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KINSMEN AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
IN TWO ILOCANO COMMUNITIES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN ANTHROPOLOGY

DECEMBER 1984

By

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ABSTRACT

Two questions are examined: (1) Do voluntary associations need kin solidarity in order to thrive among kin-related, land-short, subsistence-oriented farmers? and (2) What promotes kin solidarity among land-short, subsistence-oriented farmers?

I noted not only the crops grown, the available technology, population densities and settlement patterns, but also social class and status ranking. I thus analyzed the mutual impact of the ecosystem and the social system upon the Philippine communities.

The second question was answered first by showing that a peculiar form of irrigation system, corporately owned woodlands, semi-corporately owned ricelands, interkin marriages, child adoption, patronage by a wealthy and influential kinsman dissipate frictions over partition of land in a densely populated area such as Teppang-Karayan.

Indeed the paradox is that Teppang-Karayan, which is poorer than Rantai, the other community I studied, has more cohesive kin groups as suggested by answers to questions about whom villagers turn to in case of an emergency and contingency and whom they esteem as friends.

Contrary to the literature, this kin solidarity does not inhibit the formation of voluntary associations. The presence of recognized leaders and a stable group of followers has provided organizations with a pre-bureaucratic structure. Moreover, the quest for higher status by affluent villagers has encouraged them to take the initiative.

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CHAPTER I

APPROACHES

It is a truism to state that no man can choose his kinsmen. By birth, he stands in relation to a particular group of individuals, as son, father, nephew, uncle or cousin. He may prefer one kinsman over another, but his relatedness to both is not subject to his approval. In contrast, he can elect to join a voluntary association and is a member, for as long as he feels that his interests coincide with those of the organization. So essential is this free exercise of the will, that we must draw another distinction, this time, with a common interest association, with which it is often confused. In certain societies, all those who have fought for their country, as regular soldiers, are also de facto members of the association, regardless of their actual use of its privileges. Under such circumstances, the veterans' association can be regarded as a common-interest rather than as a voluntary association. The latter is not co-extensive with the former; it is rather a special subset where membership depends on the individual's will (Kerri, 1976: 24; Hammond, 1972: 3).

THE TOPIC

The significance of voluntary associations. Social theory thus assigns this type of association an important role in a democracy where group consensus is the normative way for arriving at decisions (Rose, 1954: 50f.). By uniting together, association members sharpen their awareness of their interests, crystallize appropriate opinions

with respect to specific problems, and decide upon an appropriate course of action. Participation in such an association educates the individual to look closely at events, understand their significance and react accordingly, using the mechanics of self-government on a minor scale (Hausknecht, 1962: 10).

Voluntary associations play another important role, this time in economic development. Because they focus on particular, commonly agreed-upon felt needs, they are more pliable and adaptable than strict groups (Geertz, 1962). While members of a kin group expect to help and be helped by a fellow kinsmen in times of need, they may not necessarily pool their resources together to create an emergency fund. A voluntary association emerges the minute some kinsmen decide, of their own volition, to unite, say, in depositing a portion of their earnings into a common fund. Their basis for so doing is not kinship, although this may help, but rather their mutuality of goals and wills. Through such associations, the individual can take steps to improve his own economic standing.

It is possible to see voluntary associations as a transitional stage between the personal informality of kin groups and the impersonal formality of modern institutions such as banks and business corporations (Geertz, 1962: 245, 262). They educate the farmer, the worker and the clerk in dealing with hitherto unknown persons on the basis of mutually felt economic need. The experience can lead to the formation of a regular business enterprise. However, it is also possible to regard some forms of economic voluntary associations, like rotating credit associations, as ends in themselves (Ardener,

1964: 212-213); for the informal way of drawing money plus the fellowship may be all that the members want.

Accounting for the absence or presence of these associations in a given society continues to challenge investigators. After reviewing the literature on voluntary associations, Kerri (1976: 34) points out three aspects of this problem that await resolution:

- 1) The context in which a particular type of voluntary association occurs. This would mean looking into environmental factors and the cultural, social and psychological variables observable in individuals and groups.
- 2) The types of alternative strategies from which a common-interest strategy is chosen.
- 3) The interests, whether of individuals or groups, that the association maintains.

Inconsistencies in the Literature. An area that calls for exploration is the interface between voluntary associations and kin solidarity. Many authors point out that voluntary associations do not thrive in a context where kin ties remain strong. By attending to the individual's various needs, from assistance during illness to emergency loans to companionship, kin groups make such associations superfluous. Thus the natural setting for these associations is urban, rather than rural, and there, chiefly among those who are either cut off from their kin group or who no longer rely on their kinsmen for their various needs (Dotson, 1951, 1953; Wright and Hyman, 1958; Rose, 1954: 74-75; Anderson and Anderson, 1959; Sills, 1959; Banton, 1957; Little, 1957; Gallagher, 1957; Anderson, 1971: 214).

Against this, one can argue that voluntary associations flourish precisely in a situation where kin ties are strong. Because rotating credit associations involve transactions of goods, without benefit of collateral and written pledges, relationships have to be founded on mutual trust (Geertz, 1962: 262). Close kin ties guarantee that a member will not default on his payments. Thus Lewis contrasts two peasant villages in Northern Luzon: Buyon in Ilocos Norte and Mambabanga in Isabela. Rotating associations thrive in the latter community but not in the former. One reason for this is Mambabanga's relatively strong kin solidarity (1971: 150-151).

Hollnsteiner (1963: 133) takes the matter a step further by making a careful distinction between a "natural" community and a "local" community. The latter coincides with the legal-political entity with defined spatial boundaries, that is the village. The former, however, refers to a community whose members experience a sense of group identity, a we-feeling that transcends spatial limitations. The two kinds of communities may not necessarily be equivalent to each other. In Thailand and Moslem Philippines, the natural community consists of the households that cluster around the place of worship, the wat and the mosque. Among rural Christian Filipinos, the analog is not the cluster of households around a village chapel, but the alliance group which may be one or many in a local community (1963: 134).

The alliance group comes about when a man selects from among those already joined to him by bonds of kinship, ritual kinship (compadrazgo), reciprocal obligations, associational ties and patron-client relations (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 66, 135). Filipino villagers

will not work for an abstract "common good"; they find this remote and meaningless. But they will work as a group "for allies--for real, live friends and relatives from whom they can expect a return or to whom they are indebted" (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 137). Voluntary associations thrive best in the presence of an alliance group¹ (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 129).

But the circumstances that enable kin solidarity to flourish in a peasant community are likewise problematic. One cannot assume that kin solidarity is naturally strong in a rural community. Kin ties may, in fact, be weak and conflict-ridden in many peasant communities (Lopreato, 1967: 425-426). As a result, voluntary associations are unable to exist.

According to this latter line of argument, any division of farmland among the heirs engenders conflict since peasant farms are small and often low in productivity. Each one eyes his rival suspiciously, fearing that the other may acquire slightly more than his due. So much more is at stake when resources are meager. Expressed or not, these conflicts cause resentments that are not easily forgotten. And since kinsmen are neighbors and neighbors kinsmen in a peasant community, no common interest can possibly attract them to form an association (Foster, 1967a: 304). Kin solidarity is therefore weak in a high density population farming area like Ilocos Norte, where land is scarce (Lewis, 1971: 91-92, 107).

Moreover, small peasant farms make labor exchanges between households superfluous for there is more than enough labor within each household for cultivating a small farm. That sense of fellowship

created by continuous interaction in crucial tasks cannot take root and overshadow conflicts over inheritance (Brandes, 1975: 85-87; Lewis, 1971: 110-111).

Finally, since incomes are low, regardless of their kin ties, households cannot contribute to voluntary associations (Lewis, 1971: 151).

However, there are data that do not square with this viewpoint. Nativist churches, secret societies, and messianic brotherhoods have appeared among impoverished peasant societies all over the world, at different points in time. All of these have sought to transform the peasant's condition by proposing another social order. Some have tried to realize this order through peaceful means; others through force of arms (see, for example, Sturtevant, 1976: 132-138). Such associations, regardless of their aims and means, should surely be classified as voluntary associations. And they suggest that peasants are indeed capable of transcending their poverty and their conflicts for a common cause.

Even more significant for my interest was Griffiths' study of garlic traders in Bawang, an Ilocos Norte village (1974). Farms are small, being less than half a hectare, and yield only 80 cavans per hectare. And yet villagers of both sexes have successfully formed trading companies that sell the produce as far as the metropolitan region itself. They also have a community association that organizes the annual fiesta and invests the proceeds in civic projects, such as paved walkways (1974: 159). Members of these two voluntary associations are closely related to each other by blood. Indeed traders

rely on kin networks to expand their sphere of trade; they ask a cousin in a distant village to act as their agent (1974: 170).

The Problem. For my field study, August 1978 to December, 1979, I took two Ilocano villages: Teppang-Karayan, which has several fairly active common-interest associations, and Rantai, which had them in the past. The former lies a few kilometers south of Laoag, the capital, the latter almost the same distance north of Laoag.

Teppang-Karayan has the following:

- 1) Several social savings associations (among);
- 2) Two social-civic clubs (sosyodad), both in existence for the past twenty years. (One of them has sponsored the formation of a high school, a marketplace, a social hall, a consumers' cooperative and a credit union);
- 3) A seven-year-old consumers' cooperative;
- 4) A four-year-old credit union, and
- 5) An irrigation society (zanjera) which even non-members help.

Rantai used to have:

- 1) A social savings association that died out in the early 1950s;
- 2) A social-civic club that died out within two years of its formation, and
- 3) A consumers' cooperative that lasted for only three years.

Its district has several irrigation societies which have a hard time getting members to work on the allotted days.

As I shall explain in more detail, of the two communities, Teppang-Karayan is the poorer one. Its farms are smaller, are more fragmented, and to this day suffer from a yearly water crisis. More fortunate is Rantai which enjoys irrigation, even at the height of the dry season.

As my research progressed it became increasingly clear to me that kin ties were more cohesive at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai. The former had certain institutions, not found in the latter, which promoted interdependence and mutual cooperation among kinsmen.

My dissertation's problem may be defined thus: How are voluntary associations able to flourish in a community where kin ties are strong and where most members are poor peasant farmers? Those three angles of the problem--voluntary associations, kin solidarity, and poverty--supposedly contradict each other. According to one viewpoint, sturdy kin solidarity, especially among peasants, discourages the formation of its rival: voluntary associations. However, according to another viewpoint, weak kin solidarity is just as much an inhibiting factor, for it implies underlying conflicts among kinsmen over inheritable property and meager incomes.

There are three closely interrelated questions I am raising:

- 1) Under what conditions can voluntary associations thrive among kin-related, land short, subsistence-oriented farmers?

- 2) Under what conditions can alliance groups thrive among such households?
- 3) Under what conditions can alliance groups promote the growth of voluntary associations?

To narrow the scope of my problem I should point out what sort of associations I am not concerned with in my dissertation. Lately the government has sponsored various farmer organizations:

- 1) The Samahang Nayon (literally Village Association) a pre-cooperative that aims to teach farmers how to market their products and also gives them insurance in case of accident, illness and death;
- 2) Farmers Association, which instructs farmers in new agricultural crops and techniques; and
- 3) Barangay Brigades which gather mostly the young, or less than thirty years old, into different committees in charge of health, emergency, beautification, new forms of livelihood

My study does not concern itself with these associations, nor with religious types, of which there was an active example at Teppang-Karayan. I was more interested in:

- 1) Traditional, indigenous and secular associations;
- 2) Non-indigenous but still spontaneously formed associations (that is, formed by the people themselves); and
- 3) Associations, such as consumers' cooperatives, which have government support but not government sponsorship.

I was more interested in associations begun from below, by the people themselves, rather than in those begun from above.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Limitations of Cultural Ecology. At the start, I had intended to interpret my data from the perspective of cultural ecology. I would compare the two communities in terms of their physical and social environments and note how their adaptive responses accounted for the presence of voluntary associations in only one of them.

But two limitations in this approach became evident:

1) A society's adaptation to its environment becomes the first principle from which its structure is deduced.

It is held that the basic adaptation effected by any culture will be reflected in the social structure . . . thus, if variations occur in technology or environment, or both, concomitant, adaptive variations should be found in other aspects of culture. (Sahlins, 1958: 247-248)

This emphasis on the dominant role of technology is misleading. Industrialization, for instance, can be subsumed under either of two systems: capitalism, where the means of production are owned by individuals or groups of individuals; or socialism, where the means of production are vested in the state (Friedman, 1974: 461). Similarly, the presence of plow agriculture does not necessarily imply a peasant society, it can be subsumed just as easily by capitalism or socialism.

In the case of my two communities, had I merely looked at the technology, I would never have realized that some farmers were no longer pure and simple peasants. They had wage laborers working for

them; and they geared production to the needs of the market, under-producing if the demand was low. This form of appropriation has no necessary connection with the technology used.

2) By focusing on only the mode of adaptation to a particular environment, cultural ecology overlooks differences in interest between groups--interests that have little to do with adaptation. Thus landlords and businessmen may have interests that not only differ but may well oppose those of tenants and landless laborers. Voluntary associations may flourish in a community because they serve the interests of a particular group.

An Alternative Model. For these reasons, I have found Ingold's synthesis (1980a, 1981) helpful. He proposes looking at a culture's infrastructure as an interplay between the ecosystem and the social system, neither of which is reducible to the other (Figure 1).

Looked at from an ecosystem perspective, the human group appears as "an undifferentiated population aggregate" (Ingold, 1981: 120) that grows and reproduces through a constant input of materials and energy from its environment. In energy terms, the ecosystem is a network of trophic exchanges that link the human population directly with the organic resources it consumes and link those resources, in turn, with other components of the environment. These exchanges immediately influence the recipients' physical state. Food is ingested by humans, and, as in other organisms, is converted directly to energy (Ingold, 1981: 120).

The picture changes if the perspective is from the social system, for this is constituted by the relations between people in respect




Figure 1. A Synthesis of the Ecosystem and the Social System

to the environment's resources and products. "It specifies who should perform the work of economic production, how the fruits of that production are distributed, and who eventually consumes it" (Ingold, 1981: 120). Since the different phases of this production may be allotted to separate groups, each pursuing objectives not necessarily consonant with those of the rest, internal differentiation is a crucial aspect of this model. Thus, an aggregate of people may be differentiated according to their access to wealth, and socially valued resources such as income.

Because the term "production" may lead to misunderstandings, Ingold draws a sharp distinction between economic production and ecological production. The former refers to the work men must expend to get their food. This includes movement from one food location to the next, the extraction of raw food and its consumption, preceded perhaps by the intermediary stage of preparation. Among animals, these phases often occur in close succession, e.g., the wolf devours the prey it has killed on the spot where the deed was done and, while crushing the bones, consumes the meat. Among men, these phases are separable, and indeed may be realized by different groups (Ingold, 1980: 220-221). Ecological production, in contrast, refers to the dynamic process whereby energy from the sun fuels the creation of organic materials in nature. Thus vegetation assimilates energy which is converted into potential energy stored in plant tissues. In turn, herbivores and humans that consume these plants effect a further step in ecological production: the growth and multiplication of their own bodies (Ingold, 1980: 220-222).

The relations between ecosystem and social system may be defined as follows: The socially directed acts of economic production, distribution, and consumption serve to effect a transduction from the social to the ecosystem. When the farmer cultivates a field to feed his family and to pay rent to his landlord, his activity "translates" the state of the social system into a change in state of the ecosystem with which it is articulated (Ingold, 1981: 122). The soil is upturned and shoots planted, which after a few months become food for birds, rodents, and humans.

In turn, the ecosystem imposes a kind of negative determinism upon its drivers: it allows only that social system that does not contradict it. Failing this, the social system is returned to its point of origin, that is, it breaks down; or a transformation occurs in both systems (Ingold, 1981: 120).

Thus the ecosystem presupposed by swidden agriculture supports with difficulty a peasant type society. The extraction of rent and taxes by powerholders requires large total harvests on a community basis. Higher population densities and sedentary settlements become crucial therefore. But the continuous cultivation of a swidden garden beyond a few years impoverishes the soil and may cause the protective forest cover to disappear (Geertz, 1969: 14-16). This may cause famines within a peasant society that relies on swidden, leading, in turn, to unrest and rebellion (Friedman, 1975).

Both ecosystem and social system act as culture's infrastructure. For Ingold, culture is a systematic repertoire of knowledge and values that enables individuals to both explain and act upon the real world. Carried in the individual consciousness, this repertoire is amenable

to symbolic transmission and storage. Composing culture is a triangular configuration of ideology, organization, and technology (Ingold, 1981: 123-124). Ingold locates the last in culture rather than in the ecosystem, for technology cannot be reduced to the tool itself but must be seen as including such immaterial factors as a totality of skills, organizational techniques, and knowledge of the natural world and the way it behaves. "Behind every tool or technique there lies a conscious model, or blueprint, which the hunter carries in his imagination, and which he can communicate symbolically" (Ingold, 1981: 122; see Marx, 1930: 170). Like organization, it is a model for reality, an instruction for action. In contrast ideology is a model of reality for it offers an explanation, that may be either explicit or implicit, of the world. Since understanding is its primary concern, it may not necessarily induce action (Ingold, 1981: 122).

Though culture may be conceived of as playing the role of a superstructure to both social and ecosystems, the architectural image this term conveys does not adequately portray the cultural mediation of social and ecological relations. Culture, in fact, is not imposed on top but in between as a "medistrukture" (Ingold, 1981: 125). It constitutes a vital link between the components of the base by translating social rationality into practical effectiveness, by realizing social production through ecological production (Ingold, 1981: 124).

Ingold's synthesis poses these advantages for my inquiry:

- 1) The notion of a social system articulating with an ecosystem allows a direct examination of the manner in which resources are allocated in the two communities. There is no need to deduce this

allocation from the communities' form of adaptation to their environment. Moreover, the notion lays open the possibility that there can be more than one kind of economic production at work. Thus though the animal-driven plow may be the basic good, not all economic relationships households assume vis-à-vis others are necessarily classifiable as "peasant." Some households may be running their farms as regular commercial enterprises attuned to the national market economy.

2) The two communities may be composed of various groups, differentiated according to their access to resources. Some of these may be constrained from participating in associations because of their low incomes; others, better endowed, may be active participants for particular reasons.

3) The notion of an ecosystem articulating with the social system obliges us, in turn, to examine constraints imposed on the pursuit of socially-defined objectives, for instance, the ideal of raising enough rice for home consumption. The presence of such constraints may give us a clue to unarticulated but deep concerns of the households. These may explain why some types of voluntary associations flourish better in the more deprived of the two communities.

4) This interplay between social and ecosystems may be exerting selective pressures upon two components of the culture's organization: kin relations and common-interest associations, causing them to thrive in one community and to languish in the other.

My inquiry's topic may thus be redefined as follows: What are those selective pressures exerted by the social and ecosystems upon kin solidarity and voluntary associations? What adaptive responses

do these two phenomena make to the infrastructure? And how do these two phenomena articulate with one another?

Ingold's approach is useful on the broad, general, theoretical plane. However, to examine the relations that take place between households, I will draw upon Wolf's classification of the various sorts of relations possible (Wolf, 1966: 81).

Interpersonal Relations as Coalitions. Both to increase their security by widening their resources in goods and people and to retain a sufficient degree of autonomy, peasant households form coalitions, in the sense of "a combination or alliance, especially a temporary one between persons, factions, states" (Wolf, 1966: 80). There are three criteria for distinguishing various kinds of peasant coalitions:

1. The degree to which coalitions are formed between persons who share many interests or between persons tied together by a single interest. Many-stranded coalitions weave together various ties: kinship, friendship, neighborliness, and co-participation in economic ventures. These strengthen and reinforce each other. Single-stranded coalitions, in contrast, center around single interests and do not commit the participants to become involved with one another in other life situations (Wolf, 1966: 81).

2. The number of people involved in the coalition. The coalition may either be dyadic or polyadic. In the former, there are two persons or two groups of persons; in the former there are many persons or groups of persons (Wolf, 1966: 81).

3. The degree to which coalitions are formed, either by persons occupying the same positions in the social order, or by persons

occupying different positions in the social order. Coalitions of peasants with superior outsiders are vertical while their coalitions with equals are horizontal (Wolf, 1966: 81).

The permutation of these three criteria yields four single-stranded types of relationship. These are:

1. Dyadic and horizontal,
2. Dyadic and vertical,
3. Polyadic and vertical, and
4. Polyadic and horizontal.

An example of the first is the exchange relationships between buyer and seller in the marketplace. Relations between the peasant and moneylender or between the peasant and the tax-collector typify the second. Should the peasant enter a factory or a plantation, he will encounter the third type of relationship, which occurs between employers and employees, or between supervisors and supervised. All these three relationships tend to be brittle and unlikely to yield perduring coalitions. Considerations of "goodwill" are needed to strengthen them by giving them ties that approach the many-stranded (Wolf, 1966: 82-83). It is relations of the fourth type that yield enduring coalitions, for these are typified by sodalities or voluntary associations. People come together because of perceived common interests. In the process, other ties may develop: polyadic, vertical, single-stranded ties (since they elect a body of officials to represent them) and various other ties which, though incidental to the association, bring the members closer to each other.

Such ties would be many-stranded. Here again four types of relationship are possible. These are:

1. Dyadic and horizontal,
2. Polyadic and horizontal,
3. Dyadic and vertical,
4. Polyadic and vertical.

Exemplifying the first are ties of friendship or neighborliness "in which households enter into many repeated ties of varying kinds, ranging from mutual aid in production to exchanges of favors" (Wolf, 1966: 85). Some peasant communities act as a unitary group that has ultimate domain to land, and levels differences between members through such means as periodic reallocations of land. These closed corporate communities typify polyadic and horizontal many-stranded coalitions. Type 3 takes the peasant out of his class by giving him a relation with a patron who is his social, political or economic superior. In exchange for the opportunities and favors granted him by his patron, the peasant pays back "in intangible assets," such as through votes, public praise and loyalty (Wolf, 1966: 87). Type 4 occurs in descent groups. These are polyadic because many people are members on the basis of kinship ties. They are many-stranded because kinship, by its very nature, brings diverse interests together into a common set of relations. And they are vertical because such groups have an executive committee, composed of kinsmen selected on the basis of wealth, power or seniority (1966: 87-88).

Although I agree that voluntary associations are, by their very nature, single-stranded coalitions, I would like to point out that they involve a paradox. On the one hand, they may lead to many-stranded ties; on the other hand, in some societies, such as the

Philippines, they seem to require many-stranded coalitions, as a prior condition for their very existence. Hollnsteiner (1963) and Lewis (1971) have noted this of the communities they have studied.

With these frameworks in place, let me now discuss the scheme of my chapters.

Dissertation Plan. The succeeding three chapters emphasize the infrastructure.

Chapter II shows how farming, in conjunction with the social system it fuels, is realized in the ecosystem through the cultural system; and, how the ecosystem in turn sets limits on both, particularly at Teppang-Karayan.

Chapter III examines the problem of high population densities and responses taken by villagers that affect their solidarity. It then describes and counts types of household in the two communities, for the household and its head are the dissertation's unit of analysis.

Chapter IV shows how the social system differentiates each community according to class, indices of consumption and status.

Chapters V onwards, the argument shifts to the medistruature: the cultural realm. Chapters V and VI describe forms of resource sharing among households. They differentiate between resources that are shared among kinsmen, purely on the basis of kin ties, and resources that are shared among kinsmen and neighbor alike. Chapter VII establishes the important role played by kinsmen in times of need, of financial difficulty and of enjoyment, based on responses given by informants themselves.

Chapter VIII discusses three kinds of voluntary association, their compatibility, (or lack of it) with the infrastructure, and the feedback between these associations and kin solidarity.

The concluding chapter then reexamines the problem in a broader context of findings arrived at by other authors, proposes some generalizations, and suggests areas for future inquiry.

In all these, I will be proposing generalizations that may generate testable hypotheses, rather than testing hypotheses.

METHODS AND FIELD TECHNIQUES

Method. Keen on using an actor-centered approach, I have taken, as my unit of analysis, the household head, rather than the village as a whole. By household head, I mean whoever takes the primary role in decision-making within a household.

An alternative was to use the household as such, as the unit of analysis, but this would have made the inquiry unwieldy, since one must look into the behavior of the other household members. Of course, one cannot totally divorce the head from his unit since resources are, by definition, shared among household members. Thus, in classifying household heads according to social class, I took into account the entire range of jobs undertaken by the members. Nor could I very well study the household head without the spouse. Women play an important role in linking households together through such activities as food exchanges and news-sharing.

The result therefore was that I took the household head, as my unit of analysis. However, I kept an eye, at the same time, on such activities by the other members as would be relevant to my topic.

Field Techniques. To locate my two villages, I asked the officials in the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development in Laoag for a list of what they regarded as "progressive" villages. By "progressive" we both meant: having active community associations and a willingness to cooperate in new government-sponsored associations, particularly the Samahang Nayon or pre-cooperative. I also asked them for a list of villages where it was difficult to enlist the support of the people for both local and government-sponsored associations. Once the list was drawn up and choices made, I lived in Teppang-Karayan from August 1978 to March, 1979; in Rantai from April to December, 1979. While at Rantai, I visited Teppang-Karayan from time to time, at least once every two weeks.

Rather than rent a house all by myself, I lived with families and participated in their diverse activities. Gradually, I began to participate in the affairs of other households as well. Although there were certain households I naturally gravitated to because they were friendly, I made it a point to pay close attention to at least two households in each of the three levels of consumption I had conceptualized. Once I had identified these households, according to a list of indicators I had drawn up with friends, I visited them regularly.

My wife's visits to me proved a boon once she, an American-Japanese who knew not a word of Ilocano, became close to some of the women who spoke some English.

I had two assistants at Teppang-Karayan, and one at Rantai. They came from the area and had relatives all over. Two of them had experience conducting censuses.

With their help, I was able to utilize several field techniques.

- 1) Mapping--I opened my stay in Teppang-Karayan by mapping the residential area with the help of my two assistants from Teppang-Karayan, one of whom was a civil engineering student and was adept at it. When I moved to Rantai, they came in for a few weeks to map the place.
- 2) Genealogies--I took down the genealogies of the larger families in the area to understand who was related to whom. In the process, I discovered several cases of marriage between close kin.
- 3) Interviews--I conducted this in both structured and unstructured forms, according to the topic I had in mind. For specific topics like irrigation societies, I used the former; for life histories, I used the latter.
- 4) Archival research--the municipal office and district health centers had vital statistics data; the provincial office had data on land ownership.
- 5) Census and Survey--After several months' stay at Teppang-Karayan, I wrote my survey questionnaire. Because Teppang and Karayan were two villages, I intended to survey only half of the households: the odd-numbered ones in a complete testing. Although the total number of such households was 151, 8 households refused to be interviewed, leaving me a sample of 143. At Rantai, my survey became a census since I interviewed nearly all the households, and missed out on

four heads who were willing to be interviewed but were busy commuting between the village and their place of work. I had 118 informants. My questionnaire covered the following areas:

- a) Demographic features--Age; sex and marital status of the household members, number of children; adoption cases; migratory experience of the household head.
- b) Social and economic status--Education, sources of household income, occupation, land tenure, size and distribution of the farm, sources of water, technology available, sources of capital, and net harvests. Because of the peculiar character of tenure arrangement in the Ilocos, I asked how the household head was related to his landlord and tenants.
- c) Interpersonal relations--For this I modified Howard's Interpersonal Relations Questionnaire (1971: 47-49) and asked:
 - who would most likely help the informant in case of emergency such as a death in the family;
 - who would lend money for farm expenses; and
 - who were his best friends.

In each of these I asked for the person's residence and relationship to the informant. For best friends, I asked an additional question: how often did he see his friends: daily, once a week, once a month, or once a year?

The statistics I have drawn from these questionnaires are descriptive in nature. I am using them not to test and prove hypotheses, but to expand the range of evidence for the generalizations and tentative conclusions I make. I, therefore, am not giving any primacy to my quantitative data. Instead I have used my two sets of data, the quantitative and the qualitative, to corroborate each other.

CHAPTER I--NOTE

1. Another difference between an alliance group and a voluntary association has to do with interests. A variety of interests draws members of an alliance group together; these may be mutual help, companionship, filial obligations, religious practices, economic support, and political goals. A single interest suffices to bring people into a voluntary association; moreover, this interest is formally stated by the charter, whether written or unwritten, of the association. When asked about their reasons for joining the association, most members will cite this interest. In practice, however, the distinction between an alliance group and a voluntary association is not this sharp, for, as we shall see, a variety of unstated interests helps sustain voluntary associations in the Philippines.

CHAPTER II

UTILIZING THE RESOURCES

In this chapter, I will describe the available resources in the two local communities and the manner in which these resources are utilized. I will discuss more fully the implications of these for voluntary associations and alliance networks in later chapters.

It is customary to discuss the Ilocos Coast, where these two local communities are situated, as handicapped by two factors: a long drought and a limited amount of total arable land. While I too will dwell on these, it is important to realize that these characteristics have become problems largely because of the particular economic conditions faced by most Ilocanos. As subsistence-oriented farmers, they have limited access to capital and technology. Their small farm holdings would not pose as great a problem if they could afford better farming methods that would enable them to cultivate their plots more intensively. At the same time, if more manufacturing and trading opportunities existed to provide alternative sources of income, those harsh climatic and topographical factors would be less relevant.

THE ENVIRONMENT

We should distinguish between the environment and the ecosystem. The former can only be defined "relative to the subject whose environment it is, be it a simple individual, a local or regional population, or an entire species. It does not therefore exist as a system, but rather as a set of possibilities" (Ingold, 1981: 121). Although

farming households and an electronics firm may be neighbors, their environments differ in that factors relevant to farming may be totally irrelevant to the latter's operations and vice versa. Moreover, the environment does not by itself specify the manner and intensity of its exploitation; rather it imposes physical and organic constraints on the manner a given population actualizes its objectives.

For example, the environment of steppe or tundra specify that men should be hunters rather than, say, pastoralists. The distinction here is a social one: hunters appropriate the herds collectively, pastoralists individually; and this difference in turn generates the contrasting rationalities of sharing and accumulation respectively [Ingold, 1980]. But given the social relations of hunting, the environment naturally places restrictions on what may be hunted and, up to a point, on how it is done [Ingold, 1981: 121].

In the case of my two local communities, we shall see that there really are two socially defined objectives. One is production oriented to "livelihood," the other oriented to "profits" (Sahlins, 1972: 83). Each of them actualizes possibilities presented by the environment and, in the process, generates "a certain constellation of ecological associations between men, animals, and plants" (Ingold, 1981: 121). The ecosystem is precisely these associations, characterized by trophic exchanges of materials and energy (Ingold, 1981: 121).

Topography and Climate. Situated on the northwestern coast of Luzon, the Ilocos Region is a long narrow stretch of land hemmed in between mountains and sea. Indeed, at the antipodes of Ilocos Norte, the mountains slope close to the China Sea.

There are two agricultural areas in the province. One is the coastal lowland, an elevated tract of land made up, partly of raised

coral, and partly of alluvium over older sediments. This flatland, where Laoag, the capital city and most of the principal towns are situated, extends inland for 16 kms. Somewhat smaller in size is another agricultural area: the interior valley of Dingras to the east which has been formed by extensive depositions of alluvium over sediments and a rock bed (Luna, 1963.

Ringing this interior valley and marching across the entire province are the Ilocos Mountains which steadily rise till they merge into the rugged Cordillera Central, whose ridges and peaks, 800 ft. in elevation, form Northern Luzon's spiny backbone. The Ilocos Mountains' foothills hold the headwaters of the province's various rivers, like the Laoag and the Vintar, which journey towards the sea, depositing alluvium along the way.

Two well-defined seasons characterize the region: a wet and a dry. Indian Ocean air masses enter the Philippines between June and October, from a southwestern direction. Warm, very deep and humid, these masses cause heavy precipitation when they collide with winds from the northern hemisphere along the Intertropical Front which frequently crosses through the Philippines, from July onwards (Wernstedt, 1967: 48). Around this time too, tropical cyclones or typhoons develop in the area of the Marianas and sweep furiously across the eastern Visayas and Luzon, and out into the China Sea (Wernstedt, 1967: 50). Often destructive, these strong winds do not wreak as much havoc in the Ilocos because of the high mountains that dissipate their force. Nonetheless, exceptionally strong typhoons have sometimes damaged an entire harvest.

Around October, the warm, vapor-laden southwest winds stop blowing in from the Indian Ocean; instead dry and cool air masses enter in from an opposite direction: the winter steppes of Northeastern Asia (Wernstedt, 1967: 48-49). From November to May, the Ilocos Coast experiences a long season of drought.

Hemmed in by mountains and endowed with only one short season of rain, the Ilocos Coast seems inhospitable to the cultivation of rice, a plant which thrives best in ponds. This, however, is not true of the entire coast. In some areas, notably the coastal plain of Bacarra-Vintar and the inner plain of Dingras, farmers have been able to channel the rivers into year-long sources of water. The two communities I studied turned out to be the exact opposite of each other on the question of irrigation.

Two Variations on the Provincial Pattern. Teppang-Karayan,* which has many voluntary associations, is located several kilometers south of Laoag. A dirt road connects it to the highway to Laoag. Until recently the community was rather isolated from the capital because of the highway's broken condition. In 1979, the highway was rebuilt with smooth concrete. But Teppang-Karayan continues to be partially cut off from the town proper of Caoayan to which it belongs, for the Napardas River winds through the municipality, slicing it in half. Thus the town proper and one-half of the municipality are on the northern bank, while Teppang-Karayan and the rest are on the southern bank. No bridge connects these latter villages directly to the town proper. Instead the resident has to take a long detour, via another town and its bridge, to enter Caoayan's town proper. During the dry

*a pseudonym

season, when the water level reaches only up to the knees, it is an easy matter to ford the river. However, as soon as the rains fall, the river turns into a torrent that is dangerous to navigate on a raft. (See Figure 2.)

Before the southern villages acquired their own elementary and high school buildings, their children had to brave the river twice a day on rafts steered by boatmen. Enterprising villagers found it a chore to load their surplus farm produce on the rafts for selling at the town market. But the southern villages' Silaw Club finally remedied the situation, in 1969, by opening a high school south of the river and, again, in 1972, by building an open-air market plaza in the village of San Esteban.

The lush greenness of the closely spaced banana, mango and bamboo trees that arch over the roads of Teppang-Karayan deceives the visitor even at the height of the dry season, for it hides the brown fields that lie beyond. More serious even than the community's isolation from the town proper is its lack of water. The Napardas River that flows by is 10 to 20 meters below the villages and their fields. In addition, Teppang-Karayan actually receives less rain than the coastal villages (cf. Table 1). Nor does the rain always fall on time. Although the river and even the lone irrigation canal have sometimes overflowed their banks, drought is the nemesis or limiting factor of this locality. Farmers recall at least two occasions during the past thirty years when the rains came late; as a result, the rice shoots that were ready for transplant were not able to mature. "The fields turned white with dust," according to an old farmer. To ensure




Figure 2. Aerial Map of Teppang and Karayan.
(Taken on January 29, 1967 at 9:40 a.m.)
Courtesy of Certeza.

Table 1
Rainfall Patterns for Caoayan and Baybay, 1978-1979

	1977		1978		1979	
	Bay	Cao	Bay	Cao	Bay	Cao
Jan.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feb.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mar.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Apr.	0	0	51	24	323	70
May.	73	82	42	4	218	76
Jun.	241	330	223	65	210	146
Jul.	308	265	118	16	287	299
Aug.	274	176	247	53	95	184
Sep.	378	383	189	147	0	0
Oct.	0	0	125	34	0	0
Nov.	62	22	30	4	0	0
Dec.	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1338	1350	1095	347	1133	775

Source: the National Irrigation Authority Provincial Office, Laoag, Ilocos Norte. (However, Caoayan and Baybay are fictitious names.)

N.B.: The crucial months for the transplanting of rice are June and July. Note how (in 1978 and 1979) scanty was the amount of rainfall Caoayan had during those two months.

a supply of water, both the government and the farmers have tried various methods, as we shall see.

Thankfully, the area has a relatively varied resource base.

Especially during the rainy season, the rice paddies form a microenvironment that harbors edible fauna such as small crabs, snails, eels, mudfish and frogs.

The nearby river is another microenvironment. Throughout the dry season, it shrinks to one-fourth its full width, exposing broad

stretches of sandy levees. Since the land belongs to no one, anybody can grow vegetables on these unirrigated stretches. In between the cliffs and the levees, water gathers and stagnates in hollows, where some cultivate taro. Throughout the day a constant traffic to and from the river animates the narrow paths, for the river supplies drinking water to most of the households. Water from the deep wells beside the houses is used only for washing and cleaning. To supplement their food needs, a fifth of the households fish regularly in the river.

Less than a kilometer away to the south of Teppang-Karayan, are hills whose brushwood serves as firewood. Rarely does any game roam these woods, for the wild boar has been hunted to near extinction.

Most households raise their own sources of meat: pigs, chicken, goats, and dogs. However, these are usually slaughtered only for special occasions. Because of its elevation, Teppang-Karayan does not have those waterholes so sought after by carabaos to refresh their bodies. Thus a number of enterprising villagers buy oxen regularly at Dagupan, in the province of Pangasinan, and sell these to their colleagues in the area, as the exclusive work animal.

The other community I studied, Rantai, is located several kilometers north of Laoag. Its environment is much less diverse; it sits on a windy plain. There are no neighboring hills where the villagers can cut wood (see Figure 3). And though the China Sea is two villages away, it does not play a significant role in Rantai's subsistence; neither does the Nadalus River which flows a few kilometers away in the distance. Fish consumed by villagers comes from either the fields, the streams or the town market.



Figure 3. Aerial Map of Rantai
(Taken on February 8, 1967, at 2:15 p.m.)
Courtesy of Certeza.

The villagers' lives center around their fields and a stream that cuts the community neatly in half. Even at the height of the dry season, Rantai's fields are green with crops, for water is in constant supply. Thanks to a vast network of canals, constructed by Baybay's numerous irrigation societies, this area of the Ilocos receives a year-long supply of water. Indeed some of Rantai's southernmost fields are practically marshland (danaw), for they are difficult to dike off and drain.

So broad is the stream that flows through the village that two islands rise in the middle. To keep its water from rushing out too quickly to the sea, an irrigation society constructed two separate concrete dams: one in 1962 and another in 1970. The stream's banks thus vary in height: four meters from the bed, at the approach to the first dam, and 10 meters beyond the second dam. The resulting cliffs bordered with masses of mango trees give the village a wild, picturesque quality. The two islands, with their tall, vertical sides, look like stranded ships.

Previously, the stream tended to isolate the village's two halves from each other, especially during the monsoon season. Since there were no bridges, the villagers had to steer bamboo rafts to cross from one bank to the other. In 1962 and 1968, villagers availed themselves of government-donated building materials plus a government engineer's supervision, to construct two cable-suspended bridges.

However, the stream and the nearby river from which it comes pose something of a threat to Rantai and its fields. Almost every year, sometime during the rainy season, the stream overflows its banks and invades the ground floors of the adjoining houses. Fortunately,

the flood lasts for only a few hours. Should the rains be too heavy and continuous, the Nadalus River sweeps over some of Rantai's fields. This has occurred once during the past thirty years.

While lack of water is Teppang-Karayan's limiting factor, the contrary is true of Rantai. However, this factor is so infrequent, in the case of the river; and so harmless, in the case of the stream, that the villagers have no reason to fear it. Teppang-Karayan's limiting factor is more dangerous.

More so than at Teppang-Karayan, Rantai's well-watered paddies harbor plenty of aquatic fauna. But, pesticide residues have tended to deplete this, according to the farmers. The village stream used to teem with fish. However, old folks complain that there are less fish and more people today.

Household animals are the same as at Teppang-Karayan but the work animal is different. That familiar farm animal throughout the islands, the carabao, can survive here, because of the many water-holes.

THE PEOPLE

The Ilocanos, of which Teppang-Karayaners and Rantaians are members, constitute the third largest linguistic group in the Philippines. In 1970, they formed 11.3 percent of the country's total population of 36,684,486 (NCSO, 1970: Table III-17). Racially, they are Malays (for want of a better term), like most Filipinos. And their language belongs to the Northern Philippine family of the Philippine superstock (Pascasio, 1967).

The Ilocos Coast has been their original homeland since at least the sixteenth century, when Spanish chronicles first mention them (Keesing, 1962: 14). Because of various factors, Ilocanos became a migratory people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They fanned eastwards into Cagayan Valley and southwards toward Pangasinan and the Central Plain; they took part in the opening of the Mindanao frontier; and they constitute the majority of Filipino migrants to Hawaii and areas in the West Coast of the U.S.

Early Spanish chronicles mention Ilocanos' farming activities, although it is not clear whether they were already practicing wet rice agriculture by then (Keesing, 1962: 20, 27). Today wet rice agriculture forms the mainstay of the regional economy. A craft Ilocanos have been famous for, but which now plays a minor role in their economy is weaving. "Part of the former prosperity of the Ilocos Region seems to have been based on the planting, processing and weaving of cotton" (Legarda, 1955: 262). Ilocanos exported cotton textiles to America during the galleon trade, and to other places in the Philippines (Keesing, 1962: 20). Unfortunately, cheaply priced mass-produced British manufacturers killed this thriving industry during the late nineteenth century (Legarda, 1955: 264).

There is a very small colony of non-Ilocanos chiefly at Laoag: Chinese businessmen, American missionaries, and some Tagalogs and Bisayans who have come in as traders, as functionaries or as spouses of Ilocanos. In the villages where I worked, the people were overwhelmingly Ilocano, except for a few notable exceptions, as we shall see.

The possibilities and limitations of the Ilocano's environment become more significant in the light of the economies which dominate it.

THE ECONOMY

Instead of one economy, we should really speak of two economies that intersect and together influence the ecosystem. One economy bases itself on the peasant farm, the other on the commercial enterprise. The former is usually called the peasant economy, the latter the commercial, the market or the capitalist economy.

In a peasant economy production has a twofold purpose: supplying household needs and fulfilling obligations towards holders of political and economic power (Shanin, 1971: 238-241). Such obligations may take the form of rent, either as fixed rent or as a share of the crop; it may also take the form of substantial taxes, whether overt or covert (Wolf, 1966: 9-10). The peasant therefore must always strive to produce surpluses to ensure a margin of safety for his household. At times he is obliged to use household labor as a means of reducing the costs of production (Wolf, 1966: 13; Shanin, 1971: 24; Scott, 1976: 13). Although better-off peasants do produce surplus goods that are sold on the market, usually via middlemen, this does not necessarily depeasantize them. One factor to consider is how consistently they are able to sell their surplus on the market; another is the extent to which they are able to hold back selling their product until such time as prices have become favorable. Finally a third factor is the use to which they direct their extra income. The peasant typically spends his income on items of consumption: household needs

and nonproductive goods, like feasts and large, substantial houses-- when he has the means. Although such goods will not improve and expand his farm enterprise, they will enhance his standing in the eyes of the community.

On the other hand, production in a commercial enterprise is geared principally toward the market. While surplus production may be the ideal in a peasant economy as a means of compensating for the exactions of power-holders, the ideal is different in a market economy. Under-production becomes crucial to keep the prices of products high or at least profitable. Likewise, decisions concerning the utilization of domestic labor are dictated by the market. Under certain circumstances it may be more worthwhile to hire outside labor, and direct the energies of household members to other more profitable enterprises. Consumption patterns differ too in that there is a clear distinction between the household and the enterprise. Profits are plowed back into the latter to make the initial capital grow (Firth, 1964: 29). Whereas the normative rationality in a peasant economy is accumulation and redistribution, in a commercial economy it is accumulation and reinvestment.

Essential to a market economy is the existence of a medium of exchange which can convert one commodity into another, which can substitute for these commodities and which can itself be reinvested for further growth. Money is normally this medium of exchange.

Until the 1960s, a peasant economy characterized both communities, especially Teppang-Karayan. The low yields reinforced this local condition. Even at Rantai, once the landlord had taken his share of the rice harvest, the remaining portion hardly met the household's

needs. At best the tobacco crop created a tenuous link with the market economy. Cash from its sale entered into the purchase of badly needed household goods, usually more rice. In both communities, materials for both houses and clothes came from the nearby fields, and were processed at home: bamboo and hay for the walls and roofs, cotton for garments. To obtain necessities such as salt or pottery, which other communities specialized in, villagers resorted to barter. So scarce, in fact, was cash that, until the 1950s, villagers preferred to hike several hours to Laoag rather than spend their precious centavos on a ride in the occasional passenger bus. In contrast, many today think nothing of paying daily for a tricycle ride rather than walking.

The market economy seems to have first entered the Ilocos around the early 1800s, when both tobacco and rice became cash crops for export (Legarda, 1955: 165, 188-195). This encouraged improvements in the agricultural infrastructure at Bacarra, where a network of irrigation canals took shape in the fields. But it is doubtful how well even wealthy landlords thoroughly assimilated this new spirit. During the 1930s, income from the sale of their crop to Chinese middlemen went into prestige items: larger town houses, a Manila education for their children and the acquisition of more land rather than, say, more improvements at their farm. Perhaps it was the Chinese traders, who lived frugally in order to make their enterprise grow, who best caught its spirit.

At the two local communities, the 1950s constituted an economic watershed. Garlic came in as a new crop and proved better able than tobacco to command high prices with a minimum of labor. By this time

too, more cash had begun to flow into the villages, from migrant kinsmen in Hawaii. As the pace of migration to Manila quickened, some villagers came back with ideas for small businesses. A favorite one at Teppang-Karayan was supplying the village weavers with factory-made threads as a substitute for homespun cotton. Many of these small businesses failed, but they did instill new attitudes. As the villagers' links with the national market economy tightened, they began to lose their autarchy. Mass-produced commercial goods, like iron roofing, cement blocks and textiles; a higher education for the children; and occasional trips to entertainment spots at the provincial capital became new necessities. In order to increase the villagers' income, government programs of the 1970s consciously sought to commercialize agriculture. Because of massive injections of capital and technology in 1973-1974, some households in both communities began to enjoy an annual surplus of rice, a phenomenon hitherto unheard of within the villagers' living memory. They sold this surplus to middlemen, the biggest among them being the government itself. Village electrification, which took place during 1975-1976, has encouraged the growth of new commercial enterprises: rice mills in both communities and a highly successful vehicle repair shop at Rantai.

Are the farms in the two communities still peasant or have they become commercial enterprises? At Rantai, three wealthy landowners run their farms, at least during the rice cycle, like commercial enterprises; they hire a tractor and labor from outside the district and they sell their surplus on the market. Although the average farmer at Rantai still depends on tenants' performance every year, regardless

of kin ties; there have been cases where he has expelled the latter because of poor performance. Teppang-Karayaners tend to be more lenient toward their tenants, especially if the latter are their kinsmen; their agreements last for years. The precariousness of the water supply may explain the difference. Teppang-Karayaners realize that both they and their tenants have to make do with an unpredictable supply of water; consequently it is difficult to expect an annual standard of productivity. Even among Teppang-Karayaners, however, some commercial attitudes are already evident. Better-off farmers are now hoarding garlic and waiting till the prices are favorable.

Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the market economy has begun to dominate the traditional peasant one, without completely replacing or extinguishing it. Although rice harvests are undoubtedly larger, most households still do not grow enough for their needs. Moreover, even households that do sell their surplus rice are not able to accumulate enough capital for reinvestment. While the government has allowed the inputs demanded by the new rice technology to increase by 200 percent between 1972 and 1979, within the same period, it allowed rice prices to increase by only 85 percent (Ofreneo, 1980: 83). In effect, therefore, farmers are paying a heavy hidden tax. Together with the ecosystem inconsistent government policies have arrested the penetration of the market economy.

Opportunities in the non-agricultural sector of the provincial economy are limited. Laoag is a trading center of minor significance. Nor does it have a large and numerous manufacturing concerns; the Coca-Cola processing plant at San Nicolas is a lone exception. Although Laoag boasts of at least eleven banks and receives one of the

biggest inflows per year of dollar remittances in the country, it has little to show for this. These dollar remittances, according to friends working in the banks, end up largely as savings, and are rarely used for starting productive ventures. Thus only a limited number of non-farm jobs are available at Laoag for villagers who want to supplement their income. These jobs are menial in nature, like helping the cook at a bakery or sewing at a tailoring shop. Not only do they pay little, for want of a large and steady clientele--often they are also periodic in nature.

For their basic subsistence needs therefore, villagers have to rely on the farm.

THE FARM

The Crops. Assured of water, Rantai has three cropping seasons: the first, lasting from July to late October, features rice; the second, from November to February, garlic and rice; and the third from December to May, tobacco. Teppang-Karayan has only the first two of these cropping seasons. Until fast-growing, high-yielding rice varieties were popularized by the government in 1974, the rice grown in both communities was what Ilocanos call mabayag or slow-growing. While the former can yield as much as 120 cavans per hectare within 75 to 90 days, the latter yields only 40 to 50 cavans per hectare on irrigated land and half this volume on rainfed land in six months.

No doubt, the old type of rice had its advantages. Unlike awnless varieties, it requires less water; it can grow on soils of low fertility; it resists the attacks of birds, insects and, possibly,

rice blast; it shades out weeds because of its thick stem, its foilage and rapid initial growth, it does not easily fall over before the wind; and finally it shatters less than do other types, resulting in less wastage (Lewis, 1971).

Unfortunately, it has a crucial limitation: being sensitive to light, it flowers only during a particular season of the year, after the summer solstice, when the days gradually shorten. It has to be planted in July, as soon as the rains fall in order to be harvested by the last week of December. If planted in February, it postpones flowering till after the summer solstice even if it receives enough water. A second crop was thus impossible even at water-wealthy Rantai. The old type of rice gave Teppang-Karayan a worse problem. Ready for transplant by July, the rice sometimes failed to flower either because the rains did not fall on time or the water supplied by the lone canal was not enough.

Another limitation is that this type of rice can only take in so much fertilizer. Unlike the new high-yielding varieties, it has a long stalk, about a meter or so in length. Added fertilizer causes the plant to shoot even longer and thus to droop too low and lose its grains.

Given these limitations, it comes as a surprise to realize that the Ilocos Coast used to export this rice to Southern China (Legarda, 1955: 285-286). But this was early in the nineteenth century when the region's population density was lower and an efficient network of irrigation canals had just been constructed in some municipalities, like Bacarra and Vintar, by enterprising farmers. As Ilocos Norte's population grew rapidly during the remaining half of the nineteenth

century, the Coast became instead an importer of rice (Legarda, 1955: 288-289) and has so remained until 1974. Indeed, even at Rantai, until the introduction of the new rice varieties, almost half of the households had to buy rice for their home consumption.

Masayod or fast-growing rice strains started entering the Ilocos Region in the late 1960s. However, it took a special government program, the so-called Masagana 99, to popularize them in 1974 in the two communities, as in the rest of the country. Masagana 99 is part of the government's long-range plans to integrate the farmers into the national market economy by increasing their productivity and extending them easy credit.

These varieties developed by the International Rice and Research Institute grow faster and produce more. Not being as light-sensitive, they flower at almost any time of the year, as long as they have enough water; also their short stalks bend less easily in the face of strong winds. Double and even triple cropping of "miracle rice" are thus possible. But these varieties demand more inputs of capital and labor: fertilizer, pesticides and, if not hericides, at least continual help in fighting the weeds that easily compete with them for the sun because of their shortness.

Everybody agrees that the traditional varieties taste better and are softer. But only two farmers at Rantai still cultivate them. These are farmers who feel they have more than enough land to afford what has now become a luxury. The situation is different at Teppang-Karayan. Because many farmlands are still rain-fed, fully a third of them grow the old types.

Still grown by most households in both communities is the traditional glutinous type called diket which goes into rice desserts. This type takes up only an insignificant portion of the farmland.

Tobacco cultivation in the Ilocos dates back to the turn of the eighteenth century when its citizens were obliged to cultivate and sell tobacco exclusively to the colonial government. Because it required little water, the plant took hold in the Ilocos. However, what Rantai cultivates today is a low grade, native species of cigar tobacco for the use of smokers from all over the province.

During the 1950s, the government tried to propagate Virginia tobacco. But farmers disliked the added labor of building a shed and an oven to flue-cure the leaves.

The government was more successful, in the same decade, in getting the farmers to plant garlic, which did not require as much water either. Being such an essential ingredient in Tagalog and Pampango cooking--though not in everyday Ilocano food--garlic had a ready market in Manila. Of all the crops raised by Ilocanos today, garlic commands the best price and gives the most returns relative to the inputs made; for the government controls the price of rice, while allowing the prices of fertilizers and other needed inputs to go up. Farmers complain about their increasing problems in giving the high-yielding rice varieties the material inputs they need. As for native tobacco, since it is bought only by fellow provincemates, it commands a low price.

When planted to 5,000 garlic nodules, a half-hectare yields 50,000 bulbs or approximately 1,666 kilos. In 1979, first class bulbs

sold for ₱15,000 (\$1,999.20) at ₱9.00 per kilo (\$1.20). The cost of wages, fertilizer and occasional spray being ₱5,000, the farmer can hope to realize ₱10,000 in net profits.

Mung beans form a minor third crop at Rantai and Teppang-Karayan. These are purely for home consumption. In both local communities, corn is planted twice a year as food for both animals and humans.

Because of their problems with water, Teppang-Karayan farmers plant other crops that can survive on dry soils. Throughout the year, stands of sugarcane rise on unirrigated portions of the fields. Vegetables such as tomatoes, squashes, bottlegourds, bittermelons, eggplants, cowpeas and sweet potatoes, cover wide stretches of the sandy river levees and strips of the ricefields. Households are thus self-sufficient in sugar, in basi (a sugar-derived native drink), and vegetables. Surplus produce is either given to neighbors or sold at the market.

Rantai households are more dependent upon the extra-village economy: they buy their sugar, their basi and even most of their vegetables at the town market.

Fruit trees, like mangoes and bananas, shade many of the houses in all the villages, but they do not have any commercial importance.

Of former importance was cotton which the women wove into those thick cloths and blankets for which Ilocos has been famous. This ceased to be the case early in the post-war period. As the cash economy began to penetrate the countryside, thanks, among other things, to garlic and out-migration to urban centers, village women no longer found it necessary to weave cloth for household use, much less for

the market. They found it more convenient to go to the capital to buy both cloth and readymade clothes.

While Rantai farmers are less dependent on nature's vagaries because of their steady supply of water, they are, from one point of view, less self-sufficient in their other needs. They buy their sugar and their vegetables at the town market; and they procure their firewood from villagers, who come from the hilly and semi-forested northern towns, by giving either rice or tobacco leaves in exchange. Most Teppang-Karayan farmers are self-sufficient in sugar, vegetables and firewood, but not in rice.

Irrigation. An important feature of Rantai's fields is that more capital has been invested in them and for a longer period of time than is the case at Teppang-Karayan. Since the last three decades, more capital has been invested in them and for a longer period of time. Since the eighteenth century, many irrigation societies (zanjera) have sprung up in the Baybay-Ulep area and have built an extensive network of canals that criss-cross the fields.

It is no coincidence perhaps that all these took place during the same period that saw the opening of Philippine ports to world trade. The Ilocos Coast became an important exporter of rice to southern China (Legarda, 1955: 165). The coastal plain where Baybay stands was well suited to rice cultivation, since the waters of the nearby river could easily be diverted to its fields.

One of the oldest irrigation societies, the Zanjera de Bantay, founded in 1791, built a canal that draws water from the Nadalus River, carries it across several villages and their fields before emptying into the China Sea. Today, brush dams built at various points of

the river divert water into this canal, which, in turn, feeds the water into other zanjeras' canals. Secondary canals and ditches release the water into the fields. Because of the high cost of cement, most of these canals are still made of packed earth; only a few are of concrete. For the same reason, many dams, including the ones that stand in the river, are of impermanent materials: bamboo, rocks and rice straw. Notable exceptions are the two Rantai dams of rubble masonry.

Given this impermanence, zanjera members have to repair and improve these constructions throughout the year. Thus a large zanjera, like the Bantay, may set aside 80 to 100 days a year for this purpose. However since labor is distributed among its 700 members, an individual does not have to work on all the set days.

Zanjeras are really water management corporations that provide water, to whoever needs it, for a fee. Despite the peculiarities of each zanjera, certain common patterns unite them. Every zanjera has a fixed number of members who get water on condition that they comply with their duties. Chief among these is the duty to work on the society's waterworks on the appointed days. In some zanjeras, all the members have the privilege of farming equivalent shares of land (atar) that are owned by the corporation itself. This share, like membership itself, cannot be sold; it can only be inherited by the shareholder's descendants who may divide the land among themselves, but are still responsible for it as a single member. Unfortunately, because of divisions upon subdivisions, some descendants may not even know that they have a part in this share. Other zanjeras do not farm out atar; their members' sole privilege is that of receiving water.

The Baybay type of zanjera has a set of officials: president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and inspector general, whom the members elect annually on a given day. The president and vice-president oversee the work and regularly inspect the canals; the inspector-general distributes the water; the secretary notes who comes to work; finally the treasurer takes care of the common funds. All the zanjera's ordinary members join small work-groups each of which falls under the direct supervision of another official: the manunglo or caller. There are as many manunglo, appointed by the president, as there are work-groups.

Non-members receive water on condition that they pay a fee in either of these forms: (1) a portion of their land (biang ti daga) which goes to the society; (2) a share of the harvest (rasgo); and (3) cash. The biang ti daga may consist of two-thirds of the owner's land; the society allocates it for its own use.

Though only 5 percent of Rantai households (n=118) are members of any irrigation society all get water from at least one such society.

If I am correct in attributing the emergence of irrigation networks at Baybay to the commercialization of sectors of Philippine agriculture at the turn of the eighteenth century, then the market economy has exerted an important influence upon Rantai and its environs for close to two centuries now. This may explain why a more commercial spirit seems to prevail at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan.

Efforts at constructing an irrigation system at Teppang-Karayan and its environs have been more recent and more limited.

In the past, wealthy, town-based landlords at Caoayan profited little from their holdings south of the river, according to one of their aging members. Since their fields were rainfed, their tenants could give them only a small harvest per plot. Consequently, in 1924, they decided to have a four-kilometer-long canal dug that would conduct water from a nearby mountain pool to their fields. But the environment set limits on the success of this scheme, as it has done so, in the case of the irrigation pump recently installed by the government. The particular kind of irrigation society that has resulted is highly significant for both alliance networks and voluntary associations in the area.

The one-and-a-half meter wide by two meters deep canal has a facing of rocks and mortar on its sides and bottom. A small dam of rocks and bamboo blocks and collects water in the canal until the level is judged sufficient for distribution via smaller canals, ditches, and flumes. Unfortunately, the water level of the mountain pool depends on the amount of rain. Thus, though the canal is sometimes so full in July, that it overflows, by October, its content rapidly diminishes.

Originally, membership in the local *zanjera* consisted of these twenty-four town-based landlords. But during the 1920s and 1930s, like their colleagues in other Ilocos Norte towns, they sold their lands to the village farmers--sometimes their own tenants--in order to raise money for their children's education in Manila. Together with these lands went their water rights.

No land is given to zanjera members as members. There is no atar. What each owns is a right to the water, especially during the latter part of the rice cycle when the water supply dwindles. In exchange for this, every member helps repair and clear the canal of debris during the ten working days per year. However, those who hold a high social and economic status delegate the task to a subordinate.

Because the local zanjera has few members and runs a simple system of water distribution, officials here are fewer than at Bacarra: a president and a vice-president periodically inspect the canal while a secretary-treasurer calls the roll on working days. These positions last for a lifetime since elections take place only when a member either dies or goes abroad. No ditch-tender manages the allocation of water since each member knows how much water-time he is allowed--only six hours per week--and on what day.

Two-thirds of Teppang-Karayan's fields receive water from the canal at the peak of the rainy season. Local farmers, who are mostly non-members, get water for free, for it is sometimes so abundant that the canal overflows. In exchange for this privilege, however, they must assist the zanjera members on the ten canal-maintenance days. The secretary-treasurer keeps an eye on all members and non-members who show up for work. Even the village women have a role to play, as is not the case at Baybay. On an appointed day, village captains beat the drums to summon female representatives from all the households to sweep the canal of leaves and burn them lest a flood occur. At Bacarra, keeping the canal in condition is the responsibility only of zanjera members.

Once the water level goes down around October, the area that can be irrigated shrinks to 5 percent of the fields. Access to water engenders competition. First of all, from now on non-members must negotiate with a particular zanjera member whose fields lie close to his and pay per hour of water use either in kind or in cash; secondly, over and above this, zanjera members give priority to close kinsmen. This second point is significant for my topic, for "closeness" here refers not only to consanguineal proximity but to seniority as well. A seventy-year-old first cousin has precedence over a younger one. At Rantai, relations between water-users and water-givers are purely contractual in nature; that is, dyadic, horizontal and single-stranded. At Teppang-Karayan, kinship intervenes, and in a manner that emphasizes hierarchy according to age. Relations here are thus dyadic, vertical and many-stranded. The zanjera member becomes a patron to whomsoever he recognizes as kin and who must reciprocate "in intangible assets."

Other fields at Teppang-Karayan that cannot be reached by the zanjera waters try to trap rainwater. During the immediate postwar period, a few well-off farmers had expensive generator-run pumps. In 1976, the national government built an irrigation pump at Teppang to draw water from the Laoag River and distribute this through a network of cemented canals. The water however reaches only Teppang and Karayan's more northern fields, for the land begins to slope slightly upward in the village of Karayan. The project of the National Irrigation Authority employs a water-master, as immediate supervisor, and a ditch tender who distributes water from the canal to the fields.

The latter cleans only the main canal leaving the farmers to care for the ditches that run along their fields.

The NIA charges three cavans of rice per hectare for the first crop and five cavans for the second one. Despite the increase in harvest, farmers find it difficult to meet these obligations on time. During my stay in the village, the planting of rice for the first season had to be postponed three weeks because the farmers still had not paid the NIA their dues. They had neither the rice nor its equivalent in cash. Also, according to the farmers, though they may sign receipts that the water did reach their fields, sometimes the water does not in fact do so. The following year the same problem repeated itself during the first cropping season.

Farming Methods. Actual farming operations at Rantai again involve more capital than at Teppang-Karayan. Three households hire the services of a tractor driver from another village to prepare their fields for planting. No doubt these households form a small exception, since most Rantai households, as at Teppang-Karayan, rely on either the wooden or the iron plow. But they are significant exceptions; they happen to be the largest landowning families in the village, with at least three hectares per household. Two of them, by village standards, are affluent. They live in substantial concrete houses, they have additional lands in other municipalities, enjoy non-farming sources of income, and send their children to Manila for their schooling. Though they could be patrons to their neighbors, in actual fact they are not. Certainly in the matter of farming, their occasions for doing so are limited. Not only do they hire a tractor driver

from another village, in addition, like their neighbors, they make use of wage labor from other towns for the two rice cycles. At Teppang-Karayan, a natural following springs up around the more prosperous households, for the latter recruit labor from the abundant supply of landless families, within the village, for the various phases of their rice and garlic cycles.

Other phases of the rice cycle involve basically the same tools in both communities: a wooden or metal harrow for loosening the soil prior to flooding and transplanting; and a sickle (kompay) for the harvest. The last has displaced the rice-knife (rakem) that Lewis took note of as the universal tool as recently as the late 1960s. The new rice variety, being shorter and upright, is best cut midway on its stalk with a sickle rather than a rice knife. An important difference comes in with threshing. Unlike their peers at Teppang-Karayan, Rantai farmers no longer thresh their rice by beating the grain-laden stalks against the vertical sides of a deep basket; instead they feed them into a small portable thresher (tilyador). By pushing a pedal, two persons set a teathed cylinder in motion which sorts out the grains from a stalk held by two companions. The tool is manufactured locally by Roberto Agbay who, together with his son, runs a successful auto repair shop.

The animal-driven carts that one sees in Teppang-Karayan are not as common in Rantai. Most Rantaians load their rice sacks onto jeepneys for transport to the rice mill and to the buyers. In both communities, only the sticky rice variety is pounded by hand within a tall stone pestle. Ordinary rice is milled by privately-owned machines, of which Rantai has one and Teppang-Karayan three.

In general, the poorer quality of the farming environment at Teppang-Karayan seems to discourage the use of capital-intensive tools. There is greater reliance upon animal and human labor. At least this partly alleviates the surplus of labor hands that Teppang-Karayan experiences. Rantai's problem is the opposite. Despite the capital-intensive technology used by the more affluent landowners, most landowners lack a sufficient number of laborers at certain phases of the rice cycle. This has implications for the possibility of patron-client ties.

The Agricultural Cycle. The agricultural year opens in Ilocos Norte, in May, with the planting of rice seedbeds and the plowing of the fields. Transplanting normally takes place in June with the first rains of the year. But problems intervene to postpone this at both Rantai and Teppang-Karayan. Because transplanting should end before the young shoots mature, the more laborers there are the better. Rantai farmers complain about the perennial shortage of labor around this time of the year. Most of them have their farms to attend to and thus cannot be counted upon to help their neighbors and their kinsmen. During the season I was there, several households had to wait for a week and a half before they could get wage laborers. Moreover, unlike their Teppang-Karayan sisters, Rantai women are not allowed to work in the fields during the rice cycle. The significance of this I shall comment on in a later chapter. The latter come in from other towns, both north and south, via professional recruiters. With its high percentage of landless farmers, Teppang-Karayan has no problem finding wage labor. Postponements here spring from entirely

different reasons: first, an unreliable mountain pool that depends on rain; second, the inability of most of the farmers to meet their obligations to the NIA. During the two seasons I was in Ilocos Norte, transplanting in the community's northern fields took place in August, a month behind schedule, because of the second reason.

Between transplanting and harvest, a lull takes place during which individual farmers attend to the occasional weeding and spraying of their own fields. The season peaks again at harvest time: in September, at Rantai; in September, October or even November at Teppang-Karayan.

This time, Rantai farmers do not encounter problems in recruiting labor, for the task does not have to be compressed into as few a number of days as possible.

Though the harvest should be quick, lest the rats and the birds get the grain, the matter is not as urgent as in the case of transplanting. Wage laborers from other towns, indeed from as far away as Cagayan Province come to help in the Rantai harvest. Farmers are more relaxed, during this period, for the harvest is ready and they can always proceed with the task, along with members of their own household. Should outside labor be needed it is more available at this time of the year.

After the rice has been dried, it is either stored or sold to middlemen, usually the biggest middleman in the country: the National Grains Authority. However, private middlemen, being less particular than the government in examining the rice, do find eager sellers.

The second rice season at Teppang-Karayan and Rantai begins immediately after the harvest to end by February and March.

This time fewer fields are planted to the grain, for garlic is an important second crop. Villagers look forward to planing the bulb, not only because it earns more cash than rice but also because the entire process of planting and caring for it is easier than in the case of rice and tobacco. The field does not have to be replowed. Instead it is covered with hay that serves as mulch; shortly after this, the ground is watered. Big garlic nodules from last year's harvest are planted, carefully spaced from each other in rectangles. Workers do not have to bend over, half-squatting, as in the case of rice; they can plant the nodules either by kneeling or sitting on their ankles. If the soil has been well prepared during the previous rice season, weeding may not have to be speedy, a household's members can easily do the task themselves.

As the bulb slowly matures, it is watered, three to four times during the season, and occasionally weeded--all these can be done by the household itself.

The second cropping season ends in a frenzy of activity, for both rice and garlic are harvested at the same time. Households may or may not harvest the garlic themselves. Rantai farmers prefer to sell the garlic, even before harvesting it, to middlemen who assume the burden of pulling the bulbs, braiding and bundling the stems before drying and storing them. This cuts into farmers' profits since buying bulbs, sight unseen is risky, and bundling them is a time-consuming chore. Middlemen bid a lower price: However, Rantai farmers find this system (partida) more efficient, for it allows them

to devote more care to tobacco, which has already been planted in January. No other major crop follows the garlic at Teppang-Karayan. Farmers therefore harvest the bulbs themselves, sorting them out according to their grade, and preparing them for storage, while waiting for the best price from itinerant middlemen.

The most tedious crop cycle is the tobacco, which begins in December. Seeds are planted in a nursery fertilized with animal manure and left there for two months to sprout into young plants. Before they are transplanted in February, the fields are replowed, watered and harrowed. The sprouts are then planted in long rows of little mounds and watered. This is the one phase of the agricultural cycle, during the entire three seasons, where non-monetized exchange of labor becomes crucial. A daily wage cannot be given for transplanting has to take place in the cool hours of the day; early in the morning, between 7:00 and 10:00, and late in the afternoon, between 3:00 and 6:00. If done otherwise, the tender leaves will wither in the intense heat. (In contrast, rice transplanting extends right until noon, to resume at 1:00 p.m.) Since villagers are not used to paying by the hour, friends and neighbors help each other in the young tobacco through non-monetized exchanges (ammuyo).

To ensure maximum drainage, spaces in between the rows have to be plowed again. This careful, but time-consuming process of watering, plowing and redrying the soil takes place twice during the season. Some spraying occurs, but not more than twice, in order not to kill the taste. The leaves are routinely inspected for worms, and buds nipped off to induce the plant to grow crosswise. Too tall a plant

would suck the nutrients from the leaves, especially the lower ones which have the best flavor.

Household members pick the leaves in May and June, stack them in heaps on the floor of their houses and strip off the juicy stems. This done, the leaves are strung out in the sun to dry before they are aged in chests. The timing is perfect, for the sun is hottest and the sky driest at this time of the year.

Customers, usually consumers rather than middlemen, come to Rantai to buy the leaves directly from the farmers.

Between January and May, therefore, Rantai farmers have three major crops to attend to simultaneously. Teppang-Karayaners have only garlic and rice. Since the garlic season ends in March, April represents a hiatus in its farm cycle; this then is when the district fiesta is celebrated: an enterprise that involves time and preparation because of the fund drives and parades that come with it. Farmers at Rantai experience no such interlude during the long season of drought from December to May; this may be one reason why they have never had a village, much less a district fiesta. Their town proper's fiesta takes place in November after the first rice harvest and is organized by non-farming townspeople. While farm duties may not be as heavy between the rice transplanting in July and the harvest in October, the unpredictable weather discourages outdoor celebrations.

The differences between Teppang-Karayan and Rantai concerning factors that either facilitate or constrain the two types of farming, commercial and peasant, may be listed as follows: (Figure 4). Constraints are more typical of Teppang-Karayan. An added burden is its high population density, as we shall see.

	Rantai	Teppang-Karayan
Investments in tools	moderate	low
Investments in irrigation	heavy	low
Availability of water for irrigation	high	low
Availability of labor during the rice cycle	low	high
Variety of cash crops	moderate	low
Yearly consistency in the rainfall	moderate	low

Figure 4. Farming Constraints and Facilitators

SUMMARY

Contrary to expectation, it is the community with several active associations that has more precarious and more meager resources.

Because of a river, Teppang-Karayan farmers have found it difficult to market vegetables at the town proper. Moreover, until recently, the highway to Laoag was ruttled with holes. In contrast, Rantai farmers have enjoyed easy access to both the town proper and the provincial capital.

Water continues to be an annual problem at Teppang-Karayan, thus making rice cultivation a precarious task. Although Teppang-Karayan's resources are more varied (though limited in the essential factor: water), nonetheless the importance of rice in the daily diet

overshadows other considerations. Two centuries of investment in an adequate irrigation system allow Rantai farmers to plant two crops of rice and, in the case of some, even three. Teppang-Karayan's inadequate irrigation system has important consequences for kin relations. When its lone canal's water level goes down, the owners allot water only to kinsmen who stand closest to them in age.

Farm tools are more capitalized at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan; mechanized or partially mechanized tools being quite conspicuous in the former and almost wholly absent in the other. Perhaps one reason why patron-client relations tend to be weak at Rantai is that exchanges between affluent households and their neighbors tend to be limited. Not only do the former recruit labor from outside the village--as do their neighbors because of a labor shortage; in addition, they hire the services of a tractor operator to prepare their fields.

Because of the excellent irrigation systems, cropping cycles are more predictable at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan where postponements and delays are routine. Also Rantai farmers can plant three major crops simultaneously during the long season of drought lasting from December to May. Teppang-Karayan farmers can only plant two crops during this period: rice and garlic, leaving them a month of rest, April, before the first rice season starts in May. The busy schedule at Rantai thus leaves the farmers no time to organize either a village or district fiesta during the dry season, when weather conditions are ideal. Teppang-Karayan's district fiesta occurs in April.

CHAPTER III

POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Wet-rice agriculture, as practiced by the farmers in the two communities, at Teppang-Karayan especially, has been generally extensive, rather than intensive. Given this fact, plus the scarcity of well-paying, non-farm jobs, the high population densities of the two communities poses a problem. In this chapter, I shall discuss the two local communities as populations vis-à-vis their environment.

I shall therefore look into their composition, their growth rate, and the strategies taken by their members to cope with their limited resources. There are two other aspects of these populations I shall look at: their settlement patterns and their household composition. Though I shall discuss them primarily in a descriptive way as background knowledge for my topic, I shall point out some of their features that seem to be affected, directly or indirectly by population densities.

An important demographic feature of both Teppang-Karayan and Rantai, as indeed of the entire Ilocos Coast, is their high ratio of population to land.

POPULATION DENSITIES

Densities on the Regional Level. Ilocos' history of mounting population pressure on limited farmland antedates that of most Philippine regions, its population density of 66 persons per thousand hectares in 1591 was nearly three times the overall level for the newly colonized islands. Even the heavily settled area of Southern Luzon had only 36

persons per thousand hectares (Smith, 1981: 7). Between the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Ilocos' growth rates, like those of the country as a whole, merely inched upwards at 0.5 to 0.6 percent per annum. However, between 1817 and 1876 these growth rates doubled to 1.2 percent. Thus, by 1876, the region's population had reached half a million (Smith, 1981: 8-9).

These intensified growth rates coincided with a significant development in nineteenth century Philippines. During the first decades of that century, the various ports were opened, in succession, to world trade and the country's agricultural products sold at handsome profits at the world market (Legarda, 1955: 165, 188-195). The Ilocos Coast grew tobacco and indigo for export. Similarly until the 1850s, it shipped its surplus rice considered "the best in quality" to Southern China (Legarda, 1955: 285-286); after this decade, however, its production fell off (Legarda, 1955: 288-289). Since then until 1974 Ilocos has become an importer of rice.

From the 1880s onwards, high mortality rates and some outmigration combined to depress Ilocos' growth rates. Between 1876 and 1903, the growth rate actually fell to 0.029 per year (Smith, 1981: 8-9).

This picked up again, during the third decade of the twentieth century, and so gained momentum that, between 1960 and 1975, it had become 1.8 percent per year, giving the region a total population of 1,206,000 by 1975 (Smith, 1981: 9). Though these growth rates were less than that of the national 2.9 percent for the same period, none-the less Ilocos' 1970 ratio of population to cultivated hectares (11.53) was more than twice that of the country as a whole (5.71) for the same

year (Smith, 1981: 13). Hand-in-hand with these increased growth rates, the traditional custom of equal inheritance has persisted.

Thus despite increasing outmigration tiny farms have been the inevitable result. By 1900, two-thirds of the Coast's farms were already below one hectare in size, whereas on a national scale only half the farms were of that size. At the same time the tenancy rate was nearly 30 percent compared with the national figure of 20 percent (Smith, 1981: 12).

These regional patterns are represented by the two communities.

Densities on the Local Level. In 1970, the ratio of population to farmland in the entire Ilocos Coast was 11.530; at Teppang-Karayan, it was 9.167, and at Rantai, 7.912. All these ratios surpassed the national one of 5.71. More crucial than the farmland in determining the amount of resources available to all, is the cropland: the total number of hectares that can be planted during the entire annual farming cycle. If we take this as the denominator, Rantai's population density drops down by a third; but, for the other community, it dips only slightly.

In both communities, residents run farms that average less than a hectare per household: at Rantai, .517 hec., and at Teppang-Karayan, .739 hect. We should note, however, that the figure given me in the latter community includes farms outside Sarrat. The scarcity of water has obliged 53 percent of Teppang-Karayan households to farm in other municipalities, especially those of the relatively spacious Dingras Plain to the east. Within Teppang-Karayan and its immediate vicinity, the average farm size is actually less than a hectare: one-sixth of

a hectare, according to non-resident farm technicians who attend to the area.

The percentage of those who not only run but own a farm is lower at Teppang-Karayan (73.4) than at Rantai (89.0); tenancy is also somewhat lower at the former (4.0) than at the latter (6.8). However, the southern community has a larger body of landless households (12.6) whereas the northern one has less than half this figure (4.2) (see Table 2).

To place things in proper perspective: the farms' small size would not pose as serious a problem if non-farm incomes were easily available. Because of a thriving weaving industry during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ilocos exported cotton cloth to the rest of the country and even abroad. Unfortunately, as we saw above, cheaply made, mass-produced textiles from England and the U.S., were allowed to flood the country, causing the industry to collapse. As a result, cloth-weaving has survived in some villages, like Teppang-Karayan, largely as a quaint handicraft with a limited market. Had this home industry been allowed to grow and mechanize its operations, the high ratio of population to farmland might not have become the problem it is today, because more lucrative sources of income would be available.

Moreover, if the farmers had access to cheap, modern technology and if the prices for their crops attained their level in a true market economy, their tiny farms would provide them a secure source of income.

Unfortunately, given the constraints of the traditional rice variety, the precarious water supply, and the level of technology, most Teppang-Karayan households until recently, could not grow enough rice for just their household needs.

Table 2
Man/Land Relationships 1979

	Teppang-Karayan	Rantai
Population	1531	633
Number of households	302	124
Farmland	167 has.	80 has.
Cropland	203 has.	212.5 has.
Cropland without vegetables	178 has	211 has.
Vegetable farms	25 has	1.5 hect.

Based on estimates of government farm technicians assigned to the areas.

Ratios	Teppang-Karayan	Rantai
1. Population/farmland	9.167	7.912
2. Household/farmland	1.808	1.55
3. Population/cropland	7.541	2.79
4. Household/cropland	1.48	.58
5. Population/cropland without vegetables	8.60	3.0
6. Household/cropland without vegetables	1.70	.58
7. Available farmland/population	.10 hect.	.12 hect.
8. Available farmland per household	.55 hect.	.65 hect.
9. Available cropland without vegetables per person	.11 hect.	.33 hect.
10. Available cropland without vegetables per household	.58 hect.	1.70 has.

Even at well-watered Rantai, informants tell me that almost half of the households had to buy rice. The introduction of high-yielding varieties appears to have somewhat improved matters. In our interviews, we asked not only for the gross yield of rice per farmland but also data on farm costs: fertilizer, insecticide, wages and rent. As one would expect, even assuming a degree of misreporting by the informants, Teppang-Karayan fares poorly in comparison to Rantai. Although over half of Rantai's households still do not grow enough rice, 31.4 percent have a surplus and 10.6 percent just enough for their needs (n=118). In contrast, 70.6 percent of households in the Southern community experience an annual shortage leaving only 15.4 percent with just enough and 14 percent with an annual surplus (n=143).

Still, households that do raise enough rice have to cope with another problem: the escalating cost of growing high yielding varieties. From 1972 to 1979, the government support price for rice increased by only 85 percent whereas the cost of fertilizer and chemicals shot up by 200 percent during the same period (Ofreneo, 1980: 83). Correspondingly the prices of most consumer goods rose by 300 percent (Ofreneo, 1980: 83).

Thus, while the low productivity of the farms helps depress incomes; in exchange, the limited savings discourage investments in farm inputs.

It is, of course, simplistic to explain the demographic structure of the two communities wholly in terms of this vicious circle. Nonetheless certain features of this structure can be attributed, in large part, to the cycle of poverty. In turn, these features help explain the phenomena I am interested in.

DEMOGRAPHIC RESPONSES

Two such features are interkin marriages and migration. I came upon evidence of a third feature: attempts at fertility control both in the past and at present.¹ However, since it appeared to have little direct relevance to my topic, I did not look into it any further.

Because landholdings are small and in danger of passing out of the family, there is a high rate of endogamous, interkin marriages particularly at Teppang-Karayan. I shall go into this in more detail in the chapter on kin-centered sharing. For now, I would like to discuss migration as a consequence of the poverty of the area and its effect in turn upon growth rates and the age structure.

Out-Migration. Although I am describing migration patterns because of their influences upon the formation of alliance networks and voluntary associations--as a possible cause therefore rather than as an effect--I would like to say something about their connection with high population densities. Undoubtedly, the limited amount of farmland and the low yields have compelled villagers to migrate to other places in the Philippines and abroad. However, it is misleading to single this out as the only cause. It is important to note the ambivalent role of the market economy. On the one hand, it has stimulated new needs and wants; on the other hand, it has failed to create the jobs, the income, and the opportunities for realizing these needs and wants within the province. Then too, the momentum of out-migration has generated more out-migration. Between 1964 and 1978, U.S. Immigration laws made it easier for foreign-born U.S. citizens to petition for their parents, spouses, children and unmarried siblings.

For those in search of larger farmland, the most popular destination since the late nineteenth century has been the Cagayan Valley on the other side of the Cordillera Mountains. Thinly populated, this frontier region has, until recently, offered the possibility of acquiring a farm of two hectares and more. Drought is not a problem, for the fertile valley receives ample water throughout the year. Since Ilocano migration has been going on for a century, many have relatives in Isabela, which is an added incentive for migrating.

Next to Cagayan Valley come Pangasinan to the south of the Ilocos Coast, Mindoro, and Davao. Unfortunately Pangasinan has become densely populated too; Mindoro and Davao are not only too far away, in addition their Ilocano communities are few and small, making it unusual to find a kinsman or fellow villager in the same locale. And since return trips are expensive the migrant virtually cuts himself off from his family.

For earning cash, Hawaii has been the most popular destination since the first decade of this century, when its planters began actively recruiting Ilocano labor. During pre-World War II days, migrants were of the seasonal type. Sometimes leaving behind a fiancée or a bride, they signed up in the hope of saving some dollars to buy land upon their return.

Those who returned after the 1950s were able to benefit from the Social Security System which, upon their assumption of U.S. citizenship, assured them of a monthly pension after retirement, whether in Hawaii or in the Ilocos. With their dollars they were able to buy sizable farms that others could till for them, build large concrete houses stocked with the latest appliances, acquire a vehicle of their own and send their

children to private schools in Laoag. As one schoolteacher notes, half-enviously, "To think that when they left, they were the poorest in the village; now they're wealthier than many educated people in the town." In contrast, migrants who came back before the pension system came into effect, lead a life that is barely distinguishable from that of their neighbors. Their only consolation is that if they did not have land before, they now own a parcel.

During the 1960s and 1970s, a new type of migrant appeared: one who leaves for Hawaii, this time with wife and children, with the intention of settling there for good. To be able to do so, this latter type of migrant relies on the sponsorship of a close kinsman who is a U.S. citizen. While the earlier migrants worked mostly in the sugar and pineapple plantations, this latter type has a job, usually low-paying and menial, in the city.

During the past five years, new destinations--the near East and Europe--have opened up as secondary choices. Skilled and semi-skilled labor being in short supply in the oil-rich Arab countries, both Filipino and foreign construction are recruiting labor from all over the country, subject though to certain standards of quality. One household head at Teppang-Karayan, as of this writing, is now in Jeddah, as an airport driver; another at Rantai has passed the exam for carpentry with a Near East based construction firm. Though many Filipinas migrate to Europe as nurses, the few from these two communities who have done so are employed as domestic help. Being on a short term contract, migration to the Near East is seasonal; though no less contractual, migration to Europe can last for years and may become permanent.

Metro Manila ranks third as a place where cash-earning jobs can be had. It began attracting villagers, especially the women, during the late 1940s, when incipient local manufacturing created new jobs. Though a job can be found as a janitress, a clerk or a grocery assistant, a frequent complaint is that salaries are low and rented housing wretched. As a result many have come back to their village, resigned to the straitened conditions that made them leave in the first place.

Fourth in rank would be the provinces around Manila: Laguna and Cavite. Because they have more industries and better developed urban centers than the Ilocos, they offer more job opportunities, though mostly in low-paying positions such as a bakery assistant or a driver.

In a special category are the sugar plantations of Pampanga and Laguna, the abaca plantations of Davao and the lumber yards of North-eastern Mindanao. The daily routine under the tropical sun is heavy, the hours long and the pay small. Moreover one has to contend with the often harsh overseers. Seasonal migration to these jobs occupies a middle position between "push" and "pull" factors. While they promise cash, they also require a great deal of heavy manual work. Those who take them on do so because they have nowhere else to go. An example is Elias Madamba who worked for seven years in a Manila radio station. Fed up with his salary, he went back to Teppang-Karayan. However, since the farm was too small and too unproductive to support his wife and his only child, he thought of migrating again, this time to a lower-paying job as a cutter in a Pampanga sugar plantation. Fortunately, by this time, the government had built an irrigation pump in his village. Because of his increased harvest, he decided to stay.

The importance of out-migration in both communities can be gleaned from the fact that 57 percent of household heads at Teppang-Karayan have worked outside Ilocos Norte, while 40 percent, at Rantai, have done so.

When destinations are sorted out, some significant contrasts appear (Table 3)

The kinds of destination mentioned are significant. First, they suggest something about the severity of environmental stress in Teppang-Karayan. Secondly, they can indicate how much exposure the household head has had to other ways of life, where voluntary associations proliferate.

Almost a fifth of household heads at Teppang-Karayan have worked in Luzon and Mindanao plantations and lumberyards. A much smaller percentage (2.4%) of Rantai household heads have done so. Indeed the lone Rantaian who went to Pampanga did so for only a few days. He could not stand the backbreaking toil under that merciless sun. Noteworthy too is the median length of stay of Teppang-Karayaners outside Ilocos Norte--ten to fifteen years whereas the median stay of Rantaians is only four years (Table 4). Many of the household heads from the poorer community must have planned to settle permanently in those more cash-abundant places but, because of low wages, decided to go back home. In contrast, Cagayan Valley, with its promise of larger farms or at least of working with a kinsman, has been more attractive to Rantaians.

The destinations of Teppang-Karayaners are definitely more urban and semi-urban, for 33.4 percent have worked at Metro Manila and Hawaii. Only 10.6 percent of household heads from Rantai have done so.

Table 3
 Destinations Outside Ilocos Norte of
 Migratory Household Heads
 (Both Sexes)

Place	<u>Teppang-Karayan</u>		<u>Rantai</u>	
	Number of times places were mentioned by respondents:		Number of times places were mentioned by respondents:	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Cagayan Valley	7	7.2	15	30.
Metro Manila	30	30.9	11	22.
Cavite and other Tagalog provinces	5	5.1	10	20.
Pampanga/Tarlac	7	7.2	1	2.
Mindanao	18	18.5	2	4.
Masbate	-	-	1	2.
Pangasinan	7	-	2	4.
Bicol	-	-	2	4.
Hawaii	21	21.6	7	14.
Guam	-	-	1	2.
Mindoro	2	2.0	-	-
	97	100.0	50	100.0

Table 4. Years Spent by Household Heads Outside Ilocos Norte (Both Sexes)

Length of Period	Teppang-Karayan			Rantai		
	No. of household heads	% of total	Cumulative %	No. of household heads	% of total	Cumulative %
Less than a week	-	-	-	-	-	-
Between a week and a month	2	2.4	-	-	-	-
A month	-	-	-	-	-	-
Between a month and a year	2	2.4	4.8	5	11.0	-
A year	8	9.6	14.4	3	6.6	17.6
Between a year and 2 years	8	9.6	24.0	8	17.7	35.3
Between] and 3 years.	9	4.8	28.8	7	15.5	50.8
Between 3 and 4 years	6	4.8	33.6	-	-	-
Between 4 and 5 years	7	8.4	42.0	10	22.2	73.0
Between 5 and 6 years	1	1.2	43.2	-	-	-
Between 6 and 7 years	3	3.6	46.8	1	2.2	75.2
Between 7 and 8 years	5	6.0	52.8	-	-	-
Between 8 and 9 years	6	4.8	57.6	-	-	-
Between 9 and 10 years	6	4.8	62.4	3	6.6	81.8
Between 10 and 11 years	1	1.2	63.6	2	4.4	86.2
Between 11 and 12 years	2	1.2	64.8	-	-	-
Between 12 and 13 years	-	-	-	-	-	-
Between 13 and 14 years	1	1.2	66.0	-	-	-
Between 14 and 15 years	1	1.2	67.2	-	-	-
Between 15 and 16 years	1	1.2	68.4	-	-	-
Between 16 and 17 years	1	1.2	69.6	-	-	-
Between 17 and 18 years	-	-	-	-	-	-
Between 18 and 19 years	1	1.2	70.8	-	-	-
Between 19 and 20 years	-	-	-	1	2.2	88.4
Between 24 and 25 years	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 4 (continued) Years Spent by Household Heads Outside Ilocos Norte (Both Sexes)

Length of Period	Teppang-Karayan			Rantai		
	No. of household heads	% of total	Cumulative %	No. of household heads	% of total	Cumulative %
Between 26 and 27 years	1	1.2	72.0	1	2.2	90.6
Between 29 and 30 years	4	3.6	75.6	1	2.2	92.8
Between 30 and 31 years	1	1.2	76.8	-	-	-
Between 32 and 33 years	3	3.6	80.4	-	-	-
Between 34 and 35 years	-	-	-	1	2.2	95.0
Between 39 and 40 years	-	-	-	1	2.2	97.2
Between 42 and 43 years	1	1.2	81.6	-	-	-
Between 44 and 45 years	1	1.2	82.8	1	2.2	99.4
Seasonal	1	1.2	84.0	-	-	-
Total	83	100.0		45	100.0	

Notes:

1. A successive difference between age groups can be defined as $P_a - 5$ minus P_{a+5} .

2. The United Nations definition of the age ratio is:
$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{5P_a}{(5P_{a-5} + 5P_{a+5})} \times 100$$

Though the age ratio is used primarily for evaluating the quality of census returns, we can use it as well for an analysis of a population's age composition.

3. An age ratio should approximate 100.0 though actual historical variations produce deviations from 100.0.

4. The U.N. age-sex accuracy index totals the following: (a) The mean deviation of age ratios for males from 100.0; (b) The mean deviation of age ratios for females from 100.0; (c) Three times the mean age to age differences in reported sex ratios. As the acceptable total index is 20.0, the high totals for both Rantai and Teppang-Karayan emphasize the distortions in their age and sex compositions brought about by heavy out-migration.

Masbate and Bicol were also mentioned. These drew two public school teachers who sought to comply with requirements of the Bureau of Education.

Thus while many villagers have become permanent outmigrants, a substantial number of the household heads can be classified as temporary, nonseasonal migrants who have since returned. They either brought their wives and families with them to the place of destination or got married there and had every intention of settling down, were it not for their stagnant wages. Solien de Gonzales (1961: 126) notes that temporary, non-seasonal migration may intensify into recurrent migration, that is, the migrant may make irregular journeys, of varying lengths of time, to obtain wage labor during their productive years. In cases like this, wives and families would be left behind in the native villages, for the men return at frequent intervals throughout the year or may be absent for several years without returning. To this type belong those who worked in Hawaii before the 1950s and in Philippine plantations and lumberyards. Some who continue to work in Metro Manila also fall into this category. Two local boys, who are stationed in Manila as soldiers, find it cheaper to keep their household in the village rather than in the city. They thus come back every time they are on leave. Another villager, a sales agent, also commutes regularly between his village and his Manila office.

Migration may be analyzed in terms of two factors: (1) those in the place of origin that compel or "push" the potential migrant to leave and (2) those in the place of destination that attract or "pull" him to it (Lee, 1961).

"Push" factors are definitely stronger at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai. As was pointed out above, farmers in the poorer community find themselves compelled to migrate seasonally within Ilocos Norte itself to till ricelands in the Dingras Plain. Moreover, many of the landless seek wage labor in the farms of other municipalities. No other phenomenon exists in Rantai. In fact, the contrary is true. Men and women from as far south as Batac flock to it to find work.

Still, the difference between the two communities in this matter is one of degree. Even with an assured annual supply of rice, a household has to worry about its other needs.

In-Migration. Some in-migration has taken place, more so at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan. Ten household heads (8.4) out of a total of 118 at Rantai originally hailed from an urban context, Laoag and various towns proper. These also happen to be the wealthiest in the community. Most of these are teachers who teach or who have taught at the local school: One is a supervisor for a construction company; another runs the only rice mill in the village; and a group of households, the Ramil, own the biggest landholdings in the area. Proximity to place of work, marriage to a local girl, and business opportunities have induced them to settle at Rantai. The area's favorable environment may also have helped in their decision; they can at least be sure that their farms will not lack water.

Out of a total of 143 household heads surveyed at Teppang-Karayan, four (2.7) are in-migrants. Marriage to a local girl was the factor that induced all four men to settle permanently in the village. One of

those household heads is an in-migrant who has played an important role in the development of the fiesta and a community association. Originally from Pampanga, Honorato Gatmaitan, met a local girl in the course of trips as an itinerant salesman. Among these immigrant household heads, he alone is a man of means. We shall see more of him in the following chapters. The other in-migrants are farmers from villages belonging to other municipalities.

The higher proportion of in-migrant household heads at Rantai goes hand-in-hand with another characteristic; a higher rate of exogamous marriages than at Teppang-Karayan. By exogamous here, I mean marriages contracted with a woman who lives over 2 kilometers away from the village. This can mean another but distant village in the same municipality, the town proper or another municipality. Exogamous marriages at Teppang-Karayan amount to 34.9 percent of the total number of marriages; they add up to 50 percent at Rantai (see Table 28).

Migration, whether in or out, has important implications for my topic of interest.

As we shall see later on, out-migration, especially of the seasonal type, is a useful conduit for diffusing urban practices, like precisely voluntary associations. Some of the more active members of savings and community associations at Teppang-Karayan have participated in such associations during their stay in Manila and Hawaii. Then too, migrant kinsmen have become a ready source of contribution for projects undertaken by community associations. However, the role played by such kinsmen is ambiguous. More than Teppang-Karayaners, Rantaians tend to rely upon migrant kinsmen for financial assistance in case of a death in

the family and a needed loan. The higher proportion of immigrants from urban centers at Rantai may also reinforce these two patterns. Mostly professionals, these in-migrants are loyal to communities outside the local community, for instance, their peer group.

CONSEQUENCES OF OUTMIGRATION

Age-Sex Ratios. Heavy out-migration from the two communities shows in the distorted age-sex ratios (Table 5). Because of Rantai's substantial female out-migration, its sex ratios, at certain age levels, are extremely high. Though this seems typical of many Ilocos municipalities in the post-war period (Smith, 1981: 23-26) Teppang-Karayan's profile is an exception. The explanation may be that its men, as potential household heads, find themselves more obliged to migrate than would their peers at water-endowed Rantai. When women leave, the reasons are more various: (1) to find the wherewithal for the secondary expenses (clothing, medicine, education) of their families, (2) to follow their spouses, or (3) to help their grown-up children run their households.

In a population with normal sex ratios, the proportion of males to females at birth is 105. Over time, the sex ratio gradually shifts in favor of women, for, with increasing age, females surpass males in their chances of survival. Beyond 60 years, males are generally fewer than females.

Such a pattern is nowhere visible in Teppang-Karayan's pyramid (see Figure 5). At various age levels during the productive years of 20 to 49, the sex ratio fluctuates between rather low proportions of 60 and 70. Indeed, at ages 25 to 29, it actually dips down to the fifties to

Table 5. Age-Sex Ratios--Rantai and Teppang-Karayan

	RANTAI							
	Sex Ratios			Successive Difference	Male Age Ratios		Female Age Ratios	
	Male Pop.	Female Pop.	Ratios		Ratios	Deviations from 100	Ratios	Deviations from 100
0-4	41	39	105					
5-9	45	42	107	-2	107	7	107	7
10-14	43	39	110	-3	117	17	1	-99
15-19	28	35	80	30	83	-15	109	9
20-24	23	25	92	-12	96	-4	89	-11
25-29	20	21	95	3	85	-15	91	-9
30-34	24	20	120	-25	126	26	87	7
35-39	18	18	100	20	109	9	1	-36
40-44	9	15	60	40	64	-36	107	9
45-49	10	9	110	-50	95	-5	64	-99
50-54	12	12	100	10	104	4	109	-55
55-59	13	12	60	-8	144	44	1.2	
60-64	6	8	75	33	36	.64	45	
65+	20	23	87					
Total				236		246		453
Mean				19.7		20.5		37.8
	3 x	19.7	=	59.1	+	20.5	+	27.8 = 117.4

Table 5 (continued) Sex-Age Ratios--Rantai and Tepang-Karayan

TEPPANG-KARAYAN								
	Sex Ratios				Male Age Ratios		Female Age Ratios	
	Male Pop.	Female Pop.	Ratios	Successive Difference	Ratios	Deviations from 100	Ratios	Deviations from 100
0-4	71	78	91.0					
5-9	88	104	84.6	6.4	101	1	117	17
10-14	102	99	103.0	-18.4	124	24	108	8
15-19	75	79	94.0	9.0	87	-13	102	2
20-24	69	47	146.0	-52	123	23	70	-30
25-29	37	54	68.5	78	64	-36	113	13
30-34	46	48	95.8	-27	128	28	100	0
35-39	35	41	85.3	11	90	-10	91	-9
40-44	31	41	75.6	10	76	-24	121	21
45-49	26	26	100.0	-24	84	16	67	-33
50-54	31	36	86.1	13	103	3	116	16
55-59	33	36	91.6	-6	127	27	109	9
60-64	21	30	70.0	22	39	-61	58	-42
65+	75	68	110.2					
Total				276.8		266		200
Mean				5.22		22.2		16.7
				3 x 5.22 = 23.0		+ 22.2		+ 16.7 = 61.9




Figure 5. Population Pyramid of Teppang-Karayan

rise up abruptly to 75 for the next age level. On the other hand, at 65 years and over, when one would expect the age ratio to finally decline, it does the opposite, indicating a shortage of elderly women.

Neither do the sex age ratios show a smooth progression from lower to higher age levels. In a normal population, each age level is narrower than the preceding one, thus the population pyramid tapers gradually to a point. Instead each side of Teppang-Karayan's pyramid has deep cavities at particular age levels: for adult men, at ages 25-29, 35-49; for adult women, at ages 20-24, 35-39, 45-49.

As I pointed out earlier, Rantai's sex ratios are more in line with provincial patterns (Figure 6). At ages 30-39, and again at ages 45 to 59, when one expects to find more females, the opposite occurs. On the other hand, at ages 40 to 49, the proportion of males to females is much lower. More than at Teppang-Karayan, certain age groups have deficits in relation to adjacent age groups, regardless of sex. Such cavities appear conspicuously for males, at ages 20-29, and for females at ages 45 to 49.

Can these irregularities be attributed to calamities? One possibility is World War II. But fighting in the vicinity of both communities, according to informants, was insignificant. This may be so, for the main theaters of war were Cagayan Valley and the Baguio region.

Epidemics may be another possibility. Twice, within the past thirty years, severe droughts have struck Teppang-Karayan, the worst being that of the early 1950s. Unfortunately there are no demographic figures for that period, that are available, especially concerning




Figure 6. The Population Pyramid of Rantai

mortality rates. But from the 1960s onwards, for which we have the relevant figures, we can be sure that high mortality rates cannot be the cause. Heavy outmigration is the most probable explanation.

Growth Rates. We turn next to the growth rates of the two communities between 1960 and 1979. Calculated exponentially, they are less than half that of the national rate of 3.4 percent for 1970-75. They are also lower than Ilocos Norte's growth rate of 1.8 percent for the same period (Smith, 1981: 93). In fact the growth rates of both local communities have been sliding downwards (Table 6).

Table 6
Growth Rates Calculated Exponentially

Period	Teppang-Karayan	Rantai
1960-70	1.4	1.7
1970-75	1.0	1.0
1975-79	.9	.9

Neither can these low growth rates be credited to high mortality rates. The crude death rates of both communities have been generally low (Table 7) for a developing country and the crude birth rates average. Unfortunately, the absence of age-specific frequencies does not permit me to standardize these rates for close comparisons.

Because of these low growth rates, the proportion of the youths (ages 20 and below) to the economically active sector of the population

Table 7
Birth and Death Rates in the Two Communities

	Births		Deaths		Population	
	T-K	Rantai	T-K	Rantai	T-K	Rantai
1960	47	14	15	3	1265	488
1970	41	26	22	1	1445	578
1975	48	22	14	6	1525	607
1978-79	42	14	8	2	1531	633

	Crude Birth Rates		Crude Death Rates	
	T-K	Rantai	T-K	Rantai
1960	37.1	28.6	2.3	6.1
1970	28.3	44.9	5.5	1.7
1975	31.4	36.2	2.6	9.8
1978-79	27.4	22.1	2.6	3.1

(ages 20 to 64) in both local communities is lower than that of the national youth dependency ratio for 1960 (Table 8).

Table 8
Dependency Ratios

Year	Place	Total	Youth	Old Age
1978-79	Teppang-Karayan	121.9	101.2	20.8
1978-79	Rantai	129.1	113.5	15.6
1960	Philippines	142.8	136.2	6.6

However the ratio of older people (ages 65 and over) to the economically active sector surpasses the national figure. In both communities, the economically active sector appears to have a double burden, large masses of both adolescents and old people. But the problem is more apparent than real. For the village youth participate in household and farm chores almost from the time they can walk and gradually assume more responsibilities as they enter into adulthood. And the elders, both men and women, continue to work in the fields and at home till they are not longer able to do so.

To sum up these demographic patterns: the two communities are far from being isolated, indeed they have strong, continuing ties with urban centers both in the Philippines and the U.S. Substantial numbers of villagers, of either sex, at various age levels, have migrated elsewhere to seek better opportunities. While many have settled permanently in those places, others have returned, thus increasing the flow of information into the two communities. Because of heavy outmigration,

growth rates are low, lower in fact than those of the nation and the province. Nonetheless, especially at Teppang-Karayan population pressure on the land continues to build up leading to smaller and more fragmented farms. This, in turn, increases the propensity to migrate.

Will continuous out-migration finally produce, in the long run, a low-man/farm-land ratio, such as happened in Becedas, Castille (Brandes, 1975: 40-43)? Most likely not. The U.S. government has become stricter about which kinspersons U.S. permanent residents and citizens can be petitioned. Contractual jobs in the oil-rich countries are hard to come by unless one has had specialized training in skills like carpentry or mechanics. Most villagers do not have this training. Though migration to other parts of the Philippines continues, a reverse flow has been taking place. Because of inflation and stagnant wages, former migrants to the metropolitan area have returned or at least have sent back their spouses and children to the village. A few who sought work in Cagayan Valley have also returned because of the insurgency in the area.

Having examined these populations' structure and dynamics, we can now take a look at their spatial distribution.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Residential Layout. A Philippine province is divided into municipalities. In turn a municipality is divided into barrios, or more recently barangays, that are administratively dependent on a town proper, the poblacion. (Although "village" in English has a different meaning, being a unit of government that functions independently of a town, I

have translated barrio or barangay as "village" to reduce the number of foreign words in this text.) The towns proper constitute the foci of activity, power, and influence. Thus the towns proper of Baybay and Caoayan contain the parish church, the town hall, the market, the municipal high school, the rural bank, the municipal clinic and the houses of big landlords, professionals and successful businessmen.

Although farmers do dwell in the town proper, usually on the periphery, the vast majority live in the villages, close to their fields. Like other typical villages, Rantai and Teppang-Karayan are divided, in turn, into hamlets or neighborhood clusters called purok (or sitio). Hamlets tend to group around a road and to be somewhat cut off from others by natural boundaries like intervening fields, gardens or orchards. At Rantai, the gullies and streams are decisive boundaries.

Each hamlet has its own name. At Teppang-Karayan and its neighboring villages, hamlets carry the names of particular families, most likely the original settlers. And indeed, on close examination, households in, say, Purok Cabangbang at Teppang-Karayan, turn out to be Cabangbangs on either the father's or mother's side. This correlates with what I shall note, in more detail, in a later chapter: the tendency of Teppang-Karayan to give kin groupings a quasi-corporate identity. Though households in each Rantai neighborhood are as closely related to each other, they sport names of abstractions: Namnama (hope) or Kinaragsak (Happiness).

House types in these communities are diverse. The humblest and the easiest to build is the traditional split bamboo house that stands on piles and has a roofing of rice straw. When resources permit,

villagers prefer more permanent materials: wooden boards, concrete walls and galvanized iron roofing. The norm many aspire to is an all concrete house of two stories, painted and embellished with glass jalousies, fancy iron grilles and tiled floors. Since possession of such a house is equated with wealth and power, returning pensioners from Hawaii validate their new status by erecting such houses.

Rantai's relative prosperity shows in the low percentage of the traditional split bamboo huts: 6.8 percent (n=118) as against Teppang-Karayan's 32.9 percent (n=143) and in the high percentage of sturdier houses of unpainted wooden upper stories and cement ground floors: 55.1 percent as against Teppang-Karayan's 22.4 percent. However, both communities are similar in having a minority of large, solid all concrete and embellished houses, whether single or two-storied. These total a scant 2 percent in both communities (see Table 9). Moreover, though most Rantai houses have their own water pump for both drinking and washing, most Teppang-Karayan houses rely on the traditional sources of water; the river and deep wells. Only a few families have water pumps, much less running water.

Except in the northernmost part of the village, Rantai hamlets consist of loosely clustered houses. Houselots are relatively large and are ringed about by fences and low stone walls (Figure 7). At Teppang-Karayan, however, houses practically jostle each other because the narrowness of their lots (Figure 8). Though some do have fences, they often abut on these. A Teppang-Karayan house usually has neighbors on both sides and houses in front, across the street. In contrast, a Rantai house may have neighbors only on its sides for it often faces streams or fields.

Table 9
House Types

Type	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
1. Bamboo and thatch	47	32.9	8	6.8
2. All wood with galvanized iron roofing:				
a. One storey, unpainted	15	10.5	12	10.2
b. One storey, painted	1	0.7	-	-
c. Two storeys, unpainted	23	16.1	6	5.1
d. Two storeys, painted				
3. Wood and cement with galvanized iron roofing (cemented ground floor, wooden upper storey):				
a. Two storeys, unpainted	32	22.4	65	55.1
b. Two storeys, painted	4	2.8	4	3.4
4. All concrete with galvanized iron roofing:				
a. One storey, unpainted	13	8.4	16	13.6
b. One storey, painted	3	2.1	-	-
c. Two stories, unpainted	1	0.7	1	0.8
d. Two storeys, painted	3	2.1	3	2.5
Total	143	100.0	118	100.0

It is tempting to see in the relative crowdedness of Teppang-Karayan another effect of its higher population density. Since house-lots are smaller, houses tend to be built right close to the surrounding fences or houses. If such is the case, then here is one more example of how crowdedness in a rural community may actually foster, rather than hinder, resource sharing. As we shall see later on, house porches constitute a semi-public domain in both communities and are thus shared by neighbors and friends.

Household Composition. The unit of analysis in my surveys was the household head which I defined as whoever makes the decisions in a household. More difficult to define is the household itself.

What makes household definition difficult, especially in a rural and migratory context, is that individuals who are away most of the time or who may have set up their own household could still be regarded as members by the head. Though grown-up children may set up their own household either in the same neighborhood, as often happens, or in the city, as migrants, they may continue to participate in many of their parental household's essential activities. Thus, as heirs, they may receive most of their staples, especially rice, from their parents' land. Indeed chances are that they till the land of their aging parents, in addition to their own land. Also, they give part of their earnings to their parents. Interconnections like these make it difficult to sort out households from each other. Then again, an individual who has resided in a house for months or even years may still be regarded by the household head as a temporary member. An example would be servants.

One approach (Howard, 1971: 6-7) resolves the dilemma by focusing on patterns of interpersonal commitment.

"Household" may be defined as consisting of co-residing individuals; in turn, co-residence can be thought of as the consequence of a specific form of commitment--the commitment to reside together. Responses to the following questions operationally define this commitment:

1. First list all of the people who regularly live on your homestead lot and who are there now.
2. Next list those people who are living on your lot temporarily but who are not regularly members of your household.
3. Next list all those people who usually live on your lot but who are away now.
4. Is there anyone else who stays there sometimes?

These four categories can be translated into the language of commitment, by applying the following labels:

Type 1 residence: primary commitment--active

Type 2 residence: secondary commitment--active

Type 3 residence: primary commitment--inactive

Type 4 residence: secondary commitment--partially active.

Persons listed in category 1 constitute a minimal household unit; those in categories 1 and 2 together as an active household unit; those in categories 1 and 3 as a primary household unit; and those in all four categories as a maximal household unit.

Individuals may be listed in more than one household maximal unit: although Pedro usually resides in Household A, with his wife and children, he often takes his meals, draws his staples and helps in chores at Household D, where his parents live. Both households would count him as a member. In the case, however, of minimal household units an overlap is impossible, for the interview question delimits their boundaries by stressing regularity of residence and actual presence. For my census I counted only those individuals listed in each minimal household.

Most of the individuals listed as having secondary rights to residence (Categories 2 and 4) were close kinsmen, such as married children and their children and occasionally nephews and nieces. The few listed as having no relation were often household help. Many single offspring were characterized as having primary though inactive rights to residence (Category 3). They were at school away from the municipality, in the army or at work, either in the Philippines or abroad. Along with their spouses and children, married children sometimes entered this list regardless of where they resided: nearby, in the same municipality or abroad.

Table 10 gives the total number of persons for each residential category and the mean number of persons per type of household. The difference between the two communities is minimal.

Howard examines household composition from three perspectives: as whole units, as dyads, and from the standpoint of individuals as they go through the life cycle (1971: 15). Although, for my purpose, it suffices to look at them as whole units, I shall touch briefly on how the individual's life cycle may account for some obvious differences between the two communities.

Table 10
Household Composition
in the Two Communities

Category of Residence	Total Number of Persons Named	Mean Number of Persons Per Household Type
<u>TEPPANG-KARAYAN</u> (302 Households)		
Category 1	1531	Minimal household unit - 5.06
Category 2	91	Active household unit - 5.37
Category 3	290	Primary household unit - 5.99
Category 4	<u>301</u>	Maximal household unit - 6.0
Total	2213	
<u>RANTAI</u> (124 Households)		
Category 1	633	Minimal household unit - 5.1
Category 2	60	Active household unit - 5.6
Category 3	75	Primary household unit - 5.7
Category 4	<u>75</u>	Maximal household unit - 5.7
Total	843	

N.B. Minimal household unit comprises category 1 only;
Active household unit categories 1 and 2;
Primary household unit categories 1 and 3;
Maximal household unit all categories.

Howard's seven types (1971: 15-16) appear here as Types 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8. To these I have added Types 6, 9 and 10, which I came across in the course of my fieldwork.

1. one person household--confined to a person living alone.
2. nuclear household--confined to a married couple, with or without their children.
3. nuclear household with lateral extensions--containing a couple, with or without their children, and including consanguinal or affinal relatives of either the husband or wife, but without lineal descendants of either in the grandchild generation.
4. lineal extended, grandparental--containing a single person (without co-residing spouse), a lineal descendant with co-residing spouse, with or without their children.
5. lineal extended, superordinate--containing a married couple and either an offspring with spouse or a grandchild, or both.
6. lineal extended with lateral extensions--containing a single person (without co-residing spouse), a consanguine or an affine of either the single person or the non co-residing spouse with or without their children.
7. simple consanguinal--containing a single person (without co-residing spouse) with their offspring.
8. consanguinal extended--containing a single person (without co-residing spouse) and grandchildren, with or without single offspring of the senior person, and with or without other single consanguinal or affinal relations.

9. consanguinal--containing a single person with a consanguine or an affine such as a sister-in-law.
10. simple joint--containing two or more siblings without spouses.

This approach enables the observer to grasp a household as a dynamic entity, whose boundaries shift according to the kind of commitment used as the norm. Thus what deceptively appears as a single person household, in terms of an active primary commitment, may reveal itself as being of another sort, e.g., as consanguinal in terms of a primary but inactive commitment. Especially in a high out-migration region like the Ilocos, this approach helps define who are in fact included in a household.

Regardless of the criterion used, minimal, active, primary or maximal household, the nuclear household is the single most numerous type in both communities (Table 11). However its relative importance varies. Though it accounts for over 60 percent of all Rantai households, it is only slightly more important than the total of all Teppang-Karayan extended households, types 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8.

Next in importance are extended households which are proportionately less numerous at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan. Howard (1971: 18) observes that households in his Hawaiian community gain extension through the addition of grandchildren rather than through the incorporation of grandparents. This may be the case in both Ilocano communities, given the preponderance of the extended superordinate households.

The higher proportion of nuclear households at Rantai may be related to age and thus to an individual's life cycle, for the median age of both

Table 11. Household Composition in Terms of Structural Types

TEPPANG-KARAYAN									
Type	Minimal		Active		Primary		Maximal		
One Person Household	20	(6.0)	19	(6.2)	19	(6.2)	15	(4.9)	H P P/H
	20		19		19		15		
	1		1		1		1		
Nuclear Household	139	(46.0)	137	(45.0)	137	45.0)	139	(45.0)	H P P/H
	712		738		813		825		
	5.12		5.38		5.92		6.02		
Nuclear with Lateral Extensions	16	(5.2)	17	(5.6)	18	(5.9)	18	(5.9)	H P P/H
	106		109		119		112		
	6.62		6.41		6.61		6.77		
Lineal Extended Grandparental	26	(8.6)	26	(8.6)	28	(9.2)	28	(9.2)	H P P/H
	140		145		171		171		
	5.38		5.57		6.10		6.10		
Lineal Extended Superordinate	54	(17.8)	56	(18.5)	55	(18.2)	56	(18.4)	H P P/H
	354		401		435		437		
	6.55		7.16		7.9		7.53		
Lineal Extended with Lateral Extensions	7	(2.3)	7	(2.3)	9	(2.9)	9	(2.9)	H P P/H
	38		38		66		66		
	5.42		5.42		7.33		7.33		
Consanguinal	14	(4.6)	14	(4.6)	11	(3.6)	12	(3.9)	H P P/H
	46		48		47		51		
	3.28		3.42		4.27		4.25		

Table 11 (continued) Household Composition in Terms of Structural Types

TEPPANG-KARAYAN (continued)									
Type	Minimal		Active		Primary		Maximal		
Consanguinal Extended	20	(6.6)	20	(6.6)	19	(6.2)	19	(6.2)	H
	100		105		116		119		P
	5		5.25		6.10		6.26		P/H
Simple Consanguinal	3	(0.9)	4	(1.3)	4	(1.3)	5	(1.3)	H
	7		11		11		11		P
	2.33		5.25		2.75		2.75		P/H
Joint	3	(0.9)	4	(0.9)	4	(1.3)	4	(1.3)	H
	8		11		15		15		P
	2.6		2.75		3.75		3.75		P/H
All types	302		302		302		302		H
	1531		1622		1811		1832		P
	5.06		5.57		5.99		6.0		P/H

H - Number of households (figures in brackets are percentages of the vertical columns)

P - Number of persons

P/H - Number of persons per household

Table 11 (continued) Household Composition in Terms of Structural Types

RANTAI									
Type	Minimal		Active		Primary		Maximal		
One Person Household	2	(1.6)	1	(0.8)	1	(0.8)	1	(0.8)	H
	2		1		1		1		P
	1.0		1		1		1		P/H
Nuclear Household	76	(61.2)	76	(61.2)	75	(60.4)	75	(60.4)	H
	388		370		373		373		P
	5.1		4.86		4.96		4.97		P/H
Nuclear Household with Lateral Extensions	7	(5.6)	9	(7.2)	10	(8.0)	10	(8.0)	H
	21		65		71		71		P
	3.0		7.2		7.1		7.1		P/H
Lineal Extended Grandparental	12	(9.6)	11	(8.8)	11	(8.8)	12	(9.6)	H
	85		97		99		99		P
	7.08		8.81		9.0		9.0		P/H
Lineal Extended Superordinate	15	(12.0)	14	(11.2)	14	(11.2)	14	(11.2)	H
	80		88		88		88		P
	5.33		6.28		6.28		6.28		P/H
Lineal Extended with Lateral Extensions	3	(2.4)	4	(3.2)	4	(3.2)	4	(3.2)	H
	28		42		42		42		P
	9.3		10.5		10.5		10.5		P/H
Consanguinal	3	(2.4)	4	(3.2)	4	(3.2)	4	(3.2)	H
	7		11		11		11		P
	2.33		2.75		2.75		2.75		P/H

Table 11 (continued) Household Composition in Terms of Structural Types

RANTAI (continued)									
Type	Minimal		Active		Primary		Maximal		
Consanguinal	4	(3.2)	4	(0.8)	4	(3.2)	4	(3.2)	H
Extended	19		19		23		23		P
	4.75		4.75		5.75		5.75		P/H
Simple	1	(0.8)	1	(0.8)	1	(0.8)	1	(0.8)	H
Consanguinal	2		2		2		2		P
	2		2		2		2		P/H
Simple	1	(0.8)	1		1	(0.8)	1	(0.8)	H
Joint	2		2		2		2		P
	2		2		2		2		P/H
All types	124		124		124		124		H
	633		697		712		712		P
	5.1		5.6		5.7		5.7		P/H

H - Number of households (figures in brackets are percentages of the vertical columns)

P - Number of persons

P/H - Number of persons per household

female and household heads at Rantai is 46.5 years, seven years less than at Teppang-Karayan: One expects that it is during their early and mid-forties that a couple finally break away from the ancestral home at the same time that their children are completing their adolescence. Within the next decade, the children will have married and, given the custom of moving in with the parents for a while, a household head will find himself in command of a superordinate extended household.

Consanguinal households rank third in importance, accounting for 7 percent of the total at Rantai and 11 percent at Teppang-Karayan (Table 11). An important aspect of such a household in both communities is that it may consist, not only of a single parent and direct descendant, but also of a household head and sibling's offspring. This would seem to indicate cohesive inter-sibling ties, a condition that persists even should one of them die. (I do not distinguish here between male and female siblings.) I find it striking that such an arrangement is absent in the available data on Hawaiian households (Howard, 1971: 19); as is another arrangement I found in Ilocos: joint households where two or more siblings, both singles, and over thirty, live together (Table 11). These living arrangements, if voluntary, indicate continual shared activities between siblings, and thus a measure of solidarity.

Where the two communities differ strikingly from each other is in the question of single households. More common at Teppang-Karayan (4.9), most of these consist of unmarried women, over fifty years of age, who may have relatives in the village, but nonetheless live alone (Table 11). The few men who stay by themselves are all widowers whose children reside away from the municipality. Rantai has two single households:

one consisting of a spinster in her late fifties, another of a widow whose children live outside the municipality.²

In terms of the number of persons per household, the largest household at Rantai is the lineal extended with lateral extensions (10.5), followed by the lineal extended grandparental (9.0), the nuclear household with lateral extensions (7.1), the lineal extended superordinate (6.28). At Teppang-Karayan the largest such household is the lineal extended superordinate (7.53), followed by the lineal extended with lateral extensions (7.33), the nuclear with lateral extensions (6.77), and the consanguinal extended (6.26). Though houses at Rantai tend to be more widely scattered, in exchange some of them have bigger households than at Teppang-Karayan.

Ideally, a study of household types should examine a household's development over time, for these various types may be merely phases of a single genesis. However, lack of time and space prevent me from doing so.

These various household types should be seen within the larger context, the settlement pattern. Since adjoining households are often inter-related through blood and marriage, it is possible to look at their neighborhood in toto as an extended family. Thus a household head's neighbors may often consist of his married children, their offspring, and his consanguines and affines. At Teppang-Karayan, ties between neighboring households further tighten through the high incidence of interkin marriages, as will be shown in another chapter. Thus the predominance of nuclear households and the presence of single ones assume a significance different from what would be the case in a metropolitan context where similar households are unrelated neighbors.

The current literature on rural voluntary associations and alliance groups examines the relationship of the population, as a whole, to available resources. It does not stress enough the difference between households in their access to these resources.

SUMMARY

Small, fragmented landholdings, brought about by high population densities have been cited by some authors as one reason for the weakness of kin solidarity and the non-existence of associations in peasant communities. Although population densities are much higher at Rantai and Teppang-Karayan than in the nation as a whole and although ratios of population and households to either farmland or cropland are consistently higher at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai, nonetheless, as will be seen, Teppang-Karayan has voluntary associations and a relatively strong kin solidarity.

As in the rest of Ilocos Norte, out-migration has become an important response to poverty. Indeed a large percentage of household heads in both are return migrants. Favored destinations for earning cash have been the metropolitan region and the U.S. Over and above this, differences appear. Teppang-Karayaners have tried a wider range of destinations including plantations and lumberyards in Luzon and Mindanao where the work is both difficult and poorly paid. Harsher conditions at Teppang-Karayan have made migrants less choosy.

Because of heavy out-migration, the age-sex ratios show severe distortions; large deficits of females occur at Rantai and the opposite at Teppang-Karayan.

Another result is that despite the high population density and the low mortality rates, both communities have low growth rates. In turn, youth dependency ratios are lower than and old age dependency ratios higher than the national figure.

The scarcity of land at Teppang-Karayan may explain why its houses and their narrow lots cluster more tightly together than at Rantai. Many Rantai houses often sit in the middle of larger lots and face either a stream or a gully, rarely another row of houses. House layout may have some influence on conviviality among neighbors, as will be seen.

Using an emic approach and viewing the household in terms of various kinds of commitment to co-residence, certain patterns come out clearly for both communities. The dominant household structure is the nuclear, followed by the extended family, the consanguineal, the joint and the single. Teppang-Karayan differs in its having two extremes: more extended family households and more single households.

CHAPTER III--NOTES

1. On the other hand the Census for 1975 reports the mean household size at Rantai as 4.93 and at Teppang-Karayan as 4.86. For the two, my figures are 5.1 and 5.06, respectively.
2. It is noteworthy though that the higher incidence of celibacy at Teppang-Karayan seems to be another indicator that population pressure upon resources is heavier here than at Rantai. P. C. Smith notes that, for Ilocos Norte as a whole, one response to population pressure has been celibacy (Smith, 1981: 22-26).

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Authors who doubt the possibility of kin solidarity and voluntary associations among peasants have largely ignored the question of social differentiation (Foster, 1967a; Foster, 1967b; Banfield, 1958; Lewis, 1971; Brandes, 1975). They create a picture of homogeneous masses of households where each is wholly preoccupied with earning a living and holding its own against others. Nothing could be more misleading, as far as my villages are concerned. While survival may be the concern of each and every household (as indeed of all of us), the degree to which this becomes the exclusive concern varies a great deal. Certainly for a villager who lives in a large, painted concrete mansion with modern household appliances, this is less of a pressing concern than for his neighbor who lives in a tattered, quivering non-electrified bamboo hut. Assured of a regular and substantial source of income, the former develops other concerns, like becoming prominent in the eyes of the community. Leadership therefore in voluntary associations may become relevant to this goal; while kin solidarity, in turn, may buttress his exercise of leadership.

An over-emphasis on the ecosystem, as in the case of Brandes (1975) and Lewis (1971), blurs significant differences between interest groups within a village. Thus, despite the problems involved in defining those controversial topics, social class and status, I have attempted to examine

the manner in which the social system allocates resources in my two villages.

CLASS STRUCTURE

As Pertierra (1979: 74) and Turner (1978) have noted recently, most authors who write about Philippine social structure define it in terms of what their native informants perceive it to be. The result is a two-tiered structure such as rich-poor, big people-little people; or leaders-followers, though some report more than two categories (see for instance Lynch, 1979: 45-48; Hollnsteiner, 1963: 87-92; Arce, 1963: 51-63).

A distinction should be made between class and status. A social class refers to a group of persons that share the same relationship to the means of production and occupy the same position in the social organization of labor (Galeski, 1972: 106-107; Pertierra, 1979: 74). A society may be looked at as a production system where various groups play different roles in the processing, distribution and consumption of the resources. Thus, a group of persons may be the owners but not the direct processors, while neither of the two groups may concern themselves directly with the distribution of these resources (Terray, 1975: 86-89). Classes also arise from the manner in which labor is organized. In between the owners and direct processors may intervene a group of men who administer the resources in the name of the owners but who, at the same time, depend on the owners' goodwill for a share of these resources, in the form of a salary. Membership in a class is thus determined by

economic criteria which become apparent to the observer only through analysis.¹ Moreover, this membership may be as much potential as actual (Turner, 1982: 205-206). Education increases a person's chances of marketing his skills. Because of these subtle relationships to the means of production a person may, therefore, not be aware of his objective class affiliation.

In contrast, a person is aware of his status, for status is a position in a ranking system devised by a society, according to the possession or non-possession of certain resources. These resources may be purely economic, such as land, or they may be non-economic, being personal attributes such as valor (Pertierra, 1979: 78). The possession of a valued resource does not automatically guarantee a high position in the ranking system, for the manner in which a person consumes these resources may be as crucial a factor. In other words, he has to lead a style of life, expressed through speech, dress, food, housing, recreation, and education that others of the rank he aspires to approve of. Consequently, a man cannot but be aware of the rank he occupies vis-à-vis others in his society. Unlike social classes, status groups are true communities; their members share similar interests and are aware of so doing (Weber, 1970: 182).

A complete analysis of class structure would entail looking into the relations between my villages and the society of which they form a part; I would also have to disclose the juridical and philosophical underpinnings of the system (Terray, 1969: 97-98). As these would take us too far afield, I shall limit myself to a description of the local class structure.

In defining social class in my two local communities, we should keep in mind a point made earlier, namely, that there really are two economies that intersect in the region. Consequently, there are two sets of social classes, two ways in which resources are allocated. Although I shall fuse these two sets later on, since membership in them overlaps, for the sake of clarity, I will describe each set of classes separately.

In Relation to the Peasant Farm. If access to a peasant farm is the criterion, there are these three social classes: (1) the landowners, (2) fulltime tenants and (3) landless farm laborers.

Landowners can be sub-divided into: (1) those who rarely work their own land but hire others to do so and (2) those who mainly work their own land (Pertierra, 1979: 75-76). Pensioners, schoolteachers, clerks, and fulltime businessmen belong to the first. Farmland, for them, is simply an additional source of income; they usually get tenants to work their fields. An exception are three households at Rantai, which happen to be the biggest landlords in the area. During at least the rice cycle they rely on hired labor. Most landowners belong to the second category; they cultivate their own land.

A second class are the fulltime tenants. I use the term, "full-time," because of a peculiar feature of the Ilocos. Since farms are scattered in parcels, many owner-cultivators may be tenants on one parcel and landlords on another. Indeed a substantial number of households in both communities have more than one landlord or more than one tenant (Table 12). Fulltime tenants therefore would be those who do

Table 12
Number of Landlords and Tenants
Per Household

Households that either own land but have landlords on other farms or that are pure farm tenants				
Number of land- lords per house- hold	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
0	52	41.6	53	46.9
1	40	32.0	28	24.8
2	24	19.2	19	16.8
3	4	3.2	9	8.40
4	3	2.4	1	0.9
5	0	0.0	3	2.6
6	2	1.6	-	-
Total	125	100.0	113	100.0
Households that own farms and have tenants				
Number of tenants per household	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
0	58	55.2	77	73.3
1	29	27.6	14	13.3
2	10	9.5	8	7.6
3	5	4.76	2	1.9
4	-	-	3	2.8
5	1	0.95	-	-
6	1	0.95	-	-
7	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-
9	1	0.95	1	0.95
Total	105	100.0	105	100.0

not own any single piece of farmland, but share part of all that they harvest with the landlord.

Sharing arrangements vary according to the crop. After 1973, the government reduced the landlord's share of the harvest to 25 percent. Still prevailing, however, is the traditional arrangement whereby, after assuming farm expenses such as wages for hired laborers, fertilizers, and rice seeds, the tenant divides the crop with the landlord on a 50-50 basis. In the garlic and tobacco cycles, the tenant gets a larger percentage of the crop: three-fourths of the garlic because the seeds are expensive and the use of mulch adds to the production costs; and two-thirds of the tobacco because the crop requires more care than does rice.

Until the 1950s, when the government passed laws restricting the unpaid services a landlord could demand from his tenants, the town-based landlord expected that his subordinates serve in his houses during feasts, repair his dwellings, attend to his fishtraps, and offer good food to him whenever he visited their farm. Although landlords can no longer exact such services today, it is worth noting that village-based landlords, with very modest farms, continue to expect some extra help from their tenants in times of need, for instance, during house repair.

Teppang-Karayan has twice (14.7%) the fulltime tenance rate of Rantai (6.8%). Likewise its proportion of landless farmers (11.9%) surpasses Rantai's 4.2 percent, being thrice the latter's (Table 13). Not only is land scarce, its low yield works against even those who have a parcel. Unable to pay the doctor's bill because of his meager

Table 13
Class Membership of Household Heads
in Relation to Peasant Farms

	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Landowner	105	73.4	105	88.9
Full-time tenant	21	14.7	8	6.8
Landless laborer	17	11.9	5	4.2
Total	143	100.0	118	

income, the farmer mortgages his holding; but the harvest cannot cover his debts. Landless farm laborers form the third social class. They neither own nor manage any land. They support themselves and their families by taking on various farm-related jobs, like plowing, planting, harvesting, or feeding the cattle. In addition, at Teppang-Karayan, they catch and sell river fish--often to their own neighbors--while their wives sell vegetables at the market. To improve their chances, they look for farm work in other municipalities and may even wind up in Cagayan Valley where the rice ripens earlier. Given the seasonality of farm jobs, the landless therefore have no steady source of income; on the other hand non-farm jobs both within the village and at Laoag are poorly compensated.

Because of their precarious situation, landless laborers do favors for those who give them regular jobs. Once in a while they offer their employer a gift of riverfish they have caught or pumpkin flowers they have tended.

In Relation to a Commercial Enterprise. Two social classes can here be distinguished: (1) businessmen and (2) laborers (Table 14).

Categories developed by Turner for an urban Ilocos setting (1982: 211-213, 216-217) are relevant here. Businessmen can be subdivided into: (1) marginal businessmen and (2) capitalists or regular businessmen. Teppang-Karayan has more examples of the former type, Rantai has less and vice-versa. The former consists of cattle traders, pork vendors, tricycle driver, retail store owners.

Table 14

Class Membership of Household Heads
in Relationship to Commercial Enterprises

Social Class	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Businessmen:				
Regular	2	1.4	6*	5.1
Marginal	20	13.9	1	0.8
Laborer:				
Skilled	2	1.4	10	8.5
Unskilled	11	7.7	25	21.2
Household head not currently members	108	75.5	76	64.4
	143	100.0	118	100.0

*Includes household heads who run their farms as commercial enterprises.

Marginal businessmen are those who own an enterprise that requires little capital and thus yields a low return. They buy and sell goods,

via their small retail stores; or they provide services like a tri-cycle ride. Since their enterprise is small, rarely do they hire an employee or, if they do, the number of both employees and their working hours are limited. Often there will only be a single employee and his working hours irregular.

This kind of businessman may be a landowner, a fulltime tenant or a landless farm laborer. The enterprise may either supplement the farm or it may yield the major portion of a household's income; this depends on the household's access to land. Landlessness may spur a household to enter into small business. Thus a landless mother at Teppang-Karayan, with six children to feed, barter homemade sweet cakes for rice and corn from her neighbors; the corn she in turn sells at Laoag. During the harvest season she seeks work as a hired hand.

Much fewer are the regular businessmen, for the outlay for their enterprise is bigger; however, somewhat more secure too is the return of their investment. They own rice mills and public vehicles, for which they hire workers. Two highly successful cattle traders at Teppang-Karayan belong to this category. Rantai has the most profitable of these ventures: an automotive repair shop whose customers come from all over the province. Though these enterprises are much larger than the small businesses cited above, they too are usually operated by the owner and his family.

These regular businessmen all own farmland of at least a hectare; they rely on both the farm and their enterprise for their income. Some of them, like the owner of the automotive repair shop, cultivate their own fields in all cropping seasons.

Non-farm manual laborers are of two kinds: (1) unskilled and (2) skilled. Skilled laborers are those who have undergone special training in a particular skill and thus can command a better price for their services. In the two communities, these would be bakers, carpenters, seamstresses, tailors, and barbers. Most find employment in Laoag; however, since business is not continuous their employment tends to be periodic. They usually either own farms or are fulltime tenants; they thus have alternative occupations and sources of income.

Woodcutting, construction work, janitorial services are the jobs undertaken by unskilled non-farm laborers. Since these kinds of jobs are even more periodic, they attract both farm laborers and fulltime tenants with tiny parcels of land. Only 9.1 percent of household heads at Teppang-Karayan presently take on a non-farm manual labor in addition to their farm work (Table 14). This is rather misleading; as we saw in an earlier chapter, 57 percent of household heads have lived and worked outside Ilocos Norte. If we examine the work they had then, 43 percent of all household heads surveyed worked for commercial enterprises as hired hands; almost half therefore have been members of a market economy's proletariat. In the case of Rantai, the percentage of those who have worked outside Ilocos Norte for commercial enterprise is lower (22%) than for those presently working for such ventures (29.7%).

White collar workers form a separate class. They emerged at Teppang-Karayan during the 1960s thanks to the newly founded elementary school and high school, better transportation service to Laoag and other towns, and the cash economy's steady penetration. At Rantai, elementary teachers have been a part of the community since the early 1930s when a

public school was founded. Indeed one of its wealthier landlords is a retired schoolteacher who migrated from Laoag to the village back in the 1930s to avoid having to commute once a week. Two teachers at Rantai are also migrants from Laoag. Other white collar workers would be: clerks, supervisors for private companies and agricultural technicians.

The main subdivision of this class would be: (1) upper bureaucrats like school principals, head teachers, office managers and other senior administrators who supervise the work of others and are usually university graduates and (2) lower bureaucrats like administrative assistants, elementary teachers, junior clerks, mailmen and field technicians who do not supervise the work of others and whose educational qualifications are much lower (Pertierra, 1979: 76-77).

Though they hold a steady job and draw a regular salary, they depend a great deal on their farms to supplement their income, for salaries in the Ilocos as of 1978-79 had not caught up with inflation. The government's own estimate was that a couple with young children needed at least ₱1500 a month to meet their basic needs, but salaries of even white collar workers fell below this. Upper bureaucrats were earning from ₱500 to ₱900 a month; lower bureaucrats ₱300 to ₱450 a month.

White collar workers come from households that either own land or manage a sizable tract of land, as tenants, or have close kinsmen who send money regularly from Hawaii. Of the household heads interviewed, they comprise 5.0 percent at Rantai (N=118) and ^alower 2.2 percent at _λTeppang-Karayan (N=143).

Upper bureaucrats often act as brokers between villagers and the appropriate government officials. For instance, when villagers want to present a petition to the town mayor, they approach the principal or any respected teacher to draft the letter for them and accompany them on their visit. Though upper bureaucrats may lack political and economic power in the village, they wield considerable influence by the mere fact of their being educated. Except for the teacher, lower bureaucrats do not enjoy this privilege; they tend to be treated like everybody else.

Although Pertierra (1979: 73) notes the presence of two economies in his Ilocano municipality, he enumerates these classes I have described together, as a group as though they formed a continuous series. This is misleading, for these two sets of classes parallel each other, and their membership, as he admits, overlaps. To get around this difficulty, I would like to propose fusing together these two sets of classes by taking as our criterion: access to resources in general.

In Relation to Resources in General. Despite their differences, both commercial farm and peasant enterprise have this basic similarity: they are resources. If we take access to resources as the norm, we can distinguish three degrees of access to resources. These are: Moderate Control, Weak Control and No Control. I propose conceiving of each as a social class (Table 15).

The role of education in determining social class is problematic. Returning pensioners, often illiterate or semi-literate, have access to more resources than most college-trained professionals. Although I recognize that education gives one a potential position in the system of

Table 15
Class Structure Taken as Access to
Resources in General

Degrees of control over resources	Teppang-Karayan Households		Rantai Households	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
No Control Over Resources	46	32.2	16	13.5
Weak Control Over Resources	86	60.1	90	76.3
Moderate Control Over Resources	11	7.6	12	10.2
	143	100.0	118	100.0

production, I realize there is no one-to-one correspondence between education and class membership.

Under "No Control Over Resources," I have included most landless farm workers and fulltime tenants, regardless of whether or not they have a non-farm side income as a manual laborer, a white collar bureaucrat, a small businessman or a recipient of remittances. (There are notable exceptions to these which I shall discuss when we get to "moderate control over resources"). My reason for so doing is that all of them depend on the goodwill of whoever needs their services. As manual laborer or as minor bureaucrat, they earn little; moreover being employees, they do not participate in major decisions that affect their lives. Even if they own a small business, like a pedicab or a corner variety store (sari sari), their enterprise usually barely survives.

Ownership of land does not by itself increase a person's control over resources essential to his subsistence. However, according to informants, unless his holdings are over a hectare and a half, he will find it difficult to support a household of five to six persons on the holdings' earnings. Particularly is this true at Teppang-Karayan, where the uncertain water supply makes it imperative to have a larger farm. For this reason, I have placed landholding households with less than a hectare and a half under "Weak Control Over Resources (WCOR). A side income from a manual non-farm job like baking or tailoring improves a household's resources somewhat but not sufficiently because of low wages and periodic nature of the job.

I have called the most advantaged group those with Moderate Control Over Resources (MCOR). I have used the term "moderate" to suggest that, although they have a securer control over their sources of subsistence, they, nonetheless, do not have the advantage of a town-dwelling landholder whose extensive political and economic ties can secure more benefits for himself. If they are pensioners, members of MCOR may own from two to five hectares of farmland. Even if they own less than a hectare and a half, they have steady, relatively well-paying jobs such as a managerial position in a private office or a regular business enterprise. Successful business enterprises in the two local communities have been ricemills, the buying and selling of cattle (in a number of cases), and an automotive repair shop.

When we compare Rantai and Teppang-Karayan in terms of these three proposed social classes, access to resources is more readily available in the former than in the latter. The percentage of those in NCOR at

Teppang-Karayan (32.2%), while those in MCOR is somewhat less at somewhat less at Teppang-Karayan (7.6%) than at Rantai (10.2%).

The allocation of resources through the class structure constitutes the "social system" as defined by Ingold. Although the rationalities sought by the social system set in motion the ecosystem, the latter in turn imposes limits on the former.

Because of its ecosystem, the two economies, peasant and market, have been easier to realize at Rantai, than at Teppang-Karayan. Some landlords living at Caoayan often complained about how little they earned from their holdings south of the river. They understood, however, that lack of water was the problem; they could not be strict in demanding their share of a meager crop. Indeed, during the two droughts suffered by Teppang-Karayan, in the past, the landlord-tenant relationship broke down completely. Villagers planted sweet potatoes and harvested them for their family's exclusive consumption. Today this same lack of water helps hinder the transformation of the peasants into commercial farmers.

Social Classes and Kin Solidarity. The social structure I have decribed has important implications for kin solidarity. Back in the 1930s, many of the town-based landlords started selling their farms in the villages in order to finance their children's education in Manila and to buy larger but cheaper land in the Cagayan frontier. Their buyers were the villagers themselves, many of them former tenants and returning Hawayanos.

As a result, in both local communities, most of a villager's landlords and tenants are his own kinsmen. Of these the most numerous group are secondary kinsmen, followed by primary kinsmen, and finally affines (Tables 16 and 17). It is interesting to note that parent and child can

Table 16
Landlords' Relation to Household Head

Relationship	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Primary kinsmen	24	21.0	7	5.6
Father	5	4.4	-	-
Mother	2	1.8	3	2.4
Elder brother	1	0.9	1	0.8
Younger brother	6	5.3	1	0.8
Elder sister	2	1.8	-	-
Younger sister	4	3.5	-	-
Son	1	0.9	-	-
Daughter	-	-	1	0.8
Sibling (unspecified)	3	2.6	1	0.8
Secondary kinsmen	42	36.8	46	37.0
Grandparent	5	4.4	2	1.6
Grandchild	1	0.9	1	0.8
Uncle/Aunt	24	21.0	24	19.3
Niece/Nephew	3	3.5	8	6.4
Cousin	8	7.0	11	8.9
Affines	23	20.2	20	16.1
Brother-in-law	8	7.0	5	4.0
Sister-in-law	2	1.8	4	3.2
Father-in-law	6	5.3	4	3.2
Mother-in-law	3	2.6	-	-
Son-in-law	1	0.9	1	0.8
Others	3	2.6	6	4.8
No Relation	24	21.0	46	37.1
Ritual/Fictive kinsmen	1	0.9	5	4.0
Total	114	100.0	124	100.0

Table 17
Farm Tenants' Relation to Household Head

Relationship	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Primary kinsmen	11	15.5	10	20.0
Father	1	1.4	1	2.0
Younger brother	4.2	1.0	1	2.0
Elder Sister	1.0	1.4	-	-
Son	4	5.6	4	8.0
Sibling (unspecified)	2	2.8	4	8.0
Secondary kinsmen	32	45.1	14	28.0
Grandparent	1	1.4	-	-
Grandchild	4	5.6	5	10.0
Uncle/Aunt	11	15.5	2	4.0
Niece/Nephew	9	12.6	2	4.0
Cousin	7	9.8	5	10.0
Affines	7	9.8	14	28.0
Brother-in-law	-	-	8	16.0
Sister-in-law	-	-	1	2.0
Father-in-law	-	-	1	2.0
Son-in-law	4	5.6	3	6.0
Others	3	4.2	1	2.0
No Relation	17	23.9	12	24.0
Ritual/Fictive kinsmen	4	5.6	-	-
Total	71	100.0	50.0	100.0

play either landlord or tenant to each other. In either case they would still follow the sharing system used in the rest of the village.

Most of the villager's tenants, in both communities, came from either the same village or another village (usually a neighboring one) in the same municipality (Table 18). Peculiar to Teppang-Karayan is that almost a third of the tenants live in other Ilocos Norte towns, often in Dingras Valley, where many villagers have farms. Villagers' landlords too often reside in the same village, 70 percent being Teppang-Karayan's figure. But the figure for Rantai is much lower, being only 47 percent. As is not the case at Teppang-Karayan, almost a quarter (22.9%) of a Rantaian's landlords lives in the U.S., particularly in

Table 18
Tenants' Residence

Residence	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Other Ilocos Norte towns	21	28.4	4	4.3
Laoag or town proper	1	1.4	3	3.3
Same village	40	54.0	71	77.2
Another village in the same municipality	11	14.9	13	14.1
Cagayan Valley	-	-	1	1.1
Other places in the Philippines outside Ilocos Norte and Cagayan Valley	1	1.4	-	-
	74	100.0	92	100.0

Hawaii. These Hawaii based landlords are kinsmen from the same area (Table 19). Clearly overseas migration has lessened the competition between kinsmen for land, more so at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan.

Table 19
Landlords' Residence

Residence	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Other Ilocos Norte Towns	21	28.4	-	-
Laoag or town proper	22	17.3	27	24.8
Same village	51	40.2	38	34.9
Another village in the same municipality	38	29.9	13	11.9
Metro Manila and other places in the Philippines outside Ilocos and Cagayan Valley	3	2.4	5	4.6
Hawaii/Mainland USA	9	7.1	25	22.9
Cagayan Valley	-	-	1	0.9
	127	100.0	109	100.0

The fact that kinsmen are often landlord or tenant to each other certainly increases the number of activities they are in together and may intensify their interaction. For the tenant, as tenant, is expected to reciprocate his use of the land by helping his landlord, when needed even if the landlord is his own kinsman from the same village. Unlike

pre-1950 prestations, the service need not be heavy: it could consist of helping his landlord-kinsman patch his roof.

Moreover kin ties do help one become a tenant, for a landowner is expected to prefer his own consanguine before anybody else. Indeed taking in a non-kinsman as a tenant is a cause of quarrels between kinsmen. Here again, as in other situations, public opinion can exert subtle pressure. Perhaps the interplay between kin ties and landlord-tenant relations is stronger among Teppang-Karayaners than among Rantaians, for the latter have stricter standards of production than do the former. Rantai landlords review a tenant's performance every year; this strictness surprises Teppang-Karayaners who are thankful for whatever yield a tenant can harvest on his poor soil. Being a kinsman seems to carry less weight in getting and keeping land at Rantai. If tenancy indeed tends to last for a shorter period of time at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan--as my informants suggest--then kinsmen there lose another potential link between them.

Vertical dyadic ties between landlord and tenant tend to be multi-stranded at Teppang-Karayan and single-stranded at Rantai. Because of these and another factor, the high rate of landless farm workers at Teppang-Karayan, patron-client ties are more feasible at the former than at the latter.

However, even at Teppang-Karayan, kin ties may not necessary guarantee work to the landless. Two cases come to mind:

Romualdo, aged 68, suffers from watery eyes, and painful feet. He lives all alone in a hut that is miserable by village standards: large holes gape through the roof and the walls while the posts slant to one side threatening to fall at any given moment. As a seasonal worker

he lost his land years ago when his sister sold it to buy rice. He supports himself by helping feed his neighbors' poultry in exchange for which he gets food. Although his brother's large solid house is just a block away, he and his brother have not spoken to each other for a long time.

Crisanta, aged 60, can hardly stand straight nor squat for long each time she helps at her neighbors' fields because her knees hurt continually. She lives all alone in a hut that has no electricity. Just a neighborhood away lives her brother, a propertied Hawayano who helps his wife's brother by paying for a daughter's education. Crisanta tells of meeting her brother on the road the other day. They greeted each other perfunctorily and parted ways.

Because of ancient quarrels, siblings may ignore each other, even if one of them could obviously benefit from the other's bounty.

But more common perhaps at Teppang-Karayan are cases where the propertied help their landless siblings.

Mariano, aged 54, sold his land ten years ago to pay for the medical expenses of an ailing daughter who nonetheless died. He and his wife live in a hut with no electricity. He says he has no trouble finding work for his two siblings, who live nearby, have land.

After finishing my survey of households at Teppang-Karayan I took care to visit precisely those households that had no land to find out how they managed. Except for the two cases above, when siblings had a farm, landless households had no trouble finding work.

At Rantai, kin ties are not as crucial in getting work; during the rice cycle, the foremost problem is getting farm hands. As we saw in an earlier chapter, laborers have to be imported from outside the municipality to make up for the shortage of labor. It is the Teppang-Karayan laborer with no propertied siblings who faces a problem, for his community has more hands than jobs. I have met laborers who, without much ado, claim that they are closely related to their employer.

However, in a few cases, their employer, when questioned, has denied such ties by answering that so-and-so is really a cousin-in-law or a fourth degree cousin.

There are some reasons why an employer goes along with the fiction of close kin ties. One is that this gives him some assurance that his hired hand will either perform ably or at least not cheat him, a fellow kinsmen. Another is that he can make use of these ties at a future date, for instance at Teppang-Karayan popularity contests.

If the employer has some means, most likely he will want his daughter to participate in the annual popularity contest; the winner is crowned queen of the yearly district fiesta. (Or he may be pressured by his kinsmen and village officials to allow his daughter to be a candidate.) This confers prestige on his household. As these popularity contests are really fund-raising competitions where the winner is simply whoever attracts the most contributions from friends and kinsmen in both the Philippines and abroad, fund-raising dances take place continuously just before the fiesta. Somebody has to clean the basketball court where the dance will take place, to install the lights or to bring in chairs. Here is where a client's sense of indebtedness, reinforced by kin ties, becomes crucial.

What effect does the commercial enterprise have on kin ties? Even the most successful enterprise at Rantai is a family venture that brings together two household heads: a father and his married son. Another married son is also involved but he lives in his father's house. The enterprise is coextensive with the extended family. In the foreseeable future commercial enterprises in the two communities will no doubt continue to operate in this fashion just like their

bigger Manila counterparts. If and when outside labor is tapped, kin ties will still be critical as--in the farm. For the employee, emphasizing kin ties serves as a means of getting a job; for the employer this gives him some protection against theft.

INCOME LEVELS

As is well known, gauging income levels is a problem-ridden task because of the personal nature of household incomes and the difficulties in calculating all sources of income, whether in cash or in kind, especially within a farming household.

What I propose here are really indices of consumption that may give an idea of income levels. In addition, they are a key to understanding status ranking in the villages.

Indices of Consumption. One index of consumption I have used is the quality of housing. According to my informants, this is a better gauge of a household's income than size of land. For, as soon as a villager's income improves, the first thing he invests in is his house. The only drawback to this index is that the house may belong to a villager's deceased parent, who had a higher income than him. However, his continuing use of those facilities, particularly a television or a jeep, may indicate an approximately similar income level.

In my questionnaire therefore I noted the type and condition of a house, the presence or absence of electricity, its flooring and type of windows, its furniture, its cooking appliances and the presence or absence of a radio or television. I assumed that a two storey house with at least a concrete ground floor, painted walls, grilled glass

windows, tile floors, a living room furniture set, a radio, television, refrigerator, stove, running water and either a car or a jeep indicated an annual cash income of between ₱10,000 to ₱20,000 a year in addition to ownership of riceland. In other words, the more non-essential accessories a household had, the higher its income. Such a household would be in the villagers' term nabaknang, or wealthy. Two other indices placed a household in this category: the use of a tractor for farming and a child in school at Manila. Such a household would have substantial savings to spend on these status symbols and factors such, as more land, that would consolidate its position.

At the opposite extreme, I assumed that a house of tattered, rotting bamboo-and-thatch, with few furnishings, no electricity and with not even that ubiquitous possession of most village households--the radio--belonged to a household earning ₱3500 and below. The marigrigat or napanglaw would be the poorest households. Because their sources of income are uncertain and narrow, they have to borrow if not ask for rice from their neighbors.

In between these two extremes, I classified the rest of the households as kalkalaingan, or a household of moderate means. Houses here may range from one to two stories; their walls may be either entirely of wooden boards or may be of concrete in the ground floor; they are unpainted; and they have a galvanized iron roofing. They may have a living room set but definitely no fanciful accessories like grilled glass windows and tile floors. Though they have electricity, they use the traditional stove to cut down on expenses, they have radios; at the upper reaches of this category, some would have television sets; but none would have a private vehicle. Households in this category

have a steadier source of income; though they experience periods of shortage, they generally have rice for consumption; they have some side dish at every meal but rarely meat; and because all their income is spent on basic items, they have little or no savings to speak of.

A classification of the households in Teppang-Karayan and Rantai, according to these categories, yields the following distribution (Table 20) with the kalkalaingan clearly the majority in both places. Households at Teppang-Karayan with a low level of consumption are twice the percentage of those at Rantai; while high consumption ones at Teppang-Karayan are slightly less than those at Rantai.

Table 20
Levels of Consumption

Level	Household			
	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Low	31	21.7	11	9.3
Medium	107	74.8	101	85.6
High	5	3.5	6	5.0
	143	100.0	118	100.0

My two distributions roughly parallel those posited by Pertierra for three villages of Burgos, Ilocos Norte, especially Macaoayan (1979: 74).

If we cross-tabulate these hypothesized consumption levels with the three social classes, we get the following distribution. No NCOR households participate in a high consumption level, conversely no NCOR households can be found in a low consumption level. It is households in WCOR that are members of all three levels. The clear majority of Rantai households are in the most middle of categories, WCOR with consumption level (66.9), followed by NCOR with medium consumption level (11.9). Though most Teppang-Karayan households fall into these two categories, those in WCOR with medium consumption are much less than at Rantai (47.6), while those in NCOR with medium consumption are almost twice Rantai's figure (21.7). Households in the most disadvantaged category, NCOR with low consumption, are six times more numerous at Teppang-Karayan (10.5) than at Rantai (1.7). At Rantai, these households are, in fact, less in number than those in the most advantaged category, MCOR with high consumption; the latter forming 3.4 percent of the total. Households in this category constitute the smallest percentage of all Teppang-Karayan households (1.4).

An Index of Disposable Income. Perhaps a good gauge of disposal income may be the use of electricity and television. Non-use of electricity would define lack of disposable income. A television set's purchase price, the amount of electricity it consumes, plus the repairs it requires, puts the appliance beyond the means of most villagers. Three categories of households may therefore be defined: (1) without electricity, (2) with electricity but no television, and (3) with television (Table 21). The number of households at Teppang-Karayan with no electricity (27.3%) is more than twice that at Rantai (11.9%)

Table 21
Levels of Disposable Income
Based on the Use of Two Household Goods

	Household			
	Rantai		Teppang-Karayan	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Without Electricity (Low level)	17	11.9	39	27.3
With Electricity but no Television (Medium level)	88	74.6	89	62.2
With Television (High level)	13	11.0	15	10.4
	118	100.0	143	100.0

indicating more widespread poverty. But the number of Teppang-Karayan households with television is only slightly less (10.4%) than those at Rantai (11.0%).

For my analysis of household participation in voluntary associations, I shall use this gauge of disposable income. Category 1 would indicate a low level of disposable income; Category 2 a medium level; and Category 3 a high level. These categories would roughly correspond to marigrigat, kalkalaingan, and nabaknang, respectively.

Social status in the village depends a great deal on the way in which income is consumed.

STATUS

Status Ranking. The criteria for ranking persons, according to status, are both economic and non-economic.² Let us first discuss the former.

A large income helps a person achieve a high status as a wealthy person (nabaknang). However, the actualization of this status depends on how he uses his income, that is, on his mode of consumption. He must live and look wealthy. To be truly respected, a man of means should build a substantial house with modern appliances, should send his children to college, should wear fine clothes. His large income has to translate itself into a visible display of wealth. At the same time, he is expected to share his wealth through large feasts at important events of the life cycle and the annual cycle. For, if he fails to do so, he risks being tagged as naimot or stingy.

It is also expected that a wealthy man should not engage in manual work, or failing this, his children should train for non-farm, non-manual jobs, as professionals and bureaucrats. A veneer of urbanism is highly regarded, however much villagers resent urban dwellers for their arrogance. A sufficient command of English and Tagalog, fine clothes, and a large well-furnished house of strong materials are all equated with the city.

Finally, because a wealthy man has the resources, he should be a leader. By this is meant that people defer to him, that they listen to him when he speaks, and that they depend upon his bounty and his abilities for resolving some of their problems. Such a following both confirms and proclaims to all his command of a high social esteem. To attain this, however, he has to share his largesse, for instance,

through public feasts; and hold important positions in either public or private organizations such as voluntary associations.

Pertierra (1979: 74) distinguishes three status categories in Burgos. These correspond to the three levels of consumption I have proposed. He speaks of the prominent, wealthy and politically active (nabaknang); the moderate (kakalaingan); and the marginal, poor and politically passive (napanglaw). Moreover, he says that these distinctions can be made to fit the two-category system (Big People and Little People) reported by Lynch (1959, 1965) and Arce (1973). With all these, I agree, basing myself on what I have observed in the field and what my informants tell me.

However, there are also non-economic criteria that merit a man high social esteem. These would be personal attributes such as industry, generosity, and eloquence. Undoubtedly, access to resources enables a person to develop these attributes. It spurs him to work harder, it provides him resources he can share with others, and it instills a greater self-confidence vis-à-vis other people. But, I would not make these non-economic criteria entirely congruent with economic ones. There are at least three individuals at Teppang-Karayan who, though poorer than most--two of them live in non-electrified bamboo huts--are esteemed as leaders. All of them are regarded as having these three attributes. We shall meet two of these individuals below when we discuss associations, where they play prominent roles.

Status Ranking and Kin Solidarity. Throughout this work, I distinguish between two kinds of solidarity among households. One is critical

solidarity where households come to each other's aid during important events in the life cycle and yearly cycle and during periods of emergency, such as an illness in a family, or a pressing need for a loan. Another kind of solidarity is convivial in nature; here households come together purely to enjoy each other's company.

As far as critical solidarity is concerned, present class divisions do not hinder ties between kinsmen if we base ourselves on day-to-day observations; this, however, may not be true of convivial solidarity. Here status differences may create a sense of inferiority in the poorer kinsmen. Given his tiny parcel of land and middling job as baker's assistant, he cannot replace his bamboo house with a house of sturdy materials; perhaps he may not even be able to afford electricity. Right beside him, however, his first cousin has built his family a two-storey house of wood and concrete, with modern conveniences, and has sent his son over to Manila to study commerce in a city college. He will find it difficult to mix freely with his cousin. And indeed at parties in the homes of the more affluent villagers, sometimes poorer kinsmen merely peer in through the windows--in the same way tenants of the 1940s kept outside the town landlord's house for fear of getting sneered at. If the poor do come in, they stay for only a few minutes to smile nervously at their more fortunate kinsmen and gulp down some food. As one shabbily dressed farmer's wife confided, "oftentimes our fortunate cousin has to look for us, to invite us in. It is not right that we should mix with him."

What she meant by "fortunate relative" was a farmer who would be regarded as poor by town standards: he lived in a one-storey concrete house with no plumbing and could not afford to send his lone daughter

to a school for nurses. However, he had a parcel of land and could afford certain things and so was deemed "wealthy" by his cousin.

The more affluent villagers, for their part, do not have this feeling of unease. When they have parties, they invite their poorer relatives like everybody else; at their porches, they chat aimably with their poor, as well as with their not-so-poor, kinsmen. Some, like Josue Madarang, even spend their free time on projects that help their less fortunate relatives and neighbors.

These affluent villagers I am speaking of were once poor like their siblings and first cousins and can thus empathize with them. It may be a different story as far as their children--who have grown up in comfort--are concerned. Because status ranking creates a sense of community among its members, it causes the larger local community, such as a village, to divide into communities, into circles of familiars. Simultaneously, it fosters fellowship between a man and other members of his rank elsewhere, for instance, his officemates. It may subvert the feeling of belonging to the local community. Thus when Martin visits his brother's house, his eldest son, who grew up in Laoag and is at present studying for a commerce degree in Manila, stays in the car and will not go out to say hello to his relatives.

However, despite this emergent social differentiation, numerous practices create bridges between kinsmen.

SUMMARY

Because the commercial economy intersects with rather than replaces the peasant one, there really are two sets of social classes in the two communities. Landowners, fulltime tenants and landless

farm laborers make up one set; businessmen and non-farm laborers the second. Some household heads participate in at least two social classes according to the position they assume vis-à-vis the key resource in each economy. A small class that new conditions, particularly monetization, have encouraged to spring up in the villages is the white collar one of professionals and bureaucrats. Because of the peculiar circumstances of land tenure in both communities, the peasant economy encourages the use of kin ties as an avenue towards either acquiring or maintaining resources. Sources of high status are: the public display of it and sharing of wealth and income, a non-manual occupation, a veneer of urbanism and prominence as a leader. Though critical solidarity continues to bring together wealthy villagers and their poor kinsmen, increasing status differences make it difficult for the latter to feel convivial with the former.

CHAPTER IV--NOTES

1. This definition of social class owes more to recent Marxist-influenced thinkers, than to Marx himself. According to Dahrendorf (1970), Marx saw class formation as going hand in hand with class consciousness. The economic system creates a situation where an aggregate of individuals shares basic interests. However, it is political action that causes these individuals to become a class. It is important therefore, to distinguish between true classes, where individuals are aware of their common interest vis-à-vis an opposing class, and proto-classes, where individuals merely occupy the same position in the economic system. According to this line of interpretation, the groups I have described in my villages would be proto-classes, rather than classes. However, for recent Marx-influenced thinkers, neither explicit awareness of shared interests nor participation in a market economy are preconditions for class formation.
2. Svalastoga (1965: 16) distinguishes four kinds of status:
 1. Social status or amount of deference enjoyed.
 2. Political status or amount of power possessed.
 3. Informational status or amount of skill or knowledge possessed.
 4. Economic status or amount of wealth possessed.

Status, as I have defined it, corresponds to the first kind he mentions, social status. However, the boundaries between it and the other three are not that sharply defined. Power and knowledge enhance the amount of deference a person enjoys; while the use of wealth, in ways approved of by the community, increases this amount of deference.

CHAPTER V
RESOURCE SHARING AMONG KINSMEN AND NEIGHBORS

The preceding three chapters examined the interplay between the ecosystem and the social system. Having established the nature of this interplay, I can now demonstrate their effect upon the alliance group.

According to some authors, where land is in short supply, subsistence farmers have less opportunities for non-monetized labor exchanges (Brandes, 1975: 85-87; Lewis, 1971: 110-111). Consequently ties between them narrow and loosen. Indeed they even view each other with envy, suspicion and hostility (Banfield, 1958: 99-100, 121-122). They believe that, like land, the other goods they aspire for: "wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety" (Foster, 1967a: 304), cannot be increased. Whoever improves his position does so only at the expense of others (Foster, 1967a: 304-305). Kin ties cannot, by themselves, overcome this mutual hostility. Indeed they may aggravate it; for, in a densely populated area, kinsmen are more prone to quarrel over the little property there is to divide (Foster, 1967a: 304; Lewis, 1971: 91-92, 107). These tensions may erupt into sorcery accusations. Envious of the good fortune of others, certain individuals blight them with their evil eye (Foster, 1967b: 160). Such an atmosphere cannot possibly encourage common-interest associations to grow (Banfield, 1958: 86; Foster, 1967b: 136).

My data do not, however, confirm these expectations. First of all, non-monetized labor exchanges are indeed absent in these small, fragmented farms--but for reasons of efficiency. Second, despite this plus conflicts over inheritance, villagers share certain goods and services with each other.

LABOR EXCHANGES

Participation in Farming by Age and Sex. The household is the basic unit of farm production in both communities. However, the degree to which members participate in the actual process of production is determined by their age and sex.

Adult males assume the responsibility of performing the tasks required by all the phases of the different cropping cycles. Other than plowing and spraying the crops with chemicals, Teppang-Karayan women participate in all these tasks. Rantai women are more restricted; they are allowed in the ricefields only to weed and to thresh.

Although I shall discuss inheritance in a later chapter, I should point out at this stage that, unlike their Teppang-Karayan sisters, Rantai women do not usually inherit any riceland. This measure is clearly a response to the scarcity of land; the prohibition of women's participation in the rice cycle serves as a justification for not giving them any piece of riceland. The prohibition aggravates Rantai's labor shortage during the rice season and obliges households to import men and women from outside the municipality. Where Rantai women fully participate in are the tobacco and garlic cycles. Perhaps the reason for this is that land is assessed, not as garlic and tobacco land,

but as riceland. Besides tobacco is more tedious to cultivate than either rice or garlic; extra local hands are certainly welcome.

Only 10 percent of Rantai boys and girls under 14 years help at the fields, most are at school (n=118). Not so at Teppang-Karayan, where the figure is twice that of Rantai (n=143). Again this worsens Rantai's shortage of labor, and adds to Teppang-Karayan's labor glut. When Teppang-Karayan and Rantai boys do help in the fields, they join in all the phases except plowing, for which they would not have the requisite strength. Work restrictions on girls are the same as those for women.

Monetized and Non-monetized Exchanges. Since a household often cannot do all the needed farm tasks, it enters into agreements with other parties. During the 1930s and 1940s, non-monetized exchanges were common between households. Called the ammuyo, these took either of the following forms:

1) the come-all--Here a farmer, who needed help, threw a feast to which anybody could come. In exchange for the hospitality, guests helped plow, plant, transplant, as the case might be.

2) the hour-for-hour--In exchange for working so many hours at another's fields, the worker expected the farm owner to reciprocate him with an equivalent length of time, helping him on his own field, doing the same task.

In neither of these two forms is ammuyo being practiced at Teppang-Karayan today. Villagers regard both forms as wasteful. The first does not allow the host to weed out the lazy from the hard-working. On the other hand, the second slows down the farmer. It obliges him

to compensate, say a group of five who worked for him, at three days each, with a total of fifteen days, which he could have spent on his own fields, particularly during the rice transplant.

Rantaians too dislike ammuyo, for the same reasons. However, as I pointed out above, they do practice ammuyo when they transplant tobacco. Here kinsmen and neighbors help each other in the operation by using the hour-for-hour form of ammuyo.

Generally, however, villagers in both places prefer to pay for hired labor, of which there are three forms:

1) monetized contract labor (pakyaw)--The farmer estimates the amount of labor needed on his field for a particular operation; and calls in a labor contractor to bring in workers on a piece rate, rather than daily wage, system.

2) monetized daily labor--The farmer hires and pays the worker a daily minimum wage (horna), ordained by Philippine law. In addition, he is obliged to serve the latter a free lunch. Working hours are from 8:00 a.m. till 5:00 p.m. with a one hour lunch break in between.

3) non-monetized daily wage labor--in exchange for harvesting the field, the worker gets one-sixth of the amount of rice he harvests per day (tangdan, bolibol or ingkannem). Again working hours are the same as in monetized daily labor, with a one hour lunch break in-between.

Should the wage laborer come from a distant village, he is entitled to a breakfast and dinner from his employer, regardless of the kind of daily wage he receives.

For some informants, contract labor has the advantage of obliging the laborer to work faster so that he can go on to another contract.

Moreover, the employer does not have to constantly keep watch over the labor. Others argue, however, that, in his haste, the laborer may turn in a sloppy job.

In both local communities, those who prefer contract labor resort to it for a speedy operation during the transplanting of rice. Unlike Teppang-Karayaners, Rantaians unanimously prefer contract labor for the tedious and complicated operations of the garlic harvest, since the tobacco season follows soon after.

Even if daily wage labor entails constant supervision, other informants prefer this since it obliges the laborer to work harder, lest he be dismissed the following day. Its disadvantage is that the employer has to be constantly at one spot. If transplanting is taking place simultaneously on all of his scattered holdings, his will be a difficult schedule.

Lewis (1971) and Brandes (1975) attribute the disappearance of non-monetized labor exchanges to the small size of farm holdings in the communities they have studied. Thus Lewis contrasts the situation in Bayon, Ilocos Norte, with that in Mambabanga, Isabela where farms average 3.2 hectares and where ammuyo is practiced (1971: 110-111). Brandes points out that migration from Bectadas to the city has lowered population density considerably. Since labor has grown scarce, households have resorted to non-monetized labor exchanges and work groups to get work done on the farms (1975: 85-87). By stimulating more interaction between households, these exchanges help to foster a village cohesiveness that is lacking in the crowded villages of Ilocos Norte or in Bectadas, previous to out-migration.

The approach they take is thus largely, if not exclusively, ecosystemic. They neglect the social system whose rationalities shape the relationships of people vis-à-vis both their physical environment and their fellowmen. This is unfortunate, for the availability of cash and the farmer's desire for greater productivity and efficiency are equally important factors. Indeed even in Mambabanga, Isabela, the absence of cash may explain why *ammuyo* has persisted for so long.

Gamiao (1979: p.c.), who did field work in Mambabanga, Isabela, notes that farmers practiced *ammuyo* until 1974 simply because they lacked the necessary cash for hiring labor. Despite their larger size holdings, Isabela farmers seem to accumulate debts more readily, particularly to money lenders. At harvest time, therefore, all their earnings flow out to the payment of these debts. When the Miracle Rice Program in 1974 made loans easily available all over the country, Mambabanga farmers switched over to hiring paid labor. As soon as the funds dried up, they reverted to *ammuyo*.

Anderson, who did field work in Central Pangasinan, notes that *ammuyo* is practiced in a setting where cash is not readily available, where timing is not crucial, and where a shortage of labor may exist, perhaps because of out-migration (Castillo, 1981: 374).

The upshot of all these is that it is not easy to draw correlations between non-monetized exchange labor, size and compactness of land, kin solidarity and common-interest associations. Though Rantaians practice *ammuyo* during tobacco planting, they have less kin interdependence and no associations to speak of; the opposite is true of Teppang-Karayan. Indeed, in the past, *ammuyo* in its two forms, may

have even disturbed, rather than strengthened interkin ties. In the first form, the villager was obliged to welcome even the lazy and the sluggards; in the second, he had to pay back those who had helped him with labor time he might need for his own holding. Concerning the effect of labor exchanges on the propensity to form associations, especially cooperatives: Castillo notes that these are forms of cooperation for "equivalent" gain from the exchange relationship, although when and how the repayment should be made is not necessarily specified (1981: 355). Being neither a joint liability nor a joint borrowing group, neither a group action to obtain better prices for inputs and produce nor an organization for technology transfer nor a business organization, these forms of cooperation cannot be the basis for common-interest associations (1981: 355-356).

The market economy's penetration of my two local communities has made monetized labor arrangements both possible and attractive. This in turn has not discouraged the growth of voluntary associations at Teppang-Karayan.

Moreover, though non-monetized labor exchanges have largely disappeared in the two local communities, exchanges of goods and services between households remain active and frequent. Certain resources are equally shared by kinsmen and neighbors, others only by kinsmen. In this chapter, I shall consider only the former which comes in two forms: (1) day-to-day sharing which is informal and often spontaneous; and (2) ritualized sharing which occurs on key occasions in both the life and the annual cycles.

DAY-TO-DAY SHARING

The ecosystem and the social system act together to encourage certain forms of sharing to thrive, particularly at Teppang-Karayan.

Exchanges (padigo) of raw and cooked food take place regularly between households. When a woman cooks something special, particularly for a party, she sets aside a portion to give to kinswomen and neighbors that she feels close to. Raw vegetables from the household plot are likewise given to those same persons. Since many Teppang-Karayan households have parcels that cannot be watered sufficiently to grow rice on, more of them experience these exchanges than do Rantai households. The abundant water of the numerous canals encourages the latter to dedicate more of their parcels to major cash crops.

Surplus vegetables come about because a household can eat only so much of a kind before the stock starts rotting and its members complain of the monotonous fare. Also, enterprising village women are not always able to sell all their produce at the weekly open market at San Esteban.

Though Foster's Tzintzintzuan also has food exchanges, there the food is discreetly wrapped in a shawl, in order to avoid notice (1967b: 162). In my two communities, the cooked food, though not flaunted, is carried about on an unwrapped plate.

Water for household use continues to be shared at Teppang-Karayan. Unlike Rantaians, who have been using water pumps and even faucets since the 1960s, most Teppang-Karayaners draw their water from the river and from open wells. The well-owner, usually a man of means, does not charge for his resource. It is understood, however, that

should an important occasion, such as a death or a wedding, arise, well-users ought to help his household.

House porches constitute a semi-public domain. When built of either hardwood or concrete, houses generally have ground floor porches whose raised cement pedestals double as permanent seats. While even friends of the family would hesitate to enter the house interior, unless expressly invited, porches mark a transitional zone between street and interior. Friends, neighbors, and occasional strangers sit here to escape the heat and exchange stories. In the evenings, it is interesting to watch a group form at Porch A, transfer to Porch B, across the street, and end, at bedtime, at B's neighbor, Porch C. But this is possible only if the porches abut directly on the street unencumbered by a surrounding fence. Porch-hopping is thus much more common at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai. As the maps show, more houses at the latter, than at the former, have protective enclosures. Also, because of the crowdedness at Teppang-Karayan, a house often has a neighbor on either side plus three across the street. At Rantai, many houses have only two immediate neighbors, one on either side, and they face either the fields or any of the various waterways. The isolatedness of Buyon houses (Lewis, 1971: 102) is also characteristic of Rantai.

Since parcels of land are small, it makes little sense for a farmer to insist on having his own draught animal which he has to pasture every day, even at peak periods in the cropping cycles. Consequently many farmers, in both communities, do not own their animals. Instead they borrow from kinsmen and close friends. As for the owners themselves, they have their animals pastured together by hired hands.

Certain services are also exchanged for free.

When Maria Santos' boys play at an empty lot beside Felipa Damon's house, the latter keeps an eye on them. Maria is not her kinswoman in any way, moreover her own children may not always be playing with them. Being immediate neighbors, the two women have become close friends over the years. Were Felipa Maria's kinswoman, she may discipline the boys should they start quarreling among themselves. Not being one, she calls Maria's attention in case of trouble. With the locus of authority so diffused among a wide circle of consanguines, affines, and non-related neighbors, the child grows up regarding many of them as second parents. This has been observed of other Ilocano communities by other authors (Young, n.d.: 196; Nydegger, 1966: 126).

If a house is to be made of bamboo and grass, the owner calls on his circle of kinsmen and friends to help (tagnawa) him. He feeds them a free meal every day until the task is completed. However, for a house of solid materials, such as hardwood, concrete and metal roofing, he hires and pays skilled craftsmen. Because of Rantai's higher income level, this work bee is rarer there than at Teppang-Karayan.

As one can see from this list, lower incomes and scanty irrigation at Teppang-Karayan actually encourage more sharing of goods and services among villagers. Even house location and layout--and thus pro hopping--may be traced to these limited resources. Since Teppang-Karayan is more crowded and land is at a premium, houses tend to practically jostle each other.

The one item in this list that would have an equal importance in both communities would be shared child-rearing. Though this may be influenced by scarce resources, other factors enter the picture. To discuss these causal influences would take us away from the topic.

In addition to this form of sharing, an impoverished villager can look forward to feasts.

RITUALIZED SHARING

Since these feasts have been influenced by religion, I should say something about the villagers' religious affiliations. Seen in these terms, Rantai households are more homogeneous than their Teppang-Karayan peers. Two-thirds of the former subscribe to Roman Catholicism, the rest profess Aglipayanism (also known as the Philippine Independent Church)¹ and various Protestant sects. In contrast, at Teppang-Karayan, the Aglipayans predominate. They account for over half of the households; Catholics form a fourth; and members of the various Protestant sects, the remainder. There is a small Church at Teppang-Karayan that exerts an influence out of proportion to its size--3.7 percent of the total population (n=143)--These are the Rizalists who worship the national heroes, Rizal, Bonifacio, Mabini, as incarnations of God.² The popular and now deceased village captain, Placido Madarang, was their first president. He was succeeded by his equally popular son, Crispin, a municipal councilor.

Still a common set of Christian-derived beliefs and practices overrides this pluralism in both communities. Even the Rizalists follow the Christian liturgical year.

Annual Feasts. Two annual feasts are of major importance in both villages. These are All Saints' Day and Christmas.

In contrast to Tagalog and Pampango communities, Holy Week plays an insignificant role in these villages, as far as community solidarity is concerned. In those non-Ilocano communities, the chanting of the Passion and Death of Christ in verse form is done by relays of men and women, young and old. The custom naturally encourages parties that involve even non-readers, whether they be neighbors or guests from the outside. In my two villages, the devout turn on their radios to listen to taped chanting.

All Saints' Day is an occasion for sharing among villagers, their kinsmen who reside in other places, and their dead kinsmen. Migrants residing as far away as Manila and the Tagalog provinces make an effort to come home and join their families in visiting and cleaning the tombs. Aside from flowers and candles, they leave rice and coconut cakes on top of the tombs, for the dead to partake of.

In a class by itself is the nocturnal service that Teppang-Karayan Rizalists hold at their temple on the night of the feast. Two tables stand in front of the altar: one with scores of lighted candles, the other with seven food offerings to the dead. Since the sermons are long, which any member so moved by the Spirit can deliver, many bring mats and pillows on which to recline. The atmosphere of this service, as of their usual bi-weekly ones, differs markedly from that of conventional Catholic, Aglipayan and Protestant services where the congregation sits on straight-backed pews. Impressive is the fact that the names of all the dead relatives the congregation wish to remember, are recited and prayed for. The litany lasts for 45 minutes.

Thus the individual member reestablishes his bonds with his ancestors by reciting their names; at the same time, by praying orally for his fellow-members' ancestors, he strengthens his bonds with the living. The prayers, ceremony and lengthy sermons end at half-past midnight with a supper of sweetcakes and coffee, enlivened by jokes and gossip. Again I found no such parallel among the various Christian churches of Teppang-Karayan and Rantai.

Another important feast is Christmas. This time the sharers are the living: kinsmen and neighbors. During Christmas Eve, Rantaians and Teppang-Karayaners, of both sexes, bake tube-shaped rice and coconut cakes (tuppig) in underground ovens. They regale anybody who passes by with cakes. Christmastime is also the season for dances.

Two such events took place during my stay at Teppang-Karayan.

One was held at the house of a lady who commutes back and forth between Honolulu and the village twice or thrice a year, thanks to her work at a Honolulu travel agency. For the past five years or so, she has been throwing a Christmas Eve party with plenty of dancing, singing, and food. On the night I was there, the guests, mostly men and women past their thirties, came largely from the hamlet and adjoining ones. Towards the end of the affair, on Christmas dawn, the hostess gave out candies to the children and flashlights to the village councilors.

The other event took place four nights earlier when the Bannatiran Social Club organized a dance for those in their late teens and early twenties. The event took place at a sort of plaza in the northernmost hamlet of Teppang. The evening's program consisted of song numbers,

speeches, and a drama. Dancing took place during the long breaks between each number. Late in the evening, the members served food to all who came: fellow-members, non-member villagemates, and guests from other places.

Being a Christmas phenomenon, the club lies dormant during most of the year. Indeed it really is a one-man club; for its founder and director since 1950, Gilberto Mortiz, does most of the work from assigning cooks to renting the sound equipment. Members raise funds for the dance by carolling the households--of Hawayanos especially. Bannatiran is an interesting phenomenon, both in terms of itself and in reference to another community association: Silaw. The latter began in the late 1950s for the same purpose of organizing Christmas festivities. Its members too solicited funds by carolling. During the past two decades, however, it has undergone an amazing transformation into a club that has sponsored the construction of a marketplace, a high school, and a consumers' cooperative. I shall discuss the stages of this transformation in another chapter.

Rantai too has a dance on Christmas Eve. This takes place on the main road that passes through the village. But no association, no recognized traditional leader initiates the party. After consulting with the village council, the youth plan the dance. As we shall see later on, what differentiates Rantai from Teppang-Karayan is not a lack of group solidarity but a preference for spontaneous, spur-of-the-moment enterprises.

Lewis says that the village fiesta is a rare phenomenon in Ilocos Norte because of "the vacuous social character of Buyon and other

barrios in Ilocos Norte" (1971: 164). Economic poverty or the desire to save are not the sole inhibiting factors.

It may be explained, instead, by the social narrowness of life in Buyon and the near absence of reciprocal obligations. There is little to celebrate as a barrio. There is no large socioeconomic grouping to warrant and receive ritual recognition and reinforcement; there is no barrio unit which merits the guardianship of a saint . . . The most effective social ties in Buyon is that of neighbors based and nurtured, as it is in Mambabanga, by reciprocal rights and obligations. But rather than compensating for the paucity of, and conflict in, other social ties, the neighbor relation is itself debilitated and weakened. Whereas conflict between neighbors in Mambabanga can be adjusted by moving to a new location, the shortage of land and house lots in Buyon, often the very bone of contention between kinsmen, seriously limits such a solution. Buyon is in fact very nearly a "place" only. (1971: 164)

I see the matter differently. The Christmas celebration has the character of a fiesta. The exchange of cakes with the passerby symbolizes a desire to share with all, especially with those most likely to pass by: one's neighbor. And the various parties that take place, to which all may come, indicate a ritual recognition of village or, at least, hamlet solidarity.

There may also be agricultural and political factors that influence the decision not to celebrate a fiesta outside Christmastide. Before the introduction of high-yielding varieties, the rice harvest took place in November or even the early part of December. A May fiesta, as is the custom in many Tagalog villages, would be out of place in a community like pre-1950s Teppang-Karayan, whose one crop--an uncertain one at that--was harvested five months earlier. There would be nothing to celebrate with at the height of the April and May drought. Teppang-Karayan's fiesta began in 1959 at the close of a decade that saw the

successful propagation of a cash crop: garlic. Indeed the community's ordinary citizens and fiesta organizers concur in explaining their fiesta's date. They scheduled it for the first week of April, so it would fall right after the garlic harvest.

The town mayor's policies would be the political factor to consider. Some of Rantai's neighbors used to have their own village fiestas. But sometime in the late 1960s, the mayor imposed a quota on all the villages; they each had to contribute a fixed amount of cash to the annual town fiesta. Rather than spend for two celebrations, villages cancelled their own. In contrast, Teppang-Karayan's mayor has never exacted contributions, from the villages as single units, for the town fiesta.

The fiesta that Teppang-Karayan celebrates with other South of the River villages is a three day affair highlighted by parades and evening programs. On the first afternoon, the finalists in the children's popularity contest are paraded around San Esteban on flower-decked floats. The Prince and Princess receive their golden crowns and gold lamé capes at the evening program at the community center. Afterwards, public dancing (by adults) takes place. Visiting ex-villagers now residing abroad demonstrate their stage talents in a variety show on the second night. The third day marks the climax. Throughout the preceding weeks, the female candidates of the various village councils and women's clubs have been competing with each other in amassing the most votes, as the most popular muse, and therefore in garnering the most contributions since each ballot is paid for. The winner is crowned the Fiesta Queen on the last night after solemn speeches and eulogies in verse by important dignitaries. As in the

children's contest, none of the participants loses since all receive coronets and special titles such as Miss Thrift, Miss Industry, Miss Progress and Miss New Society.

As a Tagalog who has been visiting village fiestas in and around his region, I noted some basic differences. But what struck me most was the essential austerity of the whole affair, as indeed of the fiestas in the town proper. For instance, in the neighborhood where I stayed, none of the wealthier families threw open their doors to everybody, whether friends and strangers, to join in their feast. Indeed none of them seemed to have gone out of their way to prepare a special meal. I did not spot any outdoor cooking or any cooking vigils such as precede wedding and burial feasts. And this neighborhood was where some of the more committed fiesta organizers resided. The meagerness of the region's resources seems to inhibit exuberant sharing even during fiestas.

Life Cycle Feasts. Least celebrated by villagers is a child's baptism. It may or may not entail a feast. Even when a feast takes place, it tends to be confined to a small circle of kinsmen and close friends.

Nor do weddings always entail feasting. If a couple wishes to avoid this expense, they have merely to elope, seek out a justice of the peace, and return several days later to the village, confident that no celebration will be expected by their kinsmen and friends, given the "hasty" circumstances. It is otherwise if they marry in church. The solemn, public character of the ritual calls for a large feast.

Preparations for a large feast begin a day in advance. Cooks are usually male since the task of preparing and cooking the meat in huge vats requires brawn and endurance. Moreover, they may be consanguines, affines or mere neighbors.

Feasting begins at noon as soon as the bridal party returns from church. After being presented to the community, the couples dance alone on the floor to be followed afterwards by the public. Merry-making lasts till nightfall when another round of feasting and dancing takes place. Neighbors, kinsmen, friends, and even strangers are welcome to these grand affairs.

Unless a household is destitute, by village standards, the one crisis even it is obliged to commemorate is a member's death.

A wake lasts at least a couple of days. It may go beyond this if the deceased's children live far away, abroad for instance, and will be coming home. During the entire period, refreshments are served to all who congregate at the house to keep vigil as well as to those who stop by to pay their respects. After the burial, the family members serve a banquet of rice and several meat dishes to all the participants. At the end of a period³ of intense mourning, during which the surviving spouse of either sex may not leave the house, another feast follows.

Right after lunch, a table is covered with an array of special food offerings (omras): an egg standing on a plateful of rice grains, a glass of gin or coke, betel nut, and native desserts. Rice and coconut cakes wrapped in banana leaves cluster artfully together on as many as fifteen plates, like little mountains. Flower-shaped rice crepes deck the peaks. The family and guests gather at the altar to

recite prayers for the dead. From the time they finish until midnight, no one may touch the offerings for fear of incurring death. During this period, the celebrant is believed to inhabit the offerings. While waiting for midnight, the family and its guests partake of refreshments and a light dinner. With the women gossiping inside the house and the teenagers and men playing records or gambling outside, the atmosphere is anything but heavy and sad. After midnight, all lightheartedly partake of the offerings.

The ritual takes place again on the thirtieth day (makabulan) after the deathday and a year later (makatawen). It, in fact, may be repeated every year. But such annual feasts are optional; they depend on the household's resources. What is obligatory, unless the house is obviously poor, are the other feasts.

Commemorative feasts may also take place at any time of the year for reasons of health. Once Adela Madarang of Teppang-Karayan developed lower back pains. Her dead husband had apparently tapped her on the shoulder, in a dream. She thus organized a feast in his honor, malagip (which literally means "to remember"), and invited her kinsmen and neighbors to pray and eat together.

Even outside these special feasts, the dead have a claim on the attention of the living. Whenever housewives broil meat or make sweet-cakes, they set aside a portion as an offering (atang) to the dead. They place the offering close to the spot frequented by the particular dead person during his or her lifetime: a stairway maybe inside the house or a balcony. The food is allowed to decompose.

So powerful are the dead that they can make the living ill. A visitor or a household member, who suddenly develops nausea, is said

to have temporarily received an ancestral spirit. Any ancestral garment pressed against the forehead relieves the malady. At the same time, it is the force of the dead's presence that obliges their heirs to hold feasts that promote kin and neighbor solidarity. These feasts do more than draw people together for the day. As we shall see in later chapters, to support these feasts, the heirs corporately inherit some parcels of riceland and they band together with kinsmen and neighbors in a special type of association.

To sum up, there are activities in both local communities that encourage dyadic and horizontal many-stranded coalitions (Figure 9). Some of these, like porch-sharing and food exchanges, are better

Activity	Rantai	Teppang-Karayan
Porch-sharing	X	XX
Shared child-rearing	X	X
Food exchanges	X	XX
Public celebrations of Christmas	X	XX
Fiesta	-	X
Midnight feast on All Saints Day	-	X

X present

XX either encouraged by circumstances (in the case of porch-sharing and food exchanges) or better organized (in the case of public Christmas feasts)

Figure 9. Activities that Encourage Dyadic and Horizontal Many-Stranded Relations at Rantai and Teppang-Karayan

encouraged by Teppang-Karayan's ecosystem: its shortage of house space and inadequate irrigation. At the same time, dyadic and vertical many-stranded coalitions differentiate Teppang-Karayan's activities from Rantai's. While public celebrations at Rantai spring from the participants' decision to organize them, those at Teppang-Karayan originate from this and from the existence of rich patrons, such as the Honolulu travel agent.

Nonetheless all is not peace and fellowship in these villages. Precisely because some resources are shared, severe conflicts are generated.

CONFLICTS AGGRAVATED BY SHARED RESOURCES

Sorceresses are more feared at Teppang-Karayan, where resource sharing and common-interest associations are more frequent and numerous, than at Rantai.

The accused are generally old women. Other than age and sex, no socioeconomic patterns identify them. They may be single or married, poor or prosperous. A common behavioral trait is their aloneness; though they do attend parties, they do not readily mix with their neighbors. And they tap people on the shoulders--a menacing gesture in the community, as witness Adela's dream. Illnesses they inflict are diarrhea, indigestion, and skin rash. Though one sorceress reputedly attacks her victims by releasing the smoke of a cigar in the direction of a victim's house, they generally harm their victims through direct body contact: by tapping them on their shoulders, by breathing on them or by poisoning their food and water.

Eating at parties can therefore be dangerous, and so can bathing with water from a deep well--the latter a daily activity at Teppang-Karayan.

Anybody, even a kinsman, may fall a victim; for the sorceress envies good looks and wealth. Nonetheless people do greet them politely in order to avoid disaster. At the same time, they carry a bottle of blessed coconut oil, as a talisman.

Thus the very factors that bring villagers together, feasting and deep wells, can pit them against some members of their own community. True, the mutual use of these wells adds to the multi-stranded ties among households in a neighborhood; but it can create tensions which are projected on to a scapegoat: the sorceress. Still these very accusations may foster another kind of solidarity, a sense of us, the potential victims, versus her. This is truer of Teppang-Karayan than of Rantai. Most Rantai households have stopped using deep wells since the early 1960s, when they switched over to pumps and faucets. I have been told that, over the past decade, Rantai's lone sorceress has lost her powers. Teppang-Karayan continues to have six "dangerous" women.

I would not reduce such a complex phenomenon as sorcery to only one variable. Its presence in both communities suggests underlying social tensions (Wilson, 1970) centering, in this case, on roles played by old women. Whatever these tensions may be, it is worth noting that ecological and economic factors aggravate them. Thus the general poverty of Teppang-Karayan fosters the continued use of semi-public open wells which, being easily contaminated, encourages sorcery accusations.

And yet so pragmatic are the villagers that they do not mind having sorceresses as fellow-members in their associations. As we shall see, one type of association, the social savings, calls for contributions of uncooked rice and cash to a member household. Take the case of Emilio. Like everybody else, he accuses his first cousin, Crisostoma, of being a sorceress. He claims she breathed on his neck during a feast, as a result of which he developed diarrhea. But, when asked whether he minds having her as a fellow member in the same savings association, he says no. He will accept rice from her, as long as it is uncooked.

The resource sharing practices I have described here apply to both kinsmen and non-kinsmen. There are practices that hold true only of kinsmen.

SUMMARY

Despite the general poverty of the two communities, some goods and services are shared between households. These take two forms: (1) day-to-day sharing and (2) ritualized sharing. Examples of the first are food exchanges, mutual use of open wells, the semi-public character of ground floor porches, communal child rearing, and work bees for house-building. Under the second form of sharing would be the various annual and life-cycle feasts.

The rarity of village fiestas in Ilocos Norte has been attributed to economic poverty and the narrow social ties among neighbors and kinsmen. I believe, however, that Christmas plays the role of a fiesta. The cake exchanges, the public dances, and the feasts indicate a desire to celebrate their sense of togetherness. As for a fiesta outside

Christmastide, agricultural and political factors may explain its absence at Rantai and its presence at Teppang-Karayan.

The most important life-cycle feast centers on death. The numerous and various forms it takes emphasize its crucial role. So important are these feasts that they have given rise to social savings associations and to corporately owned parcels of land.

Nevertheless, for all the sharing among kinsmen and neighbors, some serious tensions lurk beneath the surface. Certain old women are singled out as sorceresses who inflict sickness on those they envy, through poisoned water and food. The very fact that water and food are often shared with neighbors and relatives--and thus easily contaminated--aggravates suspicions of sorcery.

CHAPTER V--NOTES

1. The Philippine Independent Church began, during the Philippine Revolution, as a protest against Rome's persistent backing of the Spanish friars who had taken over parishes that were manned by native diocesan priests in traditionally Catholic areas. (Unless there is a severe shortage of diocesan priests, the Church norm is that the bishop and the priests of his diocese run the parishes. Members of the religious orders devote themselves to education, to hospital work or to opening parishes in mission areas.) Gregorio Aglipay, an ordained priest from Ilocos Norte and the Vicar-General of the Philippine Army, led the protest. Though he retained traditional Catholic dogma, he translated the liturgy into the vernacular--a radical measure in pre-Vatican II days; installed only native priests in the newly vacated parishes; and offered Jose Rizal, the national hero, for veneration as a saint. During the heyday of the Revolution, Aglipay's Church promised to become the national church. Today, however, its small membership centers largely on Ilocano communities.

What began as a nationalist protest against foreign domination seems to have assumed class overtones. While many villages are Aglipayan, the towns proper are Roman Catholic. Significantly enough, though Ilocos Norte never was a magnet for Spanish migration, villagers attribute the haughtiness of the town elite, their former landlords, to "their Spanish blood."

It may be that the largely non-Catholic allegiance of Teppang-Karayaners makes them more conscious of their identity as a community vis-à-vis the town proper, whereas the opposite is true in largely Catholic Rantai.

2. Even more nationalistic is the Rizalist Church which began in the Tagalog Region and now has offshoots in the Ilocos. Its members argue that Aglipay took an important but nonetheless incomplete step in forming a truly Filipino Church. Despite his liturgy, Aglipay espoused foreign dogmas and worshipped foreign gods: Jesus, Mary and the panoply of Catholic saints. The Trinity should consist rather of God the Father, God the Sacred Motherland, and God the Holy Spirit who dwells in three heroes: Rizal, Bonifacio, and Mabini. Rizalists revere the Philippine flag and images of the heroes, instead of the cross and the host. They go to temple services, not once but twice a week, clad in what they take to be costumes of the Revolutionary period: white barong tagalog shirt for the men, and an all white Maria Clara dress for the women.

The local temple centers around a woman who introduced the cult fifteen years ago and practices healing. A dynamic speaker, she regales her congregation with prophecies about the coming Golden Age, miracle-stories, and reports of her victorious debates with townspeople over religion. However she is not the only speaker. She encourages anyone who feels moved by the Spirit to stand up and talk.

I was tempted to include the Church as another common-interest association. It is the one group that successfully combines instrumental and expressive purposes. Its members come together, not only to study and propagate the faith, but to enjoy each other's company as well. Though the other Churches at the crossroads of San Esteban attract only a few women and children to their once-a-week services, the Rizalist Temple is packed with members, male and female, young and adult, during the two weekly services which ran over two hours. Also, the members have frequent parties together. I have seen men and women eagerly volunteering to help repair the temple or to cook. I decided, however, to confine my analysis to purely secular associations.

3. The periods of mourning differ from one community to the other:
 - 1) At Teppang-Karayan, nine days of seclusion and prayers follow the burial; at Rantai, seven days only.
 - 2) At Teppang-Krayan, prayers and a commemorative feast are held nine months after the burial; at Rantai, seven months after.

CHAPTER VI

KIN-CENTERED SHARING

Given the small size of Ilocos Norte farms, their division among heirs ought to be fraught with tensions, thus inhibiting any fruitful cooperation among the heirs and their children (Lewis, 1971: 91, 197, 165). In my two communities, the division of parental property did indeed generate strife. However, I found out that there were two factors that counterbalanced this: (1) Some kinds of ancestral property are owned jointly by the heirs; and (2) there are several options a villager may adopt in order to gain access to a kinsman's resources--precisely on the basis of kinship.

First, however, let us look at the context: the Ilocano's kinship system. Following Scheans' scheme (1962), we can examine its two sets of terms, of address and of reference, as a code that shapes and is shaped in turn by actual behavior.

THE KINSHIP SYSTEM

Basing himself on Ilocano terms of reference, Scheans (1962: 42-43) identifies three concentric circles in this kinship system. The innermost is the nuclear family, the outermost the full kindred and, in-between, the core kindred. The latter consists of both parents' male and female siblings and their sons and daughters. The full kindred has, as its vertical limit, Ego's great-great grandparent and, as its horizontal limit, his third cousin. These boundaries are suggested by the fact that the Ilocano language has terms for kin

relations up to great-great grandparent and third cousin but not beyond.

The kindred's focal point, Ego, is expected to engage in frequent and intensive interactions primarily with those who are closest to him by blood, less so with those who stand in the outermost circle. He patterns his relationships with his kindred upon his role in the nuclear family (Scheans, 1962: 7). According to Scheans (1962: 35-38, 42), three principles that structure both the nuclear family and the kindred are:

1. Bilaterality of descent: Both father's and mother's kinsmen are Ego's kinsmen and should be treated accordingly.

2. Generational separation: Terms proper to each generation mark it off from the rest. Mother is ina while father is ama; parent's siblings are ikit (parent's sister) or uliteg (parent's brother) while Ego and his/her siblings are kaanakan to parents' siblings, anak to own parents.

3. Sibling equivalence: Regardless of age and sex, all siblings are kabsat, similarly all first cousins are kasinsin.

Ego is thus expected to treat both mother's and father's kinsmen as his own with due respect for generational distance.

Through the skillful use of terms of address, Ego can either expand or contract this universe. He can bring both kin and nonkin closer to himself by addressing them as though they were members of his own nuclear family (Scheans, 1962: 44-46). Thus Ego can address an aunt as Mother (Nana); an uncle as Father (Tata); cousins as Elder Brother (Manong), Elder Sister as (Manang), Younger Brother as (Adi) or Younger Sister as (Adi); nieces and nephews as My Child (Anak ko).

Indeed he can address outsiders as well with these terms. With the consent of the other party, Ego can decrease genealogical distance to increase the positive affect between the two of them (Scheans, 1962: 58). Or the reverse may take place. Scheans (1962: 58) tells of a woman who refused to get overly involved with her husband's male second cousin. She refused to be called manang (elder sister); she preferred ipag (sister-in-law).

Paralleling the consanguinal system is the affinal. Again the three principles of bilaterality, generational separation and sibling-based equivalence structure this system. Any parent-in-law of whatever sex is katugangan, a child-in-law manugang. Whether male or female, the spouse is a neutral asawa, implying thereby, according to Scheans (1962: 48) a balanced pair and thus the sibling relationship.

As in the case of his consanguines, Ego may use terms of address to create a positive affect. Kin terms his spouse uses towards both her distant and close kinsmen become his as well. Because he calls an older first cousin-in-law manong, the latter becomes more than an affine or even a cousin; through a judicious use of terms, Ego "becomes the Ego in her (the spouse's) kindred" (1962: 52).

The Spanish Catholic institution of fictive co-parenthood (compadrazgo) expands the kinship network considerably; for non-kin, who act as sponsors at a baptism or wedding, become ceremonial parents to the child or the couple and ritual siblings to the real parents. They are expected to give a gift to the baptized child and the bridal pair at least during the occasion itself, and to provide help in the

future--usually in the form of cash--to their fictive child. Non-relatives are called compadre (co-father) and comadre (co-mother) by their fictive co-parents. However if kinsmen are the co-parents, consanguineal and affinal terms are used instead.

With this kinship system in mind, we can now take a look at two interrelated property transactions among kinsmen.

BRIDEWEALTH AND INHERITANCE

Bridewealth in both local communities consists of three gifts: (1) the sab-ong or the groom's gift to the bride of the wherewithal for a prosperous future; (2) the sagut or the gift of household accessories made by the man's cousins; and (3) the parruwad (also called the nagubbaan) or remuneration to his parents-in-law. The first and third gifts are essential to the transaction; the second is optional.

The sab-ong that a man offers his bride-to-be are instruments of production and consist of such things as a carabao, a plow, a cart, jewelry, cash and land. Of these cash and land are the most essential. Ideally both should be given together, however one or the other may be given instead if the groom's resources obviously do not permit it. Should the groom be landless, he may offer a carabao or, failing even this, a harvested crop earned on another man's land.

To compensate the girl's parents for raising her and allowing her to leave the household, the groom makes them a gift of cash which again is negotiated according to his station in life. Inevitably, Hawayanos are expected to give more.

In both local communities, all the male heirs, in principle, inherit equal shares of the farmland. However, in actual fact, modifications do occur. An heir who has had more years of schooling and has a steady job in the city may give up his claim in favor of his village siblings; he may ask any of the latter to farm a parcel as a sharecropper; or he may allow the sibling to appropriate the farm's entire yield. Indeed his village siblings may exert pressure on him to act in any of these ways.

In the daughter's case, her share of the farmland depends on various factors in both communities. If a Rantai woman has brothers she does not expect to inherit riceland; for she will receive some land from her groom. The amount of land her parents do give her will be smaller than that of her brothers. Only if there are no male heirs do the daughters receive equal portions of the land.

Women's right to inherit farmland at Teppang-Karayan is complicated by social class. Parents who believe they have enough land give their daughter a share equal to her brothers'. However, poorer farmers complain that the land is too small to give to women who, anyway, will receive land upon marriage.

Quarrels among heirs, in both communities, come about for any of the following reasons:

1. Since farms are divided into parcels, one sibling may get a share that is slightly bigger than another's despite the ideal of equal division;
2. A sibling's piece of land may be better situated than another's;

3. A daughter may not inherit any piece of land because her groom will offer her bridewealth anyhow;
4. A sibling may feel that since he took care of his parents in their old age, he should receive more than the others as compensation;
5. An in-law may ask his/her spouse to claim his/her share even during the parents' lifetime; or
6. An aunt or uncle who is childless gives his/her share to a niece/nephew who, in addition to this, will also inherit from his/her parents.

While factors 1 and 3 relate to the size and distribution of the land, the rest do not and would be just as possible in a context of abundance. Divisions of parental property consisting of large urban estates among two or three siblings have been occasions for bitter quarrels among wealthy families in Manila and, I suspect, elsewhere in the world as well. It seems more accurate to state that where individual ownership is the norm, property division can engender conflict, regardless of the size involved. Since each individual has his own interests to protect, he tends to view potential rivals with suspicion, even if they are kinsmen. Their gain may well be his loss.

Though key resources are in short supply, there are mechanisms that redistribute these resources among kinsmen. Or to phrase it differently, there are ways in which a less fortunate household can gain access to resources on the strength of kin ties. We can distinguish two such ways. One is what I would call institutionalized forms, for it involves long-term relationships that have to be approved

either by law courts or by custom. The other is patronage. Though the latter can, of course, take place between non-kinsmen, there are many instances, at Teppang-Karayan, where this is resorted to precisely on the basis of blood ties.

INSTITUTIONALIZED WAYS OF SHARING

There are two institutionalized ways of sharing: one is through corporate or quasi-corporate ownership of property, the other is through what I would call "partnerships."

Corporations and Quasi-Corporations. In his community, Scheans (1962: 68-69) came upon property (sakop) jointly owned by siblings. This could consist of farm tools, farm animals, large seine nets, houses or land. Property embraced by this arrangement at Teppang-Karayan are: (1) riceland, (2) the parental house or (3) woodlands. Rantai has none of these.

Some parcels of riceland at Teppang-Karayan are inherited jointly by all the children of a deceased couple. Each year, an heir of either sex assumes the responsibility of cultivating the parcel, harvesting its yield and selling it to finance the commemorative feast on a dead parent's birthday. The parcel so used is deemed too small to divide, in the first place, among so many households. Some retain joint ownership for another reason: they want to avoid the trouble of hiring and paying for a lawyer. The life-span of such parcels is short. If the parcel is used for the ancestral feast, once the last of the ancestor's children will have died, the grandchildren will either sell or divide the parcel. If the purpose is to avoid paying legal fees

and separate taxes, the arrangement becomes dependent on the participants' mutual goodwill. Anytime one of them chooses to withdraw his share, he may do so. And indeed many appear to have done so; for none of these jointly owned parcels are more than two generations old.

A more enduring form of corporate ownership has arisen in relation to Teppang-Karayan woodlands. These woodlands are located in the nearby hills that effectively wall off the district from the municipality south of it. Because the number of heirs per woodland is large, co-owners prefer to keep the holding intact rather than to subdivide it into parcels that would be too miniscule to be of any use. Thus the Ganiron-Bumatay woodland, whose membership runs to 200 households living in several villages, is only seven hectares in size. If divided, only 350 square meters would fall to each household. According to informants, this would not yield enough firewood for a household's annual needs since most of the branches should not be cut if continued growth is to be sustained.

Because these corporations conform to most of Firth's criteria (1963: 26-29), I would call them bilateral or cognatic descent groups. There is a common name transmitted in relation to a specific resource. Thus the woodlands are known as "Ganiron woodland" or, "de la Cruz woodland." The point of attachment through which a member validates his claim is through the founding ancestors. In the case of the Ganiron-Bala woodland, all those who can trace their ancestry back to its original owners, five Bala siblings, are co-owners of the woodland. As suggested by genealogies, the siblings, three males and two females, began or assumed ownership of the woodland, at the turn of

the nineteenth century. The right to share in this holding is traced bilaterally, i.e., through the mother, the father, or both. No residence rules govern this share; what matters is a household's participation in the annual woodcutting season. Nor are there marriage rules that the member must follow. But Firth (1963: 29) says this really is less important for bilateral than for unilineal descent groups.

These cognatic descent groups spring to life during the months of August and September when a break occurs in the sequence of storms and typhoons. Heading each group is an elder (panglakay, pangamaen or, maestro kabesilya) that all the member households elect. His duties are the following:

1. to determine the days when wood will be cut,
2. to inform the members of these days,
3. to coordinate the cutting, and
4. to pay the annual tax on behalf of the corporation.

Though the elder holds office for only as long as he performs his duties well, in practice he stays for a lifetime. Assisting him is a secondary headman (escribiente) who is either elected or may be appointed by him.

After an offering is made to the land's dead owners, cutting begins. The participants are all males acting on their own behalf, their wives or either of their parents. At the end of each day they bring their bundles to the headman for redistribution. Depending on the particular corporation, between 50 to 75 percent of the cut wood stays with the cutter. The rest goes to the stocks (puunan) that own the woodland. Within each sub-division of a stock, the oldest surviving members, in other words, those who stand closest to the original

founders, receive the tribute which they in turn redistribute among all the member houses of their lineage. Thus households that did not participate in the wood-cutting may receive some of it, especially if an elderly member heads it. The cutters themselves obtain wood twice, first through their efforts, secondly through the tribute.

Most Teppang-Karayan households, around 80 percent of them, according to the woodland headman, are co-owners of the Ganiron-Bala woodland, since they can trace their ancestry back to the original owners. At the same time they may also participate in at least one other holding. Thus the Madarang cut wood at both the Ganiron-Bumatay hill and at the property bearing their name. But not all shareholders exercise this right. For instance, though Gregorio Madarang participates in at least two woodlands, he prefers to buy wood; for he has the money but not the time to cut wood. In the case of Ernesto Lomboy, he finds it more convenient to collect driftwood since his ancestral holding is too far away.

But some households do not enjoy any such asset; instead they have to gather wood from scattered stands of trees that belong to no one. Or they may haul driftwood from the river.

Hitherto the existence of cognatic descent groups in the Philippines has been noted only of the Sagada Igorots who live in the Cordillera, again in connection with woodlands (Eggan, 1960: 29). Scheans (1962: 68-69) points out that the jointly owned properties in Suba have not given rise to descent groups. Quite clearly this is not the case at Teppang-Karayan. Their presence among Ilocanos, who have had more continuous contact with both state and urban center, should not surprise us. Recent writers have discovered cognatic

descent groups even among modern upper class families in modern Peru (Gilbert, 1981), Canada (Leyton, 1965), and the U.S. (Mitchell, 1978).

One theory is that a limited amount of resources in relation to a large group of heirs stimulates the formation of cognatic descent groups (Fox, 1969: 153). Moreover, tracing descent bilineally has the advantage of allowing an heir to participate in several descent groups. Should the resources of one group be too small, he can make use of his membership in another descent group. Thus cognatic descent groups, rather than unilineal ones, are popular in areas with circumscribed resources, for instance, small island communities (Goodenough, 1955: 80-81; Caplan, 1969: 425-426; Fox, 1969: 153). The situation at Teppang-Karayan fits in with this. Without restrictions on who can cut and when they can do so, the woodlands would quickly disappear. Use of the resources has to be planned and controlled.

The parcels of riceland held in common seem to come about because they are too small to divide among so many heirs. But this alleged reason may be only one cause, and a minor one at that. More important may be the desire to remember the deceased owner; for the harvest is set aside for the anniversary feast. Due to the erratic nature of the irrigation water supply, households cannot be sure that their harvest will suffice for their own consumption, let alone for the ancestral feast. A piece of land held in trust for the ancestor overcomes this difficulty. The memorial feast may be important for quite practical reasons. It is to the advantage of poorer households to remind their wealthier kinsmen of their blood ties; for these can be invoked in case of need. The annual anniversary feast vividly recalls this primal bond.

However there are also jointly owned parcels that do not serve any commemorative feast. Thus Edgardo Lomboy, his first cousin, Pablo, and his two other first cousins jointly own a hectare of riceland. They refuse to divide this ancestral property because of the legal hassles; besides he and Pablo are used to each other. Indeed Edgardo's and Pablo's friendship is one of the warmest I have seen. Though their houses stand in different hamlets, they often come together, after the day's work, to drink, chat and joke with each other at a corner store. Indeed why should they separate? It seems that when the parties concerned clearly perceive their rights and duties, act accordingly and brook no outside interference, their willingness to own land together and their harmonious interaction have a positive feedback on each other.

But why is this arrangement absent at Rantai? Rantaians argue that the arrangement implies a division of work. Although it is the group that owns the holding, nonetheless each person is expected to put in an equal amount of labor. The rotation plowing may create friction; for Roberto may think that his brother, Pablo, does not put in as much time this year as Roberto did last year when it was his turn. Or another sibling, Juan, may die suddenly, leaving three sons in his stead to care for the plot this year and wondering how they are to divide their labor accordingly. Moreover, the locus of decision-making may be ill-defined. Does it reside in the heirs as a whole or in their informal head?

We shall meet this attitude of Rantaians towards formalized sharing of resources again in this chapter and in the last. Aside from explaining why they do not have associations, this attitude calls in question

the commonly held notion that interdependence fosters harmony and fellowship. This will be dealt with below.

Teppang-Karayaners have institutionalized another way of sharing resources. At first glance, it seems restricted to only the immediate parties concerned: the parental couple and their youngest son.

Ancestral houses at Teppang-Karayan are not sold, upon the parents' death, and their proceeds divided among the heirs. Instead the youngest son automatically assumes ownership of the house even though his older siblings may have invested more time and effort in its upkeep than he has. This has given rise to an arrangement where the aging parents and the youngest son, whether married or not, live together under one roof.

Within recent years, the stem family has been the focus of an interesting debate. One school of thought, typified by Isaevich (1975: 293) links the arrangement to impartible inheritance. To keep the holding intact and thus maintain the family's socioeconomic status, the household head chooses only one heir among his sons. The rest either migrate or stay around as celibates. Such an arrangement has prevailed in the small farms of Northern Spain. Verdon (1979) does not agree with this interpretation. He argues that the stem family appeared, during the nineteenth century, in both thinly populated Quebec and in an Ireland where population pressure on farmland had begun to ebb because of outmigration (1979: 98-99). The denominator common to both places was heavy male outmigration. To ensure that at least one offspring stay to take care of them in their old age, parents willed their property intact to only one son (1979: 102). Verdon (1979: 91) thus points out that the stem family, being

residential in nature, should not be confused with the extended family. It may be defined as two groups co-residing under one roof and linked together by filiation.

At Buyon, Lewis (1971: 91-92) notes that parents hold off giving their eldest son land he needs as bridewealth. Land is in short supply; and they need the land as a source of support in their old age. Or else they may mortgage the land to finance their eldest son's migration abroad. As a result, the second son finds himself compelled to leave as well. By the time the mortgage is redeemed or the parents are in their old age, their effective support and their dominant heir is their youngest son.

What makes Teppang-Karayan's case unique is that a non-productive resource is willed intact. Perhaps the urge to migrate has become so compelling, given the limited opportunities, that parents have to find a way to keep at least one of their sons with them in their old age. However, since the ideal of equal partible inheritance is still firmly entrenched, parents avoid provoking conflict among their children by willing not their farmland but their house.

As I remarked earlier, benefits here seem to be restricted to only the two parties concerned. But perhaps these do redound to a wider circle since the annual ancestral feast becomes doubly significant when held within the celebrant's house. The various beliefs about the dead ancestor's presence in the house indicate how closely linked the place is to his memory. By keeping the house intact, the heir does his siblings, especially the more filial ones, a service. Through the house, siblings are able to keep alive their parents' memory and

thus their fraternal bonds as well. In times of need, a Teppang-Karayaner may find it easier than the Rantaian to evoke these bonds. There is a positive feedback process that operates here. The house becomes a symbol of fraternal bonds; at the same time, fraternal solidarity encourages preserving the house's physical integrity.

Rantaians oppose this "nonsensical" practice of passing the house to only the youngest son for the same reason they oppose corporately owned farms: It engenders conflict. They prefer to sell the house upon a parent's death, and divide the proceeds among all the heirs. Each can therefore go his separate way without fear of stepping on others' toes. Because they have enough resources, they can sell family property and still have enough for each.

Though the effect of population pressure on resources is direct in the case of cognatic descent groups and indirect in the case of the stem family and corporate ricelands, we can certainly say that it does not weaken and sunder kin interdependence at Teppang-Karayan. Or to put it in another way, a fellow who resents receiving a piece of riceland, smaller than his brother's, would still maintain close ties with him because they may be co-heirs of a woodland and riceland intended for the ancestral feast. At the same time, he can make use of precisely their blood ties to gain access to his resources.

"Partnerships". Fosterage is an important institution in the Ilocos and comes about because of various reasons. A couple may be childless --in a culture that values having children. Or, the couple may have children who are grown up now and have established their separate households; as a result, the couple needs someone, preferably a second

grandson, who can farm for them and eventually inherit the holding itself (Nydegger, 1966: 45). A recently retired Hawayano may adopt a child either as a source of dollar income (for the latter is eligible for social security benefits till 21 years) or as a helper in household chores and in caring for his own natural children (Young, n.d.: 192). The natural parents themselves may find that they have too many children and gladly pass on the responsibility of providing for a child's food, clothing and education to another couple.

In some cases, the immediate catalyst may be the weaning of a child (Nydegger, 1966: 139). To facilitate the process, some mothers send their children to stay at a kinsman's house within the same village for a few days. However, these motivations and circumstances described above may intervene and lead to the child's being kept for a long time; for instance up to twenty years (Young n.d.: 184). In other cases, either the would-be parents or the natural parents may approach the other party to make an offer.

Foster parents usually reside in the same village as the natural parents. Though fosterage, in some cases, is accompanied by court proceedings and a change in family name, the child always retains its ties with its natural parents and may spend as much time with them as with its new ones. Foster parents are regarded as co-parents rather than as surrogates. Because of this, they maintain close kin ties to the natural parents. They may be the latter's sibling, parent's sibling, cousin or even parent.

This practice undoubtedly helps redistribute wealth and resources (Young, n.d.: 18) since households that foster children are better

off economically. They own land and receive cash remittances because of either past or present outmigration to the U.S. None of the foster parents in either of my two communities were poorer than the natural parents. They give the child more food and better clothes than its own parents can give it. Also they provide for its education. Indeed the latter responsibility may be another cause of fosterage, especially in the case of the eldest child.

For the natural parents, the foster child becomes not only one burden less but an investment as well. If the child is sent to a college in the city, obtains a degree and embarks on a well-paying career, its natural parents can be assured of a steady source of support in their old age. Through the child an alliance inevitably develops between the two sets of parents. The foster parents feel they have contracted a debt of obligation to the natural parents for giving them one of their children. Young (n.d.: 200) mentions the case of Carlos who gave his aunt one of his children. As a result, she paid for his entry into a career. Thus a young Rantain father who earns a meager income as a jeepney conductor wants to have another child, in addition to his three-year-old son, "so he could be adopted by a Hawayano."

As an option, fosterage exists in both communities I studied. Poorer Teppang-Karayan has predictably more fosterage cases than Rantai (Table 22). Its figure, for foster parents, is thrice that of Rantai's and, for parents whose child is being fostered, one-and-a-half times that of Rantai's.

Should a village in either community harbor a grudge against his brother over their inheritance, he can still manage to gain access to these resources by having his child fostered by his brother. Better

Table 22

Adoption

Adoption by Household				
	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
No	128	89.5	113	95.8
Yes	<u>15</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Total	143	100.0	118	100.0

Adoption from Household				
	Teppang-Karayan		Rantai	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
No	132	92.3	111	94.1
Yes	<u>11</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5.9</u>
Total	143	100.0	118	100.0

yet he could have his child fostered by his parents for, in case his parents die, he could administer their piece of land on his child's behalf.

Another option is possible. The villager could marry off his daughter to his brother's son or even to his own brother. Interkin marriage is another form of alliance that enables the villager to consolidate or even expand his resources.

Marriage may take place between a man and any of the following:

1. his cousin from either side, whether of the first, second or third degree;
2. either his sibling's or cousin's daughter;
3. or either of his parent's cousin, whether of the first, second or third degree.

What makes marriage between first cousins remarkable in a Christian Philippine context is that many of the churches frown on the practice. Villagers themselves are aware of a taboo on the practice; they giggle in embarrassment when they mention such-and-such marriage and say that it is not right that a girl and a boy who carry the same family name should marry. There is even greater uneasiness about marriages between a man and his brother's daughter. Just the same, villagers are extremely candid about why such marriages take place: (1) to strengthen kin ties and (2) "to keep the family property from passing into the outsiders' hands" (tapno saan a maisabali ti kukuada).

Though the land that a woman receives, upon marriage, goes to her rather than to her parents; nonetheless, like the rest of her siblings, she is expected to help support them in their old age. Thus any conflict over inheritance that a villager may have with his sibling or first cousin is cancelled out by having his daughter marry his kinsman's son.

Intragenerational kin marriages, that is, between cousins, have been a traditional practice (Hydegger, 1966: 47; Lewis, 1971: 90). What seems fairly new is intergenerational kin marriages, i.e., uncle-niece marriages. Here again property considerations are at work. Due to a shortage of Filipinas in Hawaii, during the 1920s and 1930s,

many ex-plantation workers from that generation who return to the village are old and single. Since the aged retiree will not be interested in farming his sizable ricelands, inevitably he will cast about for a tenant. His preference is to look to his siblings, and among them, the brother whose daughter he has married will be favored.

The marriage between a man and his mother's first cousin which I came upon is unique and is probably an exception. It was contracted by a farmer, during the late 1930s, when he was around twenty-one.

Until three decades ago, tunggali was a common practice: a brother and his sister were married off to a corresponding pair from another household so that, in the exchange of bridewealth, a perfect circle resulted. Also favored in the past was singgalot or intermarriage between two families, generation after generation, in the manner of a phratry. This kept property circulating within those two families only. In the absence of these options, a last resort seems to have been non-kin territorial endogamy: marriage to somebody from at least the same village or neighboring villages so that property would remain within the immediately surrounding territory.

Intragenerational kin marriages necessarily take place between propertied families for the purpose is to consolidate family property. This is not necessarily the case with intergenerational kin marriages. While the fellow who marries his brother's daughter is a retiree with a steady dollar income, his own brother, his father-in-law, may not even have a piece of land. No doubt, in the cases I have observed, the father-in-law has land. But he may have acquired this as a consequence of his daughter's marriage. A more thorough research should include data on the father-in-law's property history.

Marital patterns for male household heads differ significantly between the two communities in several respects:

1. The number of male household heads at Teppang-Karayan who marry their own kin is over three times higher (24%) than that of Rantai (7.4%) (Tables 23, 24, 25);
2. Endogamous marriages, which we can define as marriage with someone belonging to a household within a one kilometer radius from one's village, is again higher at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai: 64.9 percent vs. 50.3 percent. At the same time, Teppang-Karayan marriages contracted with someone from a different town are a paltry 2.19 percent compared to Rantai's 30.8 percent (Tables 26, 27, 28).
3. Marriages between close kin occur in Teppang-Karayan at practically all age levels. This is not the case at Rantai (Table 24).

The significance of these patterns is best seen when we recall that, unlike Rantaians, most Teppang-Karayan households have farms outside their municipality. Also, more of the household heads have lived and worked outside Ilocos Norte for extended periods. Despite these migratory patterns, kinspersons, as marriage partners, figure more prominently at Teppang-Karayan than Rantai.

There is yet another option left to a fellow who feels aggrieved by the division of parental property. Either he or his children could play clients to a sibling with more resources.

PATRONAGE

Highly visible at Teppang-Karayan is the help extended by the more prosperous individuals to the child of either their sibling or first cousin. The outstanding example is Josue Madarang. Coming from

Table 23. Interkin Marriages: Teppang-Karayan

Household Head's Age-level	Consanguinity With Wife						Total
	First Cousin	Second Cousin	Third Cousin	Uncle	Nephew	No Relation	
15-19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20-24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
25-29	-	1* 0.8** 20.0**	-	1 0.8 20.0	-	3 2.4 60.0	5
30-34	-	2 1.6 15.8	1 0.8 7.6	-	-	10 8.1 76.0	13
35-39	-	2 1.6 18.0	-	-	-	9 7.3 81.0	11
40-44	-	2 1.6 22.2	-	-	-	7 5.6 77.7	9
45-49	-	2 1.6 18.0	-	-	-	9 7.3 82.0	11
50-54	-	1 0.8 5.0	3 2.4 16.6	1 0.8 5.5	0.8 5.5	12 9.7 66.6	18

Table 23 (continued) Interkin Marriages: Teppang-Karayan

Household Head's Age-level	Consanguinity with Wife						Total
	First Cousin	Second Cousin	Third Cousin	Uncle	Nephew	No Relation	
55-59	-	3 2.4 20.0	-	-	-	12 9.7 80.0	15
60-64	-	1 0.8 12.5	1 0.8 12.5	-	-	6 4.8 75.0	8
65-69	1 0.8 5.8	2 1.6 11.7	2 1.6 11.7	-	-	12 9.7 70.5	17
70+	1 0.8 6.2	1 0.8 6.2	1 0.8 6.2	-	-	13 10.5 81.0	16
Total	2	13	10	4	1	93 =	123

*Number of households
 **Percent of total
 ***Percent of row

Table 24. Interkin Marriages: Rantai

Household Head's Age-level	Consanguinity with Wife						Total
	First Cousin	Second Cousin	Third Cousin	Uncle	Nephew	No Relation	
15-19	-	-	-	-	-	1* 0.9** 100.9***	1
20-24	-	-	-	-	-	1 0.9 100.0	1
25-29	-	-	-	-	-	14 13.0 100.0	14
30-34	-	-	-	-	-	15 14.0 100.0	15
35-39	-	-	-	1 0.9 6.0	-	14 13.0 94.0	15
40-44	-	-	-	-	-	9.0 8.4 100.0	8
45-49	-	-	1 0.9 12.5	-	-	7 6.5 87.5	8

Table 24 (continued) Interkin Marriages: Rantai

Household Head's Age-level	Consanguinity with Wife						Total
	First Cousin	Second Cousin	Third Cousin	Uncle	Nephew	No Relation	
50-54	2 1.8 15.3	-	-	-	-	11 10.2 84.6	13
55-59	-	-	-	-	-	11 10.2 100.0	11
60-64	-	-	-	-	-	5 4.6 100.0	5
65-69	-	-	-	1 0.9 14.3	-	6 5.6 85.7	7
70+	2 1.8 22.2	-	-	1 0.9 11.1	-	6 5.6 66.6	9
Total	4	-	1	3	-	100	= 108

*Number of households
 **Percent of total
 ***Percent of row

Table 25. A Comparison of Interkin Marriages in the Two Communities

Village	Consanguinity with Wife						Total Male Household
	First Cousin	Second Cousin	Third Cousin	Uncle	Nephew	No Relation	
<u>Teppang-Karayan:</u>							
Total no.	2	13	10	4	1	93	123
%	1.6	10.6	8.1	3.3	0.8	75.6	100.0
<u>Rantai:</u>							
Total no.	4	-	1	3	-	100	108
%	3.7		0.9	2.8		92.6	100.0

Table 26. Marriages by Residential Patterns: Teppang-Karayan

Household Head's Age-level	Wife's Residence Before Marriage				Total
	Same Village	Next**** Village	Same Municipality	Different Municipality	
15-19	-	-	-	-	-
20-24	-	-	-	-	-
25-29	2* 1.6** 40.0***	2 1.6 40.0	- - -	1 0.8 20.0	5
30-34	4 3.2 30.7	- 2.4 23.0	3 4.8 46.2	6	12
35-39	1 0.8 9.0	3 2.4 27.0	3 2.4 27.0	4 3.2 36.0	11
40-44	3 2.4 33.3	- -	4 3.2 44.4	2 1.6 22.2	9
45-49	5 4.1 45.0	2 1.6 18.2	1 0.8 9.1	3 2.4 27.2	11
50-54	8 6.5 45.0	4 3.2 18.0	3 2.4 9.0	3 2.4 16.6	18

Table 26 (continued) Marriages by Residential Patterns: Teppang-Karayan

Household Head's Age-level	Wife's Residence Before Marriage				Total
	Same Village	Next**** Village	Same Municipality	Different Municipality	
55-59	3 2.4 20.0	7 5.6 46.6	1 0.8 6.0	4 3.2 26.6	15
60-64	5 4.1 62.5	2 1.6 25.0	-	1 0.8 12.5	8
65-69	10 8.1 38.0	4 3.2 23.0	-	3 2.4 17.6	17
70+	11 8.9 68.0	4 3.2 25.0	1 0.8 6.2	-	16

*Number of households

**Percent of total

***Percent of row

****Within a radius of 1 km.

Table 27. Marriages by Residential Patterns: Rantai

Household Head's Age-level	Wife's Residence Before Marriage				Total
	Same Village	Next**** Village	Same Municipality	Different Municipality	
15-19	-	-	-	1* 0.9** 100.0***	1
20-24	-	-	1 0.9 100.0		1
25-29	4 3.7 28.0	2 1.8 14.0	2 1.8 14.0	6 5.6 42.0	14
30-34	5 4.6 30.0	2 1.8 13.0	1 6.6 15.0	7 6.5 46.6	15
35-39	6 5.6 40.0	1 0.9 6.6	4 3.7 26.6	4 3.7 26.6	15
40-44	3 2.8 33.3	1 0.9 11.1	-	5 4.6 55.5	9
45-49	1 0.9 12.5	2 1.8 25.0	3 2.8 37.5	2 1.8 25.0	8

Table 27 (continued) Marriages by Residential Patterns: Rantai

Household Head's Age-level	Wife's Residence Before Marriage				Total
	Same Village	Next**** Village	Same Municipality	Different Municipality	
50-54	6 5.6 46.2	1 0.9 7.6	4 3.7 30.7	2 1.8 15.3	13
55-59	4 3.7 36.3	-	5 4.6 45.4	2 1.8 18.1	11
60-64	2 1.8 40.0	1 0.9 20.0	-	2 1.8 40.0	5
65-69	5 4.6 71.4			2 1.8 28.5	7
70+	8 7.4 88.8	-	-	1 0.9 11.1	9
Total	44	10	20	34 =	108

*Number of households
**Percent of total

***Percent of row
****Within a radius of 1 km.

Table 28. A Comparison of Marriages by Residential Patterns in the Two Communities

Village	Wife's Residence Before Marriage				Total
	Same Village	Next Village	Same Municipality	Different Municipality	
<u>Teppang-Karayan:</u>					
Total no.	52	28	16	27	123
%	42.3	22.8	13.0	21.9	100.0
<u>Rantai:</u>					
Total no.	44	10	20	34	108
%	40.7	9.3	18.5	31.5	100.0

a family that, by village standards, had average resources in the 1930s, he might have ended as another farmer. Fortunately his work at a mill and remittances from his brother in Hawaii helped pay for his college education during the 1940s. Thanks to his talent and his degree in commerce, he landed a good job in a bank in Laoag and rose to become one of its top officials. Making use of his savings and investments he bought sizable tracts of land in his province, in Cagayan Valley and even in Metro Manila as well. However, he certainly has not kept his wealth to himself. Not only has he paid for the schooling of many of his nieces and nephews, in addition he has let them stay in an apartment wing of his at Laoag, for free. One such nephew he has helped is Mariano Bantay who is the school principal and is Josue's right-hand man in running Bannatiran Social Club. After Josue got himself a car, he passed over his jeep, on permanent loan, to a brother's son, Crispin Madarang. (In turn, Crispin, a town councilor, has not kept its use to his own immediate family. Whenever somebody--kinsman or not--from the village has to be rushed to the hospital, he uses the jeep.) After Crispin's eldest son, Domingo, fell from a tree and had to be hospitalized, Josue's wife instructed her help to bring food to Crispin twice a day at the Laoag hospital.

Josue's is not an isolated example at Teppang-Karayan. After Amador Ganiron abandoned his wife and children in Manila for another woman and after squandering their savings, his brother invited his wife and seven children to settle in the village and stay in an empty two-storey wooden house of his that nobody was using. Uncles' and aunts' relationships with their nephews and nieces can be warm and close; for they try to help in the best way they can. As we have seen,

sometimes they go to the extent of fostering the latter. In other cases, such as these, they become patrons.

What does the patron get in exchange from so acting? Public esteem for one; these patrons also happen to be community leaders and spokesmen. It is to them that villagers turn for advice; it is they who enjoy the seats of honor at community feasts. They are regarded as nabaknang, as wealthy and prominent--a title which validates their moderate control over resources. Also, having received favors, the client cannot but reciprocate. For instance, Mariano Bantay, whose schooling was partly sponsored by his uncle, takes time out from his busy schedule to help run the Silaw Social Club and the Consumers' Cooperative of which his uncle is the president.

Though patronage also occurs at Rantai, I have not come across any case that parallels the highly visible and constant munificence of Josue Madarang. True the Rantai patron, usually a migrant, sends money to the nephew or niece who may be in school or in a hospital. But what makes Madarang's patronage different is that he has helped and continues to help a broad range of kinsmen. Also he comes over from outside the village, from Laoag, at least once a week, to visit. Rantai patrons, who live outside the village and are as wealthy as Josue, do not do so for the simple reason that they live outside the province. In turn, because of this, their client kinsmen's opportunities for reciprocity are limited.

Several factors converge to encourage the practice of local patronage at Teppang-Karayan. These would be:

1. The presence of a unique type of irrigation society coupled with woodland corporations,

2. The emergence of a local-born economic elite,
3. Possible political ambitions, and
4. The town elite's disdain for villagefolk.

Mention has been made of the lone irrigation society at Teppang-Karayan. Thanks to this a unique form of patronage thrives south of the river. Since membership is limited, its members become patrons to their non-member kinsmen. Although the outsider must be likeable or must do favors for the patron, he must first of all be related by blood to the latter. The degree of kinship becomes the crucial test. The meagerness of Teppang-Karayan's resources thus strengthens kin ties during October and November; at the same time it encourages the would-be client to perform tasks that add more ties to his bonds with his patron-kinsmen. A Rantaian's relations with irrigation societies do not get this personal. As a non-member, he receives water on the basis of contractual agreements. In exchange for water, he either gives a fixed share of his harvest or yields a proportionate piece of land. This reciprocity takes place between equals rather than between superior and subordinate; at the same time, it is impersonal rather than personal. To use Wolf's categories, it is a horizontal and dyadic single-stranded relationship.

The hierarchic nature of the bilateral descent groups that own the woods also lends itself naturally to a patron-client relationship. To some extent, the would-be woodcutter relies on the headman's goodwill towards him, as a supposed fellow kinsman.

The manner in which the two communities have been socially stratified may also explain why local patronage is more active in one

than in the other. Rantai's elite are either long-established wealthy residents or in-migrant white collar professionals who have married local girls. Most of them have a college degree; many of the rest have at least finished high school. The best friends they speak of in interviews come from the town and the city. It is with these that they normally interact, given the chance. Consequently, they feel no need to enhance their status in an area they regard as a suburb. They may build themselves fine sturdy houses well stocked with the latest appliances, but for whose eyes are these meant--their neighbors or their urban friends? Nor have they cultivated a clientele in order to enhance their status in the community. Indeed the decision by some of these families to mechanize their farm operations cuts loose one potential patron-client tie. Other peculiarities of Rantai serve to weaken such ties: During the rice cycle, labor becomes scarce and has to be imported from outside the municipality; and even small landlords review their tenants' performance annually and discontinue those they consider unproductive, regardless of kin ties. The situation at Teppang-Karayan is the reverse: the emergent elite are local-born, usually have a limited education, and have differentiated themselves just recently from their kinsmen. They value cultivating a local following and are able to realize this thanks, in part, to an oversupply of labor. The longer tenure of tenants at Teppang-Karayan and the more flexible attitude shown by the landlords towards their performance--perhaps because of the poorer quality of the physical environment--also make patron-client ties possible.

But why do the economic elite of Teppang-Karayan value cultivating a local following? One reason may be political ambition. Some residents of the South of the River district argue that they should secede from Caoayan and form their own municipality. After all, they now have their own high school, assembly hall, and marketplace. Were that to happen, the common consensus is that Josue would easily be elected mayor. In actual fact, during the 1970s, a brother of his was elected vice-mayor for Caoayan, another the village captain for Karayan. An ambitious citizen of Rantai did not understand the importance of cultivating such a following. Though he belongs to one of the wealthier, long-established families of Rantai, he has few, if any followers. He neither throws feasts nor opens opportunities for villagemates, like sponsoring the education of the deserving. Thus when he ran for the position of municipal councilor, few of his own villagemates voted for him.

Prejudices among townspeople against villagefolk may also motivate Teppang-Karayan's elite to seek a higher status within rather than without the village. To this day, old, town-based families speak disdainfully, to outsiders like me, of "those villagefolk." Though some of the village elite have finished college degrees and have become successful professionals, this attitude can dampen their desire to find a place among the town elite. The situation is different with the Rantai elite. Because of their town origins, they have no difficulty in finding acceptance among their urban peers.

All these should not, for a moment, make us doubt that some of these patrons, like Josue, act out of a sincere concern for their

fellowmen's lot. However, as in many human situations, this motivation may converge with other forms as well.

An Overview. If we look at these various kin-centered ways of sharing resources, from a broad perspective, we will note that some have been stimulated more directly by the peculiarities of the physical environment; others by the ideals proposed by the dominant economies; still others by a conjunction of factors from both the ecosystem and the social system.

Woodland corporations have come about because of the closeness to Teppang-Karayan of wooded non-irrigable hills. On the other hand, the "partnerships" that characterize both Teppang-Karayan and Rantai have been encouraged by the ideal of consolidation and accumulation of private property, within a condition of scarce land and cash. But the importance of patron-client ties at Teppang-Karayan can be traced partly to the ecosystem (the oversupply of landless farmhands and the unique irrigation canal) and partly to the social system (the respect accorded to those who can command a following).

Looked at in terms of Wolf's categories, these represent various forms of many-stranded coalitions, for they all make use of kinship and a fund of goodwill (Figure 10). Corporations and semi-corporations exemplify polyadic, vertical, and many-stranded coalitions, since these consist of descent groups whose leaders have been chosen on the basis of their status and control over resources. "Partnerships" are dyadic, horizontal, and many-stranded; one household offers its child for adoption or marriage in exchange for help in its various endeavors. Finally, the patron-client ties between individual households epitomize,

of course, vertical, dyadic, and many-stranded coalitions. The variety and strength of many-stranded coalitions at Teppang-Karayan thus weave households together into true alliance networks. Such networks would be what Ilocanos call partidos.

Activity	Rantai	Teppang-Karayan
Woodland corporation	-	X
Corporate ownership of parcels of farmland	-	X
Adoption by a fellow kinsman	X	XX
Interkin marriage	X	XX

X - present
XX - more frequent

Figure 10

Activities That Encourage Many-Stranded Coalitions
Among Rantai and Teppang-Karayan Kinsmen

Though dyadic, horizontal and many-stranded coalitions bind Rantai households together, locally-based vertical, many-stranded coalitions are either weak or nonexistent. Potential local patrons do not cultivate a following. As we shall see in the following chapter, migrant kinsmen do help their village kinsmen, but since they live outside the village, being U.S. residents, they do not constitute true

patrons. Consequently, Rantai does not have strong locally-based alliance networks.

Kin solidarity is thus tighter at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai. Another way of putting it is that Teppang-Karayan kinsmen constitute much more of a "group."

THE FORMATION OF KIN GROUPS

Groups versus Aggregates of Individuals. Though there is a continuum between a simple aggregate of individuals and a fully organized "group," the latter differs conspicuously in that its members interact with each other (Hare, 1962: 10). In addition:

1. They share one or more motives or goals which give direction to their group, and agree on a set of norms which establish the boundaries within which they relate to each other and carry out their activities;

2. If interaction continues, a set of roles stabilize and the new group becomes differentiated from other groups;

3. A network of interpersonal attraction develops on the basis of the members' "likes" and "dislikes" for one another.

The content of this interaction is twofold:

1. It may be directed toward the completion of group or individual tasks and may thus be called "task behavior." It would consist of the members' observing, hypothesizing and formulating action;

2. Or, it may be directed toward the relationships between group members that form the basis for problem-solving and may thus be called "Social-emotional behavior." Control and affection represent typical forms of behavior (Hare, 1962: 12).

Within the role structure, hierarchies emerge (Blau, 1964: 57). Some individuals become the focal point for the group's activities. It is through them that group members may collectively decide on their goals and develop their norms. The leader, whether formally or informally chosen, enables the group to fulfill their goals and conform to their goals. Indeed he may acquire his high position because he approximates these ideals more than anybody else in the group.

No doubt kinsmen at Rantai help each other out with goods and services in times of need; and they listen to each other's joys and sorrows. But there are added goals and norms at Teppang-Karayan which give a predictable, annual direction to interaction among kinsmen. Wood is cut and redistributed sometime during the rainy season within each corporate woodland; the lone irrigation canal is cleaned by all those who seek to affirm their kin ties with its owners; and the ancestor's parcel is cultivated by a designated kinsman for the sake of the commemorative feast. Within these forms of interaction, at least four roles have emerged, each with well-defined rights and duties. The first three are really variants of patron-client roles. The fourth is in a class by itself.

1. leader versus follower,
2. headman versus woodcutters,
3. water giver versus water taker,
4. heir of the ancestral house versus non-heir siblings.

Insofar as task-oriented behavior is concerned, Teppang-Karayan's kin groups more nearly approach the notion of a "group."

Conflicts Over Shared Resources. Still, relations among kinsmen within a partido are far from being idyllic. I have mentioned Pantaians' fears about corporate ownership and ultimogeniture. They see these as creating frictions rather than fraternity. Indeed there does seem to be conflict over woodlands in some descent groups. Some young villagers, heirs, not of the Ganiron-Bala woodland but of another, did not know the location of their ancestral holding. They claimed that their relatives were concealing it from them. While increased population growth may stimulate the emergence of cognatic descent groups, at a certain stage, further increase may restrict the criteria for admitting members. This, of course, will create conflict among the heirs.

The differentiation that accompanies increasing group cohesiveness also engenders conflict. That there are leaders at all may be galling to some.¹ Despite Josue's generosity, some of his kinsmen make snide remarks about him and his life-style. His wealth--the very factor that makes him an effective patron--causes resentment.

On the other hand, the fact that some kindreds do not own any riceland or woodland, and cannot look to any wealthy kinsman for support puts them at a decided disadvantage. Their weak position emphasizes for all the villagers the importance of having the proper kin ties.

SUMMARY

The Ilocano traces his ancestry bilaterally and categories all those within his generation, regardless of sex, are, at a formal level, equally important. By using kin terms of address that are strictly applicable within his nuclear family only, he is able to reduce

affective distance between him and his consanguines and affines. The partition of small parcels of parental property would seem to create insurmountable conflicts among kinsmen. Various ways of sharing resources counterbalance any such tendency. One such way is through corporate ownership of land. At Teppang-Karayan, some parcels of riceland and tracts of woodland are owned by cognatic descent groups that come together on particular occasions to exercise their right as a body. Another way is through what I term "partnerships." By having a child fostered by a wealthier household, a couple broadens its access to resources; for, upon reaching adulthood an educated child can be a better source of support. Moreover, the foster parents develop a sense of indebtedness to them. Interkin marriages too constitute a "partnership." Because grooms offer land to their brides upon marriage, a man who marries off his daughter to either her cousin or to his own brother may be able to increase his own sources of support. A third way of sharing resources is through patronage. Some wealthy villagers shower all sorts of favors on their nephews and nieces; in exchange, they win their community's esteem.

Since kin groups at Teppang-Karayan are much more structured than at Rantai, they come much closer to what theorists call a "group." However, precisely because of this internal differentiation, plus the sharing of key resources, their propensity to conflicts may be stronger.

CHAPTER VI--NOTE

1. Blau notes a paradox in group integration: "For social acceptance requires some outstanding qualities that make an individual a differentially attractive associate, but outstanding qualities raise fears of dependence that inhibit acceptance as a sociable companion. The individual with superior abilities can make contributions to the group as a whole but by doing so he displaces other members from a superior position. The rewards they obtain collectively from his contributions and the rewards they forego individually as the result of his superior status combine to produce this ambivalent attitude toward him, which is likely to be most pronounced among those of relatively high status, whom he directly threatens to displace." (1964: 57)

CHAPTER VII
PATTERNS OF RESOURCE-SHARING

To countercheck my observation of interactions and activities involving kinsmen, I asked my respondents, in my census and survey, whom they dealt with in a given situation. I modified Howard's Interpersonal Relations Questionnaire (1971: 74, 79, 88, 90-91, 98, 103) and used it to find out patterns of interkin behavior in three situations:

- 1) A death in the family,
- 2) Financial need, and
- 3) Moments of relaxation and enjoyment.

I asked the respondent to list as many persons as he could in each category and to state their relationship to him together with their current residence. For the third situation, I asked an additional question: How often did he see these persons--daily, weekly, monthly, annually or not at all?

Aside from finding out who were the persons regarded as valuable in these situations, I had another purpose: to contrast what I would call "critical" versus "convivial" solidarity. By "critical," I mean solidarity during a crisis-event which can be of two sorts: (1) a phase in the life-cycle, such as a birth or death; and (2) a contingency, such as a shortage of needed cash. "Convivial" refers to that solidarity that blooms when friends enjoy each other's company on the basis of mutual, personal attraction. Occasions that stimulate

convivial solidarity would be a drinking party, a picnic or even a passing conversation.

I distinguish between the two, because persons whom a fellow may rely on for emergency loans need not be those whom he would want to relax with and vice-versa. A sibling may better serve the first purpose and a non-kinsman the second. The warm feelings and fellowship that characterize conviviality are not essential to critical solidarity. A man does not have to like his creditor. Indeed he may even nurse some resentment towards the latter for being more economically secure. Nonetheless he continues to associate with the latter, out of expediency, secure in the belief that his creditor will come to his rescue when the hour comes. Thus, it is perfectly possible for a villager to join an association where a fellow-member is a kinsman whose life-style and wealth irk him, if he regards this relationship as useful to his own purposes. Earlier, I mentioned the case of a villager who hates his first cousin, because of property disputes and her supposed sorcery. Nonetheless, should she, in their savings association, give him her fixed contribution of rice, he would take it, as long as it is uncooked.

Since the crucial factor of access to resources has been a pre-occupation throughout this dissertation, I tabulated answers to these three questions with three degrees of control over resources:

- 1) No control over resources,
- 2) Weak control over resources, and
- 3) Moderate control over resources.

The results pretty much confirmed my observations. Kinsmen play a prominent role in both forms of solidarity.

CRITICAL SOLIDARITY

During a Rite of Passage. In case of a death in the family, the median number of helpful persons cited by respondents is slightly higher at Rantai (3.00) than at Teppang-Karayan (2.66).

Consanguines, defined as both Primary and Secondary Kin, account for most of such persons: 69.0 in both communities (Table 29). However, the relative importance of the secondary and primary kin varies from one community to the other, as well as from one social class to the other. Secondary kin play a more important role at Teppang-Karayan (41.3) than at Rantai (22.81) (Table 29). As we saw earlier, adoption and patronage by grandparents, uncles and aunts are more frequent and conspicuous at Teppang-Karayan. Therefore, when someone dies in his household, a Teppang-Karayaner inevitably tends to seek out more of them plus his nephews and nieces (whom he may have adopted or helped in other ways) than would a Rantaian who looks mainly to members of his primary kin. There is an added reason for the difference in emphasis. Rantaians have more kinsmen who live abroad and who therefore would have greater access to cash. The percentage for Rantai is 29.5, for Teppang-Karayan, 3.2 (Table 30).

However, the differences between the two communities concerning the primary kin's importance are not that sharp. Increased control over resources at Teppang-Karayan encourages more emphasis on the primary kin. Therefore those with moderate control over resources

Table 29
Relation of Helpful Persons to Respondent

Relation of Helpful Persons	Respondents according to access to resources:			
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Primary Kin:*				
Teppang-Karayan	33 (21.9)	51 (28.3)	24 (40.7)	108 (28.7)
Rantai	23 (42.6)	95 (46.1)	46 (49.4)	164 (46.19)
Secondary Kin:				
Teppang-Karayan	58 (38.4)	79 (43.9)	24 (40.7)	161 (41.3)
Rantai	15 (27.8)	57 (27.7)	7 (9.5)	81 (22.81)
Affine:				
Teppang-Karayan	34 (22.5)	22 (12.2)	8 (13.6)	74 (19.0)
Rantai	14 (25.9)	46 (22.3)	28 (29.5)	88 (24.8)
No Relation:				
Teppang-Karayan	26 (17.2)	11 (6.11)	3 (5.1)	40 (10.3)
Rantai	2 (3.7)	8 (3.9)	5 (5.3)	15 (4.22)
Ritual Kin	-	-	-	-
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	151 (100.0)	180 (100.0)	59 (100.0)	390 (100.0)
Rantai	54 (100.0)	206 (100.0)	95 (100.0)	348 (100.0)

*Father, Mother, Elder Brother, Younger Brother, Elder Sister, Younger Sister, Son, Daughter.

Table 30

Residence of Helpful Persons

Respondents according to access to resources:				
Residence of Helpful Persons	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Other towns in Ilocos Norte:				
Teppang-Karayan	4 (3.8)	- (2.8)	-	4 (0.8)
Rantai	-	2 (0.9)	- (1.2)	3 (0.8)
Town Proper:				
Teppang-Karayan	3 (2.1)	1 (0.3)	1 (1.6)	5 (1.5)
Rantai	1 (1.9)	9 (4.2)	4 (4.7)	14 (4.0)
Same Village:				
Teppang-Karayan	123 (84.8)	301 (94.4)	56 (80.3)	480 (91.3)
Rantai	28 (51.9)	107 (49.5)	47 (54.7)	182 (52.1)
Next Village:				
Teppang-Karayan	7 (6.7)	7 (2.2)	3 (4.8)	17 (3.2)
Rantai	2 (3.7)	4 (1.9)	3 (3.5)	9 (2.6)
Metro Manila:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	3 (0.9)	-	3 (0.6)
Rantai	4 (7.4)	12 (5.6)	1 (1.2)	17 (4.9)
Other Places in the Philippines:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	-	-	-
Rantai	4 (7.4)	10 (4.6)	7 (8.1)	21 (6.0)

Table 30 (continued) Residence of Helpful Persons

Respondents according to access to resources:				
Residence of Helpful Persons	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Abroad:				
Teppang-Karayan	8 (5.5)	7 (2.2)	2 (3.2)	17 (3.2)
Rantai	15 (27.8)	65 (30.1)	23 (26.7)	103 (29.5)
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	145 (100.0)	319 (100.0)	62 (100.0)	526 (100.0)
Rantai	54 (100.0)	216 (100.0)	86 (100.0)	349 (100.0)

attach equal importance to both primary (40.7) and secondary kin (40.7) (Table 29).

Affines rank third in all the social classes in both communities, except among those with moderate control over resources at Rantai where it takes second place. Non-kinsmen and, especially ritual kinsmen, rank last in both communities. Significant nonetheless is the large percentage of non-kinsmen (17.2) that a Teppang-Karayaner with no control over resources turns to for help (Table 29). It is more than twice the percentages for all other social classes. In all the three situations I asked Teppang-Karayaners about, those with no control over resources mentioned the most number of non-kinsmen. This may be a strategy to compensate for the meager resources of their circle of fellow kinsmen.

The percentage of helpful persons who live abroad is larger at Rantai--over a quarter in each social class--than at Teppang-Karayan, where it drops down to 6 percent or less in all three classes (Table 30). At the present time, more of the Rantaian's helpers live in different places in the Philippines. This pattern parallels what we saw in the preceding chapter about the exogamous marital patterns at Rantai and may, in fact, be their consequence.

As a result, although most helpful persons in both communities reside in the same village as the respondent, the percentage for Rantai (41.9, 49.5, 54.7) is conspicuously less than at Teppang-Karayan (84.4, 94.4, 90.3) (Table 30).

During a Contingency. When it comes to borrowing money during a contingency, the median number of lenders at Rantai (2.22) is lower than

at Teppang-Karayan (2.57). This reverses the relationship we saw in the situation above. Other than this, borrowing patterns repeat assistance patterns with only slight variations.

In both communities, most creditors are consanguines: again mostly secondary kin, at Teppang-Karayan (45.1) and mostly primary kin, at Rantai (49.0) (Table 31). The secondary kin's importance at Teppang-Karayan varies directly with a household's degree of control over resources. The interpretation I made earlier in noting the patterns of assistance, applies to this situation.

Affines have greater significance, as a source of loans, among those with no control over resources at Teppang-Karayan (20.8) and Rantai (29.2) (Table 31). Likewise, it is in this disadvantaged group that non-kinsmen become important--10.8 at Teppang-Karayan and 12.5 at Rantai. If a man has no land and has a low income, chances are that his kinsmen are just as deprived. Necessarily he would be compelled to borrow money from outside his circle of consanguines.

Ninety percent of a Teppang-Karayaner's creditors live within his village or the next. The figure for Rantaians (59.5) is much lower because so many more of their creditors live abroad (Table 32). There are notable differences from one class to the other in both communities, but the pattern is not clear.

More of the Rantaians' creditors are distributed in other places, such as Metro Manila (3.9), the town proper and Laoag (3.9) and other places in the Philippines (3.9). At Teppang-Karayan, the corresponding figures are less than half of these (Table 32). After his own village and neighboring villages, the next most important source of creditors for a Teppang-Karayaner is other Ilocos Norte towns (10.8) (Table 32).

Table 31
Creditors' Relation to Respondents

Creditors' Relation	Respondents according to access to resources:			
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Primary Kin:				
Teppang-Karayan (26.9)	35 (30.3)	57 (22.0)	13 (27.85)	105
Rantai	7 (29.2)	60 (46.5)	32 (69.3)	99 (49.00)
Secondary Kin:				
Teppang-Karayan	54 (41.5)	57 (44.1)	33 (55.9)	170 (45.09)
Rantai	7 (29.2)	38 (29.5)	2 (4.1)	47 (23.26)
Affine:				
Teppang-Karayan	27 (20.8)	41 (21.8)	8 (13.6)	76 (20.15)
Rantai	7 (29.2)	26 (20.2)	10 (20.4)	43 (21.28)
No Relation				
Teppang-Karayan	14 (10.8)	7 (3.7)	5 (8.5)	26 (6.89)
Rantai	3 (12.5)	5 (7.2)	4 (8.2)	12 (5.94)
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	30 (100.0)	188 (100.0)	59 (100.0)	377 (100.0)
Rantai	24 (100.0)	129 (100.0)	49 (100.0)	202 (100.0)

Table 32
Residence of Respondents' Creditors

Creditors' Residence	Respondents, according to access to resources:			
	No Control	No Control	Moderate Control	Total
Other Towns in Ilocos Norte:				
Teppang-Karayan	5 (3.8)	1 (0.6)	1 -	2 (10.8)
Rantai	-	3 (2.3)	-	3 (1.5)
Town Proper:				
Teppang-Karayan	4 (3.0)	1 (0.6)	1 (1.8)	6 (1.6)
Rantai	1 (4.2)	6 (4.7)	1 (1.9)	8 (3.9)
Same Village:				
Teppang-Karayan	109 (82.0)	136 (79.5)	48 (84.2)	293 (81.2)
Rantai	14 (58.3)	67 (52.3)	36 (67.9)	117 (57.1)
Metro Manila:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	5 (3.0)	-	5 (1.4)
Rantai	(4.2)	(3.1)	(4.7)	(3.9)
Other Places in the Philippines:				
Teppang-Karayan	1 (0.8)	2 (1.2)	-	3 (0.8)
Rantai		6 (4.7)	2 (3.8)	8 (3.9)

Table 32 (continued) Residence of Respondents' Creditors

Creditors' Residence	Respondents, according to access to resources:			Total
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	
Abroad:				
Teppang-Karayan	3 (2.2)	10 (5.8)	2 (3.5)	5 (4.2)
Rantai	7 (29.2)	36 (28.1)	13 (24.5)	56 (27.3)
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	133 (100.0)	171 (100.0)	57 (100.0)	361 (100.0)
Rantai	24 (100.0)	128 (100.0)	53 (100.0)	205 (100.0)

Because many Teppang-Karayaners have farmlands in the Dingras Plain, they have developed in those municipalities a network of friends that they can count on for loans.

Both Rantaians and Teppang-Karayaners thus rely heavily on their consanguines, not only during a turning point in the life-cycle, as would be expected, but also in a matter as delicate as borrowing money. Villagers trust that their kinsmen will be willing enough to help them.

Patterns in these two situations, I have described, have another significance. They help explain the disappearance of voluntary associations at Rantai and their persistence at Teppang-Karayan. With creditors and helpful persons all over the Philippines and abroad, the Rantaiian has a more certain source of financial aid during a crisis. He has little reason to join a voluntary association whose purpose is to give emergency goods, in the case of savings associations, or to extend credit, in the case of consumers' cooperatives.

CONVIVIAL SOLIDARITY

A Teppang-Karayaner's median number of best friends (3.48) is higher than a Rantaiian's (2.85). This may partly be a response to the tight circle of interkin solidarity I have noted in a previous chapter. Many crucial activities at Teppang-Karayan, from water management to farming to cutting wood, involve being with fellow kinsmen. Because some of these activities, by their very nature, generate conflict, Teppang-Karayaners go outside their circle of kinsmen to find solace and relaxation.

These two reasons may also explain the greater preference for affines as friends at Teppang-Karayan than at Rantai--29.8 for all

classes (Table 33). However, we should be cautious about this. Given the higher rate of inter-kin marriages at the former, the chances of having an affine who is also a kinsman are also that much greater.

Secondary kin constitute the greatest source of friends at Rantai. Over 50 percent of friends come from this group, especially among those with moderate control over resources (65.2) (Table 33). Non-kinsmen and friends play a poor second and third. Perhaps this pattern fits in with what Rantaians have often said. "It is better for kinsmen not to hold property together: Let each have his own separate property, and do with it as he pleases to avoid bickering over who has prior claims."

Nonetheless, even at Teppang-Karayan, consanguines, whether from the nuclear family or the full kindred, play an important role in friendships. Taken together, their percentage of friendships never drops down below 15 percent across all the social classes.

The overwhelming majority of Teppang-Karayaners' (95.6) and Rantaians' (93.2) friends come from the village itself (Table 34). Surprisingly enough, contrary to the closed-in image that Teppang-Karayan conveys, friends cited in this community are somewhat more widely distributed in various places, than is the case at Rantai. Some of the Teppang-Karayaners' friends are in another Ilocos Norte municipality (0.4), in the town proper or at Laoag (0.62), at other places in the Philippines (0.4), and abroad (0.2) (Table 34). In exchange, however, a larger proportion of Rantaians' friends are in the town proper or Laoag (11.3, 2.2, 9.6) (Table 34).

One reason may be the accessibility of these urban centers from Rantai, for reasons I have stated earlier. In the case of those with

Table 33
Friends' Relation to Respondent

Friend's Relation	Respondents according to access to resources:			
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Primary Kin:				
Teppang-Karayan	4 (7.8)	34 (15.6)	4 (3.5)	42 (11.0)
Rantai	10 (4.1)	14 (6.6)	1 (1.1)	25 (4.6)
Secondary Kin:				
Teppang-Karayan	6 (11.8)	67 (30.7)	22 (19.5)	95 (24.9)
Rantai	129 (52.9)	125 (59.0)	58 (65.2)	312 (57.2)
Affine:				
Teppang-Karayan	18 (35.3)	45 (20.6)	51 (45.1)	114 (29.8)
Rantai	33 (13.5)	32 (15.1)	8 (9.0)	73 (13.4)
No Relation:				
Teppang-Karayan	23 (35.3)	71 (32.6)	35 (31.0)	129 (33.8)
Rantai	59 (24.2)	31 (14.6)	19 (21.3)	109 (20.0)
Ritual Kin:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	1 (0.5)	1 (0.9)	2 (0.5)
Rantai	13 (5.3)	10 (4.7)	3 (3.4)	26 (4.8)
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	51 (100.0)	218 (100.0)	113 (100.0)	382 (100.0)
Rantai	244 (100.0)	212 (100.0)	89 (100.0)	545 (100.0)

Table 34
Residence of Respondents' Friends

Friends' Residence	Respondents according to access to resources:			
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Other Towns in Ilocos Norte:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	-	2 (2.3)	2 (0.4)
Rantai	-	-	-	-
Town Proper:				
Teppang-Karayan	2 (1.2)	-	1 (1.1)	3 (0.62)
Rantai	6 (11.3)	5 (2.2)	7 (9.6)	18 (5.1)
Same Village:				
Teppang-Karayan	161 (95.8)	217 (97.7)	79 (89.8)	457 (95.6)
Rantai	47 (88.7)	216 (96.0)	65 (87.8)	328 (93.2)
Next Village:				
Teppang-Karayan	4 (2.4)	4 (1.8)	5 (5.7)	13 (2.7)
Rantai	-	4 (1.8)	1 (1.4)	5 (1.4)
Metro Manila	-	-	-	-
Other Places in the Philippines:				
Teppang-Karayan	1 (0.6)	-	1 (1.1)	2 (0.4)
Rantai	-	-	1 (1.4)	1 (2.8)

Table 34 (continued) Residence of Respondents' Friends

Friends' Residence	Respondents according to access to resources:			
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Abroad:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	1 (0.5)	-	1 (6.2)
Rantai	-	-	-	-
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	168 (100.0)	222 (100.0)	88 (100.0)	478 (100.0)
Rantai	53 (100.0)	225 (100.0)	74 (100.0)	352 (100.0)

moderate control over resources, there is an added reason: their peers, white collar workers, live in these urban centers. An example is Jose Paltaw. By profession a supervisor for a construction firm at Laoag, his 30 hectares of partially irrigated riceland in the neighboring town of Pasayak make him one of the wealthiest men in the village. His best friends are his co-employees, according to him. He spends a great deal of his free time in their company at the city.

Another reason may be the higher level of education of respondents in Rantai, a factor that enables them as well as pushes them to mix with their own peers in town centers. Thus Vicente Ramos has no land of his own and is a poorly paid employee at a radio shop at Laoag. He has, however, finished high school and a course on electronics at a vocational school. Originally from the town, he settled at Rantai after marrying the daughter of one of the farmers. Despite his ten years of stay in the village, his closest friends are in the town proper.

From these patterns, we can conclude that there is a crucial difference between critical and convivial solidarity. My informants admit that conflict over property does indeed pit kinsmen against each other; nonetheless fruitful cooperation is still possible. Although they may not feel at ease drinking with a cousin who has gotten more than his just share of an ancestral piece of land, they are willing enough to help that cousin with goods and services in case of a death in the family. "Those two situations differ from each other," explain my respondents. For that matter, they claim they are willing enough to join an association where that cousin is a fellow member as long as they know the association will benefit them. Thus some kinsmen

of Josue may carp about his wealth, but they accept what help he extends them and they have joined the consumers' cooperative he set up. However, when they are in his presence, they do not engage him in friendly banter.

A second significant point is the vivid impression of kin solidarity that comes across even in convivial moments. If there really are deep-rooted conflicts that make it impossible for kinsmen to come together in poor, land-short communities, these should show in an area as sensitive as choosing friends. But such has not been the case. Juan Waig may feel uneasy in the company of Mario Waig, his first cousin, because he feels the latter's father, Roberto, has taken more than his share of the ancestral property. However, he harbors no such grudge against another of his father's brothers, Crisostomo. For this reason, as well as the compatibility of their personalities, he feels at home in the company of Fred, Crisostomo's son. We cannot assume that a man will be at loggerheads with each and every first cousin over property.

My findings square with those of two authors (McArthur, 1977; Nydegger and Nydegger, 1966) who have also done field work in the Ilocos. They note that an adolescent peer-group plays an important role in a villager's socialization. Indeed the role is one that the family willingly shares with it as a partner rather than as a rival (McArthur, 1977: 244). These peer-groups are generally composed of neighbors from the same hamlet (sitio or purok); and these neighbors are often close kinsmen as well (Nydegger, 1966: 154; McArthur, 1977: 241). Such is the intensity of interaction, that these peer-groups

are both work and play groups: "the same group that relaxes and play together, hangs around together, drinks together, etc. also frequently works together" (McArthur, 1977: 57). McArthur's study confines itself to adolescence but my findings suggest that these patterns extend even beyond. I have mentioned the first cousins Lomboy who jointly own a parcel of riceland and often drink and chat together at the corner store.

But the two communities differ regarding frequency of contact between respondents and their friends. Whereas Teppang-Karayaners claim meeting 92.4 percent of their best friends every day, Rantaians make this claim for only 60.7 percent (Table 35). Once a week encounters are five times more important at Rantai (36.8) than at Teppang-Karayan (7.0) (Table 35). In both communities, those with moderate control over resources see their friends the least often. However, the figure for Rantaians (49.0) is more than four times that for Teppang-Karayaners (11.4) (Table 35).

The very harshness of Teppang-Karayan's environment makes the schedule lighter and thus encourages more social interaction. There are only two rather than three cropping seasons; there is no tobacco crop that requires constant care and attention and because many fields cannot be irrigated properly during the second cropping season, these are easily converted into truck gardens. Thus, upon moving to Rantai, I was struck by the rarity of hangers-on at the corner stores even at twilight--the opposite of what I had grown accustomed to at the other community.

The difference in layout between the two communities may also be significant. With their porches on the road, the fenceless, closely

Table 35
Frequency of Contact with Friends

Contacts with Friends	Respondents according to resources:			
	No Control	Weak Control	Moderate Control	Total
Daily:				
Teppang-Karayan	162 (91.5)	209 (94.6)	78 (88.6)	449 (92.4)
Rantai	37 (67.6)	146 (64.0)	33 (43.7)	216 (60.7)
Weekly:				
Teppang-Karayan	12 (6.8)	12 (5.4)	10 (11.4)	34 (7.0)
Rantai	16 (37.2)	78 (34.4)	37 (48.7)	131 (36.8)
Monthly:				
Teppang-Karayan	2 (1.1)	-	-	2 (0.4)
Rantai	-	2 (0.9)	3 (3.85)	5 (1.4)
Annually:				
Teppang-Karayan	1 (0.6)	-	-	1 (0.2)
Rantai	-	1 (0.8)	3 (7.0)	4 (1.1)
None:				
Teppang-Karayan	-	-	-	-
Rantai	-	-	-	-
Total:				
Teppang-Karayan	177 (100.0)	221 (100.0)	88 (100.0)	486 (100.0)
Rantai	43 (100.0)	227 (100.0)	76 (100.0)	356 (100.0)

packed houses at Teppang-Karayan, tend to encourage conviviality at night; whereas the loosely scattered, tree and fence-enclosed houses of Rantai do the opposite. Rantai hamlets seem so much darker at night, even though more houses have electricity, because of the wide tree-darkened spaces between houses.

Finally Rantaians with more moderate control over resources tend to see their friends less often for various reasons. Their friends often live in another community, like the town proper; and as professionals and businessmen they find that they have to attend to their paperwork at home.

Does the greater frequency of contacts between Teppang-Karayaners predispose them to joining associations? I do not see any connection between the two phenomena, other than the possibility that by its being heavier, the workload at Rantai may inhibit participation in associations.

On the other hand, the heightened frequency of contacts between friends has a more direct bearing on the second point I have tried to establish in this dissertation, namely, that kin solidarity can take place even among land-short, low-income households.

Homans (1950: 34-40) has argued that for a group to emerge, individuals must participate together in the same activities, must interact frequently with each other and must feel sympathy for each other. Not only are kin group activities more numerous at Teppang-Karayan, as I have shown in the preceding chapters, kinsmen there do feel for each other, for they mention close relations in their list of friends, and they often interact on a daily basis with each other.

SUMMARY

In addition to observing interactions and activities among kinsmen, I asked them to list whom they turned to in three situations: for help in case of a death in the family, for a loan, and for companionship during periods of fun and enjoyment. The first two situations exemplified what I call "critical" solidarity, and the third "convivial" solidarity. These two forms of solidarity should be kept apart, especially in trying to explain why kinsmen, who are at odds with each other, are nonetheless fellow members of an association. To get a fuller picture of the persons mentioned, I asked for their relationship to the respondent and their place of residence and, for convivial solidarity the respondent's frequency of contact with them.

Consanguines figured prominently in the first two situations, in both communities, regardless of social class. There were some notable differences though; the full kindred was given emphasis at Teppang-Karayan and the nuclear kindred, at Rantai. While most of those mentioned reside in the same village as the respondent, the number of those living abroad is noticeably higher at Rantai. This may explain why two forms of associations have died out at Rantai but are still active at Teppang-Karayan.

Non-kinsmen become more conspicuous in the third situation. They form a large source of friends. However, even consanguines are mentioned as close friends by the respondents. Moreover, Teppang-Karayaners claim to meet them and other friends on a daily basis. This suggests that not all kinsmen are at odds with each other in a land-short, low income community. Some definitely sympathize with each other.

CHAPTER VIII

KIN SOLIDARITY AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

Though kin solidarity is active in both local communities, it expresses itself differently in each of these. Coalitions between kinsmen at Teppang-Karayan with their simultaneous vertical and horizontal exchanges between locally residing kinsmen are alliance groups as defined by Hollnsteiner (1963: 66, 72-73). Vertical exchanges are less prominent in Rantai. Resident potential patrons are more interested in acquiring status in other communities; actual patrons, like migrant kinsmen, live far from the village, and thus exercise limited patronage. Rantai's alliance groups, if we may call them such, are translocal, rather than local as in Teppang-Karayan, and thus weaker.

Moreover, though poverty is widespread in both local communities, there are significant differences in wealth and income within each community. Some households definitely enjoy a surplus and manifest this through the consumer goods they acquire. At the opposite extreme are households that are so destitute that they cannot even afford electricity.

It is in terms of these differences in kin solidarity and access to resources that we can now examine voluntary associations.

In his overview of the literature on common interest associations, Kerri (1976: 34) proposed studying them in terms of the following questions:

1) What causes individuals and/or groups to resort to voluntary associations as mechanisms for dealing with adaptive patterns? To what extent do cultural, social and psychological traits along with environmental factors serve as causal or limiting factors for the formation of certain types of associations?

2) What types of alternative strategies are available?

3) Are the interests and adaptation those of individuals or of groups?

I shall analyze the various types of associations at Teppang-Karayan in answer to these questions. Afterward I will examine these associations in relation to kin groups.

Since Teppang-Karayan has several associations (Figure 11), I shall concentrate on only those that are active, non-agricultural and non-government sponsored. (Government-sponsored associations I am examining separately in Appendix A.) Basing themselves upon an interpretation of associations' functions, Gordon and Babchuk (1959) classify them into three categories:

1) instrumental, those "designed to maintain or create some normative condition or change" which "focus on activity and goals that are outside the organization itself";

2) expressive, those providing "continuing gratification" to the individual through "activities confined and self-contained within the organization itself"; and

3) instrumental-expressive, those combining the aims and functions of the two preceding categories.

Type of Association	Teppang-Karayan	Rantai
1. Age-Graded	Pensioneers' Club (I) Youth Club (I-E)	---- Youth Club (I-E) - defunct
2. Community	Silaw (I-E) Bannatiran (I-E) Barangay Brigade (I)	---- ---- Barangay Brigade (I)
3. Consumers	Consumers' Cooperative (I)	Consumers' Cooperative (I) - defunct
4. Occupational	Farmers' Precooperative (Samahang Nayon) (I) Farmers' Organization (I) Zanjera Paddul (I)	Farmers' Precooperative (Samahang Nayon) (I) - (still lacks members -- two years after inauguration) Farmers' Organization (I) Zanjera Aripit (I) Zanjera Danum (I) Zanjera Waig (I) Zanjera Talon (I) Zanjera Rantai (I)
5. Savings	Four Rotating Credit Associations (I) Eight Social Savings Associations (I) One Credit Union	---- One Social Savings Association (I) -- defunct

I - Instrumental E - Expressive I-E - Instrumental-Expressive

The meaning of these categories, as proposed by Gordon and Babchuck (1959) is explained in the text.

Figure 11

Common Interest Associations
in the Two Communities
1945-1979

SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS

There really are two kinds of associations covered by the Ilocano term, among:¹ 1) social savings associations and (2) the rotating credit association. In both, the group as a whole makes a payment to members at an agreed-on occasion, but they differ as to their purpose, their membership, their duration and their organization.

1) Social savings associations are organized to ensure that each member has a ready amount of cash and food during a crisis event. As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, the paramount crisis event is a death in the family. Baptisms and weddings play a secondary role. New events that are the *raisons d'etre* of two *Teppang-Karayan* amongs are high school graduation on the one hand, and the annual popularity contest for the *fiesta* on the other.

Agreed-on contributions for the traditional events are uncooked rice, cash, and sometimes eggs. Thus in the among of *Jovencia Ganiron*, each member contributes two cupfuls of rice and ₱ 2.00 when a death occurs in a fellow member's household. In addition, all the members help clean the house and prepare food for the feast.

Payments in rotating credit associations are in cash only, and are not accompanied by extra services. Members are free to dispose of these payments as they will.

2) Since most social savings associations involve cooking and housecleaning, their members are usually women. However male informants assure me that all-male amongs have existed in the past.

Membership in social savings associations also tends to be territorially based. Members come from two or at most three adjacent

hamlets. Indeed in one among all the members were from one hamlet only. On the other hand, in rotating credit associations, members may come from widely dispersed hamlets and from different villages.

3) Payments in social savings associations are made only when a critical event takes place: death, baptism or wedding; payments in a rotating credit association are given at agreed upon periods throughout the year, for instance, at the end of each month. While social savings associations may last for years until every member has had her turn, rotating credit associations have a limited duration since payments are frequent and periodic.

4) In social savings associations, the president herself keeps a list of the members and does the collecting; in rotating credit associations there are two officers: a president and a secretary-treasurer. The president invites people to join, but once that is over does nothing else; the secretary-treasurer has the task of keeping the membership list, collecting the payments and delivering them.

In some cases however the boundary between these two types of association blurs. A recent one of 20 people had, as its purpose, home improvements ranging from adding a room to acquiring new furniture. The members agreed on a much larger contribution, ₪ 200 each, to be given to a particular member at the end of each month. Turns were decided by drawing lots. Another centered on the fiesta popularity contest. Each year the association would sponsor the daughter of a member household as their candidate for the popularity contest. But this association fell apart after two fiestas, because none of its candidates won.

One social savings association functions like a credit union. Starting with 20 members, it has grown to 43. Upon joining, each member pays ₱ 5.00. Should either an accident or a death befall a member's family, every member gives 2 cupfuls of rice plus ₱ 1.00 which has recently been increased to ₱ 10.00 to keep up with the prices. Contributions for baptisms and marriages are not automatic, for the member in question has to apply to the president.

Rather unusual is what is done with the initial fees. They are deposited in the bank to gather interest and may be borrowed by members at the usurious interest rate of 20 percent per annum. However no collateral is needed. That some members have left without paying may be the reason for this high rate.

Every year all the members come together to audit the association's finances and to be reminded of their obligations. This too is unusual since members of other among convene only when payments have to be made.

Members come from a wide area: the villages of Teppang-Karayan, San Esteban plus the town proper itself. The men and women who formed the original nucleus have campaigned and attracted mostly their first and second cousins.

Since the founder is Prospero Madarang, elder brother of Josue, the president of the consumers' co-op and founder of the credit union, we can understand how outside influences have entered the scene.

Unlike Lewis (1971: 150-151), I did not find savings associations that rare in the Ilocos Norte countryside.² Teppang-Karayan had at least 12 of these in 1979. Rantai itself used to have a social savings

associations in its northernmost hamlet, but, after the round of payments finally ended in the 1950s, no steps were taken to start a new one. A kilometer south of Rantai two villages have such associations to this day.

The Context. The ecosystem and social system have acted together to encourage the survival of social savings associations at Teppang-Karayan.

The area has experienced uncertainties in rice cultivation; moreover, it still suffers from shortage of cash. Although close kinsmen can be counted on to help the household of the deceased with their services, they may not necessarily be able to supply rice and cash. In case they have an annual surplus of rice, their potential benefactors may still find it difficult to rely on just their spontaneity and generosity because of memories of rice shortages and famines. An among has the advantage of being a contract between a household and a group of households, that obliges them to come to its help at the appropriate occasion. Although the coalition is horizontal, polyadic and single-stranded (as in any association), it can be looked at as an extension or a further development of horizontal, dyadic, many-stranded coalitions between households. The agreements assure an individual household that its fellow members, whether kinsmen or not, will come to its aid with the specific kind of assistance needed. Kin solidarity certainly benefits savings associations, for it helps guarantee that payments will be made. Indeed, in many of these, members tend to be kinsmen who either live in the same neighborhood or in adjoining neighborhoods.

In exchange, the fact that fellow kinsmen make payments benefits kin solidarity.

During the 1970s, high-yielding varieties of rice and government-sponsored irrigation entered Teppang-Karayan. But these benefited largely those households that could afford the chemical inputs needed and that had farms on the northern section of Teppang close to the new irrigation canals. For many, the old insecurities persisted.

Another factor surfaced. Some households became prosperous chiefly because of the inflow of dollars in the form of remittances and pensions. They continue to join the savings associations probably because any payment given them in their hour of need is still something to look forward to, extra hands at cleaning the house and cooking the feast are certainly welcome, and their membership will show their neighbors that their improved finances have not made them selfish.

Motivations for joining rotating credit associations and social savings associations that have graduation and popularity contests as their lynchpin may be different. Here the desire for either attaining or maintaining a high status may be paramount. The goals of these new associations are certainly not hallowed by tradition, and they are not regarded as urgent even by the households concerned. Indeed they are luxuries; for to throw a high school graduation party for a son or to have a daughter in a popularity contest shows that one's resources are above average. Status can also be gotten by heading an association. The manner in which the Women's Club is organized is revealing. All its twenty members are officers: thus there are three vice-presidents, five secretaries and two sergeants-at-arms!

To be an officer, no matter how titular, attracts esteem. Of the twelve among presidents, only two are poor and marginal (napanglaw), the rest are wealthy and prominent (nabaknang), according to the indices of consumption that I described above.

Why then have the Rantai elite not seized on these associations to enhance their status? As was pointed out earlier, two Rantai elite families, the Reyes and the Ramil, were wealthy and respected even during the 1930s. At that time theirs were the only two storey houses of galvanized iron roofing, painted wood, glass windows and cement ground floor in a community of bamboo and thatch houses. Moreover the Reyes enjoyed respect on two additional grounds: they were originally town dwellers (from Laoag) who had migrated to the village to live near the school where they worked as teachers. Most of the other members of the local elite share a similar background: they are college-educated professionals who grew up in an urban setting and have migrated to the village because they are teachers at the district school or are married to a local girl or are both. The well-irrigated ricefields may have been further inducements: these migrants bought sizable plots in and around the village as investments rather than as their main source of livelihood. Being both professionals and migrants, their closest friends continue to come from the town and city. Their horizons lie outside rather than inside the community which, for all intents and purposes, they regard as a suburb.

The situation is far different at Teppang-Karayan. Only within the past thirteen years or so has a relatively prosperous elite emerged. With the salient exception of Josue Madarang, its members are not college educated, although their children may be; nor do they usually

hold white collar jobs. Typically they are individuals who either have married a pensioner or have a close family member abroad sending them sizable regular contributions. Their closest friendships stay within the community. Were they to consider opening friendships with the town-dwelling elite, they would encounter deep-seated prejudices against villagefolk.

In the absence of a savings association, what do Rantai and non-member Teppang-Karayan households rely on?

Alternative Strategies. Each time a death occurs at Teppang-Karayan, the village captain solicits ₱ 1.00 from every household, and should they fail to pay on time, he imposes a penalty of ₱ 2.00. There is no such villagewide alternative to the among at Rantai. Instead those who want to help give a voluntary contribution (arayat) without expecting an equivalent repayment when their turn comes. This is by no means unique to Rantai; for Teppang-Karayan Rizalists also practice arayat for baptism, marriage or death. Thus the household of the deceased Rizalist can count on payment from the among, if anybody in the household is a member of one, plus additional voluntary contributions from fellow members. Two households at Rantai, both members of the Aripit Irrigation Society can count on receiving contributions (birbiris) from their fellow members. These consist of cash payments (₱ 1.00) and an egg per member. Finally insurance policies provide some safeguard. Many more household heads at Rantai (21.2) are potential recipients (n=118) than at Teppang-Karayan where only 5.0 have such protection (n=143).

Rantai informants argue that this association may, in fact, create conflict since its exchanges do not always balance out. Within the span of its existence, a household may experience two deaths, whereas the rest only one each. Since the former receives two payments instead of only one, others will resent it. Teppang-Karayaners have resolved this problem in their current savings association by mutually agreeing that each household can receive only one payment during the association's existence, regardless of how many deaths may befall it. However it is possible that the savings association of thirty years ago may not have had this rule. There is another way in which these exchanges may fail to balance even through the Teppang-Karayan solution is followed. Since such an association may last for years, inflation can easily corrode a payment's value. Within five years from an association's birth a contribution of ₱ 1.00 may shrink by half.

Rantaians seem to dislike this institution in the same way they dislike corporately-owned farm parcels and ultimogeniture. For them, permanent or semi-permanent forms of group activities lead to more involvement with other people, especially kinsmen--this can only cause friction. It is not that they shun all group effort. When Edicio Daguio fell from a tree and landed his thigh on a sharp branch, his villagemates immediately organized a dance to raise some money for his hospitalization. When the town officials decreed that each village in the municipality had to donate ₱ 400 each for the celebration of the town fiesta, the youth organized a similar fund-raising event. During my eight month stay at Rantai, at least five such dances took place for various purposes. Rantaians can work together as long as their group effort remains an unstructured, spontaneous activity.

What they shun are prolonged group activities that require abiding by rules and installing officers and awaiting delayed and dubious benefits. This has fostered a cultural attitude that further discourages Rantaians from farming associations.

As we saw earlier, garlic, as a cash crop, became widespread in the Ilocos during the 1950s. Moreover after 1947, Hawaiian planters began recruiting Ilocano labor again, especially at Baybay where they had a substation. At the same time because of a combination of factors, real wages were rising in Hawaii. It may be that the resulting flow of cash to Rantai dampened any enthusiasm for starting another savings association. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the percentage of expatriate persons mentioned as sources of help, during a death in the household, is significantly higher at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan. The greater availability of rice at Rantai may have been another factor. With the association's disappearance Rantaians finally had an excuse to disengage themselves somewhat from the affairs of their fellow kinsmen and neighbors.

The disadvantage of the spontaneous variable contribution that Rantaians favor is that it creates uneasiness in someone who has witnessed periodic shortages. He cannot be sure that the potential donors will have something to give him, in an emergency, even if they wanted to. An appeal to kin ties does not suffice, since the other household has to think of its own interests first. The implicit contract that is the among grounds its appeal on a recourse to sanctions: disavowal of the erring household by association members acting as a body.

Interests Represented. Are the interests represented, those of individual households or groups of households? Quite clearly, participation in an among redounds to the benefit of individual households rather than to that of any organized group. Neither here nor in any of the other associations I shall be discussing is there any evidence that participation will enhance the standing of households or individuals organized together as a group.

More than two-thirds of the sampled households at Teppang-Karayan participate in at least one savings association. If we break this participation down according to levels of disposable income, the following pattern emerges. The highest level of participation occurs among households with the most disposable income (86.6) (Table 36), the lowest level among those with the least (59.0).

Table 36
Participation in Among at Teppang-Karayan
By Levels of Disposable Income

Income levels	Household Head		Total
	Participation	Non-Participation	
Without Electricity	23 (59.0)	16 (41.0)	39 (100.0)
With Electricity but no television	64 (72.9)	25 (28.0)	89 (100.0)
With Television	13 (86.6)	2 (13.3)	15 (100.0)
	100 (69.9)	43 (30.1)	143 (100.0)

The limited participation of the latter is understandable, since a contribution of even ₱ 1.00 and a handful of rice represent a substantial drain on their meager resources. Besides, the poorest households would probably not be expected to throw a funeral feast. Earlier, I pointed out that the shortage of cash may explain the persistence of among at Teppang-Karayan. It seems, however, that if a household's income drops too low, to a bare minimum, it works against participation in a savings association.

Thus the propensity to join local savings associations assumes a bell curve. As income rises, more households join because they can meet the fees and because they are under more pressure to throw ritual feasts. However, still higher incomes may reverse this trend if a household begins to prefer nonlocal communities, such as expatriate kinsmen and officemates.

In 1957, a group of ten young men from Teppang-Karayan and nearby villages went caroling to solicit contributions for a Christmas dance at Teppang to which all could come. The venture was a success. They became well known in the surrounding district as an amateur singing group that readily performed on improvised stages made of barrel drums and bamboo. They went caroling again and were able to raise ₱ 200-- thanks especially to pensioners. Encouraged, they thought of organizing a district fiesta as none had ever taken place south of the river. They hired a band and sponsored a popularity contest. The four adjacent villages of San Esteban, San Norberto, Karayan and Teppang each contributed a candidate who had to sell a given number of ballots to win. Silaw members had fun, for every week they went to the social dance

of the different candidates. By 1959, the group had doubled in size with new members from four more villages. The fiesta too became bigger. To attract people to it, Silawans hired and paid a dramatist to present a zarzuela (a traditional operetta) in which some of them acted so as not to pay for actors. Moreover, they hired a caterer to sell elaborate noodle dishes.

At first the ten members wanted to help each other with contributions among-style in case a fellow member got married. Somehow this never worked out. More successful was the agreement that in case of a death in a member's family, fellow members would donate a sum of money. The practice has survived to this day.³

The group's core had been Enrique Carandang, Pablo Lomboy, and Ernesto Lomboy, who was the latter's best friend and first cousin. Remarkable was the fact that they had, as president, a non-Ilocano, Honorato Gatmaitan, who was just then learning to speak Ilocano. As an underwriter for an insurance company and as a travel agent, he had met a local girl and thus decided to settle in the village. Being from Pampanga, a province famous for its fiestas, Ilocanos deemed him an expert on the matter. In 1959, Josue Madarang and his own youth club decided to join Silaw. Since his two brothers, Remigio and Prospero were the village captain for Karayan and the vice-mayor for Sarrat respectively, political leaders were encouraged to join. Indeed Silawans invited and made all village officials in the district ex-officio members.

Because of its success, Silaw attracted politicians' attention. The Alliance Party, which has a strong following in the vicinity, enlisted their help during electoral campaigns in the early 1960s.

In exchange Silawans expected that, once in office, the Alliance would help them secure jobs, preferably in the government bureaucracy. However since the rest of the municipality elected the Progressives instead, the Silawans' political plans for their club fell apart.

Other government officials became interested in Silaw. Employees of the Presidential Arm for Community Development saw in Silaw a chance to initiate local, grassroots projects. After Josue Madarang joined, he suggested sponsoring community projects with the fiesta proceeds. As a result, Silawans were able to build a Health Center. Community workers approached Silaw officials and convinced them to turn the fiesta into a productive endeavor. Proposed as an urgent project was the creation of a market. As we saw earlier, Caoayan's southern district was isolated from the town center by a river and by a main road that until recently was full of holes. Three years passed before this was realized, not because Silaw had lost momentum but because some municipal councilors opposed it, fearing that this might compete with the town proper's own market. Fortunately, a local election brought three leaders from the district to the municipal council. In 1966, a lot by the crossroads at San Esteban was bought and has since served as the site for an open market each Wednesday morning.

Right beside the marketplace a cement stage was constructed, as the focus of community gatherings. Two new projects were envisioned at this time: a multi-purpose center and high school. At the start however, this latter project met with determined opposition from the mayor himself who feared that this would compete with the town proper's high school. But Prospero Madarang, who had by then become vice-mayor, pushed through the proposal in the municipal council. Another obstacle

surfaced. Villagers south of the river, the intended beneficiaries, were skeptical about the school and continued sending their children to the town. But Silaw overcame their doubts by buying books and chairs and donating one-half of the tuition fee for scholars. "Of course," as Prospero Madarang commented, "the presence of a high school made the fiesta merrier."

In 1969, the construction of a multipurpose center began and was completed three years later. As envisioned, the ground floor would hold small community gatherings involving fifty people at most. In 1976, an annex was added to house a postal office. Workers and Silaw officials organized a Consumer's Cooperative in 1973 with the store as its center. During my stay at Teppang-Karayan in 1978-79, Silaw initiated another project, a credit union. We shall see more of these two later on.

Meanwhile, the association became a formal organization in 1966 registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in Manila. It had as its officers: a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, a public relations officer, a sergeant-at-arms and an auditor. Their duties and privileges were to be those of any conventional modern lineup of officers. In practice, from what I observed during my stay here, the key positions were those of president and auditor: the former formulated policies and executed policies concerning the organization as a whole while the latter checked the books. The secretary ranked next in importance.

Another important change took place when Honorato Gatmaitan ceased being the leader. From 1966 to 1977, Josue Madarang has consistently

been re-elected as president. This was significant, for the club became a more formal society with a bureaucracy of sorts. It no longer was a spontaneous gathering of enthusiastic young people. Josue Madarang had degrees in commerce and pre-law which Honorato Gatmaitan did not have; also he played a key position in one of the provincial banks. He drew on this expertise to manage the club's finances and projects.

It was also about this time that Madarang's fortunes grew rapidly. He bought himself a house in Laoag and properties in other provinces and Metro Manila. Some of the other members too became increasingly prosperous, thanks to remittances from abroad. In a number of cases these remittances helped finance their children's entry into lucrative careers such as medicine. Gradually the club began to connote wealth and influence.

In 1978, Silaw had forty listed members, of both sexes, over half of which came to the lone annual meeting. Though no longer the president Josue continued to be a figure to reckon with in the association. During the annual meeting, members including the president would turn to him when problems arose.

Silaw's one consistent annual project is the fiesta, especially the popularity contest. The contestant, who usually is in her late teens, may be sponsored by either a village council or by a club. Her supporters solicit contributions from kinsmen, neighbors and friends locally and abroad. The girl who garners the most contributions and therefore the most votes, becomes the Fiesta Queen. Funds raised by each contestant are split in half between the sponsoring body, be it a village council or a club, and Silaw. Of Silaw's share, 20 percent

goes to administrative expenses, including the contestant's prize for merely joining and 30 percent to Silaw's other project for the year.

In 1979, five villages joined the contest. Teppang participated twice, for its village council and its women's club each had their own contestants. The winner, who was sponsored by the San Esteban village council, brought in ₱ 7000.

The Context. Griffiths (1974) has shown how the inflow of cash into the Ilocos village of Bawang via successful garlic traders and return migrants from Hawaii led to the formation of a local, prosperous elite in the Ilocos Norte village of Bawang. Though the village's community association includes, in principle, all the male residents, it is the emergent elite, the nabaknang that takes the keenest interest in the association's annual project, the fiesta. Events like the popularity contest enable the elite "to receive recognition and reinforcement" as wealthy households (1974: 15, 152, 165).

A parallel trend has occurred at Teppang-Karayan over the past two decades. There too the inflow of cash via outmigration and, to a lesser extent, garlic has created a prosperous minority that seeks to enhance its new status. An important venue with high status overtones in Philippine towns and cities is the social club; for it organizes the fiesta ball which climaxes the year's round of social events. A social club in the countryside connotes urbanity, largesse, sophistication and graciousness. Hand-in-hand with the market economy, urban styles of consumption have invaded the countryside.

Silaw began as a club for all the youth, especially the men, who were eager to have a grand time picnicking and staging zarzuelas.

During my stay in the Ilocos, Silaw had ceased to be youth centered; it had become a club open to all. In fact, however its membership had become identified with another category, the more affluent villagers. This explains both the club's success and stagnation.

Although the club has successfully completed several projects, nonetheless, looked at from another angle, it is failing. To use Babchuck's categories, it has ceased being an "expressive" association; it has instead become a purely "instrumental" one.

True, a loyal core has stayed on through these years, but many members have either left or have lost interest; at the same time few new ones, especially from the younger age groups, have joined. Older members recall how merry the club was during the early 1960s: parties were common, indeed members used the slightest excuse to throw parties. Today there is only one get-together, the annual general meeting where over half went when I was there. It may well be that with easier access to Laoag moviehouses, traditional operettas have lost their attraction. Besides as veteran members age, they need more time to be with their families. This second reason however loses its force if we look at the Rizalist Church whose members represent a wide range of ages and yet still party constantly.

A more plausible reason, a third one, is what some villagers have hinted at: that it has become a rich man's club. True, the formal cost of membership in the club has actually gone down over the past decade. Before, aside from coordinating preparations for the fiesta, the club had its own candidate for the popularity contest. It competed with the villagers and other interested associations for the fun of it. Naturally Silaw members were expected to contribute financially

to their candidate's success. Today the club asks only ₱ 10.00 a year as membership fee. However, many of its faithful members, above all its officers, are obviously well-to-do. They dress like urbanites and have their own private vehicles. An average villager would find it difficult to mix with them and not be reminded of what he lacks. Thus the Lomboys, who formed the original core of the club and have remained as poor as before, are extremely critical of Josue whom they accuse of tampering with the funds.

The more influential and wealthier officers, for their part, do not seem aware of this hidden animosity. Indeed the comments of one of them suggest that he no longer can empathize with the attitudes of the poorer ones. He complains about Silaw members demanding payment for cleaning the plaza instead of doing it for free, or about their charging for gas when they transport fiesta supplies. What he overlooks is that those who clean the plaza are poor farmer members who seize the occasion to earn extra cash. White collar workers like him would certainly not volunteer for the job.

The history of Bannatiran offers an interesting contrast to that of Silaw. There definitely is no prestige attached to being a member of Bannatiran, for its core membership and its head figure among the poorer households. Yet the club has survived up to the present. One reason for this is that the project is a simple one; soliciting contributions for the Christmas dance. And Gilberto Mortiz has taken upon himself the responsibility of organizing the dance annually, with the help of his allies. Perhaps a strong motivating factor is the low reputation he has earned on account of his alleged maiming of a kinsman in a fight. Fellow-villagers still whisper about the incident;

his annual project may be his way of building up his status, at least among the young.

Alternative Strategies. In the absence of a social club a wealthy villager who seeks recognition could simply throw a feast to which all could come. This in fact has been the traditional pattern. Remigio Madarang still wins praises for the abundant pork and wine at his many feasts during his lifetime. But this event can be remembered only by a small group of people: his guests and neighbors. No souvenir program, as at a fiesta, will commemorate it for future generations or publicize it to the entire municipality; no permanent material structure, like the stage built by the social club, will carry an inscription of the host's name.

If the up-and-coming villager has set his sights on the town or on the city, both feast-giving and joining a local social club would be meaningless. Instead he would prefer to spend more time with his urban friends, develop ties with the right people and enhance his status in their eyes. This seems to be the route taken by Rantai's elite.

Should a villager be motivated to initiate projects that would help his community as a whole, he can either organize a social club with a plan or action, or rely instead on spontaneous reactions to a particular alternative. One project in the 1960s was urgent at Rantai: the construction of bridges over the stream to connect the various neighborhoods together. This the villagers themselves achieved in cooperation with the PACD (see Appendix A). The latter supplied engineering expertise and the materials such as wood and cables, for

the suspension bridges. The villagers in turn gave their labor. Because of their ready support, each bridge was installed within a matter of days.

Of course, this alternative's disadvantage is that no long-range projects can be initiated. True, many of the projects realized by Silaw would be meaningless at Rantai. Given the town officials' attitudes, Rantai would be foolish to organize its own district fiesta; then too the town market and the high school are easily accessible by public transport, just five to ten minutes away. Still Rantai and its neighbors have problems unique to the area. For instance, the road connecting them to the highway becomes impassable for several days during the wet season. A social club could help organize manpower and solicit contributions to solve this perennial problem that Rantaians themselves complain about.

Interests Represented. Over a quarter of those interviewed, 38 households, claimed membership in Silaw (Table 37). This obviously is an exaggeration since Silaw's roll, in 1978-79, had only 40 members--half of which came from other villages, principally San Esteban and San Norberto. Also only one-half of Teppang-Karayan households fell within our survey's scope. Perhaps Silaw's prestige is responsible for these claims. Also, having joined in a Silaw project, a villager may think that he is a de facto member.

Most of the households with the most disposable income claim to be Silawans (60.0). The opposite is true of the two other kinds of households. Only 24.7 percent of households with a medium level of disposable income claim to be members; even lower is the corresponding

percentage for households with the lowest level of disposable income: 15.4 percent. Clearly, Silaw's prestige has greater drawing power over the more prosperous households.

Table 37
Participation in Silaw at Teppang-Karayan
By Levels of Disposable Income

Income levels	Household Head				Total	
	Participation		Non-Participation			
Without Electricity	6	(15.4)	33	(86.4)	39	(100.0)
With Electricity but no Television	64	(24.7)	67	(74.2)	89	(100.0)
With Television	<u>9</u>	<u>(60.0)</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>(40.0)</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>(100.0)</u>
	37	(25.9)	106	(74.1)	143	(100.0)

Though Silaw now has the reputation of being for the elite, nonetheless Teppang-Karayaners cooperate with its main project: the annual fiesta. How should we explain this paradox? One reason may be the use of patronage. Silaw's present secretary is Mariano Bantay who has long enjoyed his uncle Josue's favors, such as the use of his jeep or lodging at his Manila apartment during his visits. Being the school principal, Mariano can enlist the support of teachers and students alike for the various fiesta parades. He also publicly tallies all the contributions to the popularity contest; this Herculean task begins after dinner and ends early the next morning, just a few days before the fiesta. Josue has helped the daughter of Braulio, Karayan's village

captain by giving her a good job at the cooperative store. Thus Braulio has every reason to get his village council to sponsor a contestant for the popularity contest. An active Silaw member is Crispin Madarang, another of Josue's nephews. A municipal councilor and the president of the Rizalist Church, he uses the jeep loaned to him by his uncle to bring emergency cases to the provincial hospital. Among the club officers for 1977-78, there are four others who play similar patron roles in the area.

Thus while horizontal, dyadic, many-stranded coalitions between kinsmen benefit the formation of savings associations, an additional factor, vertical, dyadic, many-stranded coalitions, is needed to keep the social club in motion.

Nonetheless, judging from the villages that usually do participate in the popularity contest, Silaw's sphere of influence is limited to five villages out of a total of fifteen villages south of the river. Significantly enough, these villages are located along the irrigation canal. Several possibilities come to mind. The kin groups to which the leaders of Silaw belong are based largely in these villages along the canal. This certainly holds true for the Madarang, Ganiron, Carandang and Bantay. Another possible explanation is that some owners of the irrigation canal are also officers in Silaw. Artemio Ganiron, Josue's first cousin, is the president of the irrigation society, the business manager for Silaw and the head of the biggest woodland holding for the area. Eliano and Enrique Carandang who have been consistently active in Silaw are the brothers of Alfredo Carandang, vice-president of Silaw and are co-owners of the irrigation canal. Thus the villages along the canal have every incentive to cooperate in the Silaw projects.

The fortunes of the other social club, Bannatiran, have followed a single track. Since its inception, a few years after Silaw, it has been identified with only one man, its founder and continuing president, Gilberto Mortiz. He too has his allies, his best friends from his village; but he has no clients, since his household is one of the poorer ones in the village. From its foundation down to the present, Bannatiran has had only one annual project: the Christmas dance in the northernmost neighborhood of Teppang. Its roster includes more young people than Silaw, since the dance is primarily for the youth. For this reason too, its roster has continually changed as its members enter adulthood, marry, and settle down. Except for Mortiz' few allies who are household heads like him and of the same age, most members drop out of the club once they become household heads. Thus, only a few household heads in my survey mention being Bannatiran members.

One project Teppang-Karayaners took to heart, if one judges by number of members alone, is the consumers' cooperative.

CONSUMERS' ASSOCIATIONS

On the advice of government community workers, Silaw Club organized a consumers' cooperative in 1972. The initial capital came from a government grant of ₱ 1000 to each interested village. The villages were to loan the money to volunteer households who would become members and pay back the loan with part of the cooperative's income after a certain period of years. Of the eleven villages south of the river only five responded. These were the five villages of Teppang, Karayan, San Norberto, San Esteban, and Santa Inez. (The first four were situated

along the irrigation canal. The last lay 2 kilometers to the east and did not derive any benefit from it.) Despite the loans, the cooperative's inauguration was greeted with skepticism. People feared there might be strings attached or that, should the venture fail, they would lose money. Even today some harbor suspicions about the organizers' motives: are they really sincere or are they not planning to eventually turn the store into a private business? However, from 600 members, in 1972, the cooperative had grown to 1,312 by 1978; during the same period the capital had increased from ₱ 12,680 to ₱ 60,329.

The cooperative store holds office at the multipurpose hall built alongside the market plaza and is open to the public. Members enjoy a discount for every purchase they make. They receive the refund in a lump sum during the annual general meeting. Indeed this patronage refund accounts for 29.5 percent of the annual savings which, in 1979, was ₱ 11,262.63. Members find this refund, which really is a form of savings, attractive. They also like the credit extended them on farm supplies, particularly fertilizers and pesticides. They do not get such credit from Laoag stores, although these offer lower prices. Convenience for both members and non-members is a third attraction, for the store is the only such entity south of the river in the municipality. Moreover, it stands by the marketplace and the highway.

From 1972 to 1979, the line-up of officers, president, secretary-treasurer and manager, remained the same. Josue Madarang, Ernesto Carandang and Luis Malsino were consistently elected president, secretary-treasurer and manager, respectively, by the board of directors made up of all the captains of all the eleven member villages. Only

the vice-president is different, for the original one migrated to Hawaii in 1972. Both Josue Madarang and Ernesto Carandang are, of course, key figures in Silaw Club. Malsino has a courtesy position as manager-- a common phenomenon in Philippine business organizations. Lacking a degree in business and unable to speak English sufficiently to participate in periodic seminars on cooperatives, he merely implements Josue's directives.

During my last few months at Teppang-Karayan, Josue and some of his Silaw co-members opened a drive to attract people to a newly formed credit union. This time applicants would not be able to count on any loan from the village councils; they had to shoulder a share of the capital with ₱ 200, payable within two years. In exchange, as members, they could borrow at a 14 percent interest per annum. Collateral was required, but, since the member was known, his application could be processed immediately.

Aside from this Josue counted on another attractive offer: death benefits. Aware of the importance of the among he incorporated its features into the credit union. Thus if a member or a beneficiary should die, each credit union member would immediately give ₱ 5.00. To avoid conflicts over benefits, he proposed that only one beneficiary per member could benefit from the among; also the beneficiary could not receive any among contribution if he died within five years from the time he succeeded the dead member. Not surprisingly, Josue campaigned for the credit union at wakes. When I left the field, some households in two villages, Karayan and its neighbor, San Norberto, had joined.

The Context. Goods sold by the co-operative store are canned foods, soft drinks, beer, school supplies, toiletries, fertilizers and insecticides. A store selling such items would have been inconceivable before the 1940s when Teppang-Karayan and Rantai were to a large extent self-sufficient economic units. Because of the steady penetration by the national and international market economies, villagers began to look at these as important, if not essential household items from the 1950s onwards. Similarly pesticides and petroleum-based fertilizers became necessities after 1973-74 when the government popularized high-yielding rice varieties.

And the very concept of a consumers' cooperative with its emphasis on capital shares and capital accumulation is of course, the product of a market economy. It would not have been as relevant within a purely peasant context.

According to my informants, Rantai used to have a co-operative store in 1946. It was founded by Frederico Casambre who had migrated from the town proper and had married a local girl. The stockholders were mostly from Rantai and the nearby village of Waig. But because the stockholders bought on credit and owed more than their share of the stock the venture collapsed, within a few years, to become another typical provincial retail store. This Casambre had to run by himself. However even this effort finally failed in 1953. A decade later, Casambre migrated to Hawaii to join his son.

The peculiar location of the South of the Bank villages vis-à-vis the town proper and until recently their relative isolation from Laoag may also explain why their cooperative has thus far succeeded, whereas Rantai's has not. With its market and stores, the town proper is only

five minutes away from Rantai by public transport. Quite possibly, any price advantage the store had was offset by the fact that the town center's stores were close by and had a wider range of goods. On the other hand the river and a highway that until recently was potted with holes may have made the South of the Bank cooperative attractive to its public. Following the steep increase in oil prices during the 1970s, fares rose dramatically. Indeed during my stay in 1978-79, fares increased twice. A ₱ .60 ride from San Esteban to Laoag in September, 1978, had become ₱ 1.20 a year later. Meanwhile the government had not adjusted the price at which it bought rice from farmers, nor had it permitted salaries to keep pace with inflation. So that ₱ 2.40 for a round trip jeepney fare had come to represent a large proportion of a schoolteacher's daily wage of ₱ 13.30.

Josue's use of patronage may be a third factor. True, being an accountant and cashier at a bank, he emphasizes professional competence as a criterion in choosing store personnel. Thus the three girls who run the store, as bookkeeper, treasurer and assistant, certainly have technical expertise. They all hold college degrees in commerce. At the same time, however, patronage coupled with kin ties does play an important role in ensuring their loyalty to Josue, loyalty in the form of honesty and diligence. Josue helped finance the studies of two of the girls and even allowed them to stay in his Laoag residence during the course of their studies. One of these two is his first cousin's daughter, another a second cousin's daughter. As a further check, Josue's wife pays an almost daily visit to the store. Again, as in Silaw, dyadic, many-stranded vertical ties are important.

That Casambre lacked a local clientele may help explain his failure. He does not appear to have gone out of his way to help his villagemates financially. For instance no informant could recall his having sponsored anybody's education or his having helped anybody secure a job. In the elections that gave him a seat in the municipal council, his own villagemates did not vote for him.

Alternative Strategies. Villagers who desire goods can buy them at Laoag as well as at the co-op store. Should they lack money for buying at either place they may try to borrow from their neighbors and kinsmen, as we saw in the previous chapter. But there are disadvantages to borrowing. Some villagers take advantage of the needy by charging 7 to 10 percent interest per month. Moreover, although a borrower may have a kinsman abroad who will lend him money at no interest, he may have to wait for some time before the migrant kinsman answers. Unfortunately, a delay in buying fertilizer can prejudice his planting activities. In contrast the cooperative extends credit on farm supplies. The necessity of obtaining chemical fertilizer on time, rather than getting consumer goods at a discount, may be what motivates most households to join. Perhaps if the cooperative had been founded before the introduction of Miracle Rice, it would have done less well or even failed, despite Josue's relatively efficient administration.

Interests Represented. The trend is clear (Table 38). The higher the level of disposable income, the greater a household's interest in joining the cooperative. Such consumer goods as canned goods, soft drinks, beer, and tissue paper, all of which are valued as prestige items, can be bought at a discount--thanks to the patronage refund. Moreover,

Table 38
 Teppang-Karayaner's Participation in
 Consumers' Cooperative by Levels
 of Disposal Income

Income levels	Household Head				Total	
	Participation	Non-Participation				
Without Electricity	23	(59.0)	15	(41.0)	39	(100.0)
With Electricity but no Television	69	(77.5)	20	(22.5)	89	(100.0)
With Television	13	(86.5)	2	(13.3)	15	(100.0)
	<u>105</u>	<u>(73.4)</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>(26.6)</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>(100.0)</u>

the household benefits from credit in the event of a contingency. The small difference in percentage of participation by high and medium income households, 9.1 percent, suggests that once a household has some disposable income, it tends to join the cooperative.

As would be expected, the lowest figure is for households with a low level of disposable income. Consumer items are simply unthinkable luxuries for households that have to worry about where to get their rice and their vegetables. Indeed the wonder is that 40 percent of such households are members. The most likely explanation is that, when the cooperative was being organized, some of these households volunteered for the government loan to member households. It is also possible that some of these households have indeed been able to save money for the required initial capital, by borrowing or working hard. Thus a lady

who had no land but managed to support her six children, by doing odd jobs, intended to borrow money to join the cooperative. She would buy beer at a discounted price from the cooperative store and sell it to the passengers and drivers of buses passing through San Esteban.

Thus the households least predisposed to join any of these three associations are the poorest ones. This is to be expected, given their insufficient income. Not all households in a farming community fall into this category. For this reason, a classification of households, according to income levels, can explain why other households in a land-short community, do join associations.

SCARCE RESOURCES AND PARTICIPATION IN ASSOCIATIONS

Some generalizations that could be made about the impact of scarce resources upon participation in associations would be:

1) Extremely limited access to land and to cash, as in the case of the poorest households, inhibits formal membership in associations e.g., the savings association and the consumers' cooperative that center around economic transactions.

2) A less limited or a broader access to land and to cash, as in the case of middle income households may encourage both formal membership and active participation in associations that promise to be new resource bases.

3) A broad and secure access to land and cash, as in the case of high income households, has a double effect. On the one hand, it may discourage participation in associations such as the savings association and the consumers' cooperative whose primary benefits are basic subsistence items. On the other hand it may encourage participation

if the household sees in them an opportunity to enhance its status by either acquiring valued consumer goods or by exercising leadership.

4) Households may choose to forego any benefits they can gain by joining the association if they see in the latter a potential source of conflict.

5) A system that encourages patronage encourages participation by clients and patrons alike in associations. The degree to which a client joins in the association's activities may depend on the magnitude of his debt to his patron.

KIN TIES AND ASSOCIATIONS

When we turn to the relationship between associations and kinship ties we note an ambiguity in the current literature. Geertz (1962) and Lewis (1971: 150-151) point out that such associations flourish in a context where kin ties are strong. They explain why this is so in the case of social saving and rotating credit associations. Since these involve transactions of goods, mutual trust is essential; close kin ties act as a safeguard against a member's defaulting on his payments. But other authors argue that voluntary associations act as a surrogate for kinship. Thus, in the U.S., Mexico, Europe and Africa, membership in associations is strongest among urban working men who are either cut off from their kin group or who no longer rely heavily on their kinsmen for their various needs. For this reason, these authors see a direct connection between urbanization and voluntary associations (Dotson, 1951, 1953; Wright and Hyman, 1958; Rose, 1954: 74-75; Gallagher, 1957).

Norbeck's (1962, 1976) observations on Japanese associations are unique. Unlike Europe and Africa, Japan has active voluntary associations in both rural and urban areas. Undoubtedly, it is possible to regard these villages as urbanizing:

Many farming communities are in fact administratively parts of cities, and their members participate more and more in urban affairs. (1962: 81-82)

But Norbeck does not believe that kin ties are necessarily weakening in the rural areas where such associations flourish. On the contrary kinsmen are valuable, being in short supply because of out-migration. The daughters usually marry outside their birthplace and, since the farms are tiny, only the elder sons stay at home. Hence a proliferation of the various types of associations, irrigation, fire prevention, funeral, neighborhood or tax, substitute for the kinsmen a household used to rely on for help (1962: 77-78).

Another possible role a voluntary association can play vis-à-vis kin groups is explored by Anderson and Anderson (1965) in their study of a French village's transformation. Associations help traditional groups, the family, the church, and economic bodies adapt to the increasingly exact and complex requirements of a modern state. Thus a family association can act as an effective pressure group to lobby for cheap and better housing (1965: 228).

Teppang-Karayan associations do not act as surrogates for kin groups. Indeed savings association members are first and second cousins to each other in addition to being neighbors. At Silaw, Josue Madarang is brother to Prospero, the public relations officer, is first cousin to Artemio Ganiron, the business manager, and is mother's brother to

Mariano Bantay, the secretary (Figure 12). As we have seen, there is, in fact, a positive feedback relationship between kin groups and voluntary associations. Mariano Bantay and his first cousin, Crispin Madarang, may have joined the social savings association of Juanita, wife of Artemio Ganiron, because her husband is their parents' first cousin. Also the Ganirons live directly in front of their houses. Similarly the fact that their father's brother, Josue, headed both Silaw and the Consumers' Cooperative may have been an added reason for their participation on those associations. Now that they are members, Crispin and Mariano undoubtedly find that the activities of these associations heighten their interaction with each other and with their uncles. Their ties have acquired more strands, for they share more activities together.

Over time, the newer forms of savings associations and the credit union may gain importance at the expense of kin ties. Kinsmen may no longer find the former crucial for attaining their various needs. But this is only a future possibility.

In other societies associations help kin groups meet the demands of a modern state by acting as pressure groups (Anderson and Anderson, 1965). Were the consumers' cooperative to act as more than a store and to link up with other consumers' bodies in the country, conceivably it would help the family procure cheaper and better made goods. But this certainly is not happening today.

At present, Teppang- Karayan voluntary associations play two roles vis-à-vis kin groups:

- 1) They supply goods and services that kin groups either cannot give or cannot guarantee;




Figure 12

Kin Relations Among Some Silaw Members

- 2) They draw their informal organizational structure from kin-based hierarchies.

Kin groups, at Teppang-Karayan, have as their domain: (1) subsistence-related activities such as wood-cutting; (2) the celebration of phases in the life cycle such as birth, wedding and death; (3) the celebration of the ancestral cult; and (4) some activities that involve property transactions, such as marriage or the sale of the parental house.

But they have not become so structured that they can handle long range plans for their members' welfare. They can offer their members spontaneous help in the form of services and goods; however, they do not have a revolving fund from which they can draw money to help a kinsman with funeral expenses. The parcels of land that some kin groups corporately own are intended, as we saw, for the expenses of commemorative feasts only. I think, in contrast, of Philippine Chinese kin groups which act like corporations; they have a common fund presided over by a family manager, usually the most active senior male (Davis, 1973: 199-200). I also think of Punjabi unilineal kin groups which are co-extensive with a common craft or trade. The eldest male member heads the enterprise, keeps the funds, and decides on the policy. When there are various sources of funds, members turn over to him all their income and receive back whatever he apportions (Maron, 1956: 117-118).

Much less do Teppang-Karayan kin groups have the resources and the organization to promote village and district-wide projects such as staging a play, or founding a health center. The various associations cover these other domains.

Another domain is that of high status positions. Internally differentiated into leaders and followers, these kin groups have only so many high status positions open. Additional positions are available in associations.

In exchange, associations benefit from the existence of vertical and horizontal kin ties. Though Silaw and the consumers' co-operative are formally organized as modern bureaucracies, their informal, day-to-day organization relies heavily on kin-based patron-client ties, and on the alliance group. Through the reciprocities inherent in these structure officials can expect the proper execution of their policies. This certainly fits into a pattern observed even for new, urban-based organizations in the Philippines. Many continue to be run the way they began--as family enterprises. And, also, through supervisors may have no kin ties with their subordinates, they exact loyalty in most matters (Arce, 1979: 171, 175). Closer to Teppang-Karayan, Bawang garlic traders rely on kin networks to expand their sphere of trade. They ask a cousin in a distant village to serve as their agent and incorporate a garlic wholesaler from another community as their compadre (Griffiths, 1974: 170). Kin relations like these, real or otherwise, presumably help reduce risks by guaranteeing a steady supply of goods and of honest, reliable services.

Vertical kin ties are less important among savings associations. Except in the case of the semi-credit union, their organization is simple. The president does little more than to ensure that members honor their pledges. Horizontal, dyadic exchanges between neighbors and kinsmen suffice to serve as guarantees.

SUMMARY

To understand why some types of associations exist at Teppang-Karayan, I have made comparisons both within and without the community: between Teppang-Karayaners who joined and those who do not, between conditions at Teppang-Karayan and those at Rantai. Teppang-Karayan has three types of associations, savings, community and consumers. Since all these involve sharing resources, the poorest households are unable to join them. The less poor or the average households that become members do so because they see, in the savings association and consumers' cooperative, additional resources bases. Because these benefits involve basic subsistence items, some wealthy households find them that attractive. When they do become members there may be an additional reason, they may see in these associations a means to enhance their status by acquiring valued consumer goods or by assuming leadership. The one association that has tended to become associated with the wealthy is the social club, a type of community association which has successfully completed civic projects over the past two decades.

Rantai used to have these associations. The among seems to have been a source of conflict because it actually gave unequal benefits. Today the securer rice supply resource base has made joining the among even less compelling. Wealthy households seem little interested in enhancing their status locally through these associations. Since they are largely white collar workers and migrants from the town, they seek status outside rather than inside the community.

Voluntary associations are able to co-exist with kin groups at Teppang-Karayan because they cover different domains. In turn, the hierarchic organization within the kin groups enables two types of voluntary associations to mobilize support for their projects by tapping the leaders of kin groups.

CHAPTER VIII--NOTES

1. Lewis uses arayat for social savings associations and among for rotating credit associations. My informants in the two communities use arayat as an all-embracing term for forms of help rather than for a social savings association. Among thus stands for two types of savings association. This is another example of the wide variation in the use of terms, even within the same province.
2. According to Lewis (1971: 151), there are few, if any, social savings associations (which he calls arayats) in Ilocos Norte villages. None existed at Buyon, Ilocos Norte, whereas Mambabanga, in Isabela, had a number. He says that arayats "reflect a social cohesiveness not found in Buyon plus a social-economic cost and involvement which the barrio people of Ilocos Norte simply cannot afford."
3. The incorporation of funeral benefits into associations that have wide and varied goals has been noted in another Ilocos Norte village by Griffiths (1974: 159). The Bawang Progressive Club organizes the annual fiesta and invests its earnings in community projects. But it also functions as a funeral association, for each member pays ₱ 3.00 to the family of any member who may die.

CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There were two questions I raised in the first chapter. These were:

- 1) Does kin solidarity help voluntary associations thrive among kin-related, land-short, subsistence-oriented farmers?
- 2) What promotes kin solidarity among land-short, subsistence-oriented farmers?

As we noted earlier, Hollnsteiner (1963: 131-2) cautions against equating a community with a village. There is a difference between the local community, whose members are spatially bound together on the basis of their geographic proximity, and the natural or sociological community, whose members experience a sense of group identity, a we-feeling regardless of spatial considerations. The local community, the village, may not necessarily be equivalent to the second type of community (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 132).

It is difficult to define the configuration of this local, natural community among rural Christian Filipinos. In Thailand, the task may be easier. All those households that cluster around the temple and give alms to its monks constitute a community. The same may be true of the houses that cluster around the mosque in Filipino Moslem areas (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 133-134). Among rural Christian Filipinos however, the chapel is used only for sporadic activities and is visited by the priest only on certain occasions. The parish church is too far away to serve as the focus of a village's activities (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 134).

The natural community in a rural area is most likely the alliance network which is made "by selecting from among those already joined to ego by bonds of kinship, ritual kinship (compadrazgo), reciprocal obligations, associational ties and patron-client relations" (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 66, 135). Filipino villagers will not work for an abstract "common good"; they find this remote and meaningless. But they will work as a group "for allies--for real, live friends and relatives from whom they can expect a return or to whom they are indebted (Hollnsteiner, 1963: 137).

When I chose to compare Teppang-Karayan with Rantai, my basis for so doing was the proliferation of associations in one and their absence in the latter. I had no way of knowing beforehand that alliance groups would be strong in the former and weak in the latter, although I vaguely suspected this might be so. Further research in the villages confirmed that causal linkages did exist between the phenomena under study.

Hollnsteiner may thus be correct in proposing that Filipinos find it easier to work for allies, for persons with whom they have vertical and horizontal reciprocities. If the alliance group is cohesive, goals set by an association fit in readily with the preexisting reciprocities between the participants. For instance, new members attend meetings, not necessarily because they are interested, but because they owe the leaders favors.

The existence of a strong alliance group at Teppang-Karayan does seem to promote a sense of community which has translated itself into voluntary associations.

An alliance group creates a stable group and a recognized leadership--both essential ingredients for any organization to exist.

Thus at Teppang-Karayan, leaders of the alliance group are also leaders of the voluntary associations. Because stable groups exist in which they exercise their influence, their associations acquire a ready core of members. Josue and Serafin who play key roles in the community association are also leaders in their kin groups. Josue is quick to secure advantages for his kinsmen; Serafin heads the woodland holding of his cognatic descent group and being a member of the local irrigation society, dispenses water to kinsmen he chooses to recognize as such. Among the followers themselves, various forms of sharing create enduring ties. They exchange food with each other periodically, they help each other at ritual occasions, they own woodlands together and take turns tilling corporately owned parcels of riceland.

Data from another part of the world, Italy, confirm the usefulness of an alliance group for promoting voluntary associations. Silverman (1968) compares two areas in Italy and shows why alliance groups and associations occur in one and are absent in the other. Her essay is relevant for another reason. She questions the applicability of Banfield's notion of "amoral familism" (1958) to other peasant societies. It will be recalled that Foster (1967b) cited Banfield to support his contention that peasants all over the world are at odds with each other over limited goods and are thus incapable of community-wide enterprises. Silverman situates Banfield's peasants in perspective, by examining in detail both the social and cultural systems at work in Southern and Central Italy. She contrasts two areas in Italy according to inheritance patterns, farm contracts, owner participation in the production cycle, the organization of work, and the settlement patterns.

According to Silverman, agricultural land in Southern Italy is divided into parcels, each of which is cultivated essentially as an independent unit. As a sharecropper, the cultivator gives fifty percent of the harvest to the owner; as a rentee, a fixed payment. But landlords take little interest in their land; they prefer to delegate all the main entrepreneurial functions to the cultivators and devote their time to urban pursuits. The tenuous single stranded relations between the two are further exacerbated by the short span of rental and sharecropping contract--for a year or less, rarely longer than two to four years (1968: 11-12). Because of partible inheritance in equal shares, land units change hands and acquire new dimensions continually. Vertical exchanges are thus weak and infrequent. So too are horizontal exchanges.

The labor unit consists of the individual, or part of the family or sometimes the whole nuclear family plus hired day laborers. If the land is insufficient for the family, they work the scattered parcels of others; if the land is too large, they contract cultivators. Even on one plot of land, different types of contract are in effect: ground crops and vines may be cultivated under tenancy, while tree crops may be assigned to hired labor. Because of this fragmented economic activity, there is no basis for stable cooperative association between households. Moreover, the settlement pattern tends to isolate households from each other. No one lives on the land and so there are no neighbors in the countryside. Cultivators, absentee landlords, tradesmen, and the nonagricultural provincial elite live together in agro-towns separated some three to five kilometers away from the fields (1968: 14). In the towns, residences do not cluster together according

to occupation, and persons of common interests are not in close, exclusive proximity (1968: 14).

Formal organizations are thus difficult to sustain, since there are no acknowledged leaders. Persons who attempt to initiate and maintain concerted action on a non-coercive basis find themselves with no followers. There are only slight community-wide activities; taken as a structural unit, the local community is weak (Silverman, 1968: 2).

The situation is different in Central Italy. There the unit of production is the integrated farm, rather than the parcel of land. It is maintained as a unit over time, typically for many decades, and has an identity apart from the current owner or cultivator. Because the farms range from two hectares to 30 or more, it is to the advantage of the tenant-cultivator to have a large, expanding family. Three to four generations of a patrilocal, extended family live together on the farm, leaving no room for hired labor (Silverman, 1968: 6-7). The tenant-cultivator, who usually has no land on his own, has rights and obligations defined by a contract which is tacitly renewed from year to year (Silverman, 1968: 7). He provides the labor and receives approximately half of the crops in kind. He frequently interacts with the landlord who takes a keen interest in his enterprise and participates in most aspects of production. Indeed the relationship between the two may be called a "partnership" (Silverman, 1968: 7). Since both the landlord and the tenant live close to the farm, households have neighbors whom they engage in continuous mutual aid and exchange of services (Silverman, 1968: 7).

Unlike Southern Italy, numerous and varied associations are able to flourish; they are initiated, led or, at least supported, by landlords. Even small centers have local level voluntary associations such as bands, dramatic societies, religious confraternities, charity organizations and agricultural cooperatives. Other associations are community branches of national organizations (Silverman, 1968: 10).

Associations thus flourish in one area and languish in another because of a crucial difference: Central Italy has both stable group interests larger than the nuclear family and a leadership group (Silverman, 1968: 15). It is worth noting that, in a crucial factor, the size of land, Teppang-Karayan differs from Central Italy and resembles Southern Italy instead. The average size of farms in the Central Italian regions is about ten to fifteen hectares (Silverman, 1968: 6); at Teppang-Karayan, it is less than a hectare. But stable groups larger than the nuclear family emerge in both places because contracts between cultivators and landowners are of long duration. At both Rantai and Southern Italy (Silverman, 1968: 11) contracts last only for a year or less, thus promoting a high turnover of personnel. In addition, at Teppang-Karayan, there are groupings that, of their nature, have hierarchical forms with clearly defined leaders and promote horizontal exchanges between members. These are the local form of irrigation society, and the woodland and riceland corporations. The numerous irrigation societies that feed water to Rantai's fields could provide leadership roles, but most Rantai households are customers rather than members of these societies.

Perhaps kin solidarity is less important, as a prerequisite to the formation of voluntary associations in a rural area, than the existence of stable groups and a recognized leadership. In the Philippines, kin solidarity helps articulate these two factors. Note, however, that, in the Central Italian example, the landowner who heads organizations is generally not a kinsman to his tenant cultivators. He is bound to them by pure patron-client ties.

I pointed out earlier that there seems to be a contradiction in the literature over the role of kin solidarity vis-à-vis voluntary associations. Some would say that it encourages the latter groups to grow, other would deny this. Perhaps the contradiction can be resolved if we distinguish stages in the growth of an association.

Any association passes through the following three stages (Katz and Kahn, 1966:71):

Stage One - Environmental pressures upon people with common needs generate task demands to which the latter respond with a simple production structure based on cooperation (Katz and Kahn, 1966:1).

Stage Two - The primitive production structure that has emerged may not necessarily be a social organization. Meanwhile a new situation arises. In addition to those common needs which invite cooperation, people have their own individual, personal needs. Thus while roles within the production structure have to be stable and uniform, the behavior of individual members may vary. In response a managerial system emerges (Katz and Kahn, 1966: 71-72). People no longer merely do what the task demands of them; they follow impersonal rules that are binding on all as members.

A maintenance subsystem also develops, to keep track of the rules, to socialize new members into the system and to administer rewards and sanctions. In response to both the managerial and maintenance subsystems, the production structure tightens. And a bureaucracy that consists of an authority structure realizing itself through an impersonal, universal set of rules appears (Katz and Kahn, 1966: 72-73).

Stage Three - The organization becomes further elaborated. Its interaction with the environment necessarily takes several forms: It obtains materials, recruits personnel, disposes of its product, and calls on the support of outside structures to facilitate these various functions. New structures spring up in the organization to meet these explicit needs (Katz and Kahn, 1966: 74-75). To ensure efficiency, uniformity and clarity of functions, impersonal rules binding on all members become even more important.

While an alliance group may be useful at Stage One as a framework for common action, it may prove a hindrance at Stages Two and Three, for two reasons.

First, in a bureaucracy, functions should be allocated according to merit and talent. But relations within an alliance group base themselves on reciprocities either between individuals or groups. Between a patron and his client, the latter's ability to return the favors done him by the patron may be more important than efficiency and effectiveness at his post. Second, for those within the alliance, non-participants tend to become outsiders with whom they have little common interest. Unless an alliance

group can embrace the entire organization, which is improbable, it may cause divisions between those who belong to it and those who do not.

The Consumers' Cooperative at Teppang-Karayan is in Stage Three. The storekeepers regularly buy goods to sell to the members and to the public. Josue chooses the personnel and sends them to seminars on cooperative management run by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development. At the moment, Josue Madarang has struck an even balance between the favoritism natural to an alliance network and the efficiency demanded by a bureaucracy. The nieces he has hired to run the store are beholden to him because of favors he has bestowed on them in the past; at the same time they are college graduates with degrees in business and commerce. Still, it is easy enough to imagine a situation where Josue's successor might bow to pressures from his kin group over hiring decisions. The other problem posed by an alliance group, factionalism, may be at work in Silaw, the community association. The negative comments of some village leaders are reactions not only to the core members' wealth but also to the latter's participation in a particular alliance group, of which the former are not a part.

On the other hand, I do not see the alliance group as posing a threat to the survival of savings associations. Their type of organization is in Stage One; they have a simple production structure consisting of dyadic contracts. Uniform, impersonal rules are at a minimum here. Indeed the alliance group may be useful in exerting pressures on each member to make the agreed on payments.

I find it significant that the voluntary associations mentioned in the literature as beneficiaries of a high level of kin solidarity are associations that either do not have or have no need of a well-defined bureaucratic structure. Such would be the savings association (Geertz, 1962), and the small garlic trading companies of Ilocos Norte (Griffiths, 1974: 170). These associations require little or no accounting of general funds. The funds of a savings association do not stay long in the hands of the officers. They are collected to be given immediately to a member within the same day. In the garlic companies of the Ilocos the senior partner may be entrusted with the capital of the other members, usually close kinsmen from the same neighborhood, when he purchases garlic in a distant village. But "always one transaction is completed before another is begun; that is, while garlic may be purchased at different times, it is sold all at the same time" (Griffiths, 1978: 135-37). It is conceivable that if the financial transactions of these associations were to grow in organizational complexity and therefore need a bureaucracy, serious conflicts may arise between bureaucratic requirements and kin solidarity.

During an association's formative stages, kin solidarity in the form of an alliance group may be necessary as a readymade, easily understood framework. With increasing bureaucratization, however, as occurs in many urban-based associations, kin solidarity may be disruptive. By the same token, kin solidarity may be useful at all times to certain associations that, by their very nature, never really develop a more complex impersonal structure. Worth exploring is the relationship between the bureaucratization of associations and kin solidarity.

The second question I have concerned myself with in this inquiry seeks the factors that encourage the emergence of alliance groups. Within the context of Philippine research, this second question is probably more innovative than the first, for a commonplace among Philippine-oriented scholars is the alliance group's crucial role in many social institutions.

To identify these factors, I took a cue from Ingold, I examined both the manner in which villagers exploit their environment and the manner in which they allocate resources among themselves. While I noted the differences in terrain and access to water between Rantai and Teppang-Karayan, I also examined the impact of two intersecting economies: the peasant and the market. I found this approach useful for it obligated me to investigate interpersonal relations that arose not from the exploitation of the environment as such but from the manner in which the fruits of this exploitation were appropriated. Thus I was able to explain why, contrary to expectation, the community with more ecological stress, exhibited more cohesion among its members.

Because of Teppang-Karayan's hilly terrain, it has developed a unique form of irrigation society, one where water is allocated to outsiders on the basis of their kinship to the owners. The woodlands on the hills are owned corporately by all those who can establish their relationship, bilineally, to the original owners. The woodland's headman allows only those who can prove their lineage the right to cut wood. As a result, cognatic descent groups have emerged with distinct foci of authority. Other practices encourage both vertical and horizontal exchanges among kinsmen. Ancestral houses are not sold, upon the death

of one's parents, but willed to a youngest son; small parcels of rice-land are reserved for the annual ancestral feast and farmed in rotation by all the heirs of the deceased celebrant; more than at Rantai, endogamous, inter-kin marriages and adoptions of children by kinsmen are widely practised.

Circumstances favor patron-client ties. There is a substantial pool of landless laborers that landowners can rely on for assistance in a variety of tasks. Moreover, despite this situation, agreements between landlords and tenants tend to be long-term, possibly because of continuing water scarcity. Through greater access to cash, remittances by migrant kinsmen, and higher education, a local elite has emerged and seeks to validate its status inside rather than outside the community. They have deliberately cultivated a following among kinsmen and neighbors in the district. Indeed, in response to questions about their sources of help in times of emergency, villagers cite neighbors and relatives dwelling within the same district.

Rantai's context tends either to weaken alliance groups or, at least, to maintain them at a low level of cohesion. For a variety of reasons, there are no cognatic descent groups. Water is not a problem at Rantai; there are at least five irrigation societies that supply water to the farms the year round. Relations between the farm owners and the irrigation societies are impersonal and businesslike. In exchange for a fee, the latter release water on a regular, predictable basis. Since there are no hills at Rantai, there are no corporately owned woodlands. Although ancestral feasts do take place during anniversaries, no parcels of land are owned corporately and cultivated

in rotation by the heirs. Nor is the ancestral house passed on intact to a single, fixed heir. Instead Rantaians prefer to divide ancestral property among the heirs.

Rantai's elite shows scant interest in cultivating a local following. Together with the favorable terrain, Rantai's more active participation in the market economy seems to encourage landlords to be strict with their tenants. Every year, they review their agreements with the latter and renew them on the basis of productivity. Nor is there a large pool of landless farm laborers that could constitute a clientele. Instead Rantaians import hired hands from other municipalities to help in the rice cycle. Indeed the affluence of some households enables them to hire a tractor driver, again from outside the village.

Migration in and out of the village makes it difficult to form cohesive locally-based alliance groups. A large proportion of the local elite consists of professionals who migrated to the village for various reasons. Their allegiances lie outside the village. For their part, ordinary residents turn to kinsmen living abroad for help during an emergency or when they need a loan.

Except in the northernmost neighborhood of Rantai, non-monetized exchange labor during the rice cycle was disliked by both Rantaians and Teppang-Karayaners. Rantaians used non-monetized exchange labor extensively during tobacco planting. This form of labor's presence in a community where alliance groups are weaker suggests that it has no causal relationship with kin solidarity. This is not surprising, for this variable is an instance of the daily organization of labor. A

more relevant variable is the manner in which resources are allocated by the production system. The presence/absence of patronage, a crucial variable as we have seen, is affected directly by this allocation of resources.

What should be explored in the future are the immediate neighbors of these two communities. This would show if the patterns I have described hold true of their districts as a whole and, if not, what the reasons might be. For instance, Lewis' Buyon which is located just a few kilometers away from Rantai has the same low level of cohesion. On the other hand, Teppang-Karayan's eastern neighbors do not repeat its patterns. Government community workers complain about their lack of leaders and the difficulty in getting people to participate in projects.

Traditionally the barrio (recently called the barangay), has been regarded as harboring those virtues missing in an urban community: neighborliness, helpfulness, and a unity of purpose. Government projects aimed at improving the lives of rural dwellers have therefore taken the barrio as a unit; they assume that a barrio's residents have a sense of togetherness that sets them apart from other barrios and that encourages them to work for their mutual benefit. To a certain extent this is true; the sorceress is often she who lives yonder in the other village. However, this picture of the Philippine village as a discrete social entity is inaccurate. A more natural community is the alliance group which may not be co-extensive with the village. Rather than a lone tree, an Ilocano village resembles a mesh of branches growing out of different trunks, not all of which stand within the same enclosure.

APPENDIX A

GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ASSOCIATIONS

The voluntary associations that interest me are private enterprises undertaken by the people themselves. To appreciate their significance, I would like to discuss government-sponsored associations found in the villages, and how these are faring.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Government-run rural development programs at Rantai and Teppang-Karayan date back to the 1950s, the decade immediately following the grant of political independence in 1946. President Ramon Magsaysay's government (1953-57) sought to win Communist rebels by promising them land in the Mindanao frontier and by initiating public works projects, like free artesian wells, in the villages (Po, 1980: 20). To coordinate these projects and these heavy investments in infrastructure, the government created the office of Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD).

Unlike succeeding rural development programs, the PACD was generous with both funds and advice. This was true of Rantai, where two suspension bridges were built by the villagers making use of materials donated for free by the government. At Teppang-Karayan, the PACD's help took on an added form, that of advice on community projects. PACD officials convinced the organizers of the district fiesta to use the proceeds for more relevant, long-lasting civic projects like a high school, and

showed them the steps to take. Once the villagers had decided on the nature of the project, the PACD contributed a share of the building materials.

During the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos, the PACD was changed to the Department for Local Government and Community Development, and later on to the Ministry for Local Government and Community Development. The new body had a wider scope of activities. It sought to promote village associations through a cooperative development program, and coordinated the projects of local administrative units. At the same time, it ceased being generous with money and materials; instead it emphasized advice and training, in order to awaken the villagers' own initiative.

It was through the MLGCD that I was able to locate the villagers I worked in. I asked the staff at the provincial office at Laoag for a list of villages where associations were active and a list of villages where the staff was having a hard time promoting associations. Thanks to the MLGCD, I was able to gain entry into the villages.

Over the past thirty years, the government has sponsored several kinds of associations aimed at improving the lot of the farmers.

COOPERATIVE AND PRECOOPERATIVES

Because marketing has been a consistent problem of small farmers in the Philippines, the government created a body, in 1952, the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCF) to organize, promote and supervise Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Associations (FACOMAs) throughout the islands. The FACOMA would serve as a channel

for extending loans to farmers, it would help them procure commodities, process their products and keep these in storage (Po, 1980: 59).

Only one FACOMA was organized per municipality; it was to consist of a minimum of 200 farmer members, each having bought and paid for at least one share of stock in the association. The authorized capital was not less than ₱ 50,000, of which at least 20 percent of the subscribed capital was paid up. Credit was extended to the farmer on the basis of his productive capacity. Directing each FACOMA was a Board of Directors, elected by secret ballot, consisting of a president, vice-president, secretary-treasurer and a manager. At least five FACOMAs in a province or district formed a provincial federation; all federations in turn were to form a national association (Po, 1980: 59-60).

Few farmers at Rantai and, especially at Teppang-Karayan, joined the FACOMA; for the Virginia tobacco they raised was consistently rejected as substandard. The small amount of quality tobacco grown by Teppang-Karayaners was bought by farmers from the next municipality and resold to the FACOMA.

Less than a decade after its inception, the FACOMA ran aground. In 1959, four-fifths of FACOMAs all over the country were operating at a loss. By the 1960s, their activity had decreased, while the government concentrated the loans on pilot areas. FACOMAs were disbanded with the declaration of martial law in 1972 (Po, 1980: 61-62).

Their collapse was brought about by several factors: (1) since they required some amount of initial capital, they were dominated by better-off farmers; (2) they were either too large and too centered on the municipality as a unit, to be meaningful to the average farmer;

and (3) because of their centralized structure, politicians found it easy to raid their funds (Po, 1980: 62-64).

Though few Rantaians and Teppang-Karayaners joined the association, its decline made an impression on them, especially at Rantai, according to my informants. Farmers became wary of joining any new and similar organizations, such as the Samahang Nayon, a precooperative that the post-1972 government sponsored. This hesitation was truer of farmers at Rantai than at Teppang-Karayan, perhaps because a FACOMA in the latter's municipality never really was organized.

Upon the declaration of martial law in 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed a nationwide land reform program, as one of the cornerstones of his regime. To strengthen the land reform program, the government organized the Samahang Nayon or Village Association. Farmers became eligible for transfers of land, only as members of cooperatives. However, as an intermediate step, to develop the skills and attitudes appropriate to running a cooperative, farmers had to join a precooperative, the Samahang Nayon (Village Association) (DLGCD, n.d.).

Unlike the FACOMAs, these precooperatives are village-based and have a maximum membership of 200 and a minimum membership of 25. The officers and members of the board of directors are elected by the local Samahang Nayon. To discourage corruption, while selecting for committed leaders, officers serve on a voluntary basis with no remuneration. Moreover, the precooperative as a whole cannot engage in any business undertaken. Funds for the Samahang Nayon are of three kinds: (1) the Barrio Guarantee Fund, (2) the General Fund, and (3) the Barrio Savings Fund. Each member gives 1 cavan of rice (50 kgs.) of unmilled rice per harvest to the Barrio Guarantee Fund. Thirty percent of the BGF

is used for insurance purposes, the remaining percent going to land payments made by SN member recipients of the land reform program. Aside from these, each member pays a membership fee of ₱ 10 and an annual due of ₱ 5 to the General Fund. Should a member avail of a loan from an accredited lending institution, he has to save 5 percent of this and entrust it to the Barrio Savings Fund.

Samahang Nasyon members are automatically members as well of the Cooperative Insurance System of the Philippines which aims to promote group life insurance among farmers. The minimum number of a group to be insured is 25 and all policies are attached to life, i.e., benefits will be paid in the event of death (DLGCD, n.d., 1975a). There are four kinds of insurance benefits a deceased member's household can expect. One kind of insurance is a yearly renewable term insurance. For every ₱ 8 that a member pays per year, his heirs are entitled to receive ₱ 1000. Another kind protects bank savings. Should a villager want his family to receive, at his death, the amount equivalent to his bank savings, he pays ₱ 6.50 for every ₱ 1000; he can insure savings as small as ₱ 200 and as large as ₱ 5000. A third form of insurance protects loans contracted by a member by having the CISP pay the balance of a deceased member's loan from accredited institutions. Finally a land payment protection insurance makes it possible for heirs to own land in the event a man dies before completing his payments.

The insurance system was what attracted Teppang-Karayaners to join the SN, according to MLGCD officials. As was shown by Chapter VII, this concern with death benefited the kind of private voluntary associations active in their village. Forty-four percent (n=143) of Teppang-

Karayan's household heads were members of the SN; some of them had, in fact, already benefited from the policies.

MLGCD officials had a different story to tell about Rantai's SN. During my stay there, they always had a hard time convoking the members for a meeting. In fact, even the officers themselves would not show up.

There seems to be a number of reasons for this apathy. Rantaians steer clear of continuous, semi-permanent group efforts that require a fixed organizational structure of long duration. They frown on the various forms of corporate holdings common in Teppang-Karayan; and they frown as well on voluntary associations. Another reason is that Rantaians make more use of modern economic institutions. Twenty and two percent of Rantaians are insurance policy holders (n=118), as opposed to less than 5 percent of Teppang-Karayaners (n=143). This competes with the attractions of the SN and indeed of the traditional savings associations. Although more Rantai household heads (69.5%) avail of bank loans than do their Teppang-Karayan peers (11.9%), they do not seem keen on covering these loans with some form of insurance. Perhaps they figure that the risks they run on their own are much less than what they would contract by joining an association that might fail. The memory of the FACOMA hangs heavy.

Finally we should note the kind of leaders there are in the various SNs. Again this fits into a pattern that explains the weakness of voluntary associations at Rantai. Roberto Agbay, the president of the SN at Rantai is one of the wealthier villagers. Aside from owning land, he and his son own and run an automotive repair shop that grosses at

least ₱ 200 a day. Aside from this, he has his own farmland of about a hectare, plus an additional half hectare that he cultivates as a tenant. His holdings benefit considerably from his innovativeness and enterprising spirit. He looks out for new agricultural techniques and eagerly experiments with these. He could be a patron in the area, but he is not, because he is more interested in spreading the teachings of the philosophical group he belongs to, the Seekers, among all Filipinos, and among all men.¹

Roberto is the only member of his community in the entire province; but in Cagayan Valley there are hundreds of his colleagues. He shows little interest in propagating his ideas among his neighbors. They find his ideas and his group's mode of dressing--long hair, bare torso and skirt--strange. When his son got married, few villagers went to the feast, despite the abundant food. As a result the celebration lasted for only two hours, rather than the entire afternoon, contrary to what I had expected.

Although leaders at Teppang-Karayan come from better-off households, there are notable exceptions to this. Cornelio Biren, who heads the other SN at Teppang-Karayan, the SN that MLGCD officials regard as the best run in the area, has no land of his own. He is a full-time tenant and is a member of the SN precisely because he hopes to get a parcel for himself. This motivation plus his own personal qualities, an eloquence and a willingness to listen to others, may explain why his SN is active.

SUMMARY

Government-run rural development programs in both local communities have been in existence for the last ten years. They have gradually shifted their focus from gifts of cash and materials to providing technical advice and expertise. Government-sponsored voluntary associations have also changed their point of emphasis. Thus the first cooperatives sponsored by the government, the FACOMAs, were cooperatives empowered to help the farmers process and market their products. They were large, were centered on the municipality rather than on the village, and were integrated under a central national federation. This caused problems such as low levels of participation by members and malversation of funds. Thus the government instituted instead the Samahang Nayon, a precooperative that would initiate its members into the skills and attitudes needed for running a cooperative. In exchange it offered a comprehensive group life insurance plan that covered a variety of areas in a member's life. To avoid the mistakes of the FACOMA, the Samahang Nayon was decentralized, given the village as its focus, and was limited in membership.

Few Rantaians and no Teppang-Karayaners, joined the FACOMA, since they did not raise quality Virginia tobacco. Its collapse seems to have made Rantaians skeptical about associations in general. Because of this, the kind of leader their SN has, and other factors, the SN at Rantai has never met as a body. In contrast, some of the households at Teppang-Karayan have already benefited from the SN's insurance policy. The leadership here, as in privately run voluntary associations, is more motivated.

APPENDIX--NOTE

1. The group holds that questions about the existence of God and the saints do not really matter. More important is that each man attune himself to his own inner voice. They also believe that since a Third World War is imminent, men and women should learn to live simply, for the factories will shut down. Thus the men go around unshaven and barefoot even in the cities; and will wear only shorts or skirts--"in the tradition of our Malay and Indian ancestors." In their farms they refuse all pesticides, and insist on using only organic non-chemical approaches to farming. They pride themselves on being the original hippies.

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