-1949 China, the focus of historical study was, naturally enough, on revolution and especially making clear the course of modern and contemporary world history leading to the "inevitable" victory of socialism in China. Historians were called on to emphasize the present and to make the past serve the present. For reasons which will become evident in Chapter Two, historians at times hesitated to heed this recurring call.

PRC historians generally agree that modern Chinese history began with the 19th century Opium Wars. The modern era in world history, however, coincides with the 17th century English Bourgeois Revolution. In the Marxist scheme of dialectical materialism, this marked the beginning of the bourgeois political dictatorship accompanying the rise of capitalism which is now, in the late 20th century, in its moribund stage. The 19th century Paris Commune, barely mentioned in most non-Marxist and Western world histories, gains significance as the first attempt in the history of mankind to establish a proletarian dictatorship. This emphasis on revolution and the need for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to legitimate its new position makes these two historical events excellent examples to illustrate variations in interpretations as political policy and uses shifted over time.
An analysis of the attention given to the history of the Third World within the context of world history writing serves a somewhat different purpose than the analyses focusing on particular historical events. An analysis of this sort will hopefully shed some light on Chinese perceptions of its own ambiguous position as an important world power while it remains unquestionably a developing Third World country. China may deny any ambition to seek superpower status, but there is no denying the increasingly critical position it holds in today's tripolar world political configuration. Since China is both a leader of the Third World and a great power with obligations, a look at the Chinese treatment of Third World history can reveal the ways in which China's ambiguous status has shaped not only its writing of world history but also foreign policy decisions.

Most of the other secondary literature dealing with the Chinese world view in the post-1949 period has concerned itself with Chinese foreign policy and especially with the views of Mao Zedong. Good examples of these are works by B. Schwartz (1967, 1968b) and S. Kim (1979). The study undertaken here is deeply indebted to the pioneering work on world history in the PRC of Dr. Wang Gungwu whose article, "Juxtaposing Past and Present in China Today", provided many stimulating ideas and information on key primary sources.

When looking at a field of historical writing, the most obvious sources are the works written on the subject. In
order to determine what books were published on world history, the Quanguo Xin Shu Mu (National Bibliography) and the Quanguo Zong Shu Mu (National Cumulative Bibliography) provide the most complete list of new and reprinted books and textbooks. These bibliographies allow the researcher to know what materials there are and also permits one to determine, upon examination, if those materials seen or collected are a representative sample.

The major journals used are national publications such as Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Studies), Lishi Jiaoxue (Teaching History), Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti (Problems in Teaching History), Shijie Lishi (World History), etc. Newspaper reports as well as special features on history in the major nationally circulated papers, like the Renmin Ribao and Guangming Ribao, often provide clues to impending changes in policy and are thus of great value in determining new departures in interpretation. Some locally published materials, such as articles from college journals, are also used.

The censorship exercised over publication in the PRC both limits what we know about contrary opinion and defines, to some extent, the position of the government and Party. Verification and clarification of certain points and questions raised in the investigation of the published materials were, therefore, greatly facilitated through a series of interviews conducted with scholars, teachers, and students in the world history field at six colleges, universities, and institutions in the PRC.
Chapter Two

Writing World History in the PRC

In China during the first years following the Communist seizure of power, the focus of historical inquiry tended to be on the recent past that had led to the founding of the PRC. More specifically, the task was to link the victory of the "new democracy" led by the CCP to the world socialist revolution. In spite of the strained relationship between the CCP under Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) under Stalin during WW II and the Chinese Civil War, China's new leaders saw the advantage of linking their victory with the revolutions of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe.

Asserting clearly that China's new historical era was coterminous with the world's present, Mao declared to the Political Consultative Conference meeting in September 1949 that their success was not an aberrant form of revolution but the inevitable result of China "falling behind" economically in modern times as a result of a century and a half of "oppression by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments." (Mao, 1977:17) Mao completely rejected any notion of China in terms of Marx's loosely shaped ideas of oriental despotism or of it evolving along development lines of an Asiatic mode of production. (Starr, 1979:258)1

1 The question of the Asiatic mode of production was not so
As Joseph Levenson pointed out, Chinese intellectuals in the early twentieth century were attracted to Marxism because it did not place China in a position of permanent disadvantage but posited a future surpassing even the achievements of the West. (Levenson, 1968:134)

The legitimizing link with the Soviet Union not only gave the new Chinese state international recognition but also served to safeguard the victory from hostile foreign threats. As the war in Korea heated up, the policy of "leaning to one side" became both a theoretical and practical necessity. It is not at all surprising that the first rewriting of world history in the post-Liberation period dealt with putting a better face on pre-Liberation relations with the USSR, the influence of the Russian revolution and new praise for Stalin's contribution to the Chinese revolution's victory.²

² For a well illustrated example of this rewriting of pre-Liberation Sino-Soviet ties see A. Whiting's article on the shifting content of Hu Sheng's book *Imperialism and Chinese Politics* (Whiting, 1955:174-75)
Establishing this vital, legitimizing link with the USSR in the recent past implied linking China's more distant past with a non-Chinese past. But what was the non-Chinese past? Judging from Mao's comments in 1941 on the need to reform the study of history, one might get the impression that Chinese Marxist historians were well versed in non-Chinese history: "Many Party members are in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the last one hundred years or of ancient times. There are many Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing ancient Greece; but as for their own ancestors - sorry, they have been forgotten." (Mao, 1967c:19) It is likely, however, that Mao was pointing out the distance between the educated elite and the revolutionary cadres rather than an over-abundance of experts on ancient Greece.3

In the early 1950s, only a handful of mostly foreign trained historians had any expertise in Western history. Moreover, with few exceptions, the well known historians were not Marxist nor were they inclined to accept the Party's verdicts on China's past or fit it into universal Marxist categories. Furthermore, if, as Hu Shi noted, a major drawback for Western scholars in writing a comprehensive

3 It was the distance between these two groups coupled with the crisis of the new Japanese offensive, which prompted Mao to launch the Party rectification campaign in Yanan. See, (Selden, 1971:188-210) for a discussion of the composition of these groups and the aim of the campaign to create unity within the Party. Selden also views the 1941 rectification as the prototype for the Hundred Flowers campaign and the Cultural Revolution in the post-1949 period.
world history was the lack of essential Asian materials, then the same held true in reverse for Chinese scholars in post-1949 China. Thus, the lack of foreign primary sources, the few people capable of handling the materials that did exist, plus the ideological barriers between most historians and the new regime helped designate two main areas of historical study: China and the world, with over two-thirds of the historians dealing with China and less than a third with the rest of the world. More than thirty years later this division still persists and can be seen in the division of faculties in history departments and research groups as well as in the curriculum of secondary and post-secondary education.

Pre-1949 efforts at writing world history in China relied mainly on British and American textbooks such as those by C. Beard, C.J.H. Hayes and P. Moon, J. Wayland, and L. Thorndike as sources. The publication of Fudan University historian Zhou Gucheng's three-volume Shijie Tong Shi in 1949 and its reprinting in 1950 and 1958 suggest that such works initially went unchallenged. But this work did not meet the task of providing a Marxist analysis of world history that made clear the inevitable victory of the revolution and the eventual triumph of socialism over capitalism. To fill this need, a flood of new and reprinted translations of Soviet materials appeared in the 1950s.

---

4 A third area, archaeology, also comes under history in the PRC since there is no separate field of anthropology.
Similar to the case of economic development strategy, in the early years of the PRC Chinese historians relied heavily on what might be called the "Soviet model" in world history. Basic elements of this "model" include the adoption of the Soviet periodization of world history originally set in the 1930s and nearly total reliance on Soviet source materials for facts and interpretations. The Soviet division of history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods corresponds, for the most part, to developments in what should correctly be called a history of Western civilization. Prompt translation during the decade of the 1950s of the periodical literature and new monographs that emphasized the study of "contemporary" history (marked by the October Revolution) coincided with the CCP's desire to stress the recent past.

Soon after the victory in 1949, the Chinese reprinted several Soviet textbooks on world history originally translated for use in the base areas during WW II. Most prominent among these were the volumes on ancient, medieval, and modern history by A.V. Minulin, A.E. Kosminsky, and A.V. Efimov respectively. These books were already in their second and third printing by 1950 and were reissued regularly into the middle of the decade. They are the same books commissioned in the 1934 decree on civic history by Stalin mentioned above in connection with the purging of the influence

---

For a discussion of the historiographic content and ideological implications of the stress put on the contemporary period in the 1950s and early 1960s see the essays in the volume edited by John Keep, Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (Keep, 1964).
of Pokrovsky. In other words, these volumes, while framing the general scheme of world history, allowed room to accommodate a more informal periodization within separate eras as well as within individual countries.6

Among the new Soviet materials translated were the Soviet Academy of Sciences History Institute's four-volume *Course in Modern History* (1950 and 1953) and the two-part *Course in the Modern World* by Efimov and I.S. Galkin (1953-54). In addition to these general studies, a large number of translations were published on specialized subjects, such as the world wars, American aggression in Asia, etc., numerous histories of the Soviet Union and several editions of the writings of Lenin and Stalin. To aid Chinese historians in the cultivation of their theoretical skills, no less than forty-seven titles on dialectical materialism were translated, published, and reprinted between 1950 and 1953.

Amid this torrent of Soviet translations a few general works on world history by Chinese historians also appeared in the early 1950s. In addition to the three-volume world history by Zhou Gucheng already mentioned, the first and only printing of Cao Bohan's *Shijie Lishi* (World History) came out in April, 1950 and Zhou Qingji's two-volume *Xinbian Shijie Lishi* (New Edition World History) was first published in late 1953 and reprinted in early 1954 before it was panned by reviewers, not for a slack ideological stance,

6 For a distillation of the the Soviet position on the periodization of world history see, (Zhukov, 1960:220).
but for being poorly digested Soviet sources put together in a "scissors and paste" history. (Wang, 1975:6) Pu Yiren's condensed world history also came out in the spring of 1954.

Besides these general world histories, several books in specialized areas appeared in the early 1950's. Among these were a reprinting of Lin Judai's outline of modern Western history (Lin, 1950) and his study of the English Bourgeois Revolution in 1954. Zhang Jiyuan published his single-volume of lecture notes on ancient world history the same year.

The first post-Liberation Chinese world history textbooks produced were the volumes on the ancient and modern periods edited by Wang Zhijiu which first appeared in the spring of 1954. These were reprinted in updated versions until the spring of 1956 when they were replaced in popularity by the three part world history edited by Li Chunwu and Yang Shen-mao and published between September 1955 and March 1956. These two men were noted for their contributions to the translation of Soviet materials. They continued to work together in the field, jointly editing a three part upper-middle school textbook titled Modern World History and Contemporary Soviet History in April, 1956. By summer of the same year, this work evolved into a two part upper-middle school textbook titled Modern and Contemporary World History. (Li and Yang, 1957) Because of the rapid revisions and changes in these texts and also because some versions were directed to lower and some to upper level
middle school, these books dominated the textbook scene from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s when they were eclipsed by new text which closed contemporary history with the end of World War II, or at the latest with the founding of the PRC.

In the early to mid-1950s, however, the new regime needed to legitimize its rule not only in the scheme of world history through connections with the Soviet Union, but also in the eyes of the Chinese people. This objective depended largely on the ideological remolding of land-hungry peasants, industrial capitalists, and a handful of intellectuals. For the latter group, six years of re-education aimed, as R. MacFarquhar put it, at insuring "unquestioning acceptance of Communist Party leadership and Marxist-Leninist doctrine for an intelligentsia trained for the most part in Western democratic ideas." (MacFarquhar, 1960:6)

The shortage of Chinese Marxist works in world history above the middle school level is perhaps indicative of the difficulty of the ideological remolding and the fate of the first attempt to write such a work discloses the limited success of "re-education" of scholars in the world history field. In 1956, the Ministry of Higher Education initiated a project to write a three-volume world history. The project failed to come to fruition when two of its three authors, Yang Renpian and Lei Haizong, were labeled "bourgeois" during the opening attacks of the anti-rightist campaign in the summer of 1957. Yang Renpian perhaps received
his "bourgeois" label for his role as general editor of a collection of world history documents. Nine of the ten numbers in the series were documents on European history (including the ancient Near East and modern Russia) and were apparently translated from European materials, not retranslated from Russian. (Wang, 1975:7) Given the lead time necessary for publication, the eight volumes which appeared in the summer and fall of 1957 were obviously ready for printing prior to the criticism which aborted the textbook project. The last two volumes in the series which came out in the winter of 1957-58, however, listed only the translators and not a general editor.8

The case of Lei Haizong is clearer. In April of 1957 at a Hundred Flowers forum in Tianjin, Lei suggested that Marxist social sciences had not developed after 1895 (Engels' death). He further questioned its applicability to pre-modern China (or the pre-modern West, for that matter). Such views were quickly rebutted and criticized and when flowers began to wilt in the early summer, Lei became a prime target.9 Undoubtedly, Lei was not alone in his opinion

7 I believe Wang Gungwu is referring to this series but he mistakenly identifies the editor as Yang Rengeng (Yang Jen-keng). Also, my investigation of the bibliographic sources turned up four numbers in the series on pre-modern and six on modern history, not the five and five designated by Wang. (OGXSM,1957(8):14; (10):18; (11):18; (12):21; 1958(2):4; (5):2)
8 Five of the first eight volumes were published in June and early July just as the crackdown on "rightest" thinking began.
9 For Lei's views and the initial rebuttal see (Lei,
and his criticism of fundamental principles made it clear that the ideological struggle to remold the intelligentsia was not yet over.\(^\text{10}\)

The failure of this first attempt to compile an advanced-level Chinese world history text favored a warm welcome for the largest single translation project up to that time in the field of world history: the ten-volume (each volume in two parts in Chinese) *Shijie Tong Shi* edited by E.M. Zhubkov\(^\text{11}\) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences historical section. Soviet publication of the series began in 1955 and by 1959, when the first volume was published in Chinese translation, five of the set were completed. The favorable review the first translated volume received in November, 1959 (Qi, 1959:7) praised Soviet scholars for using up-to-date research on Chinese history to place the transition from slave to feudal society in the third century B.C., thus making China the first, i.e., the most advanced civilization of the time. This self-serving praise may well have been aimed at defending the independent economic course China was attempting in the late 1950s against Soviet criticism. Praised for its "brilliant contribution" in 1959, the

\(^{10}\) In fact, during the next period of "blooming and contending" in the early 1960s, another historian, Liu Jie from Zhongshan University again questioned the applicability of Marxist class analysis to pre-modern world history. See, (Liu,1963) and (Yang,1963).

\(^{11}\) This is the same series mentioned in Chapter One above.
series was strongly criticized in 1963 for "serious errors." A look at the lengthly criticism in the May issue of Lishi Yanjiu reveals the polemical content of this change of heart. Focusing on the example of Korea, critics charged that Soviet writers violated Marxism-Leninism and committed the same errors of prejudice as bourgeois scholars. Soviet scholars were accused of copying "word for word" from bourgeois (mainly Japanese) sources. (Jin, 1963:28) The logic of such criticism, however, cuts both ways. While Soviet scholars are cited as "reactionary" for reliance on "bourgeois" sources, nothing is said of the even heavier reliance of Chinese scholars on Soviet sources. In spite of the growing ideological split between China and the Soviet Union, translation of the ten part world history continued. By 1965, when the Soviet work reached completion, the first five volumes of the series were in Chinese editions. Apparently, translation work on the series continued through the hectic years of the Cultural Revolution but publication did not resume until 1972 with the translation being completed only in 1978.

Although Soviet translations continued to dominate during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chinese scholars did produce some specialized materials in the form of reference works and lecture notes on world history. These were often published by colleges or universities and restricted in circulation. An example of this type of work is the Shijie

After the setback of the anti-rightist campaign, efforts to compile a comprehensive world history were not undertaken again until 1959 when Zhou Yang, Deputy Director of the Party Propaganda Department, initiated a new project under the general editorship of Zhou Yiliang. Although primarily concerned with domestic cultural matters, Zhou Yang also had a role of some importance in international affairs at the time. As an outgrowth of increased interest in Africa and Asia in foreign police issues, plans to form an African-Asian Society of China were laid in the spring of 1959. Zhou Yang, who attended the Afro-Asian writers conference the previous October, was one of those responsible for establishing the society and became its first chairman when it was officially inaugurated in 1962. Zhou Yang's activities in these areas may account for his backing of the renewed project in world history, which was first published in 1962. Zhou Yiliang's 1955 history of Sino-Asian peace and friendship, obviously stimulated by political interest in the region after the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations in 1955, may have contributed to him being selected by Zhou Yang to edit the new series on world history.  

12 The emphasis on Asia was also noticeable in the new history syllabus set by the Ministry of Higher Education after 1955. The new interest in Africa in 1958 resulted
This three-volume, six book world history represented the efforts of many individual scholars from several schools, but it was Harvard educated Zhou Yiliang who, as the main editor, received the most notoriety. This series has remained the core work in general world history for over twenty years. Its staying power, however, is no less remarkable than that of its editor.

Zhou Yiliang's father was a very successful capitalist with extensive mining and manufacturing interest prior to Liberation. The elder Zhou's cooperation with the new regime won him a position (as a member of a "democratic" party), in the National People's Congress when it formed, a position he still holds. Educated in the USA and Japan before Liberation, Zhou Yiliang joined the CCP in 1956. This potentially troublesome class background and perhaps his association with Zhou Yang (purged in the Cultural Revolution), made him an obvious target for criticism during the Cultural Revolution. After spending some time in the "cow shed" and going "down to the countryside"—in his case, down to the mines—from 1969 to 1971, his ideological reeducation was complete enough for him to become a leading figure in the radical Liangxiao writing group in 1973. This group was closely associated with Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and, like similar mouthpieces in other disciplines under the control of the radical leadership faction, came under the personal supervision of Yao Wenyuan.13

---

13 In the renaming of the Asian history course to Afro-Asian history with a corresponding change in the syllabus. (Wang, 1975: 9)
During the criticism of the "gang of four," Zhou Yiliang claimed he was deceived by their twisted "ultra left" line. Apparently this self-criticism was officially accepted and he, though "humbled and a broken man," as one sympathetic colleague put it, regained his position at Beijing University, serving as chairman of the History Department there until the summer of 1983. Less sympathetic observers express the opinion that in the shifting political climate of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Yiliang's choices were pragmatic all along—to the point of spilling over into opportunism.

At the same time that Zhou Yiliang's new series began preparation in 1959, a notable change was taking place in middle school textbooks. Prior to the great leap forward, several upper middle school texts on contemporary world history included in their final chapter a glowing account of the glorious achievements in China up to 1957 and praised the unity of the International Communist Movement led by the Soviet Union. By mid 1959 these books were reprinted for the last time and the new texts omitted all reference to China's post-Liberation history. The piling evidence of serious economic errors in the great leap and the lessons learned by scholars, both in and out of the Party, during

13 For insight into the Liangxiao writing group and their juxtaposing past and present to make a current, though not always clear, political point, see (Goldman, 1981:161,173-176).
the anti-rightist and Party rectification campaigns of 1957 and 1959 (especially after the Lushan Plenary session) made it expedient to end the discussion of contemporary history with the end of World War II or the founding of the PRC. The Peng Dehuai affair in 1959 shattered the illusion of Party unity and the withdrawal of Soviet experts in 1960 shattered the image of unity with the socialist camp.

The economic retrenchment of the early 1960s was accompanied by a retreat to the past among historians, especially those in Chinese history. When the split between the PRC and the Soviet Union became more obvious, it also seemed that following the Soviet lead in foreign history was no longer necessary for ideological purity. As Wang Gungwu summed up this trend, "from the main historical debates of the period 1959-1965, there is little doubt that the interest in this (Chinese) past was returning to a more familiar Chinese way and had departed from the more uplifting task of changing the Chinese peoples' outlook towards the world."

(Wang, 1975:11; parenthesis added) If the goal of world history studies in the first decade of Communist rule in China was to fit China's past into the greater context of world

14 A preoccupation of Chinese scholars with their own history was certainly not new. But the retreat to the past seems to have intensified after the anti-rightist campaign. In keeping with the stress on the present and future vision of the great leap, Chen Boda, in 1958, admonished historians to "emphasize the present and deemphasize the past," something historians seemed reluctant to do at the time. For the proforma response of several historians to Chen's call, see the opening articles in issue number 5, 1958 of Lishi Yanjiu.
history, the retreat to the past, especially the Chinese past which scholars knew so well, turned into an attempt to re-work world history to follow the lead of historical developments in China's past.

Writing in 1961, Wu Tingqiu in his article, "Establish a New System of World History," proclaimed that China, not the West, was the first to advance to class society, to progress from the slave to the feudal system and should, therefore, be considered the "classic" forms of these stages of history. (Wu, 1961: 4) This claim to being the society to first make these transitions had been made before; what was new was the claim to being the model or "classic" example of these transitions. From such an exalted place one need not know too much about non-Chinese history in order to comprehend Marxism-Leninism and dialectical materialism.

A few months later, Li Shu, editor of Lishi Yanjiu after 1958, put it more bluntly by saying that the direction of historical study "consists of explaining the general laws of the development of human society on the basis of Chinese history, particularly on the reflection of these laws in the history of China." (Li, 1961:7) In the section of this article directed to Chinese studies in world history, Li attacks their Eurocentrism that narrates world history from the imperialists' point of view.

These points were at the heart of the arguments made by Zhou Gucheng a few months earlier in February of 1961. In
his article, "A World History Wanting of World Characteristics," Zhou criticized world history teaching materials saying, "World history, as the name implies, should deal with the history of the entire world and it ought to actually have a world character. In fact this is not the case. All world history textbooks up to the present, regardless of whether or not they are progressive, have a European center and look like European history." (Zhou, 1961:3) A brief look at any sample of Chinese textbooks on world history would validate Zhou's charges.

Ironically, it was on the subject of Eurocentrism, introduced by Zhou himself, that both Soviet and Chinese critics later attacked him. On the Soviet side, Zhou was accused of failing to credit the work of Soviet historians, "who have done much to unmask the Europocentric dogma of bourgeois historiography...." Zhou is further charged with bourgeois errors of his own, in a Sinocentric way:

In his scheme, attention is focused on cultural influences and interaction, i.e., aspects that are central to many concepts of bourgeois historiography, with the difference that Zhou Gucheng emphasizes everywhere the special, exceptional role of Eastern culture in the history of mankind." (Vyatkin, 1968:337)

The Soviet critic pushed home the polemical tone of the time by adding that since Zhou's views went uncriticized in China, it could only mean that his ideas had the sympathy of the editors of the journal and of those who guided its activities, i.e., the CCP.
Contrary to the Soviet charges, some of Zhou's ideas had been challenged at home. In fact, Zhou's two-volume survey history of China, first published in 1939 and reprinted (unrevised) in 1957 as the anti-rightist campaign gained steam, was strongly criticized during the great leap for its bourgeois point of view, which failed to credit peasant rebellions as the motive force of history. (Zhao and He, 1958:3) and (Chen, 1958:3)

Zhou's ideas came under fire again between 1963 and 1965. Initially, the criticisms were similar to but milder than those made by the Soviets. But as the general criticism of revisionist thinking within China became stronger and more pointed, so did the specific criticism of some of Zhou's ideas. Out of a series of articles by Zhou in 1962-1963 on questions regarding the history of artistic creation there emerged a debate on Zhou's aesthetic concept of the "spirit of the age." In response to his notion of contradictory class views combining to form a "spirit of the age" (Zhou, 1963a), Yao Wenyuan wrote a measured critique of Zhou's ideas pointing out that such a concept denied the role of class struggle in shaping consciousness. (Yao, 1963:3) Zhou defended his idea of converging class

---

15 M. Goldman uses the debate on Zhou Gucheng's aesthetics as an example of the uses of Chinese history in the Party struggle of 1962-1964. (Goldman, 1973) Because Zhou is also a noted writer of world history and since many of his points are related to world history, the controversy regarding his ideas is given greater attention here than some of the other debates of the early 1960s mentioned briefly below.
opinion by basically arguing that the whole is more than the sum of the parts.

Using present day China as his example, Zhou pointed to the many languages, peoples, religions, etc., which taken separately, are less than the whole reality of the PRC. Extending this analogy to the realm of ideas, Zhou used Yao's characterization of the present as one of proletarian revolution to illustrate that there were also non-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary elements present. These had not been done away with, Zhou argued, or transformed by class struggle, but reconciled. (Zhou, 1963b:2)

Rather than counter Zhou's point that China was less than fully revolutionary, Yao backed away, confining his rebuttal to Zhou's views on the source of artistic creativity. (Yao, 1964:2)

After nearly a year of attack and counterattack (June, 1963 to May, 1964), the debate between Zhou and Yao over the "spirit of the age" cooled down. Doubtlessly, however, the ideological similarity between Zhou's views and the heated criticism which soon began over Party School philosopher Yang Xianzhen's position of "two combines into one" could not have gone unnoticed. 16

16 M. Goldman directly links Zhou's "spirit of the age" as well as Wu Han's (and others') idea of "universal ethics" with the views expressed by Yang Xianzhen's students. (Goldman, 1973:95) In another debate over formal and dialectical logic, Mao Zedong and Zhou Gucheng agreed that the two were different kinds of logic and could not be mixed. This was not the first time these men had agreed, yet retained their differences. Their acquaintance went back to the Hunan peasant movement but more recently, in
As the Socialist Education campaign moved to the cities in the form of a controlled Party rectification in the fall of 1964, Yao was mildly criticized for his attack on Zhou; but this was not a major trend. Soon afterward, Zhou's world history and Chinese history came under renewed criticism, this time for their Eurocentricism. Between November, 1964 and March, 1965 over half-a-dozen articles appeared in the Guangming Ribao history page bitterly attacking Zhou for his focus on the emergence of Western civilization and accusing him of duplicity in his claim to write world history from a non-European point of view. One critic, citing the author's foreword to the 1958 "revised" edition of the third volume, states correctly that "the revisions are not in the text of the book" implying that the content itself is "revisionist." (Zhang, 1964:4) In the foreword, Zhou indicated that the series was intended to serve both the general reader and the researcher in world history as a reference source.17 His critic points out that his work is based entirely on Western secondary sources, makes no attempt to employ dialectical materialism in its analysis, beautifies

the Anti-rightest campaign, Mao called Zhou "one of my rightest friends."

17 It is also interesting to note that in the original foreword which remains in the "revised" edition, Zhou mentions four volumes planned in the series. The fourth volume, which was never written, was to treat contemporary history in terms of the era of emerging world equality. (Zhou, 1958:1) Recently, colleagues have suggested that he edit a forth volume that could be prepared by graduate students and researchers in the Fudan University History Department, but he has rejected this proposal, not wanting to put his name to work that is not his own.
the oppression of colonialism, and misrepresents the importance of class struggle by emphasizing class unity.

The premise of the criticisms leveled at Zhou Gucheng reflect the main issues of the ideological debate between the CPSU and the CCP in the early 1960s and, increasingly from 1963-1965, in the debate between Mao and his opponents within China. Internationally, China challenged the Soviet view of détente with the "imperialist" United States of America and opposed the idea of a peaceful transition to socialism as meaning that national liberation fronts should give up their struggles or that minority communist parties should lose themselves in coalition governments.

Within China, well known Marxist scholars of Chinese history and culture including historians Jian Bocan, Wu Han, and Liu Jie and philosopher Feng Yulan expressed their views that certain Confucian concepts like ren had universal application and that class conciliation rather than class struggle advanced history. This second view, which later became tagged the "concession theory," was part and parcel of the concurrent discussions on historicism (Feuerwerker, 1968:2-4), the "reversal of verdicts" on historical figures (Uhalley, 1966), and the uses of historical plays to portray officials of the old feudal society as righteous heroes of the people. All these views began to emerge into the open in the liberalized atmosphere of the post-leap recovery.
By the Tenth Plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee in October, 1962, economic recovery seemed fairly sure. Mao's call for renewed class struggle, however, did not get immediate response, although some of the bolder personal criticism of Mao and the great leap, such as the "Evening Chats at Yanshan" and "Notes from Three Family Village" soon ended. Rebuttal to the liberal academic views mentioned above began slowly and cautiously in 1963 and came from younger scholars educated in China and, like the debate between Zhou and Yao, reflected issues of importance in the rising domestic political crisis.

As Mao advanced his assessment of the Soviet Union as revisionist in the polemics of the early 1960s, his concept of class restoration and specifically the threat of capitalist restoration became a more refined theory. (Esherick, 1979:56-57). In his speech at the Tenth Plenary Session, at the same time that he called for renewed class struggle, Mao drew attention to the tendency of old class elements to reassert their power:

Now then, do classes exist in socialist countries? Does class struggle exist? We can now affirm that classes do exist in socialist countries and that class struggle undoubtedly exist. Lenin said: After the victory of the revolution, because of the existence of the bourgeoisie internationally, because of the existence of the bourgeois remnants internally, because the petty bourgeoisie exist and continually generates a bourgeoisie, therefore the classes which have been overthrown within the country will continue to exist for a long time to come and may even attempt restoration. The bourgeois revolutions in Europe in such countries as England and France had many ups and downs. After the overthrow of feudalism there were several
restorations and reversals of fortune. This kind of reversal is also possible in socialist countries. An example of this is Yugoslavia which has changed its nature and become revisionist, changing from a workers' and peasants' country to a country ruled by reactionary nationalist elements. In our country we must come to grasp, understand and study this problem thoroughly. We must acknowledge that classes will continue to exist for a long time. We must also acknowledge the existence of a struggle of class against class, and admit the possibility of the restoration of reactionary classes. (Mao, 1974, pt. 2: 189)

Not long after this September Plenary session, revisionism made its first appearance as a theme in world history. The development of this idea of class restoration in the works of Marx, Lenin, and the earlier writings of Mao will be taken up at greater length in the next chapter on the interpretations of the English Bourgeois Revolution. Suffice it to say here that class restoration gradually became a major idea informing the evaluation of all revolutions. In Wang Gungwu's opinion, this theme was the "first glimmering of a Chinese perspective on world history.... The theme of restoration could sharpen the distinctiveness of the new orthodoxy, the new Sino-Marxist view of world history." (Wang, 1975: 16) A decade later this threat of class restoration was the thoroughly familiar justification for Mao's emphasis on the need for revolutionary vigilance in "continuing the revolution."

Although triggered by the controversy over an historical play, and although scholars and administrators took the initial brunt of the Red Guard attacks, the real targets of
the Cultural Revolution were not academics but the "revisionists in power taking the capitalist road." Universities closed and academic life per se ceased during the intense years of the Cultural Revolution. Over thirty people died in clashes or under pressure at Fudan University, home institution of Zhou Gucheng. He, however, seems not to have suffered greatly. His writings were strongly criticized for lack of a class viewpoint, but he was not attacked personally. Some observers credit his mild treatment during the Cultural Revolution to the fact that Zhou had no political enemies; therefore, it neither hurt nor benefited any faction to attack him personally. Others claim that the personal friendship he continued to have with Mao provided protection from harsh treatment.

Other scholars in the world history field were not as fortunate as Professor Zhou. After enduring the attacks of the Red Guards, most went "down to the countryside" between 1969-71 along with other intellectuals to learn from the masses, as we have already seen in the case of Zhou Yiliang. The ideological message to intellectuals was quite clear: class struggle against the dangers of the "embourgeoisment" of a new educated, technocratic elite must continue in the period of transition from socialism to communism; indeed, the success of the one depended on the success of the other.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and intensified clashes along
the Sino-Soviet border, China ended the near total diplomatic isolation characteristic of the Cultural Revolution. On the one hand, the new "united front" in foreign policy was zealously anti-Soviet (the Soviet Union was now not only "revisionist" but also "social imperialist") and the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" was vigorously attacked. On the other hand, uniting with other Soviet critics, most notably Yugoslavia which played a major role in the non-aligned movement, called for some interesting and contradictory about-face maneuvers. In the twelve years prior to 1970, Yugoslavia had been the target of some of China's harshest criticism, especially when it was used as a foil to attack the Soviet Union. By 1970, the "revisionist" label was dropped, diplomatic relations were upgraded to the level of ambassador, and the Foreign Minister of the government that was referred to only a year before as the "Tito renegade clique" was planning a visit to Beijing. (Martin, 1983:18-21) The contradictions inherent in a united front based on an anti-Soviet policy also paved the way for normalization of relations with China's former archenemy, the United States. "Uniting with all those who can be united with to isolate the main enemy" had concessionist aspects which ran counter to the political dictums of the Cultural Revolution and had repercussions internally in the Lin Biao "affair" (Chen, 1979:33) and by polarizing the "radical" and "pragmatic" factions within the Party and government after 1972-1973.
The thaw in bilateral relations was reflected in the translation and publication of brief national histories. This series first appeared in the early 1960s and had reached 65 titles before the Cultural Revolution. The number of these short histories continued to grow in the early 1970s especially after China's admission to the United Nations in 1972. Translation work of this sort seems to have occupied the talents of many world history scholars during part of their stay in the countryside. That same year, publication resumed on the Soviet Academy of Sciences world history series.

The revival of interest in world affairs also brought a renewed call from the party to study world history. In the first of several articles in the Party's main theoretical journal, Hong Qi, writer Shi Jun (literally "history army," apparently a pen name) stressed the need to study world history in order to grasp the objective laws of social development, learn from the struggles of other people, improve understanding of Marxist theory, and, above all, to grasp class struggle as the key link. (Shi, 1972a:4-14) The second article focused on the three stages of the modern era: "free" capitalism, monopoly capitalism (imperialism), and the birth and victory of socialism. While not totally dismissing the distant past, "in studying world history," Shi Jun writes, "we should lay emphasis on modern and contemporary history." (Shi, 1972b: 15)
Shi Jun's characterization of the present world situation as one dominated by two superpowers, whose collusion and contention maintain them in their position, prefigured Mao's last major theoretical statement, the "three worlds theory." This theory of first world superpowers, second world developed states, and third world developing nations, placed China as a leading nation among the struggling third world countries by virtue of its successful revolution against imperialism and its opposition to socialist imperialism (hegemonism).

The third article deals exclusively with the main obstacle to the success of socialist revolution in the contemporary period, i.e., imperialism. The summary review of the growth of imperialism given in this article ends with the by then familiar assessment of the CPSU as opportunist and revisionist. "While paying lip service to socialism...it in fact pursues the imperialist policy of expansion and plunder and tries to carve out spheres of influence by every means. The Soviet revisionists are social imperialists, pure and simple." (Shi, 1973a:15) The views contained in these articles were obviously intended for a larger audience than Hong Qi readers as evident from their publication in booklet form by the Central government that was reprinted by seventeen provincial presses over the next year. It was also translated in the major foreign languages journal Beijing Review.
Shi Jun's message was apparently taken to heart. Four of the five world history books published in the first half of the 1970s dealt with the modern period and clearly reflected the emphasis on class struggle, the dangers of class restoration and the evils of imperialism. A revised second edition of Zhou Yiliang's three volume set also appeared in 1972. Several pamphlet size history series dealing with a wide variety of topics and time periods began publication at this time. The readings in historical knowledge series (Lishi Zhishi Duwu) and the mini-history study series (Xue Dian Lishi) were nearly all devoted to non-Chinese history and reflect the new interest in non-European history as well. (QGZSM, 1972:315-319; 1973:169-279)

By the early 1970s most writers used a Marxist analysis in their work and no longer apologized for insufficient theoretical training. The restoration theme, because it could be applied universally, allowed relevant lessons from the non-Chinese past to illuminate the Chinese present and in this way establish a new unity between the Chinese and non-Chinese past.

The change of leadership and direction in China following the deaths of three major revolutionary figures and the arrest of the "gang of four" in 1976 had a definite effect

---

18 The revisions to the modern section of this series were minor, however, and furthermore did not reflect the themes stressed in Shi Jun's articles.
19 Some of the numbers in these series were reprints of works done in the early 1960s. Publication of these series continued through the 1970s.
on the writing and research of world history. The most obvious first effect was the de-emphasizing of class struggle and the stressing of great harmony to achieve the four modernizations. The "opening up" of China under the more liberal policies of Deng Xiaoping was accompanied by the creation of the World History Institute in the newly organized Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1979. This institute conducts research projects, trains graduate students, and publishes a translation series (mostly of primary source materials), as well as a bi-monthly journal *Shijie Lishi*. This new journal did its part to criticize the errors of the "gang of four" with regard to world history. The strongest attack came in the spring of 1979 in the form of a book review of the "ultra left" inspired *History of Social Development* (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Zhengjiao Xi, 1974). The book is cited for errors in class analysis, for factual errors, and for serious omissions. (Hu, 1979:80-84) While critical of the "gang of four" for molding world history to their own political ends, the same journal did not hesitate to call for placing world history at the service of the "four modernizations." On the one hand, author Chen Zhihua stressed the need for "liberation of thinking." On the other hand, he made it clear that political considerations could not be separated from the learning process, especially with regard to current events and propaganda.

20 The title, *Renmin Shehui Fazhan* is translated in the journal as *History of Mankind*. The translation given above, however, seems more accurate.
Although politics, in one sense of the word, has been replaced by economics in commanding both domestic and foreign policy, the new policies have political rationales which must be adhered to by active scholars.

The shift in emphasis soon became evident in the new journal's content. Since 1980, there have been numerous articles reassessing the question of the motive force of history and challenging the "voluntaristic" element of Maoist thinking by looking more closely at the "deterministic" side of Marxism. More attention is now given to modes of production and less to relations to production. 21

Survey world history textbooks revised since 1979 also show a similar shift in emphasis. In some cases, however, only the most radical rhetoric has been eliminated and new summaries added to draw attention to the significance of economic changes. 22 The new world history currently being compiled by groups of nationally known scholars may give an indication as to whether new directions are also taking place structurally. Dependence on Soviet materials is still common but this is changing as scholarly exchange between China and other nations strengthens. 23 The weight of China's

21 See for example Luo Rongqu's article on the internal relations between the motive force and ultimate cause in historical development (Luo, 1980) or Pang Zhuoheng's translated article on the significance of the Marxist position on the motive force of history with regard to China today (Pang, 1980).

22 For a good example of these cosmetic changes compare the 1979 revisions to the Shanghai Shifan Daxue textbook to the 1973 original.
own history has also proven difficult to overcome, resulting in the unsatisfactory exclusion of China from world history materials.

Although mass political campaigns are shunned by the current leaders, the need for scholars to support the new political line has not changed. A genuine effort to "seek truth from facts" is apparently taking place, but because of its propaganda and indoctrination value, world history, especially the history of the PRC, remains under close government and Party control. In these two respects, the liberal atmosphere in post-Mao China is little different from that which J. Keep describes in the post-Stalin era in the USSR: "Modern studies receive greater priority than ever before. ...(But) as a general proposition it may be said that ...the more likely a subject is to affect the party's power and prestige, the less scope exist for a historian to make original judgements." (Keep, 1964:11-12)

With this caution in mind, the three case studies that follow on the English Bourgeois Revolution, the Paris Commune, and the Third World do not attempt to evaluate the correctness or inaccuracy of Chinese scholarship. Their purpose is to demonstrate the impact of the political, economic, and intellectual context set forth in this chapter on

---

23 A recent result of the availability of American and West European sources is the reassessment of World War II which plays down the role of the Red Army in the defeat of Germany under Hitler.
the treatment and interpretation of these cases by drawing upon and expanding themes already introduced, i.e., Eurocentrism, and class restoration, to reveal in part the content and process of a Sino-Marxist World view.
Chapter Three
The English Bourgeois Revolution
and Modern World History

The position of the 17th century English Revolution in the scope of world history may at first glance seem a trivial issue. But, as P. Laslett framed the problem in his latest edition of The World We Have Lost, "As the twentieth century wears on towards its end, the issue becomes more, not less important, and that to an ever increasing number of people throughout the world." (Laslett, 1984:184-85) One reason for the increased attention given to the English Bourgeoisie Revolution, says Laslett, is a "persistent preoccupation of historians (with revolutions) and from their responsibilities to the political beliefs and to the social controversies of their own day." (Laslett, 1984:184) He further notes that in the post World War II era many socialist regimes have been established and that a "revolutionist ideology predominates in so large a part of the globe, and every nation, to be a nation has to have its revolution, it is a necessity, an urgent necessity to decide whether the first revolution of them all did take place in our country in the seventeenth century." (Laslett, 1984:185)

Laslett's decision against the notion that a social (or even a political) revolution took place in 17th century England is well known. So is the work of C. Hill in support of
the interpretation that the 17th century English revolution was the first national revolution. For a new regime, such as the CCP, flush with revolutionary success in the post-World War II period, the revolutionary interpretation of one social class replacing another in the position of political supremacy had much appeal.

This chapter will examine how Chinese historians since 1949, involved in their own "social controversies", as Laslett called them, have treated the English Bourgeois Revolution. The main issues dealt with here include the adoption of the English Bourgeois Revolution as the start of the modern era and as the model for those that followed; the stress on the role the people (especially the peasants) played in bringing the bourgeoisie to power; the English Bourgeois Revolution as a continuing revolution and as an historical example of the threat of class restoration; and finally, as the product of economic and legal growth.

Because one or more of these issues were stressed at different times does not mean that the other aspects disappeared entirely from the interpretive narrative of textbooks or from the pages of academic journals. Therefore, the time frame used here (and in the other two case studies) cannot be strictly chronological. It does, however, seek to show process in the way the interpretive emphasis shifted under the influence of political and social changes in the PRC. Therefore, an attempt to deal with themes in turn generally creates a chronological approach.
Since the middle of the 1950s, Chinese historians of world history have interpreted the 17th century upheaval in England as the first major successful victory of bourgeois revolution and as such, the start of the modern period of world history. In the first five years of CCP rule, however, there was no consensus on either the meaning of 17th century English events or in using it to designate the modern era. This seems to have been the case with Chinese historians and their Soviet mentors.

Among Chinese historians, both Marxist and non-Marxist, of the early 1950s there was no agreement on the dividing line between medieval and modern in world history. Even historians whose special focus was European history were not inclined in the early years of CCP rule to view the English Bourgeois Revolution as the division. For example, Marxist historian Lin Judai whose works on Western European history were well known prior to 1949 failed to credit the 17th century English revolution with founding the modern period of world history. The revised edition of his 1949 Xiyang Jindai Shi Geng (Outline of Modern Foreign History) was published by the Ministry of Education for use as an upper middle school textbook under the title Waiguo Jindai Shi Geng (Outline of Modern Foreign History). The Ministry's foreword to the text made it a point to emphasize the three divisions within modern world history as follows:

The first period began with the late 18th century French bourgeois revolution and goes down to the early part of the seventh decade of the 19th
century to the eve of the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune. The second period begins with the Paris Commune of 1871 and goes to the early 20th century when capitalism enters its last stage—imperialism. The victory of the great October Revolution in 1917 began a new era for all human history; from this time on we enter the third period of modern history. (Lin, 1951:1)

That the English Bourgeois Revolution was not yet seen in the early 1950s as the start of the modern era is also evident from Cao Bohan's 1950 Shijie Lishi (World History) which states that "the new geographical discoveries (late 15th early 16th centuries) was the beginning of modern world history." (Cao, 1950:35) Clearly, the 17th century revolution had not yet been elevated to the pivotal position it would acquire by the middle of the decade.

Accompanying this lack of agreement over the position of the English revolution in the periodization scheme there was also a variety of interpretations of that event. Zhou Gucheng's treatment, for example, put greater emphasis on the religious issues building up to the civil war. While acknowledging the economic and political causes of the revolution, he reduced both of these to forms of emerging opposition to "divine right" monarchy, "therefore, between 1642 and 1660 there was a revolution of the Puritans." (Zhou, 1958:628) Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the importance that peasants and city commoners, i.e., the people, would soon receive, the writers of world history in the early 1950s described the mid-17th century English conflict in terms of kings, nobility, merchants, and landlords.
Neither was there any effort made to establish the English Bourgeois Revolution as the start of a broader revolutionary trend in modern history, nor claims made that the revolutionary victory of the CCP was the most recent evidence of such a trend.

Post-Liberation leaders, however, were eager to confirm that China's revolution was an integral part of world revolution. Proof, as Wang Gungwu noted, "was in the close alliance with Soviet Russia and other socialist countries...." (Wang, 1975:3) But this alliance emphasized the present and left little time for the past. The past, both Chinese and non-Chinese, still had not been dealt with in regard to Marxist stages of social change. No agreement had yet been reached on the main factors which created each new stage of history or the timing of new stages in various parts of the world.¹

The lack of a coherent view on both periodization and interpretation was central to the criticism raised by He Ju in his 1953 article in the GMRB recommending the launching of research in world history. Typical of writings in the post-Liberation years, He Ju begins with a critique of the study of world history in "old" China. He pointed out the deficiencies in serious research, the limited quantity and questionable quality of materials, and the shortage of

¹ The latter is still an unsettled issue. As a result, China, itself, remains barely integrated into modern world history even today. This problem is considered in greater depth in Chapter Five.
people trained to use foreign sources. "Four years after liberation," He continues, "this situation still exists." In his assessment, the reason for this persisting problem was a lack of official policy measures which make historians "hesitate to move forward." As to why the necessity for such study, He Ju rationalizes as follows,

The history of a single country does not develop in isolation, therefore, there must be a study of world history. Moreover, in order to understand the development of human history and particularly in order to understand the development of political revolutionary forces in the modern period, there must be a study of world history. (He, 1953:5)

He's suggested solution to these persistent problems was to train more historians in the field and to promote translation of source materials, especially recent Soviet works.

In the early 1950s, however, there was no unanimous opinion among Soviet historians regarding the English Bourgeois Revolution as the start of the modern world history. The Soviet Academy of Sciences' Course in Modern History, translated into Chinese in 1950, for example, considered the French Revolution as the start of the modern era. The works of Efimov, on the other hand, took the view that the English Revolution started the new period, as did most of the current Soviet materials being translated in the early 1950s. Because the first Chinese Marxist texts written in the early 1950s were modeled on Soviet texts such as Efimov's, they adopted the English Bourgeois Revolution as the demarcation of modern history.
The Chinese choice of the English Bourgeois Revolution as the starting point of modern history depended on more than the fortunate adoption of one Soviet scholar's work over another's. As He Ju stressed in the article cited above, world history should be studied with the aim to "understand the development of proletarian revolutionary forces in the modern period." In China's recent revolutionary history, these forces were represented by the peasants and the workers, i.e., "the masses of the people" (under the leadership of the CCP, of course). A look at the content of the textbooks and teaching materials published since the mid-1950s reveals this emphasis on the role of the masses in bringing the bourgeoisie to power in mid-17th century England.

Letting the non-Chinese past serve the Chinese present in the 1950s meant linking China's revolution to a long established chain of modern revolutions. In this process, the role of the people, and especially the peasants, became an important issue. With regard to Chinese history, Mao's pre-Liberation pronouncements that, "peasant uprisings and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese society", predominated in the writing of Chinese history in the first decade of Communist rule. (Mao, 1967b:308) The weighty role given to Chinese peasants in eroding away feudal society is not without its dialectical problems.  

---

2 See (Feuerwerker, 1968:16-17)
Compared to the predominant position the peasants played in reinterpreting China's past, the emphasis it receives in the interpretation of the English Bourgeois Revolution may seem more balanced. When compared to most Western and even earlier Chinese accounts, however, the peasants' role looms much larger. It is interesting to note that only one Chinese scholar interviewed acknowledged the spill-over from Chinese history to world history on the question of the peasants. The others denied any attempt to emphasize the peasants' role in the English Bourgeois Revolution. A sample of world history textbook materials for middle schools since the mid-1950s supports the minority view. The peasants' role in the development of modern revolution as it began during mid-17th century in England receives as much stress as does the struggle between the monarchy and old aristocracy on the one hand and the combined "bourgeois" interest of the new aristocracy and capitalist elements on the other.

In the lower middle school textbook by Wang Zhijiu, for example, most of the section on the English Bourgeois Revolution deals with the role of the peasants. Peasants

---

3 This sample includes the major lower and upper middle school textbooks by Wang Zhijiu, Li Chunwu, and Yang Shengmao as well as reference materials for teachers of modern and contemporary world history and teaching methods texts. Related materials from the two journals dealing with pedagogical issues in the history field, Lishi Jiaoxue and Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti are also used. It is important to keep in mind that at this time no sanctioned Chinese works were yet completed for the post-secondary level.
are portrayed as brutishly oppressed by the old feudal system in the form of taxes, levies, and services and exploited by the new aristocracy of landed wealth which had emerged as a result of the enclosure movements. Uprisings of peasant and bourgeois elements in Scotland precipitated the crisis; peasant and worker support of Parliament was the key to the bourgeoisie's success but its fear of the revolution getting out of hand resulted in ruthless suppression of the peasants by the new ruling class. As Wang sums up, "the bourgeoisie and landlords enjoyed their complete revolutionary outcome paid for by the blood of the English people. The feudal system was smashed but the feudal oppression of the people was only replaced by the oppression of the bourgeoisie." (Wang, 1956:45) More or less as an afterthought, Wang adds that the English Bourgeois Revolution marked the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the first national victory of capitalism.

The upper middle school text gave equal space and more detail to political struggle between Parliament and the monarchy. Depth is added to the role of the peasants by bringing in the uprisings in Ireland and the "diggers" movement to reclaim wastelands for use by poor peasants. The threat of the peasants to the new regime is said to have led Cromwell to drastic suppressive measures. Although succession squabbles emerged among the top military leaders after Cromwell's death, it was the inability to suppress the new
upsurge of peasant unrest that resulted in the decision to restore the monarchy. In a sense, this interpretation credits the peasants not only with the responsibility of bringing down the king in the first place but also for restoring the monarchy to power. (Li and Yang, 1957:6-7, pt. 1)

If the textbooks did not lead teachers and students along the proper path of interpretation the teacher's reference and methods books were very clear. In the teaching methods book for upper middle school world history courses, teachers are repeatedly instructed to stress the positive role of the masses in the English Bourgeois Revolution. Under the section on the main purpose of the classroom session dealing with the English Bourgeois Revolution, teachers are urged to,

recount the whole course and the result of the English Bourgeois Revolution so that the students recognize the positive role of the masses. After the bourgeoisie seized power with the support of the people, it ruthlessly suppressed them. The English Bourgeois Revolution did accelerate the growth of capitalism, promote revolution in other countries, and advance theory, ... (but) the focal point of this class period is to explain the role of the masses, the progressive nature of the English Bourgeois Revolution, and its limitations. (Sao, 1956:21)

Teachers could also rely on reference books edited by the textbook writers to outline their main lecture points:

When lecturing on this chapter, begin by giving a brief explanation of the 17th century English Bourgeois Revolution as the start of modern history, henceforth, the rise of capitalism in the world; modern world history is the history of the growth and decline of capitalism. This enables the students to recognize the basic characteristics of modern history. When lecturing on the
civil war, you must emphasise the function of the masses; due to the actions of the people, foremost, the positive contribution to the war effort by the private small farmers, the royalists were defeated. Only thus was revolutionary victory possible; only the masses are the true promoters of the historical process. After stating the significance of the English Bourgeois Revolution for smashing the feudal system and stimulating the growth of the productive forces, the final point to be stressed...is that only the socialist revolution can liberate mankind from oppression. (Shou and Yao, 1958:57-58)

A self study book in world history from the late 1950s further reduced the essence of the English Bourgeois Revolution. Revolution itself is called the locomotive of history and the peasants' movement just prior to the civil war is credited with "forming the social basis for the English revolution." (Ye, 1956:60) Oblivious to the inherent contradictions for their own revolutionary experience, this work goes on to argue that as capitalism replaced feudalism so capitalism would be replaced by socialism, "determined by the objective economic law that productive relations must be suited to the nature of the productive forces." (Ye, 1956:61)

The civics lesson from this interpretation of the English Bourgeois Revolution in the school textbook materials of this period reflects the view that modern history is the history of revolutionary movements of the people, especially the peasants. Their role was seen as essential to victory from the first successful national bourgeois revolution down to the victory of socialism over capitalism. To make this
lesson clearly relevant to the contemporary Chinese situation, the last chapters in the textbooks are devoted to the founding of the peoples' democracies in Eastern Europe and Asia and the people's liberation struggles in the post-World War II period. The "great victory of the Chinese people" is treated in some detail up through the 1st Five-year Plan (1952-57) and the Chinese socialist revolution is ranked second only to the October Revolution in Russia in importance in contemporary world history.

The emphasis on the revolutionary role of the peasants in the English Bourgeois Revolution could also serve to underwrite the policies of the transition to socialism then going on in the Chinese countryside. From land reform to agricultural producers' cooperatives, there were repeated calls for the peasants to reorganize and socialize China's agriculture. The scale of involvement in the collectivization of Chinese agriculture most probably involved directly more people than the revolutionary victory itself. "The point is," said Mao in his preface to the study report, Socialist Upsurge in the Chinese Countryside, "that China underwent a fundamental change in the second half of 1955. Of China's 110 million peasant households, more than 70 million (over 60%) have up to now joined semi-socialist agricultural producers' cooperatives in response to the call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party." (Mao, 1978:2) Although Mao's views on the importance of the masses and the
need to stress relations to production over productive forces did not go unchallenged in the late 1950s, the emphasis remained clear with regard to history lessons. Writing at the height of the great leap forward in the summer of 1958, an article by Liu Wenying clearly states the basic thread to be followed in dealing with the peasants in the bourgeois revolution.

In the teaching of the history of the English and French revolutions we must clarify the great role of the masses; we must also bring to light the dual nature of the bourgeois revolutionaries. We must discuss comparatively the role and position of the masses in the periods of the bourgeois and proletarian revolution. In this, we of course must appropriately link (relate) the broad masses of Chinese working people to the question of their unprecedented positive and creative nature in the period of the new democratic and socialist revolution. (Liu, 1958:27)

In addition to the possible uses for Chinese domestic policy in the transition period, this stress on the revolutionary role of the masses was also in keeping with the spirit of the interpretative trends in modern world history in the Soviet Union. The preference of Soviet materials that advanced the theory that the English revolution was the first national bourgeois revolution marking the beginning of modern history was formally sanctioned at the conference of socialist historians which met in Moscow in 1956.

By the turn of the decade, E.M. Zhukov, main editor of the ten-volume world history by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, summarized Soviet views on the periodization of modern world history to the 11th International Congress of
Historical Science in Stockholm. In his report to the Congress, Zhukov stated that, "the most important landmarks of each country are the main social movements, which reflect the activity of the people, the makers of history." (Zhukov, 1960: 220) He goes on to specify that the most important landmarks in world history are "the events which testify to mankind's advance from the relatively low to higher forms of social organization." (Zhukov, 1960:220)

While China's interpretative views on world history were not at great variance with those of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, China's development strategy was. The policies of the great leap forward, especially the rapid creation of the People's Communes, came under criticism from both the Soviet leadership and more cautious planners at home.

With compromises on major issues, the 8th CCP congress meeting in September of 1956 appeared to be a unity congress. The downplaying of personality cults after the 20th CPSU congress and Mao's announcement of his desire to withdraw to the "second ranks," were also elements in a compromising atmosphere. 4

The resolution of the 8th CCP Congress, presented by Liu Shaoqi, agreed with Mao's assessment that a basic transformation had occurred in the Chinese countryside. It went on

4 On the one hand, the opponents of the higher agricultural producers cooperatives admitted their error in negatively evaluating these more advanced collective structures. On the other hand, Mao's Twelve Year Plan for Agriculture was shelved. For a further discussion of the compromises of the 8th CCP Congress, see (MacFarquhar, 1974:9-20)
to state that the major contradiction now was "between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces." This put the emphasis on building up the productive forces. Mao soon took exception to this account of what constituted the basic contradictions even after the near completion of the transformation to socialist ownership.

Five months later in his address to the Supreme State Conference "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" Mao stressed that "in Socialist society, the basic contradictions are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces and between superstructure and economic base." (Mao, 1977:393) A year after the 8th Congress, in October of 1957, Mao restated and distilled these contradictions further. "Now it is clear cut: in proceeding through the transition era from capitalism to socialism, the main (or fundamental) contradiction is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism." (Mao, 1974, pt. 1:75)

Opposing views on approaches to economic development that surfaced among the top CCP leadership before the launching of the great leap forward in 1958 became central to Mao's post-leap critique of the Soviet Union's model of reliance on the productive forces. In spite of the failure of the great leap forward, Mao remained convinced that resolving the contradictions in the productive relations and between base and superstructure were primary to China's socialist
development. He still felt that correcting the productive relations would unleash the pent-up power of the productive forces allowing rapid economic growth. The opposing view, later known as the theory of the productive forces, held that changes in the productive relations depended on the development of the productive forces. This view is obviously more gradualist than Mao's.

In the early 1960s China was salvaging its economy from the disastrous attempts to simultaneously revolutionize both the productive forces (especially rural light and heavy industry) and the productive relations (communization). Furthermore, Sino-Soviet relations had hit a similar snag in the assessment of the world revolutionary movement over the issue of peaceful evolution to socialism vs. revolutionary overthrow of the old order.5

Mao's withdrawal to the second line in the post-leap recovery period was in part devoted to a closer study of the question of political economy. His "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's 'Political Economics'" drew attention to the error of emphasizing the productive forces. Mao disagreed with the Soviet work's assessment that China's victory in the reform of economic ownership prior to the achievement of industrialization was particular to China's case. Mao pointed out that Eastern Europe had also won the socialist victory prior to industrialization and recalled that in the

5 As will be seen in Chapter Four, the experience of the Paris Commune's seizure of power also became an issue in Sino-Soviet relations at this time.
transition to socialism in the Soviet Union the question of ownership was resolved before the push for industrialization. (Mao, 1974, pt. 2: 269) Seeking to put the question into a larger historical framework, Mao turns to another revolutionary period.

From the point of view of world history, the bourgeoisie launched their revolution and founded their own countries not after the industrial revolution, but before it. They also brought about a change in the superstructure and acquired the state apparatus first and then conducted propaganda, gained strength and pressed vigorously for a change in the productive relationships. The organization of productive relationship and its smooth operation paved the way for the development of productive forces. In England it was after the bourgeois revolution (post-17th century) that the industrial revolution... got under way. (Mao, 1974, pt. 2: 269)

These arguments were aimed at countering the Soviet emphasis on heavy industry as well as constituting a critique of domestic policy during the recovery period from the great leap forward. When the same logic of struggle between classes and social relations to production was applied to the international situation it raised several issues which became central to the Chinese charges of new "revisionism" by the Soviet Union. It also led to the articulation of the perceived threat of class restoration. Mao's speech to the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, cited at length in Chapter Two, made clear his assessment of historical precedent for the old ruling class seeking to regain power. After reconfirming that classes and class struggle still exist in socialist society, he focuses on the
possibility for capitalist restoration occurring after the socialist revolution.

Mao's renewed call for class struggle in the face of the threat of capitalist restoration spoke directly to his assessment of the Soviet Union as a modern revisionist state. The restoration theme, begun in the early 1960s, also became an important issue in domestic politics for the next fifteen years and formed the ideological rationale for the necessity for "continuing the revolution." Three months after Mao's September speech the Party's theoretical journal, Hong Qi, carried a long article by Wu Jianmin on the feudal restoration during the English Bourgeois Revolution. Wu's article came a month after another important piece done by Shi Dongxiang on the law of class struggle and had a companion piece in the same issue on Lenin's ideas on class struggle during the transition period. Wu's article, even without these others to set the context, clearly states the main issue in its opening paragraph:

Revolution is the violent action of a newly emerging class overthrowing the decadent class. For the ruled class to crush thoroughly the ruling class definitely is not something accomplished in a day. A reactionary ruling class will not voluntarily retreat from the stage of history, it will not accept defeat and will do everything possible to fight and resist to the death. Even after they have been overthrown, they will try to restore themselves and regain the position they had lost. Therefore, for the newly emerging class to thoroughly defeat the decadent class and establish its own rule it must go through repeated, complex, and protracted struggle. (Wu, 1962:15)
Wu's article chronicles not only the restoration of the feudal monarchy during the English Bourgeois Revolution but also brings out the tenacity of those deposed by narrating the attempts of the old ruling family to regain power down to the early 19th century! (Wu, 1962:17-18) The following month an article in Zhongguo Qingnian by Wu Yuzhang universalized the restoration notion when he stated that "no revolution in history has been free from relapses. Bourgeois revolutions are not free from them, neither are socialist revolutions." (Wu, 1963:5) This last comment was obviously directed at the Soviet Union.

The restoration theme stressed in these writings supported Mao's views which were firmly rooted in the Marxist classics. The restoration theme, however, seems to have attracted little attention from among historians of Chinese history in the early 1960s, although many of them were soon drawn into the debates on class viewpoint vs. historicism.

Wu Jiemin's article did get some response from those in European history. From 1963 through the summer of 1965 several articles appeared in the CMRE and in university journals documenting the back-sliding history of bourgeois

---

6 Esherick's article "On the Restoration of Capitalism in Mao and Marxist Theory" traces the origins of the restoration theme in Marxist literature and its emergence, in slightly altered form, in the Thought of Mao Zedong. (Esherick, 1979:41-77)

7 Cf (Dirlik, 1977) and (Goldman, 1972)
revolutions in Europe. One such article by Pan Runhan on 25 September 1963 dealing with the problem of restoration in the French Revolution opens with a quote from Lenin to the effect that, "history has never had a revolution which once victory was achieved all was well or where you could sit back and relax." (Pan, 1963:4) The remainder of the article's narration of the Bourbon restoration was perhaps deliberately timed to offer comparative lessons with the next day's lead article on "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Nation?", a joint polemical editorial of RMRB and Hong Qi.

Textbook production during the early 1960s seems to have lagged behind. In fact, textbook materials for the whole decade of the 1960s are meager. According to information in the two bibliographies used in this study (QGXSM) and (QGZSM) there were no new major middle school textbooks published or even old ones reprinted after early 1963 until the early 1970s. Course outlines and teachers' reference materials continued to appear until the start of the Cultural Revolution. The shortage of textbooks notwithstanding, J. Unger's work on Chinese education points out clearly that the civics lesson of the threat of class restoration was indeed a part of classroom instruction. "Especially after 1962," says Unger, "when the split with Russia introduced the concept of "revisionism" into the political vocabulary

---

8 Some of these articles deal with aspects of the French Revolution (Liu, 1965:4), (Zhao, 1964:4). Some are on reactionary views in general (Chen, 1963:4) and one specifically on the English Bourgeois Revolution (Qi, 1963:4).
of secondary schools, stress was placed on the question of whether the new generation would, in fact, be worthy successors to the historic revolutionary tradition." (Unger, 1982: 158, 278 n. 40)

The shift in emphasis also left behind the 1962 Shijie Tong Shi, the major work in the world history of the 1960s. This volume, under the general editorship of Zhou Yiliang, gives greater detail to the events of the English Bourgeois Revolution, including the Stuart restoration. But no special attention is given to this restoration; neither are there generalized lessons drawn for understanding the course of revolutions, be they bourgeois or socialist. The final revisions for the modern part of this series were done by well known scholars in European history with experience in textbook writing, namely, Yang Renpian, Jiang Mengyin, and Lin Judai.9

This series came out soon after Mao's 10th Plenary Session speech raised the threat of class restoration and the necessity for class struggle. The volume's interpretation of the English Bourgeois Revolution (and other revolutions), however, does not reflect the emphasis on the restoration theme. The new volume gave greater detail to the peoples participation in the events of the English Revolution, especially the "diggers" and the "levellers" movements as well.

9 It should be recalled that Yang and Jiang were prominent in the aborted 1956 world history textbook project. Although Yang was criticized for bourgeois ideas in the Anti-rightists campaign of 1957 he was still allowed a role in the 1962 series.
as a deeper analysis of the political parties vying for control in the period of the commonwealth. Proportionally, greater detail is also given to the period of the Stuart restoration under Charles II. Much like earlier works on the English Bourgeois Revolution this one also states that after Cromwell's death, the pressure of the people's movement led to the restoration.

This period also saw an upsurge in the situation of the people's movement. In the west, anti-enclosure peasant riots broke out on a massive scale. Soldiers' agitation appeared in the army stationed in London. Independents, republicans, and Levellers radical elements held a meeting to ferment rebellion. As a new domestic war became imminent, the capitalist class and the new aristocracy did their utmost to set up a powerful political rule so they could stop the development of the people's movement. Since they had doubts and fears about the military-controlled rule, they hoped to restore the old dynasty which had been overthrown. (Zhou, 1972:38)

In this passage, the restoration is the work of an element of the revolutionary bourgeoisie under pressure from the masses. No mention is made of the old ruling class sneaking back into power or of restoration as an integral part of the anatomy of all revolutions as became common in the textbooks of the early 1970s. In the closing section on the meaning of the English Bourgeois Revolution, brief mention is made of the compromising and conservative nature of the revolution that made it impossible for it to thoroughly destroy feudal power. (Zhou, 1972:44)

The restoration theme played a significant role in the domestic and foreign rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution.
No better example comes to mind than the core assessment made in the self-criticism of Deng Xiaoping in 1966. "The present revolutionary movement is aimed at preventing the restoration of capitalism and the emergence of revisionism in China; this is a proletarian initiative in the global revolutionary movement." (Deng, 1966:60)

By the early 1970s when "trial use" world history textbooks were again being published, the restoration theme had also penetrated into the interpretative debates on Chinese history. This was especially so after the launching of the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius. In his contemporary assessment of what later became known as the "gang of four" years, Wang Gungwu concluded that by early 1974 previously accepted views of the Chinese past had been transformed through the application of "a more integrated Sino-Marxist interpretation of world history." (Wang, 1975:22)

While Wang avoids saying precisely what this Sino-Marxist interpretation of history is, he does see it emerging from a higher level of Marxist theory demanded from historians in the wake of the Cultural Revolution and the penetration of the restoration theme over the years 1962-72. "Certainly," says Wang, "the assertion of the 'restoration' theme distinguishes this view of the past from Soviet, 'Western', and traditional historiography." (Wang, 1975:23) This theme had obvious universal application and provided direct relevance
between the study of world history and a deeper understanding of the Chinese revolution.

Before new textbook materials began to appear in 1973-74, the most widely reprinted work concerning world history was the collection of articles by Shi Jun mentioned in Chapter Two. These articles touch on many of the important features of China's assessment of the world revolutionary movement at that time and incorporate much of the class struggle ideology of the Cultural Revolution. Special attention is given to the role of imperialism in world history and the growth of liberation struggles among Third World nations. This aspect of these articles will be returned to in the chapter on the Third World. Important to note here, however, is the stress put on linking China's past and present with world history and the inevitable victory of revolution over counterrevolution.

The study of world history will enable us, by acquiring a knowledge of the entire process of world history and drawing on historical experiences, to better understand the special features of the present world situation. World history will tell us that to overthrow the old system and establish a new one is a great revolution. This has been the case in every great turning point in human history. (Shi, 1972a:5)

Shi Jun applies the logic of his reasoning to the collapse of the Western slave system and the bourgeois world revolution that swept both Europe and America. The latter was characterized by frequent civil and international wars, attempted restorations and opposition to them, resulting in
monarchies and republics. The struggle of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples since the birth of Marxism has "rocked the whole world," says Shi Jun. Furthermore, such upheaval is as normal as that of the past and "reflects the life and death struggle between contemporary revolutionary forces and counterrevolutionary forces -- an 'upheaval' by which the imperialist-ruled old world is headed for collapse and a socialist new world is advancing toward victory." (Shi, 1972a:6) Thus, while the threat of restoration exists the eventual victory of revolutionary forces is also a major lesson of world history.

The new materials of the 1970s carried an added prologue to the English Bourgeois Revolution in the form of the negative example of the late 16th century bourgeois revolution in the Netherlands. In the 1973 Shanghai Shifan Daxue text, the revolution in the Netherlands, which also overthrew Spanish domination through the leadership of the Calvinists, "was not a thorough-going revolution because it failed to thoroughly carry out the internal anti-feudal struggle." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, pt.1:24) The text goes on to stress that "the bourgeois revolution of the Netherlands was just a practice for the English Bourgeois Revolution." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973, pt.1:25) The chapter on the English Bourgeois Revolution is credited to Lin Judai, whose earlier work we have already seen.10 It will

10 This two-volume Shijie Jindai Shi was originally written in 1971 as teaching material for students in the Huadong Shifan Daxue history department and was formally
be recalled that Lin's textbook of the early 1950s did not view the English Bourgeois Revolution as the start of modern world history. As revision editor to the 1962 series of Zhou Yiliang, Lin had a hand in the more detailed version of the English Bourgeois Revolution including the section on the Stuart restoration mentioned above. The 1973 text, however, was clearly influenced by the predominance of the restoration theme in the intervening years. Although the role of the people's movement receives as much attention as before, the episodes of the revolution are now marked by two civil wars and the final settlement of 1688 is viewed as less thorough-going than previously perceived and resulted in a conservative compromise. The closing lines of the chapter reveal the stress on the idea of the continuing revolution and the threat of class restoration in the early 1970s interpretation. "The course of the English Bourgeois Revolution indicates that the revolutionary road is invariably a winding one, even though the revolution was such that one exploiting class replaced another. The English Bourgeois Revolution from 1640 to the coup d'état of 1688 pass through repeated and tortuous struggles for nearly half a

published under the auspices of the Shanghai Shifan Daxue Modern World History Writing Group. Lin Judai, along with Chen Chongyu and Ai Zhouchang are acknowledged as being the "responsible editors" for the first text in the revised single volume of the same book republished in 1982. Since the 1973 edition credits the Shanghai Shifan Daxue's history department with authorship, the bibliography cited here does also. Because the 1982 edition gives Lin Judai, et al., as the editors, this edition is cited under Lin's name.
century, only then could the newly emerging bourgeoisie stabilize its rule." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue, 1973, pt. 1:61)

The three-volume Jianming Shijie Shi (Brief World History) published the next year by the writing group from the Beijing University history department is the most academic in tone of the world history works published in the early 1970s. But the message was the same:

The period of history from the Stuart dynasty's restoration to the coup d'état of 1688, this period of history shows that the road of revolution is a tortuous one. Even though it was a revolution that resulted in the substitution of one exploiting class with another, it also had to go through several reversals. Overthrowing the reactionary classes does not mean that they will voluntarily retreat from the stage of history, they will always, by every means possible, plot to restore the "Paradise Lost." This is an objective law. (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974, pt. 2: 28)

The single-volume world history works published in the early 1970s were usually supplemental readings for both students and non-students. These works also illustrate the trend toward a de facto revision in the periodization of world history. The admonition of the Party for historians to "emphasize the present and de-emphasize the past" which began in the 1950s seems in part to have been taken to heart. For example, the Shijie Jian Shi (Condensed World

---

11 It should be noted that there had been a steady increase in the use of explanatory footnotes and a wider range of citation from Marxist literature and other sources in all the history books of the most recent decade.

12 The "Paradise Lost" is of course a reference to the work of John Milton, who is not dealt with in this 1974 history but is in the Zhou Yiliang series which was reprinted in 1972. For this analysis of Hobbes, Locke, and Milton see (Zhou, 1972, pt. 1: 42-44)
History) which covers primitive society to the end of World War II devotes only the first 100 pages to the entire period up to the English Bourgeois Revolution and the last 100 pages to the past 100 years! (Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974)

The result of this is to squeeze out the middle ages as such. Ancient history now came to be divided into early, middle, and late periods. The contemporary phase of the modern period (marked by the October Revolution and the end of World War II) has become more of a separate field of study and is less and less referred to as a subdivision of modern history. This new periodization of world history has the interesting effect of making world history more uniform with Chinese historical development by lumping all slave and feudal periods together under the rubric "ancient." Comparisons with the embarrassingly long "feudal" period of Chinese history are thus minimized. 13

Popular world history literature in the early to mid 1970s allowed reductionist history to reach a new height. The essay on the English Bourgeois Revolution in the short volume Shijie Jindai Shi Jianghua (Introduction to Modern World History) written by the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Writing Group attached to Beijing University's history department, for instance, summarizes the reactionary nature

13 This also allows for integrating the start of the modern periods of world history and Chinese history if and when the view that modern Chinese history began in the late Ming or early Qing dynasties is accepted. This theory of "capitalist sprouts" may be growing in popularity as indicated by its inclusion in the 1982 Chinese history middle school textbooks. (Wang, 1982:129-130)
of the revolutionary process. "Upheaval, setbacks, more upheaval and again setbacks until final destruction; this is the logic of the reactionary faction toward the people's affairs in the world and is also the pattern of class struggle." (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974: 18) In another condensed, more topically arranged book published in the youth self-study series by the Shanghai Shifan Daxue's Political Studies Department, the English Bourgeois Revolution is discussed sketchily and more comparatively with other European revolutions. (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974: 207-216) This book was supposedly strongly influenced by the "gang of four" and was heavily criticized in 1979 for its errors of fact, inconsistencies, and ahistorical interpretations which gave peasants in earlier periods greater revolutionary consciousness than they actually had. (Hu, 1979: 80-84) The youth self-study series also included a volume called Lectures in World History, written by the history department of Shanghai Shifan Daxue. This book, while not a narrative history, does retain a basic chronological approach to the arrangement of the lectures. As might be expected, a separate chapter or lecture is devoted to the Stuart restorations (one in 1650-51, the other in 1660). (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1975: 25)

It can be seen from these examples that the restoration theme as it emerged in world history works of the first half of the 1970s was clearly demonstrated in its application
to the English Revolution. The winding road of class struggle with setbacks and advances comes to be taken as an objective and universal law of history. What is less clear is the class analysis behind the application of the restoration idea. Exactly which group or class of people plotted, engineered, or gave in to compromises that resulted in the Stuart restoration? Opinions on this question seem divided three ways. From right to left on the political spectrum, the credit is given as follows: 1) the royalists party elements, the reactionary feudal ruling class restored the monarchy. (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974b:19), 2) the big bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy compromised and paved the way for the restoration of the top capitalist and an undifferentiated feudal aristocracy. (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973,pt.1:52) (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi,1974a:24) (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi , 1975:25), 3) the bourgeoisie, in general, and the new aristocracy. (Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi,1974:27) (Zhou, 1972:38). It is interesting to note that the last group credited with restoration of the monarchy was also the vanguard leadership of the bourgeois revolution. This inconsistent class analysis persists into the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 1976 the Chinese revolution itself may be said to have undergone one of those twists and turns inherent in all revolutions. The coup d'etat which removed the "gang of four" was assessed by some China scholars in the West as a victory for revisionism and a "Great Leap Backwards." (Bettelheim,
1978:37-130) Since that time, the Cultural Revolution has been officially condemned as a big mistake that cost China ten precious years of development. The rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and others previously banished from power as "capitalists roaders" has resulted in the steady decentralization of government and Party control over the economy and the promise to tolerate "two systems in one country" (capitalist and socialist) once Hong Kong is reunited with the motherland. In light of this new situation, the interpretation of the English Bourgeois Revolution and particularly the restoration aspect, has undergone a reevaluation.

The restoration theme as a part of the English Bourgeois Revolution begins to diminish in importance in the late 1970s and early 1980s. No longer do textbooks and reference materials devote a separate section to the restoration of the Stuart dynasty. For example, in the textbooks that underwent several revisions in trial versions between 1978 and 1982 only the 1660 restoration is mentioned and no separate subheading is used to set it off as earlier 1970s works had done. The earlier attempt to return to power by Charles I is mentioned but it is no longer described as a class restoration. (Renmin Jiaoyu, 1978:116-117) (Shou, 1982:148-149) The emphasis put on the threat of class restoration in revolutions in general or in the English Bourgeois Revolution in particular is drastically toned down in these new textbooks. The universal feature of class restoration is completely
ignored. Instead, the chapter on the English Bourgeois Revolution ends with the observation that "the rule of the English bourgeoisie passed through several reversals and only then was it able to establish itself. But the seemingly powerful feudal forces were incapable of resisting it. The English Bourgeoisie Revolution raised the curtain on the gigantic bourgeois revolutionary movement of Europe and North America. Because of this, its real significance in world history is that it marks the beginning of modern history." (Shou, 1982:149)

The writer and editor of this middle school text also published a college level text the same year. These two men, Shou Jiyu and Li Chunwu it will be recalled, were active writing textbooks and reference materials in the world history field back in the late 1950s. Their 1981 Jianming Shijie Shi (Brief World History), while giving a section to the 1660 restoration, does not stress the universal nature of restoration. Although the bourgeoisie and the new aristocracy are accused of trying to restore the monarchy in the last years of the Protectorate, main credit for "sweeping clear the path for the Stuart dynasty's restoration" is given to the royalist Scottish general, Monk. (Li and Shou, 1981:381)

Along with the more obvious elimination of the bold face quotes of Mao and Marx on the front pages, the 1982 revision of the 1973 Modern World History by Lin Judai also had a
general toning down of the rhetoric of class struggle. There is also a reassessment as to which group was the main force of the English Bourgeois Revolution. Most all of the text and materials had previously credited the masses (peasants, handicraft workers, urban poor, commoners in the army) with being the main force of the revolution. A comparison of the same sentences from the 1973 and 1982 text, however, reveals a change on this important issue.

The masses were the main forces of the revolutionary movement, theirs was the decisive role in the revolution but they received the chains of the new capitalist exploitive system. (Shanghai Shifan Daxue, 1973:61)
The landholding peasants were the main force of the revolutionary movement, but after the revolutionary victory they were eliminated by the rapid growth of capitalism. (Lin, 1982:62)

The later version, it may be argued, was only a more refined rendition of the earlier one with the "masses" more clearly specified. This may be true, but overall tone is certainly different. The "chains of capitalism" is certainly a more negatively emotive statement than that of the "growth capitalism." These lines close the 1982 edition while the 1973 version goes on to generalize the "repeated and tortuous struggles" common to all revolutions.

The changing attitude toward the masses and to what their role has been in historical change is currently undergoing some reevaluation. Reevaluation has taken the form of carefully argued articles on questions of what Marx and Engels viewed as the "motive forces" of historical development.
Luo Rongqu, in his article "On the Internal Relationship between the Great Motive Force and the Ultimate Cause of Historical Development" sets forth in materialist terms the connection between class struggle and economic factors. "Class struggle must be examined as a kind of economic force, as the social manifestation of the internal contradictions of the productive relationships." (Luo, 1980:9) Luo goes on to assert that, from the great motive force (class struggle) one can trace back to the ultimate cause (development of the productive forces). "We must trace the causes of the motive force through bringing out the sequential development of class struggle to grasp the economic backbone of historical development." (Luo, 1980:9) In applying this approach to the English and French bourgeois revolutions he concludes that the latter was more thorough-going than the former because capitalist productive forces were more advanced in the 18th century than in the 17th century. (Luo, 1980:9-10) His emphasis on economic change as the cause behind class struggle forces him to question the previously high praise given to the peasants for their role in creating historical change. In his assessment, the role of peasant struggle and peasant uprisings in both Western and Chinese history has been extremely exaggerated and he points out that even the large scale uprisings only resulted in a return to the status quo.
In another such article, "The Marxist Theory of the Motive Force of History and its Significance for Today," historian Pang Zhouheng further refines the distinction between the "ultimate motive force" or "primary motive force" and the "immediate driving power" or "great lever." The former represented the development of the productive forces; the latter class struggle. As Peng explained it, the economic movement is the ultimate force in historical movement. The class struggle between the newly emerging and decadent classes is the main 'immediate driving power' or 'great lever' driven by the 'ultimate motive force.' At the same time, there are many other immediate driving powers or levers imbedded in different classes and facets of life. Consequently, all these forces, governed by the general law of economic development, are merged into a common resultant of forces which produces all the events which unfold before our eyes and make up history. (Pang, 1980:149)

Pang's analysis of the role of peasant uprisings is also similar to Luo's and he also questions the validity of the assertion made by some Chinese historians that peasants extracted "concessions" from feudal rulers by noting that, in their struggle with big powerful feudal landowners, the interest of the ruler and the peasants often coincided. He further argues that the largest single change to occur in productive relations in China's long feudal history came in the mid to late Tang dynasty when there were no peasant uprisings. (Pang, 1980:160-164) The power behind the "ultimate

14 The idea of a common resultant is dealt with at some length in Pang's article and is reminiscent of the "two combines into one" theory of Shang's students in the early 1960s and also of Zhou Gucheng's notion of the "spirit of the age" espoused at the same time.
motive force" of economic development in Pang's opinion is the "self-activity" of the peasants. Violence, he states, "even revolutionary violence can only be regarded as a 'mid-wife'...in bringing forth the new system and new elements, and cannot be regarded as the 'ultimate motive force'. ...The 'ultimate motive force' was still economic movement, particularly the movement of the productive forces because of the changing capacities for 'self-activity' of the working people." (Pang,1980:157)

This stress on the self-activity of the working people throughout the article is focused on in the final section and is directly related to current policy trends to promote "self-activity" among the Chinese working people. (Pang,1980:165-69) These reevaluations of the motive force of history obviously challenge the prominent role previously given to the peasants in the English Bourgeois Revolution and make class struggle take a back seat to economic movement as the ultimate motive force.

In sum, the remaining significance of the English Bourgeois Revolution is its position as the start of modern world history. Few of the other earlier Chinese views remained intact as the PRC entered the 1980s. The peasants' role, seen as the motive force since the 1950s, and even the validity of revolutionary violence are now questioned. While the once stressed threat of class restoration is being gradually weeded out of the textbooks, the new stress on the development of the productive forces has emerged.
Chapter Four

The Experience of the Paris Commune

"The Paris Commune and the International Communist movement are not really academic subjects as they are studied here.... Affirmative views are always expressed and there does not seem to be any real change in interpretation," commented a senior Chinese historian interviewed. For major American world history writers, the Paris Commune seems not to be a subject either, academic or otherwise. Neither Stavrianos nor McNeill mention the Paris Commune and the UNESCO series, History of Mankind, gives it only one line.¹

This scarce mention of the Paris Commune in American world history literature contrasts greatly with the attention it receives in the Chinese world history materials where entire chapters of textbooks and popularized history reading series are devoted to it. The reason for this contrast becomes obvious once the basic Marxist assessment of its position in the history of socialist revolution is clarified. Simply stated, the Paris Commune is seen as the first attempt at proletarian dictatorship that launched the first attack on the bourgeois state and from which all following proletarian revolutions proceeded. As such, the experience of the Paris working class during the 72 days of

¹ This lack of attention to the Paris Commune in the UNESCO work is criticized in the notes to the text by the Soviet historian V.M. Dalin.
the Commune are thought to have valuable lessons for succeeding generations striving to establish proletarian dictatorships. But the short-lived workers' uprising in Paris during the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 is of little or no significance to Western historians who focus on the political moves toward liberal democratic reform in late 19th century Europe.²

Within the Marxist tradition, however, the place of the Paris Commune is firmly established. Marx's and Engels' contemporary assessment and later reflections constitute the core of materials for its interpretation. From these works emerge several characteristics and lessons. Foremost for Marx was that the Commune illustrated the principle that the "working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery" but must create a new type. (Marx and Engels, 1971:68) The citizens retained direct control over the new state through election and recall powers over officials and it also aimed at preventing alienation between the government and the people by limiting the salaries of officials to that of worker's wages. The highest organ of the new structure combined both the legislative and executive roles of government in a single "working, not parliamentary body." (Marx and Engels, 1971:71) Some of the Commune's political and economic reform measures considered important

² Some of the newer American textbooks, such as (Burns and Ralph, 1983) and (MacKay, Hill, and Buckler, 1984) give about one paragraph to the Paris Commune, interpreting it mainly as a patriotic movement opposed to capitulation to Prussia.
were the separation of church and state through secularizing the schools, doing away with the standing army in favor of a citizen's national guard, making the police the revokable agent of the Commune, back rents were remitted, abandoned factories were operated by former employees organized as co-operative societies, etc. (Marx and Engels, 1971:26-8) The Paris Commune was also hailed for upholding internationalism as exemplified in the presence of foreigners on the Commune Committee. (Marx and Engels, 1971:27) In spite of the Commune's failure, Marx saw valuable lessons to be drawn from its experience and it is with regard to the Paris Commune that Marx provides some indication of his views on the nature of state power under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin showed special interest in the experience of the Commune on the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power, especially with regard to the soviets competing with the provisional government for political power just as the Paris Commune had challenged the legitimacy of the Versailles government under Thiers. Lenin's use of the Paris Commune as an operational concept in the struggle for power, however, soon vanished in the face of harsh organizational realities. As M. Sawer in her essay on Soviet images of the Commune put it, the Paris Commune was "no more than a legitimating myth." (Sawer, 1978:251)
The success of the October Revolution where the Commune had failed led Soviet historians to focus on two negative lessons of the Paris Commune, namely, the role of the proletarian political party and the alliance with the peasants. The importance of the proletarian party was to become the cornerstone of Leninism and Soviet historians were soon to evaluate the failure of the Paris Commune in terms of the Bolshevik success. The Commune was defeated, said G.M. Steklov in 1928, because of a lack of a "Communist Party worthy of the name." (Steklov, 1968: 199)

The second point, the importance of the alliance between the workers and peasants, was also emphasized by Lenin and later by Stalin and from the early Soviet historiography on it became important in the evaluation of the Paris Commune. Paraphrasing the historians of the early 1920s, Sawer points out the stress placed on the failure of the Paris Commune to understand the peasantry. "This lack of understanding of the peasantry, reinforced the wall standing between the Commune and the provinces, as did the lack of any consistent effort to propagandize the benefits the revolutionary government would bring to the peasantry." (Sawer, 1978: 254)

Sawer concludes that, after Lenin's death, changes in emphasis on the Paris Commune continued to occur as the Party

3 The Soviet works referred to are N.M. Lukin's Parizhskaja Kommuna 1871g. (Moscow, 1922) and A.I. Molok's Parizhskaja Kommuna i krestianstov (Leningrad, 1925). Although the Chinese bibliography used in this study does not indicate that these works were translated into Chinese, it is clear that Chinese scholars were familiar with their ideas.
The historiographic emphasis on the Paris Commune in post-1949 China has also shifted to comply with or justify Party policy. The point of this chapter is, therefore, to examine these different emphases to see how this pivotal event in China's perception of world history has been used for both negative and positive lessons. But the use of the Paris Commune as a legitimizing myth or as an operational concept cannot be fully understood through the world history literature alone. As implied in the opening quote, the Paris Commune is a highly politicized subject in the PRC. Therefore, greater use is made of political and ideological writings in order to comprehend the impact this relatively minor late 19th century Paris uprising has had on shaping China's perception of the course of world history, the nature of the proletarian state, and China's assessment of contemporary international politics.

Considering that many of the Chinese world history books available in the early 1950s were based on secondary Western sources, it is not surprising that the Paris Commune is a neglected subject in them. Zhou Gucheng's series, reprinted in 1949 and 1950, fails to mention it. Cao Bohan's volume places the Paris Commune as the last in a series of five democratic revolutions in France starting from July 1789. (Cao, 1950:48) In the one sentence Cao gives to the Paris Commune a rather confused image emerges:
The fifth revolution was in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War; defeated, Napoleon III capitulated and the workers and petty bourgeoisie rose up violently, organizing a revolutionary government called the Paris Commune led by socialist party people; it was later disbanded by the reactionary bourgeois military. (Cao, 1950:50-1)

This account runs together the bourgeois republican assumption of power after Napoleon III's surrender in September 1870 with the events in Paris between 18 March and 28 May 1871. Although leadership is credited to "socialist party people" (shehui dang ren) there is no reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat and instead of being the first experience of proletarian dictatorship it is seen as the last in a series of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in France.

In the reprint of the upper middle school textbook by Lin Judai in 1950, however, the Paris Commune receives greater attention. Although this text devotes only a few short paragraphs to the Paris Commune in the chapter covering France from the July revolution to the Franco-Prussian War, the events are presented much more clearly. It is also cited as the first experience in history of the proletarian dictatorship but no special significance is attached to this or lessons pointed out. (Lin, 1950:98)

By the middle of the decade this former neglect was rectified and from that time until the present the Paris Commune has been treated as a major event of great significance in the course of world history. In the summer of 1955, just
before the printing of the new textbooks based on Soviet secondary sources, a 50-page volume on the Paris Commune was published by Hu Daicong in a popular reading series. Citing no sources, but referring to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, Hu introduces the course of the Paris Commune revolution from the origins of the Franco-Prussian War through the establishment of the "Government of National Defense," the declaration of the Commune, and its final defeat. The book concludes with a chapter on the lessons of experience from the Commune, as became typical of succeeding treatments.

The four lessons Hu draws from the Paris Commune experience are the necessity 1) to destroy the old state and create a new type structure; 2) to have revolutionary party leadership; 3) to form a worker-peasant alliance; 4) to protect the revolution by firmly suppressing the counterrevolutionaries. All except the first of these represents a failure on the part of the Paris Commune and on all four points Hu affirms that the Chinese revolution has advanced their correctness. (Hu, 1955:45-8) The legitimizing link to the Paris Commune is strengthened here by suggesting that China had learned from the mistakes of the Paris Commune and that correcting its errors had led to communist victory in China. The new world history texts that soon followed Hu's work were clearly based on secondary Soviet sources and repeated most of his points in their own full chapters devoted to the Paris Commune. 4

4 As already noted, textbooks writers at this time were
The interpretation of the Paris Commune that emerges in these new textbooks is always framed in terms of lessons to be learned. The lower middle school text naturally had the most simple assessment. The Paris Commune was the first blow to the bourgeoisie and it failed because it lacked genuine Marxist socialist leadership and because it failed to unite with the peasants. "Only under real revolutionary leadership and only with the alliance of the workers and peasants will revolution then be able to achieve victory." (Wang, 1956:86) The reference book for this level in addition to these points suggests that the teacher also make clear to the students that "from the seventh decade of the 19th century, capitalism started down the road of decline." (Shou, 1956:166)

The upper level text too stressed the lack of a Marxist Party and a worker-peasant alliance and added a few other, mostly negative, examples to learn from. After praising the Commune for establishing a new state structure a list of mistakes is included: failure to promptly suppress the counter-revolutionaries, failure to take control of the Bank of France, and failure to strengthen the revolutionary

also engaged in translating Soviet materials. The major secondary Soviet texts first translated between 1950 and 1955 when the new Chinese textbooks began appearing were the four-part Course of Instruction in Modern History by the Soviet Academy of Sciences History Institute and their two-volume Course of Instruction in Modern World History. In addition to these secondary Soviet materials, new editions of Marx's and Engels' works were also available providing contemporary accounts of the events in Paris in the Spring of 1871.
dictatorship. (Li, 1955:84-5) Also included in this text is a brief section on the relationship between the Paris Commune and the First International. Sections on this topic have grown in size in later textbooks.5

All these mid-1950s textbooks and teaching materials state that all proletarian revolutions since the Paris Commune have relied on its experience. But the most emphasized points are the errors and negative lessons. As the upper middle school teachers' reference puts it, "when narrating the mistakes of the Commune, teachers can explain that if there had been a political party armed with revolutionary theory,...then mistakes could have been avoided." (Bao, 1956:118) Teachers are told parenthetically that they can illustrate the "great role of the revolutionary Party" by showing how the CCP's revolutionary leadership advanced toward victory using the worker-peasant alliance and by ousting the reactionary party's rule. (Bao, 1956:118)

The 1956 world history self-study reference book boils down the experience of the Paris Commune in similar terms.

Naturally the Paris Commune failed, but it had real historical significance. It smashed the state machine of the old bourgeois class and established a new kind of state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this was the embryonic form of the soviet political power.

From the causes of the failure of the Paris Commune, valuable lessons can be drawn. Firstly, at the time, France still did not have the leadership of a Marxist revolutionary political party,

5 Li follows up on this connection between the Paris Commune and the First International in an article the next year. See (Li, 1956:22-5)
therefore, it committed many mistakes: it did not promptly press the attack against Versailles; it did not sternly suppress the counterrevolutionaries; it did not strengthen the revolutionary dictatorship. Secondly, the Commune did not establish a relationship with the peasants and all alone they were easily defeated. These lessons have been of great guiding significance for the later revolutions of Russia and our country. (Ye, 1956:83)

It becomes quite clear from these works that the Chinese interpretation of the Paris Commune in the 1950s relied more heavily on Soviet historiography than on Marx's own emphasis, and understandably so. Legitimacy for the "New Democracy" had much to gain by suggesting that the CCP had learned from the negative example of the Commune's failure and the positive example of the October Revolution (which had corrected the faults of the Paris Commune). Doubtless, however, China's own revolutionary experience taught Chinese Communist leaders the importance of the revolutionary Party and the role of the peasants long before they became well acquainted with the Paris Commune, but not perhaps before they were aware of the Soviet historiography of it.6

In spite of the stress on the negative lessons of the Paris Commune in these new textbooks, Chinese Marxist historians also interpreted their own revolution as carrying out the most positive lesson of the first proletarian dictatorship, that is, the smashing of the old state form and

6 Starr notes that the Paris Commune is referred to only twice in Mao's pre-Liberation Selected Works, both times to its failure. Starr concludes from this a reluctance on Mao's part to draw on foreign history for models. The truth may be that he is drawing on foreign (Soviet) historiography of the Paris Commune. (Starr, 1972:108)
establishing a new type of government. By 1957 this point was singled out for special attention. Liu Wenying in his article on the characteristics of the Paris Commune's political power, listed four basic features: 1) it was organized by the masses; 2) it practiced the highest form of democracy - proletarian democracy; 3) it combined legislative and executive powers into one working body; 4) it initiated proletarian democratic centralism. (Liu, 1957:35) After examining these points separately and making the case for the Commune's organization of political power to be an embryonic form of the soviets in the Russian Revolution, he extends the connection to China stating that, "the state power of the PRC belongs to the same type state as soviet state power and the Paris Commune." (Liu, 1957:38) Liu justifies this link by pointing out that the revolutionary party of the proletariat, the CCP, is taking the leading role in the state and the state organization is carrying out the dictatorship of the proletariat in the period of transition. Furthermore, the state organization of China's proletarian dictatorship is also similar to the Paris Commune in several other aspects such as the masses' transformation of state organizations, its democratic nature, the high level unity of legislative and executive responsibilities, democratic centralism, etc. (Liu, 1957:38)

This retrospective linking with the Paris Commune, however, did not exclude differences. Liu notes that because
of China's particular historical and social conditions, its
dsystem of people's democracy also has its own characteris-
tics, including the comparatively broad class alliance,
the existence of a unified military organization, a multiple
party system, etc. He concludes that if the Paris Commune's
organization of state power formed the sprouts of the sovi-
ets' dictatorship and if this is the classical form of
proletarian dictatorship, then "the state power of the PRC
is a particular form of the dictatorship of the proletari-
at." (Liu,1957:38)

Establishing the inheritance of the historical experi-
cence of the Paris Commune extended the legitimacy of the
first proletarian dictatorship to the new Chinese regime
while asserting the validity of China's differences.
Although historians pointed out the positive lesson, that
the proletariat must smash the old and establish a new type
of state, it seems clear from these passages that China had
already accomplished this goal. Except for placing China in
the line of legitimate socialist revolutions, the positive
lesson of the Commune had little political currency until
the start of the Sino-Soviet split. As Starr put it, "an
active interest in the details of the experience of the Par-
is Commune and a concern with its relevance to contemporary
Chinese domestic and foreign policies seems to have arisen
during the course of Mao's formulation of the polemic argu-
ments with the Soviet leadership during the years 1957-64."
(Starr,1972:110)
In November 1957, while in Moscow attending a conference of socialist party leaders in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, Mao cited Marx's positive lesson of the Paris Commune in his "Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition": "The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes." (Mao, 1963:89) The declaration of this conference echoed support for this revolutionary stance and later polemical materials go so far as to claim that "the erroneous views of the 20th Congress (CPSU) on many important questions of principle were rejected and corrected by the 1957 meeting of fraternal Parties." The question of principle that the Chinese felt was being compromised was the necessity of smashing the old and creating a new type state, e.g., the principle lesson of the Paris Commune. (RMRB, eds., 1963:19-22)

This new political interest in the principle of the Paris Commune, however, grew gradually in the late 1950s, before the ideological split with the post-Stalin Soviet leadership became open, and was significantly absent as a model or reference for the communization movement during the great leap forward. But the positive lesson of the Paris Commune came to the foreground in the early 1960s to legitimize attacks on the notion of the "peaceful transition" to socialism.

7 This major 1963 polemical editorial contends that "despite these changes, the formulation in the Declaration on the question of the transition from capitalism was still unsatisfactory." (RMRB, eds., 1963:21)
The 1960 Hong Qi editorial celebrating Lenin's 90th birthday, "Long Live Leninism", opens with the positive lesson of the Paris Commune which, the writers made a point of noting, came one year after Lenin's birth. Appealing to the experience of the Commune, its most important principle is restated: "the proletariat should use revolutionary means to seize state power and smash the military and bureaucratic machine... and establish the proletarian dictatorship to replace the bourgeois dictatorship." (Hong Qi, eds., 1960:1-2) The purpose behind relating this principle of the Paris Commune to Leninism and the October Revolution is clearly to criticize the "new revisionist" ideas of peaceful transition, identified at this time with the Tito regime in Yugoslavia.  

The danger, from the Chinese point of view, was in confusing the idea of a peaceful foreign policy for socialist countries with domestic policies of the proletariat in capitalist countries. This danger is at the heart of the piece by the Hong Qi editors mentioned above. "They thus hold that peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems means capitalism can peacefully grow into socialism, that the proletariat in countries ruled by the bourgeoisie can renounce class struggle and enter into 'peaceful cooperation' with the bourgeoisie and the imperialists..."

As noted before, in the early part of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese often used the Tito regime as a foil to attack the Soviet Union's leadership. See, (Martin, 1983:8-9)
In sum, the editorial argues that the very nature of class struggle makes the possibility of peaceful transition an "extraordinarily rare opportunity in the history of revolution." (Hong Qi, eds., 1960:40)

The 90th anniversary of the Paris Commune in 1961 was commemorated by the publication of several translations. Two major secondary works were translated, one by Soviet historian P.M. Kerzhentsev, (History of the Paris Commune of 1871) and the other a well-known account by French historian H.P.O. Lissagarary, (Histoire de la Commune de 1871).⁹ Other materials either translated or published at this time include the Protocols of the Meeting of the Paris Commune, an anthology of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the Paris Commune, a collection of brief biographies of the Paris Communards, and a volume on the poems and poets of the Commune (especially noted was the influence of the Paris Commune on the writing of the lyrics of the "Internationale").

For more popular consumption, RMRB editorials, articles and stories on 18 and 19 March 1961 barraged readers with the historical significance of the Paris Commune, firmly linking the Chinese revolution to the line of revolutionary succession begun in 1871 and upholding the lesson of violently overthrowing the old and creating a new style proletarian dictatorship. (Ai, 1961:7) (Zhang, 1961:7) The Hong Qi

⁹ Kerzhentsev's work is translated from the 1959 revised edition of this Stalinist-era work; see (Kaierrencefu, 1961). The 19th century work by Lissagarary is translated from the 1956 German translation of a 1947 Paris edition; see (Lishajialai, 1962)
article of that week on the Paris Commune reflected the same tone but sounded a new note. Writer Shi Dongxiang contended that the revisionists within the Second International who Lenin triumphed over by adhering to the principles of the Paris Commune were the same as the "new revisionist" regime in Yugoslavia because their common line was that capitalism would "peacefully evolve" into socialism. (Shi, 1961:8)

The major 1962 college level world history text under the general editorship of Zhou Yiliang also reflected this attention to the positive lesson of the Paris Commune. Although the causes of the failure, the negative lessons, are not ignored, nearly three times as much space is given to the positive principle of overthrowing the old and creating a new proletarian state. The line of legitimacy from the Paris Commune through Lenin and the soviets is now thoroughly incorporated into the text and extended to the Chinese Revolution. "The victory of the Chinese revolution is the victory of Marxism-Leninism in China and is also the victory of the principle of the Paris Commune." (Zhou, 1972, pt.2:28)

10 The sections of this text that deal with Lenin's struggle within the Second International and the seizure of power by the soviets in the October Revolution fail to repeat the connection with the Paris Commune. This failure to follow through was partially corrected in the early and mid-1970s materials. (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973, pt.2:225-43) Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the most revised section of these early 1970s works in the post-Mao years has been that on Lenin's struggle against opportunism and revisionism in the 2nd International (Lin, 1982:684-710) but the Paris Commune remains as an historical lesson. (Lin, 1982:702)
As noted in the previous chapter in the case of the English Bourgeois Revolution, this series does not yet reflect the views on the threat of class restoration that became so prominent soon after Mao's speech to the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee in September 1962. It was here that Mao raised the issue of capitalist restoration in socialist countries and pointed to Yugoslavia as an example of this having already occurred. In the 1964 polemical statement, "On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World," Mao points to the Paris Commune, not only as the start of the international proletarian movement but he also goes further to state that the overthrow of the Commune began another movement, this one a series of capitalist restorations, the most recent examples of which were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The only historical evidence of "peaceful evolution", Mao argued, was from socialism to capitalism, not the other way around! (RMRB, Hong Qi, eds., 1964:60-3)

As the issue of class restoration shifted and became central to China's internal political struggle there was also a shift in which aspects and lessons of the Paris Commune were emphasized. It seems clear that Starr is correct in saying "the Paris Commune was very much a part of Mao's thinking as he formulated his ideas concerning the problems which arise during the period of socialist society and as he developed his 'theory of continuing the revolution under the ________

11 Concerning Mao's connection with the authorship of the polemic see (Johnson, 1969:34)
dictatorship of the proletariat' designed to attack those problems." (Starr, 1972:113) 

The major article in Hong Qi by Zheng Zhisu, commemorating the 95th anniversary of the Paris Commune in March 1966 is prefaced by an editor's note which restates unequivocally the lessons and links for China to the Commune. The lesson is the principle of violent revolution to seize power, smash the old bourgeois state machine and practice the dictatorship of the proletariat. "Upholding or betraying this principle has always been the difference between Marxism on the one hand and opportunists and revisionists on the other." (Zheng, 1966a:23) And "why", ask the editors, "is the revisionist CPSU opposing China?" Because the Chinese revolution has "inherited and developed the experience of the Paris Commune and...the CCP today is a great standard-bearer of Marxism-Leninism and is struggling resolutely against all renegades who have turned their backs on the principle of the Commune." (Zheng, 1966a: 23-24) Two-thirds of this lengthy article are focused on aspects of this principal lesson, including the nature of the proletarian state and a critique of peaceful transition. The last section, however, concentrates on those aspects of the Paris Commune that may
provide prophylactic assistance against the "transformation of its state organs from servants of society into masters of society." (Zheng, 1966c:23)

To prevent the degeneration of the state organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Engels is quoted as saying the Paris Commune provided "two infallible means." These were the election and power of recall over all administrative, judicial, and educational posts through universal suffrage and the provision that kept official salaries at the level of workers wages. Zheng concludes from this that the real masters of the Paris Commune, and by extension, all proletarian dictatorships, were the masses. (Zheng, 1966c:23-4) The experience of the Paris Commune in preventing careerism and in wiping out material incentives are also stressed as ways of closing the gap between government and the people. (Zheng, 1966c:24-5)

This article anticipates many of the issues and proposed solutions to problems addressed in the Cultural Revolution. The anti-bureaucratic impulses from the Paris Commune as well as the theme of the revolutionary creativity of the masses in Marx's interpretation of the Commune were relevant to Maoist strategists in 1966-67. (Meisner, 1971:490-1)

Mao's first direct reference to the Paris Commune as a precedent for the Cultural Revolution came in his comment to the Central Committee leaders on the first "big character poster" (da zì bāo) at Beijing University in late May 1966
saying that it was a "declaration of a Chinese Paris Commune for the sixth decade of the twentieth century, the significance of which surpasses that of the Paris Commune itself." (Mao, 1969:58) It is not surprising that the Paris Commune had appeal to the youths, mostly students, and to intellectuals who had for a decade been digesting the increasingly heavy diet of the Paris Commune experience.

The "Sixteen Point Guideline for the Cultural Revolution" issued in August 1966 made Zheng's earlier points on the Paris Commune a part of the basic programmatic strategy. In order to transform the new spontaneous organizations emerging into permanent forms of government power, point nine stressed:

It is necessary to institute a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune, for electing members of the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates to the cultural revolutionary congresses. ... The masses are entitled at any time to criticize members of the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates elected to the revolutionary congresses. If these members or delegates prove incompetent, they can be replaced through election or recall by the masses after discussion. (CCP, 1966:10)

The programmatic aspect of the Paris Commune's election and recall system was made more clear later that same month in a Hong Qi article by Liu Huiming on the "General Election System of the Paris Commune. Liu seems to move back and forth in time and make little distinction between policy of the Commune and the program of the Cultural Revolution. The commune committee, he states, must be responsive to the peo-
people and accept their supervision. The committee must work among the masses, personally implement the laws, examine results, keep close contact with the people, listen to their opinions, make work reports to them and carry out self-criticism. (Liu, 1966:36-7) These views epitomized the anti-bureaucratic spirit of the early Cultural Revolution.

By January of the following year, Chen Boda was advising representatives of rebel revolutionary groups in Beijing to stop seizing power from each other and do it on a city wide scale, "like that of the Paris Commune, making use of a representative body of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants to seize power." (Chen, 1967:1) Later in January, RMRB carried the forthcoming Hong Qi editorial on power seizures with the first official reference to Mao's assertion that the Beijing University da zi bao of the previous year was the declaration of a Beijing Commune. 13 The issue of Hong Qi containing this editorial also carried several articles on the power seizures and also a long essay dealing with Engels' work "On Authority" which stressed that the Paris Commune failed because it had been "too restrained in the use of its authority." (Hong Qi, 1967:21)

The "unrestrained authority" of the Chinese urban masses, fired by the image of the Paris Commune, erupted in January and early February 1967. On 5 February the short-lived Shanghai Commune born of the January storm was proclaimed. 14

---

13 It is interesting to note that the official reference is to a Beijing Commune, not to a Chinese Paris Commune.
Several other cities soon followed suit: Taiyuan, Beijing, Harbin. But the rebellious communards of 1967 failed to integrate the mass organizations and the highly touted Paris Commune election system was never implemented. By late February, even Mao seems to have abandoned the Paris Commune as a model for the organizational changes he aimed at in the Cultural Revolution and discussion of these changes turned to the "three-in-one alliance" of the army, revolutionary cadres, and revolutionary masses and eventually to the Revolutionary Committees. As Starr noted in 1972, after 1967 there was no mention in the official press of the relevancy of the Paris Commune to Chinese domestic politics. (Starr, 1972:121)

By the time of the centenary celebration of the Paris Commune in 1971 its uses had basically returned to the realm of foreign policy polemics. In the early Cultural Revolution it had provided inspiration for reforming the state structure to make it more responsive to the people in the hope of preventing the alienation of the people from state power. The precise measures of the Paris Commune, however, were hardly applicable to China's situation in the mid-1960s. The communards of 1967 were not seizing power.

This brought to power Zhang Chunqiao in Shanghai and that city became a stronghold for the particular brand of radicalism later identified with the "gang of four". Hu Yuwei and Yang Xinji's novel *Those Wild Gala Days* is an interesting work of historical fiction that gives an account of this January revolution. I am grateful to my friend Susan Daruvala for bringing this work to my attention and for sharing with me her manuscript analyzing the political climate revealed in the novel.
from a bourgeois state and their enemies were not external as Versailles troops aided by Prussia had been nearly a century ago.

Although no references were later made to the ill-conceived attempt to establish "Chinese Paris Communes" during the heat of the power seizures of the Cultural Revolution, the Paris Commune weathered the storm of that turbulent time and emerged in the early 1970s world history literature in only slightly altered form from its treatment in the early 1960s.

The centennial of the Paris Commune was not greeted with nearly the same publication effort as in 1961. Only a small pictorial pamphlet on the Commune was published in Shanghai (Bali Gongshe, 1971) and a brief pocket-size history edited by Zhong Guojiang was printed in Hong Kong. (Zhong, 1971) The smashing of the old and establishing the new proletarian state dominates the content of these publications and much is made of how Marx and Lenin used the "eternal principle of the Paris Commune" to struggle against both opportunists and revisionists. The Paris Commune still had its political uses and, for the study of Marxist

15 The 1961 volume of Marx's, Engels', Lenin's, and Stalin's writings on the Paris Commune was republished also.
16 The same tone is reflected in the joint editorial by the editors of Renmin Ribao, Hong Qi, and Jiefang Jun Bao entitled "Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." (RMRE, HQ, JFJB, eds., 1971) Starr also points out that the 100th anniversary celebration was upstaged by the celebration of China's second satellite launch which was arranged for the same day. (Starr, 1978: 303)
theory, its pedagogical function too. In his 1972 call to study world history, Shi Jun cited Marx's *Civil War* in France as an example of how correct analyses of historical events can lead to enriching and developing theory. The secondary and post-secondary world history texts that began to reappear in 1973-74 reflected the renewed stress on the use of the principle of the Paris Commune as the theoretical basis of the critique of the Soviet Union in terms typical of the early 1960s polemics. What is new is the recognition of the significance of the historical conditions in determining the outcome of revolution.17 For the first time in the world history textbooks, the Soviet Union is referred to as "renegades" and "revisionists" and nowhere more strongly than in the sections on the experience of the Paris Commune.

All the texts stress the eternal principle: the first lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Commune is the necessity of armed revolution to overthrow the old bourgeois regime and establish the new proletarian rule. At this point, some of the texts insert Mao's distillation of this necessity: "political power grows out of the barrel of the gun." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973,pt.1:23) The Soviet Union is most strongly attacked for its betrayal of

17 The three major college texts are: (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974a), (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi,1973), (Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi,1974) The absence of middle school level materials is mitigated by the availability of other secondary education-level materials such as (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Zhengjiao Xi, 1974), (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1975), (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974b). Two of these last three appeared as part of the "youth self-study" series.
the Commune's basic principle in the Beijing University History Department's text. Here scholars, who "serve the demands of the Soviet revisionist", are criticized for going to great lengths to tell how the Paris Commune was "a bloodless revolution" and how peace is the necessary condition for social transformation. (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974a:357) Later, in summing up the experience of the Paris Commune the writers point out,

the great leaders, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao based on carrying out the proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship have continually enriched and developed the experience of the Paris Commune. Moreover, they defended the revolutionary principles of the Commune against opportunists and revisionists of every description -- traitors to the cause of proletarian revolution. ...Under Lenin's leadership came the victory of the October Revolution; China, under Chairman Mao's leadership achieved the victory of the New Democracy and the socialist revolution, both were the victory of the Paris Commune. The Soviet revisionist clique has renounced the principle of the Paris Commune and the road of the October revolution. As the proletarian dictatorship peacefully evolved into the bourgeois French regime, they (the Soviets) and those of that time are the same hand strangling the Paris Commune.... (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974a:358-9; parentheses added)

The way this passage traces the line of legitimate Marxist revolutionary succession to China and the way it makes upholding the principle of armed revolution the true measure of a proletarian regime was still in keeping with the anti-Soviet foreign policy of the 1970s. Simultaneously, however, the vocabulary of peaceful coexistence was being steadily revived as China began to emerge from the diplomatic isolation of the Cultural Revolution.
The added measure of historical perspective found in some of the world history works of this time may be reflective of this widening world view. Noticeable in this regard is a slightly new twist to an old reason for the Commune's failure. Instead of reeling off dogmatically Lenin's critique that the Paris Commune failed because it lacked a genuine Marxist revolutionary party, this assessment now had the added comment that "the basic reason for the Commune's failure was caused by the limitations of historical conditions so a proletarian revolutionary party guided by Marxism had still not taken shape." (Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974:227)

China, under conditions of the time since the late 1960s, has more and more frequently separated the "upholding of the principle of the Paris Commune" in theory from advocating it in practice. As Beijing's conception of its role in world politics broadened at this time, it abandoned the bipolar view that world issues were decided by the USA and the USSR. This policy was reflected in the shift toward establishing diplomatic relations with a wide range of European and Third

---

18 A similar passage also appears in (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1972,pt.2:21). Identical wording appeared in the 1971 joint editorial mentioned above "Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Mao had made a similar point in his essay "On Contradiction." After asking why the bourgeois revolution in France (1789) was not linked directly to the proletariat revolution of the Paris Commune but the bourgeois revolution in Russia (February) led directly to the proletarian revolution in October and why China's revolution was directly linked with socialism and could avoid taking the capitalist road, he answers saying, "the sole reason is the concrete condition of the time." (Mao,1967a:34)
World governments, especially after its admission to the United Nations in 1972. This change, however, did not mean an end to making foreign policy decisions based on an anti-Soviet stance. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the perceived and real Soviet military threat to China's borders gave new meaning to the concept of peaceful coexistence in China's attempt to build an international "united front" against the hegemony of the Soviet "social imperialist."

Notably absent from the textbooks cited above is any reference to Yugoslavia as an example of "peaceful evolution." This is not an accidental oversight because the most obvious example of how the new significance for peaceful coexistence was selectively divorced from the dangers of peaceful transition but tied to anti-Soviet policy was the normalization of state relations between China and Yugoslavia in 1970. With little fanfare, China dropped the "revisionist" label it had used only one year before to refer to the "Tito renegade clique" and early ambassadorial talks were dominated by questions connected with the policy of the non-aligned movement of which Yugoslavia was a leading member. (Martin, 1983:16-18)

This separation between upholding the eternal principle of the Paris Commune theoretically and assessing the prospects of proletarian revolution in light of historical

19 For a study of the importance of the Soviet military threat to China's foreign policy see, (Gurtov and Huang, 1980)
conditions of the time had the effect of lowering the militant profile of the interpretation of the Paris Commune. The toning down of the revolutionary rhetoric begun in the early to mid-1970s has continued in the post-Mao period. The volume of children's stories from the Paris Commune published in 1977 again cited the historical limitations for the failure of the Commune; Marxism still had not achieved a dominant position in the workers movement. (Duan and Chen, 1977:4) The stories focus on the heroic efforts of the fearless communards, men, women, and children alike and on their personal sacrifice to the cause of the Commune.

The first issue of the new monthly journal Shijie Lishi (World History) in 1979 carried an article that may be the exception to the generalization that the Paris Commune was no longer seen as relevant to Chinese domestic policy after 1967. This detailed article on the Commune election system begins with a brief criticism of Lin Biao and the "gang of four's" abuses against proletarian democracy but by the conclusion another point seems to be made:

Today even though the proletariat is victorious, it is still facing how to handle this problem of state. If after the proletariat seizes political power a democratization of the state apparatus is not thoroughly carried out, the proletarian state can similarly regress into a bourgeois parliamentary system or even back to the feudal system. ...The Commune election system was the kind of measure that prevented the servants of the society from becoming the masters of society, even today this has great practical significance. (Cao and Sun, 1979:19)

20 This article makes use of Commune documents, French and Soviet secondary sources, as well as the usual Marxist
This article could reflect the Party's toleration and even tacit support of the early democracy movement of 1979. "Under the conditions of the time," one might say, the Paris Commune again had its domestic political uses. Correcting the one-sided democratic emphasis of this article may have been the object of a short note that appeared three months later in the same journal. The thrust of this note is that not all the office holders of the Paris Commune were elected. There was also a system of appointments and some of these were to high level positions including the minister of the railroad, the minister of health, director of the Bank of France, and the chief of police. All these were appointed by the Commune Central Committee. ("Dushi Zhaji", 1979:82) From this it is concluded that "from the practice of the Paris Commune we can see that all the leaders of the proletarian state, reflecting the principle of democratic centralism, must adopt the combination of the two forms of elections and appointments; they cannot rely only on elections." ("Dushi Zhaji", 1979:82)21

The journalistic attention to the Commune election system was not carried over into the trial versions or the final text of the full-time ten year upper middle school world classics on the Paris Commune. There are no less than 53 footnotes in this 9 page article.  

21 The note implies that there has been some confusion over the translation of Lenin's work on the Paris Commune that has led to misunderstandings of which officials were subject to voter election and recall. Some alternative translation choices are suggested for getting at the real meaning of the Russian original.
history books. The narrative of these works moves smoothly from the Franco-Prussian War to the establishment of the Commune, its measures, and a noticeably longer section on the heroic struggle to defend it. The source of the Commune's failure is still seen as the absence of a Marxist revolutionary party (for historical reasons) and, as an afterthought, the lack of peasant support is mentioned as another cause of failure. (Renmin Jiaoyu, 1979:55) The principle of the Paris Commune to violently smash the old and establish the new proletarian state is still called eternal but no attempt is made to relate this principle to the victory of the Chinese revolution. (Renmin Jiaoyu, 1979:56)

The 1982 revised edition of the early 1970s world history text by Lin Jiaodi made mainly cosmetic changes on the chapter on the Paris Commune. The format changes mentioned earlier which removed Marx's and Mao's quotes from the front pages of the text and no longer put quotes by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao in bold face type was typical of the toning down that continues. Only one line of the text in the Paris Commune chapter is altered to omit part of a sentence. In the discussion on what measures were needed to curb the counterrevolutionary media and writers, the 1982 version mentions only that "the bourgeois used their positions to create public opinion and poison and confuse the people's minds as they subvert the Commune to their counterrevolutionary
goals and purposes." (Lin, 1982:467) The earlier text went on to make the point that the Commune "had not yet recognized that in launching class struggle in the ideological sphere, that it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973:12)

As China enters the mid-1980s, the experience of the Paris Commune seems less and less connected with China's revolutionary experience and more and more related to the level of development of the international communist movement in the last three decades of the 19th century.22 The image of the Commune's experience today has become that of heroic workers who launched the historic struggle between the bourgeois and the proletariat.

---

22 This rising interest in the international worker's movement was pointed out above as was the fact that the most extensive revisions to Lin Judai's text was on this issue.
The phrase "Third World" was coined as a part of the post-World War II nomenclature to describe the handful of countries who steered a neutral course between the major East and West power blocs. As the Cold War cooled down, the term shifted its meaning to an economic designation to refer to underdeveloped portions of the world as measured against the capitalist developed First World and the socialist developed Second World.\(^1\) This more inclusive economic definition takes in nearly all of Central and South America, Africa, and Asia and it spawned a new vocabulary to describe the differences between non-, under-, and developing nations.

Although the term Third World is of recent origin, the conditions that produced the economic backwardness of these nations have a much longer history. The study of this history by post-World War II Western social scientists, observed Stavrianos, did not rise from their spontaneous initiative, "rather they were responding to the political

---

\(^1\) The definitions of the First and Second Worlds given here do not correspond to the same divisions in the Mao's "Three Worlds" thesis mentioned in Chapter Two. In that thesis, the First World is represented by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Second World includes the other industrially developed nations who are more or less manipulated and controlled either directly or indirectly by the First World powers. The Third World label, however, is used to refer to the same group of underdeveloped nations.
upheavals of their times: the revolutionary movements in the
Third World, the rapid disintegration of imperial struc-
tures, and the Cold War, which made the fate of colonies and
ex-colonies a matter of concern to policy-makers in Washing-
ton and Moscow." (Stavrianos, 1981:34) A similar view with
more menacing motives was expressed in discussions with a
Chinese historian. "I think Western historians are inter-
ested in Third World history because they are presently una-
ble to assert control over Third World nations. In the
past, when imperialist powers controlled these countries,
there was no interest in their history. Now that power has
shifted back to the Third World, the bourgeois historians
are interested so that they can seek new ways to control."

Apart from the motives behind the study of the Third
World, the research results are beginning to show, as Stav-
rianos put it, "that the underdevelopment of the Third World
and the developement of the First World are not isolated and
discreet phenomena. Rather they are organically and func-
tionally interrelated." (Stavrianos, 1981:34) This
interrelatedness makes the emergence of the Third World as
integral a part of modern world history as the rise of Euro-
pean dominance and also makes it distinct from non-European
history of the pre-Western contact period. As noted in
Chapter One, the trend toward greater awareness in Western
historiography of the need to transcend national and region-
al boundaries resulted from new global integration
in the post-World War II era. This has been reflected in the larger sections devoted to the Third World in the world history literature, although the connection between development and underdevelopment is not always made clear.

China, as with most of East Asia, remained external to the emerging world economy until the late 18th, early 19th centuries and, even then, successfully resisted total colonialization. This produced a condition described by Chinese Communists as a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. Present day Chinese scholars, acutely aware of the effects of imperialism on their own country, cast nearly all of modern Chinese history in terms of China's anti-imperialist struggle. Whereas the English Bourgeois Revolution may mark the beginning of modern world history, the First Opium War is seen as marking the start of modern Chinese history. As pointed out in Chapter Two, Chinese Communist blamed China's Third World status on China falling behind economically in modern times because of a century and a half of foreign oppression and reactionary domestic rule. The combination of these factors made it possible to merge the completion of the bourgeois democratic with the launching of the socialist revolution in China. This interpretation lays stress on the interrelationship between developed Europe and an underdeveloped China from the outset of China's modern history.

The extent to which this interpretation of how China became a Third World country influences China's treatment
of other Third World areas and reflects China's self-image in the world history literature is the focus of this case study. The obstacles and limitations of sources and foreign policy fluctuations in the post-1949 period are also discussed to provide the context of the treatment of Third World countries in modern world history. To do this does not mean examining the attention given to each Third World country dealt with in the world history materials individually. This would be laborious and of questionable value taken separately. Rather it means determining the quantitative and qualitative nature of the attention given to Third World regions in an attempt to understand how and why these elements changed.

The problem of Eurocentrism in both Western and Chinese world history writing has already been pointed out. Ironically, in the first decade of Communist rule in China it was the three-volume *General World History* (1950) of Zhou Gucheng, strongly criticized in the early 1960s for being Eurocentric, that provided the most extensive treatment of non-European areas. The subtitle of volume 3, "The Expanding Scope of the World," indicates the author's awareness of the greater integration among the various regions of the world in the modern period. The subtitle lives up to its name by devoting nearly half (42%) of the volume to non-European areas, including colonial North America. Some of the European sections, such as the voyages of discovery, indirectly touch on non-European regions.
This volume also includes long sections on the economic, political, and social history of China.² Zhou makes some attempt to place China in a comparative context in order to understand the causes for the failure of mercantilism to develop in China.

The charges of Eurocentricism, therefore, could hardly be based on the share of attention Zhou gives to Europe as compared to the emerging Third World areas. The prominence of the European perspective, however, is clearly evident from the long summaries and quotes from Western secondary sources, even in the discussion of Chinese-Western relations. Furthermore, as later Party critics were to point out, Zhou's European slant on colonialization is evident in his stress on such things as the growth of trade with the new world colonies without mentioning the effects of this on the native population. (Zhou, 1958: 812-814)³ In the sections on China's relations with Western mercantilism (Zhou chooses to use this term rather than imperialism throughout the book) the rapid growth in the opium trade is chronicled and the Treaty of Nanjing is mentioned but nothing is said of the Opium War. (Zhou, 1958: 780-781, 796) Here and elsewhere, cooperation and accommodation characterize relations between European nations and the colonial, semi-colonial parts of the world.

² It should be recalled that Professor Zhou also wrote a General History of China, first published in 1939 and revised and reprinted in 1956 and 1980.
³ Many examples of this "beautification" of colonialism in Zhou's work are cited in (Lu, 1965: 4)
The other volume published in 1950 by Cao Bohan gives only four pages to Third World areas from late antiquity to World War I is thoroughly Eurocentric focus is not actually broken in these four pages because they deal entirely with "the liberation movement of Eastern peoples," in response to the war in Europe. (Cao, 1950:94-98) Appended to the brief treatment of the liberation movements in Turkey, North Africa, India, the Philippines, and Korea is a one-line mention that China's revolution is covered in Chinese history not world history. Without establishing any real interrelationship, the section closes by asserting that all these civil wars and anti-imperialist struggles before WWI and the October Revolution "were part of the bourgeois revolution, after that time they were part of the proletarian socialist revolution." (Cao, 1950:98)

The Outline of Modern Foreign History by Lin Judai, reprinted in 1950 as an upper middle school textbook carried a front note from the Ministry of Education explaining that "as for giving a view of world history, this book especially lacks materials from outside of Europe and America...and as for integrating the view of modern world history, this book is wholly lacking in a narration of the birth and development of socialism and in an introduction to the great thinkers Marx and Engels." (Lin, 1950:2) Teachers are cautioned about these deficiencies and referred to the Soviet textbooks to fill the ideological gap.
The Eurocentric criticism is well taken. Only two short chapters totaling 16 pages are given to the rivalry of imperialist in Africa, the Near East and Asia with 6 of the 10 pages on Asia focused on Japan from the Meiji Restoration to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. (Lin, 1950: 144-149)

The middle school world history texts that began publication in the mid-1950s rectified some of the ideological shortcomings of the earlier Chinese texts but with regard to the balance of attention, the Third World remains slighted. Latin America, for instance, is completely ignored. These texts share the same Eurocentric bias as the Soviet text they were modeled on and which they replaced. It is only in the final section on the changing appearance of the world after World War II that the emphasis shifts to Asia, the Third World region with which China is most concerned. 4

These materials are of special interest because they are the only PRC world history text sources that contain sections on the post-World War II period. After a brief discussion on the formation of the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe and the post-war surge in industrial growth in the Soviet Union, the focus of attention turns to Asia. Although mention is made of the founding of the other "people's democracies" in Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia, only

4 The general characteristics summarized here reflect both the lower and upper middle school texts, their teachers' reference books and the world history self-study materials published and reprinted between 1955 and 1959. (Wang, 1956: 134-149); (Li and Yang, 1957: 118-139); (Shou, 1958: 241-260); (Ye, 1956: 132-142)
China's is singled out as being of historical significance, "the greatest event since the October Revolution. ... All peace loving people of the world are elated with the great changes in China because each change in new China signifies an increase in and consolidation of the forces of world peace." (Li and Yang, 1956:121)

The prominent Asian focus of this post-World War II section reflects China's own post-war foreign policies that were consciously oriented toward Asia. Responding quickly to current events, these texts pursue the theme of China as a leader of the international peace movement (pitted against the center of imperialist aggression - the United States) by including references to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's "five principles of international relations" set forth in the rapprochement with India in 1954. (Wang, 1956:149)5

The 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations is hailed in these texts as "the first international conference in human history where colonialist countries were not represented." (Li and Yang 1956:129) The texts point to American opposition to the Bandung Conference through its influence on members of the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO, both of which aimed to block Communist, namely Chinese, activities in the region. The teachers' and students' reference materials express the mid-1950s Chinese perspective that the spirit of the Bandung Conference marked the decline in

5 With slight variations these became the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" advanced by China and adopted in the resolution of the Bandung Conference the next year.
American imperialists' influence in Asia. Furthermore, in the new era of liberation and cooperation that had begun among Asian and African nations, China was taking a leading role. (Ye, 1956:138-142) (Shou, 1958:252-259) The role of the Conference in consolidating world peace drew attention in the Lishi Jiaoxue article by Yang Shanglin in 1958. The writer points out that in addition to the adoption of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, the Bandung meeting also declared support for the ten principles for promoting world peace and cooperation. (Yang, 1958:45)

In addition to the impact the conference had on the content of the world history texts, it also spurred interest in earlier Chinese relations with other Asian nations, including conference host Indonesia, and Burma, with whom China had a border question to settle. As Wang Gungwu noted, "obviously, direct political interest in these areas stimulated attention toward the nature of China's historical relations with Asian countries." (Wang, 1975:8) As mentioned before, Zhou Yiliang's 1955 History of Peace and Friendship between China and the Countries of Asia was the first book to respond to this stimulus. Zhou followed up in 1958 with a volume on the Ancient History of Asia, a more scholarly work in keeping with the authors' own specialty in ancient history.

The shortage of both scholars and sources in South, Southeast, and West Asian history made it necessary to
reprint Feng Chengzhun's nine volumes of Western translated sources on these regions.\textsuperscript{6} With few exceptions, however, new materials translated came mostly from Soviet materials. (Wang, 1975:9) The world history syllabus set by the Ministry of Higher Education reflected an Asian focus after 1955 and by the time the newly organized Congress of Asian-African Solidarity met for its second meeting in 1960 in Guinea, Beijing University had restructured its Asian course work as Afro-Asian history. (Wang, 1975:9)

The textbook materials and topical works on Third World regions in the world history literature support J. Camilleri's assessment of China's mid-1950s policy toward Third World nations as one that "by stressing the identity of interest between Communist China and neutralist Asia, Peking (sic) was attempting not only to heighten the long-term revolutionary significance of the movement for national independence but also to derive at least short term advantage from a buffer zone that might safeguard China against military attack." (Camilleri, 1980:82) Camilleri goes on to make the point made earlier in this study that even at the height of China's conciliatory phase of foreign policy after the Bandung Conference, Beijing always took pains to distinguish its notion of peaceful coexistence from the "active coexistence" advocated by the "Tito revisionist clique." (Renmin Ribao, eds., 1959:11)\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{6} These volumes included the works of G. Ferrand, L. Aurousseau, G.E. Harvey, P. Pelliot, E. Chavannes, and S. Levi to name a few.
The Asian-African focused world history materials of the mid and late 1950s, as already noted, included no mention of Latin America. This remaining Third World region, however, was not totally ignored in the journal literature. But here too the stress was on American political and economic intervention in the area in the post-World War II period. In an article on national liberation movements in Latin America, writer Su Lu introduces his main topic of American aggression in Latin America with a summary of the region's pre-colonial and colonial history down to the time of the 19th century independence struggles. These independence struggles are interpreted as

basically bourgeois revolutions. But, at the same time, the bourgeoisie of these countries (mainly the commercial bourgeois) was not mature and the proletariat not yet formed. None of the countries after independence had smashed the power of the landowners; on the contrary, it was consolidated and developed. With the exception of Haiti and Mexico after 1910, none were able to carry out land reform. (Yang, 1958:30)

Britain, and the United States are charged with taking advantage of the struggles to gain political and economic dominance in the area. By 1913, 1/5 of the total British foreign capital investments was in Latin America. After World

7 Tito's "active coexistence" purportedly opposed siding with either power bloc and opposed "all kinds of colonialism." In 1959, the Chinese saw only one kind of colonialism but, by the early 1970s, the Soviet Union came to be seen as a hegemony-seeking socialist imperialist power. This reassessment, as already discussed elsewhere in this study, permitted the normalization of state and Party relations between China and Yugoslavia.
War I, however, American influence in the region rapidly replaced Britain. "All these conditions," concluded Yang in this summary section, "caused Latin American countries after independence, not only to have a long period of sluggish economic development but also to gradually lose political and economic independence." (Yang, 1958: 30)

As the PRC was entering its second decade, China was more isolated within the socialist camp and tensions with the United States also mounted because of the Quemoy Crisis and the growing American presence in Indochina. Both of these factors, coupled with increasing domestic political radicalism, led Beijing from the eve of the Cultural Revolution to a more militant foreign policy stance. The effects of this shift on both the restoration theme in the English Bourgeois Revolution and on the principle lesson of the Paris Commune have already been discussed. Although the world history materials since the great leap forward no longer included a treatment of events much beyond World War II, nevertheless, the attention given to the history of colonization and the anti-colonialists' struggle of the Third World in modern world history increases significantly in the early 1960s. The 1962 series edited by Zhou Yiliang responded to China's expanding interest in global affairs by enlarging the scope of world history to include more on the Third World. In interpretations, however, it does not yet fully reflect the

8 This article's assessment is cited at some length to serve as a reference for comparison with interpretations in later textbook materials.
growing militance in China's foreign and domestic policies.

As might be expected from a series under the general editorship of Zhou Yiliang, the two volumes on modern history of his *General World History* gives nearly 1/3 (31%) of its attention to the Third World. Of the 1/3 devoted to the Third World, nearly 3/4 (73%) deal with Asia, with 15% going to Africa and 12% to Latin America. Unlike most of the secondary and post-secondary world history texts published after the Cultural Revolution, this work does not ignore China's own experience with colonialization and its anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle. Included in this are sections on China's economic, cultural, and political relations with its Asian neighbors (Zhou, 1972, pt. I: 104-108) and the influence of China on Europe in the 18th century (Zhou, 1972, pt. I: 108-111). Examples of Western colonial penetration in West Asia (Ottoman Empire, Iran), South Asia (India), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma), and East Asia (China, Korea, Japan) are given separate treatment in turn and resistance to colonial inroads is noted from the beginning.

In the chapters on Africa, separate attention is given to the various regions of the continent from the 16th through the 19th centuries. The slave trade receives topical treatment and is assessed as an imperialist crime with devastating effects on African development. Again the pattern of colonial intrusion followed by peoples' resistance is described.
Interest in Latin American history, according to one historian interviewed, was a by-product of China establishing diplomatic relations in the late 1950s with several countries from this region, then regarded as the "backyard" of Yankee imperialism. Doubtlessly, the victory of Castro in Cuba also stimulated interest in this area of the globe. By the early 1960s, Latin American history courses appeared in the curricula of several universities in Beijing and Shanghai. Language deficiencies, however, made working with primary sources a problem. As one Chinese historian in this field noted, few of the first Chinese historians of Latin American history could read either Portuguese or Spanish and thus learned their Latin American history mainly from the works of American historians.10

The chapters in the 1962 series on Latin America focus on the national independence movements of this first colonized region. The section on the significance of the independence struggles offers a mixed interpretation. While the heroic actions of the masses are stressed to illustrate that

9 In the case of sources for African history in the early 1960s, Wang Gungwu notes that where Soviet sources were inadequate, much of the materials came from British books and these were used to compile new and revised texts. (Wang, 1975:9) According to interviews, this series is no exception to the reliance on these "bourgeois" sources.

10 Specific mention was made of the writings of W.S. Robertson, John P. Humphery, J. Fred Rippy, Lewis Parkes, and for labor history, the works of Marxist historian, William Z. Foster. Most of these are pre-World War II works and some with pronounced political and cultural bias.
"only the people are the real makers of history," leadership of the independence movements was in the hands of the native born white landowning class (creoles). The creoles opposed colonial rule on the one hand but upheld large landed property on the other. Therefore, "the revolution did not shake the foundations of the old society... and after independence, the great landowners and the Catholic Church did not lose their basic position. This was an important cause for economic stagnation and for political despotic rule in several Latin American countries." (Zhou, 1972, pt. 1: 213) In spite of this negative assessment of the 19th century Latin American independence, the section closes by stressing the positive effects of the end of direct colonial control.

The victory of the independence wars created conditions for progressive development in Latin America. The system of colonial rule was abolished, republican rule was widely established, the authority of the Church was limited... the majority of the countries either partially or completely did away with the slave system and abolished the commercial monopolies, prohibitions, laws, and regulations which had obstructed the development of the productive forces in colonial times. The Latin American independence movements partially achieved the task of the bourgeois revolution. (Zhou, 1972, pt. 1: 213)

In part two of this series, a summary account of the political and economic conditions in Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries paints a picture of land-hungry peasants whose uprisings are repeatedly suppressed by native-born elites relying on the backing of one or more imperialists powers. The advent of British, French, and
especially American imperialism in the region is given prominent attention in the summaries. To illustrate these generalizations, individual attention is given to the nationalist movements in Cuba, Mexico, and Brazil. In the case of Cuba, the longstanding "revolutionary friendship" between China and Cuba is highlighted in the role of Chinese immigrant workers in the Cuban independence struggle. Jose Marti is quoted as saying in 1895 that "in the heroic struggle to achieve Cuban national independence, Chinese fought like tigers on the battlefield. They fervently shed their last drop of blood for Cuban independence." (Zhou, 1972, pt. 2: 347)

No mention is made of the wars and disputes among the newly independent states in Latin America. Neither are terms such as semi-colonial and semi-feudal used to characterize conditions in the region. For all Third World areas, armed struggle by the people is stressed and forms the thread of the Third World's response to colonialist powers. In keeping with the interpretations in other parts of the volume, here too, there are no charges of class restoration when the old ruling class takes power after the people have won the independence victory. Also, no identity is suggested between the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and between colonial powers and the colonial.

11 Perhaps the inclusion of this historical link between China and Cuba was a reflection of what Camilleri called a "skillful propaganda campaign" to discredit Soviet actions in Cuba and create an anti-Soviet faction within Cuba. (Camilleri, 1980: 106)
semi-colonial Third World in the late 19th century. Although such an assessments would have been in character with the more militant foreign policy after 1963, these views were reflectd in the world history literature only in the early 1970s because of the hiatus of the Cultural Revolution.

When Shi Jun renewed the call to study world history in 1972, the militant stance was clearly evident. The first of several Hong Qi articles between April and November of that year under this pen name concentrated on the common history of oppression of Third World nations and stressed that class struggle was the key link to understanding the nature of international relations in the period of capitalism and especially in its moribund stage of imperialism.

Though they are separated by mountains and rivers, the common struggle against colonial aggression has bound together the oppressed peoples and nations of the three continents. A knowledge of this history enables us to realize profoundly that the Chinese people and the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are class brothers and comrades-in-arms who are closely linked as flesh and blood and share weal and woe, and that China and the overwhelming majority of Asian, African, and Latin American countries belong to the Third World. (Shi, 1972a:9-10)

The example Shi Jun uses to illustrate the long arm of this imperialist link is the case of the "British colonialist bandit Gordon, who took part in suppressing the Taiping Revolution, (and) was killed by the Sudanese people when he went to Africa to repress them." (Shi, 1972a:9, parentheses
added) Drawing from the foreign policy propaganda slogan "where there is oppression there is resistance," modern and contemporary world history is said to be the "unceasing heroic struggle of the proletariat and oppressed nations and peoples...against capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism." (Shi, 1972b:23)

The study of imperialism and of the national liberation movement was the focus of Shi Jun's last two articles. Here, for the first time in the discussion of the Third World in the context of studying world history, appears the Leninist thesis that "because of the uneven political and economic development of imperialism, the world imperialist front would be broken through at where it is the weakest and the socialist revolution would triumph first in one or several countries." (Shi, 1973a:13) Ironically, by the early 1970s, the imperialist camp had acquired a new member from the Chinese point of view, namely, the Soviet "social-imperialists." In the article on the study of the national liberation movement, the interrelatedness of capitalist development in Europe and the rise of the Third World is seen as cause and effect. "The history of the world shows that modern colonialism emerged in the wake of the inception and growth of capitalism in Europe." (Shi, 1973b:18-19) Resistance is also seen as the dialectical opposite to the "invasion and enslavement" of imperialism.

12 It is interesting to note the increased number of accounts in the early 1970s in the political and popular press linking old and new Czarist aggression, especially against Eastern Europe.
Many of the positions implicit in Zhou Yiliang's 1962 world history text are boldly explicit in Shi Jun's articles. As already noted, these articles were compiled as a pamphlet and frequently reprinted in 1972-73. The world history materials that appeared over the next several years also reflected this emphasis on imperialism and the Third World struggle against it. When taken to the extreme, the reduction of the history of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to one of the anti-imperialist struggle had the effect of reducing the level of attention to Third World areas.  

Presumably, with their history integrated into the study of imperialism, it required only general references to make the point. The 1974 youth self-study volume, *History of Social Development*, done by the writing group of the Political Studies Department of Shanghai Shifan Daxue is an example of this extreme. Non-European areas are frequently interlaced with the European scene. In the modern period, much discussions is given to the nature of imperialism. In a brief two pages on how the growth of imperialism sharpened the contradictions between the colonial and semi-colonial areas and the imperialist metropolitan states, all three Third World regions are dealt with in caricature form while dwelling on the importance of the people's resistance. (Shanghai Shifan

13 Notably in this regard, Shi Jun's articles were titled "On Studying some history about Imperialism" and "On Studying some history of the national liberation movement."
The post-secondary world history textbooks of the early to mid-1970s, however, were less extreme in their emphasis on imperialism, although the percentage of their materials focused on the Third World tended to be less than in the 1962 series. In the 1974 modern world history by Zhongshan Daxue the emphasis on imperialism and the commonality of the anti-imperialists struggle is illustrated in the lumping together of several examples from all Third World regions in a single chapter designed to highlight the people's democratic revolutionary movement. (Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974:286-298, 344-358)

In the other two major post-secondary textbooks of this period, the chapters on the Third World are also a chronicle of resistance in response to oppression. The narrative of the people's movements is filled with references to their colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal Third World status. Some problems result from the attempt to force identity between these movements, however. One such problem was the assertion that the Haitian Revolution "set an example for..."
the people of Latin America who were striving for the cause of national independence." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973, pt. 1: 186) Such a generalization has little meaning when it becomes evident from the other examples that they happened twenty years later and that none followed the pattern of Haiti's slave revolt.

Asia still receives the most attention given to the Third World, over 50% in all three texts. China's own anti-imperialist struggles, however, are not dealt with directly. Instead, China is linked with other struggles in the region in ways similar to the examples of Cuba and "Chinese" Gordon already mentioned. For example, the Zhongshan Daxue text links the Indonesian and Chinese "people's" resistance in a section on their resistance to Dutch colonialism from the 17th to the 19th centuries. In addition to drawing parallels between Dutch territorial intrusion in Indonesia and in Taiwan, the participation of overseas Chinese in the 1740-1741 anti-colonial uprising in Java is said to "clearly show the traditional militant friendship of the Chinese and Indonesian people in their struggle against colonialism." Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974: 135)

16 A similar analysis is made in (Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi, 1974a: 115)

17 Just how militant that friendship was, had been a concern to the new military government of Suharto in September 1965 after severe anti-communist and anti-Chinese repression in Indonesia in the wake of Sukarno's fall.
Mutual support in the anti-imperialist struggles of Asian nations was the focus of the summary conclusion in the Shanghai Shifan Daxue text. Generalizing from the example of how 3,000 Chinese revolutionaries fled to Vietnam where they got a warm reception and support after a 1907 armed uprising failed, the text states that, "in the same way, revolutionaries from numerous other Asian nations were also active in giving support to the Chinese people. The history of revolution testifies to the traditional friendship of the Chinese people with the oppressed peoples' of Asia in the anti-imperialist anti-feudal revolution." (Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi, 1973, pt. 2: 173)

These early to mid-1970s world history textbooks were also infused with many quotes from Lenin's works on the nature of imperialism and Chairman Mao is cited regarding the character of protracted struggle with nearly as much frequency. These quotes are often aimed at pointing out the relationship between the political and economic crises within capitalist countries and the increase in resistance activities in Third World regions. The reductionist trend of the early 1970s to treat all Third World history as a series of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggles has not changed in the post-Mao period; if anything, Third World history has become more subsumed in the emphasis on imperialism. The 1982 publication of a revised edition of the Shanghai Shifan Daxue 1973 text, now properly credited
to Lin Judai, had basically no changes in the section on the Third World.

In the 1978 trial version of the new full-time upper middle school world history texts covering modern and contemporary history, only 19% of the focus is on the Third World. Some of these sections have generalized headings such as "the new era of national liberation movements" and "the new high tide of national liberation movements and the anti-fascist struggle of the people in capitalist countries."

This text asserts that the October Revolution opened a new era and that, "from this point on, the revolutions of the oppressed peoples were no longer part of the old bourgeois or capitalist world revolution but were a part of the new proletarian socialist world revolution." The only problem with this assertion is that all the examples cited are either anti-imperialist struggles with bourgeois leadership as in Egypt, or an anti-feudal bourgeois revolution as in Turkey under Kemal, or bourgeois-democratic movements as in Latin America. In other words, none of these examples, as dealt with, illustrate or even suggest an ideological shift to socialism in the nature of Third World resistance.

Another change in this new middle school text of the late 1970s and early 1980s is, that while making clear the common condition of oppression by imperialism, little attempt is made to show solidarity of support among the Third world nations in their struggle against imperialism. The 1982
This waning attention to Third World solidarity in the world history literature may well reflect the fact that, by the late 1970s, China had normalized relations with Japan and the United States of America; economic cooperation with capitalist imperialist nations had become more important than opposition against them. In the closing section of his article on the emergence of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, Liu Simu, of the World History Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out how in the past China had resolutely united with other Third World countries in their struggles against imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism while at all times strictly respecting the sovereignty of all, giving aid with no strings attached, and making no demands for special privileges. "In the past, it was this way. In the days ahead, according to our economic development, we will continue as in the past, in increasing this (economic) aspect on the premise of the five principles of
peaceful coexistence, carrying forward and expanding "South-South cooperation...." (Liu,1983:9, parentheses added) Liu, however, does not ignore the obstacles to economic cooperation between Third World states, citing the current troubles within such Third World organizations as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the Islamic National Congress, and the on-going war between Iran and Iraq. While different levels of economic development among Third World nations are credited to their different national histories, it is also noted that this makes exchange of mutual benefit, one of the five principles, difficult to achieve at times. (Liu,1983:9) This situation clearly poses limitations on China's economic cooperation with the Third World, especially since China now seeks to acquire state-of-the-art technology in the effort to advance rapidly.

On the one hand, as China's international political and economic attention shifts toward its relations with the developed capitalist and socialist nations, it seems unlikely that the treatment of Third World nations in the world history literature will take on more depth. Neither would the current emphasis on the development of the productive forces find many applications in Third World regions where such development is conspicuously absent. On the other hand, however, it is possible that as more and more primary sources become available to a new generation of more highly trained historians, an attempt will be made to
refocus the treatment of Third world history to include more stress on the systematic process of Third World underdevelopment (similar to the approach now being taken in the Western literature) and less on its resistance to imperialism.
Chapter Six
Conclusions and Perspectives
on New Directions

Although academic interest in world history takes a distant second place to the interest in China's own past among Chinese historians, world history is, nonetheless, an established field of historical study and is firmly entrenched in the secondary and post-secondary history curricula, a situation not matched in the United States. The study undertaken here sheds light on the nature of political interest in world history, exposes the main thread of an interpretation of modern world history, and suggests at least two kinds of political uses of world history in post-1949 China.

Political interest in the writing of world history has been illustrated here in the careers of some historians and in the impact of political campaigns on the production of world history materials and on shifting the emphasis of historical interpretations. The careers of the two Zhous (Zhou Gucheng and Zhou Yiliang), for example, span the entire period under study. The works of both of these world historians have been criticized for being overly faithful to their sources, the elder Zhou, Zhou Gucheng, to Western secondary works of the early 1900s, the younger Zhou, to mainly Soviet and Japanese sources of a later generation. The
glimpses of their careers seen in this study show that both men were politically active and served in leadership capacities within the academic community and in government.\footnote{Zhou Yiliang's academic and political connections have already been discussed. Zhou Gucheng was head of the History Department at Fudan University before the Cultural Revolution. At age 85, he is currently head of the government Council on Education, Culture, Science, and Health.} Their careers, along with those of others such as Yang Renpian and Lei Haizong, were also shaped by the vicissitudes of various political campaigns.

These campaigns also effected the production of world history materials and the selection of authors and editors frequently had political implications, as in the case of the aborted project to write a college level world history in the late 1950s. The speed with which policy changes were at times reflected and even anticipated in the world history literature seems to indicate a fairly responsive political-bureaucratic apparatus within a comparatively small but politically active group of historians.

By this it is not meant to imply that all scholars in world history are politicians, but rather that even scholarship of purely academic intent remains subject to political scrutiny that effectively controls its dissemination. For example, a scholar who wanted to argue that modern world history began in the 16th century with European global exploration and not in 17th century England, may get local or even national circulation for his ideas (depending on the
political climate) but no textbooks would reflect this view, no review books for examinations or reference works would mention arguments for anything other than the English Bourgeois Revolution as the starting point of modern world history. All this suggests that Kahn and Feuerwerker's observation made twenty years ago still holds true: "the writing of history continues to occupy under the present regime, as under its predecessors, a critical place among the preoccupations of the ruling strata." (Kahn and Feuerwerker, 1965:13)

Political interest has had an equally significant impact on altering the emphasis of historical interpretation in world history. The main task of Chinese historians in world history since the mid-1950s has been to trace the revolutionary movements of the modern world in such a way as to reveal the inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism and to depict the victory of the Chinese revolution as the logical outgrowth of this global revolutionary trend. The adoption of this revolutionary conceptualization of world history resulted in writing modern world history textbooks and materials oriented mainly toward the political events of Western Europe. Taking their lead from the Soviet historiography of the 1950s and emphasizing the role of the masses in making history, the English Bourgeois Revolution was established as the start of this modern revolutionary process. Although it is generally assessed as not having been
a thorough-going revolution, it is seen as the first revolution to make the political shift necessary for achieving the bourgeois-capitalist dictatorship. The sequence of revolutions following this 17th century beginning leads through the American and the French bourgeois revolutions and the industrial revolution to a bourgeois-capitalist society that produced its own "grave diggers" in the form of the proletariat. The uprising of Paris workers in 1871 is credited with inaugurating the proletarian revolutionary movement, making this erstwhile minor event a major turning point in modern world history leading directly to the success of the October Revolution and via this connection to the new-democratic socialist revolution in China.

This cursory link served to connect the Chinese revolution led by the CCP to the long line of emerging world revolutions and reaffirmed Mao's pre-Liberation assessment that a communist party could viably exist and bring about a new democratic-socialist revolution in agrarian China only because of the existing conditions of world imperialism. This revolutionist link became strained in the early 1960s when debate within the socialist camp and among the Chinese leadership openly questioned the correctness of following the Soviet development model for China's particular conditions. Asserting that China's revolution had inevitably followed the socialist revolution of Russia did not mean

2 As already noted, the other great legitimimizer in the CCP's victory, the peasant masses, also received credit for being the makers of world history.
that China should also follow it in approaches to socialist construction. Furthermore, the divergent foreign policy needs of the two socialist giants resulted in a clash of world views that broke China's link with the majority of socialist states and effectively dissolved the socialist camp.

As the Soviets moved toward detente with the West, China moved toward a more militant anti-imperialist position. In the rhetorical and geopolitical contention between the CCP and the CPSU, China began to assert that the Chinese revolution was the major remaining legitimate heir to this world revolutionary movement since the Soviet Union had become revisionist. Although the world history literature at times responded rapidly to changes in policy, the world view that made its way into the textbook interpretations was often more conservative than the corresponding political rhetoric. The situation of the early 1960s illustrates this point. As the image of China as a revolutionary model for other Third World nations to emulate emerged stronger in the Sino-Soviet dispute, discussion of post-1949 China disappeared from the text books and even the treatment of China's pre-Liberation history has deteriorated since that time reducing Chinese history in the world context to a catechism of anti-imperialism.

One explanation for this curious inverse relationship lies in the Eurocentric premise of the revolutionist conceptualization of world history that has presented some lasting
contradictions when Chinese historians were faced with the actual task of meshing Chinese history into world history. Despite the repeated attacks on Eurocentric world history, the Marxist assumption that the main trend of modern world historical development is the growth and decline of capitalism and the birth of socialism, has thus far dictated that the writing of modern world history in the PRC be mainly on European developments. In keeping with this European focus, even China's relations with its Asian neighbors are viewed in light of their mutual solidarity in opposing imperialism and developing the national liberation movements that rose in revolutionary response to it. Thus, imperialism (first at the hands of the Europeans, later joined by the Americans and the Japanese) is seen as providing the major impetus for the changes in modern Chinese history. While failing to explain why China itself did not develop into a capitalist society from its feudal past (presumed to have existed in the Marxist view), the revolutionist conceptualization does offer a tool to critique both China's

3 For somewhat different reasons, Western world history works share this Eurocentric focus and scholars and educators are still grappling with the problem of providing a global conceptualization of world history. A recent conference report on world studies courses in high schools listed this as the number one problem facing American social studies teachers. The two other main problem areas were textbooks that do not present a global approach to world history and the large numbers of teachers who know little about world history and are ill-prepared to teach world studies courses. (Remy and Woyach, 1984:3)
traditional past and the modern west. It also gives reasons for China falling behind economically and holds forth the prospect that, as Levenson put it, "instead of being a laggard, following in western footsteps," revolutionary China, led by the CCP, was charting a new course. (Levenson, 1968:134)

Changes in the scope, emphasis, and interpretation of world history in response to shifts in domestic and foreign policy since the early 1960s, seems to indicate that the civics function of world history has gone beyond simply justifying the new political order and has also been used to legitimize current policy. Historical examples of class restoration, as seen in the English Bourgeois Revolution, served to support China's "revisionist" assessment of the Soviet Union, while the threat of class restoration provided a fundamental reason for the necessity "to continue the revolution" within China. The history of the Paris Commune was also used in the "revisionist" critique of the Soviet Union and was offered as an ideal to inspire changes in political and productive relations in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Even though the post-Mao leadership in China has dropped the stress on "politics in command," historians are still exhorted to make the past, including the non-Chinese past, serve the present.

As the focus of the current Chinese leadership turns toward developing China's productive forces and away from
the former focus on class struggle (the revolutionist view), the function of education also seems to be shifting toward an emphasis on education as "a tool of the struggle for production...." (Zhang and Xie, 1979) It follows that a view of world history conceptualized along the more revolutionary aspects of Marxism may also prove unsuitable for carrying out the "social function" of world history in the struggle to develop China's productive forces. If this logic holds true, changes along the lines suggested at the close of Chapter Five might be expected.

Obviously, the three case studies focused on in this study do not exhaust all the important points of interest in gaining a full understanding of the world view reflected in China's post-1949 world history literature. One such area of interest touched on in passing here, but certainly deserving of deeper analysis is the increased attention given to the emergence and development of the international communist movement. Investigation of this topic potentially offers a Chinese perspective on the nature of the major ideological and political problems among socialist parties and states of the world.

Of equal interest to the subjects stressed in world history are the omission of topics from the texts. Because of its focus on political history, Chinese world histories all but ignore the social, cultural and, to a surprising degree, economic developments that accompanied political change in Europe.
Closer study of these omissions could give insight into the molding of images of capitalist society conveyed in the world history literature. The conspicuous omission of an adequate treatment of modern China in the context of world history begs for a comparison study between the world views reflected in modern world history and modern Chinese history works. Such comparisons promise to probe the problem of "residual traditionalism," as Levenson expressed it, among Chinese Marxist historians. (Levenson, 1968:145)4

Another area of interest that exceeds the bounds of this study is the whole scope of interpretation of pre-modern world history. Questions such as whether the Eurocentric perspective dominates the ancient and medieval past, what structural concepts are used and how they are related to the revolutionist concept of the modern world era, all these and other aspects offer valuable topics for further research.

This initial investigation into the writing of world history in the PRC, therefore, has only opened the door on a potentially rich source for research into the making of a Sino-Marxist world view.

4 All the scholars interviewed acknowledged the problem of omitting China from modern world history. When queried as to why this problem persists, nearly all responded that China has a long and complex past that would be difficult to digest and integrate into world history.
Bibliography

Western Language Sources

Ballard, M. ed.

Barraclough, Geoffrey

Beasley, W.C. and E.G. Pulleyblank, eds.

Bettelheim, Charles and N. Burton

Black, Cyril E., ed.

Boorman, Howard

Brome, Vincent

Burns, Edward and Philip Ralph

Camilleri, Joseph
1980 Chinese Foreign Policy, the Maoist Era and its Aftermath Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Charbonnier, Jean

Chen Boda

Chesneaux, Jean
1976 "La Contradiction principale des etudes Chinoises," Le Mal Devoi, cashiers jussieu 2, Universite de Paris VII.

Chi Hsin
Chien Chiao

Chinese Communist Party, Eighth Central Committee,

Chinese Communist Party, Central Committee General Office, eds.

Cohen, Paul A.

Costa Richard H.

Crane-Byng, J.L.

Croizier, Ralph

d'Encausse and S. Schram

Deng Xiaoping

Dickson, Lovat

Dirlik, Arif

Draper, Hal, ed.

Enteen George

Esherick, Joseph W.
Fairbank, J.K., ed.

Fei Xiaotong

Feuerwerker, Albert

Feuerwerker, A., ed.

Feuerwerker, A. and S. Chang

Feuerwerker, A., R. Murphy, and M. Wright, eds.

Fitzgerald, C.P.
1965 "The Chinese Middle Ages in Communist Historiography," China Quarterly, no. 23, 106-121

Fitzgerald, Frances

Gardener, Charles

Goldman, Merle

Goldman, Merle

Grieder, Jrome B.

Gurtov, Melvin and Byong-Moo Hwang
Harrison, James P.

Herr, N.W.

Hsiung, James Chieh

Hulsewe, A.F.P.

Hummel Authur, trans.

Israel, John

Johnson, Chalmers

Kagarlitski, J.

Khan, Howard and A. Feuerwerker

Keep, John, ed.

Kim, Samuel S.

Langer, William L.

Laslett, Peter
Levenson, J.R.

MacFarquhar, Roderick

Mackay, John, Bennett Hill, and John Buckler

McNeill, William H.

Mancall, Mark

Mao Zedong
Mao Zedong
1969 "Talk Before Central Committee Leaders (21 July 1966)," translated in U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong, Current Background, 891, 58.
1974 Miscellany of Mao Tsetung Thought (1948-69) pts. 1, 2. Arlington, Joint Publication Research Services (JPRS# 61269-1, 2).

Martin, Dorothea

Marx, K. and F. Engels

Mazour, A.G.

Medlin, William K.

Meisner, Maurice

Mellon, Stanley

Moody, Peter, Jr.

Moraze, Charles, ed.

Munro, Donald J.

Ojha, Ishwer C.
Pang Zhuoheng

Pepper, Suzanne

Pokrovskii, M.N.

Read, Conyers

Remy, Richard and Robert Woyach
1984 Strengthening High School World Studies Courses (Conference Report) Columbus: Ohio State University-Mershon Center.

Renmin Ribao and Hong Qi, eds.

Renmin Ribao, Hong Qi, and Jiefang Jun Bao, eds.

Sawer, Marian

Schneider, Lawrence

Schulkind, Eugene

Schwartz, B.

Segal, Gerald, ed.

Selden, Mark
Shi Jun

Sokolsky, G. E.
1928 Outline of Universal History. Shanghai: Commercial Press.

Starr, John

Stavrianos, L. S.
1981 Global Rift, the Third World Comes of Age. New York: William Marrow and Company, Inc.

Steklov, G. M.

Suhulkind, Eugene, ed.

Tai Yi

Uhalley, Stephen, Jr.

Unger, Jonathan
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1934 "On the Teaching of Civic History in Schools in the USSR, (decree of the Council of People's Commissaries of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party - Bolshevik)," in The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 13, no. 37, 204-205.

Van Kley, Edwin J.

Vyatkin, R.V. and S.L. Tikhvinsky

Wallerstein, Immanuel

Wallerstein, Immanuel, and T. Hopkins

Wallerstein, I., ed.

Wang Gungwu

Wells H.G.

Whiting, Allen S.

Willis, Roy F.

Yu Ping-Kuen

Zhang Anmin and Xie Jinglong

Zhukov, E.M.
Chinese Languages Sources

Ai Siqi (艾思奇)
1958 社会历史首先是生产者的历史 劳动创造人类的世界 (Shehui lishi shouxin shi shengchangzhe de lishi: laodong chuangzao renlei de shijie), Beijing: San Lian Shudian Chuban.

1961 巴黎公社必将遍布全世界 （"Bali gongshe bijiang bianhu quan shijie,"）EMRB, 18 March, 7.

1979 巴黎公社的一切公职人员都是选举产生的吗？ （"Bali gongshe de yiqie gongzhi Renyuan dou shi xuanju chan sheng de ma?;"）Shijie Lishi, no.5, 82.

1971 巴黎公社-纪念·巴黎公社-一百周年. （Bali gongshe-Jinian Bali Gongshe yi bai zhou nian.）Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She.

Bao Qichang, et al. (包启昌)
1956 世界近代史教学法 （Shijie Jindai Shi jiaoxue fa.）pt.1, Shanghai: Xin Zhishi Chuban She.

Beijing Daxue Lishi Xi (北京大学历史系)
1974a 越南世界史 近代部分， （Jianmingshijie Shi, Jindai bufen）Beijing: Renmin Chuban She.

1974b 世界近代史讲话 , （Shijie Jindai Shi Jianghua.）Beijing: Renmin Chuban She.

Cao Bohan (曹伯韩)
1950 世界历史 , （Shijie Lishi.）Shanghai: San Lian Shudian.

Cao Tejin and Sun Yoawen (曹特金, 孙耀文)
1979 巴黎公社的民主选举制 , （"Bali gongshe de minzhu xuanju zhi,"）Shijie Lishi, no. 1, 11-19.

Chen Baohui (陈宝辉)

Chen Chongwu (陈崇武)

Chen Hefu (陈鹤夫)
1963 资产阶级国家观的反动本质, （"Zhan jieji guojia guan de fan dong benzhi,"）GMRB, 14 October, 2.

Chen Zhihuai (陈之华)
1979 世界史研究与四个现代化 , （"Shijie shi yanjiu yu si ge xianzhai hua,"）Shijie Lishi, 3-8.

Cheng Peide (程培德)
1965 反国际共运的民主合作论, （"Bo Zhou Gucheng de dizhu dian ke 'hezuo' lun,"）GMRB, 13 January, 4.

Cheng Qiyuan (程秋原)
1965 批判资产阶级世界史, （"Ping Zhou Gucheng zhu Shijie Tong Shi,"）GMRB, 10 March, 4.
Daerli, ed. (达尔力）
1950 近代史数据， (Jindai Shi Jiaochong,) Du Kezhan, trans.
Beijing: Xinhua Shubian

Duan Wanhan (段万翰)
1977 巴黎公社的故事， (Bali gongshe de Gushi,) Shanghai:
Renmin Chuban She.
"Du Shi Zhaji" (杜史札记)
1979 巴黎公社的一切公职人员都是选举产生的吗 ?，("Bali gongshe
de yi qie gongzhi renyuan dou shi xuanju chansheng de ma?")
Shijie Lishi, no.5, 82.

He Changqun (何昌群)
1961 关于古代东方封建国家土地所有制的几条札记。("Guanyu gudai
dongfang fengjian guojia tudi suo zhi de jiu jiao zhaji,") GMRB, 30 August, 4.

He Ju (何jumlah)
1953 建议开展世界史的研究工作，("Jianyi Kiazhan shijie shi de
yanjiu gongzuo,") GMRB, 12 December, 5.

He Zuorong (何作蓉)
1980 也谈 “亚细亚生产方式”，("Ye tan ‘yasiya shengchan

Hu Daicong (胡代聪)
1955 巴黎公社， (Bali gongshe,) Beijing:
Tonggu Chuban She.

Hu Yutang (胡玉堂)
1979 亚 社会发展史，("Ping Shehui Fazhan Shi,")
Shijie Lishi, no.2, 80-84.

Ji Taoda (季同达)
1957 阿克塞的停留,1895年吗？("Makesi zhuyi tingliu
zai 1895 nian ma?") GMRB, 28 April, 8.

Ji Wenfu (季文夫)
1956 关于历史评价问题，(Guanyu Lishi Pingjia Wenti.)
Beijing: Renmin chuban she.

Jian Bocai (贾伯才)
1949 历史学的教程， (Lishi Zhuxue Jiaochong.)
Zhang Chun: Xin Zhongguo Shuju.

Jiang Mengyin (蒋孟引)
1957 第一次世界大战， (Diyici Shijie Dazhan.)
Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She.
1982 论文化领域，("Lun Kewenle,"" Nanjing Daxue
Xuebao, no. 2, 48-59.

Jiang Zongzhi (江宗祺)
1956 普法战争中法德两国工人的反抗斗争，("Pu-Fa zhanzheng
zhong Fa-De liang guo gongren de fasheng douzheng,)")
Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 11, 28-29.

Jin Xiheng, et al. (金锡亨)
1963 关于世界通史 (苏联科学院编) 有关朝鲜的叙述的严重错误
("Guanyu Shijie tong shi (Sulian kexue yuan pian) you yu
chaoxian de xushu de yanzheng cuowu,"") Lishi Yanjiu,
no.5, 11-28.
Kaierrencefu (凯尔任策夫)

Lei Haizong (雷海宗)
1957 社会科学需要不断发展，但是马克思主义还停留在1895年的地方
("Shehui kexue xuyao buduan fazhan, danshi makesi zhuyi hai tingliu zai 1895 nian de difang,"") RMRB, 22 April, 3.

Li Chunwu (李纯武)
1956 第一国际与巴黎公社，("Diyi guoji yu Bali gongshe,")
Lishi Jiaoxue, no. 11, 22-24.

Li Chunwu and Yang Shengmao (李纯武, 杨生茂)
1957 世界近代现代史，(Shijie jindai xindai Shi, di san ban.) vola.1,2. Wuhan: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Li Chunwu and Shou Jiyu, et al. (李纯武, 肖纪瑜)
1981 简明世界通史，(Jianming Shijie Tong Shi.) Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Li Dazhao (李大钊)
1959 集集，(Xuan Ji.) Beijing: Renmin Chuban She.

Li Jiaji (李家基)
1957 东欧各国对历史科学院的歪曲和反对中国史分期问题研究的谬论
("Chi Lei Haizong dui lishi kexue de weiqu he fandui Zhongguo shi fenqi wenti yanjiu de miulun,"") Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 6, 35-38.

Li Shu (栗书)
1961 毛泽东同志的改造我们的学习和中国历史科学
("Mao Zedong tongzhi de 'gaizao women de xuexi' he Zhongguo lishi kexue,") RMRB, 7 July, 7.

Lin Judai (林其海)
1951 外国近代史纲，(Waiguo jindai Shigeng.) Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

1964 论法国资产阶级和无产阶级革命，("Lun Faguo zizhan jieji shengli hou fengjian jieji de fubi,"") Huadong Shida Xuebao, no. 1, 31-40.

1982 世界近代史，(Shijie Jindai Shi.) Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She.

Lishajialai (李沙加列)
1962 1877年公社史，(yi ba qi yi nian gongshe Shi.) Beijing: San Lian Shudain.

Liu Huiming (刘惠明)
1966 巴黎公社的全面选举，("Bali gongshe de quanmian xuanju zhi,) Hong Qi, no. 11, 36-37.

Liu Simu (刘思穆)

Liu Wenying (刘文英)
1957 巴黎公社政教的性质及其特点，("Bali gongshe zhengguo de xingzhi jiqi tedian,"") Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 2, 34-38.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Journal/Book</th>
<th>Pages/Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liu Wen Ying</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>关于美法资产阶级革命史教学的基本问题</td>
<td>Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 7</td>
<td>25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Zongxu</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>论法国资产阶级革命中的无政府派</td>
<td>Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 7</td>
<td>25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Xiaoping</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>同谷是殖民主义残余的护符</td>
<td>Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 7</td>
<td>25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Zhenyu</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>问题集中，（《史论集》）</td>
<td>Beijing: San Lian Shudian.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo Rongqu</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>历史史学的发展的内在动力与终极目标的内在联系</td>
<td>Lishi Jiaoxue, no. 5</td>
<td>3-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makesi, Engebi,</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>论巴黎公社，（《Lun Bali gongshe.》）</td>
<td>Beijing: Renmin Shuban She.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molouke</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>米留克在巴黎公社中阐明人民群众的决定作用</td>
<td>Lishi Jiaoxue, no. 2</td>
<td>14-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Runhan</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>论法国资产阶级革命中的封建残余问题</td>
<td>GMRB, 24 October, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qi Sihe, et al.</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>历史科学史研究的评述</td>
<td>RMFB, 21 January, 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qi Wenying</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>论英国资产阶级革命时期的封建残余问题</td>
<td>GMRB, 23 October, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1972《全国新书目》（Quanguo Xin Shumu.） Beijing: Beijing Tushuguan Banben Shuku.
1973-80《全国新书目》（Quanguo Xin Shumu.） Beijing: Quanguo Xin shumu Bianji Bu.
1972-77 全国总书目，(Quanguo Zong Shumu.) Beijing: Guojia Chuban Shiye Guanli Ju Banben Tushuguan.
1979 全国总书目，(Quanguo Zong Shumu.) Beijing: Zhonghuo Bananhu Tushuguan.

Renmin Jiaoyu (人民教育)
1958 初级中学课本世界历史上册教学参考书，(Chuji Zhongxue Keben Shi jie Lishi Shang Ce Jiaoxue Cankao Shu.) Shanghai: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.
1978 世界历史，(Shi jie Lishi.) Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Renmin Ribao, eds. (人民日报)
1961 巴黎公社的伟大创举，("Bali gongshe de weida chunagj;") RMRB, 18 March, 1,4.
1961 永远发扬巴黎公社的伟大精神，("Yongyuan fayang Bali gongshe de geming jingshen;") RMRB, 18 March, 4.

Ri Zhi (日知)

Shanghai Shifan Daxue Lishi Xi (上海师范大学历史系)
1973 世界近代史，(Shi jie Jindai Shi.) vols. 1, 2, Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She.
1975 世界史进展，近现代部分，(Shi jie Shi Hua, jin.xindai bufen.) Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She.

Shanghai Shifan Daxue Zhengjiao Xi (上海师范大学政教系)
1974 社会发展史，(Shehui Fazhan Shi.) Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She.

Shanghai Fuxing Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoyen Zu (上海市复兴中学历史教研组)
1958 关于巴黎公社一系列问题的研讨，("Guanyu 'Bali gongshe' yizhang jiaoxue wenti de yanasi;") Lishi Jiaoxue Wenti, no. 11, 19-21.

Shen Zhanghong (沈长红)
1951 初等外国史课程，下册，(Chuxue Waiguo Lishi Keben, xia ce.) Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chuban she.

Shi Dongxiang (施东香)
1961 纪念巴黎公社，("Jinian Bali gongshe,"') Hong Qi, no. 6, 5-8.
1962 阶级斗争规律的不能忘记的，("Jieji douzhen guili shi buneng wangji de,"') Hong Qi, no. 22, 12-22.

Shijie Shanggu Shi Xian bian xie zu (世界上古史纲)
Shou Jiyu and Yao Yongbin (寿纪瑜,姚永滨)
1958 初级中学课本世界历史下册教学参考书, (Chūji Zhōngxué Kèben Shìjié Lishi Xià Ce Jiàoxué Cankao Shū.) Shanghai: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Shou Jiyu and Li Chunwu (寿纪瑜,李纯武)
1982 世界历史, (Shìjié Lishi.) Zhejiang: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Song Min (宋敏)

Sulian Kexueyuan Shìjié Lìshì Yanjiu Suǒ (苏联科学院世界历史研究所)
1982 1971年巴黎公社史 下册, (Yībā qì yī nián Páli Gōngshù Shǐ, xià zuò.) Chengdu: Chengdu Chuban She.

Su Lu (苏禄)

Wang Jiaying and Wang Hongzhi (王家英,王洪志)

Wang Zhijiu (王志九)
1956 世界历史 下册, (Shìjié Lishi, xià zuò.) Shanghai: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Wang Zhijiu and Yao Yongbin (王志九,姚永滨)
1958 初级中学课本世界历史上册教学参考书, (Chūji Zhōngxué Kèben Shìjié Lishi Xià Ce Jiàoxué Cankao Shū.) Shanghai: Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She.

Wei Hongyu (魏宏育)

Wei Qiwen (魏其文)

Weng Dacao (翁大昭)

Wu Jiang (吴江)
1978 历史辩证法论集, (Lishi Biānzhèng Fǎ Lùn jí.) Beijing: Renmin Chuban She.

Wu Jiemin (吴介民)


1961 Wu Tingqiu (吴廷球) 建立世界史的新体系，("Jianli shijie shi de xin tixi," ) GMRB, 10 April, 4.


1958 Yang Shanglin (杨尚林) 亚非会议在巩固世界和平中的作用，("Yafei huiyi zai gonggu shijie heping de zuoyong," ) Lishi Jiaoxu Wenti no. 6, 44-46, 6.

1961 Yang Zhijiu (杨志九) 如何体会经典作家关于东方土地制度的理论，("Ruhe tihui jingdian zhuojia guangyu dongfang tuodi liliun?," ) GMRB, 10 May, 4.


1964 Ye Zuozhou, et al. (叶作舟等) 初中世界历史 (自学参考用书)，("Chu Zhong Shijie Lishi Jianghua(sixue cankao yong shu.) Zhejiang: Renmin Chuban She.

1952 Yu Peiming (俞沛明) 近代世界史，上一下，("Jindai Shijie Shi, shang-xia ce ce." ) Shidai Chuban She.


Zhang Yaqin and Ri Jianfu (张雅琴, 白建夫)  

Zhang Youlun (张友伦)  
1972 第二国际(历史知识读物), (Di er Guoji (Lishi Zhishi Duwu), Beijing: Shangfuyin Shuguan.

Zhang Zhilian (张芝联)  
1964 赫尔城是彻底的'欧洲中心论者' , ("Zhou Gucheng shi hetou chewei wei de 'ouzhou zhongxin lun' zhe," ) GMRB, 3 December, 4.

Zhang Zhongshi (张忠思)  

Zhao Chengde and He Chunliang (赵承德, 何纯良)  

Zhao Keyoa and XuDaoxun (赵克华, 蒋道勋)  
1961 从经典著作中看土地国有制 (Cong jiangdian zhe zuo kan fengjian tudu youzhi,) GMRB, 16 August, 4.

Zhao Ruifang (赵瑞芳)  
1965 关于法国玻利维亚探险的原因问题 , (Guanyu Faguo beipang wangchao fubi de yuan yi wenti," ) GMRB, 14 July, 4.

Zhi Chun and Xue Sheng (白纯, 孙盛)  

Zhong Guojian, ed. (钟国简)  
1971 巴黎公社, (Bali gongshe,) Xianggang: Chaoyang Chuban She.

Zhongshan Daxue Lishi Xi (中山大学历史系),  
1974 世界通史, (Shijie Tong Shi,) Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chuban She.

Zhongyang Renmin Guangbo Diantai Gouji Bubian (中央人民广播电台国际部编)  
1982 世界历史之窗, (Shijie Lishi Zhi Chuang,) Beijing: Guangbo Chuban She.

Zhou Gucheng (周谷城)  
1958 世界通史, (Shijie Tong Shi,) Shanghai: Shangfuyin Shuguan.


1962b 艺术创作的历史地位 , ("Yishu chuangzu de lishi diwei," ) Xin Jianshe, no. 168, 64-70.
Zhou Gucheng (周谷城)
1963a 《评关于艺术创作的一些问题》, ("Ping 'Guanyu yishu chuangzuozuo de yixie wenti',") Xin Jianshe, no. 174, 93-97.
1963b 《统-整体与分别反映》, ("Tongyi zhenti yu fenbie fanying,"）
GMRB, 7 November, 2.

Zhou Yiliang, ed. (周一良)
1972 《世界通史 近代部分 上下冊》, (Shijie Tong Shi--Jindai bufen, shang, xia ce.) Beijing: Renmin Chuban She.

Zhu Bo and Zhang Hui (朱波, 郑惠)
1962 《列宁论过渡时的阶级斗争》, (Liening lun guo du shiqi de jieji doujeng,) Hong Qi, nos. 23-24, 5-14.

Zhu Xiaoyuan (朱小元)
1981 《马克思认为英国资产阶级革命是保守的吗？》 ("Makesi renwei Yingguo zichan jieji geming shi baoshou de ma?,")
Shijie Lishi, no. 4, 85-87.