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BRITISH AND CANADIAN IMMIGRATION
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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY

MAY 1977

By

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ABSTRACT

Always among the most numerous groups of immigrants to the United States, until 1969, the British and Canadians seldom claimed the attention of historians, just as they caused little discussion among the American people generally. Sharing a common language and closeness of culture with Americans, the British and Canadians remained unhyphenated—they were America's "invisible immigrants."

A number of important studies on the British immigrant, if not the Canadian, do exist, but they are concerned with Britons' experiences and their contribution to the American mosaic during America's "century of immigration," the one hundred years from 1815 to 1914. The purpose of this study was to extend the record of British and Canadian immigration beyond the statistical reports of government departments since the hiatus of World War I and to present an interpretive commentary on the significance of these two streams of immigration—to the sending countries; to the receiving country; and to a sample of individual immigrants themselves.

It became apparent in studying British parliamentary debates and British periodical literature that emigration to the United States was not a matter of much concern after 1914. The United States was a distant third receiver of British immigrants, after Canada and Australia. In the case of Canada, the reverse was true. Canada, though a major receiver of immigrants—encouraging especially those from the British Isles—was unable to compete with the United States in providing economic opportunities for its own population. The perennial drift to the south
of its native-born men and women caused concern to government officials, businessmen, educators, and others.

From the viewpoint of the United States, British—and English-speaking members of the British Commonwealth—were highly desirable immigrants since acculturation presented no problems. Moreover, these immigrants were usually better educated than other immigrants and possessed professional, technical, trade and other skills which accrued to the benefit of American industry.

Primary sources such as letters, diaries, and other manuscripts utilized in studying nineteenth-century immigration were not found in public depositories for the period since World War I. The author therefore substituted a questionnaire survey to personalize the immigrant experience. Data was collected by mail, telephone and personal interview from the experiences of 244 British and 220 Canadian immigrants residing within a four-state sampling area of California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.

The questionnaire and follow-up interviews elicited information on immigrants' motives coming to the United States, choice of destination and subsequent experiences. Data was also collected on immigrants' age, sex, marital status, education and usual occupation at time of immigration. Replies indicated that the economic motive predominated and that a large majority saw themselves as successful in their accomplishments. On questions of social and cultural enrichment the British were conspicuously ambivalent. Nevertheless, the majority fully expected to remain permanently in the United States. Approximately 70 percent of the adult British interviewed indicated they were or would become American citizens. Canadians, because of their North
American background, experienced no comparable cultural shock but often remained uncommitted to permanent residence in the United States. Canada was physically close—with opportunities to maintain associations more readily than Britons. Only 60 percent answered affirmatively regarding naturalization. Canadians and Britons both revealed feelings of guilt about leaving their homelands—Canadians because their country needed trained men and women to assure its development; Britons because they felt uncomfortable at deserting what was sometimes referred to as a sinking ship.

For all their invisibility and relative ease of assimilation, however, the British and Canadians found they could not reject their past absolutely. Their children achieved that state of fusion and harmony with their environment that their parents seldom found.
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Chapter I

Introduction

Our American culture, our speech, our laws are basically Anglo-Saxon in origin, and therefore I have not included a history of the millions who came from England to the United States. It is interesting to point out, however, that although the British have contributed most to the American culture they have been studied least. The immigration of Englishmen from 1870 to 1890, for example, exceeded the Scandinavian total for these decades, and probably equalled the German immigration.


Probably the reason the British have been studied least of the several ethnic groups which made up America is that they are not regarded as "foreign" by most Americans. The common language, English, at once exempts Britons from alien status in all but a legal sense and it even confers upon them a certain deference not normally shown among the native-born to one another. Many white Americans, it appears, are proud to claim British heritage and none may be more aware of this than the immigrant groups represented by Carl Wittke, Oscar Handlin, Laura Fermi, or Louis Adamic. The British, alone of alien nationals in the United States, are not distinguished by an identifying prefix. Hence, qualified citizenship in a social and cultural sense is a fact of life for the non-British immigrant.

Despite Charlotte Erikson's characterization of nineteenth-century English and Scottish immigrants as "invisible immigrants,"¹ several

scholars of immigration have discovered them and produced useful studies on various aspects of British immigration. Besides Erikson, Stanley Johnson, Rowland Berthoff, Oscar Winther and Wilbur Shepperson have contributed to the field. To date, however, only Berthoff continued the chronology of British immigration to the United States beyond 1914, but even his British Immigrants to Industrial America, 1790-1950, contained only two brief references to the post-1914 period.

European immigration to America, in general, of course, received much less attention from the public, their legislators, and scholars in the years following implementation of the restrictionist immigration laws of the 1920's. Although immigrant associations in America continued to press for amendments and quota revisions to benefit the ethnic groups they represented there was little likelihood of the debate being resumed. The provisions of the immigration laws of 1921 and 1924 made it clear that unrestricted immigration belonged to history. The final victory of the restrictionist lobby, after forty years of petition, came because the majority of the American people appeared to favor it and because Republican Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge did not withhold their approval. Never again would annual admissions to the United States exceed one million persons, as happened in 1905, 1906, 1907, 1910, 1913, and 1914.2

Great Britain was more fortunate than most countries in having an overseas empire to which she could export excess or unwanted population.

Though Canada, Australia and New Zealand had all become self-governing dominions by the beginning of the twentieth century, they still looked principally to the Mother Country for their population needs and they vied with one another for the favors of British emigrants. Canada, especially, was flushed with excitement over the prospect of huge agricultural and industrial expansion at the turn of the century. After the Boer insurrection was subdued in 1902, South Africa received substantial numbers of British migrants, while Australia and New Zealand were again attracting large numbers of immigrants by 1907, recovering from a prolonged lag of interest. The Dominions together attracted more British immigrants than did the United States for the first time in 1905, and continued to do so until 1915. Canada became the prime destination for the British in 1910, followed by the United States.³

This was the heyday of Canada's immigration. Since 1896, Canada had received a net gain in migration between herself and the United States for the first time in her history, an interlude which lasted until 1915. In 1911, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Canada's Prime Minister, was moved to assert that even as the nineteenth century had belonged to the United States, the twentieth century belonged to Canada.

Because of their north American habitat and close associations through family ties, business and cultural interests, Canadian immigrants were even less visible, even less distinctive than British immigrants. Americans had no reason to limit the influx of Canadians, although some New Englanders were becoming worried at the growing alien

population of French Canadians from Quebec and the Maritime Provinces.\textsuperscript{4} Here, as in Texas and California, the availability of cheap foreign labor was welcomed on the one hand and despised on the other for cultural and religious differences.

Canadians were welcomed in most places in the United States and regarded by Americans as different from themselves in merely superficial ways. Curiosity remained as to why Canadians seemed to prefer British rule to equal status within the Union, long after the Dominion became self-governing. If Canadians remained subjects of the King, or Queen of England, how could they truly be free and independent? Though military conquest of Canada was never seriously voiced by public officials after the Civil War, many Americans confidently predicted or continued to believe that Canada would, sooner or later, be ready to join the Union.\textsuperscript{5} Thus, while Canadians were sometimes thought of as rather obtuse in their separatism, they were not generally thought of as foreigners, with the exception of the French.

Most of the literature published on the subject of Canadian immigration to the United States since 1920 has appeared in periodical form, mainly in Canadian magazines. Leon Truesdell's \textit{The Canadian Born in the United States}, a census tract published in 1943, analyzed the statistics of the Canadian element in the population of the United States, while Marcus Lee Hansen and John Bartlett Brebner's \textit{The Mingling}

\textsuperscript{4}R. C. Dexter, "Gallic War in Rhode Island," \textit{The Nation}, August 29, 1923, pp. 215-16.

\textsuperscript{5}W. A. Deacon, "Will Canada Ever Come In?" \textit{American Mercury}, November, 1925, pp. 314-21.
of the Canadian and American Peoples (1940), is concerned, as implied, with two-way migration across the border. The latter interprets census statistics from 1850 to 1930. Two-way migration, Canadian and American immigration regulations and policies have also been the subjects of a number of graduate theses. ⁶

It is the purpose of the present study to interpret and give some form to British and Canadian immigration to the United States in the virtually unexamined decades since the resumption of immigration after the four years of world war which terminated what has been termed America's century of immigration, 1815-1914. First-hand documentation of the immigrant experience since World War I is extremely limited in contrast to the earlier period when the notoriously reticent British and their Canadian compatriots spend much energy committing their thoughts and observations on America and Americans to print and paper. Letters, diaries, unpublished manuscripts and other recordings of thoughts and experiences have not come to light. Publishers and collectors have shown more interest in native minorities and the problems of Asian immigration since the quota laws of the 1920's became effective. Liberal trends set in motion by the Depression and World War II have been responsible for this reorientation. Despite this lack of interest, British and Canadian immigration continued, at least until 1968, to represent a significant numerical body out of the total number of immigrants admitted annually.

Far greater concern for migration was shown in the sending countries. British and Canadian legislators filled pages upon pages in

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⁶Cited in bibliography.
discussion of immigration and emigration in volumes covering their Parliamentary Debates. National periodicals in both countries gave much attention to the subject of migration, while statistics and pertinent comment were continuously published by the newspapers. The focus of British concern differed fundamentally from the Canadian, however. Unemployment and overcrowding of Britain's urban centers brought government support for emigration and a scheme for assisted resettlement in the British Dominions. Canada, on the other hand, faced the perennial problem of attracting large numbers of immigrants for her national development to offset the drift to the south of her native-born lured by the promise of greater economic opportunity. For Britain, emigration to the United States was of minor importance after 1914, the Dominions acquiring the great majority of those leaving the country. For Canada, however, it was of paramount concern.

The printed records referred to above have been the main sources for the chapters dealing with immigration to the United States from the view of the sending countries. Insofar as statistical references are concerned, the most reliable and most frequently used have been those of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States' Department of Justice and the Bureau of the Census' Population series. Official records of the sending countries have incomplete data on the number of departures.

Lacking the kind of personal record available to investigators of the hundred years between 1815 and 1914, a questionnaire and interview survey was substituted, the purpose of which was to personalize the immigrant experience by reconstruction. The author set himself no fixed
number of interviews, intending to continue the survey until the point was reached that responses to set questions tended to become repetitive. The author utilized telephone and personal interviews to follow up the return of completed questionnaires by mail whenever responses invited further contact or appeared to offer particularly interesting motives or experiences. Data was collected and analyzed from the experiences of two hundred forty-four British and two hundred twenty Canadian immigrants residing within a four-state area of California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. 7

The area of selection was arbitrarily undertaken for several reasons: first, the author's personal knowledge of the Pacific coast states and Hawaii give him a frame of reference in discussing experiences of British and Canadian immigrants; second, research in these metropolitan areas was anticipated to be fruitful because of the relatively large numbers of British and Canadian-born residents found there according to the census of the population; and third, the anticipated size of an adequate sample did not seem to merit greater diffusion. The author prepared the questionnaire as an experiment—from which future studies might be launched in the same or different areas. One-third of both samples, moreover, British and Canadian, came to the area following a sojourn elsewhere in the United States. The accumulated responses represented a cross section of occupational groups and ages and revealed definite patterns in immigrants' motives for emigration, in their choice of destination and in their subsequent

7 A methodological note following Chapter X explains how British and Canadian immigrants were "discovered" and contacted.
The majority of working adult immigrants in the British and Canadian samples obtained stressed economic opportunity above other considerations in making their decisions. However, in expectation and experience Britons not surprisingly revealed differences in knowledge and understanding of American conditions, compared with the Canadian group. Whereas Britons have been and still are impressed with the vastness of the physical scene and the size of man's inanimate creations in America, the North American panorama is "home" to Canadians. Whatever political or cultural differences distinguish Canadians from their southern neighbors, they find unremarkable the common aspects of American life which so often intrigue the British. Britons' fascination for "American" ways of doing business, "American" dress, speech and social custom provide Canadians with constant reminders of their American environment and their close relationship with the people of the United States. Canadians' search for national identity was noted as a factor in the acclimation of many Canadian immigrants to the United States.

The terms, "British" or "Britons," used interchangeably hereafter, include citizens of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In United States' immigration records, no distinction was made between citizens of the Irish republic and the United Kingdom prior to the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1924. At that time, United States consular offices abroad were required to issue visas, including immigrant visas, to travellers prior to embarkation. This prior approval not only avoided the possible hardships of being denied entry at the
receiving port and relieved harassed immigration inspectors but also facilitated better control over the issuance of monthly quotas.

The passport regulation applied to Canada and all Western Hemisphere countries despite their exemption from quota provisions until 1965. Prior to the establishment of a permanent quota system for European immigration in 1924, annual arrivals from Canada were not differentiated by country of origin. Instead, statistics recorded country of last permanent residence, and immigrant arrivals by race, sex, and occupation. Many "Canadians" admitted prior to 1924, therefore, were re-emigrating Britons, Germans, and Scandinavians, constituting a deferred type of immigration. Compilation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of immigrant arrivals by both country of origin and country of last permanent residence, after July 1, 1924, made it possible to perceive the extent of this deferred immigration.
Chapter II

Emigration: The British View

Emigration from Great Britain to the United States after World War I as never to be resumed on the scale of pre-1914 migrations. Britons could choose between several Commonwealth destinations, most of which now offered inducements such as paid or assisted passages, housing, jobs, or settlement on the land. The Empire Resettlement Act, 1922, represented the first coordinated attempt between Britain and the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, to effect a redistribution of British manpower from congested urban areas in the industrial Midlands and North of England, and from uneconomic agricultural districts in the country to the population-deficient Dominions.

The resettlement scheme was not without its critics. Indeed, emigration as a public policy, assisted or otherwise, had been challenged earlier as improvident and claimed to be counterproductive. Critics refuted advocates' contentions that Britain was overcrowded and that her growing population threatened an already vulnerable living standard, pointing out that human resources were Britain's most valuable asset. Wealth could be generated by the proper utilization of manpower.¹ The drain of British skilled workers to the United States in the

nineteenth century, it was argued, made it possible for America to build an industrial capacity whose manufactures competed with British goods on world markets.  

Advocates of large-scale migration pointed out that despite Britain's population growth in the nineteenth century the nation had maintained its standard of living through its traditional role as chief supplier of the world's manufactured goods, and leading mercantile carrier of the world's raw materials and produce. The situation had now changed. During the last third of the nineteenth century, the United States, followed by Germany and Japan, gradually eroded Britain's virtual control of world trade. British capital had contributed to America's industrial expansion in huge sums, thereby hastening the inevitable challenge. Then, between 1914 and 1918, German submarines in the Atlantic ocean destroyed hundreds of thousands of tons of British merchant shipping. Revenues derived from the carrying trade were known as "invisible exports" in British commerce and represented a vital source of income to offset Britain's adverse balance of trade.

American and European competition and the cheaper wages paid Asian workers resulted in serious disruptions in the British economy and rising unemployment in the early twentieth century. The movement of rural population in increasing numbers to urban areas and the migration of Scots and Irish to English mining and manufacturing towns added to the difficulties of providing jobs at minimum living wages.

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2 In the nineteenth century, British laws prohibited certain classes of workers from emigrating in order to prevent the export of industrial secrets. See Rowland T. Berthoff, British Immigrants to Industrial America, 1790-1950 (1953).
Attrition due to natural causes and emigration still had not overtaken the natural increase, advocates of emigration showed, even when the high level of emigration during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was taken into account. One London *Spectator* contributor who felt undue alarm had been expressed concerning emigration compared the population of Greater London in 1911 to each of the preceding decennial censuses back to 1861. A steady growth of between 10 and 23 percent had taken place, the population rising from 3,222,270 in 1861, to 7,251,358 in 1911. The Greater London population in the latter year was 46,000 greater than that of the whole Dominion of Canada, nearly 63 percent higher than Australia's population, and seven times that of New Zealand. Similar figures could be produced, added the *Spectator* article, "for all the more important great towns of England."³

Commenting on the feasibility of putting the urban unemployed back to work on the land, the writer said:

> The idea that any large proportion of the people who are now swelling our already overcrowded towns can find employment on the land is a complete delusion. The establishment of small holdings and the extension of market-garden cultivation may make room for a few more thousands on the land, but only a few thousands. Even if we planted all the people on the land that could by any possibility manage to get a living out of it we should still not overtake the present growth in the urban population.⁴

Clearly, continued the writer, the answer was to find an outlet for Britain's surplus population "in the uncultivated spaces of the

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⁴Ibid., p. 912.
Empire."

At the present moment there are still millions of untilled acres in Canada and Australia where English people can maintain healthy lives and make life more enjoyable for the emigrants who preceded them and who now suffer from a dearth of population. At the same time there is the important political consideration that unless Canada and Australia are peopled by English emigrants they certainly will be occupied by peoples of other origin. In particular there is the grave danger that if Australia cannot acquire enough inhabitants of British stock she may be overrun by Asiatic races. 5

David C. Lamb, Commissioner for the Salvation Army, was also a strong supporter of emigration as a cure for unemployment. Writing in The Spectator in 1928, Lamb stated that Great Britain had added two million to its population since 1914, but in no single year since the close of hostilities and the country exported 300,000 persons, the conservative "emigrable surplus" estimated by economists he had consulted. During the five years prior to 1914, said Lamb, the flow of emigrants to all countries averaged over 400,000 per year; during the last five years, 1923-27, the average had been considerably less than 200,000. 6 The Empire Resettlement Act had been a failure, Lamb declared. Less than one-quarter of the available funds of sixteen and a half million pounds had been drawn upon for emigrant assistance. Perhaps "recent progressive social legislation here" may have taken "something of the economic and social 'kick' which previously existed," but he was confident that the spirit of adventure was not yet dead.

5 Ibid.
Lamb called for an effort to match that spirit of enterprise which had taken six million Britons to the United States between 1853 and 1888. The British Empire had natural resources far exceeding those of the United States, the Commissioner declared. "Who then shall say that the present-day Britons are less enterprising or less resourceful than their predecessors of fifty years ago?"7

It may be that British promoters of the resettlement scheme lacked initiative in seeking suitable emigrants and failed to coordinate their efforts with immigration agencies in the Dominions. Perhaps the latter had made too many general assumptions with regard to British emigrants' motives and interests, and may have been guilty of misrepresentation in their zeal to attract settlers, as one British journal observed in a post-mortem commentary on the resettlement act.8 Commonwealth employment agencies and immigrants agreed that there was a lot of "facile talk" about resettling Britain's surplus population on the farms and ranches of the Dominions with little sense of reality. The typical Englishman was "a creature of the towns," said the London Literary Digest. British emigrants sent out to Canada or Australia to populate the Dominions "generally have no concept, much less experience in cultivating vast acreages. Most do not know how to manage a suburban garden." The "essential preliminary" to peopling the Empire's vacant spaces, said the writer, "is to people England's rural spaces with Englishmen." The drift to the towns in England was duplicated in

7Ibid., p. 756.

8"Emigration at the Dead End," The New Statesman & Nation, (London), August 1, 1931, p. 133.
Canada, and was especially prevalent in Australia. 9

British emigrants to Canada in the years before World War I re-
membered the ambivalent attitude of some Canadians they encountered
and even hostility when approaching employers for work. Englishmen,
expecially, appeared to have established a bad reputation for an un-
willingness or inability to adapt to Canadian ways, not only in the
rural districts where Englishmen's feelings of alienation through lack
of psychological or physical fitness for farm labor were most commonly
felt but also in the urban centers where their trades or professional
skills should have found a ready market. In the decade prior to the war,
during a period of unprecedented expansion, Britons in Canada constantly
encountered appendages to job notices, stating, "No British Wanted,"
or, "No Englishman Need Apply."10 Yet in spite of the visible and
audible rebuffs encountered by many British immigrants before the war,
official Canadian government policy continued to stress the importance
of maintaining the predominance of British stock in Canada in the
post-war decade, just as the United States made its preference clear in
apportioning the annual immigration quota heavily in favor of British
immigrants.11

9"Problems of British Emigration," The Literary Digest, (London),
January 23, 1927, p. 20.

10Norman Leslie Boulding, British emigrant to Canada in 1911, per-

11The explanation seems to be twofold: first, the Canadian and
American governments were more concerned with controlling the heavy flow
of immigration from eastern and southern Europe than in individual selec-
tion during the 1920's; the second, the English were very often wrongly
judged by the unfavorable experiences of employers with a non-representa-
tive minority, the so-called "remittance men"--often the irresponsible
scions of wealthy families sent abroad--paid to remain in exile.

15
Despite unemployment in post-war Britain, British labor unions were diffident about endorsing emigration as the solution to the problem. There was much work to be done in the construction industry, in particular, neglected during the war years and now faced with the task of providing homes or remodelling dwellings for returning service-men. Salvation Army Commissioner Lamb, though an outspoken advocate of large-scale emigration believed the government should provide the necessary funds for a massive program of slum clearance.

We need a statesman who will unhesitatingly parallel the twin problems of unemployment at home and the danger of the vast vacant lands in the King's Oversea (sic) Dominions, and couple with a twenty years' programme of Empire migration and settlement a Homeland Slum Clearance Scheme . . . even if it called for an expenditure of a thousand million pounds.\(^{12}\)

What a transformation it would be, declared Lamb, if the two million pounds spent weekly by the government in providing the unemployed with relief could be turned into four million a week in wages. What might have been done with the five hundred million already spent in providing subsistence to workers, he questioned.

H. M. Hyndman, Labour Party Member and a caustic critic of the Conservative Government, castigated those who promoted the export of Britain's labor force. During the war he suggested that the nation should get rid of its "non-producers: the Dukes, Bishops and Peers. . . ." These people and the domestic servants they employed "might be most conveniently spared." Hyndman pointed out that the loss of British manpower due to war casualties would further increase the disproportion

\(^{12}\)Lamb, "Emigration as a Cure for Unemployment," p. 756.
of men and women in England. The country could not afford the drain of manpower by sending returned servicemen overseas again. These men were the potential and real producers of wealth, Hyndman declared. A huge rebuilding job awaited servicemen after the war—"the clearance of slums and creation of garden-type urban environments, jobs which only males could perform."13

The postwar slump of 1921-22 which followed overproductivity in 1919-20 created new demands among labor groups for government action to deal with unemployment. The editors of The New Statesman, a Left-leaning British weekly journal, told its readers in 1921 that emigration as a solution to the unemployment problem was "a delusion and a snare." The brief prosperity in the immediate aftermath of war was possible because anything manufactured could be sold. In the postwar world, Britain needed intelligent economic planning, regulated by the government. The pre-war system of unchanneled private enterprise had no place in Britain's future.14

The New Statesman's editors agreed with one of their readers, whose unsigned letter they published, that the British government was at fault in allowing export licenses for the shipment of textile machinery. "When we ship textile machinery to countries that will later be competing as manufacturers," wrote the correspondent, "we will have to face up to problems of unemployment on a permanent basis."15

13Hyndman, "Emigration Madness."
14"Unemployment and Emigration," The New Statesman, November 12, 1921, p. 165.
15Ibid.
It was true, agreed the editors, that Britain should ship only finished products, as in the nineteenth century, and not give its customers an opportunity to dispense with its trade. It was a mistake, however, declared the journal, to conclude that emigration was anything more than a temporary expedient. There need be no drop in the national income and in the standard of living so long as strict control was maintained over commodities marked for export.\textsuperscript{16}

No doubt to the disappointment of Mr. Hyndman and his socialist friends, Britain's titled aristocrats showed no disposition to leave the country or surrender their privileges, despite the increasing tax burdens laid upon them. Land ownership was the symbol of titled wealth in England. The breaking up into smaller units and sale of lands to the \textit{nouveaux riches} would destroy the prestige of the old nobility although it probably would solve their problems of declining net income. Meanwhile, the vast majority of British families lived in rented dwelling units or purchased homes on land they could never own. Britain's losses through emigration consisted, therefore, of skilled tradesmen who knew they would be better compensated in America and the British Dominions with the prospect of becoming landowners themselves and proprietors of their own businesses, and, increasingly, of professionals and technicians who recognized greater opportunities for affluence overseas.

The continuing capacity of the American economy to absorb a high proportion of skilled workers among immigrant arrivals is indicated

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}
by the statistics showing British immigration to the United States by major occupational group. (See Table 1, p. 20.) The proportion of skilled immigrants in the British total approximated 30 percent in all but the first and last two years shown. Even more striking were the proportions of the professional and technical category, which rose from less than 4 percent in 1925, to 1515 in 1965, and surpassed the percentage of skilled workers in the totals for 1970 and 1975.

No official record was made of British emigration until 1959, but Commissioner Lamb's Salvation Army resources enabled him to estimate that 200,000 Britons left the homeland every year between 1923 and 1927. United States Bureau of Immigration statistics show that an average of 48,000 British immigrants were admitted annually during the five-year period, or nearly 25 percent of the total. The United States was third choice of emigrating Britons during this period, after Canada and Australia. In the 1950's and 1960's, the contrast between the restrictionist and highly selective policy of the United States and the open doors of the Dominions was especially evident. Although emigration from Britain again averaged 200,000 persons annually during these decades, the United States received an average of only 22,000 annually, or 11 percent of the total. The United States was a distant third in the number of British emigrants received after Canada and Australia.17

With such a small proportion of British emigrants bound for the United States, Members of the British Parliament spent little time

TABLE 1
BRITISH IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, 1925-1975\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional &amp; Technical</th>
<th>Skilled(^b)</th>
<th>Miscellaneous(^c)</th>
<th>Occupation Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925(^e)</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5,898(^f)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10,772</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935(^g)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945(^i)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4,387(^j)</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4,668</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7,331</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,228</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7,736</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)U.S. Bureau of Immigration, Annual Report: 1925, Table 33; 1930, Table 37; 1950-75, Table 8.

\(^b\)Includes clerical and kindred workers; craftsmen, formen, and kindred workers; and operatives and kindred workers.

\(^c\)Includes farmers and farm managers; managers, officials, and proprietors; sales workers; private household workers; service workers except private household workers; farm laborers and foremen; and laborers, except farm and mine.

\(^d\)Group consists of housewives, children, and others with no reported occupation.

\(^e\)Tables for 1925 and 1930 provide detailed occupational statistics by specific titles.

\(^f\)Accountants were included in the clerical category as skilled workers in 1925 and 1930.

\(^g\)Data not available by country--1935, 1940.

\(^h\)Quota admissions. Actual total slightly higher but unknown.

\(^i\)Data given "by race or people." Omitted as non-comparable.

\(^j\)Sales workers included in the clerical category in 1950.
regretting their loss. Attention was focused upon Britain's self-governing Dominions as receivers of the nation's unemployed or surplus population, according to the point of view prevailing at the time. After 1922, with government funds allocated to assist the passage of emigrants bound for Dominion and colonial destinations, Members were more concerned that the Empire Resettlement Act, 1922, functioned efficiently than in debating the need for emigration. Questions were raised, for example, on reports of British subjects assisted with passage to Canada who subsequently emigrated to the United States. Parliament did not intend to subsidize emigration outside the Commonwealth and Empire.18

Except in such matters, little concern was shown by Members of Parliament for those emigrants who journeyed outside the jurisdiction of "British" countries. The government revealed that 87 percent of adult males and 82 percent of adult females and children embarked for Commonwealth and Empire destinations.19 The highly-favorable quota assigned the British by action of the United States Congress—over 20 percent of the total in 1921 and 1924, and nearly 43 percent in 1929 when the national origins principle became effective—made little incursion into the volume of British emigrants who left home annually to start a new life in Canada, Australia, or other British destinations. The United States' quota for British immigrants was filled only twice


in 1923 and 1924, during the entire period of the quota laws' operation, from 1921 to 1965.\textsuperscript{20} Even these exceptions must recognize the inclusion of Irish nationals, traditionally the most numerous emigrants from the British Isles, who were not enumerated separately by the Bureau of Immigration until the fiscal year ending June 30, 1925.

Worldwide economic depression during the 1930's followed by six years of war in Europe curtailed all British emigration. In the fiscal year 1931, more immigrants entered Great Britain from the United States and the British Dominions and colonies than departed the islands. The New Statesman & Nation commented that the virtual cessation of emigration was a fact which had passed almost unnoticed by Parliament and the press yet held far more significance than was realized. It was not a mere interruption caused by depressed economic conditions but the end of an era of free immigration. The United States, now protected by its quota laws, was "engaged in the gigantic task of welding its chaotic elements into a national community."\textsuperscript{21} Canada and Australia were demonstrating their independence by deporting British subjects without means who had become a public charge. Many returning British emigrants complained bitterly about misinformation and misrepresentation.

\textsuperscript{20}In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, Britons used over three-fourths of their quota of 65,721 numbers, but very much less than half thereafter. See Table 27 for quota and total immigration statistics.


\textsuperscript{21}"Emigration at the Dead End," New Statesman & Nation.
on the part of the Dominion governments. They were incensed over the failure of the British government to intercede on their behalf. It was one thing to face deportation and suffer the humiliation of it from a "foreign" country like the United States but quite another to be thus treated in a "British" country. The New Statesman & Nation, commenting on this attitude, reminded Britons that the Dominions now controlled their own policies—"we don't own them, and we cannot expect to influence their decisions to suit our own needs."22

The reverse flow of migration into Great Britain continued through fiscal year 1938.23 Fears that a general war in Europe was inevitable within months grew in the aftermath of the ignominious Munich settlement of September, 1938, and Britain's net gains through migration turned into losses. The human outflow was not large but included a number of affluent Britons who transferred investments as well as families, preferring Canada or the United States for resettlement. North America was closer to Great Britain than Australia or South Africa, yet far enough removed from the anticipated danger zone.

In the summer of 1939, the British government announced plans to evacuate British schoolchildren from London and the industrial centers, England's Midland and northern counties—areas expected to become targets of German bombing attacks. Foster homes were quickly found in Dominion countries and in the United States, and a number of private boarding


23 Mitchell, p. 51.
schools became home for many British children in 1939. Because of the U-boat menace in the Atlantic, most of these evacuees remained abroad for the duration of the war. Some took employment after graduating from school, and a few went on to college. Some enlisted in the Armed Services of the host countries when they reached their military age. Most of the younger children returned home to complete their schooling after the war, but many returned to the scenes of their wartime experiences in later years.

The first decade of peace, 1945-1955, however, was unremarkable for British interest in emigrating to the United States. The admission of British war brides of American servicemen and other United States' citizens overseas boosted British numbers substantially in 1946 and 1947 but admissions for 1948 indicated that this movement was over, as more than 90 percent of that year's total were quota immigrants. As in the post-war decade of the 1920's, the British were more attracted by Commonwealth resettlement schemes with their paid or assisted passages than by the prospect of life in the highly-competitive

24 Shawnigan Lake Boys School, near Victoria, British Columbia, was one such institution. A former student, now an architect in Honolulu who was a child evacuee from Britain in 1939, informed the author that probably one-third of the wartime enrollment at the school was made up of British boys, and that a sister school for girls, located nearby, also had a large number of British girls enrolled. Geoffrey G. Paterson, personal interview with the author, Honolulu, June, 1976.


26 Geoffrey G. Paterson in interview with author, Honolulu, June, 1976, spoke of personal contacts with former schoolmates who, like himself, had returned as immigrants.

27 See Appendix C, Table 27.
United States. Polls taken in Britain in 1947-48 indicated that as many as 42 percent of those contacted said they had "thought of emigrating," but only 6 percent of this number named the United States as their preferred destination.28

There were other practical considerations to be taken into account besides that of transportation expenses in emigrating to the United States. Non-existence of a national health plan and higher cost of medical services, including optical and dental care, in the United States was certainly a factor in the calculations of families contemplating a fresh start overseas. Greater job competition in the United States led many with marketable skills to worry over the possibility of unemployment and the consequences of being without income. British fiscal policies had placed severe restrictions on the amount of currency its citizens were permitted to take out of the country, thus adding to emigration difficulties and apprehensions. The "foreignness" of the United States, with its ethnic variety and racial divisions, was disconcerting to some prospective emigrants. Loyalty to Great Britain and ties to British institutions had much to do with their views of the United States. Emigration to the Commonwealth seemed more practical from every standpoint. The familiar benefits of a British society awaited them at the end of a less expensive journey in lands that were hungry for population, especially British population. In Canada, or Australia, it was easier to remain British—to live under the familiar flag and sustain learned attitudes towards parliamentary

democracy, codes of rank, social behavior, obligation and reward.

If the percentage of Britons polled in 1947-48 who "thought" of emigrating had actually carried it out, the home island might have been depopulated in the proportions suggested for its proper capacity.29 The loss, however, would not have been equitable since it would have taken from Britain virtually the same age group, its most productive human resource, that went to war to protect the British Isles a few years before. In fact, out of a national work force of approximately fifteen million males, the net loss by migration to and from the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire in the two years, 1947-48, was only 161,000 persons, or not much more than one percent of the male labor force. Moreover, the gain by immigration of Irish and European workers cut this deficit substantially.30 Insofar as migration between Britain and the United States was concerned, Britain suffered a net loss of approximately 36,000 persons in the two years 1947-48, losing three emigrants for every immigrant gained.31 Of the 16,000 emigrants to Britain from the United States during this period, however, nearly 5,000 were returning British emigrants.32

The British public and press paid little attention to estimates of net losses by migration. Almost everyone knew someone who had

29 "Depopulate third of Britain to solve crisis," Science Digest XXVII (February, 1950), 12. See also, Brinley Thomas, "Must Britain Plan Mass Emigration?" Foreign Affairs XXVII (April, 1949), 475-85.

30 Mitchell, p. 51.

31 Ibid.

already gone or was contemplating emigration. Restless returned servicemen and others discouraged by the prospect of continuing austerity in Britain concluded that better material conditions, business and employment opportunities awaited them in Australia, Canada, and the United States. In late 1947, former Prime Minister Winston Churchill, still glowering over his dismissal by the British electorate in the victory summer of 1945, scorned emigrants as "rats, deserting a sinking ship."33 The effects of wartime maritime losses and dislocation of Britain's world trade continued to hamper economic recovery, however, and in late 1950, Sir Frank Whittle, British jet propulsion expert, urged twenty million Britons to emigrate. It would be more patriotic to leave than to stay, Whittle told his countrymen. Time reported a recent poll had shown 35 percent of the population expressing a desire to leave, almost sufficient to reduce the population to its optimum number consistent with national safety, according to the aviation expert.34

In 1950 and 1951, British immigrants to the United States dropped to about half the 1946-49 average, then increased about fifty percent in 1952-56. The lower levels of the 1950's partially reflected gradual improvements in conditions in Britain but may also be attributed to vigorous promotion by both Canada and Australia to attract British immigrants. Australia, in particular, expended much effort to increase its population through immigration, being understandably apprehensive over the victory of Communism in China, Red-sponsored aggression in

33Churchill made this somewhat intemperate remark in the autumn of 1947, shortly before the author "deserted the ship."

Korea and the potential power of heavily-populated Indonesia. These shocks induced the Australian government to offer assisted passages to Australia to Americans and continental Europeans as well as to British emigrants.

The next noteworthy fluctuation in the levels of British immigration to the United States occurred in 1957. Canada was the main beneficiary of a large outflow of British emigration, which was later estimated at 230,000 by London's business journal, *The Economist*.\(^{35}\)

British Member of Parliament Angus Maude asserted that the upsurge in emigration was the result of the disastrous consequences and loss of British prestige among nations, rather than the political decision to intervene in the Suez crisis against Egypt in the late fall of 1956, which prompted Britons by the hundreds of thousands to apply for Commonwealth and American visas:

> There is no doubt that the Suez fiasco administered a severe shock to a very large number of people in this country. I am not here speaking of those who were horrified by the original decision to invade Egypt, for there is no evidence that there has been any great rush by them to shake off the morally contaminated dust of Britain. To a much greater number of people, the shock consisted in the discovery that their rulers, having decided to take drastic action to protect the rights and interests of Britain, were either unable or unwilling to go through with it.\(^{36}\)

A *Time Magazine* observer agreed with Maude that the long lines of

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Londoners waiting outside consular offices for visa applications was a symbol of protest, rather than a manifestation of real desire to leave:

Womb to tomb medical care, high standard of living, full employment, political freedom, and as much peace as most nations in the world. Why are Britons again increasingly thinking of leaving? The fact is, the majority never will leave. They will go on in their jobs and life believing that there is 'no future in it'—and making it so.37

The "main limiting factor" of British recovery was exemplified in this typical British attitude, declared the *Time* writer. The debilitating mood of the "psychological emigrant" pervaded the country, he concluded.

Another American writer was struck by the ennui of the British scene and the counterproductive energy that was generated by the negative attitude expressed in the phrase "no future." People used it cheerfully, even, as though relieved of the effort of trying to achieve anything—of being exempted by society as a whole from conventional ambitions. The desire to avoid the possibility of being called to military service may have prompted many visa applicants but threats of reprisal from Russia and condemnation by the United States for Britain's Suez action quickly extinguished that likelihood. When questioned by American news representatives, Britons spoke of their decisions being made "for the children's sake," or for a better future for themselves. They sought lower taxes and higher rewards, and also

a safer place—somewhat questionable—in case of war. 38

As Angus Maude predicted, emigration would not assume exodus proportions because most people would tire of waiting for space on ship sailings; having demonstrated their displeasure with government ineptitude, "psychological emigrants"—as the Time correspondent characterized them—would reconcile themselves to making the best of their circumstances. Judging by the continuing influx of Europeans, Africans, and Asians from the Commonwealth, who sought to share these prospects, they were much better than merely tolerable. In 1960, emigration from Britain dropped to 124,000 persons, the lowest since World War II. 39

The decline in total British emigration at the end of the decade, lasting until 1962, was due partly to Canada's difficulty in assimilating its post-Suez flood of 108,000 British immigrants—twice its normal annual intake. Greater stability at home was another factor. Meanwhile, however, a new source of unrest was developing. Non-white immigration from the Commonwealth escalated rapidly in the late 1950's and pressure upon the British government by labor and other groups to consider restrictions aggravated the building tension. An outbreak of ugly racial incidents in a few English cities in the early 1960's may have been responsible for a steady increase in emigration after


39 "Who Leaves Home?" The Economist.
immigrants from Britain until 1969. Increased British immigration might have developed even higher but for two unrelated events. The first occurred in 1965, when the United States embarked upon its fateful commitment of combat troops in support of the government of South Vietnam. The second event was the implementation, on July 1, 1968, of the amendments to the Immigration Act of 1952, which abolished the national origins principle upon which the preferred status of Great Britain rested securely with 42.8 percent of the annual quota of immigration.40

Throughout the period of quota limitation, from June 3, 1921, to June 30, 1968, the relative position of Great Britain, as the most-favored nation in immigration legislation, always placed it at the top or among the leaders in numbers of immigrants admitted annually. The years, 1949-1952, reversed the usual order, with Germany and Poland interchanging first and second place, attributable mainly to the large proportion of refugees admitted under the Displaced Persons Act, 1948.41 Liberalization of laws affecting alien relatives of United States' citizens was reflected in the massive increase in nonquota immigration, after passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.42 Beginning in 1953, nonquota aliens accounted for more than half the annual

42U.S., 66 Stat. 163-282 (Changes in the 1952 law allowed both spouses, husbands as well as wives of U.S. citizens exemption from the quota. Unmarried children under 21 were also accorded nonquota status.)
admissions to the United States, reaching as high as 73 percent, in 1956. Great Britain ranked fourth or fifth in terms of total numbers sent, behind Germany, Italy, Canada and Mexico, in every year from 1949 through 1963, excepting 1958, when she occupied third place. Britons also ranked third in 1964 and 1965, after Canada and Mexico, and again in 1968, following Cuba and Mexico. 43

Despite the general upsurge of nonquota immigration after the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, became effective, British nonquota entrants remained at minimum levels; between 1.5 and 5 percent of total British admissions between 1952 and 1965. 44 The most spectacular statistic of the quota immigration from Britain concerned those admitted under occupational preference, particularly the rate of increase of those classed as professional and technical. 45 "Are Scientists Ever Lost?" asked the editors of The Economist in 1963, advancing the theme that science is international. The journal noted the fact that Britain was losing about 17 percent of its Ph.D.'s in the early 1960's, compared with only 8 percent in 1952. Added to this loss was the number of scholars going abroad on fellowships for temporary periods who decided to accept employment overseas. The migration of scientists was not a net loss to Britain, however, said The Economist, as there were about as many foreign scientists in the United


44 British immigrants were more often single than other European immigrants; those who were married brought fewer minor children and parents than some European nations.

45 See Table 2, p. 51.
Kingdom as in the United States. Thus the judgment would have to be made in qualitative rather than quantitative terms.46

Nevertheless, by 1967, The Economist expressed growing concern at the accelerating rate of emigration of scientists and engineers graduating from British universities to the United States and other destinations. In-migration was no longer making up the losses in these groups and, in general, foreign engineers and scientists arriving in Britain were not as well trained as the home products. Six years earlier, noted The Economist, 20 to 25 percent of graduating scientists and engineers were leaving the country. Now, in 1967, it was approaching 50 percent. The loss of engineers was especially deplored as these were needed for the future of British industry. Greater pay and better opportunities for quick advancement attracted graduates to the United States. Promotion was "slower but surer" in the United Kingdom, but "the road up to the Boardroom is long and the chances of reaching it slim."47

British concern over the so-called "brain drain" tapered off at the end of the decade. The needs of Commonwealth countries were being met to a greater extent by improved training facilities at home and it was no longer a simple matter for professional and technical personnel to enter the United States after 1969, when the numerical limitations provisions of the Immigration Act of 1965 became wholly effective.


Under the new system, in which all independent nations of the Eastern Hemisphere became eligible on equal terms for the 170,000 annual visas allotted to the hemisphere, only the higher qualified and those in labor-short categories from the Eastern Hemisphere could be sure of admission.\(^{48}\) Although any one nation might draw to the limit of 20,000 numbers out of the total allotment to the hemisphere, competition made it unlikely that this would occur. Britain ranked seventh in 1969 and 1970; thirteenth in 1971 and 1972; tenth in 1973; twelfth in 1974; and eleventh in 1975. In the 1970's her annual numbers stabilized between 10,000 and 11,000. Implementation of the Immigration Act of 1965 marked the end of an era in United States' immigration practice, but to no single European country could the change in policy have had greater symbolic, if not practical significance, than to Great Britain.\(^ {49}\)

\(^{48}\) For purposes of the Immigration Act of 1965, (U.S., 79 Stat. 911-22), the Eastern Hemisphere includes the rest of the world outside the American continents and islands appurtenant to the Americas, such as the Caribbean group and those adjacent to Alaska and Canada.

\(^{49}\) Symbolic rather than actual because of the loss of Britain's traditional preferred status throughout the history of United States immigration restrictions, 1921-1975.
Chapter III
Immigration: The American View

The cataclysm of the First World War suspended European immigration for the duration of hostilities, but not discussion of it, especially in the normally-receiving countries. In the United States, the restrictionist lobby gained support for its campaign to limit admission of national groups forming the so-called "new immigration," inhabitants of the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. The lobby did not achieve its goal of numerical limitation during the war but the general immigration law of 1917 expanded the list of inadmissible categories and reaffirmed the right of immigration inspectors to deny entry to persons whom they judged as "likely to become a public charge."¹ The restrictionists' greatest success was the passage by Congress of the literacy test—over President Wilson's veto in 1917. This victory represented a solid gain for advocates of the principle of selection.

The purpose of the literacy test was to discourage prospective immigrants from the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, now far more numerous than immigrants from the "old" sources of Northern and Western Europe. Illiteracy was known to be much more prevalent in the "new" source countries. Furthermore, objected the restrictionists,

"new" source immigrants had little or no experience as citizens of a democracy, and their religious faith was variously Roman Catholic, Hebrew, Eastern Orthodox, or Islamic—seldom Protestant.

The gains of restrictionists in 1917 were consolidated as a result of America's entry into World War I. Subjects of the German Reich, the amorphous Austro-Hungarian Empire and those of Turkey became classed as enemy aliens, unless they had taken out first papers for naturalization. Then, the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik victories caused consternation in Western Europe and raised American fears of subversionist activities by Bolshevik sympathizers in the United States. Italians—the most numerous source of "new" immigration—had demonstrated the argument of their detractors that their volatile nature and ragged discipline made them undesirable additions to the American population. Germans, hitherto respected in America for their industry and accomplishments, were vilified as subservient to Prussian militarism and lacking in a real commitment to democracy. German-Americans were suspected of disloyalty and together with Italian and Slavic aliens felt the lash of nativist fury which claimed the American nation was degenerating as the result of massive infusions of unassimilable foreign stock. ²

Several factors induced public concern between 1917 and 1923 over resumption of immigration at pre-1914 levels and the lack of a standard of immigration selection. First, it was assumed by Americans that millions of Europeans would seek admission to the United States after the

²The theme of degeneration was lucidly expressed by Madison Grant, eugenicist and racist, in The Passing of the Great Race (1916).
four-year interruption of war. Old empires had crumbled, leaving many Europeans stateless and unwanted. The statesmen and technical advisers who redrew the map of Europe in 1919–1920 could not satisfy everyone. The dissention and prospect of future conflict over disputed claims spurred many to join the millions whose embarkation for America had been deferred by the world war.

A second factor lay in the belief that the labor shortage which characterized the American economy throughout most of the nineteenth century had been filled by the unprecedented immigration of the early twentieth. Unemployment rose to over three million in 1921-22. Labor strikes became more prevalent, raising suspicions and allegations that post-war immigrants were infected with Bolshevik doctrines; bringing disruption to American industry, threatening the safety of the worker and the pride with which he did his job. The strikes of 1919-20 were generally blamed on "Red" activities in labor unions and by foreign anarchists—professional troublemakers with no respect for American tradition and custom. The ghettos of New York and Boston, of Philadelphia and Baltimore, and the segregated immigrant colonies in rural areas of the United States depicted the fallacy, restrictionists contended, of the melting-pot concept of unlimited immigration. It was foolhardy, they believed, to add to the burgeoning social problems of the unassimilated millions who were already in the United States—the barely literate and generally unskilled laborers and tenant farmers of Central Europe.

A third factor concerned political assimilation and education. It would be difficult, claimed supporters of restriction, to preserve
American democracy when such a large proportion of the alien popu-
lation possessed no appreciation of political obligations and duties
of a citizen in a democratic state. Millions of potential voters
from the autocracies of Europe could easily be manipulated by unscru-
pulous elements in American politics. Where would alien loyalties
lie in some future confrontation with the Powers of Europe? If they
remained culturally isolated from American traditions in their ethnic
everis, could they resist the rhetoric of the demagogue, the appeal
to ancient instincts and the old allegiances? Would the failures and
the malcontents become instruments of the terrorists and anarchists
who preached revolution against the very society which sheltered them?
American wanted no part of Bolshevism. 3

The Per Centum Limit Act, signed into law by President Warren G.
Harding on May 19, 1921, 4 signalled the success of those who favored
numerical limitation of European immigration. The 1921 Act, though
an historic milestone in United States' immigration history, was
adopted as a temporary measure, however, pending further Congressional
study for a permanent policy of selective immigration. Designed to
limit the number of immigrants who could come to the United States on
a strictly numerical basis, the Act remained in force two years beyond
the intended one-year interim term, until 1924.

Passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 5 immediately reduced the

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3 Edith Phelps, The Restriction of Immigration (1924), pp. 5-9.
4 U.S., 42 Stat. 5-7.
numbers of immigrants to be admitted annually by more than 50 per-
cent, from 357,803 to 164,667 persons. The principle of selection
was manifest in the allocation of quota numbers by countries of origin
and the restoration of future numerical supremacy in the population of
desired nationals was assured by the imperatives of the so-called
national origins principle. When this permanent provision of the 1924
law became effective, July 1, 1929, the quota allocation to Great
Britain and Northern Ireland jumped from 34,007 numbers to 65,721, an
increase from 20.65 percent of the total to 42.75 percent. 6

The Commissioner for Immigration probably expressed the feelings
of most legislators and administrators of the new act in his Annual
Report for 1925:

I feel certain that if any legislative changes
are still required they will be simply amenda­
ty in nature and not in any sense radical,
because we now have the essential legislative
machinery to secure a proper standard of immi­
gration as well as to keep the volume of such
immigration within proper limits. 7

Determination of the "proper standard" was to be achieved in the
numerical limitations' provisions of the new act, section 11, subdi-
vision (a), which established the new basis as follows:

The annual quota of any nationality shall be 2
percentum of the number of foreign-born indivi­
duals of such nationality resident in continental
United States as determined by the United States
census of 1890, but the minimum quota of any
nationality shall be 100. 8

6Ibid.
p. 1.
8U.S., 43 Stat. 159.
The new basis for determining annual quotas was a clear and frank expression of the principle of selection. The 1921 act had already favored immigrants from Northern and Western Europe, allotting them 55.2 percent of the total quota against 44.6 percent for those from Southern and Eastern Europe. The restoration of European immigration in the proportions of the 1870's and 1880's, when British, German, and Scandinavian nationals dominated annual immigration, was completed by the adoption of the census of 1890 as the new basis of enumeration. At a stroke, legislators nullified the impact of two decades of very heavy immigration from new source countries such as Italy, Russia, Hungary, Austria, and Greece. In the generation prior to World War I, new sources provided more than three-fourths of America's total immigration. Under the 1924 Act, the nations of North and West Europe received 81.9 percent, while those of the South and East were given 15.9 percent of the annual quota, beginning July 1, 1929.

Supporters of selective and restrictive immigration and those advocating better administrative procedure for control might well have celebrated the passage of the Acts of 1921 and 1924. The immigration laws of those years represented the triumph of a movement which first brought together a number of disparate elements opposing immigration policy some forty years earlier—ironically at the same time the Statue of Liberty was erected in New York harbor, extending the hospitality of American shores to the tired, the poor, and the down-

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9 Phelps, Restriction of Immigration, p. 33.

It had been a hard-fought battle with adversaries who opposed restriction for reasons which included idealism, the concerns of various ethnic groups, political considerations, and business interests. As contemporaries looked forward to indefinite preservation of the principles embodied in the new laws without radical change, there appeared no reason to anticipate otherwise. Ironically, economic depression and renewed world war virtually suspended debate and immigration at the same time, but these events could not be foreseen by lawmakers or the public in the 1920's. Moreover, the principles embodied in the Act of 1924 resisted change for forty years—the same length of time it had taken to translate them into law.

Once the 1924 Immigration Act became effective, interest in the subject flagged. Legislation achieved controls favored by the majority. Greater selectivity enhanced the changing character of immigration from a hitherto artisan and peasant composition to one in which technical and professional persons became more conspicuous. Although no coded system of occupational preferences existed prior to 1952, consular officials abroad were assigned the task of determining eligibility and desirability of alien applicants for immigrant visas, after 1924, to overcome congestion at Ellis Island. Consular interviewers gave preference in issuing immigrant visas to persons with skills and attributes most needed at the time in the United States.

Perhaps the statue should have commemorated almost three centuries of European immigration; ideals which had been met, rather than imply America's unlimited capacity and willingness to absorb even greater numbers in the future.
When American writers took up the subject of immigration after 1924, nativist views were ascendant. The Saturday Evening Post, Collier's, Forum, and The American Mercury were unmistakably restrictionist. Contributors expressing these views included Kenneth Roberts, Owen Wister, Madison Grant, Edward R. Lewis, and Henry Pratt Fairchild. The titles of some contemporary articles speak for themselves. Nevertheless, advocates of free, or less fettered immigration, were not silenced by the triumph of the restrictionist camp. During the next forty years Carl Wittke, Louis Adamic and Oscar Handlin were among writers calling for more equitable allocations of quotas among all nations. The national origins principle, they declared, was unworthy of American democratic principles and ideals. Generally, such writers recalled the special contributions immigrants of various ethnic backgrounds had made to American life. William S. Bernard, Maldwyn Allen Jones, and John Fitzgerald Kennedy also voiced their support of these views, the latter leaving his initiative in reversing discrimination to be completed by President Johnson, in 1965.

The sometime sharpness of the national legislative debate over immigration policy became a memory of yesteryear as the nation slid

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into the mire of economic depression in 1930. By September, a worried administration gave the Commissioner for Immigration a directive to instruct inspectors to apply the "likely to become a public charge" provision for exclusion much more diligently. As a consequence of enforcement and difficulties encountered by resident aliens in qualifying for state work and relief programs departures from the United States exceeded arrivals in 1931. In his Annual Report, the Commissioner noted that "for the first time since the Civil War the number of alien immigrants admitted annually fell below 100,000, and the number of recorded departures exceeded the arrivals of the immigrant class."13

The ebb tide of immigration continued through the troubled decade of the 1930's. Economic conditions in the United States made some gains in 1935-36, only to be almost wiped out in the slump of 1937-38. Only in 1940, when huge Allied war orders for food and armaments boosted production did the Great Depression come to an end. Within months, the war in Europe had stimulated all sections of the American economy, ending unemployment and producing a shortage of manpower. As in World War I, industry turned to married women and single girls to make up labor deficiencies. Immigrant arrivals were sharply reduced, due to the war in Europe and the danger to Atlantic shipping.

In 1945, when civilians were once again able to use whatever conveyances existed for travel to America, existing United States immigration laws precluded any public outcry against the resumption of

immigration. Some fears were expressed that America's compassion for the plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe might invite innumerable resettlement problems if allowed to run uncontrolled. It was soon clear, however, that the vast majority of these unfortunates only wanted to return to the countries from which they had been taken during the war by the Nazis and search for survivors of their broken families. Nevertheless, the United States Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, 1948, to allow for the admission of 205,000 refugees within a two year period, ending June 30, 1950.14

Reference has been made to the numbers of British war brides of American military and government personnel who brought about the first revival of British immigration to the United States since 1930, in 1946 and 1947.15 Their arrival created much interest among the American people. Popular magazines featured the wartime romances of G.I.'s and British girls and delighted curious readers with reporters' interviews with the brides, eliciting the girls' impressions of American men, the place of women in American life, the relative sizes of American homes, cars, incomes, compared with what they had known, and differences in dress, speech, food, cooking, as well as their attitude on a number of social and political questions. Contrary to general

15 See page 24.
expectations, the British girls were often outspoken in their views.\textsuperscript{16}

The next minor wave of British arrivals to create attention in the United States was also feminine. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, American executives in New York discovered a new status symbol in the English secretary. English girls were especially welcome in the offices of long-established law firms, insurance companies, advertising agencies and other public contact firms. American businessmen were intrigued by the British accents but beyond this they found the girls responded well to direction, were loyal and efficient, polite with clients, and had a good concept of business operations. English secretaries became a part of the acquisitive businessman's symbols of success, along with the latest electronic equipment, golf clubs, and the house in Connecticut. As for the girls, they found New York exciting, their bosses exacting but kind and considerate, and their salaries double what they received in London. Many of these girls travelled to America on immigrant visas with the intention of finding employment in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, or other major cities. Often, American friends or relatives determined their choice of destination. Frequently, however, English girls came to the United States as curious visitors, were offered employment and decided to stay. Employers usually had little difficulty in obtaining work permits from the Department of Labor for English girls trained in clerical and secretarial skills. Such girls had what one writer described as nous,

\textsuperscript{16}G. Samuels, "40,000 G.I. Brides Appraise Us," \textit{New York Times Magazine}, December 1, 1946, p. 20; see also "Brides from Britain" \textit{Newsweek}, February 4, 1946, p. 50; and "Here Come the Brides," \textit{Newsweek}, February 18, 1946, pp. 61-2.
a Greek word symbolising the spirit of adventure. 17

The mid-1960's saw Americans re-discover the British in many ways. A young Lancashire rock music group known as The Beatles caused a sensation upon their arrival in America, after gathering an international reputation in Europe. The mops of long hair and folk-style entertainment provided a lead to American youth which had hesitated to follow its own "flower children"—the "hippie" phenomena of San Francisco.

Rock groups emulating the Beatles' style flourished, and in the popular music field as in the realm of business, anything British was now definitely "in." British clothes and British sports cars enjoyed a new vogue, and the popularity of British actors soared, whether new arrivals like Michael Caine or Anthony Newley, or longtime Hollywood residents such as Cary Grant and David Niven.

This new development of American regard for the British appeared entirely spontaneous, an outpouring of goodwill that had not often been evident in Anglo-American relations. This was probably possible because of Britain's demise from Great Power status in the world and the fact that America had matured since 1941, no longer feeling self-conscious in recognizing British achievement. America had become a homogenized society and there was no longer any profit or pleasure in "twisting the lion's tail."

In fact, Americans had been considerably sobered by the discovery that since 1950, Europeans did not necessarily look up to America as

the virtuous leader of the free world, magnanimous in her programs of foreign aid and the best example of a working democracy at home. Anti-American propaganda, much of it Communist-inspired, had sown mischievous seeds of suspicion and cynicism about American motives in her world role since 1945. American tourists and businessmen in supposedly friendly West European countries were taken aback at the virility of anti-Americanism in the 1950's and 1960's. In the missile crisis of 1962, Americans were incredulous that many of her so-called friends and allies echoed the Communist Press in hailing Nikita Khrushchev as the savior of world peace. Between 1957 and 1965, America endured the censure of world opinion for the ugly racial confrontations at Little Rock, and Oxford, Mississippi, while racial prejudice in Russia, India, the Middle East, Australia and South Africa continued unabated. In the United Kingdom, colored immigrants from the Caribbean and from Asian Commonwealth countries clashed with white supremacists in Nottingham and Camden Town. Eugenists Enoch Powell of Lancashire and Orval Faubus of Arkansas were limbs off the same tree, but America paid the price of power.

Repudiation of the national origins principle in the new Immigration Act of 1965 was hailed by American liberals as a great victory for democratic principles in providing equal opportunity for all who wanted to make a fresh start in the New World.\(^\text{18}\) There were two fundamental departures in policy contained in the new act. The system

\(^{18}\)Oscar Handlin, "At Last, A Fair Deal For Immigrants," Reader's Digest, May, 1966, p. 29.
of numerical limitation imposed against all independent countries outside the American continents has been described earlier. The second departure imposed numerical limitation upon countries of the Western Hemisphere—for the first time in immigration history. Western Hemisphere aliens admitted to the United States for permanent residence were to be classed as "special immigrants." A separate allocation of 120,000 annual numbers was set up for this control. The occupation and close relative preferences were not applicable to Western Hemisphere aliens; instead, "special immigrants" would be admitted without respect to country on a first-come, first-served basis until the annual allocation was exhausted.

The old quota system was to be phased out over a period of three years to allow for the processing and elimination of the backlog of oversubscribed quotas for Italy, Greece, and certain other countries. The unsubscribed numbers of high quota countries like Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany would be utilized for this purpose. Introduction of numerical limitation against the Western Hemisphere became effective July 1, 1968, when all provisions of the act would be in operation.20

In addition to these major changes, the act placed greater emphasis upon reunification of families and less upon occupational preferences. The codified preference system, adopted in 1952, had discriminated in favor of "skilled aliens," giving them first preference

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19 See p. 34.

and up to 50 percent of the numbers of each national quota. In 1965, the revised preference system reduced the priority of skilled aliens from first to sixth preference but accorded third preference status to professional and technical workers and to aliens of unusual or special accomplishments in the arts and sciences. Both occupational groups were allocated 10 percent of the national quotas. Immediate and close relatives of United States' citizens and resident aliens received 74 percent of the annual quotas, specified in the first, second, fourth, and fifth preferences, while the remaining 6 percent was allotted to the seventh preference, which provided for the admission of refugees on a permanent basis.

Slowdowns in the growth rate of the American economy in the mid-1960's, despite the effort required to maintain half a million troops in Vietnam by mid-1968, resulted in fewer new jobs at home and consequently less opportunity for aliens applying for immigrant visas. The listing of many job classifications as "overcrowded" by the Department of Labor resulted in automatic denial of visa applications filed by persons with unneeded job skills. In terms of overall numbers admitted, however, due to the extension of relative preferences—immigration increased substantially after full implementation of the 1965 Act. Between July 1, 1968, and June 30, 1975, immigration ranged

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between 350,000 and 400,000 persons annually, levels not attained since the mid-1920's. 24

Naturally, a much greater diversity in national and racial origins characterized post-1965 immigration with the admission of Asians on an equal basis with Europeans. A decline in overall European immigration was inevitable in the sharing of numbers from the common pool for the Eastern Hemisphere, the size of which had remained virtually unchanged since the quota law of 1924. 25 The only European nations to show large percentage gains in an immigration study comparing admissions in 1975 with those of 1965 were Portugal, Greece, and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, Spain, and Italy made modest gains, while the remaining countries of Northern and Western Europe sustained heavy losses. European immigration was down 34.8 percent; Asian immigration went up 540.5 percent. 26

Besides the arrival of Asian immigrants as the second-largest 27 continental group in the 1970's, the most significant feature of immigration statistics resulting from the 1965 act has been the

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25 The 1924 Immigration Act provided for the annual admission of 164,667 persons. This number was reduced to 153,714 when the national origins principle became effective in 1929. The Immigration & Nationality Act, 1952, raised the quota to 154,657 persons and the amendments of 1965 provided 170,000 numbers.

26 See Table 2, on page 51.

27 The largest group, North American immigrants, numbered 146,668 persons in 1975, only 14,199 more than the Asian group.
**TABLE 2**

**IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF BIRTH,**
**YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1965 AND 1975<sup>a</sup>**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Number 1965</th>
<th>Number 1975</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>296,697</td>
<td>386,194</td>
<td>+30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>-76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>-67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>-72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>-74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4,039</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>-78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24,045</td>
<td>5,154</td>
<td>-78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>9,984</td>
<td>+232.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>-44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5,463</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>-76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10,821</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>+6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3,085</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>-73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2,256</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>-82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>8,465</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>-53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>11,845</td>
<td>+490.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>-29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,549</td>
<td>+15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>-80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>-72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>5,118</td>
<td>+176.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>27,358</td>
<td>10,807</td>
<td>-60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>3,524</td>
<td>+25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>-57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China and Taiwan</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>18,536</td>
<td>+356.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>4,891</td>
<td>+586.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>15,773</td>
<td>+2610.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>+190.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>4,274</td>
<td>+34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>28,362</td>
<td>+1210.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>+1301.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>31,751</td>
<td>+914.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>4,217</td>
<td>+1870.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>3,039</td>
<td>+1244.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asia</td>
<td>5,426</td>
<td>16,669</td>
<td>+207.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

growing proportion of aliens belonging to the numerically-exempt classes.\textsuperscript{28} In the seven fiscal years from July 1, 1968, to June 30, 1975, aliens exempted from numerical limitation accounted for a steadily-increasing proportion, until 1975, of the annual totals of all classes. Total world and British exempt percentages are shown in Table 3.

\textbf{TABLE 3}

\textbf{ALIENS EXEMPT FROM NUMERICAL LIMITATION: \% OF TOTAL\textsuperscript{a}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>British</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}U.S. Commissioner for Immigration & Naturalization, Annual Report: 1969-75, Table 6.

The upward trend in number of exempt category admissions would seem to assure a continuing rise in overall immigration statistics in the future unless there is a corresponding lower use of allowable maximums in annual limitations in one or both hemispheres. Ironically, since 1965, the United States received its greatest rate of increase and second-largest numbers from sources it virtually barred only a

\textsuperscript{28}Spouses, parents, and children of U.S. citizens comprised the great majority in the exempt classes.
generation earlier. Moreover, the traditionally-preferred sources of Northern and Western Europe, which the Acts of the 1920's sought to encourage, were outnumbered by immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe by a ratio of 2.4 to 1, in 1975.

Whether the reaction of the 1970's against what many Americans considered the result of an excess of liberalism in the 1960's would bring about a latter-day attempt to erect barriers against nationals formerly excluded or discouraged remained to be seen. The breaking of the 400,000 plateau, more than 100,000 of whom were exempt category immigrants, caused some Americans to express concern that plans for a zero population growth for the future were endangered. Freelance writer Leslie A. Westoff noted in the New York Times Magazine that one in five additional Americans were immigrants in 1970, compared with one in six in the 1960's, and only one in nine in the 1950's. In the present decade, only 12 percent of all arrivals were certified for a specific job by Department of Labor officials in a specific city. The remainder were admitted under relative preferences or belonged to the exempt classes of immigrants. The majority of immigrants,

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29 Philippine immigration, for example, totalled 3,130 in 1965; almost doubled in 1966, with 6,093; ranked 11th among the nations in 1967, with 10,865; 7th, in 1968, with 16,731; 3rd, in 1969, with 20,744; and was 2nd behind Mexico from 1970 through 1975 with more than 30,000 immigrants in each of the last three years. Korea ranked 3rd, China-Taiwan 5th, and India 6th, in 1975. The highest-ranked European country in 1975 was Portugal, in 8th place. (Sources: Commissioner for Immigration, Annual Reports: 1965-1975. Table 6).

therefore, could live and work where they chose. Officials of metropolitan areas such as New York, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and Honolulu had good reason to regard with apprehension the thousands of immigrants who were added to the congestion of their cities and to the burdens of overtaxed municipal services such as schools and hospitals, transportation and welfare roles.31

America must decide what level of population she could accommodate in the year 2000, and whom she wanted to include, declared Westoff, co-author of the demographic study on population growth From Now To Zero.32 We need time, she urged, to put our house in order; to take care of our present problems.

Yet the America of 1973 was not that of 1923. America's role in the world and global relationships seemed to preclude the likelihood of future selective immigration on the basis of nationality, whatever course might be indicated as desirable by the American people. Moreover, restrictive amendment of the humanitarian revisions of the Act of 1965 as the close relative preferences and other provisions were described might be politically impossible in the future as recent aliens became naturalized and added their voting strengths to their respective ethnic blocs. Americans, it appeared, would have to live with the decisions of 1965 for the foreseeable future.


As Carl Wittke's comment on the British quoted in the Introduction implies, one purpose of this study is to suggest that the British immigrant's supposed invisibility is too readily assumed; that his background, motivations and experiences frequently preclude his assimilation and that the "anguish of becoming American"¹ may be as psychologically debilitating to him as to the Italian fisherman or Polish peasant.

It is axiomatic, in the author's opinion, that all immigrants, whether they set foot on the shores of the American, African, or Australian continents from Europe and Asia shared certain common imperatives. By their act of migration they demonstrated more than average decisiveness in ordering their lives. Family, friends and acquaintances admired the emigrants' courage—or failed to deter them from their foolishness. For better or for worse, the migrants elected to compete with the fluid society whose preserve they invaded, hoping to capture a share of the rewards. Their success in this pursuit would ultimately justify their act of separation, in their minds as well as in the minds of those who watched them go. Not all succeeded, even in relative terms, but they lived out their days prodded and haunted

by this imperative.

For some, vindication did not carry with it a lifetime of exile. The Chinese railroad worker, the Hindu field hand, or the Italian and Yugoslav miner were motivated by visions of accumulating wealth sufficient to sustain life as local princes in their native lands within a few years, and many achieved it. Many of the British artisans who came to the United States in the nineteenth century, when their hands were eagerly recruited for the factories, looms and mines of America, stayed only as seasonal workers, then returned home. Historian Rowland Berthoff notes that the wage differential between Great Britain and the United States was sufficient to make the annual voyage worthwhile for those Britons who wished to keep their permanent residence in the British Isles.²

Non-English speaking immigrants in America had good reasons to envy the British immigrant's advantages in language, law, political experience in democracy and cultural closeness. Britons' invisibility as aliens was merely a matter of shedding a few exterior identifications, they thought. Many British wished it might be as simple as that. True, Englishmen and Scotsmen were more likely to become managers, executives, doctors and lawyers than Russian peasants or Italian laborers because of language and schooling in a much more advanced system of public education in Great Britain, followed by opportunities to acquire professional and vocational training. Professional and skilled workers usually endured less physical hardship than farmers

and laborers. Even Welsh miners and stonemasons became shift bosses and superintendents more readily than continental Europeans in the same occupations because they talked to industrial managers in their own language. Of all the immigrant nationalities from the British Isles only the Catholic Irish were regarded as alien by nativist-minded Americans in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and tended to remain longer in menial occupations or in low paid domestic or public service.

Small wonder, then, that the European immigrant was puzzled by British expressions of disenchantment and admissions of cultural shock. S. K. Ratcliffe, British journalist and lecturer, commented in 1927 on British immigrant reactions as follows:

It is taken for granted by many people that the immigrant from Great Britain must of necessity find himself far less startled and bewildered than the Italian or the Central European when he meets the first shock of America. And this no doubt is so, for two reasons mainly. First, the Briton in the new country hears around him his own language, though spoken with what seems to him a quaint difference; and secondly, he is, perhaps in the majority of cases today, an urban worker and therefore no stranger to the life of an industrial or commercial city. But even so America must be to him a land of extraordinary strangeness. He has never seen anything like it. The scene, whether in town or country, is something that he could not have imagined. The external differences between England and America are altogether indescribable: and to begin with, there is the immense difference of scale.\(^3\)

Describing this difference in scale, Ratcliffe continued:

Britain is a little land, rather more than twice

the area of Ohio. All railway journeys are short, for the sea is within easy reach on all sides. The villages are tiny, and to the eye of the continental European, no less than to that of the American, the countryside seems cut up by the hedges into the pattern of a crazy-quilt. The Russian or the German peasant is accustomed to the horizon of the wide plain; the English villager knows nothing of great distances. The city worker from Manchester or Birmingham, from Glasgow or Dundee, comes, it is true, from a relatively large and crowded centre, but the scale to which he is accustomed is still very small, and for him the mass and clangor of New York or Chicago, even of Cleveland or Detroit, cannot fail to be a crushing experience. Before crossing the Atlantic he thought, very likely, that Pittsburgh would be only Sheffield with an American accent. He finds that he has come, not only into a new country, but into a new and terrifying civilization. 4

With nativist prejudice minimal towards Britons in most periods of American history it is probable that the obstacles to assimilation were largely internalized in the minds of Britishers who resisted Americanization. After all, environmental differences, great as they were, became less awesome with familiarity. Wilbur Shepperson, author of a study of nineteenth-century Englishmen who were repatriated from the United States as disenchanted emigrants, observed that too often British immigrants were psychologically ill-equipped for life in a strange land. The British quickly learned and adjusted to American business practices, but they remained ideologically inflexible and could not reconcile themselves to social and political patterns. They were frequently irritated by what they considered was excessive American nationalism and were annoyed by the "constant demand that all

4Ibid.
Englishmen offer unqualified praise of the new order." Disenchantment which grew out of unfamiliarity and distaste for many cultural aspects of American life, combined with homesickness, turned many Britons homeward, "a good deal less hostile to crown and bishop and decidedly more critical of republicanism." Nineteenth-century Britons, said Shepperson,

... longed for the comfortable assurance of status, for the constricting yet unifying habits of dress, of speech, of religion, and of social life. ... They missed respect for the land, loyalty to class, dedication to craft, permanency of employment. For many, the very thought of home became a flight of the imagination rather than the recollection of a reality. They stood rooted in the past, no longer with a desire to free themselves, even from its debris. They felt an urgency to escape from the cataclysm of America.5

While both Ratcliffe and Shepperson used the encompassing terms British and Britons on occasion, it is clear their remarks pertained primarily to Englishmen. The disenchantment which led a high proportion of Englishmen to return home in the 1920's was not displayed in the same degree by Scots, Irish, or Welsh immigrants in America at that time.6 This may not mean that the Scots, Irish and Welsh were more content with American life but all three groups historically had known greater economic hardship due to inhospitable land or circumstances of tenure than the English, and were accustomed to migration and adaptation—mostly to England itself in search of employment and

5Wilbur Shepperson, Emigration and Disenchantment: Portraits of Englishmen Repatriated from the United States (1965).

6See Table 4, page 60.
### TABLE 4

**BRITISH MIGRATION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1929,**

**SHOWING RATE OF RETURN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>English To U.S.</th>
<th>English From U.S.</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
<th>Northern Irish To U.S.</th>
<th>Northern Irish From U.S.</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
<th>Scots To U.S.</th>
<th>Scots From U.S.</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
<th>Welsh To U.S.</th>
<th>Welsh From U.S.</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>27,871</td>
<td>8,099</td>
<td>1:3.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9,347</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>1: 6.3</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1: 8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>33,431</td>
<td>7,839</td>
<td>1:4.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15,954</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>1:13.4</td>
<td>1,757</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1: 9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>15,249</td>
<td>6,434</td>
<td>1:2.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9,018</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1: 9.9</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1:14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>21,585</td>
<td>5,505</td>
<td>1:3.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>23,019</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1:32.6</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1:34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>24,466</td>
<td>4,361</td>
<td>1:5.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33,471</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1:40.5</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1:25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>13,897</td>
<td>6,681</td>
<td>1:2.1</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1: 5.7</td>
<td>12,378</td>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>1: 6.3</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1:16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>10,599</td>
<td>4,921</td>
<td>1:2.1</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1: 2.0</td>
<td>13,661</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>1:10.2</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1:34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>9,990</td>
<td>4,994</td>
<td>1:2.0</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1: 3.0</td>
<td>12,611</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>1: 8.7</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1:24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>7,338</td>
<td>6,039</td>
<td>1:1.2</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1: 3.9</td>
<td>11,085</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1: 7.4</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1:39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>8,008</td>
<td>6,058</td>
<td>1:1.3</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1:54.8</td>
<td>11,892</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>1: 7.2</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1:25.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Notes:**

- **U.S.** Commissioner-General of Immigration *Annual Reports: 1920-29*, Table III.

- **b** Enumeration of English, Northern Irish, Scots, and Welsh is by country of last permanent residence.

- **c** Prior to 1925, the Northern Irish were not distinguished from the rest of Ireland.
greater economic opportunity in English cities.

Although pride in being British was never an English monopoly, the Englishman felt he had given up more than other Britons in leaving his native land. England was the most affluent part of the United Kingdom, leading in industrial development and production. London was not only the political, financial and cultural center of the British Isles but was the capital and mecca of the Commonwealth and Empire too. The United States had been a part of that British Empire, pioneered mostly by Englishmen in the beginning. The discovery that the largely homogenous nation of 1776 which had proclaimed its independence but had become a composite of several races with a distinct identity of its own—in some respects totally alien to the Englishman—was a cultural shock which many were unable to absorb and accept.

It is understandable, then, that American nationalism always seemed more abrasive to Englishmen because of England's historic pre-eminence and leadership of the English-speaking world. In the twenty years between the two world wars, British conventional wisdom has it that Britain's decline as a world power and her economic difficulties were not only the fault of her erstwhile enemy Germany—for disrupting the peace of the world and causing so much personal suffering among families—but also the greed and tardiness of the United States in failing to recognize its joint responsibility to defend the democratic principles it espoused so fulsomely, in concert with Britain and France.

Britons did not forget these grievances when they travelled overseas. Indeed, as expatriates of proud nations old and new, will assent,
there is nothing more likely than the typical immigrant experience to evoke romantic myths and awaken nationalistic loyalties, especially when the immigrant is faced with new and momentous problems, or an indifference to his background and former associations. People seldom reject their past absolutely.  

Those British immigrants who were unable to cross the cultural bridge—to become of America as well as in America—were more likely to retain the old resentments and prejudices, or maintain at least a wary and defensive perspective. Some of those who returned would echo an impassioned indictment such as the following:

... of all the ludicrous races now tenating the planet, the American ranks first in my calculations. Not diabolical or clever—rather, stupid and gullible. Not hardy and forthright, as the history books have it, but soft and bewildered. Not pioneers and experimenters, as my Manchester pedagogues once told me, but landgrabbers and imitators. 8

Such outbursts might rarely find their way into print in journals of restraint and fidelity but the American Mercury was never recognized by the public for the former quality, whatever its readers believed of its credibility. The article was published, of course, for its sheer provocative value and its editors were not disappointed. 9

7Personal interview by the author with British immigrants in Canada and the United States, 1947-77.

8"To Hell With America," By An Englishman, American Mercury, March, 1938, p. 308.

9The journal's "Open Forum" was lavish with space for reader comment in its May, 1938, issue. The general tone was of shock or anger but one reader thought it might be a hoax and another declaimed the journal as "sophomoric" for publishing the article.
The anonymous Englishman's claim that his cogent summation, "To Hell with America," was an attitude shared by "thousands, perhaps millions" of his fellow-countrymen is not likely ever to become documented as proof or falsehood, but Britons around the globe whether immigrant or native-born in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or in Africa or Asia, acknowledge its existence and recognize its unifying bond.

Nevertheless, the British immigrant in America, whether he be Englishman or otherwise, began his journey optimistically and usually determined to judge America fairly and without malice. After all, if he were successful in this new land he must have found America compatible in some respects. Inevitably, the pervasiveness of American culture would bring about changes in attitude, perhaps subtle and indistinct at first, yet inexorable and lasting.

The "Americanization" of Britons depended in most cases on their reception by Americans, socially, and their success in making a living in the United States. When the British were able to transcend the natural reticence and reserve for which they were notorious, their assimilation usually became a smooth and pleasant experience. In some cases, British immigrants arrived predisposed to admire and accept American values and standards because of harsh experiences at home. Gerald Fletcher, a young English businessman who came to the United States in the mid-1920's, provided a good example of this attitude.

Fletcher found the American scene stimulating, exciting and challenging. In America, he discovered, ability was the requisite to money and success, not a matter of whether the young man had
acquired the flavor, "like a cheese," of the establishment for which he worked. Denied a promotion in England because of his youth, he claimed, Fletcher went to America and doubled his starting salary—which was about the same that he had left—in less than a year. Within three years he had doubled that amount again. Jubilant at his success Fletcher declared:

If I had the temerity to walk into the office of an English business leader and tell him that I wanted a job, and that it was immaterial what the salary was so long as there would be an opportunity for me to be making two thousand [$10,000] a year before I was forty, he would probably telephone for the keepers from the lunatic asylum to come and take me away . . . . If a man is not worth two thousand a year, he will not get it anywhere. But if he is worth it, he is more likely to get it in America than anywhere else.10

Who could blame the young men of England for seeking opportunity elsewhere, Fletcher asked, if their own country offered little prospect to ambition and provided no incentive to remain at home. If English businessmen were at all concerned for profits, why did they not make things more attractive for those who can make profits for them—even if they happened to be young?

British resistance to change, felt Fletcher, was ingrained in business practices and would inevitably result in declining British prosperity in the face of foreign competition in manufactures and trade. A complacent belief in the superiority of British products would not solve the deficits faced by British Chancellors of the Exchequer. The country could no longer pretend to first-class status

and was in danger of slipping to third-class rank. The prospect did not appeal to him:

... although a great many second and third-rate powers are quite nice countries in which to live for those who worship their country as the heathens worship false gods, they are not suitable for such as me.

I would rather live in a country of force without background than in one of background without force; a country which is a rising power than a country which is a fading one—even if the fading is due to an effort to act the gentleman.\[11\]

Fletcher's rebellion against hidebound tradition was no isolated instance. In a sense, most emigrants rejected the Establishment in their native lands whether their countries were rising or falling in relative power. Emigrants left their homes out of personal frustration or dissatisfaction for existing circumstances in their homelands. They were anti-traditionalists, however, not so much because they disapproved the social order or philosophic rigidity as because they played no authoritative role in it. For example, the younger sons of landowning families in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England often chose emigration over a life of dependency on the provisions of inheriting elder brothers. Again, most English seventeenth-century religious dissenters would have preferred accommodation and compromise within the existing hierarchy to exclusion in the colonies. Nevertheless, by their act of emigration, colonists grasped an opportunity to escape these frustrations and dissatisfaction and to set up similar societies in which they would be the leaders and impose their selection upon

\[11\] Ibid., p. 232.
As in earlier times, British emigrants in the twentieth century were motivated primarily by social and economic considerations rather than ideological beliefs. The questionnaire survey discussed in the next chapter makes it clear that economic opportunity surpassed all other considerations in the decision to take up residence in the United States. British arrivals showed little or no knowledge of American political institutions and little real interest. They had not fled political persecution and it would not occur to them to think of British justice as anything but fair, impartial and unimpeachable. Making a living with sufficient compensation to enjoy the greater material benefits of American society and the time to appreciate these rewards were their prime objectives, free from the limitations of practiced economy by government and business and the age-old discriminations.

In actuality, relatively few British immigrants contacted had experienced discrimination in Great Britain personally. The English, in particular, were acutely aware of rank and instinctively identified one another by bearing, dress and features so that the embarrassments of contact might be avoided. If recognition was necessary, then it could be signalled in the appropriate manner, and should conversation follow, the proprieties of the occasion would be observed. The English in America usually found it difficult to adjust to a system in which social status could be purchased through the acquisition of wealth.

The typical British immigrant since 1920 came from a middle class or lower middle class background if he were a white-collar worker or from the working class if he were a blue-collar tradesman, skilled or
otherwise. Each was class conscious but none was more painfully aware of social and economic discrimination in Britain than the so-called lower class. The "upward mobility" of the working-class Briton was severely constricted by the rigidity of custom. The vast discrepancies in British public education perpetuated class divisions by design, rationalized by the governing and managerial classes as inevitable because of the country's need to practice economy. Protesting Britain's "rigidly hierarchical way," British educator Tyrrell Burgess, a former news editor of the Times Educational Supplement, declared in 1963:

The two big defects of British education are poverty and rigidity. Poverty shows itself, at compulsory school age, in teeming classes and unwholesome buildings. . . . Rigidity is due partly to poverty and partly to tradition. If there is not enough to go round, the decisions you make about who is to get what's going tend to be irrevocable. But on top of these there are plenty of British educators who believe that only a relative few should be educated carefully and in detail, anyway. So time-honoured arrangements and institutions must be preserved.12

As a result of the system of selectivity, Burgess showed, approximately 8 percent of British schoolchildren went on to receive a higher education, compared with 25 percent or higher in the United States, where public education was open and dynamic.13 Even a completed high school education was beyond the prospects of most British children in the 1960's. Ralph Denton, an educationally-disadvantaged British immigrant to California in 1956, made this comparison of the British and


13 Ibid., p. 12.
American systems based upon his experience:

I was born in Whitechapel, in one of the poorest areas of East London. At age 15 school was over for me and I could see no opportunity for a worthwhile career in England. So I signed on a freighter and went off to see the world. I received a permit to stay in California and took a Bachelor of Nursing degree in Sacramento while I worked at odd jobs. I became interested in the work of the Seventh Day Adventists and I'm now a field director of our drug-abuse program, Crusade Against Drugs. I just don't think such a career would have been possible for me in England. Social work is usually done there by voluntary groups such as the Society of Friends or by the do-gooder type of person who doesn't need to work for money—it becomes a kind of a penance for them.14

Gerry Jordan, another immigrant from a London working-class district, added these comments:

I was born in the East End of London, near the docks. When I was 15 I took a "mock-up" matric., which included English, French and Mathematics. I did well but ambition doesn't count for much if you are from the working class in England. You are judged by the way you speak. People there are very accent conscious and I was a Cockney.

I went to Jamaica first and got into the hotel business. In Canada I sold magazines door to door and taught dancing. I'm in the travel business now, in Hawaii, and have never found that lack of a higher level of education limited a man's progress in America. It's what you can do and have done that impresses people in this country. And that's the way it should be.15

At the other end of the British social scale stood immigrant Alan Pryce-Jones, a journalist and former editor of the London Times.'

14Ralph Denton, personal interview with the author, Honolulu, Hawaii, June, 1976.

Literary Supplement. Jones left England not as a young man like the two East London boys but at the mature age of 50 to accept a position with the Ford Foundation in New York. He had made several previous visits to the United States which had led him to contrast his own life in London to those of Americans in his own profession and he became restless and fascinated by his discovery of the real rather than the superficial differences between the two countries. Resistance to change was a fact of British life Jones became aware in his trans-Atlantic travels. Americans easily discarded the unworkable, the obsolete. Whereas England asked "why?", America asked "why not?" England placed quality before logic; never questioned the dictum that the "old ways," the tried and true, were best. Prudent hesitation, however, was often no more than laziness. Jones blamed "national apathy" for the survival of Britain's "caste system," although he admitted it made for order, easier relationships, and was more workable socially and in business.¹⁶

Eventually, Jones made his decision to leave England permanently. His chief motivation, he wrote, was need for a change, for stimulation. His life in London was too secure, easy, uneventful. His background, which he described as upper-middle class, afforded his education at Eton and Oxford. As the son of a colonel in the Coldstream Guards, Jones could have chosen an Army career, while his education made certain a prominent place in the professions. He had done well, but he became unsettled in his middle years. He had resisted the siren song of the

Like a middle-aged man who has taken a young bride, Jones discovered a lightness in his step and an exuberance and verve for life that he had almost forgotten. He could not entirely transcend his instincts and his old senses of value, however. He became acutely aware of both the joys and the irritations of New York. Reared on the sanctity of quality, he was disturbed that New York rather easily accepted the "second-rate," but New York was a more interesting place to live and work. "The inertia of Europe," he found, "has not crossed the Atlantic with the Mercedes Benz, vodka and Pucci prints."\(^{17}\)

Looking back at England from New York Jones believed change was necessary but impossible as long as all classes of British society placed continuity of tradition above the needs of the times. The author believes it would be more accurate to state that all classes of British society acquiesced in the maintenance of the status quo. Britain's population, like that of Germany, was and is fundamentally passive. Both have greater respect for authority than the United States, a country which constantly affirms constitutional guarantees against authority, or excessive exercise of it in the name of law and order.

The god of tradition was evoked by American political analysts in their inquiries into British behavior during times of national stress. The protests at the time of the Suez debacle were orderly. The vast majority of the people polled who "thought" of emigrating did not go. They would "wait and see." George F. Will, a commentator for

\(^{17}\text{Ibid.}\)
Newsweek, related Britain's calm acceptance of its perennial economic difficulties to a traditional resistance to thinking in economic terms. "Damned dots" was what Lord Randolph Churchill called decimal points when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. Plain inefficiency was at the root of the problem, asserted Will, quite apart from the "debilitating silliness" of socialism:

A thousand years of history have produced a society deficient in those socially useful forms of controlled aggression (striving, coveting, risk-taking, competing) that bring a nation's economic life to a rolling boil. But it is idle to say that a nation's character is the nation's defect. 18

There were plenty of Britons at home and in America whose blood might come to a rolling boil upon reading Will's appraisal. Another example of American insolence, members of the older generation would say. The moment of anger would pass, however, in serene disregard for the more vulgar manifestations of life.

Probably no diversion more perfectly or more aesthetically expresses the British spirit of withdrawal from the mundane as the time-honored sport of cricket. Meticulous attention is paid to dress of the players, who must all appear in white flannels, white shirts, and white leather boots or shoes and wear nothing likely to distract the eye while on the field. Cricket is teamwork, the point being to defeat the opposing eleven honorably and as decorously as possible.

American spectators at these rituals are fascinated by the restraint of British cricket crowds. Few Americans have seen the game played on

fields in the United States, and very many fewer have ever participated as players. Cricket is still played in America in 1976, mainly in California, Hawaii, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, though the lack of interest displayed by more than a handful of Americans together with a diminishing number of new immigrants does not bode well for its continuance far into the future. The game in California derived most of its publicity—entirely unsought, naturally—from the British film colony in Hollywood, led by the ubiquitous C. Aubrey Smith, Knight of the British Empire. Curious onlookers could watch the white-clad figures at play on the sports fields of U.C.L.A. every Sunday prior to World War II.¹⁹

British movie actors and actresses in Hollywood have been nationally respected and locally esteemed, as professionals and as individuals. In a nostalgic review of the British colony, Geoffrey Bocca wrote that this was particularly true of the pre-war generation of British expatriates in Hollywood. C. Aubrey Smith, veteran actor and symbol of British propriety became its unofficial mentor. Bocca contrasted the loyalty of the group around Smith in the interwar years with the "detached, unsentimental middle and lower-middle class of the post-1945 group in Hollywood." Bocca commended the "manners, clothes, style and taste" of Smith, Bruce, Brook, Coleman, Grant, Niven and Denny and castigated the "rudeness of Mason, the disloyalty of Granger and Simmons, the bad conduct of Newley, Newton, Burton and Taylor."

The former preserved a corner of respect for Britain in Hollywood,

¹⁹Geoffrey Bocca, "They Kept the Old Flag Flying; The British Colony of Hollywood," Horizon, V (September, 1963), 74-81.
men and women who kept British allegiance and customs.20

Precisely because these movie stars were known as British, they were not expected to give up their customs and conform to American styles and manners. They would have lost their charm to attract by doing so. Most European stars, especially the Garbo's, Bergman's, Gabor's and Chevalier's might also indulge their national idiosyncracies and be loved for them. Not so the lowly immigrant, who could expect censure for failure to take "Americanization" seriously, especially if he or she were a long-time resident of the United States.

Movie star idolatry and the hero worship accorded outstanding figures in the field of sport has often been cited by social and political commentators in the United States as evidence of Americans' need to elevate an elite above the mass of democratic society—compensation perhaps for the lost majesty of royalty when this was repudiated in 1776. Britons have been surprised and amused by what they view as an American fetish for symbols of monarchy—the queens and princesses of the campus and beauty pageant, and the exalted members of social and business clubs.

Many of these fetishes were begun in the make-believe world created by and around the movie industry in Southern California when it moved there from New York, early in the twentieth century. New York still possessed its magic for young English secretaries with their spirit of adventure and middle-aged malcontents alike in the in the years after World War II, but the rapid industrial development

\[20\text{Ibid.}\]
of Southern California together with its salubrious climate proved more than a match for America's largest city in its power to attract the British immigrant.

Thus it is in recognition of British immigrants' growing preference for Pacific region destinations\textsuperscript{21} and for other reasons explained earlier in the Introduction, that the questionnaire survey, discussed and analyzed in the next chapter, focuses upon the British experience in the Pacific coast states and Hawaii.

\textsuperscript{21}As illustrated in Table 30, p. 208.
Chapter V

British "Invisible Immigrants" Discovered

The purpose of this study's questionnaire and interview survey was to ascertain three major facets of British immigration to the Pacific Coast states and Hawaii between 1920 and 1975; motivation, destination, and subsequent experience. In addition, information as to the subject's age, sex, marital status, education and usual occupation was gathered in order to give the survey a more individualistic and personal character. 1

Of the 244 persons who constituted the British group surveyed, 85 were males, 90 were females, and 69 were children under eighteen years of age. The marital status of the adults was as follows: single, widowed, or divorced males, 27; married males, 58; single, widowed, or divorced females, 27; married females, 63. Table 5 shows the age of the whole group at the time of their entry to the United States.

TABLE 5

BRITISH IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: AGE AT TIME OF IMMIGRATION a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade of entry</th>
<th>Under</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60 &amp; above</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 aQuestionnaire survey and personal interviews with the author, October 1975-March, 1977; hereafter cited as "questionnaire survey." (For United States Immigration Service statistics on British immigrants by age and sex, see Appendix C, Table 28.)

1 See Appendix B.
The total group represented a wide diversity of occupations, as seen in Table 6:

**TABLE 6**

**BRITISH IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED:**
**USUAL OCCUPATION AT TIME OF IMMIGRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Non-Professional Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educator</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Salesmen</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Domestic servant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Office clerk</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. engineer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Communications operator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Draftsman</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lumberman</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Photographer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Telephone technician</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Air pilot</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Air stewardess</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering technician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Librarian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Beautician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Diver</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dressmaker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fashion model</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gardener</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hair stylist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hospital orderly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marine engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Railroad engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ship's captain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X-ray technician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Housewives, children,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and no occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                          |        | Total:                         | 182    |

*a* Questionnaire survey.

*b* Includes 41 housewives, 69 children, and 5 of unstated or no occupation.
The wide diversity in occupations of the adult British immigrants shown in Table 6 reflect a varied educational background. All but nine of the professional group were college graduates. Among the non-professionals, totalling 113 adults—including housewives and those stating no occupation—51 had completed a secondary school education in private or public British schools, while a further 15 had received vocational training. Low level achievers were more numerous among the immigrants of the earlier decades. Group levels of attainment are shown in Table 7.

**TABLE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRITISH IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS ATTAINED*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than secondary                                     28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary only                                          51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training                                     15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college                                            6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First degree                                            23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced degree(s)                                      30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstated                                                22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>                                               <strong>175</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Questionnaire survey.

The future prospects of British immigrants, like those of American-born residents of the United States depended largely on their educational attainment and occupational experience. Although most immigrants came to take up better jobs and improve their material prospects and living conditions, many immigrants sought employment in particular locations where they might avail themselves of special educational opportunities. Others discovered a purpose in expanding their educational horizons after their arrival. Further education was usually undertaken with a practical
purpose in mind, such as gaining knowledge for a better job in a new or related field. An English girl who came to San Francisco from Quebec commented:

Education was not a factor in my decision to come to San Francisco but I attended the University of California at Berkeley part-time while I was working and finished an M.B.A. I am now a management science analyst and I have a new world of opportunities.  

Another English resident of Canada found a new career in the United States as a result of attending school on a part-time basis:

A vacation in Hawaii in 1964 made me determined to return here. I had become tired of running a business that had lost its challenge. I held several good positions as an accountant while going to the university to broaden my qualifications in another business specialty. At the time I finished my B.B.A. I was working at Queen's Hospital. I had become so interested in public health as a field that I took a master's degree in it, then taught other students the same course the next semester! Now I am teaching and administering a health training program for the State.  

As might be expected, educational motives were more usually expressed by academics seeking professional advancement and/or better research opportunities in the United States. A Scottish professor of chemistry stated his reason for emigration as follows:

I was interested in the work of Dr. Linus Pauling at Cal. Tech. He was chairman of the Chemistry Department when I met him and this led to an offer to join the staff. The equipment, research facili-

2Mary Carryer, personal interview with the author, San Francisco, August, 1976. All interviews and correspondence were conducted by the author—footnotes hereafter are abbreviated "interview", or "correspondence."

3Geoffrey Linton, interview, Honolulu, June, 1975.
ties, and general conditions of contract were far superior to what I had been used to.\(^4\)

Exceptional research opportunities also attracted an English sociologist:

I left England in 1958 and spent 15 years in Malaysia before coming to Hawaii. I was attracted by interesting research possibilities and I like to live in a multi-racial society.\(^5\)

Overwhelmingly, however, the motives of the respondents were economic, as has been traditionally the case for Europeans bound for the New World. It is true, of course, that in the case of family migrations the economic incentive rested primarily with the breadwinner—that frequently wives expressed no other motive than to be with their husbands and that children of school age played little or no part in any family decision to emigrate. Single females of working age were found to be less concerned with money-making than single males, in this survey, especially if they belonged to the nonprofessional category. The "spirit of adventure" and thoughts of marriage, children, and home-making made the single girl's outlook more tentative and subjective. Nevertheless, as Table 8 indicates, the economic motive was acknowledged with greater frequency than any other. Respondents usually checked more than one item of motivation, however. In many cases, nonworking wives indicated economic motives shared with their husbands in addition to "family ties." Dissatisfaction with conditions at home—in employment or in a general sense with living conditions in the country—gave

\(^4\) John Watt, Pasadena, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.

\(^5\) Harold Prowse, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.

79
TABLE 8

BRITISH IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED:
MOTIVES FOR EMIGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Times cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Better jobs</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To improve future prospects</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Better living conditions</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Family ties or friends</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Educational opportunities</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Dissatisfaction with home conditions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other reasons</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aQuestionnaire survey (175 adults responding).

many emigrants the "push" that started them on their journey in search of better material circumstances in the United States and better prospects for their children. In most cases, British immigrants were qualified, experienced workers who had little difficulty in finding better jobs in their fields or employment which held more promise of advancement than the positions they had vacated in the British Isles.

The responses of British immigrants revealed most did not have employment in the United States secured prior to their arrival. A "better job" was cited only fifty-one times in the survey although this did not necessarily mean that only fifty-one persons interviewed came to secured employment. Immigrants sometimes accepted job offers that failed to compare in their functions, responsibilities and compensation with their British employment—provided it seemed likely that promotion would be rapid and surpass that anticipated at home. Dissatisfaction with conditions at home was a strong factor in these instances.

The majority of British immigrants interviewed indicated by their
responses that they were confident of early success in their pursuit of employment in their particular fields. Frequently immigrants accepted unrelated employment for the sake of conserving their funds. Expenses, like income, were found to be generally higher in the United States than in Great Britain.

Concern for material comfort was by far the most frequently mentioned and implied factor in each of the items a, b, c, and f, described in Table 8. This was particularly in evidence in subsequent conversations with British immigrants of the 1950's and 1960's. The hardships and trials endured from 1939 to 1945 extended like a blight through much of the post-war decade in Britain and the hopes for a return of material prosperity and national prestige were continually being disappointed. The illusion of national strength and prosperity was maintained for some Britons during the interwar period, 1919-1939, especially in the 1930's, when the home islands were receiving more immigrants from the British Dominions and the United States than were emigrating in the other direction. Yet unemployment in the 1920's was remembered coldly by some immigrants of that decade:

There were so many unemployed miners and ship-builders in Scotland after the First World War that everyone started to leave. Many of us came to work on the sugar plantations of the Big Island of Hawaii—the Hamakua coast on the Big Island is still known locally as the "Scotch coast" because so many of us settled there in the early 'twenties.6

Scotland was a depressed area all through the 1920's. I was trained as a Chartered Accountant. The only thing to do was to walk Samuel Johnson's

"noblest prospect"—the high road to England, or go overseas. 7

I returned to the locomotive works at Luton, Beds., after three years in France fighting "the Hun" only to find my job taken and high unemployment. I was hired as a "spare" on call-out but soon realized it was no place for me.

Government economies in military budgets following "the war to end all wars" ended the careers of two Royal Air Force pilots:

I resigned my commission in the R.A.F. in 1929 because I could see no future for the Service in England. 9

I was one of the youngest pilots ever to join the Royal Flying Corps as it was called then, at 17 years old. I saw action in France at 18, and probably would have stayed indefinitely in the Service after the war if the Labour Government hadn't practically disbanded the Service in carrying out its foolhardy disarmament policy. 10

Frustration, disappointment and disillusionment were widespread in the second post-war period too, after 1945:

Before the war I was apprenticed to Post Office Telephone Engineering. In 1945, I returned to the Post Office after service in the R.A.F., and soon found that the government was suspending all expansion for fifteen years. It took at least two years on the waiting list to get a telephone installed after the war. I became discouraged and decided to sound out the chances of emigrating to California where we had family friends. 11

---

7 John Ednie, Honolulu, correspondence, October, 1975.
8 Fred Wales, Los Angeles, correspondence, December, 1975.
9 Bob Halleck, interview, Honolulu, October, 1975.
10 Keith Tennant, Berkeley, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
11 Ron Tomlinson, Los Angeles, Ca., correspondence, November, 1975.
I was one of the British schoolchildren evacuated by the government to Canada during the war. When I went back I studied architecture at Oxford but found job opportunities very limited when I graduated. I was offered a job in Philadelphia--then I went out to San Francisco after a year.\textsuperscript{12}

In spite of all we went through--people seemed content to go back to the old ways. I felt my children would have a better future away from class-conscious U.K. Also there are so many vocations that one can take up here that simply don't exist in Britain.\textsuperscript{13}

I became very dissatisfied with the situation in Britain. The social environment in the late 40's and early 50's was that the public was entitled to (anything) since it was their right. The Labour Government used this phrase repeatedly. People are entitled to rewards for their contributions, not as an inherent right. The removal of self respect of an individual, with progressive dependency on government to provide the necessities of life is a malignant process, destroying societies, witness the loss of status of Britain, loss of self-respect seen in Newfoundland after their joining Canada. Parasitism, by greedy and slothful people, upon the thinking, working minority will eventually sap the strength of any society, as it does in an organism.\textsuperscript{14}

An English immigrant in her mid-forties also commented on the decline of English morality:

The social climate is still as chilly as the weather. The war and the hardships endured since then seem to have sapped all vitality out of the country. No one seems to care, either, which I find is the most disturbing thing about it.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Geoffrey Paterson, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.

\textsuperscript{13}Jean Ainlay, interview, Seattle, Wa., August, 1976.

\textsuperscript{14}James D. Bramhall, Portland, Or., correspondence, January, 1976.

\textsuperscript{15}Gillian Bennett, interview, North Hollywood, Ca., August, 1976.
A more recent immigrant to California, in 1975, ventured his motives for emigration as follows:

I've had a varied background, from ladies' hairdressing to insurance and property development in England. I did pretty well during the 'sixties but I suffered very heavy losses in 1972 and then when the oil embargo was on I lost a fortune. There was terrific financial oppression, rising inflation and a penalizing of those who wanted to make money. It became hopeless.\textsuperscript{16}

The foregoing comments reveal a considerable depth of dissatisfaction with conditions in the British Isles during the period of this study. "Getting away from it all" was a strong propellant sending Britons south and east to Africa and Australia and west to Canada and the United States. It is noteworthy that one-third of the survey's respondents came to the United States following a sojourn in one of the Commonwealth countries:

My husband and I came to Portland, Oregon, from South Africa but we were both born in England, and educated there. We decided to emigrate to the United States because we were apprehensive about the race problem in South Africa and friends assured us we would have no difficulty finding a job here.\textsuperscript{17}

There was plenty of work in Australia while I was there—until very recently it was the only Commonwealth country still actively pursuing a promotional policy to attract immigrants. Compared to England I found the landscape unbelievably drab and dreary. There is a lack of local color and I noticed that the people themselves, in the cities, seemed restless and unsure of themselves.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16}Michael Sandground, interview, Canoga Park, Ca., August, 1976.

\textsuperscript{17}Edith Grisewood, Portland, Or., correspondence, January, 1976.

\textsuperscript{18}Gordon Bryant, Honolulu, correspondence, October, 1975.
My husband is in the advertising business. We went out to Canada in 1966, to Vancouver, to get away from a number of things—bad weather, family dissention, the limitations on enterprise and looked forward to a fresh start in a young country. After two years my husband felt his career would be advanced by joining an agency with larger accounts in the United States. His enquiries brought him an offer in San Francisco. 19

I was a gardener on Lady Dalkeith's estate in Scotland when a friend of mine in the nursery business went out to Canada and wrote for me to join him. We did all right but decided to move to the states when we heard that business was much better there. We went first to New York where we met other British friends and decided to go out to California together. I was in business in Pasadena until a year ago. 20

Most of the preceding statements from British respondents to the survey have indicated some concern for "getting ahead" professionally or within a vocation, and to improve prospects for themselves and their families. They expressed belief or confidence in being able to secure congenial employment that would support greater affluence than they were able to enjoy at home. Some stressed political disenchantment as their reason for leaving Britain, some expressed dissatisfaction with the state of the job market, industrial development and distribution of wealth, while others criticized the lethargy of British workers, lack of initiative of the people and general apathy that pervaded the country. Britons who came to the United States via Commonwealth countries were also attracted by professional or educational opportunities, by a desire to enjoy a higher living standard

20 Peter Sims, interview, Sierra Madre, Ca., August, 1976.
and by the knowledge that money brought into the country could be taken out without restriction—a penalty of which many seemed unaware when they attempted to transfer funds from Rhodesia, South Africa and Australia, in particular. Britons who had emigrated to Canada because of the relative ease of return to the homeland compared to African and Australian destinations could migrate to the United States and still maintain this closeness while reaping the additional benefits they sought.

A number of interesting and informative responses were received, however, from persons who were not primarily motivated by economic considerations. In some cases it was apparent that respondents were either persons of substantial means or simply bored with their lives. A Harley Street (London) specialist wrote:

In 1938 I was practising medicine in London and had a house in Beacon's Park. I had a chance to go on a world cruise as the ship's doctor so I left my practice in the hands of a colleague and was away for a year. I stayed in England during the war years but was convinced in 1946 there would be another war before long so decided to get out while I could. 21

A Honolulu physicist told the author:

I simply became totally and utterly bored by my surroundings. I had gone as far as I could go—I had reached the top in my field by the time I was thirty. I was simply bored as hell—call it male menopause if you will. 22

Decisions for emigration were not always premeditated, as the following comments indicate:

21Clement Nicory, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.

22Fred Greenwall, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.
I suppose you could call it the spirit of adventure that brought me to America. I landed in New York and have travelled all over the country. I have never really thought in terms of making more money. I have always been able to save enough to go on somewhere else when I want to.23

I didn't come to America as an immigrant but I eventually stayed. I first came here with the Egyptian minister to the British legation in Washington. I also lived in Greece and Turkey and went to China after Washington before returning to America.24

The Society of Friends asked me to assist them as an administrator in Philadelphia after the war. I lived in Philadelphia at different times and in overseas missions after I myself became a Quaker. I am on my way back to Philadelphia now after a three-year tour in Hawaii.25

Health reasons prompted the emigration of some respondents:

My parents sent me to New York right after the war to stay with some distant relatives who had offered to look after me so I could regain my health. I had not been able to get the proper foods during rationing in wartime Britain. I was nineteen at the time. The following year my new family decided to move to California because they thought I needed a warmer and drier climate.26

I was twelve years old when my stepfather brought my mother to California for the sake of her health.27

Interest in California for reasons of health and climate figured prominently in respondents' answers to the second major facet of the

23Nora Syme, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.
24Edith Hansen, interview, Sierra Madre, Ca., August, 1976.
26Patricia Weinbaum, Santa Monica, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
27Howard Smith, Burlingame, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
survey—that dealing with immigrants choice of destination.

TABLE 9

BRITISH IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN CHOICE OF DESTINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration</th>
<th>Times cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Convenience to place of employment</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Climate</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Physical environment</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Family or friends</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Other reasons</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Questionnaire survey (175 adults).*

The British were attracted especially to Southern California because of the fortunate combination of superior climate and economic opportunity. Family and friends resident in the area added strongly to their choosing this destination. The preference for Southern California is revealed in census statistics as indicated in Table 10.

It will be noted that only one city in Northern California, San Jose, increased its number of British-born in 1970 while only one city in Southern California, Pasadena, had fewer British-born in 1970 than it had in 1920. Most California cities reflect the results of heavy immigration in the 1920's in the census for 1930 while the 1940 census shows a population decline among the British-born due to very low immigration during the depression decade and to natural death rates among the older immigrant population. The smaller volume of post-World War II immigration from Britain than that of the 1920's is revealed in the census figures for 1950. The moderate flow of British immigration between 1950 and 1970 is reflected in the census of the latter year but
**TABLE 10**

**URBAN "PLACES" WITH 1,000 OR MORE BRITISH-BORN RESIDENTS**

(CALIFORNIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern California</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>6,798</td>
<td>8,713</td>
<td>6,698</td>
<td>5,223</td>
<td>1,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>14,121</td>
<td>18,392</td>
<td>13,541</td>
<td>9,662</td>
<td>5,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern California</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burbank</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glendale</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>1,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>4,097</td>
<td>3,431</td>
<td>3,731</td>
<td>3,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>14,937</td>
<td>32,452</td>
<td>28,080</td>
<td>25,710</td>
<td>22,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>1,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>2,317</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td>3,497</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>4,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>1,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Monica</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>2,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrance</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates fewer than 1,000 British-born residents.

It is also evident that Britons followed the movement from the central cities to the suburbs during this period—even to smaller cities outside metropolitan areas, e.g. San Jose and Santa Barbara.

The climate, employment conditions and opportunities and the gen-
eral living style of California were mentioned most frequently by respondents to the questionnaire:

We moved from London to Victoria, B.C., in 1958 at the urging of my wife's brother. We liked very much but found the climate too damp. I managed to get a job as a draftsman with the city of Los Angeles and since coming down here my wife's health has been much better.28

I was 23 years old and came to Los Angeles in 1923 because we heard of the wonderful climate and great opportunities for young people.29

I graduated from the London School of Journalism and am now a travel counsellor in Los Angeles. I was attracted to California because of the climate and friends here who wanted me to come out.30

I became bored with my life as a secretary in London. I like the sun and joined the California throng. I had some family here but knew them only slightly from a visit they made to England a few years ago.31

This is the only place to live where you can find out what's going on and be available if there is work to be had. I'm an entertainer and you have to be visible to be remembered. I think life is great here. I especially like being able to play tennis all year round.32

In 1952 I was able to visit my relatives in Venice, California, for several months and worked in a hospital. This experience made me realize the advantages of living in California. The weather was superb compared to the English climate, the working conditions much more friendly, and much more modern.

28George McCarten, interview, Glendale, Ca., August, 1976.
29Alice Child, Ventura, Ca., correspondence, December, 1975.
30Susan Sherman, interview, West Los Angeles, Ca., August, 1976.
32Peter Knowles, interview, Burbank, Ca., August, 1976.
and my credentials as an X-ray technician very acceptable. I returned to Britain in 1953 convinced I wanted to live in California but didn't get back until 1956, after I was married to an electronics engineer who was dissatisfied with his job and future prospects in England.33

A combination of beneficent climate, attractive living conditions and beautiful physical environment lured many Britons from different parts of the world to the islands of Hawaii between 1920 and 1975:

I received a high school education in Scotland then articled with a firm for six years until I received my diploma as a Chartered Accountant, in 1929. Many friends had talked about Hawaii and I was attracted by the thought of the climate and the beauty of the islands. I was also led to believe, quite correctly as it turned out, that there were better prospects of employment with one of the large industrial firms like C. Brewer or Alexander and Baldwin.34

I have done consulting work as an engineer in the Middle East, the Solomons, England and Australia. We settled in Hawaii because we like Pacific life and music and because we find things progressive here. Also there is the beautiful climate.35

My husband and I left the U.K. in 1955 to go out to Australia. We lived there nine years then had the opportunity to come to Hawaii to open up an office for our company. The weather is good here, most of the advantages of American life are available without many of its less pleasing aspects. We don't mind the slower pace of life--coming from Australia we are used to getting things done in Hawaiian time.36

33Celia Thompson; Santa Monica, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
34David Watson, Honolulu, correspondence, November, 1975.
35Joseph Bryant, Honolulu, correspondence, November, 1975.
36Joyce Watson, interview, Kailua, Hawaii, October, 1975.
My wife and I were both born of British parents in Singapore and grew up there. Hawaii has a better climate than Singapore and there is less political tension here. We feel comfortable in a multi-racial society.37

Third major facet of the questionnaire's concern was to record the subsequent experience of the British immigrant and to ascertain his or her own assessment of their decision to emigrate in terms of economic gain and social and cultural expansion. The questionnaire also asked the immigrant's intentions as to permanency of residence in the United States and naturalization. The responses of the 175 adults in the group are shown in Table 11.

### TABLE 11

**BRITISH IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: DECISION & CONSEQUENCES OF EMIGRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sure</th>
<th>Unstated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(a) Do you now view your decision to emigrate positively?</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(b) Have your expectations been fulfilled in terms of economic progress?</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(c) In terms of social and cultural expansion?</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(d) Do you expect to remain in the United States permanently?</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(e) Will you become a U.S. citizen when eligible?</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aQuestionnaire survey (175 adults)*

At the time of preparing the questionnaire the author believed immigrants would be able to answer items in question 9 with a minimum of equivocation. Knowledge acquired through prior contacts seemed to suggest that unless the immigrant experience was very unfortunate or disappointing in general economic, social or cultural terms, he or she would certainly respond positively and affirmatively to item 9(a). Those with bitter, negative experiences usually returned to their homelands. All three who answered question 9(a) negatively, stated their intention to return home, considering their experience a failure in terms of making a successful adjustment. The question called for a general conclusion, which perhaps might have been placed more logically following those questions eliciting particular experience.

It was anticipated that answers to particular reference would reveal varying degrees of affirmation but most persons who responded to the questionnaire acknowledged success in economic terms. Promotions, increased incomes, material acquisitions made possible by greater purchasing power than they had known in Britain and the dynamism of American business practices were all mentioned in correspondence and interviews:

We sold our home near London in 1949 and moved, me, husband, and baby to Los Angeles. Ron filled in time gift-wrapping for the May Company while his references and qualifications were being checked by Pacific Telephone. Once he was hired by the Company he never looked back. He found that his British training in the Post Office Telephone service had been more comprehensive than that received by most of the Company's employees and it helped him get ahead. He soon started moving, being promoted around the country until he became Chief Engineer in Texas. He is now Vice-President with

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an overseas telephone company.\textsuperscript{38}

I think a person can get to the top in most countries if he is willing to make the necessary sacrifices and has a little more than average intelligence. It seems more common among people in the United States to assume one another to have high aspirations and ambitions than in many other countries. The belief that anything is possible in the United States is still prevalent, I find. People here are admired for not being content to settle for what they have.\textsuperscript{39}

I wanted to live on the west coast and find the San Francisco Bay area a very attractive location. Life here has been stimulating and rewarding in every sense. The cost of living is high here but salaries are also higher and you keep more of what you earn. British taxes are so oppressive.\textsuperscript{40}

Although I have been here only a year, I feel completely at home and can say it has been a good move in every way.\textsuperscript{41}

Accompanying the quicker promotions and better compensations in American business were greater expectations on the part of employers, Britons discovered, especially in decision-making and personal dedication. The assumption by employers that their workers were vitally concerned in the growth and fortunes of the company was novel and challenging to Britons generally. While the relationship between company prosperity and personal welfare seemed obvious to Americans, Britons had no great appreciation of the connection in their past experience.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{38} Gwen Tomlinson, Los Angeles, correspondence, January, 1976.

\textsuperscript{39} Geoffrey Linton, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{40} Mary Carryer, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{41} Susan Sherman, \textit{op. cit.}
\end{footnotes}
A job was a job and usually nothing more. Few British employers sought to develop the relationship through employee involvement in company affairs, policies, or investment. Especially since 1945, the welfare state in Britain seemed to have been the major factor in de-personalizing employer-employee relations. The interdependence of each became less and less apparent to the worker and employer alike.

While Britons generally found American business practices dynamic, and personally elevating and broadening in the recognition they received, they expressed greater ambivalence with respect to their social and cultural experience. Virtually all those interviewed in the survey experienced an initial period of suspension—a feeling of separateness while roots were being established and associations formed. Naturally, the more extroverted overcame cultural hurdles more quickly than the conservative and reticent. Single men found it easier to make friends than single women because of the social inhibitions placed upon women seeking introductions. In the case of married couples, however, non-working wives sometimes made social contacts more readily than their working husbands, especially if they had children of school age. Mothers would become acquainted with other residents of the neighborhood through contact with the school friends of their children. An English mother in California who had lived previously in New Zealand told the author that cultural adjustment to the United States had been easier for her than it had been in New Zealand, despite her expectations to the contrary. Although New Zealand was a "British" country, with the European population very largely British, its geographic isolation and agricultural pursuits had produced somewhat insular ways of thinking and preserved habits and customs that were
"twenty or thirty years behind the times." She continued:

We didn't have much money when we came here but we were amazed to find how easily we could afford to buy commodities that would have been out of our price range in New Zealand. Any quality goods were very expensive down there.

We met people through our children and through the church group. I worked as a secretary when I first came here too, which helped me get to know people. Everyone was very friendly and my "English accent" was an open sesame—people seemed to be fascinated by it. ⁴²

Other nonworking wives reported similar experiences with regard to their receptions in the communities—neighbors were friendly, helpful, and curious.

The cultural adjustment of the working husband was more difficult to ascertain. Aside from the immediate imperatives of smooth communication—such as learning to write the month before the date and substituting "zee" for "zed" in the alphabet, British men seldom made friends of their business associates and tended to strike up friendships with other Britshers they met in the daily round of commuting, lunch hours and business connections. ⁴³ This tendency was more evident among professionals and those at management levels in business, than among tradesmen and younger men.

Like their working fathers, British children were abruptly immersed in a world of unfamiliar contexts—systems, customs, idioms of speech, and differences in ways of thinking. Like their parents,


⁴³ One British resident told the author that he was still confused by the order of writing dates after twelve years in the United States.
American children could be friendly, helpful, and curious. Like children everywhere, on the other hand, they could be indifferent, unthinking, or cruel. The acceptance of British children by their peers was generally related to the formers' willingness to adopt local tastes and styles. Being so obviously different, in appearance and speech, the imperative for British children to conform was stronger than for local children. Excellence in school performances, especially in athletics, and an amiable disposition was usually the best guarantee of acceptance.

Although the numbers of men and women contacted was approximately the same, the author found that British women were generally more responsive to questioning and curious as to the purpose of the survey and its outcome. In particular, women showed greater interest in considering their replies to questions concerning cultural adjustment—possibly because women are assumed to place greater emphasis upon the home and neighborhood environment. The importance of the home and school made housewives more sensitive to the notion of "belonging" where they lived. The husbands' view of his home was more likely to be limited to economic considerations with some references concerning the demands upon his free time. Husbands and wives were both disposed to move into more affluent neighborhoods as and when they could afford to, and in common with native Americans developed a profit motive toward real estate acquisition, a less permanent commitment to such decisions.

44 British children's experiences were related to the author mainly by their mothers.
Acceptance of American standards in business and adoption of attitudes towards material possessions in common with native Americans did not remove lingering regrets in the minds of those who appreciated the fine arts. The wife of an English engineer employed by Boeing Aircraft, in Seattle, made these comments:

We have made many friends here and are glad we came. We miss many things of our former life in London, though going to the theatre, concerts, the ballet, browsing for antiques, books, etc.45

Comparisons in the public school education of England and the United States was often mentioned by mothers with school-age children:

We have been disappointed in the American system. The incentive is left up to the child too much and they automatically move from one grade to the other often without deserving to. There are no standards to be maintained and there is not enough supervision of schoolwork at home either. But I still think that America is a land of opportunity to any ambitious youngster.46

Apprehension for the future development of their children in the more permissive American society provided worries for some parents while others regretted that their children would grow up without firsthand associations with Britain. Ties with the homeland kept some families in a continuing dilemma:

In 1972 we went back to England to "touch base"--to see where we were at. After six miserable months staying with relatives we bought a house and within two years we had reestablished all the old contacts and had our roots down in England. ... I am still not sure why we came

45 Cynthia Thomas, Mercer Island, Wa., correspondence, June, 1976.
46 Edith Grisewood, Portland, Or., correspondence, June, 1976.
back. We have—or I have—no frame of reference in the United States. Control over our children is a major problem here. My husband makes more money here and we are better off in that respect but so far at least I have not been able to reconcile myself to permanent residence here. 47

Even after 29 years here I am not sure if I would stay if I were left alone as I have kept very close ties with family and friends in England and we have visited them and had them visit us fairly often too. 48

Homesickness of emigrants—or their being missed by relatives at home—sometimes led to the emigration of other members of their family:

I came here in 1968 at the age of 68. My granddaughter was the first to come over as a girl of 18. She was in San Francisco and one by one got her family over, father, mother, brother, and then me, her grandmother. 49

Notwithstanding their criticisms, reservations, and divided affections, the vast majority of respondents indicated their intention to remain as permanent residents of the United States.

The last item of the questionnaire, 9(e), indicated a large majority had become, or intended to become United States citizens. At the same time there were few declarations of desire to become American citizens that could not be construed as rationalizations. American citizenship was not idealized by Britons, as it has appeared to be by other European nationals at different times. With few exceptions, the English, Scots and Welsh considered British nationality equal to

49 Doris Coppard, Sunnyvale, Ca., correspondence, August, 1976.
or better than American citizenship yet for obvious reasons they sel-
dom voiced their belief. Practical considerations usually prompted
Britons to apply for American citizenship. Many responded that they
had often "thought about it," but deferred making a decision there
being no compelling reason. The longer the length of residence, the
more likely the respondent had obtained American citizenship. Dimin-
ishing contacts as a result of the demise of the older generation and
the bringing up of a new generation in the new country gradually built
up an increasing sense of commitment and an erosion of older loyalties.

The remarks of David Burns were typical:

I have never really thought much about it--
I have never been interested enough in Ameri-
can politics to miss the opportunity to vote.
I'm not restricted in any way and the only time
I'm reminded that I'm an alien is when I have
to send in the postcard every January to let
the government know I'm still here. After ten
years in this country I think of it as my home
and I'd never want to live anywhere else--
unless I was rich, and then it doesn't matter
where you live.

At one time the idea of giving up my status as
a British subject probably would have bothered
me. I have no connections any more in the U.K.
I expect to make the change. 50

Practical reasons motivated Geoffrey Linton who told the author
frankly that he sought a position with the State of Hawaii which, in
1969, did not employ non-citizens:

I have never held any strong feelings about
nationality so it was not a hard decision to
make. In any case, I understand that if you

50 David Burns, interview, Honolulu, December, 1976.
are born British you remain British insofar
as their law is concerned. I guess that gives
me dual citizenship.51

Another respondent applied for citizenship when immigration author-
ities told her that a United States citizen could petition the Depart-
ment of State for an immigration visa for her sister living in London.
As a resident alien she could not do this.

For many Britons, their only objection to acquiring American
citizenship appeared to be their aversion to renouncing their allegi-
ance to Great Britain:

I consider myself a loyal citizen of the United
States and would never do anything to the detri-
ment of this country. But at the same time I can-
not bring myself to make a statement renouncing
allegiance to the land that gave me birth. To
me this is dishonorable.52

To Anne Hayward it became a matter of honor to acquire citizenship
as soon as she was eligible, a distinctly minority view:

It is not morally right to refuse the obligations
and duties of citizenship if you make your per-
manent home in a country.53

One of the few respondents indicating enthusiasm for the status
of American citizenship wrote:

Here we felt accepted right away, were never
labelled as "aliens" or given to feel we had
stolen anyone else's job or place in the com-
munity. We felt that life in the U.S. offered
us tremendous opportunity and it was up to our-
selves what we made of it. We still think fondly

51Geoffrey Linton, op. cit.
52Colin Bell, op. cit.

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of England but are proud to be Americans.\textsuperscript{54}

At the other end of the spectrum a husband and wife declared stoutly that nothing was superior to being British:

Absolutely no. There would never be any circumstance to make us give up our citizenship. We were born and remain steadfastly British. . . British to the core!\textsuperscript{55}

Strong opinions were voiced against over-indulgence in patriotism from two Honolulu sources; one a scientist at the University of Hawaii, the other a retired physician:

I was offered an interesting post-doctoral fellowship at the California Institute of Technology. The fact it was in the U.S.A. was of no significance to me. . . . I have no intention of becoming a citizen of the U.S. but no longer consider myself as a British citizen except for legal purposes. "Nationality" is a faintly ridiculous concept, of some historical interest and some lingering significance but basically an anachronism today. Amongst all the interesting possible political systems, who, given the choice, could be so churlish as to align himself with only one?\textsuperscript{56}

I have always been opposed to nationalism as the cause of wars. We should work for the good of mankind, as citizens of the world.\textsuperscript{57}

The prevalent mood of participants in the survey was one of satisfaction and anticipation. Nearly all believed they had benefitted materially as a result of their move to the United States and many acknowledged that the experience of living amongst a dynamic people

\textsuperscript{54}Gwen Tomlinson, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{55}William and Daphne Miner, interview, Sierra Madre, Ca., August 1976.

\textsuperscript{56}Martin Raines, Honolulu, correspondence, June, 1976.

\textsuperscript{57}Clement Nicory, \textit{op. cit.}
with the greater expectations of a restless and youthful country had expanded their own horizons. The British in America were also pondering the proposition, "why not?"

Most Britons exhibited pride in their homeland even while they were often sharply critical of it and of the apathy manifested by its people. The immigrants rejected defeatist attitudes and reproved adherence—with very few exceptions—to tradition for its own sake. Like most youthful and thoughtful Americans, Britons found the United States far from perfect, but believed in its future possibilities to advance steadily in that direction under enlightened and honest leadership, inspired by the interest of the people who supported them. Most of these immigrants consider themselves Americans now—yet they may be accounted credits to the land of their birth as well as to the nation which gained talent, experience and energy by their admission.
Chapter VI

Canadian Immigration to the United States:
The Canadian View

Restless Canadians have always viewed the United States as a viable and frequently more profitable alternative to remaining in Canada. Most Canadian centers of population lay within one hundred miles of the American border, a situation which gave Canadians an excellent opportunity to travel to, and become familiar with, the United States. The establishment of family or friends across the line usually increased the frequency of such visits while the rigors of trans-continental travel in Canada, prior to World War II, often made long detours through the United States more economical in time and cost for the businessman and tourist.

Since the American Revolution, migrants from Canada usually settled in urban and industrial centers in the border states of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington. French-speaking Canadians formed large minorities in Rhode Island and Connecticut, as well as in the border states of New England. English-speaking Canadians went mostly to New York, Pennsylvania, and to the border states lying to the west.¹ Increasingly, since 1920

¹See Table 34, p. 213 for statistics on Canadian-born in the United States by Regions and Divisions, 1920-1970.
Canadians of both ethnic groups migrated either to work or retire in the "sun belt" states of Florida and California, which offered both bright economic prospects for future growth and a warm escape from winter frigidity. United States Bureau of the Census statistics for these two states between 1920 and 1970 are shown in Table 12.

**TABLE 12**

**CANADIAN-BORN IN THE STATES OF FLORIDA AND CALIFORNIA, 1920-1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Florida</th>
<th></th>
<th>California</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>2,306</td>
<td>57,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>7,204</td>
<td>7,657</td>
<td>94,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>8,491</td>
<td>7,576</td>
<td>88,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>13,184</td>
<td>7,990</td>
<td>102,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960b</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970c</td>
<td>43,816</td>
<td></td>
<td>153,725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Not available. The 1960 Census did not provide this information. Foreign-born were included in the total of "foreign stock."

Canadian-born residents of the United States were not enumerated by ethnic origin in 1970.

The decision to emigrate was often undertaken lightly, with none of the fateful feeling of total, irrevocable commitment felt by Europeans when they placed an ocean behind them. Canadians could board trains, busses, drive automobiles—or even walk home across the undefended border merely by satisfying immigration officers of their identity. Frequently, Canadians worked in the United States with commuter passes before deciding to take up permanent residence in the
country. Border crossing between Canada and the United States had been a common occurrence ever since the migration of the Loyalists during the American Revolution.

Although the development of Canada closely paralleled that of American continental expansion in form, though on a smaller scale and generally at a later date, Canada generally suffered a net loss due to migration as a result of this free movement and interchange of population. The only period when Canada received a net gain was between 1896 and 1914, when American farmers from the Dakotas and Montana discovered choice, cheaper land on the Canadian prairie and formed several communities in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Economic depression, felt especially severely in Western Canada, ended the northern migration in 1914, sending many American immigrants home in the next few years, accompanied by large numbers of native-born Canadians. 2

Canadians continued to cross the border freely when post-World War I United States immigration policy placed quota limitations upon countries outside the American continents. The only difference noticed by Canadian immigrants was the requirement to obtain a passport prior to border clearance and closer inspection of the visa applicant's means of support. Since United States contract labor laws were not applied against Canadians, satisfaction was easily obtained that the Canadian immigrant would not become a public charge. The enormous increases in Canadian emigration in the years 1923–1924 may be partly

adduced to a fear that proposed United States immigration legislation might impose quota restrictions against countries of the Western Hemisphere. Such fears proved to be groundless, however, and the decline in numbers after 1924, annually, until the end of the decade reflects both the steady economic improvement in Canada during this period and stabilization of the expanded United States job market.

Nevertheless the continued drift to the south caused concern and embarrassment to Canadian official circles for the remainder of the decade. Undoubtedly, the Conservative opposition to the Liberal Government made the most of the much-publicized high levels of emigration to the United States, reciting cumulative losses and the failure of the Government to attract more immigrants from Europe. The Government disclaimed any knowledge of emigration figures—no statistics were kept and the United States' figures were thought to be higher than they actually were—and pointed to the numbers of British and European immigrants coming to Canada which actually gave Canada a net gain in migration.

One Opposition Member, Peter McGibbon, compared the estimates of the Minister of Immigration, Robert Forke, with those of the United States Commissioner of Immigration. In the five years, said McGibbon, from 1923 through 1927, some 50,000 more Canadians moved into the United States than the total of immigrants Canada had been able to attract from the entire world. Moreover, he pointed out, since July 1, 1924, only native-born Canadians were represented in United States'
statistics showing immigrants by country or region of birth. A comparison between these figures and statistics showing the total number of arrivals from Canada with immigrant visas showed very clearly that the vast majority of those leaving Canada were, in fact Canadian born. How long could we afford this drain of 80, 90, or 100,000 persons annually? McGibbon asked.

Another Opposition Member, Charles Dickie, of Nanaimo, British Columbia, a frequent critic of the Government's record on immigration, told the House of Commons that Canada was spending millions of dollars trying to get people to come to the country while the United States was spending vast sums trying to keep them out. "For the past 25 or 30 years [Canada] has been an immigration agent for the United States," he complained, saying that "we are losing the cream of our population."

Another Member called it a tragedy that there were a million Canadians in the United States competing with their homeland.

The theme of Canada as a "sieve" through which immigrants passed on to the United States was not new in the 1920's. A hundred years before, Canadian Governors sent out from England complained they could not prevent people going to the United States to stay. Even during the period of Canada's greatest industrial growth—when two trans-

4 Table 31 tabulates these figures for comparison.
6 Ibid., 651.
7 Ibid., 720.
continental railroads and a number of important branches were built to colonize the West and transport its agricultural harvests, Canada added five million to the population of the United States through emigration and reproduction between 1870 and 1920, according to immigration statistics and actuarial tables. One writer was reminded of Samuel Johnson's analogy that "the finest view in Scotland was the high road into England."9

The reversal of heaviest immigration northbound between 1896 and 1914 gave rise to high hopes and exultations of the kind Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier expressed in 1911.10 The onset of depression in 1914, which lasted through Canada's participation in World War I—and lingered into the middle of the next decade—dissipated these dreams, leaving many Canadians with a sense of futility. The publication of the Dominion Census of Population, 1921, awakened the country anew to the seriousness of the imbalances in migration. A contributor to an important Canadian periodical expressed it as follows:

By the 1911 Census, the population of Canada was placed at 7,206,643, and the last census, taken in June, 1921, showed it as 8,788,483. But in the intervening decade the excess of births over deaths presaged a natural increase of 1,836,000 souls, and the Immigration Department claimed 1,975,000 arrivals from abroad as permanent settlers. If, therefore, Canada had retained all her own natural increase and her immigrants as well, she should have had in 1921,
after making full allowance for the direct and indirect losses of the war, a population well in excess of ten million souls. The deficiency between that total and the figures of the 1921 census can only be explained by a leakage on a vast scale.  

The slow growth of Canada's population was illustrated by the Victoria Daily Times in the following tabulation:  

**TABLE 13**

DOMINION OF CANADA
IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION, 1914-1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Departures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>384,787</td>
<td>86,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>144,789</td>
<td>82,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>48,537</td>
<td>101,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>75,274</td>
<td>105,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>79,074</td>
<td>32,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>57,702</td>
<td>57,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>117,336</td>
<td>90,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>148,477</td>
<td>72,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>89,999</td>
<td>46,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>72,887</td>
<td>117,011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada's participation in World War I, commencing in August, 1914, and the dangers of transatlantic travel from marauding enemy submarines

11"Canada and the Migration Problem," The Saturday Review, (Toronto), January 13, 1923, p. 44.

sharply reduced immigration to Canada during the fiscal years 1915-19. Questions of patriotism and allegiance to the Mother Country and Empire inevitably arose publicly in Canada, driving many dissidents from national policy into exile in the United States. The introduction of military conscription in Canada in 1916 laid bare the tenuous harmony between Anglo and French components of the population. Although home service as an alternative to overseas duty was accepted as a compromise in heated House debates, thousands refused even this accommodation. Departures from Canada to the United States increased approximately 25 percent in fiscal years 1916 and 1917. In fiscal year 1918 a sharp reversal occurred, which was probably due to the fact that the United States had been in the war for the full twelve months of this period and was enabled to induct aliens as well as citizens for military service.

In the next two fiscal years, 1919 and 1920, Canada lost nearly all her gains from immigration to the United States; but an eighteen-month long depression in the United States economy, from early 1921 to mid-1922, slowed the rate of departures from Canada. Net gains in this period turned again into a net loss in fiscal year 1923, when the economic situation in the United States became buoyant once more. Mr. Arthur Meighen, Leader of the Opposition and former Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, told the House of Commons that in the later months of 1922, Canada lost 8,000 people per month. This fact was the

\[13\text{See Table 13.}\]
main cause of the reduction of unemployment in the large cities of Canada, said Meighen, and not anything that the Government had done to alleviate the problem. The Government took credit for the reduction, he said, but it did not say where the unemployed had gone.  

Charles Dickie, Opposition Member from Nanaimo, knew where they had gone; where they were going, and why:

They are going down to Southern California, from British Columbia and Western Canada and there are very good reasons for that; unexampled prosperity reigns down there owing to the development of immense oil wells and other activities.  

Dickie reported that many Canadian families would like to return to Canada given the incentive to do so. He did not think the exodus from British Columbia, his native province, would continue "for much longer." Nevertheless, in order to bring the migration to an end, he declared, "we have to make this the country we want it to be."  

The rate of loss revealed by Arthur Meighen in late 1922 continued in 1923. The Victoria <em>Daily Colonist</em> observed:

From 1917 until the summer of 1922 Canada managed to maintain a narrow annual surplus to her advantage but since the number of citizens permanently leaving the country each month has continued to exceed the number admitted.  

When the United States Commissioner-General of Immigration reported his findings for the twelve months ending June 30, 1923,

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11aCanada, Debates, 1923 Session, I, 20-1.
11bIbid., 1924 Session, II, 236.
11cIbid.
11dDaily Colonist, (Victoria), November 25, 1923, p. 31.
concerned Members of Parliament informed the Commons that of the 117,011 persons who left Canada for the United States, 99,434 were "absolutely Canadians who had been brought up in this country for years." This number included 39,295 English; 30,438 French-Canadians; 17,045 Scotch; 12,000 Irish; and 656 Welsh. It was the intent of the Opposition to refute the Government's claim that Canada's losses were more than made up by immigration, since much of this was non-British and could be shown as a qualitative loss, official policy being to promote British immigration on a preferential basis.

Critics of government immigration policy and its administration continued to berate responsible officials upon the theme of qualitative losses until the end of the decade. Table 14 illustrates why this continued.

It will be observed, of course, that in terms of raw numbers, a steady decline in emigration took place each year after 1925, when conditions in Canada showed definite signs of recovery. Substantial increases in total immigration to Canada occurred after the low point of 1926. As the Government side pointed out, Canada appeared to be winning its battle to retain its newcomers and slow down the exodus of the native-born.

Just as British Members of Parliament were concerned that the British government administer its functions efficiently in the Empire Resettlement Scheme of the 1920's, their Canadian counterparts harried their government over what they considered a golden oppor-

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18 Canada, Debates, 1924 Session, II, 1850.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration, All Sources</th>
<th>Emigration To United States</th>
<th>Native-Born Canadians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>148,560</td>
<td>200,690b</td>
<td>n/a c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>111,362</td>
<td>100,895</td>
<td>102,192d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>96,064</td>
<td>91,019</td>
<td>83,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>143,991</td>
<td>81,506</td>
<td>71,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>151,597</td>
<td>73,154</td>
<td>56,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>167,722</td>
<td>64,440</td>
<td>50,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aCanada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book, 1931, p. 173; United States, Commissioner-General of Immigration, Annual Reports: 1925, Tables 43 & 50; 1926, Tables 33 & 42; 1927, Tables 33 & 44; 1928-29, Tables 37 & 48, respectively.

bIncludes Newfoundland.

cNot available.

dIt appears to be a statistical error—the actual number was probably 92,181, judging by the proportions of the years immediately following.

tunity in danger of being lost. Opposition Member Robert Manion, Fort William, Ontario, warned that unless Canada moved quickly, Australia would "earmark all the £3 million which the British government was prepared to spend yearly on emigration under the Empire Settlement Act." Five years later, another Opposition critic of immigration officials, John Clarke, presented the House with a comparison of the numbers of Britons who had emigrated to Canada and Australia:

19 Canada, Debates, 1923 Session, I, 1111.
### TABLE 15

**DESTINATION OF BRITISH EMIGRANTS CANADA AND AUSTRALIA, 1920-1927**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>59,603</td>
<td>86,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>74,262</td>
<td>76,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>39,020</td>
<td>80,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>34,508</td>
<td>80,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>72,919</td>
<td>84,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>53,178</td>
<td>82,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>37,030</td>
<td>90,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>49,784</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a*Canada, Debates, 1928 Session, I, 721.

*b*Not available.

The Opposition in Canada's Parliament continued to hammer the Government for its alleged incompetence in handling the immigration question. Members still spoke of Canada's losses through emigration as an exodus, despite their steady decline since 1925. R. B. Bennett, the Conservative leader, likened these losses to wartime casualty lists. In the seven years, 1922 to 1928, inclusive, Canada had lost 700,000 "of its finest"; 100,000 more than the whole population of British Columbia. The Liberal Government was to blame, charged Bennett, by reason of administrative inertia, and principally because of its low tariff policies, which had put Canadians out of their jobs and driven them out of the country.20


The tariff policy of the Liberal Government was strongly attacked by Conservatives. Declaring that the country needed a return to the National Policy of John A. MacDonald, Canada's first Prime Minister, Conservative Member of Parliament, D'Arcy Plunkett demanded that the "protectionist policy of the United States should be our policy too."

Emigration was a more important question than immigration, said Plunkett, in another allusion to the loss of native-born Canadians. "I am in favor of taking steps to stop emigration from this country." 21

Plunkett's statement sounded like an authoritarian threat, but its militant tone was meant only to emphasize the need for a radical change in fiscal policy. Dr. S. F. Tolmie, Conservative leader of the British Columbia Legislature, also supported higher tariffs, but not at the expense of selling British Columbia lumber, wood products, base metals, and the harvests of sea and field. Though Great Britain had been Canada's, and British Columbia's, best customer, the volume of sales to the United States would have to increase to assure further development of the economy and greater prosperity. Tolmie's answer to the emigration problem was to attain such prosperity that the young men of Canada would not want to leave. The British and other Europeans would also be attracted to come in large numbers. Only Canada's "unsatisfactory economic and business condition" was responsible. In spite of what the Prime Minister says to the contrary, declared Tolmie, "the man on the street knows only too well that we have been passing

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through hard times individually and collectively."\(^{22}\)

Three years later, Dr. Tolmie was still repeating the refrain of developing natural resources as Canada's first concern. Speaking in support of a party candidate in Fernie, British Columbia, Tolmie lamented that the provinces' university graduates still had to cross the border to find employment. Canadians from other provinces were coming into British Columbia, but many of these potential assets were lost to the United States when they heard of better opportunities south of the border:

> And still this was a land of wondrous resources rich in wealth of minerals, timber, fisheries, and the potentialities of the soil; something was radically wrong or it would be otherwise.\(^{23}\)

As for increasing immigration, Tolmie did not favor any large scheme to bring newcomers to British Columbia, "until we have taken care of our own people, and have decreased emigration from this province."\(^{24}\)

The theme of the need to develop national opportunities as deterrents to emigration attracted many political analysts, economists and others writing on the subject. Analyzing the reasons why Canadians left their homeland, Edward Kennedy wrote:

> Canadians do not leave Canada for trivial reasons. They do not leave for political, religious, or individual liberty. All of

\(^{22}\)"Lure to Leave Canada Can be Checkmated," The Daily Colonist, October 20, 1925, p. 1.

\(^{23}\)"Tolmie Would Halt Exodus From B.C.," The Vancouver Province, July 4, 1928, p. 13.

\(^{24}\)Ibid.
these they have in Canada in as great measure as they can possibly have them in any other country in the world. Industrial opportunity is the American lodestone that has attracted to the United States millions of emigrants from the old world and hundreds of thousands from the new, during the last fifty years of industrial expansion and growth in that country. When Canada can offer to the world industrial opportunities the equal of those to be found in the United States, there will not be blizzards enough, nor zero temperatures enough, from Halifax to Vancouver, to drive Canadians over the line, or induce them to renounce the country of their birth, in favor of a citizenship which, however good it may be, is in no way superior, in "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," to the citizenship to which they were born.25

It was industrial opportunity combined with local unemployment that sent Tolmie and Dickie's British Columbians to the oil wells and other new developments in Southern California in 1923 and it was the lure of wages at $8 to $10 a day for bricklayers, carpenters and plasterers in Chicago and Los Angeles that recruited Canadian workers from every province in Canada, following the American business revival in mid-1922.26 The loss of Canadian university graduates similarly had its chief explanation in the economic motive. Maclean's Magazine published findings of a questionnaire submitted to 1,000 Canadian university graduates living in the United States in 1927. Of the 203 who responded, representing a variety of professions, 57 percent cited economic advantage as the primary reason for accepting employment in the United States. Twenty percent had left Canada for better

25Kennedy, p. 279.

26John A. Stevenson, p. 20.
opportunities in advanced education and a wider field for the special-
ist. Thus, 77 percent of those contacted responded that they left home for greater opportunity in the United States. Of the remainder, 9 percent cited health and climate, 5 percent gave family and personal reasons for moving, while 5 percent objected to political, social and intellectual conditions in Canada. The lure of the unknown attracted 2 percent and another 2 percent stated miscellaneous reasons.27

The problem of attracting suitable immigrants to make good the promise of an abundant Canadian life was not mainly the lack of industrial opportunity that appeared to drive out the native-born. European immigrants were primarily farm workers, encouraged by the Canadian government and by Canadian railroads to colonize the vast, open spaces of the Canadian West. This encouragement was qualified, however, by the fear that their numbers might rival and surpass those of British stock. Keeping Canada a British country in terms of its population appeared an ever-present concern to English-speaking members of the Canadian government.

While the peasant farmers of the Scandinavian countries and the Central European plains adapted well to conditions on the prairies of Western Canada, immigrants from Great Britain generally did not. The typical twentieth century British emigrant was an urban product, used to the amenities and sociability of town life. Even those Britons with agricultural experience found the Canadian rural scene totally alien. They were unaccustomed to the severity of the climate—

the extremes of heat and cold—the bareness and extent of the flat plains was a depressing prospect; the size of the average holding staggered them, and they had to learn methods of husbandry appropriate to the land and the vast scale of operations as cultivators for the commercial market. In the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the types of British men and women who endured the hardships of early American settlement and those of the Maritime provinces and St. Lawrence valley were not to be found for the Canadian West. When British emigrants landed in Canada, the United States or Australia, they usually added to the populations of the already crowded towns and cities. It was axiomatic, commented an anonymous contributor to the Canadian Saturday Review, considering the climatic extremes and rigors of life on the Canadian prairie, that:

only a very limited number of people of English birth will ever consent to spend any large part of their lives on a Canadian prairie farm. The Scotch, having served a youthful apprenticeship to dour winters, will remain in larger numbers, but the population of the prairies will always be cosmopolitan in texture until it can supply its own native stock.28

Experts on immigration problems, such as Canada's Minister of the Interior, Sir Clifford Sifton, were disposed to think that Canada must look elsewhere than to Britain for large numbers of agricultural settlers, concluded the Saturday Review's correspondent.

The problem of "keeping Canada British," then, was not a simple matter of allocating funds from government resettlement schemes and providing transportation, but one of finding suitable jobs, homes

and living conditions that were not too dissimilar to their native experience. Should Canada fail to provide such amenities, immigrating Britons would simply follow the path of the dissatisfied native-born to greater industrial and other opportunities in the United States, or return home.

The great Canadian debate on immigration and emigration became suddenly academic when the country slumped into the worldwide depression of the 1930's. The United States' 1930 Census revealed statistics that only two years before the publication of this information would certainly have added fuel to the flames of political controversy over Canadian migration. The census reported 1,286,389 former Canadians living in the United States, the highest number ever recorded, representing 1.1 percent of the entire United States population and 9.1 percent of its foreign-born population. Of greater significance to Canada, however, was the fact that this number of expatriates represented 12.4 percent of the Canadian population of just over ten million. Had this population of emigrees remained in Canada and its progeny added to the total, it seems likely that Canada's population in 1930 should have been about fifteen million, or 50 percent higher.29

Canada's aspirations to greatness were severely frustrated by more than her rigorous climate, her need for agricultural population, or the retention of her trained and educated skilled and professional classes. Capital for industrial development, the basis for greatness

in the past one hundred and fifty years, could not be found in sufficient amounts in Canada. British, American and other foreign investment had to be solicited. Perhaps Canada's most serious deficiency, psychologically as well as physically, was her lack of a passable highway between Eastern and Western Canada. Although the first transcontinental rail link had argued the natural north-south configurations of the Canadian landscape by breaching the Great Continental Divide in 1885, and a government-financed and operated airline inaugurated trans-Canada passenger service in 1937, it was not until the 1960's that Canadians were able to drive an all-Canadian route by automobile on what could be designated an all-weather, first-class highway.

Deferred acquisition of these symbols of nationhood bothered Canadians increasingly after World War II. Canada's military contribution had been outstanding in proportion to her population, just as it had been in the earlier world struggle. Canadians abroad wore their "Canada" shoulder insignia proudly and gained British and American respect as disciplined, resourceful and courageous individuals. Like the veterans of World War I, returning Canadians brought home a heightened sense of national pride and special identity—but it was a sense that quickly dulled in the native environment. Soon a new spate of articles appeared in the national journals deploring the renewed trend among trained and educated Canadians to migrate to the United States. Once again, higher wages and greater opportunities for education and advancement were cited as the principal causes. Once again, one would read that the answer lay in imaginative private and government-sponsored
programs to create opportunities which would keep Canadian graduates home and provide good jobs in industry for Canada's technicians and tradesmen.30

The resumption of emigration was more than offset, however, by large-scale immigration, especially from Northern Europe. In the early post-war years, a large proportion, usually about one-third, were of the refugee category. The refugees—or displaced persons as they were generally known—were accepted provisionally as immigrants, subject to rendering terms in domestic service or other directed occupations by the Department of Labor for terms of one year or longer. The object of these indentures was to give prospective immigrants and future citizens an opportunity to learn English and prepare them in other ways for acceptance and absorption into the mainstream of Canadian life. In 1952, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Walter Harris informed the House of Commons that the proportion of Displaced Persons in Canada's annual immigration had declined to 22 percent. British immigrants accounted for more than 30 percent of the total, while France, Holland, and other countries of Northern Europe sent established citizens with means which would accrue to the present and future benefit of all Canadians.31

The early 1950's were years of rising optimism in Canada but they were not without their sobering cautions. Heavy American


31 Canada, Debates, 1952 Session, IV, 4270.
financial investment in Canadian companies and the establishment of a number of important subsidiaries to American firms led to expressions of fear that the United States would soon be able to dictate Canadian trade policies and political relations with foreign customers as a result of American control over the Canadian economy. The rising volume of trade with the United States as a receiver of Canadian primary resources such as timber, metals and grains and of partially-treated products such as pulpwood and metal ores brought demands that these natural resources be fully processed and refined in Canada. The Government of Canada recognized the desirability, naturally, of creating whatever means might encourage industry to ship refined and finished products, and thereby create more jobs for Canadians, but Canada faced the reality of resistance in the American market, protected by its formidable tariff system.

The Canadian industrial boom of the 1950's still was unable to provide financial and advancement opportunities comparable to those existing for most skilled tradesmen and professional and technical personnel in the United States. By 1956, the number of Canadians emigrating annually to the United States reached 30,000 persons, a figure 50 percent higher than the average for 1946-49. Canadian Business asked: "What's the bait across the border?"--and came up with the same results as before--more money; more opportunities. 32 Another business journal discovered that the female work force in Canada had

been reduced in greater proportion to their numbers than the male work force as a result of emigration. In the past five years, according to a Dominion Bureau of Statistics survey, 4,500 registered nurses had left Canada for the United States. Of the more than 14,000 professional and technical personnel who had emigrated in the five years ending June 30, 1955, over half were women. Even the so-called New Canadians, the immigrants from continental Europe upon whom great hopes had been settled by the government as cultivators of the land and nation-builders, were showing a disposition to move where the opportunities were greatest. The Vancouver Sun, reporting the loss of 2,620 British Columbians to the United States in the first half of 1956, remarked that 544 of this number were "recent immigrants to Canada."34

By 1963, the loss of professional and technical personnel, together with the business category of managers and administrators, had risen to 24.9 percent of annual Canadian emigration. In 1956, these two categories had made up only 11.3 percent. In addition to the loss of 36,003 native-born Canadians in 1963, 14,506 persons were admitted to the United States who gave Canada as their country of last permanent residence.35

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34. "Southbound Exodus from British Columbia Continues Despite the Boom," The Vancouver Sun, August 16, 1956, p. 2.

While Canada's losses by emigration were increasing in the early 1960's, reaching their peak in 1965, her intake of immigrants had declined since the high mark of 1957, as Table 16 illustrates.

TABLE 16

DOMINION OF CANADA
IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION, 1956-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration, All Sources</th>
<th>Emigration To United States</th>
<th>Native-born Canadians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>164,857</td>
<td>42,363</td>
<td>29,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>282,164</td>
<td>46,354</td>
<td>33,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>124,851</td>
<td>45,143</td>
<td>30,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>106,928</td>
<td>34,599</td>
<td>23,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>104,111</td>
<td>46,668</td>
<td>30,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>71,689</td>
<td>47,470</td>
<td>32,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>74,586</td>
<td>44,272</td>
<td>30,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>93,151</td>
<td>50,509</td>
<td>36,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>112,606</td>
<td>51,114</td>
<td>38,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>146,758</td>
<td>50,035</td>
<td>38,327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada's "brain drain" evoked much national comment in the business and popular periodicals during the 1950's and early 1960's. The daily press carried items on the subject frequently. The attention given to the numbers of these losses---because they were increasing---usually obscured the fact that Canada was also a receiver of brains, not only from Europe but from the United States too. American development of Canadian resources frequently brought in management and high level technical personnel with their families. Sometimes these families
remained long enough in Canada to put down roots and to bring up a new generation in the country. American investment created more employment in Canada for her skilled workers and for the professional classes.36

The actual numbers of "lost" Canadians did not go unchallenged. George M. Morrison, Chief of the Executive and Professional Division of the National Employment Service, agreed that the loss of 2,700 Canadians annually, classified as professional workers was not one to be tossed off with a shrug, especially if they were all highly qualified people such as engineers and scientists. But this was not the case, said Morrison. Included in the professional category were religious workers, dancers, chorus girls, showmen, and professional athletes. These persons averaged 452 annually, or over 16 percent of the "professional" total. Doctors, dentists, lawyers and clergymen, and other such individual workers emigrated if they saw greater opportunities for profit or service. This group averaged 410 persons annually, or 15 percent of the professional total.

Trained and student nurses were leaving Canada in the early 1950's at an average of 635 per year and made up 23 percent of the total, but Morrison thought that some of these could be counted on to return. As for the engineers, the emigration of whom has caused the greatest concern, one might believe we were losing thousands annually. The facts were that over the past six years, from July 1, 1945, to

June 30, 1951, the average was 231 per year, and in the last three years of this period it had dropped to 207, or less than 8 percent of the professional group. Morrison conceded that there was a continuing loss of "valuable human resources," but that the picture had been distorted by "calamity howlers" and that it was not as black as some pessimists painted it.37

Nevertheless, the drain continued and accelerated in the next decade. The professional group, which had amounted to between ten and twelve percent of the total in the early 1950's, doubled by the early 1960's. Disclaimers were still voiced on the significance of these figures. One survey asserted that of 307 persons receiving Ph.D.'s from Canadian universities only seventy-two planned to leave Canada permanently. Only thirty of this number were Canadian born. Against this loss, Canada was gaining fifty-five non-Canadians who were receiving Ph.D. degrees in Canadian universities and had decided to remain in Canada. The analysts construed this as a net gain of twenty-five. Moreover, they claimed that of eighty-five Canadian graduates of United States universities going into employment in 1962, fifty-seven were returning to Canada.38

That the brain drain was not simply in one direction was shown in a 1966 study by a University of British Columbia economics professor and an American colleague. The investigators showed, moreover, that

educational costs were not borne disproportionately by Canada. When Canadian graduates went south to finish their training, the cost accrued to the United States. Two out of three returned to Canada, bringing with them some American "brains" fully trained at no cost at all to Canada. 39

In a summary of findings on the migration of Canadian born, Department of Manpower and Immigration official T. J. Samuel stated that the return rate of Canadians had been about 35 percent in the period 1955-60 and 40 percent in the period 1960-68. He attributed the rise in the return rate as follows:

An increasing proportion of professionals among the emigrants, greater cultural uniformity of recent emigrants, failure of many of them to raise their earnings to U.S. levels, and the social and political conditions in the U.S.A. may have induced higher rates of return migration. An increasing rate of return migration is also suggested by the declining proportion of Canadian-born opting for U.S. citizenship. 40

Samuel's findings on the return rate do not tally with those of the surveys referred to above but it should be noted that the latter's work is a comprehensive study of total Canadian migration rather than a narrow and limited study of a particular class of worker. He did find, however, that non-professionals, who formed the majority and were older, had a lower rate of return migration than professionals. "Nearly half," he said, "of the professionals who emigrated in the


period 1955-59 had returned to Canada by 1960.\textsuperscript{41}

Samuel asserted that the push and pull factors causing migration are found to be applicable to both emigration and return migration. It was suggested by his findings that the non-economic factors were more important for professionals than for non-professionals. Summarizing the "brain drain," Samuel thought it might be better understood if considered as an exchange of brains, or brain trade mutually beneficial to both Canada and the United States, rather than as a drain or gain. Even if looked at from the latter view, said Samuel, Canada was currently having a net gain of brains from the United States in the late 1960's.

Notwithstanding these findings of Canadian government research, the 1960's showed a significant increase in total emigration.\textsuperscript{42} The total exceeded 50,000 for the first time since 1930 in three successive years, 1963, 1964, and 1965. Though still well below the exodus proportions which jolted Canada in the 1920's, it seemed likely the trend might have continued but for the 1965 change in United States immigration policy which directly affected Canadians for the first time. The early reaction of Canada's leading business journal, The Financial Post, to the new laws was that Canadians would not be much affected, at least not the professional classes. The "target" of the United States legislation was not Canada but Latin America. Republicans in Congress, and Southern Democrats, feared a Latin population

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 43.

\textsuperscript{42}See Table: 31, p. 209.
"explosion" and a big push to get into the United States. President Johnson had been forced to make a "deal" with conservatives, said the journal, to extend numerical limitation to the Western Hemisphere in exchange for a "liberalization" of the laws making it possible for more relatives of United States citizens and resident aliens to be reunited with their families in the United States.

What the Financial Post had not foreseen, however, was the administrative slowdown in approving Canadian immigrant visa applications, not so much as the result of new regulations which required individual certification by the United States' Department of Labor, rather than approval by category, but because of the decision to accord permanent residence status to Cuban refugees residing in the United States at the rate of 40,000 per year. This number was to be taken out of the Western Hemisphere's annual allotment of 120,000 persons, a reduction of one-third of the available numbers. Whereas the Department of Labor regulations added weeks and sometimes a few months to the processing of Canadian applications, the admission of the Cuban refugees to immigrant status over three years beginning July 1, 1968, soon created a backlog in processing that extended the waiting period to two years by 1971.

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While individual certification meant the submission of evidence of employment and a petition by the employer to the Department of Labor prior to application for an immigrant visa, certain professional classes in the top demand labor category received automatic certification. In mid-1968, these included all engineering branches, architects, chemists, physicists, pharmacists and those in the medical and related professions. 46

The emigration of American professionals north into Canada reached 3,215 in 1966, while 3,703 Canadians moved south. Complaints and fears were being voiced in Canada that the American "invasion" posed a serious threat to the development of Canadian culture and nationhood, especially by American professors teaching in the social sciences and humanities faculties of Canadian universities. Fewer Canadian professionals and others moved into the United States after 1965 because of frustrations encountered in extended waiting periods but there were at least two other important reasons. First, almost all the prospective emigrants would become subject to United States military service, being of the age group liable to induction. Second, wages in Canada had risen 28 percent in the past four years, an increase which dampened the long-time economic incentive. 47

Canadian immigration to the United States was severely curtailed after July 1, 1968, by the numerical limitations provisions of the

46 "Professionals Get Quick Nod, No Welcome Mat For Unskilled," The Financial Post, June 29, 1968, pp. 11-12.

Immigration Act of 1965, notwithstanding any of the above-mentioned factors. Unexpected, however, was the sharp drop in total emigration to the United States during the 1970's. Political dissention, social unrest and a shrinkage of economic opportunity combined with the frustrations of the waiting game and more equitable prospects in Canada reduced annual totals to the lowest levels since the period, 1932-45.48

For the first time in its history, Canadian migration dropped from a place of high rank and special importance in United States immigration calculations to one of negligibility. Always among the top five senders and usually in the first three prior to 1969, Canada fell to ninth place in 1970 and 1971, and to thirteenth in 1973, 1974, and 1975. The exodus had halted. Pessimists and calamity howlers in Canada would have to look for other causes to fret over.

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48See Table 3.1, p. 209.
Chapter VII
Canadian Immigration to the United States: The American View

The Immigration Act of 1965 placed a numerical limitation upon the admission of immigrants from independent countries of the Western Hemisphere for the first time in United States' immigration history. Before the implementation of this law on July 1, 1968, Canadian-born residents of Canada were restricted only on the general immigration provisions for exclusion, videlicet, health, morals, literacy, and likelihood of becoming a public charge.

According to Toronto's The Financial Post, the real "target" of the new legislation was Latin America. Ironically, it was Canada which suffered the adverse consequences of numerical limitation as Mexico and Cuba, the two leading Latin American sources of immigration for the United States in 1965, both surpassed Canada in numbers sent from 1970 onward. By 1975, as indicated in Table 17, the West Indian island nations of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic also provided more immigrants than Canada.

The Canadian newspaper rightly surmised, however, that the new United States immigration laws were not designed to discourage Canadian immigration. The declared intent of the 1965 Act was to equalize opportunity among all independent nations. Nevertheless, the limitation of 20,000 visa numbers for immigration to any one country did not apply to natives of the Western Hemisphere, who were classified as
TABLE 17

IMMIGRATION FROM WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES: 1965, 1970, 1975<sup>a</sup>
(NORTH AMERICA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total, North America</td>
<td>126,729</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>129,114</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>146,668</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>38,327</td>
<td>30.24</td>
<td>13,804</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>7,308</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>37,969</td>
<td>29.96</td>
<td>44,469</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>62,205</td>
<td>42.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>19,760</td>
<td>15.59</td>
<td>16,334</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td>25,955</td>
<td>17.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>9,504</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>10,807</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>14,066</td>
<td>9.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>15,033</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>11,076</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19,332</td>
<td>15.26</td>
<td>28,667</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>26,058</td>
<td>17.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, Annual Reports: 1965, 1970, 1975, Table 6.

"special immigrants." The creation of a pool of 120,000 annual visa numbers was considered sufficient to allow the normal flow of immigration from Canada, Mexico, and the West Indies to continue in the future and also for the much smaller numbers who came from Central and South America. Since Canadians generally possessed higher educational attainments, skills, and training than Latin Americans, it was naturally assumed in Canada as well as by United States lawmakers that Canadians would have little trouble competing for immigration visas under the new system.

Not anticipated, however, was the waiting period which quickly developed as a result of the decision to allot one-third of the quota for the Western Hemisphere for the next three years to adjusting the status of Cuban refugees to that of lawful permanent resident. More permanently discouraging to Canadians, however, was the realization
that many more Mexicans than Canadians were able to establish exemp-
tion from labor certification requirements because of close relation-
ship to a United States citizen or resident alien. This exemption
avoided the first step—and that which seemed to take the most time
in the process of applying for an immigrant visa—leaving those with-
out this advantage in a prolonged state of uncertainty over their
future. Congressional Representative Frank Horton, of Rochester,
New York, described the quota system as intolerable, and a "severe
strain on business and political relations between Canada and the
United States."1

Congressman Horton went on to say that he supported the proposal
of Representative Michael A. Feighen's House Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion and Nationality of the Judiciary Committee to amend the immigra-
tion laws with a worldwide preference system and a numerical ceiling
of 300,000 immigrants annually. All nations would have a maximum
limitation of 20,000 visas annually, excepting Canada and Mexico which
would each have 35,000 numbers annually. In this way both major con-
tributors in the Western Hemisphere would be able to send immigrants
in approximately the same numbers as they had for the last decade.
Horton proposed a new nonimmigrant category to enable Canadian busi-
nessmen to transfer key personnel to American offices of Canadian
companies without having to hurdle the obstacles to obtain immigration
clearance. Businesses could not wait up to a year to obtain immigra-
tion approval of personnel transfers, declared Horton, warning that

unless ways were found to eliminate these frustrations Canada might impose strong reciprocal limitations upon American citizens seeking similar privileges.²

There was considerable sentiment voiced in recognition of the special relationship and community of interest between the United States and Canada, in particular, during the debates of 1965 relative to amending the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952. Senator Sam Ervin, of North Carolina, chairman of the subcommittee studying proposed changes to the act, indicated his pleasure with the amendment which would give recognition to the special relationships with countries of the Western Hemisphere, especially to Canada. Senator Philip A. Hart, of Michigan, citing the traditional friendship and common interests of the United States and the Dominion of Canada, hoped that some reassurance might be voiced to allay the fears of public officials of Canada that traditional two-way migration would not be halted by the new bill. Michigan and other northern states which have experienced Canadian migration, said Hart, have found that "the Canadian who has decided to become an American makes a magnificent American citizen."³ Senator Ervin declared that he personally opposed abolition of the national origins quota system but had set aside his feelings when he realized his opposition had no chance of success.

Though Northern legislators sympathized with Senator Hart's

²Ibid., p. 36920.

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revelations of Canadian concern, they represented voters from many ethnic groups, mainly from Europe, and could not afford to be accused of discrimination. By contrast, the South had been penetrated least by immigrants throughout the national period. Southern senators, therefore, could voice opposition to the amendment to equalize alien access to the United States with equanimity. Of the eighteen nays registered when the vote was taken, sixteen came from the South, one from a Southwestern state, and one from the Northeast.  

Canadians followed the Senate debate with interest and concern, as noted in Chapter VI. Yet because of the cultural and geographic closeness of their two countries, Canadians and Americans seldom thought of one another as "aliens," except in a legal sense. Although few Canadians favored political union with the United States at any time in Canada's history, or believed it likely, Americans since 1776 generally assumed that Canada would eventually seek union with the United States and be accepted. Canada's quest for an identity that was neither British nor American was never well appreciated in the United States. This was hardly surprising. The contradictions implicit in Canada's confederation of two major ethnic groups that exchanged suspicion and hostility more commonly than understanding and friendship led naturally to speculation as to Canada's political durability. Moreover, Canadian editors encouraged this speculation in the amount of attention they paid to Canada's bilingual and bicultural

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Ibid., p. 24783; the amendment passed the Senate 76-18. Six senators did not vote.
problems.5

Not all American commentators viewed the prospect of union optimistically or as necessarily desirable. A contributor to the American Mercury wrote in an objective and sensitive appraisal of Canada's future that Canadian susceptibilities were "wounded" by the failure of the United States to recognize Canada as a separate political entity. Wrote the contributor:

My own feeling is that annexation can never be a live question until after Canada has become in every respect independent. . . . As an important part of the British Empire, Canada will never consider becoming a subservient part of the United States. Should events lead to her independence some understanding . . . will be a necessity but I believe that organic union will never be desirable for either nation.6

After the Statute of Westminster, 1931, passed by the British Parliament, gave all British Dominions full power over their external affairs and created them equal partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the conditions for annexation becoming a "live question" now had been met. In fact, the Depression Decade saw the development of much closer Canadian-American relations, especially after the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt; an intimacy that lasted into the war years of the 1940's. A noted Canadian writer observed of the period with some distaste that Canadian Prime Minister McKenzie King, the

5In American periodicals of the 1920's, examples abound in Forum, Literary Digest, Living Age, American Mercury, Collier's, and The Saturday Evening Post; Canadian comment on annexation, or union with the United States appeared in Canadian Magazine and Saturday Review.

6W. A. Deacon, "Will Canada Ever Come In?" American Mercury, November, 1925, p. 321.
grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie, who led a revolution against the patronage of imperial masters, "virtually went on all fours to President Franklin Roosevelt and at the end of his life he was given a sizable grant by the Rockefellers." 7

The political and social climate of the 1920's and 1930's in the United States, of course, was vastly different to the post-World War II period when minority ethnic groups were encouraged by the passage of Civil Rights Acts to demand special attention. During the nativist 1920's, many United States Congressmen made no secret of their preferences and believed the United States had every right to establish a system of selection by race as well as one of numerical limitation. During the debate on the permanent legislation to control immigration in 1924, it was apparent that many Congressmen objected to quota exemption for natives of countries of the Western Hemisphere. Representative Cyrenus Cole, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, stated one of the problems:

> What shall it avail us to close the ways of the Atlantic and Pacific, if we leave open the thousands of miles along our southern and northern boundaries? . . . If across these boundaries we received only Mexicans and Canadians, the matter might not be so serious, but we find many Europeans entering America by these back doors which we have left open. We let in not only Mexicans who can pass the literacy and health tests, but Europeans who have lived five years in those countries, and the forging and falsifying of certificates of residence are easily accomplished. 8

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8 U.S. Cong., Cong. Record 68th Cong., 1 sess. 1924, p. 6476.
Cole revealed the distinction between Mexicans and Canadians in the minds of Congressmen more explicitly when he stated there were many in the chamber who objected to "non-inclusion of Mexicans" in the bill limiting immigration. He hoped that supplemental legislation would be included and went on to point out that if the 2 percent quota were applied to Mexico it would mean that only about 1,500 Mexican immigrants would be admitted annually.9 "If we want to keep America and American labor especially, truly American, that number may be ample."10

The specific reference to Mexican workers as alien peoples left no doubt as to politicians' preferment for Canadians. Yet the diplomatic problems posed for United States-Latin American relations made a discriminating amendment imprudent. It was either a question of total exemption for the Western Hemisphere or total inclusion within the quota system for the rest of the world. Congress, therefore, decided to reject the amendments to extend the quota system to the Western Hemisphere.

It was clear, however, by the intent of the national origins principle to determine immigrant volume by selected races and nationalities. Adoption of this principle ensured that British immigrants and those from northwestern Europe would form the large majority of future immigrants. The government of the United States made no direct overtures to entice British immigration but many Britons who had

9Ibid.
10Ibid.
emigrated to Canada joined the stream of native-born Canadians seeking better economic opportunities in the United States. The concern among many Canadians over the loss of their hard-won immigrants and native-born citizens noted in Chapter VI was acknowledged in American journals published in the mid-1920's. In 1923, the Literary Digest attributed Canada's recent losses to a laggard home economy and the lure of new opportunities developing in the United States; coupled with an American labor shortage caused by the 1921 immigration law which had slowed the supply from Europe. 11

The high water mark of Canadian immigration was reached during the twelve months between July, 1923, and June, 1924, when over 200,000 persons entered the United States as immigrants from Canada. 12 The exodus came chiefly from the financially depressed agricultural provinces of Western Canada and from the Maritime provinces of the East. The great majority of this number of immigrants were Canadian born, since the amendment made by Congress to the 1921 act provided that European immigrants to Canada must complete five years residence there before applying to emigrate to the United States. In March, 1924, the Literary Digest commented on this situation:

Any movement that takes trained, native-born Canadians who are replaced by untrained immigrants from Europe is an undesirable state of affairs for Canada. 13


12 See Table 31, p. 209.

The outflow of Canadian-born was delaying industrial recovery, declared the journal, and the depression of 1921-22 was continuing in Canada to some extent because of it. A few months later, the *Literary Digest* claimed that the Canadian government was so concerned over its population losses due to emigration that it was concealing the true figures from the Canadian public. To cover up its embarrassment, said the journal, the King Government pointed to the numbers of returning Canadians and European immigrants entering Canada—while ignoring the fact that for every immigrant gained, two residents of Canada left for the United States. Moreover, declared the journal, immigration authorities estimated that 50,000 persons entered the United States from Canada illegally during fiscal year 1924.¹⁴

The smuggling of aliens from Canada was never as serious as the problem faced by immigration officials on the Mexican border in terms of the numbers who successfully eluded inspection. Yet there were hundreds of access routes that remained without adequate surveillance along the 4,000-mile land border with Canada. In winter, aliens frequently walked across the frozen Detroit and St. Clair rivers and traversed other such natural boundaries easily in winter, in the Eastern provinces. The United States Commissioner of Immigration remarked that the similarity of Canadian law to United States law screened and protected the United States to some extent from undesirable aliens who might attempt to enter the United States via Canada. Native-born Canadians who evaded immigration inspectors might never be

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discovered, of course, because they mingled inconspicuously with the population. During the 1920's, however, United States law enforcement officers on the Canadian boundary were more concerned with apprehending cargoes of liquor being smuggled into the country in violation of the Volstead Act than in tracking down illegal aliens.15

American labor unions in the border cities remained concerned over the influx of all Canadian workers, legal or illegal. One particularly abrasive practice was that of the Canadian commuter. Residents of Windsor, Ontario, went to work daily in Detroit, Michigan, across the St. Clair River by bus, train, or automobile, where they received higher wages for the same jobs they spurned in Windsor. The Canadian jobs were filled by immigrating Europeans who subsequently became naturalized Canadians to facilitate their admission to the United States.16

Although in 1927 only 10,227 European-born immigrants entered the United States from Canada—representing about an eighth of the total from that country—the number of illegal aliens believed to have evaded inspection along the Canadian border was estimated at about 50,000. The majority were presumed to be foreign-born Canadian residents since the quota provisions did not apply to persons born in Canada.17

The risk of detection to Polish nationals illegally residing in the


17See Table 14, p.114.
United States in cities with large Polish minorities—like Buffalo or Detroit—was probably not much greater than for native-born Canadians in the large northern metropolitan areas since the former were generally absorbed into ethnic ghettos.

Among lawful immigrants to the United States from Canada the most insular in outlook and least assimilable were the French-Canadians, especially those who came from rural districts. In Rhode Island, where French-Canadians comprised sixteen percent of the state population in 1920, friction developed over the issue of separate school accreditation which was based upon religious and cultural differences between themselves and the dominant political groups in Rhode Island. The strength of the French-Canadian group, politically as well as numerically, was demonstrated when certain schools were able to exclude the English language except for such state requirements as recitation of the pledge of allegiance to the United States and for the study of American history.\(^{18}\) The flood tide of French-Canadians began to ebb by mid-1924. Love of the homeland and the "unassimilable nature" or quality of the French-Canadian character were cited by the Literary Digest as reasons for the diminution of the flow.\(^{19}\)

Friction between Americans and migrant Canadian workers was localized and minimal, however. For many years, logging operators in the northern woods of Maine and Massachusetts utilized Canadian labor


\(^{19}\)"Canada's Immigration Boom," Literary Digest, October 11, 1924, p. 21.
on a seasonal basis. American employers were required by federal law to furnish the government with a bond assuring the maintenance of temporary status of these foreign workers and their return to Canada at the termination of their employment. The Canadian government issued labor exit permits to enable some sixty United States timber operators to hire approximately 6,000 skilled Canadian woodsmen a year. While jobs in United States cities were plentiful, the employment of Canadian woodsmen brought no serious objection from spokesmen of American labor. The work was arduous, camp conditions often primitive, and the locations of operations usually scores of miles away from settled communities. Most American workers refused to consider separation from their families and the comforts of urban living for weeks, sometimes months at a time.20 Only the onset of the Great Depression, and rapidly rising unemployment brought controversy to the hitherto amicable arrangement.

The sudden economic decline brought renewed demands for immigration limitation. Early in 1930, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization began to study H.R. 6741, a bill to amend the Immigration Act to make the quota provisions applicable to Mexico, Cuba, Canada, and the countries of continental America and adjacent islands. A resolution, adopted by the Canadian Club of Boston, on February 10, 1930, against an immigration quota for Canada was read into the Congressional Record by Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of North Attleboro, Massachusetts, who strongly urged rejection so

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as not to jeopardize cordial Canadian-American relations. An immigration quota for Canada, declared Martin, would create "a source of irritation to the wonderful peace and goodwill" which had existed between the two countries for more than one hundred years. 21

Representative Robert L. Bacon, of Westbury (Long Island), New York, agreed with Martin and presented the House with statistics to show that Canadian immigration had diminished steadily since the high point of 1924. Moreover, he revealed, in 1929 Canada received as many American immigrants and returning Canadians from the United States together as she was losing by migration to the United States. This situation was a healthy one, declared Bacon, and indicated that application of the quota system to Canada would be inappropriate and not in the interests of the two countries. His statistics are tabulated below:

### TABLE 18

CANADIAN-AMERICAN MIGRATION, 1925-1929 a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Migration To U.S.A.</th>
<th>Migration to Canada</th>
<th>Net Loss to Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Immigrants</td>
<td>Returning Canadians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>100,895</td>
<td>15,818</td>
<td>43,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>91,019</td>
<td>18,778</td>
<td>47,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>81,506</td>
<td>21,025</td>
<td>56,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>73,154</td>
<td>25,007</td>
<td>39,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>64,440</td>
<td>30,560</td>
<td>33,798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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a U.S. Cong., Cong. Record 71st Cong., 2 sess. 1930, p. 4755.

Meanwhile, in the Senate, Senator David I. Walsh, of Massachusetts, remarked that Commissioner of Immigration Henry E. Hull "does not make a good case for placing quotas on Canadians or for any system of selective immigration for that matter." He continued:

"Our Canadian citizens are among the best we have. They have the same language—or, in the case of French-Canadians, soon acquire it. They are united to us by similarities of government, of judicial methods, and by a hundred kindred ideas and customs."

Nevertheless, immigration statistics for the year ended June 30, 1930, showed that 63,502 persons were admitted from Canada in the previous twelve months, almost as many as for fiscal year 1929. Worsening economic conditions in the United States during 1930, however, reduced the desire of Canadians to emigrate. Implementation in September, 1930, of more rigorous screening of all immigrants under the public charge provisions of the 1924 immigration act took some of the urgency out of the question of further restrictive legislation, although some labor groups continued to press for new studies. A proposal to restrict henceforth total Canadian migration to only 10 percent of the 1930 admissions met understandably with strong protests from Congressmen whose districts contained large numbers of former Canadian residents. Representative Francis B. Condon, of Central Falls, Rhode Island, called the proposal "neither wise nor just." It was a complete reversal of a one hundred year policy of friendship and mutual cooperation, said Condon. Moreover, it was inhuman since it

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22 U.S. Cong., Cong. Record 71st Cong. 2 sess. 1930, p. 6928.
would have the effect of separating families permanently.23

Representative Condon called the attention of the House to the fact that Senator Felix Hebert, the junior senator from Rhode Island, had been an immigrant French-Canadian. A former governor of that state also came from Quebec. The United States was home to many thousands of "splendid citizens" from Quebec, said Condon, who were numbered among the leaders of American political, social, and business life. To those who saw the proposal to restrict immigration for two years as a partial remedy for unemployment--Condon answered that unemployment was not caused by immigration. He was sorry, he said, to see labor asking for this legislation.24

One must be cautious, of course, in viewing statements and remarks of certain United States Congressmen as clear and valid expressions of their true feelings towards Canadians and Canadian immigration. Congressmen in the vanguard of protest against restriction of Canadian immigration invariably stood for districts in border states with substantial minorities which had acquired American citizenship and therefore with the vote. By the same token, however, politicians could not ignore a majority which might be antagonistic to a policy of continued immigration from a foreign source.

Representative Louis Ludlow, of Indianapolis, Indiana--whose district contained relatively few immigrants, and espoused isolationist views in foreign affairs--believed it was necessary to place further

24Ibid; H.J. 500, the Joint Resolution to restrict immigration for two years, was passed 299-82 with 49 abstentions.
restrictions on immigration "to protect not only American labor but also the immigrant himself." It was not fair, said Ludlow, to allow the immigrant to come in looking for a "paradise of prosperity" only to discover a "dead sea of disappointment." By the spring of 1931, however, when Ludlow was speaking, the failure of the American economy to recover from its worst slump ever was known in most areas of the world--Canadians, because of their close proximity to the United States knew better than most people. Immigration from Canada during fiscal year 1931 dropped to one-third of the previous year's total. By 1933, it numbered only 6,074 persons, less than 10 percent, in fact, of the totals of 1929 and 1930, thus meeting the goal of the exclusionists. Lack of economic opportunity was the only deterrent needed. Further revision of the immigration laws to control the volume of immigration had become superfluous.

It was not until 1946 that Americans became aware again of the interest of Canadians to emigrate to the United States. In the spring of that first post-war year, the United States news magazine, Time, reported that Canadians were "besieging American consular offices from Halifax to Vancouver in greater numbers than any time since 1931." Time gave the following reasons: removal of wartime restrictions on labor permits to leave the country; easing of exchange restrictions on taking money out of Canada; urban unemployment rise; the continuation of wage controls; and the higher wages of American industry and better

25 Ibid., p. 6840.
26 See Table 31, p. 209.
27 "Southward Trek," Time, April 1, 1946, p. 38.
economic prospects of the United States. Canadian brides of American servicemen numbered 7,216—less than a quarter of the number of British brides—who added to Canadian migration in the immediate post-war period but annual admissions to the United States from Canada remained at less than half the numbers admitted in 1929, until 1952.28

Despite the encouraging growth of the Canadian economy in most parts of the Dominion after the removal of wartime controls, Canadians resumed their practice of comparing opportunities in the United States with Canadian prospects, and, if these appeared advantageous, moved across the border with little hindrance from immigration authorities. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, made a number of amendments to the 1924 Act but none which changed the free movement of Canadians who were able to meet the general requirements of immigration law.29 In common with the so-called "wetback" invasion from Mexico of illegal aliens which caused national concern in the mid-1950's, the number of illegal aliens infiltrating the northern border of the United States increased.30 This fact also brought attention to Canadian seasonal workers who enjoyed the benefits of American employment at higher wages than they could earn at home while contributing nothing, it was alleged, to the support of local communities through

taxes, or in spending their earnings, most of which they took with them back to Canada. 31

Canadian woodsmen working on temporary permits in the northeastern forests became the subject of attention in the mid-1950's. The occasion, however, was not due to rural unemployment but rather to the change of attitude toward forestry occupations by American workers. Since World War II, the logging industry had become increasingly mechanized and stronger union organization forced operators into providing better working conditions and fringe benefits for union labor. Improved roads into formerly remote areas of logging operations and increased use of chartered air services were gradually transforming the industry into a Monday to Friday operation. Friction occurred when many operators allegedly hired migrant Canadians at lower wages. Union representatives accused industry operators of violations of wage and hour regulations and claimed that American workers were being crowded out of jobs by "visiting" woodsmen. 32 The issue was resolved when the Canadian government suspended granting exit permits to Canadian woodsmen at the request of the United States government.

Although relations between the two countries were far less cordial in the post-World War II period than during the administrations of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King, considerations of continental defense in the 1950's against the possibility of surprise attack over the polar route from Europe and Asia brought an increase

31 Ibid.
in Canadian-American cooperation at the national level. The development of Canadian resources, particularly those of uranium, oil and natural gas, and the depletion of American reserves of energy and difficulties of obtaining supplies abroad on a reasonable and dependable basis led many American economists and government trade officials to think in continental terms. While national interest and prudence dictated a careful regard for Canadian sensibilities—though not observed very often in practice—according to Canadian editors, Americans' general preference for their northern neighbors as immigrants above any other national group has existed for generations on a personal level for reasons that have nothing to do with politics, trade, or the joint occupation of a continent. The preference has been sustained, because despite any expressions of irritation or disapproval, Canadians are manifestly "closer" to Americans in every respect.
Chapter VIII
Canadians in the United States

The majority of immigrant Canadians has always been of British stock. Like the British, they represented most socio-economic classes in their own country and they dispersed widely across a northern arc from New York to California. The other founding ethnic group of Canada, the French-Canadians, totalled one-third of the Canadian-born population in the United States in 1900, but declined to less than one-fourth by 1950. The less affluent French-Canadians immigrated en masse to the mill towns of adjacent New England in search of higher wages and steady employment. The United States Census showed that in the New England states the numbers of Canadians of French origin often equalled and sometimes surpassed those of British origin, but that in all other geographic divisions, the French element has never exceeded twenty percent of the total; and often it was less than ten percent, between 1920 and 1970. A third group, the so-called "New Canadians," comprised mainly of post-World War II arrivals from Europe, has contributed approximately thirty percent of the total number of Canadian immigrants since 1955. The "New Canadians" came principally

2 See Table 34, p. 213.
3 See Table 34, p. 209.
from the peasant villages of Europe but included a number of highly-skilled technicians and professional men and women, immigrants Canada counted upon to offset the drain of native-born "brains."

The relative importance of these three groups in Canadian immigration to the United States since 1920 might be construed either by their numbers, or by their impact upon American communities in which they settled. On the basis of this criteria it would be fair to state that "New Canadians" living in the United States would not be recognized as any different from European aliens who had emigrated directly to the United States. Their command of English and knowledge of North American life and ways would suggest only their former education and the term of their residence in the United States. Only the native-born Canadian, French or English, would be distinguished as Canadian by idioms or inflections of speech. French Canadians from the provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick were easily discerned in the New England states because of generally poorly developed English language skills and tenacious ethnocentricism. On the other hand, persons of French Canadian ancestry from urban areas in Ontario or from the four western provinces often had no upbringing in the French language and were culturally fused with the English-speaking majority. Hereafter, then, the term "Canadian" is meant to include all persons born in Canada or naturalized with fluency in the English language whatever their ethnic background.

Because Canadians of British stock formed the majority of Canada's population until the census of 1941—and still comprised 44.6 percent in 1971—it was often remarked that Canadians felt culturally closer to
Britons than to Americans.\(^4\) The racial strains of the American "melting pot" were far more mixed—and older than those of Canadian society. On the other hand, because of Canada's land border with the United States, Canadians were much more familiar with American customs and social differences than the British. Many things which Canadians took for granted, and perhaps duplicated in their own country, were utterly alien to Britons. Thus, the English-speaking Canadian immigrant in the United States was imbued with an even greater aura of invisibility than the British immigrant.

Like the British immigrant, the typical Canadian's motive for seeking permanent resident status in the United States was first and foremost economic. Unlike the emigrant Briton, however, possession of an immigrant registration card afforded the expatriate Canadian a high degree of mobility. No ocean separated him from the homeland; he could cross and recross the border at will.

Undoubtedly, the lower sense of commitment felt by Canadian immigrants was related to the ease of exercising his options. The frequency with which Canadian residents of the United States might fly or drive back to visit with friends and associates made it easier for him to keep intact his social and business connections. He could become the ideal of which the visionaries of the 1930's dreamed, the continentalist, proudly Canadian but recognizing an encompassing allegiance to a northern Pan-Americanism.\(^5\)


There was only one problem with this vision, and that was American nationalism. No matter how strongly a Canadian might feel about his country and its merits relative to the United States, or any other country, once he was admitted as a resident of the United States he quickly learned to expect of Americans that they had little or no knowledge of, and very little interest in, Canadian affairs. Hugh MacLennan, a distinguished Canadian author, put it this way:

If Americans think of us at all, they think of us . . . as a little brother who is doing a fine job by imitating big brother's shining example in most of the things he does. But Americans are not really interested in us as a nation with a growing self-consciousness and we would be fools to expect them to be. A great nation is interested in a small one only if that small one makes trouble for it or is known to be spectacularly immoral . . . 6

Immigrating Canadians were often chagrined, therefore, to realize that while they could recite the names and locations of most of the American states and could cite the economic activity associated with many of them, Americans would look vague at the mention of Saskatchewan or Nova Scotia. Canadians were as familiar with Time, or Reader's Digest as Americans, but few Americans had ever heard of Maclean's--Canada's national magazine--except as a toothpaste!

Behind the extended hand of welcome to the United States lay the automatic assumption of Americans that the immigrant—whether Yugoslav, Pole, or Canadian—had opted for America out of a belief that he aspired to the ultimate in democratic fellowship, and material opportunity. This was not an unreasonable assumption; the United States

had fifty million immigrants to prove it, and their statements pro-
vided an endless testimonial. Nevertheless, Canadians were often
uncomfortable with the implied assumption that by their act of immi-
gration they had renounced their faith in, and allegiance to, Canada.
Canadians usually resisted, privately, this loss of distinction.

Americans were much more interested in the individual himself than
in his background as a foreign national. Although Americans were
educated to appreciate their own national traditions, those of other
nations seemed to them antiquarian by contrast. Americans were pres-
ent and future-minded people who celebrated success by planning greater
future ventures and rallied to counter adversity with such ringing
challenges as "we have nothing to fear but fear," and "yes, we can."
Into this milieu Canadians could be sure of a cordial welcome; they
were recognized as better educated than any foreign nationals as a
group and superior to home products in many specialized fields of
training such as nursing, medicine, and engineering. Canadians prac-
ticed thrift, appeared to be law-abiding, and became responsible citi-
zens.

Many Canadians found the forward orientation exciting. They
talked about the "faster pace" of life in the United States and sur-
prised themselves when they realized how easily they had adapted to it.
They began to wonder what they might have accomplished in Canada if

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7 For a good example, see Robert S. Benjamin, ed., I Am An American
(1941).

8 These comments, and those of the previous two paragraphs, are based
upon the author's own experience and discussions with Canadians resident
in the United States.
that nation had been less establishment-oriented, more flexible, and more willing to try out new ideas and promote younger men on the basis of talent and potential. Having defined what they admired most in American society they could now take a more objective view of the one they had left.

For most Canadians, the home environment had been a stable influence in their lives. It had provided an opportunity to mature gradually, to learn an appreciation for tradition, thrift, conservatism, and compromise. Coming to the United States, the young Canadian often felt like the private school student who suddenly found himself surrounded by the equalitarian banalities of a large state university.

"I love the dynamism of this country," exulted a Boston real estate developer from Montreal. "There's just more of a meritocracy here, a willingness to recognize talent. And guts." In Canada, people were inordinately suspicious of the businessman, declared the developer, but there was an acceptance of the entrepreneurial role in the United States. The Horatio Alger myth and pragmatism that permeated American society were not deprecated as barely legitimate or moral. Businessmen were kept honest by their competitors, and by a public that had a keener understanding of their needs and role in the society.9

A former Canadian, a Harvard law graduate and special legal advisor to a White House trade representative, claimed:

... it's difficult to imagine too many areas where the challenges would be as great as they

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are here, and by extension, people who love complexity and problems are going to head for the places where they can deal with these problems.

A gross national product at something like a trillion dollars a year, a population of 200 million people and an American corporate team that controls millions and millions of dollars of foreign investment—obviously give range to international, commercial and legal problems that just don't exist in Canada. . . . I'll put it this way. It took me between 30 and 60 seconds to accept the offer to teach at Harvard. And it took me between 10 and 15 seconds to accept this job at the White House. These were not hard decisions.10

The recognition of talent and promotion by merit and ability was the overriding theme of these expatriates' comments. The young attorney remarked:

One of the remarkable things about the U.S. Administration, . . . is that there are so many young people in positions of relative power who got there on sheer merit and sheer ability. In this sense the United States is far more democratic. There's much less of the old school tie. It's much harder to fight the pecking order in Canada. 11

The memories of Canada conjured by the old school tie were not the common experience of Canadians. The majority of Canadians were educated in the public schools and there were fewer private colleges and universities in proportion to public institutions of higher education in Canada than there were in the United States. What Canadian immigrants shared in common was the British connection, and in this sense, usually unconsciously, they revealed the attitudes and values expressed by the old school tie's unchanging stripes and plaids.

10Ibid., p. 38.

11Ibid.
Immersion in the American business environment and discovery of the political vitality and personal relevance of the neighborhood community worked gradual changes and modifications of these attitudes and values. The Canadian-American suddenly realized the distance he had swum from the Canadian shore—and the closeness of the American beach ahead.

Most Canadians find that they reach their critical stage of decision after they've been in the U.S. for about three years. By then, they've ceased to be irritated by the lack of American interest in Canadian affairs and by the small differences in everyday American life. They've known what it's like to feel the immigrant's compulsive urge to hustle, and, as a result, they've usually done very well at their jobs. They've made friends and their children are established in schools.13

About this time, recalled a Hollywood film producer and former Canadian,

... you start to feel guilty about abandoning Canada ... so you rationalize—you tell yourself that there is no place for xenophobia in the modern world; you remember that the kind of job you want doesn't exist in Canada or if it does, it's closed to you by now because the people whose experience is entirely Canadian are firmly established in the line-up. You try to throw off your emotional ties by getting angry at the lack of opportunities and you end up telling yourself you did the only possible thing—which is probably true.13

If expatriates do not return to Canada at this stage they probably never will, concluded Maclean's writer Christina Newman. Within two


13Ibid.
more years they become eligible for citizenship and many will apply for their papers. They do this both because they want a say in the political affairs of their communities by this time and because of subtle pressures exerted on them by employers and friends to establish themselves as "real Americans." At this point, they—and their children—are lost to Canada forever.

Some Canadian immigrants and their families were recovered in the 1960's through the efforts of a Canadian government program called "Operation Retrieval." The program was aimed primarily at Canadian students in the United States who were on the point of graduating with first or advanced degrees. Canadian consular offices in the United States kept university placement offices supplied with information on current job opportunities in Canada and invited students to write or meet with consular representatives on campus visits to discuss employment possibilities and avenues of contact. The effort was inspired by the attention given to the "brain drain" during the last "free" decade of Canadian immigration to the United States.

Though Canadian students in the United States were classed as nonimmigrant and were required to register their presence as such as part of the university registration procedure, it was a relatively easy matter in the 1960's for graduates to obtain employment offers in the United States and petition successfully for an adjustment of status to permanent resident. Like Canadians admitted directly to the United States as immigrants, students were required to satisfy immigration authorities that they had adequate means of support. Only rarely could students show evidence of support for longer than
one academic year, but by careful management, summer employment, and
government-insured loans when necessary, students were able to main-
tain their status and continue their education. Since United States
Department of Labor regulations allowed foreign students to accept
summer employment—except in periods of high national unemployment—
Canadians, like the nationals of less affluent countries, frequently
remained in the United States on a year-round basis. Thus, while
their living standards and contact with working Americans were vastly
different from the experience of the resident immigrant, they too
became aware after three years or so that the nature of their links with
Canada had undergone a change. Immigration statistics revealed that
one out of four foreign students in the United States, including Cana-
dians, did obtain an adjustment of their nonimmigrant status to per-
manent resident alien.14

Because of the orientation of "Operation Retrieval" it was
extremely unlikely that the Canadian who entered the United States
directly as an immigrant would ever have heard of it. Those who re-
turned to Canada permanently did so for a variety of reasons, none of
which included government inducements or overtures. The decisions
were usually highly personal and less likely to be economic than the
motives for their outward passage. "If the same excitement and the
same opportunity existed in Canada . . . I'd rather be there," ad-
mitted one expatriate. Sometimes, during moods of depression,

14 Theodore Woodin, Foreign Student Advisor, University of Hawaii,
Manoa campus, personal interview with the author, Honolulu, September,
1975.
Canadian expatriates might write Canadian employers or agencies in hopes of an invitation to return. Christina Newman found in talking to the manager of a Toronto employment agency that suspicious attitudes prevailed among some Canadian businessmen concerning applications from expatriates. Their resistance seemed to be based on skepticism of the applicant's ability—doubting that anyone would want to return to Canada if they were successful in the United States.15

From his viewpoint, the unsettled expatriate was more likely to deduce the rejection as retribution for having deserted Canada in the first place, though he may not have conceived it as implied for disloyalty. Still, as the ultra-conservatives regarded Canadian nationalist aspirations as placing Canada before monarch and empire as impertinent, so ultra-nationalists might be cold to the petitions of its "turncoats."

Despite the periodic fuss about a brain drain and the need for providing greater opportunities in Canada there was little evidence that Canada ever expected to see many of her expatriates return home. Probably it was the transmission of this attitude by friends and associates in Canada as much as official indifference which influenced the immigrant subconsciously when he began to assess the plusses and minuses of his three or four years in Syracuse or Canoga Park.

Sometimes, friends and relatives in the United States made the difference between staying or returning. Often it was because of family

15Newman, p. 40.
or friends that the immigrant had packed his bags for New York, Michigan, or California, in the first place. Canadians, like Britons, took their cue from Americans' attitude towards their past. They became present-minded, generally avoiding the ethnic clubs and societies that the extroverts among them and the sentimental attempted to keep afloat, yet their earliest contacts in the United States were often former Canadians. If these contacts had been residents of the United States for some time—if they had become the Canadian-Americans of the journalistic surveys—they were helped immeasurably by the knowledge of their friends' experiences. Sometimes, Canadian-Americans were responsible for the emigration of former colleagues and assisted them in becoming professionally established.

The motion picture and television industries in Hollywood provide good examples. Canadian theatrical talent in Hollywood was at least as well represented by its writers, directors, music arrangers, dancers and producers as by its actors. Though the names of Mary Pickford, Walter Pidgeon, Norma Shearer, Glenn Ford, and Raymond Burr were known as well as Britain's Grant, Andrews, Smith, or Niven, only a few of those connected with the industry would be able to identify director Norman Jewison as a former Canadian, or writers Ron Clark and Allan Blye, music consultant Denny Vaughn and producer Saul Ilson, as a quartet of Canadian brains behind the Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour.

These Hollywood colonies of Canadian talent—or "Canadian Mafia,"

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as Hal Tennant, a *Maclean's* correspondent, heard these expatriates described—did not come together by chance. Saul Ilson, the producer of the show, needed proven talent for the launching of the series and naturally thought of Blye, Vaughn and Bill Davis, the latter to direct the show, because he knew their work from his Toronto days with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Wilt Melnick, a Hollywood agent recommended by Jewison to Toronto actor Larry Mann, was so impressed with his first Canadian discovery that he subsequently acquired other Canadians as clients. "I feel guilty about it," said Melnick, referring to the exodus of talent from Canada, "I'm destroying an industry." Melnick's maneuvers might be less destructive than he thought, Hal Tennant considered, but there was no questioning how receptive Hollywood was to Canadians. There was an assumption that if the actor, writer, or director was from Canada, then he was seasoned in his craft.

Just as a salubrious climate and professional opportunities attracted Canadian artists to Hollywood, so climate and economic expansion in Southern California drew thousands of Canadians from all walks of life. Los Angeles and Orange led the fifty-two California counties in numbers of Canadian foreign-born counted in the 1970 Census. Seven out of ten Canadians, or Canadian-born lived in the southern counties.  

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17 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

The magnetism of California and reservoir of potential customers was the purpose of a survey conducted by Air Canada, made public in 1967 by the Canadian Consul in Los Angeles. Air Canada estimated a market of 450,000 "Canadians" in the Los Angeles area which included (1) Canadian citizens resident in the area; (2) former Canadians who had become United States citizens; and (3) the American-born children of Canadian citizens and former Canadians. The estimate was approximately four times the number of Canadian-born living in the area and three times that for the state, which was probably a reasonable figure allowing for reproduction.

From this point of view, thought Financial Post's Sam Solomon, the Canadian influence in Southern California was substantial. Checking Canadian derivatives, he found that two of the five elected supervisors of Los Angeles County had Canadian ancestry. Philip Isley, recently retired mayor of Beverly Hills, was a former Canadian. In commerce, Fred Hartley, Vancouver-born graduate of the University of British Columbia, was president of the giant Union Oil Company of California. Bullock's renowned department store bore the name of a Canadian immigrant and former Canadian, Joseph Benaron, was president of Thomas Organ Company, one of the world's largest electric organ manufacturers. Solomon discovered famous corporation lawyers and made special mention of the medical group. Graduates of McGill and University of Toronto were tops in their field in Los Angeles. There were more doctors than any other professional group among the two hundred-odd

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members of the Canadian Society of Los Angeles. He also noted especially the Canadian contingent in the entertainment field, since this group was obviously better known to the general public than any other.

Solomon concluded his article with a short list of ethnic clubs which had appeared as a result of Canadian immigration. His comment on their fortunes is a telling reflection of the struggles faced by Canadian nationalists in their own country:

> All these groups are fighting a losing battle to maintain a Canadian identity here at a time when Canadians at home are still wondering whether they are one nation.\(^{20}\)

Some of these ethnic clubs and societies were contacted by the author for the purpose of corresponding with and interviewing recent immigrants and former Canadians. Conversations with club secretaries revealed the low state of activity of most of these groups whose main function in the 1970's seemed to be the promotion of group charter flights, by no means exclusively to Canada or Great Britain.

Since few members of these Canadian Clubs were active, it became necessary to investigate other likely sources to discover the identities of Canada's invisible immigrants. These discoveries, with their individual motives, expectations, and findings are the subject of the following chapter.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
Chapter IX
Canadian "Invisible Immigrants" Discovered

The same questionnaire used to record Britons' motives for emigration to the Pacific Coast states and Hawaii, their choice of destination, and subsequent experience as immigrants was employed to obtain data on Canadian immigrants resident in the United States. As in the case of the British, information as to age, sex, marital status, education and usual occupation was gathered in order to give the survey a more individualistic and personal character.

Of the 220 persons who constituted the Canadian group surveyed 81 were males, 83 were females, and 56 were children under eighteen years of age. The marital status of the adults was as follows: single, widowed or divorced males, 28; married males, 53; single, widowed, or divorced females, 24; married females, 59. Table 19 shows the age of the whole group at the time of their entry to the United States.

TABLE 19
CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: AGE AT TIME OF IMMIGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade of entry</th>
<th>Under 18</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60 &amp; above</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aQuestionnaire survey and personal interviews with the author, October, 1975–March, 1977; hereafter cited as Questionnaire Survey. (For United States Immigration Service statistics on Canadian immigrants by age and sex, see Table 32, p. 211.)

1See Table 32, p. 211.
The total group represented a wide diversity of occupations, as indicated in Table 20:

TABLE 20

CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED:
USUAL OCCUPATION AT TIME OF IMMIGRATIONa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Non-Professional Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educator</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Machinist</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Building contractor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Printer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Airline pilot</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Librarian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musician</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Communications operator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public relations special-ist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farm manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social worker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dental assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth counsellor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fashion designer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hair stylist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hotel clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photographer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Housewives, children, &amp; no occupationb</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 53

Total: 167

aQuestionnaire survey.

bIncludes 45 housewives, 56 children, and 19 of unstated or no occupation.

The wide diversity in occupations was equally true for their educational backgrounds. The professionals generally held academic or professional degrees beyond the baccalaureate level. The non-professional included a number with first degrees, housewives usually predominating.
Most of the immigrants with less than high school education came to the United States in the period before World War II. Levels of educational achievement are shown in Table 21:

**TABLE 21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level Attained</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than secondary</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary only</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First degree</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced degree(s)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstated</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aQuestionnaire survey.

The future prospects of Canadian immigrants, like those of American-born residents of the United States, depended to a great extent on their educational attainments. While most immigrants came to take up better jobs and improve their material living conditions, many immigrants sought employment in particular locations where they might avail themselves of special educational opportunities. Others discovered a purpose in expanding their educational horizons after their arrival. Further education was usually sought for practical reasons, such as acquiring knowledge for a better job in a new or related field. Many adults who returned to school were nonworking wives who became bored with the round of neighborhood coffee parties and bridge luncheons. Many female Canadian respondents to the questionnaire indicated they had no motive besides that which they shared with their husbands—hopes for better future prospects, improved living conditions—but they less often indicated dissatisfaction with home conditions, which suggested
that emigration for many women was a passive decision—an acceptance of their husbands' desires.

The motives of the emigrants who initiated these decisions were overwhelmingly economic, as indicated in Table 22.

**TABLE 22**

**CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: MOTIVES FOR EMIGRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Times cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Better job</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To improve future prospects</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Better living conditions</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Family ties or friends</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Educational opportunities</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Dissatisfaction with home conditions</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other reasons</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aQuestionnaire survey (164 adults).*

Canadians shared Americans' appetite for material possessions and believed there was a greater variety of opportunity in a country whose business leaders were temperamentally capable and willing to think in bigger terms and take the requisite risks in their business dealings.\(^2\)

Canadians generally expressed less dissatisfaction with conditions at home than British emigrants—*in economic terms their standard of living was second only to the United States and well above that of Great Britain and continental Europe. Moreover, Canadians had little total disaffection for their government such as some Britons showed. In

\(^2\)Several Britons who had sojourned in Canada as immigrants before re-emigrating to the United States also spoke of the conservatism of Canadian business in discussions with the author.
general those interviewed displayed middle-class attitudes free from the bias of class that permeated the thinking of some British immigrants who sought to maintain or overcome the finer distinctions of class identification. Thus Canadians usually held more divided views of the benefits to be realized from emigration to the United States than the nationals of other countries—and because of the land border could more easily temporize in making commitments to stay in the United States as immigrants.

Canadians geographic proximity to the United States and familiarity with Americans and American conditions gave them a special advantage over other immigrants. A Canadian resident might interview prospective employers in the United States simply by taking a few days off from work or scout employment opportunities while on vacation or business trips. Bill Ouimette, of Victoria, British Columbia, personally known by the author, became bored with his government job and a predictable, rather dull future, in his estimation. Ouimette and his wife took a vacation trip down the Pacific coast to see where they would choose to live if they had the opportunity. While in southern California he was offered a job as a tax consultant with the Irvine Ranch, near Newport Beach. He accepted, finding both job and living conditions very desirable.

A Windsor, Ontario, receptionist took an extended lunch hour one day, rode the short bus ride through the Canada-Detroit tunnel and interviewed for a better job as a radio-therapist. The former receptionist met her husband there, a former Canadian who was a librarian at the Detroit Public Library. The husband had studied library science at Stanford and had always wanted to return to California. After a
few months, the couple moved to Sunnyvale, California, when the couple both found jobs in the area.  

While immigrants came from nearly every Canadian province to the Pacific coast states, the western provinces provided the greatest number because of their closer proximity. There was an additional factor in that American ties were strong in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba—a legacy of the northward migration from the plains states of the United States at the turn of the century. A respondent who was a boy of ten, in 1921, recalled:

> My father was an American who moved to Edmonton during the boom period of the early 1900's. He returned to the United States when Western Canada collapsed financially in 1920—the bottom fell right out of it. Many of our Canadian neighbors decided to go south too when this happened. No one paid much attention to the border in those days. California was booming and that's where most people headed.  

California in the 1920's offered higher wages and better working conditions than British Columbia according to an ex-Vancouver pharmacist:

> A pharmacist was making $125.00 a month in Vancouver working a 64-hour week in 1927. In California he made $150.00 a week for a 54-hour week.  

A booming construction industry in Southern California in the early 1920's and reports of high wages drew two brothers from Northern Ontario in 1922:

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3. Marie Petrie, Sunnyvale, Ca., correspondence with the author, October, 1975. (Hereafter cited as correspondence).


My older brother wrote back to the family in Ontario to persuade them to let me come out to join him in Seal Beach. There was a lot of work in California for anyone in the construction industry. My brother was an electrician and taught me the trade. Some months we made $300.00 each with overtime.6

Buoyant business conditions in California during the 1920's were recalled by the owner of an automobile franchise in Petaluma who later moved to Santa Barbara:

Things were rough in western Canada in the car business but you couldn't go wrong with a good dealership in a California community when we moved down in 1923.7

Canadians moving to California were attracted not only by employment opportunities, business conditions and higher living standards but also by California's much publicized salubrious climate. This was particularly appealing to Canadians living in areas where winter seasons were long and severe:

My family just got tired of the snow and winter cold in Canada. My father was a barber and figured he could cut hair in Pasadena and be a lot more comfortable at the same time. I was 15 when we moved down here and finished school in California.8

Considerations of California's climate were again prominent in the determinations of Canadians searching for better future prospects in the post-World War II years:

A better climate and preference for smaller cities brought me to Santa Barbara from Vancouver.9

6Sydney A. Worrall, interview, Oakland, Ca., August, 1966.
7George Mooney, Santa Barbara, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
8William T. O'Hearn, interview, Honolulu, December, 1975.
9Tom Lawrence, Santa Barbara, Ca., correspondence, May, 1976.
I decided to relocate here because I thought business would be good, I would not have as much travelling as I had in Vancouver where I lost two hours a day commuting, and recreation would be cheaper and closer at hand. Besides all that we were fed up with the rain in winter--you know what that's like.10

I came to California because there were more opportunities in my surgical specialty and better facilities to work with. Then the warmer climate made the idea that much more attractive.11

This is an exciting place to live. We feel that we are at the center of things, where new ideas find fertile soil in which to grow and develop. You can sail, golf, ride and swim all year round in almost perfect weather.12

The desire to be "at the center of things" prompted a Canadian professor of sociology to move to California when he had the opportunity:

I came to California for strictly academic reasons and because I believe that in the United States, and especially here, you are at the cultural center of the western world.13

Better educational opportunities in California were cited by two former residents of Alberta:

Library science was a new and undeveloped field in Canada when I came to California in 1956. I came to Stanford to study--I had no idea of remaining at the time.14

10Russ Hewer, Fresno, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
11Barry Sherman, Pleasanton, Ca., correspondence, November, 1975.
12Dorothy Ouimette, interview, Newport Beach, Ca., August, 1976.
14Eleanor Peete, interview, Stanford, Ca., August, 1976.
I went to Berkeley in 1945 to train for the ministry and my wife enrolled to study for a degree in music.\textsuperscript{15}

Utah was the immediate destination for a young Mormon from Saskatchewan in search of higher education:

Originally I came to the United States as a student, in 1956, to Brigham Young University at Provo, Utah. I couldn't go to a university in Canada without passing grades in every high school subject. As a member of the Mormon Church, B.Y.U. was a natural choice and a magnet for hundreds of kids in southern Saskatchewan and southern Alberta who belong to the church.\textsuperscript{16}

The limitations and inflexibility of institutions of higher education in Canada were criticized by a young Canadian biologist:

I have a faculty position at the Institute of Arctic Biology, University of Alaska. The work done here is not even considered in Canada, even though the country is three-fifths Arctic and Subarctic. In spite of myself I was forced to admit the U.S. are far more enlightened in their approach to science.\textsuperscript{17}

Dissatisfaction with future prospects in his position with the Canadian government led another Canadian scientist to seek professional advancement in the United States:

My husband was employed by the Canadian Department of Agriculture after receiving his Ph.D. in Agronomy in the U.S.A. Limited future prospects in Canada was the reason for our moving here. My husband is in business as a consultant in crop production and soils usage. I am working part-time as a nurse—I am an R.N., trained at Vancouver General Hospital.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15}Theodore Crawford, interview, Sunnyvale, Ca., August, 1976.

\textsuperscript{16}Alfred Pratte, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.

\textsuperscript{17}Hans Behrisch, Fairbanks, Alaska, correspondence, January, 1975.

\textsuperscript{18}Dorothy Baldwin, Walnut Creek, Ca., correspondence, December, 1975.
Somewhat more unusual among Canadians than Britons was the motive expressed by a Saskatchewan physician:

When the socialist government in Saskatchewan nationalized medicine they drove a lot of doctors out. Socialized medicine does not make for greater efficiency in practices and improved health care for patients, rather the reverse because of the demands of the bureaucracy. I would not work as the servant of the state. 19

As indicated earlier in this chapter, most respondents to the questionnaire emphasized economic motives although a few cited academic and cultural reasons as being prime considerations. A substantial number of adult women and all the minor children, it has been noted, were involuntary immigrants. In the same category, brides, or fiancées of American citizens came to the United States because their husbands, or intended husbands, resided there:

I moved to California with my husband who is an American citizen. He had lived in Canada five years, then was transferred to his home office. 20

To be with my husband was the reason I moved to Seattle. 21

Fell in love. 22

The transfer of key company personnel to the United States could also be classified as an involuntary immigration:

After five years in this country and with a family you begin to put down roots. I was transferred

20 Marilyn King, Santa Monica, Ca., correspondence, December, 1975.
22 Veronica McDonald, Napa, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
by my company so I'm not an immigrant in the usual sense but my future and my family's is probably going to be here.23

Family ties and the loneliness of a married daughter in California developed into a permanent stay for this respondent and his wife:

My daughter's husband was overseas and she asked us to come down to stay with her for a while. I never had any thought of emigrating but I got restless and took a job as pressman with a publishing firm. We decided to apply for permanent residence then to make it legal.24

Domestic problems led to unpremeditated immigration in both the following instances. A former British Columbia housewife wrote:

I ran away from an alcoholic husband. Was actually going to Australia via freighter but ran out of funds waiting for sailing—had to cash in ticket. Obtained job in Oakland as secretary. Now studying transactional analysis to become a therapist.25

An Alberta resident who was a former Scottish war bride told the author:

I married a Canadian serviceman during the war. When I arrived in Alberta in 1946 I was shocked to find we had to live with his family. He had said he owned a ranch but it turned out to be his family's. I soon found we had nothing in common and grew to hate everything about the place—especially the isolation in winter when we were sometimes literally cut off from the world. So I left and went to New York, did some modelling, and worked part-time as a secretary. I also worked in Nassau, Bermuda and California.26

Another unpremeditated immigration to the United States occurred as a result of an urge to travel:

23 Thomas G. Webb, Concord, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
25 Audrie Cirque, Walnut Creek, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
26 Sheila Beglie, interview, Victoria, B.C., July, 1976.
I had a desire to travel and live somewhere else than southern Ontario—but I would not have chosen the United States, per se. I came to Hawaii with a friend on vacation, had a wonderful time, saw an ad in a professional journal for a librarian, applied and was accepted.27

The vast majority of immigrants, of course, took the conventional steps to obtain permanent resident visas before leaving Canada, whether they had made prior arrangements for employment or not. The major factors, then, in channelling ever increasing numbers of Canadian immigrants to the Pacific division states were better economic opportunities, the presence of family or friends, a good physical environment, and the lure of a temperate climate with year-round opportunities for a variety of recreations. Table 23 indicates the relative importance of these factors to the respondents to the questionnaire survey.

TABLE 23
CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED: IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN CHOICE OF DESTINATIONa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration</th>
<th>Times cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convenience to place of employment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical environment</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family or friends</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aQuestionnaire survey (164 adults).

The number of Canadian-born residents of the Pacific Division of the United States Census in 1970 stood 20 percent higher than recorded

27Nancy Knowles, interview, Honolulu, November, 1975.
in the 1950 census. Statistics indicated that the heaviest flow of Canadians into the Division went to California. While the states of Washington and Oregon together contained 66,368 Canadian-born residents in 1950, or approximately 60 percent of California's 110,754, in 1970 they contained only 48,667 Canadian-born, or less than 32 percent of California's 153,725. Even more revealing was the fact that seven out of ten Canadian-born residents in California lived either in Los Angeles or Orange county. That Canadians have contributed increasingly in the numbers which formed the continental trek to urban centers of Southern California since 1920 is shown in Table 24.

It will be noted that only two cities in Northern California, San Jose and San Mateo, reported a higher number of Canadian-born in 1970 than in 1920. Both these cities, located within forty miles of San Francisco, experienced considerable industrial growth after World War II and became urban in character. All Southern California cities except Pasadena recorded higher numbers of Canadian-born residents in 1970 than in 1920. The 1930 census reflects the heavy immigration during the 1920's to California cities while the 1940 census shows a decline during the depression decade and because of natural attrition. In common with many migrating Americans, Canadians continued to show their preference for Southern California in the postwar years. The most outstanding feature of the 1970 census of California's urban growth shows Canadian participation in the general population movement to Southern California's beach cities and the new suburbs of Los Angeles.

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28See Table 34, p. 213.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>5,227</td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>1,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>7,083</td>
<td>9,601</td>
<td>8,615</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>4,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>3,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southern California**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burbank</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downey</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Grove</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glendale</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>1,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntington Beach</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>3,589</td>
<td>3,138</td>
<td>3,473</td>
<td>3,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>13,741</td>
<td>30,740</td>
<td>27,755</td>
<td>27,969</td>
<td>27,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>2,216</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>5,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Ana</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Monica</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>1,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrance</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aUnited States Census of the Population: 1920, III, 123-24, Table 12; 1930, III, 267-69, Table 18; 1940, III, 564-66, Table 24; 1950, Part 5, pp. 105-07, Table 34a; 1970, Part 6, pp. 439-44, Table 81; the census of 1960 did not provide this information as foreign-born residents were included in "foreign stock" without differentiation.

*Indicates fewer than 1,000 Canadian-born residents.

While Canadians have shared Americans' enthusiasm for the more casual life-style of the so-called "sun-belt states" from Florida to
California and Hawaii, they were still attracted to employment opportunities and living conditions in urban United States centers close to the Canadian border. In the Pacific Northwest, the state of Washington attracted 20,550 Canadian immigrants in the twenty years, 1956-1975, inclusive, while Oregon received 6,986 Canadians. Together, the two states received about a quarter of the numbers who went to California during the same period. Nevertheless, the United States census shows a decrease in the numbers of Canadian-born in urban "places" of the two states between 1950 and 1970, as indicated in Table 25:

TABLE 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellingham</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everett</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>13,824</td>
<td>15,745</td>
<td>12,545</td>
<td>13,332</td>
<td>8,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>3,836</td>
<td>3,856</td>
<td>3,177</td>
<td>3,490</td>
<td>1,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacoma</td>
<td>2,978</td>
<td>3,156</td>
<td>2,679</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Oregon     |      |      |      |      |      |
| Portland   | 6,437| 8,351| 7,029| 6,816| 3,100|

* Indicates fewer than 1,000 Canadian-born residents.

29 U.S. Commissioner of Immigration & Naturalization, Annual Reports: 1956-1975, Table 12A.
The earlier years, 1920-1950, indicate a growth pattern very similar to that of California. The 1930 census shows the substantial immigration of the 1920's, while the 1940 census reflects the effects of the depression years. This is followed by the resurgence of immigration in the early postwar years, revealed in the census of 1950. If it were possible to differentiate the numbers of foreign-born from the foreign-stock recorded in the 1960 census, it is likely that the cities of the Pacific Northwest would have shown a decrease, reflecting the great surge of interest in California, even though total numbers of immigrants in the 1950's was much higher than in the previous decade. Fascination for California continued in the 1960's, reaching its peak about 1965. The continuing trend of increasing Canadian immigration during the 1960's was not evident, as Table 25 shows, in the Pacific Northwest.

As might be expected, Canadian residents of Washington and Oregon came mostly from, or via, the Pacific coast province of British Columbia—especially from the urban area of Vancouver, located only thirty miles north of the United States border. The cities of Seattle and Portland attracted most Canadians in the post-World War II period. The fluctuating fortunes of the Boeing Aircraft Company, a major employer in the Seattle-Tacoma area, had their effects upon the flow of Canadian immigrants which consisted increasingly of professional, technical and skilled workers but fewer Canadians went into the mill towns of Everett and Bellingham and other smaller Washington centers as they did in the 1920's and earlier. British Columbia's logging industry in the 1950's and afterward offered as many and often better opportunities for em-
ployment. Spokane, the commercial center of eastern Washington and hub of an inland empire which used to include southern British Columbia's Kootenay district, continued to add to its urban population after World War II but competition for most job categories denied entry to the employment market for nearly all Canadians except those with skills in current demand.

Vancouver, British Columbia, also provided the island state of Hawaii with a number of permanent residents in the 1960's. Hawaii had been a playground for Canadians ever since Canadian Pacific Airlines inaugurated trans-Pacific passenger service between Vancouver and Sydney, Australia, with intermediate stops at Honolulu, and Nandi, Fiji, in 1949. In the 1960's, many Canadians discovered the quiet pleasures of rural Maui, purchased condominium apartments with a view to returning for long winter sojourns and, upon retirement, came back to the islands as permanent residents. Gordon Gibson, a prominent Vancouver lumberman and onetime member of the legislative assembly in Victoria developed his Maui home into a commercial resort hotel.30 A veteran pilot of the Royal Canadian Air Force subsequently went into business in Kailua, on the island of Oahu, having decided to make Hawaii his home. In an interview with the author, Dave Babineau said:

I retired here in 1962 from the R.C.A.F. We had visited here many times before we decided to move here permanently. My wife and I looked over many places—Florida, the Caribbean, Australia, New Zealand, Tahiti—and decided this place was the best all round. Here we have great climate, beautiful scenery, an interesting diversity

30 Gordon Gibson, interview, Honolulu, April, 1976, operator of Maui-Lu resort.
of cultures, and it's not that expensive to go up to see the relatives now and then, and not too far away for them to come and visit us.\textsuperscript{31}

Not all Canadian immigrants to Hawaii were retirees. Vacation experiences in Hawaii sometimes made visitors want to return and were willing to give up homes and jobs to come back as immigrants and make a new start. A Honolulu real estate broker told the author:

\begin{quote}
I came to Hawaii on vacation and thought there was nothing like it. I came back three times before I left my job as a civil engineer in Manitoba. But I've never regretted it. Real estate is more fun than working on sewage treatment plants.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

The migration statistics show that 2,993 Canadian immigrants entered Hawaii between 1959, the year of statehood, and 1975.\textsuperscript{33} The United States census for 1970 recorded 1,927 Canadian-born in Hawaii—about 15 percent of the numbers who resided in Oregon in that year.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus far in this chapter, the motives and choice of destination of the respondents to the questionnaire survey have been examined. The third major concern of the survey was to record immigrants subsequent experiences, as shown in Table 26.

Further comments made with respect to the decision to emigrate when respondents were subsequently interviewed seemed to indicate that Canadian immigrants, like the British, were of the belief that their decision had seemed the right thing to do at the time and that they had

\textsuperscript{31}Dave Babineau, interview, Kailua, Hawaii, November, 1975.

\textsuperscript{32}Gordon Crabtree, interview, Honolulu, December, 1975.

\textsuperscript{33}U.S. Commissioner of Immigration & Naturalization, \textit{Annual Reports:} 1959-1975, Table 12A.

\textsuperscript{34}See Table 34, p. 218.
TABLE 26
CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED:
DECISION & CONSEQUENCES OF EMIGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Question 9(a)</th>
<th>Question 9(b)</th>
<th>Question 9(c)</th>
<th>Question 9(d)</th>
<th>Question 9(e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you now view your decision to emigrate positively?</td>
<td>Have your expectations been fulfilled in terms of economic progress</td>
<td>In terms of social and cultural expansion?</td>
<td>Do you expect to remain in the U.S. permanently?</td>
<td>Will you become a U.S. citizen when eligible?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Sure</td>
<td>Unstated</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(a)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9(b)</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Questionnaire survey (164 adults).*

Further comments made with respect to the decision to emigrate when respondents were subsequently interviewed seemed to indicate that Canadian immigrants, like the British, were of the belief that their decision had seemed the right thing to do at the time and that they had not given it serious thought since. Obviously, those immigrants with bitter experiences and incapacity to adjust to circumstances usually returned home, counting their decision to emigrate a mistake.

Like the British, also, the great majority of questionnaire respondents and persons interviewed subsequently affirmed they had made economic gains in coming to the United States. A few sample comments...
on experiences follow:

At Brigham Young University I took a B.A. and an M.A. in Communications, then went into journalism. Do you know that when I left Canada there were 102 daily newspapers—there were 1,765 in the U.S. at the same time. Even taking the difference in population into account that still provides Americans with nearly twice as many newspapers to read—there's no question I have gone further here than I could have in Canada. 35

I had more opportunities to make money in the United States than anyone could dream about in the group I went around with in school. But I'm also a compulsive gambler and never seemed to be able to hold onto much that I earned. 36

Our move to Southern California has been a stimulating experience and I've already had two exciting jobs before I decided to go into business on my own. 37

I find I have more time for my clients, more time to relax in Fresno and the tax laws here allow me to keep more of the money I make. 38

With regard to the question of social and cultural enrichment, again the majority of Canadian respondents replied affirmatively. Living in the United States proved a stimulating experience for most Canadians. Many spoke of the "faster pace of life" in the United States, the greater restlessness of Americans and their apparent need to be always "on the move." David Cantell had shown his intellectual satis-

35Alfred Pratte, interview, Honolulu, June, 1976.
36Sydney Worrall, interview, Oakland, Ca., August, 1966.
37Bill Ouimette, interview, Newport Beach, Ca., August, 1976.
38Russ Hewer, Fresno, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
faction at being a part of American life, referring to the United States as "the cultural center of the western world," while Bill Ouimette of Newport Beach found California "an exciting place to live . . . at the center of things."39

Joan Pennington, of San Francisco, a former British Columbian, corresponded enthusiastically on the "spiritual and intellectual energy" she found in California:

I have a great deal of emotional attachment to Canada. Didn't leave it out of dissatisfaction or even in expectation of a better life in the U.S. However, I have grown to love the Bay area and crave the cultural and intellectual exchange available here in such bounty. I'm also drawn to this city as a centre for medical advancement, (research & equipment in my field of interest--ultra sonography). There is a spiritual and intellectual energy here which is undeniable—even in face of the physical beauty and simplicity I remember in B.C. I tend to equate B.C. with a happy childhood—something pleasant, but behind me now.40

The superior quality of western life was the pleasant discovery made by a former Torontonian, now resident in Portland:

Despite what you often hear in the East—that the West is provincial and culturally inert—I have found the opposite to be true. Besides the celebrated Western hospitality—which I have experienced in both Canada and the United States—there is generally a higher standard of living. I find the quality of life is far superior in the west.41

Marilyn King, a British Columbian in California, found her neighbors possessed of a "greater community spirit" than she had known in

39Quoted earlier in the chapter.
40Joan Pennington, San Francisco, correspondence, November, 1975.
41Robert Finch, Portland, Or., correspondence, November, 1975.
Canada. Americans, she thought, were "less reserved than Canadians."42

In general, Canadians interviewed were generally less ambivalent than the British on questions of social and cultural adjustment. This is probably attributable to the fact that Canadians, after all, are North Americans and found such adjustments relatively easy to make. They had been exposed to United States' culture on a multiplicity of levels whereas the British often knew Americans and American life only through popular music, news magazines and motion pictures.

Most of the Canadians interviewed expected to remain permanently in the United States. Those who were not sure usually replied "no" to the question regarding application for citizenship. Canadians appeared to favor obtaining American citizenship less than the British group surveyed. Excluding the numbers in the unstated column, only 60 percent of the Canadians compared with 70 percent of the British reported either having acquired this status or intending to apply for naturalization. The discrepancy may not be as significant as it might appear, however. Fifty-six percent of the Canadians surveyed arrived in the United States since 1959 whereas only fifty-one percent of the British arrived since that year. The greatest resistance—or indifference towards changing allegiance was evident among the more recent arrivals of both countries, as might be expected.

Nevertheless, the renewed stirrings of Canadian nationalism in the 1950's were manifest in some of the attitudes and outlooks expressed by respondents: A Kirkland, Washington, housewife and part-time nurse

42 Marilyn King, Santa Monica, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
who emigrated from Canada in 1956, stated:

I like living here but always think I would return to Canada some day. I will not give up Canadian citizenship.43

Several Canadian female respondents made strikingly strong affirmations of their intent to remain Canadian:

My husband became an American citizen. I will remain Canadian.44

I'm proud to be Canadian and will likely remain one.45

I still don't have any plans to stay in the U.S. after nine years here. I would not relinquish Canadian citizenship.46

Because many Canadian women in the group belonged to the involuntary immigrant category, discussed earlier in the chapter, they were more likely to feel a sense of emasculated identity than their working husbands—and had more time to consider and reflect on the changes that had come into their lives.

The men in the Canadian group were more often likely to think in terms of obligation and of wanting to make the transition complete:

It is my personal belief that a person who willfully goes to a country, obtains employment and intends to stay in that country has a moral obligation to seek naturalization.47

43Glenna Cummings, Kirkland, Wa., correspondence, October, 1975.
44Dorothy Baldwin, Walnut Creek, Ca., correspondence, December, 1975.
45Veronica McDonald, Napa, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
46Audrie Cirque, Walnut Creek, Ca., correspondence, October, 1975.
47James Richardson, Costa Mesa, Ca., correspondence, January, 1976.
I became a citizen of this country because I'm in business here and I felt it was the right thing to do. This is home to me now.48

The physical closeness of Canada, however, enabled Canadian immigrants to maintain old associations. Improved and faster public transportation and the greater use of private cars and trailers in the post-World War II period afforded most with the opportunity of returning periodically to Canada. To many Canadians, citizenship was a strictly practical matter, as it was to many Britishers. Still, the longer the Canadian-American remained a resident of the United States, the less he would feel concerned about Canada's qualms over national identity and the place of Quebec in the confederation.

Meanwhile, the strident tones of Canadian nationalism were gradually seeping into American consciousness, and the Canadian resident alien in Bellevue or Burbank was more likely than ever to feel the pressure of friends and associates to become a "real American."

Chapter X

Conclusion

In researching materials on British and Canadian immigration to the United States since 1920, it became evident that little was known or recorded concerning the motives or experiences of the individual immigrant. It is hoped the preceding chapters have illuminated this dark area to some extent, first by examining prevailing conditions and attitudes in the immigrant's country of origin, or embarkation, which very often contributed to the decision to emigrate; second, by scrutinizing contemporary attitudes in the United States towards British and Canadian immigrants; third, by examining and evaluating the lean amount of immigrant experience which has been published since 1920; and fourth, by reconstructing a variety of immigrant motives and experiences through personal inquiry with a number of former British and Canadian residents.

In the case of the first objective, records showed that British emigration to the United States was never a matter of apprehension to the British government or public after 1920 because the numbers "lost" to the United States were relatively small compared with the numbers which embarked for the British Commonwealth. Because almost all Britons knew of someone personally or indirectly who had emigrated or was planning to leave Britain, the decision to seek fame or fortune elsewhere did not stigmatize that individual. In the 1920's, the British government actually encouraged emigration, both to solve unemployment and to assist
the underpopulated British dominions and empire in development of their resources. The government made no attempt to restrain Britons leaving the country after World War II, except to restrict the exchange of sterling for American dollars in the immediate postwar period in order to block the drain of hard currency needed for international trade. Emigrants who had jobs to go to in the United States were not much bothered by deferred transfers of their funds but those who might have been deterred were probably attracted away by offers of assisted passages to certain Canadian provinces, and to Australia and New Zealand. Canada, on the other hand, was a receiving country of British immigrants and with development and expansion problems to be met at home deplored the loss of her native-born to the United States. Canadians who left to take up residence in the United States were stigmatized to some extent—made to feel by fellow Canadians they were forsaking a homeland that needed them.

The differences in prevailing conditions and attitudes in Great Britain and Canada had a noticeable effect on British and Canadian immigrants' attitudes towards their home countries and, by extension, their feelings with regard to assimilation in the United States. As noted earlier, British immigrants interviewed by the author were more outspoken than Canadians in voicing dissatisfaction with home conditions. Many Britons had "put up with" inconveniences, shortages, restraints, inefficiency and high taxes for several years—and foresaw no remedial changes in the future. They were ready to close the door on the past and exhibit a receptive attitude towards new ideas, methods and mores they encounter in the United States. Moreover, no less than eighty-five of
the 244 British immigrants discovered came to the United States from a British Commonwealth country—fifty-three from Canada alone. The effect of a second emigration tended to loosen homeland ties still further—the intervention of more time and distance travelled broadened the immigrant's perspective. In rejecting his first choice he was usually even more determined to make a successful adjustment to the second. When Canadians emigrated to the United States their action was less a rejection of Canada than acceptance of a special offer or benefit that could hardly be refused. In most instances, when discussing the permanency of their residence with the author, Canadians exhibited a desire to return home some time in the future. The longer they remained in the United States the less likely this became but Canadians liked to feel the step they had taken was not irrevocable.

Geographic proximity and ease of return to Canada have been cited as affording Canadian immigrants psychological advantages other immigrants did not have. The vigor of Canadian nationalism—especially notable in the 1950's and gaining strength in the 1960's—added to some Canadians' sense of disloyalty in leaving Canada. Theirs was no longer the country described in the history texts invariably as a cultural "bridge" between Great Britain, the Empire, and the United States of America. The generation which kept Prime Minister Mackenzie King in office for over twenty years was mesmerized by the allusion that was fostered by Canadian statesmen to give the Canadian people a feeling of pride and particular place—a unique usefulness—in "explaining" or "interpreting" Britain to the United States, or vice versa. Canada, it used to be asserted, was a "British" country in a fidial sense and an American
one by geography and economy.

The cultural "bridge" with Great Britain and the United States may have been a non-rewarding myth but it gave Canadians a unique, if somewhat subordinate role. The tie of sentiment Canadians felt for Britain and the Commonwealth—excepting French-Canadians, of course—never existed between Canada and the United States despite their physical closeness and many mutual interests. That Americans did not show understanding or sympathy for the fact that Canada sought to change its "little brother" image was strongly resented by many Canadians who tended to look upon the nation's junior partner role in mutual hemispheric concerns with suspicion and distrust of American motives.

While Canadian nationalism has been manifesting anti-American features since the 1950's, the British, divested of empire and reduced to the economic importance of a middle-sized European state, now received the kindlier regard of Americans who "rediscovered" their special contributions to western culture. British immigrants in the United States were surprised by Americans' high regard for British arts and crafts, literature, music, and theater. They discovered a large reservoir of respect for English traditions far beyond admiration for English bone china and Scottish tartans. In business, the British secretary was idealized as an example of courtesy and efficiency and an English accent became so desirable a status symbol that many American girls were said to be at some pains to acquire it.

To be recognized as a Canadian in the United States by a few differences in pronunciation and voice inflection was often surprising to Canadians but no cause for dismay. To be identified as a Canadian
and therefore English was, on the other hand, disconcerting to Canadians of the post-World War II generation whose sense of national pride was deflated. Canadian immigrants in the United States were sensitive to the apparent indifference of the American public to Canadian affairs, until they themselves lost touch with their continuity. In their early days as immigrants in the United States Canadians often could not bring themselves to the realization, calmly, that Canada was a sprawling land mass to the north of the United States in the eyes of most Americans—a nice place to go on a vacation—but otherwise rather dull in its daily affairs which were of little or no consequence to themselves. Unless Canada's government threatened disruption of its supplies of oil or natural gas to the United States or imposed import restrictions on American products likely to be hurtful to the producers and the communities they supported, what Canadians thought or did made no impact on American daily life.

For "loyal" Canadian immigrants in the United States the gradual adjustment of perspective was a difficult transition. Several respondents to the questionnaire were aliens of some fifteen or twenty years in the United States as permanent residents who declared they would never relinquish their Canadian citizenship. These Canadians, and Britons whose emotional attachment to the homeland could arouse such declaratives as "we are British to the core," obviously would remain culturally un-assimilated in American society.

The acquisition of American citizenship did not imply necessarily that the cultural stage of assimilation had been reached at the same time. Many persons, British and Canadian, sought citizenship for singular
practical reasons, while others filed applications out of a conviction of obligation as much as desire, persons who would remain alien in a cultural sense all their lives. The British, while they generally spoke enthusiastically of their adjustments and achievements in an economic sense, were more likely to remain culturally adrift between Britain and the United States than Canadians because the differences in the ways of life of the two countries were far less subtle. Canadians in the United States were far less visible, socially and culturally than the British, despite strong personal feelings over questions of nationality. The North American environment was home to them.

Because their numbers in annual immigration totals were relatively high between 1920 and 1968, as in earlier times, Britons and Canadians helped to sustain the strong Anglo-American tradition in the use of English language, law, and many religious and parliamentary institutions. One may only obtain some idea of the collective influence of Britons and Canadians on American life in any period, however, by examining the nature of individual contributions. In the case of celebrities, this is manifest, whether they are entertainers, writers, scientists or leaders of religious cults. The vast majority of British and Canadian immigrants remain invisible—except to friends and acquaintances and until a study such as that undertaken in the questionnaire survey is analyzed. Since Britons and Canadians enjoyed such a clear lead in natural advantages such as common language, closeness of culture and educational opportunities over their competitors from other nations it was not surprising to find Britons and Canadians in positions of responsibility in industry, government, and academia. Thus it was also not surprising to
find these immigrants in middle class circumstances of affluence or better, living in homes in newer and preferred suburban areas of major and smaller cities. Their children, too, would grow up to enjoy a headstart over the children of parents whose native tongue was not English and would quickly become indistinguishable from middle class American children. Unlike other national groups, too, the British and Canadians of the second generation were totally assimilated culturally. They achieved that state of fusion and harmony with their environment that their parents seldom found.
Contact with British and Canadian immigrants was established in the following ways:

a. through published lists of naturalized citizens of the United States which showed countries of origin, followed by searches of telephone and other directories available in the city of publication.

b. through the cooperation of consular officials in California who enclosed my questionnaire with materials being mailed to passport applicants.

c. through lists of Who's Who regional publications.

d. by contacting secretaries of social and business clubs which were formed by and for the benefit of British or Canadian immigrants.

e. by contacting church groups, libraries and private school administrations.

f. by consulting university faculty lists and department heads.

g. by consulting the personnel heads of business firms, newspaper and television establishments.

h. through introduction to friends and acquaintances of persons contacted.

i. through personal friends and acquaintances.
Appendix B
Please record name and address on attached card.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Native of what country, county, or province ____________________________

2. Country of last permanent residence ________________________________

3. Year of entry as immigrant to the United States ______________________

4. Age and marital status at time of entry ______________________________

5. Reason(s) for emigration to U.S.: (a) better job __; (b) to improve future prospects __; (c) better living conditions __; (d) family ties or friends __; (e) educational opportunities __; (f) dissatisfaction with home conditions __; (g) other reasons (please specify) ____________________________________________

6. Important considerations in your choice of destination: (a) convenience to place of employment __; (b) climate __; (c) physical environment __; (d) family or friends __; (e) other ______________

7. Present occupation: ___________________________ please state if different to usual occupation and your occupation at time of emigration __________________________________________

8. Number of years schooling: public __; private __; college or university __; degree(s) held ____________________________ professional or vocational training __; type __________________

9. Please answer yes or no to the following: (a) do you now view your decision to emigrate positively __; (b) have your expectations been fulfilled in terms of economic progress __; (c) in terms of social and cultural expansion __; (d) do you expect to remain permanently in the United States __; (e) are you or will you become a U.S. citizen when eligible __. 

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Appendix C
# TABLE 27
## BRITISH IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1920-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total* Number</th>
<th>Subject to Quota</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total* Number</th>
<th>Subject to Quota</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920(^b)</td>
<td>48,062</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>13,437</td>
<td>12,912</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>79,577</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>12,491</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922(^c)</td>
<td>42,670</td>
<td>77,342</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>17,631</td>
<td>17,024</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77,342</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>19,230</td>
<td>18,626</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77,342</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>19,309</td>
<td>18,678</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>30,771</td>
<td>29,710</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>17,849</td>
<td>17,323</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>31,217</td>
<td>29,782</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>21,582</td>
<td>20,581</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>29,716</td>
<td>28,257</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>27,570</td>
<td>26,607</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>31,505</td>
<td>30,469</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>27,613</td>
<td>26,946</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>31,674</td>
<td>30,442</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>20,954</td>
<td>20,279</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>51,467</td>
<td>50,275</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>24,643</td>
<td>24,016</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>13,592</td>
<td>12,934</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>22,717</td>
<td>22,146</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932(^c)</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>21,189</td>
<td>20,647</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>25,916</td>
<td>25,373</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>29,108</td>
<td>28,653</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>27,358</td>
<td>26,954</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>21,441</td>
<td>19,838</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>24,965</td>
<td>20,918</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>28,586</td>
<td>24,393</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,321</td>
<td>2,828</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>15,014</td>
<td>11,327</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>14,158</td>
<td>9,547</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>4,361</td>
<td>3,956</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>10,787</td>
<td>6,545</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>10,078</td>
<td>5,996</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>10,638</td>
<td>5,812</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>10,710</td>
<td>5,854</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>3,182</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10,807</td>
<td>6,336</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>34,314</td>
<td>6,718</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>24,045</td>
<td>16,424</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>25,814</td>
<td>23,510</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>21,475</td>
<td>20,178</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^a\)United States Commissioner of Immigration & Naturalization, Annual Reports: 1920-21, Table XIVA; 1924, Text Table II; 1925, Table 50; 1926, Table 42; 1927, Table 44; 1928-31, Table 48; 1939-40, Text Table V; 1943-44, Table 20e; 1945-75, Table 6.

\(^b\)Enumerated only by country of last permanent residence, not by country of birth in 1920 and 1921.

\(^c\)Not available by country of birth for 1922-24 and 1932-38.

*Excludes returning residents and students; both categories are enumerated as "nonquota immigrants" under Sec. 4, Immigration Act of 1924.

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TABLE 28

BRITISH IMMIGRANTS BY AGE AND SEX, 1950, 1960, 1970a

| Year | Under 5 | 5-9 | 10-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | Under 60 & Un- | Total |
|------|---------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------| known |       |       |
| 1950b | 935     | 744 | 1,476 | 4,039 | 2,318 | 1,903 | 1,195 | 827 | 2 | 24,643 |
|       |         |     |       |       |       |       |       | 5 | 8,692 males | 15,951 females |
| 1960  | Male    | 811 | 585   | 935   | 2,626 | 2,023 | 892   | 524 | 295 | 1 | 5,728 |
|       | Female  | 817 | 574   | 2,251 | 7,442 | 2,253 | 1,094 | 974 | 545 | 1 | 8,430 |
| Total |         | 1628 | 1,159 | 3,726 | 11,481 | 4,576 | 2,988 | 1,498 | 2 | 14,158 |
| 1970  | Male    | 838 | 800   | 628   | 1,236 | 1,165 | 533   | 257 | 271 | 1 | 5,457 |
|       | Female  | 742 | 754   | 970   | 3,405 | 1,235 | 520   | 329 | 475 | 1 | 7,980 |
| Total |         | 1,580 | 1,554 | 1,598 | 4,641 | 2,397 | 1,058 | 586 | 7 | 13,437 |

aU.S. Commissioner of Immigration, Annual Report: 1950, Table 10B; 1960, Table 9; 1970, Table 9.

bMale and female immigrants not differentiated by age group. Prior to 1950, age and sex was recorded by race, rather than country of birth.
TABLE 29
BRITISH IMMIGRANTS BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
1950, 1960, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>1,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, administrators, and proprietors</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>_b</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>304c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers except private household</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and foremen</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives, children and no occupation</td>
<td>5,955</td>
<td>10,794</td>
<td>6,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Admitted</td>
<td>13,437</td>
<td>24,643</td>
<td>10,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aU.S. Commissioner of Immigration, Annual Reports: 1950, Table 8; 1960, Table 8; 1975, Table 8.

bSales workers were included with clerical and kindred workers in 1950.

cTransport Equipment Operators were segregated from this category but are included in this number in 1960.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST</td>
<td>584,030</td>
<td>759,510</td>
<td>560,944</td>
<td>411,568</td>
<td>275,522</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CENTRAL</td>
<td>307,310</td>
<td>354,933</td>
<td>252,908</td>
<td>202,489</td>
<td>131,815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>60,125</td>
<td>64,316</td>
<td>52,914</td>
<td>67,219</td>
<td>101,912</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>184,024</td>
<td>224,164</td>
<td>176,306</td>
<td>162,937</td>
<td>176,850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW ENGLAND</td>
<td>197,820</td>
<td>226,173</td>
<td>163,848</td>
<td>122,112</td>
<td>74,914</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID. ATLANTIC</td>
<td>386,210</td>
<td>533,337</td>
<td>397,096</td>
<td>289,456</td>
<td>200,698</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST N. CENTRAL</td>
<td>230,870</td>
<td>292,608</td>
<td>213,368</td>
<td>173,567</td>
<td>113,671</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST N. CENTRAL</td>
<td>76,440</td>
<td>62,325</td>
<td>39,540</td>
<td>28,922</td>
<td>18,144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO. ATLANTIC</td>
<td>33,645</td>
<td>40,054</td>
<td>36,078</td>
<td>46,231</td>
<td>77,228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST S. CENTRAL</td>
<td>8,633</td>
<td>7,967</td>
<td>5,499</td>
<td>6,820</td>
<td>7,220</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST S. CENTRAL</td>
<td>17,847</td>
<td>16,293</td>
<td>11,337</td>
<td>14,168</td>
<td>17,464</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MOUNTAIN</td>
<td>62,481</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACIFIC</td>
<td>121,543</td>
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<td>136,708</td>
<td>154,570</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>704</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
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<td>127,880</td>
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<td>105,958</td>
<td>129,957</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>13,528</td>
<td>10,260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
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<td>32,183</td>
<td>24,862</td>
<td>21,492</td>
<td>16,085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


bThose born in Northern Ireland not included in 1920.

cThe Census of the Population for 1960 did not provide this information. The foreign-born were included in the total of "foreign stock."

dInformation not available prior to statehood.
### TABLE 31

**CANADIAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1920-1975**<sup>a</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Native-Born Canadians</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Native-Born Canadians</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>90,025</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>63,502</td>
<td>43,607</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>72,317</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>21,687</td>
<td>16,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>46,810</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>7,929</td>
<td>7,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>117,011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>6,074</td>
<td>-&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>200,690&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>7,945</td>
<td>7,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>100,895</td>
<td>102,181&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7,695</td>
<td>6,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>91,019</td>
<td>83,660</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>8,018</td>
<td>7,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>81,506</td>
<td>71,279</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>11,799</td>
<td>10,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>73,154</td>
<td>56,236</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>14,070</td>
<td>11,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>64,440</td>
<td>50,614</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>10,501</td>
<td>8,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>10,806</td>
<td>8,303</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>21,885</td>
<td>18,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>11,280</td>
<td>8,428</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>25,880</td>
<td>20,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>10,450</td>
<td>8,519</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>33,354</td>
<td>28,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>9,571</td>
<td>7,235</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>36,283</td>
<td>28,967</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>9,821</td>
<td>7,023</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>34,873</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>11,079</td>
<td>8,866</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>32,435</td>
<td>23,091</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>20,434</td>
<td>18,627</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>42,363</td>
<td>29,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>23,467</td>
<td>20,983</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>46,354</td>
<td>33,203</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>24,788</td>
<td>21,794</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>45,143</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>24,516</td>
<td>20,798</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>34,599</td>
<td>23,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>46,668</td>
<td>30,990</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26,850</td>
<td>13,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>47,470</td>
<td>32,038</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>22,709</td>
<td>13,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>44,272</td>
<td>30,377</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>18,596</td>
<td>10,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>50,509</td>
<td>36,003</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td>8,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>51,114</td>
<td>38,074</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>12,301</td>
<td>7,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>50,035</td>
<td>38,327</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11,215</td>
<td>7,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>37,273</td>
<td>28,358</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>34,768</td>
<td>23,442</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>41,716</td>
<td>27,662</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>29,303</td>
<td>18,582</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>United States' Commissioner of Immigration & Naturalization, Annual Report: 1925, Tables 43 & 50; 1926, Tables 33 and 42; 1927, Tables 33 & 44; 1928-1931, incl., Tables 37 & 48; 1943, Tables 6 & 20e; 1944, Table 4; 1945, Table 6; 1946, Tables 13 & 6; 1947-1975, incl., Tables 6a and 6, respectively. See also United States' Commissioner of Immigration & Naturalization, in Department of Labor Annual Report: 1932, Table 1, p. 83, & Table 3, p. 85; 1933, p. 48; 1938, p. 97; 1939, Table V, p. 93; United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965, p. 5.
TABLE 31 (continued)


b Prior to 1925, legal residents of Canada were not differentiated by country or region of birth for statistical purposes.

c Includes Newfoundland, undifferentiated in annual statistics prior to 1925 and in 1946 only.

d Statistical error—the actual number was probably 92,181, ten thousand less persons, judging by the proportions of the years immediately following.

e Not available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Under 5</th>
<th>5-9</th>
<th>10-19</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60 &amp; over</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>7,106</td>
<td>3,419</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,262 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,781 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Male</td>
<td>2,712</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>2,635</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>2,383</td>
<td>5,461</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 Male</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>838</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>2,384</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,804</td>
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</table>

\(^a\)Commissioner of Immigration, Annual Report: 1950, Table 10B; 1960, Table 9; 1970, Table 9.

\(^b\)Male and female immigrants not differentiated by age group. Prior to 1950, age and sex was recorded by race, rather than country of birth.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and kindred</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, administrators, and proprietors</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical &amp; kindred workers</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>-b</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives and kindred workers</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>151c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers except private household</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and foremen</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives, children and no occupation</td>
<td>9,455</td>
<td>16,817</td>
<td>4,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Admitted</td>
<td>18,043</td>
<td>30,990</td>
<td>7,308</td>
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</table>

a Commissioner of Immigration, Annual Reports: 1950, Table 8; 1960, Table 8; 1975, Table 8.

b Sales workers were included with clerical and kindred workers.

c Transport Equipment Operators were segregated from this category but are included in this number.
### TABLE 34

**CANADIAN-BORN IN THE UNITED STATES**

**BY CENSUS REGIONS & DIVISIONS, 1920-1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>257,430</td>
<td>357,126</td>
<td>297,597</td>
<td>403,698</td>
<td>218,890</td>
<td>341,127</td>
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<td>39,726</td>
<td>294,871</td>
<td>52,839</td>
<td>307,587</td>
<td>37,231</td>
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<td>3,396</td>
<td>25,867</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>26,660</td>
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<td>141,714</td>
<td>17,020</td>
<td>178,385</td>
<td>14,284</td>
<td>162,441</td>
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<tr>
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<td>235,871</td>
<td>264,261</td>
<td>254,604</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>213,342</td>
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<td>M.D. ATLANTIC</td>
<td>17,045</td>
<td>121,255</td>
<td>33,336</td>
<td>149,094</td>
<td>23,890</td>
<td>127,785</td>
</tr>
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<td>29,267</td>
<td>224,625</td>
<td>42,308</td>
<td>254,688</td>
<td>29,950</td>
<td>200,003</td>
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<td>WEST N. CENTRAL</td>
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<td>70,246</td>
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<td>52,899</td>
<td>7,281</td>
<td>40,522</td>
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<td>SO. ATLANTIC</td>
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<td>12,228</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>15,608</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>17,669</td>
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<td>347</td>
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<td>233</td>
<td>2,493</td>
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<td>8,178</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>7,439</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>6,498</td>
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<td>30,615</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>23,835</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>19,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACIFIC</td>
<td>5,566</td>
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<td>13,342</td>
<td>154,550</td>
<td>11,695</td>
<td>142,844</td>
</tr>
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<td>4,340</td>
<td>43,929</td>
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<td>39,329</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16,601</td>
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<td>15,350</td>
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<td>57,380</td>
<td>7,637</td>
<td>94,020</td>
<td>7,576</td>
<td>88,165</td>
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</table>

### 1950

<table>
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<th>REGIONS</th>
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<th>1960b</th>
<th>1970c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST</td>
<td>192,960</td>
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<td>333,415</td>
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<td>164,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>4,516</td>
<td>39,104</td>
<td>82,714</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>13,590</td>
<td>186,521</td>
<td>231,807</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEW ENGLAND</td>
<td>171,286</td>
<td>185,415</td>
<td>216,736</td>
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<td>21,674</td>
<td>126,522</td>
<td>116,679</td>
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<td>22,935</td>
<td>184,663</td>
<td>142,193</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEST N. CENTRAL</td>
<td>4,408</td>
<td>33,928</td>
<td>22,292</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO. ATLANTIC</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>26,984</td>
<td>64,921</td>
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<td>5,155</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEST S. CENTRAL</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>8,744</td>
<td>12,638</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOUNTAIN</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>21,070</td>
<td>26,008</td>
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<td>11,669</td>
<td>165,451</td>
<td>205,799</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
<td>2,508</td>
<td>45,073</td>
<td>35,977</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,171</td>
<td>17,614</td>
<td>12,690</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>7,990</td>
<td>102,764</td>
<td>153,725</td>
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<td>Alaska</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 34 (continued)


bThe Census of the Population for 1960 did not provide this information. The foreign-born were included in the total of "foreign stock."

cCanadian-born residents of the United States were not enumerated by ethnic origin in 1970.

dInformation not available prior to statehood.
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