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UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, PH.D., 1978

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY MAY 1978

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This study is an analysis of what Britons have written about America in travel commentaries from 1935 to the present. It continues the previous studies of Allan Nevins, America Through British Eyes (1948), George Harmon Knoles, The Jazz Age Revisited: British Criticism of American Civilization During the 1920's (1955), and Richard L. Rapson, Britons View America, Travel Commentary, 1860-1935 (1971). The analysis is topical and includes chapters on American character, schools, children and parents, women, race, religion, and American world leadership. The annotated bibliography, which contains nearly two hundred entries, reflects a careful gleaning after having read all British commentaries about America since 1935 listed in British sources such as the British National Bibliography and the American Library of Congress catalogs. The annotated bibliography includes the credentials of the authors, which were used in evaluating their commentaries.

In observing America the Britons reveal two critical aspects about contemporary society: (1) the components of American society
which are successful, progressive and exemplary, and (2) the components of American society which are unsuccessful, stagnating and illustrative of confusion of purpose or lack of will. While the Britons do not believe the United States to be 'coming apart', they judge American society to be an uneven success. The Britons view us from the perspective of déjà vu; having been the world's leader, they have significant insights concerning the triumphs, stalemates and disasters of a world pro-counsul. The backdrop for this especial perspective is a role reversal between Britain and America which took place after World War I: former teacher became pupil, former leader became supplicant. Throughout the British comments on American social institutions there are two themes which are intertwined. One of the themes is of America's maturation or 'coming of age'; the other is of American equality, judged by the Britons to be our pivotal socio-political value. Maturity and full egalitarianism would come together; if America could correct her social inequities, then America would 'come of age' in the spiritual as well as the material sense. This harmony would enable America to form a world view or vision and become the world model. Until this harmony could be realized, America was still in the process of becoming. While the Britons point to great strengths and great weaknesses in contemporary America, their views offer a refreshing antidote to a generation of Americans who perhaps view themselves in an 'age of uncertainty'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II THE BRITONS' AMERICA</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III AMERICAN CHARACTER</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV THE SCHOOLS</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V CHILDREN AND PARENTS</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI WOMEN</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII RACE</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VIII RELIGION</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IX WORLD LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER X EPILOGUE</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
Introduction

"The hopes, beliefs, enthusiasms that I brought to America in 1925," said Denis Brogan (1964), "have not been deceived. America, today, is a more interesting, civilized, promising society than it was in that year, and the pursuit of happiness is still less of a waste of effort there than in any other country known to me." Since the early Twenties, Britons have looked both East to the Soviet Union and West to America for a new world model. "In an increasing way," said Sir Philip Gibbs (1920), as a result of the World War I "the old supremacy which Europe had is passing westward." Many Britons, witnessing the demise of the Victorian British Empire, believed the torch of world leadership had passed to America, and hoped, as Gibbs said, "the flowering time of America seems due."¹

Throughout British commentary from the earliest reports from the colonies to modern telecommuniques, there is the theme of America's maturation. The Britons described America first as a youth, then young adult, and most recently as having matured or come of age. From the Twenties through the Seventies, the Britons saw America in the process of becoming the world model or leader. In doing so, they reveal two critical aspects about contemporary American society: (1) the components of American society which are successful, progressive and exemplary, and (2) the components of American society which are unsuccessful, stagnating, and illustrative of confusion of purpose or lack of will. The Britons do not believe American society
is coming apart, but their commentaries reveal both areas of great strength and great weakness. American society was judged an uneven success. Exactly what our strengths and weaknesses are, as viewed through the eyes of the British, should be of vital interest to a generation of Americans believing themselves to be floundering in an Age of Uncertainty.

America's coming of age was just beginning around 1920 as Britain's Victorian Empire was dwindling to mere recollection. America was young, strong and virile; Britain was aging, debilitated by the war, and her spiritual leadership was becoming increasingly sterile. During the period covered by this study, beginning in the late Twenties and continuing through the late Seventies, there is a gradual role reversal between Britain and America; former teacher becomes pupil, former leader becomes supplicant, albeit graciously. It is this important and special relationship which forms the backdrop for the commentaries.

Much of what the Britons have to say comes from the perspective of *deja vu*; having been the world's leader, they have significant insights about the triumphs, stalemates and disasters which are simply the risks of the world pro-counsul. For those Americans who find being the champion, or one of the contemporary champions, a burden and strain, this study should prove most refreshing. The Britons overall, find the flowering time of America to be now and do not find Americans to be drooping or exhausted.

Life's race "is not a race that many people win," said Brogan, "but Americans, I think, enjoy the race more than we do." Both
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Britons found simple optimism and idealism to be energizing and propelling forces. However, they saw that these might become temporarily jaded by crisis of self-confidence such as the Depression, the launching of the Russian Sputniks or the retreat from Vietnam. But usually in their final conclusions they agreed with Brogan's comment: If America "is not 'the last, best hope of earth', where is that happier and more hopeful land?"\(^2\)

This study continues the work of Allan Nevins who wrote America Through British Eyes (1948) and Richard L. Rapson who wrote Britons View America, Travel Commentary, 1860-1935 (1971). My study brings travel commentary analysis up to the present and uses the topical methodology of the Rapson book. I have selected the following themes or topics for study, some of which are additions to the Rapson list: American character, schools, children and parents, women, race, religion, and American world leadership. These topics were most often selected by the Britons themselves as the most dynamic social forces in modern American society. Like the Nevins' work, my study is interested in delineating attitudinal tone changes in British commentaries about America. In this study a travel commentary is defined as any book descriptive of America written by a citizen or resident of the British Isles, based on a personal visit to the United States.

Many of the Britons who wrote travel commentaries about America since the late Twenties are well known writers (H. G. Wells), news
correspondents (Alistair Cooke), statesmen (Winston Churchill), historians (Denis Brogan), political economists (Harold Laski), journalistic men of affairs (J. B. Priestley), lecturers on tour (Margaret Powell), students (Hugh Willoughby), or colorful personalities who simply loved America as an adventure (Brenden Behan). In addition there are a host of lesser-known writers who wrote guidebooks on America for quick sale in Britain, and professional observers like engineers and scientists who came on technical fact-finding tours. As the annotated bibliography illustrates, most of the authors selected for inclusion in this study have been to the United States many times, possess an in-depth knowledge of the basic facts about our country, and therefore were able to explore the intricacies of our culture and to explain them in meaningful terms.

Since the period of the 1870's, the type of traveler to America has drastically changed. Increasingly, it is the British scholar who is studying America. This has become ever more true since the role reversal between Britain and America; with America now the teacher, the Britons have become immensely keen on 'what's happening in the States', because they know that what happens in America, prefigures what is going to happen in England. Hence, the Britons who wrote commentaries about the United States since 1935 were not viewing America for fun or whimsy; essentially, they now studied America to learn, perhaps to recognize a life-line or even a pattern for survival. Written by so many distinguished Britons, these commentaries enjoyed great popularity in Britain being well received and
well read. America was no longer a rough, dirty, ill-mannered upstart, as the commentaries since 1935 showed her to be powerful, technologically efficient, pulsating with energy and, if she could only solve her domestic social problems, moving toward a mature, adventurous encounter with the future. Our British visitors found it a very exciting time to be an American.

Historiography

British travel commentary has proved to be a rich source of information for American social and cultural historians for more than a hundred years. The first systematic study of foreign commentaries was Henry T. Tuckerman's *America and Her Commentators: With a Critical Sketch of Travel in the United States*, published on the eve of the conclusion of the American Civil War in 1864. The format of Tuckerman's extensive work was primarily a bibliographical essay in which he identified the major foreign commentators—French, British, German, Italian, Scandinavian—and proceeded to interpret what each author had to say through a chronological ordering from earliest colonial times to the Civil War. This important basic work related travel commentary to contemporary events in the American experience explaining why the foreign observers, whether from prejudice, personal background, or in wit or with wisdom, said what they said. Tuckerman's volume may very well have influenced the later work of Allan Nevins because the bibliographical narrative approach was used effectively by Nevins in his analysis of British
commentary in 1923, and Nevins largely agreed with Tuckerman's conclusions as to the motives of the writers from abroad in coming to America and in writing about their experiences.

Tuckerman believed 1864 to be a favorable time for a retrospective view; he believed there was a need for popular enlightenment, at home and abroad, as to the past development and present condition of the republic. Tuckerman used travel commentary to explain and interpret the America which had been engaging in the great fratricidal struggle. The climate of opinion in which he wrote was vitally important, as he stated: "The war...tested the political magnanimity, the press, the prejudices, the social philosophy, and humane instincts of Europe; and if the crisis has evoked much that is mean and mortifying...so also has it called forth memorable, benign, noble words of cheer and challenge from volunteer champions of America abroad...." There was much to be learned from foreign observation as the United States set its course towards reconstruction. Tuckerman knew that comments mean and mortifying could be every bit as valuable to a nation undergoing critical self-examination as plaudits of cheer and challenge.

The great strength of Tuckerman's work was his excellent analysis of foreign commentary about America generally since the eighteenth century, and especially the accounts by French and British writers. Crevecoeur, l'Abbe Robin, Count Rochambeau, and de Tocqueville are but a few of the shining personages interpreted. French commentaries about America after 1776, during the French Revolutionary period and
Napoleonic Europe, are as insightful as the comments written by
Arthur Young about France just before 1789. Certainly Tuckerman's
lengthy section on British commentary on America is of equal value
and comparable in quality, including as he did the views of George
Berkeley, Andrew Burnaby, Charles Dickens, Frances Trollope and
her son Anthony as well as a compendium of other influential
Britons of the early periods. Tuckerman's great contribution was he
knew which foreign commentators knew what they were talking about
and which spoke from gall, vitriol, inexperience or envy.

The next book which utilized British travel commentary as
resource material was John Graham Brooks' *As Others See Us: A
Study of Progress in the United States*, published in 1908. Brooks
used foreign commentators of many nationalities as Tuckerman had,
and too, was influenced by the climate of opinion in which he wrote
as he cited foreign observations to champion the goals of Progressive
reform. Brooks quoted critical observations about the United States
which pointed to corruption, lawlessness, the boss machines, the
gargantuan trusts, bribe taking and the corroding influences of
immorality at all levels of government to call for a national house
cleaning. In comparison with the earlier Tuckerman volume, the
Brooks study is superficial, slanted and spurious.

"The Point of View of the British Traveller in America," an
article by E. D. Adams which appeared in the *Political Science
Quarterly*, XXIX, 1914, explained the motives of British travelers in
America who came between 1810 and 1860, but nothing vital or new was
added to the previous Tuckerman views. Lane Cooper, in "Travellers and Observers, 1763-1846," published in The Cambridge History of American Literature, 1917, presented an excellent bibliographical listing with brief annotations but limited interpretive comment or analysis.

After Tuckerman and Brooks, the third author of a book analyzing British commentary was Jane Louise Mesick who published The English Traveler in America, 1785-1835 in 1922. What was new in this volume was a systematic attempt to arrange the voluminous accounts and observations into manageable categories for study. Mesick's work recognized common themes throughout the British accounts and hence she arranged her book according to the topics or themes treated by the Britons such as Manners and Customs, Slavery, Agriculture, Manufacture and Industry, Education and Literature, Religion, Character, and The Future of the Union. Significantly, in her study, the first theme "in importance and obviousness was the spirit of equality" in America.5 Mesick grouped together, sometimes haphazardly, sometimes with precision, comments from the Britons about America's "sophisticated little beings" the children, the elevated position of women, the lack of an established religion, the "sensitiveness" of Americans to criticism, and a distinctive "American character."6 Many of the common themes identified by Mesick are still common topics for Britons who have observed America more recently, which seems to partially plead a case for continuity in some American values. Mesick's study used seventy-eight books and
was penetrating in regards to the observations of Thomas Hamilton, Harriet Martineau, John Melish and Mrs. Trollope. Mesick freely admitted the limitations inherent in foreign commentaries in regards to prejudice, ignorance, political bias or personal background. Both Tuckerman and Mesick realized that the British commercial travelers were going to remark on America's manufactures and tariffs, the English farmers on agriculture, educators on the school system, a Lyell on the rocks and mines, a Dickens on the literature of America. This perspective does not lessen their value; in many cases their especial credentials enhance their observation's credibility. Any student who intelligently uses travel commentary for analysis carefully notes the especial lens of each observer before he begins to evaluate their observations; this personal focus is freely admitted and their varying degrees of authority to speak on a subject evaluated with full knowledge of the individual Briton's credentials in mind.

A year after the publication of the Mesick volume, Allan Nevins published American Social History as Recorded by British Travellers, 1923. This work is an edited anthology in which he introduced excerpts from selected British books about America with penetrating essays. Nevins introduced the book with his primary reason for completing such a work. "Relatively few of the books are kept in print, and not many are to be found outside the largest libraries. For these reasons a real place exists for a volume that furnishes characteristic and interesting passages from several scores of the
most illuminating works, and which summarizes the contents of a good many more. What was new and unique about the Nevins volume was the suggestion and analysis of tone changes through time in the British commentaries. He divided the commentaries before 1922 into four categories and these will be described in chapter I as background for my work. Nevins concluded his 1923 book with an excerpt from Henry Nevinson's _Good-bye America!_ (1922) which typified the tone of respect and positive affirmation for the United States which Nevins believed only justified after World War I. Nevinson had just covered the Washington Naval conferences and expressed his farewell to New York: "Good-bye most beautiful of modern cities!...Good-bye to heaven-piled offices, so clean, so warm, where lovely stenographers...sit leisurely at work or converse in charming ease!... Good-bye to beautiful 'apartments' and 'homes'....to central heating and radiators, fit symbols of the hearts they Warm!...Good-bye to the long stream of motors--'limousines' or 'flivvers'!" While Nevins had judged the comments on America made by Britons in the early 1920's to be positive and laudatory, he became less sure of exactly what the British tone really was by the late Twenties. When he revised his book in 1948 he simply titled the concluding section, which dealt with commentaries between 1922 and the 1946, "Boom, Depression, and War." Nevins never really explained either the tone or the tone change during the late Twenties, Thirties and early Forties. It has been one of my objectives in this study to do so, and I have suggested that a tone of critical expectancy characterizes
British commentaries by the late Twenties and continues until 1935-1939. In my study I further suggest that by the late Thirties the theme or tone of critical expectancy changes to one of deference, created by a loss of faith in Russian socialism and the fears and realities of the World War II. Nevins had intuitively felt this tone of deference but did not explain the reasons for its evolution or the time period in which it occurred.

The Nevins works (1923 and the revised 1948 edition) are certainly the most far-reaching and thoroughly comprehensive studies in the field. Nevins, like Tuckerman, knew which Britons had the credentials to really see and interpret America and which did not. Even though Nevins' methodology was later criticized by James Eckman, Nevins, because of his excellent knowledge of so many facets of American history, wove together compelling essays which integrated British views on America with American fact and opinions. In short, Nevins possessed the credentials to place the British comments in proper context.

Between the monumental study of Nevins and the next book, there were three dissertations and one master's thesis produced in the field. S. H. Reed's "British Travelers in the United States, 1835-1870," was written as a doctoral dissertation at American University in 1931 and is unpublished. Paul Ashby wrote a master's thesis titled "America Through the Eyes of English Travelers, 1880-1929" at American University in 1932. J. D. T. Hamilton, a doctoral candidate, wrote "The South as seen by British Travellers,
1800-1860," at the University of Mississippi in 1938. And W. E. Chace wrote "The Descent on Democracy," at the University of North Carolina in 1941 as a doctoral dissertation. In 1943, Max Berger published his dissertation as a book titled *The British Traveler in America, 1836-1860*. This is a well researched and carefully written monograph which concludes with an excellent annotated bibliography. And like the previous works in the field, the Berger study reflected the climate of opinion in which it was written. Berger stated his purpose: "At a time when Americans are observing their English ally more closely and more critically than ever before, it is interesting to turn back the pages of history and see what Englishmen thought of America a century ago." Berger's study was arranged *topically* as he investigated such themes as slavery, religion, education, and character in America.

In 1946, James Eckman wrote a dissertation titled "The British Traveler in America, 1875-1920," at Georgetown University. Eckman utilized an excellent bibliography and amassed a great deal of descriptive data, but in his conclusions, he attempted both to agree with and to discredit the work of Allan Nevins. Eckman stated that the general tone of the commentaries written by Britons in the early Twenties was essentially critical, whereas Nevins had found their writings to be essentially laudatory of America. However, at the same time Eckman agreed with Nevins that there was "a very decided respect manifested by Englishmen toward America," a recognition based on the position and power of the United States after 1918.
Eckman's work lacked a central focus and his conclusions appear ambivalent.10

Henry Steele Commager offered an edited anthology, *America in Perspective: The United States Through Foreign Eyes*, in 1947, in which he drew from the travel accounts written by diverse nationalities. Among the Britons that he included were Dickens, Alexander MacKay, Edward Dicey, Mathew Arnold, and Denis Brogan. Commager did not imply that he was an expert in the field of travel commentary analysis, but nevertheless, he wrote a witty, highly intellectual introduction to the excerpts he presented.

Six years later in 1953, Robert G. Athearn published *Westward the Briton* which interpreted British travel accounts about the romantic American frontier. Athearn concentrated on the period 1860 to 1900 and focused on the regions of Colorado, Utah, Montana and New Mexico. His work recalled many myths and legends from the old west; some he retold in jest and others were exposed as 'tall tales'. His work includes valuable personal narratives from Britons like Isabella Bird who traveled through the Rocky Mountains in the 1870's. Athearn's work is an important regional supplement to the previous works which seldom touched on the remote American frontiers.

Like Allan Nevins, George Harmon Knoles, author of *The Jazz Age Revisited: British Criticism of American Civilization During the 1920's* (1955), was concerned with tone changes in the commentaries through time. Knoles was concerned with the tone changes in the Twenties and he found the Britons becoming increasingly critical
between 1920 and 1929. My own explorations into this period essentially have reached the same conclusion. Knoles summarized his findings: During the Twenties, "British interest in America ran high," but American civilization seemed shallowly rooted in materialism and thus "failed to inspire confidence." My study begins approximately where The Jazz Age Revisited ended and continues through the Thirties to explain the tone change to deference.

"Americans have generally enjoyed knowing what others have thought of them, their country, and its civilization," wrote Knoles. "As a people, we seldom tire of looking at ourselves and, seemingly never more so than when our persons are reflected in mirrors which make us over into giants, or pygmies." Contemporary Americans, suggested Knoles, "...can make use of the perspectives and insights of foreign observers in their efforts to come to terms with their own culture." In the Twenties Knoles found "the question that plagued most articulate Britons was whether the emergence of the United States to a position of commanding importance represented a good or an evil thing for Europe and the world." This is a central focus in my study--to evaluate British views of America's role as world leader, materially and spiritually.

Richard L. Rapson published the most recent book utilizing British commentary as source material in 1971 and titled his analytical work Britons View America, Travel Commentary, 1860-1935. Of all works in the field, the Rapson volume is perhaps the most penetrating in interpreting what the Britons said and why they were
vitaly interested in the subjects he selected for analysis: American schools, children, women, politics, and churches. His book also has a coherent focus. He emphasizes the values in America of equality and progress as propelling forces behind America's institutions.

William J. Barker, writing in the *American Historical Review* suggested: "For a lesson in the sensitive, helpful use of travel accounts, Rapson must be read."¹⁴ My study is essentially a chronological extension of the Rapson and Knoles books, beginning in 1935 but by necessity going back to see the large configurations from the Twenties which influenced commentaries in the early Thirties. My study is also a continuation of the Nevins work as it is concerned with significant tone changes in the commentaries through time. The conclusions are entirely my own and represent my personal interaction with the wealth of fascinating observations made by Britons on the contemporary American scene.

**Methodology**

Although the list of British travel accounts used in this study comprises nearly two hundred volumes, it is a highly selective bibliography, representing just over one half of the books written by Britons about America since 1935. In building the bibliography initially, both British and American sources were consulted. The *British Museum General Catalogue of Printed Books* is the British equivalent to the catalog of the Library of Congress. There are two essential keys to using the British Museum indexing system which I employed: (1) The *British Museum Subject Index* and (2) The *British
National Bibliography which is continuously updated by a Weekly List of the most current acquisitions. The Subject Index was consulted under subject headings pertinent to my selected topics such as: United States--social life, history, travels and trade, and the New Deal. The British National Bibliography, coded and arranged according to the Dewey decimal system, listed valuable books under similar headings: United States--description and travel, social life and customs, civilization, modern history, and Social conditions--United States. All books listed under the above subject headings were originally listed in the bibliography, each volume located and read. From the original list, approximately half the books were retained; the volumes not included were determined to be of limited or no value either because they were not related to the study of American society and culture, such as natural history books, wildlife descriptions, or engineering-scientific treaties, or because they were considered so superficial as to be completely without merit for permanent inclusion in the bibliography. Every book was retained, however, that offered even the briefest comment about social institutions in America or in any way impinged upon the topics under study. The bibliography which resulted represents a rather careful gleaning.

American indexing guides were used both to add to the evolving bibliography and most importantly they were necessary to locate the books written by Britons as travel commentaries in American libraries if possible. The Library of Congress Catalog indicated
which books were available in the United States and often where a copy could be obtained through inter-library loan. After thorough research through the Library of Congress National Author Lists, 1942-1962, the National Union Catalog Pre-1956 Imprints, the National Union Catalog and several regional library indexes such as those for the New York Public system, the Harvard Widener collection, the Bancroft Library at Berkeley and the Dictionary of California University at Los Angeles, every book was located. Each book was obtained through the University of Hawaii's Inter-Library Loan service if they were not part of the university collection.

A few of the British accounts had originally been published in the United States and were identified in A Cumulative List of Works Represented by the Library of Congress Printed Cards, Books: Subjects 1950-1978. Beyond simply acting as a supplement to identify extraneous volumes, this index was a useful guide to changes in book titles when the travel accounts had been republished in either Britain or America. This guide, consulted after the others, provided comforting verification that the British references had been consulted under proper topical headings because similar bibliographical entries reappeared as a result of cross checking in this American source.

Next, I proceeded to verify that each of the authors of a volume in the bibliography was indeed a Briton who at some point had journeyed to America and produced one or a number of travel books or scholarly accounts based on the experience. Usually, the author, his nationality and his purpose for writing the book about America was
neatly stated in the opening pages and upon reading the book, I understood the author's personal background clearly. A few were very difficult to identify as six used pseudonyms and several were relatively obscure writers. When every biographical index had been consulted without result, I read reviews of the book if available, to correctly identify the author as a Briton. I have annotated the bibliography to show the credentials of the authors used in this study. The annotations combine a statement from the author when available, as to his purpose in writing his book on America and a brief biographical sketch which I gathered from the standard sources such as *International Who's Who*, *The Dictionary of National Biography*, *Twentieth Century Authors*, *Longman's Companion to Twentieth Century Literature* and *World Authors*.

I did attempt to weight the books and give more attention to those authors and books most qualified to speak on the complex social issues under study. The criteria used to evaluate each of the accounts were: (1) the credentials of the author, as I believe the better known Britons were more capable of speaking as representatives for Britain and were able to command greater attention at home for their opinions about America; (2) the number of visits and their duration, assuming that continuous contact with America and Americans over longer periods of time leads to possibly greater insight; (3) the quantity and quality of contacts of the Britons in America, including friends, political contacts, the diversity of regions traveled through, experiences in private homes, their invitations into school
classrooms, union meetings, church services, youth groups, women's organizations etc.; that is, some determination was made about their experiences apart from the typical tourist beat and information which could have been gathered from our local newspapers; (4) material which was merely narrative or descriptive was subordinated to that material which was analytical. Commentaries which attempted to explain America rather than just describe it were used whenever possible; and, (5) finally, a judgement was made concerning the quality of the analysis: did the observer have the essential facts? Was the observer on the scene? Was the analysis a composite of many occurrences or limited to a single unique experience? Did the writer himself or herself have a vested interest in making the analysis; that is, was the analysis objective or propaganda? All of this of course is related to the most central methodological question of all--can we believe what the Britons say? After applying the above criteria and continuously asking why are the Britons writing what they are, the answer is emphatically yes. Taken as a whole, the writers of this composite study are from the British upper classes, well educated, socially prominent and intellectually nimble. But they were usually careful to see our society in its many layers and even though they represent an elite panoply, they were very interested in society's lowest levels. They took care to see the entire social matrix, seldom shot from the hip, and usually observed many examples before venturing comment.

In addition to the travel accounts, I have also included scholarly treatises which interpret American society, written by
individuals like Denis Brogan and Harold Laski. Brogan's American Character reflects no single trip to America but is a reflection of a sustained, long term intimate knowledge of the United States, its people and culture. His American experience began in 1925 when he came as a student on a scholarship to Harvard where he obtained his master's in American history in 1927. And Harold Laski's monumental work American Democracy represents no single visit but represents a lifetime of interaction with America and a steady accumulation of insight. A few Britons, like Alistair Cooke, have become American citizens after spending long periods of residence in the United States.

After identifying each of the authors in my bibliography as a Briton and after knowing their credentials, I read through all the books and carefully noted all comments about any social and cultural aspect of America's society. Then I proceeded to select from the massive amount of material that which had appeared most frequently in analytical form within the British commentaries themselves. My resulting topics, American character, schools, children and parents, women, race, religion, and world leadership, were selected because they were most frequently addressed by the Britons. Many of the Britons' books used similar chapter headings as they believed that the place of the schools, the role of youth and women, the dilemma of race, the lack of spirituality and the new role for the United States in world affairs to be the most significant topics for their own study. The topics of technology and wealth were discussed by
the Britons either in tandem with the above topics or were identified as underpinning the larger social issues they discussed. For example, technology in the Britons' view was inseparable from the schools and world leadership; it was also evaluated as a liberating force in relation to the American woman, but was viewed as a dehumanizing factor too, when the Britons described the alienation of youth. For the most part, topics such as technology and wealth were addressed in so far as they affected America's social institutions and cultural relationships.

As the sheer quantity of British commentary materials increased through new technologies of printing and global instant communications, I had to make a choice as to what was the best material to work with in the sense of providing the most far-reaching interpretations of America. While I acknowledge the availability of newspapers, magazines, films, and speeches, for in-depth analysis I have selected books. Essentially, I am in agreement with George Harmon Knoles who explained: "I did not exploit periodical literature (with but a very few exceptions) for the simple reason that to enter the newspaper and magazine field would have involved me in a hopeless morass of detail without the assurance that my story would be the gainer." Further, after limiting the scope of my material, I faced the question of what to quote from the commentary sources and what to paraphrase. Again, I am in agreement with the methodology of Knoles, when he stated: "Some readers may deplore my heavy reliance upon direct and indirect quotation from the writings of the authors consulted. I
followed, this practice deliberately in order to carry over into the present study some of the flavor of the originals."¹⁵ My study has utilized extensive quotations for the same reason, conveying the original feeling and proper context.

The biases, the prejudices, and the especial lens of the British individual authors are freely acknowledged. It is well understood that the personal background of each observer greatly influences what he sees or writes about America. However, the very personal lens does not necessarily lessen credibility and sometimes may even enhance the Britons' trustworthiness. Thus, in the chapter on education, I have included the remarks of L. P. Jacks, himself a professional educator, who toured America in 1886, 1904, 1909-1910, 1913, 1929 and 1931-1932. Jacks saw many significant changes in our educational system, and had opportunities to talk with leading American educators. He made cogent and analytical statements concerning the complementary intermesh of our schools and our technical-industrial society. On the other hand, many Britons made no claim to be unbiased. Bernard Newman came as a journalist and political spokesman for the cause of Britain in the opening years of World War II and freely admitted as one of his primary goals the fostering of close relations between Britons and Americans. In wartime, he would not dream of insulting an ally and told us as much. In 1967, Gerald Priestland, special correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation said: "On certain subjects I plead guilty to being opinionated."¹⁶ Personal perspective, prejudgement and
ignorance are recognized within the commentaries, but when the
British observations are used with care and discretion the material
becomes a tremendous resource. From the plethora of material
available, I have selected what in my mind is most reliable, objective
or suggestive. The outcome was well worth the extra distance I
traveled to put the British commentaries in proper context. The
Britons speak to us with real wisdom and meaning when they seek to
explain the America of the Thirties, the Forties, the Fifties, the
Sixties and the contemporary Seventies.
Footnotes for CHAPTER I


3 Henry T. Tuckerman, America and Her Commentators: With a
   Critical Sketch of Travel in the United States, (New York,

4 Ibid., p. 12.

5 Jane Louise Mesick, The English Traveller in America, 1785-1835
   (New York, 1922), 64.

6 Ibid., p. 299.

7 Allan Nevins, American Social History as Recorded by British
   Travellers (New York, 1923), republished as America Through
   British Eyes (New York, 1948) and reprinted in 1968. The 1968
   edition was used for this quote, p. v.

8 Henry W. Nevinson, Good-Bye America! (London, 1922) as quoted
   by Allan Nevins in America Through British Eyes (New York,
   1968), 395-396.

9 Max Berger, The British Traveler in America, 1836-1860 (Glouster,

10 James Eckman, "The British Traveler in America, 1875-1920,"
    (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1946), 306. Eckman
    criticized the methodology of Professor Nevins. Eckman said
    Nevins had altered the original texts of the commentaries he
    cited. Eckman also suggested that Nevins' references were
    incorrect, and pointed to the errors and omissions in the
    bibliography. Professor Nevins however, felt no need to
    correct the errors pointed out by Eckman in the 1948 revision.
    For an additional discussion of the Eckman criticisms of the
    Nevins' work see Richard L. Rapson, Britons View America, Travel

11 George Harmon Knopes, The Jazz Age Revisited: British Criticism
    of American Civilization During the 1920's (Stanford, 1955 rev.

12 Ibid., p. v.

13 Ibid., p. 127.
14 *American Historical Review*, LXXVIII (June, 1973), 657.


CHAPTER II
The Britons' America

British visitors often began their travel accounts by describing their first impressions of America. They did this for two reasons: first, to illustrate really how different America and Americans are from Europe and Europeans, and second, to dispel any doubt in the reader's mind, either American or British, about their credibility. In describing their first impressions, they were usually careful to show how they later refined their first views, and became more adroit at analysis. Too, many Britons laid out their preconceived impressions of America before coming, explaining what is taught in British schools about the United States and described forces such as the movies or television which shaped their initial images. The Britons used this introductory, exploratory material to set the stage, and the next brief section in this chapter attempts to do the same. It outlines the first meetings between Britons and Americans.

First Glimpses

"I cannot pretend," said Margaret Powell (1973), "I had no preconceived opinions" of America. "Of course I had. With the spate of news about America that is written in newspapers and magazines and heard on the radio and television, I had my own idea of the country...so on my first glimpse, I looked at everything, determined to take it all in." Powell, a British novelist on a
lecture tour, explained that she knew exactly how America would be:
"It would be vast and noisy, one mass of huge cars, populated by people who cannot breathe in the polluted atmosphere, or who fear violence." America was where everybody would be rushing madly from place to place with no time to talk to strangers; all taxi-drivers and shop assistants would be rude. The architecture would be hideous, littered with neon signs, and culture, all Britons know, is non-existent in America. Powell freely admitted her prejudices, but boldly admitted at the end of her stay that she "loved America, for its sheer sense of adventure....for its teeming life, and for its air of 'here we are, like us or not'."¹

Susan Cooper (1965), correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation, began to indicate some of the most obvious differences between Britain and America as the newly arrived traveler tries wildly to fit every unfamiliar detail into the nearest and most obvious slot. The moment of first arrival creates unreality for the visitor, she said. "Go into the airport restaurant for a cup of coffee, and find the waitress slapping napkin, coaster and glass of iced water in front of you, whether you will want them or not, before you can blink--well, of course; all Americans drink iced water all the time. Everyone said so. Go into a tobacconist's kiosk for matches, not because you need them but because you want to spend your first new American cents, and the man pushes over a book of matches and waves the money away--well, of course, Americans give things away free all the time. Everyone said so." "This," she
explained, "is the way images have grown...and at first seem to perpetuate themselves." Everything in America at first seems to shout out lavishness. Cooper could find no better example of lavishness, on first impression, than her first hotel room, "subtly different from any hotel room" she had ever been given before. She gaped at "a large bed, venetian blinds with twenty-four inter­tangled cords, a television set that will receive five channels....heat from the radiators panelled into the wall, a constant humming...of the air-conditioning." She remembered "a telephone, with the letter '0' and the numeral '0' marked in separate holes so that all the numbers you dial for the first three weeks you will dial wrong....a box of paper tissues that before long will make you think handkerchiefs the most remarkably insanitary survival in the Western world." She marveled at a small, tiled separate bathroom (something to be specially requested in Britain, but a commonplace in the U.S.A.) where you will spray water ineptly everywhere she said "in an effort to find which knob turns on the shower." She gazed astonished "at the cellophane-wrapped toothglasses and the proud strip of paper stretched across the lavatory seat announcing with impressive obscurity: 'This seat is SANITIZED for your protection'."²

This lavishness was certainly interpreted by the Britons as representing vast material wealth. But also, while they are the comforters which make life pleasanter in America, they are also, thought Cooper, "signs of freedom." One has so many choices in
America. For example in music one may choose between neo-pop, neo-classical, a mish-mash of Broadway medleys, acid rock and cut-down Tchaikovsky. Affluence shouts loudest of all among the most superficial impressions of Americans. But on closer look, the Britons found social equality to be a taproot for this seemingly universal abundance. The good things in the United States were mass produced with the masses in mind. Looking deeper still, the Britons would criticize us for not extending this abundance to the ghetto. But at first glimpse, these were the symbols of universal vie de luxe.  

And beyond the impressions wildly gathered upon first arrival in America, the Britons understood that they brought with them preconceived images which they had imbibed at home as part of their mental baggage. No one explained these preconceived images of America better than Alistair Cooke, who opened his book America with a personal memory narrative saying: "During the First World War, I was a small boy in Blackpool, a seaside town on the northwest coast of England....It had hundreds of boarding houses and a stretch of sand on which it was possible to drill thousands of soldiers... The town accordingly became a vast cantonment, and pretty soon after the United States declared war in 1917 the 'doughboys' arrived." Seven Americans were billeted with Cooke's family, and young Alistair "had the experience, extraordinary in those days for a provincial middle-class boy, of encountering in the flesh the
legendary tribe of 'the Yanks,' who were known to us only through the silent and often baffling antics of Buster Keaton, Mary Pickford, and William S. Hart at the so-called picturedrome.4

"The Americans", said Cooke, "moved in like a football team invading a hospital...." These new green Americans were merged with British British blue-jackets, a group of wounded British troops and "the melding of these convalescents with the bouncing Americans was not easy." The Americans' proclamations that they had come to save the day and to win the war were greeted frigidly. Everything about the Yanks was peculiar and fascinating, as "all their ranks had identical table manners and, so far as we could tell," said Cooke, "identical accents, therefore confronting the British officers with touchy problems in guessing at social station." It is significant in Cooke's personal experience that one of the first things he noticed as being different about Americans was their air of social equality. To a young Englishman, trained to look for proper accents and school ties, and encouraged to attend the better schools, this equality was astonishing. Too, the Americans did have manners after all, as the Yanks "treated my mother with a New World courtesy." And even more startlingly, "they addressed children as equals." For a child trained to know his place and to defer to age, this was even a bit disarming. Young Cooke asked his father why the Yanks seemed to be of sallow complexion and his father explained that the biscuity complexion must be due to the famous American skyscrapers they had heard so much about which
kept the sun off their faces the year round. Having never seen America's New York, this certainly seemed plausible.\(^5\)

During his school days, Cooke remembered, the only American texts then compulsory were *The Deerslayer*, *Hiawatha*, *The Legend of Sleepy Hollow*, and *Tom Sawyer*. "My mental picture of the United States...became sharper but not...more accurate." Cooke now envisioned New York as a land of tall skyscrapers and sallow complexioned men with Indians lurking in the suburbs. When the musical *Show Boat* toured England, Cooke came to know the Mississippi as a place "thrashing with steamboats and gamblers, who were nudged aside from time to time by a man in a white suit and a bushy white mustache who kept rushing to the stern and dropping a plumbline and shouting, 'Mark Twain'!" There was very little, Cooke confessed, "in my excellent grammar school education to rip apart this tough patchwork of preconceptions, for in British schools in those days American history stopped abruptly with the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, on the principle that if they didn't need us, we didn't need them."\(^6\)

After World War I, "both the national prejudices I had imbibed and the personal memories of 'the Yanks' that tended to contradict them began to blur together and fade" said Cooke, "as the inevitable reaction against Our Gallant Allies set in." At home in England in the Twenties, America became known to Britons as a lurid society of licentious movie stars, ruthless gangsters,
boastful citizens, and grasping bureaucrats who worked for Uncle Shylock. Americans said Cooke, seemed out "to bleed old Europe white with demands for war reparations." And "while it was proper to defer to one's parents when they bemoaned the money-mad Republic across the seas and contemplated every American import, from canned beef to shirts with collars attached, as typical bits of 'shoddy,' these horrors paled for me and my friends before the heroics of Lindberg, Douglas Fairbanks, and Bobby Jones; the country's reputation for beautiful and pliant females;...and the joys of American jazz."7

Americans for the most part in the Twenties were disenchanted with Europe, a Europe which had signed secret treaties during the war and now haggled over colonies and former debts. Americans disliked Europeans having the cheek to look down their noses at American standardization and to label Americans parsimonious. America turned inward to solve its domestic troubles with postwar labor strikes, to combat Bolshevism suspected of seeping in from war-torn Europe, and to attempt to enforce the unenforceable laws of prohibition. America turned away from Europe and the League of Nations. As Cooke said, "she wanted to slide back into a bath of nostalgia for the good old days before the war and Wilsonian internationalism."8

And that flourishing factory of popular mythology, Hollywood, did not disappoint Americans or Europeans as it plied the arts of
romance, sex, high adventure and escapism. Hollywood, said Cooke, "is the main reason why the America of the 1920s that passed into the file of the world memory is not an America of throbbing steel production, not the sudden flowering of a brilliant native literature, but a kind of mass idiocy and frivolity." Europeans first laughed at, and then avidly copied the latest American fads—-the Charleston, bobbed hair, cocktails and nightclubs. They enjoyed the songs of Richard Rogers, the slow rhythm of Irving Berlin and the bounce of George Gershwin. The Americans were on top, but the British resented it just a bit, and often portrayed the American in Britain as naive and cultureless. A movie popular in the 1930's in England features as its hero a young American on a train bound for Oxford where he was to study under a Rhodes scholarship. He was seated opposite an English parson buried in his newspaper. The young American gaped at the small-scale landscape and blurted:
"You know, sir, I guess the whole of England could be fitted into one corner of Nebraska." Thereupon the parson quipped: "But to what end, young man?" This was the "classic English riposte," said Cooke, "to the classic American response on first seeing England."9

When Cooke first arrived as a student on a scholarship from Yale in 1932. he remembered: "I couldn't go out in the evening to mail a letter without being stopped by nicely dressed men who had told their wives they were out looking for night work. So they were--they were out on the streets cadging dimes and quarters."
But if seeing rich Americans now scrapping for a meal was shocking, Cooke warmly praised the choice of Franklin Roosevelt as the American redeemer. To an Englishman, raised in the tradition that the best and the brightest young men from the finest English schools entered politics, it was simply good sense to call upon the leadership of a man from a family of the American landed gentry. But in America, in the land of equality, Cooke realized "it was a heavy handicap for an American politician to have gone to Harvard and to have an upper-crust accent." Roosevelt was not in the mainstream of mediocre politicians so traditionally elected by Americans, such as the "reliably weak, pliable and accommodating" Harding, or the "wry as a crab apple" Coolidge. And to compound Roosevelt's disabilities he had been paralyzed by polio when he was forty and never regained the use of his legs. Americans might argue with Roosevelt, and they might oppose his policies, but on first glimpse, Cooke noted that universally he was respected. And as illustration, he noticed a very special convention adopted by the American press: they never photographed Roosevelt in movement. "I saw him once being lifted out of his car like a sack of potatoes, and put on his feet, and given two sticks and two helping hands, and his hat stuck on his head for him. This was not the Roosevelt the public saw. They saw the burly upper body, the bull-like neck, and the tossing head, the confident saviour of the Republic in a dark time."

First impressions were never considered more important than during World War II, when "we had to admire each other or perish,"
said Cecil Roberts (1947), a wartime lecturer who toured America for Britain's Ministry of Information. Military urgency generated yet another source of preconceived images about America. Before the British Tommies came to the United States for flight training, they were to read Notes on America, a part of which suggested: "You are going to America as guests. Therefore you will receive almost unbounded hospitality. You will be expected to show appreciation. Do so. You will not be expected to tell your hosts and hostesses what is wrong in your opinion with them or their country. Don't do it. Don't be misled by the fact that everyone will ask you how you like America. They mean how do you like it, not what you dislike."

The Notes outlined priorities, telling the reader: "You are going to the United States to learn: to learn your job, and, no less important, to learn to like and understand Americans....Speech is not an index of class position. Do not assume that Americans mean the same things by the same words we use; make sure you know the meaning of American slang, you may be funnier than you mean to be....Your hosts may be afraid of the shyness and reserve which is attributed to all Britishers and Englishmen in particular. They may fear a snub. But there is no need to assume false geniality or behave unnaturally....American friendliness means he is genuinely interested in knowing you, accept his openness and don't be put off by it." Sport in America was also an indicator of American values and characteristics, as the pamphlet warned: "Don't expect the stately minuet of cricket with its elaborate etiquette on the
[American] baseball field. The idea is to win, not just to have a game. Americans do business as they play games—with great attack and vigour, noise, zest and enjoyment—to win. The dollar is a scalp, a medal, the achievement of success and is pursued as such....Above all, beware of thinking that the United States owes help to Britain as a duty. You should state frankly that American help is absolutely necessary to us, however. Finally I will give you a motto which you find at railway crossings in the States. It is "Stop, Look, Listen'. And I would add—'Smile'." Bernard Newman, a British novelist who toured America in 1943 on behalf of Britain's Ministry of Information, was the author of this commonsensical pamphlet. He introduced the Tommy to some essential American traits—sensitivity to criticism, friendly openness and lack of reserve, the fact that how one speaks is not an indication of social class, and the idea of competitiveness among Americans.

And just as the young Britons were briefed for their first encounters in America, so too, the young Americans were to read Notes on Britain before they landed to join ranks with British expeditionary forces. The reciprocal pamphlet, which Newman had a hand in writing, advised: "You are now in Great Britain as part of the Allied offensive, to meet Hitler and beat him on his own ground. For the time being you will be Britain's guest....If you are from an Irish-American family, you may think of the English as persecutors of the Irish. There is no time to fight old wars....The British are reserved not unfriendly. If Britons sit in trains or buses without
striking up conversation with you, it doesn't mean they are being haughty...they don't speak to you because they do not want to seem intrusive or rude. The British have phrases or colloquialisms of their own, for instance to say 'bloody' means a swear word, usually...." And proper behavior, suggested the Notes on Britain, was as important as the proper attitudes: "Do not argue for the decimal system over the British pound, shillings or pence... The Britons wouldn't be pleased to hear you call it 'funny money' as they sweat hard to earn it with wages much lower in Britain than in America....Don't be a showoff, the British dislike bragging....The British are tough. Don't be misled by the British tendency to be soft-spoken and polite. The English language did not spread across the oceans and over the mountains and jungles and swamps of the world because these people are panty-waists....Sixty thousand British civilians, men, women, and children have died under bombs...they have plain common guts...." "On furlough," the Notes said, "you will probably go to the cities, where you will meet Britain's pride in age and tradition. In London they will point out to you Westminster Abbey, where England's Kings and greatest men are buried, St. Paul's Cathedral and the Tower of London. They mean just as much to the Briton as Mount Vernon or Lincoln's birthplace do to us....You may be a little confused at first by driving on the left side of the road and drinking warm beer....There are two things you must not do to a British Tommy, your counterpart: He will not appreciate you swiping his girl or your not appreciating that his army has been 'up against
..." In summary, advised the pamphlet, "look, listen and learn, before you start telling the British how much better we do things....And one last thing: If you are invited into a British home and the host exhorts you to 'eat up, there's plenty on the table', go easy. It may be the family's rations for a whole week spread out to show their hospitality." Again, this simple common-sense booklet said to learn one another's cultural peculiarities before judging.12

The wartime emotional embracing ended with victory, but many points of contact and information remained for Britons and Americans: hundreds of troops remained in Britain and Europe as part of the NATO forces. Tourists, students, businessmen, diplomats and journalists accelerated the flow of cultural exchange across the Atlantic.

America did not retreat into isolationism after World War II. The assumption of new responsibilities by the United States in places around the world formerly held or influenced by Victorian England called forth new images about America, as Brian Magee (1958), a British student just returning from a study-stay at Yale, explained: "The expansion of America in the present century is in some ways like the expansion of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Now, as then, the richest, most powerful and 'advanced' continent in the world is spreading its influence to every other corner of the globe....In the past Britain exported syphilis, missionaries, gin and technology to distant lands and
called them civilization. Today America exports soldiers, swing, films, and vulgarity and we resentfully call it coca-cola-ization."
The British conservative image of America in the post-1945 period largely rotated around a view of the United States as a nation of the nouveau riche, and Americans as the parvenues with cultural values of the arriviste. The Yank that had twice rescued Britain and the Allies appeared now as "over-paid, over-sexed and over here." Magee mocked his pompous countrymen: "We know the Americans: fat, thick-featured, over-dressed men with cigars and too much money, loudmouthed, boastful and rude, uncouth, uneducated, conscious of the price of everything and the value of nothing, disdainful of all that is set before them, be it scenery or plumbing." Some Britons believed the stereotype of the Ugly American to be the norm. What had produced this image of America? Magee believed these ideas of America in the early postwar period had developed as a "defense-mechanism." "The Americans we firmly believe," said Magee, "have everything that money can buy, and nothing else. Their superiority is quantitative and material--more, richer, stronger, higher, wider, larger. Bigger but not better. Qualitatively, we know that it is we who are superior. In relation to America and Americans our deepest emotional need is to maintain this belief that we are superior 'in the things that really matter'--wisdom, culture, education, respectability, government, music, literature, art, tradition, history. Americans may be richer but we are more civilized."
"From these deep well springs," said Magee, "our cultural
illusions about the United States are watered and nourished."
"In the face of all evidence to the contrary we cling fiercely to
the faith that Americans are culturally inferior—not because they
are but because we deeply need to believe they are." Magee made
this statement as hundreds of young Britons applied for passports
to come to America as part of the brain drain. In talking very
frankly about the cultural illusions held by Britons about America,
he hoped to wash away the misconceptions "about what America is
not...." in order to begin "looking at America as it really is...."
Young Britons in the Fifties believed that America was opportunity.
America "is not, as some people still imagine, a more reactionary
society than ours: it is a more radical, more progressive one, more
accepting of change, more creative," said Magee. America is out in
front, offering "all the things we are fighting for here...the
absence of class distinctions, a democratic educational system,
equality of opportunity in industry, management, the professions
and government."\textsuperscript{13}

After the Suez Crisis which represented the "end of the dream"
of re-establishing the British Empire, said British social historian
Harry Hopkins, Britain was "purged at last of the slow poison of
that particular sort of anti-Americanism which is based in jealousy
and self-pity." "Britons were free to seek their own particular
accommodation with technological society while holding on to our
own lifeline of continuity in these seas of change."\textsuperscript{14} Increasingly,
British political and social leaders looked to America as a model.
The entire domestic social history of post-Victorian Britain can be written in terms of an increasing popular demand to democratize British society. To rid it of its emphasis on the right schools, proper accents, and social classes. The condition of equality, as found in America, became the goal. This explains why British commentators visiting America since 1935 have asked such specific questions, probing deeply into our social matrix. They want to know what works and what does not, and in their exercise to learn about our social underpinnings, they exposed the good with the bad. They turned our society over and over to view its convolutions. Even though many visitors represented Britain's intellectual elite, they were most interested in viewing American society from underneath if their own democratic experiments were to be successful.

This critical, questioning posture, wanting to know, to understand, and to learn is really quite a change from the earlier writings about America from Charles Dickens, Mrs. Trollope or Harriet Martineau, all of whom saw the early republic as a crude, raw youth 'with the bark still on'. There had been a role reversal between Britain and America: former teacher became pupil; former leader became supplicant. "My basic political beliefs," said Magee, "are in individual liberty, social equality and economic opportunity, and the undeniable fact is that there is more of these things in the United States (for all its faults, which I shall have plenty to say about in this book) than there is in Britain." The vast majority of Britons writing about America since 1935 essentially
agreed with Magee and along the way they pinpointed segments of our society that needed to be reclaimed, vitalized or humanized. Their commentaries collectively do not form a 'Why America Slept' scenario. Instead, they encourage us out of the post-Vietnam withdrawal and Watergate scandal syndrome of disillusionment and self-criticism. They urge us on towards additional pioneering efforts in the great experiment of American democracy.

Tone Changes Through Time

"Taken all in all," wrote Allan Nevins, "these British travels are an indispensable source of information upon American social, economic, and political history. The books that the Americans themselves have produced in the same field, such as Olmsted's invaluable records of travel in the South before the Civil War, are few and far between." "An American," continued Nevins, "can seldom view the culture of even another section than that in which he was reared with sufficient detachment to write a first-rate study of institutions and manners. Men, customs, and ways of thought and action have not the shock of novelty that will inspire a vivid description, or will suggest questions that lead to a penetrating analysis. An Englishman is just enough of a stranger to see us with a fresh and curious eye, eager for every new impression; he is not enough of an alien, as most Continental Europeans are, to confuse nonessentials with essentials, or to mistake the meaning of what he sees." While Nevins might have mentioned other native regional writers in addition to Olmsted, such as John Gunther or John
Steinbeck, it is true that the Britons do what Americans seldom attempt: they view our culture whole. They interpret America in its totality and interject qualifying remarks about select regions such as the South. Nevins considered travel commentaries, especially those written by Britons, to be "among the most vital records of our national past," primarily because the commentaries integrated the components of American society and interpreted the matrix. After reading a vast number of British travel accounts of America, one comes to an important understanding: there appears to be definite tone changes in the commentaries through time. Climates of opinion, both within Britain and outside in global politics, would most assuredly influence how an individual would evaluate what he found in America. It is the objective of this section to define the tone change in British commentaries which occurred in the late Twenties and early Thirties. In order to understand tone changes which have occurred in the past, one may first look to Allan Nevins' 1923 study "American Social History As Recorded by British Travellers," and then his revised, updated continuation, published in 1948 as America Through British Eyes.

The first period of British commentary writing on America was titled by Nevins as one of Utilitarian Inquiry, (1789-1825). Britons came to the new Republic to survey potentialities for investment, for building factories or for settling down as farmer or professional. America seemed "sunny, quiet and prosperous" (until the War of 1812) during the Industrial Revolution and the period of
the Napoleonic Wars, both of which produced massive social upheavals in England. The second period of travel commentary was labeled *Tory Condescension*, (1825-1845). Professional writers, such as Charles Dickens, Harriet Martineau, Captain Marryat and Mrs. Trollope, now interested in America for literary material, were attracted to our shores. Their picture of America, influenced by the so-called Tory press at home, intended to discredit the spirit of liberalism then growing in England and portrayed Americans as immoral, irreligious, illiterate, brutal and dirty. America was still the land of youth, raw, crude, with the 'bark on'. When asked what the greatest difference was between England and America, Mrs. Trollope characteristically quipped: "the want of refinement." Their picture of America was somewhat at variance with the analysis of the young Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, who found America's greatest source of strength to be her condition of equality. The image of the common man, so much appreciated by the English liberals and de Tocqueville, was anathema to the Tories and most travellers from Britain shared the Tory political view in this second period. 17

The third period of travel commentary for Nevins was titled *Unbiased Portraiture*, (1840-1870), which was seen as an era of detached appraisal, without political philosophizing. England had taken one of many steps to liberalize her own society in the Reform Act of 1832. Especially after the Civil War and the elimination of slavery, British writers recognized the astonishing industrial capabilities of America, proclaiming the United States as beyond the
rawness of youth. Attempts were now made to redress the former biased, incorrect and plainly caricatured accounts of the United States. One writer of this period, Alexander MacKay called for a faithful portraiture of a great people. But while the United States might be maturing, it still had one really disgusting habit noted by almost every traveler; it was the America proclivity for 'tobacco-chewing'. MacKay was disgusted as floods of tobacco juice frequently squirted all over the railway cars forcing him to take refuge on the platforms. It rankled him when passengers would spit between his feet and over his shoulders while speaking to him; and he reeled when one individual took the quid from his mouth and drew ornamental figures on the window pane with it. In spite of their revulsion to 'the chew', our visitors became more genuinely interested in America as America: our republican form of government, educational facilities, methods of industrial incorporation, freedom of the press, separation of church and state and the efficiency of justice. Anthony Trollope, writing about America in less caustic tones than his mother, was vitally interested in manners and morals, as any good Victorian would be, and offered an interesting patchwork of evolving America: He noticed the spoiled children who ordered beefsteak, cakes and pickles for breakfast; the hurried meals of money-mad Americans who took no time to linger over sherry or tea. He pointed to the commercial and rowdy character of religion, and was shocked, as a postal official himself, by the use of all postal appointments as political plums. Trollope pictured American women as pushing Jezebels, and recommended that all American women
immediately turn their attention to their proper sphere which was
caring for their men.  

A fourth period in travel commentary tone was called simply
Analysis, (1870-1922) in which Britain's most eminent writers came
to America to study our institutions more in depth. Analysis was
now the objective, not mere narration or description. Monumental
tomes emerged about America from Britons in this period, such as
James Bryce's The American Commonwealth (1888), which represented
four lengthy trips to the United States and reflected his keen
understanding of the political forces at work in our society. Bryce
was a professor of civil law at Oxford and increasingly it was this
kind of traveler who was venturing to and studying in America. His
objective was not to describe, but to explain America and to enable
us to see ourselves as we had never seen ourselves. The writings of
Rudyard Kipling about America, From Sea to Sea (1899) and American
Notes (1891), appear somewhat shallow, almost flippantly sarcastic,
and pale before the highly intellectual treatise of Bryce. But in
fairness, Kipling was not uniformly hostile to America and even
though he found Americans raw and lawless, still he proclaimed 'I
love them', and indeed he married one! The travel books in this
period commanded a wide audience and great attention in Britain,
having been written by authors of great eminence. This in itself
indicates the stature and respect now commanded by the United States,
believed Nevins. But something else was happening too. Victorian
Britain was beginning to feel the strains and weight of Empire. At
home, the veneer of Victorian prudery and moralism was cracking under new demands for a more democratic society. British women were on the march, echoing Labour's demands for better working conditions and higher wages. Britons began to take a long look at the republican experiment in the United States and significantly came to America to learn. The Britons wondered how Americans would come to terms with their own cracks in the ideal of social equality, so evidenced by the inequities of blacks, women, new immigrants, marginal farmers, laborers, and southern sharecroppers. In spite of its many faults, Britons such as H. G. Wells wondered if the future could not be read in America. Would the United States evolve toward an increasingly humane social community? Could America make its ideal of social equality a reality? The Britons wondered if their faltering Victorian society could receive revitalization through a quick study of American techniques and experiments.

In 1948 Nevins republished his study and added a new section, (1922-1946), but was not quite sure what to label this period as the commentaries seemed so diffuse; so he gave the new section the simple chronological reference Boom, Depression and War. He had lumped together the Twenties and the Thirties. George Harmon Knole (1955) found the tone of British writings about America throughout the Twenties to be essentially critical; whereas Nevins had attempted to suggest a tone of respect and deference which was certainly approving of America. How can these two different evaluations be explained?
In part it can be explained by dividing the Twenties from the mid-Thirties, as my investigations have found a pivotal tone change occurring between 1935 and 1939. Knoles is essentially correct, and his work is well documented, when he says the British commentaries throughout the Twenties are critical. America seemed mired in materialism and had nothing more to offer Britain than standardized largess. But Nevins is quite right, too, when the period of deference is properly identified. The tone of deference really appears when the British Left became increasingly disillusioned with Russian socialism as an experiment during the Stalin purges in 1934-35, and especially after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact in 1939. Too, the tone of deference increasingly became apparent in the writings of British Conservatives as they were alarmed by the rise of Fascism and Nazism and their expansion in Europe. Then American technology, materialism and standardized goods became power rather than simply mechanized 'shoddy'. First, as road signs pointed toward World War II, and then after Britain was in the war, fighting alone during her "finest hour" (1940-1941), the tone of deference reached a crescendo. Britain deferred to, even revered, its potential ally and never was America more popular with British visitors than when we entered the war on their side and decided to fight in Europe first.

From my own investigations I would prefer the term critical expectancy as the proper label for the tone of British commentaries about American between 1920 and 1935. Throughout this period the
Britons believed the United States would either become the world model or collapse, worshipping at the Golden Calf of materialism. This is why the commentaries of the Twenties appear at the same time to be critical, ambivalent and diffuse; the Britons were critical of material wealth without the proper spiritual qualities to humanize it; however, they were expectant, even hopeful as in the example of H. G. Wells, that America could develop these spiritual qualities, come to full maturity, and lead the world. Many thoughtful Britons had seen the torch of leadership pass to the United States in 1920 and knew that what happened in America would eventually influence England and the rest of the world. From the perspective of déjà vu Britons would advise us. Because their own fate was intertwined with ours, they would criticize our weaknesses, loudly chastizing us for our shortcomings, but out of a supportive expectation that we could be better, and so the world. That is why in the early days of the Depression, many of our visitors were so critical when we seemingly, stood wringing our hands in despair. They were concerned with the mood of Depression and encouraged us to regain the old confidence, competitiveness and idealism. And America did, and so again set the world's pace.

The theme of critical expectancy acted as an energizing force—a touchstone for Americans living through the Crash of 1929 and the first years of the Depression. Americans were expectant too, about seeking a new economic-political model, rooted in realism, but based on equality. Americans too, looked for the future in America.
During the Twenties and the early Thirties, when the tone of critical expectancy was at work, the commentaries did not lose their analytical quality. It was only during the war years that the tone of deference really existed, and that was because we had to admire each other or perish. After the war, British commentaries returned to critical expectancy, hoping America would become the world model by developing spiritual qualities which balanced her magnificent wealth. They wanted America to 'come of age'.

British commentaries from the Thirties through the Seventies (except for the brief period of deference mentioned) reflect the tone of critical expectancy by asking specific questions. A careful selection of examples offer an illustrative overview. Scottish novelist and political writer, Mary Agnes Hamilton asked In America Today (1932), if Americans could psychologically recover from the crash and depression: "It is impossible to resist the feeling," she said, "that there is more depression here than the facts justify... it is the mood rather than the facts that is serious." British political-economist Harold Laski, in Democracy in Crisis (1933), asked if a move toward state socialism was not inevitable in America to combat the economic crisis. He soon decided that the American economic model, refashioned by the New Deal along modified capitalist lines would clearly endure as he outlined in American Democracy (1948). British educator L. P. Jacks, in My American Friends (1933), called America "self-critical" and a "problem-hunter's paradise," he challenged Americans to form a "competent followership" around a
viable leader to work their way out of the slump. Could individualistic Americans cooperate he asked? And answered decidedly yes. America would survive when challenged by the severest test in the best sense of Toynbee's adversity thesis.

After 1934, praise for America's recovery was almost universal. The commentaries of radio commentator, Stuart P. Mais (*A Modern Columbus*, 1934), Scottish novelist, A. G. A. Macdonell (*A Visit to America*, 1935), and Irish biographer, Shane Leslie (*American Wonderland*, 1936) provide examples. The general tone, while still observing critically, was entwined with effervescence and congratulations as America was described by Leslie to be at worst pandemonium and at best, a wonderland. H. G. Wells came to take a closer look at the America of the New Deal in 1934 and again 1935 and produced as a result, *The New America, The New World* (1935). Perhaps after all, the future lay in America, and new deals would spread around the world. Wells, ever the utopian, hoped "these are the years of opportunity that remain to us. During these years the vague, exciting promise of a New Deal for mankind which has been dangled before our people, may be converted into a clear, firm intension, planning definitely, experimenting boldly, explaining lucidly, to evolve that new phase in human affairs, that fuller life which is manifestly so possible and so tantalizingly not yet in our grasp." There it was, succinctly, a clear statement of what the United States might yet become and offer to the world. For Wells, as for many other British intellectuals after 1935, and especially after 1939, the New Deal model might re-adjust the world mechanism, becoming the nucleus of the World Brain.
Even when we acknowledge the socialist and utopian views of Wells, exhilaration for the United States seemed not to be confined to those who held hopes for the future. Morgan Philips Price, in *America After Sixty Years: The Travel Diaries of Two Generations of Englishmen* (1936), clearly expressed his support for America as a model. He was an agriculturalist who came specifically to study the agricultural innovations of the New Deal and proclaimed them superior to the Soviet Five Year Plans. Socially too, the American society was viewed as more egalitarian and free than the closed Russian community. Price's volume moves close to the tone of deference that Nevins spoke of, but it is in J. B. Priestley's *Midnight on the Desert* (1936) and *Rain Upon Godshill* (1939) that British enthusiasm for the United States resonants. Priestley, the famous English novelist and radio broadcaster, believed America was the exemplar: "America is definitely in front, she hardly knows she is leading us, but she is. Russia can turn the old economic and political system upside down, but no sooner has she done so than she takes a long look at America. One country after another will follow suit. They may be ten years behind, but they are following on steadily." But America must spiritually define herself. America "will have to discover where it is that she is taking the rest of the world."23 This was the most important challenge advanced by our visitors. Does America have a world view, a vision, the Britons asked in the Thirties, and they still ask the same question now. America needed something spiritually tougher than mere materialism. Did America
have an ideology rooted firmly in traditional values, the Britons asked. Could these values be exported around the world, or are Americanisms, such as social equality, predicated upon a unique American experience?

After their questions about the resilience of America during the Depression, the next important specific question asked was, would the United States come into the war on the side of Britain against Nazism? Books which reflected the tone of deference attempted to explain America's slowness of thought and action and usually concluded with an appeal for commitment. Representative works were written by the journalist, William Dwight Whitney (Who are the Americans, 1941), the labor leader and Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, Sir Walter Citrine (My American Diary, 1941), and the dramatist, John Hay Beith (America Comes Across, 1942). Later, as the war was coming to an end, many Britons wondered if America would slip back into isolationism or accept the responsibility of world leadership. The former famed political scientist at Oxford, Denis Brogan, addressed this important question in American Character, (1944), as did the British news correspondent, Basil Dillon Woon in Roosevelt, World Statesman (1942).

At the end of the war, Britons were enthusiastic about America. "I am not interested in what is wrong here," Spectator editor, James Pope-Hennessy said, "but in what is right. I don't want to pick holes....I like America. More correctly, I love America. I love Americans. Why insult them by pointing out where and how they differ from some other civilization?" Likewise, English novelist
and humorist, Wyndham Lewis, in *America and the Cosmic Man* (1948), predicted: "It is, I believe, the destiny of America to produce the new species of man. Americans really are quite unconscious of what a novel kind of people they are. It is my argument that we can read our own future by an imaginative scrutiny of what is occurring, and what is so plainly destined to occur in America."\(^{25}\)

The tone of critical expectancy began to reappear in ever more caustic, satirical and witty observations such as in *Don Iddon's America* (1951). Don Iddon was the chief American news correspondent for the London *Daily Mail* between 1945 and 1949. Iddon's columns revealed how peace seemed elusive to Americans in the postwar period and illustrated how Americans increasingly blamed, not themselves, but the intransigent Russians and the ingratitude of Europeans receiving aid, for their troubles. Now the central question was asked, does America have the maturity to be the world leader? Can Americans act responsibly when they control the death dance of the atoms? Can they accept non-alignment from a nation receiving their aid, or is neutrality to be damned? Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech had warned America of the awe-inspiring accountability which accompanied every world power. Will America rise to meet the demands exacted of greatness, asked political journalist Michael Robertson in *Beyond the Sunset* (1950). "That she is great in the material sense there can be no shadow of doubt, but there is a latent potential of spiritual greatness not yet called forth or realized, which one day may provide us with inspiration and light,
just as today the magnitude of her material production helps sustain us. This key idea has remained the central question asked by the Britons in the Sixties and Seventies. Does America have the spiritual greatness to deal with racism, poverty, inequality in public education, second-class citizenship for women, the revolt of youth against the alienation of the multiversity complex and a war in Vietnam, and the apparent loss of meaning in the teachings and popular preachings of the traditional churches? Does America have the ability to solve her internal dilemmas so that she might yet establish, in the sense of John Winthrop, a city on the hill, a beacon to the world?

The thoughtful British commentaries allow us to draw our own conclusions, but they skillfully guide us, explaining and interpreting America in an entirely fresh, very different way from our native critics. The United States attracted thousands of young Britons in the mid to late Fifties, and Brian Magee, in Go West, Young Man (1958) explained this brain drain. On the eve of the youth revolt in America, foreign youth had found the United States offering more equality of opportunity than any other country in the world. And British professor of political science, Alexander Werth, explained the American reaction to the launching of the Russian Sputniks. Even though he titled his book America in Doubt (1959), his entire thesis is quite the contrary. Americans were not in doubt or suffering from an over-reaction to the Russian challenge, nor was the generation of college students in the late
Fifties the silent or careful generation. British political journalist, Mervyn Jones, in Big Two (1962) compared the United States and Russia. Jones told Americans they had nothing to fear from the boast of Nikita Khrushechev that the Russians would catch up with Americans by 1970. Jones believed "they could overtake Yugoslavia by 1970." The real battleground, however, was not in megaton bombs, but involved the standard of living in both countries. Undeniably, there were several gaping holes in America's social fabric—the poor, the ghettoized, the inhabitants of skid rows, the blacks, the uneducated and the underskilled. Could America correct these dilemmas in time to win the hearts and minds of uncommitted nations? Could America really afford private affluence and public squalor as Galbraith earlier had asked? Gerald Priestland, special foreign correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation, described in America-The Changing Nation (1967) our nation as still in the process of becoming. Can America become the material and spiritual world leader in time?

British commentary since 1935 about the United States forms a discernible coherent consensus about the strengths and the weaknesses of our society. They tell us a great deal about ourselves, both good and bad, in the chapters which follow about American character, schools, children and parents, women, race, religion and our position as world leader. Throughout, the reader should be cognizant of what the Britons feel to be (1) the components of American society which are successful, progressive and exemplary,
and (2) the components of American society which are unsuccessful, stagnating, and illustrative of confusion of purpose or lack of will. The Britons do not believe our society is coming apart, but they reveal areas of great strength and great weakness. America is judged an uneven success and is still in the processing of maturing as world leader. The Britons give us both wisdom and succor (a terribly British word) in a supposed Age of Uncertainty.
Footnotes for CHAPTER II


11 Cecil Roberts, *And So To America* (Garden City, 1947), 530.


16 Magee, *Go West, Young Man*, p. 16.

17 Allan Nevins, *American Social History as Recorded by British Travellers* (New York, 1923), republished as *America Through British Eyes* (New York, 1948) and reprinted in 1968. The 1968 edition was used, p. 341.


Mary Agnes Hamilton, *In America Today* (London, 1932), 70.
Harold Laski, *Democracy in Crisis* (Chapel Hill, 1933).


Denis Brogan, *The American Character* (New York, 1944), 149-165.

Wyndham Lewis, *America and the Cosmic Man* (Garden City, New York, 1948), 16-17.


Magee, *Go West, Young Man*.
The Britons observed distinctive qualities in Americans as people. They described habits and customs which seemed to identify Americans anywhere in the world. They pointed not just to idiosyncrasies of language, accent or humor, but searched beyond, into American values and beliefs. The Britons wondered if Americans had a world view? They wondered what the ideological values were within the American mind and if they could be identified? The Britons wondered if there was an identifiable American character. This chapter seeks to identify what Denis Brogan called "the total personality of the American state, of American society, its communal American character."¹

A useful definition of American character, and the one used in this study, is provided by the anthropologist, Anthony F. C. Wallace as he described the following components of a national character: (1) the "genius" of a people, that is, the general frame of reference of the whole society; (2) "a world view," the characteristic outlook of a people on the universe; (3) the "themes" of a particular culture, a list of propositions which describe the good life and the goals of human existence; and (4) the "ethos," or usual style of emotional experience. Wallace's definition of national character included the totality of these components as he explained:
"The description of the national character of a people is apt to include statements about genius, world view and values. What distinguishes national character as a concept is, first, its usual restriction to the citizens of modern, politically organized states; and, second and more important, its emphasis upon the articulation of a large number of components into a structure or pattern."²

It is a structure or pattern that is sought from the British commentaries. What values can be gleaned from the multitude of comments made by the Britons, and do the British commentaries reveal themes which define our American character?

"Everything Americans do, everything foreigners say about us, is examined for the light it may shed on the American character," said Thomas L. Hartshorne (1968). He recognized, as did David Potter, that there is still a solid base for the use of a national character as a conceptual model. He described it as a "useful, large-scale generalization to cover the prominent characteristics of the national culture;" it is a "semi-metaphorical descriptive device."³ Historically, David Potter explained, the concept of national character was identified with superheated patriotism, or pseudoscientific racism, in the 1930's, and had therefore fallen into disrepute. Some historians, he realized, remain skeptical of its use as a conceptual tool. But to deny national character, he believed, is to deny a nation's culture. Anthropologists since the 1950's and 1960's have helped historians redeem the concept with methodological precision. Greater objectivity, Potter believed, was now applied to the subject and the concept of an American
character remains valid. In every culture, in Samoa, in Germany, in Iceland, in Bali, wrote Margaret Mead, we find consistencies and regularities in character formation. Clyde Kluckhohn believes the statistical prediction can safely be made that a hundred Americans will display certain defined characteristics more frequently than will a hundred Englishmen comparably distributed as to age, sex, social class, and vocations.\(^4\) Hartshorne agreed: "Americans tend to be more like each other than they are like members of any other nation," and he believed it possible to identify large areas of uniformity. He believed studies of national character, using precise definitions, could be much more than racial stereotyping. The concept of national character allows us to see broad patterns, which facilitate thought and communication between scholars of various disciplines.\(^5\) National character allows us to view our culture whole, offering a conceptual balance to the tedium and minute detailed specialization of the econometric school which draws broad conclusions from finite data. Hartshorne believed the idea of national character was most useful "when it is applied to a large, heterogeneous nation like the United States." All scholars who work with this concept understand its use as descriptive of modal attributes; there is no 100% American and the concept has no predictive value to determine individual traits.\(^6\) Using the definition of national character advanced by Anthony Wallace, it is possible to extract from the British observations very large general patterns which may indicate some uniformity in American values.
Get Aheadism and Social Progress

Mary Agnes Hamilton (1932) believed "the urge to get on--that's the essence of Americanism." In spite of the Depression, Americans still appeared to champion a special destiny for the nation and a faith in individual success. "America's real and proper achievements," said Edward Bliss Reed (1932), a former Commonwealth Fellow, "have all been in the world of affairs, business and mechanical invention, and all but the most self-satisfied of Europeans will willingly grant her supremacy in that world." The ideal of get-aheadism was measured by Americans in practical terms (usually money), observed the Britons, and this emphasis carried over into other aspects of life. Americans "avoid abstractions whenever possible," and have a "tendency to measure up or concretize their political and religious persuasions," said Reed. Even American words like "Democrat, Republican, Episcopalian, Fundamentalist have very, very definite meanings," he explained, much more so than "Conservative, Socialist, Anglican, Agnostic carry for the Briton." Being so achievement oriented and so competitive, "Americans are sensitive to criticism," continued Reed. Unlike the British, the Americans do not cultivate criticism as a mental exercise for fun. Nor can Americans be disinterested or objective about criticism; criticism is viewed as something personal—like a coat to be worn or not worn, it is a possession. British educator L. P. Jacks found Americans, paradoxically, both boastful and self-effacing: "As a people the Americans are the most self-critical on the face of the earth. They are much
addicted to painting their own portrait. Along with a profound and exultant sense of achievement there goes, at least among the thoughtful, a sense of uncertainty as to what it is all worth, and even a lurking doubt as to whether it is worth anything." Jacks found that Americans frequently engaged in an orgy of self-criticism, discussing the problems they faced and making designs for the future. Americans may boast that they are "the Lord's elect and America God's own country," but Jacks determined America to be "a land of contrasts," as "nowhere else is national self-criticism practiced with a severity so relentless and a mockery so bitter." "The 'hope' of which America is said to be the Land," viewed Jacks "is tempered with many misgivings."7

As American achievement was seen by the Britons to be measured in practical terms, it was natural for them to find educational preparation for success based on the same terms. American scholarship is addicted to detail, said Edward Reed; it evolved statistics, but is disinclined to prescribe laws. Americans are not speculative as Britons are; they rely on proven facts. "Americans move more easily in the "practical as opposed to the theoretic world," said Reed. Empiricism Reed believed was a thread connecting American traits and social institutions, as he proposed: "empiricism is the source of both the weakness and strength of the American character. It has made their success in practical things, it has delayed their success in theoretical things... and made ...the practical type of mind inevitable and the theoretical type of mind unimportant."8
For many of our observers, the practical mind was viewed wanting, as "the American people are beginning to cast about for a positive national destiny." Practicality had subdued the frontier and industrialized America; world leadership now called for theoretic vision. As Britons viewed the American mind amidst the depression, they saw that statistical facts and figures had not created Utopia. Reliance on the practical and pragmatic alone was sometimes sterile, as Reed described:

"The practical man substitutes morals for morality, prosperity for felicity, information for knowledge, beauties for beauty; the reflecting man imagines the principle of virtue, truth and happiness in his mind's eye; but the practical man will practice only virtues, comprehend only truths, enjoy only happy moments."  

There were limits to get-aheadism; it might be a powerful, energizing motor, but when stalled, the Americans must be prepared to be philosophical, cautioned the Britons. A nation, like all individuals, cannot expect success winning, achievement, all the time; when these measures of success are absent, one must be prepared to envision them in the mind's eye, holding them as ideals and possessing the courage to move onward. The Britons had envisioned America in the 19th Century as a land of youth; now they believed, it must come to maturity, perhaps through hard knocks, but such is the school of life. Our visitors supported the American emphasis on achievement and the faith in progress but asked us to consider, "what is it all for?" Could Americans think in ideal abstractions?
Americans seemed to look ever forward as Scottish novelist Archibald Macdonell (1935) described: "Americans are alive to the value of modernity, fertile in experiment... and feverish in the search for something new." This seems like the descriptions of Americans in the 1920's as Britons used similar adjectives to depict Americans as emotional, self-critical, social, material, practical, extrovert, gregarious, optimistic, and active. In the Twenties, America was the pace-setter in things exotic, and material. However in the Thirties, material became almost synonymous with productive capacity and productivity. Britons watched the American economic model being rebuilt by New Deal craftsmanship; would their get-aheadism prevail? Edward Bliss Reed noted that "Americans glory in their industrial efficiency and admit it... Britain turns up her nose in scorn, not because she has not been striving for comparable efficiency--she has, but with small success--but will not admit it...." British journalist John Gibbons (1935) echoed, "America is the best Hated Nation on Earth." Was there evidence of a sour grapes attitude developing towards America's achievements?  

As America pulled out of the Depression and as the British Empire began to break apart, some Britons now made a liability out of get-aheadism and progress, as Archibald Macdonell suggested the Americans do not look to the past, but only to the future: "Americans are self-conscious over the lack of antiquity...the American does not like strangers to say that America is a new country." Lacking a history, "America disliked being told so."
Macdonell chided Americans through historical parallel: "Scotland does not admit the superiority of England because the clans were barbarous cattle-thieves when Alcuin was Archbishop of York and the friend of Charlemagne, nor do the English regard themselves as a lower order of humanity than the Italians because the English were facing the rigours of their climate in a coating of woad when Virgil was riding with Horace down the Appian Way. But the American has got this notion into his head and nothing will expel it, and he takes a morbid delight in trotting it out in public and wringing his hands over it. He has created a bogey and is cowed by it. But woe betide the foreigner who so much as hints at the existence of the bogey." Macdonell created a convenient plus for England. He continued the parody, emphasizing that beyond lacking a history, Americans did not care for the past they do possess as he described a graveyard in the center of New York: "After all, here was an authentic piece of that Antiquity which the Americans so passionately long for. Here, in the Trinity churchyard, lie men who took part in the making of the United States. (The parish dates from 1697.) But the stones are neglected and the inscriptions are often almost illegible, and an atmosphere of decay broods over the scene. It is as if a compromise has been arranged between the rival forces of Antiquity and Modernity. The Modern Spirit allows the church and its burial ground to remain in the heart of the financial district where site-values must be about a million dollars a square inch, while in return the Spirit of Antiquity makes the concession that the historical relics of America's past shall be allowed to rot away to dust."
Macdonell's remarks are disingenuous. They illustrate the defense-mechanism described by Brian Magee (1958). Some Britons in the 1930's believed America may have material wealth and industrial efficiency but Britain was still ahead in the things that really matter, like history, philosophy and culture. But on the whole, sour grapes, nurtured by envy, was not the theme in British commentary of the Thirties. The majority of the observers viewed America as the land of gigantic industrial capability and were unwilling to denigrate America's tremendous material wealth and culture. Get-aheadism remained predominantly as a virtue—a vital, energizing force in the American character.

Ronald Mitchel (1935), a Commonwealth Fund Fellow, found a revealing personality difference between the frank American and the guarded Englishman which goes far in explaining the prevailing attitudes as Americans began to displace the British as the world leader:

"The young American, whether an undergraduate or a business man of sixty, is never ashamed to breathe "Gosh!" and just gaze at something that surprises and moves him. The Englishman, particularly the southern Englishman of university education, refuses to be caught off guard, and will conceal his natural emotion of admiration or wonder and even disparage what he is really moved by lest he should open himself to ridicule for his naivete."  

After the Stalin purges of 1935-36 began to discredit Russian socialism abroad, capitalistic America began to have other redeeming qualities in the eyes of the Britons beyond material wealth. Shane
Leslie stated that the British were not "gullible Gullivers" when they described "the present America is one of transition...the rising America is the best hope for the future of both civilization and culture." Leslie the famous Irish biographer of Jonathan Swift saw Americans doing everything on a gigantic scale from roads to skyscrapers. Arthur Bryant (1936) described America's "wealth and power" as natural results of "courage, energy, vitality--in the race which creates them." The Americans were deemed a splendidly unique people, a Homo Americanus. For British historian Bryant, as for many Britons, the American Dream still lived in America as the American ideal--the ideal of social progress and individual get-aheadism. But not all Britons were yet convinced that America possessed greater values than Philistinism.

Equality

As America re-emerged as an alternative to the Russian and British economic models, our visitors became even more interested in the social underpinnings of success. British agriculturalist Morgan Philips Price (1936) proclaimed "the absence of snobbery is one of the best features of American society." The absence of social classes in America was viewed as a tremendous strength in America; equality of opportunity was the propelling force behind progress. It colored all personal relations as Ronald Mitchell said, "hypocrisy is foreign to the straightforward American...he would rather admit his simplicity and have done with it;" where "pretentiousness exists it is heartily ridiculed." Equality promotes "youthfulness,"
"enthusiasm," and "freshness" which is the American's "greatest charm." Equality was the origin too, many Britons believed, of American optimism.

Equality too colored American humor for the Britons. Humor in America was for the masses and some of the greatest humorists have been the originators of tall-tales and cracker-barrell bits of philosophy, whereas in Britain, humor is an elite craft. Mitchell commented on these social differences: "Many Americans are quite convinced that no Englishman has any sense of humour whatever. On the other hand an intelligent and witty Englishman is frequently bored by having to smile at an American joke which is so obvious as to be painful. It is true, I think, to say that the average English-man either sees through an American joke too quickly or never sees through it at all...Over-elaboration seems to be the fault of the English joke. When an English joke is good, it is a beautifully conceived piece of subtlety. American jokes are hit or miss. When they are good they are brilliant...when they are bad they just hurt." Equality encouraged Americans to be gregarious as well as open and straightforward. Maie Perley (1940) the wife of a visiting British professor at Indiana, observed reticence, so common in England, as by no means an American characteristic; in America, it might be described as an unknown quantity. She found the American completely free of inhibitions and expanded: "Mr. Average American is a disconcertingly candid fellow who will discuss his love life with a perfect stranger and tell it with the same blatant candor that he employs to discuss political situations." The American, she found,
is a loquacious traveler; there is nothing of the English reserve about him. While on a train, she found "it quite useless to try to evade him, for even though you stack yourself with books and barricade yourself behind a positive bookstall of newspapers, you can be quite sure that he will storm your defenses...he loves to talk and to talk about himself."\(^{16}\)

The ideals of progress and equality have produced the typical American, but was this person standardized, wondered the Britons. Did standardization in material production generate standardized people? The genile Scotsman Andrew Elliot (1939), argued for individuality, saying, "the American is not just a calculating machine-made person, but very real, open and genuine." British political pamphleteer Robert Mowat (1938), while arguing too for the individuality of Americans, found it possible "to generalize about American society. There is an American civilization or social habit."\(^{17}\)

On the eve of the second World War, Britons strove even harder to discover the national character of America. Bernard Newman (1943) toured America to promote Anglo-American collaboration and cooperation. "My mission," he recalled, "was to see America so as to be able to tell my own people about it." He endeavored to "dispell strange notions" held by the British about America, which he believed were exploited by the Nazis. He mentioned many ideas which would please Americans: "Americans are generous; their charities cover the earth, and no cry of distress goes up anywhere which does not
bring a prompt response in dollars. And when the Americans give, they give with both hands—as we in England have reason to know."

Fearful, lest Britons take American aid too lightly, or view it as yet another Yankee scheme to get rich, Newman said: "America is warm and open. Cynicism is almost officially discouraged and malice confined to politics and the popular press." Although Americans were shown to Britons to be "good chaps," there also appeared in Newman's guide cautionary statements about the Americans: "...remember that games are a good guide to national character; Americans do business as they play games—with great attack and with vigour, noise, zest, and enjoyment—and to win. The money is not sought for its own sake particularly, and Americans are not any more avaricious than other people in business...but the dollar is a scalp, a medal, the symbol of achievement and success and is pursued as such." This was a caution to British readers against expecting the Americans to grant loans, leases and aids totally without the dollar sign attached. Americans are generous, but also hard-headed business people.

Newman offered other cautionary statements to Britons eager to please a wartime ally: "The best key to a nation's mind is its language. English? Not at all. It may be called English, but it is American. If you come from Southeastern England or speak the standard English of the South of England you will be accused in America of having an English accent. And why not? Our English is London English." More important than the mere accent, warned Newman, was the social value that Americans did not place on language. He
made this most clear:

"For Englishmen ways of speech are often bound up with ideas of class distinction. Now of course there are differences in any country between the speech of the well-educated and that of the ill-educated, and America is no exception; but you must beware of transferring unconscious assumptions drawn from your English experience to totally different conditions. The United States was a revolutionary, equalitarian country all the time the frontier was moving west and in spite of changes, remains so to this day. Speech is not an index of class position, either way." Equality disallowed class judgements on speech or manner of dress, as Newman praised: "Americans are not snobs...they are still more interested in where a man is going than in where he has come from."  

Newman noticed the spirit of get-aheadism that had been recognized by Mary Hamilton in the early 1930's, as he said: "There is a lot of Horatio Alger still in America." He believed there were times when this sentiment might be carried too far, however, as "the get-ahead-at-any-price idea" may become "anti-social." He suggested agreement with the Rotarian ideal: "service above self," and commented, "I believe that is growing to be a fundamental America idea." A master of psychology, Newman subtly applauded Americans for giving aid to Britain. A final point brings home his emphasis on close cooperation between Americans and Britons: "rugged individualism and success will continue to be powerful forces in this virile land. There is one qualification to be made:
I encountered more talk about rugged individualism than practical examples. The fact is that Americans work best in teams—mass production is the final culmination of team-work, and in this the Americans excel."20 Personal achievement could be won through voluntary collusion and task conformity in addition to the more traditional individual effort. The Britons saw Americans acting both collectively and individually and saw no paradox in this behavior. Their own question was, why the bravado over rugged individualism when Americans cooperate so well.

The New Americans and Cosmic Man

Hilary Saunders (1944) described the Americans as "a new people with all the vigour and panache of youth." The "present and the future," Americans feel, "belong to them...the past can take care of itself." Americans have a tremendous "zest for life—they give hard knocks and expect to take them." As the war ended, Britons found optimism running high: "Throughout my long journey," recalled Saunders, who traveled in America for the British War Ministry, "I never met a bored American." Americans are "in love with life and living;" they are filled with a "natural exuberance." Marvelling, Saunders continued: "Americans are informative, articulate, very conscious of themselves and their country; few Americans imagine that they might fail in life, such a thought never enters their head. It is this attitude that has given America success." Here again is the familiar get-aheadism or the ideal of individual and social progress recognized by so many other Britons. Harold
Laski (1948) echoed, "No state, until our own day, has done so much to make the idea of progress a part of the mental make-up of man," as America. 21

At the end of the war, Harold Laski believed Americans formed a new national type. The American "has an experimentalism in temper, a passion for making his own way in life, a zeal for self-assertion...is confident that he is in himself a person of social significance...is rarely interested in the past because he is so certain that the future will bear no relation to it...and assumes that he will have the right to move continually forward." Wyndham Lewis (1948) believed Americans would evolve a new international species of man—a Cosmic Man. This new man would be "a perfectly eclectic, non-national, internationally minded creature, whose blood is drawn—more or less—from all the corners of the earth, with no more geographical or cultural roots than a chameleon." Lewis quoted Trugot's phrase, "this people (the American) is the hope of the human race." 22

The ideals of One World and the hopes for a Cosmic Man did not come to pass, and after the war ended and recovery was on its way, the tone of British commentaries fragmented. The observations of Laski and Lewis represent the apex of a supportive, deferential posture towards America bred in wartime. English writer Leslie James (1950) signaled the beginning of a new attitude and description of Americans as *parvenues* with the corresponding values of the *arriviste*. "Only if Europeans—especially the English—have a real
understanding of America, will they be able to teach Americans to conduct themselves in a manner English gentlemen thought other Englishmen should conduct themselves, when England was the leading Power in the world.\textsuperscript{23}

With James, the old 'sour grapes' attacks and the denigration of America as lacking in experience, dignity, and culture re-appeared. James viewed the pace of American life as exhausting, as Americans "hopped about," "bolt their food," and "instead of drinking to light a fire inside them, they drink as if they were attempting to put one out...what compels Americans to move like jumping beans?" Our refined observer answered his own question: "Americans have no past, no tradition, no class system and no planners; they cannot live long lives of polite understatement like the British simply because 'it has always been done'." The diatribe continued as James believed "the American is always unsure whether he has a personality at all," due to the absence of social classes. "At the core, he is never sure he is someone. His entire life is spent seeking reassurance on this point." Life in America was seen as being unenviable; the American is so rushed in competing, and so busy trying to find out how to conduct his life, that he never has time to live it. The comments of James were not without humor, however, as he described "Americans of both sexes are poor lovers. They bring to lovemaking as to all other activities, two qualities only--energy and speed." Further, "necking, petting, smooching, pitching woo...is an abbreviated form of lovemaking...exasperated
Europeans have called it another damn American labour saving device.24

Sometimes the Britons, describing the same trait among Americans, disagreed in their interpretation, as many observers noticed the "refusal of Americans to fence themselves in." Professional journalist Michael Robertson (1950) explained that the cynical Briton argues that "lacking inner resources, reserve and stability, Americans are afraid to be alone and do not wish for privacy;" on the other hand, the more generous observer interpreted this by saying that Americans have no fences because they regard people who build them as "stand-offish, stuck up, in fact a stuffed shirt."25

More holes were picked in America's social fabric in the 1950's as Banks and Ward (1952) pointed to racism in the "land of equality," to violence and lawlessness in politics and the strike methods of labor. They were supported by the British Broadcasting Corporation and complained of the American "distrust of and antagonism to government." The criticism that standardization of industry had produced the mass American was revived from the Twenties by British author-sculptor Rom Landau (1953):

"Man becomes very much like the object of his worship. Now what the Americans worship is technological achievement, which symbolizes for them the victory of mind over matter...good plumbing, fast cars, efficient mechanical gadgets, all these have become for them more than mere means towards an end. They are admired for themselves, for their perfection, even for their aesthetic attributes."
During the war, technology was seen by the Britons as power; now technology was dehumanizing.  

But in spite of the few bitingly critical British commentaries, the trend in the Fifties, as in the early Thirties was essentially to congratulate America. Most Britons agreed with Landau that "the term American Way of Life has come to be more than a time-saving cliche. It is not a tag on which to affix a bundle of preconceptions and prejudices. It is neither tentative nor apologetic, nor is it boastful. It simply says, 'this is the way we live and the way we do things'." Landau realized the American does not mind having a car, bathroom or TV set exactly like everyone else's. He does not object to standardization, or to the description of being a regular fellow. Most Britons saw the Americans relishing in their way of life--so much so that they sought to export it abroad through foreign aid. Americans seemed to feel they were a chosen people as political journalist William Blake (1955) pointed to the belief in America as "God's Green Footstool." J. W. Morpurgo (1959) who had lived, worked and studied in America noticed the self-same confidence as he teased: "America was the child of George Washington, and before him there was only God."  

Insightfully, a few Britons in the Fifties cautioned America about carrying the zeal for progress and equality too far. The American way of life, which seemed to work so well at home, should not necessarily be proselytized to the world. J. B. Priestley (1955) understood the American zeal better than any other Briton
as he warned against the drive for perfection. "Only gods succeed in walking on the rainbridge; mortals fall to their death, for the rainbow is only a beautiful semblance that stretches across the heavens, and not a road for corporeal human beings; they must go through underneath..." America's drive for utopia could be her undoing, as Priestley saw Americans believing the words of the song 'Somewhere, over the Rainbow'. Priestley used great skill and humor to tell Americans of this grave error. "Every time I go from downtown Houston out to the Shamrock Hotel, I read my favorite notice: Turn Right on Next Block For Perfection. I believe it has something to do with oiling or cleaning cars, but that doesn't matter. Half the people in these cities are turning, or about to turn, on next block for perfection. That is, they believe, just round the corner. Not something a little better, nor much better, than what they already have or are--but Perfection." This driving belief explained to Priestley why "one wall out of every four in the bookstores is filled with volumes explaining how to turn right on next block and the perfection you will find there. Exercises, from Muller to Yogi; every possible variety of diet; Gracious Living and Finer Things; armour-piercing salesmanship; Personal Magnetism; Daily Rejoicing; Mystic Secrets from Tibet: take your choice, remembering that Perfection itself is close at hand." Here is a caution against carrying get-aheadism to an extreme; but the quest for utopia was as old as America: "Probably the parents of the people who buy these books came from Europe believing they would find Eldorado, the
Fountain of Youth, the philosopher's stone. This generation is continuing the quest. Somewhere, somehow, perfection is to be found." Priestley pronounced this "belief is one of the keys to the character and behaviour of the American people. It explains much of their optimism, the moods in which they feel that one vast generous gesture from them will put the world right; also their sudden and dangerous anger when they discover that perfection is not there round the next block; their bewildering alternations of naive hopefulness and cynicism." Priestley believed, as he watched Admass* spread Americanism around the world, that the drive for perfection could only have serious consequences if unrestrained: "And the end product of all this, I suspect," he said, "will be explosive mountains of frustration, Krakatoas by the gross. If the patient virtues have withered away, after so much discouragement, and it is finally discovered that magic can't be laid on--then to hell with it all!" Priestley drove to the heart of the American mind in the Fifties. His observations, striking now such a familiar chord after the disillusionment of Vietnam, explain the real origin of a sense of unease felt by many Americans in the Sixties and Seventies. The rude awakening that after all, perfection was not round the corner.

*ADMASS explained Priestley in Journey Down A Rainbow (1955) increasing productivity, plus inflation, plus a rising standard of material living, plus high-pressure advertising and salesmanship, plus mass communications, plus cultural democracy and the creation of the mass mind, the mass man." The people firmly fixed in ADMASS are ADMASSIANS.
Paradox, Change and Continuity

By the late Fifties, the Britons found America a land of paradox, perhaps related to a blurring of values. J. W. Morpurgo observed: "America is a continent and its people as varied as its scenery and yet there are certain typically American social characteristics." But "until the foreigner grows sensitive to paradox," said Morpurgo, "he cannot appreciate America." Perhaps unfortunately, "once he becomes resigned to paradox he is near ceasing to be a foreigner."

The paradoxes were many and mixed: "A land dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, in which Jim Crow laws flourish and are upheld by honest white men who are themselves ardent for democracy and, in most of their social habits, kindlier than any other people on the face of the earth; unequalled resources"... yet conditions "... that breed hideous poverty as a side-product of great riches; snobbery, more active than any that we know in England, practised without hypocrisy by the same men who have preached and fought for equality; free, progressive and universal education flourishing side by side with sham culture,...false learning and great scholarship; a devotion to tradition, in a land given over to modernity: these are but a few of the contradictory qualities and the paradoxical characteristics that make America and Americanism."  

One of the most serious paradoxes viewed by the Britons was that prosperity has not brought with it a sustaining civilization comparable to the old civilization of Western Europe. Mass production
has encouraged leisure, but leisure has not been used to create new spiritual ideals and goals. Americans do not know what is it all for? Europe, Morpurgo believed, will follow America economically, but has grave reservations about the spirituality of Americans. The European adheres to the old belief in creative thought and original, independent, intellectual effort. Europe looked to America for ideological and intellectual support as well as for economic aid at the end of the war, as Morpurgo concisely stated: "The old man [Europe] is desperately weak but will not surrender his convictions; the muscular youth [America] is too ignorant to help." His remarks are somewhat akin to the ideas of Henry Miller's and those of other domestic critics who argue for heterodoxy, creativity, imagination, humanism and the emergence of a spiritual athlete. The machine, say these critics, has become our Golden Calf. In America there is need for revolutionary vision and noble international causes.

A crisis of values seemed to be felt in the mid-Fifties and Denis Brogan (1957) described what he termed the values of a "new success." He found young Americans willing now to have larger families and consciously making a decision for leisure rather than for ever-expanding income. The new values in the mid-Fifties seemed to glorify being 'with family', as opposed to the older idea of striving to be a 'good provider'. "The naive Horatio Alger attitude is less smart than it was," said Brogan as he viewed the reassessment of old values. "The whole western world is involved in a crisis of values," but he found it no more acute in the United States than in Europe.
Was America 'coming apart?' as the book of Carey McWilliams proposed? Fellow American, Samuel Lubell pointed to a deep uneasiness growing in America which seemed to reflect an anxiety over impending disaster. Lubell suggested that as a nation we were beset with problems beyond our control. McWilliams was deeply concerned about the image of America "that is being beamed throughout the world, and which springs at us from the slick pages of mass publications." He called for "a leadership that will fashion...an image of the collective American effort in which we can take pride."

Americans were familiar with the critical or enviable comments about materialism in America from the Twenties through the Fifties, but somehow the foreign comments in the Fifties stung more as the United States felt increasing responsibility as the world's leader. And after Sputnik, many Americans had self doubts. ³²

Alexander Werth (1959) was a visiting British professor of political science at Ohio State during the Fall, 1957, semester when Sputnik went up. He answered the critics, both foreign and domestic, by describing the quality of American life as much more free and open than in Europe. He found that American young people were not tepid; the students in the Fifties did not compose the careful generation. Americans would respond unhysterically to the Sputnik challenge; educational curriculum was flexible enough to refocus on the applied sciences. America was not arthritic, but was still young, vital and optimistic. Americans were far from silent, unthinking, or scared. Werth found the mental conformism of
Americans had been greatly exaggerated, and that "Europe has a grossly over-simplified and over-standardized idea of America." Werth expressed an "uncanny feeling that Europe is perhaps becoming a less free world than America." Even during the Sputnik events, Americans could still laugh at themselves and turn a buck; as Werth illustrated Yankee ingenuity and get-aheadism:

"An Atlanta restaurant comes out with a sputnikburger with a small dog, the 'dog' being a cocktail sausage on a hamburger garnished with Czarist Russian dressing topped by a 'satellite olive'. A Philadelphia grocer moves his over-stocked and undersized potatoes by dubbing them 'spudniks'. A new potato peeler is inevitably a 'spudnik'."

For Werth, the American values of progress and equality had not been changed by Sputnik. Americans were not part of a lonely crowd, nor had they escaped from freedom, or joined businesses as organization men, nor followed the road to serfdom. Traditional values would prevail in America. But for other Britons, like Denis Brogan (1958), the Russian launching was, for an instant, an enormously significant event, as Brogan stated: "For the first time, in my thirty years' study of the American Way of Life, I am not convinced that it, at the moment, has what it takes to win this contest."

He offered, "the best advice a friendly foreigner can give the American people is to run scared." But, as Werth illustrated, American did not discard their beliefs, and a single American rose to 'get America moving again'.
John F. Kennedy reiterated America's faith and optimism in his 1961 Inaugural Address. He personified the new American:

"Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has passed to a new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a cold and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today."

Americans threw back the gauntlet to critics and challengers alike in ringing phrase. Most European intellectuals and virtually all our British observers adored Kennedy the man and acknowledged the arrival of Camelot. Perhaps the spiritual vision would now spring forth from America. Denis Brogan (1960) recognized that the affection Americans held for Kennedy as a man was very unusual as "mere reverence for political authority is rare in the United States. There is great, even superstitious, reverence for the Constitution and the American Way of Life," but not necessarily for the President. Britons recognized that John F. Kennedy won greater accolades than any President since Franklin D. Roosevelt. Political authority, recognized the Britons, claims no reverence in America because it "was delegated from bottom up and no appeal was made to tradition." The Britons found Americans "optimistic about the potentialities of the average man." And they marveled at the Kennedy charisma which elevated America towards New Frontiers. 34

From their perspective of deja vu the Britons in the early Sixties cautioned us against riding too high. Denis Brogan (1960)
believed "the United States is now affluent enough, if not to afford all that Professor Galbraith wants, at least to afford far more laziness and consequent opportunity for reflection than any past American generation has known." He prophesized: "I have no belief that American productive capacity and genius is in for any serious decline. My fears are of the direction that may be given to that capacity and genius." Brogan believed America had responded fully to the Sputnik challenge; America should have no need to fear comparison or competition. "If America can hold her own can she fail, in a not-limitlessly remote future, to win?" World leadership would come naturally to America if she had the courage "to hold to that which is good in its own traditions." "If Americans do that, intelligently, the battle is more than half won and a great part of that half is, to be sure, in our own hearts, that we believe in and trust our way of dealing with the human situation." America would not come apart; the center would hold together around the values of equality and progress. To despair was pointless; the future lay with America. 35

"Compared with the European, the American is still optimistic, cheerful, energetic—convinced that if not all is for the best in the best of all possible countries, it is on the way to becoming so." The American is also convinced, said Brogan, "with much justification, that the things that threaten the admirable 'American Way of Life' come from outside, convinced with less justification, that the world (which cannot any longer be ignored) will beat a path in due
time to the America doorstep to buy the new mousetrap, 'know-how'."

True, Brogan found plenty of ostentatious pessimism. Americans
ask: "'Why can't Johnny read?' 'Why Elvis Presley?' 'What of the
farmer?', 'What of the small businessman?' But all in all, the
American as seen by the visiting and friendly foreigner seems still,
by European standards, at east in Zion."36

There was no need to trumpet challenges to adversaries in the
Cold War; no need to display an arrogance of power or zeal for world
perfection. Unfortunately, it took Americans some time to heed the
warnings from our British observers, especially over Vietnam. London
news correspondent Susan Cooper (1965) found Americans "curiously
defensive." America was described as an "insulated New World."

Americans were defensive when asked about the war in what Cooper called
"the American Way--more than local pride, more than patriotism...a
kind of accidental complacency, which is a little less than arrogance
and a little more than smugness."37 Americans sat complacent behind
a "golden curtain" of materialism. Was America's youthful vigorous
leadership solidifying into aging self-satisfaction? Could America
heed criticism? Would America come apart over the war?

British political journalist James McMillan (1972) believed
traditional values had broken down in America; there had been a
flight into nihilism represented by the shallow cult of youth with
its false idols of drugs, sex and acid rock. The rudder was gone in
America; things would fall apart. Michael Davie (1972), correspon-
dent for the London Observer, saw technology as "causing a fundamental
and rapid change in almost all conditions of life" in America.
Nevertheless, the future still could be read in America; specifically for Davie, it could be read in California. Davie described a shadowy malaise in America: "a disturbing feeling" that Americans had "inadvertently turned a corner and got on an unfamiliar road."
"The spreading doubts among the comfortably-off about the way they have ordered their lives, the feeling that affluence creates more problems than it solves," and the "inability to cope with the new leisure" created by technology, has produced "a sense of unease."
It was, in short, a sensation that society is not holding together. 38

But Alexis De Tocqueville in the 1830's confronted too the paradox of an American society that was fragmented by self-interest and self-seeking, yet nevertheless was unified by "a principle of inner order." The inner order was the principle of equality. Patriotism and religion also provided cohesion. Davie marvelled at American resilience; Americans "have the capacity to make mistakes and then retrieve them." And this capacity for recovery goes beyond social or technological tinkering; the American nation had acquired an identity in the words of De Tocqueville, from 'marching through wilderness, drying up marshes, diverting rivers, peopling the wilds and subduing nature', and had thereby acquired a 'hidden sinew giving strength to the whole frame'. Davie saw Americans "poised to learn," and had no doubt that through America's get-aheadism and equality, Americans would solve the crisis of values. 39
Margaret Powell (1973), a popular British novelist, summarized the Britons' views of America since 1935 as she argued that Americans are strong, young, independent, loquacious, attentive, sincere, loyal, boastful, but she believed Americans had "something to boast about." It was absurd, she believed "to denigrate America as being shallow and uncultured." The future lay in America, as H. G. Wells had believed, and Britons would continue to read their fortunes in the palm of America. "I felt a sense of tremendous power about America," said Powell. "It appeared to be a country that could absorb anything and anybody." 40

Richard L. Rapson, in Britons View America, 1860-1935, (1971), found a "well defined harmony" within British travel commentaries. He found that equality was the "spirited motor," in the eyes of the Britons, which propelled America as its central underlying value. The belief in progress was a second pivot around which Americans and American institutions rotated. After 1935, Rapson wondered if the harmony he had observed in British writings had broken apart to form an "ill defined dissonance." 41 From this study, the answer appears to be that the harmony continued. Amidst the Depression there was critical expectancy within and without America; would American society hold together? If so, what would the traditional values be? Could equality and progress survive? Emphatically, yes, found our British visitors after 1935. Equality continued as the energizing force propelling individual get-aheadism and social progress. Alexis De Tocqueville appears to have been essentially
correct when he labeled equality as the most basic American value: "Nothing can satisfy (Americans) without equality...they would rather perish than lose it." Peter Bromhead (1971), a professor of politics, University of Bristol, echoed: "There is no habit of humbly accepting an unfavorable inherited place in society" in America, and further, "if people believe in equality of opportunity the existence of that belief tends to make the opportunity more equal."\(^{41}\)

The Britons saw great congruence between American values and American social institutions. Significantly, the Britons tell us where our values of equality and progress are congruent with their institutional manifestations, like the schools, and where they are not. And while the Britons found the two themes of equality and progress to be continuous and often congruent with social institutions, they realized all in America could not be packed into tidy boxes; some paradoxes and incongruities would remain. They pointed to inconsistencies between ecological ideals and business demands; they saw our love for technological gymnastics, while holding a nostalgia for the simplicity of the pioneering past.

Americans did seem to share identifiable values; America did seem to possess the fundamentals of a national character. The Britons believed that many public character traits and traditional values were taught and internalized in American schools. It is to that institution which we now turn.
Footnotes for CHAPTER III


5 Hartshorne, "An Introduction to National Character" in Forging the American Character, p. 1.

6 Ibid.


8 Reed, Commonwealth Fund Fellows, pp. 86-87.

9 Ibid.


15 Morgan Philips Price, America After Sixty Years, the Travel Diaries of Two Generations of Englishmen (London, 1936), 101.


17 Andrew Elliot, Hell! I'm British: A Plain Man Looks at America (London, 1939), 157.
Robert Balmain Mowat, The United States of America (Bristol, 1938), 110-111.


19 Ibid., p. 182.

20 Ibid., p. 4, 43.


22 Laski, The American Democracy, pp. 4-5.
Wyndham Lewis, America and Cosmic Man (New York, 1949), 203, 11.

23 Leslie James, Americans In Glasshouses (London, 1950), foreword.

24 Ibid., pp. 10-20.

25 Michael Robertson, Beyond The Sunset (London, 1950), 43.


27 Landau, Among The Americans, p. 63.


29 Morpurgo, American Excursion, p. 3-4.


33 Ibid., p. 149, 178, 106.


39 Ibid., pp. 249-250.


CHAPTER IV
The Schools

Of all American institutions, the ones which best reflect the values shared by Americans are the schools. Equality and progress are the guidelines of the educational process and are represented in their products, the children. The Britons were keenly interested in America's educational preparation of its youth. They felt the success or failure of the schools would mark the success or failure of America as a world leader.

"Of all the differences between Britain and America," wrote Susan Cooper (1965), "none is quite so complicated as that between the two countries' educational systems." In Britain, education has always been linked with some kind of elite; before 1945, it was a social elite of wealth and birth, and after the introduction of the 'New Britain' in the postwar period, it was an elite based on merit. Education in Britain never has been for the masses. In America, egalitarianism is the very cornerstone of educational foundations. American education is democratic, rooted in equality, practical and technically-oriented in its positive aspects, and standardized, mediocre, non-aesthetic and unacademic in its negative elements. In saying these things, the Britons looked closely, often going into schools and talking with educators. Their comments were most pointed after 1945, when Britain was democratizing its educational opportunities and looked to the American commonschool for possible direction.
Where the British and the American school systems come together is in the identification of the future with youth. In both systems the students are the hope of tomorrow. Progress and a better world can be insured through an investment in the education of the young.

Americanization

"The word school in America covers every type of educational institution," wrote Denis Brogan (1944); "being at school may mean being in a kindergarten or at Harvard" to Americans. The essential purpose of the schools "is teach Americanism, meaning not merely political and patriotic dogma, but the whole habits necessary to American life," Brogan observed, and most other Britons essentially agreed. The ideological purpose of the schools was to teach American values. The main political goal "is to bring together the young of all origins, to provide, artificially, the common background that in an old, rural society is provided by tradition," said Brogan.

Lacking a long history, America essentially created one, inculcating "a common language, common habits, common tolerances, and a common political and national faith" among its children.

The schools were seen by the Britons to be the instruments for the Americanization of immigrants. British political journalist Robert Mowat (1938) said: "the grade school and the high school have succeeded in making a people out of scores of immigrant races, gradually assimilated to the original English stocks. The result is American civilization, a continuation of the European..., but developed with a richness and originality of its own. And among the
many civilizing agencies in early American society two are outstanding, the minister and the teacher." A bond of common knowledge and experience could be provided equally for every child in the schools. Furthermore, study was not the only "way up to Americanization—to acceptance;" through the schools; "sport" was another, said Brogan. Sports "do the job more dramatically for the newcomers gifted with what it takes to excel in competitive contests." This process of Americanization—the teaching of American values, would remain, Brogan believed, "an important and necessary part of the function of the American school."³

The schools achieved their purpose admirably, however, the Britons also viewed several drawbacks to the desire to make 'good Americans' out of widely varying people. British agriculturalist Graham Hutton (1946) suggested Americanization meant that schools "must iron out disparities, establish an American average to which pupils must conform, and must necessarily...standardize them." J. W. Morpurgo (1949) restated similar concerns: "Democracy interpreted in the American manner means the ability to live a l'Amer­icaine, the grasping of American virtues and the rejection of any ambition to be different. This democracy is successfully imparted by the schools, and though they boast of their outstanding pupils, it is the mean that is their real pride."⁴

But the unifying force of American education was praised, as Denis Brogan (1941) observed: "the creation of general literacy and a common written and spoken tongue, intelligible everywhere except
possibly in the deep South, is an achievement as remarkable as the
creation of Mandarin Chinese or Low Latin or Hellentistic Greek, and
this tongue is certain to be the new lingua franca of the world."
This cohesion was prefaced by the ideals of the Puritan fathers who
wished to create a public knowledgeable of Christian teachings and
also the Jeffersonian ideal that only the literate could discuss
and decide, and so live in freedom. "The American public-school
system...is really designed to teach the art of living in a demo­
cratic and competitive society, and that it does," judged Brogan,
"on the whole, very well."

The little red schoolhouse in America acted as a political and
social force to promote equality. This theme has been continuous in
British commentaries from the nineteenth century through our present
day. In 1920, Sir Philip Gibbs "was overwhelmed with admiration
for the American system of education...England lags a long way
behind here, with its old-fashioned hotch-potch of elementary
schools, church schools, "academies for young gentlemen"--the
breeding grounds of snobs--grammar schools, and private, second rate
colleges; all complications are swept away by the clean simplicity
of the American state school to which boys of every class may go
without being handicapped by the caste system which is the curse of
England." In America "wealth and position did not wait to see if
their man wore the right sort of tie," echoed journalist Basil
Dillon Woon (1941); free public education encouraged equality and
disparaged caste and class. "Democracy begins in the schools and... so long as equal educational facilities are not offered all its children, so long as Government remains a prerogative of Eton and Harrow" Woon lamented, "England is not a true democracy."  

During the early 1930's, Britons saw congruency between American values, especially equality and democracy, and the institutional framework of the schools. Theoretical purpose and practice meshed, as L. P. Jacks (1933) proclaimed: "So long as mass production continues to be the basis of American industry it is hard to see what other methods education could adopt without becoming hopelessly estranged from the main currents of national life."

Education prepared students for life in competitive, industrial America. Jacks answered the critics of the 1920's who pointed to standardization in American education, saying, "whatever one may think of American civilization in general, and however conscious one may be of the falling short in American education, there can be little doubt that the two are well adapted one to the other, in the sense that training given to young people corresponds fairly well to the life the vast majority are likely to lead." Jacks noted the close symbiotic relationship between education and business, suggesting "the money has come out of business, to be sure, and through most of its results flow back to the source from which the money came there is generally a residue left for things of the spirit." This good neighbor policy between the schools and industry would come under severe attack in the 1960's.
In comparing the purpose of American education with the goals of the British system, political economist J. Ellis Barker summed up the disparities in 1927: "Education may be either ornamental or practical. British education has been rather the former than the latter. It was designed by clergymen and scholars for the use of the children of the old leisured class which needed no preparation for the struggle of life. English education has rather developed culture, character and manners than the practical abilities. In the United States education was organized by hardworking, thrifty and exceedingly practical farmers, artisans and business men. The object of American education has been the preparation of the young for practical life. In accordance with the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and national tradition, the young were trained to habits of independence and industry, and to resourceful self-help." These distinctions were important for understanding the controversy among educators on both sides of the Atlantic over quality vs quantity. Edward Bliss Reed (1932) succinctly described the differences between the British system, which emphasized quality, and the American system, which emphasized quantity in mass education, when he said: "English education teaches you how to think;... American education teaches you what to do."8

Quality vs Quantity

The Britons realized that the essential purpose of American education was to teach Americanism, but they wondered if in our
zeal to provide free public education to all, we had neglected quality. James Russell Lowell had remarked in the late nineteenth century that Americans were "the most commonschooled and the least cultivated people in the world." And as the industrial assembly-line techniques created standardization in production, the Britons began to wonder if standardization was the core of the schools. Shane Leslie (1936) believed it was so, as he expanded: "American colleges are excellent societies for the diffusion of useful knowledge. They supply it in canned or pemmican form, and relieve vast numbers from the necessity of thinking for themselves. In the same way that cheap cars are relieving myriads of the need for walking." Ethel Tweedie had remarked before the first World War, that American education "produces high mediocrity, but apparently retards the inspiration of genius." Shane Leslie would agree saying, "the American school system does not educate...it only smears the courses on the men. They emerge like luggage after a well-planned tour covered with labels but with very little acquirement within." And as Leslie wrote during the Depression in America, he found college graduates "a superior class of the unfitted."9

The doubts held by Britons about the American educational system continued from the late 1930's into the post-war period. Because World War II had been waged against Nazism and the values it represented such as thought control, it was perhaps to be expected that the Britons would caution Americans about educational technique. Graham Hutton lived in the Midwest during the war and noticed "education in America is not a matter of 'leading forth from'
the pupil the capacities he or she may possess. It is more the 'putting in' standards of good Americanism and of general knowledge."

While American education was free to all, it might become the same for all; where was provision for the gifted child? Quite simply, where was provision for the 'different child', out of the mainstream and the cult of the average? Methodology was caustically attacked, as Hutton said: "The American high school's and college's emphasis is heavily upon indoctrination rather than on education in the strict Latin meaning of those words; on putting in rather than in bringing out; upon instilling the ideas of others rather than on criticizing them or getting students to form ideas of their own; upon examinations of the student's absorptive capacity rather than of his originality or exposition; upon assimilation rather than on an independent critical power to reason and discriminate." The emphasis on indoctrination might even misconstrue knowledge, as Hutton observed in the case of American history: "The teaching of patriotism and what it means to be an American is bound up with the teaching of history from textbooks approved, and even commissioned on well-defined lines by politicians. The results are not always good for a sound conception of history or of other peoples, or for independent and critical judgement. But they are doubtless good for Americanism." ¹⁰

The Britons were eager to tell us that the American educational system was "vastly influenced by Germany between 1840 and 1900, and much of that influence still remains." Whereas the English educational system "aims to discover and then develop the original and
independent qualities or capacities of the young mind," said Graham Hutton, "the American system supplies an average of potted knowledge." And the average had to be lower in terms of knowledge, wider in terms of social accomplishments, behavior and basic skills, to accommodate the children of alien immigrants. And as every child was democratically held to be equal, it followed that "the pace of the class should be set within the average pupil's range of ability—often, indeed, within that of the slightly backward pupils, to be on the safe side." Devotion to the cult of the average had produced several paradoxes in American traits, as Hutton outlined: "emphasis on individualism but also on a standardized average, the greatest tolerance in the world but equally great emphasis on conformity." 

"American state education is admirably democratic," noted Brian Magee (1958), "but its standards are disgracefully low. There is only one kind of school for every child, from the genius to the idiot, and all are educated together." British education, on the other hand, "has admirable standards but is disgracefully undemocratic. Quality is achieved at the cost of segregating children into different schools according to their abilities." Magee found "quality and equality in education" to be "both wholly desirable, but they are not fully compatible." He found Britain and America have moved in opposite directions in regards to this dilemma. "The British sacrifice equality too much to quality, the Americans quality too much to equality." Americans pay the price in endemic anti-intellectualism; Britons pay the price in endemic snobbery.
Whereas their educational system was aimed at the tutelage of the elite few, the Britons pointed to oddities in our system such as mass produced learning, grading by points or credits, textbook examinations, and in general complained of our educators who treat young minds like sides of beef, counts of yarn or qualities of tobacco. They saw our system placing too much emphasis on the utilitarian as L. P. Jacks warned:

"The fatal idea that nothing is worth learning except for its economic utility has certainly got a firm hold on the minds of all who participate in it from the governors of universities to the children in the primary schools. To this cause the low standards of American education, in the academic sense of the word, is largely attributable."

The technical orientation of industrial America was reflected in its schools, but the Britons believed in the Greek ideal of education which prepared the individual for both work and play. In America proper study of the arts and humanities and the preparation for leisure were neglected by emphasis on the practical. Bernard Newman (1943) quoted an American friend who said: "We have only small training in the gracious art of mental contentment...our aesthetic minds are starved by this mechanical age. Machines may print a book, but they will never write one." Newman concurred and laughed with derision at a poster which read, "experience is a dead loss if you can't sell it for more than it cost you." His reply was "the best experience is never sold, but stored in the mind." But should it be the schools' responsibility to train an individual in how to spend his free hours?
Harold Laski (1948) realized that "the preparation for the creative use of leisure in the middle years of life...is one of the most important guides to living the American school can provide."\textsuperscript{13}

As Edward Bliss Reed had emphasized, the American and British educational purposes were essentially different; the English training is in "thinking," the American training is in "doing." Taking this idea into account in the controversy over quality vs quantity, the Britons became less critical. Shane Leslie concluded, "if the Americans have not produced a permanent upper-class living on its leisure and tradition, they have certainly produced the best informed middle-class in the world." And Graham Hutton agreed, saying: "Whatever schools and colleges may lack in developing independent critical faculty or originality....they offset by developing practical and technical skills." Rather than thinking in abstractions, it is in technique that the American student excels. Americans ask "Will it work?" Britons ask "Why it works."\textsuperscript{14}

American educators were critical of many of the same points that our visitors pointed to. In our eagerness to prepare all students for life in America, Abraham Flexner, founder of the Institute for Advanced Studies, wrote in 1930: "We have tried to include in the high-school curriculum every kind of subject and activity, intellectual, vocational and technical. It cannot be done; or it can only be done at the expense of genuine education." The American system attempts too much. Besides criticizing the course-unit system which turned education into an unrelated sequence of block
studies, American educators in the 1950's looked again at educational philosophy. Frank Aydelotte, former President of Swarthmore, and pioneer in the development of undergraduate honors work, believed:

"In Europe, boys and girls who attend secondary schools will at the age of eighteen be about two years further advanced than American students of the same age...This difference is due to the fact that in Europe the least gifted students are not admitted to the secondary schools, while in (America) they are not only admitted but are allowed to set the pace."15

Inequalities

After illustrating how America's educational philosophy, which focused on an equal education for all, might produce mediocrity, a few insightful Britons went further. They dared to say that some schools were inherently unequal. Harold Laski observed: "there are schools so magnificent that both their architecture and equipment take one's breath away; and there are schools so mean and pitiful, usually in the South and most often deemed good enough for Negro children, that even some of the black-listed schools of London are admirable by comparison." British journalist Mervyn Jones (1962) remarked too of the disparities in facilities: "Everything in America—schools, mental hospitals, prisons, the 'standard of living'—varies from the admirable to the atrocious, from a source of legitimate pride to a cause for shame, from better-than-Sweden to worse-than-Spain. If it is hard for me to distinguish between a school in Leningrad and one in Odessa, it is equally hard to credit that a school in Harlem and one in Denver (to say nothing of a rural school
in Mississippi and one in New Hampshire) are in the same country."

In looking for explanations, Denis Brogan pointed out "that the South, which shows up badly, apart from its aversion to spending money on the education of Negroes, has more children and less revenue per thousand of the population than any other region." But the most important reason offered by the Britons for the inequalities in schools was their administration through local control. "One of the great weaknesses of the American educational system," said Denis Brogan, "is the fantastic number of independent school authorities." Local school authorities are controlled by parent groups (PTA) and local politicians. And as a result, the quality of each state's education varies directly with its tax base and wealth of its citizens. In England, there is a Ministry of Education and the national government sends out her Majesty's Inspectors to visit and make reports on each local education authority. Unfortunately, according to the Britons, education in America is the most decentralized of all public institutions. Local control was measured by Susan Cooper, who compared Britain and America: "The Englishman's closest contact with his child's education comes in meeting teachers, headmaster or headmistress; he is very remote from the administrative process of the Ministry of Education...and he can exert no influence over general educational policy except by his choice of party at the General Election. The American, knowing that he pays a direct tax for schools....can feel far more inclined to make demands on the
system. The phrase 'our schools' bears more weight in an American community. They are their schools: a local facility, like the public library or the roads. And like these last two, they are open to everyone and must cater to everyone's needs."

"Local control of education is democratic, but it is not egalitarian," quipped Graham Hutton. Denis Brogan agreed, noting, "at best, the American elementary schools are better housed and as well staffed as those in western Europe, but the variations in equipment, efficiency, and availability of American schools are very great indeed, and many American states guarantee to the children of their poor less school advantages than any state of western Europe."
The poor in America were outside equality. Mervyn Jones illustrated that the cohesion of the community, so important to the original purpose of American education, was in the early 1960's conspicuously absent in the slum schools of New York. Class and race acted now as segregating forces, as he drew a vivid picture: "The trouble is--as New York parents explained with a sigh, and after an earnest disclaimer of reactionary ideas or racial prejudice--the Puerto Ricans. In the first place, there are so many of them that almost all schools, certainly in Manhattan, are bursting, while competing claims and the high cost of land retard school building. Secondly, a lot of them do not speak English; a teacher of history or physics cannot bring the class up to much of a standard when most of it has only a smattering of the language he is teaching in; Thirdly, many of them are opposed to the whole idea of being in school when they are, by Caribbean
standards, adult." Even without race prejudice and without dark rumors of knives and marijuana, these considerations suffice to impel the average 'respectable' parent to transfer his children to a private school. "By now, education as a unifer of class and race no longer exists in New York." Beyond the problems of inner city ghettos, their poverty, language barriers, racism, and populations little interested in education, are the problems in rural communities. "Many rural districts are either too poor or too small to provide quality education," wrote British educators, David and Margaret Smith (1973), as there are still about 4,000 one-teacher elementary schools in rural America." Public expenditure on education is twice as much in New York as it is in rural Alabama. As a partial solution, the Britons had suggested federal aid to education as early as 1947. They discounted the American fear that centralized bureaucratic control of the country's school systems would follow inevitably in the wake of federal money. As in Britain, where educational policy was centralized, they believed the national government likewise should enjoy a super-ordinate position in America. In addition to the idea for a master plan for education, Graham Hutton offered goals for improving the system:

"Until direct local control of public education is reconciled with the need for greater and equal opportunities, until the public schools are "out of politics" or at least out of party politics and the spoils system; until the salaries and tenure of teachers are alike improved and made more secure, less open to abrupt political action, the high ideals and aims of a parents, teachers and pupils will never be realized."18
As Britons further probed the inequalities in our educational system, it was certain they would pose the question of classes or ranks among the democratic schools, free and open to all. Denis Brogan re-interpreted the idyllic scene of the little red school house: "It is often asserted that the class bias of English education is unknown in America. This is an exaggeration of an important truth. Especially in cities with a very large immigrant population, prosperous parents refuse to send their children to schools whose tone is likely to be set by the children of immigrants. Semi-private day schools, like those associated with Teachers' College in New York and with the University of Chicago, serve the needs of this class. But boarding schools are more and more popular. Some of these are old foundations, like the Phillips Academies at Exeter and Andover..." But these 'prep' schools or 'finishing' schools were viewed to be a small footnote to the much larger volume of public, state supported institutions. And "while the picture of American school-life as an ideal democracy is wide of the truth," Brogan concluded, "school does not make such a difference to the future career and social self-satisfaction of the American as it does to that of an Englishman." No one could have explained the essential differences better than an Englishman educated in America. J. W. Morpurgo quoted an American father, whom he agreed with, who spoke of the varying attitudes towards 'class' and education: "The difference between your attitude to prep schools and the attitude of you English to your public schools is social, not sociological."
We worship similarity; you, for all your boastful quotations from Napoleon, hate to be thought of as shopkeepers. You want to be patrician. We want to be the same as the next man. So whereas most of your aristocracy is educated in segregated private boarding schools and most of your bourgeoisie aspires to a private education for its children, our middle-classes want to stay middle-class, they don't want their children to be different from their neighbours' children....In England it's a social advantage to have been to Eton; in America something of a disadvantage to have been at Groton.\(^{19}\)

The original purpose of American education--to assimilate different children from widely differing economic or family backgrounds to the American Way, was successfully accomplished in frontier America. But after 1920, when the majority of people resided more and more in urban areas, the original purpose, although still valid, failed to assimilate the poor and the ghettoized. The original organization of the schools through local control allowed very different needs to be served on the frontier as civilization rolled across America. But as the twentieth century wore on, increasingly the decentralized system was criticized. The problems of vastly irregular standards and the disparities in public expenditure caused the Britons to speak out for a more national system of planning, financing and control as in England. But beyond the limitations placed on the system by local control, our visitors
praised the creation of literate public, an American language, an educational model with prepared students for 'living' in an industrial community, a classless society, and a common bond of knowledge and experience. America had indeed produced the best informed middle-class in the world. 20

The British Style

Throughout the 1930's and early 1940's Britons had asked critical and probing questions about the character of American education. One of the basic reasons for this was that Britain was searching for answers to her own educational dilemmas. Especially during the war, Britain realized the need for highly skilled technicians in large numbers and looked again at the American methods of mass education. Beyond the economic need, there was also a social need. During the war, a 'New Britain' was discussed which was to be based on social equality. The Labour government, elected in 1945 and boasting Clement Atlee as Prime Minister, pledged itself to a free secondary education for all, with a parity of esteem. The American idea of the common school had migrated to Britain and promised revolutionary changes.

This educational quest explains why so many of our British visitors probed the specifics of how our system worked. They visited schools, colleges and universities; they visited classrooms, witnessed audio-visual demonstrations, and talked with educators. They worried over mediocre standards and methodologies which seemed
to reward rote memory as opposed to thinking because Britain was about to invest in her youth. As the Empire declined, it was hoped the young with their brains would restore Britain to eminence.

Parity of esteem and a free secondary education for all was to be guaranteed in post-war Britain through a tripartite division of the state secondary schools into grammar, modern and technical tracks. While the fee-paying schools would remain, such as Eton, it was anticipated that mass, free public education in the American sense would diminish their influence. As plans were implemented by the Atlee government, state education was divided into two stages: primary up to the age of eleven, and secondary from eleven to sixteen. At age eleven a most important examination—the Eleven Plus—was to be taken by each student. The results of this examination determined which secondary school—grammar, modern, or technical—the student would attend. Significantly, this single examination determined what kind of secondary school the student could attend. The grammar school was designed to give a liberal and scientific education up to the age of eighteen; the grammar school is considered the 'college prep' track, but also prepares students for the General Certificate of Education.* The modern school stresses general education through the age of fifteen. The technical school teaches largely a

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*The General Certificate of Education—O Level or Ordinary Level—is granted after successful examination at age sixteen; the G.C.E. Advanced Level is granted at age eighteen after successful examination. Both the grammar school and the modern school prepare students for the O-level examinations.
vocational, skills oriented curriculum. All are state-supported and open to all persons, but the divisions are based on academic merit.  

In describing their own postwar system, the Britons eagerly persuaded us that quality and standards had not been diminished by the introduction of equality. Susan Cooper expounded on the British amalgam: "In Britain, education has always been linked with some kind of elite; and so has always been in one way or another exclusive. The schools, which catered first to a socially privileged core, spread gradually down the social and economic scale; but as they spread, their academic standards formed new barriers which in most cases replaced those of money and birth, producing a new elite—that of the meritocracy. British education is a matter of privilege still, though now of privilege that must be earned rather than inherited." 

The structure of the British system is a series of hurdles to be jumped: the eleven plus, the G.C.E., Ordinary level at sixteen, and Advanced level at eighteen, the university first or second year examination, and at twenty-one or twenty-two the first college degree. Cooper explained "the idea behind this structure is that of exercising the muscles of the mind; of giving it incentives to stretch to its full capacity. No amount of democratic change within the system has ever altered this basic idea." The stretch principle remained too in each of the streams or ability tracks. British
teachers in the modern school, developed to cater more effectively for those whose capacities were not academic enough to take them into the grammar schools, attempted to draw up their students towards each successive hurdle or examination; if a modern school student passed the O-level, then he was encouraged to push on toward the A-level if he had the ability. "It has become a matter of treating every child as if he were a plant: of making sure that it is given the right environment, and of then proceeding to feed it so that it will grow as fully and as fast as it possibly can," said Cooper. This is in distinct contrast to the observation that American students may not be challenged enough. American educator James Conant believed "the majority of bright boys and girls were not working hard enough," in the schools he visited to make his 1957 educational report. This lack of "stretching the muscles of the mind" was seen by Cooper to be "the central drawback of the American educational system." "There is no denying that the overall American pattern handicaps the proper development of many children who could have gone much further, much faster, if they had not been held back by teaching standards designed for the average student." But on balance, she conceded, Americans might accuse Britons of "exclusive practices" and denying "the chance of a higher education to many who would have had the talent to benefit by it."
Other British writers such as Peter Bromhead (1971) were not so certain that the common school idea had really abolished the old social privileges. Eton and Harrow still very much have their place in England. Why are they so successful, asked Bromhead, himself an educator, both in having an excessive number of applicants for their limited places, and in seeing so many of their former pupils claiming the leading positions in so many of the departments of the nation's life? "The crude answer," he offered, "is because English society is what it is, and the public schools are part of it." Realistically, "plain snobbery, emulation, and the quest for status-symbols" remain as motives for parents to send their children to a fee-paying school. And despite further attempts to introduce egalitarianism—such as the move for comprehensive high schools which would abolish ability tracking,*—"tradition dies hard."24

British universities are all quasi-private as the government allocates funds to each of the forty-odd institutions. But the government allows the faculty-community dominated councils to fix educational policies. Because of these circumstances, it was natural for the Britons to see no threat from federal aid to education in

*The Labour government required every local Education Authority to prepare a scheme for converting all of its secondary schools to the comprehensive system not later than 1968. However, the anti-Labour majorities which controlled nearly all of the local education authorities in 1968-71 were in general very reluctant to introduce changes in a hurry.
America.* And beyond the method of financing, the major distinction between the American state-supported colleges and universities and higher education in Britain was the tutorial system. The post-war expansion of British university facilities was "achieved without any decrease in the ratio of teachers to students," which in general "is about one teacher to every ten students," said Peter Bromhead. "The high ratio of teachers to students and the large amount of personal contact between them constitute the chief merit of the English universities in general." The tutorial system is predicated on these low ratios, and Oxford offers the best example of how the system operates, as Bromhead outlined: "The teachers are called 'dons'. Most of these are Fellows of their colleges, but at the same time many hold university appointments as lecturers or professors. Part of the teaching is done by lectures organized by the university...the average don gives one or two lectures a week, on a subject which is his special field of interest...a student may choose the lectures he will attend, though his own college tutor will advise him which lectures seem likely to be most useful." Apart

*Nor do the British see dilemmas in federal aid to church schools. When education became universal, and free, church schools, largely Anglican and Roman Catholic, were taken into the general system (about one-third of all primary schools are church schools). They enjoy state support and large degree of self-determination. The general principle is that the more money the church contributes towards the cost of maintaining the buildings the more independence it keeps, and the more positions on the board of managers, and the more control over the appointment of teachers.
from lectures, teaching is by means of the tutorial system, which has been, in modern times, one of the chief foundations of the greatness of Oxford and Cambridge. "Each Fellow in a college is tutor in his own subject to the undergraduates who are studying it. Each student goes to his tutor's room once every week to read out an essay he has written, and for an hour he and the tutor discuss the essay...he may be assigned to another don in his own college or in another college when he is studying some particular topic which is outside the special interest of his own tutor...the tendency is to avoid set courses...the advantages of the constant personal contact between teacher and student are obvious..." The absence of the tutorial system proved to be the central criticism the Britons leveled against our system of higher education below the postgraduate level. After World War II, it was the university level that the Britons were most interested in. They had accepted the common school idea and now they were interested in America's training of the technocrats.25

Higher Education

Overall, the Britons were not impressed with undergraduate college or university level education; only at the post-graduate level did American institutions demand academic rigor on a par with British educational standards. Samuel Putt (1956) found the entry level standards for most Americans colleges and universities "appallingly low," as "first year students in America would have no hope of passing the university entrance examination in Scotland."
(Glasgow University or Edinburgh are on a par with Oxford and Cambridge.) Further measured Putt, "it takes the American student at least one good year of graduate study to attain the level customary for a good honours student in Scotland."26

Many of the Britons had direct contact with American institutions of higher education either as students themselves, or as visiting professors, lecturers on circuit, or acquaintances of American educators. The single most striking comment issued by our visitors was the statement that American undergraduate education was paternalistic. "The weakness of the American system, as it seems to me," said Edward Bliss Reed (1932), "is that it neither depends on nor develops individual responsibility in study. Under its routine and discipline the greatest sufferers are the relatively few outstanding students. The chafing of many of the men themselves under its paternalism and their often repeated admiration and idealization of the older English universities are significant." The Britons pointed to the tyranny of loads of homework, exercises, reports, and assignments forced upon the unfortunate student. Reed believed it was like going "to a secondary school in Britain." This resemblance was heightened by the fact that "little or no outside reading is required" in American college courses. "One reaps sheaves of notes at lectures, and from these alone is the grain of knowledge garnered." Simple, point by point, "repetition of the lecturers' utterances is all that is required to attain success in examinations," he chided. No questions of a discursive nature were set before the
student which would require a well-balanced presentation of his own views or allow him to arrive at a conclusion different from that held by his examiner. And perhaps most damning, he remarked, "the number of questions asked do not allow the student time to write good English," forcing students to resort to tabulation in order to "assure the examiner that they know the salient points required in each answer." Students had no time to think, understand relationships, nor has knowledge acquired had time to sink in. Learning in America, as Graham Hutton had said of secondary education, was "assimilative rather than reflective." The system tended "to produce an individual whose knowledge is divided by water-tight bulkheads."²⁷

Ursula Branston (1940) a correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation, recognized the "lack of opportunity for independent, self-directed study," and the overall "low achievement of the undergraduate level." Edward Reed complained of the "lack of uniform standards among American colleges," and the "lack of external examiners." Former Commonwealth Fund Fellow, Samuel Putt criticized undergraduate American education in two points: "Firstly, it produces graduates who are well trained in following and repeating the ideas of other people, but not nearly so good at criticizing those ideas or producing any of their own--the type of mind which an Oxford professor described recently as being able to 'fiddle cleverly with other peoples' ideas;' and secondly, it produces graduates who are
experts in some branches of their subject but do not seem able...to relate their specialized to their general knowledge."28

Responsibility for low standards had to be accepted by the system itself, as the Britons related them to "the low standards attained by American high schools." It was not possible for the colleges and universities to aim at a high standard for the first degree, explained Samuel Putt, and furthermore "an increase in the numbers of undergraduates produces an over-all lowering of standards." He believed only "at the graduate level are standards comparable with those attained in a British University." And while the American Master's examination was equated with an Honours examination in Britain, "the quality of the graduates at the PhD level is very nearly the same."29

Very often, often degorging their critical opinions, the Britons would admit that they had been comparing two quite different educational purposes in comparing the American and British styles. Samuel Putt contrasted:

"The American university system is intended to provide a wide section of the population with a training which will enable them to do work of certain kinds—to be doctors, to be industrial engineers, to teach economics—and so on. In Great Britain, on the other hand, a university education is reserved for only one in every six hundred, and is designed...to provide students with a training in how to think, and with some notion of the world about them."30

*British Bachelor's degrees are at two levels, Honours and Pass. In some cases the Honours degree is given for intensive study and examination in one, two or perhaps three related fields, while the Pass, or General degree may be broader. Sometimes Honours represents top merit.
The remark of Edward Bliss Reed, 1932, that British education teaches you how to think, and American education teaches you what to do, has remained remarkably consistent in British observations.

The Britons believed the graduate school served America's technological and industrial needs very well. Edward Reed linked preparation and market demand, saying: "The effort of the graduate schools to produce large numbers of competent workers, rather than to encourage only a few who are really outstanding, is important in America where the aid of science is being so wholeheartedly applied to industry." Twenty-five years later, Hugh Willoughby (1958), after studying agriculture at Indiana, praised the technological emphasis, "this, I think, is a good scheme. Seek first technological efficiency and all things will be added unto you...if your economics are not straight, your culture will ultimately suffer." Wholeheartedly he believed that "America owes much to the fact that it has put technological development first; we Europeans may laugh at much of American civilization, but surely, its industrial foundation is sound." Willoughby's observations were made in 1956-57, the year of the Suez crisis. He saw the collapse, the finale which killed the Empire. He watched the Brain Drain from Britain to America swirl around him and even though he planned to return to England and apply his skills there, he knew the future lay with America. He knew the basis of America's greatness was technology. He said "technology is the new international language," and believed it would form the basis of a common culture throughout the world. America's technical
institutions were the envy of scientists all over the world with their magnificent laboratories and research equipment. Although Americans are not praised for pure speculation, they are congratulated for "the extreme brilliance of achievements in the more practical fields of study and research."31

If "the undergraduate educational experience is likely to be more varied and more superficial than in most European countries," noted David and Margaret Smith (1973), "it is in the graduate school that the real strength of American higher education is to be found." But the Britons noticed, since there is no Honours degree in undergraduate training, that American students entered the graduate facility with "no more than a grounding...in the subject which they intended to make their life work." As a result, our visitors found the graduate program intensive in the extreme. They viewed the courses required before independent dissertation work to be "numerous," "embracing almost all branches of the subject studied," and "extremely thorough." Edward Bliss Reed found seminars stimulating, developing "that readiness and facility in verbal expression which is characteristic of American students in general." The greatest strength of a graduate program in America is "its thoroughness and the way in which it familiarizes the student with the literature of all the branches of the subject of study." The comparable British graduate student "lacks this depth of familiarity with other work that has been done in the field," said Reed. "The American system of instructing the student in previous research and
methodologies "undoubtedly leads to a saving of time and makes it possible to qualify a great number to carry out independent research."

How different these comments are from the comments about the undergraduate programs. Phrases like sound discipline, practical application, excellent techniques of scholarship, bubbled out of the British commentaries in praise of education's top levels.

J. W. Morpurgo (1949) said that Americans were not interested in the "creative or original...but to piece together the parts, be they of a machine or of the British Constitutional System, that is an essentially American quality." Thoughtful Britons, looking at the entire educational emphasis, agreed with Graham Hutton that "the ship sails forward with a heavy list to one side." Something should be done, they believed, to redress the balance, between the practical and the artistic, the quantifiable and sources of poetic genius. And prophetically, Graham Hutton realized, "the young sense this," they understand that "the vessel lacks equispose."³²

But the Britons recognized that links between the industrial sector and the university systems partially dictated the curriculum's emphasis on the practical and technical. Gerald Priestland (1967) mentioned the pressures on the major universities: "Needing (like Galbraith's Mature Corporation) to keep growing, they have to attract talent to produce results to attract money to attract talent to produce results ad infinitum." Results are the measurable and the practical, not the ephemeral. "Up to the Sixties the system went unchallenged," wrote James McMillan (1972), as "large corporations
supplied large sums of money to the universities...and employed large numbers of graduates trained for tasks by the corporation's cash." The friends of the system claimed, "with Justice," said McMillan, "that free enterprise patronage diminished the authority of the State in the university and to that extent made the university a freer institution." Corporate funds bought lavish equipment and provided scholarships. But university "research work," said Priestland, "has tied them to the big corporations and the federal government, often to the neglect of undergraduate teaching." He elaborated "neglect," saying, "I have met visiting British professors who were shocked at how little teaching their star American colleagues are required to undertake, at how much time they may spend away from the university itself, and at how little effort they make at communicating with the undergraduate body at all. American college authorities are often so busy looking over their shoulders at their financial benefactors, their boards of governors, state legislature and 'powerful alumni' (the affluent Old Boys) that they appear to forget about the students in front of them." Like many Britons, he believed the American universities had been co-opted; "instead of being autonomous centres of independent learning, they have become part of the economic and political machine."33

What the Britons had sensed earlier concerning the lack of equipose between the practical and the artistic, and the chain between universities and industries, was in the 1960's to become the
basis for the youth revolt against the system. "In every way U. S. university authorities were beholden to capitalistic corporations," stated James McMillan, "thus, there was fuel a-plenty in the USA for a violent student reaction against the unquestioned assumption that universities were on a conveyor belt taking them from school to factory via college or brain-processing department."34

British universities "have achieved their quality at the expense of quantity," compared Priestland, "and in this case quantity means people." The demands of the American technological economy necessitates large numbers of college graduates; the ever-expanding market, until the recession of the Seventies, seemed to ensure jobs. And although "some may sneer at the low standards of some American bachelor degrees, at least the mediocre are given a chance to stretch their minds and approach their employers with some higher qualification and too, the late developer has a better chance of redeeming himself than he gets in England." American students might protest against the multi-versity complex, but in England, many of them would never have the opportunity of attending a university at all. Priestland speculated that by 1980 only 16 to 17 per cent of Britain's youth would be able to attend a college, which is less than half the American proportion. The major outcome of the American educational system was opportunity.35

But there was a price to be paid for mass college educational opportunities; with the increase in student numbers comes alienation--
a sense of being 'other' to the system which is trying to move them along by its own rules towards its own objectives. A sense of being 'other' to university administration, employers, and parents. Educational factories had produced no sense of community, no intimate tutorial sessions or individually assessed papers, and no moral tutelage. There was open rebellion against enormous classes, computerized grading and record keeping, and being treated like a punched card in a mechanical index—from which came the motto 'I am a human being; do not fold, spike or mutilate'.

The central question is whether or not the colleges and universities in their organization and purpose reflect contemporary values. Certainly if the purpose of university education today remained, as in Puritan days, to train ministers for the clergy, we would readily admit that the institutions and values were incongruent. But the needs of modern America are the needs of a complex, highly industrialized society. The training of technocrats at the moment still seems essential. The Britons believed we trained our technocrats very well at the graduate level. However, the Britons are quite right in criticizing American undergraduate education. The students of the Sixties perhaps did have fuel a-plenty as James McMillan stated. It seemed inconsistent to David and Margaret Smith that "education provided at the bachelor level is often of poor quality," whereas, "the American graduate system produces some of the world's greatest scholars, scientists, and technologists." The graduate
schools cater for far greater numbers than in any other nation, and have carefully designed programmes; the best schools have no equal anywhere in the world. Undergraduate schools, except for the small, private facilities, should probably review and perhaps re-tool curriculum designs. 37

Overall, the Britons saw great strengths and few weaknesses in the American educational system. Education was strongest at the top levels training the technocrats; it was weakest in the primary and secondary schools for disadvantaged students, ranging from the urban ghettos to the rural South. Our most recent visitors pointed to many contemporary educational problems now under review by American educators: lack of financial resources can be a barrier to college entry; racial minorities and lower income groups are still under-represented; about a quarter of all black students attend largely segregated colleges, and these are often of lower quality and with less well qualified faculty; university faculty are predominantly white males; there is a distinct stratification of American colleges and a degree from the 'right' institution is worth far more than one from just any college.

At the lower levels of education, the Britons spoke of the controversial issue of busing as a means of achieving racial balance in schools. Another controversial issue centered on sex education in school, the introduction of which has been vigorously opposed by parents in some parts of the country. 38
Finance is a problem in the American educational system at all levels; there is currently a "taxpayers revolt," observed the Smiths, "with an increasing number of bond issues defeated at the polls" forcing some schools to close temporarily. Mervyn Jones showed concern over "the lack of nation-wide standards" for high school graduation and the absence of a nation-wide curriculum. Currently, Americans too are wringing their hands over low levels of high school achievement, and are discussing a standardized examination which would ensure minimum competencies for a high school diploma.

On a very human level, parents and educators are very aware of the real problems students face in relation to drugs, violence, racism, early sexual experiences and pregnancies. These difficult-to-handle issues are receiving more and more attention as so many students do not seem to know "what is it all for" in relation to school opportunities. Of particular concern to the young, noted the Smiths, is the whole question of relevance. The Britons realized this issue is a global issue, not just an American dilemma. Telecommunications may revolutionize education; perhaps this will be necessary to keep pace with the speed of technological change. But along the way we must provide for the human, emotional needs of our youth who face ever accelerating changes in the life around them.

Our educational debates will continue over quality versus quantity and technocrat versus humanist. Our visitors, cognizant of the problems in education on both sides of the Atlantic, congratulated America's educational system in accomplishing its stated
purpose: to prepare the young for life in America. As long as the future could be written in terms of a competitive, highly industrialized society, the schools seem to reflect a most basic congruence between American values and their institutional manifestations. The schools provided opportunity; whether or not America's youth would capitalize on that opportunity is rooted in the basic training offered by each American family.
Footnotes for CHAPTER IV


5 Brogan, *American Character*, pp. 139-140.


   Ethel Tweedie, *America As I Saw it, or America Revisited* (New York, 1913), 134.


11 Ibid.


14 Reed, *The Commonwealth Fund Fellows and Their Impression of America*, p. 84.


18 Hutton, *Midwest At Noon*, p. 259-263.
Jones, *The Big Two*, p. 128.


23 Ibid., p. 182.


25 Ibid., pp. 173-177.


27 Reed, *The Commonwealth Fund Fellows and Their Impressions of America*, p. 110, 120.
Hutton, *Midwest At Noon*, p. 121.

Reed, *The Commonwealth Fund Fellows*, p. 110.
Putt, *Cousins and Strangers*, p. 89.
29 Putt, Cousins and Strangers, p. 91.

30 Ibid., p. 90.

31 Reed, The Commonwealth Fund Fellows and Their Impressions of America, p. 112. Hugh Willoughby (pseud.) (author's real full name Charles Nigel Harvey), Amid The Alien Corn, and Intrepid Englishman in the Heart of America (Indianapolis, 1958), 33. Hutton, Midwest At Noon, p. 253-254.


34 McMillan, The Roots of Corruption, p. 81-82.

35 Priestland, America--The Changing Nation, p. 189-190.

36 Ibid., pp. 188-189.

37 David and Margaret Smith, The US--How They Work and Live, p. 122-123.

38 Ibid., pp. 124-126.

39 Jones, The Big Two, p. 132.
CHAPTER V

Children and Parents

No other institution, after education, of American society better reflects the belief in equality and progress than the relationship between children and their parents. The emphasis on egalitarianism within the family team astonished our visitors, rooted as they were in Britain's class hierarchies which gave credence and great respectability to advancing age. In America, the young were viewed as a renewing force, advancing society toward a better future.

In Britain there is more of the ideal advanced by Plato in his Republic which emphasizes that with age comes wisdom. The place given to children in America was both a source of amusement and disdain for our visitors. They had laughed at the nineteenth century caricature of the cigar-smoking cherub but wondered if he did not need more guidance and moral tutelage. They were sure the American child needed more discipline and guidance as they surveyed the youth revolt of the Sixties; the cigar-smoking cherub had turned into the pot-smoking Hippy, and the Britons had many critical things to say about this phenomenon.

But overall, the Britons saw congruence between the metaphor of America as a land of youth and the actual young people of the country. "Nowhere are children more valued, prized and better treated" than in America, advanced Graham Hutton (1946), and "nowhere are the names and attributes of boys and girls so generally used by, or for, so many middle-aged men and women."¹ But young
America must be allowed to grow up, assuming mature responsibility for America's future as world leader, and they must be trained carefully within the family.

Precocity and Independence

Our British visitors in the nineteenth century found the American child precocious in the most alarming sense of impertinence and disrespect for elders. The children were amazingly adult and the Britons saw them as "small stuck-up caricatures of men and women." Children in America were really not children at all, or did not seem to act like children, as Isabella Bird said: "I have never seen any children, only debased imitations of men and women." This picture was reinforced by Lady Emmeline Stuart Wortley who described: "Little America is unhappily, generally, only grown up America, seen through the telescope turned the wrong way." In the nineteenth century, Britons viewed our children as impertinent, disrespectful, and as arrogant brats. Bernard Newman, (1943), continued these ideas, describing the American child as "unbearable, completely spoiled, unrestrained, a nuisance to himself and all about him." William Blake (1955) described our children as "spoiled," "capricious," "insolent," "overriding," and "arrogant."²

The Britons of the nineteenth century chuckled when they described an amusing child. Eyre Crowe recounted how he and his companion, William Makepeace Thayer, came across a youngster reading a newspaper, "already devouring the toughest leaders, and mastering the news of the world whilst whiffing his cigar, and not without
making shies at a huge expectorator close at hand." English journalist Cecil Thompson (1939) described his first impressions of American children in the same amusing manner, saying, "I almost expected to be told a smutty story or invited to join them in a cocktail," they appeared so grown up. 

J. B. Priestley (1937) continued the theme that an American child appeared as an adult writ small, as he said the most unpleasant children in America "reminded one far more of miniature adults either drunk or crazy than of children." American children were more adult in their tastes and style of life, though not in temperament, than English children. The American child's tremendous precocity he found "sometimes amusing, sometimes alarming." By precocious, he meant the fact that children "were very rude to their parents," and were "most exacting and shrill in their demands." L. P. Jacks (1933) agreed, saying of American children, "a more unruly lot I have never encountered." The American lady who had described them to him as "limbs of Satan, whose life consisted of a perpetual yell, was not far from wrong," he conceded. The "efforts of their parents to restrain them, never very forcible, were quite futile." J. B. Priestley found that the parents "had traveled so far from the old fashioned notion of parental authority that now they were oddly apologetic and conciliatory in their attitude towards" the children. Jacks continued: "as I studied their ways I seemed to be getting a new light on the phenomenon of 'lawlessness' of which one hears
so much today in all parts of America." Lawlessness was perhaps encouraged by the parents, at least partially, as Jacks described a conversation in New Orleans with a lady who had two daughters in college during Prohibition, as she confided to him: "It was a common custom at dances for the "boys" to come provided with hip-flasks of gin or whisky which they offered to their girl partners. She hated the idea of girls drinking anyhow, and had done her best to dissuade her own daughters from the practice: 'But young people in these days go their own way; parents have little influence over them.' What she most feared, however, was the poisonous quality of the liquor carried by the boys. She therefore made a practice of giving each of the girls, when going to a dance, a flask of pure gin, of which she kept a supply in her house for the purpose. 'It was the lesser of two evils'."

And a mother of five children told Dr. Jacks "we mothers are rapidly losing all influence over our children, and I don't know how we can recover it. We have little or no control over them, whether boys or girls. The schools and colleges take them out of our hands...they become more and more intractable to home influence and there is nothing for it but to let them go their own way." But the Britons believed that many parents, while complaining of "uncontrollable children," wanted and encouraged their children "to go their own way," as the mother with the hip flasks for her daughters illustrated. Moreover, this precocious behavior was some-
times seen by other Britons to be independence, and a virtue rather than a vice when not carried to extremes.\textsuperscript{5}

This idea, too, had been a theme of long standing, as Philip Gibbs had written in 1920: "The children of America have the qualities of their nation, simplicity, common sense, and self-reliance." For many of our visitors, equality for our children had produced precocious behavior, but many Britons interpreted the same self-assertive behavior to be "independence." British newspaperman Sir Philip Gibbs believed America's reverence for equality was carefully inculcated in the children. American children "are not so bashful" as their English counterparts and they are "free from the constraints of nursery etiquette" which made so many upperclass British children "afraid to open their mouths." American children "are also free entirely" from "juvenile snobbishness" which is still cultivated in English society, where well to-do-parents train their children "to look down with contempt upon children of poorer classes."\textsuperscript{6}

Professor Jacks (1933) believed "the independence of American children is a phenomenon with a good as well as an evil side." Independence among immigrant children was seen as a force aiding Americanization. In the schools, the child is Americanized; he returns home to educate his parents.* Professor Jacks demonstrated

*Erik Erikson in Childhood and Society, 1963, explains how the children of immigrants, as the first real Americans through acculturation, become their parents' cultural parents.
how children of immigrants might become a vital part of the acculturation process, as he described a South side New York high school in the 1930's: "Without a single exception I could find they were all spotlessly clean, decently clothed and apparently well fed and healthy. I looked in vain for a single dirty face or ragged garment...meeting one of the playground supervisors...she said 'the fact is that a kind of public opinion has got established among the children, so that if one of them comes dirty to the school or the playground the others immediately drive him off and send him home to get cleaned. The children have their own standard of cleanliness... and they impose this standard on their homes and compel the mothers to keep them clean.'" Here the Britons found our youth dictating to parents in a most positive way. Jacks concluded "that the independence and self-assertiveness of American children is not an unmitigated evil."7

The origin of this behavior lay for most Britons in the American emphasis on equality. Jacks had related the liberties of children to the Declaration of Independence, saying of American children, "they are beginning to act it before Thomas Jefferson expected," He believed that many American boys and girls declare their independence of parental authority and assert their inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and plenty of money to pursue it with, at a surprisingly early age." But the Britons wondered at what point in the growth of a human being can be rightly claim equality with men in general? Is there no age limit at the
lower end? Britons did not really believe children to be inherently equal with parents, and marvelled at the parents acquiescence to this idea. Professor Jacks believed this tendency to indulge children contributed directly to "the decay of family life" which was "visible and rapid in certain quarters of American society."\(^8\)

The closer Britons looked at American children the more they realized that the American view of the child as the central pivot and thrust for success and progress in the future placed heavy burdens on children. Precocity was tolerated and independence encouraged by parents who wanted their children to grow up and make good. These attitudes and expectations were not without certain liabilities as Priestley described the strange quality of stridency among our children:

"They seemed to be living at too fast a pace; they were not solid enough; they appeared to be over-excited, almost hysterical, from the moment they first got up; and they never sank quietly into themselves. Always, and not just after they had first arrived, they looked like children who had made long wearisome journeys and been kept up too late. Most of them seemed to me to be allowed to stay up far too late every night, but that is probably nothing but an English view. But there was nearly always something too bright-eyed, restless, strident, about them that suggested children at the end of a party that has gone on too long." The result was that although many of them were strong and active, they had a disturbing air of fragility. The process that would eventually turn them into quick tireless women and husky men seemed miraculous. "I was always afraid that suddenly
they would collapse, to lie white and shaking for weeks. But they
never did. They continued giving firework displays of noise and
energy, though always, it seemed, in immediate danger of bankrupting
themselves." Nor did Priestley believe that the pressures on and
expectations for our young people to be relieved. "Watching some of
these families—the King or Queen Child, nervous, fine-drawn, per­
emptory, and the anxious attendant parents—I felt at times that
some procreative virtue must have left these middle-class Americans...
and that children now were extremely rare." By comparison, there is
something "healthy and heartening about an easy and fat fertility, in
the bouncing families we see among such races as the Italians, the
Jews, the Chinese." Priestley was disturbed by "families that
consist of two anxious parents and one nervous delicate, lordly
child." While our children were quick and intelligent, and not
without charm, he found too, "something very disconcerting about
them." Was their disconcerting aura related to America's emphasis on
achievement? Would America's drive for perfection allow children to
fail as well as to win? Even in the land of equality, did not
children need and want parental guidance to prepare them for living
democratically? Did not devotion mean giving both sustenance and
discipline? The parent-child relationship in America was a false
aberration of what the Britons considered to be a valid norm of
behavior, and must be corrected at once. 9

The theme of the precocious child has been continuous in British
travel commentaries describing America, and in recent decades the tone
of their criticisms has picked up cadence. Former polite and discreet criticisms by the 1970's have been replaced with directness and a sense of urgency. British news correspondent Alexander Campbell (1971) said, "young people in the 1970's behave rather more poorly than usual, and their elders manifestly have no notion how to cope with the situation." He was aghast that "venereal disease" in America "is a brush fire, and crime statistics link white suburban youth with drugs, vandalism, and cases of sadism." He was not amused by precocious "twelve-year old girls who on top of half-inch artificial eyelashes wear chartreuse, apple-green, vermilion, or chalk-white eye shadow to school," or at middle-class little girls who yelled, "Get the motherfuckers out of here!" They did not understand toleration for "juvenile truants." "The precociousness of American children," said Campbell, "unquestionably poses problems," and he believes its toleration to be leading to "the decay of manners" and "the general corruption of society." In calling for the restoration of parental guidance, James McMillan (1972) warned "indulgence without discipline is the recipe for disaster."10

To Do Well by the Kids

"Troublesome as his children are," said L. P. Jacks, (1933), "Uncle Sam is very fond of them and means to do the best for them he can. He may be obdurate enough about international debts, but mention the children and his heart softens at once." On both sides of the Atlantic, many parents who had experienced first the Depression
and then the second World War were committed to the idea that "My child will have it better than I did." A unique occurrence during the war allowed British children and many mothers to directly experience American parental indulgence. Some four thousand British children, accompanied by eleven hundred mothers were evacuated from major population centers after the heavy bombing raids of 1940, which burned parts of London and other civilian areas. They eagerly accepted the hospitality of American homes. Cecil Roberts (1947) recalled, "most Americans never faltered in the measure of their hospitality, though the duration was longer than either of the parties expected...some of those children will never forget their American sojourn, and their return to the homeland left an ache in the hearts of foster-parents and children" alike. The experiment was judged highly successful. "If we had been overrun by the Nazis we should have reproached ourselves with not placing more mothers and children outside the clutches of the barbarians," Roberts said. Perhaps no better example illustrates the generosity of America and their fondness for children than this acceptance and indulgence of British children as well as their own. Roberts remembered a radio broadcast held a few days before Christmas, 1940, which illustrated how the young Britishers enjoyed America: "I had the task of introducing at the microphone a number of British children in a transatlantic talk with their parents. I should not have accepted the task. It would have broken down the toughest exile from his homeland. Thousands of miles across the ether, in complete darkness,
under a terrible rain of bombs, anxious parents stood by a microphone while here in this room on Broadway little Jimmy, Mary and Johnnie, for a few seconds holding back their tears, forced a note of cheerfulness into their voices." They assured their unseen fathers and mothers that they were well, were very happy and there was just really nothing at all to worry about. One little girl of ten with tears streaming down her face, in grief at the sound of a loved voice, repeated desperately, "I'm very happy, Mummy darling, very, very happy!"...Some of the children were amazingly self-possessed, and one distracted fond parent asked, "Do you want to come home darling?" received a firm "No--never, you've no idea what it's like here!"--this from a grim young lady of twelve whose frightful candour we could not interrupt in time. "Darling!" came an agonized wail from England. I confess I felt like crying into that microphone myself and only the necessity of holding up the courage of these youngsters kept my voice from betraying my heart...." 11

Roberts noted that some British children had a hard time upon returning to England after the war. "They did not turn a tap and find hot water gushing out; they did not rise in warm bedrooms and trot around in light clothing;...they missed the corner drugstore where they learned to perch on stools and eat ice creams of a size Europe has never known." But the memories were in the long run very happy ones and productive as Roberts concluded: "they will know and be able to correct the distortions of American films and bear witness that America is not solely a land of tycoons, crooners, hot
dogs and boogie-woogie." This had been a cultural exchange, and for better or for worse, the idea of American indulgence of the child and youth spread to Britain.\textsuperscript{12}

"American parents in the forties," said James McMillan, "poured out affection for their children in a manner that was simply hysterical and sometimes nauseating." Parental motives, he said, were "good--they didn't want their children to suffer the harsh childhoods they'd had to accept, in the years of the Depression. The war added an extra piquancy. Fathers returned to toddlers and lavished on them all the sentiment which had been denied expression. Whatever children asked for they got." In Europe, similar emotions existed "but there were not the material means of expression," which McMillan believed to have been "fortunate."\textsuperscript{13}

Britons wanted to do well by the kids in celebrating their first peacetime Christmas in seven years in 1945. "But filling the stockings was another matter," wrote British social historial Harry Hopkins (1963). "In one shop 200 surplus R.A.F. kites, price 24 shillings, 6 pence, were sold in an hour; model planes used in training the Observer Corps, and ex-R.A.F. rubber dinghies, were bringing five pounds each." James McMillan recalled, "Winston Churchill, then in Opposition, asked to be shown a sample of the people's rations. When the food was laid out on a tray before him he exclaimed: 'Why that is not a bad meal!' It was pointed out to him that this was not a meal, but the rations for a week, at which he cried out: 'My God, the people are starving!'" In a
145

Bath newspaper an embittered soul advertised: "Wanted: Egg-timer, sentimental reasons. Wanted: Egg, same reasons." On December 31, 1945, too late for Christmas, recalled Hopkins, "the first shipment of bananas to reach Britain for six years arrived at Avonmouth and was welcomed by a dockside ceremony by the Lord Mayor of Bristol. But for many months to come England was full of children who had never peeled a banana." 14

Youth in America is its "most precious possession," wrote McMillan, "her chosen people." And nothing illustrated this idea better than the cult of the teenager in the late Forties and early Fifties, which has been glorified ever since. Teenagers—that indeterminate age group which teetered uneasily between childhood and adulthood—were now the Big Thing. Entire industries were geared to providing "them with their own clothes, music, literature, food and advertising," said McMillan, and "the commercial reason for exploiting the 13-20-year-olds was obvious." Their pocket money equalled what most able-bodied men had earned as incomes in the depressed thirties, and as they lived with parents, "there were no prior commitments to house purchase, rates etc.;" if they happened to be working part-time, they had even more. The American adults responded joyfully; "the teenage cult chimed in with the great American tradition of being a 'young' country," he said, "and by giving America a teenage culture, other Americans would stay young longer." 15
To do well by the kids now meant that they would enjoy the fruits of all the hard work, pioneering, devotion and inventive genius of the generations who had gone before. Yet strangely, juvenile delinquency rapidly spread in major American cities of the 1950's. Nicolas Ray, after eight months of research into the social phenomenon, wrote Rebel Without a Cause. Jimmy Dean it seemed, personified perfectly the teenage 'rebel.' Rebel "pictured the kind of social nihilism" said McMillan "which gripped the offspring of wealthy parents. Materially, the boy, the rebel without a cause, had everything--except the understanding of his elders. So he went to the bad." Never before had there been an age when so many young Americans were so well off; there was no struggle. Indulgence continued and when not placed in tandem with parental guidance, would reap the whirlwind. 16

The Family Team

The precocious or independent behavior displayed by America's children and youth was formed, the Britons believed, in the family. Within the family team children were considered equals, as partners, as individual people. Graham Hutton (1946) described the parental attitude toward their offspring in the context of the family: "Their own youthful characteristics help them to show a friendly, big-brother, big-sister devotion to children that does not partake of sentimentality. It is too deep for that. Children are still treated as if they were rare;....parents are strict and managerial
with children until they are about ten years old. Then they trust their children infinitely more than parents do elsewhere, and at younger ages. Parents do not interfere in their children's lives as much as they do elsewhere. Whether it is right or wrong, good or bad, is another matter." In the presence of indulgence, Hutton also found the conspicuous absence of dictated discipline. "It is significant," he said, "that the parents in a community will never...put their heads together to lay down common parental rules."
The children of postwar America had their own charge accounts, fashions, and lipstick; furthermore, they were allowed to stay out together until midnight before they were sixteen, and from families in all income brackets. And what was most astonishing, parents even help their children to break the law by letting them and their friends drive the car before the children are legally old enough to own a license. Permissiveness by American parents was a common theme described by the Britons, and it did not seem to vary from the approval of flappers and the raccoon-coated men of the 1920's with their hip flasks, to allowing teens to drive cars illegally in the American mid-west in the staid 1940's. Hutton saw this permissiveness in much the same way as J. B. Priestley had; Hutton commented that this quirk of parental behavior put great "stresses on young shoulders."^{17}

"Among the great majority," said Graham Hutton, "the children have to grow up, work, and be adult very young." This was especially true "of the farmers' families." The Britons wondered if American children were not expected to grow up too fast, as they noticed
American children maturing faster than their European counterparts. J. B. Priestley wondered if "frustration" resulted from the American co-educational experience, as he said of school influences: "...the atmosphere of some American co-educational institutions... seemed to me overcharged with sexuality, that too much time and energy were wasted on the preliminaries of courtship (and not always on the preliminaries) and the attendant rivalries and jealousies. Youngsters of about twenty do not greatly miss the other sex if members of it are not on show. They are more likely to form valuable friendships with other young men or women if mating is not part of the college routine. They will have plenty of time for all the complications of the sexual life after they have taken their degrees. Why not a few celibate and uncomplicated years devoted to work and play, argument and friendship?" The results of permissiveness within the family and by the schools greatly disturbed Priestley; he was astounded to "see senior high-school boys and girls behaving, over midnight cocktails, like rather unscrupulous amorists of forty." And he asked quite logically, "if boys of nineteen needed a strong coarse mixture of blatant sex and booze, when they ought to be at the idyllic age, what was to happen to them later on in middle life? Having arrived at manhood with the habits of gay dogs of fifty, what will they be like after another thirty years, when they are fifty? Will they be retired sour sensualists by that time? Or will they be wanting something very fierce and rank indeed to amuse them?"

Meanwhile, early sex and co-education in college would do them no good at all.
Further evidence that parents want their children to grow up and go their own way is provided by the fact that "surprisingly," said Graham Hutton, American parents and children are "less demonstrative toward each other in public and private than in Europe." This was not true of babies, "to whom everyone accords everything and in whom everyone is passionately interested." This lack of demonstratable affection for children was explained by Hutton with "the parents want their children to grow up; they do not want them to be dependent or what is called 'sissy'." Above all, American parents seem to want to let the children go their own way, hoping to encourage them to run their own lives. This develops the initiative, competitiveness, and resourcefulness which characterizes adult Americans.19

British writer, William Blake (1955) was not convinced, however, and still wondered "what is behind all this" child indulgence. "Why do American fathers, clever in the professions or in business, unflaggingly realist in their daily pursuits, sharp bargainers...why do they come home, see a whippersnapper half as tall and a third as heavy, utterly dependent on their economic grace, and stand there beaten, bullied by this inherently helpless object?" For Blake, the result of indulgence was not "initiative, competitiveness, and resourcefulness" as Hutton had found, but the production of the American brat. And most importantly, the American family did not prepare the child for the real world. American families "train their children, or, rather fail to train them, for a world that does not exist, that of unlimited self-expression." The child is encouraged
falsely; youth is prepared, by this extension of his liberty for a
career in which, when it matures, it can only suffer far more than
any one does normally. The world is so much more hostile than one's
family, that the child must be prepared for it. The American family
over-protects the child from being thwarted or developing complexes.
No executive would tolerate a clerk who refused to carry out an
order because at that moment he would rather step outside and play
baseball. Indulgence of youth encourages baby egoisms to extend into
young adulthood.20

Looking back throughout the history of America, Britons found
indulgence all the way back to John Winthrop's Half Way Covenant
allowing Puritan children to enter the Church and full citizenship
without proving they were among God's elect. Blake reviewed, "from
the eighteenth century onwards the American kid has been pampered to
an extent not known in the old world. Even a Rousseau, a Pestalozzi,
a Froebel, a Montessori,...would never have allowed their libertarian
fantasies to reach such absurdities." Traditionally, the Boston
boys of 1775 were the same when pelting Redcoats as most of them are
today. Young America was the terror of the 1850's and part of the
lost generation of the 1920's. Our visitors saw rebellious behavior
among children throughout our history, and believed American parents
collaborated with the rebels at least to the point of toleration.
Unfortunately, Blake concluded, "most Americans do not know this long
history of spoiled children."21
Untrammelled youth proved in the end to be unproductive and personally destructive, as Blake told a story of a lady in New York who wished her children to be artists: "One, a girl, was truly endowed. Her father was a near genius in easel painting and in murals. The girl lived, breathed art from babyhood. Yet her mother firmly refused to allow her to go through the travail of learning techniques: this would limit her 'mode of expression'. The girl today, a grownup young woman, is a competent but faulty painter in whose technically deficient work one catches glimpses of a talent that might have been." The Britons believed that all youth needed training; to not give guidance was to cast off parental responsibility and authority. They complained of the fact that American children are being trained for brutal self-affirmation and for little else. When they complained of the passionate arrivisme of our children, what they really feared was adult arrivisme in world affairs; "the world is not made up only of a conflict of wills," said Blake, "the implementation of wills requires antecedent knowledge and clever adaptation." Unbridled behavior among children in America was seen as amusing in the nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century, especially after the conception of the Bomb, it was viewed as dangerous and irresponsible egoism.  

The usual reason "given for this old and strange habit" of indulging children, said Blake, "is that families were large, the parents were occupied with a savage foe, a hostile nature, they had to do everything afresh that had already been done in Europe, that
space was not a consideration so children were free to roam." Out of these many varied explanations comes the focus that the children were the hope of tomorrow. The children represented society's future. America was promises, and the children would make them realities. Children were the vehicles of progress, with their energies, their enthusiasms, and their vitalities.  

These ideas partially explain the treatment of the aged within the American family; they are a subordinate part of the family team. Deference and respect for elders, their experiences, their wisdoms, do not permeate American family relationships as they do in Europe. Shane Leslie (1936) found that "the elderly count for very little in America"...it is "no wonder elderly Americans go to the old countries," as America "is reserved for youth." Unfortunately, he lamented, "baldness and wrinkles are taken for signs of senility instead of wisdom." In Britain (particularly before the war) there was much more of the Greek ideal outlined by Plato's Republic. In a traditional community, youth understands its place and its apprenticeship; the elder statesmen are allowed roles befitting the guardians or the philosopher-kings. But not so in America. "The youth take no notice of the old," said Leslie, "who are pathetically pleased to find themselves in the company of their youngsters." America, in its zeal to get-ahead had discounted a vital resource, the Britons felt, in the aged.
The Youth Revolt

The youth rebellion of the 1960's in America certainly could have been predicted from the Britons previous observations. They were witness to American parental indulgence of their children's precocious behavior; they had viewed parents encouraging independence to the point of lawlessness, and commented on the hysterical desire to materialistically give their children everything. In fact James McMillan (1972) suggested "that indulgence without discipline is the recipe for disaster," and found all necessary flammable elements present for a youth upheaval in the decade of the Sixties. The infants of the Forties were now the teenagers of the Sixties, and the teenage cult, which had been well launched in the Fifties, allowed them to become rebels without a cause and to look back in anger. Yet for all their social disaffection, remarked McMillan, "there was a strange ring to the protest bell. It summoned to dissent, but it did not peal out for a triumphant alternative."

Trained only for self-affirmation, America's youth offered few well-reasoned solutions to correct what they viewed as problems within the established order.

Our British visitors watched closely as student demonstrations erupted on American campuses, such as, Berkeley, under the slogans of the Free Speech Movement, in 1964. The Britons, who had recently adopted the American common school as their own educational model in the postwar period, wondered, "was this to be the outcome?" Gerald Priestland (1967) found "alienation" to be a root of the
youth revolt. Alienation he defined as "a sense of being 'other' to the system which is trying to move them along by its own rules towards its own objectives." There was "a strong sense of being other to the university administration, other to the employers who are eagerly waiting to take them on, other to the parents who urged them into the university." Our visitors believed that American parents had indulged their children to the point where many of them had difficulty coping with the real world. For many students in the early 1960's, the real world was the multi-versity complex. "For an individual seeking to find his own identity, not in isolation but in terms of a place within the framework, everything is far too big. Many students are not used to being away from their home community: 'You're mostly alone...You can't find you', one of them cried" to Priestland, who sympathized. Wanting to be treated as a human being rather than as a mechanical card in a computer deck was a reasonable objective, believed our visitors; but wanting to "Stamp Out Reality," or "Turn on-Tune in-Drop out: was socially irresponsible and reflected indulged baby egoisms. 26

Our British visitors noticed a deep mistrust among the revolting youth of anybody over thirty. Thirty was seen as a surprisingly high age limit to be fixed as the qualification for damning derision from the young. This would naturally exclude "anybody whose virgin vote could not have been for John F. Kennedy" reasoned Gerald Priestland, and also "reflects the wide age spread" among the students themselves. It pointedly excluded the parents, who they ruthlessly mocked and
held responsible "for getting them into this meaningless place (the university), and setting the traps of race warfare and Vietnam at the exit." Priestland interviewed American students, seeking to find answers to the breakdown within the family. Students indicated only symptoms of the family coming apart, as they said of their parents: "They are hypocrites...they are churchgoers but not Christians, voters but not democrats, citizens of a republic without believing in liberty, equality or fraternity. They get stoned on martinis but forbid us to take acid. They invite lung cancer with their cigarettes but warned us against marijuana. They lie to us about drugs and about sex; what they say we know to be untrue. Pot does not drive you insane. Sex without marriage does not ruin your life. You can't trust them." 27

In their zeal to pursue the ideal of 'My kids will have it better than I did,' parents had insured comforts, successes, and possessions for their children; but this indulgence had disallowed hardships, failures, and self-denial. When American youth told their parents, 'Go and stuff yourself', the parents recoiled in horror. How did this happen to us, the generation who did so much for our children, they wondered. McMillan offered a common sense answer: "What is most appreciated is what is hardest earned. The generation which grew to man and womanhood in the past decade were given advantages they would have been better to have won for themselves." 28

The Britons worried over the dimensions of the youth problem, realizing that America's hopes for the future lay with the young;
if America was to become the world model, it was expected that the youth would be its architects. Legitimately the Britons realized the young rebelled against "the big battalions of American society--military, political and industrial--which have usurped the individual's right to frame his own moral choices. To restore that right, to restore the individual to his place, is the prime necessity. But it is necessary, too, to avoid the extreme of solipsism--the barren conviction that the individual can believe in the existence of nothing but himself." Thus was targeted, perhaps the most important goal of the family team--to be guardians against solipsism, and to teach interdependence, mutual responsibility and respect.  

How serious really was the youth problem in America, our visitors inquired. "Even if no more than 15 per cent of America's students are active about their frustrations," said Priestland, "they--and especially those in the predominantly Negro colleges--are already in a position to become the spearhead of a new class force." Our observers wondered at the national discussions to lower the voting age to eighteen which would expand this "new class force," which for them was unpredictable in social behavior. "Some will grow out of it," they said, "but others will not, and even from the college campus the group is capable of considerable impact upon society, generating reactions which will drive the movement further and wider still." The Britons worried too over the absence of understanding among officials called upon to deal with the problem, as Priestland described "heavy-handedness": "The first big
manifestation was the so-called Free Speech Movement in Berkeley in 1964, a crisis exacerbated by the authorities' heavy hand. Berkeley is the property of the state of California, and when prominent voters and taxpayers became shocked by the indiscipline and 'filthy' language (a rather bogus issue), the chancellor called in several armed police to disperse the demonstrators. There could have been no surer way of identifying the university with 'them', the establishment, the hypocritical middle-aged power structure." The British observation that heavy-handedness would exacerbate the problem and "will drive the movement further and wider still," had credence in displays such as the siege of Chicago," so aptly described by Norman Mailer. The Chicago Presidential nominating convention of 1968 was a siege which featured the Yippies against the Pigs, vividly portrayed in all its gory detail by television. 30

The role of the media in the global youth revolt cannot be ignored. Media partially glamorized the heroes of the youth rebellion--Mario Savio, Mark Rudd, Bernadette Devlin and Danny Cohn-Bendit. The young demonstrators saw their sentiments "quoted and analyzed in the magazines, the newspapers and on television--sometimes exaggerated, but at the same time clarified and framed in importance," said Priestland. Media provided a forum and used its techniques to fine advantage. Furthermore, youth has an extensive media arsenal of their own--protest singers, campus radio stations and papers, the so-called 'underground press' and the electronic duplicators which make pamphleteering so much easier. Marshall McLuhan, author of
The Medium is the Message, suggested that modern media such as television had led youth to "expect Discovery and Involvement." The young "reject goals, specialized jobs, they want roles--total involvement--and are not afraid of amateurism." But more importantly, the Britons recognized that America's socialization of the children through indulgence was far more important in shaping their contemporary behavior than either the media or the schools. Quite true, the media reinforced parental indulgence and the failure to prepare children for the real world; television 'taught' unreal expectations--not everyone can be Bionic Man or Woman, just as all romances cannot have a Cinderella ending. The child must be trained for success and failure, to win, but also to lose; he must understand change, continuity and paradox. 31

The Britons were never worried that the youth rebellion had been inspired by a Communist Plot, a familiar excuse heard in America. "The nearest the New Left gets to a communist idol is Fidel Castro, or the late Che Guevara; they, like the students, oppose the American monster." But the strongest element "in the New Left is probably nihilism," said Priestland, and as in all "destructive movements, the greatest villains are liberals who provide the votes that prop up the establishment, who preach progress but compromise with reaction." There was no recognizable program, "no pealing out for a triumphant alternative," as the Britons said. One of the best examples of there really being no program was the National Conference for New Politics held in Chicago, September, 1967. This meeting "was
taken over by Black Power as surely as Goldwater took over the Republican party in 1964," remarked Priestland. "The only branch" of the youth movement, "which has any prospects of action or results is the Black Power Movement, and that is more properly a tree on its own, to which the New Left must cling like ivy." At the conference, representatives of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS) illustrated how true this was, as these white delegates "agreed to allow every Negro vote to count as five, and ended by accepting a black manifesto denouncing 'imperialist Zionist Israel' (Black Power being viciously anti-Semitic), and branding Lyndon Johnson as a 'savage and beastlike character'." This total capitulation to interests other than their own erased any separate identity or issues for the SDS. For thoughtful activists, it was as futile and self-destructing as Hippydom is for the passivists. 32

The Britons found nothing very new in the Hippy movement. Alistair Cooke (1968) wondered if "discovering your own identity," as a cliche of the hippies, really was very different from "the old slang phrase of the twenties--'Be Yourself'." The roots of the Hippy way of life, go back through Kerouac's 'Beat Generation' of the 1950's, to Steinbeck's winos in Tortilla Flats, to Thoreau living in simplicity in Walden Pond and the North American Utopians. "Zen Buddhism, Hinduism, Christian mysticism and Aldous Huxley" all have been borrowed from, said Priestland. He observed firsthand the hippy "scene" of Haight-Ashbury in 1967: "At the height of the Haight season, about August, there must have been about 15,000 Hippies
there; most of them weekenders or summer pilgrims, not more than a quarter full-timers. With long hair and painted faces, beaded, belled, costumed from anywhere between the Wild West and the Spanish Main to Rajasthan and Rishikesh, they lolled in doorways, shacked up in attics or strolled about amiably begging. A sect known as the Diggers rustled up free food and clothing; a free clinic provided medical care; a free legal aid service helped to bail them out. "In the dance halls groups like the Grateful Dead and Moby Grape saturated their senses with sound and colour; from time to time there would be huge Love-ins or Human Be-ins, in the nearby park..."

There was something infantile about wanting to wander through strawberry fields forever to look for Lucy in the sky with diamonds; it was escapism--a flight from reality. A community like the Haight did not exist on making love not war, but on dope, grass, and acid. San Francisco hippydom "was one big toxic bazaar"; and, as Priestland remembered, "really a very sad place."33

Who became a 'Hippy' the Britons wondered, and what were they seeking? Part of the answer was given by Priestland: "...almost everyone who came there needed help in coping with life, not encouragement in opting out of it. There came the mentally disturbed, the schizophrenics, catatonics and psychotics; the school dropouts, those who could see no future in their lives, the delinquent, and the children of broken or breaking homes. There were thousands of runaways who had simply been unable to communicate their despair to their parents; or whose parents had responded with spoiling and easy
permissiveness instead of constant engagement—a remarkable number of Hippies were remittance—man whose parents regularly sent them funds." Events associated with the American Hippy movement shocked all Britons, including visitors to America as well as residents in England. They wondered if the Ban the Bomb crusades, supported by Bertrand Russell and other domestic passivists, would evolve into destructive, violent behavior. Parents in America and Britain shuddered at children who freaked out, leaping from windows, convinced they could fly, or who gazed at the sun until blinded, or bled to death admiring the jewels in their own blood. Films like A Clockwork Orange and Straw Dogs, both based on stories written by English authors, reflected the growing British concern over true-to-life violence committed by their youth. The post-war ideal, to do well by the kids, had had similar effects in England, although the youth revolt there never attracted proportionally such large numbers. And what do the youth want? They really do not know, believed Alexander Campbell (1971); "ready to rip apart society with their bare hands, the New Americans have no notion of what to put in its place and are unaware of even so elementary truth as that it is quite impossible to begin anything again from scratch." The youth rebellion had no sense of history, either of their own nation's or about other people's; some rebels have informed eminent scholars that their services are no longer required. Very likely they would be surprised to hear that the French revolutionaries in the same spirit cut off Lavoisier's head after remarking that the Revolution had no
need of chemists. For most Britons, the youth movement was simplistic and naive in the extreme.  

Lacking a world view, American youth attempted to escape into the ways of another continent altogether. The Hippies were culturally unprepared for the Eastern (Hindu) way of life they tried to emulate; and even in the East, nirvana comes but to few saints. To attempt to copy something totally foreign was, in Priestland's words "to invite psychological disaster." And as self-renunciation was barren as an ideology, so too was romantic solipsism of the generation of Byron and Shelley. Old romantic ideals and foreign philosophies would not provide answers in a complex American society. One could not return to pastoralism, nor flee into nihilism or existentialism. The here, the now, and the future remained as ever-present challenges and would not go away.  

And what about America's youth within the "disadvantaged" families—the poor, the Black, the Chicano, the jobless. The Britons touched a nerve with their comments about youth crime and child violence. Gerald Priestland (1967) said, "episodes of violence reveal...their origin in the frustrations of an insecure minority." In the self-destructive riots of Watts, Newark or Chicago, "some class or individual is trying to find a place which gives him meaning; he is told that America is the land of opportunity, where anyone can rise to the summit by his own endeavours; and yet he is unable or inadequate to win that place." Ironically, the Britons saw in classless America vast cleavages between the economic strata,
with an ever-increasing number of urban poor. Ironically too, the Britons saw that in the attempt to strike back at WASP society, a minority youth did so "often at the expense of his peers...hence the victims of violence are often of the same race, class or even family."36

The Britons help us a great deal in looking at the expectations we place on our children: "at all levels, the American way of life constantly demands high achievement--often impossibly high," noted Priestland. "There is still such mobility that parents can urge their children to move on towards higher levels than they themselves enjoy...yet the very fathers who urge them on may be failures, discredited, themselves unable to cope with the strain." Seen from this perspective, there is a familiar cohesiveness to the twin rebellions of middle-class and Black youth; is there any real difference between saying 'Up the organization!', and 'Burn, Baby Burn!' Both represent disillusionment and despair. Both are rooted in ambition which is thwarted, as Priestland said: "when the child runs after the success he has learned to crave, he finds that he can never catch up with it, for society has denied him the education in the case of disadvantaged minorities which it demands more and more." The bandwagon of success is accelerating; if he cannot jump aboard, he will throw stones at it; it is a fraud. Authority let him down, betrayed him. Here is hate, and hate is the father of violence. Without definitive classes, all children in America, Black and White, rich and poor, believe in the American Dream. The child in America
is not taught to accept very low expectations and achievements as his lot. He is taught to believe in equality and achievement. Therein, seems to be the root of the problem for disadvantaged children unless the federal or state governments are effective in equalizing opportunities. The Britons asked us to face these harsh facts squarely. 37

But above the levels where state aid seemed essential, the Britons maintained that proper preparation for facing the realities of life in America rested with the family. Past indulgence would have to be tempered with discipline to produce the socially responsible leaders of tomorrow. Our visitors interpreted the youth revolt of the Sixties to be the result of unbridled lusts and passions of supra-egotism among our youth; children in America were shorn of deference, of awe, of worship. Above all, the youth rebellion was pronounced sterile—it propagated nothing. Escapism had not been the answer; our young people realized they could not recreate the simplicity of an ashram by short-circuiting their minds. The simplistic past could not be recaptured; life in America would move technologically forward. 38

From all their comments on American children and parents, the Britons would have us understand that in 'sparing the rod and spoiling the child' parents ran the risk of preparing children for unreality. Adequate preparation for adulthood and responsible social behavior and leadership required devotion plus discipline. Guiding the child was part of parental authority; it had to be
assumed as a parental responsibility. Moreover, all of society is really rooted in the family; if the family breaks apart, so too will society. Hence, it was necessary, believed one visitor, to remind both children and parents of the wisdom of Edmund Burke (1793) who linked free government with mature adulthood: "Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites...society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there is without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate minds cannot be free...Their passions forge their fetters."39
Footnote for CHAPTER V

1 Graham Hutton, *Midwest At Noon* (Chicago, 1946), 203.


   Cecil Thompson, *I Lost My English Accent* (New York, 1939), 204.


   Cecil Roberts, *And So To America* (Garden City, 1947), 148–149.


17 Hutton, *Midwest At Noon*, p. 204–205.
167

18 Hutton, *Midwest At Noon*, p. 204.

19 Hutton, *Midwest At Noon*, p. 207.


21 Ibid., pp. 31-32.

22 Ibid., p. 36.

23 Ibid.


27 Ibid., pp. 191-192.


30 Ibid., p. 192.

31 Ibid., p. 191.

32 Ibid., p. 193.


36 Ibid., p. 224.

37 Ibid., p. 225.

38 Ibid., p. 204.

CHAPTER VI

Women

The American woman represented one component of American society that was not fully congruent with American values of equality and progress. America, they understood, trumpets equality for all, men and women, but the Britons found the American women denied equal rights. Through their narratives they pictured her in a curiously ambiguous state of equality, free in many respects, especially by technology from laborious chores, yet certainly not equal in career opportunities. Women were considered by the Britons to be a significant minority who did not share in equal protection before the law, finding them, like Blacks, sometimes treated separately and unequally. But if America was to become the world leader, how could it deny full citizenship to women?

In the nineteenth century, our visitors praised the America woman as representative of refinement and culture. Women reflected the best of American life and the graduation of the United States from a raw crude, tobacco-chewing youth, to a society of young adulthood, properly socialized with good manners and knowledge of the arts. The American woman was seen as a leader in this evolution towards a higher appreciation of culture's accouterments. However, the Britons in the early twentieth century found the American female still in her place, specifically the same place; she had not been allowed to develop and express her special talents. She seemed
bound by social dictates to remain a young adult who should be lovely
but not think too much, and listen becomingly. They contrasted her
to the European woman who seemed to grow with grace and intelligence
into middle age, still confident of her special importance and
identity as a woman. The Britons hoped American women would mature
and come to full equality, as this would be an important indicator
of America's coming of age as world leader.

The Cult of Youth

In the Thirties, the Britons noticed the American woman paid a
great deal of attention to how she looked. She wanted to stay young
but paradoxically the new fashions and technologies employed to help
her stay young, produced, in appearance, a standardized article.
There was no individuality or separate identity for the American
woman who "worshipped" said Mary Agnes Hamilton at the "shrine of
Beauty." Hamilton found the American female self-consciously
competitive, driven to remain youthful. Hamilton said: "Inspect any
audience, at a lecture, concert or opera, any gathering in which
females are present" and a sizeable proportion of the females will
be found attending...to their faces." The devotees of the beauty
cult appear frenzied, as "out of their ubiquitous reticules pop the
hand mirror, the puff and the lip-stick, tributes to their uncertainty
as to whether the great task of the day has really been satis-
factorily done." This activity caused Hamilton to doubt "the
Gynocracy statement" that woman rule America, since the object of
all this disciplined attention to face and form is the attention of
the male. Hamilton placed this devotion to youthful beauty very high on her list of "disintegrating elements in American life," and high among the pre-occupations which "block a true sense of values." The craving to always look good, believed Hamilton, led to "the avoidance of thinking about subjects other than one's self."

The Britons remarked that there were no "middle-aged women" in America, but just two ages, "young and old, both beautiful," said the Scottish writer Andrew Elliot (1939), but rather "too many blondes for my taste." Whatever their style or shade, "they stuck to it until one day they decided to 'be their age' and then by some magical process they were grey or white." This coverup of nature's process was not fully appreciated by J. B. Priestley (1937) who abhorred the cotton wigs: "...there is one type of elderly American woman who looks terrifying to me. She has cotton-white and elaborately waved hair; all the honest lines have been blotted out of her face, except just here and there where the powder lies thick like snow in a mountain crevice; her mouth is small, grim, and incongruously scarlet; and usually she wears something fancy in the way of spectacles or eyeglasses." At a quick first glance, this type of woman looks like a distinguished specimen of American motherhood, perhaps intellectual and public-spirited, but also the sweet gentle guardian of the hearth. "After another look she begins to look stupid, intolerant, uncompromising, and sometimes downright cruel; all desiccated in her womanhood; a whitened tyrant..." Priestley wondered what force drove these women to such lengths. "Why be so
aggressively feminine day and night? Why not relax, let up? A few wrinkles, a washed pale cheek, a mouth without lipstick, comfortable old clothes—in short, an appearance like nothing on earth—how welcome a sight that would be." It was over this quest for eternal youth and enhanced beauty that Priestley made his famous quip, "it is a bad business being a woman in most places, but in the United States it must be hell. No relaxation. No letting up for a second." The Britons realized the pressures and demands placed on the American woman: she must be careful about her breath and body odors, juggle with the gourmet kitchen gadgets and coquetry, the children and culture. Admass appeals pressed women over onward, "but where exactly it is they are going," said Priestley, "the rest of us do not know." The Britons feared that American women really did not know either but overstrained themselves in their driving quest. The Britons suspected the quest was for self-definition.

"The efforts to restore and regulate Beauty are overdone," noticed Shane Leslie (1936) as "an unsleeping army of beauty—doctors defies old wrinkled Time from ten thousand beauty parlours." American women "are sent to the beauty shop like soiled linen to be smoothed and sometimes ironed before being returned to the world of unsuspecting men." Leslie noticed "arms of goddesses," "bare throats worthy of Greek sculpture," and "with their hair they weave delicate nets," but beneath all this beguiling display, "at heart American women are Puritans disguised as houris." The flappers teased and enticed Leslie, who laughingly said, "American women are
irresistible whether there is anything to resist or not," but lamented, "they run to identical types." Ursula Branston (1940) agreed, "this act of uniformity gets boring. Every plain man has a beautiful wife, for the simple reason there is no other kind."4

Standardization, while supporting the cult of beauty, produced a standard article; "the men behind the machines" said Ursula Branston, "have created no more standard article than the modern American woman." Maie Perley (1945) wondered mockingly if American women "spend the night wrapped in cellophane and employ careful hands to extricate them" in the morning. Female hairdos were judged to be works of plastic art, and the whole display of ornamental beauty not unlike a giant marionette show, reeking artificiality and unreality. Women, said Perley seemed "dropped on the scene where, controlled by a myriad of strings and expert hands, they are performing a dumb show against a vast glittering curtain."5

American "smartness" is "curiously standardized," said Mrs. Hugh Willoughby (1958), as "the average girl is more anxious to wear the currently fashionable dress than to possess the exclusive individual style." "I cannot imagine this happening anywhere in England, where fashions are followed with more discrimination and are not accepted wholesale. The English girl selects from current trends only those colours and styles which suit her personally. Once chosen, she wears them longer." In America, a "girl buys cheap and scraps; the styling is good, the finish is not." However, she mentioned that her husband, Hugh, commented with an almost tactless
enthusiasm on the clothes and grooming of the girls. American beauty, she concluded, reflects not only the higher standard of wealth and ease of housekeeping, but also the national scale of values, as smartness and good grooming are American customs. In the post-war period, American attitudes and styles formed a "New Look" in Britain, spreading from Chealse to Soho. Nylons—the miracle fabric that had flashed around the world first on the legs of US servicewomen—sold on London's black market on Oxford street for 35 bob! Godfrey Winn (1948), a British novelist, reported on a New York visit to the studio of Elizabeth Arden, and found Arden's efforts to find new creams to halt aging a "triumphant success." English journalist Doris Nelson (1960) was enthralled by an invitation to visit Slenderella, where mechanical erasers wiped fat away. What American technology could not do!

The Britons viewed our females in the Thirties to be youthful, fashionable, gracious hostesses, excellent homemakers, enthusiastic in artistic pursuits and possessed, especially when around men, of a childlike gaiety and sparkle. But they found that in the America it was more difficult than in Europe to enter middle-age, explaining why so many of the visitors found only two ages—young and old. In the Twenties, the flappers had perfectly reflected exuberant, experimental America and the willingness-to-try-anything attitude of youth; the Depression seemed to reinforce the position of the subordinate woman, socialized as she was to not really compete with men, especially jobless men.
If the American female was dazzling, the Britons saw the American male as rather subdued. Cecil Thompson (1939) who married an American woman, furthered his own case as he observed: "In my eyes the American men suffered by contrast. Most of them bored me. They were bores because they were natural bores, or because they worked so hard to prove they were not bores. They were such nice fellows that I wanted to contrive to have them found drunk in a brothel. Or such blades, always talking about how many women they had slept with and how drunk they were last night, that I wanted to take them to dinner at a Salvation Army Hostel." Britons agreed that American men are the best and the noblest of husbands, but they are seldom lovers as are the Europeans. Americans are never allowed to divorce a guilty wife. "An American naming his wife's correspondent is cut at the clubs with acid chivalry," said Shane Leslie. He believed "it extraordinary how much American men will take from women." He saw "a child sick over a stranger in a train coach. The stranger rose and apologised to the mother for being in the way!" His subsequent reaction reveals the British attitude toward women: "In Europe the woman would have been removed with her infant." On another occasion, Leslie found himself in a lift with three men where he "was sent up and down three times by two idiotic women changing their minds. Not till the women were out did the men dare to curse." Leslie championed their restraint saying, "American men are not aristocrats, but gentlemen they are in the old and spacious manner."
Probing the Mind of the American Woman

A few Britons satirized the stereotype of American women and the idea of the United States as a Matriarchy. "American women think they are the offering of the gods to mankind and deserve immediate worship, which they receive equally as virgins or matriarchs," said Shane Leslie (1936). "The result is that America is a better place for a women at every age and stage," as he found her spoilt as a girl, idolized as a wife, until, as an elderly mother, she becomes a State divinity, with a day of worship set apart called Mothers' Day. The American female "received admiration thin: adoration, fat. Men show humility instead of jealously," appraised Leslie, while women are "marvellously free and frank and sure of themselves," and enjoy all manner of worship, be it physical or intellectual. He echoed Oscar Wilde who had called the American girl, 'the most fascinating little despot in the world'. By British standards he found our women emancipated, proclaiming only "two refuges left uninvaded--American football and the Supreme Court."

Continuing in jest, he offered: "it does not seem impossible for a woman to be President, which would open a position at the White House for some well-dressed husband to occupy as the First Gentleman in the Land." Leslie applauded the American woman's elegance, taste, and refinement, praising her perfect hospitality. He was expansive in his thanks for her splendid friendship, interest and inspiration.

"Through dancing," said Andrew Elliot (1939), "I came to see another side of American life," as he relished the fun-loving spirit
of American women. "It is a woman's country...American women fairly make the men jump through hoops," as one debutante told Elliot "she always took two men to a dance" so "she'd be sure of having a good time." Elliot observed our female species more closely: "In spite of having moved around the world a bit, I was still under the impression that romantic overtures were left to the male sex." "Imagine my embarrassment," he recounted, "when a sweet and very young thing, after inviting me to take her up on the boat deck to see the stars, issued a further invitation for me to kiss her. (I had intended to, in any case, but apparently I was a bit too slow for her.) She was very alluring but, as I said, very young, so presently I suggested that we turn in. I escorted her to her cabin to find that she was under the impression that my remark had meant that we were to spend the rest of the night together!"

Female aggressiveness in America was also observed by the British lecturer and radio commentator, Stuart P. Mais (1934), although he did not find such a romantic interlude, as he explained: "I am not quite sure of my feelings for the American girl or for the young married woman. She is almost invariably lovely to look at, and dressed to perfect taste, but she is too sure of herself. I dislike the way she corrects her husband on points of topography and the running of trains, points on which men are usually more reliable." Mais was more than a little disconcerted to hear "an infallible Amazon addressed as 'Honey' by someone whom she obviously regards as of a slightly lower order."
"Although I had found the American girls' friendliness delightful for a casual shipboard acquaintance," said Elliot, "a certain belated loyalty prompted me to pay tribute to the fine qualities of our British girls, their courage, their good sportsmanship, their dignity, their character. They may not dress so smartly, their dancing cannot compare, but they make a better showing in the pinches."

Cultural differences in breeding, social position, or simply the unfamiliar, partially explain the summation of Elliot. And too, political journalist, Basil Dillon Woon (1942) confessed that many a British male was actually baffled by the American woman: "We really do not understand her in England. Her scintillation seems diamond-hard beside the good, dull, velvet polish acquired from centuries of horsehair and plush by our English women. They willingly reflect light; the American woman must radiate herself."

Every British convention "trains our women to self-obliteration, to deference to male superiority, to an appearance, at least, of bored haughtiness. How agreeable to the masculine ego!" And yet, he said, "how often I have seen, in London drawing-rooms and clubs, a collection of English women throwing out this same aura of well-bred indifference—and their males clustering about some impudently vivid American girl, imperious and accustomed in her demand for their homage." 11

The dominant theme in relation to the American woman from the early 1930's through the early 1950's was essentially focused on the
American woman as "ornament." A lovely, tantalizing--often expensive to maintain--desirable help-mate of man. When the Britons visualized her in this way, they were not disparaging, but congratulating. After the war, however, with the 'New Britain' claims for equality, increasingly many Britons took a more critical tone in their praise or blame of America's women. Mary Weston (1945) a British novelist and world traveler, told Americans plainly that if a position of world leadership was to be conferred upon the United States, "the American woman and her point of view has got to change." Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was held to be a shining example of strength and individuality, "without good looks and a dolled make-up." She was bitingly critical of the "woman as ornament" role she saw most American women, who appear to have been made from the ancient recipe of sugar, spice and everything nice, but they do not, as in the ancient ditty, sit on cushions eating strawberries and cream, but in deluxe cars, where they dine upon American men." "Falsely," Weston recounted, "we are led to believe that they are the most favoured women in the world, rich with the mental and spiritual gifts of the gods and materially endowed with the offerings laid at their feet by the devotion of the great he-American, that personification of all strength and tenderness." In all the world, Weston told her European suffragist sisters, "there is surely no human being with so much egoism and self-pride as the American woman, and in the Eur-Asian point of view, more deluded." What was the source of error or wrong?
American men, she believed, have "deluded women into thinking they are important and wonderful in subjugation." Men, especially Southern men, kept up a "little game" of pretending "that their women were just lower than the angels—or perhaps angels on earth." Rubbish! Weston protested. "To treat a woman, theoretically, as just less than angels, is funny when it isn't ridiculous." She accosted a Southern gentlemen on this subject of woman's place and he responded. "Equality! Why no, sure no. There can't be equality between one of God's own ladies and just a mere man." Weston failed to see any humor in his remarks as she heralded, "equality is what modern Europe desires, not sameness, but equality," as she echoed Simone Beauvoir's challenge for women to rise from subordination as "the second sex."12

This goal would be very difficult for the American woman to do, evaluated Weston, as no one seemed to believe the "myth about the superior nature of women more devoutly than the American woman herself." "That's what makes her so astonishing to a European; she also believes she is a woman long before, and a great many times more often, than she is a human being." She is greatly conscious that she is a feminine creature. Her "credo seems to be 'I believe in my femininity. I believe in all those things which decorate it, clothes, cosmetics...I believe no other woman in the world is so feminine. I believe the heart of man melts in my presence'." Weston looked at the American woman and saw cloying and artifice;
she believed this behavior was socially destructive. She saw these features best in the smile of the "poised Society Woman." It was unnatural, "a sort of physical drill with numbered position—first, center of lips go up; second, lips slightly elongated; third, corners descend. Pause. And so on until, about twenty, the entire cycle is complete and the face is again smileless." 13

In 1936, J. B. Priestley had wondered, "what makes the American woman so aggressive?" In 1955, he explained the conditioning forces which, in his view, made the American female "too feminine," "too arch," "too anxious." He believed "life in America is dominated by the masculine and not the feminine principle. The values of this society are masculine and not feminine." If American women "become aggressive, demanding, dictatorial, it is because they find themselves struggling to find satisfaction in a world that is not theirs. If they use sex as a weapon, it is because they so badly need a weapon." Priestley believed our women to be "like the inhabitants of an occupied country. They are compelled to accept values and standards that are alien to their deepest nature." American society was uprooted; yet a woman wants to take root. "She is deeply conservative," yet, American "society is nothing if not progressive." She desires "an erotic personal relationship;" what she gets "is a muddle of hasty sex, social partnership, and a tangle of legalities." She believes "in the ancient wisdom of the heart," yet "society attends to anything except that, offering her in place of it technics, gadgets, graphs, statistics." A woman's "essential nature cries out
for a devoted lover, healthy children, a happy home filled with easy intimate talk, laughter," and nothing whatever of "cybernetics and science fiction, buildings at two thousand feet high, travel at five hundred miles an hour, stainless steel robot attendants, and dinners served in capsules." A woman, found Priestley, "is the most traditional creature in the world." Especially in America, she "is imprisoned in a society that has said goodbye to every tradition, where everything is new fashioned."14

Priestley, from the perspective of conflicting values between men and women, did not find it strange for the American female to "take her revenge," "compete," "bringing to the conflict her will and power and hysterical energy." She would "naturally be hard on men" because they represent and are responsible for her feelings of deep unease, frustration, insecurity. She resents the triumph of the masculine principle. Our Britons found basic incongruities between the desires of men and women in America; Priestley called it a battle between "Logos" and "Eros;" Thurber had called it "the battle of the sexes." Priestley suggested, "masculine and feminine values" should be "properly balanced, harmonized." Western "he-men" and fragile heroines should be replaced with the interdependence of yin-yang.15 Mary Weston was so concerned with the role of American women because she knew that America after 1945 would set world standards. Familial patterns in the US would greatly influence those in Britain.
Roles

Our British visitors saw American men and women playing a series of roles, carefully defined through socialization, in relation to one another. "I'm afraid my husband spoils me," said many American women to Mary Weston, who retorted, "curiously childish phenomenon." Weston called this "the game of 'Wonderful Woman' or 'Spoilt Woman'." But perhaps this game and artifice were essential as Weston viewed "few American men who can treat a woman as a companion and intelligent being." "How far the behavior between the sexes is genuine and how far a pose, is difficult to discover," said Weston watching the game in operation; she doubted "that either take it seriously in the depths of their minds."

British men marvelled at the number of different, often conflicting roles that were played successfully by American women. Basil Woon (1941) conversed with a "feminine intellectual", without the typical English "uniform of thick spectacles and ill-fitting tweeds." This extraordinary person not only had intelligence, but the wits as well "to know a woman's place in the scheme of things;" she knows "that the real business of a woman is her man." Career women he voted most successful, and few lack charm and femininity. What has prepared her for balancing any number of roles? "The schools," said Woon, have allowed the American girl, in relation to the masculine element, "to be on equal terms with him;" she has played with him, studied with him, worked with him. Nevertheless, socialization within the family and components of American society
like the schools have prepared the female for a subordinate role, however skillful and rewarding, as Mary Weston encountered a "female intellectual" preserving her "womanhood": "A very intelligent and good-looking professional woman called. Her conversation was delightful and enlightening. She asked to introduce her boy. He was a clever American Pole. He, too, was interesting because of his wide knowledge of American, English and continental plays. Then they came together; her intelligence faded away, she was apparently entirely absorbed in her appearance—tilt of hat, polish of nails, position of neck and hands. She was apparently, a damned fool. I asked for an explanation. She said she must "hold" her man." The same experience was repeated with other young women and their boys. "Not at all nice." Most conversation between the sexes, Weston pronounced "badinage," and believed it sad when it occurred among any class "but when it occurs among University students and intellectuals it becomes a tragedy." J. B. Priestley was also "convinced that good talk cannot flourish where there is a wide gulf between the sexes, where the men are altogether too masculine, too hearty and bluff and booming, where the women are too feminine."17

Mary Weston reacted adversely to the American male as he "constantly gives the impression that he is saying, now be pretty, have nice shoulders, arms, that I may look at them and be thrilled, at least a little. Stir up my emotions, that's your function and, in return, I'll give you all sorts of nice things and tell you that you are the cream of creation; but don't talk politics or literature or
economics for more than two seconds or I'll have lost that thrill, See!" Did the American woman obey the command to thrill but not to talk politics? Weston answered, "The American woman often does, but the European frequently does not." This demurring attitude on the part of the American woman infuriated Weston, who reacted with "there is nothing more annoying, at times more insulting, to an educated and cultured European woman, than the attitude of many American men."  

The Britons' comments revealed a different relationship between the sexes in America as compared to Europe. A learned and adventurous Frenchman, Weston recalled, was "bored by the way the American woman was constantly throwing about her sex." He said the European woman is usually an excellent conversationalist, "illuminating all subjects with the subtle aroma of her own sex," and is "more sexually attractive." "Sex is the best of life," he said; "let's have it as an hors d'oeuvre, or a savoury, but not for the whole damned dinner and, for God's sake, don't dish it up as a sweet."  

Matrimony seemed to allow the American woman to be more herself, for it was in the American home, within the confines of the family, that the Britons observed the homemaker as "deservedly and keenly home-proud," a "natural born hostess of infinite charm, kindliness and consideration." In the home, Britons found the American woman, "as resourceful as her husband in his business or on the farm." Hutton described homelife in the Midwest just after 1945, when the returning GIs refocused "on family." The American woman is aided by
labor-saving devices, but these are not to be considered luxuries. British domestic service is from "four to ten times as costly" in America as in Europe; Americans call it help, noted Hutton, in token of equality. "Help is very rare" in American homes, making the technical gadgets necessities. And beyond running the house like a wizard, the typical American homemaker is interested, more than her husband, found Hutton, "in more of the ideas and issues that swell the tides of contemporary thought. And she is often more alert, discerning, and discriminating than her overworked and overworking husband." She puts her husband and children first; loyally, conscientiously, without question. She is Mom to husband and children alike; the Britons found so many evidences of man's dependence on, and interest in, women. Hutton believed, "the women repay it and foster it by great care of their figures and faces, their charm, and their appearance—even if they follow so many well-advertised fashions and ways to secure charm that so many seem standardized."

"It is not true, he said, "as nearly all Europeans believe, that American women are universally spoiled by their men; any more than it is true, as nearly all Americans believe, that all English wives are domestic slaves, all French wives betrayed, and all German wives are whipped. There is surprisingly little difference between the status of the housewife and the running of a home in Cedar Rapids and San Quentin, La Crosse and Bruges, or Cleveland and Budapest," except in America one has all the wonderful technological gadgetry, and certainly a higher standard of living. Basil Dillon Woon found
the American homemaker "hardworking," saying, "of no other woman on earth is so much expected and obtained." "In the overwhelming majority of Midwest families," said Hutton, "Pop is not the underdog. He is not driven by his wife to make more and more dollars in order to 'keep up with the Joneses'." He is quite capable of providing that drive for himself, and does so mainly to provide wife and children with a bigger and better life. He does not rebel at what Europeans call the tyranny of women and children, but is resigned and tamed by the age of forty into domesticity.  

Divorce, however, was "common" in America, as Shane Leslie said (1936) "divorcees once associated with a scarlet letter, are now presumed attractive and socially clever." For an American woman, he found "to divorce an unnecessary husband is as easy as weaning a child," and "sometimes a divorced woman has the amusing whim of remarrying her divorced husband." Our females, he believed, have "taken the laws of marriage into their own white hands instead of taking lovers, as in Latin countries, into their white arms. They marry, and continue to marry, the men they wish to live with." Constant divorce "enables them to keep abreast of their passions, including their greatest, which is for respectability." Hutton judged, "divorce has increased and is still increasing." As in other countries, "the effect of two world wars within a generation has been to slacken not only the traces of matrimony but also those of all personal and social morality."
The ambiguous position of women in relation to the social ideal of equality as a continuous theme in British commentaries after the war. J. W. Morpurgo (1949) aptly described the paradox of the female condition: "They have their equality but it is in essence the very negation of equality. They are on their pedestal but it is man's imagination that models the statue." He agreed with Priestley's observations, saying, "the rules of equality are all man-made but woman is expected to play honestly, to run with him and never outstrip him, to be his mental equal sometimes, but never openly his mental superior. One convention gives her liberty to be more thoughtful than he, another convention takes the liberty away."

The female in America was not well defined as an equal or an individual; she seemed to mirror masculine desires and mold her role around them.

J. B. Priestley recognized (1955) that Admass forces were unhealthily dominated by the masculine principle. In advertising "there is no true feeling for Woman herself." Advertisements exploited women, in their focus on over-emphasized breasts and undeveloped hips, which do not suggest man's mate, his companion along the road from the Old Stone Age. Man in America, in this lust for the erotic, seemed to exhibit in him "a famished and frustrated baby, never finally weaned, still eager and hungry for the breast."

Advertising's "straining curved silk, its bulging sweaters, its 'thems and thoses', its melons and globes and moons, so generous in their promise of lactation, are not luring the customers to bed but
making them leap up in the cradle. " That was only half of the picture for Priestley as he asked too about "the narrow-hipped boyish figures that support, so inadequately, those magnificent bosoms? Surely no mothers there? No indeed; they do not belong to essential Woman, brooding, fertile, deep-rooted; they represent Woman in her new aspect, away from her own ancient realm, all the smart hard girls who may compete with men but do not challenge and reject the values of the society that men have created: they symbolise what is left, sadly diminished, nearly impotent, almost a freak, of Eros in Admass."23

The Willoughby's (1958) continued this theme of ambiguity of circumstance for the American woman, saying: "at first sight the American woman is the most emancipated in the world, and in England we often heard of the American matriarchy. In America we found things rather different." They found "a surprising survival of Victorianism in the general attitude towards women's brains." On dates "the man does most of the talking, probably avoiding serious subjects, and the girl listens becomingly. The really intelligent girl tries to avoid the stigma of undue cleverness for fear of losing dates or marriage prospects." They found too "this masculine attitude is not, of course, peculiar to America, but many of our American friends of both sexes, and specially those who have visited Europe or who have met a number of Europeans, have made a special mention of it and regret it." Mrs. Willoughby served in the British Air Force for six years during the war, which she mentioned in a talk to
a women's group; this provoked one question only, "Did you meet your husband in the Air Force?" There was no interest in her responsibilities.

From a British male's point of view, dating in America was a tedious, unrewarding experience, as Brian Magee (1958) described. He noticed that American females expected gratuities--chairs to be held for them and so on. He remarked that on one occasion, after he and a date had reached their destination in a car, the female just sat. "The first time this happened to me, I thought the girl day-dreaming," so he stuck his head back into the car and said "cheerfully: Come on ________, we're here." Later, he understood America's social conventions like opening car doors, and although happy to comply, thought the whole tedium unnatural. Further, "although an American woman expects to receive courtesy she seldom expects to give it." He thanked a young woman for holding a door for him, and she rounded him angrily, saying, "I wasn't holding the door for you, I was looking for my key. In this country women don't hold doors for young men." Magee's thoughtful reply was, why not? American women seemed socialized to be provocatively impudent as he described another date: "on the way she tole me when to put my umbrella up and when to take it down. When she got her first drink at the bar, instead of waiting while I got mine and then moving, with some such phrase as "Where shall we sit?", she turned her back on me and started trekking across the floor. I watched where she went, snatched my drink, and followed along behind. I was irritated; but remembering what I had
heard about American women I started to observe other couples closely, and sure enough most if not all of the moment-to-moment decisions about where to go and what to do were being made and acted upon by the woman without reference to the man." The Englishman was indignant with the expectation that he should be a poodle. But "there was no point in blaming an individual woman, or regarding her as domineering or self-centered or ill-mannered: she was trained to behave like this, brought up in a culture where such behavior was expected of her...but this is a basic reason for much of the family turmoil, including divorce, that characterises the nation." Honor, supposedly the companion to love, was judged by the Britons to be conspicuously absent in the male-female relationship in America. Magee talked not only of isolated events, as "in my experience alone, and in the course of only one year, this sort of incident occurred frequently. Women seemed to command attention with avidity and indifference while at the same time rudely emphasising the fact that they were under no obligation to be similarly considerate. In other words, they seem consumed with resentment at not being men."25

In Europe, believed Magee, what is different is our attitudes toward each other. Further, and perhaps as a result of strained unnatural behavior between the sexes in America, sexual harmony he found strangely elusive in American marriage; from conversation he found "impotence common even among young men." A "successful," "young" executive in New York confided: "I woo my job all day and it drains my emotions dry. In a strange way...I am even romancing
my boss. By the time I get home I'm incapable of making love to my wife." Relations in America seemed forced and tense. Married love, judged political columnist William Blake (1955), "that rich sentiment based on mutual pre-occupation with all that is spiritually most important for husband and wife, certainly has its place in America but how many other idols overshadow that little world."26

Women on top in Bed?

How did the American woman compare with women of other countries? Were they more or less liberated? As the Britons during the Cold War compared the United States and Russia in every conceivable capacity, it was natural to contrast their women. Mervyn Jones (1962) opened his comparison by suggesting that regardless of country, "women won't be on top until they're on top in bed." Where women are the recipients and not the initiators of sexual pleasure, "they will be the recipients and not the initiators of arrangements and decisions." No matriarchy existed in America, said Jones, as he explained the subordinate position of women: "the evidence for the alleged female domination consists either of assertions which simply beg the question, or of facts which are equally true of countries which nobody has suggested are run by women, such as England, France and Germany." The facts that women outnumber men, and own more property because they live longer than men, were proved by Jones to be meaningless. Yet, "one is left with the claim," said Jones, "that they influence their menfolk." But the question is not really whether American women talk, but whether they are listened to.
Jones discounted this womanly influence as he described: "one American husband, possessed of a certain status, has a highly effective way of dealing with his wife: while she expounds her views—thoughtful and well-reasoned views, it seemed to me—he leans back, smiling gently and swilling his drink, and repeats in an audible undertone: 'Penis envy, penis envy.' No doubt his grandfather used to say: 'Nonsense, my dear' in just the same voice, but without the same unassailable assurance."27

After building his case for the subjugation of American women, Jones also developed a brief portraying the Russian women. Jones heard it alleged that women dominate the country of the U.S.S.R., and that equality between the sexes exists in unrivaled perfection. He found it true that both men and women were integrated in eating "at an official canteen or quick-service stolovia," but Jones "never saw a man behind the serving hatch or carry the buckets of soup from the kitchen." "Equality," emphasized Jones, "means, first and foremost, that women work. Should you ask what kind of work they do, the answer is: 'Anything'."28

But the number of women in the professions in Russia is impressive, as "two-thirds of the doctors in the Soviet Union are women. Most teachers are women." Jones found that the number of women employed did not decline in higher positions; "at three of the four schools I visited (all Russian schools are co-educational), the head was a woman." Further, "when I sat through a trial," observed Jones, "the presiding judge and the public prosecutor were
both women," A deep gulf existed, however, between the Russian professional women and the woman who swept horse-droppings from the streets of Moscow. A female guide noticed that Jones "was struck by the laboriously-bent women in shawls and kerchiefs, most of them rather old," as she said: "Ah, foreigners are always talking about that...these women like to have something to occupy themselves...most of them are training to drive machines." Jones did not dismiss these figures so easily, remarking, "street-cleaning machines can occasionally be seen, especially in Moscow, but all those I saw were driven by men." 29

Russian social expectations seemed most oppressive in rural areas, as Jones viewed: "On the farms, I saw gangs of women hoeing and weeding, but I never saw a woman driving a tractor or even a cart. At building sites, I saw women unloading bricks but men operating cranes." After leaving Russia by train, Jones entered Rumania, proclaiming, "the first thing that made me feel I was in a different country was the sight of a man filling in a pot-hole with a shovel. I don't remember seeing a man touch a shovel anywhere in Russia." War losses partly explain what Jones observed, but his overall conclusion was striking: In Russia, "the idea of treating women with consideration is neither natural nor inculcated. The old Russian attitude of a woman as a man's extra set of muscles has merged with the communist doctrine that woman shares the duties of labour. Where they converge, the woman whose mother shovelled the
194

snow outside the cottage door is found shovelling snow from the factory gate. That women should do different work from men is, in the communist view, reactionary, and in the inborn Russian view, just soft. Such is the theory. The practice is that women do, in fact, different work-harder work." For Jones, the treatment of women in America was better, but just barely, than in Russia. Both countries were administered by men; both cultures treated their women traditionally. Equality was still a promise for the future. Capitalism and Communism had produced largely the same results in relation to woman—her subordination.

In Britain, post-war emphasis for a 'New Britain' with promises for equality was just beginning to move the English women toward emancipation. "For thirty years," wrote Harry Hopkins, "Government has saluted the principle of equal pay for equal work while protesting that, unfortunately, the financial position made this quite, quite impossible." But suddenly in 1955, "in the civil service and in teaching the thing was done." In addition, "the long-standing rule barring the employment of women after marriage had been dropped a little earlier." The "last male strongholds were falling," as in 1946, "even the Foreign Office had opened its doors to women." And "in the Fifties, Oxford and later Cambridge overcame its traditional monasticism at least to the point of removing the historic quota limitation on women undergraduates, which the Warden of Wadham now boldly declared to have been 'most foolish, out-of-date, finicky'." The House of Lords "grasped the nettle" and resolved to admit
hereditary peeresses in their own right." By the end of the Fifties, "only the Church, the London Stock Exchange, the Jockey Club and a few Pall Mall clubs continued to hold out" against the trend to promote women to full equality. "Most women," said Vera Brittain (1953), a former suffragette, "still occupy positions as substitute-delegates, vice-chairmen, sub-editors, and assistant-secretaries," rather than positions of first power. And "galling as it might be to the old-time feminist, women appeared reasonably content with this state of affairs." Postwar domesticity reigned in both Britain and America, as Denis Brogan (1964) observed: "the young American woman today is as convinced as ever Eve was that the 'proper study of womankind is man'." The young American and British woman, "wants above all a husband and children;" the American female "hopes to catch the all-American boy, as one of them put it to me recently."31

Gerald Priestland (1967) continued the theme of ambiguity in the condition of American women. He found her striving for identity and equality because of "the pressure to succeed;" but found her, too, demurring to men, in the "heritage of old Europe." At times, it seemed to him, "as if there were two parallel societies which intersect only at the table and in bed;" as America is not a truly integrated society of men and women. American women, he concluded, "do not observe that in almost all their activities they are being treated as a separate community." He saw, as so many other Britons had, the American woman being exhibited as ornament. Presidential candidates, "campaigning with their wives by their side," display
them "as accessories, trophies, tokens of normality." Politicians do not approach women as individuals, but as "women-voters," which are "to be cultivated as a bulk commodity." Further, if anyone doubted his personal observations, "they have only to examine the record of women in American politics," he offered; "one senator out of one hundred (1967), twelve representatives out of 435. This is only slightly better in Britain (15 peeresses and 28 members of parliament--the latter in a ratio of one in every 22 members as against one in every 36 in the House of Representatives), but the point once again," he affirmed, "is that the United States is emphatically not a woman's country, and that women are very far from getting their fair share of it."32 In the Thirties, British commentaries interpreting the status of women in America appear fractionalized, in the sense of being split, between how British men viewed the condition of American women vs how the British women evaluated her position. Before 1945, J. B. Priestley in the only British male to severely criticize the unequal treatment of women in America. But after 1945, the Britons become almost unanimous in their condemnation of feminine second class citizenship.

Neo-feminism

"Not long ago, the role of women in American society," viewed British television news commentator, Robert Hargreaves (1973), "was based on certain universal and seemingly immutable assumptions. Mother, wife homemaker--these were the roles to which every normal American woman was assumed to aspire and expected to conform." The
feminine ideal was one of blameless domesticity in the late 1940's and 1950's. American women were marrying earlier and having more babies than ever before, isolated in their new homes in suburbia as never before. "The housewife was wooed by the advertisers, idealized by her magazines, pampered by more household gadgets than any other women in the world," viewed Hargreaves. It was widely acclaimed that technology had liberated her from household drudgery of woman's work. The new supermarkets ended time-consuming shopping chores, prepackaged food reduced cooking time, while the up-to-date kitchens with the dishwasher, eyelevel ovens and dazzling array of labor-saving devices was said to be the envy of all other women in the world. With her free time, she could now devote more of herself to the rearing of her children and the care of her men.

Suddenly in the turbulent 1960's, this pleasant scenario of the feminine ideal soured. Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique*. Through careful door-to-door survey research, Friedan found that many American women suffered from an unknown malaise because they had no identity as individuals. Women were viewed as nurturing rather than creative, intuitive rather than intelligent, emotional rather than logical, and submissive rather than aggressive. The core of the problem for women today, wrote Friedan, is a problem of identity—a stunting or evasion of growth that is perpetuated by the feminine mystique. Our culture does not permit women to accept or gratify their basic need to grow and fulfill their potentialities as human beings.
Friedan's book "had an enormous influence on the attitudes of women across the nation," judged Hargreaves, "and there, followed, perhaps inevitably, a reaction to the mindless stereotypes of the later 1950's." The whole status of women as individuals began increasingly to be called into question. Women, the Britons explained, were simply not happy with the role in which they had been cast, and the neo-feminism was certainly encouraged by a new generation of younger women, influenced by movements to reform poverty, promote civil rights for minorities, opposition to the war in Vietnam and movements on college campuses. Some called it the New Feminism, others Women's Liberation. What was the magnitude of female involvement wondered the Britons. "While only a tiny minority of women have paraded through the streets carrying slogans denouncing the sexist attitudes of male chauvinist pigs, or publicly thrown their bras into trashcans in protest," viewed Hargreaves, "almost all of them have been affected by a new awareness of their changing position and their changing aspirations." Gerald Priestland (1967) judged, in spite of the facetious jokes about female Turkish bath attendants and 'My name's Fred and I'm your bunny', the neo-feminist movement to be justified. He found the greatest barrier to real integration of the sexes to be "the ego of the American male." Quite objectively, he reasoned, it would be "difficult to secure real integration, rather than the separate but equal status that was unsuccessfully offered to the Negroes."34
Progress was being made on a wide front, however, as Hargreaves evaluated: "since this decade (of the seventies) began there have been important improvements in the status of women in American society. The more public changes have taken place in the role of women at work: legal changes, promising them more equality with men, and fairer opportunities in the professions." But Hargreaves found the most profound change to be invisible. There were "signs of a fundamental and probably permanent transformation in the average American woman's attitude toward marriage, sex, and the family, changes that most men and many women find difficult to articulate and perplexing to understand."

While the leaders of the Women's movement were not found to be love-starved neurotics, "it is true," judged Hargreaves, that "the search for a clear definition of the Women's Liberation movement is not always helped by the attitudes of the more militant women themselves." Feeling deprived and sex-typed, their public arguments have 'concentrated for much of the time on what often appear to be trivial symbolic issues: whether to call themselves Mrs., Miss, or Ms.; whether the presiding officer at their meetings should be called a chairman, chairwoman, or chairperson; protests against what they regard as sexist advertising--those perfumes, for instance, that carry the headline One More Pleasure You can Give Him, or those for National Airlines that entice businessmen to Fly Cheryl in a not-very-subtle appeal to sexual adventure." Hargreaves noted the invasions of all-male bars, still hallowed ground in
England in a few places, believing these antics detracted from the "vaguer but more substantial discontent of the American women, particularly in her role as wife and mother." There has been a kind of cultural revolution—experimentation with new life styles, communal living, group child-rearing, experimentation with or open declaration of lesbianism—predicated on feelings of sexual dehumanization. But the Britons did not find the traditional American family breaking apart as Hargreaves stated: "it is unlikely that the institution is about to be swept away in a new cultural revolution."36

Significantly, Women's Liberation was deemed by the Britons to be still a largely middle-class phenomenon, due in part to the suburban housing patterns and the suburban lifestyle into which most young middle-class wives are thrust. It is a life to which the college-trained American woman, better-read and more ambitious than ever before, is almost wholly unsuited. Consequently, she is often ill-prepared to cope with two enormous traumas that normally come to her in the course of her marriage. The first comes with the arrival of children. Until then, she has more often than not been a working wife with interests and an occupation in the wider world. Abruptly she is plunged into the world of domesticity and often this world is in a dormitory suburb, her role restricted to caring for her home and rearing babies. The traditional activities that once gave her a sense of dignity and economic worth—making clothing, canning, baking, producing and marketing garden produce
and eggs, supplementing the family income in a variety of ways--
are often not available to contemporary suburbia women. Americans
buy things now, they do not make them anymore, although there is a
noticeable trend to re-capture some of these lost arts. Elizabeth
Janeway explained in Man's World, Woman's Place that these tradi-
tional womanly skills, once so vitally important to the feeding
and clothing of mankind, have deteriorated into hobbies or leisure
time play activities for women. Thus, the American woman's role
atrophied around the specialized task of bringing up the children. 37

A cross-cultural study in the 1960's conducted by Leigh Minturn
and William W. Lambert revealed unusual child-rearing practices
among American women studied in a New England town they labeled
Orchard Town. American women were far more worried about the
correctness of their own behavior and that of their children than
were the women in Mexico, the Philippines, India, Okinawa, and
Kenya. In part this was because "the American women were so
isolated and had as their principal task the rearing of their
children. Their belief that they must guide their children's
development along proper channels fed their anxiety about confor-
mation to ideal norms that are culturally unclear, and their conviction
that no one else can adequately substitute for a mother makes them
reject alternative caretakers even when they are available. The
relatively high emotional instability of these mothers appears to be
due, in part, to the large amounts of time they spend in charge of
children." 38
It follows therefore, as Hargreaves suggested "that the woman who wishes to find some fulfillment beyond her children, or who, for economic reasons, needs to do so, must look for such fulfillment in work outside the home." And this is an outlet towards which more and more woman are turning. By 1970, more than four married women out of ten had jobs outside the home, twelve million of them with children at home under the age of eighteen. 39

Significantly, the Britons found working wives to be a stabilizing factor in contemporary American society. Women who were bored at home or possessed by feelings of ennui could not be vital cohesive elements in either marriage or a family. Working mothers presented new challenges to Women's Lib: the need to create massive day-care centers, an upgrading in the status of day-care jobs and the development of surrogate mothers. Still, in spite of these handicaps, more and more American women are finding it possible to combine work and home. Women are marrying later, spending longer time as single working women and are likely therefore to have both the ambition and the necessary skills and experience to resume their jobs after the birth of their children. Families in the 1970's are growing smaller, thanks in part to oral contraceptives and increasingly liberalized abortion laws in most states. Women too are living longer and are thus spending less of their active life as mothers. The new role for women in finding autonomy within and without the family greatly eases the possible second trauma which comes when the children leave the domestic nest. In
contrast with other western countries, this growth in the female
work force is a very recent phenomenon. In both France and Britain,
Hargreaves found the employment rate among women has remained fairly
constant since 1900, at a rate of some 50 per cent in France and
40 per cent in Britain. Women in America have approached that rate
only since the 1960's.40

In spite of the recent growth, Hargreaves found the world of
work in America still very much dominated by men, and "here the
Women's Liberationists have easily understandable grounds for their
protests." Women "are usually paid less than men for the work they
do." In 1972, an American survey revealed that the American woman
earned only three dollars compared to five dollars paid to a man
for the same job. Hargreaves found "job discrimination still preva­
ient in many fields" with women noticeably absent from managerial
positions. "In a nation devoted to the principles of equality,"
said Hargreaves, "it is surprising how very few women make it to
the highest reaches of their society." No woman has been nominated
to the Supreme Court, only a handful of women have ever sat as full
members of the Cabinet, and for Hargreaves, the idea of a woman as
President of the United States seems "as remote today as it was in
1920." Gerald Priestland echoed the criticism that America had not
dealt out equality to its women: "Naturally, the American woman
comes in all sizes, shapes and temperaments. She is not, however,
getting a square deal; for the least true of all generalizations
about America is that it is a woman's country, run by women.
J. B. Priestley wrote once that America is as much like the matriarchy it is supposed to be as the Marine Corps. Quite obviously--indeed, too obviously for some sociologists--it is a man's country, ruled by men far more exclusively than Britain is." The Women's movement has helped the American woman psychologically to escape the Doll House to which social attitudes have for so long confined her. And new and drastic changes to come were "symbolized in a historic vote in the Senate in March 1972, when that now all-male body (but which then had one woman member, since defeated for re-election) voted overwhelmingly to approve the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the U. S. Constitution" said Hargreaves.

Many Americans, both male and female, judged Hargreaves "seem still to be unaware of what revolutionary changes would be introduced when and if ERA does pass into law." Women would be equally subject to the draft and would according to most interpretations also be subject to combat duty. Women would no longer be exempted from hazardous jobs such as mining. Too under ERA, Hargreaves was eager to point out, "a woman would no longer be obliged to change her name on marriage, while husbands would no longer be obliged automatically to provide financial support to their wives. Instead that duty would fall upon the partner most able to provide it. Alimony would become equally available to both husbands and wives in divorce cases and special laws protecting women from certain sexual offenses--though not from rape--would have to be abolished... If ERA ever came about," he appraised, "it would represent an
avalanche indeed." David and Margaret Smith (1973) found the American male generally "sympathetic" to the women's cause, but found both sexes "uncertain" about the total effect of ERA. Nevertheless, they believed the far reaching repercussions of the move for feminine equality to be "quite dramatic."42

The Britons' comments interpret the moderate sectors of the feminist campaign, but none of the observers remarked on the radicals associated with the New Left who linked sexism with racism, nor did they comment on consciousness-raising sessions, organizations such as SCUM (Society for Cutting Up Men), or the raid of the radicals on the Miss America Pageant in 1968 where they threw padded bras and false eye lashes into a freedom trash can. For the Britons, these displays only detracted from the larger more significant issues such as the real need for a stable feminine identity and equal pay for equal work. Neither did they support the Total Woman concept of Marabel Morgan who seemed to re-echo stale platitudes from the 1950's about total submission to and reverence for the male. The Britons felt that in its moderate aspects the Women's Movement was important in contributing to a more stable family and society. In its radical aspects, the movement was destructive, often self-destructive.

American women did not want to be men, observed our visitors, they merely claimed the right to be judged as individuals, as people, as Americans. The Women's Movement was a manifestation of
America's coming of age. American women must be allowed to be their age, not kept as pampered homebodies, reasoned the Britons. The American woman would hopefully be allowed to move from youth to graceful full adult womanhood with all the attendant responsibilities and rewards. The flowering of American women, deemed the Britons, was a natural part of America's growing from a land of youth to mature world leader.
Footnotes for CHAPTER VI

2 Mary Agnes Hamilton, In America Today (London, 1932), 159-162.
3 Andrew Elliot, Hell! I'm British: A Plain Man Looks At America (London, 1939), 27.
   Priestley, Midnight On The Desert, p. 56-59.
4 Sir Shane Leslie, American Wonderland: Memories of Four Tours in the United States of America (London, 1936), 241.
5 Ursula Branston, Let The Band Play "Dixie"... Improvisations on a Southern Signature Tune (London, 1940), 77.
   Maie Clements Perley, Without My Gloves (Philadelphia, 1940), 41.
6 Hugh Willoughby (pseud.) author's full name: Charles Nigel Harvey, Amid The Alien Corn, an Intrepid Englishman in the Heart of America (Indianapolis, 1958), 102-104.
7 Cecil Thompson, I Lost My English Accent (New York, 1939), 67.
8 Leslie, American Wonderland, p. 238-239.
9 Elliot, Hell! I'm British, p. 45, 12-13.
10 Sturt P. Mais, A Modern Columbus (Philadelphia, 1934), 200.
11 Elliot, Hell! I'm British, p. 18
   Basil Dillon Woon, Eyes West (London, 1941), 137.
12 Mary Weston, My Friend America (London, 1945), 128-129.
13 Weston, My Friend America, p. 130.
15 Ibid., 133.
16 Weston, My Friend America, p. 131.
17 Woon, Eyes West, p. 137.
   Weston, My Friend America, p. 131-132.
   Priestley, Journey Down A Rainbow, p. 31.

19 Ibid.

Woon, *Eyes West*, p. 139.

Hutton, *Midwest At Noon*, p. 203.


26 Magee, *Go West, Young Man*, p. 75. 


28 Ibid., p. 109.

29 Ibid., p. 109-110.

30 Ibid.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., pp. 559-560.

38 Ibid.


CHAPTER VII

Race

Whereas the Britons found the American woman in a curiously ambiguous state of equality in America, they found American blacks were totally without equality. Blacks in America were outside the system and lacked identity as Americans in the sense that they are denied liberty and equality for all. The Britons told us inequality for women in America was rooted in sex-role definitions and socialization processes; they knew inequality for blacks was rooted, sometimes maliciously, in race prejudice. The Britons told us that no greater problem than racial inequality exists in America, as Stephen Barber (1970), a journalist for the London Daily Telegraph, warned: racism "could well prove to be more serious than any threats from the Russians, Chinese, or even an economic slump." Racism "naggingly and everlastingly questions the American ideal enshrined in the Declaration of Independence: 'We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal'. The plain fact, observed Barber, "is that Americans of black African ancestry are not the equals, even today, of their white fellow countrymen; discrimination against the Negro* minority, which constitutes eleven per cent of the population, continues."

*Negro, Coloured, Black appear throughout as used by the British commentators themselves.
"Colour bars exist in countries other than the US—including black ones," but "the important difference," compared Barber, "is that there is less hypocrisy about it elsewhere." Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, and colours, determined Gunnar Myrdal, have something in common: a set of beliefs, a political creed. He believed the American creed to be the cement in the diversified structure of this great nation. "The Negro in America believes in the creed," said Barber, "but knows it is not lived up to: the white majority knows it too. This fact sets up strains of a peculiarly schizophrenic kind." All of our British visitors, from the Thirties to the Seventies agreed with Hugh Willoughby (1958) who, when asked what he "didn't like in America." replied, "in particular the race question" because it "clashed so flagrantly with their publicly proclaimed principles."2

Lynching Sambo

Our British visitors knew very well the history of American slavery, the events surrounding emancipation during the Civil War, and the efforts to liberate and integrate former slaves into white society. They understood too, the migration which had taken place from 'plantation to ghetto' during World War I; some blacks had gone to southern towns, but many had moved North, numbering half a million by 1919. The North offered escape from the poverty of sharecropping, the humiliations of Jim row legislation, the lack of jobs, and personal security. Northern cities seemed to promise decent food, homes and education, and opportunities for advancement,
however, restrictive covenants worked to shuttle the newly arrived migrants into ghettos and the garnishment of wages bound them in debt. By the mid-thirties, novelist-journalist John Gibbons (1935) pin-pointed the bitter hostility which existed toward negroes in the North and South: "I somehow got an impression of a whole people absolutely cut off from their neighbours and growing everyday still further apart."³

Everywhere in America, the Britons identified racial prejudice as the source of injustice. They realized racism "is a fascinating problem," as William Teeling pondered (1933), "a problem scarcely faced in America--where even to meet a negro is considered a disgrace." Seeking historical perspective, Teeling offered: "It must not be forgotten that for the vast majority of American negroes, freedom from slavery has come only in their grandfathers' time and it is already too soon to state with any reasonable accuracy what their influence is going to be on America and the world." Although free, Teeling found the negro in the South considered "as dirt--no matter how much he tried to keep himself in his place--a place very clearly defined in the South."⁴

Though many blacks had migrated North seeking jobs during the Depression, Teeling found "their power at the moment is almost nil, and some authorities think in fifty years, through their insanitary living, there will be no negro problem, they will die out."
Teeling did not agree with these serious thinkers in America. Once organized, he envisioned blacks as a formidable political force as
"even now the Negro leaders claim that if all negroes voted as negroes they could elect whom they liked in many States, and they could be a deciding factor in a Presidential election." Education for the American negro, Teeling believed, would be a pivotal factor in advancement even though "its fruits are not yet apparent, but the fruits will certainly include a demand on the part of the negro to use the vote to which he is legally entitled." Significantly, the British visitors saw the American blacks as working within the system to achieve their goal--to become part of the American Dream. They saw very early, that blacks simply wanted to become Black Americans and join in the promise of 'the American way of life.' Whatever the future would bring in America, the Britons in the 1930's saw that the mind of the American black was already well prepared to assume risk and sacrifice. Britons like John Gibbons (1935) shrewdly saw past the Sambo facade--the false pandering behavior of some blacks especially in the Deep South. Gibbons believed the American only deluded himself when he called the negro a child, a simpleton, or someone who had to be cared for in his place. Gibbons recognized this erroneous stereotype for what it was as he said: "In all the books that I seemed ever to have read, the coloured man had been a rather jolly person, pathetically simple and almost anxiously ready to laugh at the white man's lightest whim...But here in the real Dark South was no sense of simplicity and most certainly no eagerness to amuse the White Massa...of a
surety it is not the negro of Louisiana who twangs his old banjo to
the praises of his beloved White Master. He is far more likely, I
fancy, one day to twang an old but exceedingly sharp razor!"^6

Looking closely, the Britons found that the blacks had a
culture all their own, outside white society. Gibbons described a
trip to Bayou Lafourche, Louisiana: "It was about as remote a
townlet as might be found," he had been told by friends, and
"Voodoo Worship was supposed still to go on there." Expecting to
really see the native characteristics, he related, "there was
nothing whatever to be seen beyond a rather untidy village of negro
hutments; I came away with the idea that if I lived there for a year
I should, as a white man, be exactly as wise as I was when I went." Walking through the hamlet "one got a sense of a black and blank
wall of sullen and lowering hostility."^7

In the South, the Britons saw how this sullen hostility was
held in check. William Teeling described the separate entrances for
whites and blacks, the separate waiting rooms, restaurants, and
train compartments. They did not pronounce these 'separate but
equal', and Teeling was appalled when he was to be taken to a Mardi
Gras Black Ball in New Orleans, that he had to meet his hosts "away
from my hotel which they could not enter." Coming home from the
Black Ball, which had been "better than an ordinary Country Club
dance," Teeling brooded: "I could not help but think a little
seriously on how all this was going on to the complete ignorance of
the white people in the town," and "I came away a little frightened
at this serious and terrible problem—I saw many educated negroes that do not like the whites—and what may be their influence as negro leaders?" After journeying to Tuskegee Institute, where he spent nearly the whole day, being shown around by the son of Booker T. Washington, Teeling described his mortification as he boarded a bus upon leaving: "In front of the students, one elderly professor got into the bus and finding no seat at the back, sat on a vacant one in front." The conductor stopped the bus, "turned around and looked at this negro teacher: 'What the ______ do you think you're doing--get back there to the end, you filthy nigger,' was all he politely snarled, and back the man had to go and be squashed and bumped between much less pleasant negroes for nearly 30 miles."

The Britons were shocked by the color line in America, not because the treatment of blacks in colonial areas of the British Empire was so different, but because in America the treatment clashed so flagrantly with much-proclaimed American equality. 8

"The treatment of the American negro made me rather ill," said John Gibbons (1935), as he too noticed the "colour line": "As you mount a street-car in the great and wonderful Canal Street of New Orleans there will be in the back of every seat two little holes in which to fit a slotted rail; you will sit towards the front of the car and as a negro enters he will sit at the very back and behind that rail. As more negroes enter and the back seats fill up, someone will have to move forward and will carry that rail with him and fix it higher up on another seat. No white may sit behind that bar and
no coloured man or woman may sit in front of it. That bit of rail
stands for the Colour Line and it is exactly as long as from
Louisiana and Florida up to Maryland and the Mason Dixon line."
Everywhere Gibbons traveled in the South, "it is always there, and
in railroad or bus, in church or cinema the negro will generally
get the back seat and always the worst."9

"Lynching niggers" made our British visitors physically, as
well as spiritually, "rather ill." "I was talking about it to one
American woman," whom Gibbons described as "a handsome middle-aged
mother of a family," and "she told me lynching wasn't over at all,
not by any means; only the newspapers didn't write it up as much."
Further, "she hoped that lynching would never be over; it was the
only protection that she and the other white wives and mothers had."
She spoke to Gibbons with great animation, as though the whites
lived in a country of terror, where any day some spark might set up
an explosion. Vividly, "she told me," Gibbons explained, of some
lynching that she herself had seen only a year or so earlier; as she
described "the smell of frizzling fat as it run out of the wretched
negro's heels, I know exactly what I thought, and I only wish that
I had been sick over her carpets."10

One Briton, Basil Dillon Woon (1941), had seen a lynching
himself in the mid-thirties in Texas. The plot was predictable: a
white girl, aged nine, had been "raped and murdered by some fiend."
Rumor spread "that a middle-aged black had also been walking in the
same vicinity" as the irrigation ditch in which the girl's body had
been found. On this evidence alone, Woon described "...a mob--of those same orderly, well-behaved, normal citizens I had seen earlier that day going about their various affairs--formed...six-shooters and ropes appeared from nowhere." The Negro quarter was invaded and torches put to a number of the poor little wooden shacks in which the town's coloured labourers lived. Filled with panic, the Negroses fled "Suddenly a part of the mob...came shouting wildly. In their midst was a coloured man about thirty years old...insane with fear...his eyes were starting from his head...his tongue lolled, choked out by the rope around his neck...the mob was dehumanized...There were some I knew...the keeper of the drug store...a waitress in a lunchroom I patronized...What if this wasn't the right man?...He was a Negro, wasn't he? Lynch him! Burn him!...They--these civilised people of a progressive community--took that poor black man to the heart of the city and there, at a stake in the public square, they burned him alive." In the aftermath, Woon said that no one would recall the savage torture as "people went about with averted faces. None would look at his neighbour...or admit he had been anywhere near the public square the night before." Woon encouraged all Americans to face the questions this incident poses.11

"Lynchings are rare now, and decreasing in number yearly," offered Morgan Philips Price (1936), yet "a typical comment on Southern politics" is "the story told us in Atlanta." A sheriff had stopped a lynching, and, "when he was offered a medal, said that
he would rather not have it, because he was going to stand for the State legislature at the next election" and did not want to appear as "a protagonist of the negroes." Beyond lynching, Price saw economic competition as a factor in racism in the depressed South, as he said: "The greatest danger to good relations between the two races seems to be the discrimination against the negro in the industrial field. The depression has hit the South quite as badly as, if not worse than, any other part of the United States. And the white section of the working classes and the small farmers, or 'poor whites', as they are called, are as bad as the professional classes and well-to-do whites in trying to shift the burden of the depression on to the shoulders of the coloured people, thereby intensifying race feeling." Blacks are "the last hired and the first fired." Southern State "legislators distribute federal money so that the mere coloured man gets as little as possible of it. It is the easiest thing in the world for a southern politician to get the ear of the public by saying: If there is any money going the whites have got to have the first pickings, and if anything is left the nigger can have the leavings."\(^{12}\)

"The truth is," judged Price, "that the South has not yet outlived the political traditions that arose out of the Civil War," with "party organizations" still "aligned as though Sherman's troops had just marched out of the South, and the Democratic Party was still the bulwark of State rights against the oppressor in
Washington." A possible solution was advanced: "if the New Deal is going to succeed it will have to increase rather than diminish the power of the Federal Government to interfere in the economic affairs of the States." "The Democratic Party in the South," viewed Price, "is hardly a political party at all, but rather a private parliament in itself, engaged in sharing out administrative offices" to "various classes of the community and united on one main issue, the keeping of the negro in a subordinate position." Price was suggesting "if the President desires to move to the Left in such matters as equality of public relief between the races, or the public ownership of electric power in the Appalachians," these things by necessity, would have to be undertaken by national directives, as "there will be no united party behind him in the South." Price, who traveled throughout the South, referred to the "slums" of Gainesville, just north of Atlanta as "pathetic little Uncle Tom's cabins," away from the main streets and street lighting," "roads rutted and unpaved;" "everything indicates poor wages and underemployment." Most pathetic of all were the Christian churches of the negroes: little wooden barns with tiny, rickety crosses on them, suggesting that they were hoping to make up in the next world what had been denied them in this. Evidences such as these were plain examples of the urgency for national New Deal planning to come into the South on a massive scale, as poverty was but yet another tool to keep the negro in his place."
Our visitors in the Thirties understood that racism is an American problem, not just a dilemma for the rural redneck South. Shane Leslie (1936) recognized liberal hypocrisy in the North, pointing out "it is very easy to be indignant on behalf of the negro, if the writer does not have to live in a town or country where the majority is black." Southerners "know how to talk to the negro, how to humour him, how to argue with him and get the best out of him." In the North "the negro is ignored, treated frigidly and kept out of jobs." If there was no political, economic or social equality, North or South, for the negro, religion was often closed to him too; "In the South there are Jim-crow cars, waiting rooms and churches. Separate travelling to market or to Heaven is the only solution yet. The churches in the North say negroes must be treated like white but they do not encourage their presence." All God's children in America, it seemed to the Britons, were supposed to be white. 14

In addition to lynchings, economic suppression, and separate but equal facilities, Britons such as Harry J. Greenwall (1936) saw other subterfuges to keep down the negro vote. "Negroes in some states have to prove that their grandfathers voted in a Presidential election," or "a poll tax of 1 is imposed," and a "would-be negro voter must prove he can not only read and write," but he must also "construe." But throughout their commentaries, the Britons voiced support for the American black, saying he had more than "rhythm," "rippling laughter," "melody and song," and "native humour".
Greenwall a British journalist, touring America in an election year, recognized "the negroes have intelligence enough to work out their own fate, given sufficient material support and moral sympathy."15

Harlem Lights

In their search for "material support" and "moral sympathy," the Negro "has taken over great belts of cities where I remember white population before," observed Shane Leslie (1936). "Harlem in New York has become the greatest negro city in the world," with a culture all its own: "black shops, black policemen, black girls, black talk and chatter, black music and song." Just as John Gibbons had found the culture of Bayou Lafourche, Louisiana to be in-penetrable by whites, so too, Archibald Macdonell (1935) found the culture of Harlem. He had come to Harlem "to view some coloured folks who do not dwell under the beneficent shadow of that Empire's flag," and he exclaimed he immediately qualified for the "green turban." "Green," he said in self-recremation, "is the right word, for I went in the small hours of the morning to a night-club that was run entirely to attract strangers and mugs like myself, and I saw of course just as much of the real Harlem as a traveler sees of the African jungle by sitting in the cocktail-bar of a Union Castle liner in the harbour of Capetown." He understood that he had been led to artificial night-clubs which cater to tourists; these watering holes he labeled "loathsome places," offering exactly what one has preconceived in mind: "the barbaric rattle of drums,"
"thick African lips," "twisting contemptuously in song," or a "fetching young man" in "obscene contortions." This, Macdonell knew, was not the real Harlem. 16

For in the Twenties, there had been a great flowering of black artistry--the Harlem Renaissance, during which Harlem had attracted aspiring writers, musicians and intellectuals of all hues, many of whom achieved national recognition in fiction, poetry, essays, theatre, jazz and classical music. Shane Leslie (1936) called their contribution to melody and song in America immense, saying "the music played at London night clubs is almost intolerable after hearing negro bands," and "the singing of Ancient and Modern Hymns by our Cathedral choirs, compared to negro spirituals, is an insult to the Creator of all harmonies." Harlem's fame really began with Claude McKay's book of poems, Harlem Shadows, 1922, which included "If We Must Die," a bitter commentary on racial violence and the struggle to be equal. In 1925 a leading New York Journal, Survey Graphic, devoted a "special issue" to the "Renaissance," edited by Alain Locke, a black philosophy professor, which gave national recognition to the literary movement in Harlem. As Langston Hughes has aptly described, "Harlem was in vogue" in the Twenties. Jazz in its original form was a distinctive black idiom. It had wailed out of the Dixie brothels where it was born and swept the country, and the British travellers longed to hear the wanton, musical epilepsy of the Jazz Age. The fans of Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington were black and white. Our visitors were intelligent
enough to know they had not even scratched the surface of the true culture of Harlem. Harry J. Greenwall (1936) knew that "the emotions of the Negroes in America are not to be judged by such plays as 'Porgy' and 'Green Pastures', for they "are plays about Negroes," not by Negroes. One finds "the real Negro when he is able to give his own interpretation of something, not when he is being interpreted." "The Negro is tremendously interested in education," said Greenwall; "that was one of the baits for living in Harlem, to get culture."\^17

Greenwall found, however, that "only nine schools have been built in Harlem in the last thirty-six years; making no allowances for even a normal increase of population. Many Negro schools in the South closed up on account of the Depression, and the harassed parents sent their children North to try and get them educated." Greenwall spoke with teachers in the Harlem schools and recalled "heart-rending tales." "One boy who fainted in class was found to have been without sufficient food since three days...a principal of one school testified that out of sixteen thousand Negro families known to him, seven thousand were without means...in ninety per cent of the cases the father was missing, and the mother was trying to keep the home together by working herself." The Britons noted the high rate of prostitution, the overcrowding of hospitals, the lack of police protection, the lack of adequate food relief, and asked, as Greenwall phrased it, "what is America going to do about it," and answered, "America is going to do nothing about it."\^18
Equality was not for negroes in America, the facts illustrated to our British observers. "The slums of Savannah," said Maie Perley (1940) "are another example of the extreme social contrasts as they exist in America," the country "where luxury scales to limitless heights on one hand and poverty sinks to unfathomable depths on the other." Wealth and poverty sit incongruously together in the lap of a progressive nation. In the struggle between conflicting ideologies, as World War II burst across Europe, Perley reminded Americans: "if the foreign agitators who come mouthing false promises and lying prophecies are to be successfully staved off, then it behooves those who scream loudest for democracy to set about condemning instead of condoning" racism. Inequality was the dry rot which would topple democracy in America, not agitators for either communism or facism. Perley was profoundly shocked to find "socially the negro is treated like a pariah" even in the most liberal of atmospheres in America, "the campus." While he is permitted to enter universities in the North, "he finds that living accommodation is difficult and sometimes impossible to secure;" often he must "reside in negro quarters." At the "university of Illinois," Perley found "no negro can buy food on campus...out of the classroom, the negro is a creature apart, and strictly treated as such," posing as a "forlorn figure" particularly in a University setting. The Britons found segregation in the South complete, in the North condoned, and absolute in the border states too, as Ursula Branston (1940) remembered the remark of a young Kentucky widow: "she closed
closed her beautiful eyes, and swore that she'd kill any child of hers who ignored the colour bar."  

The colour bar, revealed Perley, "touched negroes on the raw" and she explained the vehemence of a black Harlem mother: "Folks is folks," she would say, smouldering with rage. "Color don't make them no different. We've all got t'eat. But some folks just don't reckon it right, I guess. They make it that tough for a colored man to get work and then blame him for every darn thing that goes wrong. It's no wonder that he gets the devil in his skin once in a while. If taxes are good for colored folks, then work's good for them too. They can't pay no ways else. Life just don't seem easy for colored folks, I guess." Our British visitors from the Thirties through the Seventies would agree that "life just don't seem easy for colored folks," placed as they were outside equality, but they wondered how long smouldering rage could be suppressed in a nation committed to building a free world.  

From Appeal to Power  

The incongruence between preaching morality abroad while denying human dignities at home became ever more apparent during World War II, as one million American blacks served in the armed services. In 1941, the army and navy had iron-clad Jim Crow laws, but protests from black organizations led to token appointments of high ranking black officers, such as Benjamin O. Davis, the first black brigadier general. Segregation began to be eased out during the war, and for
the final assaults in Germany the army was integrated on the platoon level. President Roosevelt had authorized through an executive order in 1941 "that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industry or government." All government contractors complied, or were under threat of being called before the Fair Employment Practices Committee. But these measures were distinctly not enough as Bernard Newman (1943) said "the Englishman may feel disturbed" at the "gap which still exists between the white and black population" in America; "segregation is complete," as "theoretically all men are equal, but they are not. Theoretically all men may vote, but they do not." The clash remained between America's greatest ideal, equality, and racist realities.

For American blacks, it appeared time to understand, as W. E. B. DuBois had said in 1934, that the campaign of appeal for social justice has reached its limits; power is now needed to reinforce appeal. Bernard Newman recognized these significant changes in thinking among American blacks, as he foretold: "I do not believe that America has solved its colour question. I believe that it will be raised with added force when victory is won. The case of India has aroused wide interest...the Negroes are watching India very carefully, and we shall hear of the parallel more than once...So far American trade unions have not espoused the negro cause, but soon they will have to make up their minds. Further the negroes are beginning to organize themselves financially...they are
not cowed...they are rising in their own estimation of true values, and resent white condescension. If the feeling spreads, it will have wide repercussions." Black American psychologist Kenneth Clark summarized the mood of the postwar: "racial injustice is as American as apple pie, but so is the struggle against it." Cecil Roberts (1947) noted the colour problem still "presses heavily upon the American mind. The division is sharp and bitter." Roberts had been shocked when Marian Anderson was denied a hall in which to sing in Washington, D.C. by the Daughters of the American Revolution; he applauded Mrs. Roosevelt who resigned from the DAR and invited Miss Anderson to sing at the White House. "The battle," he observed, "goes on over the whole country," as he remembered in August, 1944, seeing "a large delegation of Negro ministers" standing "in silent prayer" while a Senate subcommittee considered a bill to establish a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission. The war brought the status of the Negro to a head. It made Americans see the folly of segregating Negro blood given for blood banks, and established the brain capacity of Negro and white as equal. But even though the old biological, pseudo-racist myths about inferiority were banished, "the USA is like a rainbow, a blending of many cultures, creeds and colours," said Roberts, but "stops short of black."22

Paul Robeson has asked, "We want a democracy for all men, not merely for white men," but Cecil Roberts's observations illustrated how far away that dream might be, as he described: "In February, 1945, at the venerable William and Mary College in Virginia, the
college weekly paper suggested the time would come when Negroes should attend the college, fraternise and 'marry among us'. There was an uproar and the college authorities demanded in future the right of censorship or the suspension of the publication." Freedom of speech and racial equality were seen by Roberts to be at "issue at William and Mary," but he lamented, "the authorities prevailed."

The episode at William and Mary was but a prelude to a larger stage, as "the problem is now a national one," viewed Roberts, "enlisting the efforts of many public-spirited whites who courageously attack the fortresses manned by fear and prejudice." These leaders "are aware that the United States cannot advance to the moral leadership of the world to which her economic and military power nominate her without eradicating this deep blemish from her system," this "great wrong against the Negro."  

Demands for racial justice and reforms in America would be increasingly linked to the emergence of the Third World. As Asian and African nations gained independence, the United States eagerly sought their support against the Soviet bloc in the Cold War. Political thinkers, as pragmatists, were discomforted by racial discrimination at home which included embarrassing incidents in which African delegations were denied accommodations in some American hotels while attending conferences of the United Nations. Soviet repressions in eastern Europe appeared matched by mistreatment of American blacks at home. The time had clearly arrived to rid America of glaring racial injustices if the US was to assume world leadership.
In the postwar, Anglo-Saxon color prejudice is a great political handicap, said Denis Brogan (1944), "in a world overwhelmingly 'colored' and no longer in awe of the white man's murderous magic." Brogan noted the contrast between American promises and performance; he found "the Negro conviction that talk about race mixture" is "a cover for economic exploitation" to be "justifiable." It is unhealthy that the colour question should force on the South a denial, in practice, of the American political religion of equality. Many Americans, Brogan knew, objected to this state of affairs, as "all intelligent Southerners know that unless the economic, educational, social and moral level of the Southern Negro is rapidly raised, the South must continue poor and backward." But Brogan saw too the extreme difficulties in lobbying for change, as to assert equality for blacks is to be dubbed a "nigger lover" in the South, so shamefully, the real problems of the South are kept off the agenda of politics. What passed for political leadership in the South was viewed with disdain as Brogan was astonished that "the South Carolina legislature" would "go on record in 1944" as being against "the co-mingling of the races," pledging itself to "maintaining white supremacy" "whatever the cost."

Brogan admitted, shaking his head, that this voice from the South Carolina legislature "undoubtedly speaks for most Southerners."24

In fairness, Brogan said, "the South naturally resents the view that it created the problem because of its own original sin." For the Britons, the problem remained the national sin, as
during Reconstruction, the South needed "positive government" and "could not get it" from either Northern or Southern leaders, as the victorious North behaved with "economic ruthlessness," and the total southern economy was "disorganized." Mistakes of the past continued to feed the flames of sectionalism and worst of all, viewed Brogan, the South was given an alibi, "a reason to be permanently sorry for itself"--a "permanent excuse for all internal weaknesses and faults." And worse for recovery and the future, the South "was excused from assessing its own share in the troubles"; "only today is the South slowly accepting the fact that the sins of the 'damn Yankees' and 'uppity Niggers' are not enough to account for all Southern troubles." Brogan hoped all Americans, especially Southerners would heed the prophecy of Jefferson: "Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just." The 'terrible swift sword' of retribution would surely fall on all Americans should they fail the dictates of humanity by continuing to withhold equality from black Americans. 25

"The most profound study of American society, by a European, since Tocqueville's masterpiece of a century ago," was viewed by Brogan (1947) to be Gunnar Mrydal's The American Dilemma. The books of de Tocqueville and Mrydal were similar in merit, method, and most significantly, in theme, as the central concept in both works was equality. The Mrydal work illustrated the contrast "between the formal equality of American life," as a value or theme, "and this permanent challenge to the egalitarian thesis, the American caste
system based on colour." It is the dilemma presented all over the world to the defenders of the American free way of life. As the United States bids for world leadership, "every lynching or sanctioned murder in a convict gang," every political career "like that of a Governor Talmadge," seems, criticised Brogan, to the outside world as "a scandal greater than any given by a Borgia pope." 26

The Britons realized that America had come to this great dilemma precisely because the Declaration of Independence has such meaning in America. The dilemma "is the result of its virtues as much as of its vices," observed Brogan, as Americans truly believe in equality for all, but simultaneously attempt to qualify it for blacks and other minorities. The American version "of the caste system is so difficult a problem because it is so imperfect a system." "If there were a true caste system, on Indian lines," Brogan offered, "American Negro misery might be greater but white discomfort at the sight of that misery, and its social and political consequences, would be much less." The American conscience therein lay the real dilemma, saw the Britons. For if a society is based (as South African society is based) on a frank acceptance of the rights of one race over the other, with just as much "justice" allotted to the inferior as the superior thinks it can afford, an apparent stability is achieved. But in American society where the formal political religion of the nation is in flagrant contrast with much of its practice, a grave internal strain is imposed. Brogan
likened the quandry to the situation of Macbeth, as "the average American, faced with the egalitarian implications of his political religion, either admits that he cannot say "Amen" or, saying it, must, like the publican, pray for mercy on a sinner."27

Typically American solutions for amalgamating immigrants in the past did not work or were not allowed to work in respect to blacks. In the Thirties, most Britons agreed with Shane Leslie (1936) that the only solution of the problem of Black vs White is "eugenic," as "it stands to reason that white blood will eventually extinguish the black." Through interbreeding, Leslie found "every black quarter is becoming whiter every year" as he counted six different types of coloured girls in one car on the Illinois Central railway: "the coffee-coloured, light orange with much rouge, mahogany, sallow, chrome, sickly white with tousled hair and thick lips alone to proclaim the octoroon." Looking at these beautiful creatures, Leslie expressed, "the negro race are certainly not to be treated as a lower type of humanity." The Britons found tremendous paradox in black-white sexual relations, as white man help themselves to dark girls while the converse is punishable by death. Also, "slaveowners often could not help loving their dark concubines, though they sold their own children relentlessly." Nevertheless Leslie hoped "the perfect American of the year A.D. 2000" would prove the melting pot thesis correct, blending "a new race" in the New World from all colors.
Beyond miscegenation, the Britons hoped racial inequality could be solved through the great American device of get-aheadism. But Denis Brogan (1947) revealed "the optimism of Booker Washington, his conviction that the Negro mouse-trap maker would be allowed to attract the world to his door," believing "any individual who learned to do something better than anybody else," had "solved his problem, regardless of the colour of his skin," did "not work out." The black was denied the fruits of progress as well as equality; he was placed outside the system of get-aheadism. And during the New Deal, Brogan observed "it is even possible that the extension of trade unionism" has "weakened the Negro position by giving new force to labour monopolies". In the old days "the Negro might break into an industry as a 'scab,'" now "he cannot even do that in many industries controlled by the American Federation of Labor." In America, the black working man and the white working man have not become friends and allies against a common foe. 29

J. P. Morpurgo (1959) confirmed that the two basic problems in Black-White relations in America were "the difficulty of race assimilation and economic competition." Implicit in the first problem is the objection to miscegenation. Morpurgo pointed out, however, that Americans have great difficulty in explaining this distaste, because "despite his repugnance for friendship and marriage, the white male has no objection to having sex relations with black women. In fact, in countries with mixed populations, coloured women are looked upon as particularly desirable and their
erotic skill is emphasized with salacious eagerness." In the Southern States the illicit but ever-current definition of a 'Southern gentleman' is a man who has had sex-relations with a negress."..."But if a white woman, from love, passion or financial need, associated with a black man, she will be socially ostracized and he may be lynched." The Britons saw through the distaste as Morpurgo explained "the apparent vital obstacle to solution, the barrier against miscegenation, has been constructed by instinctive white prejudice." This barrier to solving the problem by eugenics only guarantees America's own failure. In relation to the second problem--economic competition--Morpurgo saw human resources being wasted. For the black, technological progress has made his unskilled labor unmarketable; he is free to starve, but not free to be educated. Morpurgo saw the American black as an expatriate living in his home country, an American without America. 30

Morpurgo believed that 'Stalingrad' a poem by black poet Langston Hughes explained the dream of black Americans:

Stalingrad -
Never Paradise -
Just a city on the Volga
Trying peacefully to grow,
A city where some few small dreams
Men dreamt came true.
A simple city
Where all worked, all ate
All children went to school.
No beggars,
No sick without attention,
No prostitutes,
For women had jobs
And men had wives.
People respected each other's lives.
Communal brotherhood,
A city growing toward the good.
Stalingrad--not Paradise -
Yet not bad.

The problems that Stalingrad has overcome (in Hughes' opinion) are those very problems that beset the negro in America, noted Morpurgo. 'All worked and all ate,' obviously technical progress had not driven the unskilled laborer to unemployment. 'People respected each other's lives'--no lynchings. 'No prostitutes'--the easy way of a white man with a black girl is anathema to coloured leaders. 'Communal brotherhood'--that is the negro's dream.

The black adulation for a Communist city should not be misinterpreted by white Americans, cautioned Morpurgo. "Despite his bitterness and desperation the negro is a good American convinced, with his white countrymen, that America is 'the cradle of liberty', 'the home of democracy' and the 'land of opportunity'." The black remains an American and covets Americanism. Though 'Stalingrad' is "an eulogy of Russia, even though Langston Hughes may be a Communist himself," evaluated Morpurgo, "his near Paradise is full of strangely American symbols."

The Britons wondered if the new generation in postwar America would be more liberal in their thinking. In Mobile, Alabama, Brian Magee (1958) deliberately raised the question of desegregation, a "taboo" in the finer Southern circles. Three young men decried, "we are more liberal than our parents," "we know that equality for the negro is coming and that nothing in the world can stop it. Our
parents think it can be stopped, but we know it can't." But they wanted it to come "gradually, without violent upheavals—over a period of, say, thirty years." Most of all, the young Southerners proclaimed "we don't want it forced on us. We want the negroes to have the same opportunities as everyone else," only "we don't want them in here eating with us," and "we don't want our children going to school with them." In fact, "on the specific question of the schools it's our generation that's the most adamant because we are the people with young children." Magee probed further, finding the fear of mixed marriages to be the real reason for refusing to integrate the schools. "The negroes are so backward," the men groped to justify themselves, "they haven't the mentality of whites," and "they're not clean," they "have all sorts of diseases," and "there's just an enormous difference in level." Magee then asked if the young men had any objection to integrating negroes of "high calibre," as he described "in Paris" he had met "a very good singer and his wife, both of them Americans, he coloured and she white"; they were "respected." Magee teased, "You'd have no objection in a case like that, of course?" One of the young men blurtedly out fiercely: "I hope they stay in Paris!" 33 

Like Americans, the Britons themselves were divided in opinion over the issue of "integration." Cecil Roberts (1947) had explained: "I have no political prejudice against the Negro, but I want neither to consort nor live with him any more than I wish to live with Chinese, Japanese, Indians, or Arabs, a feeling which they probably
reciprocate in regard to the white man." His remarks reflect the British colonial mind and the belief in passing out equality by the spoonful. Brian Magee (1958), in explaining separate but equal train accommodations, reacted violently: "I was forbidden to go in the swing doors marked COLORED. It was more of a shock than having a complete stranger walk up to me on the platform and spit in my face. Suddenly out of the blue, I was being insulted, abused, humiliated, mortified, not merely more than ever before in my life but more than I ever dreamed possible. I was being segregated. I could not walk into that room and buy a railway ticket--because of the colour of my skin. Spontaneously, violently, involuntarily, I was hurt and angry." As he boarded the train, he noted the crowning idiocy; the whites and negroes came out of their separate waiting rooms, piled on the train together, and "buttock to buttock we sat, and chatted together all the way to Washington."

Brown vs The Board of Education, 1954, had declared an end to segregation in public schools, but in the South, opponents of school integration refused to move with all deliberate speed. Seeking an end to segregation and to remove Jim Crow laws in the South, the civil rights movement propelled by Martin Luther King initiated sit-ins, ride-ins, walk-ins, based on civil dis-obedience and non-violence. These were "years of stirring activity," said Gerald Priestland (1967), just as the Fifties began "the years of nobility and martyrdom" in the move for integration and full equality.
Years of Stirring Activity

"It seems to me," said Denis Brogan (1964)," that the growing tension over desegregation is the most ominous internal sign in America today." The Fifties and Sixties were "years of stirring activity," said Gerald Priestland, "as hundreds were beaten, savaged by police dogs, shocked with electric cattle-goads, battered by fire hoses and nauseated with tear gas." Looking back over the significant confrontations between black and white America, Priestland recalled, "I covered some of those events as a reporter and shall not easily forget the atmosphere of terror and hatred, nor the idealism and brotherhood of the marchers."36

Stephen Barber (1970) remarked "it is amazing how belatedly the nation's white liberals came to realize that the time had arrived to take concrete steps to end discrimination." Passions had reached uncontrollable heights, as Barber was shocked at the death of a French journalist in Oxford, Mississippi, in a riot occasioned by the forced admission of a single Negro, James Meredith, to the state university. He wondered at the barbarism which allowed Medgar Evers to be "shot by a man who has never been punished to this day" in Jackson, Mississippi in 1963. "Americans have a peculiar blind spot on the race issue," castigated Barber as he described a curious encounter in 1963 between Attorney-General Robert Kennedy and a group of a dozen Negro personalities which included Harry Belafonte, Lena Horne, James Baldwin, Lorraine Hansbury, Kenneth Clark, and Jerome Smith, a twenty-five year old
veteran of the Freedom rides. Kenneth Clark explained to Barber that the meeting had developed swiftly from dialogue to diatribe, but it was not a "pointless encounter." "There was communica-
tion...for the first time, I do think the Attorney-General...heard how the Negro people...could no longer be asked to be reasonable." 37

Dr. Clark further explained to Barber that "what rattled Kennedy from the onset was a flat statement by Jerry Smith to the effect that he found it 'nauseous' that there had to be any such discussion." Smith added that he and others in his age group felt no sense of identity with their white--co-nationals. Specifically, he insisted that they would not 'follow the flag' if called upon to help liberate Cuba from Communism. (This was in the summer of 1963, before Vietnam arose to haunt America.) "This shocked Kennedy no end," said Clark, and "he never quite recovered. But for our part, we were shocked that he was shocked and that he seemed genuinely unable to understand Jerry's argument. It showed a strange naivete...." Barber explained, "in vain, Kennedy sought to make a case for proceeding step by step towards Negro emancipation. His guests stolidly replied that the time for 'deals' had ended." James Baldwin, author of Fire Next Time, told Kennedy "that a fundamental moral issue had arisen affecting America's posture as the leader of the democratic world and that it was time--high time--for his brother, the President, to show greatness and not wriggle and manoeuvre." At this point, recalled Barber, "Jerry Smith said that the next time a Negro youth sought admission to a
Southern all-white university, the President of the United States should personally conduct him thither instead of calling out the troops. 'This obviously stunned Bobby--he couldn't see it our way,' Clark recalled. 'But the fact that he wanted to talk at all showed he was not a devil. There were no devils that afternoon--only an ugly past that was still very much with us'. "The meeting illustrated to the Britons that in 1963 there would be no 'second Emancipation Proclamation' from the Kennedy administration to rival the document of 1863."

"Letter From Birmingham Jail," written by Martin Luther King in April, 1963, explained to all Americans, black and white, that one has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. The harsh reality of inequality was the pivot in the success of the March on Washington in August, 1963, where King made his most moving address, "I Have a Dream"--the dream, the hope of equality. As blacks called for Freedom Now, the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas seemed to obliterate the dream that the federal government would use its coercive force to provide equal protection and opportunity under law. But the dream was not lost, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, galvanized through Congress by President Johnson, forbid all racial discrimination in public accommodations, called for an end to discrimination--either racial, sexual, ethnic or religious--in employment, and allowed that any adult with a sixth grade education could not be barred from voting because of illiteracy.
At the end of 1964, as King won the Nobel Peace Prize, the civil rights movement directed its attention to voter registration. Again, the federal government showed its willingness to coerce the states into promoting equality for blacks as Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 which authorized federal officials to register black voters in the South. But by the late Sixties, "when all the marching and legislating was done," said Gerald Priestland (1967), "the net effect was that expectations had risen faster than accomplishments, and some of the areas most important to human meaning and dignity had barely been touched at all." The majority of blacks lived in cities and were now penalized by the destruction of the urban cores. Blacks lacked the education to compete for skilled jobs. The Civil Rights act of 1964 was "feebly applied" said Priestland, "and today (1967) the percentage of integrated Negro children has risen to no more than 15 per cent." While acknowledging the gains of the civil rights movement which sought to work within the system, the Britons saw more militant leaders waiting in the wings. Blacks had long debated whether the path to liberation and equality lay in gradualism or immediacy, in accommodation or militancy, in integration or separation.39

While the conflicting strategies were debated, the "love affair," as Priestland (1970) called it, between youthful white Northern liberals and southern blacks had cooled. "The former began to find a more exciting cause in opposition to the Vietnam War and the latter became increasingly attracted to the slogan of "Black
Power."

Black Power "was born of impatience," Priestland recognized, "of disillusion over reform by legislation, and of an awareness that many white Civil Rights workers had exhausted their indignation and expected the Negro to make his way patiently up the new ladder which had been opened to him—the white man's ladder, on whose lowest rungs the black man stood." Black Power, saw the Britons, was not shouted so much "in the threat to use it as in the complaint that there was none; Black Power "then, is another cry of frustration, and one which plays into the hands of white racism." 

Black consciousness and nationalism had grown stronger as the movement for integration had stalled. One of the sharpest critics of King was Malcolm X, a sometime pimp and drug runner, who reformed under the influence of the Black Muslims led by Elijah Muhammad. "Islam," said Stephen Barber (1970) was seized upon "to symbolize antagonism to the white man's Christianity," which was hollow and bankrupt. Initially militant and violent, and advocating guns for blacks so that they could control their own lives, Malcolm X was later to break with Muhammad when he discovered true Islam as a result of a pilgrimage to Mecca. Malcolm X had seen other areas of the world where "colour is not as obsessive a subject," and had begun "to see there might be some redeeming features about light-skinned persons," when he was assassinated by black gunmen in 1965. Barber suggested Malcolm X "was about to venture off into fascinating new heresies" before he was killed; now he has joined the pantheon of heroes of the Western world's radicals, and death has kept his image pure.
The Black Power slogan of the Sixties began with Stokley Carmichael, leader of SNICK (Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee). SNICK "had started in 1960 as a voter-organizing movement with a dozen or so members from southern Negro colleges," explained Priestland, and "within four years it had spread into some of the northern and middle western colleges." Carmichael, born in Trinidad and educated at Howard University, was both a rabble-rouser and entertainer--"probably the best night club turn since Mort Sahl," judged Priestland. But his genius was his charismatic leadership and his "rhythmic chants like 'Hell No--We Won't Go'," (to the war in Vietnam) and it was Carmichael who put the word 'honkie' into the national vocabulary. Racial pride had been touched by "Black is Beautiful," the phrase of Marcus Garvey in the Twenties; now "Black Power" reactivated black cohesiveness, 'Afros' appeared, dashikis became fashionable, and demands rose for Black Studies. The major premise of the Carmichael group was that ghettos were internal colonies of America, badly exploited by white outsiders. The similarities with the revolutionary or newly independent African states were easily identified. To 'free themselves from colonial rule,' said Carmichael, blacks must band together, Be Black, Buy Black! Blacks must work with their own kind; thus, the white liberals who had joined the civil rights movements in the early Sixties, were purged from SNICK in 1965. The "love affair" with the liberals ended. 42
Just how bitter, disillusioned and filled with despair American blacks had become was revealed to Gerald Priestland who covered a demonstration in Jackson, Mississippi: "My cameraman and I had stopped beside a group of S.N.C.C. members to change film. As we tinkered with the apparatus,"two of the Snick boys cursed us in a steady crescendo of obscenity: "'Get out, white man, get away from here. You stink, you stench, you're fouling the air. I can't eat my food now--your shitty stink has polluted it. Take your eyes off my girl here; she's black and beautiful, a thousand times more beautiful than your whore of a mother. I guess you'd like to stick your rotting white****in my girl; well white man, if you don't stop thinking that thought this moment I'm going to string you up and cut off your******and ram them right down your******white throat. d'you hear, white man? D'you hear? Now come and crawl and apologies to my girl! Come and kiss her beautiful black***and I'll kill you for it!'" At that point the film was threaded and "we plodded away among the trees; it had been a very unpleasant couple of minutes. But no worse, I suppose, than the two or three centuries during which, mutatis mutandis, the black man has had to listen to the same sort of abuse from his white overlord." The blacks seemed consumed with vengence and rage, hating their powerlessness. Black Power advocates promised to build an all-Black political base and pledged themselves to continued separation of the races. Any black who denied this committed soul suicide.43
King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the NAACP opposed the black nationalist movement and black power as divisive. On the far Left, the Black Panther party, an avowed revolutionary movement, was founded in Oakland, by Eldridge Cleaver. The civil rights movement could not channel the rage and frustration in America's black ghettos which erupted into riots in Watts, Chicago and Newark in the mid-Sixties. While again the negro problem was seen by the Britons to be a national concern, its most explosive side now was in the northern ghettos. They saw the rat-infested housing, the new housing projects that became crime-ridden, segregated slums, they saw the listless unemployed reduced to poverty because of lack of education, skills and jobs. They witnessed the rising juvenile crime, the numbers racket, drug pushing and prostitution which flourished unchecked. James Baldwin's *Fire Next Time*, 1963, had precisely warned in eloquent terms that racial blow-ups in the ghettos were eminent. In the summer of 1965, in Watts, amidst cries of 'Burn Baby, Burn!' racial violence exploded. Looking at the pattern of the riots from Watts to Newark, Priestland remarked, "these were not Civil Rights demonstrations, nor were they assaults out of black areas against white." They were "community equivalents of a psychotic going beserk and wrecking his own home," except "that since the ghetto rioters had no pride of ownership in their communities, it was not their homes, but the camps into which an alien society had pitched them." There had been a common anatomy to these riots as they occurred "spontaneously," were conducted by
the "unemployed," and a large number of youngsters from "broken families," who answered "to no authority at home." The riots took place in areas "poorly served by public transport" creating the feeling among the ghetto populace of "being shut in." The rioters were the urban poor who believed themselves exploited. This explained to our British viewers why credit records are usually the first thing destroyed when a ghetto shop is looted. Invariably, the ghetto is the scene of appalling relations between citizens and the police. A "young looter" was asked by Priestland what he was "achieving," and the boy mocked: 'chievin'? Don't aim to 'chieeeeve nothin'--that's a honkie word. We just aim to make such a nonsense of the honkie's set-up, he'll have to come up with somethin' else. An' if we don't like that--we'll burn that down too.' The Britons understood that this was not black power, only a negative vote on white policy.

"The rubble and charred remains of burnt-out buildings," wrote English novelist and political essayist, Ethel Mannin (1967), "were still to be seen in the spring of 1966, and I saw them for myself." The correspondent for the London Times had reported "the people of Los Angeles are showing themselves unwilling to foot the bill and to remedy some of the biggest grievances behind the riots," and Mannin had come to view the muddle: "high unemployment, low income for those at work, substandard housing, and one-parent families." Mannin believed "the first thing needed" in Watts to be "Jobs" as only work can give people respect," especially people living under
the ethos of America. They need a place in society, the feeling that they can look 'Whitey' in the eye. "At present," Mannin confirmed that blacks of the ghetto are "outcast, outside society," "because they have nothing they having nothing to lose, so why not release frustration in rioting, burning and looting?" Most disturbingly, Mannin believed among the whites, "nobody cares," "no one has any intention of solving the problem." The authorities merely "suppress it." Mannin found "nothing in Watts; no work, no cinema, no hospital, no hope." Young people flood the streets because on the streets there is at least the possibility of something happening; inside the homes there is only overcrowdedness. The "young people have no standards," "no values." For the Britons, the Watts riot was no surprise, reflecting as it did simply a protest by a group of people maddened by their own wretchedness in the midst of unparalleled prosperity. 45

If American blacks were not allowed to join the system, the Britons realized they would throw stones at it. In these self-destructive riots--Watts, Chicago, Newark--Gerald Priestland understood "some class or individual is trying to find a place which gives him meaning." He "is told that America is a land of opportunity, where anyone can rise to the summit by his own endeavours, and yet he is unable or inadequate to win that place." In an attempt to strike back at WASP society, the Britons knew too that a minority youth did so often at the expense of his peers; hence, the victims of violence are often of the same race, class or even family. Touching
a nerve, the Britons revealed youth crime and child violence in the ghettos to have their origin in the frustrations of an insecure minority. The American Dream appeared as a fraud to black youth taught to crave success but held back by discrimination. Out of this despair and disillusionment had not only come Black Power, conceded the Britons, but also Watts, 1965.46

"The Angry Voices of Watts," was an article written by Budd Schulberg for the Los Angeles Magazine, June, 1966 which told of Schulberg's creative writing class in Watts. The ghetto blacks had plenty to say: "The white man is power-mad and full of greed. Since the slavery days he's used us for cheap labor." "It's pretty obvious that he won't give up that power and top position without a fight. Non-violence is finished. Martin Luther King is a joke. God wasn't with us when we came over here in the slave ships, and the white man's God sure as hell isn't with us now." "We can't wait for the President's Great Society. We can't wait another five years. Not even another five months." And another student, no less violently: "If you really thought we're human you wouldn't allow us to live like this." "If we were some foreign country like the Congo, you'd be worried that we might go Communist and you'd send us millions of dollars to keep us on your side, but here at home you still take us for granted. You think you've got us on the end of your string like a yo-yo. Well, we are not going to hang on that string any more. I tell you we're ready to take our stand here and to die for our freedom in the streets of Watts."47 The Britons
expected Americans to be shaken and frightened by the anger, bitterness and hatred, but most Americans, to the Britons worry and amazement seemed to ignore even the most careful reports recommending change in black-white relations. There seemed to be a corroding hopelessness among blacks; among whites apathy or fear appeared as rejection—"Nigger, stay away from my door."

But all the negro wanted was to come in—into the mainstream of society, the system. The Britons saw this too, as "the majority of American Negroes," wrote Priestland, "are not really in a revolutionary frame of mind." For all the "Burn Baby, Burn: talk of the young dropouts, "most Negroes still see an attractive society around them; they do not want to destroy it, but to join it as equals." They want the things white America has: decent housing, schooling and employment, and they are probably "more concerned about the failure of the police to establish public safety in the ghettos than they are about police brutality." The blacks would agree with Pat Moynihan "that a satisfying job with a wage one can live on is the most important thing of all." Americans should not be mislead by mob hysteria, cautioned our visitors, as "when it comes to the sober point, Negroes are Americans," and "when they vote they vote Republican or Democratic, not Black Power." What blacks are now seeking is the chance to exercise their power effectively within the established party organizations of their communities, just as Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans and Jewish-Americans have done in the past.
In the hope of quelling hysteria among both blacks and whites, the Kerner Commission (properly the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders) published its report March 3, 1968, with the avowed purpose of shocking the nation into averting disaster. The report, continued Priestland, "made few discoveries which had not been available for years, but never before, by a body of such eminence, had white Americans been told flatly that the fault was theirs."

"'White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II', wrote the Commission." The report reminded white Americans that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto: white institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it. The report told Americans that essentially our nation is moving towards two societies, one black, one white--separate and unequal. Floyd McKissick applauded the report saying, "we're on our way to reaching the moment of truth." It's the first time whites have said "We're racists. Now's the time to seek common truth." the Commission's physical recommendations were to build massive public housing facilities, establish a minimum income of $3,335 a year for a family of four, and recommended the federal government "shoulder 90 per cent of the cost." "All this," evaluated Priestland, "implied a massive, compassionate and sustained attack" on the effects of racism," and "could and should require as much money as was being spent on fighting communism in Vietnam."

But above everything else, the report was so significant because
of its spiritual message. "The need," it said, "is not so much
for the government to design new programmes as it is for the nation
to generate new will." "Just as Lincoln a century ago put
preservation of the Union above all else, so should we put creation
of a true union—a single society and a single American identity—as
our national goal." 49

The problem had been identified as racism and the Britons
asked us in the late Sixties point blank if America could really
afford racism, either in the potential loss of a golden fortune in
goodwill around the world, or the loss of productive and purchasing
power which no scientifically managed economy could contemplate.
The Britons agreed that there are no quick, simple solutions
such as Americans hanker after—only long, complicated solutions.
But they agreed that America had taken a first step, when they
acknowledged publicly that there are "two nations, and that the
black one must be rebuilt and raised up to the level of the white
one before the barriers between them can be broken down and the
two can mingle in equality." Priestland continued with the
assessment, "interracial marriage, still less common in the
United States than it is in Britain, will have to become a lot
more common before we can say the worst is over and the two races
have accepted each other as equals." But our visitors had no
doubt that "the problem will be solved, because in the end it must
be solved." To think otherwise is to accept the destruction of
America. What was needed, they believed, is not so much a crash
programme, but a "continuous national commitment and the leadership, the will and the money to pursue it." The Britons found more humanity and goodwill in America than the viewer of newsreels might suppose, but also less sense of urgency. Herein lay the crucial weakness as America approached the early Seventies. 50

"The sheer lethargy of the majority of the nation," said Edmund Ions (1967), a Lecturer in Politics at the University of York, in refusing to face and combat racism "is perhaps the biggest single obstacle to progress." While mass Americans refused to examine their consciences, the policies of Nixon's administration revolved around benign neglect. Stephen Barber (1970) realized that Nixon's domestic political strategy required "that he strengthen his support in the South amongst conservatives who were formerly loyal Democrats." Nixon did not need to curry favour with the blacks for this. Perhaps there had been too much concentration on the race issue ran the argument of the benign neglect advocates. Overzealous police action against militant Black Panthers, for example, might well provide them with opportunities for martyrdom, heorics and histrionics. The Nixon administration tried to attract the silent black majority, which shares most of the concerns of its white counterpart but which had previously been ignored by the government. The phrase benign neglect had come from a report written by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the chief advisor on Urban Affairs. The report was to have remained secret, but when revealed, appraised Barber, "infuriated black militants and moderates." The
The upshot of the whole episode was to further radicalize blacks, as even the moderate black leadership felt compelled to speak violently against benign neglect which smacked of tokensim or accommodation. Increasingly, the militants won support for their criticism of the police state, and the policies of ameriKKKa.51

The Britons advocated "a sense of urgency" for Americans to find a solution to the race problem, calling for commitment to its ideals of equality, and leadership to bring black americans into the system. This is a moral imperative if the United States is to be the leader of the free world. President Carter has called for human rights around the world, and correctly the Soviets have jeered 'put your own house in order.' The Britons shuddered at America's terrible problem, wondering what kind of a society tolerates remarks like the one made by a Maddox aide during the funeral of Martin Luther King: "You know what they're going to do when they catch Martin Luther King's killer? Fine him fifteen dollars for shootin' coons out of season!" America had not come nearly far enough from the days when they had approved the smell of frizzling fat as it ran out of the wretched negro's heels while burning him alive. Could America, asked the Britons, become the world leader? Not without truly and totally disavowing racism, they warned. The riots were destructive spasms "against the whole bloody system: part of the let's 'smash it up' mood of the age, compounded by the headache of being lost in an atomised, competitive society," viewed James McMillan (1972). It was a reaction to the
old doctrine of self-help, aptly summarized by champion boxer Archie Moore: "Do we bring those who worked to get ahead down to the level of those who never gave a damn? The world owes nobody--black or white--a living. God helps those who help themselves." Nixon's reactionary government had seemed to agree; Carter's administration is yet to prove itself on whether it will stick to self-help or re-design the system to diminish racism and promote equality. Increasingly, the Britons said something very special to Americans: they wondered if the old values of self-help and material get-aheadism were enough. They asked us to consider a larger vision--more essentially to find a vision--which would sanction us for the acceptance of world leadership, and in doing so, most surely Americans would grant equality to black Americans. America was challenged to re-examine her spiritual goals, re-affirm her political religion of equality, to make her vision reality.
Footnotes for CHAPTER VII

1 Stephen Barber, America In Retreat (London, 1970), 154.

2 Barber, America In Retreat, p. 154-155.
Hugh Willoughby (pseud. author's full name: Charles Nigel Harvey), Amid The Alien Corn, an Intrepid Englishman in the Heart of America (Indianapolis, 1958), 154.


5 Ibid.

6 Gibbons, Is This America?, p. 58.

7 Ibid.

8 Teeling, American Stew, p. 294-302.

9 Gibbons, Is This America?, p. 59.

10 Ibid., p. 103.

11 Basil Dillon Woon, Eyes West (London, 1941), 152.

12 Morgan Philips Price, America After Sixty Years, the Travel Diaries of Two Generations of Englishmen (London, 1936), 194-196.

13 Ibid., p. 205-208.


16 Leslie, American Wonderland, p. 214.

17 Leslie, American Wonderland, p. 212.
Greenwall, American Scene, p. 176.

18 Greenwall, American Scene, pp. 177-178.

19 Maie Clements Perley, Without My Gloves (Philadelphia, 1940), 117-120.
Ursula Branston, *Let The Band Play "Dixie"...Improvisations on a Southern Signature Tune* (London, 1940), 22.


Cecil Roberts, *And So To America* (Garden City, 1947), 220-222.

23 Roberts, *And So To America*, pp. 223-224.


25 Ibid., p. 115.


27 Ibid., p. 272.


31 Ibid., pp. 192-193.

32 Ibid.


34 Roberts, *And So To America*, p. 224.

Magee, *Go West, Young Man*, p. 104-105.


37 Barber, *America In Retreat*, p. 160.

38 Ibid., pp. 162-163.


40 Ibid., pp. 244-252.

41 Barber, *America In Retreat*, p. 164-165.
42 Priestland, America--The Changing Nation, p. 252.

43 Ibid., pp. 243-244.

44 Ibid., pp. 254-255.


46 Priestland, America--The Changing Nation, p. 244.


48 Priestland, America--The Changing Nation, p. 258.

49 Ibid., pp. 258-264.

50 Ibid., pp. 265-266.


52 Max Hastings, The Fire This Time, America's Year of Crisis (New York, 1969), 63.

Our British visitors observed great harmony between American religion and the values of equality and progress. The congruence was too perfect as there was too much 'of the world' in American-style religion with its emphasis on popular preachers, practical or functional religion which could be used for self betterment or social improvement, the administration of religion as a business, and its use as an underpining of patriotism. For the most part, the Britons wondered at what passed in America for religion.

In the Twenties and Thirties, the Britons viewed Americans worshipping the Golden Calf. And if they were abashed at vulgar materialism in America's religion, they were bemused at the messiahs—from Aimee Semple McPherson to Father Divine. During World War II, our visitors observed Americans using religion to support patriotism, and in fact they saw American religion to be little more, entwined as it was with purely secular values. Religion did not peal out a sense of sin or speak of God's wrath, but rather congratulated Americans on their way of life, picturing America as God's own Country, and Americans as God's elect. Americans boasted of a religious revival in the Fifties, but all British observers doubted any return to true faith and devotion, and instead saw the 'revival' as born of fear, either of Communism, the bomb or simply the unknown. Religion was seen as merely
functional in the sense of "You've tried tranquilizers, Why not try God?" Religion in the Fifties pandered to Admass, and youth of the Sixties sensed this, believed the Britons. Christianity seemed to be in spiritual pawn to secularism and this explained much about the Youth Revolt to the British as well as the focus of youth on Eastern cults and psychedelic mysticism.

Above all, the Britons felt that Americans still searched for meaning in their lives. Material wealth was not enough; they needed, indeed wanted, something stronger and tougher to give them a vision, a world view. Shane Leslie (1936) watched Americans gropping for answers, saying America "gives the impression of being on the point of bursting into a great pentecostal religion." As the Evangelicals of the 1970's attract ever increasing numbers, it appears that Leslie's prophecy may well be true.

Practical Religion and Popular Preachers

In the nineteenth century, the Britons found American religion "popular in the best sense of the word," but in the twentieth century, they felt devotion had degenerated into hypocrispy, sham and vulgar materialism. L. P. Jacks (1933) believed "the religion of the people remains, in name at least, predominantly Christian;" but, he confided, "I strongly suspect the whole population of leaning to paganism, Aphrodite competing with Mammon for the place of chief deity." "The sons of Belial also abound, though not as an organized denomination, unless the bootleggers and their kindred may be considered such." Shane Leslie (1936) believed religion in
America lacked piety; "endless are the Utopias, Idealisms and variety shows exhibited by the Churches." "Their motto," he chastized, "is like that of the cinemas: anything to draw a crowd. The glad Gospel, the glad hand and the glad eye are extended." Religion in America was judged a business and the success of the individual churches depend on the personality of the preacher. "Religion in America needs an encyclopedia," chided Leslie. "It is an unreligious country, and yet contains more sects and differing churches than any country in the world."2

John Gibbons (1935) had noticed that Americans like their clergymen "to be indistinguishable from themselves," with no "high hat" manner, nor demeaning self-denial. Gibbons asked an American priest how the orthodox vow of holy poverty could be reconciled with America's emphasis on prosperity. "Every country has its own ways," replied the priest, and America is "a prosperity-worshipping land." Gibbons explained, "his congregation would have no use for a priest who was not well dressed, and if he had an automobile, then it would have to be the biggest and the most powerful in the parish, and ought really, to have the very loudest and most offensive hooter in the whole diocese." The self-denial of Saint Francis "wouldn't get much of a run in modern America," said Gibbons; "holy poverty wouldn't fit in with the kind of hooter his parishioners demanded."3

Christianity in New York, found Shane Leslie (1936), "lies too dead for message, and requires galvanization." And this it
got, in the person of Billy Sunday. Galvanization meant a "good business sense," and Billy Sunday was a showman as "thousands hit the starry trail, thousands shook the prophet's hand, thousands hoped, and believed." Leslie mocked the carnival atmosphere: "It seemed too good to be true. Is Heaven as easy to get as going to a circus and shaking hands with the entertainer? The music is cheerful and the entertainer is arresting, but to those who understood the difficulty of religion, it is pathetic. Mr. Sunday has no doubts, no internal strife, no theology. The Kingdom of Heaven can be turned out like soup—to which Billy gives the sparkle of champagne. Many folks are left happier and comfortable. The orthodox, the stupid and the judicious are left with a faraway sense of pathos that in two thousand years of Christianity we have not got further than Vaudeville."4

"The Promised Land of the American People," Jacks found was California; my first impression was such as one might receive on arriving at a City of Refuge, or alternately on entering the atmosphere of a religious Retreat." California, "it seems, is the place where harassed Americans come to recover the joy and serenity which their manner of life denies them elsewhere;" it is the place "to study America in flight from herself," as to California come those "imbued with the 'philosophy of escape'." To "the victims of hard climates, monotony, boredom and life's contradictions in general, California is like a magnet." "You can hardly imagine Christianity being born in California," Jacks offered, "though it is less difficult to
imagine it coming to an end there. Certainly the Puritan strain of it has died out on the sea beaches. What the new cults can do to provide a substitute remains to be seen."

One of the new cults that was avidly reported on by the Britons of the Thirties was the Four Square Gospel of Aimee Semple McPherson. William Teeling (1933) did not know whether to be "shocked or impressed" as he watched Sister Aimee arrive back in Los Angeles as a star, amidst bands, a crowd of thousands, councillors from the city, and a welter of photographers. The Temple of Aimee, found Geoffrey Harmsworth (1939), "is like a small Albert Hall built of concrete, with a lighthouse on the roof from which God's Publicity Agent sends out her messages of faith and hope to suffering humanity." He revealed, "professional interceders pray day and night (for a fee) for those who have strayed so far from the straight and narrow path that even Sister Aimee's healing touch cannot save them from Satan's clutches." This tongue-in-cheek hilarity of Harmsworth continued as he described the inside of the Temple as "an inferior movie palace." Instead of Garbo and Gable, he found "vivid likenesses of Sister Aimee, attired as an angel, with hands outstretched, invoking the power of the Holy Ghost."

Cases displayed crutches and other discarded tokens of the halt, the maimed and the blind. While Harmsworth doubted that true religion could be served up in such ludicrous fashion, Teeling pronounced her "impressive" as he watched her sermonize on the "Attar of Roses": "She took us first to Algeria and into the desert.
Described the camels, her dress, and her adventures, then how she found an oasis, and compared it to finding, in this world of sin, people leading a Christian life. Later, she took us through the Algerian street of perfumes and described how many roses were trampled and suffered to make that perfume, Attar of Roses...Then she likened this to the life of Christ, His suffering and then the Perfume He spread around the world." Even though Teeling found it "incongruous" for Aimee to have a telephone on stage "which she frequently used" while waiting to speak, and though he might complain of tawdy sentimentality and theatrical conjuring, he pronounced "she preached sound common sense." "I came away realizing that this Canadian woman, born and bred in Ontario, though she has taken a lot of money from poor people, is yet giving them in return just what they want; whether it is a high standard or not is not the point; they give their money and they get what they want." But while religion American-style might be suited to American needs and expectations, he admitted his skepticism, saying, "nowhere in the world is Christianity preached quite like it is at Los Angeles."

Harold Laski (1948) was more cynical, as he called Sister Aimee a "skillful exploiter of emotion," "uninhibited by any scruples of delicacy," preying on "the starved impulses of ignorant multitudes to reap a financial harvest."6

"A remarkable successor," compared Shane Leslie, to William Jennings Bryan is "the radio priest, Father Coughlin, who addresses millions every Sunday, denouncing bankers and foreign alliances and
championing silver." In 1936, Coughlin was described as a man "of level brow" and "decided diction," "who discusses every point offered to him." Of "all economic talks I ever had," remarked Leslie, "the most rapid and exciting was with Father Coughlin."

The priest was so "popular" because his "preaching is not on religious but economic values," therefore he appealed "as no religious prophet has ever appealed" before "to a country which is not really religious." Denouncing the Golden Calf, he was "a power both Church and State have to reckon with," said Leslie. However, Harry J. Greenwall (1936) called the politicized priest a "would-be Messiah," whose influence was curtailed through "an unfortunate disclosure." Preaching bimetallism and encouraging government silver purchases, he was shown not to be altogether disinterested when the government published a list of "holders of silver" and there upon was "the Radio League of the Little Flower," Coughlin's Royal Oak, Michigan broadcasting firm. In mocking tone, Greenwall pronounced, "the public was profoundly shocked." Another "messiah" noted by Greenwall was "the Negro Father Divine," Harlem based, feeding "thousands everyday without charge," and "no one knows the source of his immense wealth." Father Divine seemed to work miracles, maintaining "heavenly dormitories in which thousands live on his bounty," travelling "in limousines," maintaining "a fleet of buses" for the faithful, "free chicken dinners to those who pack the balconies at his meetings," and who by 1934, had established "fifteen branch heavens." Upon getting out of a plane, Father Divine was
asked, "how close to Heaven did you get?", he replied, I carry it with me." The travellers complained of the way Americans treated religion, but in the depths of the Depression, Greenwall praised Father Divine for delivering the goods, echoing Teeling's comment that it was just what people want.7

The ministerial style in America was popular but not doctrinaire and never hell fire and brimstone. More in the mainstream of religion, Morgan Philips Price (1936) described the attraction of popular preaching in conservative suburbia, as he described a sermon which opened with "an address to the children." The minister had placed an old alarm-clock which had been thrown into a rubbish heap on the pulpit and told the children that he would give it "a fresh chance to prove itself reliable and truthful. Understanding that the preacher had set the clock to go off just at that moment, the whole congregation was still as mice. One could have heard a pin drop. As the silence continued, and it became clear that the clock would not speak the truth, a titter was heard, then a guffaw, and then a peal of laughter, until finally the whole congregation rocked and re-echoed with mirth." Price believed he understood "why the churches in America are full on Sundays."8

The Britons were essentially critical of the manner in which Americans mistreated religion. They wondered, is there not a place, indeed a need, for orthodoxy? Should religion be so closely aligned with this world? Rather, should it not be preparing men, through instilling a proper understanding of sin, for the next world, the
Kingdom of God? Popular religion in America seemed not to turn faces upward to behold the radiance of the infinite, but allowed—even encouraged—man to turn earthward with his hoe. In the Twenties and Thirties, the Britons believed Americans worshipped anything—and that anything was usually vulgar; further, they abhorred turning religion into a business, and they wondered at offering free chicken to swell congregations. But nowhere else was religion so commonsensical, so direct, so supportive of people's everyday needs and hopes; American religion asked questions of and answered upon the here and now. Religion might be unorthodox, unmysterious and simplistic in America, but Americans, despite the Depression, still had faith, hope and charity.

A British immigrant, George S. Brookes (1940), considered "the crucial resource" in America to be "spirit," as "not dulled, nor lulled, supine, secure, replete, does man create, but out of stern challenge, in sharp excitement, with burning joy. Man is the hunter still, though his quarry be a hope, a mystery, a dream." "On these, hangs the future of the world." America was still searching for a world view, but this was seen to be a source of vitality. Americans had the courage to seek answers, daring to embark on the quest. Americans might lack mystery in their religion, but they still clung to hope and dreams for a better future.
Religion and American Values

America "is Protestant in a far deeper sense," determined Denis Brogan (1941) "than a mere statistical statement can convey, as the whole background of American history: is "Protestant;" the "dominant ethos is Protestant. Attitudes of Catholics and Jews are "profoundly affected by this saturation of the national life in the Protestant tradition." Brogan defined the "Protestant tradition": "It emphasizes preaching rather than the sacraments, the Bible rather than church organization, and, since the middle of the nineteenth century, good works, or in modern terms service, rather than doctrine. The tradition identifies sanctity with success; too, Protestantism tends to merge with the wide-spread secular idealism of the nation, which wishes to be good but does not claim to be religious." Indeed, said, Brogan, the difference between the church and the world, in America, has largely disappeared. Rotarians and Kiwanians are interchangeable with the priesthood. He found secular and religious views of life are mingled; religion helps to make men good, i.e., honest and non-criminal, and to diminish adolescent indiscipline, so it is supported by financial contribution, sometimes by personal service, and by advertisements calling attention to its benefits in the local press, paid for by the local business community. Religion in America was judged not only popular, but also practical in the sense of functional; religion could be a corrective to society's ills; it could mold better men and women and thereby a better society.\textsuperscript{11}
Religious beliefs and national aspirations, observed the Britons, have achieved great harmony, perpetuating in a cycle, the values of equality and progress. Against the belief that, in America, most things were possible, that faith and energy could remove mountains in this world, that communities could be converted en masse, old-world theological pessimism, said Brogan, (1941) fought in vain. When Jonathan Edwards "tried to turn back the tide" against the religious ideology being remolded in America "it was not even a rearguard action that he was fighting," quipped Brogan (1944), "it was a return from Elba for the old orthodoxy, a return that ended in a decisive Waterloo."12

And even though church and state were separated in America, the Britons remarked on the integration of the two, not of institutions but of values. "Deep in the American mind," said Denis Brogan (1941), "is a belief that his is God's Country, and the phrase is no mere booster's boast, but the statement of a sacred truth." Not only was the God whom Americans worshipped an American, "it is not uncommon," remarked Susan Cooper (1965), "especially in condemnations of 'atheistic Communism', for Americans to speak of God as if he were the country's own property," a monopolized quantity. Religion, patriotism and progress were seen as closely entwined; "American religion is committed...to an optimistic view of God's purpose in the world and to an identification of that purpose with the purpose of man, especially American man," noted Brogan. Harold Laski (1948) noticed the same congruence between the value of progress
and American faith; Americans were citizens of a chosen people especially favored by God; to them was allotted a destiny nobler than that which awaited the old fatigued world of Europe. For Americans there was to be salvation, and salvation consisted of freedom, individualism, democracy, and success. "Religion...lost its supernatural and other-world character," echoed Brogan (1944), as Americans pulled their God down from the heavens, to install him "as a kind of King of Brobdingnag" who promised "whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass," grow "upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind... than unproductive saints."13

Thus, through this recasting of the image of God in American terms, the productive American saints resolved the old dilemma of worldly success and spiritual salvation. For Americans, the acquisition of property became a sacred calling; Peter Bromhead (1971) recognized that in America, "no test of God's election is more clear than that of worldly success." In some popular versions of modern American religion, added Brogan, "prosperity is not merely evidence of virtue--it is virtue;" for Americans, "wealth, material success, happiness in this world is the Kingdom of God."

The belief in social and individual progress insured by God appeared confirmed, said Brogan, by the American historical experience. The Puritan Fathers have set 'a city upon the hill, a beacon to the world', the pioneers had crossed the plains claiming the triumph of Manifest Destiny, and in modern times, observed David and
Margaret Smith (1973), "America has championed itself as a major force for good against evil."\(^{14}\)

The Britons found congruence too, between the ideal of equality and American religion. The Britons marvelled that in America one religion is as good as another, and at the limitless freedom of expression for the pulpit and the inter-denominational cooperation. "America is remarkable now, as in the past," said Bromhead, "for its attachment to the principle of freedom of belief or disbelief." He realized that as the early Americans had escaped from religious persecution in their old countries, so they were determined that there should be no state religion, and complete freedom of belief and religious practice or non-belief has been jealously guarded from the beginning. Freedom of religion had not opened the way to atheism, as Bromhead found "toleration" in America "remarkable" and suggested "it has not led to a decline in actual religious belief or practice, but to the contrary." Equality in America sanctioned free choice and individualism in one's religious pursuit, but most Britons wondered at the idea of elevating the sinner to a position of responsibility in selecting a version of God's truth that served him best. In religion, one dealt not simply with political, economic or even social arrangements, but with the word of God, eternal truth, and certainly matters more universal than the first amendment.*

*In the Regents' Prayer Case (1962) the Supreme Court held that prayer, even nonsectarian prayer, could not be offered in the public schools. Court critics argued that the justices were interfering with the free exercise of religion, but the High Court stayed with Jefferson and the first amendment, adding another stone to the solid wall dividing church and state.
They wondered, should not the churches have more to say about personal moral conduct? Should a religion be tested, asked Denis Brogan (1941) by the "immediate utilitarian value of its contribution to social peace or economic prosperity?" And coming from England with its established Anglican Church, they asked, should the state have no concern for religious belief?15

Moreover the Britons dared to point out some basic inequalities in American religion. The official theory of the United States is one of complete religious neutrality, noted Brogan (1962), "yet in practice this official neutrality means that the United States has a religious bias, and that religious bias is towards some vague, undenominational Protestantism." He believed the formal equality in America conceals a real inequality, as an American who belongs to any of the Protestant denominations is accepted as being automatically a suitable candidate for high office. No Catholic is, but "President Kennedy may have broken this tradition." Bromhead recognized too a vague pressure "in favor of religion," especially Protestantism. "The United States was made by Protestants and cast in a Protestant mould. The founders and the major part of the population had a lively hatred of Catholicism." Brogan agreed, "to men like Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, both enemies of the 'priests', the thought of a Catholic President would have been not so much odious as absurd. And I am convinced that this feeling of absurdity is an important part of the American makeup today," although Kennedy's great personal magnetism had carried the Catholics a long way toward equality. But here was the rub; the
United States is committed to a neutral view between Christian denominations; it is committed to denying preference to one denomination rather than to another. God is not in the Constitution, and all religions formally compete on even terms. But the Catholic politician is at a distinct disadvantage, as he is always in danger of being pushed into a corner by some dialectician who wants him to harmonize his unconditional allegiance to the United States with the claims of his Church (to be universal and to assert its views over the omnicompetent state). Put that way, it cannot be done. The Catholic politician must submit to a civil religion.\textsuperscript{16}

The Britons applauded the new "flood of Catholic politicians" coming into office in the Sixties, believing it represented America's coming of age, in the sense that full equality was being granted to the great immigrant blocs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the last great immigrant group whose assimilation is far from complete is overwhelmingly Protestant, the Negroes. Whatever the limitations, Brogan proclaimed, "the Catholic Church in America has come out of the catacombs," and is in "every way more respectable intellectually, socially and economically than it was even when Al Smith ran; the days when Joseph P. Kennedy complained of "being constantly described as an Irishman," or an Irish catholic, instead of an "American" are over.\textsuperscript{17}

Religion in America, whatever its shortcomings, was evaluated as offering certainly more equality than its counterpart in Britain. The Church of England--The Anglican Church--is "established" by
law, receives finances from the state, and until very recently its churchmen were also paid and appointed by the government. Befiting the unification of Church and State, the Queen is the head of the Church, and all monarchs are crowned in Westminster Abbey by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Alterations in the Church "cannot be made without the consent of Parliament," "though many people in the Church wish this were not so," said Bromhead (1971). Bishops are appointed by the Queen upon recommendation of the Prime Minister, and although they are no longer party politicians, the senior bishops have seats in the House of Lords, but rarely speak or vote on party matters. Most astonishing to Americans are the degrees of class and caste associated with Anglican membership. Bromhead related that "the bishop of a diocese is a great man in his area; people call him 'My Lord' and he lives in a palace which may (or may not) be worthy of that name." The colloquial terms High-Church and Low-Church correspond respectively to the Catholic and Protestant tendencies exhibited in varying degrees, side by side, in the contemporary individual parishes. "Individuals are inclined," noted Bromhead, "to choose the particular church they like best, because it is the right 'height' for their tastes," and "social" as well as "personal" considerations are important. 18

Overall, the Britons wondered if religion in America, with its emphasis on equality and social progress, had not allowed itself to compromise too much with this world. Everywhere the Britons looked, they found spirituality in pawn to popular culture, politics and Admass.
Religion in Admass

The Britons saw clearly that the churches in America accepted the secular standards of success, and as Harold Laski (1948) said, organized themselves "as closely as possible on the successful activities of the outside world." "I venture to think," he continued, "that the American Churches, as a mass expression in American life, produce religiousity and not religion."19

By religion, Laski meant "that profound sense of an infinite universe so complex, so mysterious, so certain...with the power to elevate." Religion is independent of historical dogma and is the outcome of lonely meditation. True faith gives comfort and accepts mysteries beyond human penetration. True religion is the inner and passionate impulse which drives those who possess it beyond and above themselves to an elevation where they can conquer immediate desire, caprice, suffering and pain. The Britons believed true religion and true faith, "can never compromise with the world." Religion in America seemed to have prostituted itself; drive-in churches, ministers as media personalities, and flashy, glibe appeals were anathema to our British visitors. The truly religious individual possesses an inner vision; it is a spirit, said Laski, "a conviction in being called to a higher realm."20

Finding no true religion in America, only "religiousity," Laski explained what he meant: "religiousity" is "the support of the folklore of some specific social order by bringing to its general support the magic aid of an institution which claims its
foundation in the will of God." Religion in America had been co-opted, he believed, for purposes of patriotism; sanctity was used for national glorification, or for the glorification of national values, **not true orthodoxy**. Whosoever should challenge the national ethos, would be deemed a heretic for failing to understand the will of God. Churches in America, he ventured, had lost the power to guide and determine what "is the right and the good."  

Thus, religiousity in America appeared to the Britons as seldom more than patriotism or self-congratulatory applause for material achievements. This religiousity certainly lacked a proper sense of sin, piety, and devotion to a higher, larger realm, and personal sacrifice. Seldom did our visitors see Americans aroused to reverence or awe; Americans were seen as smug, complacent, and even confident of discovering the mysteries of the universe through science and technology; afterall, had not Americans won the race to the bomb? Why not now to the Great Secret of the infinite? Would America become the new Atlantis, destroying itself in the quest for the imponderables? What a shame, believed the Britons, to have no joy in the mystery of the universe; how boring and how meaningless life would become if perfection could be caught just round the corner. Life would become meaningless without a hope, a dream, a vision. Could greatness be sustained if somehow Americans leaped through the magical barriers which tantalized, giving hope and vision to all earthlings since eons before Stonehenge? What a pity to have all the answers.
Religion in America did not inspire wonder, nor, found Laski, has it been "the function of the Churches to produce men and women of moral sensitivity." "There is an earthly Philistinism about them," as American religion and churches "compromise with the powers that be." This clouds America's "religious vision," or lack of it, "in the sense that I have sought to give it." Laski compared American religious sects to "those curious cults of the later Roman empire which provided their votaries with a sanction at once for acquiescence and escape." The church in America underlined the status quo, accepting and acquiescing to materialism, and most damning, "permitting no rival to challenge its authority."

Toleration there was, but it was toleration for the American way of life; Americans did not see the churches as the instruments through which the pattern of right and just is woven. In short, Laski found no "moral" leadership in American religion; it had sold-out. But Mammon should not be placed before God; the preaching of the good ole boy, the popular minister, must begin to contain something tougher, more orthodox, if Americans were to be saved and inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. The churches in America could become spiritual leaders only if they would break with popular clamorings; until then, the churches would remain little more than "a stabilizing influence in the community."

At home and abroad it was generally recognized in the late Forties and Fifties that America was undergoing a "religious revival," as Denis Brogan (1957) suggested. The Cold War and threats
of nuclear war helped stimulate this "awakening." Skeptics scoffed that going to church was just a new suburbia fad, but still, the number of people involved seemed to indicate something which amazed even the most blase observers. In 1950, over 50% of the American population belonged to churches and synagogues; by 1958, church membership climbed to over 66% of the population. By comparison, in 1860 only 20% of all Americans belonged to any church. As church attendance went up, so too did the sale of religious books and church construction. Religion in this period, said Brogan "is blue chip." Articulate sophisticated theologians like Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr and Martin Buber spoke to large, varying audiences as the awakening seemed to touch all denominations, and people placed their "faith in faith." Public opinion surveys in the 1950's showed over 95% of all Americans of adult age believed in God, about 90% believed in prayer, and 77% believed in an afterlife although, and this is significant, "only 5% expressed any fear of hell."

"In God we trust" was made the national motto and the words "under God," plucked from the Gettysberg Address, were added to the pledge of allegiance. Positive thinkers attracted wide readership as Rabbi Joshua Liebman's *Peace of Mind* (1946) and Norman Vincent Peale's *The Power of Positive Thinking* (1952) sold millions. Americans were told "Believe in Yourself! Have faith in your abilities! Without a humble but reasonable confidence in your own powers you cannot succeed." These books were in the tradition, identified by the Britons, which made religion in America a
utility; to "have" religion was almost to be in possession of a quantity in America, as opposed to a quality.23

Americans in their search for meaning, believed the Britons, looked in many odd places. J. B. Priestley expressed his amazement at a large billboard which repeated the ancient warning: "The Wages of Sin is Death but the Gift of God is Eternal Life." "There it was, the old growl of thunder, with miles of Nomadmass on either side of it." "Considered simply as one advertisement among many, it was the boldest, the most astounding, on view." For, he chided, "what was stale orange juice as against fresh orange juice, ordinary gasoline as against gas-with-a-tiger spring," compared "with this threat of Death and promise of Eternal Life?" "Either this was the biggest and most impudent lie along the road" or a statement that "reduced all others to the most trivial twaddle." Here in America Priestley was being offered a choice not between Bing Crosby and Alan Ladd, Camels and Luckies, Shell and Esso, but between Death and Eternal Life. "Yes sir!" He said, "I was delighted to see it there, bang in the middle of Nomadmass;" America needed a "sharp reminder" of the "wages of sin," and Priestley believed, "it ought to have been repeated, in larger gaudier lettering, every mile or two." Priestley suspected, however, "that the people who put up that bold notice did not know what it meant," believing as he did that most Americans were Philistines and money changers, and thus he proceeded to "preach" a "Lay Sermon for Nomadness."24
"Observe the present tense of the statement"—"The Wages of Sin is Death but the Gift of God is Eternal Life, instructed Priestley. "There is no 'will be' or 'shall be' about it; His gift simply Is: we receive it by recognizing it for what it is." God is "not about to intervene, either to punish or reward." And "what is this 'eternal life'?" "Eternity is not unending time. It is outside time. It involves another dimension of things." Americans lead an existence "along a one-way track from the cradle to the grave;" "we think that the happiness we crave can only be somewhere further along the time-track, so we drive on and on as in Nomadmass."* "Here and Now can never do it, we must arrive at There and Then, which become Here and Now again, and once more rejected." Americans must release and come to a "heightened state of consciousness;" "eternal life is always a new and heightened experience of Here and Now." He recommended "all moments of noble living, the ecstasy of love, the compassion and understanding that enter into every genuine personal relationship, the creation and rapt appreciation of great art, the adventures of the mind among significant

*ADMASS, Priestley explained "is my name for the whole system of increasing productivity, plus inflation, plus a rising standard of material living, plus high-pressure advertising and salesmanship, plus mass communications, plus cultural democracy and the creation of the mass mind, the mass man...people firmly fixed in ADMASS as ADMASSIANS...people who wander about in it along the highways are NOMADMASSIANS." Nomadmass is "dominated by the internal combustion engine. To enjoy it you must never get out of your car. So you have drive-in everything."
ideas, even an amazed wondering about ourselves, all demand this unknown dimension, this timeless being."25

"The more we are enslaved by time, behaving like a hen hypnotised by a straight line drawn before it, the more remote we are from this eternal life," said Priestley. "We are rejecting God's gift, the higher level of being." Priestley challenged Americans to give up their love for materialism; "to stop going on and on, round and round, in time." One could enjoy Admass or turn to religion, but "you cannot," he scolded, "do both at the same time." Beware of "religion which comes out of ballyhoo" for it is "not true religion but so much sentimental juggling with symbols, once potent," but which now have "lost their real meaning and force." Priestley's "lay sermon on nomadness" was delivered with the same purpose as Jonathan Edwards' "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God."26

In the Fifties, "the illusion that to be materially secure is to have inherited the earth exerts the same thraldom as in the piping days of the twenties," said Rom Landau (1953). But, he warned, "life not anchored in a sense of spiritual security easily loses its meaning." And spiritual security, he knew, "is hard to achieve in a civilization that glories in nothing so much as economic security." Landau believed "a deep uneasiness is abroad, especially among the younger and the more thoughtful;" they seem to have realized that one material achievement only paves the way for the exhausting claim of another."27
While the Britons recognized a religious "revival" in the postwar period in terms of numbers going to church, significantly none of the visitors saw any revival of true spirituality in America. Denis Brogan (1957) reached back in his own experience to explain contemporary American religion. "Just before I went to the United States in 1925, the 'Monkey Trial' in Dayton, Tennessee, had delighted the European world. Here was the most powerful, richest, most complacent society in the world making a fool of itself over Jonah and the Whale, over the literal accuracy of Genesis. To a continent weakened and, in its heart of hearts, thinking itself disgraced by the recent civil war, the spectacle of William Jennings Bryan, former Secretary of State, thrice candidate for President, floundering over primitive cosmology was funny and comforting." Skepticism over the literal inspiration of the Bible was already commonplace in Europe when it first reached America in 1925; Brogan half-jokingly recalled, "every big city had its fundamentalist champion, refuting the 'scientists', and millions went through an agonizing reappraisal."28

But in 1957, Brogan found "the case altered, or so it seemed." He had gone to a "highbrow party in Chicago, among people 'liberal' in politics and 'advanced' in the arts. He recalled, "I met a brilliant young architect who after exposing his views on the search for God (it was after midnight, 'they call it the Bourbon hour', as the poet might have put it) asked me for mine. When I replied that I was an agnostic, he said in wonder, 'I didn't think you were as
old as that!" Brogan found the remark symptomatic, as "religion like many other things is booming in America; it is blue chip."
True, there had been a slight revival of interest in religion in England, something of a return to 'the Church' among the intelli-
gentsia, but nothing like what Brogan was witnessing in America. He found "more Americans are church members than ever before," determining the crude figures to be impressive. The "fact of numbers is important--but what do they indicate, he asked." With numbers increasing, is there no revival of faith? "There may well be," he said, "but I should place doubt, rather than faith, high among the causes of the religious boom." He found "many fugitives from a brave new world of progress, prosperity, temporal happiness;" and too, "the Depression, the war, the concentration camps, the Russian purges, Hiroshima" all are enough to create "scepticism about the liberating forces of Marx, Freud, Henry Ford, John Dewey--to name some of the important prophets of the past generation." At the time (1920's-1930's), "orthodox religion had preached that these were false prophets," so "perhaps the old-time religion was right." Whatever the judgement, "the anti-clericalism of Mencken, and a host of imitators is now old hat." In the Fifties, Brogan found the average man ready to listen to the professional religious teacher. 29

Unfortunately, Brogan found that the American churchmen in the Fifties had little to say, and few Americans asked, Is what these teachers saying, true? "Christianity," Brogan believed, "is far
less worldly than the world." "Its aim can never be reduced to producing peace of mind, to creating national unity, to providing a substitute for Communist faith, to being an extra arm of the Voice of America, a remedy for child delinquency, or easy divorce."

As all Britons from the Twenties through the Fifties said, true religion "affirms views about the universe;" it poses imponderable questions as to the nature of that universe; is it blind, hostile, indifferent, or friendly? "A great deal of the present 'religious revival' is, said Brogan, political in a very wide sense, where it is not the result of a shocked fear of the world in which we all--agnostics and 'believers'--have to live. There is a marked identification of 'religion' with 'Americanism', which in turn seems so often to mean 'the free enterprise system'.'" He wondered at the theological implications of the recent insertion of 'Under God' in the pledge of allegiance. "Partly, he said, it is a meaningless evocative phrase; partly it is the deliberate association of God with 'the American Way of Life'." How often he wondered, has it the meaning Lincoln gave it, the submission of the American way of life to the judgement--to the possible condemnation--of the all-judging and harsh God of the Second Inaugural? "Very seldom, is my guess."30

The good theologians in America know this; it is they who are most skeptical of the value of what passes for 'religion'. Foreign and domestic clerical leaders "worry, wisely, about what harm the adoption of the 'Church' as a service organization by a deeply
secular society may do to the life of real religion." Brogan doubted that people would refrain from asking of their churches, "is it true?" in the future. Soon there would come practical tests of American religion, perhaps from blacks, perhaps from students. Brogan found the state of religion in America unprepared; "the belief in God bred by foxholes is not what the United States needs; something tougher, more firmly based on belief in a divine plan for human destiny, will be required--and in great amounts--if the churches are to be leaders not auxiliaries, commanders-in-chief not mere tolerated chaplains."31

Henry Adams, in his famous Education, posed the essential conflict between materialism and spirituality. Brogan (1961) called it "a statement of the predicament of modern man in the late nineteenth century, assailed in his long-accepted certainties by the impact of science and of sociology." Adams was torn between the values implicit in the opposing forces of the Virgin and the Dynamo. Brogan likened Adams' condition in 1900 to the contemporary American condition; "in feeling his preparation inadequate for this world of flux, Adams was merely stating...a nearly universal dilemma, of having to live 'between two worlds'." Adams, like modern American men and women, was seeking a doctrine, a practice, a world view that could be clung to and serve as a plan of action. Money was a good, a highly desirable, a necessary thing, but to make its pursuit the chief end of man was unsatisfying; it was a
limited world view. In the thirteenth century, the Virgin had her
palaces like Chartres, where the weary and bewildered could be
comforted and the human mind had its ordered system of knowledge in
the *Summa* of St. Thomas. What could the new twentieth century
offer? Adams asked science and technology and got no answer.
Brogan believed, "for the background of our present perplexities,
the 'Education' is an indispensable document." He "speaks for an
American attitude that we tend to ignore, for that critical side of
American life that knows how much more the human heart needs than
mere material goods and the vulgar success that Henry Adams, to our
profit, escaped."32

"In the Affluent Age," asked James McMillan (1972), "with men
freed from the grinding need to toil brutishly for sustenance, would
not they have the time, opportunity, and desire to turn to religion?"
He concluded, "They have the time and the opportunity. But the
desire? Alas, the one adjective that no one would think of applying
to the age is 'spiritual'." Gerald Priestland (1974) asked of
Americans: "are we starved of emotional satisfaction, for what in
days gone would have been religious nourishment?" Are we a species
without a religion? Although Americans have every reason for
needing one, we have no sense of common destiny, no sense of being
brothers or sisters under the fatherhood of God or anything else.
McMillan echoed with similar lament, "What ever happened to God?"
Unfortunately in the period of the religious revival the church had
been made more relevant to modern life, humanized, as the rolling of
the stone, the raising from the dead, the feeding of the multitude, the walking on the water now became so many fairy-tales, wholly unacceptable in the light of twentieth century science and rationality. What was being proffered, said McMillan was "a view of Jesus and God, so filled with genuine doubts and qualifications as to render the Christian message very nearly meaningless in the spiritual sense." 33

Crisis of Values

A sign of the "meaninglessness" of Christianity was the turning away from Western religion by many young people. Under the sign of Aquarius, the counterculture members from Berkeley to Boston searched for new and different religious experiences, experimenting with psychedelic mysticism, astrology and the occult. Eastern religions stressing love, social harmony and peace appealed to the generation disillusioned by the violence of the War in Vietnam. The Nation of Islam (the Black Muslims) enjoyed rising membership as it appealed to the ghetto poor as a "therapy against the ravages of the white-dominated hell called America." 34 Yoga, Zen Buddhism and transcendental meditation seemed to offer spiritual guidance and insight which the traditional religion in America lacked. In the Sixties, too, some church leaders became more militant, sensing the need to assume positions of strong moral leadership. Martin Luther King became a champion in the civil rights movement and Eugene Carson Blake, secretary general of the World Council of churches was arrested in 1966 after being involved in a civil rights
demonstration. Many church leaders realized that the times and issues demanded they take a stand, and they entered into antiwar demonstrations (Father Daniel Berrigan was arrested), civil rights marches, school boycotts, rent strikes, and welfare unions.

Thus, in the absence of standards of morality which are well defined in America, and without outspoken criticism of the establishment to humanize the brokers of power, it appears natural that our youth would revolt in a sense similar to the Reformation. They searched for spiritual answers and personal identity through inspiration. About them they saw only false prophets and idols. Therefore, they sought new answers and meaning in Hinduism, yoga, Taoism, drug cults to expand consciousness—i.e. expand human understanding, experimental sex as a means of physical and spiritual kinship, romanticism of returning to nature as nudists or communal farmers. Their plea for 'LOVE' was really a response to the sterility of contemporary values; a call to return to a basic Christian ideal. Faith and brotherhood, they agreed, should be restored to uncorrupted form; the Philistinism as described by Laski should be exorcised. Materialism was not enough.

Michael Davie (1972) pointed to the "crisis of values," most easily observed in California as a "social San Andreas fault," or cleavage between the Berkeleyites and the world of Ronald Reagan, the Radical Right. The crisis involves an assault on 'old values' by people who are motivated by different 'new values'. "The gap between the two is now so wide that it is hard to imagine how it
could ever be bridged." For Davie, the Century Plaza hotel in Los Angeles seemed to be symbolic of the 'world of Reagan', as he viewed the Plaza as "a fitting temple for the worship of the God of Growth," the Plaza was a proof of identity and represented financial substance. The 'world of Berkeley' was represented for Davie by the Berkeley Art Museum, a building stark and angular, with rough concrete walls, symbolic of detached, even dreamy, gentleness and tolerance. What had caused the crisis of values was the inability of these two worlds to communicate. There were serious social disorders, like the Charles Manson killings in the summer of 1969, which indicated how badly absolute moral values were needed in America, and how essential basic agreement was on what those values should be. For Davie, no detail of the Manson murders "was more disturbing" than the behaviour of the girls "when photographs of the Tate bodies were produced in court, the corpses linked by nylon rope, a carving fork protruding from a dead man's stomach. The girls huddled together, giggling." The case could not be simply dismissed with "live freaky, die freaky;" "the real battlefield," observed Gerald Priestland (1967) is society as a whole, with all its interlinked and interdependent factors." Media was not the cause; the lack of a stabilizing anchor in America was.

The young protestors who said "affluence is not enough" in the Sixties had something important to say, although they offered no alternative. Lacking an anchor, today's actual or self-styled revolutionaries are fragmented and without consistent direction.
Affluence had provided the material basis for students to be able to ask "what is the purpose of life?" But the "New Left pays little attention to the Old Left," viewed Davie; "the New Left are determined to approached everything de novo," and "have declined to pay attention to any lessons the past may provide."

Perhaps the most baleful result of the revolt has been the undermining of the center position in politics. One of the handicaps of liberalism is that 'rational deliberation' takes a lot of words, and there is no middle-of-the-road slogan with the force and brevity of 'Send in the Troops' or 'Off the Pigs.' Unfortunately, in Davie's view, what the revolt of the young people has principally achieved has been to "stir up a much more formidable revolt of the masses--the Radical Right." Davie noticed Reagan often wearing a stetson, in which the "role of modern governor merges into the role of old-time sheriff." Davie saw the old values--"rural democracy is superior to urban democracy," the idea "of the individual standing on his own two feet," "hard work," "respect for elders," "law and order," "reliance on the gun," and "suspicion of alien minorities"--as not offering any alternative either. Neither the 'world of Reagan', nor the 'world of Berkeley' could provide all the answers. There had to be a middle ground, in which all could reason and decide.

"California," found Davie, "is the richest and the most materialistic society in the world, but it is also the scene of an extraordinary reaction against materialism." This is not as paradoxical as it sounds, as Henry David Thoreau pointed out, it is
only after people have secured the 'necessaries of life', that they are 'prepared to entertain the true problems of life'. Thus, Davie explained, the richer the Californians get, the more they worry about what they got rich for. 37

"Nowhere," affirmed Davie, "outside of California is there such a variety of organizations catering to spiritual anxiety." Many of these spiritual centers search for new values. Workshops, seminars, research, self-actualization, psychotherapy, hydro-psychotherapy, videotape feedback, bio-feedback, personal awareness, 'Awake, Tune In, Unfold,' encounter groups, human potential, expand human awareness, role playing, gazing, touching, smelling, rubbing, a silent encounter; surely no other people in the world had the where-with-all to be so concerned with their minds as Americans. Davie asked a convert to Hindu philosophy why it was a profound experience, and the devotee answered: "It provides you with an ultimate resource--some kind of thing which you turn to when what one calls one's own resources are exhausted. It provides a reassurance that you won't just go screaming mad or flip under pressure, or that even if one does flip it is sort of irrelevant." 38

Again, Americans always seem to want to use religion for get-aheadism.

Aldous Huxley came to California in the 1930's to write for Hollywood and developed in middle age an overwhelming interest in "the true nature, both physical and psychological, of man." The more he looked into it, the more Eastern religions did have
something to offer, as any religion, he conceded, was bound to create objects of worship: gods, defunct saints, and so on. But Christianity persisted in regarding its deities as independent realities. The Oriental philosophers on the other hand, were perfectly clear that all deities are projections of the mind and ultimately unreal; for Oriental philosophers, the vision was the ultimate reality. This was the central issue, for Davie in looking at modern America said, Americans lacked a vision, a direction, what Henry Adams had called a world view, a plan for action. Thus, it was in the context of finding a vision, that Aldous Huxley, and later many young Americans after reading *The Doors of Perception* (1954), experimented with mescaline to provide a "mystical experience," both "chastening" and "rewarding." Drugs were an aid to contemplation. Unfortunately, many Americans lost sight of the original purpose— to search for vision or meaning— and got lost along the path of unrighteousness. "Huxley," explained Davie, "had no doubt that he himself had had a glimpse through drugs of the nature of the ultimate reality," and surprisingly, Davie viewed, "his drug experiences continually remind him of what he called 'the fundamental all rightness of the universe'." This interest generated by Huxley spread to the Beats, the hippies... who "called into question the whole aim of western civilization." But at its core, what seemed to Davie to unite all "these young people and movements," is "their anti-materialism." They simply doubt "that material prosperity is the high road to happiness." Why is this happening
now? he asked. Because Americans, especially Californians, "have the time, the money and the assurance of future comfort that leaves them no alternative except to confront their own anxieties."

"Hitherto, only a tiny elite in any society has asked the question 'What am I?', the rest have been too busy staying alive, or have been ready to accept a system of belief handed down by the elite." Now, "in California, not only is there no general system of belief, but millions of people have the opportunity--and many of them the education--to worry about the dreadful void." 39

Davie saw Americans plunging inwards--into solipsism--in the hope that the search for self knowledge would somehow provide a new code of values to live by. Robert Hargreaves (1973) disagreed, saying that religious belief, while certainly not dead in America, was "beginning to take on more and more noninstitutional, nonsecular forms." Hargreaves found a back to basics or a return to orthodoxy movement in the mid Seventies. This was the major propelling force behind the popularity of the evangelists. Americans wanted a religion that maintains a body of unshakeable beliefs, strict internal discipline, zeal, exclusiveness and a distinct code of ethics. They no longer want their churches to be tolerant and relevant so much as they want them to explain the mysteries of human existence in ultimate terms. Davie found Americans contemplating the self; Hargreaves found Americans returning to old style religion but in noninstitutional forms such as the Jesus movement and in the entertaining hits Jesus Christ Superstar and Godspell.
In June, 1972, 75,000 young people poured into Texas for Expo 72, a religious festival chaired by Billy Graham. The young people chanted with apparent fervor—'Two bits, four bits, six bits, a dollar. Everyone for Jesus stand up and holler'.

As this study concludes, it appears that Hargreaves may be right as the evangelists have continued to attract ever-increasing numbers of Americans, many who are proclaiming themselves as 'born again Christians.' Old time religion is being recycled, as revivalism is no longer considered the territory of rednecks, faith healers, holy rollers and counterfeit preachers. Americans are down on their knees, pursuing the word day-by-day instead of just going to church on Christmas and Easter. It is estimated that there are 45.5 million evangelicals in America today. William Martin, a sociologist at Rice University said: "The Evangelicals have become the most active and vital aspect of American religion today."

Most evangelicals now are conventional Protestants who hold staunchly to the authority of the Bible, and to orthodox Christian doctrine. The word of God is spread through the linament—and locker—room chapels, Jesus rock, and congresses of the laity. Billy Graham continues to increase his popularity through his crusades. The Britons said Americans now want, indeed they need, spiritual orthodoxy or in the words of Henry Adams, a world view. Currently, many Americans appear to have found it.
Religion in America had formerly been in spiritual pawn to politics, Admass and to relevance. To Britons as well as Americans, it appeared that absolute moral values had been removed. This had left Americans floating, pessimistic, with a feeling of helplessness. In the most recent British commentaries, there is a hopefulness that Americans may be finding an anchor, thus ending their search for meaning and allowing the crystallization of a vision, a plan of action at home and abroad. They looked expectancy for the United States to 'come of age'.
Footnotes for CHAPTER VIII

1 Sir Shane Leslie, American Wonderland, Memories of Four Tours in the United States of America (London, 1936), 223.


4 Leslie, American Wonderland, pp. 76-77.

5 Jacks, My American Friends, pp. 93-98, 106.


8 Morgan Philips Price, America After Sixty Years, the Travel Diaries of Two Generations of Englishmen (London, 1936), 108.


10 George S. Brookes, Thank you, America! The Tribute of an Englishman (New York, 1940), 175.

11 Denis Brogan, USA: An Outline of the Country (London, 1940), 54.


17 Ibid., p. 173.


20 Ibid., pp. 313-322.

21 Ibid., p. 321.

22 Ibid., p. 321-322.


25 Ibid., pp. 161-166.

26 Ibid.


29 Ibid., p. 93.

30 Ibid., pp. 94-95.

31 Ibid., pp. 95-96.

32 Ibid., pp. 130-139.


37 Ibid., p. 167.

38 Ibid., p. 192.
39 Ibid., pp. 197-198.


The Britons viewed the United States as an example of not only equality and progress, but also as an exemplar of a maturing nation, changing from a raw youth to a mature adult. America is still in the process of becoming rather than being the world model. It is still, in the eyes of the Britons, the world's best hope for mankind. As a vigorous, almost crude youth changing into young adulthood in the Twenties and Thirties, the Britons wondered at America's idealism and utter lack of cynicism. During the Depression, our visitors saw Americans "vent their disappointment on themselves," said British educator L. P. Jacks (1933), "because they feel the example itself has deteriorated." Americans tried to live up to the expectation of the world's best hope, and in the Thirties were possessed by the bitter feeling that they were setting a bad example for the rest of the world. This stung so much because America was born with the feeling of mission, of being a beacon to the world as John Winthrop had hoped. To set an example of liberty, equality, progress and democracy was certainly a "laudable ambition" praised Jacks. But as America moved through the triumph of World War II, and then into disillusion and despair over Cold War issues, the Britons told us again and again how difficult it is to expect perfection from ourselves--and most importantly, how difficult it is to expect it of others. They found Americans demanding too much, and too affronted at things Un-America or Anti-American. To grow to
maturity, pride would have to be conquered, messiah complexes abandoned, and diversity tolerated. Overall, America was an adventure to our British observers. They believed it a very exciting time to be an American, even calling post-1945 the beginning of the American Century.

Challenge to Idealism

After World War I, America was judged by the Britons to hold a new place in the world, and to be possessed with new meaning. Novelist-newspaperman Sir Philip Gibbs (1920) lauded America as imbued with "the spirit of adventure," a "democratic paradise," and the place "where every man" has "equal opportunity and rights." America had no need for Machiavellian subtlety in foreign policy, making her "diplomacy as simple as a child's copy-book maxim." By contrast, Europe, because of her decrepit age, was forced to rely on backstairs influence, melodrama, and rivalries, secret treaties, even political assassinations. America's youth, geographical remoteness from Europe, and her abundance of resources, had kept her free from menace and beyond all rivalry. Americans in world leadership seemed possessed of a certain freshness and vigor, but also a naivete, seeing things only in black or white. The United States had entered the Great War in the spirit of crusaders; the doughboys had viewed themselves as rescuers fighting against criminal powers. The American foreign policy and leadership stance was permeated with a strong sense of moral duty, idealism, and a
proclivity to set the world to rights. In this attitude, Americans were viewed as being completely sincere, as "Americans are more completely free from cynicism than any people in the world," lauded G. K. Chesterton (1922); "it is the great glory of Americans that they are not cynical."2

The source of America's moral idealism was the American creed rooted in equality. Chesterton the British poet-novelist-critic, knew America's creed "is at once the broadest and the narrowest thing in the world;" it suggests the "brotherhood of all men," but that brotherhood could only be based on American terms set "forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence." Chesterton believed, perhaps too harshly, that America's creed was similar to the Spanish Inquisition in its intolerance, dogmatism, and condemnation of anarchism, and by inference too, its condemnation of atheism. When transferred to the international scene, America's political religion of equality became "not Internationalism," said Chesterton, but "Americanization." "We understand nothing till we understand the amazing ambition to Americanize the Kamchatkan and the Hairy Ainu." On the other hand, Gibbs believed America's ideals could be used to gain liberties for other nations and to forward the welfare of the human family, and saw the creed as a source of vital energy. America was an exemplar, being free from "the old heritage of caste," "snobbishness," "militarism," and the "fetish-worship" of "Junkers." America is "a nation of nobodies great with the power
of the common man," whereas Europe is ruled "by their somebodies" with their "pomposities" and "High Panjandrums." The future, proclaimed Gibbs, lay in America, as "it is the nobodies whose turn is coming in history and America is on their side." In the positive sense, America's idealism in foreign policy could be vital energy, and in the negative sense, Imperious behavior. And while America had been built as a nation out of exiles, and while she housed nationalities at the end of the street which for the English remained at the ends of the earth, the Britons cautioned us about remaking the world in our own image. Not only would foreigners not appreciate the American creed of equality, many, even those who spoke the same language, would not understand it sociologically, as equality said Chesterton, "is by no means especially intelligible to an Englishman who tends at his best to the virtues of a gentleman and at his worst to the vices of the snob." There was no need, said our visitors, to proselytize our creed as zealots. Equality is an exciting spiritual adventure at home in America, and "it remains to be seen," said Chesterton, "whether the ideal will be able to shape the realities or will be beaten shapeless by them." America itself was an exciting adventure, and experiment still admired and watched from afar. America should retain her ideal of equality, and her enthusiasm and excitability in short, "the spirit of the explorer."³

"I think in an increasing way," said Gibbs, "the old supremacy which Europe had is passing westward." To America now came the
torch of leadership as a "new Atlantis." "Europe is stricken, tired, and poor. America is hearty, healthy, and rich," appraised Gibbs, "the flowering time of America seems due." The land of youth metaphor for America was changing to young adulthood. The Britons through the Twenties were willing to place their faith and trust in America because they judged her disinterested. The United States "is not out for empire," said Gibbs, or "for revenge," or "diplomatic vanity," nor is she given to "aggressive warfare" for "world domination." Americans are basically a "pacific people," or as John Gibbons (1935) echoed, they are not a "military people."

However, Chesterton found the American easily aroused by "small provocation" to defend his creed and way of life; "there is a kind of sense of honour, like that of a duellist, in his readiness to be provoked," indeed, "there is some parallel between the American man of action" and the "idea of the gentleman with a sword at his side." This quality of idealism coupled with the tyranny of the majority, Gibbs recognized, might lead to "popular intolerance" and "sudden gusts of popular passion," as in America "idealism attains almost supernatural force." When it "happens to be right it is the most splendid and vital force in the world," but if "it happens to be wrong it may lead to national and world disaster." Nevertheless, in the Twenties, the Britons believed the destiny of the American people is now marked out for the great mission of leading the world to a new phase of civilization. And as people of destiny they might choose to be kind or cruel, kill or cure, be reconcilers or destroyers.
America was acknowledged by the Britons as "the world's best hope for mankind."\(^4\)

By the late Twenties, Britain was entering the throes of a decaying empire, and the smug veneer of Victorianism was being chipped away by apostles for reform or reaction. Increasing socialism for Britain after World War I had made it increasingly difficult to return to the old days. America was seen to be new and modern, especially in technological efficiency and scientific management in this period of blight for Britain. Labor in America, viewed political-economist J. Ellis Barker (1927), had been a "principal beneficiary" from the new techniques and machines; America was a "land of progress" while Britain slipped into "stagnation."

America "is a model to the world and a monument of human competence," while Britain's "economic position" was judged "critical." Barker's recommendation was "to kick out the labour-leaders who look to Russia instead of America for their ideas and inspiration" and bring in the "new machines" and American "methods." "Unless England Americanizes her methods," he said, "England and the British Empire will become an appendage to the United States."\(^5\)

But after the Great Crash of 1929, the Britons were not so confident and began asking, "Can America Last?" "Will her idealism prevail?" The Britons found America confounded by the Depression, and far removed from the glorious days described by Herbert Hoover on March 4, 1929, as recalled by British novelist William Fitz-Gerald (1933):
"Our highways are choked with millions of automobiles;" Here are our savings-banks fairly bulging with deposits. Our colleges are turning away thousands of young people who never before had money for the Higher Education. And look at our homes, filled with costly piano-players and radios, with phonographs, vacuum-cleaners, porcelain baths and every known electric gadget to save labour and boost our Delight of Life!

Hoover's pipe-dream had not lasted long, but what was really distressing to our visitors in the early Depression was the mood of despair rather than the economic facts. America seemed to have lost her old buoyant idealism, appearing outraged and baffled by misfortune, unaccustomed as she was with suffering. Needing perspective, said Mary Agnes Hamilton (1932) "depression blocks its view; America cannot see around it." Many excuses had been laid on--"bankers, politics, democracy, mixed races, Prohibition," as "to all these, the calamity is referred." "For years, it has been an article of faith with the normal American," she professed, that "America, somehow, was different from the rest of the world." Now "doubt" is the real "trouble" which "lies, unspoken and unspeakable in the back of the American mind." It is "the real poison root" of the Depression in America. The Britons likened the American experiences to a child coming of age as Hamilton offered one image: "A child falls. It grazes its knees. For the first time, it sees its own blood, and feels, acutely, its own pain. Surprise, horror, a sense of injustice, of sharp and sudden and highly disagreeable collision with malign forces outside itself, aggravate simple physical distress. Feelings escape in a howl of anguish, which is
followed, as a rule, by a period...of bitter sobbing and whimpering. Of this hurt child, inexperienced in suffering, obscurely indignant, and altogether helpless, I was again and again reminded, in 1930." "We see America now in the mingled charm of crudity and power only half understood of adolescence," said Edward Bliss Reed, (1932) "the time to put away childish things is surely near."6

Conceptually in America, Hamilton found "a sense of ignorance, of being wholly and blindly in the dark" as to what should be done; intellectually, there is the sense that "the great machine having got, somehow disjointed from its center, is whirring perilously, in a void. No one knows how to re-attach it, or to what...it is breaking their spirit." It is from "lack of purpose" that the American people suffer, Hamilton determined, and "without vision the people perish." But America has "the imagination and the harsh, almost callous vigour of youth." She has, said Reed, "the power of enlisting the imaginations of the young along lines, not of conservation, but of continued exploration and experiment." Reed believed idealism in America would be restored, pronouncing "the fulcrum of world history in the immediate future lies in the United States." L. P. Jacks (1933) compared America to the lion in Milton's account of the Creation, as "now half appeared the tawny lion, pawing to get free his hinder parts" and predicted: "then springs, as broke from bonds, and rampant shakes his brinded mane."7

Jacks asked if Americans had the will, the purpose, and the discipline required to "get free his hinder parts" and effect what
he termed "a planned society." Given the tradition of equality, would Americans march to a common drummer? Would they become a competent followership? This would be difficult indeed for Americans because the American's conception of his country is his conception of himself writ large. In his eyes America is not merely a nation of individualists, but, perhaps more significantly, an individualist nation. America, said Jacks, tried "to go her own way," as the London Economic Conference illustrated. "In her collective spirit, no less than in the practice of her individuals, America is a walking Declaration of Independence." But, cautioned Jacks, "America is not as self-contained as she aspires to be, as he has fallen into economic entanglements with the rest of the world which count for far more...than any number of treaties," or "schemes aiming at the balance of power." Was America a democracy "without discipline," asked Jacks, or could she follow a competent drummer?  

"The New Deal was born of this sense of resentful bewilderment," said London School of Economics Lecturer, S. H. Bailey (1935), and "politically it is true to type." An upsurge in a democratic direction seems to form the traditional reaction of the American people to periods of crisis. The British viewed the New Deal to be in the democratic mainstream, and not as a shift toward Fascism or Communism. Significantly, American democracy allowed a competent followership, and Mr. Roosevelt was not slow to seize the opportunity presented by the agitation of the great majority for vigorous action.
President Roosevelt, as the competent drummer, "from the onset received warm support," viewed Bailey. No longer was the "best government" the "least conspicuous." The President displayed an uncanny mastery of the arts of popular persuasion, employing the telling phrase on the platform and the disarming simplicity of the microphone to capture the imagination and sustain the interest of the most volatile public in the world. Franklin D. Roosevelt was most successful with his campaign of the "Forgotten Man," said Bailey, as "everyone hoped that he would be identified sooner or later with the forgotten one whose welfare was the especial solicitude of the President." The New Deal was experimental; it was not a system of social philosophy," but was "a series of experiments," which coincided with "the ordinary American citizen's belief in the empirical and a deep rooted mistrust of abstract ideas."

In three and a half years a "realm of certainties" had suddenly collapsed, viewed Bailey, "and the citizen found himself groping in an enigmatic obscurity." The New Deal "is the sympathetic response of the Administration to this feeling." Americans, however, are pragmatists: "the ad hoc character of experiments, which it is openly admitted may not succeed, strikes an immediate response in a continent of ad hoc minds." The Britons viewed both superficially and in great depth, depending on their expertise and interests, all of the alphabetical agencies, the massive programs aimed at "relief, recovery and reform," as Bailey labeled them, and understood that "among the active initiators of policy" there were "at
least three prominent groups." The "radicals," represented by "Mr. Rexford Tugwell, would like to bring about," surmised Bailey, "a greater equality of individual incomes through an extensive program of socialization." Secondly, the "social reformers," said Bailey, "are concerned with building up some form of control in the public interest over different parts of the economic system and with securing recognition for certain elementary social rights." Within this most powerful group he found "Miss Perkins, Mr. Ickes, Mr. Wallace, and the "Hot Dog Boys," as "the followers of Professor Frankfurter are called in Washington." Thirdly, a large body of supporters of Mr. Roosevelt "consider that the experiments are purely temporary in character and that upon an appearance of business recovery they will cease to perform any useful function and should disappear."

This was the attitude of the Chamber of Commerce. The Britons marveled at the Roosevelt coalition and the personal magnetism of the President as Shane Leslie (1936) said Roosevelt held and fascinated his audience like a "snake charmer." Leslie heard Roosevelt's speech to the new Code Committees, and described: "Franklin Roosevelt's entry was most moving and I experienced that tremor which no Royalty can cause me in Europe when I heard the usher announce: The President of the United States!" His clear "unabashed diction, his vital sincerity and prophetic confidence left no room for criticism." Franklin D. Roosevelt was like "the Irish doctor who worked steadily through his cabinet of medicines, convinced he would hit on the right one sooner or later" said Leslie
"and he did!" "The mind of Washington is happy but confused, confused but happy," believing "the promise of American life" to "still hold good." Bailey found that while Franklin D. Roosevelt held "enormous personal prestige," he can "act neither as a dictator nor as the arch-priest of a new social cult." He has acted like the "fisherman who is forced to fish for his political livelihood, has put out many rods in the hope of landing three big fish—Relief, Recovery and Reform," but no one "can prophesy with any certainty what the actual haul will be." An American farmer explained: "I guess he plays by ear," to which Bailey replied: "It is almost inevitable that the harmonic results are baffling to classical ears." 10

"It is certain by now," determined Bailey, "that the United States will never return completely to the individualism of the expansionist days," as "the period 1932-1936 may have in common with the years 1914-1919 and 1861-1864, the historical distinction of constituting a milestone in American history." What were to be the consequences of the New Deal? Certainly one of the most significant results was the exceptional degree to which the Federal Government intervenes in economic life. Intervention implied every degree from loose supervision to direct participation, with the most significant example of the latter being TVA. "The Tennesse Valley Authority," said Bailey, is regarded from one angle as a "relief scheme," and from another as a "large scale experiment in state socialism." The new role for government as the interventionist state
allowed the Federal system to be "a planning authority" in agriculture, a "compulsory power" in transportation operations, the "guardian of the public interest," and a "regulator" in finance, labor relations, and social human rights. Overall, the New Deal established a compensated economy using Keynesian economics in which the function of Government is "to offset incipient booms by high taxation and the contraction of credit, and incipient depression by an increased expenditure on public works and credit expansion. Government intervention in the economy had become an indispensable condition. The Britons recognized the New Deal had also greatly increased the powers of the Presidency, and expanded the authority of the national government "at the expense of the several states." It "accelerated political consciousness" to the point where most Americans were now aware of what Will Rogers called "the big argument" in Washington.\textsuperscript{11}

Along side the Cabinet, our visitors noticed a most interesting phenomenon: a regular practice is developing of Presidential consultations with an intimate circle of technical advisers. This "may reinforce presidential influence at the expense of that of the rest of the Cabinet," ventured Bailey. They noticed, too, that in America, the "best minds" usually do not go into politics. This is in contrast to the British tradition of the "best families" dedicating themselves to "public service." Hence, the Britons were concerned with the moral standards of the public administrators, saying the spoils system, politician partisanship, and the lack of
permanence of tenure in the civil service were formidable obstacles to its reform. But British educator L. P. Jacks found one of the essential underpinnings to the success of the New Deal to be its symbiotic relationship with the intelligentsia. Democracy in America failed to attract the best minds due to "the humiliations of vote catching, the arts of deceptive manoeuvre, the atmosphere of intrigue, in which democratic politics are prone to get involved," however, democracy needed the "unofficial service" of the intelligentsia as "an ingredient" for success. In America during the New Deal, the Britons viewed the intelligentsia "as a body" abstaining "from direct participation" in "national government," yet "they furnish the government with expert service as required. But they do not govern." "An intelligentsia," by virtue of its keen "historical sense," "is too long-sighted to deal effectively with issues that are of passing or temporary importance. On the other hand, a government in whose composition the intelligentsia forms no part is too short-sighted," sacrificing the "greater issues" to expediency. It was the miracle of the New Deal, believed Jacks, that the President had reached a happy balance between the thinkers and the doers. 12

H. G. Wells (1935), in his utopian schemes would have preferred more leadership from intellectuals co-operating around the world to solve common problems, thus forming the nucleus of a world-state or world brain. America was the land of the go-ahead tradition and limitless energy, and held all the elements to potentially lead the
world to a cosmopolis. But he believed the New Deal leadership to be distracted by raucous voices—like those Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and Francis Townsend—and was "muddling through" without a definitive plan." America, however, was still "the New World," where policy is determined with "open eyes" through "public discussion" and "there if anywhere, the intimations of a future world state are to be found." British journalist Harry J. Greenwall (1936), on the other hand, had expected no definitive plan: "I believe America will remain for a long time in a fluid state," but the "revolution" through improvisation, "will continue." Most Britons agreed with Greenwall that Americans are pragmatists, not Platonists, and "to tell the world hustle in America does not exist is attempting the impossible." 13

The Britons complained of America's failure to participate in the League of Nations and the World Court, and in 1933 they felt betrayed by Roosevelt's torpedoing of the World Economic Conference. But while they chastized America's position on the war debts, international loans, the tariff, and the currency questions, they championed Franklin D. Roosevelt for being wise in time. Roosevelt knew how to seize power and use it effectively, as Greenwall explained: "Franklin Delano Roosevelt came to power in a moment of panic. He was faced with two alternatives: a bloody revolution or a bloodless revolution. He chose the the second. America had her revolution. Roosevelt gave away money, food and clothes. He gave people new hope. He prevented America from committing suicide."
America had regained her balance. Her idealism was restored and equality savaged, as Anthony Jenkinson (1936) who had just graduated from Oxford, found: "America, is, in comparison with England, delightfully free of the stifling atmosphere engendered by class distinctions. In other words, America is a democracy." And "contact with that democracy comes to the Englishman like a breath of fresh air"...it "invigorates him" Shane Leslie chuckled "everybody has lost a fortune and is gaily off to make another."  

Optimism shone brightly, as Leslie found "no cringing," nor did Americans "whine" over "the unkind deal they had received from the wheel of fortune." They placed their hopes in Franklin D. Roosevelt, and "their philosophical courage," said Leslie, "made me feel better for the human race." Leslie saw the advertisement "U. S. TIRES" and protested, "No, she doesn't!" only later to understand the American spelling of "tyres." "America will not become tired or stale or mummified like a European country. I have lived long enough to see her boom herself twice into wealth and sink twice under panic. I shall live long enough to see her rich again, and I shall probably go out with the next depression." America's idealism, her get-aheadism, and her resilience was the source of her charm and power. Franklin Roosevelt embodied these very American qualities, believed the Britons, as Harry J. Greenwall (1936) described his first impression: "He is very, very handsome; he has the face of a male film star, and his voice is more attractive than that of any film star I ever heard speak. From the crown of his head down to his
waist, Mr. Roosevelt is the perfect type of manhood. From his waist to his feet he is crippled... He cannot rise without assistance; he cannot stand alone; he cannot lift his feet more than about an inch from the ground. In every house in which he lives there must be lifts; everywhere there are ramps along which the President must slide his feet from place to place. It takes the character of a MAN to overcome such physical disability and with it to reach the White House, irrespective of successful policy or otherwise, and Mr. Roosevelt is that man." Greenwall wondered, as he watched the President slide his feet along that ramp "as if he were chained by the ankles...perhaps the chains, the invisible chains, are symbolic? Perhaps this laughing Adonis is chained to policies he can never unshackle." Nowhere was this more true than in America's responsibility and opportunity to lead the world. Would America assume her destiny they asked, or circumvent the challenge?

"We Europeans," revealed J. B. Priestely, "are taught to think of the United States as the country that is only just beginning, the land of unlimited opportunity, the place that is all a golden future." America, having survived the Depression, was still in the process of becoming. "America is definitely in front; when compared with other countries, European or Asian; she hardly knows she is leading us, but she is. Russia can turn the old economic and political system upside down, but no sooner has she done so than she takes a long look at America. One country after another follows suit. They may be ten years behind, but they are following on
steadily." America's responsibility was enormous, and above all, the Britons desired to know if America had a purpose or understood her purpose. They feared, as Priestley judged, "America does not know where she is going, but if she walks into some abyss of barbarism, she will not walk alone. This, I concluded, was a solemn responsibility," demanding maturity and rationality. "Britain had a similar responsibility when she achieved her industrial revolution, and led the way to the slagheaps and dirty back alleys and poisoned air, to the greed and cynical indifference of competitive industrialism." So far, Britain, judged Priestley, "has failed the world, for having led us into this dark pit, she has not yet led the way out. It is now America's turn." He found in America an energizing "spirit" but hoped we would modify some "social ideas" "to keep up" with the technological "engineers and builders." America needed to borrow some enterprise and courage from the engineers to solve dilemmas of social inequalities—the internal dilemmas of racism; social inequality in education, jobs and housing, and to resolve the ambiguous condition of equality for American women and spiritually define its goals. "In short you will have to discover where it is you are taking us," Priestley asked of America. From the British past, he understood that world leadership in a mature and responsible sense could only be achieved by having Americans come to terms with where it is we are going. To lead, America must first spiritually define herself and to spiritually define herself she
needed to resolve domestic incongruences between the values of equality and progress and social institutions. Only through these guideways, could America and the world avoid the dark pit which was Britain's deadend. Franklin Roosevelt's last hand-written speech inspires us in this direction: "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be the doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith."16

Challenge to Leadership

After the invasion of Poland by the Nazi menace, Britain's own faith in the realization of tomorrow was put to its most severe test, and ultimately America's idealism too would be challenged. Americans did not experience World War II as personally and intimately as did the British from 1939 to 1941. English novelist on lecture tour, Cecil Roberts (1947), recalled how he first heard the news of war while in Evesham: "Walking down a side street, we heard a radio broadcasting the solemn voice of Prime Minister Chamberlain. We listened by the open door of a cottage. A girl wife came to the door, with a baby in her arms, and shyly invited us to enter and listen. The Prime Minister was declaring war on Germany, she said. We entered that decent little abode, with the simple furniture of the newly-wed, the gaudy ornaments, the shiny leather parlour suite." The young husband, a railway porter, sat there in his shirt sleeves, with a little girl evacuee on his knees. When the Prime Minister had finished his solemn address to the British Empire the National Anthem was played. "We all rose in
that little parlour, and looked sadly at each other. It was war. A new age, beyond all our imagining, had begun. The world would never be the same again. I caught the eye of the boy husband as we stood there and he seemed to say to me, "I know what this means. In a few weeks I shall be a soldier. Next year at this time my wife may be a widow and my child have no father,"...a death knell rung by a madman in Berlin." British social historian, Mary Borer, remembered too the early preparations and real fear: "For many of us those memories of the early days of September 1939 are a confusion of rapidly built air-raid shelters, of the sudden blackout, of hurrying figures groping their way through familiar streets which had become unfriendly, of darkened trains arriving in still darker stations, of the issue of gas masks, which we were ordered to carry with us at all times,...young men who the day before had seemed schoolboys, now appeared overnight in uniform...girls exchanged their summer dresses for the khaki and blue of service uniforms. Hundreds of bewildered school-children...gathered at the London railway stations for destinations unknown, even to the weeping mothers."17

So fortunate was America, said the Britons, not to face the holocaust at home. All of the Britons who visited America during the war told us things we would expect from someone who wanted our help very badly. But in doing so, they made Americans aware of their sacrifices. The Britons revealed painfully what it was like to read grim news about the sinking of the Athenia, bound for
America with 119 British women and children; to Lay tank traps on rural British roads and dig for victory, fearing famine; to be on fire watches, and experience nightly raids during the Blitz with the London docks ablaze from plane to plane combat overhead. Every Briton remembered the blood, toil, sweat and tears, and every British visitor in this period wanted to know when the Yanks are com'in?

Prime Minister Churchill headed a coalition government representing all political parties and appointed Clement Atlee from Labour as his deputy. Masterfully, he commanded Britain's Finest Hour: "Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous states have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag nor fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight in the seas and the oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air; we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds...in the fields...in the streets,...in the hills...We shall never surrender..." Churchill believed that if the island fell, the Commonwealth countries and the British fleet would carry on the struggle until "the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old." Significantly, none of the Britons visiting America between 1939 and 1941 doubted America's ultimate entry and rescue; perhaps because
of this confidence, the beloved Magna Carta, symbol of British
democracy and freedom, came to the United States for safekeeping. 18

In the Twenties and early Thirties the Britons had described
America as childlike, then adolescent, then young adult. As
World War II approached, it was apparent that young America had
come of age, as news correspondent Basil Dillon Woon (1942) lauded
Franklin D. Roosevelt's "cleverness" in "international diplomacy."
No longer, viewed Woon, "could it be said of the United States,
as Will Rogers phrased it, that she 'had never lost a war nor won
a conference'." America was now a "doughty joust'er in the "inter­
national tourney," and Woon added, "if poker was the game, both
Hull and Roosevelt were wily players." Woon recalled, "there had
been a day when American ambassadors were amiable gentlemen of
distinction in their own milieu but who were as children when they
were pitted against the suave and cynical calculation of European
diplomacy." Emphatically, stated Woon "that day is over." American
representatives were now "shrewd" and "trained in diplomacy." 19

"Yet, in the same months that the prestige of the American
Government and diplomats was rising by leaps and bounds in Europe," said Woon, and the name of Roosevelt was being regarded with love
and veneration by the Old World, in the United States the idol was
in danger of becoming the martyr. Woon, speaking to a multi-
millionaire in the Ritz Bar, Madison Avenue, was told: "The trouble
with us, we haven't the guts. We ought to shoot the fellow before
he gets us." Another banker snarled: "Shooting's too good for him.
Ought to be boiled in oil." "Surely," Woon asked utterly incredulous, they are "not talking about the President of the United States?" "About that ___ ___ ___ in the White House, you mean? They sure are," was the reply, "and you ought to hear 'em when they get really warmed up!" The Britons found that for many Americans Roosevelt was a Godlike figure, but for others, he was "the worst-hated man in the world." But what was extra-ordinary was the openness, the freedom, and the total lack of fear to discuss one's personal views. America was an extra-ordinary democracy. But not without short-comings and paradox, as Woon found in some circles that Roosevelt was considered "a tool of Big Business," and in other circles he was seen as "a Communist." America displayed extra-ordinary tolerance but also intolerance. A Roosevelt detractor warned that the President believed in Bolshevik rule, to which Woon replied, "well, so do I, don't you?" "He looked at me as if for years I had been a viper nestling unsuspected beneath his third waistcoat button." But afterall, laughed Woon, "Bolshevist rule" means "majority rule. That's all."²⁰ His host failed to see any humor, confirmed as he was that Roosevelt was a "red." The Britons had recognized these portrayals of intolerance before, over the same issue, during the Great Red Scare of 1920-21; they were to find it again during the red hunts of McCarthy.

The Britons, eager as they were for military support, could not fail to recognize the isolationist bloc against intervention and even preparedness. But they saw the wily statesman securing 'millions
for "his first love—the Navy," and appropriations for relief of European refugees. In comparison with the isolationists, Roosevelt was seen, by Woon as "clear-eyed" about the eventuality of America's being drawn into the war, thus the Britons encouraged an Anglo-American alliance. They saw Roosevelt utilizing every power vested in his authority to condemn aggression but unfortunately, deemed the Britons, "the President of the United States can bring against would-be aggressors every sort of persuasion save one": the "threat of war." Due to America's constitutional system whereby only Congress can declare war, Roosevelt was seen "as a crusader wielding a sheathed sword." He could "impose trade sanctions," "embargo munitions," "denounce," and "gravely view," but not "threaten war." The education of the American public toward preparedness was judged by our visitors to have been a monumental task, masterfully accomplished. 21

With the bombing of Pearl Harbor, "the American conscience was intact," said Woon, as the "violently isolationist majority" is now "convinced" fighting is "the only way to preserve the principles on which their liberties are founded." Sir Philip Gibbs (1942), who was in America during Pearl Harbor elated: "Surely the Japs had committed hara-kiri." "Victory is now certain," he rejoiced, due to the potentiality of American armaments and manpower. The spirit and power of Americans will not allow civilization to go down in darkness and, through their fortitude believed Gibbs, "the lamps would be lit again one day." 22
Throughout the war our visitors used similar words to describe America or America's position as world leader: conviction, sincerity, optimism, tenacity, strength, character, dependability, faith in final victory, power, will and spirit. Gibbs found President Roosevelt facing the war "buoyantly and undismayed;" he "looked at the future with bright eyes, waving away the failures of the past," to proclaim: "We are doing it!" This "confidence," this belief "in ultimate success," this "idealism" was the unique source of America's energy and accomplishment. "American exuberance is not due to conceit," viewed John Hay Beith (1942), English novelist, as the "cause is entirely different." "America is a comparatively young member of the comity of nations, and she feels, not without reason, that the older countries are inclined to be a little patronizing towards her, despite her overwhelming strength and prestige." America, he believed, "is conscious of a certain condescension in foreigners," and this "galls an American to the root of his being. So he overstates his case and overplays his hand, partly to impress the foreigner, and partly to satisfy his own legitimate pride in the noble heritage he has built up." American idealism would aid in winning the war, but at the war's end, the tendency to overplay a hand would produce in some British circles the image of the Ugly American.23

"Through the six years of war," confessed Cecil Roberts (1947) "a somewhat artificial relationship was imposed upon us." Britain and America "had to admire each other or perish and there were moments
when we were so genuinely united that the subsequent differences, inevitable with the coming of peace, were emphasized by contrast."

Americans watched the Britons in the postwar period establishing the New Britain along egalitarian lines, as the newly elected Labour government promised a free secondary education for all with a parity of esteem, a National Health Service, and industrial reorganization to promote technical efficiency. Britain was becoming more like America. But Americans seemed to have difficulty understanding why Winnie was turned out, reflecting for our visitors the romanticism which lingered in American foreign policy; Americans could not understand the disillusionment with the Conservative leadership. Unfortunately, in a very short time, they could not understand the disillusionment shown towards America and Americans who, after all, were the architects of final victory. Here, more than anywhere else was the real significance and application of the British perspective of *deja vu*. As world leaders one cannot expect to be loved all the time, the Britons confided. By the very nature of the top position one engenders envy, suspicion, fear, and hate. Tis folly to expect more; and suicidal to demand perfection, meaning total alignment with United States attitudes and policies. Was America a mature world leader, able to accept things un-American, even anti-American? Or was the atomic bomb, an example of America's technological genius, the final act of human insanity, "the *reductio ad absurdum* of war."24
Idealism Exultant then Jaded

Denis Brogan (1944) found in postwar America the same moral idealism which had propelled Americans in the Twenties and Thirties. Again, moral idealism in foreign affairs was rooted in equality: "America is built like a church on a rock of dogmatic affirmations. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights...that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." These words or slogans are very important to Americans who are completely sincere about their convictions. Whereas cynical Europeans might chide: "How absurd an ambition for a people to attempt, by written constitution, to establish justice!" It is "an ambition to make lawyers laugh and philosophers weep." And "to promote the general welfare;" "what is this entity so confidently labeled?" Brogan wondered "what would a Marxian or a Machiavellian make of it?" Americans, Brogan found, remained uncynical, convinced that America was God's country and firm in their sense of mission to establish a beacon to the world. Americans love oratory, phrases, the evocative power of verbal symbols, and find heroic rather than comic traditional ringing phrases like Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death! The European might mock such romantic naivety in public speakers who use phrases of patriotism, but not so the Americans. Americans, found Brogan, "like absolutes in ethics," and in foreign affairs Brogan reminded us again of our tendency to see events in terms of black or white. The Britons found postwar
America, as Don Iddon (1945), correspondent for the Daily Mail, London said, "exultant," and "engaging in a carnival of understandable self-congratulation." But, wondered the Britons, would America soon be disappointed as former alliances broke apart, complexities appeared, and American authority, was challenged? Could America move beyond her naive moral idealism?

Britons "must provide" the Americans, said Hilary Saunders (1944), lecturer for the British War Office, "with the tools that our greater experience can fashion, with which they can get on with the job of building the brave new world." From the perspective of déjà vu should come advice. The torch had been grasped by the Americans and "let us never forget that it is the old men who dream dreams," said Saunders, "but it is the young men who see visions."

The British traveler has always been a viable analyst of American culture, illustrating for Americans where we are weak and where we are strong. Britons have remained valuable critics except for the war years, 1939-1945, "when we had to admire each other or perish," as Cecil Roberts (1947) reflected.

Graham Hutton (1946) re-sounded the trumpet of criticism of America's foreign policies, suggesting that the United States held a "messianic complex." Our idealism, when exported abroad, appeared to non-Americans as Imperious behavior. Hutton explained that Americans have a "massive ignorance of the outside world," and have difficulty in seeing themselves as others do. "The stranger is confused," Hutton illustrated, "when told that the Russians,
French, and British are playing power politics by claiming 'spheres of interest'; he thinks of the Monroe Doctrine. He is surprised when Russian and Turkish concern over the Dardenelles, or British concern over the Suez canal is treated as power politics or imperialism; he thinks of Panama, the Canal Zone, and the way it was obtained. He is puzzled to find overwhelming support for Communists in Balkan countries...where they are treated as the people rebelling against tyrants or monarchs." The Briton "tries to square it all" and cannot; yet, in fairness, Hutton said, "it sounds like England almost a century ago."27

But this seemingly imperious behavior "is certainly not hypocrisy," said Hutton, "just as it was not hypocrisy in Victorian England. It comes from youthful, naive, undiscriminating, over-simplified self-confidence. It comes from optimism; from a certainty that anything can be solved permanently, quickly, easily. It runs the risk of great disappointments and frustrations, as the British grandsons of the Victorians can testify." In America "it comes from having been insulated for so long and having achieved miracles in insulation, without needing to consult or get along with anyone but other Americans."28 Now America must display maturity, but the process of coming of age would be painful. Hopefully, America would be poised to learn and lead; the theme of critical expectancy resounded in British commentary, echoing from the Thirties.

"While Americans are godlike," lampooned Don Iddon (1945), "they should remember they are not gods." Many Europeans began to fear
the young technological giant who now possessed the Bomb and controlled "the death-dance of the atoms." "President Truman," judged Iddon, "remains very steady and is avoiding the Chauvinistic statements and boasting which lesser men are mass-producing." A primary fear in all European minds was "the enormous gap between man's scientific achievement and his political infantilism," as Iddon implied that the greatest gap was in America. Debate on the internationalization of the atomic bomb was described as shrill and hysterical and the sincerity of US attempts to place nuclear energy in the hands of the United Nations was suspect. Iddon objected to the self-praise of the Americans over "the secret of the bomb's discovery," calling it an "international invention" and "outside politics." The American attempts "to harness science to the narrowly nationalistic and political chariot are crude," he warned, "belonging in a wheelbarrow era." Our visitors hoped to accelerate the maturing process of the American mind toward world leadership as they told us: "When Americans use the biggest, best, strongest, wealthiest, greatest, mightiest, most powerful," and the like, they are "describing the armed forces, the finances, the industrial machine, the scientific establishment and the political position of the United States." But, cautioned Iddon, "non-Americans hear only Jingoism," and this self-eulogy can only "drain the reservoir of good will which American achievement deserves." "The richest and strongest boy in school is not likely to be the most popular, particularly," reminded Iddon, "if he has
has difficulty in not flaunting his money and his muscles!" The Britons complained in harsh tones of the termination of Lend-Lease, the post-war loan to Britain with interest and the failure of vitamin-plus America to send badly needed food to England at the end of the war. Iddon was indignant over America's waste and surfeit: "You see the long lines of dustbins, ash cans, trash boxes, waiting to be emptied or carried away. They are crammed with rejected and discarded food--remnants of steaks, bones still heavy with meat, nibbled rolls and crusts, half chickens, half-finished grapefruits, oranges only partially squeezed, potatoes over-cooked or under-cooked and therefore uneaten, the soiled whites of eggs, fruit and vegetables toyed with and sent back, bits of meat, lumps of fat--all the rich crumbs from rich America's table. One week's accumulation could feed a million people."

Future harmony lay, warned the Britons, in the health and community of all, especially in the economic rehabilitation of war-torn Europe.29

Even before the pronouncement of the Cold War, the Britons recognized U. S. relations with Russia were not good, as evidenced by a noticeable trend towards militarizing the U. S. diplomatic service. As America assumed responsibility for containment of Communism through the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the Britons could not decide if America assumed world leadership "reluctantly," "gingerly," "with embarrassment," or "confidently," even "stridently." Iddon chuckled: "As America is being asked to step to the top of
the class, it thinks longingly of the days when someone else was the team captain."

Britain, in the eyes of our visitors, still had a thing or two to tell the young upstart Americans. Britain "is to do anything but murmur, 'Hear, hear', when the U. S. speaks." Britain now had a blueprint of its own, grounded in egalitarianism and predicated upon socialism. The Britons had long been critics of America's social services, especially to the poor, and now highly touted their National Health Service as the London Daily Mail explained the new services to the Englishman:

"On Monday morning you will wake in a New Britain, in a State which 'takes over' its citizens six months before they are born, providing free care and free services for their birth, early years, their schooling, sickness, workless days, widowhood and retirement. Finally, it helps defray the cost of their departure. All this, with free doctoring, dentistry and medicine-free bath chairs too. All this you begin paying for out of your weekly pay packet, 4 s and 11 d. You begin paying next Friday..."30

The New Britain was domestically re-vitalizing, but compared to America, Britain was not rich. America was the wealthiest country in the world, certainly too, the most powerful, as Iddon surveyed: "It has more gold and goods and gear than any nation in the world. It has more bombs and battleships, machines and motor-cars, radios and refrigerators, coco-nut, custard pies and ice cream sodas than the rest of the world put together. Its shops are jammed, its stomachs full, its railways and roads crowded. Its citizens earn almost three times as much as before the war. It is
terrifyingly strong and brimming with vigour. Is it happy? It is not. It is racked with insecurities and anxieties. The more powerful it grows, the more deadly the weapons it develops, the more apprehensive it becomes." America's behavior as world leader became increasingly nerve-wracking to Europeans who wished to return to some semblance of normalcy. Faced with her own urgent dilemmas, Britain often found America's sensitivity distracting, always "Feudin', Fussin' and a-Fightin'," as Iddon plucked from the song. The United States "was feuding over the Marshall Plan, fussing over the special interim aid to Europe, and fighting the Comintern programme." Caught in the middle, Britain shuddered, "people who call this a Cold War are poor judges of temperature."\(^{31}\)

America, they warned, was not mature enough to accept diversity. "Some in Wall Street think" the English, said Iddon, "are heading for a peculiar British kind of Communism" simply because Britain has nationalized certain basic industries. Our visitors saw us shamelessly interfering, and buying influence in politics around the world. Americans in Italy were advising people what to do and when to do it. Good boys will receive dollar bills. Rascals will get nothing. Iddon jeered: "The slogan could be: 'When in Rome, do as the Americans do'."\(^{32}\)

If the nerve-wracking wrangle between America and Russia continued, reasoned the Britons, perhaps Europe might be re-discovered as a potential arena for British influence. Perhaps the war had rung down the curtain on the old British Empire, but raised
it again on the multi-ethnic Commonwealth. But the idea of European unification with Britain in the vanguard did not last long, as France appeared to be shifting toward Communism and West Germany seemed to be an economic satellite of American capitalism; the former the British found "too liberal," the latter "not liberal enough," said British historian Bentley Gilbert (1970). Meanwhile, within Britain there was controversy over the Labour government's "subservience" to the United States; the "anti-subservients" or "Keep Lefters" eventually coalesced around Aneurin Bevan, who charged America with "dollar diplomacy" and proposed an independent course for Britain in foreign affairs. 33

In the Forties and early Fifties both the Conservatives and Laborites had reason to be offended by American attitudes. Britons found Americans intruding everywhere in the world with their astounding wealth and equipment; they were the new oilmen in the Middle East, the roadbuilders in Greece and Turkey, the businessmen in Germany and Japan and the New information officers all over the globe. They appeared as the New Romans with indelicate manners of the parvenues and the arriviste. On the intellectual level there was also the question asked within Britain, how should communism be evaluated? Even though Animal Farm, George Orwell's best seller in 1945 had savagely attacked the Russian system and its claims for democracy, the Keep Lefters in Britain still looked to Russia for possible answers to social domestic questions. In short, Communism in Britain, especially among the liberal intellectuals did not
raise the same alarm as it did in America. And the Conservatives within Britain, although they looked to the private enterprise American technical model, had grievances against the upstart Americans too. The Tories, said British social historian, Harry Hopkins (1965), "would refer in the most ingratiating terms to the Anglo-American alliance, but in their private conversations," would refer to the "insufferable, cultureless, adolescent parvenues" who had so monstrously succeeded to the pro-consular places they themselves had once occupied." With envy and bent pride, "they hated the Americans' guts in a way that Labour was hardly capable." \(^{34}\)

America "is Rainbow Land with a pot of gold at every turning. But behind the golden-dollar-decorated curtain there is worry. The coat Britain wore with such elegance so long is beginning to feel like a hair-shirt to the U. S. She wonders how Britain led the parade for over two centuries, stepping out smartly, avoiding obstacles skillfully, and all the time keeping everyone in his place." Part of this statement reflects a self-eulogy for Britain certainly, but it is also a challenge which calls for further maturation in America. The United States, continued Iddon, "is flustered and floundering, hurt at the ingratitude of the nations, bewildered by the un-merry-go-round of events." Did America still cling to childlike playthings, refusing the awe-inspiring accountability which comes with the primacy in power. Could America come to grips with feelings and attitudes of ingratitude from former allies and non-aligned countries who received foreign aid? "It is a new
experience for Americans seeing others putting on the neutrality
make-up, dressing for a non-belligerent role," said Iddon, and
America "is not amused." America's "enthusiasm for doling out aid
wholesale is being qualified," as he chided, America demands "a
polite thank you" instead of "shouts of affront and insult." What
was needed? American maturity certainly, and in the interim "the
quiet, modulated voice of Britain is needed now," Iddon recommended.
"Eardrums are bruised by the growl of the Bear and the scream of
the Eagle." This quarrel, "rapidly degenerating into a brawl, between
Russia and the United States is jarring and juvenile."35

From their perspective of déjà vu, our visitors explained what
it was like to rudely awaken to the views of others, as Samuel G. Putt
(1956) former Commonwealth Fund Fellow explained: "We Britons were
astonished and pained to discover that in spite of our efforts to
'do good' we have been very cordially disliked by our proteges. We
were all brought up to believe that the British way of life had
spread justice, built useful dams, dispelled idolatrous mumbo-
jumbo and opened avenues to freedom." But, in the course of these
activities "it did not occur to the English to enquire whether or
not their subject races loved them." And so, "although we were
shocked when we discovered the truth on this score, we were not
outraged at the notion of international ingratitude." We were hurt,
admitted Putt, when were told that the Pax Britannica was an
unwelcome bondage, but not mortally. The American reaction to
disappointments was judged by the Britons to be much more acute, as
"Americans care very much more than we ever did about what other people think of them. The desire to be loved, for nations as for individuals, said Putt," is so often a source of despair.

L. P. Jacks (1933) had warned America about being "over-critical" of itself; Mary Hamilton (1932) had been alarmed by the "mood" of despair rather than the facts of depression. "When something goes wrong, 'I wuz robbed' is the spontaneous comment" in America, said Denis Brogan (1952). Amidst frustration and disappointments, the US reacted as a "pompous citizen who says 'You can't do that to me'."

Don Iddon echoed: "It was probably a good idea to have the H. Q. (of the UN) in the U. S., otherwise America might have decided not to play and take its baseball home." In British eyes the United States remained in the early postwar years as the world's best hope for the future, but they urged us to accelerate our maturation, as Iddon ridiculed, "put up the chewing-gum."36 The time for leadership was now. Perhaps that is why McCarthyism was such a disappointment to the Britons.

Pumpkin Patch Paranoia

"We are about to look at the trials of a man," said Alistair Cooke (1950), "who was judged in one decade for what he was said to have done in another." Young intellectuals of all political hues had contributed vital energy to the New Deal experimentalism, but in the 1940's to have traveled with or flirted ideologically with Communism became a crime as the trials of Alger Hiss illustrated. "The issue was very simple," explained Cooke. "Chambers, an ex-Communist,
had accused Hiss, formerly in the State Department during the New Deal, of having at that time pilfered confidential State documents and passed them on to him in the service of Communism. Chambers said that Hiss had been a Communist then and was his best friend in the party. Hiss denied all of it. "After two trials, enlivened by tales of buried typewriters and of microfilm hidden in a pumpkin," Hiss was "convicted in 1950 of perjury, recalled C. P. Hill (1967), Senior Lecturer at Exeter.37

But the guilt or innocence of Alger Hiss was not the point of concern to our British visitors; they found the probes of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and especially the demonic behavior of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy to be frightening in the country supposedly leading the world. Britons winced at what appeared to be fear and hatred of the Soviet Union; they abhorred the perverse obsession with fereting out communist infiltrators. They believed it absurdly wrong to point to Russia as the cause of all our ills, and as Cooke interpreted, patently stupid to persuade Americans that they "had been betrayed by the New Deal." Cooke found it alarming that "a nation with a religious trust in Progress simply cannot admit that even when the best is done, hard times may follow." McCarthyism, sadly for the Britons, represented America's reaction to failure and disillusionment. China had been lost, the Korean War had resulted in barren stalemate and startling military defeats; unfortunately, said Hill, "many Americans began to believe that their defeats and failures must be the result of disloyalty
and treason." The "climate of liberal opinion in the thirties," remembered Cooke, had supported Russia until the Stalin purge trials of 1935-36, then almost uniformly American intellectuals had supported the New Deal. But the Cold War climate of opinion seized upon the Hiss trials, generating a "newspaper circus," said Cooke, and at its basis "was the element of politics." 38

Our visitors saw McCarthy in demonic fury whipping up the issue and they described him as "impudent and adroit in argument," a "bully who believed in the big lie and the sweeping accusation," as Hill appraised. Hill was appalled that "there was plenty of support for McCarthy, who for about four years led a merciless campaign to prove that the real peril to the United States lay in Communism and treachery at home." McCarthy made use of wide powers granted to him as the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, summoning civil servants before him in order to smear their characters with the suspicion of Communism. And, wrote, Hill, the "witch-hunt spread through the land," "oaths of loyalty were imposed" upon "school and university teachers" and "trade union officials." "Members of religious minorities, pacifists, reformers, artists, were regarded with suspicion;" men were damned merely because they had flirted with left-wing movements in the Thirties. Needless to say, "if this is the brave new world, I'll take the cowardly old one." 39

J. B. Priestley (1955) was deeply frightened by America's crisis of self-confidence represented by McCarthyism. He had talked to
a gentleman "aggressively Southern" all "flushed and talkative"
with Bourbon about "the communists" in America. The man told
Priestley "in all seriousness, that the frequent mockery and
burlesques of the old Southern chivalry were all deliberately
inspired by the Communists." But even Mark Twain, Priestley
reminded him, had poked fun at chivalry, but the Southern "was
not convinced...he saw Reds everywhere, Red plots in everything."
Priestley appraised: "He was really a bit dotty," but "there was
something frightening in his political dottiness, his fanaticism, his
monstrous unreason, his refusal to question any evidence that
supported his case, his permanent state of bloodshot anger."
Priestley shuddered, "a thousand like him, all fiery with bourbon,
would be ready to lynch anybody merely on suspicion."

Far from inspiring confidence in our abilities as world leaders,
Samuel G. Putt (1956) explained, "there is something strangely un-
nerving in the spectacle of a mighty nation made up of people who all,
individually, believe themselves to be capable of a well-adjusted
progress to heaven-upon-earth. When that same nation, in its
collective identity, spends an inordinate deal of time looking
under its bed for bogey-men, we Britons...are already forewarned to
giggle, what in heaven's name, is American afraid of? What if there
is a Communist chiropodist in the U. S. Navy? Suppose a pinko egg-
head does lambast the social system? Need one take it all so
tragically? America, we feel, is sound enough to blow away all her
cobwebs in one coast-to-coast gust of intelligent laughter." The
real problem which concerned our visitors was America's self-doubt. "We fear," said Putt, "that the cobweb-hunters are growing too solemn for the confident laugh." Putt's recommendation was wisely humorous: "In the opinion of many British visitors the Union needs, at the moment, not a new Fouche to organize her counter-espionage but a new Moliere to recall her to a sense of proportion: 'On veut bien etre mechant: mais on ne veut point etre ridicule'."

As Chesterton in the Twenties had found Americans intolerant of criticism and dogmatic about the American creed, so too, found our visitors in the Fifties. But "why labour to prove the known attractions of your way of life?," asked Putt. "Reopen your immigrant gates and the world will continue to prove them for you. Talk less about liberty; give free rein to your native critics, and they will prove your freedom." It is, after all, believed Putt, "only in political matters and public utterances that Americans ever show the slightest inkling of a lack of confidence." For in their "private lives it is all so different. For the average citizen nothing is imposible, no progress unattainable, no comfort beyond the reach of the rewards of hard work." Domestically, the familiar get-aheadism in American Character worked well, and Americans enjoyed great success. "Yet," said Putt, "few free nations show such astonishing sensitiveness to the presence of internal or external criticism, or seem so ready to expect disaster to follow upon the heels of minor expressions of dissent." This same remarkable sensitivity to criticism had been earlier recognized as an American trait by former Commonwealth Fund
Fellow, who found Americans cannot be "disinterested or objective about criticism; criticism is viewed as something personal-like a coat to be worn or not worn...it is a possession." Was this evidence of youth and immaturity? Or "does the strain of effort after personal and material perfection," advanced Putt, "so tauten American nerves that unconformity can come to look like treason? How otherwise can one explain the nervous twitches of a nation which by its own claim, and by the consent of nearly everybody else in the world, is pretty nearly impregnable?"

McCarthyism represented the tyranny of the majority for the Britons, the one great risk recognized by de Tocqueville of granting equality to the masses. What was the taproot of McCarthyism, asked the Britons? What had so impassioned the public majority?

"Republicans, said C. P. Hill, "saw it as a means of returning to political power;" many "joined happily in talking of the twenty years of treason under Democratic rule since 1933." Too, "once McCarthyism was under way, many politicians were unwilling to come out against it for fear" of "implication." More generally, McCarthyism "offered a range of scapegoats for American failures abroad; it enabled those numerous Americans who believed that Uncle Sam had long been taken in by foreigners to display some of their patriotism;" and "it gave satisfaction to those...who thought that Truman's government was soft on Communism." The downfall of McCarthy came, recognized Hill, when he became involved in a dispute over the promotion of an army dentist "suspected of having once sympathized
with Communism." In this confrontation, McCarthy had challenged the Army and the proceedings were televised. Americans "were disgusted by his bullying, his sneering, and his strident unfairness;" "public opinion turned sharply against him," and the US Senate responded with censure.  

"The results and the legacy of this deplorable episode," said Hill, "are hard to access." McCarthyism certainly produced "disunity" among Americans; it "undoubtedly undermined the morale of those who worked for the government." "It silenced a great deal of free expression of opinion in a country which has traditionally always claimed to stand for individual freedom above all else." On the other hand, McCarthyism had taught us valuable lessons: "many Americans undoubtedly learned from this affair the perils to which freedom may be exposed by the follies of its own defenders." And too, Americans "had a lesson in the dangers which can arise in a democracy as a result of the pressure of public opinion upon a minority."  

The Britons, in relating their interpretations, hoped to encourage us to blow away self-doubts and re-affirm our ideals. In short, the Britons told us that to label the early Fifties as an "age of anxiety" was pointless and was possibly the result of America's penchant for self-criticism. The Britons wanted America's idealism and her buoyancy and optimism to prevail because it served as a source of vitality.

If Americans should learn to be more tolerant of diverse opinions at home, so too they must tolerate diversity abroad. "The
story of the United States," applauded Denis Brogan (1960), "has been a success story," but to expect "quick results" in foreign negotiations, while "natural" for Americans, is actually "dangerous." Americans should not demand "uncommitted nations" to "speak up in meetings" or "stand up and be counted." Moral idealism was again recognized as a taproot of foreign policy as Brogan described: "the very moral candor and passion that, more than self-interest, have made the American people ready to bear the great burdens imposed since 1945 have their dangers. It may not be wrong to see the outside world in black and white, but it is wrong to expect the world to see itself in black and white. It is wrong...to expect the outside world, even the most friendly parts of it, to accept American leadership automatically or to see all questions in an American light," believed Brogan. "The moral fervor which Americans bring to political principles...may have their roots in the Evangelical tradition." From this perspective, "the errant nations should accept conversion and testify to it in word and deed." But do the errant nations submit? "They, alas, said Brogan, "seldom do so, and often not enough for the United States safely to build a policy on it." 44

"The domestic virtues of wanting quick results," Brogan counseled, "of disliking secrecy, of insisting on...the acceptance of grant moral principles, are less visibly virtues on the international scene." In international affairs, "very imperfect solutions are all that can be hoped for, and the pursuit of perfection can--and usually will end
in deception and disillusion." This was what, said the Britons, would contribute to an attitude of uncertainty unrooted in fact. Expecting perfection and easy answers could only result in disillusion and loss of equilibrium. "Disillusion is one of the great dangers facing the citizen and weakening the effectiveness of the politician" in America. "The American citizen as a world citizen," cautioned Brogan, will have to be content with small successes, with successes to be hoped for rather than successes immediately realizable. He will have to learn to put up with bad manners, ingratitude, incompetence. And, of course, not all of his political agents will, be wise, upright, or lucky." Americans must cultivate "patience," and "the virtue of patience does not exclude the duty of realistic criticism and of democratic skepticism. Many, but not all, good American political habits will be usable in the outside world. But the failure of the outside world to meet American standards will not absolve the American citizen of his duty to that outside world or make it any less true that a concept of citizenship that does not extend beyond the frontiers of the United States is sterile and self-defeating today." Americans cannot be bound by "dangerously exclusive national or doctrinal coils at the very moment that man is about to take off into space." Americans cannot expect perfection in a most imperfect world.

One of the doctrinal coils, America's anti-Communist posture, pulled the United States into "Vietnam--The Trap" as Gerald
Priestland (1967) called it. "Set beside the racial struggle, the dollar crisis and the rebellion of youth, Vietnam has been very nearly too much for the United States to bear; the traditional faith in the nation's ability to solve any problem it puts its wits to has been undermined. "From the beginning, most Britons were hard pressed to explain America's involvement in far away Vietnam. "The damnedest thing is," a young American draft-dodger told Priestland, a British Broadcasting Corporation newsman, "Vietnam is not what the United States is about. The Germans and the Japanese wanted to destroy us; but why should we go out and destroy the Viet Cong? Why? Nobody tells us the truth..." American information on the war proceedings was first hand—it was a "television war," said political journalist James McMillan, (1972). The United States honour, our boys out there, were worth fighting for; but reports like Senator Edward Kennedy's of January 1968, denouncing Saigon's corrupt, idle and arrogant officialdom, made increasing numbers of Americans question whether the price they were paying was worthwhile. The Britons dared to reveal issues and problems in fighting an Asian war that patriotic Americans—or naive Americans—did not face squarely. Priestland cited the report of Sidney J. Roche, a "former planning officer on General Westmoreland's staff who later served as an adviser on Pacification." Roche resigned in despair, in March 1968, after concluding that his government had learned nothing from the Tet offensive launched by the Communists. "The Army of the Republic of Vietnam may very well be the worst Army in all of Asia.
It is organized along lines employed by modern armies thirty years ago. It is top-heavy with needless headquarters and administrative elements. Its weapons, in the main, are outdated and no match for modern Chinese and North Vietnamese regulars. Its leadership is ineffective, poorly trained and head over heels in graft and corruption. The Army is quite content to sit in camps take their share of the graft and corruption and let the United States Army do the fighting and take the casualties...All of these problems remain after more than seven years of military assistance by the United States." In evaluating the overall problems, Priestland agreed that "aid programmes in Vietnam have been wasteful," "over-funded with no clear-cut idea of the goal to be obtained," and "badly managed, with confusion as to who really manages what." "Supervision has been non-existent, and many struggle with the idea that somehow we will win by the sheer weight of our expenditures; waste has been the keynote with many United States employees apparently labouring under the misapprehension that all of the supplies and equipment come from some vague source which has an unlimited bounty to dispose of, all free." These two factors, the corruption of aid to Vietnam and the unwillingness of the Vietnamese to fight, "preyed on the minds of America in the weeks that followed the Tet offensive." These factors made Nixon's hopes for "Vietnamization" later seem absurd to our British commentators. The Britons had better historical perspective than the Americans, as Priestland said, "Vietnam itself does not
exist, and never has. There has always been a split between North and South; for centuries the South sought intervention from the West, the North from China. It is the same battle today, to create something that never was, over the heads of the peasantry."

"They know," said Priestland, "only their family, their village, their religion, perhaps their regional tribe. Now the warlords have replaced the French with the Americans and the Chinese with the Russians—that is all." The Britons tried to explain that foreign countries do not share American moral values and Priestland offered: "Always the Vietnamese have managed to use the outsiders for their own purposes. There is an ancient proverb in the Mekong Delta: There are five evils—Fire, Flood, Famine, Theft and Central Government. The last is the worst." 46

This very different philosophy, said Priestland, accounts for "the overwhelming feeling one has in Vietnam, that the war is going on three totally different levels—that of Washington, Moscow and Peking; that of Saigon and Hanoi; and that of the Vietnamese people. No two levels are engaged in the same struggle for the same reasons."

"What is the Saigon government really up to? What do the peasants really think, wonder the Americans. What do the Americans really want, wonders Saigon." An American reporter told Priestland, "It's bad enough not speaking the same language; but even when there's French in common, you realize we still don't think the same." And to the Britons, "to a non-American," evaluated Priestland, "it is what the war has done to Vietnam and its people, and to America and
its people, that really makes one wonder if it is worth the cost."
From the vantage point of Europeans, Americans are accused of
"killing unjustifiably," possessing motives "crudely expansionistic,"
but on the other hand, said Priestland, they are attempting to
"save something worthwhile in South Vietnam, the right to live
under a system which allows the individual a greater freedom of
choice than communism does." But at the heart of the problem was
the question of whether western standards of freedom could ever
apply to the peasantry of Vietnam.

The Britons found the Domino theory--if Vietnam went communist,
then Thailand, Malaya and Burma and India and Pakistan would follow--
to be an unsubstantiated guess at best. It represented a lack of
toleration for other systems beyond the American, based on
stupidity and arrogance that the American model could be universally
applied--by force if necessary. The Britons found the Americans un-
cooperative at the Geneva 1954 Conference, and understood that
Dulles and Eisenhower had no intention of supporting free elections
in Vietnam when it was universally acknowledged that Ho's forces
could easily carry victory. The Britons chastized us for working
outside the Geneva accord and the UN to organize SEATO, which they
saw as a thin veil to protect South Vietnam. "To put it unkindly,"
said Priestland, when the United States formed SEATO, sending bids
to her Asian friends, "it was like joining the church in order to be
able to call your war a crusade." Moral idealism was still the
signpost for American foreign policy; Americans, sadly, could not
recognize shades of communism, understand nationalistic communism, or believe that perhaps communism would work better than capitalism in underdeveloped Asian countries. For the Britons this was not the arrogance of power, as Fulbright labeled it; it was plain, naive moralistic stupidity. America, said James McMillan, was made to look "foolish," as she "tried to convince the world she was restricting her giant's strength out of a statesmanlike moderation" but was "unconvincing." America's pride, realized the Britons, now pulled her into a morass; "politically, the US had committed her prestige to a campaign," said James McMillan, "which militarily she was incapable of winning." Not only were the American ideals of equality and progress called into question as exportable doctrines, but technology was ironically challenged as well. "Never has the term the 'impediments of war' had a more exact application than in Vietnam," believed McMillan, as Americans "were literally impeded by the colossal amount of equipment they took with them into battle." Gadgetry had become an end in itself, as commanders could "whistle up helicopters, artillery, tanks, dive bombers;" sadly, they did not win the war. And increasingly, as the world condemned America, the American youth of the Sixties re-structured the problem: Vietnam was a small Asian nation borne down by the mighty capitalist foe; brave peasants struggling to free themselves from the cloying grip of corruption. Much to the chagrin of American allies like Britain, Vietnam seemed to unite Russia and China because neither contestant for the leadership of the Communist world dare display a lack of
zeal for the Vietcong. Critically they watched American attempts to first establish a viable government in South Vietnam, and then wink at Diem's assassination when he proved unable to quell the Buddhist insurrectionists. They saw the attempts at censorship in controlling the news which left Vietnam through American and foreign journalists. They told us of the illegal bombings raids in Cambodia and deplored the official version of the gulf of Tonkin Crisis, which they knew was only partly true. They believed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution unjustified, and after this event, Britain's governmental leaders began to drift away from support of the US policies. At the base of it all, Priestland simply wondered "what vital national interests of the United States could be involved in so unlikely a place as Vietnam?"^47

The Britons wanted us to understand that it might be no great loss to America if South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma did go communist. Provided "they went quickly enough and without foreign intervention, there might be reasonable hope of their becoming nationalist communists of a not intolerable sort," said Priestland. Further, looking towards fending off future problems, Priestland revealed, "the current Washington view of the Philippines as the 'bastion of free democracy in Asia' would be hilarious if it were not so tragic. If the United States really wants to save the next ring of nations beyond Vietnam, such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan, the history of South Vietnam has some clear lessons on what she should be doing there." The "future of Japan" viewed Priestland is the "most hazardous." Removed
as a pivotal power in Asia after the Second World War, Priestland wonders what will happen when she is "tempted to nuclear rearmament?"

It is possible that Japan may become embroiled with either Russia or China, but also "she may turn her eyes back towards Okinawa, Hawaii, and the Aleutians." Thus, concluded Priestland, "it is not only China that the United States must watch, but unpredictable permutations and developments among China, Russia, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines."

At home, the war caused serious dislocations. President Johnson, presenting his budget for 1968-69 told Congress: "Faced with a costly war abroad and urgent requirements at home, we have to set priorities...we cannot do everything we would wish to do...I am proposing delays and deferments..." of funds for Model Cities. The Britons believed it absurd that the war on Communism should come before the war on poverty.

Realizing the futility of the Vietnam trap, Johnson and Nixon were committed to withdrawal. Johnson's administration, however, had pledged that peace would not be purchased at the price of a communist regime in Saigon; Nixon wanted a peace and withdrawal with honor. Both ideals had to be sacrificed to reality. Priestland knew in 1967 that "in the long run...Vietnam will not have been saved, and she will not have saved Asia," as the communists had penetrated the nation far more deeply than is apparent on the surface. Only Americans hoped it to be otherwise. James McMillan wondered in 1972 if "America's credibility as the major force for peace" had been "fatally
eroded" as the American withdrawal was completed. The Britons wondered could the old idealism of America bounce back from defeat?  

Our visitors found America's defeat in Vietnam refreshing; they believed America had matured, accepted a defeat, worked with frustration, and heeded Arthur Schlesinger's warning in Bitter Heritage against the revival of the old McCarthyism and scapegoats for failure. Losing was difficult for most Americans to accept, the British understood, but they believed we were the better for it; instead of finding a deplorable collapse of patriotism and faith, they found happily the toleration of heterodoxy. Priestland boomed with pride: "America has shown a far greater confidence in democracy than would have been imaginable fifteen years earlier." America had come of age, now tempered by humility.

Looking back through the twentieth century, The Britons saw America intervening in the world more often as a guest than a gate-crasher. Priestland remembered, "we, in Europe, have soon forgotten how we longed for the Yanks to come in, back in 1917 and 1941, and how we lamented their extrication in 1919. And when, in 1947, they finally renounced their warm isolationist overcoats and jumped in up to their necks, it was because the Europeans, and particularly the British, could no longer carry the burdens of peace alone, any more than we had been able to bear those of war." This deployment of power and affluence around the world "has naturally caused envy and resentment" as well as "gratitude and wonder," said Priestland.
Thoughtful Americans such as Senator William Fulbright have protested the arrogance of United States power, against her imaginary sense of mission, her over-readiness to intervene, to strut the world as a know-all. Too, Walter Lippmann has traced a persistent flaw in America's moralistic approach to the world—an approach which has given her a Foreign Theology rather than a Foreign Policy, identifying Communism and its various mutations as reflections of the one Satan. Although our British commentators agreed basically, their criticisms were less harsh and their concepts more penetrating as to why Americans felt a sense of mission, as Priestland said: "In part this is due to America's Puritan heritage,...to the sense of being a chosen People, set apart from the corruptions of Europe, and now called to restore the world to the truth." And, as de Tocqueville first observed, "it is singularly difficult for so open a democracy as America to play the game of diplomacy with the same flexibility and secrecy as others." Americans, said Priestland, will have to accept some limitations to "open covenants, openly arrived at;" in short, America must accommodate herself to an understanding of the world's diverse diplomacies.

And above all, in blaming Communism for her domestic and foreign ills, America was riding full tilt up the wrong avenue. The US has made many mistakes in the past, as the Castro-Cuban revolution episode reminds the world. Instead of making friends, or at least acquaintances, of the nationalists, it made enemies of them and
confirmed everything that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism had forecast about the Imperialists. Americans must recognize that Communism is often the religion of the Nationalists of the under-developed world, and something to be put up with and lived with until it mellows and changes. In Eastern Europe, Americans have been obliged to make that recognition. But, the United States has no other religion to offer in Communism's place. So-called Americanism is merely a private, non-exportable variety of nationalism, judged Priestland. "It is not enough to cry 'Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness,' for all of these are conditional and limited, and the communists cry them (conditionally) too."  

America must define herself spiritually. From the Twenties through the Seventies this has remained a basic theme. Still in the process of becoming, America must find a world view, a spiritual vision to come to full maturation. The social incongruencies involving blacks and women would have to be resolved before spiritual vision is possible. And America's spiritual vision will have to be something tougher, more humane, more universally appealing than Communism. And when America finds this vision, she need not try to Americanize the world with it. America may teach best by example.

The American Social Matrix, a Summing Up

The Britons have ably discussed and analyzed the social matrix of America wherein a visionary world view might develop. They have
indicated possible avenues for practical as well as spiritual growth by indicating where we are strong and here we are weak.

Richard L. Rapson's study, Britons View America (1971) advanced four "unmistakable attributes of a revolutionary society" in America between 1845 and 1900:

(1) Americans possessed "an intense idealism;" Their ideology centered "around the mythic faiths in equality and progress..."

(2) Americans possessed a "fervency, an energy, even a religious zeal in the execution of that faith." Americans "seized upon their national destiny with unshakable, unquestioning conviction and set out to achieve it without reservation."

(3) Americans "had created bold institutional innovations to achieve that destiny;"...this sense of radical departure and pioneering experimentation dominates British discussion of nineteenth-century American institutions."

(4) Americans "believed they had a destiny, a future, though vague, millennium in which brotherhood and justice would reign..."54

Rapson found great harmony in the nineteenth century between these social ideals and America's social institutions, such as the schools and churches, but he wondered if the harmony had continued through the twentieth century or had fragmented into an "ill-defined dissonance." This study has illustrated that essentially all four
of the attributes used by the Britons to describe America in the
nineteenth century continued into the twentieth at least as far as
the late Seventies. "Idealism," "a fervency...even a religious zeal"
in America's destiny, her "bold institutional innovations to
achieve that destiny," and the utopian belief in the future, have
remained as continuous themes throughout America's history. The
twin forces of equality and progress propelled and energized
America toward her destiny, which really reached all the way back
to John Winthrop's notion of establishing a beacon to the world, and
forward to being the world model.

On balance, the Britons since the early Thirties reveal several
additional attributes of a revolutionary society in America:

(1) America was still in the process of becoming. America is
still a "revolutionary" society from the standpoint of
being open and free. It is also still maturing, as the
Britons spoke of America as first a "land of youth" then
"young adulthood" and believed that she was reaching
"the flowering time" or full maturity as the twentieth
century was approaching its conclusion.

(2) America in its maturing process has successfully passed
a number of "crises of confidence": The Great Depression,
McCarthyism, the Sputnik challenge, the loss of China,
and the Vietnam withdrawal. At each stage, America's
resilience allowed her to bounce back. Thus, the Britons
would never use the phrase the "age of uncertainty" for America in the Sixties and the Seventies. America had met challenges before and would meet them again, successfully. America has the capacity to make mistakes and retire them.

(3) But, while the Britons did not find contemporary American society "coming apart" or "falling apart", they did point to severe incongruences within America's social matrix that needed repair.

(a) In education, America needed to insure equality of opportunity to Blacks and all other minorities or disadvantaged groups. Perhaps this would involve national as opposed to local control of public education. Schools in America need to train all children for better utilization of leisure. And above all, the Britons asked that the question of quality vs. quantity in education be re-examined. Surely, America is rich enough to provide for the "different child" outside the cult of the average, especially its most able students. The Britons believed that young minds should be stretched and found our most able students unchallenged. In the land of equality, they found the brightest students discriminated against. But on the whole, America's
schools received high marks, especially graduate programs which trained technocrats and the lower levels which provided basic preparation for life in America.

(b) In reviewing the parent-child relationship within the family, the Britons remarked astonishingly that there was too much equality in the sense of permissiveness. They called for greater parental tutelage and authority. The objected strenuously to the precocious behavior of American children and the indulgence of parents which did not prepare them adequately for the real world.

(c) In relation to the American woman, the Britons found her accorded too little equality. Women were not socialized in America to view themselves as the equals of men, but yet they lived in a harshly competitive society which rewards aggressive behavior. Thus, the Britons found America women in an ambiguous condition of equality, giving rise to their descriptive phrases which called her "aggressively dependent." What a strange condition, believed the Britons to be competitively feminine. The role of the American woman was ill-defined, and the Britons supported whole-heartedly the Women's Movement as a means to resolve her ambiguous state
and achieve self-definition. If complete equality was to be achieved in America, its citizens had to respect the rights of the individual personality, male and female.

(d) American blacks were found completely outside equality. This was the most shockingly serious problem in America because racism "clashes so flagrantly with their cherished principles...that all men are created equal." America has a caste system based on color; legislation to award equality to Blacks, the Britons found feebly applied. The United States can not hope to advance to the moral leadership of the world to which her economic and military power nominate her without eradicating this deep blemish from her system. What had to change in America was the attitude of white racism which now impeded miscegenation and economic opportunities for Blacks.

(3) The harmony between secular values and religion in America was pronounced too perfect by the Britons. Religion in America seemed to sanctify materialism and to offer nothing more than patriotic fervor. Popular preachers and practical religion pandered to ADEMASS. The Britons asked, was there not a place, indeed a need, for orthodoxy? Religion they
believed should not be so closely aligned with this world, but should be preparing men, through instilling a proper sense of sin, for the next world, the Kingdom of God. American Christianity was found nearly meaningless, in the sense that it lacked coherent doctrine, thus explaining for our visitors why America's youth had turned to psychedelic mysticism and eastern cults. Religion in America lacked a spiritual vision, and that in short, precisely defined what was wrong with America. The United States lacks a "world view" and spiritual orientation and direction.

Thus, it is hardly surprising in the concluding chapter on world leadership that we find the Britons encouraging the "maturation" process for America, hoping that through "coming of age" she will find too a mellowing, coherent spiritual vision. An ideology which utilizes "all that is good" in American culture, as described throughout this study, but which elevates America to a new plateau. With critical expectancy the Britons awaited to see America achieve an inner vision, and come to something tougher than materialism. If America could achieve a world view, the conviction of being called to a higher realm in abstract spiritual self-
definition, then surely the United States would be the beacon to the world.

(4) And thus, we have come full circle in this study back to idealism, in the sense of "mission." Throughout the Thirties through the Seventies, when the Britons spoke of America's idealism, they were describing it in the sense of being an example, and a sense of obligation to be the "best" world model. Thus, after Watergate, Alistair Cooke asked, can America's idealism last? And subsequent Britons have nodded yes, agreeing with Cooke that America's idealism is her vital source of energy. Happily, the Britons were convinced that we would come eventually to an inner vision. We would finally know what is it all for, largely because we pursued life's tasks with the spirit of evangelists hoping to set the world to rights. The physical giant may yet possess the essential spiritual qualities requisite to accomplish our self-proclaimed task. Britons, and Americans for all their self-criticism, essentially agree with Denis Brogan's ideas as he looked back through his personal adventure with America and remembered: "The hopes, beliefs, enthusiasms that I brought to America in 1925 have not been deceived. America, today, is a more interesting, civilized, promising society than it was in that year, and the pursuit of happiness is still less of a waste of effort there than in any other country known to me...if America is not 'the last, best hope of earth', where is that happier and more hopeful land?"
Footnotes for CHAPTER IX


2 Sir Philip Gibbs, People of Destiny (New York, 1920), 93-102, 111. G. K. Chesterton, What I Saw In America (New York, 1922 original publication date; the 1968 edition was used), 269.


8 Jacks, My American Friends, p. 239-243.


11 Bailey, Mr. Roosevelt's Experiments, p. 36-42.

12 Jacks, My American Friends, p. 61-66.


Franklin Roosevelt's last speech as quoted by Cecil Roberts,
*And So To America* (Garden City, 1947), 289.

17 Roberts, *And So To America*, pp. 3-4.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 145.


24 Roberts, *And So To America*, p. 530-533, 37.


28 Ibid.

29 Iddon, *Don Iddon's America*, pp. 11-17.

30 Iddon, *Don Iddon's America*, pp. 23, 34.

31 Iddon, *Don Iddon's America*, pp. 31-35.

32 Ibid.


   Iddon, *Don Iddon's America*, p. 49.


   Hill, *The United States Since the First World War*, p. 111.

   Iddon, *Don Iddon's America*, p. 11.


41 Putt, *View From Atlantis*, pp. 158-159.
   Reed, *The Commonwealth Fund Fellows*, p. 82.


43 Ibid., p. 115.


49 Ibid., p. 292.


52 Ibid., pp. 303-305.

53 Ibid., pp. 305-308.


CHAPTER X
Epilogue

"This is an exhilarating moment in human history. Far from being an Age of Trouble, or Alienation, or Anxiety, this is rather the age in which man for the first time can turn from his age-old struggle for survival to a new struggle for self-fulfillment that will enable him to realize his humanity.

Homo sapiens is on the way to becoming Homo humanus."


Americans since the Sixties have debated whether or not we are living through an age of uncertainty. At the end of World War II the United States seemed to be standing at the threshold of a new Golden Age. But after the scandal of Watergate and the retreat from Vietnam, it seemed as if that age had slipped from our grasp. Many Americans believed themselves and their political leaders to be groping and floundering. Lacking decisive purpose or plan of action. Watergate exposed an orgy of high-level wrongdoing, lying and cheating and gross immorality. Richard Nixon was thrust from office by the combined diligence of the public, press and Congress. For the first time in history, the American President had left his post in utter disgrace. And just when moral courage seemed most lacking in our leadership at home, there was the collapse of our military efforts in Vietnam and the subsequent Communist occupation
of the entire country. Americans could neither win nor negotiate a 'peace with honor'. By the middle of 1975, America seemed unable to control her problems within and without. There were few leaders, no heroes, and no remaining legends and illusions. Everything appeared tarnished or bruised. The American critics described their fellow countrymen as uncertain, in doubt, and suffering a crisis of values. America by the mid-Seventies, in the words Carey McWilliams had used for the Sixties, seemed to be 'coming apart'. Certainly the former empassioned Kennedy phrases which had promised that Americans were prepared to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship to support the Pax Americana no longer seemed credible by 1975-76. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the internationalism of the previous generation of Cold Warrior, while both noble in intent and spacious in design, had merely overcommitted America, her resources, and her allies. The Quixotic titling at windmills was over. The Nixon Doctrine announced that the United States would begin retreating from overcommitment abroad.

As contemporary Britons observed the crisis of values and the uncertainty among Americans, they, like Mary Agnes Hamilton during the depression, were more concerned with the mood than the facts. Had America really lost her nerve? Would she succumb to this scenario of domestic self-flagellation? Would she be crushed by disappointment and failure? Would America fly into small pieces, fragmented and disarrayed? Since as early as 1974, the British observers have answered emphatically, no! However great our current difficulties, the Britons believe that America will find solutions.
Simon Winchester, in *American Heartbeat* (1976), described the Watergate story for the *Guardian*. "The office in Watergate had just been broken into; the *Washington Post* was only then beginning to unravel the seamy tale; and the White House was posturing in a state of injured majesty." Then it all "started to ooze from the woodwork," and Winchester said he traveled through America in order to see "if the conscience of America had been pricked" and how Americans would react to disappointment. What he found in America were individuals "strong, and worthy of honour and respect." At times, he confessed, America frightened him, even infuriated and sickened him. "But beneath all the grubby horrors with which this society has invested herself, beneath all the glitter and schmaltz and cheap scandal, there is a remarkable and a deeply honourable people."¹

"America," said Robert Hargreaves, "has lost its immunity to history." The experience in Vietnam forced America to recognize limits of its power. Watergate was disillusioning but not defeating. The British commentaries since the mid-seventies encourage us to regain our balance and confidence. They remind Americans that we are amongst the most self-critical people in the world. "...in an age of national dissatisfaction," said Esmond Wright, Director, Institute of United States Studies, University of London, "there is a danger that Americans...will overlook the achievements of contemporary American society. Concurrent with the rise of anxieties about national policies many things were done and done well, whether judged by American or European standards."²
As the preceding conclusions in the chapter on world leadership explained, America still has grave social inequities. However, the Britons tell us not to be atrophied by the recent failings either at home or abroad. Americans must face the issues; we cannot be mesmerized by sudden confrontation with holes in the social fabric, nor can we hide behind the golden curtain of material comfort described by Susan Cooper. The Britons argue for action, leadership and daring. The Britons argue their case in a number of ways: (1) by placing our current dilemmas in historical perspective, (2) by offering their personal impressions of how Americans reacted to a crisis such as Watergate, (3) by acknowledging that many of our problems are global, (4) by reminding us that to demand perfection from ourselves and especially from other nations in foreign affairs is naive to the point of being fatal, and (5) by suggesting throughout this study where America is weak and where she is strong in social issues.

Esmond Wright's article, "America: The End of the Dream?" (1974), directly addressed the issue of uncertainty or "wakefulness" as he called it. He wondered if wakefulness should not be placed in historical perspective. The "wakefulness that is about in America today," he said, "reflects worries often grounded in myth. The present seems worse than the past, because both friends and critics have forgotten what the American past was really like." He believed Americans acted like the children of Genesis, who, once expelled from
the Garden of Eden, now lament and repent of their past with a
vehemence and hyperbole characteristic of America in all ages.
"...the things about which Americans protest today are not new at
all."

"Europeans as well as Americans should find reassurance in
the fact that many of the problems that trouble American society
today are not unique in time and place, but have their counterparts
in earlier eras of the American story." He wondered if the
problems of Vietnam in the 1960's, the racial violence, the hippy
culture and draft-dodging were any worse than the witch-hunting of
McCarthyism and the beat generation of the Fifties. In the Forties,
when the fear of a nuclear holocaust was so new, was not the 'age
of anxiety' similar, even worse than today's 'age of uncertainty'.
When many Americans look back on the Forties, they see the best
years of their life; could this be true of the younger generation
of Americans who in the future will look back on the Sixties and
Seventies as the best years of their life? American critics
complain that America is coming apart. But have we not been there
too before? In the 1920's, American intellectuals complained of the
'lost generation', and many left the United States in protest against
Babbitry, the Ku Klux Klan, or the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti.
Placed in historical perspective, Watergate and the retreat from
Vietnam seem like any number of previous hurdles successfully
surmounted. And too, were those good old days as interesting, as
challenging, or as intellectually stimulating as the present?

The youth of the Sixties found that looking backward to a romantic past was both inadequate and sterile. The future lays uncharted and the United States is challenged to explore. The Britons do not find us without the courage to stand between the lightning and the thunder.
Footnotes for CHAPTER X


4 Ibid., p. 290.

5 Ibid., pp. 290-291.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


This volume is a collection of essays on stimulating and significant themes in American history which were originally written for British readers. Upon reflection, the authors believed such a volume would be welcomed in America as well. Seventeen British scholars have made essay contributions, remarking intelligently on America's Constitution, political parties, commerce, race, labor, industry and foreign policy. The contributors are for the most part British lecturers in the field of American History or American Studies at major British universities such as Oxford, Cambridge and The London School of Economics. Published on the occasion of the 350th anniversary of the foundation of Jamestown, Virginia, this volume comprises some of the most articulate and scholarly observations made of America.


Allen, an English novelist and literary critic, taught for a summer in 1935 at the State University of Iowa, and he says: "I have the chance from time to time living and working in the United States: I was visiting professor at Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in 1955-1956 and at Vassar in 1963-1964. This is especially important to me since I am as much interested in American writing as in English." He has maintained what he describes as a "love-hate" relationship with America. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. In The Urgent West Allen focused his attention on the American Dream as it has been revealed in American literature. He arrives at conclusions about the nation's complex and often contradictory sense of itself. The ideas are perceptive but often familiar to Americans. Significantly, Allen suggested that the American Dream is no longer limited just to Americans, but "has become the property of the Western world."


A pleasant but superficial account of traveling in America which emphasizes the proper tourist attractions for the never-been-to-America-before British reader; it is of limited value for analysis of contemporary American society or its problems.

Both authors are journalists, and originally much of the material which appears in the book was published in Punch. Even though the book begins with "a sense of urgency in the USA," the tone throughout is one of flippancy and is written primarily to entertain rather than to inform. They relate for a British readership, their impressions of the American West in the image of Gary Cooper, flapjacks and ghost towns. The book is satirical with points of obviously erroneous history, as when it is suggested the Vieux Carre in New Orleans must have been names after Carry Nation, and was written for the sophisticated Briton who knows America and Americans well enough to see subtle jokes and puns.


This is an account of the United States in the very early Thirties by an English script writer for radio who faced unemployment in New York and decided to drive his family to Florida. Casual scenes in the Carolinas and in Georgia are described along the route and when they had arrived in Florida, the family took up a beachcombing life on an island near St. Petersburg. It contains some interesting scenes of sponge-fishing and Florida bootleggers, but otherwise is of limited value for social analysis.

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This book continues the adventures of the English Robinson Crusoe vagabonds as they traveled to California in search of employment. It describes a motor trip across the heartland of America in a broken down old Plymouth which chugged along on 10 H.P., and contains some valuable information on American regions especially the Southwest near Santa Fe. This book, obviously written for quick sale in Britain, capitalizes on the British interest in and image of the American Cowboys and Indians. While in California, the English script writer concluded a successful Western, sold it to Hollywood and with the money returned East and thence home to England. It is charming, but does not provide criticism or analysis of America.

A lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Bailey produced an insightful economic appraisal of the New Deal as he viewed it in 1934-35. He spoke of the new "compensated economy" and noted the extent to which the Federal Government "intervened" in the economy, stating that America could never return to the old days of an unregulated economy. Concerned with Britain's economic and financial position, he toured America on a fact-finding tour and made astute professional comments along the way.


Lord Kinross had come to America, he said, to fill in a gap in his experience. He attended a lecture presented by Aldous Huxley on the brave new world of America and argued with him later over the future of America. Kinross lunched with Arthur Schlesinger Jr. at the Harvard Faculty Club and visited with Adlai Stevenson and the Englishman Hilaire Belloc who had settled in America. This is an interesting book for glimpses into high society and the inner political circles in America, but is a somewhat ego-centric monologue on America as seen by a member of the British elite. While he did speak of the KKK, the problem of segregation, Hollywood and Santa Monica's muscle beach, one of the most outrageous things that happened to Balfour was his near arrest as a vagrant in Hollywood at 11:30 p.m. because he was not riding in a taxi!


Banks and Ward opened their account with the statement: "We traveled ten thousand miles in the United States, and this is the story of our journey. Because we were there only a few months and cannot claim a profound knowledge of America, we are being modest in our comments, and on the whole letting the American people speak for themselves." In an oral history exercise, Banks and Ward traveled with a microphone and recording machine. They were supported by the British Broadcasting Corporation in cooperation with the Economic Cooperation Administration. They labeled themselves as "reasonably intelligent travellers," and obtained interesting material on American education, religion, labor conditions and race relations. The book is divided into sections: The East, the Mid-West, The South, and concludes with the story of a lightening trip from "Coast to Coast". They also included a valuable
section on European and American misunderstandings about each other. On the whole, a worthy volume for an almost pictorial closeup of America in the early Fifties, but with little depth.


Barber is a well-known and widely traveled British foreign correspondent, and at the time he wrote this book was the chief of the Daily Telegraph's Washington Bureau. He has a knack, wrote one admirer, "of always being in the centre of events." As a war reporter he saw action from Alamein to Anzio. He covered the Greek Civil War, the Palestinian troubles and was in Hanoi to witness the French collapse in Indo-China. He covered the Dallas story when President Kennedy was assassinated. He has lived in Washington since 1963. His book is an arresting commentary of the plight of modern America. In essentially critical terms he discusses the dilemmas of race, violence, school busing, and mediocre to corrupt politics, and suggested in 1970 that the Nixon plan for Vietnamization of the war in Indo China was "impossible." His thesis is suggested in the title--America is about to retreat from world leadership and responsibility. The Nixon Doctrine is evidence of this tendency. The message for Britons and all Europeans is clear--the giant staggers and Europeans are now forced back on their own resources. A moving, challenging book which tends to agree with many New Left themes currently written about America by Americans. He poses important questions.


"This book," explained Barker, "owes its origin to a six months visit to the US and to many years of study of American economic affairs." Barker traveled four times across the United States studying agriculture, mining, forestry, education, and national and local government. He determined character and leadership to be the twin foundations of America's wealth and power when Britain desperately was attempting to match American production and new technology. He was vitally interested too in American labor and the absence of any socialist or Labor party. He believed the extravagant demands of Britain's Trades Union Congress had almost bankrupt British industry and he hoped to carry home with him the "secret" of America's economic success and to convince his country's leadership to adopt similar methods. A valuable book, certainly favorable to materialism in the United States during the Twenties.

Battershaw is an educator who taught in Minnesota in the early Sixties. He is interested in the qualities of the American character and primarily but capably describes "life in America" involving his personal experiences with plumbing and central heating. Parts of this book are insightful, such as his economic descriptions of the South, the attitude of most Americans in really not caring about events outside their national borders, the ideal and the reality of equality, and American politics. A good look at the American value system with changes and continuities through time.


Beaton is a photographer and designer of costumes for plays and ballets; during World War II he was a war photographer for Britain's Office of War Information. This book is a humorous recollection of a lecture tour in the US in the early Fifties. A mixed volume, it contains insights in relation to America's efficiency, love of gadgets, and for what he termed America's nervous enthusiasms. He was happy to see women beginning to play more natural roles, moving beyond their former ingenue parts. He was harsh on Hollywood, calling it the celluloid oasis, noticed the plastic side to luxury, and in some social relations a degree of inhumaneness. His book is similar to his photography work, a sharp look at selected places and people, well in focus.


Irish playwright (1923-1964). The attention his writings have received is buttressed by his eccentric public behavior, as his chief declared recreations were drinking and talking. Behan loved New York, calling it "the greatest city on the face of God's earth." In comparison he found London "a wide flat pie of redbrick suburbs." The volume is illustrated by creative pencil drawings by Paul Hogarth and recalls Behan's favorite sights and people: Greenwich Village, Park Avenue, the Oasis Bar, the Fulton Street Fishmarket, Mike Sheehan's Bar, McSorley's old Ale House and 3rd Avenue. For anyone who enjoys New York, Behan's color and flavor are easily appreciated. Interesting as a first glimpse, capturing sights, smells and sounds.

On a speaking tour of twenty thousand miles in America, Beith traveled South to New Orleans from Chicago and eventually spoke in nearly all of America's major cities about Britain's cause in the Second World War. Beith (1876-1952) was an English dramatist and novelist. During his travels in America and throughout this volume, he carefully told a potential ally exactly what Americans wanted to hear. He was a publicist who desired to please and therefore his views appear conventional.


An important book which points to America's fear in a world leadership role, and written for British readership asking them to understand America's youth and inexperience. According to Blake, the United States lacks a spiritual center and "insolence and panic" seem to often dominate American political and international behavior. In many ways the themes seem reminiscent of the British critics in the Twenties who labeled Americans as Philistines, worshipping at the Golden Calf. Blake does not give up hope, however, that America will come to her senses and steer a more stable course in world guidance, but his critical remarks are made in direct challenge to American policies, especially those of John Foster Dulles, in the Fifties.


This book reflects a three-month lecture tour in 1939. Bolitho, born in New Zealand, was a novelist, historian and biographer who lived most of his life in London. He was an intimate friend of the Prince of Wales, and was considered the unofficial court biographer of the British royal family. His best known works are Albert The Good, Victoria and Albert and Edward VIII: His Life and Reign published after his abdication. At one time Bolitho contemplated escaping to California to retire, believing that Europe was sick and tired and sour. Of all countries in the world, he loved the United States best he remarked, "because the people are honest and comparatively true." Since World War II he gave 130 lectures in the United States. Haywire, written on the eve of war, speaks earnestly of the need for close Anglo-Saxon ties. He loved America in all its aspects, its food, hospitality, technology, spirit, and simply said so with gusto. For the most part the book is a descriptive narrative but it contains some spots of real insight in relation to American women, children and American pride in their homes,
and is quite good for British impressions on the domestic life of Americans.


Bolt is a Senior Lecturer in American History at the University of Kent and has produced a well researched textbook on the history of America from colonial times to the present for British university students. Her comments are especially valuable on the post 1945 period in foreign affairs and she has good insight into the racial issues in our country. The book provides separate chapters on Blacks and Indians and includes significant material on ethnicity and immigration. A valuable book from the standpoint of understanding what British students are taught in their own universities in a course on American Civilization.

Branston, Ursula. *Let The Band Play "Dixie"...Improvisations on a Southern Signature Tune.* London: Harrap, 1940.

Miss Branston resigned her position with the British Broadcasting Corporation in order to make this visit to the American South. She landed in Baltimore, went by bus to New Orleans, and thence to New York by way of Natchez, Memphis and Knoxville. This is one of the few full-length accounts by a foreign observer devoted entirely to the South. Even though she visited during the Depression (1938-1939), she does not make reference to the slump but was much more interested in seeing and reporting on the South objectively. She met with College Presidents, Deans of Women, attended a tobacco auction in Charleston, the WPA headquarters at Baton Rouge and Knoxville. She saw CCC camps, and talked to public farm administrators about the problems of sharecroppers, and social workers working with Blacks in rural poverty areas. This is a factual and authentic travel account free of bias, reflecting an inquiring and intelligent personality.


Brittain came to America in 1925-26, 1934 and 1937. During the first visit in the Twenties, she lived in a small New England town as a little-noticed wife of a visiting professor. In 1934 and 1937 she returned to the United States as a famous English novelist on a successful lecture tour. She spoke throughout the South and in toto visited thirty of the forty-eight states. A graduate of Oxford in Modern History she has produced a number of studies on women's history most notably *Lady Into Woman* (1954) which is largely the history of the English female struggle for equality but contains some interesting sidelights on the
American suffragettes. She describes the "long shadows of the depression laying on the land" in America in *Thrice A Stranger* and has most valuable things to say about New England closed social communities and how difficult it is for an outsider to break into networks of a closed social grouping. An objective yet personal narrative of much that is good and some that is bad in American domestic life.


Brogan (1900-1974) has been described as an Irishman born in Scotland and educated in France, England and America. A graduate of Oxford, Brogan came to America for the first time in 1925 to study at Harvard on a grant from the Rockefeller foundation, and obtained an M.A. in American History in 1927. Upon his return to England, he lectured on American History at the University of London and on American government at the London School of Economics. He was later appointed a Fellow and tutor of Corpus Christie College, Oxford. From 1939 on he was a professor of political science at Cambridge University. This book represented his analysis of "the working of the American political system as it is today." In 1944, after America had survived the Depression and Second World War, a new edition of this book was published in which he applauded the American political structure for its durability and resilience. Reinhold Niebuhr has spoken of Brogan's "extraordinary gift for understanding and illuminating the woof of constitutional principles and the warp of political tactics in the fabric of democratic history, whether in his own or in other nations."

Nevins said of this volume: "Not a book of travel, but a treatise so penetrating and well informed that no survey of British studies of American can fail to give it an important place."


This is part of the World Today series. As the title indicates it is an outline of America but even so it covers a vast area, delving into the problems of rural government in America, the positions of unions and the influence of the American press. There is an entire chapter on religion and education. An important book presented with a 'once over lightly approach'.

__________. *The Crisis of American Federalism: Being the Tenth Lecture of the David Murray Foundation in the University of Glasgow.* Glasgow: Jackson and Son, 1944.

This book was first introduced as a lecture at the University of Glasgow in February 23, 1943. Brogan spoke of the flexibility
of the American constitutional system and its ability to meet the crisis of the world depression. Federalism, he pronounced, can respond to a crisis which demands firm decision and decisive action.


This book was originally published in Britain as The American Problem, and it is interesting to note the change in title for American audiences. The "problem" discussed was America's slowness in entering the Second World War to aid Britain. Brogan does a superb job of going carefully back through American history to trace the threads of prudence and caution in logistical planning before engaging in war. The United States experience does not spell getting somewhere with an eye to being the 'fustest with the mostest' but naturally and traditionally America's experience has been to attempt isolationism from the wars of Europe. The new problem to be faced after the war was whether or not America would succumb to traditional isolationism or assume her new role as world leader. Brogan explained American values throughout our history admirably.


"American Themes is a selection from a great mass of periodical writing on America done by me in the past sixteen years," wrote Brogan in his preface. The original articles had appeared in Britain's leading newspapers and magazines such as the Times Literary Supplement, the Manchester Guardian, the Spectator, the Oxford Magazine, the New York Times, and Harper's Magazine. All of the articles were arranged in chronological order. Some of the most valuable articles were "The Negro Dilemma," "Give Up Hollywood?," "The Bulldozer," and "The American Language."


This book is part of the Yale series and is a biography of FDR. It gives a world perspective to the Depression and contains an objective view of President Roosevelt.


This book was originally written for presentation at the University of North Carolina as the Weil Lectures with "citizenship" as an important and timely topic. There were three
lectures, the last devoted to citizenship in America which is a basic discussion of how American democracy works. At the conclusion of the section on citizenship in America, Brogan pleads for a "world view" as potential world citizens. Again, much valuable material and insight is offered in relation to American political values.


This volume is also a collection of previously published articles as was his book, American Themes. What appears in this volume are "pieces of a length that allowed some development of the theme and had for subjects themes of more than mere news interest," wrote Brogan in the preface. "The Presidency" first appeared in Encounter; "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," and "Unnoticed Changes in America," appeared in Harper's Magazine. "The Catholic Politician" first appeared in The Atlantic Monthly. The book contains many strong pieces of writing from many magazines which had published the articles originally in the Fifties.


This volume initiated the Jacob Blaustein Lectures in International Relations at Lehigh University. Brogan originally delivered the lecture series in March 1965. The book contains valuable insights as to the origin of the Cold War and the many barriers, some self-created by Americans, to serious and deliberate talk between the United States and Russia. Brogan gives a great deal of cogent advice to America's would-be statesmen concerning patience and persistence in a less than ideal world.


Bromhead is a professor of politics, University of Bristol. "This book," wrote Bromhead, "is based partly on experience of living in America, partly on continuing contacts with Americans in England, partly on the reading of the current American literature about the society." Bromhead suggests that there is no doubt about America's material success but there is less agreement about the values and social organization on which this progress has been based. Bromhead presented a picture of life in America in the late 1960's. He discusses race, poverty, education, ecology, religion and government. It is most interesting from the standpoint of (1) what a Briton selects as America's contemporary problems, and (2) viewing a Briton's statement as to what the United States may or ought to do to solve our many dilemmas. He encouragingly places many of America's current dilemmas in the context of global problems.

"My decision to sail for this continent (America) was prompted by the experience of an Englishman from my own town," wrote Brookes, "who had achieved success." The author left Liverpool in 1912 and came to America to "find a place in the sun." This is an intriguing tale in the vein of Horatio Alger. Brookes received a call to be a pastor in an American Congregational church shortly after he had arrived nearly penniless. He found his fortune in the New World and brought his family over from the English Midlands to join him as he worked first as a printer's devil and part-time pastor and later as a school teacher. Through hard honest work he finally returned to college and received a Doctorate at Hartford Seminary. His book is his tale of thanks to America—the land of opportunity.


"At the time this journal was written," said Brown, "I was the General Secretary of the Civil Service Clerical Association... which caters to the Clerical Grades in Government Departments in Britain." He was invited in this capacity to go to America in order to convey to Americans the British war effort. Brown arrived in the United States in September, 1941 and was in America during the attack on Pearl Harbor. He stayed for five months lecturing to "innumerable meetings, public and private," and wrote a number of articles for American and British consumption and delivered radio broadcasts to American audiences which described how England "was up against it" while fighting the NAZIs alone. This was his first trip to America and his book is a record of his daily impressions—his journal jotted down from day to day. He felt an intense interest "in the life and affairs of a great Ally in this war." As one might suspect, he was careful to say all the right things which might please a potential ally.


Bryant is a British historian. In 1935 he delivered the Alfred Watson lectures on American History, Literature, and Biography for the Sulgrave Manor Trust and the lectures were subsequently published as The American Ideal. In 1936 he succeeded G. K. Chesterton as writer of "Our Note Book" page in the Illustrated London News. His varied career has included writing radio plays for the B.B.C. and editing the speeches of Neville
Chamberlain. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Bryant believed that America had the necessary spiritual qualities of courage, energy, and vitality to recover from the Depression and time has proved him correct. If these important spiritual qualities were lost by Americans he forecast that wealth and power would also be lost as a natural consequence. A book written as much to challenge Americans as it was to describe Depression America to Britons.


This is the story of how an English immigrant family began as a medicine show troupe and spent thirty years of work and travel in the showboat business. Starting in Price's Water Queen at Augusta, Kentucky, Billy Bryant and family roamed the reaches of the great Mississippi. The book deals with a limited region, and contains little social analysis.


Buchan is currently a Professor of International Relations, Oxford University. He has worked as a Washington correspondent for the *Observer* (1951-1955) and acted as Commandant, Royal College of Defense Studies, London, 1970-1971. Buchan has visited the United States a number of times both as journalist and educator. He is sympathetic and supportive of America's leadership and recent decisions in world affairs, however, he seeks to temporize our fears of Communism.


John Buchan (1875-1940) was a Scottish novelist, biographer, historian, publisher, lawyer and diplomat. A graduate of Oxford, Buchan combined many different professions as he was called to the Bar by the Middle Temple in 1901, assisted the *Spectator* editorially, and in the same year became part of the British diplomatic staff in South Africa. He is perhaps best known for his biographies of Montrose, Cromwell and Julius Caesar, and for his appointment in 1935 as Governor-General of Canada. He visited President Roosevelt officially in Washington before his untimely death in 1940. Lord Tweedsmuir is well remembered in England and Canada as an excellent romantic novelist and adroit pro-consul. Of this book he said: "This book is a journal of certain experiences, not written at the experiencing moment, but rebuilt of memory." It contains a specific section on "My America," in which he remarks on American humor, statesmanship, and racial problems. "Americans
are the sternest critics of their own country," Buchan wrote, but he believed the American to be "the most steadfast human being alive." He pictured the future of the United States as not less than glorious.


Campbell described himself as a "detribalized Scot who for nine years lived in Washington, D. C." He breaks some of the "Myths" about America—that America is an affluent country and that America is the land of equality—by viewing our cities, poverty pockets, youth in rebellion, the Mafia, labor unions, the shameful neglect and ill-treatment of natural resources, and concludes "there is too much national hypocrisy." However, even after debunking our myths, he assures anxious Americans, including draft dodgers, that there are absolutely no lands of hope and glory to be found anywhere. Washington is still the capital of the world and Americans are basically very decent people. "Thus my book," he concludes "which seems harshly critical of the US is really an essay in flattery. It is based on the premise that Americans have no right to have Troubles." Campbell tells us, or rather reminds us, of our contemporary plight but does not wring his hands over our inability to correct the situation. He has every confidence that Americans will find solutions to the hard questions of our current existence.


Chesterton (1874-1936) was an English essayist, novelist, polemicist, and man-of-letters. His greatest and most enduring friendship was with Hilaire Belloc, whose views on religion, politics, and history chimed so well with his own that the two men were often lumped together facetiously as "The Chester-belloc." History, literary criticism and art criticism also engaged the interest of this astonishing man. Chesterton went to America in 1922 and produced this volume as a result. Chesterton wondered, what manner of people inhabited that continental domain known as America? His answer is insightful, especially in regards to the new position of the United States in world leadership. He deplored the "Americanization of the world," however, rooted as he was in romantic Catholic medievalism. With great brilliance and wit, he described America as one might describe an exotic plant, definitely intrigued, but desiring to keep a safe distance from its tentacles.

It is well known that Churchill was a great literary figure as well as a statesman. Beginning with the story of The Malakand Field Force, 1898, he produced many works of biography and history. His personal familiarity with momentous happenings, his fine expository style and power in matters of strategy and tactics and his sense of color and adventure give his six volume history of The Second World War a place unequaled in narrative history of those momentous years. Churchill's leadership during Britain's Finest Hour could never be forgotten, nor his public oratory and mastery of forensic fisticuffs, nor the big cigar nor the bow tie that were his trademarks. The last chapter in this book, *Great Contemporaries,* is devoted to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The admiration and the shared common experiences come through the Churchill biography warmly, as he eulogizes a deceased friend as a defender of eternal human values. From his especial vantage point, Churchill writes of moments and events that only he had knowledge of, and does so with great generosity towards Roosevelt.


Visiting America on the eve of her entry into World War II, Citrine, as Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress addressed the convention of the American Federation of Labor in New Orleans in November, 1940. In this volume the entire address to the 6-th annual convention of the AF of L, headed then by William Green, is reprinted in the appendix. The book itself is largely devoted to underscoring the very "close affinity" between America and Britain as World War II opened in Western Europe. Citrine visited Dallas, Forth Worth, and Tulsa, then went on to Charleston. Citrine was careful not to offend Southern labor leaders in relation to the "Negro problem."


This book is largely a "how to travel in the United States by motor car" guide. It contains an interesting section on the American "motel," and has a large appendix with tourist oriented travel tips pertaining to currency, tipping, a description of the Alaskan highway, a description of baseball, and the American gallon. Strictly a travel guide, but it is interesting to see what British guides consider the "essentials" for the novice Briton to know before venturing to America.

Cooke, a British born essayist and journalist and graduate of Cambridge, came to the United States for the first time in 1932 as a Commonwealth Fund Fellow to study at Yale. While on his American fellowship, he specialized in the study of American language; his fellowship was renewed and he spent the next year at Harvard. Upon returning to England in 1934, he went to work for the BBC as a cinema critic and later his duties were extended to radio reporting. In 1936 he became the London correspondent for the National Broadcasting Company in America. He covered the abdication of Edward VIII and the Munich Crisis for American radio audiences. In 1938, Cooke returned to the United States as commentator on American affairs for the BBC and as special correspondent for the *London Times*. In 1941 he became an American citizen. In the early Forties, he made a 20,000 mile motor trip all over the United States which lasted six months. He later used many of his experiences and information gathered for his America series for the BBC. In 1949 and 1950 he attended the two perjury trials of Alger Hiss and turned his coverage into *A Generation on Trial*. *Time* called this book "a model of balance and lucidity." The *New Yorker* hailed it "as one of the most vivid and literate descriptions of an American political event that has ever been written." Cooke summarized his own views of the Hiss ordeal, calling it "the trials of a man who was judged in one decade for what he was said to have done in another."

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Since 1947, Cooke had given a series of radio broadcasts from America for the BBC interpreting American life to British audiences. Cooke called these "radio essays," and they were collected and published as the *Letters or One Man's America*. Cooke stated that he had attempted to tell his British listeners what was "most characteristic about the people and landscape of the United States." The Britons, he said, wanted "to understand the foibles of the rich uncle across the seas." The book contains some interesting pieces: "Joe Louis," "New York, New York," "My First Indian," "What's the Matter with America?" and "Letter to an Intending Immigrant." Cooke's style is always witty and penetrating.

In 1972 and 1973 Cooke won emmy awards for his narration of the NBC-imported and BBC-produced America series. Harry F. Waters of Newsweek (Nov. 27, 1972) wrote: "What charms in America is the presence of a sort of kindly stepfather, who is intensely interested in his adopted offspring, but not about to nag. The series is the first, and perhaps the finest, gift to the nation for its 200th birthday." Cooke is urbane, articulate and has a knack for presenting "a once over lightly treatment to complex subjects." Cooke himself explained how he did the America series: "The whole business is one of selection. It's boiling down." Few British or American commentators could have done this in such a knowledgeable and entertaining way as Alistair Cooke.

Susan Cooper first came to the United States as a correspondent for the London Sunday Times. She began her book with the statement: "This is a book about an uneasiness. It puts forward a particular view of the United States, which is contained, more or less, in its title." Americans seemed ignorant, not only of every country but their own, but of their own place in the world. Americans lived isolated behind a Golden Curtain of materialism; the typical American appeared self-congratulatory and complacent about any events outside their own private worlds. Cooper discusses the common illusions shared by both Britons and Americans about one another and the conditions and circumstances that seem to perpetuate these false images. She has included chapters on American education, religion, sports and leisure time activities, and race relations.
In world relations, her central thesis is a plea for world perspective among Americans. Isolationism is a luxury that not only America, but the world, cannot afford.


Cottenham arrived in America in 1935 and toured America from the Atlantic to the Pacific by automobile. An enthusiastic conteur, Cottenham tells interesting stories about his elite friends and hosts in America, commenting on women, impudent children, the interior of American homes, and the finer points of American culture. He was strongly opposed to the condemnation of President Roosevelt which most of his aristocratic, upper-class American friends displayed, to his discomfort. In the land of equality, interestingly, he seemed to dislike aristocratic pretense even though he was considered to be of the British upper social circles. One has the feeling that he disdained the nouveau riche even though he accepted their hospitality.


Born and educated in London, Creasey produced four hundred and fifty books between 1932 and 1964. These volumes were mainly crime novels which he wrote under his own name as well as various pseudonyms: Gordon Ashe, Norman Deane, Kyle Hunt and Peter Manton. His book is largely a descriptive travel log as he compares London and New York, speaks of the cost of petrol, American advertising, motoring through Indian reservations in the Southwest, and frontier nostalgia of Carson City, Nevada. He enjoyed California, Salt Lake City, Yellowstone and the Grand Canyon. This book contains little social analysis, and is largely a "Traveling Through" America diary printed as a guidebook for British tourists coming to the States.


Cunliffe traveled ten thousand miles by bus across the United States from New York through the South and up to San Francisco and then returned through the Pacific Northwest, the Northern states to the East. "This book is about people not places," she wrote. She enjoyed America and Americans and devoted large space in her narrative to the people she conversed with on America's excellent motor coaches. She did not go beyond describing her first glimpses and impressions to make any insightful analysis.

Davie is a British journalist who followed the events of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as a foreign correspondent for the *London Observer* in Washington. This book is one of the first to tarnish the image of Kennedy and begin to see redeeming qualities in Johnson and to applaud his efforts, especially in working with Congress. The "glamorous" image of the Kennedyites in contrast to the "crudities" of the Johnson camp, Davie believes drastically overdrawn, largely by the American media. Johnson is described as a healing influence and the man who broke the log jam which had bottled up the Kennedy bills on Civil Rights and Federal aid to the cities. LBJ took the bull by the horns and succeeded where Kennedy could not. This is an insightful book into the mind of President Johnson, as Davie describes him as an "outsider" in Washington social circles with feelings of being looked down upon except in "Johnson Country" around Austin, and a most valuable behind the scenes view of LBJ the man, written by a journalist who rated him better than Kennedy.

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Davie views California as a microcosum of the future, both in America and throughout the world. He recalls his first visit to America in 1952 "when I was the English member of a group of NATO journalists who were taken on a free tour of the US by the State Department...the Department hoped that, having accepted the bribe, we would subsequently write more favourably about America than if we hadn't taken the trip." Davie believes that what happens in California and America prefigures what will happen in Europe, hence he is vitally concerned with the contemporary crisis of values, the emergence of the Radical Right to do battle against the Berkeley Left, and the use or misuse of technology. The disintegrating inner city cores, the problems within the ghettos, the meaninglessness of former religious values, the revolt of the youth all bother him deeply. American society has some very serious cracks, but overall, Davie concludes that Americans are resilient and experimental and will find a way out of contemporary dark times. They must, or the whole world will fall under the same collapsing spirit.

The De La Pasture family was an emigre family from France who fled during the French Revolution to England. Elizabeth had several governesses in her youth whose various traits she combined to form the voluble and flightly Mademoiselle of the Provincial Lady's diary. In 1933 E. M. Delafield (pseudonym) came to the US for a lecture tour and the results first appeared serially in Punch and were subsequently published as The Provincial Lady in America. She tripped through America light-heartedly, making graceful appearances amidst the high-fashioned social circles. This is largely a story of me in America rather than descriptive of what she saw or learned.


"Aided by London's News Chronicle and the gracious sanction of the Illustrated London News, whose film critic I am," wrote Dent, he arrived for his first visit in America. "This is a sheaf of first impressions, no more." The book claims to make no generalizations nor form any theories about America, yet proves to be an excellent source of criticism on the American theatre and life behind the scenes of theatre people. As a travel narrative, he described football, San Francisco and New York. He included conversations with Joseph Henry Jackson of the San Francisco Chronicle, and with prominent figures associated with drama productions and dramatic criticism. Parts of his narrative will be most appreciated by those Americans with an intimate knowledge of the American stage.


Digby, a young Irish-Englishman, as he described himself, and his wife drove from New York through the American Southwest to California where they rented a small redwood cabin near Mendocino. From this mountain retreat they were able to do some writing and "look at some scenery that stood still." This is a rambling narrative, valuable for an unusually observant section and discussion on the high cost of dying in the United States, a topic strangely juxtaposed to their idyllic retreat in the redwoods.


Dukes is a Lecturer in History at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. "This is the time," he writes, "neither for fear nor
complacency. It is a time for mutual understanding." This book was written "not so that Americans may like the Russians, but so that each may understand the many points of similarity." In the apprehensive position of being geographically and spiritually caught between the United States and the Soviet Union, Britons have often spoken in the tone of Dukes who calls for rational discussion, moderation and mediation between the Super-powers. There are so many points of similarity--both countries had extensive frontiers, both were off-shoots of Western European civilization, and both claim to be Federated Republics--why can't detente work?


The Reverend James Duncan of the Episcopal Church in England came to America on an exchange and acted as rector of St. Peter's Church, Niagara Falls, New York for three months in 1951. Duncan was encouraged by the strength of the Episcopal or Anglican church in the United States and believed there was a religious revival afoot in the early Fifties. He was impressed by the private financing of American churches in general, the generous support for their pastors, and the complete separation between Church and State and total freedom of faith. He thought that English clergyman had quite a bit to learn from the American methods of soliciting funds for new buildings, charities and the like. He noticed that religion in America was very practical and that Americans "liked the exposition of dogma to be fitted into the fabric of their daily life." Americans welcomed humour, not levity, and Duncan happily obliged his adopted American congregation. This is an interesting book for comparing religious attitudes between Britain and the United States.


A Scotsman, Elliot passed judgment on almost every conceivable aspect of American life--our women, children, industry, manners, language, dancing, music, churches, race relations, technical gadgets in the home--but he objected to females who danced cheek to cheek on first acquaintance and wore rolled stockings. He traveled throughout the South on a slow train, enjoyed New Orleans and Dallas, and was not outraged by white America's treatment of the jovial, soft-spoken Negroes. Elliot was a gentle Rabelais who enjoyed hospitality in some of America's finest homes but made clear his prejudice for the British cultured way of life and a decent cup of tea.

Fairlie, a British journalist, has written a valuable book on what he calls the "politics of expectation." He believes the Kennedy rhetoric which exhorted Americans to action and specifically to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe," raised the public to a fevered pitch and then, after limited accomplishments, the public became disillusioned. The Kennedys had kept the nation "standing on tiptoe, and nothing is more exhausting," said Fairlie. He believes the sense of uncertainty or uneasiness in contemporary America comes from this arousal of expectation and high achievement and the subsequent failure to arrive at the desired ends. An intriguing view and a good look at the politics of the Kennedys after they have been stripped of their charisma.


Fitz-Gerald was a British novelist who often used the pseudonym of Ignatius Phayre. His remarks on America reveal that he expected the United States to falter in the throes of Depression, both politically and socially. As the New Deal was just beginning, Fitz-Gerald wondered if the United States lacked confidence in its democratic institutions and if it wasn't "confounded" by the economic reverses. One has the impression that Fitz-Gerald is unsympathetic, even a bit envious of America's technology and leadership which had expanded during the Twenties. He seemed to be saying, perhaps the arrogant Yanks would now be put in their place, as the downward economic spiral challenged American wits and mettle.


Florence is Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Social Science, University of Birmingham. He explains in great technical and statistical detail the intermesh between British and American industries. The book includes very little social commentary but is excellent in discussing corporate structures and financial inter-relationships between American parent companies and their European subsidiaries. A valuable book from the stand point of illustrating the financial dependence of Britain on American industry and policy.

Ford (1873-1939) was an English novelist and miscellaneous writer who launched the English Review in 1908 for the express purpose of publishing a poem by Thomas Hardy. William James, T. S. Eliot, Robert Frost, H. G. Wells and Wyndham Lewis all published articles in Ford's Review. Ford also wrote historical novels which included two on Catherine Howard and another on Henry Hudson. In his account of his American experience he records his impressions of the trial of Bruno Hauptmann (the supposed Lindberg child kidnapper) at Flemington, calling it a "veritable carnival." He was much attracted to the South and traveled through Virginia and the Carolinas in a bus. He visited Allen Tate. His record of the South contains an implied defense of slavery and is valuable as a balancing force to the other travel accounts representing the other side.


Gibbons is an English journalist. As the title indicates (a question noting surprise), Gibbons was amazed not to see the materialism in America he had been led to expect from former castigating remarks of British visitors to America in the Twenties. He included an excellent chapter on Prohibition, and makes astute observations about the treatment of Blacks in the South. He appreciated American efficiency, the telephones cleanliness and observed America's "classless" society rooted in equality. Even though he disliked American movies, he did not believe America lacked culture. This is a light, humorous book for the most part, but which contains some biting, poignant remarks on the "lynching" of Negroes.


An English journalist and novelist, Sir Philip Gibbs ventured to America just after the First World War. He believed: "For the sake of the future of the world and all the hopes of humanity we must get to the heart of each other and establish a lasting and unbreakable friendship" between Americans and Britons. Gibbs had worked as the educational editor of the publishing house of Cassell & Co. and later for the Daily Mail and Daily Express as a correspondent. He was awarded the Knights of the Order of the British Empire award in 1920 for his war coverage in France. Just after the war, Gibbs traveled widely in America on lecture tours in 1919, 1920 and 1921. His writing is marked by high idealism, impatience with shams, and a sense of high adventure of life. Gibbs spoke of the tyranny of the majority in America, and of the things which control it
or exacerbate it. He spoke of Americans as a people of destiny—to lead the world. Equality was marked as one of America's most valuable spiritual qualities. He expressed high hopes for America and the globe as the United States assumed the primacy formerly held by Britain.

Gibbs made a cross-country lecture tour on the eve of World War II and visited Dallas, Forth Worth, Oklahoma City, Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky. The English novelist was impressed by the intelligent and forthright manner of American young people and praised American education. He represented England better than he reported American, but even though his insight is far from profound, he does have important comments on race, industrial capacity and foreign policy.


Gorer opened his book with an interesting methodological statement. "In this book," he said, "I am trying to apply some of the methods and insights of cultural anthropology to a great modern community." Gorer had first visited the United States in 1935 and received training in anthropology from Drs. Mead, Benedict and Dollard. He later was invited by the Rockefeller Foundation to return to America to make a study on the impact of films and radio on American audiences from an anthropological point of view. Through this work he covered most of the United States and met with American sociologists in these allied fields. Later, he worked for a time at Yale, associating himself with psychoanalysis and behaviorist psychology and produced a detailed study of American childhood and youth. From Yale, he went to Washington, D. C. to join one of the British wartime missions. At the end of the war he produced The American People. He attempts to delineate America's national character and utilized many public opinion polls carried out by Elmo Roper for Fortune magazine. The book is based on his seven years' experiences and encounters while living in the United States. His opening chapter is titled "Europe and the Rejected Father." In throwing off the authority of Europe, specifically that of Britain, Americans were simply acting out the part described by Freud and the psychoanalytic theorists, said Gorer. Rejecting English authority was a natural rejection of a father figure which represented authority and was coercive, arbitrary, and despotic. Each new generation, especially the second generation immigrants in America continuously rejected authority and championed in its place egalitarianism. Americans freely attack their own government
and political leaders out of the same rejection of authority--
the father figure. Gorer has insightful things to say
concerning the Americans' love of success, chasing the dollar
as a form of competition rather than pure avariciousness, the
problems of race and ethnic minorities and the place of women
and children in American society. A valuable book from the
standpoint of his conception that there is an identifiable
American character. For the student of psycho-history, a
valuable analysis.

Greenwall, Harry J. American Scene. London: I. Nicholson and
Watson, 1937.

Greenwall, a British journalist, came to America just after
the 1936 re-election of President Roosevelt. "Predictions," he
stated "concerning America, are difficult and dangerous.
It is far safer merely to record things as they are at a given
time. That is the purpose of this book." Greenwall developed
the general policies and attitudes of the New Deal and stated:
"I believe the Roosevelt Revolution will continue." Greenwall
describes his impressions of Roosevelt, whom he admired, Father
Coughlin and Huey Long, both of whom he denounced, and lesser
figures associated with the New Deal administration. America
had survived the Depression; the New Deal had been a "bloodless
Revolution."

Hamilton, Mary Agnes (Adamson). In America Today. London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1932.

Scottish novelist and political writer, Mrs. Hamilton was born
in Manchester but reared in Glasgow (b. 1883). She assisted
Philip Gibbs in editing the Review of Reviews. In 1929 she was
elected to Parliament as a Labour delegate and from 1933 to
1937 served as a governor of the British Broadcasting Corporation.
She has also served as an alderman of the London Country Council
and worked for the Ministry of Information, completing a brief
history of women in the trade union movement in Women At Work,
1941. Mrs. Hamilton wrote a definitive biography of Ramsey
MacDonald titled Man of Tomorrow in 1929. In 1932 she made her
fourth trip in five years to the United States and found the
"mood" of the depression to be far more serious than the
economic statistics. Could Americans psychologically recover
from the depression she asked? Was America whirling perilously
in a spiritual void? Hamilton wondered if confidence, hope and
former idealism which had supported the material prosperity of
the Twenties could be recaptured and used to propell prosperity
again. Vitality depended too completely on materialism she
feared, and lacking material success Americans' lacked a
fiercely ideology to which to turn. The book contains intelligent and articulate comments on women, race, character, and spirituality—or the lack of it—in American society of the early Thirties.


This book is not entirely devoted to the United States, but contains sections from Manchester, Cambridge, Europe and America, which autobiographically retells Hamilton's life story through the friends she has known. "I first crossed the Atlantic," she wrote, "before 1914, and have since traversed it seven times." Hamilton recalls discussions with Lillian Wald at Henry Street and Jane Addams at Hull House, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Frances Perkins when she was Deputy Commissioner for Labor under Governor Al Smith of New York, and Sinclair Lewis. This is a valuable insight as to the connections of a British traveler, as Hamilton seemingly had entry into elite intellectual and political circles at home, in America and throughout Europe.


Mrs. Hamilton delivered the Montague Burton International Relations Lecture at the University College, Nottingham in 1947, and this book is a reprint. Her themes deal with America's demobilization after the Second World War, the policies of President Truman, and the general efforts to re-enter a peacetime rhythm. But she found "a deep sense of insecurity" in America, as many Americans, she believed, were uncomfortable in their new role as world leaders. Americans were torn, she illustrated, over the issue of the Truman Doctrine. This is a sober statement on the mood of postwar America.


"This book began," wrote Hargreaves, "as a byproduct of my assignment as correspondent in America for the British television news program News at Ten, an assignment that has taken me, during the past four and a half years, to almost every state in the Union..." Hargreaves has covered news events as varied as presidential politics and the Apollo moon missions, racial desegregation in the Deep South and the discovery of oil on the northern shore of Alaska, the Manson murder trial in Los Angeles and the unfolding drama of the Watergate affair. He found the United States contradictory, possessed of great strengths and great weaknesses. His approach is frankly a treatment of America
"as news," as he surveys the "wreckage" of the decade which followed the assassination of Kennedy. When Kennedy died, something, perhaps America's confidence," seemed to Hargreaves to have died with him. A challenging and sometimes encouraging portrait of the United States, presented at a time when Americans seem groping for new leadership and fixed ideals. Hargreaves describes an American civilization which has certainly not fallen to the level of the Roman Antonines, "but from Dallas to Watergate via the streets of Chicago and the paddyfields of South Vietnam, the institution of the Presidency has today sunk to its lowest point of regard since the United States first became a major figure in the world arena." This is a most arresting and challenging book.


Harmsworth, an English journalist, made a six-weeks tour of the United States in the autumn of 1938. "The present volume does not pretend to be a volume about America," he wrote, "It is merely a series of impressions of many diverse scenes and personalities hurriedly drawn." Harmsworth had been to the United States on four previous occasions and even though he pleads spontaneity, his remarks are carefully considered on race relations, education, women, geographical regions and science and technology. On the eve of the second World War, he was eager to tell his American readers that "I like America."


Hastings spent a little over thirteen months in the United States between August 1967 and the Presidential election of 1968. He was reporting for the London Evening Standard and announced "I think my own personal turning point came when Robert Kennedy was assassinated." While he was not a personal admirer of Robert Kennedy, he wondered at the kind of society that produced political assassins of Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Medgar Evers and so many others including the Kennedys. Hastings is especially concerned with racism, vividly describes Watts, and prophetically characterized Nixon as a "most unlikeable person." He felt the national malaise in America was its lack of convictions.

Henfrey is an English journalist/writer who originally began this book as a diary so he makes no pretense or claim that it is an account of the USA. Rather, "it is simply an experience of it--most of it shared with my wife June." The author is white and his wife Black and he has valuable personal stories of US reactions to inter-racial marriage. Henfrey views America from a very personal lens which often seems similar to New Left writings as he selected as topics: A Shaker village in upstate New York, a Jewish community in New York city, Hippy life in San Francisco and migrant laborers and their goals in California. Henfrey includes autobiographical portraits of the "inarticulate" looking at America from underneath, as he portrayed "Jacob Slotnik, age 81," a personal story of a Jewish tailor in Manhattan. He makes important points about ethnicity in America, and how ethnic cohesion in slum conditions provided an anchor for first generation immigrants. Henfrey finds the process of Americanization often to have been a disrupting force which diffused and confused the old values. Henfrey has taken a long look at the unusual and disadvantaged elements in society in a tone that is somewhere between that of Michael Harrington's *The Other America* and the outraged American New Left writers.


Hill is a Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Exeter. His book is a grammar school text which contains good sections on the evolution of the Cold War from the British perspective and is especially valuable for his interpretation of McCarthyism in the 1950's.


Hodson (b 1891), English journalist and author, worked for a series of London newspapers: Daily Mail, 1924-1929, News Chronicle and the Sunday Times. He was a war correspondent during World War II and worked on official publications and government films from 1943-1945. His book on America praises American ingenuity, strength and leadership in material production. One of the central themes is the need for a continued close relationship between Britain and America in the postwar years.

An English scientific and economic writer, Hogben (b. 1895) graduated from Cambridge and later held posts at the universities of London and Edinburgh and Canada's McGill University as a Professor of Zoology. After 1947 he taught at the University of Birmingham. Hogben was lecturing in Norway when the Nazis invaded Scandinavia. The book is largely the story of his attempts to get back to England in the course of which he traveled thousands of miles and visited the United States.


Huddleston (1883-1952), a well-known English newspaperman, was deeply impressed with America's material prosperity, her spiritual idealism and prefigured America's future as glorious. He wished that Great Britain could emulate the American economic and social system. But alas, just as his book was published, America experienced the Great Crash and the onset of the Depression. His comments are valuable as an example of a most enthusiastic British supporter of the American way of life in the late Twenties.


This book was published as part of the New Certificate Geography Series to be used as a basic grammar school text in British public schools. Hudson is Deputy Headmaster and head of the Geography department at King James' Grammar School, Alondbury, Hudderfield. Even though the text is sketchy and basic, it contains a fairly good concluding section on America's social problems: Alaskan Eskimos, Indians, and Blacks. Hudson concludes: "It is difficult for the US to preach the doctrine of racial equality overseas effectively if she continues this illiberal treatment of the Negro element in her population." He asks quite candidly: "Can she effectively lend support to the claims of the native peoples of South Africa to equality while her own people continue to curb the aspirations of their kinfolk?" The US must assume the moral as well as the economic leadership of the world and in order to do this, and must tidy up its own house before preaching to the world about basic human rights.

Hughes is an Irish citizen (b. 1918) born in New York city, but since 1945 he has resided in Europe, currently in Sweden. His book is a parody on American history done in cartoon form. He thoroughly debunks America's frontier experience as he shows the US calvary shooting down unarmed Indians with the caption: "The invention of the revolver in 1835 by Sam Colt was instrumental in the spread of Yankee culture." The tone is critical and caustic, puncturing myths about America's greatness. It contains many ideas that would be labeled New Left and concludes properly with a debunking of the Presidency by referring to Watergate. "This is a savagely funny alternative look at America's heritage...revealing some of the sorry truths behind the distorted picture painted by more traditional history books," acknowledges the forward which is unsigned.


An English agriculturalist, Hutton visited the United States during the late Thirties and explained, "by the accident of the war, I came to live in the Middle West." Thus, this book, "is of just another book by a foreigner about America...it is about a region of the United States, the people who live in it, their institutions and their characteristics...it is only a personal record of what struck an Englishman most about the region in which he has spent five years of the last eight." Lord Bryce had intended to do a book on the American Midwest. Hutton has certainly succeeded in fulfilling the ambition by producing an intimate and reflective view of Midwestern cultural nuances, family life, farm work, and life in Midwestern cities. He has included significant sections on education, the family, leisure time activities, the press and media, women, politics and values. There is a great deal of paradox in the Midwest, traditionally founded by "progressives" and its current image as the heartland of American conservativism and traditionalism. Even in 1946, Hutton remarked that many Americans seemed to be searching for something spiritual to believe in, beyond themselves and beyond materialism. A most valuable book which touches every aspect undertaken by this study of American culture.

Don Iddon (christened Ernest Frederick Iddon) (b. 1912) is an English journalist educated at Burnley Grammar School and the Wheelwright School, Dewsbury. His first job was in Fleet Street at the age of 19. He soon was writing for the *Birmingham Gazette* where he received a by-line at age 20. He subsequently moved on to the *Daily Express* and he went to New York in 1937 as assistant correspondent and in 1938 he joined the *Daily Mail* as chief American correspondent, a post which he held when his book was published. *Don Iddon's America* is a collection and selection of dispatches cabled to the London *Daily Mail* from the United States every week between 1945 and 1949. Many were written hurriedly to catch the newspaper's deadline and some are inevitably contradictory. The diary is essentially newspaper material, thus, Iddon states: "If you find me avowing some opinion with vehemence in the early part of the book and asserting the exact opposite some pages later you must put me down to the fallibility of any newspaperman shooting from the hip and writing off the cuff."

He offered as his purpose: "My column for the *Daily Mail* has tried to present the American scene as witnessed through intensely British eyes." Iddon reports on Washington politics, the decisions within the United Nations, entertainment, personalities, fads and fashions. Thus, there is no central theme or aim within the book but the collection is valuable for evaluating moment-to-moment British reactions to things American in the post-war Forties. Iddon is never dull.


Imlay is a British lecturer at Hall School, Hampstead, and displays an idealistic view of the United States. He bluntly attempts to eulogize and deify Robert and John Kennedys. "I am asking," he wrote, "that idealism, which found its expression in the two Kennedys in the 1960's, should again be given currency in our political and social vocabulary and ways of thinking."

He makes a claim for the 'idealist without illusion'. Increasingly, the British know that the future of their home country is intimately tied to the fate and fortune of America, and many young British writers hope earnestly that we will solve what some have called our contemporary crisis of values.


Ions is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of York. His book is a collection of selected documents to be used as a text in British Grammar schools, specifically in the Sixth Form, and is part of the World Studies series. The book contains valuable
401

edited introductory material to each of the document sections. While his writing is essentially favorable to Kennedy, hero-worship is distinctly absent as Ions correctly pictures Kennedy as first and foremost an adroit, even manipulative, Irish politician in the tradition of Boston's back alley and bloody political skirmishes. He has interesting ideas on how Kennedy, using the phrase borrowed from Winston Churchill, called the Eisenhower administration "the locust years," or a period of blight and stagnation, offering to get America moving again. For the time when it was written (1967) this is a most interesting view of the idol of Camelot. It appears that some Britons were not as taken with the Kennedy image as were Americans, and Ions exposes the reasons why.


Jacks, English educator, philosopher, essayist and editor (1860-1955) first entered the ministry and then became a professor of philosophy at Manchester College, Oxford, where he also served as Principal from 1915 until his retirement in 1931. Jacks first came to the United States in 1886 as a post-graduate student at Harvard University and he remarked on his conversations with Charles Eliot and William James. He came again on a series of lecture tours in 1909, 1910, 1912-1913, 1924 and 1929. The basis for My American Friends was an extensive tour under the auspices of the American Association for Adult Education. Jacks was one of the most perceptive of all British travelers as he wrote intelligently of education, self-criticism, children and youth, women, intellectuals associated with the New Deal, recreation and the place of America in world affairs.


A British author, James wrote probably the most critical book about America since 1935. Part of what he writes is satire; the other part is written from envy which sounds like sour grapes. He criticizes American machine technology and material abundance, saying: "Europeans know that Americans, in gaining their wealth, have become as culturally barren and impersonal as the machines they operate." He complains, "the average American is drowning in a sea of standardized abundance...he must thrash and kick his life away, consuming and wasting..." One of the few books on the United States since 1945 reflecting pure virulence. For James, there are no redeeming qualities to life in America. He believes Europe has the things which really matter--culture, history, art, philosophy--whereas life in the United States is sterile. The tone is defensive and the statements wrong-headed.

Jenkinson came to the United States as a young aristocratic Englishman in the 1930's. This tender shoot, newly graduated from Oxford, visited Huey Long, and Jenkinson recalled that he was subjected to the characteristic Long interview in which the Governor harangued the Briton one moment and read the Bible to him the next. He attended the kidnapping trial of Bruno Hauptmann at Flemington, noting how the press dominated the trial and "milked" the proceedings with ruthless and tireless efficiency. He believed the newspaperwomen to be more hardboiled than the men. He commented on America's elite society, the schools, local politics, the state of the economy and foreign relations. This book is mainly descriptive portraiture with limited reactive commentary and no analysis.


Jones, a journalist/guidebook writer, enjoyed America and praised technology, education, the high level of living and "typical" American characteristics. Americans he found like to be liked, resent criticism and are often boastful! But he believed "Americans have something to be boastful about." As the Sixties opened, Jones described Americans and our institutions in generous terms.


"I went to America and to Russia in 1961," wrote Jones, "because to know these countries is essential to a knowledge of the modern world...in this book I describe what I saw." He traveled by air, train, car and bus through America, while in Russia he traveled with his own car. In each country he covered three thousand miles; he did not go to California or to the Deep South, nor to the Baltic Republics nor the Caucasus. Writing at a time when comparative history was popular, Jones draws most interesting parallels between the two superpowers. The United States comes off much better in regards to industrial consumer capacity, communications, variety and quantity of food, and the relative "openness" of society. Russia is better in providing public housing and eliminating poverty; Jones found no Skid Rows in Russia but found one in almost every major American city. Had Americans learned nothing, not even compassion, from the experience of the Depression? How could Americans, amidst so much plenty, tolerate so much deprivation among its urban poor, the aged and the helpless. One might complain of the lack of freedom in Russia, but there it is state policy that nobody starves or goes without

This book introduces a potential British tourist to America and is largely a guidebook giving information on climate, food, how to obtain a visa and so forth. The authors state: "America is different. It is not the least like England, although many of its roots are English...unless a traveller goes prepared to find a foreign country, he will miss or misunderstand half of the United States."


Lancaster is a Lecturer in History at Madeley College of Education. His book is an edited collection of newspaper articles, letters, speeches, sections from treaties and novels, and he has interpreted their significance in an edited introduction to each section. His remarks deal with effectiveness of NATO, world dilemmas in the Middle East, America's involvement in Vietnam among other topics which seek to explain America's attitude viz a viz the world. He is sympathetic yet critical of many American actions and warns us of over-reacting to Communism as a doctrine.


Landau is a British author and sculptor who lectured in America in 1952. He found the chatty ladies club atmosphere, as depicted by so many foreign lecturers and native cartoonists, notably absent from his experience as he described the American woman's cultural aspirations as intelligent and sincere, not affected. He has important comments on education, (Princeton was his favorite university), spirituality, the arts, and technical efficiency.


Laski was an English political scientist (1893-1950) born in Manchester and brought up in an orthodox Jewish household. He attended New College, Oxford and graduated with first class honors from the School of Modern History in 1914. He taught at McGill University in Canada, Harvard (1915-1919) and Yale (1919-1920). In 1917 he was the Henry Ward Beecher lecturer at Amherst. Upon returning to London he taught at the London
School of Economics and the University of London until his retirement. In the Thirties he accepted many visiting posts: Yale (1931-1933), Moscow (1934) and Trinity College, Dublin (1936). Laski was also deeply involved in British politics as he was a member of the Fabian Society, a member of the Industrial Court and a member of the executive committee of the British Labour Party. A convinced Marxian in 1933, Laski was not sure that democracy in "crisis" in America could survive the Depression. He opens with the comment that "certainty has been replaced by cynicism." Was the old idea of individual acquisitiveness outmoded, he wondered, and suggested the possibility of a new collectivism.


Edmund Wilson called Laski "a well equipped scholar and able political thinker" and no where is this statement better represented than in Laski's monumental work on American democracy. Almost eight hundred pages long, this book includes chapters on the traditions of America, political institutions, both Federal and State and Local, business enterprise, Labour, religion, education, culture (which is primarily literature), minority problems, the professions, press, cinema and radio, and America as world power. "In a sense this book has been a generation in the making," he opened, and continued: "I can plead only two things in defence of the result; first, that this book is written out of deep love of America, and, second, that I have done my best to make intelligible to Europeans, and, above all, to Englishmen, why America arouses that deep love." Laski, even though an avowed Marxist, produced a balanced account and his ideas have been included throughout this study when appropriate. Laski debated and discussed his ideas with many distinguished American professionals and he acknowledges them: Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Dr. Alfred E. Cohn, Max Lerner, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, President Roosevelt, E. R. Murrow, Robert and Helen Lynd, Merle Curti, Charles and Mary Beard and a host of others. In this book, unlike his earlier one, Laski never doubted that Americans could overcome both inertia and fear, a heartening reminder in the Seventies.


Shane Leslie was an Irish biographer (b. 1885) noted for his work on Jonathan Swift. His writing combines erudition, conservativism, humor and truculence in even portions. His father was an Irish baronet and his mother was Leonie Jerome of
Madison Square, New York. He attended King's College, Cambridge. In 1907 he went to Russia and became a friend of Tolstoy. At various times he was a reviewer for the Daily Telegraph and London Sunday Times. He was proud of being a relative "of Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Parnell and of the Red Indians through his American grandmother." His book American Wonderland resulted from his lecture tour of America in 1933. He came as the Rosenbach Fellow of Bibliography at the University of Pennsylvania. He produced a potpourri "of the America I have loved," he said, "during the past quarter of a century." Leslie's comments are personal, but filled with wisdom and effervescence, as he views education, literature, women, American language and humour, racial elements, sport, historical places and most of our geographical regions.


An English novelist and humorist, Percy Wyndham Lewis (b. 1886-1957) was actually born in Maine of English parents but returned to Britain while still an infant. He was educated at Rugby and at the Slade School of Art in London. He was the editor of Blast, which had been co-founded by Erza Pound, and was the leader of the Vorticist movement, one of the ultra-modern artistic movements in the era of Dadaism, Cubism and Surrealism. Lewis achieved fame first as a novelist, next as a critic and philosopher, then as a political pamphleteer. Through all this, he continued to paint. He described himself: "I am a novelist, painter, sculptor, philosopher, draughtsman, critic, politician, journalist, essayist, pamphleteer all rolled into one of those portmanteau men of the Italian Renaissance." Modesty seems to be the only quality lacking. In 1940 Lewis came to the United States and spent the next eight years living in America and Canada and was for a time an advisor for the Library of Congress.

America, I Presume was finished just as German's forces were at the gates of Paris in 1940. Lewis had come on a lecture tour in 1939 and remembers the Atlantic crossing, fearing being torpedoed as the Athenia had been just 100 miles away. He stayed for three months in Nineveh, New York where his wife Agatha Morgan had relatives. He included an amusing piece on "race" in which a blue-blooded American family is discussing its family tree and is unwilling to accept an Italian grandmother, saying she MUST be French. In a more serious vein, he discusses the tendency in America toward state socialism, views the Negro problem, praises American equality and education. He judged America to be a unabashed success.
Lewis opened this volume with Turgot's phrase, "this people (the American) is the hope of the human race." America after the Second World War was described as "the most aggressive national personality extant...it is a new kind of country." He comments on America's idealism as a source of strength, and suggests that the American spirit could be the nucleus of a world state. "The US is the future world model of the cosmic society and cosmic man." This is a postwar utopian plea for building attitudes of internationalism as opposed to nationalism. Lewis concluded: "It is, I believe, the destiny of America to produce the first of a new species of man. It is the first of the great 'melting pots'...and it is my argument in this book that we can read our own future by an imaginative scrutiny of what is occurring, and what is so plainly destined to occur, in America."


Macdonell (b. 1895-1941), a Scottish novelist, satirist and writer of detective fiction was educated at Winchester and achieved his first fame as a humorist. In 1933, he published a humorous, amusing study of British manners and customs titled England, Their England, and Christopher Morley wrote in the foreword: "I imagine Mr. Macdonell watching the oddities of England, calmly self-contained for say, (15 mature years). Then he could bear it no longer. Something snapped. He uttered a long and echoing guffaw. But in the actual relief of this explosion he realized also that while laughing he had learned to love." Macdonell came to America in 1934 as Secretary of the Sherlock Holmes Society of London and attended a state dinner of the American organization, the Baker Street Irregulars, on December 7, 1934 in New York. His book resulted from this trip and his comments are insightful about American women, sports, humor, the press and media, race and politics. He felt that Americans really do not take enough time for leisure activities and play games as they do business—to win. Macdonell found many things in America delightful and says so in a flattering manner. Macdonell was killed and during the war in an air raid at Oxford in January, 1941.


A British journalist and correspondent, McMillan's views are pro-British. McMillan is bitingly critical of the concept of "collective security" and the United Nations in particular. "The machinery of the UN, built by perfectionists, is not relevant to the times in which we live." He asks a hard question,
one which Americans seldom ask themselves: If the men of power
can talk to one another at the click of a switch or meet with
only a few hours delay, then what is the point of a vast assembly
of minor representatives engaged in permanent squabbles?
McMillan believes the UN is a luxury the West cannot afford,
nor should the major powers be hypocritical in regards to its
real powers of coercion or peacekeeping. Unfortunately the
dream for the UN does not correspond to the reality, as he
labels it "a glass lie!"


McMillan asks "in an age of competitive coexistence, when
technology is power, do the British want to surrender completely
to the US?" This is a valuable book which illustrates the
amount and kind of American investments made in Great Britain
after the Second World War. He has amassed enormous amounts of
statistical data to show how Americans have infiltrated the
British market in terms of auto production, drugs, computers,
and foodstuffs; even chewing gum and baby-food used in England
are "made in America" or made by an American subsidiary in
Europe. McMillan complains of the "politics of dependence" in
economics which has led to Britain's nuclear dependence on the
US. Is this a good idea he asks? This work is important for
understanding the extent to which Britain is tied financially
to the fate and decisions of the US.

The Roots of Corruption: The Erosion of
Traditional Values in Britain from 1960 to the Present Day.

McMillan looks at the breakdown of traditional values, the
apparent flight into nihilism and self-destruction among the
youth of the Sixties as they delved into drugs, liberal sex, and
anti-social violence. As the book opens he places two events in
juxtaposition: in 1960 Kennedy was elected President and
D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover was liberated from the
vile bonds of Victorian morality, as a decision in London's Old
Bailey allowed it to be published and sold. These two events
seemed to symbolize that "youth was now in the prow in the
most powerful State in the Western World and in the oldest
Parliamentary democracy...the inhibitions on sex were being
overthrown." McMillan is critical of the modishness which
masqueraded as revolution; youth in general, worldwide sought to
tear down the old order but had nothing new to erect in its place.
At the end of the Sixties, a sad disenchantment was evident as
one after another of the vaunted hopes of the early Sixties
crumbled. "Perhaps no decade has been such a demolition of
"certainties," he wrote. This is a provocative book which asks if the former permissiveness and the current reaction to it would not produce a conservative swing in the pendulum back toward the Right. This is a British view of 'Coming Apart in the '60's', as McMillan sees student demonstrations, wild sex, hard rock, racial riots rampant in the ghettos, the influence of the media and the influence of accelerating technology. McMillan believed that what was happening in the Sixties in America was happening also in England.


"At the end of August 1955 I gave up my job and my apartment in Oxford and prepared to leave England...I had been given a one year Fellowship at Yale." This book is insightful and cogently written as Magee describes the attitudes of the British toward America and Americans during the Brain Drain of the Fifties of the best and the brightest from England journeying to America for greater opportunities. Magee is careful to temper British possible resentments by discussing the pros and cons of American society. What comes through is that Magee is a loyal British citizen, but also intelligent enough to know that world power has shifted from the British Empire to the United States and no amount of vitrol or bile on the part of British former pro-counsels towards America will restore the former balance. Magee enjoyed his study journey, commenting on graduate education, sports, churches, women, dating, art, newspapers, historical monuments, family life, children, civil rights and the Deep South. This is an intelligent, balanced account.


In the fall of 1934, Mais (b. 1885), an English writer and lecturer, made the Grand Tour of the United States giving weekly talks over the BBC describing his trip. He began at Jamestown and crossed the South from Florida to the West Coast. This book contains parts of his speeches and is enthusiastic, even breezy, as he speaks of American manners, speech, women, civic organizations, and various regions of the States. Mais was educated at Oxford and from 1918 to 1936 was literary critics successively for the Evening News, Daily Express and Daily Graphic. At the time he wrote his book on America he was one of the leading broadcasters for the BBC.

A bright cheerful account by Mannin (b. 1900) who came to the States in Spring of 1964 upon the invitation of some young Arab leaders who wished to honor her, as her book *The Road to Beersheba* was published in America. She returned to California seeking a "non-European setting" for her next novel and made a grand tour of America by bus. She has many experiences on the East and West coasts but writes little to nothing on the South. She has written an excellent section on the American Indians and on the aftermath in Watts. What she took time to see, she saw very well. Mannin is an English novelist and essayist who wrote: "I was born in London of working class parents of Irish descent." She left school at 15 to take a job as a stenographer, gained experience as a journalist and began writing novels. She has been a member of the Independent-Labour Party (Revolutionary Socialist). However, she said: "South to Samarkand is the story of my final disillusionment with the U.S.S.R." *An American Journey* lauds American freedom and openness but condemns pockets of poverty and deprivation. A woman of strong convictions, she has intelligently expressed them.


In 1947, Father Victor Marron went to America to converse with his Catholic counterparts in America. Marron is a priest of the great Diocese of Clogher and attended the consecration of Reverend Thomas McDonnell as Auxiliary Bishop of New York. He crossed the United States by car, stopping at the Grand Canyon and in Hollywood. He met with Cardinal Spellman, Cardinal Dougherty, Mayor O'Dwyer and other Catholic notables. The author draws America with a kindly twinkle in his eye and draws you along with his enthusiasm. The introduction is written by Shane Leslie.


An English novelist, Merritt (b. 1887) used her pseudonym in writing her travel book on America. While she was supportive of many aspects of American life (household cleanliness), she also was caustically critical about American women and the interaction between the sexes in America, which she deemed artificial and unnatural. She admired Mrs. Roosevelt, and wanted American women to come to equality and professional liberation. Merritt's tone is reminiscent of the British suffragists. While she enjoyed her sojourn in the States, she confessed she could hardly wait to return home to England.

Mitchell came on a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship in the early Thirties. He was "to live among the American people and travel over any part of the country I pleased, the idea being that I should know more about America and Americans when I returned to Britain and help in my small way to foster friendly relations between the two great English-speaking countries," he said. This is certainly not an in-depth study, but he did include some valuable material on American slang and English usage in the United States which differed from the English spoken in Britain. Also, he included a brief section on American newspapers and the media. This a spotty volume which contains glib off-hand comments about American coinage and then proceeds to mention something profound about American homes, their setting and landscaping which to him reflected American values.


Morehouse, as a military-minded Englishman, describes the efforts of the United States to gear up for war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He traveled extensively throughout the United States viewing the military installations at the Presidio and talking to General DeWitt. He allows his fears of another possible attack on the Mainland (possibly San Diego, Seattle or Bremerton) to show through his commentary. He includes an interesting discussion of how a military minded Briton looked at Executive Order 9066, which interned the Japanese in relocation camps. Morehouse believed the order essential to internal security as did many American military personal during the war hysteria. He comments on how different the "war" is in the States, with no blackouts, no nightly bombardments and plenty of food on American tables. This is a volume written definitely to garner sympathy and military support for the British effort during the second world war.


"My principal qualification as an authority on things typically American and on typical Americans is that I went to the United States, not as a visitor, but to live and to work, when I was old enough to observe but still young enough to discredit most of the misconceptions, still pliable enough to be persuaded that typicalities are often false. My principal reason for writing this book is that I wish others to discover the same thing, in the same way." Morpurgo, British born of Greek ethnicity, was
a student in an unidentified American College between 1937-1939. He returned after the war for a second excursion. His comments are carefully chosen as he describes and analyzes American families, education, child-rearing, the ghettos, material largess, literature and the media. Morpurgo touches every aspect covered in the present study as an astute observer displaying critical detachment.


Alistair Cooke called Morris a "Flaubert in orbit." Denis Brogan described this book, published in Britain with the title _As I Saw the U.S.A._, "One of the very best travel books, one of the very best travel books, one of the very best impressions of contemporary America I have ever read." Morris displays great skill in conveying the emotional tone of a place utilizing the apt and aromatic word. Morris as a British journalist arrived with his family in 1953 and traveled throughout the forty-eight states. Morris explores American character, and readily acknowledges that there is no such thing as the Standard American, but finds charm in the "glorious profusion of elements" both human and regional. Morris is a graduate of Oxford, and has worked as a foreign correspondent for the London Times and the Manchester Guardian. Morris recalls that his journalist experiences, before he turned to writing novels and special monographs, enabled him "in a superficial but extraordinarily enjoyable way, to see almost the entire world before I was thirty-five." His account of America is perhaps one of the best known and cogently written of all British travel commentaries on the subject.

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"This book," wrote Morris, "is a view of the urban world, as it looked, sounded and smelt to an Englishman in the 1950's and 1960's." His itinerary included Moscow, Munich, Naples, New York, Odessa, Oxford, Paris, Port of Spain, Prague, Rawalpindi, Reykjavik, Rio de Janeiro, Rotterdam, San Francisco, Santiago, Singapore, Stockholm, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Triest, Venice, Warsaw, Washington and Wellington. From age 25 to 35 Morris was a wandering foreign correspondent. He recalls, "I sniffed the Cold War...in Berlin, Moscow and Kabul. I sensed the resurgency of European energy in Rotterdam, Paris and Brussels. I observed the already aging strength of Communism--cruelly in Marienbad, sadly in Warsaw, endearingly in Odessa, menacingly in Hong Kong...I felt North America hardening with power in San Francisco and Washington." Morris reaches an astonishing
conclusion:..."for all the horrors of our time, for all the woes of our Cassandras, for all our real forbodings and alarms, the world is perhaps in a friendlier condition today than it ever was before..." The book contains no social analysis about the particular condition of the United States, but has many interesting thoughts in relation to America's intermesh with the world.


This book is an intriguing study of the one-man denominations in American religion. The independent ministries—the preachers—are well researched by Morris as he conveys the "spirit" or the attraction of individuals such as A. A. Allen, Oral Roberts, C. W. Burpo, Reverend Ike, Carl McIntire, the Armstrongs and Billy Graham. This is a most interesting account of the evangelists phenomenon in current America.


Mosley is a British journalist/correspondent covering entertainment in America. He reviews Hollywood from the inside in the Thirties, describing the star system, the commissary, the staging and historical research behind film making. He thoroughly enjoyed America, especially California, and his reception from the publicity conscious American actors and actresses.


"The United States," wrote Mowat, "is the greatest single achievement of European civilization." Mowat, a journalist/political pamphleteer in England, came on a tour of the United States on the eve of the Second World War. He praised the United States for its wealth, progressive ideas and technical know-how. In this book, the emphasis is on close collaboration between the two great Anglo-Saxon countries, as he labelled them—Britain and America. On the eve of war, the book is a plea for a united front. It contains valuable information on international diplomacy in the Thirties and evaluates the success of the New Deal.


Nairn is an English architect whose book is the result of a 10,000 mile trip in the United States in 1959-1960. American architecture he summed up in a simple phrase, calling it "a terrible bit of butchery."

This work provides an airy, humorous account of an English journalist in America. Some aspects of America she described with almost a tongue-in-cheek laugh as when she described slenderizing by automation. Other topics are approached in dead earnest, as when she described Black families in Harlem. This is a mixed volume, containing flattery, mockery and pointed criticism.


Encouraged and supported by the British Ministry of Information, Newman, an English novelist (1897–1968), came to America to foster Anglo-American collaboration and cooperation. "My mission," he wrote, "was to see America so as to be able to tell my own people about it. At the same time I might be able to dispel a few of the strange notions about the British which are still held by some Americans...and which are exploited by our enemies." Bernard Newman was engaged in the warfare of words and came to the United States to see it clearly, but also sympathetically as one would view an ally. Even though he freely admitted his lack of objectivity, he candidly described American women, our race dilemmas, technological devices in American homes, American entertainment, our treatment of children and the role of the United States in world affairs.


Neyroud came to the United States for the first time during the era of Calvin Coolidge. He found a job in Boston and later New York as a foreign correspondent for a London newspaper. He lived in Greenwich Village during the Depression, and remembered too the days of Prohibition, speakeasies, and visiting the various ethnic sections of New York. He loved America as a land of opportunity. This volume is an autobiographical flash-back to the America of the Twenties and Thirties.


Nichols (b. 1899), English essayist, novelist and playwright, was educated at Marlborough College and at Balliol, Oxford. While at Oxford he founded the *Oxford Outlook* and was president of the Oxford Union Club, the famous debating club. In the late Twenties he contributed articles to the London *Daily Sketch* and *Sunday Chronicle*. Both in England and America he gained a reputation as a daring and unusual interviewer. Nichols had invested heavily in the American Stock Market and lost his
fortune in the Crash of 1919. He promptly decided to return home to England and recouped his losses by writing best sellers. Nichols was well known as a pacifist, and these sentiments are reflected in Cry Havoc! in which he lambasts munitions makers and the war mongers.


The author came to America with her husband Sidney Nolan, a painter, and together they toured several cities looking for subjects and peering into American museums. They toured most of the central and western states by car and found D. H. Lawrence's place in Taos, New Mexico most interesting. Shortly thereafter, Cynthia was found to be tubercular and she was placed in a hospital in New York. Half of this book is devoted to discussions of her treatment in the institution and is certainly depressing. The book has little value as a social commentary unless one is keenly interested in comparing American health care with the British National Health Service.

Orr, J. Edwin. This is Victory: 10,000 Miles of Miracles in America. London: Marshall, Morgan and Scot, Ltd., 1936.

Arriving in Boston in the early Thirties, Orr described: "I went straight to Kenilworth Street to become the guest preacher of Reverend Robert Kilgour of the Christian Missionary Alliance. Orr described America as a land of faith, even intense revivalism as he visited Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts. "In summing up," he observed, "evangelical Christians in America are second to none." He found his New England tour inspirational.


Parker is a Professor of International Relations at Oxford and has amassed prodigious statistical data to compare the United States and the U.S.S.R. Parker selected as his major topics: geographical background, natural resources, the economy, agriculture, industry, transport, population, political parties and the future prospects for detente. This book is really an economic study with intricate discussions of inflation and underemployment of America’s potential labor force. America, possessed of a heavy industrial plant, faces continuing overproduction and underconsumption. His facts, ideas and prospects have a familiar ring as they seem like echoes of the explanations for the Great Depression. The book is valuable too for its illustrative figures which show how the space/research industries have denuded America and the entire free world of its best brains.

Pepper at 29 is a journalist and interviewer with Independent Television in Britain and an alumnus of the World Press Institute in the United States. This book, his first, is a result of a 40,000-mile working tour of America as a British Fellow to the World Press International. He traveled about America in the company of fourteen other writers and broadcasters from different countries who were also receiving fellowships from WPI. Amerigrope, a collection of reports and essays, many of them highly subjective, paints one well traveled journalist's picture of the American condition. Pepper believes America is groping for answers, values, solutions and leadership. His work, as he describes it, "is an oblique, impressionistic narrative"...and the "fashioning has been done by firework and axe, daub and jab."

Pepper finds no common theme in modern America; there is no glue he believes to hold the societal parts together. This book was written with the intention of shocking Americans out of apathy and into action, and is similar in style and tone to many American New Left writers, although it seems more shocking to have outsiders remind us of worms and diseases in the rural areas of South Carolina or to hear foreign observers retell the vile curses of a Lester Maddox toward American Blacks.


Maie Perley is an Englishwoman writing as the wife of a visiting Professor at the University of Indiana. She describes America in caustic tones and was displeased by American women who constantly primp and paint, disorderly children, and fast-paced living. She vividly described poverty in the mountains of Kentucky and in the slums of Savannah. Overall, she preferred England to America.


Oxford educated, Pope-Hennessy, (b. 1916) was the literary editor of the Spectator at the time that he published his book on America. He loved the United States, saying: "I am not interested in what is wrong here but in what is right, I don't want to pick holes...I like America. More correctly, I love America. I love Americans." This English biographer, historian and travel commentary writer had first ventured to America as a young boy when his father was military attaché at the British Embassy in Washington, D. C. His book on America recalls the friendliness, the openness, the candour that he found in America after the war. He describes our culture, theatre, efficiency, equality and peculiar mannerisms with a real fondness and generosity.

This book was originally commissioned as one of the 'Studies in Economic History', edited by Professor M. W. Flinn on behalf of the Economic History Series, explained Potter, calling his work "an introductory guide to a very large subject." The book is written for Britons who "are not familiar with many aspects of American life." The book is really a comparative history, as Potter discusses contemporaneous conditions and problems. Potter is a Professor at the London School of Economics and has written and insightful, analytical, and well researched volume on the American economy of the Twenties and Thirties.


Potter (b. 1900) is an Oxford educated English humorist who has worked for the BBC (1935-1945) and perhaps is best known for his books on "gamesmanship." The satirical "one-upmanship" and "lifemanship" gambits are funny parodies on the 'How to Win Friends and Influence People' type of self-help books. His writing is scintillating, yet he rarely probes into his victims without the preliminary anaesthetic of good humor. Potter toured America in 1951, traveling across the country from New York to California. His book contains ideas gathered from this visit and from two trips to America in 1955. He remarks on McCarthyism, youth, women, humor, the American family and sports. He lunched with Dean Acheson and conferred with his countryman Aldous Huxley. During his first trip in 1955 he gave a series of lectures on the subject "English and American humour compared." Potter saw Americans as some of the greatest "gamesmen" in the world.


A relatively well-known British writer, and novelist (she enjoyed being recognized by some fellow Englishmen while touring Mount Vernon), Powell made her first trip to the United States in 1973. She was enchanted by the massive dimensions of the United States, the gigantic architectural structures, and seemed to relish the many friends she made in the process of speaking before American civic groups. The book is certainly more than a 'me in America' monologue however as she has great insight into American contemporary problems such as youth's rebellion, race, poverty, the lack of adequate public transportation, the professional inequality of women and the dilemmas of the United States in foreign policy viz a viz the Soviet bloc and disarmament. Overall, a sympathetic account of America which encourages us to face the future with courage and confidence. A book which says throughout to count your blessings, Americans!

This book is divided into three parts. The first section deals with memories of Price's father who toured the United States just after the Civil War. The younger Price, using letters and his father's diary, retraced the adventure of the elder Price across the continent via the newly constructed trans-continental railway. This section is especially good on the Mormon experiment in Utah and a view of the South during Reconstruction. The second section deals with a return visit of his father who brought his new bride to the American West, where he met with General Sherman and toured the garrisons in the region which is now New Mexico. Fifty-six years later, the author and his wife made a tour of the United States which followed the former route of his parents. The younger Price arrived in November, 1934 and was keenly interested, as an agriculturalist, in the A.A.A. program of the New Deal. Price comments on almost every topic undertaken in this study and is fully confident that the United States will remain capitalistic and dynamic, possessed as the country's people are, with the pioneering spirit from the frontier.


Priestland is a correspondent for the BBC who opened this volume saying: "For the experience behind this book, I must thank the British Broadcasting Corporation and in particular, my colleagues of the Foreign News Department which sent me to America from 1858 to 1960 and again from 1965 to the present (1967)...on certain subjects I plead guilty to being opinionated." One of the five or ten most important books written on America by a Briton since 1935, Priestland included sections on foreign policy, civil rights, education, religion, the revolt of youth in the Sixties, Vietnam, violence, the media and so forth. He stated his intentions clearly: "This book is conceived primarily for British readers. This, in itself, may make it all the more interesting to Americans...to see how their strengths and failings appear to an outsider who knows them and likes them." For Priestland, America is continuously in the process of becoming.

Admitting to being perhaps unfashionably "liberal and Christian," Priestland wonders if violence world-wide is an accelerating phenomenon or if past periods in history have been even more violent. He convinces his readers that "society as a whole" is responsible for violence—racial violence, terrorist violence, personal violence, or macabre violence. Significantly, Priestland finds that the media is not responsible for violence. Unfortunately, violence is woven into the fabric of contemporary life. This is an arresting book with global perspective.


English novelist, essayist and dramatist, J. B. Priestley (b. 1894) wrote a novel in America during the winter of 1935-36 while staying in a little hut amidst the Arizona desert. He has important things to say about the competitiveness of women, the search for spiritual meaning in America, and the tendency for Americans to be better collectivists than individualists. He found American children strident and indulged. Hollywood he condemned as exploitive. This book is part autobiography, part commentary on America and part grand appraisal of the state of the world. Priestley graduated from Cambridge with honors in English literature, modern history and political science. He published his first article at age 16 and between 1922-1929 he published two or three books a year. The Good Companions, 1929, was an enormous success in both England and America. In 1932 "I began a new career as a dramatist," he wrote, "with Dangerous Corner, which has since played all over the world." He had a most successful lecture tour of America in 1937 and stayed on to ruminate and write, and Midnight On The Desert recalls this experience. Priestley's views on the Left are well known, though he says, "but I am definitely anti-Marxist." This is a knowledgeable, urbane view of America.


This volume was written on the Isle of Wight and contains flashbacks to his trip to America in 1937. He speaks of America's lack of class distinctions and explains to both Americans and Britons how astonishing this freedom and equality are as no American has to suffer the "political handicaps of class attitudes and position." When compared to America, Priestley finds England is not a democracy. The book includes an interesting
section on time as a concept, and Priestley explores in the H. G. Wellian sense the idea of a future memory. Written on the eve of Fascist-Nazism clash with democracy, Priestley applauds America.


"This is not another of those books about America," writes Priestley and his wife, Jacquetta Hawkes, whom he married in 1953. So why write about America? Partly to describe the way of life of the American Indians living in the Southwest, especially the Pueblos, and to see by the contrast Dallas and Houston which are so close in geography but so remote from the simple Indian ways in their prosperity, modernization and 'progressive' conveniences. Priestley uses this contrast as a vehicle to condemn ADMASS, NOMADNESS and HASHMASS, all products of the glittering, electronically pulsating, super high pressure advertising state of American civilization in the mid-Fifties.


Pritchett, an English journalist (b. 1900), was formerly a businessman before he turned to writing. He was Director of The New Statesman and has done a series of talks for the BBC. Pritchett enjoyed his adventures in New York and the environs, and comments on the architecture, theatres, galleries, public parks and describes Americans as being different from Europeans in general characteristics, values and attitudes. This work is a mixed volume with limited social analysis.


This volume is an edited collection of comments on America written by the Commonwealth Fund Fellows who came from Britain to America between 1946-1952. In each year covered by this anthology, twenty graduates of United Kingdom universities, plus five civil servants from Britain and five officials from the Dominion Government Departments have come to America on the Commonwealth scholarships. This collection continues the work of Edward Bliss Reed titled The Commonwealth Fund Fellows and Their Impressions of America published in 1932. Putt speaks of a Homo Americanus in the edited portion, calling Americans a special type, distinct from Britons and Europeans. Putt himself had been a Fellow during the 1930's and then again in 1950 and 1954. He has selected material on education, the family, the press,
politics, women, children, race, science and technology. There is no overall theme, but the collective remarks, like their multiple authors, are insightful.

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Atlantis is of course America, a technologically sophisticated society that may self-destruct if proper spiritual values are not cultivated to balance man's scientific ingenuity. Putt marvels at the conveniences, gadgets, out-of-this-world kitchens, but like so many of his fellow Britons, he wonders if materialism is enough. Americans do not seem to know what their material wealth is all for, nor do they slow down and accept leisure time pursuits as worthy when they have assumed a comfortable lifestyle.


Ranier came to the United States during the booming Twenties and invested in real estate in Florida. The English visitor towed a dredge across the Gulf of Mexico and developed an island. His resort weathered a hurricane, but caused some doubt about his desire to continue in this "real estate madness." The book contains little or no social analysis.


Major Raven Hart, a well-known English Canoeist, went over one thousand miles down the Mississippi River from Hannibal, Missouri to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He had a keen eye for character and an excellent ear for the rhythms of American speech. The book is full of technical information for the canoeing enthusiast and the account is scenic, and informal, but contains little social commentary on American institutions.


Reed was an English journalist (b. 1895) who claimed to be "relatively unschooled." He worked his way up through the ranks in the newspaper world in London to become the sub-editor of the Times by 1924. He was its assistant Berlin correspondent from 1927 to 1935 and its Central European correspondent until 1938. Reed was described as "an anomaly—a thorough Tory who hates Fascism." He covered the Normandy landing of the Allies in 1944 as a freelance correspondent, and he toured the United States and Canada shortly after the
war and again in 1951. He found much to admire in America but he suspected signs of various "conspiracies" in the United States related to Communism and political Zionism. His perverted zeal in Anglo-Saxonism mars his judgment in some respects.


The Commonwealth Fund was established as a cultural exchange, offering young men and women from the Commonwealth an opportunity to study and travel in the United States. In many ways this became the British counterpart of the Rhodes scholarships offered to Americans to study in British universities. The aim of the cultural experience is of course to foster friendship through knowledge and understanding of the host country. This volume has some most valuable comments on education, the politics of the New Deal, the rearing of children, culture and the arts, and the design and efficiency of American homes. The Fellows who contributed material to this edited anthology are knowledgeable and articulate about America's subtleties and diversities.


Roberts (b. 1892) was an English novelist, short story writer and dramatist who worked for the Board of Trade in Nottingham, then took a post as a junior master in a boys preparatory school and then went to work for the Liverpool Post as literary editor from 1915 to 1918. During World War I he was a correspondent with the Royal Air Force. In 1920 he arrived in New York on the day Prohibition began. He embarked on a lecture tour which was repeated in 1924, 1927, and 1929, and then during World War II he spent six years lecturing in the United States. His collective impressions are recorded in this book. He admired Eleanor Roosevelt, spoke of the American educational system, the media, women, civil rights, America's major cities and the greatness of the United States in world affairs. He is an uncritical portrait, written in the tone of a postwar friend and ally.


"Now almost a year after returning from America," wrote Robertson, "I have, for the first time a picture of that country which is clear and complete." He asked one central question in his book: "Will America rise to meet the demands exacted of greatness?" That America is great in the material sense there is little doubt, but Robertson realized "a latent
potential of spiritual greatness, not yet called forth or realized." He articulates the central issue of our time, which is can America find spiritual self-definition. While he asks the important questions, his book offers few answers.


Rose (b. 1933) was born in the United States but received his Doctorate from Oxford and now teaches at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (since 1966). His specialty is British politics and he has edited a most valuable book which is a collection of intelligent, well-researched articles on America written by British educators. Marcus Cunliffe contributed "New World, Old World: The Historical Antithesis," H. G. Nicholas offered "The Relevance of Tocqueville," Jim Potter contributed "You Too Can Have Statistics Like Mine: Some Economic Comparisons." There are eleven major articles, concluding with Esmond Wright's "America: The End of the Dream?" This is an important and timely book presented by some of Britain's best known professors in the fields of British-American Studies.


Saunders (b. 1898) came to the United States on a mission for the British Ministry of Information during World War II. Saunders had written Combined Operations Command (1943) and it had been selected as a best seller by Book of the Month Club. He was in America to relate to various audiences how such a book had been written. Combined Operations Command was essentially a war operations inside-scope and was eagerly read on both sides of the Atlantic. Pioneers is a closeup description of America during the war. Saunders spent a great deal of time in Hollywood because of his interest in war information and war newsreels and movies which he believed should be "accurate" not embellished. He concluded that Hollywood film makers had no conception of the conditions of wartime Britain. Beyond his subjective interest in wartime reporting, the main themes which attracted his attention were American youth, women, money as a measure of success, art and popular forms of entertainment. After the war, Saunders served as librarian in the British House of Commons.


This volume is largely an educational text which contains excellent information on education, women, the problem of race
and industrial production in America. The information contained is up to date and the book offers reliable statistics on various sectors of the American economy from the United States Labor department. Primarily for grammar school use, the book is highly readable and informative in relation to contemporary problems.


Snowman (b. 1938) attended Cambridge and later Cornell (1963) and has labeled himself a "historian." In this book he has concentrated on the social developments in America since the Twenties, and he finds a "tug-of-war between those forces making for social conflict and those making for social stability in the United States." He describes the stabilizing (or centripetal) aspects of America's social diversity and the more disruptive (or centrifugal) forces. This, is an interesting descriptive idea when Americans are taking about our society lacking a center or wondering if the central core of our community will hold together. He opened his book with "The 1920's: An Age of Rose-coloured Nightmares," and comes chronologically up through the late Sixties. He analyzes wealth, youth, technology, the Depression, foreign policy, the Negro revolution, the Berkeley rebellion, the strains of suburbia on women, and the legacy of Kennedy. Snowman tells us many things that American authors and critics have already told us many times, but he deals with some material--like the position of women in suburbia after 1945--in a fresh and insightful manner. Snowman concludes happily with the idea that both stabilizing and disrupting forces are essential to the dynamism of contemporary America.


Spender (1862-1942), the brother of Harold Spender, was educated at Oxford and worked as the editor of the Westminster Gazette from 1896-1922, a paper of high repute under his leadership. Spender passed the autumn and winter of 1927-28 traveling in America as a Walter Haines Page Fellow. He traveled throughout the United States including the South. He enjoyed New Orleans, Atlanta and New York, was uncritical of America's love of materialism and the plight of the Negro. His book is largely conventional, convivial patter.


Teeling (b. 1903), in American Stew has produced a strange mixture of insight and undigested material. Pursuing the unconventional and wanting to get off the beaten track of previous Britons who wrote about the United States, he wrote in depth on Aimee Semple McPherson, an Amana village and a
Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Southern California. He attended a magnificent Black Ball in New Orleans during Mardi Gras (1932) and enjoyed himself thoroughly, but understood that racism was an explosive issue as neither Blacks nor whites communicated intelligently with one another. He attended Negro church services and talked with a Negro undertaker. Teeling came away convinced that he did not want to die in America. Teeling has written a journalistic commentary with some flashes of brilliance, much intriguing narrative and some items which are purely sensational and uninformative.


Thompson (1906-1951) was an English journalist who toured the United States during the mid-Thirties. He reported on the trial of Bruno Hauptmann, the accused kidnapper of the Lindberg baby and compared the opening of the trial to an opening night on Broadway as there were many celebrities and mink coats. He was appalled at the crassness of several "hawkers" outside the court room who sold replicas of the kidnap ladder. Thompson comments on American men and women and their peculiar habits and manners, the media and press, and American "justice." This is a mixed volume which contains some good reportorial material but also some material that has been previously overworked and is blatantly unoriginal.

Trousers will be Worn. New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1941.

This book is a continuation of Thompson's adventures and lessons learned in America. He married an American journalist, Dixie Tighe, the society columnist for the *New York Post*. In *Trousers*, the author describes America's Cafe Society, the regime of debutantes, and European princes looking to marry rich American young ladies. His book is very funny but little more than a polite jab at the pretenses of the American elite.


Tressler (b. 1908) intended this volume to be a parody on a contemporary account of travel in England written by Margaret Halsey titled *With Malice Toward Some* (1938). He ventured by auto to Florida and enjoyed the beaches, food and company of American friends. The book is humorous and flippant as he intended.

This book is an articulate and humorous travel account of Lady Vyvyan touring America by all means of transport and enjoying the hospitality of her many American friends. One of the most interesting sections of her book explains American "Gadgets," and her explanation that most Americans are totally dependent upon them. She explains the American dishwasher as an extravagant waste of water, the car as having a crippling effect on Americans' legs, and described some of them—an electrical food grinder—as downright violent! She enjoyed the United States but wanted her British readers to understand that Europe is really much different from America and that Europeans cannot be lulled into an artificial sense of closeness or dependence. Hers is a book which takes a long look into the interior of American homes and domestic relations.


H. G. Wells (1866-1946) was an English novelist, historian and scientific writer who loved to speculate on the future, and in his early writing he believed the future could be found in America. Wells never forgot his lower class origins; his father was a gardener, small shopkeeper and later a professional cricket player and his mother was a lady's maid and housekeeper. These origins contributed to his later socialist leanings and philosophizing. He worked his way through school first as a draper's and then a chemist's apprentice. Wells did so well at Midhurst Grammar School that the Master wanted him to stay on after graduation as his assistant. Instead Wells went to London, won a scholarship to the Royal College of Science and graduated with Honours from London University in 1888. He had been encouraged by Thomas Huxley, under whom he studied and might have remained a biologist all his life had he not collapsed from overwork, was found to be tubercular, and was obliged to give up his teaching post and recuperate. Restored to health, he went to work for the Saturday Review, beginning his career in journalism and as a novelist simultaneously. He joined the Fabian society in 1903, calling himself a liberal democrat. The London Times later called him "an irrepressible non-stop genius." His scientific novels never failed to stir the imagination, such as *The Time Machine* and *The War of the Worlds*. In this book, *The New America, The New World*, he described the early New Deal as he had personally viewed it in 1934 and 1935. As a utopian, he believed that America's New Deal might possibly provide the world with a model, and his opening chapter is titled "New Deals Throughout the World." But while he admired President
Roosevelt very much, he saw the President confronted by "raucous voices and inexplicit men"—Charles E. Coughlin, Huey Long, and Francis Townsend—who seemed to be spoiling proposals for progress. At the end of the book, Wells envisions America as releasing its great energy, emerging triumphant from the Depression and "readjusting the mechanism" of social economics around the world. And the American triumphant model would become the nucleus of a world order, a world state, and world brain. Essentially socialist and romantic in tone, the book is most valuable as an example of one aspect of the mind of the British Left in the Thirties.


Werth spent his entire stay in America in Thurber's native city, Columbus, Ohio. "I am glad about this," he remarked, "for it seems to me that it was the only way, in a short time, to get to know Americans well." Like most "European liberals or left-wing intellectuals," as he described himself, he stated "I had of course developed since the war many of the familiar prejudices and prefabricated notions about America." Then he was asked to teach a course in contemporary European history at Ohio State in the Fall of 1957, the year Sputnik went up. "This book," he said, "shows how some of the old notions were quickly swept away after even a brief contact with the real thing." This is a most valuable book for a look at the Little Rock, Arkansas racial confrontations, the American reaction to the launching of Sputnik, and American graduate level education. He integrates many opinions from his students and states emphatically that America is not "coming apart," as his friend Carey McWilliams stated, nor were the students of the Fifties placid and tepid. Unlike his title, Werth did not find America in doubt.


This book was organized and edited by David Garnett, who put the book together after the death of White, and the narrative is based on White's journal of his lecture tour in the United States in 1963. White (1906-1963) was a novelist who had come to America once before to stay with Julie Andrews when she was acting in Camelot. His journal reveals that rumors of President Kennedy's women in the White House may be true. White commented on items at random including the beatniks, art and architecture, the theatre, American race relations, youth, sex and early marriage, violence, the Kennedy assassination and American
values. White believed in many ways, the United States was falling into decline as ancient Rome had for similar reasons, but he was hopeful that America's youth and idealism could correct the flaws before they became fatal.

Whitney, William Dwight. **Who are the Americans?** London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1941.

"This little book aims at giving the principle features of the American scene and to make them available to the British reading public within the limits of an evening's reading," explained Whitney. This book was an attempt during the early war years to explain the slowness of American entry into the war against Hitler. It tried to build a background for what Britshers were reading in their daily newspapers, and concluded with a plea to America to enter the war on the side of democracy and the Allies. It is largely a propaganda piece.

Willoughby, Hugh (pseudonym of Charles Nigel Harvey). **Amid the Alien Corn: An Intrepid Englishman in the Heart of America.** Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.

An English agriculturalist, the author came to America as a graduate student in the Midwest with his wife Bridget. He had taken his degree in history at Oxford but was now attempting to learn advanced agricultural techniques which could be useful to England. The book is really a diary of his adventures with people and places in the United States which contains insightful comments on American domestic life, relations between the sexes, education, race, children, religion and technology.


Winchester is a British correspondent for the Guardian who arrived in the United States in the Autumn of 1972 just as the Watergate scandal was breaking. He wondered if America's conscience had been pricked and if Americans would recover from their disillusionment. He traveled through Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. He found Middle America surviving, strong and worthy of honour and respect. He stated, "beneath all the glitter and schmaltz and cheap scandal, there is still a remarkable and deeply honourable people." America would recover from Watergate and the exposes of high level wrong doing. A timely view of the United States which argues for the resilience of Americans in time of crisis.

Winn, a journalist, made a four-months tour of the United States just after the war and wanted to write a book which would allow his British readers to travel by proxy and see America through his eyes. He opened his book with "the traveler visiting a new world for the first time, especially if he has some training as a reporter, catches up, if not with history, at any rate with the present, the rather important, revealing present. And sometimes...it is the little things, the tiny portents, the half-inaudible asides that tell you the most about a place, or even a whole populace." His comments are meant to be whimsical and he included very funny sections on women, beauty and vanity. Amidst the postwar cares and the concern over the nuclear bomb, he intended to lift Britons from these heavy concerns to a level of cheer and laughter.


Woon, an English journalist, has traveled throughout America since the end of World War I. This book is a social commentary on America and contains analytical material on women, education, children, race, domestic homelife, morals, manners and customs. Woon is an astute observer, selecting his topics carefully and is neither flippant nor glib, but exceedingly articulate in describing the Americans at home.


"I wish to present, to fellow Englishman," Woon began, "Roosevelt the World Statesman rather than Roosevelt the American politician. Unreserved admiration may imply semi-blindness to faults, but in my case admiration followed skepticism." Woon had followed the career of FDR from the early days when he was a young diplomat at the Versailles conference and explained that at first he had had serious reservations about the man: "When I came home that day after interviewing him in Chicago when he overrode tradition by personally accepting the nomination for President, I said to my wife, 'I'm afraid of him. No man who seems so candid, so sincere, and yet who is in politics, can be sincere.' Woon states that his skepticism grew out of "cynicism of a case-hardened newspaperman." But Woon glorified FDR the man and the politician in this biography, praising him for a world view. By comparison, to Woon, Churchill seemed chained to the nationalistic interests of the British Empire.