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DEPENDENCY AND AFFLUENCE AS CHALLENGES
TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PALAU

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ANTHROPOLOGY MAY 1986

By

Joshua L. Epstein

Dissertation Committee:

Alice G. Dewey, Chairman
Stephen T. Boggs
Ben Finney
Norman Meller
Truong-Buu Lam
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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that I acknowledge here could only have been based on my parent's bedrock of love and support. Dad, I know you are here to see this.

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ABSTRACT

The study examines attempts by the inhabitants of a tiny and emerging, dependent country to control development in their islands. The research was conducted between 1979 and 1981 in Palau, now a constitutional republic, and still part of the United States administered Trust Territory of the Pacific.

The theoretical approach is the dependencia variant (Cardoso and Faletto) of dependency theory, supplemented with an anthropological perspective. A multilateral framework, that recognizes an international state, as well as economic, system is also used (Koo). The work adds to the small body of dependency analysis in the Pacific. Particularly for tiny Pacific islands, such applications should be handled with care.

Palauan culture and history is introduced, including the complex interaction between Palauans and a succession of differing foreign powers. The dissertation's heart analyzes a number of roughly sequential events that were pivotal in Palau's contemporary political evolution. These start in 1975 with the controversy over whether to locate a "superport" for oil transhipment and storage in Palau, and end with initial challenges to the Executive's leadership of Palau's constitutional government in early 1981. During these events, some Palauans attempted to assertively cope with dependency by means of a number of socio-political strategies and an interaction mode.

The study also has theoretical implications. Some of the shortcomings of early dependency and of world-systems theory are illustrated, as well as areas where a dependencia approach can be supplemented.
Furthermore, the study examines two dynamics that are highly germane to controlling development; political mobilization and closure. The relationship of closure (the articulation and integration of societal goals and priorities) to mobilization, and both of these to dependency, are explored.

The study also spotlights the maturation of a fundamental development dilemma in Palau. This dilemma pits desires for political control against the felt need for massive economic support. Palau's "national underdevelopment" is also distinctive however. In fact aspects of the Palauan case associate it with two of the most worrisome aspects of modernity--massive damage to the environment and the build-up of nuclear weapons--that threaten us all.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

The problem addressed in this dissertation is the extent and the means through which the inhabitants of a tiny emerging, dependent country can establish a broad-based definition of and control over the process of development. The study takes a comparative view of the challenges and opportunities faced by Palau (Belau),\textsuperscript{1} one such emerging country in the western Pacific.

In better-known anti-colonial movements the commonly harsh, polarized, and brutalized conditions surrounding anti-metropolitan resistance has presented both opportunities and impediments for the indigenous articulation of and adherence to challenging socio-political goals. In contrast in the Palau Islands, as elsewhere in Micronesia, material conditions are rather comfortable, at least compared to more typical Third World settings. To an important degree, the lack of harsh, extractive and exploitative conditions in Palau has been due to the distinctive nature of the dependency relationship with the United States. Yet it is precisely this comfortable dependency which has confronted Palauans with some of the greatest challenges to, as well as opportunities for, the formation and pursuit of indigenously controlled development.

Energetic and sustained pursuit of mass-oriented, national development is challenging and problematic for any "peripheral" country.
For the small islands of the Pacific, relatively autonomous development is especially difficult. These islands have a fragile environment with very small developed resource bases. However, even on islands that were once isolated, tastes have developed for foreign goods and experiences positively associated with modern life. In Micronesia, American financial aid has helped create and satisfy these tastes, and a relatively pervasive, seductive and seemingly benign dependency has taken root. In the end it may prove extremely difficult to disengage from this situation. In the meantime, Palau has been vulnerable to and the target of various pressures from its metropolitan/donor power and from other, external interests. There is also a potential danger that intrusive U.S. military interests could result in a massive, disruptive, and damaging usage of Palau. Actually both "development" and dependency have been fostered in Palau largely as an adjunct to United States's military/strategic interest.

In this section, a number of theoretical approaches for examining the development process will be reviewed. This background is essential for an understanding of the dependencia approach utilized in this dissertation. Like other variants of dependency theory, dependencia emerged in part as a reaction to an earlier theory, namely that of "modernization."

Theoretical Discussion

Modernization approaches did not constitute one coherent theory. All of them have been heavily criticized and are little-used today. Nevertheless, they have some relevance for this dissertation both for
understanding subsequent theories and because modernization approaches retain some utility in the Palauan case.

One modernization approach was structural-functionalist in which "traditional" and "modern" patterns were contrasted (Parsons 1951; Redfield 1941, 1950, 1961). The emphasis was on an integrated system reaching maturity. Capitalist society and pluralistic democracy were usually the implicit models for the "mature" system.

A second approach was the social-psychological. It assumed that chances for development depended on the right psychological attitudes being held by society's members (McClellan 1961). Structural factors such as politics and economics were not emphasized. A third approach emphasized contact with and the diffusion of "modern" institutions, technology, and associated attitudes as these have emanated from the developed West (Lerner 1958).

The modernization approaches centered on the question of how development proceeds and why it often deviates from expected patterns. They shared the view that the developed, industrialized nations could play a positive, even vital role in the efforts of Third World nations to achieve a modern and satisfying way of life. To a significant extent this could occur through the assistance that "advanced" powerful nations could render through "aid" of an economic, psychological (instilling the "right" attitudes), and political variety. Development would occur when the right mix of technology, attitudes, capital, and institutions took hold. According to this view, the nations of the developed West would be quite willing to assist Third World nations to modernize along rational, capitalistic, pluralistic-democratic lines.
These views reached their most influential expression with R. W. Rostow's "Stages of Economic Growth," popular during the early 1960s (Chilcote 1981:279, also Sunkel 1973:288). At that time the U.S. was at the zenith of its post-war confidence and influence. The Marshall Plan had contributed importantly to the revitalization of Europe and in the wider crusade against international communism. It was believed a similar approach to the developing world would work as well. According to "modernization" experts, there seemed little reason to believe that the proliferation of post-colonial states had not cleared the way for liberal, non-communist modernization, spurred along by western "aid."

Development in much of the Third World, however, did not follow this scenario. This was glaringly the case in parts of Latin America (Sunkel 1973:134). There during the 1960s, the U.S. sponsored an Alliance for Progress involving huge amounts of aid. What occurred contrasted sharply with modernization expectations. Where economic growth occurred it was slow and was often accompanied by various malevolent social consequences such as an increasing gap between rich and poor with the further entrenchment of a relatively tiny, extravagant, and predatory foreign-oriented elite. The life-style, values, and economic/political interests of such "national" elites seemed to have more in common with international interests than with national development, especially the precarious welfare of the majority of the population. This marginalized, impoverished majority continued to provide a setting for extremism of the Left or Right.

Paradigm shifts in development theories have occurred in concert with, and often as a consequence of, transformations and events in the "real world." The lack of balanced, integrated, national development
in Latin America, despite the massive "assistance," cast doubt upon the accuracy and applicability of modernization assumptions for the Third World. The mid-to-late sixties was also a time of upheaval. The war in Vietnam and protest against it, student activism, "Black Power," urban unrest and anti-colonial revolutions all provoked a need for a more adequate paradigm than modernization to better explain the struggles and transformations that seemed to be gripping much of the world (Cardoso 1977:17). Within this context, a pair of related theoretical challenges to "modernization" emerged, namely dependency and the world systems approaches. These largely replaced modernization views.

Dependency Theory

"Dependency is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others" (Dos Santos 1970:231). In retrospect, this assertion might seem simplistic. However it signified an advance in comprehensiveness over "modernization." Dependency theorists came mainly from the Third World, particularly Latin America and Africa. Theirs is a largely Third World scenario which has tended to focus on the economic, social, and political transformations and "distortions" that occur when peripheral societies are incorporated into the capitalist West (Duvall 1978:55).

A dependency perspective, as a critical approach, stands diffusionist/modernization thinking on its head. Unlike the scarcity, modernization approaches, dependency theorists maintain that peripheral nations are "underdeveloped" not because they are isolated or
insufficiently endowed, but because of the nature of their integration with "advanced" powers. Dependency theorists recognize that diffusion from and integration with the "modern world" do take place, but they emphasize that this does not proceed in such a way that the subordinate party will ever come to resemble the "mature" societies of the West. Instead, due to the nature of the links connecting the dominant, metropolitan power to its peripheral "satellite," the former is in a position to enhance its advantages while perpetuating the subordinate position of "underdeveloped" regions (Mahler 1980:56).

The metropolitan-satellite relationship is developed and maintained through an extensive pattern of asymmetrical contacts and interactions consisting of "aid," trade and debt arrangements, education, and often through military assistance. The interaction serves as a bridgehead for the internalization of metropolitan interests in the periphery. This internalization is concentrated socially with the entrenchment of a "co-opted" and "internationalized," peripheral elite (Mahler 1980:68). The lifestyle and interests of this elite tend to coincide with those of the "advanced," metropolitan power. Such co-opted elites can be therefore expected to follow a modernization strategy that meets their own and international needs, but which is inappropriate for, and may involve the deprivation of, most of the inhabitants of the developing country.

Dependency theorists assume that, within the context of dependence, certain processes are likely to adversely affect the rate, direction, scope and viability of peripheral attempts at "development" (Duval 1978:58). It is assumed that with dependency, comes peripheral vulnerability. One measure of this is the dependent parties' attachment
to and valuation of the goods and/or services that the dominant power provides. Other dynamics can also affect the stability of the metropolitan/satellite relationship, for example the calculation of the costs and benefits associated with rupturing a dependency relationship or seeking to alter its terms. It is also assumed that as external dependency deepens, there is a constriction of development options.

A major aspect of dependency theory was its "development of underdevelopment" thesis. In its most extreme and polemical form, it maintained that significant nationally-oriented, autonomous development in the periphery was impossible so long as dependent, external links remained. A. G. Frank was an early and influential proponent of this thesis (1967). During the 1960s and more strikingly in the 1970s however, dramatic exceptions arose. Dependency theorists responded to the realities of the newly industrializing countries (NIC's) such as Taiwan and South Korea in part by changing their focus from a certainty of economic stagnation and other "malevolent" consequences to processes associated with "dependent development," and some growth.

World Systems Theory

In the 1970s, there was a shift as the popularity of dependency theory was superseeded by world-systems theory. The focus on "international links" between domestic and external elements of dependency theory, gave way to "global" analysis, the focus of world systems theory. This shift like the earlier one to dependency theory, was in part a response to political developments.

By the 1970s, it was clear that the wave of formal decolonization after World War II had not eliminated peripheral dependence or
core power domination. Instead of posing a fundamental challenge or alternative to such domination, anti-colonial revolutionary movements now seemed largely co-opted and/or forced to accept First World terms. Such indications of the resilience and absorptive capacities of the world capitalist system was one factor that led Wallerstein (1974) and others to assign determinate importance to the global, multilateral level. World system theorists have tended to concentrate on the mechanisms and processes that maintain the preeminent position of core states, and of the global economy.

Dependency theory established that development and/or underdevelopment cannot be understood in isolation from the processes and relationships connected with advanced, capitalist powers. It rejected the modernization view that the causes of poverty and "underdevelopment" are to be found primarily within the societies that are characterized in this way. Dependency's successful challenge helped to temper some of the naive optimism of the modernization approaches, and pointed out the inadequacy of studying individual societies as if these existed in isolation from external interests and forces (Chariot and Hall 1982:102). This heightened awareness is particularly beneficial for anthropologists, as many of their studies had been very localized.

In making such points, however, dependency theorists sometimes carried these too far. Dependency theory has been correctly criticized when it maintains that development or underdevelopment can only be understood as both an expression, and as an automatic consequence of, core/metropolitan interests as these are "transmitted" to the periphery (Chariot and Hall 1982:93). Moreover, this view of external interests and their "distorting" effects sometimes serves to absorb all the blame
for any limitations to development and/or undesirable characteristics that are associated with the Third World. I feel this is unfortunate, as it can have the undesirable effect of deflecting both indigenous and analytical attention away from the very real dilemmas that indigenous peoples face.

In any event, it is clear that some of the assumptions produced by early dependency theory were overdrawn (Chariot and Hall 1982:93). This is more of a criticism of a rigid and polemical dependency perspective than of the dependencia variant of dependency theory which I utilize in this study. This variant is discussed shortly.

In comparison to dependency, the world-systems theory achieved a broader grasp of the global processes of capitalist accumulation, penetration and persistence. In doing so, world-systems theory helped to break more completely with the tendency to regard individual nation-states as the widest parameter for analysis (Skocpol 1977:1089). World-systems theory, in moving from an "international" to a "global" perspective, was an advance in comprehensiveness.

The world-systems theory, with its multilateral perspective, has some utility for this study. As shall be seen, the Palauans have been remarkably effective in discerning and exploiting some of the multilateral dynamics that reach beyond Palau's "special" relationship to the United States. In addition, one of the anticipated threats that some Palauans mobilized against (plans to build a "superport," discussed in Chapter III) involved international economic as well as political factors.

Hagin Koo (1984) makes a distinction between two types of multilateral systems. One is the international "state system" where the
objective for the core power is to enhance its geo-political and military influence. The other is the multilateral capitalist system, whose aim is extraction of resources, on terms favorable to the movement of advanced capital towards the core of the world economy. The state system can be conditioned by, but is not reducible to the economic system. As an example, there are periods and regions where geo-political concerns far outweigh the importance of market-oriented, economic ones for the core power involved. As will be seen, Palau and the other Micronesian Islands are clear cases of the primacy of geo-political interests.

A multi-lateral, "global" perspective remains useful, however, only if we retain our skepticism of tendencies within this theory to allege that the system is "all-pervasive and self-perpetuating" (Smith 1979:276, 288). Moreover, early dependency theory, like world systems theory, essentially places all causality on external and/or economic factors. Both are teleological and reductionist, often failing to take account of the variety of indigenous factors and how these articulate with various external forces (Petras 1978:33, Skocpol 1977:1078, Smith 1979:264-265). For an anthropologist, such tendencies are particularly disturbing. If carried too far this view can deprive local histories of their "integrity and specificity" (Smith 1979:257), ignoring the reality that even "peripheral" peoples have "their [own] history . . . culture, and struggles" which they pursue (Koo n.d.:6). In contrast to this, a world systems approach may reduce indigenous history, culture, consciousness and attitudes to dull and washed-out, folksy reflections or distortions of determinate, core forces. For an anthropologist, such a reductionist approach is quite inadequate as it tends to relegate
indigenous elements, including socio-political forces, to a secondary, almost epiphenominal place (Gerstein 1977:75, Koo 1984:6).

This dissertation is designed to take a "fine-grained" look at the way the people of Palau have acted to gain greater control over their resources and their lives in the face of metropolitan and other external pressures and enticements. The focus is on the relative autonomy and control that a peripheral power attempts and achieves. Consideration of this in relative terms is sometimes missing from a world systems perspective which views questions of indigenous autonomy and control in absolute terms, as being either present or absent. Application of such a standard can be misleading. For instance, although post-colonial regimes are powerfully affected, and often constrained, by continuing economic dependence and political vulnerability, it would be misleading to dismiss post-colonial regimes as being merely "neo-colonial." It would be inaccurate as it suggests that the distinctions are trivial between colonial status and the often hard-won independence, as well as the movements or regimes animated by some anti-core tendencies (Smith 1979:262). Both a more sensitive and realistic view is that some autonomy and control can be achieved through decolonialization, particularly when this succeeds against substantial pressures.

Dependency and world systems theories have many assumptions in common but also have a somewhat different emphasis. Dependency primarily looks up through the lens of a particular, peripheral country to its bilateral relationships with the metropolitan, core power (Koo 1984:7). This is in some contrast to a world-system perspective, which generally looks down from above. Consequently, a dependency approach can get
a better grasp of the nature, dynamics, and ramifications of development and underdevelopment in a particular, developing country.

The Dependencia Approach

The Dependencia approach has been the most useful for this study. This variant of dependency was developed primarily by researchers working in Latin America, such as Cardoso and Felatto (1979).

A "Dependencia" perspective, like the more general dependency theory, involves an appreciation of structural impediments to development and a recognition that many of the impediments, as well as some opportunities, are to be found in the relationship between the metropolitan and satellite power. In examining this interaction the Dependencia perspective warns that one should have a healthy skepticism as to the likelihood that foreign "aid" from a dominant and strategically-interested power would in fact be deployed to support national development. Quite the contrary, as Dependencia theorists have pointed out, "aid" from such a donor.metropolitan power may be used as a renumerative/coercive tool to ensure that the basic interests of the metropolitan power are not transgressed. "Aid" used in this way, and more specifically the indirect threat of its withdrawal, has been a matter of strong concern to Palau.

The development dilemma that Palauans have come to face has been described, at least in very general terms, by Dependencia theorists. They refer to the contradiction that exists between the attempt to "cope with external interests in a politically autonomous way" and the de facto situation of dependence. Political sovereignty and control is desired, but "economic subordination" continues, and is even reinforced
(Cardoso and Felatto 1979:21). Though the nature of "economic subordination" in Palau is rather distinctive, still a dilemma of "national underdevelopment" has faced the Islands since the mid-1970s.

The dependencia approach has a number of emphases which differ from general dependency theory, and which have been particularly useful. Cardoso and Felatto (1979) stress that the objective of a dependencia analysis is to specify the conditions and ramifications of a particular case of dependency. In part this is done to get beyond the simplistic assumptions associated with early dependency theory, namely that results for the periphery are invariably disadvantageous, and that the relationship is one of simple and mechanical domination of indigenous elements by external ones. Dependencia exhibits less concern for abstract, theoretical principles than did earlier dependency theory. Instead it emphasizes a search for knowledge that is embedded in concrete conditions. Dependencia practitioners emphasize that their findings should not be automatically or formalistically applied to explain diverse cases (Duvall 1978:55). Rather the emphasis is on examining, in a historically and contextually sensitive way, particular cases of dependency.

It should be noted, however, that Cardoso and Fellato (1979:xxiv) have expressed the hope that more generalized principles will be discovered, arising out of dependencia's case study approach. As part of this endeavor, dependencia theorists have pointed especially to the need for an analysis of seemingly divergent and distinctive dependency situations. They have pointed out that at the time they were writing, relatively few dependencia analyses have been made of contemporary and of atypical, "colonial" situations. As we shall see, a study of Palau
helps to fill this gap. In several striking ways, the conditions of dependency in Palau diverge sharply from that in most of the developing world. Even more unusual is the fact that there are marked parallels between possible developments in Palau and two major threats to the West: degradation of the environment and the arms race, possibly resulting in nuclear war.

In addition to its stress on context and specificity, a dependencia approach exhibits what Cardoso and Felatto call a historical-structural, dialectical approach. With this, the interest is in the "structural conditioning" of social life and its replication, as well as in the "historical transformation" of social life. As Cardoso and Fellato state, forms and conditions of dependency can change. With a dependencia perspective, one seeks to identify the structural possibilities for such change, as well as the mechanisms and possibilities for a pattern's entrenchment and preservation (Cardoso and Felatto 1979: x, xi).

Another characteristic of the dependencia approach is the recognition of a complex relationship between internal and external factors. From this perspective, dependency is not seen as simply the internal side of an imperialistic coin. Rather the relationship between the external and internal is extremely complex, with structural links that are not simply based on external exploitation and/or coercion. More often, linkages are based on complex "coincidences of interest" between local, strategically-placed groups and external ones. Given this perspective, it is the task of dependencia analysis to illustrate and examine the complex ways in which external and internal forces interact, and are "interwoven" (Cardoso and Felatto 1979:15).
In this dissertation I follow the "dependencia" approach in order to emphasize my preference for this approach and to contrast it with the simplistic and inadequate emphases that can be found in dependency and world-systems theory. In addition, dependencia has been supplemented by certain useful elements from other macro theories, specifically some aspects of world systems theory, and to a much lesser extent from modernization views. There are other theories that might have been useful. However, approaches such as mode of production, articulation of modes, an emphasis on the state, and/or on public policy, had little relevance in light of both practical and empirical aspects of my study.2

The approach used can be summarized in a number of points. Point one: the analysis of indigenous social and political groups, processes, and tendencies must include the international links that connect Palau to the outside world since what happens internally cannot be explained without taking into consideration the links with external forces (Sunkel 1973:51).

Point two: the importance attached to such external links must not lead to an underestimation or a dismissal of the constraints to development that may be largely indigenous to the system. For instance, in Palau the material resource base is quite limited, at least to support the kind of opportunities and lifestyles that many Palauans have come to expect.

Point three: the dependent system being analyzed consists of two groups of elements, the external and external, and also the relationship between them (Sunkel 1973:51). These relationships are complex. Some local groups may act to sustain dependency and/or a particular dependency arrangement. Others may give lukewarm support, express
opposition, or over time change their stance. Moreover, whatever the
posture of local forces and alignments, these are often informed by
indigenous preferences, expectations, interests, and objectives. These
are influenced by cultural, historically-based, and/or contemporary
considerations.

Point five: Analysis should not only include economic factors
and political institutions. Less formalized but politically relevant
factors such as world-views, value-orientations, etc., must be taken
into account, particularly if these relate to Palauan views of themselves
and their interaction with outsiders. The holistic quality of such
analysis is both anthropological and in line with a dependencia
perspective.

Point six: Particular hegemonic powers operate with distinct
interests, capacities, and constraints. Palau, a tiny satellite has
been unevenly influenced by a succession of differing foreign powers.
In this analysis, attention is also paid to the existing and anticipated
relationship of Palau's metropolitan power, the United States, to com­
peting geo-political blocks in the international state system and to
the global economy.

Conditions of Dependency in Palau

Both the nature and conditions of dependency in Palau are rather
distinctive. Palau's involvement in the international arena, through
the United States, has not drawn most islanders into an economic or
socio-political arrangement that has led to any decline in material
standards of living. Unlike the more typical Third World pattern, in
Palau a rising dependent affluence has not come at the expense of the
majority of the population. Marginalization, impoverishment, political repression or a lack of human rights has been muted so far in Palau. Instead a flood of "aid" has inundated the Islands. At the same time, considerable democratic, political development has also taken place.

The fact that the metropolitan power has no interest in extracting economic resources means that many of the forces which create a classical dependency situation are not present. As a result of this and other factors, such as the extremely small scale of the Islands and the huge, financial subsidy, the dependency pattern in Palau has taken on a particularly pervasive, seductive, and often a seemingly benign character, especially when contrasted to most of the developing world.

One common characteristic of the developing world is the low income of the majority of the population, and rising economic inequality between the rich and poor. Palau does not fit into this characteristic very well. In Palau there are a large number of government employees, who are paid comparatively well, and whose earnings are further spread by means of the contemporary version of traditional reciprocity exchanges between kin groups.

Palau has experienced slow economic growth. This is also a common characteristic of the developing world, and in fact, there has been little, real economic growth in the midst of the huge U.S. subsidy.

A third characteristic of the developing world is regional disequilibrium. In Palau this is muted, partly due to the small and compact nature of the islands. Travel and communications are comparatively easy and frequent.

The increasing internal imbalance is a fourth characteristic. While basically economic, it has sociological and political dimensions
as well. In a typical Third World dependency scenario, there is a foreign-oriented elite that is relatively tiny, but highly conspicuous, and seems to live off surplus extracted from the rest of the population. The majority is marginalized by being deprived of opportunities for advancement due to restricted access to adequate health, education, and government services. In Palau, however, such internal polarization and marginalization of the majority is quite mild. In part, this is because the U.S. subsidy penetrates broadly and in depth in the small and compact islands with their relatively tiny population. In addition, American "aid" has been distinctive in emphasizing widespread achievement of relatively advanced education and other avenues for cosmopolitan training and exposure.

Fifth, the political regimes in underdeveloped countries tend to be unstable, ineffectual, and often authoritarian. This political pattern is only partially true of Palau. Both the District and Trust Territory levels, and more recently the Republic of Palau, have been viewed by some as ineffectual, being overly bureaucratic, but not as authoritarian. Palauans, both in their comments and institution building, have demonstrated a desire for democratic safeguards and anxiety over the possibility of a "dictatorship" emerging in Palau. This concern is due to the liberal, democratic orientation fostered by the Americans. In addition, there is an ethno-historical and contemporary Palauan fear that the balanced and controlled competition of traditional Palau might be totally superseded by a new, "winner-takes-all" game. Objectively, it is clear that during the American period there has been an increasing degree of popular participation in pan-Palauan politics.
A sixth characteristic of typical underdevelopment is specialization in the production and export of raw materials and cash crops. This description does not fit Palau. In fact there has been little accumulation that has been appropriated and extracted for export since World War II. Rather, what Palau has that is of primary external interest is strategic location. So far, however, the United States has not moved to utilize this for activities highly disruptive to the Palauans, nor more generally, has the U.S. proceeded with its intrusive military plans, at least as of 1985.

Another contrast between Palau and a typical situation of underdevelopment involves the opportunities available, and the people's perception of these. In most of the Third World, the majority see themselves as being quite restricted in their extra-local social, political, and economic options. Palau on the other hand is faced with a variety of options, or at least in some respects so considers itself to be favored.

**Palau's Development Dilemma**

The constraints and opportunities associated with dependency in Palau have provided the seedbed for a development dilemma. This dilemma involves two poles of choice, each having embedded within it both advantages and potential dangers. One pole contains desired political autonomy and control, but coupled with the possible loss of dependent affluence as a price. The other pole contains dependent affluence, perhaps along with the tools for development. But this is also coupled with continuing restrictions, and the possible reduction of, political autonomy and control. This in turn could leave Palau
vulnerable and exposed to worrisome, intrusive interests. The last are potentially quite damaging. On the one hand, Palau could continue to get more deeply involved in dependency, with its seductively high levels of subsidy and the affluent lifestyle thereby supported. Initially, the price for this was continuing and even increased vulnerability to unwanted, external plans. The Palauan campaigns both against a superport and against incorporation into the Federated States of Micronesia involved the foregoing of some anticipated rewards for the sale of enhancing Palauan control over development. However, by the end of the 1970s the United States had begun to fear that Palauan moves towards control and autonomy could threaten America's underlying, strategic interest. At this point, the United States began to threaten to reduce or withdraw its subsidy in the future if the Palauans did not acquiesce to American "requirements." Thus Palauan efforts to control development became associated with a threat, both to dependent affluence and to Palauans' well-being and resources.

In some senses Palau's dilemma is not unique. Dependency theorists have pointed out the underlying conflicts and ambiguity in a situation of national underdevelopment, such as exists in Palau. Palau's difference lies in the greater penetration, both in breadth and depth, of the dependency on the U.S. and the material affluence thereby procured. The disadvantages on the other hand are as yet only potential. In view of the scope and nature of envisioned U.S. military activities, however, the disadvantages and dangers could be substantial, indeed. Given Palau's limited and fragile resource base, this is particularly true. So far in this equation, concrete and seductive advantages in the dependency relationship have been pitted against spasmodic threats,
and the potential of major undesirable consequences in the longer run.

Given this framing of opinions, one of the approaches taken by Palauans has been to try and maintain the seemingly benign, but unstable status quo. The continuation of this appears as all the more desirable since the U.S. had not, and as of the time of this writing has not, made concrete moves to activate its military interests. Nor has it appeared to absolutely and consistently insist that a reduced or eliminated subsidy is the unavoidable price for Palauan control. Therefore the continuation of the status quo as a third option has appeared as both feasible and desirable to many Palauans. The description and analysis of Palau's dilemma is a major contribution of this study.

Socio-Political Strategies

Another contribution of the study is the description and analysis of Palauan socio-political efforts directed towards enhancing both specific and more generalized strategies for indigenous control. There are three types of strategies. Domestic political campaigns is one of these. They involve the generation, utilization and deployment of resources, primarily within Palau, so as to achieve a desired socio-political effect. Political campaigns are relatively informal, but they can be pursued to support more formalized strategies.

Institution-building is another strategy, and like political campaigns, is primarily domestic. It can however have externally-oriented objectives and effects. For instance, in Palau the national constitution was developed primarily to provide an organizational framework for the conduct of national economic, political, and social life.
It is also protective of Palauan resources, particularly in its safeguards against worrisome, external interests and plans.

The strategy of using leverage, compared to political campaigns and institution-building, is directed externally though with the intention of procuring a desired, domestic effect. An example of this strategy is the recruiting of support from the internationally active Nuclear Free Pacific Movement, starting in 1980. There are two techniques for gaining leverage: external appeals (both informal and formal, legal ones) and secondly, formal negotiations. Both are employed to influence external elements so as to affect modifications in their activities that are relevant to Palau. Leverage involves a heavy component of domestic/external interaction. External actors may have their own reasons for being interested in Palau. These may incline them to develop a coincidence of interest with particular Palauans. Palauans, for their part, have been adept at gauging the potential political advantages in such coincidences of interest, and often frame their appeals accordingly.

The identification of these strategies supplements the dependencia approach, and is in line with recent calls for the development of additional analytical tools and perspectives to achieve a comprehensive and concrete post-modernization paradigm.

**Mobilization and Closure**

Another contribution of this study is the significance of two other concepts which have emerged from the analysis, namely mobilization and closure. Although the word mobilization is commonly found in discussions of political action, it is useful here to give a precise definition
of how it will be used in this dissertation. Mobilization is the generating of commitment to and support for socially-demanding political goals and priorities by a relatively broad segment of the population. Mobilization can be either specific, as for instance, used for a particular strategy or technique, or for more generalized purposes, such as in mobilization for national development. Given the research problem it is most relevant to ascertain the factors that impede and facilitate mobilization at the more inclusive level.

The second concept is that of closure. I define this as the articulation of socio-political goals and priorities, particularly as these become more explicit, comprehensive, and long-range. The achievement of closure, for a developing society, can appear as both necessary and problematic. After all, such societies often face dramatic and unprecedented challenges and opportunities. In the face of these, members of the indigenous society may develop a variety of responses. Unless some closure on common values in relation to, and strategies for development can be achieved, coordinated and effective socio-political action is unlikely. Therefore, the question of how and to what extent Palauans seek and achieve closure over the means and ends of development, and the relationship between these, is central. As with mobilization, it is assumed that some degree of generalized closure is a necessity for attaining significant, indigenous, relatively broad-based control over development.

Closure is a complex concept involving both process and outcome. Furthermore, it involves a number of dimensions or aspects. One dimension is the articulation and translation of popular concerns, aspirations, and objectives into relatively explicit socio-political goals.
A second is the development and consistency in the use of strategies to achieve these goals, particularly when the strategies evolve towards increased coherence, attractiveness, and applicability. Third is the establishment of consistent priorities among wants, needs, and goals which either subjectively or objectively seem to conflict. Fourth is the development of socio-economic and political mechanisms to enhance cultural/national identity, and which can be used as a vehicle for the enhancement of the other dimensions as well.

Like mobilization, closure can occur at a specific or more generalized level. Generalized closure is at a higher structural and symbolic level and as such, has the potential to transcend strictly local or kin-based concerns. It is closure that is achieved or frustrated at this inclusive level that is of primary importance for this dissertation.

Before moving on, it is necessary to further clarify the concept of closure. Closure cannot be equated, necessarily, with consensus. In fact, to do so would be overly formalistic, as well as simplistic. An appearance of consensus does not necessarily indicate underlying agreement. Furthermore, in addition to consensus in some cases, other avenues exist for achieving closure, such as political contests and fights. For a more detailed discussion of consensus, as it relates to decision making, see Baily's discussion in Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, edited by M. P. Banton, pages 13-14.

Just as closure cannot be equated with consensus, closure is not identical with being mobilized, though a relationship can exist. Mobilization, as has been noted, involves developing a sense of commitment to goals and priorities and the pursuant deployment of resources. For its part, closure concerns the articulation, refinement, and
coordination of both means and ends, as well as the relationship between them. Clearly then, mobilization and closure can support one another.

Prior to this study, the relationship between closure and mobilization has not been explored. Nor have dependency theorists focused sufficiently on mobilization as it affects and is effected by dependency. This study explores these questions and provides some of the ingredients for the construction of an adequate post-modernization theory. Despite relative comfort based on dependent affluence and despite the absence of obvious facilitating factors for anti-core mobilization--such as gross political oppression and/or economic exploitation--Palauans have engaged in a substantial amount of socio-political activity aimed at deflecting, buffering, and at times resisting external impingements and anticipated threats. A focus on mobilization facilitates the exploration of how and why this has occurred, and the strengths and limitations of such Palauan efforts.

In contemporary Palau, closure has been somewhat more problematic and sought after than mobilization. Nevertheless, both mobilization and closure have been highly salient and both have been conditioned by the pattern of metropolitan/satellite contact and interaction, as dependencia theorists would expect. However the dynamics of mobilization and closure, and the relationship between them and to other aspects of the indigenous political system, cannot be explained simply by the pattern of metropolitan/satellite interaction and the more general conditions of dependency. The relationships often involve multi-dimensional causality. Among other things, they are influenced by domestic political dynamics and by subjective and symbolic factors including identity concerns. Adequate attention to these factors
requires a move beyond dependency theory. Such a move is not necessarily in conflict with the eclectic dependencia approach. The theoretical position which I have presented is necessary to adequately address our research question; namely how, and to what degree, have Palauans achieved a viable and satisfying formulation of their identity, needs, and place, in the contemporary world, in light of their conditions of dependency?

An Unusual Conjuncture of Circumstances

The research design for this dissertation was built on the expectation that Palau would demonstrate, in microcosm, the emergence of an anti-colonial movement in an emerging country. Palau, however, simply does not fit into any of the patterns typically encountered in either the Third or Fourth Worlds.\(^6\)

It does partake of a number of characteristics common to the Third World such as a long colonial history, now capped by a dominant, metropolitan power with intrusive and potentially disruptive interests. Moreover in contemporary Palau, some nationalist and occasionally anti-colonial rhetoric is expressed by leaders. Though there is something of a manipulative flavor to this, still it also reflects some substantive sentiment as well as an interest in nation-building. This interest has, of course, animated the Third World.\(^7\) But, as noted, Palau in many ways diverges from a typical Third World development and dependency pattern. Based on objective factors, if one had to pigeonhole Palau, it is best described as Fourth World because it is small-scale, relatively powerless, and has a minimal resource base, albeit a strategically-located one.
The Palauan case however, is distinctive, even among Third and Fourth World groupings, because it has a number of aspects clearly connected with two of the most worrisome problems threatening the "developed world," namely the awareness of the need to control environmental degradation, and to reduce the threat from nuclear arms and materials. These concerns have been major referents for socio-political activity both in Palau and the industrial West.

Palauan reactions to their deepening development dilemma are both illustrative of, and can be revealing for, inhabitants of more dominant powers. The Palauans exhibit some recognition of the connection between their dilemma and ours. As demonstrated in the following pages, people in the periphery may develop insights on a global scale. Perhaps in this case the center can learn from the periphery. We see this as part of an anthropological journey, which takes us full circle, by demonstrating how in learning about the periphery, we learn more about ourselves.

Methodology

This dissertation is based on 18.5 months of fieldwork in Palau District of Micronesia from November 1979 through May of 1981, during which time the Palau District became the Republic of Palau. Before my arrival, sponsorship had already been arranged with the Department of Education, based in Koror. The Department provided me with office space and logistical support and through the Department I became acquainted with many Palauans.

Initially, I was assigned a Palauan fieldwork advisor by the Department, but soon arrangements were made for me to live with a Palauan
family. The elder of the household was a chief of Koror and a highly respected and noted indigenous authority on cultural and historical matters. Unfortunately, soon after my arrival, this man died. I decided nevertheless to remain with this family since I wanted the experience of staying with the same family during my time in Palau. Moreover, the head of the household, through his government job, had a significant contact with one of the major political factions in Palau.

Information was amassed from a number of sources. The primary source was contact with Palauans. With five informants I maintained frequent contact over essentially the whole field period. Another ten Palauans were also very important and I met with them consistently over long periods of time. In total my diaries show I had at least some contact with 170 Palauans. These people were most commonly those concerned with politics, and in descending order of importance, consisted of educators, traditional leaders and elders, people in cultural affairs, and Palauans involved in community affairs and organizations. Among these informants eight belonged to the Modekngei. A number were from the other major religions in Palau, the Catholics, Protestants, and Seventh Day Adventists. Government workers was a cross-cutting category. To a lesser extent, I interacted with Palauans in medical, legal, and other professions. The category of "mixed" was also significant. In this the combination of education and politics was most frequent.

I also conducted approximately sixty formal interviews. Nineteen people were interviewed more than once, ranging from 2-5 times. The distribution in social categories was similar to that described above. Some interviews were taped. In addition, a number of Palauans in
education and I developed a voter attitude survey to which 120 Palauans responded.

In addition to the Palauans I also had contacts with a number of Americans and other non-Palauans. Five Americans were interviewed. This included an individual connected with the policy formation of U.S. status negotiations, two political advisors to Palauans, and the District Administrator in Palau. I also had contacts with three Americans in mass media, two economic advisors, and a number of non-Palauans in political and administrative staff positions.

In addition, I attended meetings of a political, community, and/or educational nature. My observation of Palau Legislature sessions was supplemented by my access to the journal kept by previous and current legislatures. I attended public hearings, celebrations, and inaugurations, including ones for the beginning of a new Legislature in 1980 and for the start of national, constitutional government in 1981. I also attended contests and exhibits of "cultural awareness" projects. I also frequented restaurants and other public gathering points where small groups of Palauans would come to talk, and attended parties and receptions ranging from informal picnics to official government functions.

Political campaigns offered additional information through speeches, debates, and various gatherings ranging from "house-to-house" discussions to meetings attended by hundreds in Koror. Campaign posters, pamphlets, media coverage and the tabulated results of referendums and election campaigns also added to my understanding of events. Documentation also came from United Nations reports, transcripts of meetings, reports of the Palau Status Commission, etc. In addition, there was
also information in published form from the District of Palau, the Trust Territory Government, and later from the Constitutional Republic. I also took hundreds of slides and photographs while in the field.

Certain decisions had to be made during this fieldwork. For instance, originally I envisioned a rough balance between the "urban" (i.e., Koror) and "rural" components of my study. However, for a number of reasons, I decided against this. For one thing, I did not want to do a village study. Quite a number of these have already been done. Moreover, a primarily village-based study could not have provided sufficient data on matters of national importance in Palau. It also soon became obvious that Koror with its population of approximately 7,000 is the primary and most visible setting in which national politics is pursued. I was struck as well by the compactness of the islands, and the relative ease of travel and communications there. "Urban/rural" dichotomies in a setting are comparatively slight, particularly when compared to the more typical circumstances present in the Third World. Though most of my time was spent in Koror, approximately 2.5 months were spent in other municipalities. I visited nearly all of the municipalities of Palau (excepting the Southwest Islands) for periods ranging from a day or two, to a month.

In many ways, my timing and fieldwork site were fortunate. I arrived in Palau shortly after a crusading, popular coalition was established and was able to watch it change, once it had achieved power. A referendum on Palau's constitution, Palau's first national election campaigns, and the initial months of national, constitutional government all took place while I was in the field.
My research did not stop when I left Palau, however. Upon returning to the U.S., I visited the East Coast where I interviewed a U.S. official, in addition to a former legal/political advisor to a major Palauan leader, and renewed conversations with a United Nations official who has provided me with much helpful information before the fieldwork in Palau. Before going to Palau, I had also observed a United Nations Trusteeship Council session at which Palauans were present. My work then had come full circle.

Because of the rich and varied information base, the small scale of the islands, and the large pool of informants, it has been possible to study dependency and indigenous attempts to control development in both a qualitative and comprehensive way.

**Relevant Studies**

The work done by researchers in Palau has provided much ethnographic and historical information which has been utilized in this dissertation. This appears primarily in Chapter II on the historical and contemporary setting. But generally, this work is not relevant theoretically, with two exceptions.

McKnight's work, and particularly his dissertation (1960) has some relevance because he traces a major cultural theme, that of competition, as this is expressed at a number of levels in Palauan social structure. Moreover, McKnight's concept of "incultural modernization" (1974:38), the possibility that modernization can proceed by adaptively building upon indigenous cultural prototypes and respond to guidelines that are set by the indigenous, target society is also relevant. McKnight's interest coincides with my research question and with the integrated,
nationally-focused, autonomous development path that is preferred by some dependency theorists. The work by Donald Shuster (1982) also has some relevance, since he attempts to work at the pan-Palauan level and deal with Palauan interactions with foreigners and other external forces.

Outside of Palau, but in the Pacific, some work involving dependency theory has taken place. Papua New Guinea has been the subject of one such study (Amarshi, Good, and Mortimer 1979), as has Hawaii (Kent 1983). The emphasis in these works is generally that of dependency, not dependencia. More emically grounded, and in line with dependencia, are two articles written by anthropologists; one by Peoples about Kosrae (1978), the other by Peterson about Ponape (1978). Both studies caution us against applying simplistic dependency models to Micronesia. Beyond the Pacific, the approach of my dissertation may be identified with studies of local response to the world system. Some of Mintz's work on the Caribbean (1977) is an example of this.

Organization

Chapter II, the historical and contemporary setting, provides necessary background on Palau's characteristics, its traditional culture, and interactions with external elements, including the accelerated program of American-sponsored "development" that started in the 1960s. Subsequent chapters contain a number of emphases. The first concerns primarily defensive/reactive strategies pursued against worrisome and externally-originated development schemes. The anticipated threat, discussed in Chapter III, was the proposed plans for a "superport" for oil transshipment and storage, to be located in Palau. The second controversy overlapped with the end of the superport issue. It concerned
the question of whether Palau should continue to define and identify itself politically with the rest of Micronesia. This question became pressing when a federation embracing most of the Trust Territory was proposed. Chapter IV discusses these developments.

The next section also consists of two chapters. These describe and analyze a more creative and protectionist Palauan approach. Chapter V deals with the development of Palau's national constitution and with the emergence of a dispute over this, which involved the U.S. Development of the constitution represented an advance over earlier, Palauan strategies in that it was more protectionist, comprehensive and long-range. But the constitution's creation also had the unintended effect of moving Palauans closer to the horns of their development dilemma. The involvement of the U.S., and the differential Palauan response to this, provides us as well with concrete examples of the dynamics elucidated by dependencia theorists. In addition we see how attempted insertions of metropolitan influence can, under certain conditions, produce contrary effects.

In contrast with Chapter V, Chapter VI moves beyond a direct application of dependency theory. It concentrates on the dynamics of mobilization and closure, and the relationship between them. It also relates the foregoing to other aspects of the indigenous political system, as well as with the circumstances which link that system to the actions and policies of the metropolitan power. This is done with a focus on the Peoples Committee, a broad-based and issue-oriented political coalition that emerged within the context of Palau's constitutional dispute. Chapter VII continues the analysis through the altered circumstances of a coalition that was now in power.
The final section of the dissertation focuses on Palau's transition to "nationhood." It begins in Chapter VIII, with Palau's first national election campaigns. These amounted to mobilization contests, the winners of which would occupy vital leadership positions in the new government. Furthermore, the process and outcome of the presidential race involved some closure over national goals and priorities, related to development. Chapter IX follows with a discussion of the initial expressive and policy directions of the new government. Initial challenges, and the Executive's response, is the subject of Chapter X. Increased Palauan political control and economic self-reliance were the stated objectives. The relatively comfortable, and seemingly benign conditions of dependency continued to impede those goals, however.
CHAPTER I--NOTES

1In this dissertation I use the term Palau. When the constitutional republic was established in 1981, the term Belau was used by some and appeared in a number of documents and maps. It was my impression, however, that as of the early months of 1981 Palau, and not Belau, was the term used by most Palauans. In 1982, in a telex to Pacific Magazine (January/February 1982, vol. 7, #1, issue 31), the following distinction was made: "When speaking or writing in English, official name of the country is Palau. In vernacular, Belau is official" (Bonifacio Basilius, Public Information Officer, Olbil Era Kelulau, OEK [National Senate]. Since that time, when speaking in English, Palau has been the predominate term used. However, there is still some ambiguity when it comes to publications. For instance, Richard Parmentier in an article for the American Anthropologist (vol. 87, #4, December 1985) uses "Belau (formerly Palau)." However, after consulting with experts on contemporary developments (Dr. Donald Topping, Director of Social Science Research Institute and Professor of Linguistics, and Karen Peacock, of the University of Hawaii Pacific Collection), I have decided to use Palau, since it is the term that was predominate at the time of this writing. Moreover, much of the dissertation refers to the Islands before there was a constitutional republic.

2Analysis by mode of production was not appropriate since few material resources are being produced that are of interest to the metropolitan power. Articulation of modes, perhaps, could have been more relevant. However this requires a detailed and extensive examination of economic conditions and factors and the present study concentrates more on socio-political dimensions. Theories emphasizing the role of the state were also of limited relevance since for most of the period studied, a Palauan state did not exist. This circumstance, and the fact that I chose to concentrate on the emergence of goals and priorities, not on policy implementation by an elite in formal power, also reduced the relevance of another approach, that of public policy.

3Though some difference in the level of government services, and other modern amenities exists between central Koror and outlying municipalities, these are minimal, at least in comparison with most Third World settings. Nor can the differences within Palau be grasped from the vantage point of a simple, center-periphery model. Once again, this is unlike the case in much of the Third World.

4F. G. Baily has drawn an analogy between the conduct of politics and a game that is played according to certain rules. Whereas political competition, in Baily's terms involves jockeying for competitive advantage within, and according to a set of rules, a political fight involves an effort by one or more groups to destroy the game, and replace it with another (Baily 1969:1).
Baily (1969:17) defines a political system as a political structure, plus a broader environment. The former includes both formal (i.e., institutional) and informal aspects, such as normative and pragmatic rules (1969:5). The latter consists of social, as well as non-social (i.e., natural) elements. There is mutual dependence and a relationship of reciprocal causality between the political structure and the environment. An indigenous political system contains the above-mentioned attributes, but can be distinguished somewhat from the articulating mechanisms that link it to the metropolitan power, and to the wider multi-state, and global economic system.

The term fourth world has not been rigorously defined. Rather, it is a descriptive category, one that generally refers to a number of characteristics. Generally it is used to describe relatively powerless units that are small-scale, with a limited resource base. Referents for this term have varied, all the way from indigenous peoples now exploited by the Third World, to the marginalized and underprivileged in western societies (Worsley 1948:371). One early usage of the term which is perhaps most relevant to Palau is the fourth world as described by Skinner (1976:6). He maintained that, in marked contrast to the Third World, in the Pacific pluralistic, democratic rights and politics is the norm, and was obtained through a de-colonialization process that was remarkably non-confrontational and non-violent. One can of course question just how de-colonized the region is, given the massive and continuing metropolitan interests in much of the region. In any case, it is clear that the Pacific, and particularly its small islands have material resources bases that are quite small, contain societies that are small-scale with insufficient resources to directly and forcibly confront metropolitan pressures. Therefore, as with other peoples that can be considered fourth world, it is not surprising that the Palauans have frequently appealed to international opinion particularly since this has been permitted and even encouraged by the distinctive conditions of dependency in the region. But Palau is by no means a perfect fit with this model. Occasionally it displays some autonomist, anti-colonial sentiment more characteristic of the Third World. In addition it is a First World power, the U.S., not a Third World country which still has intrusive interests.

Like the concept of Fourth World, that of the Third World is multi-faceted and somewhat ambiguous. For an incisive discussion of the emergence and evolution of this concept see Worsley (1984:306-321). Here, I will simply point out the degree of Palau's fit with this concept. Palau is Third World to some degree as Palauans are "conscious of [their] colonial history (Worsley 1984:306) with some sense that this links Palauans with other developing regions. Moreover, Palau is Third World in the sense that there is some, at least idealized sentiment that Palau emerge as an independent and non-aligned country.

As noted in my discussion of conditions of dependency, Palau's fit with economic characteristics of Third World underdevelopment is problematic at best. Perhaps this is part of the reason why, in contrast to most Third World situations, the Palauans do not necessarily see
their colonial history as having created underdevelopment. Rather, and in line with the eclectic and manipulative cast to Palauan interactions with foreigners, in rhetoric these foreigners are sometimes pictured as having brought highly valuable, as well as less desirable development to Palau.

In some contrast with economic dimensions, regarding politics there is one area where Palau does fit a Third World perspective. As Worsley states, the "Afro-Asian group" of ex-colonial, newly independent and non-aligned countries which emerged after World War II emphasized the independence of the state, internal decolonialization, the replacement of foreign personnel, and the creation of a national culture (Worsley 1984:316). Palauans, as their Constitutional Republic began to emerge, seemed to subscribe to these objectives even though the Third World, having lost its innocence through continuing economic dependency, has since subscribed to a "neo-colonial" view.

8 The Modekngei is a religion in Palau that will come up repeatedly in this dissertation.

9 Many leaders, particularly those who were young to middle-aged, preferred to talk to me in English. When my Palauan was not adequate, a Palauan translator was utilized. Some of the interviews, speeches, etc., that were made in Palauan were taped when transcribed and translated by my assistants and me into English.

10 It may appear that this study concentrates too heavily on Koror. This is not the case however, for a number of reasons. First, the majority of the population lives in Koror. As of 1980, this proportion was approximately 55 percent (see Chapter II, page 40, also chapter note 3). Second, the proportion of Palauan informants interviewed by me was evenly balanced between informants conducting activities primarily in Koror, and those interviewed in other municipalities, and heavily involved in activities there, as well as, perhaps, in Koror. Third, virtually all my informants agreed that, for better or worse, the bulk of national political activities were carried out in Koror. My research took account of this. Fourth, the flow of information and personnel between Koror and the hinterland was frequent, and appeared to occur with relative ease. Many of my informants, for instance, would repeatedly visit Koror in order to keep abreast of, and participate in, national political developments.

11 Village-based studies by anthropologists have included that of Barnett (1960), M. Force (1976), R. Force (1958), McKnight (1960), Parmentier (1981), Smith (1977), Useem (1945), and Vidich (1949).
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SETTING

Palau has been unevenly influenced by a succession of outsiders and metropolitan powers with different interests, capacities, and impacts. Palauans have actively responded through patterns of interaction which have varied through time. Into these interactions, the Palauans have carried their ethno-historic predispositions, contemporary interests, and concerns as these are re-defined in light of changing opportunities and constraints. This historical reality is best understood through a dependencia approach.

Palau's Characteristics and Traditions

Traditional Palau was a well-integrated and productive society with pronounced syncretic and absorptive tendencies. Well-endowed with resources on a Micronesian scale, Palauans conducted a lively socio-political life that stressed controlled competition, the manipulation of social relationships, and an elite-controlled receptivity to innovation.

The Palau Islands consist of an archipelago located at latitude 6 degrees 53 minutes N to 8 degrees 12 minutes N, longitude 134 degrees 8 minutes E to 134 degrees 44 minutes E in the western Pacific. Stretching for 125 miles in a roughly nort/south pattern, Palau is north of Melanesia and east of Southeast Asia. The nearest large land masses are Mindanao, 550 miles to the west and New Guinea, 410 miles to the south (see Figure 1).
NAME EQUIVALENTS:
Sumatera = Sumatra
Jawa = Java
Sulawesi = Celebes
Saram = Ceram
Okino Tori = Parea Vela
OGASAWARA = BONIN IS.
KAZAN = VOLCANO IS.
Minami Tori = Marcus
PALAU = BELAU
Koarae = Kusai
c
Banaba = Ocean
VANUATU = NEW HEBRIDES
TUVALU = ELICE IS.
Kiritimati = Christmas

Figure 1. Location of Palau
Palau's islands vary in size and resources. In the extreme north is Kayangel, Palau's only atoll complex. Next is Babldaob, a weathered high island of approximately 155 square miles. To its south the island complex of Koror is part volcanic, part limestone. Then beyond the minute mushroom-shaped islands below Koror, are the slightly larger islands of Peleliu and Anguar. The Southwest Islands of Sonsorol, Pulo Anna and Tobi, though traditionally not part of Palau, have since been incorporated.

On a Micronesian scale, Babldaob is quite large and well-endowed with resources. The southern islands in contrast are "ecologically poor" (Parmentier 1981:5). Within Palau, the relative size difference between inhabited islands has been regarded as highly significant. This perception still exists, and contribute to regionalist prejudice and loyalties that one can still find in Palau.¹

The population, before western contact, has been estimated at 25-50,000. Figures for the present population vary considerably.² For 1980, the approximation is; Koror (7,495), Babldaob (4,596), Peleliu (820), Angaur (354), Kayangel (247), the Southwest Islands (188), amounting to a population for Palau of 13,674.³ Therefore, 55 percent of the Palauans lived in Koror.

The Palauans conceived of the universe as composed of "competing dualities" (Smith 1977:460). Socio-politically, this was capped by two district confederacies (McKnight 1960:99) divided by a roughly southwest/northeast boundary (see Figure 2). The confederacy of Babldaob with its capital at Melekeok was presided over by the holder of the paramount
MAP 3
PALAU

Figure 2. Boundary Between District Confederacies
title, Reklai. The other confederacy, Yaoldoab, was presided over by the Ibedul. Its capital was Koror.

When significant European contact began, the confederacy of Yaoldoab was consolidating its position as leader of a powerful alliance of Palauan districts from the southwest. It came to encompass the southern islands, Koror proper, and some villages on the western coast of Babldaob Island. The Babldaob Confederacy covered most of the remaining areas of Babldaob Island and Kayangel.

Palauan villages were also grouped into individual districts. Each consisted of a dominant capital village plus satellite villages and hamlets. Within the district, clans were matrilineal and ranked, largely by ascription.

Villages, ideally, consisted of 10 or more ranked clans. Male clan heads served on a Council of Chiefs, which was the final authority for all village affairs (Parmentier 1981:131). Within the council, status positions were relatively fixed with relationships of "mutual friendship" (Parmentier 1981:140), balanced reciprocity, and mutual support being largely prescribed. Men's clubs served as military/production units within the village and for the district (Goodenough 1977:60). Women's clubs provided food, entertainment, and earned wealth.

The smallest social units were extended family households, formed around a matrilineal core. Affairs of the household concerned basic production and consumption, kinship and life-cycle activities, and much of the economic exchange (Parmentier 1981:107).
There were two different leadership styles in traditional Palau. One was the moderate, consensual style of chiefs. The other was the more aggressive style of the men's club leader (McKnight 1960:87). Within a village, the chief was supposed to enhance village solidarity and well-being (Force 1958:71). A chief should preside over group discussion, leading to consensus. Consensus is valued in Palau. 4

This somewhat idealized picture of a village chief contrasts sharply with the style of the men's club leader (McKnight 1960:90). Ideally, such a leader was heroic and energetic, inspiring the club to emulate his drive, stamina, and bravery (McKnight 1960:88).

Today, as in traditional Palau, leadership style is important in determining public support. In 1980, during Palau's first national election campaign, the leading presidential candidates exhibited styles that seemed almost diametrically opposed. Each, however, was congruent with one of these traditional styles. One candidate seemed the classic, consensual leader. The other candidate seemed a leader of intense energy, daring, and tenacity. Though informants tended to evaluate the consensual leader as the more "traditional," the dynamic, decisive leader ran a close second in the race. It would be pointless to argue which style was or is more "traditional," particularly as leadership and politics in Palau have always been complex.

In traditional Palau, the "ways of politicians" also involved secret strategies for obtaining personal influence (McKnight 1960, also PCAA 1978:50). Some observers feel such strategies are still used (see Shuster 1982:281).
Controlled competition, productively woven into the socio-political fabric, is a theme that stands out for anthropologists who have investigated Palau (McKnight 1960:5). Traditionally competition was fostered by moiety-like divisions at a number of levels, including the chiefly councils, men's clubs, clan organization, etc. (McKnight 1960:100). At least at the lower levels, such controlled competition operated to support socially productive activities such as food preparation, public works, defense, etc. (Vidich 1949, also McKnight 1970:169).

In addition, controlled competition existed as an ideal. Opponents in conflict should be of roughly equal in strength and social standing. Ideally, no one political leader or group should completely dominate all the others (McKnight 1977:18, 19). This concept of appropriate, controlled use of influence still has salience in the contemporary interaction between Palau and the United States.

In old Palau, frequent and elaborated economic exchanges and a flexible kinship system imparted considerable fluidity to a social system which stressed rank/hierarchy as well as a pervasive, achievement-oriented competition (Smith 1977:458). The informants who stressed the "democratic" nature of old Palau, emphasized the avenues for social achievement and mobility that were present. In traditional Palau, there was a complex relationship between competition/manipulation and a counter theme of unit solidarity and cooperation. The latter tends to be highlighted today by those who seek to emphasize the "consensual" aspects of Palauan life.
Informants also reported that context, as opposed to rigidly defined categories, is the determinate for much behavior in Palau. Clearly Palauan society was both situationally and formally oriented. In particular, the former influences contemporary Palauan reactions to political ideology.

Palauan culture has long been noted for its inclination to "adapt ... opportunistically" (Shuster 1982:142). As McKnight (1977:31) points out there was a well-defined, elite-controlled protocol for the absorption of strangers and new information. A number of informants commented that Palauan culture was and is oriented towards political innovation, thereby confirming McKnight's view that Palauans are predisposed towards new political forms and "games" (McKnight 1960, 1977:16). Before contact with the Western world, Palauans may have occasionally been visited by drift voyagers from Southeast Asia. But with the arrival of westerners on the scene, Palauans received vastly increased input from strangers and quickly learned to make political use of this.

Western Contact

The first significant contact between Palauans and westerners began in 1783 with the shipwreck of a British trading vessel, the Antelope. It ran aground on the reef near Koror. Almost immediately the Ibedul procured British weapons and military assistance from these sailors and used this in 3 victorious engagements.

The Ibedul also arranged to have his son travel to England to bring back useful knowledge and techniques (PCAA 1978:106). Visiting English ships continued their involvement with, and military aid to Yaoldaob.
Such interaction encouraged Palauans to believe that every new group of foreigners could be utilized politically (Shuster 1982:37).

By the 1830s, American whaling ships were also visiting Palau. They were received with ambivalence, even hostility, from the people of the Babldaob confederacy who equated them with the English and their aid in support of Yaoldaob's expansionistic efforts.

During the 19th century traders began to arrive, establishing a pattern of "hard bargaining" and a more permanent presence (PCAA 1978: 133). Much coveted by the Palauans was the new technology, especially weapons. Political interactions continued and took various forms.

In May of 1861 the trader Cheyane and the chiefs of Koror produced a petition addressed to the British Government, warning that Yaoldaob's rival, the Babldaob Confederacy, was prone to "interfere with [British and other] foreign shipping." Koror, it asserted, had always been protective of British "ships and lives." It continued: "As your . . . petitioners are powerless and helpless against their own [rebellious] subjects and against any other power that might [wish to] subdue [The Islands]," therefore Palau should be made a protectorate of the British. As part of this arrangement, Yaoldaob desired British assistance in disarming ". . . rebellious districts," which were now also receiving western arms. The petition appealed to England ". . . not to allow the feeble and tottering [Palauan] government to be utterly annihilated" by its rivals.

Though the British Government took no action, the petition is quite revealing. In the first place, Yaoldaob was by no means the "lawful authority" of all Palau. Secondly, Cheyane and the Ibedul were making
their appeal in terms calculated to interest the foreign power, namely the protection of shipping. Moreover Yaoldaob, under Koror's leadership, was certainly not a "feeble" power, but rather was seeking to enhance its hegemonic control. To further this end, Yaoldaob projected an image of feebleness to entice foreign support, even intervention. Palauan adeptness at calculating external appeals to suit each foreign audience would continue to be a characteristic leverage to get support from foreigners.

One consequence of Western involvement was an escalation in Palauan warfare. This, and introduced diseases, brought massive population decline. British and German ships, passing through the Islands in the later 19th century, observed continued skirmishing amidst a population reduced to perhaps 1/10 its pre-contact size.

**Metropolitan Powers**

In the 1880s, Spain wishing to head off increasing British and German interest, attempted a more permanent presence. Its involvement was quite limited, with a few priests representing both the government and church (Shuster 1982:156). Spanish religious interest did find some political expression, however, through a coincidence of interest between the priests and some Palauan chiefs. Unlike Polynesia where religious power helped to legitimate chiefly authority, in Palau chieftainship was an essentially secular office. The relatively achieved, and mystically-based, power of the shamans constituted the major rival to chiefly power. Chiefs were therefore motivated to suppress shamans and could do so without threat to their own power base. The Spanish were
interested in such repression as part of their campaign to wipe out "paganism." Spanish power was so limited that this, like the rest of its efforts, had only a limited effect.

Spain was forced to give up its Pacific possessions after its defeat in the Spanish-American War (1898). From this point until World War I, Germany was the metropolitan power in Palau. In contrast to the Spanish, the Germans established an administration designed to develop an productive and extractive, colonial regime. A police force was initiated, with a few Palauans involved. Some social control measures were also introduced.

A pattern of interaction emerged which was more complex than that with the Spanish, because the Germans were interested in utilizing the chiefs for indirect rule. For their part, the shamans were increasingly irritated with the deepening German control. In 1906, shamans started to organize to resist the Germans and were advocating rebellion to the chiefs. German repression, assisted by collaborating chiefs, eliminated shamans as a political "threat."

The major German effort concentrated on economics. Their only real success was phosphate mining, mainly centered in Angaur. In order to conduct the mining this foreign power, in an unprecedented move, acquired substantial amounts of Palauan land. This was accompanied by a considerable amount of fraud and coercion (PCAA 1978:207). Copra production was less important but involved coercion as well. In addition to their economic programs, the Germans, to a lesser extent, engaged in other efforts. They sought increased social control of the Palauans, and introduced a limited range of government services, including
education. Palau's leadership, and particularly the Ibedul, expressed a keen interest in having high-clan children take advantage of this foreign education. Palauan interest in, and opportunities for, obtaining western education, and other forms of cosmopolitan experience, would increase in later years.

At the outbreak of World War I Japan took possession of German-administered islands, including Palau. The Japanese had a far greater interest, involvement, and effect. A branch of Japan's Imperial Navy governed Palau and in 1921 the League of Nations gave Japan a mandate over Micronesia. This allowed the Japanese to treat Micronesia as an "integral" part of Japan (Shuster 1982:71). They were not supposed to utilize The Islands for military purposes, however, though they would actually do so after withdrawing from the League.

Japanese rule in Palau became increasingly direct with the installing of an expanding and more intrusive colonial apparatus. Two groups of Palauans emerged: one foreign-oriented, the other, called the Modekngei, developed as a pro-Palauan, nativistic, and increasingly anti-Japanese movement. The primary initiators of the Modekngei were two Paluans, Termedad and Ongesii. Termedad probably knew of the repression of the shamans and of a number of charismatic, indigenous religious leaders active towards the end of the German rule (Shuster 1982:72). The earliest Modekngei leaders had some familiarity with foreign education, Christianity, and with a metropolitan power (Shuster 1982:74).

Around 1916, Termedad went through the culturally accepted way of becoming a shaman. Together with Ongesii, Termedad began to gather a following. Their movement emerged as the Modekngei, which means "to bring together." The objective was to unite Palauans and bring them into
renewed, close association with the gods that watch over Palau. The Modekngei leaders engaged in healing acts, and performed "miracles." They also stressed a commitment to social morality through a strict adherence to rules. The Modekngei opposed Japanese programs for "modernization" and assimilation as culturally threatening. As they gathered strength, Tenmedad and his followers destroyed a rural government school, and advocated the curtailment of interaction between Palauans and the Japanese (PCAA 1978:383).

The Japanese viewed the Modekngei as anti-modern and anti-foreign (Shuster 1982:141) and were concerned about alleged Modekngei exploitation of common people. Some Palauans, especially those who stood to gain from the Japanese presence, were anti-Modekngei. Some Christian Palauans for doctrinal reasons also tended to be anti-Modekngei (Shuster 1982:76).

Using intelligence provided by such Palauans, the Japanese apprehended and jailed three key leaders in 1918. Thus began the first in a series of repressive campaigns. However, in a pattern that repeated itself, the arrest of some Modekngei leaders did not badly cripple the movement, since other leaders or even a whole region would shoulder responsibilities and carry on. Between 1925 and 1938, the pivotal leader influenced the Modekngei to become more nativistic and explicitly anti-Japanese (Shuster 1982:76).

Many chiefs also chafed under the restrictions imposed by the Japanese. Chiefs felt that perhaps some of their emasculated power could be regained under the leadership of the Modekngei. By late 1937, the Modekngei was supported by all village and district chiefs. With
this support, the Modekngei enjoyed full control of indigenous political authority.

The Japanese by this time were already committed to their plans for militarist expansion for which they wanted to use Palauan labor and resources. Consequently, the Japanese were in no mood to put up with Modekngei interference. The stage was set for another Japanese campaign against the Modekngei. Shuster submits that, as of 1940, the Modekngei was "thoroughly repressed" (Shuster 1982:177). However, in view of the Modekngei resurgence in 1944-45,7 repression was far from complete. In fact, generally, the Modekngei demonstrated continued resilience and strength despite, and to some degree because of, Japan's heavy handed colonial presence.

Despite the Modekngei, the Japanese proceeded with efforts to create a productive and extractive, Japanese-oriented society. They considered all village land to be "public" and proceeded to claim it. By the late Japanese period, over 80 percent of all clan and village-held land was alienated (Parmentier 1981:324). Japanese instituted forced labor of Palauans and also adopted a policy of massive immigration and importation of labor. By 1940, Palau had a population which has been estimated as high as 22,000 Palauans and 39,000 Japanese, Koreans and Okinawans (Nevin 1977:64). Koror grew from a cluster of villages into a "little Tokyo" (PCAA 1978:389). As of the late 1920s, the Mandated Islands, especially Palau and the northern Marianas, were an economic asset; revenue from Palauan phosphate, from fishing, agriculture, and mining created a favorable balance of trade for Japan (Shuster 1982:178).

Japanese educational efforts were also substantial. By 1936, there were 1,523 Palauan children enrolled in elementary school. A very few
Palauans were even selected for schooling in Japan. Though the overall objective of education was Japanization, some informants approved of the work ethic and sense of discipline which they felt were instilled by the Japanese. They contrasted this with the attitude of islanders "not wanting to work anymore" which some associate with the Americans.

Japan's efforts to "modernize" and Japanize Palau were cut short by militarization and destroyed by war, a fact not lost on contemporary Palauans. As Japan prepared for war, Palau became most important to them for its strategic location. The secret militarization of Palau was well-established by 1940. It involved the placement of airfields, gun batteries, a naval base, and deployment of at least 25,000 Japanese troops (Parmentier 1981:34).

From 1942, however, Japan was pushed back from its island bases. In Palau, preparations were made to repel an expected American invasion. Some Palauans, voluntarily and otherwise, contributing to Japanese defensive preparations. American bombing was intense in 1944, by which time all Palauans had been moved to Babladoab. Instead of attacking there the Americans invaded in the south, at Peleliu (and Angaur), where bloody fighting occurred.

Meanwhile, the 25,000 Japanese troops on Babladoab were isolated, along with the Palauans. During 1944-45 conditions on Babladoab deteriorated rapidly despite some relief efforts by the Modekngei. Normal functioning of the government and the economy ceased as Japanese authority collapsed, being replaced by an increasing atmosphere of lawlessness and terror (Shuster 1982:177). Isolation and starvation continued to grind into Babladoab as the island was pummeled by air attacks.
Japan formally surrendered on September 2, 1945 and on the same day the by-passed Japanese garrison on Babladaob also surrendered. Though this put Palau fully into American hands, some destruction continued. Upon entering Koror, American troops set about destroying what was left of "Little Tokyo." Certainly the Palauans must have been shocked and dazed by the extremely violent and sudden change-over of metropolitan powers. Perhaps in addition, these terrifying war years demonstrated to Palauans how interaction with ambitious foreigners could bring chaos and death.

The United States: A Contradictory Power

Treatment of the American involvement is divided into two periods. During the first period, from the end of World War II to the 1960s, U.S. involvement was minimal. From the 1960s on, it increased dramatically with profound and multi-faceted consequences. In fact the difference in the degree and impact of American involvement between these periods has been as great as that between the different metropolitan powers that have administered Palau. Treatment from 1960 is divided into the "optimistic 1960s," and the more "turbulent 1970s." As of the mid-1970s, the case study of this dissertation begins.

1945 to 1960

The American military viewed the Micronesians as a "liberated people" (Richard 1957:164). The Palauan attitude was far more mixed. The Japanese infrastructure, which had benefited Palauans in some ways, now lay in ruins (PCAA 1978:474). A number of informants, when they
look back on Japanese rule, view it as a time of predictability, social cohesion, and a reasonably adequate standard of living. Some of my informants as well as some of Parmentier's contrast conditions under the Japanese with the "terror and desperation" (Parmentier 1981:35) of the war years, and with the lack of social coherence and direction that some associate with American influence. The American view of Micronesia was based on very different considerations, however.

Americans had learned through bloody experience that Micronesia is strategically located in the western Pacific, and can be used as "stepping stones" (Gale 1979:6) for military aggression. The U.S. military therefore regarded continuing American control as essential (McHenry 1975:73). They, and a number of high ranking U.S. government officials, argued for outright American annexation of Micronesia. This view, however, met some resistance. The U.S. Department of State pointed out that annexation would clash with Allied support for decolonization and would be difficult to justify in the emerging United Nations. More generally, Americans have a democratic self-image, and have been reluctant to view their country as a colonial power (McHenry 1975:185, also Kiste 1982:2).

In 1947, Micronesia was designated a "strategic trust," the only one ever created. Although the United States' humanistic, political, and military/strategic impulses were all discernable, the arrangement was weighted towards the continuance of American control (McHenry 1975:3). In contrast to the former Japanese mandate, under the trusteeship the Americans were permitted to fortify, and station military forces in the Islands. In addition, and contrasting with the
other United Nations trusteeships, the United States could close the
territory to outside scrutiny for security reasons, and had veto power
in the Security Council of the United Nations (Gale 1979:63, also
McHenry 1975:3).

Nevertheless, the United States had a number of obligations. It
was supposed to enhance the economic, social, educational, and political
development of Micronesia (McHenry 1975:6). The strategic trust was not
meant to be a permanent arrangement, resulting in the absorption of
Micronesia by the administering power. Rather, it was supposed to
result in the sort of economic, educational, and political development
which will allow islanders to chose freely between a number of status
options, including independence. The United Nations has consistently
emphasized that the option of independence should be available to the
Micronesians and that, at the very least, the United States should not
hinder progress towards this goal (McHenry 1975:38-39).

Indeed, in international settings the United States seemed to
emphasize a desire to offer Micronesia the full range of status options.
The United States, however, would demonstrate a strong reluctance to
envision Micronesia either as independent or as associated with a foreign
power. Underlying this is the military's view that continuing control
of Micronesia is a strategic right and responsibility. However,
paternalistic/humanitarian and international/political considerations
would also influence the American approach, and in fact, American policy
would prove remarkably confused and inconsistent.

There has been the disjunction between America's public stance and
its underlying military stratégic preoccupation (McHenry 1975:12). In
addition, the degree of American attention to, and impact in the region
has varied considerably. The territory is remote, both geographically and culturally (Hammel and Kiste 1981:1). In part, because of American diffidence towards its colonial role but also because Micronesia has not been of pressing importance to the United States, there has been the lack of a seasoned and well-oiled American administrative apparatus in the Territory. An additional factor is the bureaucratic infighting and bickering in Washington, particularly between the U.S. departments of State and Defense. In sum, Micronesia would be administered by a metropolitan power with a complex set of somewhat divergent interests, and a multi-faceted government apparatus of competing power blocks. This is in marked contrast to the relatively monolithic, colonial approach that had characterized the Japanese.

In Palau and some of the other Micronesian districts, the United States was primarily interested in little more than strategic denial. Before the 1960s, little effort was expended by the Americans on economic or political development. At first the military authorities relied to a significant extent on chiefs, in the establishment of American authority. Initially, the chiefs' influence was enhanced. This in turn tended to undercut the political base of the former, "collaborationist" group of Palauans who had become influential under the Japanese. The American presence also had some effect in stimulating a small group of Palauan "radicals" who dreamed of a rebuilt economy and Japanese-style development (Shuster 1982:241). Their dream was not to be realized, however.

In 1947, the first elections were held for a Palau Congress, a purely advisory body to the U.S. At its inception, the Congress was reminded of its circumscribed role and was simply regarded as part of the
Trust Territory Government. Regulations for the body stressed that its duty was merely to "submit opinions and recommendations" on matters raised by the Civil Administrator, an American. In 1949, 16 municipalities with roughly the same boundaries as the old districts, were created (see Figure 3). At this local level, there was a bit more emphasis on "self government," but even here Palauan powers were sharply circumscribed.

In 1951, authority over the Trust Territory was transferred to the Department of Interior from the Navy. During the 1950s, however, little change resulted from this administrative shift. A High Commissioner (HCOM), appointed by the U.S. President, was the principal U.S. government official in the region (McHenry 1975:9). The HCOM took his instructions from the Department of Interior. The department would operate as a rather bemused, understaffed, and aimless caretaker administration (Nevin 1977:78). As Interior's administration of Micronesia began, there was little or no training for those Americans who went out to the Territory. They often remained isolated and aloof (Hammet and Kiste 1981:3).

In one sense, Interior's approach would be benign and paternalistic. Micronesia was viewed as similar to the western frontier, which had since been incorporated into the United States (Nevin 1977:99). This integrationist/absorptionist view had more than a tinge of "... colonial arrogance" (Nevin 1977:85).

Advancement in self-government proceeded at a moderate, gradually accelerating pace. A new Palau Congress was established in 1955. This Congress had a bit more authority than earlier, pan-Palauan institutions but it could not pass laws and primarily, was an advisory body.
Figure 3. Municipalities of Palau
Economic development was also quite modest. Both Navy's and Interior's view of its potential was quite limited (Gale 1979:83). A 1948 document stated; "the islands cannot be expected to be self supporting. Rather they are a liability and an inevitable charge on the public [i.e., American] purse" (Nevin 1977:82). In view of the escalating cost of maintaining Micronesia's dependency in later years, this 1948 assessment was prophetic. During both these administrations, Palau to a significant extent was "cast back on its own ... resources" (Parmentier 1981:37). Fishing and agriculture helped fill the gap left by the obliteration of the economy developed by the Japanese.

There was some American interest, however, in fostering Micronesian economic self-reliance. An economic advisor put it this way in 1958: "We are concentrating [our] priority on the Micronesian subsistence economy. Before introducing new elements ... we must upgrade what [the Micronesians] already have" (Nevin 1977:84). In actuality, little upgrading of any sort was accomplished. However, in retrospect, in view of the unbalanced development that would grip Micronesia as of the 1960s, this earlier period takes on a more balanced, realistic hue. The dark side of this picture, however, is the paternalism that it implies, and the fact that even a limited and realistic program of economic development was not attempted.

Educational efforts were also limited. Nevertheless, the Americans almost immediately committed themselves to providing universal education, initially through the elementary level. As we have seen, the Palauan positive regard for the advantages of western education and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure has deep cultural and historical roots.
During the Navy Period, each village complex in Palau exhibited a keen desire to obtain an elementary school (Shuster 1982:183).

Though the approach to education was one of "restraint" (Nevin 1977:85), educational efforts soon acquired an Americanized and bureaucratized flavor. Increasingly, this emphasis bore little resemblance to the lives led by most Micronesians or to a future that they could possibly support (Nevin 1977:94). As during Japanese times, foreign education within and beyond Palau, was "synonymous with employment, social advancement, being modern," and associated with a dominant power for at least some Palauans (Shuster 1982:183).

During the first half of the 1950s in Palau an American named Vitarelli became Palau's first education administrator. He favored a community-based, "learning by doing" approach. This was aimed at enhancing Palauan pride and economic self-reliance. Two Palauans, who were receptive to his ideas (i.e., Aifonso Oiterong and David Ramarui), would assume posts of educational leadership during the 60s and 70s, and would regard "community schools" as a possible counter-balance to the "hollow, rigid, formalistic, and bureaucratic approach" increasingly characteristic of the Trust Territory (Shuster 1982:191).

During the 1950s, there was a gradual expansion of the school system, with a growing number of students traveling to Guam for a high school education. It was clear that as the opportunities became available, students exhibited a keen interest in securing cosmopolitan-oriented, academic training with much less enthusiasm for the study of economically productive skills that might have contributed to an economic base.
A number of trends emerged that became current with the educational expansion of the 1960s and 70s. During the 1950s, there began a connection between American education and advancement in elective politics. In traditional Palau, techniques of political influence, persuasion, and innovation were passed on through restricted channels. Now, instead of being highly restricted, pathways for acquiring prestige and influence through externally-derived practices such as western education beginning in the 50s was having a social leveling, democratizing effect. This was to reach major proportions as of the later 1960s.

Generally the U.S. administration during the 50s was a "holding operation," requiring no great investment of U.S. attention and resources (Gale 1979:82). This quiet interlude was in marked contrast to former Japanese rule, and to the frenzied, American-sponsored "development" that commenced in the 1960s.

An Optimistic Decade

The 1960s ushered in massive changes in Micronesia as the territory became the target for accelerated "development" sponsored by the U.S. Conditions of seductive dependency emerged during this period. A complex set of factors, including global, metropolitan-satellite, and indigenous, shaped the pattern of development during this time.

As of the 1960s, the United Nations was a forum for the expression of international opinion against colonialism, wherever colonialism was thought to still exist. In 1961, a United Nations Visiting Mission (UNVM) went to Micronesia and issued a report which sharply criticized the United States handling of the territory (Gale 1979:101). The
report "stunned" the Kennedy Administration and put the U.S. on the
defensive as regards the wave of anti-colonialism sweeping the U.N.
(Gale 1979:110).

The U.S. was sensitive to international opinion and to some extent,
felt bound by its own democratic ideals and humanitarian concern. This
was highlighted in 1962 by health problems in the territory (Gale 1979:
101, also Nevin 1977:124).

At the time, the Kennedy Administration was also faced with an
international situation that seemed both "difficult and unstable"
(Nevin 1977:110). This was the period between the Bay of Pigs fiasco
and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Military/strategic concern did stimulate
increased U.S. attention to Micronesia; however, there were other
factors as well.

Within the U.S. government, a "lively debate" over Micronesia's
future resurfaced between the U.S. departments of State and Defense
(Gale 1979:99). Their respective positions have been discussed. A
third position, that of the Department of Interior, reflected somewhat
a meshing of the State and Defense Departments' views. Interior's view,
stated most idealistically, has been the pursuit of "good government
for and the well-being of the Micronesian people" (Nevin 1977:105).
This mixed paternalism with the absorptionist view that eventual
incorporation of Micronesia would be best for all parties concerned.
The U.S. Congress has also paid some attention to Micronesia. In
general, Congressional views have been a mix of paternalistic
humanitarianism and outright military/strategic concerns.

As the 1960s began these differing emphasis and institutional
interests produced bureaucratic bickering and grid-lock, between the
U.S. power blocks involved. A commission was organized in an attempt to resolve this and to help actualize an integrated and effective U.S. policy for the region (Gale 1979:107, also Nevin 1977:125). Headed by a Harvard economist named Solomon, the commission and its report became known by his name.

The Solomon Commission visited all the Micronesian districts in 1963. While much of their report was classified, periodically sections of it have "leaked." In fact the version cited is the one purportedly obtained by a Palauan-led activist group.13

The Solomon Report decried the slow pace of political, and particularly of economic development. While The Report took note of the growing international criticism of the United States' administration, it reaffirmed the "necessity" of retaining Micronesia for military/strategic purposes. Nonetheless, the report warned of possible embarrassment to the U.S. since, very soon, the United States would be the only nation still administering a trusteeship (Gale 1979:107, also Solomon Report 1963:4).

The Solomon Report recommended a plan to create favorable conditions for a plebiscite vote during which Micronesians would chose to be associated with the U.S. The report also warned that certain risks were involved. For one, it was recognized that incorporation of Micronesia would be a controversial action. The United States, after all, would be "moving counter to the anti-colonial movement . . . [and would] be breaching its own policy . . . of not acquiring new territorial possessions . . ." (Solomon Report 1963:7). Moreover, such a move could be financially costly. The report correctly predicted that, "for the foreseeable future, [Micronesia] would have to be heavily
subsidized" by the U.S. Some concern was expressed that an uncontrolled, protracted, and extravagant dependency could develop. In fact in later years, Micronesians and Palau would assertively seek to prolong the relatively comfortable status quo. This depended on massive and continuing U.S. aid.


Along with a degree of self-rule, education was targeted as a major vehicle for encouraging development (Gale 1979:109). Specific mechanisms for this should seek to develop "in a gradual way, [the Micronesians' interest] in favor of permanent affiliation" with the U.S. Among the mechanisms suggested was a "U.S.-oriented curriculum" for schools, along with an increase in the number of scholarships for study in the United States (Solomon Report 1963:13).

The Solomon Report had advocated a coherent, coordinated absorptionist policy as a way of persuading the Micronesians to subject themselves to continuing American control. Such a coordinated, integrated approach did not materialize, however. Instead, during the Johnson Administration, the flood of aid that started in the early 60s became a torrent. The American aid program simply expanded "out of control" (Hammet and Kiste 1981:4). The momentum kept building to simply expose islanders to ever increasing dosages of "American
largesse" (Nevin 1977:112). In approximate figures the Trust Territory's budget climbed from 5 and 1/4 million in 1960 to 17 and 1/2 million in 5 years later. By 1970, the amount stood at over 48 million dollars, an increase for the decade of over nine times (Gale 1979:104).

Years after the Solomon Report, when the Micronesians became more attuned to international currents, some Micronesians and outsiders would allege that this massive aid program amounted to a well-integrated and malevolent plan for U.S. domination. For instance some in Palau would describe The Solomon Report as "America's ruthless blueprint for annexation ..." (McHenry 1975:19). However such a stark view, while perhaps rhetorically appealing, does not take account of a number of factors that are important for understanding dependency.

The word "ruthless" underestimates the seductiveness of the dependency that was accelerating in the islands. The image of a deliberate, well-orchestrated conspiracy also underestimates the degree of ambivalence and inconsistency involved in the American approach. Moreover, whatever U.S. intentions, the development of a relatively integrated and self-reliant political economy in Micronesia would have been difficult, even with the best of intentions, given the mounting indigenous expectations and the very limited, local resource base. In addition, throwing vast amounts of "aid" at foreign problems is a characteristically American approach (Nevin 1977:23, also Kiste 1982:1). The impact of this has been facilitated by the small-scale and compact nature of Palau. Another factor facilitating the dependency pattern is that both of the avenues emphasized by the metropolitan power, namely education and political development, have been characteristic foci for Palauan interest and elaboration.
During the 1960s, education received the greatest emphasis. On the U.S. mainland at the time, education was a major vehicle for federal aid. Education was also favored because it seemed acceptable to America's U.N. critics, and it was regarded as an easy place to show quick results. Education could also be politically useful, in the sense of forging a positive, "ideological link" between Micronesia and the U.S. (Gale 1979:120). Economic development on the other hand was viewed as a more protracted process, with less certainty of success. It could also lead to politically undesirable consequences since, if it did succeed, this might lessen Micronesia's vulnerability to the United States (Gale 1979:121).

Education became the largest single sector of the Trust Territory budget, rising from $3,865,890 in 1966 to $12,855,600 in 1975. The changes wrought, especially in secondary education, were quite dramatic as the Trust Territory began "advertising" the right of every youngster to a formal education in a college-oriented environment (Gale 1979:116).

During the 1960s, a large contingent of American teachers were brought to Micronesia, and by 1966, one out of two Micronesian classrooms had an American teacher (Gale 1979:118). In addition to contract teachers, a large contingent of Peace Corps volunteers (PCV's) was deployed. At its peak, this amounted to the highest per capita PCV involvement in the world (McHenry 1975:132). These volunteers spread out into communities with an informal penetration which had a mixed effect. Volunteers felt relatively free to criticize the American role in Micronesia (Nevin 1977:134), especially as many of them were fresh from protest activities in the United States. In fact some Peace Corps
lawyers got into an outright controversy with the Department of Defense. To some extent, the Peace Corps encouraged Micronesians to be more assertive in relation to U.S. demands. However, these were attitudes some Micronesians were developing in any case, due to one largely unanticipated consequence of American-oriented education and cosmopolitan exposure: its effect of encouraging some Micronesians to increasingly assert their contemporary interests, through politically sophisticated means (Nevin 1977:133). At the same time, another aspect of metropolitan/satellite interaction was the encouragement of soaring expectations on the part of Micronesians for an externally-subsidized way of life that they could not possibly support. This tended to increase the dependence on U.S. aid.

Another impact and consequence of the strong push in education was the mushrooming of the educational bureaucracy (Gale 1979:123). With this bureaucracy, rose a new "elite," that of government workers (Nevin 1977:200). However it must be understood that "elite" in this case refers to quite a substantial proportion of the population, not a small minority. The broad spread of the "benefits" from this government employment was part of what made the dependency so seductive.

The basic curriculum in Micronesian schools changed little from the bureaucratic, academic, Americanized style already established. Vocational training continued to be "something people need[ed] but apparently did not want" (Nevin 1977:168). Instead Micronesians preferred education that could serve as a springboard to government employment and cosmopolitan careers.

Formal political development was also being stressed and Palauans eagerly seized upon and elaborated opportunities for political activities
and expression. In 1963, a Palauan legislature with increased powers was created. In addition to passing laws, this legislature could override a district administrator's veto by a 3/4 vote. Elected to this legislature was a group of relatively young men, among whom was Roman Tmetchul who had recently developed considerable political and economic influence. He and others had attended Japanese schools and also had post-war experience in Guam, Hawaii, or the Philippines. They had some command of English and an increasing grasp of American political techniques (Shuster 1982:255). Some of these techniques paradoxically would be used as leverage against unwanted metropolitan influence.

The second major development of 1963 was the establishment of political parties in Palau. The major ones were the Liberals and the Progressives. Previously, the only extra-kin and extra-regional political groupings were the Modekngei, and to a lesser extent, the politically-active Seventh Day Adventists.

Although in retrospect, a number of Palauans would conclude that political parties had a divisive and harmful effect, initially there was considerable sentiment that political parties would be "a good thing." It was thought they might offer a competitive mechanism, not too different from traditional Palau's bipolar system. Moreover political parties promised to move the political arena beyond ascribed, kin-based, or religiously-based criteria.

By the end of the 60s, Palau's two parties exhibited increased cohesion and organization, although a certain lack of consistency, with individuals shifting back and forth in faction-like style, would continue. The parties also developed a certain regionalistic flavor.
The parties started to recruit support based on issues and stances. For example, the return of public lands, long a subject of concern, became a matter of public debate between the parties. The Liberal Party appeared to favor Palauan action while the Progressives wanted to depend on the Trust Territory and as a result, lost some support. Increasingly, they were seen as the party less concerned with getting lands returned, and as more interested in detaching land for "development" and exploitation, perhaps even by alienating it to foreigners.

Two other issues would become a focus for party positions. One of these was the question of war claims. The Palau Legislature in 1963 set up a war claims committee. Reportedly, this was at the instigation of the Liberal Party. The emerging Progressive Party position was that the Trust Territory should fund and organize a war claims office.

The subject became increasingly controversial. The Liberal Party claimed credit for the Palau Legislature's war claims commission which was beginning to bear fruit. Islanders were also learning that assertive tactics could be effective with the Americans. The Liberal Party in general, and Roman Tmetchul in particular, became well-known for such assertive tactics.

A third issue was the question of political status which has been a major question in political campaigns since the early 1960s. Generally, at this period the Liberal Party supported greater political control, with political independence as the ideal goal. The Progressive Party on the other hand seemed to support a closer relationship to the United States, and were more comfortable with the prospect of rapid, western-oriented development. On this issue too, the Liberals came to
be seen as more oriented towards "Palau for the Palauans" and for increased Palauan assertiveness and political control.

The Modekngei, though not a political party, was quite active in pan-Palauan political affairs as of the 1960s and after this time. The Modekngei had evolved into a highly complex politico-religious movement and continued to wield major influence as it was a large group, and tended to vote in a block. As one Modekngei informant described it, the movement "picks up the good politicians and steers them" towards goals favored by the Modekngei. They have, however, withdrawn support from leaders and group that deviate from the above mentioned paths. The Modekngei, like the Liberal Party, seemed committed to enhancing Palauan identity and control. Throughout the 1960s the Liberals enjoyed strong Modekngei support. The popularity of Liberal Party positions, the influence of some of its leaders, and the Modekngei support, all propelled the Liberal Party to domestic dominance during this period and throughout the mid 1970s.

Generally during the 60s, electoral politics broadened dramatically. Palauans increasingly came to the conclusion that a "much larger arena [was opening up] for political maneuver" (Shuster 1982:255). This supplemented the Palauan ethno-historic predisposition for seeking out new arenas for influence, competition, maneuver, and political "games" (McKnight 1974). The Palauan political field was increasingly "fluid, dynamic" and complex (Shuster 1982:365). Generally, the 1960s was an optimistic decade. Increased educational and political opportunities developed amidst an accelerating dependent affluence. However, the political status negotiations between the Congress of
Micronesia, which first met in 1965, and the United States was disappointing. Although these were carried on at the all-Micronesia level, they were closely followed by Palauans, and was in fact led by one of them.

In contrast with the model of early dependency theory, the interaction between Palau, Micronesia and the United States cannot be adequately viewed simply as a bilateral relationship between a dominant power and a satellite. In this case, there were three parties, with the Congress of Micronesia and Palau, being dependent on the United States. Moreover, though the COM's power was limited in a number of ways (Gale 1979:114), the ensuing interaction points up another weakness in simplistic dependency theory. In contrast to the expectations of early dependency theory, both Palau and the COM have not always been compliant satellites, despite their heavy economic dependence on the United States. America may have been planning to create a weak body when it established the COM. However once established, the COM's "principal preoccupation . . . [would be] to confront the power and authority of the American-controlled" administration (same).

The COM grew impatient with what it saw as the slowness of the U.S. response to Micronesian inquiries about self-determination. It established its own political status commission and selected Lazarus Salii, a leader of the Liberal Party from Palau, as Chairman. By the end of the 1960s three status options were being actively considered by the Micronesians: (1) total independence, envisioned as complete internal and external Micronesian control but with no guarantee of U.S. financial support, (2) integration with the U.S., resulting in commonwealth or statehood, or (3) free association with the U.S., which
Micronesians envisioned as allowing them to be fully self-governing in internal affairs, while the U.S. guaranteed continuing high levels of financial support. In return for this, some Micronesian resources would be made available for U.S. military use (McHenry 1975:90).

For its part the U.S. would publicly adhere to a definition of Micronesian free choice as "the process by which a people determine their own political status" (McHenry 1975:141). Actually, U.S. policy departed significantly from this since underlying U.S. (strategic) requirements have meant that the U.S. acts as if a "free" and reasonable choice for the Micronesians does not include independence.20

As the Micronesians articulated their position it became clear that they sought an improvement in their relationship with the U.S., not a termination or even lessening of the relationship. The COM recognized both U.S. strategic interests, and Micronesian desires for increased political control as irreducible realities. However, when the negotiations commenced, the Micronesians were disappointed as they were confronted with the American "hidden policy" which sought unimpeded U.S. control (see McHenry 1975:91-97).

In 1969, the U.S. drew up a commonwealth proposal. This reflected the Defense Department position that Micronesia simply could not be allowed to obtain a degree of self-government "that included [Micronesian] control of their land" and status (i.e., through a right of unilateral change of relationship) (McHenry 1975:98).

It was at this point that a U.S. official was quoted as making a statement that has come to be used as an example of U.S. insensitivity and callousness towards the region. The then Secretary of Interior
Hickel was present at a meeting which the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also attended. According to Hickel, he disagreed with Kissinger over whether the U.S. had either the right or the necessity to "invoke eminent domain" over the Micronesians. To this Kissenger replied; "there are only 90,000 people out there, who gives a damn?" As a matter of fact, through a commonwealth agreement, the U.S. could gain permanent and uncontested control (McHenry 1975:98), however, the Micronesians flatly rejected this.

Status Chairman Lazarus Salii termed the U.S. proposal "almost totally objectionable." As he put it, the U.S. "would control our future. Micronesia would become a permanent part of the U.S.'s political family--that is the term they use--but eminent domain would remain eminent domain; veto [power] would remain veto power.

. . . Micronesia would be the newest, smallest, and most remote non-white minority in the U.S. As permanent and as American as, shall we say, the American Indian" (Salii in MacHenry 1975:99). This unexpected Micronesian rejection invalidated an apparent metropolitan assumption that all the "aid" being provided would automatically promote satellite compliance. As noted, the metropolitan attention to education and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure was having a number of unanticipated, contrary effects. One of these was the increasingly assertive, political consciousness being developed by some islanders.

It had been assumed by the COM that, as part of free association, aspects of the relationship not absolutely tied to U.S. strategic interests would be subjected to increasing Micronesian control. After all, the U.S. was a democratic power, and was subject to international
opinion. Of course, the U.S. was also the donor/metropolitan power with strategic interests in the region. Given this, from the external vantage point of dependency theory, it was never likely that the U.S. would facilitate Micronesia's development as a politically independent and economically viable nation-state. After all this could decrease Micronesia's vulnerability and therefore its susceptibility to metropolitan interests. However, dependency theory was not the perspective of Micronesians at the time.

Irrespective of this, however, some Micronesian leaders were exhibiting increased political consciousness. To a significant extent, this was a consequence of the opportunities for western education and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure being offered through the interaction with the U.S. Early dependency theorists asserted that education is primarily a vehicle for the co-optation of a domestic elite through westernization. However, as can be seen from a number of cases of de-colonialization in the Third World (Vietnam and Indonesia are two examples), western education can also lead to increased political sophistication, and at times, to assertiveness. In Micronesia and especially Palau, education has cut both ways. For instance by the later 1960s "intellectually [the Micronesian leaders] were moving farther and farther away from a commonwealth status as this had been proposed by the United States" (McHenry 1975:102). The rejection by the Micronesians of the commonwealth offer "complicated matters" (McHenry 1975:102) for the U.S. In addition, continuing U.S. bureaucratic infighting served to impede a quick and decisive American response. The complexity of this interaction demonstrates the importance of
understanding emic views and expectations. This is necessary in order to grasp the sense of frustration and alienation when the metropolitan power acts in such a way as to provoke the perception that legitimate, indigenous expectations are being denied. Such a complex, and in ways contradictory pattern of metropolitan/satellite interaction has been in marked contrast to the monolithic, more classically colonial pattern which had developed under the Japanese. The "contrary" aspects of American rule would become even more pronounced during the turbulent 1970s.

The Turbulent 1970s

By 1970 certain developments led to increased turbulence and some uncertainty in Palau's politics. In part, this was due to domestic matters. Other developments were more directly connected with Palau's relationship to the rest of Micronesia and to the United States, including American's assessments of its "requirements" as a global power.

Beginning in the late 1960s, a shifting international balance of power caused the United States to reasses policy (McHenry 1975:163). As a result of problems emerging in Vietnam the U.S. military was clearly interested in finding more politically secure areas than Southeast Asia to base U.S. forces. Micronesia was seen as one such area (McHenry 1975:63). Consequently, the U.S. military's interest changed from strategic denial to potential use. Palau had particular strategic value for the U.S. due to Palau's closer proximity to areas where an increased presence of Soviet forces was expected. Given Palau's considerable land
mass, its use for military training exercises was also being considered. In fact the military began to reveal plans for massive requirements: access and anchorage rights at Palau's main harbor, some additional development of adjacent areas, the use of airfields, the right to acquire 2,000 acres for exclusive use, and another 30,000 for joint use by Palauans and the military. On land, amphibious assault and jungle warfare exercises were envisioned. In addition, the military indicated that it might want to store weapons and/or toxic substances on its acres of exclusive use. The land area the military wanted may not seem large by continental standards, but one should remember the small scale of Palau, and that anticipated military use could involve close to 1/2 of Palau's arable land! And finally, from the mid 1970s on there have been persistent rumors of a U.S. intention to base nuclear submarines in Palau. The prospect of such military use provoked deep concern among Palauans.

Troubled Negotiations

Heightened United States military interest in Micronesia was a consideration during status negotiations in the early 1970s, as was increased interest, on the part of Micronesians, for greater political autonomy and control. However, during the course of negotiations, it would become clear that the United States did not want to entertain all Micronesian preferences on future status and might even use promises or threats connected with "aid" as a means to secure Micronesian compliance.

In June 1971 President Nixon stated his "continuing interest" in Micronesia. For talks in 1971 the U.S. explicitly stated three major interest: general concern for the "welfare" of the Micronesian People,

At the time of negotiations held in Koror in 1972, the mood was "bleak and confrontationist" (McHenry 1975:107). As the see-saw negotiations continued, tentative agreement was reached on a preamble and three topics (internal affairs, foreign affairs, defense) for a compact of free association. However this provoked considerable controversy in Palau. The next round of negotiations then broke down over the question of political independence. Negotiations then resumed in 1973, only to collapse over the level of funding to be offered by the U.S. Informal talks continued however.

A number of major issues emerged during the formal negotiations. Many of these would also arise later, when the Palauans conducted their own negotiations after 1977. One issue was control over future political status. According to Lazarus Salii, free association was an "acceptable compromise" between American and Micronesia if the Micronesians were able to unilaterally terminate this status (McHenry 1975:108). The U.S., however, was insisting on mutual consent for any post-trusteeship alteration.

By late 1972, it was no longer clear whether the Micronesians preferred free association or independence. Independence as a desirable status was gaining ground in Palau and Truk. While the COM did not take a clear position, independence as a status option was receiving greater Micronesian consideration by this time.

In fact independence was a "growing force" in Micronesia, particularly in Truk and Palau (McHenry 1975:111). Moreover, Salii's
initialing of elements of a free association compact in 1972 had touched off vocal criticism in Palau. As seen by United States, Salii was "in trouble" with other Palauans, over the initialing, and now wanted to demonstrate that he could "handle" (McHenry 1975:112) the Americans--that he could be more assertive. Based on comments made by my informants, Salii's initialing was controversial and highly unpopular in Palau. In any case, the U.S. public position on independence was not clarified until November, 1973, when the U.S. approved it as a status option. Nevertheless, status negotiations remained troubled. This was because other issues remained unresolved.

The question of land and its acquisition by the U.S. military was another major concern. Access to land and its control had become a point of discussion between Palauans and the Trust Territory (see p. 69). As the Micronesians learned more about U.S. land requirements they were "pleasantly surprised" (McHenry 1975:115) since even by Micronesian standards, military requests for land did not seem large. However as noted, this was not the case for Palau. There U.S. requests could have a substantial impact on a relatively large proportion of resources. This provoked considerable Palauan unease that was also fueled by Palauan memories of land alienation and resource abuse during the later Japanese period and World War II.

During 1972, the Palau Legislature stated that "the military was not welcome" in Palau (McHenry 1975:115). The Speaker of the Palau Legislature and a paramount chief stated that discussion of possible land use by the U.S. military could only take place after all land held by the Trust Territory was returned.
The Palauan position on the return of lands contributed to a more assertive stance by the COM. This demonstrates that, as with the relation between metropolitan power and satellite, Palau's relationship with Micronesia cannot be understood as a simple, mechanical domination by the more inclusive unit over the localized one. To the contrary, the Palauans were exerting an effect on the Congress of Micronesia that was out of all proportion to Palau's material resource base. This was due primarily to the Palauans' political sophistication, efficacy, and assertiveness.

More generally, however, the conflict remained. The U.S. wanted "safeguards" to ensure that if public lands were returned, the U.S. would be able to use the land at some future time for military purposes. The Micronesians objected to such "preconditions."

Control of laws was another issue during the negotiations. After rejection of the U.S. commonwealth proposal, the U.S. acceded to the Micronesian position that they be able to develop and implement their own constitution and national government. Nevertheless, it was the U.S. position that any constitution should be consistent with the basic understandings of a compact of free association envisioned between Micronesia and the U.S. (McHenry 1975:116). The Micronesians were encouraged, but ambiguity remained: if a constitution became the supreme "law of the land" before free association was finalized, then how could the former be held accountable to the latter? After all, "free association" was a mere conceptual understanding, one that was likely to be subject to variable interpretations. This question was not pressing during the status negotiations of the early 1970s; however, it was a
focus for mobilization and controversy during Palau's constitutional dispute (see Chapter V).

The definition and control of foreign affairs also became an issue during negotiations. As the negotiations wore on, the U.S. became quite disturbed by Micronesian requests for some degree of control in foreign affairs. Generally the U.S. would insist on securing full and unrestricted authority over what they defined as their military/strategic requirements. The Micronesians were trying to establish a distinction between external affairs irreducibly tied to military/strategic concerns, and those dealing with Micronesian economic, cultural, and political matters (McHenry 1975:121). Micronesians were willing to delegate the former, but not the latter. A potentially complicating factor has been that, as the U.S. military interest changed from denial to potential use, the line between military/strategic and other matters might become difficult to draw. This could be especially true in districts such as Palau, where the possibility exists for a massive and highly disruptive use. Palauans would be confronted by this question, explicitly and directly, for the first time, when they developed their constitution in 1979.

The level of funding also became a focus during the negotiations. The see-saw movement and twists and turns in these negotiations demonstrate the importance of taking an interactive view of the metropolitan/satellite relationship (for details see McHenry 1975:123). The COM had explored the possibility of independence. The U.S. had refused to discuss this, however. Then, for the first time, the U.S. began to publicly couple the level of aid it was prepared to give to
agreement on a political status that the U.S. preferred. The threat of reduction of future metropolitan aid, or even complete withdrawal, was voiced. As discussed in Chapter I, dependency theorists have pointed out that such renumerative/coercive tools are often used by dominant/donor powers.

Until this point in the U.S./Micronesian relationship, at least publicly both sides regarded the level of funding as a subordinate matter, in relation to other concerns. But in 1973 the Micronesians took the position that they would agree to a political status that the U.S. preferred only if the U.S. financial offer was sufficiently "generous." The U.S., on the other hand, took the position as of this juncture that it would only provide a high and assured level of funding if the Micronesians agreed to a status agreement which the U.S. preferred.

There has also seemed to be divergent perspectives as to whether the U.S. or the Micronesians were primarily responsible for development. U.S. negotiators appeared to believe that the Micronesians were responsible, and therefore aid should be provided based on a calculation of Micronesian needs, but with the expectation that sometime in the future the Micronesians would move towards a more efficient and self-reliant government and economy. Hopefully at that point, the U.S. subsidy could be reduced. As my informants reported on this period, however, and based on the interactions I observed, some Palauans and perhaps other islanders have felt that the U.S., with its great wealth, was primarily responsible for development. Micronesians might or might not choose to reduce the affluent dependency but the U.S. had no
right to insist on this. It is also possible that some islanders sought to play upon U.S. sensitivity, concerning its image as a generous and altruistic international power, doing this as a means to procure more aid.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps the view described has also sprung from a still "colonized," dependent mentality.\textsuperscript{25} In any event, as the negotiations wore on between the U.S. and Micronesia, it was the metropolitan power, not the satellite, that seemed more interested in reducing dependency. A role reversal of sorts had taken place. Palauans, in addition to exhibiting this mentality to some extent, ushered in the 1970s with increased domestic, as well as externally-directed political competition and assertiveness.

Palauan Politics in the 1970s

Particularly in Palau, the 1970s was a period of increased turbulence and perhaps uncertainty. Domestic and external developments and the relationships between these shaped the political field. This period of high tension even included shots being fired at two Palauan leaders. In one incident, a number of by-standers were wounded.

As the 1970s began, the question of return of lands, which had become a party issue in the 1960s, escalated to the point of internal strife and confrontation. Circumstances reached the boiling point when a Progressive Party leader, not of high traditional rank, suggested that land in Koror held by the Trust Territory should be distributed to whoever was willing to develop it, irrespective of traditional rights. This suggestion polarized opinion to the point that groups of people from the opposing factions nearly came to an open and violent confrontation.
Political status was another issue that reached new heights of controversy. In April 1971, there was a public demonstration in Palau in support of the COM's unease over U.S. military requests. This activist-led demonstration involved signs, some of which read: "Palau is mine, not yours. We want peace, not a military presence in our land. Ours is ours, not yours to control. We support our leaders, full control of our foreign affairs." This demonstration, involving 300-500 Palau High School students, took place as United States/Micronesian status negotiations were being conducted in Koror in 1972. By this time independence enjoyed quite considerable support by Palauan leaders. Roman Tmetchul favored this course as did the influential Modekngei.

The political field was also enlivened by the return of students who had been to American universities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, during a period of student unrest. Soon after their arrival back in the Islands, some of these Palauans became activists and among other things, began to mobilize support to oppose some U.S. demands. This "contrary" response was unanticipated by the metropolitan power.

Shuster describes the activists as a "second generation" of contemporary, Palauan leaders (Shuster 1982:269). This new group, even younger than the first, encountered greater resistance in mobilizing support, in part because of their relatively novel objectives and their "grass-roots," protest-oriented political tactics. There were indications as well that activist politics as of yet, was culturally unacceptable (Shuster 1982:269). This should be surprising, since activists addressed themselves to extra-local and extra-kin issues, this, in a society that was small-scale and still quite personalistic.
I interviewed at least five Palauans who had been influential activists in Palau. The events being discussed had happened some 2-9 years before and my informants' were undoubtedly influenced by subsequent events. Their views, however, are useful reflections of the past, and help to reveal the dynamics of the contemporary situation. Considerable detail is presented on the emergence of the activists for the theoretical point already mentioned, because much of the data is fieldwork-derived, and therefore has greater richness.

A number of the activists went to private high schools. At least one of these institutions, located in Micronesia, has a reputation for academic toughness and rigor. Even during high school years a number of future activists were questioning the nature of the status quo in Micronesia. "Why are the Americans here? Why are we taught [mostly] about American and western history . . . so that we become alienated from our own cultural roots . . .?" This is how one informant described his questioning.

All informants who were former activists emphasized the importance of their exposure to the student protests and unrest on American campuses during the later 1960s as a factor which influenced them to pursue activist politics, upon their return to Palau. For instance Moses Uludong, dubbed "Palau's radical leader of the early 1970s" (Office of the President 1981:20) was involved in student demonstrations while he attended college in Hawaii. In addition, Uludong talked to church groups and Micronesian leaders when they passed through Hawaii.

The most ideologically-oriented of the activists related their views of Micronesia to a broader context of anti-colonial struggle. As
Uludong said: "it was Africa in the 1950s. In the 1960s, it was independence and revolution. This was all part of an international mood and frenzy." Palauans indirectly participated in this through protest demonstrations, as did many others on American campuses at the time. Activists such as Uludong also began reading the anti-colonial literature of Third World countries (Shuster 1982:269).

Activists felt they were in the best position to "accommodate [and synthesize] both traditional and foreign influences" so as to mobilize support for autonomist objectives in Palau (activist informant). Yet even by their own admission, activists were in an awkward position to promote such a synthesis upon their return to Palau, which occurred in the early 1970s. At the time, these Palauans were in their early twenties and at least 2 of the 5 of my informants described themselves as coming from "low" clans or villages. In old Palau, although there were avenues for social mobility, generally political power still came with advanced age and high clan status. To a lessened but considerable extent, this was still true in the 1970s.

At least through the first half of the 1970s, attempts by the activists to mobilize other islanders were described by informants as both difficult and frustrating. Until 1975, according to informants people "told their children . . . not to talk to" the activists who were considered "radicals, and show-offs." People would say "the activists just want to give us problems." People thought the activists "were crazy and that we had been [inappropriately] influenced by the American students . . ."

Certainly the activists were opposed to the continuation of the "Establishment" in Micronesia which they saw as increasing Micronesian
dependency. They viewed the Trust Territory Government and the Palau District as lacking in any defined strategy or doctrine that could promote self-reliance and political independence. As of the early 1970s, the activists wanted the Trusteeship ended and the Americans "kicked out." They felt such action was necessary before islanders could effectively deal with any other problems. But by the same token, the activists did not present a coherent political and economic alternative to replace the Trust Territory if it was dismantled and the Americans removed. 26

One of the targets of activists in Palau were the foreign-owned companies located there. Activists developed connections with some of the Palauan employees. Moses Uludong was involved in this. There was a strike in 1973.

Afterwards, during a stint as a volunteer teacher, Uludong became closer to a number of college-educated, high school teachers. He and a number of these became the core members of the emerging activist movement, named Tia Belau ("This is Palau"). This group aimed to promote Palauan self-reliance, and Micronesian independence. Activists urged that there be a restructuring of education in the high school so as to accommodate a greater emphasis on enhancing Palauan identity and economically productive activities (Shuster 1982:217). During 1971, however, organizational efforts to reach out to educational personnel made little progress. As one informant stated other teachers "did not want to get mixed up in our activities." Activist influence was more substantial among students. There was a protest strike by Palauan dormitory students in 1972. The same year, activists organized and led
a demonstration protesting U.S. military demands, manned mostly by Palau High School students.

By the end of 1972, Tia Belaud members had a written platform (see Appendix A). In developing it, activists held meetings and engaged in heated discussions. During these, books were circulated and films shown about "struggles" in other parts of the world. Tia Belaud also began publishing a newspaper, both to transmit information and to take sides on issues dealing with the "... betterment of Palau" (Tia Belau v. 1, June 23, 1972).

Until the late 1970s, the activists for the most part avoided connections with influential Palauan political and economic leaders. They viewed such "Establishment" leaders and the government in general as too bureaucratic, and as hopelessly dependent on the U.S. There were some minor exceptions to this, however. Between 1972 and 1974 there was some activist interest in developing an association with Roman Tmetchul. At the time, both Tmetchul and the activists were advocating economic self-reliance and political independence. Such an association failed to materialize, however, due to the activist distaste for political parties, which they saw as elitist and divisive, and for "Establishment" leaders. Tmetchul, already influential, probably felt that he did not need the activists.

Something of an alliance emerged between the activists and some chiefs, however. In 1968 and 1973, the chiefs boycotted legislature sessions, feeling that they were being excluded from meaningful participation in national politics. A degree of linkage emerged between the traditional elite, whose power was slipping and the young activists
who had yet to gain a major voice, based perhaps on a shared feeling that the established political structure had acquired too much power. It was also a way for the activists to gain more influence for themselves.

In 1973 the activists supported the chiefs' boycott with a position paper which they presented to the High Commissioner. Significantly, the political tactic of boycotting the Legislature had now been established. It would be used in 1975 when elements of the Progressive Party sought to contain Liberal Party domination, and again during Palau's constitutional dispute.

Shuster maintains that the activists' dramatic, protest behavior and "passionate" sorties in support of self-determination and anti-colonialism "caught everyone's imagination and attention" during the early 1970s making this "small group of activists disproportionately influential . . ." (Shuster 1982:217, 218). My interpretation diverges somewhat from this. Clearly, the early 1970s as opposed to most of the 1960s, was a time of increased "nationalistic fervor" and some questioning of the status quo in Palau. The activists were involved in this and could benefit from it. Activist influence during the early to mid 1970s was, however, limited substantially by the factors mentioned above. More important still was the absence of a truly galvanizing issue for activist politics. Such an issue did not arise until plans for a "superport" became controversial in 1975/76. This is treated in Chapter III.

In some contrast to the activists, the Modekngei maintained quite substantial influence throughout the period and also contributed to the nationalistic flavor of the times. In contrast to how they are sometimes
pictured, the Modekngei are not rigid traditionalists. Rather, they want selective preservation, and a careful integrative approach to desired modernization. They seek to preserve and enhance "good customs," those that promote cooperation between Palauans and which act to prevent "wide gaps" from developing between the rich and poor in Palau. The Modekngei do not necessarily envision a national government built along traditional lines. They do seem to prefer an externally restrictive, national government that can protect Palauan resources from both internal and external abuse. Unlike the activists, the Modekngei came to their position largely as a result of the domestic history and development of their movement. This development illustrates how a primarily indigenous movement, historically conditioned by its interactions with metropolitan powers, can contribute to a contemporary, nationalist orientation.

The formation of a House of Chiefs, the final political development to be discussed, was institutional. Established in 1976, the HOC played a significant role in the political events and controversies that provide the case study for this dissertation. Therefore a brief discussion is in order. In March, 1976 the Ibedul, who was relatively young and with cosmopolitan exposure and activist leanings, requested the establishment of voting power for chiefs. This was defeated by the Legislature's elected members, and a legislative crises ensued. As a consequence, a new charter was issued for the Legislature in April, 1976, establishing a bicameral Legislature, containing a House of Chiefs. The evolution of the HOC deviated from the expectations of even those Palauans who were instrumental in forming it, as did the evolution of political parties. Such evolution demonstrates how unintended and unanticipated consequences of deliberate actions can powerfully effect the political field.
Shuster claims that, with the HOC, the power of chiefs was sharply reduced at the national level. Shuster attributes this primarily to traditional, rurally-based leadership losing ground to modern, western-oriented, "urban" interests (Shuster 1982:290). However, other elements were also involved. The composition of the HOC rapidly shifted towards relatively young cosmopolitan-oriented acting chiefs who often spent much of their time in Koror, while engaged in contemporary, political/economic activities. The HOC also seemed politically associated with, and perhaps dominated by, one of the major political factions in Palau by the mid-to-late 1970s. This alleged association would have a backlash effect, eroding popular support for the position of acting chiefs. This was a significant factor effecting mobilization during Palau's constitutional dispute (see Chapter IV).

Education

Education during the 1970s was basically an acceleration of the pattern established in the 1960s. Alfonso Oiterong, who was Director of education had some understanding of a community-oriented, self-reliant approach. Despite this, however, during the 1970s, American-oriented education and the bureaucracy reached new heights. American support for educational programs ranging from cultural awareness programs to school lunch expanded enormously. By 1978, Palau was receiving $357,000, an amount which more than doubled by the next year (Shuster 1982:213).

The number of Palauan and other Micronesian college students also rose dramatically. Palauans eagerly and assertively sought this education. Palau, next to last in terms of population, among the six Micronesian districts consistently ranked first in the number of students
studying abroad. As in the past, few chose subjects such as agriculture and marine sciences that might assist in reducing Micronesia's dependency.

The Modekngei during the 1970s provided an interesting addition to education. It established a high school in rural Palau, with the intention of getting away from the "corrupting" influences of life in Koror (Shuster 1982:218). It was also part of a "centralizing" trend in the religion.

Dr. Viterelli, then Vice President for research at the University of Guam, encouraged the move feeling it could help Palau to develop economic self-sufficiency which in turn could be a stepping-stone to political independence. The Modekngei also received external aid in the form of approximately $12,000 a year (the 1980 figure) from a foundation in California.

Shuster says that, as time went on, it "... would become obvious ... that Viterelli vision" of economic self-reliance and self-sufficiency was not "deeply shared by very many Modekngei" (Shuster 1982:221). It should be noted as well that Viterelli vision was in fact contrary to the tide of seductive dependency and artificial affluence sweeping Palau. Despite this, particularly during its early years, Ibobong, the Modekngei school, stood out as an idealistic exception to the more dominant trend.

A Distinctive Kind of Development

Massive changes have taken place in Micronesian and Palauan society, particularly from the 1960s on, especially in the fields of education, governmental structure, and political expression. "Development" of a kind has taken place, but it has been skewed and
unbalanced. There has been a deepening and striking disparity between the fast pace of educational and political elaboration, and stagnation or even retrogression in the economic field.

The development of American-sponsored education, the government bureaucracy, and less directly Palau's contemporary, political structure have all depended in large part on massive, external subsidy. By 1966/67, the U.S. was providing 90 percent or more of Micronesia's budget (Nevin 1977:30). Micronesia's balance of trade was increasingly distorted. In 1973, Micronesian imports totaled 73 million compared to just 6 million in exports, and most of the latter was paid for from U.S. funds. In Palau, the import to export ratio stood at 5:1 (Johnson in Herz 1977:27).

In contrast to the limited economic development, the elaboration of education, its bureaucracy, and more generally of the government economy was staggering. By the early 1970s approximately half of all salaried workers in Micronesia worked for the government (Nevin 1973:33). In Palau, as of 1977, the government economy employed 75 percent of all wage-earners (Johnson in Herz 1977:27).

There have always been substantial obstacles to an autonomous development path regardless of American intentions. An adequate understanding of this must go beyond dependency theory, and perhaps beyond dependencia as well. Though more flexible and historically-grounded, a dependencia approach like dependency and world-systems is a theory that tends to focus on exploitation and asymmetrical power relationships. These approaches may not grasp the reality that island material resources are quite limited and perhaps inadequate, especially
given the preference for white-collar work and lifestyle that many islanders have come to expect.

It must also be added that the distinctive dependency in Palau and Micronesia has served to condition development options. For instance, Nevin has pointed out how the inflated "dreams" of Micronesians, fostered and now supported by artificial affluence, have become so "unreal" as to inhibit even the limited and realistic economic development which might otherwise have taken place at the Trust Territory level (Nevin 1977:25). Attitudes and expectations were being fostered by the high levels of aid, and these bore "almost no relation to the [productive] realities of life" in the region. Not only had islanders acquired a taste for this but increasingly, they have come to expect this and are under the "illusion" that somehow, it will invariably continue (Nevin 1977:24).

Nevin described these circumstances as "frightening," though he does not dwell on the reasons. With the dependencia approach the dangers become quite clear, and in fact are central to the theory. Given the massive degree of economic dependency, Palauans like other Micronesians could be extremely vulnerable to unwanted and/or undesirable metropolitan demands or intrusions, as the price for this continuing dependency. A metropolitan power can threaten to reduce, or even cut off, its "aid," so as to gain satellite compliance. As dependencia theorists have pointed out, this threat can be one of the most potent weapons at a metropolitan power's disposal. In fact, the U.S. would sporadically wield this threat.

Dependencia theorists would describe the "development" analyzed in the present chapter as an extreme case of disarticulation and imbalance
between a number of sectors of a "satellite" which is increasingly
dependent on its metropolitan power for economic, and other forms of
support. This has lead to an overall pattern of development that makes
it difficult for Palau to pursue a relatively integrated, autonomous
path. This pattern in turn fosters more discrete "distortions," such as
the preferences and opportunities for consumption oriented lifestyle,
coupled with a disdain for manual labor and the subsistence activities
which normally form the backbone of "Third World" life. In many ways,
this pattern of pervasive and seductive dependency can be more difficult
to throw off than the classic, exploitative colonialism that has been
endured by much of the Third World.

By the mid 1970s, while on this vulnerable and yet seductive
economic path Micronesians were "casting about" for a viable, political
future (Nevin 1977:36). Micronesian status negotiations with the U.S.
were stalled, however. At the same time, internal separatist tendencies
were maturing in the Marianas. Separatism was also becoming a major
force in Palau and the Marshalls as well.

The political economy of Palau generally fit the broader,
Micronesian pattern. The accelerated program of non-extractive subsidy,
an aberrant case of "development," was penetrating with a dependency that
was both wide and deep. The Palauans, however, as has been characteris-
tically the case, would demonstrate a greater assertiveness and perhaps
sophistication in seeking ways to exploit, manipulate, and at times even
to lessen dependency, and the vulnerability and narrowing of options
that this can involve. In Palau, dependency, political sophistication
and assertiveness were all developing in tandem. Palauans did not seem
to perceive themselves as vulnerable to America or other external pressures despite their economic dependency on the U.S. During 1975-76, however, a plan was prepared to locate a massive port for oil storage and transhipment in Palau. This provoked an unprecedented controversy over the advantages and disadvantages which such "development" would bring to Palau. This controversy heightened Palauans' awareness of the vulnerability connected with dependency, including susceptibility to external manipulation and control.
CHAPTER II--NOTES

1. In contemporary Palau the term "rock islands" refers not only to the "poor" ecological conditions of the southern islands. It also expresses a view that "rock islanders" are culturally inept and deprived in comparison with the natural richness, cultural sophistication and political prestige historically associated with Babladoab and its high clan. But on the other hand, a number of informants from the southern islands commented that high-clan northerners are parochial, rigid, and close-minded and that the impetus for progressive social development has always initiated in the south. Archeological evidence also points to a "drift" of migration from south to north (Parmentier 1981:5). Palauan creation mythology and ethno-historical accounts also talk of this (Parmentier 1981:210).

2. This estimate is based on the average between two sources; District population figures for 1980, and a survey done by the Palau Community Action Agency in 1979/80. The District estimates are considerably higher, with the exception of Koror. Reportedly, the District counted Palauans who were no longer residing in a particular municipality or in Palau, whereas the PCAA survey eliminated these Palauans from its estimates. The figures presented in the test are the average between the two surveys. Here are the figures for both surveys, with the District figures in front: Koror 6,921/8,069, Babladoab 5,910/3,281, Peiirieu 1,014/626, Anguar 570/138, Kayangal 343/151, Southwest Islands 225/151 for a total of 14,989/12,365.

3. For political purposes, such as registration for voting, a number of Palauans consider themselves domiciled in the islands of their birth.

4. As Shuster (1982:9, 10) notes; "Non-Palauan anthropologists have identified intergroup and interpersonal competition and manipulation ... as a basic theme in Palauan culture. Balanced in dynamic tension [to this] ... is a counter theme of cooperation, unity and community." Contemporary Palauans often refer to the latter as consensus.

5. Though Palau was a ranked society, frequent and elaborated economic exchange patterns, and a flexible kinship system (Smith 1977:458) imparted some opportunities for social advancement to achievement-oriented Palauans, as did the men's and women's clubs (McKnight 1960:110-117). Furthermore, as McKnight describes it (McKnight 1960:59), generally the elite in Palau was "... a very indefinite group, subject to few categorical rules and [to] many situational factors." Palau, compared to other societies in Micronesia on the basis of hierarchy, can be characterized as less so than Yap, and roughly on a par with Ponape.

6. Parmentier (1981:81) also reports this.
One informant estimated that during The War, almost 90 percent of Palauans were Modekngei. There was the matter of seemingly accurate Modekngei predictions about the War. There was also the belief that supernatural protection from the Modekngei could protect Palauans from harm by American air attacks. They offered a psychological and social support network during the War. The Modekngei also organized material and logistical support for those Palauans from other islands, who were now relocated on Babdaob. And finally, the Japanese were much too consumed with carrying on the War to devote much resources to repressing the Modekngei by 1944/45.

Books on Micronesia (Gale 1979, McHenry 1975, Nevin 1977) also divide their treatment of American influence into the period before and after 1960.

American control, since the defeat of Japan in World War II, has been at minimum, oriented towards denying the future use of Micronesia to powers that potentially could be hostile to the United States. Such strategic denial, and perhaps limited use, could be accomplished through U.S. reliance on the internationally recognized perrogatives embedded in the strategic trusteeship. During this period, military use would be heaviest in the Marshalls and Marianas and virtually non-existent on Palau.

In fact the Trust Territory administration reminded the Palau Congress of its limited role, at the inception of that Congress. "In no sense was the Palau Congress [to represent] an independent nation," but rather, must operate strictly in an advisory fashion (Richard 1957:398, 399).

Rules for the Election and Conduct of Congressmen, 1949.

According to the charter of the Olbill Era Kelulau Era Belau (the Palau Congress) of January 5, 1955, this Congress had the power of resolution. Meller submits that, as of the late 1950s, the procedure followed had the High Commissioner concur with District recommendations in such a way that both the "American personnel and indigenes [were] treating the process as akin to legislating, despite the legal fiction that the law-making power resided entirely in the High Commissioner" (Meller 1969:67). My informants did not share this view. Rather, according to them, the Legislature, at least as so regarded by most Palauans, did not emerge from its advisory role to that of a law-making body until the charter for the Palau Legislature of July, 1963. As per that charter, the Legislature could pass laws, subject to the approval of the District Administrator and of the High Commissioner. By a 3/4 vote, the Legislature could override the District Administrator. For his part the High Commissioner was required to act within 60 days. If he did not take action within that time, the bill in question would become law (charter of the Palau Legislature, July 25, 1963, article 4, sections 4-9).
On May 27, 1971, Mr. F. T. Uludong, a Palauan and Chairman of the Micronesian Independence Advocates, submitted a report that was purported to be a copy of the introduction and summary of volume 1 of the United States Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands conducted in 1963, and popularly known as the "Solomon Report." The copy was presented to the United Nation's Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (petition 1192, copy with University of Hawaii Pacific Collection). An original copy of volume 1 in complete form is not available; apparently, it still remains classified. Mr. Uludong's cover letter is reproduced in Appendix A as it is a good example of the rhetoric employed by Palauan and other Micronesian activists at the time.

This regionalistic configuration was due to a number of factors. For one thing, Palau's paramount chiefs affiliated themselves with different parties—the Ibedul with the Liberal, the Reklai with the Progressive. The confederacies these title holders led bisected Palau along a southwest/northeast line. Secondly, the influential Modekngei soon decided to support the Liberal Party. Both these factors tended to increase Liberal strength on Babldaob's west coast, while Progressive strength was in the East.

One informant, intimately concerned with the return of lands stated; "The land that is held by the Trust Territory . . . claimed it because they took it from the Japanese who claimed it because they took it from the Germans, etc., etc."

Liberal forces believed at the time that in pursuing war claims, they were moving against probably opposition from the American Executive as well as Military. The Liberal Party did not seem overly intimidated. Anticipating that their pursuit of the issue might embarrass the U.S. groups mentioned, the Palau Legislature adopted a Liberal-sponsored resolution for a war claims commission. According to informants, a resolution was chosen as the means to proceed since a law might have been vetoed by the High Commissioner.

Dr. Meller has reported that, according to his informants, Lazarus Salii vied with Roman Tmetchul for leadership of the Liberal Party (personal communication). As my informants looked back on this period, however, it was Roman Tmetchul who was usually mentioned with respect to assertive tactics. Furthermore, the stress on Tmetchul is in part, due to the need to fully introduce the background of this leader, since he would play such an important part in the events analyzed in this dissertation.

Officials were unsure about the size and vitality of the Modekngei during the 1950s. But by the 1960s, there were indications of a Modekngei resurgence of strength. One Palau District document of the time estimated Modekngei followership at 1/3 of the population (Shuster 1982:132).
The COM issued a report in 1968 which enumerated various status options: independence, free association—a sort of protectorate status modeled after the Cook Islands, integration with a sovereign state (i.e., commonwealth), territory (leading to statehood), or the status quo (McHenry 1975:90). The Report contained no recommendation as to which status was best.

The position sometimes taken by the U.S., namely that the Micronesians are simply not capable of independence, is actually in conflict with U.N. resolution 1514 pertaining to political status. According to this resolution, the "inadequacy of political, economic, spacial or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence . . . ."

Eminent domain means the right of a government to take private property for public use, in this case, the right of the U.S. government to take Micronesian land for U.S. military purposes.

Dr. Meller has indicated (personal communication) that one reason for this subordination was the view that funding was a relatively easy matter to resolve. Therefore, it could be dealt with after more difficult issues. This may have been the case. It also should be pointed out, however, that in Micronesian's public statements at the time, funding was described as a less important matter than the control of laws and future status (McHenry 1975:122).

At the time of my field study, Palauan views on development can best be described as somewhat cautious and mixed. To a significant extent, some of this caution and ambivalence was the result of the controversies and other events, which in fact provide the case study for this dissertation. These events took place from the mid-1970s, into the 1980s. Nevertheless, I feel the views expressed by my informants during 1979-81 were present, though perhaps not as pronounced, in the early-to-mid 1970s. Having made this caveat, I will very briefly recount a number of such views.

There was some doubt as to the advisability of fully and irrevocably entering into a market economy. Such an entrance might eliminate the economically cushioning, and redistributive effects of the traditional economic exchange networks that continued to exist in Palau. M. Force's study (1976) also mentions this. But on the other hand, such "customs" are regarded as burdensome by some in Palau, being viewed as an impediment against capital accumulation for an individual's advanced educational, or entreprenurial plans.

Informants also pointed to what they saw as some of the negative effects of the influx cash from the government economy, at the village level. According to some informants, the penetration of this economy made it more difficult to promote and execute village-oriented, community projects. Both Parmentier (1981) and Shuster (1982) make a similar point. For their part, a number of my informants related what they saw
as the unfortunate attitude of Palauans, "unwilling to work" anymore, to the broadening and deepening consumer-oriented, bureaucratic lifestyle in Palau.

On the other hand, some informants, including a number of leaders, were clearly interested in accelerating "development." One informant, a legislator, articulated this view with a question. Why, he asked, "is it that New York gets all the development and a place like Palau [gets none]?" Perhaps New York was the referent because this informant knew that the researcher is from that state.

24 This would be difficult to determine, as it is doubtful that Micronesians or Palauans would admit to such a strategy.

25 During my field study, as indicated by my informants, an attitude was held by some Palauans to the effect that it was the responsibility of the United States to develop Palau, coupled with some resentment when American efforts were seen as inappropriate, insufficient, and/or ineffective. More generally, a colonized mentality is discussed in the following works, among others; Prospera and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization by Mannoni, London in 1956 and in Wretched of the Earth by Fanon, New York in 1966.

26 During 1980 in an interview Moses Uludong expressed a working definition of activist objectives. "The question is, how much control the Palauans will have and at what level (i.e., elitist or mass). Control should be both indigenous and spread out [broad-based] . . . ."

27 Acting chiefs: A representative of a chief, designated to conduct certain activities on his behalf. Acting chiefs initially emerged so as to aid a chief, who might be quite elderly, infirm, and/or not sufficiently familiar with contemporary and externally-oriented matters, to conduct his affairs. Acting chiefs, according to my informants, also became a source for popular discontent however. This was because such chiefs, rather than being approved by a clan (the appropriate way to designate a chief traditionally), were reportedly appointed in unilateral fashion by a chief. Furthermore, a number of acting chiefs might be appointed, so as to pursue differing, particular tasks. Perhaps this contributed to largely disfunctional, intra-clan competition. And finally, as reported by some of my informants, acting chiefs were seen by some Palauans as being primarily immersed in contemporary and externally-oriented economic and political affairs for largely personal objectives, not for the interest of the community.

28 With exception of the figure for 1980 which came from Shuster (1982), all figures on education cited here were compiled from Trust Territory, education figures. Mr. David Ramarui, who at the time was on leave from his Trust Territory post, was kind enough to make this data available to me. The number of students abroad from Palau was 193 in 1970, 207 in 1971/72, 263 in 1972/73 and 283 in 1973/74.
29 The Jans Foundation is located in California. Mr. Jans has been described as a very wealthy individual, interested in idealistic and unorthodox projects.

30 "Artificial" in the sense that its existence almost entirely depends on external support.

31 Political elaboration: I use the word elaboration to connote the sense of an increase in size and complexity, but not necessarily of any improvement in effectiveness, and/or in the system's ability to support itself.

32 Political sophistication: As Palau became more dependent, they simultaneously learned to be more politically sophisticated; for instance they learned which Congressmen, Executive aides, United Nations personnel, etc., to approach with what sorts of arguments for help on particular matters.
CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT THROUGH A SUPERPORT?

This chapter deals with the controversy over plans to locate a major oil port and transhipment point in Palau, which evolved during the mid-to-late 1970s. The controversy is analyzed primarily as it affected Palau, however, it also speaks to a much broader issue: the question of self-determination, in the form of control over development as a "peripheral people" face integration into a world dominated by superpowers and a global economy. Such control is often lost when "peripheral" regions are drawn into the global economy (Wallerstein 1979). Palauan opposition to plans for a "superport" is a case of how some in the periphery managed to exercise significant control over the process of development.

To understand the controversy over a "superport" one must understand the superport plans, the possible alternatives, and the rise of external opposition to the Project. A more detailed treatment of the controversy, as it involved Palauans, follows, concentrating on the anti-superport campaign. The chapter closes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of this campaign, and the light it sheds on both mobilization and closure.

Before the superport controversy, Palau was little-known to the outside world. The superport controversy thrust Palau onto the pages of influential foreign newspapers and magazines.¹ In fact, before the superport fight was over, Palau was emeshed in a web of economic and
political interests involving Japan, Iran, the United States, and the international environmentalist movement.

Analysis of the superport controversy provides us with a specific case for examining the "pressures that are brought to bear when already developed nations confront developing ones . . . over the issue of development" (Herz 1977:1). The superport concept took shape among individuals from powerful nations, with productive economies, but was aimed at a small group of Pacific Islands, part of the "Fourth World." A number of development questions were raised in Palau as part of the controversy. If dramatic economic growth resulted would it primarily benefit Palauans or outsiders? If the former, would a few islanders, with strategic outside connections, grow rich at the expense of most other Palauans? Would economic benefits from such a project outweigh uncertain social benefits and possibly disastrous consequences to the environment? Based on a calculation of anticipated costs and benefits, Palauan opposition to a superport grew.

The Superport Concept

The concept for a superport was developed by an international entrepreneur named Robert Panero who submitted a study to the Imperial Government of Iran in 1975 in which he urged the development of a superport in the western Pacific. Given the magnitude of his plans he felt it would have to be pursued by an international consortium of nations, led by an oil-producing one such as Iran. This project might also satisfy the substantial and increasing oil needs of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim, especially Japan (Panero 1975:15). A number of
conditions made such a port seem both feasible and attractive to international oil interests.

"Ultra large crude carrying" oil-tankers began to be used by the mid 1970s. These "supertankers," running up to 500,000 dead weight tons could operate with personnel and transportation costs no greater than those of much smaller tankers. Therefore, in terms of economy of scale, it made sense to build and use the larger tankers.

However, these ULCC's have deep drafts and poor maneuverability. The busy Malacca Straits Route, which had been used up to this time to transport oil from the Middle East through Southeast Asia, was too shallow and narrow to handle ULCC's safely. Therefore, there was a need to develop a new route.

By the time the superport concept emerged, both governments and industry in Japan, Okinawa, and in industrialized Southeast Asia were aware of the serious overcrowding and pollution problems associated with deep-water oil tanker ports (Panero 1975:12). Also the ports available in Japan and Southeast Asia were generally too small and, moreover, opposition by anti-pollution forces there could make it politically risky to enlarge these ports or develop new ones. Building an alternative port in a Western Pacific island group might circumvent the difficulties. ULCC's could berth and unload their cargoes into smaller tankers, which could then continue on to Japan, Okinawa, or to Singapore, and be easily accommodated without need of expansion of their ports (Panero 1975:12). Moreover a small, isolated island population was unlikely to have either the means or the political sophistication to effectively protest superport development.
Palau was thought to be such a place. It also had a strategic location near a new Lombok Straits supertanker route (see Figure 4) and a large reef-protected area that seemed particularly well-suited for conversion into a deep-water harbor (see Figure 5). It also had sufficient adjacent land areas, that could accommodate the "spin-off" industries expected from superport, which was rare in other islands in Micronesia.

Panero viewed Palau, along with the rest of Micronesia as politically stable for the foreseeable future, which contrasted favorably with alternative sites. Micronesia was under the administration of the United States and seemed likely to remain so for decades to come. Therefore, it was less likely that threats from external, non-Western powers would disrupt superport operations and there seemed little risk of a future indigenous nationalization of oil facilities. Panero pointed out that, by the time of his 1975 pre-feasibility study, a Japanese industrial group and a major ship-building concern were already being organized to pursue the superport project. "Informal" consultations between Panero and certain Trust Territory and other U.S. officials had revealed a positive U.S. attitude towards the Project, according to Panero (Panero 1975:1). He said further that Palauan legislators, commercial leaders, and traditional chiefs "welcomed the idea" of a superport (Panero 1975:13).

Given the state of Palau's economy, it is not surprising that some of Palau's leadership at first viewed the superport as an antidote for existent dependency. In fact, some unease over dependency was a factor for both sides in the superport dispute. For example, Moses Uludong, an
Figure 4. Oil Shipment Routes
independence-minded Palauan activist, expressed concern about Palau's economy at an international symposium against the superport in 1977. Uludong saw the dependency, and Palau's government economy with its relatively massive bureaucracy, as one of "our biggest problems now. What do we do with . . . bureaucrats . . . who receive many high salaries that our government cannot afford? . . . I am scared right now. What are we going to do with 1,500 Palauans who are used to . . . the idea that without really working . . . they will still get paid for it?" (Uludong in Herz 1977:60). Panero in his 1975 report emphasized that through the revenue and infrastructure developed by a superport Palau could achieve "a level of economic development . . . beyond any prior conception [for Micronesia], and at a much quicker pace" (Panero 1975:55). Though Uludong and others did not see it as an acceptable mode of development, for some a superport held out the promise of a viable economic base.

If the superport became a reality, the areas to be affected would include a northern portion of Babldao b, the Kossol Reef area, and Kayangel to the north (see Figure 5). The details of superport plans, as well as the specific siting in Palau went through a number of changes and included "spin-off" industries related to the primary oil storage and transshipment function, such as other petro-chemical industries, a steel mill, etc. At one time, the envisioned energy demand was so great that a nuclear power plant on Kayangel Atoll was considered.

The Project involved a number of uncertainties. For example, the amount of revenue that Palauans would actually earn from the project depended on how well they or their representatives negotiated with the
Possible sites for a supertanker port in Palau to serve the tanker route to Japan (above).

Figure 5. Proposed Superport Location
Japanese and Iranians (Johnson in Herz 1977:29). It was also not certain that revenue from a superport would enhance the general standard of living. This depended on the intention of the leadership involved and on the development of a mechanism to ensure that the revenue was widely distributed.

Secondly, as Panero himself pointed out, the bulk of jobs connected with a superport would be highly technical and few of these were likely to be filled by Palauans who lacked the necessary, specialized skills (Panero 1975:25).

Third, by the mid 1970s questions had arisen as to just how economically efficient supertankers were. Should their use cease, the need for a deep-water port might vanish as well. In the long run, though, the most serious economic limitation was the finite nature of oil reserves. It was estimated that these would be depleted in another 40 years. If ten years were deducted to allow for superport construction, that would give the facility a life expectancy of only about 30 years (Johnson in Herz 1977:29).

Fourth, the social effects that a superport would bring were largely unknown. What dislocations might arise when the construction was finished and those Palauans who had been employed found themselves without jobs? What would be the long-term effects of rapidly increasing Palau's cash economy at the expense of the subsistence sector, in which over 50 percent of the Palauan population was still primarily engaged (Johnson in Herz 1977:29)? Some increase of the market/cash economy at the expense of the subsistence one is not unusual with modernization.
However, the very large scale and rapid pace anticipated from superport development was likely to produce major social disruptions.

Another problem was that Palauan might lose free access to and control over 1/3 of their land and perhaps 10 percent of the Palauan population would have to be relocated to make way for a superport (Olson 1978:51). What would be the depth and manifestations of these Palauans' sense of loss? The anthropologist Robert McKnight was one of a number of cultural anthropologists who wrote about the possible social effects of a superport (1977). He emphasized that serious disruptions could occur if clans were removed from the villages from which they derived their regional source of identity. The effect of such relocation, according to McKnight, "would be the functional equivalent not only of the destruction of historical monuments . . . but also [of] the burning of a whole library of books" (McKnight 1977:39). Moreover, these people would have to be put somewhere else. If they settled as immigrants in other communities, what strains would this put on such host communities? By 1977, when the superport controversy peaked, no social impact statement had been completed to answer such questions. 

In contrast to this uncertainty over the human dimension, there was little doubt but that the environmental effects of a superport could be disastrous. Among other things, there was the danger of oil spills from the ULCC's themselves. Some ultra large tankers are 1,400 feet long, as tall as the Empire State Building in New York. ULCC's must have one mile to stop, and had run aground on shoals and reefs, even colliding with other vessels. The first big oil spill from a ULCC was the notorious Torrey Canyon debacle, which blackened beaches on both the
French and English coast in 1967. As of 1978, there had been 60 other major oil spills worldwide (Olson 1978:31).

A study of a relatively small oil spill showed an almost total kill of every kind of marine animal in the area of maximum oil concentration (Sports Illustrated 1978 April 13:13). Three months later the oil was still spreading along the ocean floor, and no significant amount of marine life returned until nearly a year after the accident. A spill 350 times larger dumped 60 million gallons of oil into the sea in 1978. It is also not rare for oil to be spilled inside a terminal. In the United States alone 1,476 of these spills were reported in 1971 with 1,632 the following year (Science 19 November 1976, vol 194; 794).

In addition to oil spills, the construction of an oil-port usually results in heavy siltation, which can smother and kill a reef. Panero proposed an International Sea Park and Marine Biology Zone as an environmental "counterweight" to superport development. But given the ocean currents around Palau, some of the siltation from a superport could well have ended up in the park. Moreover, if the superport escalated, as anticipated, into a major industrial complex, there could also be thermal, air, heavy metal, and even nuclear pollution (Olson 1978:33).

Possible Alternatives

By the mid-1970s, when the superport was just being proposed, the few existing resources in Palau had barely been developed, and none to a point that they could support Palau's "government economy" or fuel economic development (see Olson 1978:20). Palau's strategic location for U.S. military interests could have been an alternative, but as of 1978,
such an option was viewed with ambivalence if not downright hostility by many Palauans (Ibid). Informants' statements in 1979-81 also indicated that the Palauans held mixed attitudes towards the U.S. military and/or were ambivalent, particularly if this meant massive use of Palau's resources for military purposes.

Another alternative would be for Palau to continue on the path of an American-supported, increasingly dependent economy. Though seemingly a contradiction, perhaps this could proceed as Palau moved towards increased autonomy and political control, all the while funding this through American aid. This option might be particularly attractive if large-scale and potentially disruptive projects, such as a superport or massive military use, either did not materialize or were stalemated due to a lack of consistent and pressing, external interest. This third alternative has, in fact, been the one adopted since the demise of the superport. It will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.

External Opposition to a Superport

Opposition to the superport emerged virtually simultaneously among some western-educated Palauans and among American and internationally-based environmental groups. The actions of the latter will be dealt with first. In 1975, the Pacific Science Association officially took a stand against the superport during its annual convention. "The site [of the proposed superport] would be of unequaled value in Oceania if it could be set aside as a scientific, environmentally protected marine park. The ... project should be abandoned on scientific grounds and because of its adverse effects ... on the human population and the
biota of Palau" (Resolution 9 of the 13th annual convention, Pacific Science Association, 1975). The PSA and at least one marine biologist viewed Palau as containing one of the richest reef and marine environments in all of Oceania. Before the superport fight was over, the Sierra Club, the National and World Wildlife Fund, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and many other environmental and scientific groups with international followings all expressed support for the anti-superport cause.

Other reasons were expressed for opposing the superport. George Wald, a Nobel-prize winning Harvard scientist turned activist, stated: "The problems of Palau are our problems." Those tiny islands were up against "big oil, big arms" and superpower, strategic interests (Wald in Herz 1977:67). Wald, some others attracted to the anti-superport cause, and Palauan activists felt that there was a connection between superport and U.S. military interests. In 1975, 1976 and 1977 newspapers and magazines in both the Pacific and the U.S. mainland carried stories linking U.S. strategic interests to superport plans. A number of public statements by members of the U.S. armed forces seem to highlight the military's interest in Palau and a superport, in a way that was offensive to some Palauans. In one instance in January of 1976, Admiral Kent Carrol, Commander of U.S. naval forces in the Marianas, visited Palau and favorably assessed the superport concept (Wald in Herz 1977:69). A Commander Burt, also in 1976, reportedly said: "You realize that there are millions of people in Japan and only 14,000 in Palau. We may have to sacrifice those 14,000" (in A Superport ngmei Belau:4). Burt's remarks, like the earlier ones of Henry Kissinger
(see Chapter II), evoked a negative reaction on the part of Palauans who viewed it as indicative of a callous American view that islanders were insignificant and expendable, for the sake of international interests.

Some outsiders saw Palau as an example of "the most heartless exploitations of the poor and unwary and . . . [of the] defenseless [that] goes on" in the midst of "development . . ." (Wald in Herz 1977: 67). To view Palauans as "poor" and "unwary" is based on an overly simplistic, romantic image of islanders as purely innocent victims in the grip of malevolent international powers. In making their external appeals, anti-superport Palauans used this image for manipulative purposes.

Wallterstein (1982) points out that in many anti-systemic movements, the "democratic ideals" of a core power are embraced by those in the periphery, and by some "progressive" elements within and beyond the metropolitan power. These ideals are then used to evaluate the conduct of this power. Some Americans, Japanese, and other foreigners who were drawn to the anti-superport struggle applied these sorts of American, idealistic standards emphasizing the right of self-determination, and of the need for broad-based popular knowledge of and input into decisions of broad impact. They therefore found the circumstances surrounding the superport plans very disturbing.

By 1977, a number of pro-environment, anti-pollution groups, based primarily in the U.S. or Japan, were in an alliance with anti-superport Palauans. The National Resources Defense Council, a leading American environmental organization, was very active in the anti-superport struggle. It spelled out its strategy at the 1977 Oceanic Society Symposium devoted primarily to the superport question. The NRDC's
objective was to "set in motion a process whereby Palauans [could] decide their own future and control their own natural resources" (Compton in Herz 1977:49).

The NRDC engaged in a multi-pronged effort directed towards Japan, the United States, the United Nations, and Palau. It was acting as the legal arm and coordinator in an international coalition of environmental groups. This included nations as far away from Palau as Norway and France. For their part, as will be discussed shortly, some Palauans organized a "Save Palau Organization" (SPO) to stop the superport. At times, the SPO communicated through spokespersons from the NRDC or similar groups, as for example during appearances before the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce and before the U.S. Senate.7

NRDC and other U.S. citizen action groups also sent movies and other visual and informational materials to Palau dealing with pollution. They were utilized as part of the SPO's village-level campaign (Compton in Herz 1977:48). Indigenous activists had mixed attitudes towards all this help on their behalf.8 By this time, they were carrying on a vigorous anti-superport campaign of their own in Palau.

**Palauan Opposition to a Superport**

Elements of the indigenous opposition to the superport can be traced back to activist influences, discussed in Chapter II, on some young Palauans who attended American universities during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Palauan activists by the mid 1970s had developed their own organization and newspaper. They continued to avoid alliances with established, influential leaders and political groups, instead utilizing
"grass-roots" tactics as a mobilization device. This involved reaching out to "ordinary" Palauans through extra-kin and extra-regional appeals on contemporary concerns, such as labor conditions and U.S. military demands.

During their stays at American universities some of the activists had become aware of environmental concerns in the United States. For instance, one activist went to a university in Montana. There, he saw the cutting of timber and its processing through pulp mills. He told me how this would "stink up the whole place, but if you shut this down, then the place will be clean but there will be no jobs." Similarly, the choice for Palauans could be phrased in terms of fueling the economy or preserving the environment. In Palau, however, this dilemma would be particularly painful. The proposed economic stimulus was foreign-inspired and both the benefits and negative effects might be very marked. Moreover, any foreign comments on The Project, whether pro or con, could be viewed as external interference in Palauan affairs. In fact some Palauans who favored the superport also resented such outside interference. As an example, the Palauan leader Roman Tmetchul objected to the role being played by foreign environmentalists: "I can't accept all this so-called environmental concern ... These people want to keep Palau a human zoo so they can come and swim and take pretty pictures and then go back to their own lives ... [Meanwhile] people here are out of work" (Roman Tmetchul in New York Times February 7, 1977:10). Activists on the other hand viewed their Palauan opponents as people whose only concern was to amass greater wealth and increase political power at the expense of most other Palauans.
The activists also saw the superport debate as a highly significant political opportunity. One former activist commented; "We saw the superport as a big thing . . . since as an issue it affected Palau as a whole, and not just one municipality." It was an issue that would powerfully determine the present and future quality of life for all of Palau and as such, could provide a mobilization target on a universalistic, pan-Palauan scale. Also, opposition to superport plans by the young activists was congruent with their anti-establishment and anti-big-business orientation.

In early 1976, the High Chief Ibedul, who was himself rather young (32) and had just recently returned from service with the U.S. Army in Europe, agreed to be the spokesman for the Save Palau Organization (SPO), organized by some Palauans to fight the superport. Tia Belau activists had been instrumental in forming SPO; however it also embraced Palauans who, though anti-superport, were not necessarily strong supporters of the activists. The activists themselves sought to maintain this distinction, both for their own interest and for the sake of their less "political" and "non-radical" compatriots in SPO. Aside from the Ibedul, in this latter category was also a Palauan who was an environmentalist with scientific training. Both he and the Ibedul were to play important roles in the anti-superport campaign.

Informants who are former activists told me that, at first, it was hard to convince the Ibedul to join the anti-superport fight and lead the SPO. "But we told him how there is a lot of money behind this thing [the superport] but that this would not go to Palauans." And they asked: "what about the mess of Palau" after this project was completed?
The SPO would have a single focus, to block a superport, but its tactics would be both sophisticated and eclectic. One example was the recruiting of the Ibedul, a traditional leader with considerable cosmopolitan experience. Its efforts would also have both an external and internal dimension. Domestically, making villagers aware of and concerned about the anticipated, negative impacts from a superport was not easy. Nevertheless, this challenging communicative/mobilization task was dealt with impressively. Outside of Palau, activists in cosmopolitan settings pictured Palau and the superport question in such a way as to appeal to international environmentalists, and less directly to anti-colonial and anti-establishment sympathies.

**Palauan Anti-Superport Campaign**

In 1976, Palauans within the SPO initiated their campaign at the village level; this, according to one activist, was unusual up to that time. Traditionally, it would have been strange for an individual or group to engage in public persuasion in any village or region other than one's own, particularly if such campaigning transgressed the traditional, confederacy lines. However, this same informant felt that having High Chief Ibedul of Yaoldaob as SPO spokesman both helped to establish the group's legitimacy, outside of Palau, and provided a means of entry for village-level campaigning within much of Palau.

A teacher in an elementary school in northern Babldaob, an area of anticipated superport impacts, described the process of mobilizing village-level opposition to the superport. The villagers did not have any concept of a superport; however, some of them did remember the large Japanese ships anchored around Palau during World War II and the damage
that was inflicted by American bombing. Activists could relate possible superport effects to these memories. One anti-superport poster read, "bringing oil to our reefs would be like dropping bombs on them." Activists, would also compare the size of supertankers to "KB" bridge (790 feet). This is a well-known landmark in Palau that connects Bablao to Koror, and is by far the largest architectural structure in Palau.

Many villagers are fishermen, or women who gather food from the sea. Activists explained how superport development could adversely effect the ocean, reef, and lagoons, showing films, such as "Sea of Eden," a British-produced documentary on the superport question, and also a film on the detrimental effects of siltation on reef life in Hawaii. The technique was to compare superport development to objects or circumstances that villagers could actually see or had historically experienced. This technique would crop up again in activists' anti-nuclear campaigns.

With something as large and unprecedented as a superport, both as a project and in terms of its unknown effects, it was no easy task to relate this meaningfully to villagers. Technologically, the proposed superport would be an extremely complicated enterprise. One informant explained: ". . . we had to explain about harmful chemicals, nuclear waste, etc. There are no words for this in Palauan so we'd use mekngit kar," which can be translated as "bad medicine."

Villagers also tended to think of Palau as the center of the universe. This is not surprising, given that in old Palau both the world and human society were thought to have originated in the area of Palau (see Chapter II). However, such a cosmological perception does not
mesh easily with thinking about a superport, with its international and even global ramifications. To overcome this limitation, activists would show villagers a large map. On it, they would point out how the Palau Islands are just tiny dots in comparison with the huge, powerful nations that seemed to support the superport project. Demonstrating Palau's vulnerability in this way probably helped to raise villagers' concern over the harmful effects expected from a superport.

Activists at the village level also made specific efforts to explain to high-clan elders about the anticipated, harmful effects. Informants reported that they had sought out these elders, both because these traditional influence agents were less likely to be acquainted with the latest aspects of international plans, and because the activists recognized the elders' importance in the formulation of village opinion. The first point involves an interesting role reversal. In a traditional context, high-clan elders would have the most knowledge of village affairs. However, the proposed superport was a foreign-inspired, and highly technological concept that would be emeshed in a world of multi-national consortia, nation-states, and superpowers. This international dimension was something activists knew more about.

SPO Leverage Efforts

The SPO's efforts to apply leverage to external forces consisted of two related components. One was to attract international sympathy and support by appealing through the press, meetings of the United Nations, and at international, environmentalist meetings. The other track was to use such forums, and especially the United Nations and U.S. Congressional hearings, to directly influence American policy towards the Trust
Territory. By 1976/77 SPO and Tia Belaud activists had found common cause with international environmental groups and appeared at numerous forums and symposiums outside Palau. The remarks of High Chief Ibedul at the 1977 Oceanic Society Symposium, held in San Francisco, are typical. He said that Palau is so small, both geographically and demographically, that the odds against it in any contest with major powers are very unequal. He suggested that perhaps superport developers viewed Palau as a "dumping ground" for pollution that was no longer being tolerated in the industrialized world. He added that it was probable that outsiders, not Palauans, would gain the major benefits and warned that any material benefits could not possibly outweigh the social evils and "cultural pollution" that would be spread by a virtual army of foreign workers. Palauans might even become a minority in their own islands through a process of interaction that would inevitably result in an "... erosion of Palauan identity, ... customs, and lifestyle," to be replaced by western materialism and greed (Ibedul in Herz 1977: 17).

This argument for blocking the superport constituted an appeal based on the need to maintain Palau's cultural identity. In describing this, the Ibedul stated that Palauan life was "based on family ties ... which guarantee the well-being of all" (Ibid). Such a characterization, whether accurate or not, was clearly a strategy designed to appeal to a cosmopolitan audience to help achieve an internal socio-political objective, namely that of derailing the superport.

Most disturbind to the Ibedul was the impression that the options of island leadership were being "conditioned" by outsiders (Ibedul in
Despite public statements being made to the contrary, the Ibedul and many others were also disturbed by the conviction that Panero, the Japanese, and the U.S. military would strive to be the parties to decide on a superport in a secretive and un-democratic fashion. Within Palau, the Ibedul was concerned that elements of the Palau Legislature, in conjunction with some Palauan businessmen and with Panero as a catalytic, foreign entrepreneur, might encourage superport development with little input from other Palauans or even against their will (Ibedul in Herz 1977:19).

The Ibedul also resented the fact that Panero had stated that Palauan political and economic leadership would welcome the superport project. He wanted to know exactly which leaders Panero had canvassed? Whoever they were, the Ibedul felt that they constituted only a small minority of Palau's leadership, part of a rising, Palauan elite which stood to gain directly from the project. He felt that these pro-superport leaders did not represent the "true wishes" of Palau.

The themes, symbols, and rhetoric employed by SPO Palauans were contained in the pamphlet, *A superport ngmei Belau?*; a joint publication of the SPO and the Micronesian Support Committee in Hawaii. The pamphlet begins with a diagram comparing the size of a supertanker to Palau's Koror-Bablaob bridge. Next there are photographs of a petroleum terminal complex in Japan and the water-cooling tower of a nuclear reactor. The pamphlet states that a petroleum terminal "can be expected to be operated by only 100-200 persons of . . . skilled laborers, engineers, and management." There is the implication, stated explicitly in other SPO rhetoric, that Palauans would be extremely unlikely to get such jobs. It is also pointed out that such an industry is expected "to
yield relatively little to the economy [while it] damages large amounts of land and water and produces enormous amounts of wastes." Other associated dislocations, disruptions, and damages that have resulted from superport development in other regions are also discussed. It is noted that a nuclear power plant was planned in connection with the superport and added that "no one knows the risk of a catastrophic accident for the large, experimental nuclear power plants now being planned and built."

Next are pictures of Palauan children and of a fisherman in a lagoon holding a spear and fishing. This is immediately followed by a supertanker underway, almost bearing down on the reader. There is information on oil spills and an explanation of why Palau was selected as a site. There is also mention of U.S. military plans and of a foreign view that the "small population of 14,000 is not expected to provide significant opposition" to superport plans.

The pamphlet continued with pictures of Palauan children, and of women in a village, and with various statements from Palauan leaders, villagers, and an official of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. All were in opposition to the Project. It ended with a reproduction of the poster comparing oil on Palauan reefs to bombing them.

Consciously or not, over-simplified and idealized images of Palau were being projected for external consumption, to secure an intended political effect. Palauan interest in and expertise at pursuing such leverage has long been characteristic. It should also be noted that the images downplayed the sophistication of Palauans, and the manipulative element in their dealings with outsiders which have often focused on acquiring new avenues of material advancement and success. The only
break with such manipulation occurred during the late Japanese Period. At that time, the massive and highly intrusive Japanese presence led to dislocations and finally to a devastating war. Given this history, it is not surprising that some Palauans, in their opposition to the superport, harkened back to memories of World War II.

Evolution of the Controversy

According to the activists, "secret reports" on superport plans were being circulated among developers as of 1974. In 1975, the Pacific Daily News based in Guam exposed the proposed superport project. That same year, residents of a hamlet in northern Babdaob signed a petition objecting to what they saw as a shroud of secrecy surrounding superport plans.

It was not until 1976, however, that superport plans became widely known in Palau. In January the activist newspaper (Tia Belau) published a special edition concentrating on anticipated dangers from the superport. Anti-superport petitions were signed against superport plans by some villagers, by Palauan students in Hawaii and on the U.S. mainland, and other Micronesian students attending institutions in the U.S.

That same year Chief Ibedul spoke on behalf of the Save Palau Organization at the United Nations Trusteeship Council meetings in New York, and before the National Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C. A month after this two SPO members attended a number of international conferences that adopted resolutions against the superport. The issue peaked in 1977, when there were United States Senate hearings on the superport and appearances by both SPO and Tia Belau representatives at the United Nations Trusteeship Council meetings.
As of 1977/78 the issue seemed likely to be resolved in one of three ways. One of these could be a decision favoring the superport through governmental action. By this time the Palau Legislature had formed an Environmental Protection and Port Authority Development Board. Its special committee on the Palau Port Authority had been granted wide discretionary powers, vis-a-vis a superport. According to law, this Authority and its committee were empowered to "represent the people of Palau for all uses . . . [of] all inner and outer reefs . . . [and] oceans within the District" (Sixth Palau Legislature, bill 856, October 1977). The Special committee consisted of four Palauans and four outsiders. By June of 1977, the Committee had hired Mr. Panero and a Palauan businessman. The Ibedul at least regarded this businessman as Panero's "local counterpart" in Palau (Ibedul in Herz 1977:19). Moreover, the head of the Port Authority was regarded by many to have definite pro-superport leanings.

The Palau Legislature directed that the superport question should be decided in a popular referendum once feasibility studies were completed. It seemed to superport opponents, however, that the decision was already being made by the Legislature, in less democratic fashion, given the warm reception it had accorded the superport plans and the time, money, and other resources which the Legislature had already expended. To superport opponents, this seemed tantamount to the Legislature's tacit approval.

Within the Legislature, however, it began to appear less likely that a unilateral decision would be taken to move forward with superport development. By late 1977, some influential pro-superport Palauan
politicians were showing less enthusiasm as the project became increasingly controversial.

An alternative proposal suggested that the question be submitted to a popular vote. Nevertheless, at least one prominent, anti-superport leader opposed such a plan. From his point of view, the government through which the plebiscite would be administered was not Palauan, but rather "colonial" (Uludong in Herz 1977:51). He felt that both it and the media in Palau were controlled by an economic and political elite which had vested interests in the development of a superport.

Palauan activists and sympathetic outsiders felt that Palauans could not make an informed decision as there was no trustworthy source of adequate information on the potential effects of a superport. The Interior Department stated that the U.S. agreed such information must be available to Palauans before any referendum took place. However Fred Zeder, at the time Director of Territorial Affairs, made remarks that some interpreted as being in support of the superport. Such ambiguity in the pattern of U.S./Palauan communication would be a continuing factor affecting both mobilization and closure during later events.

Some Palauans were worried that even if rigorous environmental and social impact statements could be prepared, such reports would not be meaningful to village Palauans (Herz 1977). Moses Uludong, as Spokesman for Tia Belaud in 1977, urged that there should be a moratorium on the development of all major projects in Palau such as the superport, until the Palauans had greater control over the government, decision-making and access to vital information (Uludong in Herz 1977:52). Given the rising crescendo by late 1977 of superport criticism, it was rather unlikely that the superport could pass on a referendum.
A third possibility was that an influential individual or group either within or outside of Palau would pre-empt the superport by withdrawing vital support, or by mounting implacable opposition. United States Congressman Phillip Burton, who was relatively well informed and quite influential on Micronesian affairs, appeared to be proceeding on this course. In December of 1977 he stated: "I am an environmentalist. I am opposed to the superport... As long as I am in the U.S. Congress there will be no superport in Palau" (Pacific Daily News, December 29, 1978:1). Opposition of that sort could clearly blunt if not derail the plans.

Ironically, it was the shift of attitude of Roman Tmetchul, businessman, as well as Chairman of the 6th Palau Legislature's Political Status Commission, that made a Palauan superport rather unlikely. During the mid 1970s Tmetchul was regarded as one of the primary domestic supporters of the superport, but by 1978, he had changed his stance. In January of 1978, Tmetchul stated: "I oppose the superport... The only reason for the Palauans ever being interested in a superport was their desire to get off the United States dole. We wanted control of our own economic destiny. We were conscious of the choice the world was forcing upon us, either to destroy our unequaled natural environment or to remain dependent on U.S. welfare. Under these circumstances, I could not choose the latter. [Nor] could I ask my countrymen to revert to the jungle..." By the latter, Tmetchul meant reverting to a strictly subsistence economy as was the case in pre-contact Palau (Tmetchul in Oceans Magazine, January 1978:62).15

For Tmetchul and for some other Palauans, at least for a time the superport had seemed to offer a way to "break out of a cycle of
dependency" (same) and to establish greater economic viability. For the activists, and for increasing numbers of Palauans as the controversy wore on, the anticipated environmental, cultural, and socio-political costs of establishing a superport were too great.

Tmetchul's change of heart was probably in part due to a recognition that his pro-superport position was increasingly unpopular. It was also based on his understanding that an "equitable economic arrangement" in the form of an anticipated relationship of "free association," could be forthcoming from the United States. The Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC) was already well into negotiations on this with the United States. By 1978 the question of future political status, and especially that of Palau's relationship to the rest of Micronesia, had eclipsed the superport as major issues of pan-Palauan concern.

Conclusion

The prospect of a superport presented Palauans with what seemed to a mechanism for rapid development on a massive scale. In all probability, this would have resulted in economic benefit for at least some Palauans. Revenue from a superport might also have provided an economic alternative to the U.S. subsidy.

The superport controversy facilitated alterations in the Palauan, political field. It provided the activists with their first major entry into the world of emerging, national Palauan politics. Their grass-roots and protest-oriented political style achieved increased notice and respectability due to the anti-superport campaign which they had powerfully advanced. This activist-style, "grass-roots" politics foreshadowed a shift towards a more populist style of pan-Palauan
politics. It also demonstrated the ability of Palauans to gain leverage on the local political scene using outside groups.

It is also important to note that Palauans opposed to the Project successfully promulgated the view that its massive scale and technological complexity would place it outside of Palauan control and far-reaching transformations anticipated also threatened to be disruptive and degrading. Most of all, opponents evoked fears that a massive development of this kind could involve major damage to Palau's fragile environment. Many Palauans came to the position that superport development was an unacceptable mechanism for getting off the "U.S. dole." Though some Palauans might have benefited, anticipated environmental, socio-political, and cultural degradations associated with the Project were regarded as too costly.

"Development" became a highly debatable issue for the first time in Palau and questions concerning mode, pace, who should control it, and at what cost to the Palauan natural and social environment, had been articulated to an unprecedented extent. Up to the time of the superport controversy Palauans, having a fairly comfortable lifestyle, did not face immediate threats to their welfare. Development was certainly not an overriding concern and there was little awareness of the dangers that could accompany it, aside from the memories of World War II. As is often the case, explicit concern over programs for development was restricted to a relatively small, western educated group.

The superport controversy demonstrates that "development" as such is not necessarily an explicit concern, much less one that permeates beyond a relatively small segment of the population. It was the
superport controversy which heightened popular awareness of the dangers and dislocations that inappropriate development could bring. It posed a potentially massive threat to the people and to their very finite and fragile resource base. The sophistication of the Palauan response is one more element that adds to the distinctiveness of the case.

The concept of reactive clarification is important for an understanding of Palauans' response to the prospect of a superport. As a result of the controversy, many Palauans seemed to have formed a clearer idea of the kind of development they did not want. Based on the considerable opposition to a superport, at least these Palauans did not want development to be foreign inspired, elitist controlled, to involve huge projects, and proceed too rapidly. Nor did they want development that would be highly disruptive, even dangerous, to Palauan society and its environment. The controversy also crystallized the sentiment for development through plans that are publically disclosed, involve popular input and participation, and with benefits that are broad-based, and not extractively procured.

The concept of reactive clarification also has relevance for the concept of closure and for development theories. It illustrates that closure is not necessarily achieved in a direct, linear mode of progression, but rather at certain times it can be achieved at least partially through an indirect, reactive process. However, when explicit economic and socio-political preferences are articulated, such preferences can powerfully influence the public response to development plans.

The internal campaign against the superport overcame formidable obstacles. In the first place it could involve very tangible benefits
for some Palauans. In the second place it was only a plan for the future, all the more difficult to conceptualize due to its technological complexity, vast scale, and unknown effects. Anti-support activists mobilized domestic support by relating the proposed project to objects and circumstances that villagers could actually see or had historically experienced, thus making it more concrete. They also used similar techniques to dramatize Palauan vulnerability to impingements and harm from external, powerful, intrusive interests. Heightening Palauans' sense of vulnerability in such ways fueled the indigenous mobilization of sentiment against the superport. The ability of the activists to present vividly this anticipatory perspective indicates considerable mobilization insight and sophistication.

Palauan anti-superport campaigners pursued their mobilization and leverage efforts, facilitated by both an anticipatory and comparative perspective. In addition to impressions about the future, the Palauan anti-superport campaign was also based on comparative insights as can be seen from repeated references to Guam and Hawaii. They were repeatedly mentioned as examples of the kind of "development" that Palau should avoid.

This comparative/anticipatory perspective also had a more specific, political cast. During the superport fight, opponents of the Project often pictured their Palauan adversaries as greedy and irresponsible individuals who were ready to sell Palau "down the river" (Compten in Hertz 1977:43) by abetting foreign, intrusive interests. Given Palauan preferences, and the history of the Islands, unease over this is quite understandable (see Chapter II). More generally, concern
over irresponsible uses of power reached new heights during the superport controversy. Opponents of the Project fanned concern that superport development would facilitate the entrenchment of a powerful and remote, foreign-oriented elite. This worrisome scenario corresponds with the transformations associated with the "development" that has swept much of the Third World. The counter-scenario, directly mentioned, as well as indicated by my informants, was that of western, pluralistic democracy headed by responsible, protectionist leadership. This has been sought after by Palauans as a means to fulfill ethno-historic expectations and to prevent potentially worrisome and intrusive interests from degrading Palau.

Outside the Islands, Palauans opposed to the superport engaged in leverage tactics, using fulcrums in the international arena. These Palauans utilized a coincidence of interest of an unusual though emergent type, namely that of an alliance with relatively idealistic, anti-systemic forces, especially the environmentalist, in the international arena. For their part, some Palauans proved adept at presenting the Palauan situation so as to appeal to the relevant external groups. It should also be noted that the distinctive dependency found in Palau has presented islanders with increasing opportunities to engage in such leverage tactics.

The opponents of the superport showed greater skill than the supporters in making external appeals, perhaps because they adopted a more public and populist political style. This populist-democratic style brought them more in line with the values and style of "anti-system" forces within the metropole and beyond. Influential
pro-superport Palauans exhibited a leadership style that seemed elitist, secretive, and perhaps not democratically inclined.

The alliance between SPO Palauans and international groups also in part developed because the Palauans linked their interests to a concern widely-felt in much of the "developed" West, namely the threat of environmental degradation specifically from oil spills. That some Palauans could make this linkage illustrates that the "world system" is not monolithic, but rather that there are cleavages and ambiguities within it which indigenous groups can exploit. The Palauans have long been predisposed to seek out and utilize such intersticies. Activists, with their experience and training (see Chapter II), proved particularly adept at this. Both the internal opposition to the superport and external leverage efforts were mounted effectively, and pursued in a complimentary and coordinated fashion, thereby having a cumulative effect. Though these Palauan efforts played a major part in blocking the superport, other factors beyond Palauan control also influenced the outcome of the dispute. One international factor was the Iranian Revolution. This drastically cut oil production for export, making an Iranian-backed superport much less likely.

At the same time attention must be paid to potential and existent limitations of the Palauan anti-superport strategy. The external appeals made by anti-superport forces were often ambivalent. Inter-spersed with comments condemning attempts by foreign elements to "condition" or "intervene" in Palauan affairs were dependent images as part of the external appeals for assistance. This ambiguity is illustrative of Palauans' ambivalent view of the value and results of
metropolitan influence, and of the dependency relationship. In subsequent periods the lack of a consistent attitude might act to destabilize mobilization for, and closure over, the means and goals of development.

In addition, Palauans' use of external appeals for the pursuit of non-Palauan ends might be impeded if such appeals continued being made to divergent foreign interests, as part of conflicting, internal strategies. Pro-superport Palauans for example appeared interested in enticing international economic, and less directly military interests. Anti-superport Palauans facilitated the interest of the international, environmentalist community. If this pattern of conflicting appeals was to continue, external interests might be able to play one group of Palauans off against another. In fact, the superport controversy helped to crystalize an uncertainty which has continued to haunt Palau's prospects as a nation: this uncertainty concerns the extent to which Palauans have either the will or the capacity to manipulate foreign interests, so as to benefit Palau as a whole. Perhaps Palauan leaders would continue to entice foreign interests to benefit particular Palauan leaders or groups, at the expense of the rest of Palau. Since the superport controversy, events have taken both tracks.

Reactive clarification had taken place to an extent, resulting in a degree of closure over development preferences. However, this had emerged in opposition to a specific project. Though successful, the anti-superport campaign was primarily a defensive, reactive strategy, in contrast to the more assertive and comprehensive, socio-political strategies that emerged later.
The very specificity of anti-superport mobilization facilitated its success, but also limited its ability to facilitate closure. This in turn limited the strategy's broader applicability to the underlying development dilemma facing Palau. As the seeming immediacy of the superport threat faded, so did the relatively strong sense of Palauan vulnerability and constriction of development options which the project had evoked. Palau's more generalized pattern of seductive dependency appeared again as quite palpable.

In addition, there was another weakness. The success of the anti-superport campaign had bought more time for Palauan leadership to forge or adopt an acceptable mode for development. But what might this be? The superport controversy provided no answers, nor did there seem a pressing need for this. With the prospect of a superport pushed back beyond the horizon, the seemingly benign conditions of a relatively comfortable dependency once more served to diffuse Palauan concern over vulnerability to worrisome, intrusive interests.
CHAPTER III--NOTES

1 In a thorough but not exhaustive search, out of approximately 106 media pieces on the superport, most appeared (97) between 1976 and 1978, with the largest number (51) in 1977. Articles appeared in U.S. mainland newspapers (The Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, New York Times and Washington Post), in Asia (Far Eastern Economic Review, the Asian Wall Street Journal), in the Pacific (Marianas Variety and News, the Pacific Daily News), in Hawaii (The Honolulu Advertiser and Star Bulletin and Ka Leo O Hawaii) at the University of Hawaii), and in Palau (in the activist newspaper Tia Belau).

2 Dead weight tons is the measure of tanker displacement when the tanker is fully loaded with its crude oil supply.

3 A number of these characteristics were similar to those which had facilitated the escalation of U.S. military interest from strategic denial to potential use, a few years before this. In the military's view, these small islanders were isolated, politically backward, and had a limited resource base. The military assumed that these islands would be less subject to "adverse political movements" that might embroil the U.S. in bloody, foreign conflicts, perhaps leading to the forcible objection of the United States (McHenry, 1975:63).

4 It should be noted that superport plans did not become a subject of popular, widespread debate in Palau until 1976. In January of that year, a Palauan newspaper published accounts of superport plans. Therefore, Panero's sampling of opinion as regards a superport must have been based on consultations with individual Palauan leaders and businessmen, and/or on querying some members of the Palau Legislature, but not of the public at large.

5 In 1977, anthropologists Goodenough and Smith wrote a proposal to explore the possibility of preparing a social impact statement. UNESCO (the United Nations agency) was also interested.

6 Judging from my fieldwork conducted a few years after this, contemporary Palauan leaders try hard not to miss major coverage of Palau by influential media. Based on this, they must have been aware of this coverage and in fact one activist leader provided me with a list of articles from the international media on the superport.

7 See Palau Deepwater Port, publication 95-24, United States Senate.
8One statement in support of such help: "We sought help where we could and are thankful to those who came to our aid" in the Honolulu Star Bulletin (May 27, 1978:A-9). A more equivocal statement: "We need their help, we admit that . . . . But they have this way of taking over." Remark of a Palau activist to the Los Angeles Times (February 2, 1977:1).

9The Ibedul's role was prominently mentioned in a number of media pieces, including articles with the following headlines: "Palau Chief Fights Oil Deposit" in the Washington Post, December 19, 1976, page E1, "Palauan Chieftan Asks U.S. Senate Committee Aid in Fighting Superport" in the Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1977, page 3, "Palau Islands Chief . . . to Protest International Oil Superport Plan" in the San Francisco Chronicle, June 14, 1977, page 6.

10This statement appeared on posters that were printed by the Save Palau Organization. I do not know the extent to which such posters actually appeared in Palau.

11"Port Pacific and industrial labor with families and supporting facilities must be imported and established. With families, the total population to operate the Palau installation should not exceed 10,000-12,000" (from a Superport ngmel Belau?:4). At this time the district figure for Palau's population was stated to be 14,511. This is probably too high.

12Both in activist literature at the time and by my own informants, a concern was voiced that Palau not end up like Guam or Hawaii where the indigenous, original inhabitants had indeed become minorities in their own land.

13The Micronesian Support Committee was based in Hawaii. Its leaders regarded MSC as an ally to and supporter of Micronesians in their self-determination efforts. I do not know how many of the pamphlets were circulated in Palau.

14Three hundred signed in Ngaraard, 54 in Hawaii, and 75 Palauans signed anti-superport petitions while on the U.S. mainland.

15Tmetchul probably stated the options in such a stark way so as to achieve increased dramatic effect. Nevertheless, I noticed that during my fieldwork some Palauans framed their options in terms of either total immersion into the West and attendant dependency or a cut-off of external links and resulting deprivation, isolation, and economic hardship.
CHAPTER IV
A SEPARATE PATH FOR PALAU?

Just as the superport controversy was winding down, another issue was peaking. This was the question of whether Palau or Micronesia was the essential political unit for Palauans. According to what parameters would Palauans define themselves before the world? This question had an identity as well as a political component and sheds light on this dissertation's investigation of Palauans' attempt to control development.

The unity/separation issue, like the superport controversy, was not directly coupled with the metropolitan powers' strategic interest and therefore was not directly tied to aid. Rather, it primarily involved Palau's interaction with another dependent party, the Congress of Micronesia, and the relationship of both of these to the United States. The question of unity/separation was, nevertheless, a watershed dispute, since it determined the parameters for both national identity and political evolution that the Palauans would pursue. A shortcoming of dependency theory is that it does not focus on such processes of ethnic and political boundary setting, assuming that these are already defined. In Palau, this was clearly not the case, and by paying attention to these processes a more flexible and inclusive dependencia approach can be established.

The working out of the unity/separation question occurred in two episodes. During the first, Palauans decided to negotiate separately with the United States, apart from the rest of Micronesia. The second
episode culminated with the decision to vote against the constitution for a Federated States of Micronesia, and in this way to reject incorporation into a Micronesian political entity.

By the mid 1970s a struggle had developed. On one side were those who wanted to maintain the unity of Micronesia, both through continued acceptance of the COM's leadership role and by approving the constitution for a Federated States of Micronesia. Such people were referred to as "unionists." Pitted against them were the "separatists," emerging first in the Marianas and then in the Marshalls and Palau.

**Disenchantment with the Congress of Micronesia**

Palauan leaders, from the time that the COM had been created, entertained "positive expectations" of the body's potential and Palau's place in it (Palau Political Status Commission, abbreviated as PPSC Situation Report 1976:5). However by 1974 a different trend was apparent. The initial view of the COM as a facilitator of Micronesian identity (informant interview) was giving way to feelings of "frustration" and "distrust" (PPSC Situation Report 1976:5), also view of a former separatist leader).

Some Palauans clearly were disappointed with the performance of the Trust Territory Government and with the COM. They viewed both as cumbersome, overly bureaucratic, too costly, and insensitive to the needs of Palau. There was also some disappointment over more specific matters, such as the COM's handling of revenue sharing between districts and the distribution of various forms of U.S. "aid." Separatists came to view the COM leadership as unbending in pursuit of its sense of
Micronesian interests, while being unresponsive to those of Palau. This perception was reinforced by COM efforts to develop a constitution.

Early in 1974 the Trust Territory passed a law establishing procedures for a Micronesian constitutional convention. By this time Roman Tmetchul, head of the Palau Legislature's Select Committee on Development, and representative to the COM, was inclined to seek more power for the district of Palau, including separate political status negotiations (Shuster, 1982:275, 276).

The Palau Legislature at this time similarly supported a "loose federation" of Micronesian states (resolution no. 74-(1)-9). According to the resolution, the people of Palau "cannot and shall not [support] any . . . form of [Micronesian] unity unless the districts themselves retain control over all domestic matters . . . ." The Liberal Party, which dominated the Legislature, also supported this view (Shuster 1982:276).

A Tmetchul-sponsored bill to establish procedures for a Palauan constitutional convention was approved by the Palauan legislature, also in 1974. The thinking was that Palauan delegates to the Micronesian Constitutional Convention should have a clear idea of Palauan needs, goals, and priorities as these related to constitutional development. If these were not facilitated with the development of a Micronesian constitution, then a constitution produced by Palau could serve as the "general basis of the future government of Palau-outside of the political family of Micronesia." (5th Palau Legislature, 6th regular session 1974). The Palau ConCon completed its work, producing two draft constitutions as of May 30, 1975, although these were never
voted upon. As these Palauan developments were unfolding, an election was held to select Palau's representatives to the COM-sponsored, Micronesian ConCon.

In May, 1975 an "Outline of Position" was drawn up by Palau's delegation, stating the constitutional preferences and objectives of Palau's delegation to the Micronesian ConCon. This eventually became known as Palau's seven "non-negotiable" requirements (PPSC Situation Report 1976:4). It is not surprising that, as Shuster states, in view of the "small population yet intensely competitive energies" of Palau (1982:283), Palau's delegates to the Micronesian ConCon felt that they needed certain assurances before Palau would agree to any union (PPSC Situation Report 1976:4). The Palauan requirements follow:

The Palauan delegates demanded that the capital of the federation be located in Palau. In addition each district should be regarded "as the basic political unit." Districts should have full authority over their internal affairs and over external matters that could impact particular districts such as military use of land. There should be equal representation from each district, irrespective of population. In addition, districts should have the option of unilaterally terminating their inclusion in the Micronesian entity if a district felt that its interests were not being served. The Palauan delegates also felt that any Micronesian confederation should attempt to secure an arrangement through political status negotiations with the U.S., which could be altered or unilaterally terminated by the Micronesians if they wished.
From the separatists point of view the constitution drafted by the COM convention for a Federated States of Micronesia rejected many of the "indispensable" Palauan points (PPSC Situation Report 1976:4). Separatist spokesmen listed the shortcomings, as they saw them, when they appeared as petitioners to the United Nations (Trusteeship Council) in 1977. From their viewpoint the Trust Territory Government had evolved into a "bloated and burdensome bureaucracy" that was aimless, and operated without "any clearly defined policies [or] direction of its own" (The Roundtable Conferences 1977:3). They felt that the proposed FSM constitution amounted to the perpetuation of the Trust Territory Government approach which had proved "unworkable" (Moses Uludong, petitioner at United Nations Trusteeship Council Meetings 1977).

Tmetchul at the Trusteeship Council meetings described the Constitution for the proposed Federated States . . . as a "study in the art of centralizing government powers" (Palau at the 44th United Nations Trusteeship Council Meeting, abbreviated as Palau at UNTC 1977:20), a far cry from the "loose confederation" which some Palauans advocated. More specifically, they were concerned that the proposed FSM Congress would effectively control most of the government since it could dominate both the executive and judicial branches.³

A fear of political domination by other districts with the possible loss of control of Palau's resources to non-Palauans was a major factor that fueled the separatist drive. More specifically, Tmetchul was concerned that a "very powerful and centralized Congressional government" would assume nearly dictatorial control and
operate with little input from the local, district levels (Palau at UNTC 1977:appendix from UNTC meetings, Tmetchul T/PV 1363:17).

In the proposed constitution the central government would have a deciding voice over land-use decisions in Palau and other districts. This in particular was "extremely unacceptable" to Tmetchul. In Palau, control of land has been traditionally connected with the exercise of power and prestige, and it was already known that U.S. military "requirements" could involve a great deal of land (see Chapter II). Also unacceptable to Tmetchul was the fact that the draft constitution provided that by a 2/3 vote in the proposed Congress and by 2/3 of the state legislatures, a treaty (such as the proposed Compact of Free Association between Micronesia and the United States) delegating major powers could be ratified. This could occur without deciding the matter through a popular referendum. 4

Separatists were also concerned that in the Federated States, Palau could be continually out-voted, since they claimed that representation would be based on population (Palau at UNTC 1977:21). Palau's population was the second smallest among the Micronesian districts and it might be overwhelmed, particularly if the other districts united to form an anti-Palau block. 5 Even worse, Palau would be unable to extricate itself from this situation since the proposed constitution gave the central government the right to oppress separatist movements (see Declaration of Intent 1977, also Pacific Daily News September 28, 1976:4).

In their public statements, separatists stressed that they were not opposed to unity per se (United Nations, Vervatim Records, United
Nations Trusteeship Council Meetings, abbreviated as UNTC 1976:61). They also felt however that the various island groups in Micronesia must first be regarded as separate political units, with differing characteristics and distinct interests that should be respected (UNTC 1976:61, also Pacific Daily News September 17, 1976:39). In actuality, a number of provisions had been included by the Micronesian ConCon to accommodate the Palauans' positions. Irrespective of such adjustments, however, the separatists felt that under a guise of Micronesian "unity," a constitution had been produced which violated the irreducible concerns of Palau. A vote on the FSM constitution would occur on July 12, 1978. At this point, it is necessary to shift focus, so as to examine the negotiations for separate status being carried on by some Palauans in the international arena. Palauan efforts in this regard were highly visible and increasingly influential during 1976 and 1977 and resulted in success by the end of that period.

**Separatist Leverage**

During the unity/separation dispute, leverage was pursued through appeals and negotiations. Separatist negotiators led by Tmetchul proved tenacious, resourceful, and sophisticated as they sought out interstacies in the multi-faceted field of U.S. power blocks and individual Americans concerned with Micronesia. Separatists also continued to press their case at the United Nations.

The drive to detach Palau from Micronesia can be traced back at least to 1973 and became clearly visible, and of significant influence, with the establishment of the Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC)
in 1975. Among the PPSC's objectives was one to conduct studies to explore a number of political options that might be open to Palau, as well as to enter into discussions with the United States for negotiations to conclude a preliminary political status agreement (resolution no. 75-(1)-2). Of course, for this to occur, the PPSC would have to be recognized as the legitimate negotiating arm of the Palauans.

In May of 1975, Roman Tmetchul as the newly-elected Chairman of the PPSC, sent a letter to the United States Ambassador requesting a formal dialogue over Palau's future status. Tmetchul indicated the PPSC's interest in an agreement that would be "similar in nature" to the commonwealth agreement than being formulated between the United States and the district of the Northern Marianas.

When taken at face value, the status preference that Tmetchul indicated was indeed a switch from his earlier preference for independence, which was discussed in Chapter II. In Shuster's view, Tmetchul's apparent change was in part a tactic to catch his domestic opposition off balance (1982:281). The fact Palauan leaders in high Trust Territory positions, as well as the activists, were "completely surprised and confused" by Tmetchul's initiative (Shuster 1982:281) towards a course which some speculated was favored by the U.S. military, as well. But just because Tmetchul now seemed to favor such a course does not mean that he was simply a compliant and externally-oriented leader, out to please the United States.

In fact, Tmetchul and the PPSC were not necessarily committed to a permanent and close relationship between Palau and the United States, such as in commonwealth. Both in making their appeals and in their
negotiations, separatists exhibited a characteristic Palauan skill in framing requests so these would appear to conform to external preferences and objectives. More specifically, it is possible that Tmetchul had concluded that the best way to get the Americans talking was to mention a status that the U.S. seemed to prefer. Once negotiations commenced, however, Palauans might alter both what they advocated, and what they would agree to. This in fact proved to be the case. It is also possible that, by the time of Tmetchul's apparent switch, he had concluded that immediate, outright independence was not feasible because of Palau's extreme economic dependency. Delimited dependence for a specified period therefore was necessary to build up Palau's economic base and other necessities for longer-run economic self-reliance and political autonomy. This would in fact be the PPSC's position. However, this did not emerge with clarity until nearly the end of the unit/separation dispute. What can be said is that Tmetchul's motivations and objectives were influenced by quite a complex mix of substantive and tactical considerations. Some of these were primarily domestic in nature, while others were more externally-oriented. Such an intermingling of factors can best be apprehended with a dependencia approach.

In July, 1975, a few days before the beginning of the Micronesian constitutional convention, a COM-sponsored referendum was held in Palau and other districts on political status options and the question of Palau's relationship to the rest of Micronesia. Palauans' response as regards political status was somewhat ambiguous. The response concerning Micronesia was far more clear-cut. Two questions related
directly to this: "do you support the unity of Micronesia" and "shall the COM continue to negotiate . . . (political) status on behalf of all the districts?" Palauans favored both Micronesian unity and COM leadership of negotiations by quite substantial votes. This however did little to derail the separatist efforts.

During June and July of 1976, Palauans favoring separate negotiations were quite busy. The PPSC met informally with the U.S. in Saipan. The U.S. had earlier indicated that separatist Palauans should wait for a further clarification of the situation in the Northern Marianas before pressing Palauan separatist demands. Now the U.S. indicated that Palauans and other Micronesians should decide first whether to accept the COM-sponsored, draft constitution for an FSM, and also decide on a compact of free association with the United States before making separatist demands (PPSC Situation Report 1976:7). The PPSC responded that U.S. adherence to this position would be an "expensive and wasteful exercise in futility" (PPSC petition to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, UNTC 1976:62) since both the FSM constitution, and any political status developed by other Micronesians would not be acceptable in Palau. At this time, a PPSC delegation also met with Congressional and State Department officials and attended the annual United Nations Trusteeship Council meetings in New York (43rd session 1976).

In September 1976 a referendum was conducted by the 6th Palau Legislature on the question of separate negotiations. Although officially ignored by the United Nations, the U.S., and by the COM, the results were nonetheless striking. Eighty-eight percent of those
who voted approved of the position that Palau should negotiate separately with the U.S. (District figures, also Appendix R in PPSC Situation Report 1976:77-79). The domestic significance of this referendum will be discussed shortly. For the present, it is sufficient to note that the PPSC and Palauan separatists took the referendum as a strong mandate for their cause. By late 1976 the "myth of [Micronesian] unity" (Pacific Daily News September 28, 1976:1) was further eroded as the Northern Marianas was breaking away, seemingly aided and abetted by the United States.

In January, 1977 the PPSC informed the COM that Palau would no longer participate in the COM's status commission. A few months later, the U.S. Executive Branch officially invited both the PSCP and Palau Legislature, along with the COM, to participate in a "Roundtable Conference to explore ways to renew progress in stalled political status negotiations (see Chapter II).

Before the conference the PPSC again traveled to Washington and met with Congressmen, staff, officials of the U.S. Departments of State and Interior, and a Presidential aid. They also appealed for a show of unity among Palauans so that the U.S. and the rest of the world would "recognize the depth of Palauan resolve..." to pursue the separatist cause (PPSC Report to the Legislature 1979:13). The PPSC also released a Declaration of Intent at this time, detailing the reasons for Palauan separatism, and it was soon officially adopted by the Palau Legislature (HEM joint resolution 35-3).

In May after the PPSC attended the first "Roundtable Conference," it traveled to the U.S. mainland once again, where it continued to
develop contacts with sympathetic members of Congress. They also attended the UNTC meetings in New York, commenting that these meetings were the "most important event and effective forum . . . available [for Palau] to present its views to the world community" (PPSC at UNTC 1977:1). Up to this time, the United Nations looked with disfavor on any activities that would lead to "fragmentation" of the Trust Territory. The PPSC now felt, however, that within the Trusteeship Council there was growing acceptance of the concept that Micronesian unity should not entail the creation of a politically "unrealistic structure" such as the envisioned FSM (PPSC at UNTC 1977:1).

During a second Roundtable Conference held on Guam in July the PPSC presented a position paper on "common links." It proposed that nearly sovereign districts be connected in a loose confederation, linked by services that would be mutually beneficial. This confederation would be coordinated by a "secretariat" with representatives from all the districts. It should not be surprising that, as proposed by these Palauans, the body would have little real power, even on issues relating to foreign affairs and defense. Even secession would be permitted and the status sought from the U.S. should be revocable as well. This arrangement might have provided Palau with ample space for continued maneuver.

In contrast to some of the Micronesians, the United States was more positive in its view of the common links proposal. The U.S. stated it still believed that there was real value in maintaining some form of Micronesian unity, but also felt that this could be achieved in a creative and flexible way (The Roundtable Conferences 1977:2).
During 1977 Palauan negotiators made vital strides in their effort to detach Palau from the rest of Micronesia (Situation Report 1976:6). The PPSC felt that U.S. officials were increasingly sympathetic to the idea that "Palau should have the future political status [that its] people want and choose, regardless of the opinions or wishes of others." (PPSC Report to the Legislature 1979:7). "Others" in this case meant the Trusteeship Council, official U.S. policy, and the pro-unity stance of the central Micronesian districts.

American officials continued to advise the PPSC to proceed cautiously (The Roundtable Conferences 1977:12, 31, also "Message from President Carter," in The Roundtable Conferences, Appendix 5). Separatists responded that if the U.S. did not recognize Palau's "right" to negotiate bilaterally then political status talks might continue at a snail's pace, or no progress would be made at all (Situation Report 1976:6, also The Roundtable Conferences 1977:3). This point was well-taken13 and during negotiations in July, the U.S. formally advanced a "two-tier" position. At the bilateral level, elements of an anticipated free association agreement that had specific impacts on a particular district, such as U.S. military use and operation requirements, would be discussed between the U.S. and that particular district (joint statement of the United States-Micronesian Conference, July 25-27, 1977).

At least one PPSC member felt that this two-tier approach amounted to a breakthrough for Palau, although others were concerned that the U.S. position was too vague. For instance, they asked how would it be determined what issues were Micronesian or district-level, especially
in ambiguous cases? Generally, however, the PPSC viewed the option of bilateral status negotiations coupled with the PPSC's right to participate in future multilateral sessions as a major advance (The Roundtable Conferences 1977:2).

On September 24, 1977 the Carter Administration officially invited the PPSC to negotiate on Palau's status at the next formal negotiating round. The PPSC regarded this as official U.S. recognition that the PPSC, and not the COM, was the legitimate negotiating arm of Palau.

By late 1977 the PPSC saw the U.S. as having recognized the following points: 1) the PPSC was a full negotiating participant with the right to pursue and conclude a preliminary status agreement with the United States. 2) Palau was "a separate nation," distinct from Micronesia. Therefore any Palauan participation in an all-Micronesian entity could only occur if the Palauans agreed (PPSC Report to the Legislature 1979:8). The separation of Palau from Micronesia was basically recognized by the end of that year.

The attainment by the Palauan negotiators, effectively led by Roman Tmetchul, of the right to negotiate separately with the United States demonstrated their skill and persistence. As with the superport controversy, some Palauans were demonstrating the ability to project Palauan concerns externally. Palauan leverage, gained through negotiations, facilitated the separatist position. Action was also being taken in Palau. Description and analysis of the campaigns there starts with developments leading up to the referendum of September, 1976.
The Campaigns in Palau

In March of 1976 a United Nations Visiting Mission (UNVM) was in Palau. During their short stay they met with a cross-section of island political, economic, and community leaders. From this mission's report, we get a glimpse of how unity/separation was being understood in Palau at the time. Keep in mind that this was approximately six months before a referendum was held to determine whether Palau should negotiate separately from the rest of Micronesia.

Along with talk of the superport, the unity/separation question was a topic of much discussion. In a meeting with members of the Executive Committee of the Palau Legislature and with the PPSC, it was stressed that the people of Palau should be given the opportunity to choose a political life separate from the rest of Micronesia. Moreover, by this time the separatist drive in the Northern Marianas was concluding with recognition of commonwealth by the United States Congress. In Palau there was talk that Palau, like the Marianas, should be able to pursue its own political course (Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, UNVM Report 1976:12).

Unity had been "imposed," and in its envisioned form threatened to be disadvantageous. The 1976 UNVM Report noted how this fear stood out over others, and was expressed by Palauans at every level (UNVM 1976: 8, 12). At least one magistrate also expressed a fear that Palauan lands might be dissipated, and even go to outsiders, if Palau joined with the other districts.
In addition, there seemed to be a consensus concerning the PPSC objective of seeking a political status through separate negotiations with the United States. This was a departure from the sentiment expressed during the 1975 referendum. Possible reasons for this shift will be discussed shortly.

During the 1976 campaign opponents of Palau's separation utilized a "superport strategy" (PPSC Situation Report 1976:14), linking the separatist drive to the enticement of superport development in Palau. According to this view, a Palau detached from the rest of Micronesia could be more easily influenced by intrusive superport, as well as military interests. During 1976, the alleged link was emphasized especially by the Tia Belaud Movement. The matter of ulterior motives and foreign interests is discussed at greater length as part of the treatment of the campaign over whether to adopt the FSM constitution, in 1978.

Another argument of those opposing separate status negotiations was to point to the PPSC's stated objective of pursuing a status arrangement "similar in nature" to the envisioned commonwealth for the Northern Marianas, and maintain that this status was not desired by most Palauans. To counter this, the PPSC denied that its intention was strictly to follow the Northern Marianas. Rather, the emerging relationship between that district and the United States could serve as a "guideline for [positive] negotiating" by Palau (PPSC Situation Report 1976:14). Yet even with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to discern the real motivations behind the PPSC's shifting statements on political status. This matter receives more attention in the context of 1978.
The strong "yes" vote for separate talks in 1976, with 88 percent of those voting approving of this position, was partly due to the fact that Palau's two major political parties formed a common front in support of separate negotiations during the 1976 campaign (Pacific Daily News September 17, 1976:39). Moreover pro-unity forces during the campaign were relatively weak and disorganized (Shuster 1982:284). Furthermore, in view of the election returns, pro-unity arguments had little impact at the time, while those of the separatists were attractive. As Shuster points out, separatists during the campaign managed to "...identify ... Micronesian unity with Palauan cultural subordination [while] separatism was identified with Palauan ascendancy" (1982:304). Clearly by the vote of 1976, the unity/separation issue was "emotionally charged," with a "no" vote (i.e., one for not conducting separate negotiations) acquiring a connotation of denying one's "Palauan-ness." Unity, for many, had come to represent a "reduction of Palauans' control over [their] lives, land, and [political] ... destiny" (Shuster 1982:284). Perhaps the Palauan public was catching up to the sentiments of separatist leaders in this regard. Tmetchul's increasing influence, and his leadership position in the separatist cause, may have also convinced some Palauans that separatism was the proper course.

However, Shuster's characterization of the situation as one of "ethnic identity, rather than a political issue" (same) is overdrawn. As will be documented in the discussion of the 1978 campaign, political factors and substantive issues (for example the desire for local economic and political control) were elements of the separatists appeal, along with ethnic pride.
The results of the 1976 referendum were widely touted by separatists as proving the popularity of their cause. PPSC leader Tmetchul felt that the vote represented a "strong mandate" from the people and said the U.S. and U.N. would "think twice" about "impos[ing]" unity on Palau (Pacific Daily News September 28, 1976:1). In fact the U.S. did alter its negotiating position on this matter (see pages 149, 150).

Despite separatist advances, pro-unity forces both within and outside of Palau continued to push for COM leadership in the status negotiations, and later, for Palauan acceptance of the FSM draft constitution. Within Palau, a group called the Concerned Citizens of Palau, led by the Ibedul and one Progressive Party leader and staffed primarily by younger Palauans (Shuster 1982:299), was quite active in the pro-unity cause. In a sense it represented a continuing strand of activism from superport days. The Ibedul, who had been Spokesman for the Save Palau Organization during the superport fight, was now one of the spokesmen for the Concerned Citizens. This group tended to concentrate on Palauan fears of a non-democratic elite, an activist concern since superport days. More specifically, the Concerned Citizens was irritated by the absence of Tmetchul and another Palauan leader from numerous COM sessions and charged them with "a calculated attempt . . . to weaken the cause of Micronesian unity," through a display of disinterest towards the COM. Several petitions were sent to the COM, urging the expulsion of Tmetchul from that body.

At roughly this time, Palauan separatists issued a "Proclamation of Palauan Leaders," complaining of "illegal" interference by the COM
in the internal affairs of Palau, through its support of pro-unity elements. From the viewpoint of separatist leaders, the COM was continuing to attack the "integrity" of Palau and its leaders, such as Tmetchul. This leverage attempt proved unsuccessful as on February 25th, Tmetchul was in fact expelled from the Senate of the COM. His expulsion, however, did not have a major, detrimental effect on either his domestic standing or on the cause of Palauan separatism.

As compared to the campaign for the 1976 referendum, the one in 1978 over the draft FSM constitution was far more contested. In Palau both sides campaigned hard, right up to July 12th, referendum day (UNVM Report 1978:36). The discussion which follows is based on informants, a file of the Pacific Daily News, a United Nations Visiting Mission Report, and on the work of Shuster (1982).

The stakes were high during the 1978 referendum since it would determine whether Palauans approved the FSM constitution, thereby including themselves in the new Micronesian state. Both unionists and separatists were confident of victory, and the intensity of their campaigns led to a climate in which the general public was "bombarded" by arguments that often seemed confusing and contradictory (UNVM Report 1978:36).

Both sides employed similar campaign techniques, including radio and television spots, public meetings, rallies, and "political picnics" (Pacific Daily News file). There was even a motorcade consisting of 125 vehicles, through the center of Koror, after which there was an encampment by a group that was 1,000 strong (same).
The unity side now consisted of one faction of the Progressive Party, Palau's two paramount chiefs, the Concerned Citizens of Palau, and a minority faction of Tia Belaud activists. Support from the traditional sector was less solid, however. The House of Chiefs was divided; one faction being aligned with the paramount chiefs, the other supported the Tmetchul/separatist block and working with the separatists in the House of Elected Members.

The unionists received some support from the COM, but with results that were mixed. When the COM dispatched a multi-district delegation of traditional leaders to Palau to support the unionist cause, this stimulated the HOC to pass a resolution urging a separatist vote. It also was a catalyst for the Palau Legislature to launch its own colorful and multi-dimensional, separatist campaign (Shuster 1982:300).

The separatists, in contrast to unionists, did not emphasize receiving external support and were primarily funded by the Palau Legislature. Separatist ranks included: the majority in the Palau Legislature, the PPSC under the leadership of Tmetchul, predominate elements of the Liberal Party associated with him, some Progressive leaders, the Modekngei, the majority faction of Tia Belaud, and some chiefs. Both the Modekngei and activists have tended to favor increased islander political control, and protection from degradations associated with intrusive interests and externally-oriented plans. Of course these two groups differed considerably, one having a long history in Palau, the other being much more recent. Nonetheless, the common concern has made both groups of particular interest for this dissertation. Why did these groups chose to ally themselves with separatism?
As the 1978 campaign peaked, separatist leaders asked the Modekngei to state its preference. One Modekngei spokesman described his group's reaction thusly: "We do not want you to come here and ask us to vote . . . yes or no. We want you to tell us, when we are going to be separated from . . . Micronesia." (Pacific Daily News file). According to this spokesman the Modekngei had "cast their ballot" for separation back in 1974 when they established their high school to stress self-reliance. They viewed rejection of the draft FSM constitution as an important step in the process that would move Palau to nationhood, which they wanted to achieve by building on Palauan strengths and resources. Inclusion of the Modekngei in separatist ranks undoubtedly boosted this cause.16

Tia Belaud also joined the separatist ranks in a major shift from its previous position. This "third party" group of relatively young people and some workers had originally sought a unified and independent Micronesia. Tia Belaud had opposed the Northern Marianas separation, viewing it as having been spawned by U.S. military interests. Tia Belaud's position changed, however. In 1977, spokesman Moses Uludong was advocating that each island group first determine its own political process and destiny, before joining in a Micronesian federation (Moses Uludong, UNTC 1977:51). This position was officially adopted by Tia Belaud, but came only after a major conflict which split Tia Belaud's ranks (interview with Uludong).

Those in Tia Belaud who were inclined towards unity felt that the organization should remain true to its original platform. Pro-unity activists also felt that the various island groups had much more in
common than the aspects which divided them and that separatist forces were over-emphasizing differences that were minor. Even some informants, who had been pro-separatist Tia Belaud members, reported that they privately were uneasy. Given the activists' generally universalistic views, it should not be surprising that there was a reluctance to emphasize ethnic distinctiveness.

Despite this, Tia Belaud separatists came to believe that separation was a better way to achieve self-reliance and political independence for Palau. Like other separatists, those in Tia Belaud were disappointed with the COM's leadership. The logistical problems and financial costs involved in maintaining such an all-Micronesian entity were seen as making effective and responsive government difficult.

The arguments and positions advocated by both sides during the 1978 campaign were, for the most part, similar to those articulated for the 1976 campaign. Only a brief summation is presented here. The theme of self-determination was stressed by separatists, particularly in external settings (UNTC June 8, 1977:38-40, 41; June 8:27; June 9:28) and also in Palau. There it resonated with Palauan desires for ascendancy and control. Of course the right of self-determination depends on which group is recognized as the indivisible, real or potential national unit. For both the United States and the United Nations this had been the Trust Territory, and not Palau.

The Palauans, however, clearly thought of themselves as a distinct people. For separatist Palauans, Micronesia was merely a "concept of political and geographic convenience which had come into being as a
result of historical happenstance and accident," primarily to serve external interests (UNTC meetings 1976:58, also 1977:3). It was stressed that geographically and linguistically Palau had more in common with the Philippines than with the central and eastern Micronesian groups (Roman Tmetchul in Pacific Daily News September 28, 1976:1). On both counts, in fact, their position was correct.

Within Palau, the separatists struck a responsive cord by emphasizing the possibility that integration in the proposed FSM would lead to the political domination of Palau and that non-Palauans might have a decisive say over the disposition and use of Palauan resources. Separatists argued that Palau instead should control its own resources, and utilize these for a development path of Palau's choosing.

Separatists pointed out that the different island groups had varying economic potentials. Palau had a relatively large land mass, small population, a considerable foreign (i.e., military) interest, and marked political assertiveness and efficacy. With these attributes, according to the separatists, Palau was in a favorable position to pursue either self-reliance or the accommodation of external interests, and the procurement of revenue from this.

Interwoven with separatist arguments was a substantial identity component. Palau is often viewed as the district, aside from the Marianas, that is the most entrepreneurial and western-oriented. Yet as one Palauan leader told me, Palauans have consistently combined a strong sense of ethnic and cultural distinctiveness with an outward-looking, cosmopolitan orientation. Therefore the substantial degree of westernization that is apparent in Palau does not mean that Palauans
would necessarily accommodate metropolitan interests, or soon want to
become Americans. In the context of the unity/separation dispute, as
noted separatists tended to highlight the differences between Palauans
and other Micronesians. Separatists hinted that Palauans, if they
joined the FSM, would be held back by island groups which they view as
less assertive, politically effective, and innovative than Palau.

The PPSC/separatist position on political status was unclear,
however. At times, the PPSC and Tmetchul seemed to stress a desire for
a close and enduring relationship with the United States. When the FSM
draft constitution appeared to be in conflict with the anticipated
status of free association, thereby provoking metropolitan objection,
separatist Palauans chided the COM for being interested in the
"unrealistic" and "euphoric" goal of independence. At other times,
members of the PPSC seemed to indicate a preference for independence
themselves. I have already noted a number of possible reasons for this
oscillation (pages 145, 146). To these it should be added that perhaps
the PPSC was ambivalent over which socio-economic and political
development path Palau should take. As the unity/separation dispute
wore on, however, a clearer Tmetchul/PPSC position emerged.

The PPSC continued to stress its desire for a close relationship
with the United States, at least in the short run (UNTC meetings
1976:57), though it was interested in independence for the longer-run.
In the meantime, Tmetchul and the PPSC wanted to concentrate on
building Palau's capacity to support independence by increasing
production and self-sufficiency (Declaration of Intent 1977:6). Free
association could provide the necessary, transitional framework for
this. As part of the arrangement, the PPSC anticipated that Palau would receive an assured level of support for at least 15 years. With this support, and guided by a United Nations economic development plan completed for Palau in 1977, the separatists felt that they could lay the groundwork for future self-reliance and real (as opposed to strictly formal) political control. They also felt that their planning would be more realistic and cost-effective than that being carried out by the COM (The Roundtable Conferences 1977: Opening Statement).

Palauan unionists in contrast argued that a united Micronesia would have a far larger resource base, and therefore would exercise greater economic and political leverage at the international level. Pro-unity forces were also critical of the PPSC's negotiating stance and accomplishments, particularly the eight point Principles of Free Association signed by the PPSC and U.S. negotiators in April of 1978 (see Appendix). 17

As noted, the unionists also felt that the other side was exaggerating cultural and other differences between the island groups as part of a base appeal to Palauan chauvinism and pride. When I talked with Palauans who had been pro-union, they looked back with distaste on what they saw as separatist appeals to narrow-minded and prejudiced sentiments in Palau. Remarks like, "would you like to eat with X islanders" or have to interact often with X islanders reportedly had been made to discourage unionist ideals.

Another unionist concern was the rising power of Tmetchul and his associates. Ironically, it was the very success of Tmetchul in rallying separatist forces, which contributed to unionist concerns.
about the Tmetchul-oriented block. By late 1978 Tmetchul was recognized as Palau's wealthiest and most successful businessman. He and his associates were influential in the PPSC, the Palau Legislature and were now dominant in the Liberal Party. Pro-unity activists, and perhaps others, were concerned that Tmetchul and his associates were planning to establish a "dictatorship" in Palau. If separation occurred, some unionists were concerned there would be no outside, Micronesian authority to which to appeal in order to restrain domestic abuses of power in Palau. A relatively minor strand of this same concern had to do with the place of Palau's hereditary leaders.18

Unionists were also concerned, and attempted to tap into fears that ulterior motives were behind the separatist stance, including links between separation and plans for a superport and the military in Palau. Reminiscent of the activist suspicions that separatism in the Northern Marianas had been instigated by U.S. military interests, unionists now charged that external, potentially intrusive interests were aiding separatism in Palau.

As noted, the UNVM to Palau in 1976 had heard comments about the possibility of a superport. The mission had viewed this possibility as "not foreign" to separatism, since a separate Palau would not have to share superport revenue with other districts. Media pieces also linked separatism to a superport and U.S. military interests (Honolulu Star Bulletin 1976 September 29: A-16 and Pacific Daily News 1977 February 23: 1, also Shuster 1982:281).

In claiming that there was a connection between superport plans, separatism, and U.S. military interests, unionists--particularly those
of an activist persuasion--were in part seeking to maintain the solidarity they had generated during the superport controversy (Shuster 1982:297). Nevertheless, the concern voiced by the pro-union activists cannot be entirely reduced to tactical considerations. Some unionists were genuinely concerned that separatism provided a smokescreen for an alliance between Palauan businessmen, international economic interests, and U.S. strategic concerns. These Palauans felt that separatism was really a Trojan Horse, to open the way for dominant businessmen in Palau to establish a "dictatorship" (Pacific Daily News file, photograph of 1978 campaign poster) that once established, would encourage intrusive and worrisome plans to be carried out in Palau. 19

Tmetchul and the PPSC were concerned enough about such speculations to devote time to denying that any such links existed (Tmetchul at UNTC 1977, June 8:43). First and foremost, Tmetchul rejected the notion that the separatist movement was "motivated by the greedy desires" of Palauans to horde all the revenue from a proposed superport. As of 1977, Tmetchul described that project as "no more than an over-publicized conceptual prospective" (same). He claimed that feasibility studies had been suspended by the time of the United Nations Trusteeship Council meetings of that year (Tmetchul at UNTC meetings 1977 June 8:43). He also emphasized that the pro-separatist stance in Palau had a long history, predating consideration of a superport. In March of 1977, Tmetchul wrote a letter to Senator Henry Jackson, the chairman of the Senate committee that held hearings on the proposed superport, in which he asserted that the superport had "absolutely nothing to do" with political status and/or the separation of Palau. He acknowledged, however, that due to Palau's "total commitment [to] progressive economic
[development], some people" might have gotten the impression of a
linkage between the separatist drive and superport plans (see March 24,

Tmetchul also denied that Palau's desires for a separate political
status and constitutional evolution were the result of a United States
"divide and conquer strategy." A related point, linked by some to
separatism, was the allegation that CIA activities had "exploited and
fostered" Micronesian disunity. The COM had made this charge in
connection with the revelation that the CIA had "bugged" the Micronesian
leadership during status negotiations in the early 1970s. In letters to
U.S. Congressmen, Tmetchul stated that "certain [pro-unity] factions and
interests" in the COM were playing up this issue in order to discredit
the basis for the separatist movement in Palau . . . " (letter to Senator
As with superport speculations, Tmetchul maintained that CIA activities
were "totally disconnected to the innate causes and . . . complexities
of Micronesian disunity."

In addition to such denials, the distribution of political forces
on the ground in mid 1978 demonstrates the lack of relationship between
separatism and the other issues, at least for some Palauans. A number
of influential individuals and groups who opposed the superport,
supported separation. This was the case for the majority faction of Tia
Belaud, and for the Modekngei. These groups operated in a "grass-roots"
manner or were "close to the people" in some other way. It is unlikely
that such elements would support separatism if the only motivation
behind that plan was to establish a "dictatorship" of externally-
oriented and irresponsible Palauan leaders.
The apprehension over a dictatorship voiced by some unionists was fueled by a specific fear, namely, that Tmetchul and his lieutenants would achieve hegemonic domination, and thereby would bring to an end the fluid and elaborated "game" of political competition in Palau. There was also concern that, in their pursuit of this, the Tmetchul group would entice worrisome, external interests in ways that could badly damage Palau. Despite their attempt to fan such concerns, this unionist argument did not have a decisive impact on the rising separatist strength. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the unionist/activist emphasis on hidden motives and external links had resonance with the recent superport controversy, and would re-emerge with unprecedented force during Palau's constitutional dispute (see Chapter V).

In actuality, separatism was fueled by a number of local factors, though it may have been favored by intrusive interests as well. As has been seen, neither unity or separation can be understood as simple opposition or compliance with metropolitan influence. Clearly indigenous groups can differ on the best way to enhance political autonomy and control. Such complexity, as opposed to a simple and mechanical view of causality invariably flowing from a core power to "peripheral" targets, is best understood through a dependencia approach.

Referendum Results on the FSM Constitution

By 1978 a faction of the Progressives, along with the Tmetchul-led Liberals, had combined their efforts in order to push for Palau's separation. Separatists attributed their strength to the emergence of a broad-based consensus in Palau that a political system and development
path, distinct from Micronesia, was best. By the end of the 1978 campaign, largely under the leadership of Tmetchul, separatists had put together a winning coalition. The vote was close, however.

More than 93 percent of Palau's registered voters, the highest percentage of voter turn-out for any district, went to the polls on July 12th. Fifty-five percent voted to reject the proposed FSM constitution while forty-five percent voted for approval. The strength of the latter vote is rather surprising, given the preponderance of politically organized and influential groups which had rallied to the separatist cause.

Forces opposing Tmetchul demonstrated by the 1978 vote that their influence was considerable, as was their determination (Shuster '1982: 307). The outcome of this contest, however, did propel Tmetchul to a position of unprecedented influence. Having said this, however, it is important to note that the Palauan referendum results should not be interpreted in a simple fashion. For some, this vote had been a question of whether to accept the FSM constitution. For others, a unity vote was based on a dislike or fear of leaders and personalities associated with the other side. On the other hand, a "no" vote might mean rejection of the FSM, but not necessarily of unity per se. For all practical purposes, however, the vote on July 12 of 1978 ended the unity/separation dispute in Palau. From then on, in fact, Palau would seek its own political status and constitutional course.

A tactical alliance had been formed, in which Tmetchul occupied a prominent place. As will be seen, however, the solidarity which had developed between some of the allied groups proved short-lived. Once the specific objective of detaching Palau from Micronesia had been achieved,
Palauans' focus and interest quickly shifted to a new political arena: Palau's constitutional struggle of 1979/80. As with the superport and unity/separation issues, this latest event would raise both substantive questions and also serve as a weapon in the age-old Palauan game of political maneuver for domestic power and prestige.

Analysis/Conclusion

During the unity/separation campaign, in line with an emerging, Palauan stance to seek greater control over island resources and decision-making, the separatists heightened concern that integration into the FSM could lead to a loss of Palauan control, resulting in external use and abuse of Palauan resources. In addition to the matter of control there was also an identity component. Actually political, economic, and identity-based concerns all fueled separatism and the line between these was never clear-cut. An overly reductionist and mechanical early dependency or world systems approach would likely have failed to grasp the reciprocal influence between the factors discussed.

The evolution of the unity/separation controversy had an impact on power alignments within Palau. Despite the considerable influence and determination of the unionist opposition, the process and outcome of the unity/separation dispute both reinforced the influence of Tmetchul and of his associates. The controversy also drew many activists somewhat closer to established political power. The Uludong group had effectively campaigned, as part of a coalition that included "Establishment" political and social groups, for a cause that prevailed. In another way, however, this dispute had been costly for activists. In contrast to the superport controversy which had fostered activist solidarity, the
unity/separation dispute splintered activist ranks. In fact, Tia Belaud ceased to exist by the end of the dispute as the single, organizational vehicle for activists.

Like the anti-superport cause, separatism was largely a defensive and reactive thrust against a proposed plan for development which had worrisome aspects. During the superport controversy, the primary fear was of externally-oriented economic domination, operating in collusion with an externally-oriented and socially irresponsible Palauan elite to degrade Palauans and their environment. During the unity/separation dispute, the apprehension was over envisioned, external political domination, involving a loss of Palauan control. Note that in both cases, fears concerned anticipated developments. This future-oriented aspect to Palauan development issues is part of what makes Palau such an interesting case.

There were also differences however, between the superport and unity/separation controversies. Instead of rejecting an individual development project, as was the case with the superport, separatist Palauans carried their oppositional stance to a much broader front by rejecting participating in development initiatives if these were forged and directed outside of Palau. Moreover, during the unity/separation dispute, Palauans utilized a foreign-derived sanction (referendums) in order to authoritatively decide which path to take. A third contrast is that unlike the superport controversy, unity/separation did not involve a strong sense of anticipated, internal polarization between a foreign-oriented elite and other Palauans. Rather the split was along an inside/outsider dimension, despite the efforts of some unionists to present the controversy in the former light.
As with blockage of a superport, the successful effort to detach Palau from the rest of Micronesia did not provide a development alternative. A largely defensive and reactive strategy had, once again, succeeded. Yet having decided to forgo the larger resource base of a united Micronesia, what economic base and/or other development means would Palauans put in its place? Increased emphasis on productive/subsistence oriented activities was advocated by the activists, Tmetchul, the Modekngei, and by the United Nations Development Plan. However, nowhere in sight was a means to wean Palauans away from the increasingly bureaucratic and consumptive lifestyle to which they were growing accustomed. Free association, by the end of the dispute, was emerging as a seemingly attractive and viable short-to-medium range alternative. But even as this came into view, it was no more than a set of supposed understandings, and, Palauan reservations about the strategic/military aspects of such an agreement showed no signs of diminishing. A concrete, comprehensive, attractive means for Palauans to pursue island controlled and oriented development was simply not provided by the unity/separation dispute.

Nonetheless, there had been some closure. As with the superport dispute, the controversy surrounding unity/separation helped to clarify, at least in a reactive sense, Palauan views on development. The separatist campaign had demonstrated that a politically decisive margin of Palauans wanted Palau to negotiate its own political status, were concerned about external domination and a loss of Palauan control, and felt that Palau should forge its own identity and structure as a nation. However once this latest threat of an integrationist scheme receded,
comfortable conditions of dependency once more operated to assuage
Palauans' immediate concern over extent impingements and longer-range
threats.
CHAPTER IV--NOTES

1. For detailed discussion of this, see Shuster 1982, page 283.

2. According to the PPSC, the seven points emerged from community meetings, held in Palau, during which a "specific Outline of Position (Appendix H in the Situation Report) . . . to direct the duties and activities of the Palau delegation in Saipan. These particulars were later to be publically labeled as the seven non-negotiable requirements of Palau," according to page 4 of the Situation Report. At least one well-placed informant, an influential leader who supported separatism, reported this same perspective, namely that the Palau delegates, in preparation for the Micronesian ConCon, drew up Palau's non-negotiable requirements. Dr. Meller (personal communication) has a differing view. According to his sources, the seven, non-negotiable points did not take final shape in Palau, but rather in Saipan, though there "may have been preliminaries" in Palau to this effect.

3. More specifically, a simple majority in the proposed Congress would elect the President, who could then appoint court justices, with the 2/3 approval of Congress.

4. It is true that, in the political status negotiations of the time, a referendum was mentioned. This however, may not have reassured many Palauans. After all, even if such a referendum was required for the Trust Territory, Palau's political status preference might be outvoted by the other Micronesian districts.

5. Palauans tend to describe other island groups as docile and unsophisticated. For their part, islanders from other groups tend to describe Palauans as too assertive, competitive and opportunistic.

6. For example, the stipulation that a 2/3 vote by states would be required to pass laws on a second reading.

7. Early in 1973 a bill of the 5th Palau Legislature to establish a status commission was vetoed because, at the time, the U.S. seemed firmly opposed to separate negotiations with Palauans and regarded the establishment of a Palauan status commission as a move towards that direction (Report to the Palau Legislature: The State of Negotiations with the United States Government as of December 31, 1979:1).

8. The results on status in this referendum were of somewhat "dubious" credibility (Shuster 1982:280), in view of the low voter turn-out and because Palauans had not been asked to prioritize their vote.
On the question, do you support the unity of Micronesia?, 48.67 percent voted "yes" while 16 percent voted "no." On the question of "shall the COM continue to negotiate on behalf of all the districts?," 48.5 percent voted "yes" while 18.74 percent voted "no."

Before this referendum, the COM had voted to make Ponape and not Palau the capital of the Federated States, thereby rejecting one of Palau's "requirements."

The districts of Ponape and Truk immediately opposed the Palauan proposal. These and other central Micronesian districts which supported the proposed FSM constitution suspected that both Palau and the Marshalls were no longer interested in supporting unity in any form. The suspicion was that Palau was using its "common links" proposal to dupe other districts into lending support to what was actually a separatist drive (Pacific Daily News 1977 July 24:1).

The Palauan representatives took note of this contrast. From their point of view, the PPSC's repeatedly tried to be flexible, but only met with COM intransigence and obstructionist tactics.

At least one U.S. spokesman during the negotiations in July stated that a major reason that the U.S. decided to adopt a more flexible approach was to allow for "prompt progress" in the stalled political status negotiations (Pacific Daily News July 26, 1977:1).

In fact in mid-March, 1976, Tmetchul and the Speaker of the Palau Legislature were in Iran, meeting with officials of an Iranian tanker company and a Japanese trading firm. The Palauans assured the Iranians and Japanese that they "would be able to secure land, reefs, shoals, and water areas for [superport] purposes . . ." (Minutes of the 2nd coordinating committee meeting for the Palau Project, cited in Shuster 1982:285).


The Modekngei at this time had a voting strength estimated at 1,000 (Pacific Daily News files).

Some unionists felt that the agreements amounted to a wholesale accommodation of the U.S. military. This was particularly disturbing to some pro-union activists who, like other activists, had voiced opposition to a large-scale U.S. military presence.
18 In Guam in May, 1978 the Ibedul and Reklai said that hereditary leaders would "become mere figure heads in a separate Palau ruled by Roman Tmetchul and his separatist supporters" (Shuster 1982:302).

19 At least initially, when Tmetchul and a number of other Palauans leaders seemed receptive to a superport, such links were logical to make, based on the reported activities of Tmetchul. At a meeting in Tehran he assured the Iranians and Japanese that Palauan resources would be available for a superport and that facilities would be protected, since Palau had "recently petitioned the U.S. for direct commonwealth status." Tmetchul reportedly continued that this status was necessary to "ensure economic and strategic support and protection" for Palau (Minutes of the 2nd coordinating meeting, March 15, 1976 as cited in Shuster 1982:285).
CHAPTER V
DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTION AND ENSUING DISPUTE

This chapter concerns Palauan efforts to develop a national constitution, and the ensuing dispute which pitted some Palauans against both others and the United States. More specifically, a coincidence of interest developed between the United States, which objected to aspects of Palau's Draft Constitution, and those Palauans who were also dissatisfied with the Draft. Their combined pressure had the unintended and unanticipated effect, however, of stiffening the resolve of a widening group of Palauans to "defend" the drafted constitution.

Both the superport and unity/separation struggles had been primarily defensive, reactive, specific efforts in opposition to externally-oriented plans. The forging of Palau's constitution signified a more comprehensive, formal, and potentially long-range strategy to control development. The objective was to provide Palauans with a national framework for their islands, which had just distanced themselves from an all-Micronesian embrace.

The constitutional dispute, which followed close on the heels of the drafting of a constitution, provides a case through which to examine some of the dynamics that are central to a dependency, as well as to a dependencia approach, namely, the emergence of a coincidence of interest between a dominant, external power, and a segment of leadership in the "periphery." The United States, in order to obtain "satellite" compliance, indicated that in the future it might reduce or withdraw its "aid" to Palau. This is as expected from dependency theory. However, a
specific attempt by the United States to exert influence, as well as the coincidence of interest between the United States and a local faction, had the unanticipated consequence of increasing Palauan resistance to U.S. demands. Such a "contrary" result would be an anomaly from the viewpoint of early dependency theory, though not for a dependencia perspective. The reasons for this "contrary" aspect of the metropolitan/satellite interaction are highlighted and explored.

On the eve of the emergence of Palau's constitution, the Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC) proposed a plan for the Islands to reach goals of constitutional development, the transfer of power from the Trust Territory and Micronesia, and the attainment of a political status agreement, all within one year (Recommendations for the First Year of the Operations of the Government of Palau by Beck, Brophy, Rengill, Yoichi and Silk 1978:8). This chapter starts with a discussion of their plan.

A Choice Over Strategies

In October of 1978, a number of members of the PPSC submitted an outline for a lean, streamlined, decisive government designed to move rapidly, and in an integrated fashion, towards post-Micronesian political objectives. The report was entitled "Recommendations to 1st year of Operations of the Government of Palau" and was written by three Americans, legal/political advisors to the PPSC and a Palauan member (Recommendations ... 1978:1).

The report emphasized the inter-dependence of Palau's transition, constitutional, and political status objectives, and proposed that
certain measures to enable Palau to "act for its own interests in a prompt . . . authoritative and unified manner" during the crucial period ahead (Recommendations . . . 1978:1). Specifically, it was recommended that the PPSC become the Commission on Status and Transition, that an Office of Legal Council be established, as well as a Palau Government Council, described by the report as an "interim quasi-executive office" (Recommendations . . . 1978:6). Recruitment for key positions would either be determined by Roman Tmetchul, his close associates, or those viewed as being under his influence. In fact, the PPSC proposal was rejected both at the Trust Territory level, and by Palauans, largely due to concern that Tmetchul and his associates, by occupying key positions in the proposed transitional government, could dominate Palau's political evolution, perhaps even establishing a "dictatorship." This reaction illustrates how an attitude towards the political intentions of a particular leader or group can effect the response to a development strategy. Recognition of such political considerations is insufficient in any analysis that merely considers the substantive merits of a particular plan being proposed.

After rejection of the PPSC plan, Palauans implemented procedures for a constitutional convention. This relatively assertive and protectionist effort was the first explicit move towards formal and symbolic closure in the construction of a national unit for Palau. Moreover, the emphasis in the Constitutional Convention (ConCon) would depart markedly from the elitist approach which some associated with the PPSC. In fact the ConCon would recruit a relatively broad-based and diverse pool of leaders for an endeavor that would be quite public, and the focus of much popular interest and support.
Palau's Constitutional Convention

In September 1978, Palau's legislature passed the law establishing procedures for a constitutional convention. The legislation directed that the Convention draft a constitution for a "sovereign" Palau. At the same time, however, the convention was also instructed to produce a document that would "make allowance for the establishment of free association with the United States" (Public law 6-55-1, 6th Palau Legislature, September 26, 1978). This involved a potential conflict.

On November 28th Palauan voters went to the polls to popularly elect delegates for the convention, and were faced with a large and varied choice. Of the 89 candidates running for 38 seats (all contested), some were prominent individuals long connected with Trust Territory and/or Palauan politics. Candidate Lazarus Salii, head of Economic Services for the Trust Territory, was an example. Another influential Palauan, Roman Tmetchul, did not run. He was, however, expected to wield considerable influence through his associates and relatives, many of whom ran for delegate seats.

Those elected as ConCon delegates covered a wide range of social categories and groups. The majority were "well-known professional men" (The New Republic, edition 1, Pacific Daily News February 8, 1979:19). Two-thirds were from the government sector, of which one-fifth was from education. Delegates also included six lawyers, two clergymen, and a doctor, a judge, a "housewife" and a stevedore.

The most voter support went to community-oriented, consensual populist leadership. Father Felix Yaoch, a Catholic priest and community
leader, received the highest number of votes. Another religious/community leader, Protestant Pastor Billy Kuartie also did well. Both these leaders were interviewed to ascertain their interest in and views on the convention. These community-religious leaders very much wanted to assess the wants and needs of Palauans, and to lend assistance in the attempt to development a national structure to meet such needs. In their view, a constitution could prioritize, and then safeguard community interests and needs on a pan-Palauan scale. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that going into the Convention, the Catholics or Protestants existed as unified, political blocks. Such political cohesiveness, and block voting, is characteristic of the Modekngei (p. 70).

The selection of delegates was a setback in the Tmetchul group's effort to control political development. Moreover the election can be interpreted as something of a repudiation of the secretive, elitist and self-interested style that some associated with Tmetchul. Once again, we see that the basis for and nature of indigenous preferences—in this case for political style—must be appreciated to understand political and other forms of development in a "peripheral" country. Recognition of this is insufficient in early dependency theory, in contrast to dependencia, which is a more flexible approach.

Though not in a position to control the Convention, some of Tmetchul's supporters did win delegate seats. Their connection to him was primarily through either his regional base in Airai, or through past and present associations based on economic and/or political activities, concentrated in Koror. Another group, referred to by some as the "Saipan Mafia," was apparently centered around Lazarus Salii. "Saipan Mafia"
refers to the view that these relatively well-paid Palauans, with Trust Territory administrative jobs, wanted to ensure they could find similar positions in Palau by influencing the Convention to write a constitution providing for a large and well-paid bureaucracy. Support for a elaborated and complex national government did not merely spring from the desire by some to hold government jobs, however. Rather, as will be shown, the primary desire was to embed democratic safeguards. This political consideration would not have been properly appreciated if a primarily economist, theoretical approach had been taken, such as early dependency and world-systems views.

Going into the Convention, the Tmetchul and Salii-oriented groups were seen by at least one observer as the dominant factions (Shuster 1980:74). On the other hand the Modekngei delegate, as well as a "diverse collectivity" of community-oriented representatives, were relatively unattached. Haruo Remeliik, the Deputy District Administrator and now a ConCon delegate, was reportedly targeted for support early by some activists. Remeliik, as well as the other community leaders already discussed, were regarded as being sympathetic and responsive to the concerns of ordinary Palauans. As one informant stated, Remeliik "has been with the people all of his life, help[ing] them physically and financially." Financially, he had the reputation of contributing generously and often during times of need and for economic exchange "customs." Structurally, Remeliik's position as Deputy District Administrator (Distad), the highest administrative post occupied at the time by a Palauan, was conducive for developing extensive links and relationships based on reciprocity and obligation. Such relationships
count for much in contemporary Palau. Remeliik's influence visibly increased with his election as ConCon President\(^6\) and, during the Convention, he was widely viewed as a moderate and level-headed leader, who functioned as a "calming point" (Gwenda Iyar, Pacific Daily News reporter, interview).

A question faced early by the Convention was whether the new government should be based on a presidential or parliamentary system. More specifically, the choice was between a national government consisting of three branches, and capped by a popularly elected president, or a legislative body of one house that would select a prime minister.\(^7\) Witnesses and delegates who spoke on behalf of a presidential system felt it would provide more freedom of choice, plus a clear separation of powers through a system of checks and balances between the government branches. Supporters of a parliamentary system argued that this would be less cumbersome and costly, and therefore more appropriate for a small nation. In general delegates expressing support for a parliamentary system were oriented towards Tmetchul.\(^8\)

The Saipan group also submitted many proposals for a constitution that would have been similar to the FSM constitution rejected in July.\(^9\) In contrast to the "Mafia" and the Tmetchul-oriented group, the Modekngei submitted relatively few proposals to the Convention. Their position was "... you non-Modekngei leaders propose and we will dispose" (Freeman 1979:3). By all accounts, the Modekngei was in a powerful position to so "dispose."\(^10\)

As of mid-February, 1979 the ConCon was well into its deliberations and running smoothly (Pacific Daily News February 15, 1979:8). The
feeling of compromise which prevailed contrasted sharply with the recent, white-hot controversy over Palau's separation from Micronesia.

Two issues did become the foci of some debate, however. One was the question of land, control of which has characteristically been of concern to Palauans. The other issue, already mentioned, was the question of whether Palau should have a parliamentary or presidential system. By early March the parliamentary option was losing favor, as it was feared that Tmetchul-oriented forces might dominate such a government.

Another matter raised during the Convention was relevant to Palau's underlying development dilemma, and would become a focus for dispute. This was the possibility of conflict between Palauans' desire for political control, as embedded in the constitution, and the desire for continuing, high levels of financial support, anticipated from free association. Perhaps as part of an attempt to influence the Convention, and when that failed, to enlist United States support for constitutional revision efforts, the Palau Political Status Commission ran a number of media advertisements/information bulletins on the ConCon's work. In one of these, the PPSC delved into the "question of sovereignty." It stated that "of all the issues facing the [constitutional] assembly the question of sovereignty is perhaps the most delicate . . . because it bears upon the relationship [between] Palau and the United States" (The New Republic, edition 2, in the Pacific Daily News February 20, 1979:14). This relationship, including U.S. strategic "rights" and "responsibilities," had been at least loosely defined by the agreed-upon principles of free association, signed by the PPSC in April 1978.
As of early 1979, Palau's leaders were interested in procuring increased political control for their islands. In a media article entitled Palau's "Constitution to Assert Sovereignty," ConCon delegate Lazarus Salii stated that while free association was "in the minds of . . . delegates, it is not taken for granted" as the only possible course (Pacific Daily News February 15, 1979:8). The very name of the PPSC's full-page bulletin/advertisements, i.e., "... the Emerging Sovereign Nation of Belau" (my emphasis) was suggestive, and seemed to connote an interest in independence. In addition these bulletins described the ongoing status negotiations with the United States as resulting in breakthroughs in Palau's ability to make treaties and to conduct other aspects of foreign affairs (editions 2 and 3 of the New Republic, in Pacific Daily News, 1978 February 20:14 and 24:33, respectively). The vigor with which the PPSC was advancing on this front could easily give the impression that Palau might be interested in independence. During the Convention, a proposal advocating a politically independent and non-aligned Palau was signed by 30 out of 38 delegates. Another advocated that Palau should be economically self-reliant, thereby freeing itself from foreign economic and political control.

For Palau, the continued appeal of free association was its assured level of financial aid and infrastructural support. Most ConCon delegates, however, at least before the advent of United States objections, felt that the "emerging nation of Belau" should have full control over its internal affairs and foreign policy. But could Palau be independent and still obtain free association with the U.S.? This question was asked in one of the PPSC's media advertisement/bulletins.
A Pacific Daily News (PDN) editorial also speculated about this.

The editorial, entitled "Will Palau Make a Run at Independence," was "curious to see" what would happen if the Palauans drafted a constitution for an independent nation or was viewed as having done so by the United States. The editorial stated that the United States, "which has long proclaimed itself a champion of freedom in other places . . . could hardly turn down a legitimate plea . . ." by the Palauans for independence (PDN February 16, 1979:33). However, one could question whether the U.S. necessarily adheres to the international, morally-based right of self-determination when its strategic objectives seem at stake. In any event, the PDN editorial correctly pointed out that some politically assertive and sophisticated Palauans might want to "test the U.S." on just how far Palauans could go. In other words, how much autonomy and control would the U.S. permit, without it being alienated to the point where it was unwilling to assure Palau of continued, high levels of support? In all likelihood, there was also a desire on the part of some Palauans to experience claiming autonomy, after many decades of foreign rule.

Most of the ConCon was a period of relative calm. External interests and constraints seemed rather remote and non-pressing. In this atmosphere, Palauan delegates felt free to express a maximal and idealized sense of Palau in political, economic, and cultural terms. The degree of U.S. responsiveness to Palau's assertion would be taken by some in Palau as a test of the extent to which the U.S. was really willing to apply its democratic principles.
The constitution produced was, among other things, an indicator of pan-Palauan preferences and concerns as these related to national government. The following discussion also includes aspects of the constitution which became targets for U.S. unease.

Under the constitution, Palau's national government is supposed to protect the environment, foster the development of a national economy, and ensure the well-being of its citizens through social service programs in health and education. The constitution was also supposed to enhance Palau's cultural well-being.

The articulation of "traditional rights" (article 5) with the national government is ambiguous, however. Article 5, section 1, of the constitution states that the national government should take no action to "prohibit or revoke the role or function of a traditional leader as this is recognized by custom and tradition." But this applies only up to the point of conflict with the national constitution, where the latter prevails. Article 2 states that statutes and traditional law are "equally authoritative." In the case of conflict, the statute takes precedence, [but] "... only to the extent it is not in conflict with the underlying principles of traditional law" (article 5, section 2). The means to determine such laws and principles are not spelled out.

Generally speaking, the constitution permits a Palauan policy with both "modern" and "traditional" leadership. At the national level, candidates are elected to office through popular votes. Below this the form of government is left up to individual states to decide. The approach may have the advantage, as one informant stated, of "taking
chiefs out of the [pan-Palauan] legislature and putting them back in the municipalities . . . ." In the years before and during my study, chiefs and especially "acting chiefs" lost considerable prestige among some Palauans. In part, this was due to the circumstance that in the HOC, and in pursuit of contemporary economic and political objectives, some acting chiefs were seen as often absent from their local communities and as no longer intimately aware of, or concerned about conditions in the village.

In addition to perhaps lessening the role confusion and ambivalence that had developed between "traditional" and "elected" leadership, the dual structure established by the constitution granted a large degree of autonomy to the states. It was hoped this might stimulate economic development by encouraging economic competition and self-reliance.

The constitution emphasized the importance of having an open, accessible government to an extent unheard in old Palau, and not present in some western democracies. One provision in the constitution resembles a western style bill of rights. It guarantees certain fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly. Freedom of the press in Palau's constitution includes a provision that no reporter can be required by the government to divulge sources (article 4, section 12). Moreover every citizen also has the right to examine any government document and to observe official deliberations. The open government supported by the constitution resulted from a desire to avoid undue domestic concentrations of power. Avoidance of this has an ethno-historic basis, namely the desire to maintain political competition (see Chapter II, p. 38). It is also a reaction to the excesses of
recent history, in which some leaders have been seen as making "secret" and controversial deals with powerful outsiders (see Chapter III on the superport controversy).

Palau's constitution called for an internally responsive and responsible government. A major objective was to build in safeguards, mainly through provisions for popular referendums, so as to prevent domestic abuses of power and especially any linkages between these and predatory, external forces. These protectionist and externally-restrictive provisions of the constitution aroused U.S. concern, and are discussed in some detail below.

The constitution applied an archipelagic definition of Palau's territory and jurisdiction. This claims as Palauan "all of the islands of the Palauan archipelago, the internal waters, [and] the territorial waters extending to 200 nautical miles from a straight archipelagic baseline" drawn from the furthermost reef and island points of Palau (article 1, section 1).

The constitution also maintains that its articles and sections are "the supreme law of the land" (article 2, section 2). To the extent that any treaty or other foreign arrangement contradicts this, it is invalid, unless approved by a referendum process (see below).

The Palauan national government can delegate certain defense, treaty-making, or other governmental powers to the United States, or to some other foreign power. This must be approved, however, by 2/3 of the members of each house of the Palauan Congress and through a popular referendum. Moreover the constitution stipulates that "any such agreement which authorizes [the] use, testing, storage or disposal of
nuclear, or other "harmful sustances" requires the approval of 3/4 of the votes cast during a popular referendum. In effect, then, even for nuclear transit, a 3/4 vote of approval must be obtained.

Two other provisions proved worrisome to the U.S. One of these (article 8, section 7) prohibits the national government from exercising eminent domain if the purpose of this is to procure land for the "benefit . . . a foreign entity." The other article (15, section XI) stipulates that any amendment or infringement of the constitution for the purpose of avoiding inconsistency with free association requires the approval of a majority of those voting in 3/4 of the Palauan states.

These provisions were to enhance broad-based Palauan, political control. Another aspect of the constitution, however, could have the contrary effect of maintaining or even increasing Palau's vulnerability to outsiders. The national government would be large, social service-oriented, and quite expensive. Government employees would have to be paid. The amount of funds required for this, and for government services, would likely greatly exceed that which could be generated from Palau. Large amounts of foreign aid might help fill this gap. Such aid, however, was likely to be offered with conditions. As of 1979, the condition that appeared most likely was a relatively massive and active U.S. military use of The Islands.

The constitution seemed designed to enhance local autonomy/control, but also would probably require massive external support, with no priority established between these potentially conflicting objectives. Therefore, constitutional development had the unintended effect of moving Palau closer to the horns of its development dilemma. The protective and externally restrictive safeguards embedded in the constitution were part
of a structure that, in all probability, would require massive support from the U.S. If sufficiently disturbed by Palau's constitution, however, the United States might not be willing to provide such support. The potential weak-point in closure created by this potential conflict became manifest when U.S. objections were raised, and will be discussed shortly.

Most delegates (35 out of 38) signed the Draft Constitution on April 2. A small minority did not, however. The dissatisfaction of these delegates, who were associated with Tmetchul, centered around two points. At least one demurring delegate expressed the view that the Draft Constitution would weaken if not destroy the authority of Palau's chiefs. Secondly, and more importantly, they maintained that the proposed government would deepen dependency, while eroding the chances for productive economic development. They also argued that the Draft Constitution could put Palau in the impossible position of asserting autonomy, and yet at the same time, of requiring massive dependency. In fact the U.S. soon began to indicate that Palau could not have both unfettered autonomy, and assured dependence. The few delegates, and others who attempted to point to this unfolding dilemma were in a weak position to do so, in view of the domestic standing of their faction leader, and because of other circumstances at the time. This will be discussed at greater length where appropriate.

A number of questions remained even after most delegates signed the Draft Constitution. The constitution had established a Post Constitutional Convention Commission (PCCC) to make the arrangements for a popular vote on the draft, scheduled for July 9th. The PCCC was also
supposed to help implement the transfer of power from both the Micronesian and Trust Territory levels to Palau. However, the Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC) still regarded itself as the legitimate power for transition (Freeman 1979:4).18

Ideally, transition would involve empowering the Palauan Government to act largely on its own, free of Trust Territory constraints. In early 1979 the PPSC claimed that it had made impressive gains in its ability to oversee Palau's international relationships,19 as details of free association began to emerge.20 Therefore the PPSC might feel entitled and obliged to take steps to revise portions of the Draft Constitution that seemed incompatible with free association. The PPSC in fact, would soon take this view.

United States Objections

Towards the end of March, just days before the adjournment of Palau's ConCon, the brief period of calm came to an end as the United States began to communicate unease over aspects of Palau's emerging constitution. The United States was concerned about the constitutional requirement that 3/4 of the Palauan states, through a majority vote of citizens there, must give their approval if the constitution is to be amended to make it compatible with free association.

The United States was also concerned about the requirement that 3/4 of the voters in a general referendum must approve of any introduction of nuclear or other "harmful substances" into Palau. Moreover, the U.S. did not want to accept the Draft Constitution's claim of jurisdiction over a 200 mile, archipelagic limit. If no nuclear materials were
permitted within this area, such a limit would amount to a sizeable "nuclear free zone" in a strategic area of the Pacific. The U.S. viewed this with alarm.

Another major area of U.S. concern was the constitutional provision that restricts the use of eminent domain by the Palauan, national government. To the U.S., this introduced real uncertainty as to whether a Palauan government could secure adequate lands for U.S. military purposes.

When the ConCon delegates learned of the U.S. concerns, they decided against making major alterations. This stance was due to a variety of reasons, ranging from assertive dependence to autonomist views. There was sentiment among the delegates that the U.S. concerns had been communicated much too late for proper consideration. Some delegates felt that eventually, the Draft Constitution could be compatible with free association. Some felt that the U.S. would back down on its objections. There was also a view that constitutional provisions should only be changed to the extent this did not compromise the interests of Palau, as articulated by the Convention (Carlos Salii at UNTC, 1979 May 24:26, 29-30).

As can be seen, the reasons for the Convention's stance were mixed. However, it must not be overlooked that a "nationalistic-ethnic feeling" (Shuster 1980:78) came to permeate the Convention, and had a somewhat intoxicating effect. During the Convention, a majority of the delegates seemed to adopt the view that their task was to assert "unconditional sovereignty, self-determination, and [Palauan] national identity (Shuster 1980:76). One only has to read the preamble of Palau's constitution to get a sense of this. In the face of U.S. unease, the consensus of
most of the convention was that constitutional development had been a truly representative, democratic process. Therefore, the results of its work in unmodified form should be voted upon by the people in a referendum on July 9th.

The Ambassador's Visit; An Attempt at Influence

Just weeks after the Convention, on April 30th, U.S. Ambassador Rosenblatt came to Palau and held a "closed-door" meeting with certain legislators, former Convention delegates, and members of the PPSC. In one sense, the process culminating with the Draft Constitution had succeeded too well. Metropolitan concern had now been aroused. In fact, Rosenblatt's visit highlighted the impression that the U.S. would use at least an implied (i.e., future-oriented) threat of "aid" withdrawal to obtain Palauan compliance to American demands. Whatever its long-range effects, for the present the U.S. Ambassador's visit had the unintended effect of broadening Palauan support for defense of the Draft Constitution. This "contrary" effect was due to the Palauan perception that Rosenblatt's visit had constituted an ill-timed, overbearing, and inappropriate U.S. intrusion into Palauan affairs.

Rosenblatt stated that over the past months, the United States "had been encouraged by the fact that the peoples of the Trust Territory have taken on new responsibilities for self-government . . . " and viewed Palau's establishment of constitutional government in this light (Rosenblatt 1979:1). The U.S., felt however, that at this juncture, elements of the Draft Constitution were incompatible with American interests. The Ambassador suggested that the U.S. would not be prepared to offer free association so long as such "ambiguities" remained in the
Draft Constitution (Rosenblatt 1979:7). He pointed out that if the impasse was not resolved, then Palau might want to negotiate for another status, such as independence. This status would not include any assurance of continuing high levels of financial support, however.

Shuster maintains that when the Ambassador delivered his remarks these were "not meant ... as a political threat, [but] ... as a statement of how the U.S. Congress functions" (Shuster 1980:78). Rosenblatt himself stated that: "what steps, if any should be taken to solve this are for Palauans ... to decide." Many Palauans, however, did not take his remarks in this light. For them, the Ambassador's visit constituted unwanted U.S. "interference."

Haruo Remeliik walked out of the April 30th meeting in protest and his action made a favorable impression on some Palauans. One informant, who credited himself with being the first one to "blast Rosenblatt," stated that Remeliik deserved "all the credit" for taking the first real stand against perceived U.S. pressure by his "walk-out" from the April 30th meeting.

Remeliik's action enhanced his domestic standing, which was already strong. Moreover, now that U.S. objections were being raised, his defense of the product of that convention put him squarely on the indigenous side in a dispute that was developing pro American and pro-Palau connotations. Remeliik, in characteristic form, did not make his stand known through highly-charged rhetoric or bombastic action. Even when he walked out, reportedly this was done in a polite and understated, but firm way. This action was particularly striking, as it was unexpected from a leader
who was often viewed as soft-spoken. Moreover the walk-out was viewed by some as particularly courageous since Remeliik, in effect, was defying his Trust Territory "boss."

Nonetheless, he was not the only Palauan to object that day. Protestors holding signs were present just outside the Legislature Building while the Ambassador was inside, delivering his remarks. Judging from the signs and youthful appearance of many in the protest, it is almost certain that some activists were involved. Certainly the quasi-nationalistic and anti-imperialistic rhetoric that was displayed matched the thinking of many activists. Some of the placards read: "Rosenblatt go home," "Rosenblatt we don't want you," "why the closed door meeting, are you afraid of Palauans?" Others said: "Rosenblatt, do you want another Marcos, Park, Somoza, or Shah in Palau?," "USA, defend us from whom?," and "Stop interfering in [our] internal affairs." The theme of interference should be familiar. Beyond this, the cosmopolitan awareness of the demonstrators is indicated by the mention of political leaders in the Third World. The sign "defend us from whom?" needs further explanation. Although U.S. rhetoric emphasizes that U.S. defense "obligations" stem from a desire to defend islanders, a Palauan perception is that actually, the U.S. has little interest in defending Palauans and that there would be little need for this if Palau was not militarized. In this Palauan view, U.S. strategic "obligations" are primarily to serve American interests and influence, while having little to do with Palauan concerns.
Position of Tmetchul and the PPSC

In contrast to pro-draft Palauans at this time, the Tmetchul faction saw itself in a convergence of interest with the United States. This was due to a complex mix of tactical and substantive, domestic and externally-oriented reasons. Such complexity is expected from a dependencia perspective.

Late in the Convention (March 15th), the PPSC sought an American review of the emerging draft constitution. From the viewpoint of the U.S., the PPSC's review request was "entirely logical and proper" (Rosenblatt's statement, page 2). However, as shall be discussed shortly, the appropriateness of such PPSC activity would be disputed by Palauan opponents.

As early as March 28th, in one of its New Republic bulletins, the PPSC had expressed sympathy for those Palauans who were dissatisfied with the emerging constitution. According to the Republic . . . , the "swelling opposition" of Palauans to the Draft Constitution generally centered around three points which corresponded to the minority objections raised during the ConCon. The PPSC stated that the Draft Constitution would create a government "so gigantic and predictably expensive" that Palau would have to continue to rely on continuing and massive flows of U.S. aid, which might be uncertain, since the Draft Constitution lacked sufficient "flexibility" to satisfy U.S. military interests (New Republic, edition 4 in Pacific Daily News 1979 March 28:14).

By mid April, the Palauan Legislature began to express an intention to withhold funding which had been ear-marked for the Post Constitutional Convention Committee (PCCC). The Legislature's emerging position against
the Draft was both in response to, and in support of the lead taken by the PPSC. What were the substantive reasons for the Tmetchul-led PPSC to adopt its position?

When it became clear that the Draft Constitution had not accommodated basic U.S. concerns, the Speaker of Palau's legislature as well as Tmetchul, Chairman of the PPSC, and his associates concluded that if Palau wanted free association, then it would have to make alterations in that constitution. For these Palauans, the conflict between it and the anticipated status of free association was irreducible. Based partly on this assessment, they now took the position that the Draft Constitution had to be revised.

In mid March, a group of Palauans composed of PPSC members, legislators, and chiefs went to Washington to discuss U.S. objections to the emerging constitution. According to the Speaker of the Legislature, the PPSC had requested both the Legislature and the PCCC to select representatives for this trip. The PCCC Chairman was quoted as citing insufficient funds as the reason for his non-participation (Pacific Daily News 1979 April 30:6). Yet other PCCC members, and some additional former ConCon delegates, were also reluctant to go. Quite possibly, this was because they saw the trip as an effort by Palauans who were dissatisfied the Draft Constitution to encourage the United States to more forcefully voice its objections to the Draft, and lend its support to Palauan pro-revision efforts. Naturally pro-draft Palauans wanted no part of this.
Emergence of Pro-Draft Activity

Forces in favor of the Draft Constitution engaged in mobilization and leverage tactics, designed to block what they viewed as undemocratic efforts to revise it. Their defensive efforts were in some contrast to the development of the constitution, which had just taken place. That development was a potentially assertive, comprehensive and forward-looking approach towards nation-building that was unprecedented in Palau. In some contrast, efforts to defend the constitution can be seen as something of a shift backwards to a more defensive and reactive strategy, somewhat similar to those pursued during earlier events (i.e., during the superport and unity/separation disputes). Here is one example of how the process of achieving closure over development strategies does not necessarily proceed in a linear or cumulative fashion, for it can change its rate and course in response to various circumstances.

Moreover, the examination of the basis for and emergence of support for the Draft Constitution exposes the factors which, in this case, led to increased "peripheral" resistance, instead of compliance.

Early in 1980, I interviewed a leader who had been influential in the 6th Palau Legislature, and was at the forefront of Palauan efforts to revise the Draft Constitution. He, among others, reported that because of the Rosenblatt visit, "there was some reaction against the U.S. in Palau." To a significant extent the movement supporting the original Draft Constitution was aided by resentment against perceived, U.S. intervention against a Palauan, democratic experiment, one which had elicited much popular interest and support. In fact a variety of informants stated that the U.S. was now seen by many as "trying to
threaten the Palauan people to change their constitution." Especially coming after the near-euphoria over self-determination and the political expansiveness associated with the ConCon, the pressure from the United States provoked resistance against what many saw as inappropriate behavior.

A number of informants, particularly those who opposed revising the Draft Constitution, were incensed due to a feeling of identity impingement. By this is meant the perception that the United States had first encouraged, but then sought to limit, Palauan efforts to enhance and project a national identity and to pursue democratic political development (i.e., self-determination). The perceived inconsistency of the American position led to a sense of frustration and betrayal among some Palauans, who felt that their legitimate political expectations were being denied. To these Palauans, the United States seemed bent on rolling back Palau's progress on political development because it might undermine the preferences and strategic interests of the United States. In fact the United States appeared to some as intent on facilitating exactly the kind of destructive linkage between Palauan and external forces which the Draft Constitution's safeguards had been designed to impede. Since the "attack" on these was mounted by some Palauans, in seeming collusion with American interests, the Palauans involved also became target for an indigenous sense of identity impingement. As one pro-revision memorandum stated; Many Palauans "... found the U.S. intervention, and the seeming cooperation with that intervention by the ... Legislature, to be offensive to their dignity as individuals and as a nation" (copy of original, from the collection of Stuart Beck, an American attorney who was an advisor to Roman Tmetchul).
There was also a fear that the Tmetchul group was acquiring too much power. In part, this may have been fueled by characteristic Palauan unease about influence that is concentrated, not balanced (see Chapter II). More specifically, and in the recent past, apprehension had developed over Tmetchul's leadership because he had succeeded too well. Tmetchul had masterminded Palau's separation from the rest of Micronesia, and was quite energetic in his pursuit of political status. According to anti-Tmetchul informants, he and his associates were absolutely determined to enhance their grip on Palau's political evolution, and on other aspects of development. According to this view, Tmetchul had attempted to gain control over Palau's future government through the PPSC's transition plan, and when that failed, by attempting to control the ConCon. The effort, as noted, was unsuccessful. At that juncture, according to anti-Tmetchul informants, the Tmetchul faction sought to elicit American objections to the Draft Constitution, so as to enlist American support for constitutional revision efforts. Whatever the accuracy of this view, it became widespread and worked against Tmetchul, and helped supporters of the Draft Constitution.

Moreover, the leadership style of Tmetchul, which some saw as elitist, self-interested, and secretive, contrasted unfavorably with that of Remeliik, and other leaders who began to work for protection of the Draft Constitution. These leaders were seen by many as consensual,26 moderate, and public in their decision-making. In addition the Tmetchul group compounded the reaction against it by making the "tactical error" of seeming to "openly say that Palau should submit to U.S. demands" (pro-draft informant). This exposed the Tmetchul forces to the charge
of being an irresponsible "tool" of the Americans. To some extent, this accusation leveled against them by their Palauan opponents was motivated by a domestic, tactical reason. Clearly the coalition which formed ostensibly over the issue of constitutional integrity, also wanted to "... beat up ... Tmetchul" (the description of one pro-draft informant). The opportunity of effectively challenging the Tmetchul group, and perhaps of dislodging them from power, was indeed salient. However the reaction against Tmetchul also had a major substantive, and externally-oriented component; that of constitutional defense. Moreover as the controversy over the Constitution escalated, the reaction against Tmetchul and that one against U.S. "interference" fused.

On the first of May, the Palau Legislature passed a resolution establishing a special task force to review the Draft Constitution in light of U.S. objections. On May 6th, Remeliik's opposition was expressed in a letter in which he declined the Legislature's request that he appoint two out of ten members to the task force.27

Despite Remeliik's refusal, and without his participation, the Palau Constitutional Drafting Commission (PCDC) was organized to review the Draft Constitution and commenced work with a representation that was far less broad-based than had been that of the ConCon's.28 The PCDC reported that certain constitutional provisions had indeed gone "too far," provoking irreducible U.S. concern. For this reason, the PCDC maintained that ratification of the Draft Constitution "would amount to a rejection of free association." To ensure that an impasse did not occur, the PCDC recommended that the Legislature provide for the drafting of a new constitution more amenable to U.S. interests.
On May 10th, the day that the PCDC submitted its report, a bill was introduced in the Legislature to repeal the enabling legislation which had established Palau's ConCon. In effect, this "bill 1140" would also invalidate the Draft Constitution.

When this bill was being formulated, certain former ConCon delegates met and discussed ways to stop further legislative action. This was in addition to pro-draft discussions being held among some legislators at the time. Release of the PCDC report and introduction of bill 1140 increased the sense that the Legislature was now "trying to scuttle . . ." the Constitution. The reaction among many former ConCon delegates "ranged from disagreement, to anger, to dismay" (Pacific Daily News 1979 May 15:3).

At the point when 1140 was introduced a "substantial number of legislators were able to identify . . ." both the implications and impending negative reaction against the Legislature, and particularly, against its moves to revise the constitution (Carlos Salii at UNTC 1979 May 24:27). As a result, initially nine legislators, and then another, commenced a boycott to deny the Legislature a quorum for conducting business.

In addition to the circumstances surrounding these constitutional events, some boycotting legislators took their stand partly due to a generalized feeling against the role that political parties had come to play. From the late 1960s the Liberal Party had dominated the domestic scene and in the mid 1970s, controlled the highest offices in the Sixth Legislature (see Chapter II, pp. 68-70). Over the issue of unity/separation, prominent leaders of both the Liberal and Progressive
parties came together in a coalition led by Tmetchul (see Chapter III, page 166). By late 1978/79, however, this bi-partisan faction dominating the Legislature was increasingly seen as deviating from a path that could benefit Palau. Instead, the dominant Liberal Party as led by Tmetchul, along with a number of influential Progressive Party allies, came to be seen as "out to get anything and everything for [their] own benefit" (informant), with little concern for most followers, or for Palau as a whole. More specifically the PPSC/6th Palau Legislature's handling of political status, its ambitious transition plans, and now its attempt to revise the Draft Constitution, increased dissatisfaction to the point where support for the Tmetchul-led, bi-partisan block slackened. The ten boycotting legislators came from both of Palau's major political parties. Sentiment against the Tmetchul-led bi-partisan block did not cause the boycott, but certainly was a contributing factor.

The boycotting legislators soon joined forces with other supporters of the Draft Constitution who were beginning to coalesce by mid-May. Some influential community leaders, such as traditional chiefs, were contacted early by organizers supporting the original constitution. A number of influential Palauan women, several of them high-clan, were soon drawn in.

A number of relatively young men who had western legal training and were former ConCon delegates lent support as legal advisers and as spokesmen to the press. A distinction should be made between these men and the activists. Activists (a number of whom were women) had cut their political teeth on the superport issue. The other Palauans
discussed, in some contrast, were a little older, and had received much of their training outside the Islands.

In mid May, due to the boycott by the legislators, the Legislature was unable to conduct business. A number of petition drives were launched by Draft Constitution supporters. In May and June of 1979, a number of Palauans representing various pro-draft groups appeared as petitioners at the United Nations. Their arguments help explain the stance of a movement gathering domestic strength, and seeking to project influence internationally. By the time of the UNTT meetings, supporters of the Draft Constitution were coming together in a coalition under the leadership of the Group to Save the Draft Constitution (GSDC), soon to be known as the People's Committee.

Petitioners at the 1979 UNTT meetings represented most former members of the Constitutional Convention, most activists and two groups which had arisen in relation to previous controversies: the Concerned Citizens of Palau and the Save Palau Organization. All of these petitioners emphasized the diverse and broad-based nature of their groups. A populist emphasis would remain characteristic of the groups supporting the Draft Constitution.

The activist organization Tia Belaud had developed influence during the superport and unity/separation disputes, but had split over the latter issue. Most activists, however, supported efforts to defend the Draft Constitution. Moses Uludong explained their stance: "Our organization since its formation . . . has dedicated itself to the struggle for self-government and eventual sovereignty and independence." Uludong viewed the formation of Palau's constitutional government as an
essential step on this path (Uludong at UNTC 1979 May 29:26). In addition, the Draft Constitution's restrictive clauses regarding U.S. military activities conformed to views that activists had long expressed.

Pro-draft petitioners objected to the timing, manner, and content of U.S. influence. In their view, the U.S. was encouraging undemocratic tendencies in Palau and thereby was contradicting its own general, public position supporting self-determination. Pro-draft petitioners appealed for support based on both U.S. and international democratic principles. This had also been the case during earlier controversies; however, there now was a greater emphasis on the rhetoric of national self-determination, even of anti-colonialism. Nonetheless, a considerable amount of ambivalence was still attached to these appeals.

The objective of supporters of the Draft Constitution was not to make the United States cease its influence and simply go away. Though continuing U.S. "interference" was at times resented, actually the pro-draft objective involved getting the United States to behave appropriately. Pro-draft petitioners especially urged that the United States help to restrain undemocratic elements in Palau, which, it was claimed, America had wrongfully encouraged (Moses Uludong at UNTC 1979 May 29:27). A similar charge, to a lesser extent, had been made during the superport controversy.

Petitioners felt that delegates to the ConCon had appreciated the concerns of the United States and they had also understood that the principles of free association, agreed to in 1978, were the foundation for an anticipated free association agreement. But at the same time, it was claimed that the delegates had been quite aware of "the wishes of
the people of Palau," and had felt there was strong domestic support for Palau's extent constitutional development (Carlos Salii at UNTC 1979 May 24:29-30).

In contrast, Rosenblatt's visit was viewed as relatively undemocratic. Petitioners felt that his remarks (with their implied threat of aid withdrawal) constituted overbearing and inappropriate pressure against "a small nation," one that the U.S. was supposed to be nurturing. Petitioners viewed this as analogous "to a situation where a little boy has been forced to the edge of a cliff." He is saved by the hand of a bigger man who is holding the collar of the boy's shirt. "Now the boy is told either to accept the demands of the bigger man or [the boy will be] let loose" (Carlos Salii at UNTC 1979 May 24:28). This story is couched in the paternalistic/dependent imagery of a small boy and his relation to a much more powerful figure. The fear is also being expressed that Palau will be "cut loose" from that figure's support, and there is worry as well as resentment, due to the impression that the United States was trying to force the Palauans to make an unequivocable choice between acquiescence, or at least relative economic deprivation. The "cliff" these Palauans were referring to, was in fact a representation of their development dilemma.

Adding fuel to the controversy was at least the appearance that American efforts were being aided and abetted by undemocratic Palauan elements. As one petitioner stated: "anyone except the most naive observer could have advised Mr. Rosenblatt that his coming to Palau would be viewed locally as an attempt to shore up the sagging political fortunes of the Chairman of the PPSC, Roman Tmetchul" (Ibedul at UNTC 1979 May 29:11). Clearly Palauans supporting the Draft Constitution
had come to feel that Tmetchul, the PPSC, and the majority in the Palau Legislature, were willing "lackeys" of the United States (Uludong at UNTC 1979 May 29:27). A petitioner stated the issue in this way: [would] "the people of Palau . . . or a handful of individuals in the Legislature who have alienated [themselves] from the public . . . be the ones to decide the fate of the proposed constitution" (Roman Bedor at UNTC 1979 May 24:37)? Petitioners warned that the latter would be the case if the Palau Legislature was permitted to unilaterally revise the Draft Constitution.

Petitioners added that the U.S. "intervention" had increased divisiveness in Palau, and that this was particularly unfortunate, since it came at a time when "the Palauan people . . . needed to be mending fences and preparing to work together" for Palau as an emerging nation (Ibedul at UNTC 1979 May 29:1). As can be seen, nation-building was now a referent for Palauan appeals.

Petitioners also pointed out that there was no concrete or finalized free association agreement at the time when Palau's original constitution was being drafted. Rather there were only certain agreed-upon principles. On the bases of a unilateral, U.S. interpretation of these, Palauans were being told to rearrange their constitution. If they agreed to this, then Palau's sovereignty and the constitution's supremacy would mean little or nothing, petitioners said.

Towards the conclusion of the petitioner statements one Trusteeship Council representative asked if the constitutional dispute was not an internal, Palauan matter? If so, he suggested that it should be handled by Palau's legislature. One petitioner responded thusly: "In so far as
the question of [a constitutional] referendum strictly remains an internal matter . . . , then the answer might appear to be yes." But it was the position of pro-draft petitioners that both the manner and timing of U.S. influence had encouraged the Legislature to embark on the arrogant and irresponsible course of threatening to delay the July 9th referendum or even to declare the Draft Constitution null and void (Carlos Salii at UNTC 1979 May 24:31).

As the UNTC meetings concluded, the United States sought to clarify its position on the timing of Palau's constitutional referendum. Possibly in response to leverage efforts supporting the Draft Constitution, the U.S. representative to the Trusteeship Council in June 6th submitted that an earlier statement that the July referendum might be postponed was simply an effort to "deal realistically with . . . the informal news" coming from Palau. But as of June 6th the U.S. was assuming that, unless word to the contrary was received, a July 9th referendum on the Draft Constitution would be held (U.S. representative Petree at UNTC 1979 May 24:53).

Meanwhile, the controversy was becoming internationalized. The Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons (Gesukin) expressed its approval of Palau's "nuclear free" constitution. In fact, during and after this constitutional struggle, some Palauans would further develop links with the international, anti-nuclear movement. In addition, U.S. strategic interest was clearly aroused. On May 30th, the nightly television news in Palau carried a report that the Deputy Defense Secretary for East Asian, Pacific and Inter-American Affairs stated that the strategically-related provisions of Palau's Draft
Constitution were quite objectionable to the United States. Opposing
groups of Palauans had either played upon, or had inadvertently
attracted, the interest of divergent groups within the international
community. As before, this would add to the complexity of Palauan
politics.

Conclusion

From the present chapter, we have seen how the interaction between
the United States and the various forces in Palau involved action,
reaction, and complex motivations and objectives, at least on the part
of Palauans. Such multi-dimensional causality, involving varying
proportions of influence between domestic, domestic/metropole, and
global forces, can be accommodated with a dependencia approach. Moreover,
and as regards to socio-political strategies, the development of Palau's
constitution marked some movement from the defensive and reactive
emphasis of earlier events to a more assertive, comprehensive and
potentially long-range approach, that of nation building.

This chapter has also illustrated how, at least in the Palauan
case, the formation of and response to development strategies cannot be
viewed solely as a reaction to the metropole's policies and influence.
To a considerable extent, the form and process of Palauan socio-political
attempts to control development are also influenced by primarily domestic
circumstances, involving the indigenous political system. For instance,
the PPSC sponsored plan for an integrated and decisive approach to
Palau's development was rejected, in large part due to suspicions about
the Palauan faction advocating this plan. The anxiety over an abuse of
power was also fueled by an ethno-historic sensitivity, as well as by near-contemporary circumstances, such as the superport controversy.

A relatively broad-based, populist, and participatory approach to national development was pursued by the ConCon. During its deliberations, constitutional development took precedence over the need to secure an economic base. This occurred despite the Tmetchul group's emerging position to the effect that there was an irreducible conflict between Palauans' desire for political autonomy/control and for assured high levels of economic support from the United States. Rejection of the PPSC plan, the selection of ConCon delegates, the general indifference to Tmetchul's pragmatic, economic approach, and even the preference for a large and complex national government were partly the result of widespread anxiety over the Tmetchul groups' political style and objectives. As demonstrated by the Palauan case, we must take into account salient aspects of the indigenous society and its political system if one is to understand the evolution of development strategies. A reductionist and economistic approach, such as early dependency theory, would not have been adequate. The sensitivity to socio-political factors described is compatible with a dependencia approach.

The constitution produced was protective of Palauan resources, and was externally-restrictive. The concern behind constitutional safeguards had some resonance with the earlier strategy of blocking the superport. In both cases, there was a desire to prevent abuses of power, resulting from an alliance of irresponsible domestic leadership with predatory outsiders. Moreover, as with the anti-superport strategy,
there was remarkable anticipatory aspect to the constitution's protectionist emphasis. It was directed against anticipated impingements and degradations that had not occurred, but which might. With a constitution, however, the emphasis noted crystallized as safeguards. This was part of a more formalized and institutionally-embedded approach.

The chapter illustrates the difficulty of establishing a Palau-oriented and controlled mode of development, despite a considerable Palauan desire to do so. Palauans were attempting to enhance their political control in a situation of extreme dependency, and continuing vulnerability and the difficulties which they faced constitute what dependencia theorists call the dilemma of "national underdevelopment" (Cardoso and Felatto 1979). More specifically, we have seen how the constitution produced had an unanticipated consequence of moving Palau closer to the horns of its dilemma. On the one hand, the externally-restrictive structure proposed was meant to be protective of Palau's resources, and thereby reduce Palau's vulnerability to potentially harmful intrusive interests. However, the government proposed was likely to be very expensive, thereby necessitating that Palau continue to receive large amounts of "aid." This, in turn, was likely to perpetuate extreme dependency and vulnerability. Yet even the prospect of continued dependency might be endangered, since constitutional development had aroused metropolitan concern to the point where the aid it provided might be reduce or withdrawn in the future, that is, unless Palauans complied with U.S. demands.

The developments analyzed also illustrate the circumstances that result in an attempted insertion of influence having a contrary effect.
Explication of this has both policy and theoretical implications. As to
the former, there are numerous examples of powerful and wealthy nations
which have attempted to gain satellite compliance by applying great
amounts of pressure to little avail, or even with highly destructive
consequences. As to the latter, this dissertation's examination of
contrary effects supports criticisms of mechanical and reductionist
dependency and world-systems approaches. As illustrated by this chapter,
unintended and unforeseen phenomena can flow from the pattern of
metropolitan/satellite interaction. This is as expected from a
dependencia point of view.

As the Palau case illustrates, the interaction between metropole
and satellite is highly complex and both affects, and is effected by,
attributes of the indigenous society, including its political system.
The various local perceptions of external links and connections, and
value attached to these can vary considerably. Such fluctuations can
result in outcomes that have externally-oriented consequences. For
example, to many Palauans most of the time the ConCon was in session
seemed a period of relative calm. Metropolitan interests, much less
impingements, appeared as fairly remote and non-pressing. This
perception was due to the circumstance that, in many ways, up to the
point of the constitutional dispute, the United States had seemed to
encourage Palauan strides in "self-government" and self-determination.
Many Palauans expected, or at least hoped, that this circumstance would
continue. In such seemingly permissive setting, the atmosphere evoked
by the ConCon as an indigenous, symbolic event contributed to an air of
political confidence, assertiveness, and even of nascent nationalism.
The metropolitan power, however, after having been seen to encourage Palau's experiment in nation-building, expressed concern that the Palauans had gone too far. The American stance in early 1979 evoked the perception that this metropolitan power was acting inappropriately and inconsistently. The sense of blocked and frustrated ethno-historic and contemporary preferences, of legitimate expectations being denied, engendered identify impingement. This sentiment helped to energize efforts to defend the Draft Constitution, and defense of this, obviously, had externally-oriented consequences. Similarly, overt U.S. pressure, as symbolized by the visit of an Ambassador, only served to increase Palauan resistance to constitutional revision since this instance of American "interference" was widely viewed as ill-timed and inappropriate.

Most generally, the Palauan response to the perceived U.S. pressure was mixed. As noted, some Palauans moved to "defend" the Draft Constitution. Others, some of whom exercised political authority, developed a coincidence of interest with the United States. As expected from a dependencia perspective, the reasons for this convergence were complex.

As with the initial U.S. attempts to "interfere," the broader coincidence of interest between the United States and a Palauan faction had a contrary effect. At the time, there was a rising sense of concern about the Palauan faction involved. Moreover the coincidence of interest was viewed as an attack on a process and style of political development (i.e., public, democratic, and populist) that was increasingly being experienced and positively regarded by Palauans. Palauans who supported the Draft Constitution began to skillfully tap into these sources of unease and also correctly sensed that the Tmetchul
faction was vulnerable. Tactical, stylistic, and substantive considerations all fed into the pro-draft cause. Such an eclectic mix is not surprising from a dependencia perspective.

The controversy escalated, with both sides in Palau moving to enlist support from divergent interests in the international community. This aspect of Palauan activity illustrates the value of a multilateral, as well as a bilateral perspective. Especially those Palauans who supported the Draft Constitution sought out elements beyond Palau's special relationship to the United States, as some had done before during the superport controversy.

Pro-draft appeals were articulate, highly relevant, although somewhat ambivalent. American "interference" was decried on the one hand, but at the same time, America was urged to exercise appropriate influence by fostering democracy. Indicative of this ambivalence, pro-draft appeals were sometimes couched in paternalistic/dependent imagery. The United States was urged not to force islanders to the "cliff" of having to choose between political autonomy/control and economic support, both of which were desired. The desire to avoid having to make a choice between them would continue, on the part of many Palauans. The ambivalence and ambiguities generated by this are as expected from a dependencia perspective.

With the emergence of the constitutional dispute, Palau's underlying dilemma assumed more specific shape. The matter of autonomy/control and/or financial support had now surfaced specifically in the conflict between constitutional integrity and continuing high levels of aid. Neither the Draft Constitution, nor initial activities to defend
it, sought to directly confront this dilemma. Clearly Palau's constitutional development had taken a dramatic lead over efforts to secure a productive economic base. Therefore, objectively, Palau continued to be quite vulnerable to external constraints and interference, particularly those relating to its donor/metropolitan power, the United States.

Most generally, the present chapter has explored the complexity of the relationships between indigenous, indigenous/metropolitan, and global factors as these have intersected in Palau, sometimes producing unanticipated consequences.

Developments in Palau would also impinge on the United States. The United States would now have to deal with a highly popular and effective political coalition, the People's Committee. This coalition would see as its mission the defense of Palau's protectionist and externally-restrictive Draft Constitution. Moreover the scope, duration, and political style of the PC were remarkable. It would even contain some elements that seemed nationalistic. Such multi-directional influence is an anomaly for early dependency theory, but not from a dependencia point of view. The next two chapters discuss the ascendance and the attempted, partial institutionalization of the People's Committee.
1 In early December, 1978, High Commissioner Winkel vetoed the Palau Legislature bill which contained the PPSC-inspired, October transition plan. In his veto message, Winkel noted the lack of public hearing in Palau on the plan, the restricted methods of recruitment, length of tenure, and the vague and elastic powers mentioned in the plan. A Pacific Daily News article discussing this stated that Winkel opposed the plan based on a concern that the "Palauan People would have little or no control over the activities of the new agencies and their staffs," as stipulated by the plan (1978 December 6:6). Shuster makes a similar point, stating that Winkel was concerned that the plan "concentrated too much power in the hands of too few people" (1982:312).

2 During the 1980 national election campaign Modekngei votes were relatively uniform. Most (2/3 out of our voter survey) went for candidate Remeliik. Protestant votes were scattered among various candidates. Catholic votes were slightly less scattered, but still far more so than with the Modekngei.

3 There are strong indications that the Tmetchul group had wanted to control the Convention, and fully expected to do so. According to Shuster (1982:311, 312), a number of Tmetchul's advisors had suggested several ways to accomplish this. One was to have a convention that was not fully elected, by having the Speaker of the (6th) Palau Legislature appoint ten members. The Speaker, as well as the majority in the Legislature, were aligned with Tmetchul. A second position was that the ConCon could be persuaded to write a constitution containing, as Shuster puts it, "the development philosophy underlying the evolving compact of free association." Two avenues might be used for this; to encourage Palauans working in Saipan, expected to share Tmetchul's views on development and political status, to run as ConCon delegates, or secondly, to require in the enabling legislation for the ConCon, that any document it produced must be compatible with Tmetchul's negotiating position on free association. Although the enabling legislation was passed, it was unsuccessful in controlling the delegates.

In any case, one of Tmetchul's advisors stated to Shuster that at the time the ConCon commenced, the Convention was of "no great concern because ... we [i.e., the Tmetchul-oriented group] were going to control" it (Shuster 1982:311, ftn. 151). Such confidence proved unfounded, however. In examining the slate of elected ConCon delegates, Shuster puts the "pro-constitutio block" at 34 out of 38 delegates (1982:325). Based on my fieldwork, I suggest that out of the delegates, 21 were definitely anti-Tmetchul, 8 favored him, with the rest being either neutral or not known to this researcher. An exact determination of the size of the Tmetchul block would be difficult to ascertain, since Tmetchul and those closely associated with him tended to operate in a relatively non-public, indirect fashion. According to any informed estimate, however, the Tmetchul block was a small minority, and in no way was in a position to dominate the Convention.
It is true that a number of these delegates had earlier been delegates to the Micronesian ConCon, and were on record as opposing a large, bureaucratic government at that time. I have no indication that this position was salient for many Palauans at the time of their own ConCon. None of my informants mentioned it as a consideration.

These had been a Palauan District Administrator, Thomas Remengesau. He was replaced by an American, Kim Batchellor who was acting District Administrator from January of 1979 until the start of Palau's constitutional government.

The two leading candidates for the Presidency of the Convention were Remeliik and Kaleb Udui, a politician with legal experience. Concerning Udui, there had been some question whether his business connections with Japan might conflict with the interests of the Convention (Freeman 1979:4).

One activist leader who was not a member of the Tmetchul-oriented group suggested that there be a parliamentary system, but with a Prime Minister who would be elected through a popular vote.

As best I can determine, Tmetchul did not publically and directly argue his preference for a parliamentary system. Statements of the New Republic to this effect, however, can be assumed to reflect Tmetchul's positions as these bulletins were from the Palau Political Status Commission, of which Tmetchul was Chairman.

In the central Micronesian districts where a constitution for a Federated States of Micronesia had been approved, this entity was now known as the Federate States of Micronesia.

One American observer noted that the Modekngei stated to him that they could muster 6,000 votes. A PDN estimate put Modekngei voting strength at 1,000 in 1978. The number of registered voters in Palau at the time was 6,500 (the July, 1978 figure) to 6,995 (the July, 1979 figure). Based on this information, I estimate Modekngei voter strength at the time at 2,000.

In March, 1979, a number of ConCon decisions were reported in the press which did not correspond with the Tmetchul group's preferences (see "President System Favored" Pacific Daily News 1979 March 7:7, also "Constitution Concerns Top Chief" Pacific Daily News 1979 March 24:3). Moreover by late March, the United States began to express unease over aspects of the Palau's emerging constitution (see "Palau Nuclear Ban Irks U.S." Pacific Daily News 1979 March 20:1 and "U.S. Threatens Palau Constitution" Pacific Daily News 1979 March 28:1). In fact it was reported that U.S. concerns had been outlined in a "lengthy dispatch to Roman Tmetchul, . . . [thereby confirming] earlier
reports of the State Department's unhappiness" (Pacific Daily News 1979 March 28:1). Editions of the New Republic, up to this point, had not criticized the work of Palau's constitutional convention. The tone of the PPSC's New Republic changed markedly, however, with an edition on March 28 (in PDN 1979 March 28:14) that was sharply critical of the ConCon and of the merging constitution. For his part, by this time the ConCon's president criticized both the tardiness of the U.S., in making its objections known so late to the Convention, and the PPSC as well for not forwarding U.S. complaints (PDN 1979 March 28:1). When one examines the timing of these occurrences, and based on my informants, it appears quite likely that the PPSC, up to the point when the Convention clearly deviated from paths which the PPSC would have preferred, had advertised its own work and that of the Convention, partly through the New Republic. However when the objections of the U.S. and the PPSC to the emerging constitution crystallized, the PPSC began to distance itself from the Convention and itself with U.S. concerns, and thereby elicit U.S. support, to fight against the emerging Draft Constitution. In late March Remelik as ConCon president charged that the PPSC was "not sharing information fully with the Convention" and that the PPSC, without the full knowledge of the Convention, was seeking to entice U.S. pressure against the emerging Constitution (Remelik in Pacific Daily News 1979 March 28:1).

12 Though it is true that the United States was not objecting to "sovereignty" within the context of free association in Micronesia's proposed constitution at the time, Palauans seemed to take little notice of this, nor can the two situations be equated. Unlike the Federated States of Micronesia, the Palauan situation entailed an area of greater strategic value to the U.S. Moreover in Palau, the United States had a stated interest in active and possibly large-scale military use of The Islands. Furthermore there were stricter controls on harmful substances and on land if used by a foreign entity, in the case of the proposed Palauan constitution.

13 Point 5 of the "Statement of Agreed Principles for Free Association:" "The United States will have full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to Micronesia, including the establishment of necessary military facilities and the exercise of appropriate operating rights . . . ."

14 In addition to informant interviews, this statement is based on a number of sources. According to Shuster, "the majority of convention delegates perceived their mission . . . in terms of unconditional sovereignty, self-determination and national identity. [In fact] the Convention ignited a feeling of cultural revitalization that manifested both ethnic and nationalistic elements" (1982:320). A similar impression is gained from media treatment of the event. In an article of February 15, 1979, Lazarus Salii (head of the ConCon's Committee on the Executive) stated: "Palau's constitution will be the supreme law in Palau and will assert Palauan sovereignty" (Pacific Daily News 1979 February 15:8). Two weeks later, when United States objections to
aspects of the constitution were being voiced, Gwenda Iyechad, a reporter who had monitored the ConCon and who was also interviewed by this researcher stated the following in an article entitled "Delegates Angry at U.S. Demands:" [Delegates] meeting ... to begin final consideration of the proposed constitution ... decided to ignore demands and criticisms leveled at their efforts by U.S. Ambassador Rosenblatt. ... Instead, delegates reaffirmed their desire that the constitution be the supreme law of the land and [that] all other agreements ... be subservient" to it (Pacific Daily News 1979 March 30:3).

15 Article 15, section 7 of the Constitution; "upon effective date of this constitution the employees of the district government ... shall remain as employees of the national government ...".

16 One cannot assume that only the delegates who refused to sign the constitution were part of the Tmetchul block. In fact, two delegates who did sign would be prominent pro-revision efforts. Perhaps once U.S. objections to the constitution were raised, such delegates believed there was a greater possibility for making constitutional adjustments, and of the U.S. withholding the option of free association, than was the case before the advent of U.S. pressure. Such calculations motivated at least one prominent delegate to adopt a pro-revised position, in line with Tmetchul, even though he had signed the Draft Constitution.

17 At the state level, the national constitution suggests that state organization should follow both "democratic principles and tradition" (article XI, section 1). However, a role for chiefs in the organization or operation of state government is not mandated by the constitution.

18 A few weeks after the veto by High Commission Winkel, in early December, of the PPSC-inspired transition plan which was then a bill in the Legislature, the PPSC submitted a revision which separated Palau's constitutional convention from purely transition matters, as per Winkel's preference. This version was approved with a budget of $45,000 (see Shuster 1982:313, fn. 154).

19 In an edition of the New Republic entitled "Treaty Power Breakthrough for Palau," the PPSC described the political status negotiations of January, 1979 as having "resulted in a breakthrough of major importance [by] grant[ing] Palau treaty making powers in the post-Trusteeship period." It further described "other ... objectives achieved by the PPSC over the past two years ... (a) United States agreement to Palau's right of unilateral termination during the free association period, (b) Palau's right to establish its own 200 mile marine resource zone ... (c) [and] the agreement to sign a compact with the U.S. on a government to government basis. [In contrast], previously Palau would split its sovereignty, giving defense and foreign affairs to the U.S. ... Now [however], Palau's new government will delegate all


21. Assertive dependency - Insisting on the right to claim support and to control the conditions under which it is given.

22. "In exercising our inherent sovereignty, we . . . proclaim and reaffirm our immemorial right to be supreme in these islands. . . . We renew our dedication to preserve and enhance our . . . national identity . . . in establishing this constitution of the sovereign Republic of Palau" (from preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Palau, my emphasis).

23. Six days after the ConCon completed its work, former ConCon president Remeliik strongly objected in a letter to the statements made by an American advisor, a Mr. Brophy, to the PPSC. Responding in particular to Brophy's statement that "the constitutional convention was interfering with [Palau's] national interest," Remeliik's reply was that "the people of Palau simply cannot be insulted in this way." Remeliik admonished Brophy, stating that "as an outsider you should not be so hasty in denouncing the representatives of the people of Palau and the work produced by them" (copy of letter to Brophy).

24. My information on this comes from the photo record of the Pacific Daily News.

25. Treatment of this perspective is primarily based on informant interviews.

26. Consensus is an outcome which is reached when all parties to a decision, at least minimally, converge on a position, although the underlying reasons for and degree of commitment to this convergence may vary. A consensual leader is one who sees as his or her primary function that of facilitating the public's ability to make decisions based on consensus, and then to help execute such decisions through agreed-upon action in the political system.

27. Since the enabling legislation for the ConCon was passed, Remeliik viewed constitutional development as passing through three stages. First: drafting a constitution. Second: explaining its provisions to the people in preparation for a referendum. Third: ratifying the constitution through this referendum. At the time his May 6th letter
Remeliik felt that progress had reached stage two. He also felt that if the position of the U.S. on the Draft Constitution could damage Palau's prospects for free association, then Palauans could be made aware of this as part of their political education for the July 9th referendum. "Nothing should be done to alter and stop [the] chain of constitutional progress," Remeliik said.

The PCDC included representatives from the PPSC, the Legislature, and from the District Government. In contrast to the ConCon delegates, the PCDC members were appointed, not popularly elected.

Informants opposed to Tmetchul felt that the Palau Political Status Commission, under his direction, had become increasingly elitist and secretive, as it pursued ambitious plans that potentially, could seriously disrupt and degrade Palauan society. Toshiwo Nakamura, a ConCon delegate and, at the time, soon to be head of the Post Constitutional Convention Commission, articulated this concern in a statement to the media. On March 15, 1979 he said; "The People are not trusting their existing leadership [i.e., the 6th Palau Legislature and PPSC] because there is a lack of communication about Commission [i.e., PPSC] activities" (Pacific Daily News 1979 March 15:12). Nakamura's statement was indicative of the general unease over Tmetchul's leadership style. The contrast between that style and that of the People's Committee, both as a counter-elite social movement, and as part of a coalition in power, is discussed in Chapters VI and VII, respectively.

On May 14th a petition signed by 78 Palauans, signatures for which had been obtained "in a matter of hours," according to a pro-draft source (Roman Bedor at UNTC 1979 May 24:36), was sent to the Speaker of the Legislature urging the Legislature not to tamper with the Draft Constitution. On May 17th two additional petition drives were launched with the Trust Territory High Commissioner and U.S. Department of Interior as recipients for these.
CHAPTER VI
THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

This chapter, the first of two, examines the evolution of an unprecedented political coalition in Palau, the People's Committee. This broad-based, issue-oriented, and highly effective coalition arose within the context of the constitutional dispute. The evolution of the PC provides case material for examining mobilization, and its relation to closure. To a lesser, though emergent extent, nation-building was also the focus of PC activity.

The present chapter deals with the PC in 1979, when it was a relatively informal group. It had two objectives: The first was to defend the constitution approved by the ConCon in April—hereafter referred to as the Original or April Draft Constitution—with efforts on its behalf labeled as pro-draft. A second and related objective was to dislodge from power the Tmetchul group, which was seen as working in collaboration with the United States. The People's Committee was a remarkable political phenomena for Palau. It mobilized an overwhelming degree of popular support, for a time largely transcending Palau's normally factionalized politics. Moreover, it sustained itself as a diverse and issue-oriented coalition for a duration that was unprecedented in Palau.

During 1979, the specificity of the PC's goals facilitated its mobilization of a following. This mobilization, and the PC's ability to rebound from temporary setbacks and re-take the political initiative,
resulted in repeated PC victories which led to power. The evolution of the PC from that point, i.e., from 1980, is discussed in Chapter VII.

**The PC Emerges**

By May and June of 1979, fear and envy of Tmetchul and his followers became fused with a sense of resentment and outrage because of that group's constitutional stance. By late June efforts to defend the Original Constitution were being coordinated by the People's Committee.

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact emergence of this movement. Public statements by those who were involved, differ somewhat. Here, it is sufficient to place the PC's initial appearance in the period from mid to late May, and certainly by June 1st.

Alfonso Oiterong, head of Education in Palau was selected as PC Chairman. Since he was not a legislator, he could not be tarred with the brush of being involved in efforts to "scuttle" the Draft Constitution. Oiterong was viewed as relatively apolitical. Rather, his career had centered in education and community affairs. His community-oriented image was rather similar to that of Remeliik, another leader prominent in pro-draft activities. In addition, as Director of Education, Oiterong was embedded in a public service-oriented organization that was at least as conductive for domestic, political influence as Remeliik's position with the District Government.

**Two Groups in the Coalition**

Two major groups constituting a part of the PC were activists, most of whom supported the coalition, and the Modekngei. Both of these groups considered themselves autonomy-minded and pro-Palauan and as such, are
of particular interest for this dissertation. After a brief discussion of their reasons for supporting the PC, more general reasons for the PC's popularity are covered.

By late 1978/79, the Modekngei was disenchanted with the leadership of the Tmetchul group. Some felt that Tmetchul and his associates had tried to take unfair, economic advantage of the Modekngei. The Modekngei had also opposed the pro-superport stance of Tmetchul and elements of the 6th Palau Legislature. There was also a sense that Tmetchul was too closely associated with Japanese investment interests. Moreover, by the time of the constitutional dispute, Tmetchul's rapid pursuit of political and economic goals which could effect all of Palau was viewed by the Modekngei as disturbing, and even "scarey" (Modekngei information). Their confidence in Tmetchul and the political apparatus he seemed to dominate (i.e., the PPSC and 6th Palau Legislature) was further eroded when this group turned against the Draft Constitution, in seeming collusion with the United States.

Modekngei support for the PC was also based on their support for Haruo Remeliik, one of the PC leaders. Over the years, Remeliik and the Modekngei had developed a close tie based on social and economic reciprocity. In addition Remeliik, in contrast to Tmetchul, was seen as a socially responsible and considerate leader who favored a moderate and broad-based development strategy. Moreover, just recently Remeliik had acquired additional prestige through his role at the ConCon, and in defense of its work.

Modekngei support was also based on their recognition of the need for a constitution that would be protective of Palauan resources, especially land. Modekngei leaders considered land to be at the center
"of all the activities that make life for us human beings easier and safe. It is one of these properties that never gets lost, except if you sell it . . . . If we lose the land, there will be no place for us to live." Palauan control of land was seen as protected by the April Constitution.

The same Modekngei leader who articulated this view also expressed a fear that Palauan businessmen might benefit exclusively from selling land to outsiders. Having done this, such businessmen might "forget all about . . . the rest of us Palauans." This fear of Palauans developing strategic connections with outsiders, and then acting irresponsibility towards other Palauans, has been pervasive, and is an anticipatory response to an unwanted development scenario.

The Modekngei especially supported the externally restrictive provisions of the Original Constitution that could impede intrusive U.S. military interests. The Modekngei was concerned with preserving and enhancing Palau's natural and social environment. They viewed with particular alarm the possible introduction of nuclear, and other "harmful substances." As one of their leaders stated: "These nuclear materials are really dangerous things. We do not know how much the U.S. wants to store here and it might make some of us live in not very good conditions."

According to the Modekngei, people needed time to develop a consensus on the best ways to handle the contemporary problems and opportunities facing Palau. A Modekngei leader stated that if Palauans took the time to think things out, and executed matters clearly, then there should not be any conflict with the United States. Once in place, a sound constitution and national government could provide an umbrella
of protection for all Palauans and for the natural environment. Given the importance attributed to this, the Modekngei was opposed to any hasty measures to revise the Original Constitution, merely to accommodate U.S. concerns (interview, same).

Most activists, as well as the Modekngei, supported the PC in its efforts. For years, activists had been against "the establishment" in Palau. This establishment (the Tmetchul-oriented group) was now being opposed by the People's Committee as well. As one activist put it, "we had been able to sell our concerns to the PC."

To a significant extent the PC leadership did adopt activist campaign techniques such as public protest, grass-roots organizing, autonomist rhetoric, and an issue focus. As with the activists, the rhetoric of autonomy, and even of anti-colonialism, was expressed by the PC.

Putting aside for the moment the question of whether this was indicative of a deeper PC commitment to a political ideology or set of programs, most activists were attracted to the PC because of the anti-establishment stance that some of its leaders seemed to be taking. For instance Remeliik was seen by activist supporters of the April Constitution as a "grass-roots" leader with a populist style. By "grass-roots," it was not meant that Remeliik emphasized protest politics. Rather he "participated in" Palauan culture, day-by-day. He was seen as doing this by administering to peoples' needs, being sensitive to their concerns, and living like them. Moreover Remeliik was not considered wealthy, nor was he regarded as primarily interested in business. Populist and community-oriented leaders were pivotal in the PC.
Additional Bases of PC Support

Apprehension over U.S. military interests was a general basis for PC support. This concern was anticipatory, but also had a historical basis, and was stimulated by the anti-military tone of some PC rhetoric (see pp. 243-245). Although the PC's stance on the military was never clarified, some PC supporters understood the coalition to be against a large-scale military presence, especially if it involved nuclear materials.

The worrisome scenario connected with this was described by a Modekngei leader. With nuclear weapons and the coming of other U.S. military equipment, could come war. Palau could once again become a target, as had been the case during World War Two. According to this view, it was precisely because the Islands had been militarized by the Japanese that the Americans responded with a devastating retaliatory attack. Therefore, in contrast to the often-stated U.S. government position that a major U.S. military presence would "protect" Palau, at least some Palauan see the probably result in almost opposite terms. As my informant stated: "we have already experienced war and we know that, you in your big countries, ... you already know where the very important [enemy] ... weapons are kept. These places then become targets for attack, ... and if this occurs, then the conflict is not only between you and [your] enemy. Nuclear weapons kill everybody and if these things leak or there is an accident, that will be the end of our islands and us ... ."

The April Constitution was characterized by a well-placed informant as "very restrictive" of possible U.S. military activities. Clearly it
could make such uses difficult, and as the PC gathered momentum it argued that only the Original Constitution, with its safeguards, could protect islanders from such a fate. Even high ranking officers of the 6th Palau Legislature appreciated the depth of popular apprehension over the military, and acknowledged the effectiveness of the PC's emphasis on this.3

More general attitudes towards a constitution also played a major role in building PC support. As one Modekngei leader stated: "The constitution is not new. It was not written before, but [we] had one." This expressed the view that Palauan society had been well-integrated, with a polity that worked, supported by self-reliant islanders. An informant who was a former ConCon delegate, and major spokesman for the PC also expressed this view.

A constitution was regarded as a means to re-establish social coherence and predictability in a society that was increasingly subject to new, often divisive forces. Informants pointed to the impact of outside influences such as the introduction of cash, as "bringing all kinds of problems into Palau." Other problems, such as the numerous clashes between "traditional" and introduced jural practices, complicating disputes over land, were also noted by informants as sources of contemporary concern. In the face of this situation, traditional techniques of social control seemed "no longer adequate" to deal with contemporary Palau. A constitution was seen as a means to provide Palau with an overall framework within which the society could function coherently and productively, while being protected from undesirable foreign influences. A former ConCon delegate and PC spokesman stated; "Framing a constitution is the way to preserve Palau."
Clearly by 1979, the framing of a constitution was seen as necessary, deeply meaningful, and as an exciting opportunity for Palauans. Due to the colonial regimes, the chance for Palauan control over island resources had been limited. Even during the American period, "power came down from the Trust Territory . . . and the High Commissioner" with virtually no participation by Palauans at the highest levels of executive authority (leader/informant). Both the ConCon and the constitution were seen as signaling increased Palauan assertiveness, self-confidence and control.

"When we talk about a constitution, this is something that the people really felt was Palauan." By the time of the Convention Palauans felt that they had a chance to develop their own form of national government. These comments by Alfonso Diterong, Chairman of the People's Committee, capture the twin sentiment of having the chance to assert Palauan identity and control, and of developing a framework to enhance this.

Moreover, internationally a constitution would "show to the world that Palauans are part" of it, that "we have our own law, rules and policies to protect our people." A constitution would be a reassertion of "Palauan identity," extended internationally, after many decades of external control.

According to Diterong, the attitude among the people was "let's get on with it. Let us frame a constitution and then any differences we will try and work out with the U.S." Many Palauans apparently felt the U.S. would respect Palauan desires and objectives, as articulated in a constitution. After all, the United States "is a democratic country"
and therefore would accommodate the expressions of popular will.

However during the constitutional dispute, this idealistic view was sorely tested.

As described by Oiterong; "an opportunity [had been] given to ... the people ... so that we can govern ourselves ...." But then the U.S. had attempted to forcibly intrude its three major concerns. The perception developed; "... you have given us this opportunity," but then "you interfere." This was both infuriating and disappointing, engendering a sense of identity impingement, as defined in Chapter V. In fact the pressure on the Original Constitution only served to increase its symbolic and practical value in the eyes of many Palauans. This in turn helped build support for the PC's pro-draft efforts.

A Dense Field for Maneuver

The PC now faced challenges, mainly of a legal and procedural kind, from both its domestic opposition and the Trust Territory. These challenges would have the effect, in the longer-range, of enhancing the PC's position. In its initial skirmishes, the PC both employed, and had to confront a variety of tactics.

The first challenge was the Legislature's attempt to outflank the continuing pro-draft boycott (see Chapter V) by claiming that, in contrast to pro-draft forces, the Legislature only needed 1/2 of its members for a quorum. If this interpretation held, enabling the Legislature once more to conduct business, then the impediment to further legislative moves against the April Constitution would be removed. In the meantime, and without any legal clarification from the Trust Territory, the legislature prepared to reconvene and approve bill 1140.
If this became law, it would invalidate both the ConCon and the Original Constitution. Faced with this prospect, the PC organized a protest. An informant reported that in a single night, June 24th, the PC mobilized substantial support including both young people and elders with traditional prestige.

On June 25th, a majority of the Legislature met and voted to approve Bill 1140. As the vote was being held, 500-600 supporters of the April Constitution were demonstrating in front of the Legislature Building, urging that body to "let the people decide" on the constitution. According to the *Pacific Daily News* (1979 June 28th:4), about 200 adults then crowded into the building as the bill was being passed. In Alfonso Diterong's words, "we begged the Legislature not to pass 1140," but to "give it to the People" instead. If you were there, "you should have seen the me'chas" (elderly, high-clan women). Some of them were very upset."^5^ In an editorial the *Pacific Daily News* stated; "The citizens of Palau ought to be the ones to decide if they want their proposed constitution. If a particular group is opposed to it, [they should] . . . campaign against it and vote . . . at the polls. The action by the Legislature . . . to kill the document and scrap the planned referendum is absolutely outrageous. . . . We doubt that the people of Palau will forget or forgive . . . [such] arrogant behavior" (*Pacific Daily News* 1979 June 27th:10). This assessment proved remarkably correct.

On the 25th, some members of the People's Committee filed suit with the Trust Territory High Court, challenging the legality of the Palau
Legislature's quorum. If this suit was accepted, then Bill 1140 had not been passed since the Legislature had not acted with a quorum. As can be seen, pro-draft efforts already involved popular protest as well as legal appeals. PC tactics would diversify further.

On the 26th about 100 Palauans went to the Palau Court House where Justice Burnett of the Trust Territory High Court was present. Despite the demonstrators' the Justice took no action to restrain the Legislature. In fact a Trust Territory court decision would not be forthcoming until after the July 9th referendum over whether to adopt the April Constitution. Such timing, involving a lack of fit between Trust Territory legal decisions and Palauan legislative and informal political activities, would further complicate an already intricate political situation.

Within days after the Legislature's action, 1140 was sent to the High Commissioner. He did not act on this or any other Legislative measure, taking the position that such action would be inappropriate in lieu of a Trust Territory court decision pending on the quorum question.

For its part, the Legislature continued to act on measures. On June 29th, it passed resolution 1029 proclaiming that there would be no July 9th referendum. Instead, a referendum would be held at a later date so as to provide time for revision of the constitution. The Legislature also created a Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC). The purpose of the CDC was to review inconsistencies between the April Constitution and free association. It was also empowered to "reconcile, void, and eliminate" the inconsistencies and make other constitutional revisions as the CDC saw fit. (Hereafter, such efforts are referred to
as revisionist, or pro-revised.) Once again we see the persistence of a crucial assumption among revisionist forces, namely that the Original Constitution was incompatible with free association, and therefore must be revised.

In addition to its legislative action, revisionist forces engaged in leverage tactics. In Resolution 1033 the Legislature sought to ensure that both the United States and United Nations were aware of its position that the April Constitution was legally dead, so there should be no July 9th referendum. It also warned the United States, that if it were to fund a July 9th referendum, the Legislature would regard this as an instance of American "interference." Note that the charge of interference had also been made, when it seemed to their advantage, by pro-draft forces, earlier in the dispute. In fact both sides either admonished the U.S. for its "interference," or sought to entice U.S. influence. Having said this, however, it should also be pointed out that the PC, even when calling for such influence, did so with a consistent stress on the necessity of aiding democratic forces in Palau, and restraining undemocratic ones. Revisionist forces, in contrast, generally made their appeals based on procedural matters and legal interpretations.

As of July 6th, the High Commissioner was maintaining his position that since the legal suit filed by the People's Committee was still pending, it would be improper for the Trust Territory to act on Bill 1140. For its part, the Legislature continued to maintain that the measure had been properly passed, was law, and therefore the proposed referendum was "canceled" and illegal. The legal maneuvering was
clearly a factor adding to the complexity of the situation. In any case, for the time being, the Legislature's attempt to stymie the referendum failed.

The July 9th Campaign

In some contrast to the revisionist forces, those supporting the Original Constitution consistently put their emphasis on mobilizing domestic support through participatory means within Palau. The first major test of the PC efforts in this regard was the referendum of July 9 on whether to approve the April Constitution. With an emphasis on voluntary efforts, the PC began its campaign.

Pro-draft arguments for July 9th were similar to those already discussed. Opponents, however, felt that the PC was misleading Palauans. In this view, the PC was taking advantage of the vulnerability of its domestic opposition by picturing them in the inaccurate though provocative light of "making its own constitution" and of "selling Palau to the U.S." Whatever the accuracy of such charges, the PC in employing them was striking a responsive chord.

In the days immediately proceeding the referendum there was little public debate (Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 1978:25). Revisionist leaders told their followers not to participate in the referendum. The PC on the other hand, campaigned vigorously.

On July 9th the voter turn-out of 63 percent was considered high, given the circumstances (UNVM 1978:34). The result was a dramatic victory for the PC with 92 percent of the voters approving the Original
Constitution. One influential pro-revised informant reported that most of those voting had little knowledge of the content of the April Constitution. Instead, they had been carried away by the emotionally and symbolically-charged PC rhetoric. However it was the impression of the United Nations Visiting Mission (UNVM) that the constitutional controversy had increased the public's understanding of both the Original Constitution, and of the issues involved. The UNVM stated further that the overwhelming majority of voters, in making their choice "were both expressing their distrust for certain ... representatives who had been in charge for too long, and were ... affirming ... their nationalism." One influential pro-draft leader described these dynamics in more detail. "Since the U.S. imposed on Palau's constitution writing the requirements of U.S. defense, so the people chose on the basis of the U.S. or Palau. The issue was Palauan [national] identity versus U.S. interests." At this time, Palauans indicated a strong preference for the former. Thus a symbolic/identity factor powerfully contributed to the PC's mobilization of support. Such factors are not sufficiently addressed by dependency theory, but they can be appreciated from a dependencia perspective. For complete results of the July 9th referendum, see Appendix B.

Complicating Factors

Supporters of the Original Constitution now took the position that the July 9th vote was a clear mandate for the installation of a government based on that constitution. The Legislature, however, continued to maintain that the referendum was invalid. The Speaker of
the Legislature also maintained there was no clear and consistent U.S. position, and that this added to the confusion. A perception of mixed and uncertain signals from the United States had been a factor during the superport controversy, and would remain an element in the interaction between Palau and the United States.

Another factor complicating the political situation was the varying and ambivalent appeals made by the competing Palauan groups to various external parties. This had also been the case during earlier disputes (see Chapter III and IV). On July 13th, 1979 the boycotting legislators sent a cable to the U.S. Secretary of Interior asking him to bypass the Palau Legislature, and certify the results of the referendum held earlier that month. "Boycotting Legislators want U.S. Intervention," read the PDN headline describing this turn of events (Pacific Daily News 1979 July 21:8). The boycotting legislators stated that their certification request was on behalf of the majority in Palau. However, this leverage attempt proved unsuccessful.

Metropolitan decisions with contrary effects also complicated the U.S./Palau relationship. On July 24th, Justice Burnett concluded that the Palau Legislature was acting appropriately when it conducted business with a simple majority as a quorom. Therefore bills 1140 and 1142 had indeed become law. The effect of this was to remove any legal standing for the ConCon, the Draft Constitution, and the July 9th referendum. Following this, as called for in law 1142, the Legislature appointed members to a constitutional drafting commission.

Many Palauans who supported the Original Constitution were "profoundly disturbed" by the Burnett decision (Shuster 1980:80). Among
some, there was a sense that the timing as well as the content of the court decision had been politically motivated. 8 A number of Palauan students at the University of Hawaii also expressed shock. 9 A Palauan petition urged that the results of the vote be recognized, despite the Trust Territory ruling. There was also pressure from the United Nations for the United States to clarify its position, which it did. On July 27th the United States unequivocally upheld the Legislature's interpretation of its quorum, thereby upholding the Legislature's legal/procedural efforts to overturn the July 9th referendum.

This turn of events, coming just weeks after the PC's victory at the polls, was something of a blow to the pro-draft cause, at least for the immediate future. But in a significant sense, the apparent pro-revised victory was actually a defeat for those forces. The setback for the PC proved quite temporary. As with the coincidence of interest between Palauan revisionist forces and the United States, the Trust Territory's legal ruling had the unintended, contrary effect of contributing to the PC's support. Much frustration was provoked, and this strengthened the PC's position. This reaction was due to the perception that what Palauan pro-draft forces had won through democratic, external, procedural means. In fact, fueled by the frustration over Burnett's decision, the PC's objective escalated from simply defense of the April Constitution to that of driving Tmetchul forces from power and replacing them with PC leaders. As one supporter of the Original Constitution said: "we lost the argument [over the court decision]. However, we had won a major, political fight."
Following the Trust Territory court decision, the Palau Legislature appointed nine members to the Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC). Out of the nine, at least three were strongly linked to Tmetchul. Five were former ConCon delegates. On August 2, the Palau Political Status Commission submitted a report to the Drafting Commission. Four of their recommendations sought to lessen constitutional restrictions so as to satisfy U.S. strategic concerns. The report recommended that the Draft Constitution's ban on harmful substances be reworded so as to permit nuclear transit. It suggested further that Palau's national government be allowed to exercise eminent domain to procure lands for U.S. military purposes. Third, it suggested that the Legislature's margin for approval of a free association compact, before it could be voted upon by the public, be reduced from the Original Constitution's 2/3 majority to that of a simple one. Fourth, the PPSC agreed with the U.S. position that the Original Constitution's 200 mile archipelagic claim, also contained in that constitution, was "contrary to international law" (Palau Political Status Commission August 2 Report, page 4) and should be dropped.

The PPSC commission also suggested a number of changes that were not closely related to U.S. concerns. For instance, it recommended that the bicameral legislature, as laid out by the Original Draft Constitution, be made unicameral. In suggesting this, it stressed that the legislature should be the product of a balance between the need for an inexpensive and decisive government and the large, complicated structure set out in the April Constitution. The PPSC recognized that the latter was designed
to "ensure numerous checks and balances: and to "divide power," ensuring that "no one person or group would be able to control the [future] government" of Palau (PPSC August 2 Report, page 17). It is worth remembering that for many ConCon delegates, rejection of the PPSC's 1978 transition plan, and the parliamentary system favored by Tmetchul forces, had been based on just such a fear: i.e., that Tmetchul and his associates would be able to dominate such a government. Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why supporters of the Original Constitution would interpret the PPSC's and the Palau Legislature's attempt to make constitutional alterations as an attempt to re-establish their political control through undemocratic means.

On August 21 the Constitutional Drafting Commission submitted its report to the Palau Legislature. For the most part, the CDC's recommendations matched those of the PPSC. Once again, a number of changes suggested by the CDC had little to do with U.S. concerns and seemed primarily oriented towards Palauan domestic politics. On August 23, the Palau Legislature accepted this "new," revised constitution. The political situation was still quite fluid, however. Elections for the next, 7th, Palau Legislature were slated for September 4th. For its part, the 6th Palau Legislature passed on to the High Commissioner measures that would have cancelled these elections, while reconstituting the 6th Palau Legislature into an interim government until a constitution was installed. Naturally the People's Committee opposed this plan.

In Guam early in August, there were meetings between U.S. officials and Palauans, including the People's Committee. Since Ambassador
Rosenblatt agreed to speak with both the Legislature and the PC, the latter felt it had gained at least a measure of United States recognition (Shuster 1980:80). A PC organizer who was visiting Hawaii stated: "... now Rosenblatt [will] have to ... deal with us as a political force."

At the time, the PC was urging both its Palauan opposition and the U.S. not to cancel the September 4th elections, and to respect the results of the July 9th vote. More discussions were held in Saipan and a week after this, the High Commissioner vetoed the Palau Legislature's bills, thus clearing the way for the September 4th elections.

This turn of events put supporters of the Revised Constitution in an awkward position. As September had drawn near, ranking members of the Palau Legislature deliberately failed to file for re-election. This was an attempt to influence the High Commissioner to rule favorably on the Palau Legislature bills (Shuster 1980:80). When this did not occur, few members of the legislature majority block could run in the September election. On the other hand, PC forces had been preparing for the election ever since their setback in July. One can only speculate as to why revisionist forces put themselves in such a vulnerable position. Perhaps the inconsistent pattern of U.S. actions with their contrary effects, had thrown Tmetchu1 forces off balance. It is clearer that the PC's preparations were consistent with that coalition's emphasis on, and expertise at, mobilizing popular support in Palau.

On September 4th candidates affiliated with the PC achieved a sweeping victory, winning 22 out of 28 seats in the Legislature. Of the few candidates supporting the Revised Constitution, only one had
managed to win. However, a referendum on the Revised Constitution was due to be held on October 23rd. If a "yes" vote prevailed, then a 7th Palau Legislature would not take office and the PC's earlier victories would be negated. On the other hand a "no" vote would leave open the possibility of reviving the Original Constitution. It would also mean that the 7th Palau Legislature, composed almost entirely of PC-affiliated leaders, would take office. Therefore, for both sides, the October 23 vote was crucial.

Referendum on the Revised Constitution: A Showdown Vote

The October referendum was hotly contested. Forces in favor of the Revised Constitution were well-supplied with funds. Reportedly much of this went for political barbecues, picnics, parties and the like. While such campaign activities are common in contemporary Palau, informants who were generally opposed repeatedly labeled this as "bribing the people." This charge was not made against the PC.

The alignment of forces for the campaign was generally similar to July 9th. One addition on the side of the Revised Constitution was the participation of some members of the House of Chiefs. Apparently, they were asked by the 6th Palau Legislature's majority to campaign actively for the Revised Constitution. However, the campaign efforts of HOC members in villages often proved counter-productive. Reportedly some villagers were not enthusiastic about chiefs, and especially acting chiefs, attempting to dictate political choices on matters that were national, and extra-traditional in scope. This view has already been mentioned.
The positions presented first are those for voting "yes," to approve the Revised Constitution: It was maintained that the original one was irrevocably in conflict with the desired, and anticipated status of free association. A "no" vote would "kill [the chances for] free association" with the United States, revisionist campaign material stated. Revisionist forces also emphasized the unstable economic conditions in Palau and the rest of the Trust Territory. In view of this, free association was required, so as to obtain a "15 year guarantee" of financial aid and infrastructural support. With such support, both the Palauan Government and individuals would be better able to make plans, as the economy would be secure. One pro-revised piece stated "... vote for security, vote for predictability, vote yes." Another was more direct; "the trusteeship is ending, save your job, save your salary, vote yes."

These forces also argued that a defeat for the Revised Constitution would badly delay Palau's emergence as a semi-autonomous nation. From this viewpoint, rejection of the revised draft would put Palau "... in the position [that it had been in] a year ago, [with] a whole year's work" of constitutional development wasted. Furthermore, if a new (i.e., 7th Palau) pre-constitutional legislature took office, Palau's powers and autonomy would still be quite limited. On the other hand, if Palauans voted to approve the Revised Constitution, then a constitutional government could be in place by 1980. When this occurred, Palau would be in a much better position to negotiate for "recognition ... and ... assistance ..." from the international community (revisionist campaign piece).
It was also argued (in a piece entitled "Our New, Stronger Constitution") that the Revised Constitution only added a few "minor, strengthening changes," made primarily to "clarify matters that [could be] troublesome" in Palau's relation to the U.S. It was argued that the changes were "... prudent" (same) in their recognition of irreducible U.S. interests, and did not erode Palauan interests or autonomy. Revisionist forces further maintained that the Revised Constitution did not alter the structure of government, as proposed by the original one. Those opposing the Revised Constitution did not share the above view. Their position will be discussed shortly.

Revisionist forces also charged that the PC was irresponsible, was simply interested in power, and was manipulating both the public and the constitutional issue simply to get into office. In one cartoon, the PC was pictured as a wolf in sheeps' clothing.

Revisionist forces also maintained that the impact of U.S. military uses and operations would be minimal, and subject to Palauan control. "Nothing will happen without Palauan approval," one memorandum said. According to another memorandum, military use would probably only impact "some land in the jungles of Bablaab, four times a year, for two weeks at a time, marines will train in the jungles. No marines will go near anyone's house. No marines will go near anyone's ... taro patch, ... near a cemetary or [near any] other sacred, or important site ... ." Rather the U.S. would be offering Palau "$250 million, [for the right] to have those marines run around in the jungle."

Supporters of the Revised Constitution did acknowledge that it would remove "transit" from its ban on nuclear and other harmful substances. They sought to minimize apprehension over this, however.
stated: "some misinformed people [supporters of the Original Constitution] have apparently said . . . that the nuclear provision in the revised constitution . . . means [that] nuclear weapons will be stored here for 15 years. . . . This is not true. . . . To us, and to the United States, transit means . . . passing through" and that is all.

Arguments to Vote No

In sharp contrast to its opposition, a major focus of the PC's campaign to disapprove the Revised Constitution was to emphasize the possible impacts and dangers associated with a large-scale military presence. During the October campaign the PC maintained that the safeguards in the Original Constitution could prevent such a disruptive and dangerous presence from materializing, as opposed to the revisions, which were designed to facilitate access for the military. Even supporters of the Revised Constitution acknowledged that, given the PC's graphic and stark portrayals of military and nuclear-related dangers, the "people in Palau became afraid of the military." Actually, such Palauan concerns stretch back to at least World War II. Now these concerns were fanned by PC leaflets, with their photographs of highly technological death-dealing weaponry (leaflets are presented in Appendix C).

On the cover of one "vote no" leaflet, in English and Palauan, is a phrase adapted from the preamble of the Constitution: "In founding Belau our forefathers displaced none, [and] wished no other place than this." This leaflet conveys the theme of commitment to a Palauan life lived within the framework of the indigenous natural environment. In striking contrast, are the images that appear on the back of the leaflet;
an American jet fighter and a warship. Between the jet and ship is a question, written in both English and Palauan; "Are these charming angels of death... to visit Palau?" There is another question, in Palauan which asks: "are these things... for the defense of Palau or are [you, we?] inviting... death and destruction with these things?" As has been noted, U.S. rhetoric to the effect that its military was primarily interested in protecting Palau has not convinced all islanders.

Inside the cover of one of these leaflets in large letters it says: "Save Palau from nuclear accident." This is printed over a photograph of a fleet of warships underway. Across this photograph is an arrow pointed towards the words, "transit=accident, temporary storage=holocaust, use=..." This refers to the view expressed that a "right of [nuclear] transit" could make Palau the site of nuclear disaster. This would be the case if Palauans "agree[d] to the three things the U.S. wants," as contained in the Revised Constitution.

One of the cartoons shows a very large nuclear bomb. It is animat, and is glaring down at a very little man whom it holds in one hand. The man is labeled as a Palauan. The relative size difference indicates how powerless Palauans (and others) seem, compared to nuclear weapons.

In this same leaflet is another statement in Palauan. Translated it says; the "... campaign [for the revised constitution] is really associated with dangerous weapons that will bring sickness and death" to Palau. One finishes this leaflet with the sight of the mushroom cloud from a 1947 nuclear test at Bikini Lagoon, in the Marshalls.
Palauans of an anti-nuclear persuasion were quite aware of U.S. nuclear activity in the Marshalls, and referred to this as one means to increase concern.

Defeating the Revised Constitution was portrayed by the PC as the way to safeguard both Palauans and their environment. One of their campaigns signs read; "Protect Palau vote no." This protectionist, anti-nuclear theme was also expressed on PC posters such as;

vote no = happiness and peace
... [vote] yes = scary danger

In addition to the PC's emphasis on nuclear and other military dangers, it voiced the concern that the majority of the Palau Legislature, despite the peoples' wishes, intended to "sell" Palau to the U.S. or to some other power. One leaflet said that without the safeguards embedded in the Original Constitution, Palauan resources could end up in "the hands of a few unscrupulous men." Under the text is a clenched fist, a symbol of political protest and indignation common on American campuses during the later 1960s. The underlying theme, that a few irresponsible Palauan leaders might "sell" The Islands, has been a major, publically expressed fear since the time of the superport controversy.

The PC also maintained that some of the changes made in the Revised Constitution were irrelevant to U.S. strategic concerns, were major, and could effect the very structure of Palau's national government. At least 5 of the 8 constitutional revisions in fact had little to do with U.S. concerns. The PC was aware of this, and it reinforced their view that a major purpose of the alterations was to satisfy the domestic political preferences of the Tmetchul group.
The People's Committee also argued that a no vote would be a reaffirmation of support for democratic principles. It asserted that the Palauan People, and not the Legislature, should control constitutional evolution. One PC poster stated: "It is not the Palau Legislature that holds the destiny of Palau. It is your hand that casts the ballots . . . ."

Another message was that Palau would be relinquishing its claim to a significant amount of resources that were claimed by the Original Constitution.

**Political Status and the Campaign**

The Vice-Speaker of the Legislature, Joshua Koshiba challenged the PC, in an open letter, to "come forth with its' position . . . on free association." Some supporters of the Revised Constitution also requested that a "secred deal" was being struck between some of the PC leadership and the Americans to override elements of the constitution. In fact both Palauan sides in the controversy accused the other of making "secret deals" with the Americans.

Pro-revised Palauans charged that the PC's position on political status and a constitution was unclear. They suggested that in fact the PC was oriented toward a number of divergent positions. A revisionist leaflet characterized these: One, that the Draft Constitution "needed fixing" for free association, but that nothing else should be changed. Two, that it needed fising for free association, and that other things might be changed, but not now. Three, that the April Constitution did not need fising. Or four, that it may or may not need this, but it did not matter since the Trusteeship, with its aid, was bound to continue.
Based on informant data and given the circumstances at the time, it is clear that some supporters of the PC hoped that its rather anti-colonial rhetoric, and continued support for the Original Constitution indicated a commitment to the goals of an independent, self-reliant, non-alligned Palau. Others in the coalition preferred free association for the foreseeable future. Among these, some took the view that either the intact April Constitution and free association were ultimately compatible, or that the U.S. would back down on its objections. Others simply preferred the status quo.

Nevertheless, the various PC views had one common denominator: The Original Constitution should be defended, since it had been democratically forged, contained valuable safeguards, and was supported by the public.

But what if constitutional defense entailed jeopardizing free association? As we have seen, the PC did not clarify a position. It intimated that perhaps, such clarification would not be necessary, as it was possible that the U.S. would soften its hard-line position, or at least that the pattern of Palau/United States interaction would leave room for such an outcome.

But as supporters of the Revised Constitution asked: Why would the U.S. offer free association if its underlying interests were not met? Independence was never a stated, immediate PC goal. Some felt, however, that it was implicit since the PC advocated support for the Original Constitution, even though the U.S. continued to regard it as incompatible with free association.
A PC position that would soon emerge involved "subsidiary agreements," distinct from a compact of free association, but which would go into effect at the same time. However this or other mechanisms for outflanking aspects of the constitution, were not widely known in 1979. Therefore, a lack of clarity over the PC's position on the constitution and political status was not just a biased perception, it was an objective fact.

Voting Results

On October 23rd, of the nearly 90 percent of the registered voters who turned out, most voted against the revised draft, in a ration of 2:1. Even this was surpassed in at least 7 municipalities.23 The only dramatic exception to popular rejection of the Revised Constitution was in the municipality of Airai, the home base of Tmetchul. In Ngiwal, and among absentee voters in Guam and Hawaii, the vote was split fairly evenly.

In Ngiwal, structurally conductive links were a factor giving the yes vote some strength. Tmetchul's wife, who is a vigorous campainger, is from the area. As regards Hawaii and especially Guam, the Revised Constitution's inclusion of dual citizenship was popular. For the complete figures on the referendum, see Appendix B.

Generally, the Revised Constitution was soundly defeated. However, this cannot be taken as an unequivocable expression of support for a particular political status. This was the case even though the tone of PC campaigning, as during earlier campaigns, took on something of a "Palau versus U.S." flavor. But the PC took the position as well that
Palau's constitution and prospects for free association were separable matters. At the end of 1979, the interaction pattern with the U.S. in fact seemed to substantiate the view that Palauans could adopt the Original Constitution without suffering any adverse consequences in their relations with the United States. More specifically, after the October 23rd referendum PC Chairman Oiterong was informed that the U.S. "wanted a meeting." According to a well-placed informant, this invitation was generally taken as evidence that the U.S. "had not really closed the door" on free association, despite Palau's rejection of the Revised Constitution.24 The U.S. seemed quite willing to talk with the PC leadership and the new legislature. This sequence of events served to reinforce a PC impression, or at least hope, that constitutional development and political status were indeed separable, and that the former could be handled first.

Analysis/Conclusion

The People's Committee, as a diverse coalition, mobilized support on a number of bases. For one, it attracted a number of influential groups for a variety of reasons. These included an extant relationship with a PC leader. An example of this was the relationship between Remeliik and the Modekngei. For another, tactical considerations could be involved. For instance activists were attracted to the PC in part because it seemed to offer them a conduit to greater participation in the national, political arena.

Substantively, support for the PC was closely tied to the defense of the Original April Constitution. Support for the constitution was
due to a number of factors, these included; recognition of the need for a constitution, the value attributed to the democratic process of actually framing one, the value of this particular constitution, and particularly of its protective and externally-restrictive aspects.

In addition to its bases of support, the variety, coordination, and effectiveness of PC tactics contributed to the movements' success. The PC engaged in a multi-pronged effort that included protest demonstrations, campaigning for votes, etc. Another domestic element of the PC's success was their attractiveness of its leaders. Generally, they cultivated a style (i.e., consensual, participatory, populist) that was emerging as preferred. Moreover Remeliik and Oiterong, the two most important PC leaders, had solid reputations as community servants. Furthermore their relatively apolitical, "clean" records contrasted favorably with the apprehension over Tmetchul.

The PC's success was also facilitated by its leverage tactics. The PC mounted its appeals to affect U.S. policy, to deal with the moves of its domestic opposition, and with the relationship between these. Unlike pro-revised appeals which stressed legalistic and procedural considerations, those of the PC emphasized self-determination. This put them more in line with both the domestic shift towards participatory, populist politics and with the relatively idealistic component of both American policy and international opinion. This congruence contributed to the effectiveness of the PC's leverage, which helped its cause.

Furthermore the PC's internal and external campaigns were integrated, and supported one another. For example the results of the votes, which demonstrated impressive internal mobilization, might have
come to nought if the PC had not been able to deal with the legal and
procedural challenges of its opposition. Both in terms of sequence,
and cause/effect, these complex avenues for political expression and
maneuver interpenetrated one another. The PC was not disoriented by
this, and throughout, persuasively portrayed itself as a popular,
pro-Palauan coalition.

Contrary effects, resulting from the pattern of metropolitan/
satellite interaction, also facilitated the PC's mobilization. These
effects were provoked on at least two, specific occasions by what was
seen as attempts by the United States to intrude its influence in ways
that were poorly timed, and inappropriate in both manner and content.
More generally, the seeming alliance between a Palauan faction, and
American pressure for constitutional alterations had a contrary effect
since it eroded both the position of the Tmetchul faction involved,
while broadening PC resistance. In our discussion of this, we have to
see the importance of historical and symbolic factors. For instance
resistance to the pressures for constitutional modification were
heightened by the fact that this pressure was associated with a highly
worrismatic and symbolically potent threat, that of military activity,
particularly if this involved a nuclear presence.\textsuperscript{25} The salience of
this concern was both historically-derived, and the product of a
comparative/anticipatory perspective. Moreover, the constitution itself
became increasingly valued symbolically, as it was now threatened, along
with its' assertion of Palauan national identity and democratic political
control. Due recognition of the symbolic, historical and political
factors just described would be alien to early dependency theory, though
this is not the case for a \textit{dependencia} perspective.
An additional factor aiding the PC's cause was the miscalculations made by its domestic opposition. It is possible that the Tmetchul-oriented group was caught off balance by the inconsistent and unpredictable impacts of U.S. influence. For instance, the Tmetchul group found itself positioned so as to be quite vulnerable to the charge of being an irresponsible "tool" of the Americans. Moreover in its leverage attempts, the Tmetchul group put much reliance on legislative, legal and procedural efforts. This contrasted with the PC's focus on the mobilization of popular support, which facilitated the PC's portrayal of the Tmetchul group as elitist and undemocratic.

The PC mobilization was also facilitated, at least during 1979, by its limitation on closure. Closure within the PC on the relationship between the constitution and political status, had been avoided for a number of reasons. As noted the PC was internally diverse on this question. Given this fact, the adoption by the PC of one clear-cut position could have alienated much of its following. Moreover, the pro-revised argument which linked economic security to a yes vote, and deprivation with disapproval of the Revised Constitution was not persuasive, due to other considerations more salient at the time. These included concern over the military, and about an abuse of power from the very Palauan group that was taking an economic/pragmatic position. Moreover Palauans in general seemed loath to confront the horns of their development dilemma. Seeking to avoid a linkage between control/autonomy and high levels of continuing support was a means for this, and was probably a popular, though largely implicit, PC position. Such aspects of the Palauan political structure and social environment so
salient at the time, would probably not have been apprehended if a reductionist, economistic approach had been used.

In 1980, PC-affiliated leaders would almost fill the new legislature. In defending the Original Constitution and driving Tmetchul-oriented forces from power, the PC had achieved remarkable success. But there were questions that outlived the PC victories of 1979. It is appropriate to end the chapter by mentioning them.

In power, the PC would be in a new political environment, markedly different from that which had existed during the coalitions' ascendency. Amidst such altered circumstances, would the PC endure as a group with populist leadership, in a close relationship to its followers, committed to protecting Palau?

Secondly, there was no consensus within the PC on certain vital and longer-range questions, such as the desirability of metropolitan influence. This ambivalence was indicated by the PC's appeals, which carried a mixed message. In addition, the PC had not developed a clear cut position on a preferred political status and its relationship to constitutional integrity.

"Defense" against constitutional revision had been successful. What steps would now be taken to re-approve and implement the Original Constitution, and at what priority and pace? Moreover, what would happen if the U.S. remained recalcitrant in its constitutional demands? Would some degree of relative deprivation and austerity be entertained by Palauans as the price of constitutional integrity, if the choice came to this? Would these questions be raised at all, or might the
Palauans find grey areas and interstices between such sharply-etched alternatives? An answer to these questions would depend on subsequent circumstances, one of the most important being the interaction pattern between Palau and the United States.
CHAPTER VI--NOTES

1One PC source put the movement's beginning at May 15th. Another, a few days later (Roman Bedor at UNTT meetings, June 6th). Still another PC source dated the movement's emergence as June 1 (Victor Uherbelua, Chronology of Events, also Alfonso Diterong, interview February 1, 1980).

2Structurally conductive: Political conductiveness; Refers to organization/institutions that are not primarily designed for political purposes, but which nevertheless due to certain characteristics are highly conductive to the promulgation of political influence. This concept was in part derived from the concept of "cultural conduciveness," as described in Protest Movements in Rural Java by Sartono Kartadirdjo, 1973, Oxford University Press, pp. 11-20. As to the statement comparing the level of prestige and political conductiveness between involvement in education and the district government, this is based primarily on developments in 1979/80. In 1979, Diterong who was Chairman of the People's Committee had background mainly in education. Toshiwo Nakamura, another PC leader who was head of the Post Constitutional Convention Commission, and was Speaker of the PC-affiliated 7th Palau Legislature, like Diterong, primarily had background in education. Other indications of the influence accorded to those in education included reliance on them as field workers for political education by the 7th Palau Legislature in preparation for the July, 1980 constitutional referendum, etc. Furthermore, and in contrast to the sentiment expressed by some informants that those working in the District Administration were really underlings of the Americans, those in Education were regarded as not necessarily prone to sympathize with United States objectives.

3According to one of these officers in the Legislature, it would have been ideal if Palau could take the position that The Islands would be neutral, and that "no military forces should come here." But this informant felt that in the practical world of international politics, this was not feasible.

4While on the U.S. mainland during the Trusteeship Council meetings the Speaker of the Legislature and some others reviewed an order issued by the United States Secretary of Interior made in the aftermath of Palau's rejection of the constitution for a Federates States of Micronesia. The order elevated the Palau Legislature to the same status, in relation to Palau, as had been occupied by the former Congress of Micronesia. As that body had operated with a simple majority quorum, and not the 3/4 quorum of the Palau Legislature, the majority block in the Palau Legislature now concluded that the Palau Legislature could
also operate with a simple majority quorum. This view was legally upheld by the decision of Trust Territory Justice Burnett on July 24, 1979. The case was Kebekol Alfonso et al vs. Sadang Silmai et al, in a legal decision by Chief Justice Burnett of the Trust Territory High Court, entered on July 24th, 1979.

More than one informant stressed that on serious occasions when overall community and/or Palauan interests seem at stake, it is the women who "really stand up." This applies particularly to the older women of leading clans. Traditionally such older, high-clan women exercised strong influence in both local community and broader political affairs. Today, their influence may not be as direct, nevertheless they still occupy an important, regulatory/supervisory role in contemporary Koror and in the villages. For instance, during the installation of the 7th Palau Legislature, I noticed that the front rows of public seatings would usually be occupied by these women who followed the proceedings intently.

The Legislature took this position based on the fact that after the High Commissioner received Bill 1140 on June 27th, a 10 day review period had passed without his action. This time frame was disputed, however, as it was unclear whether the High Commissioner had 10 or 30 days in which to act.


An influential, well-placed PC leader regarded the timing of Burnett's decision as politically motivated. According to this informant, Burnett was receiving pressure from the United States executive to postpone a legal decision until after the July 9th referendum result were known. In this way, if the result went against United States interests, and those of the allied, Palauan faction, then there would still be a legal mechanism with which to overturn the referendum since the 1979 ConCon and April Constitution would be legally invalidated. Whether "paranoid" or not, it is significant that a ranking member the PC viewed the Trust Territory decision-making process in this political light.

The shock of disbelief was often followed by intense anger and then despair (Shuster 1980:80). A Palauan student at the University of Hawaii, when I asked her about the Trust Territory legal decision, said: "The Americans are just trying to show how much they hate us." Another Palauan student was also upset.

This transit right might involve temporary storage and use as well. For instance, as the PPSC report pointed out, a U.S. nuclear submarine traveling through Palauan waters, or making a port call would use its nuclear reactor for locomotion, from which there might be some leakage. Moreover, nuclear missiles arm such submarines and are routinely "stored" on board.
Actually, in the last few years, the emerging consensus on Law of the Sea has been contrary to the U.S. position, at least among Third World nations.

For example, permitting dual citizenship, which would be attractive to the estimated 3,000 Palauans living overseas, and revisions ensuring the direct participation of chiefs in setting up state government (Shuster 1980:81).

In early August, a petition surfaced which had been circulated in Palau for a month. Signed by more than 2,000 Palauans, it urged both the Palauan Legislature and Trust Territory High Commissioner to respect the results of the July 9th referendum and urged that the September 4th election be held.

Only seven had filed, four had later withdrawn. Of the remaining three, only Baules Sachelong, a long-time legislator from Airai, won a seat in the new, 7th Palau Legislature.

According to my sources, they could use $100,000 earmarked for political education on the campaign for the Revised Constitution (Diterong, interview, also memoranda, September 5, 1979, entitled "Campaign Outline" by Glen Roberts).

Informants, especially those supporting the People's Committee, tended to characterize their Tmetchu-l-led opposition as being primarily motivated by economic considerations. These same informants described the People's Committee following as being primarily motivated by political idealism and a sense of service to the community and emerging nation. Shuster's work supports this view. More specifically, as regards the October 1979 referendum Shuster states: "The Legislature . . . had $125,000 with which to carry out . . . political education [for their campaign]. . . . In contrast, the People's Committee, relying on donations, had only scant resources and depended on the political idealism and dedication of its followers . . . " (1980:82).

One revisionist memorandum asserted that there were 185 fewer government jobs in 1979 than a year earlier. Similar figures for the declining government job situation at Trust Territory headquarters were also presented. Another memorandum stated that in 1976, the Trust Territory appropriation was 117 million. In 1979 it was 114 million. For 1980, the proposed budget was 99 million.

These points were made by Professor J. K. Galbraith in an article in the Pacific Daily News which was also reproduced as a revisionist memorandum (Pacific Daily News September 10, 1979).
Of course neither wolves nor sheep are indigenous to Palau. However, contemporary Palauans are very much aware of the connotations of this imagery, as it is used in the West.

Non-aligned to the extent that a relatively massive and active U.S. military presence would not be involved. As a pro-revised memorandum acknowledged, "some opinion-makers in Palau (especially Catholic and Modekngei) are apparently opposed to free association because of the size of the economic package and reportedly prefer a more austere independent Palau."

On July 8, 1975, a referendum had been held in Palau on the question of political status. The choices were (a) independence, (b) commonwealth, (c) free association, "in a relationship with the U.S. which may be terminated or chaged in the future," (d) statehood, (e) present status "remaining indefinitely as a United Nations Trust Territory, administered by the U.S.,” and (f) other. The results were: (a) yes 445 (18.3%), no 869 (34.9%), (b) yes 171 (6.8%), no 905 (36.4%), (c) yes 1,120 (45%), no 526 (21.5%), (d) 183 (7.36%), no 880 (35.39%), (e) 1,288 (51.8%), no 370 (14.88%), (f) yes 38 (1.5%), no (30.32%). Notice that the choice present status received the highest number of votes, followed by free association with independence third. During 1979/80, the PC repeatedly stated its preference for free association, on Palauan terms.

Revisionist memorandum; "[Some] opinion-makers support continued trusteeship. This is a particularly powerful argument among middle-aged employees of the U.S. government who have been "Solomonized" and, although they do not particularly like the Trusteeship, prefer its predictability to an uncertain future."

The vote was most overwhelming in Anguar (65:1), followed by Ngarchelong (10:1), Peleliu (8:1), Nuremlenguii (7:1), Ngeschar and Ngetpang (both 6:1), Kayangel and then Ngaraard, with a ratio of 3:1.

Initially the U.S. wanted this meeting for December, 1979. It then, however, accommodated the PC on timing, changing the date of the talks to January 1980, when the 7th Palau Legislature would be installed. This reinforced the PC's impression that the U.S. was willing, and even eager, to talk with the PC's leadership and the new legislature.

Revisionist memorandum; Particularly "the nuclear issue is a very scary one to the People of Palau ... [and] the other side has exploited this issue skillfully while we have been in the position of having to defend the U.S. military and their nuclear weapons." It goes on; "the proposed joint use of Palauan lands by the U.S. military has ... been a difficult concept to sell" and as evidence, noted the heavy vote no turnout in the October referendum from areas where heavy U.S. military use was expected.
Revisionist memorandum; "Disturst of, and anger at the Sixth Palau Legislature [has led] to a loss of credibility of [the] Legislature's leadership," and moreover that "the leadership of the other side has very skillfully exploited [both the overall situation and] . . . the mistakes made by the Legislature."
CHAPTER VII
A COALITION IN POWER

This chapter deals with the People's Committee while it was in power. It begins with the installation of the PC-oriented, House of Elected Members (HEM) in January, 1980. At this stage, the relationship between that body and the PC was very close. Their coalition is referred to as the PC/HEM.

Once in power, the PC/HEM moved to operationalize and implement the preferences, goals and priorities that had been developed while the PC was a protest movement. The primary goals continued to be the pursuit of political status negotiations on free association, and to officially revive and then implement the Original Constitution. Commitment to both these objectives, however, continued to involve a potential conflict between the preferred mechanism for economic support (i.e., free association), and the protectionist and externally-restrictive aspects of the Original Constitution since these might alienate the very donor/metropolitan power interested in providing such support. An open conflict did not materialize, however. Instead, the PC/HEM continued to move on both objectives, without establishing a priority between them. This circumstance was facilitated by a complex set of factors, as expected by dependencia theory. More specifically, for the political status negotiations, both the perceived and objective pattern of metropolitan/satellite interaction influenced Palauans, as did a number of more generalized, indigenous ethno-historic and contemporary
expectations, as well as substantive positions. A focus on such interaction is a feature of dependencia theory, and also retains the strength of an anthropological approach (see p. 265).

The PC/HEM's tenure in power was partly a test of the coalition's ability to maintain a populist, participatory, and pro-Palauan stance, from a position of established authority. In addition, the PC/HEM was faced with the divisive influence of increased incentives and opportunities for intra-coalition political competition and maneuver between various leaders and groups. In this setting, the efforts of the PC to maintain itself as a coherent and effective body proved increasingly difficult, especially in view of the specificity of its mobilization and its limitations on closure.

The PC remained intact slightly beyond the constitutional referendum of July 1980, which approved the Original Draft Constitution. Soon afterwards, however, the coalition broke apart. A "nomination" process for choosing one PC candidate to run for Palau's presidency was seen as arbitrary, elitist, and undemocratic, thus violating the populist and participatory political style which many Palauans had come to expect. This was the final straw that broke the PC's back.

Primary Objectives; Initial Pace

As noted, the two primary objectives of the PC/HEM were to revive the Original Constitution and to proceed with political status negotiations. For a number of reasons, the PC/HEM proceeded cautiously during its early months. It wanted to rebuild the public's trust in pan-Palauan leadership, which had been badly shaken by the
Tmetchul-oriented group. To avoid a similar erosion of public trust and support, the PC/HEM wanted to be viewed as more accessible and responsive instead of running rough-shod over the public's views, for the pursuit of questionable objectives. Also Remeliik and Oiterong, two of the key PC leaders, both emphasized a cautious and consensual approach. In addition, there were charges in the media (Pacific Daily News 1980 February 7:7), supported by at least one informant, that the pace of PC/HEM objectives was impeded in part because legislators were concentrating on passing "pork-barrel" legislation, to benefit their own constituencies.

Simultaneously, a practical constraint on the Legislature's early work was an acute shortage of staff and other help. There were two factors involved in this. First, the HEM had sought to remove all vestiges of the old power group, including clerical help (Pacific Daily News 1980 February 26:6). Second, at least some of those associated with that group felt that the leadership of the HEM was inexperienced, would be incompetent, and they did not want to be associated with this.

**Political Status**

The PC/HEM's position on political status and its relationship to constitutional integrity remained uncertain. Free association was the preferable status, if it could be procured on Palauan terms. Independence was a second option, but was seen as an alternative only if overt U.S. pressure became extremely overbearing, and was sustained.

Engagement in political status negotiations, leading to free association, continued as a primary PC/HEM goal. Increased funding,
Palauan control, the nuclear and land questions were all on Palau's negotiating agenda as 1980 began. Palauan expectations and assessments of the interaction with the United States would also condition the PC/HEM's approach.

On January 3rd, Tmetchul resigned from the Palau Political Status Commission (PPSC). He informed the United States that from the PPSC's point of view, the defeat of the revised draft of the constitution also meant Palauan rejection of the U.S. offer of financial assistance which had been made as part of a free association proposal in 1979 (see Chapter VI, p. 241). Further negotiations with the U.S. would have to be conducted by representatives of the PC/HEM. The Palauan delegation chosen for talks in January was not sent to negotiate, but simply to gather information and report it back to Palau.

For his part, the U.S. Ambassador hoped that America and Palau would not have to start from the beginning in their negotiations. It soon became clear this was also the position of the PC/HEM. But it was also clear that, from the PC/HEM's perspective, some matters needed further work. Speaker of the Legislature Nakamura in a Pacific Daily News interview (of January 22, 1980, page 5) stated that U.S. land requirements were still a sensitive issue and that the proposed level of funding was too low.

A prevalent view among PC/HEM leadership was that the financial assistance was, in part, compensation for U.S. strategic utilization of Palau. Therefore the level of funding should be commensurate with the level of U.S. strategic need. From the viewpoint of some of the PC/HEM leadership, this need was quite high. One legislator stated; "the U.S.
is interested not just in strategic denial. It also wants an active involvement . . . [and because of] Palau's location near Southeast Asia . . . Palau [has] . . . greater military/strategic value to the U.S." than the central Micronesian districts.¹

But even if funding increased dramatically, would this satisfy all Palauan concerns? A few months after the new Legislature its Speaker remarked that Palauans still had a number of substantive concerns, not strictly reducible to levels of funding. For one, Palauans desired increased control over all aspects of decision-making. In fact Palau continued to press for both increased funding and increased control.

Another concern, that over nuclear materials and/or weapons, had gained considerable visibility during the constitutional controversy. One pro-PC informant felt that the present legislature had been elected in large part due to their apparent anti-nuclear stance. This informant felt that if these legislators now reversed their position, the Palauan public would "never buy this," and would feel betrayed.²

On another point, the 200 mile territorial boundary (see Chapter V, p. 187, 190-191), at least one influential legislator felt that Palau was also unlikely to retreat. After all, "we . . . are not a continental people [and the] 200 mile limit makes us feel bigger." Moreover, unlike the United States, the PC/HEM felt it was possible that ongoing, international Law of the Sea negotiations would support the Palauan position.

So far in this chapter I have treated substantive concerns, such as level of funding, as the elements which determined the PC/HEM's approach to negotiations. Expectations and criteria for evaluating the
interaction with the United States, including Palauan views of the correct purposes, style, and significance of negotiations also conditioned the PC/HEM's approach. The Palauan expectations and criteria used by them to evaluate interactions with United States were a product of indigenous ethno-historic predispositions, contemporary concerns, and extent interests. An understanding of the above is highly relevant for dependencia theory, with its interest in the dynamics and processes of metropolitan/satellite interaction, and also provides a case for the anthropology of diplomacy and international relations. 3

Clearly Palauans, even some of those with international experience, have criteria for evaluating their interaction with American negotiators that are significantly based on quasi-traditional values of mutual support, reciprocity, and the restrained use of influence/force. The importance attributed to these criteria is primarily based on informants, a number of whom were involved in the negotiations. To a lesser extent, attribution is based on tracking the negotiations with sources such as status commission reports, and the news media.

As to the relative purposes of the negotiations, an informant with the U.S. Office of Micronesian Negotiations gave the following account: 4 He said that when the Americans negotiate, this is done with certain maximal demands that reflect the country's national interests, though there are fall-back positions. Nevertheless, the objective is to secure through a linear, step-by-step process, concrete, even conclusive results. In contrast, for the Palauans, according to the same informant, the "negotiations are a constant, they never start or end." Rather it is the process of negotiations that is most important. "In
Palau, he said, "negotiations are an art." This same view was expressed by a number of Palauan informants. As in many non-western societies, relationships in Palau are built on strands of reciprocity, mutual obligation, and indebtedness subject to continual fine-tuning and readjustment.

Moreover, as stated by the American informant, the "greatest strides" in Palau's recent political evolution have taken place during, and with some relation to, ongoing negotiations. According to my informant, Palauans and other Micronesians have come to see "an intrinsic merit" in such negotiations.

Palauans have sometimes seen the negotiations as a means to assert themselves and the legitimacy of their views internationally. This view was expressed by a number of Palauan informants. In addition, some islanders want to maintain the status quo and inconclusive status negotiations could be a means. In contrast, if and when the Americans got what they wanted, they might just "forget about Palau" and Palau might lose the benefits it enjoys.

Another possibility was that a Palauan position would solidify and be seen as irreducibly opposed to fundamental U.S. concerns. This might alienate the U.S. to the point where it might refuse to offer free association. The U.S. had already hinted at such a course, and the prospect remained unsettling. On the other hand, as opposed to the unknowns and possibly austere consequences of independence, free association was still seen quite desirable and as providing needed support. And yet, once free association negotiations were completed,
Palau might be caught fast in a web of non-negotiable, possibly burdensome commitments lasting for years, decades, or even half a century.5

It would take time, foresight, and skillful negotiating by the Palauans to obtain free association on terms that most Palauans would embrace. Fifteen years of inconclusive negotiations had already passed. During the period, there had been a shift of negotiating responsibility from Micronesia to Palau, along with major shifts in Palau's politics.

As of 1980, PC/HEM forces felt that more work had to be done to ensure that Palau would be protected from possible damage arising from its relationship to the United States. PC Chairman Diterong remarked in May of 1980: "We all know there is a cliff there, and if we go we might fall. . . . [We will] try to go down with a rope first, and see what it is like." Proceeding slowly and carefully with status negotiations was a way for Palauans to explore with their rope. In the meantime, both dependent affluence and increased opportunities for domestic and international political expression were seen as likely to continue, with military impacts being kept at bay.6 As can be seen, there were incentives for continuing the status negotiations, but not necessarily for concluding them. Given this, it is not surprising that the PC/HEM during much of 1980 proceeded slowly.

Another factor which cautioned the Palauans was a sense that their quasi-traditional and contemporary expectations for interaction had been violated by the United States, especially during the constitutional dispute. In fact, it is conceivable that Palauans, even as of 1980, viewed the U.S. partly as another clan, albeit a very powerful one. If
so, then Palauan expectations about controlled competition and conflict would come into play. Ideally and traditionally, such conflict stopped short of absolute domination of the weaker party by the stronger one. In fact, the stronger, more affluent party might be expected to recirculate some of its wealth, especially since, in this case, the U.S. would clearly benefit from a Palauan resource; its strategic location.

Instead of openly admitting the strategic value of the islands for the U.S., however, the Americans appeared to downplay this aspect of the relationship and also to operate, at times, in an unscrupulous fashion. This view probably heightened existing Palauan concern about dominant outsiders, their intentions and impacts. Such Palauan concern has a historical base, reaching back to at least Japanese times. As one informant said: "The Japanese came and said, we are from Asia, we want everyone to be free." Palau was acculturated towards Japan, as that country "poured propaganda over" Palauans. Yet at the same time, the Japanese were "building up their military," and were using Palau as a base for this. This informant reported that "there was [now] a suspicion that maybe the U.S. was fooling us [as Japan had earlier] and maybe ... [the Americans] fell they are so smart that they can manipulate us." The Palauans exhibit a skill and interest in manipulating outsiders but can feel uncomfortable if foreigners manipulate them.

Another informant elaborated, linking the above-mentioned sentiment to the American period: "I for one feel offended by the U.S. because I know what the U.S. really wants and [I also know] the way the U.S. is getting at this. I can read the way the U.S. moves, and it really
irritates me. They really want this island. But the way they are asking for it . . . they are trying to make me believe that the U.S. really does not care. They are trying to make us believe that they have just happened to come to know us Palauans for the last 30 years, that there just happens to be this U.S. Trusteeship, and that they just happen to be here and simply want to help us." The negative assessment of U.S. motivations and behavior was contrasted by this and other informants with a more positive, even idealistic view of international relations. According to the latter, the U.S. should say; "... you are our friends, our relatives, and in order to protect . . . the freedom of the world we will give you so much money in return for your help. When I help a friend, I like to feel I am appreciated, and needed." Another Palauan informant elaborated on the theme: "if you want to be friendly then you give an inch and I give an inch." Instead of one country "fooling" another, basic issues of common interest should be examined in an open atmosphere of give and take. Of course this is an ideal picture. In a more practical mode, I am sure that Palauans, particularly those with international experience, recognize that altruism aside, the powerful nations wield great influence internationally.7

Clearly, however, some Palauans resented what they saw as a U.S. disposition to "throw its weight around" and exhibit cultural arrogance. In a number of instances, informants expressed resentment of what they saw as an American tendency to think of Palauans as materially and culturally poor. "The U.S. acts like it is giving us something and that we are poor people and are worth nothing . . ." (PC/HEM informant). In
line with this view, Palau could not possibly be developed without massive assistance from the United States. If the Palauans "toed the line" then the U.S. would have the generosity to reciprocate by bringing Palau into the modern world. Otherwise, the Palauans would remain isolated, "poor, and backward." Some Palauans resented such reasoning, which they took as an American view.8

The ideal relationship between the U.S. and Palau, as expressed by informants, was one of reciprocity and mutual assistance from which both could benefit while neither one is badly deprived. Yet to some Palauans, the U.S. appeared to be "asking for more than it should," and with a degree of influence that was inappropriate. As one informant said, "when you have a baby, an infant, you don't challenge it to a wrestling match." In addition to the emphasis on a controlled use of influence/force, note the dependent/paternalistic flavor to this imagery.

There was the perception that the U.S. was not living up to its own democratic ideals, the ones it publically espoused, and which Palauans had come to both value and find useful. A Palauan involved in negotiations over political status had stayed with an American family while in high school in Guam. He had also gained experience working in an American bank, where he had become manager. He liked the Americans as people, and respected their lifestyle. "Americans are good people," he said. "They tell you what they want, what they think, and show sincere concern for people's advancement and well-being." In school, this informant's favorite subject was American history. He felt that he knew "the real America and the appropriate way things are done in America, and how the U.S. government functions" domestically. Whether
or not this informant's view are realistic, he believed he understood
the "U.S. system and its values" and was disturbed, since the U.S.
appeared to be playing by different rules in Palau. What irked some
Palauans was their perception that beneath its public veneer of
democratic rhetoric, the U.S. was acting undemocratically, by applying
pressure against Palauans. This pressure might intimidate them. It
could backfire, however, since Palauans generally do not respond to
direct pressure, particularly if it is seen as leaving little room for
future maneuver.

In part because of the perceived lack of sustained, external
pressure, the PC/HEM did not clarify a position on political status and
the constitution through much of 1980. That such pressure did not
materialize was primarily due to the pattern of U.S./Palau interaction,
which led some in the PC/HEM to believe that the U.S. might reverse its
stand on at least two of the three disputed, constitutional provisions.
This perception was pronounced by the time of the constitutional
referendum of July, 1980. But considerably earlier, the specific
interactions between some Palauan leaders and U.S. officials facilitated
the Palauan impression that the U.S. might not remain adamant in its
constitutional demands. For instance, the visit of a U.S. Congressional
delegation in early January was taken by at least one high-ranking HEM
member as substantiating the PC's view that the PC had been right to
assume that "the U.S. would knock on our door right after the votes
[from the October, 1979 referendum] were counted." Sure enough, two
military transport planes with U.S. Congressmen arrived with U.S.
Congressman aboard. My informant felt the American delegation had been
told to come to Palau so as to obtain a better picture of Palau's new
leadership and that the Americans might now be willing to positively entertain the PC/HEM's preferences on political status and the constitution.

What exactly were their preferences? There was no clear picture at the time. In an interview on January 30th, the Speaker of the Legislature stated that if a compact of free association came out contrary to certain provisions of Palau's constitution, then "the Palauan People would decide" on what course to take. The voters' ratification or rejection of such a compact would determine whether the constitution needed to be adjusted. Also during 1980, the PC/HEM began to point out that aspects of the constitution could be suspended or superseded through "subsidiary agreements" (see Chapter X for further discussion of this).

Yet even well-placed PC/HEM informants were not sure where the PC/HEM was heading on the question of political status and the constitution. In fact informant assessments changed almost week by week. For instance one informant, frustrated at the slow pace of PC/HEM initiatives, reported in February that the Legislature now valued free association more than constitutional integrity. Three weeks before this, the same informant had said that the PC was "on record" as "not giving a dam about free association," if the choice was between it and constitutional integrity. Views also varied as to whether independence could be an alternative.

One popular view was that free association, lasting for a period of 15 years, could be a transition period in preparation for independence.
In the meantime with U.S. support, Palau's economic base could be developed. According to this scenario, as time went on Palau would require less and less aid, as its ability for self-reliance increased.

As one informant reported, however, there was a risk connected with this strategy, namely that over the years, Palau would be moving "closer and closer to the U.S. through indoctrination" and other means, "leading to the ultimate Americanization of Palau." This trend might be viewed positively by those who sought a commonwealth status, but for those seeking either outright independence or free association as a "stepping-stone" to this, increasing dependency and "Americanization" would be viewed as an unfortunate loss of Palauan integrity and control.

In contrast to free association, when independence was considered, it was usually thought of as a less-than-ideal status. Palauans might chose it, however, if they were faced with extreme, highly disturbing U.S. pressure. Though for a time in 1979 the U.S. was perceived in this light, the pressure did not seem sustained, which mitigated against the possibility that the PC/HEM would develop a clear-cut, autonomist position.

To the contrary, as of June 1980, one influential member of the House of Chiefs stated the prevailing view: "the Americans are now our friends and our negotiating partners." American was "needed" for its continuing aid, necessary to maintain present government services and to fuel economic growth. Palauan positions so based could be vulnerable, however, as it was a view that is far removed from one of nation-states and super-powers driving hard bargains to maximize their interests, while giving as little as possible in return. This latter view is probably
more in line with the objective operation of international affairs than either former view, or Palauans' quasi-traditional expectations.

It is true that in Palau's primarily bilateral relationship with the United States, a particular conjunction of domestic and international factors has created a circumstance wherein overall U.S. behavior has generally appeared to match and relate to Palauan expectations. In fact, it has been the perceived transgression of such standards which has fueled the Palauan's occasional sense of identity impingements (see Chapter V). Nonetheless, these standards may ultimately prove unreliable since they rest on an unstable foundation. Only two of the factors which have induced the United States generally to behave in a restrained and benign fashion (United States democratic values and international oversight) are significantly related to Palau. The other factors that determine America's behavior cannot be strongly influenced by Palauans. Perhaps foremost among these is the degree of urgency in the United States' evaluation of its military/strategic requirements.

More specifically, in the shorter-run, understandings or agreements negotiated prior to a plebiscite on political status—say through subsidiary agreements—might put the PC/HEM in a position where it would be inclined or impelled to a position that could be interpreted as abrogating the constitution's protectionist qualities. Could the HEM or any group tracing its roots to the PC, be in such a position without incurring unacceptable political damage to its pro-Palauan reputation? I put this question to Roman Tmetchul on January 4th, the day after the 7th Palau Legislature was installed. He replied that the PC/HEM had
such a high opinion of its own public relations abilities that it might feel free to take such a course.

Another informant, well-placed in public affairs with an activist background, presented a different view. He felt that the PC/HEM would not put itself in such a position because of the political damage it would likely incur. Neither of these scenarios materialized, however, since the PC/HEM did not have to take an unequivocal stand on the issue.

Stresses and Strain

Nonetheless, as a socio-political movement now in power, the PC/HEM began to show signs of strain. Considerations of power enhancement by individual leaders and groups within the coalition competed and could conflict with adherence to an overall PC direction and priorities. Such power dynamics are not primarily addressed by dependency theory. Attention to them can augment the more flexible dependencia approach.

The increased tension in the PC/HEM was apparent by March, and resulted from a number of factors. For one thing, the political environment was different that it had been in 1979, when the PC was a counter-elite protest movement. In 1980, this broad-based coalition was empowered, and sought to implement its objectives in an institutionalized setting through legislative means. As one PC/HEM leader stated; "sometimes you find that you cannot do things that you promised . . . at the grass-roots level," once formal power is obtained. Some irritation was evident between those in the HEM who were more "social movement oriented," and "bureaucratic politicians" (PC/HEM informant), who were
both more comfortable with, and thended to rely upon, legislative means to achieve their objectives.

The procedures associated with such a reliance tended to frustrate some activists, and perhaps others, who had developed very high expectations for the start of open and responsive government. For instance, an activist/informant, a number of other interested Palauans, and I went to an HEM session in February to observe. Upon being informed that it was a "closed-door meeting" session, the activist remarked that "nothing had changed," and described the situation as similar to what many saw as the undemocratic, closed-door exchange between Rosenblatt and a select group of Palauans. Clearly, however, at least some PC/HEM leaders remained quite aware of the importance of maintaining broad-based support for the coalition. A number of these were informants, and had expressed the view that the 6th Palau Legislature's loss of support had been partly due to the negative reaction engendered by the perception that the 6th Palau Legislature had operated in a secretive and elitist fashion. Lest this same fate befall the PC/HEM, one legislator/informant stated: "We have to watch our step."

It is clear, however, that a degree of divergence was opening between the goals of the PC and HEM. As one influential PC leader and legislator reported, when the HEM was installed its goals and the PC's were the same. But as of April, there were indications this was no longer the case, Haruo Remeliik, for one, noted a "division of ideas."

In fact, according to a number of informants, there were members of the PC who had supported it primarily to advance their own political careers. They had joined the PC simply to be swept into power. Now
that this had occurred, some leaders wanted to do things their own way, and not at all in accordance with "the beliefs of the PC" (PC/HEM informant).

Another source of strain, one that made the maintenance of the PC's coherency and sense of unity difficult, was the lack of a political ideology, or comprehensive set of extra-constitutional programs. According to a PC/HEM informant, PC beliefs "were a simple thing," leaders should "do what... they should as representatives of the people." Representing the people meant engaging in public service for all Palau as opposed to individual, kin, or regionally-based aggrandizement. However, this was an informal expectation, not a systematic approach. In lieu of the latter, and in the midst of changing circumstances, adhering to a PC path was not easy.

The most important source of strain was the fact that PC leaders were now in a position to build up their own, extra-local bases of support. The tempo of this intra-coalition jockeying would increase as Palau's national elections drew near. (If the constitution was revived and ratified, then these elections would be held on November 4th, 1980.) It should be emphasized, however, that despite these strains, the PC/HEM coalition remained intact for most of 1980. To a major extent, this was because one of the coalition's major objectives was yet to be fulfilled: revival and approval of the April 1979 Constitution.

Meanwhile the PC/HEM's major domestic opposition, the Tmetchul-oriented group, was keeping a low profile. In fact this had been the case ever since the new legislature began. Tmetchul had stated that for the most part, for the time being, he would withdraw from
pan-Palauan politics. Instead he would concentrate on economic development in his home municipality of Airai where he was involved with airport, road, and sawmill construction. His supporters often stressed how much economic progress Airai was making. He would also concentrate on his business activities in Koror.

In unobtrusive ways, however, Tmetchul continued his political activity. Meetings that were apparently well-attended, were held by Tmetchul and his associates to map strategy vis-à-vis the PC/HEM. These were not broad-based mobilization attempts, however. Instead, they were reportedly "super-secret" meetings of his group. Therefore, for most of 1980, the PC/HEM did not face a direct, domestic challenge. This added to the diffuseness of Palau's political system, thereby removing one of the major mobilization referents of the PC.

The HEM's formulation of a new status commission is discussed next. Formation of the commission involved the ambitious PC/HEM objective of reaching beyond its existent, domestic power base, and to gather a broad-based group to externally represent Palau. Their attempt, on both counts, was not fully successful.

The HEM Formulates a Status Commission

A major intention in formulating the Palau Commission on Status and Transition (PCST), was to forge a united front of responsive and representative leadership to advance Palau's political status and transition objectives. Less directly, there was the intention to move towards the construction of a united, Palauan political entity so as to reduce external vulnerability, and bring to an end fruitless and
divisive, internal competition. To some extent, these objectives were also meant to facilitate national integration, as a step towards nation-building.

In early February, an informant/observer of the HEM remarked how a "major conflict" could emerge over the selection of members for the new status commission. It was likely that everyone in the HEM was interested in being on the commission as its work would be important, prestigious, and involve frequent travel and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure.

A well-placed legislator, soon to be a ranking member of the new commission, gave the following list of groups that should be represented: the leadership of the 7th Palau Legislature, the Trust Territory administration at the district level, ethnic minorities [i.e., Palau's Southwest Islanders], various political groups, representation for all 16 municipalities, areas that would be most affected by U.S. military needs, religious groups, the People's Committee, and the opposing "political faction," i.e., the Tmetchul-oriented group. In a sense, the degree to which the HEM included these groups would be a test of its ability, with help from the PC, to reach out and build a united, political front. As part of this task, choosing status commission members from a "wide-spread cross section representation of our [Palauan] community was [regarded as] a matter of utmost significance and sensitivity" (House of Elected Member report #25).

A legislator/informant explained the importance of including the PC's political opposition. "Unless we invite them into the commission then there will still be a group raising hell in the community." Moreover "outsiders, such as the United States," might be able, as they had in the past, to take advantage of Palauan divisiveness.
Another reason for an all-embracing PC/HEM approach was more domestically-oriented. An informant, who was both a PC leader and a legislator remarked; "We want to show people [from] the 6th Palau Legislature that we are not vindictive, despite the fact that we are now in power. ... After all, they will be back in power sometime. ... We are trying to show them that you can keep power without ... keeping another group down." It was recognized that reaching out to the opposition would not be easy. But as noted, it was felt that the costs of not attempting this could be heavy. As one informant stated: "[if] Palau ... is going to be hurt, it will be by divisive and destructive, internal competition" which then forms linkages with the outside.

The Speaker of the Legislature made almost all the appointments to the 19 member Palau Commission on Status and Transition. Out of this appointments, eleven came from the HEM. After the members were selected, they voted Haruo Remeliik as their chairman by a margin of at least 2 to 1. The commission started meeting in April.

To what extent were the PC/HEM criteria met by the selections made? The answer is mixed. On the positive side, Palau's ethnic minority, the Southwest Islanders, were represented as were areas to be heavily impacted by U.S. military plans, mainly in Bablaob. The region of Yaoldaob was well-represented by such prominent and influential figures such as Lazarus Salii, his brother Carlos, and by Remeliik. The selection of figures such as Itulbong Luii, outspoken and influential in the PC, provided additional representation.

However, a number of groups found little or no direct representation. Recognized spokespersons for women, religious groups, and the political
opposition were not included. According to a key PC/HEM leader, one
source of objection to including the opposition came from grass-roots
and community-oriented elements of the PC. Some of these were concerned
that inclusion of the opposition could lead to renewed and even
escalating strife in Palau. The fear was that if the opposition was
included, it might "try and twist things to further their own political
needs and aspirations," and would be in an excellent position to do so,
with access to the inner workings of the PCST.

Another consideration was the desire of at least some PC/HEM
leaders to put primary emphasis on strengthening their individual
positions. As one influential PC legislator stated: "once you get into
the legislature, there is a huge amount of interest in remaining there.
It is nice to talk about a united front; however, there are also more
practical, short-range objectives such as accommodating persons and
groups who have been the most help in building your ... base of
support." To some degree, this was a conflict between the short-term
political interest of network building and competition, and the longer
range, more ambitious task of building a unified Palau.

Remeliik, now Chairman of the Commission, was from Pelilieu. He
saw himself as representing all of Palau in pursuit of a status agreement
that "will benefit everybody." He was disturbed by remarks that the
commission was "southern dominated." He felt that those making such
statements were simply trying to fan regional prejudice and animosities,
to advance their own political fortunes in an opportunistic way.

According to Remeliik, as of the later 1970s people preferred to
evaluate leaders not based on clan-status or regional affiliation, but
based on "what the individual is doing for ... Palau." Remeliik
himself occupies a middle-level clan position. His view that Palauans now largely disregarded regional and kin-based criteria in favor of substantive issues and a performance record may be overstated. Clearly though, there has been movement in this direction and a relatively universalistic, and achievement-oriented emphasis, which characterized the PC, would also remain a feature of Remeliik's approach and would facilitate his successful bid for Palau's presidency (see Chapter VIII).

Reaction to Remeliik's selection as commission chairman was mixed. Some expressed positive views. In this quarter, Remeliik was regarded as a consensual and responsive leader of the kind that Palau needed after years of Tmetchul's "secretive" and "elitist" approach. In addition, some felt that Remeliik could be a strong leader when this was required. Remeliik's past action in "standing up to Rosenblatt," and in resisting pressure from the former legislature, were seen as positive indications of this.

On the negative side, views were expressed that he lacked the talent, skills, and assertiveness that would be necessary to oversee successful negotiations with the U.S. In addition, at least one major political figure felt that there was a conflict of interest since Remeliik was now both Deputy District Administrator and head of the elected governments' status and transition efforts. A charge of a "southern bias," and of the inappropriateness of southerners holding Palau's highest offices, was primarily expressed by a leader/informant who was himself probably biased. Nevertheless, such rhetoric would resurface during Palau's upcoming presidential campaign (see Chapter VIII).
Views of the qualities and potential of the commission also varied. On the positive side, informants felt that the new commission was more representative of different sectors of Palau and had stronger links to "grass-roots" elements, than did the former commission, PPSC. At least pro-PC/HEM informants viewed the new commission as more likely to be responsive to popular input from a wide variety of Palauans.

Negative comments about it centered around its alleged lack of experience and expertise in international relations. There was also a view that the PCST, particularly with Remeliik as its chairman, was likely to be less forceful and tenacious than the former commission under Tmetchul.

One consequence of the formation of the PCST, envisioned by a high-clan leader from Babldaob, was a geographic and issue-oriented split in Palauan society. Remember that traditionally, there was a southwest/northeast division of Palau. According to this informant, the new status commission had been organized "to the displeasure" of the northeastern villages. He felt that this displeasure might be funneled into the national, political arena where it could become associated with antagonism over U.S. military requests, which were concentrated in the north. The resulting tension might take on a north versus south orientation, particularly since the "southern dominated" PSCT would have to procure land for the U.S. military, mainly from the north.

One leader who might utilize such a development was John Niraked, head of the Palau Land Authority. Moreover, as a high-clan easterner, he could be expected to have a major say over land use and allocation there. He stated to me in April that if the U.S. did not "water down"
its demands, then Palau's status commission would have a hard time "selling a compact . . .," especially if this commission had "... the flavor of a southern dominated . . . organization." Interestingly enough, although Niraked spoke disparagingly about regional antagonisms in April, he was to use a strongly regionally-based appeal during his unsuccessful bid for Palau's presidency, some months later.

1980 Constitutional Referendum: The Last PC Victory

Palauans would vote once again on a constitution. The document was basically the same as the original draft, popularly approved in 1979 but then was overturned through legislative/legal means. However, after the PC-oriented 7th Palau Legislature came to power, it revived the Original Constitution which was now to be voted on. The date set for this was July 9th, 1980.

In June, a Committee on Political Education was organized by the HEM to prepare for the referendum. Legislator John Niraked was appointed as Chairman. Meetings of the CPE were open, and I attended a number of these. Various resource people spoke at the meetings.

For this campaign, the PC/HEM adhered to its position that there was no necessary connection between Palau's adopting the Original Constitution and the chances for free association. This was a popular position, as it removed any necessity to make an unpalatable choice between two desired goals: those of political control/autonomy and of assured, economic support. The Palauan desire to avoid this choice was first explicitly discussed in Chapters V and VI.

At a CPE meeting two weeks before the July 9th referendum, Speaker of the Legislature Toshiwo Nakamura said that there were "... no
issues now." According to him, the vital matter at hand was simply to approve the Original Constitution. He advised field representatives "not [to] let the people get confused between the constitution and a compact" of free association. After all, a compact was still subject to further negotiation. The constitution on the other hand was in completed form. After its approval, political status arrangements could be finalized.

Legislator Kuniwo Nakamura also spoke as a resource person. He maintained that for the purposes of the referendum, the constitution and status were separable matters; Palauans could ratify the constitution without worrying about harming the chances for free association. Yet in minor ways, Nakamura suggested that there was indeed a link.

He pointed out that, in the negotiations the PC and then PC/HEM had "deliberately shied away from discussion areas of possible conflict" between the constitution and U.S. requirements for free association. Despite this, he felt Palauans would have to face the fact that the U.S. military wanted access to lands, and to other Palauan resources for military purposes.

He also communicated his impression that the U.S. was reducing its demands in at least 2 of the 3 areas of constitutional dispute. He maintained that the U.S., during the last round of negotiations, had given Palau "all kinds of green lights" that negotiations on free association could progress without Palau having to revise its constitution. He did caution, however, that the U.S. might still insist on nuclear transit.

The idea that Palau could maintain constitutional integrity, while still obtaining free association, was the most appealing assumption on
political status. Nevertheless, one speaker at a CPE meeting stressed that Palauans "had to decide what they want." The Constitution would "not really be the supreme law of the land" if it was subservient to a compact of free association (CPE meeting, June 27th). This conflict is the same one identified by the Tmetchul group. At the time, however, little credence was given this view, or to the reality of the problem.

Instead, the dominant view was that the two issues were separable, or at least could be attacked sequentially, with the constitution coming first. But though popular, this view tended to ignore what was in reality two aspects of a single dilemma. This limitation on closure in the short-run facilitated the PC's mobilization. In the longer run, however, the failure to face the tie between the dilemma's two aspects could de-stabilize both constitutional integrity, and/or a preferred arrangement for free association.

Tmetchul-oriented forces did not campaign vigorously for the July referendum. This had the effect of facilitating structural closure in the sense of constitutional ratification. It was the assessment of the Tmetchul group that the people "had decided already" to pass the constitution. Reasons for this public sentiment varied, but cumulatively these amounted to a very strong possibility that the constitution would be approved. With this assessment by anti-PC forces, they kept a low profile during the campaign, due in part to their longer-range political strategy. As one informant from that group reported: "We do not want to say anything now against the constitution" since it could only result in additional damage to the Tmetchul group's political standing. Rebuilding this was viewed as especially important since the group was aware that "people [were] already thinking about the November 4th
[national] elections," in which Tmetchul-oriented forces sought to do well. Note how, during the campaign, a faction's longer-range, political calculations helped clear the way for a specific closure (approval of the constitution).

In addition to their assessment of political realities at the time, the Tmetchul group's stance was congruent with the Palauan ethno-historic stress on political maneuver and on competition. Dependencia theory seeks to explicate and analyze such interactions between contemporary and ethno-historic factors. Anthropological research has a similar interest, and also shares dependencia's stress on relying to a major extent on a case study, inductive approach for understanding circumstances that may differ from our own.

Externally, the PC/HEM appealed for support from a relatively idealistic segment of the international community. Palauan rhetoric to this end sprang from a substantive commitment to the ideals, as well as from a manipulative intent. Furthermore, the links that developed between the PC/HEM, and external groups were advertised by the PC/HEM. The positive attitude that was associated with this was in sharp contrast to the negative feelings toward the Tmetchul group's external alliances in 1979.

For the July 1980 referendum, the PC/HEM sought to project an anti-nuclear and self-determination stance. This message projected in the wider Pacific and Pacific rim had two components: First, that approval of the constitution would be a great stride in self-determination for Palau. Second, this constitution had an even greater value since it also maintained an "anti-nuclear" position.
The 7th Palau Legislature received over fifty telegrams and letters expressing support. Speaker Nakamura stated: "these messages indicate that the whole world is watching events as they unfold in Palau with interest and concern for the needs and rights of the Palauan People [including] Palau's inalienable right to self-determination by the constitutional process . . . ." A Palau Legislature Newsletter added; "especially singled out for support were the provisions for a nuclear ban . . . ."

Clearly the PC/HEM statements were made to attract the interest and sympathy of foreign audiences. But what did they mean to Palauans at the time? One Palauan friend said that the HEM statement was simply part "of a campaign to get the constitution . . . passed. You taught us how to play [international] politics and now we play it to you." In other words, this Palauan and some others knew that anti-colonial, anti-nuclear rhetoric was a means to attract foreign support for a domestic cause, albeit one with external implications. Whether such rhetoric was also indicative of a deeper, enduring and widespread commitment in Palau to the sentiments being projected is less certain.

Clearly, however, some activists were committed to such views. One factor contributing to their point of view was a comparative/anticipatory perspective, particularly common among them. This in turn has been facilitated by the Palauans' own innovative and eclectic tendencies, and by the opportunities for education, travel, and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure, available to contemporary Palauans.

By July 3rd, Japanese and perhaps other anti-nuclear foreigners were in Koror, talking with Palauan activists. On the same day, I
talked with a Palauan involved in anti-nuclear activities. I should note that this informant was particularly well-traveled, having been exposed to political activists from many lands. Her views may not be typical of Palauans. They are, however, representative of Palauan activists, and more particularly those of an anti-nuclear persuasion. Given the relatively universalistic, qualitative approach to issues exhibited by the activists, the persistence of these views through a number of events and their disproportionate influence, a full understanding of activist views is essential.

As one of Palau's more western educated and internationally-exposed individuals, my informant's experience stretched far beyond Palau. For instance she had recently attended a panel with discussion about Palau's "anti-nuclear" position, at the University of Hawaii. She remarked that people in Hawaii and in other parts of the Pacific were talking about Palau, and she viewed this in positive terms. Here we see a self-conscious awareness of the value of international opinion for the promotion of an allied cause in Palau.

Moreover, while on the U.S. mainland this informant reported visiting a naval base where she obtained information on the new Trident nuclear submarine. She mentioned how many cities the missiles from a Trident could destroy and said that in California, "they are building a freeway" just to move Tridents to the sea. She said she had heard that a Trident was as long as three football field and asked me exactly how long that was. She clearly was impressed and disturbed with the immense size, and destructive capacities of such a weapon. Note that in some respects, the difficulty in visualizing both the dimensions, and the possible effects of such a presence were similar to the difficulties
facing the activists during the superport controversy. In both cases, the specter of a very large, technically sophisticated and dangerous system being deployed in Palau though potentially very disturbing, was difficult to visualize concretely.

Given the background and experience mentioned, however, this informant and other activists tended to an extent to think in international, and even global terms, about the threats facing both "developed" and "underdeveloped" regions. My informant remarked how "we have to think of the world as a single, small, inter-related unit." At the Department of Education, she was involved in ecology and earth science. With this interest and background, she felt that nuclear weapons like the Trident "threaten everybody's survival" and should not be deployed, certainly not around Palau. She and other activists tended to emphasize the inter-connectedness of the contemporary world. As noted, they also had the political sophistication to recognize, and the opportunities to exploit, the fact that a Palauan cause could benefit from contact with and support from relatively idealistic elements in the international arena.

Simultaneous with its use of leverage, the PC/HEM pursued vigorous efforts in Palau to mobilize support for constitutional ratification. Given the lack of domestic opposition, the campaign itself was quiet. At least around Koror, there were few if any "vote no" signs. When the election was held, the voter turnout was high, and those voting for ratification won by a landslide, getting 78 percent of the vote. As during the October, 1979 campaign, the major exceptions were in Airai and Ngiwal, demonstrating a certain degree of irreducible support for the Tmetchul group. But the extent of this was small in comparison with
the massive support given to the original, April Constitution, which was now approved (see Appendix B for the results of this referendum).

Reasons for the "yes" vote were complex, and it would be misleading to take the vote as expressing a unified position on the relationship between constitutional integrity and political status. The vote did indicate a Palauan preference for treating efforts to forge and approve a constitution, and to obtain a preferred political status, as separate matters, however. Despite the ambiguity involved in the lack of closure, the PC/HEM productively employed the rhetoric of self-determination, including an anti-nuclear position.

One informant who had considerable international experience, having occupied an influential position in the PPSC, felt that political autonomy and constitutional integrity had not really been PC/HEM goals. Rather, they had been a bargaining ploy to elicit more attention and support from Palau's paternalistic metropolitan power. The informant compared such Palauan rhetoric to "a child who is screaming all the time," so as to make its parents take better care of it. For the July 9th referendum, however, the PC/HEM had pictured Palau as committed to constitutional integrity, which had attracted a wide international audience. Consequently, my informant felt that Palau should now "live up to its name and [its international] reputation," by adhering to the substantive content that its rhetoric seemed to imply. If, on the contrary, Palauans still regarded assertive dependency as "business as usual," then my informant was concerned that this could damage Palau's international "credibility," and therefore its ability to exercise leverage for national objectives by eliciting external support. This
informant had been in the forefront of constitutional revision efforts. Yet he, and some others associated with the Tmetchul group, argued by the end of 1980 that constitutional integrity must be maintained. For some, this was probably based on the reasoning articulated by my informant.

Certainly on the domestic scene, there were indications that a number of leaders who had been against the Original Constitution now seemed willing to support it. This shift, like the low profile of the Tmetchul group before the constitution's ratification, resulted from the group's calculation of political strategy and was also congruent with the characteristic Palauan emphasis on political competition. Since the constitution was now approved, national competition would have to be carried on within its parameters.

As July 9th passed, the upcoming national elections were far and away the most exciting prospect for Palauans. Undoubtedly, these elections would be the next major stage of Palau's political evolution. Moreover, the mergence of political campaigning would have a final, destabilizing effect on the PC.

**The PC "Nominates" a Candidate**

A segment of PC leadership moved to "officially" nominate one candidate to run for president of Palau. This nomination process came to be viewed as elitist and arbitrary, in contrast to the populist and informal, democratic style which had characterized the PC for most of its life.
It was difficult to get detailed evidence on the crucial PC meetings which were described as "quite sensitive" by PC/HEM supporters. By interviewing informants, some of whom attended the meetings, the following picture emerged: By the end of July various PC/HEM leaders eyed the upcoming national elections with some concern. It was felt that it was possible that without a mechanism to dramatically narrow the field of PC-affiliated candidates, the Tmetchul-oriented opposition could win. There was real concern that in the presidential race, Tmetchul could prevail against a divided opposition.

An obvious mechanism for narrowing the PC field was to develop a primary system. Interest in this was expressed by informants both in Pelilieu and Koror. Alfonso Oiterong, the PC Chairman was aware of it. But as he stated, discussions "got nowhere" for a number of reasons. For one, there was an aversion to having the PC evolve into anything like the former political parties which many viewed as elitist, self-serving and unresponsive. A primary system struck some Palauans as a mechanism that was associated with political parties, and was therefore to be avoided. Beyond this, there were logistical problems in organizing a general means of PC participation. Not the least of these was a time constraint, as election campaigning soon had to begin.

In early August, a "general meeting" of the PC was held. It was decided that PC leaders would determine which PC candidates were serious about running for president. At the time, four or five PC leaders seemed interested. It became increasingly clear that the PC nomination process would not be one of rank-and-file participation. Rather a pool of PC leaders, in theory representing the entire group, would make the determination of one presidential candidate.
Lazarus Salii declared himself in the presidential race, and was successful in his attempt to get the PC's "official" endorsement. He reported that he wrote to "officials" of the PC, including Chairman Oiterong, and also to Palau's two high chiefs, and to over thirty other members of the PC's "core leadership." According to Salii, this core consisted of those people, "who for the last 18 months, have been making the decisions and consulting with the general population on the constitution. In any group there is a core of leaders." He also felt that these leaders formed a "screening committee," a natural choke point for weeding out unworthy aspirants.

Actually, influential PC members can be grouped into two categories. First were those who were well-known politicians of long-standing. Secondly, there were PC leaders who had not been prominently known as politicians before constitutional development began. A number of such leaders had very substantial reputation as community servants, and demonstrated useful skills during the development of Palau's constitution, and in the ensuing dispute. Remeliik and Diterong were examples of this category.

Oiterong had been chosen as PC chairman at the outset. According to informants who later opposed the nomination process, a meeting was held at his house. A number of prominent Palauans, influential in the PC, attended. These in turn selected a pool of 30-38 "official" PC leaders.

As noted, initially four or five candidates were being considered for the PC's nomination. One of these was dropped because he seemed to be making overtures to Tmetchul. At the next PC leadership meeting
another aspirant was removed, this time voluntarily. This left three candidates for the nomination; Legislature Speaker Toshiwo Nakamura, Lazarus Salii, and Haruo Remeliik. Either during this meeting, or during the last one, these candidates were requested to make statements explaining why they should get the nomination.

In contrast to Salii, Remeliik stated that no matter what the "official" leaders decided, he would run for the presidency of Palau. He felt he could not ignore the wishes of his numerous supporters. He further stated that the national election should be a wide-open affair. Everyone who was qualified should be able to run.

Remeliik was not the only one to express reservations about the PC nomination process. And along with Remeliik, some others felt that there was really no longer a need for the PC. After all, the purpose of this coalition had been to defend the Original Constitution, a goal that had been accomplished. Palauans of this persuasion felt that the process of choosing officers for constitutional government through national elections should be a free-wheeling affair. It should not be impeded by undemocratic restrictions, instigated by a relative few leaders.

In response to such arguments Oiterong maintained that it was important to "... keep the unity" of the PC. He and other Palauans of this persuasion felt that the PC still had a legitimate objective. They wished to make sure that PC oriented forces, and not the Tmetchul side, won most of the elections for the new government. Those PC/HEM elements that came to disagree with the PC "nomination process" shared the concern about Tmetchul. Ironically, the attempt by PC "officials"
to nominate one presidential candidate raised levels of dissatisfaction past the point where the PC could endure.

During the final PC nomination meeting, even a small number of the "official" leadership expressed disagreement with the process, arguing that it was unrepresentative. They warned that if the PC went through with its nomination, the coalition would fracture into different groups, as each candidate had a respectable following.

Despite this, most of the "official" PC decided to go ahead and vote. Salii won easily. During September, however, there was increasing dissatisfaction with both the nomination's process and outcome. One activist remarked: "the group that nominated Salii said they were the PC but they were not. They were just a little group . . . that got together and then decided among themselves that they would endorse a candidate." "If you asked the real PC, the 92 percent who voted for the constitution . . . , now they say they do not know what is happening and that they do not understand this powerful effort [by PC "officials"] to select for and control both of the highest offices of Palau's new government" (another PC/HEM member). This evaluation was in sharp contrast to the PC's previous stress on a close, public, and relatively informal relationship between populist leaders and broad-based support.

In addition, although less "educated" in a western sense than Salii, Remeliik was regarded positively by many. It was felt that Salii had not "worked as hard for the constitution" as had Remeliik. Moreover, in contrast to Remeliik, Salii had been absent for years during his service for the Trust Territory administration. Remeliik
on the other hand was seen as more Palau-oriented. This criteria would be important during the presidential campaign.

During September, the political situation grew more fluid and confusing. As one PC activist stated: "different groups were now meeting in Koror, each claiming that they were PC." Questions of "who is the real PC," "who are the PC officials" became topics for public scrutiny and debate. The first question became even more confusing as leaders, long absent from Palau returned to campaign, claiming that they were or had been PC. Thus, the PC coalition as a unified block dissolved by the end of September. Disenchantment with the quasi-official PC leadership, its "nomination" process, and competition over Palau's national elections were the final centrifugal forces which dissolved the organization.

Conclusion

The People's Committee had emerged as a popular crusade, with a close and informal relationship to its followers. The movement demonstrated its popularity by marshalling the broad support needed to overcome the power group that was entrenched at the time. On the one hand, the specificity of the PC's objectives served to facilitate specific mobilization and limited closure. But in a more general sense, once the highly distinctive circumstances which spawned the PC were transformed, the limited nature of the PC's objectives destabilized both mobilization and closure.

The coalition had arisen at a time when Palau's political system was polarized to an unusual extent. The PC both contributed to, and
benefited from, this super-charged environment, as discussed in Chapter VI. In 1980, however, Palau's political system was increasingly diffuse. The PC was in power and its domestic opposition was quiescent. While this facilitated constitutional ratification, it also deprived the PC, which had been an oppositional movement, of a domestic threat against which to mobilize. There was also the perception of a lessening of United States pressure. More specifically, some members of the PC/HEM believed that the U.S. might soften its position on a number of disputed constitutional points. While this permitted the PC specifically, and Palauans in general, to avoid at least for a time the painful horns of their development dilemma, it also kept the dilemma intact for another day, and removed a threatened interference, which had been a source of unity.

Now, with its external referents for mobilization removed, the PC's internal mechanisms to maintain both commitment and clarity of purpose proved insufficient, particularly after the coalition's specific objectives were achieved. The interest remained to promote national unity, as well as certain informal expectations. But although salient, these were never formalized or systematized into a political ideology, or set of extra-constitutional programs. The fact that the PC/HEM objectives did not escalate beyond a constitutionalist strategy was largely due to the relatively comfortable, politically permissive conditions of dependency at the time. These same conditions, however, by removing any gross and oppressive impediments to the PC, dampened the possibility that it would develop into, or provided a basis for, a Palauan nationalist movement.
Rather, the PC's goals remained quite specific. During 1980, the PC/HEM was encouraged to accomplish these goals in a democratic, and incremental fashion. Given indigenous preferences and expectations, including those specifically of the PC, Palauans had reason to hope that the horns of their development dilemma could be grasped sequentially: first by procuring autonomy/control, and then by obtaining desired support. The perceived behavior of the United States contributed to the Palauan sense that such a course was feasible.

The avoidance of the linkage between the horns of Palau's development dilemma proved to be a comforting, politically expedient, and apparently a feasible strategy for the People's Committee. However, this also meant that, as the PC dissolved, Palau's underlying development dilemma remained largely unaddressed.

The PC had accomplished its specific goals: ratification of the constitution and removal of the Tmetchul group from power. In the process, Palau's political system had been considerably transformed. The PC had carried populist, participatory politics to a new height. But having fulfilled its limited objectives, the PC broke apart. An altered political environment, the lack of sufficient internal mechanisms to maintain the necessary commitment and clarity of purpose, violation of informal expectations, and the new avenue for political competition as national election campaigning began were the centrifugal forces which dismembered the PC.
A number of Palauan informants, including negotiators, also expressed the view that since the U.S. interest in those districts involved only denial, and not denial plus use as was the case for Palau, therefore in view of this Palau should receive more funds.

Moreover, at least some in the PC/HEM expected continuing support for an anti-nuclear position from the international community. By this time anti-nuclear activists from Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan were making visits to Palau and urging Palauan adherence to an anti-nuclear stance. I do not have data on how many visits there were or how often. It is sufficient to note that Palauans who found an anti-nuclear stance compelling and/or politically expedient still looked to anti-nuclear activists from many lands for sympathy and for support.


This is an inter-departmental office of the U.S. government charged with formulating and pursuing U.S. status negotiations, under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador and President.

A compact of free association and three subsidiary agreements were initialled by the PCST in November, 1980. Under its terms, certain aspects related to strategic considerations would be in effect for 50 years, during which time Palau would receive compensation. This agreement is further discussed in Chapter X.

Actually, according to the Trust Territory regulations there is nothing to stop the U.S. from an active military utilization of Palau. However, a prevalent view in Palau is that such use is extremely unlikely unless and until the Trusteeship is concluded and a definite political status is approved.

This remark should be qualified, however. Consistent with the island-centric locus traditionally displayed by Palauans (see McKnight 1977:35, also Parmentier 1981:8, Shuster 1982:18), Palauans in 1980 still exhibited indications of such a perspective. For instance, it was reported to me that when plans were being made to celebrate the inauguration of Palau's constitutional government, there was mention that perhaps the U.S. President-elect could postpone the date of his inauguration so as to attend the ceremonies in Palau (from interview with Kim Batchellor, District Administrator in Palau).
In at least one instance, there was some verification that this Palauan view of a U.S. perception was correct as to limited resources. During my fieldwork I had a conversation with a State Department Liaison Officer. He described Palau as resource-poor with little or no chance for development without massive and continuing U.S. aid.

In fact regional pride in Airai sometimes verged on separatism. One Tmetchul supporter reported that in June/July, Airai was involved in "its own negotiations" with foreigners. Airai was composing its own anthem, and Tmetchul's ambitious economic involvements included airport construction, and reportedly plans for a citrus company and shipping line.

The enabling legislation stipulated that of the Commission's members, eighteen were to be appointed by the Speaker of the Legislature with the District Administrator appointing the 19th. Out of the 18 appointed by the Speaker, two were supposed to be appointed in consultation with the Chairman of the House of Chiefs, and these two were to be drawn from that body (public law 7-1-10, 1st regular session, 7th Palau Legislature, January 1980). Clearly, there was some expectation that a commission of this size could accommodate, and that it was in fact necessary to include, "all of the different interests of Palau." The informant who made this comment was soon to become head of the Political Status Committee of the Commission on Status and Transition.

According to one PC-affiliated legislator from Angaur who was on the Commission, a lot of easterners were willing to vote for a Yaoideaob Palauan to chair it. One southerner was approached but declined. Haruo Remeliik was then selected. Reportedly, given the choices that were available and Remeliik's popularity and prestige, some on the Commission from the east and north felt that Remeliik, though as southerner, was the best choice.

There have been persistent rumors in Palau, and also reports in the media, that The Islands will become a basing area for Tridents. Two such media reports, both written by R.C. Aldridge, appeared in The Progressive magazine. The first, entitled "A Hideout for Trident?" was in the February, 1977 issue. The second, "Jaws III: The Pentagon Sinks its Teeth into the South Sea Islands," was in the May, 1982 issue.

The voter turnout on July 9th was approximately 69 percent. This was down slightly from the October, 1979 referendum. But it was slightly higher than the original, July 9th vote. When one considers that this was the fourth referendum or election in a space of one year, the turnout can be considered rather high.
14 In Airai, the votes cast against the constitution increased by approximately 11 percent, as compared to the October 1979 referendum. For Ngiwal the ratio remained approximately the same.

15 I was in Peleliu at the time.

16 Initially, it was assumed that the PC was going to nominate both a presidential, and vice-presidential candidate.

17 This public and ultimately informal relationship between the leaders and public was in contrast to the PC nomination process which was viewed as elitist by some. One PC/HEM informant remarked: the PC officials were "still trying to play politics like this was done 10 years ago," assuming that a relative handful of people could nominate certain others as representatives for this broad-based group and that the rank and file would meekly go along with this. The assumption proved false.
CHAPTER VIII
FIRST NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

This chapter deals with an unprecedented event in Palau; the first national election campaign for posts in the fledgling, constitutional government. The event provides additional material for our analysis of mobilization, closure, and maneuver as part of nation-building, a task which the People's Committee had only begun. In some contrast to Chapters VI and VII, the present one contains a description and analysis of a mobilization contest between Palauan candidates. This was unlike the issue-oriented campaigns of the now defunct People's Committee.

The elections on November 4th, 1980 were for the Congress as well as Executive. This research, however, concentrates on the presidential race. To closely follow all the Congressional candidates would have been impossible in the field, and too cumbersome to analyze. Secondly, in comparison with the presidential race, Palauans tended to view the vice-presidential contest as less significant. Third, it was the presidential race that best embodied national issues. Moreover the first president might play a dominant role in determining the pace and trajectory of the new government. (For a discussion of the vice-presidential race see Shuster 1982:354-357.)

With the break-up of the People's Committee in August of 1980, three candidates emerged who had been active in that organization. These were Lazarus Salii, Haruo Remeliik and John Niraked. All had announced their candidacy by mid September. By the end of the month,
Roman Tmetchul and David Ramarui (Director of Education for the Trust Territory) joined the race, making a total of five presidential candidates.

Of the candidates, Remeliik receives the most attention. He won the election, and from his successful campaign we get a glimpse of what a plurality of Palauans responded to, and of how Remeliik proposed to lead the new republic. I was able to accompany Remeliik and his campaign on a six day swing through various Babdaob villages. This is referred to as the Babdaob trip. Statements by Remeliik's campaigners are distinguished from the candidate himself, and statements that are not from the trip are so noted.

Treatment of Palau's national election campaign is divided into a number of sections. The first describes the candidates and their campaigns and analyzes the vote. From examining the presentation (both style and content) and unintended messages conveyed by the candidates' campaigns, and the public's response, we obtain a sense of national preferences on topics and concerns related to political, economic, and other aspects of development.

Discussion of the candidates' campaigns is also a prerequisite for this chapter's second section, which takes a broader view than the first. It does not confine itself to a discrete, one-on-one correspondence between candidates' presentations and the public's response. It explicates and analyzes social concerns, topics, and matters worrisome to the public, particularly as these relate to questions of dependency and nation-building. Did such concerns, topics, and sources of public unease escalate into controversy, or were they
deflected from this path? This broader approach is also required since Palauans did not view the presentations of individual candidates, extent public concerns, topics, and worrisome matters as discrete or detachable, but as intertwined.

I then discuss why the degree of a candidate's identification, and particularly his loyalty to Palau, emerged as highly salient, despite the fact that this criteria for evaluating leaders was for the most part not explicitly articulated. Nor, for the most part, did the candidates try to escalate assessments of loyalty into a weapon for controversy.

An assessment of closure follows, and the concept is further clarified. Moreover both the process and outcome of the campaign engendered some closure, and also revealed highly significant areas where it was lacking. More specifically, a number of questions involving dependency, though subjectively and objectively quite salient, did not become targets for intense and sustained, public scrutiny. Nevertheless, some closure was achieved over pan-Palauan preferences, goals, and priorities related to dependency and development.

The Candidates and their Campaigns

Haruo Remeliik

Remeliik's emergence as a candidate coincided with the break-up of the People's Committee. Within weeks, it was clear that many of the former PC's rank and file and some of its leaders supported him.

Remeliik was not as well-educated in a formal, western sense as some of the other candidates. Rather his background and training were centered in Palau. Remeliik had served as an Associate Judge of the
District Court and he had also been a legislator. Moreover, his years of service as Deputy District Administrator (Distad) put him in the position of administering to the needs of a wide variety of Palauans. Such support can count for much in reciprocity-minded Palau. His interest in pan-Palauan politics became obvious with his election as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and then as its president. He became known as one of the strongest defenders of the constitution produced by that convention.

Remeliik's supporters and some others saw his wide experience with aspects of Palauan life as supplemented by personal qualities that enhanced his stature as a leader. They pointed to his "quiet," yet "steady" composure. This seemed to combine patience, an ability to listen, and a capacity to demonstrate strength when needed. He could also expect support due to his close relationship to the Modekngei and from Pelilieu, his home municipality. In addition, Remeliik drew to his side most leaders with an activist background.

Remeliik and the activists might seem strange bedfellows. The activists had been considered "radicals," whereas Remeliik had the reputation of being politically cautious. However, Remeliik's "closeness" to the People, and the sense that he supported a "Palau for the Palauans" stance, inclined most activists to support him.

There was also a strategic dimension to his relationship with some activists. Leaders with activist backgrounds tended to be energetic, well-educated, and familiar with international affairs. Their support was a useful addition to Remeliik's primarily domestic orientation. For their part, a number of these leaders felt that Remeliik would be
The Remeliik Campaign sought to reinforce the impression that he was broadly familiar with Palauan social conditions, wants, and needs. During the Babldaoab trip, in one village, a Remeliik supporter, emphasized that the candidate did not need the assistance of local residents to guide him around the Island. The campaigner stated that "even though Remeliik was originally from Peleliu . . . in most cases he shows us the way . . . ." In another Babldaoab village, an elderly villager stated that "when you [Remeliik] . . . appeared here, even though you are from Peleliu, you seem to know exactly" the situation. "When I hear you talking, your tone is very encouraging because you seem to know everybody [in terms of their social position] . . . and you respect them all during you talk . . . ." This compliment was impressive, particularly in view of the Babldaoab-centric perception that Palauans from the south are less cultured and refined. Moreover during the Babldaoab trip, Remeliik and his supporters commented on current events in particular villages, demonstrating familiarity, and probably conveyed a sense of empathy as well. (Shuster 1982:353 makes a similar point.)

Remeliik preferred to campaign at village/community meetings, and in other relatively small-scale, face-to-face settings where there is ample time for people to sit and listen, and to ask questions. In his talks Remeliik often explained matters slowly, sometimes repeating points until they were well understood. In a few Koror hamlets, this face-to-face, interactive approach could also be relied upon because,
according to a Remeliik campaign manager, those particular hamlets were still socially cohesive.

More generally in Koror Remeliik did not appear at a number of public engagements where other candidates debated against each other before large audiences. Remeliik's campaign manager, who did attend most of these, was verbally attacked during at least one of them because of Remeliik's absence. However, the Remeliik camp felt that their resources could be better spent on other activities. It was reported just days before the election that the candidate debates in Koror were part of an effort to "tie Remeliik down" at a time when he should be campaigning widely in Palau. Sentiment was also expressed by close Remeliik supporters that if he deviated from his emphasis on relatively small-scale, face-to-face campaigning, he might lose his "distinctively Palauan style."

In addition to being "close to the people," Remeliik's campaign sought to emphasize the desirability of a government that would be for all the people, a government with no "favorites." His campaigners pointed out a number of criteria that should not form the basis for supporting a candidate. Support should not be based on kin ties or on an expectation of reward, either in the form of a division of "spoils" or based on "gifts" of food, beverages and the like to villagers. One villager who opened a Remeliik meeting stated that "he was not involved in bribery with one of the candidates ... ." This same individual stated that Remeliik had come to the village without food or gifts. "Let us put that idea [i.e., of food or gifts] aside because in the previous campaigns ... that sort of thing was clearly done for the
purpose of bribing." Such political gift-giving was unfortunate as it had the negative effect of distracting people from concentrating "on the real issues, and on the future leaders of Palau."

Support should also not be based on "discrediting" other candidates (Remeliik). Remeliik's emphasis on this comes up repeatedly, and will be discussed further.

Support should not be given to a candidate who "would use money as the origin of their ambition for public office." At this same village, a villager responded to Remeliik by instructing him "... You ought to forget about the money, and sacrifice your life to the public."

Remeliik campaigners stressed that he was "not one of those who gets richer through participation in government ... ." Rather he was portrayed as committed to selfless service for Palau.

The Remeliik Campaign conveyed a view of leadership and government that was relatively universalistic, public-service oriented, and not regional. Remeliik emphasized that he wanted to serve all Palauans, whether "rich or poor, high or low clan, young or old," and irrespective of geographical location. Support should be based on a candidate's record, qualifications, and demonstrated commitment to "work for the betterment of all the people" in Palau (Remeliik).

Remeliik stressed the need for responsive leadership and government. As he stated in one village: "my idea is that the president of Palau should not be a big chief, but should be a big servant to the people." In another he remarked; the president "should serve as the people's eyes, ears, and hands." With constitutional government, such responsiveness might take on a more institutionalized
form. In fact Remeliik defined the government's stability largely in terms of its ability to be responsive. He stated that "everybody will own this [new] government. Therefore, we should all come together and put our thoughts into it."

The Remeliik campaign repeatedly emphasized that his main concern was to "explain the facts and the real situation to the people" (Remeliik) so government reorganization could proceed in an atmosphere of "trust and peace" (Remeliik campaigner). They maintained that Palau's first president "should not rush things" in terms of governmental reorganization (Remeliik campaigner). Instead changes should occur gradually, with the full understanding and consensus of the people involved.

According to the campaign, as Palau proceeded with this complex task, it should have a president who really "honors" the constitution and should be a person that other Palauans can trust, depend on, and feel comfortable with. In short, Palau's first president should be a leader who "really cares for the people" (Remeliik campaigner).

In addition, it was stressed that Palau's first president "must be well aware of our traditions and customs and must work ... to preserve our heritage that distinguishes us" from other peoples (Remeliik campaigner). Structurally, knowledge of Palau's "cultural aspects" was all the more necessary since the Constitution had not "defined the role of custom" (same).

Remeliik's over-arching emphasis was on unity and consensus, and this evoked a positive response. Unity was seen as a welcome antidote to the divisiveness of recent years and as a necessary ingredient for
nation-building. A Remeliik campaigner stated: "During the last ten years, there have been dissents (sic), aggravations, and sometimes even violent behaviors [in relation to] the development of our government . . . . ") Remeliik stated in a different village that "unity has been absent in the minds of our leaders and among the people in general, therefore nothing can be improved. Instead we spent so much time arguing and arguing but always [end up] standing at the beginning . . . ." As opposed to this, unity was necessary so that national leadership could "pull all of our resources together and make them work" (Remeliik campaigner). Without unity and consensus, Palau would "remain in a critical, political situation" since people "would still be . . . all against each other" at a time when "we are working to establish . . . our islands as a nation" (same).

Stories, analogies and jokes during the Babdaob trip also alluded to the unity/cooperation theme. In one village, a Remeliik campaigner made a joke about a number of dogs that were snarling, and about to get into a fight. The campaigner said: "you people of . . . [village X] just want to fight." To this a villager replied, "Like any other community . . ., we people of [X] have always quarreled among ourselves. But now we are facing a new government and so have to put our past disputes aside."

The theme of unity was also illustrated when an influential villager told a well-known story. "The people of [Y] village went fishing. In the beginning they were very cooperative. But after they caught the fish, they could not decide on who would get what kinds and amounts of fish. They started dividing the fish, but by the time they were finished, the fish had spoiled."
The need for a better integration of efforts between different elements of government, and sectors of society was also stressed by the Remeliik Campaign. They felt that the President, in addition to being quite familiar with the domestic traditional and contemporary situation, should also be able to deal with external/international forces.

The attitude of the Remeliik campaign towards economic development was mixed. In his campaign literature, Remeliik stressed the importance of creating a "pro-business attitude" in Palau, so as to encourage the activities necessary for promoting controlled economic growth. He maintained that the adoption of such an attitude by the public depended on whether trustworthy leadership was empowered. "We believe that if the consumers trusted the government leadership enough, they would be willing to create a pro-business attitude," Remeliik said (as interviewed by R. Idechong).

A minor uncertainty associated with Remeliik was some doubt as to his competence and training to deal with national, and especially externally-related matters. It was alleged in some quarters that Remeliik had been "passed over" for promotion due to an unimpressive work record as deputy DistAd. Both Remeliik and his campaigners responded with two points. Remeliik maintained that the comments about his work record "... amount to political talks which [politicians] usually play in order to dump garbages on other people" to discredit his candidacy and to advance their own. As noted, Remeliik made a positive point about his campaign not engaging in such tactics.

Secondly, his campaign maintained that he had not been in a position to do very much constructive for Palau "given the structure of the [Trust
Territory] government," which was portrayed as ineffectual. Moreover Remeliik occupied the "number two slot" in the district government, and so was additionally constrained.

As to doubt over Remeliik's training to deal with economic development and external relations, the candidate replied: "If a person is sincere and ambitious [i.e., hard-working] and is well aware that he is a public servant, these are the important qualities that are needed . . . ." He also stressed that the executive team to be overseen by him would include western educated, and internationally sophisticated Palauans. These points helped to assuage the minor worries about Remeliik's competence.

Roman Tmetchul

Tmetchul, like Remeliik, was not in a particularly strong position when it came to western education. Instead his background and qualifications were centered on economic and political matters. As discussed in Chapter IV, by the mid 1970s Tmetchul was recognized as the wealthiest, if not the most influential, man in Palau. As of 1978, Tmetchul's Pacifica Development Corporation had the second largest number of employees of any Palauan-owned company. Because of his business activities, Tmetchul as a economic patron, might add support to his political campaign.

In addition to his economic activities, Tmetchul also had extensive experience in politics, having been one of the first senators from Palau to the COM. There his activities became controversial when he emerged as the spokesman for Palauan separatism. From 1975 to 1980, Tmetchul
headed the Palau Political States Commission and also served in the 6th Palau Legislature.\(^{17}\)

Tmetchul's clan/kin relations were mostly connected with Airai. At the time of the election Tmetchul was an acting chief in that municipality. Kin relations included a number of Airai/Koror\(^{18}\) politicians, influential in their own right. Moreover through his wife he had a connection to an east coast Bablodaob village. He could also count to some extent on support from the Seventh Day Adventists.\(^{19}\)

Tmetchul was ambitious, and undoubtedly felt he could do the best job in setting Palau on a viable course. One factor encouraging him was the House of Chief's endorsement (see p. 316). Another was that Tmetchul would face a divided opposition, due to the dissolution of the PC.

During the campaign Tmetchul's emphasis was on economics. His closest campaign advisor reported that he wanted to see Palau industrialized rapidly. Ideally, he said, Palau should be like Singapore or Japan. For Tmetchul, such a preference involved an element of competition. He wanted to demonstrate that Palauans could be as capable and industrious as the citizens of any "developed" nation. My informant described Tmetchul's mentality as that of trying "to beat," or at least to catch up with any other place. A full-page political advertisement summarizing Tmetchul's economic proposals appeared in the Pacific Daily News, stating that his "first priority is to develop the economy of Belau . . ." (Pacific Daily News 1980 October 25:40, see Appendix D for copy). In order to accomplish this, Tmetchul made the following proposals: To "utilize the best available Palauan talents
and technical assistance from outside consultants . . . ," and to seek "economic and technical assistance" from the United States, Japan, other nations, the United Nations, and from private institutions. Moreover trade and commerce should be encouraged between the states in Palau, and between Palau and other nations, particularly in the "Pacific Asian region." To reduce communication, transportation, and other infrastructural impediments, Tmetchul proposed to construct a good system of roads, domestic and external communication, and government services.

One strength of the Tmetchul campaign was its style. Like Remeliik, Tmetchul campaigned in a Palauan fashion but also more eclectically, utilizing more media, and not avoiding public debates. Like Remeliik, Tmetchul reportedly often went to villages, and seemed comfortable operating in small-scale, face-to-face settings. His varied style was successful, though probably not quite as popular as Remeliik's. A number of attributes of the Tmetchul campaign evoked mixed reactions, however. His influence and visibility in the international arena was viewed positively by some Palauans. His supporters felt that only Tmetchul could go "by himself" and negotiate with the Americans. However for others, the impression that Tmetchul was in close touch with powerful, international forces had negative connotations. As noted, during the constitutional dispute, he was successfully attacked as being a "tool" of the Americans.

A second characteristic which evoked a mixed reaction was Tmetchul's "godfather" image. His supporters took his economic accomplishments as evidence that their candidate "could do so much for Palau." Some also
admired Tmetchul's ability to exert and extend his influence, one supporter remarking that "Tmetchul is the godfather who can bury them all." Detractors, however, pointed to this same characteristic as evidence of unscrupulous and socially irresponsible behavior.

A third mixed blessing in the Tmetchul campaign was the relatively large amount of money spent, reportedly far more than did any other candidate. Palauan critics of this sort of campaigning pointed out that people were glad to go to political barbecues, picnics, and other such entertainments, but these did not influence their vote. In fact informants joked about this, but their response could also be serious. One informant stated: "we [may] receive money but our vote is secret. It is ours. We make the final judgement . . . . If money is offered, you can take advantage of it, . . . but do not betray your vote."

Nevertheless a number of anti-Tmetchul informants acknowledged that the use of money could persuade some Palauans who could be "bought off." Judging from his voter support, the money had a mixed, rather than simply a negative effect.

Another factor with mixed results was the Tmetchul campaign's use of some Palauan chiefs. The House of Chiefs reportedly endorsed his candidacy in a nearly unanimous resolution. However as the campaign wore on, some of these chiefs appeared to sustain damage to their own influence. A backlash effect against chiefs who are seen as attempting to dictate choices for others on matters of extra-traditional, national significance had surfaced during earlier events (see Chapter II, p. 90 and Chapter VI, p. 240). During the national election campaign, one pro-Remeliik informant stated: "I feel the chiefs are no longer
following traditional ways when they get involved in politics" in this way. "... If they do get involved, they should represent the view of most of their subjects. But some do not do this now and this is why they are losing influence."

Tmetchul also had a reputation for being disrespectful of authority. This perception was associated with Tmetchul's generally assertive leadership style. One informant reported two relevant incidents for Airai. He said that Tmetchul had put up a sign for "the provisional government" of Airai in a hamlet there. According to this informant, Tmetchul had not obtained permission from the people of the hamlet to put up the sign. At night, young men from the hamlet took the sign down and broke it up.

On another occasion Tmetchul had a flag for Airai put up in the same hamlet. Reportedly, some high clan women from the hamlet confronted Tmetchul and asked him, "who you are you and why did you put that flag up?" Tmetchul then took the flag down. Whatever the accuracy of such reports, there was a perception that Tmetchul could be arrogant, and over-extend his authority. On the other hand, there were those who looked up to what they saw as Tmetchul's tenacity, daring and drive.

A number of elements of the Tmetchul campaign definitely hurt his candidacy, however. Many Palauans were disturbed that Tmetchul might have little use for western-style democracy. His principal adviser reported that Tmetchul was sympathetic to the discipline and authoritarianism of the German, and particularly the Japanese Period. As has been noted, on the eve of and during the constitutional dispute,
there was building concern that Tmetchul and an inner circle of associates might try to install a "dictatorship" in Palau.

Tmetchul also had a reputation for being sly and inconsistent. As one well-placed PC informant stated: "Tmetchul is like an octopus. When he sits on the coral, he becomes just like coral. But when he goes to a sandy beach, he becomes just like the color of the sand." During the 1980 campaign some felt Tmetchul said different things to different people simply to increase his political appeal. Others felt that he took advantage of people, exploiting them when he had the chance. Whatever the accuracy of these perceptions, they cut into his popularity.

Apprehension over the development path which Tmetchul was thought to prefer also had some negative effect. Tmetchul's positions on development are discussed in more detail in the second section of this chapter. At this point, it is sufficient to say that his apparent preference for rapid, externally-oriented, and potentially destructive "development" worried some Palauans.

A less significant drawback to the Tmetchul campaign was a degree of regionalist sentiment attached to it. As one example, during the campaign, a few less-politically-informed supporters indicated that if Koror people did not vote for him, Tmetchul might cut off the water supply to Koror. To the extent that Tmetchul's campaign acquired a regionalist flavor, this hindered his campaign.

Lazarus Salii

Among the presidential candidates, Salii was one of the two most cosmopolitan, and western educated. He and Ramarui both had a degree
from an American university. Over the years, Salii had amassed considerable experience in Trust Territory political matters. In 1965, he was elected to the lower house of the COM; later he was elected to the Senate. He also headed the COM's status negotiations during their initial years and he had a major hand in developing the idea of free association. He also had extensive experience with Trust Territory administrative posts. More recently in Palau, Salii was among those elected as a delegate to the constitutional convention. In 1980, in light of this experience and education, he was nominated by the "official" PC as their presidential candidate. This proved a mixed blessing, however.

During the early weeks of the campaign, a number of "official" PC leaders supported Salii, but as the campaign wore on Salii's popularity with the general public was less than assured. As this became clear, some "official" PC leaders became more circumspect in their support.

Some continued their support. One such leader was the female head of Yaoldaob's most prominent clan, the Idid. She concentrated on mobilizing support for Salii in central Koror. However, there were indications that this attempt irritated some Palauans who did not like to have "rank pulled on them." This was particularly true for Palauans who were residents in Koror but who still had strong ties to other municipalities. There was irritation with the female clan head's stance since it seemed an effort by a leader with a neo-traditional position of influence to pressure Palauans to adopt a stance of questionable popularity, on a matter of extra-traditional significance. As noted, such pressure can have a backlash effect.
Salii continued to emphasize the support being given to him by some "officials" of the former PC. By doing so, he contributed to a wide-spread perception that he was out of touch with "grass-roots" elements of that former organization, and with Palauans as a whole.

Another mixed factor in Salii's campaign was the nature of its staff. He recruited a number of Palauans who, like himself, had spent a lot of time outside of Palau while they worked for the Trust Territory, mainly in Saipan. There was a similar fear that "Saipanese Palauans," not oriented to Palau, might scoop up all the best positions in the new government. Thus Salii's substantial reliance on Trust Territory "big shots" was in part a hinderance.

Salii's campaign style at the national level, was a clear weakness. It concentrated on communicating in large, public gatherings, through sophisticated media such as large, glossy posters, T-shirts, and a distinctive television spot. Informants outside of his camp reported that such a reliance was viewed as inappropriate.

His posters sported a large, glossy photograph of him against a blue background, with a yellow star. This evoked interesting comments from a number of my informants. Instead of being impressed, they remarked how the posters indicated that Salii was no longer familiar with Palau. As one Remeliik supporter put it: "Palau is small enough so that a candidate can visit every house," or at least every hamlet. This informant and others remarked that "everybody [should, does?] know everybody in Palau." For Salii to make heavy use of a relatively impersonal, media-oriented campaign suggested to some that he and his accomplishments were no longer vitally relevant, or well-known to Palauans, otherwise, he would not have to "advertise" in this way.
In contrast to Remeliik and Tmetchul, Salii exhibited a preference for western-style debates as opposed to village-level campaigning. This statement is based on my informants and observations. He and his supporters also stressed his superiority over other candidates, basing their assessment on his western education, Trust Territory experience, and on his prominence outside of Palau. These aspects of the Salii Campaign were counter-productive for a number of reasons. First, they violated the preference that candidates should "not put themselves up and others down," at least in obvious, overbearing ways. Second, Salii appeared to utilize campaign techniques that were viewed as overly westernized, and unPalauan. Moreover the qualifications that he emphasized, were mostly foreign derived. This reinforced the perception that Salii's training and political style were too outside-oriented, and this was a hinderance.

John Niraked

None of the other candidates could compete with Niraked in clan status. Moreover it was generally recognized that he excelled in his ability to employ the Palauan language in an evocative, and arresting way. Niraked also had background and experience in a number of areas. He had considerable legal background, and was involved in the administration of public lands. At the time of the election campaign, he was head of Palau's Land Authority. He also had political experience both at the Trust Territory level, and in Palau as a Progressive Party leader, and in the 6th and 7th Palau Legislatures.

Like Remeliik, Niraked had not accepted the validity of Salii's "official" PC nomination. Yet Niraked's vote total in the September,
1979 elections had not been impressive. Moreover, around the time of the PC "nomination" meetings, there were indications that Niraked was making overtures to Tmetchul. Consequently, there was perhaps some question whether Niraked could be a popular candidate.

Niraked's style during the presidential race did not emphasize a high visibility, media approach. He concentrated instead on attempting to reach out and address a few "very basic..." issues in Palau. He stressed the importance of land, control of which has long been an indicator of wealth and power. He attempted to make a connection between land issues, political status negotiations, and U.S. military interests, and to use this as a controversial issue against other candidates. This effort was based on a number of related themes. The first was partially traditional, but also involved the matter of national integration; i.e., that it was inappropriate for a southerner (i.e., Remeliik or Salii) to be in a position of political authority over all Palau. Secondly, Niraked maintained that it was inappropriate for Palau's leadership to facilitate the use of a relatively massive proportion of Palau's arable land for military purposes. Third, Niraked opposed any alteration of the constitution for the sake of such use. In his literature, he targeted Salii and Tmetchul, as well as Remeliik, as Palauans with histories of involvement in political status negotiations which could compromise both the constitution and Palauan control of land. In contrast to this, Niraked pictured himself as "trying to hold onto the land for the Palauan People," against anticipated inroads from foreign powers and collaborating Palauans.
Niraked put out campaign literature that graphically illustrated his points (see Appendix D). On one page, in Palauan, is the following message; "This [map] is the outline and picture of the land of Palau that will be lost if we agree to free association, as this has been formulated to date. The people who have been responsible for the development of this situation which has come to a head in the last three years, are Salii, Tmetchul, Remeliik and the American Rosenblatt. Their arrangement for free association will destroy the land, which is the foundation and supports . . . most of the people. Their arrangement also contradicts our constitution. The land and our constitution are the two things that provide the foundation [the basis] for our way of life. But if we elect John Niraked as our president he will deal directly with this issue. He will not be bypassed by status negotiators, and if we do not want this free association package, then Niraked as our president will never let it happen. Instead, to the Americans he would say: This is too much [this last sentence is in English]."

Niraked's candidacy was seen by some as Paluan in style, and there seemed to be little concern as to his loyalty (see pp. 348-351). These aspects of his campaign, coupled with his focus on land and its relation to political status, might have struck a responsive chord. Niraked, however, suffered from major weaknesses in his campaign and these reduced the salience of his message. As of late 1980, a wide range of informants reported that he had a serious reputation problem. As one informant stated; "Niraked does not have a principle of his own. Rather he keeps on changing course." Some said that he used substantive
questions merely as political "weapons" to further his own career. Irrespective of what he said, some Palauans no longer believed Niraked.

Another weakness in his campaign was his sharp and overt attacks against other candidates, in marked contrast to Remeliik. Niraked's regionalist appeal was also a weakness. Outside of the core area of the old Babladaob Confederacy, his regionalist focus had a contrary effect as it offended some Palauans from elsewhere in Palau, and some with relatively pan-Palauan, and universalistic views.

David Ramarui

Like Salii, Ramarui was comparatively well-educated in a formal sense. During the 1980 campaign Ramarui stressed that he had been one of the first Micronesians and the first Palauan to get a college degree. He also had some experience in politics; however, this was less extensive than a number of other candidates, and most of it had been gained decades before the election. With the exception of Salii, however, Ramarui had the most experience at the Trust Territory-wide, administrative level, primarily in education.

He also had a strong reputation for honesty and integrity. This, coupled with his "clean" record, might have put Ramarui in a position of considerable strength. A number of factors severely weakened his campaign, however. First his timing was off. He came into the race relatively late and by then, a number of his strategically-placed relatives were behind Remeliik. Logistically, Ramarui's staff never expanded beyond the "remnants" of a wider kin-pool. This contributed to his lack of an adequate campaign organization.
Second, as with Salii, Ramarui's career had taken him outside of Palau for many years. Both candidates were regarded by some as "having been away from Palau too long," which highlighted concern about their identification (see p. 350).

Third, Ramarui, like Salii, seemed comfortable with debating, more that with face-to-face, smaller-scale campaigning, a technique which some viewed as inappropriate. Another impression of Ramarui did not enhance his campaign. He stressed that he was "first" in educational qualifications, thereby casting aspersions on a highly popular candidate (i.e., Remeliik) who lacked as much western education. Both this alleged activity, and Ramarui's television spot, may have violated the informal rule of not "putting oneself up and others down" in public, in an overbearing way. Moreover by focusing on education, Ramarui was emphasizing a qualification and characteristic that was foreign-derived. This was a drawback, and is discussed further in the chapter's section on the impact of a candidate's perceived cultural identification on the campaign.

Among the presidential candidates the most clear-cut contrast in leadership style was between Remeliik and Tmetchul. Tmetchul was seen as tough, assertive, and effective. He was viewed as a leader who could get Palauans "from here to there," even if this meant traversing choppy water. In speaking Tmetchul tended to stab rapidly at his points, and then to hammer away. In contrast Remeliik's speaking style was softer, slower, more indirect.

Tmetchul was also considered sly like a fox, as Americans say. There were some who admired his ability to maneuver, often keeping his
long-range objectives to himself and a core group of followers. Remeliik, in contrast, was associated with a more public style of politics, both from the ConCon and his People's Committee days.

In fact Remeliik was seen by many as a consensual leader. Supporters viewed him as being especially willing to listen to people and be sensitive to their conditions, wants, and needs. In their campaign style and approach, both Remeliik and Tmetchul were generally regarded as able to relate to islanders in a Palauan fashion. Therefore their identification was seen as being with the Islands.

Analysis of the Vote

Remeliik won the election by a plurality. The 1,955 votes he received amounted to 30.7 percent of the total. Tmetchul came in second with 1,608 votes. Salii was third with 1,453 votes, followed by Niraked with 992 and Ramarui with 258 votes (District of Palau figures, with details presented in Appendix B).

Remeliik demonstrated at least some support in virtually every voting region of Palau. Geographically, Remeliik's support was overwhelming in Kayangel/Ngarchelong, an area of strong Modekngei influence, on the west coast, in Peleliu, and in the Southwest Islands. In Peleliu, Remeliik's strong showing was due to the fact that he is from that island, which is also a strong area of Modekngei and Catholic influence. Remeliik is of the latter religion but also has close ties to the former.

Remeliik's strength in the Southwest Islands overwhelmed even Salii, the other candidate from Yaoldaob. Perhaps Remeliik's strength in the Southwest was a result of his stress on equal opportunity and service for
all Palauans. Southwest Islanders— inhabitants of Sonsorol, Tobi and Pulo Anna— traditionally were not part of Palau. Today they are a distinct ethnic group, and occupy a minority position.

In the populous and all-important district of Koror, Remeliik did reasonably well. Let us focus on the vote in Koror in more detail. In the hamlets of central Koror the race was between Tmetchul and Salii. The exact mix of reasons for their strong showing there is not clear. A close supporter of Tmetchul attributed it to the greater exposure of people in Koror to cosmopolitan and international news. This informant, plus Salii’s campaign manager, felt that both Salii and Tmetchul were particularly strong in Koror because Palauans there are more aware of these candidate’s cosmopolitan accomplishments in this port-town and administrative center. In central Koror, there was also the factor of the support given to Salii by the female head of the Idid Clan. Some informants also felt that, given the lack of an organized, inclusive political group, some people "reverted back to the politics of six to ten years ago," the politics of the political parties. In those days both Tmetchul and Salii were leaders of the Liberal Party, which had been strong in Koror.

In the outlying hamlets of Meyuns and Ngerchebed (see map in Appendix D), the picture changed dramatically in Remeliik’s favor. Since these are relatively populous hamlets, Remeliik’s strength there came very close to making up for his poor showing in central Koror. His strength in Ngerbeched and particularly Meyuns was due to a relatively high proportion of residents there with Peleliu or other Yaoldaob ties, coupled with a strong Modekngei presence.
The only area where Remeliik was considerably outdistanced was in the east coast region, where Niraked got the most votes, followed by Tmetchul. The outcome in this region is not surprising. Niraked is high-clan from this region, and had directed his campaign towards it. There was also something of a Babldaob-centric flavor to Tmetchul's campaign. Remeliik's showing in the region was respectable, however. And even in Airai, the heartland of Tmetchul's candidacy, Remeliik as opposed to the remaining candidates managed to obtain some support. These showings reinforce the conclusion that Remeliik was able to obtain generalized support.

Tmetchul, like Remeliik, obtained substantial support in a number of voting regions. Aside from his home base of Airai, his area of particular strength was central Koror. Generally on Babldaob, Tmetchul received substantial support in most regions. His strength, however, fell off dramatically in areas south of Koror. After all, Tmetchul is a northerner, and his campaign seemed oriented to that region, and to Koror.

Salii had a more uneven support pattern that either Remeliik or Tmetchul. Salii did well in Koror, especially in the central hamlets. Not surprisingly in his home island of Angaur, he also did quite well, getting 180 of the 230 votes cast. However on the West Coast, Salii trailed in third place. Moreover, on the East Coast, Salii's vote was quite weak, even compared to Ramarui.

Informants attributed Remeliik's relatively broad-based strength to a number of factors. As one of his core supporters stated: "Some people had said that Remeliik was the candidate of the west coast and
Yaoldaob. But the election showed that he was the candidate of all of Palau. Remeliik's pan-Palauan emphasis had born fruit.

Second, Remeliik supporters pointed out that he was a good "neo-leader," meaning a leader that "follows some Palauan style, but who also mixes this with some American/western elements, and who knows both." Remeliik's style was Palauan, but he surrounded himself with a number of campaigners well-versed in American/western politics, and international matters.

Third, Remeliik was generally regarded as a leader who for years had been administering support to the Palauan people. Informants pointed out that such aid was customary for a Palauan leader and that reciprocity-minded Palauans "do not forget this." 53

Fourth, there was the Modekngei factor. In light of the election returns, there can be little doubt that Remeliik got the lion's share of their support. 54

Fifth, the Remeliik group had allocated their resources intelligently and effectively. They avoided debate situations where Remeliik would not excel 55 and concentrated instead on less formal, smaller-scale settings. As noted, Remeliik was adept at this sort of campaigning. Furthermore, this emphasis served to heighten the "Palauaness" of his campaign, by contrasting it to relatively westernized style associated with Salii and Ramarui. Another factor contributing to the Remeliik victory was the attractiveness of his theme of unity and consensus.

Cumulatively, the various attributes of Remeliik and his candidacy evoked the sense that, more than other candidates, his primary identification was with the Islands, and that he could be trusted to be
loyal to them. The reasons why assessments of identification and particularly loyalty were so important is further discussed on pp. 348-350.

Tmetchul's popularity with the voters came close to matching Remeliik's. Tmetchul employed an eclectic and effective campaign, and Palauan sympathy for an underdog may have also aided Tmetchul. Moreover his spelling out of relatively concrete economic measures may have been attractive to some. In fact, his strong showing may have indicated that some Palauans' "fear of businessmen," which had been evoked most visibly during the superport controversy, had lessened somewhat.

Tmetchul had a number of clear weaknesses, however. He still had something of a political reputation problem: there was concern over his loyalty, including a fear that he might not be subject to indigenous popular control, if empowered.

By a slight plurality, Palauans chose Remeliik, a candidate whom many trusted, and who advocated that the national government should be for everybody. The pan-Palauan, public service, and universalistic emphases of the Remeliik campaign were consistent with activist views, sentiments expressed during the ConCon, and by the People's Committee. These continuing emphases, and the fact that the candidate most strongly identified with them won the election over four other candidates, demonstrated a significant degree of incremental closure on preferences for national leadership and government operations.

At this point, our focus shifts to a more generalized level as we examine externally-relevant social concerns and topics at the time of
the campaign. How were these addressed by the candidates, with what consequences for mobilization and closure?

**Major Concerns, Topics, Issues**

The topic of education was discussed during the campaign, though it was relatively minor in comparison with the economy and political status-related matters. Nevertheless, some focus on education is instructive for a number of reasons. For one, the opinions the candidates expressed on the relationship of education to national development reveal an emic recognition that deleterious effects can flow from dependency, coupled with a desire to ameliorate these. Second, the positions taken by at least two of the presidential candidates illustrate the potential conflict between the western, liberal concept of education embraced by some Palauans, and the use of education for fostering Palauan self-reliance and productive economic activity. Both early dependency theorists, and some Palauans, viewed increased national self-reliance and productivity as essential if dependency was to be curtailed.

A number of politicians had worked for the Department of Education in Palau and had experience with higher education outside the Trust Territory. In my talks with these Palauans, a view often expressed was that the educational system fostered both dependency on the United States, and alienation of Palauans from their own society.

Two of the presidential candidates, Salii and Ramarui, spent the most time discussing education, and had contrasting viewpoints. Ramarui felt that the educational system was basically on the right track, although its performance could still be improved. His philosophy of
education was influenced by the American, liberal tradition. Education should develop individual talents and abilities to the greatest possible extent. This in turn would make for more responsible and effective citizens,\textsuperscript{59} which could improve society (interview).

Salii, on the other hand, felt that Palau's educational system should be reassessed "before we continue with it in the new government" (Salii at Palau High School talk October 22, 1980). He felt that the system was mis-educating many Palauans, preparing them for careers and social conditions that did not exist in Palau. The ideal track in the present system was to prepare Palauans for higher education, mainly in America. Salii was concerned that the skills, attitudes, and values thereby absorbed might not contribute to the well-being of Palauan society. He did feel that education, if conducted properly, could help motivate and train Palau's youth for economically productive activities. Tmetchul shared this view, and along with other candidates mentioned commercial fishing and farming as activities that should be increased, with help from education.

Remeliik's position was somewhere between Ramaru's and Salii. Remeliik was committed to the promotion of health and education as "national goals, embodied in the constitution." He added that access to and benefits from education should be dispensed without regard to ascribed characteristics. For Remeliik, on the one hand Palau's education system should contribute to the community and nation. But it should also be oriented to further the career goals and talents of the individual (Remliik at Palau High School talk October 22, 1980).\textsuperscript{60} It is conceivable these two goals might conflict, and such conflict can be seen as a limitation on closure (see p. 353).
The Economy

Treatment of economic questions during the campaign is covered in some detail for a number of reasons. In comparison with education, concern over aspects of the economy seemed far more widespread. Secondly, like education but more so, the discussion of economic questions during the campaign revealed a considerable, emic recognition of some of the dangers of dependency, including distorting effects. Third, explication and analysis contributes to our understanding of the factors that determine whether dependency-related campaign concerns and topics, that arouse considerable public unease, in fact become foci for controversy or are deflected. Despite doubts about the economy, and the effort of one candidate to escalate them escalation did not occur, for reasons that are discussed.

During the Babldaob trip, expressions of concern about the economy centered around two related aspects, its dependent nature and "unnaturalness." Palauans who used this latter term did so in two senses. They equated a natural economy with self-sufficiency and recognized that Palau's economy was far from this. They also used "naturalness" to refer to a subsistence-oriented, socially embedded economy and expressed concern that Palau's economy was moving away from a subsistence base and consumption activities were shifting to an individual basis.

One Remeliik campaigner gave the following example of his home village; "Every time there is a graduation ceremony in __, the father goes to Koror and buys a shirt, pair of pants, or shoes for the graduate. The following day another speedboat goes for kerosene and
other items. In one week the village of D has already spent $500" in this fashion. Efforts to obtain wanted items for the government economy/import sector were reportedly not coordinated on a village-wide basis. Instead, individually-owned speedboats made countless trips to Koror.

The former "natural" balance between local production and consumption, both for subsistence and prestige items, seemed to be weakening. The corrosive element was seen by some as the spreading government economy centered in Koror, and supported externally. Moreover since cash is spent on imported items, most of the profits from this pass out of the village. As Remeliik put this in a village: "When a villager throws his paycheck to [a village store], they in turn take this money to Koror. [This] leaves nothing behind in the village except empty mackeral cans."

There was concern over the distorting effects of the subsidized, cash economy. It was reported that, because of the villagers' keen interest in acquiring cash for imported items, they might accept relatively useless, government projects simply because these are funded with cash. On the other hand, they might shun work on village projects that were really needed, if this did not involve receipt of cash. In one village, a Remeliik campaigner once again used his home village as an example. "We of E village heard of a [government] ... program. We got some money for road improvement, which we literally had no need of. We started the project and found that we had so much money that we decided to widen the road. In the middle of the project, we found out that there was no money left. And now the road is only half finished,"
but the people are not willing to work on it anymore unless they get
paid. What was intended to help the village has had many negative
results."

The flow of interest and activity away from the "natural"
subsistence sector was seen as increasing the villages' dependency on
Koror, center of the government economy, yet there seemed little real
economic growth. This situation was at least partially understood by
villagers, and it was clear that the "economic issue" was a major
concern in Palau. As a Remeliik campaigner put this in one village;
"everyone seems to be involved in such discussions" about "the bad
economy . . . of Palau." Remeliik, and apparently, many others did not
think that "this is the model of the economy that we should be
following."

Other concerns were more specific. One of these, over the
possibility of an "empty government" which lacked the funds to operate
effectively, demonstrated a widespread recognition of one of the dangers
of dependency; the threat of insufficient metropolitan aid. But
although this concern was fanned by Tmetchul, Remeliik managed to handle
it as a non-issue.

Unlike Remeliik, Tmetchul expressed doubt that sufficient funding
was assured to support Palau economically, and to fuel its development,
since the status question was still unresolved. As Tmetchul stated:
"We have finished with the constitution but we have not established a
formal agreement with the U.S. [Nor have we] created a solid base with
any other forms of aid . . . . It is like a ship that has been
completed and is ready to start its mission. It is ready to sail, and
to travel to our destiny, our destination. But as we embark, we are
not sure whether the fuel is enough or sufficient to help us to complete, to accomplish our journey. So that as we go along, we are afraid that [our ship] will run out of fuel" (Tmetchul at High School talk, October 22, 1980).

From the vantage point of the November election, a free association agreement was not on the immediate horizon. In view of this, Tmetchul felt that the "issue of our relationship with the U.S.," must be clarified and resolved. He wanted to know if Palau would have the money to pay the relatively high salaries of government officials, to continue government services and to expand these? If Palau did not secure this aid from the United States, then Tmetchul asked "where will we get the money?" Tmetchul asked? He was not alone in expressing concern about an "empty government." Villagers voiced it as well.

In the villages, this topic provoked considerable anxiety. I was present to observe how Remeliik dealt with this. In one village he was asked: "Let us hear you explain the saying that we will be left out or ignored?" Remeliik asked exactly what this villager meant. The villager replied that "it is a big rumor now . . . and it has worried us that [the U.S.] will loosen their hand from us." And another villager asked: "Now suppose that the U.S. asks for what they want, and we tell them what we want, and we both have a conflict, what would the U.S. think? Is there any consideration on our part [as to what if the U.S. stops] its financial aid?" Remeliik responded by saying that Palau would have to insist that U.S. give it enough aid. "It is our responsibility to tell them [the Americans] that they must do their responsibilities to help develop the country before we can talk seriously about a compact agreement" (Remeliik). But the village
magistrate persisted, explaining that "many people at Palau are thinking that if we insist on getting what we want then the U.S. might pull out their hands from us."

Remeliik maintained that the new government would not be "empty" since it was "the U.S. responsibility to develop this country; she cannot leave us alone, for reasons that are numerous." These reasons were: first, that the U.S. "is the world's richest, and among the most powerful nations." It is easy to see why this attitude (not uncommon elsewhere in the developing world) is especially found in Palau where ethno-historic experiences and the current levels of American aid have made such expectations feasible. Furthermore, some Palauans cast the United States in the role of the traditional wealthy and powerful patrons who were expected to recirculate at least a portion of their wealth.

Secondly, Remeliik maintained that the U.S. "understands that other nations, such as Russia, are looking forward to seeing if the U.S. has accomplished its task." The most obvious interpretation is that Remeliik was aware of the oversight function of the United Nations, in which Russia plays a part. However, given the context at the time, it is likely there was at least the implicit message that Palau might swing towards countries unfriendly to the United States, if America failed in its "responsibility" to develop Palau.

Third, under the arrangements of the Trusteeship, termination could not occur until a compact of free association or an alternative status was completed. Remeliik suggested that the time necessary can "give us the idea of prolonging termination . . . [and the] status quo [until] around 1983." In other words, given the time it would take for both
sides to finalize any agreement, Palauans did not have to worry about this anytime soon. In the meantime, Palauans might continue to maneuver without having to face a reduction in funding, since it was already committed.

Remeliik also maintained that those whom he regarded as fanning concerns about an "empty government" in actuality were aware of the situation and were just trying to "... make people worry ...," and also were using this as a political "tool." Remeliik admonished such leaders not to mislead other Palauans in this way.

In addition, he also attempted to defuse apprehension over the possibility of a cut in jobs because of government reorganization, or an austerity scheme. A campaigner in one village stated that "the President and the Legislature must have patience, and would not rush to lay off workers or to [unexpectedly] transfer them." This campaigner further stated that it would be the President's responsibility to "protect [government] jobs" so that the transition to a Palauan government "would be easy and lenient ... ." Remeliik's positions were probably somewhat reassuring.

Aside from Remeliik's position, there were other reasons why the economy did not escalate into a focal point for controversy during the campaign. For one, although all the candidates were concerned about the economy's overly dependent and consumption-oriented character, none of them had a set of concrete and persuasive answers on how to reorient the economy away from dependency, and stimulate economic growth. Further development of fishing, agriculture, and an educational emphasis on vocational skills was generally suggested. None of the candidates, however, could provide a structural framework and/or motivational
incentive. In fact any disruption of the economic status quo was viewed with some apprehension, especially given the perceived alternatives.

Over the question of foreign projects and investment, however, a remarkable amount of incremental closure existed. In part, this was built upon the reactive closure which had begun to emerge during the superport dispute. During the election campaign, Remeliik favored foreign investment if it was limited and controlled by Palauans.

With the exception to some extent of Salii, the protectionist and rather cautious approach of Remeliik was shared by the other candidates. For instance, Ramarui had "reservations [about] the kind of foreign investment that exploits resources [primarily] for the profit of outside investors" (Ramarui in R. Idechong interview). As Ramarui put it; "We all know that there are very big foreign business that want to invest [here] ... with the intention of making profit while our needs [would be viewed as] secondary . . . ." (Ramarui, WALU TV debate, October, 1980). These sorts of investments "are not good for Palauans," Ramarui said. As an example of this type of investment he mentioned the tourist industry in Saipan, which he regarded as owned and operated by Japanese.

Moreover, in the area of agriculture, Ramarui "knew that the Japanese are interested in coming in" to Palau and that if they came in, "they will bring their families and in time . . . will dominate . . . the area" (Ramarui in R. Idechong interview). As illustrated by these remarks, there was continuing unease over the prospect of foreign economic and political domination. Concern about this was partially
connected to Palauan memories of the later Japanese period and had re-surfaced during the superport dispute.

Remarks by Niraked reinforce the contention that Palauans were still somewhat leery of economic development, particularly if it was too rapid and massive. Niraked remarked during an interview, that "there is a big threat" to the natural beauty, cultural distinctiveness and political integrity of these islands. This threat was "the excitement of the business community of Palau to try and improve Palau as an industrial nation. I do not want to see Palau produce a millionaire because Palau cannot maintain a millionaire without sacrificing its beauties ... I am talking about projects like the superport" (Niraked in R. Idechong interview).

In fact, past plans for a superport served as a lesson against inappropriate and potentially degrading development plans pursued in a secretive, elitist fashion. This indicated that some incremental closure over development preferences had occurred in Palau by the time of, and as a consequence of the election campaign. Remeliik in a village remarked how in the past "development plans were so secretive that this caused a lot of confusion," and a reaction against plans of doubtful benefit to Palau. To counteract this, Remeliik stressed that "everything must be discussed in the open" since otherwise, "there [will] be no communal benefit" from ill-conceived development plans and activities being fostered on the Palauans, by irresponsible leaders.

In two villages, while I was present, a Remeliik campaigner mentioned the superport. In one he said: "The superport issue [was] an indication that the people are not well-informed. [But] fortunately we banned the whole project. Otherwise our reef could have been
destroyed by complex structures, by pollution, by big oil tankers," etc. In another he said: "You people here should be very familiar with the [past] struggle against the superport." This campaigner acknowledged that "some Palauans were behind [the project] and that we almost let it in without good explanation and understanding" of its likely effects. His portrayal was most graphic in another village: Permitting the superport to "come [to Palau] . . . would have . . . contaminated our waters . . . and devastated our place," he said.

All the presidential candidates publically advocated that laws be implemented, and a screening mechanism established, to safeguard against inappropriate and uncontrolled foreign economic activity. Even Tmetchul, at one time viewed as a proponent of the Superport project, recognized in 1980 that the question of foreign economic activity was a "very sensitive and volatile issue" (Tmetchul in R. Idechong interview). Like other candidates, he stressed that the most important criteria for permitting a project should be whether its primary benefits would accrue to the local economy, and the people of Palau (Tmetchul, WALU TV debate, October 1980).

**Political Status**

Political status and concerns closely related to it—such as constitutional integrity and possible intrusions by the U.S. military—ranked along with the economy as major topics that provoked considerable public unease. Discussion during the campaign, as with the economy, revealed an emic recognition and concerns about the possibly harmful underbelly of the generally comfortable, seemingly benign conditions of dependency. Furthermore, like Palauans' treatment of
economic questions, that accorded to political status helps to reveal the complex and problematical conditions that determine whether a dependency-related topic emerges as controversial.

One such topic was political status. Before the presidential campaign was in full swing, a close supporter of Remeliik speculated as to whether independence would be discussed as a status alternative. However, neither independence, nor any status aside from free association arose as a major topic, despite some interest in them. Nevertheless in various ways, political status negotiations were constantly on the minds of some Palauans. During the Babladaob trip, responding to questions, Remeliik said that no political status position could be maintained unless Palauans reached consensus on it. For this to occur, people must obtain accurate information on status options. Remeliik further maintained that he should not be singled out for criticism on political status since other leaders had also been involved. He also said that any agreement would take time to complete, and that, in any case, nothing would occur unless and until the Palauans agreed to it. Furthermore, he continued to emphasize that candidates who tried to escalate status and related concerns into a controversial issue were simply "play[ing] politics" for short-range, opportunistic reasons and that this was unfortunate, because it would make an enlightened consensus more difficult to reach. In one village Remeliik stated that the "critics" of the emerging compact of free association were simply attempting to "mislead peoples' thoughts . . . [as] . . . part of our Palauan politics," with its intense competition and maneuver. He was critical of this, saying that the compact is "not something that should be played with" in this way.
Remeliik maintained that a thoughtful and democratic decision on status would require cooperation between Palauan leaders, and between them and the population. With such cooperation "[we can all] get together and put a great deal of effort into considering the advantages and disadvantages" of any agreement, he said. Notice that on the question of status, as on all other vital matters, Remeliik maintained that the most important step was "to get all of the leaders [and people] together to work . . . towards unity."

What of the relationship between the constitution and political status? All candidates pledged to support the constitution. Remeliik stated that the question of status negotiations was "not as important as our constitution" (Remeliik in a village). He reminded Palauans that he was one of the original supporters of the constitution, and would not turn against it now. Even Roman Tmetchul, who had fought for revising the constitution in 1979, now expressed strong support for it.65 There were nevertheless at least two views on the relationship between the constitution and political status. One position was taken by Tmetchul and Niraked. They maintained that the constitution should not be altered in any way. Nor should Palauan negotiators make any commitments that could conflict with it. Niraked stated: "... People are trying to make some trick of making incompatibilities [between the constitution and a compact] subside to the point where the two documents can coexist . . . . I think we should not play tricks on people. The constitution is the supreme law of the land and [it is] . . . incumbent on the negotiators that the compact of free association will not . . . violate the provisions of the constitution" (Niraked in R. Idechong interview).
A second position, taken by Remeliik, Salii and Ramarui, was that a means could be developed to adjust the constitution to the requirements of free association. Ramarui stated that "he had heard, although not read, that the U.S. [now] seems to say that there may be a way of making the two documents compatible" (Ramarui in same). Candidates who referred to accommodation were not specific about its form. They only said that it would be "outside of" the free association compact, and that through it U.S. requirements could be met without constitutional alterations (Salii, WALU TV debate, Ramarui at Palau High School talk). In the same vein, Remeliik stated that an "agreement with the U.S. has been reached to solve [any problems] outside of the constitution." Yet Remeliik also stated that if changes were needed to fully satisfy American demands, then "we will do as our constitution directs ..." (Remeliik, WALU TV debate).

In the weeks and months after the election, it became clear that the mechanism for such accommodation was "subsidiary agreements" (see Chapter X). These would be attached to, but not actually part of a free association compact. Nevertheless, they would go into effect at the same time, and could override aspects of the constitution. This mechanism, however, was not widely known at the time of the election campaign. Rather, the state of knowledge at the time was best expressed by candidate Salii. He stated that Ambassador Rosenblatt "had agreed that the outstanding issues between Palau and the United States could be treated as issues for negotiation, rather than as constitutional issues" (Salii in interview by R. Idechong).

In addition to the relationship between Palau and the United States, Palau's foreign affairs was a topic for some discussion. At the
beginning of the campaign one of Remeliik's close advisors showed me a
draft of a position paper. According to it, Palau would seek a
relatively non-aligned foreign policy. "First string" relationships
should be with countries and entities in Micronesia and the South
Pacific. The second string was the U.S. and Japan. The third string
would be communist countries. Of course this was probably an ideal, and
not a pragmatic scenario. Practically speaking, Palau would find it
difficult to develop relationships with communist nations, since it was
likely to disturb the United States, and be vetoed under the anticipated
compact of free association. Moreover, due to Palau's extreme economic
dependency, the U.S. and Japan were likely to be "first string" in
importance, not second.

Another tendency could also run counter to the Remeliik campaign's
preference for establishing a non-aligned foreign policy; namely the
assessment that "at this stage of our economic and political development
[we] need the friendship, protection, and financial assistance of the
U.S." (Haruo Remeliik, A Candidate for President, Why We Support Him
also Haruo Remeliik, A Platform, both reproduced in Appendix D). The
points just mentioned point out the gulf between the ideal externally-
oriented objectives, at least of the Remeliik and Niraked campaigns,
and practical circumstances. For his part, Salii was viewed by many as
quite western-oriented and "pro-American," while Tmetchul seemed more
oriented towards Japan.

A topic related to political status, namely the possible use of
Palau by the United States military, was a source of considerable public
anxiety. Apprehension had remained from earlier events. During
Remeliik's Babldaob trip, a number of villagers expressed confusion and
apprehension over the possible loss of Palauan lands to U.S. military activities. As one villager stated: "there is a strange thing I heard. We heard that many acres of land have been sold. What do you say about it? Will you elaborate . . . so that we . . . understand what is going on?"

Remelik, like the other candidates, emphasized the importance of land in Palauan life. But except for Niraked, all candidates were somewhat ambivalent on the question of the use of Palauan land by the U.S. military. In general, Remelik felt that Palauan land was not something to be sold to outside interests for any reason. Thereby land, which he described as "our root [which] our lives are directed to" (Remelik), would not be alienated from Palau. Yet he could envision a temporary use of land through lease arrangements which might last 50-100 years (see Chapter IX).

Remelik also maintained that "we [as negotiators] do not have the right to make any commitment [to the U.S.] about land." First, the Palauan land authority was supposed to explain any plans for land use to the community and get feedback. Not until the Commission completed this work, approval was obtained from the various municipalities, and "all important documents [were] completed, [would] we negotiate with the U.S." on the matter of land. He also stated that the U.S. could only gain access to land if "we allow them to do so." Remelik implied that the decision was not his; rather, it was up to the people in a referendum. In fact this was his position on all the worrisome externally-related concerns associated with political status.

Nevertheless Remelik's position, particularly on land, was still ambivalent. On the one hand, he seemed in opposition to a long-range
loss of large amounts of Palauan land to "outsiders," including the U.S. military. Yet he also seemed willing to accept the fact that military use of land would be part of free association.

All candidates, however, without exception expressed the strongest reservations about a nuclear presence. Salii remarked that the nuclear question "weighed heavily" on his mind. He did feel that through negotiations with the U.S., the Palauans could ensure adequate safety measures and minimize dangers associated with nuclear activities (Salii, WALU TV debate).

A more skeptical view was strongly stated by Roman Tmetchul. As Will be remembered, in 1979 Tmetchul had supported a revised draft of the constitution, which would have loosened Palau's "harmful substances ban." Clearly, an "anti-nuclear" stance was popular during 1980, and Tmetchul, like a few of his associations, may have felt that Palau's integrity was now committed (see Chapter VII, p. 291).

Tmetchul's remarks illustrate the variety of experiences that could be marshalled for an anti-nuclear position. During the campaign, Tmetchul remarked: "If I had the power to do so, I would wipe out all forms of nuclear power in the world. My experience in the last war in Palau [World War Two] plus the results of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Three Mile Island incident [in the U.S.], plus the testing of nuclear bombs in the Pacific and the effect of radiation ... [in the Marshalls?] on the environment substantiates my opinion. I, for my part will do anything to refuse the concept of nuclear activity in Palau" (Tmetchul in WALU TV debate). As was the case with the activists, Tmetchul's concern with the nuclear question cast a
broad net, capturing incidents separated by great distances and decades.

More specifically, Tmetchul stated that "there is a provision against nuclear [materials] in our constitution. If there is any indication by the people that this law [should] be modified, it has to be done according to our constitution, which calls for a referendum" to pass by a 3/4 vote. At the time, other candidates seemed to share this view.

A Question of Loyalty

Loyalty was an informal, largely implicit standard meant to ensure that any executive leader advance the overall interests and welfare of Palau. The concern over loyalty was a Palauan way of attempting to prevent a bifurcation between a foreign-oriented elite and a relatively and/or absolutely deprived majority. Dependency theory has pointed out how this development often accompanies "modernization" in the Third World. Such internal polarization and external linkage has so far been muted in Palau; nevertheless, the possibility that it might occur has worried some Palauans.

A number of informants expressed the hope that Palau's small scale and dense kin networks could prevent such predatory elite formation. Nevertheless, there was uncertainty and some apprehension whether, even with what objectively can be referred to as this situational constraint, such an elite formation could be avoided. The uncertainty and unease of some Palauans over their islands' vulnerability to such a development fueled the desire to ascertain a candidate's loyalty. One villager during the Babldaob trip communicated this
perception with a particularly vivid remark: "whoever is elected president, I ask that he will not betray Pa'au. Palau is our beautiful island and we do not want to see it wasted. Whatever your relationship is with the United States, that is fine . . . . But do not destroy Palau. This is our Palau and not anyone else's."

In addition to the desire to insure popular control over leaders, the emphasis on a candidates' loyalty was due to the desire for control over the development process. There was apprehension that development proceeded too rapidly, and massively, it could badly disrupt Palau and degrade its environment. These fears are reflected in a remark by one informant, a school principal, who said: "Palauans are still very afraid of sudden moves, they are afraid that if Palau moves too fast, then it will break." 70

There were a number of indicators by which voters seemed to judge a candidates' loyalty. One of these was the extent to which a leader was involved in a Palauan way of life, in contrast to being seen as strongly attached to a cosmopolitan lifestyle, and associated with external political and/or economic interests. The concern was to ascertain the candidates' frame of reference or identification. Had the candidate spent most of his time in Palau? 71 Did he participate fully in Palauan social life and "customs?" Could he relate comfortably and effectively to Palauans throughout the Islands, not just in Koror? Salii and Ramarui were seen as comparatively weak in this regard. Could the candidate be trusted to advance the overall interests and welfare of Palau, above externally-derived interests and priorities? Remeliik and Vice-Presidential candidate Oiterong were seen as scoring highly on this criteria.
A candidate with a Palauan identification, it was felt, would be more likely to be loyal to and protective of Palauans' well-being and interests. It was recognized at some level, however, that identification and loyalty were not invariably congruent. For instance in a number of ways, candidate Tmetchul seemed to be "one of us," i.e., he could conduct himself appropriately as a Palauan. Yet there was also doubt as to his loyalty, based on some apprehension over his approach to leadership and the development path he seemed to advocate.

Another characteristic used to judge a candidates' loyalty was the stance he had taken on the constitution, as had been demonstrated during the constitutional dispute. Many still equated past defense of the constitution prepared by the ConCon as indicative of a commitment to stand by Palau, during times of trouble. Remeliik and Diterong were seen as strong in this regard.

The two concerns addressed by loyalty--control over leaders and over the development process--were related. Many seemed to assume that a consensual, public, and pro-Palauan leadership style was more likely to be associated with enhanced indigenous control over and broad-based input into the development process. This expectation worked to the benefit, primarily, of Remeliik's candidacy.

In contrast, Tmetchul's behaviors and positions, and to a lesser extent those of Salii, aroused suspicion based on this expectation. A perception, which had first come to prominence during the superport controversy, still lingered, and was particularly associated with Tmetchul: Some felt that his approach to government was elitist, secretive, and relatively undemocratic, and this, coupled with the development mode that he seemed to prefer, could badly disrupt and
possibly degrade Palau. Tmetchul was viewed by some as closely associated with external, potentially predatory, economic interests, and this still caused apprehension. For his part, Salii was viewed as both identifying with a cosmopolitan way of life, and perhaps with American political, and even military interests (Salii's campaign leaflet is reproduced in Appendix D). Doubts as to both candidate's loyalty cut into their campaigns. As detractors said, there was concern these candidates might turn Palau "into something like Guam," or even Hawaii. Some fear lingered that Palau could be overwhelmed by massive and highly disruptive development schemes, largely controlled by foreigners, and that Salii, and particularly Tmetchul, might have a hand in this.

Matters of Closure

The process and outcome of the national election involved closure in a number of ways. There was closure over the fact that relatively ascribed status, such as clan, kin, regional, and local affiliation, was no longer of determinate importance. In fact one of the reasons why Niraked's focus on such affiliations was counter-productive at the national level was the lessening salience of such criteria for the general public. Moreover Remeliik's contrasting focus on achieved merit and universalism was appealing, particularly in view of another weakness in Niraked's campaign--his political reputation problem.

The campaign also revealed the expectation that a candidates' identification be with the Islands, and that he should be loyal to them. As one aspect of this, qualifications and training that were seen as primarily foreign-derived, particularly if heavily relied upon, and in
lieu of indigenous qualifications, proved counter-productive. For instance though Remeliik was not as western-educated as either Salii or Ramarui, this difference did not harm him, for reasons that have been mentioned. Furthermore a populist, public, and consensual style was viewed favorably, though it must also be said that there was some concern over a possible lack of political effectiveness from such an approach, particularly when it came to externally-oriented economic and political matters. Especially in light of this, Tmetchul's assertive and dynamic style, coupled with his considerable experience in successful political and economic ventures, evoked a considerable positive response.

Remeliik, the successful candidate, persuasively argued that the government should operate to serve and protect all Palauans. During the course of the campaign, he also articulated and sought to popularize the national goals of cultural well-being, economic self-reliance, economic prosperity and political stability. Explicit and broad-ranging rational goals such as these had not been previously articulated.

Remeliik advocated that development should be public, subject to broad-based input and indigenous control, and move at a moderate pace. It should be participatory and involve a substantial, "bottom-up," village-oriented component. As noted, there was a striking degree of incremental closure on the view that foreign input and projects might be beneficial, but should be carefully screened. The above emphases were more than consistent with attitudes expressed since the emergence of the superport dispute, and thereby indicated some incremental closure.

But by the same token, another development style had been presented, and had obtained significant support. Both Salii and Tmetchul expressed some preference for rapid development, even if
disruptive, so as to maintain or even enhance Palauans' cosmopolitan standard of living, primarily from revenue through military use, and/or by the growth of a market economy, and from foreign-inspired economic activity. Actually Salii seemed to tone down his receptiveness of the military during the campaign. Tmetchul, for his part put less of an emphasis on the role of massive foreign investment and projects than was the case during the superport controversy. Nevertheless, it was generally the case that the development mode envisioned by both Salii and Tmetchul seemed to diverge markedly from the more moderate, controlled, and Palauan-oriented path suggested by Remeliik. It was possible that, at some point in the future the Salii/Tmetchul path might emerge as the more popular. This might occur if apprehension over anticipated impacts lessened and a more moderate and Palau-oriented mode was seen as ineffective in maintaining the "affluence" that many Palauans have come to enjoy and expect.

Closure, at least in the short run, was also reached in the sense of concerns and topics which were not escalated into major issues, and therefore did not require a great deal of the public's explicit attention. Education did not become a controversial issue because none could provide a concrete and attractive plan for using education as a means to decrease cosmopolitan tastes and other aspects of dependency, although most candidates agreed that some reorientation was necessary. Earlier, this same problem had confounded activists, the Modekngei, and idealistic outsiders.

There was also a sort of closure on the avoidance of a topic--that of political status. It was argued there was no need for Palauans to be overly concerned about such questions during the campaign. Remeliik
argued against escalating these concerns by maintaining that he would carry out the people's will, and that ultimately, Palauans would exercise broad-based democratic control by deciding on status through a referendum. This reassuring position, Remeliik's domestic standing, and the weaknesses of those who attempted to escalate status-related concerns (see pp. 317, 318 and pp. 323, 324), mitigated against them becoming a controversial issue.

In addition, none of the candidates presented a status alternative to the anticipated free association. Perhaps the lack of more discussion was partly based on a realization that to raise independence as a choice could put a candidate in an extremely vulnerable position, since to advocate autonomy might also in effect, be a position in support of economic deprivation. 75

Moreover, the need for closure on the worrisome and fundamental question of political status seemed obviated by the continuing ability of the Palauans to put off a decision, facilitated by the appearance of only moderate pressure from the United States. Both the seeming opportunity, as well as the incentives for avoiding a binding decision continued. Perhaps most important was the Palauan desire to avoid the painful horns of their development dilemma.

Before concluding this treatment of closure, other areas in which it was limited should be assessed. One indication of a lack of closure is multiple goals that conflict. Two of Remeliik's stated economic goals, that of continual improvements in standard of living and that of lessened dependence, could in fact compete. Remeliik felt that, as he looked around Palau, "many of us are living in poverty. [It is] not that we are hungry, but rather that the Palauan economy was not
providing sufficient income for families [so that they could] better their lifestyle" (Remeliik in a village). At the same time, Remeliik went on to say, "an [economic] system functions better without so much dependence. I believe that a country's independence is achieved first by having a developed economy . . . . No nation . . . can even claim to be independent without a strong and stable economic base." There was little discussion by Remeliik of how it would be possible to move towards self-reliance on the one hand, while maintaining economic prosperity on the other.

In foreign affairs, there was the potential conflict between Remeliik's assertion that Palau should project itself as an emerging, non-aligned nation, and the preference for free association. Furthermore, the U.S. might apply political or economic pressure against any Palauan attempt to detach itself from the American sphere of influence. Remeliik avoided this potential for conflict.

Another indication of a lack of closure is the presence of goals of different ranges that might conflict. Remeliik's view of free association as a short to medium range goal to reach the more distant one of political independence and economic self-reliance can be questioned. Would free association really prepare the way? Or would dependency and vulnerability continue, and even deepen? Remeliik was advocating a gradual and "lenient," transition period, but if this was the case, would such a transition occur at all?

There were other limitations to closure as well. Certain goals were emphasized but the means to reach them were not clear. "Without unity, it will be impossible to achieve other goals. [Therefore] one of my objectives is to unite the people . . . and get them to work in
harmony . . ." (Remeliik in a village). In one village Remeliik said: "I devote myself to try to put things back in place, to heal the sick and to look forward to good cooperation between the leaders and the people for the critical period in front of us." Remeliik felt that by establishing unity "all of Palau will be well-off socially, environmentally, and politically and we shall retain our Palauaness so that the people should [be] . . . comfortable and happy" (in another village). He also saw cooperation as one remedy for Palau's economic ills (see pp. 311, 312). The message was certainly attractive, almost mystical in tone.

Remeliik further maintained that "consensus" could be used to settle disputes, and to establish priorities, at all levels of government and society. But how would this really work? How would "traditional consensus" (Remeliik) operate at the national level in a society as complex and multi-faceted as contemporary Palau? Within Palau, would substantive goals and issues, especially if these involved controversy and/or painful trade-offs, be resolved and assigned priorities simply by emphasizing the desirability of unity, to be achieved through consensus? In one sense Remeliik did address this question as he maintained that for the first four years, national leaders' priority should be on internal matters. However, without national leaders taking a clear and consistent stance on matters as potentially divisive and disturbing as political status and U.S. military requirements, what would prevent such matters from periodically becoming foci for exhausting strife and controversy?

Another uncertainty was related to the limitations of the stress on loyalty as an informal means for encouraging Palau-oriented and
controlled development. The stress on loyalty, as opposed to a more ideological or institutionalized stance, occurred due to a number of factors: Palau's small scale makes a personalistic and relational, as opposed to a categorical and ideological approach, both feasible and logical. After all, in a setting such as Palau, people's assessment of leaders can be significantly based on direct observation, personal knowledge and interactions. Due to the society's small-scale, and perhaps also due to the relational and manipulative emphasis often demonstrated by Palauans, judgements on matters of national and even international importance are sometimes based largely on informal and personalistic standards. But can a judgement that a leader is loyal, largely based on personalistic criteria, even as augmented by a constitutionalist stance (i.e., reliance on the externally-oriented safeguards embedded in the constitution), really protect Palauans from domestic abuse, external intrusions, and predatory alliances between the two?

At least from the point of view of this observer, the remaining uncertainty can be stated as follows: Would national leaders over the long-run have the desire to resist the pressure for accommodation of underlying and intrusive metropolitan/donor interests given the seductiveness, and increasingly the pervasiveness, of the dependency gripping Palau? Secondly, if such an intention existed, would Remelik and the national executive have the control and power to pursue a path of Palau-oriented and controlled development, particularly if this contained aspects that irritated the United States, or another dominant and/or donor power? In other words, would the outside world let Palau
develop in its own way? The answer was far from certain, and might be largely determined, by factors having little to do with the largely personalistic indicators used to assess loyalty.

Conclusion

The relationship between conditions of dependency, how they are locally perceived, and the indigenous response is problematical and highly complex. Early dependency theory scarcely addressed this relationship, whereas a dependencia approach can do so. In fact, as the present chapter demonstrates, we cannot assume that public apprehension over dependency-related questions necessarily translates into a major focus for public scrutiny and debate. For example, widespread questioning of Palau's subsidized economy, political status and related matters, and did not escalate into focal points for intense interest and controversy during the campaign. This was despite the fact that these concerns provoked considerable unease, and involved aspects of Palau's underlying and persistent dilemma.

It is also true, however, that the concerns expressed demonstrated some indigenous recognition of the dangers and distortions associated with dependency. There was some recognition of the corrosive effects the broadening, subsidized economy on indigenous social cohesion, and productive capacities. There was also concern over the possibility of a financially crippled, "empty government." This indicated widespread anxiety over Palau's vulnerability to a reduction or withdrawal of American "aid." To keep these funds flowing, Palauans were uncomfortably aware that they might have to alter their constitution, so as to accommodate a highly disruptive military presence.
Political status and related concerns did not escalate for a variety of reasons: There was the domestic weaknesses of the leaders attempting to fan these concerns, the domestic strengths of the candidate who sought to deflect anxiety, and the fact that his position resonated with, and was faciliated by, more general conditions. As noted, there were incentives for Palauans to maintain the status quo, including the avoidance of Palau's dilemma and the fact that no concrete, convincing, and comprehensive alternative to the generally comfortable status quo was presented. Moreover the continuing ambivalence and ambiguity of Palauan leadership was facilitated by the perceived lack of overbearing pressure from the United States. From this review, we can see how local responses to development questions can be heavily conditioned, and in fact can only be appreciated, with a full understanding of relevant indigenous dynamics as these affect, and are effected by, externally-related constraints and possibilities. Dependencia theory has helped to explore this complexity.

In contrast to the deflection of political status and related concerns, the assessment of a candidate's loyalty emerged as a highly salient factor, despite the fact that the candidates generally did not try to escalate this as an issue. Nevertheless, given the widespread desire to empower leaders who would act responsibly in the face of cosmopolitan inducements, the degree of identification and loyalty attributed to a candidate was a significant determinate of the support that he received.

In addition to throwing light upon issue deflection and escalation, the saliency of the loyalty question is instructive in other ways. First, it demonstrates Palauans' continuing desire for control over
both national leaders and the development process. Secondly, the interest in identification, and particularly loyalty constituted an informal and largely implicit response to fears that Palau's conditions of dependency might change much for the worse. This indicates that some Palauans were responding in an indigenous manner to a future-oriented threat from an envisioned development scenario, a scenario which has also been focused on by dependency theory. Within Palau, the concern about loyalty reflected the same fear which had led to the development of constitutional safeguards and sanctions. In both cases, Palauans worried that the situational constraints existing in Palau might no longer be adequate to impede undesirable externally-oriented developments from occurring, thus necessitating the provision of deliberate, supplementary protective measures. In a large-scale setting, and in more harsh conditions, Palauans' apprehension over abuse of power from an alliance between irresponsible, domestic leaders and predatory outsiders might have fueled a more ideological stance. In Palau, however, the emphasis was on constitutional safeguards and loyalty.

As noted, the indicators for loyalty involved lifestyle, leadership, as well as substantive position. The assessment of a leader as identifying with, and being loyal to Palau could have a strong impact on the popular response to a substantive position. Remeliik's background and training, his record, and campaign all reinforced the impression that he identified with, and would be loyal to, Palau. Scoring high on this, and in conjunction with the other strengths of his campaign, he was able to treat a number of widespread public concerns related to political status as a non-issue.
Within Palau, in the context of the election campaign, Remeliik's position—that there was no pressing need to worry about political status and related questions—emerged as reasonably persuasive. While the limitations on closure inherent in this position helped Remeliik win the presidency, it also meant that Palau's underlying development dilemma remained intact, and might undermine nation-building. Here is an example of a limitation on closure that aided a specific mobilization attempt (i.e., the amassing of support for Remeliik's presidential victory), but which in the longer-run might have a de-stabilizing effect.

Somewhat ironically then, the greatest area of closure was the preference for avoiding having to make a binding decision over the development options facing Palau, as these were framed and embedded in Palau's underlying dilemma. By the end of the election campaign, Palauans were clearly interested in retaining options for their own preferences: the maintenance of high levels of economic support, and the enhancement of Palauan political control, partly to pursue Palauan oriented and controlled development. In the next chapter, I will discuss Remeliik's plans for a "middle path" of national development, a path which some hoped could procure all of the above-mentioned things.
CHAPTER VIII--NOTES

1 The rhetoric of the Vice-Presidential race emphasized support for the President, for the constitution, and for support between the different branches of government. This statement is based on the campaign literature of at least the two leading Vice-Presidential candidates (see Appendix D for candidate Alfonso Oiterong's leaflet) and on the statements made during a Vice-Presidential "meet-the-candidates" discussion/debate held in Ngiwal village on Babladaob on October 3, 1980 (translated and transcribed from tape).

2 A concern is defined as a subject of general interest having to do with some aspect of the political system. A public concern is not necessarily a subject of popular unease and apprehension, or of concern, in that sense. A campaign topic is an explicitly delineated area for discussion, for example, the role of education in national development. An issue is a topic around which two or more stances have crystallized, and which becomes the focus for strong sentiments and public dispute.

3 Escalate: In her book *The Politics of Inequality*, M. Sharma discusses escalation in the sense of an increase in the level of a dispute, for instance from the domain of the family to that of the village-wide political arena. Sharma's discussion includes consideration of why certain political activities do not escalate, and others that do. A general attribute of the latter, within the context of contemporary Indian villages studied by Sharma, is of a "powerful man [who] exploits and manipulates a dispute [over scarce resources] to his own interest and advantage" (Sharma 1980:89, 107). Sharma's discussion is relevant to escalation, as it is used in this dissertation. However the concept of deflection, as used in this chapter, is independently derived. Furthermore, we have seen how a highly salient concern that is not treated as a major campaign topic by leadership, can nevertheless become crucial in determining the public's view of its interests.

4 The highest level of education attained by Remeliik was his years of attendance at the University of Hawaii during 1957-59.

5 Remeliik was Clerk of Courts in 1957-63, and 1963-69, was elected to the 4th Palau Legislature and elected as its Vice Speaker in 1968, was Associated Judge of Palau's District Court in 1969-71, and then Deputy District Administrator until 1980.

6 Remeliik did not appear at a number of public engagements where other candidates spoke, and where debates took place. These included the last PC meeting, two village "meet-the-candidates" meetings, an engagement at the Micronesian Occupational College, and a meeting arranged by a Palauan teacher's federation that was just emerging at the time.
A number of informants not connected with the Remeliik camp expressed displeasure with Remeliik's absence from these meetings since they felt that his presence would have helped to demonstrate a spirit of good sportsmanship and of respect between candidates.

Of course kin connections were a resource utilized by all the candidates. For instance, during the Babildaob trip, relatives provided places to sleep and some food. Nevertheless a wide range of informants reported that, as of 1980, kinship was "breaking down" as a primary criteria on which to base support for national leaders. Rather, Palauans were becoming more issue and performance-oriented, in part due to non-traditional controversies and events occurring in Palau. In particular the Remeliik Campaign made a positive point out of a focus on performance, rather than on kin ties, during its campaign. During the Babildaob trip, one Remeliik campaigner mentioned a number of times that he was not supporting his relative, but was supporting Remeliik instead because he felt that Remeliik was better qualified. In one village, this campaigner remarked upon seeing a number of his relatives: "you must be like me. You must see the good person and support him [and even] if your relative is running, disregard this if you know [of] a better candidate."

However in one sense such contributions are important. They can demonstrate the continuing interest and connection between a candidate and a particular community. Such a leader is "still alive" as far as the community is concerned. He has shown that he is still interested in community happenings, gatherings, and the like. On the other hand, if a candidate does not exhibit such interest publically and consistently, he may be considered politically "dead" as far as the community is concerned.

There was the positive perception that Remeliik did not and would not use relationships of social indebtedness and obligation to put individuals and groups into a situation of permanent disadvantages. This was in contrast with the "godfather" image that some associated with Tmetchul.

It is true that Remeliik could rely on Peleliu with its relatively large population base, but yet from the beginning, it was also clear that Remeliik was more than a Yaoldaob candidate. Two of Remeliik's three most important campaigners were from Babldaob, one from the east coast and one from the north.

A stable government is one that is "firmly established, predictable, and consistent because it functions strictly by the constitution. It does not have favorite people, it does not have enemies . . . . A stable government will consider all people equal and treat them accordingly . . . " (my emphasis). From Why We Support Him, a Remeliik campaign leaflet.
In one sense, it was remarkable that Remeliik's campaign literature pointed with surprise to the lack of a "pro-business" attitude in Palau. After all, the activists, a number of whom were now influential in the Remeliik Campaign, had been telling Palauans for years that businessmen were out to "sell" the Islands. This activist stance, which involved some distrust of Palau's economic, as well as political leaders, may have mellowed somewhat as the activists themselves became more "Establishment." At this point, suffice to say that Remeliik was seen by his supporters and by some others as the leader who was most likely to "protect" Palauans, their culture and environment from the disruptive and possibly degrading effects of rapid and western-inspired, socio-economic change.

After five years of elementary school under the Japanese, Tmetchul went to high school under the Americans. Reportedly, he also spent a semester studying law at a university in the Philippines.

PDC had 68 to 86 of them. This is based on the figures of the Palau District Planning Office (1978) and of the Revenue Office (1977/78) respectively.

Some of Tmetchul's young workers had the reputation of being extremely loyal. They helped with the construction of his campaign headquarters in Koror. In turn Tmetchul reportedly helped these young men in various ways, for example, if they encountered legal difficulties.

After Palau's rejection of the constitution for the Federated States of Micronesia in July of 1978, the Palauans who had been representatives to the Congress of Micronesia became members of the 6th Palau Legislature. Tmetchul was on of these.

Though many of these politicians were from, or had substantial kin ties to Airai, a number of them had spent years living in Koror where they were involved in business, served in the legislature or on political status commissions.

In our attitude survey of people, of the 10 respondents who identified themselves as Seventh Day Adventists, nine said they were for Tmetchul. Of the 12 respondents who identified themselves as Modekngei, one was for Tmetchul while eight were for Remeliik. Of course as a sample this is extremely small. However, the identification of Tmetchul with an SDA block and Remeliik with the Modekngei is also based on informant comments and interviews as well as media accounts.

Tmetchul utilized media to some extent. Tmetchul's people came out with T-shirts (these said "Roman Centurian") and other materials. But unlike Salii, the Tmetchul campaign did not produce professionally-done glossy posters. Tmetchul did have a television spot, but unlike
Salii's, the Tmetchul spot concentrated on the candidates' qualifications, record, and proposals.

21 I did not get the chance to accompany Tmetchul on any of these trips. That is why I refer to them as "reported."

22 In one municipality, three presidential candidates reportedly gave substantial amounts of food and money to villagers. According to an informant from there, the villagers were amused when they calculated that each of the few votes received probably cost that candidate $50. Other incidents similar to this were reported.

23 The fear of an emerging "dictator" in Palau had surfaced before, namely during the unity/separation and constitutional controversies.

24 Palau's reservoir is in Aira.

25 In 1976, Salii went to work as the first Director of the Trust Territory Office of Planning and Statistics and then became Director of the Trust Territory Department of Resources and Development.

26 Both the male and female heads of the Idid Clan, and thereby of the Yaoldaob Confederacy had considerable exposure to and experience in the international arena. For instance the Ibedul had served with the U.S. Army, having been stationed in Europe. After this he was heavily involved with the anti-superport campaign. During this, and for status negotiations the Ibedul traveled widely to conferences and meetings in Hawaii and the mainland U.S. Moreover both the Ibedul and the Bilung were involved in contemporary business activities. In part their influence rested upon western-derived and acquired characteristics. That is why I refer to such leadership as "neo-traditional."

27 This term was used by a pro-Salii informant to describe these individuals in a neutral-to-positive sense. But for some Palauans not oriented towards Salii, the prominent participation by such "big shots" in the Salii campaign was viewed negatively.

28 "Sophisticated" refers to materials and posters that are professionally done and to electronic media, such as radio and especially television.

29 Salii's television spot featured an American country-western song, the "Green, Green Hills of Home," being performed by a Palauan singer who lived in Saipan. As this music played, aerial views of Palau provided a backdrop for a large image of Salii's face that faded on and off the screen. There were other candidates, such as Tmetchul and Remelik, who had at least one television spot. But theirs were either understated, or concentrated on qualifications and substantive points.
Reportedly, when some female elders saw the Salii posters they asked; "is it really Salii or someone else in the photograph?"

This outside orientation to the Salii campaign took a concrete expression with the counting of absentee ballots. Salii picked up substantially more votes from this than did Remeliik. However, Salii's advantage could not come close to making up for Remeliik's far greater strength within Palau.

Salii preferred "large public gatherings and did little house to house campaigning," according to Shuster (1982:350).

These qualifications were given by the "official" PC as their reason for nominating Salii.

Shuster makes a similar point to that made in the text. "According to Palauan social mores, a candidate never boasts his accomplishments or qualifications . . . . [Instead], that is to be done by another person, . . . [and more generally] good campaign style follows social mores which require self-effacing behavior, self-sacrifice and concern for the community" (1983:122-123).

Shuster so describes Palauans' reaction to Salii's campaign, i.e., that Salii's style was viewed as "very American" (1982:349).

After high school in Guam, Niraked's job experience included being senior interpreter and translator for the Palau District in 1955-56, District Prosecutor in 1958-61, a Law Clerk for the Office of Attorney General in 1962-66. Niraked was licensed to practice law in the Trust Territory, was the first Micronesian to head the Micronesian Legal Service, and had additional experience as a legal consultant.

Dr. Meller (personal communication) reports that, based on his sources on Micronesia during the 1960s, Niraked had a reputation as a less-than-successful political candidate. It is true that between the start of the COM in 1965 and 1974, Niraked was defeated in 4 out of 5 of his bids for a Senate seat. (See Shuster 1982:266 for a discussion of details.) However, as Shuster points out, despite Niraked's reputation as a "loser" (same, 267), he gained "valuable experience during these senate races" and emerged as one of the political, "heavy-weights" in Palau's contemporary politics. My data from the field tends to support Shuster's position. According to my informants, though Niraked suffered from a political reputation problem, he was very much an influential political force to be reckoned with in the 1970s and into the 80s. After all, Niraked was a member of the 6th Palau Legislature, boycotted it in 1979, was elected to the 7th Palau Legislature, appointed as head of the Land Authority in 1980, and also served as head of the PC/HEM's public education effort for the constitutional referendum of July 1980.
Though Niraked won his seat, he just made this by coming in 5th among the legislators running at large.

Niraked viewed land as "a basic support for the future life of [the Palauan] economy" and as the "basis for [Palauan] control and ... freedom in the future." He regarded the constitutional safeguards on land as a recognition that "control of land is both a basic resource, and the basis for [the exercise] of political power."

"People are asking, why do we have to give up so much of our land to the U.S. military ...? I would like to point out that the U.S. is asking for a total ... of land ... that amounts to more than 1/2 of Palau's useable, municipal lands" (Niraked in interview by R. Idechong).

In his treatment of the election Shuster contrasts the "very Palauan" style of Niraked with the westernized approach of Salii (1982:349). These two candidates, in fact, can accurately be contrasted in this way. However, as to a Palauan style, Remeliik probably matched Niraked in this, and was a lot more influential. Moreover Tmetchul probably came close to matching the indigenous flavor of Niraked's style, and like Remeliik, was more influential.

After elementary school, Ramarui had three years of vocational training under the Japanese. This was the highest a Palauan could rise in the educational system at the time. Under the Americans, Ramarui completed high school, special training in Guam, and then college in the United States.

For three years, he had been a member of the Palau Council, had also been Vice-President of the Palau Congress, and Vice-President of the advisory Council of Micronesia. In 1967, Ramarui was elected to the Congress of Micronesia as a senator.

Over the years Ramarui had been an elementary school teacher in Palau, Principal of the public high school, Director of Education for the District, and then Director of Education for the Trust Territory. Ramarui held this post at the outset of the campaign.

At least some Remeliik campaigners and supporters expressed the view that confrontationist debates were an "American [campaign] style." In view of this, one Remeliik campaigner discounted comments made to the effect that Remeliik was either intellectually ill-equipped or "afraid" of such debates as a negative factor for the Remeliik campaign. Given Remeliik's minimal participation in these, and his impressive voter support, this informant's assessment proved correct.
During one talk Ramarui mentioned how he had been working for the Trust Territory for 30 years. Of these "I have been in Saipan for the last 20," Ramarui said (Ramarui at Palau High School talk). As Ramarui tended to emphasize this over other qualifications, this had a counter-productive effect and cut into his campaign. The same dynamic worked against Salii. As regards both these candidates, there was some sentiment that they had achieved prominence at the Trust Territory level and now scarcely looked backwards toward Palau.

In question 4 of the survey we asked; "the reason you voted for --- and against ---." Remeliik and Tmetchul came up as the most frequent opposed pair by a margin of better than two to one over the next most frequent pair.

He got 321 votes from this region, as compared with the second and third-runner who got 102 and 97 votes respectively.

Kayangel/Ngarchelong comprised one senate voting district. This was referred to as "SD1." Other municipalities were similarly grouped.

Salii is from Angaur. Some view this as an island of low status. In any case, it has a population that is quite small for a political base. Population figures for Anguar: Palau Community Action Survey (1981) figure or 138 for Anguar's resident population. The Palau District figure for 1978/79 is 575. Notice the extreme variation between these two figures. One possible explanation is that the PCAA figure does not include Palauans from Anguar residing outside the island. Nevertheless, I would imagine that the correct figure is between these two for Anguar's population, perhaps at 267.

Shuster's assessment of this factor differs somewhat from my own. Shuster describes the Ibedul and Bilung as being "very effective at selling" Salii's candidacy (1982:350), and moreover that their efforts in combination with Salii's "heavy use of media, active friends" [including the help he received from Palauan leaders working in Saipan], etc. "very effectively promoted" Salii's candidacy (1983:124), particularly in Koror. I feel this underestimates the backlash effects, discussed in the text of the dissertation, even for central Koror, and particularly for the outlying hamlets.

Remeliik got 57 votes in Airai. Though not surprisingly, this total was much less than Tmetchul's total of 213 votes, it is also true that Remeliik's vote was considerably stronger than either Salii's (15 votes) or Niraked's (10 votes) showing in that municipality.

I heard it repeatedly stated that Remeliik, had in effect been campaigning for "10 or 20 years," by developing a strong reputation as someone who cared about, and for, Palauans.
At Ibodong, the educational center for the Modekngei, Remeliik got 57 out of 58 votes. In other areas of strong Modekngei influence he also did very well.

As one of Remeliik's campaign managers noted, Remeliik was "not an aggressive, combative person," preferring to be "polite" and restrained and to make points in a somewhat indirect manner. Remeliik did not tend to respond effectively to the verbal initiatives of other candidates. He was not personally comfortable with directly challenging opponents. These points were expressed by Remeliik campaign strategists, as well as by other informants. Shuster makes a similar point (1983:126).

As reported by one of his close associates, who was also one of his campaign advisors, by late 1980 Tmetchul was "bounding upward" after his low-point at the hands of the People's Committee in 1979 and early 1980. During that time, Tmetchul was "pushed so low" by the PC, which seemed to "step on Tmetchul [while] he was down." This may have violated the Palauan sense of balanced competition, the same sense that Tmetchul had offended with his worrisome activities in later 1978/79.

From the mid-1970s on, some Palauans expressed the view that businessmen could not be trusted. This was the activist view and was adopted to some extent by the PC. Two days before the election, an informant expressed a negative or at least a cautious view of Palauan businessmen. "With the businessmen, you have to be really careful. They are like crocodiles, and are very dangerous. They only think about dollar signs. That is what they dream about, [as they] try to buy all of Palau." Just days after the election, a similar view was expressed. However, Tmetchul's strong showing, given the economic emphasis of his campaign, may have indicated that though fears over this were still salient, their intensity had lessened somewhat.

A point of view that could be taken is that because Remeliik won with approximately 30% of the vote, this did not constitute a significant endorsement. Admittedly, Remeliik won as a minority candidate. However this being said, his victory indicated a significant degree of popular approval for a number of reasons. These are (1) his victory was generally regarded in this light by informants. The informant base included over 60 Palauans, strictly concerning the national elections and involved the presidential candidates themselves, their advisors, staff, supporters, opponents, and relatively disinterested observers. (2) the fact that Remeliik's strength indicated both by informants and election returns was spread most evenly throughout Palau, in comparison with other candidates. (3) He received the support of influential groups such as the Modekngei. (4) Along with other PC-derived candidates, Remeliik faced a unified Tmetchul block. Salii and Remeliik were clearly from a PC background. Salii, as will be remembered, had been nominated by the "official" PC. Salii, Remeliik, and to a lesser extent Niraked and perhaps Ramarui were all to a degree splitting the PC vote.
Given this circumstance, Remeliik's victory was impressive. (5) A simple deduction made on the basis of voter returns would be both inadequate and misleading. First of all, returns must be handled with caution as evidence, particularly in reference to a political system as dense, complex, and personalistic as that of Palau. Secondly, the voter attitude survey conducted as part of field research indicates that the primary opposition was between Remeliik and Tmetchul (45%). The second most common opposition (20%) was that between Tmetchul and Salii. As opposed to combining the vote totals of Salii and Tmetchul, the survey indicates that though only 30+ percent of the voters cast their ballots for Remeliik, 75.6 percent of the voters were opposed to Tmetchul, and of these, 65 percent were voting for their Remeliik or Salii. In other words they were supporting past leaders of the PC. Based on the survey, there is perhaps some indication that 75 percent of the voters were suspicious of Tmetchul's strong leadership style and/or rapid, foreign-oriented development, which Tmetchul seemed to prefer. A copy of this survey is in Appendix D. (6) Other researchers (i.e., Shuster, Quimby/Iyechad) also support the interpretation presented in this dissertation, i.e., that Remeliik's victory indicated some preference for both the leadership style and development mode most directly associated with him. (7) And finally, both Tmetchul and Salii to some extent seemed to tone down the contrast between their view of development and that most directly articulated by Remeliik, and to a lesser extent by Niraked and Ramarui.

59Ramarui discussed his philosophy of education in a number of articles. See "Putting Educational Critiques into Perspective" in the Micronesian Reporter, volume xxvll #1, first quarter, 1979.

60Some Palauan parents in conversation with me, and reportedly with others, expressed the view that continually increasing opportunities for advanced education, travel, and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure was quite beneficial, since this was regarded as a means to enhance one's career objectives and standard of living. In fact this may be the majority view.

61Salii felt that Palauans could afford to be more relaxed and allow other people (i.e., foreigners) to come in and "help develop the economy." He felt that to accommodate this, Palauans would be willing to relax their laws and regulations in order to "create a more inviting environment for foreign investment." In 1980, Salii felt confident that Palauans were "more development oriented" than they had been in the past. He did recognize that in the past, there had been a fear among Palauans that their land would be alienated that they might become "second class citizens" as a result of foreign domination coupled with an inappropriate development mode. Salii attributed much of that fear to the fact that before, Palauans "did not have political control over their own government." They would have such control with the start of constitutional government, he maintained (interview).
This village is located in an area of northern Babladoab that would have been heavily impacted by the superport project.

The Remeliik campaign, or at least some of its activist-derived proponents, seemed to regard political independence as the most desirable long-term goal for Palau. But generally within the Remeliik camp there was at least some ambiguity. A Remeliik campaigner in a village remarked that "ties between us and the United States [will] have to be done permanently." Such "permanent ties" may not be compatible with independence.

For instance, it was a matter of domestic prestige to demonstrate that your leader could obtain a better "deal" from the Americans.

Tmetchul stated that "an important role of the President is to protect our constitution so that no foreign influence can affect it" (Tmetchul at Palau High School talk).

In his campaign leaflet Salii saw a compact as "an instrument that will enable the United States to develop even closer ties and cooperation [with] us in the years ahead . . . ."

Remeliik's ambivalence is further demonstrated by his statement in one village, in which he compared Palau's situation to that of the Marshalls. "There is not much difference between us and the Marshalls," he said. "In fact, we can get an even better arrangement . . . . since we have larger areas of land that the U.S. wants . . . . and as opposed to the Federated States of Micronesia we offer much of our land to the United States" (my emphasis).

Dewey (1978) distinguishes between three types of controls in coordinated group activity. One of these are safeguards: "those forces which tend to control social action without themselves being specifically social," and which arise from the "situational context of the society or are provided by the technical means existing within the society" [and which] usually operate to deter undesirable actions . . . ." (page 33). Dewey points out that a "situational safeguard" in many traditional societies is offered by their small-scale. Interaction is carried on between "fairly small, face-to-face groups which live in relative isolation, and have non-market, non-monetized economies." Within this context, a "complex network of reciprocities exist[s] . . . [and this] interdependence . . . creates . . . a means of controlling one's fellows" (page 35). My usage of the term situational constraint is akin to Dewey's situation safeguard. Moreover informants themselves recognized that the small-scale of their society was hopefully a situational constraint that could impede unwanted elite development.

In a paper examining leadership in voluntary association, Dewey (1978) argues that the development of effective leaders "hinges in part
paradoxically on the development of controls over the actions of the leaders themselves," so as to assure followers "that they [can exercise] control over leaders" (page 33). Clearly the Palauans have demonstrated a desire to exercise such control.

On the other hand, supporters of Tmetchul tended to view their candidate's boldness in charting out an economic development path for Palau in positive terms. As one close supporter put it, Tmetchul was a "man of ideas" and action who "keeps us progressing." This informant told me that she preferred working with such an individual. After all, if developments went too far, then others could move to control this. This informant agreed, however, that "there is a fear about going [i.e., developing Palau] too fast." But she asked, "who is going to leave who behind?" As she saw it, Palauans would have the right and opportunities to control Tmetchul if he abuses his position. If Tmetchul moved too fast, "we could work to stabilize his progress," this informant said. However, it was clear that some other Palauans felt much less comfortable with Tmetchul and with the mode of development that he advocated.

There was also a negative reaction to candidates who had been away from Palau for long periods doing Trust Territory work who now "wanted to come [back] in, and who felt they could win just because they were famous, or well-known outside of Palau." This sentiment was expressed to me by a number of informants.

This view was in part based on Tmetchul's relationships with Japanese businessmen. During his time as head of the Status Commission and afterwards, he made frequent trips to Japan and seemed to feel comfortable dealing with the Japanese. Secondly, he had an affinity for the regimentation and discipline which some Palauans associate with the German, and particularly the Japanese period. A close relative and associate of Tmetchul, who was one of my informants, traced Tmetchul's orientation back to Tmetchul's exposure to, and work with the Japanese before and during World War Two. Another informant, this one a supporter of Remeliik, described Tmetchul as in touch with Palauan culture, but with an overlay derived from the Japanese period.

The fact that Oiterong, a college-educated candidate, was the successful Vice-Presidential candidate does not necessarily cloud this picture. After all Oiterong did not emphasize his foreign-derived education as a qualification during the campaign. On the other hand, he did stress his indigenous attributes including identification and loyalty, without being overbearing about it. This style matched that of the successful presidential candidate, i.e., Remeliik. And finally, the Vice-Presidential race, as has been shown elsewhere, cannot be treated as being of equal importance with the presidential race. Therefore, it cannot be used as an indicator of the popular response to candidates.

According to Remeliik development efforts should start with the individual, moving through the community, towards the national level.
His campaign emphasized that the states in the new republic should provide the organizational and popular base for participatory, economic development. However, the states should be able to count on the national government for needed guidance and support. Moreover, the national government would have the task of coordinating state efforts and of integrating them into a national development plan.

Objectively, perhaps the Palauans could make up for some of the loss of United States support by diversifying their donor base, and/or through other activities and strategies. However, many islanders appeared to believe that the status choice could be a stark one indeed, and was between a continued high standard of living, in association with the United States, or independence, with little or no foreign support.

The position that loyalty was a highly salient factor is supported by informant data, only the most vivid of which has been quoted in the text, as well as by the work of other researchers. Shuster states that "the two men with the greatest amount of identification with Palau's recent grass-roots causes" won the presidency and vice-presidency of Palau (1983:129).

Actually, a number of remarks made by Remeliik and his campaigners did allude to the absence of one or two of the candidates from Palau, for long periods of time. In a few instances, remarks were also made to the effect that such candidates lacked an adequate familiarity with Palauan conditions, wants and needs. These remarks, however, were usually made indirectly, and did not constitute a major aspect of the Remeliik campaign.
CHAPTER IX
FIRST DIRECTIONS

This chapter concerns the initial expressive and organizational directions formulated as Palau's national, constitutional government began. The treatment is divided into two parts. The first, "celebrating nationhood," concerns the organization and mobilization of resources, and especially the celebrations to mark the emergence of the constitutional Republic of Palau at the end of January, 1981. The fact that this symbolic event was mounted at all was remarkable, given the impediments to mobilizing community interest.

The national symbols that were utilized are examined. The themes are noted, as well as the part these played in creating an idealized, symbolic environment, which was invoked during the celebrations. This had an exhilarating effect, particularly since an image of Palau as a national society was presented. Palau's continuing dependency, vulnerability, and other impediments to indigenous development were temporarily banished from the scene.

The second part of this chapter concerns the Executive's initial efforts to translate its understanding of Remliik's "mandate" into concrete policies. As the new government started, the emphasis became that of further articulating, and beginning to implement national goals and priorities.

From the beginning, there was hope that the new government, and particularly the Executive, would formulate a national development plan. The beginnings of Executive direction emerged with the
President-Elect's inaugural address and from Palau's first presidential news conference. Both of these occurred on January 31, 1981. Five months later, Remeliik articulated a "middle path" for Palau's development. It presented issues of dependency and a set of national goals, with an explicitness that was unprecedented. However, like the celebration of nationhood, the middle course for selective modernization existed almost entirely on a symbolic level. It also rested on a number of questionable development assumptions. To turn this into a concrete, much less a viable, policy, delicate balancing between diverse and potentially conflicting components was required. Moreover the path advocated did not directly assault Palau's development dilemma.

**Celebrating Nationhood**

In July 1980, an Inauguration Committee was created, composed of Palauans from the District Government, the Legislature, and other Palauans involved with community affairs, and some in private business. It was under the Transition Committee of the Palau Commission on Status and Transition.

By late January, "Plau [was] set for a huge celebration" (Pacific Daily News headline of that date). As the PDN reported, a long list of foreign dignitaries and representatives, Trust Territory and U.S. military personnel, Palauan leaders and school children were set to participate. The Inauguration Committee and staff had swelled to over 90 members, with a budget of approximately $166,000 (Pacific Daily News 1981 January 23:6).

Many (150) foreign representatives from more than 30 nations and other entities were invited to attend, these included: American Samoa,
Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, the Northern Marianas, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, and the United Nations. News media, particularly from Japan and the United States, were also invited (see Appendix E). They were invited to witness celebrations and the ceremony that would "mark the beginning of self-government [in Palau], [and of] an independence ... which is rightfully ours." The invitation also mentioned how Palau had "struggled through periods under . . . [foreign] administrations" (invitation).

Organization of these celebrations took place amidst various uncertainties. After all, Remeliik had only been elected by a slight plurality. This edge may have been eroding by this time, given the initial challenges which faced Palau's chief executive (see Chapter X). One of these was the developing competition and mistrust between strong supporters of the Chief Executive in this branch of government, and the Palauan Congress, particularly the Senate (see Chapter X). The resulting tension contributed to the uncertainty over inauguration planning (also see Shuster 1981b:10). There was also a deadlock over the selection of some Congressional officers, most seriously in the Senate. This impeded the operations of both houses of Congress, including the assistance they could give to inauguration efforts.

Furthermore, there was uncertainty over whether the President, or one or both branches of Congress, had primary responsibility for the inauguration. The level of funding was also uncertain. Initially the Trust Territory had provided $30,000, less than 1/4 of what the Inauguration Committee had requested. Palau's Senate also indicated that it could provide only limited funding, though contributions from
the private sector made up for some of this.\textsuperscript{2} Moreover the time left to finalize plans grew short.

Generally support for inaugural preparations was uneven. Factional loyalties competed with the national perspective, promulgated as part of the event. The Executive and the Inauguration Committee emphasized that the ceremonies were to mark the start of national, constitutional government. Not everyone, however, viewed the preparations in this way. Some Palauans wondered whether the inauguration was primarily meant to "advertise" Remeliik and his administration. Informants reported that many Palauans who had voted against Remeliik "did not give a damn" about the inauguration, while those who had supported him supported inaugural preparations, though there were exceptions to this.\textsuperscript{3}

There was also a lack of enthusiasm among some chiefs, since in their eyes, chiefly authority had been sharply reduced with the adoption of the constitution, which Remeliik had strongly supported. Some viewed the reduction of chiefly authority as having been championed by Remeliik.

Moreover, there was some indication that one or two of Remeliik's political rivals were attempting to utilize the dissatisfaction of some chiefs to fuel a broader, anti-Remliik movement. This failed to materialize.\textsuperscript{4} But partly due to the effort, reportedly some of Palau's leadership, particularly on Babladaob, was giving a mixed or even negative message about whether to support the inauguration.

The head of the sub-committee on food and beverages described community response, based on the amount of resources that were contributed. At least one village totally refused to cooperate. A more usual pattern, though, was that only part of the food which had
been pledged by a village would be delivered. One village pledged 1,000 pounds of taro, but it delivered this uncooked. Another pledged five sea turtles, one sea bass, and fried bananas. The fried bananas were delivered but not the rest. Another village pledged ten turtles but delivered seven.

The Inauguration Committee, in order to mobilize support, relied significantly upon relatively young, college educated Palauans. Their self-conscious and cosmopolitan awareness of the need for Palau to display a national identity led them to support the inauguration event. The perspective of these Palauans, and the problems encountered, were somewhat akin to those which had confronted anti-superport activists during that controversy. Then as now, some Palauans criticized the prominent involvement of the young, western-educated Palauans. Many of these recent college graduates had been away from Palau for extended periods of time, had just recently returned, and might lack the knowledge and prestige to mobilize community support. Some of the young people agreed that they must take a cautious, subordinate position. They also felt, however, that they had useful skills (such as in writing proposals for external funding), and the energy and motivation to contribute importantly to inauguration efforts. They felt, moreover, that such a contribution was particularly necessary given the lack of interest, and even opposition, of some leaders to inaugural events. More generally the difficulties of the Inauguration Committee remained within manageable bounds.

Community support for inauguration preparations, though uneven and of moderate intensity, was significant nonetheless. According to one
estimate, without it the inauguration would have cost $150,000, while with the community support that was received, the figure was roughly cut in half.

As the inauguration drew nearer, Palauans' interest increased and even enthusiasm was generated. An editorial in a high school newspaper on January 1 said: "... After years of being pushed aside in our own home, we will now rule again, protecting the interests of our children and lands. For the first time, in many, many years we are the owners of our home! ... Palau stands strong and proud. How wonderful it is to be a Palauan at this time ..." (January, 1981).

The symbolic orientation of the Inauguration was a matter of some concern. On the one hand, at least according to Palau's Chief Executive and the Inauguration Committee, the Inauguration should announce the emergence of the nation of Palau to the rest of the world and as has been shown, a long list of foreign guests was invited. The Inauguration should also reinforce among Palauans a sense of domestic unity, social and political integration, and national consciousness (see also Shuster 1981a:11). It should also be good fun. To meet these expectations some felt that the celebrations should be carried out in a distinctively Palauan style. It was also realized, however, that a traditional model did not exist for expressing pan-Palauan unity and political integration.

Actually, there was no one view about whether the celebrations should be designed primarily for Palauans, or to make an external impression. In part this was solved by having some of the celebrations directed mostly toward Palauans while others were mainly for the international community. For instance, an "inauguration ball" on the
night of January 31st was by "invitation only" and was primarily designed for the foreign dignitaries. At the same time, in another part of Koror, there was free public entertainment, which, in fact, a great many Palauans attended.

The substantive concern over whether the inauguration should be primarily internally or externally oriented recalls the concern over identification that was so salient during the recent national elections. But unlike that event, during this one there was no sharp dichotomy. Rather inaugural activities could be and were decided on a case-by-case basis, without an overall decision on the issue. The eclectic mix that resulted perhaps reflected the integrative and absorptive capacities of modern Palau. Another message, probably unintended, was that Palauan identity was mixed and ambivalent. Clearly there was some concern over whether inaugural events were, and/or should have been primarily internal or external in orientation, indicating that identification was still a salient concern.

An effort was made to consciously formulate a number of symbols for the enhancement of Palau's national identity, and this accelerated with the proximity of the upcoming inauguration events. During 1980, a national flag contest was held, with the objective of finding the design that would be "... most evocative of the traditional and cultural heritage, hopes, and aspirations of the people of Palau."

The design selected featured a goldent-yellow full moon against a blue background. The reasons for this selection were explained by Palau's House of Elected Members; "The Palau National Flag is a golden-yellow full moon upon a sky-blue background. Palauans of all islands have had a traditional and emotional affinity for the moon. The
Palauan full moon represents the peak of cyclic activity of the earth [and the best time for]... celebrations.... The full moon blazes in symbolism of our Palauan national unity and destiny, the blue background symbolizing the final passage of the foreign... authority from our land. The full moon gives a feeling of warmth, tranquility, peace... and domestic unity" (HEM resolution 089, July 13, 1980).

Although the design elicited mixed reactions in Palau, when the flag was displayed internationally, Palauans reacted with enthusiasm. It accompanied Palau's delegation to the South Pacific Arts Festival to New Guinea in July. According to Legislator Oiterong, one of those who went to the SPAF, when Palauans saw their national flag raised there, they were "very excited [because]... at the festival, they considered [Palau]... a country." A number of other informants who went to the SPAF, also expressed this view.

Also in late 1980, a bill was passed for a commission to develop a national anthem. As with the contest for the flag, community and traditional experts were utilized as advisors in creating the anthem (which appears in Appendix E). The anthem speaks of the strength of Palauan traditions, Palauan pride, and of aspirations for a united land governed justly and well.11

By the time of the inauguration, in addition to the flag and anthem, two other national symbols were employed. One of these, the kabékel, was the traditional war canoe. The last kabékel had been constructed 50 years before this time. Their utilitarian function had ceased with the pacification of colonial rule. But in 1980, as part of a broader stress on cultural awareness and revitalization, two kabékel were constructed
using the traditional design. The first of these was launched in Ngeschar village in February. Although this occurred on a work-day, the launching ceremony was very well attended by a crowd estimated at 1,000. Many Palauans and some Americans, including government officials, were on hand to witness the launching and to congratulate the Palauans. The next day in Koror, High Commissioner Winkel and Ruth Van Cleve, a Department of Interior official, were presented with models of a kabékel. In June, the second kabékel, built in Airai, was launched, during a ceremony that was well-attended.

A number of informants commented on the two kabékel. First, that they were a symbol of cultural pride and assertiveness. It will be remembered that in old Palau, these were war canoes. Second, that kabékel might heighten Palauans' sense of cultural distinctiveness. After all, "only Palau had kabékel." Third, the canoes were something that Palauans had heard about, but which many had not seen. Building the canoes again and seeing them paddled evoked a sense of cultural revitalization and resurgency. There were other themes as well.

As soon as the first kabékel appeared, it was a referent for political rhetoric. Speaker of the Legislature Nakamura, at the Ngeschar launching said that the canoe was a good model for Palauans since to operate it effectively, all paddlers have to work together towards a common goal. During the inauguration ceremonies, one highlight was the race between the canoes (see p. 384). This reportedly tapped into the undercurrent of competition in a highly visible, productive fashion.

Kabékel were also used to convey the necessity for Palauans to build on their own traditional and other cultural strengths, and use
these as a support for the task of nation-building. The remarks of Van Cleve and Winkel about the Ngeschar kabékel may have contributed to a Palauan impression that the Trust Territory Government was eager to support Palauans in their cultural reassertion efforts, and even in nation-building. Moreover during his inauguration address, President Remelik commented on the race between the canoes.\(^\text{12}\)

Another symbol was the bái. In old Palau, these striking buildings served as the meeting-houses for village chiefs. Unlike the canoes, traditionally-constructed bái were not entirely gone from the scene in 1980, and community meeting-houses are still very much in use.\(^\text{13}\) During the inauguration festivities bái or their replicas were utilized in a number of instances, generally to evoke a sense of constructive deliberation and consensus.

Inauguration events occurred in rapid succession in various parts of Koror and Airai. On January 28 foreign guests arrived at the airport. An honor guard of Palauan policemen in dress uniforms and carrying rifles marched up beside the aircraft. Passengers exited under Palauan and American flags. Next a troop of Palauan dancers came out from the terminal, and danced up to the aircraft. The Vice-President of the Republic was on hand to greet the visitors.

On the 29th a ship from Yap, carrying Micronesians to Palau's celebrations, arrived at Palau's harbor at Malakal. Despite poor weather, this arrival was well-attended.\(^\text{14}\) A school marching band moved up and down the dock. Then Palauan dancers, the same troop of mostly high school students that had danced at the airport, performed on the dock. The Ibedul and Vice-President Oiterong made welcoming remarks. The Governor of Yap spoke as well.
In the evening, there was a variety show. Most of the crowd of approximately 900 was quite young, being either in grade or high school. Interspersed were some of the foreign dignitaries. Traditional and historical Palauan dancing was performed. In general the entertainment was eclectic, featuring Guam-based, "Polynesian" numbers, other dancing, and skits.15

On the 30th, more visitors arrived at the airport. There they were met by Palauan, "national escorts" who drove them to the bái at Airai. Most of the day was taken up with water-related events. This included speedboat races and was capped by the race between the two kabékel. This race was the subject of avid interest, with many bets over which canoe would win. By this time the crowd attending was very large and tightly packed,16 and there was more dancing.

On the 31st, an inauguration parade marched through the streets of Koror towards the athletic field where the ceremony would take place. This parade contained contingents of Palauan school children dressed to represent the different historical periods in Palau. The first group was traditional Palauans. Next, behind their respective flags, came school children dressed as Britains, Spaniards, Germans, Japanese, and Americans. The Americans were represented as a Seabee (naval construction) detachment, along with their motto; "seabee can do."17 After this came a final contingent of students dressed as traditional Palauans, holding Palauan flags.

Numerous floats were also in the parade. At least one depicted the former Japanese administration. A young Palauan was dressed as a Admiral complete with a sword, driver, horse and carriage. Another float welcomed visitors to the Republic of Palau, and displayed flags
of various countries. There were also floats representing the different branches and departments of the national government, the states, the private sector, and different occupations.

In addition to the floats, there were numerous marching contingents, including a U.S. Navy band. The press was also very much in evidence. They, other visitors and Palauans furiously snapped pictures as the parade moved down the street, flanked on both sides by a dense crowd. The parade ended with the group of Palauans dressed traditionally entering the inauguration field. The anthem of each country which had administered Palau was then played, culminating with Palau's anthem. Parachutists also descended unto the field, with the designs of United States, United Nations, Trust Territory, and Palauan flags on their parachutes.

Remarks were then made by various Trust Territory officials, Palauan leaders, and other public figures. Chief Ngeraklang, a highly respected leader and cultural historian, discussed the five countries which have had a direct impact on Palau. "Palau was well-developed when" the English arrived, he said. He described some of Palau's material culture, and recounted how the Ibedul of that time had been quite fascinated by some aspects of the knowledge and technology possessed by the English. As Ngeraklang pointed out, over the centuries the Palauans have acquired many valuable materials and techniques from the West. The theme of Palauan leaderships' interest in and success at obtaining valuable innovations through their associations with foreigners has been noted by many who have studied Palau (see Chapter II). As regards the United States, Ngeraklang emphasized the further development of education. He stated: "because of this education we
have been able to see the world . . . through its [i.e., the American]
democratic system we have been able to compete for the knowledge
available in the world . . . " [Today] " . . . we are independent,
we have a new canoe."

A number of themes are discernable here. First, the familiar
Palauan stress on competition. Second, Palauan interest in the
opportunities that a foreign education can provide. Third, the
inculcation of democratic principles. And fourth, the view of Palau
as an emerging, independent nation. Another theme discussed by Chief
Ngiraklang, that of internal harmony and cooperation, was in fact the
most pervasive during the inauguration.

On the evening of the 31st a program of "inaugural sunset
entertainment" was held at the playing field. Once again, the
entertainment was varied. Some of the younger Palauans, especially,
enjoyed the American popular music. As thousands of Palauans attended
this entertainment, an "inaugural ball" was held in another part of
Koror. This was an event primarily meant to entertain the foreign
guests. Moses Uludong, a politician with an activist background, was
Master of Ceremonies. He apologized for any slips of protocol,
remarking that "first births [of a nation] are always difficult."

During the evening, gifts were presented to Palau by representatives
of a number of nations, including Papua New Guinea. The Papua New
Guineans stated that the start of Palau's constitutional government
marked a " . . . significant step for [the political evolution] . . . of
Palau." Uludong took the opportunity to mention the geographical
proximity of Papua New Guinea, and the cultural affinities. He also
pointed out Palau's proximity to the Philippines, suggesting that an air-link be established.

On the next day, February 1, the foreign guests were taken on a picnic to the "rock islands." Reportedly, this was a huge success. So ended Palau's celebration of nationhood.

It had been a heterogenous mix of domestic and foreign, historical and contemporary elements. In all Palauans were portrayed in a confident and assertive light, with the realities of dependence and vulnerability being de-emphasized. Instead, the symbolic environment that prevailed for a few days evoked the sense of an emerging nation, eager to increase economic and cultural ties with a broad range of countries, particularly in the Pacific. Supported by unity, consensus, other cultural strengths, and democratic principles, Palauans were pictured as establishing political control, as foreign authority vanished from the scene.

**Executive Objectives and Priorities**

In the weeks and months after his election, Remelik listed the following as vital tasks facing the executive branch: its organization, selection of a cabinet, and formulation of economic plans. To help organize the Executive, Remelik established a task force, including some of his closest supporters, a number of whom had activist backgrounds.

Consistent with his emphasis during the election campaign, Remelik regarded the forging of unity and stability as vital objectives. This was a major emphasis in Remelik's inauguration address. Stressing
that the nation included all parts and sectors of Palau, Remeliik in his inaugural address stated that unity should be sought "not in ... one village but in all ... villages. Not on one council but in all ... councils. Let us unite [to build] the new Republic of Palau . . . ."

Remeliik advocated three mechanisms for encouraging unity. One was to develop broad-based participation by Palauan leadership in the new government. During his first news conference, Remeliik noted that a number of his opponents from the recent election seemed interested in serving in the Executive Cabinet. He said he was encouraging such interest, as part of an effort to stimulate broad-based input into the national executive (Remeliik in Pacific Daily News 1981 February 2:3). It was now time, he said, for Palauan leaders to all "... work together for the benefit of ... the nation" (Remeliik in Pacific Daily News 1980 November 14:4).

A second mechanism to encourage unity was to strive for regional balance, a criteria that Remeliik would emphasize in his selections for the cabinet (see Chapter X). A third was to encourage a "consensus approach," which was "so much of a part of the traditions of Palau" (inaugural address). Remeliik felt that consensus could be applied "at all levels of national policy making and planning . . . ." This stress would continue to be central.

During this initial period he stated a position on free association similar to that during his election campaign. He estimated that it might be "one, two, or three years" before there was resolution on political status (inaugural address) and therefore, resolution of this question was not a pressing matter. Moreover, as during the election
campaign, there was some ambiguity in Remeliik's statements on a preferred status. He was asked during his news conference whether there was a conflict between his characterization of Palau as an "emerging, non-aligned nation" (inaugural address), and the anticipated status of free association. Remeliik replied that free association was meant to be "temporary," a transitional status, an "assistance . . ." to enable Palau to build political independence and economic self-reliance in the longer-run. He was also questioned about possibilities for the establishment of a U.S. military base on Babdaob. Consistent with his previous statements, Remeliik maintained that actual U.S. military use, and final agreement on a status compact, were still subject to Palauan and other approval. In the meantime, no worrisome activities or impacts could occur.

During his inaugural address (reproduced in Appendix E) Remeliik began to flesh out the four national goals first articulated during the national election campaign. He described self-reliance as meaning that Palauans should "turn more to [their] own resources to meet [their] needs . . . ." The second goal, economic prosperity, should involve the "full utilization of . . . national and human resources for Palauans." Remeliik dwelt on the third goal, cultural well-being at some length. "This new nation, . . . this craft we sail, . . . it has such strange and unusual equipment. What is to help us follow our journey and find for us our fish at night?" Remeliik stressed the importance of traditional knowledge, saying this would be "the foundation . . . of [Palau's] vessel" of state (inaugural address). This theme of relying upon cultural strengths to help guide Palau
through the unknown and challenging waters of nation-building was pervasive.

The fourth goal was to "... promote political stability." This was essential if Palau's unity in diversity, an image articulated by Remeliik, was to culminate in "reach[ing] the most constructive consensus for action" in Palau.

In his inauguration address, Remeliik also started to focus on economic development with some detail. He stated that the question of development was "... [a] great typhoon [facing] developing and emerging nations" and that the government's policy was to proceed cautiously. Efforts would be made to develop resources for Palauans and by Palauans, attract foreign investment where Palau's economic goals would be enhanced, and ultimately establish "control over our financial destiny."

Remeliik cautioned that "the most difficult part of our journey ... will be the tricky task of balancing self-reliance with our present standard of living." He further stated that "it would take all our combined wisdom to sail these narrow reefs and [to] judge the tide."

Some closure over development was indicated, as Remeliik mentioned that it might not be possible to pursue self-reliance, and a comfortable standard of living equally. This recognition of possible conflict had been absent during the election campaign.

Closure in other ways was still quite limited, however. As during the election campaign, Remeliik did not dwell on how foreign "aid," particularly if procured from the United States, might involve constraints on Palauan autonomy and control. Instead he merely hinted
at this when he said that the task of "balancing self-reliance with our present standard of living" might involve "... sacrifices, and disappointments ...". More detailed economic planning was just emerging at the time.

Initial Economic Planning

In 1980, the Palau Legislature retained the services of Rivkin Associates, a New York-based consulting firm, and by late 1980, a "Palau Indicative Development Plan" was nearly finished. The drafts of the plan that I examined were from November and December of that year. These are referred to as the "Rivkin Plan."

There had been economic plans before this, perhaps the most prominent being the United Nations Development Plan for Palau, written in 1977. Both it and the Rivkin Plan favored the attainment of a self-supporting economy through balanced, economic growth. In actuality, the Rivkin Plan, in contrast particularly with the UNDP, was much more closely tied to an anticipated status of free association, and to a heavy reliance on the "aid" expected.

According to the Rivkin Plan the assistance provided by free association should stimulate and be gradually replaced by, the "... resources derived from the growth of [Palau's] productive sectors" (December Draft, Chapter 6:26). To this end, appropriate economic policies, for instance restraints on government spending, should be undertaken by Palau's government.

The Plan submitted that foreign investment, when combined with "Palau's strategic location, affords excellent opportunities for economic growth" (December Draft, Chapter 7:16). It was hoped that trade and
tourist activities might emerge, particularly as Palau was well-positioned in relation to a number of major ports and population centers in East and Southeast Asia, as had been illustrated decades earlier, when Palau had been a productive part of Japan's "co-prosperity sphere."

The Plan estimated that the goal of attaining a predominantly self-supporting economy required a dramatic increase in Palau's gross domestic product (GDP). While acknowledging that the growth rate projected was "very high," as compared with most developing countries,²³ the Plan pointed out that some of the circumstances in Palau were far more fortunate than was the case in "low income," Third World countries. For example, resources need not be diverted to finance programs to mitigate serious deprivation, according to the Rivkin Plan.

The Plan maintained that the assurance of major U.S. financial support during the period of free association could provide sufficient resources for Palau's economy to sustain a well-designed and balanced program of growth. This was "on the assumption that disciplined programming of these resources [i.e., the U.S. subsidy] is possible." It should be noted that this assumption, in view of Palau's government economy and high levels of consumption, is open to question. In any case, according to the Rivkin Plan, Palau could achieve self-sufficiency within the 15 years of free association.

Increased exploitation of marine resources, both for export and for import substitution, was recommended. The Plan acknowledged, however, that so far, the development of marine resources had "witnessed stagnation." A number of measures were suggested to overcome this.²⁴
The development of agriculture and agro-industries was also advocated. At the time, as the Plan pointed out, commercial agriculture was "dimunitive" in size and scope (November draft, Chapter 8:1). Considerable constraints on its development were noted by the Plan.25

Perhaps the most intractable problem concerned motivation and values. The Rivkin Plan pointed out that Palau's education system had, among other things, inculcated a value system that was not conducive to farming, or any other kind of manual labor. Note that, as with development of marine resources, the Rivkin Plan did not provide a concrete means for reversing or even retarding the growing consumer orientation and Palauans' attachment to bureaucratic, government work.

Tourism was also discussed as a possibility. However, for the present Palau was at the end of a long line of limited air service, and other constraints as well.26 Moreover some informants, particularly those with activist backgrounds, continued to express skepticism as to the desirability of a major tourist industry in Palau.

The Plan also discussed the current state of the private sector. It characterized present conditions as "so restrictive that . . . it [is] remarkable that the private sector is able to operate at all" (November Draft Chapter 6:6). Credit was restricted while the prevailing wage rate was set by "artificially high" government salaries. In addition, the private sector in Palau was mostly involved in sales at retail stores. Government salaries paid for most of the imported items purchased there. As can be seen, even much of the private sector was heavily dependent on the government economy, which was externally supported.
In addition, there was the "ascendancy of Koror" to contend with. The economic position of Koror was drawing people from the rural areas in pursuit of the government jobs and more government services. This removed many able-bodied, working age Palauans from villages. In addition, the money sent by Koror dwellers directly back to their villages, or dispersed through economic exchange, was further "monetizing" the entire economy, pulling it away from subsistence.

The Rivkin Plan targeted the education system as one means to facilitate productive, economic development. It advocated an education system which could offer "each ... child the opportunity to prepare realistically for his future, [and that should] minimize the attraction of an education [that prepares one] for bureaucratic employment." (November draft, Chapter 8:6). The Rivkin Plan, however, did not provide a comprehensive guide on how to utilize education in this way.

In addition to the Rivkin Plan, another source for governmental economic planning originally came from the District Government's Office of Management Services (OMS) and from an advisor there, Ray Bruce. Bruce had come to Palau in August, 1980. It was understood that, when there was a president-elect, this individual and Bruce would decide whether to continue Bruce's services. When Remeliik was elected, Bruce was retained.

At that time, Bruce was engaged in a research project designed to articulate the various options and alternatives for government reorganization. As part of his fact-gathering effort, he interviewed 150 Palauans involved in business and government. During these, two questions were asked followed by open-ended discussion. "What do you feel are the most important problems and opportunities with which the
new government will have to deal . . . ?" "What changes do you feel the new government should consider in reorganizing government operations" (Organizational Models for Government Operations 12/5/80:2)?

By November 1980, points from these interviews were listed in the draft of a paper on "Strategic Areas for Concern for Action in Developing [Government] Policy . . . ." One concern was the administration of government operations, as there was a desire to reduce the cost of government operations and make them more effective.

Another was development of Palau's natural, human, and economic resources. Options were suggested such as letting the private sector do some or all of this, enlisting the help of the United Nations, or "make the U.S. do it [i.e., develop Palau's resources] via the [free association] compact agreement."

There was also an interest in government reorganization, and more specifically, in the Executive. Options still being considered included the development of an executive cabinet for policy and decision-making through consensus. The emphasis on consensus related to Bruce's discussion of "traditional culture." More specifically, Bruce had encountered sentiment to "rely more on the strengths of the Palauan culture, tradition, customs, and its [subsistence] economy." One of the "action alternatives" suggested was to reorganize the government, both at the national and the state levels, to incorporate the "traditional consensus approach to policy-making decisions."

Palau's leadership was also concerned about public service delivery. Options included supporting the private sector, decentralizing some services to the states, or to generally reduce government social
services "to a level that the nation and its citizens have the ability to pay for" (Strategic Areas of Concern . . . 11/2/80, page 6).

The OMS and now Bruce\textsuperscript{28} suggested that to organize a government, it is useful to know what the government's priorities will be. The Palauan state was just emerging at the time. In view of this, Bruce suggested identifying the general areas of national concern, and then formulating "action options" to make progress on these. He felt that key desires, most likely to produce national goals, were for economic self-reliance, economic prosperity, political unity (i.e., stability) and cultural well-being. These projected goals were basically the same as those articulated by Remeliik during his election campaign.

Bruce recognized that all these goals might not be in harmony. For instance, as an OMS report pointed out, Palau might achieve "economic prosperity" by having foreign investors come in and turn Palau into a "mini-Hawaii." In the process, however, Palau's cultural well-being might be destroyed, and therefore, it was suggested that guidelines be established, particularly to cover the areas where national goals were likely to collide.

Areas of conflict could not yet be defined in concrete terms but an OMS report did pinpoint the conflicts most likely to emerge. These were presented as questions: "How are we to go about developing the nations' resources to achieve self-reliance [without really becoming more dependent]? What standard of living [or level of services] should be available in the [Palauan] community? How do we assure that the national government supports/shares the resources, service delivery, responsibility and funds with the states in a fair and equitable manner?"
How do we assure that our cultural identity will not get lost in the shuffle between self-reliance and economic development? What is the role of government operations in the national development of resources? How will we assure that major development projects are completed in the national interest, etc. In comparison with the Rivkin Plan, the emerging OMS/Bruce Plan put more emphasis on cultural well-being, political stability, and also focused to a greater extent, more explicitly on questions of dependence.

It also presented a number of models for government organization, in view of likely national goals and areas of concern. In the first model, for a "flat," service delivery organization, the present function of Palau's government—to allocate most of its resources to the delivery of public services—would continue. A second model was called a "core organization," in which the national government would not be involved in either public-service delivery or resource development, except as regards law enforcement and regulatory matters (Organizational Models for Government Operations, R. Bruce 12/15/80:11).

Another model, in fact the one to be favored, was the "focused organization [for] resources development." This would involve reducing the national government's role in public-service delivery, while dramatically increasing its role in the development of national resources. The form and pace depended on the formulation of a national development plan. Such a plan should involve significant public input, as the effort contemplated could be "very extensive, and would most likely effect every nook and cranny of the life and culture in Palau" (Organization Models for Government Operations, R. Bruce 12/15/80:9).
In addition to models for government organization, Bruce articulated a number of possible development modes. (1) Palau might develop a semi-industrialized market economy, providing a tax base to replace U.S. grants. (2) The current United States assistance might be dropped for economic privileges that would be provided as compensation for U.S. strategic utilization of Palau, as part of free association, or from another donor source to replace the U.S. (3) Perhaps Palau could reduce the necessity for such aid by drastically lowering the present standard of living in education, health, government jobs and other services, thereby slashing the amount of funds necessary to operate the Republic. Bruce described this option graphically, by stating that Palau might "turn off the lights and go back to village life." Palau might also pursue some combination of the options mentioned above.

Bruce pointed out that any decision could be "hard," and that each alternative could involve good points, as well as "one or two unacceptably bad ones." For instance, allowing a relatively massive and active U.S. military presence could profoundly change the Palauans' way of life in undesirable ways. Or finding other donors to simply replace the U.S. aid might amount to little more than exchanging "one master for another." "Turn[ing] out the lights" as part of a complete return to subsistence might also not be acceptable. And finally, a combination of such actions, if improperly managed, could expose Palau to damage from the "hard" aspects of any or all of them.

As part of his effort to find a way around such "hard aspects," Bruce emphasized the importance of Palau's subsistence economy, and its potential for contributing to national development. Bruce noted that
"the western view of subsistence economy" was often based on a situation of "severe poverty economics." In such areas and situations, western-trained economic planners have often viewed the role of the subsistence economy in a negative light, seeking to replace it with an industrial one. This perspective can involve taking a market view of national wealth, and of evaluating it strictly in terms of Gross National or Gross Disposable Product.

As with the Rivkin Plan, Bruce pointed out that Palau was not in a situation of "severe poverty economics." In addition, there were other reasons why taking a GNP/GDP view was inappropriate. Bruce felt that even a cursory look at life in Palau indicated that the greater part of Palauan activities, and the values associated with them, were embedded in Palau's village, subsistence economy. In fact he felt this economy might very well be the major one of Palau whereas the market economy, funded by U.S. assistance, might be just "be a thin layer." Bruce's view may have underestimated the importance, both in a seductive and corrosive sense, of Palau's government economy and the retail one that was largely dependent on it. In any case, he argued that it was vital to put a strong value on an enriched subsistence economy. Not only could it be valuable for national development, but Palau's cultural traditions and identity were also closely linked to it. Since one of Palau's national goals was cultural well-being, the links between economic development and Palau's culture should not be overlooked. It also followed that it was unacceptable to simply replace the enriched subsistence economy with a market one.
Bruce suggested that a means be found to enrich both the culture and the economy, in mutually supportive fashion. This should involve both bottom up and top down planning, though Bruce tended to concentrate on the former, and emphasized the need for village input and participation.

He felt that the strengths and values in the village economic/cultural matrix could be used as a foundation on which to build specific resource development projects. Villagers should articulate their needs and engage in projects to pursue them. The national government could encourage local initiative by providing needed advisors, financial and infrastructural support.

Most generally, the Bruce Plan sought to avoid having to embrace "unacceptable" development options such as total military accommodation, reckless and uncontrolled development, or procuring another donor, simply to replace the U.S. He suggested that in part, undesirable options could be avoided through a strong contribution from Palau's subsistence-oriented, cultural/economic matrix. This could enhance cultural well-being as well. In addition, increased market production and a controlled use of American and perhaps other foreign aid could help foster economic well-being and self-reliance.

State of the Nation

Remeliik's State of the Nation address, before a joint session of Congress in April, 1981, constituted the first articulated plan for Palau-oriented and controlled development. This in itself represented a considerable degree of closure, albeit at the rhetorical level, over
development preferences and goals, and to a lesser extent, over priorities. Moreover to an unprecedented extent, the plan presented by Remeliik both recognized the realities of dependency and other constraints to development, and a Palauan desire for broad-based input and indigenous control over development.

A number of advisors to the President and Vice-President contributed to the speech. Some discussion of this is beneficial, as it helps to reveal the background and tendencies of Palauans who had relatively direct access to the Chief Executive, and therefore to his "inner circle." Victorio Uherbelau, the Special Representative of the President to status negotiations, had contributed to Remeliik's treatment of free association and foreign affairs. During 1979/80, Uherbelau was a legal/political advisor to the People's Committee and was elected to the 7th Palau legislature. Ray Bruce also had input into the speech. Ideas and emphases developed by him found expression in Remeliik's articulation of national development goals, and the model for a "focused resource . . ." development organization of the Executive. In addition, like Bruce, Remeliik continued to stress the importance of Palau's village, economic/cultural matrix. Additional points of correspondence between Remeliik's and earlier economic planning will be noted when necessary.

Moses Ramarui also contributed. He was a leader with an activist background and through him, a number of other leaders of an activist persuasion had influence on the speech.

Vice-President Oiterong, as well as Yoichi Rengill, his Special Assistant, also were involved. Rengill had been associated with the Modekngei.
The fundamental questions Remeliik raised were similar to those of Bruce. What part of Palau's unique village life should be preserved, and what part thrown away? How could Palau protect and maintain its sovereignty? How could it develop as a self-reliant nation, and enhance Palau's self-determination in foreign affairs? Such questions had mostly been implicit during earlier events. Now to an unprecedented extent, these were articulated, and treated explicitly. Remeliik's approach was comparatively comprehensive. This represented a considerable degree of closure over development goals, and to a lesser extent, over priorities and the means to achieve them.

Characteristically, Remeliik during his address stressed that Palau's development in large part should be based on Palauan "strengths." These included cultural aspects such as consensus, that "tradition" of decision-making and community participation in Palau, as well as material resources. By building on these Palau could be in the position to best determine what outside help was absolutely needed to "help Palau on [its] way." This was as preferred to an over-reliance on external aid which could have the undesirable effect of "push[ing] Palau back into dependency."

Remeliik acknowledged that Palau's current economic situation was "fairly bleak." But despite such difficulties, he declared it to be his desire to embark "on a dramatic national development effort to make Palau self-reliant." In order to accomplish this, Palau had to reduce the dependence of its economy on government funds. This should involve an increase in the utilization of Palau's indigenous resources, along with better organized and more effective government.
Remeliik fleshed-out the goals of self-reliance, economic prosperity, cultural well-being and political stability, goals first articulated during his election campaign. He stated that Palau would be self-reliant when it no longer had to rely on other nations to supply it with the funds needed for the country. Palau could accept aid from "...trusted friends to help us develop ways to improve our life... [but efforts should also depend]...on what we will be able to provide for our...needs through our village and market econo[m[y]."

The second goal, economic prosperity, must involve more than material well-being. "Prosperity" was also concerned with maintaining Palau's cultural values, and the former must not come at the expense of the latter. Remeliik pointed out that there were already too many examples of island societies "which have achieved...economic prosperity [but have] yet ended up destroying the original cultural identity and people."

Remeliik continued to emphasize one aspect of Palauan life—decision-making through consensus. He described this as "a dynamic form of political stability" which enables each person in the various communities and in Palau to freely "participate in the decision process..." He stated that it was clear that "through traditional consensus, we can decide [even] the most disputed matters" even on national affairs. Actually, the contemporary stress on this is based on a selective interpretation, and idealization, of both the Palauan past and present village life. Remeliik's stress on consensus, and his confidence that it could be employed at all levels of government and society to solve virtually any problem was a pervasive theme in his rhetoric.
After setting out Palau's national goals, Remeliik suggested that all of these goals could not be pursued to an equal extent, simultaneously. Some goals might have to be de-emphasized. For instance Remeliik noted that over 80 percent of Palau's government budget was spent on social services. He pointed out that "it is a hard fact that we ourselves are not able to pay for the health, education, and public services [that] we now enjoy" and hinted that a reduction in government services might be a solution.

He suggested that the model for government organization should focus on the development of national resources. In his speech, Remeliik advocated that the Executive Branch become "the main instrument of change for self-government." The executive would be used to try to reorient the entire government to pursue Palau's national goals. Remeliik explained that the executive would utilize a cabinet with ministers. There would be five members of this cabinet, for the ministries of state, national resources, social services, administration, and justice. The overall objective was to "replace Palau's present dependence upon funds generated by the U.S. Congress with [Palau's] own self-reliant economy and social structure."

Remeliik sketched the functions and responsibilities of each ministry during his speech. Only the broad outlines are discussed, as this is necessary to understand Remeliik's middle course. The Ministry of National Resources was charged with developing Palau's human, natural, cultural, and economic resources, for the benefit of all Palauans. Development of Palau's enriched subsistence economy, as well as the market economy was stressed. The national government was directed
to provide assistance to the states and villages for resource development projects, many of which could be locally managed. The emphasis on development from the bottom up, supported when necessary by assistance from the national level, was consistent with Remeliik's earlier views and with those of Bruce. Remeliik also stressed a conservation orientation, advocating that Palauan resources be protected from degradation, by "either . . . ourselves or . . . outside forces."

A Ministry of Social Services was also to be established. Remeliik hoped that the size of the government could be reduced as Palau's natural and cultural resources were enhanced. He also wanted to support the private sector at points where it could provide services more effectively. The states and the communities should shoulder increased responsibilities as well.

In his discussion of the Ministry of Administration, a highly significant assumption was exposed. Remeliik stated that "it is important to keep in mind that the present government operation is the only institution available to us [that] we can use to begin our national development towards self-reliance . . . . Either we remake the government into an institution which will take us on our way to our goals, or we must dismantle it and try to build another one . . . . We have decided to use this government . . . , but to focus it on [our national development goals]." In other words, the executive proposed to use a segment of its own bureaucracy to shrink bureaucracy. Bureaucratic resistance might be encountered.

As he had done during the election campaign, Remeliik advocated a "... close liaison and open dialogue" between different government
branches and agencies. He stressed the new Ministry of State's proposed role, stating that it should "seek to develop those internal and external relations that are mutually supportive, and are in the best interests of Palau."

During his speech, Remeliik's position on political status was still somewhat circumspect. In this, he was closer to Bruce's thinking than to the Rivkins. Remeliik stated that the free association compact could help to develop Palau, but was "a two edged sword." "If we do not manage it [correctly], . . . it can sink us deeper into dependence." He mentioned that six more subsidiary agreements still had to be initialed. He mentioned that to conclude negotiations on these agreements a new Palauan negotiation group, headed by Uherbelau, had been formed. He also stated that as of that time there was no set time-table for a plebiscite on status. He did say that "a fair, impartial, and unbiased public information campaign [would be conducted] throughout [the] Republic." "... All of us will decide, through this plebiscite, [on] our nation's self determination . . .," he assured. This position coincided with the one articulated during the election campaign.

In foreign policy, Palau's "efforts to regain . . . self-determination [is] our most important objective . . . ." He advocated that Palau transform its relationships with other nations, especially with the United States, from those which maintained Palau "as a dependent . . . state" to relationships based on "mutual assistance, and [on real] development."

A diversification of aid donors was also advocated. But as with free association, some caution was expressed. Foreign aid could be
helpful but "too much aid . . . can be a danger to a small island economy such as ours," Remeliik said. Aid should be carefully managed, and ultimately controlled by Palauans. Foreign investment would also be permitted, but only to the extent it contributed to Palauan economic goals.

Remeliik concluded his speech by delineating the three basic "channels" Palau might use to get through the "reefs" of its national development task. Two options rejected were an endless passive dependence, or a headlong and reckless pursuit of economic development, also involving external aid. Remeliik advocated a middle course instead: some dependence, and an active pursuit of controlled, economic development.

This middle course would be built on indigenous, Palauan strengths, balanced with the need to develop economically, and to become more self-reliant. With this course, Palau might avoid having to embrace worrisome options, and instead hopefully be able to exercise considerable control over the pace and terms of their entry into the "modern world market economy."

Remeliik acknowledged a middle course could be "longer and slower . . ." than a less moderate strategy. Time, patience, delicate balancing, and some sacrifice for the long-run, would all be necessary for this course to succeed, he admitted. But he also felt that with this course, Palau could enhance its "dignity and identity . . .," and find "room to grow . . ." in the contemporary world. He acknowledged that following this course had its dangers; the course was "narrow . . . [and] . . . mistakes could drift [Palau] into other channels" leaving the Islands "dependent again, [or] exploited by foreign economies, or both."
Success would also require consensus, a characteristic focus of Remeliik's. He stated that "we all must agree to travel this [course] together" and concluded by appealing for unity as the essential ingredient, upon which all else rested. The emphasis on unity, consensus and on participatory development was consistent with the views he had earlier expressed.

In effect, Remeliik was presenting a plan for selective modernization, for a Palauan-lead and controlled entry into the "modern" world. Remeliik's plan, as with Bruce's thinking, was in line with the implicit solution often recommended by dependency theorists, i.e., for balanced and integrated, nationally-oriented development. This was the case even though perhaps Bruce and certainly Remeliik were not directly familiar with a dependency perspective. The middle path, however, was more varied and even heterogenous than the recommendations of early dependency theorists, which were designed to promote self-reliance and to eliminate the unequal ties linking a satellite to its metropole. In contrast Bruce and Remeliik felt that if aid was sufficiently controlled and disciplined, it could be utilized for the attainment of Palau's longer-range, autonomist goals. Confidence in this regard sprang from the Palauans' interest in and expertise at manipulating outsiders. Perhaps also, there was a recognition that--given the limitations of Palau's miniscule resource base, and the temptations of seemingly available "affluence"--a self-reliant strategy was not generally attractive, nor was it likely to work.
Conclusion

The inauguration celebrations and ceremony were a success, if judged by the popular interest elicited. As the festivities drew near, many Palauans seemed to be caught up in an air of celebration and nascent nationalism, similar to the atmosphere during Palau's constitutional convention. However, the limitations of this celebration for nationhood must be kept in mind. The ceremonies/celebration, as during the ConCon, came at a time when Palauans felt relatively free from overbearing, external pressure. There was little need, nor the desire, to examine possibly painful trade-offs and conflicts in the idealized, symbolic environment. Symbolic reification of this sort might have its own costs, however. At the time of the celebrations and ceremony, and unlike the atmosphere during the constitutional dispute, Palauans did not seem to be arousing metropolitan concern. In fact the Palauans were encouraged to believe that they could proceed on a broad front in efforts at cultural assertion, and even nation-building. However, past experience of the United States suggests that the U.S. is likely to respond in a defensive/assertive fashion to substantial increases in Palauan economic and political control, particularly if these could be interpreted as threatening U.S. strategic interests. In the future, if U.S. concern was in fact aroused, Palauans would still be in a position of vulnerability, due to continuing dependence. In the meantime, though, through their symbolic expressions the Palauans might gain an inflated and unrealistic perception of the amount of political and economic control they possessed. This perception might also have the effect of
lessening Palauan's motivation to pursue more concrete means for exercising political/economic control.

As noted, there was a concern over whether the inauguration should be primarily internally, or externally oriented. This recalls the interest in a candidates' identification during the recent election campaign. But in contrast to that event, during this one there was no need to choose since both externally and internally oriented events were held. This may have been reflective, as well, of the integrative and absorptive capacities of contemporary Palau. And finally, it may have been an expression of the Palauan reticence to adopt one integrated and highly coherent position on development.

The second part of this chapter discussed the emergence of the new executive's direction and priorities. A number of desires expressed in the election period carried over to the government in power. Remeliik's stress on unity was still paramount, and as in the case of the People's Committee and Remeliik's election campaign, the inclusion of the political opposition, regional balance, and consensus were seen as facilitating mechanisms.

A number of ambiguities, however, also remained from the election period. Could free association actually lead to Palau's longer-range goals of political independence and self-reliance? Could it be congruent with Remeliik's desire for a non-aligned foreign policy? Would there be a major U.S. military presence in Palau, and if so, to what extent and when?

The chapter on the national elections noted the existence of a number of competing and potentially conflicting development goals. By
the time of the inauguration, there were still no priorities between the specific goals of economic prosperity and self-reliance and between them collectively, and the desire for cultural well-being. During both his election campaign, and as the new government began, Remeliik advocated a development mode that would (1) enable Palau to protect its "fragile" natural resources, (2) maintain and enhance Palauan control over the Islands' development and future destiny, (3) maintain and increase the present standard of living, while at the same time pursuing self-reliance, and (4) follow a mode of development that was participatory, and involved wide-spread benefits. Remeliik, however, continued to be vague concerning the means to establish a priority between these goals and about any trade-offs that might be involved in favoring some goals over others.

Initial economic planning was then discussed. Bruce, in his plans, targeted areas of potentially conflicting goals to an unprecedented extent. Moreover, unlike the Rivkin Plan, Bruce indicated that some reduction of government services was probably essential. Bruce's plans were also more concerned with cultural well-being, and with the relationship between it and economic development. As a means to mitigate, or even avoid altogether undesirable, highly disruptive options, Bruce focused on Palau's enriched subsistence economy and suggested that developing it, in tandem with the market economy and supplemented by highly controlled, foreign aid, could provide Palau with a balanced and integrated development strategy.

Remeliik's state of the nation address was dealt with. It indicated a continuing elaboration and definition of Palau's national
development goals. The articulation of priorities, although somewhat more substantial, was still limited.

The address also reflected a greater stress on self-reliance, on the desirability of lessening Palau's external dependence. Remeliik expressed confidence that Palau could effectively move in this direction despite the considerable impediments, not the least of which was the extent and nature of the subsidized, government economy. There was also somewhat more focus on areas of potential conflict between the goals of self-reliance and economic prosperity and between these economic goals, collectively, and cultural well-being.

Remeliik's "middle course" was presented as a way around very worrisome and unpalatable options such as reckless and headlong development, continuing with a "welfare state," or a massive and active U.S. military presence. Instead, this middle course sought a balanced and controlled development by relying on Palau's strengths and traditions, its enriched village economy, the market sector, and controlled foreign input. The assistance from free association could be beneficial if used in a coherent and disciplined fashion to further Palau's national development goals. More generally, Remeliik continued to maintain that dependency, if properly managed and controlled, could be a powerful tool to facilitate the achievement of Palau's long-range goals of greater economic self-reliance and political autonomy.

The strategy for selective modernization outlined by Remeliik indicated an impressive degree of closure; however, there were limits to it. The course contained questionable development assumptions, such as that it was politically possible to manipulate dependency so as to
reduce it, and more specifically, that a government could use a segment of the bureaucracy to reduce itself. Moreover, this same executive branch was supposed to serve as the primary instrument for purposeful change. Palau's underlying development dilemma was not directly addressed, aside from Remeliik's mention of the need for "delicate balancing" between the goals of economic prosperity and self-reliance, and some recognition of the limitations on control posed by dependence. The matter of military use of Palauan resources had also not been directly confronted, much less resolved.

And finally, both the inauguration and Remeliik's middle path were primarily at the symbolic level. The first centered around ceremony and celebration, and the second, at this stage, was simply rhetoric. In this form, however, there was no need to make hard choices between alternatives that have to deal with the allocation and mobilization of scarce resources. If the middle course was to become effective policy, such decisions would have to be made.

In a symbolic environment, quite a number of potentially divergent emphases can be contemplated. In fact, this was the case for both the inauguration event and Remeliik's rhetoric. The continuing dependency, vulnerability, and other limitations to control was de-emphasized, and pictured as superceded by Palauan cultural and political ascendancy, and even independence. Remeliik's middle course, at least at the symbolic level, was a moderate compromise that might enable Palauans to outflank unpalatable options and proceed with their own development. But beyond the rhetoric, just how viable was this path? An answer could only be forthcoming as based on the National
Executive's performance and its response to challenges. The first of these was to arise even before the new government was in place.
CHAPTER IX--NOTES

1 As one high official of the Congress expressed it: "Palau is now like an airplane [that is] moving very fast. It would be reassuring to hear the voice of the pilot [i.e., Palau's president] over the microphone. People are waiting [and] are expecting a statement of national direction . . . ."

2 These included Van Camp Seafood, Japan Airlines, the Bank of Hawaii, the Guam Reef Hotel, Continental Airlines, Mobil Oil Company, Japan Micronesia Association, Japan Airlines (Research and Development), the Taiwan Fisherman's Association, Nippon Television (NTV), New Japan Pro-Wrestling Co., Ltd., the Guam Visitor's Bureau, etc. Unfortunately, I do not have figures for each company, or cumulatively, how much the private sector contributed. I did, however, obtain estimates for a number of companies, these are: Van Camp Seafood $3,000, Bank of Hawaii $2,000, and Micronesian Industrial Corporation $1,000, Mobil Oil $1,000. These appear to have been the higher contributions from individual companies.

3 A number of leaders and their associates who had not supported Remeliik's election did support inauguration preparations, however. Perhaps they felt that it was appropriate to highlight the start of the new government, now that Remeliik's election was an accomplished fact.

4 An anti-Remeliik informant reported that meetings were planned to organize a "counter inauguration" to discredit Remeliik and the inauguration. I did not attend any such meeting, nor do I know whether any such meetings were actually held.

5 Two to three thousand people must have been present.

6 This was published in the Mindszenty High School Golden Tribune.

7 From the Inauguration Committee: "The Republic of Belau is celebrating the birth of our nation . . . . The Inauguration Committee is honored to invite you to such an important occasion . . . ." (copy of telex sent by Moses Sam, Chairman of the inauguration Committee to invite the foreign guests). From the Chief Executive: "On behalf of the Republic of Palau I welcome you to join us in celebrating the birth of our nation and her constitutional government" (President Remeliik's message of welcome on the program of inaugural activities). Moreover, Remeliik's rhetoric stressed the same point. The first line of his inaugural address was: "The Islands, this new nation, we people of Palau . . . ." I discuss the address in the body of the chapter. Shuster, in his treatment, makes a similar point. Describing the Palau
after the national elections, and on the eve of the inaugural event, he says: "The general feeling in Belau is that 1981 is a time for unity and solidarity; a time for Belau to take its rightful place among the Pacific's proud family of new nations" ("Belau Joins the New Nations . . ." by D. Shuster, New Pacific, January/February 1981, volume 6, no. 1, issue 25). As regards Remeliik's address, Shuster describes it as emphasizing "unity and destiny, [and as identifying] the goals of the world's newest nation as self-reliance, economic prosperity, political stability, and cultural well-being" (1981b:10).

8 One sub-committee of the Inauguration Committee was charged with explaining the significance of the event to villagers, so as to mobilize support. The head of this sub-committee described one of the tasks they would take: "We have been working on this . . . government for [many] years." "Now when someone in Palau is admitted to a klobák (village council) position, there has to be a feast. This is the same thing. Palau is now ready to be recognized, and so we are inviting them [outside guests] to come to this feast. This is to show that we are a nation . . . ." Some informants, however, felt that such analogies were forced and that there was no traditional model comparable to the inauguration event. One of my informants had been involved in planning Palau's participation in the South Pacific Festival of Arts, and worked for the Palau Museum. She described Palau's inauguration celebration as an unprecedented event: "People did not know what an inauguration is. We have been under the United States for so long, so that having our [own] government is hard to grasp . . . ."

9 The statement is based both on observation, and on informant reports, including interviews. A number of my informants served on the Inauguration Committee in various capacities. One arena for internal/external identification was in entertainment. It so happened that a number my closest informants were advisors to the Inauguration Committee on this question. From these informants, and from others, it became clear that a number of questions were being posed to the Committee. Should the entertainment be traditional, eclectic, or cosmopolitan? Should it be primarily designed to appeal to Palauans, or to the foreign guests? Palau could be presented as having a highly distinctive, indigenous culture, putting the emphasis on island identity. Or it could be presented as a developing society that primarily was seeking to further its relationships with the outside world. One could take a position between these two. Among Inauguration Committee members, advisors, and other Palauans, views varied. The internal debate over this within the Committee was one illustration of the substantial concern over the celebration's identification.

10 Reportedly (Dr. N. Meller, personal communication), traditional Palauan chiefs at some time previous had suggested that war canoes be reconstructed. However the suggestion was rejected by the Legislature at the time as frivolous. In addition, activist informants reported that during the early 1970s they had been interested in formulated
national symbols, but with little success. The difference, as inauguration celebrations and the ceremony approached, was that Palau's elected leaders saw a real need to have an array of symbols to help express a Palauan national identity at the time that national, constitutional government was launched. For instance, one informant who was heavily involved in efforts to develop a flag reported that he approached the Speaker of the 7th Palau Legislature and asked him: "When the constitution is adopted and the new government installed, what flag will you raise?"

11 Most commonly, this was positive, with some expressing the view that the anthem had a soft, hymn-like and "religious" quality, unlike the harsh and "militaristic" anthems of some other lands.

12 Racing through our waters, ... our war canoes quickened all our hearts. For so many years, we were but riders on other's ships, going to destinations we never chose. [But now] we are to enter the high seas to sail with all of the other nations" of the world.

13 In 1980, alone, the Palau Legislature passed measures to appropriate funds for the construction or completion of at least five community meeting houses. One abāi in Malekeok was being constructed along traditional lines. There was a traditional abāi at Airai. Another had been reconstructed on the grounds of the Palau Museum, though this one had been badly damaged.

14 I estimate that a crow of 400 was present.

15 It may be the case that in much of the Pacific, dance presentations are a mix of domestic, external, traditional and contemporary styles. This is not necessarily the case in Palau, however. Based on this researcher's photo record of hundreds of photographs taken during fieldwork, celebrations and ceremonies generally emphasized Palauan traditional and historical styles. In fact, the large number of cosmopolitan and non-Palauan cultural expressions during the inauguration event had caused some disagreement among those who had been involved with programs emphasized Polynesian-type, or Guam night club acts. Two informants, one in social studies for education, the other with the Palau Museum, felt that this was unfortunate because instead of highlighting "a celebration for independence," such numbers showed Palau as identifying with Guam, Hawaii, or other cosmopolitan centers.

16 I estimate that between two and three thousand people attended.

17 This motto was often repeated by Palauans as a joke. More than once, this was used in reference to involvements between U.S. servicemen and Palauan ladies. Aside from being a joke, I am not sure if the comment was meant to be derogatory.
18. For instance, the canoe race was proceeded by a speedboat race. Moreover as noted in the text, skydivers, including at least one Palauan descended on the playing field during inauguration ceremonies while Palauan schoolchildren, from the Modekngei school, appeared in largely traditional dress, holding Palauan flags.

19. The work of the Task Force was split into two categories. One was day-to-day operations, and the other long-range planning. Activists were particularly interested in the latter.

20. During Remeliik's inauguration address he said that "we will learn to give and take in the world, just as we do in our customs ... [and] to plan and change plans. We will learn what makes things tick and not just how to wind up the watch; ... we will learn how to sacrifice for the short term in order to gain in the long term, because our sister nations still play for keeps."


22. The United Nations Development Plan was designed for a relatively austere and politically independent Palau.

23. The Plan admitted that its ideal, projected growth rate of 20 percent was "very high" in the experience of developing nations. As examples it noted that for the years 1970-78, the average for Malaysia was 7.8, for South Korea 9.7, for Singapore 8.5 and for Ecuador 9.1 percent. For the "low income countries" this was much less: for Bangladesh 2.9, for India 3.7, etc.

24. The strategy the Draft Plan recommended involved the following tracks: Establish the necessary infrastructure to support an expanded fishing industry, establish sufficient shoreside handling and processing facilities, and strive for increased production from off-shore and from deep bottom, and reef fishing, and encourage the cultivation of new marine products and the use of Palau for material research.

25. Constraints included inadequate transportation, the land tenure system, a shortage of an effective labor force, et.

26. Aside from the limited air service, other constraints to rapid tourist development included limited infrastructure, land claim questions, organizational problems, and also the resolution of the problem of how to develop tourism while at the same time protecting the integrity of Palau's environment.
As of 1980/81 Koror contained approximately 60 percent of Palau's population. Koror was clearly developing as a "mini-metropolis with a [nearly] complete monopoly over commercial, industrial, as well as governmental activity ..." Nearly all of the infrastructure that could be used for national economic development was concentrated in Koror, though most of the commercial resources were in the sea, or on Babeldaob.

Though originally working closely with the Office of Micronesian Services, Bruce then developed his own work on a development plan. By the time that he became an advisor for Remeliik, this transition had occurred. I do not know, precisely, when it was made, however.

Such a view does not include in its calculation of value all the non-market transactions in Palau, including the work done because of interpersonal, clan, and other cultural obligations. It also does not include undeveloped resources, renewable resources, nor depletion of the same.

Remeliik stressed that Palau's people, i.e., its "human resource," was its most valuable for supporting developments.

"... Each person, each clan and village ... We can work out our consensus in plans to chart our way through the central channel ourselves. In this planning together, in this building together, we will achieve the self-reliance of a sovereign nation of economic prosperity which is fitting to our culture, and shared by all ..."

A strategy of total self-reliance, including the cutting of all dependent links, was originally advocated by some dependency theorists. This was criticized as both unfeasible and ineffective, however. In fact, it is a question of degree, of relative autonomy and control. This point is discussed in Chapter I, the Introduction.
CHAPTER X
INITIAL CHALLENGES, BROADER QUESTIONS

This penultimate chapter before the conclusion deals with the initial challenges to, and questions concerning, the "middle course" for Palau-oriented and controlled development. How relevant and viable were the largely symbolic closures achieved with the articulation of that course by the first president of the Palauan Republic, and his advisors, during the early months of 1981? Concrete answers for this could begin to emerge, given that the National Executive was now faced with a number of early challenges, constraints and opportunities. Conclusions drawn should be regarded as tentative, however, since when I left Palau, the new government had only been in power for five months.

The first challenge materialized even before the new government was in place. This was the brief but intense controversy over political status sparked by Remeliik's initialing, as head of the Palau Commission on Status on Transition (PCST), of agreements with the United States. The flare-up, coming just two weeks after Remeliik's election, constituted a test for his "not to worry" stance on political status and related matters.

The second challenge was a test of the relevance and effectiveness of consensus as a national dispute-settling mechanism, and of the likelihood of a close and supportive relationship between government branches, and particularly between an assertive Senate, and the Executive. Remeliik advocated a mutually supportive relationship as
part of his middle course. Yet almost immediately, the Senate and Executive became locked in a dispute over the selection of Executive cabinet heads.

The establishment and organization of Airai as the first state in the Republic, with Roman Tutchul as its governor, was also a challenge. It pointed up the contrast between the aura of decisive and effective leadership, associated with Tutchul, and what some saw as a lack of direction and ineffectiveness emanating from the Remeliik-lead national Executive, based in Koror.

Then a severe drought in May of 1981 also tested Remeliik, in the sense that it dramatized the felt need for comprehensive and timely measures by the national government and particularly the Executive. Remeliik was seen as not decisive in this.

The latter part of this chapter discusses a number of questions that remained. Could consensus be relied upon for achieving national development? Would the costs of a moderate and "lenient" pace of development include a lack of significant, intended change as self-reliance, and perhaps other national goals are progressively eroded by deepening dependence? Clearly political status and the development dilemma underlying it were the most inscrutable, intractable, and potentially the most crucial development questions facing Palau. However, both the option of avoiding closure and the incentives for doing so still existed. The chapter ends with a discussion of the possible costs and benefits of maintaining maneuverability and ambiguity on these questions.
Flare-Up Over Status

On November 17, 1980 Remeliik as Chairman of the PCST initialed a compact of free association and three subsidiary agreements with the United States. This touched off a brief but intense controversy in Palau. Protest against the initialing was directed mainly at Remeliik, and constituted an early challenge to his leadership of the Executive and his "not to worry" stance on political status.

In June 1980, the PCST with Remeliik as its Chairman met with the U.S. in bilateral negotiations. According to the PCST, the U.S. adopted the position that "Palau did not need to amend its constitution" to satisfy U.S. requirements for free association (PCST December Report 1980:2). The U.S. "agreement" not to discuss Palau's constitution during the negotiations was viewed by the PCST as a major accomplishment, since the Palauans could now ratify their constitution without immediately having to face ramifications on political status. Ratification of the constitution was successfully achieved on July 9.

During the negotiations the U.S. also specified its military requirements. Discussions evolved on a number of issues. Three of the most important being: to reconcile U.S. and Palauan views on maritime claims and resources, prohibit the dumping of nuclear wastes and specifying under what conditions nuclear and other "harmful substances" could be present in Palau, and to specify U.S. military use and operating "rights" (PCST December Report 1980:2). The PCST stated that it was prepared to consider U.S. military needs for land use: "We will try to identify for you [i.e., for the U.S. delegation] . . . the land areas which we believe will meet your needs . . . [and] the conditions for use
and the levels of payment [that we will] require for this" (June 19 statement on the negotiations). It also linked the level of United States compensation to that necessary to "secure the required infrastructure [for] satisfactory levels of economic development, or to support the necessary government operations during the transition from economic dependence to self-sufficiency" (same), and felt the funding proposed was too low. Rosenblatt told the Palauans that he was not authorized to offer higher levels of funding. Remeliik's response was that he would take this information back to Palau for further consideration.

In late September and early October, the PCST met with the U.S. in bilateral negotiations. This was followed by multilateral sessions, involving negotiators from the other entities in the Trust Territory as well. Progress was slow, due to a number of factors. For one, the United States now requested that the compact be changed to ensure a "permanent" denial of Micronesia for the military use of a power potentially hostile to the United States (New York Times 1980 October 6:A9). This request worried Palauan leaders, since until this time, it was their understanding that American military rights would be re-negotiable after 15 years (see pages 426, 431). The United States also seemed to be hardening its position on the sensitive matter of nuclear material, and other harmful substances.

By this time some of the other Micronesians, as well as the Palauan negotiators, were disturbed at the prospect of a Reagan victory in the American presidential elections. Carlos Salii, head of Palau's Status Committee of the PCST, felt that Reagan would "take a harder line" (New
York Times, same) towards Micronesia, with the U.S. being less free with its aid and its granting of control, while being more insistent on obtaining expansive military rights.²

As of mid-October, during Palau's national election campaigns, the PCST, at least in Palau, was keeping a rather low profile. Palauan negotiators were preoccupied with their own election campaigns, and more generally, status-related concerns were not translated into a major issue (see Chapter VIII).

During the campaign, Remeliik had said that the PCST's negotiations included discussion of nuclear materials. The U.S. had agreed there would be no dumping of nuclear waste in Palau. The question of nuclear transit was still not resolved, however. Land and its use by the military was not yet being discussed in detail. He also remarked that the PCST certainly did not "want to come up with [anything that] was contradictory to the constitution" and told villagers that the PCST was "... not ready to sign anything without the knowledge of the legislature" and until reporting to the Palauan people (Remeliik in village, October 9).

By October 28th, the U.S. and Palau seemed close to an agreement (headline of Pacific Daily News article, October 28:3). Not only had the funding levels been raised, the U.S. had also explicitly agreed to payments for the lease of any Palauan lands needed for military purposes. Appealing as these financial inducements were, Status Committee head Salii repeated that the Palauans would not sign anything until after their national elections. It is clear that the Palauan negotiating position was affected by Palauan political events, Palauans' assessments
of political dynamics in the United States, the level of funding being offered, and by substantive concerns, such as American policy on "harmful substances."

On November 3 Salii stated that "the basic issue since the Constitutional Convention, [i.e., whether or not] the constitution would have to be amended to make it compatible with free association," had been resolved in Palau's favor (Pacific Daily News 1980 November 3:7). Major areas of American concern could be eliminated through subsidiary agreements. Salii's claim that accommodation with the United States had been reached without altering the constitution would be challenged by critics, based on the view that the formal mechanisms involved (i.e., subsidiary agreements) did in fact invalidate crucial aspects of the constitution.

On October 31 the Marshalls and the Federated States of Micronesia initialed a compact of free association. According to the PCST, that compact "contained most of the changes that Palau had sought" (PCST December Report 1980:2). The PCST also maintained that in the area of nuclear and other harmful substances, Palau was achieving a "substantially greater [degree of] protection" (same) than was the FSM and the Marshalls. This brings us to the negotiations in November that culminated in the PCST's initialed of status agreements.

According to the PCST's December Report, the Palauans went to these negotiations in Washington with the objective of resolving two issues. They felt they must reach some agreement on the matter of military denial, including financial compensation, and on the question of harmful substances before they would consider initialed an agreement (PCST December Report 1980:3). The PCST did not believe that it should "tie
up Palau's land for more than 50 years" (same). It was the PCST's assessment that the U.S. would insist on military use for 50 years, and require military denial for 100 years (PCST December Report 1980:4).

Remaining matters centered around provisions to prohibit U.S. dumping of nuclear wastes in or around Palau, as well as provisions for permitting the temporary presence of nuclear powered and armed weaponry "during a time of [U.S.] national emergency" (PCST December Report 1980:6). In the end, a prohibition against dumping was achieved with Article 3, sections 2 and 3, of the subsidiary agreement regarding Radioactive, Chemical and Biological Substances. Article 4, section 3 gives the United States the nuclear "transit" rights it had long sought after. Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons was permitted "... during [any] time of ... military necessity as determined by the government of the United States (my emphasis).

The PCST according to its December Report "substantially improved upon" previous agreements (i.e., those of the PPSC under Tmetchul) negotiated on U.S. military use and operating rights. However, the PCST Report did not emphasize a number of aspects that could be interpreted as substantially lessening Palau's constitutional safeguards and/or as being less rigorous than the Tmetchul-negotiated agreements of 1979. Those earlier agreements would automatically have only been in force for 15 years, while the strategic-related aspects of the PCST agreements were for 50-100 years. Even more disturbing to some, the PCST agreement clearly permitted U.S. nuclear transit rights, something which the constitution prohibited and against which the People's Committee had seemingly fought. In addition, the PCST agreements would
in effect renounce the constitution's restriction against the use of eminent domain by Palau's national government to secure lands for the U.S. military, as well as giving up Palau's 200 mile limit claim.

In any case, a free association compact and three subsidiary agreements were initialed by the PCST on November 17th. Remeliik stated: "As in any negotiations, neither side is totally satisfied. On the one hand, Palau worries that it will not have [the] ... financial assistance ... necessary to launch a self-sustaining economy ... ." Note the PCST emphasis on obtaining adequate funding, and its continuing interest in using long-term funding to help develop a self-sustaining economy.

The "over-riding reason" the PCST gave for the initialing was to "make firm" the gains that it felt it had made before a new and possibly more demanding U.S. administration came into office (PCST December Report 1980:7). The Report acknowledged that "the position of the Reagan Administration [was] not known at this time," but also stated: "we have been told ... that the compact ... poses ... problems for the Republicans" as it grants Palau both too much autonomy and too much aid. The PCST felt that if the agreements were already initialed, it would put Palau in a "much stronger position" (PCST December Report: 1980:8).

The PCST also maintained that it had obtained substantially larger sums of money," and greater safeguards and control, than had previous negotiations (December Report: 1980:7). Through the agreements, American interference in "the [economic and social] development of Palau" would be limited (PCST December Report 1980:8). These points were disputed by those who protested the initialing.
The PCST also emphasized that it did not regard the step it had taken as "final," for either the U.S. or Palau. The PCST viewed the initialing as an "authentification of the text of the agreements," as well as a commitment by the negotiators to "recommend the agreements to their respective governments" (PCST December Report 1980:7). In fact, as the flare-up over status developed, Remeliik would take a neutral position on whether or not the agreements should be accepted. It is now appropriate to shift the discussion to developments within Palau, and more specifically, to political conditions there at the time.

Allies in Destabilization?

The decision to decide the winner of Palau's first presidential election with a plurality rule, coupled with a crowded field of candidates, meant that it was quite likely that the President-Elect would not win by a majority. In fact, Remeliik was elected by less than 350 (347) votes, with the other candidates, cumulatively, getting 69 percent of the vote compared to his 31 percent. Given this outcome Remeliik might not be in a strong position to exercise the political authority which he had so recently won.

In the weeks after the election, Niraked and Tmetchul, both of whom had mustered respectable followings, seemed interested in undermining the position of Palau's Chief Executive. (Shuster makes a similar point, see p. 361 of his dissertation.) It soon became clear that both Niraked and Tmetchul regarded Remeliik's initialing of political status agreements as an unwise and unpopular act, and one that could be politically exploited. On the first of December Niraked said: "The [voting] results were not final" and the question was still
open as to who would occupy the office of the first president of Palau. Moreover, as Chairman of the Land Authority, Niraked viewed himself as "spokesman for the entire . . . people of Palau" and indicated, as he had months earlier, that if Remeliik wanted to make land available to the military, then he "will have to come through the land authority," headed by Niraked (interview).

As December began, as reported by well-placed informants, both Niraked and Tmetchul were "really criticizing" Remeliik, and particularly, his treatment of political status. One informant reporting this was a member of the PCST. From his point of view, Remeliik's opponents were now trying to "turn peoples minds' [against Remeliik and the Compact] with . . . false information."

Public Hearings on Status

On December 17th and 18th, a public hearing was held on the status initialing and related matters. Nationally elected leaders, magistrates, traditional leaders and others were present to discuss the PCST's action. During the hearing, public reaction to the initialing came to a head.

Concern was expressed that most Palauans had not been adequately consulted with or informed about the agreements before the initialing took place. One leader asked: "Why did you not bring it [the agreements] back and have this kind of discussion" before? Especially Niraked and leaders associated with him expressed the view that particularly Remeliik, and the rest of the PCST, had approved of the agreements without consulting most Palauans and without informing them of the possible costs. Remeliik supporters disagreed with this. They
maintained that Remeliik, in contrast to the earlier commission under Tmetchul, coordinated and did not dominate his status team. Remeliik, they said, had not acted alone. Rather he had acted in full consultation with the rest of the PCST. They also said the PCST was merely "an arm, an extension of the legislature," and therefore further questions should be directed at the Legislature, not to PCST Chairman Remeliik or the rest of that body.

Those who opposed the status initialing maintained that it had "... stopped Palau from getting a better compact" (Niraked during the hearings). This ran counter to the PCST's position, discussed on p. 393. Remeliik also replied with the position that the initialing was "just between the representatives of the U.S. and Palau." It was up to the Legislature to take the next step, and as the PCST pointed out, there were still five or six steps to be taken before the Palauan public voted on a compact. As had been the case earlier, Remeliik, now as President-Elect and head of the PCST, seemed interested in dampening the concern among Palauans that room for maneuver had narrowed.

Another question asked was whether the PCST and particularly Remeliik agreed with everything that was in the agreements? In part, such questions were meant to ascertain whether or not Remeliik would endorse them. Remeliik supporters, some of whom had doubts about the desirability of the agreements, tended to side-step this question, maintaining that Remeliik's initialing did not mean that "he personally goes for" the agreements (informant comment). During the hearings, Remeliik said that the matter was up to the legislature, and then would be up to the public in a general referendum. Supporters could take
this to mean that Remelik would not necessarily support the agreements, and for those of them who were relatively autonomy-minded, this was a somewhat comforting view.

As the controversy developed, however, Remelik increasingly became the target for doubts as to his loyalty to Palau and to positions advocated by the former PC. A supporter of Tmetchul, a week after the initialing remarked that "it seems contradictory" that everything people associated with the PCST were against in 1979--a revised constitution, a large scale and disruptive military presence with even nuclear dimensions--had in effect now been approved by the agreement initialing.

During the hearings Niraked submitted that the distinctiveness of Palau's constitution rested in its assertion of an archipelagic territory, in its declaration of a nuclear free zone and in its recognition that a "close control [by Palauans] over the land... provided the foundation of true freedom from the military" and from other forms "of foreign exploitation." Some felt this control had now been removed by the subsidiary agreements.

Some Palauans felt that the November 17th agreements were "much worse" than the agreements negotiated by the Tmetchul-led PPSC in 1979, in which "there was some comfort in the fact that they were supposed to last 15 years" (informant), after which Palau would have the option to negotiate on another course. In the meantime, hopefully Palau could develop enough of an economic base to realistically consider loosening its ties to the United States. In contrast to the PPSC's negotiations, the PCST initialed agreements had strategic-related aspects lasting at least 50, and perhaps 100 years. In general, it was felt by those opposing the agreements that Palau was "giving away too much" and had
gotten too little from the Agreements. Palauan concerns did not simply involve the feeling that the financial support was inadequate, despite the heavy emphasis on this by the Palauan negotiators. For the most part the concern and the reaction against the agreements were based on fears of a degraded Palauan environment, both in terms of physical resources and a loss of Palauan, political control.

Niraked stated that "negotiations are like any other business deal. You should have plan A, B, C, each involving different amounts of trade-off. But now, on the part of Palau, it is 100 percent. Palau gives the U.S. 1/2 of its arable land, 100 years of dominion, nuclear accommodation, abandonment of the archipelagic theory, constant budget surveillance," etc. (interview on December 1, 1980). He wondered "what kind of mentality ... led Palauans and the U.S. negotiators to sign away Palau's own life for 100 years" (same). The explicitness of Niraked's focus on loyalty was remarkable. But clearly, concern about a loss of Palauan control was shared by some other leaders. One PCST negotiator commented that the agreements involved a "very elastic and long-term" provision for U.S. military use which Palauans, in the end, might not be able to control.

Niraked, as had been the case during the election campaign, attempted to highlight the worrisome aspects of anticipated military use, including its impacts on land. During the hearings, he draped a large map of Palau over the spot where a large Palauan flag hangs on the wall. The map detailed the areas of proposed U.S. military use and operations. He spoke in lurid terms about the probability and extent of the negative impacts anticipated. The Speaker of the
Legislature responded by saying that the hearing was meant to clarify the initialed agreements, not to focus on and debate military matters. Niraked, however, took the position that "what land the military wants" was highly germane. Remelilik's position at the time seemed neutral. He simply said that Niraked should be able to continue if this was what those present wanted. Indeed it became clear that those present were very interested in anticipated military impacts.6

Status Committee head Carlos Salii remarked that the U.S. mentioned three levels of priorities for military land use but that so far, the U.S. had not moved to actualize this. Various Palauans at the hearing continued with their questioning, however. What type of military would come? What kind of training and operations would be conducted? What would be their scope and what types of damage could be expected? Niraked's remarks were among the most dramatic. He asked "how could the people of Palau conduct the lives" even in the non-exclusive military zones, since even here, Palauans would have to get U.S. permission to build permanent structures? There could be uncertainty and anxiety connected with even sporadic military use. Such activities could disrupt the daily activities of Palauans, and could make long-range planning difficult.

Concern about military use and operations seemed particularly acute in areas where the U.S. have "exclusive" military rights. One leader from an area of proposed, exclusive use stated: "In _____ they want to test bombs. We do not know what kind" they will test. "But at present, if they test them, then all of Palau could be destroyed." Uncertainty over the specifics fueled apprehension.
Questions also centered around whether Palauans would have the ability to accept or reject specific U.S. military use and operations in particular locations. Remeliik responded that matters involving specific land uses should be worked out by Palau's Legislature, the Land Authority, and the people in the affected municipality. In general, the Legislature's Speaker and those present from the PSCT sought to reassure Palauans that military impacts would not be too great, and that Palauans would have control over them. Note how their attempts to deflect concern was similar to the dominant position taken by the candidates during the election campaign. Political status in the meantime, however, had become an exploitable issue and concern about anticipated impacts had continued. This now assumed a high pitch, and remained at this level throughout the hearings.

Tmetchul, though less flamboyant than Niraked, was nonetheless in opposition to the initialing. A number of his questions concentrated on levels of funding. He indicated that these agreements were not as beneficial as the ones the PPSC had negotiated in 1979. At times, like Niraked, Tmetchul seemed to emphasize a states' rights position. He maintained that many of the critical decisions on status should and would be made by the people most directly affected. Therefore, the states and the communities within them, not simply the national government centered in Koror, must have an important say over land and political status matters. This position was probably popular. Moreover, it was constitutionally sound.

For his part, Remeliik maintained throughout that it was the Palauan people, through a plebicite, who would make "the final decision"
on status. Remeliik stated that he was not at the hearings to "sell the agreements," rather, he was present to simply report on them to help clarify Palauans' understanding. In addition, as he had done on previous occasions, Remeliik stressed that nothing would happen soon, Palauans could still reject the agreements, and that no impacts would occur unless and until Palauans democratically approved an agreement. I refer to this as Remeliik's "not to worry" stance.

On November 18th sentiment grew for Niraked to chair the remainder of the status hearings. During lunch recess on the 18th, the Speaker, Remeliik, and many of those reporting from the various commissions left the building. During their absence, there was an animated discussion. When the recess was over, Niraked had emerged as "Chairman" of the hearings. One informant, present at the hearing speculated that Remeliik's non-confrontational style was one factor which permitted Niraked to seize the political initiative, for the moment. Niraked's efforts as "Chairman" culminated in a cable he sent to Washington expressing his sense of the position of the status "convention." This cable sought to disavow Remeliik's initiating of the agreements and stated that he had overstepped his authority. However the Speaker of the Legislature also sent a cable to Washington. This one stated that Niraked did not have authority to speak for Palauans on political status, and that a status "convention" did not exist.

Soon after this, the status flare-up subsided. Some viewed the attacks on Remeliik as mainly political tactics by his rivals to embarrass him and to destabilize his stewardship of the Executive. Secondly, Remeliik's domestic strength, contrasted to the limited but
rising strength of his most vocal critics, reduced the capacity for the status issue to generate sustained interest. The perception that status concerns were being politically manipulated for undesirable reasons, and the questionable political standing of the leaders seen as engaged in this, acted to rather quickly snuff out the escalation of status-related concerns.

Furthermore, as had been the case during the election campaign, no leaders could convincingly present an alternative view on political status. Niraked advocated that Palau should be prepared to "stand up" to the new American administration. He felt that Palauan negotiators tended to be too concerned about what was acceptable to the U.S. and that this was part of a still dependent, colonized mentality. He said that Palau could adopt a "take it or leave it" position, but did not offer an alternative if the U.S. decided to cut Palau adrift.

Fourth, as January began, more immediate and intriguing avenues were opening up for political expression and maneuver. Inauguration preparations were accelerating. The new Congress was being organized. Competition within and between both branches, and between the Senate and Executive, also contributed to the eclipse of political status as a burning question.

Moreover, it was becoming clear that Palau's room for maneuver had not been cut off, since a finalized agreement on status, much less the need to deal with any impacts, were unlikely to materialize soon. Remeliik's characteristic "not too worry" stance once again emerged as reasonably persuasive, though probably its ability to reassure had lessened somewhat. His neutral position on the agreements also had the effect of deflecting the suspicions directed towards him. Another
consequence of this deflection, however, was the shunting aside once again of Palau's underlying development dilemma.

Remeliik, and by implication the new executive, had survived its first, initial challenge. His popularity, however, had probably suffered somewhat, and his loyalty had been questioned for the first time. He emerged from the status flare-up in a somewhat defensive position which could have consequences for his "middle course." That course called for comprehensive change in a new direction under the dynamic and effective leadership of the President and executive branch. However, based on the flare-up over status, it was seen that Remeliik could be caught off balance by rivals who were persistent, and politically effective. In addition, political status and related questions could re-emerge as a focus for controversy, particularly if Palauan room for maneuver was seen as constricted and anticipated impacts loomed near.

**Senate Versus the Executive**

As Shuster points out, Palau's impressive show of unity and self-determination at its inauguration ceremonies only "briefly masked" Palauan political competition and unrest (1982:360). During the first months of the new administration, a dispute arose between the Executive and the Senate over the selection of executive cabinet heads. This was an early test of strength between the Executive and the most powerful branch of the new Congress. The dispute over the ministers called into question the viability of consensus as a national dispute-settling mechanism and goal-setting device. It will be remembered that Remeliik's rhetoric constantly emphasized the desirability of consensus performing these tasks. The middle course also called for a close and supportive
relationship between the branches of government. This was called into question with the ministerial dispute, as was the Executive's ability to organize quickly and operate effectively. Before going into the dispute, a bit of background is necessary.

On January 1, 1981 the installation ceremony for the public officers of Palau's first constitutional government was conducted. The President, Vice-President, and members of Congress were sworn in. The initial power balance in Congress consisted of three "fluid factions." One seemed loyal to Palau's executive leaders--President Remeliik and Vice-President Oiterong, while a second was inclined towards Tmetchul, and a third was unattached (Shuster 1982:360, 361). In the Senate, forces were evenly matched between those oriented towards Remeliik, with a PC/HEM background, and those inclined towards Tmetchul. For 13 days, from January 1st, the Senate and to a lesser extent the House of Delegates (HOD) were deadlocked over their selection of officers.

The Senate deadlock was finally broken with Johnson Torobiong, who had been a prominent member of the Tmetchul-oriented group and was a nephew of Tmetchul's, being selected as Floor Leader. A pro-Remeliik informant speculated at the time that with Kaleb Udui as Senate President, Torobiong as floor leader, and with other vocal politicians in the Senate not oriented towards Remeliik, a formidable and assertive group might soon be confronting the President and the rest of the Executive. This proved to be the case.

The initial views of Congress were presented on January 13th during a joint session. At the session, Senate President Udui noted that the constitution required that "the Senate give its advice and consent to
major presidential appointments." The Senate adopted an expansive view of its powers in this matter, and soon became embroiled in a dispute with the President over the selection of Executive cabinet ministers.

During the first weeks and months of the new administration, it appeared that the pool for selection might be somewhat limited. A number of informants reported that major figures such as Tmetchul, Salii and Niraked might be unwilling to serve for a variety of reasons. In any event, there was growing impatience for the Executive to establish its cabinet. For one thing, there was some concern that, in lieu of cabinet organization, Remeliik's personal advisors might gain too much power. There was also a gap in the chain of command since, without cabinet ministers, the relationship was between Remeliik, his advisors, and the various extent department heads.

In mid-March Remeliik submitted his choices for the ministry heads to the Senate. An attempt to promote regional balance was the most important criterion in his selections but other factors, such as competence and loyalty, were also significant. Regional balance had clearly been achieved. Competence was perhaps less certain, in the case of at least some of the nominees.

During public hearings on the nominees, a question surfaced that proved to be a straw in the wind. Did the constitution require the Vice-President to serve as head of a ministry? Some felt it was constitutionally required. A number of those who took this position had opposed the constitution back in 1979. Now however, they were insisting on what they saw as a strict adherence to it. Exhibiting a characteristic interest in political maneuver, some of these Palauans now became experts in the finer points of the very constitution which they had
originally opposed. Their interpretation would form the basis for a
challenge to the new Executive.

On April 8th the Senate rejected all of the Executive's nominees
for cabinet positions. According to the information officer of the
Congress, the reason was that Remeliik had not appointed his Vice­
President as a minister, nor had he submitted the Vice-President's name
as one of his nominees. The President's office continued to maintain,
however, that the Constitution did not require that the Vice-President
serve. Therefore the senate had no authority to insist that he do so.

Beyond the constitutional question, the Senate was also attempting
to "flex its muscle" in relation to the Executive. Moreover, at least
from the viewpoint of Remeliik supporters, anti-Remeliik elements within
and beyond the Senate "simply wanted to give the President a hard time"
and seized on the ministerial question as an exploitable issue. There
was also some sentiment that most of the nominees were not especially
qualified.

Clearly the Senate was demonstrating that it could be assertive.
However, the developing dispute was viewed in various ways. One
perspective was that the Senate was preoccupied with power and with
opposing the Executive. One informant described the Senate as "just
playing politics" instead of devoting its efforts to building a "strong,
young nation" in Palau. On the other hand, there was a sense that
Remeliik could be ineffectual, seemingly unable to exercise control over
events.

A third view was that the dispute reflected poorly on both the
Senate and Executive, indicating that they "did not listen to each
other." The informant who made this remark compared the situation to
one in which a canoe is drifting around in the middle of the ocean. "There are these currents, what does the canoe do, break itself into parts so that it can follow all directions at once?" This third view involved some measure of frustration with the national government as a whole.

By mid April the debate between the Senate and the Executive had crystallized. The legal advisor for the Executive took the position that although the Vice-President could serve as a minister, this was not constitutionally required. The legal counsel for the Senate insisted that, constitutionally, he must serve. Based on this interpretation, and in light of Remeliik's refusal to name Vice-President Oiterong, the Senate felt obliged to continue blocking all of Remeliik's nominees. Neither side budged in its position, and as during a number of earlier events, Palauan and foreign lawyers and judicial officials were among the resources deployed.

As I left Palau, the matter remained unsettled. Both President Remeliik and the Senate were still insisting on their positions and an end to the deadlock seemed unlikely soon.

The dispute's escalation had been revealing. First, although "traditional consensus" as a means of national goal definition and conflict resolution was emphasized in the rhetoric of the new government, consensus did not prevail in this case. Rather the mode was confrontationist, with both sides pressing for victory through legal maneuvering and appeals. Moreover Remeliik, as well as the Congress advocated a close liaison and a mutually supportive relationship between the different government branches. Obviously this was off to a poor start. In addition, Remeliik's plan for a middle course required that
the Executive became a forceful instrument for deliberate, comprehensive change towards a more self-reliant government and social system. But five months after the new government had been inaugurated, organization of the Executive had not yet occurred. Moreover unity and consensus were still elusive.

**Governor Tmetchul**

In his rhetoric Remeliik consistently stressed the importance of a close and supportive relationship between the states and the national government. As the national government began, Palau's first state was also organized. On January 25, 1981, Airai State was inaugurated in a ceremony held in front of its traditional bái. Roman Tmetchul, governor of the state gave an address that emphasized the desirability of a lean and effective government. Tmetchul and other speakers also stressed that hard work and cooperation were essential for Airai's development efforts.

Airai by this time was "buzzing" with economic activity, much of it being facilitated by Tmetchul. The contrast between the number of highly visible projects in Airai and the consumer and service-oriented economic structure in Koror was striking. In addition, Tmetchul's dynamic leadership and the rapid organization of the Airai government contrasted with the seeming lack of direction and ineffectiveness of the Remeliik-led Executive based in Koror. Given the long-standing and sharp contrast in leadership style between Remeliik and Tmetchul, as the months passed it is possible that Remeliik's moderate and consensual style might be seen as inadequate, in contrast to the assertive and dynamic style of Tmetchul.
A Drought

The final challenge was a severe drought from April to mid-May of 1981. Like other initial challenges, the drought illustrated uncertainties in the pursuit of Remeliik's middle course.

In comparison with the flare-up over status and the ministerial dispute, the drought was not directly a political matter. Though an "act of god," it, like everything else in Palau, could have a political taste to it.

It will be remembered that Remeliik's rhetoric stressed the importance of cooperation between the different sectors and regions of Palau. The drought, however, highlighted the distinction between Koror and the hinterland. Babdaob, and particularly its west coast had plenty of water. It was the large and dense population in Koror that suffered an acute shortage.

The response of the Remeliik-led Executive to the drought may have increased uncertainty over whether it could act in a timely and effective manner to ameliorate a pressing circumstance facing many Palauans. As the days and weeks passed, the need for timely and comprehensive action was increasingly felt. Health became a concern. Some felt that the government should declare a state of emergency, halting food exchange "customs" for a while. Moreover without regulatory measures by the national government, non-local access to water in Airai became somewhat chaotic.

One informant remarked that the new executive seemed preoccupied with minor, bureaucratic matters instead of attending to pressing, national business, such as dealing with the drought. He commented that
"if Tmetchul had been elected," the national governments' response would have been different. The government's slow response appears to have increased a perception that the national Executive could be indecisive and ineffectual.

**Broader Uncertainties and Conclusion**

Remeliik's response to the various challenges reinforced a minor but potentially important perception at the time, i.e., that the Remeliik-led Executive was not able to deal effectively with pressing, national matters. Both in style and temperament, Remeliik seemed reluctant to confront conflict and could be caught off-balance by events. As Shuster points out, some of the very qualities that had enabled him to win the presidency—his moderate and non-confrontational style—might make him a less-than-effective President. In addition, at least from an outsiders' viewpoint, consensus as a national dispute settling mechanism and as a priority-setting device was of questionable value in light of both the initial challenges and Palau's underlying dilemma. Yet Remeliik and other leaders continued to emphasize that unity and consensus were crucial, both as a means and as an end for national development in Palau.

Questions about consensus as a method for national decision-making, or means for goal articulation and assignment of priorities, have been raised in previous chapters. As noted, in old Palau competition was pronounced but it was highly integrated, and productively embedded within the framework of village life. In contemporary Palau, however, people have divergent values and do not all share a similar lifestyle.
Moreover, Palau was faced with unprecedented challenges and opportunities. The question was the ability of consensus to be effective to the extent assumed in the "middle course."

During the course of recent disputes, such as that over the constitution in 1979/80 and over ministerial appointments in 1981, resolution was not pursued by means of "traditional consensus." Nor did appeals for unity seem to have much effect. At times, consensus did seem to emerge, but only after a contest had been won or lost. One of my informants, a highly respected religious/community leader, remarked that "perhaps what is missing" was a demonstration of specific and concrete mechanisms for using consensus as a means for national development by the Remeliik Administration.

Of course one cannot pass judgement on the effectiveness of consensus for pan-Palauan and Palauan/external interactions based on the Republic's first few months. The question is raised in order to point out the possibility that no matter how much time and effort the Remeliik Administration devoted to the problem, consensus and unity might not be realized, nor might these contribute significantly to national development goals.

The new administration also seemed interested in a moderately-paced and Palau-oriented development mode, but this could have its costs. A moderate pace might mean that Palauans would not see the new government as very different from the dependent status quo. Secondly, little of the desired change might occur at all. As one advisor/consultant to the new Executive put it, the task of politically educating Palauans to move away from dependency and towards self-reliance should involve "gradual change," occurring over many years. He compared this to "changing the
body chemistry" of an organism. This had to be done gradually, since otherwise such an organism might suffer severe shock and die. But if change occurred quite gradually, the result might be a deepening and broadening of the very dependency that the new government wanted to turn back, given the seductive nature of this dependency and the option for it to continue.

In addition to self-reliance, "cultural well-being" was now also articulated as a national goal. There was concern that it might be degraded, which some envisioned in the form of a gradual but pervasive cultural "Americanization" of Palau. A continued external subsidy would probably support the maintenance of high levels of consumption of imported, non-essential items. This in turn could feed an increasingly consumer-oriented mentality and lifestyle. This could lead to the gradual replacement of a distinctively Palauan culture, meaningfully and functionally woven into the island environment, with a externally-oriented culture, largely dependent on foreign support for its existence.

More generally, Remeliik's moderate approach might lose respect and popularity if, as time went by, it was seen as unrealistic and ineffective. As noted in Chapter VIII, both Salii and Tmetchul seemed to advocate a development path that was more extreme, and possibly more decisive and effective. This option had been presented, and had obtained considerable support. Moreover, there was the considerable appeal of the status quo.

Remeliik consistently stressed the importance of obtaining support from all sectors of Palauan society if the middle course was to succeed. During his news conference on January 31, 1981 he was asked about his
relationship to the chiefs, and as previously, he discussed the importance of the traditional sector for Palau's middle course. He also reminded those present that under the constitution, the chiefs were supposed to serve as advisors to the President on matters relating to custom and traditions.

Actually however, the relationship between Remeliik and many chiefs was not close. In addition, there were reports that one or two of Remeliik's political rivals wished to fan and utilize the dissatisfaction of chiefs and use this to encourage the destabilization of Remeliik's position. At the time I left Palau, such a movement was not highly visible. By the same token, however, so long as some chiefs were dissatisfied, they could be targets for manipulation and perhaps successful mobilization. Moreover the lack of enthusiastic support from the chiefs might have serious consequences for the middle path, in view of its stress on village-based economic efforts.

In contrast to the chiefs, Remeliik's relationship to most leaders with activist backgrounds was fairly good, though there were signs of strain. One source of this was the frustration of some activist leaders with the initial slow pace of the Executive. On April 20th, Senator Moses Uludong made a public statement on this: "Our first national government has been in existence now for ... months and by all standards, the direction toward which the nation is going should have become apparent. Unfortunately, no such destination has been set and the Republic continues to plod along the same erratic course which characterized the Trust Territory [government]." Uludong at this point was expressing his impatience in order to prod the new executive, not
to attack it. He was still willing to give the executive more time, to "give it a chance" (interview) although activist patience was beginning to wear thin.

Like some other Palauans, there were activists who had reservations about Remeliik's action in initialing the status agreements. Substantively, most Palauan political activists were autonomy-minded when it came to political status. They also tended to advocate an anti-nuclear stance. Remeliik's position during the flare-up, i.e., that he was neutral on the agreements, was probably somewhat reassuring. If in the future, however, Remeliik and his administration appeared to promote the agreements, and especially if this was seen to involve the accommodation of nuclear weapons, then Remeliik might loose some of his activist support. As I left Palau, this had not occurred. So far, activist unease remained within manageable bounds.

At the time, Remeliik still enjoyed the strong support of the Modekngei, though there was also concern among them about Remeliik's initialing of the status agreement. One influential Modekngei reported that right after that status initialing there was some apprehension that perhaps Remeliik and the PCST had initialied undesirable agreements. Moreover there was uncertainty as to exactly what these agreements contained. My informant also reported that a highly respected and popular leader on the PCST opposed the initialing and this served to generate the concern that perhaps Remeliik "had made a mistake."

As for the future one might expect that, given the Modekngei's long-stated position against the alienation of Palauan land, erosion of Palau's subsistence economy, and its replacement by affluent dependence, the Modekngei would be strongly opposed to the agreements. The movement
was also particularly concerned about the introduction of "harmful substances" into Palau. If Remeliik at some future date came out in favor of the agreements he might lose Modekngei support, but given the strength of the interpersonal link between Remeliik and the Modekngei, and its reported drift away\(^{21}\) from an emphasis on self-reliance, perhaps the Modekngei would continue to follow Remeliik, even if he supported the agreements.

Two major substantive matters remained unsettled as I left the field. One was the lack of an agreement on an economic plan. Certainly the need for such a plan was stressed by the Executive Branch as well as by the Congress. In addition, according to the initialed compact of free association, a plan was required in order to establish "economic goals and policies" during the period of free association (section 211 of The Compact). There was also some pressure to establish guidelines from a number of countries interested in making investments, for example Japan and Taiwan.

As noted Remeliik inclined towards the economic plans being developed by Ray Bruce; however, no plan had been adopted. Given the tension revealed by initial challenges, there was also little reason to expect that the Congress would agree to any plan sponsored by Remeliik.

It is true that a Foreign Investment Board had been established by the Remeliik Administration.\(^{22}\) But without an overall economic development plan, and the commitment to pursue it, a coherent, comprehensive and effective development effort seemed unlikely. In the meantime, questionable assumptions remained. Could "aid" be controlled? Could a segment of the bureaucracy really be used as a weapon to reduce itself?
Could all development goals really be pursued to some extent simultaneously, or were some incompatible and even mutually exclusive? Remeliik's answers for these questions were all optimistic. However, the lack of an attractive, feasible and comprehensive development plan, plus Remeliik's response to initial challenges, indicated that despite a rhetorical "middle course," a solution for Palau's underlying development dilemma remained elusive.

The question of political status was also unsettled. Diplomatically, the only certainty was that the new Reagan Administration would subject the initialed agreements, and overall Micronesian policy, to review. Meanwhile the U.S. Ambassador and High Commissioner resigned to make way for a Reagan team and Rosenblatt received "mixed reviews" in the U.S. Congress. The Senate tended to think he had not pushed hard enough for military interests while the House, more "paternalistic" in its attitude, felt he had been too assertive in promoting a U.S.-dominated pact (Pacific Daily News 1981 March 20:8).

What the Reagan policy would be, and when this would be enunciated, was "anybody's guess" (same). Based on the past performance of the U.S., a Reagan policy might have far less coherence and consistency than the hard-line approach envisioned by some Palauans. Added to the uncertainty was the possibility of international complications.23

This dissertation has taken account of international and global factors, but with a Palauan focus. The analysis has included Palauan views of external factors, the relationship of these factors to Palauan circumstances, and the attempts by various Palauan actors to affect development outcomes. Given this perspective, the stance that Palauans
were likely to adopt is the most important question. As of early 1981, a Palauan position on political status and related questions was not clear. The status agreements which had been initialed were not popular, and most leaders and socio-political groups made no move to endorse them. In fact a number seemed likely to campaign against approval including some Church leaders, activists, and perhaps the Modekngei. Continued opposition might spring from a number of objections; insufficient funding, a states' rights position, dissatisfaction with the general contents of the agreements, and/or apprehension over the military—and especially a nuclear—presence.

As I left Palau, it seemed highly unlikely that the nuclear transit, as provided for in subsidiary agreements, could get the 75 percent popular approval that was required by the constitution. Without approval and based on past American statements and behavior, it was unlikely that the U.S. would agree to free association. This would leave political status "up in the air."

In conclusion, I want to discuss the possible costs and benefits of not coming to closure on Palau's most insoluble question, that of establishing a priority between political control as embedded in the constitution on the one hand, and an assured, high level of continued external subsidy with its linkage to military/nuclear accommodation on the other.

The benefits of not coming to a resolution were primarily in the short-to-medium range. In this, the Palauan genius for political maneuver, plus their political sophistication and myriad tactics might hamstring the United States to the point where the painful decision over
the alternatives of Palauan political control or support could be put off temporarily. In the meantime, a swarm of shifting Palauan factions and coalitions capped by a consensual National Executive could make Palau a difficult target for any foreign, dominant power to readily circumscribe, or control. Perhaps a variety of Palauan maneuvers interacting with an inconsistent and ambivalent American stance could succeed in maintaining the status quo.

Without resolution of the status question however, divisive conflict could periodically deflect Palau's talent, energy, and other resources to other goals while the chance for productive national development slipped away. This might be encouraged by the United States or another external power interested in playing one Palauan faction off against another.

The longer a divisive and unstable status quo is maintained, the more likely that self-reliance as a national goal will be progressively eroded. Other objectives, such as cultural well-being, might be degraded as well. As this occurs, an increasingly pressing need to continue massive transfusions of U.S. "aid" could repeatedly drive the Palauans to the edge of accommodating worrisome and intrusive external interests, so as to obtain much needed "aid." The impulse for this might increase if the United States appeared to indicate that Palauan concessions would be necessary for support to continue. However, the pattern of American pressure has not been consistent. When it seems to ease, status-related threats appear less concrete and pressing. As this occurs, Palauans tend to concentrate on a myriad of domestic considerations, and as has been characteristic, pursue these largely through
competition within a dense yet fluid political system, which they find quite stimulating.

Clearly, however, as I left Palau, political status, and the broader dilemma associated with it, were the most intractable and potentially crucial development questions facing the Islands. Palauans' handling of these questions might determine, to a significant extent, the degree of control Palauans retained over the development process in their islands. In lieu of, and perhaps even despite their strenous efforts, it is quite possible that in the longer run Palauans might come to accept and even embrace some loss of political control, and worrisome projects, as the price for continued "affluence" in the contemporary world.

This could only be conjecture when I left the field. At that time, a number of factors contributed to continual delaying of closure. These included the perceived inconsistency of the United States pressure and the ambiguity of its positions, Remeliik's reassuring "not to worry" stance, the intractable presence of Palau's underlying dilemma, a lack of available alternatives, a reasonably comfortable status quo, and the apparent option to maintain flexibility through continual maneuver.
CHAPTER X --NOTES

1 The Palauan delegation asked for complete details on U.S. military land needs and alternative possibilities. By this time the United States was requesting 2,500 acres on Babldao for exclusive U.S. military use, plus a joint military/civilian use of another 32,000 acres. Moreover the United States wanted the use of airfields on Babldao, Peleliu and Anguar, plus about 30 acres and additional developments for a naval facility at Malakal Harbor.

2 As reported in the Honolulu Star Bulletin (1980 October 27:A-4), this Carter advisor said that the Reagan Administration would not be "inclined towards self-determination for the territories" or for Micronesia. This advisor also said that, as Carter had "put a lot of time and effort" into finalizing political status with Micronesia, Carter wanted to "see this through" and pursue development as far as possible before a Reagan Administration might take office.

3 Shuster discusses the reasons for and consequences of this plurality rule in some detail. He states that "the fact that the 7th Palau Legislature . . . explicitly endorsed and legalized the plurality rule [for the national elections] sanctioned a wide open fight for the President and Vice President and ensured the election of Palau's two top executives by a plurality" (1982:342). In fact, all this occurred, and Shuster describes the decision by the 7th Palau Legislature as having been made "in response to strong political pressures, . . . [with] lingering consequences for the exercise of power by the new Executive" (1983:13).

4 Shuster makes this point as well (1983:130).

5 The post-election political situation was described by one of Shuster's informants, who was a "long time political participant" as one of "two doe surrounded by a hungry lion and tiger." The doe were President-elect Remeliik and Vice-President elect Oiterong. The two "stalking cats" were Tmetchul and Niraked (Shuster 1983:130).

6 One legislator-elect from Peleliu remarked: "Why not eliminate other subjects and just talk about the military use of land?"

7 Shuster, in his treatment of the Palau's national election and its aftermath, stresses Niraked as the leader primarily associated with a states' rights position, i.e., that individual states in Palau and communities within them should have a major say over whether, and to what extent any resources within their boundaries can be utilized by foreigners for external purposes (1983:130). During the flare-up over political status, Tmetchul was a strong proponent of this position, as was Niraked.
According to the constitution, the national government shall not take state (including village) land without prior consultation, nor should it use the power of eminent domain for the benefit of a foreign entity (see Chapter V).

Niraked's cable did stir enough concern in Washington for the United States to send a State Department Liaison Officer to Palau. Though ostensibly, this was to observe inauguration preparations and festivities, this officer told me that his primary objective was to "investigate what was behind Niraked's cable." In other words, was this simply Palauan factional politics or was Niraked fanning a broad-based popular sentiment that could threaten the prospect of U.S. military bases in the area? The U.S. at the time apparently was not sure.

A lawyer/politician, who at the time did not seem strongly inclined towards Remeliik. Nor did he seem an agent of Tmetchul.

A number of observers felt that since Salii was more "educated" than Remeliik, and was very much aware of this, Salii was unlikely to serve under Remeliik. Moreover for both Salii and Tmetchul there was perhaps the motivation to keep their distance from the new executive so as to avoid any public dissatisfaction that developed against it. Moreover Salii, Tmetchul and Niraked were at the time involved in economic or political activities that might serve as an independent support base. Salii was operating a travel agency and car rental agency. Niraked was involved in political efforts concentrated in Babldaob. Tmetchul was now governor of Airai and both there and in Koror was heavily involved in economic activities.

One nominee was from the north, one from the west, another from the center, and one from the east and south.

In the case of David Ramarui, the nominee for Social Services, there was little doubt as to his experience in the field, given his long career in education.

As I left the field, the dispute was being referred to the District Attorney. The case then went to the Trust Territory High Court, where the decision was in the Senate's favor, i.e., that the Vice-President was constitutionally required to serve as a cabinet minister. The case was H.I. Remeliik, A.R. Oiterong vs The Senate of the First Obill Era Kelulau, in Civil Action #62-81, Declaratory Judgement, presided over by Associated Justice Momoru Nakamura, a Palauan, and given on August 17, 1981. On September 8th, Remeliik submitted Oiterong's name as his nominee for Minister of State (PON 1981 September 8:6). The Senate approved this, and the other ministerial nominees, on September 24th in a resolution, thus ending the six month old stalemate.
For instance, Tmetchul had negotiated with a New Zealand company to make improvements in Irai's roads to the airport. Saw mills and other economic projects also could be seen in Irai.

Informants reported that there had been no such drought since 1972.

Individuals with their pick-up trucks and empty oil-drum cans drove to Irai for water to bring it to Koror. Reportedly several such trucks could be seen lined up by one stream.

Remeliik's rather cautious approach, and his reputation and ability as a "good listener" (informant) helped build his reputation as a leader who was in touch with the people, and who would be responsive and responsible to them. This aided his candidacy. However once in office, Remeliik's cautious and non-confrontational style could hinder his ability to be an effective leader, in the face of threats to and opportunities for the nation. Shuster makes a similar point (1982:364).

In the text I note the contrast between the initial months of the Remeliik Administration and Tmetchul as Governor of Airai, and how this could influence the public's response to Remeliik's middle course. Shuster makes a similar observation, noting that "Tmetchul is ... determined to acquire ... capital for the development and improvement of his state and thereby make it an exemplar of [his] dynamic and farsighted leadership" (1982:363). The Remeliik-led Executive, based in Koror, appeared to some as considerably less dynamic in its approach to development as of the time I left the field.

This was indicated by the attitude of many chiefs during the inauguration and earlier, during the status flare-up.

I have little evidence of this directly. However, an observer of the Modekngei high school who made repeated trips there after I left the field and comments from a number of others indicate that Modekngei efforts, at least at their school, placed less emphasis on self-sufficiency than in the early years, and strongly depend on external aid.

One of my informants, who served on the Board mentioned a number of the varied projects it was considering: a crocodile farm, an agreement with a tuna company, an application from a cosmetics firm, etc. This informant had an activist background, and her cautious view of foreign investment—that it be welcomed only if it contributed to the Palauan economy and helped train Palauans—was consistent with the view of most activists, and also Remeliik at the time. The fact that Remeliik had appointed members to the Board without the advice and
consent of the Senate was the basis for the Senate to claim that the Chief Executive had violated Secretarial Order 3039, which was still in effect (see Senate resolution 21 SDI as referred to in standing committee report #39 of June 26, 1981 and $42 of June 29, 1981 in Journal of the Senate, pp. 105-6, and 116, also see Pacific Daily News 1981 August 8:4). This was part of the Senate's broader stance, namely, that the Chief Executive was constitutionally required to submit all his selections for "national officers" to the Senate for its advise and consent. In the text, I have concentrated on the Vice-Presidential/ministerial question. The dispute was still going on when I left the field, and was the focal point for the Senate's position.

23 The possibility of a Russian veto at the United Nations was mentioned in press accounts.

24 Shuster characterizes this Church leadership as concerned about rapid social change, and the further Americanization that were seen as likely consequences of the envisioned free association agreement (1982:132). My informants support this view.

25 Shuster characterizes the anti-nuclear activists as a "small group of anti-nuclear Palauan nationalists (with supporters in Japan, Australia and the United States) [who] oppose the compact as a threat to Palauan independence and the island's ecology" (1983:182).

26 The content of a state's rights position has been discussed (see Chapter Note VII). Two additional factors made such a position particularly salient. For one, as Shuster notes, Remeliik as Chief Executive "has the responsibility, but not clear constitutional authority, for making land available for U.S. military operations" (1982:362). Secondly, state's rights tapped into the "long tradition of fiercely autonomous village complexes" (Shuster 1983:130) in the sense that, springing in part from that tradition, the hamlets, villages, and states might resist efforts by the national government to acquire land for foreign uses. These sub-national entities felt they did not have adequate input into and control over the process. As noted, as of the time I left the field, Niraked particularly had served notice that, in view of a state's rights position, a political status agreement might be difficult to obtain.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION

Palauan Socio-Political Strategies

The heart of this dissertation has been a theoretically-framed case study of a number of roughly sequential, pivotal "events" in Palau. During these, some Palauans attempted through various socio-political strategies, and a less conscious interaction mode, to cope assertively with dependency of a distinctive type, and under the conditions described. The first part of this conclusion recounts the evolution of these attempts.

One consistency running through them has been the desire, on the part of some Palauans, to exercise control over the mode of Palau's entry into the "modern" world. As discussed in Chapter II, a theme in Palauans' interaction with outsiders has been a desire to obtain useful additions from the wider world, while seeking to avoid unwanted aspects.

In contemporary Palau, during the 1970s and into the 1980s some Palauans on a number of occasions engaged in various activities to resist both extent and anticipated external impingements, anticipated threats, and to some degree, to embark on a course for selective modernization.

A desire to resist externally-oriented development plans was especially apparent during the superport controversy. In addition, the "grass-roots" political style employed by activists during that dispute was Palau-oriented and protectionist. In part it sought to ensure popular control over leaders whose parameters for action were no longer
circumscribed by the situational constraints built into pre-modern Palau. Palau, especially from the 1960s on, has been a target for unprecedented metropolitan/satellite as well as global constraints and opportunities. A desire to respond to these in a Palauan-oriented fashion was indicated by the stress on identification, and on other indicators of loyalty during the 1980 presidential campaign, and to a lesser extent, during inauguration ceremonies.

Another continuity has been the anticipatory nature of the Palauan impetus for and actions to protect the Islands. This is discussed further in this chapter's section on mobilization.

Palauan society was and is small-scale. This still imparts a highly personalistic flavor to Palau politics, even at the national level. The cast of characters is limited. A number of leaders have consistently exercised strong influence. But by the same token, Palau has been a focus for international interests, and contains a dynamic and evolving political system. Moreover the events described were unprecedented. As these events articulated with the various socio-political strategies, they had manifold effects. Some socio-political tendencies were elaborated, some receded, and new ones were created. Domestic power alignments were altered, as was their relationship to various external factors. In the body of the dissertation, it was necessary to tract the ebb and flow in the political fortunes of a number of leaders and groups, as well as to highlight the emergence of additional contenders and new tendencies. The power struggles that were involved need not concern us here. It is appropriate, however, to briefly review the broader issues illuminated by the events, as well as the content, and strengths and weaknesses, of the socio-political strategies.
Chapter III on the proposed superport concerned the broader issue of self-determination, in the form of Palauans' control over Palau's position in the world economy. Furthermore, among Palauans, would such control be exercised by an elite, or be more broad-based? The superport controversy was the first one to explicitly address such questions. The success of Palauan efforts to block a superport was due to a number of factors. These consisted of an effective internal mobilization campaign, as well as external leverage tactics which also had effect, and coordination between these. The campaign had its limits, however. It was primarily reactive and defensive, a specific action against an apparent threat.

Chapter IV, on the unity/separation controversy, concerned an issue that was primarily political, but which also had economic and identity components. What was the basic political parameter, according to which the Palauans wanted to define themselves in the world? Boundaries were disputed and set as part of a strategy to enhance Palauan control.

The anti-superport and pro-separatist strategies were compared. Both resulted in considerable, reactive clarification. Moreover both were successful in their specific objectives. In addition both campaigns had an anticipatory element. There were some contrasts, however.

A fear of disruptive and degrading, externally-oriented economic domination was paramount during the superport controversy. During the unity/separation campaign, the primary fear was over the prospect of external, political control. Secondly, unlike the superport controversy, there was no strong sense of anticipated, internal polarization. In
fact the parameter for identification proved to be a rather simple one, pitting insiders (i.e., Palauans) against other groups (i.e., the Micronesians). Another contrast, was that to some extent, the separatist strategy carried its oppositional stance to a broader conceptual front. Furthermore, in contrast to the superport controversy, a referendum (a foreign-derived sanction) was used to ascertain public opinion authoritatively.

The pro-separatist and anti-superport strategies had serious weaknesses. Both were largely reactive and defensive responses to anticipated threats. Neither strategy was comprehensive, nor did they offer a replacement for the possible resource bases that were forgone. Moreover, the envisioned cost of pursuing both these strategies was rather mild, since the United States did not associate either Palauan decision with the continuation or denial of economic support.

Chapter V on the development of Palau's constitution and the ensuing dispute, stands in some contrast to previous events because of the differences in the Palauan strategy. Also new is the similarity of the dynamics described to those normally dealt with from a dependencia perspective. The dynamics analyzed consisted of a coincidence of interests between a metropolitan power and a segment of leadership in the "periphery," and the complex, multi-directional flow of influence between the metropolitan power and its "satellite." At the juncture described, pressures from the metropolitan power, and from the confluence between them and the objectives of a Palauan faction, had an unintended and "contrary" effect: that of contributing to efforts to defend a constitution objectionable to the United States.
Palau's constitution-framing was a relatively formal, comprehensive and potentially long-range effort to control development through nation-building. The constitution was protective of Palauan resources, and externally-restrictive, and again there was an anticipatory aspect. In this case, however, the United States saw Palauan protectionist activities as embedded in a constitution as externally-restrictive, to the point of threatening America's underlying, strategic interest. The United States indicated that, for this reason, it might not be able to offer Palau continued financial support. Palau's development dilemma (see pp. 497-498) had now assumed more crystalized shape. A potentially fundamental conflict between Palauan desires for political control and for economic support was now made explicit in the opposition between constitutional integrity and free association. Palau's vulnerability continued as the controversy escalated.

Chapter VI dealt with the rise and success of a new political coalition in Palau, the People's Committee. The PC was unprecedented in its style and objectives, and most especially, in the overwhelming degree of support it mobilized. It presented a viable, albeit high specific, protectionist strategy. In addition the PC was also concerned with the emergent objective of nation-building. Chapters VI and VII also dealt with mobilization, closure, political maneuver, and the relationship between these components.

The success of the People's Committee was due to a number of factors: the specificity of its goals, the array of its appeals, the variety of and effective coordination between its tactics, and the ability to outflank domestic opposition. Furthermore, the leadership of
the new coalition exhibited a preferred political style, had strong domestic standings, and faced a local opposition that was increasingly feared and disliked. There were also the miscalculations of this domestic opposition. In addition, there was the contrary effect produced by external pressure, and the perceived confluence between it and an unpopular, domestic stance. Moreover, the PC's avoidance of a strong connection between Palauans' constitutional preference and the one for free association was generally popular and politically expedient. And finally, this PC stance was facilitated by the perceived interaction pattern of the United States.

Chapter VII dealt with the PC as part of a coalition in power. In this environment, the PC was no longer primarily a protest oriented, counter-elite. Now, the PC/HEM exercised institutionalized authority, and to some extent sought to use this to implement its political goals. Palauans' general, and the PC's particular ambivalence towards the exercise of metropolitan influence continued, as did the general and PC's incentives to avoid any conflict between constitutional integrity and the preferred political status. It was hoped that the horns of Palau's development dilemma could be grasped sequentially, first by ratifying the constitution, after which free association could be obtained. The perceived American interaction pattern continued to make this seem feasible.

Amidst changing political circumstances however, the limitations on closure which had facilitated the PC's mobilization, now proved destabilizing. Among other things, the PC had never developed a political ideology or set of extra-constitutional programs. Having accomplished its highly specific objectives, the coalition soon fell apart.
The chapter on the first national elections (Chapter VIII), like the one on constitutional development, dealt with an unprecedented event. It was primarily concerned with nation-building and focused on mobilization in the election, and to a lesser extent on closure. It also concentrated on the problematical relationship between "objective" conditions of dependency, indigenous perceptions of such conditions, and the positions taken by political leaders.

Chapter IX dealt with the initial expressive and organizational trajectories as Palau's constitutional government began. The celebration of nationhood, like earlier events, illustrated certain tendencies, strengths, and weaknesses. The celebration generated considerable interest, and enthusiasm and accelerated efforts to forge an attractive national identity. Furthermore, major efforts were begun to project this identity internationally. The atmosphere during the inaugural celebrations, like that during the constitutional convention, evoked a sense of national expression, and portrayed an end to dependency and external control. However, although this atmosphere had an exhilarating effect, such symbolic reification could have costs. Palau's vulnerability remained, and could even deepen. In the meantime, a false sense of control and well-being might deflect Palauan energies from the pursuit of more concrete measures to secure autonomy and control.

After Remeliik's election, his state of the nation address is notable for its advocacy of selective modernization. However, this "middle course" assumed that dependency, and even the American military, could be controlled, so as not to degrade Palauan resources, but rather to provide support for Palau's longer-range autonomist goals. Some
probably hoped that the middle course could outflank the worrisome
development options. Since the closures represented by the middle course
were still at a symbolic level, it was that much easier to represent a
rather heterogenous course as both a moderate compromise, and as
feasible. At this stage scarce resources did not have to be allocated,
or did questionable development assumptions have to be tested.

Chapter X concerned the challenges during the early months of the
new republic to President Remeliik's leadership, and to his "middle
course." The relevance, feasibility, and effectiveness of the course
now faced concrete circumstances. Largely symbolic closures would now
have to be operationalized, amidst continuing dependency and other
limits to Palauan control. In addition, there were specific challenges
to the Chief Executive, and less directly, for the Executive Branch.
In general the performance of Remeliik fuelled an emergent concern that
the President's consensual style, and moderate approach to development,
might not be effective.

Political status, and the dilemma underlying it, continued as
Palau's most intactable and inscrutable development questions. Incentives
for Palauans to avoid closure continued, as did the apparent
possibility to do so. The objective and perceived United States
interaction, the stance of Palauan leaders, Remeliik's domestic position,
the seeming lack of political alternatives, and the generally seductive
and seemingly benign conditions of dependency, all conspired to maintain
the status quo.

Nonetheless, Palauans recognized that this state of affairs was
unstable, particularly since the United States, as of the November/
December 1980 flare-up over political status, seemed to push for a political status agreement that would be favorable to its interests. At roughly the same point, the Palauans began to elaborate an interaction mode of continual maneuver. This mode in some ways, represented a retreat. It was not an explicit strategy, nor was it assertive or comprehensive. In fact, its primary function was to avoid closure on an area fundamental for national development. Such procrastination might have its costs however. These are discussed as part of the treatment of the horns of Palau's dilemma and Palauans' response (pp. 500, 501).

The Palauan Case and Development Theories

The analysis of events in Palau, the socio-political strategies, and the relationship of these to broader issues, provided a number of findings that have theoretical implications, mainly for post-modernization "macro" theories of "underdevelopment." The Palauan case has demonstrated some of the shortcomings of early dependency theory, and some of world-systems theory, as well as an important benefit of the latter. The even greater utility of a dependencia perspective has been shown, as well as areas where it too, can be supplemented.

The dependencia perspective, as elaborated by this Palauan case, can help to correct for a mistake that is sometimes made when a macro approach, such as dependency or world-systems, is simplistically applied to analyze concrete situations. These are historically and contextually embedded. A world systems or dependency approach that lacks such recognition can lead to tautological and teleological thinking that reduces the dynamics of a "peripheral" society to a weak
echo, or folksy distortion, of determinate forces emanating from the "core" of a more inclusive system.

The dependencia perspective involves being sensitive to the historical development of, and transformations in, the pattern of interaction between the indigenous society and external powers. The Palauan case illustrates how the complex nature and dynamics of the indigenous society both affect, and are effected by, that society's interaction with outside forces. Palau, as we have seen, has been unevenly influenced by a succession of outsiders. These arrivals on the Palauan scene brought differing interests and capacities. Into their interactions, the Palauans have brought ethno-historic predispositions, as well as contemporary preferences and interests. Both continuity and change have resulted from the interaction.

Palau apparently was and is today, regarded by some autonomy-minded Palauans as having been a well-integrated and productive society, almost entirely self-sufficient at the time of contact. Self-sufficiency, as we have seen, eroded during the Japanese, and particularly the later American period. Historically, however, there have also been continuities. In general, in their interactions Palauans have sought to maximize the new opportunities for enhanced mobility and political competition, while at the same time seeking to minimize associated constraints. Indigenous, absorptive and competitive tendencies continued, and were elaborated. At first this occurred with the political entrepreneurship of Palauan chiefs, who manipulated their early contacts with foreigners, mainly to serve domestic geo-political ends.
As a succession of metropolitan powers arrived on the scene, both they and various Palauan groups have behaved with considerable diversity. Some indigenous religious leaders resisted the Germans, and as the colonial presence deepened, Palauan groups polarized into pro or anti-foreign stances during the later Japanese period. This was before the devastating chaos of World War II, and the complexities enhanced by the multi-faceted and permissive American administration. Dramatic shifts in metropolitan rule did not end with the Americans, however. In fact the difference in both the level of metropolitan interest, and its impacts on Palau, were as great between the period before the 1960s and the years thereafter, as had been the differences between the preceding, metropolitan administrations. Palau's complex history cannot be understood with the simplistic model for a unvarying metropolitan interest and constant level of pressure which impacts a largely passive, indigenous population. Such a model can be found in early dependency, and some world systems theory.

The Palauan case reinforces the criticism leveled at dependency and world systems models that reduce those on the periphery to being hapless and helpless victims of overwhelming interests emanating from the core. Instead of this, as the Palauan case demonstrates, a "peripheral" people can have both the inclination and ability, if presented with the opportunities, to exercise a degree of control over the terms and conditions of their integration into the contemporary world. Palauan accomplishments in this regard reinforce criticisms of dependency and world-systems models that are overly functionalist, mechanical, and deterministic (Skocpol 1977:1078).
The Palau Islands are tiny, relatively defenseless, and highly dependent in an economic sense. And yet socio-political forces based in Palau have done more than passively cope with metropolitan and other external interests. In fact, forces originating in Palau have to some extent been able to buffer, blunt, and modify world system and metropolitan interest in order to forestall anticipated deprivations, and keep room open for maneuver.

As the Palauan case demonstrates, neither the world "system" at large, nor the particular core, metropolitan power involved with Palau, is monolithic, omniscient, or omnipotent. Starting in the 1960s, and particularly from the 1970s on, some Palauans have worked to develop highly sophisticated, and at times, effective means to exploit opportunities and minimize constraints connected with Palau's "peripheral," yet strategic position. Palauans have demonstrated an interest in, and capacity to locate and utilize metropolitan/satellite and global ambiguities and loop-holes. For instance, Palauan activists have sought out and developed links with anti-systemic forces. Cosmopolitan-informed, yet nonetheless island-oriented activists have presented their case at international conferences, at the United Nations, and even to sympathetic elements within the metropolitan power.

At times, in fact, Palauan efforts have reacted back onto the metropolitan power and other external interests, influencing them to alter plans that are worrisome to Palauans. This was the case with the anti-superport campaign, the move for separatism, and the development and "defense" of the constitution in 1979. Such protectionist activity
carried on by a broad base of Palauans would not have been predicted by early dependency theory, nor has it been a focus for dependencia views.

Early dependency (Frank 1966) and some strains of world-systems theory (Wallerstein 1979), maintained that indigenous, local factors are largely defined and determined by dominant, external forces. The Palauan case, however, demonstrates that the nature of interaction between indigenous, external, and linking elements can be highly complex, a finding that is grist for the mill of a dependencia perspective. Contributing to the complexity have been a number of emphases and attributes that have multiple effects, some leading to “satellite" compliance, others facilitating increased resistance to metropolitan and/or other, external preferences. Under the Americans, the liberal and elastic terms of dependency have involved opportunities for cosmopolitan exposure and training which, when combined with Palauan syncretic and competitive tendencies, have served to increase Palauans' sophistication about the wider world, including options for political maneuver. To some degree both Palauans' western education, and their experience with participatory democracy, has been directed to manipulate, blunt, and even to deflect unwanted intrusions from their highly distinctive patron, the United States. The characteristics noted above developed in tandem with dependent affluence. But by the same token, the liberal conditions of dependency have also engendered the rise of a government-dependent economy and a high level of personal consumption. To the extent that a significant, strategically-placed segment of the population comes to value this, and to regard its continuation as a necessity, then resistance to unwanted metropolitan authority might weaken, in the interest of ensuring "aid."
The liberal conditions of dependence have also facilitated Palauans' opportunities for an expertise at involving themselves with various international interests and forces. To a large extent, the objective of such Palauan leverage is to gain external support to aid in the pursuit of a particular strategy or action in Palau. This process has had a mixed effect. At times, it has involved a rather distinctive coincidence of interest between relatively idealistic, international forces and protectionist elements in Palau. On the other hand, to the extent that Palauan appeals are multiple and conflicting this can reduce the efficacy of such appeals as a technique for the advancement of a unified political position. The conflicting cables sent by the "Chairman" of Palau's "Status Convention" and the Speaker of the Legislature, during the flare-up over political status is an example of this (see Chapter X, p. 435). Secondly, such tactics by competing Palauan groups can be manipulated by external powers, to further their intrusive interests. Such tactics, therefore, can perpetuate Palauan divisiveness and external vulnerability.

These conditions of dependency have given the Palauans the latitude to elaborate formal and symbolic political development at a pace and degree that has far outstripped the ability to secure an economic base to support Palau's political system, and other aspects of the society. While many Palauans have become fascinated with western-style democracy, and increasingly value their experience with it, one outcome has been an extreme disjunction between the frenetic pace of political elaboration and the barely perceptible pace of productive, economic development. Among other things, this massive imbalance perpetuates Palau's dependency, and therefore its vulnerability.
The metropolitan power has been giving Palauans the mixed message of encouraging autonomy on the one hand, but of expressing unease when the Palauans are to ambitious in their desires for political control. This circumstance, along with others, has engendered a certain degree and spread of ambivalence as regards dependency and the exercise of metropolitan influence. The ambivalence also springs from other sources: Palauan ethno-historic predispositions, the inconsistent interaction pattern of the United States, the relatively comfortable conditions of dependency, and the tremendous power imbalance between Palau and the United States. At times, Palauans have seemed to ask the United States to intervene to help solve a problem, and/or affect an outcome. Yet at other times, the same or a different Palauan group will admonish the United States for "interfering" in Palau's internal affairs. Requests have been for the United States to exercise influence, but only appropriately; Palauan options for future maneuver should not be constricted, such as by forcing Palauans to confront disturbing and intractable questions.

In addition to contradictory processes, this dissertation has also pointed out a number of contrary effects of United States actions and policies that are unintended and unforeseen by that power, and which seem to run counter to an early attainment of its goals. The existence of such effects challenges a mechanical view of a uni-directional flow of metropolitan influence, as well as the similar functionalist view which assumes that an omniscient core/metropolitan power invariably exercises determinate influence. Both assumptions are found in early dependency, and some world-systems theory (Smith 1979).
During the constitutional dispute in 1979, a specific attempt by a United States representative to demonstrate America's concern, as well as the coincidence of interest between a Palauan faction and the United States, stiffened the resolve on the part of many Palauans to "defend" their protectionist and externally-restrictive constitution. The reasons for this defensive, protectionist reaction were complex, involving tactical, symbolic (both thematic and interactive), and substantive dimensions. Such complexities can only be grasped with a rich understanding of the indigenous society. Such familiarity is required, both from an anthropological and dependencia point of view. The convergence has been fruitful for this dissertation.

Both an anthropological and a dependencia approach depend on a researcher's ability to grasp salient aspects of the indigenous society. One lesson learned, has been the importance of appreciating various aspects of the indigenous society if development and dependency are to be adequately discussed. This is the case for a number of reasons. Emic assessments, including those regarding the constraints, opportunities, and the dynamics involved in the dependency relationship, must be taken into account. If they are not, it would be impossible to understand why some elements that might be regarded externally as constraints are not so viewed by the indigenes. For instance Palauans, both before and during the American Period, have sought western education, as well as other opportunities to enhance social mobility and political expression. The opportunity for these aspects of the dependency relationship have largely been provided through the high level of American support. Yet some of the Palauans who have so availed
themselves have not felt strongly constrained, nor do they seem necessarily inclined, to support American preferences. Rather, Palauans are culturally predisposed, and have been encouraged to believe by contemporary circumstances, that they can enjoy considerable freedom of political maneuver, despite their heavy economic and sociological dependence on the United States.

Furthermore, with an appreciation of indigenous points of view, one can better understand any blocking and/or frustration of indigenous expectations that may be evoked by the behavior of the metropolitan power. One example described was the Micronesian expectation that United States aid would support the development of an economically viable and largely autonomous nation-state. Determination of whether or not this was a naive view is factually significant, but not sufficient for an understanding of the situation.

Local perceptions of external links, influence, and the value attached to these can have externally-oriented consequences and very considerably. There can be shifts in attitudes towards the metropolitan power, and towards other domestic groups in some relationship to that power. For instance, during the Japanese period some Palauans changed tactics. Most chiefs, many of whom under the Germans had been collaborators, under the more inclusive rule of the Japanese, moved to support the Modekngei. More recently, Palau's Constitutional Convention was a period of relative calm during which the development of a national constitution heightened Palauans' sense of political confidence and expansiveness. But then the metropolitan power seemed to "intervene" inappropriately, and for unpopular ends. This engendered a sense of
identity impingement which in turn contributed to the defense of the Constitution. Partly due to the Palauan attitude shift in 1979, one faction was labeled, and successfully attacked, as being a "tool" of the Americans. Such attitude shifts had a number of major effects, both for Palau, and in its relations with the metropolitan power.

The Palauan case illustrates how socio-political forces, even in a miniscule and highly dependent, peripheral country, have some autonomy. Local groups significantly base their operations on long-standing, indigenous views and expectations, as well as on contemporary concerns and preferences. In Palau, declining and ascending power groups have their own reasons for positioning themselves vis-a-vis metropolitan, and/or other external interests. The dependencia perspective captures this reality with its concept of "coincidence of interest" (Cardoso and Felatto 1979). The dissertation has illustrated the formation and dynamics of such an overlapping of interests, and more specifically, that between the United States and a Palauan faction in 1979. The impetus and objectives that inclined the domestic group, consisted of a complex mix of tactical and substantive--domestic and externally-oriented--reasons. This is as expected from dependencia theory.

The formation of development strategies by Palauans, and their response to those presented by outsiders, simply cannot be reduced to the metropole's policy and influence. Circumstances in the indigenous society, including in its political system, must also be taken into account. For instance the PPSC sponsored plan for a lean and decisive approach to national development, the relatively broad-based, populist, participatory approach that was adopted instead, and the limited
influence of the Tmetchui group's urgings for a relatively pragmatic, economically-based position, were all partly due to apprehension over that group's political style and purported objectives.

More generally, the relationship between what seem objective conditions of dependency, how such conditions are perceived indigenously, and the leadership's response, is quite complex. For instance, as is demonstrated in the Chapter VIII, one cannot assume that public concerns, and even apprehension arising from dependency questions, are necessarily translated into a major issue. In the chapter on the national election and the one on "initial challenges," considerable space was devoted to an examination of how and why topics that might be of concern to the public escalate, or are deflected from this path.

An example of deflection was the question of political status and related aspects of the economy during the presidential campaign. An indigenous recognition of dependency-related problems was indicated during the campaign, and these problems provoked considerable apprehension. However, a number of factors in Palau's political system, and in the dependency relationship, mitigated against political status and related concerns becoming a focus for intense public scrutiny and debate.

Later, during the flare-up over political status, the matter was seized upon by one or two of President Remeliik's rivals as an exploitable issue. The fact that Remeliik, seemingly, had taken an unpopular, irretrievable, communally disadvantageous step sparked a brief but intense flash-point of apprehension. But even in this case, sustained escalation did not occur. Instead, Remeliik once again was successful with his neutral stance; moreover, the political credibility
of his opponents was still limited, and the lack of alternatives continued, as did Palau's dilemma and the seeming option to avoid it through continual maneuver.

As we have seen, a number of questions involving dependency, though subjectively and objectively quite salient, did not become objects for focused attention and debate. Nonetheless, some closure on pan-Palauan preferences, goals, and to a lesser extent priorities and the means to achieve them, was engendered by the campaign. The concern for loyalty was also quite salient during the campaign, even though the leading candidates had not tried to escalate the matter. Its salience, nevertheless, was due to continuing Palauan desires for control over both national leadership and the development process, in the face of continued dependence and vulnerability. Local responses to development questions can be heavily conditioned by relevant indigenous attributes and dynamics, and in fact, and can only be fully understood in light of them. These both affect, and are effected by, subjective and objective externally-related constraints and opportunities. An overly mechanical dependency or world-systems model would clearly have obscured this complexity.

The Palauan case also reinforces criticism of a reductionist, "economistic" approach to developing societies that is contained in some dependency and world-systems approaches (Smith 1977:267, Koo 1984:6). Such an approach, if applied to Palau, would have failed to grasp much of what has most concerned Palauans, as well as the protective actions they have undertaken. Neither the amount of economic resources nor of extant dependency, determines, at least in any simple or mechanical
fashion, the extent of political compliance in the periphery. Specifically, the following dimensions argue against an economistic approach. (1) the interest of the metropolitan power in Palau is primarily geopolitical (i.e., strategic) and not economic. Extraction of economic resources has not been the primary objective, nor even a significant one. (2) Although anticipated exploitation and extraction have served as a mobilization referent during some disputes, the emic, largely implicit cost/benefit calculations that have lead to particular stances have been made in light of environmental, cultural, socio-political, and other qualitative aspects, in addition to the more directly economic ones. (3) The strategies and interaction modes utilized by Palauans have emphasized the development and deployment of socio-political and communicative/symbolic resources, more than economic ones. This is not surprising, given ethno-historic and contemporary Palauan interests, their sophisticated interpersonal skills, and the lack of an economic base, aside from the American subsidy. More remarkable is that, with the mobilization and deployment of their political resources, the Palauans exerted an influence over both Micronesian and American actions and policies out of all proportion to Palauans' gross material resource base.

Furthermore, the conditions of dependency, and more specifically the mode of attachment between Palauans and the United States, is in important ways sociologically and symbolically based, as well as economically. For instance, the high levels of consumption, part of dependence affluence, involve prestige-oriented, non-essential items and a style of life that many find attractive. There is now the desire to
satisfy induced wants, some of which are now seen as essential. Though of course there is an economic element to induced wants and high levels of consumption, clearly symbolic factors are also important.

A further element in the relationship cannot be reduced to material conditions. This is the anticipatory nature of the Palauan impetus for and actions to protect their society, and its environment. These protective efforts have, to a significant extent, operated so as to confront impacts and developments which have not yet happened. This is discussed further in the section on mobilization (see p. 486).

Aspects of mobilization such as the leadership, organization, and communication also need to be taken into account. While it is true that these dimensions are influenced by the economic terms of dependency, they cannot be reduced to this. For instance, even though a "no" vote during the October 1979 constitutional referendum was equated by one side with economic deprivation, many Palauans still voted "no", rejecting a revised draft of the constitution. The reasons for this vote were complex, nevertheless, it was clear that the threat of economic deprivation at the time was less than persuasive. This was due to a large extent, to the importance of counter-veiling political and symbolic factors (see Chapter VI). Furthermore, there was the continuing desire, and the seeming opportunity, to put off having to deal with the painful horns of Palau's development dilemma. Rejecting the Tmetchul's economic/pragmatic position might be one way of accomplishing this.

In the rather simplistic view presented by early dependency, and some world-systems theory, national leaders are assumed to be a compliant elite, separated from the "backward" masses. In Palau,
however, a sharply-etched and invariably compliant elite has not taken shape. Nor are there a "masses" that are "uneducated" and "backward." Dependencia theorists can take such a distinctive situation into account, and in fact look for such anomalies, for theory-building purposes.

Early dependency theory focused on bilateral relations between the metropolitan power and its satellite. Though quite useful, this perspective has proved inadequate, and has had to be supplemented with a multilateral perspective. This perspective, derived from world-systems theory and strengthened by Koo's (1984) appreciation of geopolitical elements, has been necessary to explain the Palau/Micronesian/United States interaction pattern, as well as the American, and especially the Palauan, sensitivity to international forces.

Dependencia theorists do not minimize the difficulties, complexities, and ambiguities encountered by national leaders in their attempts to enhance political control, in the midst of continuing economic dependency. Instead, they focus on this dilemma, which they refer to as one of "national underdevelopment." In the dissertation an example of the difficulty faced by national leadership was a number of unintended effects of constitution-framing; namely the arousal of metropolitan concern, the activation of a threat of aid withdrawal, and the pushing of Palau closer to the horns of its development dilemma. This dissertation demonstrates the utility of focusing on such difficulties, and more broadly, of a focus on dilemmas of national underdevelopment.

The Palauans, however, also attributed importance to many activities and a number of events that were only tangentially related
to dependency. Objectively, a number of these were quite germane to Palau's socio-political development. The unity/separation question was the clearest example of this. The flexible dependencia approach can take account of this untidy reality. Processes of identity establishment and political boundary-setting, the amassing and maintenance of power, and the pursuit of protectionist socio-political strategies in response to changing circumstances and threats, are areas productively dealt with in this dissertation. They should no longer be minimized by dependencia theory.

The Palauan case reinforces criticism of a strategy of total self-reliance, an implicit solution hinted at by some dependency and dependencia theorists and advocated by some Third World leaders, though criticized by some world-systems theorists. The latter maintain that such a strategy was both unrealistic and ineffective. In the Palauan case, a strategy of total self-reliance is simply not feasible, given a small resource base and high expectations, the latter being sustained with American aid. And finally, although not incompatible with a dependencia perspective, this dissertation has gone further by uncovering two additional factors that are highly salient, particularly to the pre-institutional phase of national-building. These factors are mobilization and closure.

The Question of Closure

In addition to its examination of indigenous, protective socio-political strategies, and the implications of the Palauan case for post-modernization theories of development, another major component has been its focus on mobilization and closure. Indeed a primary
concern has been the means and extent to which "closure" over Palauan development objectives and priorities has been achieved. The term closure refers to a people articulating, deciding upon, demonstrating support for, and moving to institutionalize a set of development objectives and priorities that are relatively comprehensive and long range. This study assumed that a certain minimum of generalized closure is necessary for national development.

This assumption is based on the belief that there is a positive correlation between the degree of generalized closure and the control that a "peripheral" power can exert over development, all else being equal. The greater the closure over a mode for development, the more resources can be deployed in an integrated fashion so as to have the desired, culminative effect.

A number of findings have been made as to how closure comes about. Point one: closure, in the sense of the articulation of explicit goals from concerns that, while highly salient, may be more or less implicit, can be rather indirect and circuitous in its progression. In Palau, largely defensive/reactive campaigns against anticipated, controversial development schemes led to some reactive clarification over development goals and priorities, if less so over the means to achieve them. Anticipated developments which seem to threaten integrity-based concerns can throw into sharper relief the things and/or values that seem threatened. In this dissertation, a striking example of the process occurred during the superport controversy.
Faced with an intrusive and potentially disruptive development plan, most Palauans would not benefit, and might even be deprived, while a Palauan minority and outsiders reaped most rewards. The preference was
for a development mode that would be publicly disclosed, and result in wide-spread indigenous benefits, without badly depriving any part of the society, or resulting in major damage to the environment.

In Palau, some movement towards closure was particularly clear during blockage of the superport and rejection of Micronesian integration. As noted, however, both strategies were primarily reactive and defensive. Neither contained an attractive and comprehensive economic proposal, despite the fact that some anticipated resources had been forgone. As compared to these reactive and defensive strategies, closure has been much more difficult over a productive strategy, i.e., one that includes the procurement of a relatively unencumbered economic base.

Generally, the Palauan case demonstrates that any evolution of strategies from the relatively implicit, defensive, and specific to those of a more explicit, assertive, comprehensive, and productive variety can be blocked and de-stabilized, with regressions, along the way. The relatively specific and reactive, protectionist campaigns of blocking a superport and Micronesian integration were followed by constitution-framing, a more assertive and comprehensive approach. It institutionalized protection for Palauans and Palau. But then, due to internal and external pressures, a more defensive and less formal strategy was employed; i.e., the mobilization and leverage campaigns coordinated by the People's Committee. The PC, both as a socio-political, protest-oriented movement and as a part of a coalition in power had neither the inclination nor the necessity to directly confront Palau's development dilemma.
Even when closure is achieved, this process can be highly complex. During the national election campaign and as a consequence of it, some closure was achieved both in the articulation of preferences, and in areas where some ambiquity remained. The process and extent of closure were not in the form of neat packages composed from discrete building blocks of mutually exclusive categories. Rather, a degree of closure emerged as a composite picture which contained certain emphases, and associated concerns. For instance, there was some preference for a populist, open, consensual leadership style illustrated most directly by Remeliik, the successful candidate. However, there were also doubts about the relevancy and effectiveness of such a style. This doubt was one basis for the continuing interest, and substantial support for the more dynamic, assertive, even confrontational style embodied most strikingly by Tmetchul. Another example of the complexity of closure is seen in the two views regarding development. The favored one seemed to be that for Palau-oriented and controlled mode that would proceed at a moderate pace. The other was for a more rapid and externally-oriented approach advocated most forcefully by Tmetchul, and to a lesser extent by Salii. It also received substantial support and evoked continuing interest. This latter mode might predominate if Remeliik's more moderate, "middle path" proved irrelevant and ineffective.

Ironically the greatest area of closure has been the preference for avoiding it, in the form of delaying any binding decisions on political status. Rather, Palauans have indicated a preference to retain the options of continuing economic support, while at the same time, of enhancing political control. Another way to put this is that
the greatest impediment to closure has been that efforts to achieve it, when relatively comprehensive and assertive, arouse metropolitan concern to the point where dependent affluence seemed threatened. Subsequently, unpalatable and worrisome dilutions of protectionist, constitutional safeguards were coupled by the United States to its willingness to offer free association. In the face of this, some Palauans began to argue for a de-coupling of these concerns. The United States indicated little interest in such an approach. A number of factors, at this point, encouraged the Palauans to increasingly rely on an ad hoc interaction mode, one of continual maneuver (see p. 499). The primary objective of this relatively non-explicit approach is precisely to avoid closure on political status agreements. Therefore its very appeal and effectiveness depends on its inability to avoid a direct attack on a fundamental problem.

However, the lack of closure on a question as basic as that of establishing a priority between Palauan autonomy/control and continuing support could destabilize associated areas, where some closure has been reached. An example of this has been Palauans' negotiations to adjust the constitution in light of free association, subsequent to the constitution's domestic ratification in 1980.

Mobilization

Closure speaks to the definition of goals, of establishing priorities, and of a mode for enhancing a desired economic and socio-political state. Mobilization is the process of amassing support and generating commitment for the pursuit of goals, priorities, and a
mode for development. In Palau the challenges to mobilization have in many ways been parallel to those of closure, and both have been significantly influenced by the conditions of dependency.

One impediment to mobilization has been the circumstance that Palauans' extant conditions of dependency have remained comfortable, particularly in comparison with the envisioned alternatives. For both anti-superport and anti-nuclear activists in Palau, mobilization has been especially challenging. Activists have sought to arouse concern about relatively abstract, albeit potentially massive, threats from a highly complex technology that is only partially understood. Nevertheless some Palauans have recognized that, in the longer-run, the impacts from such a technology could be widespread, probably disruptive, and perhaps devastating. Faced with these circumstances, the ability of some Palauans to evoke concern over fleeting impingements and the longer-rance, complex threats has been heightened by what I have called a comparative/anticipatory perspective.

This perspective is comparative and anticipatory since it is informed with hindsight, as well as by foresight based on the processes and impacts of development in other lands. For instance, from the point of view of some Palauans, the indigenous inhabitants of Guam and Hawaii have largely been deprived of their economic and political power. This occurred, as part of a development process which transformed these islanders into a marginalized and exploited minority in their own lands. Palauans have expressed the view that this is the kind of development that Palauans should avoid. Similarly, Palauan
leaders remember the hardships of World War Two, and are aware of the problems associated with past nuclear and continuing missile testing in the Marshalls.

The comparative/anticipatory perspective of some Palauans springs from a number of factors, ranging from indigenous ones to the distinctive nature of the metropolitan power, and the conditions of dependency. As noted, Palauan society has a syncretic and eclectic tendency. This ethno-historic predisposition has been augmented by opportunities for acquiring contemporary knowledge of external processes and developments. In large part, such opportunities have been provided by the heavy subsidization of the Palauan economy, which in turn has facilitated Palauans' involvement with higher education, increased travel, and other forms of cosmopolitan exposure. These all have been provided by the Trust Territory regime.

The comparative/anticipatory perspective has important consequences. It contributes to a somewhat skeptical and detached view of Palau's current development trajectory, to an interest in alternatives, and to some caution as regards development modes that could be highly disruptive, such as the superport proposal. It has also led to what can be described as a contrary effect, i.e., to some disagreement with, and mobilization against, interests associated with dominant powers. The comparative/anticipatory perspective also has a more specific, political cast. Repulsion against the development of an irresponsible and externally-oriented, domestic elite exists alongside the attraction to western, pluralistic democracy, staffed by a domestically responsive, and responsible group of leaders.
The Palauan case demonstrates that people will sometimes mobilize so as to affect anticipated developments and scenarios, even though materially-based conditions at the time are relatively comfortable. This is an anomaly for theories of mobilization based on absolute deprivation, extreme cultural stress, or both.¹ Such theories have been primarily relevant to non-western, and modernizing settings. In these, there is often a small elite, and a comparatively "uneducated" peasant population. Palau, though part of the "developing" world, has a population that is distinctive in its relatively high degree of western education, and its access to other avenues for national and international information and expression. Armed with a comparative/anticipatory perspective, some Palauans have at times engaged in protective, future-oriented mobilizations. Given Palau's characteristics and the opportunities, one might say that such mobilizations in Palau, in the absence of material hardship may not be all that remarkable. However, such mobilization, even amidst a highly educated, literate, and mid-level socio-economic group, such as is found in the United States, is more the exception that the rule unless direct threats are encountered.²

An examination of the relationship between two factors helps to explain the intensity and pattern of future-oriented mobilizations in Palau. These factors are: (1) the threat to, or enhancement of integrity-based concerns based on extant conditions and from anticipated scenarios, and (2) the degree and locus of material rewards expected from the same. In Palau, both these factors, and the relationship between them, have varied through time and have been heavily
conditioned by the nature of particular circumstances and "events."
Analysis of the variation, by means of a broad cost/benefit
calculation—one that includes socio-cultural and socio-political,
as well as economic factors—is one means to explain the configuration
and extent of protectionist, future-oriented mobilizations in Palau
and perhaps elsewhere.

From the vantage point mentioned above, I will briefly review
Palauan socio-political strategies. The anticipated social,
environmental, and to some extent, the political costs of permitting
superport development came to be seen as outweighing the material
benefits. Moreover, it seemed likely that most of these benefits
would have gone to outsiders and to a small minority of Palauans, while
most Palauans, and the environment would have suffered as a consequence.
Presented with this scenario, a politically decisive block of Palauans
came to oppose superport development.

During the unity/separation dispute, the anticipated cost of
accepting integration was political domination, including a loss of
control by Palauans over their resources. The anticipated benefit of
integration was the greater resource base of a united Micronesia, and
therefore of enhanced economic viability and political leverage in the
wider world. Some Palauans however, viewed the proposed Micronesian
entity as likely to be insensitive and ineffective. This perception
was probably one of the factors which tipped the balance in favor of
separatism.

The factors that contributed to constitutional mobilization
included violation of Palauan concerns and expectations about the
appropriate employment of metropolitan influence, and the sense that an increasingly feared and unpopular Palauan coalition was bent on hegemonic domination. Furthermore this faction was seen by some as supporting intrusive and inappropriate United States influence and interests. In contrast, the emergent counter-elite was seen by many as pro-Palauan, as exhibiting a preferred political style, and as "defending" a document that was supported both on symbolic and substantive grounds. As the constitutional dispute developed, and during the PC's campaigns, anticipated military and particularly nuclear intrusions were a strong referent for the pursuit of protectionist mobilizations. Both for historical and contemporary reasons, the military, and particularly nuclear weapons, has become a symbolic referent with much potency in Palau.

For the Palauans who wanted to mobilize to attain unfettered Palauan autonomy, including the constitution's ban on nuclear and other "harmful substances," there was, however, the risk of alienating the United States and of jeopardizing dependent affluence. The unease provoked by such a scenario was indeed substantial. Palau in 1979-81 was a good deal more economically dependent than it had been in the mid 1970s, when superport mobilization had occurred. During that controversy, and also the one on unity/separation, a threat of metropolitan aid withdrawal was not strongly involved.

This had changed, however, by the period of the constitutional dispute. And in fact, after the early months of 1979 and the initial heat of indentity constriction subsided, the calculation of cost and benefit acquired, at least potentially, quite a painful and intractable
character. Partly due to this, a generalized and sustained mobilization for autonomist goals has not occurred.

The less comprehensive and sustained mobilization which materialized has been sparked by specific conjunctions of extant or anticipated impingements, with more generalized threats. The fact that "inappropriate" United States pressure and/or other impingements have not been constant, but rather have appeared only sporadically, has worked against the development of sustained and generalized mobilization in Palau.

In addition to the metropolitan/satellite interaction pattern, which will be discussed in more detail shortly, Palauans have generally seemed to prefer an interpersonal over an ideological approach. This is the case even when Palauans are faced with worrisome, intrusive threats from dominant powers. The emphasis on personalistic politics is partly due to Palau's small scale. The Palauan preference, in the form of personalistic, relatively informal criteria to evaluate national leadership was indicated by the focus on loyalty during the presidential campaign. In addition to this Palauan preference, the lack of an appealing ideology also mitigates against the possibility that an ideologically inspired, confrontationist political movement will gain ascendance in Palau. So, also, does a Palauan sense of pragmatism, in view of the overwhelming imbalance between their power and that which could be deployed by the United States.

Impressive mobilization, however, has occurred on a specific, issue-oriented basis. The mobilization which has occurred, has arisen from a number of circumstances: comprehensive threats, which although not extant, have been skillfully presented as being relatively
immanent and concrete. Activists accomplished this by relating issues to objects and circumstances that villagers could actually see, or had historically experienced. This technique increased Palauan awareness of their islands' vulnerability to worrisome intrusions from the outside world. Mobilization was also engendered by a relatively polarized political environment, created by an "inappropriate" American attempt to influence the political situation in Palau in 1979. More generally, some Palauan leaders have exhibited cosmopolitan political sophistication, combined with sensitivity to local circumstances.

Having discussed both mobilization and closure, what of the relationships between them? In Palau, specific mobilizations have been facilitated by self-imposed limitation on closure, at least in some cases. Both the anti-superport and pro-separatist strategies had highly specific objectives. This limitation on closure facilitated the mobilization of a following. But the highly specific nature of the strategies also meant that once the immediacy of anticipated threats receded, so did a sharp sense of vulnerability. The People's Committee also had limited goals. This specificity facilitated the PC's mobilization of a very broad and diverse following. However, as with the other examples mentioned, in the longer run the limitations on closure reduced both the relevancy and effectiveness of the PC as a vehicle for protectionist activities, and for mobilizing support.

At the ideological or organizational level, no extra-constitutional PC apparatus evolved. Once the external referents for the PC's mobilization were removed and its specific objectives accomplished, the heterogenous composition of the coalition proved to be a centrifugal force. Furthermore, the People's Committee was loath to enunciate a
single position on a number of particularly worrisome, and persistent 
dependency-related questions. This ambiguity had previously facilitated 
the mobilizing of a massive following. Those involved only had to 
agree on one or two objectives and could shunt aside more complex 
questions. In the longer-run, however, the diversity and ambiguity of 
the PC contributed to its dissolution. Moreover, the PC never moved to 
address assertively Palau's underlying development dilemma. Rather, 
both this dilemma, and its specific manifestation (i.e., constitutional 
integrity or assured financial support), continued to haunt Palau.

Remeliik's presidential campaign also involved a limitation on 
closure. It avoided making a definitive statement on political status 
and related questions. Here again was an example of a limitation on 
closure that facilitated a specific mobilization. By the same token, 
however, the limitation on closure in the successful, Remeliik campaign 
meant that Palau's dilemma remained relatively untouched, and might 
continue to destabilize nation-building. From these examples, we have 
seen how limitations on closure can facilitate specific mobilizations. 
In the longer run, however, these same limitations tend to destabilize 
both sustained mobilization and closure.

A dependencia perspective attributes much importance to the pattern 
of interaction between the metropolitan power and the satellite, for 
analyzing situation of dependency. As expected from a dependencia 
perspective, the effects were profound. The ambiguities and 
inconsistency of American policy implementation and behavior, 
particularly as highlighted by the Palauans, has both provoked and 
impeded specific closure attempts. Palauans have had time to develop
important closure incrementally, for example, in the form of a constitution. However, the very protective qualities of this constitution, which veered towards the autonomy/control horn of Palau's dilemma, did not address the associated problems, mainly the question of continuing American support. So long as the United States did not appear to be insisting forcibly that the framing of options in the dilemma could not be separated, then the vulnerable closure which the Palauans had attained could stand. However, when America felt its national interests to be threatened by the Palauan actions, the U.S. became more intrusive. This in turn provoked, at least temporarily, a reactive closure by some Palauans, who stiffened their efforts in defense of a constitutionalist stance. Because, however, the United States was not overtly consistent with its pressure, Palauans' reactive closure tended to subside, and a more fluid and diffuse political alignments once more came to the fore. There has, therefore, been some movement by fits and starts towards closure on various specific issues, sometimes emerging in the relative absence of American pressure, and sometimes crystalizing in reaction to it.

The interaction pattern has also effected generalized closure. The perception of lessened American pressure during much of 1980 undermined one basis for the PC's internal cohesion and solidarity. It also removed the sense of urgency for the establishment of an unequivocable priority between Palauan political control and financial support. In fact as time has gone on, the disjunction has widened between the incremental progress on institutional and symbolic political elaboration, and the much more limited closure over the means
for establishing a productive, economic base. Closure then, in a more
generalized sense, has been impeded by the uneveness of U.S. pressure.

The dissertation has also examined the effect of the interaction
pattern on specific mobilization attempts. Generally, Palau's
liberal, democratic politics are the object of strong domestic interest
and support. In certain periods, when American pressure has seemed
slight, a symbolic environment has heightened Palauans' valuation of
the politics of autonomy. In this permissive setting, Palauans' sense
of socio-political efficacy and of self-confidence expands towards
embracing an autonomist position. An inflated Palauan sense of their
latitude to establish political control, for instance at the beginning
of the constitutional dispute, aroused metropolitan concern. When this
concern appeared to lead the United States to attempt to dictate its
preferences, some Palauans became irritated with what they saw as
America's contradiction of the very democratic ideals it publically
espoused. The resultant sense of identity constriction has contributed
on occasion to specific Palauan mobilizations. The interaction pattern,
then, can engender specific mobilizations in Palau. The relationship
is clearly a negative one as regards generalized mobilization however.

In contrast, the uneveness of overt metropolitan pressure has
had the effect of mitigating against possibilities for an intense and
sustained mobilization in Palau. Reactive and oppositional mobilization
is not sustained, just as the level of and targets for overt United
States influence are uneven. For instance during 1979, the PC's
mobilization of support, to a major extent born of a sense of identity
constriction, was gradually eroded amidst the relatively diffuse
political atmosphere of 1980. At that time, both the PC's domestic and external opposition seemed quiescent. Neither Palauans' general, nor the PC's specific, democratic expression had been blocked. Therefore, there was little build-up of resentment or other motivation for an escalation of the PC's specific objectives into a more generalized threat to the continuance of metropolitan authority. Rather mobilization has assumed a periodic, almost cyclical trough and wave pattern. As one informant remarked, this is like riding a wave in towards the shore. As you pick up momentum, the mobilization crest breaks and largely disintegrates, until another one comes along.

The interaction pattern with the United States also has a destabilizing affect on generalized closure, and affect that is enhanced by the centrifugal force of Palau's underlying dilemma. Generally, Palau's "affluent" dependency has proved relatively comfortable, being only occasionally disturbed by irritating "interference" and by anticipated threats that appear but then recede. There is some underlying doubt as to the advisability of continuing the present course. The sporadic, and generally tolerable, level of apprehension, however, mitigates against both generalized closure and mobilization since there is no strongly felt or persistent need to protect integrity-based concerns.

Meanwhile, the question of political status as a manifestation of a development dilemma continues as the most intractable, and crucial development matters facing Palau. In the body of this dissertation, and briefly, in the following section, is a discussion of the apparent options for avoiding an unfavorable resolution of Palauans' dilemma.
Horns of a Dilemma and the Palauan Response

This dissertation has explicated and analyzed the development dilemma, and the Palauan response. The dilemma, in some ways, conforms to the situation of "national underdevelopment" pinpointed by dependencia theorists (Cardoso and Fellato 1979). The Palauan situation, however, is also distinctive. Some Palauans have come to think, with considerable basis in fact, that relative affluence can be enjoyed by many in Palau, and that the continued viability of this situation depends on a decision by the indigenous majority, on political status. On the one hand, some chance for control and autonomy is seen to exist. However, in contrast to the situation that faced nationalist leaders during de-colonialization in the Third World, in Palau, removal of the foreign authority would not involve throwing off an oppressive and extractive yoke. Rather, such a removal is seen as likely to result in, at least relative deprivation and other hardships in the short, and perhaps, in the longer run. Furthermore, due to the pervasiveness of Palau's dependency and its liberal conditions, both the choice over and effects of a Palauan decision on control/autonomy versus support could have an impact on quite a large segment of the population, not just a tiny elite. In its most specific and explicit form, the Palauan dilemma has been between constituting the power to govern themselves free of intrusive interference by external interests and the compact of free association—a mechanism for securing continued high levels of aid and other forms of external assistance.

This question is the surface manifestation of Palau's underlying dilemma. This is not to say that, at some level, the crucial nature
and framing of the options embedded in it have not been recognized by some Palauans. However, the indigenous desire to detach and rearrange unpalatable options continued, as did the desire to avoid the dilemma, as long as possible, hoping that prospects would improve.

In general terms Palau's dilemma has two poles of choice. Both have negative and positive aspects embedded in them. One pole consists of the positive option of guaranteed and massive future support. However, embedded with this is the distasteful element of continuing constraints on Palauan autonomy and probably the loss of some political control which could increase island vulnerability. This could in turn open the islands to the dislocations, degradations and dangers associated with intrusive, dominant powers.

The second pole involves the positive aspect of a high level of autonomy and of control, but this is coupled with the fear of an implied threat of metropolitan aid reduction, or total withdrawal. Such a move has the anticipated dimension of drastically reduced living standards for Palauans, leaving the Islands in relative poverty and isolation.

Too close an approach to either pole makes the negative aspects embedded in each appear as more concrete and pressing, and therefore repelling. A decisive embrace of either horn risks the possible loss of the other one, altogether. Given these poles of choice, and the generally seductive conditions of dependency, it is not surprising that the Palauans have stopped short of closure.

Remeliik's "middle course" represented the most articulate and comprehensive plan for Palauan-oriented and controlled development that was presented. However this path--Remeliik's "not to worry" stance on
political status, and his pervasive emphasis on unity and consensus--
did not directly address Palau's development dilemma. For its part,
the United States has periodically asserted that Palau cannot have both
unfettered political control and assured high levels of economic
support, and must give up some of the former to obtain the latter.
But the strength of this U.S. assertion does not remain constant and
the assertion, so far, has not been implemented.

Presented with the circumstances described, Palauans leaders
increasingly employed an interaction mode of continual maneuver.
Traditionally, there was an emphasis on maneuver, and historically
Palauans elaborated skills for playing upon the sympathies of interested
outsiders. Palauans have repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to develop
and utilize coincidences of interest as a means of leverage to involve,
chide, and/or pressure the United States. Their ability in this regard
has been facilitated by the permissive and multi-faceted American
presence, which Palauans have learned to exploit, with considerable
success.

Palauans' cultural predisposition, along with their contemporary
training and experience, sensitize them to recognize and perhaps even
to exaggerate the factors that influence the United States. Objectively,
these forces include world opinion, United Nations oversight, and
America's own democratic self-image. However, this relatively
idealistic impulse on the part of the metropolitan power has diverged
at times from the United State's sense of its global, strategic role.
Palauan leaders are aware of this disjunction, and have proved adept
at exploiting it.
Generally, the ability of Palauans to exert pressure, or at least keep open avenues for maneuver, is due to three sets of factors. First, there is the indigenous predisposition and the contemporary political sophistication of Palauans. Second, there are the distinctive aspects of both the metropolitan power, and of the Palauan dependency relation with the United States. Third, there are the circumstances that articulate the metropolitan power with relevant aspects of the international state system, and global economy. Elements two and three have presented Palauans with both constraints and advantages. Both Palauans' opportunities for and expertise in utilizing the latter have increased under the Americans, and particularly, from the 1960s on.

However, the ability for Palauans to continue to maneuver in this way rests on uncertain ground both domestically and internationally. Domestically, Remeliik's positioning during 1980 had shifted the burden from the level of leadership to that of the public, of making any hard or stark development decisions. After this, however, it might be increasingly difficult for Remeliik and the Executive Branch to avoid taking a more definitive stance on questions related to political status.

Internationally, circumstances so far have limited both the necessity for and the capacity of the U.S. to employ relatively coercive measures to obtain satellite compliance. These circumstances could change, however, perhaps heightening Palau's direct strategic value and thereby provoking a more decisive U.S. approach. In the meantime, if Palauans had relied upon continual maneuver as opposed to
diversifying their economic base, a vulnerable Palau might be forced into compliance by the sustained economic/coercive threat employed by a galvanized metropolitan power. As we have seen, then, Palau's continued success in enhancing control through continual maneuver is by no means assured in the longer run. Moreover, the mode could have some costs. A divisive and unstable status quo, coupled with deepening dependency, might eat away at the option of, and even Palauans' desire for, relatively unfettered political control.

**Distinctive Conjunctures, Paralles with the West**

As noted at the outset of this dissertation, the *dependencia* perspective involves a case study approach, in part so as to build a more adequate model to explain both development and a lack thereof. For this task there is particular interest in situations of dependency that are unusual (see introduction). Palau, certainly, is such a case. Its very distinctiveness bears arresting similarities to two major dilemmas, the environmental and nuclear, that face us in the West. I had originally gone to Palau to study, in a microcosm, the emergence of an anti-colonial movement. What I actually found was considerably different.

An extremely complex conjunction of circumstances has arisen in Palau. In a formal, political sense, Palau is well along on the process of de-colonialization. But in the midst of this, a "neo-colonial" political economy has grown. In fact the dependency engendered has proved so seductive that Palauans may well decide to forgo altogether the attainment of political control. Furthermore Palau's metropolitan
power, the United States, is highly distinctive. On the one hand, it appears benign, but it also periodically "interferes," and has intrusive interests.

In addition, there is the circumstance under which the inhabitants of this small-scale society consider matters ranging from local, to national, to international affairs. In part because of the small scale, and also due to Palauan interactive and manipulative tendencies, national and even international matters are approached to some extent from a personalistic, rather than from an ideological perspective. Nonetheless international matters are closely followed, and are discussed by Palauans of various backgrounds. It is not just an elite that has been so concerned, but also much of the rest of the population. In fact the Palauans, a people who can be categorized as occupying a strategic dot in the fourth world, have expressed a number of concerns that are more common in Third and First World settings.

Palau, certainly, is on the periphery of the "world system." Because of its strategic geo-political position on the Pacific/Asian boundary, Palau has a resource that a dominant power wants. Another partial similarity with a more typical Third World situation is the Palauans' employment of the rhetoric of autonomy and anti-colonialism.

In other ways, however, the Palauan situation has diverged markedly from the dependency and other conditions that were often found in the colonized, "developing" world. In much of the Third World, extractive and exploitative political economies and dependency relationships have developed. In these cases, a local elite may benefit, but this is amassed in collusion with powerful, external
interests and is often procured at the expense of most of the population. Palauans have exhibited some anticipatory concern about such a scenario though so far, it has not materialized. In fact, with the exception of the late Japanese Period, Palauans for the most part have not experienced the extractive, exploitative variety of colonialism that both transformed and enraged much of the Third World. In particular, Palau's latest administering authority has not been interested in extracting economic resources, nor in direct colonization. In fact, resources have flowed the other way, i.e., in increasing torrents of "aid" to Palau.

In contrast to much of the Third World, the nature and conditions of dependency in Palau have been relatively comfortable, pervasive, and in fact, quite seductive. As noted, both the "benefits" of this relationship and the costs that might be incurred could apply to a large segment of the population, not just a predatory elite. Moreover in Palau, explicit concern about the anticipated effects of inappropriate development is not confined to an elite, but has permeated to a broader segment of the population. Furthermore in Palau, there is a strong attachment to and opportunities for practicing a free-wheeling style of liberal, pluralistic, political democracy. In large part, this has been due to the major and pervasive impact of the rather idealistic, though in ways less than pragmatic, American-sponsored education. This has been grafted on Palauan competitive, eclectic, and innovative tendencies.

In Palau, the impact of dependency has brought both disadvantages and advantages. This outcome challenges the early dependency view that the consequences of dependency are invariably destructive for the
peripheral country (see Introduction). As regards a calculation of costs and benefits, there have been short-range, materially-based, relatively concrete advantages pitted against possible long-range, qualitative dangers and comprehensive harm. For the Third World, such a mix would be uncommon. It is both striking and intriguing that the distinctive conjunction of circumstances in Palau bears a substantial resemblance to the nuclear and environmental problems that confront not only "developed" countries, but the entire world.

In the West, the adverse effects resulting from the lack of effective measures to arrest damage to the environment do not strike everyone as immediate, or concrete. The damage, however, develops incrementally. By the time it is evident, the impacts may be great indeed, and could result in irreparable harm. Similarly in the nuclear arms race, the danger that it will get out of control develops progressively, with the increasing amount, and array of weapons. But though the impacts resulting from environmental degradation and an uncontrolled arms race ultimately may be devastating, in the shorter range, an unstable status quo has a lulling effect, particularly since conditions are relatively comfortable, involving a lifestyle that is seductive for many.

In contemporary Palau there has been a substantial and deepening attachment to "affluence," and to the consumption-oriented way of life, which depends on external aid. A comprehensive and sustained Palauan effort to combat unwanted world system and metropolitan intrusions at times has been seen as threatening the underlying strategic interests of the United States. In this circumstance, such Palauan efforts risk jeopardizing the "good life" by alienating the Islands' principal donor.
Adjustments in lifestyle, both in America and Palau, may be required to comprehensively attack our respective and related development dilemmas. The effort may be unsettling. In the long run if it is not made, however, then the cost may be the destruction of Palau and all other societies. Palauans, to a remarkable extent, have envisioned this and have admonished us not to make nuclear, and other forms of "development" inseparable. It is both distinctive and intriguing that an analysis of the Palauan case, as well as the views of some Palauans themselves, have thrown additional light our development dilemma, the Palauan one, and the relation between them. In a true anthropological sense, by learning about Palau we learn about ourselves. This case study has illustrated our own condition, and its vulnerabilities.

2 Both the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, for instance arose to a significant extent as a response to extent problems, and were heavily conditioned by political, social, and economic factors of the time. For a discussion of this, see The Anti-Nuclear Movement by Price, published by Twayne Publishers, Boston 1982. In particular see pages 9 and 39. For a more specific discussion of an environmental problem (that of acid rain), and of the political considerations impeding an effective response, see "U.S., Mexico Pledge Smelter Controls," by Marjorie Sun in Science, vol. 299, #4717, p. 949.
APPENDIX A

ACTIVIST RHETORIC

PLATFORM FOR TIA BELUAD

TIA BELUAD IS A NATIONALISTIC, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION DEDICATED TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT THE FREEDOM AND RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALAU AND THE REST OF MICRONESIA. WE, THE MEMBERS, COME FROM DIFFERENT ISLANDS AND VILLAGES AND FROM DIFFERENT CLANS AND CLASS BACKGROUNDS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, UNITED IN TIA BELUAD TO WAGE A COLLECTIVE STRUGGLE TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT OUR FREEDOM AND RIGHTS FROM ENCROACHMENT FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT OUR ISLANDS. WE HAVE AS OUR POLITICAL BASE ALL THE PEOPLE. WE WILL SUPPORT ALL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERS WHO SHARE IN OUR GOALS.

1. WE MUST HAVE OUR SOVEREIGNTY

Before any foreigners sat foot on our islands we were a sovereign people. But for hundreds of years we have been continually robbed of our sovereignty by powerful imperialistic nations which have occupied our islands without our consent. Like any other separate people we have a right to our own sovereignty. Any future political status, short of independence must unequivocally acknowledge this non-negotiable human right.

2. WE ARE FOR SELF DETERMINATION

Foreign colonizers and imperialists have abused our islands and oppressed our people and have denied us the right to self-determination. Our struggle is to make sure that we are not to be denied this human right again.

3. WE WANT SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW, IN PREPARATION FOR INDEPENDENCE

We know that the time is NOW for us the people to take control of our government. We cannot allow the foreigners to continue to make decisions which don't conform to our lives. Expatriates can help us but we should and we can run our own affairs. We support any means to achieve self-government for immediate independence.

4. WE WORK FOR UNITY AMONG OUR PEOPLE

For too long we have been a people divided among ourselves and the present political parties only accentuate this division. The common people are saying, LET US UNITE. NOW
is the time that we close ranks and unite to fight for our common rights and freedom. We must heed that old truth - United We Stand; Divided We Fall.

5. WE WANT CONTROL OVER OUR LANDS

In many villages and islands of Palau and the rest of Micronesia, most land is now controlled by the United States Trust Territory Administration. We want all that land returned to true owners and the communities in which they are located. We support banning sales of lineage, clan, and village lands and the establishment of lease system to protect land owners. We support collective ownership of land.

6. WE WANT A PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT

We want a constitution that promotes and protects the rights and liberties of our people. We also want a constitution that protects our traditions and customs. In establishing our government, we want a true and free representatives and socialistic government under control of the people.

7. WE WANT CONTROL OVER OUR ECONOMY

In most countries only few people control the economy and prosper at the expense of the common people who become poorer and destitute. We see this developing in our society. A few rich people now control the economy, government and politics. We oppose this situation. We want the economy to be regulated to protect and secure collective benefit for all especially the poor and the common people.

8. WE WANT A RELEVANT EDUCATION

The schools, public and private, are prime imperialists instruments that Americanize our people, by divorcing us from our social and physical environment and by creating dependency on foreign support through the inculcation of capitalistic values. We must have an educational system with approach and concepts based on Micronesian values.

9. WE SUPPORT AND RESPECT THE WORKING WOMAN AND MAN

Many of our people, old and young, now despise manual work and prefer employment in the "office." We believe in the dignity of manual work and we want our people to appreciate and respect manual work. The working woman and man has a very important role and a place in the development of our community. We support efforts to improve her or his lot.
10. **WE WILL FIGHT FOR THE RESPECT AND EQUALITY OF WOMEN**

History is one of male supremacy and dominance over his female companion. This has resulted in female passivity and oppression at home, in school, at work and in political organizations. Our society is not so different from this history. We support equal rights, opportunities, and privileges for women and men.

11. **WE STUDY POLITICAL EDUCATION**

We have many incorrect ideas because of brainwashing and indoctrinating process introduced to our thinking by foreigners through schools and other institutions in our society. It is our duty to expose and study all such ideas and bring public attention to any corruption and scandals in the government and public leaders.

12. **WE AFFIRM OUR SELF-DIGNITY**

We are proud to be ourselves. But many of our people want to be something else. In fact, many of our people are ashamed of themselves because they have been taught by foreigners who occupy our country to feel inferior and to despise the color of our skin, our institutions, and our values. We are beautiful people and we advocate development and cultivation of ourselves, our culture and what resources we have.

13. **WE BELIEVE IN SELF-RELIANCE**

We welcome support from outside but we have to rely on ourselves to survive as an emerging nation. We cannot afford to depend on colonial powers who from past and present experiences are exploiting and making us dependent on them economically, politically, socially, and culturally. We are the only ones who really help ourselves.

14. **WE BELIEVE IN SOCIAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC EQUALITY FOR ALL OF OUR PEOPLE**

Every member of our society should be accorded opportunities to fully develop herself or himself physically and spiritually. Every person should contribute to the overall development of our people, to the best of her or his abilities and should receive and acquire according to her or his needs. The fruit of our work and the wealth and resources of our country should be shared equitably by all of our people not just a few individuals among us.
Uladong's Letter

PETITION FROM MR. F.T. ULUDONG, CHAIRMAN, MICRONESIAN INDEPENDENCE ADVOCATES - HAWAII, CONCERNING THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

(Circulated in accordance with the decision taken by the Sub-Committee on Petitions at its 168th meeting on 26 August 1971)

Honolulu, Hawaii
27 May 1971

Chairman and Members
Committee of 24
United Nations
New York

Dear Mr. Chairman and Members:

On behalf of the Micronesian Independence Advocates-Hawaii, I would like to extend our sincere appreciation for your keen interest and deep concern about the political status of Micronesia.

We have recently heard that your Committee is presently planning to send a mission to our islands. We would like to take this opportunity to join our leaders in the Congress of Micronesia in extending to you our hearty welcome. And if your schedule permits, we would like to request a meeting with the Mission either before or after its trip to Micronesia.

As you may have already suspected, the United States of America, our administering authority, has never been sincere in its responsibility to carry out the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement to their logical conclusions of helping Micronesia to become self-governing and independent. For the past twenty-six years...
of its administration of our islands, the United States has given only lip service to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The United States has, instead, consciously and deliberately attempted to develop Micronesia in such a manner as to leave our beloved islands no choice but to become a territory of the United States. Many of our people have become aware of this course of development and have tried to bring it to the attention of the American people and the world. But because of our size and strength, our efforts have not borne fruits. We are therefore turning to you as our only hope of redemption.

We are fully cognizant of the fact that some members of the United Nations will habitually dismiss our charge that the United States has willfully violated the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and provisions of the United Nations Charter. To substantiate our position, we have enclosed a copy of the March issue of The Young Micronesian, which contains the verbatim report of the 1963 Solomon Island Mission laying down the foundations for the annexation of Micronesia as a territory of the United States.

The report has remained "classified" since its submission to President Kennedy in 1963. While the report has failed in its main objective to annex Micronesia by 1968, its major recommendations have been and are being implemented now.

We are bringing to your attention because we strongly believe that they deserve serious consideration by your Committee before it sends a mission to Micronesia. By reading the report, you will understand better what is happening in Micronesia and why our leaders in the Congress saw it fit to invite your Committee to come to Micronesia.

Again, the Micronesian Independence Advocates-Hawaii extends its sincere thanks and hopes for an opportunity to meet with the Members of your Committee in the near future.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) F.T. Uludong
Chairman
Micronesian Independence Advocates-
Hawaii

Note by the Secretariat: The Young Micronesian is merely a cover sheet to the report and has been placed in the files of the Secretariat, and is available to members of the Special Committee upon request.
## APPENDIX B

### REFERENDUMS AND ELECTION

July 9, 1979 Referendum on Original, Draft Constitution

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October 23, 1979 Referendum on Revised Draft Constitution

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| Total             | 1,979 (31%) | 4,371 (68%) |
| Votes cast        | 5,441       | (76%)       |
| Registered voters | 7,197       |             |
July 9, 1980 Referendum on Original Constitution

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(absentee)

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(vote totals and percentages do not match up as the number of invalid votes are not calculated into these totals)
First Presidential Election, November 4, 1980

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First Presidential Election, November 4, 1980 (cont.)

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Note: The votes cast in Koror were all assigned to a municipality of legal residence of the voter, as were the absentee ballots. The Koror votes, however, were also tallied separately, and so the number of votes for each candidate cast by Koror residents can be ascertained. Furthermore, it is possible to cross check the figure with the municipality of legal residence. I have not provided that data here, as it would be extremely detailed.

* All vote totals, with the exception of Niraked's correspond with the actual totals reported by the District Administration. With Niraked's figure, however, there is something of a discrepancy. The District reported 992 for his total. The difference is quite minor (less than 1% for the entire vote total). Furthermore, Niraked's votes were very much concentrated in one region.
APPENDIX C

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE LEAFLETS

Republic of Palau

Palau's beautiful islands... in the hands of a few unscrupulous men?

 Fist - IT'S NO DEAL - Fist

Vote:

NO
SAVE PALAU FROM NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

TRANSIT - ACCIDENT

TEMPORARY STORAGE = HOLOCAUST

USE

GUAM WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1978

by Lillian Ginoza Daily News Staff

The U.S.S. Proteus, a submarine tender formerly based on Guam, discharged highly radioactive liquid wastes into Apra Harbor during the fall of 1977, two former crewmen have charged.

Malakal Harbor ma ikel bëhil ra omeküel a diall or Palau a më na itanu

Malakal Harbor and all other ports for ships in Palau will be like this if we agree to the three things the United States wants. One of these would permit transit of ships and nuclear materials. In article 13, section 6 of the October 23rd Constitution.

John P. Bennett, 23, a former electronics technician stationed aboard the Proteus in 1975-76, said in a voluntary sworn affidavit that the submarine tender began to drain excess nuclear-contaminated wastes into Apra Harbor when mechanical failures kept the vessel from going to sea.

He said a geiger-counter check of water in Apra Harbor at the time produced a reading of 100 millicurie per hour. Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidelines call for limiting exposure of the population to less than 500 millicurie per year. NRC regulations limit exposure of industrial workers to 5,000 millicurie over a three month period.
Pacific nuclear storage?

SAIPAN - The United States has proposed to Japan that a Pacific island be used as a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, according to the Washington Post. In a story from Tokyo, the newspaper said the U.S. first proposed the idea for a regional storage base in February during negotiations in Tokyo and asked Japan to share the cost of studying its feasibility.

If built, the facility would be used by Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and possibly Mexico. The newspaper quoted officials as saying that such a facility will take five years to build.

According to the newspaper, Japan reacted warmly to the idea because, on the surface, it could contradict Japan's long-term policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in its commercial power program.

The U.S. is opposed to reprocessing plutonium, which is extracted from spent nuclear fuel. It is used in nuclear reactors and also in making nuclear weapons.

U.S. negotiators suggested several islands but in Washington officials ruled out Wake Island already mentioned in Japan as one of the islands proposed by the U.S.

Although no island in Micronesia has officially been suggested as a possible site for such a facility, the U.S. Micronesian political status negotiations have strongly opposed Micronesian constitutional bans against nuclear weapons and waste.

The Palau constitution contains such a ban unless it is lifted by a vote of 75 percent of the people. The Federated States of Micronesia must give its express approval before any nuclear storage facility is built within its boundaries.
Government Guilty of Cover-Up

To say the Marshallese distrust the Brookhaven medical personnel who study them each year is a gross understatement of the problem. For years, the Marshallese have charged that the AEC (through Brookhaven) has not provided appropriate long-term medical follow-up for their radiation-caused condition, has not taken adequate precautions to prevent their continued exposure and has continually misled the people about the problems that have resulted from their radiation exposure.

Shortly after his nephew died of leukemia in 1972, Nelson Anjain from Rongelap wrote to Dr. Robert Conard, who has been in charge of Brookhaven's medical program in the Marshalls since 1954: "You've never sat down and really helped us honestly with our problems. You have told the people that the 'worst is over' then Lekoj Anjain died. I am very worried that we will suffer again and again."
SERAL OLIBECH RA BELAU ARDI MLA CHAD ENG DIMLAK EL ORRIECEH. KEMAM A DIAK KIM OURENG ADI NGODECH EL DELENGCHOKL.

Eternal Commitment

IN FOUNDING BELAU OUR FOREFATHERS DISPLACE NONE. WE WISH NO OTHER HOME THAN THIS.

Republic of Belau
THE CHARMING ANGEL OF DEATH ... to VISIT BELAU?
KLAMIOKEL ANGHEL RA KODALL ... OLDINGEL ER BELAU?

AIKAL KLEKDALL A ELTIMAIM RA KODALL. KAU KOMEKEDONG RA KODALL EL ME MENGKAR RA KLENGAR ??

These things are just for destruction and death. Do you think that life will be preserved by inviting these things to Palau? By inviting death to Palau?

VOTE NO
APPENDIX D

NATIONAL ELECTION MATERIALS

Leaflets

PLEASE VOTE

ALFONSO R. OITERONG FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

NOVEMBER 4, 1980

HE IS AND WILL ALWAYS BE YOUR HUMBLE SERVANT!

PEOPLE OF PALAU
NEED A MAN TO
SERVE THEM, NOT
THE MAN TO BE
SERVED BY THE
PEOPLE.

KEDOUSBECH RA CHAD
EL MO MESIOU ER
KID, NG DIAK EL KID
A MO MESIOU ER NGII,
LENGII EL NGARA
DERECHIALL.

THE HUMBlest IN ALL THE LAND, WHEN CLAD IN
THE ARMOR OF RIGHTEOUS CAUSE, IS STRONGER
THAN ALL THE HOSTS OF ERROR.

A KOT EL NGARIOU EL RENG RA BELJU, SEL LE
BLEIULL RA UGHUL A LLEMELTEL A TEKOE, A KUK
MESISIICH RA REMENGEMAOL A CHELEUID LOMERJUL.

—WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
OBJECTIVES

1. PROTECT THE PALAU CONSTITUTION WHICH WAS RATIFIED BY THE PEOPLE ON JULY 9, 1980—THE PRODUCT OF OUR HARD WORK.

2. WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT IN PURSUIT FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

3. WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE.

4. INSTIT THE PRIDE THAT PEOPLE OWN THE GOVERNMENT, E.G. GOVERNMENT IS TO SERVE THE CITIZENS, NOT THEM TO SERVE THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION. GOVERNMENT IN ITS FORMATIVE YEARS IS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF CITIZENS.

5. WORK CLOSELY WITH VARIOUS STATES TO PROMOTE WELL DEVELOPED AND RELEVANT COMMUNITY CENTERED ACTIVITIES FOR YOUTH:

- CULTURAL HERITAGE AWARENESS

- SKILL DEVELOPMENT

- PHYSICAL FITNESS AND HEALTH CARE

OTHERKIALI EL TEKOI

1. AK MO OLDUBECH RA KEMPO ER BELAU EL KILENGEI ER NGII A RECHAD ER BELAU RA JULY 9, 1980—EL NGII A RDECHEL A MERINGEL EL LURELED.

2. AK MO OUREOR LOBENGKEL A PRESIDENT EL LOLDUBECH A TEKOI MA UREOR MENG MO SERBECHEL EL MO IXIKD LOUNGERACHEL PA KETZAI ER KID.

3. AK MO OUREOR NGAK MA PRESIDENT EL MO MELEMOLEM A KUNGIOLEL A URRELEL MA MESIOU EL KIREL A BUAI.

4. AK MO MELASEM EL LOUREOR MALELEM ER SEL LUDASU MA CHETENGKEL EL XAO A RECHAD RA BELUJU A GKIKALOU RA KABELEMENT, BELULU A KMO KABELEMENT A MESIOU RA RECHAD RA BELUJU; NG DIAX EL CHAD RA BELUJU A MESIOU RA KABELEMENT, A KABELEMENT A KIREL LOSTIK RA SORIR MA MOUNSEL RA RECHAD.

5. AK MO OUREOR LOHENTERIR A BEXL BELUJU RA CHELSEL BELAU LOLDUBECH A UNGIL MEKEMOKL PROGRAM RA BELUJU EL KIRIR A RENGEASEK:

- TEKOI EL KIREL A TEKOI RA KLECHAD ER BELAU

- MENGEKOKL KIREL A URREOR A CHIM

- TEKOI EL KIREL A KLISICHEL A BEDENGED MA UKEJUL
* NOTHING CAN BEAT HONESTY, HUMBLENESS, DEDICATION, SELFLESSNESS, AND PATIENCE. THESE ARE CHARACTERISTICS OF ALFONSO R. OITERTONG.

* WE ALL AGREE THAT HIS LEADERSHIP HAS HAD A LOT TO DO WITH THE SUCCESS OF THE CONTROVERSIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDA.

* IT WAS HE WHO KEPT THE PEOPLE'S UNITY UNTIL THE DAY OF SUCCESSFUL REFERENDUM.

* UNITED TOGETHER, WE THE PEOPLE OF PALAU WERE ABLE TO RATIFY THE CONSTITUTION.

* SO, PLEASE VOTE ALFONSO R. OITERTONG ON NOVEMBER 4, 1980 TO SERVE YOU AS YOUR VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELAU.

* NG DIAK A MORUCHET RA KLEMERANG MA LLEMALT, MA KLENGARIQORRENG, MA BLAKELRENG RA NGERACHEL, MA TENGET BIAT, MA KLOUELRENG.
  AIRAIKID A TENGETENGEL A ALFONSO R. OITERTONG EL KIREL A BIAT RA BELAU.

* KE DOUMERANG EL KWO QMERELHEL NGIKAL CHAD A KMAL
  KLOU A RIRELLIT MENG MLOUCHUL RA KLOU A CHERREDECH.
  KEMPO ER KID A MLE SEIKO ERA MLA MEMONG EL REFERENDUM (SENKO).

* NGI EL CHAD EL LULESTIM RA KLITAL RENG RA RECHAD
  ER BELAU EL MOL LMJUT RA SLS EL MLE SEIKO A REFERENDUM (SENKO) EL KIRI' A KEMPO.

* NG KLABJEREKED CHIM LOBA KLITALRENG , E KID A RECHAD
  ER BELAU A MLO SBECHED EL LOTBECHIT A KEMPO ER KID.

* MALEUASE , E DELEXTII A ALFONSO R. OITERTONG RA
  SENKOY ER KID RA NOVEMBER 4, 1980 MEL BOL SBECHEL
  NGII A MO MESTIJNED EL VICE-PRESIDENT.
REPUBLIC OF BELAU

John Abelabel

[Signature]

[Stamp]
I have chosen to seek your personal counsel and support as I run for the difficult office of President in the coming November election.

It is not easy to perceive the full weight of the responsibilities that this post of leadership will impose, since it will be the first time for all of us. Actually what I seek is the affirmation that you and I share the same concept of what our new Republic is all about; that we know what our people want.

We want to secure, to all Palauans first, the richness of the island living that is ours by birthright. We extend friendship to all nations and we seek the same from each. As we embark on the road to nationhood we claim only what rightfully belong to us. We want to progress and prosper along with the changing world in such a fashion that will afford our young and up-coming generation the opportunity to adapt to the modern world assertively, but at the same time to preserve our culture and to maintain a social order that will recognize and respect our elderly citizens, to whom we owe our good life and a proud past. This is, after all, the basic precept on which we have framed our new Constitution - the foundation upon which we are to build our new island nation.

These are the high goals for which I dedicate myself and to which I hope to commit the office of President.

Yours truly,
Whatever the Micronesians do, Rosenblatt said, the U.S. security interests are protected for 15 years from the date the agreement goes into effect, which the United States hopes will be no later than 1981.
HARUO I. REMELIUK

A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT

(First Constitutional Government—1981 to 1985)

Why We Support Him
There are so many and varied reasons to which person(s) or group(s) of persons endorse and support a particular candidate for the office of the Presidency.

We have, as working supporters for Mr. Haruo Remeliik, been searching, pondering and screening our minds for reasons as to why we support Mr. Remeliik for this first constitutional government; and not support the other four candidates.

We would like to share some of these reasons with you:
STABILITY* should be the theme of this very first government of the Republic of Palau (regardless of who is the President). It is vitally important that the Republic be stable. No foreign investors, for instance, would invest their money in a country whose government is unpredictable. No bold economic programs could be begun here unless we are assured of the stability of the government and the Republic. Atmosphere of stability is what Remeliik Administration aims to create in the first few years of the life of the Republic of Palau.

To stabilize a brand new nation requires a lot of different tasks. The emerging Republic of Palau is no exception. The vital tasks facing the Remeliik's theme of stability are many. Let's take a look at some of them:

WORKING, IN UNITY, WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS:

The first task in the stability effort is for the President to establish a good working relationship with the legislative branch of our government. This is not an easy task as evidenced by the political dilemma in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands where the Governor and the Legislature could not agree in a lot of things.

This task requires somebody who is strong yet understanding and rational. It requires somebody who has proven himself able to work with other leaders regardless of their belief and background. Mr. Remeliik has shown this ability as the Deputy Distad and as the President of the First Palau Constitutional Convention.

ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE GOVERNMENTS (16 of them):

Another important stabilizing factor for this new Republic is the preparation of the state constitutions and the establishment of the sixteen (16) state governments. The State of Ailai, for example, has taken this step; other states in the Republic will follow suit as soon as the national government is established and stabilized.

If the First Palau Constitutional Convention is any indication, we can expect the state constitutional conventions to be more spicy, more controversial, and indeed more delicate. This is because the

*What is stability or stable government? A stable government is one that is firmly established, predictable, and consistent because it functions strictly by the Constitution. It does not have favorite people. It does not have enemies. And it does not change laws to accommodate just a few people. A stable government will consider all people equal and treat them accordingly: the rich, the poor, the educated, the uneducated, the young, the old, men and women. (This is the basis of Remeliik Administration. All people will be heard. All people will be given a chance to speak up their mind about the welfare of the Republic. This is the fundamental principle of our constitutional government.)
state constitutions, the relationship between the state government and
the traditional system of leadership will have to be worked out and
expressed in writing. This process will make this task more difficult.

The President whose task will serve to facilitate the creation of the
state constitutions must possess certain kind of knowledge and qualifi
cations in order for him to be effective as a facilitator. He must know
the mechanics of constitutional conventions. He must know our customs.
And he must know about the basic fiber of the Palauan traditional
leadership. Mr. Haruo Remelik do possess these necessary qualifications.

GETTING ADVICE OF THE TRADITIONAL CHIEFS:

Another important stabilizing factor in the Palauan society is the
respect for and the guidance of our traditional ways and culture. Only
a person who appreciates the contributions of the culture and respects
the wisdom of the traditional ways can find benefit from the counsel of
our traditional leaders. Only a President of such character can make
determined effort to seek the wisdom of the traditional leaders.
Mr. Remelik's theme of stability acknowledges that the traditional
leaders and their wisdom are indeed integral part in the making
of this small emerging nation a stable one.

CREATION OF A STABLE ATMOSPHERE CONDUCTIVE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

We believe that if we created a politically stable atmosphere, we
can as a result, easily create an atmosphere inviting to foreign
investors. This is the reason we cannot divorce political stability
and economic development from each other. Foreign investors will come
to Palau only if we have a stable political environment first. These
are some of the reasons why the Remelik's theme of stability is indeed
most appropriate in the first stage of the life of our new constitutional
government.

ACT AS SCREENING AGENCY FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS AND ADVISORS:

The government should invite foreign investors to look for
opportunities in our new Republic. But at the same time, the government
should be in a position to screen who to accept and who to reject. The
government must protect our local businessmen and our environment. It
must also be in a position to seek out the best experts in fishing,
farming, tourism, and others; and not be content with advisors whose
grand plans and theories we cannot find use for in our island
environment.

The government must guide, protect, and balance the direction of
our economic development. These tasks are complementary to the Remelik
Administration stability effort.

HELP CREATE PRO-BUSINESS ATTITUDE OF LOCAL CONSUMERS:

For some reason, a lot of local consumers are distrustful of our
local businessmen. Economically, we cannot afford this kind of negative
attitude from the consumers. The Remelik Administration stability effort aims to reverse this negative attitude toward the business community.

We believe that if the consumers trusted the government leadership enough, they would be willing to let the government create a pro-business economic environment. (We believe that Remelik Administration will be able to create this trust among the people.) Once this is accomplished, as part of the stability effort, the President will work closely with the business community in areas such as employment, labor-management relations, price control, minimum wage, social security, training, economic planning and others.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES:
As part of the stability effort, Remelik Administration will not disrupt the present structure of the government employment system without careful study and consultation with the employees. All government employees, from department directors down to clerks and others, are what make the government work everyday. And a good labor-management relationship is one of the keys to an effective institution. These are guidance imbedded in the philosophy of a stable Republic - which is the theme of Remelik Administration.

PROMOTING PALAU-US RELATIONS:
At this stage of our political and economic development, we need the friendship, protection, and financial assistance of the US Government to help us stabilize our new Republic. This truth we realize. Remelik Administration will do its best to promote and foster a good relationship between our Republic and the American people and their government.

We believe in the concept of Free-Association. And we will accept the Compact of Free-Association just as soon as it is in the best interest of the majority of Palauans.

OTHER TASKS:
While programs aimed at stabilizing the new Republic are being carried out, the Remelik Administration at the same time will also be performing the everyday tasks of running the new government.

The on-going district (TT) government programs, services, and projects (example: health services, education, communication, public works, CTP, Status Negotiations, and others) will continue as they are; no drastic changes should be immediately made when the new government takes over on January 1, 1981.

CHANCES, of course, will come but they will come at appropriate time. Remelik Administration will work closely with the Congress and with the public through public hearings on any plans to change the structure of the government services and programs.

In short, as part of the stability effort, Remelik Administration vows to make the transition from the district government to the new
constitutional government as smoothly and orderly as possible. We are confident that with his experience as a public servant in Palau, Mr. Remeliik as President will be able to usher in the new government indeed smoothly and in an orderly manner. This is what our new Republic of Palau needs at this first stage of its existence.

Our study of these and other tasks, including the many which are outlined in the Constitution, have led us to an inescapable conclusion: the tasks of the first government are indeed many and peculiar.

All the tasks of the first government can be put together and grouped into two main areas: DOMESTIC (local) tasks and FOREIGN (outside) tasks.

Once the constitutional government begins to operate, we believe that the domestic tasks will have to take up 75% or more of the time and attention of the first government. The foreign tasks, on the other hand, will take up about 25% or less of the time and attention of the first government. (It must be noted that we are talking strictly about the first government - 1981-1985. These percentages may change from time to time in the later governments depending on the progress of our stability programs and our need to shift emphasis to foreign affairs.)

It is definitely not our own choice that the foreign affairs have to be lesser than the domestic affairs. But considering the problems - the political and social upheaval - which we have experienced in the last two years, we believe that the first government must focus its attention in getting our new nation together. THIS IS THE FIRST PRIORITY. We cannot face the outside world unless we are united as one Palau. We will not be able to agree on the Compact of Free-Association later unless we are united as one people and one Palau. (Negotiations for Free-Association will dominate the foreign affairs tasks. But we all know that the negotiation is almost completed. And once the Compact is approved and ratified by Palauans, the government will shift its emphasis to other areas.)

We need a person to guide our first government who knows about our domestic problems. We are convinced that Mr. Haruo Remeliik is the one who will be able to bring about peace and unity to Palau.

Later on, when the emphasis of the government has shifted to foreign affairs, we will then support the person better fit for that purpose as our president. For now, we need Mr. Remeliik to help our first government as it addresses our many difficult domestic problems.

THANK YOU FOR VOTING FOR YOUR COUNTRY!
UCHETEMEL A DERUCHALL
(PLATFORM)

HARUO I. REMELIJK

A CANDIDATE

FOR

PRESIDENT
PLATFORM

I. UNITY

In order to create a strong, healthy and stable nation, I believe all political groups, factions, and elements and all politicians in Palau must unite to support and uphold the intent and purpose of the Constitution of the Republic of Palau. Recognizing events and factors that have divided our nation in the past years particularly the last two years and accepting our regional and social backgrounds, I pledge to take actions to heal the wounds in our community and to reach consensus among leaders and people concerning serious issues before us.

II. LAND.

The process of returning the so-called public lands to the rightful owners which is taking place must be done fairly and expeditiously. As provided for in the Constitution, the Government of Palau must consult state governments in the use of public lands located in each of the states. I am opposed to the concept of looking at land as a marketable commodity.

I plan to establish a land use system that is fair, reasonable and relevant to our traditional land use system. Land is our origin where our roots are and must be preserved. Land preservation for the benefit of all should be a national goal. Any land in Palau to be used by a foreign entity and/or an individual must be granted through leasing process and not through selling-buying process.
It shall be the policy of the National Government to safeguard the interests of all land owners from being abused.

III. ECONOMIC POLICY.

Economic growth and prosperity is one of the top priorities of the government I wish to concentrate on. I shall seek to stimulate and encourage the growth that is based on balanced participation of foreign and local investments. An economic policy that is based on the principle of balanced economic growth and fair distribution of economic benefits to all individuals and groups of people in Palau is my goal. To this end, I shall endeavor to find means to strengthen local businesses and other productive services, including fisheries, cooperative farming and marketing system, and to seek means of creating job opportunities for all people regardless of political, social, and economic status.

IV. SOCIAL (HEALTH AND EDUCATION)

Promotion of health and education of our people are our national goals embodied in our Constitution. To this end, I shall strive to see to it that the people of Palau get proper medical care; and, education is made available to those who want it regardless of cultural or economic status.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY.

In protecting our environment we pass to our children and their children the economic benefits and the unique beauty of this island nation. With this as a goal I shall, therefore, seek to take proper measures to safeguard the ecology of our land, water and marine life. To this end, I shall recommend legislations that will provide controls and protect our resources and maintain the physical beauty of Palau.

VI. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

As a new nation coming into the internation community we extend our friendship and good will to all nations. With regards to our relationship with the United States which is still being negotiated, I shall accept and support a form of an association which will be acceptable by the people of Palau.

VII. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU.

I fully support the Constitution as the foundation of our new government. To this end, I pledge to safeguard the Constitution of the Republic of Palau and shall see to it that all provisions of the Constitution are carried out to the fullest extent.
A VISION FOR PALAU

SALII

for

President
A VISION FOR PALAU

A PACIFIC PARADISE

A dream that we share with all Palauans is to make Palau a true paradise in the Pacific, a garden-island nation that can be the pride of its people and a place for the rest of the world to enjoy, to respect and to preserve for future generations. We pledge our efforts to the pursuit of this dream, to use the powers and responsibilities of government to make it better Palau for all Palauans.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

To enable Palau to maintain itself as a self-governing island-nation and to win the recognition and respect of the world for our new republic, we reaffirm our deep commitment to the concept of free association between the Republic of Belau and the United States of America. We support the negotiations for a compact between Palau and the United States based on this concept.

We pledge to make the compact an instrument that will enable Palau and the United States to develop even closer ties and cooperation on the years ahead, to make the relationship an enduring one based on mutual respect and benefit and not on a short-term relationship based on transitory expediency.

We recognize the continuing strategic interests of the United States in the Pacific even after the termination of the trusteeship over Micronesia and will aggressively support appropriate contributions from Palau to maintain and enhance these strategic interests.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS AND NEIGHBORS

We take the position that Palau must also develop closer ties with its Pacific and Micronesian neighbors. We maintain that Palau and Japan can benefit from closer economic and trade relations. With technical and financial assistance from Japan, Palau looks toward the development of its marine resources and the agricultural potential of the island of Babeldaob for the Japanese market. Tourism between Palau and Japan, the development of the required tourism infrastructure in Palau, direct air links between Palau and Japan and the relaxation of travel restrictions between the two nations for educational and cultural purposes are all areas that need immediate exploration between the Government of Palau and the Government of Japan.

We affirm our desire and readiness to work with our neighbors in Micronesia in areas of common interest for the common good. These areas might include alternate sources of energy, promotion of tourism on a regional basis, regional air and sea transportation cooperation, telecommunications and the prohibition of a Pacific free from the dumping of nuclear wastes.
We also look toward more travel, trade, economic and cultural activities between Palau and the Republic of the Philippines, the nations of Southeast Asia and our neighbors to the south of the equator.

Because of the increasing number of Palauans residing on Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, we pledge to seek closer formal ties with Guam and the Commonwealth and to establish liaison offices in these two neighboring areas and in Honolulu.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

A top priority of our administration will be to win respect and recognition for the Constitution of the Republic of Belau, to follow a policy of enhancing the basic intent of the drafters of the constitution to make the document a living instrument which incorporates certain fundamental and unalterable principles and yet flexible enough to accommodate changing conditions in the future.

EMPLOYMENT

We recognize that until the private sector of the economy in Palau develops further, the government will continue to be the main source of employment. No employee will be deprived of or denied a job because of politics, geography, sex or religion. The government under our administration will be a government of all the people of Palau, North and South, East and West.

PRESIDENTIAL CABINET

In selecting men and women for cabinet positions, we commit ourselves to seek out the best available people. Qualifications for each job will be the primary consideration in recruiting people. We also recognize the need to provide jobs for those willing to work and willing to be trained to upgrade themselves.

The training of employees, and the provisions of appropriate skills in our educational systems will be a priority item on the agenda of the Salii administration.

SHARING THE NATIONAL WEALTH WITH THE STATES

The Constitution of the Republic requires that the national wealth be shared between the National Government and the States. It is the intention of the Salii administration to follow this principle. We will implement this principle of sharing through the budget process. The national budget will consist of the priorities of the president and the executive branch, the operating expenses of the Olbiil era Kelulau and the Judicial system and the priorities of the state governments. The state priorities will not be unilaterally determined by the National Government but by the State governments themselves. The Salii administration will work in concert with each state delegation in the Olbiil era Kelulau and the leaders of each state to set state priorities.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT

A Salii administration will encourage foreign investment in Palau. To attract foreign investment, Palau needs to create a more inviting environment and provide longer tax holidays, longer leases and other incentives to foreign investors.

Foreign investment will out of necessity be controlled to some minimum extent by legislation which will be established in concert with the Olbiil era Kelulau.

SUPPORT FOR FARMERS AND FISHERMEN

A Salii administration will support the concept of government subsidy to the farmers and fishermen of Palau. If necessary, it will put on government payroll farmers and fishermen who will produce for the government. The government will, in turn, process and market the farm and marine products. This approach will relieve farmers and fishermen of the burden of marketing their products. The government will work through an existing organization to assist the producers of Palau.

PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE

A Salii administration will pursue excellence as a goal in itself in all programs and activities of the government - in the conduct of the business of the government and in the policies and programs of the administration. We will pursue excellence in our individual conduct in addition to the public business entrusted upon us.

SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE

A Salii administration will guarantee to the people of Palau that government employees under our administration will view and conduct themselves as servants of the people and not as masters to be served by the people.

GOVERNMENT FOR ALL

Under a Salii administration the government of Palau will be a government of all the people regardless of political differences, regardless of birth, geography, religion or sex. The Salii administration will pledge to all the people of Palau a government, in short, by, of, and for all the people of Palau.
The Sun is Shining
Over the new Republic
of Belau
Roman Tmetuchel for President

Veto Roman Tmetuchel President of the new Republic of Belau. Tmetuchel is the most qualified candidate for the office of the President. His first priority is to develop the economy of Belau so that it could be more and more self sufficient. Mr. Tmetuchel’s unsurpassed ability, foresightedness and accomplishments both in public and private life are living proof of his capabilities to plan and carry out his programs effectively. In order to achieve his goal Mr. Tmetuchel proposes to accomplish the following:

To utilize the best available Palauan talents and technical assistance from outside consultants with proven credentials such as Professor Gallbrich.

To seek economic and technical assistance under a compact of free association or similar arrangement from the United States, Japan and other nations, the United Nations and its agencies such as the World and Asian Development Banks, and private institutions.

To encourage and develop trade and commerce between the respective states and between Belau and other nations, especially those in the Pacific Asian region.

Mr. Tmetuchel realizes that the economy of Belau and that of each state cannot prosper in isolation. He further proposes to pursue the following:

Promote trade and commerce between the state of Belau by constructing a good inter-state system of roads, particularly between our provisional capital in Koror and all the states in Babauland, an inter-state telephone or radio system for communication, channels, docks, harbors, small airstrips where appropriate as in the case of Palau, Anap, Kayangel and our states in the Southwest Islands, along with water and power for each state. Other benefits include access to medical and other administrative services of our government to all citizens and by opening lands in other parts of Belau for agricultural, industrial, commercial and residential developments.

Establish a satellite communication system between Belau and other nations.

Continue to promote shipping and air services from different regions to Belau at the lowest possible rates.

Provide government-insured and subsidized long-term loans at low interest to families so that they can build or renovate their homes and to fishermen, farmers, tour operators and other businessmen who contribute to the actual economic development of Belau.

Mr. Tmetuchel emphasizes that outside technical assistance and services are temporary solutions. Therefore, he pledges to give full support to an improved and more realistic public school system designed to meet the needs of the new Republic and to make Scholarships available to qualified Palauan citizens on a competitive basis. Finally, Mr. Tmetuchel pledges that if elected President he will ensure all the necessary documents for the following:

His salary shall be paid directly into an educational trust fund to support full scholarships for qualified Palauan students, to pay for school supplies, equipment and other services as may be determined by the Board of Education.

Due to the expected meager financial resources of the new Republic, he will not live in a government house nor use a government vehicle or boat except for official duties.

As a full-time President his business interests will be administered by an independent board of directors.

We firmly believe that Mr. Tmetuchel’s priorities and objectives are realistic and can be accomplished in spite of the expected meager national resources. It should be pointed out that if elected, Mr. Tmetuchel will be the second President of a nation who pledged his salary to a public cause. The late President of the United States, John F. Kennedy was the first. Veto Tmetuchel!

Paid for by the Guam-Palauans Group supporting Roman Tmetuchel for President of the Republic of Belau.

Sincerely Yours,

Roman Tmetuchel
MEMORANDUM

TO : All School Principals and Teachers and Departments
FROM : District Director of Education, Acting
SUBJECT: Questionnaires

The following questions will provide information for social studies curriculum development at the department of education in Koror. These questions concern leadership, communication and cultural values in Palau.

More specifically, education social studies people would like to understand the reasons and attitudes behind this Palau general election of 1980. How did Palauans feel about the most important issues and questions facing them as the new nation took shape? This should be recorded for future generations and it will also aid in the development of relevant classroom materials.

Please be sure to read the instructions before asking the questions on this survey. Be sure not to ask the names of those answering the questions.

[signature]
William Tabelual

cc: Social Studies Specialist
INSTRUCTION

- Do not ask or record the person's name
- Have either teachers do it, or department personnel
- The questions below are meant as a guide, if ask others, record them
- If a person has already been asked the questions, go on to someone else
- Can ask and answer in either Palauan or English
- Concerning candidates, concentrate on presidential and their staffs
- Collect these, seal in envelope, bring back to education unless other arrangements have been made, please try and return within 2 weeks

QUESTIONS

(2 and 3 can be answered as multiple choice)

1. What campaign style(s) did you like most/least?

2. Did you decide who to vote for on the basis of:

   a. family ties
   b. financial obligations, support or gifts
   c. personality of candidate and/or staff
   d. qualifications
   e. platform, ideas
   f. other, specify

3. What were the most important things facing Palau/your municipality during this election?

   a. economy
   b. political status
   c. style of government and leadership
   d. Palauans and Palauan culture
   e. other

4. Reason you vote for ____________ and against ____________ as president of Palau.

* also record date, age, sex, social position/occupation, location/municipality or hamlet if in Koror level of education, and religion of person answering the questions.
These islands, this new nation, we people of Palau, are we to set out on our new canoe as a sovereign nation among nations without any destination? And this craft we sail, how it has such strange and unusual equipment. What is to help us follow our journey and find for us our fish at night? I tell you, do not think that our traditional knowledge of the sea will fail us now. It will be the foundation and the superstructure of our vessel.

Just now, racing through the waters beneath the Koror-Babelthaup Bridge our war canoes quickened all our hearts, yet for so many years we were but riders on other's ships, going to destinations we never chose. And even before we fished our true lagoon along among the Rock Islands and our coral shores. But now a new day dawns on Palau. We are to enter the high seas to sail with all of the other nations.

This is who we are, but where do we go? And how shall we get there? I ask you: let us unite, not in one voice, but in many voices to one destination, our Palau. What is that, "our Palau"? It is a land of many islands, of many docks, of many ports but of one destination. If I go to Melekeok or Ngaremlengui, do I not go to Palau? If I go to Koror or Peleliu, do I not go to Palau? So it is also with our national destination.

Building our nation is our national destination but this destination has many goals. Self-reliance is one of these goals where Palauans turn more to our own resources to meet our needs.
AND TO CONTRIBUTE BACK TO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. ANOTHER GOAL IS ECONOMIC PROSPERITY THROUGH THE FULL UTILIZATION OF OUR NATIONAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES FOR PALAUANS. A THIRD GOAL IS CULTURAL WELL-BEING, NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND PUBLIC SERVICES, BUT IN RECOGNIZING THAT OUR TRADITIONS ARE OUR MOST POTENT RESOURCE TO HELP US ACHIEVE OUR OTHER NATIONAL GOALS. ANOTHER GOAL IS TO WORK TOWARD THESE OTHER GOALS IN A MANNER WHICH WILL PROMOTE THE POLITICAL STABILITY NECESSARY FOR THE MANY VOICES OF PALAU TO REACH THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE CONSENSUS FOR ACTION.

THIS CONSENSUS APPROACH, SO MUCH A PART OF THE TRADITIONS OF PALAU CAN APPLY AT ALL LEVELS OF NATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND PLANNING. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE CABINET, THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES, OUR COUNCILS OF CHIEFS, STATES, AND COMMUNITY GROUPS.

AT THE SAME TIME WE RECOGNIZE THAT PALAU IS NOT ALONE ON THE SEA. OTHER NATIONS, THOSE WHO HAVE SHAPED OUR DESTINY DURING THIS CENTURY AND OTHERS ARE HERE TODAY TO SHARE OUR JOURNEY, TO GIVE HELP AND ENCOURAGEMENT AND TO RELY ON OUR HELP IN RETURN. TO THEM LET US BE AN EMERGING NATION, UNALIGNED, BUT SEEKING CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS.

EVERY JOURNEY MUST HAVE ITS MAP, ITS COURSE CHARTED, AN ITINERARY OF STEPS ON THE WAY. WE MAY KNOW WHO WE ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING AND WE NEED TO KNOW JUST HOW WE PLAN TO GET THERE.

OUR COURSE OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WILL INCLUDE BUILDING A STABLE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION BASED ON THE CONSENSUS APPROACH TO DEVELOPING NATIONAL POLICY. THIS CONSENSUS WILL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A CABINET EXECUTIVE TEAM, CLOSE LIAISON WITH LEGISLATIVE BODIES, WITH THE COUNCIL OF CHIEFS AND WITH STATE GOVERNMENTS. OUR OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO REDIRECT THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION TOWARD PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE CITIZENS OF PALAU.
WE WILL MOVE THROUGH THE TREACHEROUS WATERS OF NATIONAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, THAT GREAT TYphoon OF DEVELOPING AN EMERGING NATION. OUR POLICY WILL BE PRUDENCE, TO DEVELOP OUR RESOURCES FOR PALAUANS, TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT WHERE PALAU'S ECONOMIC GOALS WILL BE ENHANCED, CONTROL OVER OUR FINANCIAL DESTINY, AND PROTECTION OF THOSE FRAGILE OR NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES.

WE RECOGNIZE TOO THAT OUR MAJOR RESOURCE, IF WE LOOK AT ALL OF THE GOALS AT ONCE, ARE OUR OWN PEOPLE AS HUMAN RESOURCES. IF CARE IS NOT TAKEN TO DEVELOP OURSELVES AS THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE ECONOMY WE DEVELOP, WE WILL IN EFFECT BE SELLING OUT OUR OWN BIRTHRIGHT.


WE WILL LEARN TO PLAN AND CHANGE PLANS; WE WILL LEARN WHAT MAKES THINGS TICK AND NOT JUST HOW TO WIND UP THE WATCH; AND WE WILL LEARN HOW TO SACRIFICE FOR THE SHORT TERM IN ORDER TO GAIN IN THE LONG TERM, BECAUSE OUR SISTER NATIONS STILL PLAY FOR KEEPS.

WE WILL LEARN AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT THERE ARE NO FREE LUNCHES AND THOSE WHO PAY THE CHECK STILL GET TO CALL THE TUNE. WE WILL LEARN TO GIVE AND TAKE IN THE WORLD JUST AS WE DO IN OUR CUSTOMS.
INAUGURATION ADDRESS - PRESIDENT MARCO I. REMELIK, REPUBLIC OF PALAU, 1/31/91

WE WILL LEARN TO COME TOGETHER FIRST AS PALAUANS IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORLD ARENA.

To us all I urge, let us unite, not in only one voice but in all our voices, not in one village but in all our villages, not in one council but in all our councils; let us unite to our one destination: building our new Republic of Palau. Then, with help from our other nations, with full reliance on our own efforts and with the divine guidance of the Almighty God, we venture forth with confidence in our success.
List of Foreign Representatives

American Samoa
Hon. & Mrs. Peter Coleman, Governor

Australia
Hon. Oliver Cordell, High Commissioner to Nauru

Cook Islands
Hon. & Mrs. Tangaroa Tangaroa, Minister of Education

Federated States of Micronesia
Hon. Petrus Tun, Vice President
Hon. Joab N. Sigrah, Vice Speaker, FSM Legislature
Hon. Johnny Hadley, Chief of Micronesian Relations

Indonesia
Hon. & Mrs. M. Soedarmono, Ambassador

Guam
Hon. Tommy Tanaka, Speaker
Hon. Felix Crisostomo, Special Assistant - Governor

Japan
Hon. James Shintaku, Advisor to Consulate General
Hon. & Mrs. Hiroshi Ohi, Consul General of Japan

Kiribati
Hon. Roniti Teiwaki, Minister of Natural Resources

Korea
Hon. Kwang Jung Song, Ambassador Korean Embassy - Philippines
Hon. Byung woo Yu, Director, Oceania Div. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Marshall Islands
Hon. Nmo Hermios, Nitijela Vice Speaker
Hon. Michael Kabua, Council of Iroijji, Chairman
Hon. Tom Kijiner, Minister of Education
Hon. Wilfred Kendall, Minister of Internal Affairs
Hon. Jeton Anjoin
Hon. Eknap Silk
Hon. Tony Johns

Nauru
Hon. & Mrs. R.B.B. Detudamo, Minister for Works & Comm. Service
Hon. Leo Keke, Secretary for External Affairs
Hon. David Orleans, Consul for Nauru in Guam
Navy
Admiral & Mrs. Fountain
Mr. & Mrs. C.B. Stepp
Commander C.B. Coats
Lt. Souder

New Caledonia
Hon. Young Vivian, Sec. General South Pacific

Northern Marianas
Hon. & Mrs. Egridino Jones, Congressman
Hon. Julian Calvo, Senator

Papua New Guinea
Hon. Aron Noaio, Member from Gulf Province
Hon. Bernard Kombil, Premier of Manu Province

Philippines
Hon. Rafael Gonzalez, Ambassador Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hon. Carlos Martinez, Philippine Consul General in Guam

Ponape
Hon. & Mrs. Strik Yoma, Lt. Governor
Hon. Nelson Peleb
Hon. Teidge Patterson

Spain
Hon. & Mrs. Cleofe Liquiniano, Ambassador of Spain in Manila

Taiwan, Republic of China
Hon. Michael T.C. Hwang, President, Pac. Pioneer Management, Inc.
Hon. Enti Liu, Rep., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hon. S.T. Shen, Rep., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hon. C.C. Ting, Chairman, Sino-Oceanian Culture & Econ. Ass.

Tonga
Hon. & Mrs. Sione Kite, Deputy Governor's Secretary
Hon. Baron Tuita, Deputy Prime Minister

Trust Territory Headquarter
Hon. & Mrs. Adrian Winkel, High Commissioner
Hon. Clarence E. Takeuchi, Special Asst. Territorial Affairs

Tuvalu
Hon. Kitiseni Topati, Sec. of Comm. & Transportation
Hon. Ilaoa Imo, Minister for Communication & Transportation

United Nations
Hon. Holcombe, UN Representative in Fiji for the Pacific
Western Samoa
Hon. Leumuli Kurene, Minister of Works
Hon. Siai Toomalatai, Member of Parliament
Hon. Alan Wendt, Government Official

Yap
Hon. Ruecho, Robert, Senator
Hon. Mike Kigimnang
Hon. Santus Wichimai
Hon Luke Tman
Hon. Peter Rutun
Hon. Tured, Ben
Chief Louis Kenfal
Chief James Mangefel
Chief Kenmed
Chief Andrew Roboman
Chief Fithingmow
Chief Bruno Thargnan
Chief Raphael Lukan
Hon. John Magefel, Governor of Yap

Guam
Hon. Joe Diego, President Chamber of Commerce
Hon. & Mrs. Carl Gutierrez, Senator 16th Guam Legislature

Associated Press
Mr. Peter O'Loughlin, Chief of Bureau Associated Press

United States
Hon. & Mrs. Don Yellman, Status Liaison Officer, Saipan

Spain
Hon. Manuel Cacho, Member of Spanish Embassy

Northern Marianas
Hon. & Mrs. Francisco Uludong, Special Assistant, TT HQ
Hon. Clarence E. Tekeuchi, Special Asst. Territorial Affairs
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Mahler, V. A.  

McClelland, D.  

McHenry, D.  

McKnight, R. K.  


Meller, N.

Micronesian Support Support Committee


Mintz, S.

Moore, W. H.

Nevin, D.

Olson, H. F.

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