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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND AND HOUSING
FOR THE URBAN POOR IN BANGKOK:
A CASE STUDY IN KLONG TOEY AND WAT CHONGLOM SETTLEMENT

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN
GEOGRAPHY

MAY 1995

By
Nopadon Sahachaisaeree

Dissertation Committee:

Jonathan Goss, Chairperson
Mike Douglass
Everett Wingert
Marry Mcdonald
Alice Dewey
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Nopadon Sahachaisaeree

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...but that by means of an equalizing YOUR surplus just now might offset their deficiency, in order that their surplus might also come to offset YOUR deficiency, that an equalizing might take place. Just as it is written: "The person with much did not have too much, and the person with little did not have too little."

2 Corinthians 8:14-15
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation could not have been completed without considerable assistance, advice, and encouragement from a great many persons and organizations. I would like to express my appreciation to all those who contributed toward my research.

I would like to express my appreciation to Population Institute of East-West Center for granting me financial assistance throughout my course work at University of Hawaii, and for the funding of my dissertation field research in Bangkok.

At the University of Hawaii, I must express my gratitude to Dr. Jonathan Goss, my advisor, who guided and encouraged me throughout this research, and to Dr. Murry Chapman who helped me throughout my years at the Department of Geography, and assisted me in developing my initial ideas for the research proposal. I would like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Drs. Mike Douglass, Alice Dewey, Marry McDonald, and Everett Wingert for patiently setting aside their valuable time to read my drafts and for their valuable advice.
I would like to express my great appreciation to my friend Nancy Aleck, who patiently and tirelessly edited my draft and polished my English grammar.

I express my thanks also to the residents and community leaders of Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom who provided me with vast amount of information needed for this research.

And finally I would like to thank the Thai Government, especially King Mongkut's Institute of Technology Ladgar-bang, which allowed me to take leave from my office to pursue my PhD in Hawaii.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates, within the framework of mode of production, how the urban poor struggle to obtain and maintain access to land and housing in a Third World city. It examines how the urban poor interact with the state over urban space, and how they apply survival strategies to endure in various urban settings. It seeks to identify the importance of different forms of land allocation—the market form, the state form, and the popular form—which distinctively determine the urban poor's life chances, an issue frequently ignored by policy makers. This research also explores the related issue of property regime, that define rules of access in each form of land allocation. An array of actors, such as the state representatives, political personalities, and local leaders were key informants in the research.

Five study areas were chosen which combine overlapping characteristics of two or more forms of land allocation. This research is based on eighteen months of field research and the basic data were obtained from structured questionnaire survey. Additional information was gathered from informal interviews with government officials, local personalities, community leaders, and members of the
community. Descriptive statistics and case study illustrations are used to elucidate the linkages between variables and their underlying explanations.

This study demonstrates that, at the macro level, the domination of the market form of land allocation is enhanced by state development strategies. A historical analysis of housing policy and the political development reveals a pattern of land transformation from the communal form to market form. The two major forms of political regimes—the dictatorial and democratic—responded differently toward the needs of urban low income housing. Most housing agencies established during military dictatorial regime failed to serve the lowest income groups because the state responded to housing issue according to political motivation rather than needs of the urban poor. On the other hand, the National Housing Authority founded during a democratic regime lacked a consistent policy and ran short of funding.

At the community level, this research found that the life chances of the urban poor are partly determined by the circumstances surrounding the distinctive forms of land allocation. Intervention by the local state also tends to magnify the rate of penetration of the market form of land allocation and further differentiate the physical conditions of the communities. Each form of land allocation tends to
support different types of household enterprise and certain type of tenancies. The level of individualism, financial need, and physical settings, which are correlated with the form of land allocation, also govern the social aspects of survival strategies of dwellers. However, the picture is rather complex due to the overlapping characteristics of the multiple forms of land allocation in each study area, and the complicated rules of access.

Politically, this research found three major powers—the state, NGOs, and local personalities—interacting within the squatter settlement in response to the political demands of the squatters. These three powers usually compete with each other to assist the community in order to achieve their goals and to gain popularity. The poorest strata of squatters who cannot legally obtain services resort to illegal privileges or indirect funding from politicians. The success of grass roots organizations lies in factors such as the nature of leaders, the appearance of tenure security which is governed by the attitude of land owners, and the source of funding.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an introduction to the research problem and a description of the structure of this dissertation. It describes, firstly, the nature of Third World urbanization and development which lead to urban housing problems. The objectives of the study are then clarified. Two major research questions and ten specific sub-questions guide the course of this research. This chapter then briefly describes the theoretical framework of the study and the significance of the political economy approach to an understanding of urban low income housing. Finally it provides a summary of the structure of this dissertation.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS

The problems of the primate city and urban congestion are almost a universal issue in any Third World country. Third World countries which aim to duplicate Western industrialization and lifestyles have neglected the rural agricultural sector. Tremendous rates of rural-urban migration combine with high natural growth rates cause primate cities to expand rapidly. Rising land values and inadequate provision of cheap public and private rental housing compel the urban poor to live in squatter settlements. Slums and squat-
ter settlements are growing at a more rapid rate than the cities themselves.

Bangkok Metropolitan Area, for example, grew from 3.5 square kilometers two centuries ago to 1,562.5 square kilometers or 604 square miles in the 1980s (ESCAP, 1987). Bangkok's rate of population growth has been tremendous during the last 30 years. Its population increased from 400,000 in 1782 to approximately 8,000,000 in the 1990s. At present, Bangkok still has a growth rate higher than 3.3% per annum. At present, it is the world's 26th largest city and will rise to the 20th largest with a population of eight million by the year 2000 (United Nations 1987). Bangkok is a mega city, and it is 21 times larger than the Korat municipality and 40 times that of Chiengmai. It comprises 10.8% of the population of the whole kingdom (see Table 1.1).

**TABLE 1.1 BANGKOK'S POPULATION SINCE 1728**

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>period</th>
<th>growth/annum</th>
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<tr>
<td>1728</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>1970-1978</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 (BMA)</td>
<td>5,600,000</td>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 (BMR)</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
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Source: NESDB 1985  
United Nations 1987a  
National Statistical Office 1984

Bangkok's growth rate is attributed more to mass migra-
tion than natural increase. While the fertility rate has been decreasing from 2.6 in the 1970s to 2.3 per cent per annum in the 1980s (ESCAP 1986), there are 1,250,600 lifetime migrants in Bangkok as of 1980 constituting 27 per cent of the Bangkok population (NSO 1984). Employment has been the major reason for this migration (See Table 1.2).

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<th>TABLE 1.2 REASONS FOR MOVING TO BANGKOK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons of moving</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seek employment</td>
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<td>Move along with families</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Job assignment</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Superficially, Bangkok's physical appearance is that of a modern city with concealed slums and squatter settlements behind skyscrapers. The present income gap is still widening (NESDB, 1986). More than 1020 slums and squatter settlements were found in Bangkok in 1985 (Pornchokechai 1985).

From the Third World state officials' point of view, squatter settlements in cities hinder economic growth and the modernization process. They are viewed as economically unproductive, illegal, and burdensome on social services. The elites views squatter settlements as a source of crime,
health dangers, environmental degradation, and social problems.

For the urban poor, however, slums and squatter settlements are cohesive and functioning communities; frequently they are as old as the cities themselves. Squatter settlements provide new migrants a foothold for adaptation in the city. Dwellers can enjoy social networks, access to information regarding employment opportunities, and mutual help in the community. They are able to stay close to their employment. The physical space of squatter settlements also makes possible informal economic activities which generate supplementary income. The urban poor's housing problems can be temporarily relieved by sharing the shelter with friends or relatives. Rental and construction costs are much lower than housing in the conventional housing market.

The Third World's urbanization process stems from unbalanced economic development and is the root of the squatter settlement issue in the city. Slums/squatter settlements are among symptoms indicating the failure of the capitalist development. The chronic problems of urban housing also reflect the deficiency of the Third-World's housing policies, and the failure of its urban development strategy guided by the mainstream Neoclassical approach.

The coexistence of distinctive forms of land allocation
governed by the Third World's macro economic development is a crucial factor determining the life chance of the urban poor and the circulation of surplus between forms of land allocation. For example, economic activities in squatter settlements indirectly support the city's economy as a whole (Armstrong and McGee 1985). However, most literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of class structure and form of land allocation. It fails to analyze the interacting process among an array of actors involved in the whole housing process--the state, the utility providers, the local NGOs, the local personalities, and the urban poor.

'Being a native Thai who grew up in Bangkok and being acquainted with the existing socio-cultural and political environment of Thai society, I have the opportunity to analyze from an insider's point of view and from the perspective of the political economy approach, the issue of low-income housing in response to the problems of urban slums and squatter settlements. This study aims to examine comprehensively and holistically the political economy of urban poor which concern different levels of social units--household, neighborhood, community, local state, and national state.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This dissertation takes a political economy approach, and specifically the analysis of forms of land allocation, to explain the squatter phenomena in a Third World city. With Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom settlements in Bangkok as case studies, this dissertation attempts to explain the emergence and persistence of slum and squatter settlements. It explores the role and nature of the state in determining the forms of land allocation in relation to the struggle of low-income households for space. It examines how the needs of the state and community conflict, which in turn reflects the conflict among social classes, and how such conflict is expressed and reconciled. In this light, it reveals the pattern of interaction between the state and the low-income community in which relations are working through a hierarchy of social units—household, neighborhood, local community to the state level. The analysis will include a discussion of policy implications for action of the different parties involved in the squatter settlements.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In response to the problem statement and the objective of the study, the following questions will direct the course of my research with the "accessibility to land and housing of the urban poor" as the major theme of the study.
1. Within the structure of the political economy, how do the urban poor in different forms of land allocation struggle to gain and maintain their access to urban land and housing?

1.1 How do the poor organize themselves to deal with the problems of urban land and housing?

1.2 How does the individual and household respond to the call for community participation, and Why?

1.3 What is the structure and role of the local community organizations in the self-help program and in the decision-making process?

1.4 What are the roles of politicians, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations, and political parties in supporting the local community organization's action?

1.5 What action should be taken by the local community organization to improve the situation of the poor?

2. How does the state respond to the struggle for land and housing of the poor?

2.1 How is the role of the state affected by class relations?

2.2 How do the state and the market formulate different forms of land allocation?

2.3 How does each form of land allocation affect the accessibility to land and housing by the urban poor?
2.4 What is the role of the household and community in survival strategies under different forms of land allocation?

1.5 FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

This research uses the political economy approach, particularly the mode of production and form of land allocation, to explain the problem of the Third World's urban low income housing (see Chapter II below). The urban squatter settlement is the outcome of the struggle by the poor to obtain and maintain access to land and housing. The underlying structural linkages are class relations and the transfer of surplus from the subsistence mode of production to the capitalist mode within the context of a Third World city. The state, the local community, local personalities, and the urban poor are important explicit actors in this process.

As mentioned in the objectives and the research questions, the ultimate goal of this research is to reveal, within the context of social, economic, and political structures, how the urban poor struggle to obtain and maintain their access to urban land and housing, and survive economic hardships at the community and household levels within the Third World's urban setting. It seeks to study how the role of the state and the market determine the
different forms of land allocation, and how each form of land allocation affects the life-chances of the urban poor. At the macro level, the state housing policy is related to the nature of each political regime and reveals the state's response to the needs of the urban poor. Within this framework, actors in the political hierarchy to be investigated are the state, the community organization, the NGOs, the household, and members of the squatter community.

Three different forms of land allocation are identified and their interaction with the life chance of the urban poor is examined. (See form of land allocation in Chapter II). Finally, the way the squatter households and the community react to state intervention by means of different survival strategies is discussed.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Beyond dealing with the issues of basic needs or low-cost housing provisions, this study challenges the conventional thinking of the Neo-classical approach which is embedded in the development policy of most Third World countries. The study attempts to overcome the theoretical weaknesses of several paradigms which fail to explain the Third World development process and the root of urban housing problems. It challenges the maneuvers of the Third
World state attempting to solve the urban housing issue through this mainstream orthodox approach.

Within the framework of political economy, this dissertation reveals how the urban poor interact with the state over the issue of urban space. It takes into account an array of actors not limited to merely the state apparatus, but including a spectrum of social classes and personalities in the Third World's urban setting.

Drawing upon the concept of mode of production, this research also seeks to explain how the life chance of the urban poor is determined by forms of land allocation, an issue consistently ignored by the state officials and policy makers. Analyzing the nature of low income housing by means of form of land allocation not only reveals the distinct characteristics of each form in determining the urban poor's life chance, but also explains how the form of land allocation is transformed from one form to the other, due to state intervention.

Within this holistic perspective, this research will derive an explanation concerning class relations and the structure of the political economy of the poor and their household survival strategies. These conditions are implicitly linked to urban class relations and the development of the national economy.
1.7 CONTENT STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation comprises seven chapters. The content of Chapter I has been specified above in the introductory section.

Chapter II establishes a theoretical framework for this study. First, it discusses the Third World urbanization process and its linkage to the urban housing issues. The pace of urban growth in the primate city is linked to the pattern of macro economic development, which is determined by the relative autonomy of the state. The disparity of income between urban and rural sectors is brought about by factors such as economic dependency, centralization of administration, and the neglect of the agriculture sector. Housing problems are related to the pattern of population growth in the primate city, increasing land values due to land speculation, and the intervention in and control of housing standards by the state.

Secondly, it explores the two major approaches to Third World urbanization, which is linked to the issue of land allocation and housing production. The two approaches are the mainstream orthodox and the political economy approaches. It discusses the pros and cons of both approaches, whereby, the mainstream orthodox approach discerns urban low income housing issues as a temporary problem which normally occurs during the economic
development process, while the political economy approach views urban housing issues as a shortcoming of the market economy. This research rejects the mainstream orthodox and builds its framework of analysis on the political economy approach. The form of land allocation is discussed in detail along with mode of production in the Third World countries. The concept of property regime is also discussed along with the meaning of rules of access. In this light, common access is differentiated from open access. Several possibilities of state intervention and the urban poor's response are also discussed in this chapter.

Building upon the research question described in Chapter I and the theoretical framework established in Chapter II, Chapter III presents the methodology of this research. First, this chapter discusses the rationale of each research tool selected to pursue the research. Second, it discusses how these research tools are used and how they complement each other. This research employs a multi-instrument approach to compensate for the weakness of one field method with the strength of the other. Third, the chapter describes the unique characteristics of the five study areas and how they fit the distinctive forms of land allocation. The final section of this chapter explains how
the field research was carried out, the problems encountered and the validity of the research.

From a historical view point, Chapter IV discusses the transformation of the form of land allocation in Thailand, which is determined by the capitalist mode of production and the development of the Thai polity. Squatter settlements transform the capitalist form of land allocation to a popular form, while the state's intervention transforms it to a state form. The increasing property value due to the state intervention tends to transform it to a capitalist form of land allocation. This chapter thus gives a parallel chronological comparison between Thailand's housing policies and the political regimes to establish an insight into the analysis of the form of land allocation and housing production, vis-a-vis the nature of the Thai states--democratic or dictatorship. This historical context helps to explain the role of the state and its relative autonomy on its housing policy toward squatter settlements in Bangkok. It also establishes a contextual background for the analysis of Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom settlements in the succeeding chapter.

Chapter V analyzes specifically the social aspects of the research findings. First, this chapter discusses how the urban poor's levels of education and income are selective factors allocating them into certain forms of land
allocation. To enter the capitalist form of land allocation, for instance, requires large sums of money and the family's regular income to pay for monthly installments.

Second, the chapter examines how land tenure and legality of land occupation in each form of land allocation govern the pattern of provision of public utilities by the providing agencies. The amount and quality of services received by the poor further affects the physical conditions of their shelter, their health conditions, and their life chance within the community.

Third, the chapter also analyzes how the state intervenes distinctively in each form of land allocation, and how the different levels of intervention determine the changing nature of land tenure, the increase in property values, and the changing of forms of land allocation. The pattern of selling and buying of property among the different classes of the urban poor are examined along with the pattern of land speculation.

Fourth, this research examines the extent to which the physical conditions in each form of land allocation facilitate the urban poor's income generation, such as facilitating household enterprises and attracting tenants to the community. It also explains how the physical conditions govern property values.
Fifth, in this chapter, the social aspects of survival strategies of the urban poor, such as income sharing, mutual help, and co-residency are highlighted to explain how the urban poor cope with different levels of economic constraint within the setting of the squatter community. The chapter also discusses how these strategies are selectively applied in the different forms of land allocation.

Finally Chapter V describes the exploitation of the unpaid labor of household members who work with a subsistence economy to supplement the family income. This situation is, on the one hand, an efficient way to relieve additional burdens from the income generating member of the household, but on the other hand, it is a form of labor exploitation, where unpaid labor in the poorest households ultimately benefits the formal economy in the city.

Chapter VI discusses the political aspects of the research findings. Within the context of Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom, it examines an array of means and channels with which the urban poor interact to exercise their political power in order to maintain their social and economic status in the city. First, this chapter explores and classifies the different agencies which are active in the squatter communities. Three major powers are discussed here—state, NGOs, and local personalities.

Second, the chapter explains how the urban poor in each
form of land allocation are conditioned by the nature of form of land allocation and are treated differently by providing agencies. Additionally, the chapter examines the role of agencies and demonstrates how the state, NGOs and politicians who are actively involved in the squatter settlement affect the urban poor. The distinctive type of intervention is determined by the form of land allocation, selectively increases property value of some areas, and gradually transforms the form of land allocation, altering the urban poor's economic opportunities. In this light, the nature of land allocation further governs the means of survival and the life chance of the urban poor. The discussion also includes information about providers who are not directly involved in the issue of land and housing in the squatter settlement, yet indirectly affect the urban poor's living conditions, socioeconomic circumstances and means of economic survival.

Third, this chapter investigates how the urban poor interact with each of the agencies--political, providing, state, and NGOs. Each agency involved in provision, development, and control in the squatter settlement has its own objectives and purposes which may or may not meet the needs of the urban poor. The urban poor exploit the privileges offered by these sources of power, legally or
illegally. Different income group in the community enjoy and appreciate these privileges distinctively. Factors to be explored include forms of land allocation, legality of land occupation, the individualistic nature of the community, and the nature of personalities and community organizations in each area.

Chapter VII gives a brief summary of what has been accomplished in this dissertation, focussing particularly on its findings. It also discusses the socioeconomic complexity of the study area which is determined by the forms of land allocation. Further research possibilities are also suggested.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE RESEARCH AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

2.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to establish a theoretical framework for this study, this chapter explores literature on squatter settlements in Third World countries. The course of economic development, the political milieu, and patterns of urbanization in a Third World country are important elements in explaining the socioeconomic condition and the spatial distribution of the urban poor in Third World cities. The introductory section will address these problems in five categories, namely, urbanization, rapid urban growth, primacy, inequality, and housing problems. A number of approaches are taken by scholars to explain these phenomena, each of which was developed within a particular theoretical paradigm and under specific socioeconomic and political conditions. For convenience, the various approaches will be organized into two major groups of paradigms--the mainstream orthodox and the political economy paradigms. In addition, since the "informal sector" approach to the problem of the Third World's poverty had been used in most literature since the early 1970s, it will also be discussed in this chapter to justify why this approach is not chosen to analyze the urban housing issue.
The mainstream orthodox paradigm comprises neoclassical economics and the modernization theory while the political economy paradigm includes dependency theory and modes of production analysis. Although theoretically distinct and with contrasting political and economic implications, some approaches, such as the informal sector, can incorporate both paradigms. In discussing these two paradigms in the context of the Third World, I will briefly describe their major arguments, their implications for urbanization and housing, and their limitations.

2.2 PROBLEMS OF THIRD WORLD URBANIZATION

A pattern is found in most Third World countries in their urbanization process. Most of them encounter a number of obstacles and problems such as rapid growth, over-urbanization, primacy, and inequality which lead to housing problems.

2.2.1 RAPID GROWTH AND OVER URBANIZATION

The pace of urban growth has been dramatic during the past forty years. The Third World's urban population has doubled from its original 16 per cent since the 1950s due to high rates of natural increase and rapid rural-urban migration.

Although the level of urbanization was found correlated with the level of economic development, the pattern of
urbanization in the Third World did not imitate exactly that of the West (Hauser, 1957 and McGee, 1967 as cited in Armstrong and McGee, 1985). In fact, the term 'pseudo-urbanization' was coined to characterize urbanization in Third World countries due to its particular characteristics. First, rapid in-migration to the city, propelled by industrialization, causes rapid rates of urban growth particularly in primate cities. Second, the Third World's economic structure differs from that of the industrialized countries. The export of raw and semi-processed materials in exchange for luxury goods from abroad causes unequal exchange which hinders the Third World's industrialization process. Third, the lack of modern employment in the city means that a large portion of the city population is employed in the informal economy and low productivity service sector. Therefore, urban involution occurred after the rural involution, meaning more people engaged in longer hours of work to obtain less income.

The recent pattern of the Third World urbanization has changed due to factors such as the slowing down of the capitalist economy and increase in oil prices (Logan and Salih 1982). According to Armstrong and McGee (1985), the most important factor affecting the orientation of Third World development and urban systems has been technological changes in some industries which make possible the shifting
of manufacturing to Third World nations which have lower labor costs. Intense transnational investment and bank loans in those newly industrialized countries brought about uncontrolled financial indebtedness on the one hand, and the shifting of labor intensive industry into the Third World countries on the other (Armstrong and Mcgee, 1985). This situation points to the fact that even though the industrial sectors of the Third World nations exploit cheap labor from the working class, these nations still cannot reduce their trade deficits.

2.2.2 PRIMACY

Another source of rapid urbanization in Third World countries was the valuing of nationalism fostered by Third World states as a mechanism to prevent the western threat, and preserve their economic dependency after the colonial period. This circumstance made their administration more centralized, particularly in large cities. Economic independence was the ultimate goal of Third-World countries trying to break free from neo-colonialism, and resulting in import substitution and export oriented industrial policies in the 1960s (Armstrong and McGee 1968, Armstrong 1980, and Armstrong and Bradbury 1983).

This pattern of Third World urbanization has been the source of urban primacy and problems, such as the
concentration of economic activities in only one large city, congestion and diseconomy in service provision. Most primate cities expanded at the rate of more than 5 per cent per annum (Gilbert et.al, 1992).

2.2.3 INEQUALITY

The complexity of changes in international economy brought about not only the increasing disparity of income between developed and Third World countries, but also within the individual Third World countries themselves. Since the growth of primate cities has followed that of industrial capitalist nations, they provide central places for transnational corporations, world financial institutions and business, administrative and political elites. Modern economic sectors, class structures, and a built environment comparable with those global metropolises are developed in the primate city (Friedman and Wolf 1982). Western lifestyles, behavior, and the values of industrial societies are disseminated to the remote areas, such as market towns and villages, even though their production structures may be underdeveloped. This brings about a phenomenon in which the rich enjoy the high standards of western life style while the poor earn less (Dunleavy 1980, Dorfman and Mattelart 1975). This phenomenon in turn brings about inequalities and unequal access to public welfare and services, not only
between urban and rural populations, but also among the different classes of the urban population in the Third World cities. Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand, is a typical case in the way its urbanization pattern has been affected by its internal and external social and political development.

2.2.4 HOUSING PROBLEMS

The phenomena mentioned earlier are factors giving rise to slums and squatter settlements. Some of these factors even prevent the urban poor from getting access to urban housing. First, population growth, both by means of migration and natural increase has been rapid in the last four decades. The provision of urban housing, either by private or public sectors, thus cannot keep up with the need of such growth.

Second, within the conventional land market, land speculation has been uncontrolled and property taxation absent, resulting in the land value sky-rocketing in the last three decades. This further prevents the urban poor, who have little purchasing power, from getting access to housing via the conventional housing market.

Third, Third World states respond to their urban housing shortages by controlling and maintaining housing standards according to modernization policies and guidelines
of funding agencies such as the World Bank. Furthermore, most Third World populations include a small portion of the elite group rather than a majority of middle and low-income classes. As Gilbert and Gugler point out, the Third world housing issue is more political than technical. Public housing and planning agencies only legitimize the state's policy and suppress the low-income group's demand (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982).

Slums and squatter settlements are common throughout the Third World cities, and Pornchokechai (1985), for instance, found 1020 slums in the city of Bangkok alone. And the Third World's officials and technocrats, such as planners and architects who were trained in Europe and the United States, view squatter settlements as unhealthy with poorly built shelters which fail to meet safety standards (Dewar, 1976; Dwyer, 1975; and Aradeon, 1978).

To tackle the present housing crisis, Third World government apply both direct and indirect policy approaches. Several strategies are exercised in an indirect way to redirect the urbanization process, namely, growth poles, satellite cities, new towns, development corridors, intermediate cities, and optimum size cities. These strategies aim to redirect population growth and reorient the spatial structure. Direct solutions to housing problems are accomplished mostly through public housing provisions.
However, the provision of housing ultimately reaches only the middle class. The amount of housing which the state strives to provide is further constrained by the high standards governed by housing regulations.

The two major approaches view these urban issues differently. The mainstream orthodox approach discerns the urban low-income housing issue as a temporary problem, which normally occurs during the economic development process. The urban housing supply simply cannot serve the demand created by the natural population growth and rural-urban migration during the transformation process from rural agricultural to urban-industrial society. Problems can be diminished by means of increasing the housing supply, urban management, and law enforcement. The political economy approach, on the other hand, views this issue as a result of uneven development, the influence of the world economy, and the incapacity of the market economy to provide housing for the poor. In addition, even though the informal sector model attempts to analyze the Third World phenomena by examining linkages within the dualistic nature of the Third World economy, it cannot clearly define the different characteristics of formal and informal sectors. Neither could it be generalized and applied to all the Third World situations. The following sections discuss the concept of
both major paradigms and the informal sector model, and their application to the issue of urban low income housing. These sections rationalize why the political economy approach, particularly modes of production, is chosen and applied to the framework of this study, and how it explains the issue of forms of land allocation in the Third World cities.

2.3 THEORY OF THE THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS

2.3.1 THE MAINSTREAM ORTHODOX APPROACH

The orthodox paradigm has been developed and applied mostly by economists in the West. This paradigm has been fostered in most Third World countries with a myth that the underdeveloped world will imitate the developed countries in their course of development. This orthodox paradigm comprises the Neoclassical/economic growth paradigm, the modernization approach, and the marginality model.

2.3.1.1 THE ECONOMIC GROWTH APPROACH

The economic growth approach was developed following the Neo-classical economic concept which originated from Adam Smith's work in 1776 and those by Jevons (1871) and Marshall (1890) in Britain. It has become orthodox among non-Marxist Third World countries, in their course of economic development.

The focus of Neoclassical thought was mainly on micro
economics, applying marginalist concepts to the operation of competitive markets. It was designed to explain the behavior of consumers and firms in a competitive setting. Thus it engaged in extensive statistical modeling, which was taken up by succeeding generations of economists.

It presumes that, first, consumers' choices are determined by their subjective preference. Second, decisions on production are determined by profit maximization of the suppliers. Third, the overall market mechanism is formed at a scale where neither the buyer nor seller can manipulate prices. In short, it argues that the supply and demand mechanism will create a unique equilibrium in price structure and ultimately equalize the quantity of supply and demand. The state is thus responsible for maintaining the market mechanism and allocating resources on the grounds of facilitating economic efficiency.

In the last thirty years, Western scholars have relied on this school of thought in their economic development processes. This theoretical approach was in accordance with the collapse of colonial power structures, the quickening pace of world economic expansion and integration, and the emergence of new social systems. The unilinear model assumes that economic development will transform society from traditional to modern. Following in Europe's footsteps,
underdeveloped countries can achieve development through European political patterns, science, and technology.

Walt Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth theory'--traditional society, preconditions necessary to growth, take-off, drive to maturity, and age of high mass-consumption--is among the classic historical models. His thesis is mainly to challenge the Marxist approach to development. This model mainly encourages economic expansion and increases in savings and investment. Its empirical observation is reflected in the marginality approach, which views the uneven development as a normal phenomenon and the urban poor as living on the margins of the society. It argues that the accumulation of the capital must be first achieved before trickle down process to the lower income group will occur. However, the persistent growth of urban poverty has proved the failure of this assumption. (see marginality theory below).

Several weaknesses are found in this economic growth model in general. As regard to Walt Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth theory,' in reality however, the path of progress in backwards societies of Africa, Asia and Latin America differed dramatically from the history of the West. It hardly followed the path of the five steps linear development as maintained by Rostow (Heilbroner: 1963). On the contrary, the pattern of development in the
underdeveloped world jumped from one type of society to another. Frank (1967) challenged Rostow's model in that it simply disregards the historical fact that economic and political expansion of Europe since the fifteenth century has involved the present underdeveloped countries as a factor of development, and in turn retarded development in these countries.

In fact, the global system existed since the fifteenth century. The transferring of surplus by the European trading powers to their home countries to reinvest in development enriched Europe yet impoverished the underdeveloped world. The present Third World urbanization process which is perceived by conventional economists as a normal phenomenon was actually a means of surplus transfer from the most remote part of underdeveloped regions to the world's cities (Armstrong and Mcgee, 1985).

This model imposes direct and indirect effects on the urbanization process. Firstly, most Third World countries attempt to advocate growth and to balance the terms of trade through industrialization which tends to neglect the agricultural sector. Peasants from the rural area are compelled to quit their farming and to serve in the industrial sector in the city. This phenomenon further brings about rapid urbanization and more congestion in the
city, which demands more urban housing. Secondly, since the policy encourages savings and investment, it inevitably increases property values and actuates land speculation, which prevents the urban poor from accessing the conventional land market.

With regard to urbanization and housing, the state, within the economic growth approach, usually allows the forces of supply and demand to determine the market, including the conventional housing market. Squatter settlement is seen as illegal and unhealthy and the state intervenes either to upgrade or eliminate squatter settlements. There are two major forms of direct intervention by the state: eviction/demolition and direct provision.

The most common government responses to the Third World urban needs have been measures such as 'urban renewal' and 'slum clearance', and the growth of housing production within the popular mode in major primate cities is controlled by means of restricting migration toward cities. The demolition of squatter settlements serves two purposes. One has been the making way of land for more productive usage. The other purpose is to discourage migration into the city. Investment in public housing for the urban poor is regarded as a hindrance to economic growth and as attracting more migrants to the city. This is called the 'anti-
accomodationist approach' (Currie, 1971). On the other hand, the state may attempt to accommodate the poor by the indirect provision of public housing in the sites-and-services and upgrading projects, often with support of international agencies such as the World Bank. There are several advantages of such an approach. First, housing programs, as a wage subsidy, will theoretically lower production costs and thus increase the competitiveness of manufacturers in the international economy. Second, it will provide the political system a safety net and lower the risks of the entrepreneur. Third, housing policy is designed to encourage a high savings rate for the population as a whole, which in turn will jack up the investment rate, in both public and private sectors. Fourth, the political stability of the state is expected to be enhanced by the social and cultural coherence of a society. Public housing policy is applied as a major element in socializing a diverse population which has migrated to the city.

This approach focuses mainly on the physical aspects of shelters. Administratively, it is a top-down decision making process. Financially it tends to recover costs or even be profit making. This approach views the problems of urban low-income housing in terms of supply and demand (World Bank 1979). Housing demand is governed by two major factors,
namely, the increasing urban population and the dwellers' 'preference pattern'. Supply of urban housing is governed by factors such as the type of provider, type of housing stock, and factors which are attributed to the constraint of housing supply (World Bank, 1987). Social issues, which frequently go hand in hand with the state provision within the low-income community, are viewed as temporary problems. They are normal phenomena during the urban transformation processes--from rural to urbanized economies and from traditional to modern societies.

The weakness of housing provision in the neo-classical model has been its emphasis on profit maximization through the medium of price and the pursuit of individual self-interest in markets which are free from government intervention. Its shortcomings are thus generated from these concepts.

First, in reality, some buyers and sellers of property are large enough to affect the market by their actions. Monopolies tend to keep the price of building materials high. Land speculation, which prevails in Third World cities, is a form of monopoly which manipulates the price of land. Frequently the state needs to intervene in order to maintain the balance of supply and demand.

Second, some commodities are consumed socially, such as road systems, public utilities, and public housing. Under
the assumptions of individual market behavior, these commodities are considered to be unprofitable and unproductive. The market mechanism can not indicate the optimum level of provision by the state or its methods of financing these commodities. Usually, squatter communities are neglected.

Third, externalities occur when private benefits are gained at the cost of the society. And it is possible that social costs would exceed its benefits, for instance, in the case of environmental pollution and traffic congestion. Critical conditions in the squatter settlements are among the costs to society.

Fourth, the concept of consumer preferences would be valid only in the market where every member of the society has purchasing power. Each of the societies differs in the nature of income and wealth distribution. Since the Neoclassical analysis ignores the normative issue of distributive justice yet focuses solely on the positive analysis of market efficiency, the most unfortunate individuals might not be able to compete for necessities, such as food, medication, clothing, and housing. Again, the extent of state intervention, without harming the market mechanism, for the sake of welfare could be difficult to define.
Fifth, there is always a time lag before supply responds to demand. These delays are major barrier to the intervention by the state. Given that the state’s provision of low-cost housing is to conform to the need of the urban poor, its provisions can hardly catch up with the growth of the Third World cities.

Finally, the intervention of the state, which aims to create a favorable environment of investment, fails to take into account its relative autonomy, which will be discussed later in the section regarding mode of production. Politically, with the relative autonomy of the state, there are three major reasons for the state's subsidization of low income housing: to gain support from the low income communities in the city, to reduce the problem of squatter settlement to satisfy the upper class, and to fulfill its own interest in maintaining and expanding state power.

Most national development plans, such as that of Thailand, address the housing issue as part of their infrastructural development (NESDB 1992-1996). Even though housing shortages in the rural area are as severe as that of Bangkok, the plan allocates most of the subsidized housing in Bangkok and its vicinity—73,000 units in Bangkok compared to 7,000 units in the other region. The uneven allocation of resources and infrastructure over the space
indicates the fact that the state's underlying motivation is rather political than functional.

In conclusion, the economic growth approach fails to analyze or to solve the problems of urban poverty in general, and the existence of slums and squatter settlements in Third World cities in particular. First, underlying housing policies—demolition and direct provision—derived from this approach mainly serve to enhance economic growth rather than to deal with the welfare issue of the urban poor. Second, since the urban poor cannot get access to the conventional land and housing market, the utilization of market forces to allocate land and housing in the economic growth approach discriminates against the urban poor. Third, this approach fails to take into account the social and political issues which play an important role determining the allocation of resources, including land and housing in Third World cities. Given the economic growth approach's shortcomings, this research seeks to apply other alternatives for its framework.

2.3.1.2 MODERNIZATION APPROACH

Along with the economic growth approach, the model of modernization describes the transformation of society from traditional to modern in terms of changes in the normative structure of the community, particularly a set of values
that hamper or facilitate the process of economic growth. The approach uses the norm of advanced, industrialized societies of the West as a standard of reference to which developing societies are compared. The theory assumes that the Western culture and value of accumulation and consumption should be taken by the Third World to replace its traditional institutions and values. A number of indicators--demographic, behavioral, societal, economic, and spatial--were used by scholars to differentiate the states of "modern" and "traditional". The theory also assumes that the path of transformation from traditional to modern is unitary and is governed by the linear law of history.

The ideology of this approach also overlaps with that of the economic growth approach. The empirical observations of both the modernization and economic growth approaches are reflected in the marginality theory, which explains how poverty has persisted in the Third World countries despite the state's effort to eliminate it (see below).

Housing policy within the modernization approach aims to increase housing standards to achieve modernity. While maintaining the efficiency of resource allocation, the modernization approach focuses on the changing of values and patterns of consumption of the West. Planning methods and regulations of Western countries are applied to control the built environment and to enhance the beautification of the
surroundings. Squatter settlements are thus viewed as unproductive communities on high value urban land. The relocation of squatters to more appropriate sites would free the land for more effective use. Since land costs depreciate according to distance from the city center, relocation sites must be located at the urban fringe, as far away from the city center as possible. Eviction and demolition have become fundamental mechanisms for clearing valuable land in the city. As Abrams (1964) brought out, slum clearance has done no better a job than does a huge earthquake. The demolishing of shelters in squatter settlements further reduces the number of housing stock. (Van der Linden, 1986).

Another manner of housing the urban poor in the city is the high rise solution. To make the most effective use of precious urban land, vertical expansion is an alternative. High rise building beautify the city and make it more livable, replacing unhealthy, substandard, and ugly squatter settlements with a better designed community. High standard architecture not only offer safer and more comfortable lifestyles, but also cultivates modernized culture and values among city dwellers. The role of the state is to transform the values of its citizens, from traditional to modern, by means of education. In the urban setting, the
state sets and controls the standard of the built-
environment as well as beautifies the city.

The limitation of the modernization approach has been
its unilinear assumption of the evolution process. It views
the normative patterns and values of traditional society as
static, as a contradiction to modernity, and as a blockage
to development. The theory also believes that modernity must
be adopted from a foreign society instead of being an
element which develops in any given society (Singer 1971).
However, the socioeconomic needs of the Third World's urban
poor cannot be accommodated by the Western lifestyle. Their
means of survival are determined by their limited knowledge
and financial resources.

Many urban problems have thus derived from this school
of thought. Since the ruling and upper class--politicians,
bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and technocrats--are groups of
people who are responsible for the planned modernization
process, decision making is frequently centralized and urban
oriented. This results in the concentration of functions
and population in the primate city (Armstrong and Mcgee
1985).

The shortcoming of the modernization approach's housing
implication has been uneven development and urban growth.
The pattern of changes in values and consumption in the
modernization process has brought about high rates of urban
growth and large numbers of squatter settlements in the city when low cost housing cannot be sufficiently provided to meet the need of the growing population. These squatter settlements are viewed as being malignant tumors growing in cities (Juppenlatz, 1970), or as being a human cesspool (Schulman, 1967).

A number of failures arise from the state's direct intervention and control. First, the high standards imposed by the authority boosts the price of housing to the point that it is unaffordable for the urban poor (Gilbert and Gugler 1982). As a result, most low-income families are heavily in debt because a large portion of income is spent regularly on their housing. Second, land use planning and zoning of the city also displaces the urban poor whose jobs are in the cities. The locations of the public housing projects do not support the urban poor's economic activities and reduces their life chance. Third, the urban poor must pay higher utility costs since the price of public services generally increases with distance. And finally, construction and labor costs tend to increase rapidly due to high demand as several large projects are constructed simultaneously.

By means of state intervention, such as upgrading programs, granting of temporary land tenure, and provision
of public utilities, property values in squatter settlements increase. Intervention by the state tends to transform the popular mode of land allocation to a capitalist mode which encourages the poor to commercialize their shelters (Van der Linden, 1986).

Relocation programs also displace the urban poor from their social network tend to further reduce their life chance. The nature of high-rise housing in the city does not support the urban poor's economic activities. The lack of space for economic activities depletes the life chance of the urban poor. The housing projects ultimately have served the less needy middle class in the city, as the poor could not afford them, sold their rights to the public housing and moved away. Countless examples of such ownership transfer can be found in the literature such as Grimes, (1976), Valladares (1978), Batley (1983), Sanyal (1981), Findlay and Paddison (1986). Gilbert and Gugler (1992) maintain that government housing at best benefits the poor indirectly in that the total housing supply increases and part of the vacated upper- and lower-income accommodation became available for the poor. Mainly, however, it has been a process which benefits the lower middle class instead of the extremely poor.

In conclusion, the modernization approach exhibits several weaknesses. First is the failure of its unilinear
assumption of the development process, which presumes that
Third World modernization will follow the path of
industrialized countries. Second, there is very little
consideration of the unique local culture, and socioeconomic
and political conditions. The high housing standard derived
from western planning not only reduces the existing housing
stock, but also benefits the upper class and hinders the
life chance of the urban poor.

2.3.1.3 THE MARGINALITY MODEL

As part of the orthodox paradigm, the marginality
approach is derived from the empirical observations of both
the economic growth and modernization approaches. It
explains in part how the ideology of the informal sector
model has been developed. The marginality theory views the
small-scale producers, petty traders, and casual workers in
the city as marginal and underprivileged sections of the
labor force. Marginality means a state of exclusion, in
which a group of underprivileged people in the Third World
is excluded from the opportunity to either generate adequate
income or obtain adequate public services (Gerry, 1979).

People affected by these situations comprise a
culturally separate group living on the physical, social and
economic margins. This approach believes in the concept of
"cultural poverty", in which the poor stay poor due to their
traditional values, lack of motivation, and their highly integrated and self-sufficient culture.

The poor's limited social integration into the society at large is the major reason they become caught in cultural poverty. Through fear, ignorance, apathy and discrimination, the poor are also isolated from political involvement, and thus become powerless. The feelings of fatalism, helplessness and inferiority further drive the poor into despair. These feelings are even passed on to the children of the poor. Large portions of the urban poor are involved in illegal activities such as unlicensed street vending and hawking (Oscar Lewis, 1966). This approach was later taken by the dependency school of development, to analyze the structure of the underdeveloped society (this will be discussed later).

With regard to the urbanization and housing implications of this approach, squatters are considered a portion of the urban population which is marginal to the conventional economy. Illegality and the inability to pay for housing in the city are the reasons preventing the urban poor from gaining access to the conventional housing market and to the provision of basic services. Poverty in squatter settlements is associated with the concepts of 'slum of despair' and 'cultural poverty'. Individuals in the slums tend to produce little wealth and receive little in return.
Unemployment, underemployment and low wages prevent people from saving money, and thus they cannot improve their living conditions. State intervention and charitable subsidization are means to help the poor to improve their living standard. Attitudinal change by means of education and clearing of slums and squatter settlements also helps dwellers to move away from the unfavorable community, transform their culture, and break the vicious circle of marginality.

The concept of marginality is criticized as considerably static since it seeks to describe status instead of analyzing historical mechanisms. Therefore, it cannot effectively examine the process of class differentiation and the mechanisms or relations within the capitalist economy. At the empirical level, several factors are found to contrast with the concept of 'cultural poverty'. First, the self-contained nature of the poor community enable collective organization instead of barring the poor from political involvement (Buchanan 1972). Second, in contrast to Lewis' (1966) statement claiming that informal employment is unproductive and unimportant to the economy, Drakakis-Smith (1980) argues that the low productivity of petty commodity, unlicensed street vender, and hawker cannot be measured by the amount of money earned, since their earning per unit is relatively low. Furthermore,
most members of the household engage in some form of employment to supplement the family income, a fact which is detailed in the section pertaining to the informal sector. Third, employment of the urban poor is not limited to the informal sector. Other areas of employment, such as waged labor retailing, domestic service, domestic manufacturing, and transportation, engage the urban poor in a wider urban economic system. Furthermore, this approach was a relatively simplistic way to define what is formal and the rest is classified "marginal". In reality there is a spectrum of overlapping economic activities which can be classified neither as formal nor marginal.

Instead of viewing the informal activities of the urban poor as an obstacle to development, Amin (1973) holds that through the examination of the current situation of urban petty commodity producers, artisans, traders, and casual workers he is able to reveal the connection between the life chances of urban workers and the mechanism, to which the process of capitalist accumulation is linked (Amin 1973). This marginality theory gives rise to the dependency theory which bases its argument on external linkages instead of the exclusion of the underprivileged from the economic system (see below).

As for the theoretical implications for urbanization and housing of the marginality approach, since illegality
and the inability to pay for housing are seen as major obstacles to housing in the city, the marginality approach fails to pinpoint the root of these problems, such as land tenure and the control of housing standards by the state (Turner 1967). At the empirical level, poverty in squatter settlement is not always associated with the concept of 'slum of despair' and 'cultural poverty' as theorized. 'Slum of hope' plays the role of a place where newcomers are able to adjust to the city. Instead of sharing poverty in the squatter settlement, the urban poor take advantage of the settlement's unique characteristics which provide them with cheap housing, good accessibility to transportation, and employment networks. Socially, the urban poor who lack money, language skill, and knowledge still enjoy kinship and in-group ties, social support and emotional security (Federico 1983, Krongkaew, 1987). More importantly, reducing a heterogeneous group to the "marginalized mass" fails to provide an adequate analysis of class relation in the world society (Amin 1973). Slums and squatter settlements reflect a distorted socioeconomic structure in which the elite class controls the political and economic resources and processes, while the majority of the population is excluded from political participation and the distribution of services (Ruland 1982).
2.3.2 THE INFORMAL SECTOR MODEL

During the late 1960s, the conventional models of development began to be challenged. The empirical failure of the Neoclassical paradigm during the 1960s reflected the fact that the linear Rostowian stage models of economic development for the Third World and the modernization model could not be proved true by empirical evidence. The Third World's urbanization process differed from the orthodox development models. The persistence of urban poverty in Third World countries reflects the shortcomings of the Neoclassical model and was challenged by the dualist or sectoral theories developed during the 1960s and 1970s.

The sectorial model argues that the Third World economic activities can be divided into two distinct categories--rural-urban, modern-traditional, and formal-informal. Among the variants of dualistic theories, the informal sector model was recommended by the International Labor Organization (ILO) to examine the structure of labor absorption which gave rise to the employment crisis of Third World cities.

The ILO (1972) describes informal activities as those with relative ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership, small scale, labor-intensive and adapted technology, skills acquired outside the formal school system, and an unregulated and competitive market. An
occupational categorization was also used by Hart (1973) in defining the distinctive characteristics of formal and informal sectors. Sethuraman (1976) also characterizes the informal sector as a substantially self-contained but easy-to-enter part of the economy. He argues that the informal sector serves the function of gradually incorporating new migrants into the formal economy.

Research in this field during the 1970s and early 1980s ranged from small-scale manufacturing (Dwyer 1971), to street-trading (McGee and Yeung 1977) and squatter housing (Drakakis-Smith 1981). In fact, much of the literature regarding low income housing—such as that of Turner (1967)—is related to that of the informal sector model even if it predates it. The essential feature of these studies has been their aim to reveal the needs of the urban poor in order that cheap goods and services will be efficiently provided. Major aid agencies later adopted the sectorial concept and incorporated it into their development strategies during the 1980s to justify their self-help programs for the poor. However, the informal sector is difficult to define unless the types of activities are defined (see Armstrong and Mcgee 1987).

By late 1970s some research started to move towards the testing of this model’s validity and the generalized
characteristics (see Rimmer et al. 1978, Bromley 1979). The result of these studies proves the complexity of the informal sector. The sharp contrast between formal and informal sectors do not exist, and this makes its definition even more problematical. Definitions based on the structure of employment--wage-earning and self-employment--precludes the possibility of waged workers employed by informal sector operators, and cannot accommodate those who are self-employed in the formal sector. Also some occupations in the informal sector are actually difficult to enter.

Furthermore, empirical research suggests that the cheap goods and services produced within the informal sector subsidize the activities in the formal sector and allows the exploitation of the urban poor. Wealth is transferred directly and indirectly from the informal economy to the urban capitalist sector. Since activities in the informal economy require less overhead and use unpaid labor within the family, these activities reduce the price of basic food and services in the city. Cheap labor is thus made available to investors in the city through this process. Therefore, within the aggregate economic system, informal economy indirectly assists the formal economy. Direct transfer is made in the form of taxes and licence fees from the obvious production of informal sector, and fines and bribery from illegal activities. Indirect transfer appears to be the
cheap food and raw materials supplied by the urban subsistence activities to the formal sector (Drakakis-Smith 1987).

Self-help housing is another form of exploitation related to the production within the informal sector. It is the way through which the state denied its welfare responsibility. The urban poor was forced to find housing outside the formal housing market, or used their unpaid labor to provide their own housing in the city.

At the macro level, there is little consistency as to relationship between the existence of informal sector and the level of development. Whether the growth of manufacturing decreases the proportion of informal sector, or the expansion of informal sector reduces the demand for higher wages in the formal sector is unclear. On the one hand, most research assumed that a reformed capitalism is able to transfer development into the underdeveloped world. Policy makers tend to view the contemporary situation of urban informal sector in Third World countries from a conventional social science viewpoint. Socioeconomic policies are believed to correct any social conflicts by targeting an individual group which might have encountered any form of hardship, and eventually the formal economy will replace the informal economy.

On the other hand, radical scholars tend to view the
informal sector concept as being used by the Third World authorities to justify the capitalist system both nationally and internationally by simply viewing the dualistic differentiation as two independent sectors--"formal" and "informal."

Since organized labor provides a means to negotiate wages with employers, it is seen by investors as a threat to capitalist development. Activities in the informal economy, such as subcontracting, is one way the capitalist exploit the working class (Castells 1980). The unregulated production process within the informal economy thus releases investors' and the state's responsibility with regard to workers' social benefits and working conditions, such as health care and housing subsidies (Hansen 1981). Informal activities grow despite the formality of the economy, not just for the sake of the urban poor's survival strategy but to conceal the form of wage labor and the proletarian work relationship (Tokman 1986).

In this way, the flexibility of unregulated activities is exploited to benefit the regulated environment of the formal sector (see Castalls 1980). Particular groups of labor, such as immigrant workers, ethnic minorities, women, and youth, are more prone to be exploited. The state, on the other hand, tolerates informal activities to prevent
potential social conflicts and to promote political patronage (Castells 1980).

Related to the concept of informalism, "self-help housing" of the "Turner school" views squatter settlements as a form of housing production outside the market. John Turner (1967) views the phenomena of squatter settlement as a normal symptom during the urbanization process where the urban poor build their shelters from used materials and with their unpaid labor outside the housing market. Since informality is viewed as only temporary, Turner argues that squatter settlements play the role of supporting the social and economic mobility of the urban poor. He believes that a temporary settlement can be transformed into a permanent settlement over time. Uncontrolled and spontaneous urban settlements are thus means of social mobility for the urban poor, as well as the government's political dilemma. "Slums of hope" are playing the role of a social safety net to prevent political unrest against the state.

The urban poor in squatter settlements are viewed as marginalized and excluded from the conventional land market as a result of their low and irregular income. Some urban necessities and services are also excluded due to the illegality of their land occupation. Turner (1967) believes that land tenure, relaxation of control on housing standards, legalization of the settlement, and housing loans are
among the most important means to encourage dwellers to invest in their housing and to create a sense of security. Squatters are capable of building their own homes if the authorities relax the enforcement of housing standards. Community organizations are used to fulfill the needs of the community (Turner 1967).

Turner's housing theories were later challenged by Burgess's mode of production approach as failing to take class structure into consideration. Housing production in squatter settlements of the Third World cities is a cheap solution to the lack of urban housing provision and releases the responsibility of the state and investors (Burgess 1978 and Castalls 1980).

Control of the state has been a key barrier to the possession of housing for the urban poor. State interventions are, on the one hand, determined by the course of macro economic development, and on the other hand, by the nature of the relative autonomy of the state. Under the market economy, state policy must facilitate economic efficiency. At the same time, politicians need popular support from the majority. Therefore, state intervention serves to fulfill the need of the urban elite as well as the urban poor. The urban poor seek to respond to state intervention collectively. Pornchokechai (1985) found

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different classes in different types of land tenure within squatter settlements in Bangkok. The urban poor living in each type of land tenure are affected by and respond to the state's policy distinctively. State interventions are more likely to benefit the middle class than the poorest strata.

The weakness of Turner's (1969) argument regarding the consolidation of slums is also criticized by the political economy approach. As Turner (1969) argues, slums and squatter settlements are only temporary symptoms of development; consolidation will ultimately occur and improve the living conditions of the squatter community. However, there are several factors which contribute to the consolidation of the squatter settlements—tenure, mode of housing production, length of lease, the limits on the urban poor to pay, the nature of the land market, state policy, security of the state, political orientation and pattern of urbanization (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992).

In contrast to Turner's (1969) belief, the consolidation of housing has also been hindered by the increasing price of building materials and the urbanization process. The physical expansion of the city, for instance, sharply decreases the availability of land. The rapid growth of the city lengthens the distance and therefore extends the urban poor's commute to work. The increasing distance from employment not only cuts the family budget for travel but also
reduces the family's time for home consolidation (Gilbert and Gluger 1992). State urban policies, zoning, and provision of services increase the land price dramatically and decrease the probability of the poor to consolidate (Evers 1975). The commercialization and monopolization of building materials by large scale manufacturers tend to increase the price of building materials. This phenomenon slows down the physical improvement of the squatter settlement due to high construction costs (Burgess 1978).

The ability of the community to consolidate is reduced by the consolidation process itself. Consolidators may move out and make room for the poorer families. The investment cycle in the community is virtually disabled by the selective out-migration of 'high achievers'. The consolidation process of the community is also governed by the availability of public services in that particular area.

In summary, the limitation of the sectorial model is attributed to its unclear definition and its difficulty to generalize. Nonetheless, much of the literature dealt with self-help housing bear the concept of informality which is closely related to the assumption of informal sector. The Turner approach, on the one hand, argue for the consolidation of the squatter community and the success of self-help housing. The Burgess approach, on the other hand,
takes the mode of production approach, and opposes to the intervention by the state. The commercialization of property has been another barrier to improve squatter settlement. Analysis by means of forms of housing production will be discussed in the section that follows.

2.3.3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH

The political economy approach takes the economic differences among social classes and the spatial segmentation of the economy into account. It seeks to relate uneven distribution of resources with the process of capitalist exploitation. Surplus is thus transferred from the lower strata to the upper class even over space--such as from periphery to core regions. This section discusses the two major approaches within the political economy paradigm, which relates to the urban housing issue in Third World cities.

2.3.3.1 DEPENDENCY THEORY

Overlapping the marginality model and informality theory, the dependency theory was developed after the unequal development model of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). It challenges the validity of the conventional assumption of the free trade theory formulated in Europe and North America. It views the world system as being divided into two clearly separate parts 'center' and 'periphery'; and the 'core society' is able to influence the

Other notions were introduced during the late 1970s describing the dichotomy of world system, such as 'advanced-backward', 'traditional-modern', 'developed-underdeveloped', and 'industrialized-primary producing'. Each of the countries can be categorized within either the industrial core or the lagging periphery. Therefore, underdevelopment in the periphery is viewed as a result of an external factor—a particular group of countries exploiting the rest of the world.

It urban and housing implication lies in the unequal terms of trade assumption. To overcome the economic influence by the core countries, Third World countries attempt to equalize the terms of trade by exporting industrial goods. Therefore, in the Third World society, urban-industrial growth takes priority over rural development. Industrial growth is geared toward luxury goods and export-processing. Industrialization also aims for external markets with minimal emphasis on the domestic market.

However, Armstrong and Mcgee (1985) explain the linkages of the dependency of the urban poor of Third World countries to the capital cities of developed countries. They
analyze Third World urbanization as a process in which primate cities play a major role in channeling surplus from the lagging regions to abroad (see also mode of production below). Castells (1977) similarly argues that primate city plays the role of agent for capitalist penetration, as a economic linkage between the Third World's rural peasants and the world cities.

The shortcoming of the dependency approach lies in its mechanism. The assumption of a "core-pheriphery" dichotomy is no longer accurate, since a 'developed periphery' can be found in some developed countries as well. Some old British colonies, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, suffer a certain level of dependency in relation to the core society. Within a larger context, the main theme of Amin's early work (1974,1976) and Wallerstein's argument on the 'surplus-extraction chain' (1976) focus mainly on inter-societal relationships within the framework of unequal relationships between the dominant nations and dependent nations rather than on the internal production structures and social relations.

The issue of uneven development was later viewed as an internal issue instead of a global concern. DosSantos (1973) and Groz (1975) hold that the Third World's internal social structures and societal class relationships have a greater influence on dependency than do external forces. Exports and
industrialization policies of Third World countries benefit the upper class of the periphery which are owners of big business, while the poor are left out of the economy (see mode of production below). In this light, Bettelheim (1972), argues that exploitation is no longer an issue among different nations, such as one nation exploiting another. It is rather an exploitation among social classes on a global scale.

A study by Castell (1977) linked the pattern of Third World development to the uneven nature of capitalist development. Dependency is thus viewed as an expression of internal organization and the articulation of production and class relationships, which is reflected in the fragmentation of the spatial and socioeconomic nature of Third World society. The causes of dependence are thus viewed as rooted in internal social structures and relationships. And the dynamic of a dependent economy is viewed as conditioned by the systems of alliances among social classes (Armstrong and Mcgee 1985).

However, the external linkage is still part of the analysis. Societies with more external control tend to be more exploitative of the lower strata. The class history thus has a great impact on the extent of exploitation from both outside and within (Cardoso and Faletto 1969).
Even though the housing implications of the dependency theory are not clearly defined, their shortcomings are reflected in the lack of class analysis, and therefore cannot unravel the root of the problem. The industrialization strategy to equate the terms of trade, on the other hand, encourages rapid urban growth and rural-urban migration. The increasing number of inhabitants in Third World squatter settlements only provides a reservoir of cheap labor for the modern industrial sector on a global scale. The illegality of land occupation in the squatter settlement, the unpaid labor of self-help housing, and the poor living conditions within the squatter settlement are forms of exploitation, to the gain of the world capitalist. (De Souza et.al. 1979).

2.3.3.2 MODES OF PRODUCTION APPROACH

The mode of production approach views the articulation of different modes of production as a way to extract surplus--from the subsistence to the capitalist mode of production. In the 1970s, development study started to shift its focus from the external factors to internal structures and interaction which determine the pattern of development in the Third World society. Writers such as Laclau (1971), Brenner (1977), Taylor (1979), and Palma (1978) resorted to a more Marxist approach, analyzing the relationship between
classes and the distinct modes of production. Analysis within the mode of production approach not only examines the economic elements of the productive system, it takes into account the elements of political superstructures, -- ie., political, legal, and administrative institutions -- set within the context of the prevailing social and political ideology of that society. More importantly, it examines the social relationship between classes involved in the process of appropriation and accumulation of capital.

Laclau (1971) maintained that capitalism had not fully penetrated Third World countries. It was instead overlaid upon existing modes of production. Since capitalism finds its way into the social formation of both core and periphery, different systems of production coexist--capitalist, state, and communal modes of production--with distinct levels of influence and interaction between the core and periphery (Armstrong and Mcgee 1985). The theory of the "articulation of modes of production" holds that the capitalist mode of production penetrates, dominates, and preserves precapitalist modes of production by restructuring them for capitalist accumulation (Laclau 1971; Ruccio and Simon 1986). Along with this process, capitalist penetration not only undermines, dissolves, and transforms precapitalist modes of production, but it also creates opportunities and strengthens the position of the precapitalist classes--ie.,
feudalism--instead of eliminating them (de Janvry 1985). A transitional mode of production is developed during this conservation and dissolution process which leads to complete transition to capitalism. The concept of articulation of modes of production and its transformation is also applied to that of forms of land allocation (see forms of land allocation below).

Mode of production also examines the differences in tools and techniques of production which function in the context of human relations. Since production is the most important means of human survival and could be used to define the function of a human society, the concept of mode of production plays the role of explaining the structure of institutional relationships within a particular society.

Russell (1989) maintains that there are three unique characteristics in human production. First, without animal instinct, learned knowledge is needed by human beings in the creative planning process. Humans also require tools to compensate for the relative weakness of their bodies. Second, the social dimension is also important in the process of human production. The mode of production which people practice greatly influences the characteristic of their lives. In other words, workers with better tools have more forces of production. The identity and character of the
society are therefore, strongly influenced by the nature of the dominant mode of production, upon which the economic foundation is built.

Inequality normally occurs in a class-based society in which the privileged class, which owns the production tools and means, exploits the surplus labor of a producing class. The production surplus is thus distributed unevenly among the spectrum of the different classes. As Russell (1989) put it,

In capitalist societies, the dominant class extracts surplus labor in form of surplus value from workers and uses the market mechanism to determine the distributions of labor, means of production, and products. The labor power of workers is a commodity, whose price (the wage or salary) is determined by labor market conditions. Means of production, the most significant of which are owned by members of the capitalist class, are traded on stock markets. Most consumer products, from food and other necessities to luxuries, are sold through retail market."

Since more than one mode of production coexists in our modern society, mode of production examines the circulation of surplus between: the subsistence mode, the simple commodity mode, and the capitalist mode of production (Banaji 1980).

Peasants in the subsistence mode of production produce for their own consumption without selling products in the market. However, due to land pressure, taxation, and needs
of consumer goods, and needs for input, peasants may be compelled to sell their labor in the industrial sector--capitalist mode of production--for cash. Land pressure, taxation, and needs of consumer goods, and needs for input are major reasons for the need of cash. Petty producers in the simple community mode partly engage in the market selling part of their produce and buying goods such as chemical fertilizer. However, due to the seasonal nature of agricultural production, some members of the household also need to sell their labor in the industrial sector for their survival during off season periods. Capital takes advantage of the situation, where labor shifts from one mode of production to the another. First, the capitalists are able to deny their responsibility for the welfare of their laborers. Second, wage rates are suppressed due to the subsidization by the subsistent and simple commodity mode of production.

In other words, low income households, which are economically discriminated against within the capitalistic system, function as income pooling units to guarantee the continuous reproduction of labor force vis-a-vis the fluctuation of labor demand. The subsistence nature of the household economy also ensures the availability of labor in the labor market and further keeps the cost of labor reproduction at a low level (Evers et.al., 1984).
A large part of "subsistence production", where producers both produce and consume their own products without channeling them through the market system, is made up of unpaid family labor within the household, particularly females and children. This includes the production and reproduction of living space, namely the building, cleaning, and repairing of one's own house. Because there is no evidence of goods entering the market or any income earned, they are categorized as "unproductive" activities in the capitalistic mode of production.

The capitalist exploits this form of non-capitalist production and without this household subsistence reproduction system, the whole Third World economy would collapse (Evers et.al., 1984). As discussed earlier in the section regarding the informal economy, these phenomena develop within a system of different levels of interrelated reproduction units: family, household, kin, neighborhood, community, and local society. The urban household's subsistence economy is further linked to market production by means of petty commodity or the "informal sector". Since the urban household's subsistence economy supports urban petty commodity production, and the costs of labor reproduction are suppressed by the existence of petty commodity, this linkage enables labor to be employed in the
formal sector at low wages. Subsistence production, therefore, indirectly subsidizes wage labor in the urban system.

While the urban poor are exploited by capital, they are marginal to the conventional housing market in the capitalist mode of land allocation. The conventional housing market is determined by the supply and demand of the market, where consumers compete with each other for the limited supply of housing stock. With the present situation of income disparity in Third World society, the urban poor cannot get access to the land market.

Therefore, the mode of production approach examines the social relation of production and how social inequality extracts surplus from one mode/class to the other. Capital is able to exploit inequality to expand its control and increase its competitive capacity for the extraction of surplus value (Armstrong and Mcgee 1985)

With regard to the implication for urbanization and housing, the mode of production approach views urban concentration as a consequence of capitalist production. The Third World society seeks to enhance capital accumulation by means of extraction of surplus through unequal exchange and direct appropriation from production (Petras 1975). On the one hand, this strategy heavily relies on export which leads to the concentrated growth and polarized pattern of urban
sites. Internally, primate city is also linked to the extraction of surplus from other production zones of agriculture and minerals (Armstrong and Mcgee 1985). On the other hand, parallel to the extraction of surplus between distinct modes of production, self-built housing in squatter settlements is produced within the subsistent mode of housing production. Dwellers build their shelters with their own labor and use materials on squatter land without cost. This condition minimizes the cost of housing in the city, and therefore, lowers the wages in the industrial sector. The cost of public utilities is also minimized since the state is able to deny provision of services to squatter due to their illegality.

Burgess (1978) viewed the issue of public housing within the context of economics, politics, and ideology. He rejected the value of self-help housing programs under the control of the state. State organized self-help housing does not eliminate costs, i.e., rent, interest, profit, subcontracting costs, administrative costs, and material cost. From the mode of production perspective, he argues that the purpose of self-help housing is merely to reduce labor costs and to put that burden on the poor.

To establish a contextual background for the classification of mode of land allocation and housing
production, three major modes of production specified by Russell (1989) are worth mentioning here: The communal mode, the state mode and the capitalistic mode of production. These three modes of production will be compared to the mode of land allocation and housing production later in this section.

2.3.3.2.1 THE COMMUNAL AND SIMPLE PROPERTY MODES OF PRODUCTION

Human societies were organized communally before the existence of classes, and the communal mode of production occupied the longest period of human history. The economic structure of early societies was comprised of primitive forces and communal relations of production, where primitive tools were not an important determinant in the production process. Since uncertainty in food finding was common in the ancient society, egalitarianism was the most important feature in this mode of production (Hawkes and Wooley, 1963). Labor had to be pooled to create a cooperative force to fight for the group's survival in the food finding process. Products from hunting were pooled to ensure the regularity of food supply. The communal mode of production developed to an advanced stage where communal societies reached the technological stage of subsisting, mostly from cultivation. Simple property modes of production was the
transitional stage toward the present capitalist mode of production, when a semi-economic class started to exist without the existence of class relation.

2.3.3.2.2 THE STATE MODE OF PRODUCTION

In the state mode, production is controlled by the ruling classes, such as the state apparatus. By means of domination and exploitation the state extracts value from its citizens via taxation. Power is monopolized while classes are only weakly developed.

In addition to maintaining order and competing with other states, the state has to legitimize itself by fulfilling popular demands, maintaining the interests of the elite class and fulfilling its own interest. To sustain its administrative structure and with relative autonomy, the state not only implements the interests of the dominant classes, but also supports subordinate classes to prevent political unrest. Theoretically, resources are allocated among all groups and geographical regions through the planning process by the state. Planning processes at the national level, however, tend to be biased against the interests of the powerless in favor of the powerful. (Saunders, 1980; Castells, 1990; and Harvey, 1982).

The decision making process of the modern state is further confounded by its structure, since it comprises a wide range of different agencies and sub-units (Saunders,
It is influenced by different social groups such as interest groups, government officials, NGOs and professionals, including the urban poor (Dunleavy, 1981; and Saunders, 1986; and Bell, 1983). Therefore, it is difficult to find a universal theory explaining the exact role of the state or pinpointing the interest group it represents.

Kwitko (1990) further analyzed the relationship between the economy and the transformation of urban space which has an impact on the reproduction of labor. Studies by Kwitko (1990) and Castells (1991) assumed that the hypergrowth in leading Asian economies was triggered by the intervention of the "development state" through their urban development policies. Their competitiveness in the world market is from the deliberate strategy planned, engineered, and implemented by their nation state. Policy intervention includes 1) control of the financial system and trade policy, 2) the repressive control of labor, and 3) building the basic infrastructure in industrial facilities, technology, and human capital. In order to succeed in promoting economic growth, the state has to rationally balance these three different roles. It must efficiently allocate scarce resources, successfully guide the course of development in a comprehensive way, and keep its relative autonomy over the interests of different groups.
2.3.3.2.3 CAPITALISTIC MODE OF PRODUCTION

The capitalist society started to develop by the thirteenth century in Europe and Great Britain, while feudalism had been declining in the succeeding three centuries. This initial capitalist development was enhanced by foreign trade which furthered its expansion.

In the subsistence economy, goods are produced and consumed by the producing households, therefore, most of them are not considered commodities. In the capitalist mode of production, private individuals own or control the major means of production of goods for market exchange. Most goods, therefore, are viewed as commodities. The market then increases its control over production and consumption.

Capitalism focuses on profit maximization rather than the utility of the product. Therefore, exchange value does not correspond with use value as claimed by capitalist ideology. In the production process, capitalists are in an unique class and can afford to own the means of production--tools, labor, and materials. In the production process, surplus value is created by labor. This surplus value is available for further investment as new capital in production, commerce, or finance sectors.

The capitalist state functions to protect and perpetuate capitalistically organized economies. Private
ownership of capital is guaranteed as a right. Businesses are also facilitated by security forces and trading laws, in order to allow smooth operation. The capitalist state is also obligated to promote the accumulation of capital, and attracts and maintains foreign investment. It offers incentives to foreign investors such as infrastructure for industry in cities, tax breaks, ensuring the availability of cheap labor, and the relaxation of environmental control.

2.4 PROPERTY REGIME AND RULE OF ACCESS

Before I discuss the three forms of land allocation which parallel the three modes of production, I shall discuss, in this section, the concepts of property regime. Rules of access and the distinction between "common property" and "open access," are crucial factors to understand forms of land allocation in relation to their physical conditions (see forms of land allocation below). Bromley (1989) develops the term "property regime," an institutional arrangement that define ownership of property, instead of "form of land allocation". He explains various types of "property regimes" that exist in the Third World countries. A large proportion of the population in these countries, especially those who belong to the lower income group, rely on their sources of income from lands which is not held fee simple. Two examples of these property regimes are farming on traditionally allocated communal land and
squatting and making a living from petty commodity in Third World cities. Under the present imperfect market economy, development assistance in the Third World is focused on private property more than other types of property regimes. Such development could be in the form of farm mechanization or land reform to redistribute the large private estates to the landless. There is very little research attempting to understand the economic activities on land under other types of property regimes.

With very little understanding of the various types of property regimes which indicate their distinctive types of accessibility to land, environmentally related literature claims that common access to land causes destructive landuse practices—such as soil erosion and deforestation. The term "tragedy of the commons" was thus used to describe the environmental deterioration in this research. However, Bromley (1989) observes that causes of deterioration lie in the failure of assigning clear ownership and stewardship. A clear indication of the structure of right, duties, and privileges is able to determine rules of access to resources. Property regime is thus a vital issue, because instead of resorting to state intervention—expropriation and control. Resources can be recovered and land can be
properly managed only when the issue of property regime
rules of access are fully understood.

In fact, the fallacy of "tragedy of the commons" lies
in the assumption of the orthodox approach. The contemporary
economic theory holds that individualism instead of
collectivity is a more proper means of decision making,
presuming that all valuable resources are individually
owned, fully mobile, and exchangeable in small increments in
well-functioning markets. However, in the real world, these
assumed characteristics do not exist. In other words, not
all valuable resources are able to be owned by individual or
are fully mobile. Information and market are also
unreliable. Therefore, the presumption of smooth
privatisation in the Third World countries is actually
misleading. Bromley (1989) contends that the most important
factor is to fully understand the distinction between "open-
access resources" and "common-property resources."

Open access is a free-for-all, common property
represents a well-defined set of institutional
arrangements concerning who may make use of a
resource, who may not make use of resource, and the
rule for how the accepted users shall conduct
themselves. By failing to understand this essential
difference, many then commit an equally serious
mistake. That is institutional arrangements over
natural resources (property arrangements) are thought
to be two polar extremes; one either has individual
(or private) property, or one has a free for all
(Bromley: 1989 pp. 875).

In other words, each type of property arrangement, except
open access, has its own rules of access, which determines the way resources are used.

Several points must be taken to account in the comparison of types of property regime. First, property arrangement is not bimodal—two extreme cases—but it comprises an array of ownership arrangements. Second, such bipolar fallacy is not only misleading, but also promotes extreme individualism in Third World countries. Third, in contrast to the argument made by economists, there are a number of success stories of common-controlled resources in the past—eg., in the Swiss Alps and in the Andes (Bromley 1989). Therefore, rules of access is a crucial factor describing forms of land allocation.

2.5 FORMS OF LAND ALLOCATION AND HOUSING PRODUCTION

Since land is one of the major conditions necessary for production, land ownership largely affects the life chance of each individual. Similar to the modes of production, particular forms of land allocation prevent the urban poor from getting access to land, which is their means of subsistence in the Third World's urban settings. The accessibility to land, however, is determined by the arrangement through which land is allocated—communal, state, or market. The form of land allocation is among the key factors determining the urban poor's means of survival
within the squatter settlement. In the present capitalistic land market, the urban poor must struggle to gain a foothold for their survival in the city by dealing with one of the three forms of land allocation: the market form, the state form, and the popular form (Goss 1991).

2.5.1 MARKET FORM OF LAND ALLOCATION

In the market form of land allocation, exchange value is the only important criterion of value and no cultural or personal meaning is necessarily involved. Within the market mechanism, the face value of land, which includes the expected surplus created by land in the future, is a crucial determinant in the pricing system. Since supply-demand of land and price competition are major principles to gain ownership of land, the rule of access in this form of land allocation, therefore, lies in the purchasing power of the competitors and the expected utility of land—i.e., fertility of land and physical location which facilitates commercial activities. The one who offers to pay the highest price gains access to land and the willingness to pay depends on the amount of utility or profit each competitor expects.

As discussed in the previous section, land speculation is thus encouraged by the nature of the capitalist mode of production. This makes urban land values increase rapidly. Land costs in Bangkok, for instance, increased from 40% to
200% during the last decade (Statistical Yearbook 1988). The provision of low-cost housing in the Third World is hindered by both the high price of land and the changing attitudes of the poor towards land as a private commodity.

Since full ownership (fee simple) is granted in this form of land allocation, there is virtually no "open access" type of property regime in this form of land allocation. Theoretically, neither does "common access" exist. However, rules of access in this category are not limited to supply-demand and purchasing power. Social affiliation and informal relationship also govern rules of access in the capitalist form of land allocation. For instance, temporary land tenure without cost might be obtained from a relative who owns the land, because he/she needs a relative to live close-by for mutual help and moral support. The "de facto" form of land allocation thus bears the characteristic of a popular form (see popular form of land allocation below). Another example is squatting over unattended privately owned land. The "de facto" rules of access are governed by the consent of people in that community, who jointly invade that piece of land, instead of purchasing power. Again, a characteristic of communal form of land allocation is incorporated.

2.5.2 STATE FORM OF LAND ALLOCATION

In the state form of land allocation, the state intervenes to manage land use in response to the conflict
between the social production of value and private appropriation within the land market. For its own legitimacy, the state also responds to popular demands for urban housing. It performs several functions simultaneously: serving the ruling class, mediating in the class struggle, maintaining its power through taxation and organizing urban space (Goss 1991). The state thus plays an important role through intervention in planning and providing of low-cost housing in the Third World.

Rules of access in the state form of land allocation are determined by the needs for political legitimacy of the state and the collective power of the citizens to persuade provisions by the state. Theoretically, "common access" and "open access" are non-existent in state forms of land allocation. In practical terms, however, with limited state personnel to control its land, the capacity of the state to get rid of invaders is often limited. Invasion of forest reserves and land beside railroad tracks are examples. These instances virtually create a de facto "open access" type of property regime in some extreme cases. In this case, no one has the right to claim ownership, but every one who invades the land attempts to grab the most out of it. This type of property regime tends to degrade the physical conditions of land.

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Resembling the articulation of modes of production, the capitalist form of land allocation also penetrates into the other forms of land allocation. State housing, for example, is provided by the state with minimal cost. However, it can be illegally sold, rented or even speculated upon. Face value of state housing is thus increased substantially, frequently exceeding its use value. In reality, a pure state form of land allocation, without some characteristics of a market form is hard to find. The rule of access is, therefore, determined partly by the purchasing power of dwellers.

Physical conditions and location of state land, particularly in public housing, are also dictated in part by the nature of the state and partly by the nature of the land market. Due to the relative autonomy of the state, its belief in the orthodox development approach, and the need to maintain its own interest, provision of housing by the state frequently serves to maintain the modernization and beautification of the city with little consideration of the economic viability for its dwellers. Most relocation projects are located at a great distance from the city center in order to minimize cost of land, which is determined by pricing of the land market. Furthermore, the design of architecture, such as that of apartment housing, does not facilitate economic activities. Such conditions
profoundly hinder the life chance of dwellers, especially the poorest group. Therefore, state intervention frequently fails to address the urban poor's needs.

2.5.3 POPULAR FORM OF LAND ALLOCATION

In the popular (communal) form of land allocation, those who possess excess land are expected to share with those who are in need of land, either within a kin circle or in patron-client relations. In some traditional societies—such as that of Northern Thailand and Indonesia—farm land was considered common property shared by members of the village. And rule of access in the popular (communal) from of land allocation lies in the consent of the community. Priority of access to land depends on the need of each community member and how he/she works/cultivates from that piece of land. Therefore, "common access" describes the type of property regime in this category. In some instance, such social space has no exact boundary and is subject to adjustments (Harvey 1985).

Practices in the popular form of land allocation, such as the invasion of private or government land by squatters, thus violates the principle of the market form and state form of land allocation (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). Rule of access in squatter settlement is "common access" instead of "affordability" or "political motivation," since every one
in the community collectively moved into and occupied a particular piece of land. Everyone has a sense of belonging on that piece of land, and are obligated to protect and maintain it.

In some instance, such as in squatter settlements which are due for eviction/demolition, dwellers start to abandon their shelters in the process of seeking alternative dwelling elsewhere. Rule of access is transformed from "common access" to "open access," since the sense of belonging in the community no longer exists, and virtually nobody owns the land. A deteriorated physical condition will develop should this situation be prolonged.

The articulation of capitalist form of land allocation also plays an important role. Most common property in traditional rural communities, such as those in Northern Thailand, has been transformed to private property along with the articulation of modes of production. Even though householders in squatter settlements cannot legally claim ownership, shelters and communal rights to a particular plot of land still can be rented, leased, or even sold in practice. Therefore, a pure popular form of land allocation no longer exists in reality. Property value in most squatter settlements rise over time if tenure is perceived as stable.
Some even view housing in squatter settlement as a form of investment.

2.5.4 FORMS OF HOUSING PRODUCTION AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENT

Parallel to the three forms of land allocation, Goss (1991) attempted to relate another three forms of housing production: the simple commodity form, the petty commodity form, and the capitalist form of housing production.

In the capitalist form of housing production, builders aim for the full exchange value of the commodity whereby labor is paid and materials are purchased. In the petty commodity form of housing production, a portion of the labor contributed to the house might be unpaid even though the final product is, in part, able to gain capital return by means of letting or selling with an expected value. In the simple commodity form of housing production, however, though some of the materials have to be purchased, dwellers build their own shelters to minimize labor cost. Frequently building and dwelling occur simultaneously. Housing of this type is thus limited to only use value.

In reality, there are always linkages among the three forms of land allocation and among the three forms of housing production. As discussed earlier, categories may change over time--popular to market, or popular to state
intervention. And above all, market forces are the most important determinant of land allocation, articulating the other two forms of housing production. For example, property value increases due to state intervention and usually compels the urban poor to move out of subsidized housing projects. They are replaced by the middle income group who can afford to pay the market price of the housing.

Given the present conditions of the capitalist mode of production in the Third World, the urban poor cannot get access to housing in market form of land allocation. Selfbuilding in the popular form of land allocation is their only means to obtain access to urban housing. How the popular form of land allocation and simple commodity form of housing production exist in the Third World context is more a political and economic issue than merely the nature of the Third World's housing policy (Gilbert and Gugler 1992).

As discussed earlier however, the nature and ideology of the state which adheres to the modernization ideology, has to advocate beautification of the city as part of the modernization process to fulfill the needs of the urban elites (Gilbert and Gugler 1992). Building standards of the simple commodity form of housing production is likely to be rejected, since the educational training of architects and planners who work for the state is primarily western Euro­centric (Dwyer, 1975).
The popular form of land allocation, in some instances, is tolerated in Third World countries due partly to the relative autonomy of the state. The Third World state needs to gain legitimacy for its authority. It is necessary for the state to offer some benefits to the poorer sectors in the society to gain popular support. Land invasion is tolerated in some case, due to political pressure from the poor (Collier 1976, Payne, 1977). However, the Third World state is more likely to allow the popular form of land allocation only when the ownership of private land is not directly threatened. Public land is thus more prone to be invaded than privately owned land. Whenever the state needs political support from the urban poor, it tends to ignore the illegality of the squatter settlements. This strategy is also used by the Third World state as a means to ease political tension (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992).

The socioeconomic and physical improvement of self-help housing is thus determined by the state's channeling of resources, the control of land speculation, the price of building materials, and the provision of infrastructure. The actions of sincere government are also limited by their resources (Dwyer, 1987; Fujima, 1987).

The improvement of squatter settlement is also hindered by the threatening of eviction and demolition, which
frequently cause abandoning of shelters and breaking down of sense of belonging in the squatter settlement. This situation transforms a "common access" type of property regime to an "open access," which further deteriorates the physical condition of the shelters.

Goss (1991) holds that forms of housing production and land allocation affect the "life-chance" of dwellers in a number of ways. Popular appropriated space is crucial for productive activities such as preparation of food for sale, rearing of livestock, and storage of vending carts. Supplementary income might be generated in the area by means of subletting and other economic activities.

Other physical conditions which facilitate economic activities and attract tenants include good accessibility to shelter, healthy environment, proximity to access road, and the availability of utilities. Social conditions within the community are also factors governing the life chance of the urban poor. Mutual help, moral support, informal money lending, co-residing, income sharing, and employment information obtaining within the community also facilitates the life chance of the urban poor.

Therefore, the composite factor which comprises location, physical conditions, and social settings of a settlement is a crucial constituent governing the life chance of its dwellers. Such factors are, in turn,
determined by the forms of land allocation and the nature of its property regimes. In the market form of land allocation, for example, location and physical conditions are likely to allow a better economic opportunity than settlements under the other two forms of land allocation. In other words, the ability to pay a higher cost dictates a better choice of location and physical condition. Social coherence in a community under the market form of land allocation, however, might not be as favorable as those under a popular form of land allocation. The collective sense of belonging in a communal form of land allocation tends to be stronger than in that of market form.

Settlements under the state form of land allocation, which have weaker purchasing power, cannot compete for a location as favorable as those under a market form of land allocation. Since their physical conditions are designed and controlled by the state, which rarely takes the economic needs of the urban poor into consideration, it can hardly facilitate economic activities of the urban poor. Communities under the state form of land allocation also comprise new dwellers from a diverse places of origin, some of them from middle class, and their social settings are less coherent than communities under the popular (communal) form of land allocation.
The popular form of land allocation, however, is not ruled by the market force; its location can be any place in the city where unattended land is available. Frequently, squatter settlements are located close to employment at the city center. Their physical conditions are designed and division is appropriated by the consent of the community with petty commodity activities in mind. Frequently, it best facilitates economic activities of the urban poor. As described earlier, the social coherence in communities under the popular form of land allocation tends to be better than that of the two other forms of land allocation.

However, physical and social variation exists even within a single settlement with a same form of land allocation. Shelters located close to or facing main streets gain better economic opportunity and tend to be owned by wealthier owners. Large landlords who own numerous plots in a squatter settlement tend to rent them out for supplemental income. And they tend to be influential people in the community with a number of households under their control.

Within these three overlapping forms of land allocation and housing production, this research will examine the socioeconomic variation and the way the urban poor strive to live in the Third World's urban setting in reference to the three forms of land allocation. It also analyzes the state's intervention and how the urban poor's response to a wide
range of providers, i.e., NGOs, state agencies, charitable
students; and their own community organizations. Since
housing in the slums and squatter settlements is related to
the popular form of land allocation and the simple-commodity
form of housing production, this research will discuss in
detail how the urban poor in a Third World city struggle for
land and housing by means of these two forms of land
allocation and housing production.

2.6 SUMMARY

This chapter examines the literature and research on
squatter settlements in Third World countries. To explain
the spatial distribution of the urban poor over space and
the how they interact within their socioeconomic setting
Third World cities, it is crucial to address a number of
problems in the Third World cities, namely, urbanization,
rapid urban growth, primacy, inequality, and housing
problems in order to establish a contextual background for
the theoretical background of this research.

The literature reviewed in this chapter establishes the
framework of my research which seeks to explain the present
squatter settlement conditions persisting in Bangkok's
Klong Toey area. Two major paradigms are discussed in this
chapter--the mainstream orthodox and the political economy
approach. This chapter gives the rationale taking the modes
of production approach while rejecting the rest of the approaches.

The mainstream orthodox approach includes the neoclassical economic growth approach, modernization approach, and marginality theory. This orthodox approach dominates the thinking of technocrats, planners and government officials in Third World countries. It believes that the pattern of Third World development will follow the Western course. Modernization, economic growth, and internationalization of trade will ultimately bring about economic prosperity and well being. In order to achieve a high rate of economic growth, the macro economic planners advocate efficiency in the production process, and urban industrialization is viewed as more important than the rural agricultural sector. The issues of rapid urban growth without development, imbalance of income, and marginality among the population, are perceived as only normal and temporary phenomena. The system will ultimately balance itself by means of the trickle down process.

The squatter settlement in the urban setting is viewed as a condition in which the developing society transforms itself from traditional to modern. Planning and regulation are thus necessary in order to control and accelerate the transforming process. Beautification and superior housing
standards are also encouraged to enhance the living standards of urban populations. The market mechanism is considered the best means to determine price and spatial distribution of resources, including land, housing, and urban services. To cope with the temporary problems of squatter settlements, the state intervenes to maintain law and order and to ensure the efficiency of economic growth. The Orthodox approach is rejected due to its structural fallacy and its failure to explain the poverty of the Third World.

The political economy approach, on the other hand, takes a broader perspective in the analysis of the development issue. It includes the development of paradigms including the dependency theory, the informal economy approach, and modes of production. Instead of explaining economic phenomena merely on the basis of market mechanisms, the political economy approach takes differences among social classes and spatial economic segmentation into consideration. It relates uneven distribution of resources to the process of exploitation by the capitalist system, which results in the transfer of surplus not only among social classes, but also among distinct modes of production. It views the mainstream orthodox approach as biased toward the elite class and against the poor, and a means in which surplus is transferred out of the Third World countries.
Urban issues of the Third World are a result of uneven development, which aims to duplicate the Western pattern of development, namely, to industrialize the country while neglecting the rural agriculture sector. Rapid urban growth and primate cities result, increasing the need for urban housing. Uncontrolled land markets further cause land speculation which increases urban land costs and prevents the urban poor from getting access to the conventional land market. The relative autonomy of the state further complicates the state's intervention in low cost housing as a provision to the urban poor in the Third World cities. Parallel to the theory of modes of production, form of land allocation is offered as an alternative to analyze the existence of squatter settlements. It is viewed as a crucial factor determining the urban poor's life chance and means of survival. It views squatter settlements as not only being left out of the conventional housing market, but as a means of surplus extraction to subsidize the Third World's industrial sector. Under this classification of forms of land allocation, this research examines and differentiates the social, economic, and political settings in each form of land allocation and how the urban poor react to these circumstances. In this light, rules of access and property regimes which partly determine the physical setting of each
form of land allocation are also crucial. The fallacy of "tragedy of the commons" has been established in recent environmental related literature. Rules of access differentiates "common property" from "open access." A clear indication on the structure of rights, duties, and privileges is able to determine rules of access to resources. Except for open access, each type of property arrangement has its own rules of access, which determine the way resources are used, which partly preserves the environment and physical conditions.

Using Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom settlements as case studies, this research uses the theoretical political economy framework to explain Third World policies towards low-income housing. It seeks to explicate the existence and persistence of slums and squatter settlements, and how the urban poor react to the intervention of the state. Several more questions are involved, namely, how successfully are the poor in Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom building their own homes? What are their priorities? To what extent is the success of self-help housing in these areas limited by the structural conditions of Bangkok city? How has the Thai government reacted to the housing issue and why have these policies been adopted? To what extent has the Thai government acted in the interests of the poor and to improve urban conditions? A micro-macro integrated approach is also
applied to reveal how the urban poor in five different low income areas struggle for housing, within the Bangkok socioeconomic situation. The chapter that follows will describe the research methodology and the background information regarding development, urbanization, and low cost housing in Bangkok.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

As described earlier in Chapter I, this research attempts to explore the squatter phenomena in a Third World city as determined by the different forms of land allocation. In this light, the role and nature of the state, including other internal and external agents--service providers, NGOs, community organization, community leaders, and local personalities--directly or indirectly transform the forms of land allocation with their activities. This process determines the struggle of the urban poor for housing space in a Third-World context. It also seeks to explain in part, the emergence and persistence of slum and squatter settlements in a Third-World city. It examines how the needs of the state and community conflict. It reflects how the state approaches the conflict among social classes.

To examine these linkages, data needed for analysis in this research includes information both from fieldwork and from secondary sources. Fieldwork was conducted in five communities in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom areas of Bangkok; secondary data ranges in scale from the community to the national level.

This chapter describes the methodology applied in this research. First, I shall discuss the rationale for each
research tool used and how they complement each other. Second, I describe the five study areas and how each of them fits the concept of distinct form of land allocation. And finally, I discuss how the field research was carried out and some the problems encountered.

3.2 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH APPROACH

Quantitative research in the field of social science relies primarily on survey techniques. Two types of surveys are usually employed, namely, random sampling and the census survey. Representativeness is the major concern of the sampling survey while a census survey attempts to portray features of the entire population living in a particular society. Generalization is primarily made by means of statistical calculation and extrapolation in order to predict the possibility of phenomenon occurring in a larger population. Two types of limitations occur in this method. First, in-depth and subjective information is difficult to obtain, since a large number of informants are included in the survey procedure to ensure the validity of the research. Second, the awareness of being studied may bring about distortion in responses (Pelto et al., 1970).

The Case study method, however, bases its argument on the cogency to theoretical reasoning to understand the interaction of fragmented pieces of facts (Yin, 1981 and
Mitchell 1983). The holistic nature of the case-study focuses on a wide-range of contextual factors to establish the socioeconomic and cultural linkages in a society (Feagin 1991). The validity of this method is challenged by quantitative researchers, since qualitative researchers hardly label and codify their data, and therefore, subjective interpretations are possible.

Given the advantage and weakness of both methods, this research attempts to employ both techniques complimenting each other.

3.2.1 MULTI-INSTRUMENT APPROACH

Webb (1926) holds that social researchers must deal with the art of note taking, personal observation and interview in unraveling complicated details. The use of documents and literary sources, and the collection and manipulation of statistics are also important. Therefore, a combination of research methods can better disclose the truth in a more accurate fashion. Methods developed by the Chicago School (Easthope, 1974) also include observation, interviewing, document collection, and life history enquiries in the field research. The essence of this multi-instrumental approach is the first-hand experience, where a city could become a laboratory for the social investigator. Social research is built upon the experiences of research
workers as well as survey documents in which unstructured interviews and observational methods are applied (Fairbrother, 1977).

Participant observation is another method frequently employed in field research. Pons (1969) utilized four different techniques to collect relevant data. They are observational methods, documentary evidence gathering, statistical sources from work records, and interviews. Pons gives equal emphasis to both observational and statistical methods. A checklist is applied, however, to guide the observation and to avoid unsystematic and irrelevant data. Since researchers must deal closely with their subject, it is crucial to balance the amount of information collected subjectively and objectively by means of participant observation and the formal interview technique.

3.2.2 FIELD INSTRUMENTS

Given the aforementioned rationale, this research thus employs a multi-instrument approach, which comprises literature research, community census, structured questionnaires, informal interviews, and participant observation. The data is derived from both primary and secondary literature research. Primary data gathered by means of structured interviews, informal interviews, and participation observation is applied to examine the
socioeconomic, cultural and political setting of the urban poor at the household and community levels. It also reveals how the urban poor interact with the state housing policy. Information from secondary sources is used to examine state policy, and details of the geographical historical context.

As discussed earlier, each research tool and technique has its own limitations. The multi-instrument strategy employed here is used mainly to overcome the shortcomings of each individual method. In this fashion, each technique complements the other's limitations with its strengths, allowing the researcher to check the statement of one informant against another, and to compare both with his/her direct experiences in the field community. In other words, a more subjective qualitative method is applied to supplement the objective quantitative field techniques.

3.3 STUDY AREAS

This section lays out the rationale for the relevance of the study areas. It first establishes the contextual background of the study areas by relating the political economy approach discussed in the previous chapter to the pattern of socioeconomical development, urbanization, and the nature of land and housing in Thailand. This contextual information is also a crucial ground upon which the studies of the five areas is built. Second, drawing upon the
contextual background, this section describes in detail how the five selected study areas of Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom represent the three forms of land allocation. Third, it describes the implementation of this research, using the multi-approach method to compare the life chance of the urban poor in the five study areas.

3.4 OVERVIEW OF THE FIVE STUDY AREAS

Five study areas in two squatter settlements of Bangkok are chosen to represent the three forms of land allocation. They are Zone 1, Area 9, 70 Rai, and Flat 11-18 in the Klong Toey settlement and a small squatter community in the Wat Chonglom area, which represent different form of the three forms of land allocation and housing production. This section describes the unique physical, social and economic settings of each settlement and the history of its development.

3.4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE KLONG TOEY SETTLEMENT

The Klong Toey settlement is located in the southern part of Bangkok, north of the Chaopraya River, on the west bank of Prakanong Canal (see Map 3.1 and Map 3.2). It occupies a portion of the Port Authority's property, next to its present shipyard. The PAT currently owns a total of 2,240 Rai (3.5 square kilometer) of land in the Klong Toey sub-district, 200 Rai (0.319 square kilometer) of which is
MAP 3.1 LOCATION OF KLONG TOEY SETTLEMENT
MAP 3.2 LOCATION OF THE FOUR STUDY AREAS WITHIN THE KLONG TOEY SETTLEMENT
occupied by its facilities. This property was acquired by the Thai Government in 1937-1939 to accommodate the Port Authority of Thailand. The Klong Toey squatter settlement covers an area of 423 rai (0.676 square kilometer). Its total number of residents as of 1992 was estimated to be 35,000 comprising approximately 5,500 households. The settlement has grown rapidly, along with Bangkok, in the last 35 years. A study by PAT showed the number of households in the area grew as high as 6,000 in 1973. At present, it is the largest slum/squatter settlement among Bangkok's more than 1000 settlements of this type.

Measures to clear the settlement have been employed since 1964 when land value in Bangkok began to increase. (See Chapter IV: the transformation of forms of land allocation in Thailand). In addition, the PAT needed more land for its dock expansion to support the country's industrialization process. By 1972, more than 1,500 households along the east bank of the Chaopraya river were evicted. The PAT, however, failed in several attempts to clear the Klong Toey area. By mid 1970s, a land sharing program was initiated by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to lease a total of 292 Rai (0.466 square kilometer) of the land in the North-west portion of the port's property to relocate the squatter settlement.
Under the land sharing scheme, the lowest income group still cannot afford to pay for the cost of housing and land rent. Eviction is unavoidable when more land is acquired by the PAT. Three strategies were proposed by the (NHA) to ease the tension between the Klong Toey dwellers and the PAT administration—a slum upgrading program, site-and-services, and apartment buildings. (See Chapter IV for detailed discussion on public housing in Thailand) (See also Map 3.2) These three strategies grant distinctive types of land tenure to give different areas. This situation gives rise to different forms of land allocation and housing production according to their respective nature of land tenure. The chronological development of the community is portrayed in Figure 3.1.

Eighteen walk-up apartment-buildings were built for the relocation program. Flat 1-10 was located across the express way and Flat 11-18 next to the squatter settlement.

The 70 Rai Area was the location of former squatter communities which were destroyed by a fire. This area was then cleared to accommodate a site-and-services scheme for evicted dwellers from the east side of the Klong Toey settlement.

Zone 1 has been marked for upgrading without land tenure being granted. Since it is situated rather far away from the Port's offices and dock areas, it therefore faces
no immediate plan for eviction.

Area 9 is a squatter block adjacent to the Port's warehouse and is waiting for an impending eviction to make way for the warehouse's expansion.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PLANS</th>
<th>IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>LAND AND HOUSING POLICIES</th>
<th>EFFECT ON LAND ALLOCATION AND HOUSING PRODUCTION</th>
<th>RESPONSE BY THE POOR VIA COMMUNITY ORG. AND COLLECTIVE POWER</th>
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<td>Job availability in the area attracted thousands of families, mainly from the rural area to reside in the community.</td>
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First eviction:

| 1956 | Capitalism | All the families which were scattered | Very little resistance: there was sufficient room to move around in the Klong Toey community. |
| 1957 | Slum clearance and relocations. to the north and the Klong Toey west of the premise. |
| 1958 | Multiple evictions: Beiging of crowding |

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**FIGURE 3.1 A CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KLONG TOEY'S LAND AND HOUSING.**
<table>
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Sources: National Housing Authority of Thailand

FIGURE 3.1 (CONT)
3.4.2 REPRESENTATION OF THE FIVE STUDY AREAS ON THE THREE FORMS OF LAND ALLOCATION AND HOUSING PRODUCTION

Each of the five study areas in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities carries different types of land tenure and legality, which brings about unique socioeconomic characteristics according to its type of land allocation and housing production. As diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural structures, they are excellent case studies through which represent the three forms of land allocation in the comparison of the dwellers' life chance and survival strategies. As discussed earlier in Chapter II, however, the capitalist form of land allocation tends to articulate into other forms of land allocation. In the popular form of land allocation, shelters and communal rights can eventually be rented, leased, or even sold in practice. Property value also increases if land tenure is perceived as secure. Likewise, ownership of state housing can be illegally sold, rented or even speculated. Face value of state housing thus increases substantially. In reality, therefore, there is virtually no pure state or communal form of land allocation, without market characteristics. And the rule of access in both communal and state form of land allocation is determined partly by the ability of dwellers to pay.

Likewise, a pure market form of land allocation is
nonexistent. In the market form of land allocation, other than the market mechanism and face value of land, its rule of access might also be determined by the social affiliation and informal relationship, or even communal consent.

Furthermore, the essence of characteristics of land allocation in this research is its direct or indirect impact on the life chance of the urban poor. Characteristics of physical space and access to shelter, for example, play a great role on the productive activities. These distinctive characteristics in each study areas, therefore, will be outlined in this section.

According to the chronological development of the Klong Toey settlement described earlier, Area 9 is a squatter settlement with absolutely no tenure security. Eviction is expected for the expansion of the Port Authority. The occupation of this piece of land by the community is considered "illegal". Since it carries a characteristic of an "open access" property regime due to impending demolition, physically it is the most run-down with minimal provision of public utilities. Socially, however, it is an old established community. It is the only uncontrolled settlement in the Klong Toey, and represents the noncapitalistic or popular form of land allocation and housing production (See Figure 3.2)
Zone 1 is a squatter block under the NHA’s slum upgrading program. Public utilities, such as water supply, concrete walk-ways, and electricity are provided by the NHA, despite the lack of land tenure. The present survey found a
high percentage of projects which were joint ventured by the local residents and NGOs with portions of funding derived from political parties, the BMA and the NHA. Property values are higher than that of Area 9 due to better physical conditions and the availability of public utilities. At the time of this study, there were still different rumors regarding impending evictions and relocation which causes insecurity among dwellers. This area represents a transitional state, from a noncapitalistic to a capitalistic form of land allocation. In other words, it represents a mixed state- popular- and lower level of capitalist-form of land allocation.

The 70 Rai Area is under a site-and-services development project with a 15-year tenure to accommodate squatters evicted from "Lock 12", an eastern parcel of the Klong Toey area, which was cleared for warehouse expansion during 1984 and 1985. However, only eligible families which can afford to build a house up to the NHA's standard are present owners in this area. Each eligible family obtains a subdivided plot of land with utilities to build their homes on a total area of 70 rai, from which the name of the area was derived. Land rental payment is collected on a monthly basis by the NHA officials. The initial survey shows a moderate level of renting, sub-letting, and commercial activities in the area, and many eligible owners have sold
their right and moved away. Unlike flats, this community provide on-the-ground housing with full provision of public utilities, it has a high market value. It represents the overlapped capitalistic/state form of land allocation.

Flat 11-18 is a set of eight state-owned walk-up apartment buildings, located on the land of the Port Authority of Thailand, next to the Klong Toey settlement. The purpose of these walk-up apartments was to accommodate evicted residents who are able to afford regular monthly payments. A high number of squatters who moved to these dwelling units have been replaced by the middle class from outside Klong Toey settlement who seek to find cheap housing, some of whom buy the unit only for speculation. The preliminary field check on the eight buildings shows a fair level of consistency with regard to type of dwellers and income level in different buildings. Residents of this cluster of flats comprise a mixture of relocatees from the local squatter settlement; middle class families who replaced the extremely poor, by buying the right to public housing from the original dwellers; and a number of employees of PAT. A final advice from NHA, 'Flat 14' from the 'Flat 11-18' cluster was chosen as most typical representing here the state/market form of land allocation.

Wat Chonglom is a semi-squatter settlement on private
land, adjacent to the Klong Toey settlement, south-west of the Klong Toey community (See map 3.3). It comprises 155 households with a total population of approximately 790. It was once a squatter settlement on private land, which is now granted year-by-year rental tenure by the owner, the Boonyaraksa Company.

The legalization of Wat Chonglom squatter settlement was started in 1978 when approximately 10 households were granted short-term tenure from the owner of this piece of private property. Rent contracts have been reviewed every year by the landlord. The annual rent is 10 baht per four square meters. Since rent is collected on a regular basis and house registrations are provided to each household, it is considered a legal residential area on leased private land.

More households later joined the community to rent the subdivision from the company and to build their own homes. The 5 Rai community of Wat Chonglom was surrounded by similar low-income settlements, warehouses, and the south-bound express way. A development program was started in 1981 by the Prachakorn Thai Political Party. Development activities, such as construction of concrete walkways, are self-help programs financed by external NGOs. Financial assistance for the project is provided by the City Bank of Thailand with no interest. The elections of local community
Map 3.3 THE WAT CHONGLOM SETTLEMENT
committees began in 1984 in order to maintain the on-going projects. A fire in 1987 which destroyed a total of 38 households drew more support from NGOs and the private sector. With similar physical settings and socioeconomic conditions to that of the Klong Toey settlement, the Wat Chonglom community is thus included as part of the five study areas.

According to the present survey, most of the structures in Wat Chonglom are two-story wooden houses with decent concrete walkways. Since the Wat Chonglom community is located on a swamp, flooding during high tide in the rainy season is typical. The settlement was arranged into blocks with most of the secondary walkways connected to two main access walkways along the front and the back boundaries of the settlement. The two access walkways were too narrow to allow auto traffic, which poses a major threat during fire and does not facilitate economic activities.

These unfavorable physical conditions brought about two typical characteristics shared by a number of slums/squatter settlements in Bangkok. Since this parcel of land is surrounded by private property, and the only access is by means of the railroad, it can hardly be developed nor gain high commercial value. Being a large land owner in Bangkok, the present land owner of 'Wat Chonglom' would rather
collect higher rents from his other relatively more valuable plots elsewhere in the city than to fight with the present squatters. Minimal fees, however, are collected each year by means of his secretary, and tenure is on a year-by-year basis. Occupants do not perceive any pressure with regard to security since eviction was rarely mentioned by the land owner.

Wat Chonglom shares common physical and socioeconomic characteristics with Klong Toey slum--distance from work, type of job opportunity at the nearby enterprises, and the amount of rent paid for sub-rental accommodation. The only distinction between the "Klong Toey" and "Wat Chonglom" communities has been the type of land tenure and the involvement of NGOs.

Moreover, the experimental upgrading project in the community is funded by 'City Bank' as a charity project. Occupants in the community enjoy tidy concrete walkways, rainstorm drainage and organized garbage disposal projects without cost. The community has recently been named by the BMA (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) as the outstanding squatter community in Bangkok. The 'Wat Chonglom' community--a popular/capitalist form of land allocation--is, therefore, chosen as a comparative study area to cross check the validity of research with communities within Klong Toey.
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIELD STUDY

Following the research design described at length in Chapter II and the beginning of this chapter, this section describe the implementation of the field study. Since an integrated approach is applied in this research, I shall relate my field activities and field experience chronologically. Data gathering occurred in three stages of field research, namely: document research, structured survey, and informal interview.

3.5.1 FIRST STAGE

The first stage of data collection focuses on background information and longitudinal data. It includes data concerning the historical development of housing policy in relation to the political regimes in Thailand and economic development policies back to after World War II, squatter settlement in Bangkok, and community organizations which are active among the urban poor of Bangkok. Relevant data also includes historic, demographic, and political developments in Thailand in general which can be used as base line information for my study.

During May 1991- May 1992, extensive document research was done in the libraries of Chulalongkorn University, Thamasart University, the National Library, the National
Informal interviews with key officials were also conducted during this period. Officials interviewed in this stage include administrators of the NHA, Department of City and County Planning, and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. Official documents on planning, administration, and housing policies in Thailand were also obtained from informants during the interviews. I enquired into attitude, and personal opinions toward urban low income housing and squatter settlement. Through discussions with these informants I was able to derive underlying reasons and information--such as conflict among agencies and the practicality of state policies--which cannot be obtained by means of documentation.

3.5.2 SECOND STAGE

Field enquiries for the second and third stages took almost nine months starting from November 1991 to mid July 1992. And subsequently, I focused on the socioeconomic, demographic, and political data in the five study areas. Household census and structured questionnaire were administered in the five selected study areas. Three separate cluster samples, 150 households with approximately 700 inhabitants each in "Zone 1," "Area 9," and "70 Rai Area," within the Klong Toey squatter settlement were
chosen. Types of land tenure and level of state intervention are major criteria for area selection. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Area 9 was selected to represent the popular form of land allocation, Zone 1 represents the transitional popular/state form of land allocation, 70 Rai Area areas represent the state/capitalist form of land allocation, and Wat Chonglom functions as a control area.

Maps of the five communities were obtained through the local NHA office. An aerial photograph taken in the late 1980s was updated by a walk-through field check. A cluster number was assigned to each of the blocks in each community, after which, a random sampling by means of lot drawing was conducted to select a cluster of 150 households from each area.

Two levels of information needed to be obtained--base line information and specific/detailed information on the socioeconomic and family structure of the urban poor. Therefore, two types of structured questionnaire surveys are used to obtain this information. The census survey aims to cover all 150 households of each selected cluster while structured interviews covered only 75 households in each area.

The sampling frame for the questionnaire survey is based on the initial community census survey. A second walk-
through survey of each community was conducted to obtain a final household count and a list of house numbers for sampling purposes. Again, a lot drawing method was used to select households to be interviewed.

Ten research assistants, all of whom were fourth year students from the Social Science Department of Mahidol University, were hired to conduct the interviews. A four-hour training program was given to these ten research assistants prior to the actual census survey, to ensure the validity and consistency of the inquiry. They were instructed to adhere to the house number assigned to them and told that questions were to be read from the questionnaire to avoid confusion and to maintain uniformity. They were instructed to go back to the same household at a different time for the interview, if the household head, the household member who make decision and administer the household's need, was absent during the first visit. A list of criteria for physical observation was also given to achieve consistency.

The questionnaire was formulated concurrently with the first and second rounds of field checks. Research questions were first analyzed and broken down into small groups of questions. These questions were then separated into two groups--baseline and specific. The census survey aims to cover the base-line information including: age, gender,
place of birth and origin, marital status, family structure, formal education, occupation and economic situation, length of stay in the present cluster, and housing circumstances, such as housing condition, type of land tenure, and amount of rental payment.

Detailed information to be acquired by the structured questionnaire included in-depth information on social and political aspects which were the main target of this second round of surveys. This in-depth inquiry focused on the different socioeconomic needs and survival strategies of families in the different study areas. Detailed information includes employment, children's schooling, institutional constraints, socioeconomic situation, history of movement, purposes of move and stay, length of stay in the present cluster/building, how the present housing was acquired, type of land tenure obtained, amount of rent, relation with their neighbors, linkages with rural family, benefit from governmental and NGO programs, and active participation in the local community organization (See translated questionnaire in Appendix).

The testing of the questionnaire for census survey was done within the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities themselves. Five sets of questionnaires were used with dwellers in each of the five study areas. Research
assistants were instructed to list the wordings and question content which were unclear or confusing. After the test survey, a meeting was held to discuss the possible problems and ways to improve the questions and wording. The final questionnaires were revised accordingly. The census survey was conducted after the questionnaire revision with all the households of the selected clusters.

The in-depth questionnaire survey was conducted in the same clusters of Klong Toey area and Wat Chonglom, and in Flat 14. A random sampling method was applied to select only one-half of the censused households to be interviewed. The in-depth questionnaire was revised after the census survey had been conducted and some acquaintances had been cultivated in the neighborhood. The same group of research assistants was employed in this operation.

3.5.3 THIRD STAGE

Three types of research techniques were applied in the third stage of field research. They are focus group interviews, informal interviews with key figures in the community, and participant observation--sitting in on meetings of community committees and meetings between NGOs and community members.

A focus group interview was conducted in each of the selected clusters in Klong Toey area. This includes four household heads from each previously interviewed area of
Klong Toey, Flat 14, and Wat Chonglom. This focus group interview dealt with subjective and detailed information, such as real income of the family, perception of economic constraints, issues of tenure, the strategy of the community in response to the state's housing policy, and political disputes. Again, a lot drawing method was used to select designated household heads for each session. Invitations were sent in advance to these household heads to arrange meeting times.

The focus group technique provides insights into the local culture, historical background, and socioeconomic structure -- patterns of communal and pooled labor, types of informal employment, attitudes toward the communal organization, the extent to which each member participates in the organizations' activities, networks of helpers, reciprocity between neighbors, social interactions and social organization.

A check list was created for the needed information. The group was interviewed informally in a relaxed atmosphere. Each of the members were encouraged to voice his/her view. Some uncertain facts could be cross checked among the four members who participated in the interview to obtain the most accurate data.

The only obstacle in this interview was the absence of
male household heads in the day time, due to their working schedule. Those who work the night-shift needed their rest during day time as well. Therefore, the week-end was found to be a more appropriate time to conduct this focus group survey.

Another minor problem was the characteristic of humbleness in the Thai culture where conversation on touchy issues is normally avoided. Only in a relaxed informal environment can sensitive issues be brought up and discussed comfortably. Therefore, in practice, this focus group discussion was conducted during casual organized dinners or lunches where several household heads were invited to gather on a spacious front porch. An informal interview was conducted in a relaxed environment while children were present and occasionally joined the conversation. The weekend television programs seemed to be the only barrier to the interview. Since television is the only means of low-cost entertainment in the slum, a high percentage of households own and extensively watch television especially during weekends.

Along with the focus group interviews, in-depth interviews for case studies were conducted with three adult dwellers from each study area. Again, a lot drawing method was used to select the designated informants. Detailed information to be obtained focused on their life-history.
such as, age, gender, employment, marriage status, children's schooling, socioeconomic situation, history of movement, purposes of move and stay, length of stay in the present cluster/apartment, preference for physical setting, type of housing tenure obtained, amount of rental payment paid/received, relations with neighbors, benefit from governmental and NGO programs, their active participation in the local community organization, and their response to the present socioeconomic circumstances set forth by the intervention of the state.

Informal interviews with the local key figures were conducted in this stage. At least one member from each of the main community committees and active NGOs in the community was interviewed. Information includes the objectives, activities, interaction with other agencies, accordance with the local residents, source of funding, achievement, and future objectives.

Most of the local NGOs, namely, the Duang Prateep Foundation, the local churches, the community committees, and the local temples were very cooperative in answering questions and giving information. Citibank, which funded the Wat Chong Lom project, however, declined to be interviewed or provide any information.

Field observation was conducted throughout the period
of field study in the five areas. The process of field survey, starting from field check to the end of interview, took eight months and three weeks in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom areas. This permitted close observation and personal participation in the community to check the validity of data. The occasional sitting in on meetings of the community committee also helped to gain some insight into the committee's activities, local issues, the values of community leaders, strategies and solutions to the existing problems, and their collective reaction to the state intervention.

Another tactic to engage in informal conversation and field observation was to join the local festivities, recreation and sport. Precautions had to be taken because there is a high number of heavy drinkers in the local community which often provoked aggressive behavior late in the evening. Due to the fact that more time was spent in the Klong Toey than the Wat Chong Lom community, more detailed information was gathered from Klong Toey.

The 1992 May political riots in Bangkok turned out to be another opportunity to learn about the political impact and the dweller's perspective toward political power. Very few occupants were unwilling to express their position to strangers and the political orientation can be perceived and deduced from the overall political climate of the community.
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

Research findings are described and generalized by means of linkages and comparisons among different areas of low-income households, namely, the capitalist, state, and popular forms of land allocation. Two types of data analysis are integrated, namely, quantitative and qualitative analysis.

In the quantitative analysis, the SPSSPC+ statistical package is used for data calculation, sorting, and tabulation. Two sets of data are entered separately--data from the field census and data from the structured interviews. Most of the data are found consistent, except some "no answers" which are treated as missing data. The type of land tenure and the form of land allocation are the factors determining variables such as household socioeconomic situation, employment opportunity, level of family income, family structure, and physical environment of housing and its surrounding. These factors are cross tabulated with the type of land allocation to reveal their relationship between the form of land allocation and the life chance of the urban poor. Different groups of households in distinctive low-income areas representing different form of land allocation are used as separate
models in an analysis of the overall land distribution system in Thailand.

Qualitative data obtained from field research in this category are in the form of field notes, sketches, and tape recordings from informal interviews, participation observation, and focus group interviews. Compilation of data includes the transcription of interview recordings and the sorting of field notes.

The findings of each case-study reflect dweller's pattern of behavior within the context of each respective study area which plays a part in the larger socioeconomic structure. Generalizations are made by means of "logical reasoning" and the assumption that all social units have structural analogies and that theories which can be tested in one instance can be generalized to macro as well as micro social situations (Back 1973). Generalizations on a larger scale are made through the comparison of findings in different contexts of the local socioeconomic and cultural settings.

3.7 SUMMARY

This chapter rationalizes the methodology applied in this research. First, this research employs a conventional quantitative technique, which is supplemented by a case study method. It attempts to employ both techniques in
conjunction with each other whereby the validity of information gathered by means of the case study method is supplemented and cross checked with information from the quantitative approach.

Methods include literature research, community census, structured questionnaire, informal interview, and field observation. Information gathered and analyzed in this research is therefore, derived from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were used to reveal the socioeconomic, cultural and political setting of the urban poor at the household and community levels. Data from field surveys also serve to explain the way the urban poor react to the state housing policy. Information from secondary sources such as literature research were used to establish the state policy, background details and a historical context.

The five study areas in Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom represent the three forms of land allocation, since there are some overlapping characteristics in the selected study areas. Zone 1 and Flat 11-18, for instance, represent the transitional form and state/capitalist form respectively.

The next three chapters present and analyze research findings. I shall begin with the relation of Thailand's housing policy and its political regimes in the chapter that follows.
CHAPTER IV

DYNAMIC OF LAND ALLOCATION AND THE THAI STATE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the key factors preventing the urban poor in Bangkok from getting access to land and housing has been the present characteristics of land holding--form of land allocation--which is a result of the intermingling of the national development policy, the political characteristics during the development process, and the land market. For instance, freeholding without control of land ceiling--a highest amount of land that one can own by law--enhanced land speculation in Thailand's present market economy. The promotion of foreign investment in Thailand further increased land prices making the urban poor more marginal to the land market.

This chapter discusses the transformation of the form of land allocation along with the mode of production of Thailand. It also analyzes the form of housing production along with the nature of the Thai political regimes. The analysis of the characteristics of the state and the land and housing markets helps establish the context of the political economy of squatter settlements in Bangkok, for the analysis of Klong Toey settlement in the succeeding chapter.
4.2 THE DETERMINANT OF MODE OF PRODUCTION ON THE FORM OF LAND ALLOCATION IN THAILAND

Mode of production of a society, as discussed in Chapter II, determines the form of land allocation of that community. Changes of trade policy usually affects the dynamic of the form of land allocation. This section discusses how the Thai state, by means of its development and trade policies, determines the form of land allocation in Thailand.

The state/communal form of land allocation had applied to Thai society before the existence of the market economy in Thailand. Normal Thai citizens were entitled to own a piece of land sufficient for subsistence cropping during the feudalistic period. The first land legislation was enforced during King Rama V's regime in the Ratanakosin (Bangkok) period, the early stage of the capitalistic mode of production. This law marks the beginning of the transformation from the state/communal form to a capitalist form of land allocation. Changes with regard to the pattern of land holding in this period had been the result of the socioeconomic transformation due to Western colonization over the South-East Asian region. Foreign trade with the Western World affected the pattern of land use, ownership, and the commercialization of land.
The control of squatter settlements and the regulation of land began during King Rama VII's regime in 1937. Foreign companies started to invest in large scale land trading in the Kingdom. It was the first time that land was considered a form of commodity to be mortgaged, bought, and sold freely. For the first time, a commission was set up to revise the land legislature, to protect the right of private property, and to control the invasion of vacant land. This movement illustrates the intensification of the capitalist form of land allocation, still limited to the capital city. The articulation of capitalist form of land allocation started first in the capital city.

Patterns of land regulation changed little after the civil revolution in 1932 which ended the absolute power of the monarch. A large number of the revolutionaries were from the elite class and the military, and therefore, favored the freehold form of land ownership. Land problems at that moment were not prominent enough to facilitate the land reform proposed by Dr. Preedee Phanomyong. Instead, a land ceiling legislation—a ceiling on the amount of land owned—was created.

Large parcels of land in central Bangkok and elsewhere were still owned by the Crown, a state form of land allocation. A land ceiling was established once in a while, only to moderate the size of plots for the rest of the land.
to relieve political tension. The problem of land for housing in Bangkok still did not exist even amidst the high concentration of land which belonged to a handful of the privileged class, because population density in the capital city was still low before World War II.

Major economic development by means of export and foreign trade was started after World War II, under P.Pibulsongkram's administration. Development started to be influenced by Neo-classical concept after the visit of Pibulsongkram to the U.S. In this era, the capitalistic mode of production started to diffuse to the provinces.

It had been more than a decade after World War II in the regime of Field Marshal Sarith Thanaratana that the land ceiling act was revoked because it was believed that it would hinder the country's economic growth and foreign investment. During this long period of dictatorial regimes from the regime of P.Pibulsongkram in 1948, Thanom 1, Sarit, to the end of Thanom 2 in 1971, a legislation was enacted to enhance the growth of industrialization (See Industrial Finance Corporation Act: 1959, Industrial Investment Promotion Act: 1962, NEC Announcement No. 227: 1972, and NEC Announcement No. 328: 1972). As indicated by Karnjanapraporn et.al.(1978). These acts of legislation were mainly to promote private enterprise, encourage high accumulation of
capital, increase national productivity, and promote entrepreneurship (Nathalang 1978). The existing land ceiling law was relaxed in favor of large land ownership for industry. Encouragement of the investment of Foreign funds in the industrial sector was done by means of the provision of infrastructure at cheap rates. Cheap manual labor was also among the incentives. This policy encouraged a high transformation rate from the popular form to the capitalist form of land allocation. The rapid rate of urbanization and the diffusion of information also delivered the urban way of life and values to the rural population.

The penetration of capitalism into Thai society, however, did not increase land pressure in the early stages, since the population-land ratio could still facilitate the transformation without causing many problems until after World War II. The Thai "model" thus differs from the other four models--the Latin American model, the Indian model, the British model and the Japanese model--indicated by Phasuk Pongpajhit (1991) (See Appendix A).

First, Thailand has never been politically colonized and therefore, the original feudalistic pattern of land ownership had not been completely eliminated. Second, Thailand had never gone through a major process of industrialization like that of the British, which process transferred large numbers of farmers to the industrial
sector. Third, the major cooperation of large land owners and foreign investors did not occur until the modern era where corporations and foreigners were not allowed to buy land in the Kingdom. Finally, Thai farmers had little power nor support within the parliamentary system. The paternalistic character embedded in the Thai culture, instead, made the Thai peasant more passive and prone to exploitation. It further suppressed the issue of class conflict. This circumstance made possible the transformation of land ownership during this modern era without any disruption.

Land pressure during the initial development stage was of lesser extent and therefore, delayed the process of compelling landless farmers into the industrial sector in the cities. The expansion of Bangkok is gradual in its initial stages with few land issues. One of the important element as mentioned by Douglass (1984) and Pongpajit (1991) has been the balance of population-land ratio. The invasion of forest land by landless peasants had been a political safety valve to relieve the political tensions. As analyzed by Douglass (1984), it was difficult to identify clearly the division of classes indicated by ownership of land, be it in Bangkok or else where in the Central Plane. Interest groups were formed by means of ethnic origin,
external economic ties, linkage with the former feudal class, and groups related with the land interests.

With mutual benefit, the local influential groups, which include merchants, military men, and rice-mill owners, usually had linkages with large exporters, manufacturers, and military men at the national level. These local interest groups were developed from large land owners, money lenders, and labor hirers affiliated in a form of paternalistic relationship in a Buddhist and Merit making context (Andrew Turton, 1985).

The four models by Pongpajit (1991) and the Thai politic and economic settings described earlier shared some common features. The national political situation is closely related to the pattern of land ownership and how it facilitates the transformation of an agricultural- to an industrial-economy. Along with this process, the form of land allocation in the rural areas was gradually transformed to the capitalistic form. The pace and pattern of transformation is also linked directly with the pattern of rural-urban migration to the city and the need of land for housing which was determined by the political structure, especially after World War II. The major distinction has been the unique socioeconomic and political development of Thai society which adopted a unique characteristic of social relations set within the context of paternalism in the Thai
society, making land issues rather implicit at the beginning stages.

4.3 THE EXTENT AND PATTERN OF TRANSFORMATION OF FORM OF LAND ALLOCATION IN BANGKOK

The pattern of socio-political and economic development directed by the state after World War II structured Bangkok's land market during the early 1950s. Rice farmers surrounding Bangkok started to sell their fragmented farm land to developers during the real estate boom in 1950. Thirty five per cent of the farm land was between 1.6 to 5.6 hectares (10-35 rai). Among these plots, 48.7 per cent were those of owner-cultivators. Survey by the land department in the early 1960 shows a drastic decrease in number of owner-cultivators to 24 per cent in some villages surrounding Bangkok (Department of Land 1965).

The transformation of farm land to real estate--from a semi-capitalist to a full-capitalist form of land allocation--by speculators was a consequence of the changing structure of occupation, selling of farm land to dwellers in Bangkok and the rapid rising of land price against the low price of produce.

Residential land in the old city center has been transformed to commercial use. A decline in residential land use occurred in districts such as Pom Prap, Pathum Wan, Bang
Rak, and Thon Buri Districts, which are located in the city core. Since land value escalates at an unrealistic rate, most land owners attempt to maximize profits from their land to meet its commercial value; eviction of squatters settled on private land is inevitable (See map 4.1 and map 4.2).

The expansion of Bangkok has led to a substantial population increase in the outer ring of the city. Districts which constitute high population growth are Bang Kapi, Bang Khen, and Min Buri Districts in the north and northeast sections, and the Sumut Prakarn Municipality and Prakanong District in the south. These districts and municipalities have gained in area of residential land use, owing partly to the high concentration of new industries in this area. The outer ring of Bangkok, however, is too far away from the economic opportunities in the city center, especially for squatters who have limited or no education.

Industrial activities have also increased in Bangkok's outer ring. Industrial land in this section of Bangkok grew by 7.6 percent during the period from 1968-1979 (Center for Housing and Urban Settlement Studies, 1985). A number of slum dwellers in the inner core were evicted and moved to the southern portion of Thonburi.

Tussakorn (1985) holds that there were 1,114 land development projects in Bangkok by the year 1973, involving
MAP 4.2 MAP OF BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AREA
BY DISTRICT
10,400 hectares (65,000 rai) of land. Seventy-five per cent of the selling and buying of land was small plots which shows the gradual progress of land concentration in Bangkok (see table 4.1).

**TABLE 4.1 SIZE OF PLOTS CHANGING HANDS DURING 1968-1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of plot (hectors)</th>
<th>per cent share of ownership transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>less than 1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 and more</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Land 1975.

A study by Durand-Lasserve (1985) indicated that the chain of land speculation during the period of 1960-1972 extensively increased land value in and around the city and accelerated the dismantling of the rural community around Bangkok. A large portion of the lower class were forced to live in "temporary homes" crowded together on large pieces of rented land. Two major forms of state intervention by means of financial support on the land and housing market--via the Housing Welfare Bank and via commercial bank--during this period further enhance the extent of land speculation. The three forms of land allocation--capitalist, state, and popular--started to become obvious in the early 1950s.

The first 5-year-National Development Plan was drafted
in the regime of Field Marshal Sarith Thanaratana, with the assistance of U.S. economic specialists. Its centralized development strategy caused more urban-rural disparity and thus attracted more rural-urban migration to Bangkok city, and thus gave rise to high population density in Bangkok, especially in low income communities. The discontinuance of the land ceiling act further accentuated land concentration in Bangkok and the central plain. The industrialization and modernization policies accentuated by the National Economic and Development Board, (NESDB 1961, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992) and the neglect of the rural agricultural sector (Douglass 1984) likewise worsened the situation.

At present, approximately 80 per cent of land in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) is privately owned (Center of Housing and Human Settlement Study, 1985). The shortage of land in Bangkok is mainly an outcome of land speculation and large private holdings. A study by ESCAP found 1,647 square kilometers of vacant land within and around the urbanized and built-up areas (United Nations, 1987b). A survey by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration confirmed the fact that proportion of vacant land in Bangkok was almost as high as 40% in 1986, the highest among all categories of land use (see Table 4.2).
TABLE 4.2 LAND USE IN THE BANGKOK METROPOLITAN REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF FUNCTION</th>
<th>AREA SIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential,</td>
<td>11.5% ( 18,099 ha, 44,723 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial,</td>
<td>1.4% ( 2,224 ha, 5,457 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional,</td>
<td>2.7% ( 4,173 ha, 10,312 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious,</td>
<td>0.5% ( 708 ha, 1,750 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure,</td>
<td>0.3% ( 429 ha, 1,060 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant,</td>
<td>39.8% (62,387 ha, 154,161 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River and Canals</td>
<td>3.5% ( 5,436 ha, 13,431 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial,</td>
<td>1.4% ( 1,784 ha, 4,408 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehousing,</td>
<td>0.4% ( 686 ha, 1,695 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational,</td>
<td>0.8% ( 1,310 ha, 3,237 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational,</td>
<td>0.3% ( 400 ha, 988 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road network,</td>
<td>2.5% ( 3,845 ha, 9,501 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural,</td>
<td>34.6% (54,313 ha, 134,210 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others,</td>
<td>0.7% ( 1,080 ha, 2,669 acres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (156,874 ha, 387,643 acres)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 1986.

The survey found, however that 34.6% of Bangkok was classified agricultural land, even in the city center. In reality, a large portion of this land was formerly orchards which were recently purchased by large developers. The characteristic of agricultural use was still maintained to avoid high property taxes. For instance, during early 1980s, banana orchards still existed amidst the busy and expensive business districts. Other vacant plots were temporarily rented out for agricultural use while waiting for the price to increase. This phenomenon not only causes leapfrog development, it is also the major reason for land shortage and long commuting for low income groups (Kammeier, 1984).
Unattended plots tend to be invaded by squatters--either new migrants from the province or squatters evicted from other settlements in Bangkok (Pornchokechai, 1985). This phenomenon transforms the form of land allocation among the three forms discussed earlier in the previous chapter. Klong Toey settlement is an example of invasion of a piece of government owned property which transformed the capitalistic form of land allocation into a popular form of land allocation. The state's intervention in the area further transformed it to a state form of land allocation. The increasing property value after the intervention, however, transferred it back to a capitalist form.

Without any genuine land reform or explicit land policy, the urban poor have very little means to get access to the land market, and must resort to the popular form of land allocation--the squatter settlement. In this light, the intervention by the state transforms the popular form of land allocation back to the capitalistic form. Without grass roots reformation, however, the transformation of feudalistic society to a capitalistic society only transforms the elite class to the wealthy class. At present, the elite class still owns large portions of land in and around Bangkok city. The pattern of land ownership has remained unchanged despite the political changeover.
Increasing land values further enhance the upper class's rate of wealth accumulation.

A large portion of land in Bangkok Metropolis which used to belong to the elite class was sold or leased to developers. Land owners tend to settle on one of the scattered pieces of their land (London 1976). Some large land owners either build row houses or subdivide their land into small pieces for rent without public services to minimize cost. These settlements grow into high density residential areas for the poor (Rabibhadhana 1978).

As mentioned earlier, rapid increases of land value is usually closely associated with extensive land speculation. The face value of land is unrealistically higher than its use value. Since land costs are far too high to be affordable for the urban poor, new migrants have no alternatives but squatting on large pockets of unused private and public land (NBOE: 1981). This phenomenon gives rise to squatter settlement.

The disparity in the government's service provisions has been another important factor preventing the low-income group from getting access to services which promote environmental health, such as garbage disposal, rain storm drainage and a clean water supply. Illegality has been the main reason justifying the neglect by the state.
Furthermore, these services are well beyond the urban poor's ability to pay. This phenomenon brings about even more unhealthy living conditions in the squatter settlements (Pornchokechai: 1985, Nathalang: 1978 and Yamklinfung: 1973).

In addition to the Thai custom of dwelling as an extended family, economic constraints also put families together to minimize costs and share facilities. In spite of the physical congestion of squatter settlements, coresidency and income sharing are means of survival of the urban poor.

Given the present sociopolitical conditions, Thailand's housing provision cannot be reached by families below the lower middle class.

4.4 THE NATURE OF THE STATE AND FORMS OF HOUSING PRODUCTION IN THAILAND

Paralleling the changing form of land allocation, the form of housing production has been transformed by the intervention of the state—eviction, and direct or indirect provisions. Since the autonomy of the state is only relative, its roles include the establishment of economic efficiency, supporting wealth accumulation among the upper social strata, while maintaining the state's legitimacy. The state housing policies are thus governed by the national development policy, popular demand, and the pursuit of its own interests. Public housing policies, likewise, aim to
realize numerous conflicting goals. Inevitably, it interacts with the unbalanced development in Third World countries (Kwitko 1989).

The dominant form of housing production has been gradually transformed from a communal to capitalist along with the economic development process. The urban poor in squatter settlements who cannot afford access to the conventional land market, revolutionized the capitalist form into a simple commodity form of housing production by means of their self-built housing. Interventions by the State, in turn, transforms it to a state form of housing production. The increasing property value preceding the intervention further turns it back to the capitalist form.

The crisis of the Thai housing policies is attributed partly to the failure of Thai academics to address the root of the issue. Literature on Bangkok's low-income housing focuses extensively on the socioeconomic rather than political aspects of the issue. Social scientists such as Raphipat (1982), Therasawad (1973), Jamarick (1980), Yap Kioe Sheng (1992), and Kaosongyot hold that socio-economic and physical factors contribute to the origin of slums and squatter settlement in Bangkok. Rural-urban migration, the physical setting of the city, lack of government planning and control over housing construction, patterns of
settlement and land use planning, the life cycle and family pattern of settlers are factors cited the existing literatures.

Some literature, such as that of Jamarick (1980), cites patterns of public and private land holdings, land speculation and increases of land value, and disparity of state's provision of services as major factors leading to squatter settlements. Disparity of government spending between urban and rural development is also cited as a major cause of massive rural-urban migration, and therefore housing needs in Bangkok are magnified. Major funding was appropriated for educational institutions in Bangkok to which students are attracted. Bangkok's rate of growth was further enhanced by its function as a center of finance, communication, and administration (Raphipat, 1982, Vijitwathakarn, 1966). Unquestionably, socioeconomic and physical aspects are the only concerns in low-cost housing research on which public housing policies are based.

Evidently, most Thai scholars take a moderate view of the issue of urban low income housing with very little literature examining the urban housing issue within a framework of the political economy approach and modes of production. As a result, the course of housing development has been influenced by the mainstream orthodox view.

Even though public housing policy in Thailand has never
functioned as one of the national economic development strategies as in Hong Kong, it has been considered one of the development components since the end of World-War II (Patpui 1984). Each of the political regimes has had its own housing policy which reflects the way the Thai state influenced the dynamic of housing production in which the urban poor struggle for land and housing in the closed urban land market. A pattern of state housing policy is found related to the characteristics of each regime.

The public housing program in Thailand was, in fact, started in the early 1950s by four government agencies, namely, Public Housing Division (PHD), Welfare Housing Office (WHO), Housing Welfare Bank (HWB), and Slum Improvement Office (SIO). The objectives of housing programs altered from time to time according to the unstable and changing regimes of the Thai Government.

During the regime of P. Pibulsongkram, a period of "National Capitalism" was established less than a decade after the 1932 revolution. The Public Housing Division (PHD) under the Department of Social Welfare was established to assist self-help settlements in the province with little effect. Its only goal was to provide sufficient housing stock for the country, not particularly for the urban poor.
A chronological comparison of both housing development and political regimes is presented in Table 4.1.

During this early period of industrialization, as well as the Public housing program provided by the PHD, semi-private institutions, such as the Lottery Bureau, the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, and the State Railways, started their own housing programs in the late 1940s, merely to enhance their productivity and the morale of their employees (Nathalang 1978). This type of subsidized housing did not transform the capitalist form of housing production into a state form, since it was still owned and maintained by the enterprises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>(2)REGIME</th>
<th>REGIME</th>
<th>POWER</th>
<th>IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>PLAN</th>
<th>POLICIES</th>
<th>AGENTS</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of Land</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>[housing stock for]</td>
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<td>[PHD], population in the</td>
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<td>1942</td>
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<td>Tawee</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 4.1** A CHRONOLOGICAL COMPARISON OF POLITICAL CHARACTERISTIC OF DIFFERENT REGIMES AND THEIR LAND AND HOUSING POLICIES.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR (2)</th>
<th>REGIME</th>
<th>POWER</th>
<th>IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>PLAN</th>
<th>POLICIES</th>
<th>AGENTS</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Kuang</td>
<td>e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>P. Pibul</td>
<td>Dictatorship</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>WHO provides low income rental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td>e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Phot</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>ae</td>
<td>Welfare Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Thanom</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>ae</td>
<td>Welfare Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1956-1957

1956 | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1957 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |

1958 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1959 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1960 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1961 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1962 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1963 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1964 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1965 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1966 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1967 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1968 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1969 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1970 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1971 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1972 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1973 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1974 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1975 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1976 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1977 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1978 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1979 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1980 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1981 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1982 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1983 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1984 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1985 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |
| 1986 | Thanom | Democratic | ae | Welfare Bank | |

FIGURE 4.1 CONT.

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Throughout the regimes of Kuang, Tawee, Seni, Pridi, and Tawal, from 1942 to 1947—a period of more democratic governments—the state housing policies were kept unchanged. However, the urban housing issue did not pose too much threats during these regimes, nor was much attention given to the public welfare due to the relatively political situation.

The origin of the national public housing policy accompanied the prevailing industrialization and import substitution strategy during the early 1950s. The Welfare Housing Office (WHO) was then established in 1951 after
large amount of migration from the rural areas into the city of Bangkok, as a result of the export substitution and industrialization scheme which drew part of the work force from the rural farms into the manufacturing sector in Bangkok. The population increase in the capital city at that time was already larger than 150,000 each year (Karnjanaprakorn et al., 1978). This situation started to bring about problems of living congestion and slums in the city (Douglass 1984). The Welfare Housing Office (WHO) was established to provide rental homes for low-income dwellers in Bangkok—a state form of housing production—during this period.

Laws and regulations had been introduced in P. Phibulsongkram's regime to encourage foreign and domestic investment in the industrial sector. Without explicit statements on the purpose, WHO had an implicit goal to support the growth of industrialization in Bangkok (see also Industrial Promotion Act, 1954). Finances for housing programs was made available through the government's Housing Welfare Bank (HWB), founded in 1954, to render loans for the housing projects at low interest rates. New technology was introduced into the housing and construction material industry, to increase the efficiency of production and promote investment in this area. The capitalistic form of land allocation was, henceforth, enhanced and subsidized. On
the contrary, the needs for cost-recovery, and the high price of the new technology, prevented the program from reaching the lowest income strata. Such intervention implicitly prevented the urban poor from getting access to low-cost housing.

Under such circumstances, housing had become a form of investment for the upper income group due to the rapidly increasing land values in the city. It also encouraged transfer from the state form to a more capitalist form of housing production. For example, subsidized housing projects during the late 1950s and early 1960s such as Economic Village, Pornsawangnives Village, Patavikorn Village, Friendship Village, Seri Village, Olan Village, and Muangtong Nives are currently occupied by the middle and lower-upper income groups. According to a survey during the month of January 1992, the unit price in these areas ranged from 1.5 to 10 million baht.

During the end of P.Pibulsonkram's and the early part of Sarith's regimes, congestion and diseconomy in the management of Bangkok started to prevail. The Slum Improvement Office was founded in 1961, to work under the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA). Its main task was to relocate slums and squatter settlements and in some instance, it offered upgrading programs to the slum
communities. During these dictatorship, harsher measures were applied to clear the squatter settlements. The PHD and the WHO had limited their role to housing provision within the public sector, and they allowed the private housing market to supply the rest of the housing needs (see Table 4.3). The slum relocation and clearance actions of the SIO further reduced the existing housing stock. This clearly indicates that the full autonomy of the dictatorial regime can effectively suppress the growth of the popular form of land allocation.

**TABLE 4.3 A COMPARISON OF HOUSING PROVIDED BY THE STATE AND THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS DURING THE 9-YEAR PERIOD FROM 1963-1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS REJECTED</th>
<th>NUMBER PER CENT OF HOUSING UNITS PURCHASED</th>
<th>NUMBER PER CENT OF HOUSING UNITS RENTAL</th>
<th>NUMBER PER CENT OF HOUSING UNITS PURCHASED</th>
<th>NUMBER PER CENT OF HOUSING UNITS RENTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>20,212</td>
<td>19,892</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>19,082</td>
<td>20,469</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>336</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,821</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>5,882</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>4,819</td>
<td>7,919</td>
<td>11,703</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>8,020</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,716</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>16,825</td>
<td>60,237</td>
<td>68,898</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Housing Bureau, Department of Public Welfare.

By the year 1972, the annual population growth in Bangkok was 5.17%. According to the NESDB (1972, 1976) it
was estimated that there was a backlog of 133,524 units of housing, mainly for the urban poor. The figure increased to 169,407 units by the year 1981. The state agencies delivered fewer than 6,000 units, merely 4.5% of the total needed by the year 1972. In this situation, despite great labor needs in the city, the capitalist form of land allocation was encouraged and little public housing was supplied, resulted in more slums and squatter settlements in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.

After the coup d'etat in November 1971, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was formed by the National Executive Council (NEC) in 1971 as a state enterprise with minimal subsidy from the state. The prime objective of the NHA was to ease the problem of housing shortage in Bangkok. The major concerns of the NHA were, therefore, to increase the present housing stock to operate a real estate business as one of the state enterprises, and to beautify the city. Under the National Economic and Social Development Plan, the NHA is the only government agency which oversees the urban low-income housing. The form of housing production under the NHA is thus not limited to the state form, it also includes the capitalist/market form of housing production. Under the limited budget and cost-recovery basis, slum clearance and upgrading are its major policies toward squatter settlements.
Part of the NHA's sites-and-services projects had been financed by the World Bank since 1977. The World Bank's cost-recovery concept emphasizes the dwellers' ability to pay and according to the NHA Report (1985), subsidization of low-cost housing programs can reach down to only the 50th percentile of the total income group. This means that the rest of the 50 per cent of population, most of whom are in the lower income strata cannot get access to the NHA's housing.

In addition, during most military's regimes in late 1970s, the NHA was encouraged to focus more on the beautification of the city rather than the provision of housing. A large portion of its long term financial programs was channeled to the lower-middle income group, to the provision of public utilities, and to large projects which had the advantage of economies of scale (NHA report, 1985).

The NHA's present responsibilities are mainly to acquire land and to produce and supply shelters in the conventional housing market, both for the public and government employees; to clear and upgrade slums and squatter settlements; to appropriate housing loans; and to oversee some community development projects. Its foremost objective is to facilitate home ownership for those who can afford it. Its slum upgrading programs, however, are limited
to areas with legal tenure, and where physical appearance contributes to the beautification of Bangkok.

The NHA's projects still interact, in part, with the force of the land market under the pressure of the funding agencies. The instability and short-term nature of the elected government brought about an inconsistent and short-term housing policy. The relatively long-lasting regimes of military dictatorships, which have more ruling autonomy, were careless about the poor and their livelihood. The inconsistencies of the Thai housing policy further hinders the NHA's performance and the direction of housing provision. Despite the NHA's attempt to maintain its low-cost housing projects, budget constraint and political pressure from the elite class force the NHA to shift its policy from serving the poorest group of urban population to serving the middle class who can better affords housing.

Furthermore, under Thailand's present capitalist mode of production, housing in Bangkok has been developed in a way that it is considered a type of luxury good or commodity rather than a means to supply basic human needs. The 1991 and 1992 survey of the top ten highest spending on media advertising showed that housing projects rank the highest among the luxury goods and services (see Table 4.4). In this light, spending on housing advertisements was approximately 4 times as much as the second highest item--department.
stores. A higher investment--indicated by the high cost of advertisement--means a higher expectation of profit and high cost of the product. The capitalistic form of housing production is, thus inaccessible to the urban poor. The NHA thus gearing toward being part of the conventional housing market which will no longer benefit the urban poor.

### TABLE 4.4 TOP RANKING ADVERTISERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>JAN - MAY 1992</th>
<th>JAN - MAY 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing projects</td>
<td>1,280.0</td>
<td>1,406.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department stores</td>
<td>306.1</td>
<td>394.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shampoos &amp; conditioners</td>
<td>253.9</td>
<td>357.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>245.9</td>
<td>298.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office equipment</td>
<td>227.6</td>
<td>298.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>210.1</td>
<td>293.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars</td>
<td>201.7</td>
<td>280.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detergents</td>
<td>174.0</td>
<td>263.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetics/skin care</td>
<td>148.7</td>
<td>230.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy products</td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>225.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Spending for 1993 totaled Bt 9351.8 million.
Source: Media Focus Co Ltd

Even though the present role of the NHA has changed according to the changing of the macro economic development policy, the cost recovery policy and the control of housing standards were still maintained as the goal of the low cost housing program. Loans with low interest rates were made possible through commercial banks. The NHA was able to generate part of its income from its middle class housing
projects to subsidize lower income housing. It also is bound to provide and maintain public utilities such as water supply, electricity, and garbage disposal within the community of which it is in charge. These activities tend to marginalize the urban poor who illegally live in the squatter settlement. It transforms the popular form of land allocation into the capitalist form. (see Table 4.5)

TABLE 4.5 NHA'S PLAN FOR 1974-1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF UNITS</th>
<th>LOWEST-INCOME</th>
<th>LOW-INCOME</th>
<th>LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME</th>
<th>MIDDLE INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the Governor, National Housing Authority.

Furthermore, the NHA's fiscal plan was made according to the balance of the supply and demand of estimated housing. Yet it could never catch up with the housing needs in the primate cities like Bangkok. For example, it planned to provide 170,000 units of housing in Bangkok, among them 10,000 units, only 5.9% of the total housing being built, targeted at the lowest income group in the slums and
squatter settlements. However, the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991) still declared a serious problem of slums and squatter settlement in Bangkok:

In particular the poor living in slums lack essential basic services. ... Between 10 and 20 per cent [of the Bangkok population] living in over crowded [slums] communities may be considered poor enough to warrant assistance in regard to infrastructure and social services. In providing adequate basic services to the urban poor, the responsibility for allocating funds should be shared between the central government and the local authorities. (NESDB 1987-1991: 292)

The NESDB's work plan, drafted during the Prem regime, aimed to establish policy guidelines to develop the estimated 500,000 low-income urban poor and slum dwellers in the BMR. Housing will be built and slums upgraded by improving access to basic services. In addition, security of land tenure for residence for prescribed periods of time will be supported, shelter will be provided for evicted communities and community participation in developing their own communities will be encouraged. Coordination between concerned agencies will be clarified and the private sector will be encouraged to foster self-reliance, occupational training and compulsory education among the low-income group, especially the youth. (NESDB 1987-1991: 293-294).

The Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan incorporated the issue of public housing in its infrastructural development section. It stated the problem that "There are still at least 190,000 housing units, whose conditions need to be improved and upgraded, while, during the Sixth Plan period, only 30,000 housing units in slum communities had been upgraded." (NESDB 1992-1996: 67-68).
Its infrastructural policy, however, aims to provide "basic services to ensure an adequate quantity of supply at sufficiently high quality to meet the demand of the industrial sector and of general economic expansion." (NESDB 1992-1996:70). The housing work plan aims to provide 65,000 units of low income housing in Bangkok and its neighboring towns, emphasizing workers in industrial plants, and to upgrade 80,000 households in urban slums (See map 4.3).

In this situation, the housing scheme tended to benefit the middle and upper income groups, who enjoyed cheaper construction materials with higher quality. Most of the public housing projects proved to be unaffordable for the lowest income groups. My present survey from Flat 11-18 indicate that the average family annual income on this particular public housing area is Baht 116,323, reaching only the lower-middle income group in the city. Among these dwellers, 75% were from outside the Klong Toey area and had bought the right to occupy their present housing units.
MAP 4.3 LOCATIONS OF LOW-COST HOUSING PROJECTS AROUND BANGKOK
4.5 SUMMARY

The situation of slums in Bangkok was conditioned by the development of a public housing policy which attempted to maintain conflicting goals. A number of factors contributed to the failure of Thailand's public housing policies. Among them, the Neo-classical thinking of national economic development schemes, initiated since the late 1940s, influenced objectives and means of public housing provision in Bangkok. The unbalanced economic growth and foreign investment multiplied the land value, making it impossible for low-income group to get access to housing in the market. The rapid growth of housing demand due to rural-urban migration further complicated the problem.

Politically, short-term governments denied sincere responsibility for the housing problem. Land issues have become a chronic obstacle to housing development, when land speculation is rife and land value increase rapidly in the city. Controls on land ownership had to be relaxed due to the pressure by large land owners and the elite class.

The action taken by the state during the past six decades reflected the role of the state toward the issues of low income land and housing in Bangkok at the macro level (See Figure 5.1). A comparison between housing policy and the political development of Thailand reveals a pattern of
transformation in the form of land allocation. Within Thailand's unique political development, most of the long lasting regimes were dictatorial, whose power was acquired by means of political coups. The longest dictatorial period started from 1948 to 1972, covering the regimes of P. Pibulsongkram, General Sarith, and General Thanom. During these regimes, even though the state bore more power than the democratic period, it's legitimacy to exercise its rule was to replace the corrupted politicians. A large portion of its support were from the merchants, the military, and the state officials (Chaloemtiarana: 1979). However, it still needed consent from the majority of the lower income group to prevent political unrest.

Except the NHA, all the housing agencies were founded during these dictatorial regimes while the state had relatively more power than civilian governments. The autonomy of the state in decision making during such periods was relatively high, while freedom of expression by Thai citizens was suppressed. Those providing agencies founded in this period thus failed to serve the lowest income groups.

Almost all the democratic governments, on the other hand, lasted only one year or less, before the parliament was dissolved and an election took place. The NHA which had been founded during one of these democratic regimes, however, has to generate income of its own to support parts
of its on-going projects. Its failure lies in the inconsistency of housing policy at the macro level, and the lack of a fiscal budget to accomplish the more needy projects.

The present low income housing projects have thus become a significant issue due to short-term and unstable civilian government. Being short of funds, low income housing projects were only partly subsidized and had to conform to a cost-recovery scheme to relieve the budget burden of the contemporary administration, which was frequently threatened by military coups. Therefore, dwellers were required to make regular payments for the cost of high standard housing. Such demands can hardly be met by the lower income group such as wage workers or street vendors whose income were not stable (Pornchokechai 1985). This pattern transforms the form of land allocation from a communal/popular form into a capitalistic form of land allocation.
CHAPTER V
SOCIOECONOMIC CONSTRAINT OF THE URBAN POOR
AND THEIR SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Form of land allocation interacts with the life chance and level of income of the urban poor in several ways. On the one hand, the life chances are affected by the physical environment in that areas in which the physical setting allows informal employment—cooking of food and preparation of goods for street vending—give the urban poor a better opportunity to supplement their income.

On the other hand, dwellers are allocated into a particular type of land allocation according to their ability to pay, which in turn is determined by the number of family members who generate income; the level of the income earner's education; the availability of employment; and distance to work. Most of these factors are directly or indirectly related to the form of land allocation. The higher income group has more choice to enter any form of land allocation, but the poorest group is virtually barred from buying shelters in a more capitalist form of land allocation due to lack of purchasing power. Only the middle income families with stable income can afford to buy or to rent the flat units or a sites-and-services plot.

As described in Chapter III, due to the articulation of
capitalist form of land allocation and social involution, there is no pure market, state, or popular form of land allocation. Each of the five study areas shares at least two or more characteristics of forms of land allocation. Furthermore, other factors, such as rules of access and the nature of land owners make each of the areas unique.

With a few exceptions, therefore, different forms of land allocation, and these characteristics described earlier, have both a direct and indirect effect on their dweller's generation of income. Land tenure, for instance, directly determines land and property value and the level of rent to be collected. Indirectly, it governs how public utilities are provided by the state through its providing agencies. The accessibility of public utilities, in turn determines the physical condition which attracts tenants, and facilitates economic and commercial activities. The illegal occupation of land, on which these poorest groups depend, prevents them from getting access to public service which further reduces their life chances.

In addition, since approximately half of the household's incomes in the poorest group (see below) are supplemented by income from sources other than from the household head, these families require additional members of the households to work to help supplement their income.
Therefore, the physical conditions of the living quarters must allow informal economic activities--such as food preparations for street vending or laundry--which needs additional space and decent access walkways. The social setting of the community must also facilitate a collective economy, such as co-residence, income sharing, and mutual help (see below in this chapter). These physical and social environments tends to be available in communities with a popular form of land allocation and to facilitate the urban poor's informal economic activities. The poorest group needs to live in such communities to exploit these features of the popular form of land allocation.

Socially, the cohesion of and the sense of belonging to the community are determined by the number of years neighbors stay together to build relationships among members in the neighborhood. In other words, the strength of the community is determined by the length of stay of its members. The consolidation of the community brings about collective activities which indirectly facilitates the partial improvement by dwellers of their socioeconomic conditions, i.e., by means of income sharing, co-residency, and mutual help (see Figure 5.1 and discussion on the political aspect in Chapter VI). Transformation of land allocation from one form to another brought about by state intervention tends to dissolve the evicted community and
bring new middle-income members into the new community.

With the framework specified above, this chapter discusses research findings on the socioeconomic aspect of the urban poor's survival strategies within the complexity of the five study areas. First, this chapter examines how the urban poor with different levels of education and income are allocated into a particular form of land allocation. Second, the chapter analyzes how the different levels of state intervention in different forms of land allocation determine the dynamic of land tenure and the changing form of land allocation. The pattern of selling and buying among the different classes of urban poor will be analyzed in conjunction with changing property value and land speculation.

Third, this chapter looks at how land tenure and the legality of land occupation in different form of land allocation govern the pattern of provision of public utilities which further affects the physical conditions of the urban poor, their health conditions, and their life chances within the community.

Fourth, this chapter examines how differences in the physical conditions in different forms of land allocation facilitate a particular type of household enterprise and how its physical setting attracts different tenants to the
community. This chapter also examines the affect of physical conditions on property values.

Fifth, this chapter highlights social aspects of survival strategies of the urban poor, such as income sharing, mutual help, and co-residency, and how they deal with different levels of economic constraints in the squatter community. A number of factors will be discussed in conjunction with distinctive strategies in each of the forms of land allocation. Those factors are individualism, financial need and the distinctive physical settings of different forms of land allocation.

Finally, within the context of the household, this chapter describes how unpaid labor is performed by different members of the household in the income supplementing process in different forms of land allocation. It is, on the one hand, an efficient way seeking to relieve additional burdens from the income generating member of the household. On the other hand, it is a form of labor exploitation, where unpaid labor in the poorest households ultimately benefits the formal economy in the city.

5.2 CONDITIONS OF TENURE AND PROPERTY VALUE

Property values differ among the three forms of land allocation according to each of the respective type of land tenure, location, and physical conditions. The rate of selling and speculation also varies according to land
values. The rate of selling is partly indicated by the
mobility of the population and the cohesion of the community.

Three types of population are found in the study areas. They are migrant families which have moved into the settlement since the first time they arrived in Bangkok, and built their shelters, families which moved around within the settlement and either own or rent the shelter, and families--mostly from the middle income group--which recently (less than 5 years) moved from the nearby squatter settlement or from the provinces, who either buy or rent the shelter. Length of stay in a particular community indicates the extent of mobility of a particular family. However, since the second group has been living in Bangkok, yet moving around from one community to another, length of stay does not always indicate rural-urban migration.

The result of this study shows a pattern of house ownership, which indicates that the urban poor are spontaneously self-allocated into different forms of land allocation, according to their ability to pay for their housing. Area 9 and Zone 1, which fall within the popular/open access and popular/state form of land allocation, comprise the highest proportion of dwellers who are originally from within the Klong Toey settlement, most
of whom are also owner occupiers (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Since Area 9 has the least tenure security, and its occupants started to move away due to the eviction threat, this bears the lowest commercial value. Its rules of entry are virtually "open access." Therefore, there is more selling and buying of property in this area than Zone 1 (see Daeng's case below). Zone 1 is facing less eviction pressure from PAT than Area 9, and it retains a higher proportion of owner occupiers who cannot afford to move elsewhere.

**TABLE 5.1 HOME OWNERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OWNER</th>
<th>RENTERS AND</th>
<th>AVERAGE LENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N SUBLETTERS N</td>
<td>OF STAY (YEARS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>73.97%</td>
<td>54 26.02%</td>
<td>19 21.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>78.86%</td>
<td>56 21.12%</td>
<td>15 23.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>71.05%</td>
<td>54 28.94%</td>
<td>22 8.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>17.14%</td>
<td>12 82.85%</td>
<td>58 6.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLON</td>
<td>49.29%</td>
<td>35 50.70%</td>
<td>36 15.252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5.2 THE ACQUISITION OF THE PRESENT HOUSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NEW *</th>
<th>ORIGINAL</th>
<th>BUYING*</th>
<th>DON'T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OWNERS N</td>
<td>OWNERS N</td>
<td>RIGHT N</td>
<td>KNOW N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>0 71.23%</td>
<td>52 28.76%</td>
<td>21 .00%</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>0 70.42%</td>
<td>50 26.76%</td>
<td>19 2.81%</td>
<td>2 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>60.50%</td>
<td>46 21.05%</td>
<td>16 18.42%</td>
<td>14 .00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>7 12.85%</td>
<td>9 74.28%</td>
<td>2 1.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLON</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
<td>3 52.11%</td>
<td>37 43.66%</td>
<td>31 .00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some respondents prefer to be called newcomers than right-buyers; they belong to the same category.
Along with the process of allocating the urban poor into different forms of land allocation, pressures from the PAT has consistently compelled some dwellers who can afford living quarters elsewhere to move away, especially in areas where tenure is not granted. The moving families were replaced by either people from within the Klong Toey settlement itself or squatters who are evicted from other settlements in Bangkok.

Daeng, a street vendor, whose husband works as a wage laborer at the port to support their five children, stated: "Our family is trying very hard to find alternative housing in this vicinity since we heard about the official eviction announcement from the PAT. With a limited and unstable income, we have to live in Area 9 without choices. We can neither afford a place elsewhere nor find a new job to support the family. With Bangkok's traffic condition, Kaew (her husband) has to travel 5 hours round trip on the bus to work at the port. Some of our neighbors have moved to the 70 RAI area because they can afford high rent. Since the PAT never has a definite objective, we just stay on."

Daeng's case demonstrated that only those from the poorest group live in Area 9, remaining out of financial constraints rather than choice. The selectivity process screens away families that can afford housing and find employment elsewhere.
However, there are some exceptions within the Area 9 community. Attaporn lives in Area 9 not because of his absolute poverty, but due to his proprietorship in this area. Attaporn's father moved his family into Klong Toey in the early 1950s and currently occupies several plots of land in Area 9 and Zone 1. After having survived several fires in these areas, Attaporn built four semi-permanent shelters for rent, two of them located in Area 9 and two in Zone 1. He then collected enough money to buy another plot in the 70 Rai's sites-and-services area (see 70 Rai below). He moved his family to 70 Rai in the early 1980s. However, he and his wife still retain a small noodle shop in Area 9. His income from collecting rent and the noodle shop is sufficient to support his father and three sons without difficulty. Attaporn's case indicates that income disparity and social variation still exist within a single community.

A high percentage of renters is found in Flat 11-18 which is a state/capitalist form of land allocation. A large portion of original dwellers sold their rights to the present owners and moved back to the squatter areas inside or outside Klong Toey. The survey found only 12.9 per cent of owners of flat units are original relocatees from the Klong Toey's slum area and the shortest average length of stay among the five areas. A large number of new owners do
not live in the units yet rent them out to dwellers who can only afford the lower-than-average housing in the Klong Toey settlement. Approximately 5 per cent of the total units are without occupants. This indicates the high rate of selling and buying for speculation.

Panthong, a housewife in Flat 11-18, explains: "Except for the vacant units down the corner, most of the households living on this floor, including myself, are renters. Renting a unit here is not easy. One must have enough advanced money to guarantee the monthly rent payment and utility costs. The owners of my unit does not mind if I pay my rent a few days late. But they don't want to risk losing money if I run short of money to pay for utilities. Some owners feel renting out the unit is too much of a hassle and would rather leave them locked vacant."

Given the setting of Flat 11-18 where only a handful of housing is provided by the state to solve the squatter issue of Klong Toey, only the families with stable monthly income can afford to stay in such housing. Even though economic activities in these apartment blocks are strictly controlled by the state, their commercial value and the pattern of speculation reflect a more capitalistic form of land allocation. The setting of Flat 11-18 also points to the fact that speculation is likely when the commercial value of the property increases due to the articulation of capitalist
form of land allocation. In Bangkok's present economic context, where competition for housing is high and little economic activity can be done within the flat units, urban poor who acquired a unit often sell their right and move away to the areas where more economic opportunities are more available. Panthong relates that her next door neighbors sold the unit to the present occupant because they could not continue their small carpentry business due to lack of space and the restrictive architectural design. Even though some types of business are still illegally conducted in these flats--beauty salons, video rental shops, and soft drink vendors--most of them aim to serve only people in the community. These businesses also need larger amount of capital than do street vending.

There is a relatively lower percentage of renters in the 70 Rai area which falls within the capitalist/state form of land allocation. 71.05 per cent of the occupants in 70 RAI are present owners while only 28.94 per cent are renters, which indicates a high rate of owner-occupiers. The average length of stay is still as low as eight years due to a high rate of selling by the original owner/builders. Most of the new occupants describe themselves as "newcomers" instead of "right buyers" since it appears legally more suitable. The figures from the present
survey show the original owner/builders of the sites-and-services plots constitute only 21.05 per cent and the remaining 78.95 per cent moved from elsewhere.

The high percentage of owner-occupiers in this area is due to a number of factors. First, unlike apartment buildings, an on-the-ground site-and-services program offers a more spacious environment for dwelling and working. Each household can legally build its home according to its lifestyle. Second, despite the self-built concept, part of the building still needs professional builders to meet the city's building standards. The high cost of standard building materials and workmanship increase the cost of housing and reduces the lucrativeness of property speculation. Third, the rather short term fifteen-year tenure promised by the PAT discourages speculation the increase of property price over time. And finally, the physical characteristics of low rise housing offer a better opportunity for home enterprises than property speculation. Small business carried out in this area is considered an alternative form of investment. Present owners who can afford housing in this area prefer to stay and do business rather than renting out their property and living somewhere else. The study, however, found a high percentage of multiple home owners who live in a separate unit while renting out the rest of their property.
Due to high property values in the capitalist form of land allocation, new occupants need a large sum of money to buy the contract and to cover the building costs of the house. Pracha, a 70 Rai resident, bought his home from someone who had been a resident since the beginning of the community in 1979. He is working as a semi-skilled carpenter in a furniture factory, 15 kilometers from Klong Toey. His boss calls upon him whenever he needs extra labor. His wife Malee has a part-time job with a sub-contractor weaving leather strips on shoes and runs a small front porch business selling candy, bar soaps and other household necessities. Their six children aged at 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 attend the local public school. Since Pracha built the house in 1979 with the help of some close friends, he has constantly made extensions whenever he has time. He even helps his neighbor work on extension projects with minimal return. As Malee says: "I like to stay here because the rent is low. And by the time our contract is over, our children should be able to take care of themselves. Pracha bought this contract from the former owner for 35,000 baht. We still needed to invest another 25,000 baht for the basic structure. Fortunately Pracha's boss needed him constantly during those years so we can pay our debt in about 7 years. Most of us who are living here have a small business of some
sort at home. The contract is short and we need to work efficiently."

Pracha's case indicates that 70 Rai is no longer a state form of land allocation, since the ability to pay is the major rule of access in this community. Physical and economic settings in the community, in turn, determine the life chance of the occupants. Several factors facilitate Pracha's living in 70 Rai--a capitalist/state form of land allocation. Firstly, he saved a large sum of money to buy the rights from one of the original owners. Secondly, he was able to pay for the building cost of his house. Thirdly, 70 Rai is a place where his carpentry skills can earn some additional money by helping his neighbors build their houses while building his own house. Finally, while Pracha is now away for his carpenter employment, Malee also earns a considerable income from a small business at home, supported by the 70 Rai's physical setting and the purchasing power of people in the community.

Several additional factors conditioned the living characteristics of 70 Rai. Even though the occupation in 70 Rai comprises a high percentage of wage laborers, most of them are highly skilled workers such as carpenters, and construction subcontractors. Their rather constant income, according to the nature of their skill and employment, supports their means of survival in the 70 Rai area. A high
percentage of the new buyers have sufficient capital to invest in both the housing and home enterprises. The services provided by the NHA, i.e., electricity, water supply, and concrete walk ways, further enhance both their living conditions and life chance.

Wat Chonglom has its own unique characteristics. Due to its poor access, this settlement can hardly be developed or gain a higher property value for large scale development project. The Wat Chonglom community has gained its landlord's consent to occupy this piece of land, with short-term year-by-year contracts on tenure. It is also supported by one of the upgrading projects sponsored by the Citibank which improves its physical standards. Such physical standards and the rather stable rent tenure attract more stable income subletters into the area while screening out the lower income subletters. The composite effects of these factors substantially facilitate the improvement of living conditions in this community.

This study found a moderate percentage of buying and selling in the community in the last five years--a total of 43.66 per cent. However, 52.11 per cent of the dwellers are owner-occupiers while with only 4.22 per cent are new immigrants. The low rental rate of land and the subsidized upgrading program by the Citibank dramatically raised the
commercial value of housing in this community. Its relatively safe environment attracts more factory workers to the area.

Mr. Samrit Thongpat, Wat Chonglom's community leader, relates that figures from the previous survey by the PAT show that approximately twenty per cent of the dwellers in the Wat Chonglom community are factory workers who sublet a room here from the house owners. About 15 per cent of the households own more than one shelter, some of which are subdivided for rent. Factory workers are normally single or married without children. They can afford regular rental payment since they have a rather regular income. Most landlords tends to prefer quiet female tenants. A fair number of these female workers are from the provinces and are relatives of the house owners. According to the community leaders, drugs and crime are relatively less severe than in other nearby communities. The price of property is increasing rapidly. However, very few people were willing to sell their rental contract during the period of the research.

In summary, the pattern of house ownership in the three forms of land allocation reveals a number of facts. Forms of land allocation interact directly and indirectly with the life chance and level of income of the urban poor. Family income is determined by the physical environment which
facilitates life chance in the urban poor community. On the other hand, the capitalist form of land allocation tends to articulate into the other forms of land allocation and to transform their rules of access. In this light, the state form of land allocation tends to transform itself into a capitalistic form of land allocation over time, even though administratively, it is still under state control. The urban poor are thus allocated into different forms of land allocation according to their level and type of income, which determines their ability to pay for housing. With a few exceptions, the poorest group tends to be allocated to the popular form of land allocation because of economic constraints instead of by choice. Physically, as related by Panthong, the incompatibility of the architectural design with economic activities further prompts the urban poor to sell their rights in state land and move back to where they can make a living. The physical setting of site-and-services which supports economic activities tends to attract the lower middle income group which can afford it. This group is able to enjoy both economic opportunity and the state housing.

Differences in type of land tenure and property values are the most distinctive characteristics of different forms of land allocation. However, state intervention frequently
enhances the articulation of the capitalist form of land allocation, which further triggers land speculation. The succeeding section will discuss research findings on the effects of changing land tenure on increasing property values and population mobility in different forms of land allocation.

5.3 PLACE OF ORIGIN AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE AND THE CHANGING OF FORM OF LAND ALLOCATION

As discussed earlier, the degree of state intervention determines the characteristics of land tenure and the form of land allocation and housing production. In other words, state intervention enhances the rate of articulation of the capitalist form of land allocation. Changes in forms of land allocation, in turn, determine the face value of the property, which further regulates the pattern of changing ownership by means of buying and selling and moving into and out of the community. This phenomenon is thus reflected partly in the pattern of population movement in each area. It also has implications regarding both the economic and social aspects of the communities.

Length of stay in a community, therefore, reflects in part the extent of population mobility and the extent of buying and selling of property. The present survey found a rather consistent pattern of population movement and length
of stay across the different forms of land allocation. Dwellers in the popular form of land allocation tended to stay more permanently than the capitalistic form. This research found 48.8% of the respondents in Zone 1 had never moved compared to 2.1% and 2.9% in 70 Rai and Flat 11-18 respectively (see Table 5.3).

**TABLE 5.3 PLACE OF ORIGIN (LAST MOVE IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BANGKOK</th>
<th>CENTRAL</th>
<th>NORTHERN</th>
<th>NORTHEAST</th>
<th>EASTERN</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>NEVER MOVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason Area 9 has a lower population of non-movers than Zone 1 is due to the fact that part of Area 9's population has gradually moved out of the community due to the threat of eviction by the PAT. The rules of access, which have been transformed from common to open access, enhances the mobility rate of the inhabitants. A portion of the population was then replaced in part by those recipients of rights to public housing, who had sold their rights and moved back from Flat 11-18 and the 70 RAI sites-and-services area to Area 9. This includes a large portion of population who moved to Area 9 from other squatter settlements of Bangkok. This rapid pace of turnover further enhances the transformation of access rules from common to open access.
Zone 1, therefore, retains the highest percentage of original settlers indicated by the longest mean length of stay in the Klong Toey community (16.9 years), followed by Area 9 (16.236 years) (see Table 5.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.4 LENGTH OF STAY IN THE KLONG TOEY AND WAT CHONGLOM SETTLEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this light, granting of fairly secure land tenure without proper measures of control tends to inflate property value and encourage land speculation. Since a fifteen-year land tenure is granted to dwellers in 70 Rai, land and housing in this area has started to gain higher face value. Legally, this area is recognized not as a squatter settlement, but as a residential area on leased land. Practically, however, the PAT can revoke the 20-year contract at any moment. Due to such uncertainty, the cost of housing in this area is relatively lower than the average housing in Bangkok, which attracts more of the lower-middle income group who seek temporary low-cost housing. In other words, the rules of access are also determined in part by market forces. This condition is indicated by the high percentage of new households and a shorter average length of
stay. The survey found only 2.1% of the total households are original participants in the 70 Rai's site-and-service program. The average 10.868 years of staying in the Klong Toey community indicates a large portion of the population moved around within the Klong Toey community itself. The rest of the households either moved from the province or from other squatter settlements in Bangkok.

Since Flat 11-18 has the most secure tenure in the Klong Toey settlement, it shares a similar pattern of movement in the Klong Toey community with 70 Rai. The only difference is Flat 11-18 has a shorter average length of stay. Only 2.9% of the respondents have not moved in the last five years with an average of 6.29 years of stay in the Klong Toey community. This indicates a high number of selling of dwelling units in Flat 11-18 to occupants from outside the Klong Toey community.

The Wat Chonglom settlement, which has some security of tenure, has a pattern of movement which falls between the two groups--the Area 9/Zone 1 group and the 70 Rai/Flat 11-18 group. Despite of its year-by-year contract of tenure, the Wat Chonglom occupants tend to perceive that their tenure of land is rather secure, since they have never been threatened by eviction. Approximately 12.3% of its
respondents have not moved in the last five years with an average of 13 years in the community.

In other words, dwellers in a more capitalistic form of land allocation are more likely to be new dwellers from outside the settlement, since it has a more rapid turnover of population. Economically, this pattern indicates a high buying and selling rate in communities of the more capitalistic form than that of the popular form of land allocation. A higher income group is also expected in the more capitalistic form of land allocation.

However, land tenure and property values are not the only reasons for moving from or staying in the squatter settlement. Economic constraints tends to be a better explanation for dwellers to choose the popular form of land allocation. The next section will discuss the different underlying reasons for dwelling in the various forms of land allocation.

5.4 SELLING AND MOVING TO/FROM THE SQUATTER COMMUNITIES

Economic objectives and employment accessibility are the two important factors to be discussed in this section. A consistent hierarchy of factors which make it necessary to stay in the present communities is found in the five study areas.

Regarding the intention to sell or to retain their shelters, this research found that the people of Wat
Chonglom have the highest percentage of owner-occupiers who need to retain their shelter. 83.9% of owner-occupiers in this area do not want to sell their homes and 9.85% of them need to stay in the community because there is no alternative housing available for them (see Table 5.5). Due to the disadvantage of its poor accessibility to the main street, it is an ideal neighborhood to accommodate low income wage workers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.5 SELLING CONSIDERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOT SELL BECAUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ALTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9 89.04% 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1 74.64% 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI 34.21% 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18 31.42% 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM 83.09% 59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area 9 has the second highest percentage of dwellers (89.04%) who need to stay in the present community. All of the dwellers who express their need to live in the community specify economics as the major reason. Since Area 9 is physically the most deteriorated and has absolutely no security of tenure, alternative housing of equal value would be relatively easy to find around Bangkok. The rest of the dwellers who express their need to sell their shelter are
either expecting a higher return from the sell (2.73%) or are in need of cash (6.84%), both of which are in a very low percentage. This indicates a low level of speculation.

However, there are also some exceptions within the Area 9 community. Attaporn's case, described earlier in this chapter, indicates that absolute poverty might not always be the reason for staying in Area 9. Attaporn's proprietorship in this area allows him to generate income not only from rent, but also from his noodle shop. Speculation might not be Attaporn's incentive to retain his father's property in Area 9, since property value has not increased rapidly due to impending eviction. However, income differences still exist despite the deteriorated physical conditions in this community with an "open access" type of property regime.

The people of Zone 1, which is the transitional form of land allocation, show relatively lower economic and employment needs than those of Area 9 and Wat Chonglom. As few as 18.30% of the dwellers in Zone 1 hesitate to move from their present home due to lack of alternative housing. There is a higher percentage of speculation in this area than in Area 9 and Wat Chonglom. Four per cent of the owners expect a high return from their property.

Dwellers in Flat 11-18 and 70 RAI, which are the state/capitalist and transitional forms of land allocation, rank an even lower in opportunities for economic endeavor.
and employment. Alternative housing of equal condition proved to be a more important factor. Dwellers also expect a higher price from their dwelling unit. Due to the fact that the 70 Rai area has been granted a 15-year tenure, the price of the property tends to decrease as the 15-year tenure is approaching its end. The study shows the highest percentage of owners intending to sell their property while the price is still high. All 47.36% of owners who express their intent to sell their house cite "high return" as the reason for selling. Again, intervention by the state via sites-and-services program tends to enhance the process of articulation of the capitalist form of land allocation and to transform the state form of land allocation to a capitalistic one. It greatly increases property value which induces selling and speculation. The declining tenure expectation further prompts owners to sell their property before the value decreases (see also Table 5.5).

5.5 DEGREE OF STATE INTERVENTION AND PROVISION OF SERVICES

Land tenure determines not only property value, it also implies the legality of land occupation, which further governs the state's provision of public services. The physical setting of the different forms of land allocation, as a result of segregated provisions, further affects the well-being and life chance of dwellers. This section will
discuss in a greater detail how the distinctive legality in different form of land allocation brings about the different types of public service provisioning.

The accessibility of public utilities in each area affects differently both the physical setting of each settlement, and the economic condition of households in each of the areas. Local regulations do not allow the provision of electricity and water supply to households which do not hold a house registration. Consent from the landlord is needed for the application of a house registration and the provision of public utilities. In the cases of Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom, lack of land tenure is the major obstacle, besides the unaffordability, preventing dwellers from obtaining utilities. The present survey shows the different types of treatment from the utility providers according to the type of land tenure (See table 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.6 PROVISION OF ELECTRICITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOT PROVIDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Therefore, legal issues appear to be among the most important factors determining the living conditions in the squatter settlements. Since all households in Area 9 are considered completely illegal, only 67.12% of the families are provided with electricity from the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), and only 20.54% of the households are legally provided with water supply. The rest of them have to either share their electricity with their neighbor or buy it from the local utility broker at a
higher cost. However, almost all households in Area 9, 70 RAI, and Flat 11-18 are able to acquire services from the authorities. This situation, therefore, differentiates both economic and hygienic conditions of one form of land allocation from another. The collection of garbage, for example, greatly affects the hygiene of the community. The present survey reveals that a total of 82.19% of the households in Area 9 never obtains garbage collection service from the city, while only 18.30% and 2.85% of the households in Zone 1 and Flat 11-18 cannot get access to garbage disposal. Virtually all the residents in 70 RAI and Wat Chonglom can get access to garbage disposal by some means. This may partly explain the relatively poorer health of both Area 9 and Zone 1 and makes for the more appealing physical appearance of the 70 RAI and Flat 11-18.

Another factor affecting the health and hygienic conditions of the dwellers is the provision of rainstorm drainage such as that serving as sewers in Central Bangkok. The typical means of human waste disposal in Bangkok is ground-sipping type of septic tanks. The rest of the waste water is drained through the common rainstorm drainage through a network of canals into the Chao Praya river which directs all the waste water into the Gulf of Thailand. Almost none of the households in Area 9 and Zone 1 are provided with such rainstorm drainage. Waste water is
generally returned to the swamp beneath the house. Such accumulated waste water encourages the breeding of mosquitoes. Pressure from underground water during the rainy season and high tide period obstructed the sipping process of septic tanks and causes an unfavorable smell. Almost all the households in 70 Rai and Flat 11-18, however, have their sewers connected. A network of drainage lines was built during the planning of site-and-services and the flat project. Flooding and accumulation of waste water rarely occurs in these two areas. Due to Wat Chonglom's low land and flooding conditions, drainage cannot properly channel waste water into the canal. Only 54.92% of the households get access to rainstorm drainage compared to more than 98% of both 70 Rai and Flat 11-18 of Khlong Toey (see Table 5.9). These differences of physical settings in each of the study areas proved to be one of the major factors attracting tenants into the community, which affects the economic opportunity of the households.

**TABLE 5.9 PROVISION OF RAIN STORM DRAINAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>NOT PROVIDED N</th>
<th>BANGKOK N</th>
<th>COMMUNITY N</th>
<th>OTHER/NHA N</th>
<th>TOTAL N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>98.63% 72</td>
<td>1.36% 1</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>94.36% 67</td>
<td>4.22% 3</td>
<td>1.40% 1</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>1.31% 1</td>
<td>3.94% 3</td>
<td>67.10% 51</td>
<td>27.63% 21</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>5.42% 1</td>
<td>12.85% 9</td>
<td>10.00% 7</td>
<td>75.71% 53</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Beautification of the physical environment appears to be the underlying reason for upgrading by the authority rather than welfare and the provision of public utilities. According to Mai Boonyasop, one of the community leaders in Zone 1, the upgrading program in this area was initiated by the NHA and is jointly sponsored by NGOs, the military, and some political parties. And in order to continue acquiring its funding, the output of the upgrading program must be visibly obvious. However, the major successes of the project have been the building of a network of concrete walkways in the area and the direct connection of the water supply from the Bangkok Waterwork Authority. Rainstorm drainage was considered a low priority since it cannot function properly in conveying waste water from the area. Again, land tenure plays an indirect role in determining the provision of public services, even from non-governmental organizations. Unlike Zone 1, Area 9 is not directly threatened by eviction, and therefore, upgrading is allowed. The provision of walkways and water supply not only improves the physical conditions, it also enhances life chance of dwellers.

Accessibility to shelter affects not only the quality of life and public safety but also economic opportunities within the different form of land allocation. Access streets in the five study areas range from temporary broad walks to
concrete streets. Planning, type of materials and the condition of access streets and pedestrians walk ways are determined by the types of housing programs in each area, which is determined by the type of land tenure and legality within each form of land allocation.

The lowest income group in Area 9 cannot afford to build concrete walkways with their own budget. Access ways in this community are mostly temporary board walks, with only 9.58 per cent of the households alongside concrete walkways and 6.84 per cent alongside concrete streets. Therefore, safety has long been a major problem, especially during fires, since temporary board walks are unstable and narrow. Permanent boardwalks also need constant maintenance and can hardly accommodate handcarts. This situation also hinders the transportation of goods into and out of the community (see Table 5.10). Further more, the physical setting of Area 9 is deteriorated by the "open access" nature of its property regime. Dwellers in Area 9 started to seek alternative shelters elsewhere due to the eviction threat, and vacant plots are thus available for occupants who sold their right to public housing and are in need of shelters. This situation develops an "open access" type of property regime, in which proprietorship and responsibility of dwellers are not clearly stipulated. Since virtually no

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rule of access is specified, occupants tend not to maintain the physical settings of the community as common property.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA 9</th>
<th>TEMPORARY BOARD</th>
<th>PERMANENT BOARD</th>
<th>UNPAVED STREET</th>
<th>CONCRETE WALK</th>
<th>CONCRETE STREET</th>
<th>TOTAL REAL WAY</th>
<th>N NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.57% 34</td>
<td>27.39% 20</td>
<td>9.58% 7</td>
<td>9.58% 7</td>
<td>6.84% 5</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>1.40% 1</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>97.18% 69</td>
<td>1.40% 1</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>1.31% 1</td>
<td>81.57% 62</td>
<td>17.10% 13</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>30.00% 21</td>
<td>70.00% 49</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>7.04% 5</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>92.95% 66</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the concrete access ways in Zone 1 and 70 RAI are narrow and do not accommodate auto traffic, goods can be transported into and out of the community easily by handcart. Venders' push carts can be brought into shelter at night conveniently.

Physical variation also exists within each community. Households located on main streets are able to take advantage of good access to motor vehicles which allows more profitable economic activities than those dwellings on secondary streets and along walkways. Examples of economic activities along main streets are auto mechanic shops, body shops, medical clinics, small grocery stores, newsstands, and medium-sized restaurants, while there are mostly small household enterprises along the secondary streets. Property values of shelters along main streets, therefore, increase.
more rapidly than of those located on the secondary streets. However, since Area 9 has only a temporary boardwalk and Wat Chonglom has only concrete walkways, these two areas have a more consistent pattern of access, and less variation in economic activities than 70 Rai and Zone 1. Since Flat 11-18 are walk-up apartments buildings, variation between floors exists according to the height of each floor. Goods can be more easily delivered to the lower floors than to the upper floors.

In short, the provision of public services has a profound impact on the welfare and economic situation of the low income households. This situation differentiates the physical condition and economic opportunities among different forms of land allocation. The illegality of the popular form has been an obstacle to the urban poor, preventing them from getting access to a wide range of public services. The lack of public utilities suppresses the property value, discourages renting, affects the environmental health, and diminishes economic opportunities. In addition, dwellers must pay a higher per-unit rate when an illegal connection is made through their neighbors.

Since the lack of public services decreases property value and discourages potential tenants, land tenure, which governs the pattern of service provisions thus plays a significant role in income generation from housing. It
directly affects the pattern of renting itself. The next section discusses the research findings pertaining to income as generated by housing in greater detail.

5.6 HOUSING AS A SOURCE OF INCOME

Another strategy to supplement the family income is to sublet unused space in the shelter to individuals or families outside the existing household. This differs somewhat from the co-residency strategy, which will be discussed later. Different forms of land allocation have their own pattern of subletting. Low income communities with minimal tenure and with moderate levels of intervention, on the one hand, tend to attract more subletters due to their rather decent physical conditions and cheap rent. On the other hand, the urban poor have very little alternative but to sublet their home to supplement their shortage of income. The middle income group in the state/capitalist and capitalist forms of land allocation tend to resort to other types of economic activities, such as home enterprises, rather than subletting part of their home. With sufficient income, some of the middle class families, such as that of Kwan, a subcontractor who live in the 70 Rai area, do not find it congenial to have a stranger living in their home. This study found that Zone 1 and Wat Chonglom have the highest rate of subletting--40.84% of the total households
in both areas (see Table 5.11). Zone 1 is in a transitional form of land allocation which went through several slum-upgrading programs joint venture by NGOs and the NHA. Despite its limited accessibility, Wat Chonglom likewise went through a comprehensive upgrading program sponsored by Citibank. Both communities have more preferable physical environments than Area 9. Both areas attract more subletters from other parts of Bangkok's slums and new migrants from rural areas than Area 9. The income insufficiency of households in both areas, on the other hand, tends to encourage householders to sublet their surplus spaces.

**Table 5.11 Coreidence and Subletting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Allowing Some One to Live With</th>
<th>Subletting</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Total Real Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 9</td>
<td>75.34%</td>
<td>28.76%</td>
<td>2.62 : 1</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 1</td>
<td>85.91%</td>
<td>40.84%</td>
<td>2.10 : 1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Rai</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>18.42%</td>
<td>2.71 : 1</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat 11-18</td>
<td>67.14%</td>
<td>7.14%</td>
<td>9.40 : 1</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wat Chonglom</td>
<td>60.56%</td>
<td>40.84%</td>
<td>1.48 : 1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 28.76% of Area 9's residence sublet their shelters. Firstly, being located on an unfilled swamp without proper means of access and utilities, Area 9 is relatively less attractive to subletters who can afford to pay minimal rents. Secondly, being too poor and without any
tenure security in their present housing, dwellers are hesitant to make any extension to be sublet. With the exception of Flat 11-18, most of the dwellers who are renters and subletters in the other four study areas described their relationship with the landlord as average or 'indifferent'. Without the pressure of high property values, Area 9 has the highest number of dwellers who have 'excellent' relationships with their landlord. Since Area 9 attracts very few tenants, the good landlord-tenant relationship might be attributed to the generosity of the landlords in this area (see Table 5.12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.12 RELATIONSHIP WITH LANDLORDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY BAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A higher return is normally expected in the capitalist form of land allocation because most owners tend to view housing as a form of investment. Kwan stated that most of the businesses in the 70 Rai area generate higher return than the rest of the Klong Toey area. One should obtain an equivalent of what a business can make while renting out
one's home. Therefore, household enterprise is more desirable for house owners than renting. In the 70 Rai area, only 18.42% of its households sublet their homes to outsiders. This situation reflects a strong individualism and is due to the fact that residents in the 70 Rai area expect more income from other economic activities performed within their shelter than from subletting their homes. In other words, subletting is less a survival strategy for 70 Rai than other communities in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom areas. The present survey found that most households which face main streets in the 70 Rai area are pursuing some form of economic activity.

Prapot, a butcher who lives in the 70 RAI area, stated that his business needs a large space. It is able to yield more return than renting the room to a stranger. Even though the killing of pigs is normally performed in the nearby field, most of the cutting and sorting is done inside his home. Then the pig is put on his pickup truck to be delivered to the nearby market. Prapot offers cheaper pork to his retailer and is handy should any of them need extra pork at a particular time. The killing occurs approximately 20 minutes before delivery while pork from the farm takes an extra day. Retailers are able to obtain fresh and perpetually available pork. Even though home killing of pigs is illegal, it is very common in the Klong Toey area,
especially during festival periods. Since most food stuffs, besides Prapot's live pigs, are from the nearby Area 9 and Zone 1, the 70 Rai area also serves as a place to process and to channel domestic products from Area 9 and Zone 1 to the local markets. According to Prapod, types of businesses differ from one area to the other. The value added on products processed in 70 RAI is much higher than that of Area 9 and Zone 1--normally pigs are raised in Area 9, yet they are killed and sold in 70 Rai. Live pigs are bought from Area 9 at a low cost, whereas the price of pork increases dramatically after killing and processing. Prapot thus considers space in his shelter more valuable than that of Area 9, and more worthwhile to use for business rather than subletting.

In other words, the higher property value of 70 RAI--an area with a capitalistic form of land allocation--tends to raise the level of expectation on return generated by the shelter. The once prevalent traditional style of social values is then weakened by the commercialization and speculation of property. Rates of subletting are therefore, the lowest among the five study areas. Despite the expectation of high returns from property, 7.89% of the subletters describe their relation with their landlord as 'excellent,' second only to Area 9. This situation is due to
the high level of income in this area which eases economic pressures.

Only 7.14% of the households in Flat 11-18 are found subletting their dwelling units. This circumstance is due to the fact that a high percentage of flat dwellers are already renting from the speculators. Each unit might be shared by several people who rent from the present owner. For owner-occupiers in Flat 11-18, living space in each unit is too limited to be subdivided for more dwellers outside the family. Besides, most owners are lower-middle class whose steady income has made subletting the least desirable option. Social relations in this community tend to be more individualistic, and housing is more commercialized than in the rest of the study areas. Socially, more than half of the renters--55.71%--describe their relationship with the house owners as 'very bad.'

Subletting is, however, common in the Wat Chonglom area in addition to its high incidence of co-residency. The unfavorable physical setting of Wat Chonglom impairs its potential for larger scale home business. There is no major access street and entry is available only through the railroad, and thus no motor vehicle larger than a motorcycle is able to get access the community (see map in Chapter III). The neighborhood thus becomes a dormitory community, where large portions of its space houses workers from the
nearby factories. Supplementing the household's income by means of subletting is found more than other means of income generation. As high as 40.84% of the households in the Wat Chonglom community sublet their home to individuals outside their families (see Table 5.11). Most renters are workers from the nearby factories. However, due to low property values, and therefore, less capitalistic nature in this community, most renters have moderately good relationship with their landlords (see Table 5.12).

The pattern found in the five study areas indicates that the extent of subletting as income generation is determined by both economic, social, and physical factors. First, the physical condition of the area is among the most important factors in either attracting tenants or providing alternative sources of income. Despite the stronger traditional life style in the popular form of land allocation in Area 9, subletters are discouraged by its deteriorated and congested physical conditions. Zone 1 and Wat Chonglom, on the other hand, are under the upgrading program which has substantially improved their physical condition, increased their property values and attracted more tenants than Area 9. Good physical conditions are, however, a product of the provision of decent public services which is determined by land tenure and forms of
land allocation. Wat Chonglom's physical setting allows limited accessibility which limits other types of economic activities and leaves its dwellers no other alternative except to sublet their houses.

Secondly, the ability to invest in a commercial enterprise yielding a higher return than subletting tends to suppress subletting. 70 RAI's dwellers, for instance, fall within the higher income group and tend to use their space for economic activities other than subletting. With limited ability to invest, occupants in Area 9 resort to petty commodity and small home enterprises as primary means of economic survival. Women and children work to reduce the cost of living and to supplement household income. This same pattern of survival strategy is exploited in higher income areas such as 70 Rai in the case of Prapot.

Socially, the extent of subletting is also governed by the level of individualism of the residents. The research findings indicate that residents in the popular form are less individualistic than those in the capital form of land allocation (see mutual help and co-residency below).

5.7 Employment and Journey to Work.

Tenure and form of land allocation also have a profound impact on employment and length of journey to work, which are important determinants to income and means of survival. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the availability of means
of supplementing the income is the most important factor governing the economic survival of the family, since a large portion of income is derived from members other than the household head, especially in the lowest income groups. This section discusses how the economic aspects of different forms of land allocation govern the life-chance of the low income households.

I shall start the discussion with a profile of the household heads. Level of education is one of the factors determining the probability and level of household heads' job attainment, and therefore, his/her income. Level of education indirectly allocates the household into one of the three forms of land allocation. In fact, level of education interacts with level of income whereby individuals from higher income families have a better chance to receive a better education, and better educated individuals tend to have higher incomes. New migrants with little education can hardly obtain sufficient and constant income to get access to land held in the capitalist form.

The survey found a consistent pattern in the level of the household head's education—lowest in the area with the popular form of land allocation and highest in the area with the state/capitalist form. This pattern exists due to the fact that buyers of dwelling rights tend to be middle class
and more educated than squatters. The average of educational attainment points to the fact that Flat 11-18 has the highest education level while Area 9 has the lowest. However, differences in level of education and level of income among each of the areas are made less explicit by the large number of relatively low income renters in 70 RAI, Flat 11-18, and Wat Chonglom. (see Table 5.13).

**TABLE 5.13 AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA 9</th>
<th>ZONE 1</th>
<th>70 RAI</th>
<th>FLAT 11-18</th>
<th>WAT CHONGLOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.477</td>
<td>7.142</td>
<td>8.491</td>
<td>5.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The form of land allocation is not only correlated with the level of education, it governs the availability of employment and the distance from home to work in two different ways. Firstly, forms of land allocation implicitly allocate dwellers with different level of education to different areas according to their ability to pay, as discussed earlier. Level of education, however, also determines the individual's type and location of employment. Secondly, the ability to pay for housing is also associated with the ability to invest in a household business. Dwellers in the capitalist form of land allocation engage in larger home businesses than do those in the popular form.

Along with the level of education, the study also
found a consistent pattern of employment in the five study areas. Even though the most prominent type of employment in all areas is wage labor, ranging from 29% in Flat 11-18 to 40.7% in Area 9, there is a significant difference among other types of employment. The physical setting of each area also plays a significant role in determining these differences. For example, there are more home enterprises in both Zone 1 and 70 RAI than the rest of the areas since Zone 1 and 70 RAI are on-the-ground type of housing which facilitates economic activity (see Table 5.14). Flat 11-18 and Wat Chonglom, however, have a more restrictive physical environments, and therefore, accommodate less home enterprise and more salary workers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.14 OCCUPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SMALL SALARY DEPENDENTS</th>
<th>TOTAL BUSINESS N WORKERS N</th>
<th>N NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>.0% 0</td>
<td>8.7% 45</td>
<td>29.7% 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>2.1% 15</td>
<td>3.5% 26</td>
<td>43.7% 319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>1.3% 5</td>
<td>3.4% 14</td>
<td>33.0% 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>.2% 1</td>
<td>10.9% 69</td>
<td>45.8% 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>.0% 0</td>
<td>10.9% 37</td>
<td>35.6% 118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The level and regularity of income also determines the form of land allocation that the urban poor can afford. Physical space in the different forms of land allocation, in turn, dictates to a certain extent, the types of employment. The regular salary of government officials guarantees the regular rental payment of housing in Flat 11-18. This process automatically filters out the lower class without a regular income.

Nongnuch, a housewife and laundry cleaner, lived in Area 9 at the time of survey. Her husband, Poj, is working as a brick layer for a construction company. The subcontractor called on Poj whenever he needed him paying him 200 baht a day. They had to give up their flat because they could not afford the regular rental payment since Poj's job was seasonal. Nongnuch herself could not continue her laundry service from the apartment due to its lack of space to hang cloths. The unit was later sold to Somchart, a clerk who works for the district administration office. Somchart's monthly salary together with his wife's wages at the garment factory is enough to pay the monthly installment. The demand for cost recovery in public housing project which require regular payment and creates an economic mismatch between the ability to pay of the urban poor and these demand. They are major obstacles barring the poor from access to public housing.
Nongnuch's case reflects a number of factors contributing to the importance of the popular form of land allocation to the urban poor. First, Poj's irregular income is a key factor preventing him from living in Flat 11-18. Second, social network in Area 9 enable Poj's employer to call upon him whenever labor is needed (A detailed discussion regarding social network and contract labor will be presented later in this section). Third, physical space in Area 9 facilitates certain types of household economic activity, such as Nongnuch's laundry business. Fourth, Somchart's level of education allows him to work as a civil servant and thus determines the regularity of his salary and ability to pay for rents in Flat 11-18. Government housing is virtually inaccessible to the poorest group.

However, home enterprises still can be found in higher income communities such as Flat 11-18. Despite of the prohibition of commercial activities, and the limited physical settings of Flat 11-18, the present study found a number of economic activities in the buildings. Approximately 3% of the households in Flat 11-18 engage in some kind of commercial activity, i.e., beauty salon, barber shop, video store, small grocery, and soft drink vendors. Only 0.2% of the population are street vendors. Most of these activities exist in spite of the fact that they
violate the NHA's apartment regulations. Although the closest area where food can be obtained is 10-20 minutes walk, some food stalls are temporarily allowed in the basements of the flats to serve the community, on a case by case basis.

As mentioned earlier, the physical setting of Wat Chonglom barely facilitates household economic activities making subletting a prime alternative. On the contrary, housing in this settlement becomes a major source of income supplement for the household. This makes Wat Chonglom an inexpensive and decent place to stay for most factory workers. However, regularity of income is still a key factor allowing people to live there. In addition, residents can stay close to their relatives where social supports are easy to find. The social aspect of survival strategy will be discussed later in this chapter.

Table 5.15 DISTANCE TO WORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTANCE FROM WORK/KM</th>
<th>AREA 9</th>
<th>ZONE 1</th>
<th>70 RAI</th>
<th>FLAT 11-18</th>
<th>WAT CHONGLOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 N</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 N</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 N</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 N</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE N</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately half of the family income, especially
that of the lowest income group, is generated within the household (see Table 5.16). The form of land allocation is a significant factor determining the way households obtain their supplemental income. Intervention by the state and NGOs tends to economically benefit the middle class rather than the poorest group. The relatively larger living area and decent access to the shelters, such as concrete walkways and concrete access streets, facilitate home enterprises in the 70 RAI community, the facilities of which are subsidized by the NHA and NGOs. Zone 1 also enjoys upgraded facilities--concrete walkways and water supply--which are not available in Area 9. The form of land allocation, therefore, indirectly governs the availability of particular life chance in that area, which is part of the major source of family income. The result of the survey shows that Area 9 has the highest number of street vendors despite its deteriorated physical settings and lack of public utilities. On the contrary, Zone 1 and 70 RAI have the highest percentage of home-enterprises since these communities have the highest purchasing power (see also Table 5.14).
Table 5.16 PROPORTION OF INCOME GENERATED IN THE HOUSEHOLD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA 9</th>
<th>ZONE 1</th>
<th>70 RAI</th>
<th>FLAT 11-18</th>
<th>WAT CHONGLOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of HH</td>
<td>2342.322</td>
<td>3069.279</td>
<td>3722.167</td>
<td>8322.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>5121.127</td>
<td>6905.103</td>
<td>7745.989</td>
<td>9686.157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 512 729 401 635 337

Average income generated by other members 54.3% 55.5% 51.9% 14.0% 40.05%

Proximity to employment is among the key factors relating to forms of land allocation since types of employment outside the household are important determinants of distance and time spent on traveling to work. The present survey found that most dwellers in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities work within a radius of 4 to 10 kilometers, which implies the importance of Klong Toey's location close to employment, especially for the lowest income group. According to Kru Prateep, low paid jobs, such as factory work and porters, which need little skill and knowledge, tend to concentrate around Klong Toey squatter settlements. Furthermore, the location of the Klong Toey settlement is not so important for the state/capitalist and capitalist forms of land allocation such as 70 RAI and Flat 11-18 where less employment is available in the settlement itself. The survey found the average time of overall journeying to work ranges from 1.6-2.3 hours.

The location of the popular form of land allocation is
also important for employers to locate their prospective workers. Certain types of job, such as sub-contracted construction work, as in the case of Poj discussed earlier, are seasonal and tend to be far away from worker's residence. Sub-contractors called upon workers when ever they needed them. This process needs a worker network through which organizers can identify the distinctive skill of each particular worker and where to find them. Workers who clustered in the Klong Toey community can be easily and quickly teamed up since workers themselves know each other well.

Jamlong is a ready-made seamstress, living in Area 9. She obtains her sewing jobs from sub-contractors who roam around the Klong Toey area distributing materials and collecting ready-made dresses. Jamlong's husband, Kamdee, is a painter who is currently working for a high rise project. She relates that, in some instances, Kamdee has to leave home and stay at the construction site day and night during work days, and return home only on holidays throughout the project, which is situated on the other side of Bangkok. Normally construction sites would provide temporary shelters for workers who cannot commute in order to increase the efficiency of the work force. Samorn and Boonsri, aged 12 and 14, help their mother to sew after school and during
week ends. She prefers that her husband stay at the
construction site even though it is only 10 kilometers away.
The Bangkok traffic makes it impossible for Kamdee to
commute. Kamdee's income contributes to only half of the
family's earnings; the family could not survive if Jamlong
were unemployed. The economic survival of most families in
the Area 9 need the supplementary incomes generated from the
household enterprises or vending activities prepared at
home. The rest of the family members who declare themselves
"unemployed" are, in fact, often assisting the income
activities of the families.

In other words, the location of the popular form of
land allocation is an important factor in a number of ways.
First, it is a place where networks for employment can be
found. This type of network does not exist in other form of
land allocation due to several factors. Unskilled labor does
not concentrate in the capitalistic form of land allocation
and residents of Flat 11-18 hardly know each other. Second,
it functions as a foothold for Kamdee's family while he is
away at the construction site. Third, it is a place where
half of the family income is achieved.

In Jamlong's case, the household is a place where
unpaid labor is exploited. Often times, most members of the
low income households work without pay to support each
other's economic activities. Jandee's household is a classic case.

Jandee's husband, Manop, works as a porter at the PAT. Manop's employment is contracted by a shipping company where he is called upon whenever a ship arrives. He spends the rest of his time helping Jandee prepare preserved fruits and traditional deserts to be sold on the street. Their three children, aged 11, 13, and 15, attend the local public school. Somchai, the first son, spends his weekend selling flowers and newspapers at a nearby intersection's traffic light supplementing the family's income. He also responsible for the preparation of supper after school for the two brothers while Chandee sells her desserts on the street. The other two children help acquire supplies for Jandee's desserts from a small supply shop at the nearby market place where she usually obtains her supplies and make the payment a few days later. The significance of living in Area 9 for Jandee's family was due to the fact that porters are usually clustered in certain areas and are easily teamed. Jandee needed space in the house, sufficient to mix, cook, and bake her desserts, which Flat 11-18 does not offer. Their monthly income is less than 6000 baht, not sufficient to live in the 70 Rai area where the average income is close to 8000 baht.

Urban poor of Third World countries survive life in the
city not only by means of economic measures. Socially, the urban poor extend their survival strategies outside the boundaries of the household. The aggregation of urban poor in the same community creates a wide range of mutual help. The sections that follow discuss the different types and extent of mutual help which occurs in different forms of land allocation.

5.8 THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF THE POOR'S ECONOMIC SURVIVAL

The urban poor encounter not only economic hardship, they also have to cope with social and psychological problems. However, the differences in socioeconomic and physical settings of different forms of land allocation cause them to react differently. Several strategies, such as income sharing, mutual help, and co-residency, are applied to relieve their economic and psychological dilemmas in order to survive in the city.

5.8.1 INCOME SHARING

One of the prominent strategies of the urban poor is to pool their income within their households. Income pooling is, in fact, a traditional way of life within the Thai society where members of the family work in the field and the household head administers the income to provide food and necessities to the members of the household. In modern rural Thai society where part of the household income is from non-farm employment, children pass on their non-farm
monthly income to the parents to supplement the farming activities, especially during the off seasons. This tradition still prevails among the urban poor as a mean of household survival strategy. Each area with its own form of land allocation and housing production has a distinctive degree of income sharing. With the exception of Area 9, the present survey reveals a particular pattern whereby the popular form of land allocation has the highest portion of income sharing, while the capitalistic form has the lowest. Since Area 9 has a high number of new in-migrants, particularly from the nearby squatter settlement, whose traditional characteristics have already been weakened, income sharing in the household is also suppressed. With the exception of Wat Chonglom, this assumption is also supported by the fact that the level of income sharing corresponds with the average length of stay in each area, namely, those who stay the longest have the highest level of income sharing. As mentioned earlier, acquaintance and friendship developed in the community reduce the extent of individualism and establish a higher rate of income sharing (see Table 5.17).
Table 5.17 INCOME SHARING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INCOME SHARING N</th>
<th>NO INCOME SHARING N</th>
<th>REAL NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>71.23% 52</td>
<td>28.76% 21</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>83.09% 59</td>
<td>16.90% 12</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>59.21% 45</td>
<td>40.78% 31</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>45.71% 32</td>
<td>54.28% 38</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>28.16% 20</td>
<td>71.83% 51</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Narin, a worker in one of the gas stations on Rama IV road, sublets two rooms in a shack in Zone 1. His four fellow workers take shifts staying in one of the rental rooms while Narin and his wife take another separate room. Cooking and eating is the only major problem in the household since each of the members works and return home at a different time. Some of them have to leave home early in the morning. Each of the members pays 700 baht per month for rental, utilities and food. Seefa, Narin's wife has the responsibility of administering the budget, buying food, and cooking, and spending the rest of her time on her laundry business. Meals are prepared in the afternoon so that all six members of the household can have dinner together after two of them return from work and before the other two leave for their night shift jobs. The leftovers are kept for breakfast. Narin explains that it is the only way to reduce the high cost of living in the city. Eating together and helping each other as a household is their way of life in
the province where they came from.

Income pooling in the popular form of land allocation is more prominent than in the capitalistic form of land allocation due to several reasons. First it is more necessary for the poorest group in the popular form due to its relative irregularity of income. Secondly, the more individualistic setting of the capitalist and state/capitalist form is an obstacle to income sharing. Third, the physical setting of the state/capitalist form of land allocation allows little social interaction. The same reasons applied to other social strategies such as mutual help.

5.8.2 MUTUAL HELP

Collective activities in the field was the traditional Thai way of life in the past, especially in rural settings. Planting and harvesting of crops was done communally before the commercialization of agriculture. Mutual help among households in the same village has long been a tradition. On the other hand, an older community tends to be more close knit and more mutual help is expected. This principle applies distinctively to the level of mutual help in the different communities associated with the various forms of land allocation.

The present survey shows a consistent pattern of
mutual help along the different forms of land allocation and housing production. The highest level of mutual help is found in Area 9, within the popular form of land allocation, while the lowest is in Flat 11-18, the more capitalistic form of land allocation. The result also indicates the fact that level of social integration and individualism varies along with the different forms of land allocation. The level of mutual help in each area also coincides with the age of the community indicated by the average length of stay. Area 9, Zone 1, and Wat Chonglom have higher average lengths of stay than 70 RAI and Flat 11-18 and therefore, have more closely knit communities where mutual help is more prevalent. The physical setting of the community is also a factor determining the level of mutual help among neighbors. Dwellers in high rise buildings are found to be more individualistic than dwellers in low rise housing. Flat 11-18 has the lowest rate of mutual help since households are separated by solid walls (see Table 5.18).

TABLE 5.18 MUTUAL HELP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>93.15%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>90.14%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9.85%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>56.57%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43.42%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>32.87%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67.14%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>80.28%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19.71%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

220
Several factors contribute to the lesser extent of mutual help in Flat 11-18--its physical setting, the individualism of the people in the community and their higher level of income which means lower financial need. Duangkamol is a high school student originally from Ayuthaya, whose parents bought a flat unit to accommodate their children while pursuing their education in Bangkok. She lives with her two brothers aged 14 and 16. Her aunt, Peanjan, is working as a cook at a nearby restaurant and is the only adult in the household. According to Duangkamol, dwellers in the flat buildings usually lock their doors and mind their own business. Normally, dwellers know each other through the association of their children, who play with each other in the hallways since there is no any playground nearby. Time spent at the small soft drink store next to the stair case is too short to know anybody. The beauty salon downstairs, where she usually gets her hair cut, is a place where people gossip and but most occupants know their neighbors only superficially.

The form of land allocation also influences the types of mutual help--money lending, house/baby sitting, and emotional support. Again, social and physical setting, and the needs of the dwellers are important factors facilitating certain types of mutual help. Most of the
respondents--ranging from 87% to 97%--obtain mutual help. This involves all three types: emotional help, money lending, and house/baby sitting. The only distinction is that a different priority has been given to each category in the different areas. With the exception of Area 9 and 70 RAI, most of the mutual help is in the form of money lending, house sitting, and baby sitting. Since the urban poor cannot get access to any formal financial services due to their lack of suitable collateral mortgage, informal money lenders are common in most areas of the Klong Toey settlement. Short term money lending from neighbors helps to relieve financial crises, such as unexpected sickness or accident of the family members. It also helps the residents to avoid the high interest charged by professional money lenders.

This research found that Area 9, the popular form of land allocation, has the highest percentage of dwellers citing mutual financial support as a top priority. Wat Chonglom is an exceptional case where a financial cooperative is available in the community. Money lending is seen as less important in this community. Only 2.81% of residents from Wat Chonglom and 8.57% from Flat 11-18 rate money lending from neighbors their first priority of mutual help. The rate of mutual money lending in Flat 11-18 is low due to two reasons. First, there are more middle class
residents in these Flats whose financial situations are less constrained than those living in Area 9 and Zone 1. Secondly, most flat dwellers resort to professional money lenders rather than mutual lending due to the individualistic nature of the flat community (see Table 5.19).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONEY LENDING</th>
<th>HOUSE/BA</th>
<th>EMOTIONAL HELP</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWER YES AND CHOOSE TOTAL</th>
<th>ALL THREE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>21.91%</td>
<td>27.39%</td>
<td>42.46%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>91.76%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>11.26%</td>
<td>71.83%</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>91.53%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
<td>6.57%</td>
<td>36.84%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>55.25%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>32.83%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>70.42%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>80.26%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Psychological issues have been another major concern of the Klong Toey community. A recent survey by Debavalya et.al. (1983) shows the social and economic pressure in most slum communities in Bangkok are higher than average. Economically, the income of most households in Klong Toey are low and unstable. Most families can hardly spend any leisure time together, since almost all the members of the households must take jobs to help earn a living. Concurrently, they are threatened with impending eviction by
the landlord from their present home. It is common for dwellers to seek emotional comfort from their neighbors.

This study found two separate groups which rate psychological support differently among the five study areas. The high groups comprises Area 9 and 70 Rai where 42.46% and 36.84% of the dwellers, respectively, cited mutual psychological support the most important mutual help. The low group includes Zone 1, Flat 11-18, and Wat Chonglom, where only 5.63%, 2.85%, and 4.22% of the dwellers rank psychological support the highest priority.

In short, types of mutual support depends much upon the community's circumstances, which vary from area to area. Area 9 appears to need more psychological help than other types. This is due to the fact that the Area 9 community is facing more hardships than the other areas--financial, eviction, and physical conditions. Area 9's physical setting allows a higher degree of socialization than Flat 11-18 and therefore, house/baby sitting appears to be more prevalent in this area. The 70 RAI area has a higher rate of emotional help despite its more individualistic nature. Perhaps it is due to the fact that emotional support can be easily obtained from friends and relatives remotely through telephone rather than from immediate neighbors.

The fewer instances of emotional support in the popular form of land allocation is also because all members of the
family must work to make a living. Jansri is a housewife living in Area 9. After being frequently unemployed, her husband became an alcoholic. This situation further barred him from getting decent employment. Jansri is now working two jobs to support the family— as a house maid and collecting plastic bags from trash cans after she returns home from her first job. Running short of money to feed her family, and facing her husband's abusive behavior, Jansri is under excessive pressure, both economically and mentally. She receives little psychological support from her neighbors, not because they are unsympathetic, but because she hardly has time to converse with them. Jansri, however, does receive financial support from her neighbors in the forms of money lending and child care while both Jansri and her husband are away from home. The case of Jansri reflects the fact that individualism has started to develop even in the popular form of land allocation due to lack of time, socioeconomic hardship, and emotional pressure.

In summary, mutual help, as one of the urban poor's reactions to the socioeconomic pressure of the urban squatter settlement, is governed by the different socioeconomic and physical settings of the different form of land allocation.
5.8.3 CO-RESIDENCY

Budget sharing within a household is another survival strategy taken by dwellers in the slums. Co-residency means allowing individuals outside the family to reside with the family. The arrangement can be on a shared cost basis, or allowing someone to temporarily share the unit with cost. It indicates not only the means of survival of the household, but also reflects the degree of individualism.

This research found a high percentage of co-residency in the overall Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom settlements as expected, since the five study areas are communities with relatively lower income compared to the average households of Bangkok. However, a difference in magnitude among the different forms of land allocation and housing production is found among the five study areas.

With the exception of Wat Chonglom, the study shows a rather consistent pattern of co-residency among the five study areas--households in the popular form of land allocation have more co-residency than the capitalist/state form of land allocation. Several factors affect the extent of co-residency--financial constraints, physical space/living conditions, land tenure, and the level of individualism.

Area 9 and Zone 1 which are the popular and transitional forms of land allocation have the highest rate
of co-residency. Physically, Area 9 is relatively more deteriorated and more congested than Zone 1. It thus allows less room for outsiders compared to Zone 1. The 70 Rai area is more capitalistic in nature and is thus more individualistic. Fewer co-residents are found in this area. Flat 11-18 is under the state form of land allocation and housing production in which living space is limited by the physical structure of the high rise building. The high percentage of co-residency in Flat 11-18 is due to the fact that there is a rate of renting from speculator landlords, whereby several tenants rent a unit and share the household expenses.

Even though land tenure and collection of rent in Wat Chonglom is merely on a year-by-year basis, its residents have never been threatened with eviction by their landlords. This implicitly strengthens the occupants' sense of security, and thus attracts more relatives from the province to arrive and live with them. Since most co-residents share household expenses, including rental payments, they have a better opportunity to reduce the cost of living in the city.

Pornpen is a factory worker who resides with her aunt and uncle in the Wat Chonglom community. She migrated from Petchabune one year before her two sisters. Three of them are now working at the same factory and send home part of
their wages. Pornpen related that there are two advantages in staying with a relative while in Bangkok. Besides giving her parents peace of mind at home, she is able to save a portion of her income from free housing provided by her uncle and expense sharing with her two sisters. Living close to her work place gives her more opportunity to find a second job when needed. The more traditional social environment maintained by members in the community helped her to adjust to the city's way of life. Prasart, Pornpen's uncle, owns a small store in the community. Having Pornpen and her two sisters living in the household, Prasart is able to leave home, when the girls are back from work, to gather used paper for his wife's paper bag pasting. The girls help with the housework in exchange for free accommodation. In fact, part of the reward transferred to Pornpen's uncle can by no mean be calculated in terms of money. The agglomeration in living together acts as a strategy of survival within the low income community.

On other hand, living space at 70 Rai is relatively more spacious and offers better physical living conditions than Are9 and Zone 1, yet only 50% of its households allow members outside the family to reside with them. This situation indicates the relatively strong individualistic nature of the community.

In short, the extent of co-residency is governed by the
economic constraints of the dwellers rather than by choice. However, there are a number of factors in the various forms of land allocation which govern the pattern of co-residency. Those factors are financial need, limit of physical space/living condition, land tenure, and level of individualism of the urban poor.

5.9 SUMMARY

The findings of this research indicate that the life chances of the urban poor are determined by the environments found in the diverse forms of land allocation and some other intermediate factors. The complicated interaction among the social, economic, and physical factors in each community, thus plays an important role determining the life chance of the urban poor.

Firstly, level of education and income are factors allocating the urban poor into a certain forms of land allocation according to their ability to pay. To live in the capitalist form of land allocation, one needs a large sum of money to pay for the contract and an additional budget for building costs. In addition, the family needs a regular income to pay monthly installment.

Secondly, the distinctive level of state intervention in various forms of land allocation determines unequally the dynamic of land tenure. This situation enhances the rate of
articulation of the capitalist form of land allocation into the existing communal and state form. It further changes property values and encourages speculation. Buying and selling go along with this process.

Thirdly, the provision of public utilities is determined by the types of land tenure and legality of land occupation in separate forms of land allocation. The varying levels of provision thus differentiates the physical conditions of one community from the other.

Fourthly, distinctive physical conditions in various forms of land allocation, on the one hand, facilitate different types of household enterprises and attracts certain classes of tenants to the community. On the other hand, each type of land allocation influences property value differently. Both of these have a direct impact on the urban poor's ability to generate income. However, variations within each form of land allocation exist according to its unique physical settings. Shelters located along the main streets have a greater economic advantage. Furthermore, the open access nature, such as that of Area 9, further deteriorates its physical setting.

Fifthly, the different levels of individualism, financial need and the distinctive physical settings of the alternate forms of land allocation determine the social
aspects of survival strategies, such as income sharing, mutual help and co-residency, distinctively.

Finally, the unpaid labor performed by members of the household in the income supplementing process ultimately benefit the formal economy in the city.

The unique socioeconomic settings in each form of land allocation explains, in part, how the urban poor are allocated into the each community and how they react in order to survive in such a socioeconomic milieu. The scope of survival strategies is not only within the household or neighborhood. The complex structure of the urban political system involve several parties at the local and national levels. The exercise of power is not limited to the state. Involvement ranges from state agencies down to the local patrons, the utility brokers, the drug dealers and the urban poor themselves. All these agents and individuals act differently in each form of land allocation. This complicated structure will be discussed in detail in the chapter that follows.
CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE URBAN POOR'S SURVIVAL STRATEGY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes the interaction between those who function in the political structure of the squatter settlement, and the urban poor. It seeks to explain the motivation and actions of the different agents to aid the urban poor in the five study areas, and the extent to which benefits delivered by distinctive agents reach the urban poor according to their form of land allocation. In addition, this chapter discusses how the urban poor exercise various political survival strategies in dealing with the diverse agents and how they respond to the charitable provisions of each agency vis-a-vis their forms of land allocations.

The previous chapter shows the significance of the forms of land allocation in determining the socioeconomic circumstance of the urban poor. Form of land allocation governs the pattern of land tenure, legality, provision of services, physical environment, and property values. Indirectly, it also differentiates the life chance of the
urban poor--by the variation of working space, employment, financial, and emotional circumstances.

To meet such needs, the urban poor in each form of land allocation adopt particular political strategies. They not only seek means of economic survival within particular niches in their squatter communities, but also exploit the complex relation of political power within and outside their settlements. Since interventions by a wide range of agents--state, NGOs, local organizations--affect the life chance of the urban poor distinctively, the urban poor choose to exploit separate agencies according to their socioeconomic circumstances and needs. Dwellers in the capitalist form of land allocation usually take advantage of state subsidizes and low cost utilities supplied by the providing agencies. Those who are in the popular form, on the other hand, seek protection from both legal and illegal powers--local politicians, charitable students, and the military. Community organizations are also one of the means used to exercise collective bargaining power in order to obtain assistance to suit the needs of the squatters.

At the same time, political agents seek to incorporate the urban poor into power relations: the state, for example, intervenes in the squatter settlement for reasons of security, popularity, and legitimacy; and NGOs, both local and
international involve the community to fulfill their ideological goals. Projects have been started in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities by numerous agencies with varying degrees of effectiveness. Dwellers in each form of land allocation benefit from the local organization and personalities distinctively.

The power structure controlling Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities is further complicated by the large number of agencies involved which can be classified consistent with these three types, the state institutions, NGOs, and the local organizations and personalities.

The state institutions involved in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities comprise three major groups with three major objectives: security, administration and politics. The security agencies include the local police and the military, whereas the administrative agencies involve public service suppliers, welfare providers, and planning agencies, most of whom are civil servants. The local and national politicians are elected representatives from political parties (see table 6.1).

The NGOs comprise two major groups of agents: domestic and international. The domestic groups mostly pursue the goals of their charitable ideology. They include the majority of the non-governmental organizations, such as educational institutions, charitable student groups, and
other volunteers organizations.

Agencies originating within the communities are individual personalities and community organizations and this category includes elected community organizers, community leaders, patrons, local power brokers, utility brokers, under-ground lotto operators, and drug dealers. This is the only group that comprises individuals from within the local community. They are the agencies through which most of the external agencies exercise their power. (See table 6.1).
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**AGENCIES**

**I. THE STATE (external)**

1.1 SECURITY

1.1.1 THE MILITARY

A. The Capital City Protection Task Force
B. The First Infantry of the Thai Army

1.1.2 THE POLICE

1.2 ADMINISTRATIVE

1.2.1 PUBLIC SERVICE AGENCIIES

A. The Electricity Generating Authority
B. The Metropolitan Water Work
C. The Telecommunication Authority of Thailand

1.2.2 THE PLANNING AGENCIES AND CIVIL SERVANTS

A. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA)
B. National Housing Authority (NHA)
C. Department of Public Welfare (Subdivision of Child and Adolescent Welfare)
D. Department of community development

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<tr>
<td>F. Department of labor (Division of job finding service)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Division of Child and youth's welfare control</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Board of Drug Prevention and Control</td>
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1.3 THE REPRESENTATIVES, POLITICIANS

| A. The local politicians | | | | I | I | B | B | B |
| B. The Community Development Volunteer Project | * | | | | B | B | B | B | B |
| C. The Urban Development Project | * | * | | I | I | B | B | B |

II. THE NGOs (external)

2.1 LOCAL NGOs

2.1.1 EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

| A. Division of Human Settlement, Asian Institute of Technology | * | * | I | I | I | I | B |
| B. National Institute of Development and Administration | * | | | | N | N | I | I | B |
| C. Department of Public Welfare, Thammasart University | * | | | | I | I | B | B | B |

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<td>I = indirect benefit to</td>
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</table>
| D. Institute of Thai Study, Thammasart University
| E. Department of Community Development, Kasetsart University
| F. Population Institute, Chulalongkorn University
| G. Center of Urban Study, Chulalongkorn University
| H. Department of Public Health, Mahidol University
| I. Department of Social Science and Anthropology, Mahidol University |

2.1.2 CHARITABLE STUDENT GROUPS

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<td>B. Social Development, Thammasart University</td>
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<td>C. Slum Development Group, Ramkhamhaeng University</td>
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<td>D. Chula Community Group, Chulalongkorn University</td>
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<td>E. University for community, Kasetsart University</td>
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<td>F. Catholic Group, Kasetsart University</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Health improvement and anti-drug group, Kasetsart University</td>
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<td>H. Social Development Group, Kasetsart University</td>
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<td>B. National Council for Women</td>
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<td>C. The Catholic Council for development of Thailand</td>
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<td>D. The Thai Association of University Women</td>
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<td>E. The Thai-Muslim Women Association of Thailand</td>
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<td>F. The Thai Volunteer Women of Reserve Army</td>
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<td>G. The Rachinee Alumni Association</td>
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<td>I. The Family Planning Association of Thailand</td>
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#### 2.2 INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

| A. The UNICEF | [**N**] [**N**] [**N**] [**N**] [**B**] |
| B. UNCHS (HABITAT) | [**N**] [**N**] [**N**] [**A/B**] |

#### III THE URBAN POOR (internal) AND THEIR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

| A. The patron | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| B. The utility broker | [**N**] [**N**] [**N**] [**A/B**] |
| C. The drug dealers | [**A**] [**A**] [**A**] [**A**] [**A/B**] |
| D. The large land lord | [**A/B**] [**A/B**] [**A/B**] [**A/B**] |

#### 3.1 PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALS

| A. The block organization | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| B. The Ruam Num Jai Foundation | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| C. The Child Foundation | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| D. The Duang Prateep Foundation | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| E. The Community Credit Union of Thailand | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| F. The Community Group for Hygiene | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| G. The Volunteer Project for Social Development | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |
| H. Community Relation Group | [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] [**I**] |

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There are rules of access within each of the communities, which represent different composite forms of land allocation. As described earlier in Chapter II and Chapter III, Area 9 is a popular form of land allocation which is also facing impending demolition. It carries the characteristics of "open access" of property regime. The community's collective power is diminished by the nature of its open access.

Even though Zone 1 is under an upgrading program, it still retains, in part, the characteristics of a communal form of land allocation. It thus bears the characteristics of state/popular form of land allocation. Collective power in the decision making process is applied by the community members, to both persuade the state to provide services and to protect and distribute its common interests. Its rules of access are determined mainly by the consent of the community. However, the gradual increase of property value also enhances the capitalist nature of its form of land allocation. Its rules of access are thus determined in part by the ability of the community members to pay for housing.

Due to the 70 Rai's favorable physical conditions and the rather secure land tenure, the attribute of state form of land allocation has been gradually replaced by that of market form. Its rules of access are thus determined more
intensely by its dwellers' ability to pay than by communal consent.

The property regime of Flat 11-18 was also transformed due to the articulation of the capitalist form of land allocation, though to a lesser extent than that of 70 Rai. Since property value in this community does not increase as rapidly as that of 70 Rai, it's rules of access is still more of a state form than a capitalist form of land allocation.

The penetration of the capitalist form of land allocation is more limited in the Wat Chonglom community than both 70 Rai and Flat 11-18. The prime reason has been its unfavorable access to motor traffic which hinders economic activities in the community. Therefore, rules of access in this community are governed more by communal accord than by the individual's ability to pay for housing.

Forms of land allocation are thus important factors determining rules of access and how each of the agencies intervenes in the lives of the urban poor in the squatter communities (see Table 6.1). Since most agencies approach the urban poor through the local communities and their leaders, common property rules of access tends to better accommodate intervention by outsiders than other types of property regimes.

Some exceptions do exist to the hypothesis of forms of
land allocation and property regime. Factors other than forms of land allocation and rules of access also contribute to the political success of the Wat Chonglom community. First, according to Mr. Samrid, a community leader in Wat Chonglom, dwellers in Wat Chonglom tend to perceive a more secure land tenure than residents in other squatter communities, despite its year-by-year tenure contract. This phenomenon is partly due to the unique nature of Wat Chonglom's land owners who have never posed an eviction threat to the community. Second, the unique community organization of Wat Chonglom, led by Ms. Orathai Aj-am, has instituted a successful community development project. Concurrently, a long-term loan without interest from Citi Bank helps improve the community's physical condition.

With the contextual background specified above, the sections that follow analyzes the motivation of each of the agencies and the way they intervene, assist, and organize the urban poor in both the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities. How the poor respond to the intervention of each agency vis-a-vis their forms of land allocations and housing production will also be investigated. Although few agencies, institutions, and personalities explicitly focus on land and housing, the interaction between the urban poor and external agents indirectly affects the distinctive means
of survival of the urban poor according to their respective forms of land allocation and their socioeconomic circumstances.

6.2 THE STATE AGENCIES

State agencies which are involved in the squatter community include the local and central governments, and they perform a variety of functions--security, administrative, and political. Several goals are set forth by each of the agencies according to their responsibility and expected achievements. This section analyses the role and the motivation of each agency and the community members' response to their administration and provisions.

6.2.1 THE SECURITY AGENCIES

The security agencies comprise two different governmental agencies--the military and the police department. While the police department has direct control over the squatter community in terms of vice suppression, military involvement in the squatter settlement is related to national security. Both agencies have implicit goals in dealing with the squatter community.

6.2.1.1 THE MILITARY

Since the 1932 revolution, Thai society, especially rural communities have perceived the military as the liberators of the nation whenever the nation faces any crisis. The state controlled media usually publicizes the
positive roles of the military after each coup. During normal circumstances, the military owned media--radio and television stations--broadcast prime time propaganda programs to maintain its popularity. Thai citizens, considered the state media as 'official' and 'reliable'.

However, following the military's crack down of the student uprising in 1976, in which hundreds of innocent students were massacred, the military's media has been perceived as untrustworthy. A recent example is the May, 1992 event, where the former military junta attempted to return to power. The military media was, once again, used as a tool of propaganda during the political protest. This incident resulted in the ousting of an army general, who appointed himself an unelected prime minister, and the overturn of an army-backed government.

Despite the shifting of political perception, the idea of a military return still persists among most top ranking military officers. The media pushes for a stronger national leader to clean up the perceived corruption of the elected civilian government. The military's current role in the Thai society is still politically motivated. First, it seeks to gain political popularity and ruling legitimacy after each coup or after the appointment of a particular commander-in-
chief. Second, it is common for most high ranking officers to take a political career after retirement.

According to Kru Prateep, a famous community leader in Klong Toey, most army commanders-in-chief have the ultimate goal of becoming prime minister. It becomes a vicious circle in the Thai political system, where the Army commander-in-chief stays in the post for as long as he can to gain popularity and enjoy political privileges. He then pursues a coup in order to make way for his premiership. In order to gain financial and political support, the military depends upon the elite class. Modernization, growth and security are thus pursued by the military to meet the financial providers' needs. The military thus, from time to time, assists the eviction process by moving squatters' belongings during evictions and tearing down houses in the squatter areas.

Support from low income communities, on the other hand, is also important to the ruling legitimacy of the military. According to Kru Prateep, the military plays a significant role in the Klong Toey community. Low income communities which constitute a large portion of the Bangkok population, are ideal arenas in which to obtain and test their initial popularity. The high living density and needy nature of the squatter settlement make military activities in the area obvious to the public.
General Arthit, for instance, donated to the Klong Toey community a large sum of money he obtained from Siam Motor, a company which belongs to his wife's family, in order to gain support from the community. The armed force's past activities in the Klong Toey settlements included building of shelters, walkway systems, and other public utilities amidst the illegality of the squatter settlement.

According to Thep, a community leader who has been living in the Klong Toey community since 1962, the role of the military in squatter settlements has never been certain. It either assisted the PAT in the demolition efforts or helped squatters build their homes to legitimize its coup attempts. It is typical that after a coup, or after a fire in the community, military men from the First Infantry would be brought in to help people put up their temporary shelters. In this way, their popularity has been maintained. It is enough to keep people in the poor community silent during the coup.

Whenever harsh measures are needed, however, the military is brought in. During several evictions in 1970s, and even in the 90's, the military helped to move squatter's belonging out of their homes and tear down their houses. The most recent case of military involvement in the eviction process was the demolition of slums across from the Queen
Sirikit Convention Center and along the nearby express way, a few weeks before the World Bank Convention took place. This beautification project had military forces remove personal belongings and tear down shacks which might be considered "unsightly" to the convention participants.

Thep asserted that the inconsistency of the military brings about suspicion regarding the armed force's intent toward the urban poor. The lower income group in the Klong Toey community feels indifference about the military's action. Their past experience assures them that their present situation would not change much whether or not the military rule the country. Furthermore, the military's activities in the squatter settlement are not determined by the national development policy, but only by certain high ranking officers or commanders from the First Infantry and the City Protection Task force which are based in Bangkok. In fact, the missions performed by the military should be the responsibility of the NHA or BMA instead of the Army. This practice not only reveals the deficiency of the civilian government but also indicates the competition for power between the military and the civilian government.

From the cases specified above, the motivation of the military's involvement in the squatter settlement can be challenged for a number of reasons. First, administratively the armed forces have very little relevance in the squatter
settlement except for security. Its actions in the squatter community thus lacks a clear mandate. Second, it has no specific position regarding the existence and livelihood of any squatter settlements. It thus pursues conflicting activities and goals in most major low income communities, including Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom. Perhaps, the only explanation for its intervention is to gain legitimacy to rule the country.

In this light, a high percentage of dwellers are reluctant to express their views regarding the involvement of the armed forces in the squatter communities, especially in Area9, Zone1 and 70Rai. According to Ms. Ungsongtham, the chairperson of Duang Prateep Foundation in Klong Toey, the urban poor are taught to be submissive and obey authority.

This research found that residents in areas with more secure tenure, such as 70Rai and Flat11-18, perceived minimal threat by the acts of the military, since they are living legally in the areas. On the contrary, they benefited more from the military's assistance, primarily in free labor from the First Infantry. Residences in these areas are assisted by the building of public access walkways, building of relief shelters after major fires, and cleaning of sewer lines after flooding.

Residents of Flat11-18 are even able to enjoy a
library with books donated by a military general. Hence, residents in the more capitalistic form of land allocation appreciate the military's charity and are more liberal in expressing their views. While this group benefits most from military assistance, because they represent a segment of the population which is economically more independent and socially more urbanized, they are more ready to criticize the illegal activities of the military. Although 44.28% of the dwellers in Flat1-18 and 34.21% in 70Rai acknowledge the helpfulness of the military, they also comprise the highest percentage in this two areas with the courage to criticize the military.

Residents in Area9 and Zone1, on the other hand, have experienced harsh actions by the military during numerous evictions in the past decades. Even though community members in these areas have received a fair amount of assistance from the military in terms of physical improvement, few respondents from Area9 and Zone1 appreciate this assistance (10.95% and 16.98% respectively). In addition, due to the illegality of their living situation, residents in these two areas are hesitant to make further comments on the motivation of the military (See Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 PERCEPTION OF MILITARY MOTIVATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOME HELP</th>
<th>NO COMMENT</th>
<th>GREEDY*</th>
<th>GOT PAID*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>10.95%</td>
<td>65.75%</td>
<td>23.28%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>16.98%</td>
<td>77.46%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>34.21%</td>
<td>31.57%</td>
<td>32.89%</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>44.28%</td>
<td>25.71%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>19.71%</td>
<td>76.05%</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Answers compiled from open ended questions.

The level of awareness of the assistance of the military, therefore, varies according to the level of land tenure. In Wat Chonglom, which has a year-by-year tenure, residents have never been evicted by the military, yet do not much appreciate its services, perhaps because the military has very little involvement in the community. Furthermore, Wat Chonglom residents may feel hesitant to comment on the acts of the military due to the Thai culture's tendency to avoid unnecessary criticism. The well established community organization in Wat Chonglom also ensure its security which prompt them to ignore the military's helping hand.

In response to military intervention, the urban poor take advantage of the benefits whenever the opportunity arises, yet avoid confrontation when it comes the time for eviction. According to Kao, a community leader in Zone 1, influential military personalities are able to provide
privileges to local residents in the several areas. Like most politicians, the military can obtain a house registration to facilitate a utility application. Asking an army general to get a child into a local public school is also a common practice. With modern equipment and semi-skilled workers, the military can assist with the building of basic infrastructure or even the rapid construction of shelters. Labor contributed by the military is considered an advantageous element for residents in areas without secure tenure where provision by the state is not possible. After each fire in the community, the military gets involved in helping dwellers repair their housing damages. The army's water trucks are practical during water shortages. In normal situations, the community's close relationship with the military establishes a bargaining power against the administrative officials. This is another reason why residents of the popular form of land allocation avoid making negative comments about the military. In terms of land and housing, intervention by the military does not make a significant difference to the middle class who are relatively less needy and whose land tenure is already secured.
6.2.1.2 THE POLICE

Ideally, the local police are responsible for the protection against crime and the maintenance of security in its territories. As one of the units of the state apparatus, the local police exercises power over this territory, both legally and illegally. At the same time, they maintain linkages with their superiors at the national level.

Squatters interact which the local police according to economic status, type of occupation, and the type of community in which they are living. Since socioeconomic status and occupation of dwellers interact with forms of land allocation, forms of land allocation affect the extent of contact with the local police in different ways. For instance, the level of illegality in land occupation determines the severity of eviction by the local police. Type of occupation, such as street vendor, which is considered illegal, determines the extent of confrontation with the authorities. Participation in local illegal activities, such as prostitution, drug dealing, and gambling, also involves local police actions. Since these activities are distributed according to the forms of land allocation and housing production, they can be said to indirectly determine relationships with the local police.

The political structure within the police force itself
is also problematic. The promotion of a police officer, for example, requires that a large amount of money be paid illicitly to his/her superior. One of the methods to fund his/her promotion is by means of crafty acts in squatter communities in which dwellers are helpless and hesitate to report any wrongdoing.

Kru Prateep, a Klong Toey born community leader, has seen the development of power plays in the Klong Toey community throughout her life. She maintains that as the community grows, the situation becomes more complicated. Illegal activities are dominated by "colored power" (police and military--the armed force is known as green--while the police department as brown-power). Such activities include gambling, pool parlors, illegal lotto, and drugs. She maintains that local custom has developed wherein certain illegal activities are run by influential groups, some of which are backed by the local police. This pattern is not limited to the Klong Toey community, of course.

When an officer gets acquainted with the local patrons, they are most likely to collaborate and enjoy exploitation of the local people. The relationship lasts as long as both parties are still satisfied with their share of interests. Reprehensible activities which involve some local officers
range from drug dealing and prostitution, to lotto and the operation of motorcycle taxis.

Drug dealings for instance, are a major problem that frequently involves local officers. Once in a while, a 'preestablished' fake drug raid is performed by officers in charge of the area, to obtain necessary records for their superiors. Kru Prateep states that since the drug pushers are untouchable, the only thing the community leaders can do is to build public awareness to avoid further drug addiction.

One classic drug case is related by Kanjana, a community leader of Area9. In addition to helping drug addicts in her area, she attempts to decrease the cases of drug abuse by helping the police get rid of drug dealers. However, she has found that the major parties involved in the drug trade, besides the drug pushers, are some of the local police officers. To avoid conflict, good police officers who are not involved in the drug trade tend to turn a blind eye on their colleagues' acts and keep silent. Getting rid of drug pushers is difficult. Besides being threatened by drug pushers themselves, Kanjana has to selectively report the incidence of drug transactions to the right police officers. Even though higher ranking police officers are not directly involved in the local drug trade, Kanjana found that the linkage of the drug circles involves
some officers in higher positions and even some in the central police department. The power structure within the squatter settlement is complicated, not only by the number of criminals, but also by corrupt officers.

Other kinds of illegal activities--such as lotto and prostitution--are also under the protection of the local authorities. According to Patana, one of the community leaders, these activities could not exist if they did not involve the local authorities. The local "big men" pay monthly protection fees to the local officers and part of this money ultimately reaches some of the officers in the central police department.

Illegal power exercised by some police officers differs according to forms of land allocation. Those in the popular form of land allocation are most vulnerable to abuses by the police authorities. According to Knajana, illegal power exercised by the police also includes extortion which is less likely to happen in the more capitalistic form of land allocation such as 70Rai and Flat11-18, which have more land tenure and are more legal.

Crime rates also differ from one form of land allocation to the other. Drug problems for instance, are related to economic difficulties within the community which, in turn, invoke family problems and enhance psychological
disorder. According to Kru Prateep, most people consider drugs, and other inhalation substances such as thinner, as sources of relief. Since part of the police's power is structured to relax law enforcement or is even behind the drug pushers, drug dealers are abundant in some areas. The possibility of being affected by the drug network is relatively high especially in areas affected by economic hardship. Crime suppression by the central police department is unlikely to occur in the local community, as long as cover-up money is paid to some of the local and central police officers in charge.

In response to such circumstances, crime and violence can only be prevented and suppressed by means of community organizations instead of resorting to the authorities. Even though crime and drugs are relatively more prevalent in Area 9 and Zone 1 compared to the other areas, preventive awareness can be promoted more easily in these two areas due to their cohesive nature. Without the involvement of the police force, both communities have succeeded to a certain extent since anti-drug groups were established and a campaign against drug abuse was launched. Even though these campaign have no direct impact on the drug dealers, Kru Prateep hopes that the campaign will at least reduce the demand for drug.

Kru Prateep maintains, however, that rates of crime,
such as thievery, robbery, and physical assault, are quite low in most areas, since a neighborhood watch has been organized. Furthermore, she holds that nobody wants to commit a crime in his/her own neighborhood since most people know each other very well. However, Kru Prateep maintains that individualism in the community is an important factor preventing the joint efforts to combat crime. Therefore, the neighborhood watch tends to works better in communities of the popular form of land allocation than the capitalist form.

6.2.2 THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

The administrative agencies which are involved in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities comprise the planning agency and the utility provision agencies. Most provisions of these agencies are biased against the dwellers in the popular form of land allocation due to their lack of purchasing power and the illegality of land occupation. However, the urban poor resort to other means of obtaining needed services.

6.2.2.1 THE PUBLIC SERVICE AGENCIES

Since Bangkok is centrally administered, most of its public utilities are operated by one of the state enterprises, namely, the Metropolitan Water Work Authority (MWWA), the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
Other services, such as garbage disposal, health care, primary education, and the maintenance of road systems, are provided by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (MBA).

Owing to the limited capacity of the providing agencies and the city's goal of suppressing illegal settlements, Bangkok law does not allow any public services to be provided to illegal residents of any given area. House registration and personal identification are required to apply for utility services. Obtaining a house registration, in turn, must be done under the landowners' consent. Technically, squatters can never obtain a house registration due to their illegality. The level of public service and utility provisions thus varies according to the legality of land occupation, underlying the different forms of land allocation (see Table 6.4).

Given the above conditions, disparity of provision is virtually determined by the dweller's form of land allocation which involves land tenure and legality of land occupation. Besides, it has been a custom that services such as garbage disposal require residents to pay extra monthly fee to service men as an incentive to bring the garbage truck into the community. Since income and affordability varies according to forms of land allocation, the frequency
of garbage truck entering a given community, also, varies indirectly according to the form of land allocation. In other words, garbage men tend to enter the area with popular form of land allocation less frequently than the more capitalistic form.

Even though telephone service is not considered a life sustaining utility, under Bangkok's severe traffic condition, it is still important for the urban poor. With TOT's full capacity, telephone service is still out of reach for most residents in Bangkok. Telephone for business usage is considered the first priority. The waiting period for most business phones is 2-3 years, depending on the area and population density. A limited number of public telephones in the community is the only alternative in squatter settlements. However, some powerful individuals, who establish external connection with certain politicians or military men, can still own a telephone. Installing a private telephone requires approximately 10,000 baht, an equivalent of $400. Only residents in 70 Rai and Flat 11-18 can afford to obtain a telephone. The survey found only a few front porch businesses along the main street of Zone 1 own a telephone. The high cost of telephone installation selectively prevent residents in the popular form of land allocation from getting access to the service. Since public telephones, which costs one baht per call, are limited and
are frequently broken down, private telephones are frequently modified to serve as pay-phone for five baht per call. This situation, on the one hand, helps the urban poor to be within reach of the service, but it further differentiates life chance in different forms of land allocation.

Utilities have been one of the bargaining instruments of authorities to force the poor out of the illegal settlement. According to Anchana, a community leader from Zone 1, to obtain a water or electricity meter in her community is far more difficult than for households in 70 Rai and Flat 11-18. Part of the problems has been the lack of ability to pay the bill, since income of most households is unstable. Harsh measures, such as disconnection, are frequently applied.

Squatters who cannot get access to public utilities react to the unequal treatment by resorting to different channels. Politicians, from time to time, assist residents in the popular form of land allocation to obtain house registrations in order to apply for services, and utilities such as water supply can be obtained through the local broker at a higher cost. Electricity can also be obtained through neighbors, but connections through neighbors or buying from brokers are more costly than having a direct
connection. And the poor end up with paying more money per unit, and getting poorer.

Forms of land allocation and property regime are not the sole factors governing the accessibility to public services of the urban poor. The land owner's consent--such as that of Wat Chonglom--is also a crucial factor. Despite the popular/capitalist nature of Wat Chonglom community, under its land owner's accord, it is a legal settlement. Each of the households is equipped with a house registration. Therefore, public utilities can be obtained directly from the service provider at the regular cost.

**TABLE 6.3 PROVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES BY SERVICE AGENCIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ELECTRICITY</th>
<th>WATER SUPPLY</th>
<th>GARBAGE DISPOSAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EGAT N</td>
<td>WATER WORK NHA N</td>
<td>BMA N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>67.12% 49</td>
<td>21.90% 16</td>
<td>13.69% 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>95.77% 68</td>
<td>95.77% 68</td>
<td>61.97% 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>97.36% 74</td>
<td>97.36% 74</td>
<td>6.57%* 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>100.00% 70</td>
<td>100.00% 70</td>
<td>85.71% 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>80.28% 57</td>
<td>74.64% 53</td>
<td>33.80% 24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Special arrangement was made through community to serve the rest of the community*
6.2.2.2 THE PLANNING AGENCIES AND THE CIVIL SERVANTS

The two major public agencies which actively carry out projects in the Klong Toey areas are the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA). Both public agencies attempt to approach the community by encouraging the participation of residents to improve their shelters.

6.2.2.2.1 THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THAILAND (NHA)

The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a state enterprise which is responsible for its own financing. Since the NHA's original responsibility is to provide housing for middle and lower income groups, especially within the Bangkok Metropolis, its task at Klong Toey at the time of research was mainly to mediate the land conflict between the PAT and the present dwellers, to tear down physically deteriorated shelters of squatters, to upgrade the shelters and living standards of legal dwellers in the community, and to provide low cost housing--rental or hired purchase--to the middle and low income group in the evicted blocks. Some public utilities are also provided through the NHA. Services are provided to the community whose land is not in immediate acquisition by the PAT.

Even though the original intent of the NHA is to tackle the problem of low income housing, its role in provision of housing has been diminishing over time due to lack of
budget and motivation. Further more, it is heading toward privatisation, wherein housing production would be gradually incorporated into the conventional housing market. Its main focus will be shifted to the commercialization of its housing projects. At the time of the survey, the NHA's projects were gearing to meet the needs of the middle class instead of the poorest strata.

Since each form of land allocation which offer different type of life chance attracts a unique group of population with a typical level of average income, each of these income groups tends to perceive and react to the NHA's actions differently. Dwellers' level of satisfaction with the performance of the NHA, therefore, varies according to type of land tenure. In reality, the middle class in Flat 11-18 obtained subsidization while the lower strata faced harsh eviction measures. Area9, Zone1 and Wat Chonglom have only 9.3%, 27.1%, and 5.6% of the inhabitants respectively, who gave positive answers. There are 37.7% and 58.3% of the 70 Rai and Flat 11-18's residents who felt positive toward the provisions of the NHA. There are, however, 40.3% of the 70 Rai area who felt the NHA's provision negative compared to only 20.8% that of Flat 11-18.

Residents who benefit from the NHA's arrangement tend to express a positive opinion. Malee is a long time resident
in Zone 1 who sells curry and rice noodles on the street. She expresses her satisfaction with the NHA's provision because there has been a major change in her area since she first moved in. All of the deteriorated boardwalks in the community were turned into a network of concrete walkways after the up-grading project initiated by the NHA. She no longer needs to collect water at public faucets, since she now has her own water meter through the arrangement of the NHA.

However, residents who express a negative attitude can be categorized into two major groups: those who have never benefited from the NHA's provision and those who are not sure about the NHA's policy. Panya who live in Area 9 and who has never benefited from NHA's provisions, expresses his dissatisfaction toward the performance of the NHA. He maintain that the only impact it has on his community is to notify residents to move out of the settlement rather than perform productive works that contribute to the community's quality of life. Sukanya who lives in 70 Rai expresses her disappointment in the inconsistency of the NHA's policy. Even though a 15-year land tenure has been granted to the community through the NHA, she is threatened with the prospect of eviction each time the PAT has an expansion project. Since land costs in Bangkok have increased more than 20 times in the last decade, the PAT aims to develop
and make a profit from its land at Klong Toey, even though a new Eastern Sea Port has been constructed at Chonburi Province to support the industrialization of the country.

The variation of attitude within each particular area is perhaps due to the fact that the nature of employment is different in each area. The living density in 70Rai area is high which can hardly accommodate its commercial activities. Since a large portion of residences in Flat11-18 are lower-middle class salary workers, they perceived fewer problems with NHA's arrangement.

In addition, most of the 70Rai residents are originally from the Klong Toey areas who experienced eviction and other actions from their former areas prior to moving to 70Rai. Their former experiences still influence their present way of thinking (see Table 6.4).

Furthermore, despite the high proportion of owner occupiers in 70Rai, there is a high portion of dwellers renting in the area who belong to the lower strata. NHA's nature of provision appears to be in conflict with the needs and economic nature of this class. Since NHA has very little involvement in Wat Chonglom, very few respondents in this area are willing to give their views, but the Wat Chonglom community has not been evicted by its land owner, most
residents perceived that tenure security is high and feel indifferent toward the NHA's services.

Table 6.4 SATISFACTION WITH NHA SOLUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>VERY UNSATISFACTORY N</th>
<th>UNSATISFACTORY N</th>
<th>MODERATE SATISFACTORY N</th>
<th>SATISFACTORY N</th>
<th>VARY SATISFACTORY N</th>
<th>NO FACTORY N</th>
<th>ANSWER N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>24.65% 18</td>
<td>30.13% 22</td>
<td>13.69% 10</td>
<td>5.47% 4</td>
<td>4.10% 3</td>
<td>21.91 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>42.25% 30</td>
<td>25.35% 18</td>
<td>1.40% 1</td>
<td>9.85% 7</td>
<td>16.90% 12</td>
<td>4.22 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>30.26% 23</td>
<td>10.52% 8</td>
<td>13.15% 10</td>
<td>30.26% 23</td>
<td>7.89% 6</td>
<td>9.20 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>11.42% 8</td>
<td>10.00% 7</td>
<td>12.85% 9</td>
<td>28.57% 27</td>
<td>20.00% 14</td>
<td>8.56 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>4.22% 3</td>
<td>1.40% 1</td>
<td>43.66% 31</td>
<td>5.63% 4</td>
<td>0.00% 0</td>
<td>45.06 32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The urban poor respond to the arrangement of the NHA in a number of ways. Firstly, through their community organizations, the Klong Toey residents have initiated a land sharing program in the squatter settlement, and a 15-year land tenure is granted to residents in 70 Rai. Through their community organization, Flat 11-18 also succeed in negotiating with the NHA to relax the commercial restrictions on apartments. However, according to Kru Prateep, the PAT through the arrangement of the NHA still, from time to time, threatens to revoke the contract. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter V, the urban poor tend to sell their rights and move back to areas where life chances are greater. In Area 9 and Zone 1, dwellers who have moved back to the popular form of land allocation lobby local politicians and the military to delay the PAT's eviction. The poorest group whose income relies on an informal
economy, also takes advantage of the NHA's arrangement by selling their rights. Third, the group which profits most from the NHA's arrangement has apparently been the higher income group. Their buying of rights into the Klong Toey community enables them to enjoy subsidized facilities and other arrangements through up-grading and sites-and-services programs.

6.2.2.2.2 THE BANGKOK METROPOLITAN ADMINISTRATION (BMA)

The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration has been responsible for keeping Bangkok's growing population in check and for the provision of public services, i.e., health care, education, and employment services. Access to these public services during the 1950s-1970s was difficult, since they required proof of legal residency to be legitimate to apply for the services.

The urban poor within the squatter community are able to benefit from the BMA's provision of health care. There are two community health centers in the Klong Toey area which are accessible to most of the urban poor. The centers are responsible for only minor cases of illness and health care, such as treatment of normal colds, diarrhea, and small injuries. Basic health care includes child immunization, and prenatal consultation. Nutrition education is also included in the program. Patients need to pay minimal treatment fees
and the cost of medication which are relatively cheaper than most private clinics.

Schooling is a major issue in the squatter community. The one-baht-a-day school run by Ms. Prateep Ungsongtham in the early 1970s was not accredited by the Department of Education. Despite their equal ability to provide basic education for local children, such activities are considered illegal. The urban poor reacted by turning the school over to the authorities. However, a different problem arose following the intervention by the state. The one-baht-a-day school was taken over by the BMA which is responsible for compulsory education up to grade six. The school was then accredited, and graduates were allowed to continue their education in other public schools. An additional school and a nursing station were also established to serve the community. Nonetheless, a house registration, a fee, and a uniform are needed to enjoy these services, and the regular schedule of classes requires full time attendance. These requirements implicitly prevent children in the popular form of land allocation from taking advantage of this provision. Because the nature of the popular form of land allocation does not allow house registration, low income families in the popular form of land allocation cannot afford to pay even the minimal fee for the required uniform and books, and the pattern of income generation in the popular form of land
allocation requires children's assistance. The requirement of full time school attendance discourages parents from sending children to schools.

The provision of access walkways and hygienic facilities such as drainage and garbage disposal which are discussed earlier in Chapter V are under the responsibility of the BMA as well. Even though state agencies claim a community participation policy, none of them encourages grass root decision making. Since public provisions are biased against the popular form of land allocation due to their differences in legality, the urban poor resort to alternate sources and personalities both within and outside the community. According to Kanjana, a community leader in Klong Toey, collective power can be exercised and the community's needs are obtained through community organizations and political representative instead of the BMA. Since politicians aim to assist the squatter community by gaining political support, some basic infrastructures in the "neglected" communities still can be obtained through BMA by means of political pressure. The most beneficial areas would be Zone 1 and 70 Rai which have some tenure, where provision of basic infrastructure is still legal. A detailed discussion regarding interventions by community leaders,
6.2.3 THE ELECTED POLITICIANS (STATE/LOCAL)

Even though most of the politicians' activities are not directly related to the provision of land and housing, the urban poor tend to resort to their assistance to avoid regulations which are biased against them. The instability of the Thai political system has brought about a unique political milieu. Most elected regimes tend to last less than their four-year terms. Such frequent interruption, whether by military coup or by house resolution, prompts politicians to be financially prepared for the succeeding electoral campaign. A large number of Thai politicians are either merchants or influential figures from the state apparatus, such as high ranking officials from the military or the police department. While popularity among the majority of the lower strata is crucial, a large portion of the campaign budget tends to be contributed by the upper class. Similar to the military's approach, most politicians espouse conflicting goals in order to maintain their popularity among both the urban poor and the ruling class.

Since the Klong Toey community is densely populated, politicians campaign extensively for electoral support in this territory during elections. According to Thep, a
community leader in Area9, most politicians tend to arrive before the election. Endowments provided by political parties come in the form of construction materials, food products, books for the community library, and attractive pledges of housing provisions. Contribution and promises as such are made intermittently to the community, frequently through community leaders who play the role of campaign manager in this territory. Upon receiving construction materials, local community leaders organize labor from occupants to build public facilities.

According to Kru Prateep, the chairperson of the Duang Prateep Foundation and a dominant local community leader, most politicians are considered honorable figures among the lower strata and are not subjected to criticism. As a paternalistic society, Thais in the lower strata usually resort to "Poo Yai" or influential persons for assistance. Politicians who behave as "Poo Yai" know how to get access to the community. Selling of cheap rice and household supplies from trucks with banners advertising certain political parties is a common maneuver. Economically, the urban poor benefit from this type of political venture in exchange for their popular support.

Furthermore, politicians can use their wealth and influence to obtain privileges for their clients, such as having one's children enter certain public schools, bailing
someone out of drugs or gambling custody, and acquiring a
permit to sell food in a certain open air market. According
to Mr. Yok, another old timer in the Klong Toey community,
the "Dek Fak" (protege) system has been deeply rooted in the
Thai culture throughout modern history. This operates
especially intensely within the government circles--public
education, military, and police. Most public schools are
able to admit only a limited number of students each year,
who are theoretically only the brightest group of students
who pass the entrance examination. Since children from the
squatter communities lack the time and opportunity to
prepare for such competition, it is almost impossible for
children from Klong Toey to enter certain prestigious public
schools, even if they are fortunate enough to have the house
registration necessary to apply. In practice, however, a
quota is set aside for "Dek Fak" in most of the district
schools. This tradition makes it possible for politicians
who seek electoral support from the Klong Toey community to
apply their privilege to introduce children of community
leaders into public schools in exchange for political
favors.

Another case has been the two-step promotions for civil
servants in certain offices, especially those who work for
the Ministry of Interior. Pojaman is one of the flat
dwellers who works as a clerk in Prakanong District Office. She relates that even though government officials cannot be partial toward nor offer additional help to a particular political party, most of the politicians usually seek help from district employees in their respective district offices to gain privileges in their campaign during election seasons. Furthermore, since the nature of the district officers' work is able to gain them some power in their controlled territory, the local officers can influence the decision-making of the community and establish the candidate's image among the community members. Successful politicians frequently award cooperative officers with double promotions after each election in return for their support.

Economically, the urban poor in the popular form are more destitute than those in the capitalist form of land allocation. Politically, they are able to exploit privileges from the politicians to balance the biased regulations against them due to the illegality of their land occupation.

6.2.3.1 STATE FUNDS RUN BY POLITICIANS

Some state funded community projects are also used as a channel to promote politicians' popularity. The urban poor in the popular form of land allocation are able to take advantage of this provision more than those in the capitalistic form. The Community Volunteered Development
Project which is operated under the Ministry of University Affairs, has been founded by Prachakorn Thai—a Bangkok based political party. The project is massive, as large as the NHA and the BMA in some areas. Besides the Klong Toey settlement, the project covers more than one hundred and fifty additional slums and squatter settlements around Bangkok. The other instance has been the Urban Development Project. Though under the operation of Mahidol University, it is initiated and sponsored by representatives of the Democratic Party. More than ten million baht are appropriated to this project each year for the development of Bangkok's low income communities, including Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom.

Even though the underlying purpose of these two projects is to establish and maintain a close relationship between the electoral communities and the candidates, some of whom were elected representatives at the time of survey, these projects are welcomed by low income communities. According to Mr. Yok, most community leaders, including himself, are approached by political leaders to participate in the projects. After an informal relationship develops, the asking of favors in the manner of a patron-client relationship becomes normal practice. Frequently, community leaders play the role of mediator between the community
members and politicians. Mr. Yok explains that "as a human, most people cannot refuse the political leaders' offer. This opens up a way for them (the politicians) to ask for returned favors during the electoral season." In this manner, community members also get acquainted with those political leaders who show up and contribute money to community projects. Contribution is, therefore, a form of investment in order to introduce themselves to the community before the election. However, their projects are beneficial for the urban poor, especially in the popular form of land allocation.

Wat Chonglom's community based project, which has been introduced by a scholar outside the community and supported by a loan from City Bank, has proved to be more successful than those politically motivated projects. Several factors are involved. First, Wat Chonglom's project is community based; most initiatives and long term activities have been done by the community members. The common access nature of this project brings about a sense of belonging in its participants. Second, the scholar who introduced the project is not politically or economically motivated. She thus does not expect any return. Unlike projects funded by the state, however, this project needs to pay back its loan to the bank without interest. Members of the community feel obligated to work diligently to recover the cost. Third, Wat Chonglom's
project is kept on a small scale which makes it more manageable. Finally, the unique nature of the land owner who never intimidates or evicts occupants establishes a sense of security in the community.

6.2.3.2 ILLEGALITY, PATERNALISM, AND THE POLITICIANS

The urban poor also take advantage of the paternalistic culture of Thai society in overcoming the illegality of land occupation. Not all of the support given by politicians to the squatter settlements is legally sound. Except for the 70 Rai and Flat areas, the rest of the communities are considered illegal squatter settlements. As mentioned earlier, public utilities can be provided to only legal residents and a house registration is needed as proof of legal residency. Obtaining a household registration, to apply for a water meter, however, can be done easily through the politicians. The paternalistic nature of the Thai society is still obvious although it has started to fade away in the more capitalistic form of land allocation, such as 70 Rai and Flat11-18.

This condition is indicated by the fact that a high percentage of respondents in both 70 Rai and Area 9 does not agree with the politicians' conduct in the squatter settlement. There are 30.26% and 47.14% of dwellers in 70 Rai and Flat 11-18 compared to 9.85% and 5.63% in Zone 1 and
Wat Chonglom who express a perception of hypocrisy in politicians (see Table 6.4). The high percentage of disagreement might be due to the fact that these two areas have a legal status and are able to fully benefit from most utility providers. Residents of area 9, on the other hand, need more assistance from politicians because of the difficulty of getting a house registration and legally obtaining utility from providers. Only 20.54% of its dwellers in Area 9 disagree with the politicians' intervention.

Various communities with distinctive forms of land allocation perceive and react to the politician's maneuvers differently. Perhaps the socioeconomic and cultural differences between each area are major underlying factors. According to Kru Prateep, even though politicians have very little effect on the positive development of squatter settlements most of them show up just before the election, make some speeches, start a project, and then never show up again until the next election.

The poorest group still receives some help from them, and politicians most effectively and successfully convince the urban poor in the areas which have some security of tenure, such as Wat Chonglom, Zone1 and Flat 11-18. Since land tenure here is no longer the most important factor, provisions such as building materials are appreciated by
dwellers. On the other hand, dwellers in area 9, which has absolutely no tenure, view land tenure as more important than other types of assistance. The inhabitants of 70Rai area, which is the most liberal community have the highest average income, however, there are very few dwellers who appreciate the politicians' offers. One of the reasons is, perhaps that dwellers here already enjoy provisions by the BMA and NHA (see table 6.5). As mentioned earlier, the urban poor tend to take advantage of the paternalistic culture of the Thai society in overcoming the illegality of land occupation. Therefore, politicians in the squatter settlement are the means to overcome the legal issue to channel resources to the poorest group.

Table 6.5 PERCEPTION TOWARD MOTIVATION OF POLITICIANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVIDING FOR COMMUNITY</th>
<th>REPRESENT COMMUNITY</th>
<th>DO NOT KNOW</th>
<th>BUYING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>19.17% 14</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>52.05% 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>29.57% 21</td>
<td>9.85% 7</td>
<td>45.07% 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>17.10% 13</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>50.00% 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>20.00% 14</td>
<td>7.14% 5</td>
<td>17.14% 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>59.15% 42</td>
<td>.00% 0</td>
<td>29.57% 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Answers compiled from open end questions.

6.3 NGOs

6.3.1 DOMESTIC NGOs

There are two types of Non-governmental organizations
which function in the squatter settlements: domestic and international. The domestic NGOs comprise a number of charitable organizations, i.e., educational institutions, charitable student groups, and religious groups. The international agencies comprise the UNICEF and the UNCHS (HABITAT).

As a respected figure in the Klong Toey community, Kru Prateep maintains that the community must be optimistic and receptive in receiving external assistance, to which the community can give appropriate political support in return. Community leaders are advised to analyze, prior to receiving any contribution, whether the approach offered might lead to a sincere resolution of problems, or to further complications of the present situation. The course of action must depend on the need of the majority of the Klong Toey community. The non-governmental organizations which operate in the Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom communities can be categorized into five groups. This section discusses how the urban poor react to each of them.

The faculty of Social Welfare, Thamasart University and the Human Settlements Planning Division at the Asian Institute of Technology are the two domestic institutions which have played the greatest role in community based development planning in the Klong Toey settlement. They were involved in a slum child development project, appropriate
technology for low cost shelters, and social welfare projects. However, after the October 6 crackdown in 1976, most such institutions ceased their community involvement. Other domestic institutions have only used Klong Toey as a study ground for their academic research. The extent of activities by researchers--ie., study, research, and counseling--depends on the interests of the individual faculty which is periodic and inconsistent. According to Daeng Muangkham, a community leader in Area9, most local residents are fed up with the academic activities in the area, and most householders now refuse to answer questions. Some residents even expect financial return from being interviewed.

Student activists involved in the squatter projects include students from nine university groups/clubs in Bangkok. The major objective of these groups is to gain a better understanding of the problems of low income communities in Bangkok and to announce the information to the public at large. Small-scale programs organized by these groups include informal study of community based sociocultural issues, teaching basic literacy skills to children, and informally assisting communities facing eviction. The limitation of time and resources, however, restricts the scope of their community involvement.
More than twenty groups of registered non-governmental organizations work vigorously in Bangkok's low income communities, fifteen of which can be found in the Klong Toey settlement. They are listed under "other group" in Table 6.1. Only two of these organizations originate from within Klong Toey--Ruam Num Jai Foundation and Duang Prateep Foundation--and their objectives are currently the provision of basic services and the protection of human rights. The rest of the agencies are humanitarian in nature and have little concern about the causes of socio-political problems in the community. The majority of the groups are small and they work closely with local communities to provide child education, job training, social welfare, and public health care. Despite financial problems and limited personal, both Duang Prateep and Ruam Nam Jai foundations are independent from the control of the state and work efficiently for the welfare of the urban poor.

The urban poor are able to exploit the efforts of NGOs to help relieve their social and economic hardship in the community. Most helpful is the Duang Prateep Foundation, which originated in Klong Toey. It is currently funded by international agencies, and is helping with the problems of finances and education in the area. According to Kru Prateep, the founder and chair person of the foundation, the most common problem of people coming to Duang Prateep
foundation to seek help has been that of debt where their houses are mortgaged and at risk of being taken away. Loans and services for job seeker are provided to help with the community's financial problems.

In addition, Duang Prateep Foundation offers approximately 6000 scholarships for youngsters at the primary level nation-wide. According to Vilaipron Rojposane, a social worker in Klong Toey, most of the families in the Klong Toey area are poor and can hardly afford to send their children to private schools. Even children with scholarships can persist only as far as grade 8. Public schools in this area have only recently transformed from the once illegal schools run by local the community. They only focus on the academic aspect of teaching. The problems of moral and social welfare, such as drugs and family issues, are frequently overlooked. Kindness and goodwill are therefore the most important aspects offered by this local NGO.

Despite the transformation of local schools--from the former illegal one-baht-a-day schools to public schools--the Welfare Department together with BMA and the Education Department is not capable of handling the needs of education in the area. The local NGOs thus play a substantial role in funding the local preschools and nurseries. The five public schools in Klong Toey serve the whole area up to the
compulsory level. Fourteen child-care centers provide preschool education at a minimal cost--3 baht or 9 cents per day. This includes lunch and supplemental food for children who suffer from malnutrition, or might not have lunch otherwise. Children from the poorest families, whose parents are both engaged in day time jobs, get the first priority.

The urban poor also resort to assistance from the informal organizations in the community. They mainly comprise young graduates who want to contribute to the society at large. Most projects focus on the urban poor in general, and are not limited to the issues of squatter settlements. Groups which were involved in Klong Toey at the time of this research are Community Group for Hygiene, The Volunteer Project for Social Development, Community Relation Group, Center of Japanese Volunteers, Foster Parents Plan International, and Office of Urban Community Operation. Despite their enthusiastic intent their role in the community has been limited by the small number of their volunteers and limited participation of community members. These NGOs tends to give a higher priority to residents in the popular form of land allocation.

Wat Chonglom's community organization is supported by a dedicated volunteer, Ms. Orathai Aj-am who had studied the community and seeks external funding to support community project. The upgrading program proved to be a very
successful one due to a number of factors. First, the empathetic nature of the land owner assures the Wat Chonglom residents that there will be no brutal eviction. Secondly, dwellers of Wat Chonglom, in turn, have a positive attitude toward the community's tenure security, despite its year-by-year tenure contract. This situation encourages and enhances joint voluntary efforts by the community members. Third, the local based organization, founded and assisted by Ms. Aj-am, includes several self-help groups which have been established to benefit the community. Wat Chonglom is thus an exceptional example of a successful settlement whose features are not directly related to the form of land allocation.

### 6.3.2 INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

UNICEF is an international agency, whose effort, though not focusing directly on living conditions, deals with the welfare of children in low income communities in Bangkok, including Klong Toey. A large portion of its funding is contributed to projects involving children's education and health. UNCHS (HABITAT), however, indirectly funds the slum upgrading projects through the NHA and BMA. The particular area which obtains assistance from HABITAT is Zone 1. Forms of land allocation, again, play an important role in the distribution of aid. The issue of legality is
the main obstacle preventing residents in the popular form of land allocation from getting access to foreign aid, since most projects are joint ventures among state and foreign agencies. Residents in Area 9 and Wat Chonglom must therefore rely on community based organizations for obtaining fund directly from both international organizations.

6.4 COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS

Participation in local community organizations is one of the household's economic survival strategies, i.e., to share resources, organize their collective bargaining power and to enjoy psychological support. How community organizations benefit the local dwellers is determined by several factors. First, the willingness of community members to participate is determined by the perception of the immediate benefits, the implicit intent of the organizers, and the availability of time the individual is able to contribute. Second, the agencies and their administrators dictate the availability of resources, how they are allocated, and how the decisions are made. Third, the unique objectives and implicit goals of each agency, i.e., education, political advantage, and charity, determine how the community benefits from the organization. Some of their objectives might not fit the needs of squatters.
The role of community organizations is a crucial factor determining the socioeconomic differences among the three forms of land allocation. Residents’ socioeconomic status and life chance in each of the study areas influences their motivation to participate in local community organizations and determine the level of their participation. Community organizations are the only grass roots organizations which are operated entirely by the community members. Squatter households are able to gain support from and voice their needs through their community organizations which have elected councils and leaders. However, this research found a number of limitations in the organization and administration of local community organizations. The most successful one has been in the Wat Chonglom community where upgrading projects are currently funded by both UN’s HABITAT and CITIBANK. Several factors have led to the success of the community organization—the cohesiveness of community, its small size, its well structured organization, and the extensive involvement of educational institutions in the community.

According to Ms. Orathai Aj-am, an academician involved in Wat Chonglom's community project, despite the submissive nature of the urban poor, grassroots based community development projects are useful. The community needs only a good idea and the initiative to start a project to improve
the members' quality of life. In the very first stage, someone from outside usually points out the way to organize the participants and assist the community in obtaining external resources to fund its projects. Traditional Thai culture still prevails in the low income community and discourages initiative from the poor. Community members must learn how to be self-reliant and make their own decisions. Ms. Aj-am's findings appear to correspond with those of this research; the priorities of the urban poor are sufficient income, an employment network, basic services including safe drinking water, health care, and house extension. The community organization is, therefore, more important to residents in the popular form of land allocation than to those in the state/capitalistic form. Since the urban poor lack bargaining power, the community organization is the only collective power they can apply in their survival strategy.

Even though there is an elected community organization in almost every community of the Klong Toey study areas, most of them have been started and mobilized by external forces such as NGOs. Their function at the time of research was mainly to represent and establish dialogue with the authorities, such as landlords, utility providers and state officials. They also organized and supported community
development programs initiated and funded by external sources. Very few of those projects were initiated by community leaders.

In short, community organizations in Thai society are still in an infancy stage. Their goals and strategies are frequently misunderstood. The paternalistic culture of Thai society, which corresponds with the class structure tends to marginalize the urban poor and suppress their awareness of their rights. Frequently, decision making processes are influenced by the local "big people".

6.4.1 LEADERS

Since grassroot community organizations are still partially illegal under the Thai law, unregistered organizations cannot be legally recognized. This research found that most community leaders still lack ability and experience to organize, motivate, and convey messages. Most projects succeed only over the short term.

Thai paternalism seems to cultivate a sense of complacency or even arrogance in the leaders. Most external aid is organized and implemented by means of community leaders and they are invited to seminars, training sessions, banquets, and to meet with celebrities. After receiving such privileges and applying their power for a certain period, leaders begin to feel themselves in a higher
position than the average community member, and that their virtues surpass those their neighbors. Peer relationships between leaders and community members thus start to fade and are replaced by a patron-client type of relations. Because community leaders receive special treatment from the funding agencies, a hierarchical structure is created. As mediating agents between the community and the external funding agencies, community leaders behave as providers toward their community members.

The interests of the community are often overshadowed by the needs and influence of interest groups. These powerful groups comprise land owners of the squatter settlement, local landlords, local utility brokers, large money lenders, money pool operators, local sub-contractors, and power brokers which include influential figures, the local criminal syndicate, and drug dealers.

6.4.2 COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Community participation in local community organizations is limited both by time constraints and by a lack of motivation. The decision to join the organization is based on expected advantages to be gained. This study found that dwellers in the more capitalistic form of land allocation participate more intensely in communal organizations. 70Rai and Flat11-18, the state form and
capitalistic forms of land allocation, have the highest rate of community participation among the five study areas, 52.7% and 50.2% respectively. Wat Chonglom and Area9 have a medium rate of community participation. Zone1, however, has the lowest participation rate in community organizations (see Table 6.6).

| COM.ORG. | ROLE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS |
|-----------------+-------------------------------------------------------|
| PARTICATION | LEADER ACTIVE NON SUPPORTER OTHERS (RECEIVING MEMBER ACTIVE HELP) | N |
| AREA 9 | 36.98% 27 | 1.36% 1 24.65% 18 | 60.27% 44 | 13.69% 10 0.0% 0 |
| ZONE 1 | 33.80% 24 | 1.40% 1 8.45% 6 | 16.90% 12 | 71.83% 5 1.40% 1 |
| 70 RAI | 52.63% 40 | 5.26% 4 76.31% 58 | 2.63% 2 | 11.84% 9 5.26% 4 |
| FLAT 11-18 | 50.00% 35 | 1.42% 1 30.00% 21 | 24.28% 17 | 26.71% 18 18.57% 13 |
| WAT CHONGLOM | 40.84% 29 | 1.40% 1 11.26% 8 | 61.97% 44 | 22.53% 16 1.40% 1 |

This pattern occurs for a number of reasons. First, dwellers in 70Rai and Flat11-18 are poorer than the average population of Bangkok. And they are in need social welfare. Second, almost all the members of households in Area9 and Zone1 of Klong Toey must engage in making a living to supplement the household income, which leaves them very little time to participate in the communal organization (see Table 5.16 and Jamlong's case in Chapter V). In contrast to Area 9 and Zone 1, income in Flat 11-18 is almost exclusively contributed by the household head (see also
Table 5.16), giving other members of the household more free
time to participate in community organizations. Third, since
Area 9 and Zone1 has absolutely no tenure, dwellers tend to
feel that there will be not much help from organizations
regarding eviction.

This research found that community leaders in the
popular form of land allocation tend to be motivated by the
tenure security, and therefore, their obligation to the
community and their sense of belonging according to the
length of their stay in the community. Community members'
own anticipation regarding the tenure security of their
settlement is also an important factor motivating the extent
of their participation in community organizations. Wat
Chonglom is an obvious example where this contributes to the
success of the community organization.

Some occupants are suspicious of the motivation
underlying the charity of the organizers. Their experience
with political leaders and military personal, who take
advantage of the community, tends to make squatters feel
uncertain regarding the intention of other community
organizers. Therefore, locally based leaders and non
political leaders tend to be more trustworthy. Other
community leaders tend to put more efforts on their
organization because they perceive, from their past
experience, the benefits of its activities.
Somjate is an active community organizer in Area9. She moved into Klong Toey settlement in 1975 from Samutprakarn, a small town on Bangkok's periphery. Together with her husband and three children, Somjate made her living by means of buying and selling used bottles. She handled her own business after her husband died in 1979. She leased an old truck, roamed around the Klong Toey area buying used bottles in the afternoon. She usually stayed home for the rest of the day sorting bottles and crushing the unusable ones to be sold as recycling material. According to Somjate, she spent her spare time as a community leader. Since she and her family are virtually "fostered" by the community, she believes the organizational work is a way to repay community, particularly by assisting newcomers. After eight years of community service, her sincerity is still questioned by members of her community. She is frequently accused of siding with the politicians or the PAT in getting matters resolved. Due to their former experience, dwellers in the squatter areas view communal relationships in the village as closer than those of the urban community. They also view their village fellows as more trustworthy than their urban neighbors. Since what they obtained in the urban setting always needed something for exchange, they expected that the charity given by the community organizer also
demands something in return. This is one of the reasons the lower income group of the slum families refuse to participate in communal organization.

Somjate's case shows several unique factors of community organization in the popular form of land allocation. First, since property values in the popular form of land allocation do not increase, it retains most old-timers in the area. Individuals like Somjate are moved by their sense of belonging and obligation to the community to serve or participate in the community organization. Second, community organizers need a high level of idealistic motivation, since the past experience of community members concerning the politicians' and military's motivation have made them feel suspicious of the community organizer's intention.

This survey found that, among dwellers who do not participate in the local community organization, a large portion of them cite a busy schedule as a major obstacle. Time constraints are more a problem for the poorer group--such as those living in Area9, Zone1, and Wat Chonglom. Many of those who participate in the local community organization, however, do so because they feel obligated to participate as a member of the community, especially dwellers from communities of capitalistic and state forms of land allocation. The second largest group
participates for the sake of their children's future (see Table 6.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHY PARTICIPATE</th>
<th>WHY NOT PARTICIPATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMIT FOR THE DEPEND AS A SAKE OF ON AVAIL</td>
<td>REQUIRE DO NOT TIME N CHILDREN N OF TIME N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.21% 6</td>
<td>26.02% 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.12% 15</td>
<td>1.40% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.05% 16</td>
<td>20.05% 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.42% 22</td>
<td>10.00% 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.71% 14</td>
<td>11.26% 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While residents in the popular form of land allocation see very little advantage of community organizations due to their illegality, communities of the capitalistic form of land allocation, such as 70 Rai, on the other hand, are individualistic in nature and the average income is much higher than the rest of the study areas. Collective action by the local community organization is not seen as a vital survival strategy. Lower income communities with subsidization from the state, such as Flat 11-18 and Zone 1, have a perception of greater importance of community organizations. Short-term tenure as well as state subsidization need to be maintained by means of the collective power exercised by the community organization as a means of increasing the security of the settlement. Joint
efforts and collective decision-making must be applied in order to obtain and utilize resources granted by the states and NGOs. Therefore, there is a higher percentage of dwellers in these two areas that perceives a need for community organizations. The case of Wat Chonglom is exceptional where the highest percentage of dwellers, among the five study areas, who are non-active members (61.9%), specified their reasons for not participating as that it required too much time (43.3%), and felt indifference regarding the advantages of participation (47.2%). Since Wat Chonglom is located on privately owned land and the community has never experienced the threat of eviction, dwellers here have always felt at ease and perceive relatively little importance of the community organization. Also since a larger portion of the dwellers in this community are workers in the nearby factories, they have very little spare time to contribute to the community organization.

Among the dwellers who perceive advantages of the community organization, negotiating with land owners is usually a low priority among the study areas except Area9. Among its dwellers who perceive advantages of the community organization, 45.3% of them stated that negotiation with landlords is the most important purpose. Since Area9 is the only area which has absolutely no tenure, the community
organization is the only hope for dwellers to negotiate with the PAT for an extension of their residency in the squatter settlement. New occupants who intend to sub-let a portion of someone else’s living quarter in the more capitalistic form of land allocation, such as in 70Rai and Flat11-18, resort to community organization as a source of information to find available rooms. Among occupants in 70Rai and Flat11-18, who perceived advantages to community organization, 40.6% and 70.0% of them specify "finding living quarters" as their first priority (see Table 6.8 and Table 6.9).

Table 6.8 THE ADVANTAGE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VERY UNHELPFUL</th>
<th>UNHELPFUL</th>
<th>INDIFFERENT</th>
<th>HELPFUL</th>
<th>VERY HELPFUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA 9</td>
<td>26.02%</td>
<td>31.50%</td>
<td>21.91%</td>
<td>13.69%</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>21.12%</td>
<td>11.26%</td>
<td>21.91%</td>
<td>45.49%</td>
<td>13.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>33.21%</td>
<td>26.02%</td>
<td>17.10%</td>
<td>22.35%</td>
<td>22.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>14.28%</td>
<td>10.71%</td>
<td>21.12%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>14.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>9.85%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>21.12%</td>
<td>44.47%</td>
<td>16.30%</td>
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</table>

Table 6.9 THE WAY THE ORGANIZATIONS ARE HELPFUL

<table>
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<th>FINDING LIVING</th>
<th>GIVING INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>28.76% 21</td>
<td>26.02% 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZONE 1</td>
<td>16.90% 12</td>
<td>39.43% 28</td>
<td>42.25% 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 RAI</td>
<td>18.42% 14</td>
<td>40.78% 31</td>
<td>40.78% 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAT 11-18</td>
<td>18.57% 13</td>
<td>70.00% 49</td>
<td>11.42% 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT CHONGLOM</td>
<td>36.61% 26</td>
<td>21.12% 15</td>
<td>43.66% 31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Other than negotiating with the authorities, the urban poor establish their community organizations to mediate and distribute resources provided by either the state or NGOs according to their rule of access. They are also used to organize the community's collective activities to make full utilization of resources which improve the living condition of their local community. The distribution of information regarding community events by the local community organization is, therefore, the most important aspect, especially in Zone1, 70Rai and Wat Chonglom which are subsidized intensely by external sources.

Among the occupants who did not perceive any benefit to community organizations, a high percentage pointed out that they never participated due to lack of time—44.4%, 59.7% and 65.2% of Zone1, Flat11-18, and Wat Chonglom respectively. The extreme example has been cases in Wat Chonglom and Flat11-18, where a large portion of dwellers are factory workers who can not afford to contribute their time to community projects (see Table 6.10).
Table 6.10 THE WAY THE ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT HELPFUL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>DO NOT KNOW N</th>
<th>NEVER PARTICIPATE N</th>
<th>NEVER TRUST N</th>
<th>ORGANIZERS N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 9</td>
<td>9.58% 7</td>
<td>15.06% 11</td>
<td>75.34% 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 1</td>
<td>19.71% 14</td>
<td>45.07% 32</td>
<td>36.61% 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Rai</td>
<td>3.94% 3</td>
<td>11.84% 9</td>
<td>84.21% 64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat 11-18</td>
<td>4.28% 3</td>
<td>60.00% 42</td>
<td>35.71% 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wat Chonglom</td>
<td>26.76% 19</td>
<td>64.78% 46</td>
<td>8.45% 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the lower end of the economic ladder, dwellers of Area 9 saw no reason for community leaders to be motivated to help them without return. At the higher end of the economic ladder such as 70 Rai, however, dwellers are rather too haughty to receive assistance from outsiders, or even from leaders within their community. The urban social setting has transformed their attitudes from those of the traditional Thai rural society.


The power structure in a squatter settlement is rather unique. People who exercise power in the community can be classified into two categories. They are the patron type and the local kingpin. Patron figures include elders, the respected persons, landlords, and community leaders. The local kingpin, on the other hand comprises influential
persons, some large landlords, power brokers, drug dealers, and gambling den operators.

The first type of community member is well-known and highly respected by his/her peers, and is a potential leader or member of the community organization. The patron type includes large landlord large money lenders, old-timers, and elders of the community. However, the largest and most obvious type of this group has been the landlord who occupies more than one dwelling unit, renting them out to make a profit. The second type known as "powerful people" is also well-known to the community members. They exercise their power either through the respected people or through their illegal activities in the community.

Surapong, a member of the community committee in 70Rai, maintains that even though these influential people tend not to make themselves obvious by serving as members of the community committees, they frequently influence the decision making of the committee. Some community leaders even come from this group. They are not all corrupt or trouble makers. Some of them work hard for the community or contribute money to charity in order to legitimize themselves. They are ultimately accepted by the community and are to work within it.

Samphan, another community committee member in Area9, agrees with Surapong. He maintains that the reason local
residents tolerate some illegal practices is due to the fact that not all activities performed by this group are harmful; some even help to facilitate the well-being of the community. For example, while the BMA cannot provide public transportation in the community, illegal mini-bus and motorbike taxi services are able to provide cheap and efficient transportation for the poor. The operators still make a living, even though part of their income is appropriated by the police department.

The informal interviews indicate, however, that the local interest groups or influential people tend not to support any activities which might hinder their own interests. Projects such as anti-drug campaigns would not succeed should one of the drug dealers or their relatives serve on the committee. Other members would no longer dare to discuss this issue in order to avoid confrontation. Furthermore, since these powerful people have already acquired some wealth from their semi-illegal or illegal activities, they no longer support the interests of the poorest group. Socially, they are on the next step to seeking fame, power, position, wealth, and status rather than basic needs as do their fellow community members.

For safety reasons, however, very few respondents agreed to make any further comment regarding the illegality
of the influential group. This question was, therefore, deleted from the questionnaire. The perception and reaction of residents in different areas representing different forms of land allocation can be portrayed by their relationship toward their landlords. Apparently, most respondents refused to make comments—84.0%, 73.0%, 85.7% and 91.5% in Area9, Zone1, 70Rai, and Wat Chonglom respectively, asserting that they feel 'indifferent'. Flat 11-18 has a unique situation where there is a high percentage of speculation. Tenants in this area have the courage to voice their concern, since most landlords who rent out the units live elsewhere. Although it can hardly be generalized, the survey does show a pattern of patron-client relations in the squatter area. Dwellers in the popular form of land allocation, such as those in Area9, have the best relationship with their patron, i.e., landlord, while those in the most capitalistic form of land allocation have the worst (see table 6.11 and 6.12).
Table 6.11 RELATIONSHIP WITH LANDLORDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Zone 1</th>
<th>70 Rai</th>
<th>Flat 11-18</th>
<th>Wat Chonglom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Bad N</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>19.71%</td>
<td>55.71%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad N</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent N</td>
<td>83.56%</td>
<td>73.25%</td>
<td>85.52%</td>
<td>91.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good N</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent N</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
<td>7.89%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12 LANDLORD REACTION TO PAYMENT DELAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Zone 1</th>
<th>70 Rai</th>
<th>Flat 11-18</th>
<th>Wat Chonglom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly Paying</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
<td>6.57%</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harsh</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>6.57%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>7.89%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure to Evict N</td>
<td>19.17%</td>
<td>45.71%</td>
<td>18.57%</td>
<td>16.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sing N</td>
<td>75.34%</td>
<td>35.52%</td>
<td>70.42%</td>
<td>57.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental N</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>87.32%</td>
<td>97.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.6 SUMMARY

Under the paternalistic nature of the Thai society, the urban poor resort to several strategies in order to survive in Bangkok's urban settings. With Klong Toey and Wat Chonglom squatter settlement as a case study, and within the framework of political economy, this chapter has analyzed how the people use various means, within the social circle and also through various other channels within the power structure to survive in a Third World city. These comprise governmental, non-governmental, internal, and external agencies which compete with each other to accomplish their goals. Since the agencies which operate in the squatter
communities have their own purposes, they usually do not fit the needs of the urban poor. Communities within the different forms of land allocation, however, react differently to the provision by each agency. Socioeconomic circumstances, determined by the different forms of land allocation, further govern the way the urban poor react.

The interactions between the urban poor and political agencies are complicated by the number and varieties of parties involved in the squatter settlements. Even though a number of providers do not directly touch on the issues of land and housing, they indirectly affect the living conditions, socioeconomic circumstances, and means of survival of the urban poor in the squatter settlements. The form of land allocation is an important factor in differentiating the types of interaction between the urban poor and the agencies in each study area.

Three major powers are found to be crucial in the squatter settlements: state, NGOs, and local personalities. Forms of land allocation greatly affect the interaction between the urban poor and each of these. Although these three powers usually compete with each other to assist the urban poor in order to achieve their goals and to gain popularity, they also indirectly and implicitly complement each others in a number of ways. When the poorest strata,
for instance, cannot legally seek protection and provisioning from the state, they resort to illegal privileges from either politicians or powerful figures from the local communities. Squatters who are not eligible to receive assistance from the state also obtain indirect funding by means of political parties. In order to seek political support, politicians establish projects which are supported by the state in the squatter settlements. The urban poor exploit this privilege while realizing that the underlying objectives of politicians are not charitable. The higher income group, which can buy their right into the community, in turn, enjoys most of the provisions both from the state and NGOs. The urban poor, whose life style does not match the living conditions in the state form of land allocation, still can benefit from the selling of rights.

Dwellers in the state/capitalistic form of land allocation enjoy more from the legal providers such as EGAT, NHA. and BMA. Therefore, they do not appreciate the provisions of other agencies as much as those in the popular form.

Dwellers in the popular form of land allocation, however, are less individualistic in nature and the provider agencies are biased against them. Grassroots organizations are among the means of access to political power to which the poorest group resorts. While residents in the popular
form of land allocation are affected most by the illegal activities and are abused by some corrupt officials, they also exploit the illegal privileges from politicians and "powerful people" in their local communities.

Several factors determine the success of projects carried out by the community organization. First, the perception of community members toward the security of land tenure is an important force to encourage community members to participate in the community's joint efforts. Underlying the perception of stability in the settlement is the dwellers' experience of the landowner's attitude. Intimidation and eviction could abolish the confidence of occupants and discourage their collective endeavor. On the other extreme, the severe threat of eviction could also drive squatters to apply their aggregate power to negotiate with the land owners. Second, the motivation of community leaders is also an important factor contributing to the success of the community's joint efforts. Wat Chonglom has been an obvious example where a scholar's sincere initiatives in collaboration with the community's needs brought about successful squatter development programs. Finally, a small contribution from the private sector, such as a low interest loan, under proper management, can bring about extensive improvement in the squatter community's
physical setting. The lessen learned from the Wat Chonglom community might not be universally applied to the rest of the settlements. It reveals, however, the ramifications of other factors besides the forms of land allocation.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a summary of the research and some possible policy recommendations according to its findings. First, it addresses the problems of urbanization in Thailand and the state's urban bias which gives rise to slums/squatter settlements in Bangkok. Second, it establishes a summary of theoretical discussion on the related theories/models and their implications for urbanization and housing. Third, it describes the study area and a summary of the field research. Fourth, it relates the research findings to land allocation—the dynamic of land allocation in the Thai state, the social and political aspects of the squatter settlement in relation to the three forms of land allocation. Finally, it discusses the research findings and the contributions of this research to the literature of the Third World urban poor. Some possible topics for future research are also suggested at the end of this chapter.

7.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

Thailand's biased urbanization process has been implicitly determined by its macro development plan and
sectorial policies--trade policy and development strategies--which unintentionally over-ride the explicit spatial policy. The import substitution and export promotion policies make Bangkok the only leading industrial center and the only port. It is abundant in labor, public utilities, and means of communication. The food subsidy policy, which attempts to reduce the cost of food in the city, tends to suppress the price of produce and compel small farmers to leave their farms. The promotion of farm mechanization and utilization of chemicals require farmers to invest more heavily in their farming. This system tends to devastate subsistence farming and does not benefit landless farmers. The monetary and credit policies are also biased against small businesses in the city. Large foreign investments have the privilege of tax breaks.

Bangkok's high population growth rate is attributed partly to high rate of migration. Most of the migration to Bangkok is due to economic pressures i.e., neglect of the agricultural sector and lack of employment in the rural area (ISO 1984). The policy of promoting satellite cities surrounding Bangkok further hinders the inter-regional distribution policy. Regional cities fail to divert streams of migration to Bangkok. Those cities cannot compete with Bangkok's satellite cities in attracting migration (ESCAP, 1985).
Bangkok's rapid growth prompts a great need for urban housing and services. However, several factors contribute to the lack of efficiency of spatial planning. Development and urbanization strategies at the city level are frequently influenced by different interest groups, such as merchants, large landlords, land speculators, real estate business owners, multinational corporations, and the military. This phenomenon results in the pursuing of different conflicting activities and goals.

The autonomy of the state is limited in both planning and implementation. Since the state is financially supported by the elite class, most law enforcement and legal policies are biased against the poor and in favor of the rich. The implementation of state programs is also hindered by bureaucratic procedures and fragmented administrations.

Furthermore, there has been a lack of planning to guide the course of urbanization in Bangkok. Decision making is based on the immediate interests of the decision makers and their surrounding parties. The short period of ruling in each regime is a further hindrance making long term policies impossible.

Due to imperfections in the private land market which gives rise to land speculation, land value in the city center is increasing at an unrealistic rate. Most land
owners attempt to maximize profits from their land to meet the increasing value of land. Residential land in the city has thus been transformed to commercial use. This situation not only prevents the urban poor from getting access to land for housing, but also encourages the eviction of squatter settlements by the landowners. The high level of land concentration in the central plain heightens the number of landless peasants and brings about large streams of migration into Bangkok to seek non-farm employment.

As a result, there were more than 1020 slums/squatter settlements in Bangkok in 1985, as surveyed by Pornchokechai (1985). These slums/squatter settlements are pictured by officials as areas with unfavorable and congested living conditions and as sources of social and health problems. Thai officials and most scholars view the severity of such conditions as the consequence of Bangkok's physical setting which does not support expansion and development, rather than examining the root of the problems (Pornchokechai: 1985, Nathalang: 1978 and Yamklinfung: 1973).

There have been a number of approaches which are taken by scholars to unravel the Third World's issues of urbanization. These approaches also can be applied to the problems of urban housing. Each of the approaches was developed within a particular theoretical paradigm. Three categories of paradigm are discussed in this
dissertation—the orthodox approach, the informal sector model, and the political economy approach. Among them, the mainstream orthodox, which comprises the Neoclassical economy and modernization thinking, dominates the Third World's development philosophy. This paradigm has been fostered in Third World countries with a myth that the underdeveloped will imitate the industrialized countries' course of development. It encourages economic growth and the transformation of the Third World's values toward a Western lifestyle and pattern of consumption.

The housing market in this paradigm is based on an imperfect market economy, which is prone to speculation. The face value of property increases rapidly exceeding its use value. The urban poor are thus excluded from the land market and are forced to live in slums/squatter settlements. To deal with urban housing problems, the Third World state applies measures such as 'urban renewal' and 'slum removal' for the sake of urban beautification and economic efficiency. Housing standards are set up to control the production of housing. The squatter settlement is considered an unproductive sector in the city which is a hindrance to economic growth and attracts more migration from the rural areas. However, the state's direct intervention usually serves to lower the cost of labor, and to relieve political
pressure. Most projects can hardly reach down to the lower income group. The urban poor are also displaced by most relocation projects which are located far from employment.

The empirical observations within these paradigms give rise to marginality theory which views the urban poor, who engage in informal economic activities, as an underprivileged sections of the labor force. The concept of "culture of poverty" dominates the thinking of this model. Poverty is viewed as a result of traditional values and lack of motivation. Actions by the state include attitudinal change by means of education and slums/squatter settlements clearance to help dwellers out of the unfavorable situation. This model, however, fails to explain the root of the problem such as the issue of class and the influence of the elite class in controlling the polity and economy of the country.

The informal sector model was establish by the ILO, identifying a dualistic model of the economy as 'formal' and 'informal.' Related with this model, housing approach such as that by John Turner (1967), viewed slums/squatter settlement as housing production outside the conventional housing market. They are symptoms of urbanization, social safety nets to prevent social unrest during economic transformation. These settlements could be improved if the state relaxed standards control and provided sufficient...
public services. The informal economy model was criticized by the mode of production approach as it failed to take class structure and the nature of the land market into account. Furthermore, the mechanism of this paradigm cannot be applied universally due to the unclear definitions of informal sector activities.

The political economy approach comprises dependency theory and the mode of production approach. Dependency theory examines the linkages between 'core' and 'periphery' societies and presumes that under-development in the periphery is a result of external factors, wherein the core society is exploiting the periphery. The Third World attempts to equalize the terms of trade and break from the stage of dependency by means of exporting industrial goods. However, the shortcoming of this approach lies in its mechanism, which ignores the internal structure of social relations.

The modes of production approach, however, deals with internal structures rather than external, examining the articulation of different modes of production as a way to extract surplus from the subsistent to the capitalistic mode of production. The approach takes the relationship between classes and the distinct modes of production into account. Its analysis also includes the elements of political
superstructures of a particular society. Land is among the important means of production, and can be classified into different forms of allocation as parallel to the mode of production. Form of land allocation not only determines the accessibility for the urban poor to housing in the city. It also governs the life chance of the urban poor by means of its unique physical and spatial characteristics. This dissertation takes the political economy approach in examining the survival strategies of the urban poor. Hence, within the context of different types of land allocation in Third World cities, this dissertation explores how squatters are affected by the state and other internal and external agencies involved; and how they respond to the different types of provisions.

However, the various types of property regimes also play an important role in determining the socioeconomic and especially the physical settings of squatter settlements. The key issue has been the rules of access which relate to each form of land allocation. In order to avoid the fallacy of "the tragedy of the commons" in the analysis of the physical settings of the squatter settlement, one must differentiate open access from common property.

With Klong Toey squatter settlement as a case study and Wat Chonglom as a controlled study area, a multi-instrument approach is applied in the field study. A quantitative ap-
approach is complimented by the case study method to overcome the weaknesses of each approach. Information from secondary sources is applied to establish the state policies, and the historical context.

Communities within the Klong Toey settlement are classified by their land tenure according to their respective types of squatter development programs—sites-and-services, upgrading, and apartment buildings. The four selected communities in the Klong Toey area represent the three forms of land allocation—the capitalist form, the state form, and the popular forms. However, they cannot perfectly fit into these three forms of land allocation described by the theoretical framework of this research due to their overlapping characteristics. These overlapping characteristics are apparently a positive feature in this research differentiating how each of the characteristics influences the urban poor within the context of land allocation.

In this light, Area 9 represents the non-capitalist/popular form; Zone 1 represents the transitional (from popular to capitalist) form; 70 Rai represent the capitalist/state form; and Flat 11-18 represents the state/capitalist form of land allocation. Wat Chonglom has the characteristics of a typical Bangkok slum/squatter.
settlements on privately owned land where physical characteristics do not optimize commercial value. It is treated as a control area in this study.

The field study was implemented in three stages. The first stage involved the acquisition of secondary data from library research and primary data from informal interviews with relevant state officials. The second stage took almost nine months in the five study areas, focusing on the socioeconomic, demographic and political data. Field instruments included a household census and a questionnaire survey. The third stage of research involved three types of research techniques—the focus group interview, the informal interview and participation observation. Two types of data analysis are integrated in this research—quantitative and qualitative analysis. The SPSSPC+ statistical package is used for data calculation, sorting, and tabulation. Compilation of qualitative data includes transcription of interviews, recordings and sorting of field notes.

7.3 RESEARCH FINDINGS

Three major aspects of findings which are related to the three forms of land allocation are described in this dissertation—the dynamic of land allocation and the Thai state, the social aspects of the squatter settlement in relation to the form of land allocation, and the political aspects of the urban poor's survival strategy.
The transformation of forms of land allocation in Thailand has been determined by two factors--Thailand's political ideology--feudalism/democratic--and its industrial development strategy. As discussed in Chapter II, the capitalist form of land allocation tends to articulate into other forms of land allocation over time. Patterns of land holding in Bangkok have been gradually transformed from the communal/feudalistic form to the capitalistic form of land allocation during the colonization period and the end of absolute monarchy. The direction of economic development also determined the transformation of land use patterns in Bangkok--from residential to commercial and industrial. The rapid expansion of Bangkok due to the urban bias and the rapid increase of property values due to land speculation are major factors which gave rise to urban slums/squatter settlement.

A comparison between the state housing policy and the nature of the political regimes of Thailand reveals the extent of the Thai state's autonomy. It is crucial to understand this contextual background prior to analysis of the political economy in the five study areas in Chapter V and VI. Two major types of government emerged in the recent history of Thai polity--civilian and military dictatorship. Most long term governments were dictatorial and ruled by the
military whose power was acquired by means of political coups. Even though their political support came from merchants, the armed forces, and government officials, these regimes still needed popular support. Most of the housing agencies, such as PHD, WHO, HWB, and SIO, were thus started during these periods to obtain political support from different classes. The activities of these agencies range from housing provision to slum clearance, which indicates the diverse housing policies during these regimes, attempting to satisfy both the elite class and the urban poor. On the other hand, civilian governments, intermittently interrupted by military coups, had relatively shorter terms of rule, and carried less power. These regimes lasted only one to two years before the dissolution of the parliament. Therefore, they could not develop long term policies or carry out long term projects. These findings also point to the fact that the autonomy of the state is relative.

Findings pertaining to the social aspects of slum/squatter settlement demonstrate that the urban poor's socioeconomic conditions interact primarily with the form of land allocation. Level of education and income, for example, selectively establish the urban poor into a particular form of land allocation according to affordability. However, a cycle of interaction effects explains how the form of land
allocation effects the life chance of the urban poor. The characteristics of land allocation--type of land tenure and legality in the settlement--determine the dweller's legitimacy to receive provisions of public services by the state. The level of provision, in turn, has a direct effect on the physical condition of the settlement. Physical conditions in a particular area facilitate certain types of household enterprises and attract a particular type of tenant. Furthermore, property value is also influenced by the characteristic of land allocation--length of tenure and the availability of public services. These situations primarily ultimately affect the urban poor's means of income generation directly or indirectly. The social aspects of survival strategies are also determined by the unique physical conditions, the extent of financial needs, and the level of individualism in each form of land allocation.

Parallel to the concept of mode of production, the articulation of the capitalist forms of land allocation is a means by which surplus is extracted and transferred. Surplus generated by unpaid labor within the household for supplementing the household income is finally transferred to the formal economy at large.

The political aspects of the findings in this case study reveal a complicated power structure in these squatter
communities. Three major powers which actively interact with communities in these settlements are the state, NGOs and the local personalities. The study found that the urban poor usually resort to different sources of power to fulfill their economic needs. However, there are a number of agencies involved in these communities, competing with each other to achieve their own goals. Frequently, therefore, their activities hardly meet the needs of the urban poor. Some external agencies, although they do not directly deal with the issues of land and housing, indirectly affect the living conditions of the urban poor, and the form of land allocation thus plays an important role in determining the needs and reaction of the urban poor.

The three sources of power mentioned earlier, while competing with each other to gain popularity, indirectly and implicitly complement each others in a number of ways. The illegality of the squatter settlement can be overcome and provisions can be made to the urban poor in the popular form of land allocation. The paternalistic nature of the Thai society provides a means in which privileges can be granted to the urban poor by the politicians through state funded projects. While taking advantage of this type of provision, the urban poor realize that the underlying goals of politicians are not benevolent. However, dwellers in the state/capitalist form of land allocation, who are eligible
to receive direct provision by the state, do not see the importance of such provisions. Factors other than forms of land allocation, also determine in part the political milieu within the urban poor community. First, the appearance of tenure stability, which is determined by the nature and attitudes of the land owners, encourages members of the community to contribute to the community development projects. Second, the type and motivations of community leaders who establish community development projects are crucial to gaining trust and commitment from participants. And finally, external sources of funding are also important to implement the project.

This research also found that grassroots organizations in the community are a means for the urban poor to exercise their political power. Rate of participation, however, depends on the availability of time the individual has to contribute and the immediate benefit he/she expects. Some dwellers who benefit from the community organization's activities feel obligated to contribute time and efforts to the organization.

7.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH

The principal significance of this research has been its initiatives to examine the survival strategies of the urban poor in a Third World city by means of the
classification of the distinctive forms of land allocation, associated to the mode of production approach. It challenges the conventional thinking of the neoclassical approach and its related paradigms currently applied in most Third World administrations in that it fails to explain the socioeconomic and political issues of the urban poor. The research, therefore, applies the concept of property regime to define rules of access in each form of land allocation to avoid the fallacy.

This research attempts to analyze the spatial activities within the urban settings. It links the physical condition of the squatter community with its socioeconomic and political settings.

The advantage of this research was derived, in part, from the nature of my origin. As a researcher originally from Bangkok, I found the research areas and respondents easier to approach than an outsider might have. Respondents felt at ease while talking to me, since they expected that I would respond with sympathy and understanding. I was accepted in most social gatherings and merged into their activities without difficulty. By means of such participatory endeavors, an insider's view can be obtained.

In addition, the five study areas are located close to my residence which allowed the flexibility to commute or stay in the area as long as I wished for the length of my
field study. Therefore behavior and environment were conveniently observed. Most literature regarding housing and squatter settlement in Thailand are published in Thai language, and I was able to read and comprehend most contextual issues according to the Thai socioeconomic and political settings. As a Thai, I was also able to approach and interview most Thai officials without difficulty. Most high ranking officials including local community leaders were also available to give comments and express their personal views.

However, some disadvantages did exist in this study. First, some literature and research on the Thai socioeconomic and political context were either not available or incomplete. Therefore, an indepth longitudinal comparison on the development of Klong Toey was not possible. Even though the analysis of this study has been written in a candid manner, criticism of the conduct of the authorities is done with great care. Since this research is done from an insider's perspective, an outsider's view is needed to balance the viewpoint.

The contribution of this research to the field of geography has been its initiative to politically analyze the spatial conflict over a Third World's urban space by means of the classification of land allocation. It examines how
the limited urban land is expropriated and utilized within the framework of political economy. Since the ideology of the Third World state is biased and is politically motivated, frequently for the sake of economic growth and against the need of the urban poor, findings of this research should be educative for government officials and policy makers to adjust the direction of their ideology. The disclosure of the underlying situation of a Third World's squatter settlement is crucial to guide not only the direction of housing policy, but also the course of national development and urban policy.

7.5 CONCLUSION

Problems of housing for the urban poor in Third World cities cannot be viewed separately from the issue of land. Socioeconomic, cultural and political aspects in slum/squatter communities at the micro level need to be investigated together with the course of national development at the macro level. The political economy approach is able to help in the understanding of the causes of urban bias which gives rise to slums/squatter settlements in Third World cities, especially Bangkok. Parallel to the concept of modes of production, the classification of forms of land allocation helps differentiate the urban poor's needs underlying the social, economic, political, and physical settings of each form of land allocation. A
comparison of the five study areas also helps in the analysis of the impact of state provisions on the social structure of squatter communities, whereby, the shifting of land allocation from one form to another changes the life chance of the urban poor. The analysis of social structures also looks at the different active agents and personalities in the community who compete with each other to achieve different goals. The responses of the urban poor reflect their discreet strategies to avoid legal measures which are set forth by the elite class to discriminate against them.

7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Experiences from this research point to the fact that a number of chronic problems in the Third World's urban settings, especially that of Bangkok, are still neglected. This situation needs further in-depth research to establish proper solutions.

Land issues which need immediate attention include the high rates of land speculation, the unrealistic increase of property values, and traffic congestion due to lack of land use planning. Appropriate urban land policies are needed to relieve these land related problems.

Physical issues also involve the extensive expansion of the city boundaries and the lack of a mass transit system which causes severe traffic congestions. The inappropriate
physical design of low cost housing provided by the state which cannot meet the needs of the urban poor, also needs further investigation and readjustment.

Financially, public housing programs provided by the state are not accessible to the poorest strata due to two major factors. Both the 'cost-recovery' concept of most projects and the high housing standards required by financial institutions, such as the World Bank, increase housing costs. Policy makers must find other financial alternatives to lower the cost of housing to meet the affordability of the poorest group.
APPENDIX A

THE FOUR LAND TRANSFORMATION MODELS BY PONGPAIJIT

The British economy was a prototype of Western capitalism. The industrial revolution swiftly brought farmers out of the agriculture sector. The large number of landless farmers, thus, had to work as wage laborers. Large land owners were also powerful in the ruling government, compelling the industrialist to resort to laborers for political support. After the industrialist had succeeded in seizing political power, they allied with the land owners again to enjoy the capital accumulation.

The Latin American experience was a stereotype of capitalism dominated by large land holders being advocated by colonization. During the more than 200-year of Spanish colonization, large land owners were powerful rulers in the rural political structure, bringing farmers into the industrial sector. The cooperation among land owners, the military, and foreign investors brought about more landless farmers and more disparity to the economy.

India was a once-colonized Asian country whose economy used to be dominated by the agriculture sector. The industrialization process just before World War II brought about a new generation of medium and wealthy farmers working to facilitate the growth of the industrialization itself.
The conflict between the industrial and agriculture sectors, however, was on produce prices which directly influenced the price of food, the level of urban wages and therefore the costs of investment. This brought about confrontation of farmers against the pro-industrialization government and difficulty on industrial development of the country after World War II. The wealthy and middle class farmers therefore, supported the farmer-based political parties which later dominated the Indian Parliament.

Japan, as described by Pongpajjit (1991), is a highly developed capitalistic country in which farmers are still powerful in the parliament politic. The process of capital accumulation had started after the Meiji revolution. The economy of the country was then gearing toward export substitution and foreign trade.

While the rest of the world was dealing with the aftermath of World War I, Japan had developed itself into a industrialized nation with an increasing number of entrepreneurs and working class in most cities. On the contrary, the political trend was moving toward a more socialistic one. The peasant class, however, allied with the military after the economic recession in 1930 forming a nationalism movement. This facilitated the return of capitalism during World War II. It was not until the end of World War II that the U.S. controlled the Japanese economy
and insisted on land reform to eliminate political power of the influential large land owners. This accelerated the emergence of the small and medium farmer-land lords who became the base of the present Liberal Democratic Party.
APPENDIX B

HOUSEHOLD CENSUS

Number__________________________________________
Date of interview_________________________________
Name of household head____________________________
Name of respondent_______________________________
Address: House number:____________________________
Street name:____________________________________
Lock number:____________________________________
[1] Area 9
[2] Zone 1
[4] Flat 11-18
Interviewer_______________________________________
Result of interview:
[1] completed
[2] not completed
[3] not at home
[4] refused
[5] appointment: Date__________ Time _____________
Notes:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Household structure and living conditions
1. Number of household members (including respondent) _____
2. Detail information of each member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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**Code:**
- **Sex:** 1=male 2=female
- **Marital status:** 1=single 2=married 3=divorce 4=widow
- **Region:** 1=Bangkok 2=Central 3=Northern 4=Northeastern 5=Eastern 6=Southern 7=never move
- **Relationship W/HH head:** 1=friend 2=spouse 3=child 4=co-resident 5=immediate relative 6=relative 7=parent 8=grandparent
- **Occupation:** 1=home enterprise 2=civil service 3=service 4=wage labor 5=street vendor 6=merchant 7=employee 8=unemployed

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3. What is your present conditions of land tenure and security?
   [1] facing eviction
   [2] absolutely no tenure
   [3] no land tenure but some security
   [4] 10-20 years of tenure
   [5] more than 20 years of tenure
   [6] Other (specify) ________________________

4. How long did you occupy this plot of land/unit of flat? for ___________years.

5. What is the status of your house ownership?
   [1] renting
   [3] living with relatives
   [4] purchased & owned
   [5] co-residing (sharing)
   [6] sub-letting
   [7] government provided
   [8] provided by employer
   [9] squatting
   [10] Other (specify) ________________________

6. a) If you are the owner of this house or present unit of flat, how did you obtain it?
   [1] new squatting (less than 2 years)
   [2] occupied since the former generation
   [3] buying the right from someone else
   [4] don't know

   b) If you are a renter or sub-letter, how did your landlord obtain the present plot of land or unit of flat?
   [1] new squatting (less than 2 years)
   [2] occupied since the former generation
   [3] buying the right from someone else
   [4] don't know

7. What is present housing's category of land improvement program?
   [1] land sharing
   [2] no intervention (evicting)
   [3] up-grading
   [4] site-and-services with 20-year tenure
   [5] government housing
   [6] Other (specify) ________________________
8. Provision of public utilities
   a. Does electricity available in your home?
      [1] electricity is not available
      [2] Yes, through the Electricity Generating of Thailand
      [3] Yes, through neighbor with higher rate than that
          from EGAT
      [4] Yes, through neighbor with reasonable rate
      [5] Yes, through illegal connection
      [5] Other (specify) _________________________________
   b. Does tap water available in your home?
      [1] Tab water is not available
      [2] Yes, through the Bangkok Water Work Authority
      [3] Yes, through neighbor with higher rate than from
          BWWA
      [4] Yes, through neighbor with reasonable rate
      [5] Yes, through illegal connection
      [6] Yes, through public water tap
      [7] Other community _______________________________
      [8] Other (specify) _______________________________
   c. Does garbage disposal provided in your area?
      [1] not provided
      [2] Yes, by Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
      [3] Yes, by community organization
      [5] Yes, by religious organization
      [6] Other (specify) _______________________________
   d. Does rain-storm drainage provided in your area?
      [1] not provided
      [2] Yes, by Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
      [3] Yes, by community's organization
      [4] Yes, by NGOs
      [5] Yes, by religious organization
      [6] Other (specify) _______________________________
   e. What is the condition of accessibility to your home?
      [1] temporary board walk
      [2] permanent board walk
      [3] unpaved street
      [4] concrete board walk
      [5] concrete street
      [6] Other (specify) _______________________________
f. Who provides the above walk-ways or streets?
   [1] Building together
   [2] Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
   [3] community organization
   [4] NGOs
   [5] religious organization
   [6] Other (specify) ____________________________

g. Is there any health care service in the your block?
   [1] No, there is no any health care services provided
   [2] Yes, by Bangkok metropolitan Administration
   [4] Yes, community organization
   [5] Yes, by NGOs
   [6] Yes, by religious organization
   [7] private clinic
   [8] Other (specify) ____________________________

h. Does the health care services cost any thing?
   [1] It is free of charge
   [2] Yes, with minimal cost
   [3] Yes, with full cost
   [4] Other (specify) ____________________________

i. Are there police, fire unit, and other security services in the community?
   [1] Police man
   [2] Fire unit
   [3] Guard
   [4] Other (specify) ____________________________

j. Who provides the above security services?
   [1] Bangkok metropolitan Administration
   [3] Community organization
   [4] NGOs
   [5] Religious organization
   [6] Police Department

k. Is there any public education program in the community?
   [1] No there is not
   [2] Yes, there are child care centers
   [3] Yes, there are kindergartens
   [4] Yes, there are primary public schools
   [5] Yes, there are secondary public schools
   [6] Yes, there are job training programs
   [7] Other (specify) ____________________________
1. Who provides the above education programs?
   [1] Bangkok metropolitan Administration  
   [3] Community organization  
   [4] NGOs  
   [5] Religious organization  
   [6] Department on Non-formal Education  
   [7] Other (specify) ___________________________  

9. Housing condition  
   a. What functions are included in the dwelling unit?  
      (more than one category might be chosen)  
      [1] separated living space  
      [2] separated dining space  
      [3] separated sleeping spaces  
      [4] separated multi-purpose space  
      [5] storage area available (for vending equipments)  
      [6] kitchen included  
      [7] laundry area included  
      [8] bath room included  
      [9] separated working area (for income supplement purpose)  

   (Answer to questions 8b.to 8e. are observations from interviewers)  
   b. What is the physical structure of the house?  
      [1] concrete and masonry  
      [2] wood and concrete  
      [3] wood and other permanent materials  
      [5] non permanent materials  
      [6] Other (specify) ___________________________  

   c. conditions of the house structure  
      run-down  well maintained  

   d. tidiness of the dwelling unit  
      messy  well kept  

   e. cleanliness in and around the dwelling unit  
      dirty  clean  

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B: Household economy:

10. What are the major sources of your household income? (more than one category might be chosen)
[7] other (specify) __________________________

11. Is there any economic activity in your dwelling unit? (more than one category might be chosen)
[1] none
[2] front porch candy shop
[3] beauty salon or barber shop
[4] soft-drink and grocery
[5] video rental
[6] dress making
[7] coffee shop
[8] restaurant and noodle shop
[9] auto mechanic and repair shop
[10] food preparation for street vending
[11] other (specify) __________________________

12. How much is your monthly household income: ____________________ Baht

13. Did you share your income with the other members of the household?

14. Other than your household, did you offer/receive any mutual help to/from your neighbor ie., money lending, baby-sitting, food preparation, house keeping.

C: Participation in community organization

15. Do you participate in any of the community organization?

16. What roles do you take in the organization?
[7] other (specify) __________________________
17. Why did you participate in such organization(s)?


18. Have community organizations been of help during crisis i.e., eviction, fire, economic difficulty?
   [1] yes
   [2] no

19. In what ways?


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QUESTIONNAIRE

Number________________________________________

Date of interview________________________________

Name of household head____________________________

Name of respondent________________________________

Address: House number:______________________________

Street name:_______________________________________

Lock number:


Interviewer_______________________________________

Result of interview:

[5] appointment: Date_____________ Time _____________

Notes:________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

1. Do you own the house?

2. If you do not own the house,
   What is your relationship with the owner?
   [1] renter
   [2] sub-letters
   [3] friend
   [4] relative
   [5] leaser
   [6] employee
   [7] co-resident
   [8] other (specify)__________________________
3. If your are a renter
   a) how do you pay your rent?
      regular monthly payment
      [1] working in exchange for housing?
      [2] co-residing and share the expenses
      [3] co-residing for free
      [4] other (specify)
   b) Did you pay rent regularly?
   c) How did your landlord react if payment is delayed?
      [1] apply harsh measure
      [2] threaten to evict
      [3] compromising
      [4] wait until payment is available
      [5] let you live for free for a while
      [6] other (specify)

4. How did you describe your relation with your landlord?
   a) formal informal
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
   b) bad good
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
   c) business non-business
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
   d) not respectful respectful
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
   e) not sympathetic sympathetic
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

5. If your are the owner
   a) how did you obtained the house?
      [1] bought it from the former dweller
      [2] inherit it from the former generation
      [3] hiring some one to build it
      [4] build it yourself little by little while living in it
      [5] other (specify)
b) If you are the owner and if you have a second place to live,

will you allow your friends who are in need of housing stay here temporarily for free?

why

c) will you rent it out to supplement your income?

why

d) How much rental do you think you can get? _________

e) will you sell your house instead of renting it?

why

f) If you're thinking of selling it, will you sell it now or later?

why

g) Do you think the price of your house is increasing or decreasing over time?

why

h) Do you think that, despite the limited land tenure or illegality, getting a house here is a form of investment?

i) To your knowledge, how many of your neighbor sell/buy their houses/dwelling unit?______________ for how much?________

j) Why did they sell/buy their house?
[1] move from some where else?
[2] move to some where else Where?
[3] in need of cash
[4] to be rented for income supplement
[5] have enough space of living
[6] as a form of investment (speculation)
[7] other (specify) __________________________
6. What are the major sources of your household income?
   [1] wage labor
   [2] formal employment eg., clerical, managerial and
       government services
   [3] small business at home (specify)________________________
   [4] street vender

7. How long is the average distance from your present
   residence to your household member's places of
   employment?
   a) average of distance_________________________ km.
   b) average traveling time_________________________ hours
   c) How do you perceive the distance from your present
      residence to your household members' places of
      employment?
      far away near
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

8. If your major source of household income is not wage
   labor or formal employment, what is your space
   requirement at home? (more than one answer can be
   chosen)
   [1] space for selling and storing of merchandise
   [2] cooking and preparation for street vending
   [3] space for customer servicing eg., barber, and beauty
       salon
   [4] space for small manufacturing eg., tailoring,
       laundering, and cottage industry
   [5] space for agriculture and cattle raising
   [6] other (specify)__________________________

9. a) Do you think the available space of your present
    residence is sufficient and appropriate for your
    required activities?

   b) If it is not sufficient or appropriate, why?__________

   c) What do you need other than what you
      have?________________________________________

10.a) How much is the total monthly income of your
    household?_________________________ Baht

   b) Did you share your income with the other members of
      your household?
c) How did your household share income and expenses (more than one answer can be chosen)
[1] income pooling for household expenditure
[2] work longer hours to support temporarily unemployed members
[3] grow vegetables or raise life-stock, etc., for subsistence consuming
[4] subsisting on home-made food and products to be sold at home or on the street
[5] supporting youngster in the household for education and job training
[6] doing house-work, eg., laundering and cooking, for the one who earn household income
[7] other (specify)______________________________

d) Other than your household, did you offer/receive any mutual help to/from your neighbor ie., money lending, baby-sitting, food preparation, house keeping.

e) If you do offer/receive mutual help, how?__________

11. Do you satisfy with the way the state provides public utilities?
not satisfy very satisfy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

12. How do you describe the motivation and actions of politicians and political parties in dealing with housing problems in your area?

13. How do you describe the motivations and actions of military to housing problems in your areas?

14.a) Do you satisfy with how the NHA deals with the problems of squatter settlement in your area?
not satisfy very satisfy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b) why

15.a) Now you are living in

b) Have you ever moved to or from one of these areas?

c) If you have moved to or from one of those areas, did you perceive the any difference among those areas?

d) If you perceive any differences, how do you rate the following areas? (5=most preferred, 4=preferred, 3=indifference, 2=not so preferred, 1=unpreferred)

d.1) in terms of social relation
[ ] Zone 1    [ ] Area 9
[ ] 70 Rai    [ ] Flat 11-18
[ ] Wat Chonglom

d.2) in terms of economic viability
[ ] Zone 1    [ ] Area 9
[ ] 70 Rai    [ ] Flat 11-18
[ ] Wat Chonglom

d.3) in terms of living condition
[ ] Zone 1    [ ] Area 9
[ ] 70 Rai    [ ] Flat 11-18
[ ] Wat Chonglom

d.4) in terms of public facility
[ ] Zone 1    [ ] Area 9
[ ] 70 Rai    [ ] Flat 11-18
[ ] Wat Chonglom
16. What kind of housing and in which area do you think it should be most affordable for you? (5=most affordable.....1=least affordable)

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<th>Area</th>
<th>Types of housing</th>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Zone 1</td>
<td>[ ] government built flat</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[ ] site-and-services</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] 70 Rai</td>
<td>[ ] area up-grading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Flat 11-18</td>
<td>[ ] professional-built</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Wat Chonglom</td>
<td>[ ] self-built while</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] other (specify)</td>
<td>[ ] occupying</td>
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</table>

17. What do you perceive concerning the side effects from government intervention in your area?
- [ ] increasing costs of urban land and housing
- [ ] decrease the ability of the poorest group to get access to low cost urban land and housing, ie.,
  higher rents and higher cost of transportation
- [ ] other (specify)________________________

18. What type of government intervention is most preferable for you? (5=most preferable.....1=least preferable)
- [ ] provision of cheap land at far-away suburb
- [ ] guarantee of short term on-site tenure ie., 10 years.
- [ ] provision of building material for public services ie., walk-way construction
- [ ] building standard control
- [ ] other (specify)________________________________________

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