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RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT IN KIANGSU PROVINCE, 1917-1937: EDUCATORS TURN TO RURAL REFORM.

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, PH.D., 1978
RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT IN KIANGSU PROVINCE,
1917-1937: EDUCATORS TURN TO RURAL REFORM

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN HISTORY
MAY 1978

By

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ABSTRACT

This is a detailed study of the development of a rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu province between 1917 and 1937. Together with similar movements in Shantung and Hopei provinces, the Kiangsu movement was one of the most important components of the nation-wide rural reconstruction movement which prevailed in China from the late 1920's through the mid 1930's. Despite the significance of the movement as a major social movement of the time, there have not been many studies made on the subject. The present study is thus an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the nation-wide rural reconstruction movement with specific examples drawn from the Kiangsu case.

The Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement grew out of three national education reform movements, the mass education movement, vocational education movement, and rural education movement. Central institutions supporting these movements, the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, the Association for Vocational Education, and the Hsiao-chuang School, became the three main rural reconstruction institutions of the province.

The emergence of a rural reconstruction movement out of these three education movements was due to a combination of social, intellectual, and political factors. The movement arose in response to the deteriorating rural situation during the 1920's and the early 1930's. It developed through heightening concern for the common people, populist tendencies, practical educational trends, and the social activism that became intensified among a portion of intellectuals after the May Fourth Movement. The Kiangsu movement was also spurred on by the political atmosphere in
the 1920's which sought to unify the country and to construct a strong modern state. John Dewey's social and educational thought and Sun Yat-sen's political ideas were influential in varying ways.

The Kiangsu movement produced many prominent rural reconstruction leaders who were mostly educators and "returned students" or who had at least received modern educations. They included such nationally known educational reformers as Huang Yen-p'ei, T'ao Hsing-chih, Kao Yang, and Chiang Wen-yü. These educators identified the rural problem--one stemming from pervasive poverty, ignorance, poor health, and lack of ability on the part of peasants to organize and defend themselves--as the root of China's trouble. They regarded the solution of the problem as fundamental to the "salvation of China." Hence, they launched movements to improve rural life and develop the capacities of the people, working for and with the peasants. Having been educators originally, their reform approach was gradual and educational. They were nationalists and thus strongly resented foreign imperialism. Although they had been influenced by western ideals and practices, the new China they wanted to construct was one which would be based on the basic principles of western democracy, yet devoid of the vices of capitalistic society. That is, they wished to create a society which placed more emphasis on the welfare of the majority of the people. This fact imparted some aspects of liberal socialism to a segment of their movement.

Reconstructionist approaches to rural reform were basically opposed to those of the Chinese Communists who relied chiefly upon the methods of revolutionary class struggle. This was the chief reason why the reconstruction movement has been criticized in the People's Republic of China.
as a "tool of capitalistic society." However, it is noteworthy that the reconstructionists and the Communists shared many rural reform ideas and techniques. Some of these techniques are still being used in mainland China. Thus significantly, despite its ultimate failure, some of the effects of the Kiangsu movement remain, bestowing historical continuity to some of the rural improvement ideals and techniques followed by the Chinese Communists, even though the societies the two groups ultimately aspired to create differed considerably.

The ideas advanced by the rural reconstructionists also differed from the Kuomintang's "topdown" approach to rural problems. This Kuomintang approach was clearly manifested in the Nanking government's venture to establish the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien in Kiangsu. Because of this basic difference, the Kiangsu reconstructionists who stressed a "bottom up" approach, failed to gain significant Nationalist support in spite of some help during the initial stage of the movement. This problem, together with the tendency of the Kiangsu rural reconstructionists to concentrate their efforts in suburban villages in the southern parts of the province, tended to make the movement a limited one. Ultimately, in 1937, the Japanese invasion of Kiangsu caused the movement to dissolve. Hence, the Kiangsu reformers failed to accomplish their goal of reconstructing rural China on an extensive scale.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................ iii
ABSTRACT .................................................. v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................... x
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ................................ xii
MEASUREMENT UNITS ....................................... xiii

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 1

CHAPTER II. RURAL SITUATION AND PROBLEMS IN KIANGSU PROVINCE 21
Place of Kiangsu Province in China ................. 23
Rural Situation and Problems in Kiangsu, 1913-1937 .... 36
Locations of Rural Reform Districts of the Three Rural Reconstruction Institutions and Their Problems ........ 73

CHAPTER III. THE RISE OF THE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT IN KIANGSU PROVINCE 81
Mass Education Movement and Rural Reconstruction in Kiangsu ........... 82
Rural Education Movement and Rural Reconstruction Movement in Kiangsu Province ........... 119
Vocational Education and Rural Reform in Kiangsu ........... 130

CHAPTER IV. FOUR LEADERS OF THE MOVEMENT AND THEIR RURAL REFORM THEORIES 143
T'ao Hsing-chih (1892-1946) and His Theory of Rural Reform ........... 144
Chao Shu-yü (? - 1928) and His Theory of Peasant Training ........... 160
Kao Yang (Chien-ssu) (1891-1944) and His Theory of Rural Mass Education ........... 172
Chiang Wen-yü (Heng-yüan) (1885- ) and His Theory of the Unity of Wealth and Education ........... 182

viii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER V.</th>
<th>THREE MAJOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION INSTITUTIONS: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS</th>
<th>195</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Kiangsu Provincial College of Education</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Hsiao-chuang School</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Association for Chinese Vocational Education</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER VI.</th>
<th>REFORM PLANS AND PROCEDURES OF THE THREE RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENTS AND THEIR EXPERIMENTAL DISTRICTS</th>
<th>258</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform Districts and Reform Views</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform Procedures of the COE</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform Procedures of the AVE</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Hsiao-chuang Group's Reform Plan and Procedure</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER VII.</th>
<th>RURAL RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENT OF THE CHIANG-NING SELF-GOVERNMENT EXPERIMENTAL HSIEH</th>
<th>371</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Origin and Significance of the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hsien Reconstruction Programs</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CHAPTER IX. | CONCLUSION | 410 |

<p>| ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES | 430 |
| FOOTNOTES | 431 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 500 |
| GLOSSARY | 526 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Distribution of Rural Population Percentage Among Fifty-Nine Hsien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Amount of Wheat Production per Mou 1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Population Changes in Chin Kiang, Kiangsu, 1913-1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ratio Between Regular Tax and Surtax Kiangsu 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chief Occupations of 374 Big Landlords in Kiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Percentage of Tenant Families Among Total Number of Families Kiangsu, 1921-1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Annual Budget Balance of a Tenant Family, Wu-chin, 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Interest Rates in Kiangsu 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Annual Budget Balance of Owner-Farmer Family in Wu-hsi 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Percentage of Five Important Items of Family Expenditures in Tu-shan Chen, Chiang-ning, 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Established Years of Twelve Reform Districts and Conditions of Their Locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Important Projects of the Mass Education Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Distribution of Mass Education Halls in Kiangsu Province 1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Number of Hsien Peasant Education Halls in Kiangsu Province Involved in Given Projects as of 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kiangsu Provincial Normal Schools and Rural Branch School 1923-1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Plan for Training Local Village Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Yearly Schedule for the Kao-ting Projects in the Hui-pei District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Yearly Reform Schedule of the Hui-pei Reform District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Projects Carried Out in Hui-pei District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Occupational Distribution of Members of Chou-lung-an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tzu-chih hsien-chin-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Reform Items of the Chon tung-an Village Improvement Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>The Yearly Reform Schedule of the Hsu-kung-ch'iao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Estimated Annual Expenditures of A KHT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Number of Mass Schools Established in the Reform Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The State of Credit Cooperatives in the AVE and COE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform Districts, 1929-1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Peasant Loan Centers in the Reform Districts in Kiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Achievement of Construction Work of the Reform Districts of the AVE and COE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Comparison of the Number of Social Education Facilities between the Experimental Hsien Period and the Previous Hsien Period, Chiang-ning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Achievement of the Hsien Health Projects, Chiang-ning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Government Experimental Hsien, September, 1933, to August, 1934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Map of Kiangsu</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sixty-one Hsien of Kiangsu Province</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Population Density of Kiangsu Province</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Distribution of Provincial and Hsien Peasant Education Halls, Kiangsu Province, 1932</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Organization of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Location of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education and Its Rural Experimental District; The AVE'S Shan-jen-ch'iao Experimental District</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Location of Hsiao-chuang School and Its Rural Reform Areas</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Organization of Hsiao-chuang School</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Organization of the National Association for Chinese Vocational Education</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Locations of the Association for Vocational Education, Ts'ao-ho-ch'ing Agricultural Corps, and Shan-hai Kung-hsüeh-t'uan</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Locations of Rural Reform Districts and Areas of Three Reconstruction Institutions in Kiangsu Province and the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Organization of Hsü-kung-ch'iao Village Improvement Society</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Map of Chiang-ning</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEASUREMENT UNITS

Length measure
1 li = 0.358 mile or 0.576 Km.

Capacity measure
1 sheng = 1 pint
10 sheng = 1 tou
1 tou = 1 peck
10 tou = 1 shih
1 shih = 100 catties weight

Weight measure
1 chin = 0.597 Kg. or 1.316 lb.
100 chin = 1 tan
1 tan = 131.57 lb.

Square measure
1 chien = 6 feet square
1 fang = 3.2 square meter
1 mou = 0.15 acre or 0.06 hectare
100 mou = 1 ching

Currency value
1 fen = US $0.003 (1935)
10 fen = 1 küeh
10 küeh = 1 yüan
1 yüan = US $0.3 (1935)

Source: Tanaka Seijirō, Chūgoku nōsonmondai (Rural Problem of China), (Taiheiyou mondai chōsakai, Tokyo, 1940), 321-327.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the development of rural reform efforts launched by three educational institutions in Kiangsu Province between 1917 and 1937. The three institutions were the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, the Association for Vocational Education, and the Hsiao-chuang School. By turning into centers for promoting rural reconstruction, these institutions led the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu. In addition, they played an important part in the development of the rural reconstruction movement (hsiung-ts'\un chien-she y\un tung)\(^2\) which flourished in China as a nation-wide movement in the 1930's. This study is thus undertaken in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the nation-wide rural reconstruction movement with specific examples drawn from the Kiangsu experience.

The Rural Reconstruction Movement

The rural reconstruction movement was a social reform movement in China which began in the mid-1920's, culminated during the middle years of the 1930's, and declined after the 1937 Japanese invasion of China. It included efforts to improve the lives of the rural population and the development of the rural village.\(^3\) These rural reform efforts were sometimes national or provincial in scope and sometimes official or private.\(^4\) However, the national movement was initiated by private reformers and institutions, and the government joined it
later. From the beginning to the end, the movement was dominated by private reformers. A similar trend occurred in the Kiangsu movement even though the provincial government supported its own rural reconstruction projects. Accordingly, this study will focus mainly on rural reform efforts by the three rural reconstruction institutions—one government sponsored and two privately endowed.

The ultimate goal of the national movement was, as in many other twentieth century Chinese reform movements, the salvation of the country (chiu-kuo). With the conviction that the root of China's weakness lay in rural problems, the movement sought to achieve its goal by remolding Chinese society through the rejuvenation and improvement of village life.

The rural reconstruction movement was, in broad terms, a combined outcome of two factors: intellectually, it was a product of the social reform trend among Chinese intellectuals which germinated in the 1910's and became intensified in the 1920's after the May Fourth Movement; socially, it emerged with the critical situation in rural areas of the nation from the 1910's through the 1930's as its background. The movement was an outgrowth of several different social reform efforts by a small number of intellectuals who came to realize the importance of the countryside and by local leaders who endeavored to improve their native villages in various places in China. In the initial stage, the aims of the reformers were diverse and limited in scope. The reformers tried to cope with only one or two aspects of the rural problem such as pervasive illiteracy, backward agricultural techniques, lack of training in self-government, poor public health, or lack of local defense.
While working for their respective aims the reformers realized that rural problems were too complex to be tackled by any single group or approach. They also found that all the aspects of the problem were mutually related and that in order to deal with the rural problem more fully and effectively they needed a more comprehensive approach and closer cooperation among the reformers. They thus began to communicate with each other and to broaden their aims and approaches by borrowing from each other. In addition, the reformers shared many similar traits which served later as a binding force among them. The common basis was their similar occupational background, disposition, and social outlook. Most of these reformers were educators whose propensities were action-oriented. For example, rural reconstruction leaders such as Huang Yen-p'ei, Liang Shu-ming, Yen Yang-ch'u, T'ao Hsing-chih, Chiang Wen-yü, and Kao Chien-ssu (Yang) were all prominent educators, who prior to becoming rural reconstructionists had been engaged in such activities as the promotion of vocational education, the mass literacy campaign, the village self-government movement, and mass education (Min chung chiao-yü). These men regarded the improvement of the lives of the rural masses as a most urgent and fundamental enterprise for the revival of China. They believed that as long as rural people remained troubled, ignorant, weak, and disunited, there was little hope for China to become a strong nation. Because of this belief they not only went to rural villages themselves and worked for and with the peasants, but also recommended that other intellectuals "go down to villages" (hsia-hsiang) for the cultivation of the people and the reform of their lives.
Even though they recognized the necessity of government assistance, the reformers agreed that rural reform should be carried out from the bottom up, based on the masses and according to the actual needs of the people. They advocated comprehensive reform programs which would bring about a balanced development of all aspects of rural life. They believed that unless the development of life was well-rounded the people could not enjoy wholesome lives.

Their reform approach was a gradual and evolutionary one, stressing education and persuasive methods. This approach was opposed to the revolutionary and violent ways advocated at that time by the Chinese Communists. The reconstructionists' rural reform ideas were essentially motivated by humanism and nationalism, and had little to do with political ambitions.

As conditions deteriorated, rural construction institutions proliferated all over the country between the late 1920's and the early 1930's. Because of the necessity of cooperation among the reconstructionists and on the basis of the common traits they shared, the rural reconstructionists came to form a united force among rural reconstruction institutions in the early 1930's. The Rural Work Discussion Society (Hsiang-ts'un kung-tso t'ao-lun-hui) established in July, 1933 was the organization symbolizing such a united force. It was an informal society organized with the purpose of exchanging different experiences and new ideas in rural works, discussing common problems and seeking better reform methods jointly among the rural reconstruction institutions in the nation.
The numerical strength and the sphere of influence of the rural reconstruction movement grew more rapidly after the establishment of the discussion society. According to the survey taken by the Ministry of Industry in 1934, there were over 600 major rural reconstruction institutions in the nation engaged in rural reform work in 1,000 places. The annual meetings of the Rural Work Discussion Society, which were held three times between 1933 and 1935, attracted an increasing number of participants, representing more institutions from more provinces as time passed. The first meeting attracted 63 participants, representing 35 organizations; the second meeting, 150 delegates, representing 76 institutions from 11 provinces; and the third and last, 169 delegates, representing 99 organizations from 19 provinces. The participating institutions included private rural reform institutions, semi-public agencies (i.e., mass education and peasant education halls), universities, cooperatives, and government agencies at various administrative levels.

The movement was also seen by many people both at home and abroad as a hopeful and encouraging sign pointing toward a new China. The movement was widely discussed in numerous contemporary Chinese magazines. It also became an important topic for international symposiums, and was reported on in foreign journals.

Spurred by the strong trend of the rural reconstruction movement all over the country as well as its own hope to prevent the spread of Communism in the countryside, the Nanking Government, which had shown little concern for the distressing rural situation and was even suspicious of the rural movement, also began to pay more attention to
the rural problem. At the Second Interior Administrative Conference (Ti erh-tz'u nei-cheng hui-i) held at Nanking in December, 1932, to which rural reconstruction leaders were invited, the hsien administration reform plan (hsien-cheng kai-ko-an) was adopted. One of the major recommendations included in the plan was that the problem of rural reconstruction be approached in the provinces experimentally and on a hsien-unit basis: specifically, that a "research institute of hsien government reconstruction" (hsien-cheng chien-she yen chiu-yüan) be established in each province to conduct experimentation, and that an "experimental area" (shi-yen ch'ü) be set aside as a "laboratory" which would be under the direct control of the institute. In May of the following year (1933), the government set up the Rural Rehabilitation Commission (Nung-ts'un fu-hsing wei-yüan hui) within the Executive Yuan. This commission became the highest organ for the Nanking Government's rural reconstruction project. In February and September of the same year, the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien in Kiangsu and the Lan-chi Self-Government Experimental Hsien in Chekiang were established at the recommendation of the Central Government. Also the Ting-hsien and Ts'ou-p'ing experimental hsien were established in Hopei and Shantung respectively in the same year (1933). By the mid-1930's the rural reconstruction movement reached its peak, enjoying wide-range influence and even affecting the government.

However, in the midst of this expansion, the rural reconstructionist movement declined suddenly after 1937. For one thing the rural reconstructions failed to achieve unity among themselves. However, the main reason for the decline was the Japanese invasion of China in
July, 1937. Shantung, Hopei, and Kiangsu provinces, where the nation's most influential rural reconstruction institutions were located, soon fell under Japanese occupation, causing the leaders of these institutions to become refugees. Their rural reconstruction institutions continued to be active throughout the war both in the remaining Kuomintang areas inland and behind the Japanese occupation lines. Most of their activities were, however, incorporated as a part of the war-time resistance programs. After the Sino-Japanese War, the movement did not recover its pre-war position but simply disappeared as the nation was swept into civil war between the KMT and the CCP. The rural reconstruction movement thus became a permanent casualty of external aggression and civil war.

Significance of the Movement

Despite its short life and failure to achieve its ultimate goal, the national movement remains a significant historical phenomenon in the history of modern China for the following reasons.

First, the movement was one of a series of reform movements in modern Chinese history which attempted to save China from her political, social, and cultural dilemma. In addition, the movement was different from the other previous reform movement in its approach. Whereas earlier reform movements, such as the Hundred Day's Reform attempt (1898), the Constitutional Movement (1909-1911), the Federalist Movement (1920-1923), and the New Cultural Movement (1915-1924) were largely confined to either intellectual circles or the elite groups of society, the rural reconstruction movement was linked with the rural masses, working for and through them. The rural
reconstructionists identified the rural problem as the root of China's trouble and regarded the solution of the problem as the fundamental road toward the salvation of China.\textsuperscript{23}

It is interesting to note that around the same period some Chinese Communist leaders had ideas similar to those of the rural reconstructionists. For instance, during the New Cultural Movement Li Ta-chao and Mao Tse-tung showed a strong concern for the rural masses. Also, P'eng P'ai, the son of a Kwangtung landlord, had begun organizing peasants in the Hai-feng area in Kwangtung Province as early as 1921. Later, his peasant movement developed into the first Chinese Soviet Government in the Hai-feng and Lu-feng areas in the winter of 1927. Mao, who had early realized the potential of the peasantry, participated in a peasant movement in Hunan in 1926.\textsuperscript{24} Experiments by rural reconstructionists also took place around the same period. For instance, in Kiangsu, the first rural reconstruction experiment was launched in Hsü-kung-ch'iao of K'un-shan hsien in 1926. Another reform experiment by the Hsiao-chuang School was conducted in the northern suburbs of Nanking in 1927. Moreover, as will be seen in Chapters Three to Seven, many rural reform principles and projects used by the rural reconstructionists were similar to those employed by the Chinese Communists during the Yenan period.\textsuperscript{25}

Second, rural reconstruction was a comprehensive reform enterprise whose scope of activities was more inclusive than any previous reform movement. It emphasized the broad development of all aspects of the rural people, promoting cultural advancement, economic welfare, and the cultivation of self-government on the part of the people. The previous reform movements had centered on either politics or culture.
Third, the rural reconstruction movement was a product of an intellectual activism which began to gain momentum from the mid-1920's among some Chinese intellectual groups. These intellectuals (e.g., Liang Shu-ming, Yen Yang-ch'u, T'ao Hsing-chih, and Chao Shu-yü) sought to build a bridge between knowledge and the actual lives of the masses through direct participation in the affairs of the people. This was a new intellectual trend after the New Cultural Movement.

Fourth and lastly, as mentioned earlier, the rural reconstruction movement was a nation-wide movement which spread to North, Central, as well as South China and affected governments (i.e., the central and provincial governments) and intellectual circles. It lasted for more than a decade from the early 1920's to the latter part of the 1930's.

Kiangsu and the Movement

Kiangsu province played an important part in the development of the rural reconstruction movement. It was one of the three most important provinces in the movement, the other two being Shantung and Hopei. The importance of Kiangsu province in the movement can be explained by the following three points.

(1) The Kiangsu rural reform movement was one of the earliest in the nation. The first rural reform effort in the province occurred in 1917 when Chu Chih-ch'u, an enlightened local leader in Ch'ang-chou (presently Wu-chin), undertook a village reform project in his village and neighboring villages. This was the second rural reform effort of such a kind in the nation. Its only predecessor was
Mi Chien-san's similar effort in Ting-hsien of Hopei province in 1904. Five years later, in 1922, several normal schools of Kiangsu province set up rural branch elementary schools in villages in their vicinity, and tried to train rural teachers and guide rural improvement works. These efforts were merely an incipient form of rural reform in the province. However, their reform approaches, including various self-help programs and education-centered methods, became a fundamental part of the rural reconstruction endeavors in Kiangsu province.

The full-fledged rural reconstruction experiments in Kiangsu by such rural reconstruction institutions as the Association for Chinese Vocational Education (Chung-hua chih-yeh chiao-yü-she), the Chinese Education Improvement Association (Chung-hua chiao-yü kai-chin-she) which set up the Hsiao-chuang School, and the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education (Chiang-su sheng-li chiao-yü hsueh-yuan) started in 1926 and 1928, respectively. Their establishment took place several years earlier than those of their counterparts in other provinces.

In addition to the early start of the movement Kiangsu was also known for a rather widespread rural improvement atmosphere throughout the province. There were around 2,000 rural reform agencies in the province by 1930. This number was one of the highest in the country. In cultivating this atmosphere of rural reform, the provincial government played a major role. It was the provincial government that initiated the mass school (min-chung hsüeh-hsiao) and the mass education and peasant education halls, and financed them from the provincial budget.
(2) Many important leaders of the rural reconstruction movement emerged in Kiangsu province. Leaders like Huang Yen-p'ei, T'ao Hsing-chih, Chiang Wen-yü, Chao Shu-yü, and Kao Yang were not only prominent in the province, but also throughout the whole nation. Huang and T'ao were nationally known educational reformers, and the others were also famous as college presidents or chiefs of the Department of Education of the provincial government. These people not only inspired rural reconstruction enterprises within the province, but also contributed greatly to the growth of the movement on the national level. Huang Yen-p'ei and T-ao Hsing-chih could be counted among the four most important leaders in the development of the national movement, together with Liang Shu-ming and Yen Yang-ch' u.

(3) The Kiansu movement is also noted for having developed varieties of reform approaches. As mentioned earlier, Kiangsu province had three major rural reconstruction institutions which had different backgrounds and traditions, the Association for Chinese Vocational Education, the Chinese Education Improvement Association sponsoring the Hsiao-chuang School, and the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education. The former two were private institutions, and the last, a public institution. Rural reconstruction approaches employed by these institutions were basically all educational. However, reflecting the nature and the background of each institution, the three institutions differed in their immediate aims, concrete programs and methods of carrying out reform programs. For instance, in the initial stage, the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education stressed the training of mass education leaders and agricultural
experts, and concentrated on the spread of literacy in the province through government-sponsored mass schools. Continuing these former traits, the college tended to emphasize civic or political training of the people even later when its program embraced a comprehensive rural reconstruction policy which included cooperatives and health programs.

The Hsiao-chuang School started as a normal school. Thus it tried to tackle the rural problem by training good rural teachers who could perform a double function for the rural community by educating rural children to become culturally and economically capable peasants and leading the rural people in rural improvement work. Hsiao-chuang trained normal school students and rural children; at the same time it led a variety of rural reform projects in adjacent villages in which students and village people participated together.

The Association for Chinese Vocational Education, which started with vocational education, regarded "livelihood" (sheng-chi) education as being most important although it tried to balance livelihood education with what it called "cultural education" and "political training."

In addition to the above institutions, the designation of Chiang-ning hsien by the central government as one of its two government-sponsored self-government experimental hsien made the rural reconstruction projects in the province more varied. As a government-run experiment, it was natural that the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien reflected government policies toward
the rural masses. Thus the presence of the self-government hsien within the province offers us a good opportunity to compare the aims, approaches, and effectiveness of rural reconstruction efforts between private reconstructionists and governmental institutions.

Significance of This Study

Despite the importance of the movement pointed out earlier, like most of the historical phenomena during the Nanking period, the study of rural reconstruction has been neglected in the United States. There exist only several articles, including unpublished theses on the movement. Moreover, most of these works are either too general or deal only briefly with certain aspects of the movement. Only recently, several scholars in the United States have inaugurated in-depth studies of the rural reconstruction movement. These scholars are Harry Lamley, Lyman Van Slyke, Charles Hayward, and Guy Alitto. But, in view of the broad scope and complexity of the movement, they have all confined their studies to certain aspects of the movement. They seem to believe that a correct over-all picture of the movement can be obtained only when partial in-depth studies of the movement are completed and their results collated. I subscribe to the same idea and therefore have chosen to concentrate on one province, namely Kiangsu.

In spite of the scant study of the subject, the rural reconstruction movement as a whole has received a negative assessment in the United States and China. Robert Lee argued in his brief article that the rural reconstruction movement failed because the rural reconstructionists tried to change rural society while they supported the
status quo by working in cooperation with the village gentry; therefore the reconstructionists' gradualism lacked middle-class support and could "only prolong the tenure of the old regime." In a collection of articles, Chung-kuo hsiang-ts'un chien-she p'i-pan (A Critique of Chinese Rural Reconstruction), the Chung-kuo nung-ts'un group headed by Ch'ien Chia-chü launched a wholesale attack on the rural reconstruction theories advanced by Liang Shu-ming and Yen Yang-ch'u. The group criticized Liang's theory as nothing but a disguised attempt to maintain the status quo of the society and to carry out a theory of "reactionism" (fu-ku chu-i). As to Yen's theory they branded it mistaken, for in their claim Yen's so-called "four fundamental ills" in rural areas, namely, poverty, ignorance, poor health, and self-centeredness, were not the roots of the rural problem, but merely symptoms of the problem. Thus they argued that as it was based on the wrong diagnosis; Yen's reform enterprise was doomed to failure.

The above criticisms are not based on objective evaluations of actual works and achievements of the movement. Lee's arguments are without concrete supporting evidence. The Chung-kuo nung-ts'un group's assessment of the movement was ideologically prejudiced already before looking into the evidence. This is clear because their criticism was rendered during the period when the rural reconstruction movement was at its peak. They used some negative examples in their attack on the movement as evidence, and there is a strong indication that the examples were selected with bias in mind. As a nation-wide movement in which thousands of reform workers
and hundreds of villages were involved, it is always possible that some portion of the movement could be defective. It is equally possible that there were cases which brought about really beneficial results for the rural people. The question should then be the problem of over-all performance of the movement. In addition, the Chung-kuo nung-ts'um group was not currently in a position to assess the overall situation of the movement objectively. As a small group of scholars, the Chung-kuo nung-ts'um (a journal of agricultural economics) group did not maintain liaison with the vastly scattered rural reform experimental districts in the nation. As a result, they did not have many facts upon which to base their evaluations. Thus their arguments were only theoretical and highly subjective. Furthermore, at that time the rural reconstruction movement was still in progress.

In the early part of the 1950's, criticism of Liang Shu-ming and Yen Yang-ch'u was renewed in mainland China. This time, T'ao Hsing-chih, a Kiangsu rural reformer, who had been the object of so much praise by the Chinese Communists at the time of his death in 1946, was included in the attack. At the time of T'ao's death, Kuo Mo-jo compared T'ao even to Confucius, and the Chinese Communist leaders praised him as a "genuine people's teacher." The three rural reconstructionists were criticized as being "reformists" (kai-liang chu-i che) who acted for the interest of the "bourgeoisie" and "imperialists." Liang Shu-ming was most severely criticized and was branded the "spokesman for feudalism and imperialism" and a "reactionary." This criticism was a product
of the tightening of the ideological line in mainland China in the early 1950's. In other words, as with many historical phenomena during the Nationalist period, the evaluation of the rural reconstruction by mainland Chinese scholars was political in nature and not scholarly.

In short, the rural reconstruction movement has not been studied much. Whatever the final evaluation may be, the movement should be submitted to a detailed analysis based on factual data before being labeled or historically interpreted. This is what my study intends to do for the rural reconstruction movement by analysing the Kiangsu experiences. Three more specific purposes of this study are: (1) to increase our knowledge of rural conditions in China during the Nanking decade by studying the rural situation in Kiangsu province and the various difficulties which rural reconstructionists encountered in their reform work; (2) to better understand some aspects of the trends of the period by studying the development of the three major rural reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu and the efforts and theories of their leaders; and (3) to clarify the nature of the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement and its contribution to the nation's rural reconstruction movement as a whole.

Scope and Organization of the Study

The scope of this study will be primarily confined to the efforts on the part of three main reconstruction institutions and by the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien in Kiangsu province. However, an attempt will be made to relate these efforts to the national scene, for the movement in Kiangsu province was not the
product of reform agitation fomented solely within the province, but was also a result of a general national trend in China.

The time covered in this study will be a span of twenty years, from 1917 when an incipient form of rural reform appeared in the province, to 1937, the first year of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In examining the rural socio-economic background of the movement, it seemed necessary to cover at least several decades preceding the 1930's. But in the present treatise only the period between the 1920's and the 1930's will be surveyed in detail.

This study is divided into nine chapters, including this introduction. Chapter Two consists of three sections. The first section presents Kiansu's geographical setting and its political, economic, and cultural position in China. This section is designed to facilitate the readers' understanding of the subsequent chapters by providing him with general knowledge of the province. Hence, the presentation is highly selective and confined to information relevant to the subject. The second section analyzes difficult conditions and problems Kiangsu rural villages experienced during the 1920's and 1930's, in spite of Kiangsu's favorable position compared to other provinces. Here, the Chiang-nan (South of the Yangtze) region will receive the main emphasis because Kiangsu's rural reform movement was carried out mainly in this region. The third section introduces locations and social conditions of the twelve rural reform experimental districts run by the three main rural reconstruction institutions.
Chapter Three deals with the rise and development of rural reconstruction trends in the province. In brief, the chapter analyzes the processes in which each of Kiangsu's three main rural reform institutions (all originally educational institutions) was led to undertake rural reconstruction work. The role of the Kiangsu provincial government and the social and intellectual trends in the province are discussed as well. Also, the mass movement and mass education policies of the Canton and Nanking government will be dealt with in conjunction with the rise of the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu.

Chapter Four discusses the careers of the four leading rural reconstructionists of the three institutions in Kiangsu and their rural reform theories. This chapter will thus show the intellectual and ideological sides of the movement.

Chapter Five relates to the establishment, operation, and training procedures of the three major rural reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu. While discussing the three institutions, the chapter will focus on common traits shared by the three institutions and diverse elements among them.

Chapter Six will examine reform plans and procedures of the three institutions. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will briefly review the general location of the three institutions' reform districts and the reconstructionist views of each. Sections two to four will discuss the reform plans and procedures followed by the three institutions.
Chapter Seven analyzes actual rural reform programs and activities by the three institutions. This chapter consists largely of two parts. The first part concerns the results of actual programs carried out in the areas of educational reform, cultural improvement, economic improvement, political and civic training, health improvement, and construction. And the second part presents difficulties and lessons learned in the rural reform experiments.

Chapter Eight deals with a different type of rural reconstruction work launched by a county government in Kiangsu, the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien, for the purpose of comparison with efforts of the three institutions. This comparison will help to elucidate the nature of the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu. At the same time, the comparison will shed some light on the Nanking Government's position toward rural problems, for the Chiang-ning Experimental Hsien was established as a project of the Nanking government.

Chapter Nine, the last chapter, presents a summary of the major findings and conclusions of this study. This chapter will mainly focus on the following three aspects: (1) the significance of the rural reconstruction movement in the history of modern China, based on the findings in the Kiangsu movement, and the clarification of the role of the Kiangsu movement in respect to the national movement; (2) the character of the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement as studied from social, intellectual, and political perspectives, and (3) an overall assessment of the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement, including a review of the roles of the leading reconstructionists and an evaluation of the achievements of respective reform
efforts by each of the three institutions, including their impact, the difficulties they encountered in carrying out rural reconstruction projects.

As is evident from the organization of this study, the discussion runs in a broad sense along two themes. One concerns the rural problems which brought about the rise of the rural reconstruction movement. The other pertains more to the rural reconstruction movement itself in Kiangsu province and to the issues involved.
CHAPTER II
RURAL SITUATION AND PROBLEMS IN KIANGSU PROVINCE

"In order to save China, first save the rural villages!"¹ This was a representative slogan of the rural reconstruction movement in China expressing the aim and character of the movement. The slogan implied that while national salvation was the ultimate aim of the movement, the salvation of rural villages was the immediate aim. Why the cry for the salvation of rural villages as a means for national salvation? For two implicit reasons: the rural reconstructionists thought that the rural areas were vital for China's revival and, secondly, they believed that a crisis situation prevailed in rural China. These implicit reasons were the raison d'être for the rural reconstruction movement. Were there then sufficient grounds for such beliefs by the rural reconstructionists? What were the actual conditions and problems of rural society in China in the 1920's and 1930's? This chapter is an attempt to answer these crucial questions by examining this period of the Kiangsu province.

I will first present the general picture of Kiangsu province, including its geography and its political, economic, and cultural relationship with the rest of the nation. This is designed to help readers understand the subsequent discussion of rural conditions as well as development in the province. Secondly, I will discuss the rural situation in the province from 1913 to the latter 1930's. Lastly, I will briefly explain the general locations of the rural reconstruction experimental districts and their problems.
Fig. 1 Map of Kiangsu.

The Place of Kiangsu Province in China

Kiangsu Province is situated in the southeast part of China between the eastern longitude of 116 and 123 degrees and between the northern latitudes of 31 and 35 degrees. It is bounded by the Yellow Sea on the east, Chekiang Province on the south, by Anhwei on the west and southwest, by Shantung on the north, and Honan on the northwest. Administratively, it consisted of sixty-one hsien in 1928 as shown on the following map.

Situated around the lower parts of the Yangtze River, Huai River, and the old bed of the Yellow River, the province consists primarily of alluvial plains formed by the sediment of the above rivers. Although there are a few isolated hills in the northern part of the province, the land, for the most part, is relatively level. The area around the mouth of the Yangtze River is commonly called the Yangtze Delta, while the area around the Huai River and the old Yellow River bed, the course of which has now moved to the north, is called the Huang-Huai plain or Huai plain. These two regions are so level that travellers often cannot see hills for hundreds of miles. As a result, Sun Yat-sen called the plains "one of the most vast and fertile plains in the world." According to a survey conducted by the government in 1933, the level plain amounted to over 86 per cent of the total area of 140,362,875 shih mou (935,799,288 acres). Hilly regions consisted of only 6.7 per cent of the total area, being 10,923,357 shih mou (72,826,141 acres). The remaining 7.2 per cent of the total area was covered by water.
### Key To Figure 2

**Sixty-One Hsien of Kiangsu Province**

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Fig. 2. Sixty One Hsien of Kiangsu Province.
Kiangsu is also a land of many rivers, canals, and lakes. George Cressey, a famous American geographer, exclaimed: "Probably nowhere else in the world is there an area with so many navigable waterways." Besides the Yangtze and the Huai rivers there are five other rivers of considerable importance in the province. They are the Chin-huai-ho, Chu-chiang, Lou-chiang, Wu-sung-chiang, and Huang-pu-chiang. There are many canals which form an intricate network and serve as an artificial drainage system which takes the place of rivers. Of the canals, the Grand Canal, which was built by Sui Yang-ti (the second emperor of the Sui Dynasty) in 610, is the most famous, being 800 li in length within the province. It was the principal line of communication between the North and the South in traditional China. However, since the construction of the Tientsin-Pukow railway, it has outlived its usefulness. In addition to the many rivers and canals, there is a considerable number of lakes in the province. In the Yangtze Delta area alone there are more than 250 lakes of considerable size. The Taihu is the largest lake in the province, being 120 li from north to south and 90 li from east to west. The fields on the bank of Taihu are very fertile and particularly suitable for mulberry trees.

There is a variation of climate between the southeastern part and the northwestern part of the province. The climate in the southeastern part of the province is quite mild, as it is regulated by breezes from the sea while the northwestern part is decidedly continental in character, being extremely cold in winter and very hot in summer. This climatic difference accounts for the variance of
agricultural products between the northwestern part and the southeastern part of the province, the former being the winter wheat-kaoliang area, and the latter, the rice-wheat region. This has led to a different standard of living between the two areas. The people in the northern part of the province have been poor compared with the people in the southern part, the Yangtze Delta region, in general. The province has more or less a uniform distribution of rainfall throughout the year. Although there is a definite summer maximum, according to the geographer Theodore Shabad, only about 40 per cent of the rainfall comes during the three summer months, June through August. The average amount of rainfall for the entire region is about 1,200 mm (45 inches), which is sufficient for agricultural productivity.

The location of the province is strategic. Situated at the mouth of the great Yangtze River, Kiangsu holds the key position in land and water transportation, and the city of Shanghai constitutes the gateway to the interior of China. The Yangtze River is navigable for stream craft for some 1,200 miles. Thus, it provides a natural thoroughfare to the interior. The province also holds an important place for railway transportation throughout the country, linking southern China and northern China. It is traversed by several important trunk railway lines. The Tientsin-Pukow railway runs northward, and is crossed by the Lung-Hai railway at Tung-shan in northern Kiangsu. Tung-shan and Hsu-chou have been important strategic locations since ancient times, for these locations command roads leading to four northern provinces: Shantung, Hopei, Honan,
and Anhwei. The Nanking-Shanghai railway links Nanking, the capital of the Nationalist Government, with the greatest industrial and commercial center, Shanghai, while the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo railway ties Chekiang province to Kiangsu. These railway lines became the object of military competition during the warlord period.

Its favorable topographical factors and strategic location combined to make Kiangsu politically important in the nation's history. There are six provinces which have held political centers of the nation throughout Chinese history. They are Shansi, Shensi, Checkiang, Chihli (present-day, Hopei), Honan, and Kiangsu. Among them Kiangsu is one of the two provinces which contained the seat of the nation's capital for the longest period, the other province being Honan. Fourteen dynasties had their capitals within the regions of Kiangsu province. Hsü-chou, Yang-chou, Wu-hsi, and Nanking were the places where the capitals were located, Nanking being the most frequent site. The total time Kiangsu served as the nation's political center was about 1,200 years.

Immediately after the 1911 Revolution, Kiangsu was governed by tu-tu (military governors), with fu (prefectures) as political units. Such tu-tu included Ch'en Chi-mei (Shanghai fu), Niu Yung-chien (Sung-chiang fu), both of whom were revolutionaries, and Ch'eng Te-chuan (Su-chou fu), an ex-Ch'ing official who collaborated with constitutionalists during the Revolution.

After the failure of the so-called Second Revolution which attempted to overthrow Yüan Shih-k'ai from July through September of 1913, Feng Kuo-chang, one of Yüan's most trusted generals, became the
military governor of Kiangsu, and thus the province entered under the control of the Pei-yang military clique. Therafter, until 1927, when it was captured by the Nationlist revolutionary armies, Kiangsu remained under warlord control and experienced three major wars between powerful warlord faction, mainly Wu Pei-fu's Chihli clique and Chang Tso-lin's Feng-tien clique.

The first of three wars, the so-called First Tung-nan War (September, 1924) was fought between the tu-chün (military governor of Kiangsu, Ch'i Hsieh-yüan, who belonged to the Chihli clique, and the tu-chün of Che-kiang, Lu Yung-hsiang, who was in alliance with Feng-tien clique, over the territory of Sung-Hu (Sung-chiang and Shanghai). In this war Lu was defeated and forced to flee to Japan. The Second Tung-nan War (January, 1925) was fought between the same cliques. This war ended in a victory for the Feng-tien forces. As a result, Ch'i Hsieh-yüan fled to Japan and Kiansu was placed under the control of the Feng-tien clique. The third war was the Feng-Che War (October, 1925) fought between Sun Ch'üan-fang, then the tu-chün of Chekiang, and Chang Tso-lin's forces. Chang's forces were defeated in the war and Kiangsu came anew under Sun Ch'üan-fang's control. Kiangsu thus thrice became a warlord battlefield during one and a half years time and suffered incalculable damage to life and property.

Kiangsu was recovered by the Nationalist Revolutionary Forces in March, 1927, and Nanking was made the capital of the nation. From then on until 1973, the province remained the political center of the country and was one of the two provinces held under firm control by the Nationalist Government, the other being Chekiang. The governorship
30

and political committees of the province were appointed from among
leading figures of the Kuomintang (KMT). 17

As indicated by the Chinese proverbs—"When Soochow and Hangchow
are ripe there is no famine in the world," or "Kiangsu is top in
wealth and taxes in the world"—Kiangsu was one of the richest regions
of China. Level and fertile land and favorable climatic conditions
made the region the nation's granary. The Yangtze plain of southern
Kiangsu had especially favorable conditions for agriculture. In this
region, the growing season lasted for about 300 days. Thus,
generally two crops could be cultivated each year, but when vegetables
were grown, three crops were sometimes obtained. It had a rich
variety of agricultural products: rice, wheat, barley, cotton, beans,
sorghum, kaoliang, peanuts, tea, peppermint, potatoes, sweet potatoes,
rapeseed, and yellow grass. 19 Of these, rice, wheat, barley, and
cotton were the chief products. During the summer when the rice crop
was ripening, one traveller observed, "the whole country is one vast
succession of paddy fields, exceptions being those areas where
mulberry or cotton is dominant." 20 Winter crops were wheat, beans,
rapeseed, and barley. The area of cultivated land reported to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce amounted to 204,244,201 mou,
which represented 71 per cent of the entire region, the highest
percentage in the country.

The outstanding agricultural products indicate the importance of
Kiangsu. In 1933, the province produced about one-twelth of the
total amount of the nation's rice crop, approximately 66,000,000 tan;
for wheat, one-eighth of the total national yield, about 55,000,000
tan; for barley, 36,764,000 tan, or about one-fourth of the total national production; and for cotton, a total of 46,281,191 tan (in 1932), or one-fifth of the total.

Sericulture was an important secondary occupation in rural villages. Kiangsu has been known as one of two leading sericulture centers in the country, together with Chekiang. This industry thrived especially in the area around the Taihu. During the period of the richest harvest, the amount of cocoons produced in the province reached one-third of the total national production. In the lower Yangtze plain, about 90 percent of all farm households engaged in the cultivation of mulberry trees and the breeding of silk worms. Wu-hsi, an important industrial city near the Taihu, produced one of the finest silks in the world.

The lower Yangtze plain has long been known as a land of fish. Fisheries are abundant in the multitude of shallow lakes and waterways, particularly in the Tai and Chao Lakes and in the Yangtze estuary. Transportation business by small boats constituted another important side job for many peasants in the lower Yangtze plain. However, these many rivers and lakes were also frequently the source of tragic floods in the province. Also, areas along the Huai River, such as Huai-yin, Lien-shui, and Ssu-yang near the Grand Canal, were dens of bandits.

Kiangsu, particularly in the Yangtze Delta, has traditionally been China's leading industrial center, notably in terms of cotton and silk textiles. With the development of Shanghai, it became the most industrialized province in the country. The important industrial cities of the province were Shanghai, Wu-hsi, Su-chou, Chen-chiang
(Chinkiang), and Nan-t'ung. The province was rich in a variety of other industries: shipbuilding, machine manufacturing, cotton spinning, silk reeling, paper manufacture, printing, flour milling, leather tanning, tobacco, gourmet powder, sugar, tea-firing, chemicals, pottery, and power plants. Among them, spinning and weaving, printing, flour milling, and electric power plants were especially important industries and surpassed those of other provinces.  

Kiansu's industrial prominence in the nation can be easily viewed by the number of factories it possessed by comparing with the national provincial figures. In 1935, of the nation's 80 major weaving factories, Kiangsu held 60 per cent. According to the investigation made by the military committee of the Nationalist Government in 1937, Kiangsu had 6,197 factories which constituted 33.1 per cent of the nation's total number of factories, 53.5 per cent of the nation's total industrial capital, and 51.9 per cent of the nation's total number of workers. The total value of industrial production of the province was also foremost among the provinces, reaching 214,129,521 yuan in 1933. 

Having been a political center for many dynasties and economically one of the richest regions of the country, Kiangsu had a proud intellectual tradition. Together with Anhwei, Kiangsu served as one base for the School of Empirical Research in the Ch'ing period, which constituted the main trend of Ch'ing learning. Many great scholars of this school were from Kiangsu province. 

From the Republican period (1912-1927) through the Nanking period (1928-1937), Kiangsu played a leading role in education and in
social and intellectual movements of the country. It produced such renowned educators as Chang Chien, Huang Yen-p'ei, Kuo Ping-wen, Chu Ching-nung, and Yüan Hsi-t'ao. Thanks to these scholars Kiangsu played a pioneering role in such educational areas as teachers' schools, agricultural education, textile schools, compulsory education, and vocational education. As we will see in later chapters, this fact led to the development of the three nationally important rural reconstruction institutions, which are the main objects of our study, in Kiangsu province. The Kiangsu Provincial Education Association (Chiang-su sheng chiao-yü hui) and the Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association headed by Yüan Hsi-t'ao, were also organizations of national influence. The Kiangsu Provincial Educational Association was particularly significant in that two leading national educational reform institutions, the Association for Chinese Vocational Education and the Chinese Education Improvement Association which played a role of parent body for Hsiao-chuang School, were greatly indebted to it for their emergence and operation. Shanghai and Nanking were the main bases of these two educational reform institutions. Naturally, together with the cultural and economic reasons described below, the three major rural reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu were located near such cities as Shanghai, Nanking, and Wu-hsi; their rural reform experimental districts were concentrated mainly in southern Kiangsu, the wealthier, more productive, and more convenient region of the province in terms of transportation. Hence in the following section, more will be discussed about conditions of southern Kiangsu than about those of northern Kiangsu.
By having Shanghai and Nanking within its boundary, Kiangsu became one of the nation's two leading educational provinces, especially for higher education, together with Hopeh province. According to the 1934 statistics from the Ministry of Education, Kiangsu then had the highest number of college graduates in the nation. In comparing the number of colleges and universities in Nanking and Shanghai in 1932 with those of Peiping, another of the nation's centers of higher education, Shanghai and Nanking had six national universities and sixteen private universities, whereas Peiping had four national universities and seven private universities. Thus, Shanghai and Nanking functioned as major centers for the nation's intellectuals.

As a seat of many higher educational institutions and as an international trading city, Shanghai became the site for many nationally known social and intellectual movements. After the May Fourth Movement it became the main site for student movements, labor movements, and an important base for a mass literacy movement. In this situation, Kiangsu enjoyed rich human resources and became one of the provinces most sensitive to national, political, social, and intellectual trends.

Although Kiangsu was a province highly advanced in industry and education, it was still predominantly rural, and the average educational level of the population as a whole was very low. In 1933, the total population of the province was 32,169,697. Of this amount, the rural population comprised 84 per cent. Meanwhile, of the total area of the province (163,023,000 shih mou or 108,682.05 square
kilometers) 98.72 per cent was rural, while urban areas constituted only 1.28 per cent. As for the illiteracy rate of the province, 78 per cent of the population was illiterate as of 1930. In 1930, the ratio of school children was only 13.55 per cent, as against approximately 86 per cent among the total number of school-age children.

To summarize, Kiangsu was in many ways more blessed than most of China's provinces. Kiangsu was one of the richest provinces of China in terms of agricultural production, and was also a prominent commercial and industrial center. It was China's most advanced province with respect to education, and thus relatively rich in human resources. Its position as a primary base of the Nationalist Government made it relatively stable politically. These favorable factors all helped Kiangsu become one of the pioneering provinces in China's rural reconstruction movement.

However, Kiangsu shared most of China's rural problems, as discussed above. It was predominantly rural. Most of its population was illiterate. It experienced an adverse effect from foreign economic influence in the rural economy. Kiangsu also suffered from civil wars between warlords, bandits, and from frequent natural disasters. Other rural problems also existed, which will be discussed in the following section. In the 1930's the distressing rural situation in Kiangsu led many Chinese scholars to lament that if the rural situation of Kiangsu province, the nation's richest area, was in such bad condition, how much worse was the situation in other provinces. In other words, the rural conditions of Kiangsu province reflected the seriousness of China's rural problem.
The Rural Situation and Problems in Kiangsu, 1913-1937

Given the introductory background, I shall, in this section, examine the rural situation in Kiangsu province during the Republican and Nanking periods. Here I will be chiefly concerned with major rural problems such as population, land tenure, rural credit systems, tax systems, educational conditions, poverty, war, natural disasters, and the rural socio-political structure.

The Population Problem

The significance of population density in China's rural area is well expressed by John Lossing Buck. He points out that population density determines farm practice and sets the standard of living since upon the number of those who must share the given amount of produce rests the satisfaction and comfort of all. He also observes that population density even concerns the peace and order of the countryside, for if there are more men than can find employment, banditry increases. To add to Buck's remarks, the magnitude of rural population is also important because it reflects the condition of village areas. This will be shown in the following pages.

It has already been stated in the preceding section that a large majority of the Kiangsu population in the early 1930's was rural, some 84.3 per cent of the total population (i.e., 30,285,951 out of 35,807,771). Of the sixty-one hsien, except for Shanghai and Chiang-ning, there were not any hsien in which the rural population did not exceed that of the towns and cities. If we tabulate the percentage of rural population by hsien, the results are as shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.
Table 1. Distribution of Rural Population Percentage Among 59 Hsien

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural Population Percentage</th>
<th>Number of Hsien</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62 to 70%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 to 80%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 to 90%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 to 98%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from Chiang-su sheng-chien (Mirror of Kiangsu Province), ed. by Chao Ju-heng (Shanghai, 1935), 36.

Kiangsu ranked the highest in population density of any province in China, having an average density of 730 inhabitants per square mile (294 per square kilometer). But the density varied from one place to another within the province, depending largely upon the natural environmental conditions. Generally, the geographical distribution of the rural population within the province can be described as follows: the most densely populated region was the eastern part of southern Kiangsu, especially in the areas around the Taihu and along the Yangtze River. These areas are naturally blessed with many lakes, fertile soil, a mild climate, and an abundant amount of rainfall. Thus, the areas are highly appropriate for agriculture, in addition to having convenient navigable water routes. Therefore, it was natural for people to flock to these areas. In 1935 the population density of these areas varied from 1,000 to 3,000 inhabitants per square mile. This was also the region where most of the rural reconstruction experiments were conducted.
Fig. 3. Population Density of Kiangsu Province.
Although situated south of the Yangtze River, the western part of southern Kiangsu was sparsely populated because of unfavorable geographical conditions for agriculture such as rugged land and lack of irrigation systems. The population density in this region was less than 1,000 per square mile.

The central portion of the province—namely the Huai Plain, and the area around the Pao-ying, Kao-yü, and Ta-tsung lakes, was also convenient for water transportation, and fertile soil. But this portion was less densely populated than the eastern part of southern Kiangsu because of frequent floods from the Huai River and the Grand Canal. The population density of this area varied between 500 and 1,000 per square mile.

Northern Kiangsu, both west and east, was the least densely populated region because of hilly terrain and a continental climate. The area had a population density from 300 to 750 per square mile. As for the overall situation, about one-third of the total population of the province was concentrated in southern Kiangsu, whose area was only one-fifth of the total area of the province. Because of this situation, the average land area per family in northern Kiangsu and central Kiangsu tended to be larger than that of southern Kiangsu.

The highest population density of Kiangsu reflects the population growth in the twentieth century. The population recovery of Kiangsu, following heavy losses during the Taiping Rebellion, appears to have been slow. By 1932, even after three-quarters of a century, Kiangsu's population had not reached the population level of 1852, that is, 44,494,000. The population of the province in 1932 was 35,807,771.
However, it is generally believed that Kiangsu was "badly over-populated already in the early nineteenth century."  

The population problem can be viewed as essentially that of (1) a balance between the population and land productivity, and (2) the economic development of the area (e.g., the degree of industrialization). Hence, we may consider these two factors in order to assess the population problem in Kiangsu. But since the population situation varied between different localities even within the province, we need to distinguish the overall demography of the province.

The growth rate of the rural population in Kiangsu seems to have been slow. According to the investigation made by the Central Agricultural Experimentation Bureau, the growth rate of the rural population was only fifty per cent during the sixty-year period between 1873 and 1933. Taking the population of 1873 as an index of 100, the population of 1893 was 108; the population of 1913, 128, and the population of 1933, 150. This represents an annual growth rate of a little over 0.7 per 100 persons. This was a somewhat slow rate compared with that of foreign countries. For instance, the natural population increase rate for Bulgaria was 1.93; South America, 1.71; Holland, 1.52; Egypt, 1.5; and Canada, 1.44 during the corresponding period. Nevertheless, when we compare the rate of population increase with the expansion of cultivated acreage in Kiangsu during the same period, there was an imbalance between the two. Whereas the growth rate of the rural population was 50 per cent, the rate of the cultivated acreage was only 10 per cent. Thus, the increase of the cultivated acreage did not keep up with the population growth rate.
This imbalance naturally resulted in a land shortage which we will discuss in the following section.

Moreover, the productivity of Kiangsu land was low compared with those of foreign countries. The following table gives us the relative position of Kiangsu's land productivity in comparison to other countries.

Table 2. The Amount of Wheat Production per Mou, 1925.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Bushels</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Bushels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>7.7 (1.64 shih)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above statistics clearly shows that Kiangsu's productivity was far below the average of most countries. Yet, as discussed earlier, Kiangsu had one of the highest population densities in the world. As a result, Kiangsu was hardly self-sufficient in food supply as of 1928. Kiangsu produced a total of 15,122 million catties of food crops per year against the yearly food requirement of 15,160 million catties of food crops, having a deficiency of about 38 million catties in that year. 52

Next, what was the degree of industrialization in the province which could relieve the population pressures in rural areas? As was stated earlier, Kiangsu was the most industrialized province in the
country. However, except for Shanghai, Wu-hsi, Chinkiang, Nan-t'ung, and Su-chou, the population of most cities in Kiangsu was less than 500,000 and was still predominantly rural. Moreover, the percentage of urbanized areas in comparison with that of rural areas in these major industrialized hsien was extremely low. For instance, in Chinkiang hsien, the seat of the provincial capital, only 0.48 per cent of the total area constituted urban district, and the remaining 99.52 per cent, rural districts. Wu-hsi hsien, the most industrialized hsien next to Shanghai, had only 0.51 per cent urban districts, and 99.49 per cent rural districts. Nan-t'ung had 9.8 per cent urban districts, and 90.2 per cent rural ones. In Wu-hsien, 0.42 per cent were urban, and the remaining 99.58 per cent was rural. Statistics on the changes of population in the above five cities are not available except for Chinkiang. The population changes in the city of Chinkiang between 1913 and 1932 are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Population Changes in Chinkiang, Kiangsu, 1913-1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>474,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>466,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>523,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China Industrial Yearbook, Kiangsu, 1933, Comp. by Ministry of Industry, Shanghai, 1933, 100.

Hence, the population increase was approximately 50,000 in Chinkiang over a 20 year period, which was not a large increase. This fact substantiates, in part, Wang P'eit'ang's comments on roles of cities
in Kiangsu in his work, *Local Handbook of Kiangsu* (1937). He said that in the early 1930's cities in Kiangsu were not only unable to absorb the rural population, but they tended to drive city people out into rural areas owing to industrial depression. 55

Taking the above discussions together, it seems evident that although Kiangsu was the most industrialized province in the nation, its degree of industrialization seems to have not been sufficient enough to relieve the population problem in its rural area.

As for the situation of the local population, northern Kiangsu seems to have had few problems with excessive population in contrast to the situation of southern Kiangsu. For instance, it was reported that in the later part of the 1920's, Hsiao-hsien in northwestern Kiangsu had a shortage of rural population mainly because of years of natural calamities, continuing civil wars and banditry. However, Nan-t'ung hsien in southern Kiangsu had a severe over-population problem. According to Professor Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, in Chin-sha district of that hsien, each peasant tilled less than one mou of land because of over-population. 56 In K'un-shan hsien, likewise in the south, over-population was also mentioned as an important factor contributing to the economic difficulties of peasants in 1936. 57 Rural reconstructionists in Huang-hsiang, a village in Wu-hsi hsien, also reported a severe land shortage due to over-population. 58

The situation of agricultural labor may be another good indicator of the rural population. According to an investigation of thirty-three hsien of Kiangsu by Professor Ch'en Cheng-mo in 1933, the number of hsien where agricultural laborers were in excess was eighteen,
which represented 54 per cent of the total number of hsien investigated; where labor was short, nine hsien (27 per cent); and where labor was adequate, six hsien (19 per cent). Professor Ch'en also analyzed the major reasons for excessive labor, which he placed under twelve categories. Among the twelve categories, land shortage accounted for 20 per cent, natural calamities, civil wars, and banditry accounted for 35 per cent, and the decline of urban industry and rural economy accounted for 45 per cent.

The results of the above study show two things: (1) in Kiangsu more than half of the hsien investigated had an over-population problem, and (2) over-population was a phenomenon closely related to the general decline of the rural economy in the late 1920's and the early 1930's.

In connection with the agricultural labor situation, the movement of population between cities and rural areas is also worthwhile to consider, for the movement reflects an aspect of the rural problem. A rural exodus was a general phenomenon throughout Kiangsu in the early 1930's. Causes for this rural exodus were many, as can be seen from the following examples.

During the 1920's, Wu-hsi became the second largest industrial city in Kiangsu possessing many factories. Many villagers around the city left the land for employment in the factories in the city, for factory wages were higher than those in the villages. The agricultural labor shortage thus created in these villages was in turn supplemented by migrant laborers from other hsien such as Ch'ang-shu and Chiang-yin, and also from northern Kiangsu.
In Li-she chen, a small chen (a market town with villages centering around it) of Wu-hsi hsien located about 50 li northwest of Wu-hsi city, a massive rural exodus occurred in the early 1930's. About 21 per cent of the total population left the chen for other places. The reasons were described as being "the decline of rural family industry, surplus labor owing to the mechanization of agriculture, the decline of sericulture, and continuing bad crops." Most of the emigrants went to cities such as Shanghai, Soochow, and Wu-hsi, and became factory workers, peddlers and coolies.

Village peasants in the vicinity of Ho-ch'iao of I-hsing hsien used to cultivate farms larger than those in Wu-hsi hsien. In these villages, tenants tilled three to forty mou of land, and owner-farmers had one to two hundred mou of land. However, because of the price decline of agricultural products, the size of farm land decreased, and many peasants moved to towns and cities.

Such emigrants were mostly able-bodied adult males. For instance, according to an investigation conducted by Professor Yen Hsin-che at T'u-shan-chen, in Chiang-ning hsien in 1931, of the 286 total households, the number of those who left the chen and worked somewhere else was 108, which represented 7 per cent of the total population. Among them males accounted for 95 per cent or 103. Those who were from twenty to twenty-nine years of age were the most numerous, comprising 47.18 per cent of the total emigrants. Similar phenomena were reported in Nan-t'ung, Chiang-tu, and T'ung-shan. Hence, only women, old people, and children were left, and a severe farm labor shortage occurred. This situation caused a further decline in agricultural productivity.
To summarize, the following three points can be made: (1) although population density varied from one place to another within the province, Kiangsu as a whole had an over-population problem; (2) the excessive population vis-a-vis limited arable land, created a shortage of farm land and food, and caused rural emigration, which in turn resulted in a shortage of farm labor and eventually attributed to the decline of agriculture; and (3) adverse socio-political conditions (i.e., civil wars and banditry) and economic factors (i.e., decline of rural industry) had an aggravating effect upon the peasants' plight already induced by over-population.

The Land Problem

The land problem was a most important and acute one in rural China. Since land is the foundation of agriculture, this problem represented the question of survival for the peasant. The land problem in China's rural areas was essentially twofold. One aspect was the shortage of cultivated land; the other, an excessively unequal distribution of land. Another problem, such as the parcelling of cultivated land can be considered a consequence of the land problem. 65 These two aspects of the land problem were closely related to each other like two sides of one coin. While the former was one of the chief causes for the poverty of the Chinese peasants, the latter was partly responsible for the former, and at the same time, a source for the unjust socio-economic class relations in rural areas.

Although it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of statistics, all studies by agricultural economists show that the shortage of cultivated land was a general phenomenon throughout China. An
investigation of eighteen provinces made in 1922 by the Central Bureau of Postal Affairs of the Peking Government, indicated that the average area of cultivated land per person was only 2.44 mou. In 1933, Liu Ta-chên estimated the average area of cultivated land per peasant as being less than 3 mou, as did Chang Hsin-i in 1932. Wu Wen-hui's calculation in 1935 was 3.00 mou.

To determine the area of cultivated land necessary for a per capita subsistence level is not easy. The size of land holdings varies according to the fertility of land as do standards of subsistence. However, the following opinions of various scholars and institutions will provide us with some useful basis upon which we can judge the degree of the shortage of cultivated land in China.

Based on an investigation conducted in various places in China between October, 1923 and March, 1924, the China International Famine Relief Commission concluded that in the case of good land, a family of five persons needed at least 15 to 20 mou. On the basis of the Commission's findings, the average area of cultivated land per person comes out to be five to six mou, assuming that the land is of average fertility. In comparison with the commission's estimate, the Chinese peasant had less than half of the necessary farm area.

The land situation in Kiangsu was not much different from the national average even though the situation varied between different localities. According to a survey of the agricultural conditions of southern Kiangsu, conducted by the Agriculture Department of Southeastern University in 1922 and 1923, the largest percentage of farm land per family ranged from 5 to 15 mou (one to two acres), which
comprised 63 per cent of all farms. Moreover, 92 per cent of all farms in southern Kiangsu were under eight acres. Let us now turn to various local situations in southern Kiangsu.

In T'u-shan-chen of Chiang-ning hsien, Professor Yen Hsin-che found in 1934 that out of 286 families 67 were landless. This represented 23 per cent of the total families in the chen. The families whose land holdings were one to nine mou totalled 118 (39.51 per cent). Thus, in T'u-shan chen the families whose landholdings were less than nine mou constituted 62.94 per cent of the total number of families.

In 1931, in the tenth ch'ü (district) of Wu-hsi hsien, the average size of cultivated landholdings per middle peasant family was five to six mou. However, the majority of the peasants were tenants who did not own any land. In Li-she chen of the same hsien the average farm size per family in the same year was also five mou of rice fields and one mou of mulberry fields. According to an investigation conducted in 1933 by the Rural Rehabilitation Commission, in Ch'ang-shu hsien poor peasants constituted two-thirds of 142 representative families, and the average size of the cultivated landholdings per family was 5.1 mou. However, most of their land was leased from others. The average size of their own land was only 0.7 mou.

Similar situations existed in most parts of northern Kiangsu. According to the same Commission mentioned above, in P'ei-hsien, which is located in the northwestern corner of the province, poor peasants accounted for 61.2 per cent of 184 representative families, and the average size of their cultivated land holdings per family was only three mou. In Ch'i-tung hsien which was located immediately north of
the Yangtze River, poor peasants constituted 57.8 per cent of 347 representative families, and the average size of their cultivated land holdings was 5.2 mou.

We can note from the above discussion that there was a contraction in the cultivated areas per person, even between the 1920's and the 1930's. Whereas the largest percentage of the average farm size in southern Kiangsu in the 1920's ranged from five to fifteen mou, the average size of cultivated land per family in the 1930's was only about five mou.

Local situations showed similar results. For instance, in Chingkiang hsien, where the owner-farmer percentage was highest in southern Kiangsu, between 1923 and 1933, families cultivating less than 19.99 mou increased from 29.15 per cent to 67.61 per cent while those cultivating more than 20 mou decreased from 70.85 per cent to 26.32 per cent. In Wu-hsi hsien, during the same period, families cultivating less than 10 mou increased by 12 per cent, while those cultivating more than 20 mou decreased by 10 per cent.

The causes for this contraction of the average amount of cultivated landholdings were many. The first was the proliferation of people in the limited land areas. Between 1912 and 1933, while the total area of cultivated land in Kiangsu increased by 8 per cent, population increased by 17 per cent. This imbalance between cultivated land and population caused a shortage of land relative to the number of people.

The second cause was the equal inheritance system in which properties were divided among male children after the death of the property owner. According to Professor Ch'iao Ch'i-ming's study in
1926, 85.5 per cent of the land in Nan-t'ung and 85.2 per cent in K'un-shan owned by farmers was inherited land. The tendency of the Chinese peasants was not to leave their native place. Hence, as their household land was repeatedly being divided, the area of land under cultivation could only diminish.

The third cause was the reduction in agricultural profits after subtracting agricultural costs (i.e., the cost of draft animals, fertilizers, and agricultural laborer's fare), plus high land taxes plus numerous surcharges for owner-farmers and heavy rent for tenants. Under such circumstances small peasants could not afford to cultivate a large sized farm.

The fourth cause was the rise of land prices while the economic situation of small farmers was deteriorating. For instance, during the period between 1905 and 1924, land prices in K'un-shan rose 350 per cent for good land, 369 per cent for medium quality land, and 464 per cent for poor land. During the same period in Nan-t'ung land prices went up 250 per cent for good land, 242 per cent for medium quality land, and 255 per cent for poor land. The rise of land prices was due to the increase of population and the development of transportation and industry. With rural economy deteriorating in this period, it was almost impossible for small farmers to buy new land. Naturally, city capital flowed into rural areas and was invested in rural land.

The fifth and the most important cause was the concentration of land ownership which took place from the 1910's through the 1930's. This was a fairly widespread phenomenon both in southern and northern
Kiangsu. Several local examples will suffice to demonstrate the extent of concentration of ownership. In Chiang-yin hsien the total area of cultivated land was 3,000,000 mou. In 1927, about 2,000,000 mou were owned by big landlords, many of whom lived either in market towns or cities. A field investigation conducted by the Institute of Social Science of the Academia Sinica in 1929, found that in twenty representative villages in Wu-hsi, landlord families accounted for only 5.77 per cent of the total village families, yet their land amounted to as much as 47.28 per cent of the total cultivated land. The poor peasant families, which constituted 68.49 per cent of the total village families, had to share only 14.17 per cent of the total cultivated land.

Similar land concentrations occurred in other hsien such as I-hsing, Chingkiang, Nan-t'ung, and K'un-shan in southern Kiangsu. Northern Kiangsu was well-known for landlordism and the development of rich owner-farmers. Whereas in southern Kiangsu, small landlords having less than 100 mou were most prevalent. In northern Kiangsu, big landlords having 1,000 mou were most prevalent. Regarding land concentration in northern Kiangsu, an example of the situation in P'ei-hsien in 1933 may be cited. According to Chang I-pu's analysis of the field investigation data collected from twenty-eight representative villages in four hsien in Kiangsu, which was sponsored by the Rural Rehabilitation Commission, landlord families in P'ei-hsien constituting only 0.7 per cent of the total families investigated, owned 49.5 per cent of the total cultivated land. The families of rich owner-farmers comprised 4.9 per cent of the population, yet owned
18 per cent of the total cultivated land. Poor peasant families, comprising 61.2 per cent, shared only 12.1 per cent of the total cultivated land. The result was that while the average size of cultivated holdings for rich peasants was 80.8 mou, and for poor peasants, only 3 mou.82

As is evident from the above discussion, when absolute areas of farm land compared to the rural population was already scarce, land concentration in the hands of small numbers of people further aggravated the long-existing unequal distribution of land and became one of the chief causes of land shortage for the majority of peasants. Land concentration was a product of the general poverty of the peasants. It took place primarily at the expense of owner-farmers of small land-holdings. With the small size of land, even in normal times, they barely maintained subsistant standard of living. Hence, when there were special family occasions such as funerals or weddings, some family mishap or crop failure, they would often lose their land property. Such loss of property occurred mainly through mortgaging land. The peasants first would mortgage their land while hoping to redeem it later. However, under the increasingly difficult economic conditions, they would fail to pay mortgage money, mortgage interest would grow, and eventually they would lose the land. The result of an investigation made in Wu-hsi in 1929, indicates that of rich-peasant land, only two per cent was under mortgage, while as much as 38 per cent of poor-peasant was so. On the other hand, it was found that nearly six per cent of rich-peasant land consisted of land held on mortgage, as did over ten per cent of landlords' land.83 As a result, the number of
owner-farmers decreased while the number of tenants increased. Cases in K'un-shan and Nan-t'ung provide good examples of such land losses by small owner farmers. During the period between 1905 and 1924 in K'un-shan, while owner-farmers decreased in number by about 17 per cent, tenants increased by about 20 per cent. During the same period in Nan-t'ung the number of owner-farmers decreased by seven per cent, whereas tenants increased by approximately 18 per cent.

The problem of the small size of cultivated plots for the peasants was aggravated by the parcelling of land. Farming land in Kiangsu consisted of many separate plots which were scattered over varying distances. For instance, according to Chen Han-sheng's study, 34 representative families in 24 villages in Wu-hsi hsien, each of which cultivated more than 16 mou held an average of twelve plots per family during the early 1930's. Each individual plot, on the average, was two and a half mou in size, while the smallest plot was only 0.53 mou. This land fragmentation was detrimental to farming in various ways. It hampered rational land utilization. It made the peasants waste time and effort. It made the use of mechanized agricultural implements difficult, while it increased the expenditures for agricultural laborers. The parcelling of land was a combined outcome of several factors: the equal inheritance system, the loss of land by small owner-farmers due to the increasingly impoverished rural economy, and the increased need for paths or roads for access to small, scattered plots.

The Problem of Heavy Taxes

In conjunction with diminishing agricultural profits and other factors mentioned above, heavy taxes played an important role in making
peasant life difficult. During the period of 16 years between 1904 and 1920, land taxes in Wu-chin tripled from 0.4 元 to 1.2 元.

During a similar period, the land taxes in Wu-hsi, Chiang-ning, Hsiao-hsien, Chiang-tu, and Shanghai all had increased by 275 per cent to 555 per cent. 86

According to regulations regarding land tax collection issued by the Nationalist Government in October, 1928, land taxes should not have exceeded one per cent of the land price. 87 However, the regulations were not followed. In 1933, land taxes in P'ei-hsien were 10 per cent of the land price of the area; and in K'un-shan, 5 per cent. 88 In addition, there were numerous surtaxes attached to the land tax. The number of land surcharges varied among hsien.

Kiangsu province as a whole had no less than thirty kinds of surcharges. 89 Moreover, according to the same government regulations, the surcharges were not supposed to exceed 30 percent of the regular tax, but the aggregate amount of various surtaxes usually amounted to many times that of regular taxes. Table 4 shows the ratio between the regular land tax and surcharges.

The proportion of land tax to the whole agricultural income was high. According to the investigation made by P'ing-shan (Chen Hsien-seng's pen name) in an eastern village of Wu-hsi hsien, the average agricultural income per mou was 22 元 and the land tax, 2.5 元. Thus, the land tax accounted for 11 per cent of total income. 90

Furthermore, since tax payments were made in silver, most peasants who did not have silver at their disposal had to sell agricultural products in order to pay the tax. As was the situation in late
Ch'ing times, owing to the price decrease of agricultural products at the time of tax payment, and due to the price manipulations by rice merchants, the peasants suffered a great economic loss in this tax-paying process. If they met a bad year, they could only borrow money at usurious rates from landlords, merchants, and money lenders, and mortgage their land, crops and other property. This was the initial phase in the peasants' loss of land, their source of livelihood.

Table 4. The Ratio Between Regular Tax and Surtax (Kiangsu, 1933)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surtax' ratio to land tax</th>
<th>Number of Hsien</th>
<th>Surtax' ratio to land tax</th>
<th>Number of Hsien</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 time</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 times</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>above 11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3 times</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>above 12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4 times</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>above 13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 5 times</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>above 16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6 times</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>above 20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 7 times</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>above 25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 8 times</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amano Motonotsuke, Chūgoku nōgyō keizairon (A Treatise on Chinese Agricultural Economy), Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1942), Ch. 6, 30.

Besides, the peasants suffered from various extortions by village officials and local tax collectors. Ta-chia-tou in Pao-shan hsien presents an example. When local tax collectors came down to villages for tax collection, 0.4 yuan was collected from each family for transportation fare, plus one tou of wheat and two chin of cotton.
a year. In 1937 in Tung-nan hsiang of Wu-hsi hsien, 1.2 sheng of rice per mou was collected a year at harvest time by rent collector in 1934. The amount of such extortion was more than three and one-half times that of the regular land tax and surcharges. Such extortions were a widespread phenomenon throughout the province.

Of course, landlords and rich owner-farmers also felt the heavy taxation. However, under the corrupt tax collection system, the big landlords and rich owner-farmers dodged taxes by bribing and influencing local tax clerks and collectors.

Most of the small owner-farmer land fell into the hands of new landlords residing in town and cities. Many of these new landlords were rent collectors, merchants, usurers, and administrative officers. In the spring of 1930, the Kiangsu Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs in Chinkiang made a survey of 514 big landlords of the province. Occupations of 374 were definitely known, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Chief Occupations of 374 Big Landlords in Kiangsu (Each Owning Above 1,000 mou, 1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military and Civil Officers</th>
<th>Usurers</th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Industrial Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Kiangsu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of families</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>27.33</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>22.36</td>
<td>7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Kiangsu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of families</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>57.28</td>
<td>28.17</td>
<td>14.55</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chen Han-sheng, The Present Agrarian Problem in China, China Institute of Pacific Relations (Shanghai, 1933), 19.
Each of the 514 big landlords investigated owned from 1,000 to 60,000 mou. Of the total of 373 landlords, 44.39 per cent were military and civil officers of different ranks, 34.34 per cent were pawn shop and money shop owners and individual usurers, 17.91 per cent were shop keepers and only 3.21 per cent were shareholders of factories. 96

The Problem of The Tenant System

Among Kiangsu peasants, tenants were a majority, according to investigations made by private institutions and scholars. The percentages of tenant families in Kiangsu province between 1921 and 1927 were estimated as follows:

Table 6. Percentage of Tenant Families Among Total Number of Families (Kiangsu, 1921-1927)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Minimum %</th>
<th>Maximum %</th>
<th>Average %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chin-ling circuit</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-Ch'ang circuit</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai-hai circuit</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan-t'ung</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K'un-shan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-ching, Chiang-yin and Wu-chiang</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinkiang</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Hence, it may be said that the tenant system constituted an important rural problem in Kiangsu. Under the tenant system, the rent problem
was the key factor. It directly affected the lives of the peasants and determined the socio-economic relations between tenants and landlords.

Rent was very complicated. For our purpose in this section, they can be divided mainly into two categories: one was the fen-tsu (division rent) system; the other, pao-tsu or ting-tsu (fixed rent) system. Although their nomenclature differed from one place to another, these systems were widely practiced in Kiangsu province.  

Under the fen-tsu system, landlords and tenants divided the harvest of agricultural products according to a certain proportion agreed upon between them in the tenant contracts. The ratio between landlord and tenant was determined according to the fertility of the soil, and the landlord's supply of agricultural means such as seeds, agricultural animals, and fertilizer. Ratios thus varied among different localities. According to the 1934 China economic year book, the division ratio in 18 districts investigated ranged from 40 per cent (landlord) to 60 per cent (tenant), 50 to 50 per cent, and 60 to 40 per cent. But the 50 to 50 per cent system was most prevalent.  

Under the pao-tsu or ting-tsu system, the rent ration was fixed. Rent varied according to the class of land. For instance, in the early 1930's in K'un-shan, rent per mou of good land was 1.10 shih, whereas that of middle grade and poor land were 0.9 and 0.6 shih, respectively. In Nan-t'ung, rent per mou of good land was 1.00 shih, middle grade land, 0.5 shih, and poor land, 0.46 shih.  

It was many scholars' view that regardless of the fen-tsu system or pao-tsu system, rent at this time was high with respect to the
small size of cultivated land. To take the 50-50 per cent ration under the fen-tsu system as an example, after paying 50 per cent of the harvest and deducting agricultural expenses such as fertilizer, seed and agricultural laborer's fare, only 20 to 30 per cent of the harvest was left for the tenant. The following table regarding the annual budget of a Wu-chin tenant family which tilled 12 mou of farm land in 1927 gives us an example of the difficult peasant life after paying rent.

Table 7. Annual Budget Balance of a Tenant Family
(Cultivated land = 12 mou, Wu-chin, 1927)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Item</th>
<th>Amount (shih)</th>
<th>Price (yuan)</th>
<th>Expenditure Item</th>
<th>Price (yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>Rent (50%)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Food for Agricultiral animals</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straw</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Implements</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellany</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 396 | Total 260

Balance = 396 - 260 = 136 (yuan)


Assuming that the family had four persons and the expense for the family's daily food was 5 chiao (1 yuan=10 chiao), the remaining 136 yuan could support the family for only eight months.
In case of the fixed rent system, a way of measuring the high rental rate is to determine the ratio of rent to the land value. According to an investigation made in 1922 by the Joint Association of Education, Industry, and Administration of Kiangsu Province, the average ratio of rent to land value in Kiangsu was 8 per cent.\textsuperscript{101} This was a considerably high rate compared to that of other countries. For instance, in England the average ratio of rent to land value was 4 to 5 per cent.\textsuperscript{102}

Furthermore, the rent had increased substantially during this period. Professor Buck's study found that between 1905 and 1924 rent had increased 297 per cent for pao-tsu in K'un-shan and 272 per cent for both pao-tsu and fen-tsu in Nan-t'ung.\textsuperscript{103} In Kiangsu province as a whole, the average rent had more than doubled from an average of 3.50 to 7.86 yuan over five years between 1922 and 1927.\textsuperscript{104}

Again, as we saw earlier, the average size of cultivated land for small peasants had diminished in this period. Also, living expenses continuously increased whereas the purchasing power of agricultural products decreased.\textsuperscript{105} With the shrinking income due to the diminished size farm land, the rise of living expenditures, and the decreased purchasing power of agricultural products, we can easily see how the 100 per cent increase in rent in five years was exorbitant for the small peasants. Moreover, the tenants were required by custom to pay varying amounts of deposits (ting-shou ch'ien or ya-tsu) in Kiangsu before paying rental fees.

Naturally, many times tenants could not pay their rent. If they paid rent, there would remain little agricultural capital for the
following year. In case of failure to pay rent the delayed rent would simply turn into debt with interest applied. In worse cases, the rent defaulting tenants were arrested and put in jail. For example, in February, 1929, in Soochow, as many as 800 tenants were arrested and put in jail because of their failure to pay rent.

In March, 1933, similar arrests were made in Shanghai and Ch'ang-su, and it was reported that the imprisoned tenants were prevented from engaging in spring cultivation.

The Problem of Rural Credit

On the whole the interest rate on loans in Kiangsu was high. The interest rates reported in fifty-two hsien in 1933 are shown in the following table.

Table 8. Interest Rates in Kiangsu (1933)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Ordinary Interest Rate</th>
<th>B. The Highest Interest Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Rate per month</strong></td>
<td><strong>No. of Hsien</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Constructed from Ch'e Ming, "Chung-kuo nung-ts'un ching-chi chung te chieh-tai wen-t'i" (Loan Problems in the Chinese Rural Economy), Tu-shih yü nung-ts'un (Cities and Villages), ed. by Ch'ien Chia-chü (Shanghai, 1935), 36-37; 38.

From the table above, we can see that more than 60 per cent of the hsien investigated had interest rates about 2 per cent per month for ordinary loans and that around 65 per cent of the hsien had
interest rates from 3 to 10 per cent per month. An interest rate of around 3 per cent might not be considered high. But for various reasons such as the threat of being arrested on rent defaulting, the urgent need of money for family occasions and agricultural capital, and the scarcity of money in rural areas, peasants often turned to landlords, pawnshops, and merchants to borrow money at usurious rates.

High interest rates resulted from the depletion of rural credit which came about with the general decline of the rural economy and social instability. Peasants previously had borrowed small sums from friends or relatives without interest. For large amounts of money, they depended on the ch'ien-hui or credit association usually comprised of a dozen members. Each member deposited prescribed sums of money at regular intervals into the association's treasury for safekeeping. Each member could borrow the full amount of deposits and repay the sum with a small interest charge. The right to borrow was granted on a revolving basis, and each member took his turn. However, with the withering of the rural economy the peasants had little money. Not only did it become difficult to borrow among friends, but also the ch'ien-hui system disintegrated.

Peasants also borrowed from rich peasants and landlords at low interest rates. With growing social instability from the late 1920's on, many rich peasants and landlords moved to towns and cities in order to avoid bandits. With them money also flowed from rural villages. Due also to this so-called "flight of money," the peasants had to borrow money at usurious money rates.
The Peasant Economy

We have thus far discussed the various factors which were responsible for the economic difficulties of the peasants. What was then the actual state of the peasant economy? Since we have studied the tenants' annual budgets by discussing rental rates, here it seems sufficient to consider only the family of a small owner-farmer as an example. According to a study conducted in Wu-hsi in 1923, the balance between the annual income and expenses of a family of five persons having 10 mou of farms was as follows:

Table 9. Annual Budget Balance of an Owner-Farmer Family in Wu-hsi in 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crops</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 yuan</td>
<td>180 yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sericulture</td>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable &amp; Livestock</td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous income</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous income</td>
<td>Social activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weddings &amp; funerals (assuming once every ten years)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Tax</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 234 yuan Total 274 yuan

Balance = - 40 yuan

Source: Tung Ch'eng-hsun, Chung-kuo nung-ts'un fuhsing wen-t'i (Problems of Chinese Rural Rehabilitation), (Shanghai, 1935), 199-200.
The above budget balance was for an ordinary year. Still the income from ten mou of farm land could not meet the expenditures of a family of five persons. Then it will not require much imagination to see that during bad years the economy of the family would have worsened.

Professor Yen Hsin-che's study of T'u-shan chen mentioned earlier, also reveals a similar condition of peasant economy in the villages. Of 286 families studied in the chen in 1934, annual incomes of below 199 yuan accounted for 65.74 per cent (188 families). It was found that over 90 per cent of the families having incomes below 100 yuan had a deficit averaging 79.69 yuan a year. Eighty-one point six per cent of the families having incomes between 100 and 199 yuan had a deficit averaging 44.53 yuan.113

What then were important expense items and their percentage of total expenditures among these poor peasant families? Table 10 gives us clues regarding such questions.

Table 10. Percentage of Five Important Items of Family Expenditures in T'u-shan chen, Chiang-ning, 1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expense Items</th>
<th>% of Total Expenditure for Families with incomes below 100 yuan</th>
<th>% of Total Expenditure for Families with income between 100 and 199 yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>60.88</td>
<td>65.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>9.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>18.91</td>
<td>19.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Yen Hsin-che, Nung-ts'un Ching-chi tsao-ch'a (An Investigation of Rural Families), (Shanghai, 1934, 113.

According to the above statistics, out of the total expenditures, food consumption took at least 70 per cent (food and part of the fuel) for those families. There was little for cultural expenses such as education, recreation, and travel. These were luxuries for Chinese peasants. Still they had large annual deficits. From these facts, one can readily imagine the degree of their low standard of living.

State of the Peasant's Education, Health, and Superstition

Under such deteriorating economic conditions it is no wonder that the educational standards of peasants were very low. To cite the case of T'u-shan-chen again, out of 286 family heads, 140 had not attended school at any level (48.95% of the total number); 204 (71.31%) could not read a newspaper, and 219 (76.57%) could not write a letter. Also, out of 286 families, 174 (60.84%) did not have anyone in the family who had attended school. Situations in other localities were not much different. According to an investigation conducted in the early 1930's by the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, in villages near the college, out of the 215 males and females between 19 and 70 years of age, 122 (56.7%) were illiterate. In the tenth district of Wu-hsi hsien in 1931, out of a total of 17,968 adults, 10,054 (56% of the total number) were illiterate.

As a by-product of ignorance, superstition was prevalent among the rural population. The people worshiped Bodhisattvas, earth gods, and Kuan-ti (Kuan Yu, a general of the Three Kingdoms period deified
in later generations as China's God of War). The practices of worshiping these gods might be, of course, viewed as popular religion. However, they were often degraded into a superstitious status by emphasizing the aspects of invoking blessings and curing illness. 117 Many peasants also believed in shamanism, and heavily depended upon fortune telling and geomancy for seeking advice on important family affairs such as moving, weddings, and sending children to school. These superstitions were harmful to the peasants in several ways. First, the peasants wasted great sums of money in view of their impoverished lives. For instance, in 1929 in Huang-hsiang village of 160 households (a rural reform experimental district of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education), a total of around 2,000 yuan was spent for activities related to superstition. Two thousand yuan was roughly equivalent to the aggregate annual expenses of ten peasant families. 118 Secondly, superstitions were detrimental to peasant health, for when villagers were sick they went to shamans instead of medical doctors. Although there is no reliable data available, the loss of many lives in rural areas was attributed to ignorance and superstition. 119

It was a common belief that the rural population was generally healthier than city people because of cleaner air, exposure to sunshine, and constant physical labor. However, the health conditions of the Chinese rural population were inferior to that of city people. Because of malnutrition, poor sanitary conditions, and lack of knowledge concerning personal hygiene and public health, the peasants were more susceptible to disease. There were not many doctors in
rural areas, and even so, the peasants could not afford to see a doctor. According to an investigation by the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education in the Pei-hsia District in 1933, out of 116 representative peasant families, 62 families had sicknesses, the number of sick people totaling 112. Of the diseases, malaria was most frequent followed by dysentery, cholera, typhoid, and small pox. In Huang-hsiang villages in 1931, out of all the children below six years of age, more than sixty had trachoma. Among adult diseases, the investigators found that skin disease, hook worm, and syphilis were also widespread. These diseases are mostly related to lack of knowledge about personal hygiene and unsanitary conditions.

The poor sanitary conditions in peasant life in Kiangsu can be partly understood by way of the following data. Of various indicators, we might consider three: areas of houses, sources of water, and the home environment. If we take the situation in T'u-shan chen mentioned earlier, the average area of 286 houses in the village was 2.35 chien (about 80 square feet). As for the sources of drinking water, it was found that out of 286 families, 13 (4.54%) used river water, 39 (13.64%) used well water, and the majority of 235 (81.82%), used water from lakes or ponds. This was a widespread phenomenon in other areas in Kiangsu as well. Regarding the home environment, only 27 houses (9.44%) were considered sanitary. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the infant mortality rate was high, and that many people died young from disease in rural areas.
Rural Socio-political Structure

The chief political institution in the rural area was the ch'ü-kung-so during the Nationalist period. The ch'ü-kung-so was the link between the hsien government and the hsiang (rural districts) and chen (town), the basic units of local political organization. The Nationalist Government favored chiefs of ch'u (district) and established many ch'u training centers (ch'ü-chang hsün-lien-so) in the provinces. Most of the ch'u chiefs were graduates of the training centers, and many were intellectuals, and largely middle school graduates. On the surface, these intellectuals held part of the political power in the rural areas. However, actual power resided in the hands of the gentry and landlords similar to that of the traditional periods. The predominance of gentry and landlord political power in rural areas was particularly evident on the hsiang and chen levels. The Rural Rehabilitation Commission found that in 1933, of 235 chiefs and deputy chiefs of hsians and chen in the sixth ch'u of Wu-hsi hsien, 78.3 per cent were landlords, 13.6 per cent rich peasants, and only 8.1 per cent middle peasants.

It was also found that during the Republican Period among 123 village and town chiefs in the same districts, fathers of about twenty were t'u-tung or tung-shih (village trustees), most of whom were local gentry. The situation in Li-she chen of Wu-hsi hsien was a good example of landlord control of village political power. In the chen where the Hsüeh clan was dominant most of the Hsüeh were landlords in the area. They controlled the local administrator civil litigation, people's organization, party (KMT) affairs, and
the local militia. For instance, the chief, deputy chief and five inspectors of ch'ü-kung-so were all landlords belonging to the Hsüeh family. There were fifteen village KMT members, and nine of them were of the Hsüeh clan. There were no peasant members involved. Of 75 members of the village agricultural society (ts'un nung-hui), the president and five on his staff were all Hsüeh landlords. The local militia system (shang-t'uan) was also controlled by landlords—the president, vice president, and training officer being landlords.125

Thus, all of the political apparatus in this village and others was monopolized by the landlord group, and was used for advancing landlord interests, mainly by way of pressing tenants for rent payments and for interest on loans. Under the political and economic influence of the landlords, the local bureau of public safety (ti-fang kung-an-pu) became a tool for landlords. As we noted earlier, many rent defaulters were arrested, beaten up and put into prison, by police and rent collectors.126 In Kiangsu tsu-chan (landlord bursaries), a remnant of the late Ch'ing, also continued to operate with undiminished power, as is well demonstrated by the works of Professor Amano Motonotsuke and Dr. Muramatsu Yuji.127 In short, the system of joint rent collection by landlords and the government remained intact during the Nationalist Period.

Influences of Civil Wars and Foreign Commercial IntrusIon

It has been already stated in the first section that during the Republican Period Kiangsu was under the control of three different warlords and was the battleground of strife between warlords three times. Consequently, during this period, Kiangsu peasants suffered
war damages and heavy financial burdens for supporting the warlord regimes. For instance, between 1913 and 1916, the peasants' part of the total revenue of the provincial government increased from 57 per cent to 74 per cent. However, expenditures directly benefiting the peasants amounted to less than six per cent of the total. Such a trend continued during the Nationalist Period. For instance, in 1931, peasants contributed 69 per cent of the total revenue to the provincial government, but only three per cent of the total expenditures were allocated for agriculture and mining.

Human losses and economic damages from the three wars in the province were enormous. According to an investigation by the Kiangsu War Damage Investigation Committee, during the first Tung-nan War (September to October, 1924), the war-inflicted area included nine hsien. The loss of civilian lives came to around 1,200. About 1,000 houses were burned down, and the ravaged land amounted to about one million mou. Several hundred refugees appeared. The total cost of war damages was approximately 60 million yuan. However, these were the damages of only one war. Hence, one can easily imagine the extent of the war damages the Kiangsu peasants suffered from all three wars.

Foreign influence also had an effect on the rural economy. Direct influence was registered through foreign aggression and the effect of imported goods on the rural economy. Indirect influence was evident through changes in China's international market.

From various evidence the advent of foreign commodities seems mainly to have had continuous adverse effects on the rural economy.
In Kiangsu, we may cite cotton weaving, flour milling, oil milling, and silk yarning as important rural industries that suffered from foreign commercial influence. Among these industries, the harmful effect of foreign import commodities was particularly pronounced in the area of cotton weaving, the most prevalent rural home industry in Kiangsu. After being ruined in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the rural cotton weaving industry temporarily revived during the First World War. However, this was partly due to the drastic decline of imported foreign cloth during the war, while some families employed western weaving machines. However, as foreign imports began to increase after the war, the rural weaving industry began to decline again. The importing of cheap artificial rayon especially had damaging effects upon the rural weaving industry.

To take some examples, in Li-she chen of Wu-hsi hsiien, cotton weaving flourished between 1916 and 1919, but declined rapidly thereafter. During the early Republican Period there were around 300 looms in the chen, but the number of looms was reduced to less than 30 by 1932. Similar situations were reported in Ch'ang-she, Ch'ing-pu, Pao-shan, Nan-t'ung, and K'ung-shan, hsiien.

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1932 also had an adverse effect on the rural Kiangsu weaving industry, for Manchuria used to be an important market for Kiangsu's cotton cloth. During the occupation all trade ties were cut off.

After the opening of China, China's rural economy became more and more closely dependent upon the world capitalist systems. Between 1873 and 1930, the export value of agricultural products had increased
210 per cent from 2,866,000 to 6,285,000 yuan and from 2.6 per cent to 45 per cent of the total exports. Naturally, the prices of Chinese agricultural products were greatly influenced by the conditions reflected by the international market. The outbreak of the Great Panic in 1929 had a serious impact on the export of Chinese agricultural products. Because of the protective tariff policies of foreign powers, Chinese agricultural products lost most of their international markets. Furthermore, foreign countries dumped their agricultural products in China at very low prices. Rice is one example. From 1927 through 1937, there were price differences ranging from 0.13 to 0.92 yuan per shih between imported rice and the domestic rice. Between 1930 and 1933, when China felt the impact of the Panic must acutely, the amount of rice and wheat imports increased tremendously. From an average of about ten to twelve million tan of rice imported in the early 1920's it jumped to twenty million tan in 1931. For wheat, the yearly import increased from an average of three to four million tan before 1929 to more than ten million tan in 1933. The protective tariff and dumping policies of foreign countries combined to bring about a sharp drop in the price of Chinese agricultural products. This situation created what was called a "disaster amid good harvests," and peasants suffered great economic losses. Such phenomena were reported in Hsü-chou, Shanghai, Chinkiang, and Nanking areas during the early 1930's.

In the previous section, we saw that in the late 1920's a rural exodus occurred as a result of rural bankruptcy. However, from 1931
on, the reverse happened. The economic depression in cities due to the Great Panic drove many peasant-emigrants back to rural villages. This back stream to villages from the cities caused another problem in rural areas. Many families that returned were reduced to the status of landless peasants, having lost both city employment, and farms in the villages. Moreover, among those who went to towns and cities individually, there came to exist a few people who did not like to till the land anymore after tasting urban life. Thus, agricultural unemployment increased, a factor which further aggravated the rural situation.

There was also the problem of insecurity. The disintegration of the rural economy led more people to become bandits, or soldiers. Since many landlords moved to towns and cities which had better defense systems, the peasants became the main target of bandit plundering.¹⁴⁰ Many of the young people who were discharged from armies became countryside lumpens detrimental to agricultural work.¹⁴¹ Rural society was thus caught in a vicious circle in which its economy continuously deteriorated.

Locations of Rural Reform Districts of the Three Rural Reconstruction Institutions and Their Problems

It has been mentioned in the preceding section that rural reform districts of the three rural reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu were mostly concentrated in southern Kiangsu. In this section general locations of the reform districts and their social and economic conditions and problems are examined. Such knowledge of the reform districts is vital in order to better understand the
reform activities of the three reconstruction institutions (refer to Chapter Seven), for their reform programs were determined largely by the local needs of each district. Furthermore, such knowledge, I believe, will help clarify the nature of the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement as a whole.

In Kiangsu there were twelve major rural reform districts run by the three institutions in 1937. In order to examine these reform districts let us first consider the physical features (e.g., location, transportation, and size) and population of the districts (refer to Table 11 on the following page). Secondly, we will be briefly looking at the social and economic conditions of the districts. Further information necessary for discussing rural reform experiments in these districts will be presented in Chapter Seven.

From Table 11, the following two facts are worthy of special note. First, while reform districts run by the College of Education and the Hsiao-chuang group were by and large clustered around the locations of the two institutions in the suburbs of Wu-hsi and Nanking, respectively, those of the Association for Vocational Education (AVE) were scattered over several different hsien. This was because the reform districts of the former two institutions were established solely by each of the two institutions, whereas those of AVE were mostly the products of joint enterprise between the AVE and local leaders who earnestly desired reforms for their areas, and sometimes the results of joint action between the AVE and hsien government. Secondly, reform districts of the three institutions were mostly located in the suburban areas of or near major cities in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inst. Reform Districts</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Size or Area (li²)</th>
<th>Population (households/people/year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huang-hsien</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Wu-hsien</td>
<td>2 li north of the Northern Gate of Wu-hsien city</td>
<td></td>
<td>a small village</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130 house/700 peo.</td>
<td>(1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao-chang-an</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td>ab. 2 li from the college in the northern suburbs of Wu-hsien city.</td>
<td></td>
<td>115/502/ (1932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou-lung-an</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 li north from Wu-hsien city.</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 villages, 4 square li</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 villages, 4 li</td>
<td>570/2,929/ (1933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bordering the college on the north, east, and west.</td>
<td></td>
<td>106 villages, 88 square li</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,301/32,401/ (1934)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui-pel</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 li southeast of Wu-hsien city.</td>
<td></td>
<td>342 villages, 136.5 square li</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ab. 20 li from Wu-hsien Railroad Station.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,893/25,392/ (1932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pei-hsia</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 li north of An-ting Railroad Station on the Nanking-Shanghai Rwy.</td>
<td></td>
<td>40 villages, 40 square li</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>accessible both by land and water.</td>
<td></td>
<td>735/3,597/ (1934)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang-ja</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Chen-chiang</td>
<td>10 li north of Hein-feng Station on the Nanking-Shanghai Rwy.</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 villages, 7 li</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>convenient in terms of railway transportation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7/5,774/ (1931)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 square li</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ab. 36 li. west of Soochow.</td>
<td></td>
<td>198 villages, 146.2 square li</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>conveniently accessible both by land and water.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7/15,631/ (1932)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan-jenchiao</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Wu-hsien</td>
<td>10 li northeast of chang-yen chen</td>
<td></td>
<td>7/ 25 square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>southwesterly suburbs of Shanghai city.</td>
<td></td>
<td>730/3,508/ (1930)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>conveniently accessible by land and railway line.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ku-kaochuang</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Tai-hsien</td>
<td>24 li north of Hu-p'ing-men of Nanking.</td>
<td></td>
<td>242 villages, ab. 100 square li</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta-pe-chching</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Shang-hsien</td>
<td>22 lin north of Shanghai city on the border between Peo-shan and Shanghai hsiien.</td>
<td></td>
<td>a small village</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** (1) For the reform districts of the College of Education and the Association for the Vocational Education, see Hsü Yung-lin, Chung-kuo hsien-ta'un chien-sha yun-tung kai-k'uang (National Situation of the Rural Reconstruction Movement), (Tsou-p'ing, 1935), 150-413; (2) For the Bin-su-chuang group, see Section Two of Chapter Five in this study; (3) For geographical locations of the reform districts, refer to maps contained in chapters five and six of this study.
the province such as Shanghai, Nanking, Wu-hsi, and Soochow or near towns of hsien governmental sites (e.g., Chiang-yen) or commercial routes (e.g., An-ting and Hsin-feng). Also all reform districts but one (i.e., Ku-kao-chuang of the AVE) were situated in southern Kiangsu. 143 This was mainly because, as indicated earlier, the three reconstruction institutions were located in southern Kiangsu. Since their reform efforts were a new venture in the country, the smooth development of the reconstruction movement in the future depended greatly upon the initial success of each project. Hence, it was natural for the institutions to choose places nearby and convenient to reach as reform sites in order to observe reform experiments readily and provide guidance for village reform work. Another reason was that village leaders in southern Kiangsu were generally more enlightened than those of northern Kiangsu owing to influences from the big cities mentioned above.144 In addition, rural reconstruction experiments required considerable capital and human resources. In the long run, they were also the responsibility of the reform villages. Moreover, southern Kiangsu was, on the whole, economically more prosperous than northern Kiangsu and had rich human resources since most of the big cities in the province were located in the south. Accordingly, villages in southern Kiangsu, suburban villages of big cities in particular were considered more appropriate for initial reform experiments than those of northern Kiangsu even though there were some exceptions in the cases of the AVE's reform districts. These suburban rural reform districts in Kiangsu were somewhat unique in respect to the China-wide rural
reconstruction movement. For instance, rural reform experimental districts run by leading rural reconstructionists in other provinces such as Liang Shu-ming in Shantung (i.e., Tsou-p'ing district), James Yen in Hopeh (i.e., Ting Hsien district), and P'eng Tu-t'ing in Honan (i.e., Chen-p'ing district) were situated relatively far from big cities. It was said that such locations were selected in the belief that rural reform experiments should be conducted in "typical Chinese villages" which did not receive urban influences so that the rural reconstruction methods fostered in such villages could be generally applicable to all rural villages of China. This "typical village" approach was criticized as ineffective by Ch'en Hsu-ching who wrote many critical articles on the rural reconstruction movement in China in the 1930's. According to Ch'en's observation, areas far away from large cities had difficulties in acquiring specialists and funds necessary for the reform work. Also in such areas the maintenance of local security constituted a big problem which could sometimes lead to the halt of the reform work. Hence, in Ch'en's opinion, villages near cities were more appropriate for rural reconstruction experimentation during the initial stages.

The concentration of the reform districts in the few hsien of southern Kiangsu was in distinct contrast to the locations of provincial government-run mass education and peasant education halls, discussed in detail in the following chapter. These latter halls were spread throughout the province. Such differences arose mainly from the fact that mass education and peasant education halls were a provincial government project which obliged every hsien to establish more than one such type of hall.
Social and economic conditions of the rural reform districts of the three institutions varied a little from one place to another. In particular, we can conceive several differences between the suburban rural reform districts of big cities such as Shanghai, Nanking, and Wu-hsi, and reform districts situated away from the larger cities. First of all, villagers of the suburban districts had more opportunities to engage in factory work in cities, which helped supplement rural income. For instance, 17.6 per cent of the total population of the Hui-pei district and about 10 per cent of the population of the Pei-hsia district were engaged in factory work in Wu-hsi city.149 The people of the Kao-chang-an district lived largely on truck farming of chiao-pai (zizania latifolia), a kind of edible vegetable for the markets in Wu-hsi.150 The suburban villagers also had better communication lines and health measures and were better protected against banditry and famine. To take the Pei-hsia district for example, the district had several hsien police detachments stationed at several strategic locations. There were also locally supported pao-wei-t'uan (security corps) and shang-t'uan (merchant corps) had a Road-Cleaning (ch'ing-tao) club and regularly carried out summer medicare programs in the villages around the chen. In the area of irrigation, most of the district people (83% of the peasants by 1932) used water-pumps and could escape drought disaster.151

However, in large measures, the rural reform districts, including the suburban districts above, also suffered many of the rural problems which we discussed in the preceding section (e.g., problems such as land shortage, excessive population, heavy rent and
taxation, illiteracy, poverty, poor health, superstition, banditry, and the like). Most of the districts had problems of land shortage due to over-population. For instance, in 1933 the average area of cultivated land per family in Huang-hsiang village was less than 3 mou, and the entire farmland in the village belonged to landlords. The land problem in other districts were also acute. During the early 1930's the average area of cultivated land per family in the majority of the districts was under 10 mou, the exceptions being San-jen ch'iao (about 15 mou) and Hsü-kung-ch'iao (about 18 mou). The people of the districts were generally impoverished. Large numbers of families in the reform districts of the College of Education were reported in debt. The low level of education was a common problem to nearly all the districts. For instance, the illiteracy rate of the inhabitants was 67.8 per cent in the Huang-hsiang district in 1928, 70 per cent in the Hui-pei district in 1932, and 72 per cent in the Pei-hsia district and 64 per cent in the Hsü district in the same years. As noted earlier, because of ignorance and poverty, many villagers suffered from diseases and malnutrition. Superstition was prevalent among the districts' people, also. It was mentioned earlier that suburban villagers had better chances to supplement their rural income by working in the factories of nearby cities. However, conversely, as in the case of the Pei-hsia district, rural home industries in the suburban districts declined under the influence of urban industries. Also, despite its proximity to Nanking, the capital of the nation, the
villagers in the Hsiao-chuang reform area were often troubled by bandits even as late as 1930. 158

Under these circumstances, it was clear to the rural reconstructionists that suffering was a way of life for the rural population, the definite majority of the Chinese people. The rural reconstructionists felt that as long as this majority remained ignorant, impoverished, troubled, physically weak, and did not know how to unite among themselves, it was impossible for China to survive. They, therefore, regarded rural rehabilitation as the most urgent and important task for China.

In conclusion, it seems necessary to reemphasize the following three points. First, rural conditions and problems in Kiangsu province were serious enough to cause the three educational institutions to turn to the reconstruction movement. Yet, at the same time, Kiangsu's prominent position on the nation's political, economic, and cultural scene helped the three institutions play pioneering roles in China's rural reconstruction movement. Second, the rural reconstruction efforts by the three institutions were carried out mostly in villages near important cities or communication routes in souther Kiangsu. Third and lastly, rural problems were interrelated and could not be relieved by partial solutions. Therefore, as we shall see in the succeeding chapters (Chapter Seven in particular), the rural reconstructionists in Kiangsu attempted to attack rural problems in a comprehensive way.
The rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu province was primarily an outgrowth of three educational reform movements which flourished during the latter part of the 1910's and throughout the 1920's. These movements were the "mass education movement" (min-chung chiao-yü yün-tung), "rural education movement" (hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü yün-tung), and "vocational education movement" (chih-yeh-chiao-yü yün-tung). They were initially nation-wide movements which had diverse aims. The mass education movement was mainly concerned with adult literacy and civic education. The rural education movement aimed at improving the quality of rural education which had been neglected and had little relevance to the needs of rural life. The vocational education movement arose to redress unemployment problems by promoting vocational education within and without the educational systems. Due to the deteriorating living conditions in rural areas, as noted in the preceding chapter, the three movements became involved with rural reconstruction work. Moreover, despite their nation-wide character, the three movements developed into the three main streams of the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu province. The following pages present a detailed analysis of the development of these three movements.
The Mass Education Movement and Rural Reconstruction in Kiangsu

The Origin of Mass Education

Since the late 19th century, there had been continuing efforts by both government and Chinese intellectuals to elevate general educational standards by popularizing education. For instance, "simple character schools" (chien-tzu hsüeh-t'ang) were established by the Ch'ing government. Various schools such as night schools and "half-day schools" were established by intellectuals. There also appeared pai-hua-pao (vernacular newspapers), newspaper reading centers, and education exhibition centers during the last ten years or so of the Ch'ing dynasty. Moreover, t'ung-su (popular) education developed during the early Republican period (1912-1917). This featured attempts to spread education among the people mainly through novels, dramas, and public lectures. Finally, there emerged the so-called "p'ing-min" (commoner) education movement (1920-1926), which was a private nation-wide popular literacy movement initiated by James Yen. However, mass education, as dealt with here, reflects the movement initiated by the Canton Nationalist Government in 1926 and further developed by the Nanking Government as a nation-wide movement during the latter part of the 1920's and the early 1930's. This politically motivated movement benefited from the various educational efforts on behalf of the people during the previous decades, and from the commoner education movement in particular. In contrast to the commoner
education movement, the mass education movement emphasized civic and livelihood (sheng-chi) education in addition to literacy education. However, because of distinct political differences between the Canton and Nanking governments, the meaning and purpose of the movement were construed differently by the two Kuomintang (KMT) regimes. The following sections deal with this movement and the relationship between the mass education movement and the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu province.

The Canton Government and Mass Education

On March 11, 1925, after the death of Sun Yat-sen, his celebrated will was issued. It called for Kuomintang members "to arouse the masses" in order to achieve revolutionary objectives. The phrase "to arouse the masses" is significant because it reflects an important part of Sun's new revolutionary ideas during his later years. His new revolutionary ideas stressed the education and political participation of the people as essential conditions for the success of the revolution. At the same time, following the Soviet example, Sun adopted the policy of "ruling the state through the party" and endeavored to train and organize people along the Kuomintang's political line. Sun's ideas as such became a guiding principle for the educational policy of the Canton Nationalist Government. As a result, in 1926 the Kuomintang adopted so-called "tang-hua" (party-line) education as its official education policy, which would make education concur with
the KMT's policy line. Mass education was conceived as a part of this tang-hua education program. This was manifested in the draft concerning the tang-hua education policy, prepared and announced in August, 1926, by Hsü Ch'ung-ch'ing, a member of the Education Administration Commission (Chiao-yü hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui) and Chief of the Department of Education of the Canton Government.  

In his draft Hsü argued that under the current circumstances Sun Yat-sen's political ideas formed the only road for China to follow in order to achieve social progress. In order to achieve social progress Hsü advocated that educational policy should correspond to general revolutionary policies of the KMT. This was the essence of tang-hua education. Main components of tang-hua education were industrial education, political education, and military training. Through these types of education the people would be trained to become a revolutionary force for the National Revolution. As concrete programs for tang-hua education, Hsü proposed fourteen items. "Expansion of mass education" was one of them. Other important items relating to mass education were the reform of rural education and the elimination of old habits arising from an over-emphasis on book learning and the socialization of schools.  

An analysis of Hsü's exposition of the contents of tang-hua education shows that a mixture of John Dewey's educational thought
and liberal socialism constituted the ideological basis of tang-hua education. We can find a sign of John Dewey's influence in the inclusion of the socialization of schools as one of the fourteen items tang-hua education would carry out. In both his books and speeches in China, Dewey strongly maintained that education should become an instrument for the improvement of the people's lives and should be closely related with social life, which was the essence of the socialization of schools concept.\(^{11}\)

The tendency of liberal socialism can be found in Hsü's discussion of the KMT's fundamental economic policy in conjunction with the objectives of tang-hua education. In the discussion, Hsü advocated the abandonment of "anarchical individual production methods" and the adoption of nationally systematized production methods, a collective production approach "to which direction historical process was inevitably moving."\(^{12}\) This idea can be viewed as a part of Sun Yat-sen's gradual socialism manifested in his Principle of Livelihood.

Moreover, defending the validity of emphasizing industrial education Hsü employed a more radical argument akin to the Marxist proposition of Überbau (superstructure) theory. He said: "Some people might say, 'such emphasis on production work means the negligence of morality and culture.' Our answer to such allegations is that morality and culture is built upon an economic foundation. Therefore, our emphasis upon production work is not to neglect
morality and culture but rather to reconstruct their base." It is not difficult to understand this mixed presence of diverse elements of liberal socialism and Marxism in the same exposition of the KMT's educational policy. In the first place, Sun Yat-sen, to whom the origin of tang-hua education was attributed, equated his Principle of Livelihood with socialism and also with Communism. Yet, he never clarified the meaning of such an equation. This created confusion among his followers. Some regarded Sun's statement equating the Principle of Livelihood with Communism as a political tactic for relaxing tension between the Communists and the right wing of the Kuomintang; others considered it to be evidence of Sun's pro-Communism. At any rate, it is possible that Sun's ambiguous position regarding Communism could easily be interpreted among his followers as a sign of his tacit tolerance of some Communist theoretical elements. Secondly, at the time when Hsü announced the tang-hua education policy (i.e., August, 1926) the Communist influence was still strong in the Canton government. Hence, as was in the cases of mass movement policies of the Canton regime at that time, we cannot totally exclude the possibility of some Communist influence on the regime's educational policy.

With regard to political education Hsü argued that unlike the imperial period when politics was a mere ruling instrument of the privileged class, politics should serve the interests of the people. The development of the people's capacity to run the society for themselves should be the main objective of political education. He also said: "if rulers tried unilaterally to infuse their political
ideas into people, the people's creativity would be suffocated. Such a viewpoint appears to have contradicted Sun's concept of one-party rule which was declared in 1924. But in fact, it was essentially in accord with tenets of liberal socialism and local self-government for which Sun stood.

The announcement of Hsu's draft sparked conflicting opinions among Chinese educators regarding tang-hua education. For instance, in September, 1926, a faculty meeting at Fu-tan University opposed tang-hua education. Tang-hua education was also opposed by many other universities which were not under the KMT's control. It was argued that the KMT tried to make education a political tool for the Party. Even Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, a KMT veteran and a renowned educator opposed it indirectly, advocating the independence of education from politics. This situation necessitated further clarification of the meaning of tang-hua education. Hence, in July, 1927, Wei Ch'üeh, another member of the same commission and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, published a draft of the educational policy of the Kuomintang Government, which was approved by most of the committee members. In the draft, Wei Ch'üeh said:

Tang-hua education means the revolutionization (ko-ming-hua) and popularization (min-chung-hua) of education under the leadership of the Kuomintang. Our educational policy should be based upon the fundamental policies of the Kuomintang. The fundamental policies of the Kuomintang are the Three Principles of the People, the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, and various resolutions of the national conferences of representatives. Educational policy should be determined according to these sources. This is the concrete meaning of what we call tang-hua education.
Yet Wei stressed that tang-hua education was more than merely teaching the Three Principles of the People and making propaganda for the KMT. He demanded that the people correctly understand the two key words, the "revolutionization" and "popularization" of education as described in the above paragraph. According to Wei's explanation, "revolutionization" meant two things: (1) to oppose conventional education, whose purpose was the perpetuate traditional thought and whose method was inductive and based on memorization, by basing education on the "most developed" natural sciences and social sciences; and (2) to make education into a tool for achieving political and social revolution. He said that in unequal societies education became a tool of the ruling class to protect their interests and to oppress the people. Hence, only the privileged class could enjoy education. Thus the purpose of revolutioned education was to overthrow such an unequal social system and to reconstruct society on the basis of "true" freedom, equality, and fraternity.

The "popularization" of education meant to make education available to all the people and to train personnel who would work for the welfare of the masses. Criticizing education in the past for having produced only special class interests and selfish personnel who oppressed the people and sought to further their interests by linking up with "warlords and imperialists," Wei stressed that the new education must emphasize training personnel to serve the masses.

From the above explanation, it is evident that Wei Chüeh's draft incorporated almost intact most of the tenets suggested in Hsü Ch'ung-ch'ing's draft. Yet, there is a feeling that the socialistic
aspect (i.e., liberal socialism) of the tang-hua education was strengthened in Wei's draft with a noticeable militant tone. Both Hsü and Wei viewed the objective of tang-hua education as training and organizing the people for a political revolution, namely the reconstruction of a new political system based on Sun Yat-sen's political ideals. Hsü did not mention social revolution explicitly. On the other hand, Wei clearly included social revolution as an objective of tang-hua education. In clarifying the meaning of tang-hua education, Wei revealed the feeling of class antagonism by pitting the "oppressed masses of people" against the "privileged and opposing class," and advocated the overthrow of the entire social system. In addition, he tried to make certain that tang-hua education would follow the policy line of the Canton Government by suggesting that all the resolutions passed in the previous national conferences of representatives be made guiding principles for tang-hua education.

Again in Wei's draft, mass education was suggested as the first item of tang-hua educational policy and was recommended to be carried out side by side with mass movements. Mass movements had already been actively promoted by the KMT as a part of its new revolutionary programs. But, little effort had been made by the party to educate the people. He regretted this negligence of training the people. He believed that mass movements, which mainly featured militant activities such as processions, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, bill-sticking, and so forth, alone were insufficient for transforming the people's strength into a national revolutionary force. People needed to be educated and trained, at the same time. Wei said that
since areas under the KMT's influence were daily expanding as the Northern Expedition progressed, mass education was all the more necessary. Hence the party should pay special attention to mass education.²² In the light of this reference, the national revolution Wei had in mind was revolution in a broad sense, a revolution which included the "stage of constitutional government." Thus mass education was to be used more for a long-term purpose than as an immediate revolutionary expedient for the destruction of warlords.

Regarding the concrete method of carrying out mass education, Wei proposed to establish various special schools for peasants, workers, and women so as to teach them basic Chinese characters and various other knowledge and practical skills necessary in their life. In addition, he also suggested that students should learn to discard the old notion of becoming government officials, a bad legacy of the imperial civil service examination. They should participate in the work of supplying knowledge to the masses of peasants and workers necessary for reconstruction work. In order to facilitate such student work, educational institutions were recommended to set up "guidance centers" and various short-term special training centers for school graduates. These centers would encourage the graduates to work among the people and provide basic training necessary for mass education and mass movements. In conjunction with these measures, Wei thought, the government should open various special agriculture, industrial, and commercial schools so that such schools might contribute to the national economy through research and experimentation.²³
In short, mass education was conceived by the Canton Government as a part of tang-hua education. This was an attempt to make education serve the Kuomintang's effort on behalf of the national revolution. Mass education was to supplement mass movements by providing the means to organize and train the people for revolution. Compared with mass movements, the mass education movement was designed for long-term revolutionary goals and was much less militant. However, the movement still contained radical elements since it was intended for a social revolution. The character of the mass education movement changed with the inauguration of the Nanking Government as the central authority of China in October, 1928. Nevertheless, mass education which was proposed in the drafts of Hsü and Wei is important because, as will be shown below, the mass education movement in Kiangsu emerged under its influence.

The Nanking Government and Its Mass Education Policy

Shortly after the Nanking Government was inaugurated in 1928, the Northern Expedition came to a close. According to Sun Yat-sen's "Three Stages of the Nationalist Revolution," China had now entered the period of political tutelage. Article Eight of Sun's Fundamentals of National Reconstruction defined the KMT's task in this period as training the people in the exercise of their political rights and the performance of their civic duties preparatory to entering the constitutional stage. Hence, education of the people was considered an integral part of the tutelage program in fulfilling such a mission. Mass education was supposed to be an important part of the Nanking regime's responsibilities. Furthermore, according to
the spirit of Sun's theory of the three stages of the revolution, the mass education policy of the Nanking Government should have been an extension of that of the previous Canton Government. However, as the general views of the Nanking Government concerning mass movements changed from those of the Canton regime, so did the Nanking Government's opinion's on mass education.

The fundamental difference stemmed from the negative attitude of the Nanking Government toward existing mass movements. This was a result of the ascendancy of party conservatives headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's anti-mass movement position was evident in late July and early August, 1926, when he proclaimed martial law in Canton and banned "all labor disturbances for the duration of the Northern Expedition." Few people understood then the true meaning of this proclamation in relation to the fate of mass movements in the forthcoming period of the Northern Expedition. Many mass movements, which had mushroomed in territories occupied by the Nationalists, were subsequently smashed by the Nationalist armies and their allied troops in the course of the Northern Expedition. Chiang Kai-shek's Shanghai coup on April 12, 1927, was only a high point in this destruction of mass movements. It triggered many similar attacks on mass organization in other cities.

Needless to say, suppression of mass movements and the Party Cleaning Movement (the eradication of Communist elements from the Kuomintang) which followed the Shanghai coup, were staged to get rid of the power base of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During the period of the KMT-CCP alliance, most mass organizations, especially
labor unions and peasant associations, came under Communist control. The expulsion of the Communists from the Wuhan Government in the middle of June, 1927, and the merger of the Wuhan Government with the Nanking Government in the following month was a complete victory for the more conservative factions (i.e., the right and middle wings) of the KMT. With good prospects for building a national regime, a different policy in regard to mass movements became a major concern for the new Nanking authorities. This problem emerged as a major issue of debate between the conservative and the left KMT factions throughout 1928. During this period, while the conservatives held power at central party headquarters, the left wing faction still retained considerable power in lower party organizations in spite of defeat at the higher level.

The problem of mass movements became one of the major items in the agenda in the Fourth Plenum of the KMT's Second Central Executive Committee which was held in Nanking from February 2 through 7, in 1928. The conference was dominated by Chiang Kai-shek and Tai Chi-t'ao. Tai, once Sun Yat-sen's secretary and a founder of and later a convert from the CCP, was now a foremost anti-Communist KMT theorist and a close associate of Chiang Kai-shek. The important decisions of the plenum with regard to mass movements were set forth as follows: (1) to halt all mass movements temporarily until party affairs were settled; (2) to abolish the bureaus of peasants, workers, merchants, youths, and women and to set up instead bureaus of organization, propaganda, and training, and (3) to change the name of the Committee for Mass Movements to the "Committee for Training the Masses." This was the to which Ch'en Kuo-fu and his followers were appointed.
In explaining his own proposal Chiang Kai-shek said that because mass movements in the past were separated from KMT authority they had fallen under Communist control and had become a tool of class struggle. The Kuomintang's mass movements (the Canton Government's) had been revolutionary in nature because their target was the warlords. However, since the warlords had been eliminated by the revolutionary armies, the revolutionary object of mass movements no longer existed. Therefore, the orientation of mass movements should be changed to a more constructive direction. The specific suggestions Chiang made for the "constructive" mass movements included: (1) the enactment of a peasant protection law, (2) the increase of practical knowledge among the people, and (3) preparation of rural cooperatives, agricultural banks, and peasant educational facilities. 31

Explaining the reason for the elimination of the five mass bureaus in a news conference held on March 10, Ch'en Kuo-fu, Chiang's close associate, maintained that the existence of bureaus for various social classes had proved administratively ineffective and had incited class conflict, caused trouble in the party, and weakened party control over mass movements. He said that the Committee for Training Masses was organized in order to remove the popular misunderstanding that the Kuomintang had neglected the mass movements. Labelling peasant associations and general labor unions in the past as "murder weapons of the Communists," he said that mass movements thereafter should be based on the "Three Principles of the People." He also suggested that "class cooperation," not "class struggle" would be the means of the mass movement. 32
Ch'en Kuo-fu's statements were essentially a reiteration of Chiang Kai-shek's position on mass movements. Both seemingly recognized the necessity of mass movements but in considerably different terms from those of the previous radical type. Both Chiang and Ch'en wanted to place mass movements under the tight control of the Kuomintang and to restrict the activities of mass organization to those which in the party's view were "constructive" ones. Consequently, as we shall see below, mass movements markedly shrank and eventually became non-existent.

In the meantime, mass organizations in various regions asked the central party headquarters to retract the virtual ban on all movements. On February 21, 1928, representatives of various organizations in Kiangsu, such as provincial labor unions, student unions, and women's associations, held a joint conference. There they adopted a petition which asked the central party to cancel the order banning mass movements and to determine and announce a concrete policy on mass movements as soon as possible. Four days later, mass organizations in Nanking also made a similar request to the central party headquarters. However, the party did not show any intention to lift the ban. On May 11 of the same year when labor unions asked the party leaders to revive mass movements, Chou Chi-ch'ing a member of the central committee of the party, replied that because there were still many Communists hidden in the capital, looking for opportunities to instigate mass insurrections, and also because of the Tsinan Incident (May, 1928), the government could not revive mass movements.
On February 23, the Kiangsu provincial party headquarters decided to carry out a mass propaganda campaign. In explanation of the campaign's purpose, the provincial party declared that the "misunderstand" gap between the masses and the party was most dangerous and that the party should criticize and guide the government from the vantage point of the people. This declaration also maintained that at times the party had acted against the masses' interest. It also pointed out that the party had committed two mistakes in the wake of the party-cleaning movement. One was that the party-cleaning movement was excessive; the other, that the party failed to clarify its policy toward the masses. The declaration claimed that warlords, imperialists, local strongmen, and bad gentry took advantage of such failures and oppressed the masses. Finally, the provincial party headquarters decided to focus attention on workers and the peasants, saying that the party must not disappoint these masses of enormous revolutionary potential. Although the Kiangsu party headquarters did not name the central party leaders, its campaign was obviously an indirect attack on the policies of the central party headquarters under the conservative factions. On the following day of the campaign, the central Nanking party headquarters sent "appropriate personnel" to purge and lead the provincial party.

The decisions of the fourth plenum on mass movements also drew criticism from the left wing of the party. The leftists' view was forcefully presented by Ch'en Kung-po, an ex-Communist and a close friend of Wang Ching-wei who then went into self-imposed exile. Through a series of articles in his short lived periodical Ko-ming
p'ing-lun (Revolutionary Critic) (May-Sept., 1928) and other publications, Ch'en argued for the revival of mass movements. The main points of his argument can be summarized as follows. The Kuomintang was a revolutionary party representing workers, peasants, and small bourgeoisie. The National Revolution remained unfinished and therefore still required mass movements. It was wrong to ban mass movements because of the Communists, for mass movements were one thing and the Communist problem was another. If mass movements in the past were led by the Communists, it was the Kuomintang's mistake, not that of the masses. The Kuomintang should try to find out its shortcomings in mass policies and correct them instead of banning mass movements. If the party continued to ban mass movements, the masses' suspicion of the party would grow and even develop into resistance against the party. The party also would lose its revolutionary character which was the life blood of the KMT. Hence, in order not to disappoint the masses and to retain the revolutionary nature of the Party, the Party should revive mass organizations and endeavor to lead them to fulfill its revolutionary task.

Ch'en's assertions were immediately challenged by men such as P'eng Hsueh-p'ei, Chief editor of the Chung-yang jih-pao (Central Daily News) and a professor at the Central Political University, and Wu Chih-hui, Sun Yat-sen's associate, a senior KMT veteran, and a strong supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. They rejected Ch'en's contention that the KMT represented workers, peasants, and small bourgeoisie, arguing that the Kuomintang was the party for all classes of the people. Moreover, Ch'en Kung-po became the target of the right
wing faction's denunciations and subject to investigation by the party's disciplinary committee on the charge of hurting the party. Copies of the Ko-min p'ing-lun were not allowed to be sold in Kiangsu and Hopeh provinces by the provincial governments. In subsequent years, the views of the left wing KMT faction were completely suppressed.

Mass movement policies of the Nanking Government were carried out as enunciated during the Fourth Plenum. On March 15, 1928, all mass organizations were reorganized with pro-government personnel as their nuclei under the direction of the Committee for Training Masses. The First National Educational Conference (May 15-30, 1928) passed a resolution to establish a committee for mass education and to implement it throughout the country in "due course of time." At the same conference it was decided that tang-hua education would be replaced by "San-min chu-i" education on the ground that the term "tang-hua" was a product of "those who opposed the KMT." Needless to say, this "opposition" referred to both the CCP and KMT left-wing members. In October of the same year, Tai Chi-t'ao, who had a more negative outlook toward mass movements than Ch'en Kuo-fu, was appointed to the Committee for Training the Masses, following Ch'en's retirement. Eventually in April, 1929, Tai was named Minister of Training. Thereafter, until Tai moved to the Examination Yuan in January, 1930, the mass movement policy of the Nanking Government were greatly affected by Tai's opinions.

Tai's views on mass movements differed little from those of Chiang Kai-shek. He strongly opposed the "outdoor activities of mass
organizations." The following remarks of Tai Chi-t'ao, in a speech delivered at the KMT Chekiang provincial headquarters in December, 1927, is a good example of his views on mass movement. Regretting the failure of the KMT leadership during past mass movements, Tai said:

We should not have taken the workers' movement out of the factory, the peasant movement out of the field, the merchants' movement out of the shop, the student movement out of the school... We promised them the benefits of doing so. However, nothing beneficial came out of such activities. 46

In a speech at the Central University of May Day, 1929, Tai also said: "After the May Fourth Movement there occurred a major mistaken trend in both the intellectual and social movements. What was this mistake? For example, in the labor movement there was much 'negative' activity and very few 'positive' movements. After the May Fourth Movement few constructive works appeared in the social, political, and intellectual fields; there were only excessive deeds in destructive areas." 47 "Constructive" and "positive" movement here meant training the people into "sound" and "productive" citizens, namely "sound" in the sense of becoming capable of contributing to the economic reconstruction of the country. Tai was not much concerned with civic training for the people. Hence, it is clear that the movement Tai conceived did not necessarily mean the education and training of the people for the third and constitutional period. His standpoint was the dominant one among Nanking leaders, and became the underlying principle for the mass movement policy of the government throughout the Nanking period. 48 Within the scope of such restricted views, the "Operational Method of Mass Schools" and the "Outline of the Worker's Education Plan," were promulgated in January, 1929, and the "Regulation
of Agricultural Extension Service," in March of the same year, in order to provide a basis for a more conservative mass education movement. 49

The more conservative mass movement policy of the Nanking Government differed from that of the Canton Government along the following three points. (1) The simultaneous promotion of mass movements in conjunction with mass education during the Canton period, was dropped. (2) The main emphasis was placed on literacy education and production training while civic training which emphasized the "four people's rights was neglected. (3) The militant tone of class struggle characteristic of the mass movement policy, in effect during the Canton period, was eliminated. Instead "class cooperation" was advocated. In brief, the mass education movement during the Nanking period became an alternative to previous radical mass movements during the period of KMT-CCP alliance. Movements during that previous period had mainly focused on class struggle between landlords and tenants or management and workers. They were also used as a part of the revolutionary tactics against warlords and "imperialistic" powers. Their methods were mostly of a militant nature. The leaders of the Nanking Government considered such methods to be "destructive." They believed that mass movements should be channelled into more "constructive" efforts such as "literacy movements" (shih-tzu yün-tung), agricultural reform, and cooperative movements. Their aims were ultimately reflected by the mass education movement which was carried out by the Kiangsu provincial government.
The Mass Education Movement in Kiangsu Province

Being in the central position of the nation culturally and politically with Shanghai and Nanking, the new capital of the KMT Government within its boundaries, Kiangsu Province was quick to respond to the changing educational policies of the Nationalists. When the Fourth Plenum of the KMT revealed the outline of the Nanking Government's mass movement policy, the Kiangsu Provincial Government decided almost simultaneously to carry out mass education in the province.

As basic measures for the development of mass education, the provincial government took two major steps in February, 1928. First, it allocated thirty per cent of the "eight per cent mou special tax" (pa-fen mu-chuan), which had been instituted in the preceding month as a provincial education tax, for the purposes of mass education. Second, it established a mass education workers' training institution on the college level in order to secure sufficient mass education personnel for the province.50

The task of establishing a mass education institution was given to Mrs. Yü Ching-t'ang, a famous woman educator trained at the Teachers' College of Columbia University, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Educational Expansion in the Department of Education of Kiangsu Province. Early in 1928, Mrs. Yü set out to establish such an institution. In early March, she invited mass education specialists such as James Yen and Tang Mao-jo (leaders of the National Association of Mass Education Movements in Peking) and consulted with them.51 As a consequence, the Mass Education School of Kiangsu College (Chiang-su ta-hsueh min-chung chiao-yü hsüeh-hsiao) was formally established...
in April. This was the first college-level institution in the nation specifically designed to train mass education workers. The fact that the Kiangsu's provincial college was established as a mass education institution indicates the deep concern for mass education on the part of the provincial government leaders at that time. This mass education school was the predecessor of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, which became the center of the Kiangsu mass education movement and one of the three major rural reconstruction institutions of the province, as discussed below in Chapter Six.

The Kiangsu government's decision to carry out mass education in the province was made three months ahead of the adoption of a resolution by the First National Educational Conference to establish a committee for mass education in preparation for a national program in the "near future." It was eleven months ahead of the promulgation of Regulations for Operation of Mass Schools by the Central Government. In fact, when Mrs. Yü first undertook to establish a mass education institution in February 3, 1928, the Fourth Plenum of the KMT was still deliberating educational policy. The above facts indicate that the mass education policy of the Kiangsu Provincial Government was not a direct product of the Fourth Plenum of the KMT.

Our material is silent about the origin of such a provincial policy. But in addition to the time factor, other circumstantial evidence points to the strong probability that the origin of the Kiangsu government's mass education policy lay in the Canton regime's tang-hua education policy manifested in Wei Ch'üeh's draft. For instance, the chief of the Kiangsu Department of Education in direct charge of
establishing the mass education institution at that time was Chang Nei-yen. He was a member of the Educational Administration Committee of the Kwangtung Government, and had participated in drafting Wei Ch'üeh's tang-hua education draft. Moreover, the first two items of Chiang's educational policy announced at the time he became chief of the Department of Education were: (1) to carry out civic education, and (2) to expand and reform hsien, city, and rural education, and emphasize vocational education as well as agricultural education. 53

Emphasis on civic education (in a positive sense) and educational reform, especially in respect to rural education, are in agreement with what Wei Ch'üeh's draft of tang-hua education stressed.

It was also significant to note that four months after the establishment of the Mass Education School the provincial government decided to establish a Workers' and Peasants' Academy (Lao-nung hsüeh-yüan) as a co-project of the Mass Education School. 54 Previously, the Educational Administrative Committee of the Canton regime had stipulated that workers' education would be included in the Kuomintang Government's educational policy in addition to those items announced in Wei Ch'üeh's draft. 55 The term "lao-nung" (worker-peasant) had frequently been used during the period of the KMT-CCP alliance but had fallen into disuse during the Nanking period. However, in June, 1929, as the School and Academy were merged to form the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education (COE), the terms "mass" and "workers and peasants" were dropped. The reason seems to have been that the term "lao-nung" was not consistent with the political disposition of the Nanking Government which abhorred militant class movements mainly carried out by peasants and workers.
Such a change indicates that from around mid-1929, the influence of the Central Government began to be felt on provincial mass educational policy.

The aims of mass education by the Nanking Government were not officially defined until January, 1934. It was declared then that the objectives were "to develop the living capacity and the organizing ability of the people so as to achieve national independence, universal civil rights, and the elevation of the people's livelihood." But during the Nanking period these objectives were not earnestly pursued by the Nanking authorities. In the meantime, different aims for mass education were expressed by public institutions (i.e., mass education halls) and private educators. In Kiangsu, public mass education institutions espoused mass education as a part of the KMT tutelage program which emphasized civic education. On the other hand, private education leaders tended to view mass education more from the standpoint of social reform even though they recognized the political aspects of the mass education program.

Kao Yang, President of the COE and a leading authority on mass education, defined the objectives of mass education as "to develop sound citizens, to reform the society, and to make individual life wholesome." Ch'en Li-chiang, a professor and a mass education theorist at the same institution, viewed the objectives of mass education as "to reform the lives of the people, increase social efficiency, and arouse national consciousness among the people through the capacity of education." Thus, these private mass education leaders considered mass education mainly as supplementary education and a tool to improve
the lives of the people. As we shall see later in this chapter, this
difference in objectives of mass education as reflected between the
government and private mass education leaders, served as the starting
point from which the mass education experiments conducted by the COE
gradually moved away from the mass education policies promoted by the
conservative Nanking leaders. The latter stressed mainly the spread
of literacy and were less interested in civic training and social
reform in rural areas.

Mass Schools and Mass Education Halls

Mass education in Kiangsu Province was carried out mainly through
two types of public institutions. They were mass schools (min-chung
hsüeh-hsiao) and mass education halls (min-chung chiao-yü kuan). Mass
schools featured adult education. There males and females between the
ages of 12 and 50, who had been deprived of educational opportunities,
were taught basic knowledge and skills needed in daily life. The
subjects taught at these schools were basic written characters, the
Three Principles of the People, party doctrine, the use of the abacus,
simple calculations, and music. Besides these, Chinese history,
natural science and public health were also taught when local
situations permitted. The length of education at mass schools was
four months. As is shown in Table 12, mass schools functioned many
times as parts of mass education halls.

The mass education hall was a remodeled version of the already
existing "popular education hall" (t'ung-su chiao-yü kuan) of the
Republican period. Popular education halls had been set up in
provincial government seats in October, 1915, at the initiation of
Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, then Minister of Education, as popular education centers where the people could learn useful knowledge and develop civic spirit (i.e., patriotism, observance of the law, and morality) through public lectures, reading newspapers and magazines, and other activities. These halls were changed into mass education halls in August, 1929, when the University District System (Tai hsüeh-chih) was abolished. The reason for such a change was attributed to the degeneration of popular education halls into merely display centers for newspapers. The mass education hall was a comprehensive institution whose functions were complex and widespread. Its functions included: carrying out literacy education, livelihood education, and public health education. The details of the important projects of the mass education hall are listed in the following table.

Table 12. The Important Projects of the Mass Education Hall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Education</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Literacy Education:</td>
<td>Mass school, mass library, newspaper reading room, wall newspapers, mass education materials, character information center, center for writing for the illiterate, mobile library, popular lectures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political Education:</td>
<td>Various commemorative meetings, party doctrine study club, antique exhibition, lectures on current affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pastime Education:</td>
<td>Recreation room, mass tea house, art exhibition room, mass park, drama study society, and calligraphy society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Livelihood Education:</td>
<td>Science exhibition room, science laboratories, organizing cooperatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Family Education: Model family system, the society for studying family affairs, and family visitation and counseling.


The scale of mass education projects and the size and organization of mass education halls varied considerably between provincial and hsien supported halls. For example, while annual expenditures for provincial mass education halls ranged from 40,000 to 56,000 yuan in 1931, the annual expenditures for hsien mass education halls varied from 1,000 to 9,000 yuan in the same year. The number of staff members at the halls also varied. While the provincial education halls had around 15 to 36, the number at the hsien halls ranged from 1 to 29, but the average was 5 to 6. These mass schools and mass education halls were set up mostly in cities and towns.

The mass education movement in Kiangsu Province seemed to be one of the largest in the nation. This can be seen in the total number of Kiangsu's mass schools and mass education halls compared with those of other provinces. In 1930, the total number of mass schools in Kiangsu was 1,341, which was third in the nation after Shansi and Hopeh provinces. The total number of mass school students were 97,502. The total number of mass education halls in Kiangsu was 84 in 1928. This increased to 135 in 1929; 184 in 1930; 210 in 1931; and 239 in 1932. Provincial mass education halls totalled only three among this number throughout the Nanking period. The rest were hsien education halls. According to P'eng Ta-ch'üan, such numbers of Kiangsu's mass
education halls were not only the largest in the nation, but also many times larger than that of any other province. The number of mass education halls in each hsien also differed, ranging from 1 to 10. Table 13 shows the distribution of mass education halls in Kiangsu province.

The funds alloted for mass education out of the total provincial education budget was not large. However, compared with other provinces, Kiangsu's mass education expenditures were relatively high. We do not have statistics for the funds exclusively allocated for mass education. However, the statistics for social education expenditures approximate the amount for mass education expenditures.

According to the statistics compiled by the Ministry of Education in 1934, during the four year period, 1929-1933, the expenditures for social education in Kiangsu nearly doubled, increasing from 392,586 yuan in 1929 to 542,587 yuan in 1930; 630,487 yuan in 1931; 591,212 yuan in 1932, and 624,212 yuan in 1933. According to these figures, Kiangsu province ranked first nationally in total expenditures for mass education during this period except for 1929 when it was second. Likewise, the percentage of social education expenditures out of the total provincial education budget nearly doubled, increasing from 9.77 per cent in 1929 to 11.08 per cent in 1930; 12.92 per cent in 1932; and 17.75 per cent in 1933. Such a rate of increase was one of the largest in the nation, allowing Kiangsu to rank first nationally in the percentage of social education expenditures out of the total provincial education budget from 1931 on. With the first college-level mass education training school in the nation, the nation's
Table 13. The Distribution of Mass Education Halls in Kiangsu Province, 1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hsien</th>
<th>No. of Halls</th>
<th>Hsien</th>
<th>No. of Halls</th>
<th>Hsien</th>
<th>No. of Halls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiang-ning</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hsien</td>
<td>No. of Halls</td>
<td>Hsien</td>
<td>No. of Halls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu-yang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tsung-ming</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tung-tai</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li-shu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hai-men</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T'ai-hsien</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao-shun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wu-hsien</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kao-yü</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang-pu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>K'un-shan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pao-yang</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu-ho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wu-chiang</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tung-shan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinkiang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wu-chin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Feng-hsien</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuang-sha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wu-hsi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sui-ning</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan-yang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I-hsing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I-cheng</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin-tan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chiang-yin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pei-hsien</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li-yaang</td>
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<td>Ch'ing-chiang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hsiao-hsien</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
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<td>Nan-t'ung</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>T'ang-shan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ang-shu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ju-kao</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pei-hsien</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-tung</td>
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<td>T'ai-hsing</td>
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<td>Kuan-yin</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sung-chiang</td>
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<td>Huai-yin</td>
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<td>Kang-yu</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nan-hui</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ssu-yang</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Huai-an</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ing-p'u</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lien-shui</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shu-yang</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng-hsien</td>
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<td>Fou-ning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tunghai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin-shan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yen-ch'eng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Su-chien</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ai-ch'ang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chiang-tu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chia-ting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tung-hai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 135

largest number of mass education institutions, and greater mass education expenditures than any other province, Kiangsu was foremost in China's mass education movement.

Despite the active development compared with other provinces, evidence shows that the effectiveness of the mass education movement in Kiangsu was very limited. First, as we saw earlier, the average number of staff members at the mass education halls were 5 to 6, and yet the variety of mass education projects assigned to the halls were many. Also, the number of mass education halls per hsien were very small, mostly one or two. As a report from the Wu-chin Mass Education Hall frankly confessed, it was almost impossible for one or two halls to cover the entire hsien adequately, carrying out such a variety of mass education projects as listed previously.71

Moreover, the ratio between salaries and expenditures for projects assigned to mass education halls in 1931 indicates that the average ratio was 69 per cent for salaries, to 31 per cent for projects.72 In other words, only about one third of mass education funds were spent on various mass education projects. As was seen previously, the average total annual expenditure per hall was 3,500 yüan. Then, the annual expenditure for the projects per hall would have been a little over 1,000 yüan, that is, about 80 yüan a month. One can hardly imagine that such an amount could adequately maintain so many projects as shown in Table 12.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, most of the mass schools and mass education halls were situation in hsien seats (cities) and towns. Thus, the rural population in most need of mass education was virtually
neglected by the mass education movement. In October, 1933, a frustrated mass education worker declared that the mass education halls were sick. He pointed out the main shortcomings of the halls in Kiangsu were: (1) the bureaucratization of the halls' administration, (2) the superficiality of mass education projects, and (3) the lack of will to mingle and work with the masses on the part of hall members.\(^{73}\) These shortcomings seemed to have continued to exist thereafter. The provincial mass education movement became stagnant in 1932. Thenceforth, the rural reconstruction efforts led by the COE became the dominant trend in the mass education movement of Kiangsu province.

**Turning Toward Rural Education and Reconstruction**

Since Kiangsu was a major granary region and more than 85 per cent of the population was rural, the Kiangsu Provincial Government had always been concerned with rural affairs. Hence, when the province established mass education schools early in 1928, the government also decided to set up similar institutions for peasants. These institutions were peasant education halls (*nung-min chiao-yü kuan*). As in the case of mass educational halls, the provincial government devised three preparatory measures for establishing peasant education halls. First, on November 19, 1928, the government promulgated regulations concerning the operation of *hsien* peasant halls.\(^{74}\) Second, it designated 75 per cent of the "tin foil special surtax" (*po-te chüan*) as a subsidy fund for these *hsien* halls. According to the regulations, each *hsien* would receive 1,819 yüan annually from the provincial government as a subsidy.\(^{75}\) Third, the provincial government established the T'ang-shan located about five miles west of Nanking, in the spring of 1928, as a
preliminary experiment before allotting peasant education halls to the hsien. The basic responsibilities of the T'ang-shan Education Hall was to provide peasants and their children with rudimentary education and to conduct supplementary training courses for adult peasants. In addition, the T'ang-shan Peasant Hall was charged with the following three missions: (1) to increase agricultural production by using scientific agricultural techniques, (2) to reform rural organizations with "social science methods" so as to alleviate the peasants' economic plight and also cause peasants and their children to maintain sufficient interest in village life, and (3) to experiment with various new methods of rural reform applicable in hsien peasant education halls. With such missions, during the period between November, 1928, and December, 1929, the T'ang-shan Peasant Education Hall experimented with cultural projects, women's associations and nurseries, health programs, and an agricultural experiment project.

The results of these experiments were regarded as successful. Thus the provincial government directed each hsien to establish at least one peasant education hall by May, 1929. The function of the hsien peasant hall was similar to that of the T'ang-shan Peasant Hall mentioned above. A detailed list of activities undertaken by the hsien peasant education halls is shown in Table 14.

The staff size of the peasant education halls was, by and large, smaller than those of the mass education halls. According to an investigation in 1932, the staff of the various peasant education halls ranged from 1 to 7, the average number being 2 or 3. The annual budget of the halls varied between 960 and 2,237 yüan, and the average
Table 14. The Number of Hsien Peasant Education Halls in Kiangsu Province Involved in Given Projects as of 1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Projects</th>
<th>No. of Halls</th>
<th>Title of Projects</th>
<th>No. of Halls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass School</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Combined Commemorative Week</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving mass school</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rural kindergarten</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft practice class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mass information office</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of writing for another person</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Circulating literature</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour lecture</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rural park</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative agriculture field</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Agricultural experimental station</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural training course</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agricultural extension</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural reform society</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Weather report</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special model family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Exhibition room</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass tea house</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Playground</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National martial art society</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire-righting society</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation room</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Pingpong room</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music room</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Library</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall newspaper</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lecture hall</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama center</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vegetable garden</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Huang Ching-ssu, "Ssu-nien lai hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü" (Rural education during the past four years); historical materials, Chiao-yü tu-chih (The Chinese Educational Review), 23:7 (July, 1931), 98.
percentage of project expenditures was less than 35 per cent of the total operational budget of the halls. The total number of peasant education halls in the province between 1931 and 1933 rose from 70 to 86.81

The hsien peasant education halls were mostly situated in market towns (chen) and villages. The geographical distribution of the halls is illustrated on the following map. As we can see from this map, except for Wu-hsi, Tung-shan, and Tan-yang hsien, most of the hsien had less than two halls. According to the estimates by Chiang Wen-yü, a leading rural reconstructionist of the Association for Chinese Vocational Education, the most desirable number of peasant educational halls was one hall per 5,000 people.82 If we follow Chiang's calculation, Shanghai hsien, with a population in 1932 of 972,600, ought to have had 194 halls, and Ch'uan-sha hsien, with a population of 108,802, should have had 21 halls. Chiang's estimates were, of course, ideal ones. But when we contrast the number of existing peasant education halls in a hsien against Chiang's standards, the gap between the two is too large. Moreover, the duties of the educational staff involved more field work than those of the mass education halls in cities and towns, for the peasants were always busy with farming and also were widely scattered geographically. Two or three personnel at a hall, which was an average number of staff in the hsien peasant halls in the province, were totally inadequate to take care of local rural needs. Accordingly, as one report pointed out, the staff members of the hsien halls tended to spend most of their time within the halls waiting for the peasants to come to seek advice about agricultural problems instead of going out and helping the peasants.83
Fig. 4. Distribution of Provincial and Hsien Peasant Education Halls, Kiangsu Province, 1932. Source: Constructed from Ti i-ts' u chung-kuo chiao-yü nien-chien (The First China's Educational Yearbook), Comp. by Ministry of Education, p'ing-pien, Shanghai, 1934, Reprinted in Taipei by Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh-she, 1971, lo37-lo41.
Thus, although the peasant education halls were established out of an active concern for rural improvement on the part of the provincial government, in most hsien their functions became by and large ceremonial by the early 1930's in terms of their actual effectiveness.

As the rural economy deteriorated rapidly during the early 1930's, besides setting up peasant education halls, the Kiangsu government adopted another measure in order to improve the rural situation. That was to establish an over-all rural improvement policy. In April, 1930, the Department of Agriculture and Mining convened the representatives of all the rural reform institutions in the province for two days for an initial rural reform conference. Among the representatives were such leading rural reformers as Kao Yang, Chiang Wen-yü, and Yang Kai-t'ao, a rural specialist and professor at Chin-ling University. The purpose of the conference was to discuss a rural reform plan and its operational schedule for that year. The government wanted to hear the opinions of the rural reform specialists and adopt meaningful government policies. At the opening ceremony of the conference, Yeh Chu-ts'ang, the governor of Kiangsu, said: "The rural village is the foundation of the Party and the government. Only by having established itself among the peasants, can the Party be called a party. Only on being established with the peasants in mind, can policy be called policy. Only when based upon the peasants, can the state be called a state. I want, therefore, to promote rural reform throughout this province with the full support of the government." 84

At the conference, five basic principles for a provincial rural reform policy were adopted. These were: (1) agricultural improvement and the promotion of cooperatives would be the main axis of rural
reform; (2) rural reform would be carried out on the basis of rural investigations and through educational means; (3) reform programs would be adapted to local needs and conditions; (4) the improvement of all aspects of peasant life would be the objective of rural reform; (5) rural reformers would work within a fixed budget and in cooperation with one another. At this conference, 39 concrete rural reform proposals were also submitted for discussion, and most of them were passed. The approved proposals were to be sent to the Department of Agriculture and Mining for implementation as provincial policies.

Information is not available regarding the degree to which the proposals were actually carried out. However, the conference certainly reflected an active concern for rural improvement on the part of the provincial government. It also must have further stimulated rural reform efforts. It was reported that during 1930 there were almost 2,000 active rural reform agencies in Kiangsu province.

In such an environment, the mass education movement in Kiangsu came to engage in rural reform as an important part of its mission. More mass schools were set up in rural villages. Mass education halls began to experiment with rural reform work in nearby villages. For instance, in August, 1930, the Provincial Nanking Mass Education Hall designated two villages, Hua-lin and Mao-lin, both of which were located about 20 li southwest of Nanking, as its rural reform experiment districts. In these reform villages the hall carried out such reform programs as setting up an adult night school, a tea house, a character-learning center, and a dispensary. It also organized a
local personnel training course for rural reconstruction and a credit cooperative, conducted a literacy campaign, sponsored public picnics, and staged an agricultural exhibition. The Chinkiang Mass Education Hall also opened a rural reform district at Ch'iao-tou chen in Chu-yung hsien and carried out similar reform projects. Another example, as such, can also be found in the Provincial Hsü-chou Mass Education Hall which was established relatively later than other halls (i.e., in May, 1932). The Hsü-chou hall placed more emphasis on rural improvement work than on projects for cities and towns. The mission of the hall was to increase agricultural productivity, promote rural organization, and enhance the cultural level of villagers. The hall had three rural reform experimental villages: Pa-tsu-chieh village located about three li north of T'ung-shan city, and Shih-ch'iao village located about ten li north of the same city. In these reform villages the hall initiated reform projects similar to those of other provincial halls mentioned above. According to statistics prepared by Hsü Ying-lien, by 1934 the reform experiments achieved considerable results.

The Kiangsu Provincial College of Education also shifted its emphasis to rural reconstruction experiments from 1931 on. In the same year, the college reduced mass education work and increased rural reconstruction experiments, the ratio of expenditure becoming one to four. Moreover, it opened two more new rural reform experimental districts, the Hui-pei and Pei-hsia districts in the vicinity of the school. The former district included the existing small reform villages of Huang-hsiang and Kao-chang-an. By 1933, the Kiangsu
Provincial College of Education had become a rural reconstruction institution. Kao Yang and other leaders of the college declared: "Mass education is a means to achieve rural reconstruction." In short, the strong political character of the mass education movement at its inception was gradually diluted, and social reform themes became more prominent in the movement in Kiangsu. This happened after 1930 as the College of Education shifted its emphasis from city-oriented mass education to rural reform. As some mass education workers frankly recognized, the mass education movement promoted by the provincial government became torpid, while the rural reconstruction efforts promoted by the College of Education developed into dominant reform themes during the early 1930's.

The Rural Education Movement and the Rural Reconstruction Movement in Kiangsu Province

Although more than 80 per cent of the Chinese population was rural, conventional Chinese education was urban-centered and mainly available for rich people, leaving most of the rural masses in ignorance. Not only were most of the schools concentrated in cities and towns, but urban-style education, inappropriate for rural life, was offered at rural schools. The rural education movement was a reform movement designed to correct the neglect of rural oriented education and the misguided direction of conventional education. At the same time, the movement aimed at relieving the critical situation in rural areas by improving rural living through education.
The Emergence of the Rural Education Movement

The rural education movement emerged in the early 1920's. It was a product of the social and intellectual trends following the May Fourth Incident of 1919. First, concern for the common people, which appeared along with the concept of democracy during the May Fourth period, increased among Chinese intellectuals. Many schools opened free night sessions for workers and the children of the poor. In January, 1920, the Student Union of the University opened its "Night School for the Plain People." In Shanghai, sixteen free schools were opened for children who could not afford to pay for their education. This trend of stressing the needs of the common people culminated when Dr. John Dewey visited China (May, 1919-July, 1921) and spoke of a democratic society and pragmatic education. The term "democracy" in Dewey's educational theory was translated into Chinese as p'ing-min chu-î (the principle of common people) instead of min-chu chu-î (democracy). This p'ing-min chu-î came into great vogue in China at that time. The Commoner Literacy Movement (P'ing-min shih-tzu yün-tung) (1921-1926) which was launched on a nation-wide scale by James Yen and T'ao Chih-hsing (Hsing-chih later), the latter the General Director of the National Association for Advancement of Education and later a founder of the Hsiao-chuang School, was a direct expression of this commoner-primacy trend. As indicated earlier, this literacy movement contributed much to the development of Kiangsu's rural reconstruction movement.

Second, the populist idea of "going down to the villages" (hsia-hsiang) which was first advocated by Li Ta-chao in July, 1918,
gathered strength among a portion of the Chinese intellectuals. In Kiangsu the Shanghai Student Association conducted a civic education campaign in the area of K'un-shan in 1926. During the same year, the Association for Vocational Education conducted surveys on rural conditions in the Huang-hsu and K'un-shan areas as preliminary work for a rural improvement project.

Thirdly, in educational circles, concepts of universal and practical education prevailed. These concepts were greatly intensified by the visits of a number of eminent foreign educators and scholars such as John Dewey, Paul Monroe, Bertrand Russel, and Adolf Driesch following 1919.

Finally, in contrast to the cultural debate during the May Fourth period, the tendency among the intellectuals afterwards was predominantly action and social reform oriented. The formation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1920 by a few May Fourth participants, the commoner literacy movement, and the intensification of the labor movement during this period were good indications of such a trend.

Along with this new milieu there appeared fresh reflections among thoughtful Chinese educators concerning the general condition of education in China. They found that the most neglected and deteriorating area in Chinese education of the time was rural education. Thus reform in rural education came to be one of the most urgent issues in Chinese educational circles.

The person who first advocated the need for rural educational reform was Yü Chia-chü, a graduate of Chung-hua University who
studied educational philosophy at Edinburgh University. After returning to China from Scotland, Yu started a rural experimental school called "Tzu-chih hsūeh-hsiæ" (Voluntary school) in his native village of Huang-pa, Hopeh province, in 1919. Based on this experience, Yu wrote an article in the Chiao-yü kai-chin (Educational Reform) in the winter of 1919, entitled, "The Crisis of Rural Education." In this article he described the bankrupt state of rural education with few schools and students, and advocated the necessity of a new rural cultural movement or rural education movement. As reasons for the bankrupt state of rural education, he pointed out that most of the rural people were too poor to have their children attend schools. Moreover, most school teachers did not want to work in rural areas because of low pay, the lack of desirable social conditions, and little opportunity of enhancing their knowledge. In 1921, Yu published another article in the Chung-hua chiao-yü chieh (The Chinese Educational Circle), entitled "The Significance and Direction of the Rural Education Movement." In this article Yu further elaborated on his previous points regarding the state of rural education, and at the same time, made concrete suggestions for rectifying the situation. He cited as fundamental shortcomings in rural education two factors, namely lack of good schools and the pedagogical and city centered educational content used in rural schools.

In explaining these points he pointed out that if the rural population were to be continuously left in ignorance, the intellectual gap between the urbanites and the rural people would be ever widened.
Since rural villages did not have good educational facilities, those who wanted to have their children receive a good education sent them to the cities. Those who were thus educated in cities from childhood became accustomed to city life and did not want to return to rural villages. If this trend continued, there was a danger that social divisions between urban classes and rural classes would occur. Then not only would the ideal of a democratic society be contradicted, but also a dangerous social conflict might occur which would destroy the peace and order of society. Hence, rural education was not only a problem of rural society, but also a problem of the whole society.

Yü also pointed out that although urban and rural needs were different, conventional educators used urban curricula in rural education without any change, thus making the offerings of village schools inappropriate for rural life. This was why the existing educational system had little appeal to the rural inhabitants, he maintained. Therefore, Yü argued, rural education should be reformed so as to provide the rural people with knowledge and skills useful in rural life.

As concrete means to correct such flaws of rural education Yü suggested launching the rural education movement through normal schools as a part of a general social movement. In order to improve rural schooling he believed that normal school education should first be reformed. He set forth the following three reform measures: (1) normal school teachers should give instruction with rural problems in mind so that the students could relate their academic subject to their rural situations and thus equip themselves with knowledge
appropriate to rural needs; (2) a department of rural education should be set up and rural experimental schools established; and (3) a spirit of serving in rural villages should be fostered among normal school students.103

Yu's articles had two significant effects on the subsequent development of the rural education movement. First, they evoked considerable discussion about rural education reform and helped create an atmosphere for such reform in Chinese educational circles. After Yu's articles, many others pertaining to rural educational reform appeared in various educational journals such as the Chiao-yü kung-pao (Educational Information), Chiao-yü tsa-chih (Journal of Education), and Chung-hua chiao-yü-chieh (Chinese Educational Circle). Yu's articles also helped set the direction of the rural education movement. The ultimate aim, which Yu put forward for the movement, namely social reform starting from reformed rural education, remained unchanged throughout the movement. In methodology, as Yu suggested, reforming rural society through normal schools and rural elementary schools was the central approach of the rural education movement.

The Role of Kiangsu Province in the Movement

It was the Kiangsu educators who showed the most immediate response to Yu's suggestions. Between 1922 and 1924, several members of the Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association (KCEA) published articles on the rural education in the I-wu chiao-yü (Compulsory Education), the KCEA's organ.104 Although the details of the articles varied, they all agreed on the necessity of normal schools moving into the villages and of training future rural school teachers in the
actual rural environment. These ideas were quickly reflected in Kiangsu provincial policy. In 1923, five provincial normal schools set up branch schools in adjacent chen (rural market towns) surrounded by villages. The names, places, and years these normal branch schools were established are shown in the following table.

Table 15. Kiangsu Provincial Normal Schools and Their Rural Branch Schools, 1923-1924

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normal School</th>
<th>Location of Branch School</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The First Prov.</td>
<td>Ch'ui-hung ch'iao, Wu-chiang hsien</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Prov.</td>
<td>Huang-tu chen, K'un-shan hsien</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third Prov.</td>
<td>Lo-she village, Wu-hsi hsien</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fourth Prov.</td>
<td>Ch'i-hsia shan chen, Chiang-ning hsien</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fifth Prov.</td>
<td>Chieh-shou chen, Kao-yu hsien</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chiang-su chiao-yü kai-lan (Outline of Kiangsu Education), Comp. by Chiang-su chiao-yü t'ing (Department of Education of Kiangsu Provincial Government), Vol. 1 (Shanghai, 1932), Reprinted (Taipei, 1971), Historical Material Series No. 7, 393-419.

From the above table, we can see that except for the branch school of the Fifth Provincial Normal School those of the other provincial normal schools were located in southern Kiangsu. This was a phenomenon similar to that of locations of rural reform experimental districts run by the three rural reconstruction institutions, as discussed in the preceding chapter. As noted earlier, most educational institutions were concentrated in southern Kiangsu.
In 1924, the National Association for the Advancement of Education (NAAE) created a special committee on rural education. In addition, in the same year, special investigations of rural schools in typical communities were jointly conducted by the NAAE and the KCEA. Their report stirred up great interest in rural education among educators. Moreover, in 1925, at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the NAAE held in T'ai-yüan, Shansi province, it was recommended to the Ministry of Education that normal schools should establish rural branch schools in emulation of the organization and methods used by the Kiangsu Provincial normal schools. As a result, other provinces such as Shantung, Honan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Hupeh, and Kwangtung came to establish similar rural schools, one after another.

The year 1927 witnessed significant rural education activities in Kiangsu Province. In January, the Department of Agricultur of Chin-ling University held a "Rural Work Discussion Conference" (Hsiang-ts'un fu-wu t'ao-lun hui) which attracted more than 150 participants. The conference delegates concluded that rural education should be an instrument for developing villages and improving rural life. In the same month, student unions of various schools in Shanghai organized a Propaganda Corps for Rural Civic Education (Hsiang-ts'un kung-min chiao-yü hsüan-ch'uan-tui), and carried out civic education propaganda in such areas as Nan-hsiang, Wei-ting, and K'un-shan. In May, the Association for Chinese Vocational Education (AVE), the NAAE, the National Association of Mass Education Movements, and the Department of Agriculture of Tung-nan University
jointly established a "Joint Committee for Reforming Rural Life" in Nanking. At the conference, Huang Yen-p'ei, the founder of the AVE and ex-minister of Education of the Peking Government, and T'ao Chih-hsing were elected Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively. This conference was significant because, as we shall see in detail later, the Hsü-kung-ch'iao experimental reform district, one of the earliest and most important rural reform districts in Kiangsu, developed out of this conference. In September, the Kiangsu Provincial Educational Association drew up a "Plan for Kiangsu Experimental Rural School Standards." The plan included not only measures directly related to the reform of rural schools, but also emphasized rural life as an important object of reform by such schools. Details of the school reform plan included: carrying out adult literacy education by using a "ten thousand character textbook," conducting lectures on various practical subjects during the agricultural slack season, leading villages in improving seeds and agricultural implements, eradicating crop insects, promoting auxiliary industries, teaching public health, holding recreational meetings, and helping with weddings and funerals. In other words, the association believed the rural school should become the central institution for rural reform. The association also decided to select several rural schools, whose principals had shown good management results and have them experiment with the reform plan. Assistance by hsien educational departments and other professional institutions, was to be provided.
In December, a similar plan for guiding rural schools was drafted by the NAAE. It specified help in guiding five rural schools in Kiangsu and maintaining an experimental rural normal school in the village near Nanking. 113

Of the various rural education activities of the year 1926 discussed above, two points are especially worthy of mention. One was that of the two objectives of the rural education movement, namely, the improvement of rural schools and the reform of rural life, the latter was increasingly stressed. The other, the NAAE, which was one of the most important private educational institutions in China at that time, shifted its emphasis from the mass literacy education movement to the rural education movement. The NAAE became a major center for the national promotion of rural education thereafter.

The active participation of the NAAE in the rural education movement provided a new outlook and fresh vitality for the movement. The person most responsible for this was T'ao Chih-hsing, General Director of the institution, about whom we will discuss more in detail in Chapter Five. T'ao together with Chao Shu-yü, helped greatly in reorienting the direction of the rural education movement toward more active participation in rural reform work. T'ao believed that rural normal schools should be involved in active rural reform work beyond merely producing rural school teachers. Rural schools would make the best agencies in reforming rural life. For him, in a broad sense, the rural school was a means to achieve rural reconstruction. This idea was well expressed in his short article
entitled, "Declaration of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Education Concerning Reform of the Nation's Rural Education,"
published in the Chung-hua chiao-yü-chiēh in December, 1925. In
this article T'ao held that the reform of rural life can be achieved
by developing rural education suitable to actual rural life. 114

The Hsiao-chuang Experimental Normal School was established by
T'ao in a small village in the vicinity of Nanking in March of 1927
in order to implement the ideas expressed in the above declaration.
With the establishment of the Hsiao-chuang School, the rural education
movement became a fullfledged rural reform movement. The school
became one of the three major reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu
province. Hsiao-chuang's methods, both in student training and rural
reform, greatly influenced the other rural reconstruction institutions
in Kiangsu. For instance, the practice of "going deep among the
masses" advocated by the Hsiao-chuang group, became a fundamental
method used by the College of Education and the Association for
Vocational Education in carrying out rural reconstruction work. 115
Also, "unity of teaching, learning, and doing," which was the Hsiao-
chuang's educational method, became a basic instructional principle
employed by these two reconstruction institutions as well as by
other rural normal schools in Kiangsu and other provinces. 116 Many
rural schools carried out rural reform works in the villages in their
vicinity in emulation of the Hsiao-chuang school. The Ch'i-hsia
Rural Normal School, one of the five aforementioned rural schools,
was one such example. The Ch'i-hsia school carried out for the
peasants in the vicinity such programs as (1) managing an
inexpensive general store, (2) opening a small museum, (3) setting up a bath house, (4) providing simple medical assistance, and (5) establishing a library for peasants. 117

In summary then, the rural education movement in China developed with Kiangsu province as its center. Only after 1928, did most other provinces set up provincial rural normal schools. The movement initially concentrated on educational reform, but with the growing emphasis on rural reform it became a part of the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu. The Hsiao-chuang School was a model rural reform school which grew out of the rural education movement.

Vocational Education and Rural Reform in Kiangsu

Vocational education evolved from "practical education thought" (shih-yung chiao-yü ssu-hsiang) which emerged in 1913 in reaction to the failure of foreign education practices borrowed during the late Ch'ing period. The imported systems had not yet met the needs of Chinese society. Industries did not prosper. The majority of the people were still impoverished. Schooling had little applicability to actual society.

The man who pointed out the ineffectiveness of formal education in China and who first advocated practical education as an alternative, was Huang Yen-p'ei. He became Chief of the Kiangsu Department of Education in 1913. He expounded the necessity of practical education in an article entitled, "A Discussion on Adopting Practical Education at Schools" which appeared in the Chiao-yü tsa-chih in May of that
In this article Huang wrote: 118 "The purpose of education is to furnish people with essential things in life and to help them adjust to their environment and become independent." However, he maintained that Chinese education failed in these purposes. 119 He also suggested concrete reform measures in elementary and middle school education.

In December of the same year, Huang also expressed opinions on higher education. He assessed the proportion of students in Kiangsu province majoring in law and government (political science) and those studying other disciplines such as industry, agriculture, medicine, and education. He found that there were ten law and government students for each science-technology-education major. Huang wrote his findings in an article entitled, "A Dangerous Phenomenon for Future Education," in the Tung-fang tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany). In this article, he deplored such an extremely unbalanced ratio and warned against excessive student concentration in law and government. He said that over-population, sponging off other people, and small productivity were most responsible for China's poverty and weakness. In his opinion, whereas agriculture and industry were productive in nature, law and government entailed sponging off other people. Thus he considered the concentration of students in law and government harmful for the development of the nation. He pointed out that while there were many important fields for the nation's well-being (e.g., education, medicine, etc.) which lacked qualified people, "all the talented and intelligent students were engaged in law and governmental studies." He ridiculed this situation, saying, "If
this situation continues there will be governors but no governed, and there will be officials but no people." He maintained this was contrary to the republican ideal. Hence, he advocated, "students should study and teachers should teach, hereafter, exactly what society needs." 120

Huang's suggestions concerning the employment of practical education were immediately echoed by Chuang Yü, an editor of the Commercial Press. Chuang published an article entitled "On the Employment of Practicalism" in the Chiao-yü tsa-chih, in October, 1913, which noted that practical education had developed in Europe due to the influence of such scholars as Thomas Bacon, Pestalozzi, and Montaigne. Concurring with Huang's suggestion of adopting practical education in China, Chuang criticized Chinese education as being "false, unoriginal, exaggerated, and supplemental," and recommended that the Ministry of Education should prepare curricula of a more satisfactory and useful nature. Then each provincial educational department should select and teach subjects listed in the Ministry's curricula appropriate to conditions in their respective provinces. 121

Huang and Chuang's declarations for practical education did not amount to educational theories. However, they struck a responsive cord among Chinese educators. As a result, practical education came into vogue in Chinese educational circles during the 1913-1915 period. The Chinese Educational Review published a special issue on practical education. 122 Textbooks were revised along the lines of practical education. In 1915, the outline of educational policy announced by...
the Yuan Shih-k'ai administration included practical education as one of the four fundamental areas of emphasis. 123

The Vocational Education Movement

After Yuan Shih-k'ai's demise in June, 1916, China was plunged into a state of incessant civil war. The people were beset with insecurity and destitution, caused by wartime destruction and inflation. The number of those who could not afford any schooling increased daily. Solutions for the people's livelihood became a most urgent task. With this pressing situation Chinese educators turned from practical education to vocational education. 124

In January, 1915, Kuo Ping-wen, a Ph.D. from Columbia University and a prominent educator from Kiangsu province, then staying in the United States, expressed his opinion regarding Chinese education in Tung-fang tsa-chih. In his article, Kuo attributed the unemployment of school graduates and the stagnation of industries in China to the failure of Chinese education to respond to the demands of society. He explained how vocational education had been developed in the United States and Europe, and suggested introducing vocational education in China. 125

In October, 1915, Ch'en Tu-hsiu published an article entitled "Today's Educational Policy" in the Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New Youth), and listed four educational objectives. As the third objective, he proposed to place emphasis on vocational education. Ch'en argued that today's world was an economic world, and today's society was a society of industry and enterprise in which the productivity of an individual member constituted the foundation of the welfare and
happiness of society. However, according to Ch'en, in China the traditional ethics which centered upon filial piety, the custom of taking delight in high but empty talk, idleness, and exploitive bureaucratic practices, had inhibited economic development. As a consequence, China had fallen to the status of a third-rate nation, whose people were idle, impoverished, and miserable. In order to escape from such a situation, China had no other course but to emphasize vocational education.

However, it was Huang Yen-p'ai who became the chief exponent of vocational education and succeeded in turning vocational education into a nation-wide movement. As described above, when a portion of Chinese educators were showing a growing interest in vocational education, Huang Yen-p'ei was sent to Panama in 1915 as secretary of a Chinese industrial mission to attend the inaugural ceremony of the American Panama Canal. On his way back to China, Huang inspected American schools and was greatly impressed by the success and prevalence of vocational education. He learned there that vocational education was also in great vogue in European countries. From his observations, Huang came to be convinced that vocational education could solve both the unemployment problem of students after graduation and offset the declining economy of society better than the practical education which he had been advocating, for while the former directly trained people for certain jobs the latter merely stressed the utility of learning in general.

Upon returning to China, Huang strongly advocated the necessity of vocational education. His advocacy evoked great response from
various sectors of Chinese society. Since vocational education not only provided training needed for one's livelihood, but also helped develop local industry, businessmen in Kiangsu province expressed their intention to help promote vocational education programs. The Kiangsu Provincial Education Association (Chiang-su sheng chiao-yü hui) organized a study group to investigate vocational education. Educators such as Kuo Ping-wen, Ch'ien Pao-chüan, and Chiang Wei-chiao, organized an inspection group and went to the Philippines and Japan to observe how vocational education operated in those countries. In the Philippines a large sum of money was donated by the overseas Chinese community for vocational education in China.128

In this milieu of mounting interest in vocational education, Huang Yen-p'ei, together with such leading educators and businessmen as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Yü Jih-chang, Chiang Meng-lin, Wang Cheng-t'ing, Yen Hsiu, Kuo Ping-wen, and Ch'ien Yung-ming, established the Association for Chinese Vocational Education (Chung-hua chih-yeh chiao-yü she) (AVE) in Shanghai in May, 1917.129 From then on, the AVE became the headquarters for the promotion of vocational education in China. After the establishment of the AVE a vocational education movement developed rapidly throughout China. In October, 1917, the National Council of Education (Ch'üan-kuo chiao-yü hui lien-ho hui) developed a plan for carrying out vocational education.130 In 1921, vocational education replaced "industrial education" (shih-yeh chiao-yü) as a new education policy adopted by the same council, and formally became a part of the national educational system. 131
In July 3-7, 1922, a National Conference of Vocational Education was held in Tsinan. Seven meetings were held and fifty-eight persons representing forty-three organizations and eleven provinces took part. Nineteen important proposals were discussed. One was to send a petition to the President requesting him to appropriate special funds for the promotion of vocational education in China. Another was to draw an outline of standardized curricula for vocational schools, qualifications for admission, and the number of school hours.

Other indications also revealed the national response to vocational education. From 1922 on, Szechwan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Chekiang, and Fukien formulated plans for the reconstruction of vocational education according to the new system drawn up at the conference. Shansi province organized a provincial committee on vocational education and appointed one supervisor for each of the twenty educational districts to take charge of vocational education. Yünnan set aside the tobacco tax for the development of vocational preparation. Hupeh ordered all its counties to appropriate 20 per cent of their educational funds for the promotion of vocational training. In Kiangsu, the vocational education movement was particularly strong, having the highest number of vocational schools in the nation. In 1922, Kiangsu had 196 vocational schools out of the national total of 1,353. Moreover, inspectors of vocational education were provided, and the provincial education association organized a Federation of Vocational Schools.
At the outset the AVE's purpose for vocational education was defined merely as "to prepare for the livelihood of the individual." The AVE's slogan was "to have jobless persons get occupations and for those who have jobs to enjoy them more." But, in 1919, the AVE enlarged its objectives to prepare the individual for service to society and increase the productivity of China. This meant that the perspective of the AVE had broadened from a narrow concern for the individual's livelihood to that of the welfare of the nation.

These enlarged objectives necessitated social reform of a much broader scope than merely training people for jobs. Thus as we saw in the preceding section, the AVE joined the rural education movement then arising in China. Also, in May, 1926, the AVE decided to carry out rural reform experiments in An-ting chen of K'un-shan hsien and Hsin-feng chen of Chen-chiang hsien, in Kiangsu province in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture of Tung-nan University, the NAAE, and the National Association for Mass Education. From then on, the AVE gradually shifted its emphasis from vocational education in cities to rural reform efforts.

In June of the same year, the Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association held a four-week rural education training session for hsien normal school teachers in Kiangsu at Tung-nan University in Nanking. At this session, Huang Yen-p'ei, Chiang Wen-yü, and Chao Shu-yü, all of whom were staff members of the AVE, were invited to give lectures. Their lectures included such topics as rural vocational guidance, the situation of Kiansu's rural elementary schools, rural credit cooperatives, rural sanitation, and rural
self-government. In other words, the session was dominated by lectures on rural reform.\footnote{137}

In the area of actual field work, in September of the same year (1926), Huang Yn-p'ei and Chao Shu-yü made a survey of the rural conditions in the village of Ch'i-shu yen in the vicinity of Ch'ang-chou city. There they studied methods of rural improvement and at the same time organized an agricultural cooperative.\footnote{138}

In October, the AVE opened a rural reform experimental district in the village of Hsü-kung-ch'iao, as mentioned in Chapter Two. This was the AVE's first formal undertaking in rural reform experimentation. The Hsü-kung ch'iao district was also one of the earliest rural reform districts in the nation set up by rural reform institutions. Thereafter, rural reconstruction became the main business of the AVE. As of 1932 the AVE operated five rural reform districts in Kiangsu.\footnote{139} This was the largest number of districts operated by a single association or reform group.

**Summary**

The Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement developed mainly from three nation-wide educational reform movements (i.e., the mass education movement, the rural educational movement, and the vocational education movement) whose original aims differed from one another. Accordingly, the Kiangsu movement came to be pluralistic in its nature and reform approaches. Several reasons can be cited as to why these three national movements became the three main streams of the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu. First, the key institutions involved in these three movements were
based in Kiangsu province and launched rural reform projects within the province. The COE was located in the vicinity of Wu-hsi city and established experimental reform districts within Wu-hsi hsien. The rural education movement, which was chiefly led by leaders of the NAAE, the mother institution of the Hsiao-chuang School, together with others of Tung-nan University and the Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association, developed with Kiangsu as the central region. The AVE, the chief institution of the vocational education movement, also had its headquarters in Shanghai, and most of its reform district were within Kiangsu.

Second, although the three institutions were concerned with differing areas of educational reform, they all became committed to social reform. In addition to reforming the existing educational system, they strove to improve the lives of the commoner population and considered national salvation as their ultimate goal. When living conditions in rural areas deteriorated, leaders of the COE, Hsiao-chuang, and AVE came to believe that rural reconstruction of a broader nature should be urgently undertaken for the revival of China. They turned to the countryside, experimented with rural reform methods, and eventually formed together a larger movement with a common aim, namely the revival of China through rural reconstruction.

Third and finally, the Kiangsu government actively promoted rural reform efforts. The provincial government initiated the mass education movement from which a part of the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement derived. In addition, as we shall see more in detail in the following chapters, the government supported rural reform
efforts by the three major institutions (moderate reforms by the AVE and COE in particular) both administratively and financially. All the above factors combined to help foster an active rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu.

The mass education movement was devised by the Canton KMT Government and carried out by the Nanking Government. But the positions of the two regimes regarding the movement differed from each other. The former conceived of mass education as complimentary to mass movements in achieving social and political revolution. Hence, the Canton concept of mass education contained radical elements intended to bring about drastic social change even though much of the mass educational program were not so radical. On the other hand, the Nanking Government viewed the mass education movement as a part of its tutelage program and eliminated radical aspects of the movement injected by the Canton regime. It only retained "constructive" aspects of the movement, namely the elements contributing to political stability and economic reconstruction. Thus strictly speaking, the term "mass," which is usually related to revolutionary regimes, is not appropriate for the Nanking movement. Yet, the same term was used because in theory the Nanking Government was still supposed to be a revolutionary regime, although in actuality the regime had lost its revolutionary character.

Kiangsu's mass education movement, of which the COE was the central institution, arose under the stimulus of Canton's mass education ideas, but was carried out during the Nanking period under different policy lines of the Nanking authorities. Nevertheless,
COE leaders' views on mass education slightly differed from that of the Nanking Government. The COE leaders considered self-government training of the people and social reform (i.e., the improvement of the people's lives) as the central theme of so-called mass education. Stimulated by mounting demands for rural rehabilitation in the midst of deteriorating rural conditions in the late 1920's, the social reform bent of the COE leaders led their so-called "mass education" to become linked with rural reform.

Yü Chia-ch'u's suggestion of a reform movement in rural education, rendered in 1919 and early 1920, gave rise to a national rural education movement mainly through the help of Kiangsu educators. Initially, the movement was primarily concerned with changing the curricula and functions of country-side schools to more rural-oriented ones. But as the rural economy of the country deteriorated during the 1920's, the movement became a part of the full-fledged rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu.

The AVE's original concern was to prepare people for various jobs through vocational training. But experiencing the same rural decline mentioned above, the AVE also eventually shifted its emphasis to the inclusive improvement of rural life. Furthermore, this institution played a pioneering role in the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement by carrying out rural reform experiments as early as 1926.

Lastly, because of the previous educational reform traditions of the three reconstruction institutions, as we shall see in the following chapters, the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement
developed as a social movement with a strong emphasis on education. This movement strove for cultural and socio-economic betterment of the rural population through educational means in contrast to the Communist-type of peasant movement which was a part of a grand political and revolutionary scheme, relying upon class-struggle as the chief means. The Kiangsu rural reconstruction leaders also differed from indoctrinated Marxian Party cadres. They were basically moderates and educators worked through their respective reconstruction institutions relatively free from political party affiliations or direct government supervision and control.
CHAPTER IV

FOUR LEADERS OF THE MOVEMENT AND THEIR RURAL REFORM THEORIES

One of the main characteristics of the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu province was diversity in its promotional institutions. So it was with the leadership and theories of the movement. Kiangsu had more nationally-known rural reform leaders than any other province. Most outstanding were Huang Yen-p'ei, T'ao Hsing-chih, Chao Shu-yü, Kao Yang, and Chiang Wen-yü. These were the leaders of the three main rural reconstruction institutions in the province mentioned in the preceding chapter. Huang Yen-p'ei remained involved mainly in educational reform. The other four leaders played leading roles in rural reconstruction and developed their own rural reform theories. Because of their similar social views and reform objectives, the theories these four advanced had much in common. These people were originally educators, and they advanced their theories mostly from educational theories to more comprehensive rural reconstruction programs. Yet, at the same time, their theories also contained different attributes reflecting the reform programs and priorities followed by their respective institutions. T'ao Hsing-chih and Chao Shu-yü headed the Hsiao-chuang School, Kao Yang, the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, and Chiang Wen-yü, the Association for Chinese Vocational Education. Since the rural reconstruction movement was represented by these four men and was carried out according to their theories, it is important to know their background and rural reform theories in
order to better understand the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement. This chapter presents brief accounts of the four leaders and their reform theories.

T'ao Hsing-chih (1892-1946) and His Theory of Rural Reform

T'ao Hsing-chih was one of the most significant figures in the entire rural reconstruction movement in China. It was T'ao who realized the importance of rural education earlier than most of his contemporary educators and who played a leading role in making the rural education movement into an integral part of the rural reconstruction movement. As will be shown below, among the rural reconstruction leaders T'ao practiced most thoroughly the spirit of "going among the people" (tao min-chien ch'ü) by associating his life with the lives of the peasantry. His rural reform theories and projects achieved popularity and were imitated by many rural schools and other reconstruction institutions.

T'ao Hsing-chih was originally an educational reformer. His rural reform efforts, which were brought on by the declining rural conditions during the 1920's, developed as an extension of his previous educational reform activities. Hence, let us begin our discussion with a brief examination of T'ao's early life and his educational reform activities.

T'ao's Early Life and Activities

T'ao Hsing-chih was born on September 16, 1892, in the village of Wang-tun-yüan, Hsi-hsien in Anhwei Province. His father, Jen-ch'ao, was a landed farmer of small means. T'ao was originally named Wen-ch'ün. In his early childhood, T'ao received a traditional
Chinese education from his father. When he reached fifteen years of age, T'ao entered the Ch'ung-i Middle School, a Protestant missionary school. At the school he showed unusual academic competence, completing the four-year course in three years and becoming a favorite student of the principal of the school, Mr. G. W. Gibb. Then T'ao entered the Protestant-run Kuang-chi Medical School in Hangchow. But because he refused to be baptized and also because he lost his faith in medicine as a career, he quit the school after several months. In 1911, at the age of 19, he entered the literature department of Nanking University with the financial aid of Mr. Gibb.

It was at Nanking University where T'ao's character as an educational theorist and future rural reformer was well displayed. T'ao organized a public speech society and sponsored a patriotic fund-raising campaign. He initiated and edited the Chin-ling hsüeh-pao, the university magazine. He was also active in a study club devoted to social welfare and political affairs.

In academic fields, T'ao acquired fame in writing, mathematics, and physics. He developed new interests in education and philosophy, which would become his primary fields for the rest of life. T'ao became attracted to Wang Yang-ming's (1472-1529) philosophy, especially Wang's theory of the "unity of knowledge and action" (chih-hsing ho-i). As an indication of his firm belief in this theory, T'ao changed his name to Chih-hsing (Knowledge-action). T'ao used this name until the late 1920's when he changed his name again to Hsing-chih (Action-knowledge), realizing that "action is
the beginning of knowledge." Thus during his career as educational reformer and rural reconstructionist, T'ao was known by two names, Chih-hsing and Hsing-chih.³

In 1914, T'ao graduated from the university with honors. In the fall of the same year, having borrowed some money from his relatives, T'ao went to the United States for advanced study. First, he enrolled at the University of Illinois as a graduate student in political science. At the University of Illinois, T'ao met a former student of John Dewey who was teaching a course in educational administration. It was through this teacher that T'ao was first introduced to Dewey's educational philosophy. T'ao was so impressed that in the following year (1915) he transferred to the Teachers' College of Columbia University. At Columbia he became a favorite student of John Dewey, Paul Monroe, and William Kilpatrick. He earned an M.A. in education in the spring of 1917.

Upon his return to China from the United States in the autumn of 1917, T'ao was appointed a professor in education and dean of academic affairs at the National Nanking Advanced Normal School (Nan-ching kao-teng shih-fan hsiuh-hsiao), which was the predecessor of the Nanking Teachers' College. During his tenure of office he attempted to reorganize the school on Deweyan principles which placed emphasis on the development of individuality, practical education directly related to the daily lives of the people, popular education by which any citizen, regardless of his social and economic status, could enjoy the benefit of education, and the method of "learning by doing" and of "studying together." But he
failed, owing to opposition from the conservative professors within the department of education.

Outside the school T'ao also joined in educational reform efforts by such scholars as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Hu Shih, Kuo Ping-Wen, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu. As a disciple of John Dewey, his efforts in educational reform were mainly directed into two areas: the popularization of education and the democratization of educational systems (i.e., emphasis on the development of individuality and pragmatic teaching-learning method) in China. In order to achieve such aspirations, T'ao, on the one hand, introduced new educational thoughts and theories of western scholars through theoretical works which appeared in educational journals such as Hsin chiao-yü (New Education) and Hsin chiao-yü p'ing-lun (New Educational Critic).

On the other hand, he endeavored to reform the Chinese educational system by organizing the National Association for the Advancement of Education (NAAE) together with such leading educators as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Pan Yüan-lien, Huang Yen-p'ei, Chiang Meng-lin, Kuo Ping-wen, Hu Shih, and Yuan Hsi-t'ao. T'ao was chosen Director-General and simultaneously became editor of the Hsin chiao-yü, the association's official organ. The NAAE developed after a few years into one of the most influential educational reform organizations in China. Most of the nation's leading educators, including the Minister of Education, were members of the NAAE. As of 1925, its membership accounted for more than 2,000 both within the country as well as abroad.
But the difference between T'ao and other scholars (e.g., Hu Shih, Chiang Meng-lin, and Ch'en Tu-shiu) was that, as his name indicated, he placed importance on the practicality of knowledge and tried to realize his ideals through action. During the years of 1915-1923 there occurred the so-called New Cultural Movement in which traditional Chinese culture was severely criticized by scholars trained in Western scholarship. There arose heated controversy between proponents of modern and traditional scholarship over the viability of traditional Chinese culture. During this period T'ao was not involved in this controversy. Instead, he concentrated his effort on the spreading of literacy among the people in the neighboring villages of his school.

After the establishment of the NAAE, the literacy movement became one of the main projects of the association through T'ao's efforts. In June, 1923, T'ao, together with Chu Chi-hui, established the Nanking Commoners' Education Advancement Association (Nan-ching p'ing-min chiao-yü ts'ui-chin hui) and actively carried on a literacy campaign in Nanking and its neighboring areas. In two months the movement spread to Wuhan and other cities. T'ao's specific effort to spread literacy began to develop fully when he joined with James Yen, who had achieved good results in a similar movement for the Chinese workers (hua-kung) sent to France during World War I. In August of the same year, T'ao, together with James Yen and Mme. Hsiung Hsi-ling (the wife of an ex-premier of the republican period and social reformer), organized the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Commoners' Education
The association became the central institution for carrying out a nation-wide literacy education movement for illiterate workers. T'ao himself authored the P'ing-min ch'ien-tsu-k'o (The People's Thousand Character Lessons), a textbook for the literacy movement, in cooperation with Chu Ching-nung. Traveling in many cities throughout the country, he made promotional speeches for the literacy campaign, opened evening schools, and organized "people's reading circles" at all possible places (e.g., homes, shops, factories, inns, and temples) where peddlers, workers, rickshaw pullers, and other illiterate types could learn basic Chinese characters.

However, the fact which deserves our special attention is that the purpose of T'ao's literacy campaign was not merely to spread literacy among the Chinese people. In October, 1923, in a letter to a friend, T'ao said that the literacy movement was an effort to change society. Moreover, he maintained that the purpose of the movement was to abolish class distinction by narrowing the intellectual gaps between classes. He also said that his aspiration was "to create an open society by using open education." In other words, T'ao's literacy campaign was a social movement.

The years of T'ao's literacy campaign were during the warlord period (1916-1927) when virtually all of China was divided among many regional militarists, large and small. These warlords waged wars among themselves, forming military groupings as their interests dictated. As a result, Chinese society and politics were in great
confusion. Under this difficult situation, T'ao believed that although political unification would be hard to achieve in the near future, education could be unified. He wanted to achieve educational unification in order to accelerate political unification. In other words, T'ao regarded the development of individual Chinese as the fundamental work to overcome warlord politics and to establish a democratic government. Hence, T'ao's literacy movement attempted to lay a foundation for social and political reform.

While traveling in many cities and having contact with the masses of people, T'ao found that his dress was different from that of the common people and that this prevented him from becoming intimate with them. He threw away the intellectual's dress and wore a plain cotton jacket, a pair of cotton trousers, and a skullcap. T'ao remained in such attire for the rest of his life.

Rural Education Activities

By 1926, despite his missionary-like enthusiasm and endeavors, T'ao felt the limitation of the effectiveness of the literacy movement which had been primarily centered around cities and their adjacent areas. The movement, in his words, seemed to have arrived at a dead end (shan-ch'iuang shui-chin). The answer to this dilemma T'ao found was to develop a rural education movement. He saw that the Chinese masses were none other than the peasant who constituted more than eighty per cent of the Chinese population, and that those who most needed help were peasants. He was deeply troubled by the distressed lives of the peasants, worsening daily during the mid-1920's. Thus T'ao came to believe that rural
villages were the real places where he could render truly significant service for Chinese society. 21

T'ao's rural reform scheme was to improve rural life with rural schools, rural normal schools in particular, as the chief agencies of reform. His "Declaration of Reform of China's Rural Education" which was announced in December, 1926, reads in part:

> Our new mission is to assemble one million comrades, to advocate the establishment of one million rural schools, to reform one million rural villages so that each village can have new life, and eventually create a new life for China by common efforts. 22

The reason why T'ao designated rural normal schools as the central agencies for his rural reform effort was that he wanted to achieve two purposes simultaneously: (1) to train rural teachers who would also function as rural workers, and (2) to educate rural children, the future masters of rural society, to become sound farmers. 23

The establishment of the Hsiao-chuang School, mentioned earlier, in the suburb of Nanking in 1927 was the concrete start of this new experiment.

The Theory of Life Education

The Hsiao-chuang period (1927-1930) was the period of maturity for T'ao's thought. The Hsiao-chuang School was a product of T'ao's unique social and educational views, but conversely it was also a testing ground for his thought and theory.

T'ao's new theory of education, developed during the Hsiao-chuang period, was his so-called "life-education" theory. 24 In it he stressed that the relationship between education and life was a dialectic one. In the process of the struggle for life, the need
for education arises: education improves life to a certain level; and improved life affects education and changes it. In his opinion, this was particularly true in respect to the masses of people, for conventional education was too expensive for them to afford. Of course, T'ao believed, this situation had to be changed; education had to be made available for all the people. At the same time, education had to be closely related to the life of people and presented in the way the people wanted.25

It is natural from the above observation to see how the concept of "education for life" was derived. By this educational concept T'ao meant education which provided the means for living and helped improve life. To borrow T'ao's words, "since life needs food, education should teach how to get food; since life needs shelters, education should teach how to build houses; and since in life men and women live together, education should teach the proper relationship between men and women."26 In this sense, life-education was totally different from "decorative" traditional education; it was productive and practical, he maintained. Furthermore, T'ao felt that it was not sufficient for education to provide merely the means for living. According to him, education should be able to bring about changes in life and society. Only by being able to do so does education become true education. Thus T'ao postulated the purpose of life-education to be twofold: to develop the capacity of the people and to reform society.27 All the three educational concepts above were compactly expressed in a dictum, "life is education," which is the first proposition of life-education.
The second proposition of life-education was "society is school." This concerns the domain of education. When life itself is regarded as an educational process, it is natural that all of society becomes the domain of education. In contrast to Dewey who wanted to inject the social environment into the schools, T'ao viewed the whole society as a vast classroom. T'ao said, "whether it be alleys, highways, villages, factories, prisons, or battle grounds, all places related to life are classrooms which educate us." This concept was practiced during the Hsiao-chuang period. For instance, T'ao once took students to a watch repair shop in order to teach them how to repair watches. He also organized a "children's inspection team" (lu hsing-t'uan) among the students of Huai-an Rural Elementary School, and took them to the "1.28" battlefield (Japan attacked Shanghai on January 28, 1932) and various places of Shanghai in order to show the brutality of Japanese imperialism. In connection with this proposition, T'ao stressed that the people should strive together to increase their knowledge by learning from each other. He said: "the masses of people (ta-chung) are all teachers, fellow students, and students at the same time. Whenever people meet they should teach what they know to others and learn from each other." He also said that there should not be strict distinctions between teachers and students, for old people over sixty years of age can learn from children. The purpose of studying together is to achieve progress on the part of all people.

The third proposition of life-education thought was the principle of the "unity of teaching, learning, and doing," the
methodology. This principle required that teaching, learning, and doing be linked into one. Explaining this principle, T'ao said that teachers should adjust teaching methods to the learning methods of students and should have students find answers to problems for themselves. He further stressed that both teaching and learning could be most effective when carried out through action (literally doing, tso). 31

The three propositions of life-education discussed above are either the inversion of John Dewey's educational dicta, "education is life" and "school is society," or an extension of Dewey's concept of "learning by doing." John Dewey forcefully advocated such educational concepts not only in his works but also in his lectures made during his stay in China (1919-1921). Dewey held that schooling should be a form of community life. 32 T'ao also had formerly believed in the Deweyan concepts. T'ao found that these were not adequate to solve the Chinese problem after his "seven years" of experience at the Nanking Normal High School. To take Dewey's concept of "school is society" as an example, the creation of a social microcosm within the school could, he thought, hardly meet the enormous social needs in a country like China. To borrow T'ao's words, "to attempt to teach students about society by socializing the school was like placing a few twigs and leaves in a bird cage. One achieved an approximation of the environment, a microcosm, but the gap between the microcosm and the world remained too wide. The bird cage was still a bird cage, not the forest, not the real world." 33 In other words, in his opinion, it was not enough to depend only on
the schools to bring about educational effects necessary in the Chinese society. Education was to be moved out of the schools and into society. From such viewpoints, T'ao reversed the Deweyan doctrine. Instead of "Education is life," T'ao proclaimed that "Life is education." Instead of "school is a society," he proclaimed that "society is a school." The theory of the "unity of teaching, learning, and doing" was merely an extention of Dewey's idea of "learning by doing." Not only the learning method, but also the teaching method should take "doing" as the principal approach, T'ao believed. Notwithstanding such reversed opinions, one can hardly deny that T'ao's "life-education" was derived primarily from Deweyan educational premises. T'ao frankly admitted:

Had there not been the theory "Education is life" as a precedent, there could never have been produced the theory of the "unity of teaching, learning, and doing." But by the time the latter theory took shape, the whole of education had changed direction. This new direction is "life is education."34

Nationalism constituted another important part of life-education thought. T'ao viewed life-education as the "education for overcoming national crisis." He declared that China was at the point of perishing, and in order for China to survive, the Chinese people should be educated and learn to solve the problems of the country by uniting among themselves. He thus demanded that the "comrades of life-education" regard the preservation of Chinese territory, the complete recovery of the nation's sovereignty, and obtaining the freedom and equality of the Chinese people as their supreme mission.35

Lastly, T'ao's life educational concept contained an element of collectivism. As a disciple of John Dewey and a liberalist, T'ao
recognized the value of developing individuality in education. However, while working in Chinese society he found that the Chinese social and political conditions called for developing capabilities of the people to act collectively. He saw tremendous potential in the people as the chief source for constructing a new China and believed that such a potential could be utilized most effectively only when individuals learned to act collectively.37

The Rural Reconstruction Theory

Based on the social and educational views discussed above, T'ao advanced concrete suggestions for rural reconstruction. His rural reconstruction theory begins with an analysis of the sources of misery of the peasants' life and decline of rural society.38

T'ao felt the impact of foreign imperialism was most responsible for the distress of the Chinese rural society. Like many contemporary intellectuals he believed that China's rural problems were first triggered by foreign imperialism and deteriorated progressively in chain-reaction fashion with the general decline of social and political conditions in China.39 Domestically, he considered warlords, bad gentry, and local strong men to be the main source of peasant misery. Apart from war damage, peasants suffered immensely from the requisition of labor, livestock, grain, and carts by warlords. Civil wars and the huge military expenditures were largely supported by the money exacted from the peasants in the form of various surtaxes.40 Local gentry and strong men were not only the exploiters of the peasants, but also the "running dogs" of the warlords, T'ao said. Thus he had a strong feeling against them. This was well
reflected in one of the slogans T'ao made at the Hsiao-chuang School. The slogan read: "Make friends with horses, sheep, oxen and cows, chickens, dogs and pigs. But gentry, local strong men, and warlords are your enemies."\(^{41}\)

After identifying the causes of China's rural problems, T'ao suggested principles and methods of rural reconstruction.\(^{42}\) First, as a prerequisite to rural reconstruction, T'ao called for resisting imperialism by mobilizing the entire capacity of the Chinese people. He felt that unless China rid herself of imperialism she could not become prosperous by any means. His feeling of anti-imperialism became more intensified after Japan's open invasion of Manchuria in September, 1931, and her attack on Shanghai in January, 1932.

Also he advocated that in rural reconstruction work "true peasants" should be the principal object. By "true peasants" he meant peasants who earned their living by tilling land with their own labor. By the phrase, "principal object," he stressed that the welfare of the peasants should be given the first consideration. As concrete programs of rural reconstruction, T'ao proposed to teach the peasants "true knowledge," which meant practical knowledge beneficial to the life of the peasants. He also suggested developing self-government ability of the peasants so that they could conduct their own affairs. He noted that the Chinese peasants worked mostly for others (e.g., landlords and local gentry). In order to correct this situation, he thought that rural reconstruction should include scientific agricultural training and the introduction of cooperatives among the peasants.\(^{43}\) He also suggested that the peasants be
provided with organizational capability so that they could protect their products from others' exploitation.  

In connection with educating the peasants, T'ao stressed that special efforts should be made to train the peasants to become rational human beings who can plan their own life and appreciate the meaning of life. Also T'ao was much concerned with the problem of obtaining rural reconstruction personnel. For this end he suggested training all the professional people needed in rural reconstruction (i.e., doctors, engineers, agricultural specialists, soldiers, artists, and teachers), for most of the professionals remained in cities, and few came down to work in rural villages.

T'ao also attached particular importance to the education of rural children, for rural children were the peasants of the future. They should be given, T'ao asserted, confidence in their thought and behavior and should be taught to set their goals, but not only in order to accumulate personal wealth. He also believed that children, if properly cultivated, could become excellent workers in rural reconstruction. As we will see in the following chapter, this belief was tested in the so-called "little teachers" program which was an effective tool for spreading literacy among rural people.

As chief agencies for rural reconstruction work, T'ao assigned a dominant role in rural work to rural schools. In T'ao's scheme, the function of the rural school was to be not only an educational institution, but also a community center for training village leaders and an agency for rural reform. Teachers of the rural school were to be school teachers as well as leaders of rural reform. This
conception of the rural teacher as a nucleus of village reconstruction has, as Philip Kuhn pointed out, a strong elitist tone. Yet, T'ao stressed that such an elite individual should join the rank and file of the people. Only the "peasantized" intellectual could be an effective agent of change. Thus T'ao advised his students and other rural reconstructionists to become peasants themselves.

Finally, T'ao recommended that rural workers have a broad perspective and yet start from small things. He said, "Although one works in a small village, he needs to be in constant communication with the world so that he might forget that his work is a part of the grand project of rebuilding the entire country." In order to maximize the effectiveness of rural reconstruction work, he suggested obtaining cooperation from as many private and public institutions as possible. For example, he said: "In order to ease peasant economic problems rural reformers should endeavor to gain cooperation from banks and agricultural stations. In order to prevent disease, they should obtain help from hospitals, and to improve roads they could get assistance from the department of highways of the government."

But politically, T'ao took a neutral stance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. He welcomed cooperation with any organization and groups, including both parties, as long as such cooperation would be beneficial to the peasants. However, because of the radical tendencies of his ideas, in addition to the fact that T'ao's friends included some leftist writers and intellectuals, T'ao eventually came to be regarded as dangerous by conservative KMT leaders and local traditional elements. Consequently, as will be
seen in the following chapter, his work was hindered by the KMT government in various ways. Nonetheless, his rural reform thought and his indominable reform zeal became a great inspirational source for other reformers.

In brief, the central theme of T'ao's life and thought was the welfare of the common people, the peasants in particular. His activities had a populistic element which sought to mobilize the energy of the lower stratum of unorganized and oppressed people. His rural reform theory was an adaptation of John Dewey's educational concepts to China's particular needs. T'ao's thought was social-reformist and nationalistic in that it aimed to improve the lives of the rural people, to realize an egalitarian society, and to save the country. It was an ingenuous blend of the concept of democracy, the idea of pragmatic and productive education, respect for manual labor, and an aspect of collectivism.

Chao Shu-yü (? -1928) and His Theory of Peasant Training

During the 1920's Chao Shu-yü was one of the outstanding theorists and planners of rural education and rural reform in China. He rendered an important contribution to the whole rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu province by helping to initiate rural reform works undertaken by all three main rural reconstruction institutions. His ability as a rural specialist was highly regarded among rural reformers. But his early death from illness in September, 1928, made him fall into obscurity.

Unfortunately, there remain few records about his early years. However, his career becomes clearer from 1920 onward. Between 1920
and 1923 he was a professor in Education at Chin-ling University in Nanking. In 1924, he moved to the National Tung-nan University and taught rural education. It was around this time that Chao began to distinguish himself in the national rural reform movement. In September, 1925, he was invited to become Chief of the Department of Rural Education of the National Association for the Advancement of Education (NAAE), which was then increasingly turning its attention to rural education. After that, Chao became the closest colleague of T'ao Hsing-chih in T'ao's rural reform experiments. Around the same time, he also worked for the Association for Chinese Vocational Education (AVE).

Chao played a key role in planning many rural educational and rural reform projects. When the Kiangsu Rural School Discussion Conference was held in Nanking in August, 1924, Chao drafted for the conference a plan of organization and a curriculum for rural education. In his draft, Chao suggested that lessons be related to rural life so as to promote the students' love for their localities and the teaching of scientific agricultural techniques. Chao was also appointed one of two chief planners of the experimental rural reform project in Shansi province in late 1925. This project did not materialize due to civil war in northern China which lasted from 1925 through early 1926. However, a similar project in Kiangsu, a province politically more stable, was being contemplated by Huang Yen-p'ai and other rural educators. In May, 1926, representatives of four institutions (i.e., the AVE, the NAAE, the Association for the Advancement of Mass Education, and the Department of Agriculture of Tung-nan University)
decided to carry out a joint rural reform experiment at "an appropriate place" in Kiangsu. Chao was again chosen as chief planner and supervisor for this project. The Hsū-kung-ch'iao reform district mentioned earlier was the outcome of this project. Chao's plan for this project included programs such as: (1) to disseminate improved seeds, eliminate harmful agricultural insects, and promote auxiliary industries; (2) to reform elementary schools and carry out compulsory education; (3) to inaugurate adult education; (4) to provide vocational guidance; (5) to organize various cooperatives such as sales, purchasing, and credit; (6) to establish people's libraries and lecture halls and to organize a children's agricultural artifact corps; (7) to carry out a public health campaign; (8) to repair and construct roads and to plant trees; (9) to carry out an anti-gambling and anti-opium campaign; and (10) to increase the recreation opportunities of the peasants. As we will see later, these reform programs were emulated in many other rural reform experiments.

It was mentioned earlier that the Hsiao-chuang School was established by T'ao Hsing-chih. However, more precisely, the school was a joint venture between T'ao and Chao. The school was the realization of a part of Chao's grand and detailed rural reform plan drafted in 1925. Chao's plan included the establishment of a rural research center, a department of rural education, an experimental normal school, and an experimental rural primary school in Kiangsu province. This project was to be funded by money appropriated for the research of China's rural problems from the Boxer Rebellion indemnity returned by the United States government for the promotion
of Chinese education. At Hsiao-chuang, while T'ao Hsing-chih was the principal, Chao was superintendent of the normal school, a part of the Hsiao-chuang organization. During his Hsiao-chuang career, Chao delivered a series of lectures on rural education and rural reform. He also contributed articles to magazines. These lectures and articles were collected and published as the first book of the Hsiao-chuang series in 1933. T'ao Hsing-chih commended Chao: "A man of golden words who can rarely be found for many generations, whose intelligence and knowledge are as sharp as cold ice and as jade, and his work of life as illuminating as the sun and moon." 

In July, 1928, Chao was appointed President of both the Kiangsu Provincial Academy for Mass Education and the Workers and Peasants Academy. But after two months he died from illness.

Theory of Peasant Training

Among the many articles which Chao wrote, two deserve special attention because it was mainly through them that Chao advanced his theory of peasant training, a synthesis of his views on rural education and reform work. The two articles were "Educational Revolutionary Education" which was originally delivered in a lecture at Hsiao-chuang School in March, 1928, and "Theory and Method of Peasant Training" which appeared in Hsin sheng-ming (New Life), a journal sponsored by Chiang Kai-shek, in June, 1928. The following discussion of Chao's theory is based on these two articles.

Chao's theory of peasant training was an outcome of a number of his particular political, social, and educational views related to China's problems. In his socio-political view there are a few
indications of Sun Yat-sen's influence. First of all, he considered
the Nationalist Revolution based on the Three Principles of the People
as the best way to save China from the current predicament. Also,
in explaining the significance of peasant training, Chao reminded
readers of the celebrated phrase in Sun's will, "to arouse the masses
and strive together" and pointed out that peasants constituted more
than 80 per cent of the Chinese population. Hence, the peasants
should be the main force of the revolution. Their training and
participation in the revolution were essential for the success of
the revolution, he maintained. 66

Chao found the necessity of peasant training also in historical
development of educational trends and in China's current social and
political conditions. Chao pointed out that, historically, educational
trends, both in the West and China, had advanced from the education
of a small number of the privileged class to popular education, from
impractical education to practical education, and from higher education
to elementary education. He also noted that political rights had
followed a similar historical process. That is, they had passed from
the hands of a small number of privileged classes to the common
people. 67 It seems that Chao borrowed these ideas from John Dewey.
Dewey had presented similar views in his lecture made in Shanghai in
early May, 1919. 68 However, China lagged behind such historical
trends in education and political development. Chinese education
had not cast off attributes of traditional education, namely
"aristocratic, ruling class-centered, bureaucratic, and 'man-eating'
qualities." 69 In Chao's opinion, these unsavory elements should be
purged from Chinese education. In order to do so, Chao maintained that "educational revolution (chiao-yü ko-ming) and "revolutionary education" (ko-ming chiao-yü) were necessary. By "educational revolution" Chao meant making education more popular and more practical. In this sense, Chao's educational viewpoint was similar to that of T'ao Hsing-chih. There were, however, differences between the two men's theories. Whereas T'ao's assertion of education reform stemmed mainly from social and educational concern, Chao's suggestion of "educational revolution" was more political in motive.

Chao perceived that Chinese society had had only two classes, the rulers and the ruled, and that their status was interchangeable. The rulers were "literati" (tu-shu-jen), and the ruled were "non-literate" (pu-tu-shu-jen) who were peasants, artisans, and merchants. The purpose of study in traditional Chinese society was to become a government official. If one did not want to become a government official, there was no need for him to study. Such a concept had become a general social norm in Chinese society and kept the masses of people ignorant. With this educational outlook, the rulers indoctrinated the people, making them believe that politics was only the affair for the ruling class; the ruled need not be concerned with politics. In that way, the rulers perpetuated their status, and the people came to forget their political right and became incapable of even running their own affairs. Chao further noted that it was the people who fed the rulers. However, they did not realize this. Rather the rulers considered their luxurious living as the emperor's grace and reward for their service to him. Accordingly, they were
eager to please the emperor and were concerned only with their personal interests. As a result, politics, the "business of administering the affairs of the masses of the people" (kuan-li chung-jen te shih), became a means for furthering the ruling class' interests, and the people became ignorant, impoverished, and indifferent to public affairs. This was, Chao considered, how China became weak, and why the Chinese people came to be behind the peoples of other countries. Thus Chao strongly advocated an educational revolution which would induce popular and practical education and help improve the lives of the people.

By "revolutionary education" Chao implied the training of peasants. Chao regarded China's problem as essentially stemming from the backwardness of the Chinese people in knowledge, organization, and production. In order to rectify the backwardness of the Chinese people, Chao felt that training of the peasants, the majority of the Chinese people, was the best short-cut. As indicated in the preceding chapter, peasants had been organized and mobilized by the KMT for the Northern Expedition during the period of KMT-CCP alliance. However, the peasant movement had been largely controlled by the Chinese Communists. Chao considered the direction of the previous peasant movement to have been mistaken. Like many KMT members, he felt that the previous peasant movement had been used by the Chinese Communists for their own interests instead of for the purpose of the National Revolution or for the genuine welfare of the peasants. While using the Kuomintang title in the peasant movement, in fact, the Communists had alienated peasants from the Kuomintang and
attempted to enlarge their power base among the people by exploiting the peasant movement. Chao considered this development of the peasant movement destructive, and came to advocate a new type of peasant movement along what Chao termed the "real" San Min Chu I line. It is not clear what he meant by the "real San Min Chu I line." In the light of his other remarks he seems to have implied his support for Sun Yat-sen's peasant policy expressed in Sun's 1924 lecture on the San Min Chu I. Sun would have solved peasant problems through positive government policy such as granting land to all landless and tenant farmers, issuing agricultural implements, repairing irrigation systems, instructing the peasants in scientific agricultural methods, and establishing banks for peasants.

In addition to policies advocated by Sun Yat-sen, Chao advocated that the capacities of the peasants be developed through training. Chao used to say to the peasants that they, not politicians, were the real masters of the country and that in order to become able masters they must improve their capabilities. In 1927, Chao also criticized the politics of the time as "man-eating politics through collaboration between warlords and politicians under the name of the San Min Chu I." He denounced the warlords and politicians for exploiting the San Min Chu I as a camouflage for pursuing their own interests. He likened them to lang (the wolf) and pei (a kind of wolf with shorter forelegs) who, according to Chinese legend, lived on things stolen from human beings. It is said that while a lang was good at running but lacked schemes, a pei was full of devices but a poor runner. Thus they stole things from human beings by cooperating
with each other. Chao did not clarify whom he was referring to by such an allegory. But, in view of the political development of China at the time, it is obvious that Chao was deploring the KMT conservatives who had made alliances with the so-called "new warlords" in the process of the Northern Expedition.

Judging from the contents of his theory of peasant training discussed below, Chao's views on the peasant movement differed from those of the KMT conservatives who had nullified the movement. His sympathies were rather close to those of KMT left-wing leaders (i.e., Liao Chung-k'ai, Wang Ching-wei, and Ch'en Kung-po) even though there is little evidence which indicates Chao's political affiliation with KMT leftists. Both Chao and the KMT left-wing leaders were opposed to the class struggle approach of the CCP, yet favored continuous and active peasant movements through peasant associations. They also shared a strong feeling against the existing traditional elites (i.e., gentry, warlords, and local strong-men) and imperialism.

What then are the concrete programs of peasant training Chao proposed as alternatives to the Communist-controlled peasant movement? They encompassed three kinds of training: basic, political, and production training.

Basic Training. Basic training was to provide the peasants with essential knowledge of life, such as reading, writing, and a minimum knowledge of Chinese culture. Chao believed that in order for one to be independent and to become a good citizen such knowledge was a minimum requirement. Without knowledge, he pointed out, one could not resist both natural and social disasters and preserve himself;
more importantly, he is incapable of remodeling his environment. In short, to provide the peasants with basic knowledge was to lay the foundation upon which the peasants could develop abilities to improve their lives.

**Political Training.** Chao attributed both the distressing life of peasants and the weakness of China to the people's lack of political consciousness, organizing ability, and courage to struggle. Because of these shortcomings the Chinese people were incapable of fighting domestic and foreign oppressors, he believed. Political training was designed to correct such weaknesses of the Chinese people. As an example of the effectiveness of political training, he cited the political training given to the cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy. He believed that one of the main factors which contributed to the success of the Nationalist forces' victory during the Northern Expedition was political training.

Concrete subjects for promoting political consciousness, according to Chao, included teaching the Three Principles of the People, clarifying the cause of the Nationalist Revolution, and explaining China's domestic and international situation. Like Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai, Chao believed that in order to have the peasants participate in the National Revolution, the peasants should be made to understand what the Nationalist Revolution meant, why such a revolution was necessary, and what the revolution had to do with them. Chao thought that in this political training it should be made clear that the Nationalist Revolution aimed for the destruction of warlords and imperialism and the elimination of corrupt officials,
bad gentry, and local strongmen. Through political training Chao thus wanted to help promote both political and social revolution.

As a means to develop the organizational and self-government capabilities of the peasants, Chao proposed to use peasant associations. He hoped that the peasant association would function as the central body not only for protecting peasant interests against unfair exploitation, but also for developing such self-government capabilities of the peasants as making local defense plans, constructing roads, and exercising the four powers of the people.

Production Training. Production training was designed to provide the peasants with scientific agricultural knowledge in order to increase agricultural productivity. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Chao shared Sun's view that China's economic problem was essentially the problem of shortage of absolute national wealth which was closely tied with national productivity. When the nation itself was poor, Chao pointed out, it was meaningless to ensure fair distribution of wealth among the people. Hence, he held that the most urgent need for China was to decide how to increase national productivity. In addition, between agriculture and industry, he was of the opinion that the development of agriculture was more fundamental and critical than the development of large industry in order to solve China's economic problems. Chao thus emphasized agricultural training of the peasants.

Lastly, while suggesting the three kinds of peasant training, Chao stressed the carrying out of the three programs simultaneously. Only by doing so, could the purpose of peasant training be fully
achieved. The three programs were complementary with one another. Basic training would be of little help to peasants without the latter two programs. Conversely, if political and production training were given without basic training, their progress would be very slow, for both programs required a certain level of knowledge, which basic training would supply. Chao applied a similar logic to the relationship between political and production training. He feared that if political training were given without production training, it might be used as a tool of class struggle as the case in the Communist-controlled peasant movement. Communism worked most effectively in places where people were impoverished and yet their political consciousness was high. Production training also needed political training in order to safeguard the profits to the peasants. Without political training which would awaken the peasants concerning their rights and give them organizational ability, the increase of production by the peasants would easily result in only "fattening the exploiters," he said.

In short, like T'ao, Chao was nationalistic and a social reformer. He had deep concern for the peasants' plight, and viewed education as the chief means for improving the lives of the people. But Chao was more politically oriented than T'ao in his motives. He viewed rural reconstruction as a part of the national revolution to construct a new China. He also agreed with many parts of Sun Yat-sen's political ideas. Yet Chao's approach was more direct and radical than Sun's in promoting the welfare of the peasants. Through training Chao aimed to have the peasants actively regain their political rights and
safeguard their economic interests for themselves, instead of passively waiting for benevolent government measures. In the last analysis, it can be said that Chao's ideological position was an eclectic one encompassing the views of both T'ao Hsing-chih and Sun Yat-sen.

Kao Yang (Chien-ssu) (1891-1944) and His Theory of Rural Mass Education

Kao Yang was a leading theorist of mass education in Kiangsu. It was under Kao's leadership that the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education developed into an important rural reconstruction institution in the province as well as in the nation. He was considered one of the national leaders in the rural reconstruction movement in China, together with Liang Shu-ming, James Yen, and Chiang Wen-yü. He was one of the founding members of the Rural Work Discussion Society in 1933.

Kao was born in Wu-hsi city on February 18, 1891. At the age of 17 (1908) he entered Wu-sung Middle School and graduated in 1911. After his graduation, he stayed at home for one year. At this time, Kao already showed active concern for the education of people. He set up a night school class and taught illiterates. In the following year (1912), he was admitted to the law college of Tung-wu University in Soochow as a sophomore and graduated in 1915. In the winter of the same year he went to the United States at his own expense, entered Cornell University, and obtained a Master's Degree in economics in 1917.

After returning from the United States in 1918, Kao's role in China was primarily that of an educator. He became chairman of the
Department of Commerce at Chi-nan University in Shanghai and prepared the groundwork for the Commercial College of that university. Upon his father's death in the following year, Kao disposed of his part of the family fortune and established the Wu-hsi Private Middle School. Fulfilling his father's life-long wish, he dedicated this school to the training of local young people. Poor in his youth, Kao's father had not had a chance to be educated.

Between 1920 and 1927, Kao Yang served in a number of different positions. In 1924 he left Chi-nan University and became a professor at Chung-kuo Kung-hsüeh (Chinese Public College). In 1927 he worked for the China Merchant Company, and in the spring of the following year, he was appointed Secretary of the Kwangtung Government. Thus by early 1928 Kao was a man of well-rounded experience in education, business and government affairs.  

However, it was at the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education where he launched his life-long career devoted to mass education and rural reconstruction. Upon Chao Shu-yü's death in September, 1928, Kao was invited by the Kiangsu Provincial Government to succeed Chao as superintendent of the Kiangsu Provincial Academy of Mass Education and, in the following month, of the Workers and Peasants Academy. In the autumn of 1930 these two institutions were merged to form the Provincial College of Education with Kao as President. He served in this position for thirteen years until 1941, when the college was forced to close down due to financial difficulties during its period of refuge at Kuei-lin during the Sino-Japanese War. Thus it was
under Kao's leadership that rural reconstruction work by the College of Education was carried out from its beginning to the end.

As president of one of the nation's top rural reconstruction institutions, Kao established himself as national leader in the rural reconstruction movement. He participated in many private and public meetings concerning rural reform. He also published numerous articles on the subject. In the summer of 1931, Kao established the Chinese Rural Education Association (Chung-hua hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü she), together with Ku Mei, Chiang Heng-yüan (Wen-yü) and Chin Hai-Kuan. The aim of the association was to muster all the capacities of the nation's rural educators and carry on a rural education movement on a national scale. In December, 1932, when the nation's leading rural reconstructionists, such as Liang Shu-ming, James Yen, Wang I-k'o and Liang Ching-han, met in Nanking and agreed to establish a national organization of rural reconstruction, Kao Yang also participated in the meeting as one of the initiators of the organization. The organization was formally established at the Shangtung Rural Reconstruction Research Academy at Tsou-p'ing on July 14, 1933. It was named the Rural Work Discussion Society (Hsiang-ts'un kung-tso t'ao-lun hui). This was a sort of national forum for discussing problems and exchanging new ideas among rural reconstructionists throughout the nation. It was through this society that diverse rural reconstruction projects over the country were welded together. They formed, for the first time, a national movement. The rural reconstruction movement then became one of the most powerful social movements in China at the time. The Rural Work Discussion Society
had three annual meetings between 1933 and 1935, which drew rural specialists from various private and public institutions in the nation. At all three meetings, Kao was elected to one of the chair groups.

**Theory of Rural Mass Education**

As a leader of the rural reconstruction movement in both the province and the nation, Kao tried to develop a rural reconstruction theory suitable for the Chinese rural scene on the basis of his field experience and research. Reflecting his position as the leader of a mass education institution, Kao's idea of rural reconstruction was particularly well expressed in the following three articles: "A Draft for the Method of Spreading Rural Mass Education Movement in Each Hsien in Kiangsu Province" (April, 1932), "Our Understanding of Rural Reconstruction Problems" (July, 1933), and "Discussion of the Central Problem of Rural Work" (October, 1934). The discussion of Kao's theory of rural mass education below is primarily based on the above three articles.

Kao's theory of rural mass education can be conveniently explained in two parts: his opinions on the problems of rural reconstruction in general and his rural reconstruction approach. The former includes his views on the social and historical basis of the rural reconstruction movement in China and the objectives of the movement. The latter pertains to methods of rural reconstruction.

**General Understanding of Rural Reconstruction Problems.** Like other rural reconstructionists, Kao Yang also conceived of rural reconstruction as a means of solving China's problems. Kao shared
Liang Shu-ming's views that China's decline began with the inroads made by Western civilization, and that rural reconstruction was the only viable way left for China's survival. Kao said: "China had been prosperous. However, since the invasion of Westerners and their civilization China's politics, economy, and culture declined daily.... If this situation was allowed to continue without any remedial measures, China would not survive in the world.... All previous reform efforts to arrest the decline of China since the "Hundred Days Reform" attempt (1898) had failed because they were nothing but upper-class movements waged by a small number of officials and intellectuals, having little to do with the masses of people. Excluding the masses at the bottom of society, these reform efforts had been like a building without a foundation." Hence, Kao advocated that the reform movement should be based on the majority of the people at the bottom. Moreover, he suggested that the movement should be aimed to awaken the people so that "they could control the government and dedicate their mind and strength to the reform of the country."  

As indicated earlier, Kao conceived of mass education as a means of national reconstruction in a broad sense, namely social, economic, and political reconstruction. Accordingly, when he recognized that the rural population accounted for more than 75 per cent of the Chinese people, he identified rural mass education with rural reconstruction.

Kao also noted the important position of rural society in the nation's economy. Kao disagreed with the idea that industrial development would lead to a national revival. First of all,
according to his judgment, it was hardly feasible in the current international situation to develop industry to the level of the advanced countries. He pointed out that after World War I, Western countries were depending on controlled economic policies and high tariffs and also resorting to dumping policies in foreign markets in order to ensure the maintenance of their national industries in the wake of the world depression. Under such circumstances, China's competition against other countries in commerce and industry would not only fail, but would also accelerate the economic decline in China that had already set in. In contrast, he maintained that if China were able to increase agricultural production and become self-sufficient in food and industrial materials, the flow of China's domestic capital out of the country would stop, and with the active circulation of domestic goods China would soon recover her economic strength.96

Adhering to the above viewpoint, Kao came to be involved in the debate, regarding the proper economic road for China, waged between the Tu-li p'ing-lun (The Independence Review) represented by Wu Ching-Ch'u, and Liang Shu-ming and other rural reconstructionists in 1935.97 Kao supported Liang Shu-ming's assertion that China should induce commercial and industrial development through agricultural progress (yu nung-yeh fa-chan kung-shang-yeh). Kao held that the attempt to induce agricultural development through commercial and industrial progress would lead China to endless suffering even though such an approach might bring momentary relief to the Chinese economy. As an example, he cited the fact that China's purchase of Western
goods for the past thirty years had driven Chinese villages into a serious economic crisis. On the other hand, he held that methods of inducing commerce and industry through agricultural progress was a more natural approach for China, for China had been and still was predominantly a rural society.

**Rural Reconstruction Methods.** As in the case of other rural reconstructionists, Kao considered the educational approach as the chief means of advancing rural reconstruction. Identifying rural problems primarily as poverty, ignorance, the lack or organizational ability, and poor health, he believed that such problems could be solved only through education and training and that such an educational approach should be carried out by persuasion, not by coercion on the part of the government. This was because the success of rural reform work largely depended on the people's willingness to participate in such work and on their "self-teaching" and self-reliant habits. These qualities could not be developed through coercion. For the same reason, Kao felt that rural reconstruction should be carried out from the bottom up instead of from the top down. Like T'ao Hsing-chih, Kao believed that rural reconstruction should be carried out according to the needs of the rural people and that rural problems could be best understood only from the peasants' standpoint. This was a different position from that of Nationalist government officials who tried to impose government programs on the people from the top down as they saw fit.98

Viewing educational methods as primary, Kao was also a gradualist in his reconstruction approach. He did not think that rural
reconstruction was a kind of work that could be accomplished in a short period of time. He suspected those who advocated hasty reconstruction of having motives other than working for the genuine interest of the peasants. Kao seems to have been opposed to the rural revolutionary approach taken by the Chinese Communists. He cautioned rural reconstructionists to anticipate many difficulties in the future and be prepared to endure any hardship ahead of them and to keep working in good faith until the completion of their task. He warned them not to abandon the masses and not to forget that their work was a sacred mission. 99

Within the bounds of rural reconstruction activity he included all aspects of peasant life—political, economic, and cultural. Specifically, he proposed to carry out six comprehensive training programs: civic, livelihood, literacy, health, family, and recreation. Through such training, he hoped to increase agricultural productivity, organize peasant economic organizations (i.e., cooperatives), and lay the foundations for local self-government in rural society. 100 But he stressed flexibility in practice by placing emphasis on certain programs in accordance with the needs and conditions of each reconstructed area. For example, if the area was most troubled by the bandit problem, emphasis should first be placed on defense projects. If the area was located favorably for rural industry, the rural reconstruction program should stress the development of rural industry. If the area enjoyed a high literacy rate and high economic standards, political training could be made the central theme of rural reconstruction work. 101 As agencies for carrying out these
programs, Kao conceived the utilization of the existing local mass education institutions (i.e., mass schools and mass education halls) most appropriate. He suggested that mass education institutions, with two or three staff members per 100 to 500 households, be established. 102

As a method to bring about maximum effects of the rural reconstruction effort, Kao advanced in 1934 the so-called theory of the "unity of politics and education" (cheng-chiao ho-i), which stressed cooperation between rural reconstruction workers and government agencies at various levels. 103 He pointed out that the government's attempts to enforce the pao-chia system and such social policies as the prohibition of opium smoking and foot binding were often met with stiff popular opposition which could, in the worst cases, develop into riots. In Kao's observation, such opposition arose due to the lack of governmental efforts to persuade the people, and also due to the low educational level of the rural population. He felt that, for example, it was in this area that the government could get assistance from local reconstruction institutions. He also pointed out that the little concern shown by hsien governments for the reformers' local development programs had a very frustrating effect upon rural reconstruction efforts. Considering that rural reconstruction was the work China was most in need of, Kao believed, such government attitudes should be corrected. In addition, cooperation between the two sides would be mutually beneficial. When local government agencies and rural reconstruction institutions cooperated, not only would rural reconstruction work be greatly facilitated, but also government policies in rural areas would be more smoothly carried out.
As concrete methods to implement such "unity of politics and education," Kao suggested the following three measures: (1) to carry out rural reconstruction work in liaison with local leaders, governmental offices of education and agriculture, party branches, local administration organs, police, and the local military; (2) to make chairmen and deputy chairmen of hsiang, and chairmen of lü join village improvement societies (hsiang-ts' un kai-chin hui) organized by rural reconstructionists; (3) to transfer rural reconstruction projects to local people in due course and to induce local government agencies to participate in rural reconstruction work so as to make them understand the importance of such work.

Kao Yang's theory of rural mass education was less original than those of T'ao Hsing-chin and Chao Shu-yü. It was a combination of his experiences in mass education and some aspects of Liang Shuming's rural reconstruction theory. The main difference between Kao and Liang concerned cooperation with the government in rural reconstruction. Whereas Liang tried to avoid involvement by the Nationalist Government in the rural reconstruction movement, Kao welcomes the government's participation, providing that each party would complement each other's weak points and would not attempt to dominate the other.

One of the fundamental bases of K'ao's theory was Sun Yat-sen's idea that the people should be trained in order to become a viable revolutionary force in the Nationalist Revolution. He recognized the government's responsibility for the training of the people as prescribed in Sun's three stages of revolution. However, he believed
that such training should not be carried out only from the government's vantage point, but that it should also reflect the needs of the people. Kao's theory of "unity of politics and education" can be viewed as a compromise between Nanking's efforts to impose its reconstruction schemes on villages and the rural reconstructionists' grassroot approaches.

As the president of a public institution of higher education, Kao's approach was more moderate than those of Liang Shu-ming and T'ao. Kao made a great effort not to criticize any social group of the government. As a result, as will be seen in Chapters Five and Six, rural reform efforts by the College of Education lasted longer than T'ao's reform venture and obtained better cooperation from the central and provincial governments. In this respect, the relatively cautious nature of Kao's approach to government policies and the existing social system became an asset to the college's rural reconstruction effort.

Chiang Wen-yü (Heng-yüan) (1885- ) and His Theory of the Unity of Wealth and Education

Chiang Wen-yü was a main figure in rural reconstruction efforts by the Association for Chinese Vocational Education (AVE). He was, along with other leading Kiangsu reconstructionists, a scholar and educational administrator.

Chiang was born in Kuan-yün hsien, Kiangsu province in 1885. He was educated at Peking National University and spent most of his life in Kiangsu, teaching and serving as an educational administrator. He taught at such universities as Chung-kuo University, Kuang-hua
University, Hu-ching University, and Ta-hsia University. The latter three universities were located in Shanghai. He was also Principal of the Kiangsu Provincial Eighth Normal School and served as an educational inspector. In April, 1926, he became Chief of the Department of Education of the Kiangsu Provincial Government.\textsuperscript{104}

Chiang's involvement in rural reconstruction was through the AVE of which he was a founding member and Chief of the Department of Business Affairs (Shih-yeh pu). This department controlled all the projects of the AVE. As the head of this important department, Chiang was the second most important man in the AVE, next to Huang Yen-p'ei, the founder of the institution. As indicated earlier, because Huang, one of the few national leaders in Chinese education circles, was busy with many other activities, most of the AVE's business was run by Chiang.\textsuperscript{105}

Chiang came to be interested in rural reform in late 1925, when the AVE shifted its emphasis from urban vocational education to rural work. As in the cases of the other reconstruction leaders, Chiang's involvement in rural reform work also started from concern for rural educational reform. For about one year from April, 1926, while he was heading the Department of Education of the Kiangsu Provincial Government, he helped the rural education movement in various ways as it began to gain momentum in the province. In June, 1926, when Tung-nan University held a rural educators' summer training session, Chiang participated in the session as a lecturer.\textsuperscript{106} In November of the same year, Chiang issued a directive to rural schools in each hsien to stress agricultural education.\textsuperscript{107}
In March, 1927, when the AVE began to run the Hsu-kung-ch'iao rural reform district alone, Chiang, who by then had resigned from his government position and returned to the position of chief of the AVE's business department, came to supervise the overall project. A few years later, many other AVE rural reform experimental districts were established. Then Chiang became a sort of spokesman for the AVE's rural reconstruction effort. He participated in meetings on rural education and reform, representing the AVE. According to a report which appeared in Min-chien, the official organ of the Association for the Advancement of Mass Education Movement in Ting-hsien, it was Chiang who first initiated the formation of a national organization of rural reconstruction. He stated: "I think that no matter who starts them or what approach they use, the purposes of all rural reconstruction institutions are identical. In order to increase the effectiveness of rural reform work, we must communicate with and help each other." In January, 1932, the Huang-hsü rural reform district run by the AVE sent out questionnaires to various rural reconstruction institutions in the country concerning the establishment of a national organization of rural reconstruction. Then, Chiang Wen-yü went to Tsou-p'ing to discuss the matter with Liang Shu-ming at the Shangtung Rural Reconstruction Research Institute. In July of the same year, when the AVE held its annual meeting at Fu-chou the AVE also convened a "Conference of National Federation of Rural Reform Institutions: (Ch'üan-kuo nung-ts'un kai-chin chi-kuan lin-ho-hui). However, this attempt to organize a national organization miscarried, for representatives of many institutions did not arrive because the meeting
Another effort to form a national organization was made in the following year (1933) in the wake of the Second National Conference of Internal Affairs. The result was the aforementioned "Rural Work Discussion Society." At all three annual meetings of this society, Chiang was elected as a member of the chair group, representing the AVE. Chiang thus became a national rural reconstruction leader.

The Theory of the Unity of Wealth and Education

While Chiang was engaged in rural reconstruction work, he authored a book and wrote a number of articles on rural education and rural reform. In these studies emerged his so-called theory of unity of wealth and education. This theory starts with the diagnosis of rural problems. Like James Yen, he regarded root problems in rural China as primarily ignorance, poverty, poor health, and disunity (san). Let us review briefly Chiang's understanding of these four problems.

In Chiang's opinion, the problem of ignorance in rural areas was entirely due to unequal educational opportunity. This had been created by mistaken educational objectives in the past. Educators had concentrated only on education in urban areas and neglected education in rural areas. Not only was the number of schools for rural children insufficient but also little money was spent for rural education. For example, in Kiangsu province, most hsien educational budgets, which ranged from $600,000 to $100,000, were used for urban schools and only token funds were allocated for rural education. Thus, he held, it was no wonder that rural education was in such poor condition.
As a main cause of poverty among the rural population, Chiang, like T'ao Hsing-chih and Kao Yang, first blamed foreign economic intrusion as being chiefly responsible for the decline of the rural economy. He attributed a continuing flow of capital out of the country for the past several decades to foreign economic imperialism. Another major cause of poverty, he believed, was the extremely confused social and political conditions of China, created by civil war and banditry during the warlord period. Over the period, hundreds of thousands of peasants had been killed, exacted, uprooted, and forced to become refugees. Rural people were given inadequate government protection against banditry. Public works were unattended. As a result, agricultural productivity decreased. The peasants thus could only become impoverished.

In regard to rural health problems, Chiang repudiated the truth of the common saying that rural people were healthier than city people because of a good natural environment and much physical exercise. On the contrary, he pointed out, rural people were in poor health because of malnutrition and little knowledge concerning private hygiene and public health.

Finally, Chiang shared Sun Yat-sen's observation that the Chinese peasants, like "loose sand" (san-sha), lacked unity. He thought that this shortcoming resulted from the peasants' lack of experience in group activities. He considered this lack of unity a very serious weakness, for peasants were incapable of governing their own affairs and open to exploitation and oppression by warlords, banditry, and local strongmen.
Chiang's objectives in rural reconstruction were the curing of the above four problems. Of these four problems, Chiang regarded poverty as the root. He believed that peasants were aware of the advantages of education and had every intention to send their children to school, but poverty prevented them from doing so. Chiang asked, "When one barely earns even insufficient food, can there be any desire to join organizations and receive self-government training." He also pointed out that many rural youngsters, who suffered from malnutrition and still had not reached adulthood, were subject to heavy work beyond their physical strength and had their health and growth ruined. In short, in Chiang's view, problems of ignorance, poor health, and disunity were merely by-products of the problem of poverty. Therefore, Chiang advocated placing the greatest emphasis on solving the poverty problem through rural reform work. He suggested using education as a basic means for such a purpose. This view was the basis of his theory of "unity of wealth and education."

According to Chiang's definition, the unity of wealth and education means "to teach the peasants how to acquire wealth and simultaneously to furnish them with practical knowledge and moral training for a sound life." As practical knowledge for the peasants, Chiang included (1) the operational skill of maintaining new agricultural machines, (2) knowledge of poultry and honey bee raising, and (3) information about various cooperative systems and group training necessary for cooperative activities. Chiang suggested that such knowledge and skills should be taught through
demonstration and practice. He recommended wide publication of the advantage of such knowledge in actual life among the peasants. Chiang also recognized the importance of literary education. However, his position was that for rural adult education, scientific agricultural training should be made the central subject, and other education, secondary. In his opinion important and urgent aspects should get first treatment. 115

Chiang divided the organizational forms of carrying out rural reform projects into two categories: "multiple-form organization" (fu-shih tsu-chih) and "single-form organization" (tan-shih tsu-chih). The multiple-form organization referred to the method of organizing rural reconstruction work on a large scale, utilizing a variety of reconstruction agencies (i.e., rural elementary schools, mass schools, medical dispensaries, cooperatives, rural warehouses, and agricultural experimental stations) under a large institution as the general headquarters of reconstruction work. The Hsü-kung-ch'iao project was a good example of using this organizational method. The Hsü-kung-ch'iao reform experiment was carried out with a village reform society as the central reform organ which utilized mass schools, rural schools, cooperatives, and a medical dispensary under the general leadership of the AVE. The single-form organization entailed methods in which rural reform depended on single agencies, primarily a rural elementary school or a peasant cooperative. Of the two organizational methods, Chiang recommended using more single-form organizations. The multiple form cost more and was less durable in
a poor country like China, even though its immediate results seemed spectacular.\textsuperscript{116}

Chiang welcomed the government's participation in rural reconstruction since he recognized the administrative advantages. However, he regarded persuasion and education as the primary means of reform work. Chiang felt that educational institutions were more appropriate as central agencies for rural reform. In order to bring about the maximum effect, he believed, close cooperation not only among the various rural reconstruction institutions themselves, but also between them and the government agencies, was most desirable.\textsuperscript{117}

In the final analysis, Chiang's theory was a combination of a number of elements. In addition to his own views, many parts of his theory were drawn from field experience gained by the AVE rural workers. His theory was also influenced by the ideas of James Yen, T'ao Hsing-chih, and Chao Shu-yü. As with other rural reconstructionists, he believed that rural reform work should be carried out in simple and economic ways, appropriate to China's needs. Also because Chiang was an important man directly in charge of the AVE's rural reform programs, his ideas were put into practice in the AVE's rural reform experiments. For this reason, Chiang's rural reform theory was often regarded by others as representing the AVE's official reform policy. In addition, Chiang's career in top provincial posts in education, including that of Chief of the Department of Education, greatly helped the AVE obtain various types of support from the Kiangsu government for its rural reform efforts.
Summary

The four reconstruction leaders shared, in a broad sense, many common elements in their careers and views of rural reconstruction. They were originally educational reformers. As rural conditions of China declined in the latter part of the 1920's, they all came to view rural reconstruction as most urgent and fundamental for the salvation of China, and shifted their educational reform efforts to the rural movement. They were fundamentally reformists who believed in gradual and peaceful reform through educational means in contrast to the Communists' violent method of class struggle in solving rural problems. They focused on rural problems involving mainly poverty, ignorance, health, and security.

These four leaders agreed that rural reform should be carried out from the bottom up based on actual needs of the people instead of from the top down imposing the government's will upon the people unilaterally. Recognizing the government's responsibility for the welfare of the people, they called for government cooperation. These similar views served as common ground upon which the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement could be based.

The four leaders all became nationally known rural reconstructions by playing important roles either in the development of the rural education movement into a full-fledged rural reform movement (e.g., T'ao Hsing-chih and Chao Shu-yü) or in the formation of the Rural Work Discussion Society in 1933, which functioned as a national forum for rural reconstruction institutions in China (e.g., Kao Chien-ssu
and Chiang Wen-yü). This fact helped Kiangsu become one of the most important provinces in the national rural reconstruction movement.

Along with the similarities there were also differences in the details of the four leaders' understanding of the rural reconstruction movement, their attitude toward the existing political and social system, their approach and emphasis in carrying out rural reform programs. The differences reflected the individual careers of the leaders and the orientation of the institutions to which they belong.

Among the theories set forth by the four reconstructionists, that of T'ao was the most novel and radical. T'ao suggested the most unconventional educational approach, which regarded the improvement of lives of the people as the chief aim. He emphasized pragmatic and productive education, respect for manual labor, egalitarian ideas, and collective efforts. His view of rural reform was both populistic and nationalistic. He strongly denounced the existing rural power-holders (i.e., gentry and local strongmen), stressing intellectuals' responsibility to awaken and assist the rural masses in developing the capacity to improve their lives for themselves. He also urged the rural people to unite among themselves and help one another to develop their social and political status collectively. Through these new social and educational concepts, which he termed "life education," T'ao wished to construct a new Chinese society which differed greatly from the existing one—a society which was free and egalitarian and liberated from domestic militarism and foreign imperialism. T'ao tried to achieve his social and educational ideals through the Hsiao-chuang School, a rural normal school, and the
kung-hsüeh-t'uan, a village reform organization but failed because of the Nanking Government's suppression and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. T'ao's theory contained elements which were divergent from John Dewey's educational concepts (e.g., collectivism versus individualism, propositions that "Society is school" versus "School is Society" and that "life is education" versus "Education is life."). He, nevertheless, was intellectually much indebted to Dewey's thought in forming his ideas. T'ao essentially adapted Dewey's ideas to the needs of China. His training under John Dewey at Columbia University and his career as an educational reformer made a strong impression on his social and educational outlook.

Chao Shu-yü, the closest colleague of T'ao Hsing-chih, agreed with Tao's general idea of rural reform. Chao's theory of peasant training was also influenced in part by Dewey's educational thought. In forming his theory Chao was more politically motivated than T'ao. Chao shared many elements of Sun Yat-sen's political and economic ideas as well as those of KMT left-wing leaders in relation to the problem of peasant participation in the national revolution. Chao agreed that peasants should be the main force of the revolution and that their lives would be better improved by means of positive rural policies of government rather than through radical social revolution. Yet Chao appears to have been more emphatic in promoting the training than was Sun. He wished to make them capable of improving themselves and protecting their interests against corrupt and oppressive elements of the existing society. This position seems to have been more acceptable to the provincial government. Thus Chao was
entrusted by the Kiangsu government with the job of establishing the nation's first college-level institution of training mass educators and rural workers. But the work was completed by another person (i.e., Kao Chien-ssu) because of Chao's early death.

Kao Chien-ssu, President of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, expressed still different reform attitudes. His broad experience both in the KMT Canton government and commercial circles in the past seems to have had considerable influence on his reform outlook. Kao's reform position was close to that of the government. Yet, he maintained his own theory. He viewed rural reform essentially as an extension of mass education work which the government promoted as a means of its political tutelage program; he placed foremost importance on the development of the peasants' self-governing capacity. Endeavoring to follow faithfully what Sun Yat-sen said in this regard, he had a far more serious attitude than did most government leaders. Furthermore, Kao's theory was later influenced by the rural reconstruction ideas of Liang Shu-ming who advocated the rehabilitation of rural villages as the only road for China's salvation. Liang considered villages as the foundation of Chinese culture. His idea was, as a whole, not favorably viewed by the Nanking authorities at that time.

With a variety of experience in government administration, Chiang Wen-yü, a representative reformer of the Association for Chinese Vocational Association, was also more a man of practical affairs rather than a theorist. His reform theory was thus the combined product of field experiences of his own as well as those of
his colleagues, and of consultations with other reconstructionists (i.e., T'ao Hsing-chih and Chao Shu-yü). Chiang was also influenced by Sun Yat-sen's concept of self-government. He called for cooperation between the rural reconstructionists and the government for rural reform work, primarily emphasizing the economic improvement of peasant life.

In conclusion, compared with T'ao and Chao, Kao and Chiang were relatively moderate and more practical in their reform approach. T'ao and Chao certainly advanced more original and ideal reform ideas which contributed to the initial formation of the rural reconstruction movement, and appeared more to the peasants than did Kao and Chiang.

As we shall see more in detail in the following chapter, the radical ideological elements and the rigid attitude of the former two men in relation to traditional local elites and the Nanking government eventually resulted in the early end of their reform efforts. In contrast, the latter two reformers employed an approach designed to achieve their objectives step by step, maintaining a good relationship and even close cooperation with the provincial government and local power groups in rural reform. Consequently, reforms launched by the College of Education and the AVE under their leadership lasted longer and accomplished greater results. If the survival of reconstruction organizations was the first prerequisite to a successful reform movement, it might be said that the approaches taken by Kao and Chiang were more practical and judicious in the turbulent Nanking period.
CHAPTER V

THREE MAJOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION INSTITUTIONS:
THEIR ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

It has been mentioned in previous chapters that the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu was primarily the work of the three main rural reconstruction institutions, namely, the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education, the Hsiao-chuang School, and the Association for Chinese Vocational Education. It was through these institutions that the rural reconstruction theories discussed in the preceding chapter were put into practice. Through them rural workers were trained, and rural reform experiments were planned and conducted. Hence, study of these three institutions is essential for understanding the rural reconstruction movement in Kiangsu. These three institutions are dealt with in this chapter. Since the background of each of these institutions is discussed in Chapter Three, this chapter will be mainly concerned with the organization and operation of the institutions.

The Kiangsu Provincial College of Education

The Establishment and Purport of the College

Regarding the character and brief historical background of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education (COE) some discussion has already been made in Chapter Three. Before we make further study of the set-up and function of the institution, it seems necessary to repeat here the following two points which were made
in that previous chapter. First, the COE was a college whose purpose was: (1) "to train mass education workers and agricultural specialists who would serve the sixty-one hsien of Kiangsu Province; and (2) to research, plan, and experiment in agricultural techniques and mass education for the province." Kiangsu being an important granary area of the country, the provincial government attached a special importance to agricultural development. Also, containing the political and cultural centers of the nation since 1927, Kiangsu had been one of the provinces where both popular education and mass education movements were most active. It was fitting that in this background the Kiangsu government made its only provincial college a central institution for promoting agriculture and mass education in the province.

Second, during the early 1930's the COE came to regard mass education as a means to achieve rural reconstruction. The leaders of the college considered that if mass education did not have rural reconstruction as its goal such education would become empty and useless. Moreover, they felt that other than mass education there was no better way to achieve rural reconstruction. The reason was that they viewed mass education as a tool with which they could organize the people, enlighten them, ascertain their problems, and develop their capacities. This process would enable them to find the ways to solve their problems. Furthermore, the COE leaders regarded rural reconstruction as a shortcut to achieve a national revival, for the rural population constituted more than 80 per cent of the total population of China and agriculture was
the most important industry in the country. Thus the COE was not an ordinary college of education. The college was a special school which aimed at developing the common people and agriculture of the province. Simultaneously, it served as a social reform institution.

The COE, as such, was an outcome of the merger in June, 1930 of two provincial academies, namely, the Mass Education Academy and the Workers' and Peasants' Academy which were established in February, 1928 and in January, 1929, respectively. The merger was effected under the leadership of Kao Yang, who had been Superintendent of the Mass Education Academy since October, 1928, in accordance with the new college regulation promulgated by the Ministry of Education after the abolition of the University District System by the Nanking Government.

The COE was located about 2 li north of Wu-hsi, a large industrial city. This suburban location was considered ideal in terms of the school's purpose. The city had thousands of workers who would benefit from mass education. The school also had many villages in its neighborhood where students could carry out field study in rural work.

The school was equipped with various facilities which corresponded with its mission. Besides the 103 mou of the school campus, the college had 30 mou of farmland for agricultural experimentation and an additional 200 mou of farms and hilly terrain given by the provincial government. The college's experimental farm consisted of four divisions relating to crops,
horticulture, stock farming, and an insect laboratory. In addition, there was an extension division which propagated the results of experiments by the above four divisions among peasant families. In the division of crops, emphasis was placed on the selection of improved seeds of rice and wheat; in the division of horticulture, on flowering plants; in the division of stock farming, on cattle, sheep, pigs, chickens, bees and sericulture.

The COE also had a factory which was used for experimenting with the manufacture of various small implements necessary in daily life as well as to provide practical training to students. The factory consisted of a carpenter shop and an iron workshop, and its operations were related to three functions--manufacturing, business, and student training. The facilities of the factory were simple, costing only about 400 yüan. It was said, however, that the factory produced about 200 kinds of small implements. The products of the factory were not only simple to use, but also inexpensive. Prices of the factory's products were only one-tenth of those of imported goods and half of those of domestic manufacture. The factory also manufactured class-room equipment such as blackboards, desks and chairs.

Students were drawn from all hsien of the province. According to the original plan, each hsien was to select one or several student applicants. Those who were admitted to the college through an examination were trained at the hsien's expense. After graduation, they were to return to their native hsien to conduct mass education and work for the improvement of agriculture in the hsien.
The idea was to achieve a balanced development of all hsien in the province. However, the number of students from each hsien was not even because of differences in the academic level. There were some hsien which did not have any students at the college because the students from the hsien failed to pass the entrance examination. Vacancies thus created were filled with private students and students from other provinces. The COE was co-educational, but male students were in the majority. As of June, 1930, the total number of students at the college was 240.

In light of contemporary standards, the faculty and staff members of the COE seem to have been quite good. As of 1936, the total number of faculty and staff members was 112, of which the faculty comprised 50. According to my investigation, nine of the faculty were graduates of American universities, most of them having an M.A. in education or agriculture, and one having a Ph.D. Other professors were trained either in Japan or in Great Britain. It was said that the COE was the place where Kiangsu's best specialists in mass education and agriculture were assembled.

**Organization and Finance**

The college consisted of three major departments: the Department of General Affairs, the Department of Training Affairs, and the Department of Research and Experimentation. The Department of General Affairs took care of general administrative business, such as clerical work, accounting and medical service. The Department of Training Affairs was in charge of student instruction and related business. It, in turn, comprised three
sections, namely Admission and Records, Instruction, and Moral Discipline. The Department of Research and Experimentation conducted research, planning, and experiments in mass education and scientific agricultural methods. It also was in charge of the school's various publications, including journals and research papers. Various mass education facilities and rural reform districts of the COE, mentioned in Chapter Two, were also run by this department. The details of the COE's organizational structure are shown in the following chart.

Being a provincial school, the COE's expenditures were almost entirely financed from the provincial treasury. Although students were required to pay certain amounts of money, the percentage of their contribution to the school's total budget was minimal. According to the statistics published by the college in 1936, the school's expenditure increased during the five years between 1929 and 1935 more than 300 per cent from 60,299 yuan to 202,000 yuan. This increase, of course, indicates the rapid growth of the college both in number of school employees and facilities. To go into more detail, the statistics show that the expenditures began to increase sharply from 1930 with more than a 70 per cent increase compared with the previous year. This abrupt change reflects the merger of the two academies (the mass education academy and workers' and peasants' academy) to form the COE. It also coincides with the rural reconstruction trend in both the province and the nation which began to pick up momentum from 1930 and culminated several years later (1933-1935). With this overall increase of
Organization of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education

President

School Conference

Dept. of Research & Experimentation

Dept. of Instructional Affairs

Dept. of General Affairs

Comm. for General Affairs

Comm. for Training Affairs

Comm. for Research and Experimentation

Mass Education Experimental Institution

Admissions & Records Sec.

Business Office

Moral & Discipline Sec.

Research Sec.

Communication Sec.

Editing Sec.

Publication Sec.

Research Lib.

Agri. Education Sec.

Mass Edu.-Sp. course Br.


Agri. Experi. Station

Field Study Guidance Comm.

Library

Experimental Work Shop

Dispensary

Party Doctrine Training Comm.

School Planning Comm.

Eco. Exam. & Audit Comm.


Business Mgr.

Controller's Office

Office of Secretary

Health Office

Fig. 5. Source: Chiang-su sheng-li chiao-yü hsüeh-yüan i-lan (Catalogue of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education), (Wu-hsi, 1936), 4.
the college's expenditures, the funds for research and experiments, which accounted for around one-seventh of the total expenditures, also increased yearly. According to Kao Chien-ssu, rural reconstruction experimental work absorbed more than 80 per cent of the COE's total expenditures in 1933 and the same trend continued thereafter.

Training of Students

The training of students was carried out by the Department of Instructional Affairs. Under the department, there were two major four-year courses and four special two-year courses. The four-year courses included mass education, agricultural education, audio-visual education, and manual-work teacher courses. (lao-tso shih-tzu).

In training students the COE emphasized the development of the mind and learning based on doing. Specifically, the school desired to develop among the students the habits of hard work, perseverance, frugality, and scientific thought. These qualities were considered the most desirable virtues for the future mass education and agricultural specialists working among the rural people. This cultivation of the mind was effected mainly through a program of moral and disciplinary training (hsün-yü). In carrying out this program, student life was divided into three areas, namely thought, behavior, and life style. The school hoped to develop particular qualities in each area.

First, in the area of thought, the school tried to instill students with the KMT's basic ideological beliefs such as:
(a) the Nationalist Revolution is the only way for China to survive, (b) the Three Principles of the people are the only and the best principles for reconstructing a new China, and (c) mass education and agricultural education are fundamental for the task of reconstructing a new China.

Second, in the area of behavior, the school stressed "scientific behavior" and disciplined behavior. "Scientific behavior" referred to behavior which had a purpose, method, and plan. Disciplined behavior had two meanings: one was to subordinate emotions to the reason and to observe regulations; the other, to subordinate one's individuality to the group objective, sacrificing his own personal whims. This last attribute was what Sun Yat-sen stressed as a most desirable quality which the people should honor in striving for the Chinese Revolution.16

Third, in life style, the school wanted to inculcate among the students frugality, modesty, and dedication, and to emphasize the discarding of all desires for privileged status and corrupt behavior. It also stressed diligence, perseverance, and the development of a strong body and a "winning spirit".

For this moral and disciplinary training, a number of specific programs were employed. One of them was a lecture program by dignitaries. Kuomintang leaders, high government officials, and famous educators were invited to give lectures on various social and political issues. Another program was "Sun Yat-sen Weekly Commemorative Meetings", which were held every morning, and participated in by students and staff members under the
direction of the president of the college. Military training also constituted a part of moral and disciplinary training. It emphasized cooperation among the students and taught disciplined and organized habits. In addition, student self-government activities were encouraged, and students were advised to read books on morality. They were required to keep "self-development diaries" (hsiu-yang-lu) in which they reflected on things they did during the day. It was hoped that by so doing they could develop good qualities and correct bad habits for themselves. 17

The above-mentioned principles and methods of student training reflected the position of the college as a public institution which was obliged to follow faithfully the KMT line. 18 The KMT's revolutionary concepts, Sun Yat-sen's political ideals in particular, thus constituted the chief guidelines for indoctrinating the COE's students and for disciplining their behavior.

From the standpoint of educational theory, the college was influenced by the Deweyan concept of Education. There is much evidence showing such an influence. Leaders of the college such as Kao Yang and Ch'en Li-chiang used Dewey's educational ideas extensively in formulating their theories of rural education. For instance, they viewed mass education as comprehensive lifelong social education for the whole people. In their training of students, they stressed social service and field training. As they all recognized in their works, these concepts were
directly borrowed from Dewey's educational thought.\textsuperscript{19}

Instruction at the COE consisted of both classroom lectures and field studies. Of the two, as mentioned above, the college placed greater importance on field training.\textsuperscript{20} The school considered the period of field training as an important opportunity for students to supplement knowledge gained in the classroom through actual experience in the countryside and to test theories studied in the classroom against the real problems of rural society.\textsuperscript{21}

Field training for the students who were in four-year major courses (i.e., mass education and agricultural education) was conducted in the following order as the students advanced. Freshmen made an inspection tour of the various experimental institutions of the college. From the sophomore year, students participated in the actual mass education program conducted by the college in nearby villages or city areas under the guidance of faculty members. The difference between the sophomore and junior years was that junior students visited other rural reform institutions as observers in addition to their field work in the college's experimental districts. In the senior year, students were to carry out field work by themselves, staying in villages or cities for a semester. The villages of Kao-chang-an and Sh-ch'iao, both of which were located about 2 li from the North Gate of Wu-hsi city, and the South Gate area of the same city were designated as experimental districts for student training in 1929. Of the two training areas the majority of students was assigned to villages rather than to the city.
For the students enrolled in the two-year program, special field training courses comparable to those offered to freshmen and sophomores in the four-year program were conducted during the freshman period. In the second year, their field work was comparable to that of junior and senior students in the four-year program.22

It has been mentioned that the COE had about 30 mou of farm land on campus. Agriculture students were required to engage in farm work three to twelve hours a week between spring and autumn, learning various agricultural techniques from the freshman period through the junior year. In their senior year, students were sent to nearby villages to demonstrate scientific agricultural techniques to the peasants.23 The students in mass education courses conducted their village field training in the villages of Kao-chang-an and She-ch'iao, mentioned earlier. In the summer of 1932, these training areas were expanded and formally named the Hui-pei Mass Education Experimental District, and were continuously used for field training.24 Since field training was considered one of the most important student programs, a close examination of the process of field training will help the reader to understand the COE's character. For this purpose, let us take the summer training of senior students in 1934 as an example.25

Twenty-five students participated in field training under the supervision of seven professors and staff members of the college headed by Yü Jen-sheng, an associate professor and Chief of the Hui-pei Experimental District. Guiding principles of the rural work exercise included four points. First, reform work should
Fig. 6. The Location of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education and Its Rural Reform Experimental Districts; The AVE's Shan-jen-ch'iao Experimental District. Base Map: Chiang-su Ch'uan-sheng fen-t'u (The Divisional Map of Kiangsu Province), Pub. by Ya-hsin ti-hsueh-she, (Shanghai, 1912).
fulfill what the peasants most needed, and should be carried out with minimum expenditure. The school believed that rural work should be attempted within the economic capacity of the people so that they might not become another economic burden to the people. It also cautioned against seeking superficial achievement (i.e., impressive statistical figures instead of concern for the qualitative improvement of rural life). Second, students were advised to approach the peasants with a sincere and friendly attitude, and to endeavor to arouse a "voluntary spirit" (tzu-tung cheng-shen) among the peasants for reforming their own lives through educational methods. Third, it was stressed that students should share hardships with peasants and do things with their own hands. The school considered gaining the people's faith as the best guarantee for successful reform work. Fourth, students were told not to be afraid of outside obstructions in rural work and to be concerned only with relieving the peasants' plight with steadfastness. What they needed to do was to try their best, but not to be regretful if their work did not achieve immediate success.

The field training was conducted in emulation of actual rural reform work. First of all, the district was divided into six experimental subdistricts plus guidance (fu-tao) subdistrict villages. Students were assigned to the six subdistricts in order to carry out reform experiments for themselves.

In these villages, the students first undertook various preparations such as contacting village leaders, setting up reform headquarters, making reform plans, reports, work schedules, and
establishing communication links with other organizations outside of the district. The students were also to practice keeping work records, accounting, purchasing goods, and taking care of official papers. Then, the students were given a number of key experimental themes according to the conditions of their subdistricts. For instance, in Hu-chiao-tu subdistricts, economic improvement and cultural training programs were emphasized. The students introduced improved rice seeds developed by the college agricultural station by having 14 households try them. Chicken stock in the village was also improved by distributing 12,000 artificially incubated chickens among the peasants. A credit cooperative of 48 members was organized with an operational capital of 84 渊 which was borrowed from the Wu-hsi Branch of the Provincial Agricultural Bank. For cultural programs, the students opened a peasant night school and two women's schools, where the national language (that is, basic Chinese written characters), elementary social and political knowledge, and simple arithmetic were taught. Each school had about 40 students.

In the Wang-chia-t'ang subdistrict, reform work was focused on an experimental rural school. The COE students organized a compulsory experimental class with about 40 children. Using self-compiled textbooks, their aim was to complete the four-year elementary course within two years by teaching without holidays. They also operated a "literacy-guidance corps" for those who had a relatively high education (i.e., elementary school graduates) and used them in propagating literacy in the area.
In the Hsi-chang subdistrict, family education, local security, and health education were central areas of concentration. The students opened a male adult night school in which 42 people were enrolled. The aim of the school was to train local leaders. In instruction, the pao-chia system and public health were particularly stressed. With the people of the area they constructed a public playground which could accommodate as many as 1,000 people. They also set up two mass tea houses and a dispensary. In a similar manner, the students in other subdistricts experimented with various reform projects according to the given experimental themes of their districts.

This field training seems to have been effective for both the students and the villagers. According to Professor Ch'en Li-chiang's report, the students' daily activities during the training were very tightly scheduled. They were to work continuously from 6:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. with less than two hours of rest for meals. Nevertheless, it is said that they were very enthusiastic about their work. The villagers also acquired the following benefits from the students' field work. Four mass schools were set up with a total number of 320 students along with one rural elementary school with 79 students. Also established were one fish-farming cooperative, one credit cooperative, and one transportation and sales cooperative. Each subdistrict organized "village improvement societies". Each subdistrict also came to have a dispensary. Finally, there were 40 mou of special-contract farms (t'e-yueh-t'ien) throughout the entire district. Yet the field training program did
not impose any financial or other burdens on the villages. Hence, according to Professor Yü, a supervisor of the students, the villagers showed a very favorable response to the students' work.\footnote{31}

In short, the field training was designed in such a way that it benefited both students and villagers simultaneously through the rural reform experiments.

As mentioned earlier, research and experimentation were one of the two key missions of the COE. This task was carried out by the Department of Research and Experimentation which was formed in 1930 by merging separate departments of experimentation and research.\footnote{32} During the initial stages of the school, the aims of the department were largely confined to serving the aims of the college or at best the interests of Kiangsu Province. The aims were defined to be: (1) to study the theory and practice of mass education and to discover problems and their solutions through experimentation, and (2) to provide the students of the college with creative opportunities in which each student could learn methods of mass education from his own experience.\footnote{33} Thus the department was responsible for students' field training and development of mass education and rural reconstruction theories.\footnote{34}

Research topics changed every year according to the needs of the college and mass education trends. Prior to 1930, the department directed its efforts mainly toward developing new mass education approaches. It collected foreign literature on adult education, domestic journals and statistics published by educational institutions, and information concerning mass education
in various parts of the nation. It also regularly held research and discussion sessions every other week at the school, where the faculty and staff members submitted papers and discussed various problems of mass education. The results of such studies and discussions were published in the Chiao-yü yü min-chung (Education and the Masses), the organ of the college. The department also compiled other mass education literature.35

After 1930 we find that the department shifted its focus to problems related to rural reconstruction. For instance, the following topics were dealt with: population problems, land problems, rural problems, labor problems, the policies of foreign powers toward China, ethnic psychology with special emphasis on the Chinese people, social psychology in relation to Chinese social customs and methods to promote nationalism, and adult psychology to be applied to increasing people's ability and the formation of study habits. The department also collected and analyzed various statistics about rural villages and published the results in the same journal.36

As was the case of research, prior to 1930 mass education was the main subject of the COE's experimentation. For experimentation the COE established two mass schools, three mass libraries, two mass tea houses, one women's education center and several health education centers in the nearby villages. It also organized a student team, a mass drama society, a folk music society, and a mass newspaper society. These organizations were all used for the education of the people. The COE felt that the early acquisition of techniques utilizing such organizations would be of great help
to the students in carrying out their future tasks. The students were required to participate at least in two projects every semester. At the end of semesters they were obliged to make written reports on their participation in the projects, and the reports were counted as part of their academic achievement.  

After the completion of training at the college, the graduates returned mostly to their native hsien and served in mass education and rural improvement works. During the six years from the outset of the school in 1929 to 1935, the college produced 400 graduates. Of them, 344 graduates served in Kiangsu province in 1935. According to a survey made by the college in the same year, about 76 per cent (250 persons) of the provincial graduates worked at institutions related to mass education and rural work. The remainder, about 90 persons, were engaged in other kinds of jobs such as ch'ü chiefs, political officers in the army, and principals and teachers of middle and elementary schools. It is also said that when the graduates had difficulties in their work the college authorities would extend guidance and cooperation to resolve their problems.

In view of the above facts, we can say that the school was fulfilling its mission mentioned in the beginning of this section. In addition, as we shall see in the following chapter, the COE remained a leading rural reconstruction institution in the province and carried out many reform projects until the Japanese attack on the province in 1937.
The Hsiao-chuang School

The Beginning of the School

In the preceding chapter it was mentioned that the Hsiao-chuang School was the first fruit of the rural reform ideals devised by T'ao Hsing-chih and Chao Shu-yü. The school began as a rural normal school. But the dream of its founders was far more than producing merely rural elementary teachers. On April 2, 1928, two weeks after the opening of the school, T'ao wrote to the Hsiao-chuang people: "I deeply hope that by uniting our efforts we will be able to increase the production and defense capabilities of the 'true peasants' through training. Our first mission is to liberate 340 million Chinese peasants; secondly, to assist the liberation of the peasants in Asian countries; and finally, to be able to help in the liberation of the peasants of the world. Our school should become not only the starting point of the revolution of Chinese education, but also the center of the revolution of world education." In his poem entitled "Dawn of Hsiao-chuang" T'ao expressed the mission of the school: "to make the rural masses, who are the absolute majority, the masters, not slave again; to eliminate 'false knowledge' and create 'true knowledge'; to get the shih (i.e. the gentry who monopolized the traditional Chinese officialdom) class out of office and thereby get rid of the 'shih' character at the head of the Chinese conception of the four classes (shih nung kung shang), and to make intellectuals live among and for the people, not above the people." From the above remarks, it is clear that from the beginning the Hsiao-chuang School started with quite radical motives.
The School was formally established on March 15, 1927, in a small village called "Hsiao-chuang" (small village) which was located about 8 li north of Ho-p'ing-men of Nanking and 3 li south of Yen-tzu-chi. The first character of the villages' name meaning "small" was changed by T'ao Hsing-chih to the character denoting "dawn" which had the same pronunciation. The name of the school, "Hsiao-chuang" thus means the "dawn of the village", signifying that the birth of the school marked the beginning of a new life in China's rural villages.

The spirit of the school was well demonstrated in the fact that the school started in spite of extremely difficult political and economic circumstances. The establishment of the school coincided with the time of local battles between the Nationalist forces and Sun Ch'üan-fang's army, which disrupted the whole region around Nanking. The war also adversely affected the finances of the school. According to T'ao's original estimate, at least 15,000 yuan of initial funds and 12,000 yuan of operational money were needed for the start of the school. Most of these funds had been pledged by T'ao's friends and other interested people. However, the war situation around Nanking made it difficult for the contributors to keep their promises. Therefore, the school started with only 1,000 yuan which came out of the private fortunes of T'ao and Chao.

The opening ceremony of the school was a strange scene. It was held in an open area in front of a peasant house. Only fifteen student and ten dedicated teachers, including T'ao, Chao, and
Fig. 7. The Location of Hsiao-chuang School and Its Rural Reform Areas. Base Map: Chung-hua min-kuo ti-t’u (National Atlas of China), Editor-in-chief, Dr. Chang Ch'i-chün, Pub. by National War College, Republic of China, (Taipei, 1962), Vol. 4, p. 5.
Nevertheless, it is said that the ceremony was conducted in an unusually solemn and resolute atmosphere, and the participants were in high spirits. At the outset, the school buildings comprised merely four tents temporarily set up on a piece of bare land with facilities of one table and several benches borrowed from the peasants in the village. But, within two years, as a result of painstaking efforts by both the teachers and students who worked on the school buildings and studied at the same time, the school came to have ten or so buildings, such as an administration hall, auditorium, workshops, library, laboratories, dining hall, exhibition hall, and music hall. They were made of earthen walls and thatched roofs. In the meantime, with donations from various institutions and private supporters, school equipment was assembled little by little. The school's population (i.e. teachers, students, and other employees) increased to around 3,000 in total. Thus by the end of 1929 the school had developed into a large educational and social reform group.

Organization

Having started as a rural normal school, the Hsiao-chuang School at first consisted of an elementary teacher training section and a nursery teacher training section. In three years the school had grown to have eight "center" elementary schools, four "center" kindergartens, a normal school, and a middle school. The word "center" was purposely attached to the elementary schools and...
kindergartens in order to indicate that each school was important in its own right, not subordinate to the normal school, and that the schools were centers for both teaching and practice as well as for social reform. These elementary schools and kindergartens were scattered in the villages within 30 to 40 li from the normal headquarters in Hsiao-chuang.

The Hsiao-chuang School was operated under five departments: Life Affairs, Administration, Elementary School Guidance, Kindergarten, and Social Reform. The organization of each department is shown in the following chart.

The student body was organized into five groups, and each group had a particular subject to study. These groups were the agricultural society, drama club, art and craft society, biology club, and mass education study society. Unfortunately, information regarding the financial aspects of the school is not available. But, according to circumstantial evidence, the school seems to have been maintained chiefly with the money donated by individual supporters and private institutions.

**Student Training and School Management**

The distinctive character of the Hsiao-chuang School lay, more than anything else, in the unique method of school management, together with its particular objective. First of all, there was no limitation on the age of students for admission. The entrance examination was very simple, consisting of writing an essay on a subject related to China's rural problems, mathematics, a short
## Organization of Hsiao-chuang School

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<th>Dispensary</th>
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<td>Document &amp; Records Sec.</td>
<td>Education Sec.</td>
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<td>Material Sec.</td>
<td>Secretary Office</td>
<td>Health Sec.</td>
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### Normal Student Body

- Agricultural Study Society (K'an-shou hsūeh-yüan)
- Drama Club (Ho'-p'ing hsūeh-yüan)
- Articraft Club (San-yüan hsūeh-yüan)
- Biology Study Club (K'ai-so hsūeh-yüan)
- Mass Education Study Society (Ch'i-hsiang hsūeh-yüan)

### Clubs
- Biology Study Club (K'ai-so hsūeh-yüan)
- Mass Education Study Society (Ch'i-hsiang hsūeh-yüan)

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**Fig. 8.** Source: Constructed from Liang Shu-ning, “T’a-shan chih shih” (Rock in Other's Mountain), Hsiao-chuang i-yeh (A Page of the Hsiao-chuang School), ed. by Fang Yu-yen, (Shanghai, 1934), 255-256; K'ung Hsüeh-hsiung, Chung-kuo chin-jih chih nung-ts'un Yün-tung (Rural Movement in Today's China), (Nanking, 1934), 282.
speech, and an interview to test the applicants' spirit of social service and their willingness to do the work required at the school. Likewise, academic levels of the students varied from junior middle school graduates to those with three years of college education. As shown below, this heterogeneous academic background necessitated the discarding of the conventional class instruction system and the adoption of an individual guidance system.

As stated earlier, the rural teachers which the Hsiao-chuang School aimed to produce were not to be ordinary teachers; they were to be rural workers at the same time. The policy of the school stated: "The objective of education in this school is to produce good rural school teachers who will be loved and respected by children and the people. We hope that, on the one hand, the graduates of this school will be able to create good rural schools and to educate children well; on the other hand, that they will also be able to guide the people and to make the rural schools they serve into centers for the reform of rural society."52 In order to achieve such an objective the school designated four most desirable qualities for ideal rural teachers. These four qualities were:

(1) the body and hands of peasant, (2) the head of a scientist, (3) the disposition of an artist, and (4) the spirit and zeal of social reformers.53 All the educational principles and methods at the school were designed to develop these qualities among the students.

As mentioned earlier, the management of the Hsiao-chuang School was based on T'ao's concept of life-education. The school
was run along democratic and egalitarian lines. All the school members, from the principal, teachers, and students down to school workers, lived on the campus forming a community and sharing every aspect of the community life. Teachers and students ate and slept at the same place. They jointly participated in all the school work, from cooking and digging earth to tilling land, constructing and repairing roads, and purchasing goods. In connection with this communal work, "taking departure from a rustic life, we approach paradise" was their slogan. This community life was designed to develop among the students the habit of hard work and perseverance. It also enhanced a strong esprit de corps among all the members of the school. School duties such as educational plans, correspondence, transcription, accounting, general clerical work, maintenance of school appliances, management of the library, and even janitorial work were divided among and carried out by the students under the guidance of the teachers who were called "tao-shih" (guides). This was to provide the students with actual experience in various aspects of school management in preparation for their future work.

The daily life of the students consisted of morning meetings, free discussions, individual learning, group lectures, various forms of labor, and other activities.

During the morning meetings in which all the school members participated, after singing the school song and hearing business reports, T'ao Hsing-chih or a teacher gave a short lecture on various topics. Then students and teachers jointly discussed daily work and other subjects. Serious topics such as current
political and social problems or issues in rural reconstructions were dealt with during the meeting conducted at the end of every week. These group discussions were stressed as an important part of student training.  

In the school instruction there were no fixed curricula, no textbooks, and no classrooms. Except for public lectures and field work required of all students, the students studied on an individual basis according to their personal interests and needs. But they were to act according to schedules. There was a weekly life schedule issued by the school which applied to every member of the school. Besides this public schedule, every student was required to make his own daily schedule, and to set up weekly, monthly, and yearly plans, which had to be approved by the teacher under whom the student was assigned to study. This was individual learning, and this method was to develop the habits of self-learning and planned life among the students. Other than this individual learning, the students were required to attend public lectures on various topics delivered by the principal, teachers, or guest speakers.

Field study was divided into two parts, the so-called "front-line" practice and "rear-line" practice. The students were to take both training courses in rotation. The front-line students practiced teaching techniques at the center schools set up by the Hsiao-chuang School, while the rear-line group remained at the normal school and made educational plans and prepared teaching materials for their fellow student-teachers in the front-line group.
Then the two groups switched their roles. This field work process was conducted under the close guidance of the normal school teachers. For agricultural training, the school used 100 mou of arable land which was half of the school's total land. Every student was to rent 0.5 mou of land from the school for agricultural experimentation by paying two yüan for the annual rent. The students were required to sow rice or grow vegetables. During this agricultural experiment the students received guidance not only from the teachers, but also from two outside advisory groups, namely the advisory committee consisting of experienced peasants from the nearby villages and the planning committee made up of agricultural specialists from Chung-yang University and Chin-ling University. Since farming required everyday care and since summer was the busy season for agriculture there was no summer vacation at Hsiao-chuang School. In addition to this agricultural labor, the students participated in such labor as the construction and repairing of bridges and roads, forestation, and irrigation work on the school campus and in nearby villages.

Military training was another aspect of student training. Unlike the case of the COE, this program was started from practical necessity for security. During the first year of the school, the school experienced several bandit attacks in the Hsiao-chuang and Yen-tzu-chi areas. There was even an incident in which a child was kidnapped from a peasant family by bandits in Hsiao-chuang, and the family was forced to pay eight hundred yüan as ransom. Military training started in August, 1928, under the direction of a military officer by the name of Liu and six soldiers sent by
Feng Yü-hsiang who was close to T'ao Hsing-chih. The school bought about twenty rifles and pistols, and with them students earned rifle marksmanship and simple attack and defense tactics. The students also took turns in standing guard and patrolling the school at night. Later, student military training developed into peasant military training in the area. This military training made a great contribution to the maintenance of security in the area. After the start of military training and the organization of the peasant defense corps, the bandit problem disappeared in the area. 62

In addition to the above training, the students were required to participate in the program of so-called "life district" (sheng-hou ch'ü) experimentation. The "life district" was made up of several villages in the vicinity of the school which were designated by the school as areas for student training. This program was first designated as one of "going out to meet friends" (hui p'eng-yu-ch'ü). For the Hsiao-chuang people thought that to refer to peasants as friends was more appropriate for the purpose of the program. The students visited peasants in the evenings, made friends with them, discussed their problems, made suggestions, and explained about the school. This program was to remove peasant distrust concerning the new education which the Hsiao-chuang School offered, to gain an understanding of peasant hardships and problems, and to win peasant support for the school's rural reform efforts. 63

The Hsiao-chuang School also had several community service centers: the Center Tea House, the Hsiao-chuang Dispensary, and Center Carpenter Shops. Students were required to participate
The Center Tea House was set up in Hsiao-chuang village. It served as a center for both the social education of the students and the recreation of the peasants. Many tea houses in Chinese villages had degenerated into places for opium smoking and gambling. The school made this tea house a place for sound recreation and education. It was operated jointly by Hsiao-chuang teachers, students, and peasant representatives. The students met the peasants in the tea house and taught them how to change their undesirable customs and life habits through dialogue. After farm work, the peasants came to the tea house and enjoyed drinking tea, playing Chinese chess, and listening to music. It was said that the tea house won great favor among village wives in particular, for through this new tea house their husbands and children could enjoy healthy recreation and learn many useful things. The Center Tea House received financial assistance from the Association for Vocational Education (AVE).

The Hsiao-chuang dispensary at the school treated diseases of the village people. It was also the place where students practiced simple medical treatments and public health. The facilities were very simple and were operated by one director, one doctor, and a nurse. The dispensary had, however, many patients. It was said that there were patients who came from villages as far as 40 li away. When vaccinations and innoculations were conducted by the dispensary staff, the students participated as aides.

The center carpenter shops were set up in two places, one at
Shih-erh-chiang, the other, at Ch'ang-sheng-tien. This was also a co-project with the AVE. It was organized as a workshop for students as well as for rural carpenters to improve their skills. All the furniture used in the Hsiao-chuang School and at the center-elementary schools and kindergartens was made in these shops. 66

The school also carried out various rural reform projects such as the "Village Federation Self-Defense Corps", an annual inter-village athletic contest, a fire-fighting society, a law and politics discussion society, and a well digging group. We shall discuss the details of these projects in Chapter Seven. The students were required to participate in these projects. 67

In ideological training the school emphasized nationalism strongly tinged with anti-imperialism, democracy and egalitarianism (with opposition to warlords, bad gentry, and local strong men), self-reliance, the sacredness of labor, and a cooperative spirit. These traits would be developed mainly through the aforementioned teachers' lectures, group discussions, and communal living and labor.

Such multifunctional reform activities by the Hsiao-chuang School for villagers seems to have been basically influenced by John Dewey's thought. In 1920 Dewey delivered a speech on the responsibility of the rural school to the village community before the students of a normal school in Shangsi Province. The gist of his speech reads in part as follows:
The school must be the community center for dissemination of knowledge of sanitation. The school playground should be a recreational resource for the entire community. The teacher should be the liaison between the provincial health department and his village. He should also promote interest in wholesome recreation. Bands, choruses, and orchestras made up of pupils should stimulate formation of adult musical groups. Teachers should harness talent for dramatics and present social dramas which can be understood by villagers. School auditoriums should be utilized for public lectures, as well as for showing films and slides. Teachers should pressure the provincial department of education to establish traveling libraries. The school should be the scene of political rallies.68

There can be found a considerable resemblance between Dewey's above suggestion and the Hsiao-chuang School's community activities.

In order to maintain order in the school and also to teach the students village self-government, the school was organized as a self-government body which was patterned after chuang (a group of villages). Each branch school was regarded as a village, and teachers and students were members of villages. Each village had its village head, and the principal was the chief of the chuang. They jointly drew up village regulations at village meetings and all, from the chief of the chuang to the villagers, were equally subject to the regulations. In order to enforce the regulations a disciplinary committee was organized. There were three degrees of punishment for violating the regulations. First, for light violations a warning was given. Secondly, for a relatively serious violation, one had to enter the "self-reflection room". Inside this dark room, the violator was to reflect on his errors for several hours. Lastly, the most serious violator was asked to leave the school. The accused had, however, the right to appeal
during a general meeting of the chuang (Ch'uan-chüang hui-i) if he did not admit his guilt.69

Hsiao-chuang School's novel educational objectives and methods gradually became famous and attracted many inspection groups and visitors from many parts of the country. Among the visitors was Chiang Kai-shek, the political and military power-holder of the time. Many rural normal schools imitated the Hsiao-chuang School.70 But Hsiao-chuang's particular method of school management and its position against warlordism, imperialism and especially, the existing social and political system, was regarded as anti-government. Consequently, on March 29, 1930, the Hsiao-chuang School was forced to close by the Nanking Government. The direct cause was the demonstration of Hsiao-chuang normal students at Hsia-kuan, the northern part of Nanking city, in protest against "British imperialism". Several days before, the workers of the British-owned Ho-chi factory at Hsia-kuan entered into a strike demanding a wage increase. During the strike in front of the factory an incident occurred in which three workers were shot to death by British sailors. The incident aroused the public anger among the Chinese people in the area. The indignation of the Hsiao-chuang normal students was particularly great. They went to Hsia-kuan in a group and staged a demonstration, distributing leaflets and condemning "British imperialism" in speeches. The Nanking Government took this demonstration as a riot against the government and closed the school.71

The government's version of the Hsiao-chuang School's "crime" was that the school was a hotbed of Communists and had plotted a
rebellion against the Nanking Government in secret alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang. As mentioned previously, it is true that T'ao Hsing-chih was close to Feng. Yet, it is difficult to confirm the truth of the Nanking Government's accusation. There is a conflicting report by the former secretary of the Village Federation Defense Corps organized by the school. According to him, the government investigators did not discover illegal weapons allegedly supplied by Feng Yu-hsiang at the Hsiao-chuang School. Moreover, Mai Ch'ing, a biographer of T'ao Hsing-chih, suggests another interpretation. Mai thinks that the Hsiao-chuang School was closed because T'ao had previously brought on Chiang-Kai-shek's enmity. According to Mai, when Chiang visited Hsiao-chuang School, he was not greeted with as great a reception as he was used to receiving on such occasions. Chiang was not received by T'ao but by other staff members of the school because T'ao was engaged in other work. From then on, Hsiao-chuang was suspected by the government as an institution harboring dangerous ideas.

It might be too naive to believe such a personal grudge of Chiang against T'ao was the sole reason for the closure of the school. But considering that Chiang's political power was increasing at that time, Chiang's displeasure could constitute a factor which unfavorably affected the fate of the school. In addition, the social and political conditions of the time were disquieting enough for the government to be apprehensive of radical activities by the Hsiao-chuang School. Since it was only three years after the breakup of the KMT-CCP alliance, the
Communists were still capable of staging insurrection in Shanghai. In addition, Chiang's Nanking regime was facing a grave challenge by "new warlords" who had collaborated with Chiang in the Northern Expedition. Of the anti-Chiang forces, Feng Yü-hsiang was one of the chief leaders. In other words, in such a threatening situation, the friendship between T'ao and Feng and the cold reception of Chiang upon his visit to the Hsiao-chuang School must have caused the government to suspect the school.

Besides, the activities of the Hsiao-chuang students were becoming increasingly radical. For example, not long before the demonstration at Hsia-kuan, the Hsiao-chuang students had passed a resolution not to pay train fares. Some Hsiao-chuang students had been actually involved in conflict with train conductors over the matter of train fare. The students not only refused to pay train fare themselves, but also propagated the same idea to other passengers in speeches and by distributing leaflets containing such ideas. This was an activity overtly against the existing social and political system.

Throughout three years of rural reform work the Hsiao-chuang faculty and students had won strong support among the peasants around the school. Such support was well demonstrated in the following incidents. According to a report in a Japanese newspaper, when the government sent officials and soldiers to impound the school, about 500 peasants resisted with arms against the government force, shouting Hsiao-chuang slogans. Because of the peasants' opposition the government officials failed to impound
the school on that day. It was only through persuasion and negotiation with the people of the area by the Ministry of Education that the government was able to close down the school.\textsuperscript{76}

In brief, taking all the above facts into consideration, it is not difficult to imagine that the presence of the Hsiao-chuang School in the vicinity of Nanking was seen by the Nanking authorities as a threat. Consequently, the government decided to close down the school.

Despite its three short years of life, Hsiao-chuang education seems to have been quite effective. The Hsiao-chuang School produced many devoted and able rural reformers. The reformers included Sun Min-hsün, who established three elementary schools with no money; Li Ch'u-ts'ai, who became a staff member of the COE and authored several books on rural education (e.g., P'o-Hsiao or The Exposure of Hsiao-chuang School); Ch'eng Pen-hai, who played a major role in the establishment of the Chekiang Provincial Hsiang-hu Rural Normal School and the Wang-lun-ch'un Rural Normal School in Kwangtung Province; and Fang Yü-yüan, who was in charge of the publication of the Hsiao-chuang series and a staff member of the "Life Education Society". Also, there had been a great demand for Hsiao-chuang graduates from many provinces and hsien as teachers for their rural normal schools.\textsuperscript{77} A part of Hsiao-chuang's educational system (i.e., "center-school" system) was also adopted by many schools and eventually became a part of the Ministry of Education's policy. The students' love for the school, the unity among them, and their sense of mission for
the revival of the country, were especially strong. Even after the closure of the school, the Hsiao-chuang students continuously communicated with their teachers, including T'ao Hsing-chih, and endeavored to propagate Hsiao-chuang's educational ideals wherever they went. T'ao's indomitable spirit and the solidarity among his students made it possible for the hsiao-chuang cause to revive within two years in the Shanghai and Pao-shan areas in the form of so-called Kung-hsüeh-t'uan (Labor-Study-Unions).

Kung-hsüeh-t'uan (Labor-Study-Union) Movement

After closing the Hsiao-chuang School, the Nanking Government ordered that T'ao Hsing-chih and other teachers of the school be apprehended. Some of them were arrested. But thanks to an early warning by one of his friends in the Nanking Garrison Command Headquarters, T'ao was able to escape arrest. T'ao fled to Shanghai and lived in the French Concession quarter. T'ao, who was an activist by nature, could not remain idle. Two years later, namely in 1932, with a number of the same staff members who had worked at the Hsiao-chuang School, he initiated another rural reform movement in a suburb of Shanghai. Since his effort to reform rural society through rural normal and elementary schools had been shattered by the government and could no longer be continued, this time T'ao attempted to achieve the same objective by directly organizing villages into units which combined three functions of production, learning, and self-defense into one.
This new movement was the so-called Kung-hsüeh-t'uan (KHT) movement.

Explaining the meaning of the KHT T'ao said:

"Kung" means to labor or to work. "Hsüeh" means science or to study. "T'uan" means organization or union. To put it in more detail, to work is to develop life; to study is to make life bright; to have organization is to protect life... Let us develop and animate the lives of the people with people's work; let us make the people's lives bright with science for the masses; and let us protect the lives of the people by developing their organizing ability. "T'uan" does not mean an institution. It means an organization, the unification of force, the organization of force, the concentration of force, and the exercising of force together.79

In his "Explanation of the Preliminary Plan for Rural Labor-Study-Union Experimentation" T'ao further explained:

The Rural Labor-Study-Union is a small factory, a small school, and a small society. It represents the meanings of production, progress, equality, cooperation, and defending self as well as fellow masses. It is designed to produce a reformed village which will become a "new cell" full of living force by making factory, school, and society into one... The approach the Rural Labor-Study-Union takes is different from the traditional one. In the traditional method school and society were separated, but the Rural Labor-Study-Union advocates "Society is school." In the traditional method teachers taught but did not translate what they taught into action, and students learned but did not practice what they learned. The Rural Labor-Study-Union advocates that action should be central of both teaching and learning.80

From the above explanation it is apparent that T'ao did not discard his idea of saving China by reforming villages, which he had held at the beginning of the Hsiao-chuang School.81 Also, reform ideals which T'ao had advanced during the Hsiao-chuang period were maintained as they were. Hence, it can be said that the KHT movement was an extension of the Hsiao-chuang reform effort in a different form in the changed situation.

According to T'ao Hsing-chih, the whole village did not have
to be organized into one KHT. There could be a variety of KHT in a village such as children's KHT, youth KHT, and adult KHT as long as the groups were organized to carry out the aim mentioned above.

The first KHT was established on October 1, 1932, at Meng-chia-mu-ch'iao, a village in Ta-ch'ang ch'ü of Pao-shan hsien, located about 22 li north of the city of Shanghai on the border between Pao-shan hsien and Shanghai hsien. It first started as a children's KHT with about ten children. It was organized by Ma Lü-shien and Wang Tso-chu who were sent by T'ao Hsing-chih. The organization was named "Shan-hai Kung-hsueh-t'uan". During the first two months these two teachers had great difficulty in convincing the local people about the necessity of the KHT namely because of their difficulty in communicating with the villagers who used a different dialect. Soon, however, the people began to understand that the organization was genuinely concerned with the welfare of the people and started to send their children to the KHT. As a result, one year later the number of students had increased to around three hundred.

As the children's KHT prospered, various types of KHT such as a production KHT, a poultry farming KHT, a cotton KHT, and a fish farming KHT came to be organized among the peasants. Furthermore, with the good results of the Shan-hai KHT, KHT spread to fourteen large and small villages within a forty li radius of Meng-chia-mu-ch'iao. As of 1935, there were ten large KHT centers in Shanghai and Pao-shan hsien. Thus starting with the children's KHT, T'ao's KHT project developed into a full-fledged
rural reform movement. But with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on August 13, 1937, the KHT movement was suspended. We shall discuss some reform activities of the KHT, together with those of the other two reconstruction institutions, in Chapter Seven.

The Association for Chinese Vocational Education

The Association and Rural Reform

The Association for Chinese Vocational Education (AVE) was the oldest educational reform institution of the three institutions. It was also one of the two most influential institutions, together with the National Association for the Advancement of Education (NAAE), in Chinese educational circles. As mentioned earlier, most of the nation's leading educators were affiliated with the AVE as either members of the Board of Trustees or as ordinary members. Moreover, like Huang Yen-p'ei, President of the AVE, many educational leaders were simultaneously members of the AVE as well as of the NAAE. In the year 1927 the AVE had 6,330 members and ninety-six organizations representing all the provinces of China as well as Europe, America, and other regions where Chinese resided.

It has already been mentioned in Chapter Three that the original purpose of the AVE was to promote vocational education throughout the country. Some important projects of the AVE are as follows: First, in 1918 the AVE established the Chuang-hua Vocational School in Shanghai for experimental purposes with funds donated by domestic supporters and overseas Chinese. The School had five departments: (1) an engineering department which offered such
courses as iron work, carpentry, enamel work, and button manufacturing, (2) a "preparatory department" for the students of the work-study program in France, (3) a department for vocational teachers, (4) a department of commerce, and (5) a department of clerical work. The AVE also organized industrial continuation schools and higher commercial continuation schools in big cities such as Shanghai, Nanking, and Tientsin. 87

Secondly, the AVE conducted various surveys about the conditions of vocational schools, the condition of vocational school graduates, vocational education publications, conditions in various industrial centers, and also about the prices of goods in different localities. Results of the surveys were used to improve vocational education and to guide vocational school graduates. For such purposes the AVE formed a Vocational Guidance Committee in cooperation with the members of the faculty of the Chung-hua Vocational School. Through the compilation of books relating to vocational guidance and through consultations, the committee provided information in regard to trades, industries, and other occupations along with the best methods of preparing to enter each of them. For the same purposes the AVE also published Education and Vocation, a monthly organ of the association; Life, an English bi-annual; the Vocational Education Series, and some other works. Besides, the AVE arranged for lectures by well-known educators, held training sessions for vocational teachers, and sponsored exhibits on vocational education in various cities. 88
As mentioned earlier, however, from the mid-1920's the AVE shifted its emphasis to rural reconstruction. The transformed character of the AVE is well manifested in the reform guideline of the AVE, entitled "Operational Method of the Rural Reform Experiment". The guideline says: "Rural education involves most of our vocational education, and rural reform is the real objective of rural education. Our operation of rural reform projects is an enlargement of the education movement."

Why, then, did the AVE change its direction to rural reconstruction? Huang Yen-p'ei, the founder of the institution, attributed this conversion to the following four factors. First, pervasive popular trends (p'ing-min chu-i ssu-tsao) which, Huang claimed, made common people both the object and the basis of the AVE's reform work. Another factor was the realization of the necessity to conduct a program which would bring about a comprehensive development of society. Leaders of the AVE felt that the AVE should make the entire society an object of reform and that reform projects should start from the local level in rural areas. A third factor was the trend of experimentalism of the time and the belief in the importance of rural areas in China. The AVE hoped to discover a panacea for the political confusion of China through small-scale rural reconstruction experiments. Lastly, with scholarly specialized research and experimentation the AVE wanted, on the one hand, to guide the government, and on the other, to incite the people to carry out practical and "good work" for China (i.e., rural reconstruction work).
Chiang Wen-yü, Chief of the Department of Business Affairs of the AVE, offers a more elaborate account for the conversion. According to Chiang, it was not until 1920 that the AVE began to pay attention to the ineffectiveness of agricultural education and to the nation's rural problems. It seems that the rapidly declining rural economy in China, which we discussed in Chapter Two, caused the AVE to turn its attention to rural problems.  

The AVE's concern for the nation's agricultural problems resulted in the formation of a "Society for the Study of Agricultural Education" in 1920. In the same year the AVE also made a survey of conditions at agricultural schools in various places, and solicited opinions of agricultural specialists on methods of improving agriculture.  

The AVE reached the conclusion that vocational education could merely help to increase part of the nation's productivity but could not solve the entire vocational problem of the nation. It realized that unless the problem of production of the huge peasant population was solved through education, the purpose of the association would be meaningless. Hence, the AVE decided to focus its endeavor on the training of peasants.

The AVE's concern for rural reform was stated first in Huang Yen-p'ei's speech at the Fourth Annual Convention of the NAAE which was held in T'ai-yüan, Shansi Province between August 16-23, 1925. As indicated earlier, the NAAE was one of the most influential institutions in China at that time. Huang, the President of the AVE and concurrently a member of the board of
trustees of the NAAE, was to make a speech on vocational education on this occasion. In his speech, Huang proposed a plan called, "Experimental District Rural Vocational Education", which was in effect a rural reconstruction experiment featuring rural education. The gist of Huang's proposal can be summarized as follows:

First, they would select one village or several villages as an experimental district, which should be strategically located in terms of transportation and communication. This rural community should have a population of about 3,500 and an area of about 30 square li.

Secondly, they would investigate various features of the area such as the agricultural products, local industrial arts, educational and vocational conditions and so forth. Then, they would establish plans for a reform program for village communities based on data obtained from the investigation. The program would include compulsory education for children, adult supplementary education, vocational training, care for the elderly or disabled, medical care, public health, local self-defense, and efforts to increase agricultural productivity. The suggested objectives of the program were that there would be no waste land and no idle people; people were supposed to enjoy self-sufficiency and to help one another.

Thirdly, they would establish a central educational institution in the rural district to carry out the plan. Before carrying out the program, work priorities should be determined by taking account of such factors as indigenous self-government organizations,
human resources, and the financial capabilities of the area.

Fourth, and lastly, expenses for the reform project would be in principle borne by the local community of the area. The experiment would be carried out over a limited period, and if the experiment should prove to be successful, the reform project would be extended to other areas.

This proposal was a comprehensive rural reform program which encompassed a far broader scope than merely vocational education. Huang's speech seems to have been a reflection of the rural reform ideas of Chao Shu-yü who was one of the staff members of the AVE, for it was Chao who had advocated a comprehensive rural reform approach in the early 1920's. At any rate, with this proposal the AVE had taken a step to form a rural reform project. This proposal was significant because it became the blueprint not only for the AVE's rural reform experiments, but also for the COE's reform efforts. The proposal was accepted by Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shangsi Province. However, because of the outbreak of civil war between the Feng-tien army and Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces in October, 1925, which eventually affected Shansi Province, the project was cancelled in the midst of preparations.  

While looking for a possible alternative site for the association's rural reform experiment, the AVE decided to look about Kiangsu Province at the recommendation of Chao Shu-yü and Feng T'i-hsia. In the meantime, the AVE reached an agreement with the NAAE, the Association for the Advancement of Mass Education Movements, and the Agricultural and Education Departments of
Tungnan University to carry out the experiment jointly. As a result, the Board of Trustees for Joint Rural Reform was established on May 15, 1926.

As preliminary sites for rural reform experimentation, two places were selected: Huang-hsu chen in Chen-chiang hsien and a place in K'un-shan hsien. The main criteria for the selection of the sites were twofold. The first criterion was the easy accessibility of the area (e.g., located not far from the reform institution and near a railway station on a trunkline) so that the reform experiment could be conducted under the close supervision of the reformers. The second criterion was interest in rural reform evidenced by the village leaders in view of the fact that reform work would jointly be conducted by the reformers and the villagers. Since the experiment was the first venture of this kind in the nations its success would be evidently an important factor in the future course of future developments. The reform leaders thus seem to have considered the above two criteria as essential in determining the sites of the first reform experiment.

In July of the same year, Hsu-kung-ch'iao of K'un-shan hsien, which was located 6 li northwest of the An-ting railroad station on the Nanking Shangai line, was selected as the first rural reform experimental district. This selection was mainly due to an enthusiastic request from such local leaders as Ts'ai Wang-chih and Fang Wei-i, and the hsien magistrate, Wu Shih-ch'iao, who was a member of the AVE. In October, 1926, the Hsu-kung-ch'iao reform district was formally established. One year later, in the
spring of 1927, however, the three other institutions withdrew from the project and the AVE alone remained to conduct the Hsü-kung-ch’iao experiment. With the Hsü-kung-ch’iao experiment as the beginning, the AVE shifted its emphasis to rural reconstruction work and became one of the most important rural reconstruction institutions in China. As indicated in Chapter Two, the AVE ran more experimental reform projects than any other single institution. As of 1934, in Kiangsu alone it had five rural reform experimental districts (i.e., Hsü-kung-ch’iao, Huang-shü, Shan-jen-ch’iao, Ku-kao-chuang, and Hu-ch’iao in the suburbs of Shanghai city), which were mostly located in suburban areas of town or cities (for details, refer to Section Three of Chapter Two). It also established an agricultural implement factory at Hua-lung-lu of Shanghai city in October, 1929.

**Organization and Finance**

Basically, the AVE consisted of two policy-making bodies and three organs of practical affairs which dealt with the aforementioned projects. The former was made up of the Board of Directors and Executive Boards, and the latter of the Business Department, the Committee for the Control of One Hundred Year's Foundation, and the Committee of Management of Funds and Properties. Of the above organs, the one which had directly to do with our subject here was the business department which was in charge of the execution of the AVE's policies and programs under the direction
of the two boards. It was through the Rural Reform Division of this department that the AVE managed its affiliated rural reform experimental districts. Other organs of the department were the General Division, the Research Division, and the Correspondence and Publication Division. The General Division handled administrative business such as clerical work and accounting. The Research Division carried out the aforementioned work such as surveys, experiments, and lecture programs. The Division of Correspondence and Publication took care of public relations and publication of the AVE's organ (i.e., Education and Vocation) and other works.\textsuperscript{98}

Financially, the AVE enjoyed relatively good support. Its financial sources were several; membership fees, interest on its basic fund, income from the sales of its publications, donations from supporting individuals and institutions, and subsidies from the central and the provincial governments. From January, 1923 onward, the central Government provided a subsidy of 20,400 \text{ yuan} each year for the association. The Kiangsu Government also allotted a subsidy of 24,612 \text{ yuan} for the AVE annually. For three years between July, 1925 and July, 1928, the AVE received a donation of 15,000 \text{ yuan} from the Chinese Education and Cultural Foundation. It had also 25,580 \text{ yuan} of basic funds which kept producing interest. As of 1927, its annual expenditure amounted to 32,854 \text{ yuan}.\textsuperscript{99} Unfortunately, we do not have information about the budgetary situation of the AVE after 1928. But the budget for the Hsü-kung-ch'iao Reform Experimental District,
a rural reform project of the association, in 1933 alone exceeded 25,000 yuan.100

Rural Reform Approach

The ultimate objectives of the AVE's rural reform work differed little from those of the COE and the Hsiao-chuang School. That is, the AVE's aim was to revive China by reconstructing villages into productive villages. It was their slogan to reconstruct villages which had "no idle land, no idle and prodigal people, no illiterates, no projects unattended, and whose members were all healthy, secure, and friendly with one another."101 Regarding its basic rural reform approach the AVE decided to take education as the central means for all reform work, to begin by solving the problem of livelihood, and to conclude with the attainment of self-government. In order to achieve self-government, a certain level of education, as well as a self-defense capacity on the part of villagers, was required. Therefore, the AVE viewed cultural, economic, and political training as mutually complementary, and wanted to make a balanced improvement in the three fields.

For instance, cooperatives would be made the foundation for improving the rural economy yet, simultaneously, attention would be paid to improvement in cultural and political training. The enlargement of mass education would be the main method for improving rural culture. The realization of village self-government would be made the goal of political training. Chiang Wen-yü's so-called "Theory of the Unity of Education, Wealth, and Politics", 
The Organization of the National Association for Chinese Vocational Education

![Diagram of the National Association for Chinese Vocational Education](image)

Fig. 9. Source: Lu-dzai Djung, A History of Democratic Education in Modern China, (Shanghai, 1934), 131. with slight alterations by the writer.
as discussed in the previous chapter, represented the essential idea of this AVE position. 102

It was indicated earlier that because of the traditional approach of vocational education, the AVE placed the greatest priority on economic improvement. But in terms of political ideology there is an indication that the AVE's rural programs were to some extent influenced by Sun Yat-sen's political ideas of his later years. According to a diagram describing the AVE's rural reform work, the awakening of the peasants' self consciousness and the development of voluntary spirit, which were key factors of Sun's new revolutionary approach after the 1924 reorganization of the KMT, were made the foundation of rural reform effort. 103 The AVE also took the contents of "local self-government" which Sun prescribed in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction as the standards of its self-government experimental work. That is, a census, a land survey, road building and police work were main items of the AVE's self-government experiment. The AVE also tried to train the villagers in the exercise of their rights as citizens even though in a limited way. 104 The AVE also emphasized collectivism and self-defense in its self-government experiment, which were important ingredients of Sun's Principle of Democracy. 105

Since the AVE was an educational institution, there is also evidence of Dewey's influence on the AVE, even though the degree of the influence was not as strong as on the COE and Hsiao-chuang School. First of all, notice Huang's remark that the AVE's shift its direction to rural reform was influenced by the pervasive
atmosphere of p'ing-min chu-i of the early 1920's. The high tide of p'ing-min chu-i thought at that time was mainly attributed to Dewey who was lecturing in many places in China. Also, in 1923, in his speech at Tung-nan University, Huang Yen-p'ei stressed that the purpose of vocational education was to inculcate the spirit of social service beyond merely imparting skills. Vocational education should be concerned with helping people appreciate the significance of their occupation and should contribute to the formation of a sound philosophy of life. This was essentially a reiteration of John Dewey's remarks made three years before during his visit to China. It is also necessary to remember that the initial plan of the AVE's rural reform project was made by Chao Shu-yü, who shared Dewey's idea of practical education, commoners' education, and experimentalism.

Training of Rural Workers

Despite its rather early start in rural reform work and the large number of its rural reform projects, the training of rural workers of the AVE was undertaken much later as compared with the other two reform institutions. It was only in October, 1933, that the AVE established a center for training rural workers in Ta'ao-ho-ching chen located in the southwestern suburbs of Shanghai city. The training center was named Ts'ao-ho-ching nung-hsüeh t'uan (Ts'ao-ho-ching Agricultural Study Corps). Prior to the establishment of this corps the AVE based its rural reform experiments on the advice of established rural specialists
Fig. 10. The Locations of the Association for Vocational Education, Ts'ao-ho-ching Agricultural Corps, and Shan-hai Kung-hsueh-t'uan. Base Map: Chiang-su ch'üan-sheng fen-t'ü, op. cit.
from various social and academic institutions. For instance, Chao Shu-yü, Feng T'i-hsia, and Li Ch-i-ch'ang who planned and led the Hsü-kung-ch'iao reform experiment were all professors at Tung-nan University; and Yü Ying-chiang, Yao Hui-ch'uan and Ch'ü Chü-nung, who acted as an advisory group for the Ku-kao-chuang reform district, were rural experts invited from the AVE and the Shantung Rural Reconstruction Research Institute which was headed by Lian Shu-ming. 109

The agricultural study corps consisted of two departments: one was the Department of Rural Service, which was the AVE's own project for training rural workers; the other was the Department of Hung-yung Rural Teachers' Training, a project entrusted to the AVE by the Board of Trustees of the Hung-yung Education Foundation. 110 The foundation was organized with a capital of 100,000 yuan donated by Yeh Hung-yung, a Shanghai tycoon, for the purpose of establishing rural schools. 111 Because the foundation needed teachers who were appropriate for the schools it would establish, it asked the AVE authorities to include a course for teachers when the rural workers' training center was opened. By August, 1934 the foundation set up eight rural elementary schools within the AVE's rural reform district in the Ts'ao-ho-ching chen area. 112

The Rural Service Department selected 34 trainees through examinations from among middle school graduates who vowed to "save the country by reforming villages". The Department of Rural Teachers' Training had 15 trainees who were chosen from among those who had previous teaching experience in ordinary elementary schools.
This small number of trainees from both departments seems to have been due to the fact that the AVE set the trainee numbers in accordance with the number of its reform districts (i.e. five districts) and with the number of teachers required at the rural elementary schools established by the Hung-yung foundation. These rural elementary schools were very small and would be staffed by only one to three teachers. The objective of the training was "to achieve the improvement of all aspects of peasant life and 'real' self-government by combining wealth, politics, and education". As a training method, T'ao Hsing-chih's principle of "combining teaching, learning, and doing" was adopted.

The length of training at the corps differed between the Rural Service Department and Rural Teachers' Training Department. While students of the former department were trained for twenty months, the students of the latter were trained for ten months. The training period for the students of the rural service department was in turn divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of about two weeks of orientation training and three and a half months of formal instruction. In the classroom instruction, seven courses were offered: education, public health, agriculture, economics, village government, military training, and administrative exercise. In this phase the students of both departments received the same training together. This phase lasted from October, 1933 to February, 1934.

In the second phase the students of the two departments were for the first time divided and received separate training according to their specialized fields. In this program the students of the
Department of Rural Teachers' Training were sent to seven rural elementary schools run by the Hung-yung Education Foundation for field work. These were located in the suburban villages of Shanghai city. The students used these elementary schools as centers for their experiments in teaching and rural reform work. With this second phase, the rural teachers training students completed their training and were appointed as formal teachers to the seven rural schools mentioned above.

The students of rural service were divided into two groups, labeled the front and the rear. The former group of students, consisting of 19 persons, were sent to the AVE's rural experimental villages in the vicinity of Shanghai city as observers. Of the latter group, three students were assigned to the corps headquarters, three to the headquarters' experimental farmland, and two to livestock experimental stations. These facilities were all established in Ts-ao-ho-ching chen in 1934. Those who were assigned to the headquarters learned about the management of rural reform work. At the farmland, an area of about 70 mou called "Garden of Harvest After Labor", the students learned about agricultural work with emphasis on horticulture. Those who were assigned to the livestock experimental station studied scientific methods of stock raising (i.e. chickens and pigs). Every weekend the front and rear groups of students returned to the headquarters, discussed various problems they observed during their field work, and received additional instruction. Training in this phase lasted six months until August, 1934.
The third and last phase was a program in which the students formally participated in rural work. This phase was again divided into two periods, each of which lasted five months. In the former period the students were assigned to five rural experimental villages and two peasant education halls in the vicinity of Shanghai city, and acquired reform experience by working as a part of the reform teams of the AVE. In the latter period of this last phase the students were to carry out an independent reform work as the conclusion of their field study in villages recommended by the corps. Information concerning names of the villages and results of the field work is, however, unavailable.

To summarize, the AVE's training of rural workers was carried out mainly through field work. Four-fifths of the training was conducted in the field. The shorter training period of the AVE, compared with those of the COE and the Hsiao-chuang School, may have necessitated the AVE's heavier reliance on field practice for training rural workers (including rural teachers). Even while recognizing such a necessity, there is still the feeling that the AVE's training approach gave too great a weight to field study. Certainly, thorough field training was necessary for producing good rural workers. But the problem was that field study was concerned mainly with rural reform techniques useful in the immediate future. It thus could not provide much of the broader knowledge and culture which were also indispensable in developing the characters of ideal reformers. Moreover, the AVE's program of training rural workers seems to have been belated, lagging behind by four to five years.
those of the COE and Hsiao-chuang School. Also, considering the vast need for rural workers in China at that time, the number of AVE trainees appears to have been too few.

Summary and Conclusion

The three reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu Province had both similarities and differences. Having been educational institutions they used education as their chief means for rural reform. As rural reconstruction institutions, they carried out two fundamental functions: training of rural workers and carrying out of rural reform experiments. In training rural workers, they all placed special emphasis on the field training conducted in actual rural conditions under the guidance of the rural reconstructionists. They stressed as ideal qualities of a good rural worker such virtues as perseverance, the spirit of sacrifice, the habit of hard work, frugality, humbleness, a planned and disciplined life, and the spirit of serving the people instead of seeking personal advancement in society. In their theories of student training and rural reform, the three institutions were influenced by John Dewey's educational thought even though there were variations in the degree of Dewey's influence on each institution. Dewey's concepts of life-long education and education for the whole people, commoners in particular, became the underlying basis for the COE's theories of mass education. T'ao Hsing-chih's theory of life education which formed the central educational philosophy of Hsiao-chuang School was basically the development of Dewey's dictum,
"education is life". Dewey's idea of vocational education helped the AVE view vocational education in a broader perspective, connecting it with social service and a sound philosophy of life. Furthermore, the three institutions were interrelated with each other through the transfer of personnel (e.g. the case of Chao Shu-yü between the Hsiao-chuang School and the COE) and through cooperation in certain reform projects (e.g. the joint venture between the AVE and Hsiao-chuang School on behalf of Hsiao-chuang's rural dispensary and teahouse).

The three institutions differed mainly in their character and methods of student training. Such differences stemmed from their diverse traditions. First of all, while the COE was a public institution established by the provincial government as a center for improving Kiangsu's mass education and agriculture, the Hsiao-chuang School and the AVE were private institutions of educational reform. Accordingly, the COE was financially secure and had the best educational facilities among the three. At the same time, the overall direction of school management needed to be in line with government policy. The COE taught the students rural reform in conjunction with the Nationalist Revolution and Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary policies were made central ideals for student training. Its rural reconstruction effort developed from the mass education movement as a provincial government project. Hence, more than 70 percentage of its graduates were either assigned to Kiangsu's mass education halls and peasant halls or engaged in rural reconstruction experiments of the COE. Despite its
stress on field training, the COE's educational method was basically conventional. Like other regular colleges, classroom instruction with a fixed curriculum constituted an important part of student education.

Because it was a private institution and because of the war situation in the area of the school site at the time of its foundation, the Hsiao-chuang School experienced severe financial difficulties from the outset. Nevertheless, the school developed to become a model rural reform institution with about 3,000 members in three years under the guidance of such leaders as T'ao Hsing-chih and Chao Shu-yü. Characteristic of the school were its unique education methods, ideals, and reform approaches. The school had no set courses nor textbooks. Students were trained through a method which effectively combined individual study based on student spontaneity and their personal taste and needs, with group training. This group training stressed democratic relationships between group members, mutual responsibility, and esprit de corps. Students were taught to combine knowledge and labor, and were inculcated with strong nationalism and socialistic ideals which were a blend of egalitarianism and populistic elements. With these ideals, the students were called upon to work among the people for their welfare by becoming peasants themselves. They were also taught to be strongly antagonistic to the existing local power group-- the local gentry, "strong men" and warlords. These traits of the school were in sharp conflict with the existing social and political system, and eventually led to the forcible closure of the school by the
Nanking authorities. Many Hsiao-chuang ideals were, however, adopted by other rural schools and reconstruction institutions and spread to many parts of the country through its graduates. Furthermore, the school's reform ideas were revived in a modified form of rural reconstruction called Kung-hsüeh-t'uan which started in the suburban villages of Shanghai in 1932. By this new form of rural reform effort T'ao attempted to turn each village into a unit which had the threefold functions of education, production, and self-defense.

Through a private institution, the AVE was relatively well financed, receiving subsidies from the provincial government and donations by interested people. In keeping with its tradition of vocational education, the AVE placed prime importance on the program of economic improvement among reconstruction programs. Reform principles of the AVE appear to have been most moderate among the three institutions. They were devoid of criticism of the existing society. Moreover, the AVE was on good terms with the established local power groups and the Kiangsu government. The AVE's close cooperation with local gentry in its reform experimental districts and assistance by provincial government agencies for the AVE's rural reform work are such examples. Another characteristic of the AVE was that, not being a school, it undertook the training of rural workers later than the other two institutions. Possibly for this reason, the training period of its trainees was shorter compared with those of the COE and the Hsiao-chuang School. The number of its trainees was also extremely small.
As a whole, it can be said that the types of student training and reform approach fostered by the Hsiao-chuang School were too idealistic for the time in China. Notwithstanding the progressiveness of its ideals, the Hsiao-chuang School's disregard for the given political conditions only brought about the early frustration of its reform efforts. In contrast, the COE and the AVE were realistic in their reform approach. As a result, their reform efforts were able to last until 1937, longer than that of Hsiao-chuang School. Yet, in spite of such differences, the three institutions basically belonged to the reformist category and strove for common aims, namely the salvation of China, through rural reconstruction by emphasis on rural education. Thus, together, the three reconstruction institutions formed the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement.
CHAPTER VI

REFORM PLANS AND PROCEDURES OF THE THREE RECONSTRUCTION INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR EXPERIMENTAL DISTRICTS

In Chapter Four we discussed rural reform theories advanced by four leading rural reconstructionists of Kiangsu province. How then were their theories and principles actually put into practice through the operations of the three institutions treated in Chapter Five? In order to answer this question we need to examine both the reform plans devised by the three institutions and also subsequent reform programs and activities developed in their respective experimental districts. Their reform plans and procedures are dealt with in the present chapter.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will briefly review the general locations of the three institutions' reform districts and the reconstructionist views which were closely related with the reform plans. This will provide background information for sections two to four which discuss the reform plans and procedures followed by the three institutions. Since reconstruction plans were first devised by each institution, then implemented in the experimental districts, plans and procedures are examined on two levels in each of the three sections. As will be shown in the following pages, when plans and procedures were applied, slight variations occurred even among different districts under the same institution.

Reform Districts and Reform Views

It was mentioned in Chapter Two that the reform districts of the three institutions were mostly located in the suburban villages of
major cities in southern Kiangsu. These districts were initially chosen for easy accessibility. But it should be remembered that despite their suburban locations and some differences in urban influence, the reform districts of the three institutions were still essentially rural villages sharing problems in common with other rural areas. This made it feasible for the three institutions to launch rural reform experiments in suburban locations.

In spite of similar suburban locations, the three institutions' reform districts differed from each other. First, in regard to location and size of the districts, we find that the COE's reform districts (Hui-pei and Pei-hsia) were large, divided into subdistricts, and concentrated in villages near Wu-hsi city in Wu-hsi hsien. In contrast, the AVE's (Hstü-kung-ch'iao, Huang-hsü, Shan-jen-ch'iao, Ku-kao-chuang, and Ts'ao-ho-ching-chen districts) were relatively small and scattered over five hsien -- those of K'un-shan, Chen-chiang, Wu-hsien, T'ai-hsien, and Shanghai. The Hsiao-chuang group conducted their reform work first in the northern suburbs of Nanking and later in bordering areas between Shanghai hsien and Pao-shan hsien. Their reform areas were not large compared with those of the COE. (For the specific areas of the districts of the three institutions, refer to Section Three of Chapter Two). The Hsiao-chuang group did not refer to its reform villages as "experimental district." The reason may have been that since they tended to identify themselves closely with the peasants they did not like to give the impression that they were reformers from the outside conducting experiments within village areas. T'ao Hsing-chih held that reformers should overcome the "experimentation barrier," the term by which he cynically pointed to the pervading
Fig. 11. Locations of Rural Reform Districts and Areas of Three Reconstruction Institutions in Kiangsu Province and the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien.

experimentism in rural reconstruction movement of the time. In this context he declared "society is a school," for T'ao was arguing that rural reform efforts should be made by villagers from the outset without any fixed experimental period. The geographical distribution of the three institutions' reform districts is shown in the following map.

Secondly, it is also important to remember that unlike the cases of the COE and the Hsiao-chuang group, many of the AVE's reform districts were established through the initiative of village leaders or the provincial governments. The AVE reformers were invited to conduct local reform experiments in cooperation with village elites who were either local gentry or rich and educated people. Hence, it seems that leaders of the AVE's reform districts had greater leeway at the start than did their counterparts representing the other two institutions. For instance, it was Ts'ai Wang-chih, a local leader of Hsü-kung-ch'iao, who helped the AVE continue its reform experiment in the area when the experiment project there came to a halt. This happened after Tung-nan University, a partner institution of the experiment, withdrew because of its reorganization into the National Central University in 1928. Ts'ai also remained a central figure throughout the reform experiment. The Shan-jen-ch'iao reform experiment also started at the initiation of local leaders (i.e., Chang Chung-jen, Wang Chieh-jen, and Chu Meng-lo), who invited the AVE specialists in March, 1931, to draw up reform plans for that area. In this case, reform funds were also prepared by the efforts of the local leaders who succeeded in obtaining financial assistance from both the provincial government and Wu-hsien government. In the case
of Ku-kao-chuang reform district, the role of a local leader was more prominent than in other districts. The reform work of that district depended almost entirely on one person, Ku Chun-i, who not only initiated the reform work by requesting the AVE to guide the local reform project, but also bore most of the expenditures necessary for the reform work.  

In contrast, in the cases of the COE and Hsiao-chuang reform areas, it was the institutions that chose the reform areas. There the roles of local leaders were negligible. Leaders of the COE's Huang-hsiang, Chou-lung-an, and Kao-chang-an reform experiments were mainly peasants and sometimes local elementary school teachers. The Hsiao-chuang reform areas recorded no person of prominent social status.

Besides, in order to better understand the reform plans of the three institutions it seems useful to remember that despite differences in emphasis and social viewpoints the leaders of the three institutions shared essentially similar views on rural problems. That is, all the reconstruction leaders attributed China's rural problems mainly to conditions of poverty, ignorance, poor health, lack of organization, and lack of local defence. To overcome these five shortcomings in peasant life was the direct object of all three institutions' reform efforts; these remained the fundamental basis for their reform plans.

Reform Procedures of the COE

General Plan

The COE's rural reform plans and procedures can best be studied by examining those which the school devised for general application in the Hui-pei district. As mentioned earlier, this district was
established for the experimental application of the rural reconstruction methods devised by the college. When the district was formed in 1932, its reform period was set at three years. Because of the complexity of the reform plan, it will be discussed in three parts: reform objectives and principles, organization of rural workers, and yearly schedules.

Reform Objectives and Principles. The reform objectives which the COE chose for the district were threefold: the completion of local self-government, the development of the rural economy, and the improvement of peasant life.

In respect to the completion of local self-government, the school considered the following eight accomplishments as essential. The first was to develop character of sound citizens among the district people. As qualities for becoming sound citizens, the COE enumerated numerous conditions. These included a healthy and able body, loyal and faithful behavior, knowledge equivalent to those of an elementary school graduate, considerable vocational skill, organizational skill, and a cooperative spirit. This enumeration is important because the COE's civic education program mostly carried out through mass schools would be geared to developing such qualities. The second item was to establish properly functioning self-government organizations in each village. "Self-government organizations" meant, as prescribed in the hsiang-chen self-government enforcement law, sub-hsien administrative organizations from hsiang and chen down to la, lin as well as hsiang and chen general meetings or fang (sub-district) people's meetings. The third objective was to enable the district people to resolve disputes and quarrels by peaceful means among themselves. For such a
purpose, the reformers would organize an arbitration committee made up of those chosen from the villagers themselves. The fourth was to complete the repair of roads, bridges, dykes, irrigation ponds, and waterways within the boundaries of the district. The fifth was to have each village possess lawful and powerful self-defense organizations. Lawful self-defense organizations included a police force and a "winter-protection corps" (tung-fang-t'uan), the villagers' voluntary security organization for preventing thievery during winter nights. Sixth, each village was to have relief organizations. The seventh was to establish a good public health facility in village of the district. The eighth provided for a committee for improving the local natural environment.

This view of self-government by the COE followed basically the conditions suggested by Sun Yat-sen for a completely self-governing district. The conditions Sun prescribed in the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction include census-taking, a land survey, maintenance of police and local defense forces, road-building and repairing, and training the people in the exercise of the four powers and in fulfilling their duties as citizens. Thus to these basic self-government conditions the school added merely a few more items which were considered important in rural reconstruction work -- mediation of disputes among local people, establishing relief organizations and health facilities, and the improvement of the local natural environment.

For the second general objective, the development of the rural economy, the college specified five goals. The first was to teach peasants to practice scientific agricultural methods such as
seed-selection, fertilization, deep-furrow sowing, insect extermination, and flood prevention. The second was to enable each peasant family to have at least one supplementary occupation. These supplementary occupations included chicken-raising, bee-farming, mat-making or sericulture. The school's third achievement was to make productive use of waste land and ponds by reclamation and the development of fish farms. The fourth aim was to organize at least one cooperative in each village of the district. The kind of cooperative, that is, credit, production, or marketing, would be determined according to the need of each village. The fifth was to encourage the people of the district to form habits of frugality and saving.

For the third general objective, improvement of peasant life, the school set the following four goals. The first was to make the entire life of the district people in accord with the three principles of economy, sanitation, and beauty. The second was to provide and organize sound recreation and sports for all to enjoy. By this the school seems to have wished to encourage the people to give up bad habits such as gambling, excessive drinking, or opium-smoking and to provide them with opportunities to relax and enjoy life while developing both mind and body at the same time. Chinese chess, go, Chinese traditional music, martial arts, and picnics would be utilized for such a purpose. The third goal was to lead the people to observe funeral and wedding ceremonies and other social occasions in a rational and economic manner. This was, of course, to aid the peasant economy by cutting down on the waste which was part of the peasant life. The fourth and last goal was to encourage all the district people to possess a will to improve their lives.
What is evident from the above three general objectives is that, the COE's rural reform plan was inclusive, touching most interrelated aspects of peasant life. As a whole, it also carried a strong educational character. The general objectives aimed through education to provide the peasants with knowledge, wealth, good health, and self-governing and self-defending abilities that insured a decent life.

The principles the school set up as guidelines for carrying out reform work reflected similar points. The principles stated that the entire district should be regarded as a school; adults as well as children were to be trained for all aspects of life. These principles emphasized that reformers should base their rural work on actual conditions, taking into consideration the special circumstances in each locality. It was also stressed that the reformers' role should be that of guiding and assisting the local people so that in the end the local people would be made capable of carrying out reform work for themselves.12

Organization and Procedures of Reform Work. By what kind of methods and procedures did the COE plan to achieve the reform objectives and principles mentioned above? First of all, according to the reform plan of 1932, in view of the extensiveness of the district area with its 31 villages, the COE decided to carry out its reform experiments by dividing the district into three subdistricts. The first subdistrict consisted of 12 villages with Chiang-chia-ch'iao as the central village, the second subdistrict 6 villages with Kao-chang-an as the central village, and the third subdistrict 14 villages with Kao-ching-ch'iao as the central village.13
Then the school assigned the following personnel to the district reform team: one general director, one clerical manager, three managers of academic affairs, several assistance managers, several agricultural guidance workers, and field work students designated by the school. With the assistance of the clerical manager, the general director was to supervise and coordinate the reform work of the three subdistricts from a general headquarters which was set up at the college. The managers for academic affairs, assistance managers, and agricultural guidance workers were to be divided into three groups and assigned to subdistrict reform centers to direct reform experiments by the student field workers.

Together in importance with the division of the reform district and organization of the reform team was the schedule of the reform process. The reform program can be divided into two large stages, preparation and practice. The former stage included preparing for the "projects restricted to permanent reform centers" (i.e., mass schools, tea houses, and village dispensaries) of each subdistrict, and drawing up of yearly reform schedules. Since it was essential to have detailed information regarding various reform aspects, the COE considered the social survey of the districts to be important. According to the COE Hui-pei reform plan, the social survey included the district's geography (i.e., terrain, area, number and location of villages, and population), economic condition (size and grades of cultivated land, kinds of crops, land ownership, subsidiary industries and their credit), educational levels (literacy rate and school situation), and the customs and disposition of the community. As a work schedule, the COE decided to complete the preparation stage
within the two months between August and October of 1932, and to start the actual reform projects from October of the same year. As indicated earlier, the reform experimental period was to be three years, ending in October, 1935.

What were then the actual methods and procedures by which the COE undertook the reform work? The initial stage of the experiment involved a social survey of villages in the experimental district. The contents of this survey have already been mentioned. As in the case of Kao-chang-an village of the second subdistrict, the survey was usually conducted by COE reformers in cooperation with village improvement societies.

The second step in the reform procedure was to win the confidence of the district people. The reform work was after all for the benefit of the district people and was to eventually be carried out by them. Therefore, gaining their understanding and support for reform work was tremendously important. This required a careful approach. The COE decided to use two methods simultaneously. The first method was to launch a public relations campaign. This included such methods as family visitation, conversations at the edge of agricultural fields, and open air speeches. This kind of campaign had been conducted by the COE reformers in Huang-hsiang village of the Hui-pei district in 1929 and had proven to be very effective. At the outset the villagers showed apathy or even obstructed the reform effort. Yet after a two-month campaign, the villagers' attitudes had changed completely. "There was no villager who passed by the reformers without greetings." The mass school enrollment, only six at the outset, increased to around 70 after one year. Also, during the 1934 student field-work
period, a public relations campaign was carried out by the student workers throughout all the subdistricts of the Hui-pei district and achieved similar good results. 20

The second method was to contact local leaders and seek their cooperation for the reform experiment. In the case of the Hui-pei district local leaders were literate and relatively well-to-do people who were peasants, village school teachers, and small merchants. 21 But gentry and local government functionaries such as hsiang and chen chiefs and lu and lin chiefs were also included as local leaders. One of the reasons for contacting these local leaders was to gain local recognition by using their influence. Such methods were considered necessary, for generally rural people were suspicious of innovations.

It was not easy at first to gain the confidence of the villagers. 22 To take the case of Cheng Shao-yuan, a graduate of the COE and rural workers in a village of the same hsien (Wu-hsi), the villagers at first mistook him for a tax collector sent by the hsien government and avoided him. Facing such a situation, Cheng visited lu and lin chiefs of the area and succeeded in clarifying his purpose of working for the village with their help. In addition, through the help of these government functionaries, Cheng enjoyed the convenience of utilizing the population register at hsiang public office in order to ascertain the number of people eligible for mass schools (i.e., inhabitants above 16 years of age). He also received assistance in that the government functionaries encouraged mass school attendance. However, according to Cheng, since many hsiang and chen chiefs of the time were usurers, landlords, and local strong men who preyed on and
oppressed the peasants, the scheme to use such local functionaries was a temporary expedient until the reformers could develop new leaders among the peasants.\textsuperscript{23}

Such a necessity seems to have been recognized by the COE authorities. The school included in its Hui-pei experimental project a plan to train new leaders among the young people. Though not concrete, the school's general idea for training local village leaders was as follows.

\textbf{Table 16. Plan for Training Local Village Leaders}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 1st year</td>
<td>To initiate reform work in liaison with the existing local leaders, and simultaneously to carry out reform projects together with the existing leaders and able peasants by making them staff members of the reform work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2nd year</td>
<td>To induce the villagers themselves to initiate reform projects while the rural reformers would form various organizations and train local young people, to be staff members of the organizations. The reformers' position would be only that of guides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 3rd year</td>
<td>To transfer the rural reform work completely to locally trained people while the reformers remained in an advisory capacity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Pen-yüan p'u-chi min-chung chiao-yü chih liang-ke shih-yen, Hui-pei shih-yen chih-pu" (Hui-pei Experiment Branch, Two Mass Education Propagation Experiments of This institute, CYMC 4:3 (Nov., 1932), 462.

Thus local leadership in reform work was to be developed among villagers through practical on-the-job training over three years (the experimental period) under the guidance of COE staff and students.

Another reform procedure was to organize village improvement societies (hsiang-ts'\text{un kai-chih-hui}). These societies were designed
to function as consultative bodies for rural reformers. They would be particularly important in the initial period of the reform. These societies also functioned as vanguard organizations to promote a rural reform spirit among villagers and as instruments to plan and execute village reform projects. But in order to be recognized as legitimate organization, the village improvement societies seem to have needed the approval of hsien government authorities. For example, the Kao-chang-an village improvement society applied to the hsien government as soon as it was formed in July 10, 1930 and obtained approval one month later. With such approval, societies would cooperate with local government functionaries (e.g., hsiang, lin chiefs) in carrying out village self-government affairs such as social surveys and the organization of the lin system. According to the minutes of the 10th executive committee meeting of the Kao-chang-an village improvement society held on December 14, 1931, the committee decided to carry out a census entrusted to them by the public office. Regulations established in October, 1932, of the Chou-lung-an village improvement society also included carrying out whatever the hsien government and ch'ü public office entrusted to the society within the scope of its "self-government promotion project." With regard to membership, the village improvement societies at the beginning commonly consisted of the COE rural workers, established village leaders, (sometimes hsiang, lin, lin chiefs), and intelligent young people. This membership would be gradually expanded to include other villagers. The rural reformers would encourage all the society members to participate in all aspects of reform work. Through such participation, the reconstructionists hoped to make the members...
aware that rural reform work was their own responsibility and to have them lend their full support. They also hoped to train the villagers to work together, to conduct meetings and to exercise the "four powers of the people." For example, the village improvement society of Chou-lung-an, at its first general meeting held in February, 1932, chose the training of the people in exercising the four powers of the people as one of its most important missions. Such a decision was carried out using various opportunities such as Sun Yat-sen weekly commemorative meetings, mass schools, and mass tea houses. At these meetings the reformers taught the people basic knowledge of people's rights and how to exercise the four powers of the people. Also, the society trained its members regarding democratic procedures by providing them with opportunities to preside over a meeting or to act as a committee member. The village improvement societies of Kao-chang-an and Huang-hsiang (the first experimental village of Hui-pei district) functioned similarly.

Reform Projects and Their Yearly Schedule. The COE divided reform projects into two categories, projects restricted to reform centers (kao-ting projects) and projects which could be carried out in any location (hou-tung projects). The former meant the operation of such reform centers as mass schools, mass tea houses, and mass dispensaries. The COE considere these projects to be fundamental and urgent for two reasons. The first reason was that through the projects of mass schools and mass tea houses, the reformers would provide the villagers with a minimum of education necessary to understand and participate in the reform work and to enable the people to carry out reform work for themselves. Opening of mass dispensaries was
important because of the many diseases among rural people. The second was that the COE reformers regarded these three facilities as good places to contact and awaken the people to the necessity of reforming their lives. The COE's yearly schedule for Kao-ting projects in the Hui-pei district is shown in the following table.

Table 17. The Yearly Schedule for the Kao-ting Projects in the Hui-pei District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>1st year</th>
<th>2nd year</th>
<th>3rd year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass school</td>
<td>The COE to provide all the operational and other expenses completely.</td>
<td>The COE to continuously provide operational funds; the students to be required to pay for their text and notebooks.</td>
<td>The school operational expenses to be borned by the local community, and texts and notebooks by the students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass tea house</td>
<td>same as above</td>
<td>The COE to provide the operational expenditures; the villagers to provide labor for maintenance of the tea houses.</td>
<td>All the operational and maintenance expenses to be borne by village people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass dispensary</td>
<td>same as above</td>
<td>Patients to be charged for medicine.</td>
<td>Patients to be charged for both diagnosis and medicine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By "hou-tung" projects the COE indicated reform activities which did not necessarily involve the reform centers mentioned above. The scope of these projects was wide, including projects for civic and
Table 18. The Yearly Reform Schedule of the Hui-p'ei Reform District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>The First Year (1932)</th>
<th>The Second Year (1933)</th>
<th>The Third Year (1934)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-government</td>
<td>To hold a &quot;Weekly Sun Yet-sun Commemoration Meeting&quot; with villagers at each subdistrict mass school every Sunday afternoon, and give lectures on various aspects of self-government.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to train villagers in exercising the four powers of the people through village improvement societies.</td>
<td>To continue the previous year's work; to elect village officials through popular election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of civic character</td>
<td>To give lectures every week on great patriots throughout Chinese history and on the rise and fall of nations.</td>
<td>In addition to the programs of the previous year, the villagers would be further trained in civic spirit by making them participate in various organizations.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to encourage the villagers to publicize in the neighboring villages the necessities of civic and self-government training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>To invite agricultural specialists and have them lecture and guide villagers in scientific agriculture, sericulture, and fish-farming techniques.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to make efforts to propagate scientific agricultural techniques.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to develop villagers' voluntary spirit for agricultural improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforming supplemen tally occupations</td>
<td>To emphasize growing vegetables and planting fruit trees and the use of idle land; to teach fish-farming and raising chickens and pigs.</td>
<td>To promote rural handicrafts including the manufacture of straw ropes.</td>
<td>To promote actively the projects of the previous years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing cooperatives</td>
<td>To give lectures on the outline of cooperatives and to organize one credit cooperative by combining several villages.</td>
<td>To increase the number of credit cooperatives and their membership; to organize other cooperatives.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year, yet to place emphasis on consumers' and production cooperatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and art</td>
<td>First, to assemble those who have talents from villages of the district and organize music or other societies, and to develop their talents by inviting specialists; to hold village recreational meetings as often as possible.</td>
<td>To continue the previous year's projects; to organize drama and travel societies and thus promote more cultural recreation.</td>
<td>To continue the projects of the previous year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforming customs</td>
<td>To hold lectures on reforming customs; to organize anti-gambling, charity, and working and funeral rites reform societies.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year, to enlarge the organizations, and to endeavor to spread their efforts.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous years and reform other customs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family affairs</td>
<td>To carry out family education by holding lectures, to organize housewives' societies, and to guide family cleanliness and child health care.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous years; to hold family cleanliness contests and children's health contests.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to place emphasis on promoting fellowship among housewives and developing the organizational capacity of housewives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>To hold lectures and discussions on such subjects as public health, cleanliness campaign, vaccinations, and organizing martial art societies.</td>
<td>To hold family cleanliness contests and to conduct health examinations of villagers in addition to the work of the previous year.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to stress public health and operate a sanitary inspection team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Construction</td>
<td>To place emphasis on reforestation and the construction of dikes in order to prevent droughts and floods.</td>
<td>In addition to the work of the previous year's work, construction and maintenance of roads and bridges were to be stressed.</td>
<td>To continue the work of the previous year; to construct small village parks and to pay attention to the improvement of village landscape.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Fan-yuan p'u-chi min-chung chiao-yü chih liang-ke shih-yan, Hui-p'ei shih-yan-chin-yu (Hui-p'ei Experimental Branch, Two Mass Education Propagation Experiments of This Institute), TPIC 4:3 (Nov., 1932), 468."
political training, economic improvement, cultural reform, health education, and public work. Most of such projects were also related to several subordinate programs. For example, civic and political training pertained to self-government and developing civic character; economic improvement included guidance in agriculture, supplementary occupations, and organizing cooperatives; cultural reform necessitated guidance in recreation and family affairs; and public work related to guidance in village construction. For these programs, the COE reformers also drew up a yearly schedule to be carried out between 1932 and 1934. The detailed contents of the schedule are shown in table 17.

Examining the two schedules (tables 17 and 18) carefully, we can notice that they were both designed in such a way that they could inculcate a voluntary and self-reliant spirit as well as concrete reform methods to improve all aspects of rural life. In carrying out the schedules, it was decided that as years passed, projects restricted to reform centers would be gradually reduced in number while projects which could be carried out in any location would be increased. Also, COE reformers of every subdistrict were to submit year-end reports regarding the plans and results of their reform experiments so that the COE could compare the effectiveness of each year's reform efforts. As a result of the reform schedules, the projects shown in table 19 were carried out throughout the Hui-pei district during the first semester of 1932.
Table 19. Projects Carried Out in Hui-pei District, First Semester, 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mass schools</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mass tea house</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village dispensary</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village park</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy circulation center</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simple athletic ground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vegetable demonstration field</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chicken-raising demonstration center</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credit cooperative</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>savings society</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marketing cooperative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fish-farming cooperative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village improvement society</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fire-fighting society</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>winter-protection corps</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bee-farming demonstration center</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Details of reform activities related to these projects are dealt with in the following chapter and thus are omitted here.

Reform Procedures on the Village Level

How then was the COE's general reform plan actually applied when villages of the Hui-pei's subdistricts carried out their reform work? Let us seek answers to such a question by taking the case of Chou-lung-an village as an example. According to a report made in June, 1932 by a COE reformer in charge of the village experiment, the Chou-lung-an reform experiment took the following steps.

First, before launching the village reform work, the COE reformers conducted a survey of the village society. They then visited village leaders such as Ko Tzu-ts'ai, Yen Hsiao-ling, and Chu Hui-yüan, and...
succeeded in getting their pledge to cooperate with the reform work. At the same time, they contacted villagers by opening a mass school and a mass tea house, and assured the villagers through family visitation and talks that they were working for the good of the villagers and differed from local "strong men" (t'u-hsieh). When the villagers' interest in the reform work was promoted to some extent, the reformers began to undertake the organization of a village improvement society. Spending almost all of September, 1932, the reformers were able to establish an improvement society which they named the Chou-lung-an Self-government Promotion Society (Tzu-chih hsieh-chin-hui).\(^{33}\)

As soon as the Chou-lung-an village improvement society was organized, the COE reformers and village leaders of the society made by-laws for the society. According to the by-laws, the society's reform experimental area was limited to seven villages around Chou-lung-an. Also the following four qualifications were established as necessary conditions for membership: (a) sincerity and justice, (b) enthusiasm for the public good, (c) no unsound habits (e.g., gambling or opium smoking), and (d) proper employment. Those who satisfied the above qualifications could become regular members by being recommended by two members of the society and approved of in a general meeting.\(^{34}\) The society was to be run mainly by the executive committee consisting of nine members. Of nine members, eight were peasants; one ran a boat. All nine were literate. Similarly, peasants constituted an absolute majority of its members, including the chairman of the society. As of April, 1933, its total membership was 192. The occupational and age distribution of the members was as follows.
Table 20. Occupational Distribution of Members of Chou-lung-an Tzu-chih hsieh-chin-hui

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No. of Members</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>peasant</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peasant and boatman</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boatman</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artisan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merchant</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teacher</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>192</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age Distribution of Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. of People</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>192</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chiang Ho, "Pen-yüan shih-shi min-ching cheng-chih chiao-yü chi i shih-li -- Chou-lung-an hsiang hsiang tzu-chih chih-ch"ü-pu" (An Actual Example of Political Education of the Masses by This Institute: The First Step Self-Government Experiment at Chou-lung-an hsiang), CYMC, 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1778.
we do not have similar detailed information regarding the membership of the other two subdistricts. But we do know that the village improvement society of Kao-chang-an of the second subdistrict consisted mainly of peasants and boatmen. Peasants also accounted for the majority of the improvement society's membership in Huang-hsiang reform village, another part of the Hui-pei district. From these facts, it seems that a preponderant peasant membership seems to have been a common phenomenon for all three subdistricts.

Chou-lung-an village improvement society decided to convene general meetings bi-monthly and hold executive committee meetings monthly. I was at the latter meetings where the reform projects were planned and carried out with the help of the reformers. As in the general plan of the Hui-pei district, the committee's reform plan included all the items related to COE civic and political training, economic reconstruction, and cultural improvement in peasant life. In carrying out the reform work, the following two points were established as guiding principles. First, all the reform projects were to be determined on the basis of the needs of the villagers and carried out by the villagers themselves at their own expense. Secondly, education would be made the chief means of inducing rural reform efforts. For instance, the COE reformers and the village leaders believed awaening the people through the spread of education to be a fundamental way to achieve self-government. Mass schools and mass tea houses were used for such a purpose. Also, improvement of agriculture, organization of cooperatives, and promotion of public health were all carried out by means of education.

As brief evidence for the effectiveness of the Chou-lung-an
village improvement society's work we can examine the following 19
items executed by the society during the seven months after its
establishment.

Table 21. Reform Items of the Chou-lung-an Village
Improvement Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Items</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(1) carried out complete compulsory elementary education for both children and adults, (2) established an elementary teachers' association, and (3) reorganized traditional village school into an elementary school.</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irrigation and transportation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(1) repaired three dykes and a bridge, and (2) constructed a 493 yard highway.</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispute arbitration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(1) arbitrated a landlord-agricultural laborer wage dispute, and (2) a tax dispute between tax collectors and a shopkeeper.</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reforming village</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(1) carried out anti-gambling and anti-opium smoking campaigns, and (2) organized a gambling prevention society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(1) organized fire-fighting corps in three villages, and (2) organized winter-protection corps in four villages.</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(1) established two credit cooperatives and one sericulture guiding center, (2) planted threes, and (3) held agriculture improvement lecture sessions.</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social survey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conducted census-taking and surveys on cultivated land area, agricultural production, occupation distribution, and number of children who did not attend school.</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above discussion, it seems possible to say that in the district of Chou-lung-an the general reform principles and procedures which the COE devised for the Hui-pei district were to a considerable degree put into practice. Also, there is little doubt that the same was true with the other reform districts under the COE. 39

Reform Procedures of the AVE

General Plan

The AVE's reform plan has been partially revealed in the preceding chapter. As in the case of the COE, it started with reform objectives. Under the slogan of "unity of education, wealth, and politics," which was coined by Chiang Wen-yü, the AVE had assumed these objectives -- the promotion of culture, improvement of the economy, and reform of village organization.

The AVE's rural reform procedures were in general accord with the steps suggested by Huang Yen-p'ei in his speech at the Fourth Annual NAAE Meeting held in T'ai-yüan, Shansi province in 1926. Huang's theories have been discussed in the previous chapter. The AVE's reform procedures consisted of six steps, similar to those of the COE. 40

First, the reformers would contact local leaders of planned reform areas to seek their cooperation for experimental projects in the area. Here, the AVE did not define clearly the character of local leaders. However, as indicated earlier, local leaders whom the AVE reformers would countact were generally persons of considerable prestige with wealth, education, and sometimes traditional academic degrees. Second, an investigation would be conducted to secure detailed information regarding conditions of the experimental area related to culture, economy, health, and organizations.
Third, the precise size of the reform experimental district would be determined. Because of the limited human and financial resources, the AVE reformers considered it more desirable to start reform work in a limited area and then to expand gradually to neighboring villages. Around 30 square li with a population of 3,000 to 5,000 was considered most proper as an initial experimental area, and out of the AVE's five reform districts, four (excluding the San-jen-ch'iao district) were close to such a standard. 41

Fourth, the reformers would make as reliable an estimate of necessary expenditures as possible. The estimate was to be an economical yet practical evaluation. Needless to say, expenditures of each district would be determined according to the size of the district and the scale of planned reform projects. Actual reform expenditures of the AVE's experimental districts at the initial reform stage varied from 1,200 to 5,000 yuan. 42

Fifth, reform societies, which were similar to the village improvement societies established by the COE, would be organized with local leaders and visiting reformers. But it was emphasized that local leaders would assume principal roles and reformers assistant roles. Although the membership composition varied slightly from district to district according to conditions of each district (e.g., cultural and economic standards of the district people and number of local leaders), there was no district among the AVE's experimental district which did no have a reform society.

Sixth, the reformers would draw up a yearly schedule for reform projects. When this yearly schedule was prepared, reformers were ready to launch experiments in their respective districts. Since
reformers viewed the rural experiments as essentially the work of villagers, they planned experiments for a limited period time, then transferred the work to the local community for the villagers' own management. Hence, it was emphasized that the yearly schedule should include programs of training local reform leaders, gradually reducing the reformers' role while increasing the villagers' part so that the villagers might take over the reform work completely after the experimental period. However, according to our record, only Hsü-kung-ch'iao and Huang-hsü districts fulfilled this step. These two districts had six years as an experimental period; reform works were transferred to local people in 1934 (for Hsü-kung-ch'iao) and in 1935 (Huang-hsü), respectively.43

Finally, in order to ensure the success of planned rural reform experiments, the AVE included a number of guidelines.44 Reformers were advised to plan so that all reform projects were within the economic and intellectual capacity of the district people. Moreover, in their relationship with villagers, the reformers were cautioned not to be mistaken for government agents. Also they were to win the villagers' friendship by visiting them as frequently as possible and politely discussing matters. The reformers were also advised to show sympathy toward the peasants and to endeavor to help resolve the peasants' various difficulties. The following types of assistance were suggested: writing for illiterates (various contract forms, letters, and invitations to weddings, funerals, and other occasions), paying debts for the poor, mediating disputes among the people, helping at weddings and funerals, and curing diseases. They were also advised to respect the existing village customs and to use gradual
and persuasive means, avoiding an abrupt and radical approach when there were customs which need to be reformed.

With regard to reform expenditures, the AVE guidelines stipulated that personnel and clerical expenses should not exceed half of the total reform expenditures. Again, so as to minimize expenditures, reform projects should be carried out in cooperation with rural school teachers. In order to place reform work on a firm and continuing basis, fund were to be raised by setting up yearly savings plans drawn from various public expenditures and voluntary contributions from villagers and outside supporters. No money was to be collected from villagers except voluntary contributions.45

Reform Plans of a Local District: Hsu-kung-ch'iao

The specific application of AVE's general reform plan at the local district level can be best seen in the case of the Hsu-kung-ch'iao experimental district. According to Huang Yen-p'ei, Hsu-kung-ch'iao, together with Huang-hsü chen, was selected as one of the two reform experimental districts, by the Board of Trustees of the Joint Rural Life Improvement Association, composed of the AVE, NAAE, Tung-nan University, and the Association for the Advancement of Mass Education. These two districts were chosen in order to compare results, for the two districts had different local conditions, situated at the western and eastern ends of the Nanking-Shanghai railway.46 As pointed out in Chapter Two, while Hsu-kung-ch'iao was a well-to-do area, having level and fertile land, Huang-hsü was a relatively impoverished area with poor quality land and insufficient water for agriculture. Also, as indicated earlier, Hsu-kung-ch'iao which consisted of 41 villages with the population of 3,500 in 1934 was chosen as a reform
experimental district because of the earnest request of local leaders such as Fang Wei-i and Ts'ai Wang-chih to make their native villages an experimental district. Thus the Hsü-kung-ch'iao Joint Rural Life Improvement Office was set up at the local pao-wei-t'uan bureau in October, 1926, and reform work was launched under the leadership of Chao Shu-yü. At the time, the Hsü-kung-ch'iao reform plan included the following programs: (1) propagation of improved seeds, elimination of harmful agricultural insects, and promotion of supplementary occupations; (2) reform of rural elementary education and enforcement of compulsory education; (3) adult education; (4) vocational guidance; (5) organization of various cooperatives; (6) a sanitary campaign; (7) afforestation and road construction; (8) elimination of opium smoking and gambling; and (9) increase of recreational opportunities. Although the reform experiment was soon halted in the spring of the following year (1927) due to the various reasons explained earlier, the reform programs became the basis for new ones resumed in the district in April, 1928.

The new AVE experimental work in the district was planned as a six-year project lasting from April, 1928 to June, 1934. The AVE reformers first organized a village improvement society. According to the regulations of the society, any adult, male or female, district villager or outside social worker, who sympathized with the goal of the society could become a regular member of the society upon the recommendation of two regular members of the society.

The supreme organ of the improvement society was a general assembly which was to be held twice a year, in spring and autumn. But in actuality the society was run by an executive committee which
Fig. 12. The Organization of Hsü-kung-ch'iao Village Improvement Society. Source: Ku Mo, Min-chung chiao-yü hsin tung-hsiang (New Trend in Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1946), 63.
consisted of four AVE reformers and five local leaders represented by Ts'ai Wang-chih, an ex-provincial assemblyman at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. Under the committee functioned the department of management which carried out reform projects decided by the committee through five sections: a general affairs section, construction section, agricultural section, education section, and security section. The organization of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao village improvement society is shown in figure 11.

During the experimental period reform expenditures were supported by AVE subsidies, donations from some villagers and outside businessmen, and also by subsidies from the hisen department of education and security. However, after the experimental period it was planned that reform expenses would be borne mainly by the villagers themselves.

As was in the case of the general plan of the AVE, the Hsü-kung-ch'iao rural improvement society drew up a yearly reform schedule prior to launching the reform experiment. The yearly reform schedule contained six divisions: village government, agriculture, education, security, construction, and recreation. The detailed contents of the schedule are shown in the following table 22.

Since Hsü-kung-ch'iao was the AVE's first rural reform experiment district, its reform plan faithfully corresponded to the AVE general reform plan. The AVE's other reform districts adopted the principles, format, and basic organization followed by Hsü-kung-ch'iao village improvement society. Hence, the reform plans of the other districts were also made in such a way that villagers could develop step by step the capacity to carry out their own village reform work while they were working with the reformers over a fixed period of time.
Table 22. The Yearly Reform Schedule of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao Reform District.

1. Division of Village Government

**The First Year (April 1928-June, 1929):**
- To establish a village improvement society; to carry out village surveys; to compile village population registers; to compile land registers; to draw village maps; to set up road signs; to compile an agricultural calendar; and to hold village chiefs' talk sessions.

**The Second Year (July, 1929-June, 1930):**
- To continue village surveys; to hold village chiefs' talk sessions and villagers' talk sessions regularly; and to reelect committee members of the village improvement society.

**The Third Year (July, 1930-June, 1931):**
- To continue works of the previous year; to revise villagers population registers and land registers; and to collect reform funds.

**The Fourth Year (July, 1931-June, 1932):**
- To continue the previous year's work; and to hold model elections of village chiefs and the ch'ü chiefs.

**The Fifth Year (July, 1932-June, 1933):**
- Same as the previous year.

**The Sixth Year (July, 1933-June, 1934):**
- Same as the previous year and to hold reelectons of various village government personnel.

2. Division of Agriculture

**The First Year:**
- To establish an agricultural station; to distribute improved seeds; to study the state of agricultural implements; to establish agricultural implements exhibition rooms; to prevent and eliminate harmful agricultural insects; to prepare for the organization of cooperatives, and to teach scientific agricultural techniques.

**The Second Year:**
- To prepare establishment of meteorological station; to improve agricultural implements; to carry out afforestation; to organize loan centers and cooperatives; to hold agricultural production contests; to study about supplementary occupation; and to distribute improved seeds continuously.

**The Third Year:**
- To continue previous year's work; to establish a meteorological station, to organize a savings association, and to prepare for the establishment of agricultural warehouses.

**The Fourth Year:**
- Same as the previous year; and to establish agricultural warehouses.

**The Fifth Year:**
- Same as the previous year.
Table 22. (continued)

The Sixth Year:
Same as the previous year.

3. Division of Education

The First Year:
To reorganize the existing third elementary school into a center­elementary school; to establish additional mass schools; to draft educational creeds; and to improve villagers moral knowledge and to teach physical culture.

The Second Year:
To increase the number of classes and students; to set up night schools; to guide study and vocation; and to advocate studying martial arts.

The Third Year to The Sixth Year:
To continue works of previous years.

4. Division of Security

The first Year:
To hold pao-wei-t'uan talk sessions; to launch sanitary campaigns; to give medical treatment and inoculations; to sweep roads; and to make plans for remodeling latrines.

The Second Year:
To increase the number of pao-wei-t'uan members and train them during slack seasons; to prepare organization of a fire-prevention corps; to commence the work of remodeling latrines; to begin village dispensaries; and to begin maternity care.

The Third Year:
To train pao-wei-t'uan members during slack seasons, to organize a fire-prevention corps; and to continue the remodeling work of latrines and works of dispensary and maternity care.

The Fourth Year:
To continue works of the previous year; to enlarge the fire-prevention corps; to experiment with a traveling dispensary; and to prepare a public cemetery.

The Fifth Year to The Sixth Year:
To continue works of the previous year.

5. Division of Construction

The First Year:
To pave town roads with stones, to set up an alarm bell; to complete the peasant education hall building; to complete the public play ground; to construct a stone road between Hsü-kung-ch'iao and T'ang-chia-ch'iao; to complete a bridge connecting roads between Hsü-kung-ch'iao and T'ang-chia-ch'iao; to continue the village improvement society's building; and other public works.

The Second Year:
To continue the construction and maintenance work of roads of the previous year; and to continue repair of bridges.
Table 22 (continued)

The Third Year:
To continue works of the previous year; and to study the improvement of irrigation.

The Fourth Year:
To continue repair of roads and bridges; to undertake the improvement work of irrigation; and to prepare the construction of a village government office.

The Fifth Year:
To continue works of the previous year; and to complete the construction of the village government office.

The Sixth Year:
Same as the previous year.

6. Division of Recreation

The First Year:
To hold a new year's recreation meeting; to hold summer recreation and training meeting; to establish a mass tea house; and to prepare other recreational facilities.

The Second Year:
To continue works of the previous year; to hold a winter training meeting; to hold a summer training meeting; to prepare for the establishment of a public recreation center; and to organize a traveling society.

The Third Year:
To continue works of the previous year; to complete the establishment of the public recreation center; and to prepare the construction of a central park.

The Fourth Year:
Same as the previous year except for completing the construction of the central park.

The Fifth Year:
Same as the previous year except for preparing the construction of Sung-pin Park.

The Sixth Year:
Same as the previous year except for the construction of the Sung-pin Park.

Source: Hsü Ying-lien, Ch'üan-kuo hsiang-ts'un chien-she yüntung k'ai-k'uang (National Situation of the Rural Reconstruction Movement), (Tsou-p'ing, 1935), 435-437.
HsÜ-kung-ch'iao's schedule, which categorized reform projects into six divisions, was used in the other reform districts as well. So too was its committee system for operating village improvement societies composed of AVE's reform specialists and local district leaders. These local leaders were, as in the case of HsÜ-kung-ch'iao, mostly gentry or educated and well-to-do people. The leading figure of the Huang-hsÜ reform district, Leng Yü-ch'iu, was one of the rich gentry, and Ku Chūn-i, the initiator of the Ku-kao-chuang reform district, was, as mentioned earlier, a professor at Chi-nan University and wealth enough to bear most of that district's reform expenditures. However, unlike the COE's reform district, the organization of village improvement societies, some reform programs, and the length of experimental periods varied slightly among the AVE's reform districts. For instance, although village improvement societies of both HsÜ-kung-ch'iao and the Huang-hsÜ districts adopted an executive committee system as the decision-making body, the HsÜ-kung-ch'iao's committee did not have division of work within itself while the Huang-hsÜ's committee had three sections of its own -- planning, executive, and inspection. It seems that the latter system should have been more effective in carrying out reform work in view of its clearly defined division of work. Also the Huang-hsÜ's annual schedule included such reform programs as reclamation, establishment of a cocoon factory, and promotion of scientific sericulture which the HsÜ-kung-ch'iao did not contain. Similarly, slight variations in reform programs existed in other reform districts according to their differing local conditions. The AVE considered this variation in reform plans according to differing local conditions (yin-ti chih-i) to be
an important principle.

The Hsiao-chuang Group's Reform Plan and Procedure

General Plan

It was mentioned in the previous chapter that the Hsiao-chuang School greatly emphasized planned activities for every aspect of its members' lives. Each year the Hsiao-chuang people, as individuals or as a group, were required to draw up daily, weekly, monthly, and annual plans for their activities. Unfortunately, the available materials do not provide any information regarding a Hsiao-chuang general rural reform plan like those of the COE and the AVE. It is only through T'ao Hsing-chih's Preliminary plan for Kung-hsüeh-t'uan (KHT) experimentation, which T'ao devised as a new rural reform approach, that we can gain knowledge regarding overall planning on the part of the Hsiao-chuang group.55

According to the preliminary plan, the aim of the KHT was to train its members to be sound and able citizens who had general capabilities in the fields of military affairs, production, science, reading, exercising the four powers of the people, and birth control. They were thereby to contribute to the construction of a great China respected by others.

As principles in organizing the KHT T'ao stressed the following two points. First, the central body, the chief force, of rural KHT should be the "true peasants" who lived by tilling land with their own hands. According to T'ao, this condition was essential in order to prevent the organization from falling in the hands of "destructive people" who would make use of the KHT for their own personal benefit.
Roles of visiting reformers should be those of stimulation, assistance, and guidance, not carrying out reform projects in the villagers' stead. In other words, the reformers' task was to help villagers carry out village reforms for themselves. In order to achieve this it was necessary to develop the villagers' voluntary spirit, self-reliance capacity, and self-guiding (tzu-tao) ability. T'ao considered that villagers needed stimulation, assistance, and guidance in developing these qualities.

Reform Procedures. To organize a KHT, T'ao considered the following procedures most desirable. The first step for reformers to take was to initiate and organize a village reform society (hsiang-ts'un kai-tsao-sa) in order to develop a detailed guidance plan, estimate reform expenditures, and identify the "true" peasants. He did not here clarify the kinds of people whom the reformers needed to help in organizing the village reform society. However, in view of his strong feeling against the traditional type of existing local leaders (the gentry and local strong men), it is certain that the traditional local leaders were to be excluded. T'ao probably had in mind intelligent and reform-minded young men from peasant families, as desirable initial cooperators, as he suggested in the second step. For the second step T'ao recommended the organization from among the peasants of a board of trustees for the reform society. The board would be responsible for the expenditures of the society and for inviting a general-director and his assistance to aid in the work of the society. The society was to function as a nucleus organization in forming the KHT which would involve as many as possible, hopefully the whole village population. It was T'ao's belief that KHT should be run by the peasants based on
their own vantage point. However, in view of their inexperience in reform work, T'ao considered that peasants needed the help of specialists in rural reform for the successful management of the KHT at the initial stage.

The third step pertained to the method of enlarging the KHT. T'ao maintained that when a village was organized into a KHT and achieved financial independence in maintaining the t'uan, that village should assist other villages to establish KHT of their own. In all such cases, T'ao stressed, the KHT of each village should be based on the principle of self-reliance, making the best use of the local resources in both personnel and material. For example, T'ao said:

If rooms are needed, to borrow the use of public buildings should be made a principle, and the construction of new buildings should be restricted to only cases when such construction is badly needed. As for agricultural experimental stations it is desirable to utilize village farms, having peasants conduct agricultural experimentation through contract. Therefore, land is not necessarily to be purchased. As play grounds, barren fields could be used after being properly levelled. Likewise, in the matter of self-defense arms, at the initial stage, weapons which villagers had kept with them could be assembled and used; later they may be gradually expanded in variety and number. (57)

T'ao also suggested a concrete organizational set-up of KHT. The KHT he conceived was to have one corps chief and one deputy chief who were elected through a general election of the whole corps. The corps also needed a number of "little teachers" for teaching villagers simple characters and skills useful in rural life. The general assembly of the corps would serve as the supreme organ of the corps. It was necessary to formulate general corps regulations and make all corps members observe the regulations. The corps was also to elect two inspectors who were in charge of supervising the behavior of all corps
members including the staff members. In addition, each KHT should have at least one reform guide (a rural reform specialist) so as to receive advice on various matters concerning KHT projects. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, since there could be a variety of kinds of KHT in one village, such as children's KHT, youth KHT and adult KHT, T'ao thought that it was highly desirable for villages to hold frequent joint conferences in order to provide mutual assistance. 59

As final items of his reform plan, T'ao included the training of rural reform "guides" and preparing reform budgets. T'ao's idea of training rural reform guides was, however, a simple undetailed program. It merely suggested that the KHT reformers would welcome reform-minded young people who would join KHT and learn the organization and operation of the KHT while working with villagers. Since his former training institution, Hsiao-chuang School, had been closed, T'ao now schemed to train rural workers from among young intellectuals from cities through on-the-job training in the KHT. 60 He seems to have used them in expanding the KHT movement.

T'ao's proposal for the KHT budget was also brief. Recognizing the inevitability of variations in budgets according to special conditions and needs of each village, T'ao suggested only the minimum budget which was in his opinion needed to operate a KHT. T'ao estimated the annual general expenditure of a KHT as follows: 61

Table 23. Estimated Annual Expenditures of A KHT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Salaries for ordinary reform guides:</td>
<td>960 yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Remuneration fees for agricultural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and other production guidance:</td>
<td>960 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Installation expense of production equipments:</td>
<td>1,500 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) Mobile capital for production: 1,000  
(5) Maintenance expense: 300 " 
(6) Rental fees: 280 " 
(7) Training expense for KHT guides: 1,000 " 


Since complete records are not available, we are not certain to what extent T’ao's above reform plan was faithfully put into practice at the level of the village KHT. But considering that the KHT was sheerly a product of T’ao's personal initiation and his followers' efforts, it is reasonable to conjecture that the above reform plan must have become the basis upon which many village KHT were formed.

Summary and Conclusion

From the preceding discussions we can see that rural reform projects of the three reconstruction institutions were all based on detailed plans drawn up in advance. In addition, reviewing the reform plans, we find that they shared a number of common features. Firstly, the plans were made to cover most aspects of rural life that needed improvement, including education, local culture, economy, sanitation, village organization, and local defense. This was because the leaders of the three institutions considered the rural problems mainly as those of poverty, ignorance, poor health, lack of organization, and lack of local defense. Also, since these problems were interrelated, the reconstruction leaders felt that the reform problems should be tackled simultaneously.

Secondly, the reform plans were prepared on two levels: one on the
institutional level, applying generally to all the experimental districts, and the other on the local level for each particular reform district or village. The former functioned as a base plan for the latter. Results of each institution's research and experiments relating to rural problems provided the basic frame of reference upon which the general plans were constructed; information gained from detailed social surveys of each experimental locality was a key factor in determining local reform plans.

Third, the reform plans of the three institutions were based on certain common principles. The COE's and AVE's reform plans were designed to gradually develop the villagers' capacity to improve their lives voluntarily and to insure that the responsibility for reform work would be ultimately shouldered by the villagers. Thus yearly reform schedule on the local level were made in such a way that villagers could learn how to carry out reform work step by step while they were working with the reformers. For the same reason, the reform plans of the two institutions generally fixed certain periods of time for their experiments. After the experimental period the reform work was to be turned over to the local people. Also rural reform work was to be put on a self-reliant basis. Thus another principle was that reform projects should be designed with the capacity of the local people in mind so that the best use of local resources, both human and material, could be made. Regarding the Hsiao-chuang group, only a vague reform plan is available. But even this plan demonstrates the principle of self-reliance and the emphasis on the villagers' voluntary participation.
Fourthly, as a means to carry out rural reform work effectively, the three institutions undertook reform work according to a certain prearranged order. Reform procedures of the COE and the AVE, which were similar, each included conducting a social survey of reform villages, contacting the village people and local leaders, organizing a village improvement society, and drawing up reform schedules. The village improvement society was the central organization for the villagers' reform work. The Hsiao-chuang group's reform procedure differed from those of the other two institutions in two ways. (1) The first priority was given to the organization of a reform society which would be dominated by peasants, excluding the traditional type of established local leaders. (2) It emphasized the training of young rural workers from both rural villages and cities, and the spread of similar rural reform work to other villages.

In examining the contents of the three institutions' reform plans, the following differences in emphasis can be discerned. In general, the COE's reform plans emphasis on developing the people's capacity for self-government. Compared with the rest of the country at that time, they took active and even somewhat bold measures in developing the people's ability to exercise the four rights of the people. The AVE's plan gave more priority to the improvement of economy and the physical environment rather than to the training of the people for self-government. The AVE had only cautious and passive self-government training programs. These differing tendencies seem to have been related to the leadership of the two institutions' reform districts. In the COE districts, leaders of the village improvement societies consisted mostly of peasants and local school teachers. Leaders of
similar organs in the AVE districts were mainly drawn from established local leaders such as influential gentry or rich men of considerable social status.

The reform plans of the Hsiao-chuang group differed even more from those of the COE and the AVE in that it promoted training of the people in military affairs for their self-defense and also in birth control. More fundamentally, the Hsiao-chuang group envisioned the construction of a new society based on egalitarianism and dominated by working people. This we cannot find in the objectives of the COE and the AVE's reform plans.
CHAPTER VII
RURAL REFORM PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE THREE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION INSTITUTIONS

Continuing the discussion of the reform plans of the three institutions, this chapter attempts to determine how the rural reform theories of the three reconstruction institutions were actually put into practice. The present chapter presents two aspects of the reform experiments. The first aspect concerns reform programs carried out and the results obtained in the three institutions' reform districts. These will be discussed in six categories: programs of educational reform, cultural improvement, economic improvement, political and civic training, health improvement, and construction. These categories include all the reform programs launched by the three institutions. The second aspect presents difficulties and lessons in the rural reform experiments. Analysis will be based on reports and comments made by rural reconstructionists of the three institutions.

Rural Reform Programs and Activities

Programs for Educational Reform

It has been pointed out in the preceding chapter that the rural reconstructionists regarded "ignorance" as a fundamental weakness of the Chinese peasants. This ignorance severely limited the peasants' scope, making life nothing but a repetitious process of eating, working, and sleeping. It made them vulnerable to exploitation and
oppression by cruel gentry and corrupt local officials, and deprived
them of opportunities for self-improvement. Furthermore, it was a
root of cultural backwardness, and its prevalence among the peasants
was considered a major block in the development of the Chinese
society. Hence, the problem of ignorance became one of the funda-
mental concerns for the rural reconstructionists, who attempted to
solve it by means of educational improvement in villages. Programs
of educational improvement were carried out primarily by two approaches:
(1) the increase and improvement of rural elementary schools, and (2)
elimination of illiteracy among adults.

The increase and improvement of rural elementary schools was a
fundamental approach to solving educational problems for rural
children. As indicated in Chapter Two, the percentage of school
attendance in reform districts was very low. For instance, in 1933
the Hui-pei experimental districts of the COE had one small elementary
school with fewer than fifty students enrolled, while the total
number of school age children in the district was more than 1,600.²
Before 1928 the AVE's Hsü-kung-ch'iao, which had a total population
of 3,500, had a total population of 3,500, had a small public
elementary school and a private school, with both schools' students
totaling only about 100.³ Huang-hsü district of the same institution,
which had a total population of 5,774, also had only a small rural
elementary school.⁴ Likewise, situations in the other districts seem
to have been no better than those of these three districts. However,
since both increasing the number of schools and improving school
facilities required large sums of money, the reconstructionists' work
in this area was limited. According to information available, out of
the rural reform districts mentioned in the early part of the preceding chapter, only the following districts showed some observable results in increasing the number of schools.

In the Hui-pei district, which included such villages as Huang-hsiang, Kao-chang-an, and Chou-lung-an, the COE reformers established by 1936 two six-year elementary schools which admitted 79 and 31 students, respectively, and on four-year experimental rural school which had 61 students. Because of the small number of teachers responsible for students of many differing age groups, it was customary for these schools to conduct classes by dividing the students into two groups: a whole-day class group for the small children, and a half-day group for the older children. In view of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao case mentioned below, another reason for such a division seems to have been the consideration that older children usually helped their parents in the family and field work.

Of the AVE's reform districts, the Hsü-kung-ch'iao district was known for establishing a relatively large number of elementary schools. During the six-year experimentation between 1928 and 1933, the district set up four new elementary schools in addition to the two existing schools. We do not have data concerning the enrollment of each school, but it is obvious that the schools were generally small possibly because of the stringent budget. Kuan-lan School, established in memory of Yuan Hsi-t'ao, a leading advocate of compulsory education in China and maintained by contributions of a Shanghai businessman, was an extreme example of a small school. This school had only one class room, a little over one chien (about four
square meters), and was run by only one teacher who was the principal and teacher simultaneously. This small school was experimenting with compulsory education for the children from 84 families in the area of the school. Hence, classes were conducted in three groups: a whole-day class, a half-day class, and an evening class for those who had to help with family work. The annual school budget was three to four hundred yuan, which was comparable to the annual expenditure of a middle-peasant family. The largest school was the Hsü-kung-ch'iao Elementary School which had less than 100 students before 1928. The school was expanded to admit up to about 400 students. This school was also made the "center-elementary school," which was a sort of model school, so that other schools in the district might emulate its instruction methods and school management. As a result of these efforts, school enrollment in the district increased from about 100 to 550 out of a total of 650 school-age children during the six-year reform experiment.

In the Huang-hsü district, only one "simple elementary school" (chien-i hsüeh-hsiao), which offered a short four-year elementary school course, was set up in cooperation with a provincial rural normal school. In the school, normal students taught village children as a part of their teaching practice. The Shan-jen-ch'iao district established two "experimental elementary schools" and five more elementary schools. But details about these schools are not available.
The Hsiao-chuang group, as we have seen previously, showed a particular interest in education of rural children and set up six rural elementary schools and five kindergartens in the villages around the school.

In order to eliminate illiteracy among rural people, mass schools (min-chung hsueh-hsiao) were used as the chief instrument throughout the districts of the three institutions. The objective of the mass schools was to educate the entire village population including children, young people, and adults. But as a rule, emphasis was placed on adult education. The organization and the contents and instructional schedule of mass schools varied slightly between different localities according to local needs. However, the overall operational methods were similar throughout all the reform districts regardless of their sponsoring institutions. A detailed examination of the operation in the Pci-hsia district of the COE below will give us a general idea of how mass schools functioned.

The mass school was operated in two ways: a fixed school system and a flexible school system. The fixed school system was a classroom type of instruction in which the adult course was divided into three classes: elementary, middle, and high. The study period of each class was four months, thus making the three classes into a complete one-year course. The children's course was divided into a whole-day class and half-day class, and the curriculum was arranged in such a way that students could complete the elementary course in four and a half years. The young people's course was a half-day
class, lasting one year. In addition, a nursery was set up to accommodate students with children.

The subjects taught were national language (Chinese characters), civic training, arithmetic, art, and singing. These were required subjects designated by the Ministry of Education, and therefore were offered at every mass school. In addition to these, history, geography, science, and agriculture or commerce could be added according to local needs and the level of the students.

For literacy education there were three textbooks available. They were: Three Principles of the People One Thousand Character Textbook which was prepared by the Ministry of Education, a Peasants' Thousand Character Textbook compiled by the National Association of the Mass Education Movement, and People's Reader compiled by the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education. In Kiangsu and Chekiang areas it was said that the People's Reader was used more because not only was the vocabulary more appropriate for the areas, but also the length of the book fit the four-month course of mass schools in these provinces. The People's Reader contained about 1,300 basic Chinese characters. After completing this book one was expected to be able to read newspapers and write personal letters.

The activities of mass schools were not without difficulties. The most critical problems were related to attracting students (chao-sheng wen-t'i) and student drop-outs (liu-sheng wen-t'i). Because of the peasants' suspicion toward new things and intrusion of outsiders, it was not easy for rural reformers to attract a sufficient number of students for mass schools. Usually it was only
after an active propaganda campaign through posters, visitations, and speeches that they were able to convince the people of the benefits of the mass school. It was said to be especially important to stress that attending a mass school required little money.

Student drop-outs presented an even more difficult problem. There were usually many students at the beginning of classes. But toward the end of the course the students began to drop out leaving only a few students. Reasons for this phenomenon were many: lessons that were too difficult, too many family matters to take care of, the long distance between the school and home, and opposition from the family head, etc. In order to prevent this drop-out tendency, the reformers employed such methods as improving the teacher-student relationship, using easy textbooks, and visiting students' homes and explaining about the necessity of education to the family. The number of mass schools newly established by the reformers in the reform districts is shown in Table 24.

The flexible school system was to supplement the shortcomings of the fixed school system. Owing to various reasons such as misunderstanding, shyness, busy work, and the social custom of keeping men and women apart, there were many people who did not attend the mass schools. Such cases were especially prevalent among housewives. In order to reach these people, various additional teaching methods were devised. They included the so-called "mobile teaching" (liu-tung chiao-hsüeh), the "little teachers" and "middle teachers" system, and the People's Newspaper (min-chung-pao).
Table 24. The Number of Mass Schools Established in the Reform Districts (1936)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Number of Mass Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui-pei</td>
<td>12 (549 students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pei-hsia</td>
<td>20 (1,424 students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsu&quot;-kung-ch'iao</td>
<td>1 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang-hsü</td>
<td>1 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan-jen-ch'iao</td>
<td>5 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku-kao-chuang</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao-chuang School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao-chuang village</td>
<td>3 (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (1) for COE districts HTKK, 402 (Hui-pei), 398 (Pei-hsia); (2) for AVE districts op. cit., 442 (Hsu"-kung-ch'iao), 448 (Huang-hsü), 454 (Shan-jen-ch'iao), and 457 (Ku-kao-chuang); (3) for Hsiao-chuang reform area, Liang Shu-ming, "T'ashan chih shih" (Rock in Others' Mountain), Hsiao-chuang i-shui (A Year of the Hsiao-chuang School), ed. by Fang Yu-yen, Shanghai, 1934, 251.

The mobile teaching system was a method in which teachers went to students' homes during the students' spare-time and gave instruction. This type of mobile class was conducted mostly in the evening after supper, and the number of students was usually three to five. 15 As of 1936, however, only Hui-pei and Hsu"-kung-ch'iao districts operated two mobile classes each. 16

As briefly mentioned earlier, the little teacher system was a means devised by T'ao Hsing-chih at the Shan-hai Kung-hsüeh-t'uan (KHT) in order to solve the problem of a teacher shortage, using advanced students to teach other students. Mottos of the KHT in this method of learning and teaching by students themselves were "to pass
knowledge you learn to others at once," "to teach the people you meet," and "to learn from the person you meet." Children were capable of teaching not only fellow children, but also their sisters and brothers, and parents. They were found especially convenient and effective for teaching women who tended to shun male teachers, as was the Chinese custom. Thus having proved to be a very effective and economical way to combat illiteracy, this system spread to many parts of China.17 Adopting this system, the Pai-hsia district encouraged school children to teach each other and also adults who were illiterate. Furthermore, emulating the little teachers system, the district devised the so-called "middle teachers" system which used young people who received education above elementary level in teaching illiterate adults.18

The "People's Newspaper" was used in Pai-hsia district to combat illiteracy. It was a newspaper for the villagers, which used simple characters like those contained in the People's Reader so that it could help the people increase their reading abilities. The paper was also designed to help the rural population develop the habit of paying attention to current social and political affairs in the village as well as in the nation, and thus functioned as an instrument forming a sound public opinion among the villages. This paper had a readers' column, and students of mass schools were encouraged to contribute their writings.19 In the other districts the method of using wall posters (pi-pao), which reported in sample character important current news, announcements, and useful information, was also employed for the same purpose.20
The reformers' efforts to improve the educational level of the peasant by means of mass schools and the other supplementary methods achieved considerable results in most of the reform districts. Among the COE's reform districts, for example, in Kao-chang-an village, the number of literate adults before 1931 included 139 males (49 per cent of the total number) and two females (1 per cent). These figures increased to 182 (66 per cent) of males and 34 (15 per cent) females after one year of education. In Huang-hsiang district, the number of literates for the ages between seven and ninety-five increased from 43 (9.2 per cent) to 324 (46.5 per cent) as a result of three years of instruction from March, 1929, through June, 1931. In Hui-pei district, a large district consisting of 168 villages in 1936, the number of literate adults increased from 8,745 (30 per cent) to 11,660 (40 per cent) for the two years of 1933 and 1934. For the Pei-hsia district, we do not have data for literacy changes. But the mass schools of the district educated 2,914 adults over three years between 1932 and 1934.

In Hsü-kung-ch'iao, the representative reform district of the AVE, during the six-year experiment between 1928 and 1934, the number of school children increased from 260 to 650; the number of elementary schools, from two to six plus two mobile classrooms; and the number of literate adults from 568 (28.1 per cent) to 1,524 (43.3 per cent).

Programs for Cultural Improvements

Cultural backwardness, which was a byproduct of ignorance, was another problem hindering the sound life of the rural population. This included bad social habits such as gambling and opium-smoking, wide-spread superstition, and harmful social practices such as early marriage and wasteful expenditures on family occasions. These
habits and practices were not only bad for the spiritual life of the peasants, but also, as we have seen in Chapter Two, aggravated economic difficulties. Hence, the expulsion of such practices from the life of village people occupied an important place in the rural reform effort.

Gambling seems to have been prevalent among the rural population in Kiangsu. Majong, chiu-chih-p'ai, and even poker were popular not only among the male peasants, but also among women. There were also many opium smokers. According to a writer, in K'ung-shan hsien in the early 1930's even the smallest town had four to five opium parlors called "yen-teng." For another example, a village in the Hui-pei district which consisted of only 570 households had several opium parlors. As mentioned earlier, tea houses in the villages also used to be places for gambling and opium sales.

In order to correct these bad social habits various means were used. As one such means, we have already cited in Chapter Five the remodeling of tea houses into sound peasant recreation centers commonly called "mass tea houses." This method was employed by all three institutions. Prohibiting gambling and opium-smoking, the mass tea house was used as a place for villagers to rest, drink tea, and enjoy acceptable games such as go and Chinese checkers. Villagers also learned various forms of useful knowledge concerning agriculture and current affairs from lectures which the reformers specially arranged. Anti-gambling and anti-opium smoking campaigns, which were usually conducted by the village improvement society, were other means used throughout the reform districts. The society
members would pressure gamblers to stop their bad habits and advise opium parlors to close. In the Shan-jen-ch'iao district of the AVE, as a result of the anti-opium smoking campaign, the villagers voluntarily organized a "Group for Warning Against Opium" (Chieh-yen-t'uan), which encouraged the villagers to counsel with each other against smoking opium. They also used anti-opium smoking pills to cure opium addicts. Huang-hsiang, Hsü-kung-ch'iao, and Ku-kao-chuang reform districts reported that after carrying out such methods, gambling and opium smoking disappeared in their villages.

The rural reformers were not against religion itself. But they considered that the rural people should be emancipated from superstition, which was based on groundless beliefs related mainly to good and bad luck instead of helping the spiritual growth of the people. In Chapter Two we saw how superstition had a harmful effect upon the lives of the rural people in terms of economy and health.

The methods the reconstructionists employed to eliminate superstition in their experimental districts were many and included publicizing the evils of superstition, using such opportunities as commemorative meetings, recreation meetings, and class hours at the mass school. The village improvement society held public-hearing sessions on the superstition problem. The societies also showed villagers movies which exposed the falseness of superstition. In some districts they even remodeled village temples, often centers of superstition, into mass schools. Some of these methods had been used during the period of the KMT-CCP period as a part of the peasant movement. We have already seen one example of the actual benefits of
the reformers' effort to eliminate superstition in the case of Huang-hsiang village, mentioned in Chapter Two. The villagers could save considerable sums of money by reducing contributions to various folk gods and shortening worship days. Yet at the same time, we also saw that because superstition was strongly rooted in the life of rural people, it was very difficult to eliminate it completely.33

Settlement of disputes among local people (hsi-sung) was another important aspect of the cultural improvement program in many reform districts. Village improvement societies of the COE's Huang-hsiang and Chou-lung-an districts and the AVE's Shan-jen-ch'iao and Ku-kao-chuang districts had a "dispute arbitration committee" (t'iao-chieh wei-yüan-hui or hsi-sung-hui) in order to resolve disputes among villagers.34 To take two concrete examples of dispute settlement, the Huang-hsiang district's dispute arbitration committee took care of twenty-five disputes during the two years of 1930 and 1931. The disputes were as follows: landownership disputes, 5; quarrels, 4; assault and battery, 4; husband-wife quarrels, 3; inheritance disputes, 2; property damage negotiations, 2; debt settlements, 2; adultery, 1; and a buy-and-sell dispute, 1.35 Chou-lung-an village improvement society also recorded two incidents of local disputes resolved in 1932. The first incident was a wage dispute between a landlord and agricultural laborers which occurred in autumn of the same year. The village improvement society invited representatives of the two sides and had them agree upon the standards of wages (i.e., for men laborers 0.24 yüan per day and for women laborers, 0.20 yüan) and publicly announced the result.
After that, the landlord-laborer relation became normalized. Another incident concerned arbitrary exploitations of cigarette and liquor shops by Wu-hsi hsien tax collectors. In the same autumn, there even occurred an incident of battery on shop owners by the tax collectors. The village improvement society intervened in these matters and resolved the aggravated relations between the two sides peacefully through mediation. After the village shop owners began to have access to the society's mediation, not only did the tax collectors' graft cases disappear, but also the village shop owners' taxes were lightened. 36

Preservation and propagation of traditional folk dramas and martial arts, and the introduction of modern plays and music were also an important part of cultural improvement work. They were used to enrich the lives of the rural people and also to supplement the effects of other reform programs. To take dramas as an example, in Kiangsu province, as in other provinces, traditional local folk dramas were very popular among the rural population. Their themes were taken from historical events and traditional novels, and their contents were mostly about promotion of virtue and disapproval of vice. These dramas were used by the reformers in various ways in their reform efforts. Some of them were used in arousing national sentiment, and others, to help increase historical and geographical knowledge among villagers. Through modern plays the reformers tried to propagate the concept of human rights, awaken nationalistic feelings, and encourage efforts to improve peasant lives. 37 The reformers of the COE organized a "mass drama society" with the
students and studied and performed various dramas related to peasant life and rural reform for the villagers around the school. In Huang-hsiang village a drama society was organized with more than twenty villagers, staging more than ten different plays during the three-year period between 1929 and 1931. It is also known that the Hsiao-chuang School organized a drama club with both students and teachers, including T'ao Hsing-chih himself, and presented frequent shows in the neighboring villages for the purpose of enlightening the peasants. The use of drama was also included in the AVE's cultural reform methods. But we do not have records that show the actual use of drama in the AVE's reform districts.

Music was also heard in the same fashion. The learning of traditional operas and training in traditional musical instruments were encouraged. For such a reason mass tea houses in some reform districts were equipped with traditional musical instruments, and the villagers organized music societies and learned how to play the musical instruments. This program had a double effect. It not only contributed to preserve traditional popular culture, but also helped to divert the villagers' interest from unsound games to more constructive recreation. Modern songs were also written and taught. Words of the songs were those which promoted agricultural productivity, cooperatives, nationalism, and literacy. This use of music in rural reform was again adopted mainly by the COE and Hsiao-chuang groups.

As a part of cultural improvement programs, the reformers were also concerned with the recreation of village people. In the districts of the COE and the AVE the reformers sponsored community
recreation meetings, athletic contest, picnics, hikes, and swimming events. 44 The Hsiao-chuang School held a so-called "Village Federation Athletic Meeting" every year in which the people of villages in the vicinity of the school vied with one another in the special skills and talents of each village. 45 The purpose of these activities was to evoke community spirit among the peasants and inculcate an aesthetic appreciation while providing good opportunities for enjoying their spare time.

In addition, wall newspapers, popular lectures, movies, and reading societies were also employed by the reformers of the COE and the AVE as means to improve the cultural aspects of peasant life.

Programs for Civil training 46

Chinese peasants were often referred to as being selfish and uncooperative. They were also said to be deficient in public-mindedness and organizational ability. Depicting these traits of the Chinese peasants a Chinese proverb says: "everybody sweeps only the snow in front of his door." Also these weaknesses were referred to by Sun Yat-sen as "i-p'an san-sha" (a plate of loose sand). 47

The rural reconstructionists felt that these traits of selfishness, uncooperativeness, and apathy toward social and political affairs must be overcome in order to improve rural life as well as to develop the whole Chinese society. As Chao Shu-yü pointed out, because of such shortcomings the peasants were vulnerable to exploitation and oppression by corrupt officials and traditional local leaders, and the country remained in a political confusion.
Programs for the civic training of rural people were designed to develop such attributes as organizational and self-government ability, the spirit of unity and cooperation, and political consciousness among them. These programs can be examined by dividing them into the following three categories: training for exercising the four political rights (ssu-ch'üan), training for self-government, and the promotion of political consciousness.

**Training for Exercising the Four Political Rights.** With the successful completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928, the military phase of Sun Yat-sen's three-stage revolution was completed, and the stage of political tutelage was to begin. On October 3, 1928, the KMT Central Executive Committee adopted a provisional constitution called "An Outline of Political Tutelage" (Hsun-cheng kang-ling), which legalized the party's guidance of the government in carrying out tutelage work. In providing tutelage, according to Sun's Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, tutoring the people in the exercise of their four rights—election, recall, initiative, and referendum—was one of the main tasks of the party government. However, it is the general opinion among scholars of Chinese studies that during the Nanking decades the KMT regime neglected its tutelage responsibility. In regard to elections for example, in July, 1929, the Nanking Government promulgated the Organic Law for Hsien Government. According to Article 42 of the law, the chief and deputy chief of hsiang (administrative units having less than 1,000 but more than 100 households of rural population) and chen (administrative units of a similar size in market places) were to be
elected at village or town people's meetings. But throughout the Nanking period they were in most cases appointed by the hsien government. Also few hsien governments were seriously concerned with teaching the people in the exercise their four political rights.

In contrast, the three reconstruction institutions experimented with one program or another (e.g., a model election and village talk sessions) to train the villagers of their reform districts in using their four rights. Such training was mainly conducted through the village improvement societies while members of the societies participated in the meetings for village reform. The experience of the Huang-hsiang Village Improvement Society provides a good example in this respect. The society started with 31 male members in July, 1929, which was about 33 per cent of the total number of male adults above 20 years of age in the village. The number of members of the society increased to 69, which was about 63 per cent of the total male adults, by June, 1932. The society also came to have 3 female members. During the three-year period (July, 1929 - July, 1932) it held a total of 46 meetings. Until the 33rd meeting the sessions were conducted under the guidance of the rural reformer from the COE. But thereafter the meetings were conducted by the village members themselves without much difficulty. Understandably, it is said to have been difficult for the villagers to conduct the first ten or so initial meetings. The members hardly expressed their opinions about matters which in their opinion little concerned them, while everybody talked at the same time regarding issues which had something to do with them. But as the meeting continued the members of the
societies came to learn how to keep order in the meetings and follow regulations. An analysis of the membership present at the meetings show that only four out of a total of 46 meetings had insufficient numbers for a quorum. In addition, it is interesting to note that at the seventh meeting, when the main agenda was concerned with rent reduction, the attendance rate of the membership was very high. At the 43rd meeting the villagers vehemently opposed an order from the ch'u chief which meant to annex Huang-hsing village to neighboring Wu-ho-hsiang, and succeeded in stopping the order by passing a resolution to petition the hsien government. This is good evidence that the peasants could be taught to govern their own affairs when properly trained.

At the Hsia-chuang School a "Law and Politics Discussion Society" was organized with the villagers in the vicinity of the school, and used to teach members how to exercise the four rights of the people together with other political knowledge. The Hsiao-chuang group also used a fire-fighting corps which was organized with the same villagers for the political training of the peasants. Besides actual fire-fighting, the corps taught the people how to organize themselves, how to conduct meetings, and how to exercise the four rights of the people. Let us take a concrete example of how the Hsiao-chuang School taught the people to solve their problems through a democratic meeting. The case occurred at one of the local villages during a water shortage. The local school had dug a new well for public use, but water was still scarce. There was great contention in the village, since those who reached the well early
in the morning got water, while those who came late got none. 
Occasionally there was fighting among the peasants gathered at the 
well. In order to solve the problem, T'ao Hsing-chih called a 
meeting of sixty or seventy peasants, which he called "a teaching-
learning-doing session on the question of water consumption." The 
meeting was chaired by a teen-aged student. Together with a number 
of students from the Hsiao-chuang School, T'ao organized an 
advisory group for the meeting. They inserted themselves into the 
midst of the meeting and guided the young chairman in managing the 
meeting. The peasants, said T'ao, "learned to hold a meeting by 
holding a meeting." The water problem was solved by a series of 
resolutions which were approved by a vote of the whole group. 53 

As a result of the peasant training, there were some rural 
reform districts of the COE in which hsiang chiefs were chosen by 
villagers through elections under the guidance of rural reformers. 
For instance, in March, 1932, the village improvement society of 
Kao-chuang-an district held village people's meetings and elected 
chiefs and deputy chiefs of hsiang and طبع (25 families formed a طبع). 54 
The village improvement society of Huang-hsiang experimental 
district had done a similar thing even earlier in 1929. 55 

Although the details are not available, there are records that 
in the AVE's reform districts, such as Hsü-kung-ch'iao and Huang-
hsü, a model election of ch'tü and hsiang chiefs was held in 1933 and 
1934. The districts also held village talk sessions between hsiang 
inhabitants and hsiang chiefs as a means to exchange opinions 
regarding village affairs. 56
As for the Hsiao-chuang group, we have no evidence that they experimented with popular elections involving village administration. This seems to be due to the early closure of the school.

Civic education, which taught not only the privileges but also the obligations of citizenship, was also conducted through the mass schools and through "people's lecture meetings" (min-chung chiang-yen hui). Generally it appears that the COE's districts assumed more systematic and active methods in this program. This may have been a manifestation of the COE's tradition as a mass education institution. As a concrete measure the reformers of the Hui-pei district opened an adult mass school course especially designed for civic education. By 1936 the course had produced 440 graduates. The Pei-hsia district organized the so-called "civic training corps." By 1935 there were 10 corps, and a total of 1,477 members were trained through the corps. Those who had been trained formed an alumni association, and acted as the vanguard of the reform movement in the district.

Training for Self-Government. Commonly, village self-government means that village people govern village affairs by themselves. Hence, in theory self-government included all the affairs concerning the village, namely not only administration but also education, economy, security, and public works concerning the village. However, here it means a narrow sense of village government which chiefly included various basic administrative affairs of the village: census-taking and the maintenance of local records, as well as village security measures and public works. In this program of
self-government training, the reconstructionists thus followed mainly the self-government methods which Sun Yat-sen prescribed in the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* and which the KMT was supposed to implement in its self-government effort.⁵⁹

Although the Organic Law of Hsien Government was promulgated in 1929, there were areas even in Kiangsu, the foothold of the KMT, which did not have hsiang chiefs in the early 1930's. For instance, Chou-lung-an hsiang of the Hui-pei reform district reported in 1933 that there was a hsiang-kung-so (hsiang public office), but since there was no chief "the office existed only in name and village self-government was at a standstill."⁶⁰ Because of this situation, the ch'ü-kung-so, the superior local administrative organ, would frequently ask the village improvement societies of the reform district to carry out certain village administrative works in lieu of the hsiang-kung-so. The village improvement societies thus conducted sensus-taking, took care of various personnel registration (i.e., birth, death, moving, inheritance, etc.), conducted "citizen registration" (kung-min teng-chi), set up and ran the dispute arbitration committee (hsi-sung-hui), checked on sanitary conditions, and carried out village-cleaning campaigns. In the area of public works, road repairing, construction of new bridges and maintenance of old ones, and repairing of dikes were common throughout the reform districts.

For village security, the reform villages commonly had three organizations: a fire-fighting corps, a winter-protection corps (tung-fang-t'uan), and a defense corps (pau-wei-t'uan). The purpose
and function of the fire-fighting corps was, needless to say, to prevent fire in advance by educating the people and to put out fire that broke out in the villages. But since we are not familiar with the winter-protection corps and the defense corps, let us examine briefly their functions by taking some examples from the reform districts of the COE and the AVE.

The winter-protection corps was a sort of theft-prevention organization. In Kiangsu villages, theft was a great problem in winter. Hence, in order to eliminate this problem the reformers of the COE organized a winter-protection corps in their reform experimental districts. Through this organization, the members took turns in patrolling the villages in groups of two or more at night. There were reports that after the operation of the winter-protection corps, the theft problem in the villages decreased sharply.  

The defense corps was a local militia designed primarily to defend the villages against bandits. In the AVE's reform districts (e.g., Hsü-kung-ch'iao, Huang-hsü, Shan-jen-ch'iao, and Ku-kao-chuang), the corps was organized with villagers whose ages were between 18 and 35. These members were required to receive military training during the slack season between winter and early spring and assumed the responsibility of defending their villages.

As indicated in Chapter Five, the security measure taken by the Hsiao-chuang School was more active than those of the other two institutions. The Hsiao-chuang reformers organized the Village Federation of Self-defense Corps among peasants of villages within a 10 li radius of the school. At the beginning, the corps started as
an organization to suppress "bad" elements in the villages by developing organizational ability and group action. But as the bandit problem became serious in the area, the corps developed into a local defense organization. For the corps, the school purchased about twenty rifles and pistols, and had each village acquire rifles and other weapons such as swords, lances, and wooden clubs on their own. The peasants were also provided regular military training by a military officer and soldiers sent by Feng Yu-hsiang. The corps members took turn in standing guard in their villages at night and were required to assemble immediately at the school on an emergency call and help the villages in trouble. There were several occasions in which the corps actually engaged in defensive actions against bandit raids and successfully drove away the bandits.

The Promotion of Political Consciousness. Political consciousness here refers to the people's understanding of their political rights as well as their awareness of political affairs and their acquiring of nationalistic feeling. As indicated earlier, civic training in a broad sense includes the promotion of these elements.

In order to arouse political consciousness and to promote nationalism among the peasants, the reconstructionists employed various means, such as the COE's "commemorative weekly meetings" (chi-nien-chou), which were held every Monday evening in memory of Sun Yat-sen. During these meetings, besides the observation of the ceremony itself, the reformers explained current social and political events to the villagers and discussed village affairs with them. Other national commemoration days were also observed for a similar purpose.
Programs for Economic Improvement

It has been pointed out previously that poverty was one of the chief reasons for the grim life of the Chinese rural people. Hence, it seems unnecessary to reexplain why poverty constituted a major target for the reconstructionists improvement effort. Economic improvement programs carried out by the reconstructionists were many: measures for improving agriculture, the organization of cooperatives, the establishment of credit systems, the promotion of auxiliary occupations, land reclamation, and efforts to reduce land taxes and rents.

Agricultural Improvement. Various efforts were made to increase agricultural productivity. Of these, the most common was seed improvement which was carried out in cooperation with either the agriculture departments of universities in Nanking (i.e., Tung-nan University and Chin-ling University) or agricultural stations of the reform institutions and the provincial government. In order to see how this seed improvement effort was attempted by the three institutions, let us look at some examples.

Of the COE's reform experimental districts, the case in Huang-hsiang seems to have been the most successful. In 1929, the COE reformers introduced a new variety of rice, called "ch'ü-yü," among the villagers of Huang-hsiang, which had been developed at the agricultural experimental station of the COE. At first, this new seed was tried out by seven families on 33 mou of rice field. In spite of wide-spread locust harm, the result was very encouraging. The new variety yielded not only a better quality of rice, but also...
three tou more per mou than the indigenous seed. The peasants harvested 9.9 shih more of rice of the 33 mou in total. In the following year, the same seed was sown by eleven families on 43 mou of land. This time, the rate of production increase was five tou of rice more per mou. Thus during the two years of experiments, the total increase of rice the peasants harvested by using the seed improvement method amounted to 21 shih of rice, 314 yuan worth. In the third year the new variety was applied to 80 mou of land. But because of a big flood, a good part of the harvest was lost.

Pei-hsia was another reform district which gained production increases by seed improvement methods. In 1932, the reformers persuaded 38 families to try out the same ch'ü-yü seed and a new wheat called "Chin-ling no. 26," which had been developed by Chin-ling University on their farms. The production increases were 0.5 to 1 tou per mou for rice and 1.5 to 2 tou per mou for wheat. According to the calculation of a reformer in the district, if the whole district used these new seeds, in five years the district would have a rice production increase of 2,942 shih and a wheat production increase of 5,394 shih, the total value of which was about 50,000 yuan worth. Hui-pei district also had 48 families try yellow ch'ü-yü seed and new wheat seed imported from the United States on 105 mou of land, but the results are not available.

Among the AVE's reform districts, Hsü-kung-ch'iao seems to have been the most systematic in propagating the use of improved seeds. The village improvement society had around 20 mou of seedling fields and propagated new varieties of seeds tested in the seedling fields
through special contracts with selected families (t'ē-yüeh nung chia).

In addition, as a means to publicize the benefit of the improved seeds, the society held an agricultural exhibition. At the exhibition, not only were the new varieties of seeds displayed, but also detailed comparisons between indigenous seeds and the new varieties (e.g., in terms of the number of grains contained in an ear of grain and the weight of a grain, etc.) were given with pictures so that the peasants could decide for themselves.69.

The Hsiao-chuang group also used seed selection as the chief method of improving agricultural productivity. At the Shan-hai Kung-shūeh-t'uan, the reformers enabled the peasants to increase cotton productivity from 27.8 chin per mou to 60 chin per mou by seed improvement. On top of that, because of the good quality of cotton resulting from improved seeds, the peasants could earn 3 yuan more per every 100 chin than in previous times.70

A similar principle was applied to improve sericulture which was an important auxiliary income source for the peasant in Kiangsu. First, as in the cases of grain crops, improved silkworm species were introduced. Second, a scientific raising method was taught by sericulture specialists invited from the Department of Agriculture and Mining of the provincial government. Third, silk yarn and cocoon contests were held in order to stimulate production, and a sericulture demonstration center was set up to propagate scientific sericulture methods. As an example of the sericulture improvement effort, let us cite the case at Huang-hsiang village again. Between 1929 and 1931 improved silk worm species were introduced to 115 out
of 700 village families, which amounted to 265 sheets (chang). Since every sheet gained 10 yuan of profit, a total of 2,650 yuan was derived as profit. The price of raw silk produced by the improved species was to to 20 fen (cents in Chinese money unit) higher per catty than that by the indigenous species. The expansion of the area of mulberry tree fields was another measure to improve sericulture in the village.71

In improving agriculture the reformers also made efforts to introduce insecticides and fertilizer among the peasants. Because of lack of proper remedial measures, the peasants often lost a large percentage of their crops to crop insects. Also, because of little knowledge of modern fertilizers and shortness of capital, the peasants, whose use of fertilizer was mostly confined to human waste and bean cakes, could hardly achieve production increases. In this effort to improve insecticides and fertilizers the experience in the Hui-pei district of the COE seems to be an appropriate example. In order to find good remedial measures against crop insects, the reformers of the district first set up an agricultural insect experimentation field and experimented with various insecticidal methods. The results were then announced to villagers so that they could come and learn the discovered methods. The improvement of fertilizers was carried out in cooperation with agriculture departments of Chung-yaung University and Chin-ling University and with assistance from the Department of Agriculture and Mining of the provincial government. The reconstructionists encouraged the peasants to make and use farmyard manure. Simultaneously, they
introduced chemical fertilizer such as nitrogen, phosphoric acid, potash, and lime. Similar efforts were made in the Hsü-kung-ch’iao district of the AVE. In addition, the reformers of this district organized with the villagers a cooperative to purchase fertilizer.72

The shortage and the backwardness of agricultural implements proved a great hindrance in the development of agriculture. Agricultural implements the Kiangsu peasants used were mostly outmoded, having been used for hundreds of years with little change, even such implements were in short supply.73 Hence, the improvement of agricultural implements was included in the reformers' agricultural improvement program.

In the effort to improve agricultural implements, the AVE seems to have been most advanced. In October, 1929, the AVE established the Chinese New Agricultural Implement Promotion Center (Chung-hua hsin-nung-chü ts'ui-hsing-so) in order to manufacture new agricultural machines: grain threshers, grain grinders, rice-huskers, irrigation pumps, and cotton gins. These machines were sold mainly to agricultural production cooperatives which the reformers strongly advised the peasants to organize. Because the prices of the machines were cheaper than foreign-made ones, the machines were very popular among the peasants of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. Also, the center not only sold agricultural machines, but also trained the peasants in operating and maintaining the machines.74 The Hsü-kung-ch’iao district of the AVE had already surveyed the condition of agricultural implement cooperatives among peasants and had them purchase the aforementioned agricultural machines for joint use among members of
the cooperatives. These machines became a great help for agricultural work in the district. Other reform districts of the AVE, such as Huang-hsù and Shan-jen-ch'iao, also used similar methods for the improvement of agricultural implements. Among the COE's districts we can find few records which show active efforts for the improvement of agricultural implements except that in 1934 the reformers of the Hui-pei district arranged a total of 1,097 yuan of water pump loans to 48 families in order to ease the irrigation problem.

Although carried out on a small scale, land reclamation was another program for agricultural improvement. As seen in Chapter Two, Kiangsu, especially southern Kiangsu, had one of the highest percentages of cultivated land in the country. Hence, there was not much wasteland. But since land shortage was one of the most critical problems for the peasants, the reconstructionists could not neglect land reclamation when there was unused land in their reform areas. We saw that one of the AVE's reform ideals was to make sure that villages had no wasteland. Also we can find concrete examples of land reclamation in a COE district, Huang-hsiang of the Hui-pei district. Huang-hsiang village had about ten mou of wasteland, and the reformers reclaimed it with the villagers for use as a mulberry tree demonstration field. In another part of Hui-pei district, about 14 mou of barren hill land was reclaimed, and 3,932 roots of various kinds of trees were planted.

**Development of Auxiliary Occupations.** Farming was not sufficient to satisfy the economic needs of the peasants. Hence, the reformers tried to find other sources of income for the peasants. The
development of auxiliary occupations was one such effort. Since in Kiangsu, as in other provinces, chickens and pigs were important domestic livestock for supplementary income, the reformers were first concerned with improving stocks of these animals. Chicken and pig breeding were widely carried out throughout the rural reform districts. The reformers also invited specialists in animal husbandry from the universities and the Animal Breeding Station of the provincial government and had them teach the peasants about scientific methods. 80

There were many ponds and waterways in the Yangtze plain, which made fish-farming a very promising sideline occupation for the peasants. Therefore, the reformers of many districts encouraged villagers to develop this industry. This fish-farming was run usually through the organization of fish-farming cooperatives and by obtaining technical assistance from the Wu-sung Marine Middle School. By 1934, the Pei-hsia and Hui-pei reform districts of the COE had six and two fish-farm cooperatives, respectively. 81 AVE's reform districts, such as Hsü-kung-ch'iao, Huang-hsü and Ku-kao-chuang, also had several fish-farming organizations. 82

The manufacture of various local products such as matting, bamboo works, and cotton-weaving had been important sideline occupations for rural women in Kiangsu. The reformers of many districts made efforts to improve and spread such rural handicraft techniques by organizing agricultural craft societies and holding exhibitions. 83 Also, in order to facilitate the transportation of
handicraft products to markets (mostly in Wu-hsi and Shang-hai), a rural handicraft product transportation cooperative was organized in the Pei-hsia district.

**Cooperatives and Village Loan Centers.** Cooperatives were another form of rural relief measure which the reconstructionists introduced in their reform districts. The reconstructionists believed that joint efforts among the peasants based on mutual cooperation was the best way to solve the economic difficulties of the peasants. The cooperatives which the Kiangsu rural reconstructionists organized were largely of three types: credit cooperatives, production cooperatives, and transportation of marketing cooperatives.

**Credit Cooperatives.** Credit cooperatives were organized to extend low-interest credit to the peasants. Despite the fact that peasants needed capital for various agricultural and family purposes (e.g., weddings and funerals), there was, as we saw in Chapter Two, not much credit available except for usurious money which aggravated the economic plight of the peasants. Credit cooperatives were a means of easing such a problem.

In the beginning, in view of the low education level and the lack of experience in organization on the part of the peasants, the cooperatives were mostly organized on a small scale. Only after overcoming various difficulties, and in some cases failures, were the cooperatives put on a stronger foundation. Experience in Huang-hsiang village provides us with one such example. The COE reformers first attempted to form a credit cooperative in Huang-hsiang village in the summer of 1929, but failed. Their failure was
attributed to mutual distrust among the members because of little understanding of the cooperative and insufficient capital. In the following year, another effort was made to organize a cooperative with 100 元 of surplus funds from the printing business of the COE as a base fund. But it also was not successful. Within less than ten days all the money was loaned out, and only in the following year was the cooperative able to recover the money. It was only during the third attempt that the cooperative began to function properly.86

The Hsü-kung-ch'iao district also experienced similar difficulties in organizing credit cooperatives. According to Chiang Wen- yü, the representative of the AVE in the district, the peasants' ignorance and their meager understanding of the significance of cooperatives did not allow the successful organization of the cooperative from the beginning. Hence, the reformers first started with a small-scale loan center which lent up to ten 元 to the peasants. Then they had the peasants bring some kind of small security items for their borrowed money. This was to make the peasants understand that as the loaning organization needed some kind of guarantee against those who would not repay the money, so would the credit cooperatives they organized among themselves. That is, the members needed to pay certain amounts of money as their share. Only after this practice was implemented, was a cooperative organized successfully with 53 people. A central base of 2,000 元 was borrowed from the Agricultural Bank in Shanghai at an interest rate of 0.8 per cent per month. Each member was assessed two 元 as his share of the cooperative. Loans were made only to cooperative
members at an interest rate of 1 per cent per month. The profit portion of 0.2 per cent difference between the rates of bank interest and the cooperative loan was put back into the working capital of the cooperative. By 1934, the credit cooperative grew to have a total of 467 members, while the operational fund increased to 1,780 元, and loaned money from 500 to 8,000 元.

The cooperatives in the COE's reform districts were operated in a similar fashion. The only difference was that the interest rate for cooperative loans in the COE's districts was 1.2 per cent per month while that of the AVE's districts was 1.0 per cent. The Hsiao-chuang School had also planned to organize a credit cooperative for the year 1930, but it did not materialize due to the school's closure in the same year.

At any rate, considering that the monthly interest rate on an ordinary bank loan, which was very difficult for the peasants to obtain, was 2 per cent, and those of private moneylenders above 3 per cent, the credit cooperatives were of great help to the peasants in terms of both cheap interest rates and convenience of borrowing money. Hence, the cooperative movement gained the support of the villagers. The member of credit cooperatives and amount of loaned money in the reform districts of the COE and AVE are shown in the following table.

**Village Loan Centers.** Another measure the reformers initiated in their districts in order to help ease the difficult credit situation in rural villages was a "peasant loan center" (nung-min chieh-tai-so). Kiangsu province was the first in the nation to
Table 25. The State of Credit Cooperatives in the AVE and COE Reform Districts, 1929-1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Cooperatives</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Loaned Money</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Pei-hsia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>732 yuan</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Hui-pei</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>18,759</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Huang-hsiang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Kao-chang-an</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td>Hsü-kung-ch'iao</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td>Huang-hsü</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td>Ku-kao-chuang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


establish an agricultural bank whose purpose was to help the development of agriculture by providing the peasants with cheap loans. In actuality, however, the bank was reluctant to give loans to peasants on an individual basis for security considerations. The bank regulations were made in such a way that loans could be made only to groups of more than five people who were mutually responsible. In addition, the loan applications needed to have the chiefs of hsiang or chen as guarantors and prosperous merchants or shop owners as bondsmen. On top of that, upon receiving the loan, they needed to mortgage land or oxen worth twice the value of the loan money as collateral. Needless to say, when the loan recipient failed to repay the loan money within the prescribed period, the bank was
entitled to dispose of the collateral to compensate for the loan. Under these loan regulations it was almost impossible for the majority of the peasants, who were poor and lacking in organizational ability, to obtain a bank loan. On the other hand, bank loans easily came to be taken advantage of by landlords and gentry who were the local power holders in the hsiang and chen. Using their economic and social influence, they obtained low-interest bank loans and used them as their capital for moneylending at usurious rates. In other words, by such a practice, agricultural bank loans were transformed into another instrument for the exploitation of the peasants. The peasant loan center was designed to correct the above defects in the administration of loans by the provincial agricultural bank. In this peasant-loan system the reconstruction institutions functioned as intermediaries between the agricultural bank and the peasants. They assumed responsibility for the peasants' repayment of borrowed money.

The method of operating peasant loan centers was similar throughout the reform districts. Hence, we will choose the one in the Pei-hsia district as an example to show how the peasant loan center was operated. The COE reformers established a peasant-loan center in the district in 1933 in cooperation with the Fourth District Branch of the Wu-hsi Provincial Agricultural Bank. Since this financial system mainly relied on the capital borrowed from the bank, the center's loaning procedure was a little more strict than that of the credit cooperative. First of all, loans were confined to the capital which would be used for improving agriculture and auxiliary
industries (e.g., for fertilizer, irrigation, sericulture, and stock-raising). Second, in order to receive a loan the peasants needed for form a loan association with more than seven members and to obtain sponsorship of a reliable local person who could take responsibility for the applicants. The applicants also needed to mortgage certain objects as security for loans about ten yuan. The interest rate on a loan was 1.3 per cent per month, one per cent being the genuine interest and -.3 per cent a procedural fee which went to the public welfare fund for the peasants in the district. Although its loan procedure was a bit complicated, the peasant loan center constituted, together with the credit cooperative, important credit sources for economically hard-pressed peasants. The following table shows the state of peasant-loan centers in the reform districts of the COE and AVE.

Table 26. Peasant Loan Centers in the Reform Districts in Kiangsu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of PLC</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Loaned Money</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Pei-hsia</td>
<td>1 (121 branches)</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>10,000 yuan</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Hui-pei</td>
<td>1 (16 branches)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td>Hsü-kung-ch'iao</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td>Shan-jen-ch'iao</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4,458.4</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HTKK, 398, 402; Ts'un-chih (Village Government Monthly), 1:2 (June, 1930), 10; HTKK, 453.

**Production and Marketing Cooperatives.** Various production cooperatives were also organized in the reform districts. They
included rice, wheat, and irrigation cooperatives. In these cooperatives, the members jointly purchased fertilizer, agricultural implements, and other necessary agricultural materials and helped each other in such tasks as planting, harvesting, and irrigation, thereby saving agricultural expenses.\textsuperscript{93} An agricultural production cooperative of the Shan-jen-ch'iao district, which was established in 1932, and a rice and wheat production cooperative and an irrigation cooperative of the Hui-pei district were examples of these production cooperatives.\textsuperscript{94}

Marketing cooperatives were organizations for the direct collective marketing of the members' produce, agriculture products and handicrafts, excluding middle men. Because of short capital and lack of good transportation on the part of the peasants, agricultural products and handicrafts were mostly marketed through middle men. The prices of agricultural products were completely under the middle men's control, and these men profited enormously by manipulating prices at the expense of the peasant producer. To take cocoon prices as an example, in 1934 Wu-hsi cocoon merchants kept the market price of cocoons under 20 to 30 yuan per tan which was only half of the price in ordinary times on the pretext of the low price at the international market. They then bought cocoons from the peasants at less than 20 yuan per tan. In the following year, they suddenly raised the cocoon price at the market more than five times and profited around two million yuan by this price manipulation.\textsuperscript{95} Such price manipulation by merchants were not rare in regard to other agricultural products and handicrafts.
Because the cooperatives had only recently been introduced in the reform districts, there were only six agricultural marketing cooperatives throughout the districts of the COE and AVE by 1934: namely four artifacts marketing cooperatives in Pai-hsia district, one rice and what marketing cooperative and one chiao-pai (zizania latifolia, a kind of edible grass) marketing cooperative in Hui-pei district. Of these marketing cooperatives, results achieved by the chiao-pai marketing cooperative, which was established in Kao-chang-an, are particularly noteworthy. A brief examination of the results of the cooperative will help us to see how a marketing cooperative was beneficial to the peasants.

Chiao-pai was a vegetable which the peasants grew in fields as a crop-rotation product. The area around the city of Wu-hsi, particularly Kao-chang-an, was famous for this vegetable. About fifty per cent of the fields in the district grew it, and the livelihood of the peasants in the area had a great deal to do with the success of this vegetable.

In the early 1930's the market price of chiao-pai suddenly dropped, and the reformers discovered that it was mainly due to price manipulation by merchants. In order to combat such manipulation, the reformers organized the chiao-pai marketing cooperative in the district in 1932, overcoming various obstructions by the merchants. In organizing this cooperative, the reformers obtained promises from the hsien and provincial governments to help them if necessary. It became active twice a year in summer and autumn which were the harvest seasons of chiao-pai.
Despite the sponsorship from the governments, members of the cooperative suffered many difficulties from underhanded merchant schemes and extortion by staff members of the railroad stations. The merchants sold the vegetables at dumping prices in order to inflict economic loss on the cooperative products. They also damaged or stole cooperative chiao-pai in transit aboard trains by conniving with transportation clerks. According to railroad regulations, the freight fare for one bag of chiao-pai was 5 chüeh 7 fen (0.57 yuan). But the railway staff collected one yuan per bag, illegally profiting by 0.43 yuan per bag. Together with the cooperative members, the reformers persistently endeavored to correct the irregularities conducted by both merchants and railroad staff members. As a result, in the following year, they not only were able to stop the corrupt practices of the railroad men, but also won out in competition with the chiao-pai merchants at the market. The cooperative was able to raise the price of chiao-pai by one yuan and earned 3,000 yuan more than in the past. On the other hand, the merchants lost about four-fifths of the profit they had made previously.\(^{97}\)

Thus, on the whole, the cooperative movements in the reform districts were relatively successful even though their scale was not large. The number of cooperatives and their members grew steadily. The total loans granted to the peasants by the cooperatives also greatly increased. By July, 1936, in the Pei-hsia and Hui-pei districts of the COE there were 20 and 17 cooperatives, respectively, involving 1,296 persons altogether. In the Kao-chuang-an district, about 63 per cent of the total households participated in one
cooperative or another during the two-year period of reform work, 1930 and 1931. In the Hsü-kung-ch'iao district there were six cooperatives, involving 476 members by 1934. 98

The relative success of the cooperative movement in the reform districts seems to have been due to the following two reasons: (1) the genuine efforts of the reconstructionists on behalf of the rural people changed the villagers' suspicion into active support and cooperation, and (2) the reformers' unremitting efforts to lead the movement to success. Having been highly conscious of the fact that even small failures could have tremendous adverse effects on the future of the movement, the reformers did their best to make the project a success. 99

The Rent Reduction and Tax Exemption Efforts. In Chapter Two, it was pointed out that in Kiangsu high rates of rent constituted an important part of the rural problem. The unfairness of the high rent rates for the peasants had been recognized both by Chinese agricultural economists and the Kuomintang during the KMT-CCP alliance. 100 The KMT even passed the so-called "Twenty-five Per Cent Rent Reduction" resolution in 1927, which was never put into practice. 101

The rural reconstructionists were also well aware of the problem of high rent rates in peasant life. Because the problem was left to the landlords and tenants by the government authorities there was not much the reformers as private citizens could do about it. Thus there were not many active rent-reduction attempt made by the reconstructionists. But records are not completely without cases in
which the reformers tried to help the peasants obtain reduction of rents and land taxes even though the reformers' efforts were somewhat passive in nature. A rent-reduction effort carried out in the Huang-hsiang village was one such case.

In the fall of 1929 there occurred a great crop failure in the area of Wu-hsi because of locusts. The reformers of the Huang-hsiang village, together with the villagers, submitted a rent reduction petition to the hsien government. As a result, a reduction of one tou of rent-rice per mou was agreed upon between landlords and the villagers by the government's arbitration. By this measure the peasants of Huang-hsiang and its neighbor, Chang-hsiang received a reduction of a total of 500 shih of rent-rice for 500 mou of rice fields, which was of about 600 yuan in value.

In the summer of 1931, a great flood hit the area, and all the rice fields were inundated. The reformers helped the villagers petition the hsien government for a land tax exemption. At the same time, they organized a disaster area investigation committee in order to ensure that the exemption be granted fairly on the basis of accurate disaster reports. Previously, there had been many irregularities of local tax recorders in connection with land tax exemption. The tax recorders had distributed tax exemption cards (huang-piao, literally famine tickets) only to those who bribed them even though their farmlands were not damaged by the flood. On the other hand, those who really needed tax exemptions had not been given their cards. The reformers wanted to prevent this malpractice from happening again. As a result of such efforts by the reformers, about 70 per cent of
the total cultivated land, that is, 276 mou and 9 fen, in the village, received tax exemptions. The exemptions amounted to 221 shih 5 tou in total, which was around 1,772 yuan in value.

Although the details are not available, rent reductions were obtained through the reformers' effort in the Pai-hsia district in 1932. At the request of the reformers in the area, landlords agreed to give rent reductions by one tou of rice per mou, reducing the rent rate from six tou of rice per mou to five tou of rice per mou.

In the districts of the AVE we can find no efforts related to rent reeducation.

**Programs for Health Improvement**

Health improvement efforts in the reform districts assumed three main forms: (1) the treatment and prevention of disease, (2) the improvement of public health facilities, and (3) the promotion of physical training.

**Treatment and Prevention of Disease.** It was mentioned in Chapter Two that rural people suffered from many diseases. In order to provide proper medical service to village people, there was a great need for the establishment of health institutions in rural areas. In view of such needs, reform districts such as the Hui-pei and Pei-hsia districts of the COE, the Hsü-kung-ch'iao, Huang-hsü, and Ku-kao-chuang districts of the AVE, and the Hsiao-chuang School maintained from one to several public health centers (hsiang-ts'un or min-chung wei-sheng-so). These centers were usually staffed with a physician and a nurse. Besides medical examinations and treatment, they provided preventive medicine and public health education, and trained
village health workers. Small districts such as Huang-hsiang and Kao-chuang-an of the COE received regular once-a-week visitations by physicians from the COE.\textsuperscript{106}

In the beginning, it was not easy for the reformers to get the villagers to receive treatment at the health center or from visiting physicians because the village people had little faith in western medicine and could not afford treatment. Hence, much publicity and many inducements (e.g., announcement of free medical examination and treatment) were required. However, not long afterwards, on seeing the effectiveness of western medicine, the number of villagers who visited doctors gradually increased. For instance, in Huang-hsiang village, which had a population of only 780, the COE doctors treated a total of 883 patients during the months between April and November, 1929. In the Pei-hsia district, which had three health centers, the average number of patients for a center was around 250 per month.\textsuperscript{107}

"Simple first-aid medical stations" (chien-i yao-ch'ü) were another type of useful health facility set up in reform villages. In these medical stations about twenty medicines were stored for emergency purposes. The Hui-pei district had six medical stations, and the Ku-kao-chuang district of the AVE, one medical station. Other districts such as Pei-hsia, Hsü-kung-ch'iao, and Shan-jen-ch'iao maintained first-aid facilities at the village improvement societies even though they did not set up separate medical stations.\textsuperscript{108}

In order to supplement the shortage of doctors and nurses there were districts such as the Hui-pei district, which trained health workers among villagers. In this district the reformers selected
sixty bright young women who had graduated from elementary school and
trained them to be village health workers. The trainees were trained
for 36 hours at the COE in first-aid techniques, family sanitation,
and child care. Then they were sent back to their respective
villages as health workers. The Pei-hsia district organized a
"Women's Medical Aid Training Corp" (Fu-nu chiu-hu hsün-lien tui) in
1936. The reformers selected thirty bright and health you women whose
ages were between 16 and 25, and for two months taught the women
Chinese characters, medical aid, civic affairs, simple military
knowledge, and physical training. After this training the corps
members served as health workers for their villages. Although we
do not have detailed information, a maternity nurse training program
was conducted in the Ku-kao-chuang district of the AVE.

The control of epidemics formed an important part of the health
program. In all the reform districts, innoculations and vaccinations
were conducted against such diseases as cholera, brain fever, and
smallpox. To take the reform district whose statistics are available,
as examples, the Hsu-kung-ch'iao health center vaccinated a total of
3470 people including neighboring villagers during the two years
between 1931 and 1932, and Huang-hsiang village vaccinated about 200
people in the first year of the reform experiment (1929). In
connection with epidemic prevention, the people in the district of
Hui-pei were urged to eliminate flies, mosquitoes, and rats, which
were carriers of infections.

The Improvement of Public Health and Personal Hygiene. Personal
and family sanitation involves such aspects of life as drinking water,
the preparation of food, personal cleanliness, and housing conditions: namely, the degree of spaciousness, ventilation, and lighting. Improvement in these areas requires quite a sum of money. Thus it was not easy for the impoverished peasants to make progress in reforming personal and family sanitation in a short period. Hence, the reformers focused on improving matters of basic importance which took little money.

The most urgent problem with family sanitation in the villages of southern Kiangsu was the use of river water for drinking. Reformers of the three institutions were all concerned with this problem. They taught the rural people about how dangerous drinking river water was and how to disinfect such water by using yellow alum. They also recommended boiling drinking water and dug wells, mobilizing villagers for such projects. For personal hygiene, the reformers emphasized the taking of baths as often as possible. In the district of Huang-hsü the reformers set up a public bath with the help of the villagers.\(^{114}\)

In the area of public health, the existence of few latrines or extremely simple ones, scattered garbage dumps, and the practice of leaving coffins unburied in open spaces constituted the most serious problems. Various means were employed to improve these problems. The people were advised to build or improve latrines by exhibiting a model latrine, and garbage dumps were moved to places distant from houses. The reformers particularly endeavored to check the practice of placing coffins in open spaces by obtaining help from the local police stations.\(^{115}\) In the districts of AVE, such as Hsü-kung-ch'iao
and Huang-shu, public cemeteries were prepared. As an overall public sanitation program, village cleaning campaigns were the most common throughout the reform districts. The districts held village cleaning days regularly once a month, and the staff members of the village improvement society inspected local homes. Those who achieved good records in maintaining clean homes were given recognition as "model families." 

Promotion of Physical Training. Farming is hard physical labor, but it is not necessarily good for developing a balanced physique. Reformers felt that peasants needed physical culture to improve their health, especially for the growing children. Hence, physical training was included as a part of the health improvement program. In many districts the reformers encouraged young people to play various ball games such as soccer, volleyball, and basketball. According to the reformers of Hui-pei district, basketball seems to have been very popular because it did not require much land space. Chinese martial art societies were also organized in many districts.

As a means to promote villagers' athletic activities, many districts constructed "people's ground" (min-chung yün-tung-chiang). The Shan-jen-ch'iao district had nine athletic grounds, and the Huang-hsü district and the Hsiao-chuang School had one each. People of these districts had various athletic activities at these grounds. Among them, the annual inter-village athletic meeting, which was sponsored by the Hsiao-chuang School, was particularly interesting. The meeting was designed as a combination of an athletic contest among villages and an annual people's festival of
the area. The events included various programs such as rural dances, races, weight-lifting, jumping, and rope pulling. The program of the "oxen-group parade," in which peasants rode their oxen and paraded in a group circling the grounds with their village flags was most spectacular. This annual meeting had double purposes: to promote peasant health and to develop a sense of pride in agricultural work simultaneously. 120

Besides, as a part of the rural health improvement program, some AVE's districts such as Hsu-kung-ch'iao and Huang-hsü annually held baby health contests. 121

Construction Programs

As a part of self-government work every reform district carried out various construction projects. They included such public works as the repairing and extending of old roads and constructing new roads, paving existing roads, constructing village parks, public halls, and public play-grounds, and repairing and constructing bridges and irrigation systems.

In carrying out these construction projects, as in other reform programs, the village improvement societies played the leading role. The reform societies took charge of the whole process of the construction work from the initiation of the projects, to the planning and execution of the work. For instance, in 1931 the Kao-chang-an village improvement society, at its Second Plenum, passed a resolution to undertake the work of repairing and broadening the narrow road connecting She-ch'iao and the Wu-hsi Railroad Station. As concrete methods to carry out the construction, the meeting
passed the following resolutions. First, it would request the hsien construction bureau to determine the course of the road. Second, for labor it would use the conscripted labor of villagers while those who would not take part in the work were to pay 0.5 yuan per day. Third, it would start the project on April 12, 1931. Similarly, construction projects in the other districts were determined and carried out by village reform societies.\textsuperscript{122}

The methods of financing and securing labor for the construction were largely three types. The first type of method was to employ laborers and to buy materials with contributions by landlords and rich people. The construction of stone roads in Hsü-kung-ch'iao, which were undertaken between 1930 and 1933, were such examples. The groundwork of the roads were done with the money contributed by local landlords, and a rich member of the village reform society by the name of Ch'en Ming-chih donated 280 yuan for the work.\textsuperscript{123} The construction of a stone dike in the COE district of Chou-lung-an, in 1933, was another example. The construction work was carried out with money which Ko Tzu-tzai, a leader of the Cou-lung-an village improvement society collected from local rich households, totaling around 680 yuan.\textsuperscript{124}

The second type was voluntary contributions of both funds and labor by village people. In the COE Huang-hsiang district an irrigation dike was repaired completely by village labor.\textsuperscript{125}

The third type involved the employment of labor with funds raised among villagers and from outside good-will societies. This method was used in the construction of a new concrete bridge in
Kao-chang-an village in 1932. The village reform society raised about 300 元 among the villagers, and the remaining portion of the total expenditure, 1,500 元, was donated by the Wu-hsi ch'ien-ch'iao Company, a bridge construction firm.

The size, kinds, and number of construction projects carried out varied from one reform district to another according to the financial capacity of each district and the sponsoring institutions. Achievements of each reform district in construction work are shown in the following table.

Table 27. Achievements of Construction Work of the Reform Districts of the AVE and COE

1. Huang-hsiang District (1929-1932): repairing and paving roads with stone; and repairing an irrigation dike (877 chang or 263 square meters).

2. Kao-chang-an District (1930-1933): expanding and repairing roads (3 li); replacing a wooden bridge with a concrete bridge (1).


4. Hui-pei District (1932-1935): construction of a public playground which can accommodate up to around 1,000 people. (The achievements in Huang-hsiang and Kao-chang-an districts are excluded here.)

5. Hsü-kung-ch'iao District (1928-1934): repairing, expanding, and paving roads (6 li), construction of a new road (1 li long), construction of 7 new stone bridges and repairing 24 old wooden bridges, repairing irrigation system (?), construction of the village Improvement Society's office (1), construction of village parks (3), and construction of a public cemetery (1).

6. Huang-hsü District (1929-1935): digging irrigation ponds (6), dredging irrigation ponds (32), expanding irrigated fields (575 mou), construction of new roads (9), and repairing old roads (9).

7. Shan-jen-ch'iao District (1931-1935): repairing old bridges (6), repairing irrigation dikes (2), repairing old roads (6), and construction of a public cemetery (1, 50 mou).

Source: Excerpted from HTKK Parts 3 and 4: Ch'en Li-chiang, "Wômen te hsüeh-sheng shi-hsi" (Field Training of Our Students), Min-chien (Among the Masses) 1:13, 14 (November, 1934), 17.

Results of the Reform Programs and Activities

What were the results of the rural reform programs and activities by the three reconstruction institutions? There can be many ways to assess the results of the reform efforts, of which the following three seem to be most appropriate. The first method is to examine changes which occurred in the reform districts after launching the reform experiments. With the information available, it is difficult to present complete pictures of comparative situations of all the districts between the pre- and post-experiment. There were some variations from district to district in the contents and degrees of reform achievements even by the same institution, and also between different institutions. The foregoing analyses reveal differences in reform activities of various districts marked by differing characteristics of the operating institutions. In summary, it may be said that in general the COE's districts achieved relatively good results in such areas as self-government training, organizing cooperatives, and adult education, especially by the use of a mass school system, whereas the AVE's districts attained notable results in the areas of educational improvement (e.g., the increase in number of schools), security, and public work. The Hsiao-chuang group demonstrated originality in developing child education and the political consciousness of the populace, and showed considerable skills in organizing
the peasants into various forms of production corps and self-defense bodies.

In connection with the above characteristics it seems also worthy of note that achievements in some programs of the three institutions were of trivial consequence. The COE's public work program was limited in scope and variety. The AVE's programs of self-government training were less vigorous. The Hsiao-chuang group's reform programs looked in large measure piecemeal though some left enduring effects on the Chinese society. What is especially important was that despite some partial improvements effected, results of these institutions' economic programs were, as a whole, far from satisfactory in enhancing the general condition of local rural populations. These unsatisfactory results were both due to defects inherent within the institutions and to difficulties arising from the unfavorable social and political environment, which we shall discuss in the following section.

In spite of the differences in degree of success between the three institutions, however, it is also true that most of the reform districts of these institutions saw improvements in all reform areas compared with the pre-experiment conditions. The important improvements may be summed up as follows. Various educational opportunities became available, resulting in the decrease of illiteracy and in the increase in the numbers of school children. Harmful social vices, such as gambling and opium-smoking were swept away, and the force of superstition weakened. Adoption of scientific farming techniques, increased agricultural production while many
households learned to augment their income by developing a variety of sideline industries. The peasants learned to institute instruments of mutual aid by means of cooperatives and peasant loan centers as well as joint actions against oppressive forces in rural areas. They became aware of their political rights and the importance of self-government. With sanitation campaigns, various security systems, and construction programs, cleaner, more orderly and more secure conditions emerged in comparison with the pre-experiment period. Most important of all, the reformers induced the villagers to start improving the condition of their lives on their own by means of such an organization as the village improvement society.

The second method to assess the reform achievements is by measuring the extent to which the initial reform plans were fulfilled. The defects of our materials limit the feasibility of this particular method to the extent that statistically accurate information is not within our reach. However, by comparing the reform plans of some districts presented in the preceding chapter with the relative achievements discussed in this chapter it is evident that most of the planned projects were carried out. Moreover, it was reported that most of the COE and AVE districts completed their experimental periods and turned the reform projects over to the local communities. From these facts it seems reasonable to conclude that the COE and AVE completed their first-stage reform experiments. As for the Hsiao-chuang group it is impossible to measure the degree of fulfillment of their reform plans for they did not have any fixed experimental period, nor were they able to continue their reform efforts due to early closure of the school.
The third method is by noting the responses of the neighboring villages toward the reform experiments of the districts. Evidence generally indicates that the reform districts obtained favorable responses. One such instance was the expansion of the reform districts' experimental area with the voluntary joining of the neighboring villages which were impressed by the progress made in the reform districts. The COE's Hui-pei district which had included 32 villages of 1,560 households in 1932 expanded to include 168 villages of 14,838 households by 1936. The AVE's Hsü-kung-ch'iao district originally consisted of about forty villages of 605 households in 1932, but it was expanded in 1933 to the entire third ch'ü of K'un-shan hsien, forming the K'un-shan Self-Government Experimental District, which included 6,370 households and 28,436 people in an area of 271 li.

This expansion phenomena of reform areas also took place in the area of the Hsiao-chuang group's reform experiment. As we have seen, the number of Kung-hsüeh-t'uan, which started in 1932 in the village of Meng-chia-mu-ch'iao of Pao-shan hsien, increased within one year to nine in the neighboring villages. The influence of the little teachers system was particularly remarkable. Only eleven months after its establishment in 1932, the little teachers system had spread to twenty-three provinces and cities.

Judging from the findings obtained from the above three approaches, and in view of the various difficulties experienced by the reformers which will be detailed in the following pages, the results of the three institutions' reform programs in their respective districts
were on the whole encouraging. To this extent the reformers' activities were commendable. Unfortunately, their reform efforts were brought to a sudden and virtual end, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 and the subsequent KMT-CCP civil war, which engulfed the entire country and forced these ambitious reform efforts to remain in the end nothing but a local experiment.

**Difficulties and Lessons in Rural Reconstruction Experiments**

During their rural reform experiments, the rural reconstructionists experienced many difficulties. We may surmise such difficulties by summarizing reports of the reformers in various districts. According to the reformers' comments on their rural reform experiences, their difficulties were primarily of three kinds.

The first difficulty involved the slow reaction or at worst the indifference of the peasants to the rural reform programs. As evidence of the first difficulty, Ch'en Li-chiang, professor of COE who was in charge of the Hui-pei reform experiment, cited the difficulties of the recruiting and retaining of young village people for mass schools.132 This was partly because of the impoverished stated of the peasants and partly because of a conservative tendency among the peasants. The distressing conditions of rural life, which required the constant hard labor of the entire family, made it difficult for many young people to participate in mass education programs. In the district of Huan-hsiang, it took almost one year before the mass school could carry out its normal function by securing enough students (i.e., 70 students).133
Economic hardship in peasant life also prevented those of leadership ability from developing their talent. Poverty forced the peasants to devote most of their time to earning their living and deprived them of learning opportunities. This caused the want of able leadership in rural villages, which was essential for villagers' quick response to the reformers' efforts.

Owing to the rural people's conservative social attitude and their suspiciousness of newcomers, reformers would often encounter the opposition from villagers in the initial stage of their reform efforts. To cite the Huang-hsiang district case again, the reformers encountered stiff opposition from the villagers in the beginning. It took persistent effort with tremendous patience before the reformers began to win the villagers' confidence. It was important for the reformers to affirm that they came to work for the villagers, not for their own interests. Once the villagers came to trust the reformers as their friends, the villagers brought disputes to the reformers and asked for judgment. Due to the fair and judicious advice of the reformers in respect to these disputes, according to the reporter, the villagers' faith toward the reformers further increased and "there was no one in the village who did not greet the reformers with smiles at meeting them."

Due to the above factors, the reconstruction schedules of the reformers were often delayed, and the results of their reform efforts always fell short of the initial objective. As Ch'en Li-chiang pointed out, the same factors were also a source of the difficulty of developing the peasants' "voluntary spirit" (tzu-tung ching-shen) and self-reliance which the reformers considered vital for the
continuation of reform work by villagers themselves after the reformers transferred responsibilities to them.

A second major difficulty stemmed from the existing social system in rural areas which was essentially exploitive and oppressive. In rural areas of Kiangsu, as noted in Chapter Two, most of the offices in the local government were occupied by gentry who were at the same time landlords and usurers. Since the interests of traditional forces contradicted those of the peasants, efforts by reformers to improve peasant lives were apt to be in contention with the local gentry and strong men. Ch'in Liu-fang, a COE rural worker in the district of Huang-hsiang, identified gentry and local strong-men as the source of frustration in rural reform efforts. As evidence, Ch'in cited two incidents which occurred in the district. The first was gentry opposition to the reformers' effort to obtain rent reduction for villagers when that district was hit by a severe flood in 1930. Ch'in pointed out that despite the hsien government order to allow 60 per cent rent reductions upon the petition of the reformers, the landlords--many of whom were gentry living in the cities--were unwilling to grant rent reductions. The local landlords opposed vehemently the rent reduction proposal at a village meeting.

In another incident the reformers had to confront the gentry who supported the town laborers against the Huang-hsiang villagers in the matter of obtaining coal-carrying jobs for the villagers at a textile factory. Originally, the textile factory promised the reformers that it would give the jobs to the villagers in compensation
for the villagers' agreement to sell land in the village as a factory site. During the confrontation between the reformers and the gentry, the gentry called the reformers "the bad elements of disquieting thought," a phrase which they also applied to the Communists.  

The Hsiao-chuang group regarded gentry and local strongmen as the enemies of the peasants. According to Li Ch'u-tsai, a Hsiao-chuang graduate, the school actually experienced obstruction by gentry at the initial stage of its development. We lack information from the AVE reformers as to whether they were hindered by traditional forces. But this seemed natural since most of the leaders of the village improvement societies in the AVE districts were gentry. Reform programs of the district thus could not possibly be made to contradict the interests of the gentry. As a result, reform programs of the AVE's district were not as bold as those in the other two institutions. Considering all the foregoing facts, one can hardly deny in spite of some contributions by a portion of gentry, that on the whole gentry and local strongmen in the countryside formed an obstacle to the rural reconstruction effort to construct a new China.

A third difficulty stemmed from the passive rural policy of the government. It was a commonly shared belief among the Kiangsu reformers that a positive rural policy of the government was essential in enhancing the welfare of the rural population. But in the course of their reform efforts the reformers felt that the government's rural policies were too inadequate. As Ch'en Li-chiang pointed out, the price of agricultural products remained always low, irrigation
systems were left unrepaired, heavy taxes and numerous surcharges were not reduced, and local traditional elite forces who preyed on the peasants remained unpurged.\textsuperscript{138} In his report at the conclusion of the Huang-hsiang reform experiments, Kan Yü-yüan testified: "Gentry and local strong men were tyrants over the peasants. The lives of small peasants were completely controlled by them. The government became a protector of gentry and local ruffians."\textsuperscript{139}

It is true that the central and provincial governments established agricultural banks and promoted cooperatives in order to help the peasants financially. But as we saw earlier the government policy was not really helping the poor peasants, the majority of the rural people, but only middle-class and rich peasants. This was also confirmed in Kan's report.\textsuperscript{140}

The area of self-government training was not much different. As is known today, the Nanking government showed little intention of carrying out self-government training among peasants.\textsuperscript{141} This was clearly seen by some reformers. After the one-year reform experiment in the district of Chou-lung-an, Chiang-Ho, a COE reformer, criticized the local self-government policy of the government, saying: "so-called self-government is not local self-government but local 'bureaucratic government' (ti-fang kuang-chih). It is not what the people need but what the officials need....It pays attention only to a small number of people and ignores the masses."\textsuperscript{142}

Chao Wan of the Pei-hsia district observed that what the peasants suffered from most was economic difficulties and believed that only an active and large-scale rural economic policy by the government
could resolve this problem. He also suggested that in order to solve the rural problem, political solutions should precede economic solutions. 143 But the government did not make such policies.

It was indicated earlier that the AVE districts received relatively more help from the provincial government. But it seems to have turned out that this partial assistance from the provincial government in certain areas of reform was insufficient for the overall improvement of peasant life. After completing a six-year reform experiment in the Hsü-kung-ch'iao district, Chiang Wen-yü professed: "Education cannot get away from politics, and the lack of political power on the part of the reformers constitutes the biggest difficulty in rural reform." 144 In short, the passive rural policy of the government was greatly frustrating to many reformers in connection with their reform work.

Weak points in the rural reconstruction experiments naturally resulted from defects of reform principles and programs found in the actual reform experiments. They also had a great deal to do with the difficulties the reformers encountered. Weaknesses varied, of course, according to different reformers and districts. But the three main weaknesses which involved most of the reform districts were related to defects in the fundamental reform approach of the Kiangsu reconstructionists and their reform principles.

One weakness concerned inaction on such fundamental rural problems as land and population. It has been pointed out in Chapter Two that the land problem was very serious in rural Kiangsu. But as we saw, previously the Kiangsu reformers did not have any program
related to this problem other than small reclamation efforts. Being originally educators with a reformist outlook, the reformers may have given up on this problem, regarding it as simply beyond their immediate capacity. After a few years of reform experiments, however, some reformers realized that such attitudes were a serious mistake. In a summary report at the conclusion of the Huang-hsiang experiment, Kan Yü-Yüan said in 1933: "Programs of the so-called cultural and education improvement, economic improvement and political training were not fundamental methods for the solution of the rural problem. They merely touched upon side problems but not root problems in the lives of the peasants. What the peasants needed most were land and work. Since land areas were small, much of the land belonged to someone else. Moreover, since sericulture and the silk industry were failing, the peasants remained impoverished and left for the cities, giving up farming. These were the main problems which the reformers should have been concerned with. 145

Neglect of the acute land problem in the reform programs also caused self-criticism among other young reformers of the COE. Ch'in Liu-fang criticized the reformers' inaction on the land problem as a result of the tendency of choosing only easy problems and avoiding difficult ones. 146 Another young reformer by the name of T'ung Yü-chin argued that although rural reconstructionists did not have the political power necessary to change the existing land system, they should at least endeavor to find out what they could do about this problem within their capacity. As a starting point for such an effort, T'ung suggested that reformers should make a thorough survey
of the actual land situation in their districts and recommend possible solutions with their findings to government authorities. This was much better than merely sitting around and lamenting the situation, he said. His idea was that the reformers who were working daily with the peasants in rural areas should bring land problems to the government's attention with concrete data and induce the indifferent government to take positive action on the problem.

No direct information is available as to what sympathy the ideas of the young reformers received from other reformers. There is also little information which shows the AVE and Hsiao-chuang positions on the land problem. However, it seems that the concern for the land problem by the COE reformers reflected the general mood within rural reconstruction circles, for when the Third Annual Meeting of the Rural Work Discussion Society was held at the COE in 1935, the land problem was taken up for the first time as one of the main topics for discussion at the meeting. Also the land problem was chosen as one of the key research topics at the COE in 1936. But since all rural reform activities of the COE came to an end in the following year due to the Japanese aggression, this belated concern for the land problem was not reflected in the Kiangsu rural reconstruction programs.

Excessive population was another serious problem in Kiangsu villages. Yet this problem was not included among objects of rural reform by any of the three reconstruction institutions. It was only in 1932 that T'ao Hsing-chih acknowledged the importance of the population problem in rural areas and included training in population
control as one of the six rural training programs in his new Kung-
hsüeh-t'uan movement. In an article concerning rural reform methods
written in 1935, T'ao pointed out the close relationship between
poverty and the low educational level of the peasants and excessive
population. In order to control the problem of over-population, he
suggested that the Chinese traditional idea which regarded many sons
as blessings in life should be eliminated.\textsuperscript{150} In another article
which dealt with the method of propagating his "life-education,"
published around the same period, T'ao suggested that the government
should establish a permanent committee which handled the population
problem (e.g., a "committee for controlling population growth") and
let the committee be responsible for carrying out the policy of
population control on a national scale.\textsuperscript{151} T'ao's idea as such did
not have time to be properly deliberated by others or to be experi-
mented with in his reform areas, for in two years China was plunged
into war with Japan.

The population problem was heeded also by the COE. Its depart-
ment of research studied this problem as one of several key factors
related to rural problems around the same period that T'ao advocated
peasant training in birth control. Furthermore, in 1935, Ch'in Liu-
fang advocated the inclusion of population control in the rural reform
programs.\textsuperscript{152} Although again we lack information about the AVE's
position on this problem, the above facts indicate that the reformers
increasingly realized the necessity of including population-control
in their rural reconstruction programs.

A second weakness was related to the reformers' lack of political
power, which turned out to be a major drawback to the rural
reconstruction movement. The reformers had all aspects of rural life as the object of their reform effort; they even professed their ultimate aim to be the revival of the nation. From their field experience, it became increasingly manifest that their self-imposed task was too formidable to accomplish by themselves. Chiang Wen-yü, drawing upon the experience of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao experiment, claimed: "The rural reform effort from a social standpoint had a weak foundation, and its effectiveness is severely limited. When the reformers do not have political power, difficulties are great." 153 By these words, it seems, Chiang suggested that the reformers needed more political power of their own or active government support in order to carry out their reform work effectively.

The reformers' inability to correct the conditions of society was also well expressed in the following words by Ku Mae, a COE professor in charge of the Hui-pei district: "For instance, if the existing society is exploitive, reformers dare not actively reject or resist it. Yet they considered constructing a rational society by educating the people. Would this approach succeed?" 154 Ku's perspective on the future of the reform movement was not so optimistic. He saw many limitations in the reformers' work as he considered the indifferent government.

Concrete examples of the difficulties reformers experienced because of the lack of political power can be found in the cases of the Huang-hsiang and Kao-chang-an districts. In the former district, Kan Yü-yüan recorded, minor members of the local KMT obstructed the reformers' work by wielding arbitrary power. 155 In the latter,
according to Chiang Ho, a local police chief interfered with the reform efforts. Lacking political power, the reformers could find no way to redress the situation. Kan thought that until the peasants' representatives became the majority of the legislature, the reformers' "great task" could not be accomplished. Hence, he emphasized that reformers must develop the political capacity and organizational power of rural people in order to achieve this objective. This idea received the covert support of COE's president, Kao Chien-ssu. Kao declared that "national salvation" could be achieved only when the masses developed organizational habits and abilities and all social problems could be solved by the group power of the people.

In short, the AVE and COE reformers realized that the difficulties they encountered during their reconstruction efforts arose basically from the defects of the existing social and political system which could not be easily altered by a purely educational approach or social concern. Thus they came to a conclusion that their work needed strong and active backing by political power. As a means of obtaining political power some reformers went as far as to suggest developing the political and organizational capacity of the peasants with the purpose of controlling the government through group power, provided that the process would be democratic.

The third weakness pertains to rural reform procedures and principles discussed in the previous chapter. Through actual reform activities, the reform principles (e.g., to base the reform work on a self-reliant footing and creating reform programs on the basis of local needs and conditions) proved to be reasonable. Among them the
reformers' changing ideas on the issue of utilizing the traditional type of local leaders in the reform movement seem noteworthy.

It has been mentioned that except for the Hsiao-chuang School, both the COE and the AVE made it a rule, as a temporary expediency, first to contact village leaders who were mostly gentry or local strongmen and utilize their influence. But after a few years of reform experiences objections to this method arose among a portion of the reformers. As early as 1932, Kao Chien-ssu suggested that local young people be trained as the "seed of rural reconstruction." In the mid-1930's reformers such as Kan Yü-yüan, Ch'in Liu-fang, and T'ung Yü-chin began to realize the problem of utilizing local traditional forces. In their field experience, they saw that this could constitute a hindrance to the rural reconstruction movement. They pointed out that after seeing the reformers associate with local traditional leaders, many peasants tended to stay away from the reformers. They advocated concentrating on the development of new leaders among the peasants instead. The COE authorities did not make any official statement on such suggestions. But they increasingly sought to train young local leaders. The aforementioned training of thirty young healthy people as new village leaders in the Pei-hsia district and the program of training new local leaders through night mass schools in the Hui-pei district were such examples.

The AVE depended for the leadership of its reform district for the most part upon established leaders such as local gentry and wealthy people and had few programs for training young local leaders. But as we saw earlier, from the early 1939's onward this institution
also showed concern for developing new village leadership. Chiang Wen-yü suggested using elementary and middle school graduates who could not afford further advanced education after having them go through a certain period of rural reform training. It can be thus concluded that the idea of training young local people as new leaders in lieu of the existing local leaders was increasingly shared by reformers of the three institutions.

Summary and Conclusion

As indicated in the preceding chapter, rural reform programs and activities by the three rural reconstruction institutions were carried out in accordance with the elaborate reform plans of each institution. These can be categorized in six general programs: educational reform, cultural improvement, political and civic training, health improvement, and construction. In regard to these reform programs, the three institutions displayed both similar and diverse methods. The following three points can be recognized as salient features common to the three institutions. First, based on the actual needs of the village people, all the reform projects and activities of these institutions were fairly concrete and practical. This is manifest in the different reform projects they designed to redress the shortcomings and to fill the needs of rural life.

Secondly, reformers of the three institutions always chose to consult with and to work jointly with the people of their respective districts in carrying out the reform projects. In this approach of giving first primacy to the villagers, the organization of the village improvement society was of great help.
A third point common to the three institutions was that they all welcomed cooperative reform efforts with outside agencies, both private and governmental, irrespective of the fact that the degree of actual cooperation varied between each institution. The Department of Agriculture of Chin-ling University provided considerable technical assistance to all three institutions. Medical students of Peking University helped the Hsiao-chuang group's health program. The AVE received various types of assistance from the Agriculture and Mining Departments of the provincial government and from the hsien governments which asserted authority over the AVE experimental districts.

As was reflected in the reform plans of the respective institutions, the diversity between the three institutions' reform programs mainly reflected general propensities and primary emphasis of each institution.

Among the three institutions, the Hsiao-chuang reform programs and methods seem to have been the most bold and mass-oriented. Their reform projects, such as a rent reduction campaign plan, organization of an inter-village self-defense corps armed with military weapons and trained by soldiers belonging to an army which was at odds with the central government, and political training which emphasized the idea of the people as the master of government, were of such a radical character that they could easily be frowned upon by the Nanking authorities dominated by the conservative right wing of the KMT in the early 1930's.

On the other hand, the AVE's reform programs were on the whole more conservative, containing many aspects which were conciliatory
to the existing social and political order. They focused on solving the economic problems of the rural populace and on construction projects. Yet they were passive with respect to political training of the people and reforming the existing rural social fabric unfavorable to the peasants. They lacked such a program as a rent reduction campaign, and their civic training programs did not go beyond holding a model election of hsiang chiefs and sponsoring a villagers-hsiang chief talk session, which were moderate enough to be within the boundary of the Nanking authorities' tutelage policy. This conservative character of the AVE's program seems to have arisen from the fact that most of the AVE's reform experiments were joint projects with either the established local leaders of wealth and power or with the provincial or hsien governments.

The COE's reform programs can be described as moderate yet progressive. They were moderate in the sense that the COE reformers tried to work within the frame of the existing social and political system. They recognized the leadership of the established local leaders (e.g., the gentry and local strongmen) and were willing to cooperate with them in their rural reform efforts. Carrying on the mass education tradition, they placed the prime emphasis on developing the people's self-government capacity, the central task of the political tutelage program. They cooperated with the local government apparatus, such as hsiang or ch'ü public offices, in the process of carrying out such a project. Yet they were progressive. Whereas the Nanking Government tended to emphasize the people's obligation to the government rather than the people's rights and was little concerned
with developing the people's self-government ability, the COE reformers, being faithful to Sun Yat-sen's original tutelage concept, tried their best to teach the villagers how to exercise the four powers of the people. They even had the villagers choose hsiang chiefs by means of elections, a procedure that was extremely rare in other areas of the country throughout the Nanking period. In addition, they endeavored to obtain rent and land tax reductions for the peasants.

The reformers encountered various difficulties which diminished the effects of their reform work and learned many lessons in the course of their reform experiments. The difficulties included peasant apathy and conservatism, hindrance by traditional local forces and corrupt local officials, the shortage of reform funds and personnel, and the government's passive rural policy. The lessons the reformers learned during the reform experiments primarily concerned weaknesses in their rural reform movement. They came to realize that the main source of the difficulties in the reform work was the shortcomings of the existing social and political system, yet they did not grapple with these problems seriously. For instance, they found it a mistake to have few programs dealing with land and population problems which were the most fundamental and acute in rural Kiangsu. A few reformers also came to the conclusion that cooperation with the local traditional leaders would not serve the purpose of the rural reconstruction movement. They thus turned their efforts to developing new leadership among the peasantry. Similarly, they came to see that educational means alone were insufficient to achieve the desired effects; their reform work needed strong political backing. Lacking
in political power, the reformers were not only helpless before such difficulties, but also could not propagate their findings obtained in rural reform experiments to broader segments of China's vast rural population.

What then were the results of the reform experiments? First of all, despite the varying degrees of success between the three institutions, evidence shows general improvement in many areas of rural life compared with the pre-experimental era. Seeing the progress made in the reform districts the neighboring villages voluntarily asked to join the reform experiments, which resulted frequently in the expansion of the reform districts' experimental area. Also, upon completion of the initial reform projects in most of the COE and AVE districts, the two institutions turned over their reform work to the local community for the villagers to run. Considering these three facts and taking into account the various difficulties the reformers encountered, it seems on the whole that the reform experiments by the three institutions can be considered local successes even though the results in all the reform areas were not necessarily satisfactory. The three institutions succeeded at least in laying the foundation for continuous reform efforts and the expansion of their experiments in rural reconstruction work to other areas. However, the three institutions were never given the opportunity to continue their rural reconstruction movement after 1937 because of the foreign and civil wars which swept the entire country until 1949.
CHAPTER VIII
RURAL RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENT OF THE CHIANG-NING
SELF-GOVERNMENT EXPERIMENT HSIEH

This chapter deals with the rural reconstruction experiment launched by a provincial government institution, namely the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien. In the previous chapter it is indicated that the Nanking Government's rural policy was passive. The Chiang-ning hsien's rural reconstruction experiment is significant in that, as shown in the following pages, it was initiated by and carried out under the strong sponsorship of the Nanking Government even though the execution of the project was entrusted to the Kiangsu provincial government. The rural reconstruction approach taken by the Chiang-ning hsien was also diametrically opposed to that of the rural reconstructionists which we discussed in the preceding chapter. The present chapter is thus presented for the purpose of comparing rural reconstruction efforts by the three reconstruction institutions with those of the Chiang-ning experimental hsien which represented an aspect of the Nanking Government's rural policy. It is hoped that doing so will help further clarify the character of the rural reconstruction movement as carried on by the three institutions.

The Origin and Significance of the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien

Origin of the Experimental Hsien

Spurred by the strong rural reconstruction trends which formed a major social reform movement in the nation during the early 1930s,
the Ministry of the Interior (Nei-cheng-pu) sent Kan Nai-kuang, a leader of the KMT left-wing faction and then Vice-Minister of the Interior, to make a tour of rural reconstruction centers such as Ting-hsien, Tsou-p'ing, and others, toward the end of 1932. In the course of this inspection Kan was greatly impressed by the results of the rural reconstruction centers and felt the need for prompt rural reconstruction measures and reform of hsien government in order to facilitate further rural reconstruction efforts.¹

The report of Kan, based on his inspection tour, became the basis of the hsien administration reform plan (kai-ko hsien-cheng-an) which the Ministry of Interior submitted at the Second National Interior Administration Conference held at Nanking in December, 1932. Two key items were particularly emphasized in the plan, local self-government and rural reconstruction. As a means to achieve them it was recommended that each province would establish an experimental hsien and make it a model for other hsien in regard to administrative reform as well as hsien reconstruction.² The reason why hsien government was made the object of reform at the conference is that the hsien was the basic unit of local government in China which directly dealt with affairs of the people. A resolution to this effect was unanimously passed at the conference, and the resolution was sanctioned by the Political Council of the central government in July of the following year.³ During the same month, the Executive Yuan directed "those provinces which were in a position to establish experimental hsien to do so."⁴ In August of the same year, the Ministry of Interior advised the provincial governments that
each area chosen for experimental reforms should possess the following characteristics: it should be a hsien that was fairly representative of the general conditions of the province; it should have a central location in the province with good means of communication; it should be a hsien with adequate leadership and resources available to make the experimental reform a success. If the experiment proved a success, similar reforms might be launched in other hsien within the provinces. This was how the experimental hsien came to exist.

By 1933 five experimental hsien had been established in four provinces. The Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien was one established in Kiangsu. The others were the Tsou-p'ing and Ho-tse experimental hsien in Shantung province, Ting-hsien experimental hsien in Hopei, and Lan-chi experimental hsien in Chekiang. But the nature and emphasis of rural reconstruction within these hsien were by no means the same. Whereas reconstruction experiments of Tsou-p'ing, Ho-tse, and Ting-hsien experimental hsien were entrusted to private rural reconstruction institutions by the respective provincial governments, those of Chiang-ning and Lan-chi hsien were carried out under the direct supervision of the provincial governments.

**Significance of the Chiang-ning Experimental Hsien**

Despite having been the product of the resolution discussed above, the Chiang-ning experimental hsien was distinct in comparison with the other hsien in regard to the following three points. First, the Chiang-ning experimental hsien was established five months ahead
of the Executive Yuan's directives to other provinces regarding experimental hsien, namely on February 10, 1933. 

Second, the Chiang-ning experimental hsien was established by Ku Chu-t'ung, a confidant of Chiang Kai-shek and then governor of Kiangsu province, at the recommendation of Chiang Kai-shek. In other words, the Chiang-ning experimental hsien of Kiangsu province was a representative hsien which experimented with hsien government reform on behalf of the central government. The reasons why Chiang-ning was designated as such an experimental hsien were twofold. (1) Geographically it included Nanking, the capital of the nation, within its boundary. Therefore, its reform policies would not only give a good impression to foreign observers, but also would attract national attention and more easily serve as a model for other hsien in the country. (2) Owing to its proximity to the capital Chiang-ning would have easy access to the central government, the party, and other necessary institutions which could help the reform experiment in various ways. The strong sponsorship of the central government is also evident in the organization of the hsien government. The supreme organ of the experimental hsien government was the Commission for Hsien Government (Hsien-cheng wei-yüan hui), which was composed of nine to thirteen members appointed by the provincial government. The members were mostly influential party members and high-ranking government officials. At the recommendation of the commission, the provincial government appointed as magistrate Mei Ssu-p'ing, who formerly had served as professor of public administration at the Central Political University (Chung-yang
Under Mei, most of the key positions of the hsien government were staffed with graduates of the Central Political University, the educational ideal of which was to train faithful KMT elites. Besides, the educational level of the other hsien officials was generally high. Of the total of 114 members of the hsien government, university graduates comprised 48; junior college graduates, 15; university dropouts, 5; middle school graduates, 36; vocational school graduates, 5, and others, 5.

Thirdly, in order to facilitate the success of the experiment, special prerogatives were given to the hsien by the provincial government as compared with powers of other hsien. First of all, the Chiang-ning experimental hsien was given broad administrative powers. Although the experimental hsien was still under the provincial government, it was exempted from being directly subject to the current regulations of the provincial government. The regulations and administrative orders of the provincial government existed only to guide it. The hsien government was empowered to enact hsien statutes, and proclaim hsien orders. Such administrative powers were exceptional in comparison with those of other hsien. According to the Organic Law for Hsien Government which was promulgated in July, 1929, and revised in July, 1930, it was simply written: "Hsien government administers the affairs of the hsien under the supervision of the provincial government." Thus the law failed to define the specific relationship between the provincial and hsien governments. The law was silent regarding which exact functions the hsien could act on independently and through its own initiative. In practice,
however, it was common that everything lower-level government did, whether it be purely local in character or not, had to have the sanction of the provincial government.\(^{12}\)

The experimental hsien was also given special privileges in matters of finance. Through decisions at the meeting of the provincial government, the land taxes in the hsien, which usually went to the provincial treasury, were allocated directly to the hsien government. Chiang-ning was also given jurisdiction over one-half of the tax revenues stemming from the registration of title deed on land and buildings. Such revenues ordinarily went to the province. The total amount of taxes available for the experimental hsien thus amounted to 900,000 yuan per annum.\(^{13}\) This amounted to more than four times the annual expenditures of other hsien in Kiangsu. The average expenditure per hsien was around 201,000 yuan in 1933.\(^{14}\) Also, Chiang-ning's annual expenditure was about seven times greater than that of its counterpart in Chekiang Province, namely the Lan-chi Self-Government Experimental Hsien. The annual expenditure of the Lan-chi hsien came to about 120,000 yuan.\(^{15}\)

With these favorable conditions the Chiang-ning experimental hsien was to complete its hsien reconstruction experiment in four years.

**Hsien Reconstruction Program**

In view of the origin of experimental hsien discussed in the preceding section it is clear that the experimental hsien had a dual purpose, namely reform of the hsien administration and rural reconstruction. But it is necessary to remember that the latter
The objective was primary and the former supplementary. Hsü Ying-lien, an author on the rural reconstruction movement, pointed out that since the hsien were predominantly rural, hsien reconstruction inevitably involved rural reconstruction.\textsuperscript{16} In clarifying the hsien government’s fundamental position on its reconstruction experiment, Mei Ssu-p’ing said that the hsien experiment was to improve rural villages by "making works" (tso-shih) on the one hand and by "training the people" (tsao-jen) on the other through the utilization of the government’s power.\textsuperscript{17} Thus as far as aiming at rural reconstruction was concerned, there was little difference between the rural reconstructionists and the Chiang-ning experimental hsien. However, their approaches to rural reconstruction differed. While the reform effort by the rural reconstructionists was a social movement which tried to reform rural society from the bottom up through education based on the needs of the people, the Chiang-ning experimental hsien attempted to achieve similar goals through political devices, imposing the government’s ideas on the population from the top down as the government saw fit.\textsuperscript{18} Hence, it was believed that the prerequisite for success in such an approach was a strong and efficient government. For the same reason reconstruction work in Chiang-ning hsien was carried out in two phases. The first entailed administrative reforms which aimed to make the hsien government strong and efficient. Then in the second, full-fledged hsien-scale rural reconstruction work was undertaken.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Administrative Reform.} After the establishment of the Chiang-ning experimental hsien, the first measure was the reorganization of
five bureaus of the previous hsien government (i.e., finance, education, construction, public security, and land) into six departments: civil, finance, education, public works, security, and land. According to Mei, this reorganization was designed to facilitate the control of administrative organs by the magistrate and to increase efficiency. But the newly added civil department appears to have been established under the consideration that the experimental hsien was to deal with "self-government" projects as prescribed in Sun Yat-sen's Fundamental of National Reconstruction. Civil affairs such as population registration constituted an important part of the self-government work. After having consolidated the central organs the hsien government undertook further reforms in the following four administrative areas: "self-government," population and land administration, finance, and public security.

Reform in Self-Government Administration

Reform in self-government administration meant streamlining sub-hsien administrative organs. Prior to becoming an experimental hsien, Chiang-ning hsien had a self-government administrative system similar to those of other hsien, as prescribed in the Organic Law of Hsien Government mentioned earlier. Under this system there were four subdivisional administrative units at different levels under the hsien government. They were, in descending order, ch'ü, hsiang, lü, and lin (neighborhood). This system had many defects and had been subject to a great deal of criticism. For instance, the basic number of households for constituting a lin was five; a lü, 25, hsiang, more than 100 and less than 1,000; and ch'ü, 10 to 50 hsiang
and chen. Hence, there were cases in which villages of three or four hundred households were forcibly divided among three or four hsiang without consideration of the natural boundaries of the villages. On the other hand, in southern Kiangsu there were numerous villages which consisted of only three or four to several tens of households. These villages were arbitrarily joined together to form hsiang, regardless of the distance, difficult terrain, and different customs between the villages. Therefore, the villagers often did not know to which hsiang they belonged.23 If self-government was to be based on group consciousness and the exercise of the people’s four powers, this situation did not facilitate the development of such democratic tendencies. In order to correct such a situation and make the local administrative system more suitable to actual local conditions, the Chiang-ning hsien government instituted a series of reforms in the system.

In June, 1933, lü and lin were abolished and changed into ts'un and li instead. The essential points of the reform were as follows:

(a) Those villages which constituted a hsiang were called ts'un and the streets of a chen (market town) became li.

(b) The scope of the ts'un and li were determined according to natural geographical boundaries.

(c) Each ts'un and li retained its original local name.

(d) Those ts'un and li which comprised less than 100 households would have one ts'un-chang (ts'un chief) or li-chang (li chief). Those which consisted of more than 100 households would have one deputy chief in addition to a chief; and those which had more than 200
households, two deputy chiefs. The chiefs and deputy chiefs were appointed by the hsien government from among those recommended by the chiefs of the hsiang and chen. The duties of chiefs and deputy chiefs of the ts'un and li were to take care of various directives from the hsiang or chen public offices, to arbitrate disputes between villages, and to report the opinions of villagers to the superior offices. There were ts'un and li assemblies (ts'un or li hui-i) which consisted of adults above twenty years of age. Theoretically, the assembly was the supreme organ in the ts'un or li. However, the assembly proved only a formality, and had no power over chiefs of the ts'un and li.

As is obvious, these administrative reforms did not really help much in the promotion of local self-government. Their chief merit was only to overcome the arbitrary mechanical division of households.24

In December, 1933, the local administrative system was further changed by abolishing the ch'ü, the intermediary organ between the hsien government and hsiang and chen. By this change, hsiang and chen came to receive direct supervision and direction by the hsien government. But in consideration of the large number of hsiang and chen (the total number was 109), seven so-called "self-government guidance officers (tzu-chih chih-t'ao-yüan) were created between the hsien government and hsiang and chen. Their duties were primarily to supervise the work of the hsiang and chen chiefs on behalf of the hsien government. They did not deal with self-government affairs.

Another reform measure was the increase of administrative allowances for hsiang and chen chiefs. The administrative allowance
for hsiang and chen chiefs was only around six yuan per month. However, the responsibility of these chiefs was heavy. Consequently, some people did not want to hold such offices even though they had been appointed, and some chiefs tended to extort the people. Also, administration on the hsiang level was in most cases poorly carried out. In order to correct such a situation, allowances were increased as follows: 32 yuan per month for "A" class hsiang chiefs, 28 yuan for "B" class hsiang chiefs, and 24 yuan for "C" class hsiang chiefs.

To review these reform measures, there was an impression that they were primarily for more effective control of the village people. Stress was placed on the simplification of administrative channels and the consolidation of basic administrative units rather than preparing for the promotion of self-government at the grass-roots level.

Population and Land Administration

Precise information on the number and state of the population was indispensable not only for maintaining local security, but also for establishing regulations in various administrative fields. Therefore, the Chiang-ning government conducted a population census, together with personnel registration, between November 1 and 5, 1933, with assistance from the staff of the Central Bureau of Statistics. By these means, the hsien offices were able to gain valuable statistics for administration.

Meanwhile, land registration had been carried out as a preliminary measure for a land tax consolidation project. In Chiang-ning
there had not been a land survey for many years, and many land
boundaries were uncertain. As a consequence, there had arisen many
problems and corrupt practices concerning land. Land disputes were
numerous. Land aggrandizement incidents were common. Also, tax
evasions by landlords, and unfair taxation, and embezzlement of tax
money by corrupt tax collectors and tax clerks were pervasive. As a
result, government revenue was shrinking, and the tax burden of the
people was increasing. For instance, prior to land registration,
the average percentage of land-tax revenue collected was only 30 to
40 per cent of the total estimated land tax. Thus the purpose of
land registration was to increase government revenue and to lessen
the tax burden of the people by making accurate land registers based
on exact land acreage.

Land registration was carried out during two and a half months
from April 16 to the end of June, 1933. A revised Chekiang land
registration method was used as a model. The main difference was
that in the case of Chiang-ning, registration fees were not collected
from those who reported their land prior to May 31. This was to
avoid the impression that land registration was another form of
taxation. However, those who registered their land after May 31 were
charged a five fen (cent) per mou registration fee. Land not
registered by the end of June was regarded as ownerless land.

As a result of land registration, the registered taxable land
increased to 1,300,000 mou from the previously registered 1,100,000
mou. Accordingly, with greatly improved tax collection percentage,
revenues from land taxes almost doubled, jumping from about 477,000
yuan in 1932 to around 900,000 yuan in 1933. The land tax was also lightened by around 0.7 yuan per mou from the annual amount of 9.6 chueh (0.96 yuan) in the pre-registration period to 8.9 chueh in the post-registration period. Thus land registration, together with the financial reforms discussed below, was considered as a great success.

Financial Reforms

The financial administration of the hsien had been extremely confused. Graft and misappropriation of public money were rampant, and the hsien government was almost on the verge of bankruptcy. When the new experimental hsien group took over the hsien government they found that policemen's salaries had been unpaid for eighteen months. Likewise, owing to lack of educational funds for the previous six months, all the public schools in the hsien were about to close. This was partly because of the low quality of the fiscal personnel and partly because of the absence of an effective system of assessment, collection, and accounting. Hence, for the experimental hsien government, a reform of the financial administration was a most urgent task.

Financial reforms were carried out mainly in three ways: the improvement of the land tax collection system, the consolidation of taxes, and the introduction of a scientific accounting method.

Before Chiang-ning became an experimental hsien, the collection of land taxes was carried out through offices called kuei (chests) installed by the Bureau of Finance of the provincial government. There were two taxation offices: one called Yuan-kuei situated in
the eastern area which formerly had been Shang-yüan hsien. Each of these tax offices was manned by a chief (kuei chu-jen) who was responsible to the head of the financial bureau of the provincial government, principal and assistant accountants (cheng fu ssu-chang) who were in charge of accounting and tax registers, and several register clerks (ts'e-shu), and cashiers (kuei-shu) and their assistants. Aside from these office workers there were forty to fifty tax collectors under the chief of each taxation office, who were called ts'ui-cheng-li (tax payment expediters). In addition, there were hundreds of underlings of the ts'ui-cheng-li. It was estimated that in Chiang-ning there were no less than 3,000 individuals who lived directly or indirectly off the collection of land taxes alone. These people were mostly hereditary tax collectors. They received no salary from the government and were left to make their income by their own means. Naturally, they resorted to all kinds of corrupt practices for making money. Some examples of their malpractices are as follows.

The ts'ui-cheng-li exacted money from people who did not pay taxes on time, and made use of the revenue for making money (e.g., using the revenue as usury capital) by falsely reporting taxes already collected as still due. They also changed the classes of land, such as reporting wet fields (yü-t'ien) as mountain fields (shan-t'ien) and profited on the tax difference between them. Often they were bribed to report wet fields as mountain fields, a practice that benefitted the field owner. Likewise, a land register clerk would profit by falsely recording cultivated land as wasteland.
Of the money thus made, they gave part of the chiefs of taxation offices. It was known that at the end of every year each ts'ui-cheng-li sent 300 to 400 yuan to the chiefs, according to the size of their tax collection districts. Since the chief of each taxation office had forty to fifty ts'ui-cheng-li under him, the total income a chief thus received amounted to 15,000 to 20,000 yuan. If there occurred vacancies in ts'ui-cheng-li posts due to resignations or dismissals, it was commonplace for the chiefs to appoint a replacement after receiving payments of three to four hundred yuan. The newly appointed ts'ui-cheng-li who payed such large sums for his appointment naturally tried to recover the money through illegal practices. In this way corruption followed a vicious circle.37

The government was not totally unaware of the deplorable situation. However, the reason why such a condition was not corrected was partly due to the government's inability and partly because of the connivance on the part of officials, who were linked with the corruption in one way or another.38 Under such circumstances, the people as well as the government suffered immensely. The tax burden of the people constantly increased. However, not only did government revenues not increase, but the high percentage of uncollected taxes remained constant.

After the conception of land registration, the experimental hsien government launched the following reform programs dealing with the tax collection system. First, it reorganized the tax office. The two former tax offices were annexed and made into one general tax office. Under the general tax office, four branch offices were
Fig. 13. Map of Chiang-ning. Source: Chiang-su ch'üan-sheng fen-t'u (Divisional Map of Kiangsu Province), Comp. by Ya-hsing ti-hsueh-she, (Wu-ch'ang, 1912), 3-4; altered by the writer according to the map compiled by US Army Corps of Engineers, (Washington, 1955).
established at four convenient places in the hsien (locations of the four branches are not available). The chief of the office was made directly responsible to the hsien government, and accountants were sent from the hsien government. As for the other office personnel such as cashiers and the registrar, the hsien government appointed them from among those recommended by the office chief. 39

Second, the former parasitic tax collectors were discharged and replaced by newly-trained personnel. In order to prevent embezzlement of tax money, their duties were confined to expediting tax payments, but not collecting taxes. Some previous tax collectors were allowed to remain on the job, but only after rigorous examinations. They were also required to receive strict retraining. As a measure to prevent corruption, a definite scale of salaries and allowances was determined for tax personnel. 40

Third, the classification of land was simplified. The previous forty odd kinds of land classifications were consolidated into three classes and nine grades of land (san-teng chiu-fen-fa) (i.e., best first class, middle first class, poor first class, best second class, middle second class, poor second class; best third class, middle third class, poor third class). According to these new classifications, uniform tax rates were applied. 41

Fourth, tax payments were to be made directly by tax payers themselves. In addition, a discount and penalty system was introduced in order to promote early tax payments. Those who paid within the payment deadline received a 10 per cent discount of the total tax
amount while those who payed after the deadline had to pay an additional 10 per cent penalty fee.\textsuperscript{42}

Lastly, the old tax districts were abolished and replaced by hsiang and chen as new tax collection units. Moreover, the chiefs of hsiang and chen were given the responsibility of encouraging early tax payments. The amount of hsiang and chen office expenditures supplied by the hsien government was to be affected according to the record of tax remittances from each hsiang and chen.\textsuperscript{43}

Besides, as integral parts of financial reform, a modern system of accounting was introduced, and a system of centralized control of hsien expenditures was adopted.\textsuperscript{44} Also, the previous forty-odd kind of surtaxes were consolidated into fifteen tax classifications.\textsuperscript{45}

As a result, it was reported, the intake percentage of tax collection by the hsien government increased from the previous average of 30 per cent to 95 per cent.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{Public Security}

In Chiang-ning, the organization which took charge of security affairs was originally the Pao-wei wei-yuan-hui (Security-defense committee). Pao-wei-t'uan (security-defense corps) under this committee lacked strict organization and training. Thus the corps rendered little service to the people of the hsien, only wasting public money. It was said that the corps had been often employed to serve the interests of large landlords in suppressing tenants' rent resistance. The corps was also the source of many social evils such as extortion of the people and protection of gambling and opium smoking. It proved utterly incompetent in dealing with bandits, its
Although the maintenance of security was an integral part of the hsien administration, the corps had its own chain of command independent from the hsien administrative line, a feature that further reduced administrative effectiveness. The aim of reforms in the security system was to correct these defects and to strengthen the capability of the corps.

For this reason, the hsien first undertook to incorporate the pao-wei-t'uan into the administrative structure. Thus in June, 1933, the hsien government abolished the pao-wei-t'uan committee and transferred all the matters which concerned security to the Department of Civil Affairs. Then under this department a general headquarters (tsung-t'uan-pu) was established at hsien level, and under the general headquarters, ch'ü headquarters in each ch'ü, which came under direct command of the hsien magistrate and ch'ü chiefs. Likewise, hsiang and chen pao-wei-t'uan members were also placed under the control of hsiang and chen chiefs.

Training of the corps members was also improved. In order to provide good training, the hsien government established a Pao-wei-t'uan Training Center at hsien level and ch'ü training centers in each ch'ü and carried out training work in two phases. First, at the hsien Pao-wei-t'uan Training Center, about forty corps officer candidates who had been selected by each ch'ü received intensive military training for six months. Then the trainees were sent back to their respective ch'ü and became commanding officers and training officers of the ch'ü security-defense corps.
Ch'u corps training centers were established and provided corps members with three months of military training. These trainees were selected from each hsiang and chen. The allotted number of trainees was one per year for hsiang of less than 200 households, two for hsiang of 200 to 400 households, four for hsiang of 400 to 600 households, and six for hsiang of more than 1,000 households. All the expenses during the training were provided by the hsien government. After completing their training, they were organized into ch'ang-pei-t'uan (standing security corps). In 1933 the total number of ch'ang-pei-t'uan was 535. These units were the regular militia of the hsien. The number of rifles owned by the corps was about 2,000. It was said that winter banditry problems disappeared in the hsien after the organization of the ch'ang-pei-t'uan. 49

In the area of police administration efforts were made to increase the number of new weapons, intensify training, and improve policemen's salaries. Unfortunately, we lack detailed data regarding the police forces of both the previous government and the experimental hsien for comparison. We only know, according to the new government's report, that the crime rate in the hsien sharply dropped between 1933 and 1934. 50

Rural Reconstruction Projects

Rural reconstruction work, the second phase of the hsien reconstruction experiment began in the fall of 1933 when the administrative reforms came to a conclusion. The rural reconstruction programs of the hsien government can be examined, as Mei Ssu-p'ing
explained, in the following four areas: education, material improvement (economic improvement and public works), public health, and self-government.

**Educational Reconstruction**

Education in Chiang-ning before the hsien became an experimental hsien was, as indicated earlier, in a very poor condition owing to the bad financial situation. As of 1932, the total number of hsien elementary schools was 95 with a total of 161 classes with 3,490 students, and 205 teachers. This number of school children constituted only around five per cent of the total school-age children in the hsien. Because of meager salaries many teachers were leaving local schools for cities, looking for better-paid positions. Many hsien schools existed only in form. Hence, many parents stopped sending their children to hsien schools and established private schools at their own expense. 51

In order to ameliorate this situation, the hsien government introduced a number of reform measures. First, it attempted to increase the number of hsien schools. Under the slogan of "equal progress throughout the hsien," the policy of one school per hsiang and chen was enforced. 52 In addition, the hsien government encouraged the establishment of private schools, promising to provide financial assistance to worthy private schools. As a result, the total number of elementary schools in the experimental hsien, both private and public, more than doubled compared with the pre-experimental period, namely 233 schools with 353 classes. The number of school children increased to around 21,000 or 45 per cent of the total school-age children. 53
Second, in order to elevate teachers' standards, the qualification for elementary school teachers was in principle limited to graduates of normal schools. Teachers whose qualifications did not meet this requirement were retrained at a teachers' training center established by the hsien government. The hsien also almost doubled teachers' salaries so that teachers could better devote themselves to the education of the students. 54

Third, the entire hsien was divided into ten school districts, and each district was to have one center-school (chung-hsin hsūeh-hsiao). The center-school was designed to function as a nucleus for developing effective educational methods in each district by serving as a model for the rest of the schools in the district. The principal of the center-school was given the responsibility of supervising the work of the teachers of the entire district. The center-school conducted supplementary training sessions for district teachers and served as the meeting place for various activities of the district teachers. While this type of school was called a "center-school," the remaining schools were called "experimental schools (shih-yen hsūeh-hsiao)." 55

Social education was also enlarged. Previously social education in Chiang-ning had been borne by two mass education halls and one peasant education hall. The results were not good. The experimental hsien authorities thought that social education and regular education should not be separated and that the number of existing social education institutions was not adequate for the entire population of the hsien. Hence, the hsien authorities devised the method of
utilizing elementary school facilities for social education. All elementary schools were ordered to conduct social education courses for the people in their vicinity using evenings and vacation time. The content of these courses were similar to those conducted by the rural reconstructionists of the three institutions, particularly reform programs of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education. That is, hsien social education consisted of training in livelihood, language and literacy, politics, morality (tao-te), and health. From November, 1933, to February, 1934, all schools offered four-month mass night school courses throughout the hsien with 103 classes and 4,570 students. The program produced 2,885 students as the first graduates. This was only the beginning in that the number of graduates represented only 0.6 per cent of the illiterate population of the hsien. As a part of social education programs the schools were also ordered to prepare agricultural stations, mass athletic grounds, mass reading rooms, public health centers, wall newspapers, mass parks, mass meeting halls, and mass tea houses. The increase of social educational facilities as a result of the above directive, compared with conditions prior to the experimental hsien, is shown in Table 28.

In addition, the schools carried out such projects as mobile classes, an illiteracy survey, and agricultural exhibitions and contests. A forestation project was carried out with the schools as centers. In March, 1933, all schools were ordered to lead the people in planting trees in their localities. Each school was required to plant 5,000 trees in nearby mountains. The schools which did not
Table 28. Comparison of the Number of Social Education Facilities Between the Experimental Hsien Period and the Previous Period, Chiang-ning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass athletic grounds</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass schools</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass reading rooms</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass parks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass meeting halls</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass tea houses</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass wall newspapers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural stations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


have nearby mountains were to plant 50 to 200 trees around their campus. As a result, the whole hsien planted a total number of 650,900 trees, covering an area of 1,920 mou. The schools were ordered to assist in the propagation of inoculation among the people.

In the fall of 1933, a compulsory education plan was put into effect. The plan included not only school age children, but also illiterate adults. The government first made a survey of the needs for compulsory education through the hsiang and chen offices. According to the plan, children aged six to nine were to enter the hsien elementary schools; for those whose ages fell between ten and fifteen, private schools were ordered to offer a special compulsory education course; and for adults whose ages were from 16 to 40,
education was to be provided by the mass schools. Those who were required to take compulsory education were notified by the hsiang or chen offices. Such a selection method seems to have been very effective, for the hsien government had already conducted a population census and also had hsiang elementary schools take illiteracy surveys in their localities. As for those who did not comply with the notification, after one warning they were either forcibly enrolled in school or charged on to five yuan as a "school-neglecting fine." The money thus collected formed a scholarship fund for the entire hsien. Despite such a strong national measure, this policy of compulsory education did not achieve good results because of the severe drought which hit the hsien that year.  

The establishment of a middle school was another important part of the educational reconstruction program. In 1934, the government established a hsien middle school which also offered normal school courses. The purpose of the middle school was thus twofold: to facilitate continued schooling for the graduates of the hsien elementary schools; and to train elementary school teachers for hsien schools and candidates as future hsiang and chen chiefs. The number of students enrolled for the middle school was 48, and 44 for the normal school course. The training period was three years for both groups of students.

As we can easily judge from the comparative statistics given above, education in the hsien expanded greatly through the educational reconstruction program. Such expansion inevitably necessitated the increase of hsien educational expenditures. The yearly educational
expenditures increased from an average of 170,000 .yahoo after the establishment of the experimental hsien. 60

Material Reconstruction

Programs of material reconstruction included public works such as road construction and maintenance, irrigation works, projects to improve agriculture, rural credit, and the promotion of auxiliary occupations.

With strengthened administrative power and more adequate finances, the experimental hsien's achievements in the area of public works were impressive. During the period from December, 1933, through the end of 1934, the hsien constructed a total length of 63 kilometers of six-lane highways and repaired 10 kilometers of the existing highways. This was done by mobilizing about 9,000 inhabitants as a conscripted labor force. During the same period, this labor force also carried out dredging projects, saving 50,000 mou of fields from flood danger, and repaired more than 150 dikes, and irrigated about 60,000 mou of rice fields with 16 irrigation pumps. These irrigation projects proved to be a great help to the peasants during the drought of 1934. 61

In the area of agricultural improvement, the government focused on the extension of improved seeds of wheat. In 1933, 120 tan of improved wheat seeds were bought from the agriculture departments of Central and Chin-ling universities and distributed among the peasants. However, due to lack of proper guidance, the project failed. In the following year, the hsien government designated an area of 4,000 mou at T'u-shan-chen as an agricultural experimental district and
required the peasants of the area to adopt improved rice and wheat seeds in their fields. The result was unsatisfactory again because of the drought mentioned above. Since there was no compensation for the loss of the peasants, the peasants generally tended to shun the government's request. 62

Rural credit programs employed by the experimental hsien government were primarily of two kinds: various types of mortgage loan systems and cooperatives. Of the mortgage loan systems three types were important: the mortgage loan center, the agricultural-products mortgage warehouse, and the oxen society (keng-nyu-hui). For these projects the hsien government appropriated a total of 200,000 yuan.

The mortgage loan center was opened first in Hu-shu chen of the sixth district of the hsien in July, 1934, with an initial capital of 2,000 yuan. The capital was borrowed from the Nanking Branch of the Bank of Shanghai at an interest rate of 0.9 per cent per month. This was an experimental project, and if the result of the program had been successful it would have been expanded to the entire hsien. The center loaned money to the people by mortgaging such items as clothes, silver and gold objects, and agricultural products. The amounts of the loans were restricted to 60 per cent of the market value of the securities offered. The interest rate was 1.5 per cent per month in 1933, but was increased to 1.6 per cent the following year. The loan period was six months. Profits made from the difference between the bank interest rate and the center's interest rate went into the operational fund of the center. Because
securities were needed to secure loans, the program benefited only rich and middle peasants who had something to mortgage. 63

The agricultural-products warehouse and oxen society were operated on the same principle. That is, at the same interest rate for agricultural products such as rice, yellow beans, and wheat. The oxen society made loans with oxen as collateral. The oxen society was comprised of seven to thirty people who owned oxen and received loans jointly. This arrangement imposed joint responsibility on the society members in case any of the security oxen should die. 64

As is obvious from the procedures mentioned above, these two loan programs were not of much help to the poor peasants who most needed money and who comprised the majority of the rural population. It is true that the 1.6 per cent interest rate of the loan programs was considerably cheaper than the prevailing usurious rates. However, the 0.7 per cent profit margin of the mortgage loan center appears to have been too large compared with the 0.2 to 0.3 per cent rates charged by the rural reconstruction loan centers which we have discussed in the previous chapter. This was one of the reasons why the government-run loan centers were criticized by some contemporary scholars as another form of pawn shop. 65

In Chiang-ning, cooperatives were introduced as early as 1928. As of 1932, there were already 133 cooperatives in the hsien, the majority of which were credit cooperatives. But it was said that most of them did not show satisfactory results. A report of the hsien government acknowledged that there were many cases of embezzlement of cooperative funds by the staff members. Also, many
cooperatives tended to disintegrate. After the establishment of the governmental hsien, the Chiang-ning government decided to correct this situation. The government closed down the ineffective old cooperatives and organized new ones. It also adopted three principles for developing the hsien cooperatives. The three principles were:

1. to establish various production cooperatives in order to complement credit cooperatives which were primarily designed for lending money,
2. to widely publicize the benefits of cooperatives among the hsien inhabitants and thereby achieve a balanced development of cooperatives throughout the hsien, and
3. to strengthen the training of the cooperative staff.

In accordance with such principles, seven sericulture cooperatives and three cotton cooperatives were established in 1934. Unfortunately, we do not have information regarding the results of this new cooperative policy of the experimental hsien.

Of all the programs of promoting auxiliary industries, sericulture was most emphasized. Although Chiang-ning had long been famous for sericulture, the techniques had improved very little compared with those of olden times. Likewise, production on the part of the sericulture industry had not increased very much. Moreover, as noted in Chapter Two, silk prices were dropping due to the shrinkage of domestic as well as international markets because of the world depression and the competition of Japanese silk products. As a result, many inhabitants were losing their interest in sericulture. In order to revive the industry, the hsien government first established two sericulture guidance centers in cooperation with the
Agriculture College of the National Central University in the spring of 1933. Then, in the same year, the government distributed through the centers 2,000 sheets of improved silk worm species among the peasants, and in the following year, 3,000 sheets. The hsien government also had sericulture experts from the centers visit the peasants' houses regularly and provide them with technical guidance in rearing silkworms. The hsien authorities endeavored to propagate improved mulberry tree saplings throughout the hsien, simultaneously. In the spring of 1934, 800,000 roots of young improved mulberry trees were distributed among the peasants. As a result, the profits were almost 19 times those of the previous years. It was reported that profits through the introduction of improved silkworm species amounted to 90,000 yuan for three years' work. The hsien government also planned to establish a modern cocoon factory in a few years. Its aim was to produce high quality silk which could compete with products of any country in the international market.

Public Health Reconstruction

The project to which the prime emphasis was given in public health administration was that of increasing public health facilities. The hsien government decided to set up public health institutions of varying capacities at three different administrative levels, namely the hsien, ch'ü and hsiang or chen. At the hsiang or chen level there were to be branch public health stations (wei-sheng fen-so), at the ch'ü level, public health stations (wei-sheng-so), and at the hsien level, a public health center (wei-sheng-yüan). According to this plan, the hsien government established four public health
stations, and six branch public health stations between September, 1933, and April, 1934. However, the hsien health center was still in the stage of preparation by 1934.

The ch'ü public health stations were staffed with one physician, one public licensed nurse, one unlicensed nurse, one maternity nurse, one pharmacist, and one public health investigator. These stations were charged with a variety of duties, such as environmental sanitation, medical treatment, maternity care, child health, school health, public health education, and epidemic control. The hsiang and chen branch stations had one nurse, who commonly provided simple medical treatment to villagers.

Medical care at both the health stations and branch stations was mostly free. The financing of these health institutions was jointly borne by the local people and the hsien government. Funds for establishing the institutions were provided by the local people, and the operational funds, by the hsien government. Only in the event that the local people could not afford to pay for the establishment of health institutions, the hsien government would grant additional funds. The average amount of the operational expenditures of the health stations ranged from 200 to 300 yuan per month. The total number of people who received medical service at public health stations and branch stations between September, 1933, and August, 1934, reached around 100,000. The details are shown in Table 29.
Table 29. The Achievement of the Hsien Health Projects, Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien, September, 1933, to August, 1934.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical Check-ups</td>
<td>46,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Treatment</td>
<td>57,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic Control</td>
<td>22,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary Education</td>
<td>92,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Hsü Ying-lien, Ch'uan-kuo hsiang-ts'un chien-she yü-lên-tung k'ai-k'uang (An Outline of the Nation-Wide Rural Reconstruction Movement) (Tsou-p'ing, 1935), 545.

Local Self-Government Program

Lastly, in the realm of self-government training of the people, which was deemed the most important project of the hsien government experiment, no notable measures were taken by the government. For three years between the inauguration of the experimental hsien in 1933 through 1935, we can find few government programs which aimed at training the people in self-government. This fact confirms our impression, stated earlier, that the consolidation of the hsien administration system by the experimental hsien government was primarily for the effective control of the local population instead of for the facilitation of self-government training. Only in 1936, were the so-called hsiang and chen chief elections held throughout the hsien for the first time. That is, the hsien government designated candidates for hsiang and chen chief posts, one for each hsiang and chen, and the voters (adults of both sexes above twenty years of age) were only to express their opinions of whether to
approve or reject the candidate introduced to them on election day by
casting yellow or black beans into ballot boxes of the same colors.
The yellow beans meant approval, and the black beans, rejection.
This kind of special election method was, according to the hsien
government authorities, devised because of the high rate of illiteracy
and the lack of election experience. Irregardless, the problem was
that the candidates whom the government preferred were not always
(or necessarily) the ones whom the people wanted or who were bene-
ificial to the people. Hence, even in such a simple election, there
occurred various difficulties, which mostly concerned the candidates.
In some cases, the local people boycotted the election because
candidates were known to be corrupt or were oppressive strongmen. In
other cases, candidates refused to run for office on election day.
In cases of such troubles, the magistrate had to personally travel to
the local area and appoint another candidate. Besides, according to
Ch'en Kuo-fu who was then the governor of Kiangsu province, there
seem to have been numerous cases in which the people reluctantly
voted for candidates in order to avoid reprisals after the election, for
the candidates were mostly men of local power.

There is no question that the election method used by the Chiang-
ning experimental hsien reflected the hsien magistrate's view of
local self-government, which was in turn sanctioned by the KMT
leaders of the time. Difficulties of holding a full-fledged popular
election among rural people who were mostly illiterate are fully
recognizable. However, the fact remains that there was a period of
three years during which the government could have considerably
abated such difficulties if it had endeavored to train the people in self-government. Nonetheless, the hsien reconstruction programs included no program of self-government. Hence, it is possible to say that the responsibility for difficulties in holding a genuine popular election partly rested on the hsien government's negligence of local training in self-government. This becomes clear when we recall that some rural reform districts run by rural reconstructionists (i.e., Huang-hsiang, and Kao-chang-an) successfully carried out hsiang chief elections with villagers who were no more literate than the Chiang-ning peasants. The various hsien reconstruction projects of the Chiang-ning experimental hsien government ended in 1937 as was planned. The four-year experimental period expired without a fair evaluation or analysis and deprived of the opportunities thereafter to be of help to reforming other hsien government. As was the case of the rural reconstructionists, the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien was a victim of the war of resistance against the Japanese. China had to choose war for its own survival at the expense of internal reform. The Chiang-ning hsien's reconstruction experiment could not but share the same fate.

Conclusions

An overall evaluation of the character and results of the reconstruction experiments of the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien can be found in the words of Mei Ssu-p'ing, the magistrate of the hsien, who played the central role in the reconstruction experiment. In a report made in October, 1935, he said:
Chiang-ning has money as well as government authority. That is, it has 960,000 yuan of hsien revenue and strong administrative power which backs up the reconstruction work of the hsien. Therefore, it is not surprising that Chiang-ning achieved good results in the field of material reconstruction. We feel that material conditions in Chiang-ning have always been sufficient. But there is a lack of spirit on the part of the people. This is because we have done everything from the top down, relying too much on government authority. Our biggest shortcomings are the deficiency of program for developing a voluntary spirit and organizational capacities on the part of the people."72

There were other noteworthy comments on the results of the reconstruction experiment made by Ch'en Kuo-fu, who had been the Governor of Kiangsu province since 1935. Ch'en's comments were somewhat harsher than Mei's, yet were equally revealing. Ch'en first summed up the Chiang-ning experiment in a word: "Chiang-ning has only the name but is without substance (yü-ming wu-shih chih Chiang-ning),"73 and then gave the following explanation:

After the establishment of the experimental hsien, initial projects such as land registration and financial reform achieved very good results. This was because hsien government as well as all of the party members, both high and low, worked hard together to achieve success. However, after the initial projects, there were few accomplishments. The hsien government did not care for the hsien Government Committee, and party branches in Nanking were contemplating starting their own experimental works. On the other hand, the magistrate tended to do everything for himself."74

Thus both men recognized that whereas the first phase of the reconstruction work, namely administrative reform, was relatively successful, the second phase, that is, the economic improvement program and self-government training did not achieve good results. In addition, Ch'en's comments reveal that after the first phase of reconstruction endeavor the hsien government lost the support of the
party members. Disharmony developed between the hsien magistrate and the Hsien Government Committee during the latter part of the experimental period. In his comments Ch'en blamed Magistrate Mei for such estranged relations. But, possibly it can also be said that facts indicate the dissipation of the party members' interest in the reconstruction work itself.

The above two evaluations made by the highest officials in the province who were directly involved in the reconstruction experiment are surprisingly candid. They confirm our opinion of the Chiang-ning experiment as only a limited success. The Chiang-ning experimental hsien certainly demonstrated an efficient and honest government. Through the consolidation of administrative and fiscal systems, the bases of irregularities and graft by corrupt officials and their underlings were eliminated, and the hsien reconstruction endeavor brought about improved living conditions for the people in such aspects as education, sanitation, public work, and security. But the development of self-government capacities and social reform measures, such as improving economic conditions and social relations of the peasants vis-a-vis landlords, were either neglected or unsuccessful. Considering that the ultimate aim of the hsien's reconstruction experiment was to develop the people's self-government abilities and rural reconstruction, it must be said that on the whole the Chiang-ning experiment was a failure, achieving less than a half of its ultimate purpose.

Various reasons can be cited for the failure. They include a relatively short period of time for the second phase of experimentation
(compared with periods of three to six years for the reform districts of the COE and AVE). Moreover, an untimely drought occurred. Also, misunderstandings arose between the hsien advisory commission and the magistrate, and there was a tendency on the part of competing KMT members to attempt similar experiments elsewhere without really following through with the Chiang-ning project in terms of cooperation and support. The greatest problem, however, appears to have been the reform approach of the Chiang-ning hsien itself which was a top-down approach in which the government views were unilaterally imposed on the people. This was diametrically contrasted with the rural reconstructionist approach which was carried out more from the people's vantage point.

To illustrate this point a bit more the following comparisons can be made. The rural reconstructionists first endeavored to discover in their reform effort the shortcomings and the sources of distress which hampered the improvement of the peasants' lives. They then tried to develop, through education and persuasion, the peasants' desire for voluntary reform and their ability to achieve these reforms. Thus rural inhabitants could eliminate the sources of their misery and improve their lives for themselves. In so doing the reconstructionists had confidence in the capacity of peasants and relied on their potentials to bring about the revival of China. In their reform activities, the reconstructionists did not take the posture of outside teachers or benefactors. They lived among the peasants, sharing all aspects of their lives and dealing with rural problems from the peasant vantage point.
In contrast to the reconstructionists, the Chiang-ning government took an approach which relied mainly on administrative directives and the exercise of government power. The directives of the government's reform plan were not, however, based on the actual problems in rural life and were not necessarily in accord with peasants' wishes. Underneath the Chiang-ning approach lay an over-reliance on government authority and underestimation of the people's capacity. The officials adhered to the premise that authority and efficiency were all that was needed. This was a general tendency among many leaders of the KMT, who also believed that their views were the most judicious and appropriate for the nation and would eventually be beneficial to the people. The fact remains, however, as we saw in the case of the Chiang-ning hsien election, that government judgments and policies were not always right and in agreement with what the people wanted. According to Mei Ssu-p'ing's later confession, the forcible and unilateral imposition of the hsien's ideas on the people resulted in the destruction of "even the existing small voluntary spirit that the people possessed." The Chiang-ning government's approach thus brought about just the opposite result to what the hsien was supposed to achieve, namely the task of establishing a model "self-government experimental hsien."

Considering the above experience of the Chiang-ning hsien, together with those of the rural reconstructionists which we dealt with in the preceding chapter, the following conclusions can be made. In reconstruction work, strong authority and efficiency on the part of the government were necessary. Yet the people's needs and actual
circumstances in rural areas also had to be taken into account as well before rural reconstruction work could achieve its purpose. To quote Maei Ssu-p'ing's words again: "If there is only administrative capacity and no development of people's organizational and voluntary capabilities, it is just like a river without a source."  

In the final analysis, it seems possible to say that the failure of the Chiang-ning experimental hsien rural reconstruction work indirectly proved the fundamental correctness of the rural reconstructionists' approach based on the people's needs. At the same time, it confirmed the necessity of strong government support, which the reconstructionists failed to acquire, to carry out sustained reforms successfully.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The rural reconstruction movement was one of the series of reform movements in modern Chinese history which attempted to save China from her century-long social and political predicament since the Opium War. This movement was a nation-wide social movement which prevailed in China from the late 1920's through the mid 1930's. The movement differed from other previous reform movements (i.e., the Hundred Day's Reform Attempt, the Constitutional Movement, the Federalist Movement, and the New Cultural Movement) in that it was initiated by intellectuals, most of whom were educators who realized the importance of the rural countryside for the salvation of China, and in that whereas the other movements were largely confined to either intellectual circles or the elite groups of society it sought to be linked with the rural masses, working for and through them. It aimed to revive China by remolding Chinese society through improvement of rural life and developing the capacity of the rural population. This movement was seen by many people both at home and abroad as a hopeful sign for a new China, and caused the Nanking regime to have an interest in rural problems. By having a gradual and educational approach, the movement was also presented as an alternative to the revolutionary and violent ways advocated by the Chinese Communists in solving rural problems. Some authors, such as Ku Mei, attribute the origin of the movement to the May Fourth Movement. But, this was true only in the limited sense that the May Fourth Movement
brought about social activism among intellectuals. Actually, the rural reconstruction movement was a combined product of socio-economic and intellectual conditions developed from the mid 1910's through the 1930's.

The Kiangsu movement was one of the most important components of the national movement, together with those of Shantung and Hopei provinces led by Liang Shu-ming and Yen Yang-ch'u (James Yen), respectively. The Kiangsu movement was not only one of the earliest rural reconstruction efforts in the nation, but also contributed greatly to the emergence of the national movement. It produced many important national leaders for the movement, and one of its reconstruction institutions, the Association for Vocational Association, was directly responsible for initiating a national organization for the movement, which later developed the Rural Work Discussion Society.

The Kiangsu movement had a number of unique characteristics. First, unlike those of other provinces, it consisted of various rural reform efforts mainly by three educational institutions, the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education (COE), the Association for Chinese Vocational Education (AVE), and the Hsiao-chuang School. Hence, it was plural in its character and reform approaches as a provincial rural reconstruction movement. This pluralism continued throughout the movement even though there were some cases in which the three institutions cooperated and exchanged ideas in their reform efforts.

Second, emergence of the movement was due to a combination of social, intellectual and political factors. It developed with
heightening concern for the common people, peasantry in particular, practical educational trends, and social activism among a portion of intellectuals following the May Fourth Movement. In particular, John Dewey's educational philosophy which regarded education as a tool for the improvement of society contributed greatly to the Kiangsu movement. His educational concepts provided a theoretical basis for the movement even though the degree of his influence varied among the three institutions. That is, influence of Deweyan concepts was most prominent in the Hsiao-chuang group, less prominent in the COE, and least in the AVE. The influence of Deweyan thought on the Kiangsu movement was largely due to two facts. One was that many of the Kiangsu rural reconstructionists were "returned students" from the United States and were mostly educators. The other was that the Kiangsu movement grew out of educational reform movements such as the vocational education movement, the rural education movement and the mass education movement.

The Kiangsu movement was also spurred by the strong political atmosphere in the 1920's, which sought to unite the country and to construct a strong modern state. Thus, Sun Yat-sen's stress on the awakening and training of the masses and the importance of the peasants' role in the Nationalist Revolution also had some impact on ideological aspects of the movement. Sun's political ideas constituted guiding principles for the COE in training its rural workers and in its rural reform effort. Sun's ideas also served as an underlying basis for the peasant training theory advanced by Chao Shu-yü who laid the ground-work of the rural reform programs
for all three reconstruction institutions in Kiangsu. The movement also inherited the tradition of the mass literacy campaign popularized by Yen Yang-dh'u and T'ao Hsing-chih in the 1920's, and was influenced by adult education in foreign countries.

The movement emerged in response to the deterioration of the rural economy and other critical rural problems during the 1920's and the early 1930's. The Kiangsu peasants suffered from problems of over-population, land shortage, ignorance, and poor health. They were troubled by economic exploitation (high rents, irregular subcharges, and usury) and social and political oppression by landlords, corrupt local officials, bad gentry and local strong men, and by banditry, civil wars, and natural disasters. By the early 1930's the majority of the peasants were in a state of bankruptcy, and rural society was disintegrating. As shown in this study, such a situation was not a sudden phenomenon during the early Nanking period. It was basically a continuation of the situation which had exited from the Republican era even though there were some fluctuations. The rural problems were deepened and compounded by social and political confusion during the warlord period, by domestic industrialization as well as foreign economic intrusions. Conditions also deteriorated partly from the impact of the Great Panic which was strongly felt in China during the early 1930's. The rural reconstruction movement arose to redress this situation. Hence, the movement came to have inclusive programs that covered political, economic, and cultural areas of rural life. With these programs the
rural reconstructionists aspired to achieve political, social, and economic democracy simultaneously for the rural population.

Thirdly, the fact that the Kiangsu rural reconstruction leaders were mostly educators made the movement into basically a liberal and reformist one which tried to reform society through gradual and educational means. The reconstructionists were also nationalists who strongly resented foreign imperialism. At the same time, they realized that the western type of democracy with its capitalist economic system was not suitable for the Chinese society since a majority of the population were ignorant and impoverished, even though these leaders did favor a constitutional government. Hence, through their movement they hoped to construct a new China which was based on basic principles of western democracy, yet was devoid of the vices of a capitalistic society, namely the extreme inequity of wealth distribution. These facts imparted some idealistic aspects, akin to utopian or liberal socialism, to a segment of the movement (e.g., by T'ao Hsing-chih and some COE leaders such as Kan Yu-yuan and Ch'in Liu-fang). Socialists ideals stress both economic and political equality and aspire to construct a society without "the exploitation of man by man." Of course, the rural reconstructionists cannot be regarded as socialists in the full meaning of the word. However, the movement certainly contained some elements resembling socialist ideals. T'ao Hsing-chih's concept of the so-called ta-chung (masses) society, also described by him as ta-tung or Grand Harmony society, was a concept borrowed from the Confucian utopian world which envisioned a classless society where the welfare of the masses was
the central concern. This concept certainly smacked of Utopian socialism. The Hsiao-chuang group's belief in egalitarianism, their strong antagonism toward traditional local elites, and their anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist position were also close to what the KMT leftists, many of whom were considered as having socialistic propensities, advocated.

From the reform ideas officially professed by the COI reformers, socialistic elements can be hardly detected. However, leaders of the COE (i.e., Kao Chien-ssu, Ch'en Li-chiang, and Kan Yu-yuan) believed that "the mass of low-class people" should run the government, using group action. What the COE leaders meant by the term "group action" was a democratic process, not a violent revolutionary seizure of power. But the idea that the mass of low-class people should run the government certainly differed from the western type of democracy as well as from the opinion of the Nanking leaders. In addition, the COE leaders strongly believed that exploitation and oppression of the peasants by local gentry, strong men, and corrupt government functionaries should be eliminated. Some COE young reformers, such as Chen Shao-yuan, went as far as advocating that "the oppressed masses of the people should be organized in order to achieve their general interest and request the realization of the people's government." These ideas carried some socialist tinge.

AVE reformers hardly expressed their social and political views. However, Chiang-wen-yu, a top leader of the AVE, recognized some socialist characteristics in the rural reconstruction movement. Thus it can be said that as a whole the movement contained some
elements of a moderate brand of socialism. This trait might have been the reason why the movement was described by Japanese reporters as a movement of "rural socialism."

Considering the fact that a moderate brand of socialism appealed to many Chinese intellectuals during the period from the 1910's through 1930's, the above phenomenon is not strange at all. We know that, political reformers such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and his followers and even Sun Yat-sen and his associates were attracted to socialism in the 1910's in the hope that socialism could prevent violent social revolution and at the same time solve China's social, economic, and political problems. Belonging to the same reformist category, it is not impossible to conjecture that rural reconstructionists might have shared the hopes that Liang and Sun had. Attacking the same rural problems, and yet taking an approach different from that of the Chinese Communists, the rural reconstructionists presented their movement as an alternative to the Communist revolutionary approach to solving rural problems. It seems clear then why Communist Chinese historians so vehemently criticized the rural reconstruction movement, labeling it as "reformist" or "reactionary" in nature. In short, the rural reconstructionists' ideas differed from those of both the KMT leaders (i.e., the Nanking leaders) and the CCP. In this sense, we can say that Mary C. Wright's comment that "the rural reconstruction efforts have lain somewhere between the Kuomintang and Communist poles" is valid.

The fourth and final characteristic was that the attitude of the Kiangsu reconstructionists toward the central and provincial
governments was generally cooperative. The reconstructionists felt that cooperation between government and the rural reconstruction institutions was essential for the effective execution of rural reconstruction programs and for the enlargement of areas benefiting from rural reconstruction work. Based on such an idea, Kao Chientssu, the leading reconstructionist of the COE, advanced the theory of the so-called "unity of politics and education." Actually the COE received considerable financial and technological assistance from the Kiangsu Provincial Government. The Hsiao-chuang reformers also agreed to the idea of cooperation between the reconstruction institutions and government in principle, even though eventually they ran into conflict with the Nanking authorities. The AVE reformers also took a position similar to that of the COE reformers.

Because of the comprehensive nature of China's rural problem, the rural reconstructionists attacked it in a comprehensive manner. To improve all aspects of rural life was a complicated and formidable task for the reconstructionists, who were originally educators and scholars. It required a thorough understanding of every aspect of rural life, starting from agriculture to the rural market and credit system, social customs, and peasant psychology. It also demanded knowledge of various modern techniques of education, agriculture, economics, administration, and public health. In order to meet such requirements, they went down to villages and lived among the peasants. They tried to obtain the necessary information through constant research and experimentation; they organized conferences between reconstruction institutions for exchanging reform ideas.
Their rural workers were supplied with all the necessary knowledge and attributes through both classroom instruction and field training. For the areas which required special expertise (e.g., scientific agriculture and auxiliary occupations) they sought assistance from provincial institutions (e.g., the provincial agricultural stations) and agriculture department of Central University, Chin-ling University, and Tung-nan University.

As an expediency measure, the reformers of the AVE and the COE solicited assistance in their reform efforts, especially in the initial stage, from the local gentry who had great influence among the rural population. Because of this practice, it was suggested by Robert Lee and Communist Chinese historians that the rural reconstructionists worked for the interests of the village gentry and for maintaining the status quo of the existing rural society, and that the reconstructionists' gradulaism lacked "the support of the middle class." (It is not clear what Professor Lee meant here by the term "middle class" in the Chinese society.) However, according to this study, such observations were only half true. Social and political systems of the contemporary society still contained many traditional elements inherited from the Ch'ing period. The aim of the reconstructionists certainly lay in reforming such a society. As mentioned many times earlier, the reconstructionists hoped to construct a strong yet democratic nation in which every citizen could enjoy political, social, and economic quality. Furthermore, we can find no concrete evidence which proves the reconstructionists' intention to prolong the existing society.
According to our study, the reform ideals of the Hsiao-chuang group were clearly quite challenging to the existing social and political order, and as a result the Hsiao-chuang school was closed down by the government. Also it should be recalled that T'ao Hsing-chih warned against cooperation with the gentry in reform work, saying that utilization of the gentry would only result in reinforcing their power while destroying the rights of the people. Moreover, the COE leaders such as Kan Yü-yüan, Ch'en Li-chiang, and Ch'in Liufang openly argued that working with the gentry in rural reform was inappropriate. Another COE reformer, Cheng Hsiao-yüan, clearly said that the utilization of the conservative local elites was only a temporary means in a limited scope until the new leadership among the peasants was sufficiently developed. Actually the COE reformers set up programs for training new leadership in villages. Chiang Wen-yü, an AVE leader, also recognized the necessity of developing new leaders. Thus it cannot be concluded that the reconstructionists' relationship with the local gentry was "cooperation for the interests of the gentry." It may be more accurate to say that reconstructionists utilized the influence of local gentry in their initial reform efforts as a means to get the reform work going smoothly without being obstructed until the peasants developed their abilities to a degree that they could carry out reform work for themselves.

Kiangsu's prominent position in the nation's rural reconstruction movement was due mainly to many nationally-known reconstructionists among its leaders, namely Chao Shu-yü, Kao Chien-ssu, Chiang Wen-yü, and T'ao Hsing-chih, together with the wealth and relative security
and order of the province. Chao Shu-yû, who had connections with all three institutions by having paved the way for the rural reform work of these institutions, was one of the top planners in rural education and reform in the nation during the 1920's. Kao Chien-ssu and Chiang Wen-yû, both of whom had been high provincial officials and also educators, demonstrated good managerial skill as top leaders of the COE and AVE, respectively, and derived much assistance from the provincial government. But they did not waver from their reform principles. They became members of the chair-group of the Rural Work Discussion Society, which was a national organization of the rural reconstruction movement. T'ao Hsing-chih was one of the most creative and influential reconstructionists among these leaders. Although he suffered from poor relationships with the Nanking authorities due to his radical ideas, his reform theories and approaches, experimented with by the Hsiao-chuang group and used during the Kung-hsüeh-t'uan movement, had wide influence on other rural schools and reconstruction institutions. In particular, his theory of the "unity of teaching, learning, and doing" was widely popularized. His "little teachers" system was employed by as many as 23 provincial and municipal governments in the three years after its start in 1932.13

The rural reconstructionists of Kiangsu achieved relatively good results in their experimental districts. Overcoming the peasants' conservative outlook and suspicious habits toward strangers, the reformers succeeded in establishing good faith among the district people toward their reform programs. The people of the
reform districts witnessed substantial improvements in many areas of their lives. Many more children were able to receive elementary education. The number of literate villagers increased. Family incomes rose due to the improved agricultural techniques and introduction of a variety of supplementary occupations and various cooperatives. Roads and bridges were repaired and newly constructed. The villages were cleaner than before. The peasants learned about public health and private hygiene and received inexpensive medical treatment. They came to have some knowledge of self-government and their political rights, and concern for public affairs.\textsuperscript{14} There were cases in which having seen the good results in the reform districts, the neighboring villages asked to join in the reform work. Thus some reform districts were expanded.\textsuperscript{15}

However, good results in the isolated reform districts alone had little significance unless they could serve as the basis upon which the reconstructionists could fulfill the ultimate purpose of reform experimentation; that is, unless they could discover the most realistic reform approach and apply the results of the experiments to all rural areas. The Kiangsu reconstruction movement failed to achieve this goal. In pursuing this goal the Hsiao-chuang group experimented with various programs of what we can call "grass-roots social engineering."\textsuperscript{16} These programs were voluntary, egalitarian, and placed utmost priority on the interests of the peasants. This approach proved to be quite effective. It not only provided substantial help in many areas of village life but also, more importantly, developed a sense of unity between the reformers and
the peasants, which was the most important basis for the success of reform work. In this sense, the Hsiao-chuang approach deserves commendation. However, their inability to survive in a conservative social and political environment and their failure to maintain a good relationship with the central government were crucial weaknesses. Eventually these weaknesses meant the ruin of the whole reform enterprise of the Hsiao-chuang School, and became a limitation to the vigorous growth of the same group's further reform efforts, the Kung-hsüeh-t'uan movement.

The AVE operated the largest number of experimental districts among the three institutions. It had a good relationship with the central and provincial governments and closely cooperated with the established local elites in rural reform efforts. But as most of the AVE's reform experiments were joint projects with local leaders, its reform work lacked central control, and thus reform projects in various districts were uncoordinated. Its reform programs tended to place more emphasis on economic and public construction projects while they were passive about political training of the people and transforming the existing social environment.

The reform efforts of the COE appear to have been well-planned, well-coordinated, and well-supported. This seems to have been possible due to the fact that as an institution of higher learning supported by the provincial government, the college had many experts in areas related to rural reform as well as good research and experimental facilities and a good relationship with the government. Despite the close relationship with the government, the COE did not
blindly follow government policies. It devised and carried out its own reform programs which were moderate yet quite bold in character in view of the current conservative political conditions. The COE reformers were active in developing the self-government capacity of the rural people, even experimenting with village elections, and in promoting peasant economic welfare in spite of antagonism by conservative local elites (e.g., local gentry, landlords, and KMT members). Thus it seems possible to say that in the given environment of the time, the COE's reform approach was not only realistic enough to be able to survive; its programs were also progressive enough to bring about a balanced reform in the rural society.

However, we cannot but say that as a whole rural reconstruction efforts by the three institutions ended in failure. Relatively good results achieved in their reform experiments were mostly limited to suburban villages and could not expand to other areas. Consequently, the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement remained a local phenomenon and failed to accomplish its ultimate goal, the salvation of China through remolding entire villages of the countryside.

In retrospect, the causes for this failure were both internal and external. The internal causes were the shortcomings of the movement itself. The first of these was the lack of unity among the reformers of the three reconstruction institutions. Since financial and personnel resources of each institution were limited, if the reconstructionists of the three institutions had carried out rural reconstruction work in a more unified manner, pooling their experience and resources, the effectiveness of the Kiangsu rural
reconstruction movement might have been much greater. For such a united effort would have supplemented the shortages suffered by the three institutions, and the united action of the three institutions would certainly have made the influence of the movement more strongly felt on the government as well as on other institutions which were helpful to the reform movement. Another shortcoming was the lack of political power on the part of the reformers. Because of this defect, the reformers were incapable of eliminating various factors hindering their reform efforts. This might have been a reason why they were unable to carry out bolder programs touching on fundamental rural problems such as land, population, taxes, and self-government. For the same reasons, they could not instill their reform ideas in government policies.

External causes were twofold. One was the passive rural policy of the Nanking Government. That government eventually established the direction of its rural policy mainly along the lines of technological innovation in agriculture, tax consolidation, and the establishment of agricultural banks. There were few policies pertaining to social reform. Even these technological and finance-oriented policies, however, did not bring about the desired results. The reason was closely related to the problem of social reform. The problem was that local officials and functionaries at hsien or lower administrative levels did not function in harmony with the central or provincial governments. As we have seen in the cases of Huang-hsiang village and Hsü-Kung-ch'iao district, local officials and functionaries who shared interests with the conservative local
leaders often connived with these leaders and tended to protect their interests against the stipulated policies of the central government, such as the Twenty-Five Per Cent Rent-Reduction Statute. They even took advantage of the new policies of the central and provincial governments (e.g., the credit cooperative policy) in furthering their own interests and exploiting the ignorance of the peasants. These corrupt local officials, functionaries and conservative local leaders were not only a source of peasant suffering, but they also inflicted great harm on the government's cause. Nevertheless, the Nanking authorities showed little interest in transforming the traditional social and political order in the countryside handed down from the Ch'ing period. This passive rural policy on the part of the government hampered rural reconstruction efforts, for the reformers' effort to utilize government policies toward the peasants was obstructed by these conservative local forces. Sometimes they even directly interfered with rural reform programs themselves.

The other external cause was the Japanese invasion of 1937. Having Nanking and Shanghai within its boundary, Kiangsu was one of the first targets of the Japanese invasion. The Kiangsu reformers faced Japanese attack as early as August, 1937, and were forced to abandon their reconstruction bases. Thereafter, the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement never recovered.

It is difficult to judge which cause was primarily responsible for the failure of the movement, among the internal and external causes. However, one thing is clear: the movement did not collapse
by itself. It was strangled in the middle of its course by the Japanese invasion when it was about to take off to another stage, based on the experiences of the first phase of its experiments. 17

In spite of its ultimate failure, the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement was not without significance. As an important part of the national movement, it was one more expression of the intense and persistent desire by Chinese intellectuals for a strong, influential, and respectable China. This was the first social movement in the history of modern China in which the intellectuals tried to achieve their ideals by working for and with the rural masses through example and persuasion. 18 The movement had coherent theories and viable programs based upon scientific experiments and research, and made use of new western social and educational concepts as well.

The movement deserves credit for correctly identifying the root of China's problems of the time, namely, the rural problem. They saw that although the rural masses were then poor, ignorant, and oppressed, they still possessed great potential, if properly cultivated, for rebuilding China. They therefore devoted their lives to the cause of developing the capacities of these rural people through personal sacrifice. It is now a widely known fact that the Nationalist Government's debacle of 1949 was primarily due to its incorrect understanding of the root of China's problems and the failure of its rural policy. In contrast, the success of the CCP's revolutionary scheme was primarily due to its ability to identify correctly the fundamental problems of Chinese society—including the
rural problem—and win over the rural population using their great revolutionary potential by skillfully exploiting various contradictions in rural areas. As far as regarding the rural problem as the fundamental problem of China was concerned, there was little difference between the CCP and the rural reconstructionists. The only difference between the two groups concerned their purposes and methods.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that many reform ideas and techniques used by the reconstructionists were also used by the Communists during the Yenan period with much more effectiveness and on a larger scale even though their ultimate purpose and methods differed somewhat. Similar ideals and techniques employed by both the groups included: the promotion of "hsia-hsiang" (going down to the village) among intellectuals, emphasis on practical knowledge and the futility of "book learning," combining education and labor, stress on the people's voluntary and self-reliant spirit, understanding the relevance of rural education, and utilizing such means as people's or mass schools, half-study and half-work schools, sparetime schools, and music and drama clubs to educate the people. Furthermore, these ideals and techniques have compromised an important part of educational policies in mainland China since 1958.19 This situation reminds us of exactly what William Morris said: "Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it turns out to be not what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name."20 As the above remark implies,
the reform ideals pursued by the rural reconstructionists did not totally vanish even though their movement ended in failure. Although there was no direct link between the reconstructionists and the CCP, many of their ideas were and are being used by the Communists in rebuilding China in their own way. But from our study we know that Communist society was not what the reconstructionists wished to construct.

Finally, when we compare rural reform experiments by the three institutions and those of the Chiang-ning Self-Government Experimental Hsien in particular, one lesson is obvious. That is, the success of rural reconstruction work requires the proper combination of positive government rural policies and rural reform efforts by private institutions, and the proper combination of strong administrative measures from the top down and a social reform approach from the bottom up. In this connection, the following comments made by Mei-Ssu-p'ing in 1934, based on his experiences as magistrate of the Chiang-ning Experimental Hsien, were revealing:

We came to understand that administration should protect a sound social movement. If there was only the social movement and no administrative support, the effect of the social movement would be minimized and its achievement would be meager in spite of great efforts. On the contrary, if there was only administrative power and the training and organization of the people and the development of their voluntarist capacity were neglected, the effect of the reform efforts would not last long. Therefore, the social movement needs to be supplemented and guided by administration, and administration requires cooperation from the social movement.21

In other words, the two reform approaches of using a social movement and administrative authority were complementary. They may be compared
to the two wheels of a chariot. If the balance between the two
wheels are absolutely necessary in order for the chariot to proceed
well, so was the balanced combination of the two reform approaches
necessary in order to gain successful results from the rural
reconstruction movement.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

**CHIL:** Chiang-su sheng-li chiao-yü hsüeh-yüan i-lan (Catalogue of The Kiangsu Provincial College of Education), (Wu-hsi, 1926).

**CIH:** China Industrial Handbooks, Kiangsu, Compiled by Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, (Shanghai, 1933).

**CSC:** Chiang-su sheng-chien (Mirror of Kiangsu Province), ed. by Chao Ju-heng, (Shanghai, 1935), 2 Vols.


**HTC:** Wang T'ang-p'ei, Chiang-su sheng hsiang-t'u chih (Local Handbook of Kiangsu Province), (Shanghai, 1937), 2 Vols.

**HTTK:** Hsü Ying-lien, Ch'üan-kuo hsiang-ts'un chien-she yün-tung kai-k'uang (National Situation of the Rural Reconstruction Movement), (Tsou-p'ing, 1935).

**NTYT:** K'ung Hsueh-hsiung, Chung-kuo chin-jih chih nung-ts'un yün-tung (The Rural Movement in Present-Day China), (Nanking, 1934).


**TCLC:** T'ao Hsing-chih Chiao-yü lun-wen hsüan-chi (Selected Essays of T'ao Hsing-chih on Education), ed. by Fang Yü-yen, (Hong Kong, 1948).

**TCNC:** T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng chi-nien-chi (Collection of Memorial Essays on behalf of T'ao Hsing-chih), Comp. by T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng chi-nien wei-yuan-hui, (Shanghai, 1947).

**TLCC:** Tsung-li ch'üan-chi (Collection of Sun Yat-sen's Writings), ed. by Hu Han-min, 4 Vols. and Appendix, (Shanghai, Min-chih Printing Co., 1930).
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. One of the three institutions, the Association for Vocational Education, was established in 1917. Hence, this study covers the period starting from 1917 through 1937, the year when the Kiangsu rural reconstruction movement ended, even though the actual reconstruction movement began from the mid-1920's.

2. The term "Hsiang-ts'un chien-she yün-tung" was not the universal designation for all rural reform efforts in China from the beginning. Initially it was limited in its usage to the rural reform efforts made by Liang Shu-ming's group in Shantung Province in 1931. In Kiangsu, "nung-ts'un kai-chin" (rural reform) was mostly used. It was only after around 1933 that the term "rural reconstruction" became a common name for the rural efforts in China. This term seems to be more comprehensive than other terms in its implication to include a wider variety of efforts to improve the rural situation. In this study "rural reform" and "rural reconstruction" are used interchangeably.


6. In the 1910's there emerged utilitarian and practical educational trends and democratic ideas advocated by Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei and Huang Yen-p'ei which meant to change the Chinese society into a more egalitarian one and to improve the lives of the people. After the May Fourth Movement these ideas became more intensified and appeared in the form of direct action. The mass literacy movement, labor movements, and cooperative movements were some examples. For more details see Chapter Three of this study.

7. See Chapter Two of this study.

8. For instance, Yen Yang-ch'ü's mass literacy movement, Hsüeh Hsien-chou's cooperative movement, Liang Shu-ming's "Village Government" movement, and P'eng Yü-t'ing's local defense program.

9. For instance, the establishment of the Board of Directors of the Joint Effort for Rural Improvement in May, 1926, through the joint effort of the Association for Chinese Vocational Education, the Chinese Mass Education Movement, and the Department of Agriculture.
and Department of Education of Tung-nan University. Min-kuo shih-wu nien Chung-kuo chiao-yü chih-nan (Direction of Chinese Education in 1926), Commercial Press (1926), Chapter Five, 256; Liang Shu-ming's travel to Hsiao-chuang School in 1927. "T'a-shan chih-shih" (Rock in Other's Mountain), Hsiao-chuang i-sui (One Year of Hsiao-chuang School), ed by Fang Yü-yen (Shanghai, 1934), 245-258; dispatches by Sung Lo-yen to various places including such cities as Shanghai, Nanking, and Wu-hsi concerning an observation tour in May, 1930 by Liang Shu-ming on behalf of Ts'\un-shih Monthly. See Ts'\un-chih 1:2 (June, 1930), 1-2.


11. Hsü Pao-ch'ien, "Ch'\uaan-kuo hsia-t's'un yüng-tung chih hsien-k'\uaang yü wen-t'i" (Present Situation and Problems of the Nation's Rural Reconstruction Movement), Shih-yen, Vol. 2 492.

12. Chin Liu-fang, "Nung-t's'un p'o-ch'an hsien-k'\uaang hsia min-chung chiao-yü ying yu chih lao-li" (Efforts Which Should Be Taken in Mass Education Under the Present Rural Bankruptcy), CYMC, 7 (March, 1936), 749.


16. Ibid., Vol. 1, preface, and 4; Vol. 2, 3; and Vol. 3, 19.

17. This was discussed at a symposium conducted by the Institute of Pacific Relations. "Rural Reconstruction," (in China) Problems of the Pacific, 1931, Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hangchow and Shanghai, China, October 21 to November 2, ed. by Bruno Lasker, University of Chicago Press, 67-113. Domestically, it was widely discussed in such magazines as Tu-li p'\ing-lun (Independent Review), Tung-fang tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany), and Chiao-yü tsa-chih (Journal of Education). In Japan it appeared in journals such as Keizai ronsō (Journal of Economics), Mantetsu geppō (Manchurian Railway Monthly), and Toa jinbun gakaku (East Asia Humanity Studies).

19. "Nei-cheng hui-i te-chung t'i-fang tsu-chih yü nung-ts'un chien-she" (Interior Administration Conference Emphasizing Local Self-Government and Rural Reconstruction), Ts'un-chih, 3:2.3 (Jan., 1933), 15-16.


21. Nung-Shan, Chan-shih hsiang-ts'un chien-she lun (On Wartime Rural Reconstruction), (Shangjiao, Kiangsi, 1942), 12.

22. Ibid.


24. Ti i-tzu kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i te nung-min yün-tung (Peasant Movements During the First Internal Revolutionary War), Chung-kuo hsien-tai tsu-liao tsung-kan (Material Collection of Contemporary Chinese History), (Jen-min ch'u-pan she, Peking, 1953), 265.


26. "Intellectual activism" denotes intellectuals' active participation in social reform activities departing from ivory tower debates and from merely playing lip service to vital issues.

27. Chang Tse-hsüan, Hsiang-ts'un chien-she yü hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü, (Rural Reconstruction and Rural Education), (Shanghai, 1939), 56-57.

28. Ibid.

29. For example, the Shantung Rural Reconstruction Research Institute opened in 1931; the Ting-hsien experiment by the National Association of the Mass Education Movement, in 1929, and experiments in other provinces started mostly after 1930.

30. NTTYT, 158-159.

32. It is known that Prof. Van Slyke is researching on Tsou-p'ing, Shantung; Prof. Lamley is preparing to publish a monograph on Liang Shu-ming; Mr. Hayword is studying the Shantung Rural Reconstruction Research Institute; and Mr. Allitto is writing a dissertation on Liang Shu-ming and Rural Reconstruction.


34. See Chung-kuo hsiang-ts'un chien-she pi-pan (A Critique of Chinese Rural Reconstruction), ed. by Ch'ien Chia-chü, (Shanghai, 1936).


37. Liu Ta-nien, "Tsung Chung-kuo feng-chien t'u-ti chih-tu wen-t'i shang k'an Liang Shu-ming'ss u-hsiang ti fan-tung pen-chih," (The Esssense of Liang Shu-ming's Reactionary Thought Viewed from the Problem of the Feudal Land System in China), Li-shih yen-chiu (Study of History), 5 (1955), 16; Ch'ü Ch'ün-nung, "Liang Shu-ming teng so-wei 'hsiang-ts' un chien-she yün-tung' shih wei shen-ma jen fu-wu te" (What people did Liang Shu-ming's and others' so-called 'rural reconstruction movement' serve?), Jen-min jih-pao, November 10, 1955; Ho Ssu-lien, "Liang Shu-ming hsien-sheng so-pan te 'hsiang-ts'un chien-she yen-chiu-yüan" (Mr. Liang Shu-ming's so-called rural reconstruction research academy), Kuang-ming jih-pao, January 10, 1952. Also for attacks on Liang Shu-ming, see Liang Shu-ming ssu-hsiang p'i-p'an (Criticisms on Liang Shu-ming's Thought), Lun-wen hui-chi, Vol. 1 (Peking, 1955), Vol. 2 (Peking, 1956).
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


2. HTC Vol. 1, 17; CSC Chapter 3, 6.

3. Ibid., 29; CIH, 12-13.


5. CIH, 5-6.


7. CIH, 13

8. Wang Wei-p'ing, Shui-hsiang chiang-su (Kiangsu: A Water Country), (Shanghai, 1956), 9


11. Hsia Ching-liu, The State of Shanghai, (Shanghai, 1929), 177.

12. CSC, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, 40.


14. CSC, Ch. 3, 2.

15. Harley Fransworth MacNair, China in Revolution, (New York, 1931), 244.

16. For details about the first and second Tung-nan Wars and Feng-che War, see Li Chien-nung, op. cit., 480-488.

17. CSC, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, 9-14; The governors of Kiangsu Province during the Nanking period included leading KMT members: Niu Yung-chien (April, 1927-Feb., 1930), Yeh Ch'u-ch'ang (Mar., 1930-Nov., 1931), Ku Chu-t'ung (Dec., 1931-Nov., 1933), and Ch'en Kuo-fu (Oct., 1933-July, 1937).

19. HTC, 54.


21. HTC, 54-60, Shen-pao nien-chien, 1933, M-246-47, Ibid., 1934, K-7-C677, Published by Shen-pao Year Book Co. 1934 and 1935, respectively.

22. Yin Wei-ho, Chiang-su liu-shih-i-hsien chih (A Gazetteer of Kiangsu's Sixty One Hsien), (Shanghai, 1936), 12.


25. CIH, 309-883, HTC, 92-120.


27. Muramatsu Yuji, Chōkoku keizai no shakai taisai (Social Structure of Chinese Economy), (Tokyo, 1949), 64 (Table 14).


30. For Chang Chien, see Samuel C. Chu, *Reformer in Modern China, Chang Chien, 1853-1926*, (Columbia University Press, 1958), 88-113: Huang Yen-p'ei was a founder of the Association for Chinese Vocational Education and became minister of education during the Republican period briefly. He will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Chu Ching-nung studied at George Washington University and at Teachers College of Columbia University. He taught at Peking University and was an active supporter of the mass literacy movement. Later he became vice minister of education and the president of Kuang-hua University. Kuo P'ing-wen was a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He was the president of Tung-nan University, a member of the board of trustees of the Chinese Foundation for Promotion of Education and Culture which dealt with the Boxer indemnity returned by the United States, and served as a leader in various important educational institutions such as the Chinese
Education Improvement Association and the Association for Vocational Education mentioned in the text; Yuan Hsi-t'ao was a chü-jen in the late Ch'ing period, and became vice minister of education under Fan Yüan-lien. He was a foremost advocate of compulsory education in China. For Chu Ching-nung, see Bibliographical Dictionary of Republican China, ed. by Howard Boorman, Columbia University Press, (New York and London, 1971), Vol. 1, 443-446; For Kuo Ping-wen, ibid., v. 2., 276-277, For Yuan Hsi-t'ao, Hashikawa Tokio, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu sokan (A Comprehensive Review of Personnel in Chinese Cultural Circles), (Hsin-king, 1940), 383.


32. See the back page of the front cover of Hsin chiao-yü (The New Education), 3:2 (Feb., 1919).

33. The Association for Chinese Vocational Education had its headquarters in Shanghai. The Chinese Education Improvement Association was managed primarily by T'ao Hsing-chih and staff members of Tung-nan University in Nanking. T'ao was General Director of the Association.

34. Yin Wei-ho, op. cit., 9.


37. CSC, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, 35-36; CIH, 9.

38. CIH, 5-6.


42. CSC, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, 35.
43. HTC, V. 1., Chapter 4, 23; also see, Chu K'o-chen, "lun chiang-che liang-sheng jen-k'ou chih mi-tu" (A study of population density of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces), Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany) (Hereafter cited as TFTC), 23:1 (Jan., 1926), 91-112.

44. HTC, Chapter, 4. 24-25.

45. China Industrial Handbooks, Kiangsu, Comp. by Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, (Shanghai, 1933), 24-25 (see tables).

46. For the population of Kiangsu in 1852, see Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-ye shih tsu-liao (Materials for Modern Chinese Agricultural History), Vol. 1, Comp. by Li Wen-chih, (Peking, 1957), (Hereafter cited as NYZL), 10.

47. CSC, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, 35.


50. When the annual natural increase rate was 1.4 per 100 persons, the population would be doubled in 70 years. (Buck, Chinese Farm Economy, 353). If we apply this calculation method to the population growth rate in Kiangsu between 1873 and 1933, the population increase rate will be only 0.7; For the population growth rate for other countries cited, see Chiao Ch'i-ming, "Chung-kuo nung-ts'un jen-kou chih yen-chiu" (A Study of Chinese rural population), TFTC, 25:21 (Nov., 1928), 14.


54. CIH, 100, 105, 112, 117.

55. HTC, V. 1, 23.

56. Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, Chiang-su K'un-shan Nan-t'ung Anhui Su-hsien nung-tien chih-tu chih p'i-chiao i chi kai liang nung-tien wen-t'i chien-i (A Recommendation For the Reform of Tenant Problems Based on the Comparative Study of the Tenant Systems Between K'un-shan, Nan-t'ung of Kiangsu and Su-hsien of Anhwei), (Nanking, 1926), 70.
57. Ch'en Pei-yüan, "Chiang-su sheng K'un-shan-hsien nung-ts'un ching-chi chih ch'ü-shih" (Rural Economic Trends in K'un-shan hsien, Kiangsu Province), Min-chien (Among the People), 2:19 (Feb., 1936), 12.


60. Ibid., (see table 34).


63. Li Heng, "I-hsing ho-ch'iao chi chi fu-chin ti nung-ts'un" (Rural Villages in the Vicinity of Ho-ch'iao of I-hsing hsien), Chung-kuo nung-ts'un (Chinese Rural Village), 4:2 (Nov., 1934), 70.

64. Yen Hsin-che, op. cit., 48-49.

65. Wang Hsiao-wen and Ch'en Ch'uan-kang, Chung-kuo t'u-ti wen-t'i (China's Land Problems), (Shanghai, 1936), 134-135.

66. Shou Ch'ang, "T'u-ti yü nung-min" (Land and Peasants), Chung-kuo nung-min wen-t'i yü nung-min yüen-tung (Problems of Chinese Peasants and the Peasant Movement), ed. by Wang Chung-ming, (Shanghai, 1929), 233.

67. Chung-kuo t'u-ti wen-t'i (Land Problems in China), Comp. by Wang Yün-wu, (Shanghai, 1935), 81.

68. Shou Ch'ang, op. cit., 233.


70. Yen Hsin-che, op. cit., 58.
71. Hua Hung-t'ao, "Wu-hsi i-yü chih nung-ts'un kai-k'uang" (General Situation of Villages in the Corner of Wu-hsi hsien), CYMC, 3:7 (March, 1932), 1492.


74. Ibid.

75. Amano Motonotsuke, Shina nogyō keizai ron, 117.

76. Ching-wen, "Chung-kuo hsiao-ti-chu t'e-to chih yüan-yin chi ch'i yü t'u-ti li-yung chih kuan-hsi" (Causes for the numerousness of small landlords in China, their relations with land utilization), Hsin chung-hua (New China), 5:13 (July, 1937), 95.

77. Wang Hsiao-wen, op. cit., 93-94.

78. Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, Chiang-su k'un-shan nan-t'ung... , 97.

79. Hou Ch'uan-ju, "Ko-ti nung-min chuang-k'uang tiao-ch'a, Chiang-yin" (Investigation of peasants situation in various areas: (Kiang-yin)), TFTC, 24:16 (Aug., 1927), 113.

80. Wong Yin-seng, "Land concentration in Wu-sih near Shanghai," Agrarian China, pub. by Institute of Pacific Relations, (Univ. of Chicago, Shanghai, 1938), 8 (Table 3).

81. NYZL., V. 2, 54, 62.

82. Chang I-p'u, op. cit., 62; Chiang-su sheng nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a (An investigation of rural situation in Kiangsu Province), Ed. by Nung-ts'un fu-hsing wei-yüan hui (Rural Rehabilitation Commission), (Shanghai, 1933), 11-14, Table 8.

83. Wong Yin-seng, op. cit., 5-6.

84. Chen Han-sheng, The Present Agrarian Problem in China, China Institute of Pacific Relation, (Shanghai, 1933), 8.


86. Hsü Yü-p'ing, "Chung-kuo tien-fu chih i kao-ch'a" (An Examination of China's land tax), TFTC, 31:10 (May, 1934), 56 (Table).

87. Ibid., 57, 61.

88. Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 58.

Ibid., 63.

Chang Li-luan, "Chiang-su wu-chin wu-chia chih yen-chiu" (A Study of Community Price in Wu-chin, Kiangsu Province), Chin-ling hūseh-pao (Journal of Chin-ling University), 3:1 (May, 1933), 30-32.

Amano Motonotsuke, op. cit., V. 2, 83.

Ibid.

NYZL, V. 2, 607; Ni Yang-ju, "Wu-hsi Mei-ts'un chen chi fu-chin te nung-ts'un" (Mei-ts'un chen of Wu-hsi hsien and its neighboring villages), TFTC, 32:2 (Feb., 1935), 91.


Ch'en Han-sheng, op. cit., 19.

Dr. T'ang Ch'i-yli divided rent system largely into three, adding the pang-tsu (assisting rent) system to the fen-tsu and pao-tsu systems. He also added two other systems such as chuan-tsu (sub-rent) and yung-tien systems in detailed division. However, the latter three systems were basically variants of the fen-tsu and pao-tsu systems. For details, see Dr. T'ang's article, "Tien-tsu chih-tu chih bei-ching yü Chung-kuo tien-tsu chih" (The background of tenant-rent system and Chinese tenant-rent system), Nung-ts'un ching-chi (Chinese Rural Economy), Ed. by Wang Yün-wu (Shanghai, 1933), 75-82.


NYZL, V. 2, 101-102.


NYZL, V. 2, 113.

Chai-k'o, Chung-kuo nung-ts'un wen-t'i yen-chiu (A Study of Chinese Rural Problems), (Canton, 1933), 196.

John Lossing Buck, Farm Ownership and Tenancy in China, (Shanghai, 1924), 31.
104. Amano Motonotsuke, op. cit., V. 1, 409.

105. Chang Li-luan, op. cit.

106. NYZL, V. 2, 103-112.

107. Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, "Chiang-su K'un-shan...", 37.


109. Chao Hsiung, "Ch'ang-shu nung-min chih ching-chi chuang-k'uang" (The economic situation of Ch'ang-shu peasants), Hsin chung-hua (The new China), 2:2 (Jan., 1934), 82.


111. Ibid.


114. Ibid., 128-130.

115. Kan Yü-yüan, Hsiang-ts'un min-chung chiao-yü (Rural mass education), (Shanghai, 1934), 47.

116. Hua Hung-t'ao, op. cit., 1427.


118. Ch'in Liu-fang, "Huang-hsiang mi-hsin feng-su te t'i-jen yü p'o-ch'u (The Experience and extermination of superstitious customs in Huang hsiang), CYMC, 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1797-1803.

119. Ibid., 1803.

120. Kan Yü-yüan, op. cit., 137.

121. Ibid., 134.


124. Ibid., 35.


126. Ibid., 172; NYZL, V. 3, 64.


128. Sung Tzu-yüan, "Chung-kuo nung-ts'un kai-chin wen-t'i" (The Problem of Chinese Rural Improvement), CYMC, 4:1 (Sept., 1932), 101. During the period of 1914-1922, military expenditures in the province increased from 4,800,000 to 10,000,000 yuan. See, Nagano Akira, Shina no shakai undo (Chinese Social Movement), Pub. by Minami Manshū tetsudo kabushiki kaisha, Tokyo keizai chō sabu, (Tokyo, 1926), 20.


130. Huang Yen-p'ei and others, Chiang-su p'ing-tai tiao-ch'a chi-shih (The Record of Actual Damages of the War in Kiangsu Province), (Shanghai, 1924), 1-2.


134. NYZL, V. 3, 647.


136. NYZL, V. 3, 413 (see table).

137. Ibid., 413-414.

138. This term implies that despite good harvest the Chinese peasants met a great economic loss from the drop of the price of agricultural products due to the great amount of import agricultural products. Ibid., 415.
139. Ibid., 414; 417.

140. Ch'en Cheng-mo, op. cit., 766; For the increase of bandits, see NYZL, V. 3, 901-907.


142. For instance, the Hsü-kung-ch'iao reform district was a combined product between the AVE and local leaders represented by Ts'ai Wang-chih, one of the rich gentry and an ex-provincial assemblyman at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty. Ch'en P'ei-yüan, "Hsü-kung-ch'iao hsiang-ts'un kai-chin liu-nien chi-hua wan-ch'eng hou chih kao-ch'a" (An Examination after the Completion of the Six-Year Plan of Hsü-kung-ch'iao Rural Reform District), Min-chien, 1:16 (Dec., 1934), 16. Huang-hsü district started as a joint project between the AVE and the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Mining at the initiation of Ho Meng-lin, then Chief of the department (HTKK, 443). Shan-jen-ch'iao district was also run jointly by local leaders and the AVE with the help of the Wu-hsien government (HTKK, 451). Ku-kao-chuang district was established at the initiation of Ku Chün-i, a local leader and a professor at Chi-nan University, and was guided by reform specialists from the AVE (HTKK, 464). Ts'ao-ho-ching chen reform project was carried out jointly between the Hung-ying Education Foundation and the AVE. For details, see Section 3 of Chapter Six in this study.

143. As to the reason why Ku-kao-chuang, a village north of the Yangtze River, was selected as a reform district of the AVE, little information is available. The village became a reform district in 1930 at the initiation of Ku Chün-i, a local leader and professor at Chi-nan University. It was said that Mr. Ku was greatly impressed by the achievements of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao reform experiments and made up his mind to launch a similar reform program in his native village, Ku-kao-chuang. He discussed the matter with Chang Wei-ming, the magistrate of T'ai-hsien. With the magistrate's consent, Mr. Ku invited staff members of the AVE such as Huang Yen-p'ei, Chiang Wen-yü, and Yao Hui-chüan and formed a village improvement committee with leaders from the village. Thus, rural reform work began in Ku-kao-chuang under the guidance of the AVE. See HKTT, 456.

144. For the backward characteristics of northern Kiangsu, see "Tou-liu yü nung-ts'un ching-chi shin-tai te Hsü-Hai ko-shu" (Hsü-Hai regions which still stay in the stage of agrarian economy), TFTC 27:6 (April, 1930), 78. In this report, it is said that the tenancy system in northern Kiangsu reminded one of the manorial system of medieval Europe.

145. Ch'en Hsü-ching, Hsiang-ts'un chien-she yün-teng (Rural Reconstruction Movement), (Shanghai, 1946), 94-97.
146. Ibid., 95 (Appendix), Ch'en engaged in a debate with rural reconstructionists regarding the effectiveness of the rural reconstruction movement. See the Tu-li p'ing-lun (Independence Review), nos. 198, 199, 209, 215, and 216.

147. Ibid., 95.

148. Ku Mei, Min-chung chiao-yü hsiao t'ung-hsiang (The New Trends in Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1946), 56. For the distribution of mass education halls in the province, see Table 19 in Chapter Three of this study.

149. CHIL, 66, HKTT, 394.

150. Chu Jo-ch'i, "San-nien lai te Kao-chang-an" (The Three Years of the Kao-chang-an district), CYMC 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1604-1605. However, according to the information available, this district was the only one among the suburban districts whose villagers ran truck farming as a main subsidiary occupation.

151. Hua Hung-tao, "Wu-hsi i-yü chih nung-t's'un kai-k'uang," (General Situation of rural villages in a corner of Wu-hsi), CYMC, 3:7 (Mar., 1932), 1428.


153. CHIL, 66; Ibid., 62; Chao Wan, "Pei-hsia te shih-yen" (The Experimentation of the Pei-hsia District), CYMC, 4:7 (Mar., 1933), 1306; HKTT, 443, 456; NTYT, 145.

154. Hua Hung-tao, op. cit., 144; CHIL, 66.

155. NTYT, 132; CHIL, 62, 66; HKTT, 443.

156. Same as above (155).

157. Hua Hung-tao, op. cit., 1440.

158. Li Chieh, "Wo ho Hsing-chih shih" (My Teacher Hsing-chih and I), TCNC, 342.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. For details, see Kao Chien-ssu, "San shih wu-nien lai Chung-kuo chih min-chung chiao-yü" (Mass education in China for the last 35 years), Ts'ui-chin san-shih-wu-nien lai chih Chung-kuo chiao-yü (Chinese Education in Recent 35 Years), Comp. by Chuang Yü and Ho Sheng-ting, (Shanghai, 1931), 153-162.

2. T'ung-su education became a part of the official education policy of the Peking Government during the Republican period through the efforts of Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, who served as Minister of Education between 1912-1914. During this period, there were set up t'ung-su (popular) education halls, libraries, and lecture halls at provincial and hsien seats and busy market places. These popular education facilities developed into mass education facilities such as mass education halls, libraries, and lecture halls in the Nanking period. For details, see Ibid., 164-166.

3. For the p'ing-min education movement, the following books are helpful: Y. C. James Yen, Mass Education Movement in China (Peking, 1925); Lu-dzai Djung, A History of Democratic Education in Modern China, (Shanghai, 1934), 95-116; Pearl S. Buck, Tell the People, Talks with James Yen About the Mass Education Movement, (New York, 1945). As one can notice in the above works, p'ing-min education was also translated as "mass" education both by James Yen himself and others.

4. The term "mass" in the cases of the mass movement and mass education movement is a translation of min-chung or chün-chung in Chinese, a political term meaning a multitude of common people. This term was frequently employed by both the KMT and the CCP, and others after 1919 in particular, and it seems to have been, in part, from Soviet influence. The term "popular" is also used to describe movements involving a great number of common people and is more commonly used in the West. It is not easy to differentiate exactly the usages of "mass" and "popular" because of their similar connotations. Although many scholars (e.g., Franz Schurmann, James Townsend, Patric Cavandish, Martin Wilbur, and others) used the term "mass" or "mass movement" no one offers a clear-cut definition of those terms. However, by carefully examining the circumstances in which these terms were adopted, one can find the following attributes which discern "mass" from "popular" in their respective usages. First, the term "mass" has a class implication pitting a majority of common people against a small class of ruling and privileged people. Secondly, the term denotes bodies organized and mobilized for certain political purposes under the leadership of disciplined revolutionary elite groups. Thirdly, mass movements are often militant in character. In contrast, the term "popular" is devoid of class implications and militancy. It is also usually not related to revolutionary political
organizations. As pointed out in the main text, the Nanking Government and the KMT under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek lost the revolutionary character of the KMT after Sun Yat-sen's death. But they used the term "min-chung" (mass) movement for their mobilization of the people even though the character of the movement became reformist rather than revolutionary. The reasons seems to have been that although the KMT was controlled by a conservative faction it still acted as if it were a revolutionary party that inherited Sun Yat-sen's legacy. Private educators of social reform also used the same term because in my judgement they believed, in the initial few years in particular, that Chiang would faithfully follow the political lines laid by Sun Yat-sen. In connection with the above interpretation concerning the term "mass" or "mass movement," Robert C. Tucker's concept of "revolutionary movement regime" is noteworthy. Tucker considers the Leninist Government as typical of this variety of regime and counts Sun Yat-sen's Canton Government which copied the Soviet system in 1924 as one such regime. In his definition of a "mass movement regime" Tucker included three elements: (1) a regime should be revolutionary in the sense that it aims to displace the existing social and political system, (2) revolution will be accompanied by an active participation of masses of people under the energetic leadership of an elite organization, and (3) there should be a militant, centralized revolutionary party. The party develops as a disciplined elite connected with a mass following. See Tucker's "On Revolutionary Mass-movement Regimes," The Soviet Political Mind (Princeton, N.J., July, 1963), 7-13.

5. For instance, a literacy campaign was an important part of this movement. Also the Kiangsu Provincial Academy of Mass Education, the center of the Kiangsu mass education movement and precursor of the College of Education, was established in consultation with James Yen's staff members. Fu Pao-chin, James Yen's colleague, served as Chief of the Department of Research and Experimentation at the College of Education. See James Yen's Mass Education Movement, op. cit., 11; Also CHIL, 49.


7. See Sun Yat-sen, "Chung-hua min-kuo chien-she chih chi-ch'u" (The Foundation of Reconstructing the Republic of China), Tsung-li chuan-chi (Complete Collection of Sun Yat-sen), (hereafter, cited as TLCC) V. 1. 1028; also his speech at the Peasant Movement Training Institute (Nung-min yin-tung chiang-hsi so) on August 21, 1924; "Keng-che yu chi' i t'ien" (Land to the Tillers), Ibid., Vol. II, 496-500.

8. Chin-tai Chung-kuo chiao-yü shih-liao (Historical Materials of Modern Chinese Education) (hereafter cited as CYSL), ed. by Shu Hsin-ch'eng, (Shanghai, 1934), pao-pien (Supplementary), 1-8.
9. As examples of Sun's political ideals, Hsü cited the equalization of land ownership, the regulation of capital, his industrial plan, the elimination of imperialism, and the establishment of people's rights. Ibid., 3-4.

10. Ibid., 4-5, 7-8.

11. For John Dewey's Lecture in China, see Fan Kung-chien (recorded), "Chi Tu-wei po-shih yen-chiang te ta-yao" (Record of Outline of Lectures by Dr. Dewey), Hsin Chiao-yü (New Education) 1:3 (May, 1919), 326-329.

12. Ibid., 3; For liberal socialist elements in Sun's political idea, see Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, (University of Californai Press, 1970), 13-137, 308; According to the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (Macmillan Co., N.Y., 1954) V. 13, ed. by Edwin R. A. Seligman, 203, liberal socialism originated in the Anglo-Saxon countries from the works of such people as Spencer, Ogilvie, and others, and its doctrine was later developed by Henry George. It is a well-known fact that Sun Yat-sen was influenced by Henry George and moderate brands of socialism which were in vogue in the 19th century Europe.

13. Ibid., 6.


15. As to the Communist influence in the KMT from July to October, 1926, see Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How (Comp.), Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisors in China, 1918-1927, (New York, 1972), 370-372.

16. CYSL., 7.


19. The preface of the draft says that this draft was approved by most of the committee members. Wei Ch'üeh, "Kuo-min cheng-fu chiao-yü fang-chen ch'u-an" (A Draft of the Educational Policy of the Nationalist Government), CYSL, pao-pien, 10.

20. Ibid., 10-18.

21. Ibid., 12.
22. Ibid., 9.
26. Ibid., 112; 227-273.
27. From the early period of the KMT-CCP alliance, at the KMT central party headquarters, many important positions in the departments related to mass organizations (i.e., organization, propaganda, labor, agriculture, youth, and women) were occupied by CCP members. For example, Tan P'ing-shan, a leading Communist, became Chief of the Department of Organization and Lin Tsu-han, a pro-Communist, headed the Department of Agriculture with such notable Communists as Lo Ch'i-yuan, P'eng P'ai, and Yüan Hsiao-hsien as assistants. Other departments also had many Communists. The Peasant Movement Training Center established in July, 1924, was staffed with such Communists as Mao Tse-tung and Li Fu-ch'un. At the Center the students were trained by Communist methods. Peasant movements occurring during the 1925-1926 period in Hunan, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Kiangsu were attributed to Communist leadership. See Hatano Ken'ichi, Shiro shusei chugoku Kyōsantōsh (Collected Materials of the Chinese Communist Party), (Tokyo, 1961), Vol. 1, 10-11, 94, 186, 222-240.
28. Amano Motonotsuke, "Nōmin undo" (Peasant Movement), Shina nōgyō keizairon (A Treatise on Chinese Agricultural Economy), Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1942), 110.
31. Ibid.
32. Chung-yang jih-pao (Central Daily News) (Hereafter CYJP), March 10, 1928.
33. Ibid., Feb. 21, 1928.
34. Ibid., Feb. 25, 1928.
35. Ibid., May 11, 1928.
36. Ibid., Feb. 23, 1928.
37. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1928.
40. P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei, "Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang tai-piao te shih shema?" (What is the Kuomintang representing for?) CYJP, editorial, June 2 and 4, 1929.
42. CYJP, May 24, 1928.
43. Ibid., May 15, 1928.
44. Chiao-yü tsa-chih, 20:6 (June, 1928), "Chiao-yü chieh hsiao-hsi," 3. The main difference between San-min chu-i education and tang-hua education was that the former placed the utmost importance on training which developed habits of hard work, advanced agricultural technology, and deemphasized political education. Such a policy was natural for the Nanking Government which was dominated by KMT rightists who condemned social disorder associated with mass movements. In addition, the rehabilitation of the national economy was one of the most urgent tasks for the regime. See Ono Shinobu and Saito Akio, Chugoku no kindai kyoiku shoshi (A Short History of Modern China's Education), (Tokyo, 1948), 23-24.
46. Kan Yü-yüan, Hisang-ts'un min chung chiao-yü (Rural Mass Education) (Shanghai, 1933), 217.
47. Tai Chi-t'ao hsien-sheng wen-ts'un (Collected Writings of Tai Chi-t'ao), ed. by Ch'en Tien-hsi, Tai-pei, 1959, Vol. 1, 405.

49. Ch'en Li-chiang, Min-chung chiao-yü (Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1935), 31.


51. CYJP, March 12, 1928.

52. CHIL, 1.

53. CYSL, pao-pien 27, 31-32.

54. CHIL, 1.

55. CYSL, pao-pien, 9.

56. The reason for such a delayed announcement seems to have been due to the remaining disagreements among the rightist KMT leaders concerning various matters of mass movements after the Fourth Plenum. This delay also seems to signify the passive attitude of the Nanking Government toward the mass education movement in contrast to its avowed policy of active implementation. For differing views on mass movements among the KMT leaders, see John Israel's work, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937, (Stanford University Press, 1966), 23-38. Regarding the objectives of the mass education movement, see She-hui chiao-yü fa-ling hui-pien (Collection of Laws Regarding Social Education), ed. by Ministry of Education, (Shanghai, 1935), 17-18.

57. For instance, the specific tasks with which the KMT branches were to concern themselves in relation to local self-government policy were defined in October, 1928 as follows: the movements for literacy, afforestation, road building, and hygiene, the co-operative movement and the promotion of the pao-chia system of local security. It is significant that the training of the people in the exercise of their political rights was no longer among their tasks. Patrick Cavendish, op. cit., 164-165; James Townsend also points out that the Kuomintang did not fulfill its commitment to the principles of tutelage, namely self-government training of the people. James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, University of California Press, 1969, 30-32. For a similar view, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, 1912-1949, Stanford University Press, 1970, 135-137.

58. For instance, the plan of the I-hsing hsien Mass Education Hall for 1931 says: "mass education is the only method for tutelage work," Wu Pen-yüan, "I-hsing hsien-li min-chung chiao-yü kuan ch'un-pu chih-hsing chi-hua ta-chiang" (Outline of the Basic Plan
for the I-hsing hsien Mass Education Hall), CYMC, 2:8 (April, 1931), 89.

59. Kao Chien-ssu, Min-chung chiao-yü (Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1933), 18-19.

60. Ch'en Li-chiang, op. cit., 150.


62. Ibid., 699.

63. Ku Mei, Min-chung chiao-yü hsin tung-hsiang (The New Trend in Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1946), 54-55.

64. CYNC, V. 3, 700; HTKK, 771.

65. Wang Yü-ch'eng, "Chiang-su sheng ko-hsien min-chung chiao-yü kuan kai-k'uang tsao-ch'a" (An Investigation of hsien Mass Education Halls in Kiangsu Province), CYMC, 2:8 (April, 1931), 60-61.

66. CYNC, ping-pien, 605.

67. P'eng Ta-ch'uan, Chiao-yü kuan (Education Halls), (Shanghai, 1937), 5.

68. Ibid.

69. For instance, according to the statistics contained in HTTC, p. 207, in 1934 out of the total provincial social education expenditure of 1,644,141 yuan, expenditures for libraries and athletic training centers were 43,055 yuan which was only 2% of the total social expenditure. The remaining 98% was allocated for mass education halls and peasant education halls. It was also common among mass educators to use interchangeably the two words, social education and mass education. See Ch'en Li-chiang, op. cit., 455.

70. Table concerning social education expenditures of various provinces and important municipalities. Ibid., 435-437.

71. Mu Yung, "Wu-chin hsien-li min-chung chiao-yü kuan kai-chin chi-hua" (Reform Plan of Wu-chin hsien Mass Education Hall), CYMC 2:8 (April, 1931), 118.

72. Wang Yü-ch'eng, op. cit., 60.


75. Lin Tsung-li, "Kai-ko hsien-hsing nung-min chiao-yü kuan te chi-chung i-chien" (Some Opinions On Reforming the Present Peasant Education Halls), CYMC, 2:8 (April, 1931), 47.

76. CYNC, ping-pien, 709.

77. Ibid., 710.

78. Ibid., 711-712.

79. Huang Chiang-ssu, "Ssu-nien lai hsiang-ts' un chiao-yü (Rural Education During the Past Four Years), Chiao-yü ts'a-chih, 23: 7 (July, 1931), 96.

80. NTYT, 160-168.

81. The change in number of peasant education halls in Kiangsu during the three years of 1931-1933 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Provincial Halls</th>
<th>Hsien Halls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See "Yen-chiu shih-yen shih-yeh" (Research and Experimentation Projects), CYMC, 2:9.10 (May, 1931), 66.


83. Ibid., 51.

84. Chiang-su sheng nung-ts' un kai-chin hui-i hui-pien (The Record of the Rural Reform Conference of Kiangsu Province), Comp. by the Department of Agriculture and Mining, Kiangsu Provincial Government, (Shanghai, 1930), 2.

85. Ibid., 26-45.

86. Ibid.

87. NTYT, 158.
88. **CYNC, ping-pien, 703-704.**

89. **Ibid., 708-709.** In relation to the Hsü-chou hall's emphasis on rural reform it is noteworthy that the hall was established at the initiation of Chu Fu-hai, a leading KMT leftist together with Ch'en Kung-po, then Chief of the Kiangsu education department. It was the time when leaders of the KMT left wing gained a number of important positions in the Nanking Government and recovered some influence within the KMT. (Wang Ching-wei was President of the Executive Yuan and Ch'en Kung-po, Minister of Interior.) Hence, the Hsü-chou hall's program might have been influenced by KMT leftist ideas. It is also important to note that Kao Chien-ssu and Yu Chieh-t'ang, leaders of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education participated in the planning of the establishment of the hall as members of seven preparatory committees headed by Chu Fu-hai. Thus it is also possible that the direction of Hsü-chou hall's reform work might have been influenced by the rural reform approach of the College of Education. **CSC, Chapt. II, 14; HTKK, part II, 771-774.**

90. A cursory list of the Hsü-chou hall's achievements in mass education from 1932 through 1934 were as follows:

1). The number of newly opened mass schools including adult night schools were: 13 (478 students); traveling classes, 3 (100 students); reading societies of children, 8, of male adults, 8, and of female adults, 2; setting up wall-papers, 9.

2). Election of chiefs of lin and lu in the nearby villages of Pa-tsu-ch'ieh district; construction of 7 highways, the total length of which amounted to 18,477 km; repairing 2 bridges; and organization of 40 village defense societies.

3). Establishing a dispensary for peasants and conducting cleaning campaigns.

4). Running an agricultural extension farm of 50 mou; special contract-families which received agricultural technical guidance, 80; organizing cooperatives: credit cooperatives and transportation cooperatives (total member of the two types of cooperatives were 1,090); and holding contests and exhibitions of various agricultural products. **HTKK, 778-789.**

91. Chung I-hua, "I-nien lai chih min-chung chiao-yu hsin tung-hsiang" (The New Direction of Mass Education During the Last One Year), CYMC, 4:7 (March, 1933), 1365.

92. In July, 1933, the Rural Work Discussion Society was established as a national liaison organization among the rural reconstruction institutions in China. The Kiangsu Provincial College of Education was one of four most important member institutions of the Society, together with the Shantung Rural Reconstruction Research Academy at Tsou-p'ing, the National Association for Mass Education Movement at

93. Kao Chien-ssu, "Pen-yuan min-chung chiao-yü shih-yen shih-heh k'u-ang chih chih-hou" (Present Situation and Future Plan of This College's Mass Education Experimental Project), CYMC, 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1518-1519.


96. Kao Chien-ssu, "San-shih wu-nien lai Chung-kuo chih min-chung chiao-yü" (China's Mass Education During the Past 35 Years), San-shih wu-nien lai chih Chung-kuo chiao-yü (Chinese Education for the Past 35 Years), Comp. by Chuang Yu and Ho Sheng-ting, (Shanghai, 1931), 167.


100. Ibid., 102-103.

101. Yü Chia-chü, Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü t'ung-lun (A General Survey of Rural Education), (Shanghai, 1934), 141.


104. See I-wu chiao-yü (Compulsory Education), nos. 6, 7, and 9, passim.


106. W. Tschishihh Tao, op. cit., 117.


110. Ibid., 256.

111. Chiao-yü chi-k'an, 2:2 (June, 1926), 97.

112. Ibid., 2:4 (Dec., 1926), 75-76.

113. Ibid., 76-77.


117. CYJP, March 23, 1928.

118. Huang Yen-p'ei, "Hsüeh-hsiao ts'ai-yung shih-yung chu-i chih shang-ch'üeh" (A Discussion of Employing Practicalism at Schools), CYSL, Vol. 2, No. 13, 204.

119. Ibid.


124. According to this writer's observation, the difference between practical education and vocational education was that the former stressed the utility of learning in general and the latter offered direct training for certain jobs. For this view, see Huang Yen-p'ei, op. cit. (notes 107 and 109).


126. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Chih-jih chih chiao-yü fang-chen" (Today's Educational Policies), Hsin Ch'ing-nien, 1:2 (Oct., 1915), 5.

127. Liao Shih-sheng, Chung-kuo chih-yeh chiao-yü wen-t'i (Problems of Vocational Education in China), (Shanghai, 1929), 2.

128. Ibid.


131. Chiao-yü tsa-chih, special report, No. 6 (1921), 37.


133. Ibid., 128.

134. Shu Hsin-ch'eng, op. cit., 197.

135. Ibid.


137. Ibid., 259.

138. Ibid., 258.

139. Chuang Tse-hsüan, "Chung-kuo nung-ts'un kai-chin yün-tung" (Rural Reform Movement in China), CYMC, 4:2 (Oct., 1932), 204-205.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Huang Yen-p'ei was involved in more than five national educational institutions. He was President of the AVE, a member of the board of trustees of the National Association for the Advancement of Mass Education, of the Association for Advancement of Education, and of the Chinese Education and Cultural Fund (the organization in charge of the Boxer indemnity funds returned by the United States). He was also a staff member of Kiangsu Provincial Education Association and an editor of Hsin chiao-yü, the organ of the Association for the Advancement of Education.

2. For describing T'ao's early biographical background I depended chiefly upon: Hsü Shih-ch'i, "T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng te shih-yeh chi ch'i sheng-p'ing" (Life and Works of Mr. T'ao Hsing-chih), T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng chi-nien chi (Commemorative Work of Mr. T'ao Hsing-chih), Comp. by T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng chi-nien wei-yüan hui, (Shanghai, 1947), (hereafter cited as Chi-nien), 280-288; Fu Pin-jan, "Tsung p'ing-min tao p'ing-min" (From Commoner to Commoner), ibid., 260-270; "T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng chüan-lüeh" (A Brief Biography of Mr. T'ao Hsing-chih), ibid., 1-3. Besides, for T'ao's biography, the following are available: Mai Ch'ing, T'ao Hsing-chih (Hongkong, 1949); Pai Tao, T'ao Hsing-chih ti sheng-p'ing chi ch'i hsüeh-shuo (Life and Theories of T'ao Hsing-chih), (Peking, 1949); Biographical Dictionary of Republic of China, ed. by Howard C. Boorman, Columbia University Press, (New York, London, 1968), Vol. III, 243-248.

3. Chi-nien 1,8, 306.

4. During the May Fourth period (1917-1921) these scholars promoted democratic, practical, and pragmatic education. As a result, during this period Japanese and German influence on Chinese education was replaced by that of the United States. See Ono Shinobu, Chūgoku no kindai kyoiku (China's Modern Education), (Tokyo, 1948), 13-18.

5. Through a number of articles T'ao proposed replacing the "instructional method" (chiao-yü fa) with the "teaching-learning method" (chiao-hsüeh fa). While the former was a unilateral one-way teaching method from teacher to student, the latter emphasized the responsibility of the teacher to teach students how to learn, to link teaching methods with learning methods, and to continue the pursuit of learning rather than to consider his knowledge as final. Mai Ch'ing, op. cit., 14-16; Boorman, op. cit., 244.


7. See Hsin chiao-yü (New Education), 11:2 (Sept., 1925), 156.

9. For instance, in 1920, T'ao mobilized his colleagues at the normal school during the summer vacation in order to carry out a literacy campaign in the neighboring villages of the school.

10. T'ao Chih-hsing, Chih-hsing shu-hsin (Letter of Chih-hsing), (Shanghai, 1929), (hereafter cited as Shu-hsin), 20-22.

11. Ch'en Li-chiang, Min-chung chiao-yü (Education of the Masses), (Shanghai, 1934), 29.

12. Ti-i-ts'u Chung-kuo chiao-yü nien-chien (The First China's Education Yearbook), Comp. by Ministry of Education, (Shanghai, 1934), Wu-pien, 31; shu-hsin, 28-29. "P'ing-min chiao-yü yün-tung" was also translated as "mass education movement" by James Yen.


14. Ibid., 14-16.

15. Ibid., 42.


17. Shu-hsin, 56.


19. Shu-hsin, 56.

20. Ibid., 157-160.

21. Having discovered this new direction, T'ao was quite excited. It is said that in a letter to his friend T'ao confessed, "The rural education movement is the only path to life which Chinese education found at the end of its rope." Ibid.

22. Ibid., 154-156.

23. Explaining the purpose of the rural reform experimental school, T'ao said: "We advocate the development of 'living center-elementary schools' based on actual rural life, 'living normal schools' based on the 'living center-schools,' 'living rural teachers' from the living normal schools, and 'living students and citizens' from the living teachers." See T'ao Chih-hsing, "Chung-kuo chiao-yü kai-chin-she kai-tsao ch'üan-kuo hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü hsūan-yen" (Declaration of Reform of the Nation's
Rural Education by the Association for the Advancement of Education), Hsiang-ts' un chiao-yü chih li-lun yü shih-chi (Theories and Practices of Rural Education), ed., T'ai Shuang-ch'i u, (Shanghai, 1935) (hereafter cited as HTLC), 1.


25. "Sheng-huo chiao-yü chih t'e-chih" (Characteristics of Life Education), TCLC, 4.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 6-7.

29. Fang Yü-yen, Hsiao-chuang chih i-yeh (A Page of Hsiao-chuang), (Shanghai, 1934), 55-56.

30. Ibid., 57; TCLC, 6.

31. TCLC, 14-18.

32. John Dewey, "Chi Tu-wei po-shih yen-chiang te ta-yao" (Record of Outline of Dr. Dewey's Lectures), Hsin Chiao-yü (The New Education), 1:3 (May, 1919), recorded by Fan Kung-chien, 326-331.

33. T'ao Hsing-chih, "Sheng-huo chi chiao-yü" (Life is education), Wei-chih-shih chieh-chi (The "False-Knowledge" Class), (Peking, 1950), 21.


36. Ibid.

37. TCLC, 5. T'ao said, "Regardless of whether it is to strive for democracy or to develop democracy it requires the people to work in a mass, joining their forces and intelligence."

38. "T'ao Chih-hsing hsien-sheng chih i-chien," (Mr. T'ao Chih-hsing's opinion), HTLC, 5-10.

39. Ibid., 5.

It seems necessary here to point out that T'ao had a different view from those of Liang Shu-ming and Kao Yang concerning whether China should remain an agrarian state or not. Whereas Liang and Kao advocated that China should remain an agricultural society in order to maintain Chinese culture, T'ao believed that China should eventually develop into an industrial society even though he recognized that contemporary China was basically an agricultural state. Thus T'ao advocated developing new thought, law, education, and a view of life which was flexible enough to be suitable for both contemporary society and a future industrial society. For Liang's view, see Lyman P. Van Slyke, "Liang Sou-ming and the Rural Reconstruction Movement," The Journal of Asian Studies, 18:4 (Aug., 1959) 461-468; For T'ao's opinion, see HTLC, 9.

T'ao even referred to exploiters as "robbers". As exploiters he included corrupt officials, landlords, bad gentry, local strong men, and imperialistic foreign countries. Ibid.

This idea seems to have been inspired by John Dewey's speech on the responsibility of the rural school to the village community, delivered before the students of a normal school in Shansi Province in 1920. The gist of the speech is as follows: "The teacher's responsibility extends beyond his classroom and embraces his community . . . The school must be the community center for the dissemination of knowledge of sanitation. The school playground should be a recreational resource for the entire community. Teachers should be the liaison between the provincial health department and their villages. They should also promote interest in wholesome recreation. Bands, choruses, and orchestras made up of pupils should stimulate the formation of adult musical groups. Teachers should harness talent for dramatics, and present social drama which can be understood by villagers. School auditoriums should be utilized for public lectures . . . Teachers should pressure the provincial department of education to establish traveling libraries. The school should be the scene of political rallies." John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, Trans. by Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-chien Ou, Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1973, 312.


T'ao urged them to discard self-righteous, admonishing, gentry-defending, and bookworm-like attitudes and share the hardships of peasant life. Otherwise, he warned, they would not be able to gain the peasants' confidence, and their reform work would eventually fail. HTLC, 10.
48. Ibid., 10.

49. T'ao Chih-hsing, "Chung-kuo hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü chih ken-pen te kai-tsao" (Fundamental Reforms of Chinese Rural Education), HTLC, 2.


51. I have searched many Chinese biographical dictionaries, but so far I have not come across even a brief biography of Chao Shu-yü. Thus I lack information on the date and place of his birth and his educational background. However, judging from his association with T'ao Hsing-chih (1891-1946) and Shu Hsin-ch'eng (1893-1960), a famous educational historian, and their treatment of him, Chao seems to have been about their same age. According to Shu, Chao gave him helpful advice on Shu's major work, "Historical Materials on Modern Chinese Education." See Shu Hsin-ch'eng, Wo ho chiao-yü (Education and I), (Shanghai, 1932), 478. Although the name of the school is not available, we know that he was a "returned student" who majored in rural education in an American University. See Fang Yu-wen, Hsiao-chuang i-yeh, op. cit., 50. I suspect that he may have graduated from Cornell University, which had a rural education department at that time.

52. Meng-lu te Chung-kuo chiao-yü t'ao-lun (Discussion of Chinese Education by Dr. Monroe), ed. by Ch'en Pao-ch'uan, T'ao Chih-hsing, and Hu Shih, (Shanghai, 1922), Appendix 3: List of Participants, 28.


56. Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü ts'ung-chi (Collected Works on Rural Education), ed. by Fang Yu-yen, (Hsiao-chuang Series No. 1), (hereafter cited as HTTC) (Shanghai, 1933), 137-166.


58. Min-kuo shih-wu nien Chung-kuo chiao-yü chih-nan (Direction of Education in China for the Year 1926), Comp. by Shang-wu Printing Co. (Shanghai, 1927) (hereafter cited as chih-nan), 258.

59. For details, see HTTC, 190-194.

60. Ibid., 48-86.

62. HTTC, Preface 4.

63. Chiang-su sheng-li chiao-yü hsüeh-yüan i-lan (Catalogue of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education), (Wu-hsi, 1936), 1.

64. HTTC, 1-24.

65. Chao Shu-yü, "Nung-min hsün-lin te li-lun ho fang-an" (Method and Theory of Peasant Training), Hsin sheng-ming (New Life), 1:6 (June, 1928), 1-12; also contained in HTTC, 25-47.

66. Chao Shu-yü, op. cit., 1; HTTC, 25.

67. HTLC, 14-15.


69. By this term, Chiao meant education which produced those who exploited the people. This term seems to have been borrowed from Lü Hsün.

70. HTTC, 3-12.

71. Note that this definition was originally made by Sun Yat-sen.

72. HTTC, 13-16.

73. Ibid., 16.

74. For the Communists' scheme, Chao pointed out that many of the instructors at the Peasant Movement Training Institute were Chinese Communist leaders and that the students at the Institute were trained with Communist theories and methods. Ibid., 26-28. The validity of Chao's remark can be proved by the following fact. According to Chou Fu-hai (one of the twelve founding members of the CCP and a close associate of Wang Ching-wei after the CCP), the grading of entrance examination papers for the first class of the Peasant Training Institute was conducted at Tan P'ing-shan's house. Tan was one of the most important CCP leaders at that time and currently Chief of the Department of Organization of the reorganized KMT of 1924. The criteria of the selection had been not the applicants' score on the paper, but their affiliation with the CCP. As a result, the KMT members were excluded, and only those who were either CCP members or connected with the CCP, were admitted. See Ch'en Kung-po Chu Fu-hai hui-i lu ho-pien (The Combined Memoirs of Ch'en Kung-po and Chu Fu-hai), Comp. by Ch'u-ch'iu Printing Co., (Hongkong, 1967), 150. The strength of the CCP grew rapidly after it decided to concentrate its effort in the peasant movement in May, 1925. The number of the CCP members in May, 1925 was about
900. It increased to about 10,000 at the end of the same year and jumped to 60,000 in May, 1927. In November, 1926, the CCP decided at the enlarged Conference of the Central Committee not to cooperate with the KMT in carrying out peasant movements within the peasant association. Hatano Ken'ichi, Shiryō shūsei shugoku kyosantōshi (Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party), V.1 (1920-1931) (Tokyo, 1961), 10.

75. Chao Shu-yü, op. cit., 92.

76. Ibid., 93-94.

77. The peasant movement which had been carried out with peasant associations as central organizations was halted by the order of Chiang Kai-shek in early Aug., 1926. Since then the peasant movement had never been allowed to operate in the same way as before. Moreover, the peasant association regulations were revised by the Nanking Government to allow landlords to join the association while tenants who cultivated less than 10 mou of land and agricultural laborers were disqualified. Thus the peasant movement as a collective effort of the peasants to improve their social and economic well-being came to be nullified. Kan Yu-yuan, Hsiang-ts'un mīn-chung chiao-yü (Rural Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1934), 249.

78. For leftist KMT leaders' views on the peasant movement, see Liao Chung-k'ai, Liao Chung-k'ai chih (Collection of Liao Chung-k'ai's Writings), (Peking, 1963), 136-137, 169-174; Wang Ching-wei wen-chi (Collection of Wang Ching-wei's Works) ed. by Shao Hou, (Shanghai, 1936), 140, 154; and Ch'en Kung-po, Ch'en Kung-po hsien-sheng wen-chi (Collection of Ch'en-po's Writings), (1939, ?), 89, 184-186, 194-198, and 200-204.

79. Ibid., 29-30.

80. Ibid., 30-31.

81. Ibid., 31-32.

82. Ibid., 32-38.


85. Ibid.

86. CHIL, 1.


88. Cheng I-hua, "I-nien lai chih min-chung chiao-yü hsin tung-hsiang" (The New Direction of Mass Education For the Past One Year), CYMC, 4:8 (April, 1933), 1368.


91. HTKK, Appendix, 51.


95. Ibid.


97. Kao Chien-ssu, "Wo-men jen-shih chih hsiang-ts'un chien-ssu wen-t'i," op. cit., 30. For the debate between Wu Ching-han's group and the rural reconstructionists, see Ch'ien Chia-ch'ü, "Chung-kuo te chi-lu" (Forked Roads of China) Chung-kuo nung-ts'un (China's Rural Villages), 1:7 (April, 1935), 2-5; also see Tu-li p'ing-lun (The Independence below), No. 118,126,131.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.


104. Fan Yin-nan, Tang-tai Chung-kuo ming-jen lu (Contemporary China's Who's Who), (Shanghai, 1930); also see Min-kuo shih-wu nien chiao-yü chih-nan, op. cit., 231.

105. HTKK, 419.


107. Ibid., 263.


111. Chiang Heng-yüan (Wen-yü), "Fu-chiao ho-i chu-i" (The Unity of Wealth and Education), op. cit., 57; also his "Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü (Rural Education), Chung-hua chiao-yü chieh (Chinese Educational circles), 18:4 (April, 1930), 2-3.

112. Ibid.


114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., 61.


117. Ibid., 22.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. CHIL, 1.

2. HTKK, 375.

3. Ibid., 376.

4. A brief history of the establishment of the two academies and their merger to form the C.O.E. is as follows: At first, the Kiangsu government established the Mass Education School of Kiangsu College (Chiang-su ta-hsüeh min-chung chiao-yü hsüeh-hsiao) in Soochow in February, 1928 with the purpose of training mass education workers for the Province. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the school was organized by Mrs. Yu Ching-t'ang, who served as the first Superintendent of the school. As Kiangsu College became the National Central University the school changed its name to Mass Education Academy of the Central University District (Chung-yang ta-hsüeh-ch'ü-li min-chung chiao-yü hsüeh-yüan) in June of the same year. In June Mrs. Yu resigned and was succeeded by Chao Shu-yu who was then Superintendent of the normal section of the Hsiao-chuang School. At that time, the provincial government decided to establish a Workers' and Peasants' Academy on the same campus in recognition of the importance of improving the lives of the peasants and agriculture in the province. In August the academy moved to Ying-hsiang in Wu-hsi hsien, and Chao undertook the preparatory work of establishing the workers' and peasants' academy. Unfortunately, however, Chao died in September. The position of superintendent of the Mass Education Academy and the task of preparing the Workers' and Peasants' Academy were thus taken over by Kao Yang (Chien-ssu) in October. In the following month the academy moved again to She-ch'iao, T'ung-hui-lu, located about 2 li north of Wu-hsi city. This site became the permanent seat of the C.O.E. The establishment of the workers' and peasants' academy was completed in January, 1929, and in June of the following year (1930), the two academies were merged to form the C.O.E. in accordance with the new regulations of college organization issued by the Ministry of Education. See CHIL, 1.

5. Ibid., 2-3.


8. CHIL, 113-126.
9. Ibid., 3-4.

10. Students of the C.O.E. consisted of three categories: the hsien grantees who were in the majority, Kiangsu's private students, and out-of-province students. The hsien grantees were exempt from tuition. All they had to pay were fees for room and board, extracurricular activities, and experimentation, which altogether amounted to around 50 yuan per year. These fees were, however, also paid by the hsien government. Private students and out-of-province students were charged 12 yuan per semester in addition to the above fees. Ibid., 110-111.

11. See the table entitled "Annual Expenditures of the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education." Ibid., 112.


14. CHIL, 32-33.

15. Ibid.

16. In his lecture on San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People) Sun held: "China was a sheet of loose sand, suffering from an excess of individual liberty . . . let us secure liberty instead for the nation. To make the nation free, we must each sacrifice his personal freedom." Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, Trans. by Frank W. Price, (Shanghai, 1928), 213.

17. CHIL, 32.

18. For instance, leaders of the C.O.E. identified mass education as a part of the political tutelage work Sun prescribed in his doctrine of three revolutionary stages. In a paper published in April, 1932, Kao Chien-ssu declared: "Rural mass education should regard the completion of tutelage and the realization of constitutional government as its aim." See Kao Chien-ssu, "Chiang-su sheng ko-hsien tan-wei hsiang-ts'un min-chung chiao-yü p'u-chi pan-fa ts'ao-an" (A Draft of the Method for the Propagation of hsien-unit Rural Mass Education in each hsien of Kiangsu Province), CYMC, 3:8 (April, 1932), 1971-197. In a book entitled, Mass Education, published in 1935, Ch'en Li-chiang, a professor and mass education theorist at the C.O.E. said: "Reflecting upon the failure of the past revolution Dr. Sun Yat-sen taught us that in the process of the revolution 'military government' should be followed by 'political tutelage' . . . Mass education is an effort to train the people and accelerate 'political
tutelage." Ch'en Li-chiang, Min-chung chiao-yü (Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1935), 16.


20. CHIL, 32.


22. HTKK, 380.

23. CHIL, 83-86.

24. The Hui-fei District included most of the villages within the area of a 10 li radius, north, east, and west of the college. As of 1934, the area of the district was around 61 square li and consisted of 58 villages of 3,750 households. The majority of the population were peasants, accounting for 61 per cent of the total population, followed in descending order by factory workers (16 per cent), merchants (11 per cent), boatmen (9 per cent), and others. The area of cultivated land was 23,325 mou, one-third of which was owned by rich landlords of the city of Wu-hsi. Pei-hsia district was not used for student training. "Pen-yüan p'u-chieh min-chung chiao-yü chih liang-ke shih-yen" (Two Experiments by this College for Propagating Mass Education), CYMC, 4:3 (Nov., 1932), 460-461.

25. Yü Jen-sheng, "Ta-hsüeh-sheng hsia-hsiang" (College Students' Going Down to Villages), Min-chien, 1:5 (July, 1934), 12-14.


27. The six experimental subdistricts were Hu-chiao-tu, Wang-chia-tang, Hsi-chang, Yang-hsiang, Mei-ching, and An-ti-li. The guidance subdistricts were villages where rural reform experiments had already been initiated in previous years under the direction of the college rural workers. These villages included villages of Huang-hsiang, Kao-chang-an, and Chu-lung-an. See Yü Jen-sheng, op. cit., 13.


32. The Department of Experimentation existed from the outset of the college. As the need arose, in the autumn of 1929 the C.O.E. established the Department of Research. The Department of Research was in charge of the collection of data, investigations, correspondence, meetings, seminars, lectures, and publications. "Chiang-su sheng-li chiao-yü hsüeh-yüan yen-chiu shih-yen-fu shih-yeh kai-k'uang" (Outline of Projects of the Department of Research and Experimentation by the Kiangsu Provincial College of Education), CYMC, 2:9.10 (May, June, 1931), 2-3.

33. Ibid., 2; CHIL, 45.

34. CHIL, 45.

35. Some of the publications of the department other than Chiao-yü yü min-chung were as follows: (1) A Bibliography on Western Adult Education and Rural Education, (2) The Outline of Famous Western Works on Adult Education, (3) The General Situation of Adult Education of Foreign Countries, (4) A Study of Mass Education and Rural Education in China, and (5) Experimentation Reports and Research Paper Collection of the College of Education. These publications were all in Chinese. "Yen-chiu shih-yen fu shih-yeh kai-k'uang", op. cit., 4-5.

36. CHIL, 48.


38. For the detailed occupational distribution of the graduates of the C.O.E. between 1929 and 1934 compiled by the college itself, see "Pen-yüan pi-yeh t'ung-hsüeh fu-wu chuang-k'uang" (Occupational Situation of the Graduates of This College), CYMC, 5:3.4 (December, 1935), 674.

39. Ibid.

40. Chih-hsing shu-hsin (Letters of T'ao Hsing-chih), published by Ya-tung t'u-shu-kuan, (Shanghai, 1929), 197.

41. TCNC, 333-335.

42. Fang Yü-yen, Sheng-huo chiao-yü chien-shu (A Brief Discussion of Life Education), (Shanghai, 1947), 28.

43. Chih-hsing shu-hsin, op. cit., 200.
44. Ibid., 168.

45. Li Ch'u-ts'ai, P'o-hsiao (An Exposure of Hsiao-chuang), (Shanghai, 1932), 2. Out of original 15 students two students dropped out because of family matters. Some works recorded the number of the original students as 13.

46. Ibid., 11-13, 29, 33.

47. NTYT, 282.

48. Ibid., 286-287.

49. Chiang Wen-yü, "Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü" (Rural Education), Chung-hua-chiao-yü chieh (Chinese Educational Circles), 18:4 (April, 1933), 9; Hsiao-chuang i-nien chi-hua (The One-year Plan of Hsiao-chuang), ed. by Fang Yü-yen, (Shanghai, 1933), 86.

50. Liang Shu-ming, "T'a-shan-chih-shih" (Rocks in Other's Mountain), in Hsiao-chuang i-yeh (A Page of the Hsiao-chuang School), ed. by Fang Yü-yen, (Shanghai, 1934), 255-256.

51. Chih-hsing shu-hsin, op. cit., 201.

52. Liang Shu-ming, op. cit., 251.

53. T'ao Hsing-chih, Chung-kuo chiao-yü kai-tsao (The Remodeling of China's Education), (Shanghai, 1928), 137.

54. NTYT, 283.


57. Ibid., 253-254.

58. Li Ch'u-ts'ai, op. cit., 63.

59. Liang Shu-ming, op. cit., 256.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.


64. NTYT, 291; Chiang Wen-yü, "Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü, op. cit., 9-10.

65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.

67. Li Chieh, op. cit., 342.


69. Liang Shu-ming, op. cit., 256.

70. Li Ch'u-ts'ai, op. cit., 55-58.


72. Sun Min-hsün, "Sheng-huo chiao-yü fa-sheng-ti" (The Birth Place of Life-Education), TCNC, 323; Li Chieh, op. cit., 344.


75. Li Chieh, op. cit., 344.


77. Ch'eng Pen-hai, "Fa-yang Hsiao-chuang ching-shen i chi-nien lao-fu-tzu" (Let Us Commemorate Our Teacher by Promoting the Hsiao-chuang Spirit), TCNC, 327.

78. For examples of Hsiao-chuang graduates' missionary-like spirit, see Wu Fu-jen, "Pa p'u-chi min-chu chu-i te tan-tzu tan-ch'i" (To Take Responsibility for Spreading Democratic Education), ibid., 352-353.

79. NTYT, 298; Shen Tseng-shan, "T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng yü Shan-hai Kung-hsüeh-t'uan" (Mr. T'ao Hsing-chih and the Shan-hai Labor-Study-Union), TCNC, 362.

80. T'ao Hsing-chih, T'ao Chih hsing chiao-yü lun-wen-chi (The Collection of T'ao Chih-hsing's Essays on Education), ed. by Fang Yü-yen, (Hong-kong, 1948), 197.

81. Ibid., 198; Li Hsiang-po suggests in his dissertation (1970) that T'ao had shifted his interest "from peasants to factory workers" during the Kung-hsüeh-t'uan movement after his move to Shanghai. This interpretation is, however, mistaken. Certainly, the movement was not, in principle, confined to peasantry alone. Any group, factory workers in particular, were welcome to join the movement because of the similar economic and social problems they shared with the peasants. But the prime target of the movement was still the
improvement of rural life, and the peasants were the central focus of the movement. Therefore, the movement took place in villages mostly. Lee Hiang-po, Rural-Mass Education Movement in China, 1923-1937, (unpublished dissertation, Ohio State University, 1970), 175.

82. TCNC, 362.
83. Ibid., 363.
84. Ibid., 363-364.
85. Meng Ken-ken, "T'ao Hsing-chih hsien-sheng ching-shen pu-ssu" (Immortal Spirit of Mr. T'ao Hsing-chih), Ibid., 368.
86. Liao Shih-cheng, Chung-kuo chih-yeh chiao-yü wen-t'i (The Problems of Vocational Education in China), (Shanghai, 1929), 13.
87. Tiao-ch'a hsiang-ts'un chien-she chi-yao, op. cit., 231; By the "student of work-study program in France" it appears to mean the students who were to go to France as a part of the Chinese labor force which was sent to Europe in the latter part of the First World War. During the war the allies were experiencing a critical shortage of labor and requested China (which had joined the Allies on March 10, 1917) to help with the labor shortage. As a member of the Allied powers, China granted the request, and as a result, about 200,000 Chinese laborers were sent to France.
88. Djung, Lu-dzai, A History of Democratic Education in Modern China, (Shanghai, 1934), 132-133.
89. NTYT, 140.
90. Ibid., 141.
91. During World War I the Chinese rural economy showed an upward trend due to the increased demand of agricultural products from belligerents. After the war, however, namely from about 1920 onward, when European countries recovered their economic power, their demands for Chinese agricultural products decreased sharply. Furthermore, they now began to export their agricultural products to China and sell them at lower prices than Chinese products. This situation caused the Chinese rural economy to suffer a severe slump. For details, refer to Chapter Two of this dissertation.
92. Chiang Wen-yü, "Nung-ts'un kai-chin yü nung-ts'un chiao-yü (Rural Reform and Rural Education)", Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü chih li-lun yü shih-chi (Theories and Practice of Rural Education), ed. by T'ai Hsiang-ch'iu, (Shanghai, 1935), 4. Since its establishment in 1921, the NAAE had had annual meetings first at Chinan in Shantung Province, in 1922, second in Peking in 1923, and third in Nanking in 1924.

94. Although Yen was notorious for not taking sides in warlord struggles, he came to be engaged in the war against Feng Yü-hsiang's army due to both the strong requests of Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu in addition to his own worries about a possible attack on the northern part of the province by Feng's army which then occupied Suiyuan Province and controlled the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. James E. Sheridan, *op. cit.*, 191.


96. Reasons for the withdrawal of the three institutions from the Hsü-kung-ch'iao project were as follows. After its establishment in Nanking the Nationalist Government reorganized Tung-nan University first into the Kiangsu University in April, 1927 and then into the Chung-yang University in June of the same year. This change was effected over many protests and demonstrations of the students who wanted to keep the previous name of the university, "Tung-nan" (Southeastern). The students held that the change of the university's name and the reorganization of the university would result in the cutting off of the school's fine tradition which their predecessors had created. Because of the student protest, school business was halted temporarily, and this situation together with the reorganization of the personnel at the university made it difficult for the departments of agriculture and education to continue their participation in the rural reform project. The NAAE called off its affiliation with the experimental project because it opened its own rural reform institution, the Hsiao-chuang School, in March of the same year. The Association for the Advancement of Mass Education Movement also began a rural reform experiment of its own in Ting-hsien, Hopei Province. See Ch'en P'ei-yüan, "Hsü-kung-ch'iao hsiang-ts'un kai-chin ch'ü liu-nien chi-hua wan-ch'eng hou chih kao-ch'a" (An Opinion on the Completion of Six-Year Plan of Hsü-kung-ch'iao Rural Reform District), *Min-chien*, 1:16 (Dec., 1934), 15-19.

97. For the number of the association's rural reform districts, refer to Section Three of Chapter Two of this dissertation. The Chinese New Agricultural Implements Promotion Center (*Chung-hua hsin-nung-chü ts'ui-hsing-so*) was set up with a dual purpose: (1) to provide agricultural machines and new scientific agricultural implements at a cheap price, and (2) to provide the students of mechanical engineering of the AVE's Chung-hua Vocational School with opportunities to practice their skills learned at the school. The factory manufactured various engines, water pumps, threshing machines, and other small agricultural implements. *HTKK*, 462-465.


100. HTKK, 431.

101. Ibid., 421.

102. Ibid., 421-424.

103. Ibid., 425.

104. For the contents of Sun's self-government work, see Patrick Cavendish, "'The New China' of the Kuomintang," Modern China's Search for a Political Form, ed. by Jack Gray (Oxford University Press, 1969), 155.

105. For collectivistic aspects of Sun Yat-sen's political idea, see Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, trans. by Frank W. Price (Shanghai, 1928), 318.

106. John Dewey came to China in May, 1919, at the joint invitation of Peking University and the Kiangsu Provincial Education Association of which Huang Yen-p'ei was the president. Dewey stayed in China until July, 1921.


110. Ibid., 467.


112. Ibid.

113. HTKK, 477.
114. The villages were Chin-chia-t'ang, Erh-chia-ch'iao, Chao-chia-t'ang, Wang-chia-ch'iao, Ho-chia-t'ang, Chang-chia-t'ang, and Wang-chia-t'ang.

115. The villages were Chao-chia-t'ang, Chin-chia-t'ang, and Wu-chia-hsiang.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. The absolute majority of the reform districts' population was peasants, who were, as other peasants of contemporary China, suffering from poverty, ignorance, disease, oppression, exploitation, and sometimes bandit raids. See Section 3 of Chapter Two. Also details of the problem will be seen in the following chapter, passim.


3. For instance, among local leaders who were ardent in inviting the rural reform experiment to the Hsü-kung-ch'iao area were Fang Huan, a member of the gentry with a lin-kung-sheng title and a member of the former Kiangsu Province Assembly; Ts'ai Wang-chih, an ex-Kiangsu Provincial Assembly man; and Hsü Pai-tsai, Principal of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao Elementary School. A leading figure of the Huang-hsü district, Leng Yü-ch'iü was also a member of gentry. The leader of the Ku-kao-chuang reform district, Ku Chün-i was a professor at Chi-nan University. For this information, see Chang Yu-fa, Ch'ing-chi te li-hsien t'uan-t'i (Constitutionalists of the Ch'ing Period), An Analysis of Groups in the Constitutional Movement, 1895-1911, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 1971), 429; Chiang Wen-yü, "Nung-ts'un kai-chin yü nung-ts'un chiao-yü" (Rural Reform and Rural Education), Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü chih li-lun yü shin-chi (Theories and Practices of Rural Education), ed. by T'ai Shuang-ch'u, (Shanghai, 1935), 7-8; Chiang-su sheng-chien (The Mirror of Kiangsu Province), ed. by Chao Ju-heng, (Shanghai, 1935), Chapt. 3, 69.


5. The Huang-hsiang village consisted entirely of tenant households which tilled lands rented from landlords living in the city of Wu-hsi. Naturally all the members of its village improvement society, including leaders of the society such as Huang Tsu-jui, were peasants. See Ch'in Liu-fang, "Pen-yüan min-chung chiao-yü shih-tao fang-ts'ai chih i shih-li, Huang hsiang" (An Example which Prevented Natural Calamity Under This Academy's Mass Education Guidance--The Village of Huang-hsiang), CYMC, 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1585; For Kao-chang-an, see Chu Jo-chi, "San-nien lai te Kao-chang-an" (The Three Years of Kao-chang-an District), ibid., 1605; For Chou-lung-an, Chiang Ho, "Pen yüan shih-shi min-chung cheng-chih chiao-yü chi i shih-li" (An Actual Example of Political Education of the Masses by This Institution), ibid., 1777-1778.
6. Occupational data of the Hsiao-chuang village is not available. However, when a water shortage problem arose at one of the local villages in Hsiao-chuang area, T'ao Hsing-chih called a village meeting to solve the problem. At this time, those who gathered were all peasants, and the meeting was chaired by a teen-age student. From this fact it can be conjectured that most of the villagers were peasants. T'ao Hsing-chih, "Sheng-huo chih chiao-yü" (Life Is Education), Wei-chih-shih chieh-chi (The 'False-Knowledge Class'), (Peking, 1950), 24-25.


9. Ibid., 461-462. The hsiang-chen Self-government Enforcement Law was promulgated by the Nationalist Government in October, 1929. According to the law, lin, the lowest local administrative unit, would be formed with 5 households, lü with 5 lin, fang with 20 lü, and ch'ü with 10 fang, and fang and ch'ü were to have public offices and peoples' meetings, respectively. The general meeting of ch'ü was to be held once a year, and fang general meeting twice a year. Kan Yü-yüan, Hsiang-chen min-chung chiao-yü (Rural Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1935), 220; "Sina Gensei," (The China Situation), Jijikaisetsuhiyatsuka yoran (An Encyclopedic Handbook of Contemporary Affairs), (Heihansha, Tokyo, 1937), 200.


13. Ibid., 463, 469.


16. Ibid., 463, 460.

17. Ibid.


21. To take Chou-lung-an village as an example, village leaders who promoted the village reform experiment were Ko Tsu-tsai, Jen Hung-tsai, Yen Shao-ling, and Yen-Chung-ying. The former two were merchants, the third a local teacher, and the fourth, a peasant and teacher.

22. Cheng Shao-yüan, "Wo-ti min-chung chiao-yü ching-yen-t'an" (My Experiences in Mass Education), CYMC, 4:6 (Feb., 1933), 1026.


27. "P'u-chi i-ch'u min-chung chiao-yü shih-yen chih fa-tuan, Hui-pei ch'ü," (The Beginning of Mass Education Propagation Experiment in A District By This Academy: The Hui-pei District), CYMC 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1536.


33. Chiang Ho, *op. cit.*, 1774.


35. Same as note 5.

37. Chiang Ho, op. cit., 1776.

38. Ibid., 1774.

39. For instance, according to Kung Hsüeh-hsiung, the Pei-hsia reform experiment was launched with a plan and organization similar to those of the Hui-pei district. See NTYT, 135 and 139.

40. HTKK, 421-422.


42. For instance, the following were initial amounts of the AVE districts, respectively: For Hsu-kung-ch'iao: 2,000 yüan; Huang-hsu: 2,600 yüan; Shan-jen-ch'iao: 5,000 yüan; and Ku-kao-chuang: 1,200 yüan. See Ch'en Pei-yüan, op. cit., 15; HTKK, 445, 452, and 457.

43. Ch'en Pei-yüan, 15; HTKK, 431 and 445.

44. HTKK, 424-425.

45. Ibid., 425.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., 8-9.

49. NTYT, 146-147.

50. For Ts'ai Wang-chih's social status, see Chang P'eng-yüan, Li-hsien-pa yü Hsin-hai ko-ming (Constitutionalists and the Hsin-hai Revolution), (Taipei, 1969), 260. In this work Ts'ai's name was recorded in the list of Kiangsu Provincial Assemblymen as Ts'ai Huang. For this name see Chiang Wen-yü, op. cit., 7.

51. The total amount of reform expenditures in 1933 was 25,580 yüan. Of the total sum, the AVE's assistance accounted for 1,500 yüan, the hsien government subsidies, 9,100 yüan, and contributions from private supporters and loans from banks the rest of the money. HTKK, 429; also see Ch'en P'ai-yüan, op. cit., 15.

52. See note 3.

53. Chiang-su sheng-chien, op. cit., 69; for Huang-hsü district, see HTKK, 445-447; for Shan-jen-ch'iao, ibid., 453-456; and for Ku-kao-chuang, ibid., 456-459.
54. For the organization of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao village improvement society, see ibid., 431, and for the organization of the Huang-hsü's, ibid., 444.

55. TCNC, 197-201.

56. Ibid., 199-200.


58. The "little teacher" system was a method of using advanced students to teach other students or illiterate adults. Details of this system will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

59. Ku Mei, op. cit., 79.

60. TCLC, 200.

61. Ibid., 201. It is difficult for us living in the 1970's to have an actual feeling concerning T'ao's budget size. However, compared to AVE annual expenditures in Hsü-kung-ch'iao district in 1933, which totalled 25,500 yüan (refer to the preceding chapter), it is certain that T'ao's estimate was made on a considerably more frugal standard.

62. Villages in which KHT were established included Hsiao-ch'ang, Hung-miao, Chao-ch'ing-hsiang, Shang-chia-ch'iao, Shen-chia-lu, Hsia-chia-che, and Meng-chia-mu-ch'iao. The KHT at Meng-chia-mu-ch'iao, a Shan-hai KHT, functioned as the headquarters of the other village KHT. Ku Mei, op. cit., 79.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. The COE divided peasant life into the three realms of culture, economy, and politics, and devised six general reform programs, relating to civic training, educational and cultural improvement, health education, house keeping education, spare-time education, and recreation. In a similar vein, the Hsiao-chuang group considered knowledge, production, and organization as important areas in peasant life to be developed, and endeavored to improve them through the following six reform training programs: self-defense, production, science, literacy, civil rights, and population control. The AVE categorized aspects of peasant life needing reform into three main realms--culture, economic, and organization--and carried out various reform programs within each of the three. See Kao Chien-ssu, "Chiang-su sheng ko-hsien tan-wei hsiang-ts'un min-chung chiao-yü p'u-chi pan-fa ts'ao-an" (A Draft for the Method of Propagating Rural Mass Education Movement in Each Hsien in Kiangsu), CYMC, 3:8 (April, 1932), 1473; TCLC, 197; HTKK, 422-425.


3. HTKK, 442.

4. Ibid., 449.

5. CHIL, 70.

6. Chu Jo-ch'i, "San-nien-lai te Kao-chang-an" (The Three Years of Kao-chang-an), CYMC, 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1621.

7. HTKK, 439.

8. Ibid.


10. HTKK, 449, 454.

11. Ibid., 454.


14. Ibid.; In resolving the problem of student drop-outs the measures taken by the Huang-hsiang district of the COE are particularly interesting. Through the resolution of the village improvement society of the district, the reformers set up the following regulations as preventive measures against drop-outs: (1) all the villagers between 12 and 20 years of age shall enroll in the mass school, (2) school time shall be selected so as not to interfere with farm work, (3) the mass school shall not collect money, and all textbooks will be supplied by the school, and (4) those students who miss class for more than one week without proper reason will be charged a three chüeh (0.3 yüan) "ignorant-person fine" (yü-jen chüan) by the hsien police bureau, which will be used for the local beneficiary fund. Kan To-pai, "San-nien-lai te Huang-hsiang shih-yen-ch'ü" (The Three Years of Huang-hsiang Experimental District), CYMC, 3:9.10 (June, 1932), 1958.


17. TCLC, 122.


19. Ibid., 770.


23. CHIL, 66.


25. HTKK, 442.


29. HTKK, 456.


32. Ch'en Liu-fang, "Pen-yüan min-chung chiao-yü p'o-chieh nung-min mi-hsin chih i shih-li" (An Actual Example of the Elimination of Superstition Among Peasants by This Institution), CYMC 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1797-1807; also see Chiang Ho, op. cit., 1783.

33. Ibid.

34. Chiang Ho, op. cit., 1782; Kan To-pai, op. cit., 1950-51.


36. Chiang Ho, 1782-1783.

37. Hsiang-min-chiao, 277-278.


40. NTYY, 294.

41. HTKK, 421.

42. For instance, the Hui-pei district had three mass tea houses, one for each sub-district (i.e., Mei-ching, An-ti-li, and Hsi-chang). As of 1934, mass tea houses at the former two sub-districts had ten Chinese and western musical instruments, respectively, and the latter sub-district was in the midst of preparation. HTKK, 406; Huang-hsiang District was also said to have several musical instruments at the village tea house. Kan To-pai, 1961.

43. "Shih-yen pao-kao Pei-hsia san-nien," op. cit., 771: In the district of Pei-hsia, seventeen songs were taught. They included party songs, the song of literacy movement, the song of cooperative movement, the song of hoe, the song of selling cotton, the song of labor, the song of the wide road, and the song of a ream, etc.; At
Hsiao-chuang, T'ao Hsing-chih himself wrote many songs about the life of the peasantry. Among them, the Song of Hoe (Ch'u-t'ou-ko) was the most famous.

44. Hsiang-min-chiao. 283-284.

45. NTYT, 293; For a more detailed description, see Li Ch'u-ts'ai's P'o-Hsiao (An Exposure of Hsiao-chuang School), (Shanghai, 1934), 71-74.

46. The Kiangsu reconstructionists used the term "cheng-chih chiao-yü" (literally political education) for describing both civic and political education. According to the definition in a dictionary of political science, the term "political training" refers to education carried on for the masses of the people in a country which stresses strong government leadership in order to change the people's thought patterns to suit political purposes and ideology of the government. Political education is thus largely practiced in totalitarian states (e.g., fascist or Communist countries). On the other hand, civic education means the education which provided political knowledge essential to the people as sound citizens. What the Kiangsu reconstructionists attempted to do in the "cheng-chih chiao-yü" was certainly different from the political education in the above sense. It also was not merely civic education in scope and content. They not only taught the people about rights and duties of citizens the government, but also tried to develop the people's organizational capacities, which was essential for them to improve their social status, social reform spirit, and national consciousness. Considering the development of these qualities important to prepare the people for constructing a new China the reconstructionists tried to change the people's consciousness through such an education. This seems to be the reason why the reconstructionists called their education "political education." However, since "cheng-chih chiao-yü" was on the whole closer in content to civic education than to political education mentioned above, we will here use the term civic education for the reconstructionists' program of cheng-chih chiao-yü. For the definition of political education, see Seijigakujiten (A Dictionary of Political Science), comp. by Heihansha, (Tokyo, 1964), 726-727; for civic education, see ibid., 751.

47. Sun Wen, "Ti wu-chiang min-tsu chu-i" (The Fifth Lecture, On the Principle of Nationalism), San-min chu-i (Three Principle of the People), trans. by Andō Hikotarō, (Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1975), 106.


52. NTYT, 293, 292.

53. T'ao Hsing-chih, "Sheng-huo chih chiao-yü" (Life and Education), Wei-chih-shih chieh-chi (The False Knowledge Class), (Peking, 1950), 24-25.

54. Chu Jo-ch'i, op. cit., 1607.


56. HTKK, 435, 450.

57. CHIL, 68.

58. Ibid., 64.


60. Ch'iang Ho, op. cit., 1775.

61. Kan To-pai, 1950; Chu Jo-ch'i, 1609, HTKK, 435, and CHIL, 68.

62. HTKK, 440, 450, and 458.

63. Li Chien, "Wo ho Hsing-chih shih" (My Teacher Hsing-chih and I), TCNC, 338.

64. Hsiang-min-chiao, 253.

65. NTYT, 293.

66. Kan To-pai, 1953.

67. NTYT, 137.

68. HTKK, 406.

69. NTYT, 151.

70. Fang Yü-yen, Sheng-huo chiao-yü kan-shu (A Brief Discussion of Life-Education), (Shanghai, 1934), 70.

71. Kan To-pai, 1953-1954; Chu Jo-ch'i, 1619; for the price of raw silk, see China Industrial Handbook, Kiangsu, Comp. by Bureau of Trade, Ministry of Industry, 1933, 215.
According to an investigation carried out by the T'ung-shan Mass Education Hall in 1934, agricultural implements used in the villages around the hall were all outmoded ones which had been used for hundreds of years without changes. Even such implements were in short supply. For instance, in a village of 227 households three households on the average shared one ox, nine households one cart, and five households one plough. The situation in other places in the province was similar. Those who did not have agricultural implements borrowed them in exchange for providing agricultural labor to the owners. In some cases, landlords loaned implements to the peasants with interest payments attached. See Hu Shi-p'ing, "Hsü-hai nung-ts'un ping-t'ai te ching-chi kuan" (Sick Economic Situation in the Villages of Hsü-hai Area), Nung-yeh chou-pao (Agricultural Weekly), 3:47 (Nov., 1934), 995; Yü Lung-chiang, "Su-yang nung-ts'un niao-k'an" (A Bird's Eye View of Su-yang Villages), Nung-ts'un ching-chi (Rural Economics), 2:11 (Sept., 1935), 113; Ku Mei, Chung-kuo nung-ts'un ching-chi wen-t'i (Problems of Chinese Rural Economy), (Shanghai, 1935), 244-245.

For example, the Pei-hsia district had four rural handicraft production and marketing (or transportation) cooperatives. They produced an average of 369 fang (123 square yards) of matting per month. See CHIL, 63.

Credit cooperatives are founded for mutual financial aid and originated in Germany. These differed from the earlier banks in that the persons to whom loans could be granted had to be members of the association, paying regular monthly contributions. They thus


87. "Chiang Wen-yü hsien-sheng yü tui-t'an" (Dialogues with Mr. Chiang Wen-yü), *Ts'un-chih* (Village Government Monthly), 1:2 (June, 1930), 3-11.


90. To take an example, in the Hsü-kung-ch'iao district, a gentry member gathered twelve peasants, which was the minimum number of applications needed, and organized a credit cooperative. He borrowed 1,200 yüan from the Agricultural Bank in the name of the cooperative, that is, 100 yüan per member, and distributed 60 yüan to each member while using the remaining amount of 540 yüan for himself (1,300=60x11+540). "Ko-ti hsiang-ts'un yün-tung hsiao-hsi" (News About Rural Movements in Various Places), *Ts'un-chih*, 1:3 (July, 1930), 1-3.

91. Because of the responsibility to banks and the necessity of keeping each credit agency without failure, the rural reformers were particularly cautious to ensure that the loaned money would not be used for other than agricultural purposes and that the loaned money was paid in time. *Hsiang-min-chiao*, 188-196.

92. *CHIL*, 54, 63, 70.


94. *HTKK*, 454; *ibid.*, 409; *CHIL*, 69.


96. *CHIL*, 63, 69, 70.


98. *CHIL*, 54; *HTKK*, 441.

99. Chu Jo-ch'i, 1618.
100. After examining rent rates in five provinces including three places in Kiangsu, Buck and Ch'iao Chi-ming concluded that the rent rate in the areas investigated should be reduced by 22.1 per cent in order for it to be fair between landlord and tenant. Tanaka Chuo, "Kuo-min ko-ming yü nung-ts'un wen-t'i" (National Revolution and Rural Problems), Trans. into Chinese by Li Yu-wen, Ts'un-chih, 2:1 (Feb., 1932), 5.

101. The high rent rate was also recognized by the KMT government as a distressing factor in Chinese peasant life. Thus the Joint Conference of the Central Executive Committee and Provincial Representatives held in October, 1927, passed the so-called "Twenty-five Per Cent Rent Reduction" Resolution as a rent relief measure. This resolution was to be put into practice in each province in due time. But after the completion of the Northern Expedition, provinces which passed statutes to such effect annulled the statutes in less than a year. For details, see NYZL, Vol. 3, 301-306.


103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.; Chao Wan, "Pei-hsia te shih-yen" (The Experiment of Pei-hsia District), CYMC, 4:7 (March, 1933), 1306.

105. NYTV, 294.

106. CHIL, 62, 68, HTKK, 436, 439; Hsiang-min-chiao, 134.

107. CHIL, 63.

108. Ibid., 64, 68.

109. Ibid., 64.

110. Ibid., 6.

111. HTTK, 436, 459.


113. "Shih-yen wei-sheng mo-fan ch'üi kung-tso kai-yao" (The Outline of the Work of Model Sanitation Experimental District), CYMC, 2:9.10 (June, 1931), 1-8; Hsiang-min-chiao, 151-152. The custom of discarding coffins in the open space was due to the villagers' belief in geomancy.
114. HTKK, 446.
116. HTKK, 436, 446.
117. Tuan Feng-yü, op. cit., 5.
118. Hisang-min-chiao, 153.
119. HTKK, 456.
120. NTYT, 293; Li Ch'u-ts'ai, op. cit., 71-74.
121. HTKK, 446.
122. Chu Jo-ch'i, op. cit., 1606.
124. Chiang Ho, op. cit., 1782.
125. Kan To-pai, op. cit., 1584-1586.
127. To take the Hsü-kung-ch'iao district as an example, out of more than 130 reform projects planned in all the reform areas for the six-year experimental period, only ten or so were not achieved. See the table in HTKK, 435-437.
128. See NTYT, 130, HTKK, 391, ibid., 430.
129. HTKK, 400.
130. Ibid., 478.
131. TCLC, 122.
132. Ch'en Li-chiang, op. cit., 459.
133. Tuan Feng-yu, op. cit., 4.
134. Ibid.


137. Li Ch'u-ts'ai, op. cit., 97.

138. Ch'en Li-chiang, op. cit., 462.

139. Chu Jo-ch'i, 1623; NTYT, 131-134; Chao Wan, op. cit., 1309; and Chiang Ho, op. cit., 1787.

140. Ibid.


142. Chiang Ho, 1788.

143. Chao Wen, 1309.

144. Ku Mei, Min-chung chiao-yü hsin-tung-hsiang (New Trends in Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1946), 64.

145. Same as note 139.

146. Ch'in Liu-fang, op. cit., 753.


149. CHIL, 48.

150. Ibid.

151. T'ao suggested as functions of the committee the following: (1) The committee would collect population and other related data through yearly surveys, establish a population increase rate that the nation should maintain, and make the whole nation observe the announced rate; (2) It would study and propagate birth control methods throughout the country; and (3) It would persuade the people to marry after 25 years of age for men and 20 for women and to have the first child after five years of marriage and the second when the first entered elementary school. The
maximum number of children per family should be restricted to two regardless of their sex. TCLC, 114-115.

152. Ch'in Liu-fang, op. cit., 785.

153. Chiang Ho, op. cit., 1788.


155. NTYT, 134.

156. Ibid., 134; Chiang Ho, 1786.

157. According to Sun Yat-sen's theory of three revolutionary stages, it was only during the stage of constitutional government that an elected national assembly was to be formed. During the period of political tutelage, in which Kan Yü-wei was writing the report, there was no people's representative body elected by the people. Hence, it is evident that by the "legislature" Kan was referring to the National Assembly which would come later in the period of constitutional rule. For a concise explanation of the theory of three revolutionary stages, see Patrick Cavandish, "The 'New China' of the Kuomintang," Modern China's Search For a Political Form, ed. by Jack Gray, Oxford University Press, 1969, 155; For the question of a people's assembly during the period of tutelage, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, 1912-1949, Stanford University Press, 1970, 278-279.

158. Kan To-pai, 1965; NTYT, 134.


161. NTYT, 134; Ch'in Liu-fang, 755; T'ung Yun-chih, op. cit., 726-727.

162. Chiang Wen-yü, "Chiang Wen-yü hsien-sheng te i-chien" (Mr. Chiang Wen-yü's Opinion), Hsiang-ts'un chiao-yü chih-li-lun yü shih-chi (Theories and Practice of Rural Education), ed. by T'ai Shuang-ch'u, (Shanghai, 1935), 11.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII


7. *HTKK*, 530; CNHC, preface and 1.


20. HTKK, 531.


23. Ka Yü-yüan, Hsiang-ts'un min-chung chiao-yü (Rural Mass Education), (Shanghai, 1934), 222.

24. HTKK, 532-535.


27. Ibid., 536-542; Mei Ssu-p'ing, op. cit., 21.


29. HTKK, 554.


31. Ibid., 68, 75.

32. HTKK, 554-556.

33. Huang Ho, op. cit., 33.

34. Chiang-ning hsien was formed by merging two hsien, namely Shang-yüan, the northern part of the contemporary Chiang-ning, and Chiang-ning, in 1912. See CSC, Vol. 1, 3.
35. Huang Ho, *op. cit.*, 40; CNHC, "ts'ai-cheng" (finance), 2-3.

36. Regarding corrupt practices on the part of the ts'ui-cheng-li, see Huang Ho, *op. cit.*, 38-48.


39. CNHC, 4.


41. CNHC, 5; Ts'ai-cheng kai-ko, 153.

42. Ts'ai-cheng kai-ko, 160.


44. HTKK, 566-567.

45. CNHC, 3.

46. HTKK, 562.


48. HTKK, 547.


50. CNHC, 4.

51. HTKK, 567-568.


55. HTKK, 568.


59. Ibid., 577.
60. Ibid., 578.
61. CNHC, 4; Mei Ssu-p'ing, op. cit., 22.
62. HTKK, 591.
64. Ibid., 287-288; HTKK, 582-583.
67. HTKK, 587-588; Amano Motonotsuke, Shina nōson zakki (Miscellaneous Writings About Chinese Villages), (Tokyo, 1942), 139.
68. HTKK, 588.
69. Ibid., 543-544; CNHC, 2.
71. The illiteracy rate of Huang-hsiang village was 67.81 of the whole population of the village, and that of Kao-chang-an village, 75% of all the adults of the village. See Kan To-pai, "San-nien-lai chih Huang-hsiang shih-yen ch'ü," (The Three Years of Huang-hsiang Experimental District), CYMC, 3:9.10 (June, 1932), 1958-1961; Chu Jo-hsi, "San-nien-lai te Kao-chang-an" (The Three Years of Kao-chang-an), Ibid. 4:9.10 (June, 1933), 1621-1622.
74. Ibid.
75. Despite its promise to provide self-government training for the people during the period of tutelage, the Nanking government was in actuality reluctant to do so. Its tutelage program was never effectively put into practice during the Nanking period. See James R. Townsand, Political Participation in Communist China, University of California Press, 1969, 31. Chiang Kai-shek stated that it was both a privilege and a duty for all citizens to join the KMT or the San Min-Chu I Youth Corps, the party's youth auxiliary. He also said that "if there was no Kuomintang, there would be no Revolution." See Ibid., 32-33.
76. Mei Ssu-p'ing, *op. cit.*, 22.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Kao Yang, Ch'en Li-chiang, Yü Ching-t'ang, and Chao Wan, "Wo-men jen-shih chung chih hsiang-ts'un chien-shie wen-t'i" (Problems of Rural Reconstruction Which We Understand), CYMC 5:1 (Sept., 1933), 29; Preface 5-6, HTKK.


3. Preface 8, HTKK.


6. Cheng Shao-yüan, "Wo-te min-chung chiao-yü ching-yen-t'an" (My Experiences in Mass Education), CYMC 4:6 (Feb., 1933), 1032.


13. TCLC, 122-123.

14. Kan To-pai (Yù-yüan), "San-nien-lai te Huang-hsiang shih-yen ch'u" (The Three Years of the Huang-hsiang Experimental District), CYMC 3:9.10 (June, 1932), 1948.
15. For example, seeing good results of the Hsü-kung-ch'iao experiment, the people in the neighboring villages in Ch'ing-pu, K'un-shan, and Chia-t'ing petitioned the Hsü-kung-ch'iao Village Improvement Society to admit their villages to the experimental district. See NTYT, 145-146.

16. Quoted from Philip A. Kuhn, "T'ao Hsing-chih, 1891-1946, An Educational Reformer," Papers on China, v. 13 (Dec., 1959), Harvard University, 184. By this term Mr. Kuhn meant a reform approach which sought to influence the total economic, social, and political life of the village through example and persuasion. Here, rural schools were to function as a dynamic agent of control and manipulation in the countryside.

17. For instance, the AVE's six-year plan for the Hsü-kung-ch'iao reform experiment was completed in 1934; the COE's three-year experimental programs in Huang-hsiang and Kao-chang-an districts were completed in 1933 and 1934, respectively. The completion of these experiments can be viewed as the completion of the first phase of reconstruction effort by the AVE and the COE. Based on the experience in these districts, both the AVE and the COE enlarged their reform projects in the same districts or prepared other experiments in other areas. Also, as we have seen in Chapter Seven, many discussions took place among the reformers regarding various issues in rural reconstruction.

18. There were more radical peasant movements prior to the Nanking period such as the peasant movement in the Hai-feng area launched by P'eng P'ai, and the one sponsored by the Canton Nationalist Government. But they were carried out more as a part of a political movement rather than as a social movement. Furthermore, they were discontinued soon after the establishment of the Nanking Government, and thus they did not develop into a national movement.


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GLOSSARY

Anhwei
An-ti-li
An-ting
chang
Chang Chien
Ch'ang-chou
Chang Chung-jen
Chang Hsin-i
Chang Hsueh-liang
Chang Nei-yen
Ch'ang-pei-t'uan
Chang Tso-lin
Chang Wei-ming
Chao-chia-t'ang
Chao-ching-hsiang
Chao-sheng wen-t'i
Chao Shu-yü
Chao Wan
chen
chen-chang
Ch'en Cheng-mo
Ch'en Chi-mi
chen-chiang
Ch'en Kung-po
Ch'en Kuo-fu
Ch'en Li-chiang
Ch'en Tu-hsiu
cheng-chiao ho-i
cheng-fu ssu-chang
Ch'eng Pen-hai
Cheng Shao-yüan
Ch'i Hsieh-yüan
chi-chung sheng-huo
chi-lü-pu
Chi-nan ta-hsüeh
chi-nien-chou
Chi-shu-yen
Ch'i-tung
Chiang Kai-shek
Chiang Meng-lin
Chiang-nan
Chiang-ning
Chiang-su i-wu chiao-yü
chi-ch'eng-hui
Chiang-su-sheng
chiao-yü-hui
Chiang-su ta-hsüeh min-chung
chiao-yü hsüeh-yüan
Chiang-su sheng-li chiao-yü
hsüeh-yüan
Chiang-su ts'ai-fu chia
tien-hsia
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Hui-pei
hui p'eng-yu ch'ü
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Hung-yung chiao-yü chi-chin
huo-tung shih-yeh
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i-wu chiao-yü
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kai-liang chu-i
k'ang-chung-tui
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Kan Yü-yüan
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Kao-ch'iao
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Kao-yü
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ko-ming-hua
ko-ming p'ing-lun
Ko Tzu-ts'ai
Ku Chu-t'ung
Ku Chün-i
Ku-kao-chuang
Ku Mei
ku-ting shih-yeh
kuan-li chung-jen te shih
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Kuang-hua
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kuei-chu-jen
Kuei-lin
kuei-shu
kung-an-pu
Kung-hsüeh-t'uan
kung-i-ch'üan
kung-min teng-chi
Kuo-min-chün
Kuo Ping-wen
Kuo-tzu-chien

高滏橋
高郵
耕牛會
革命教育
革命化
革命評論
戈子才
顧祝同
顧君義
顧高莊
古樺
固定事業
管理眾人的事
慶祥
光華
櫃
櫃主任
桂林
窖
公安部
工學團
公益捐
公民登記
國民軍
郭秉文
國子監
K'un-shan
Lan-chi
lang
lau-nung hsüeh-yüan
lao-tso shih-tzu chuan-hsiu-ko
Leng Yü-ch'iu
li
li-chang
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Li Ch'u-ts'ai
Li-hsin-lu
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Li Ta-chao
li-yung hou-sheng
Liang Shu-ming
Liang Yao-tzu
Liao Chung-k'ai
Lien-ts'un
lin
ling-sheng
Liu Ch'eng-hsün
liu-sheng wen-t'i
Liu Ta-chün
liu-tung chiao-hsüeh
liu-tung chiao-shih

豈山
關絡
琅
勞農學院
勞作師資專修科
冷禦秋
里
里長
李企常
李景漢
李楚村
襄新路
禮社鎮
李大釗
利用厚生
梁漱溟
梁耀祖
廖仲凱
駱村
廖生
劉承勳
留生問題
劉大均
流動教學
流動教室
lù
lu-hsing-t'uan
Lü Hsun
Lu Yung-hsiang
Ma Lü-hsien
Mei-ching
Mei Ssu-p'ing
Meng-chia-mu-ch'iao
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Min-chien
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Nan-ching kao-teng shih-fan hsüeh-hsiao
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Nan-t'ung
Nei-cheng-fu
neng-li
Ning-kuei

閣
旅行团
魯迅
盧永祥
馬偕賢
梅津
梅思平
孟元橋
米鑾
民間
民衆講演會
民衆教育館
民衆教育運動
民衆學校
民衆化
民衆報
民衆運動場
民生主義
民团
毛澤東
南京高等師範學校
南門
南通
内政府
能力
掌握
po-te chüan
P'u-en
pu-tu-shu-fen
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Shih-pao
Shih-yen hsiang-ts'un shih-fan
hsüeh-hsiao
shen-shih-p'ai
shih-tzu yün-tung
shih-yeh pu
shih-yen-ch'ü
shih-yen hsüeh-hsiao

箔特捐
傅恩
不讀書人
散
三民主義
散砲
三等九分法
山窮水盡
山海
善人橋
山田
商團
上元縣
沈家樓
生計
生活教育
生死關頭
實習生活
士農工商
時報
試驗農村師範
學校
紳士派
識字運動
事業部
試驗區
試驗學校
shih-yung chiao-yü
shih-yung chiao-yü ssu-hsiang
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Su-chou
Sun Ch'üan-fang
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Wu-chia-t'ang
Wu-chin
Wu-ho-hsiang
Wu-hsi
Wu P'ei-fu
Wu-sung
Wu Wen-hui
Wu-yang hsien
ya-tsu
yang
Yang-hsiang
Yeh Ch'u-ch'ang
Yen Hsi-shan
Yen Hsin-che
Yen Hsiao-ling
yen-t'ang
Yen-tzu-ch'i
Yen Yang-ch' u (James)
yin-hu
yin-ti chih-i
Yü Chia-chü
Yü Ching-t' ang
Yü Jen-sheng
yü-ming wu-shih chih Chiang-ning
yu nung-yeh yin-fa kung-shang yeh
yü-t' ien
yüan
yuan-kuei
Yüan Hsi-t' ao
yü-jen-chüan