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FROM TEMPO TO MEIJI: FUKUOKA HAN IN LATE TOKUGAWA JAPAN

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FROM TEMPÔ TO MEIJI:
FUKUOKA HAN IN LATE TOKUGAWA JAPAN

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN HISTORY

AUGUST 1981

By

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Historians have long been intrigued by the Meiji Restoration, the events leading to it, and its significance in the subsequent development of Japan. Most studies to this point, however, have centered on the successful participants in the Restoration drama or on the exploits and thought of the radical activists. Although recent publications have discussed the roles of the fudai daimyo and the bakufu, little attention has been granted to the numerous other domains, and their influence upon the Restoration movement. This dissertation questions the legacy of the Meiji bias towards the victors of the Restoration and attempts a deeper understanding of the forces leading to the Meiji coup d'etat through an analysis of one of the major southwestern han generally regarded as unsuccessful in the Restoration movement.

Strategically located in northwest Kyushu, Fukuoka han was one of the great tozama domains of Tokugawa Japan. Ruled by the Kuroda family, Fukuoka maintained particularly close relationships with the bakufu, the Nijō family at Court, and with Satsuma. It shared with Hizen the responsibility for the defense of Nagasaki and throughout the nineteenth century the Kuroda lords were deeply involved in Western Studies. In addition, Fukuoka became an early hotbed of loyalist activity and later developed as a meeting ground for loyalist sympathizers from many domains. These factors, in conjunction with Fukuoka's geographical position, created a unique position for Fukuoka as a "middle ground," intermediary between contending sides in bakumatsu politics. In this environment, Fukuoka stood in a position to
exercise considerable influence upon the development of the Restoration movement.

Despite its significance Fukuoka han has remained relatively un-researched, and the present study is the first comprehensive analysis in any language of Fukuoka's role in the developments of bakumatsu Japan. The dissertation first outlines the historical background of the locale, describes its peculiar role in the bakuhan system, and summarizes the han status and administrative systems. An overview of the economic situation is given and the initial failure of the Tempō reforms is shown not to be the decisive factor in the han's "failure" in the Meiji Restoration. A discussion of developments during the 1850's follows, focusing on the role of the daimyo, Kuroda Nagahiro, in encouragement of modernization and involvement with the national politics surrounding Shimazu Nariakira. Throughout the dissertation special attention is paid to the vitality of the bakuhan system and to the influence and complexity of matrimonial, adoptive, and other relationships binding bakufu, Court, and han.

The study also details Fukuoka's role in the complex machinations of the final decade of Tokugawa rule and explains the immediate causes behind its failure to become a leader in the Restoration. It traces the development of a vocal loyalist group within Fukuoka and the ensuing conflict with the daimyo's professed policy of national harmony and kobugattai (unity of Court and bakufu). When the Chōshū crisis of 1864 threatened this policy, Nagahiro found a base for political action in shared interests with the loyalists. Fukuoka led the mediatory effort on behalf of Chōshū, with the result that civil war was averted and the
five rebel nobles were transferred to Fukuoka han, but the existence of the nobles transformed Fukuoka into a center of national attention and created a crisis situation within the han. Pressures from the outside combined with factionalism and a growing radicalization of the loyalists from within to threaten daimyo authority and han autonomy. The result was a wholesale punishment of the loyalists late in 1865, thus preserving han authority but effectively severing Fukuoka from further alliance with the emerging anti-bakufu coalition. While the bakufu succeeded in isolating Fukuoka, the crisis there signaled the end of the national kobugattai movement and an emerging polarization of parties which would soon result in the demise of the bakufu.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the history of the modern world there are few examples to compare with the rapid and extensive transformation experienced by Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century. Japan at mid-century was still a closed country, relatively unknown to the outside world, striving to maintain the fundamentals of a political and social system that had been in force for 250 years, but increasingly faced with internal disruption and the threat of Western intervention. A half century later, this small island nation was emerging to world power status as an independent constitutional monarchy, radically altered in political, social, economic, and intellectual characteristics. A turning point had come in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration, a nearly bloodless political coup d'état which replaced the old Tokugawa bakuhans order with a new government founded on the principle of direct Imperial rule.

Students of modern Japan, both Japanese and Western, have long been intrigued by the Meiji Restoration, the events leading to it, and the question of its significance in Japan's subsequent development. Whatever their motivation or ideological leanings, historians have found the Restoration a focal point for the study of late Tokugawa trends and the commencement of open relations with the West, or for modernization and transformation under the Meiji state. To some the Restoration was a positive event which made possible Japan's rapid modernization; others
have found in it the seeds of absolutism and militarism which led Japan into the ashes of defeat in World War Two. Although interpretations of the Restoration's meaning may vary, one thing remains clear; it was of seminal importance to the future course of events and to the evolution of the Japanese psyche.

Historical studies on the Restoration period have tended to focus on broad topics of obvious national relevance such as: diplomatic relations with the West, late Tokugawa economic developments, the intellectual background of the loyalist movement, or the role played by Satsuma and Chōshū as primary movers in the Restorationist drama and leaders of the early Meiji state. Such was the state of bakumatsu history in Japan until about two decades ago, when a growing interest in local history led to a rapid proliferation of printed documentary collections and narrative accounts on the domainal or even village level. Unfortunately, studies in the West have failed to keep up with this broad expanse of local history upon which accurate generalized accounts must be based.

The result of this neglect of local history in Western historical writing on the Restoration is that twenty years after the appearance of excellent monographs on Chōshū and Tosa by Professors Craig and Jansen,¹ we still know very little of what the other 260-odd han of Tokugawa Japan were doing. Despite recent studies on the bakufu² and the fudai domains,³ there are still crucial gaps in our understanding of the true nature of the Meiji Restoration and of the bakumatsu developments which gave it birth. All too often the tendency is to forget that Satsuma and Chōshū did not, and could not,
act alone. Their alliance, although credited with the overthrow of the bakufu, was in fact only the tip of an iceberg of numerous other such alliances.

My own studies have convinced me that a balanced and reliable history of the bakumatsu period and the Restoration must be based on a variety of comprehensive local studies balanced with wider-scoped institutional, intellectual, and social histories. The decision to study Fukuoka was made as I contemplated what was happening in the great tozama domains that did not participate in the Restoration. How and why were they different from Satsuma or Chōshū? The significance of that question for our understanding of the Restoration was emphasized by Albert Craig when he stated: "only by comparing the experiences of those han remaining inactive with those which were active will we be able to explain definitively the successes of the latter."4 It was therefore with the intention of explicating the details of the bakumatsu activities of Fukuoka han, thereby approaching the Restoration through the "back door" of a failed case, as it were, that this study was undertaken.

Aside from a few scattered and often mistaken references, Western-language material on Fukuoka is virtually non-existent. Even in Japanese there is a paucity of serious historical research on the subject, and no single work which might be considered a comprehensive analysis. Those studies that do exist have seen Fukuoka as a supporter of the opening of the country (kaikoku) and of the unity of Court and bakufu (kōbugattai), with the emphasis heavily on the side of the bakufu. Popular opinion also regards Fukuoka as sabaku, a
defender of the bakufu, and ruefully decries her failure to support the Imperial cause.

The blame for Fukuoka's "failure" in the Restoration has been ascribed to various sources. The biography of the loyalist han Elder, Kato Shisho, for example, cites the "stupidity" of the Kuroda daimyo and the intrigue of the conservative bureaucratic clique (injunha). On the other hand Lord Kuroda Nagahiro's biography blames the coercion of Court nobles and bakufu officials, while the contemporary Ishin zasshi ( ) indicts the disturbances of the loyalists for Fukuoka's failure. More recent works have pointed a finger at the economic impotence resulting from Fukuoka's failure to successfully carry out the Tempō reforms, or to the contradiction evident in the daimyo himself between daimyo authority and sonnō-jōi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian) ideals.

But if Fukuoka failed to actively participate in the Restoration, for whatever reason, is there any value in studying her, outside of creating another detailed chapter of local history? Indeed, there are several factors which make Fukuoka unique and fertile ground for investigation into the Restoration process. With a putative yield of 470,000 koku, Fukuoka was one of the great outside (tozama) domains of southwest Japan. Strategically located in northern Kyushu, it stood sentinel over both land and water routes linking the Inland Sea with Nagasaki, Higo, or Satsuma. If we combine these physical characteristics with Fukuoka's shared responsibility with Hizen for the maintenance of Nagasaki defense, we find a great potential either for
exerting bakufu control or for aiding Satsuma and Chōshū in the Restoration movement.

Several other factors also add significance to Fukuoka's role in bakumatsu history. One is an early and sustained interest in Western Studies which presaged the rapid adoption of science and technology in the Meiji era. Secondly, Fukuoka was unusual in its especially close relationship with the bakufu on one hand and Satsuma on the other. Additional marriage and adoption ties to the Nijō family at Court and to the Hitotsubashi family at Edo placed Fukuoka in the unusual position of a "middle ground," intermediary between contending sides in bakumatsu politics. Thus, a study of Fukuoka offers us an exceptional opportunity to witness the workings of intrigue, mediation, and compromise in the bakumatsu context. Lastly, Fukuoka became an early hotbed of loyalist activity and later developed as an important meeting ground for loyalists from many domains. After the five rebel nobles (gokyō) were transferred to Dazaifu in 1865 they became a symbol of legitimacy for the restorationist cause while Dazaifu became a major planning center for the anti-bakufu union of the southwestern domains. Thus, although Fukuoka did not lead the attack on the bakufu nor supply large numbers of Meiji leaders, we must at least recognize its importance in the formation of the Restoration movement.

In approaching this study of Fukuoka han in the late Tokugawa era I have followed the standard organizational approach of first analyzing the background factors which shaped the attitudes and characteristics of the domain and channeled them into particular responses to bakumatsu developments. With the background factors
well defined it was then possible to turn to a detailed description of the political developments of the bakumatsu years following essentially chronological lines.

Chapter Two describes the Chikuzen geographical setting and presents an overview of its historical background, particularly those points which came to have special impact on the participants of the bakumatsu era. In order to better understand the realm of relationships which dictated han and samurai behavior, a description of Fukuoka’s peculiar place in the baku–han system is also outlined, followed by an analysis of han status and administrative structures.

An overview of the domain economic situation is presented in Chapter Three, chiefly to disprove the contention that Fukuoka’s failure in the Meiji Restoration could be blamed principally on its failure in the economic reforms of the Tempō era. Although Fukuoka certainly struggled with economic problems, as did all domains, by the crucial final Tokugawa decade these difficulties had been brought under some semblance of control. The crisis which instigated Fukuoka’s failure was a political, not an economic one.

Chapter Four details han developments during the 1850’s, focusing on the role of the daimyo, Kuroda Nagahiro, in the encouragement of Western learning and modernization activities, as well as his involvement with the national politics surrounding Shimazu Nariakira. The roots of loyalist thought within Chikuzen are traced in Chapter Five, noting its peculiar localistic tendencies, and explaining the rise of a discernable loyalist party which came into conflict with han authority following the assassination of Ii Naosuke in 1860. In order to facilitate a clearer
understanding of the loyalist movement, a comparative analysis of the Chikuzen party is also briefly presented.

Chapter Six begins the chronological description of Chikuzen political activities by focusing on Nagahiro's attempts at kōbugattai mediation based on his desire to promote national unity and harmony. This desire carried him to organize first a Kyushu union to support kōbugattai, and then a mediatory effort to prevent civil war over the Choshū question. The initial success of the Chikuzen mediatory effort, accomplished with the aid of the Fukuoka loyalist party led to the establishment of a loyalist government as described in Chapter Seven. However, continued efforts to mediate for Choshū in the hopes of averting civil war ultimately created a crisis situation within the han which resulted in the near total destruction of the Fukuoka loyalist party. By late 1865, Fukuoka's activist period had abruptly ceased and the die was cast for Fukuoka's failure in the Restoration movement of 1868.

All names in the text follow traditional Japanese practice, with family name first. Since multiple names were common during the period in question, every attempt has been made to utilize the most common form, when such information was available. Dates given are in the lunar calendar, with 1853/9/5 indicating the fifth day of the ninth month in the year 1853. Intercalary months are noted by a prefaced "int.", such as 1860/int.8/18 or simply int.8/18.


5. For a discussion of the issue of blame, see Nishio Yotarō (西尾陽太郎), "黒田長濱と筑前勤王派 (Kuroda Nagahiro to Chikuzen kinnōh)," *史淵* (Shien), 98(March 1967), 47. Hereafter cited as "Kuroda Nagahiro."

CHAPTER II

FUKUOKA DOMAIN IN THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM

In the aftermath of the decisive Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu granted his powerful Kyushu allies, Kuroda Yoshitaka and his son, Nagamasa, the province of Chikuzen as a reward for their loyal services. With a putative yield of over 500,000 koku\(^1\) their new domain was a great improvement over their former holdings based at Nakatsu (Buzen, 120,000 koku), and made them one of the great tozama daimyo of the Tokugawa system. Upon entering Chikuzen and finding Kobayakawa Hideaki’s former castle at Najima inadequate for his intentions, Nagamasa laid plans for the construction of a new castle west of the port of Hakata and named his new castle town Fukuoka, in remembrance of the Kuroda ancestral home in Bizen province.\(^2\)

With the creation of Fukuoka han, centered on its castle town at Fukuoka and the adjacent port city of Hakata, the Kuroda lords inherited a strategic location steeped in a long history of intimate relations with both the central government and the outside world. Two and a half centuries later, as the shockwaves created by increasingly frequent foreign incursions provided the catalyst for the great changes which would inaugurate the turning point in Japanese history known as the Meiji Restoration, those factors were still at work in molding attitudes and actions within Fukuoka. In addition, the ensuing years had witnessed the development and maturation of the bakuhan system, with
its intricate interrelationships between bakufu, court, and the various han. In the domains themselves, complex bureaucratic administrative structures had developed which ordered and dominated the lives of the samurai. It was within the network of these relationships and structures that samurai, merchant, official, or daimyo lived and worked.

In order to better understand the "universe" of Chikuzen in the late Tokugawa period, we shall briefly describe Fukuoka's important geographical position in western Japan and outline the salient points of her historical heritage which played such a fundamental role in shaping the attitudes of Fukuoka participants in the bakumatsu scene. We shall thereafter examine Fukuoka's position in the bakuhan system, emphasizing the nature of its relationships with court and bakufu, and in the complex and varied interhan matrix. Finally we shall conclude with a look at the internal structure of the han through an analysis of the bureaucracy and social status systems.

Geographical Setting

Situated in the northwest corner of the island of Kyushu, the ancient province of Chikuzen forms a near right-triangle facing outward across the Korean Strait towards Iki, Tsushima, and Korea (see map on following page). The land is distinguished by relatively open river plains broken only by low-lying hills, surrounded by more formidable granitic hills. In the southwest these rugged granite peaks separate Chikuzen from the province of Hizen, while in the central and eastern sections detached clusters of granite hills both bisect the Chikuzen
Map 1. Chikuzen's Location in Kyushu
Map 2. The Chikuzen Region
triangle and form its eastern border. These regions of rather rugged hills are separated by two lowland areas that have made Chikuzen a highly productive rice-growing territory from the earliest period of Japanese history.

Extending from Hakata Bay inland and dividing the central and southwest mountainous regions is the Mikasa Lowland, named for the river which drains it. From the upper reaches of this narrowing lowland a gradual rise in elevation leads to the great Tsukushi Plain formed by the Chikugo River to the south. Thus, the Mikasa Lowland has a nearly unhindered connection to the rich coastal lowlands surrounding Ariake Bay, and therefore, to the provinces of Chikugo, Hizen, and Higo. This geographic factor, along with the fact that the Mikasa Lowland broadens into a plain surrounding a well-protected natural harbor, has made the Mikasa valley the strategic and administrative center of Chikuzen, and at times of all of Kyushu.

A second Chikuzen lowland extends along a north-south axis and separates the central from the northeast mountain regions. Here, the Onga River and its tributaries form a basin of forty to fifty kilometers in length and ten to twelve in width. Best known for being the center of Japan's coal industry in modern times, this fertile basin is also obviously an important agricultural area of low hills and open valleys.

The climate of this northern Kyushu region is best described as being intermediate of the Inland Sea (San'yō) and Japan Sea (San'in) coastal regions. Winters are damp and chilly with considerably more cloud cover than along the Inland Sea or in southern Kyushu. Summers are quite humid, and while not as hot as some areas of Japan
the heat often seems more oppressive and debilitating. Nevertheless, with an ample rainfall of nearly seventy inches per year, a growing season of over 200 days which allowed for double cropping on relatively abundant flat land, thickly forested hills nearby, and an indented, island-studded coastline, the inhabitants of Chikuzen were able to provide themselves with a fairly abundant life without any severe hardship. Relatively free of strong earthquake activity, the greatest disruptions of normal life were brought by flooding during the heavy downpours of the summer rainy season, drought, crop-destroying insects, or the awesome power of the feared typhoons.

Under such generally fortuitous conditions, Chikuzen supported a relatively dense population from antiquity. Perhaps because it was an important and early-settled area, by the beginning of the Tokugawa era in 1600 there was apparently little readily arable land left undeveloped. Thus, we do not see the rapid growth of rice production or population during the Tokugawa period that is witnessed in some other areas of Japan. Apparently the population of Fukuoka han hovered at approximately 300,000 throughout most of the Tokugawa period with about ten percent of that total residing in the dual urban center of Fukuoka-Hakata. A census of 1690 lists a population of 293,000, but this had only increased to 301,000 in 1834, and to 366,000 by the first years of Meiji.

Throughout the Tokugawa period the Kuroda family held jurisdiction over all but a small segment of Chikuzen province (see map 2). However, not all of it was administered from Fukuoka. In 1623, Kuroda Nagamasa established two branch han: one in Akizuki (50,000 koku),
which he gave to his second son; and Tōrenji (40,000 koku), bestowed upon his third son. The latter was ultimately disbanded and merged with the main han, but Akizuki han was recognized by the Bakufu as an independent domain and continued as such until after the Meiji Restoration. Nevertheless, in making reference to the main han with its headquarters at Fukuoka, we shall follow contemporary usage in referring to it interchangeably as Chikuzen, Fukuoka, or Kuroda han.

Historical Setting

Because of its historical and geographical position, Chikuzen was fertile soil for nurturing the seeds of the several contending ideas prevalent in the late Tokugawa era. Whether it be kaikoku or jōi, sonnō or sabaku, rangaku or kokugaku, Chikuzen had an historical precedence for involvement. All around the men of Fukuoka were reminders of the past importance of this northern Kyushu area for the imperial court and for the defense of the country. Could they forget that once their homeland had been central in Japan's relations with foreign countries, or that it had been the site of the only major invasion of Japanese territory by foreigners? On the other hand, Hakata had once gained considerable wealth and power as an entrepot of international trade, and Fukuoka had two centuries of continuous contact with the Dutch as a result of their responsibility for the defense of Nagasaki.

The events of bakumatsu Japan did not, of course, occur in an historical vacuum. In a society as cognizant of its past as was Tokugawa Japan, tradition and historical precedence could exert great
inertia upon the thoughts and actions of individuals and groups. At the same time, men could, and often did, shape tradition to their own purposes. We find, for example, that while some men pointed to centuries of Chikuzen loyalty to the bakufu, others countered with an emphasis on an anti-bakufu tradition of loyalty to the Southern Court during the Nambokuchō period. Yet, however it was used, the historical tradition cannot be ignored. Since so little of the history of the Chikuzen locale has been dealt with in Western languages it seems appropriate to attempt here a brief introduction which, without becoming tedious or sidetracking us from our goal of examining the late-Tokugawa scene, might hopefully shed some light on the tradition of bakumatsu Fukuoka.

From earliest times northern Kyushu had held a unique role of importance as a result of its proximity to the Korean peninsula and to the Chinese mainland. The earliest historical references to Japan in the dynastic histories of China record that thirty of the communities of the Wa (Japan) were in communication with the Chinese. Among these, several prominent ones are considered to be in the Chikuzen area: Izu (Ito, Chikuzen), Nu (Na-no-agata or Na-no-tsu = Hakata, Chikuzen), Fumi (Umi, Chikuzen), and Matsuro (Matsura, Hizen). Particularly, the Hou Han shu states that:

In the second year of the Chien-Wu Chung-yuan era (A.D. 57), the Wa country of Na sent an envoy with tribute who called himself ta-fu. This country is located in the southern extremity of the Wa country. Emperor Kuang-wu bestowed upon him a seal ....

The discovery of a small golden seal in 1784 at Shikanoshima near the
mouth of Hakata Bay, inscribed "Han (vassal) King of the Wa country Nu", tends to substantiate the identification of Nu with Hakata and underlines the importance of the Chikuzen area in early communication with the continent.  

The Wei chih chronicles also record that in the third century the Yamato government placed an ichidai-sotsu in Ito-no-kuni (now the southern half of Itoshima-gun, Chikuzen). This official, in addition to investigating the provinces of Kyushu, was to inspect any envoys coming from the Tai-fang commandary in Korea to the Wa, or from the Wa queen to the capitals of Wei or Tai-fang, insuring that there would be no errors in either messages or gifts.

The Japanese chronicles also note the close relationship between northern Kyushu and the Yamato government from the early mythological rulers on. By the sixth century when the Japanese records are more reliable, Japanese domestic politics had become increasingly intertwined with Japanese affairs on the Korean peninsula. There, the Japanese-held territory of Mimana was threatened by the rising power of the Korean kingdoms, especially Silla, and as a result, northern Kyushu began to return again to its importance of the third century. Whereas any action in Korea by Japan required ascendancy in northern Kyushu, it is not surprising that the early Japanese centralized state placed such special significance upon that region and a premium upon its control.

In order to accomplish its policy of control, as well as to establish a substantive base for diplomatic and military relations with the continent, the Imperial government founded a special government office in Kyushu
directed by a high-ranking official from the capital. The office, and later its location, was known as Dazaifu (Headquarters of the Governor-General of Kyushu). It was specifically charged with overseeing the defense of the crucial regions of western Japan, and with the delicate task of receiving envoys from China and the Korean states. Traffic between Dazaifu and the capital in the Kinai was along the Sanyōdō, the most important of the provincial roads by virtue of this vital connection.15

Originally the official charged with defense and diplomatic duties was located at Na-no-tsu near the shore of Hakata Bay, but by the time of the defeat of Japanese forces in Korea in 663 by the combined forces of Silla and T'ang China, the offices had moved inland for protection. Fear of invasion from Korea prompted construction of a great earthenwork moat and several mountaintop fortresses to guard its position.16 Despite Japanese fears, the anticipated invasion never materialized and diplomatic relations with China soon began anew. Therefore, in order to facilitate proper reception of foreign envoys and add to the prestige of Japan as a center of civilization, the central government established a reception office known as the Kōrokan as an appendage to Dazaifu. Located near Hakata Bay on what was later to become the site of Fukuoka castle, the Kōrokan provided proper lodging and reception facilities for foreign envoys during their presence in Japan, as well as for Japanese envoys to China while they awaited favorable conditions for the commencement of their missions. The Kōrokan becomes significant for our discussion because it proved to be the foundation for the later development of Hakata and Fukuoka.17
Dazaifu reached its peak of development during the Nara and early Heian periods, followed by a decline in central authority under the force of rising local and private interests. The necessity for coastal defense continued into the ninth century, although it was now increasingly concerned with the prevention of a growing tendency toward piracy and lawlessness. In 838, Japan sent its last embassy to T'ang China and this period became a turning point for the Kōrokan and Dazaifu. What had previously been an official relationship with China now became a private one as the nature of foreign guests shifted from envoys to merchants.

The central government supervised trade at Dazaifu by dispatching a karamono no tsukai (Supervisor of Chinese goods), who, with the aid of officials from Dazaifu, inspected the cargoes of the Chinese merchants. After the government had purchased the articles it required, open trading was permitted, though restricted to Hakata port. By the turn of the tenth century, however, proposals of national economic retrenchment and exclusionist, antiforeign ideas coalesced to back the establishment of regulations restricting the number of foreign merchant vessels. In 909 the Heian government ended direct control over the preferred buyer system and the head official at Dazaifu was appointed as the supervisor of trade.

The tenth and eleventh centuries witnessed a trend toward privatization of the public domain, specifically marked by the growth of shōen and the development of warrior bands in the provinces. It was also a period of heightened demand for luxury trade items. The officially controlled commerce described above was soon subverted, however, by
the growing tendency for foreign merchants to deal privately with temples, shrines, the Kyoto nobility, or even officials within Dazaifu itself. Sung merchants, who found the officially controlled trade of limited benefit, began to land at shōen which had rights of immunity, where they could carry on their secret (i.e., unofficial) trade with the shōen ryōshū or its officials. In this way the eastern section of Fukuoka (old Hakata), Hirado, and Bonotsu in Satsuma prospered as ports for secret trade. As the center of this trade, Hakata could already boast of a "Chinatown" with numerous Sung merchants permanently resident there. 19

It is in this environment that we find the Taira family attempting to extend their control over northern Kyushu as part of a general policy of emphasizing foreign trade. Through firm domination of Dazaifu, which itself had by now become a large landholder, and alliance with the powerful Usa Hachimangu and Anrakuji, the Taira were successful in transforming northern Kyushu into their own solid political, economic, and military base. Thus, in 1185, after disastrous losses elsewhere, it was the Kyushu forces that provided much of the leadership and manpower for the Taira's final struggle at Dannoura. 20

Following the defeat of the Taira, the Kamakura bakufu set out on a gradually evolving policy of extending its authority over the former Taira stronghold in Kyushu. The major local houses in northern Kyushu had been destroyed in the aftermath of Dannoura, and into the resultant vacuum stepped several Kamakura vassals from the east. Most important in Chikuzen were the Mutō, who came to exercise a major authority within Dazaifu. At the same time, they served as the new
Chinzei bugyō (Kyushu administrator) for the bakufu, overseeing military affairs and administering the Kamakura kenin (vassals). The Muto, who later changed their name to Shōni, would prove to be perhaps the dominant local force in Chikuzen over the next three centuries.21

In the long history of Chikuzen probably no other event left such a lasting impression as the Mongol invasions of 1274 and 1281.22 For bakumatsu Japan, faced as it was with another threat from abroad over half a millenium later, the memory of the Mongol attack and the saving kamikaze was very much alive. If that was true for Japan as a whole, it was even more true for Chikuzen which bore the brunt of the invasions, and where miles of defense works constructed by the Japanese still stood silent witness of these momentous events. Indeed, one of the alternate names by which Hakata was known was Sekiō, an appellation derived from the stone fortifications built at that time.23 Following the first Mongol attack of 1274, nearly 60 miles of stone ramparts were constructed all along the coast of Hakata Bay, and a garrison, manned primarily by Kyushu warriors, was established at Hakata. For the next thirty-five years the warriors from Kyushu took their turns at guard duty, maintaining a constant surveillance for further attacks, while temples and shrines intoned prayers for the safety of the Japanese homeland.

As a result of the Mongol invasions, the center of administration in Kyushu shifted from Dazaifu to Hakata. Following the second Mongol expedition in 1281, the bakufu established a new office of Meinohama bugyō (Defense Commissioner at Meinohama) just west of
Hakata headed by a member of the Hojo family. In the early 1290's the
office was changed to the Kyushu tandai, still dominated by the Hojo,
but under whom major posts were filled by the Shoni, Otomo, and
Shimazu. The Hojo were successful in expanding their authority in
northern Kyushu by means of their monopoly over the leading positions
within the Kyushu tandai, but over several decades this authority was
gradually undermined by the continued insolvency and weakening
solidarity among many of the Kamakura vassals. The Mongol Wars had
left in their wake numerous disgruntled samurai who considered
themselves inadequately rewarded for their long years of loyal
service. Furthermore, Hojo advances had been made primarily at the
expense of the leading Kamakura vassals who were waiting to take
advantage of any weakness shown on the Hojo's part to regain lost
ground. Weakness turned to sudden rout, however, when in 1333
Ashikaga Takauji moved in support of the emperor Godaigo, who had
escaped from exile, by overthrowing the Rokuhara tandai in Kyoto.
When word of this move reached Kyushu, the Shoni and Otomo seized
the opportunity to destroy the Kyushu tandai, and shortly thereafter
the Shimazu combined with the Shoni to overthrow the Nagato tandai
located near Shimonoseki.

In spite of the sudden demise of the Kamakura bakufu, Ashikaga
Takauji soon found himself driven from Kyoto by the forces of Nitta
Yoshisada. Takauji fled to Kyushu where he had the support of the
Shoni, Otomi, and Shimazu to rely upon, though opposed by a coalition
of lesser local powers. At the decisive Battle of Tatara east of Hakata
in 1336, the Ashikaga forces scored a momentous victory, and soon
Takauji had taken control of Dazaifu and was issuing calls for all Kyushu warriors to rally to his support. Within months Takauji, backed now by strong Kyushu forces, marched on Kyoto, defeated Nitta, and succeeded in establishing the new Muromachi bakufu. Yet despite apparent backing in Kyushu the Ashikaga were unable to maintain control over that region, for the seeds of discord had been sown and Japan slipped into a half-century of civil strife known as the Nambokuchō era, its name derived from the rival northern and southern Imperial Courts.

For much of this Northern and Southern Court period Kyushu was a bastion of support for the exile southern Court, and it was not until 1372, under the direction of Imagawa Ryōshun, that the bakufu was able to establish itself firmly in control of northern Kyushu. Support for the southern party centered around Prince Kanenaga, who had been sent while still a boy to represent the exile Court's interests in Kyushu. But it was the Kikuchi of Higo and their allies the Aso who provided the military backing and protection necessary in that age of conflict. While other powerful families were said to have drifted from one side of the conflict to the other under the dictates of self-interest, the Kikuchi were known for their staunchly loyal support of the exile Court. Ultimately Kikuchi forces succeeded in defeating the Shōni and then the Ōtomo in the Dazaifu-Hakata vicinity in 1361 and for ten years maintained their supremacy over much of northern and central Kyushu from their new headquarters at Dazaifu.

Centuries later in the intellectual milieu of the nineteenth century, this interlude of support for the imperial cause in opposition to the
bakufu was a significant segment of the Chikuzen legacy. As we shall see in chapter five, the origins of the bakumatsu loyalist movement are clearly linked with this tradition, and it is significant that many of the early leaders of that movement were so motivated as to erect a monument in remembrance of the Kikuchi. Perhaps it is little more than circumstance but certainly it did not go unnoticed by the bakumatsu loyalists that the Dazaifu Tenmanu where Sanjō Sanetomi and the rebel kuge (Court nobles) took exile in 1864 was the same Anrakuji where Prince Kanenaga had established his headquarters (since the Dazaifu had been burned in the struggle to subdue it).

After numerous attempts to overcome the last stronghold of the southern Court support and to re-establish the Kyushu tandai, the Muromachi bakufu finally succeeded in an expedition led by Imagawa Ryōshun with the support of Ōuchi Hiroyo from Suō Province. As a result, Prince Kanenaga and the Kikuchi were driven from Dazaifu back to their stronghold in Higo, and the Ōtomo and the Shōni, now at least nominally on the side of the bakufu, regained prominence in northern Kyushu.

In spite of (or perhaps to some degree because of) the civil strife, Japanese trade with Korea and with Ming China flourished during the Nambokuchō years. This was also the era of the wakō or "Japanese pirates" who ravaged the coastlines of Korea and China. Since the Ōuchi, Munakata, Sō, and Matsura families controlled Japanese shipping off northern Kyushu and in the Inland Sea, we must assume that wakō activities were not carried out without their knowledge and consent. When the shogun (Ashikaga) Yoshimitsu began to take a
favorable stance toward foreign trade, commerce with Korea became so richly rewarding that the Kyushu tandai and the shūgo daimyo, such as the Shōni, Ōtomo and Ōuchi, contended with each other and with the merchants of Hakata for control of Tsushima, Iki, and Hakata. Ultimately Yoshimitsu succeeded in re-establishing relations with China as well, and in 1404 the kāngo bōeki (tally trade) was begun. Since Hakata served as the port where goods procured in various parts of Japan were gathered and where the outfitting of the great trading ships took place, this period can be said to mark the beginning of Hakata's golden age. 34

For most of the fifteenth century control of the Hakata vicinity was shared by the Shōni and Ōtomo, but by the latter part of the century they had been supplanted by the rising influence of the Ōuchi. A Korean document of 1471, the Haedong chegukki, records that Hakata was divided and governed by the Shōni and Ōtomo. "Shōni controls more than 4,000 households in the southwest, and Ōtomo more than 6,000 households in the northeast.... The residents are merchants and this is a place where Ryūkyū and Namban ships gather." 35 Even if the figure of 10,000 households, from which we might postulate a possible population of 50,000, is in error, there is no question that Hakata was at this instance a city of vitality and prosperity.

In 1478 Buzen and Chikuzen fell firmly under Ōuchi control, thus culminating a process that had begun as early as 1429. The control of Hakata by the powerful Ōuchi family guaranteed the foreign trade of the Hakata merchants and placed them in fierce conflict with the merchants of Sakai and their patrons, the Hosakawa. 36 With the destruction
of the Ōuchi in 1551 the kango trade came to a final end,\textsuperscript{37} and once again private commerce and wako activities increased. Thereafter, the second half of the sixteenth century saw Hakata merchants involved in the beginnings of Nagasaki and in widespread commercial activities ranging as far as Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{38} Thus, the Christian missionary, Louis Frois, was to describe Hakata in the 1550's as a prosperous free city, and "the Venice of the East."\textsuperscript{39}

The sixteenth century was, of course, a time of internecine warfare and monumental change throughout Japan, culminating in the final unification of the country and the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu. Only those families who possessed adaptability, foresight, and a measure of good fortune were capable of surviving the rigors of the age.\textsuperscript{40} The Šoni, long dominant in Chikuzen, met their demise in 1538 under the hands of the Ōuchi. Then in 1551, Ōuchi Yoshitaka was attacked by his vassal Sue Takafusa and driven to commit suicide. The demise of Ōuchi control in Chikuzen ushered in almost four decades of near constant warfare as one power after another sought to capture the jewel that was Hakata in the hopes of tapping its wealth. In 1555 the Sue were defeated by the Mōri, another Ōuchi vassal from Aki province. Meanwhile the Ōtomo moved to take advantage of the situation by advancing from their bases in Bungo and Chikugo to take control of Chikuzen and Buzen. In 1569 the Mōri and Ōtomo locked in a bitter struggle over Hakata which resulted in the burning of the city. Many times Hakata had suffered the effects of warrior rivalries, but this time the destruction was almost complete, and many of her merchants and residents scattered or sought profits elsewhere. What
rebuilding did occur was again destroyed in the fighting with Satsuma forces in 1585-86. In 1578 the Ōtomo suffered a disastrous defeat in Hyuga at the hands of the Shimazu, marking the beginning of a decline in Ōtomo strength. By 1585 the Shimazu and their allies had nearly succeeded in the conquest of the whole of Kyushu, and were threatening Hakata. At this time, however, Toyotomi Hideyoshi had completed the unification of the greater part of Japan and so in late 1586 issued the call for an expedition against the Shimazu with Kuroda Yoshitaka as one of the leaders of the advance guard. Faced with overwhelming odds, the Shimazu retreated to Kagoshima and in the fifth month of 1587 made peace with Hideyoshi.

Returning triumphantly to Osaka Hideyoshi stopped enroute at Hakata where he intended to strengthen the castle and establish a garrison. At Hakozaki, he presented rewards to his vassals for their services. Chikuzen province and two kōri of Chikugo province were turned over to Kobayakawa Takakage, with most of the remainder of Chikugo given to Kobayakawa Hidekane or Tachibana Muneshige. Six of the eight kōri of Buzen province were granted to Kuroda Yoshitaka; the rest went to Mōri Katsunobu. While resident at Hakozaki, Hideyoshi also drew up plans for the reconstruction of Hakata, to which Kuroda Yoshitaka was assigned as overseer, and issued his famous anti-Christian edict.

The thirteen years of Kobayakawa rule over Chikuzen between 1587 and the battle at Sekigahara in 1600 were filled with activity as Takakage and his heir attempted to consolidate power within their new domain and carry out the policies of Hideyoshi. In conjunction with
Hideyoshi's plans for the redevelopment of Hakata, Takakage constructed a castle at Najima on a promontory jutting out into Hakata Bay east of Hakozaki, and began a castle town adjacent to it. Those locally prominent families that had not followed the Tachibana to Chikugo soon became the vassals of the Kobayakawa and assisted their new lords in the administration of the domain. Consolidation of control over Chikuzen was hindered, however, by Hideyoshi's announcement of a military expedition against Korea in 1591. The Kobayakawa, as well as other Kyushu daimyo, and their retainers spent much of their time over the next seven years in carrying out this grandiose, yet fruitless endeavor. As a result, the Taikō kenchi (land survey), one of the milestones of Hideyoshi's administration, was not carried out in Chikuzen until 1595-97.  

Following Hideyoshi's death in 1598, the forces still in Korea quickly withdrew and alliances were formed for the power struggle that would inevitably ensue. As relatives of the Mōri the Kobayakawa aligned themselves with Ishida Mitsunari and his western forces, but in the midst of the Battle of Sekigahara Kobayakawa Hideaki went over to the Tokugawa side, sealing the fate of the western armies. For his treachery Hideaki was rewarded by Ieyasu with the province of Bizen, while his holdings in Chikuzen were bequeathed to another of Ieyasu's Kyushu allies, Kuroda Nagamasa.  

With the beginning of Tokugawa rule and the establishment of the bakuhan system, Chikuzen entered a new era, qualitatively different from the whole of its previous history. Until this time the focal point of Chikuzen history had been foreign relations and trade, centered on
Dazaifu and Hakata. In addition, direct involvement of the central government had complicated the administrative picture and made Chikuzen unique in its development. However, under the new Edo bakufu, foreign relations were soon to be confined to Nagasaki, and Chikuzen became essentially no different from the other large tozama domains. Yet, the legacy of its past lingered on, and there were many during the crisis of the bakumatsu years who found both solace and inspiration in their heritage.

The Kuroda Daimyo and the Bakuhan System

The first decades of the seventeenth century witnessed the development, under the hands of Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors to the office of shogun, of a new central government at Edo which in essence came to redefine the political realities within the Japanese realm. This redefinition, in which the nearly autonomous warlord daimyo of the Sengoku era were transformed into the daimyo of the Pax Tokugawa by means of a gradual expansion of bakufu prerogative, is known as the bakuhan system. Founded on a delicate balance of power between the Tokugawa house and the 260-odd han of Tokugawa Japan, the system evolved over its first several decades, ultimately reaching full maturity by the time the third shogun, Iemitsu, died in 1651. The institutional details of the bakuhan system, which some scholars have labeled as "centralized feudalism", have been detailed elsewhere, but in preface to our discussion of the Kuroda daimyo two points seem to need particular emphasis. These concern the residuary
validity of the system, itself, prior to its overthrow in the years following 1868.

The first point is that the bakuhans system, as the primary ordering structure of Tokugawa society, had much greater validity, strength, and influence than it has generally been given credit for. That is not, however, necessarily the equivalent of saying that the bakufu had considerable vitality or strength. In fact, it is probably more likely that the lasting power of the bakufu amid apparent inconsistency and contradiction can be traced to the inertia of the structure which it had originally created.

Where once the dominant view of the Tokugawa era was of a static society which became increasingly stagnant and anachronistic as compared to a rapidly developing Europe, a myriad of studies over the last half-century have detailed the rise of social and economic change within Japan during the period in question. Why then do we still so often assume that the bakuhans system had to remain static to be valuable or effective? Or why do we infer the centralization process that occurred in some parts of Europe to be the value norm for Japan as well? For example, the author of a recent, well-accepted study on the fudai daimyo seems somewhat incredulous: "It is strange enough", he says, "that the Tokugawa failed where the Tudors succeeded. But even more peculiar is the long period which intervened between the first traces of weakening and the final overthrow." Nevertheless, he concedes that "the Bakufu survived for a further two hundred years, showing all the outward manifestations of effective government." Since we are talking about two full centuries of "effective government"
perhaps it is barking up the proverbial "wrong tree" to seemingly judge the era or the virility of its society wholly on the relative strength or weakness of the bakufu.

Too often, in judging the bakufu, the tendency is to overlook the crucial fact that the han had changed radically as well. Where once powerful daimyo had been a very real threat to bakufu security, in later years they were often little more than syncophants surrounded by equally mediocre han Elders. Although this was certainly not always the case, as this study of Chikuzen will later show, in Chōshū, for example, the daimyo throughout the bakumatsu period have been called incompetent and the han Elders a bunch of good-for-nothings. Yet, ability or popularity notwithstanding, the daimyo and his high-ranking vassals remained the ultimate source of power at the domainal level.

In fact, as we well know, conceptions of reality are often more powerful than reality itself. Let us not forget, therefore, that in late Tokugawa Japan, reality was for the most part still conceived of in terms of the bakuhan system. Whether the bakufu in its later years did or could maintain the authority and controls it had once exercised, or whether the failure to do so signified instead a new stage of maturity and security, the fact remains that even until the end of the Tokugawa rule few men could conceive of society outside of the traditional strictures. Viewing things more in this light, perhaps it is not so astounding that the bakufu lasted so long, but rather that it departed so meekly.

Some recent studies on both sides of the Pacific have, in fact, pointed to the vitality of the system, and to some extent perhaps of the
bakufu itself, until the final decade and a half of the Tokugawa era. They seem to agree that the political process leading to the Meiji Restoration does not really begin until the foreign crisis is joined to the internal crisis caused by economic and social change.\textsuperscript{53} Whatever the internal weaknesses or inconsistencies may have been, the political structure was not the hollow shell waiting to topple at the slightest breeze from the outside that some scholars might lead us to believe.

A second point is that in a society in which status and rank were perhaps the major factors in determining interaction, casual relationships were nearly impossible and individuals moved almost solely within the realm of traditional or familiar groups. In this environment relatives, neighbors, classmates or military companions, and bureaucratic superiors and inferiors had special significance. Few contacts developed outside of these familiar boundaries. In describing the "field" of samurai activity, Albert Craig has said that:

Only as members of such groups or collectives could individual samurai act. To inquire into the structure which groups possessed, to see the way in which frustrations, ambitions, duties, and ideals were joined in such groups, and to view the evolving relations among them is to comprehend for the first time the field in which individual action took place.\textsuperscript{54}

For the han as well, relationships were limited and ties of marriage and adoption were extremely significant and long lasting. We know for example that Satsuma, Chōshū, Chikuzen and other han gained influence at the court through marriage alliances with influential court nobles. On the other hand it was only with the greatest difficulty that third-party samurai intermediaries were able to overcome the mutual animosity and distrust between Satsuma and Chōshū in order to forge the anti-bakufu alliance of 1866.
What then was Fukuoka's position within the bakuhan system? What was the nature of her relationship with the bakufu? How about the relationship vis-a-vis the court? And finally, what significant ties existed with other han? Only by answering these questions can we begin to comprehend the matrix in which Fukuoka's bakumatsu political activities transpired. Not infrequently, the nature of the relationships determined the options open for action and created limits within which such movement might occur.

The Kuroda daimyo were among the greatest of the tozama (outside) daimyo, ranking seventh in official revenue among all of the Tokugawa vassals. Holding the title of Lord of a Province and Fourth Junior rank at Court they were privileged to sit in the ohiboma (Great Hall) at the shogun's palace for ceremonial occasions. In addition, they had enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the bakufu from the time of its founder, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and were jointly responsible with Saga han for the important assignment of the defense of Nagasaki. These facts placed Fukuoka and the Kuroda daimyo in a somewhat unique position in the bakuhan system. How had one of the tozama lords come to be so closely tied to the bakufu?

The Kuroda are perhaps one of the best examples of that class of small-scale warriors who, through their own ability and charisma, rose to prominence in the civil wars of the sixteenth century. Totally insignificant in the first decades of the century, by 1600 the Kuroda had become the primary potential threat to Ieyasu in the aftermath of Sekigahara. According to the traditional geneology (which is most
likely not wholly reliable), the Kuroda descended from Emperor Uta through the Sasaki, or Omi-Genji line. This line split into the Rokkaku and Kyōgoku families with the latter becoming ryōshū over a locale by the name of Kuroda. The Kuroda were thus a branch house of the Kyōgoku and resided in Omi province until 1511 when Kuroda Takamasa was forced to flee to escape the wrath of the tenth Ashikaga shogun, Yoshitane. With the help of relatives, Takamasa settled at Fukuoka-mura, Oku-kōri, Bizen province in obscure security. Takamasa's son, Shigetaka, was successful in selling eye medicine and after allying himself with a wealthy farmer in the area began to obtain land and open new fields. He made loans of rice or money to villagers without security and for the "low" interest rate of twenty percent, also promising food to itinerant merchants, rōnin (runaways) and others in exchange for labor services. In order to build up a band of youthful retainers, Shigetaka promised those who had borrowed from him and who had promising sons, that if they would become his kerai (vassals) then he would forgive the interest on their loans. Thus, within a short time the Kuroda had gained considerable wealth and a band of retainers numbering 200 men.

Growing in power, Shigetaka quickly allied himself with the Akamatsu, shūgo daimyo of Harima province, and his son, Mototaka, became one of the chief retainers of the Kodera, a branch of the Akamatsu. In 1545, Mototaka married the adoptive daughter of Kodera, was granted the Kodera name and was made the lord of Harima castle. Eventually Mototaka's son, Kuroda Yoshitaka (1546-1604), succeeded his father as one of the senior advisors to Kodera Masamoto. A contemporary
with Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, Yoshitaka was to become one of the great generals of the Sengoku era, establishing the Kuroda as a leading family of the realm.

Yoshitaka possessed the uncommon ability to correctly adjudge the trends of the times, and he aligned himself in turn with Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu. He gained considerable reputation as a warrior in the battles for the conquest of Western Japan, serving as one of Hideyoshi's leading generals in campaigns against the Chosokabe in Shikoku (1585) and Shimazu in Kyushu (1587). As a result of his valuable service, Hideyoshi made Yoshitaka a daimyo following the Kyushu campaign, rewarding him with six kōri in Buzen province valued at 120,000 koku, as mentioned in the previous section. After only two years, Yoshitaka turned the administration of his domain over to his son, Nagamasa, but remained active in political life. At the time of the Korea campaign, he was ordered by Hideyoshi to provide counsel for young Hidetada, the Commander-in-chief. Despite the apparent trust, however, in later life Hideyoshi is said to have been quite wary towards Yoshitaka, perhaps because of his devout Christianity, but more likely because of his ability and ambition. There was little doubt that Kuroda Yoshitaka desired to succeed Hideyoshi as ruler of Japan and had it not been for Tokugawa Ieyasu he might have succeeded.

Kuroda Nagamasa (1568-1623), raised amidst warfare and soon proved himself to be a capable military commander. At age ten he was left to the keeping of Hideyoshi as a hostage to prove the sincerity of his father's alliance with Nobunaga. He then fought alongside his father in the campaigns in Western Japan and Kyushu, assuming
responsibility for the administration of Nakatsu han in 1587. Nagamasa led the Kuroda samurai in the fighting in Korea, but then as the country polarized into two camps following the death of Hideyoshi, Yoshitaka sent Nagamasa to fight for Tokugawa Ieyasu while he remained in Kyushu to expand their fortunes there. 60

Apparently Nagamasa served Ieyasu well, for in his first action following the battle at Sekigahara, Ieyasu called for Nagamasa and before the assembled generals thanked him for his support:

"Today's victory is entirely due to your loyalty and care, and as a reward for your great merit, as long as my house shall last the interests of the house of Kuroda shall never be allowed to suffer." 61

Later as rewards were parcelled out, Nagamasa was given the sixteen kokujō entailing the entire province of Chikuzen with a productive value of 523,000 koku. Yoshitaka also was offered a large reward in territory, but declined on the premise of his age and poor health, stating that since he could rely on his son for sustenance all he desired was to spend his remaining days in peace. 62

Thus we see from the very beginning of the Tokugawa bakuhan system a close relationship between Fukuoka and the bakufu quite unlike that of most other tozama han. Too often it has been generally assumed that the tozama lords were those who fought against Ieyasu at Sekigahara, when in fact they were those who swore allegiance to the Tokugawa after Sekigahara, and included both allies and enemies. 63

Another distinction between daimyo, perhaps more important than the battle lines at Sekigahara, has been given considerable emphasis by Fujino Tamotsu in his comparative studies of domains within the bakuhan

36
framework. This differential relates to the origin of daimyo and the length of time they had held their domains and classifies all daimyo either as kyūzoku izuki (those confirmed in their holdings from the Sengoku period), shokuho (those made daimyo by Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi) or Tokugawa (those made daimyo by Ieyasu or his successors). In accordance with this system, the Kuroda daimyo of Fukuoka would be classified as an intermediate between shokuho and Tokugawa; they were shokuho daimyo transferred to a new domain by the Tokugawa.

Why is this distinction important? If we consider the internal administration of the han; particularly as it relates to the strength of daimyo control over the non-military population, and the number, origin, and organization of the kashindan (retainer band), then certainly the timing of daimyo entry had great significance for the future development of the domain. In Chikuzen's case, the Kuroda daimyo entered in 1600, following the battle of Sekigahara, and gained their legitimacy under Tokugawa fiat, rather than by gradual consolidation from below. In addition, many of the locally prominent military families had accompanied either the Tachibana to Yanagawa or Kobayakawa Hideaki to his new domain in Bizen. To fill this vacuum, the Kuroda in turn brought along their retainers, as well as merchants and priests, from Nakatsu.

Kuroda Yoshitaka and Nagamasa entered Chikuzen in 1600/5, staying first at the residences of important Hakata merchants until taking over Najima castle from Kobayakawa in the twelfth month of the same year. As mentioned earlier, Nagamasa soon laid out plans for
construction of a larger castle and a surrounding castle town adjacent to the newly reconstructed merchant city of Hakata. Within seven years the main castle and six auxiliary castles along the Buzen border had been completed. In 1614, Nagamasa was directed by the bakufu to bring troops to Osaka for the subjugation of Osaka castle, and so his heir, Tadayuki, led 10,000 troops from Fukuoka to Hyogo to participate in the fighting with Nagamasa joining him from Edo for the final assault during the summer of 1615.

In the early years of Tokugawa rule, we find further evidence of the close relationship between the Kuroda lords and the Tokugawa. In 1612 Nagamasa's heir, Kuroda Tadayuki, was granted the use of one character from the Shogun's (Hidetada) name. The following year Tadayuki was presented the surname of Matsudaira, the name of the Tokugawa themselves, and an honor bestowed on only a few of the important Tokugawa vassals. From this time forth every Kuroda daimyo was to share in these privileges.

The importance of this early relationship with the bakufu is perhaps best exemplified in the famous Kuroda sōdo (disturbance) of 1632-33. In this incident, Kuroda Tadayuki was accused by one of the han karō of plotting to rebel against the Tokugawa, and was thus called to Edo to face questioning from bakufu officials. The early decades of the Tokugawa era had witnessed numerous confiscations or transfers of daimyo landholdings for improprieties, so this was indeed a grave matter. Its seriousness was compounded by the dispossession only months earlier of Kato Kiyomasa's 515,000 koku domain at Kumamoto as a result of similar charges. Faced with the most serious threat to
its existence of the two and a half centuries of Tokugawa rule, the house of Kuroda was preserved only because of the memory of loyal service rendered by Nagamasa and the promise that Ieyasu had proferred him.

The accusation against Tadayuki, although untrue, arose from a growing antagonism between the young Kuroda lord and the aged karō Kuriyama Daizen. Tadayuki had succeeded as daimyo of Chikuzen upon the death of Nagamasa in 1623, and affairs had proceeded well at first, but gradually he came into conflict with his father's leading retainers. One of the primary causes of contention centered on the unprecedented promotion of Tadayuki's confidant, Kurahachi Jūdayū, from a family holding the office of teppo-gashira and a stipend of 200 koku to the rank of karō and a fief of nearly 10,000 koku. Gradually the old trusted karō were consulted less and less as Tadayuki, under Jūdayū's influence, was said to have become increasingly lax in propriety and extravagant in manner. Ultimately Daizen formally remonstrated with his lord only to find that Tadayuki now ignored him completely. Fearful of the future of the han, Daizen finally sent a letter to the bakufu's representative at neighboring Hita in hopes that a bakufu investigation might turn Tadayuki around before it was too late.

The resultant bakufu inquest found Tadayuki innocent of treasonous charges, but guilty of certain misconduct, so that he was to have his domain confiscated. However, because of his family's meritorious military service on behalf of the Tokugawa house and Tadayuki's own record of loyalty he was to be reinstated as lord of Chikuzen with his domain intact. For his part, Kuriyama Daizen was
placed in the custody of the Nambu daimyo of Morioka, where he lived out the remainder of his days. Thus settled, this crisis served in the long run to strengthen the bond between Fukuoka and the bakufu. On one hand it reconfirmed the promise that Ieyasu had made to Nagamasa to uphold the fortunes of the house of Kuroda, while on the other hand the Kuroda lords and their retainers were grateful for the lenient treatment they had received, especially in light of the recent confiscation of Kato's fief in Kumamoto.

Within a few years, Tadayuki was called upon by the bakufu to provide major support in putting down the Shimabara Rebellion. In the aftermath of that conflict, of course, Christianity was strictly proscribed throughout Japan, and all foreign trade was restricted to the port of Nagasaki. In 1641, Tadayuki received orders from Edo to guard Nagasaki. The following year the guard duty was assigned to neighboring Saga han, and thereafter, until the end of Tokugawa rule, Fukuoka and Saga alternated yearly in sharing this important assignment. As a result, both han were given a reduced sankin kōtai obligation, having their attendance at Edo limited to a mere one hundred days every other year.
TABLE I

KURODA DAIMYO LINEAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Lifespan</th>
<th>Fukuoka Daimyo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shigetaka</td>
<td>1508-1560</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mototaka</td>
<td>1524-1585</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshitaka</td>
<td>1546-1604</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagamasa</td>
<td>1568-1623</td>
<td>1600-1623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadayuki</td>
<td>1602-1654</td>
<td>1623-1654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsuyuki</td>
<td>1628-1707</td>
<td>1654-1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunamasa</td>
<td>1659-1711</td>
<td>1688-1711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobumasa</td>
<td>1685-1744</td>
<td>1711-1719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsugutaka</td>
<td>1703-1775</td>
<td>1719-1769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haruyuki</td>
<td>1751-1781</td>
<td>1769-1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harutaka</td>
<td>1754-1782</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naritaka</td>
<td>1777-1795</td>
<td>1782-1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narikiyo</td>
<td>1795-1849</td>
<td>1795-1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagahiro</td>
<td>1811-1887</td>
<td>1834-1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagatomo</td>
<td>1837-1902</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: 宽政重修諸家譜 (Kansei chōshū shokafu) (Eishinsha Shuppan, 1922), 3:201-214; and 福岡藩主記録 (Fukuoka hanshu kiroku), FKSS, 9:277-321.
Responsibility for the defense of Nagasaki required a relatively close working relationship with the bakufu and its officials, yet this relationship with the Tokugawa was placed on an even more intimate basis in the mid-eighteenth century as a result of adoption ties with the Hitotsubashi branch of the Tokugawa house. Kuroda Tsugutaka (1703-1775; daimyo 1719-1769), the sixth Fukuoka lord in line from Nagamasa, was past his prime when suddenly in 1762 and the year following both his sons died in quick succession. He therefore adopted as his heir the second son of Tokugawa Munetada (founder of the Hitotsubashi family), grandson of the Shogun Yoshimune and cousin to the then current shogun, Ieharu.

This adopted son became the seventh daimyo, Haruyuki (1762-1781), upon Tsugutaka's retirement in 1769 though only a youth of seven. Unfortunately he died suddenly without male issue in 1781, but his death was kept secret until an adoption could be arranged with the Kyōgoku daimyo of Shikoku. The new heir, Kuroda Harutaka (1754-1782), however, fell ill and died the next year, once again without a son to succeed him. This time the Kuroda family turned again to the Hitotsubashi house for an appropriate adoptive match. Kuroda Naritaka (1777-1795; daimyo 1782-1795) was the second son of Tokugawa Harunari and the younger brother of the future shogun, Ienari. Since Ienari remained as shogun until 1841, we can appreciate the importance of this tie with the Tokugawa extending right into the bakumatsu period. In later chapters we shall discover how the Hitotsubashi relationship proved to be both an asset and a liability: an asset in Fukuoka's attempts to mediate between court and bakufu, and
later Chōshū and bakufu, and a liability when the Hitotsubashi began applying pressure for Fukuoka to toe the bakufu line.

Another relationship which took on increasing significance as the bakumatsu period progressed was the marriage alliance between the Kuroda daimyo and the Nijō, one of the important aristocratic families (kuge) at the Imperial Court. During the early years of Tokugawa rule the bakufu had taken particular care to subordinate the Court and the kuge nobility, regulating them by means of the kuge shohatto (Regulations for the Court Nobility) under the watchful eye of the bakufu's deputy in Kyoto (Kyoto shoshidai). Marriage alliances between daimyo and the Court aristocracy were carefully scrutinized, if allowed at all, and only the Mōri of Choshū were permitted to regularly stop in Kyoto during their sankin kōtai excursions to Edo. With the passing of time and changing attitudes concerning the Court, however, these early restrictions were eased so that by the middle of the nineteenth century nearly all of the major han maintained ties with one or another of the principal noble houses. Besides the Mōri, the Shimazu of Satsuma had a long-standing relationship with the Konoe, the Yamauchi lords of Tosa with the Sanjō, Kuroda with the Nijō, and the Nabeshima of Hizen and Hosokawa of Higo with the kuge houses of Kuze and Kujō, respectively.

The relationship between the Kuroda and Nijō families stemmed from the marriage of Kuroda Narikiyo (1795-1849) to the daughter of Nijō Haruyoshi, who was Udaijin (Minister of the Right) from 1796 to 1807. The strength of the matrimonial alliance is witnessed to, for example, in a Kuroda donation to the Nijō of 300 ryō of gold after an
earthquake damaged the Nijō's Kyoto mansion in 1830.83 Narikiyo's adopted son, Nagahiro, who served as Fukuoka daimyo (1834-1869) throughout the bakumatsu period therefore had both a Nijō grandfather and an uncle, Narinobu, who served as Udaijin. Nagahiro's cousin, Nijō Nariyuki, filled the posts of Naidaijin (Minister of the Center, 1859-1863), Udaijin (1864-1868), Kampaku (Prime Minister, 1864-1867) and Sesshō (Regent, 1867)84 making him perhaps the most powerful official at Court in the decade preceding the bakufu's collapse.

Although Chikuzen was not unique in its relationship with the Court, still this factor loomed large as a determinant of Chikuzen actions and attitudes towards both the Court and the bakufu, as well as the political and ideological movements of the day. Essentially all communication between the Court and Fukuoka was funneled through the Nijō, and therefore Chikuzen activities in Kyoto necessarily centered on the Nijō residence. While the Kuroda marriage alliance with the Nijō was of indisputable importance, it takes on perhaps even greater significance as compared to other han when we consider that the Nijō were perhaps the leading noble family during the final years of the bakufu and a strong supporter of kōbugattai (Unity of Court and Bakufu). Yet, as with the Kuroda relationship to the Hitotsubashi, the connection with the Nijō had the potential of a double-edged sword, providing opportunity for influence and prestige at court, while at the same time enlarging the possibility of reverse influence from the Nijō onto internal han affairs.

Of equal importance to the ties with Court and bakufu were the varied relationships maintained between Chikuzen and the numerous
other han which comprised the bakuhan system, particularly those neighboring domains in Kyushu and western Honshu. Considering first the great tozama han which dominated the region we find that during the bakumatsu years Chikuzen was on relatively cordial terms with Chōshū and Kumamoto han, but relations with Saga han were at best strained. The relationship with Satsuma was especially intimate, however, due to the fact that the Kuroda daimyo was in reality a scion of the Shimazu household.

As ninth child of Shimazu Shigehide (1745-1833), Kuroda Nagahiro was uncle to Shimazu Narioki and great-uncle to Nariakira and Hisamitsu. These relationships are somewhat deceiving, however, since Nagahiro was born in 1811 when Shigehide was 66 years old, while Nariakira was born two years earlier in 1809. In fact, Nagahiro and Nariakira were rather like brothers, having been raised together in the Shimazu residence at Edo, and were close friends from childhood. Interestingly enough the adoption of Nagahiro as Kuroda heir developed as a result of each family's mutual relationship with the Hitotsubashi. As mentioned earlier, Kuroda Narikiyo was the nephew of the shogun lenari, but lenari's wife was also the daughter of Shimazu Shigehide and the half-sister of Nagahiro. After being adopted by Kuroda Narikiyo in 1822, Nagahiro maintained close ties with his natural family and with Nariakira in particular, as will be seen in chapter four. These blood ties between the Chikuzen and Satsuma lords provided the basis for a close relationship between the two han that would last through much of the bakumatsu era and would prove to be a significant factor in both national and intra-han affairs.
Aside from this relationship with Satsuma, Chikuzen sustained particularly close ties with the Ogasawara, the *fudai* daimyo of Kokura, and with several of the smaller domains of northwestern Kyushu, including Omura, Hirado, and Tsushima han. Being small, these han were keenly sensitive to developments within their larger neighbors and thus maintained a constant flow of envoys to keep in touch with current trends. As the political situation became more volatile in the crucial bakumatsu years the smaller domains were even more aware of their vulnerability and Chikuzen's intentions became of grave concern. Tsushima's relationship was rather unique because it was also based on economic grounds. Because Tsushima had insufficient rice land the bakufu had granted it land at the western tip of Chikuzen and the rich holdings at Tashiro near Tosu in Hizen province. Tax rice from these areas was transported to Hakata, where Tsushima maintained a permanent storehouse, and from there to Tsushima proper. With Tsushima han officials stationed on permanent duty at Hakata and as overseers at their nearby agricultural lands, intimate ties with Chikuzen were a foregone conclusion.

**Status and Administration**

The Kuroda lords governed their domain by means of a samurai bureaucratic organization essentially similar to that utilized by the other *kinsei* daimyo. Stemming originally from the military organization of the *kashindan*, han administration was built upon a foundation dominated by the prerogatives of rank and hereditary status. An understanding
of domainal administrative organization, therefore, is reliant upon a clear conception of the underlaying status system which ordered the lives of individual or collective groups of samurai. Since so much of the political machination and group antagonism which dominated the bakumatsu scene, and with which we will be concerned in later chapters, cannot be properly understood without reference to status groups and administrative cliques, it would be useful to provide an outline of the salient points of the social and administrative structure within Fukuoka han.

Fukuoka warrior society was divided into ten major classifications, as follows:92

Tairō (大老, 1 household). The Senior Elder was the general overseer of the han administration, with special responsibility for Nagasaki defense. Originally there was no distinction between karō families but after 1717 one family was named tairō and held that position hereditarily until the Meiji Restoration. Although not a branch family of the Kuroda daimyo it had been granted the name Kuroda and is generally referred to as Minagi Kuroda, after its principal residence at Minagi-mura, Geza-ōri. The Minagi Kuroda were equivalent to a small daimyo with a fief of 16,200 koku and over 150 baishin (rear vassal) households.93

Chūrō (中老, 20 households). These were the families from which karō (han Elders) and goyōnin (advisors) were selected, and who monopolized the highest level of administration. They also held rear vassals and fiefs ranging from 2,000 to 5,500 koku.
Sujime (筋目, 5 households). Relatives of the daimyo, they had high status and fiefs of 800 to 1,300 koku, but held no administrative posts whatsoever.

Ōgumi (大組, 89 households). The real mainstay of han government, this group held nearly all of the important administrative posts. In addition, they performed as envoys, and guards around the person of the daimyo and in the central castle area. Limited to those with fiefs over 600 koku, some held fiefs valued as high as 2,500 koku, though the average was just under 1,000 koku.

Umamawari (馬廻, 548 households). Mainly responsible for night patrol and marching at the side of the daimyo whenever he traveled, they could also hold some important administrative posts. Generally, they possessed chigyō (fiefs) in excess of 100 koku, the average being about 220 koku.

Musoku (無足, 410 households). Responsible for night watch and accompanying the daimyo on trips, these men were allowed only lower administrative positons. They received kirimai (stipend rice) averaging around 16 koku (5 nin fuchi).³⁴

Jōdai (成代, 316 households). The lowest rank of shi (士, knight), their main duty was manning the guardposts and gates of the castle, and of the residence at Edo. Members of this classification received an average stipend of 10 koku (4).

Rikishi (徒士, 72 households). The highest of the sotsu (卒, soldier). They served with other sotsu as guards and clerks or messengers for various offices. Had an average stipend of 13 koku (3).
Sobazutsu (側帯, 150 households). Similar to the rikishi, they averaged an income of 12 koku (3).

Ashigaru (足軽, 1,200 households). Footsoldiers who carried either lance or gun, they also staffed minor posts at the bottom rung of the administrative order. Their income averaged a mere 6 koku (3).

Although Fukuoka han had no goshi (rural soldiers, quasi-samurai) as did Satsuma, Tosa and some other han, there were two additional minor rankings below the ashigaru level. These might be termed quasi-sotsu since they were allowed to wear only one sword instead of the standard two normally worn by all shi and regular sotsu.95

Konin (小人, 330 households). Average stipend of 6 koku (2).

Koyakunin (小役人, 250 households). Received 5 koku (2).

As the above classification clearly shows, the kashindan was separated into two large divisions—shi and sotsu—along a line running between the jōdai and rikishi ranks. This single and most important division had greater meaning than any of the other ranks or subranks within the warrior status system. Only those above the demarcation could be classified as samurai, and though there may have been little real difference in the living standard of a jōdai samurai as compared to a soldier of the sobazutsu rank, in fact there was a wide social gulf separating them. It was only in the rarest of cases that a sotsu might advance upwards across that gulf. In Kan'en 1 (1748), for example, children of sotsu or baishin were forbidden from being adopted into samurai families, except in the case of relatives. A greater affront
came in Hōreki 12 (1762) when children of sotsu were barred from wearing swords, but the order was rescinded after only three years.  

Another distinction between shi and sotsu was that status could be bought and sold. Purchase of a kabu (certificate) from a sotsu household allowed the buyer to use the name of the household, receive its stipend, and serve in its hereditary offices. An example of this process is found in the case of the family of Hirano Kuniomi, the famous bakumatsu activist. Kuniomi's grandfather, a merchant by the name of Komeya, married a daughter of the old merchant family of Kanezakiya. When their second son, Kuniomi's father, was eleven years old his mother purchased for him the ashigaru status of a young man with the surname of Hirano, who had died at the age of 25 leaving neither spouse nor offspring. Applying himself to his newfound status, Kuniomi's father ultimately became an instructor in the military arts for the ashigaru and an official courier for the han.

Within the shi status, samurai were distinguished as to whether they were enfeoffed and received chigyōdaka or received stipends from the daimyo's storehouse. Generally those of umamawari rank and above received chigyōdaka, while the musoku and jōdai ranks received stipends. One of the characteristics of Fukuoka han is found in the unusually large percentage of enfeofment still in effect as late as the bakumatsu period. In 1814, of the rice received by retainers of the Fukuoka lord, 62 percent was chigyōmai while kirimai and fuchimai accounted for only 38 percent of the total. Undoubtedly as we shall later see, the strength of traditional forms had considerable causative
effect in determining the generally conservative nature of the han and
the strength of the vassals vis-a-vis the daimyo.

Another concurrent system of status differentiation concerned the
rights of audience and seating arrangement before the daimyo as the
retainers greeted their lord at the commencement of each new year.100
According to hereditary family status or administrative office the
retainers were ranked as gozama-rei (御座間礼), shōshōin-rei (小書院礼),
doku-rei (独礼), futari-rei (二人礼), gonin-rei (五人礼), hanrei (半礼),
and burei (無礼). Gozama-rei through doku-rei included all the major
leadership posts in the han administration and everyone of chūrō or
ōgumi rank. Those of this status were privileged to a private audience
with the daimyo, the rankings differing only in the room where the
greetings were to take place. As the characters imply, futari-rei and
gonin-rei samurai were permitted to greet the daimyo either two at a
time, or in groups of five. As a broad category, however, all of the
ranks from gozama-rei down to gonin-rei were collectively known as
jikirei (直礼) since they were allowed a direct audience with the daimyo.
The lowest among the bearers of jikirei status were those whose
privilege was limited to their time in office, or to a single generation.

With few exceptions all shi were of jikirei status, further
emphasizing their distinction from sotsu who held either hanrei or burei
status. Those classified as hanrei gathered en masse in the hiroma
to greet the daimyo as he passed by on his way to the shrine of the
han ancestors following the conclusion of the ceremony with the
jikirei samurai. Generally, rikishi and sobazutsu were of hanrei
status, although occasionally meritorious ashigaru were also granted this
privilege. Otherwise ashigaru and below had no right to greet the daimyo and were therefore known as burei.

Viewing the composite of the various aspects of the status system herein described, we find that certain "natural" rankings and group delineations come readily into perspective. Without question those of ōgumi rank and above can be classified as upper samurai in terms of income, ceremonial status, and qualification for high administrative office. Umamawari, on the other hand, were definitely lower in income and administrative possibilities, and were not guaranteed private audience with the daimyo. They might thus be referred to as middle samurai. Below them musoku and jōdai, although still of shi status, received a stipend rather than holding a fief and were rather limited in the administrative posts open to them. This distinction would then lead us to regard them as lower samurai. Among sotsu, too, we find two major groupings separated by both income and ceremonial status. We might therefore argue for a five-tiered status system in Fukuoka comprised of upper, middle, and lower samurai, and upper and lower sotsu.

When attempts are made to compare the Fukuoka status system with those of other domains, however, certain difficulties come quickly to the fore. The issue of general samurai rankings has been a perplexing one for students of the Meiji Restoration, particularly because so much rhetoric has been expended on Marxist-influenced theories of the "lower samurai" class origins of leaders of the Restoration movement. There is, of course, considerable disagreement over what distinguishes an upper, middle, or lower samurai, and how important such classifications
are. The problem is compounded by the fact that similar rankings in different han often go by different titles, and identical names for ranks do not necessarily connote equivalency. The ōgumi of Fukuoka, for example, are best identified with the yoriai in Satsuma or the yorigumi in Chōshū. However, there is also an ōgumi rank in Chōshū, but in comparison it is most nearly equivalent to the umamawari rank in Fukuoka or the koban rank in Satsuma. 101

This confusion has led some scholars to attempt comparative rankings according to economic indicators such as kokudaka income. Although at times helpful, this method is severely flawed in that it ignores essential status differentiations. For example within Fukuoka itself, rikishi received higher average income than did jōdai, although jōdai status was considerably higher. If such discrepancies could exist within a single domain, comparisons across han boundaries can only work to multiply the coefficient of error. There was in fact, wide difference between a 300 koku samurai from a small 50,000 koku domain where he would certainly rank as one of the premier vassals, and a middle-ranking 300 koku samurai from a large han such as Fukuoka. A truly accurate comparative picture awaits the detailing of status systems for each individual han, such as that recently done for Satsuma. 102

The han administration was a bureaucratic structure which extended downward from the person of the daimyo to exercise control over all segments of han populace: samurai groups, farmers, fishermen, town-dwellers, and priests. Although the daimyo was theoretically at the peak of the administrative order, in reality the han bureaucracy was a self-perpetuating structure which could and often
did operate without significant input from the daimyo. As outlined in the previous section, Fukuoka was without a mature daimyo for nearly fifty years in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This created a situation in which the karō and other high-ranking office holders exercised total control over han government and considerably strengthened their position vis-a-vis daimyo authority.

Immediately under the daimyo in the Fukuoka administration was the tairō, the office monopolized by the Minagi Kuroda family. The tairō maintained considerable prestige and authority and was directly responsible for Nagasaki defense, but for the most part the day to day workings of the administration were guided by the goyaku (five offices): the karō, yōnin, nando-gashira, urahanyaku, and jōdai-gashira.103

Karō (家老). Usually about five in number the karō were the directors of han government, each member taking turns in monthly rotation as primary administrator (tsukibans karō) over the collective body. The karō were chosen from the chūrō rank and were guaranteed an income of 4,000 koku.104 Under the karō the other four offices of the goyaku served as department heads over the widening bureaucratic structure.

Yōnin (用人). Also known as yōkin, there were generally four holders of this office. Chosen from the heirs of the karō and chūrō, they served as secretaries to the han administration, also fulfilling important diplomatic responsibilities as emmisaries of the han.

Nando-gashira (納戸頭). Generally four in number, these officials served as assistants to the daimyo and as overseers over his
household affairs. They were appointed from the ogumi and received 1,000 koku.

Urahanyaku (裏判役). Apparently unique to Fukuoka, this office oversaw the administration of han finances and the local governance of the non-warrior populace. The name derives from the requirement that all deeds and certificates have its stamp on the reverse to be recognized as official. Also chosen from the ogumi, the office carried an income of 800 koku.

Jōdai-gashira (城代頭). Was responsible for overseeing the jōdai sanurai, and therefore the defense of the castle. Also had responsibility for the required religious registration carried out by the shūshi bugyō. In times of war when troops were dispatched, the castle was left under the direction of the jōdai-gashira. There were usually two holders of this office chosen from the ogumi and receiving 500 koku.

In addition to the above goyaku two other important offices were appended to the karō and operated somewhat apart from the standard bureaucracy. The first was the zaiji motojime (則事元締) who was selected from either the chūro or ogumi rank as a counselor in han government and manager of expenditures. During the bakumatsu years one of the karō was often appointed concurrently to this post, an act paramount to recognition as the leading official in the han. A second office, the yōbeya (用部屋), was the only high office open to men of ability from the lower ranks of the status system. They exercised considerable influence as advisors to the karō and to the daimyo, and were often given special projects and assignments. Although they
worked as an appendage to the regular bureaucracy, in fact yōbeya were usually important figures in bureaucratic cliques with close relationships throughout the bureaucratic structure.

Under the direction of the karō, the chūrō had responsibility for the supervision of the warrior class. Relations between each samurai household and the han were administered through the military group of which it was a member, directed by a gashira. Thus, there were ōgumi-gashira, umamawari-gashira, etc., down to the ōgashira who oversaw the ashigaru.

Other important positions within the bureaucracy fell primarily under the direction of the urahanyaku:

Kanjō bugyō (勘定奉行). Administrator of han finances. Each year the budgets for each of the administrative offices was submitted to the kanjō bugyō where they were reviewed and then forwarded to the urahanyaku and the zaiji motojime. Received 300 koku plus special payment for duty at the Osaka yashiki (warehouse).

Kōri bugyō (郡奉行). Five men held positions as general overseers of local administration over the farming districts. Chosen from the umamawari rank, they received 350 koku, but if serving concurrently as shaji bugyō (社寺奉行) as they often did, they received 450 koku.

Machi bugyō (町奉行). Head of the government for Fukuoka-Hakata; 350 koku.

Ura bugyō (浦奉行). Overseer of the fishing villages; 300 koku.
In addition were the ōmetsuke, (大目付; 2 positions, 500 koku) who were head of the investigative offices, and the various administrators directing the han offices at Edo, Kyoto, and Nagasaki.

Local control over the farming population in Chikuzen was accomplished, as in other han, through a secondary bureaucracy with the kōri bugyō positioned at its apex. After 1762 the sixteen kōri of Chikuzen were divided into five large districts each controlled by a kōri bugyō assisted by about twenty lesser officials. Administrative offices were established at each bugyō's residence in Fukuoka and a general office was maintained within the castle grounds where matters pertaining to all districts could be handled. Each individual kōri bugyō took a turn in monthly rotation as manager of this office. Under each kōri bugyō there were five or six ojōya (大所屋) who in turn had responsibility over a number of villages, each governed by a shōya (所屋). Although ojōya were in all cases non-samurai, they received a payment of 100 hyō of rice and by the end of the Tokugawa period most had been granted special status allowing them the use of a surname and the wearing of swords. A survey of 1812 shows four out of 36 being allowed surnames, but by 1864 27 out of 28 were allowed that privilege. Control over fishing communities followed the same general lines under the direction of the ura bugyō, while local administration over Fukuoka and Hakata was achieved through a vertical organization of nengyōji (年行司), toshiyori (年寄), and kumichō (組長) extending downward from the machi bugyō.
1. The koku (石) was a standard measure of rice (4.96 bushels or 180 liters), and from Hideyoshi's time on became the yardstick for land granted in fief as well. The potential or putative yield, known as the kokudaka, was measured by cadastral survey according to a preset formula.

2. Fujino Tamotsu (藤野望), 藩政と藩政 (Bakusei to hansei) (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1979), p. 201.

3. This section is in large part derived from Glen Trewartha, Japan: A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), pp. 44, 546-67.

4. Many domains witnessed impressive development in rice output due mainly to reclamation and new strains of rice, and in western Japan, Tosa, for example, saw its population grow from approximately 300,000 at the beginning of the Tokugawa period to an estimated 500,000 by 1842. See Jansen, Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration, p. 21.

5. Fukuoka Ken (福岡県), 福岡県史 (Fukuoka kenshi) (Fukuoka: Fukuoka Ken, 1963), 2.1:179; 2.2:521. Hereafter cited as FKS.


7. FKS, 2.1:23.

8. Although the term han (藩) was contemporary to bakumatsu Japan, a domain was usually referred to as ryō (領) or shū (州).
Major domains were interchangeably known by the names of their province, castle town, or daimyo. Thus we obtain Chikuzen, Fukuoka, or Kuroda; similarly Satsuma might be referred to as Kagoshima or Shimazu; and Choshū as Hagi or Mōri.


10. Takeuchi Riza (竹内理三), "Dazaifu to tairiku," in 古代アジアと九州 (Kodai Ajia to Kyūshū), ed. Matsumoto Masaaki (松本正明) (Heibonsha, 1973), p. 297. The location of these states and more especially of Yamatai has been heavily debated for many years. However, the controversy over Yamatai should not divert us from our main point, which is that there was early and significant intercourse between northern Kyushu and the Asian continent. At present, there seems to be a general consensus of agreement on the locations of at least Izu and Nu. For a survey of the Yamatai debate see Mishina Akihide (三島彰英), 邪馬台国研究総覧 (Yamatai koku kenkyū soran) (Sōgensha, 1970).

11. Tsunoda and Goodrich, p. 2. The original may be found in Fan Yeh (范曄), 後漢書 (Hou Han shu), eds. Li Hsien (李賢), et al. (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1965), p. 2821.

12. For the Japanese historiography on this famous gold seal, see Ōtani Mitsuo (大谷光男), 金印 (Kin'in) (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1975).


15. John W. Hall, Government and Local Power in Japan, 500 to 1700
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press., 1966), p. 77. For the
origins of Dazaifu see Tamura Enchō (田村源一), "大宰府前
史小論 (Dazaifu zenshi koron)," 九州文化史研究所紀要
(Kyūshū Bunkashi Kenkyūjo kiyō) [hereafter cited as KBKK], 21
(March 1976), 27-54.

16. These are the Mizuki embankment (24 feet high, 90 feet in width,
and 2,400 feet in length) which still remains today as an important
landmark, and the fortresses of Ōno and Ki. See W.G. Aston,
Nihongi (1896; rpt. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1972),
2:283-84; and FKS, 1:138.

17. Tamura, p. 37 ff.; and Kawazoe Shōji (川添昭二), "古代・中世
の博多 (Kodai-chūsei no Hakata)"; in 博多津要録 (Hakata tsu
yoroku), eds. Hidemura Senzō (秀村善三), et al. (Fukuoka:
Nishi Nihon Bunka Kyokai, 1975), 1: Appendix, pp. 4-5.

18. ibid., pp. 5-6.

19. ibid., pp. 6-10.

20. ibid., pp. 12-13; Hirano and lida, p. 71; and Jeffrey P. Mass,
Warrior Government in Early Medieval Japan (New Haven: Yale


22. Toyama Mikio (外山幹夫), 中世の九州 (Chūsei no
Kyūshū) (Kyōkusha, 1978), p. 184. An example of this alternate
appellation is found in the title to an eighteenth century gazetteer
of Hakata: Tsuda Genko (津田元顧), 石城志 (Sekijō shi),


25. For details see, Hori, pp. 184-193, 195.


27. Hirano and Iida, pp. 99-101; and Asakawa, p. 236.


29. For a summary of the fortunes of Kanenaga and the supporters of the southern court, see ibid., pp. 102-106. Details on the Kikuchi can be found in Sugimoto Isao (樋原三代) (Kikuchi Shi sandai) (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1966).


31. The Dazaifu Tenmangu had as its deity the famous Sugawara no Michizane, who died in exile at Dazaifu in 903, and according to tradition the shrine was built on the site of his burial. Since this
was located on the grounds of the Anrakuji, the site developed during the medieval period as a composite temple-shrine. Ultimately the younger Tenmangu shrine obtained the dominant position and took precedence over the parent Anrakuji.


38. Of particular note were the wide-ranging mercantile activities of Shimai Sōshitsu, Kamiya Sōtan, Suetsugu Sōtoku, and Ōga Kurōzaemon which extended from Korea and China, to the Philippines and Siam. See e.g., Tanaka Takeo (田中健夫), 島井家室 (Shimai Sōshitsu) (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1961).


40. The now standard discussion of the developmental process leading toward kinsei daimyo can be found in John W. Hall, "Foundations of the Modern Japanese Daimyo," in Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, pp. 65-77. Material for the following has been derived from Hirano and Iida pp. 114-122; and FKS, 1.2:791-808.

41. FKS, 1.2:930-931.

42. For Hideyoshi's Kyushu expedition, see, among many others, FKS, 1.2:846-856; and Kuwata Tadachika (豊臣秀吉研究) (Toyotomi Hideyoshi kenkyū) (Kadokawa Shoten, 1975), pp. 196-222.


45. For the reconstruction of Hakata, see: FKS, 1.2:931-944; Kuwata, pp. 223-225. Hideyoshi's expulsion edict of 1587 can be found in

46. FKS, 1.2:781-791.

47. FKS, 1.2:871-73.


51. Craig, Chōshū, p. 114. In the bakumatsu period Satsuma, Tosa, Aizu, and Fukuoka were among those domains where the daimyo did exercise a dominant and positive role.

52. This is a viewpoint offered by some recent Japanese studies which point to a growing stabilization by the time of the fourth shogun, Ietsuna. See Fujino, Bakuhan taisei (1975), pp. 436-444, 567-586. Bolitho, pp. 38-39, disagrees.

53. E.g., see Shibahara Takuji (芝原拓自), 明治維新の権力構築 (Meiji Ishin no kenryoku kiban) (Ochanomizu Shobō, 1965), p. 76; and Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868, p. xx.

54. Craig, Chōshū, pp. 7-8.

55. 寛政重修諸家譜 (Kansei chōshū shōkafu) (Eishinsha Shuppan, 1922), 3:201-214.

57. The following account is taken primarily from, Andō Hideo (安藤英男), *Shiden Kuroda Josui* (Nichibō Shuppansha, 1975), pp. 13-36.

58. Kuroda Yoshitaka, known also as Josui, was baptized a Christian in 1583 and christened Don Simeon. He was one of the several influential "Christian generals" of the age.


60. Hirano and Iida, pp. 130-31; and Andō, pp. 121-153.


62. ibid., p. 219; and Andō, pp. 193-94.

63. This distinction is clearly stated in Craig, *Chōshū*, pp. 20-21.

64. A brief introduction to this distinction as it relates to regional characteristics in Kyushu can be found in Fujino, *Bakuhan taisei* (1975), pp. 633-34.

65. FKS, 2.1:1.

66. FKS, 2.1:1.

67. FKS, 2.1:2,176. Each of these outlying castles was placed under the supervision of a leading retainer. They were all destroyed, however, following the bakufu's *ikkoku-ichijō* (one domain-one castle) order of 1615, FKS, 2.1:9.
68. FKS, 2.1:23.

69. Other non-Tokugawa families given the Matsudaira name included: Asano (Hiroshima), Ikeda (Okayama, Tottori), Date (Sendai), Shimazu (Kagoshima), Nabeshima (Saga), Maeda (Kanazawa), Mōri (Hagi), and Yamauchi (Kōchi). For a complete list see, Tokugawa Jikki Kenkyūkai (徳川実紀研究会), 徳川実紀索引人名編 (Tokugawa jikki sakuin, jimmei hen) (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1972), 1:8-9.

70. For a summary of the affair, see Hirano and Iida, pp. 135-137. The incident is famous one, much written about because of the conflict which it entails between personal loyalty (in this case to the house of Kuroda and the memory of Yoshitaka and Nagamasa) and institutionalized loyalty (to the new daimyo, son of Nagamasa). Moreover, it is strongly colored by that ethos of self-sacrifice which so captures the Japanese fancy, as described in Ivan Morris, The Nobility of Failure (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975). Numerous fictionalized versions of the Kuroda sōdō exist. A recent one is Ryū Kankichi (剣斎), 黒田騒動 (Kuroda sōdō) (Shinjinbutsu Oraisha, 1970). Mori Ogai's version is available in English translation as Ogai Mori, "Kuriyama Daizen", in Saiki Kōi and Other Stories, eds. David Dilworth and J. Thomas Rimer (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1977), pp. 90-116.

71. For complete lists of both confiscations and transfers of daimyo fiefs during the Tokugawa period, see Fujino, Bakuhan taisei, Appendix, pp. 36-64.

72. Hita was an important Kyushu tenryō (bakufu landholding) of 123,000 koku just east of Chikuzen which shared responsibility with Nagasaki for observing the various Kyushu daimyo.
73. Hirano and Iida, p. 136; Mori, "Kuriyama Daizen", p. 110.

74. FKS, 2.1:291-92.

75. FKS, 2.1:26-27.


77. The Hitotsubashi were one of the three sankyō branches of the Tokugawa which could, along with the sanke, provide heirs if the main Tokugawa house failed to produce a son. In 1740, Tokugawa Munetada, son of the eighth shogun Yoshimune, was allowed to establish a branch house and was given residence within Edo castle near the Hitotsubashi gate, from which the name derived. Although possessing a kokudaka of 100,000 koku, Hitotsubashi holdings were scattered so there was no distinguishable domain. The Hitotsubashi branch furnished the main line with the eleventh shogun, Ienari, and the fifteenth and final shogun, Yoshinobu. See Takayanagi Mitsuhisa (高柳光寿) and Takeuchi Rizō (竹内理三), comps., 日本史辞典 (Nihon shi jiten), 2nd ed. (Kadokawa Shoten, 1974).

78. The following data on the Kuroda lords is taken from "黒田新家譜 (Kuroda shinzoku kafu)," as cited in Fukuoka Ken (福岡県), 福岡県史資料 (Fukuoka kenshi shiryō) (Fukuoka Ken, 1938), 9:277-321, [hereafter abbreviated as FKSS]. See also FKS, 2.1:79-80, 127, 134-35.

79. The highest appointment at the Court, either kampaku or sesshō, was restricted to the five Fujiwara branch families (go sekke): Ichijō, Nijō, Kujō, Konoe, and Takatsukasa.
80. Craig, Chōshū, pp. 24-25; and Suematsu Kenchō (末松謙澄), 防長回天史 Bōchō kaiten shi, revised ed. (Suematsu Shungen, 1921), 1:34.


83. "絹領 (Kōryō)," 1:61-63, 黒田家文書 Kuroda-ke monjo, no. 108.

84. Kobata Atsushi ( ), et al., eds., (Dokushi sōran) (Jimbutsu Ōraisha, 1966), pp. 1526-1540.

85. Fukuoka had very little to do with Saga during the bakumatsu era outside of the required interchange relevant to their joint defense of Nagasaki. Their mutual antagonism may be surmised from the scarcity of references to exchange of envoys for joint consultation or political cooperation. See "諸所 (Shosho)," 黒田家文書 Kuroda-ke monjo, nos. 363-372.

86. A detailed account of the relationship between Kuroda Nagahiro and Shimazu Nariakira can be found in Yamauchi Shūichi (山内修一), 葛城彦一 Katsuragi Hikoichi den (Fukuoka: Katsuragi Hikoichi Den Hensanjo, 1935) pp. 124-127.

87. ibid., pp. 97-98.

88. Bolitho, p. 102.
89. See Fujino Tamotsu (藤野保), "平戸藩 (Hirado han)," in 長崎県史: 藩政編 (Nagasaki kenshi: hansei hen) (Yoshikawa Köbukan, 1973), pp. 545-47.

90. The existence of the Tsushima kurayashiki is born witness to by the fact that the street near Hakata port which once led to the Tsushima storehouse is still known as Tsuma shōji (対馬小路).

91. Organizational diagrams for several domains can be found in Takayanagi and Takeuchi, Nihon shi jiten (1974), pp. 1159-64.

92. Compiled from FKS, 2.1:285-88; and Yasukawa Iwao (安川収), "解題 (Kadai)," in 黒田三藩分限帳 (Kuroda sampan bungencho), ed. Fukuoka Chihōshi Danwakai (福岡地方史談話会) (Fukuoka: Fukuoka Chihōshi Danwakai, 1978), pp. 441-42.

93. From 黒田美作家来分限帳 (Kuroda Mimasaka kerai bun gencho), " found in the Kyushu University library.

94. The fuchi, shown here in parentheses, was a payment from the daimyo's storehouse separate from kirimai. One fuchi was equal to 4.55 koku of kirimai, so an 18 koku 4 nin fuchi samurai would receive 36.2 koku. By comparison the 20 koku 8 nin fuchi samurai received roughly the equivalent of the 100 koku fief-holder. See Itō Ōjirō (伊東尾四郎), "福岡旧事業話 (Fukuoka kyūji sōwa)," 筑紫史談 (Chikushi shidan), 16, 37.

95. ibid., Chikushi shidan, 14, 35.

96. FKS, 2.1:289.

97. FKS, 2.1:288.

98. Haruyama ikujirō (春山有次郎), 平野国臣伝 (Hirano Kuniomi den) (Heibonsha, 1929), pp. 15-17.
99. Inoue Tadashi (井上忠) and Yasukawa Iwao (安川敬), "福 岡藩 (Fukuoka han)," in 新編物語幕史 (Shimpen monogatari hanshi), eds. Kodama Kōta (尾上幸多) and Kitajima Masamoto (北島正元) (Shinjimbutsu Ōraisha, 1975), 11:121, 137; and Yasukawa, "Kadai," pp. 440-43.

100. The following description is derived from FKS, 2.1:288-89; and Yasukawa, "Kadai," pp. 441-42.


103. Particulars on Fukuoka han administration are drawn from Takeya Yūshi (武谷祐之), "南興一夢 (Nanka ichimu)," 3, ed. Inoue Tadashi (井上忠) in KBKK, 14, 240-247; and Nakamura Gohei (中村五平), "旧福岡藩制度一覧 (Kyū Fukuoka han seidō ippan)," 議上史談 (Chikushi shidan), 21 (1919.7), 42-45.

104. More particularly, 4,000 koku atari (石当). Atari would be the
minimum income for a person holding that office. Therefore, if a 3,000 koku samurai was appointed as karō, then he received a 1,000 koku increase during his time in office. A 5,000 koku samurai received no increase, but only a payment for days of service. All offices operated on the same principle.

105. For local administration see: Nagano Makoto (長野誠), "福岡藩民正史略(Fukuoka han minsei shiryaku)," in FKSS, 1:356-422. Changes in the control structure over the farming population have been traced in Shibata Ichio (柴多一雄), "幕藩制中・後期農村支配機構に関する考察 -- 福岡藩五郎奉行制を中心に(Fukuoka han go kōri buyō sei o chūshin ni),"九州史学 (Kvushū shigaku), 64 (August 1978), 25-44.

106. FKS, 2.2:554.
The several decades prior to the opening of Japan to the West in 1854 were marked, in the eyes of those familiar with Chinese historiography, by many of the classical signs of dynastic decline. Heavenly manifestations, in the form of an uncommon frequency of natural disturbances (typhoons, floods, droughts, famines, etc.) seemed to reflect the unsettled nature of human affairs. Added to an increase in domestic, political and social disquietude brought on by economic change was a growing fear of foreign incursion. Ominous reports entering Japan told of Western intervention in India and China, and the rising number of sightings of Western ships in Japanese waters only added substance to the worst of fears. Such a situation prompted contemporary Japanese observers to utilize a Chinese term, read in Japanese as naiyū gaikan (内憂外患, troubles at home and dangers from abroad), to emphasize the dual threat with which Japan was faced. According to traditional historiography, it was the combination of these two evils which had toppled one after another of the Chinese dynasties.

In this chapter we shall deal primarily with the first of the two threats, the economic crisis which endangered the stability of bakufu and han and which had generated the general impoverishment of many among both the samurai ruling class and the peasantry. By the third
decade of the nineteenth century, a sense of urgency relative to economic and social problems had begun to permeate Japan. Many domains, including Fukuoka, and then the bakufu itself, attempted reforms in an effort to rectify pressing issues. These are the famous Tempo reforms (named after the Tempo era, 1830-1843, in which they occurred) which many Japanese historians have seen as the real starting point for the Meiji Restoration. The relative success of Satsuma, Choshu, and others of the Meiji victors in meeting these challenges has often been contrasted with the failure of the bakufu and other han as one of the major determining factors in the Meiji Restoration. What then was the economic condition of Fukuoka han? Is it possible that economic factors were the decisive elements in Fukuoka's failure to join with the other great southwestern han in taking a leading role in the Meiji movement? The purpose of this chapter is to show that they were not.

Japanese historians such as Numada Jirō and Yasukawa Iwao have opined that perhaps the primary factor in Fukuoka's failure to actively participate in the Restoration can be found in its failure to carry out effective economic reform during the Tempo period, thereby denying a firm foundation for continued modernization and dynamic han policy.2 Such a view, though common, is at best an oversimplification, however, for it fails to establish any comparative criteria for measuring the success or failure of the reforms, ignores the greater context of bakumatsu domain economics, and denies the cardinal influence of events transpiring within and without the han over the ensuing quarter century. Even limiting ourselves to the economic realm alone, we cannot ignore
the fact that despite their importance in Japanese historiography, the reforms of the Tempo period were little more than a temporary peak of activity in a near steady continuum of han reform beginning in the Bunka-Bunsei periods (1804-1830) and continuing through the Restoration.

The second threat, that of Western intervention, and Fukuoka's response to it will be discussed in chapter four, although the considerable economic ramification of an increased Western presence has significance in the discussion of the economic crisis. Obviously the two threats were far from mutually exclusive and their interrelationship is part of the complexity which marks the bakumatsu years.

It is well known to students of Tokugawa Japan that from very early in the period increasingly severe economic difficulties plagued both government and samurai alike. From the 1660's onward, and particularly after the reforms of the shogun Yoshimune early in the eighteenth century, a goodly proportion of Tokugawa policy was aimed at retaining financial solvency at the top while providing relief for distressed samurai and farmers below. Bakufu and domain alike worked hard to adjust to the challenges of a rapidly developing commercial economy as they found themselves bound to a national marketing structure based on Osaka and Edo. To some degree governments could adapt by finding new or more efficient means of gaining revenue, but samurai families were bound to a fixed rice stipend which supplied a steadily declining purchasing power in the midst of rising prices and expanding expectations. Meanwhile, among the farming population a
minority of capable and lucky individuals profited by the spread of commercial economy to the villages. Those less adaptable or less fortunate were forced into tenancy or lost their land altogether, either fleeing to urban centers or becoming paid agricultural laborers. Such social inequities were in direct contradiction with the Confucian-oriented ideals of the Tokugawa social structure and their continued existence questioned the very nature of bakuhan society.

From the early Tokugawa period onward there had existed a basic contradiction between the ideal of a purely subsistence agrarian society ruled over by a military aristocracy (which society never really existed, even in the early Tokugawa) and the increasingly commercial economy of consumption which developed inexorably from the requirements of the bakuhan system. Part of this contradiction can be traced to the process of alienation of the samurai from the land begun with Hideyoshi's policy of heinō bunri, as samurai were required to gather in castle towns where they of necessity exchanged their rice stipends for the goods and services essential to daily urban life. Even more important, however, were the requirements made against the han by the bakufu for sankin kōtai and various work projects. These impositions were designed to prevent the daimyo from amassing wealth with which to purchase military strength, and they worked remarkably well. So well did they work, in fact, that by the mid-Tokugawa period domains throughout Japan were expending up to 80 percent of their annual disbursements on sankin kōtai-related expenses, either to provide for the daimyo's retinue or to maintain members of the daimyo's family and numbers of samurai at the official Edo residences. In addition, periodic
bakufu levies and work assignments required major outlays of funds and further strained han finances. Importantly it was precisely these control mechanisms which proved to be among the most long-lasting and fundamental elements of the bakuhan system.

Expenses in Edo or for sānkīn kōtai travel required, for the most part, payments in cash and so daimyo found it necessary to convert at least part of their tax rice income into a more readily usable medium of exchange. It therefore became common for many of the han to ship large quantities of rice annually to the rapidly expanding Osaka grain market and to appoint Osaka merchants as kuramotō or kakeya to handle such transactions. Fukuoka became one of the largest sellers of rice in Osaka and high-quality Chikuzen rice became a pricing standard for the market. In the late eighteenth century nearly 90% of Fukuoka rice expenditures and 70% of total han expenses were paid for from rice sent to Osaka.

In light of the general inflationary trend and an increasingly sophisticated and complex economic life, expenditures outpaced income, and by the latter half of the seventeenth century many domains throughout Japan found themselves faced with deficits which could only be met by borrowing, usually from the merchant houses of Osaka. While some han managed deficits even in good years, much of the blame for heavy indebtedness can be laid either on reduced tax income due to poor harvests, or on extraordinary expenses arising from bakufu levies or replacement of buildings destroyed by fire. Characteristically, major periods of economic reform followed on the heels of successive years of poor harvests caused by floods, typhoons, droughts, or insect damage.
Such was the case with the reforms of Kyōhō (1716-1735), Kansei (1789-1800), and Tempō (1830-1843).  

Until the mid-eighteenth century han financial difficulties could generally be corrected by cutting costs through efforts at retrenchment and by increasing income by means of new "irregular" taxes on the peasantry, reduction in samurai stipends, and forced loans from wealthy local merchants. However, these methods alone soon proved insufficient and domains attempted to tap some of the recent commercial growth by instituting unjōgin (commercial licensing taxes), encouraging the production of commercial products, and issuing hansatsu (paper currency) of different varieties. At the same time more significant increases in income were attempted through firmer control of the village population and greater efficiency in tax collection.

Han attempts to increase overall income were plagued, however, by the impoverishment of certain segments of the rural population and the related problem of vacant land. Chōshū records of 1754 show that of the 447,000 koku of land from which taxes entered the han treasury (kurairi sodaka) more than 18,000 koku was vacant land. Uncultivated fields and peasant abscondance were a problem in Chikuzen as well, and efforts were made to increase the number of tax-paying farmers, even to the extent of accepting apparent runaways from other domains. While unproductive land in the countryside was a sign of social and economic dislocation among segments of the peasantry, it also exacerbated the problem, for it resulted in increased tax and corvee assessments for those remaining in the villages.
A further difficulty which domains faced in their attempts to recoup financial stability was the self-perpetuating burden of interest payments. If domains had difficult making ends meet in normal years it was only with great difficulty that the principal on debts could be repaid. As debts rose, interest payments alone became a major drain on han finances.\textsuperscript{15}

Although we have painted a somewhat dismal picture of the Tokugawa economic scene, it is important to emphasize that the difficulties described apply primarily to a majority of the domain governments and certain segments of the population rather than to society as a whole. Indeed, much of the dislocation and economic difficulty we encounter developed because of failure to cope with the process of rapid growth and expansion of commercial life which so distinguishes the Tokugawa era. Neither do we intend to infer the absolutely constant deterioration of han finances. The pattern was, in fact, more cyclical or erratic in nature, with periods of prosperity and free spending countered by periods of retrenchment and reform. Nevertheless, the general trend was toward increasing difficulty and growing inability of domains to cope with the problems which confronted them.

The cultural flowering of the Bunka-Bunsei era (1804-1829) and its concomitant rise in consumption was accompanied as well by an unprecedented expansion of han and samurai debt, despite efforts to the contrary.\textsuperscript{16} Matched by growing social unrest and the signs of increased Western presence, the 1830's witnessed a sense of crisis and urgency spreading throughout Japan.\textsuperscript{17} Spurred by widespread crop
debilitating bakufu financial policies, and heavy indebtedness, one han after another attempted reforms to meet the crisis. In 1830 Satsuma, under Zusho Hirozaemon, became the first to attempt what have since become known as the Tempō reforms in order to correct its economic plight. Four years later, Fukuoka and Hizen followed suit, with Chōshū commencing its reform in 1838. Not until 1841 did the bakufu initiate its own short-lived reforms under the leadership of Mizuno Tadakuni.

Much significance has been attached to the Tempō reforms by many historians of Japan, who have found in them the crucial foundation for the collapse of the bakufu, the nature of the Meiji Restoration, and the subsequent character of modern Japan. This evaluation derives from several factors which have been viewed as setting the Tempō reforms apart from earlier reform efforts, thus making them the point of departure for later developments. Most obvious is the factor of timing. Occuring just prior to the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1854 at a time when Japan was beginning to feel the pressure of increased Western activity in China, and when domestic economic and social issues were seen as having reached a crisis stage, the reforms held the potential for determining the continued viability of the status-quo.

The fact that the leading han in the Restoration were relatively successful in their reforms while the bakufu failed in its efforts has seemed to validate the causative relationship between the Tempō reforms and the Meiji Restoration. Certainly the success of the Meiji victors in economic reforms helped provide the financial basis for the build-up of military potential necessary to challenge the bakufu, but was this the
primary factor in the Restoration? William Beasley has stated that "in terms of relative military capacity, the willingness to adopt Western organization and technology was as important as the money to finance them." Since all the han were in debt to some extent (the Meiji victors often more than others), what each did with the money it borrowed was more critical than the size of the debt. Another factor which distinguishes the Tempo reforms from earlier ones, and which also divides the domains and the bakufu, is the rise in the domains of a new breed of reformers from among the middle samurai ranks. Where earlier reforms had been led by "famous lords" (meikun) who gained the respect and admiration of the populace, or by capable han Elders, the Tempo reforms were more often led by lower-ranking men with practical experience who achieved their positions through private relationship with the daimyo. Ties between these new reformers and their merchant counterparts have led to various interpretations that attempt to detect in class and economic relationships primary explanation for the character of the Meiji Restoration and the nature of government and society in modern Japan. For example, Toyama Shigeki and Shibahara Takuji see an alliance between those in the countryside and in the castle town who found themselves threatened by the specter of peasant revolt. In a variant opinion, Seki Junya argues that the feudal ruling class sought to overthrow its privileged merchant allies by alliance with weaker supporters who could not challenge its authority. Okamoto Ryōichi and others reject the Toyama theory of an emerging nascent "absolutism", describing the reforms as essentially a feudal reactionary movement to strengthen support for the bakuhan system.
A problem evident throughout such theorizing is the perhaps impossible task of describing nationwide patterns in light of diverse local variations in the response to the economic crisis. Regional trends, which would appear to hold greater potential for accurate description and analysis, remain as yet inadequately researched. Unfortunately, the difficulty in analyzing the Tempo reforms has been compounded by the widespread use of Marxist rhetoric which presupposes a degree of class-consciousness for which there is little basis, and an effort to see more significance in economic affairs than they deserve, to the exclusion of other factors. Much of importance occurred between the Tempo reforms and the Meiji Restoration, including continued reform attempts aimed at overcoming the financial crisis. In addition, political machinations within the han, the ideology of domain leaders and their attitudes toward modernization, as well as bakuhan relationships, all played a part in setting the stage for any activity in Restoration politics.

Fukuoka's Tempo reform began in the twelfth month of 1833 with the assignment of the karō Hisano Geki to the responsibility of overseeing relief efforts on behalf of samurai and commoners who had fallen into difficult economic straits. Under his jurisdiction, the han oculist Shirozu Yōtei and Hanabusa Denzaemon were assigned to carry out the reform program. Since the real commencement of reform activities early in 1834 coincides with the succession of Kuroda Nagahiro to replace the retiring Narikiyo as daimyo, many have assumed Fukuoka's Tempo reform to be a direct outgrowth of the earlier Satsuma reform. Recognizing the close relationship between Satsuma and Chikuzen and
the fact that Nagahiro was indeed adopted from the family of the Kagoshima daimyo, such a supposition is wholly understandable. Yet, while the possibility of influence from the Satsuma reforms cannot be denied, neither can we ignore the continuity of many aspects characteristic of earlier Fukuoka reforms. In fact, in larger perspective the early Tempō reforms in Fukuoka appear to be a later manifestation of the continuing reform activities begun under Hisano Geki and the urahanyaku, Akashi Kyūzaemon, during the Bunka period (1804-1817). In Fukuoka, at least, a much greater break in continuity appears in another series of reforms beginning in 1842 and continuing through the 1850's.

**Early Reforms**

As in most other major han throughout Japan, the Tempō reforms in Fukuoka were preceded by several other important periods of reform during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These were the reform efforts which followed the disastrous famine of 1732-33, the Hōreki-Meiwa reforms (1751-1771), and the Bunka reforms which came in the wake of the poor harvests of 1792-1797.

During the early years of the Tokugawa period Fukuoka han enjoyed general prosperity as compared to the difficulties some domains were already beginning to experience. Much of this prosperity was undoubtedly engendered by the wide-ranging commercial activities of the wealthy Hakata merchants noted in the previous chapter, which continued until the sakoku edict limiting all foreign trade to Nagasaki.
So it was that, under the leadership of Kuroda Nagamasa, Fukuoka developed a fairly strong financial base which included a savings program for relief purposes and strong sumptuary laws to maintain frugality and order in society. By 1622, just prior to Nagamasa's death, the relief fund totalled 23,250 kamme of silver which Nagamasa intended would last the han for 200 years.

The next several decades witnessed a rapid expansion in han expenses as the bakuhan system began to mature. Fukuoka was assigned to bienniel guard duty at Nagasaki, and all domains became entwined in the growing consumer society of Edo. Additionally, occasional natural disasters dramatically reduced income, so that the savings Nagamasa had intended for relief was soon expended and the domain was forced to borrow from merchants. According to the eighteenth-century scholar, Kaibara Ekiken, Fukuoka's indebtedness to outside merchants began during the latter part of the life of Kuroda Mitsuyuki, the third Fukuoka daimyo, as a result of several natural disasters during the Empō period (1673-1680). By the Genroku period (1688-1703) the debt rose to 5,000 kamme and in 1704 the han issued hansatsu to help recoup its finances.

In order to meet its financial needs, the han also turned to goyōkin (forced loans) from merchants of Fukuoka and Hakata. The earliest recorded forced loans were in the Kambun period (1661-1673) and from then through the Genroku period they increased in amount and frequency. In 1687 they totaled 95.369 kamme, and from 1689 to 1696 there were five calls for such loans totaling 114.3 kamme. After 1708, yearly goyōkin exactions seem to have become habitual.
The poor condition of han finances which had been gradually worsening since the Genroku period suddenly deepened, however, as a result of the terrible Kyōhō famine of 1732-33. From around 1660 sumptuary laws and orders to economize had been repeatedly issued, and the trend was toward tightened controls aimed at inhibiting luxury and commercial consumption. The goal of such orders was always to return to the "ideal" era of Nagamasa's rule. In 1722, the sixth Fukuoka daimyo, Tsugutaka, honored the 100th anniversary of Nagamasa's death, and later in 1727, when han finances grew increasingly worse, reissued Nagamasa's "Three Articles" of 1617 with his own added comments. Thereafter, the karō, Yoshida Rokurōdayū, read this edict before the assembled vassals and announced orders for samurai economy and relief of the commoners. Two years later fifteen articles were promulgated setting forth minute regulations on clothing, food, armor, wedding materials, etc. with the explanation that "the present order for economy is to return to eternal frugality based upon morality." Han finances were already strained, therefore, when in 1732 insects infested the rice crop. Despite peasant efforts to ward off serious damage, losses totalled 420,000 koku, or 80-90% of the total han production. The following winter and spring witnessed the most disastrous famine of the Tokugawa period as more than 100,000 people, nearly one-third of the total Chikuzen population, were reported to have died. Fatalities were not limited to the countryside alone, for many impoverished residents of Fukuoka and Hakata succumbed as well. Although the number of reported deaths may be exaggerated, equally
macabre reports of 40,000 deaths in the smaller neighboring *fudai* domain of Kokura, and 11,000 deaths in Kurume han lend some credence to their validity.

 Totally unprepared for such a disaster the domain government collected 300 *kamme* in forced loans from Fukuoka-Hakata and 1,200 *kamme* from wealthy residents in the remainder of the domain to assist in relief efforts. Meanwhile, the *machi bugyō* and nine leading merchants from Fukuoka and Hakata were dispatched to Osaka to borrow rice and silver while the han borrowed an additional 20,000 *ryō* of gold from the bakufu. 

 Recoiling from the severe shock of the famine, Fukuoka attempted to rebuild and strengthen the han structure and revitalize finances through a more complete grasp of the domainal economy. Modifications were made in the control structure of the *kōri*, tax rates were lowered, and vacant fields were turned over to cultivators in an effort to revitalize the villages. One important development was the establishment in 1734 of the *yōjinyokegin*, a special tax to be used for relief purposes to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring in the future. Ultimately this tax was to become the sole constant income for the domain reserve fund. Enfeoffed vassals and religious institutions were to contribute a small percentage of their yearly income, while farmers paid according to their acreage, and those residing in fishing villages or towns were taxed according to the frontal dimensions of their residence grounds. Rice derived from this tax was then converted into specie and deposited in the han treasury for use during subsequent disasters, when the money was to be loaned interest free to those in need, and then repaid over a five-year term. 

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By 1740, the restoration of the han following the Kyōhō famine was nearly complete. In that year the tax system was partially revamped and all irregular taxes were consolidated into a single, permanent tax rate of 33%. In addition, a new tax on the commercial sector was instituted in the form of a licensing fee for all stores (mise unjōgin) as the domain attempted to tap the increased development of commercial production which linked cities and towns to the most remote rural regions.

The rapid commercial growth of the mid-eighteenth century did not, however, benefit all parties equally. As has been explained, such development created severe social problems as numerous samurai, forced to live on fixed rice stipends, were driven deeply into debt, while in the villages the growth of tenancy and landlordism became commonplace. The han, too, struggled to reduce its burden of debt which remained as a carryover from the heavy borrowing of the Kyōhō years.

It was in response to such growing problems that Fukuoka instituted during the Hōreki-Meiwa periods (1751-1771) its second major reform, commencing in 1762 with the appointment of Yoshida Kyūbei as karō. The son of Yoshida Rokurōdayū, Kyūbei had initially succeeded his father as karō in 1745, being assigned responsibility over han finances in 1749. Then suddenly, in 1752, he was released by the daimyo, Tsugutaka, and replaced by Kushibashi Matanoshin. Following an unsuccessful issue of hansatsu in 1757, however, Kushibashi was replaced by Ōoto Hikozaimon, but when he in turn failed to make economic headway the karō council as a whole resumed financial responsibility. This was not wholly unusual, for from the early Tokugawa
period onward the Fukuoka government had been marked by strong authority among the karō and han government had developed based on a karō council system. Power struggles between daimyō and powerful karō on the one hand, and factionalism between karō on the other, added an unwelcome instability to domain affairs. The impoverishment of the han made the struggle for power even more acute, resulting in such rapid change in han leadership as seen at this time.

The Hōreki-Meiwa reforms instituted in Chikuzen by Yoshida Kyūbei and his urahanyaku, Yamaji Jizaemon, were far more than the simplistic demand for frugality and proscription of luxury which so often marked Tokugawa reform efforts, proclaiming a return to a supposedly idyllic early-Tokugawa state. Rather, they were a far-reaching attempt at centralization and rationalization of the total han administrative structure intended to guarantee efficient control of the domain and effective government administration. In addition, they set a pattern for future Fukuoka reforms by placing samurai and village relief on a par with the regeneration of han finances as a priority for domain administration. Thereafter, concern over samurai and peasant welfare became a hallmark of all future reform efforts within Chikuzen.

Kyūbei began the reform by establishing a meyasu-bako, or public complaint box for criticism of wayward officials, and by issuing orders for economy and thrift in all affairs. In a cost saving measure, the system requiring samurai for official duty was revised to reduce the number of samurai on duty. Then, in a major reform of the kōri system, five kōri bugyō (district magistrates) were each assigned a separate district and placed in direct control of the villages. In this way all
villages in the domain were administered by a mere 100 officials in the kōri offices, now under the control of Kyūbei himself. Kyūbei explained the rationale behind such reorganization, stating that "the kōrigata (district office) is the foundation of han finances." He therefore attempted to restore domain finances through strengthened and efficient control of the villages. Doing so, however, required a comparable strengthening of village officials. Many duties previously handled by more numerous kōri officers were now delegated to the ōjōya and shōya and the han displayed recognition of the increased importance of these commoner officials by nearly doubling their stipends and allowing them the previously proscribed use of corvee labor during their periodic trips to Fukuoka.

Like other reform efforts throughout Japan the Hōreki-Meiwa reforms included a concerted effort at reducing han expenditure by tightening domain finances and proscribing luxury. Attempts to increase han income were directed especially towards the developing rural commercial economy. In 1764 the unjō taxes on the egg and honey guilds were transferred from the jurisdiction of the machi bugyō to the kōri bugyō. The following year the unjō tax rate established in 1740 was revised from a three-tiered system to a five-level scale at more than double the previous rate. Yet, despite the fact that such levies on the commercial sector reached a peak around 1770, they amounted to little more than 10% of han income and were far overshadowed by both the village rice tax and exactions from the samurai. Therefore, the most important of the economic reforms was the fixation of the rice tax. Prior to the 1760's Fukuoka had resurveyed and adjusted the tax every
three years, but in 1771 the tax assessment was permanently frozen. Later, during the Temmei period (1781-1788) when harvests were rather poor, Yasuda Genjirō, one of the kōri bugyō, reported that "if the tax was to be reevaluated, without question many villages' rates would have to be lowered, so it is not done."50 Certainly the han attempted to draw as much income as possible from its agricultural base, but if anything Chikuzen seems to be more notable for the lightness rather than the severity of its tax burden.

While attempting to centralize control over the villages and insure production and efficient collection of tax rice, the han also moved to prevent impoverishment among the samurai and in the rural sectors. In order to aid the retainers the domain guaranteed repayment of samurai loans and attempted to maintain their income. It was only the guarantee of direct payment of samurai stipends to the merchants that allowed indebted samurai to continue borrowing and stopped the suits for non-payment.51 To aid the villages the han provided loans and set up a system to provide relief food. In 1770 the domain government established a village assistance fund (mura sukuigin shikumi) under which the joint districts would pay 50 kamme annually, to be matched by the domain, for deposit into the han treasury. This money could then be loaned to needy peasants who could thereafter repay it over five years time.52

The han also attempted to strengthen and support the villages through encouragement of farm by-employment in paper mulberry, lacquer, wax, and sugar cane. At the same time it ordered the forced distribution of uncultivated land, restructured the corvee system, and aided in the establishment of new farming families.53
Perhaps most representative of Fukuoka's efforts to rebuild its own finances by strengthening and controlling the countryside was the official encouragement of wax production throughout the domain. Used for candles and as the main ingredient for bottled oil, vegetable wax was produced from the small berry of the haze tree (rhus succedanea), and its cultivation was quite old in Chikuzen. By the middle of the Tokugawa period Chikuzen had become the center of national wax production, providing according to some sources 80% of the wax supplied to the Osaka market. To provide additional income for both the peasants and the han treasury, the domain government encouraged widespread planting of wax trees along roadways, riverbanks, in vacant fields, and on hillsides. In 1752, Fukuoka had begun a system whereby the han would supply the seedlings but required payment of two-thirds of the resultant crop, leaving one-third for the cultivator. The domain then provided collection points in each kōri from which the wax was forwarded to Fukuoka and marketed. Producers could sell their private portion to the han or were free to market it themselves, which some apparently chose to do. Later, the han developed a more thorough monopoly system which played a significant role in domain finances and continued to add an important impetus to a more diversified commercial economy in the countryside.

The Hōreki-Meiwa reforms ended with the several reforms of 1770-71 and the release of Yoshida Kyūbei as chief karō in 1772. They had resulted in major revisions of the han administrative structure which were to last throughout the reminder of the Tokugawa era. While not totally balancing the budget or erasing the han debt, they were
successful in restoring the domain to a reasonably firm financial footing which was to continue until the end of the eighteenth century. By 1773, the annual deficit had been reduced to 603 kamme, less than one-half of the deficit of 1770, and the han debt was essentially under control. Despite poor harvests during the latter decades of the eighteenth century, Fukuoka entered the nineteenth century in better shape than many other han, but then once again the economic scene began to grow ominously darker.

The Temmei years (1781-1788) had been a period of generally poor harvests throughout Japan, with widespread and devastating famines occurring particularly in the northern regions. Although Chikuzen fared relatively well, there were still many requests from the villages for relief loans and tax reductions. Then came successive years of failed harvests in 1792 and 1794-96 and the situation for both the villages and the han once again drew near the crisis state. Rising dissatisfaction and unrest in the countryside also appeared, although much less severe than the ikki of other han. In 1784 and again in 1788 peasant complaints against shōya or ōjōya resulted in punishment of those officials for discrepancies in their administration. A meyasusho submitted by farmers from several kōri in 1789 complained that: "At present the local government is causing agony and disruption among the masses. [We] want this corrected by the coming sixth month; if it is not done it will be reported to the traveling inspector." Such occurrences, though not perhaps perilous of themselves, nevertheless sounded an ominous note of social unrest for those listening within the domain leadership.
After the poor crop of 1792 Fukuoka found it necessary to borrow in excess of 12,000 kamme from the Osaka moneylenders and order a strict retrenchment in han expenditure. At the time the domain was being governed by the tairō, Kuroda Mimasaka, and the powerful karō on behalf of the 17-year-old adopted daimyo, Naritaka. So, in order to bolster public acceptance of their economizing decree the han Elders displayed once again a copy of Nagamasa's house laws. In conjunction with a cut back in expenditure they planned an increase in income via stricter collection of the rice tax and collection of goyōgin from wealthy individuals throughout the domain. Attempts to reduce expenditure received a setback, however, when the han's Sakurada yashiki at Edo was destroyed by fire, requiring 6,000 kamme for reconstruction. Although forced contributions were elicited throughout the han, the budget for 1794 listed a deficit of 1,667 kamme and borrowing at Osaka increased.

The poor harvests also adversely affected the samurai, reducing even further their already meager income. In order to aid the vassals, the han reduced the amount of agemai deductions taken from their stipends and promised to replace half of the income lost because of crop failure. In 1795 such grants amounted to 2½ bales of rice per 100 koku. Loans were made from the domain to indigent samurai and loans entered into between samurai and merchants were guaranteed by the han government.

Similarly rural policy was directed toward relief measures and restoration of village finances. Loans of rice and money were carried out, and an organization was established to provide funds necessary for
the return of pawned land. In an effort to support the domain's foundation of tax-producing farmers, those individuals without prior permits were barred from participating in commercial activity, pawned land was to be returned to the original owner who was to return to farming, and by-employment which took farmers from their fields was forbidden. In addition, the han took positive measures to establish new farmers. For example, between 1798 and 1800 entry tags were to be given in each kōri for "those entering the villages from other domains" and "those returning to the villages". 61

Efforts by Fukuoka han to improve its financial stability and simultaneously provide relief for the peasantry also resulted in the establishment at this time of a government monopoly system for the marketing of local products at Osaka. As has already been noted, wax production had long been encouraged, and the domain had been involved in collecting and transporting the product to Osaka since the mid-eighteenth century. However, like many other domains, Fukuoka had not been able to effectively tap the wealth involved in the enormous commercial growth developing even locally, and so decided, despite traditional samurai objections, to join in the profit-taking by direct involvement in commercial enterprise.

Since 1778 Sakaiya Shirōbei of Kyoto had purchased wax berries from the han, produced refined wax, and marketed it in Osaka. Then, in 1794 he requested monopolistic privileges from the han for buying up berries from samurai, farmers, and others within Chikuzen. He proposed that collection points be established at Hakata and Wakamatsu where wax would be packaged and shipped to Osaka. Once in Osaka
the wax would be handled by Kashimaya Sakugorō who would act as the kuramoto. After discussing Sakaiya's proposal with local merchants the han administration decided to deny his request, but then in 1796 set up essentially the same monopoly system under han auspices instead. Under this plan, a Wax Commissioner (haze shikumi bugyō) was placed in charge of the total operation with collection-production centers established at Hakata, Wakamatsu, Amagi, and Ueki. In Osaka the wax was to be stored at the han warehouse and sold under han supervision. Although the plan was well-organized, it met with stiff initial opposition from the Osaka wax traders who feared that control over Chikuzen wax, which totalled in excess of 3 million pounds annually, would stifle the wax trade. It was only after the Wax Commissioner, Tsutsui Kameuemon, consulted in Osaka with the Kashimaya and Konoike that the merchants' fears were assuaged and sales under the new system could successfully begin.

Without question the wax monopoly was the most successful of Fukuoka trading efforts, but han monopolies extended to other products as well. Coal production, which later became a Chikuzen trademark, also began to develop during this period, although at first the han forbade export in order to guarantee domestic supplies. Export was only allowed for the relief of poor peasants for whom coal mining became an important by-employment. Fresh eggs for the urban centers became another important monopoly, to which the famous Hakata ori (silk textile), paper, and charcoal can be added as significant trade products.

Despite such innovative reform efforts, however, no lasting gains were accomplished and the general financial condition of the han began
a gradual slide downward. Beginning in 1804 the karō, Hisano Geki, and the urahanyakū, Akashi Kyūzaemon, began a long period of reformist government which was to last until 1822. Unfortunately few details are yet known of this crucial period and its direct relationship with the later Tempō reforms. In 1813 the wax monopoly was apparently disbanded, but was again revived several years later under the broader context of a monopoly over local products (han sambutsu kaishō). In 1815, Akashi is said to have traveled to Osaka three times to confer with the great merchants of that city in order to gain some relief from the domain's financial difficulties. Although we are uncertain of the reception he received, the following year brought further distress since Chikuzen experienced a typhoon and heavy rains during the rice harvest, undoubtedly causing losses which neither the han nor the villages could afford. By 1817 the han debt stood at 31,135 kamme, the equivalent of over one million koku of rice.

In response to these economically trying times, the domain leadership apparently felt the need to once again strengthen administrative control over the villages to insure effective collection of taxes, for in 1818 the concurrent positions of kōridai and men bugyō were revived and placed immediately under the kōri bugyō in the local administration. Ten men were appointed in pairs to the five groups of kōri with responsibility to assist in overseeing village government and to supervise the collection of taxes. Meanwhile, attempts were again made to profit from controlled commerce as the han sambutsu kaishō was established to oversee trade with Osaka, Edo, and Nagasaki.
Following the release of Akashi as urahanyaku in 1822 the unsettled nature of domain government reflected the general condition of the country as a whole. In 1828 the han products plan was aborted as officials gave up on their strategy of forestalling decline by encouraging increased production. Instead they did little more than try to negotiate with the Osaka merchants concerning the han debt. Yet, despite a smouldering sense of impending crisis there seemed to be no spark to ignite the flame of a new and significant reform effort. In Chikuzen, at least, that spark came by whim of nature in the hardship occasioned through a series of destructive typhoons.

With the summer heat of the eighth month of 1828 came a powerful typhoon accompanied by heavy rains, battering Chikuzen and exacting a heavy toll. Reports of losses listed 378 people killed, 30,000 homes and 970 boats destroyed, with 150,000 koku of rice ruined. Again in 1830 another typhoon and flooding resulted in poor harvests, reduced han income, and increased poverty among samurai and commoner alike. In response, the Fukuoka government sent Hayashi Gozaemon, one of its high-ranking retainers, to Osaka to attempt a renegotiation of the han debt so as to be repaid over a ten year period. Assistance to samurai and commoners was given in 1828 and again in 1832 in the form of silver or copper kitte, essentially loans of paper currency which the recipient could use to pay off his debts. When a full-scale reform effort was begun early in 1834 its declared purpose was the relief (sukui) of the vassals as well as the commoners residing in village, fishing hamlet, or town.
Once again natural disaster had set the stage for a major reform effort aimed at revising han finances and reducing government debt. In Fukuoka, at least, it also carried with it a characteristic emphasis on relief which sets Fukuoka apart from many other domains. Although there were some new developments during the ensuing Tempo years, much of what transpired maintained strong continuities with the several decades of prior gradual reform. But that does not come as a surprise when we realize that the early Tempo reforms were carried out under the direction of the same Hisano Geki who had led the han administration since 1804. Then too, we must recognize the fact that despite our negative description of the poor state of han finances in absolute terms, comparatively speaking Fukuoka had a considerably lighter debt and seemed to be in better economic shape than either Satsuma or Choshū. In some ways Fukuoka required a positive revival of prior activity rather than the dramatic turnaround seen in other han.

**Tempo Reform**

The characteristic trend toward relief efforts visible in Fukuoka economic policy from the late eighteenth century reached fulfillment in the Tempo reforms of 1834-1836. Marked by a rapid burst of activity in which formerly low-ranking officials and merchants played a significant part, these reforms are generally judged as having ended in dismal disarray, and are therefore seen as one of the significant factors behind Fukuoka's failure to take a leading role in the Meiji Restoration. Is such an assessment accurate? To what extent did the Tempo reforms
influence the outcome of the Meiji Restoration? The answers to these questions carry important connotations for the history and historiography of bakumatsu and early Meiji Japan. Unfortunately, our knowledge of Fukuoka's Tempō reform is handicapped by meager documentation and scanty detail, yet the outlines of the events are sufficiently clear to allow a glimpse at the character and intent of the reform programs.

Following Fukuoka's characteristic pattern, the chief aim of the reform was clearly stated from its inception as the relief of both the kachū (vassals) and the inhabitants of rural districts, towns, and fishing villages. On 1835/12/24 the karo, Hisano Geki, then at Edo, was ordered to oversee such a relief effort, with Hanabusa Denzaemon and Shirozu Yōtei appointed as directors of the program. The tendency to emphasize relief for the han populace thus reached culmination in the establishment of a new bureaucratic organization, the sukui kata (Relief Office), quite distinct from the normal urahanyaku-kanjō bugyō line of financial authority. The appointment of Hanabusa and Shirozu as Commissioners over the sukui kata signaled a new development in han administration, witnessed in other domains as well, in which prerogatives of the traditional bureaucracy were rejected in favor of men of extensive practical experience, often from the middle to lower ranks of samurai society. In Fukuoka, at least, several influential merchants were also given extensive authority; for sukui kata officials included the Hakata merchants, Kameya Tōbei and Takahashiya Heizō.

What kind of men comprised this new breed of practical reformers? Lower in status origins than Hanabusa, but better known as the leader
of the Tempō reform, Shirozu Yōtei (later Yōzaemon) was a han eye physician of low rank who received a mere 15 nin fuchi prior to his appointment in 1833. Although the background of his rise to power is unknown, he may have gained influence from personal contacts with the daimyo, Kuroda Narikiyo, then suffering from acute eye ailments that eventually forced his retirement in 1834. Apparently Yōtei had obtained permission to travel to Osaka and was resident there when, because of opinions which he had forwarded to the han, he was summoned to the domain offices in Edo and then appointed as chief reformer. On 1835/1/13 Yōtei was made a hirazamurai and granted a fief of 150 koku and futari-rei status. Hanabusa Denzaemon, on the other hand, gained recognition from within the traditional system as a bureaucrat talented in financial affairs. Prior to his appointment he had served as the Osaka kuramoto bugyō and had achieved the status of kanjō bugyō kaku (rank equivalent of Finance Commissioner), placing him in the upper level of middle-ranking samurai. Undoubtedly, he was a man with considerable experience and practical understanding of the workings of the Osaka marketplace.

Interestingly we know much more of the careers of the several merchants who exercised considerable influence on the Tempō reforms. Foremost among them was Kameya Tōbei, who had perhaps the most illustrious career among the Hakata merchants of the later Tokugawa period. Born in Hakata, Tōbei began mercantile activities as a youth, selling Imari-ware from the neighboring Saga han in northern Japan. In 1809 at the age of 23 he opened a shop in Matsumae on the southern tip of Hokkaidō. Returning to Fukuoka in 1814, Tōbei worked at
selling Hakata ori in Edo, even asking the actor, Ichikawa Danjūrō, for permission to advertise from the kabuki stage. In 1819 when Fukuoka established its monopoly over han products, Tōbei was appointed general overseer of trade with Osaka and Edo. He was later given a small dwelling within the domain's Edo residence and the status of toshiyori kaku (rank equivalent of Elder) for Fukuoka-Hakata. In 1829 his status was raised to that of goyōkiki chōnin kaku and in 1832 he was granted the honor of a meager stipend of hitori fuchi. With the commencement of the Tempō reforms in 1834, Tōbei's stipend was raised to 13 nin fuchi, and he was ordered the following year to oversee the sales of local han products at the domain's Osaka warehouse where he was said to have had control over all financial affairs.

The general tenor for the more practical nature of Fukuoka's Tempō reforms had already been established in 1831/12 in an edict issued by Hisano Geki which in part reversed the long-standing emphasis on sumptuary regulation. Various types of cloth, silver hair ornaments, and other items which had been previously forbidden for general use were now to be allowed. Thereafter, the new sukuikata under the direction of Shirozu and Hanabusa instituted a major reversal of policy towards economic consumption. Up until this point han economic policy had been generally restrictive in nature, viewing the economy of consumption as essentially antagonistic to bakuhan society. But, we see in the Tempō reforms a temporary shift away from such an evaluation as Fukuoka economic leaders planned the revival of han and individual finances based upon an increased circulation of paper currency motivated by the expanded purchasing power of a more openly
consumptive economy.\textsuperscript{82} The operations of the sukuikata, while geared toward relief, can be seen as functioning in three broad categories: paper currency, monopolies, and officially sanctioned entertainment.

The new reform program began in earnest in the fourth month of 1834 after Hisano, Hanabusa, and Shirozu, who had all been in Edo, returned to the domain headquarters at Fukuoka. On 4/1 they announced a general relief plan and the following day forwarded a directive to the various domain offices concerning assistance for financially beleaguered samurai. In this document Hisano explained that the present poverty among samurai had its chief origin in the effects of the typhoon of 1828. Although loans of kitte had been made to samurai in 1832, oshimai deductions had been increased for five years thereafter in order to clear the debts, not allowing a chance for sufficient recovery.\textsuperscript{83} In addition, sankin kōtai duties, increased demands for Nagasaki defense, and rising prices had combined to make life difficult for all samurai. Many retainers were reported to be unable to fulfill their duties because of poverty. Of particular concern was the continuing "unfavorable situation" at Nagasaki where frequent visits of foreign ships required emergency guard duty, creating a major drain on domain and individual resources.

The first step of the relief plan was to issue a new series of kitte which samurai and commoners alike could use to clear both public and private debts. Since no funds remained for the redemption of the earlier certificates issued in 1828 and 1832 they were revoked, and any unpaid balances from the loans of such kitte were cancelled. Repayment of the 1834 issue was to be at the rate of seven hyō of rice per
year on each kamme of certificate value, with the repayment period adjusted according to fluctuations in the price of rice.\textsuperscript{84}

Closely connected to the relief program via loans of kitte was the reestablishment of the han monopoly system that had been abandoned in 1828. Apparently the post of Osaka kuramoto bugyō, supervising the domain's Osaka warehouses, had been revived in 1834 and it was from this position that Hanabusa Denzaemon had been promoted to co-leadership of the reform effort. It was only natural, therefore, for han monopolies to be revived as a mainstay of the Tempo relief effort. On 1835/6/22 the sukuikata opened new offices in Fukuoka's Hon-machi from which to supervise the totality of its programs, and two months later commenced operation of a warehouse on the waterfront at Nishishokunin-machi, obviously to facilitate trade in local products.\textsuperscript{85} The most important of those products, of course, was wax, so in 1835/12 the respected official, Matsumoto Heinai, was sent to Osaka to make arrangements for a kirō Hakata kaisho (Hakata Crude Wax Center).\textsuperscript{86} Evidently Hanabusa also joined in the negotiations at this time since he conveniently stopped over in Osaka enroute to Edo.\textsuperscript{87}

Once the wax center was established, wax certificates were issued by the monopoly office and were given to producers in exchange for receipt of raw wax. A form of hansatsu, these certificates precluded the necessity of currency exchange and greatly expedited the handling and sales of Chikuzen wax. In contrast to the suspicion with which many issues of hansatsu were viewed, these certificates were highly trusted and experienced wide circulation since they could be redeemed for specie at either the monopoly office in Hakata or the Nodaya merchant house at Osaka.\textsuperscript{87}
As was the case with earlier monopoly plans, other products, particularly eggs and coal, were also handled under direct han supervision. However, the primary rationale behind the monopoly system seems not to have been domain profit, but rather the provision of economic relief for the general populace by generating access to the central market place for the small producer. Although the han did profit somewhat, particularly in later sales of coal, its advantages were more indirect and to be found in greater han prosperity or in contributions and preferential treatment from favored merchants.

Probably the most intriguing characteristic of the Fukuoka Tempo reforms was the official sanction and encouragement of various forms of public entertainment. In one of the first actions of the reform taken in 1834/5, the domain allowed the performance of kabuki theater on official land at Urahamade, Nakanoshima-machi, Hakata.\(^{88}\) Under the direction of the sukuikata, four chōnin from Fukuoka and five from Hakata were selected as overseers and given stipends of 3 nin fuchi each. The first month of drama proved successful and in the following month more than 20 sumō wrestlers vied in competition before delighted crowds. Thereafter, until the end of the reforms, kabuki and sumō were regularly held at Nakanoshima. Apparently even the future daimyo found interest in such activity for on 1834/6/27 Nagahiro viewed a special sumō exhibition at his lodging house (chaya) in Hakozaki. Performers were not merely local itinerants, either, for when kabuki was again performed during the seventh month of 1834 it was presented by the company of the famous Ichikawa Danjūrō, VII.
Such popular activity sparked the development of a lively entertainment quarter on Nakanoshima which samurai viewed with great envy. At first all samurai were forbidden from attending functions there, but in the first month of 1835 the sukuikata announced its encouragement of kabuki and samurai were allowed to visit the new entertainment sector, though children under age ten were to be left at home. The spring of that same year found the Ichikawa troupe again performing regularly, while in the rear portion of Nakanoshima a special equestrian area was erected where anyone with a spark of daring and the necessary rental fee could test his horsemanship skills. During the summer the han permitted the initiation of a lottery within the amusement quarters, backed by Takahashiya Heizō of Hakata and Maruya Yōichi of Hita along with Tokudaya Bunzaemon of Kurume who carried on its daily operation. While han encouragement of such measures would have despaired earlier Confucian reformers, the practical-minded officials of the Tempo era fostered this obviously plebian activity in an attempt to spur prosperity in the Fukuoka-Hakata region and urge the circulation of hansatsu, upon which the relief program rested.

At the same time, plans were also laid for restoring stability to han finances and easing the burden of han indebtedness. One method, which was very meaningful in the status oriented Tokugawa social structure, was for the han to grant special status to wealthy commoners in exchange for cash payments. Late in 1834 a contribution plan was promulgated whereby the han would bestow an honorarium of so many fuchi upon anyone who would commit to a sizeable donation. For example, Oyama Tadahiro contributed 50 kamme, in return for which
he received a stipend of five nin fuchi in perpetuity, and status as goyōkiki chōnin kaku and nengyōji kaku (rank equivalents of Official Purveyor and City Manager). Although such contributions must have proved extremely welcome to the han, in reality their impact was minor compared to the total han budget. Far more important were the successful sales of han rice on the Osaka grain market and the continuing relationship with the Kinai merchants. Unfortunately, it was on these crucial issues that the Fukuoka reformers met their greatest failure.

One of the primary intentions of Fukuoka's Tempō reform was to benefit materially from the management of tax rice, using it as a lever in dealing with the Osaka merchants. In the summer of 1835 the Fukuoka leaders set about to rectify their plight of indebtedness by halting all interest payments on outstanding loans (payments on principal had already been postponed in 1830) and by breaking off their longstanding relationships with such important Osaka merchant houses as Konoike and Kashimaya. Yamanaka and other previous kuramoto were released and in their place the domain appointed Tennojiya Chujiro as sukuikata kuramoto with the stipend of 50 nin fuchi. After unilaterally severing ties with one group of Osaka merchants, including its principal debtors, Fukuoka thereafter pursued the establishment of a new set of working relationships with such houses as Tennojiya, Kazariya, and Izumoya, allowing them to handle the sales of Chikuzen products. However, rice from Chikuzen was one of the pricing standards of the Osaka market and the affronted merchants could not take Fukuoka's capricious actions lightly. In order to finance its Tempō reform activities the han had shipped in excess of 100,000 koku
c. rice to Osaka which it attempted to sell via its new representatives. Because of pressure from the Konoike and others, however, no one would agree to purchase the grain from Chikuzen. Frustrated, the han tried to downgrade the rice from kuramono to nayamono\(^92\) and sell it privately, but apart from the Dojima grain market it was impossible to sell such large quantities. When the rice was finally disposed of, it was at a depressed price, and proved to be a severe setback to Fukuoka's hopes for insuring financial stability.

This failure at Osaka, compounded by a sparse harvest in 1836, set in motion the collapse of the kitte issued in 1834 and the subsequent demise of Fukuoka's Tempō reform program. According to the Mugaku zakki, "one momme certificates declined in value from eight bu copper, to seven bu, and then to five; copper certificates were used to wipe noses and rumor had it that people were discarding them in front of the sukui yakusho."\(^93\) At this juncture in time the underlying resentment of the traditional bureaucracy towards Shirozu and the newly organized sukuikata became openly critical, as those who had cause to resent him successfully maneuvered to cancel the expensive kitte and have the reformers punished.

Once the reform effort took a turn for the worse, retribution came swiftly. On 1836/8/19, Takahashiya Heizo and more than ten subordinates were imprisoned, apparently for reported indiscretions concerning the lottery (they were later exiled to Himejima), while Kameya Tōbei was exiled to the countryside.\(^94\) Within weeks, Hisano Geki was released from his post as karō and forced into retirement, and his younger brother, Kuroda Awaji, who was heir to the Minagi Kuroda
house and had been given responsibility over han finances, was dis-
inherited. For his part in the reforms, Shirozu Yōzaemon was released
as sukui bugyō and retired. Mere retirement would not suffice to
satisfy his vengeful opponents, however, for the following year brought
an increasing chorus of complaints decrying the crimes of Shirozu's
reform plans. On 1837/6/29 the one-time han oculist was arrested and
exiled to Himejima. Meanwhile, the domain had already restored the
former relationship with the Konoike house in Osaka.

Although we know too little about the particulars of Fukuoka's
reform or about the background to the punishment of the reform leaders,
it is of some significance that a report to the han ōmetsuke in 1838
records a han debt of 38,086 kamme, which it blames on the typhoon of
the previous year and on construction expenses rather than on the
misdeeds and failures of Shirozu and the sukuikata. In addition,
Matsumoto Heinai, a samurai of low-ranking origins who had been given
important responsibilities during the Tempō reforms continued as a
leader in han financial circles until 1857. In 1840 he was named to
oversee the egg monopoly. The following year saw him given responsi-
bility over a plan to aid retainers in repaying debts, after which in
1842 he was placed in charge of the monopolies of all han products.
In 1855 Matsumoto was again called on to supervise Fukuoka's Ansei
reforms. Thus, despite the punishment of the Tempō reformers, the
monopolies they had instituted, along with some of the personnel in-
volved, continued to be active throughout the bakumatsu era.

In less than three short years Fukuoka's Tempō reform activities
had ended in apparent failure with its instigators turned out of office,
some to quiet retirement and others to forced exile. Bureaucratic jealousies, miscalculation of the Osaka factor, and the natural elements had all worked to bring the reformers into disgrace, but to what extent was their reform a failure? Was it a setback of such magnitude as to have significant impact thirty years later? Did economic failure at this time prevent Fukuoka han from a subsequent military buildup and acquisition of modern technology essential to the overthrow of the bakufu? To say that it was is to ignore the facts of later political, as well as military and economic development. It is to disregard the continuation of han monopoly and relief efforts and a steady stream of reform activity over the next quarter-century. And perhaps of equal importance it is to misjudge the "success" (in all the varied interpretations of that term) of the Tempô reforms in other domains. If the germinal seed of success in the Restoration can be found in the Tempô reforms of the anti-bakufu coalition, then we must recognize it for what it was: a tender shoot that relied on the nurture of subsequent development before it could achieve fruition.

By isolating one peak of reform activity from the continuum of domain economic life, earlier studies have misinterpreted the significance of the Tempô reforms in determining Fukuoka's failure to actively participate in the Meiji Restoration. Moreover, emphasis on economic causality has led them to ignore the role which bureaucratic factionalism played in the success or failure of any endeavor in domain government. As noted earlier, such a tendency was particularly dominant in Fukuoka and there is reason to believe that factionalism was as important in the punishment of the reformers as any failure of their economic policies.
Viewed in political terms, the fall of the Tempō reformers introduced a six-year period between 1836 and 1842 during which power was transferred from officials appointed by the retired daimyo, Narikiyo, to those primarily loyal to the new daimyo, Nagahiro. As for the reforms themselves, they seem to have been neither an unmitigated failure, nor an outstanding success. Their declared goal was the relief of the domain populace and we can only surmise that they accomplished some good, but could do little to rectify the underlying social permutations from which the problems derived.

Later Developments

In the latter years of the Tempō era, while the bakufu, Chōshū, and other domains were beginning their own reforms, Fukuoka continued its policies of han monopoly and general relief, though unable to muster another strong reform program of its own. The poor harvest of 1836 ushered in more than a decade of unusual weather patterns and the resultant substandard crops severely reduced tax income. Perhaps as a result of its reform efforts, Fukuoka had managed to hold the line on han debt through the early Tempō years, but with income now reduced and expenditures increased on numerous fronts, indebtedness climbed rapidly. Endō Masao indicates in his study of Fukuoka han debt that the principal causes of such increased indebtedness were the expanding administrative costs of dealing with a growing population, exactions by the bakufu, public works such as a major project on the Onga River, and the burgeoning demands of coastal defense and Nagasaki guard duty.
Successive years of poor harvests were debilitating to the samurai and peasant population as well and relief for retainers and villagers required constant domain effort and expense. In 1838 the han was forced to borrow 19,400 hyō of rice and 10,820 ryō of gold to meet requests for relief from the villages where, according to reports, peasants in Kama- and Hōnami- kōri were in an especially pitiful plight. In 1841, and again in 1844, the domain government issued hansatsu to ease the burden of individual debt and help rescue the impoverished. Yet all sectors of society were not equally depressed, and when in 1839 Fukuoka received the order to aid in the rebuilding of the West Encénté of Edo Castlé, it used the occasion to elicit contributions from the domain inhabitants. Han officials were to forego one-half their office allowance, and the villages were able to make donations totaling over 60,000 hyō.

As if an unstable economy were insufficient cause for concern, the repeated arrival of Dutch, British, French, American, and Russian ships in and around Nagasaki during the 1840's sent Fukuoka samurai continually scurrying to reinforce the contingent normally assigned to defend the port. These increasingly frequent visits, their seriousness magnified by reports of the Opium War in China, were a cause of grave concern among a wide spectrum of han officials, scholars, and nationalists, and a serious drain on already tight finances. Duly warned by the Chinese experience, the bakufu had, in 1842, softened from its ni nen naku ("Don't Think Twice") edict of 1825, which called for immediate repulsion of foreigners, to a milder policy of polite but firm denial. Nevertheless, coastal defense was of utmost importance to
Fukuoka, particularly since the strategic Chikuzen coastline guarded the western entrance to the Inland Sea, and since the Fukuoka lord knew better than most the dangerous potential of the West. Cannon emplacements were constructed and equipped, soundings were taken in coastal waters, and Western knowledge and technology were pursued in order to meet the foreign threat, but such efforts did not come cheaply. 104

In the midst of the growing military-political crisis surrounding the Western threat, Mother Nature again dealt Fukuoka a severe blow, precipitating stepped-up relief efforts which were to lead in part to the Ansei reforms of 1854-1859. Following a poor harvest in 1849, the rainy season of 1850 brought torrential downpours and three days of heavy flooding. Then on 7/1 and 8/7 typhoons battered the countryside: reports to the han government claimed 25 fatalities, nearly 7,000 houses destroyed, and over 400,000 koku of rice damaged. 105 As a result, Kuroda Nagahiro requested and received exemption from that year's sankin-kōtaï responsibility so as to devote full time to relief. Sugiyama Shingorō was appointed to oversee relief efforts and much of the reduction in samurai income was made up from han coffers. 106 Meanwhile, in Fukuoka-Hakata, a famine preparation fund was established under the direction of the machi bugyō, Hama Heidayū, whereby wealthy merchants were asked to contribute rice which would then be kept at special storehouses in both Hakata and Fukuoka. In contrast with other failures this plan proved so successful that by 1858 the machi yakusho held 13,250 sacks of rice in reserve.
In order to finance the relief activities and pay for han administration, the domain was forced to borrow 40,000 ryo at Edo in 1850, and 45,000 ryo from Osaka's Sekiya Gorō during 1852-53. In addition, the relationship between Fukuoka and the regional merchants at Hita became extremely close, as they furnished the han with at least 100,000 ryo during the six year span between 1852 and 1857.

Most prominent among the Hita merchants in dealings with Chikuzen at this time was Hirose Kyūbei, who presented Fukuoka with specific plans for samurai relief and was assigned a leading role in reforming the domain wax monopoly. Kyūbei's involvement had begun after his younger brother, Hakataya Sanemon, submitted an opinion on the wax monopoly to Fukuoka early in 1849. As a result of this proposal a new "raw wax plan" was begun and Kyūbei traveled to Fukuoka in the third and tenth months of 1850 for consultation. On the occasion of the second visit, he presented his own opinion on a reform effort and borrowed han financial records, thereby becoming directly involved in Fukuoka's financial reforms. Thereafter, in 1851/7 Kyūbei submitted a proposal for samurai relief, followed by a secret memorial on the same subject in the spring of 1852. Several months later a specific plan for samurai relief was set forth under which the sukui yakusho was to give out 110,000 ryo of loans through the han Finance Office and village heads; all samurai were to receive their total stipends without deductions, from which they were to pay off outstanding debts. To finance such a plan Kyūbei paid a visit to Sekiya Gorō in Osaka where he arranged in 1853 for a loan of 30,000 ryo, two-thirds of which was to go for relief.
That same year, when Commodore Perry sailed into Edo Bay to present his initial demands, the Fukuoka budget showed a deficit of 18,610 hyō of rice and 248 kamme silver. Unable to send Osaka the 240,000 hyō needed to meet its commitments for the following year, the han had to borrow anew, adding to a debt which now totaled over one million ryō. Despite a shipment to Osaka of over 300,000 hyō in the winter of 1854, more than two-thirds went to repay outstanding debts, the balance being left to meet han expenses. The seriousness of the economic crisis found summation in a memorial to the han from Hirose Kyūbei, wherein he stated:

...under present conditions more than normal affairs cannot be handled without borrowing. However, in recent years foreign ships have come without interruption and emergency needs have created a serious situation which will continue until the emergency is endured. Until that time it is natural for [the lord to] worry. With all due respect, for those below as well, the mood has become like treading on thin ice.

Faced with a continued financial squeeze and motivated by the fervent desire of Lord Nagahiro to promote a policy of fukoku kyōhei, Fukuoka turned again to a concerted reform effort, part of the nationwide trend toward reform during the Ansei period (1854-1859). During that critical five-year period Fukuoka carried out not just one primary reform, but several reforms extending to han administration, finance, and military organization.

The most pressing issue was, of course, to put a handle on the domain debt, so in 1854 Kuroda Yamashiro, the karō in charge of finances, was sent to Osaka for discussions with the kuramoto and other lenders. Explaining the domain's difficulties and pleading the
urgency of building cannons and warships, Yamashiro succeeded in renegotiating outstanding loans so as to be repaid over an eight-year span. With the Osaka debt temporarily under control, the han announced its intention to live strictly within its income. In a departure from past policy, relief funds to the samurai were suspended, and the domain regretfully announced the renewal of agemai deductions from samurai stipends and the postponement of loan repayments to all han inhabitants.

The call for retrenchment and reform extended to all levels of society. For example, twenty-two articles on village life were promulgated in 1855 ordering the peasantry to maintain the virtues of frugality, simplicity, and hard work. Meanwhile, several of the han Elders proposed a reduction of samurai stipends by one-half in order to supplement the domain income, but Nagahiro rejected the suggestion outright:

If the lord is wealthy while the whole domain is impoverished, it will be difficult to handle emergencies in this day of frequent public duties. Therefore, the full amount should be paid and gradually military preparations must be completed. It is I who must economize and prevent extravagance.

Government attempts to reduce expenditure led also, therefore, to the demolition of several aged government buildings and the abolition of the lord's hawkery. When one of the retainers questioned the propriety of destroying a structure which dated back to the reign of the second daimyo, Nagahiro admonished: "[compared to] not protecting the ancestors' buildings, shaming the ancestors' house is even more unfilial."
In any reform program, relief of impoverished samurai could not long be overlooked, so in 1855/10 Hama Heidayū, the daimyo's former tutor who had gained distinction as machi bugyō, was appointed to supervise the new buikukata office with responsibility for overseeing samurai relief. The following year Kuroda Yamashiro, Hisano Yoshiemon, Yabu Kōsaburō, Maki Ichinai, and Matsumoto Heinai were all sent to Osaka to help stabilize han financial affairs. With the aid of Hirose Kyūbei, Fukuoka borrowed 77,000 ryō from Sekiya Gorō at Osaka to finance a new issue of hansatsu. Of this money, 50,000 ryō was designated "for the purpose of restoring public confidence in hansatsu and absolutely not to be used for other matters."

To complement savings gained through vigorous budget-cutting, the Ansei reformers also sought to bolster income by means of contributions, more efficient control of the villages, and a reform of the wax monopoly. Hereditary status and the right to bear a surname were offered as enticement to even moderately well-to-do commoners in exchange for contributions of as little as 20-50 ryō. Even large numbers of such minor gifts were no match, however, to the coup scored when in 1855 Matsumoto Heinai and Hirose Kyūbei engineered a 10,000 ryō contribution from the combined moneylenders at Hita.

These efforts at building financial stability were matched by an attempt to shore up control of the rural tax base through further rationalization and centralization of the kōri administration. Under this program the number of fure (subdistricts) was reduced, and the kōridai (assistant district magistrate) was ordered to live in the rural area he controlled. The concern of the han with district administration and its
central role in the economic regeneration of the government was exemplified in the general inspection conducted by Kuroda Yamashiro as he personally visited each district of the domain in 1857. The result of his inquiry was a reform of kōri offices in 1858, including improved treatment for the ōjōya.122

Meanwhile the domain also aimed at increasing its income from a more profitable handling of the wax trade. Late in 1856 Hirose Kyūbei and two others were appointed to oversee the reform of the wax monopoly. By the next spring, however, Kyūbei was no longer actively involved, the operation having been turned over almost entirely to the leaders of the local wax tonya, Seto Sōemon and Sano Hampei.123 Apparently Kyūbei's own plan, which entailed monopolistic handling of Chikuzen wax in Osaka by Sekiya, met with considerable opposition from the vested interests represented by the powerful Hakata wax merchants. Unable to effectively oppose them, the han chose to cooperate instead, utilizing their management skills in the hopes of obtaining a more efficient and officially profitable wax industry.

Having made numerous reforms and considerable improvement in its financial profile since the arrival of Perry in 1853, Fukuoka had achieved by 1859 an increase of approximately 100,000 hyō in han income and had cut rice expenditure at Osaka by nearly twenty percent.124 In addition, on 1859/1/17 the kārō, Kuroda Yamashiro, received a special appointment from the daimyo to further reform the government, beginning with han finances. Initially he encountered considerable opposition, but with the backing of Lord Nagahiro and the tairō, Kuroda Harima, dissension was overcome and the benefits of his
efforts came to be more generally appreciated.125 More than anything, what Yamashiro and his understudy, Maki Ichinai, achieved was the settling of the Fukuoka debt. Documents of 1859 state rather clearly that the Osaka debt had already been settled and that the han would soon clear all its debts at Edo, as well. However, one last hurdle remained: a 23,033 ryō outstanding balance to the nearby Hita merchants. Apparently the han was successful here too, for they managed to convert 18,244 ryō to a contribution to the domain, leaving a balance of only 6,609 ryō to be repaid over a ten-year period.126

Thus Fukuoka entered the watershed decade of the sixties with its debt in at least temporary control and in far better economic condition than we have heretofore been led to believe. Although Fukuoka was certainly not free of economic restraints in that tumultuous era of momentous change and uncertainty, for that matter neither were any of the other han nor the bakufu itself. But then, the critical issues of bakumatsu Japan were decided, not so much by the strengths of domain economics, as by the matrix of power, influence, status and political persuasion.

2. Numada, "Absorption of Western Culture by the South-West FeudalDomains and Their Reactions," pp. 15-16; and Yasukawa Iwao (安川尾), "改明の藩主 - 黒田長満 (Kaimei no hanshū:Kuroda Nagahiro)," 九州公論 (Kyūshū kōron), 1.9 (January 1978), 64.

3. See for example, Fujino Tamotsu (藤野保), 大名と領国経営 (Daimyō to ryōkoku keiei) (Shinjimbutsu Ōraisha, 1978), p. 146.

4. Noguchi Kikuo (野口喜久雄), "天明・寛政期の福岡藩 (Temmei-Kansei ki no Fukuoka han),"歴史学地理学年報 (Rekishi-gaku Chirigaku Nempo), 2 (1978), 122-123.

5. Tsukahira, pp. 96-102.

6. In Kansei 4 the central han administration warned officials that dueattention should be given to assure that sufficient rice was sent to Osaka to maintain its place as a pricing standard. See Noguchi, p. 129. Also Yasukawa Iwao, "Kaimei no hanshū: Kuroda Nagahiro," p. 67.

7. Shibata Ichio (柴又一雄), "近世中後期における福岡藩の財政構造 (Kinsei chu-kōki ni okeru Fukuoka han no zaisei kōzō),"九州史学 (Kyūshū shigaku), 62 (1977.10), 54-55. Hereafter cited as "zaisei kōzō".


10. These were also the periods of reform on a national scale led respectively by the shogun Yoshimune, Matsudaira Sadanobu, and Mizuno Tadakuni.


13. Noguchi, p. 123; p. 129 includes a reference to registering those "entering the villages from other domains."


15. One contemporary writer said that interest charges on outstanding daimyo debts required the sale of three million koku of rice yearly, three-quarters of the annual sales to the Osaka market. See Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 51.


18. There were several years of nation-wide crop failure in the 1830's. The famine of 1836-1837 was especially severe and served as background for the famous uprising of Oshio Heihachirō in Osaka. See, e.g., Sakata, pp. 41-43.
19. Between 1819 and 1837 there had been a total of nineteen currency debasements, particularly offensive to samurai, who were on a fixed stipend.


22. E.g., Zusho Hirozaemon in Satsuma, Murata Seifu in Chōshū, and Shirozu Yōzaemon in Chikuzen. It is worthy of note that physicians, like Shirczu, were especially prominent in reform activities.

23. See especially the seminal work, Tōyama Shigeki (遠山茂樹), 明治維新 (Meiji Ishin) (Iwanami Shoten, 1951); and his more recent, 明治維新と現代 (Meiji Ishin to gendai) (Iwanami Shoten, 1968). Also Shibahara, *Meiji Ishin no kenryoku kiban*.


26. For example, the early problems in Kaga and Sendai are briefed in Fujino, *Daimyō to ryōkoku keiei*, pp. 178-181.

27. Endō, pp. 254-255.


29. Endō, p. 264
30. ibid., pp. 258-259. Details are to be found in Hidemura Senzō, et al., eds., Hakata tsu yōroku.

31. See Matsushita Shirō (松下志朗), 福岡藩における財政経済政策の展開 [I] (Fukuoka han ni okeru zaisei keizai seisaku no tenkai [I]), 経済学研究 (Keizaigaku kenkyū), 40, 233-34.

32. ibid., p. 234. The quote is from 福岡藩主記録 (Fukuoka hanshū kiroku), FKSS, 8:272.

33. During the Edo period whale oil was used extensively to prevent insect damage to crops. See Fujimoto Takashi, "西海捕鯨業経営と福岡藩 (Saikai hogeigyō keiei to Fukuoka han)," in 商品流通の史的考察 (Shōhin ryūtsū no shiteki kenkyū), ed. Miyamoto Mataji (宮本又次) (Minerva Shobo, 1967), pp. 71-89.


35. Hirano and Iida, p. 181.


37. Shibata, "zaisei kōzō," p. 44.

38. ibid., pp. 59-60; and Nagano, "Fukuoka han minsei shiryaku," FKSS, 1:366. A study of this system in its later manifestations is in Endō, "福岡藩の用心除ケ銀制度 (Fukuoka han no yōjin-yokegin seidō)," in Kyūshū keizai-shi kenkyū, pp. 289-314.


40. Although other unjōgin levies had been made earlier, the mise unjōgin was not established until 1740. Unjōgin taxes on mercantile activity reached a peak around 1770. Shibata, "zaisei kōzō,"
pp. 54, 57. See also Fujino, *Daimyō to ryōkoku keiei*, pp. 168-172; and Fujimoto Takashi (藤本時昌), "福岡藩における通達統制 (Fukuoka han ni okeru ryūtsū tōsei)," in 藩社会の研究 (Han shakai no kenkyū), ed. Miyamoto Mataji (宮本又次), (Minerva Shobō, 1960).


43. Matsushita, p. 240


45. For the first full analysis of the system see Shibata, "zaisei közō," p. 46 ff.

46. ibid., p. 46 citing "御法令上郡奉行心得之事 (gohōreijō kōri bugyō kokoroe no koto)," FKS, 2.1:121.

47. ibid., pp. 46-48.

48. ibid., p. 46.

49. ibid., pp. 53-57.

50. From "福岡藩郡帳要録 (Fukuoka han kōrichō yōroku)," 大田資料 (Ōta shiryō), cited in ibid., p. 46.


54. Hirano and Iida, p. 158.

55. Endo, pp. 280-81.


57. An estimated 920,000 people nationwide died of starvation or disease during this period. The toll was highest in northern Japan where many were reduced to eating grass and roots. Takayanagi and Takeuchi, Nihon shi jiten, (1974) p. 664.


59. Kansei 1 (1789)/4/20, 黒田文書 (Kuroda monjo), no. 387, quoted in Noguchi, p. 124.

60. The following information is based on Noguchi, pp. 125-129.

61. "郡町浦御用帳 (kōri, machi, ura goyōcho)," quoted in Noguchi, p. 129.


63. The total was 30,000 bales or 2.4 million kin. See Noguchi, p. 129, n. 22.

64. ibid., p. 131.

65. Higaki Motoyoshi (檜垣元吉), "福岡藩政史の研究 - 天保の改革 (Fukuoka hansei shi no kenkyū: Tempō no kaikaku [I])," Shien, 40 (1949), 165 [Hereafter referred to as "Tempō no kaikaku, I"].

67. "福岡年代記 (Fukuoka nendai ki)," Bunka 13 (1816)/8/23.


70. Miyamoto Mataji (宮本又次), "博多と福岡 (Hakata to Fukuoka)," in 九州経済史論集 (Kyūshū keizai shi ronshū), ed. Miyamoto Mataji (Fukuoka: Fukuoka Shokō Kaigisho, 1954-57), 2:53.


72. FKS, 2.1:375;

73. Higaki, "Tempō no kaikaku, I," p. 180; FKS, 2.2:729; and "Fukuoka nendai ki."


75. In a conversation during November 1979, Shibata Yasuo agreed that, before the Tempō reforms, Fukuoka was in much better financial condition than either Satsuma or Chōshū.

76. Higaki, "Tempō no kaikaku, I" p. 168.


78. For Shirozu's background see Higaki, "Tempō no kaikaku, I," pp. 171-173.


81. FKS, 2.1:179-180.

82. Higaki Motoyoshi (篠崎元吉), "福岡藩政史の研究 - 天保の改革 [II], (Fukuoka hansei shi no kenkyū: Tempō no kaikaku, [II])", Shien (Shorts), 54 (1952), 90 [Hereafter "Tempō no kaikaku, II"].

83. Higaki, "Tempō no kaikaku, I," pp. 186-187. Oshimai was a deduction from the stipend or fief income of an individual samurai taken by the han government prior to annual distribution. According to Higaki, standard oshimai for Fukuoka was 18.13%.

84. Ibid., pp. 185-189.

85. FKS, 2.1:185; and Higaki "Tempō no kaikaku, II," p. 86.

86. FKS, 2.1:711.

87. FKS, 2.1:711; and Endô, pp. 281-82, 286.

88. This aspect of the reform is described in FKS, 2.1:184; and Higaki, "Tempō no kaikaku, II," pp. 86-87, 90-92.


90. Sugimoto Isao (杉本義), ed., 九州天領の研究 (Kyūshū tenryō no kenkyū) (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1976), p. 422. Although not readily apparent section 2.4, "広瀬久兵衛と福岡藩「生蠟税改仕組 (Hirose Kyūbei to Fukuoka han 'kirō kawase shikumi'),' pp. 410-481, was authored by Kihara Yukio (木原秀幸) based upon his earlier "幕末における福岡藩財政改革と日田商人広瀬家 (Bakumatsu ni okeru Fukuoka han zaisei kaikaku to Hita shōnin Hirose-ke)," KBKK, 17(1972.3), 97-142.

92. Kuramono was the prime rice sold by the various han through their kurayashiki. Rice from other warehouses was known as nayamono.

93. Quoted in Endō, p. 261.


96. "Fukuoka nendai ki."

97. FKS, 2.1:376; and Endō, p. 265.

98. Higaki, "Tempō no kaikaku, I," p. 175; and FKS, 2.2:268. The coal monopoly was the most long-lived, and in due time the most significant.

99. Yasukawa, "Kaimei no hansom: Kuroda Nagahiro," p. 67. This was confirmed in discussion with Shibata Yasuo, November 1979.

100. Endō, p. 269. An account of Nagasaki guard duty is found in the diary of a Fukuoka samurai: see, Inoue Gon'ichirō (井上 櫻一郎), 長崎 警衛記録 (Nagasaki keieikiroku) (Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai, 1932).


102. ibid., pp. 251-263.

103. The Nagasaki bugyō directed in 1849 that upon the arrival of a foreign ship during the assigned year of guard duty, 264 additional
men should be sent; during the off-year, an extra 167 men. "綱領 (Kōryō)," v. 6, Kaei 2/3/26, Kuroda monjo.

104. Details are given in the next chapter. See also Kagetsu Jōkyō (香月昌経), 黒田長満公伝 (Kuroda Nagahiro kō den) (Fukuoka, 1905), 1:102. Hereafter Nagahiro kō den. One of the difficulties in assessing Fukuoka's economic distress vis-a-vis Western military reform is that such expenses were not paid from the regular han budget. Financial difficulties, as discussed here, are therefore not necessarily relevant to the financing of military modernization. See e.g., Sugimoto, ed., Kyūshū tenryō no kenkyū, p. 474.

105. Nagahiro kō den, 1:77-78.


108. ibid., p. 432.


110. ibid., p. 424.

111. Hirose Kyūbei, (広瀬久兵衛), "愚察 (Guan)," quoted in Sugimoto, ed., Kyūshū tenryō no kenkyū, p. 438.

112. FKS, 2.1:209-10.

113. Endō, pp. 266, 272-73.

115. The directive is noted in full in *FKS*, 2.1:209-10.

116. Quoted in *Nagahiro kō den*, 1:82-83.

117. *ibid.*, 1:83.

118. Ansei 3 (1856)/8, "Fukuoka nendai ki."


120. Miyata Chōshi Hensan linkai (宮田町誌編纂委員会), 宮田町誌 (Miyata chōshi) (Miyata Chō Yakujo, 1978), 1:772.


124. Payments decreased from 310,000 hyō to 250,000 hyō. See *ibid.*, p. 429.


When Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy arrived at Uraga Bay with a squadron of four warships on July 8, 1853 (6/6), he carried with him a presidential letter to the "Emperor" of Japan and a determination to solicit concessions for an official relationship with the isolated island nation which others before him had failed to obtain. Although his visit was not wholly unexpected, for Dutch reports of the expedition had already reached Nagasaki, nevertheless it caused great consternation both inside and outside of official circles and set in motion a swirl of political crises which would eventually bring about the collapse of Tokugawa rule.¹

In the aftermath of the initial Perry visit the bakufu was faced with a dilemma: either resist the superior armament of the West and face the possible repetition of the Chinese Opium War debacle, or acquiesce to Western demands and follow the politically unpopular course of reversing the traditional exclusion policy (sakoku) which had formed a mainstay of bakuhan polity for over two centuries. Convinced that Japan could not long resist Western demands, Abe Masahiro, the senior member of the bakufu council (roju), took the unprecedented step of calling for opinions on the subject of the American demands from all officials and daimyo, in the hopes of gaining some concensus of support for a potentially damaging bakufu action. Such a concensus, however,
was not forthcoming. Memorials submitted by powerful daimyo advocated policies ranging from support for acceptance of the demands and opening of the ports, to delay tactics, to outright rejection of any foreign advances.² By opting to solicit opinions from those traditionally barred from consultative roles in bakufu decision making, Abe had opened a "Pandora's Box" which the bakufu could not close, try as it might. The resultant political turmoil, mediatory maneuvering and intrigue became characteristic of the bakumatsu era.

Kuroda Nagahiro and the Perry Initiative

Among those who favored the opening of Japan to commercial intercourse with the outside world were Hotta Masayoshi and Ii Naosuke, both fudai lords who would in turn succeed Abe to leadership of the bakufu administration.³ Most outspoken in favor of trade among the powerful tozama lords was Kuroda Nagahiro of Chikuzen, known alternately as Narihiro, or in official correspondence as Matsudaira Mino-no-kami. Whereas Nagahiro had already served for nearly twenty years as daimyo of a major domain, jointly responsible with Lord Nabeshima of Hizen for the defense of Nagasaki, his opinions on matters concerning the foreigners were not to be taken lightly. Moreover, since he was a confidant of Shimazu Nariakira, Date Munenari, and of Abe, himself, his views carried considerable weight extending far beyond the mere confines of Fukuoka han.

The memorial from Nagahiro to the bakufu concerning the Perry initiative was dated 1853/7/17, slightly more than a month after Perry's
arrival on 6/6. 4 Comprised of three primary articles, it reveals much of the background and thought of a man who would play the dominant role in Fukuoka politics throughout the bakumatsu years. A forward-looking, practical individual, Nagahiro was impressive among Japanese leaders in his understanding of the West and his fear that the colonial experience might be repeated on Japanese soil. Thus, in the preface of his letter Nagahiro recommended that permission to trade be granted as a tradeoff between a minor harm and the calamity he believed would inevitably ensue were the request to be denied.

Nagahiro began his argument by stating bluntly that trading privileges ought to be allowed, but that the concession should be limited to Nagasaki alone, where the Americans might be regulated "in the same manner as the Dutch." As for the other requests, "permission should not be granted for the purchase of coal in the south." "Rather," he continued, "the Americans should be allowed to lease an unutilized site in Japan where they may store coal and procure firewood and drinking water. In cases of extreme hardship food should be distributed at Uraga."

There was recognition, however, of the danger inherent in allowing trade with the Americans. For, once accomplished, "... the above proceedings will reverberate around the world with lightning speed and soon ambitious countries such as England and France will certainly bring numerous warships to demand commerce." Russia, of course, would be the first; and since it would be difficult to again deny them trading privileges in light of their past requests, Nagahiro recommended that Japan take the initiative, notifying the Russians
through the Dutch commercial mission that hereafter they would be allowed to trade and would be treated as equals with the Dutch and Americans at Nagasaki.  

On the other hand, all requests for commerce from other nations should be denied. In particular, England and France were to be turned away, even repelled by force if necessary. Why the discrimination? "Among the foreign nations," Nagahiro stated, "America and Russia are trustworthy, unlike England and France who maintain both surface and hidden [motives]." Therefore, having granted trading rights to Russia and America, Japan should work through these more "trustworthy" nations to avert requests from England and France. If they persisted and attempted to use gunboat-diplomacy, "America and Russia should be called upon to send warships to drive them away and pacify them." He explained that, "This principle is [known as] using the foreigner to attack the foreigner, without loss to the Imperial forces." Herein, then, was more than mere buckling to Western pressure. "The small harm in allowing trade is that all countries will request it. But if the above [policy of] utilizing the barbarian to control the barbarian is followed, then injury will be forestalled and the Imperial country will remain secure." Moreover, were trade with Russia and America allowed, then "although Japan is a small country...there will be no affair that cannot be handled, and no interchange of goods which will be unprofitable."

After initially commenting on the American proposals, Nagahiro expounded on the inadvisability of war with the West. Then, in a lengthy third article he stepped beyond the strict limitations of the
Perry issue to set forth proposals for the future wealth and strength of Japan. To begin with, he reasoned that "regardless of the handling of the Americans, steamships and warships should be constructed as rapidly as possible," since "...a strong defense cannot be found in [cannon] batteries alone." Advising that "without Western-style warships victory is absolutely impossible," he proceeded further, stating the necessity of allowing individual domains to obtain warships of their own. In addition, he believed that Japanese merchant vessels should be ordered to follow Western models, thus reducing loss of both life and property, and allowing for increased defense capability since each could carry a small number of cannon and several samurai among its crew. Citing the example of the feared wakō of the past, Nagahiro also advised that Japanese merchant vassals be allowed to travel abroad at will. "Therefore,...if merchant ships are allowed to go to foreign lands Japan will undoubtedly prosper, and military defense will become strong."

With regard to the buildup of military strength for the defense of Japan against Western incursion, Nagahiro suggested that Japan follow the example of Peter the Great of Russia. "Russia became a great country," he wrote, "because the Emperor Peter, disguised as a commoner, toured Europe and learned for himself the construction of warships and cannon; after which he returned home, summoning artisans from Europe, and had them construct [those things] in his own country." Nagahiro proposed, therefore, that in like manner Japan should "request several artisans of cannon and warships from Holland and America and order them to rapidly undertake construction and to
train Japanese artisans, until the Japanese can successfully accomplish the task by themselves."

In conclusion, Nagahiro chastized the bakufu for its lack of preparation in the Perry affair, despite foreknowledge of the expedition gained from Dutch sources. Nagahiro himself had reported this news, despite his lack of status to properly do so, yet bakufu officials persisted in the opinion that foreign ships would not come. "Had preparation been made beforehand," he complained, "this disturbance would never have developed."

Four years following the memorials on the Perry issue, when in similar vein Hotta Masayoshi called for daimyo opinions on the Harris negotiations, Nagahiro remained firm in his commitment to an open country (kaikoku). In the interim, however, numerous other daimyo had come to recognize the value of trade on the basis of their principles of fukoku kyōhei (rich country, strong military), or were at least more willing to stand firmly behind their personal views once the onus of responsibility for initially opening the country had been laid upon the bakufu. What had motivated the Kuroda lord to espouse such a strong kaikoku policy in 1853? What was behind his distrust of the British and French or his praise of Peter the Great? How fully did he know and comprehend the West? Moreover, were his kaikoku attitudes able to be transferred to political realities? How could a tozama daimyo speak so critically of the bakufu and with such little deference? Indeed, who was Kuroda Nagahiro and why is he generally so little known? A survey of his participation during the crucial decade, 1848-1858, impresses us with the scope of his interest, and the breadth
of his activity. Yet, for the most part, his role in national politics was supportive rather than dominant; in domain affairs, dominant but lacking in support from his chief vassals.

**Nagahiro's Background**

Kuroda Nagahiro was born in 1811/3 in Edo at the Takawa mansion of the Shimazu family. The ninth child of Shimazu Shigehide, conceived in his father's 65th year, he was known as a boy by the childhood name of Tōjirō. Young Tōjirō was undoubledly doted upon by his aged father, and it is reported that he spent much time in the inner chambers of Edo Castle with his half-sister, the wife of the Shogun lenari. He also developed from his boyhood a close friendship with another scion of the Shimazu family, the young Nariakira. Despite the distance of their geneological relationship (Nariakira was Nagahiro's grandnephew), the boys were a mere two years disparate in age and there developed between them a camaraderie which lasted a lifetime. Unusual men in unusual times, in later years the two were remarkable for the unity of their interests in Western affairs and their attitudes toward the foreign presence and the desired future course of Japan.

In 1822, at the age of 11, Nagahiro was adopted as heir to Kuroda Narikiyo, daimyo of Fukuoka. Soon thereafter, he moved to Fukuoka's Edo yashiki where he lived for the next five years. During this time, as befitted the heir to a great tozama domain, he had several audiences with the shogun lenari, including his "Coming of Age Ceremony" (gempuku) on 1825/1/18, at which time he was granted the Matsudaira
surname and the privilege of using the character "nari" from the shogun's personal name. Finally given permission in 1827 to take leave of Edo, Nagahiro made his way westward to Fukuoka, the seat of his future domain. 10

The following year, as a young man of seventeen, Nagahiro accompanied his adoptive father on an inspection tour of Nagasaki. There, for the first time, he experienced primary contact with Westerners, including a lengthly discussion with von Siebold on the topics of zoology, botany, and medicine. 11 Like Shimazu Shigehide, whose exploits in Dutch Studies (rangaku) are well-known, 12 Kuroda Narikiyo was deeply interested in things Western and was well versed in botany and zoology. His collected specimens and drawings of birds, animals, insects, and of flora, and medicinal herbs numbered in the hundreds. In addition to cataloguing the native birds of Kyushu, he conducted a botanical study group at his mansion, and authored at least one book on the subject. 13 Given the openness and curiosity towards the West exemplified by both Nagahiro's natural and adoptive fathers and his early experiences in Nagasaki, it is little wonder that Nagahiro too developed a deep desire for knowledge of the West and of Western science. Fortunately for him, responsibility over the defense of Nagasaki offered numerous opportunities to inquire after developments in the outside world or to procure books on recent achievements in Western science. Later, when sankin kotai duties took him to Edo, he grasped the opportunity to gain knowledge from famous rangaku scholars such as Tozuka Seikai, Mitsukuri Genpo and his son, Shūhei, or Kawamoto Kōmin. 13
Within a year of the initial visit to Nagasaki in 1828, Nagahiro was given the responsibility of overseeing its defense in lieu of Narikiyo, who was plagued by chronic eye ailments. Gradually Nagahiro took on more responsibility in the domain preparatory to his father's retirement as daimyo on 1834/11/6. Thereafter, over the next 35 years until his own retirement in 1869, Kuroda Nagahiro remained as daimyo of Chikuzen. As a young, adopted lord, however, his control of the han was far from complete. Despite his ailments, Narikiyo still controlled the important decisions in the domain from his retirement headquarters at Edo via the powerful karō whom he had appointed. We have in the previous chapter, already touched upon the bureaucratic in-fighting which this situation produced at the time of the Tempo reforms. Following the release of Hisano Geki and Kuroda Awaji in 1836, Nagahiro was able to progressively extend his authority in the han by appointing men of his own choosing to important bureaucratic posts. A coup of particular importance was achieved in 1842 in what is known as the Edo jōfu kuzure when Narikiyo's favorites at the han offices at Edo were finally dismissed after years of reportedly corrupt and arbitrary administration. Thereafter, until his death in 1851, Narikiyo was apparently of limited influence. Nevertheless, in 1842, Nagahiro's authority as daimyo was still comparatively weak in relation to the collective influence of the traditionally dominant karō.

While Nagahiro was active in consolidating his authority within Fukuoka, and fulfilling the busy routine of a major daimyo, he maintained strong ties with his Shimazu relatives and former associates at Edo and Kagoshima. In particular, his relationship with Shimazu Nariakira
remained on intimate terms, as the two exchanged ideas on Western science and shared opinions concerning the threat which increased Western presence in Japanese waters posed for the future of the country. Their concerns were national in scope, for they knew enough of the industrialized and militarily-powerful Western nations to realize that Japan's only hope rested upon a countrywide effort of military modernization and coastal defense. They knew that individual han boundaries were of minor import in defending against Western incursion. Ultimately, therefore, the close personal relationship between Nagahiro and Nariakira and their unanimity of opinion concerning the Western challenge led to a concommitant involvement in national politics aimed at the fulfillment of their common goals. The significance of this involvement manifested itself not only in the future course of Satsuma-Chikuzen relations, but also in the development of a budding Chikuzen loyalist movement.

Nagahiro and the Shimazu Succession Dispute

The origins of Nagahiro's personal involvement in national politics lay in the alliance formed chiefly between Nariakira, Nagahiro, Abe Masahiro of the bakufu council, and Lord Date Munenari of Uwajima to see Nariakira installed as daimyo of Satsuma, replacing his father, Lord Narioki. While Kuroda Nagahiro had by 1849 already served as daimyo for fifteen years, Nariakira believed that he was still the Shimazu heir because of the obstruction of Zusho Shōzaemon, the influential author of Satsuma's Tempō reforms, and Yura, Narioki's concubine and mother of
The succession issue came to the fore soon after Nariakira and his father received a secret commission from the bakufu on 1846/int.5/27 instructing Nariakira to return quickly to Satsuma to take charge of the problems resulting from the arrival of French ships in the Ryukyus.

Nariakira had proposed, and through Abe Masahiro had secretly received bakufu consent, to allow the French limited trade, if necessary, in order to prevent the Ryukyu incident from assuming greater proportions. Fortunately, soon after his arrival in Kagoshima, Nariakira was informed that the French had withdrawn without obtaining the commercial concession they desired. The immediate crisis had been averted, but Nariakira still emphasized the need to elevate military capabilities to meet future Western challenges. Therefore, he worked energetically to strengthen defenses and to spark in the samurai ranks a consciousness of the imminent national danger, but his attempts at reform did not go unopposed by vested interests within Satsuma.

The most powerful opposition to Nariakira's efforts came from Zusho, his father's trusted advisor, who feared the economic repercussions of an expensive campaign of military development, and Yura, Hisamitsu's mother, who desired to see her son replace Nariakira as heir. With the aid of Narioki, who failed to share in his son's overriding concern for national defense, they managed to gather around themselves a core of powerful domain officials with the intention of undercutting Nariakira's programs. When Narioki, himself, arrived in Kagoshima on 1847/3/8, Nariakira's position as deputy of the daimyo became untenable and he was forced to withdraw to Edo a week later.
Soon it became painfully clear that Nariakira was being cut off from Satsuma inner circles, and that, instead, his half-brother, Hisamitsu, was being primed to replace Narioki as the next daimyo.21

Backed into a corner, Nariakira’s sole recourse was to discredit Zusho by revealing the particulars of the illegal Satsuma-Ryukyu trade, relying upon his friends to help mitigate punishment of Satsuma and aid in achieving the retirement of Narioki. Through Date Munenari, Abe and the bakufu were informed in 1848 of Satsuma's illicit commerce and Nariakira obtained "Abe's assurance that he would overlook minor irregularities and not take Satsuma to court as long as the Ryukyu problem could be solved satisfactorily."22 Confronted with the bakufu's knowledge of the proscribed trade, Zusho attempted to accept responsibility for this grave misdeed by poisoning himself on 1848/12/18.23

Although his specific role in this affair is not clear, Kuroda Nagahiro was extremely active in the intrigue, working behind the scenes with Abe and Date on Nariakira's behalf. Shortly after Zusho's death, Date Munenari paid a special visit to the Kuroda yashiki in Edo.24 In a letter to Yamaguchi Sadayasu in Kagoshima (dated 1849/1/29), Nariakira referred to the death of Zusho and the punishment of Futsukadō (another of Narioki's trusted advisors), expressing pleasure that things had progressed so well. "Mino (Kuroda Nagahiro) has made great exertions!", he stated, "and Abe has also acted his role magnificently."25 A separate letter written the same day to Yoshii Taiyu, divulged that Nariakira had consulted variously with Nagahiro concerning Zusho and Futsukadō and that Abe had already discussed the issue of Narioki's retirement with him, but the time was not yet
right. In addition, Nariakira verified reports that Nagahiro had been offering prayers in his behalf at Dazaifu Tenmangu and Hakozaki Hachimangu shrines.26

Following Zusho's suicide, severe factional strife prevailed in Kagoshima through 1849 and supporters of Nariakira turned to Nagahiro in their appeals for assistance in their cause. At the end of the fourth month, four Nariakira adherents met at the home of Nagoe Tokiyuki where they drew up a letter detailing the crimes of han officials. Copies were sent to Edo, to Nagahiro with a request for assistance, and to one of the Satsuma karō. During the summer Inoue Masatoku expressed his belief that the time had come to consult with Nagahiro in order to gain the support of the bakufu against the "evil" men in han government.28 Meanwhile, he confessed to Yoshii that nothing could be done for their cause beyond appealing to Kuroda Nagahiro and Abe Masahiro for help.29

During this time, there were disquieting suspicions among Nariakira proponents that somehow Yura was behind the recent deaths of several of Nariakira's children. Fearful of their patron's own life, and unbeknownst to Nariakira, they formulated plans to assassinate Yura, Hisamitsu, and Shimazu Shōsō, one of the karō. Before the scheme could be transformed into deadly reality, however, Lord Narioki caught word of the plot and turned with fierce vengeance upon the Nariakira adherents in Satsuma. During 1849/12 dozens of samurai from the Nariakira faction were arrested, including the father of the youthful Ōkubo Toshimichi. Thereafter, in what came to be known as the
Takazaki Purge, several of the ringleaders were forced to commit suicide, while others were exiled, demoted or otherwise punished.\textsuperscript{30}

Four of those marked for punishment fled to Chikuzen where they informed Kuroda Nagahiro of the details of the Satsuma disorder and sought protective asylum under his care. This was the chance that Nagahiro had been waiting for. Throughout 1850, with proof of the strife within Satsuma firmly in hand, he joined with Abe and Lord Date in applying pressure aimed at forcing Narioki's retirement. Gradually, their plans became reality, culminating in the retirement of Narioki in 1851/1 and the subsequent succession of Nariakira as daimyo of Satsuma the following month.\textsuperscript{31}

The first of the Satsuma fugitives to arrive in Chikuzen was Inoue Izumo Masatoku, a Shinto priest and close associate of Nariakira, who arrived on the night of 1849/12/9 at the Fukuoka home of Yoshinaga Genhachirō, a personal advisor to Nagahiro. Once in the safety of Yoshinaga's home, Inoue composed a petition to Nagahiro in which he explained conditions in Satsuma and the circumstances of his escape, and requested protection.\textsuperscript{32} Nagahiro immediately granted Inoue asylum, and set about devising a plan whereby he might turn this important revelation into benefit for himself and for Nariakira. Feeling it unwise to openly disclose the disorder in Satsuma he worked secretly through Yoshinaga so that not even those in the han offices were aware of Inoue's entrance into Chikuzen. Quietly, Inoue was given a new identity and sent to reside at the Sakurai shrine in Shima-\textsuperscript{33}

At first Satsuma was unaware of Inoue's whereabouts, but numerous searchers sent out from Kagoshima soon tracked his path to Hakata.
There they solicited the cooperation of the Fukuoka police, who, oblivious to Nagahiro's actions, aided them in their search. But when no further trace of Inoue could be found, the Satsuma men began to suspect that Nagahiro was either sheltering him or had helped him flee toward Edo. Unable to proceed further, the searchers were forced to return to Kagoshima empty-handed. Nagahiro feared, however, that Inoue might eventually be found out, so in 1850/2 he informed the Fukuoka karō of the situation and jointly they formulated plans for Inoue's protection.34

By this time Nagahiro had sent word to Abe Masahiro giving notice of Inoue's arrival and a description of affairs in Satsuma.35 Nariakira had also been informed of Inoue's flight, and through Chikuzen couriers had sent a lengthy letter to Inoue (dated 1850/1/26) in which he expressed deep satisfaction that his friend had sought refuge in Chikuzen.36 Satsuma was in turn notified through Yoshinaga Genhachirō that Inoue had entered Fukuoka and that Nagahiro would soon consult with them on the matter.37

Shortly thereafter, Yoshitoshi Chu, a Satsuma official close to Lord Narioki, was passing through Chikuzen on his way home from Edo, and therefore decided to discuss this matter personally with Nagahiro. Arriving in Fukuoka on 2/28 Yoshitoshi was presented the details surrounding the Inoue case and shown the petition Masatoku had given the Kuroda lord. To Yoshitoshi's demand for the return of Inoue, Nagahiro explained that he had already informed the bakufu of the Satsuma events because they were no longer simply private affairs, but had developed potential for affecting the entire country. Therefore, he
continued, Yoshitoshi should make no arbitrary decision without his daimyo's specific order. Yoshitoshi responded by relating the conditions of the Shimazu and again asking for the delivery of Inoue, but Nagahiro remained adamant in his denial. 38

While further negotiations were continuing between Satsuma and Fukuoka for the return of Inoue, 39 yet another of the Nariakira faction escaped confinement in Satsuma and fled to Fukuoka for safety. In replication of the earlier pattern, Kimura Tokizumi presented himself on 3/21 outside the residence of Yoshinaga Genhachirō with detailed news of Satsuma affairs and a plea for asylum. 40 Kimura, too, was placed in hiding to avoid a new contingent of Satsuma agents and relations between the two great han grew increasingly tense.

Over the next several months there was a flurry of activity as Kuroda, Abe, and Date plotted out a policy towards Satsuma. In a letter of 4/28 Nagahiro told Abe of the arrival of Kimura in Fukuoka and briefed him on recent conditions within Satsuma. Details, he said, would be sent to Date and Abe could obtain them from him. 41 A full explanation of the affairs, with the petitions received from Inoue and Kimura, was dispatched to Date (5/1), then resident at Edo, who in turn forwarded the particulars to Abe on 5/28. 42 Thereafter, Date met several times with the bakufu counselor to discuss the internal affairs of Satsuma. It was decided that they should prevent internal disorder from coming to a head and plan to force Narioki's retirement while waiting for Nagahiro's arrival at Edo. 43 Meanwhile, Nagahiro kept them posted on new developments in correspondence to Date on 5/28, 6/13, and 7/4. 44
Responding to requests from Fukuoka for instructions on the handling of the Satsuma expatriots, the bakufu replied that it felt no special need to supply any instructions, thus recognizing Nagahiro's freedom to grant asylum to Inoue. In light of the decision by both Nagahiro and the bakufu to protect Inoue until the furor in Kagoshima had subsided, Satsuma was forced to abandon any plans to arrest the fugitives. In a letter of 7/23 Ijūin and Yoshitoshi, Narioki's representatives, informed Nagahiro of this intention. By this time, however, two more Nariakira supporters had fled Satsuma for the safety of Chikuzen. Having become separated along the way, Takeuchi Han'emon and Iwasaki Chiyoshi arrived in Fukuoka on 1850/6/18 and 7/2, respectively, where they petitioned Nagahiro for the same protection already being afforded their compatriots.

Nagahiro was scheduled to make his regular sankin kōtai journey to Edo in 1850/10, and so Date and Abe had withheld final decision on the Inoue case and on Narioki's retirement until they could consult with Nagahiro personally. But a series of summer typhoons caused such heavy damage in Chikuzen that Nagahiro requested permission of the bakufu to forego his visit so as to concentrate efforts on relief for the domain populace. In order to gain acceptance of his petition, Nagahiro wrote to his friend Date (letters of 8/10 and 8/24), asking for his help in explaining the situation to Abe so as to elicit his approval. This Date did in a letter to Abe dated 9/7 in which he further explained that although the Satsuma affair resembled a private dispute, in reality it was not, since any disturbance there would affect the handling of the
Ryukyus. For his own part, Date said, he had no personal interest in the case, but was only representing Nagahiro and Nariakira.\(^{48}\)

Despite his inability to be personally in attendance at Edo, Nagahiro hoped negotiations with regard to Satsuma would continue unabated. He therefore informed Date that he was sending his private advisor, Yasunaga Ensuke, to represent him and hoped that Date would include Ensuke in all planning.\(^{49}\) On 9/19 Nagahiro notified Date that Ensuke would personally relay various written materials to him, including details on the handling of the Satsuma fugitives and plans for the retirement of Narioki. In addition, there were letters to Lord Okudaira and Lord Nambu who were also involved in the case.\(^{50}\) Ensuke was to confer secretly with Lord Okudaira, Lord Nambu, and Date, while relying on Abe Masahiro to carry through with plans for Narioki's retirement.

By this time Nagahiro and the other supporters of Nariakira had stepped up their campaign for the immediate retirement of the Satsuma lord, but their efforts were being stoutly resisted by Yoshitoshi, working on behalf of Lord Narioki.\(^{51}\) In a letter to Date Munenari and Nambu Shinjun (11/17), Nariakira reported that Yoshitoshi had presented the wholly unacceptable proposal of having Narioki continue to reside in Satsuma after his retirement. Were that done, Nariakira knew that his father would maintain his control, and the situation would, in fact, remain unchanged. Negotiations had reached a critical state, he wrote, since there was also a proposal for the retirement to be postponed until two years hence. However, were that to happen, he assured Date and Nambu, "Chikuzen (Nagahiro) would be extremely angry."\(^{52}\)
Not long after Nariakira's letter, the sustained pressure by the Nariakira coalition bore fruit, as word was received that Narioki had at long last committed to retire and name Nariakira as successor. This news occasioned great pleasure within the Nariakira camp, and from 1850/12 there was among those involved a collective sense of relief over a task well-done, even though Nariakira did not officially become daimyo until 1851/2/3. In a letter of 1/6 Nagahiro expressed his deep appreciation to Date Munenari for his assistance in the succession affair. "Truly it is because of your efforts and concern", he wrote, "that the above result had been obtained. It was, above all, for the benefit of the Imperial land."

Nagahiro, too, had exerted considerable effort on behalf of Nariakira, for which the new Satsuma lord was extremely grateful. Leaving Edo on 3/9 enroute to Kagoshima, Nariakira passed through Chikuzen where he worshipped in traditional fashion at the Hakozaki and Sumiyoshi shrines, and conferred with his friend, Nagahiro. After dining together at Kuroda's Hakozaki villa, they took occasion to discuss the future handling of Satsuma problems. At this time Nariakira expressed his sincere gratitude for the many difficulties which the Kuroda house had been forced to suffer, even to the extent of protecting Inoue and his companions from Narioki's vengeance.

As Nariakira departed from Fukuoka at the conclusion of his visit, both lords could take great pleasure in the outcome of the past several years of planning and intrigue. Nariakira was now daimyo of Satsuma, and with Nagahiro's continued backing, was prepared to take over a leading role in national politics. On the other hand, Nagahiro found in
Nariakira a like-minded friend and now-powerful ally upon whom he could rely for support in his own endeavors. Together they would work toward their common goals of national defense and military modernization. Indeed, their success in working with Date and Abe in the Satsuma affair had already laid much of the groundwork for their future activities. For example, with the Shimazu succession dispute as background, the temerity of Nagahiro's response to Abe's request for opinions on the Perry initiative is more readily understandable; without it, nearly unfathomable. Thus, when daimyo participation in national political affairs became increasingly possible after the arrival of Perry, it is no coincidence that Nariakira, Nagahiro, Date, and Abe formed the core for a new coalition active in yet another succession dispute. This time they were known as the Hitotsubashi party and the issues involved the signature of a commercial treaty with the Western powers and the successor to the office of shogun.

Nagahiro and the Hitotsubashi Party

During the mid-1850's a group of powerful daimyo led by Tokugawa Nariaki and Shimazu Nariakira attempted to pressure the bakufu into a program of reform which would give them more voice in national decision making and guide Japan in an intensive drive to bolster defense preparations. A "small and self-consciously able group," they utilized their well-placed connections with the Court and with consentient bakufu officials to push for their own policies of national regeneration. In 1857-58, the activities of the group coalesced around
the issue of shogunal succession. According to their way of thinking the exigencies of the Western threat necessitated a mature and responsible individual to lead the bakufu, and thus they proposed that Tokugawa Yoshinobu, son of Nariaki and adopted Hitotsubashi lord, fill the shogunal vacancy. Fearful of their intent and wary of their policies, conservative bakufu officials launched a counterattack under the leadership of Ii Naosuke. The result was the famous "Ansei Purge" in which several daimyo of Hitotsubashi persuasion and a number of their followers were punished by the bakufu. In turn, this repression led to the assassination of Ii and the rise in some regions of bands of loyalists dedicated to anti-bakufu action.

Although the close relationship between Shimazu Nariakira and Kuroda Nagahiro is widely acknowledged, there is little recognition of Nagahiro's involvement in the Hitotsubashi affair. Sakata Yoshio, for example, does not include Nagahiro among his list of daimyo "qualified" to be included in the elite company of Hitotsubashi adherents. One obvious reason for this general oversight is a lack of available documentation. No records are extant from this vital period for what must have been a considerable interchange between Nagahiro and Nariakira, while the dialogue between Nagahiro and Date Munenari remains, as yet, unpublished. In addition, perhaps because Nagahiro remained in Fukuoka at the time of the crucial intrigue he escaped suspicion and punishment by the bakufu, and thereby also slipped from the recognition he deserved. But whatever the reason for the oversight, there should be little question of Nagahiro's participation and involvement. In the few pages which follow we shall attempt to briefly
define Nagahiro's relationship to the Hitotsubashi adherants, particularly Shimazu and Date.

Following the conclusion of the Shimazu succession dispute in early 1851, Nagahiro concentrated more heavily on overseeing defense emplacements both at Nagasaki and along the Chikuzen coast.\(^{58}\) For Nagahiro, the rapidly expanding Western presence was a very real threat to the future harmony and security of the realm. Then came the disturbing news from the Dutch of the impending Perry mission which Nagahiro dutifully reported to the bakufu. On a nationwide basis, little was done to prepare, however, and the result was the controversy described earlier. Commodore Perry arrived unimpeded at Uraga on 1853/6/6 and just over a month later (7/17) Nagahiro submitted his opinion on the handling of the affair to Abe.

Early in 1854 Shimazu Nariakira, accompanied by Saigo Takamori, left Kagoshima for his sankin kōtai visit to Edo. The traditional overland route across Kyushu took them through Chikuzen, and on 1854/2/2 Nagahiro secretly met with Nariakira at the latter's lodging house in Lizuka. Although the route of each lord's sankin kōtai and any meetings along the way were to be approved beforehand by the bakufu, this was a secret meeting so Nagahiro had entered the area on the pretext of an hunting expedition. However, Nariakira had in fact privately informed Abe Masahiro of his intention to meet Nagahiro enroute.\(^{59}\) Meanwhile Date had sent Nagahiro a letter late in 1853, and then on 1854/1/3 Sudō Dan'emon, one of his retainers, was dispatched from Uwajima to Kagoshima, Nagasaki, and Fukuoka.\(^{60}\) The working relationship witnessed between Shimazu, Kuroda, Date, and Abe at the time of the Satsuma dispute was now being expanded to other avenues.
Nagahiro was excused from his *sankin kōtai* visit for 1854 because of the frequent visits to Nagasaki required by the presence of foreign ships there following Perry's return. In his place Nagahiro sent his heir, Nagatomo, to Edo where he met on several occasions with Date and most probably with Shimazu, as well. Letters were also exchanged between Date and Nagahiro and in 1854/10 Date's retainer, Sudo Dan'emon, was once again sent to Kyushu.

The relationship between Shimazu, Kuroda, and Date was made especially clear when in 1856 all three were present together at Edo for several months time. Nagahiro arrived in Edo somewhat earlier in the year than normal (9/10) to congratulate the shogun on his marriage to Nariakira's adopted daughter. During the next several months the three lords continually met to discuss domestic and foreign issues. On 1856/9/24, for example, Date received a letter from Nagahiro, inviting him to the Kuroda *yashiki*. Three days afterwards, Date paid a call on Nagahiro where the two shared lunch together and discussed the issues of the day. A month later Date and Kuroda joined Nariakira for a ride on one of the newly constructed Satsuma ships, and on 12/3 the three traveled together to witness an exhibition of Western military drill. And so the pattern went.

Nariakira left Edo to return to Satsuma during 1857/1 with Nagahiro departing for Fukuoka on 3/19. After his return to Fukuoka, Nagahiro, like Nariakira, placed great emphasis on han reform, particularly reform of the traditional military structure, but in the latter effort he met with stiff resistance from the conservative-minded *karo*. During the fifth and sixth months of 1858 resistance to Western-style
military reform among the leading vassals placed severe strains on Nagahiro's leadership capabilities. The diary of Kuroda Yamashiro notes that during 1858/4 Fukuoka had purchased 1,500 rifles at five ryo each, with an additional 100 guns bought on 6/6. The entry for 5/29 records that he received a circular written by Yoshida Kyûme and Maki Ichinai concerning Western-style military. "Though my views are slightly different," he wrote, "I approved and passed it on." Supporting Nagahiro's views, the circular stated that:

In these times when all under heaven is disturbed, how would the troops fare should they be called out for battle? When we ponder this, truly our hearts are ill at ease. It is therefore advisable that the strong points of Dutch technique be adopted. Upon selection of its strong points, such as gunnery, these should rapidly be assimilated [with present methods], and orders issued for the investigation of military sciences. Yet, more than diligent study, it is [military] reform and settling on a permanent system which is necessary.

It also advocated the adoption of Dutch-style drill, particularly by the most elite troops, so that the "common troops" who favored traditional patterns might be quickly won over to the advantages of the new system.

However, Yamashiro had his own plan for military reform for which he sought support. In describing a meeting to which all the karo were summoned on 1858/6/1 in order to discuss the issue, Yamashiro wrote; "My opinion is that there are advantages and disadvantages, and I fear that it would not be beneficial. When I heard that the banner carriers would not bear the [Kuroda] family insignia, I gradually slipped from agreement." Thereafter, on 6/3 and 6/6, Yamashiro and others among the karo threatened to resign from their positions in the domain government, if plans for Western drill were implemented.
The most noteworthy evidence of the difficulties which Nagahiro faced in his drive for military modernization is found in a letter written by Nagahiro to his friend, Date Munenari, shortly after the above confrontation. Nagahiro told Date that he was forwarding diagrams of a Minie rifle which his gunsmiths had obtained at Nagasaki. Since there was no duplicate he requested that they be returned after they had been copied. He then confided his problems to his friend.

We are diligently striving to establish Western military drill and though it will soon extend to numerous individuals, recent numbers are far from sufficient, which causes me grave concern. That is why I have confided in you.... This drill is not just personal whim. Although the shogun has directed that its strengths be utilized, the daily concerns from the chief vassals on down have remained wholly with traditional military forms and there are yet many who state that the foreigners have nothing to teach us. Publicly they nod their heads in agreement, but in their hearts most proceed hesitatingly. As there are rumors that Kyoto [i.e., the Court] dislikes the foreigners and favors driving them away and that those who oppose [Western drill] have gained considerable strength, my chief retainers are uncooperative at present. And though I tell the kachû [about the drill], since their superiors are this way, many have doubts.... I am sure that conditions will improve, but I have confided in you since I am alone [in this matter] and extremely concerned. Should you have a good plan, kindly enlighten me. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deal with people who know nothing of Western conditions. Although one discusses various things with them, they fail to comprehend.

Affairs were not totally bleak, however, for Nagahiro confessed that "the vassals do well in administrative and other matters. They carried out last year's reforms in good fashion and I am undisturbed about that, but [the trouble] lies only with Western military drill."

Despite his retainers' resistance, Nagahiro's attitudes concerning the West had already been well articulated in his memorial on the Perry initiative and the subsequent opinion submitted in 1857/12 concerning
the signing of a commercial treaty with the Western powers. Where Nagahiro had stood nearly alone among the great daimyo in his profession of kaikoku policies in 1853, by 1857 many other lords, particularly those among the Hitotsubashi camp, had reached similar conclusions. Already recognizing the latent difficulty with his chief vassals because of his pro-Western stance, Nagahiro had submitted his 1857 memorial "in utmost secrecy" without prior consultation with either his important vassals or his heir.\(^{74}\)

As in his earlier opinion Nagahiro exhibited knowledge of world affairs, and retained his fear of the British. "Concerning the foreign scene," he wrote, "there has been no change since the opening [of the country] to the outside [world]." With regard to the coming of the English to Nagasaki, he noted that "they are, as the Americans say, truly war-loving; as I myself have noticed on several occasions. This point is undisputable. The observations at Nagasaki which report that they are extremely powerful are correct."

As apprehensive as Nagahiro was for the future of Japan in the face of Western pressure, he was equally contemptuous of those who refused to learn from the West.

Since in the past foreign countries have been regarded with suspicion, even now 70-80% of the Japanese despise the foreigners as barbarians. There are many who rely fully on tradition alone and remain unbending. Ignorant of world conditions or of the difficulty in referring to the foreigners as barbarians, they speak only of the 'land of the gods' (shinkoku) and regard foreigners as dogs and cats. Even among the daimyo this is so.

The danger of such ignorance, of course, was a false sense of security. Therefore, Nagahiro further warned that, "because of limited vision of
the world many people don't understand that the foreigners have numerous weapons which Japanese arms cannot yet withstand."

While Nagahiro was experiencing difficulties expediting his desires for military modernization within his own domain, the maneuvering of the Hitotsubashi adherents in Edo and Kyoto reached its zenith early in 1858. On 1/8 the bakufu sent the rojū Hotta Masayoshi to Kyoto to obtain the court's approval for the apparently inevitable task of signing the commercial treaty with the Americans. One day earlier, Date Munenari had sent letters to Sendai, Echizen, Satsuma, Akita, and Fukuoka domains, undoubtedly notifying them of Hotta's expected departure and supplying needed information on conditions at Edo. Although Hotta sought support from Kyoto for bakufu policies he received a negative response from the Emperor concerning the treaty issue and thus the bakufu was forced on 4/25 to show the Court's reply to the various daimyo and again seek out their opinions.

Prior to the bakufu's announcement Shimazu Nariakira had sent a letter to Date Munenari (4/11) mirroring his concern over foreign affairs. An attempt to drive off the foreigners would surely bring on a catastrophic defeat, he explained, but on the other hand a peace treaty would lead to a gradual decline of national authority. The Satsuma lord suggested, therefore, a fifteen-year agreement during which time military preparations could be heavily emphasized in a stepped-up policy of fukoku kyōhei. Not long thereafter on 4/25 Nagahiro likewise confessed to Date his deepest fears that war would break out with the result that Japan would find herself in a situation not unlike the misfortunes which China was then suffering.
Throughout 1858 the Hitotsubashi camp utilized their connections with Konoe, Sanjō, and Takatsukasa among court nobles and with sympathetic bakufu officials to push for the appointment of Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu as shogunal successor. Until early in 1858/5 they were confident of accomplishing their ultimate goal, but the unexpected appointment of Ii Naosuke as tairō after Hotta's failure in Kyoto established an effective barrier which worked to upset their plans.78 In a report on conditions at Edo on 6/7 Matsudaira Keiei of Echizen described how Hitotsubashi fortunes had taken a turn for the worse.79 Then on 6/25, under Ii's direction, the bakufu announced its selection of Tokugawa Yoshitomi of Kii as the new shogun. Obviously disappointed, Shimazu Nariakira believed the bakufu's actions to be in opposition to the true Imperial will, and had already laid plans to obtain a special Court order to lead a large body of samurai to Kyoto.80 Here again, Nagahiro's supportive involvement was in evidence.

In advance of his intended expedition Nariakira asked Saigō Takamori to return to Kyoto stopping along the way to consult with Kuroda Nagahiro of Fukuoka and Yamauchi Toyoshige of Tosa to obtain their support.81 On 6/17, the day prior to Saigō's departure from Kagoshima, Nagahiro dispatched a letter to Date Munenari in which he stated: "It is absurd that Kyoto and Edo should differ...this causes me to suffer both day and night." He added that various rumors had reached Fukuoka telling of his own desire to secretly proceed to Kyoto to inquire after affairs there.82 As for the bakufu's foreign policy, Nagahiro exclaimed impatiently: "the ｒｏｊｕ should go to Kyoto and decide whether it will be peace or war."
Meanwhile Saigo had arrived in Fukuoka on 6/25, the very day on which the bakufu was announcing in Edo the selection of Tokugawa Yoshitomi of Kii as the new shogun. Ushered into a personal audience with Nagahiro, Saigo presented the Kuroda lord with correspondence from Nariakira concerning a possible Imperial command to proceed to Kyoto. Nagahiro in turn questioned Saigo about several points which were either unclear or with which he disagreed, to which Saigo gave a point-by-point reply. Reporting the incident later to Date Munenari, Kuroda explained that he was "in complete agreement with Satsuma's (Nariakira's) concerns" and had sent him a direct letter to that effect. In strict confidence Nagahiro disclosed to Date that he had officially notified Edo of his intention to make his regular sankin kōtai trip in 1858/11, but that "should an imperial order be relayed via Nijo" he would set out early with the excuse that "he had to inquire after bakufu and foreign affairs." For the record, however, his departure was still to be 1858/11 and absolutely no one within Fukuoka, with the exception of his own heir, knew anything differently.

A full month after Saigo's visit and the announcement of Yoshitomi's succession, conclusive word was yet to reach Fukuoka relative to the proceedings at Edo. Fukuoka officers at Osaka relayed rumors then circulating there that in fact Yoshitomi had been named heir. In a letter to Date on 7/26 Nagahiro expressed his concern that foreigners might take advantage of civil disturbance were the court to order Hitotsubashi as successor in opposition to the bakufu's apparent decision. But since Edo affairs were not know to him, he requested
that Date secretly provide some enlightenment on occurrences at Edo and render his services at this crucial time for the emperor.\textsuperscript{85} However, it was already too late for Nagahiro and the Hitotsubashi group. Unknownst to Nagahiro, Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito and Matsudaira Keiei of Echizen had already been placed under domiciliary confinement by the bakufu while Shimazu Nariakira, his lifelong associate, had died in Kagoshima on 7/16.\textsuperscript{86} Within a relatively few short months the plans for national reform formulated by the "enlightened" daimyo of the Hitotsubashi party had fallen from bright expectation into utter disarray.

The death of Nariakira proved to be a great shock to Nagahiro, seriously eroding his influence at Kagoshima and thereby diminishing his standing in the national political arena. In addition, Nagahiro had lost a close friend and advisor with whom he had been able to express his most intimate feelings. As an adopted lord, he felt isolated from his own retainers, and confessed that there was not one among them with whom he could communicate as a friend. Eighteen years after the Restoration, Nagahiro recalled in an interview with Satsuma's Ichiki Hirozane that the impact of Nariakira's passing was "no different that losing my hands and feet."\textsuperscript{87}

Reporting the details of Nariakira's death to Date Munenari in a letter dated 1858/9/13, Nagahiro complained of the sudden turnaround in his relations with Satsuma.\textsuperscript{88} He had received letters from Nariakira through 1858/6 and then there was silence until 7/28 when a letter arrived from the Satsuma karō, addressed to the Fukuoka karō, stating that their lord was critically ill. Immediately Nagahiro sent Yoshinaga
Genhachirō to investigate, but of course Nariakira was already dead. In fact, he had died the day before the Satsuma karō penned their letter! Nevertheless, no explanation arrived from Kagoshima, nor did they consult Nagahiro on the succession issue as he had expected. Though he did learn of Nariakira's passing from his own officers at Nagasaki, details were not known until Yoshinaga's return to Fukuoka on 8/26. By then it was evident that authority in Satsuma had shifted to Shimazu Hisamitsu, whose son would become the new daimyo, and that Nagahiro would no longer have a strong influence over Satsuma affairs. Undoubtedly Hisamitsu and his supporters retained a vivid memory of Nagahiro's prior intervention which eight years earlier had thwarted Hisamitsu's path to lordship.

In the same letter of 9/13, Nagahiro thanked Date for the trouble and worry which the Uwajima lord had expended over the proposed secret procession to Kyoto. In light of recent events, Nagahiro expressed his concern over the advisability of such a procession even under special court order. Besides, he was troubled by the commotion which rumors of the dispute between Edo and Kyoto occasioned among even the Kyushu populace. As it turned out, once Nagahiro was aware of the full impact of the Hitotsubashi party's failure he abstained from going to Edo altogether. Instead, he notified the bakufu that recurrence of his chronic ailments made travel impossible, but that he would send his heir to offer congratulations to the new shogun.89

Thereafter, when two bakufu steamships, one of which was captained by Katsu Kaishū, arrived in Hakata Bay on 10/18 it was quite understandable that han officials were extremely wary of having Nagahiro
present himself publicly, knowing as they did of the bakufu's punish-
ment of other Hitotsubashi advocates. ⁹⁰ However, Nagahiro's personal
concern for national defense and domain modernization were more
compelling than fear of possible bakufu accusations of duplicity.
Besides, he was particularly desirous of consulting with Dr. Pompe van
Meerdervoort (the attendant physician to the Dutch at Nagasaki) who
was accompanying the bakufu expedition. ⁹¹ If Kuroda was now unable
to participate in a national reform effort, then he was determined to
achieve his goals by encouraging like-minded bakufu officials and by
presenting positive encouragement for reform within the han.

Western Studies

It should be evident, from the letters and memorials cited thus
far, that Kuroda Nagahiro was a man of intelligence and foresight who
maintained throughout his rule as daimyo an unfailing faith in Western
knowledge and the potential benefits which such learning augered for
the future of Japan. In the face of Western power and imperialist
ambition he fervently believed that national harmony, backed by a
rigorous policy of national defense and military modernization, was the
sole path to the continuance of Japan's national integrity. Any attempt
to comprehend Nagahiro's character or motivation without recognizing
the key factor of Western studies is nigh impossible.

We have already noted that a shared interest in Western science
and technology, in particular its strategic military capability, was an
essential component in the bond which united Nagahiro with Shimazu
Nariakira, Date Munenari, Tokugawa Nariaki and other advocates of fukoku kyôhei. Nagahiro's letters to Date are replete with information on Western-related affairs: from Dutch-style military drill and news of the newest rifle imports, to the efficacy of Western medical techniques against an epidemic of cholera. In particular the intimate relationship between Nagahiro and Nariakira was cemented by the glue of common interest in things Western and a shared perception of the Western threat. It is significant therefore that upon Nariakira's death it was Nagahiro who received the European-made analytical instruments from the Satsuma lord's private storehouse, as well as a prized camera recently imported through Nagasaki.

In attempting to learn from the West, Nagahiro was especially fortunate among daimyo, for Fukuoka's responsibility over the defense of Nagasaki allowed him the opportunity of near-constant access to the Europeans stationed there. He made use of every possible occasion to interview the resident Dutch physician-scientists, to garner information on the latest developments in Western science or politics, and to procure Western books on varied topics. Although many of those books were later lost after the Meiji Restoration, at the time the Kuroda lord held one of the finest libraries of Western texts available in Japan. Fukuzawa Yûkichi records the great excitement created at the school of Ogata Kôan in Osaka when their teacher was able to borrow for several days a text on physics newly acquired by Nagahiro at Nagasaki. The students feverishly copied out the chapter on electricity before having to return it, but their exultation at having completed the task turned to awe when they learned that the book had been purchased at the fantastic sum of 80 ryô. ⁹⁴
Although Nagahiro's participation in promoting Western studies are generally little known and often overlooked; like his more famous associate, Shimazu Nariakira, Nagahiro's interests and activities are truly astounding in scope. They ranged from design and construction of cannons, rifles, and gunboats, to mining, medicines, glass-making, chemistry, and the new art of photography. Yet, despite efforts over a period of nearly two decades, Nagahiro was unable to push Fukuoka into a program of development as successful as those in Satsuma, Hizen, or Chōshū. Placed in the difficult position of an adopted lord in a domain traditionally dominated by powerful karō, Nagahiro struggled constantly against the anti-Western attitude of many of his chief retainers. It is one of the paradoxes of bakumatsu history that Fukuoka, having all the apparent advantages for leading the country in Western learning and modernization, failed to make many lasting achievements in those areas. Although a daimyo had much to do with the success of any endeavor within a domain, he was not everything, as Nagahiro's case clearly shows.

Few domains in Tokugawa Japan can match Fukuoka's record of continuous interest in rangaku. In the late eighteenth century the domain Confucianist Kamei Nammei (1741-1814) was particularly influential from his position as head of one of the two han academies in encouraging the study of Western medicine and in heightening awareness to the threat presented by increasingly serious foreign incursions. Because of Fukuoka's joint responsibility with Hizen for Nagasaki defense, there developed very early an awareness of the need for knowledge of the West as part of their obligation. For example,
Nammei was in contact with the Chikuzen castaway, Magoshichi, while his son, Shōyō (1773-1836), composed Bōkai chōgen (防海微言, Clear Words on Coastal Defense) in which he argued the expediency of knowing the changes and conditions of foreign countries. Likewise Aoki Kōshō (1762-1812), who served as the domain purchasing agent at Nagasaki and is regarded as Chikuzen's "father of rangaku," wrote in detail of southern China and the islands of Southeast Asia in Nankai kibun (南海紀聞, Chronicle of the Southern Seas; 1800). Commenting on European domination in the scattered islands he advised, "The great folly of the southern peoples is wisdom for the peoples of the north."

Kuroda Narikiyo (1795-1851), Nagahiro's adoptive father, was also a great advocate of Western learning and an enthusiastic student of botany and zoology from an early age. He often consulted with Dutch residents at Nagasaki, especially the famous Dr. Siebold, who introduced Western botanical methodology to Japan. Kamon zassai (下問雜載, Miscellaneous Inquiries), the record of a lengthy discussion between Narikiyo and von Siebold in 1828, was compiled by Abe Tatsuhira, Narikiyo's chief mentor in rangaku. Narikiyo even wrote several books based on his own botanical inquiries and conducted study sessions at his private quarters within the castle.

Raised in such an atmosphere during a period when the West was making rapid advances in numerous fields of knowledge, it is little wonder that Nagahiro, too, developed strong inclinations toward both the theoretical and practical aspects of Western learning. As daimyo, his programs to encourage the study and application of Western science
and technology were an integral part of a greater drive toward increased wealth and strength for the domain and the nation. Particularly after the commencement of the Opium War in China, Nagahiro became a staunch advocate for the necessity of adopting foreign technology to develop Japan's capacity for defending herself against Western military might. Likewise, he realized that science and technology adopted from the West could be utilized to increase the general affluence of the domain by raising the level of agricultural production and by providing for the development of items for domestic and foreign trade.

To Nagahiro, protecting Japan from Western encroachment meant first and foremost the development of modern guns and ships for coastal defense. As the Western threat became more ominous in the late 1840's Fukuoka sought bakufu financial assistance to help meet the spiraling demands of its responsibility for the defense of Nagasaki. Simultaneously, Nagahiro erected in 1847 a smelter at Nakasu, in the area separating Fukuoka from Hakata, where he intended to produce cannon and rifles needed for his proposed defensive build-up. A gunpowder factory was established in Sawara-kōri and a refractory furnace, perhaps the first attempt of its kind in Japan, was built as a support operation for the smelter. The reaction to this endeavor among the local citizenry was not wholly favorable, however, for the residents of Fukuoka-Hakata are reported to have looked upon the black clouds of smoke belching from the smelter with surprise and understandable uneasiness.
The effort to modernize and expand shoreline cannon batteries required a parallel improvement in artillery skills. To this end Fukuoka sent Fukushima Satoru to Nagasaki in 1848 to study Western artillery techniques under the guidance of Yamamoto Monojirō. Upon his return Fukushima exhibited his newfound skills in a practice demonstration at the domain artillery ground. The results were so favorable that a new artillery regiment was formed and Nagahiro sent word to Nagasaki requesting that Yamamoto supply copies of all his texts on Western-style artillery.¹⁰³ The new Western techniques found ready application in the numerous gun emplacements constructed in the aftermath of Perry's visits of 1853-54. In 1855 the bakufu ordered that all temples melt down their bells and other bronze items for use in the emergency casting of cannon. Cannon batteries were built at numerous sites in and around Hakata Bay and along the Chikuzen coastline. For Nagasaki defense alone, Fukuoka privately constructed 12 new emplacements at four locations, armed with a total of 32 cannon.¹⁰⁴

Since cannon made of copper or bronze often burst when repeatedly fired in a brief timespan,¹⁰⁵ Nagahiro was desirous of casting cannon and making small arms of locally produced iron. After a thorough search, iron-bearing soils were found at 13 locations within the domain and soon iron was being produced in Onga-kōri.¹⁰⁶ However, the casting of quality cannon was a difficult operation requiring a reverberatory furnace, which in turn entailed the need for durable firebricks to withstand the intense heat. Therefore, among the 15 individuals who Nagahiro sent to Nagasaki in 1852 for training in Western learning two were Hakata tilemakers, assigned to study
Following their return, firebricks were successfully produced and the casting master, Isono Shichibe, was ordered to build a reverberatory furnace near his residence. Using imported armament as models, an armory was built where cannons, muskets, rifles, cannon-balls, bullets, and miscellaneous accessories could be produced. Yet, despite intense effort the Fukuoka artisans were never quite successful in mastering the technique of casting large iron cannon. Their efforts in manufacturing rifles, land mines, and iron horseshoes were more productive.

Prior to the arrival of Perry and the official opening of Japan to trade with the West, Fukuoka had imported numerous standard muskets known by the Dutch term, geweer (geberu, zagaru). Thereafter Nagahiro led efforts to import and reproduce the most advanced Western weaponry available. The Crimean War in Europe and the Civil War in America had stimulated a rapid development of rifle technology. Soon the proliferation of new models made their way to Japan via the gun runners of Nagasaki. Between 1856 and 1867 Fukuoka purchased Terry, Minie, Sharp, Enfield, and Spencer rifles by the hundreds and thousands, with many more duplicates reproduced in the han armory. Eager to modernize the domain military, Nagahiro sent a sizeable contingent of Fukuoka men to Nagusa in 1856 to study Dutch military science, horsemanship, and infantry drill. Accompanying this group was the gunsmith, Kashima Denbei, who was assigned to learn gun- and machine-making. Kashima had already manufactured on his own a Western-style musket in 1854, and under the tutelage of Dr. Van den Broeck he and his associates soon completed a steam engine and learned
rifle-making techniques which were quickly put to use in the Fukuoka arms factory.\textsuperscript{111} Not long thereafter several Dutch visited Fukuoka and commented on its successful iron foundry and weapons manufacture.\textsuperscript{112} They also witnessed a demonstration of Western military drill by a select group of Fukuoka samurai. Thereafter, in 1859/7 the domain ordered the reform of its military units following the best of both Western and Japanese techniques.\textsuperscript{113} Western-style military drills were conducted on a set day each month at the nearby Hakozaki grounds, while certain of the high officials occasionally held them at their private residences, but such changes did not come easily. Without the unwavering resolution of Kuroda Nagahiro in the face of opposition from tradition-bound officials, Fukuoka would never have achieved even the successes outlined above.\textsuperscript{114}

Nagahiro was astute enough to realize that, for an island nation such as Japan, even the most modern weaponry in profusion could not provide an adequate defense if not matched by an equivalent development of naval power. In 1853 he advised the bakufu that "a strong defense cannot be found in [cannon] batteries alone," for "without Western-style warships victory is absolutely impossible."\textsuperscript{114} He therefore advocated abolishment of the long-standing 500 koku size limitation on ships which prevented the domains from constructing anything larger than vessels for coastal trade. Meanwhile, efforts were directed towards construction of Western-style ships by the han and when bakufu restrictions were finally relaxed Fukuoka followed quickly on the heels of Satsuma in purchasing Western steamships for military use.
One of the keys to the development of a Western-style naval capability was provided by Abe Masahiro and the bakufu with the opening of the first naval school in Japan at Nagasaki in 1854. The Edo government arranged for the temporary use of the Dutch warship Soembing with instructors from the Dutch navy providing both technical training and actual experience in operating a modern vessel.\textsuperscript{115} In addition to students sent by the bakufu (such as Katsu Kaishū), the school was also open to men from the various domains. Of the 168 students who received instruction the first year, only 37 were from the bakufu, the remainder originating primarily from the domains of southwest Japan. Hizen sent the largest group, 48 students; with Fukuoka second at 28, and Satsuma and Chōshū supplying 16 and 15 students, respectively.\textsuperscript{116} At the same time Dr. Van den Broeck, the Dutch physician-in-residence, conducted a school where medicine, physics, chemistry, anatomy, and mechanics were taught.\textsuperscript{117}

Supplementing the foundation begun with the dispatch of 28 Fukuoka students to the naval training facility, in 1856 Nagahiro sent five representatives from Fukuoka to learn methods of constructing warships and ten more to learn to build and operate various machinery.\textsuperscript{118} Under the guidance of Dr. Van den Broeck and other Dutch instructors this group was successful in creating a working model of a steam engine. By 1857/4, the Chikuzen retainers had built a scale model locomotive and were testing it first on Dejima, then at the Fukuoka mansion in Nagasaki. Much larger than the small-scale ones built by Hizen and Chōshū, the Chikuzen locomotive was grand enough
that the Nagasaki government thought it necessary to warn residents that the tests would generate considerable smoke.\(^{119}\)

Under Shimazu Nariakira's direction Satsuma had completed its own steamship at its Edo mansion by 1856, so when Nagahiro arrived in Edo for his sankin kōtai visit that year he requested and was granted assistance from Satsuma in steamship construction. Kashima Denbei and Muto Monbei were called in great haste from Nagasaki to study with and observe the Satsuma workers. With assistance from Satsuma, Fukuoka was finally successful in completing its own steamship, called the Battera, in 1858.\(^{120}\) However, it soon became apparent to Nagahiro and leaders of other han, as well, that purchase of Western-made ships was more desirable that the slow and not always dependable process of constructing their own. Satsuma was the first to purchase a Western-made ship in 1860, with the bakufu and Chikuzen following suit the next year.\(^{121}\) Fukuoka's acquisition was a 448-ton American freighter for which it paid $33,000. The ship was then renamed the Nikka Maru and outfitted as a warship. In 1862 Fukuoka bought a 778-ton English ship named the Columbia from the British merchant, Glover, at Nagasaki for the huge sum of $95,000. Between 1861 and the Restoration Fukuoka invested in a total of five ships of Western make, no match for the bakufu's 25 ships or Satsuma's 20 vessels, but still enough to make Chikuzen one of the leading domains in modern naval capacity.\(^{122}\) Obviously it was the training received at Nagasaki which allowed Chikuzen officers to navigate and maintain these modern ships. At least in part, the desires Nagahiro had expressed in 1853 were being fulfilled.
Nagahiro's interests were not by any means restricted solely to military endeavors and national defense. Even as a young daimyo he was known to collect insects or their larvae from areas where the rice seedlings had become infested so as to predict the chances of increased damage. Once he had discovered the source of infestation he would summon district officials and explain preventative measures. Although many of the Chikuzen samurai failed to comprehend his activities and considered them little more than whimsical eccentricies, such was far from the truth. Outside of the obvious military applications, Nagahiro's involvement with Western studies derived chiefly from his belief that the superior technology and scientific knowledge of the West would prove useful in increasing production, enriching the han, and benefiting the domain population.

Exemplary of Nagahiro's attitudes in this regard were the varied programs of the smelter he established in the domain as early as 1847, a full six years before Perry's arrival. Besides producing cannon and rifles, Nagahiro intended the smelter to provide a fuller application of Western technology to the tapping of the domain's natural resources in the hope that those resources and their resultant products might form the basis of a new policy of domain enrichment (fukoku). The smelter thus produced glassware, porcelain, inlaid mother-of-pearl, pharmaceutics, and textile dyes, as well as providing for chemical experimentation and analysis of mineral products. The porcelain and inlaid lacquerware were intended primarily for export to the West, while the remaining products were to be sold in the markets of Japan.
The production of glass was initially tied closely to the requirement for armored glass in the construction of warships, but soon involved various consumer products as well. After conducting a thorough search in the domain for the necessary raw materials, Nagahiro invited several artisans from Nagasaki to aid in the development of this industry. Within a short time the Seirenjo was producing glass candle holders, bowls, plates, trays, bottles, toys, etc. of exceptional quality and varied color. Meanwhile, porcelain was made at several sites near Fukuoka. An advisor was brought from Kyoto to direct the initial phases of the production using clay imported from Sawara-kōri and magnesium discovered in Naka-kōri for the glaze. The finest products, however, necessitated the importation of a special absolite soil from Nagasaki to obtain the desired cobalt blue coloration. Porcelain products included bowls, teacups, teapots, trays, bottles, brushstands, and the distinctive retort pot for technical use.

The study of chemistry, essential to so many practical endeavors, was also making progress at this time. In 1849 Nagahiro had sent Kawano Teizō to study first with Dr. Van den Broeck and then with Siebold upon the latter's return to Japan. Making use of his ability in Dutch, Teizō presented Nagahiro in 1856 with Chimi benran (化学便覧), a text of standard chemical analysis which he had translated from a Dutch version of the original German work. Nagahiro was greatly pleased and had the volume published that same year.

Closely related to chemical inquiry was the early development of photography, for which Nagahiro gained an interest about 1855.
Still a relatively new technique, even in Europe, the Fukuoka lord ordered several of his retainers to produce silver plates but they were unable to do so. Therefore, in 1856 he sent Furukawa Shumpei and two others to study daguerrotype photography with Dr. Van den Broeck. Shumpei returned to Fukuoka the following year and carried out experiments at his Fukuoka home, but was soon back in Nagasaki studying chemistry with Dr. Pompe van Meerdervoort, Van den Broeck's replacement. It was in 1858 that Shimazu Nariakira died and willed his camera to Kuroda Nagahiro. Shortly thereafter Pompe visited Fukuoka, and when questioned by Nagahiro concerning photography was forced to admit that it was a difficult art at which he, too, often failed. But by the following year, Shumpei was finally successful in assembling the camera which Nagahiro had received from Shimazu Nariakira and in obtaining a rough photograph. Thereafter Nagahiro built a photography room in his private garden where he delighted in having family portraits taken, also giving land near the Seirenjo where a photography studio was built and opened for business.

Another area, of far more practical value than photography, in which Nagahiro was intensely interested was the field of Western medicine. Nagahiro found that Chikuzen had a population 50,000 less than when Kuroda Nagamasa had entered the domain in 1600, and therefore as part of his general fukoku policy attempted the restoration of domain population through Western-style medicine. At this time one of the chief proponents of Western studies in general, and Western medicine in particular was Takeya Yūshi, one of Nagahiro's attending physicians. His father, Mototatsu, had been the directing physician for
the district in which he lived and overseer of infant care. As one of
the pioneers of Western medicine in Fukuoka, he had studied with
Siebold at Nagasaki and had performed dissections at Hakata in 1841, so
young Yūshi was raised with a firm background in Western-style medical
practice. One of the gravest medical problems in bakumatsu Japan
were the periodic ravages of smallpox, so while a student at Osaka in
1845-1846 Takeya completed the translation of a Dutch work on smallpox
and formulated plans for vaccinating the citizens of Chikuzen. In 1849,
Otto von Mohnique was successful in introducing smallpox vaccination at
Nagasaki and the practice spread quickly to the domains of Kyushu,
and to Osaka and Edo. Takeya worked diligently for its propagation in
Fukuoka while Nagahiro directed Kawano Teizō, then in Nagasaki, to
learn vaccination directly from Mohnique. After Kawano had verified
the efficacy of Mohnique's vaccinations two han physicians were directed
to escort five children to Nagasaki for vaccination. At first
vaccination in Fukuoka was fully voluntary and few took advantage of it
because of persistent rumors among the populace concerning its
deleterious effects. It was to combat these rumors that Takeya
composed Gyūtō kokuyu (牛痘告論) in 1850 and distributed several
hundred copies throughout the domain. Gradually the advantage of
vaccination came to be recognized among the commoners, but few
samurai allowed their children to receive the treatment. However, when
smallpox broke out again in the mid-1850's and it became readily
apparent that those who had been vaccinated did not contract the
disease, even the conservative samurai rushed to have their children
vaccinated.
Nagahiro was interested in other fields of medicine as well, and in 1852 sent seven students to Nagasaki for detailed studies. In addition, han physicians were sent to study with Chōshū's Aoki Shūhitsu and Osaka's Ogata Kōan, or for training at Pompe's medical school in Nagasaki. In 1862 Nagahiro established a medical school, the Kyōseikan, in Fukuoka for instruction in Western medicine, but like so many other of Nagahiro's projects this also met with opposition from the high retainers. Although the resultant curriculum was a combination of both Western and Chinese medicine, the Kyōseikan did become the vehicle for the propagation of Western medicine within the domain, and was to serve after the Restoration as the foundation for the Kyushu Imperial University School of Medicine.


4. Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo (東京大学史料編纂所), 大日本古文書：幕末外国関係文書 (Dai Nihon komonjo: Bakumatsu gaikoku kankei monjo) (Tokyo Daigaku, 1911 ff.), 1:566-78. A more usable, annotated version is also found in Yoshida Tsunekichi (吉田常吉) and Sato Seizaburo (佐藤誠三郎), comps., (Bakumatsu seiji ronshū), 喬末政治論集 (Nihon shisō taikei), no. 56 (Iwanami Shoten, 1976), pp. 27-35.

5. He later clarifies that the reference is to Chichishima in the Ogasawara Chain.

6. His position resembles that of the pro-Russian group within the bakufu, and the later plan of Hashimoto Sanai.


10. FKS, 2.1:179.


14. Miyamoto Mataji (宮本又次), "福岡藩における幕末の新事業 (Fukuoka han ni okeru bakumatsu no shinjigyō)," in Kyūshū keizai shi ronshū, 1: 185. Hereafter cited as "Shinjigyō".

15. FKS, 2.1:179, 181.

16. In making his own appointments to the han bureaucracy Nagahiro was limited, of course, by the status requirements described in chapter one. Neither could he make any strong move against the established karō. The deaths of several of the senior karō between 1837 and 1842 made his task considerably easier.


20. I.e., by bringing China into the negotiations. There was the fear that were the French denied trading privileges they would force the concession from the Chinese since the Ryukyus were a tributary state of China.


22. ibid.,

23. ibid., p. 226; and Kagoshima Ken (鹿児島県), 鹿児島県史 (Kagoshima kenshi) (Kagoshima Ken, 1940), 2:272-73.

24. "伊達宗成公記 (Date Munenari kō ki)," 17:54, Kaei 3 (1850)/1. This multivolumed, handwritten work was commissioned privately by the Date house during the early Showa years. Compiled from Lord Date's diaries and other relevant sources, it provides a chronological record of his life in the traditional format. This important work, along with the other records of the Date house, are now housed at the Uwajima Date Jimusho. I would like to express my thanks to its staff for their kindness and assistance in allowing me to utilize the Date records.


26. Shimazu Nariakira monjo, 1:139-143.


32. Yamauchi, p. 127; and *Shimazu Nariakira monjo*, 1:180-181, 258-299.

33. Yamauchi, p. 127.

34. Yamauchi, p. 128. Details are in "黒田播磨日記 (Kuroda Harima Nikki)," Kaei 3 (1850)/2/17-22, a photocopy of which is in my possession. The above passage is also quoted in Yamauchi, pp. 128-131.

35. Nagahiro had initially notified Abe on 12/10. See *Shimazu Nariakira monjo*, 1:267 citing "黒田斎薄手留 (Kuroda Narihiro tedome)."


37. Yamauchi, p. 131.

38. Yamauchi, p. 132; and *Shimazu Nariakira monjo*, 1:169-180, for a report of the discussion between Yoshitoshi and Lord Nagahiro.


40. Yamauchi, p. 139; and *Shimazu Nariakira monjo*, 1:299-300.

42. ibid., 1:393-404.

43. Date consulted with Abe on 6/2 and 6/11 (one source says 6/12). See Kagoshima ken shi, 2:189; and Shimazu Nariakira monjo, 1:404-411

44. Shimazu Nariakira monjo, 1:418-441.

45. Yamuchi, p. 141.

46. ibid., pp. 111-113, 140. Takeuchi was later known as Katsuragi Hikoichi.

47. Shimazu Nariakira monjo, 2:28-33.

48. ibid., 2:33-35. See also Nagahiro's letter to Date (12/3) thanking him for his assistance in gaining an exemption from that year's sankin kōtai, ibid., 2:45-47.

49. ibid., 2:33, Kaei 3(1850)/8/10.

50. ibid., 2:35-36. Both Lord Nanbu of Morioka han in northern Japan and Lord Okudaira of Nakatsu han in Kyushu were brothers of Nagahiro, and therefore involved in Shimazu affairs. Yasunaga Ensuke departed Fukuoka on 1850/9/22. See letter from Nagahiro to Date, Kaei 3(1850)/9/26, in ibid., 2:36-38.


52. Shimazu Nariakira monjo, 2:65-75, particularly p. 68.

53. Shimazu Nariakira to Date Munenari, Kaei 3(1850)/11/2 in ibid., 2:94-96.
54. ibid., 2:117-119.

55. Nariakira's meeting with Kuroda on Kaei 4(1851)/3/26 is described in Yamauchi, p. 144. See also Shimazu Nariakira to Date Munenari, Kaei 4/3/3, in Shimazu Nariakira monjo, 2:169-170.


57. Sakata, Meiji Ishin shi, pp. 70-71.


59. "黒田家家記 (Kuroda-ke kaki)," Ansei 1(1854)/2/2 cited in Ichiki Shiro (市来四郎), "斉彬公史料 (Nariakira kō shiryō)," Ansei 5. See also Inoue, Saigo Takamori, 1:40-41.

60. "Date Munenari kō ki," Kaei 6(1853)/12/29; and Ehime Ken Kyōiku Kyokai (愛媛県教育協会) 宇和島・吉田兩藩史 (Uwajima, Yoshida ryōhan shi) (Matsuyama: Ehime Ken Kyōiku Kyokai, 1917), p. 131.

61. Yamauchi, p. 61.

62. "Fukuoka nendai ki" notes that Nagatomo left Fukuoka on 4/1, arriving in Edo on 5/11. Date Munenari recorded meetings with Nagatomo on Ansei 1/7/17, 8/21, and Ansei 2/1/19; "Date Munenari kō ki," 58:27, 59:29, and 64:22.

63. Date sent a letter to Nagahiro on Ansei 1/7/18, and received its reply on 9/8. On 12/18 Date dispatched an urgent message to Fukuoka, but its contents are at present unknown. See "Date Munenari kō ki," 58:29, 60:10, 63:16.
64. Yamauchi, p. 243; and "Fukuoka nendai ki," Ansei 3(1856)/8/5.


67. "Date Munenari kō ki," 85:5.

68. "Date Munenari kō gotedome," Ansei 4/1/18.

69. Yamauchi, pp. 242-43.

70. "立花弾正日記 (Tachibana Danjō nikki)," quoted in ibid., pp. 246-47.

71. ibid., p. 246.

72. ibid., p. 247.

73. Kuroda Nagahiro to Date Munenari, Ansei 5 (1858)/7/3, in ibid., p. 245. Also in "Nariakira kō shiryō."

74. Dai Nihon komonjo: Bakumatsu gaikoku kankei monjo, 1:Appendix, 4-7. See also Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 112.

75. "Date Munenari kō ki," 95:3.


77. Letter from Kuroda Nagahiro to Date Munenari, Ansei 5(1858)/4/25, "Nariakira kō shiryō."

79. Ishin shi, 2:503-504.

80. Inoue, Saigo Takamori, 1:57.

81. ibid., 1:57.

82. "Nariakira kō shiryo." Certainly there was substance to the rumors, but since there is no record of the Kuroda-Satsuma discussions, we have no way to verify their veracity.

83. Yamauchi, p. 256; and Ishin shi, 2:457.

84. Kuroda to Date, Ansei 5/7/3, "Nariakira kō shiryo."

85. Kuroda to Date, Ansei 5/7/26, "Naraka kō shiryo."


88. ibid., pp. 153-159.


90. Kaishū's visit is reported in ibid., pp. 107-108.


92. See letters of 1858/4/15, 6/17, 7/3, 9/13 and 10/29, "Nariakira kō shiryo."
93. Kuroda to Date, Ansei 5 (1858)/9/13, "nariakira kō shiryou."


96. Yasukawa, "Kairei no hanshū: Kuroda Nagahiro," pp. 63-64. I question Yasukawa's correctness in laying most of the blame on distressed han finances. See also Hirano and Iida, Fukuoka ken no rekishi, p. 215.

97. The han founded two academies in 1783, Kamei's Seigakkan and the orthodox Tōgakkan.

98. The following is based on Inoue Tadashi, (Fukuoka han ni okeru yōgaku no seikaku)," Shien, 30-31 (March 1944), 135-162; and the recapitulation by Grant Goodman, "The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640-1853)," Diss. Univ. of Michigan 1955, pp. 218-236.


100. Goodman, p. 130.

101. See, e.g., the request from Shimazu Nariakira to Tokugawa Nariakira, 1847/6/23, for aid in gaining bakufu assistance for Saga and Fukuoka; quoted in Sakai, "Shimazu Nariakira" p. 221.

102. Kōka 4(1847); "Fukuoka nendai ki," and Miyamoto, "Shinjigyō," p. 188.

104. Ishin shi, 2:168.

105. This had been a problem earlier in Europe as well. In a report to the French government in 1775 M. de la Houliere "pointed out that during the twenty years that had elapsed since the adoption of the foundry furnace [in England] not one English naval cannon had burst while in the French navy such accidents were so common that the sailors fear the guns they are serving more than those of the enemy." Quoted in Charles J. Singer et al., eds., A History of Technology (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958), 4:101.

106. Miyamoto, "Shinjigyō," p. 191. The production of iron in Chikuzen was not new. During the Sengoku period Hakata had been a famous center for the production of swords and iron kettles.


108. Ibid., pp. 191-192.


110. Miyamoto, "Shinjigyō," pp. 186-191. One of Miyamoto's chief sources was "見島精巧氏談話 (Kashima Seikō Shi danwa)," the record of an interview held with Kashima's son in 1894. This source is now found as "福岡藩精煉所記録 (Fukuoka han seirenjo kiroku)," 睿智 (Eichi), 1 (1970), pp. 118-129.

112. ibid., 2:85 quoting from the account of van Kattendijke in Uittreksel uit het dagboek, pp. 148-149. The visit occurred in 1858/10 and is also described by Pompe in Witterman's and Bowers, trans., Doctor on Deshima, pp. 72-73.


114. See footnote 4.


116. The names of students in the initial contingent are listed in Fumikura Heijirō (文倉平次郎), 蒼末軍艦 咸臨丸 (Bakumatsu gunkan Kanrin Maru) (Ganshōdō, 1938), pp. 77-40.


120. Miyamoto, "Shinjigyō," p. 192. There is a picture of the Kan'ei Maru in 福岡百年 (Fukuoka hyakunen) Yomiuri Shimbunsha, Seibu Honsha (読売新聞社,西部本社) (Osaka: Naniwa Sha, 1967), 1:12.

121. A complete list of ships imported through Nagasaki is included in Otsuka, "Bakumatsu Nagasaki bōeki ni tsuite -- buki kansen no yūnyu o chūshin ni." Also Nagahiro kō den, 1:106.
122. Otsuka, *op. cit.*; and *Nagahiro kō den*; 1:106.

123. *Nagahiro kō den*, 1:78.


126. Attempts were made to produce both red and purple tints, but by 1858 they were still unsuccessful with red. See letter from Nagahiro to Date Munenari, Ansei 5(1858)/4/25.


130. Letter from Kuroda Nagahiro to Date Munenari, Ansei 5(1858)/9/13, "Nariakira kō shiryō."

131. Kuroda Nagahiro to Date Munenari, Ansei 5(1858)/10/29, "Nariakira kō shiryō."


134. Kaei 2(1849)/11/8, "Kōryō."
CHAPTER V
THE RISING TIDE OF LOYALISM

The events of the summer of 1858 altered radically the power structure which for several years had dominated the national political scene. By autumn Ii Naosuke, representing from his position as tairō a coalition of the traditional holders of bakufu power, was leading the Edo government to a reascendancy, as they supposed, from what had been seen as a declining control over internal and foreign affairs. The attempt by the several daimyo of the Hitotsubashi party to dominate the decision-making core of the bakufu and to reform bakuhan relationships in their favor had been effectively thwarted. Its leaders were now either dead or under bakufu sanction, and their chief sympathizers within the bakufu had been removed from office. Meanwhile, in what was to become known as the Ansei Purge (Ansei no taigoku), their activist supporters were being forced from Kyoto. Bakufu agents ruthlessly rounded up those accused of sedition or found lacking in proper credentials for residence in Kyoto, while from Edo came increased pressure on the han governments to arrest all rōnin absent from their domains without permission.¹

In the process of reasserting bakufu authority, however, Ii and company miscalculated the profound changes the events of 1858 were to occasion both at Kyoto and throughout the realm. The radical transformation in the central nexus of authority resulted in an equally drastic alteration of the essential mode of discourse. By 1858 foreign
policy was a "public" issue, and the signing of the Treaty of Commerce brought its opponents into open conflict with bakufu policy. In addition, the punishment of the Hitotsubashi party raised the ire of samurai from those powerful domains which had been its chief supporters, stirring as it did the underlying force of han loyalties. It was the coming together of opposition to bakufu policy from these two directions which many scholars have viewed as the foundation of the sonnō-jōi movement.² Alienated by the bakufu, those who found the signing of the treaties objectionable and those upset by the treatment of the Hitotsubashi party turned to the court for support. The very nature of the conflict, which brought into play highly emotional factors of han and Imperial loyalties, and under the circumstances, led to a questioning of the essence of bakufu legitimacy, made it of central importance to the future of Japan.

Those who looked to Kyoto for favor or legitimacy in their cause of resistance to bakufu policy found ample reason for encouragement at the Court. By signing the Treaty of Commerce of 1858/6/19 in direct contravention to the express wishes of the Emperor, the bakufu created an open split with the Court over the foreign issue. Two months later, the Court issued secret edicts (naichoku)³ appealing to Mito and 13 other domains for their support and warning that the bakufu's actions in signing the treaty would lead to dissension within the country. In particular, Satsuma, Chōshū, and Chikuzen were asked to lead out in championing the cause of the Court.

In the process the Court itself knowingly helped to forge an alliance of emperorism (sonno) and anti-foreignism (jōi)⁴ from what had
theretofore been separate, though obviously closely related, intellectual currents. The loyalist activists saw the Court edicts as a call to action: both to oppose the "traitors" within the bakufu whom they saw as subverting the Imperial will, and to resist what they considered unjust punishment of Hitotsubashi party adherents. In this way the year 1858 became a turning point in Bakumatsu politics. What had been diverse, often isolated, and characteristically apolitical movements, now developed with Court assistance into a more unified, highly emotionalized force capable of influencing national direction. In short, loyalism had been politicized. The rise of this new brand of *sonnō-jōi* loyalism, represented by the activist *shishi* ("men of action") as its most vocal adherents, was to dominate the political scene over the next half decade. Limited at first, its impact spread rapidly after 1860/3 when a band of loyalist *shishi* from Mito and Satsuma sent shockwaves reverberating throughout the country with their sensational assassination of Ii Naosuke.

**Loyalism**

The central identification of *sonnō-jōi* loyalism with the political machinations of the post-1858 bakumatsu era and with the subsequent developments of the Meiji Restoration led quite inevitably to the politicization of the concept of loyalism itself. Once that process had begun it was only natural that it extend to the very terms utilized to describe loyalism (i.e., *sonnō*, *kinno*). Perhaps no other terms have been referred to as widely in the history of modern Japan, or have
been applied to as many diverse ideas and individuals as those relative to loyalty to the Imperial house. As a result, the ambiguities involved in such divergent usage create real doubts relative to the identification of "true" loyalists or to the foundations of their behaviour. However, such doubts are not wholly creations of modern writing or historiography (although some of them certainly are), but are founded in the politically-charged context in which contemporaries themselves used and abused the terminology.

One of the characteristics of the Japanese scene as it developed after 1858 was that all parties, or at least all parties opposing the bakufu, were forced to rely on the Court and appeals for "loyalty to the emperor" to legitimize their own positions. Thus the cry of sonnō could, and often did, mask varied and wide-ranging political intentions. At first, it could reflect a common opposition to bakufu policy, but later even that became questionable as bakufu supporters pushed for harmony between Court and bakufu and foreign policy decisions were no longer as clear cut as they had once been. Although nearly all inhabitants of bakumatsu Japan, both samurai and commoner alike, would most likely have considered themselves loyal to the emperor, the loyalism we generally refer to infers the politicized sonnō-jo'i loyalism which aligned itself after 1858 with the fortunes of the Court in opposition to bakufu signature of commercial treaties with the West. Likewise, those who failed to oppose the bakufu's action became of necessity, sabaku, supporters of the bakufu.5

Before proceeding further, we must remind ourselves that in any discussion of bakumatsu loyalism there is the dangerous tendency to
assume that because it focused on the emperor it was a unified national force transcendent of other loyalties. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even among the leaders of the sonnō movement there was a constant struggle to reconcile their loyalty to the Court with loyalty to their individual han. In this regard Albert Craig has warned that "one must carefully distinguish between the objective consequences of an action and what that action meant to those involved in it." The fact that the great majority of active loyalists came from domains with close ties to the Hitotsubashi party would seem to indicate that loyalty to the Court or aversion to bakufu foreign policy, in and of themselves, were not usually sufficient to move men to decisive action. On the other hand, the strong sonnō factions in Mito, Echizen, Tosa and other areas were in large measure functions of han loyalty reacting against the punishment levied on their daimyo by the bakufu. Rather than transcending han and clique loyalties, the sonnō movement was often a useful facade behind which were hidden the equally potent forces of han loyalty and intrahan factional strife.

Adding to the complexity which such deeper motives contributed to the warp and weave of the loyalist tapestry, there was further ambiguity engendered by the varied roots of the bakumatsu loyalist inheritance. Tokugawa neo-Confucianism, which expounded filial piety, social order, and loyalty to one's superiors as its chief virtues, struggled over several centuries in its attempt to rationalize the crucial emperor-shogun relationship. Ultimately, however, it was the staunchly nativistic tendencies of kokugaku (National Learning) which combined with the syncretic Confucian loyalty of Mito gaku to form the primary
basis for a synthesis of sonnō-jōi ideology. In the recent work, *Toward Restoration*, Professor Harootunian has done an admirable job of tracing the progression of loyalist thought and analyzing the intellectual backgrounds of the prime movers of bakumatsu loyalist activity. Yet his work only touches on the complexity of the subject. The forces involved in the rise of a loyalist movement in Chikuzen present themselves as a case in point.

The earliest and prime antecedent of the loyalist tradition in Chikuzen is found in the teachings of the Kamei school founded by the Fukuoka scholar, Kamei Nammei (1741-1814). A physician and early follower of Ogyū Sorai's brand of *kogaku* (Ancient Learning) Confucianism, Nammei eventually evolved a distinct philosophy of his own which stressed reason in morals and government, but without Sorai's emphasis on social issues. In 1783 Chikuzen established two separate han academies for the training of its young samurai: one headed by the orthodox Chu Hsi Confucianist, Takeda Sadayoshi; the other placed under the direction of Nammei. Nammei's school, known as the Kandōkan or Seigakkan, was a model of the new realist trend in education which laid stress on talent over status and therefore set about introducing a competitive element into the curriculum.

The school achieved rapid popularity, attracting several hundred students from all over northern Kyushu, but its prosperity was short-lived. In 1790 the bakufu issued a ban on heterodox teaching and two years later Nammei was forced to step down from his position as headmaster, turning the reins over to his son, Shōyō (1773-1836). Thereafter the Seigakkan was able to continue under Shōyō's leadership.
until 1798 when its buildings were destroyed by fire. At that time the han abolished the academy altogether; Shōyō was relieved of his duties, and his students were assimilated into the rival Shūyūkan. Yet, despite the Seigakkan's brief existence, Nammei's teachings gained widespread recognition through the influence of his several thousand students, a number of whom founded important private academies of their own.\(^{11}\)

Nammei's seminal impact on the development of Fukuoka loyalism stemmed from his own investigations into the past history of his native region, and a growing concern over the threat of Western encroachment. Although intrigued by the West (as noted in chapter four), Nammei emphasized the former glories of northern Kyushu and claimed to discover in the ancient past the foundation for an ideal of reverence to the emperor. This ideal was expressed in works such as Dazaifu kyūshi hibun (大宰府旧址碑文) which recalled the prosperity of the Fukuoka area in ancient times when it was the center of Japan's relations with the Asiatic mainland. Like his father, Shōyō too found Chikuzen replete with examples of past Imperial greatness, including a traditionally unique role in national defense.

It was thus the teachings of Nammei and Shōyō, with their encouragement of reverence for the emperor and emphasis on the tradition of loyalist action in Chikuzen, which formed the primary ideological background for the development of the Fukuoka loyalist movement. Enhanced by the teachings of locally prominent kokugakusha and martial arts instructors such as Aoyagi Tanenobu, Futagawa Sukechika, Yoshidome Kyoson, and Uozumi Saburōhachi,\(^{12}\) the Kamei
school provided a clearly regional approach to the loyalist issue. By directly appealing to the rich legacy of local interdependence with Imperial fortunes they created a rationale of broad-based relevancy largely independent of national movements. In the final analysis, this tendency helped to create a widespread acceptance of loyalism in Fukuoka, but contributed to a formulation in which provincial inclinations and han loyalties remained strong.

Although links between the Kamei school and later Fukuoka loyalists can be traced through numerous lines, it was primarily the popular Fukuoka academy of Tsukigata Shinzō which transmitted the Kamei legacy to the activists of the bakumatsu period. Nearly all of the important names in the Fukuoka loyalist party were tied in one way or another to Shinzō. Many attended his school where they were trained in the loyalist persuasion and formed personal relationships of friendship and trust that were later to became the cohesive force binding the loyalist party together. In fact, it was Shinzō's eldest son, Tsukigata Senzo, who became the chief spokesman and leader of the Fukuoka loyalist party after 1860.

Tsukigata Shinzō (1798-1862) was descended from a samurai family that had originally entered service with the Kuroda in the mid-seventeenth century after having become rōnin (masterless samurai) when Katō Tadahiro's fief at Kumamoto was confiscated by the bakufu in 1632. They served as private cooks for the Kuroda lords, with jōdai-gumi ranking, until the late eighteenth century when Shinzō's father was appointed as an official Confucian scholar. As a result of meritorious service he was advanced to umamawari rank and given a
hereditary stipend of 100 koku in 1814. Benefitting from the rise in family status achieved by his father, Shinzō was able to study at Edo under Koga Seiri, and upon his return in 1817 at the age of 20 was appointed assistant instructor at the han academy. Succeeding to the family headship two years later, Shinzō entered the han bureaucracy where he fulfilled a lengthy career as a mid-level official. It was only after retiring from domain service in 1836 that he opened his school, so influential in the loyalist movement, where young men were trained in Confucian and loyalist principles.

Besides the standard Confucian training, Shinzō attempted to inculcate in his young charges a deep respect for the Imperial house and a determination to serve its interests as had the great loyalists of the past. Following the Kamei tradition, Shinzō found in the local historical context many examples of loyalist action worth emulating. He was, for example, one of the chief advocates along with Itami Matabei, Nagao Masahira, Kaizu Kōichi, and Jō Buhei, behind the erection of a monument honoring Kikuchi Takemitsu (?-1372), the Nambokuchō era loyalist who had championed the cause of the Southern Court in Kyushu. Along with Kusunoki Masashige, Kikuchi became for later Kyushu activists perhaps the chief model of loyal sacrifice and resistance to the bakufu.

An example of Shinzō's influence is found in the early training of Hayakawa Isamu, a country physician who was extremely active during the bakumatsu years as a leader in the Fukuoka loyalist party. In 1844, as a youth of 12, Isamu enrolled in a village school taught by Shinzō's brother, Kensuke. Three years later, following his mother's
return from a pilgrimage to the Grand Shrine at Ise, Isamu entered Shinzō's academy at Fukuoka. His biography records that it was under the guidance of Tsukigata Shinzō that Hayakawa was taught the importance of respect for the emperor and learned of the long tradition of Chikuzen loyalism as expressed in the writings of Kamei Nammei. Although Isamu later traveled to Edo for further training at the school of Satō Issai, and was influenced by the thought of Ōhashi Totsuan and Fujimori Tenzan, the foundation of his dedication to sonnō-jōi rested firmly on the instruction given him at the Tsukigata academy.

If the doctrines of the Kamei school, manifest through the Tsukigata academy, formed the chief intellectual backdrop to the rise of a sonnō-jōi party in Fukuoka, then the second most influential force in that development can be seen in the growth of kokugaku (National Learning). To some, this may come as a surprise. Traditionally, the rise of sonnō ideology has been viewed as being closely linked to the development of National Learning, if only because the latter stressed early literature and the unique role of the Imperial house. But scholars of the Restoration have for the most part found a lack of concrete evidence to support such a view. In his study of Chōshū, for example, Albert Craig has stated that kokugaku "had little if any influence on the rise of the sonnō-jōi movement within the great han which led in the Restoration movement." Rather, "the great outlying tozama han were almost exclusively Confucian in their make-up." Yet, however much that judgement may be true for the other great tozama domains of southwest Japan, it is certainly not true of Fukuoka. There, in contrast, the Confucian-oriented Kamei school was heavily
tinged with kokugaku coloring and a significant minority of sonnō-jōi activists found primary motivation in the ideological trappings of kokugaku doctrine. Perhaps it is an anomaly, peculiar to Fukuoka, but it was kokugaku that provided the foundation for the loyalism of most of Fukuoka's sonnō-jōi extremists, while the Tsukigata group remained more orthodox and moderate in approach. The reason behind the unusual strength of kokugaku within Fukuoka can be found in the area's unique historical tradition.

Kokugaku is a term applied to a wide range of nativistic thought, chiefly literary and religious in content, which sought to extricate Shintō teaching and ritual from syncretic foreign influence and to promote the learning of Japanese tradition. Influenced by the contemporary kogaku (Ancient Learning) movement within Tokugawa Confucianism, the "national scholars" concentrated on language study and analysis of the ancient Japanese texts with the hope of encouraging a "true" Japanese character (as opposed to "false", Chinese-inspired one) and a renewed interest in the "Divine Way". Originating with the investigation of classical poetical anthologies (Kokinshū, Manyōshū), the movement began to encompass increasing political and religious significance as studies progressed to the early histories of the Imperial land (Kojiki, Nihongi). A lifelong inquiry into the Kojiki led Motoori Norinaga, the third of the four great kokugaku scholars, to espouse a strong faith in the kami of Japanese antiquity, particularly in Amaterasu, the mythological ancestress of the Imperial house. However, Motoori's teachings were essentially religious, rather than political in nature; it remained for his self-proclaimed disciple, Hirata Atsutane,
to stress the politically oriented idea of returning the emperor to ruling power.

Why would the kokugaku movement have found greater advocacy and more telling political impact in Chikuzen than in other regions? The answer lies not so much in any Tokugawa-era peculiarity which set Fukuoka apart from other tozama domains of southwestern Japan, but rather in a growing consciousness engendered by kokugaku studies of Chikuzen's historical tradition as a key regional center of Imperial authority and prestige. The early Japanese literary and historical texts which formed the locus of National Learning inquiry contained numerous references to relics and important places in the Fukuoka vicinity.

Of special significance, because of the interrelationship between kokugaku and the resurgence of Shintō, were the large number of important shrines in the Chikuzen area. Foremost among them were Hakozaki Hachimangu and the Dazaifu Tenmangu--Anrakuji complex. Additionally the shrines at Kashii, Umi, Munakata, and Sumiyoshi were also all of ancient origin. Not only were these shrines very old, and therefore of intrinsic value to National Learning adherents in search of the pure Japanese character of antiquity, but they were also intimately related to the early history of the Imperial house and to Japan's dealings with foreign lands.

The shrines, of course, encouraged the kokugaku movement and fostered the spread of sonnō doctrine. A number of Shinto priests were very active in the Chikuzen loyalist movement, including Ura Shōzen, Matsuda Gorokurō, Ōgami Iki, and Ono Kaga (Maki Izumi's younger brother). However, the most potent force from the Shintō
field for the spread of kokugaku values and the creation of a relationship with the Court that extended beyond a mere profession of loyalism derived from the activities of Ōtorii Shinzen, head-priest of Dazaifu Tenmangu Shrine. A scion of a minor noble family related to the Sanjō, Shinzen had been adopted by the Takatsuji family, chief descendents of Sugawara Michizane, from which he was positioned as heir to the Ōtorii family of Dazaifu.20 A personal acquaintance of many of the Kyushu daimyo, Shinzen set about encouraging faith in Kankō or Tenjin (the deification of Sugawara Michizane, known as the god of literature and scholarship) and establishing Dazaifu as a center of renga (linked-verse) poetry. Through a kokugaku inspired renewal of literary and religious activity, backed by an exerted drive for Court-based prestige, Shinzen sought the restoration of Dazaifu to its former position of prominence. It was no accident then that after 1864 Dazaifu became the residence-in-exile for Sanjō Sanetomi and the other rebel Court nobles and the symbol of sonnō-based legitimacy for the tōbaku (anti-bakufu) movement.

Exemplary of the role which kokugaku played in the development of sonnō-jōi in Chikuzen is the case of Hirano Kuniomi (1828-1864), Fukuoka's most famous sonnō activist. Kuniomi, also known as Jirō, was the second son of Hirano Kichizo, a Fukuoka ashigaru. Although his father was originally of merchant stock and had purchased his ashigaru status, he had served diligently as a courier for the domain and as an instructor in swordsmanship for other ashigaru. As a result of his many years of service to the han the elder Hirano was eventually granted jikirei status and raised to full samurai rank as a member of
At age 10 Kuniomi was sent, in the pattern of other boys of his age and position, to serve as a page in the household of an upper samurai; in this case, Ōoto Gonzaemon, supervisor over all ashigaru. While at the Ōoto household, Kuniomi greatly impressed Koganemaru Hikogoro, a friend of his father, who expressed his desire to adopt the lad as his own heir. So in 1841, at the age of 13, Kuniomi was adopted into the Koganemaru household.

During the next decade, Kuniomi showed no inclinations that might presage his later development as Chikuzen's most radical proponent of sonnō-jōi. In 1845 he was appointed as a minor official in the Office of Construction and resided briefly at Dazaifu to oversee repairs on the Tenmangu Shrine's Sakura gate. Later that year he traveled to Edo for the first time, but outside of a generally broadened horizon, there was nothing particularly salient about his three years of service there. Returning to Fukuoka in 1848, Kuniomi married, and spent his leisure in swordsmanship practice and scholarly activity.

The event which commenced the transformation of Kuniomi into one of Japan's leading shishi was an assignment in 1851, as part of his official position, to a lengthy stay on Ōshima to assist in the upkeep of the famous Munakata Shrine. It was while there that he met Hōjō Ukon (Kimura Tokizumi), one of the four Satsuma samurai then in hiding in Chikuzen who had sought protective asylum under Kuroda Nagahiro at the time of the Shimazu succession dispute several years earlier (see chapter four). Hōjō was particularly fond of literature, especially Waka poetry, and was undoubtedly influenced by kokugaku; Kuniomi became Hōjō's intimate friend and student, and within a short
period the elder Satsuma man had sparked a great change in Kuniomi's attitudes. This relationship marked the beginning of Hirano's devotion to sonno-jōi and formed the basis of his unusually close relationship to Satsuma and the loyalists from Kagoshima.

Completing his duties on Ōshima, Kuniomi was assigned to travel a second time to Edo, and it was during his stay there that Perry arrived at Uraga Bay. Reportedly, Kuniomi was so moved by the foreign threat that upon his return to Fukuoka in 1854, he expressed the desire to quit his post so as to put full efforts into bunbu (scholarship and military arts). However, the following year found him on assignment at Nagasaki where he spent a full 200 days with the opportunity to observe the foreigners and their actions. While some Fukuoka samurai were busying themselves in the study of Western knowledge and technology, Hirano's Nagasaki experience only proved to solidify his jōi and anti-bakufu attitudes.

Motivated by the foreign crisis and a devotion to a kokugaku inspired ideal of the strength and purity of the Japanese past, Hirano helped found the Taichigumi (大刀組), a study group for the practice of military arts. Along with Hidaka Shirō, Fuji Shirō, and Yoshida Taro, Kuniomi led the group as they studied ancient forms of government, read extensively from the Taiheiki, and practiced with the ancient longsword. This activity, clearly rooted in the kokugaku tradition, was a measure intended to prepare the group with a Japanese spirit and military valor as unadulterated as the Manyō-style poetry which they composed. We must agree then with Kuniomi's chief biographer when he states that "Hirano was influenced most heavily by
kokugaku and his emperorism derives chiefly from that source." The fact that Fuji, Yoshida, and others of Hirano's associates all left the han to participate in extremist action bears witness to the strength of emotion which the kokugaku-style sonnō could evoke.

Normally, the political application of kokugaku witnessed in Hirano's Taichigumi would be expected to derive only from the exclusively political and rabidly xenophobic variety of kokugaku espoused by the followers of Hirata Atsutane. Although it would be impossible to deny the potential for influence on the Hirano group from the Hirata school, especially through Hojo and the other Satsuma exiles who seemed to have leanings in that direction, Hirano was not a disciple of Hirata. His own background followed other lines, but there were a number of Hirata advocates in Fukuoka. According to the figures of Itō Tasaburō cited in Albert Craig's Choshū in the Meiji Restoration, Chikuzen was second to Satsuma among the outlying han in the number of Hirata disciples (26) prior to the Meiji Restoration. Quite mysteriously the number after the Restoration dropped precipitously to only three, fewer by half than any other outlying domain.

As was the case elsewhere, many proponents of the Hirata school in Chikuzen came from among the merchant and wealthy peasant sectors of society. Despite rigorous opposition from the daimyo and han Confucianists, there was also some measure of support amongst the samurai population. Most notable in this regard were the Egami academy in Fukuoka, and the followers of Ura Shōzen, chief priest of Sakurai Shrine. Higaki Motoyoshi, an eminent historian of Fukuoka, reports that as early as 1845 Fukuoka forbade public lectures on Hirata's
teachings, while Lord Nagahiro later threatened Ura Shōzen with refusal to confirm his son's succession if he did not desist from propagating Hirata's anti-foreign doctrine.30

In spite of Nagahiro's threats, the Ura family of Sakurai continued in their activity as leaders of the Hirata cause in Fukuoka. In 1858/6 at the very peak of the controversy over the signing of the Treaty of Commerce Suzuki Shigetane, one of Hirata Atsutane's most famous pupils, entered Chikuzen on part of his tour of western Japan. Departing from Shimonoseki where he had stayed at the household of Shiraishi Shōichirō, Suzuki went first to Munakata Shrine, and then to Hakata, accompanied along the way by Ura.31

Within months of Suzuki's visit, plans were formulated for the erection of a special monument at Dazaifu commemorating the Tenmangu Shrine as a seat of "Japanese Spirit and Chinese Learning" (Wakon kansai). Those pushing the project included Suzuki, Shiraishi, and the four Satsuma exiles; also the Chikuzen loyalist merchants, Kusunokiya Sogorō of Hakata and Kurihara (Matsuya) Magobei of Dazaifu. Hirata adherents among the Fukuoka samurai who added support included several names prominent in sonnō circles: Kawai Mōzan, Tagawa Sagoemon, Kuwano Sanai, Egami Der'ichirō and his brother, Einoshin, Mandai Yasunoshin, and the ever-present Ura Shima no Kami.32

Considerable opposition to the monument developed from among the teachers at the han academy, but with the intercession of Dazaifu's Ōtorii Shinzen the project finally reached culmination.

Our discussion of the rise of loyalism in Chikuzen has to this point emphasized its localized and particularistic tendencies to the exclusion
of central trends. The relative prominence of kokugaku, and in particular its emphasis on the Chikuzen past, distinguishes Fukuoka loyalism from that of Chōshū, Mitō, or other han. This is not to overlook the influence of the more widely recognized purveyors of loyalism at Edo and Osaka, but only to place their influence in Fukuoka within a local perspective. Certainly many Fukuoka samurai attended the schools of Satō Issai, Ōhashi Totsuan, or Fujimori Tenzan. There they had the opportunity to mingle with men of other areas, but the doctrines they were taught most often seemed only to build upon or substantiate tendencies already inculcated at home. As a result, those centrally-located instructors and ideologues were of secondary rather than primary influence in the development of Chikuzen loyalism. It is still to the Kamei school and a localized form of kokugaku that we must look for the roots of Fukuoka's sonnō-jōi activity.

The Rise of Loyalist Action

Following the collapse of the Hitotsubashi party in mid-1858, Nagahiro temporarily withdrew from any further attempts at activity in national political affairs, concentrating instead on carrying out economic and military reform within his own domain. His past activities and recognized relationships with the leading members of the Hitotsubashi party labelled him a prime target for potential retaliation from the Ōi-controlled bakufu, so it was not surprising that he judiciously chose to avoid immediate confrontation. Apprised of developments at Edo by Date Munenari, Nagahiro informed the bakufu that he would be unable
to personally fulfill his upcoming sankin kōtai obligation because of illness, but would send his heir, Nagatomo, in his stead. 33

To many of the sonnō-jōi activists, Nagahiro's action was paramount to acceptance of the Court's appeal for support in the dispute with the bakufu over foreign policy. In fact, the split between the Court and bakufu placed Nagahiro in somewhat of a dilemma. He generally favored the bakufu's signature of the commercial treaties with the Western powers, yet he could hardly look with pleasure upon the development of a reactionary reassertion of bakufu authority. As a powerful tozama lord, he had supported the plan set forth by the Hitotsubashi party for reform of the bakufu so as to give greater voice to the outside lords. Now, with Ii in power, hopes of carrying out such a change had been shattered and even the measure of influence they had once achieved was being rapidly eroded.

As previously described, the bakufu's signature of the Treaty of Commerce and the punishment of Hitotsubashi adherents sparked the coalescence of opposition to the bakufu under the banner of sonnō-jōi. In various parts of the country bands of loyalists committed themselves to political action. In responding to the Court's appeals there was much talk of an expedition to Kyoto or a punitive action against the tairō. Often, Nagahiro's name was central to such plotting. 34 In part, that was a natural outgrowth of Nagahiro's former relationship with Shimazu Nariakira, for following Nariakira's death in 1858 many of the Satsuma activists had placed their faith in Nagahiro to carry through their former lord's plans. But Nagahiro's reputation extended beyond Satsuma, since Yoshida Shōin's prison writings also include reference
to a potential appeal to Nagahiro for leading the loyalist cause. "If Chōshū cannot do it," he said, "then the lords of Satsuma, Echizen, Chikuzen, and Inaba should lead an expedition to Kyoto to bring down the evil rule of Ii." When Ii Naosuke was eventually struck down in 1860/3 by samurai from Mito and Satsuma, the memorial explaining the reasons for their deed included Kuroda's name among the eight tozama lords who were considered as working for the good of the nation.

If the loyalist shishi of other parts of Japan rated the Kuroda lords so highly, why was there at this time no comparable groundswell of sonnō-jōi activity within Fukuoka? For despite Nagahiro's reputation Chikuzen remained fundamentally quiescent. Apparently, only Hirano Kuniomi had found the events of 1858 sufficiently disturbing to drive him to leave the domain and work for the loyalist cause. By the following year, Nakamura Enta, Fuji Shiro and perhaps a few others had made a like break, but on the whole there was nothing we could call a sonnō-jōi movement within the han. In fact it was not until after the assassination of Ii Naosuke that a recognizable loyalist party developed in Fukuoka. Why did it take so long?

The relative lateness of the development of a sonnō party in Fukuoka may be attributable to several possible causes. One explanation is that loyalist activity after 1858 was a direct outgrowth of the prior mediatory activities of the Hitotsubashi party. Those samurai who had previously gone to Kyoto to work for the Hitotsubashi cause on behalf of their lords had developed the references and contacts necessary for effective action. In contrast, there were no Fukuoka retainers prominent in the Hitotsubashi negotiations. Although very
much involved in the Hitotsubashi cause, Nagahiro had remained a secondary figure, working through Satsuma men in support of Shimazu Nariakira. Likewise, Hirano Kuniomi's early activities moved chiefly through channels provided by the Satsuma men exile in Fukuoka.

A second possible explanation is that the lack of bakufu punishment of the Kuroda lord excluded the possibility that a nascent feeling of *sonno* loyalism could merge with a traditionally powerful reserve of han loyalism to form an emotional force strong enough to fuel a commitment to radical action. In other words, although the Fukuoka loyalists may have been firm in their dedication to *sonno* principles, the confrontation with the bakufu was not yet so severe that they felt threatened. On the other hand, the threat was very real for the samurai of Mito, Echizen, or even Satsuma.

Lastly Fukuoka, like Chōshū, was at this time deeply involved in a crucial reform program aimed at strengthening both her financial and military capabilities. In the midst of the embroilment of 1858, Nagahiro ordered his chief *kare*, Kuroda Yamashiro, to proceed to Osaka for the purpose of settling the domain's financial relations with the Osaka lenders. Departing on 9/3 Yamashiro returned successfully on 11/11; two months later he was granted an additional stipend of 500 koku and ordered to carry out a thorough reform of the domain economy. Assisted by Maki Ichinai, Kuroda Yamashiro was a skilled and practical administrator for whom traditional han and samurai loyalties took precedence over the distant arguments between Court and bakufu. The attitude of Yamashiro, Maki Ichinai, and others among the domain bureaucracy might best be represented in the opinion of Kitaoka Yūhei,
one of Maki's proteges, who reportedly stated that jōi was "the responsibility of the sei-i-fu (bakufu); it should preserve unity within the land, organize the military, and strike the foreign countries." On the other hand, "in this dangerous situation we should continue the deeds of our ancestors, follow the commands of the government, be diligent in our offices, give support to our daimyo, and strengthen the bonds between lord and vassal, following the way of loyalty and righteousness through obedience and harmony." In the absence of a marked external catalyst with immediate local repercussions, that kind of attitude did little to encourage the development of loyalist activity.

Despite the apparent lack of loyalist activity in Chikuzen prior to 1860, there was nevertheless a strong undercurrent of sonnō-jōi attitudes. Kitaoka Yūhei, whose opinion is cited above, was closely associated with Hirano Kuniomi (despite their differences of opinion) and often debated "rulers and usurpers" with his neighbor, Nomura Bōtō, the famous female loyalist. Additionally, in 1858/10 Saigo Takamori and the loyalist priest, Gesshō, were both given a warm reception and kept in hiding in Fukuoka while fleeing arrest from bakufu agents. Apparently, Nagahiro even aided in obtaining permission for Gesshō to gain entrance into Satsuma.

Indicative of the undercurrent of loyalty in Fukuoka is the case of Nakamura Enta, who, aside from Hirano Kuniomi, remains the most important exception to the early pattern of Chikuzen inactivity. The second son of a mid-range han bureaucrat of some significance, Enta served as an instructor at the domain academy, the Shūyūkan, following his father's death. Incensed by the signing of the Treaty
of Commerce with the United States, he left the han in 1859/4, intending to kill Ii Naosuke himself. After visiting Yokohama and seeing the foreigners there, Enta's 義 (jōi) attitudes grew even stronger and his determination more firm. Hearing of the assassination of Ii by Mito samurai, he immediately set out for Mito, but upon stopping enroute to consult with Fujimori Tenzan, he was advised against proceeding further because of the factional strife within Mito.

Returning to Edo, Enta enrolled in the school of Ōhashi Totsuan who "after the Sakuradamon incident...acquired a reputation as an underground leader of patriotic samurai." Impressed with the idea that all things must be based upon 義 (giri) (duty), Enta decided that he should return to Fukuoka to motivate his lord towards a reform of han government based on the principles of sonnō- 義 (jōi). But prior to his departure, Ōhashi, who as a dedicated expulsionist was rabid in his hatred of the West, warned Enta that Fukuoka was then under the sway of the despicable 排外 (rangaku). He therefore presented Enta with a copy of his essay, Genkō kiryaku (Record of the Mongol Invasion), in the hopes that the example of the Chikuzen past might turn the Fukuoka westernizers from their fallen ways. After visiting Ise and Kasuga Shrines and the grave of Kusunoki Masashige, Enta arrived in Fukuoka on 1860/5/19 to find the han no longer quiescent, but already astir with loyalist activity.

The ambush of the 大老 Ii Naosuke outside the Sakurada gate of Edo Castle on 1860/3/3 under the blades of loyalist samurai from Mito and Satsuma was part of a larger plot intended to coincide with the first 播磨 (sankin kōtai) procession of Lord Shimazu Tadayoshi, Nariakira's
successor as daimyo of Satsuma. Essential to the plan, from the Satsuma side, was a policy of cooperation with Chikuzen proposed by Ōkubo Toshimichi and his colleagues. As the plot developed early in 1860, the Mito participants became fearful of being found out, and by the middle of the second month had decided to take action at the first flicker of opportunity. Relaying this news to his companions in Kagoshima, Tanaka Masanoshin stopped in Chōshū at the home of Shiraishi Shōichirō on 2/17, where he revealed to the Shimonoseki merchant and his houseguest, Hirano Kuniomi, the plans to kill Ii. 45

Unaware of Tanaka's message, Satsuma's Hori Nakaemon (Ijichi Sadaka) arrived several days later at Shiraishi's on his way to Edo to participate in the attack on Ii, bearing a proposal to Nagahiro for joint Satsuma-Chikuzen cooperation. With the approval of Ōkubo, the karō Shimazu Saemon, and Hisamitsu, the Satsuma loyalists intended that their lord make his way first to Fukuoka to consult with Nagahiro, and then set out for Edo. 46 Were the attack on Ii to occur before he could reach Kyoto, the Satsuma lord was to retreat to Fukuoka to await military reinforcements, after which Nagahiro would join him in a procession on Edo. With the change in plans at Edo, however, that would no longer be possible.

When Hori arrived at Shiraishi's on 2/26 and was informed of Tanaka's earlier visit and the stepped-up timetable for the attack, he hurriedly wrote a memorial to Nagahiro which he turned over to Hirano to deliver, and set forth in haste for Edo. 47 Hirano in turn departed Shimonoseki on 2/29, 48 and arriving in Fukuoka presented Hori's memorial to Nagahiro through the offices of Yoshinaga Genhachirō,
accompanied by a petition of his own. Although the text of Hori's memorial remains unknown, Hirano's attached petition suggested that in light of the disturbance which would shortly ensue, the Kuroda lord would be wise to immediately buy up quantities of rice and arms. Should han finances not permit the rapid procurement of weapons, he suggested that they be obtained from Satsuma in exchange for Fukuoka's coal; Hirano was sure that the details could be arranged by the Shimonoseki merchant, Shiraishi, who had experience in dealing with Satsuma. With Hirano's letter as background, we can more readily understand the arrival of Shiraishi Shōichirō in Fukuoka on 3/7 in a bid to become the agent for sales of the products of the domain's Seirenjo. After several days of negotiations with Fukuoka officials, Shiraishi returned to Shimonoseki on 3/16 accompanied by Kuniomi.

Within days of Hirano's departure, word reached Kyushu of Ii's assassination. Shimazu Tadayoshi was still in Chikugo, not yet having reached Fukuoka on his sankin kōtai journey, when special couriers brought the news on 3/23. Immediately, Yamada Soemon was dispatched to Fukuoka to consult with Kuroda Nagahiro on the most desirable course of action. Nagahiro advised that the Satsuma lord return to Kagoshima to await further developments, and so on 3/25 Tadayoshi's procession began its return while one of the han Elders was sent to Edo to inform the bakufu that illness had forced Tadayoshi to turn back to Kagoshima.

Meanwhile, once official notice of Ii's death had been received at Fukuoka, Nagahiro announced his own intention of proceeding to Edo on his scheduled sankin kōtai visit. His biography states:
After disaster befell Ii in 1860, people vacillated, and no one was willing to aid the bakufu. Nagahiro [felt that] after more than 200 years of friendship he couldn't sit idle at this time of crisis, so he laid plans to proceed to Edo. Whatever his intentions, Nagahiro's decision to pay his respects at Edo so soon after the attack on Ii raised a storm of protest in Fukuoka. Here was the catalyst that the Chikuzen loyalists needed, and it is from this point that we can mark the commencement of an active loyalist party in Fukuoka.

On 1860/5/6 Tsukigata Senzō submitted a lengthy memorial to Nagahiro stating the inadvisability of leaving the han to go to Edo at a crucial time when people's minds and hearts were in commotion. Instead he suggested that full efforts be expended to establish a "benevolent rule" (jinsei) like that which had existed earlier in Fukuoka under Josui and Nagamasa; "men of talent" should be appointed to office, finances placed in order, and military preparation increased. Furthermore, as long as Western drill, warships, and coastal defense works were inadequate then the safety of the domain and welfare of the people should come first. Moreover, there was still considerable uncertainty over what further action those who had killed Ii might take, so that he believed it would be extremely unwise for Nagahiro to set out at that time.

Arriving from Edo in the midst of the debate over Nagahiro's departure, Nakamura Enta consulted with Tsukigata Senzō, Takatori Yōha, and others among the Chikuzen loyalists. Essentially in agreement with the views expressed in Tsukigata's memorial, Enta despised the bureaucratic faction then in power, led by Kuroda Yamashiro.
Their actions, he believed, were wholly motivated by self-interest, as they blindly followed the dictates of the bakufu to the detriment of the interests of the Court. Support of Nagahiro's proposed trip to Edo was only another example of their unprincipled behaviour. In order to block Nagahiro's intention, therefore, outside help was needed, so Nakamura Enta, Egami Einoshin, and Asaka Ichisaku secretly set off for Satsuma to enlist the support of the Shimazu lord. Their efforts came to naught, however, when they were stopped at the Satsuma border, never making it in to transmit their appeal.55

At first Nagahiro remained undaunted in spite of vociferous opposition to his proposed journey. On 6/28 he announced to his retainers that he would be departing on sankin kōtai in 1860/10 as usual.56 However, on 7/7 word was received from the bakufu's Andō Nobumasa requesting that Nagahiro make the necessary adjustments so as to arrive in Edo for sankin kōtai duty two months early in 1860/9. Therefore the domain government announced on 7/27 that because of Andō's order the lord's procession would depart on the 22nd of the following month. As the date for Nagahiro's departure drew near the loyalists stepped up their clamour of opposition. Granted special audiences with their lord on 8/16, Tsukigata Senzō, Kaizu Kōichi, and Jō Buhei pleaded that Nagahiro reconsider his decision.57 Emphasizing the necessity of loyalty to the Court they asked that he stay to push for a reform of han government and to encourage a rapid buildup of coastal defense. Two days later Senzō was again called upon to present his opinions before Nagahiro. Following that meeting, the han government made it known that because of the disturbed state of public
opinion, Nagahiro's departure would be postponed for the time being. At last the strenuous efforts of the Fukuoka loyalists appeared to have born fruit.

The loyalists were not to have their way for long, however, for after a "cooling off" period of several months, Nagahiro issued on 10/27 a personal proclamation (jikisho) stating his renewed intention to leave for Edo, since his relatives had advised that foregoing his sankin kōtai duty "would not be for the good of the country." Thereafter on 11/14, just four days before Nagahiro's rescheduled departure, the han gave notice that during the discussion of whether or not the daimyo should proceed with the planned visit to Edo, many of the samurai had traversed the bounds of propriety to become insolent in their behavior. Even after Lord Nagahiro had issued his personal jikisho they had continued in their disruptions. Therefore, it was announced that Tsukigata Senzō, Takatori Yōha, and Kaizu Kōichi were each to be placed under the custody of one of the chūrō; while Egami Den'ichiro, Asaka Ichisaku, Itami Shin'ichirō, and Nakamura Gonjirō were all put under house arrest for investigatory purposes. In addition, Shinzō's father, uncle, and younger brother were also ordered to domiciliary confinement.

With his main loyalist critics within the han now under confinement, Nagahiro debarked from Fukuoka on 11/18 without incident, arriving in Edo on 12/20. Eight days later he presented himself for the first time to the young shogun, Iemochi. Following the usual formalities Nagahiro was unexpectedly granted an increase in Court rank purportedly in recognition to the Kuroda house for more than 200 years.
of loyal service as defenders of Nagasaki. Shortly thereafter, his bakufu ceremonial status was also advanced to permit him a lower seat in the ōhiroma (Great Hall).\footnote{61} An exceptional and sudden move by the bakufu, in light of the timing we must regard the act both as an expression of gratitude from the Edo government for Naqahiro's show of support, and an appeal for future cooperation with the new bakufu leadership of Andō Nobumasa and Kuze Hirochika. To Nagahiro, it was only proof of the correctness of his determination. The han benefitted greatly by the increased prestige and he returned home exulting in his good fortune.

Buoyed by his success in Edo and the renewed prospects for enhanced influence within the bakufu, Nagahiro returned to Fukuoka on 1861/4/5. One month later he meted out punishments to over 30 members of the loyalist faction. These included, Takatori Yōha, Tsukigata Senzō, and Kaizu Kōichi: perpetual custody with the chūrō and loss of stipend; Egami Den'ichirō, Nakamura Gonjirō, and Itami Shin'ichirō: house arrest, stipend reduction, and forced retirement; and exile on nearby islands to Asaka Ichisaku, Ejima Einoshin, Nakamura Enta, Hasegawa Hanzō, Fuji Shīrō, and Hirajima Moshichi.\footnote{62}

Having met the challenge to his authority presented by the rise of loyalist action in Chikuzen, Nagahiro turned his efforts once again to an active role in national politics as he became a leader in the new movement to end the disunity between Court and bakufu. By encouraging the Confucian virtue of harmony, as expressed in his slogan "Tenbaku goichiwa" (harmony between Court and bakufu), Nagahiro hoped to avoid the domestic conflict he knew would open the
door for foreign intervention. The Russian occupation of part of Tsushima that year made the threat of armed western intervention even more of a reality.63

The Loyalists

We have thus far described the origins of sonnō-jōi thought in Fukuoka and the rise of an active loyalist party following the assassination of Ii Naosuke in 1860. But, before leaving our discussion of loyalism to concentrate on the political developments of the post-1860 era, it might be worthwhile to ask who the Fukuoka loyalists were. Because of the Marxist orientation of so much of the historiography of the Restoration, the issue of the class origins of the loyalists has become central to the interpretation of Restoration and post-Restoration history. Thomas Huber's newly published revisionist work, The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), for example, argues that the main cause of the Meiji Restoration lay in class conflict and long-term institutional change. In this context, the correlation or non-correlation of class origin to loyalist activity is crucial to both the meaning of the loyalist movement and the significance of the loyalists' role in shaping modern Japan.

Being forewarned that the issue of class origins can be in many ways a misleading one (see the comments on status in chapter two), we prepared an analysis of Fukuoka loyalists similar to that already presented by W.G. Beasley for Tosa and Satsuma (See Table II).
### TABLE II

**ANALYSIS OF LOYALIST PARTIES BY STATUS AND AGE**

#### I. STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Ashigaru</th>
<th>Gōshi</th>
<th>Shōya</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satsuma</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>17 (77%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>16 (73%)</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tosa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>7 (32%)</td>
<td>5 (23%)</td>
<td>10 (45%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>5 ( 9%)</td>
<td>15 (27%)</td>
<td>9 (16%)</td>
<td>11 (20%)</td>
<td>15 (27%)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fukuoka</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>15 (23%)</td>
<td>15 (23%)</td>
<td>19 (30%)</td>
<td>3 ( 5%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>1 ( 2%)</td>
<td>11 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
<td>14 (74%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### II. AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>above 35</th>
<th>26 - 34</th>
<th>below 25</th>
<th>unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satsuma</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>5 (23%)</td>
<td>15 (68%)</td>
<td>1 ( 5%)</td>
<td>1 ( 5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>4 (18%)</td>
<td>9 (41%)</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
<td>1 ( 5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tosa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>4 (18%)</td>
<td>14 (64%)</td>
<td>2 ( 9%)</td>
<td>2 ( 9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>1 ( 2%)</td>
<td>17 (31%)</td>
<td>37 (67%)</td>
<td>- 0 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fukuoka</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>20 (31%)</td>
<td>22 (34%)</td>
<td>8 (13%)</td>
<td>14 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>4 (21%)</td>
<td>7 (37%)</td>
<td>6 (32%)</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The above information for Satsuma and Tosa is taken from Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, p. 158)
In order to facilitate comparative analysis we followed Beasley's general pattern: loyalist activists were classified according to age (in 1862) and hereditary status, and divided into moderate and extremist groups. The single exception to Beasley's framework was our addition of a lower samurai classification between middle samurai and *ashigaru* in accordance with the status system described in chapter two. The distinction is crucial, particularly in Satsuma where Saigō and Ōkubo, both of *koshō-gumi* rank, are much better described as lower rather than middle samurai.65 To list Hirano Kuniomi of Fukuoka as a middle samurai (as Beasley does, p. 166) totally distorts our estimates of his status capabilities.

The distinction between moderate and extremist is worth making, but often arbitrary. In many cases, an individual might be listed in either group depending on which point in his career is used for classification purposes. Despite the obvious pitfalls, Beasley categorized the moderates as those willing to work within the han government system, while the extremists were those who, for one reason or another, chose to break away from domain politics. The moderates were thus the Saigō-Ōkubo group in Satsuma and the Takechi Zuizan faction of Tosa, while the extremists were represented by Satsuma's Arima Shinshichi and Tosa's Sakamoto Ryōma and Nakaoka Shintarō. In Fukuoka, we find the moderates divided into two groups: one led by Tsukigata Senzō; with a second, bureaucratic faction led by Katō Shisho and Yano Baian. The extremists were best represented by Nakamura Enta and the indomitable Hirano Kuniomi.
What were Beasley's conclusions? He found that in general the leaders of both extremist and moderate factions "were aged about thirty and came from the lower levels of the middle samurai (i.e., our lower samurai) or from families not very much below them."66 The moderates characteristically had a core of middle ranking samurai, interspersed with a scattering of upper samurai to provide access to domain authority, and a few ashigaru or gōshi to serve as a link to the extremists. On the other hand, the rōnin extremists were "characteristically men of lower social standing" than their more moderate brethren.67

How does the Chikuzen loyalist party compare to Beasley's generalization? First, we should note that although Fukuoka had distinctive patterns of its own, it resembled Satsuma far more closely than it did Tosa. One guesses that this tendency would also hold true if Chōshū were included in the list. More specifically, we recognize that the Fukuoka moderate faction had an especially large percentage of both upper samurai and men aged over thirty-five. In fact, if only the leaders of the loyalist movement were counted the peculiarity would be even more striking. The central core of Fukuoka's moderate faction included Tsukigata Senzo and Takatori Yōha, both of middle samurai (umamawari) ranking, and Katō Shisho, Yano Baian, Takebe Takehiko, and Ibi Shigeki, all upper samurai. Jō Buhei and Kaizu Kōichi were lower ranking, but both were age 58 in 1860 and had long records of important service in the bureaucracy.

The Fukuoka extremist faction, on the other hand, was comprised almost entirely of ashigaru or low-ranking samurai. Although they were
considerably older than the Tosa extremists, their age distribution is roughly the same as their Satsuma counterparts. In addition, since most of the Satsuma extremists listed as middle samurai would probably qualify as lower samurai on our chart the status differential is really less significant than it appears at first glance. The gap between the Fukuoka moderates and extremists, however, is unmistakable.

What we discover from our survey is a picture of loyalism in Chikuzen quite different from the popular view of sonno activists as young, low-ranking social discontents. In Fukuoka, the peculiarities of Chikuzen loyalist ideology appear to have proved appealing to a broader spectrum of samurai society, including a relatively higher number of upper samurai and Shinto priests, than was the case elsewhere.

That the upper samurai participants were not mere pawns necessitated by the status requirements of Tokugawa politics, but were prominent as leaders of the loyalist party, demonstrates the continued correlation to peculiar han characteristics. Han loyalties and traditions remained the framework within which the moderates continued to operate. The longstanding tendency for upper samurai to dominate the daily workings of Fukuoka han government, thus carries over into the organization of the loyalist party as well. In part a result of a conscious effort by those of loyalist persuasion to recruit men of standing to their cause, one wonders to what extent loyalism also became an ideological cover for bureaucratic factionalism within the han. To the extremists, who for either status or ideological reasons stood on the periphery of domain politics, the crisis of the age had to be met through whatever means remained open to them.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER V

1. Craig, Chōshū, p. 93.


3. All official directives from the Court had to be countersigned by the kampaku, the highest official at Court. Those not following this pattern were considered as naichoku (unofficial edict) or mitchoku (unofficial secret edict). See Craig, Chōshū, p. 121, n. 28.

4. The concept of jōi, although usually translated as "Expel the Barbarian," was broader than mere xenophobic anti-foreignism. As often as not it had more realistic foundation in the desire to protect Japanese sovereignty from the threat of foreign domination. Those of the latter persuasion maintained a respect, if not a liking, for Western technology, but emphasized the need to eventually revoke or revise the "unequal treaties" which had been signed under duress.


7. Exceptions were Chōshū, and Kurume. See Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 141.


11. The most famous of Kamei's pupils was Hirose Tansō of Hita. For Tansō's relationship with the Kamei school see Hita Gun Kyōikukai (日田郡 教育会 ), 淡窓全集 (Tansō zenshū) (Shibunkyaku, 1971), 1:4-5.

12. All of these were influential instructors in the Fukuoka area, and former students of Kammei. See Higaki, *Hayakawa Isamu den*, pp. 4-5.

13. The family name was originally Shiogata, but was changed to Tsukigata at the time they settled in Fukuoka. See Nagano Makoto (長野誠), 月形家一門 (Tsukigata ke ichimon) (Fukuoka, 1937), pp. 2-25.

14. Hayakawa Isamu (早川勇), "筑前藩勤王論の首唱... (Chikuzen han kinnō ron no shusho.....), " (Shidankai sokkiroku), 32, 163-164.


19. The Ura family were head priests at the Sakurai Shrine in Shima-kōri, and Ono Kaga was the adopted son of one of the important families at Dazaifu Tenmangu.

20. The chief source for Shinzen's life is the autobiographical ms. 信全一世中略記 (Shinzen Isseijū ryakuki). For a summary by his great-grandson, available in pamphlet form, see Nishitakatsuji Nobusada (西高達信貞), 信全一世中略記について (Shinzen isseijū ryakuki ni tsuite) (Dazaifu: Dazaifu Tenmangu, 1969).


22. ibid., pp. 28-31.

23. ibid., pp. 33-37.

24. ibid., p. 38.

25. Yamauchi, p. 691.


27. ibid., pp. 52-54. The prevalence among the group of traditional names such as Tarō, Jirō, and Shīrō was an outgrowth of their studies into the ancient Japanese past.

28. ibid., p. 84.

29. See especially ibid., p. 142 for a table of the number of Hirata advocates according to domain.

30. From a personal conversation with Professor Higaki, 1978.

31. Yamauchi, p. 223.
32. A detailed account is found in Yamauchi, pp. 199-206. See also Haruyama, pp. 140-141.

33. Ansei 5(1858)/10, "Fukuoka nendai ki."

34. Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi, p. 100.

35. Quoted in Fujii Jintarō (藤井甚太郎), "桜田の変と福岡藩 (Sakurada no hen to Fukuoka han)," 筑紫史談 (Chikushi shidan), 5, 45.

36. Quoted in ibid., p. 45.

37. Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, p. 82. Hōjō left Fukuoka for Kyoto on 1858/7/1 and Hirano went to join him not long thereafter.

38. Shimonoseki Shi Kyōiku lin kai (下関市教育委員会), comp., 白石家文書 (Shiraishi ke monjo) (Shimonoseki Shi Kyōiku lin kai, 1968), p. 64 records that on Man'en 1(1860)/6/7, "Fuji returns [to Shimonoseki] from Miyajima."


40. Quoted in Ejima Moitsu (江島茂逸) 喜多岡勇遭難遺蹟 (Kitaoka Yūhei sōnan iseki) (Fukuoka, Ejima Moitsu, 1906), p. 12.

41. See Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 136-147; and Yamauchi, pp. 269-275.

42. Inoue Tadashi (井上忠), ed., "中村円太「自笑録」の紹介 (Nakamura Enta 'Jishoroku' no shōkai)," 福岡大学人文論叢 (Fukuoka Daigaku Jimbun ronsō), 3.3(1972), Supplement, p. 3. This is an annotated version containing the complete text of Enta's
autobiographical account, with an introduction by the editor. [The text itself will be hereafter referred to as "Jishōroku."]

43. Harootunian, Toward Restoration, p. 261. For Ōhashi see especially pp. 258-278.


45. Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 270-80; and Shiraishi ke monjo, p. 61.

46. Ōkubo Toshimichi (大久保利通), 大久保利通日記 (Ōkubo Toshimichi niki) (Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai, 1927), Man'en 2(1860)/2/18, p. 30; and Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 282-288.

47. Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 281-83.


49. The text of Hirano's petition is found in Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 288-89. Although undated it would have been presented in early 1860/3, since Hirano departed Fukuoka with Shiraishi on 3/15.


52. Nagahiro kō den, 2:80-81.
53. The text is found in Nagano, Tsukigata-ke ichimon, pp. 30-33.


55. ibid., p. 20.

56. Fuji, "Sakurada no hen to Fukuoka han," Chikushi shidan, 6, 53-55.

57. Man'en 1(1860)/8/16, "Fukuoka nendai ki."


60. Manen 1/11/14, "Fukuoka nendai ki." Also Nakano, Tsukigata ke ichimon, p. 34.


63. Relatively little attention has been given to the Russian occupation of part of Tsushima. For the most detailed treatment, see Takada Toshikichi (高田利吉), "幕末露艦の対馬占拠 (Bakumatsu Rōkan no Tsushima senkyo),"歴史地理 (Rekishi chiri), 43.1 (1924), 21-40.


65. For the status system in Satsuma see Hall, Mori Arinori pp. 24-25; and Haraguchi, Bakumatsu no Satsuma, pp. 12-14.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICS OF KÔBUGATTAI

In the aftermath of the Ii assassination of 1860, the Court and various of the daimyo found renewed hope in the possibility of regaining some of the influence they had lost during the brief but significant period of bakufu reascendancy. There was a mood of reconciliation in the air as the bakufu sought to mollify the opposition which Ii's policies had engendered and which had sparked his death. If the bakufu was willing to move toward a rapprochement with the Court, then under the appropriate conditions the Court too was willing to help close the breach that was dividing the country and threatening public safety. At the same time many of the daimyo saw this trend as an opportunity to enhance their own positions by mediating between the two competing centers of authority. Particularly was this true of those domains which had formerly championed the Hitotsubashi cause in the hopes of reforming the structure of bakufu authority to their own benefit. With Ii now removed from the scene the way was open for a renewed effort to achieve their private ambitions. Thus the post-1860 political context brought together three distinct groups, each desiring to strengthen its own position, under a tenuous alliance known as kôbugattai (Unity of Court and Bakufu). In the background, the foreign presence was a constant reminder to each of the parties of the need for moderation and unified action, lest internal
dissension permit Japan to fall prey to Western intervention in the manner that had already beset Qing China.

While the loyalist shishi continued to plan attacks on bakufu leaders and sympathizers in the hopes that a campaign of terrorism would force a commitment to jōi, Andō Nobuyuki and Kuze Hirochika of the bakufu council sought to isolate extremist opposition through a program of compromise with the Court and the disaffected daimyo. On 1860/9/4 the bakufu granted pardons to Matsudaira Keiei, Matsudaira Keishō, and Yamauchi Toyoshige, who had been punished for their activities as members of the Hitotsubashi party in the shogunal succession dispute of 1858.¹ They also forwarded to Kyoto a renewed proposal for the marriage of Kazunomiya, emperor Kōmei’s sister, to the young shogun Iemochi. Earlier the Court had rejected a similar proposal, but this time it agreed on the condition that the bakufu consent to the Court’s advocacy of jōi. Hoping to placate some of its opponents, the bakufu concurred that action against the foreigners would be taken "within seven or eight to ten years from now," after sufficient military preparations had been made.² Satisfied with the bakufu’s nominal ratification of the Court’s jōi stand the Emperor gave his approval to the Kazunomiya wedding plans on 11/1. After several years of open disharmony, Edo and Kyoto had began the process towards a reunified policy.

It was at this point late in 1860 that Nagahiro squashed loyalist dissent within Fukuoka and departed for his sankin kōtai journey to Edo. The Kuroda lord had been a member of the Hitotsubashi party and had abstained from going to Edo in 1858 after Ii had commenced the
Ansei Purge, so his arrival at this time was particularly significant to bakufu leaders desirous of reconciliation with its leading daimyo antagonists. Attempting to gain the support of Nagahiro, the bakufu unexpectedly granted him an increase in Court rank and raised him to a seat in the ōhiroma, the highest status open to a tozama lord.

The plan worked magnificently. Elated by his ceremonial promotion and the changed attitude of the bakufu, Nagahiro returned to Chikuzen in 1861/4 encouraged by the prospects of a more harmonious relationship between Court and bakufu and anticipating an increased role in national affairs for himself. His attitude towards this new trend in national developments is undoubtedly linked to the punishment the following month of the loyalists who had opposed his Edo journey. Three months later the bakufu formally announced that Princess Kazunomiya would soon be leaving for Edo. In response, Nagahiro sent Tōgō Kichisaku and Miki Denzaburō to present a monetary gift to the Court congratulating the Emperor on the upcoming marriage, a symbol of the new kobugattai policy.³

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1861 Chōshū had taken the initiative of mediating the coming together of Court and bakufu in an alternate version of kobugattai based on a memorial submitted by Nagai Uta, a senior Chōshū official.⁴ With the approval of the Mori lord Nagai traveled to Kyoto in 1861/5 and achieved the Emperor's approval for a plan which argued against the repudiation of the treaties. Advocating instead a policy of "expansion across the seas," Nagai advised that Japan build up its military while enriching itself through trade with foreign lands.⁵ This was in essence the policy that Kuroda
Nagahiro had put forward in response to the Perry initiative in 1853. Now, under Nagai's plan, however, the desired goal of unity was to be achieved by having "the general lines of policy...settled by the Court, while the bakufu accepts responsibility for its execution."\(^6\)

With the Emperor's consent in hand, Nagai set out for Edo where he found equal success in soliciting endorsement of his proposal from the bakufu.\(^7\) When the Chōshū daimyo arrived for sankin kōtai residence in 1861/12, the plan was formally presented in a memorial to the Edo government. The shogun approved, Chōshū was officially recognized as mediator between Court and bakufu, and Nagai returned to Kyoto in 1862/3 to continue working out the details with the Court.

Although Chōshū's efforts appeared certain of success, they soon came to naught, for shortly after Nagai's return to Kyoto, Shimazu Hisamitsu appeared on the scene with a large body of supporting troops and a competing Satsuma proposal far more advantageous to the Court than the one submitted by Chōshū. The Satsuma plan called for a full pardon for the Court nobles and daimyo punished as part of the Ansei Purge in 1858; the appointment of Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Matsudaira Keiei to leading roles in the bakufu; the dismissal of Andō Nobuyuki as head of the bakufu's rōjū council; and the nomination of several of the important daimyo to represent the Court's interests as political commissioners.\(^8\) Satsuma's proposition, in many ways a renewal of the demands for reform previously set forth by Hisamitsu's deceased half-brother, Nariakira, advocated a clearly favorable role for the Court. As a result, Nagai's proposal was quickly discarded and the Court appointed Ōhara Shigenori as Imperial envoy to proceed to Edo under
Hisamitsu's escort for the purpose of presenting the essentials of the Shimazu proposal to the bakufu.

The arrival of Shimazu Hisamitsu and one thousand of his retainers at Kyoto in 1862/4 was viewed with great anticipation by the sonnō-jōi extremists who saw Hisamitsu's expedition as the chance they had been waiting for to topple the bakufu and reestablish Imperial rule. The loyalist plot, conceived by Maki Izumi of Kurume in conjunction with Arima Shinshichi and others from Satsuma, was presented to the Court and later to Hisamitsu himself in the famous Kaiten sansaku (Three Proposals to Reform the Realm) of the Chikuzen rōnin, Hirano Kuniomi. However, Hisamitsu wanted no part in the loyalist intrigue. He had come to Kyoto to place Satsuma at the leadership of the kōbugattai movement, and so immediately forbade all Satsuma men from contacting the loyalists of other han. Hisamitsu's conflict with the loyalists ultimately led to open fighting at the Teradaya Inn in Fushimi on the night of 4/23, in which Arima and several compatriots were killed. Hirano, however, was not present. The story of why he was not adds an relatively unknown dimension to Hisamitsu's arrival in Kyoto, and takes us back to our discussion of developments in Fukuoka.

In the autumn of 1861, while Nagai Uta was negotiating with the bakufu on behalf of Chōshū's proposal for kōbugattai unity, and Ōkubo Toshimichi and his companions were formulating their own plans for Hisamitsu's counterproposal, Kuroda Nagahiro was also assessing the possibility of kōbugattai mediation. On 1861/9/22 Yamada Soemon, a well-known Satsuma official, arrived in Fukuoka bearing a secret opinion (gonai-i) from the Satsuma lord to Nagahiro. Several weeks
later, Hori Jirō brought additional news from Satsuma of the plan for Hisamitsu to travel to Kyoto and Edo in place of his son, Lord Tadayoshi. Hori presented the information in a personal audience with Lord Nagahiro and they talked in secret for some time. Interestingly, between the two visits of the Satsuma representatives, Nagahiro had directed his retainers to request permission from the bakufu to re-schedule his sankin kōtaï visit.

Under normal circumstances, the Kuroda lord was to depart Fukuoka in the tenth month of even years to arrive in Edo during the twelfth month; he would then stay only 100 days and return to attend to his duties of Nagasaki defense. However, on 1861/10/14, the Fukuoka government requested that Nagahiro be allowed to go to Edo early, in 1862/3, in order to receive treatment from his doctor at Edo.12 The bakufu consented, directing him to come very early the following year. The han replied that he would leave on 1/21. Four postponements later, Nagahiro finally embarked for Edo on 1862/3/27, as he had originally requested, and just one day's travel time behind Hisamitsu's procession. Was there a connection? Undoubtedly there was, but it did not necessarily imply collusion between the two great han. Hisamitsu was not on good terms with Nagahiro;13 nevertheless, one of the Fukuoka karō met with Hisamitsu on the night of 3/26 as he lodged at Yamae station not far from Dazaifu. Returning urgently during the night the Fukuoka han Elder made his report, and Nagahiro departed suddenly the following day.14

Although the plans for Hisamitsu's trip were to have remained a well-guarded secret, several Satsuma retainers informed Hirano Kuniomi
and Maki Izumi of Hisamitsu's intentions on 1862/2/1, nearly two months before his departure. It was at this time that the Kyushu extremists committed themselves to implement Maki's restorationist revolt, and they set out for Kyoto to await Hisamitsu's arrival. On 2/22 Saigō Takamori and Murata Shimpachi of Satsuma met with Hirano at Shimoseki. After discussing current affairs, they sailed together for Osaka where they arrived on 2/26. Once there, Hirano utilized his Satsuma connections to enable him to carry on his intrigues from the safety of one of Satsuma's Osaka residences.

Early in 1862/4, with Hisamitsu and his troops rapidly approaching Kyoto and the Kuroda lord not far behind, the expectations of the sonnō-jōi extremists reached a feverish peak. On 4/8 Hirano presented his Kaiten sansaku to the Court, and two days later Hisamitsu entered Osaka. Hori Jirō had already apprised Hisamitsu of the extremist plot, however. The result was that Saigō Takamori and several other Satsuma retainers were arrested and sent back to Kagoshima, while Hisamitsu issued an order forbidding Satsuma samurai from participating in any revolt or from intriguing with loyalists from other domains. Disappointed in Hisamitsu's lack of loyalist fervor and unable to remain safely at the Satsuma residence any longer, Hirano departed the Kyoto area on 4/12 in the company of a Satsuma friend, Imuta Naohira, intending to appeal to Kuroda Nagahiro.

The Kuroda cortege had been traveling several days behind Hisamitsu's procession and was at that time lodged at Okuradani, in Harima province. Hirano and Imuta arrived on 4/13 and immediately notified Nagahiro of the situation at Kyoto, apparently advising him...
against proceeding further. Imuta was arrested that night by Satsuma agents, but evidently their message convinced Nagahiro to alter his plans, for on 4/15 word was sent to Edo that Nagahiro had suddenly taken ill and was returning to Fukuoka.\textsuperscript{18} Accepting the futility of rebellion at this time, Hirano accompanied his lord's retinue on the return journey, presenting along the way a memorial suggesting that Nagahiro stay in Fukuoka for twenty days only, after which he should return to Kyoto with a large body of troops to lead the attack on the bakufu.\textsuperscript{19} Two days later as Nagahiro prepared to sail from Shimonoseki for the return to Fukuoka, Hirano was arrested and escorted back to the han where he was jailed within the confines of Fukuoka Castle.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Mediating for the Court, 1862/8 - 1863/3}

Having arrived back in Fukuoka on 4/29, Kurōda Nagahiro waited there to appraise the success of Hisamitsu's proposals and to allow Chōshū to play out its option before he decided to commit himself to any definite action. At Kyoto the Court approved Hisamitsu's program early in 1862/5 and the Imperial envoy, Ōhara Shigetomi, exited the capital on 5/22 to present the bakufu with a three-point missive drawn up by fellow noble, Iwakura Tomomi. Iwakura's message, containing the essence of Hisamitsu's proposals, was comprised of three demands: first, the shogun was to lead the various daimyo to the Court for an Imperial conference to discuss the expulsion of the foreigners; secondly, the bakufu was to allow the Court to appoint five overseers
to supervise national political affairs; lastly, Edo was to appoint Tokugawa (Hitotsubashi) Yoshinobu as shogunal heir and Matsudaira Keiei as tairō. 21

The bakufu was well aware of the contents of the message Ōhara was carrying to Edo, and as his approach grew imminent a crisis developed within the inner circles of its administration as the officials sought to arrive at a joint decision on what course of action to follow. His authority and confidence shaken, Kuze Hirochika resigned his position at the head of the rojū council just five days prior to Ōhara's arrival on 6/7. Three weeks later, its leadership in disarray, the bakufu ultimately accepted the third of Ōhara's demands; Tokugawa Yoshinobu was named as shogunal guardian and Matsudaira Keiei received appointment as seiji sōsai (supreme councilor), a position equivalent to tairō. 22 With the third and most important of the demands a fait accompli the bakufu was now placed in the hands of the former leaders of the Hitotsubashi party, as the Court surpassed the bakufu as the ultimate source of authority within the country. Having engineered the realignment, Hisamitsu returned jubilantly to Kyoto only to find that the tables of political fortune had turned once again. Under Chōshū's careful guidance the opportunistic Court was demanding a more radical approach to its relations with the bakufu.

Earlier, when it had became evident to Chōshū that Nagai's mediation had failed and that Satsuma had gained the advantage at the Court, the men from Hagi concluded that their only hope for success was to present the Court with an alternate plan, even more favorable to Imperial prestige than Satsuma's. Thus began a trend towards a
growing emphasis on the respect due the Court, matched by an attitude increasingly critical of the bakufu. Working to undermine Hisamitsu's efforts, Chōshū decided after 7/6 to favor the extremists whom Hisamitsu had tried to suppress and to actively began pressuring the Court for more extreme measures. As it turned out, Chōshū's maneuverings in Kyoto while Hisamitsu was absent at Edo with the Ōhara mission not only returned them to ascendency at the Court, but also provided the way for Fukuoka to involve itself in the effort to mediate for kōbugattai.

On 1862/7/20 the Chōshū lord expressed doubts to the Court concerning the success of the Satsuma mediation, since only the third demand had been accomplished. Instead, he suggested that Chōshū be allowed to join the mediatory efforts then being conducted at Edo. As a result, on 7/25 the Chōshū daimyo was given an Imperial order for his heir to proceed to Edo, while he was to remain behind to handle affairs at Kyoto. In the meantime, however, the udajin (minister of the right) Nijō Nariyuki had on 7/23 relayed a secret Court order (naichoku) to Fukuoka's officers at Kyoto commanding Nagahiro to exert himself on behalf of the Court for the establishment of "kōbu shinboku" (Friendship between Court and bakufu). Similar orders were given to a total of fourteen han, but Chikuzen, Satsuma, and Chōshū were especially asked to serve as mediators between Court and bakufu.

The naichoku received from Nijō was transmitted to Fukuoka where it arrived on 8/7. The same day in Kyoto, Nakayama Tadayasu relayed a message to Chōshū confirming that the Emperor desired that both treaties (1854 and 1858) with the West be revoked. When word of this
pronouncement spread the sonnō-jōi loyalists rallied around Chōshū as it quickly came to dominate the Kyoto scene. In Fukuoka, Kuroda Nagahiro was preparing to renounce his strong advocacy of kaikoku in order to follow the Court's decision for a policy of jōi.

Answering the Court's call to action, during the intercalary eighth month of 1862 Nagahiro sent his chief karō, Kuroda Yamashiro, to Edo; and three karō-class vassals--Uragami Shinano, Tachibana Uneme (Yamashiro's son), and Hisano Ichikaku--to Kyoto. At Edo, Yamashiro quickly consulted with Hitotsubashi officials and then departed for Kyoto where the other Fukuoka emissaries had already commenced discussions with the Nijō family. At this point, the marriage relationship between the Kuroda house and the Nijō took on particular significance, for it was around the Kyoto residence of the high-ranking Nijō that Fukuoka's activities centered, just as Satsuma utilized their connection with the Konoe. On int.8/25 Uragami, Tachibana, and Hisano met jointly with Nijō Nariyuki. Two days later the Court requested Chōshū's mediation for the bakufu's acceptance of its strong jōi policy, while the day following Yabu Kosaburō, Fukuoka's chief resident official at Kyoto, met privately to discuss Court affairs with Nariyuki. Meanwhile, Shimazu Hisamitsu, disgusted with the turn of events at Kyoto, headed southward for Kagoshima.

When the Chikuzen officials reported their findings at Kyoto, particularly that which Nijō told them concerning the appointment of Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Matsudaira Keiei, Nagahiro decided that it was time for him to proceed to Kyoto. Departing Fukuoka on 9/28 he arrived in Kyoto on 10/18 and was immediately presented with an
Imperial order commanding him to stay in the city and assist in the
defense of the capital. Over the next several days Nagahiro
consulted with Nijō, Konoe, and Takatsukasa. Finally, on 10/25 he was
presented with a Court order to proceed to Edo to help mediate for
bakufu acceptance of the jōi order then being taken to Edo by Sanjō
and Anenokōji, whom the Court had appointed as Imperial messengers.
While he was gone his chief vassals were to remain behind to continue
to guard the city.

With a specific Court order as backing, Nagahiro set out the
following day for Edo to help convince the bakufu to bow to the
Emperor's wishes and accept the Court's expulsionist policy as their
own. Arriving on 11/9 the Kuroda daimyo immediately set about his
task, working primarily through Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Matsudaira
Keiei to accomplish the Court's purpose. On 11/12, a bakufu con­
ference was held in which the decision was made to obey the Court jōi
order; by the 27th a reply was composed for the Court, also agreeing
to a shogunal procession to Kyoto the following spring. Thereafter,
over the next two months Nagahiro was given audiences at Edo Castle
no fewer than five times as he continued his efforts to mediate in
national affairs.

While preparations were being made for the shogun to depart for
his procession to the Court, Nagahiro took leave of Edo on 1863/2/8 to
return to Kyoto. Arriving on 2/14, the day after Iemon had set out
from Edo, Nagahiro reported his mission to the kampaku, followed by
consultations with Nijō Nariyuki the next day. On 2/16 he joined
Matsudaira Keiei, Yamauchi Toyoshige and several other daimyo in an
audience with the Emperor during which each was bestowed an Imperial cup.\textsuperscript{33} Having received gratitude for his work at Edo, Nagahiro remained in Kyoto until 3/1. Then, with the shogun just three days from Kyoto, Kuroda suddenly left for home with the explanation that he had to attend to the defense of Nagasaki and domain coastal waters.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, the Satsuma attack on several Englishmen at Namamugi the previous autumn had magnified the necessity for an expanded surveillance, but a more important reason for Nagahiro's departure was the fact that he had used his defense assignment as an excuse not to accompany the shogun on his Kyoto procession. Han officials feared that if Nagahiro was found to still be in Kyoto when the shogun arrived, then the relationship with the bakufu might suffer.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Fukuoka's \textit{Kōbugattai} Initiative, 1863/3 - 1863/9}

After the return to Fukuoka in 1863/3, Nagahiro adopted a vastly more conciliatory attitude toward the loyalists whom he had punished two years earlier. Not only had his own public utterances been brought more into line with the Court's \textit{sonno-jōi} posture, but he had recognized from his experiences in Kyoto the potential for utilizing the loyalist activists as informants and negotiators to carry out his own plans. The reception of the Imperial decree requesting his efforts for \textit{kōbugattai} had been a turning point in Nagahiro's attitude, but thereafter he followed his own interpretation of national interests in what became a consistent and unswerving advocacy of the absolute need for harmony, unity, and moderation. His principles were "harmony
between Court and bakufu" (Tenbaku goichiwa), "the jōi of a unified realm" (zenkoku ittō no jōi), and absolute avoidance of domestic disturbance (kokunai tairitsu soran) in the face of the foreign threat. 36

As a result of direct intercession from the Court, Hirano Kuniomi was released from prison on 3/29, 37 following which he received appointment to domain office as a prison official! Several months later Nagahiro celebrated his successful procession to the capital and receipt of the Imperial cup by pardoning Tsukigata Senzō and the other loyalists then in confinement. For some, like Tsukigata, the pardon was conditional, and they were still forbidden total freedom of action until the following year. 38 In effect, the loyalists were placed on probation to test their willingness to work within the domain structure in accordance with Nagahiro's principles without resorting to further acts of disruption.

Despite his acceptance of sonnō-jōi policy, Nagahiro's views of Court-bakufu unity did not entail a denial of the bakufu. Rather he advocated bringing the bakufu into line with the Emperor's wishes. For the Kuroda lord, the bakufu still had the prerogative to unify the country in fulfilling Imperial desires, and within that line of duty it should continue to maintain jurisdiction over the han. Restorationist plots and anti-bakufu behavior were therefore not acceptable, despite the purity of their loyalist motives. An even more important case against disruptive action, however, derived from the fear of foreign intervention. That threat was to become even more apparent as a result of soon to be realized Western attacks on Kagoshima and Shimonoseki.
Within two weeks of Nagahiro's return to Fukuoka, reports were received from Kagoshima concerning the outbreak of hostilities with the foreigners there, an outgrowth of the Namamugi affair. This immediately caused concern at Fukuoka over potential changes at Nagasaki, so Kuroda Harima was sent with troop reinforcements to oversee its defense operation. Fortunately no serious repercussions developed and Harima was able to return on 5/4. In the interim Hirado han had sent messengers on two occasions requesting information from Fukuoka on issues of defense policy. On 4/3 one of the Hirado karō had been dispatched to inquire after the handling of emergency situations with the foreigners; and later on 4/15 he returned with questions concerning the difficult subject of indemnity negotiations with England (in the Namamugi affair). These and subsequent examples clearly show the influence which Fukuoka was capable of exerting in Kyushu, particularly among the smaller han who were forced to regard the attitudes of their more powerful neighbors with strictest care.

The letter which Nagahiro sent with the returning Hirado official in answer to inquiries concerning the status of the Hirado-Fukuoka relationship is especially significant because it foreshadows the emergence of an initiative from Fukuoka for a unified Kyushu policy of kōbugattai activity. The opinion reads:

As [you have] expressed, we have entered difficult times. With regard to unified action, of which you are concerned, we have cordial intent toward our neighbors; already, in the present consultation we have frankly discussed affairs relative to current events...

Within several months Nagahiro was ready to call for a full alliance between the large and small domains of Kyushu to support bakufu and
Court in kobugattai policy. In large measure, his actions were directly aimed at countering the danger presented by the growing radicalization of Chōshū, whose actions were of special concern to Fukuoka not only because they contradicted Nagahiro's desire to avoid domestic disturbance, but because Chōshū's geographic proximity meant that Chōshū politics had direct bearing on the internal situation in Fukuoka as well.

The advocates of an extremist jōi policy at Kyoto had been demanding throughout the early months of 1863 that the bakufu set an early date for the actual expulsion of the foreigners to begin. In 1863/2 the bakufu had sent word to the Court replying that action against the Westerners would commence in the middle of the fourth month. Since no further notice was given, on 4/16 the Chōshū lord forwarded a memorial to the Court with a request that a specific date be fixed so that the Mori retainers could make the needed military preparations. Four days thereafter, the bakufu established the date of 5/10 as the deadline to commence jōi action. When the appointed day finally arrived the Chōshū batteries near Shimoseki reverberated with the sound of war as a United States merchant ship was shelled while attempting to negotiate the dangerous strait. Alone among all the domains in Japan, Chōshū had taken action. Retribution came swiftly in the form of an attack by foreign warships in early 1863/6 which caused severe damage at both Hagi and Chōfu. The implications of the attack were felt in Fukuoka as well, since the han was forced to watch more carefully the activities of the numerous foreign ships operating in nearby Chikuzen coastal waters.
The commencement of expulsionist attacks on the foreigners by Chōshū was matched by an increased radicalization at Kyoto where Chōshū and her extremist supporters pushed the Court to take the initiative in leading a nationwide campaign to expel the foreigners. However, their efforts, accentuated by a campaign of terrorism, sparked a violent reaction from among the more moderate kōbugattai nobles. On 1863/8/18, backed by the military force of Satsuma and Aizu, the kōbugattai forces successfully carried out a coup d'etat at the Court. As a result the extremist nobles were expelled from the Court and Chōshū, effectively blocked from access to the inner Court upon whose legitimacy its loyalist policies relied, was forced to retire from an active role at Kyoto. After a season of declining influence, the kōbugattai nobles and daimyo were now in firm control of the national polity.

In the background of events which led to the Kyoto coup of 8/18, Fukuoka played an important role in the formation of an alliance of Kyushu daimyo willing to support the policies of kōbugattai. To a considerable degree the strength of the Satsuma position during its drive to unseat Chōshū at the Court derived from the support which this Kyushu alliance provided. Although the influence, and even the existence, of the alliance has not been well recognized, it formed a significant core of strength within the overall kōbugattai movement, continuing to exert considerable influence on national and Kyushu developments until the collapse of the kōbugattai movement in 1865.

Ironically, the inspiration for the alliance in Nagahiro's own mind may have derived in part from Hirano Kuniomi's Hōkokusaku ( fungi.
Policy for National Salvation), composed in 1863/5 after his release from prison in Fukuoka. Hirario advised that Nagahiro align himself with the other great han of Kyushu, such as Satsuma, Saga, and Kumanoto, and that together they exert themselves for the Court. Within two months Nagahiro was, in fact, asking that very thing. By the middle of the seventh month of 1863 Nagahiro had decided that events at Kyoto had deteriorated to the danger point and so on 7/22 he informed the Court that he intended to assist in "fulfilling the Emperor's wishes" and "setting his mind at ease." Although personally unable to intervene because of illness, Nagahiro advised that he would send his heir in his place to accomplish his purposes.

Having decided to send Nagatomo to Kyoto in his stead, Nagahiro felt that in light of the situation, it would be extremely difficult to accomplish anything of significance without the cooperation of the various great han. Therefore on 7/26 Kawagoe Mataemon and Maki Ichinai were sent together to Kagoshima and Kumamoto to notify them of Fukuoka's plans and ask for their cooperation "in working for the Court so as to calm the Emperor's heart." Similar messages were also relayed to other han, including Hizen, Yanagawa, Kurume, and Hirado. At Hirado a Fukuoka envoy arrived on 7/26 with an opinion stating that "[we have] decided to mediate for harmony between Court and bakufu." The returning responses were in all cases encouraging. Satsuma agreed with the plan, while Kumamoto replied that they would send the daimyo's younger brothers to aid in the cause. The encouraging answer of Matsuura Akira, daimyo of Hirado, was apparently the most eloquent: "Having the intent of loyalty toward
Court and bakufu is in reality the most important task of the present moment, and the most praiseworthy....We pray for the eternal success of Court and bakufu."\textsuperscript{48}

The response from the Kyushu han was encouraging. By early in 1863/3 there had developed a clear alliance between Satsuma, Higo, and Chikuzen, who had all committed themselves to send their respective daimyo or heir to Kyoto to push for kōbugattai. Based on this alliance and the support of various other Kyushu lords, Nagahiro made preparations to send Nagatomo to Kyoto. But before their plans for mediation could be put into action, the palace coup d'état of 8/18 ousted Chōshū, drastically altering the national scene. Interestingly, one of the first acts of the Court following the coup was to summon the heirs of Kanazawa and Fukuoka, the daimyo of Kurume, and the brother of Higo's daimyo to Kyoto.

Nagahiro was of course pleased with the overwhelming success of the kōbugattai party, but he feared the potential repercussions. Armed conflict had been only narrowly averted, and now open schism threatened the security of the realm. Therefore, when several of the han Elders proposed that the union of Satsuma, Higo, and Chikuzen proceed with their plans to mediate for kōbugattai, but also include mediation for the forgiveness of Chōshū, he was immensely pleased.\textsuperscript{49} So it was that with a view toward working for the Imperial country and preventing civil war, Fukuoka embarked on a plan to aid Chōshū.
In the aftermath of the Satsuma-Aizu coup of 8/18 Chōshū lost its favored position at Court and the Chōshū troops quickly withdrew from the capital to the Mōri domain where they could assess their political losses and reconsider future plans. The changes within the Court itself had resulted in orders being given for the confinement of twelve of the activist nobles, but seven chose not to accept the punishment and fled to Chōshū where they sought protection from their former benefactors. Led by the youthful Sanjō Sanetomi, the seven activist nobles soon settled down at Mitajiri, and gathered around themselves a band of loyalist followers who rapidly organized themselves into a pseudo-military unit called the "Loyal and Brave Company," or Chuyūtai. Its members included many of the extremist rōnin who had been active at Kyoto. Some had traveled westward with the exile nobles, while others soon joined them when they found the political climate under the new kobugattai rule unhealthy for their continued freedom and safety.

The news of the coup d'etat at Kyoto and the arrival of the seven nobles at Mitajiri was rather disconcerting to Kuroda Nagahiro, who had reason to fear that the unrest so clearly evident in Chōshū might easily spread to his own domain. Besides several notable rōnin from Tosa and Kurume, it was known that a number of Fukuoka samurai were also active in Chōshū and that Nakamura Enta was then acting as Sanjō's steward. Nagahiro's fears were well-grounded, since almost immediately after Sanjō's arrival in Chōshū Ono Kaga and two Fukuoka samurai
arrived at Mitajiri bearing a Tenmangu amulet from the chief-priest at Dazaifu. Sanjō, who was related to Ōtorii Shinzen, entrusted Ono with a return letter to Ōtorii at his residence, known as the Enjū-in. Shortly thereafter Sanjō and Sawa, another of the exile nobles, sent a letter with the Fukuoka rōnin Senta Tansaburō to Yano Baian, a former karō and leading member of the Fukuoka loyalists. In response to the nobles' appeal for loyalist action, Yano replied encouragingly that the future of sonnō-jōi in Chikuzen was indeed promising.

Meanwhile, in response to the Court order of 8/19 requesting the presence of Kuroda Nagatomo at Kyoto, plans were continued for joint kōbugattai mediation by Satsuma, Chikuzen, Higo, and various other Kyushu han. On 1863/9/2 Kuroda Yamashiro was sent with a small company of officials to Kagoshima and Kumamoto to inform Satsuma and Higo that Nagahiro was ill, but that Nagatomo would be leaving for Kyoto later that month. In line with Nagahiro's decision to aid Chōshū, the Fukuoka contingent requested that the domains work jointly for kōbugattai and join in a mediatory effort for the forgiveness of Chōshū. Once Yamashiro returned to the domain, preparations progressed quickly for Nagatomo's departure on 9/26.

The procession of the Kuroda heir to Kyoto was a grand undertaking intended to be a major mediatory effort. Included in the entourage were two karō, Kuroda Yamashiro and Uragami Shinano; two yōnin, Nomura Tōma, and Tachibana Uneme; several of Nagahiro's personal advisors; and a large number of loyalists among the more than one thousand accompanying troops. Prior to the departure of this
grand retinue, however, Nagahiro took a very unusual step that reveals much of both his own intentions and the conditions within the han.

As a result of events in Chōshū, the threat of agitation with the han and among the samurai in the heir's cortège was sensed to be real enough that on the day before the scheduled departure Nagahiro called all of the samurai together for a special meeting at the castle. There, before the portraits of the two han ancestors, Josui and Nagamasa, each was required to swear an oath of loyalty and partake of the sacred wine. Nagahiro personally presented them with his own opinion followed by an address by Kuroda Yamashiro on the principle points of han policy. That such a strong measure was thought necessary evidences not only the fear that han leaders had of terrorist acts or social disturbance, but probably most importantly indicates to us Nagahiro's deep-seated desire to maintain a policy of strength through unity and harmony. Before Nagatomo's journey was out, the need for such a basic appeal to the foundations of samurai loyalty would become dramatically apparent.

On 1863/9/26 Kuroda Nagatomo and over one thousand retainers departed Fukuoka on the overland journey to Kyoto. From then until their return on 1864/4/26 the Chikuzen representatives worked through various channels in an unflinching effort to bolster kobugattai and obtain forgiveness for Chōshū. Although Chikuzen's mediation on behalf of Chōshū was the origin of considerable distrust and suspicion from other sources, their devotion was born not necessarily out of any special regard for Chōshū or her policies, but of the desire shared by Nagahiro and his chief vassals to prevent the Chōshū difficulty from developing into an internal schism great enough to spark civil war.
As Nagatomo’s retinue marched through Chōshū early in 1863/10, he was approached on several instances with petitions for his mediatory services. The exile court nobles, Sanjō and Sanjōnishi, sent a messenger on 10/2 to secretly request that Nagatomo intercede on their behalf at the Court. Likewise the Chōshū daimyo directed Takenaka Oribe to visit the Kuroda procession and request assistance in the present difficulties. Two days later, as Nagatomo passed near Iwakuni, the seat of one of Chōshū’s branch han, Kikkawa Tsunemoto also asked that Nagatomo mediate on behalf of the Mōri lord and his son. In fact, the decision to aid Chōshū had already been made prior to Nagatomo’s departure. These various pleas only served to strengthen Chikuzen resolve and confirm their sense of mission in the present undertaking.

Arriving in Kyoto on 10/19 Nagatomo and the Fukuoka retainers devoted themselves over the next several months to a diligent and consistent effort to counter divisive tendencies within the country by pleading for the forgiveness of Chōshū and the reinstatement of the exile nobles. Using established relationships with the Nijō, and with Satsuma, Higo, Hitotsubashi, Uwajima, and other daimyo, Fukuoka argued for moderation and a lenient treatment of Chōshū’s wrongdoing. During his five and one-half months of residence in Kyoto, Nagatomo also became a key figure in the kobugattai ruling faction, participating in the numerous Imperial conferences and private consultations where the major decisions of national policy were formulated.

The mediation began in earnest on 11/3 when Nagatomo joined several other daimyo in a meeting with emperor Kōmei, while elsewhere
in Kyoto his karō, Kuroda Yamashiro, was in audience with Shimazu Hisamitsu arguing for a renewal of harmony between Satsuma and Chōshū and a quick return of Sanjō and the other exile nobles. On 11/9 Hisamitsu came to see Nagatomo at his residence, and the following day the Fukuoka heir returned the visit. Then on 11/20 Hisamitsu sent one of his retainers to consult with Matsudaira Keiei, Date Munenari, and Nagatomo concerning demands for a second shogunal procession to Kyoto. The kobugattai lords expressed their approval and soon Chikuzen's Hisano Ichikaku joined representatives from Satsuma, Echizen, Uwajima, and Higo in a journey eastward to present the demands to the Edo government. Thereafter on 12/1, 12/6, 12/23, 12/25 and numerous other occasions Nagatomo met with Nijō, Konoe, Hisamitsu, Keiei, Yoshinobu, the Nagaoka brothers of Higo, and others of the kobugattai leadership to discuss the punishment of Chōshū, relations with the bakufu, and other crucial issues of the day. At the same time, Kuroda Yamashiro, Urakami Shinano, and other Fukuoka samurai also carried on frequent discussions with the kobugattai leaders and their advisors in order to persuade them to accept a more lenient policy toward Chōshū.

By the second month of 1864, the Fukuoka mediatory effort was forced into a second, more active phase. On 2/8 Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Matsudaira Keiei, Date Munenari, Shimazu Hisamitsu, and Yamauchi Toyoshige met at Nijō palace with the shogun and his advisors where they unitedly resolved to force Chōshū to surrender the exile nobles and repent of its past misdeeds. Orders were dispatched to various han for a potential military expedition should Chōshū refuse to cooperate.
but after Fukuoka stoutly contested this policy, the Court withdrew its support and the plan was abandoned. Again, the issue was open for debate so on 2/21 the kampaku, Nijō Nariyuki, called for opinions on the punishment of Chōshū. During the next month Nagatomo presented four memorials to the Court in support of Chōshū and the sonnō-jōi cause. By this time, the former unity of the kobugattai leadership was on the wane and several daimyo, including Yamauchi Toyoshige of Tosa, resigned their advisory positions with the Court and dejectedly returned home. Fukuoka utilized the advantage to its fullest to push for their own version of kobugattai.

Nagatomo's first memorial submitted on 2/23 stated a desire for leniency toward Chōshū, suggesting that suppression of Chōshū would result in a general outburst of loyalist activity throughout the country. Four days later a second memorial was presented to the Court concerning the summons of the Chōshū branch daimyo and Chōshū karō to Osaka. Nagatomo expressed his opinion that permission also be granted for them to enter Kyoto (they were then barred from doing so) lest denial of that privilege be more a cause for indignation than repentance. The third memorial submitted in 1864/2 concerned the conditions for Chōshū's forgiveness, particularly relative to the return of the seven nobles. However, it also expressed support of the general policies of kobugattai, including two proposals that were causing considerable friction between Hisamatsu's group and the bakufu leadership. As a means of showing the people the actual results of bakufu acceptance of the Court's jōi policy, Nagatomo explained, negotiations must press forward for the closing of Yokohama port. In addition, he
proposed that the bakufu order all daimyo to return to their own domains so as to devote full time and energy to coastal defense.

While Nagatomo was busy negotiating and memorializing at Kyoto he dispatched Kitaoka Yūhei, Togawa Sagoemon, and Shirozu Haku to Yamaguchi to discuss possible terms for Chōshū's repentance with the Chōshū daimyo. After meeting with Lord Mōri on 3/1, Shirozu returned to Fukukoka to report to Nagahiro, while Kitaoka and Togawa traveled first to Iwakuni for consultation with the Kikkawa, and then on to Kyoto to report the results of their mission to the Fukuoka heir. Following their return on 3/16, Nagatomo presented a final memorial to both the Court and the bakufu reporting on conditions in Chōshū and requesting permission to meet with the Chōshū daimyo and his son in the course of his upcoming return to Fukuoka so as to personally transmit the Imperial will and urge his repentance. Having announced his intention to return to Fukuoka, Nagatomo was given an audience with the shogun at Nijō palace on 4/2 and was presented with a ceremonial sword for his diligent efforts in working for kōbugattai. The following day he similarly presented himself before the Emperor and was given gifts and a naichoku ordering him to meet with the Mōri daimyo to persuade him to be obedient to Imperial wishes.

Thus commissioned by the Emperor, Nagatomo set out from Kyoto on 1864/4/4 headed for home by way of Chōshū. Prior to his departure he had sent Kitaoka Yūhei and Machii Jirōbei to Yamaguchi to inform Chōshū of the Emperor's wishes and to make proper arrangements for his passage through Chōshū and meeting with the Mōri heir. These envoys arrived in Chōshū on 4/11, and completing the necessary
arrangements, returned on 4/14 to rejoin the main procession. In the meantime, however, urgent news had reached Nagatomo at Himeji that Maki Ichinai, the leading member of Kuroda Yamashiro's ruling faction then resident at Fukuoka, had been assassinated in the pre-dawn hours of 3/24, while several other samurai had aided Nakamura Enta in escaping from prison. The courier bringing the news reported that the general opinion in Fukuoka was that the Choshū ronin had instigated this unprecedented event.

In fact, Maki's assassination and Enta's escape were both engineered by extremist loyalists from within Fukuoka, as soon became apparent. Upon investigation, a "Declaration of Crimes" was found, signed by Nakahara Dewanokami (Matsuda Gorokurō) and Yoshida Taro, stating the reasons for Maki's death:

This person has in past years acted in a cunning manner and has spoken disparagingly of the loyal shishi. Since then he has increasingly become arbitrary in utilizing domain authority. Even seeking personal profit, he has neglected the government, and thus as a great traitor to the realm he has invited the infliction of Heavenly punishment. Therefore, upon such an individual have the 'men of will' (yuushi) inflicted the punishment of Heaven.

Choshū was not unrelated, however, since Matsuda, Yoshida, Nakamura Enta, Enta's younger brother, Tsunejirō, and Kofuji Heizō all fled Chikuzen for Choshū where they joined other extremist ronin in the Choshū shotaï (irregular military units).

When Nagatomo's procession heard of this turn of events at Fukuoka they were apprehensive of proceeding through Choshū for fear of reprisals against Nagatomo. Urakami Shinano favored diverting to a sea route so as to avoid Choshū, but Kuroda Yamashiro overruled him;
since they were going to Chōshū to carry out an Imperial order, he said, they should press on without deliberation. The following day Nakamura Itaru arrived from Fukuoka to report that Nagahiro had commissioned Takatorii Yōha, Egami Einoshin, and Hayakawa Isamu to enter Chōshū, on the pretense of leaving the han, to look for Enta and survey conditions within Chōshū. Therefore, in the same fashion, Nagatomo publicly exiled Mori Yasuhei, Mandai Yasunosho, and Ozaki Yasuke from among his own troops and sent them to Mitajiri to secretly carry out his wishes.

Nagatomo's palanquin finally reached Ogeri, near Yamaguchi, where the meeting with the Chōshū heir was successfully accomplished on 1864/4/20. While at Ogeri, the "exiles" Nagatomo had sent to Mitajiri reported that a group of Fukuoka rōnin, urged on by Chikushi Mamoru, a 1,000 koku samurai recently arrived from Fukuoka, were plotting to attack Nagatomo's entourage, kill Machii Jirōbei, and then reform Fukuoka's han policy. Ultimately Mori Yasuhei, Egami Einoshin, and others of the loyalists, including even Nakamura Enta, were able to forestall the plot, but the rōnin threatened that if Machii and other "evil" retainers were not immediately removed from office upon Nagatomo's return, then they would come to punish them in Fukuoka.

After seven months of near continual effort on behalf of Chōshū, Nagatomo finally returned to Fukuoka Castle on 1864/4/26. The fruits of his labor soon became apparent as word arrived from Kyoto reporting that on 4/18 Nagahiro had again been raised in Court rank to saishō with Nagatomo increased one rank as well. The following month messengers arrived from the Mōri lord thanking Fukuoka for the heir's
Ogōri visit. Sanjō too sent a letter to Yamashiro expressing appreciation for Fukuoka's mediatory efforts. The procession had succeeded in many ways, not the least of which was the cooperation that had been extended by the loyalists in working within han guidelines for han goals. While loyalist parties had been suppressed in Tosa, Hizen, and other areas, the Fukuoka loyalists were just coming to the fore.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VI


2. Beasley, _The Meiji Restoration_, p. 175; and _Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy_, p. 203.


7. Craig, _Chōshū_, p. 171.


9. Deatails on the expectations of the extremists relative to Hisamitsu's arrival and the subsequent conflict between the two groups can be found in Craig, _Chōshū_, pp. 175-177; Beasley, _The Meiji Restoration_, pp. 184-186; and Haruyama, _Hirano Kuniomi den_, pp. 420-52.

10. The complete text of the _Kaiten sansaku_ may be found in Haruyama, _Hirano Kuniomi den_, pp. 432-36; and an annotated version in Yoshida and _Satō_, eds., _Bakumatsu seiji ronshū_, pp. 266-68.
11. Fujii Jintarō (藤井甚太郎), "文久年間 ... 長津公の公武の間に周旋 (Bunkyū nenkan... Nagahiro kō no kōbu no aida ni shūsen), "史談会速記録 (Shidankai sokkīroku), 41, 132.

12. ibid., pp. 130-132.

13. Hisamitsu had been greatly disturbed by Nagahiro's recent attempt to prevent the release of Yamada and the karo, Shimazu Saemon. See Omodaka Shōjun (面高正俊), "定府とその系譜の研究 (Jofu to sono keifu no kenkyū)," in (Kagoshima no rekishi to shakai), comp. Kagoshima Daigaku Kyoiku Gakubu Shakaika Kenkyūshitsu (鹿児島大学教育学部社会科研究室) (Dentō to Gendai Sha, 1979), pp. 50, 79-81.


16. ibid., pp. 423-32.

17. ISK, 4:42; Ishin shi, 3:80; and Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 439-42.

18. "文久二年三月長津御参府御道中日記 (Bunkyū ni nen sangatsu Narihiro go sampu godōchū nikki)," Kuroda monjo, no. 260, pp. 159ff. See also Nagahiro kō den, 2:89-92; Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 430-43; and ISK, 4:45-46.

19. ISK, 4:50. The text of Hirano's memorial is found in Haruyama, Hirano Kuniomi den, pp. 444-46.
21. See Craig, Chōshū, p. 177.
22. Craig, Chōshū, p. 178.
23. Craig, Chōshū, pp. 185-87.
24. ISK, 4:114. Again the text is in Nagahiro kō den, 2:104.
26. For the particulars of Chōshū activity, see Craig, Chōshū, pp. 188-98.
27. Nagahiro kō den, 2:104-105, and "Fukuoka nendai ki."
29. ISK, 4:181; and Nagahiro kō den, 2:106.
30. Nagahiro kō den, 2:107; and ISK, 4:199.
33. Nagahiro kō den, 2:111.
34. ISK, 4:342; and Fujii, "Bunkyū nenkan," pp. 143-44.
35. For the Namamugi incident see Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, pp. 183, 199-200.

37. Takahara Kenjiro (高原謙次郎), "維新日記(Ishin nikki)," in FKSS, 9.461. A photocopy of the original and complete ms. is in the author's possession.

38. Nagano, Tsukigata ke ichimon, p. 36.


41. "御用人日記(Goyōnin nikki)," quoted in ibid., p. 541.

42. Craig, Chōshū, pp. 199-200.

43. Nagahiro kō den, 2:98.

44. ibid., 2:112.

45. ibid., 2:118-119, although the date is mistakenly given as 1863/7/23. See also Takahara, "Ishin nikki, in FKSS, 9:467-68; ISK, 4:509; and HHKS, 4:31-33.


47. Nagahiro kō den, 2:119; ISK, 4:517; and HHKS, 4:61-63, 80.


50. Besides Sanjō, they included: Sanjōnishi Suetomo, Higashiküze
Michitomi, Mibu Mototada, Shijo Korekiyo, Nishikinokōji Yorinori, and Sawa Noriyoshi.

51. For a description of life at Mitajiri with the Chūyūtai see Jansen, Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration, p. 177.

52. Inoue Tadashi (井上忠), "筑前藩の五卿周旋運動について (Chikuzen han no gokyō shūsen undō ni tsuite)," 福岡大学人文論叢 (Fukuoka Daigaku jimbun ronsō), 6.2.3 (1974), 7. Hereafter cited as "Gokyō shūsen."

54. Nagahiro kō den, 2:120; and Ejima, Kitaoka Yuhei, p. 21.

55. Ejima, Kitaoka Yuhei, p. 21. Chōshū records list 1,072 retainers accompanying Nagatomo. See "忠正公伝 (Tadamasa kō den)," 毛利家文庫 (Mori ke bunko) v. 16, ch. 10.

56. ibid., pp. 21-22.

57. ISK, 4:597; and Nagahiro kō den, 3:9-11.

58. ISK, 4:603-4.

59. ISK, 4:608; and Otsuka Takematsu (大塚武松), ed., 吉川経幹周旋記 (Kikkawa Tsunemoto shūsen ki) (Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai, 1926), 1:199-200.

60. ISK, 5:5; and the report of Yamashiro's meeting with Hisamitsu in 伊達宗成在京日記 (Date Munenari zaikyō nikki), (Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai, 1916), pp. 214-16.

61. ISK, 5:22.
62. For Nagatomo's activity see ISK, 5:41-69; and Date Munenari zaikyō nikki, pp. 244, 262, 267, 278, 356-57, 372, 399. His retainers activities can be seen in Date Munenari zaikyō nikki, pp. 220, 253-57, 272, 304, 348, 357.

63. Craig, Chōshū, p. 220.

64. Nishio, "Kuroda Nagahiro," pp. 61-62; and Nagahiro kō den, 3:19-37 for the texts of this and the several memorials which followed. See also Bakumatsu seiji ronshū, pp. 336-228; and HHKS, 4:590-91.

65. ISK, 5:153; and Kikkawa Tsunemoto shūsenki, 1:223.

66. ISK, 5:196-197.


70. ibid., p. 27; ISK, 5:234-35; and HHKS, 4:745-47.

CHAPTER VII

THE FAILURE OF LOYALISM

While Nagatomo was away at Kyoto conducting Fukuoka's mediatory effort, Kuroda Nagahiro remained at Fukuoka to oversee han affairs and direct the kōbugattai effort. He had come to appreciate more fully the value of loyalist support, and during this interim several loyalists, including Tsukigata Senzō, were appointed to domain office. As we have already seen, Nagahiro dispatched three of the loyalists to search for Nakamura Enta and to generally survey conditions in Chōshū. Their success in dealing with the activists within Chōshū and in blocking the planned attack on Nagatomo's retinue further convinced Nagahiro of their usefulness in diplomacy with the other domains.

Several days prior to Nagatomo's arrival at Ogōri to meet with the Mōri heir, Sanjō Sanetomi had sent Hijikata Hisamoto to Fukuoka with a letter to Nagahiro urging him to appoint Yano Baian and his sei- gi ("righteous," i.e. loyalist) companions to positions in the han government. Nagahiro replied on 4/27 that he would follow his present path of mediation in order to prevent further disorder, but not long after Nagatomo's return it became clear that national events would lead Fukuoka to a stronger stand in support of Chōshū and sonnō-jōi. Within several months time the loyalists Ōoto Inaba and Yano Baian were made karō and given control over han government, while Kuroda Yamashiro, who had been the dominant figure in the bureaucratic administration for more than a decade, was released on 1864/9/21.
Meanwhile forces in Choshū were planning a countercoup to oust the kobugattai party from control over the Court and regain Choshū's dominant position at Kyoto. On 6/4 while the first contingents of Choshū men were heading for Kyoto, Nakamura Enta, who was then in Choshū with Sanjō Sanetomi, wrote to his loyalist friends, Chikushi Mamoru, Tsukigata Senzō, and Asaka Ichisaku, proposing that Chikuzen send troops to aid in Choshū's cause. Their answer was negative. No troops were sent, and Choshū's failed attack on the Forbidden Gate (kinmon) on 7/19 resulted in the issuance four days later of the bakufu order for the First Choshū Expedition. Branded as "enemies of the Court," Choshū's forces withdrew again to their han only to suffer another defeat, this time in Shimonoseki by the combined fleets of Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States.

Averting Civil War, 1864/7-1864/12

The "Incident at the Forbidden Gate" on 1864/7/19 was a severe setback to Nagahiro's declared policy of national unity and harmony, and in its wake Fukuoka came increasingly under attack for its policy of support for Choshū. From the kampaku, Nijō Nariyuki, at Court and the Hitotsubashi house at Edo came letters expressing opposition to the mediation in which Chikuzen had been engaged. Then the bakufu sent orders directing Fukuoka to scout against Choshū, and as vice-commander of the assault forces to lead the attack on Choshū's southern flank. It was obvious that Nagahiro's position was becoming extremely difficult to maintain, but if he wavered in his principles, the
four-nation attack on Shimonoseki surely strengthened his commitment to continue mediatory efforts. To Nagahiro the Shimonoseki attack was further concrete evidence of the danger which internal disturbance presented and amplified his conviction that civil war would only invite foreign intervention on a much wider scale. In order to save the nation from unmitigated disaster, mediation to prevent the eruption of hostilities was an absolute necessity.

Nagahiro thus met with both high and mid-ranking officials and called for opinions from the loyalists in an effort to formulate a united approach to the difficulties presented by recent developments. With the support of the tairō, Kuroda Harima, and newly appointed karō, Ōoto Inaba, it was decided that "full efforts should be expended for Chōshū mediation, without attempting to evade accusation." The primary spokesmen of this policy were Yano Baian, who called on the han to aid Chōshū, and Tsukigata Senzō, who supported cooperation with both Satsuma and Chōshū. Soon Nagahiro was utilizing both loyalist leaders: Yano was called in 1864/8 to the post of karō and joined with Ōoto in directing han government, while Tsukigata received a special appointment to work for the reconciliation of Satsuma and Chōshū.

Once han policy had been decided, Chikuzen quickly set about attempting to settle the Chōshū problem without the need for resorting to arms. On 8/1 Okayama han, which had also been active in mediating for Chōshū, dispatched messengers to Fukuoka and Higo inquiring after their opinions concerning the call for troops against Chōshū. Perhaps in part a response to the Okayama messengers, Nagatomo sent a letter to Higo on 8/7 seeking continued cooperation in national affairs. Both
Kuroda and Hosokawa replied to the Ikeda lord that, while the bakufu action was undesirable, it would be difficult to stop the expedition. 9 Thereafter on 8/14 while Kikkawa Tsunemoto, daimyo of Iwakuni, was sending Katsura Kyūrōbei to Fukuoka to request Chikuzen's assistance on behalf of Chōshū, Fukuoka had ordered Takebe Takehiko, Ochi Shōheita, and Asaka Ichisaku to proceed to Yamaguchi to investigate details of the foreign attack. 10

Affairs progressed rapidly during the ninth and early tenth months of 1864 as Fukuoka worked for mediatory assistance. The following day Kitaoka Yuhei and a companion arrived in Iwakuni from Fukuoka to meet with the Kikkawa lord. They described to him conditions in Chikuzen, Higo, and Satsuma, and advised that he proceed quickly to Yamaguchi where he should use all diligence to obtain a show of repentance from Chōshū. 11 Accepting Fukuoka's advice, Tsunemoto wrote a letter the very next day informing Chōshū that he had requested mediation from Chikuzen and neighboring Hiroshima; 12 not long thereafter he embarked for Yamaguchi where he arrived on 9/8 for conferences with the Chōshū daimyo. Once at Yamaguchi, Kikkawa became central to the debate proceeding within Chōshū and eventually turned the tide for the takeover of the conservative clique and the punishment of those responsible for the Kyoto attacks. 13

Following the audience with Lord Kikkawa at Iwakuni, Kitaoka traveled on to Kyoto to gain Satsuma's support for a non-military settlement to the Chōshū problem. Meanwhile Chikuzen's effort had apparently gained some recognition of success for on 9/9 the daimyo of
Okayama wrote to the lord of Inaba that they should cooperate with Fukuoka's mediation. On 9/13 Kitaoka received a letter from Kikkawa delivered by Sakai Yōichirō in which the Iwakuni lord explained his activities at Yamaguchi, also asking for assistance from Fukuoka's Kushida Kakuemon to gain acceptance of Chōshū emissaries into Chikuzen. A week later Sakai met with Kushida at Wakamatsu, where he learned that all exchange of messengers was being terminated. Within days, Fukuoka gave official notice that it was severing relations with Chōshū, in order to escape suspicion, but secretly the messengers continued. At about this time, for example, Yano and Ōoto sent Tsukigata Senzō and several loyalist companions inside Chōshū to Iwakuni, Chōfu, and Hagi as unofficial representatives. They explained that recent accusations against Fukuoka prevented the dispatch of official representatives, so Nagahiro had ordered that Senzō be sent purportedly as a spy, an "investigator of the enemy's condition," in order to fulfill bukufu orders while at the same time carrying on the mediation without suspicion.

Meanwhile at Kyoto Kitaoka had succeeded in convincing Saigō of the desirability of a negotiated settlement, and so Saigō directed Takazaki Hyobe to accompany the Fukuoka retainer to Iwakuni. Arriving on 9/30 they encouraged the Iwakuni samurai to push for Chōshū's obedience to the Court and on 10/2 a letter arrived from Tsunemoto requesting that Satsuma also join in mediating for Chōshū. By this time the shift in government within Chōshū was nearly complete, and several days later it was decided to move the government back to Hagi away from the influence of extremist shotai forces at Yamaguchi.
With affairs proceeding well toward Fukuoka's desired goal, Kitaoka returned to Fukuoka on 10/4 to report on developments at Kyoto and Osaka as well as within Chōshū. 18

Late in 1864/10, Tokugawa Keishō, the daimyo of Owari and Commander of the Expeditionary Force, arrived in Hiroshima to oversee the final stages of preparation for the scheduled commencement of hostilities on 11/18. With Saigō Takamori as a member of his staff, Owari was willing to adopt a lenient solution if a way could be found to gain Chōshū's repentence without having to resort to force. Each of the 36 han involved in supplying troops for the expedition had representatives quartered in and around Hiroshima, but Fukuoka's contingent, led by the loyalist Katō Shisho along with Takebe Takehiko, Kanjiro Shōbei, and Shindo Noboru, 20 was especially important in the ongoing negotiations. Eventually it was Saigō with the backing of Fukuoka who was able to negotiate the cessation of hostilities and the First Chōshū Expedition ended peacefully without a shot ever having been fired.

Shortly after his arrival at Hiroshima, Saigō had traveled to Iwakuni in Chōshū where he met with Kikkawa and suggested that the punishment of the three han Elders and four staff officers who had carried out the countercoup at Kyoto might be sufficient to convince the bakufu of the sincerity of Chōshū's repentant attitude. Kikkawa had Saigō's suggestion carried to Hagi where on 11/1 a council of Elders of the main and branch Chōshū domains consented to the above two points plus the transfer of the five nobles (one had died, and one had left to participate in Hirano's Ikuno uprising) as conditions for Chōshū's apology. Thus on 11/11 the three activist Elders, Masuda, Kunishi,
and Fukuhara, were ordered to commit suicide and the four staff commanders of the attack on the Imperial palace were summarily executed. Messengers were sent to Hiroshima, bearing the heads of the ill-fated Elders as evidence that the bakufu demands had been met. In response Owari postponed indefinitely the date for beginning the assault, but there was still the sticky problem of the five nobles remaining. As much as the Hagi government may have wanted to be rid of them, there was little they could do, for the nobles were in the hands of the extremist shotai who adamantly resisted any suggestion of removal. In fact, the nobles had been transferred from Yamaguchi to the Kōzanji at Chōfu where they could be more easily protected.21

While negotiations had been proceeding at Hiroshima, Fukuoka had continued sending messengers to Chōshū and Iwakuni, but some of the Chikuzen loyalists had also arrived in an attempt to block the trend toward conservative domination of Chōshū politics. Earlier, on 10/21 Tsukigata Senzō, Koganemaru Heijirō, Itami Shin'ichirō, and Hayakawa Isamu had all made their way secretly to Tashiro in Hizen where they had agreed with Hirata Oe, a karō of Tsushima han, to unitedly work for loyalist purposes and the reconciliation of Satsuma and Chōshū. Thereafter Koganemaru, one of the Fuchigami brothers of Kurume, and Oe's son, had arrived in Hagi on 10/29 to argue against giving in to bakufu demands or to the suppression of the loyalist party. On 11/12, the day after the punishment of the activist Elders had been carried out, Asaka Ichisaku, Chikushi Mamoru, Hasegawa Hanzō, and Hayakawa Isamu all entered Hagi from Fukuoka for the same purpose. But with Chōshū surrounded by bakufu forces, the Mukunashi government was in no mood to listen to their arguments.22
Meanwhile, the chain of events within Chōshū and the attempt on Inoue Kaoru's life had led Takasugi Shinsaku to flee Chōshū for safety. At Nakamura Enta's suggestion Takasugi left the Shimonoseki home of Shiraishi Shōichirō on 11/2 and, accompanied by Enta and Shiraishi's younger bother, entered Chikuzen where he took refuge at the mountain retreat of the loyalist poet-nun, Nomura Botō, on the outskirts of Fukuoka. Also escorted at times by Hayakawa Isamu and Chikushi Mamoru, Takasugi laid plans with Tsukigata Senzō for a tobaku union of the various Kyushu domains. After nearly three weeks in Chikuzen, Takasugi returned to Chōshū to begin organizing the attack on han offices at Shimonoseki that would eventually lead to the Chōshū civil war and the Second Chōshū Expedition.

By the middle of the eleventh month of 1864, Chōshū had accepted the bakufu's demands for forgiveness, but they remained incapable of taking any action relative to Sanjō Sanetomi and the exile nobles. Here, it was Chikuzen's mediation which found a solution to the problem, and made a peaceful settlement of the First Chōshū Expedition possible. Ironically, however, it also spawned new difficulties within Fukuoka itself which would ultimately result in the destruction of the Chikuzen loyalist party. When the opposition of the shotai had originally appeared as the chief obstacle to the nobles' transfer Saigo Takamori had resolved, in a fashion typical of his character, to confront the shotai himself to persuade them to release the nobles, but Kitaoka Yuhei had arrived in Hiroshima at that point seeking the responsibility for Chikuzen. As a result, Saigo and Yoshii took on the responsibility of suppressing those voices among the expeditionary force.
demanding strict punishment for Chōshū, while Chikuzen was charged with a role of assisting behind the scenes to gain the mutual consent of the Hagi government, the shotai forces, and the nobles themselves.24

On 1864/11/19, Kitaoka arrived at Hiroshima after meetings at Iwakuni and requested that Owari be notified that since conditions within Chōshū would make it most difficult for the five nobles to be directly handed over to a bakufu representative, they could first be "entrusted one each to five great han" while the troops of Satsuma and Hiroshima guarded against any shotai effort to return them.25 Iwakuni had already accepted Kitaoka's proposal, so the following day Owari forwarded two letters to Nagahiro. One assigned the Kuroda lord as overseer of this problem, the other ordered cooperation among the five han following reception of the nobles.

During 1864/12 there was a continuous flow of Fukuoka messengers across the Shimonoseki strait as Fukuoka attempted to persuade all parties to accept the conditions of transfer. In particular it was to the loyalists that Nagahiro turned for assistance because of their contacts among the shotai and their relationships with the nobles. On 11/30 Tsukigata Senzo met with Kitaoka and Saigō at Shimonoseki and after plotting out strategy crossed over to Chōshū to seek Nakamura Enta's help in gaining a solution to the problem. Two days later Hayakawa Isamu gained an audience with Sanjō and the other nobles in which it was emphasized that the transfer of the nobles would bring about the security of Chōshū and the peaceful settlement of the Chōshū Expedition. Isamu thus obtained at this time a request from Sanjō to Nagahiro for mediation on the nobles' behalf.26 The following day
another meeting was held in which the nobles were given written approval that they would not be split among the five han, but transferred to one place. But already on 12/9 Owari had sent instructions to Fukuoka that Chikuzen, Higo, Kurume, Satsuma, and Hizen should each receive one of the nobles into their custody.27

The future fate of the exiled nobles was laid on the balance at a meeting of representatives of Satsuma, Chikuzen, Chōshū, and several other han held in Shimonoseki on 12/13. Attending the conference were Takasugi Shinsaku from Chōshū, Saigō Takamori and Yoshii Kōsuke of Satsuma, Tsukigata Senzō and Hayakawa Isamu of Chikuzen, and several rōnin members of the shotai from Fukuoka and Kurume. It was decided that the nobles should depart after a peace settlement was reached, with a tentative date soon to be set for their departure. On 12/18 a second conference was held at Kokura to decide where the nobles should go, since they demanded that they remain together. Thinking of Sanjo's relation to Ōtorii Shinzen, but also of the tradition of Sugawara Michizane, Tsukigata proposed that they all go to Dazaifu where they could be guarded by representatives of the five han. This plan was vociferously opposed by Kato Shishō who relayed Nagahiro's opinion that he would not receive the nobles at the risk of public criticism of one domain alone. In the end, Kato's rebuttal was turned back by opposition from Yoshii and Tsukigata as well as from Saigō who emphasized that it was natural for the five nobles to remain together.28

Ultimately Nagahiro agreed to the transfer of the five nobles to Chikuzen after receiving a personal visit from Yoshii and a direct appeal from Higo. Undoubtedly he knew of the potential dangers that
the presence of the nobles could bring to the han, for would not the
difficulties Chōshū had encountered because of the nobles continue to
accompany them after their removal?

The Collapse of Loyalist Government, 1865

The transfer of the five nobles transformed Fukuoka into a center
of national attention as the focus that had been on Chōshū now turned
to Fukuoka instead. Although the loyalist dream had failed miserably in
Chōshū and elsewhere throughout the country, the five nobles still
represented to loyalist adherents the hope of Court support and
legitimacy. To the bakufu they were a threat, a symbol of resistance
to authority. Therefore, Edo watched them carefully and tried on
several occasions to have them turned over to the bakufu authorities
for predictable punishment. In fact, the bakufu looked upon the
nobles' transfer to Fukuoka as a grave danger. If Fukuoka joined with
Chōshū and Satsuma then any hope of bakufu control over Kyushu and
Nagasaki would be totally out of the question. It is not surprising,
therefore, that almost immediately pressure was applied on Fukuoka in
order to alienate them from Satsuma and Chōshū and to force the return
of the nobles.

The nobles stayed initially at Akama until 2/11 when they
transferred to Dazaifu where they would remain until called to
participate in the Restoration. During this time Satsuma worked closely
with Chikuzen as they had done in bringing about the transfer of the
nobles. On 2/2 Ōkubo Toshimichi and Yoshii Kōsuke met with Nagatomo
on their way to Kyoto, and ten days later Saigō also had a personal audience with Nagahiro.30 At this time Saigō proposed in secret a joint Satsuma-Chikuzen expedition to Kyoto to aid Choshū and reinstate the nobles at Court. The bakufu had issued orders on 2/5 for the five domains responsible for the nobles' custody to turn over their charges to the bakufu, so on 2/26 Saigō led a conference of representatives from each of the five domains to decide a policy in response to the bakufu's orders. Representing Fukuoka at the Dazaifu conference were Tsukigata Senzō, Chikushi Mamoru, Mandai Jūbei and Misaka Shōbei. The decision, of course, was to disregard the bakufu directive and Saigō soon left for Kyoto along with Fukuoka's Hayakawa Isamu, Chikushi Mamoru, and others in order to mediate for the return of the nobles to the Court.31

The success of the loyalists in obtaining a peaceful conclusion to the Choshū problem led Nagahiro to reform the han administration in 1865/2, as loyalists were increasingly placed into positions of responsibility to the exclusion of the conservative faction. During the second month of 1865 Katō Shishō was made karō and given general jurisdiction over the han while the long-time Elder, Urakami Shinano, was retired from office.32 The appointment of the loyalists resulted in the han being split into factions to an extent not seen before, and many of the conservatives resigned their posts in the hopes that Nagahiro would be forced by the stagnation of the bureaucracy to turn away from his loyalist appointments. With regard to the growth of intra-han factionalism at this time, the contemporary Ichin zasshi records:33
In recent years the Fukuoka retainers have split into loyalist and "vacillation" (injun) parties, and antagonisms have developed between them. The loyalists esteem the purposes of Satsuma and Choshū, emphasizing the joi doctrine in deference to the Court's opinion, increasingly taking up extremist action. They travel to other domains and secretly make friendships, boldly brandishing their self-will in defiance of the orders of high-ranking officials. The "vacillation" party places importance on bakufu orders and prefers government to continue as it has been, swearing that they will overpower the radical loyalist party.

The loyalists, who were outnumbered in the bureaucracy, felt the urgent need to convert as many of the conservative party as possible over to their side. One of their major successes was the persuasion of the tairo, Kuroda Harima, who "was overwhelmed by the arguments of Kato Shishō and finally leaned toward the loyalists." 34 Harima was closely related to Shishō and had actually at one time been designated the heir to the Kato household before circumstances required he return to his original family. 35 In this way, family relationships bound Harima, Shishō, and Takebe Takehiko into a nucleus dominating one sector of the Chikuzen loyalist party. According to the Ishin zasshi, "the radical loyalist compatriots assembled daily at the residences of Yano and Kato and held various deliberations on political forms (seitai) and their reform." 36 Through these high-ranking retainers, increasing pressure was exerted upon Nagahiro to fully commit the domain to loyalist principles. On 1865/3/2, Harima submitted a memorial with the joint signature of the han Elders demanding reform of domain government. 37 Attacking Nagahiro's lack of confidence in loyalist government, it called upon the daimyo to align himself with the collective decisions of the Elders. In so doing it counseled adoption of a policy of fukoku kyohe (Wealthy Country, Strong Military), and a
policy of unity based on support for the loyalists and punishment of the "vacillation" party. Attempting to not alienate Nagahiro it called for a han policy based, as always, on "harmony of Court and bakufu" and support for domestic tranquility.

Despite the loyalists maneuvering, however, the resignations of the conservative faction decimated the bureaucracy and threatened the unified base which Nagahiro had attempted to create for daimyo authority, regardless of his adopted status. Following Urakami's resignation, Nomura Tōma and Hisano Ichikaku requested resignation, as did the urahanyaku Kishida Sezaemon and Ōtsuka Shichizaemon. On 3/12 fourteen bodyguards all resigned and the Elders Okawa and Hayashi, who were just returning to office, both submitted resignations. Nagahiro ordered them to serve, but they soon resubmitted their resignations nonetheless.38

While Nagahiro tried to force the conservative officials to serve, the loyalists resorted to an increasing radicalization, their impatience to reform the han taking the form of force, coercion, and threats. As conservative reaction forced Nagahiro to pause to reconsider his actions, some among the loyalists showed clear intentions of going beyond daimyo authority. Thus in Fukuoka we find the unusual circumstance of the conservative clique passively resisting daimyo authority, not striking out at the loyalists, while their lord was drawn increasingly into confrontation with the loyalist faction.

In 1865/4, as the renewal of the anti-bakufu party within Chōshū became evident, the bakufu made the decision for a Second Punitive Expedition. Influenced by this turn of events both bakufu and Court
began applying pressure on Fukuoka in order to prevent its joining with Chōshū. Were that to happen the bakufu knew that all of southwestern Japan would be lost to its influence. Over the next several months numerous letters were received at Fukuoka from the Nijo, Konoe, bakufu officials at Kyoto, Fukuoka samurai at Kyoto or Edo, or from unnamed individuals all stating that Chikuzen was regarded by Court and bakufu as being of like mind with Satsuma and Chōshū, and that if action against the loyalists were not taken then the Chōshū Expedition would certainly be followed by one against Chikuzen. 39 Specifically they denounced the government of Yano and Katō and demanded their release and the reappointment of conservatives like Urakami or Kuroda Yamashiro. Undeniably these letters had a great impact on Nagahiro and his eventual decision to punish the loyalists, but in fact that trend was already developing.

Evidence of Nagahiro's growing dissatisfaction with the loyalists was already apparent in 1865/3 when Tsukigata Senzō was dismissed from office for misappropriating public funds. During the investigation, since Tsukigata was suspected of diverting money to Nakamura Enta for loyalist purposes, there was a searching investigation of Nakamura's suicide, exposed as the "disgrace of the loyalists" because it was Nakamura's own loyalist companions who had forced his demise. 40 Later Fuji Shirō was arrested and exiled to Ōshima, while Takatori Yōha's request for retirement was accepted without questions. Apparently Nagahiro's attitude toward the loyalists was growing colder by the day.
From 4/28 Nagahiro began to take a more forceful attitude toward the loyalists concerning the affirmation of his own han policy. On that day he confronted the karo and personal advisors to test their loyalty to daimyo authority and han autonomy. Within days, however, the first of several incidents occurred which would eventually turn Nagahiro against the loyalists and lead to their complete suppression. On 5/1, the loyalist Misaka Shōbei revealed to Urakami Shinano the plans of Kato Shisho to coerce thirteen of the retired han Elders to cooperate with the loyalist government. Immediately Urakami notified the others and a joint memorial was sent to Nagahiro vehemently protesting this action.\footnote{41}
The result was Kato's dismissal as karo on int. 5/19.

Nagahiro was also greatly disturbed by the widespread unrest described by Yano Baian, when on int. 5/8 he questioned Yano on the advisability of sending troops for the Second Chōshū Expedition. Yano replied that the retainers were against sending troops, indicating that at the present moment they would not listen to the lord's orders. If they were forced, he said, several hundred samurai would either assassinate their commanders or leave the han.\footnote{42} Shortly thereafter an anonymous letter arrived accusing Yano of plotting against his lord with the intention of forcing Nagahiro's retirement to the Inunakiyama villa. Located in an isolated mountain valley in the Nōgata area, the villa had just been completed as a safety retreat for the daimyo in case of foreign attack against Fukuoka castle. According to rumor the loyalists were plotting to have Nagahiro retire there, where he would be without influence, so that they might better be able to dominate his heir, Nagatomo.\footnote{43}
The final incident which turned Nagahiro away from the loyalists was the assassination of his trusted loyalist assistant, Kitaoka Yūhei. Kitaoka had been sent by Nagahiro on a special mission by Nagahiro to Dazaifu where he was to check out rumors of intrigue among the numerous soldiers guarding Sanjō and the exile nobles. Immediately after making his report, Kitaoka was struck down by his fellow loyalist, Itami Shin'ichirō, a long-time associate. As in the Nakamura case, it was disputes among the Chikuzen loyalists which came to discredit the entire movement.

The result of these several incidents and Nagahiro's growing suspicions was a wholesale dismissal of the loyalists in the sixth and seventh months of 1865. By 1865/10, Kato Shisho, Yano Baian, Tsukigata Senzō, Mori Yasuhei and others were forced to commit suicide, while numerous of their companions were imprisoned or exiled. In all, over 140 Chikuzen loyalists were punished, thus preserving han authority, but effectively severing Fukuoka from further alliance with the emerging anti-bakufu coalition.

The suppression of the Chikuzen loyalists was not merely a matter of internal cliques and factional disputes, as had occurred in so many other domains. Other external factors brought on by the Second Chōshū Expedition and the residence of the five nobles at Dazaifu created an atmosphere of disorder within the han, and Nagahiro's response was an attempt to reaffirm traditional daimyo autonomy within the han. Thus, when the Hirado daimyo inquired after the meaning of the punishment of the loyalist leaders, Nagahiro brusquely replied that the present punishment "was the result of my own suspicions," and "entirely Fukuoka han's internal affair."
In fact it was not just Fukuoka's internal affair, for it had widespread influence on the Bakufu, Chōshū, and all the Kyushu han. While the bakufu succeeded in isolating Fukuoka, the crisis there signaled the end of the national kobugattai movement and an emerging polarization of parties which would soon result in the demise of the bakufu. Although Fukuoka was far from defender of the bakufu, and did in fact provide support for the new Meiji government, its commitment did not come quickly nor decisively enough to atone for its apparent desertion from the "righteous" party comprising the Meiji victors.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VII

2. ibid., doc. 30, pp. 27-29.
3. Ejima, Kitaoka Yuhei, p. 34; and "Fukuoka nendai ki."
5. ibid., doc. 49, pp. 52-53.
10. ISK, 5:460-61; and Ejima, Kitaoka Yuhei, p. 37.

17. ISK, 5:559; and Ejima, Kitaoka Yūhei, p. 28.

18. ISK, 5:570; Ejima, Kitaoka Yūhei, pp. 28-29.

19. Shisho Kai (司書会), 加藤司書伝 (Kató Shisho den) (Fukuoka: Shisho Kai, 1933), pp. 50-51; and Ejima, Kitaoka Yūhei, p. 41.


22. ISK, 5:635; Nagahiro kō den, 3:76-79; and Ejima, Kitaoka Yūhei, p. 43.


24. Inoue, "Gokyō shūsen," p. 11; and Ejima, Kitaoka Yūhei, pp. 43-44.


34. *ibid.*, pp. 69-70.


41. *Nagahiro kō den*, 4:16-17. The Misaka affair is also described in *Katō Shisho den*, pp. 146-150.

43. Miyata chō shi, 1:781-87; Katō Shishō den, pp. 163-170; and Nagahiro kō den, 4:6-7.

44. Ejima, Kitaoka Yūhei, pp. 53-58; and Nishio, "Kuroda Nagahiro," p. 72.


46. Such as the over 4,000 Satsuma samurai and several thousand troops from other domains encamped within the han. See Nishio, "Kuroda Nagahiro," p. 71.
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ABBREVIATIONS:

FKS, Fukuoka kenshi
FKSS, Fukuoka kenshi shiryou
HHKS, Higo han kokujiki shiryou
ISK, Ishin shiryou koyyo
KBKK, Kyushu Bunkashi Kenkyuyo kiyo

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