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**IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENTS: THE CHINESE IN NEW YORK CITY**

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IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENTS:
THE CHINESE IN NEW YORK CITY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN GEOGRAPHY
MAY 1984

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ABSTRACT

Existing studies of Chinatowns and other ethnic neighborhoods have tended to be biased by the perspectives of the majority. They have explained such communities in terms of discrimination, assimilation, and the poverty circle. To explain the Chinese settlements in New York City, this study employs the behavioral approach which emphasizes the perspectives of the Chinese. It examines (1) how the Chinese, being subject to various constraints, have manipulated the urban environment to suit their interests, (2) how their attitudes toward the majority and other minorities have affected their adaptive actions, and (3) how they have organized to help modify the Chinese settlements in the city.

Fieldwork generated most of the data for this study. Such data originated from participant and non-participant observation, informal interviews, questionnaire, clippings from local Chinese newspapers, and censuses.

Historically, Chinese laundrymen and restaurant workers were scattered throughout metropolitan New York. Their dispersion was neither inhibited by discrimination nor augmented by assimilation. A questionnaire survey reveals that dispersed Chinese in New York City and concentrated Chinese in Chinatown have both differences and similarities in behavioral traits. The dispersion of the Chinese is not entirely determined by assimilation but is more directly related to their responses to housing and economic opportunities in the city.

The U. S. immigration policy favors family reunification and discourages immigrants from seeking public assistance. Such policy promotes "chain migration" and induces immigrants to congregate. The
unique demand for ethnic goods enables the Chinese to develop integrated economic activities in Chinatown. Chinatown's merchants generate wealth by providing services to dispersed Chinese throughout metropolitan New York. The Chinese reinvest the wealth in Chinatown and own many buildings there. Because the Chinese are ethnocentric and because they often channel information about housing and employment opportunities in the Chinese language, non-Chinese find it difficult to infiltrate Chinatown.

Chinatown's lack of redevelopment does not necessarily result from poverty. Rent control and tenant protection laws inhibit the relocation of existing residents and make it difficult to redevelop Chinatown. To understand ethnic communities better, it is necessary to consider their behavior in such a context.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the social geography of the Chinese in New York City. "Social geography", as defined by Pahl (1965:81), deals with the "processes and patterns involved in an understanding of socially defined groups in their spatial setting." This study explains the distributional pattern of the Chinese in New York City and draws from it implications for an understanding of the relationship between immigration, the formation of immigrant settlements, and the spatial and social organization of human activities in American cities.

At the outset, I must mention that I am Chinese from Hong Kong. My perspectives of the Chinese in New York and American society may be rather different from those of Americans. My perspectives are influenced by my upbringing in Hong Kong and by the philosophy of laissez-faire that prevails there. I believe that food, housing, education, and employment are commodities and that to acquire them, people, particularly low-income groups, have to work hard and be thrifty. Therefore, I tend to emphasize self-help and self-reliance among people. In America, however, the fulfilment of basic survival needs, such as food and shelter, is considered as a part of a person's human rights. To many Americans, some people are poor not because they have not worked hard enough but because their rights to have basic needs fulfilled have been denied by racial discrimination or other forms of social and economic injustice (e.g., unequal access to
opportunities for different groups) (see, for example, K. Clark 1967; Harrington 1962; Harvey 1973). Owing to this discrepancy between perspectives, my observations and, in turn, explanations of the Chinese in New York City may be different from those of American scholars. When the findings of this study are evaluated, it must be borne in mind that they are also the product of a foreign student's attempts to understand American society and that a foreigner's viewpoints could be different from those of Americans.

Also, because I am a foreign student, I do not share the experience that Chinese-Americans have gone through. This study, therefore, does not claim totally to reflect the indigenous view of the Chinese in New York. However, being an outsider, I am probably able to keep a greater emotional distance from my subjects and to observe their behavior more objectively than an insider. My background of being Hong Kong Chinese tends to make it easier for me than for an American to study Chinese immigrants in New York City because I speak their major dialects, read their local Chinese newspapers, can mingle with them like an immigrant, and can readily gain acceptance in their neighborhood. The bulk of the information that I collected existed in the field and was gathered through my observation of, and interactions with, Chinese immigrants. Often, conventional research methods, such as questionnaire surveys and analyses of census figures, cannot generate similar kinds of field data.

New York's Chinatown

An outstanding feature of the Chinese settlement in New York City is the concentration of a large number of the immigrants in one
locality, Chinatown. In 1980, New York City had a Chinese population of 124,000. Over one-quarter of them lived in Chinatown. New York's Chinatown is an old neighborhood and has existed since the 1870s. It is located in Lower Manhattan and is within walking distance from Downtown (Fig. 1).

Chinatown is not only a residential area. Since its inception, it has been the major commercial, employment, and service center for the Chinese throughout Metropolitan New York. Currently, over 1,400 Chinese economic and cultural establishments, such as restaurants, groceries, curio shops, general stores, garment factories, voluntary associations, and bilingual social and banking services, are located in Chinatown.

The living environment of New York's Chinatown is static but still useful. Its urban form has remained virtually unchanged since the early 20th century. Its streets are narrow and winding and are incompatible with heavy vehicular traffic. Its housing stock is predominantly made up of pre-1901 walk-up tenements. Many such buildings have deteriorated and provide substandard health and heating facilities. Despite its poor living conditions, however, Chinatown shows no obvious symptoms of economic decline and house abandonment. In fact, rapid economic development has occurred in Chinatown since the mid-1960s, due primarily to the new immigration that has come about after the enactment of the 1965 Immigration Act.

Residential clustering is, of course, not unique to the Chinese in New York City. Chinatowns exist in other American cities, such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Sacramento, Seattle, Chicago, Boston,
Fig. 1. General Location of New York's Chinatown
Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, European immigrants, such as Germans, Italians, and Jews, congregated in well-defined territories in American cities. Since the 1910s and the 1940s, blacks and Puerto Ricans have also been concentrated in large urban ghettos.

Despite the general tendency for minorities to congregate in urban enclaves, New York's Chinatown is a unique neighborhood. It is different from other ethnic communities in New York and from Chinatowns in other cities. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, European immigrant enclaves were rather impermanent. They rapidly diminished in size or completely vanished when their members entered the American "mainstream" and moved to places with better amenities. To date, few white enclaves remain within city cores.

When compared with other non-white communities in New York City, Chinatown is outstanding because of its stable economy. Since the mid-1960s, the Chinese population and economic activities in Chinatown have grown rapidly. At the same time, other non-white neighborhoods, such as Harlem, Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant, East New York, and the South Bronx, have suffered severe urban decay due to widespread house abandonment and economic "disinvestment" (K. Clark 1967; Connolly 1977; Roberts 1975; Rogin 1975).

When compared with other Chinese communities in America, New York's Chinatown is unique because of its persistence and because of its aged urban form. Functionally, all Chinatowns are similar. They are the residential, commercial, cultural, or employment centers for the Chinese. Nevertheless, the urban form of no other Chinatown in America
is as old as that of New York's Chinatown. Many Chinatowns, such as those in Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Oakland, were at one time either relocated or reduced in size due to the construction of new buildings or expressways (Chow 1977:50-54; Rose Lee 1960:65-66; Sung 1976:45). Even San Francisco's Chinatown, which has a longer history than New York's Chinese enclave, has gradually been renewed since the 1950s through the construction of low-cost housing projects and private redevelopments (Jack Chen 1980:246; Kung 1962:203; Nee & Nee 1973:320).

A major purpose of this study is to explain how and why New York's Chinatown has developed into a unique neighborhood in relation to the general development of ethnic communities in inner cities. To pursue this goal, this study will employ a "behavioral approach" in which the adaptive behavior of the Chinese is considered as the major determinant of the characteristics of Chinatown. The "behavioral approach", as described by Bunting and Guelke (1979:458), is to "look closely at individual behavior and at the overall environmental and cultural context. This type of investigation will have to be conducted against a thorough background knowledge of the specific circumstances of the group under study." In this study, the background of New York's Chinatown will be the changing situation in New York City and American society, such as changes in the U. S. immigration policy, the general attitude of Americans toward the Chinese, the socio-economic structure of the Chinese in the city, and the ecological and ethnic organizations of the neighborhoods around Chinatown. Specifically, this study will address the following questions:
(1) Given that the Chinese make up an immigrant group in New York City, how have they adjusted to the provisions of American immigration laws?

(2) Given that the Chinese make up one of the numerous ethnic groups in New York City, how have they interacted with the majority whites and other minorities, such as blacks and Puerto Ricans?

(3) How has the Chinese capacity to adapt contributed to the uniqueness of New York's Chinatown?

(4) What are the implications of the uniqueness of New York's Chinatown for our understanding of broader issues, such as the persistence of ethnic enclaves and the revitalization of central city neighborhoods in America?

People behave with incomplete information about the external world and on the basis of what they perceive. Most existing residential landuse and locational models, however, assume that people behave rationally and normatively with complete information about alternative opportunities (Chow 1976:1-2). Such models are, therefore, unable to fully explain the dynamics of ethnic settlements. To understand the Chinese settlements in New York City, this study emphasizes the perspectives of the Chinese. This approach is different from traditional views of Chinese and other minority neighborhoods in America. In the past, social scientists often regarded the minority as "the passive recipient of forces emanating from the majority" (Latané & Wolf 1981:438). In a recent review of the literature on race relations, Lambert (1981:193) observed:
Americans have a distinctive binary, unidirectional view of ethnic/racial relations. We tend to see them as if they comprised a series of dyadic relationships in which a minority is posed against a large, relatively homogeneous majority, and the overwhelmingly important aspect of that relationship is the actions and attitudes of the majority—particularly those labeled discriminatory—toward the minority. Less attention is paid to the actions and attitudes of the minority toward the majority, except as a by-product of that discrimination, or interaction among the minorities themselves.

Traditional approaches to race relations, therefore, tended to be one-sided and were inadequate to explain minorities' group behaviors. (For similar criticisms against traditional approaches to minorities and ethnic neighborhoods, see Cybriwsky 1978 and Ward 1982).

Moreover, few past studies of New York's Chinatown have addressed the unique nature of the neighborhood. Most of them have taken Chinatown as a case example of ethnic enclaves and analyzed its development within the general framework of ghetto formation (e.g., Kuo 1977; Wong 1979; Yuan 1963, 1966, 1974). To evaluate the existing hypotheses on the development of Chinatown, it is necessary to look into the tradition of social scientific studies of urban ghettos.

**Early Studies of Residential Segregation**

The tradition of studying minorities' residential patterns in cities can be traced to the contribution of urban sociologists during the 1920s, such as Burgess (1924, 1928, 1929) and Park (1926). The early work characterized newcomers to the city, including blacks from rural areas and immigrants, as groups with "an alien culture, a low economic status and a different race" (Burgess 1928:109). These people were often concentrated in slums near the central business district.
where accommodations were cheap and were within walking distances from unskilled jobs. In Park's opinion (1926:8-9), the emergence of such enclaves was a natural consequence of migration because migrants with the same racial, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds tended to congregate:

One of the incidents of the growth of the community is the social selection and segregation of the population, and the creation, on the one hand, of natural social groups, and on the other, of natural social areas. . . . The Chinatowns, the Little Sicilies, and the so-called "ghettos" . . . are special types of a more general species of natural area which the conditions and tendencies of city life inevitably produce. Such segregation of population as these take place, first, upon the basis of language and of culture, and second, upon the basis of race.

McKenzie (1926:179-180), however, emphasized the importance of economic factors in residential segregation:

Segregation is used here with reference to the concentration of population types within a community. Every area of segregation is the result of the operation of a combination of forces of selection. There is usually, however, one attribute of selection that is more dominant than the others, and which becomes the determining factor of the particular segregation. Economic segregation is the most primary and general form. . . . Other attributes of segregation, such as language, race, or culture, function within the spheres of appropriate economic levels.

Burgess (1924:92) took the "middle ground" and considered both economic and cultural factors as the underlying variables of residential segregation. He also recognized that residential segregation would be perpetuated through time because cultural and economic forces, such as the tendency for migrants to engage in ethnic occupations, tended to reinforce the differentiation of groups:

This differentiation into natural economic and cultural groupings gives form and character to the city. For segregation offers the group, and thereby the individuals who compose the group, a place and a role in the total organization of city life. Segregation limits development in certain directions, but releases it in
others. These areas tend to accentuate certain traits, to attract and develop their kind of individuals, and so to become further differentiated.

The division of labor in the city likewise illustrates disorganization, reorganization, and increasing differentiation. The immigrant from rural communities in Europe and America seldom brings with him economic skill of any great value in our industrial, commercial, or professional life. Yet interesting occupational selection has taken place by nationality, explainable more by racial temperament or circumstance than by Old World economic background, as Irish policemen, Greek ice-cream parlors, Chinese laundries, negro porters, Belgian janitors, etc.

Despite the tendency for migrants to congregate, many of them eventually tried to move out from segregated areas because living conditions there were highly undesirable. Burgess (1929:115-116) described the immigrant colony as the area "of physical deterioration and social disorganization" where there was "the greatest concentration of cases of poverty, bad housing, juvenile delinquency, family disintegration, physical and mental disease." When migrants dispersed from ghettos, however, they had to settle in other population groups' neighborhoods. This process was generally known as "residential invasion and succession" (Alrich 1975; Burgess 1928; Cressey 1938). According to Burgess (1928:112), the process of succession occurred by four stages:

(1) invasion, beginning often as an unnoticed or gradual penetration, followed by (2) reaction, or the resistance mild or violent of the inhabitants of the community, ultimately resulting in (3) the influx of newcomers and the rapid abandonment of the area by its old-time residents, and (4) climax, or the achievement of a new equilibrium of communal stability.

The process of invasion and succession, therefore, involved two situations. (1) Ghetto residents were willing and economically able to disperse. (2) Non-ghetto residents were willing to accept these "invaders" or newcomers. When explaining the dispersion process, Park
(1926) emphasized the importance of the former situation while Burgess (1928) emphasized the latter. According to Park (1926:9):

> [T]he keener, the more energetic, and the more ambitious very soon emerge from their ghettos and immigrant colonies and move into an area of second immigrant settlement. . . . More and more, as the ties of race, of language, and of culture are weakened, successful individuals move out and eventually find their places in business and in the professions, among the older population group which has ceased to be identified with any language or racial group.

On the other hand, Burgess (1928:112) argued:

> Every residential community offers resistance to the intrusion of a new group of imputed inferior status whether on the basis of race, economic standing, or cultural difference. This resistance may manifest varying degrees of intensity. In the face of Negro invasion it may go to the extremes of violent opposition.

Thus, by the end of the 1920s, several hypotheses had emerged in the literature on the concentration and dispersion of minorities in urban areas. Such hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

1. **Ethnic concentration**
   
   Cultural affinity and migrants' low economic status are the major causes of residential segregation. Moreover, the tendency for migrants to engage in ethnic occupations reinforces the differentiation between groups.

2. **Ethnic dispersion**
   
   Two hypotheses on the dispersion of minorities from ghettos can be identified. (a) Dispersion is related to migrants' socio-economic status, i.e., the higher the socio-economic status, the higher degree of dispersion. (b) Dispersion is related to assimilation. Migrants tend to disperse when their ties to ghettos on the basis of race, language, and culture are weakened.
(3) **The persistence of ethnic concentration**

Two hypotheses can be identified on the persistence of urban ghettos. (a) Some people are unable to disperse because they have failed to improve their socio-economic standing. Burgess (1929:116), for example, considered long-time ghetto residents as "the defeated, leaderless, and helpless." (b) Some people have to remain in ghettos because their dispersion is prevented by strong resistance from non-ghetto residents.

(4) **Effects of residential segregation**

Because ghettos are places of physical deterioration and social disorganization, residential segregation is socially undesirable.

**Contemporary Studies of Ethnic Concentration and Dispersion**

The above hypotheses laid the groundwork for subsequent analyses of urban residential patterns. Numerous studies, such as Ronald Freedman (1950), Trevor Lee (1977), Johnston (1971:48), MacDonald & MacDonald (1964), and Ward (1968, 1971), explored the relationship between migration and the emergence of migrant settlements in cities. Their findings consistently showed that migrants with similar social characteristics tended to concentrate in common areas because people often migrated in "chains", i.e., to places where their friends and relatives had already settled. Trevor Lee (1977:27) explained this process as follows:

One of the strongest forces influencing the development of an ethnic concentration is the operation of migration chains. A migration chain is a process whereby migrants from one specific locality in the country of origin are attracted to emigrate by friends or relatives from their own locality who have emigrated.
The links between immigrants and prospective immigrants frequently extend beyond the feedback of information and may include financial support for fares, provision of initial accommodation, and even the seeking of employment.

Johnston (1971:48) also observed:

Chain migration usually develops from the success of a few pioneers, who send back information (and often money) concerning their new home and its benefits. Their families and acquaintances decide to join them, and the pioneers help them to find accommodation and employment. Spatial clustering of residences is a natural consequence of this.

Findings from contemporary research on ethnic dispersion were, however, less consistent and often contradictory to one another. On the one hand, large numbers of studies, such as Boal (1976), Duncan & Duncan (1955), Duncan & Lieberson (1959), Johnston (1971:110-114), Lieberson (1961), and Peach (1980), showed that residential dispersion was related to migrants' socio-economic status and assimilation with the host society. Boal (1976:56-57), for example, stated, "In the urban context, we interpret the ethnic group as having its initiation through in-migration, and we assume that its subsequent social and spatial experience will be a function of the degree and speed of assimilation that occurs." Peach (1983:113) suggested that "the more segregated the group, the less the assimilation; the more dispersed, the more the assimilation."

On the other hand, Glazer & Moynihan (1970), Jackson (1981), Kantrowitz (1981), Trevor Lee (1977), Rosenberg & Lake (1976), Wallace (1953), and Ward (1971, 1982) contended that assimilation was not the only, or even the major factor of ethnic dispersion. Wallace (1953:205), for example, pointed out, "The so-called 'assimilation' process was not reflected by the geographic dispersion of the immigrant
populations into 'cosmopolitan American areas'. The dispersion was more directly related to an increase in housing alternatives as the city grew at the periphery." Ward (1982:264) said, "While levels of residential segregation amongst most of the descendants of European immigrant groups are lower than those amongst their migrant ancestors, these reductions do not necessarily describe a simple trajectory from an inner-city ghetto to suburban assimilation." In Britain, Trevor Lee (1977:161-162) studied black West Indians in London and concluded that "there was no consistent weakening of ties with the ethnic community with increased dispersal.... It is doubtful that this limited dispersal reflects a concomitant degree of social and economic assimilation into British society."

Assimilation and socio-economic status alone cannot adequately explain ethnic dispersion because they fail to account for at least the following two observations: (1) In cities like New York, Cleveland, and Boston, white ethnic groups, such as the descendants of Scandinavian, Polish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants, have continued to be residentially segregated and to maintain strong ethnic identities even though they have been highly assimilated into American society (Kantrowitz 1969, 1973, 1981; Glazer & Moynihan 1970; Ward 1971:149, 1982:265). (2) Blacks have continued to be residentially segregated from whites although many blacks have improved their socio-economic standing since the 1940s (Taeuber & Taeuber 1964; Rose 1982).

Recognizing the inadequacy of using assimilation and socio-economic status as the only factors to explain minorities' residential patterns, researchers differentiated two processes whereby ethnic concentration
could have persisted: voluntary and involuntary segregation. Lieberson (1963:4-5) suggested:

In short, aside from economic differences between ethnic groups, we would expect residential segregation under two sets of circumstances: first, if the ethnic group was of undesirable status, then the group would be involuntarily segregated; secondly, if proximity to members of the same group facilitated adjustment to the conditions of settlement in a new country or if members of an ethnic group simply viewed the residential proximity of members from the same group as desirable, there would be voluntary segregation.

The dominant view in the literature was that non-whites, particularly blacks, were involuntarily segregated because they suffered severe degrees of discrimination in housing, employment, and education. Rose (1982:134), for example, argued:

Urban black populations occupy residential areas where they constitute the majority population. . . . The basis for the existence of such communities is generally attributed to (1) discrimination and (2) residential choice. Arguments abound regarding which of the above constitutes the more critical determinant. But such arguments have little meaning if extended back in time for more than one or two decades . . . Previous restrictions on choice have led to the evolution of the ghetto configurations that served, in most instances, as modal residential communities for the nation's metropolitan black population.

K. Clark (1967:81) equated dark ghettos to colonies, emphasizing the involuntary nature of their formation and persistence:

America has contributed to the concept of the ghetto the restriction of persons to a special area and the limiting of their freedom of choice on the basis of skin color. The dark ghetto's invisible walls have been erected by the white society, by those who have power, both to confine those who have no power and to perpetuate their powerlessness. The dark ghettos are social, political, educational, and—above all—economic colonies. Their inhabitants are subject peoples, victims of the greed, cruelty, insensitivity, guilt, and fear of their masters.

Some researchers, however, admitted that it was difficult to determine the relative importance of voluntary and involuntary segregation in
ethnic concentration. Peach (1975:8-9) said:

The [segregated] pattern is the net effect of two gross forces; the first is the positive selfascriptive force which makes a group want to segregate itself; the second is the negative proscriptive force of outside society which prevents the segregated group from dispersing. From the pattern one can determine the net effect of both forces, but one cannot immediately distinguish the relative strengths of the positive and negative forces.

Moreover, many studies, such as Kenneth Clark (1967), Duncan & Duncan (1955), Harrington (1962), Harvey (1973), Lewis (1966), Lieberson (1961, 1963), Rose (1971, 1982), Rosenberg (1974:12-27), Sackrey (1973), and Valentine (1968), pointed out the negative impact of residential segregation on minorities and society at large. These studies regarded residential segregation as a symptom of the social and spatial isolation of ghetto residents from the larger society. Because of the isolation, ghetto residents were deprived of opportunities for good housing, high-paying employment, and quality education which existed predominantly in places outside ghettos. Many researchers, therefore, believed that these forms of isolation created a vicious circle which made it difficult for ghetto residents to enter the American "mainstream" (e.g., K. Clark 1967; Harrington 1962; Lewis 1966; W. Wilson 1981). W. Wilson (1981:39-40) said:

In the final analysis, the lack of economic opportunity for lower-class Blacks means that they are forced to remain in economically depressed ghettos and their children are forced to attend inferior ghetto schools. This gives rise to a vicious circle as ghetto isolation and inferior opportunities in education reinforce their disadvantaged position in the labor market and contribute to the growing gap in the economic resources of the haves and have nots in the black community.

Ghettos were therefore perceived as the sources of deviant behaviors, social discontent, and mob violence. Peach (1983:115) thus concluded,
"Ethnicity is profoundly disruptive not only of class unity but of national unity also."

Nevertheless, some other studies, such as Chow (1975, 1977), Fitzpatrick (1966), Handlin (1951), Nelli (1970), Ward (1971:117-118, 1982), argued for the benefit of residential concentration. Nelli (1970:258-259), for example, contended:

Scholars and laymen alike still too often ignore or fail to recognize values and contributions of the immigrant community and its institutions. Because it served as a staging area where new arrivals remained until they absorbed new ideas and habits which made possible their adjustment to the alien environment, the ethnic community fulfilled a vitally important function both to the newcomer and to the receiving society. It bridged the gap between rural (old world) traditions and the new urban world, and acquainted each immigrant group, from the Irish and Germans of the 1840s and the Italians and Slavs of the 1890s, to the Puerto Ricans and Negroes of the 1960s, with American urban ideas and values.

Thus, two opposing views prevail within the literature on the effect of residential segregation. While some researchers maintain that residential segregation is undesirable, some others contend that it is beneficial to migrants. Neither of these opposing views, however, adequately explains the behavior of segregated minorities. The negative view of segregation fails to explain why some ghetto residents could eventually succeed and emerge from their enclaves. The positive view of concentration, on the other hand, neglects the fact that many segregated residents have never been able to emerge from ghettos and enter the "mainstream". Ethnic concentration and dispersion are, therefore, complex phenomena. Moreover, different groups may adapt to urban situations in different ways and not a single factor can adequately explain the variety of their adaptive behaviors.
According to Glazer & Moynihan (1970:xxxiii), for instance, "Ethnic groups, owing to their distinctive historical experiences, their cultures and skills, the times of their arrival and the economic situation they met, developed distinctive economic, political, and cultural patterns."

Therefore, to understand better the processes of ethnic concentration and dispersion, it is necessary to look into the distinctive nature of each minority group's locational and social experience, to consider its locational pattern as the product of human actions, and to look into how its members behave within the historical, social, economic, and political contexts of urban society. The adjustment of the Chinese to New York City is instructive as a study of ethnic experiences in America. An analysis of Chinese settlements and adaptation in New York City can provide insights for similar understandings of other minority groups such as blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Koreans in American cities. The following section reviews the literature on Chinatowns in America.

### Previous Studies of Chinatowns

Historically, the Chinese were discriminated against in America. Virtually all studies in the past assumed that discrimination caused the formation of Chinatowns. Kwong (1979:148), for example, said, "The isolation of the Chinese was involuntary, a product of discrimination and exclusion." C. T. Wu (1976:48) wrote, "New York's Chinatown is a unique urban ghetto created in earlier decades by racial discrimination against the Chinese in this country." Murphey (1952:249) asserted,
"The majority of those who live and carry on their business in Boston's Chinatown do so because race prejudice makes living and business difficult or impossible elsewhere." According to King & Locke (1980:32), "the development of Chinatowns in major urban centers initially emerged as an economic accommodative mechanism in response to prejudice and discrimination against the Chinese in the host society."

Like the early sociologists in the 1920s, many contemporaries believed that only successful and assimilated people could disperse from Chinatowns and that some Chinese had to remain there because they were unable to adjust to American society. According to Yuan (1966:332), "the dispersion of the majority of the Chinese over the New York Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area . . . symbolize[s] the process of gradual assimilation. . . . The non-Chinatown population has, in general, a better income, education, and occupation than the Chinatown population." Moreover, Yuan (1966:331) argued that some Chinese preferred to live in Chinatown "because of their inabilities to adjust to predominantly white neighborhoods elsewhere." As recently as 1982, Loo & Mar (1982:104), in their study of San Francisco's Chinatown, repeated the same thesis of Burgess (1928, 1929) and Park (1926):

Our findings generally confirm the thesis that confinement to a first settlement enclave is due to constraints on choice and abandonment of this area occurs with increased economic status or greater choice availability. . . . Chinatown is an initial point of entry for newcomers to America. Immigrants who have difficulties with American life and society can ease the extent of these difficulties by locating in Chinatown. . . . As economic, language, and social constraints lessen for the immigrant, the need to live in the enclave gives way to the desire to move out in search of better housing and opportunities. Those most desirous of leaving are the young adults, the higher income residents, and
those who feel less need to live among Chinese. These individuals face fewer difficulties with American culture and society.

Assuming that only maladapted Chinese would have stayed in Chinatowns, researchers tended to focus on the pathology of ghetto life there. They often accepted the underlying assumption of a poverty circle. On the basis of the literature, the vicious circle that has caused the pathology of Chinatowns can be summarized as follows:

Chinatown is full of social problems. Its housing is aged, deteriorated, and sub-standard. Its public facilities, such as health, and recreational services, are inadequate. The majority of its residents are non-English-speaking, low-income Chinese. Job opportunities in Chinatown are limited to those in small businesses, Chinese restaurants, and garment factories. Such jobs normally require long working hours but offer low wages. When parents have to work for long hours, they cannot well supervise their children. Consequently, family structure disintegrates. The immigrant children tend to drop out of schools and become factory or restaurant workers. Some of these youngsters may join street gangs. Gangsters are prevalent in Chinatown and their anti-social activities terrorize the whole community.

To explain why the vicious circle had remained unbroken, most of the past studies suggested the following hypotheses. (1) The majority of Chinatown's residents do not speak English and lack "marketable" skills. They are, therefore, unable to climb up the social ladder. Cheung & de Rios (1982:150), for example, wrote, "A number of the new [Chinese] immigrants are youths who possess limited technical and English language skills. Generally they settle in or near Chinatown
with their family. Many of them, lacking marketable skills and command of the English language, are unable to find jobs." Tobier (1979:73) stated, "And, because of the limitations necessarily imposed on their job-seeking efforts by language, a very high proportion of the new [Chinese] immigrants—men and women, young and middle-aged—feel themselves restricted to jobs that are physically available within Chinatown."

(2) The American-born or American-educated Chinese are better assimilated, but they tend to live outside the ghetto and have little interaction with the Chinese in Chinatown. According to Kuo (1977:144), for example, "the successful Chinese professionals and businessmen in the metropolitan New York area have no interest in the conditions of Chinatown and no contact with its residents because of the class and cultural differences between them." Wong (1979) asserted that the dispersed Chinese in New York City were categorically "not connected" with Chinatown. He wrote, "Many social variations exist among the Chinese in New York City, but in a general way they can be divided into two groups: those connected directly with Chinatown and those who are not connected with Chinatown. The latter group is composed of foreign-born students, scholars, professionals, government representatives from both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and visiting merchants. These people ... live and work in non-Chinatown areas" (Wong 1979:34).

(3) The residents of Chinatown lack financial and technical resources and are, therefore, unable to improve the conditions of their neighborhood. Tsai (1980:337), for example, wrote, "Rising problems in
Chinatown today cannot be solved by residents of Chinatown alone, for they lack resources, both technically and financially." Kuo (1977:144) said, "Chinatown as a community lacks not only material but also human resources."

(4) Because Chinatown's residents make up a small minority, they are "powerless" to demand public funds from the government to help improve their living conditions. Yuan (1966:325) wrote, "Since governmental or community programs for slum clearance and anti-poverty are influenced by current political pressure and public opinion, Chinatown proper is not expected to receive priority over other minority communities in New York. ... [T]he Chinese cannot exert much political pressure upon the city government due to their small voting population and limited participation in local politics."

According to Kuo (1977:119), the Chinese in New York made up a "small, powerless population unable to exert any political influence on the political processes in New York City. This lack of political power has made it difficult for the Chinese to compete successfully with other ethnic groups for government aid."

As argued by these studies, the solution to pathological Chinatowns rested almost entirely on public intervention. Cattell (1962:87) wrote, "[New York's] Chinatown at the present time is going through a crisis which is bound to get worse in the next few years if the situation is allowed to progress unhindered." Yuan (1966:325) protested, "(1) [New York's] Chinatown proper is a blighted area, and yet there has been no urban renewal program for it, and (2) about half of the families in Chinatown proper are poverty-stricken, and yet there
have not been any anti-poverty funds used for them." Kuo (1977:114) asserted, "Limited resources in [New York's] Chinatown resulted in economic stagnation, which can be relieved through government aid." Sung (1979:189) proposed that the government should "explore and undertake measures to revitalize and renew the New York Chinatown neighborhood. . . . The city should realize that . . . upgrading the neighborhood will . . . provide a better environment for the Chinatown residents." Wong (1979:33) stated, "Chinatown in the seventies . . . must depend on the city, and federal governments to solve many of its problems whether it be housing, old age, schools, crime or unemployment."

The existing hypotheses are inadequate to explain the situation of New York's Chinatown because they ignore altogether the positive aspect of living in the neighborhood. Their pathological views of Chinese enclaves fail, for example, to explain why New York's Chinatown is economically more stable than many other urban ghettos. Existing studies emphasize the necessity for the Chinese to receive governmental aid in order to improve Chinatowns, but neglect the potential limitations of such public intervention. Some critics, for instance, have demanded urban renewal projects in New York's Chinatown (Sung 1979:189; Yuan 1966:325). Renewal projects, however, would have to displace the existing residents and small businesses from the neighborhood. (For the limitation of urban renewal programs, see, for example, Chow 1975, 1977:126-138; Gans 1968:260-277; Jacobs 1964:284-304.) Unless alternative residences and job or business opportunities are available to the potentially displaced residents,
urban renewal is hardly a feasible program for New York's Chinatown. More importantly, few past studies looked into the role that Chinatown's residents played in changing and improving their neighborhood. Following the traditional approach to race relations in America, scholars often regarded Chinatown as a community in which the Chinese passively responded to societal and political forces. They paid little attention to the attitude of the Chinese toward the majority and other minority groups. Wong (1979:7), for example, described the Chinese in New York as "an encapsulated ethnic group" whose "destiny . . . is clearly affected by . . . the majority." In her study of New York's Chinatown, Kuo (1977:vxiii) wrote, "I view the community as dependent on the larger society." Then, she (Kuo 1977:130) argued, "When the larger political structures place constraints on the whole group or the whole population that makes up a community, the community is not capable of making changes in the institutions that constrain them."

In reality, people not only passively adjust to but also actively try to improve their external environment. Graves & Graves (1974:117) pointed out, "The nature of man is best described as neither totally active nor passive but interactive. Operating within the many constraints which his physical and social environment impose, he seeks to overcome the problems confronting him by choosing among perceived available options. Through the aggregation of such choices man modifies and is modified by the world around him in a mutually evolving system." Also, according to Boissevain (1974:27), "a person's . . . social environment is partly ascribed and partly achieved. . . . His
interaction with this social environment is neither wholly self-determined, nor wholly predetermined. He is not only constrained and manipulated by his environment, he also manipulates it to suit his interests."

This dissertation explores several neglected aspects of the Chinese in New York City. It examines (1) how the Chinese, being subject to various constraints, such as being segregated in a ghetto, have manipulated the urban environment of New York to suit their interests, (2) how their attitudes toward the majority and other minorities, such as blacks and Puerto Ricans, have affected their adaptive actions, and (3) how they have organized to modify the Chinese settlements in the city.

Although this study deals with the Chinese in New York City, it bears implications for an understanding of minorities and urban ghettos elsewhere in America. Our existing knowledge of such phenomena is primarily based on an assumption that minorities passively respond to societal forces, such as discrimination. This study, in contrast, argues that minorities not only passively respond to, but also actively manipulate such forces to suit their interests. It, therefore, suggests a reexamination of both the assumptions and findings of traditional approaches to minorities. Moreover, this study shows that different people may react to the same macroscopic forces in different ways and that their actions result in the variation between their spatial and social experience. Hence, efforts to identify the effect of macroscopic factors, such as discrimination, and spatial and social isolation of ghetto residents, are inadequate to explain the behavior
of segregated minorities. Analyses should address the diversity of minorities' adaptive actions within the context wherein such macroscopic variables operate.

An Overview of the Study

The bulk of the information contained in this study is from field work that I conducted in New York City between March, 1980, and January, 1981. During the field work, I noticed two seldom explored situations of Chinatown. First, I observed that the social structure of New York's Chinatown was more complex than many past studies had assumed. Besides low-income, non-English-speaking Chinese, large numbers of middle-income Chinese with white-collar occupations also live and work in Chinatown. It seems, therefore, that poverty and symptoms of poverty cannot adequately explain the socio-economic conditions of New York's Chinatown.

Second, contrary to the popular belief that the dispersed Chinese in New York have little interaction with the residents of Chinatown, according to my observation in the field, many dispersed Chinese commute to Chinatown to work, to shop, and to socialize. New York's Chinatown is hardly an isolated community, as most of the past studies have suggested. The situation of the neighborhood cannot be adequately explained without considering this interaction between the Chinese in Chinatown and those in other localities in New York.

Thus, answers to three more questions are crucial to our understanding of the Chinese settlements in New York City: (1) How and why was Chinatown formed? (2) Why has it persisted? (3) How is
Chinatown related to other Chinese settlements in New York City? The following chapters will seek to provide answers to these questions.

Chapter II gives the historical background of Chinese immigration to the United States and New York City and the contemporary setting of the Chinese settlements in New York. It shows that in New York, although Chinatown has long been the largest Chinese cluster, the majority of the Chinese have nearly always been scattered throughout other parts of the city. Since the mid-1960s, small Chinese clusters have emerged in Elmhurst, Woodside, Jackson Heights, and Flushing, Queens and in Flatbush and Bay Ridge, Brooklyn. This chapter calls for subsequent explanations of why the Chinese are so distributed in New York City.

Chapter III describes the field strategies that I employed, the kind of information that I collected, and the hypotheses that I postulated on the basis of my field observation. This chapter identifies five factors which are worth further exploration in order to explain the formation and persistence of New York's Chinatown. These factors are: (1) the functions of Chinatown, (2) property ownership among the Chinese, (3) race relations between the Chinese and other population groups, (4) rent control and its effects on the development of Chinatown, and (5) internal conflicts between community groups in Chinatown.

These factors do not, however, operate independently. They are interrelated and function with other variables, such as the interaction between concentrated and dispersed Chinese, the U. S. immigration policy, and changes in the socio-economic structure of the Chinese in
New York City. The subsequent analysis, therefore, considers both the effects of these five identified factors and other variables on the distributional pattern of the Chinese in New York City.

Chapter IV relates the first three factors identified in Chapter III to the formation and persistence of New York's Chinatown. It argues that New York's Chinatown was formed and has persisted for several reasons: (1) Chinatown has functioned as a central place for the Chinese throughout metropolitan New York. (2) The Chinese own the majority of the buildings in Chinatown. (3) Chinese property-owners tend to rent their premises to fellow Chinese and hence exclude other population groups from moving into Chinatown.

Chapter V looks into the next two factors (rent control and internal conflicts) and their relationships with contemporary development in Chinatown. It also explores the effect of current immigration laws on recent changes in Chinatown and other Chinese settlements in Queens and Brooklyn.

Finally, chapter VI gives a summary of the findings of the study and draws from them implications for future research and public policy concerning minority areas in American cities.
CHAPTER II
CHINESE IMMIGRATION INTO NEW YORK CITY: HISTORICAL
AND CONTEMPORARY SETTINGS

Chinese immigration into New York City began in the 1870s. The majority of the city's pioneer Chinese, however, did not immigrate directly from China. They were "step immigrants" from California and other western states. To understand the origin of Chinese settlements in New York and the evolution of the Chinese as an immigrant group there, it is, therefore, necessary to look into the historical contexts of Chinese immigration to both the United States and New York City. This chapter looks into the historical background of Chinese immigration to the United States and the contemporary setting of the Chinese settlements in New York City.

Chinese Immigration: A Historical Background

The historical background of Chinese immigration to the United States will only be briefly noted here: brief not because it is unimportant but because it has been well documented elsewhere*. In this chapter, the emphasis is on issues that have drastically affected the demographic and distributional patterns of the Chinese in the

*See, for example, Barth (1964); Jack Chen (1980); Chiu (1963); Coolidge (1909); Daley (1978); Hoexter (1976); Kung (1962); Robert Lee (1976); Rose Lee (1960); Lyman (1974, 1977); Stuart Miller (1969); Wayne Miller et al. (1976); Nee & Nee (1973); Sandmeyer (1939); Saxton (1971); Sung (1967, 1980); Zo (1971).
Chinese immigration to the United States began in the 1850s when the Chinese immigrated to California to join the gold rush. During the 1860s, a fair number of Chinese were recruited from southern China to work on the Central Pacific Railroad. The Chinese population in the United States thus grew from a few hundred in the 1840s to 63,000 in 1870. The majority of the early Chinese immigrants were in California. According to the 1870 census, 49,227 Chinese resided in California; they accounted for 78 percent of the U. S. total Chinese population and about 10 percent of California's state population.

The continental railroad was completed in 1869, and by the late 1860s, virtually all of the gold mines in California were exhausted. Having lost their jobs on the railroad and in the mines, the Chinese worked in various industries, e.g., as domestic servants, laundrymen, and as laborers in fishing, farming, ranching, draining ditches and swamp land, construction, cigar-making, shoe-making, and woolen-clothing manufacturing. Meanwhile, the exhausted mines and the completed railroad discharged thousands of American workers. Also, large numbers of people were moving out West, taking advantage of the cheap transportation provided by the newly constructed railroad.

In California, however, American workers found that they had to compete for jobs with the Chinese. They considered the competition unfair because the Chinese worked for wages that were too low to be acceptable to whites. They, therefore, tried to oust the Chinese by coercing employers not to hire Chinese laborers and by humiliating, persecuting, and, in several instances, massacring the Chinese. Such
discriminatory actions against the Chinese were tolerated and, in fact, encouraged by law. In 1854, a California state supreme court ruling barred the Chinese from testifying against whites in courts*. 

In response to strong agitations against them, some of the Chinese in the West returned to China; some resorted to living in Chinatowns; some specialized in occupations which Americans did not care to take, such as Chinese restaurants, groceries, and hand laundries; and some dispersed to the East to look for places where the persecution against them might be less severe. The eastward dispersion of the Chinese began when a few manufacturers tried to recruit Chinese laborers in San Francisco to work in eastern cities (Barth 1964:197). In 1870, a shoe manufacturer recruited 75 Chinese laborers in San Francisco to work in North Adam, Massachusetts; a laundry owner recruited about 300 to work in Belleville (near Newark), New Jersey (Barth 1964:198-205). A cutlery company attempted but failed to hire enough Chinese laborers in San Francisco to work in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, because most Chinese were still unwilling to move to an unknown place in the East (Barth 1964:207). Nevertheless, from 1870 on, small streams of Chinese migration developed, moving from the West to the East. The Chinese "step migrants" from the West tended to move into big cities, perhaps because of the availability of jobs. Thus, in the 1870s, small Chinese settlements sprang up in big cities in the Mid-West, such as in Chicago, and on the East Coast, such as in Boston, 

*This ruling was declared unconstitutional and ineffective in 1872 (Chinn 1969:24).
Philadelphia, and New York City.

Soon, however, the anti-Chinese movement became a national issue. There were debates across the continent on whether the Chinese should have been allowed to come to the United States at all. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act (1) to prohibit the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years, (2) to allow the entry of only five categories of people from China, i.e., government officials, teachers, students, merchants, and travelers, and (3) to forbid the Chinese from becoming naturalized citizens. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was extended until its final repeal in 1943.

The Chinese Exclusion Act successfully curtailed Chinese immigration but also invited a great variety of fraud. Between 1891 and 1940, the Chinese immigrated at an average rate of only 1,800 persons per year. A good proportion of them entered the United States as bona fide merchants, students, returning American citizens, and children of American citizens. But large numbers of Chinese laborers or non-American citizens also immigrated with purchased papers, as bogus merchants, and by bribing immigration officials (Coolidge 1909:315-318). Moreover, some Chinese immigrated illegally from Canada, Mexico, and the West Indies, or into American ports as "jumped-ship" sailors.

Upon the abolition of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, the Chinese were allowed to immigrate at a quota of 105 persons per year. The quota system was established in 1924 under the National Origins Act. Under the system, immigration quotas were assigned for peoples of different nationalities according to their proportions in the U. S.
population as recorded by the 1920 census. Since the Chinese had long been excluded from immigration, the Chinese population in the United States in 1920 was small. Consequently, the quota assigned to the Chinese was also small. Nevertheless, due to the abolition of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Chinese in America were granted the right to naturalization.

After World War II, Congress passed several laws which both directly and indirectly helped increase the number of Chinese immigrants to more than 105 persons per year. The 1945 War Brides Act and the 1946 G.I. Fiancées Act enabled women in foreign countries who were married or engaged to American servicemen during the war to immigrate. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act) granted non-quota status to spouses and children of American citizens. Two special acts were passed in 1953 and 1962 to authorize the admission of about 15,000 Chinese refugees who had fled from Communist China since 1949. Thus, during 1944-1960, the Chinese immigrated at an average rate of 2,500 persons per year, and during 1961-1964, 4,800 persons per year (INS Annual Reports 1944-1964:Tables 9).

Also, since these post-war laws encouraged the immigration of American citizens' family members, they helped modify the Chinese demographic structure in the United States. Before the 1940s, the Chinese in the United States were predominantly male. The high transportation cost involved in crossing the Pacific, the Exclusion Act, and the restrictive quota system had made it difficult for the Chinese, except the few established merchants, to send for their wives
and children from China. During the 1950s, however, in response to the War Brides Act, the G.I. Fiancées Act, and the McCarran-Walter Act, more Chinese females immigrated into the United States than males. Between 1948 and 1959, the ratio of Chinese female immigrants to male was 177.4 to 100 (22,291 females to 12,546 males) (Kung 1962:33). The sex ratio of the Chinese in the United States dropped from an extremely high 2,107 males to 100 females in 1880, just before the era of Chinese Exclusion, to 295 in 1940, and then to 133 in 1960 (Kung 1962:33).

The most significant change in the pattern and volume of Chinese immigration to the United States occurred in the mid-1960s. In 1965, Congress passed an Immigration Act which abolished the quota system and allowed the entrance of up to 20,000 immigrants per country per year, a total of 290,000 persons per year from all countries. Also, the 1965 Immigration Act granted preference to the admission of American citizens' family members and people with skills that were in short supply in the United States. Between 1966 and 1977, a total of 205,014 people immigrated from China and Taiwan, at an average rate of 17,000 persons per year. During the same period of time, another 56,605 people, primarily Chinese, immigrated from the British colony of Hong Kong, at an average rate of 4,700 persons per year (INS Annual Reports 1966-1977:Tables 9). Moreover, in compliance with the preference system of the 1965 Immigration Act, the majority of new Chinese immigrants immigrated with families. A good proportion of them belonged to the professional class. During 1966-1977, over half (59 percent) of the immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were "housewives, children, and other with no occupations reported." Of the
remaining Chinese immigrants with occupations, 37 percent were "professional, technical, and kindred workers" (INS Annual Reports 1966-1977:Tables 8). Since 1981, the number of Chinese immigrants in the United States has probably further increased. After the U. S. government normalized diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1978, Congress voted in 1981 to allow the Chinese to immigrate with a ceiling of 20,000 persons per year from Mainland China, with another 20,000 from Taiwan (Lindsey 1982:29).

Historically, San Francisco was the Chinese immigrants' favorite destination in the United States. Since the mid-1960s, however, more Chinese immigrants have preferred to settle in New York City. During 1965-1974, 22.4 percent (32,513 in number) of the immigrants from China and Taiwan intended to live permanently in New York City, whereas 12.0 percent (17,417) of them intended to live in San Francisco. During 1975-1977, 19.6 percent (14,379) of the immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong intended to live in New York City; while 11.0 percent (8,077) of them intended to live in San Francisco (Table 1). In 1970, New York City surpassed, for the first time in American history, San Francisco in the number of Chinese residents and became the city with the largest Chinese population in the United States (69,324 in New York City and 58,696 in San Francisco, according to the 1970 census).

It is difficult to speculate why more Chinese have preferred to immigrate to New York City than San Francisco in recent years. It is likely, however, that many Chinese are attracted by New York City because of its size and because of the seemingly better opportunities for jobs in a bigger city. The following section of this chapter
Table 1

Chinese Immigrants by City of
Intended Residence: 1965-1977
(Cities with the largest reported numbers only)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York City</th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>Honolulu</th>
<th>Total Ch. immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,271</td>
<td>3,181</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>13,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,518</td>
<td>2,883</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>19,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,949</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>12,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3,209</td>
<td>2,205</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>15,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>14,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>12,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,190</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>17,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4,129</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>17,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>18,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>32,513</td>
<td>17,417</td>
<td>8,622</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>145,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,233</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>23,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,112</td>
<td>2,934</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>24,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>25,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>14,379</td>
<td>8,077</td>
<td>3,987</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>73,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,892</td>
<td>25,494</td>
<td>12,609</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For 1965 to 1974, immigrants from China and Taiwan. For 1975 to 1977, immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

Source: Immigration & Naturalization Service, Annual Reports: Table 12A (Table 12B for the year 1970).
describes the historical and contemporary setting of the Chinese in New York City.

**Chinese in New York City**

During the 1870s some Chinese began to leave the West for the East, with the hope that they could settle in places where they were less harshly treated. Nevertheless, discrimination against the Chinese was then prevalent throughout the country and not less harsh in New York. The unwelcome attitude of New Yorkers toward the Chinese was, for example, expressed by an editorial of the *New York Times* on September 3, 1865 (Citing S. Miller 1969:170):

> Now we are utterly opposed to the permission of any extensive emigration of Chinamen or other Asiatics to any part of the United States. • • • [I]f there were to be a flood-tide of Chinese population—a population befouled with all the social vices, with no knowledge or appreciation of free institutions or constitutional liberty, with heathenish souls and heathenish propensities, whose character, and habits, and modes of thought are firmly fixed by the consolidating influence of ages upon ages—we should be prepared to bid farewell to republicanism and democracy.

Also, on June 7, 1868, it was expressed in the *New York Times* (Citing S. Miller 1969:171):

> They [the Chinese] have characteristics deeply imbedded which make them undesirable as a part of our permanent population. • • • [M]ixing with them on terms of equality . . . would be out of the question.

Discrimination against the Chinese only gradually subsided in the 1940s, when China became a war ally of the United States. This trend continued in the 1950s, when new generations of American-born Chinese entered professional occupations, and deepened in the 1960s, when discriminatory practices in education, housing, and employment were
considered violations of any American's constitutional rights. Nevertheless, during the long period of time when the Chinese were strongly discriminated against, they were, by and large, tolerated in New York City. This was probably so for two reasons: (1) The Chinese population in New York was never large enough to pose a serious social or economic threat to the majority of the people in the city. (2) during the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, New York City was afflicted with social problems due primarily to massive immigration of poor immigrants from Europe. The Chinese were thus considered no better, yet no worse, than many other poverty-stricken immigrants.

According to the 1870 census, only 19 Chinese lived in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Three decades later, the 1900 census—the first census for the larger New York City after the consolidation of the five boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn, New York, Queens, and Staten Island) in 1898—counted 6,321 Chinese in New York City*. In 1900, however, as a result of the consolidation, New York was a city with 3.4 million people. Thus, the Chinese constituted no more than 0.2 percent of the city's population. Since then, and until 1970, they had never

*It must be cautioned that the censuses in the early history of New York City could have undercounted the numbers of Chinese. On the one hand, census enumerations in New York City were notoriously inaccurate (Ernst 1949:185-186; Rosenwaike 1972:45-48, 55-56, 88-89, 163-164). On the other hand, the Chinese were susceptible to undercounting because few of them spoke English and could hardly communicate with census takers, and during the period of Chinese Exclusion, many Chinese in New York were illegal immigrants who would likely avoid census enumerators.
accounted for more than 1 percent of New York City's total population. It was only in 1980 that the Chinese became proportionally numerous enough to constitute nearly 2 percent of New York City's population (Table 2).

Between the 1840s and the 1910s, millions of Europeans immigrated to the United States via New York. They were predominantly Irish, Germans, Italians, and East European Jews. European immigration subsided only in the 1920s, when the United States imposed quotas on the maximum numbers of immigrants from different countries. The majority of European immigrants stopped briefly in New York and then moved on into the rest of the country. However, hundreds of thousands of them stayed in New York City. One of the consequences of the massive immigration of Europeans into New York was the formation of immigrant slums in the older section of the city, particularly in Lower Manhattan. Writing in 1890, Riis (1890; reprinted 1971:2), for example, denounced the living conditions of the immigrant slums in Lower Manhattan as follows:

In the tenements all the influences make for evil; because they are the hot-beds of the epidemics that carry death to rich and poor alike; the nurseries of pauperism and crime that fill our jails and police courts; that throw off a scum of forty thousand human wrecks to the island asylums and workhouses year by year; that turned out in the last eight years a round half million beggars to prey upon our charities; that maintain a standing army of ten thousand tramps with all that that implies; because, above all, they touch the family life with deadly moral contagion.

Under these circumstances, the few Chinese in New York were looked upon as just another group of poverty-stricken immigrants in the tenement district. To New Yorkers in general, the Chinese were peculiar, but so were other immigrants, such as Italians and Jews; the
Table 2
Chinese Population in New York City: 1870-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Chinese population</th>
<th>New York City population</th>
<th>Percentage Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870*</td>
<td>19**</td>
<td>1,338,391</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880*</td>
<td>870***</td>
<td>1,772,962</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890*</td>
<td>2,648***</td>
<td>2,321,644</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>3,437,202</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,614</td>
<td>4,766,883</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5,042</td>
<td>5,620,048</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>8,414</td>
<td>6,930,446</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>12,753</td>
<td>7,454,995</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>18,327</td>
<td>7,891,957</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>32,831</td>
<td>7,781,984</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>69,324</td>
<td>7,789,862</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>124,764</td>
<td>7,971,639</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  
* For Manhattan and Brooklyn only.  
** According to the 1870 census, 133 people in Manhattan and Brooklyn were born in China, but only 19 of them were Chinese (Citing Rischin 1964:271).  
*** Rischin (1964:271).

Source: United States Bureau of the Census.
Chinese had their "vices", but so did other and more numerous, in Riis' words, "tramps" and "human wrecks" from Europe. About the Chinese in New York, Riis wrote in a tone that was highly prejudiced against them. Yet, he (Riis 1890; reprinted 1971:83) suggested that one hope for reducing the problems of the Chinese could come from a mandatory requirement for them to immigrate with families:

Granted, that the Chinese are in no sense a desirable element of the population, that they serve no useful purpose here, whatever they may have done elsewhere in other days, yet to this is a sufficient answer that they are here, and that, having let them in, we must make the best of it. . . . Rather than banish the Chinaman, I would have the door opened wider--for his wife; make it a condition of his coming or staying that he bring his wife with him. Then, at least, he might not be what he now is and remains, a homeless stranger among us.

Some other writers, however, spoke of the virtues of the Chinese. Writing in 1898 on New York's Chinese, Beck (1898:187) commented:

Let us be just to our Mongolian immigrants. There may be, and undoubtedly are, many bad, vicious men among them, and the moral standard of all of them is quite below our boasted civilization of the teachings of the Christian religion. But the majority of them, despite their strange notions of life and its pleasures, are quiet, peaceable, industrious, sober and strictly honest men. . . . It would be pronounced absolutely unjust to judge the Anglo-Saxon race by the criminals who occupy their jails and penitentiaries. Equally would it be unfair to denounce all Chinamen as culprits because there are some very bad men among them. The deeds of these criminal ones are rehearsed in our newspapers, and attract public attention and remark, while the quiet, monotonous life of the orderly, industrious majority passes unnoticed.

Van Norden (New York Evening Mail May 24, 1917. Citing Van Norder 1918:5) questioned in 1917:

Their [the Chinese] non-assimilating habits have been assailed; but why discriminate on that score, especially in light of the numerous "colonies" of aliens distributed over our territory, who are permitted to enjoy the rights and privileges of American citizenship?

In 1938, Shulman studied the tenement slums in Manhattan and observed
that "racial antagonism toward Chinese was expressed only covertly" (Shulman 1938:37). One of his interviewees, a female immigrant from Europe commented, "There are Chinese on this floor, and look, I keep my door open and they never bother me. If you don't bother them, they don't bother you. They are very good people, but they keep dirty houses--not exactly filthy, but very disorderly" (Schulman 1938:198).

Thus, in the early history of Chinese immigration into New York City, although the Chinese were unwelcome, they were on the whole tolerated and accepted. No systematic account is at hand as to how the pioneer Chinese migrated to New York. It is likely, however, that many of them were ex-laundrymen who were recruited from California in 1870 to work in Belleville, New Jersey (See page 31). Probably, after these Chinese had completed their contracts in Belleville, they moved to New York City and became independent laundrymen (Hanly 1980:56).

In 1898, Beck estimated that about 17,000 Chinese lived in Metropolitan New York--including Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, Westchester, and New Jersey. About 8,000 of them were laundrymen; the others were primarily merchants, traders, grocers, Chinese restaurant workers, peddlers, laborers, domestic servants, and farmers (Beck 1898:28-30, 58, 72, 86). By the very nature of their occupations, laundrymen and domestic servants were scattered throughout the residential areas of Metropolitan New York. Some other Chinese, particularly grocers, merchants, and restaurant workers, were concentrated in one locality--Chinatown. According to Beck, Chinatown was then a small triangular area bounded by Bowery, Mott, and Pell Streets in Lower Manhattan (Beck 1898:11-12.) (Fig. 2). Hence, Beck
Fig. 2. New York's Chinatown: 1898 and 1960s

Source: Beck (1898:11-12); Sung (1976:48)
estimated that the majority of the Chinese (13,000 in number) were dispersed within a thirty-mile radius from Lower Manhattan and about 4,000 Chinese were concentrated in Chinatown (Beck 1898:12).

During the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, Lower Manhattan was the largest, and the worst, immigrant slum in New York City. It was the oldest section of the city and lay close to the wharves, where millions of immigrants from Europe disembarked. Having landed on shore, poor immigrants tended to drift into the adjacent area to look for immediate and cheap accommodations. To meet the immense demand for housing, landlords in Lower Manhattan converted their buildings into tenements with minimal facilities but maximum partitions for as many lodgers as possible. Housing conditions in Lower Manhattan quickly deteriorated. Those who had arrived earlier and had become economically established tended to desert Lower Manhattan by moving "uptown", toward newer and more spacious residential areas in the northern part of Manhattan. Some of them moved farther away into the Bronx or crossed the East River into Brooklyn.

When the Chinese migrated to New York City in the 1870s, they acquired a few quarters in Lower Manhattan, in an area which was generally known as the Five Points. The Five Points was a notorious slum. In the 1850s, it was already described as a place where "thieves, murderers, pickpockets, beggars, harlots, and degenerates of every type" resided (New York Tribune June 19, 1850. Citing Ernst 1949:39). It was, however, also a place from which upwardly mobile immigrants tended to flee. The Chinese settled in that locality probably because of the availability of cheap accommodations.
In the beginning, the Chinese made up only a small minority in the Five Points. The majority of the residents there were Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants. Nevertheless, because the Chinese were culturally distinct from the Caucasians, they were highly visible. New Yorkers soon labeled the area Chinatown, or the "Chinese colony". Meanwhile, the Chinese established their cultural and economic bases there, such as voluntary and self-help organizations, restaurants, groceries, and boarding houses. Such establishments attracted more Chinese into the locality. Subsequently, both Chinatown's Chinese population and territorial size increased.

On the whole, the Chinese population in New York City grew primarily through migration of the Chinese from other states or through immigration from China. Few of the early Chinese immigrants had families. Natural increase, therefore, did not contribute significantly to the growth of the city's Chinese population. Even as recently as 1960-1978, the Chinese population gained only 15,849 persons by natural increase, at an average rate of 834 persons per year (Table 3). Because Chinese immigration was severely restricted by American policies from 1882 to 1965, the expansion of New York's Chinatown was slow before the mid-1960s. In the early 1960s, an eight-block area bounded by Bowery, Worth, Mulberry, and Canal Streets was generally considered New York City's Chinatown proper (Fig. 2). Thus, it took about 60 years for the Chinese to expand the territory of Chinatown from two blocks in the 1890s to eight blocks in the 1960s.

The eight-block area was regarded as Chinatown proper because it was surrounded by some ethnically and ecologically different
### Table 3

**Birth and Death Statistics for the Chinese in New York City: 1960-1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births No.</th>
<th>Deaths No.</th>
<th>Natural increase No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>1,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total* 24,263 8,404 15,849

territories. To the east of Bowery Street is a portion of the Lower East Side, which stretches northward up to Fourteenth Street and embraces an area of about 1,000 acres. Historically, the Lower East Side has been a major immigrant enclave in New York City. It was predominantly occupied by the Irish during the 1840s and the 1850s, by the Germans during the 1860s and the 1870s, and then by Eastern European Jews from the 1880s to the 1920s. Since the early 1940s, blacks and Puerto Ricans have moved into the Lower East Side and have now become the major groups there. To the north of Canal Street is Little Italy, which was predominantly occupied by the Irish from the 1820s to the 1850s and then by Italians since the 1880s. To the west of Mulberry Street is a district of non-residential lofts which are primarily occupied by small-scale garment factories. To the south of Worth Street is downtown New York, where office buildings dominate the landscape.

These boundaries of Chinatown proper are, however, only arbitrary. During the early 1960s, a fairly large number of whites still resided within Chinatown proper. Also, the Chinese began to settle in the Lower East Side and Little Italy, particularly along the fringes of Chinatown proper. The infiltration of the Chinese into the Lower East Side and Little Italy has resulted primarily from new immigration. Post-war changes in the U.S. immigration policy and the enactment of the 1965 Immigration Act have permitted more Chinese to immigrate than before. The influx of new immigrants has brought about increases in the Chinese population within Chinatown proper and in other neighborhoods in New York City.
In 1966, Yuan (1966) defined New York's Chinatown as a territory with six census tracts for the 1960 census (Nos. 8, 16, 18, 27, 29, and 41) by adding portions of Little Italy and the Lower East Side to Chinatown proper (Fig. 3). Census tract No. 29 contains the whole area of Chinatown proper; the others are in Little Italy (No. 41) and in the Lower East Side (Nos. 8, 16, 18, and 27). According to Yuan (1966), 10,604 Chinese lived in these six census tracts in 1960, accounting for 32 percent of New York City's total Chinese population (32,831).

In 1979, the New York City Department of City Planning (1979) defined Chinatown as an area with eight census tracts for the 1970 census, adding two more tracts (Nos. 6 and 25) to those chosen by Yuan (1966) (Fig. 3). The 1970 census counted 25,142 Chinese in this eight-census-tract area, or 36 percent of the city's total Chinese population (69,324).

According to the rehearsal census that was conducted in Lower Manhattan in September, 1978, 31,663 Chinese resided in the eight-census-tract Chinatown area (Bureau of the Census 1980). No official data are available on the total Chinese population in New York City in 1978. However, based on the 1980 census count of 124,764 Chinese in New York City, it is safe to estimate that the city's Chinese population in 1978 was around 110,000. In other words, probably only about 29 percent of the Chinese in New York City lived in Chinatown in 1978 (Table 4). Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the number of Chinese by census tract for the 1980 census in New York City was not yet available. It is not possible to determine the magnitude of increases in the Chinese population in New York City on
Fig. 3. New York's Chinatown: 1966 - 1979
the neighborhood level since 1970.

Table 4
Chinese Population in Chinatown and New York City: 1898 to 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese population</th>
<th>Percentage in Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Chinatown</td>
<td>In New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>4,000*</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10,604@</td>
<td>32,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25,142#</td>
<td>69,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>31,663&amp;</td>
<td>110,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>124,764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: * Beck (1898:12)
@ Yuan (1966). Chinatown included 6 census tracts: Nos. 8, 16, 18, 27, 29, and 41.
# Sung (1974). Chinatown included 8 census tracts: Nos. 6, 8, 16, 18, 25, 27, 29, and 41.
** Estimated by the author.
N.A. Not available.

As shown in Table 4, it took about sixty years for the Chinese to increase their population in Chinatown by 150 percent from an estimated number of 4,000 in 1898 to 10,604 in 1960. Nevertheless, within only a decade from 1960 to 1970, the Chinese population in Chinatown grew by 140 percent, from 10,604 to 25,142. The rate of increase in the Chinese population in Chinatown was less spectacular between 1970 and 1978: 26 percent, from 25,142 to 31,663. The slow growth rate of the Chinese population in Chinatown during 1970-1978 was, however, offset
by a rapid increase in the proportion of the Chinese living outside Chinatown.

In New York, the settlement of the Chinese in areas outside Chinatown is not a recent phenomenon. In 1898, Beck already estimated that 76 percent of the Chinese in metropolitan New York lived outside Chinatown (Beck 1898:11-12). In 1960, 68 percent of New York's Chinese lived outside Chinatown. This proportion declined slightly to 64 percent in 1970, but then rose substantially to 71 percent in 1978 (see Table 4 above). Beck's estimates are not strictly comparable to the statistics for 1960 and later years. He included the Chinese in New Jersey and Westchester in his estimations; whereas the statistics for 1960 and later years are only for the Chinese within the five boroughs of New York City. Nevertheless, it is evident that the majority of New York's Chinese have, for a long time, lived outside Chinatown.

Outside Chinatown, the Chinese in New York City have been highly dispersed. Since the mid-1960s, however, they have formed small clusters in Woodside, Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, and Flushing, Queens, and in Flatbush and Bay Ridge, Brooklyn (Kleiman 1982; Lindsey 1982:27; Sung 1979:36; Wong 1979:25). In the absence of detailed figures by census tract for the 1980 census, it is impossible to determine the degree of Chinese concentrations in these neighborhoods in recent years. Nevertheless, unpublished data for immigrants who registered under the Alien Address Program in 1979 are available in the New York City Department of City Planning, and these indicate which postal zip-code areas had the greatest number of Chinese aliens (Table 5). According to such data, in 1979, New York's Chinese aliens were
Table 5
Chinese Aliens Who Registered Under the Alien Address Program by Postal Zip-code Area in New York City, 1979*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Zip-code Number</th>
<th>Chinese aliens Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Manhattan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinatown &amp; its</td>
<td>10002</td>
<td>9,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enirons</td>
<td>10013</td>
<td>3,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10038</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10012</td>
<td>1,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10003</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Queens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmhurst</td>
<td>11373</td>
<td>2,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodside</td>
<td>11377</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flushing</td>
<td>11355</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Heights</td>
<td>11372</td>
<td>818</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corona</td>
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<td>620</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Central Brooklyn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flatbush</td>
<td>11226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ocean Parkway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midwood</td>
<td>11230</td>
<td>540</td>
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<td>Sub-total</td>
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<tr>
<td>W. Brooklyn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bay Ridge</td>
<td>11220</td>
<td>1,213</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.E. Queens</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>11432</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.W. Manhattan</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Side</td>
<td>10025</td>
<td>398</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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<td>26,909</td>
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*Zips with the greatest number of Chinese aliens only. Chinese aliens included those from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

Source: Unpublished data, the New York City Department of City planning.
most concentrated in and around Chinatown. Outside Chinatown, the
largest Chinese cluster was in central Queens, stretching from
Woodside, Jackson Heights, Elmhurst and Corona to Flushing. Smaller
Chinese clusters were in central Brooklyn (Flatbush, Ocean Parkway, and
Midwood), western Brooklyn (Bay Ridge), and southeastern Queens
(Jamaica) (Fig. 4)*.

In New York, however, the Chinese do not dominate the local
populations of any neighborhoods outside Chinatown. Elmhurst and
Jackson Heights, for example, are dominated by Hispanics, particularly
by immigrants from the West Indies. Flushing is predominantly white.
Since the mid-1960s, large numbers of Orientals, including Chinese,
East Indians, Koreans, and Filipinos, have settled in Flushing. By the
late-1970s, downtown Flushing was generally known as "Asian Town" (Sung
1979:36). Flatbush used to be primarily Jewish. In the early 1960s,
whites began to move away from a few sections of Flatbush. Since then,
blacks, Hispanics, and a relatively small number of Chinese have
settled there. Bay Ridge is basically a neighborhood of whites of
Italian descent, where the Chinese make up only a small minority.

Although the majority of the Chinese in New York are scattered

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*Because of the limitation of the data, when the distributional
pattern of the Chinese in New York is derived from the number of aliens
per zip-code area, the pattern is arbitrary. The number of Chinese
aliens per zip-code area is partly determined by the territorial size
of each zip-code area, i.e., a larger zip-code area is likely to
contain more Chinese aliens. The data do not include naturalized
immigrants who are not required by law to register under the Alien
Address program. Nevertheless, in the absence of more detailed
information, these data help illustrate in general where Chinese
clusters are located in New York City.
Fig. 4. Number of Chinese Aliens by Zip-code Area: 1979

Source: NYC Dept. of City Planning, unpublished data
throughout the city, they are not totally detached from the community of Chinatown. Many dispersed Chinese in metropolitan New York commute to Chinatown to work, to shop, to dine, and to socialize. They help support the economic activities of Chinatown. Thus, while the overall Chinese population in New York City has increased rapidly during the last two decades, the commercial and industrial activities of the Chinese in Chinatown have grown and flourished.

As in other neighborhoods in the "transitional zone" of big cities, land use in New York's Chinatown is a mixture of residential, commercial, and industrial. The majority of the buildings in Chinatown are four- to six-story walk-up tenements built in the late 19th century. Most of them are for both commercial and residential use. The first floors, some of the second floors, and the basements of these buildings are for commercial use; the upper floors are residential. In the midst of these structures are other kinds of buildings, including non-residential lofts for garment factories and warehouses.

Since the mid-1960s, the most noticeable development in the local economy of New York's Chinatown has been the growth in the number of Chinese-operated garment factories. Historically, Jews and Italians dominated the clothing industry in Lower Manhattan. In the 1950s, the Chinese owned only five garment factories in the vicinity of Chinatown, employing about 200 workers (Chinese Garment Makers Assoc. of Greater N. Y. 1980:20). By the late 1970s, the Chinese operated over 400 garment factories around Chinatown, employing about 20,000 workers (Chinese Garment Makers Assoc. of Greater N. Y. 1980:17; Wang 1981a). Garment factories constitute a form of "export industry" of the
Chinatown community. Factory owners are primarily contractors who receive pre-cut material from manufacturers in mid-town Manhattan. Such contractors hire workers to sew the material into clothing and return the products to manufacturers for sale. In May, 1981, the weekly payroll for garment workers in Chinatown was estimated at $4 million (Wang 1981a). The garment workers in Chinatown are almost exclusively Chinese. The majority of them are women, but a fair number of men also work as foremen and pressers (who steam-press clothes by machine). The estimated work-force of 20,000 Chinese workers is composed not only of the Chinese from Chinatown, but also from places all over the city.

Besides the garment industry, the Chinese generate income from a variety of commercial activities. Years ago, the commercial activities of the Chinese in New York were almost exclusively confined to Chinese restaurants and hand laundries. Laundries have never been concentrated in one locality but have been scattered throughout the residential areas in New York. By now, virtually all hand laundries have vanished and have been replaced by washing machines. Chinese laundrymen have changed their occupations, converted their stores into laundromats, or have specialized in dry cleaning. Thus, since the post-war years, laundries have no longer been of significance in the commercial structure of the Chinese in New York (Sung 1976:195; Tobier 1979:75; Wong 1979:74).

Chinese restaurants, however, continue to be a major economic activity of the Chinese. In 1980, the Chinese American Restaurant Association of Greater New York listed 831 Chinese restaurants in New
York City, with 109 of them within the environs of Chinatown (Chinese American Restaurant Assoc. 1979-1980). In recent years, Chinese restaurants have spilled over from Chinatown proper into the Lower East Side, especially along major streets and bus-lines, such as Division Street and East Broadway. Few Chinese restaurants have moved into Little Italy, however, probably because the Italians still have a strong hold on the restaurant and cafe business there.

Chinese restaurants have survived and prospered not only because they serve the demand of a growing Chinese clientele but also because Chinese food is commonly accepted by Americans. Being close to downtown New York, the restaurants of Chinatown are frequented by white-collar workers from the office district at lunch time. Also, the "exotic" Chinese cuisine has been well publicized by journalists and tourist guide books; it attracts the patronage of New Yorkers and tourists.

The prosperity of Chinese restaurants has benefitted other Chinese food-related commercial activities. These activities include, for example, the farming (mainly in farms in New Jersey) and wholesaling of Chinese vegetables and groceries, and the importation of dried and canned foods from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In recent years, Chinese groceries, vegetable stores, and fruit stands have spread outward from Chinatown proper into the industrial district, Little Italy, and the Lower East Side, along major streets such as Canal, Elizabeth, Grand, and East Broadway (Fig. 5).

Also, Chinatown has a considerable number and variety of stores, such as bookstores for Chinese newspapers, books, and magazines; curio
Fig. 5. Chinese Commercial Area
Adjacent to New York's Chinatown: 1980

Source: Chinese American Restaurant Association (1979-1980)
shops and department stores for China- and Hong Kong-made products; and travel agencies, which engage primarily in group flights and sightseeing tours to the Orient. Rapid developments in the commercial and industrial activities around New York's Chinatown have created the demand for professional services, such as banking, insurance, and accounting. Chinatown thus becomes a favorite locality for the offices of Chinese professionals. According to the directory of a Chinese trade guild, over 1,400 Chinese commercial and industrial establishments were located in the environs of New York's Chinatown proper in 1980 (Chinese American Restaurant Assoc. 1979-1980). Among the professionals, there were 43 Chinese herbalists, 65 physicians, 10 dentists, 22 lawyers or legal consultants, and 21 accountants. Almost all of the major banking corporations, including the Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan, and Citibank of New York, have branch offices in Chinatown, employing large numbers of bilingual workers to serve the community. A foreign bank, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, also has a branch office there. The Chinese themselves had accumulated enough capital to establish three banking corporations and two credit unions by the late 1970s.

The majority of these establishments were set up recently. According to a directory published in 1946, only 316 Chinese shops and offices were located in New York's Chinatown (J.C. Chen 1946). Virtually all of them were general stores, groceries, noodle factories, barbers, laundries, laundry supplies, and Chinese restaurants. No garment factories, bank offices, or credit unions were listed in the 1946 directory. The listed professionals included 12 herbalists, 4
physicians, 3 dentists, 1 lawyer, 1 accountant, and 1 architect, and were fewer in number and specialties than those of 1980 (J.C. Chen 1946:571-589).

The revival of Chinese immigration into New York has changed Chinatown considerably. Since the mid-1960s, New York's Chinatown has grown in its Chinese population, territorial size, and the number and diversity of economic activities. Recent developments in the local economy of Chinatown can, in fact, be considered surprising because, on the whole, New York City has suffered an economic depression since the late 1960s. During the 1970s, New York City lost a total of 800,000 people in its population (from 7,895,563 in 1970 to 7,071,030 in 1980, according to censuses). Between 1969 and 1975, manufacturing employment in New York City dropped from 826,000 to 528,000, with an average loss of nearly 50,000 jobs per year. The city's garment industry, which the Chinese did not enter until the mid-1960s, accounted for a loss of more than 80,000 jobs in the 1969-1975 period (Temporary Commission on City Finances 1978:38). Thus, despite the city's generally unpromising economic conditions, the Chinese in New York have survived and prospered. They have also prevented Chinatown from becoming another declining inner-city neighborhood like many others in the cores of American big cities.

Summary

This chapter has described the historical background of Chinese immigration to the United States and New York City. Before the 1960s, the Chinese were discriminated against in New York. Nevertheless, ever
since the 1870s, the majority of the Chinese have been scattered throughout the metropolis and only a fraction of them have been concentrated in Chinatown. Discrimination, therefore, did not appear to be the major factor causing the formation of Chinatown. A more important variable seemed to be the immigrants' need to have a centralized locality for their economic and cultural activities. The number and diversity of such activities in Chinatown have also increased rapidly together with the new Chinese immigration into New York City after the mid-1960s. The following chapters will analyze the mechanisms that have contributed to the viability of New York's Chinatown. Nevertheless, the basis of the analysis, that is, the information that I collected in the field, and the hypotheses that I postulated, will be addressed first.
CHAPTER III
FIELD METHODS AND FIELD STRATEGIES

Field work was of critical importance in this study because the major hypotheses of this study were formulated in the field. The purpose of this chapter is to review (1) my field methods in New York, (2) the shortcomings of such methods and the resultant limitation of this study, and (3) some of the key observations of field work.

I conducted field work in New York City between March, 1980, and January, 1981. While field work was in progress, I found out that published data on the Chinese were inadequate for detailed analyses. Proportionally, the Chinese make up only a small minority in New York. As noted, before 1970, they never accounted for more than 1 percent of the city's total population. Thus, little official data in New York have been specifically tabulated for the Chinese. For example, no data are available on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the Chinese in New York City at a neighborhood, or even borough level. To gather information about the Chinese, I had to rely heavily on field methods, such as participant and non-participant observation, informal interviews, clippings from local Chinese newspapers, and a questionnaire survey.

The bulk of the information that I collected was "qualitative" and was not free of subjective biases. Nevertheless, throughout the tradition of social sciences, field work has proven to be an effective means to study human behavior. The advantages and disadvantages of
using field methods to collect data have been well discussed in the literature and need not be reproduced here*. For this study, however, I had few options but to depend primarily on field methods to gather information.

Past studies often defined Chinatown on the basis of census tracts and used census data as the major source of information on the Chinese there (e.g., Sung 1982; Tobier 1979; Yuan 1966, 1974). This approach, however, has limitations. Chinese have never been the exclusive residents of Chinatown. As recently as 1978, in the eight-census-tract area defined as Chinatown by the New York City Department of City Planning (1979), Chinese made up only 59 percent of the population (Table 6). On the basis of census data, one can, at best, describe the general characteristics of the area in which Chinatown is located but cannot determine the socio-economic profile, or adequately explain the behavior of the Chinese there. This study, therefore, uses censuses as only one source of information; the others are primarily field data that I collected in New York. In the following section of this chapter, I shall give an account of how I collected information in the field and then pull out certain variables which are worth exploring in order to explain the distributional pattern of the Chinese in New York City.

*See, for example, Becker (1970); Chapman (1975); Filstead (1970); Schatzman & Strauss (1973:139-146); Wax (1971:3-14); Webb et al. (1973:1-34); Zelditch (1970).
Entering the Field

I arrived in New York at a time when the Census Bureau was recruiting temporary workers to work for the 1980 census. I applied for a job and worked as a census enumerator in Chinatown for a brief period of time. Because of the job, I did door-to-door interviews in Chinatown, and I gained field experience. I also became acquainted with a team of Chinese census workers and was thus able to establish a friendship network in New York.

As a census enumerator, I experienced the difficulties of conducting door-to-door interviews in Chinatown. Such difficulties result from several factors: (1) Crimes, such as muggings, burglaries, and extortions, are prevalent in Chinatown. Consequently, the Chinese
rarely trust strangers. It is difficult for a field worker to seek confidence and cooperation from his respondents. Also, a field worker himself would equally be afraid of being hurt by strangers. Some census takers, for example, would refuse to go into apartments which appeared to be occupied by hostile or "suspicious looking" people.

(2) Chinatown is basically a working-class neighborhood. Most of the residents are not at home during the day. The best time to conduct interviews is in the evening, but within this short period of time, a field worker can only manage to complete a few interviews.

(3) The majority of the buildings in Chinatown are walk-up tenements. Most of them are not equipped with intercoms at the gateways. If the security door to a building is locked, a field worker cannot get into the building, nor can he contact his prospective interviewees through an intercom at the gateway.

(4) Many Chinese immigrants do not speak English but a multitude of Chinese dialects. The majority of them speak Cantonese and Toishanese. Some speak Hakka, Mandarin, Shanghaiese, Lingpoese, and Fukienese. These dialects are mutually unintelligible. Thus, a field worker in Chinatown encounters language problems.

(5) It is generally believed that a fair number of illegal immigrants live in New York's Chinatown. Often, illegal immigrants try to avoid being interviewed.

(6) Because of the difficult situations in the field, interviewers would often "cheat" by filling in questionnaires without having interviewed the designated respondents.

Having experienced the difficulties of doing door-to-door interviews
in Chinatown, I realized that I could not rely solely on conventional research methods, such as structured interviews and questionnaire surveys, to acquire data for the study. I tried, therefore, to collect as much information as I could in a variety of other ways, including my own experience in the field.

As a newcomer to New York, I acted more or less like a recent Chinese immigrant in the city. Like any new immigrant, I had to go through the process of looking for a place to stay. Consequently, I learned about the housing market of Chinatown. In the beginning, I wanted to live in Chinatown, where I would spend most of my time for field work. Nevertheless, due to a recent influx of Chinese immigrants, the demand for housing there was high. I was unable to find an affordable apartment within the neighborhood.

Housing costs in Chinatown are high mainly because landlords tend to charge "key money" to new tenants. Rental housing in Chinatown is under rent control. Landlords cannot charge rents higher than those allowed by the city's housing laws. To supplement their profits, landlords often demand other fees. In Chinatown, "key money" may range from a few hundred to one or two thousand dollars for an apartment, depending on its size and condition.

The practice of charging tenants "key money" is illegal. Landlords in Chinatown do not advertise their vacant apartments in public but channel such information through word of mouth. They can thus select the tenants who will willingly pay them "key money" and will not sue them for such a practice. Consequently, new renters in Chinatown have to bear both high monetary (as "key money") and search costs for
accommodations.

Since I was unable to pay "key money", I had to look for a residence elsewhere. Finally, I moved to Crown Heights, a low-income area in central Brooklyn. Incidentally, my apartment there was also under rent control; but the demand for housing in Crown Heights was relatively low, and I was not charged any "key money".

Near the place where I lived in Crown Heights, almost all of the residents were blacks, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanics. But my building was exclusively occupied by Chinese. This was because our landlord was Chinese, and he preferred Chinese tenants to blacks or Puerto Ricans. When certain apartments in the building became available to rent, the landlord would advertise them only in Chinese newspapers or ask other tenants to induce friends and relatives to rent them. Such apartments were, therefore, not on the market for the non-Chinese.

During my stay there, I was involved in an incident which reflected that the Chinese were rather suspicious of blacks and Puerto Ricans in our neighborhood. It happened because some tenants and I desired to have a resident superintendent in the building. Our superintendent was a Puerto Rican who lived in a Puerto-Rican-owned building in the same block. Our landlord lived in Chinatown. Since neither the landlord nor the superintendent lived in the building, whenever our utility system broke down (e.g., a fuse burned out, or the boiler stopped running), we could not immediately get someone to fix it. The utility system of the building was so old and so poorly maintained that it broke down often. This caused tremendous inconvenience and, at times,
hardship to us, especially in the winter. We had to periodically suffer the difficulty of not having heat and hot water during cold weather.

We needed a resident superintendent to tend the ailing utility system. The superintendent also wanted to move into our building because he thought that our building was more secure than his. The landlord, however, refused to let a Puerto Rican family live in the building. He was concerned about the prevalence of crimes in the neighborhood, which were often associated with blacks and Puerto Ricans. He argued that if the superintendent moved in, more blacks and Puerto Ricans would be using the building and that we would not be able to differentiate potential muggers from the superintendent's friends or relatives. Some tenants agreed with him. The landlord, therefore, declined to provide the superintendent with a residence unless all tenants agreed to have a Puerto Rican family in the building. The tenants failed to reach a unanimous agreement and the issue was dropped. They preferred to suffer the inconvenience of not having a resident superintendent than allow a Puerto Rican family to move into the building.

In our neighborhood, the suspicion among the Chinese of blacks and Puerto Ricans was not totally unjustified. During my short stay there (about five months), four residents of my building were robbed in the hallway, and one apartment was broken into. They were all victims of black and Puerto Rican muggers. Occasionally, some blacks smoked marijuana at the threshold of our security door on the street level. These incidents frightened the tenants. To reduce the chance of being
mugged, the Chinese in my building tried to avoid meeting black and Puerto Rican strangers.

The Chinese made up a small minority in my neighborhood, but they were accepted by most of the blacks and Hispanics. None of the Chinese in my building was harassed by blacks or Puerto Ricans on racial grounds. I felt free to move around the neighborhood and I did not sense that the people there were particularly hostile to me because I was Chinese. Nevertheless, the settlement of the Chinese in my neighborhood did not reflect an assimilation of the Chinese into black society. The Chinese who lived in my building rarely interacted with blacks. They associated themselves almost exclusively with fellow Chinese, by extending their social networks far beyond the neighborhood into Chinatown and other places where their friends and relatives resided.

I observed a similar pattern of social interaction among the Chinese in predominantly white neighborhoods. My Chinese informants in white neighborhoods seldom interacted with their Caucasian neighbors. For social intercourse, they stretched their social networks away from their home sites to reach Chinese in other parts of the city. Partly because of this need among the Chinese to make friends within their ethnic group, I was able to extend my friendship network to include Chinese immigrants in different neighborhoods. As I mentioned earlier, my friendship network expanded when I was working as a census enumerator with a team of bilingual Chinese. After my co-workers had become better acquainted with me, they introduced me to two groups of Chinese immigrants who met regularly for recreation.
Participating in Group Activities

The two groups which I joined were made up of Cantonese-speaking immigrants from Hong Kong and Mandarin-speaking Chinese from Taiwan. Some of the members were American-born. The majority of members were young singles, educated in the United States, and were white-collar or professional workers. The groups were informal; activities were normally held in private homes, and members were recruited by invitation. The groups were thus restricted almost exclusively to Chinese. Occasionally, some members would bring along their American friends when taking part in group activities. Soon, however, Americans would find themselves out of place because Chinese was spoken all the time; they would not attend subsequent gatherings.

Among friends, Chinese immigrants prefer to speak Chinese even if they speak English well. When they speak Chinese, they create a sense of intimacy among themselves. The ethnic language, however, forms an invisible boundary around the immigrant group and makes it difficult for non-Chinese-speaking people to mingle with them.

Among acquaintances, however, it can be taboo to insist on speaking Chinese. In a few instances, I found myself in an awkward position when I spoke Chinese to my Chinese co-workers and they responded in English. I was thus forced to switch to English. I was puzzled. I knew that these co-workers could speak Chinese because I had heard them speak Chinese before. I then asked a community worker in Chinatown about this. According to the community worker, bilingual Chinese often considered English as the "business" language and Chinese as the "personal" language. On formal occasions, such as at work in an
office, the Chinese speak English to their colleagues, even if they could speak Chinese. On informal occasions, such as when having lunch in Chinese restaurants, they speak Chinese if they considered one another "friends". The community worker told me, "When a bilingual Chinese is speaking English to you on an informal occasion, he is conveying a message: 'Let's keep our relationship strictly business, i.e., nothing personal.'"

My subsequent experience corresponded closely to the community worker's observations. When my co-workers gradually accepted me as one of their friends, we began to converse in Chinese. Having observed what languages the bilingual Chinese used on different occasions, I learned that I could also manipulate my spoken language to vary the "social distance" between myself and other Chinese. I subsequently used this strategy to conduct informal interviews in Chinatown.

**Conducting Informal Interviews**

When I interviewed bilingual community workers in Chinatown, I proposed to them that I preferred to speak Chinese. Often, when interviews were conducted in Chinese, the atmosphere was more relaxed and the community workers appeared to be more friendly and less defensive.

Through the interviews, I noticed that Chinatown was a rather heterogeneous community. Dozens of interest groups and organizations existed in Chinatown. Each of them served or represented certain sectors of the Chinese population in New York. These groups, however, often clashed with one another, reflecting the diversity of interests
and demands among the Chinese. Having interviewed a fair number of community workers who belonged to different organizations, I noticed that internal conflicts within Chinatown existed in at least three dimensions: (1) between "rightists" (the pro-Taiwan) and "leftists" (the pro-Peking), (2) between voluntary associations (e.g., clan and district associations) and social service agencies, and (3) among social service agencies.

Conflicts between leftists and rightists in Chinatown were most obvious at the level of district and clan associations. Both leftists and rightists tried to control as many voluntary associations as possible. Traditionally, district and clan associations were controlled by the merchant class. Merchants were the elite in Chinatown. They were established, wealthy, and often elected the leaders of such organizations. Merchants were, however, the most active participants in Chinese politics. To them, connections with people in China meant business. Import and export trade between New York and China could bring them profits. To be involved in Chinese politics was an effective means of establishing connections for trade activities.

For thirty years, between 1949 (the year when the People's Republic of China was founded and the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan) and 1978 (when the U. S. officially recognized the PRC government), China had no formal diplomatic relationship with the United States. The merchants of Chinatown did business primarily with traders in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In terms of political inclinations, Chinatown's merchants were predominantly pro-Taiwan. Around the time when
President Nixon visited China in 1973, and in response to the changing attitude toward the PRC in America, some merchants who had once been rightists adjusted their political views. They gave up their rightist ideology and supported the Peking government. They became actively involved in the "normalization movement" and urged U. S. recognition of the Peking government as the sole and legitimate government of China. Their goals were fulfilled. President Carter announced the U. S. recognition of the PRC in December, 1978. Soon afterwards, trading activities between the United States and mainland China resumed. Within Chinatown, pro-Peking merchants became the first of the new China traders. They opened stores in Chinatown that carried goods exclusively imported from mainland China, and such stores did good business.

By the late 1970s, leftists became numerous enough to challenge the dominance of rightists and to control a few voluntary associations in Chinatown. The leaders of the Fukien District Association, for example, who had once been "loyal" to the nationalist government became pro-Peking in the late 1970s. The rightist Fukienese set up a new association under the name of the "Free Fukien District Association." The struggle between leftists and rightists in Chinatown is still going on, and both view each other with contempt and mistrust.

For decades, the leaders of voluntary associations, particularly the president of the C.C.B.A. (Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, Chinatown's largest voluntary organization), were regarded as the leaders of the Chinese community. In the 1960s, however, because funds were available from the federal government to "fight
poverty", a few social service agencies were formed in Chinatown. Gradually, the administrators of these agencies became influential in the community. Facing the emergence of this new class of professionals, the leaders of voluntary associations felt threatened. They regarded the agency administrators as usurpers who planned to take over their dominant position in Chinatown. On the other hand, the agency administrators looked down upon these leaders as non-professionals and conservatives who were insensitive to the welfare of New York's Chinese.

Conflicts also existed within the social service agencies in Chinatown. Each agency looked upon all others as possible rivals in the competition for public funds. The competition was keen because the agencies basically served the same population (primarily the Chinese in and around Chinatown), and their programs were more or less of the same nature. The administrators of social service agencies, for example, were cautious about releasing information to outsiders, particularly to people who were suspected to be connected with competing organizations. I was told by a researcher that the director of a social service agency had refused to grant her an interview because she was "too closely associated with another multi-service institution in Chinatown."

By interviewing community workers, I gained fairly rich information about Chinatown. Moreover, after I had developed rapport with some community workers, I asked them to introduce their clients and program staff to me for additional interviews. Consequently, my network of informants expanded. The coverage of this network was, however, narrow
because not all community workers permitted me to interview their clients. If the programs were for the "deviant class", such as youth gangs, ex-drug addicts, and people with family or emotional problems, the community workers would not allow me to interview their clients because they had to protect the confidential nature of clients' identities. In other programs, such as those set up for recreational or educational purposes, I had few difficulties in getting permission to interview clients.

With the help of community workers, I was able to contact a fair number of Chinese immigrants in New York. Nevertheless, these immigrants belonged to a selective group because they included only those who made use of community services in Chinatown. To learn about other Chinese, I needed additional help. I developed an interview schedule (Appendix) and was prepared to hire interviewers to help me conduct a survey of the Chinese in New York. However, further considerations of the situation in the field made me change my plans.

Pursuing a Questionnaire Survey

Having been a census enumerator, I learned by experience that interviewers were susceptible to the danger posed by street crimes. I was unwilling to bear the consequences should any of my interviewers be mugged or hurt in the field. Moreover, I was unable to determine a sampling frame from which I could randomly select Chinese immigrants for interviews. There were no detailed statistics on the demographic or geographic distribution of Chinese immigrants in New York City. The social organizations in Chinatown rarely kept records of their
members. Even if such membership lists had been available, they would not have constituted an appropriate sampling frame because they excluded those who were not members of the organizations. I tried to use the telephone directory and to extract from it people with Chinese last names. However, in a city with a population of seven million people, so many names were listed in the directory that it was not possible for me to go through all of them and to determine which ones belonged to Chinese.

In view of the obstacles in the field, I decided not to hire field assistants, nor to pursue a random survey of Chinese immigrants in New York. As an alternative, I sought help from community workers and my friends on a personal basis. I gave them copies of my interview schedule and asked them to distribute more copies to Chinese immigrants for responses. In this way, the schedule was actually used as a self-administered questionnaire because my helpers were not interviewers and I would not urge them to interview people on my behalf.

By the time I was pursuing the questionnaire survey, I had developed a rather extensive friendship network in New York. Those who helped me distribute questionnaires had a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. They included immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and lived all over Chinatown, Queens, and Brooklyn. They were restaurant workers, self-employed store owners, graduate students, bilingual teachers, and community workers. With their help, I was able to get responses to the questionnaire from Chinese immigrants who were rather heterogeneous in terms of places of origin, length and location of residence in New York, and socio-economic characteristics.
Before I left New York, I had collected 121 completed questionnaires, of which 50 were completed by householders in Chinatown, 38 in Queens, 24 in Brooklyn, and 9 in Manhattan outside Chinatown. Not all of them were usable for analysis, however, because some respondents answered only portions of the questionnaire. Moreover, the respondents were not representative samples of Chinese immigrants in New York. The data so collected were, therefore, not meant for statistical manipulation, but to serve as illustrative examples among Chinese immigrants in New York City.

Limitations of the Study

The small size of the sample is a major shortcoming of this study. Through both informal interviews and the non-random questionnaire survey, I managed to contact no more than 200 Chinese immigrants in the field. Nevertheless, according to the 1980 census, about 124,000 Chinese lived in New York City. I was, therefore, unable to determine to what extent the behavioral pattern of the Chinese whom I had observed was distributed among the Chinese in New York.

Moreover, my informants were predominantly young Chinese immigrants, particularly the members of the two informal groups that I joined in New York. These young immigrants were educated professionals. They tended to accept the values of the middle class as a matter of course. My contacts with working-class Chinese were relatively superficial. Although I lived in a low-income area and experienced the kinds of living conditions offered by a deteriorating neighborhood in New York City, my sojourn there was temporary. My
knowledge of the poor was limited. Also, I had virtually no direct contact with the economically or professionally most successful Chinese in New York City. I could not, therefore, eliminate all possible distortions of this study because I was unable to take into consideration the behavioral patterns of the richest and the poorest Chinese in New York City.

My cultural bias may also affect the findings of this study. Because I am a foreign student from Hong Kong, unlike American-born Chinese, I have not experienced racial discrimination in this country. My study may, therefore, underestimate the effect of discrimination on the residential pattern of the Chinese. No researchers, of course, can totally eliminate subjective biases from their studies. The selection, manipulation, and interpretation of data are often determined by researchers' personal judgement. Scholars who have experienced racial discrimination may be sensitive to it and may emphasize its impacts when they study minority groups. Because of my cultural bias of being foreign to America, I consider discrimination as one, but not the only or even the major, factor of the formation and persistence of New York's Chinatown. Some other factors are listed below.

**Observations for Further Exploration**

Several observations were discernible from my field work in New York City:

(1) New York's Chinatown is not only a residential area, but also a Chinese cultural, commercial and industrial center. Large numbers of small businesses, garment factories, voluntary associations, and social
service agencies are located in Chinatown. The functions of Chinatown could, therefore, play a significant role in the formation and persistence of the immigrant enclave.

(2) As exemplified by the residents of my building in Crown Heights, Chinese prefer to live with other Chinese and to minimize contacts with people of different races. The attitude of the Chinese toward other population groups could affect the distribution of the Chinese in New York City.

(3) Chinese landlords tend to rent properties to fellow Chinese. The distribution of Chinese-owned properties may influence the location of the Chinese settlements in the city.

(4) Rent control has significant effects on the housing market in Chinatown and the residential mobility of the Chinese in the city. The relationship between rent control and the distribution of Chinese settlements in New York should be explored in greater detail.

(5) Conflicts between community groups in Chinatown affect interpersonal relations and group interactions among Chinese. Internal conflicts could therefore influence the development of the Chinese community.

These five observations are, of course, preliminary. As an immigrant group, the Chinese are influenced by the provisions of American immigration laws. Also, as pointed out in Chapter I, the interaction between concentrated and dispersed Chinese in New York City probably plays a significant role in the persistence of Chinatown. These observations serve, however, as the initial points around which the various explanations about the city's Chinese settlements can be
induced. Chapter IV will look into the first three of them, i.e., the functions of Chinatown, the attitude of the Chinese toward other population groups, and Chinese-owned properties. Chapter V will consider the effects of immigration laws, rent control, and internal conflicts on the Chinese settlements in New York City.
CHAPTER IV
ETHNIC CONCENTRATION: THE PERSISTENCE OF NEW YORK'S CHINATOWN

In Chapter III, I mentioned several factors that could have affected the distribution of the Chinese in New York City. The purpose of this chapter is to look into three of them in relation to the formation and persistence of Chinatown. These three factors are: (1) the functions of Chinatown, (2) the attitude of the Chinese toward other population groups, and (3) property ownership in Chinatown. The effects of these factors are interrelated and their relationship has to be understood within the historical context of Chinese immigration and adaptation to New York City. This chapter, therefore, begins with a description of the process whereby the functions of Chinatown have evolved, and then explores the relationship between the Chinese attitude toward other population groups, Chinese property ownership, and the persistence of Chinatown.

The Evolution of Chinatown's Functions

New York's pioneer Chinese were from many places: California, the Rocky Mountain states, Latin America, and China (see the biographies of New York's early Chinese in van Norden 1918). The Chinese community was thus made up of groups of strangers, and the major force that tended to bind them together was a common culture. During the time when social welfare was virtually non-existent, self-help among immigrants was of critical importance to survival in America. The
early Chinese often sought help from people who belonged to the same clan lineages (which were normally extended to include people with the same family names), or who emigrated from the same districts of China (Heyer 1953; Hsu 1971:23-25; David Wu 1975:89). The Chinese, therefore, set up mutual-aid organizations in Chinatown on the basis of family names, districts of origin, and trades. They also established secret societies (i.e., tongs) whose memberships cut across clan, district, and trade boundaries. On top of these four basic types of society, the Chinese formed a confederate association, the Chinese Charitable and Benevolent Association (C.C.B.A.), so that the leaders of the many organizations could meet and resolve issues of mutual concern. This confederate society was later renamed the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association and has remained the most influential voluntary organization in New York's Chinatown.

As the functions of Chinese voluntary associations in overseas areas have been well documented elsewhere, they will not be reviewed here*. In general, these associations were fraternal societies which facilitated mutual-aid, and cultural and social activities among members. They organized, for example, rotating credit associations (hui) and provided services for religious worship, ancestor worship,

*See, for example, Barnett (1960); Barth (1964); Broady (1955); Julia Chen (1941); Dobbie (1936:119-139); M. Freedman (1960); Heyer (1953); Kung (1962:216-224); Kuo (1977:17-34); Rose Lee (1960:142-184); Light (1972:81-100); Lyman (1977:77-94); McLeod (1947:213-237); Nee & Nee (1973:63-73, 272-277); Speer (1868); Topley (1961); Weiss (1974:87-95, 145-208); Wong (1979:49-82); David Wu (1974, 1975).
and the celebration of Chinese festivals. Rotating credit associations were the channels through which the early Chinese in New York and other overseas areas borrowed money from fellow members (Light 1972:23-27; Wong 1979:117-119; Wou et al. 1973:25; David Wu 1975). According to Sung (1967:141), this system functioned in the following way:

Those who elected to join the hui agreed to pay into the pool ten dollars per share for one hundred weeks for a total of $1,000. Members who needed current funds would bid for the weekly pool by submitting a written bid before 3 o'clock that Sunday. For instance, a bid might read 50 cents or 75 cents. This meant that the bidder was willing to pay 50 cents or 75 cents for each ten-dollar share, and the other shareholders only had to deposit $9.50 or $9.25 as the case may be for that week. High bid won and the successful bidder would receive the total pool deposited that week. Repayment was effected through his weekly deposits made either previously or subsequently. . . . Eventually every member received a pool. At the end of the hundred-week period, the hui was dissolved, and a new hui would be formed, possibly with different shareholders and their proportional interests.

The Chinese practice of raising capital by joining rotating credit associations has persisted until today. It is difficult to determine how prevalent such hui are in New York's Chinatown. Nevertheless, the following two incidents, which were reported by Chinatown's newspapers, showed that the amounts of money contributed to such associations could be sizeable. In 1977, the hui organized by Lee King Shue Club, a voluntary association in New York's Chinatown, defaulted. The defaulted hui involved more than 250 members and lost over $364,000 in contributions. The members sued the club. In March, 1980, the court ruled that the club should compensate to the members $425,000 (the amount defaulted plus interest) (United Journal March 20, 1980). During 1979-1980, the hui organized by New York's Chinese Laundry Association defaulted, which involved about 300 members and over
$200,000 in contributions. The case was also taken to court. At the time of writing, the suit against the Chinese Laundry Association is still pending a court decision (Peimei News April 20, 1983).

A major function of Chinese trade guilds in the early history of New York’s Chinatown was to mediate disputes between members. Such guilds decided minimum charges within their trades, so that no member could outplay other Chinese in the market by cutting prices. The guilds also urged members to scatter to places outside Chinatown, so that each one enjoyed a guaranteed minimum sphere of economic influence within a given service area (Beck 1898:58-62; Julia Chen 1941:62; Coolidge 1909:390).

Moreover, Chinese voluntary associations, particularly the C.C.B.A., began to purchase cemeteries in New York City and New Jersey as early as the late 19th century (Beck 1898:224-225; Julia Chen 1941:60). As indicated by obituaries in local Chinese newspapers, large numbers of deceased Chinese in New York City were buried in cemeteries owned by Chinese voluntary associations. The functions of voluntary associations, therefore, touched upon many aspects of the daily lives (including death) of the Chinese in New York City. The presence of such associations in Chinatown played a significant role in the formation and persistence of the Chinese enclave.

Since the voluntary associations in Chinatown served the financial, economic, social, and cultural needs of their members, they brought about "centripetal" forces among immigrants and tended to "pull" Chinese into Chinatown. Moreover, as gathering places for the Chinese, the headquarters of these associations became centers where information
about home villages and job opportunities in New York was exchanged.

During the late 19th century, the range of jobs for Chinese was limited. Most Chinese did not speak English and were hence excluded from many occupations in the labor market. As a group, the Chinese were too few to compete with the hundreds of thousands of European immigrants for unskilled jobs. Consequently, the majority of Chinese became independent launderymen in Greater New York, and others set up businesses in Chinatown, such as groceries and restaurants, to serve the demand for ethnic goods and diets. The Chinese were thus either self-employed or employed by their fellow countrymen and avoided direct competition with other groups for jobs.

At the same time, Chinese residences in Chinatown became more permanent because some immigrants worked locally in stores, groceries, restaurants, voluntary associations, and a variety of small businesses, e.g., as herbalists, barbers, and even fortune-tellers, for fellow Chinese (Beck 1898:63-84). Gradually, family life appeared in Chinatown after a few merchants had become well-off enough to send for their families and when some Chinese were married to immigrant women from Europe (Beck 1898:33-45).

The livelihood of the early Chinese depended heavily on the web of economic networks within the ethnic group. Even if they did not earn income directly from other Chinese, they had to rely upon the ethnic group for economic resources, such as rotating credit associations. Thus, from the beginning of Chinese settlement in New York City, symbiotic relationships developed between the Chinese in the metropolis and those in Chinatown. On the one hand, the small businesses and
voluntary associations in Chinatown depended on the patronage of the dispersed laundrymen; on the other hand, the dispersed Chinese depended on Chinatown for various social, cultural, and financial services.

The high degree of interdependence among the early Chinese further influenced their occupational structure and geographic distribution in the city. The majority of the early Chinese in New York were laundrymen not only because they were excluded from the general labor market but also because they found this vocation profitable and they received communal help from fellow Chinese to set up businesses.

Before the introduction of machine washing, the hand laundry business required certain skills. Some of the pioneer Chinese in metropolitan New York were contracted laundry workers in Belleville, New Jersey (see Chapter II), and were familiar with the trade. After they had served their contracts, they moved to New York City to set up independent laundries. They passed on their skills to other Chinese, and consequently, more Chinese were trained to become laundrymen. The cohesiveness among Chinese amazed Beck (1898:62), who recorded:

The washing industry, now so largely followed by Chinamen in this country, is an entirely new vocation to them. They know nothing about it when they come to America, but very quickly master the trade under the tutelage of some "cousin" already in the business. But they have the business thoroughly systematized, and no man is considered competent to earn wages at it until he understands it in all its details. These include marking, checking, booking, making the solution, washing, boiling, drying, sprinkling, ironing, polishing, bundling and delivering. The average Chinaman will acquire all this in about a month, and is then ready for employment or to set up a laundry on his own account.

To become an independent laundryman, a Chinese needed capital. Rotating credit associations in Chinatown enabled Chinese to borrow
money from fellow countrymen for overhead investment. Moreover, the Chinese tended to pool resources by forming partnerships with kinsmen and friends (Light 1972:23-27; Siu 1953:92-102). Once Chinese were in the laundry business, they were fairly well protected by their voluntary associations and were assured of at least marginal profits. The voluntary associations decided upon minimum charges for laundering services. Chinese laundrymen, therefore, rarely engaged in "price wars" among themselves, and each was safe from being outmaneuvered by his competitors in the market. Also, after a laundry had been established at a certain locality, the voluntary association saw to it that no other Chinese would open additional laundries in the immediate vicinity. Through these self-supporting and self-disciplinary actions, the Chinese minimized internal competition among themselves. They were thus able to make their laundries profitable and to survive during a time when the metropolitan labor market was most unwelcome to them.

In the 1930s, machine washing was introduced to the laundry trade. Other groups, particularly Jews, began to enter the business and posed severe competition to the Chinese (Julia Chen 1941:102; Kwong 1979:62-63). As most Chinese laundrymen were small proprietors, they could not afford the new machinery. They adapted to the situation by setting up workshops that specialized in machine washing or drying (known respectively as "sai-yee gaai", 洗衣偈, literally meaning a clothes washing machine; and "tong-yee gaai", 熨衣偈, meaning a clothes ironing machine)*. From these workshops, people were sent out

*"Gaai" (偈) is a dialectical expression for "chi" (械), meaning machine.
to collect laundry from the hundreds of Chinese laundries and to return cleaned material. The store-front laundrymen, then, functioned as service people who dealt directly with customers (Julia Chen 1941:101; Kung 1962:183). In such a way, Chinese laundrymen saved the overhead investment required by expensive machinery, yet managed to keep charges low by centralizing most washing and drying in mechanized workshops. These workshops were assured of business because they were supplied with laundry by the many laundries in virtually all residential districts of New York.

Restaurants provided a second major line of occupations for the early Chinese in New York City. The operation of their restaurants also manifested high degree of Chinese inter-dependence. In the beginning, all Chinese restaurants were located within Chinatown. When the Chinese opened a few pioneer restaurants outside Chinatown in the early 20th century, they found them profitable (van Norden 1918:48, 60, 78). New York was then a rapidly expanding city and the market for Chinese restaurants outside Chinatown was enormous. A common goal of Chinese restaurant workers was thus to save enough money to become owners themselves. Like the laundrymen, Chinese restaurant owners raised capital by joining rotating credit associations and by forming partnerships with kinsmen and friends (Wong 1979:117-119). Using the financial resources within the ethnic group, more Chinese entered the restaurant business, and the number of Chinese restaurants in New York City quickly multiplied. By 1941, according to Julia Chen (1941:94), the number of Chinese restaurants in New York had grown to about 700, of which 90 percent were located outside Chinatown. Also like the
laundrymen, Chinese restaurant owners made use of their voluntary associations to "district" New York City so that the restaurants were scattered outside Chinatown, and each enjoyed at least a minimum "sphere of influence" within a service area (Julia Chen 1941:62).

Other Chinese economic activities, such as groceries, importation of preserved produce from China, restaurant appliances and utensils, carpentry, interior decorating, and poultry and Chinese vegetable farming, mutually supported each other (Fig. 6)*. To serve as delivery people between the dispersed Chinese and the centralized community, a few Chinese became peddlers in the early days. Later, the Chinese were able to own trucking companies themselves. To support the many laundries and the laundering workshops, the Chinese established companies for laundry supplies and servicing centers for the maintenance of laundry machines (Fig. 7. See the directory of Chinese stores in Chin 1939).

Thus, ever since its inception, Chinatown has functioned as the commercial, cultural, financial, informational, employment, and recreational center for the Chinese throughout metropolitan New York. As early as 1898, Beck (1898:57-58) observed in New York:

The laundrymen constitute by far the larger portion of the Chinese in and about the Metropolis. . . . It is true that but few of them are residents of Chinatown proper; but, though scattered over an area of about thirty miles in all directions from that center, they all recognize that as their headquarters. To Chinatown they repair weekly, or as often as possible, for such supplies as they may need, as well as for social intercourse with their countrymen, or for devotion, pleasure and amusement. . . . It is obvious,

*Before the 1930s, Chinese farms were located in Queens and Brooklyn. Nowadays, they are primarily in New Jersey.
Fig. 6. Ethnic Occupations in Relation to Chinese Restaurants
Fig. 7. Ethnic Occupations in Relation to Chinese Laundries
then, that their patronage goes very far toward supporting the various and peculiar enterprises of the compact central community.

These central functions of Chinatown have continued until today. In 1941, Julia Chen (1941:96) noted:

On Sundays and holidays [New York's] Chinatown is a really busy spot. First, it serves as a rendezvous where cousins and friends outside of Chinatown and throughout Greater New York come to visit their relatives on the Sabbath. Then, on this day of rest, hundreds of Chinese laundries throughout the city closed their businesses. These washmen having their connections and organizations in Chinatown usually spend the day there. . . . On Sunday they resort to Chinatown to purchase the necessary foodstuffs. A great number of Western visitors also come to Chinatown on Sunday where they eat Chinese food . . . , buy Oriental souvenirs, or just look around.

More recently, Sung (1979:30-31) wrote:

New York's Chinatown not only serves those Chinese people within its own boundaries, but it attracts Chinese from the tri-state area of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, and also from towns up and down the East Coast . . . . In New York's Chinatown, market day is Sunday. Tens of thousands of Chinese swarm into the area to replenish groceries for the week, to stock up on supplies needed in their businesses, to eat in the restaurants, and of course, to see friends or relatives, go to the movies or bookstores, visit the family association headquarters, attend a wedding, or even see the doctor. The sales volume in the exchange of goods and services is high. The Chinese reserve their shopping for Chinatown.

The above is not, of course, to suggest that the central functions of Chinatown are the only variables causing the concentration of the Chinese in New York City. New York's Chinatown is both a commercial and residential area. To further understand why the Chinese have concentrated there, two more variables have to be considered: (1) the relationship between Chinese and other population (particularly minority) groups in Lower Manhattan, and (2) Chinese tenure in Chinatown.
**Chinese Attitudes Towards Other Ethnic Groups**

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinatown was not the only immigrant community in Lower Manhattan. Both Little Italy and the Jewish Lower East Side were larger and more prominent ghettos than Chinatown. Since the early 1940s, large numbers of blacks and Puerto Ricans have migrated into Lower Manhattan, displaced the departing Caucasians, and drastically changed the ethnic composition of the population there. Currently, the northern section of Little Italy is predominantly Hispanic, and the Lower East Side is primarily a black and Puerto Rican neighborhood (Carey 1976:37-42). Despite the rapid in-migration of blacks and Puerto Ricans into Lower Manhattan, however, few of them have settled in Chinatown. This observation suggests that certain mechanisms have been in force to prevent blacks and Puerto Ricans from moving into the Chinese territory. Thus, to explain New York's Chinatown, two questions have to be answered: (1) Why have the Chinese continued to live there? (2) Why haven't other minority groups infiltrated the neighborhood?

As a cultural group, the Chinese are highly ethnocentric. They are conscious of their differences with others and feel that they are always culturally superior (Hsu 1970:99). This sense of Chinese superiority is manifested, for example, by the tendency for the Chinese to call themselves "people" but all others either "devils" or "barbarians". It is customary among the New York Chinese to address themselves as "Tang Yan" (唐人, the people of Tang, meaning the Chinese), the Caucasians as "Lo Fen" (老番, barbarians), the Jewish as "Ju Kuei" (Ju鬼, Jewish devils), the blacks as "Hak Kuei", and
black devils) or "Lo Muk" (老墨, dark ink), and the Puerto Ricans as "Lui-sung Kuei" (呂宋鬼, devils from Little Luzon, i.e., Puerto Rico)*. (See also Dong & Hom 1980 for similar terms used among the Chinese in San Francisco Chinatown.)

To prompt the general attitude of the Chinese toward different ethnic groups, I asked new Chinese immigrants in my questionnaire survey whether they would favor or object to the marriages if their children were married to whites, blacks, Puerto Ricans, American-born Chinese or immigrant Chinese**. Among the 106 Chinese who answered this question, the majority objected to the marriages if their children were married to whites (52.8 percent), blacks (84.0 percent), and Puerto Ricans (81.0 percent), but favored them if their children were married to American-born Chinese (45.0 percent) or immigrant Chinese (66.0 percent) (Table 7). No respondent reported favoring his children marrying blacks or Puerto Ricans.

Chinese ethnocentricism is, however, characterized by "passive superiority" (Hsu 1970:99). Before the U. S. civil rights movement in the mid-1960s, Chinese in America were rarely aggressive or militant when they dealt with other population groups. In conflict situations, they often withdrew and tried not to intensify disputes (Lyman 1974:86;}

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*The Chinese in New York call the Philippines "Luzon" and Puerto Rico "Little Luzon". Such nicknames probably originated from the emigrant communities of Chinese coolies in the 19th century, and were based on the common language (Spanish) spoken in the two areas.

**My questionnaire survey covered only new Chinese immigrants—that is, those who have immigrated from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to New York City since 1965.
Table 7
New Chinese Immigrants' Attitudes Toward Interracial Marriages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If children were married to</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>No. 56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 52.8</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>No. 89</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 84.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ricans</td>
<td>No. 86</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 81.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American-born Chinese</td>
<td>No. 9</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 8.4</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Chinese</td>
<td>No. 0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work.
1977:177; Weiss 1974:99; Light 1972:174-175). To the Chinese, their passivity did not mean that they were timid or inferior. They simply tried to avoid difficulty and to look for alternative, but easier, means to achieve their goals. Even in the days when the Chinese were severely disturbed in California, Dobie (1936:3) observed:

Being self-sufficient and proud, the Chinese in California withdrew more and more within themselves. The people alien to them mistook this for ignorance or timidity, it never occurred to them to fancy that the Chinaman's attitude was an attitude of superiority. Old people are not given to explanations. They have learned that argument and self-revelation are futile. So they retire to a chimney corner and let the youngsters raise their voices.

Nevertheless, once the Chinese acquired new opportunities, they internalized them within the "we-group" of the Chinese and at the same time exclude them from the "they-group" of "barbarians" and "devils". Although many scholars in the past scorned Chinese occupations in historic America as menial or unfulfilling, they acknowledged that the Chinese tended to raise capital within their own communities and to hire workers only among fellow Chinese (Li 1977:104-107; Light 1972:93; Siu 1953:92-102; Wong 1979:83-135). Even today, a Chinese employer, particularly one in New York's Chinatown, still prefers to hire only Chinese workers.

A major means for the Chinese to reserve employment opportunities for fellow Chinese is to manipulate their ethnic language. In Chinatown, Chinese is the daily language. The prevalence of the Chinese language there has two effects on the ethnic composition of employees within the community. On the one hand, Chinese employers tend to hire workers through oral communication or advertisements in
local Chinese newspapers. Non-Chinese are virtually unable to apply for jobs in Chinese-owned stores or factories. Nowadays, practically all Chinese-owned stores in Chinatown are staffed by Chinese. After the Chinese took over the clothing industry in the vicinity of Chinatown in the mid-1960s, the workforce in their factories has also been entirely made up of Chinese.

On the other hand, the non-Chinese corporations in Chinatown, such as banks, have to employ bi-lingual Chinese to serve clients. In 1980, as many as 12 bank offices were located in Chinatown; their employees, including managers, were dominated by Chinese. Even within the social service agencies in Chinatown, which are financed with public funds and are supposed to be equal opportunity employers, the majority of employees are Chinese. Of course, employers in Chinatown can justify their preference in hiring Chinese workers for a variety of cultural and linguistic reasons. Yet, it is obvious that the Chinese can indeed manipulate their resources and make use of opportunities in the larger society to pursue communal economic gains.

Chinatown’s garment industry

Besides commercial activities, the garment industry also plays a significant role in Chinatown’s local economy. Chinese immigrants, however, have to bear high social costs for the garment industry. Chinese garment factories are concentrated along the fringes of Chinatown, in old buildings which provide substandard working conditions and facilities. Besides substandard facilities in factories, the operational system of garment manufacturing imposes
limitations on the wages for workers. To receive pre-cut material from manufacturers, garment contractors normally have to go through a reverse bidding process. In other words, the material goes to the contractor who bids the lowest price. Being unable to control the price, contractors offer variable wages to workers on the piece-work basis. The seasonal nature of garment manufacturing also makes it difficult for contractors to offer hourly wages and provide job security to workers. During the busy season, contractors can receive more material and will urge workers to work for longer hours. During the slow season, however, contractors might not have enough material for all workers and might have to lay off some of them; some contractors may be unable to receive any pre-cut material at all and will have to close their factories temporarily.

Under such circumstances, garment workers tend to work fast and for long hours when pre-cut material is abundant but face the threat of unemployment or underemployment during the slow season for garment production. Moreover, since wages are paid on the piece-work basis, slow workers earn little, often at levels below minimum wages. To Americans in general, these kinds of garment factories are detestable and are no better than the exploitative sweat shops which were prevalent during the 19th century but had long been declared illegal (Muth 1981; Perez 1980; Tam 1978). To some Chinese immigrants, however, jobs in garment factories are the only source of income. Without garment factories, non-English-speaking Chinese would have found it more difficult to acquire jobs in the general labor market.

The majority of the garment workers in Chinatown are unionized.
Nevertheless, Chinese garment workers seldom report violations of labor regulations, such as sub-minimum wages, over-time without extra pay, or health and fire hazards in factory premises, to union leaders or city officials. Receiving few complaints from Chinese workers, officials of the city's Labor Department are unable to fully enforce the labor law in Chinatown. Few Chinese garment workers make complaints against contractors because they value immediate income more than improvements in working conditions (Tam 1978:36). At the same time, most Chinese contractors maintain that they cannot afford the capital required for full compliance with labor laws in factories and that a strict enforcement of labor laws in Chinatown would possibly force them to close factories and lay off workers.

In this respect, the relationship between Chinese garment contractors and workers is symbiotic, rather than antagonistic. On the one hand, contractors help provide jobs to non-English-speaking Chinese immigrants who would likely be unemployable otherwise. On the other hand, Chinese workers help conceal substandard working conditions from labor officials and thus prevent contractors from being bankrupted by the legally required higher standards in factories. The large number of garment factories in Chinatown also provides opportunities for workers to change jobs from one factory to another and has the effect of reducing official complaints against violations of labor laws. When workers are not satisfied with the terms that contractors offer them, they often move to work in other factories, rather than filing complaints in the local union or the city's Department of Labor (field notes).
As a whole, the garment industry of New York City has been in decline. The Chinese, however, have tried hard to protect the industry in Chinatown. On the one hand, Chinese contractors bid low prices for the pre-cut material from manufacturers; on the other hand, Chinese workers accept low wages for jobs in substandard factories, and abstain from raising complaints against illegal labor practices to union leaders and city officials. The bulk of the income that Chinese garment industry generates, however, is retained in Chinatown. Contractors acquire loans from local banks and seek services from Chinese insurance agents and accountants. Workers patronize Chinese restaurants and buy necessities from Chinatown's groceries and general stores. The garment industry is, therefore, also well integrated into Chinatown's economy and with other Chinese economic activities.

Although many Chinese immigrants have to suffer low wages and substandard working conditions, few of them consider that their opportunities for future advancement are totally blocked. Many Chinese try to save enough money to become self-employed eventually, working as grocers, garment contractors, or restaurant owners. The majority of Chinatown's garment contractors, for example, are former factory or restaurant workers who had saved enough capital to become employers themselves (Glynn & Wang 1978:19). Most Chinese immigrants, of course, cannot become economically well-off within a short period of time, but they also put their hopes on the future of their children by sending them to schools. In my questionnaire survey, I asked Chinese immigrants what kinds of occupation they would like their children to have. None of them reported that they expected their children to
become restaurant or garment workers. Rather, they all hoped that their children would have professional occupations, such as medical doctors, nurses, engineers, lawyers, or teachers. It is, of course, impossible to predict whether their hopes can come true. Yet, the Chinese are hopeful for a better future, no matter how difficult their present situations are.

The tendency to preserve economic opportunities for the members of one's ethnic group is not unique to the Chinese. In historic New York, for example, a German employer also tended to hire German workers; an Italian preferred to rent or sub-let apartments to fellow Italians (Ernst 1949:75-78; MacDonald & MacDonald 1964). Nowadays, a Dominican immigrant would try to look for a job or a residence through Dominican friends or relatives (Garrison & Weiss 1979; Sassen-Koob 1979)*. In a predominantly black and Hispanic neighborhood, such as the Lower East Side, the social service agencies are also dominated by black and Hispanic employees (Kuo 1977:88-91). These observations suggest that ethnicity may not necessarily be a liability, but could be an asset to minorities. Some minorities can manipulate their ethnic traits, such as language and culture, to pursue economic gains. Our understanding of ethnic groups, therefore, cannot rely one-sidedly on the effects of the majority's dominance of minorities. Rather, we have to consider as well ethnic groups as active manipulators able to make use of the

*See also the rather extensive literature on kinship networks, social networks, and migrant adaptation, e.g., Connell (1973); Hugo (1981); Piddington (1965); Tilly & Brown (1967); Watson (1975).
socio-economic systems in the larger society to seek benefits for themselves.

Commerce, trade, garment industry, and employment in social service agencies are, of course, not the only resources available to the Chinese. Housing is also an important economic good. To further explain why the Chinese have continued to occupy Chinatown, it is necessary to explore the ownership of properties there.

Property Ownership in Chinatown

Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze the historic trend of the ownership of buildings in New York's Chinatown because information about it is scanty. Nevertheless, according to records in the Manhattan Land Book for the Year 1978-1980, the Chinese Charity and Benevolent Association (now known as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association) has owned a building on Mott Street in Chinatown since 1919. A few other Chinese voluntary associations and stores have owned buildings on the same street since the early 1920s (Sanborn Map Co. 1979). The Land Book records major descriptions of individual buildings, such as the owners' names, transaction dates, building dimensions, and total value. But it provides no information about the previous owners. Based on the owners' names given in the Land Book, we can identify whether the present owner of a building is Chinese, but we do not know if the building had been previously owned by another Chinese. However, despite the deficiency in the data, it is evident that the Chinese began to acquire properties in New York's Chinatown no later than 1919.
The 1910s marked the beginning of a continual decline of the white population in Lower Manhattan (Grebler 1952:132). On the one hand, immigration from Europe slackened after 1924 as a result of the U. S. enactment of the quota system. On the other hand, whites continued to move away from the slums of Lower Manhattan toward better neighborhoods within the city or in the suburbs. The suburbanization of whites was, however, relatively slow during the depression years of the 1930s. It quickened in the 1950s, when the city economy in general and the construction industry in particular were recovering from the impacts of the depression and the Second World War (Handlin 1962:64; Rosenwaike 1972:132).

When whites were leaving Lower Manhattan, their properties there were available for sale. The Chinese took up the opportunity and purchased such buildings. The Chinese in Chinatown were able to acquire properties because they had accumulated wealth by providing goods and services to large numbers of dispersed Chinese throughout metropolitan New York. In the 1930s, that is, at least a decade prior to the in-migration of blacks and Puerto Ricans into Lower Manhattan, Shulman observed that "the Chinese were gradually assuming ownership and were improving many of the homes" around Chinatown (Shulman 1938:177). During the 1950s, and particularly in the 1960s, large numbers of Chinese moved into Chinatown, due primarily to new immigration streams which were permitted by changes in American immigration laws. Since then, the Chinese have purchased more buildings in the neighborhood.

By 1975, according to the New York City Department of City Planning
(1979:44), 75 percent of the owners of walk-ups in Chinatown proper had identifiable Chinese names. Moreover, during 1974-1976, the majority (78 percent) of purchasers of walk-ups in Chinatown and its adjacent portion of the Lower East Side had identifiable Chinese names (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1979:44). On the basis of the Manhattan Land Book, however, by 1979, the owners of virtually all buildings in Chinatown proper and many in Chinatown's adjacent blocks in Little Italy and the Lower East Side could be identified as Chinese corporations or individuals with Chinese last names (Fig. 8).

The Chinese, therefore, did not acquire substantial numbers of buildings in Chinatown and its vicinity until many Caucasian residents had already left the territory. Besides, the Chinese were willing and able to pay high prices for the tenements. According to the New York City Department of City Planning, during 1974-1976, the average sale price of multiple-unit walk-up buildings in Chinatown and Little Italy was $118,000 per building. It was 30 percent higher than the average sale price of the same category of buildings in Manhattan ($90,995) and 133 percent higher than that in New York City ($50,745) during the same period of time (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1978). In Chinatown and Little Italy, the value of properties was the highest within Chinatown proper, where the average prices were between $251,000 and $272,000 during 1974-1976 (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1979:43). It was thus not surprising that the absentee or departing Caucasian landlords in Lower Manhattan were willing to sell properties to Chinese (A. Clark 1975; Ferretti 1980).

Having acquired the ownership of the buildings, the Chinese
Fig. 8. Chinese-owned Buildings in New York's Chinatown: 1979
gradually replaced the remaining non-Chinese residents in Chinatown with Chinese tenants. Of course, they did not do this by force because tenants' rights were protected by law. They waited until leases had expired, or apartments were vacated, and then rented the vacant premises to other Chinese. They recruited tenants only among Chinese by keeping information about vacant premises within the ethnic group. They normally transmit such information by word of mouth or through advertisements in local Chinese newspapers. Consequently, they bar other population groups from moving into Chinatown because information about housing there is seldom diffused to non-Chinese. Meanwhile, more Chinese residents and stores were housed in Chinatown. With the Chinese acquisition of additional buildings in Little Italy and the Lower East Side, Chinatown expanded and encroached upon the two adjacent territories.

The Caucasians who remained in the territory were, of course, conscious of the Chinese infiltration. In 1974, they formed the LIRA (Little Italy Restoration Association) and conducted a joint study with the New York City Planning Commission to explore ways to rehabilitate Little Italy. Based on that study, the New York City Department of City Planning recommended that Little Italy should be designated a special district where zoning regulations would "preserve and strengthen the historical and cultural character of the community of Little Italy" (NYC City Planning Commission 1976:11). Chinese community leaders, however, considered the proposed special district legislation as a strategy to hamper Chinese business interests in Little Italy. They strongly opposed it. Consequently, according to Wang (1980:75),
"tensions between the two ethnic groups increased."

Despite the opposition from the Chinese, the city enacted the Little Italy Special District legislation in 1977. Nevertheless, this legislation seemed to have little effect on the on-going Chinese infiltration of Little Italy. Since then, the Chinese have continued to buy additional buildings and to move into the territory. By 1980, as a reporter of the New York Times (Ferretti 1980) observed in Little Italy, "And so while change has come, the friction has lessened... Along Mott, the Chinese groceries co-exist nicely with the latticini."

Thus, throughout the history of Chinese immigration to New York City, the Chinese have demonstrated that they are highly adaptable to changing situations. More importantly, while they are adapting to the city, they are able to avoid conflicts with competing groups and to prevent unnecessary losses to themselves. On the whole, the Chinese tactic is to abstain from seeking immediate gains and to wait until the time when situations are ripe for more aggressive action. In historic New York, when the Chinese were discriminated against, they adapted by becoming self-employed or being employed by other Chinese. Later, they invested in various enterprises and gradually diversified their occupations. Moreover, the willingness of the Chinese to sacrifice for, and to invest in, their children's education in America is well known (Nee & Nee 1973:151-155; Sung 1976:58-59). In fact, many American-Chinese professionals, such as lawyers, physicians, engineers, and university professors, were born to parents who used to be laundrymen and restaurant workers.

These kinds of goal-achieving behavior are, of course, not unique
to Chinese. Other immigrant groups in America have demonstrated that they can adapt to changing situations and can sacrifice present enjoyment for a better future (Bonacich et al. 1980; Glazer & Moynihan 1970:156-157; Howe 1976:245-255; Lindsey 1982; Petersen 1970). These patterns, however, suggest that minorities not only passively respond to societal forces but also actively manipulate such forces to suit their interests. Besides the impacts of macroscopic forces, such as racial discrimination, to understand minorities, we have also to consider them as active manipulators who continually make use of situations offered by the wider society to pursue communal economic and social gains.

The formation and persistence of New York's Chinatown cannot, therefore, be adequately explained by the commonly assumed causes of discrimination and assimilation. The concentration of the Chinese has, in fact, been to the advantage of the Chinese. The economic and interpersonal networks that the Chinese have established in Chinatown provide opportunities for the immigrant group to survive and prosper. The Chinese have also purposely sustained their enclave in Chinatown and have protected their economic interests there by excluding other minorities from their territory.

In short, Chinatown has evolved and persisted because of numerous interrelated mechanisms, and no single cause can adequately explain its development. These mechanisms, however, can be schematized in Fig. 9 and be summarized as follows: The dispersed Chinese earn income by serving primarily non-Chinese. Much of this income, however, is siphoned into Chinatown through the exchange of goods and services.
Fig. 9. Interactions Among Chinese in New York City

NON-CIHINESE EMPLOYERS OR CLIENTELE

income

DISPERSED CHINESE

demand for ethnic goods and services

CHINATOWN MERCHANTS

investment

Businesses:
EMPLOYERS

jobs

investment

Real estate:
LANDLORDS

residences

CONCENTRATED CHINESE IN CHINATOWN
Merchants in Chinatown accumulate wealth and reinvest it in businesses and real estate. With the ownership of property and the presence of job-providing businesses, the Chinese community becomes consolidated and sedentary. Large numbers of Chinese prefer to stay in the neighborhood either for the ease of seeking jobs or in order to live with other Chinese. As economic ventures in Chinatown are supported by a large clientele, Chinese entrepreneurs have little desire to leave the neighborhood. Therefore, although residential apartments in Chinatown are under rent control, landlords can gain substantial profits by owning or renting shops on lower floors. Despite the age of many buildings there and the high cost of maintaining them, house abandonment does not exist in the neighborhood. Chinatown continues to be a community with a viable economy and social life.

Thus, the interaction between concentrated Chinese in Chinatown and dispersed Chinese throughout metropolitan New York has played an important role in the formation and persistence of Chinatown. Interactions between these two groups of Chinese, however, depend on reciprocities. Chinese merchants, for example, do not lure consumers to Chinatown with coercive force; they run their shops in response to the demand of other Chinese and the clientele in the larger city. To further understand the reciprocal relationship between dispersed Chinese in New York and concentrated Chinese in Chinatown, it is necessary to consider how far these two groups are similar to and different from each other.
Characteristics of Chinatown and Non-Chinatown Chinese

As pointed out in Chapter III, census data do not reflect the characteristics of Chinese immigrants in New York City. To compare Chinese in New York City and those in Chinatown, I have to rely on the information that I collected in my questionnaire survey. In the survey, 121 new Chinese immigrants answered the questionnaire, of whom 50 lived in Chinatown and 71 in other parts of New York City. In subsequent analyses, they are referred to as "Chinatown Chinese" and "non-Chinatown Chinese". To compare these two groups, their characteristics, such as ability to speak English, engagement in ethnic occupations (restaurants and garment factories), language spoken at home, family diets, frequency of reading ethnic newspapers and magazines, and attitudes toward inter-racial marriages, are subject to chi square tests. However, since my samples were not randomly selected and could not statistically represent the Chinese immigrants in New York City, such tests are only for illustrative, rather than inferential purposes.

Contrary to the popular belief that minorities often have initial residences in ghetto areas and that their dispersion follows the improvement in their socio-economic status, in my questionnaire survey, the majority (83 percent) of non-Chinatown Chinese immigrated directly from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong to areas outside Chinatown. Moreover, 8 percent of Chinatown Chineses had initial residences outside Chinatown. New Chinese immigrants, in fact, seldom have a choice of where to live initially in New York City; their initial residences are often arranged for or provided by relatives or friends who have settled
in New York earlier. The location of new immigrants' relatives and friends is, therefore, a more important factor than socio-economic status or cultural differences determining the distribution of Chinese newcomers to New York City.

In several aspects, such as the ability to speak English and the engagement in non-ethnic occupations, non-Chinatown Chinese are different from Chinatown Chinese. When they were asked how well they spoke English, a greater proportion of non-Chinatown Chinese answered that they spoke English very well (15.5 percent) or well (47.9 percent) than Chinatown Chinese (4.0 percent spoke English very well and 22.0 percent spoke English well) (Table 8a). Moreover, fewer non-Chinatown Chinese engaged in ethnic occupations in restaurants (22.6 percent) or garment factories (12.9 percent) than Chinatown Chinese (40.9 percent worked in restaurants and 22.7 percent in garment factories) (Table 8b). Likewise, fewer non-Chinatown Chinese worked in Chinatown (30.6 percent) than Chinatown Chinese (61.4 percent) (Table 8c). When they were asked whether they would like to live in Chinatown, fewer non-Chinatown Chinese answered affirmatively (16.9 percent) than Chinatown Chinese (60.0 percent) (Table 8d). On the basis of chi square tests, these differences are all statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level.

In some other aspects, such as the language spoken at home and the frequency of reading ethnic newspapers, however, there are no statistically significant differences between non-Chinatown and Chinatown Chinese in New York City. As noted, on the whole, non-Chinatown Chinese have a better command of the English language
than Chinatown Chinese. Nevertheless, the majority of both groups (90.6 percent of non-Chinatown Chinese and 97.8 percent of Chinatown Chinese) spoke only Chinese at home (Table 8e). The majority of both groups read Chinese newspapers or magazines regularly (53.5 percent of non-Chinatown Chinese and 60.0 percent of Chinatown Chinese) or occasionally (40.9 percent and 38.0 percent respectively) (Table 8f). Both groups cooked Chinese food more often than American food at home. Among non-Chinatown Chinese, 35.2 percent cooked Chinese food exclusively, and 57.7 percent cooked mostly Chinese but occasionally American food at home; among Chinatown Chinese, the corresponding percentages were 64.0 and 34.0 (Table 8g). When these characteristics of the two groups of Chinese are subject to chi square tests, they are not statistically different at the 2.5 or 5.0 percent significance level.

In response to the question about attitudes toward inter-racial marriages among their children, the majority of non-Chinatown and Chinatown Chinese answered that they would be against the marriages if their children were married to whites (53.3 percent of non-Chinatown Chinese and 52.2 percent of Chinatown Chinese), to blacks (91.7 and 73.9 percent respectively), to Puerto Ricans (91.7 and 67.4 percent respectively). Moreover, the majority of them favor the marriages if their children were married to American-born Chinese (43.3 percent of non-Chinatown Chinese and 47.8 percent of Chinatown Chinese), or to immigrant Chinese (65.0 and 67.4 percent respectively) (Tables 8h to 8i). The differences between the two groups' attitudes toward their children's being married to whites, American-born Chinese, and
immigrant Chinese are not statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. However, at the 5 percent significance level, the attitude of non-Chinatown Chinese toward marriages between their children and blacks or Puerto Ricans is statistically different from that of Chinatown Chinese. More non-Chinatown Chinese would object to such marriages than Chinatown Chinese (Tables 8i and 8j).

On the basis of my questionnaire, I cannot conclude whether the differences between certain characteristics of non-Chinatown and Chinatown Chinese are the cause or the effect of their immigration to different localities in New York City. Also, it is not possible to determine to what extent the settlement of Chinese immigrants in places outside Chinatown is related to assimilation. In terms of certain characteristics, such as the ability to speak English, the engagement in non-ethnic occupations, and the location of work places, non-Chinatown Chinese appear to be better assimilated than Chinatown Chinese. Nevertheless, in terms of some other aspects, both groups seem to be equally non-assimilated, because the majority of them speak Chinese at home, read Chinese newspapers regularly, eat Chinese food more often than American food, and oppose inter-racial marriages. These findings suggest that Chinese immigrants probably choose to be assimilated in certain aspects, such as mastering the English language but, at the same time, retain some of their traditional traits, such as speaking Chinese at home and consumption of Chinese goods and foods. This behavioral pattern of the Chinese corresponds with the findings of several studies which argue that assimilation is a multi-faceted phenomenon and that immigrants may not necessarily absorb all cultural
Table 8
Characteristics of Dispersed Chinese Immigrants and Concentrated Chinese Immigrants in New York City

(a) Ability to Speak English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can speak English</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not well</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't speak English</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 17.19; significant at .05 level.

(b) Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment factories</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 8.20; significant at .05 level.
(c) Place of Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work place</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Chinatown</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Chinatown</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No occupation) (9) (6)

Chi square = 9.90; significant at .05 level.

(d) Attitude toward living in Chinatown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would like to live in Chinatown</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't care</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 29.18; significant at .05 level.
(e) Language Spoken at Home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language spoken at home</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Chinese and English</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No answer) (7) (4)

Chi square = 2.47; not significant at .05 level.

(f) Frequency of Reading Chinese Newspapers and Magazines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 1.22; not significant at .05 level.
(g) Family Diets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family diets</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese food only</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Chinese/occasionally Am.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal amount of Chinese &amp; American</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly American/occasionally Ch.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All American food</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 10.54; not significant at .025 level.

(h) Attitude Toward Marriages if Children Were Married to Whites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 3.49; not significant at .05 level.
(i) Attitude Toward Marriages if Children Were Married to Blacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outside Chinatown</td>
<td>In Chinatown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No answer)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 4.85; significant at .05 level.

(j) Attitude Toward Marriages if Children Were Married to Puerto Ricans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outside Chinatown</td>
<td>In Chinatown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No answer)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 8.50; significant at .05 level.
(k) Attitude Toward Marriages if Children Were Married to American-born Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No answer) (11) (4)

Chi square = 0.49; not significant at .05 level.

(1) Attitude Toward Marriages if Children Were Married to Immigrant Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants Outside Chinatown</th>
<th>Chinese immigrants In Chinatown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No answer) (11) (4)

Chi square = 0.06; not significant at .05 level.

Source: Field work.
traits of the host society by abandoning their old customs (Glazer & Moynihan 1970; Hastings et al. 1981; Ward 1982; Yinger 1981). The persistence of Chinese cultural traits, however, has effects on Chinatown. As long as the demand for Chinese products persists, there will be the need for the existence of Chinatown, and there will be interactions between dispersed Chinese in New York and concentrated Chinese in Chinatown.

Summary

This chapter has shown that ever since the inception of New York's Chinatown, the neighborhood has been the commercial, financial, cultural, recreational, employment, and informational center for the Chinese throughout the metropolis. Because of these centralized functions, a good proportion of the wealth earned by Chinese in Greater New York flows into Chinatown. The Chinese further invest their accumulated wealth in the economic activities and real estate in and around Chinatown. Due to their ethnocentric attitudes, the Chinese retain their economic and housing opportunities for fellow Chinese and exclude other minority groups from Chinatown. The rapid increase in the Chinese population in New York City due to new immigration since the mid-1960s has, however, brought considerable changes to Chinatown and to the overall distribution of Chinese in the city. Contemporary changes in the Chinese settlements in New York City will be discussed in Chapter V.
CHAPTER V

CHINATOWN AND BEYOND: CONTEMPORARY CHINESE IN NEW YORK CITY

As described in Chapter IV, Chinese property ownership is an important factor contributing to the persistence of New York's Chinatown. Housing in Chinatown, however, is influenced by the recent revival of Chinese immigration to New York and the city's rent control policy. These two factors, however, tend to have opposing impacts on Chinatown. On the one hand, new immigration increases the demand for accommodations in Chinatown; on the other hand, rent control discourages rehabilitation and redevelopment. Under such circumstances, housing in Chinatown is unavoidably a controversial issue. There are disputes about whether more apartments should be built for the middle-income group or for the poor. Meanwhile, the housing market of Chinatown has become so tight that many Chinese have to settle elsewhere, such as in central Queens and Brooklyn. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between (1) recent Chinese immigration, (2) the impacts of rent control and internal conflicts on the housing development in Chinatown, and (3) the dispersion of Chinese into Queens and Brooklyn.

This chapter is presented in three parts. Part 1 looks into the impact of current immigration laws on the persistence of New York's Chinatown. It argues that new Chinese immigrants tend to settle in Chinatown partly because of the immigration laws which favor family reunification and discourage immigrants from seeking public assistance.
The influx of new immigrants into Chinatown, however, heightens the demand for public and private facilities there, particularly housing. Part 2 examines the effect of rent control on the housing conditions in Chinatown and the movement of Chinese to Brooklyn and Queens. Finally, part 3 explores how internal conflicts and other problems have made it difficult to redevelop Chinatown despite the strong demand for standard housing there.

Impacts of Immigration Laws on Chinatown

Post-war changes in the U. S. immigration policy, and particularly the enactment of the 1965 Immigration Act, have allowed more Chinese to immigrate than before (see Chapter II). Besides their impact on the volume of Chinese immigration, current immigration laws have an indirect effect of reinforcing the existing Chinese concentration in New York's Chinatown.

The 1965 Immigration Act allows an annual quota of 20,000 immigrants per country within the worldwide ceiling of 290,000 per year. It also sets up a preference system which specifies the proportional distribution of eight categories of immigrants as follows (Congressional Research Service 1979:89):

First preference (unmarried sons and daughters of U. S. citizens): 20 percent of the over-all limitation of 290,000 in any fiscal year;
Second preference (spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence): 20 percent of over-all limitation, plus any numbers not required for first preference;
Third preference (members of the professions or persons of exceptional ability in the sciences and arts): 10 percent of over-all limitation;
Fourth preference (married sons and daughters of U. S. citizens)
citizens): 10 percent of over-all limitation, plus any numbers not required by the first three preference categories;
    Fifth preference (brothers and sisters of U. S. citizens 21 years of age or over): 24 percent of over-all limitation, plus any numbers not required by the first four preference categories;
    Sixth preference (skilled and unskilled workers in short supply): 10 percent of over-all limitation;
    Seventh preference (refugees)*: 6 percent of over-all limitation;
    Nonpreference (other immigrants): numbers not used by the seven preference categories.

Thus, under the provisions of the 1965 Immigration Act, the majority (74 percent) of the allowable 290,000 immigrants per year are family members of American citizens and permanent residents (under the first, second, fourth, and fifth preferences). Additionally, immigrants who are the immediate relatives of American citizens—"defined by the law to include the children and spouses of U. S. citizens, and the parents of U. S. citizens aged 21 or over"—are exempt from numerical restriction (Congressional Research Service 1979:85).

The current immigration law, therefore, encourages "chain migration", a form of migration in which new migrants move into destination areas to join relatives and friends (see Chapter I). As pointed out by studies in the past, "chain migration" often results in residential and occupational clustering of migrants in destination areas, because "former links are especially important in providing channels for getting jobs, arranging housing, and providing a sense of

*"Eligibility for seventh preference entry is limited to refugees who have fled from Communist countries or the Middle East because of persecution or who have been uprooted by natural disasters." (Congressional Research Service 1979:89)
ecological security" for new migrants (Goldstein 1978:44).

According to my survey of new Chinese immigrants in New York City, the majority of the 121 people who answered the questionnaire reported that they immigrated under the sponsorship of close relatives (53.7 percent) or as children with parents (13.2 percent); a few of them immigrated as refugees (12.4 percent) (Table 9). Among the 118 respondents who answered the question on initial residence, over half (53.4 percent) of them had initial residences arranged for or provided by relatives, and another 33.1 percent by friends (Table 10). This pattern of Chinese "chain migration" contributes more to the expansion of New York's Chinatown than to the formation of new Chinese clusters in other parts of the city. New York's Chinatown has long been the largest Chinese cluster in the city. When new Chinese immigrants immigrate to New York to join family members, many of them settle in Chinatown.

Moreover, the current immigration law discourages immigrants from seeking public assistance in the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 denies the admission of prospective immigrants who are:

"[L]ikely at any time to become public charges" (Sec. 212(a)(15); 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(15)). It also provides for the deportation of an alien who has become a public charge within five years after entry, unless the reasons for this are affirmatively shown to have arisen after entry (Sec. 241(a)(8); 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(8)).

(Congressional Research Service 1979:94)

The law, therefore, has the effect of urging immigrants to acquire immediate employment upon their arrival in this country. To those who lack proficiency in English, the best chance to become gainfully
### Table 9
Initial Status of New Chinese Immigrants When Moving to the U. S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial status</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored by a close relative</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Came as a child with parents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored by unrelated persons or organizations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a job offer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On student visa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal alien</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work.

### Table 10
Sources of Information Through Which New Chinese Immigrants Acquired Initial Residences in New York City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of information</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese newspapers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English newspapers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real-estate agents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social service agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No answer) (3)

Source: Field work.
employed is to engage in ethnic occupations and to live in immigrant
enclaves where such occupations are most readily available.

Of course, the provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act are not meant to prohibit immigrants from seeking public
assistance. The U. S. government acknowledges:

Alien eligibility requirements for participation in the major
Federal public assistance programs are set forth in the laws
and/or regulations establishing and governing those programs,
rather than in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence and refugees are
eligible for most major public assistance programs, including the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDA), Medicaid, and the food stamp program.
(Congressional Research Service 1979:94-95)

Nevertheless, during the process of screening intended immigrants,

In order to establish that he is not likely to become a public
charge, an alien seeking admission may be required to provide
assurance of financial support, in the form of an affidavit of
support, from a resident of the United States. (Congressional
Research Service 1979:94)

The American resident who furnishes the affidavit of support has,
however, to reveal his income to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and to document that he can financially support the intended
immigrant. If the American resident himself is currently, or was
previously, on public assistance, the application would likely be
deprecated (U. S. Commission on Civil Rights 1980:40).

To minimize the risk of having their applications for the
immigration of family members declined, the Chinese in New York City
try not to seek welfare even if some of them are low-income and are
eligible for certain public assistance programs*. The Chinese are,

*Informal interviews with social workers in New York's Chinatown.
therefore, willing to take whatever jobs are available to them. Although some new Chinese immigrants in New York are professionals or have received education in English prior to immigration, the majority of Chinese newcomers do not speak English. Often, the non-English-speaking Chinese have to look for jobs in the restaurants, small businesses, and garment factories in Chinatown.

In my questionnaire survey, over half of the 107 new Chinese immigrants who reported their initial occupations worked in restaurants and garment factories (36.4 percent and 18.7 percent respectively). The others had different occupations, ranging from cashiers to professional workers (Table 11). Moreover, the majority of them acquired initial occupations with information provided by friends (44.9 percent) and relatives (19.6 percent) (Table 12). The tendency for the Chinese to seek ethnic occupations and to rely upon the information provided by friends and relatives for jobs helps reinforce the persistence of New York's Chinatown. On the one hand, such jobs are most concentrated in Chinatown. On the other hand, to look for jobs within the ethnic group, the Chinese have to depend heavily on personal connections, and it is easier for them to develop such connections if they live within the community.

As a result of the interaction of the factors mentioned—the provisions of immigration laws which favor family reunification and discourage immigrants from seeking public assistance, and the tendency for the Chinese to rely upon relatives and friends for information about initial housing and jobs—large numbers of new Chinese immigrants settle in New York's Chinatown. The effects of current immigration
Table 11
Initial Occupations of New Chinese Immigrants in New York City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial occupations</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant workers</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment factory workers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical &amp; engineering workers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashiers and sales clerks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social workers, teachers, librarians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck drivers, delivery workers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No occupation or never worked)</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>(14)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work.
Table 12
Sources of Information Through Which New Chinese Immigrants Acquired Initial Occupations in New York City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese newspapers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment agents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English newspapers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School placement centers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant service agencies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No occupation or never worked) (14)

Source: Field work.
laws on Chinatown are indirect, but they help contribute to the persistence of this Chinese enclave in New York.

The influx of new Chinese immigrants into Chinatown has impacts on the development of the neighborhood and the emergence of new Chinese settlements in other parts of New York. As a consequence of new immigration, New York's Chinatown has expanded since the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, because Chinatown is immediately adjacent to the Italian and Hispanic neighborhoods in Little Italy and the Lower East Side, any increase in the size of Chinatown unavoidably encroaches upon the territories of other population groups. The expansion of Chinatown is susceptible to rebuffs which might arise from conflicting interests between different ethnic groups. As described in the last chapter, whites in Little Italy have already taken measures, through the enactment of a city law, to preserve the Italian tradition of their neighborhood. When penetrating Little Italy and the Lower East Side, the Chinese are cautious about possible conflicts with other population groups. They move into the two areas virtually on a building-by-building basis, purchasing only the tenements which have been given up by whites. The expansion of Chinatown is, therefore, necessarily a slow process, and not fast enough to accommodate the rapid influx of new Chinese immigrants from China and other areas. Consequently, the Chinese, both old and new immigrants, spread over from Chinatown and settle in other traditionally non-Chinese neighborhoods, such as Flatbush, Bay Ridge, Woodside, Elmhurst, Jackson Heights, and Flushing. The dispersion of Chinese from Chinatown will be explained in the following sections of this chapter, but the major source of the
process, recent developments in Chinatown, shall be addressed first.

New Immigration and Recent Developments in Chinatown

Many studies in the past pointed out the negative effects of new Chinese immigration into New York's Chinatown, such as the deterioration of the housing stock, high degrees of crowding in dilapidated buildings, disintegration of family life, great demand for social services, proliferation of exploitative sweat-shops, high incidence of mental illness, and the fury of youth gangs in the neighborhood*.

Cheung and de Rios (1982:150), for example, proclaimed:

In summary, it can be said that "all is not well" with the recent [Chinese] immigrants. There are increasing problems at all levels: economic, social, psychological, and cultural. As we look at various social indicators we must conclude that the needs of the Chinese in the United States are overwhelming.

Chang (1981:368) commented:

The continuing influx of new immigrants into large metropolitan areas in general and Chinatowns in particular means that many Chinese communities are going to experience greater congestion and their living conditions are likely to deteriorate rather than improve in the coming years.

Granted that living conditions in New York's Chinatown are poor, and that life is difficult for new Chinese immigrants, it must be cautioned, however, that poor living conditions in Chinatown are not caused by recent Chinese immigration alone. Poor living conditions had already prevailed in New York's Chinatown and its surrounding areas

*See, for example, Bernstein (1982); Blumenthal (1982); Chang (1981); Cheung & de Rios (1982); Chernow (1973); Daly (1983); Muth (1981); Rice (1977); Tam (1978); Wang (1979); Yuan (1974).
long before recent Chinese immigrants arrived. As a whole, Lower Manhattan began to suffer declines in population, commerce, and industry in the 1910s. Since then, practically no privately financed buildings have been erected in the Lower East Side (Grebler 1952:24). By 1960, the census revealed that almost half (48 percent) of the dwelling units in Lower Manhattan were deteriorated and dilapidated (Schwartz 1973:53). The area's clothing industry, which provided the largest number of jobs to the residents, also declined considerably between the 1910s and the early 1960s (Grebler 1952:113-119; Schwartz 1973:170). By 1968, as many as 43 percent of the non-residential lofts in Lower Manhattan were underutilized (8 percent vacant and 35 percent used for storage) (Schwartz 1973:170). Crimes, such as muggings, burglaries, and vandalism, were already soaring in Lower Manhattan before the mid-1960s. Many of these crimes were related to the prevalence of drug addiction in the area (N.Y. Herald Tribune 1965:133-134; Schwartz 1973:20-22, 149-150).

Poor living conditions are situations to which Chinese newcomers must adapt, and which, whenever opportunities permit them to do so, the Chinese try to improve. Since the mid-1960s, the Chinese have, in fact, helped stabilize the local economy and halt the long historic trend of commercial and industrial decline in areas around Chinatown. The Chinese purchase and occupy deserted tenements, reopen closed shops, turn idle garment factories operational, reestablish the area's clothing industry and businesses, and generate new income for the neighborhood (see Chapter II).

Admittedly, life is harsh in New York's Chinatown, where housing is
poor, crimes are prevalent, wages are low, and opportunities for occupational advancements are few. Yet, the Chinese strive hard to survive and to improve what they have attained. Some may move away from Chinatown to live in better neighborhoods after their economic conditions have improved. Nevertheless, the majority of Chinatown's residents stay. Among those who have moved out from Chinatown, and even among new generations of Chinese who were born or educated in New York, many return to Chinatown to work and to make use of their bilingual proficiencies to serve fellow Chinese. These people make up the bulk of Chinatown's professionals, such as physicians, dentists, pharmacists, optometrists, lawyers, realtors, accountants, journalists, banking officers, social workers, bilingual teachers, family counselors, and the administrators of social service agencies. New York's Chinatown is thus not entirely a ghetto for the poor. It is also a commercial and industrial center for Chinese businessmen, entrepreneurs, professionals, investors, and speculators. Life in New York's Chinatown is not so wretched as many past studies have portrayed (see, for example, Cheung & de Rios 1982 and Tobier 1979).

The community of New York's Chinatown is, therefore, made up of groups of diverse interests and backgrounds. In the course of the development of Chinatown, conflicts between such groups are inevitable. Substandard housing, for example, is a major problem that concerns every Chinese in New York's Chinatown. The majority of the buildings in Chinatown are walk-up tenements built before 1901. They are deteriorated and lack facilities for modern living. Many of them suffer rat and pest infestation, leaking roofs, and malfunctioning
heating systems. Such buildings are so old and defects in them are so major that they are not repairable. For better housing, these century-old tenements will have to be demolished and rebuilt*. Few Chinese disagree that housing in Chinatown must be upgraded, but what kind and what price are issues for heated debates. While some urge new developments, others contend that new buildings would make Chinatown a high-rent area and hamper the livelihood of the poor and the aged. The latter group opposes new construction unless plans are made to protect the interest of the low-income people in the neighborhood.

During the past 20 years, no new privately financed residential buildings were constructed in Chinatown. Obsolete buildings, meanwhile, make their imprint on the neighborhood. They make Chinatown appear to be a derelict ghetto and make living there both uncomfortable and agonizing. Despite their run-down conditions, however, apartments in New York's Chinatown are in great demand because of the influx of new Chinese immigrants.

Rent Control and Housing in New York's Chinatown

All rental apartments in New York's Chinatown, except those in public and publicly-aided housing projects, are under one of the city's

*According to the New York City Department of City Planning (1979:41): "There are 675 multi-family structures in the MBSA [Manhattan Bridge Study Area, i.e., Greater Chinatown], of which 99 percent are walk-ups; only 2 percent have elevators. Eighty-five percent of these buildings are Old Law tenements, built prior to 1901. Eleven percent are New Law tenements, constructed between 1901 and 1929 to the slightly higher standards of the 1901 Tenement Act. Only four percent were built to the relatively high standards of the City's 1929 Multiple Dwelling Law."
two rent regulation programs: rent control or rent stabilization. In theory, rent regulation protects the interest of renters and lowers their expenditures for housing. Nevertheless, in a neighborhood like New York's Chinatown, where the demand for housing is great, rent regulation has the effect of increasing newcomers' monetary and search costs for accommodations.

New York City began to enforce rent control in 1943. Since then, the statutory status and the regulations of the city's rent control program have undergone several changes*. According to the current rent regulation laws of New York City, all private rental units in structures of six or more apartments built prior to 1947 are under rent control. Rents for such units are allowed to increase by 7.5 percent per year if the buildings are free of building code violations. Nevertheless, if a rent-controlled unit is voluntarily vacated by the tenant, it is automatically "decontrolled" and is permitted to be rented at a "free market rent" to a new tenant. After a free market rent is negotiated between the landlord and the new tenant, the unit is then put under the rent stabilization program.

Rent stabilization covers all private rental buildings of six or more units built between 1947 and 1974, and the decontrolled units in pre-1947 buildings. Under this program, rates of rent increases for renewal and new leases are determined annually by the Rent Guidelines

*For details about New York's rental housing and rent regulation, see, for example, Kristof (1970, 1981); Marcus (1979); Olsen (1981); Salins (1980:58-72); Stegman (1982); Sternlieb & Hughes (1976); Swan (1944).
Board, an agency whose members are appointed by the Mayor and overseen by the city's Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). In 1981, the Rent Guidelines Board set the maximum rates of rent increases for rent-stabilized units at 10 percent, 13 percent, and 16 percent respectively for one-year, two-year, and three-year renewal leases. It also granted a "vacancy allowance" of a 15 percent increase in addition to those permitted for renewal leases. The vacancy allowance is levied on new tenants in rent-stabilized units upon turnovers in tenancies. For example, if a tenant was paying a monthly rent of $100 for a rent-stabilized unit, and if his lease was up for renewal in 1981, his new rent would be increased to either $110/month, $113/month, or $116/month, depending on whether his new lease was a one-year, two-year, or a three-year one. If, however, this tenant moved out from the unit, and if a new tenant moved into it during the 1981-1982 period, the corresponding rent for the new tenant would be either $125/month, $128/month, or $131/month, depending on the number of years covered by the lease.

Obviously, under the two rent regulation systems in New York City, new tenants are less well protected than long-time occupants of rent-regulated apartments. The systems are especially disadvantageous to Chinese newcomers to Chinatown, where the buildings are old and are in great demand. The majority of the buildings in New York's Chinatown were built before 1901. They are, therefore, under rent control. Turnovers in tenancies in such buildings involve a process whereby the apartments change from rent-controlled to decontrolled, and then to rent-stabilized. A new tenant has to pay a free market rent for an
apartment in an old building before his rent is subject to rent stabilization. This initial free market rent could be exorbitant. Besides, the amount of his initial rent depends more on when he moves into the apartment, rather than on how good the quality of the dwelling unit is. In New York's Chinatown, apartments with identical sizes and facilities within the same building are rented for different amounts. This is because whenever a new tenant moves in, he has to pay a free market rent, whereas his next-door neighbors continue to pay the controlled rent. Thus, under rent regulation, the later a Chinese moves into Chinatown, the higher the rent he has to pay. Yet, housing in New York's Chinatown remains obsolete, despite the higher rents that newcomers have to pay for apartments there.

In areas where demands for housing are great, free market rents are always higher than controlled rents. Under rent regulation, landlords cannot charge rents more than the regulated price. To compensate for their potential losses in revenues, landlords often demand "key money" from new tenants (Ault 1981:59; Hazlett 1982:291; Salins 1980:62). Other people, such as previous tenants, superintendents, or real-estate brokers, who play a role in controlling the access to available but highly demanded rent-regulated apartments may also request for similar kinds of money from new tenants. Although it is basically illegal, "key money" can be paid in many forms, e.g., as a broker's fee, or a payment for purchasing the furniture in an apartment. In Chinatown, "key money" is generally known as "fong dai" (房底), literally meaning "the basis of a room". Without paying it, a Chinese can hardly rent an apartment in the neighborhood.
Under rent regulation laws, a tenant saves more in rent if he occupies a rent-regulated apartment for a long period of time, that is, without moving out and without a turnover in tenancies. Consequently, a tenant who is moving out from a rent-regulated unit tends to sublease or assign his apartment to a new tenant without turning it over to the landlord*. Or, he may continue to pay the rent to the landlord under the terms of the original lease and has his "successor" or subtenant pay him. If his apartment is a rent-controlled one, the savings in rent for the subtenant are considerable. The subtenant does not have to pay the potentially sky-high free market rent because no turnover in tenancies is involved in the transaction and the landlord cannot decontrol the dwelling unit. In Chinatown, Chinese tenants try at all cost to hold on to their rent-controlled units and not to let them be decontrolled. If they have moved out from Chinatown, they still keep on paying rents to landlords and reserve their apartments for relatives or friends. Often, they would pay the rents even though their apartments might have to remain vacant for months because their relatives are still in China and in the process of applying for emigration. Such apartments, of course, never go to the open market and are not available to other Chinese who are unrelated to the

*The tenant's right to sublease is guaranteed by Section 226-b of New York's Real Property Law, which states, "A tenant renting a residence in a dwelling having four or more residential units shall have the right to sublease or assign his premises, subject to the written consent of the landlord given in advance of the sublease or assignment. Such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. . . ." (Citing Oser 1983. See also Newman 1982:37-38 and Shipp 1983b).
previous occupants (for similar practices in other parts of New York City, see Kristof 1970:317).

Thus, several factors—the common practice of paying "key money," the vacancy decontrol of rent-controlled units, the vacancy allowance for rent-stabilized units, and the tendency for the Chinese to reserve vacated apartments for relatives and friends—heighten Chinese newcomers' monetary and search costs for housing in Chinatown. Currently, New York's Chinatown is no longer an area of inexpensive dwellings as some tend to believe*. Despite the high cost for housing in Chinatown, the quality of the dwellings there remains substandard. This is unfortunate for the Chinese, but the housing conditions in New York's Chinatown cannot be substantially improved unless the century-old buildings there are rehabilitated or replaced by new construction.

Public and publicly-aided housing projects provide some standard dwellings to low- and moderate-income people in the vicinity of New York's Chinatown, particularly in the Lower East Side (Fig. 10). However, the majority of these housing projects were built during the 1950s and early 1960s. They were occupied primarily by Hispanics

*Because of the poor quality of housing in Chinatown, researchers tend to assume that dwellings there are inexpensive. The New York City Department of City Planning (1979:17), for example, stated, "The old housing stock [of Chinatown] provides relatively inexpensive dwellings, however inferior, for the low-income population." Tobier (1979:72) also wrote that the dwellings in Chinatown continued "to serve an important function as a (relatively) cheap source of housing for low-income newcomers to the city, however inferior they may be by middle-class standards."
Fig. 10. Public and Publicly-aided Housing Projects in New York Chinatown

Source: NYC City Planning Commission (1979:3.10-3.12)
before large numbers of new Chinese immigrants arrived in the area in the mid-1960s. Nowadays, a qualified Chinese family may have to wait for years in order to move into any one of these housing projects.

Confucius Plaza is the only new residential building erected in New York's Chinatown during the last two decades. It is a publicly-aided moderate-income cooperative and contains 760 residential units. It was completed in 1976 with loans from federal, New York State, and New York City governments and a private bank. Upon its completion, all of its dwelling units were occupied, predominantly by Chinese. Nowadays, the waiting list of qualified applicants for dwelling units in Confucius Plaza is exceedingly long. Eager applicants, however, have ways to shorten the waiting period. They can somehow get special assistance from the people who administer the application procedures. According to a local Chinese newspaper in New York's Chinatown, the managing board of Confucius Plaza admitted that some occupants of the housing project had violated the first-come, first-serve basis of the application process. In August, 1980, the managing board decided to replace two office workers because they had been "unable to balance their private and public interests when performing duties." (Peimei News September 13, 1980).

Long waiting lists for the dwelling units in the low- and moderate-income projects in Chinatown reflect the great demands for housing from both of the two groups of people in the neighborhood. They also reflect an acute shortage of standard housing in Chinatown. Besides its direct effect of forcing the Chinese to crowd the dilapidated walk-ups in the area, the shortage of standard housing in
Chinatown has two additional impacts on the residential mobility of the Chinese within New York. On the one hand, because of the great demand for housing, it is costly to rent apartments in Chinatown. Low-income Chinese who cannot afford the dwellings in Chinatown tend to settle in low-rent areas, such as Flatbush in Brooklyn. On the other hand, judging from their quality, apartments in Chinatown are overpriced. For the same prices, the Chinese can occupy dwellings with better amenities elsewhere, such as in central Queens and western Brooklyn. The dispersion of Chinese within New York City will be discussed below, but the emphasis shall be given to Chinese in Flatbush and Queens, because their mobility represents the residential choices of two different income groups among the Chinese.

**Chinese Settlements in Flatbush and Queens**

The Chinese began to move in relatively large numbers into Flatbush in the early 1970s. These were primarily low-income new immigrants who had failed to acquire residences in Chinatown. Currently, the Chinese in Flatbush are most concentrated in the Parade Grounds area, which is to the south of Prospect Park and is bounded by Parkside, Church, Flatbush, and Coney Island Avenues (Kleiman 1983; *Peimei News* Mar. 23, 1983) (Fig. 11). The Chinese call this area "Church Avenue", following the name of the subway station that serves the neighborhood. This is a low-rent area with predominantly four- and five-story apartment houses. It used to be a Jewish neighborhood but is now primarily occupied by blacks, Hispanics, Koreans, Chinese, and Indo-Chinese refugees.
Fig. 11. The Church Avenue Neighborhood in Flatbush, Brooklyn
Like other recent Chinese immigrants, the Chinese in Flatbush depend heavily on Chinatown for jobs and daily necessities. The Chinese are attracted into Church Avenue primarily because rents there are relatively low and because the locality is within short commuting distance from Chinatown. By subway, Church Avenue is only 15 to 20 minutes away from Chinatown. Nevertheless, this area is infested with crime and is considered to be one of the worst neighborhoods in Flatbush. In March, 1983, an article in the New York Times described the Church Avenue neighborhood as one where "even in daylight, muggings and brutality had become as commonplace as hopscotch in the summer sun" (Kleiman 1983). Although the Chinese in Church Avenue area of Flatbush enjoy relatively low rents and short commuting distance from Chinatown, they suffer a constant fear of being victimized by crimes. Many of them try to leave the area as fast as they can and to move to "better neighborhoods" in other parts of Brooklyn or Queens.

The areas in Queens where fairly large numbers of Chinese reside (i.e., Woodside, Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, and Flushing) are farther away from Chinatown than the Church Avenue neighborhood in Flatbush. Elmhurst, for example, is about 30 to 40 minutes, and Flushing about 1 to 1 and half hours away from Chinatown by subway. These areas, however, provide better amenities than Chinatown or Church Avenue because neighborhoods in Queens were developed more recently*. In

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these areas, a mixture of single-, two-, and multiple-family dwellings make up the housing stock. Often, high-rise apartment complexes with elevators dominate the spots immediately adjacent to subway stations. Surrounding such high-rises are three- or four-story walk-ups and two- and single-family houses. On the whole, rents for dwelling units in these areas are higher than those in run-down neighborhoods, such as Church Avenue in Flatbush. Many Chinese in Queens commute to Chinatown to work, but the majority of them belong to lower-middle-income and middle-income groups, and are able to pay the higher rents required for living in Queens.

Apart from the few laundrymen and restaurant workers in commercial areas, the pioneer Chinese in Queens were home-owners who began to move into Woodside, Jackson Heights, and Elmhurst in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Most of them were American-born who were "squeezed" out from Manhattan by the tight rental housing market for large apartments there. By the late 1950s, many American-born Chinese had already established their own families. As their families grew, they were in need of more living space. However, they found it difficult to rent large apartments in Manhattan because such apartments were in short supply, especially in relatively "good neighborhoods", and because families with children were often discriminated against in rental housing*. Frustrated by the difficulty of renting apartments

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in Manhattan, the Chinese who could afford the cost moved to Queens and bought their own houses. Of course, the desire to become home-owners also strongly influenced their decisions to purchase properties in Queens. Before new Chinese immigration began in the mid-1960s, however, the Chinese home-owners in Queens were few and were highly scattered. They did not form identifiable clusters in the borough.

The post-1965 Chinese immigration has accelerated the formation of Chinese settlements in Queens. Anticipating sudden increases in family sizes due to the arrival of immediate relatives from China, many Chinese are in need of large dwelling units. Because large apartments are in short supply in Chinatown and in other parts of Manhattan, the Chinese who have the means to do so, like their predecessors, move to Queens and buy their own houses. After they have set up their new homes, they are then joined by their immigrant relatives from China. Thus, the combined effects of two streams of Chinese migration, new immigration and internal mobility of the Chinese within New York, help contribute to rapid increases in the Chinese population in Queens.

As their population increased in Queens, the Chinese began to congregate in clusters. The emergence of Chinese clusters in Queens results primarily from the tendency for the immigrants to live close to one another. To a large extent, this tendency is facilitated by the presence of Chinese-owned properties in the borough. To supplement their incomes for mortgages, Chinese home-owners tend to rent portions of their houses, such as flats or rooms, to tenants. Some even convert their basements to liveable units and rent them to those who cannot afford standard flats or apartments. Since the tenants share their
premises, these Chinese home-owners screen renters carefully. They often look for tenants through the introductions of relatives and friends. Some might use classified advertisements in local Chinese newspapers, but they personally interview inquirers and select the best possible tenants. As a result of this process, tiny Chinese clusters at limited scale emerged in Queens.

Such Chinese clusters are small because Chinese home-owners in Queens are still relatively few and are scattered. Also, the numbers of rentable units in their houses are limited. Nevertheless, when Chinese investors began to invest extensively in the real estate in Queens, their investments quickly enhanced the formation of Chinese clusters in the borough. Since the mid-1960s, Chinese investors and realtors have been active in the real-estate market in Queens. Small Chinese investors tend to purchase one-family, two-family, and low-rise apartment houses for the purposes of collecting rents and speculating in them for future increase in value. Large Chinese corporations, however, aim at new developments on vacant lots, and extensive redevelopments of old buildings.

Chinese investments in Queens are most concentrated in downtown Flushing, and the Chinese cluster in Flushing is also the most conspicuous in Queens. Downtown Flushing is at the terminal of the only subway line that connects north-central Queens to Manhattan (Fig. 12). Every day, tens of thousands of Manhattan-bound commuters flock into downtown Flushing from Outer Queens and Long Island by bus, train, and car in order to transfer to subway trains. Downtown Flushing is also a major commercial and residential area in Queens. In September,
Fig. 12. Subway Routes in Queens, New York
1982, according to a New York's Chinese newspaper, about 120 Chinese stores and businesses were located in Flushing. They included restaurants, groceries, gift shops, trading companies, insurance companies, developing corporations, realtors, branch offices of Chinatown-based banks with Chinese capital, accountants, travel agencies, lawyers, physicians, dentists, acupunturists, interior decorators, photographic studios, barbers, printers, Chinese newspapers, garment factories, and knitting factories (Peimei News September 28, 1982). Such Chinese businesses in Flushing are diversified, reflecting the demand for different kinds of commercial activities from the Chinese in the locality and its environs. They also form the largest concentration of Chinese businesses throughout the borough of Queens.

In December, 1982, the first multi-million-dollar building complex financed by Chinese capital was completed in downtown Flushing. The complex, known as "Mini-Chinatown" or "New Chinatown" in New York's Chinese newspapers, is made up of thirteen low-rise buildings for mixed commercial and residential uses. Units in them were sold out even before the complex was completed, primarily to Chinese (Peimei News Sept. 7, 1981; Jan. 25, 1982; Dec. 24, 1982). At the time of writing, Chinese investors are in the process of constructing several other developmental projects in downtown Flushing, including office buildings, high-rise condominiums, and low-rise mixed-use commercial and residential structures (Peimei News Aug. 23, 1982; Jan. 8, 1983; Mar. 11, 1983). After these projects are completed, it is likely that more Chinese residents and businesses will be attracted to downtown
Flushing.

The evolution of Chinese clusters in Queens is, therefore, similar to the process by which Chinatown has expanded. Both of them are augmented by the existence of Chinese-owned properties and by the tendency for Chinese property owners to rent or sell their premises to fellow Chinese (see Chapter IV). These processes, however, have two implications for our understanding of the distribution of Chinese in New York City. (1) The concentration of Chinese in clusters is not solely determined by racial discrimination against the Chinese. Even in the absence of overt discrimination against the Chinese in today's New York, the Chinese prefer to congregate in small localities. (2) The dispersion of Chinese from Chinatown is not entirely due to assimilation of the immigrants. After the Chinese have moved into Queens, most of them still retain their cultural traits and congregate in small clusters. A more important factor affecting the dispersion of Chinese to Queens, however, is the desire of the immigrant to live in places with better amenities.

Nevertheless, in the near future, it is unlikely that any Chinese clusters in Queens will develop into neighborhoods where the Chinese are as concentrated as those in Chinatown. In Queens, the Chinese make up only a small minority, and in no particular locality do they form a dominant group. Although Chinese investors are active in the construction industry in downtown Flushing, the majority of the properties in Flushing are owned by whites. In Flushing, the Chinese have to compete for space and investment opportunities with the dominant whites and growing numbers of other minorities, such as
blacks, East Indians, Japanese, and Koreans. In the near future, it can be anticipated that the Chinese will continue to move into Flushing and other parts of Queens. However, the Chinese clusters in Queens will remain relatively small in scale and scattered in predominantly non-Chinese territories.

The occurrence of Chinese investments in the construction industry in downtown Flushing shows a great contrast to the absence of similar activities in Chinatown. During the last two decades, the Chinese purchased large numbers of deteriorated tenements but did not invest in the construction of new residential buildings in Chinatown. The absence of privately financed new residential buildings in Chinatown is surprising. As described earlier, the demand for standard housing is great in Chinatown. It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine what has contributed to the sterility of the construction industry in Chinatown. Answers to this not only help us understand the residential mobility of Chinese but also the difficulty of revitalizing a physically deteriorated inner-city neighborhood in New York.

Internal Conflicts and Other Difficulties of Redeveloping Chinatown

Past studies tended to associate poor housing conditions with poverty in Chinatown. They often assumed that the majority of Chinatown's residents were low-income new immigrants who were unable to afford high costs for housing in new or rehabilitated buildings without substantial subsidies from the government (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1979:44; Tobier 1979:73; Yuan 1966:324-325). In a study of Greater Chinatown (the Manhattan Bridge Area), the New York City Department of
City Planning (1979:55-57) concluded:

Obsolete tenement structures, the major housing resource for the Chinese population, provide only low standard housing but at comparatively low rents. Under present conditions, however, new housing, financed either privately or through public programs, is not a realistic possibility for meeting the majority of the area's housing needs.

Nevertheless, based on the analysis in the earlier sections of this chapter, several features of the housing market in Chinatown are obvious: (1) Besides low-income new immigrants, large numbers of middle-income Chinese also desire to live in Chinatown (such as in Confucius Plaza). These people can afford relatively high costs for standard housing. (2) Having to pay "key money", most of the newcomers to Chinatown must bear high initial costs for housing. The majority of the Chinese in the neighborhood are able to pay such prices; otherwise, they would have to settle in other low-rent areas, such as along Church Avenue in Flatbush. It seems, therefore, that "inability to pay high rents" is hardly a major reason for the lack of new residential developments in Chinatown. Other factors may include, for example, (1) rent control and tenant protection laws, (2) zoning regulations, and (3) conflicting interests between community groups as to how Chinatown should be developed.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, rent control tends to benefit long-time residents most. The Chinese who live in rent-controlled units in Chinatown are reluctant to move. They rarely give up such units unless they are relocated into public or publicly aided housing projects, or have saved enough money to purchase houses elsewhere. Nevertheless, even if they have moved away from Chinatown, the Chinese
often reserve their previously occupied rent-controlled units for relatives or friends. In today's Chinatown, virtually all residential units are occupied. Thus, any redevelopmental projects in the neighborhood will unavoidably confront the problem of relocating the existing residents.

In New York, tenants' rights are well protected by law. Tenant protection laws make it difficult for landlords to evict tenants even if they want to rebuild or rehabilitate the buildings (Kristof 1970:313; Newman 1982; Oser 1980). Thus, when tenants refuse to vacate their apartments, virtually no redevelopment of existing buildings can occur. The following incidents, for example, illustrate how difficult it is for investors to upgrade the buildings in Chinatown even with the assistance of incentive programs from the city government.

The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) provides low interest loans, tax abatements, and tax exemptions to landlords to rehabilitate old buildings. Having rehabilitated the buildings, landlords are allowed to increase rents to certain levels which are determined by the city's rent control and rent stabilization programs. Low-income tenants can apply for subsidies from the government to pay the bulk of the new rent. To receive the loans, however, landlords must acquire unanimous consent from tenants and to guarantee that no eviction would result from the rehabilitative projects. This loan program appears to benefit both landlords and tenants and should help revitalize many old buildings in Chinatown.

However, few Chinese landlords make use of such loans. Prior to 1980, only two buildings in Chinatown were rehabilitated with loans
from HPD (Peimei News Dec. 14, 1982). During 1981, the landlords of at least six old buildings in Chinatown were denied such loans because of opposition from tenants. The tenants of these six buildings claimed that they were unable to afford the new rent despite the availability of rent subsidies from the government (Peimei News Aug. 31, 1981; Sept. 7, 1981). It appears, therefore, that under tenant protection laws, it is difficult for private investors to improve the housing conditions in Chinatown, unless the residents are able and willing to pay higher rents for better housing.

Current zoning regulations also tend to discourage new residential developments in Chinatown. The area around Chinatown are zoned for commercial, residential, and mixed commercial and residential uses. Zoning regulations in Chinatown are, however, more favorable to the construction of commercial than residential or mixed commercial/residential buildings. Requirements for the provision of light, air, open space, and rear yards in commercial buildings are less rigid than those in residential or mixed-use residential/commercial buildings (New York City Dept. of City Planning 1979:24; 65). According to the New York City Department of City Planning, under the existing zoning regulations, it is not economical to build any new residential or mixed residential/commercial structures in Chinatown (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1979:65).

Having recognized the adverse effects of existing zoning regulations on residential developments in Chinatown, the New York City Department of City Planning recommended amendments of the Zoning Resolution in the neighborhood. In August, 1981, the city's Board of
Estimate designated a "Manhattan Bridge Special District" in Chinatown (Fig. 13)*. Within this special district, the Board of Estimate is given the authority to waive the zoning restrictions for certain developments so as to permit the construction of taller and larger residential buildings. To benefit from this, however, developers must provide public facilities for community uses, such as space in the planned structures for the establishment of child-care, youth, or senior citizens' centers. Moreover, new construction within the special district will only be permitted on vacant lots or on sites where over 90 percent of the existing dwelling units are already vacant. When relocation is required for new construction, HPD will oversee the relocation process and developers must guarantee that no harassment or coercion would be employed to evict the existing residents (Peimei News Sept. 7, 1981).

Chinese investors and a few community leaders of Chinatown welcomed the Manhattan Bridge Special District rezoning. Upon its passage at the Board of Estimate, two corporations, both financed by Chinese capital, submitted plans to construct high-rise condominiums within the special district. These two corporations were the Overseas Chinese Development Corp. and Henry Street Partners. The plan submitted by the Overseas Chinese Development Corp. was approved first, in August, in August,

*The Board of Estimate consists of eight members: the Mayor, the Comptroller, the President of the City Council, and the five borough presidents. "It determines the policy with reference to all financial matters, franchises, zoning, city planning, public improvements and real estate belonging to the city" (Smith 1966:31).
Fig. 13. Manhattan Bridge Special District: 1981
1981. The other developer, Henry Street Partners, decided to contribute $500,000 to HPD to set up a housing fund in exchange for a special permission to waive the height restriction against its planned structure. HPD planned to make use of this contribution to help rehabilitate the old buildings within Chinatown (Peimei News Sept. 23, 1982; Nov. 6, 1982).

Several community groups of Chinatown, however, strongly opposed the construction of luxury housing in the neighborhood. They were afraid that luxury condominiums would increase housing costs and reduce the availability of low-cost housing in Chinatown (Peimei News Aug. 31, 1981; Wang 1981b). To protect the interest of low-income residents, Chinatown's community groups tried to stop the two proposed high-rises from being constructed. They attacked the planned construction on two fronts, (1) by challenging the constitutionality of the Manhattan Bridge Special District rezoning in New York State Supreme Court, and (2) by gathering evidence to show that the Overseas Chinese Development Corp. had evicted the original residents through harassment and coercion.

Disputes about the constitutionality of the Manhattan Bridge Special District arose from the procedure by which the city's Department of City Planning published notices of the proposed rezoning. Prior to public hearings, the city had published notices of the rezoning in the City Record and the Comprehensive City Planning Calendar. Chinatown's community groups contended that such notices were inadequate. According to their arguments, since the majority of the residents of Chinatown did not understand English, by placing
notices in English publications only, the city had deprived the Chinese of information about the rezoning. In August, 1982, New York State Supreme Court ruled the Manhattan Bridge Special District void. The court decided, "Notice should have been published in a newspaper of general circulation within the community. The board's amendment of the Zoning Resolution and rezoning were illegal acts, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment" (NY Planning Federation 1983:7).

Subsequent to this ruling, the city government appealed to the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court. Meanwhile, in September, 1982, the Board of Estimate cancelled the special permit for Overseas Chinese Development Corp's proposed construction. The board was convinced that the developer "had attempted to coercively evict the original residents" (Peimei News Sept. 22, 1982). The other developer, Henry Street Partners, was not accused of coercive evictions; its proposed building site was on a vacant lot.

In March, 1983, the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court, First Department, overturned the earlier decision of State Supreme Court by ruling that "ours is basically an English-speaking society and that is the national language. It is appropriate, therefore, that all notices required by law to be published, be published in that language" (Citing Shipp 1983a). Under this new ruling, the New York City Board of Estimate was finally able to allow in April, 1983, Henry Street Partners to construct a high-rise condominium within the Manhattan Bridge Special District. In the meantime, the Overseas Chinese Development Corp. sued the Board of Estimate. The Development Corp. denied all allegations of forced
evictions and tried to regain the special permit for its planned construction. At the time of writing, the law suit between the Overseas Chinese Development Corp. and the New York City Board of Estimate is not settled. The community groups of Chinatown are, however, debating whether they will appeal to a higher court to challenge the ruling of New York State Supreme Court's Appellate Division on the constitutionality of the Manhattan Bridge Special District (Peimei News Mar. 21, 1983).

The legal battles between Chinatown's community groups, the New York City Board of Estimate, and the Overseas Chinese Development Corp. have far-reaching implications for the development of New York's Chinatown. They reflect the difficulty of constructing new residential buildings within the neighborhood. Although the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court ruled the Manhattan Bridge Special District rezoning constitutional, the community groups of Chinatown did not cease to fight against luxury housing. In March, 1983, they put forth several demands to the New York City Board of Estimate on housing in Chinatown. Such demands included, for example, the following statements: (1) If private developers plan to construct luxury housing in Chinatown, they must provide equal numbers of low-cost housing units in the neighborhood. (2) New rental units in Chinatown must be put under rent regulation. (3) Rent regulation should be extended to cover all commercial units in Chinatown (Peimei News Mar. 25, 1983).

The New York City Board of Estimate has not shown any indication that it will concede to such demands. Nevertheless, due to several factors, such as rent control, tenant protection laws, zoning
restrictions, and the hostility of community groups to luxury housing, the general atmosphere of New York's Chinatown is unfavorable to new housing developments. When investment opportunities are available elsewhere, such as in downtown Flushing, Chinese developers will likely invest in other neighborhoods, rather than in Chinatown. However, due to some other factors, such as the effect of immigration laws on immigrants' choices of destinations, and the concentration of Chinese-owned buildings, small businesses, and garment factories in Chinatown, the neighborhood will continue to attract the in-migration of Chinese newcomers. In the near future, the demand for housing in New York's Chinatown will remain great, costs for accommodations high, and yet the quality of housing poor.

Thus, many factors affect the development of New York's Chinatown. Some of them are "centrifugal", pushing the Chinese away from Chinatown; others are "centripetal", pulling the Chinese into the neighborhood. However, throughout the last twenty years, the physical environment of New York's Chinatown has been highly stable. On the one hand, virtually no house abandonment occurred; on the other hand, few new buildings were erected in the neighborhood. A crucial factor that helps prevent drastic changes in the physical appearance of New York's Chinatown is the conflict between group interests. Often, as illustrated by the preceding descriptions, when a certain group wants to introduce changes to Chinatown, such as by constructing luxury housing, other groups try to stop them. When the conflict is resolved, either through bargaining, compromising, or seeking decisions in courts, the conflict resolution results in new changes in the
neighborhood. Such changes may or may not be the same as originally proposed before the conflict arose. For example, Chinese investors proposed two condominiums within the Manhattan Bridge Special District. Upon the protest of community groups, the city government allowed only one of them to be constructed.

It is through this zigzag process of confronting and resolving conflicts that the people of New York's Chinatown progress in modifying their neighborhood. The process is slow because it results primarily from compromises and mutual concessions between conflicting parties. People's right to seek compromises under conflict situations is, after all, guaranteed by the democratic system of American society. Under this system, no particular interest group is allowed to high-handedly impose drastic changes onto the community of Chinatown. Meanwhile, the residents of New York's Chinatown may have to be patient with the existing conditions of the neighborhood. However, by the fact that large numbers of Chinese prefer to live, to work, and to shop in the neighborhood, the future for a better Chinatown is almost assured. The progress in improving New York's Chinatown may be slow, yet, the prospect is bright.

Summary
This chapter has related contemporary developments in New York's Chinatown to a number of variables: immigration laws and their effects on immigrants' choices of destinations, the dispersion of Chinese into New York's outer boroughs (particularly Flatbush in Brooklyn and Flushing in Queens), rent control, tenant protection laws, zoning
regulations, and internal conflicts between small interest groups within Chinatown. It has illustrated that each of these factors plays a role in affecting New York's Chinatown. The persistence of Chinatown as a Chinese enclave, therefore, cannot be understood by considering one or two variables in isolation with the effects of others. The implications of contemporary developments in New York's Chinatown for our understanding of immigrant groups in inner-city neighborhoods are addressed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: UNIQUENESS OF NEW YORK'S CHINATOWN?

Through the many years of development, New York's Chinatown has become a unique neighborhood. The preceding chapters have identified two features of New York's Chinatown. First, Chinatown is an old neighborhood. Its urban form and physical structures are similar to those of other non-white, inner-city communities. Nevertheless, unlike many black and Hispanic neighborhoods, such as Harlem, the South Bronx and Bedford-Stuyvesant, which have suffered depopulation and economic decline, Chinatown has a growing Chinese population and an expanding local economy. Second, despite its expanding economy, unlike other growing communities, such as downtown Flushing, where revitalization and construction are actively pursued, Chinatown remains physically deteriorated and has not been substantially rehabilitated. This concluding chapter summarizes the factors contributing to the uniqueness of New York's Chinatown and draws from them implications for an understanding of minority neighborhoods in American cities.

Chinatown's Viable Economy

Several factors have contributed to the viability of Chinatown's economy: (1) immigration, (2) availability of capital, and (3) interdependence of Chinese economic activities. Immigration has not only brought in more Chinese to Chinatown but also with them capital, entrepreneurial skills, and the unique demand for Chinese goods and
bilingual services. Chinese capital comes from two major sources: savings that Chinese merchants have accumulated by providing goods and services to other Chinese (Chapter IV), and money that new Chinese immigrants have brought from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and Latin America (Glynn & Wang 1978; Wang 1979). Chinese entrepreneurs are willing to invest in Chinatown because their commercial activities there enjoy a sizeable market. As discussed in Chapter IV, the market of Chinatown is not confined to its local environs but extends to the Chinese throughout metropolitan New York, New York State, and New Jersey. Moreover, the economic activities in Chinatown are interrelated and mutually support one another.

Interdependence among Chinese economic activities has two further effects on the local economy of Chinatown. On the one hand, it generates demand and opportunities for different kinds of investment and thus attracts more Chinese capital to flow into Chinatown. On the other hand, it creates a Chinese monopoly of Chinatown's special market and excludes non-Chinese from the territory. The evolution of Chinese economic networks in Chinatown results from the culturally derived consumer demand and the social organization of interpersonal relations among Chinese. Because of the unique nature of their ethnic goods, such as Chinese foods and China-made products, and because of the tendency among the immigrants to use the ethnic language, only Chinese can best provide goods and services to Chinese consumers. Moreover, merchants in Chinatown often conduct business on the basis of mutual trust and personal connections (Wong 1979). They almost always prefer to do business with fellow Chinese. Non-Chinese often find it
difficult to establish personal connections for successful economic transactions in Chinatown. Consequently, Chinese are virtually free of inter-ethnic competition within their sub-market of Chinese goods and services.

Unlike Chinese, most blacks and Puerto Ricans in inner New York and other cities lack either the capital or unique demands for ethnic goods to facilitate the establishment of integrated economic activities within their communities (K. Wilson & Martin 1982; K. Wilson & Portes 1980). They are subject to competition from other ethnic groups but are unable to generate enough capital to remain competitive even in their communal markets. For example, in a study of small businesses in Harlem, Caplovitz (1973:146) concluded, "The Harlem blacks cannot compete effectively with whites who have greater access to more economic arrangements for buying goods." Recently, Korean immigrants have successfully penetrated the grocery market in many black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in New York (Kim 1981:112-121). In the Mississippi Delta, Chinese have practically monopolized the groceries in black communities (Loewen 1971; Quan 1982).

Moreover, many black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods have undergone population decline due to massive out-migration. Those who move out from such localities tend to be the upwardly mobile and the more affluent; those who remain belong predominantly to low-income groups. Following the departure of the affluent, investors' incentives to develop these neighborhoods decline. Private banks, for example, are cautious about extending credit and mortgages to people in economically and demographically declining neighborhoods. The reluctance of private
banks to invest in poor neighborhoods is commonly described as "redlining", a practice of delineating the boundaries of declining areas in red and withholding further investment there (Taggart & Smith 1981). Lacking capital, and lacking the financial support of investors and private banks, the poor in black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods find it difficult to sustain their communal economies.

The general decline of New York's manufacturing industries has had more adverse impacts on most black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods than on Chinatown. Since the 1960s, virtually all kinds of manufacturing industry have declined in New York City. The garment industry, although declining, remains the largest employer for manufacturing workers in the city (Ehrenhalt 1981:15). Outside Chinatown, garment factories are concentrated in the garment district on Seventh Avenue in mid-town Manhattan and are scattered throughout Brooklyn, Bronx, and western Queens. The majority of blacks and Puerto Ricans have to commute to work. Their participation in the industry contributes little to the local economies of their communities.

The availability of sufficient capital, the persistence of culturally defined ethnic goods and services, and the social organization of interpersonal relations, therefore, help contribute to the viability of Chinatown's economy and the endurance of the Chinese enclave. Owing to the economic value of Chinatown, the Chinese have continued to occupy the territory in spite of its poor environmental conditions. Past developments, however, have created inertia which makes modernization of Chinatown difficult. As described in Chapter V, poor living conditions and deteriorated physical environment in
Chinatown are not the making of new Chinese immigrants. They are situations that Chinese immigrants have inherited from the historical development of Lower Manhattan, and to which the Chinese must adapt. Although amenities of Chinatown are substandard, the Chinese have to depend upon them for livelihood. Redevelopment or modernization will disrupt, albeit temporarily, the existing arrangement of economic and living activities. The Chinese are reluctant to face such disruptions and oppose drastic changes in their neighborhood. Changes, however, are unavoidable because under the current U.S. immigration policy, more Chinese immigrants and, in turn, more Chinese capital will likely be moving into Chinatown. Owing to the inertia that has long existed in Chinatown, future changes there will likely be incremental rather than revolutionary, and at small rather than large scales. The following section summarizes the effect of inertia on the obsolete environment of Chinatown.

Chinatown's Obsolete Environment

Because most buildings in New York's Chinatown are substandard, past studies often suggested that governmental intervention and urban renewal could solve the neighborhood's housing problems (see Chapter I). This proposition, however, overlooks the limitation of urban renewal programs and underestimates the inertia against environmental changes in Chinatown. In fact, the New York City government did intend to renew Chinatown in the 1950s. The plan for remodeling Chinatown was shelved because of opposition from the community. According to Sung (1979:27), "in the 1950s, ... there were plans by the New York City
Housing Authority to demolish the old buildings and put up a modern, well-laid-out Chinatown in graduated stages. The plans were scuttled when a delegation went to the Housing Authority to protest any contemplated change in its community. Those who had businesses and real estate in the area did not want their vested interests disturbed, even if it meant a newer, more attractive, and cleaner neighborhood in the long run."

In fact, not only would landlords and merchants object to urban renewal but tenants, particularly occupants of rent-controlled units, would also oppose rehabilitation and relocation (see Chapter V). Moreover, Chinatown is not the only neighborhood that has rejected urban renewal. In a study of housing in New York City, Bellush (1971:111) observed that "a long list of [public housing] projects had been abandoned, or indefinitely deferred, by borough presidents who were much too sensitive to community pressure." Only a few blocks from Chinatown, the residents of Greenwich Village defeated three city government's intended renewal projects, one street widening plan, and one proposal to open a public park to vehicular traffic in their community during the 1950s and early 1960s (Davies 1966: 72-109).

People oppose urban renewal because this program tends to disrupt their lifestyles and to cause them the inconvenience of having to be relocated and to readjust in new localities. Besides people's reluctance to be relocated and their emotional attachment to the community, several other factors have made it difficult to redevelop Chinatown. Such factors may include rent regulation, tenant protection
laws, high occupancy rate in existing buildings, high land value, zoning regulations, and conflicting interests as to how Chinatown should be developed.

As shown in Chapter V, rent regulation and tenant protection laws tend to have the effect of retaining tenants in rent-regulated units. New immigration, however, brings more Chinese to Chinatown and has two impacts on the housing market there. First, virtually all buildings in Chinatown are occupied. Landlords and developers have difficulties to rehabilitate or redevelop the existing buildings because most tenants would refuse to move. Second, there is a great demand for buildings and land in Chinatown. Consequently, land value there is high, and so is the overhead investment for new construction. When opportunities for constructing new buildings are available, to maximize economic returns, developers tend to build luxury, high-price condominiums, rather than low-cost housing in Chinatown.

Zoning regulations in Chinatown are more favorable to the construction of commercial than residential or mixed-use residential/commercial buildings. Developers are thus more willing to invest in commercial than residential buildings. To encourage more residential developments, the New York City government designated recently a special district in Chinatown within which zoning restrictions were relaxed so that certain kinds of residential building could be built taller and bigger than otherwise. Having been given the opportunity but being subject to cost constraints, developers intended to build luxury condominiums in the special district. Developers' intentions, however, were in conflict with the interest of most new immigrants who
would like to have more low-cost housing units in Chinatown. Such
conflicts resulted in lengthy battles between developers, New York City
government, and Chinatown's community groups in court in order to
decide whether luxury condominiums could be legitimately built within
the special district. In the meantime, the process of erecting new
residential buildings in Chinatown was delayed (see Chapter V).

There is, therefore, no simple solution to the housing problem in
Chinatown. Although the demand for standard housing and the capital
required for providing such units are available in Chinatown,
developers find it difficult to erect new buildings because of
opposition from low-income residents. New York City government is
reluctant to provide new public housing projects in the neighborhood,
for such projects will unavoidably require high costs for land
resumption and for the relocation of existing residents. Without
substantial numbers of new buildings, however, the great demand for
standard housing in Chinatown remains unresolved, and developers will
continue to look for investment opportunities there. In the near
future, Chinese residential developments will probably be more active
along the fringes of Chinatown than within Chinatown proper because
vacant lots and vacant buildings are more readily available along
Chinatown's fringes. Within Chinatown proper, developments will
primarily be confined to commercial, rather than residential buildings.

The majority of the buildings in Chinatown are old and have
deteriorated. They are similar to those in other inner-city, non-white
neighborhoods. Moreover, in New York City, all old buildings are under
rent regulation. Nevertheless, unlike the situation in Chinatown,
where housing is in great demand, the demand for housing in other non-white neighborhoods is relatively low due to population decline. The speculative value of properties in Chinatown is, therefore, different from that of similar kinds of building in low-income, demographically declining neighborhoods. In Chinatown, landlords supplement their profits by charging new tenants "key money". In poor neighborhoods, landlords seldom do so because their buildings are not in great demand and because few low-income residents are willing or able to pay "key money". In Chinatown, profits for owning properties come not only from residential rents but also from renting or running commercial units in buildings. Since non-residential units are not covered by rent regulation, landlords can charge high rents from store owners. Chinese merchants and professionals are willing to pay the price because, as noted, the economic prospects for locating commercial activities in Chinatown are good. With actual or expected economic gains, landlords in Chinatown are willing to keep their buildings functional. Thus, although most buildings there are old and are under rent control, virtually none of them has ever been abandoned.

In low-income and demographically declining neighborhoods, the economic gains from owning old buildings are low. On the one hand, low-income tenants cannot afford high rents, and likewise, landlords are reluctant to provide adequate facilities in buildings. On the other hand, New York City's rent law tends to have the effect of reducing landlords' incentives to upkeep buildings in low-income areas. Under the city's tenant protection laws, landlords cannot easily evict tenants even if their tenants have failed to pay rents or
have vandalized the buildings. This is because landlords' intentions to evict tenants are often challenged and may require final decisions in the city's Housing Court. The legal process involved in seeking permissions to evict tenants can be lengthy and costly, which most landlords are reluctant to go through (Kristof 1970:327; Salins 1980:45-46). According to Kristof (1970:327), New York City's rent law "leaves the property-owner largely at the mercy of tenants. Thus, in addition to the limitations on income necessary to maintain buildings properly, the rent law also prevents owner discipline of the abuse of his property at the hands of uncooperative and destructive tenants."

As such, investments in maintaining old buildings in low-income areas may not always yield the expected economic returns, because poor tenants can keep on living in apartments without paying rents, or may keep on abusing facilities at landlords' financial expenses.

At the same time, tenants also find it difficult to negotiate with landlords for better services and facilities because such negotiations would probably require decisions from Housing Court. Few tenants can afford the time and cost incurred in the legal process (Palkins 1982). Consequently, some buildings in low-income areas would reach the stage in which neither landlords nor tenants feel responsible for the maintenance work. Such buildings would eventually become unliveable and be abandoned.

Thus, although Chinatown and other non-white neighborhoods in inner New York have similar types of buildings and their buildings are equally under rent control, their housing markets are different. This is because different neighborhoods have different economic abilities to
pay for and to support housing facilities. When communities lack the capital or income to sustain viable housing markets, large numbers of buildings there would likely be abandoned. The housing market of Chinatown, however, is supported by Chinese economic activities which generate wealth by providing services and goods to Chinese throughout metropolitan New York.

Other Chinatowns in American cities also serve as the commercial and cultural centers for the dispersed Chinese within their environs. Nevertheless, for two major reasons, housing developments in other Chinatowns are different from those in New York's Chinese enclave. First, few other Chinese communities are like New York's Chinatown where Chinese virtually monopolize the neighborhood's real-estate market. For example, in Los Angeles Chinatown, another large Chinese concentration in America, Chinese owned only about 38 percent of the properties in 1974; other property owners were predominantly whites (48 percent), Hispanics (13 percent), and Japanese (1 percent) (Hirata 1975:89). In New York's Chinatown, because Chinese own the majority of the buildings, they can manipulate their property rights to oppose urban renewal programs, to protect Chinese communal interests, and to exclude non-Chinese from their territory. Lacking a similar monopoly of the real-estate market, the Chinese of most Chinatowns can seldom prevent non-Chinese activities (e.g., commercial and residential) from encroaching their neighborhoods. Other Chinatowns, such as those in Boston, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh, are, therefore, more susceptible than New York's Chinatown to urban renewal programs.

Second, New York is the only large city in America that has had an
unceasing history of rent control since the 1940s. During the 1940s, rent control was enforced throughout the nation as part of federal government's war-time, anti-inflationary measures. After the Second World War, the federal government passed on the decision of continuing, modifying, or eliminating rent control to state and local governments. Most state governments decided then to phase out rent control. By the end of the 1950s, New York State was the only state in the country still administering a rent control program (Stegman 1982:22). In 1971, rent control was imposed nationwide as part of Nixon Administration's wage and price controls. Such measures were lifted in 1973. Some city governments, such as those in Washington, D. C., Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, however, re-enacted rent control programs in mid- and late-1970s (Baird 1980:79-80; Dienstfrey 1981). In 1979, about 250 localities in the U. S. had some forms of rent control (Baird 1980:78). Nevertheless, in terms of the history of rent control, no other Chinatown in America is comparable to New York's Chinatown. In the absence of rigorous rent control and its associated tenant protection laws, other Chinatowns have been more susceptible than New York's Chinatown to urban redevelopment.

Research Implications

Our understanding of the internal development of New York's Chinatown, therefore, has to be related to the interactions between the community and external forces such as the U. S. immigration policy, and New York City's land use and housing policies. Like previous work on "chain migration" (see Chapter I), this study shows that new
immigrants' choices of destinations are influenced by the location of their relatives and friends who have emigrated earlier. Because of the effect of "chain migration", newcomers to American cities may not necessarily settle in immigrant ghettos. If their relatives have already been scattered, new immigrants tend to move into places outside ghettos. Moreover, although the majority of Chinese have dispersed to places all over metropolitan New York, a large number of Chinese, including new and old immigrants, garment factory and restaurant workers, merchants, and middle-income, white-collar workers continue to live in Chinatown. Even among those who have moved out from Chinatown, many return to the neighborhood to work, to run businesses, to seek services, to shop, and to socialize. New York's Chinatown is, therefore, not a haven exclusively for new Chinese immigrants. These observations suggest that the existing hypotheses which emphasize the impacts of non-assimilation (i.e., voluntary segregation), racial discrimination (non-voluntary segregation), and poverty on the formation of Chinatown should be re-examined.

The concept of non-assimilation alone cannot adequately explain the formation of Chinatown because of two major reasons. First, as illustrated in chapters 2 and 4, non-assimilated Chinese laundrymen were scattered throughout metropolitan New York as early as the late 19th century. Their dispersion was not augmented by assimilation but was due to the necessity for them to live in places close to jobs. Second, as pointed out in Chapter IV, immigrants can be assimilated in certain aspects but remain non-assimilated in certain other aspects. Many immigrants are dispersed even if they continue to retain some of
their traditional values and cultural traits.

Racial discrimination alone cannot adequately explain the formation of Chinatown. Historically, discrimination did not have the effect of confining Chinese laundrymen and restaurant workers to Chinatown. The dispersion of these Chinese began in the late 19th century, during a time when they were strongly discriminated against. Moreover, the hypothesis which emphasizes the impact of discrimination on ghettos ignores the influence of the internal organization of activities within ethnic groups on the concentration of minorities. The ethnocentric attitude, the unique demand for ethnic goods and services, and the emergence of ethnic economic networks among Chinese have also played important roles in the formation and persistence of New York's Chinatown.

The emergence of an integrated local economy in New York's Chinatown shows that the poverty circle is unable to explain the situation of this ethnic enclave. The poverty circle assumes that basic opportunities for social and economic advancement exist only in areas outside ghettos and are not accessible to ghetto residents (Chapter I). Nevertheless, small businesses and garment factories in Chinatown have provided opportunities for Chinese to improve their social and economic standing. Although many Chinese have to suffer temporarily low wages and substandard working conditions, they do not feel that opportunities for future advancement are totally blocked. Many of them have managed to save enough capital to become self-employed, or to invest in their children's education.

Minorities form an integral part of American society. Their
behaviors are affected and at the same time affect the organization of human activities in society. To understand American society, we should understand the role that minorities play in it. For better knowledge of minorities, more refined data on their socio-economic and demographic characteristics should be made available. At present, few such data exist for smaller ethnic groups, such as Chinese, Koreans, and Filipinos. Research efforts should be made in the future to provide better information about minority groups in America.

The relationship between minorities and American society is interactive. They mutually affect each other. To identify macroscopic factors affecting minority groups is an important but inadequate approach toward the understanding of minorities. A more fundamental approach is to consider how minorities behave, given the macroscopic variables, such as the immigration policy, racial discrimination, and changes in the employment structure in American cities, that affect them.

One of the behavioral variables discussed in this study is the interaction between dispersed Chinese in metropolitan New York and concentrated Chinese in Chinatown. The interactive relationship between dispersed and concentrated minorities is not unique to Chinese but is often ignored in the literature. Most studies assume that dispersed minorities have little interaction with ghetto residents (see Chapter I). In a study of black extended families, Martin & Martin (1978:75), however, observed:

When an individual has a "decent" home, a car, color television, good clothes, and so forth, his family is apt to see him as being in a position to aid his relatives. . . . They will expect him at
least to send something to his parents, especially to his mother. This expectation can weigh heavily on a middle-class family member because he is also aware that he gains family esteem not only by what he has acquired but also by how willing he is to identify with his family and share with them what he has acquired. Most middle-class family members save face and keep their high status in the family by making small but regular donations to the family, by being in the forefront and helping family members in emergency situations, and by helping family members in nonfinancial ways such as serving as a family adviser, helping family members to plan family activities, etc.

Some middle-class blacks return to the ghettos where they grew up and from which they have left to work in social service agencies and to help the residents. Among these middle-class blacks, Kenneth Clark, a psychologist and civil rights leader, who grew up in Harlem, moved out from the neighborhood, and later returned there for a period of time to administer a social service organization and to write the book Dark Ghetto is an example (K. Clark 1967:xiii-xv). It seems, therefore, that instead of taking the isolation of ghetto residents from the larger society for granted, future studies should give more attention to the impact of the interaction between ghetto residents and dispersed minorities on segregated areas.

This study describes several behavioral variables of the Chinese in New York City in the general context, such as their adaptation to the labor market, the interaction between Chinatown and non-Chinatown Chinese, and the interdependence of Chinese economic activities. It makes no attempt, however, to quantify such variables and to integrate them into statistically testable hypotheses. More studies are needed to refine the measurement of such variables and to test their relative importance in the behavior of minority groups. In this respect, techniques in social and economic network analyses may provide
promising tools to help identify and quantify the interactive connectivity between people and between ethnic economic establishments (see, e.g., Anderson & Christie 1982; K. Wilson & Martin 1982).

Policy Implications

The contrast between the place characteristics of New York's Chinatown and other non-white, inner-city neighborhoods shows that not all central city communities are alike nor would all of them "die" of old age with deteriorated buildings. The common approach to dichotomize neighborhoods into inner-city and suburban fails to uncover the diversity of different inner-city neighborhoods. To help revitalize inner cities, policy makers should be sensitive to the unique nature of individual neighborhoods and should employ different strategies in different neighborhoods. As noted by Goetze and Colton (1980:185-187), "the emphasis in formulating policy must be on understanding the dynamics of the urban market place and neighborhood change, and strategies must be tailored according to these neighborhood dynamics. . . . Without this sensitivity, policy makers who seek to revitalize neighborhoods are confused by conflicting objectives, and as a consequence it is difficult for clear policy recommendations to emerge." Also, according to Chow (1976:1), "Greater insight into the dynamics of inner city adjustment will be needed if the impact of contemplated public projects is to be fully anticipated."

Although internal conflicts occur often within New York's Chinatown, communal self-help and self-reliance have been a tradition among Chinese. Chinese voluntary associations, commercial activities,
real estate investment, and garment factories in Chinatown are interdependent. They help generate employment and investment opportunities for Chinese. Despite the substandard living and working conditions in Chinatown, Chinese have not actively sought large-scale assistance from governments and have relied primarily on their own resources for economic and social well-being.

Private investment has played a vital role in the economic stability of New York's Chinatown. Other non-white, inner-city neighborhoods have suffered economic decline not only because of depopulation but also the lack of capital and investors' incentives to invest there. Elsewhere, such as in Oakland, California, Chow (1981:60) observed that "private redevelopment of obsolete industrial sites into commercial and residential properties . . . has been much more successful at retaining residents in the city than have public efforts." Policy makers should be sensitive to the dynamics of neighborhood markets and should design strategies to retain private investment in inner-city communities. In areas like Chinatown, where the demand for new housing is great and existing buildings have deteriorated, some degree of urban redevelopment and relocation of existing residents with compensations from developers should be allowed. In the long run, the current policy of not allowing tenant relocation from such areas could become, as Downs (1981:149) pointed out, the policy of "slum preservation". When revitalization is inhibited, old buildings in Chinatown and similar neighborhoods will be further deteriorated because they are, in fact, too old and too seriously dilapidated to be repairable. Moreover, by inhibiting
revitalization in older neighborhoods, the city government's policy has the effect of inducing investors to invest in newer neighborhoods where opportunities for investment are more readily available. The outmovement of private capital from inner city neighborhoods will aggravate the on-going deterioration of housing there. Of this trend, the recent diversion of Chinese investment in real estate from Chinatown to downtown Flushing offers an example (see Chapter V).

In areas where house abandonment is widespread, actions must be taken to prevent further deterioration of the existing buildings, to retain or expand the existing public and private investment, and to attract new capital to move in so as to help restore the housing and economic markets. This, of course, is not a new proposition. Past studies, such as Downs (1981), Goetze & Colton (1980), and McGrath (1982), also came up with similar conclusions. Moreover, for a long time, from urban renewal programs enacted in 1949 under the Housing Act, through Model Cities under the 1966 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) under the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, to the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) under the 1977 Housing and Community Development Act, the federal government has repeatedly reinstated its intention to allocate public funds and to attract private capital in order to help revitalize blighted areas in inner cities. Nevertheless, when housing policies were translated into actions, as Connolly (1977:229) pointed out, they were "all with laudable purposes, but seemingly with little impacts on local conditions."
In the past, the majority of poor families did not benefit from housing programs because of two important reasons: (1) the distraction of the housing policy due to conflicting ideologies, and (2) the slow process involved in the planning and construction of public or subsidized housing projects. Ideologies, such as the goal of using public and subsidized housing as a means to desegregate minorities, often directed funds for housing from blighted to less needy areas. In 1968, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) stated its policy on the site selection for subsidized housing as follows:

In the future, an application for financial assistance will not be approved unless it can be demonstrated, to the satisfaction of HUD, that, in general, the relocation rehousing aspects of the proposed project will not contribute to the development or perpetuation of housing patterns which concentrate large segments of the population by racial or economic characteristics. (Citing Starr 1970:354)

In 1972, this policy was modified so that new subsidized housing could be allowed in minority areas, provided that housing needs there were "overriding", and that such needs "were not created by discrimination" (Sobel 1976:79). The general trend was, however, toward scattering new subsidized housing projects in middle-income or racially integrated areas in order to avoid the perpetuation of racial and economic segregation (Bellush 1971:114-121). Thus, in the name of desegregation, even public investment in housing was diverted from low-income, and unfortunately, the most needy areas to less needy neighborhoods.

Other public programs, such as the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration mortgage and insurance programs, promoted the purchase of new homes rather than the revitalization of old
buildings. Since sites for new homes were more readily available in newly developed areas, such programs had the effect of encouraging new construction in suburban areas but depriving older neighborhoods of the capital for rehabilitation (Banfield 1974:15-16).

The most recent housing program, the 1977 Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) was enacted to "take advantage of unique opportunities to attract private investment, stimulate investment in restoration of deteriorated or abandoned housing stock or solve critical problems resulting from population outmigration or a stagnating or declining tax base" (Congressional Quarterly 1978:69). By 1978, however, of the first $150 million allocated by HUD under this program, only $19 million (13 percent) were awarded for neighborhood projects; the majority were allowed for commercial and industrial activities in downtown and warehouse areas (Congressional Quarterly 1978:71). More recently, Listokin (1983:17) observed, "Although UDAG has been used extensively in the past to finance housing rehabilitation, the program now favors commercial and industrial projects. Housing projects can still be financed but only if they are linked to a commercial project, such as a mixed-use development." Thus, despite the stated objective of revitalizing blighted areas, federal policies have in fact given a relatively low priority to rebuilding the housing stock there.

Moreover, the slow process involved in the planning and construction of low-cost housing projects had detrimental effects on the already declined housing market in blighted areas. Often, sites reserved for urban renewal or model cities programs had to remain idle for years before new housing projects were erected. During the interim
period, the resumed buildings would be squatted or vandalized, and
would pose environmental and safety hazards to surrounding areas (Rogin
1975). The prolonged existence of vacant and vandalized sites
reinforced the negative image of the neighborhoods in which they were
located and induced more existing residents to flee. Moreover, owing
to the delay, by the time when the projects were completed, they would
be serving some people different from those for whom the programs had
originally been designed. Starr (1970:361), for example, questioned
the feasibility of New York City's West Side Urban Renewal project
because of its lengthy delay:

The preliminary plans of the West Side Urban Renewal Area were
first made public in 1958. The actual physical improvements
scheduled under this plan and under its subsequent modifications
are in 1969 approximately one-half finished. If the program as a
whole will take twenty years to execute, one wonders how it can be
considered responsive to the people living in the neighborhood at
the time. If the wishes and needs of the actual residents at the
time of approval are vital to the plan's value, does not the time
span itself vitiate this quality? The people enjoying the
benefits of the urban renewal on its completion after twenty years
of effort will presumably be very different from those who were
actually living in the area when the urban renewal plan began.

To show that written policies are not empty words, in the future,
administrative officials must give a higher priority to revitalization
of residential housing in declined areas than to investment in
commercial or industrial activities elsewhere. They must also
streamline policy provisions so that public actions can be taken more
efficiently and effectively to help revitalize blighted areas. At the
same time, ghetto residents must demonstrate that investment in their
neighborhoods will not be wasted. To do this, people have to place
great value on self-help and self-reliance. Public programs are, after
all, strategies to help individuals help themselves. Without a strong sense of self-help and self-reliance, people will find it difficult to convince the public that they deserve the kinds of help that they require.

This study has been conducted with the conviction that each locality is unique and that its uniqueness must be understood within the wider context. Like geographic analysis in general, this study emphasizes the variation between localities. Traditionally, the study of minority groups has remained in the domain of urban sociology. Sociology, however, is primarily concerned with the stratification of social groups. In sociological studies, group behavior is almost always the dependent variable; the location of social groups in urban areas is considered as one of the independent variables contributing to the variation between group behaviors. The classical hypotheses postulated by Burgess and Park (see Chapter I), for example, assumed that people in urban ghettos and those in integrated areas behaved differently. This study has demonstrated that different sub-groups of Chinese within the same locality, such as entrepreneurs and workers in New York's Chinatown, and also in different localities, such as Chinatown and non-Chinatown Chinese, have both similarities and differences in behavioral traits. It, therefore, suggests that a better understanding of the relationship between people's social and geographical space is needed—that is, we must understand better how people within the same locality and between different localities behave and interact. Since policies often induce changes in people's behaviors, they should be formulated on the basis of the knowledge
about how social and spatial groups behave and interact. Toward this knowledge, social geographic studies will provide a major source of contributions.
We are conducting a study on Chinese immigrants in New York City. We are interested in your opinions about living in New York and some other important questions. Your answers to all questions will be completely anonymous and confidential.

1. How many people are there in your household? Please list all persons in your household in the following table:

Please give answers to question 2 in the table provided below:

2a. In how many cities or townships had you ever lived for more than 3 months before you moved to New York?

b. What were these cities or townships?

c. From when to when did you stay there?

d. Did you attend schools there? If you did, what classes or grades did you complete in that city or township?

e. Did you have occupations there? If you did, what was your major occupation when you were staying in each of the city or township?

f. What were the major reasons for leaving the city or township?
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3. When you moved to the U.S.A., what were your circumstances? Were you:
   a. _____ sponsored by a close relative
   b. _____ sponsored by some other person or organization
   c. _____ came as a child, with parents
   d. _____ had a job offer
   e. _____ refugee or displaced person
   f. _____ came without a job offer, sponsorship, or parents?

4. What were the factors making you decide to come to the U.S.A.?

   a. Desire for adventure, travel, and "see the world" .................. ___ ___ ___
   b. To improve your economic position, standard of living, etc. ........... ___ ___ ___
   c. For children's education ......................... ___ ___ ___
   d. To be with relatives ....................... ___ ___ ___
   e. To be with friends ......................... ___ ___ ___
   f. To get married ............................ ___ ___ ___
   g. Political situation in China .............. ___ ___ ___
   h. Others (please specify) ________________________________
5. Could you rank the three most important factors of above making you decide to come to the U.S.A.?

1st ____;  2nd ____;  3rd ____.

6. When you first came to the U.S.A., what were your plans? Did you plan to:

   a. _____ settle here permanently?
   b. _____ wait and see what happen?
   c. _____ move to another country such as Canada, etc.?
   d. _____ return to where you came from eventually?
   e. _____ don't know (Skip to 8).

7. Have your plans changed since then?

   a. _____ no change.
   b. _____ more likely to settle.
   c. _____ less likely to settle.
   d. _____ don't know or not applicable.

8. What was your main reason for coming to New York, rather than to any other place?

   ___________________________________________________________

   ___________________________________________________________
9. When you first came to New York, did you have any problems settling down here, or was it fairly easy for you? Did you have any problems with any of these?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Getting a job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Finding somewhere to live</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. English language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. American customs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Big city life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Loneliness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other problems (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. No problem at all</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

10. Had you ever received any help from anybody in the following items before you moved to the U.S.A.? If you had, (A) who provided you the major source of help in it? (B) Where was that person residing then?

* To answer (A), please enter: (1) Relative; (2) Friend; (3) Agency; (4) Others (specify); (5) Self; (6) Never arise.

** To answer (B), please enter: (1) N.Y. Chinatown; (2) N.Y. Queens; (3) N.Y. Brooklyn; (4) Other parts of N.Y. City; (5) Other parts of U.S.A.; (6) Last place of residence (China, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Who*</th>
<th>(B) Where**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. From whom did you get the idea of immigrating?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. From whom did you obtain information on immigration?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. From whom did you get information about living conditions in New York City?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. From whom did you get help in English translation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Who helped you fill out forms and go for interviews in the U.S. Consulate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* For (A), enter: (1) Relative; (2) Friend; (3) Agency; (4) Others (specify); (5) Self; (6) Never arise.

** For (B), enter: (1) N.Y. Chinatown; (2) N.Y. Queens; (3) N.Y. Brooklyn; (4) Other parts of New York City; (5) Other parts of U.S.A.; (6) Last place of residence (China, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Who*</th>
<th>(B) Where**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f. Who advised you on what to purchase before you came?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Who arranged a job for you before you came?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. From whom did you raise money for immigration expenses?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Who acted as your sponsor in immigration?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. How about after you moved to the U.S.A.?

Who provided you the **major** source of help in the following items?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Who*</th>
<th>(B) Where**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>j. When you first came, who met you at the airport or pier?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. When you first came, who arranged initial accommodation for you?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. From whom did you get help in English translation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Who advised you on your children's education--e.g., which school to go to?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Who advised you on where to live--e.g., which neighborhood was good?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Who advised you on medical problem--e.g., which doctor or hospital to go to in case of illness?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. From whom did you seek help when seriousness arose in the family?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Who lent you money for emergency?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Since you arrived in New York, have you ever made use of the following facilities of any organizations or institutions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>If yes, of which organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Manpower training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>English classes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Recreational facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Advising and counseling services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Welfare assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Have you attended any schools, colleges, or received special training in the U.S.A.?

a. ___ Yes  

If YES, what level of education have you attained in the U.S.?

b. ___ No

14. Are you a member of any district/clan associations?

a. ___ Yes  

(1) Of which associations are you a member?

b. ___ No  

(2) What do you think are the benefits of joining these associations?

If NO.

Why don't you like to join any of these organizations?

15. Do you belong to a labor union?

a. ___ Yes  

(1) To which labor union do you belong?

b. ___ No  

16. If you have a choice, would you like to join the union?
   a. ___ Yes  
   b. ___ No
   Why do you think so? ____________________________

17. Do you belong to any other organizations or civic clubs?
   a. ___ Yes  
   b. ___ No
   What are these organizations and what do they do?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization name</th>
<th>Function of organization</th>
<th>Are most members Chinese?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What does it do?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization name</th>
<th>Function of organization</th>
<th>Are most members Chinese?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What does it do?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Do you regularly attend service at a church?
   a. ___ Yes  
   b. ___ No
   denomination ___________________
   In what language is the service held at the church you usually attend?
   ____________________________

19. Now I'd like to ask about the last Presidential Election. Did you vote in the last Presidential Election?
   a. ___ Yes, voted.  
   b. ___ No, didn't vote
   What kept you from voting?
   a. ___ Not a citizen  
   b. ___ Not in the U.S. yet  
   c. ___ Other reason: ____________________________

20. Suppose you were eligible to vote, would you be voting in the coming 1980 Presidential Election?
   a. ___ Yes.  
   b. ___ No.
21. One of the things we want to find out is how the Chinese feel about living in New York. Can you tell about all the addresses where you have lived in the city? We don't need the exact address. Just give us a rough location, e.g., "around Bayard and Elizabeth St, Manhattan, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address Street/District</th>
<th>From when to when</th>
<th>Did you own, rent, or what?</th>
<th>How did you find about the residence?</th>
<th>Why did you move?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From mon/year</td>
<td>a. Owned</td>
<td>a. Realtor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To mon/year</td>
<td>b. Rented</td>
<td>b. English newspaper</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Provided rent-free</td>
<td>c. Chinese newspaper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Friend</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. Relative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>f. Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Are you living in a government or government subsidized housing project?

a. ____ Yes. → If living in government or subsidized project:
   (1) How long did you have to wait for project accommodation after you submitted application? _______ years _______ months.
   (2) Why did you choose this project instead of any other?
       ________________________________
   (3) Excluding kitchen, bathroom, and toilet, how many rooms do you have? ____________ rooms.

b. ____ No. → If not in a government or subsidized project, answer 22b:
22b. If not in a government or subsidized project:

(1) What is the nature of your present tenancy?
   a. ___ Owner-occupier
   b. ___ Furnished apartment/house
   c. ___ Unfurnished apartment/house
   d. ___ Board/room/lodgings
   e. ___ Others: ____________________________

(2) Do you share with any other families a KITCHEN? a. Yes b. No
   BATHROOM? a. Yes b. No
   LIVINGROOM? a. Yes b. No

(3) Besides kitchen and bathroom, how many rooms do you have for
   your own use? _______ rooms.

(4) Have you ever applied for Housing Authority or subsidized
   project accommodation?
   a. ___ Yes. b. ___ No.
   If Yes, (a) How long ago was application made? ___ Yr. ___ Mons
   (b) Is the application still valid? a. Yes b. No
   (c) In which housing project do you want
       to be rehoused? ____________________________
   (d) Why do you prefer that project? ________________

23. What were the most important things considered by you when you chose
    to live in this area?
(1) living close to relatives  (5) living close to job
(2) living close to friends   (6) living close to schools
(3) close to public transport (7) close to shops, services, etc.
(4) good accommodation,
    regardless of location  (8) accomm. at suitable price,
                          regardless of its location
(9) Others ____________________________

1st consideration ____  2nd ____  3rd ____

24. Do you think that most people in this neighborhood are Chinese, of
    a different ethnic group, or is the neighborhood mixed?
   a. ___ Mostly Chinese.
   b. ___ Neighborhood mainly one group by mixed with others
       (Which ethnic groups? ________________________)
   c. ___ Neighborhood mixed, with even numbers of different groups
       (Which ethnic groups? ________________________)
   d. ___ Don't know.
25. If you had a choice, would you rather live in a neighborhood where most people were Chinese?
   a. ____ Yes.
   b. ____ No.
   c. ____ Don't care.
   Why do you think so? ____________________________________________________

26. Do you expect to ever move from this house/apartment in the future?
   a. ____ Yes.           b. ____ No.           c. ____ Don't know
   If Yes:
   (1) How soon do you expect to move?
      a. ____ Very soon; within a year.
      b. ____ Fairly soon, within a couple of years.
      c. ____ Will move eventually, but time depends on circumstances.
   (2) Where would you like to move to?
      a. ____ To another place within this neighborhood.
      b. ____ Inside N.Y. City, but outside this neighborhood
         (Which part of N.Y. City? ____________________________)
      c. ____ Inside U.S.A., but outside NYC (where:___________)
      d. ____ To another country (which country: _____________)
      e. ____ Don't know.
   (3) Why would you like to move from here?
      ________________________________________________________________
   (4) Why would you like to move to there?
      ________________________________________________________________
27. Next, I'd like to ask you about your job experience in New York City. Starting from your first job in NYC, would you list all the jobs you have had to the present?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Employer</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If SELF-EMPLOYED OR EMPLOYER, ASK 28 to 31. Otherwise, SKIP to 32.

28. Have you ever entered a partnership with any person in business?
   a. _____ Yes.    b. _____ No.

   (1) Is your partner (partners) a relative of yours?
      a. _____ Yes. How is he/she related to you? ____________
      b. _____ No.

   (2) Is your partner also Chinese?
      a. _____ Yes.
      b. _____ No What ethnicity? ____________________________

29. Do your family member help in the business?
   a. _____ Yes.    b. _____ No.    c. _____ Not applicable.
30. Besides your family members who help in the business, do you hire any employees as well?
   a. ____ Yes.     b. ____ No.

(1) How many employees do you hire in your business?
   __________

(2) Are there any relatives of yours among your employees?
   a. ____ Yes       How are they related to you?
   b. ____ No

(3) Are all of your employees Chinese?
   a. ____ Yes, all Chinese.
   b. ____ No, mixed (with what ethnicity? ____________)
   c. ____ No, all of other ethnicity (what ethnicity: ________)

31. How did you generate capital to start your business?
   a. ____ savings     d. ____ "hui"
   b. ____ loans from bank     e. ____ loans from relatives
   c. ____ loans from credit union     f. ____ loans from friends
   g. ____ others

1st major source: ___; 2nd major source: ___; 3rd:____

32. What is your wife's/husband's occupation? ______________

   education level? __________;
   schooling completed in the U.S. ___
   or elsewhere (where _______)?

33. Do you regularly (i.e., at least once a week) read Chinese newspapers or magazines?
   a. ____ regularly.     b. ____ sometimes.     c. ____ Not at all.

34. Do you cook mostly Chinese dishes or American dishes?
   a. ____ All Chinese     d. ____ Mostly American but
   b. ____ Mostly Chinese but some     e. ____ All American
   American
   c. ____ Chinese & American equally
35. Besides your relatives and family members living in this house/apartment, what other relatives do you have in New York area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative (Brother &amp; family etc.)</th>
<th>Where does he/she live? District/Borough</th>
<th>In what year did he/she move to NY City?</th>
<th>How often do you contact each other (visit, phone, letters, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Daily</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Weekly</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Monthly</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Yearly or less</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. No contact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. Do you have any relatives living in the U.S. but outside New York area?

a. _____ Yes.  
b. _____ No.  
c. _____ Don't know.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How is each of them related to you?</th>
<th>Where does he/she live? City/State</th>
<th>In what year did he/she come to the U.S.A.?</th>
<th>How often do you contact (by phone, letters, visits, etc.) each other?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Monthly</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Severly times/year</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Yearly or less</td>
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<td></td>
<td>e. No contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Options</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any relatives living in China/Taiwan/Hong Kong?</td>
<td>a. Yes. b. No. c. Don't know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is each of them related to you?</td>
<td>How often do you contact each other?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Weekly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Monthly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Several times a year</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d. Yearly or less</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. No contact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where does he/she live? (City/province)</td>
<td>Do you send money or gifts to him/her?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Yes, regularly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Yes, but only on special occasions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. After you moved to the U.S., have you ever made trips to China/Taiwan/Hong Kong?  
   a. Yes → If Yes:  
   b. No → If No  
   (1) Have you ever wanted to make a trip to China/Taiwan/Hong Kong?  
   a. Yes. b. No. → If no, why not? If yes, when do you think you will make the trip?
39. What language do you most often use at home?
   a. when speaking to your wife/husband __________________________
   b. when speaking to your children __________________________

40. How about your children? What language do they use at home?
   a. when they speak to you __________________________
   b. when they speak to each other __________________________

41. How well do you speak English?
   a. _____ very well          c. _____ not well
   b. _____ well              d. _____ not at all

42. How well does your wife/husband speak English?
   a. _____ very well          c. _____ not well
   b. _____ well              d. _____ not at all

43. How far would you like your children to go in school?
   a. _____ some high school or below  d. _____ college graduation
   b. _____ high school graduation  e. _____ post-college
   c. _____ some college           f. _____ don't know

44. What occupations would you like your children to have?
   __________________________________________

45. (a) What grades or educational levels are your children attending or have completed?
   (b) If children are working, what occupations do they have?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Attending</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
46. Would you be against it or would you be in favor of it if any of your children were going to be married to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly against</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don't care at all</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Strongly favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. black</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Puerto Rican</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Korean</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Japanese</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Am-born Chinese</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Immigrant Chinese</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

47. About how much money did you earn last year before taxes? $__________

48. About how much money did your wife/husband earn last year before taxes? $__________.

49. Do you have any other property in New York or in your last place of residence (China/Taiwan/Hong Kong)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>In New York: (District/Borough) _____________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elsewhere (where?) _________________</td>
</tr>
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THANK YOU FOR COOPERATION


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