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HAWAII'S DEMOCRATS: A STUDY OF FACTIONALISM

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HAWAII'S DEMOCRATS:
A STUDY OF FACTIONALISM

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines, through use of oral history and other primary sources, the political process in Hawaii in the years from World War II to 1974 with emphasis on the factionalism which appeared in the Democratic Party.

Pre-war Hawaii was an economic oligarchy based on the plantation production of sugar by contract laborers recruited from China, Japan, the Philippines, Portugal and other areas. The sugar producers, structured as vertical monopolies, controlled virtually every aspect of island life. The political vehicle of this control was the Republican Party.

Following the war, and relying on the pro-labor legislation of the New Deal period, labor was able to quickly organize the plantation workers and bring them into the ILWU to create a large and powerful union. The union became politically active and was joined by a new and growing middle class as former plantation laborers and their children became citizens. Together these two groups revived the moribund Democratic Party. By 1954 the Democrats were able to gain control of the territorial legislature for the first time in history. In 1959 statehood was achieved and a period of rapid growth and expansion of Hawaii's economy began.

In 1962 with the election of John A. Burns as governor, the Democrats added control of the administrative branch of government to their control of the legislature. The Burns faction of the party
quickly moved to consolidate their power and took on some of the aspects of "machine" government. Opposition to the Burns faction was centered in a liberal group headed by Congressman and then Lieutenant Governor Thomas P. Gill. Gill challenged the governor's hand-picked candidate to become lieutenant governor in 1966, but was unable to defeat Burns in the party primary for governor in 1970. In 1974 Burns retired and both the Gill faction and a faction headed by Honolulu Mayor Frank F. Fasi challenged the Burns machine. With a weak and colorless candidate the machine was still able to defeat the Gill and Fasi factions in a three-way contest and retain power.

The 1974 election demonstrated that the Burns machine transcended the power of any one individual and was, in fact, a product of the consensus of big labor, big business and big government which had benefited most from the Burns tenure in office. The 1974 election is thus seen as a major turning point in the understanding of the political development of the state to this time.

The conclusions find that Burns offered the appearance but not the substance of leadership in his three terms as governor; that he in fact presided over consensus government, and that between 1962 and 1974 the governing process in Hawaii fits the classic Madisonian model precisely. Opportunities for legitimate two-party government were lost between 1954 and 1962 because of the inability of the Republican party to shed its past and create a basis for popular appeal. As a result, Hawaii remains a single-party state where the aspirations of the people must be worked out within the framework of factionalism in the majority party.
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This dissertation examines a slice of Hawaii's political history from World War II to 1974. Much of it is known and has been written about. Now, however, with the completion of the ambitious John A. Burns Oral History project, the parts played by many of the leading actors have been clarified.

I have been privileged to have access to the taped interviews of the Burns Oral History even as the project was being carried out. The oral history has been supplemented by additional interviews, by extensive newspaper research, and by a review of the surprisingly large literature in articles and books which pertains to the period. Key individuals have aided in the clarification of certain points, and I have had access to speech files and collections of campaign literature.

One result of this research has been to reinforce a long held belief: It is impossible to discover absolute truth about events in which human beings take part. The further in time we are from the events, the more this is so. The fault is with the human animal. Memories fail. Individuals dissemble and in some cases distort when egos and reputations are involved. Newspapers, by their nature, are often inaccurate, and those inaccuracies mostly go uncorrected. Newspapers are also usually superficial, and that in itself is a distortion. And there is, of course, the problem of perspective. For reasons rooted in individual psychology people rarely see the same event in the same way. In the
sometimes heated emotional atmosphere in which political history is made, the probability of differing perceptions is amplified. The result for the researcher is two different versions of the same story—both based on the same facts.

And then there is the problem of myth. Many of the events in Hawaii's recent history are surrounded by myth. We are a myth-loving people and it has been a romantic story. Myth, repeated often enough, becomes, in the minds of some, truth.

That caveat offered, let me say that the pursuit of the thread of truth is the job of the researcher. The choices made and the turns taken in following that elusive thread in the following pages are solely the responsibility of the author. When the thread has unraveled, leaving me lost, I have offered alternative views in fairness to the reader and to those who participated in the story.

A word of acknowledgement. The interviews in the Burns Oral History cut across the political spectrum in Hawaii. Burns's enemies as well as his friends have had their chance to speak. The interviews are of immeasurable value and will be a mine of information for students and scholars in years to come. The author has been indeed fortunate to have had access to this material as it was being developed. My great debt to the project director, Dr. Stuart Gerry Brown, and to his associates, Drs. Dan Boylan and Paul Hooper, is happily acknowledged.
CHAPTER I

FACTIONALISM IN AMERICA

The American pre-occupation with political factionalism dates to the earliest days of the Republic and before. It was debated and denounced at the Constitutional Convention and its causes and means of control analyzed by James Madison as part of the effort to have that document ratified. George Washington, as he left office, warned his fellow citizens no less about faction than about foreign entanglements. And Jefferson's declaration that he would transit to heaven outside of a political party or not at all is well known.

It has been suggested that the founders' concern with factionalism was at least in part an expression of self-interest. "They elevated their own privileges into universal matters of abstract and universal right; groups who might interfere with their privileges were, in their eyes, dangerous factions." ¹

But self-interest alone, though it undoubtedly existed, was not the driving motivation. These men were devising a structure which would gain the willing support of the governed. They were practical men. The lessons of the past told them that conflict in human society was inevitable. They were concerned with how it could be contained and controlled.

They were the products, in education and background, of a European tradition which opposed and feared the division of a body politic into "faction" and "party." The political philosophers by whom they were guided, men like Hobbes, Hume and Locke had all warned of political faction. Factions subverted the law, rendered the government impotent and endangered the welfare and safety of the people, the philosophers claimed.

Parties, or formalized factions, had not appeared in the colonial assemblies, or in the Continental Congress, though factional dispute was common enough. Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution ignored the question of political parties. Yet, with our historical hindsight, it appears obvious that differing points of view should eventually evolve into formal parties. Strong-minded and strong-willed individuals—Hamilton and Adams, and Jefferson and Madison—differed greatly in their views of the course which the new nation should take. That they should contest these views before the electorate in the pursuit of power was inevitable. That some form of formal organization should arise to advance and preserve these opposing views appears—from our distance—also inevitable.

From the earliest days of Washington's first administration the well-known disputes between Hamilton and Jefferson led inexorably to factional division and ultimately to the creation of opposing parties. As Washington warned against them, they crystallized around him. Between 1794 and 1800 the party became the vehicle for the legitimate expression of political opposition. This was a new and startling development in a world in which representative democracies were few.
It became far more startling in 1801 when the system which had developed managed the peaceful transfer of legitimate power from one political party to another, a process which had taken place nowhere else except in England.

Jefferson had abandoned his opposition to parties sufficiently to accept the leadership of the Republican-Democrats and with it the presidency. By 1813 he had revised his views to the point that he could write to his old adversary and friend John Adams that:

Men have differed in opinion, and been divided into parties by these opinions from the first origins of society; and in all governments where they have been permitted freely to think and to speak. . . . To me then it appears that . . . everyone takes his side in favor of the many, or of the few, according to his constitution, and the circumstances in which he is placed.²

In the democratic republics which have developed in the world since the founding of the United States, parties are the normal method by which opposing political views are expressed and through which contests for power are conducted. Their prevalence leads to the supposition that parties may be inevitable in a political democracy. From our present perspective of two hundred years, the opposition of the founders to this mode of conducting the continuing debate on our national policy, and on our course as a nation, seems strange. The development of the political party as an institution appears logical and inevitable.

Factions Inevitable

Factional division did not, or course, disappear with the creation of political parties. Rare has been the party in American history which has been able to command a complete unanimity among all members on all issues. Bitter factional fights within the major political parties have led at times even to that ultimate division, the breakaway of dissidents and the formation of a new party. This, in fact, has been the evolutionary pattern by which new political parties have developed within the American system.

Factional disputes as the method through which minority views are expressed may be healthy. They may also be destructive if carried to the point where the political party, or, on another scale, the political system itself, is threatened.

It appears inevitable, that in any community there will be differing views of the issues which affect the community and the individual. The expression of these views, their consideration by the decision makers, and the implementation of the policies or programs which result, is the business of government in a democratic society. In this process of weighing, deciding and acting there is a three-fold problem which has not changed since the founding of the Republic:

- How to find the best course among a variety of choices.
- How to retain sufficient support from those whose views do not prevail so that the society continues to function.
- How to avoid paralyzing deadlock so that critical problems may be dealt with on a timely basis.

Politicians, historians and social analysts have dealt with these questions throughout our history. Alexis de Tocqueville observed
the American experiment in representative democracy in the 1830's. He saw its greatest threat in that broad base of common citizens upon which it was founded. Efforts to bring about consensus among this large and diverse group would be the rock upon which the nation would founder, if founder it should, Tocqueville thought. Unable to cope with the dispute over the extension of slavery, John C. Calhoun advanced the doctrine of the concurrent majority as a method by which the rights of holders of minority views could be protected, and by which the major issue of the day could be compromised. More recently, T. V. Smith advanced the view that government can function only on the basis of compromise and that no issue is too great to be compromised. Compromise of principle, indeed, said Smith, is the primary role of the politician in our society.

Pluralism

A contemporary scholar, Robert Dahl, in analyzing the solution toward which modern societies have moved in dealing with that three-fold problem cited above, has pointed out that "patterns of democratic government do not reflect a logically conceived philosophical plan so much as a series of responses to problems of diversity and conflict."

Dahl and others have called the system of political expression which has evolved "pluralistic." Dahl stated a fundamental axiom of American pluralism thus:

Instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be, wholly sovereign. Although the only legitimate sovereign is the people, in the perspective of American pluralism even the people ought never to be an absolute sovereign; consequently no part of the people, such as a majority, ought to be absolutely sovereign. According to this view, the existence in our pluralistic society of multiple centers of power ultimately has the effect of taming power, securing the consent of those ruled, and settling conflicts peacefully. Power centers, set against each other, tend to tame, control and limit. It can be and has been argued, however, that pluralist democracy is a "muddle through" process. Critics point to the increasing complexity of our world and ask if there might not be a better way.

T. J. Lowi in The End of Liberalism has been among the foremost critics of American pluralist democracy. Attacking what he calls "interest-group liberalism," he maintained that the perpetual bargaining of special interest groups had not produced wise public policy. Instead it had diminished law by parcelling out to private parties the power to make public policies; had replaced the requirement of standards by the requirement of participation; it had created new structures of privilege; it had enfeebled the formal institutions of democracy; it had ignored the problems of those unable to organize strong interest groups of their own.

Leadership

Other critics focused on the role of leadership as the key to making the system work more effectively. Herbert Croly proposed a

7. Ibid.
strong leadership elite to redirect the feet of the people to the path to the American dream. 9 Walter Lippman believed that right-thinking men, reasoning together, would find the correct solution to any problem. 10 Woodrow Wilson, writing as a political scientist, called for a leader who would direct his party, lead the nation, propose legislation and head the government. (Wilson forgot most of his own leadership lessons in the latter days of his presidency.) 11 In a more recent work, Stuart Gerry Brown analyzed the role of American presidential leadership in relationship to partisanship and popularity. The truly effective leader, Brown found, was the partisan fighter who was popularly elected. The popular leader with a mandate was far more effective than the non-partisan leader taking a statesmanlike stance "above politics." 12

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., surveying the evolution of our political party system, concluded that in new and strong leadership lay modern America's best hope. With various pressure groups in the pluralist society asserting the "right" to control policy in their areas, Schlesinger found, the general welfare could be in jeopardy. While "pluralism was the fact of life," it was "not necessarily the solution of policy."

Leadership remained the independent variable, democracy's best hope of defying economic and ethnic determinisms; leadership inspired by a generous vision of the American future, leadership determined to build a comprehensive sense of the national community, leadership capable of rallying popular confidence and support. 13

13. Schlesinger, pp. 11-111.
**Alternate Views**

We have here, then, two significant alternative views of the direction of the American political process. Our pluralistic society, evolving over two centuries of growth and increasing social complexity, appears to falter and to deal poorly with the most critical problems which beset us.\(^{14}\) It often fails to satisfy the third point of our tri-partite problem, how to avoid deadlock or excessive delay. An alternative, appearing from time to time, is that of the strong leader, supported by party and people, and with a mandate to action in the form of a massive election victory based not solely on personal popularity, but on issues.

Most scholars of the political process have focused on the national political level. However, the alternatives of government by pluralistic consensus, or by strong and positive leadership, are equally applicable to government at the state level. As V. O. Key noted:

> State politics constitutes a field worthy of inquiry both for its intrinsic importance in our public affairs and because of the opportunities it affords for the study of the political process generally.\(^{15}\)

**Relationship to Hawaii**

Hawaii is America's newest state and certainly one of the most diverse. The differences between Hawaii—physical, sociological, political—and the other territories which became part of the American union are myriad. Because Hawaii has so recently taken her place as a state and because her history even as a territory is short, little has

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yet been done to analyze the political process.\textsuperscript{16} The purpose of this study is to look at the political system in Hawaii as it evolved through the final days of territorial status and into the first years of statehood. How has pluralistic democracy operated in this, our most pluralistic state? What has been the role of the new leadership which emerged following World War II? What has been the impact of the often intense factional division within the major political party, and what the significance of the virtual collapse of the two-party system? These questions appear ripe for investigation at this point in our history. It is in hopes of making some small contribution to what must become a growing literature that this study has been undertaken.

\textsuperscript{16} The major exceptions to this statement are Gavan Daws's fine history of Hawaii, \textit{Shoal of Time} and Lawrence Fuchs's socio-political study of the islands and her people, \textit{Hawaii Pono}. In the area of local government and politics Tom Coffman's excellent study of the 1970 election in Hawaii, \textit{Catch a Wave}, is the major effort undertaken to date. These three works provide the starting point for any scholar of modern Hawaii.
CHAPTER II

BIRTH OF THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Theirs was a revolution not to destroy the existing system, but . . . to open it up. . . . the Democrats wanted admission to a system that had excluded them from many of its privileges and opportunities largely on ethnic grounds.

—Gardiner Jones
"Hawaii Politics"

The story of pre-World War II Hawaii, with its rigidly structured society, dominated by an economic oligarchy, is well known. A wealthy planter class, primarily sugar growers, operating through a group of factoring companies (the Big Five) structured as vertical monopolies, sat at the peak of the economic and social pyramid. Their power and wealth rested upon a labor force, partly alien, recruited in waves primarily from China, Japan and the Philippine Islands. By far the largest numbers recruited into this labor force—largely because of their ready availability and tractability—were peasant class farmers from Japan. Arrived in Hawaii, these workers found themselves in a rigid, class-oriented society ruled with an iron hand by the wealthy, predominantly white, entrepreneurial and managerial class. These elites discriminated against the farm laborer in general and the Oriental

in particular, and viewed any malahini (newcomer) as a potential threat and dealt with him accordingly.

For the wealthy, upper classes, life in the islands was a delight. Sugar was king and made men wealthy, and wealth meant political control. To Washington, Hawaii was a distant tropical paradise. A benevolent federal government—in contact only with the ruling oligarchy—could be prevailed upon to provide strong support for the sugar industry, without too much political interference. The U.S. government was considerably more concerned with the rights of the Navy at Pearl Harbor than with the rights of man.

For those at the lower end of the economic scale, Hawaii was far from a paradise. The plantation worker spent long hours in the fields for pathetically low wages. He was supervised by an often heavy-handed overseer, the luna. His labor contract provided severe penalties for minor infractions of company rules. If he was a citizen he was told how to vote in the territorial elections, and threatened with dire consequences if he failed to follow instructions. His children were poorly educated in a school system run by people whose children attended exclusive private schools. A paternalistic plantation management provided for his minimum needs in segregated housing, medical care and food. If, at the end of his contract, he left the plantation to try his luck in the island towns or in Honolulu, he was herded into ghettoized slums where he had to fight for survival.

2. The perspective in these introductory paragraphs is that of the individuals who lived through the experience and on whose lives this dissertation focuses. There are, quite obviously, other perceptions of the milieu of the period.
War Comes

In 1941 the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor launched America into World War II and changed Hawaii forever. By then many of the generations whose fathers and grandfathers had come from Japan and China to work on the plantations had already begun to move up the economic ladder. Most of them got their start by working long hours in small family businesses, or by taking the lowliest jobs in the towns, always saving for the education of the next generation. By 1941 the University of Hawaii was already filled with bright young Orientals preparing themselves for jobs as teachers or in middle-level plantation management. Some of the children of contract labor parents had already reached the lofty status of professional men—physicians, dentists, lawyers. They arrived, however, to find the gates of the wealthy establishment still closed to them on the ugly grounds of racial discrimination.

When the war began, ROTC students at the university donned their uniforms and reported for duty with the Territorial Guard. They were issued weapons and assigned duties protecting military installations. Within days, however, the members of the group who were ethnic Japanese were arbitrarily excluded from military service. Their weapons were taken away and they were sent home. They responded to this psychological castration by turning themselves into a voluntary labor pool called the Varsity Victory Volunteers. They offered to perform whatever menial tasks the government which distrusted them might ask of them.

By January of 1943 the military underwent a change of heart and offered the young Japanese men in Hawaii the opportunity to volunteer for Army service. Draft officials announced that they would accept 1,500
volunteers and were promptly overwhelmed with 9,000 young men asking to be taken. From this nucleus came the 442d Regimental Combat Team. In the vicious fighting in the Italian peninsula in 1944-45, this organization, along with the 100th Infantry Batallion, an organization made up primarily of older Japanese-Americans from Hawaii and the west coast, became the most decorated military unit in World War II.

Military Government

Smoke from the burning fleet at Pearl Harbor was still pouring into the air when the U.S. Army took control of Hawaii, establishing military government with the approval of the governor. The territory was in fact occupied as surely as if she had been a conquered land. 3 The Army took control of every aspect of life and the most fundamental rights of American citizens, those guaranteed by the Constitution, were suspended. Workers were frozen in their jobs by the military government. Salaries were frozen. This meant that as high paying jobs in war work became available, the plantation laborers were forbidden to leave the sugar fields to seek them—a situation eminently pleasing to the plantation management. Citizens of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from entering many areas, declared by the military to be sensitive. A curfew restricted the movements of all citizens. And, in the early days, many Japanese who had close ties to Japan were detained and imprisoned in concentration camps both on the mainland and in Hawaii.

Emergency Service Committee

As the immediate turmoil from the Pearl Harbor attack subsided and orders and directives controlling the civilian population began to pour from the military government, it became obvious that some form of liaison between the government and the Japanese members of the community was necessary. Accordingly, respected senior Americans of Japanese ancestry (AJA's), under the sponsorship of the military government, established the Emergency Service committee. Members of this organization took on the task of explaining to the Japanese community the often-bewildering restrictions and regulations flowing from the military government, and, in turn, interpreting the Japanese community to the military leaders. Other groups were created by the military government including various advisory committees, morale committees, and a Police Contact Group. The goal of these organizations was to stabilize and assist--and to control--the Japanese population in the territory.

President of the Emergency Service committee was Doctor Ernest Murai, who, with his professional standing as a dentist, was a pre-war leader among the Japanese. A member of the committee, and from 1944 on the executive secretary, was a popular high school teacher, Mitsuyuki Kido. Heading an advisory committee was Jack Kawano, a longshore leader and labor organizer. The head of the Police Contact Group was John A. Burns, a veteran police captain. Out of the war-time association of these men came the spark which would rekindle life in Hawaii's Democratic Party.
"The Five"

Jack Kawano was a second generation American of Japanese ancestry. He was born in a sugar camp in the Big Island's Puna district where he grew up. His formal education ended when he was fourteen and in the seventh grade when he went to work for the Hakalau sugar plantation, first as a field hand, and then in the sugar mill. He was paid $29 a month and quit when he was denied a raise to $45. He later worked on Lanai and then moved to Honolulu, where he went to work on the docks. By the time World War II came along, Kawano was a veteran of the struggle to organize Honolulu's waterfront workers. He had served since 1938 as an organizer and later as president of the Honolulu Longshoreman's Association, then an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.

In this capacity he became an advisor to the Emergency Service committee and was thrown into close contact with Murai and Kido. He also came to know Police Captain Burns.

In the period before the war, as relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated, Jack Burns became deeply involved in intelligence activities directed at the Japanese community in Hawaii. Working closely with the FBI, and Naval and Army intelligence, Burns headed a four-man police "espionage bureau" which "investigated cases . . . referred . . . by the FBI."4 When the war broke out he acted as a liaison between the Emergency Service committee and the

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4. John A. Burns, Burns Oral History, Phase I, tape 2. This reference is used extensively throughout. Certain individuals have been interviewed in both phases I and II of the project and the number of tapes for each interviewee range from one to eleven. For simplicity the reference will be cited as BOH, with phase number in roman numerals and tape number of the individual interview in arabic numerals as appropriate. Thus, this reference becomes John A. Burns, BOH, I, 2.
police, still retaining the anti-espionage functions. His police-assigned role was to know what was going on in the Japanese community.

When the war ended in August of 1945, the need for these various organizations, the Emergency Service committee, the Morale Group, and others, was obviously ended. But to some of those who had been involved, the contacts which they had made were important, not just from a standpoint of friendship, but from the view of shaping the future of Hawaii. Their mutual interests ranged from statehood for Hawaii to assistance for the returning veterans. Kawano took the initiative in bringing together Murai, Kido and Burns in an informal group which began to discuss Hawaii's future and particularly the role of the Democratic Party. "Why not keep this momentum to help organize the Democratic Party?" Kawano recalled. 5

Kawano brought one additional member into this group, Chuck Mau, an attorney of Chinese origins, who had been elected to the county board of supervisors (later city council) in 1940. As Mau remembered:

It was through his [Kawano's] auspices that the five of us got together. He was the sparkplug. . . . during the times that we met, he was the one that held us together. He was a moving spirit . . . . And he was powerful enough because he had an organization behind him. None of us had an organization behind us. We were nobodys. And I don't know why they picked on me. . . . They could have picked on anybody instead of picking on me to be part of the five to rejuvenate the Democratic Party, strike up into the new frontiers. That's how we got together. It was he [Kawano] that really did it. 6

This loosely organized group, The Five, began to meet almost daily over coffee or at Mau's home in the evening to discuss the future of the territory and of the Democratic Party.

5. BOH, I, 2.
6. BOH, I, 1.
The Democratic Party

Hawaii's pre-war Democratic Party has been described as a closed club, poorly organized, and divided among different groups owing factional loyalty to one or another strong leader. The party had gained some small successes in Honolulu politics, electing part-Hawaiian John Wilson as mayor. They had also, on occasion, sent single term Democratic delegates to Washington to fill the territory's non-voting House seat. But at the territorial level, where political control was exercised, they had never come close to electing a majority in either House or Senate.

During the Woodrow Wilson administration, and after 1932 with Democratic presidents in the White House, Democratic governors had been appointed in Hawaii. However, almost invariably, these men were closely aligned with the upper class oligarchy which governed the territory. In pre-war Hawaii political party labels were not very important. But the war changed all that. The ILWU, under the leadership of Kawano, had made amazing gains in the last days of the war in organizing Hawaii's plantation workers, exploiting opportunities opened by a favorable decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) relative to organizing of agriculture workers.

Organizing successes were followed by a spectacular victory in the political arena. In 1945 the union was able to apply sufficient political pressure to get a strongly pro-labor Hawaii Employment Relations Act through the legislature. Encouraged, they established a political action committee and pushed hard for a Democratic victory.

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7. BOH, Mitsuyuki Kido, I, 1; Jack Kawano, I, 1; O. Vincent Esposito, I, 1.
at the polls in the 1946 legislative elections. For the first time
the lowly Democratic Party matched the Republicans when fifteen Democrats
were elected to the thirty-member territorial House. Fourteen of the
Democrats carried the endorsement of the ILWU.\textsuperscript{8}

The union had served notice that political contests in the
post-war era were going to be different. No longer could the businessmen
power brokers of the Republican Party maintain total control over the
society. Too much had been changed by the war to return to the 1930's.

But for a time the sunrise signaling this new day looked like
a false dawn. In subsequent elections, dominance slipped back into the
hands of the Republicans. The 1946 victory was, however, an early
warning signal heard by many people. New life was stirring in the
political party many had thought dead.

\textbf{Organizing Efforts}

Jack Kawano remembered the early post-war organizing by the
Democrats:

Most of the organizing was done by individuals.
Each individual was trying to organize a group
of their own supporters that they can use when
they ran for office. . . . there was a lot of
organizing going on . . . by a lot of . . .
individuals.\textsuperscript{9}

The new activity within the party was a healthy sign. But to
the degree that the efforts were oriented about personality, with no
strong leadership around which all the groups could coalesce, division
within the party was bound to result. The pre-war leadership which had
survived into the post-war period was weak and ineffective. The Governor,

\textsuperscript{8} Gavan Daws, \textit{Shoal of Time} (Honolulu: The University Press
\textsuperscript{9} BOH, I, 2.
Ingram Stainback, though appointed by the Democratic administration in Washington, was a conservative man who felt little loyalty to the party in the territory. John A. Burns remembered pressing Stainback for patronage as a demonstration of party loyalty:

Stainback took the flat position that he was not named [governor] as a Democrat, that he was named as Stainback. It was his duty to be the governor of all the people. [He said] 'Well, the Democrats didn't put me in there. I got nothing to do with them. I'm certainly not going out of my way to support any Democrats.'

In fact, the only organization able to exert any pressure on events in the immediate post-war period was the ILWU. The union was growing bigger and more powerful each day, and as historian Gavan Daws noted, "after the sugar strike of 1946, people began to talk about the One Big Union and the Big Five as if they were evenly matched contestants."

Under the leadership of Kawano and of John A. Hall, who became ILWU regional director in Hawaii after the war, the union continued to recruit their members into the Democratic Party and to support Democratic candidates. When the 1948 Democratic territorial convention met, the labor bloc was so strong that the nominal leadership, Governor Stainback and the more conservative Old Guard members, complained that they were being overwhelmed.

But while it was not apparent at the time, the power of the ILWU within the Democratic Party had already peaked in 1948. That witless fear of a monolithic Communist conspiracy, later to be known

10. BOH, I, 5.
as McCarthyism, had arrived in the territory no less than in the rest of the nation. The tar brush of Communist Party affiliation was already being used to paint the leadership of the ILWU.

The Communist Issue

The first charges came from the commander of the U.S. Army in Hawaii. The ILWU, he complained to Governor Stainback in early 1947, was a nest of Communist snakes, and he offered FBI and Army intelligence reports as proof. The conservative Stainback, shocked to think that he had appointed many of these same ILWU officials to government posts during the war—Hall to the police commission of Honolulu, for example—made the reports public, and attacked the union leaders.

Late the same year, a man named Ichiro Izuka published a pamphlet, *The Truth About Communism in Hawaii*, in which he admitted membership in the Communist Party while a waterfront organizer on Kauai in 1942. He named other members of the party, including most of the top leadership of the ILWU. Jack Hall simply shrugged off the charges as a management attempt to break the union. Hall, no less than Kawano, had been a driving force behind the organization of Hawaii's workers. When the charges of Communist affiliation began to surface he was at the peak of his power. His union had over 30,000 loyal members. Most of them were ready to back him in any showdown fight.

For many, the showdown came in early 1949 when Hall pulled the dock workers off the waterfront in a strike for higher wages and better working conditions. It was Hawaii's most disastrous labor dispute. Virtually no shipping entered or departed island ports. Businesses collapsed and unemployment soared. Violence erupted on the picket lines.
when strike breakers were escorted onto the docks by police. The territorial government passed an emergency measure seizing the docks, but this only permitted east coast shipping to come in and was of little value. When the strike finally ended after 177 days, the monetary costs were estimated roughly at $100 million.

And there were other casualties. Tears were ripped in the fabric of island life which have never been repaired. In the aftermath of the strike, charges of Communist affiliation by the ILWU leadership became more readily believable and a host of home-grown red-baiters appeared to keep the issue alive. As a result, the surge of the ILWU to control the Democratic Party lost momentum and the influence of the ILWU within the party was never as strong again.

With accusations of communism intensifying in the wake of the dock strike, the territorial legislature passed a resolution asking for an investigation by the Committee on Un-American Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives (HUAC). This infamous organization had conducted well-publicized hearings on the mainland in an attempt to prove the existence of an international Communist conspiracy which threatened the United States government. In April of 1950 the committee began hearings in Honolulu. Izuku and others told what they knew of the party in Hawaii, and then a long series of witnesses were called, all of whom invoked the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and refused to answer the committee's questions. Thirty-nine of these reluctant witnesses were indicted for contempt of congress. Among them were Jack Hall, who, when asked if he was or had been a member of the Communist Party, declined to answer. Jack Kawano, when
asked the same question, said that he was no longer a member of the
Communist Party, but declined to answer further.

Kawano had in fact broken with the party during the 1949 dock
strike. When the reputed Communist element in the leadership of the
union proposed pulling plantation workers off their jobs in sympathy
with the waterfront workers, Kawano balked. As Kawano remembered:

There was a meeting at Jack Kimoto's home--Communist
Party executive board meeting. And at this meeting
they had decided to pull the sugar people out on strike
to support the longshoremen. . . . I came to this
meeting late . . . and Jack Kimoto told me that they
had already made up their decision. . . . So then I told
them that they were all wet, that this strike is a
longshore strike and it should not be spread any wider.
The fact that the longshoremen were able to do such a
good job on their picket lines was because we could feed
them. The food . . . was coming from the plantation
workers. So if we pull these plantation workers . . .
in my opinion we will crumble up. But he told me then,
'Jack, you are a good union man . . . but as a Communist
you lack. You don't really belong as a good Communist.'
So I told him where to go because . . . I believed in
the rank and file movement. . . . That's the way it ended
. . . and that's the last meeting I attended of the
Communist Party.13

Kawano's response to the HUAC interrogators—that he was no
longer a party member—signaled the party leadership that his break
was complete and that he posed a new danger to them. The answer brought
the wrath of the union leadership down upon his head and started him on
a course which was eventually to lead to villification, expulsion from
the union he had helped to build, and, finally, his self-banishment
from Hawaii.

13. BOH, I, 2.
New Faces

In the days when Kawano, Burns, Mural, Kido and Mau were meeting to drink coffee and discuss the future of Hawaii, one of their concerns was for the returning veterans, particularly those of Japanese ancestry who had left Hawaii under a cloud of discrimination. The files of the Emergency Service committee were filled with letters from the young soldiers written as they fought their way up the Italian peninsula. What sort of life, they asked, would they be coming home to in view of the sacrifices they were making. When after about a year and a half The Five began to look around for new members to broaden their base, it was logical that many of those brought in would come from the ranks of the returning veterans. In discussing the group's efforts to bring in new members, Mau recalled:

We knew we had to do it. The five of us couldn't do anything anyway. We had to broaden the base. We knew we wanted the young people to come in and take an active part because they were going to be the eventual leaders. We never thought that any of The Five would become a strong enough leader in the community to lead the party . . . . And we were looking for all kinds to come in because we didn't want it to slant just towards the Japanese. . . . that would have made it a Japanese party then rather than a Democratic Party. . . . The wider the racial group, the better it was for us.

As a result of these efforts to expand, new figures began to appear at the meetings. David Benz, a Honolulu businessman and publisher, came, as did young Dan Inouye, a much-decorated veteran who had lost an arm in Italy; part-Hawaiian William Richardson; Dan Aoki, a leader in the 442d veterans club, and Sakae Takahashi, a highly-respected former officer in the 100th Battallion.

15. BOH, I, 1.
The returning veterans, particularly the AJA's found in this group of older men a shared desire for change which would open Hawaii's social, political and economic structure to all, regardless of ethnic background or economic standing. Kawano, Murai, Kido and Mau were Orientals with whom the AJA's had a shared background. Burns, of course, was a haole (North European Caucasian). But he was a haole who had grown up on the wrong side of the figurative tracks. As a poor kid in Honolulu's Kalihi district he had suffered his share of economic and social discrimination at the hands of the haole elite. He spoke the language of the minorities in Honolulu, of the Chinese and Hawaiians and Japanese and Filipinos he had grown up with. He had been rubbed raw in his psyche by class discrimination just as they had been by racial discrimination.

The Five had dwelt long in their talks on Hawaii's future about the new and open society which should come about after the war. The American Dream, that chimera which had stirred the imaginations of people from the earliest discovery of the new world, was possible in Hawaii, just as on the mainland. It was the same dream which had lured millions of Europeans from their homelands to seek opportunity, unfettered by the feudal restrictions of an ancient past. It was the get-rich dream of Carnegie and Horatio Alger, but it was also the dream of the idealism of Jefferson and of Fourth of July oratory. It was the dream which had filled a continent and built a nation. It was what being an American was all about.
In Hawaii The Dream would mean a society of equals in which any man was as good as the next—no matter that his father had once cut cane for a living in the plantation sugar fields.

And now the time was ripe. The war had changed Hawaii completely and a new egalitarian society could be shaped for the future. As Murai remembered:

The thing we were trying to do was better Hawaii for people of all ancestry living here. . . . trying to improve the working conditions of laboring people . . . [to] make Hawaii a better place for returning GI's [and] for all people coming to Hawaii . . . to 16 make Hawaii racially a little better place to live.

The young AJA veterans had talked of The Dream in their own way as they slugged their way up the Italian peninsula. They had filled their letters to the Emergency Service committee with their hopes and questions. Now, if The Dream was to be achieved in Hawaii, it would be through political change, and the vehicle for that change would be the Democratic Party. The young veterans turned, quite logically, to The Five who had begun revitalization of that party.

Burns Faction

As the veterans returned and were recruited to the political wars by Kawano and Burns, the group began to turn their efforts to organizing within the Democratic Party. The party precinct structure was in a state of advanced deterioration, but the organizers, with ILWU help, turned their efforts toward revitalization of the precinct clubs. By 1948 they had been successful enough to elect Burns Oahu

16. BOH, I, 1.
county party chairman. He had resigned from the police department in late 1945, and from that time on had devoted most of his time to party organization and recruitment.

Many of the veterans, as they entered into party activity, began to coalesce around Burns. Most were members of the 442d veterans club and of Club 100, the veterans organizations created by those who had served in the two distinctive units. Burns, as a result of his work with the Emergency Service committee, had been made an honorary member of the 442d club, and this organization became a great source of recruitment.

The early loyalty of Takahashi, a former captain in the 100th Battalion with a distinguished war record, and of Dan Aoki, a 442d first sergeant who had become a leader in the veteran's organization, was material in recruiting others to the Democratic cause. Eventually, a group of these young veterans, mostly AJA's, began to meet with Burns. He had been appointed Oahu director of civil defense by Honolulu Mayor Johnny Wilson, and the group met regularly in his office in the basement of City Hall. As Burns recalled,

I had a little group that came down to my office in the City Hall. . . . We'd take it as a base, a little study of parliamentary law, of Roberts Rules of Order and procedure.17

Others remember this group as somewhat more formal, with an elected "chairman," or secretary, Mike Tokunaga, and with attendance by invitation. Eventually, this group coalesced into a loose association which became the nucleus of the "Burns group" within the Democratic Party.18

17. BOH, I, 7.
18. BOH, William Richardson, I, 1; Mike Tokunaga, II, 1.
New Factions

Factionalism within the party did not, of course, disappear with revitalization. If anything, it probably increased as the possibility of obtaining political power through the party became more apparent. The traditional leaders, Governor Stainback, Ernest Heen, the Rice family from Kauai and Maui, Charles Kauhane, David Trask, and Honolulu's Mayor John Wilson, were not ready to willingly step aside. As Kido recalled: "We fought our way in. They, I suppose, resented the fact that a new element was coming into the party and they weren't too cooperative."19

By 1949 there were three major and other minor factional divisions within the party. The lines between these divisions, however, were often obscure, with temporary alliances forming and reforming depending upon the issue of the moment. The traditional party leaders, with roots in the pre-war period of total Republican domination, were reluctant to yield power to the new elements which had been brought in by the post-war organizing efforts of the ILWU and others. Along with the ILWU group was the Burns group, looking to the former police captain for leadership, and with a membership predominantly AJA returned war veterans.

Burns's ties to the ILWU leadership were close. During the darkest days of the dock strike in 1949, Burns spent weeks in Washington pleading the cause of the ILWU before the national authority. Yet, within the ranks of the Burns group there were many who were suspicious of the ILWU leadership and willing to accept the charges of Communist association being made against them. ILWU support was welcome, and in fact necessary

19. BOH, I, 1.
if Democratic candidates were to be victorious at the polls. But the charges of Communist affiliation against the ILWU leadership were telling, and could destroy the efforts to bring about a resurgent party. Long time supporter Mike Tokunaga remembered that Burns began working to convince Jack Hall to stay out of the Democratic Party because "the Democrats could never grow with the taint of communism from the ILWU." As one of Burns's earliest AJA recruits, Dan Inouye, put it:

Those of us who met ... like Jack Burns, Dan Aoki, ... Sakae Takahashi ... were agreed on this much; any chance we had for winning the territorial legislature would go glimmering as long as we were cursed with the ILWU kiss of death.

The 1950 Convention

Many of the forces shaping this new Democratic Party were coming to a head as the 1950 territorial convention approached. On November 14, 1949 the ILWU, in the aftermath of the dock strike, had formally renounced its ties to the Democratic Party. Subsequently, Jack Hall and other union leaders resigned their party offices. Clearly, the union was signaling a new approach to the political wars.

Coupled with this was the accelerating drive of the Burns faction to gain control of the party, and the continued resentment by members of the Old Guard toward those new to the party banner who were to the left of their traditionally conservative position. In April

20. Mike Tokunaga, BOH, II, 1.
of 1950, the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings charged
the political atmosphere further when they branded those who refused
to testify before them the "Reluctant 39."

When the Democrats met in their territorial convention the
next month, this boiling political stew spilled over in a battle which
split the party into what appeared to be two major factions. It was
in fact at least three factions and possibly more.

The split came on a resolution by the Old Guard, asking that
any members of the "Reluctant 39" in attendance as delegates either
sign a loyalty oath or get out. When that resolution was turned down
by a majority made up of ILWU supporters and Burns forces, the Old
Guard walked out and established a rump convention. Both groups, the
"walkouts" and the "standpats" as they became known, elected a full
slate of party officers and adopted a platform. The ensuing split was
to continue for the next two years while the contending factions fought
each other in the press and continually advanced their claims to
legitimacy with the national Democratic Party.

While those who walked out were largely the Old Guard and
those remaining the ILWU supporters and the Burns faction, the division
was not clear cut. The Burns group immediately set out to dominate the
party machinery. As the more moderate element of the "standpats" they
were able to put out lines to the "walkouts" and soon had a foot in
both camps. Burns, as chairman of the Oahu county committee was
acceptable to both groups, and was thus in an ideal position to insure
a continuation of the growing influence of his faction.  

significant result of the split, however, was that the Democrats once again took a beating at the hands of the Republican Party in the 1950 elections.

Events of the two years following were of major significance in determining the ultimate direction which the Democratic Party was to take. Stainback's term as governor had expired even before the 1950 split and the Burns faction had been actively seeking a voice in the selection of his successor. Burns, calling upon contacts he had made in his 1949 trip to Washington, advanced the name of Oren Long, a former territorial superintendent of schools, and a Tennessean who could command southern support for confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Members of the Burns group had met with Long before throwing their support behind him and felt they had a strong commitment from him to appoint Kido, Burns and Mau to cabinet level positions in a Long administration.

When Long was actually appointed, however, the only one of the three to be offered a position was Burns. Long offered him the job of high sheriff--a process server. Long did ultimately ask the Burns group for a recommendation for the office of territorial treasurer. They proposed Sakae Takahashi although he had just been elected to the county board of supervisors. Takahashi was appointed to become the first AJA to serve in a cabinet level post in the territorial government.

24. Kido, BOH, I, 2.
Kawano and HUAC

The "Reluctant 39" witnesses before the HUAC came to trial for contempt of congress in Honolulu in January of 1951. Their cases were brought before a courageous civil libertarian, Judge Delbert Metzger, who ruled that even suspected Communists, like other Americans, had a right to invoke the Fifth Amendment. All were acquitted, to the chagrin of the red-baiters in the community.

Among those cleared was Jack Kawano. His near testimony in the 1950 hearings—the statement that he was no longer a member of the Communist Party, instead of simply declining to answer—had destroyed his position in the ILWU. Hall had denounced him as a traitor to the labor movement, and he had been attacked by Robert McElrath, the public relations man for the ILWU. 25

In early 1951, deeply concerned over U.S. casualties in the fighting against Communists in Korea, Kawano had a change of heart and decided to tell his story to the HUAC. He went to Washington in July, accompanied by Chuck Mau, and testified at length about his own activities, about his attendance at party schools in California, and about the leadership of the party in Hawaii. He ended his lengthy and revealing testimony with the following statement:

I would like to have the record show that I would like to offer my thanks and deep appreciation particularly to Judge Chuck Mau; Representative Mitsuyuki Kido; Mr. John A. Burns, chairman of the Oahu county committee of the Democratic Party of Hawaii; Dr. Ernest L. Murai, who so patiently and insistently worked on me and constantly preached Americanism to me.

They worked on me without knowledge that I was a member of the Communist Party. It was they who convinced me ... to break my ties with the Communist Party.

Later on other good citizens, through discussion on community problems and through friendly association gave me further encouragement to become a good American. Among these are Captain Sakai Takahashi, now a member of the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, ...; Mr. Dave Benz, secretary of the Democratic Party of Hawaii; Mr. Daniel Aoki, former president of the Four Hundred and Forty-Second Infantry Club; also Captain Daniel Inouye and other good citizens. 26

Kawano could hardly have done a greater service for those members of the Burns group who were being constantly attacked as party liners by the red-baiters in Honolulu. Kawano informed Mau, Kido and later Burns of his plans to go to Washington and testify. But he maintained that his mind was made up to go before he spoke to any of the three.

The suspicion logically arises that Kawano may have in fact been sacrificed by the Burns faction, fighting for final control of the Democratic Party against the conservatives of the "walkout" faction, and being regularly attacked by the red-baiters in Honolulu. Certainly such dramatic testimony, particularly with the eulogy to the Democratic politicians as good Americans, should have cleansed the Burns faction of any tint of red. Asked about this, Kawano took a pragmatic view:

Well that angle is something that I had never given it thought. Off hand, my reaction would be no, I don't think so ... 27

27. BOH, I, 2.
Following his testimony Kawano was stripped of all union positions. He attempted to make a living at various jobs and in a small business, but was finally forced to leave Hawaii for Los Angeles.

1952 Convention

As the date for the 1952 territorial convention approached, the Democrats recognized that they must try to weld the fractured party back into a single entity or again face defeat at the polls. Under pressure from Governor Long and with the active involvement of Mayor Wilson, representatives of both "standpat" and "walkout" factions finally agreed to resolve the dispute by battling for delegates at the precinct level and then holding a single territorial convention. In the ensuing convention, the Burns organization—by this time being referred to by the press as the "moderates"—gained the support of the remnants of the "walkout" faction to dominate the convention. In the key vote, the Burns group swung behind businessman Frank F. Fai, a young Marine Corps veteran, to elect him national committeeman over the veteran Democrat, Mayor Wilson. Wilson had strong support from the ILWU faction, and Burns's lieutenants saw this election as a key test in the efforts of the Burns group to overcome the ILWU's latent strength in the Democratic Party.

There were other reasons, however, for supporting Fasi. The former Marine, a member of the "walkout" faction, had regularly attacked

29. Kido, BOH, I, 1.
Burns and others as Communist party-liners. Fasi had been actively courting all factions, however, in his campaign for the office of national committeeman. 30

Just before the convention, key members of the Burns group met with Fasi at the home of Mitsuyuki Kido and promised him their support if he would halt further red-baiting attacks on Burns, and promise to clear all future statements through Burns as county chairman. They also demanded that Fasi disavow any primary campaign against Wilson for mayor. As Kido recalled:

We got his pledge, we shook hands and everything. In the convention we smacked Johnny Wilson down. We got a friend from Hawaii who brought in a hundred some odd proxies and beat Johnny Wilson hands down. The ILWU will never forgive us for that but that's one reason we took that position. 31

There may have been other reasons for the Burns faction's support of Fasi. Wilson wanted very much to be appointed governor of Hawaii territory to cap his long political career. He felt that the post of national committeeman would put him in contact with national party leaders who could influence his appointment. Members of the Burns faction, however, were worried about Wilson's advanced age. They were afraid that he would delegate the necessary mainland trips to party meetings to O. Vincent Esposito, a young attorney close to the ILWU and to Wilson, and outside the Burns circle. 32 This view, of course, conflicts with

31. BOH, I, 1. Fasi has declined to be interviewed. When the author queried him as to his version of the meeting described he responded that he would answer only if given a lie detector test and if the test was also administered to the Burns people making the statements. The response is at Appendix C.
32. BOH, I, 1 and 2.
the idea that Wilson wanted the national committeeman's post to further his contacts with national administration figures and so increase his chances of appointment as governor.

At any rate, the party convention was looked upon with approval by the Honolulu Advertiser which noted in an editorial that:

From the record, the Democratic Party appears dominated now by a right wing-moderate coalition, but it is not this alone that makes the picture a cheery one for local Democrats. Significant of the new spirit within party ranks is the attitude of standpat members. This liberal, often fiery element, did not walk out embittered . . .

Standpatters stayed until the end, getting behind right wing strength in the new central committee . . . So for the first time in two years the party has an operative central organization.33

The Burns organization's strong showing in the territorial convention was made possible by support from the Big Island. Delegate Albert Tani came to the convention carrying seventy-six proxies and controlling thirty-three others from Hawaii county. With approximately 797 votes being cast, and with the Oahu delegates fairly evenly divided, Tani's package of votes became crucial. On the key vote in which Fasi defeated Wilson, for example, the young veteran received 429 votes to Wilson's 358, a difference of seventy-one votes.34

Fasi's commitments to the Burns faction did not last long. He made a nominating speech for Johnny Wilson when the mayor announced his reelection plans, but a few weeks later startled and angered party members by announcing his own candidacy. It happened at the last minute after a mainland-bound flight which Fasi had taken was forced

to turn back to Honolulu by bad weather. That, said Fasi, was an
omen. It was God's will that he should run for mayor. "Skeptics
said that he had placed his order for campaign printing several
weeks in advance."³⁵

Once the campaign began Fasi took to the airwaves with regular
radio broadcasts and soon resumed his attacks on Burns and other
members of the former "standpat" faction as Communist dupes.

Oahu Dissidents

Burns's strength on Oahu had come under serious attack the
week before the territorial convention when a majority of the recently-
elected Oahu precinct representatives met in a dissident convention
and elected a new county chairman. Discontented with Burns's failure
to hold county committee meetings, and pointing out that every other
county committee in the territory had already held elections, the
dissident group picked John K. Akau, Jr. as county chairman to replace
Burns.

Burns branded the meeting as illegal, but the dissident delegates
appeared to have sufficient strength to defeat the Burns organization in
any meeting which might be called.³⁶

A showdown with the Oahu dissidents was avoided when Burns became
chairman of the territorial party central committee. The party con-
vention had elected Chuck Mau as territorial chairman, but Mau, not
present at the time, and embittered because he had been left off the

slate of delegates to the national Democratic convention, resigned.
Members of the central committee then elected Burns chairman, although
he was not even a member of the committee at the time and could not, in fact, vote on committee decisions. 37

Power Shifting

As the Democrats headed for the critical 1954 election in which they were to gain control of the legislature for the first time, the Communist issue continued to divide the community.

As a result of Kawano's testimony before HUAC, seven people, including Jack Hall, had been indicted for violation of the Smith Act. The Hawaii Seven, as they quickly became known, were duly arrested and brought to trial. They were found guilty in June of 1953, sentenced to fines of $5,000 and jail terms of five years, and then continued at liberty while their cases were being appealed. This, of course, provided further ammunition for the red-baiters.

All this time the territorial Subversive Activities commission was publishing its reports; civil servants and professors were arguing the merits of loyalty oaths; and a privately financed anti-Communist organization known as Imua [a Hawaiian word meaning forward] kept insisting that the worst was yet to come. 38

The 1952 party convention had definitely signaled a realignment of the power of the various factional groups. Any threat of the ILWU taking over the party was clearly extinguished, and with it much of the influence of Mayor Wilson and his close associate and supporter, T. Miyamoto. The Burns faction, on the other hand was not only in the

38. Daws, p. 375.
ascendancy, but in apparent control. Their remaining rivals were the survivors of the Old Guard, perhaps best represented by veteran Charles Kauhane; and such independents as O. Vincent Esposito; John K. Akau, Jr., the Oahu county chairman; young labor lawyer Tom Gill, and the maverick independent Frank Fasio.

No group within the party had the cohesion which Burns and his young AJA veterans now could display. At the same time some of the older figures who had done much to bring about the revitalization of the party were gone or going. Kawano had been rendered powerless by his testimony before HUAC, had, indeed, been destroyed personally. Mau had withdrawn from close participation with the Burns group after the 1952 convention had denied him the post of delegate to the national convention—a role he deeply desired and felt he deserved.39

Replacing them in the inner circle were the members of that group of young AJA's whom Burns had cultivated and educated in those sessions in his office in City Hall. And the Burns group continued to grow as more of the young veterans returned from mainland universities. Through mutual self interest as well as racial affiliation they were recruited into the orbit of the Burns faction.

Contrasting Styles

Burns had a very personal style of operating and close ties with his own faction. He neglected the formal party machinery. This led, on the eve of the 1954 party convention, to a new revolt. Frank Fasi, in his role as national committeeman, castigated Burns for failing to

call the territorial central committee into session for over twenty-one months. As a result of this inactivity, said Fasi, "the Democratic Party is lower in morale, prestige and activity than it has been in the last thirty years. It can sink no lower." Fasi did accept some of the blame for what he saw as the moribund state of the party, and shared it with all other party officials in the state. "Excepting for a small group headed by attorney Tom Gill which is attempting to accomplish something, the party is practically dead," Fasi said.

Fasi's comments on the state of the party are illustrative of the whole issue of factionalism. The Oahu county committee, independent of Burns, was quite active. Members were working on a number of projects designed to build the strength of the party. One effort was that of a small group under Gill which had identified large numbers of unregistered voters in precincts which would logically be Democratic. Gill had estimated about 25,000 of these in Oahu's fourth district alone, and was conducting a major registration campaign. In addition, the county party headquarters had been re-opened, and publication of a county party newspaper, the *Oahu Democrat*, had begun in January.

Burns, on the other hand, generally ignored the territorial central committee, preferring to work with his own group of supporters and advisors. As Burns recalled:

> After '48 we started a group meeting almost weekly. And that group sort of took over trying to make decisions as to who might run, who might not run, where they'd run, what jobs they could run for if they wanted to. . . . Particularly in that group

were Chuck Mau, Jack Kawano, Sakae Takahashi, Dan Inouye, . . . David Benz, . . . Ernie Murai, . . . Mits Kido, . . . William Richardson, . . . [and] Mike Tokunaga.42

Mau and other early Democrats remembered the Burns faction as open and accessible to all, interested in creating an ethnically balanced party which would appeal to all Hawaii's racial groups. As younger members came along, however, they found the faction closely controlled with all power centered in the small group of supporters surrounding Burns. 43

The Advertiser followed Fasi's speech with an editorial praising his stand, and touting the need for a two-party system in Hawaii.

The ineffectiveness of the Democratic Party of Hawaii as an instrument in the two-party system is a result of the rift between the right and left wings of the organization from which the party has never recovered. A rebirth now is needed. Two strong parties are vital to the general welfare.44

Neither Fasi nor the Advertiser editorial writer apparently had their ears very close to the ground. For at this point, the Democrats were just nine months away from a smashing victory which would establish them as the majority party for the first time in territorial history.

1954 Convention

In the 1954 territorial party convention, Burns, with his faction in control, was re-elected party chairman. However, the

42. BOH, I, 7.
43. Robert Oshiro, BOH, II, 3. See also David McClung, II, 1.
victory was not won without a stiff fight, with opposition led by former "walkouts" Ernest Heen and John K. Akau, Jr. Interestingly, the key attack on Burns came from his old friend and long-time associate in building the party, Chuck Mau. After the Burns faction had elected a strong majority of delegates to the central committee, it was obvious that there was still considerable personal opposition to Burns as chairman. At this point Mau, also a nominee for the chairman post, withdrew his own name and then urged that Burns should also withdraw "in the interests of party harmony and unity for the forthcoming elections." Burns declined, and the remaining opposition to him collapsed in the face of the obvious strength of his faction.

The Burns faction was not so successful in coping with opposition a week later when the Oahu county delegates met. The Burns-supported candidate for chairman of the Oahu county committee, Thomas Miles, was defeated by Tom Gill by a vote of seventy-two to fifty-three. Once again, control of the Oahu county committee was kept out of the hands of the Burns faction. The election was, in fact, a continuation of the fight in the state convention where a large block of Oahu's fourth district voters, with Gill among the leaders, had opposed Burns. Following his election, Gill offered an olive branch, noting that "there have been differences but I consider them erased and we [state and county committees] are going to work as a unit." Burns supporter William Richardson in his turn pledged that "the central committee will work with the county committee and support

46. Ibid.
it in all its undertakings." The appearance—if not the reality—of harmony settled over the party.

**Surprising Victory**

The Democratic victories in the election of 1954 were, to say the least, surprising. Democrats had expected to make gains against the dominant Republican majority. But they had not anticipated the overwhelming victory which gave them control of both Houses of the territorial legislature for the first time, and gave them control of county governments on Oahu, Maui and Kauai. Democrats were elected to over two-thirds of the seats in the House, and gained a nine to six margin in the Senate.

To that small group who had undertaken the revitalization of the party right after the war the victory was sweet, but still surprising. Dr. Murai recalled that:

> We expected to win, but we didn't expect that [size victory]. . . . I was happy for the candidates who were elected but I think the deepest sense of feeling that I had was after all these years, our efforts of building up the party paid off.\(^4\)

Chuck Mau was "surprised in a way, but yet not surprised because we were steadily gaining ground." The victory, Mau said, was due to the philosophical differences between the Democrats and Republicans which he and others had been talking about for almost ten years.

> We'd come a long ways by then in proving to the rank and file there was substance to what we were saying and the goals that we wanted to achieve, what we wanted


\(^{48}\) BOH, I, 2.
to do. We knew that it had already taken root and that the idea was being spread more and more. So, in a way, surprised that it came because I didn't know it would come that soon and yet not surprised because—hopefully—we've always hoped that there would be one day, a Democratic landslide ... But it happened and the surprise was that it came so soon. 49

Party Chairman Burns, narrowly defeated in his own last minute candidacy for delegate to congress in this overwhelming Democratic year, had not anticipated the scope of the victory. "My group ... thought that we might get one or two across the board, here and there, across the board," he recalled. "They didn't have any real expectations."

But the victory came, Burns said, because the people had gotten the message that the revitalized party was trying to project, and he credited the 1954 party platform with getting the message across.

We went on the various subjects that were of interest, explained our position, explained the opposition's position and illustrated what would happen under it. ... We pointed out that statehood had been long promised but no coming, no doing, or anything else—that we would achieve it, or else go for something else. Not going to fool around ... we had a land policy ... Ability policies, that a person should be recognized for ability for jobs regardless of race, color or creed. 50

The people, Burns said, recognized that the Democrats were offering "revolution by evolution ... by a quickened legislative process of evolution, not by just simply evolution itself, but by quickened legislatively-hastened change." 51

49. BOH, I, 2.
50. BOH, I, 10.
51. Ibid.
The "Revolution"

The 1954 Democratic victory has been called "Hawaii's second revolution." It is at best a poor choice of terms, more hyperbole than substance. The 1954 election was the culmination of changing patterns of social and political development with roots in the New Deal legislation which pre-dated World War II. Aided by NLRB decisions, labor had fought for and virtually achieved parity with management by 1950. At the same time the Oriental element in Hawaii's population was rapidly changing. Former aliens were becoming citizens and voters. Increasing numbers of young Oriental students were enrolled at the University of Hawaii, intent on making their lives better than those of their parents. And the slowly growing involvement of Orientals in the professions and in small businesses was creating a broadened middle class.

The established powers in the community—the factoring companies, the big trusts, and their vehicle, the Republican Party—were insensitive to the changes taking place about them. Insular to an extreme, and locked into patterns of benevolent paternalism which governed their attitudes toward their less fortunate fellow citizens, they were unable and unwilling to adapt to a post-1932 America. The New Deal was slow coming to Hawaii, but it was inevitable that it should arrive.\(^{53}\)

The political victory was sweet, and those early post-war Democrats were entitled to enjoy it. But they had only won a battle,

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52. The use of the term probably originated in journalistic accounts of the 1954 elections. It was given academic respectability, however, by Fuchs in *Hawaii Pono*.

they had not yet won the war. The new and untried Democratic legislators were about to get a harsh lesson in political reality; first from a veteran member of the Old Guard faction who would make them rue the day they put him in power as speaker of the House, and then from the appointed Republican governor who would wield his veto power to cancel out their best legislative efforts. That "legislatively-hastened change" which Burns saw the people voting for wasn't going anywhere in 1955. The "revolution" for the moment, was stalled. In addition, the factionalism which had developed in the process of revitalizing the Democratic Party would undercut the consolidation of power for another eight years. Before the Democrats would truly gain complete political control of the state in 1962, factional fights would destroy their best legislative efforts, and even temporarily cost them control of the Senate. More importantly, factionalism would rob them of their opportunity to elect the first governor of the new state of Hawaii.

The process of change was evolutionary, not revolutionary. And in 1954 it still had a long way to go.

**Social Change Significant**

This is not to deny the sociological significance of the 1954 election. For the first time, Orientals had been elected in numbers approximating their strength in the general population. The significance of the gains can be seen in the table below, which illustrates the percentage of Orientals in the territorial government. 54

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Of the 50.5 per cent of elected officials in 1955 who were Orientals, 43.0 per cent were Americans of Japanese ancestry.

But sociological change and political revolution are not the same thing. At least one poll conducted shortly after the 1954 elections indicated that political loyalties had changed very little. Questions which had been asked in a poll in 1948 were repeated in 1955 to determine if major changes had occurred in the area of political party preference. The major finding was that "there was no significant change in the propositions directly linked or leaning toward each of the two majority parties." When asked how they normally thought of themselves, as Democrat, Republican or Independent, the following results were obtained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In analyzing the results of the poll, the authors concluded that, "It seems a clear inference that at least a major portion of

this [polled] group . . . pays no attention to political parties when considering candidates."\(^56\)

A further interesting result was in response to a question on the most important thing the territorial government should be doing for the people of Hawaii. In the 1948 survey major concerns were for improvements in housing and sewerage, better roads and reductions in the cost of living. By 1955, the major concerns had shifted to jobs and a better school system. Most interestingly, that major concern of the men who had revitalized the Democratic Party—the issue of statehood—was a minor issue to the polled group. In 1948 only five per cent of those polled thought that obtaining statehood was the most important thing the territorial government could do. By 1955, with the political take-over by the Democrats intervening, this number had fallen to two per cent.\(^57\)

Why then, the overwhelming support of the electorate for Democrats in 1954? Obviously, large numbers of independent voters also identified with parts of The Dream. They recognized and opposed the continuing economic domination of the society by the Big Five and their vehicle, the Republican Party. The Democrats had talked of change, of the chance for those at the bottom of the social and economic pyramid to rise, and the independent voters had listened. The growing, newly enfranchised middle class had nothing in common with the Republican Party. They were natural Democrats. By 1954 there were sufficient numbers to make their weight felt.

\(^56\) Bergman and Nagoshi, p. A-27.
CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATS IN POWER

We were successful in 1954. Then we had power. Then we got factions.

--- O. Vincent Esposito

We got prosperous. Then we got different factions.

--- John A. Burns

It is perhaps not surprising that two men who after 1954 found themselves on opposite sides of the factional fence should recall the cause of party division in such similar terms.

It is of course not true that factionalism came only with success. As we have seen, many of the maneuvers carried out to win the success of 1954 were behind the ever-growing factionalism in the party. Jack Burns's practice while head of the party of ignoring the regular party machinery and working closely with his own group, was a key element in the development of factionalism.

With success, however, the factional fights shifted for the moment out of the territorial and county committee conventions, and into the legislative halls of Iolani Palace.

1. BOH, I, 1.
2. BOH, I, 10.
In the legislature new factors influencing factional loyalty came into play. Neighbor island legislators had specific interests upon which they divided with the Oahu delegation; there was a wide range of ideologies within the membership; and "chamber" loyalty became important when House and Senate moved in different directions. All of these played a part at one point or another during the 1955 session.

Party Platform

The Democrats looked upon their coming to power as a mandate for action by the people of Hawaii. They had, beginning in 1952, presented their vision of a better society concisely and coherently in the party platform. Attorney Robert Dodge, a transplanted mainlander who had cut his political teeth on New Deal politics in his home state of Washington, was the party theoretician.

In the early 1950's Dodge began working with a group of party members to formulate a coherent expression of the philosophy of the Democratic Party. The group was made up of people more interested in political theory than in the nuts and bolts of party organizing. Burns, for example, played no part in this group. The ideas developed by Dodge's "brains trust" were boiled down into a party platform of only seven planks for the 1952 and 1954 campaigns. It replaced an unwieldy—and no doubt unread—platform of 75 planks. The goal was to define as simply as possible the essential differences between Democrats and Republicans.

Dodge and his group felt that the issues of greatest concern among Hawaii's people were taxes, the problems surrounding home and land ownership, the rights of labor, education, and statehood.

First class citizenship was a part of The Dream, and statehood was the vehicle by which it would be achieved. "The people of Hawaii want and are entitled to the full privileges of citizenship which only statehood . . . can bestow," said the platform.

Hawaii's citizens were willing to pay all taxes necessary to "meet the legitimate needs" of the community, but the existing tax laws were out of date and inequitable. The Democrats would "shift the burden from those least able to pay to those who are most able to pay." They would eliminate the inequitable ceiling on real property tax and plug "the loopholes which have favored certain special interests." The special interests remained unnamed, but obviously the plank was aimed at the big trusts, the plantations and their huge land holdings, and some individuals whose property holdings were notoriously undervalued.

Land ownership was critical in Hawaii, the platform recognized. Needed were laws to permit fee-simple purchase of homesites, and long term leases for small farmers.

In the area of education, again a building block of The Dream, the platform pledged the elimination of book rentals and special fees in the schools, lowered university tuition, and to "abolish all practices which limit educational opportunities." Those limiting practices were deeply embedded in Hawaii's public school system. Traditionally, the children of plantation laborers and of recent immigrants had been taught in schools in which they were not expected to be proficient in English.
Other children attended "English Standard" schools where they received far better educations.

For the workingman, the platform promised an increase in minimum wages to federal levels and a forty-hour week. "Labor should never be treated as a commodity but should be always treated with dignity and respect," the platform said. 5

The Democrats were trying to put The Dream into words the people could understand and to which they would rally. The document which they devised became the basis upon which they ran in 1952 and 1954, and the basis of the legislative program after the 1954 elections.

The 1955 Session

When the 1955 legislature convened, the young and untried Democrats quickly fell victim to the political maneuvering of older and more experienced politicians. Charles E. Kauhane, a veteran of political battles going back to the pre-war period, was elected speaker of the House. Burns threw the support of his faction behind Kauhane and told others within the faction to stand aside. 6

It was a fatal error. Part-Hawaiian Kauhane was no friend of the largely AJA contingent of Burns supporters. Operating in close alliance with a small group of his own, Kauhane demonstrated his distrust of the new arrivals. He consistently bypassed the normal machinery of the House. Instead of assigning bills for consideration to the standing committees, Kauhane appointed select committees, invariably made up of

6. Tokunaga, BOH, II, 2.
the same members: William E. Fernandes, Manuel S. Henriques, and Toshiharu Yama from Kauai; Philip P. Minn from Oahu, and Pule Akoni from Hawaii county. These five, with the occasional addition of Daniel Inouye, the floor leader, or of Maui delegate Nadao Yoshinaga, were routinely designated to conduct the legislative hearings. Most of the Kauhane group were closely associated with the ILWU.

The majority of the Democrats finally revolted against the speaker's leadership after Kauhane had assigned 43 bills to his select committee during a single day's session. They called a caucus on April 15, determined to bring about a change. However, they failed to overthrow Kauhane and the session continued in acrimony. The speaker became even more overbearing and abusive, treating Floor Leader Dan Inouye, Burns's chief lieutenant, as an errand boy. He consistently referred to the Democratic faction opposing him as "the Diet," and made references from the chair to a "second Pearl Harbor." The injection of the racial issue into the debate was inaccurate as well as unseemly. Of the fifteen Democrats opposing Kauhane, four were not Japanese, and one of his five close supporters was Japanese.

This fratricidal blood-letting by the Democrats quickly ate up the statutory sixty days of the session. By the legal closing day, April 29, many of the major measures called for in the Democratic platform had not even come to the floor of the House. In a move often practiced, but of doubtful legality, the clock in the chamber was stopped and the session continued on until the end of May. Ultimately the majority of the Democratic package was passed--bills calling for land revision, tax

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reform, changes in the insurance code, and support of the schools—all rooted in the party platform. In all there were 72 measures which reflected the "mandate" which the party had received in the election of 1954.9

But the factional fighting had been costly. The bills—backdated to April 29—went to the desk of Republican Governor Samuel Wilder King. He opposed most of them, and, with the time which had elapsed, had only to exercise a pocket veto. The session was adjourned. Time to override the vetoes had run out. The mandated reforms which the people of the territory apparently desired and for which the Democrats had worked for ten years, fell victim to the Democrats' own factional battles.10

A Bitter Lesson

The young Democrats had gotten a bitter lesson in political reality in their first attempts at exercising elective power. For some the disillusionment, though temporary, was deep. Maui Delegate Elmer Cravalho, later to serve as house speaker and become an important party leader, told a reporter a week before the end of the session that he was "making a full and complete break with politics. I couldn't serve in another House like this one has been."11

Spark M. Matsunaga, later to serve Hawaii as a congressman and a U.S. senator, also declared that he would not seek reelection as the end of the session approached. However, Matsunaga had second thoughts,

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and in a closing day speech told the speaker with whom he had contested so bitterly:

Old politicians never die, they just smell that way. It was with that thought in mind that I said I would not seek reelection... but as I realize the accomplishments of the session, I somehow begin to like that political smell. I said if you [Kauhane] persisted in your ways you would be known as a mere two-bit politician. Looking at the score again I say you will not go down as a two-bit politician.12 I am sure you will go down as a great politician.

Kiss-and-make-up may have been the order of the day in the afterglow of the session, but the bitter memory lingered on. Kauhane left the House in 1956 to run for the Honolulu board of supervisors. He lost and many of his fellow Democrats breathed a sigh of relief. But it was too early to assign Kauhane to the political graveyard. He would make one last appearance on the scene—again as a spoiler—in the 1959 session.

Hawaii's voters were not overly impressed with the Democrats in their first turn at bat in the territory's history. Sampling by the Hawaii Poll after the legislative session found that 58 per cent of the people didn't even have an opinion as to the most important legislative accomplishment of the 1955 session.13 Twenty-seven per cent of the respondents said that the Democratic-controlled legislature of 1955 had done a poorer job than the Republican-controlled legislature of 1953.14 In addition, seven out of every ten people surveyed when asked how they thought Governor King was doing in his job, either said that they were satisfied or highly in favor of the governor's performance.15

As Tom Gill noted in his 1956 end-of-term report as Oahu county chairman:

12. Ibid.
In 1954 we were not given a mandate for the next half century. Each election will have to be fought and won with the same zeal as the last. 16

Burns Finally Wins

In 1954, the year of the Democratic sweep, party leader John Burns had been narrowly defeated in his campaign for Hawaii's single non-voting delegate seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Burns had first sought the seat in 1948 as a last-minute addition to the ticket and had been overwhelmingly defeated by Joseph R. Farrington, wealthy Republican publisher, and son of a former governor. Farrington died in office and had been replaced in a special election by his widow, Elizabeth. In 1954, seeking a full term, she defeated Burns by fewer than a thousand votes.

The reasons for Burns's defeat in the face of the overwhelming Democratic tide are hard to understand. Burns had worked hard for the party ticket, perhaps to the detriment of his own campaign. 17 His campaign was also short of money. Close supporter Mike Tokunaga recalled that when he approached ILWU leader Jack Hall for a contribution in the late stages of the campaign, he was turned down. The attitude of the labor leader was that Burns couldn't win anyway. The ILWU did, however, take out a newspaper advertisement endorsing Burns which ran in the final days, and Tokunaga, invoking the "kiss of death" theory, felt that may have been a major error, hurting far more than helping. 18

At any rate, in 1956 Burns was determined to try again. As the campaign progressed, Mrs. Farrington dragged out the old bogey man, communism, and tried to tie it not only to Burns, but by indirection to all Democrats. But it was much too late for that tactic. Her stridency alienated many of the independents who made up the largest bloc of Hawaii's voters, and Burns beat her by over 15,000 votes. In his fourth try for elective office, the party leader had finally achieved victory.

The Honolulu Record attributed Burns's win, at least in part, to a reduced level of factional infighting in 1956. The paper's political commentator noted:

Those who were responsible for [past] factional fights were not as active on the political scene or were not around this year. They include Harold Rice, Ingram Stainback, Ernest Heen and Frank Fasi. 19

In the legislative contests the Democrats had their 1954 margin reduced, but still managed to hold control of the House electing eighteen of the thirty members. In the Senate the party increased their seats to twelve in the fifteen-member body cutting the Republicans to their smallest membership in history.

1957 Session

The Democrats had made political hay out of Governor King's veto of their program. Most telling was a campaign brochure which listed in side-by-side columns the promises of the Democratic platform, the legislation which had been passed in 1955 to fulfill the promise,

and the fate which the legislation had suffered at the hands of "King Sam;" as they labeled the Republican governor. Now, in 1957 the Democrats were ready again with the same program. But, typically, a factional skirmish over the speakership was to precede any positive legislative action. The struggle delineated nicely the status of factionalism within the party at that point in time.

During the 1956 campaign, Burns had told Maui Representative Elmer Cravalho he should run for speaker. Cravalho was an independent with no close ties to the Burns faction at that time, and Cravalho maintained later that Burns urged his candidacy for "unity purposes." Mike Tokunaga felt that Burns's goal as always was to neutralize any opposition within the party. His support of Cravalho as speaker was intended to isolate the growing influence of O. Vincent Esposito.

By the time the House Democrats caucused to pick a speaker, Daniel Inouye, second in prominence in the Burns faction only to Burns himself, also was a candidate. In addition, the ILWU was pushing the candidacy of Mark Norman Olds, a Big Islander just elected for his first term. In the caucus it became obvious that Olds had no chance, and the ILWU faction switched support to Cravalho. On the second ballot Inouye, believing he had the promise of seven votes, got only three. He had, he felt, been double-crossed by the ILWU faction, and in response threw his support behind Esposito, who was elected.

In the early days of party rebuilding after the war, Esposito, with strong ties to Johnny Wilson, had been close to the ILWU. He had

22. Ibid. See also Advertiser, December 2, 1956, p. 1.
a strong pro-labor record, but he was extremely independent and could not be counted automatically in labor's pocket. During the 1949 dock strike, Esposito got involved in planning for a barge service to bring essential goods to Hawaii. Nothing came of it, but longshore leader Jack Hall resented the attempt. Despite this, Esposito maintained that he had a good relationship with Hall until 1956. At that time the union leadership became more conservative and a split ensued. Hall told Esposito at that time: "I would rather deal with a prostitute, because I know where she stands, than to deal with a liberal."  

Esposito greeted his election as speaker with the promise of great things to come. "We will come through," he told a newspaper interviewer. "I've always felt that time would come when a responsible legislature would come. We've got it now."  

The same newspaper later praised Esposito's leadership, noting his ability to bring the various factions together, and to skillfully resist being baited by the remnants of the Kauhane faction. Esposito's leadership, the paper said, was a "vast improvement."  

The main order of business in the 1957 session was the enactment of that legislative program which had been destroyed in 1955 by Governor King's vetoes. Once again the majority Democrats pushed through legislation based on the 1952 and 1954 platforms. They increased education appropriations, raised teachers salaries, and provided money for student scholarships. Agricultural workers were brought under the

23. Takahashi, BOH, I, 3.
24. BOH, I, 1.
umbrella of the state unemployment compensation law, and a minimum wage of one dollar an hour for all workers was approved. Real property tax laws were revised to promote the productive use of land and various steps were taken to improve and promote the economy. The impact of taxes on those at the lower end of the economic scale was eased by the repeal of an existing across-the-board two per cent tax on salaries and wages, and by the imposition of increased corporate income taxes and taxes on public utilities and insurance companies. King, apparently under some pressure from Washington, tempered his use of the veto power and much of the program survived to become law.

Statehood

Burns, as Hawaii's congressional delegate, had little to do with the Democratic program in the territorial legislature. His was a different problem—getting congress to approve statehood for Hawaii. Without statehood Hawaii's people could never truly become first class Americans. Again and again in the tenure of Burns's predecessors, statehood enabling bills had been introduced in the congress only to founder and die. In anticipation of statehood, a territorial constitutional convention was held in 1950. The constituent assembly wrote a conservative document designed to appeal to those in the national legislature who could approve statehood.

Burns aggressively pushed the cause of statehood. He lobbied the southerners whose residual opposition was based on the spurious

27. Fuchs, p. 330.
grounds of race prejudice, and cultivated the leadership figures, Sam Rayburn, Lyndon Johnson and others. Burns's political forte was his persuasive ability with individuals and in small groups.

In the cloakroom politics of the capitol, with the leadership, and with his fellow Irish Catholics who were in powerful positions, he was extremely effective.

From 1953 statehood for Hawaii had been linked with statehood for Alaska. This linkage united all opposition to either of the territories and insured that no bill could pass. In 1958, sensing that the only way to succeed was to break the link between Hawaii and Alaska, Burns agreed to hold back the Hawaii bill. Alaska was approved and became, in June, the 49th state.

But the move was poorly understood and little liked in Hawaii. Typically, Burns failed to explain his strategy. He campaigned for reelection in 1958 in an atmosphere of suspicion. He had, his Republican opposition implied, sold out on the statehood bill.\(^{29}\) To the chagrin of his close supporters, he finally told the voters that if he did not achieve statehood in 1959, he would never come before them again seeking political office.\(^{30}\)

The tactic was successful. Burns was reelected, beating Farrant L. Turner, the widely respected former commander of the 100th Infantry Batallion, by over 14,000 votes.

Burns had correctly read the will of congress. Hearings on Hawaii statehood began in January, and by mid-March a bill had been approved by both Houses. A referendum in Hawaii agreed by an overwhelming


\(^{30}\) Dan Aoki, BOH, I, 2.
seventeen to one vote, and on August 21 the Republican president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, signed the appropriate declaration at a ceremony to which Democrat John Burns was not invited. Statehood, the keystone of The Dream, had finally been achieved.

1959 Session

Following the 1957 session the territorial legislature had been reapportioned with significant changes in the size and geographical make-up of the body. The House was increased from thirty to fifty members and the Senate went from fifteen to twenty-five. The changes granted increased—though not equitable—representation for Oahu in proportion to the neighbor islands.

This gave many new Democrats a chance to seek office. In the legislature which convened in early 1959 new faces destined to become powerful in the party heirarchy appeared for the first time. Tom Gill, who had served from 1954 as Oahu county chairman, was elected, as was David McClung, a former labor union official who had become a practicing attorney and who eventually would be Senate president. John C. Lanham, later to serve on the bench in Honolulu was elected from the mid-Oahu town of Wahiawa. And, fatefuly, the veteran Charles Kauhane, speaker in the 1955 session, returned from his two-year hiatus.

Many House veterans jumped to the Senate, including Inouye; Patsy Takemoto Mink, the independent Young Democrat leader later to serve in congress; and George Ariyoshi, later to become lieutenant governor and ultimately succeed Burns as governor. They were joined by the maverick Frank Fasi, elected in his first try for territorial office.
This was, of course, the year before statehood. Many of those senators—Inouye, Mink and Fasi—would disappear from the Senate in the pursuit of national office the following year.

But before that, the 1959 territorial House would go through the bitterest factional fight yet, one which would create deep and bitter divisions and cost Democrats both the governorship and the state Senate in the first statehood elections.

Tom Gill, though serving in elected office for the first time, was no stranger to the territorial legislature. In the 1955 legislature he had served as Senate attorney, and then in 1957 had shifted to the House where he was administrative assistant to Speaker Esposito. He was credited, along with Robert Dodge and Esposito, with getting the 1954 party platform translated into bills and passed through the legislature.31

To Gill, Esposito, and many other members of the new House in 1958, much of the Democratic promise of 1954 remained unfulfilled. Land reform, for example, had been achieved in only a minor way by revision of the tax laws. The thorough-going changes which would get land out of the hands of the large estates and trusts and into the hands of the common man had not been made.

Accordingly, following the election Esposito and Gill set out to organize the House in a way which would expedite radical reform in Hawaii's land laws.

31. Dodge, BOH, I, 1.
The Factional Fight

In a House caucus on November 16, Esposito was elected speaker and by a vote of 18 to 15 was given the authority to appoint all committee chairmen. The vote was a clear victory for the "independent" members in the House over the "factions of the ILWU and Delegate John A. Burns," and was "a reaction of freshmen legislators against ... pressure ... by spokesmen for Burns and the ILWU."32

The caucus at the same time approved a plan by Esposito and Gill to bracket various committees for more efficient operation. Under the plan, joint hearings would be conducted by the committees. Finance, Economic Development and Tourism would be bracketed together, as would Judiciary and Land Reform, and also Agriculture, Natural Resources and Public Health.

Veteran independent Spark Matsunaga was elected the majority floor leader, and when the committee chairmanships were revealed, all important posts went to the members of the "independent" faction. Cravalho, candidate of the Burns-ILWU faction for speaker, was given not Finance, which he had requested, but the relatively unimportant committee on tourism.

Gill, certain that the independents were in control, proceeded with pre-session hearings on a radical land reform bill which would drastically revise land use and ownership in Hawaii. The hearings and their attendant publicity played upon some of the deepest-felt fears and emotions within the community. The majority of the privately-owned land in the islands was closely held by a group of large estates

and administered through various trust arrangements. The Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians were deeply suspicious of any move which they felt threatened the Bishop Estate trust. This trust controlled the largest block of privately-owned lands in the territory. Its income was used to support the Kamehameha Schools, exclusively for children of Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian descent.33

The Party Splits

The Democrats again caucused on December 6. The meeting broke up after an acrimonious debate when the fifteen delegates linked to the ILWU or Burns walked out. The "independents" still had an eighteen vote majority in the Democratic caucus. But it would require twenty-six votes to organize the House and elect the Speaker. The time for fence-mending and compromise was at hand. But Esposito and Gill were convinced that eventually the dissident fifteen would have to return to the fold. The alternative—a coalition with Republicans—was unthinkable in view of the recent past history of the party.

In fact, there were many forces working. Burns and his faction, as always, hoped to isolate any opposing faction. If they could not control, they could certainly maneuver for a share of the power. Jack Hall could influence the neighbor island delegations where the ILWU power was still secure. He was strongly opposed to the leadership of Esposito and Gill. They were those "liberals" whom he had come to despise. Hall was pushing Kauhane for speaker and a return to the days of 1955. And the Hawaiian members of the House were

33. Meller and Horwitz, pp. 5 ff.
worried about the land bill. Kauhane, David Trask from Maui, and Manuel Henriques from Kauai, all part-Hawaiian, all saw the land bill as a major threat to the Bishop Estate.\(^{34}\) Kauhane and Hall worked together in secret. Burns, in Washington, negotiated with all sides.

**Coalition**

Eventually, a strange deal was struck. The Republicans joined in a coalition with the Kauhane-Burns-ILWU Democrats. But remembering 1955, the Republicans refused to go along with Kauhane as speaker. Cravalho had held himself aloof from the bitterest infighting, and the coalition turned to him. They agreed to support him as speaker if the Republicans got certain specific committee memberships. Cravalho agreed and the dissident Democrat-Republican coalition took over.\(^{35}\)

An unnamed Republican member told the Honolulu Advertiser:

Vince [Esposito] made two major mistakes. He treated the Republicans like they were of no importance at all. And he assumed that the great majority of Democratic legislators wouldn't dream of entering a coalition with the Republicans.\(^{36}\)

It was a strange turn of events. The party which had come to power in 1954 in a "revolution" against the entrenched interests in the society had obviously changed. Under the many factional pressures, the House Democrats had lost all semblance of unity and some of them had climbed in bed with the enemy. Criticism was handed out all around. Author James Michener, a strong Democrat supporter, condemned the coalition in colorful language. It was, he said, "an evil thing which

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will have unnatural consequences." Republicans got their lumps from the Advertiser's editorial writer who wrote:

The Republicans, espousing enlightened moderation, formed a coalition with the most radical elements of the Democratic Party ..., one which they will rue for a long, long time. Many Democratic House members normally loyal to Burns could not stomach the coalition. Tadao Beppu, the candidate of the Burns faction against Gill for Oahu county chairman in 1956, recalled that he backed the "independents" in the fight. Not, he said, because he favored Esposito, but because he opposed any coalition with Republicans.

David McClung moved to the Esposito side for the same reason. In the end, the fifteen Democrats who had originally walked out of the caucus were trimmed down to a hard core of eleven, mostly neighbor islanders with close ties to the ILWU. But with the Republicans the eleven could control the House.

Close members of the Esposito-Gill group announced that they would not support the coalition and refused committee chairmanships. Gill announced:

We've served notice that we will not accept any responsibility under a coalition. We will serve on committees as representatives, but we can't take any coalition chairmanships. It's their show. They'll have to run it.

At the time, and in retrospect, some of the principals blamed Gill for discounting the possibility of a coalition and for holding too adamantly to the original organizational plan of the

39. BOH, II, 2.
40. BOH, II, 1.
41. Advertiser, February 20, 1959, p. 4.
"independents." "Vince [Esposito] would have been happy to make an accommodation," but, "his supporters, including Gill, would not compromise," McClung recalled. 42

Gill himself remembered:

I guess we must have over-played our hand. We weren't very smart about it. But having run on certain ideological planks, like land reform and a few things like this that we thought were important, we put together a tentative organization of the House... which got everybody upset... It was obviously a bad psychological thing to do, because it gave people talking points.

Burns's Position

The only non-coalition Democrat seemingly happy with the turn of events was Jack Burns. From far off Washington the delegate wired Cravalho that his election was a tribute to his "exceptional abilities as a great public servant." 44 To the non-coalition Democrats that was offensive enough, but Burns then followed up with a letter to Kauhane which really raised eyebrows around the corridors of Iolani Palace. Burns praised Kauhane's role in the organizational fight. He had performed, "a great service to not only the voters of your district, but to the whole of Hawaii by your alertness to the dangers present in the situations... which would have resulted... in untold harm to Hawaii's cause." 45

The cause to which Burns referred of course was the all-consuming one of statehood for Hawaii. The strategy of separating Alaska and

42. McClung, BOH, II, 2.
43. BOH, I, 1.
Hawaii had the previous year brought statehood for Alaska. Now, barring any last minute surprises, it was Hawaii's turn. The land reform bill which the Gill-Esposito "independents" were tailoring looked like just the sort of surprise Burns wanted to avoid. The conservative leaders of the U.S. congress might well take a dim view of any such radical measure and statehood could be derailed once again. So Burns praised the defeat of the Esposito-Gill faction.

Despite his concern for statehood, Burns's congratulatory messages were inept. The majority of House Democrats—22 of them—had opposed the coalition with Republicans. The delegate's rhetoric did not please most members of his party. 46

The land use bill, the root of the controversy, was finally passed in a watered down form. It was a much milder law than that which had been proposed by Gill at the beginning of the session. 47 Obviously, conservative forces in the community could rally their power when they felt really threatened. Any truly "revolutionary" reforms would call forth strong and disciplined opposition. Those who had brought about the 1954 victory for the Democrats remained in power, but they too were becoming less interested in radical reform. Life, observably, was improving for many of them. Economic and social barriers had fallen and the chance to "make it" as individuals was open. If The Dream had not yet been achieved for all, at least a part of it had arrived for some.

46. Ibid.
Conservative business leaders from the Big Five companies now selectively supported Democrats because of their pragmatic assessment that "it was the political reality that the Democrats had taken over the electorate." Accepting such support, of course, meant incurring obligations. Lines of communication between big business and the Democratic reformers were opened, and some of the reforming young politicians began to find areas of mutual interest with the board chairmen from Merchant street. The devil theory about the Big Five, so popular in Democratic circles before 1954, began to seem less appropriate. For some, self-interest was becoming far more important than the public interest. In 1959 Hawaii stood at the brink of a period of growth and prosperity which would expand the economic pie so rapidly that opportunities for economic gain were rampant. Nothing could have been more effective in dampening down the revolutionary fervor of the pre-1954 Democrats.

With statehood in the summer of 1959 came the chance for Hawaii's people for the first time to elect their own governor and to have voting representation in the U.S. House and Senate. But the repercussions of the factional struggle in the 1959 territorial House would deny to the Democrats the governor's office and even cause them to lose their majority in the state Senate. From the viewpoint of party gains, the factional fight had been costly indeed.

CHAPTER IV
THE STATEHOOD ELECTION

The passage of the statehood bill by the U.S. congress set off seismic vibrations in Hawaii's political community. Along with the general joy of the populace that the often-denied goal had at last been achieved, was the recognition by the politically astute that great new opportunities had been created.

In those heady days of street celebrations and self-congratulatory newspaper editorials, Delegate John Burns was given great credit for his role in the statehood struggle. His supporters urged him to come home to Hawaii immediately to turn the success to political advantage. But the delegate delayed returning to Honolulu until most of the fervor was well past. His reasons were both political and personal. Sugar legislation was before the congress, and hearings were scheduled. Senator Lyndon Johnson, the minority leader, had become interested in Burns's plan to establish an East-West Culture and Learning Institute in Honolulu, associated with the University of Hawaii. And Burns's youngest son, James, was due to graduate from a mainland university and the delegate felt a strong family obligation to attend.1

1. Aoki, BOH, I, 3.
Burns, in fact, seemed little aware of the political scurrying in Honolulu until he received a call from Inouye. He had, Inouye told Burns, just announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate.\(^2\) Burns was not pleased. He was the titular leader of the party, and certainly the leader of the Burns faction. The right slate was critical to the first statehood election, and he didn't want these decisions made unilaterally. Burns quickly dispatched his closest aide, Dan Aoki, to Honolulu to get things under control.\(^3\)

**The Burns Slate**

The slate-makers went to work. Burns, Aoki and Mike Tokunaga decided that two of the party's long-time faithful, William Heen, and the former governor, Oren Long, should run for the U.S. Senate.\(^4\) Inouye was told to back off. He could, he was told, run for the single seat in the U.S. House, and then in two years, with Long retiring gracefully, the faction would support Inouye for the Senate. Inouye reluctantly agreed.

Burns himself decided to run for governor although his personal preference would have been for a Senate seat. He was well-liked in Washington and had proven his effectiveness in the national political arena. But with the governor's office came patronage, and through it the opportunity to continue to build his political power.\(^5\) He sent word from Washington with a long-time supporter from Maui, Seichi "Shadow" Hirai, to Mitsuyuki Kido, to keep himself available to run for lieutenant governor.\(^6\)

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Tokunaga, BOH, II, 3.
5. Ibid.
The Burns faction slate for the top offices was set: Burns for governor, Heen and Long for the Senate, Inouye for the House, and Kido for lieutenant governor.

But there were complications. The Burns faction was, after all, only a bare majority within the Democratic Party. There were other ambitious Democrats. There were also powerful elements within the party who resented Burns's role in the 1959 House fight. Many dedicated Democrats did not take gladly to the high-handed slate-making of the Burns faction. Many Democrats felt the party candidates should be selected in the party primary.

The Opposition

Pushing Inouye back to the House race had already caused a problem. Assured by Inouye that he was a candidate for the Senate, young Patsy Takemoto Mink had announced her candidacy for the single House seat. Now Inouye, under pressure from Burns, was forced to renege. Mink decided to contest the seat anyway and told Inouye she would oppose him in the primary.

House Floor Leader Spark Matsunaga was being pushed by Esposito and others around him to run for lieutenant governor. Matsunaga had defied Burns once before and won. In 1954 Matsunaga had wanted to run for the territorial House from Oahu's old fourth district. Burns and his slate-makers, fearing that Matsunaga's candidacy would take votes from Inouye, and not anticipating that Democrats would win five of the six seats in the district, told Matsunaga to stand aside. Matsunaga

8. Inouye, p. 269.
declined and won handily. Now he was intent on running for lieutenant governor against Kido.

Then there was the maverick Frank Fasi. Long on the outs with the Burns faction, Fasi announced he would run against Heen for one of the two Senate seats.

The delegate himself had problems. He had no serious challenger in the primary election. But when he came home from Washington he brought along a Harris poll showing that in the gubernatorial race he was trailing the incumbent Republican by a sixty-five to thirty-five percentage margin. Inexplicably he failed to tell even his closest supporters about this poll and most of them went on their way feeling Burns was a shoo-in to be the first elected governor of Hawaii.

The Primary

The Burns slate began to come apart in the primary election. Burns, Inouye and Long were all nominated, but Fasi beat out Heen for the second Senate seat. Burns's hand-picked candidate for lieutenant governor, Kido, narrowly beat Matsunaga.

The general election campaign was hectic. Party unity was out the window and it was every man for himself. Burns, though most of his supporters failed to understand it, was facing a formidable opponent in William F. Quinn. A charismatic Irishman, Quinn was a young Honolulu lawyer transplanted from the mainland. In 1957, to his surprise, he was appointed territorial governor by President Eisenhower. In his two-year term he had won his way into the hearts of Hawaii's people.

10. Don Horio, BOH, II, 1. See also Hirai, II, 1; Turk Tokita, II, 1; and McClung, II, 1.
The Burns campaign had other problems. Sure that their candidate could not lose, Burns's closest supporters were becoming arrogant. One close observer remembered that they "had it locked up and didn't want to let anybody else on the band wagon." These accusations were particularly leveled at Burns's close associates, Dan Aoki and Mike Tokunaga. Tokunaga agreed later that there "might have been" some justification for the charge.

The "Second Mahele"

The key issue in the campaign, and one upon which some felt the election turned, was the "second mahele." Hawaii's mahele in mid-19th century had marked the change from a feudal land tenure system to one of private property. All the lands of the islands had been divided among the king, the government, the chiefs, and land tenants.

Quinn, in the general election campaign, struck directly to the heart of the land hunger of Hawaii's people, when he announced that he would support a "second mahele" which would divide up government-held lands among all Hawaii's citizens. The issue was kept alive by daily press conferences, complete with maps illustrating what would be given away on the various islands. It was simplistic, but tremendously appealing to Hawaii's land-hungry voters.

The Democrats, stunned by Quinn's theft of one of their key long-standing issues, reacted slowly. Finally Burns, knowing that

13. BOH, II, 2.
his campaign was in trouble even if most of his supporters did not, set out to make peace with the "independent" faction of non-coalition House Democrats. As Tom Gill remembered:

He finally came around . . . and asked some of us from Oahu to help him. . . . So Esposito, myself, Takahashi, . . . Wakatsuki, quite a number of the folks who were . . . the independent or disconnected Democrats. . . . went out on the stump for Burns, and we spoke for him, and took off after Quinn. . . . [and] this great mahele thing. . . . We were able to cut the thing down, just took it apart, it was easy to do.15

Gill believed that "if the campaign had gone another week or so Burns might have beaten Quinn."16 Burns's lieutenant, Dan Aoki, agreed. "Had the campaign lasted another three weeks or so I think we would have won," he recalled.17

But the gap was too great. Burns, to the great shock of his close supporters, lost to Quinn by over 4,000 votes.

Why Burns Lost

Many reasons have been offered for Burns's defeat. He ran for the wrong office, should have run for the Senate. Quinn was far more popular as an incumbent than the Democrats had perceived. The Republican campaign defused some of the Democrats' best issues, including statehood. Burns was far behind from the beginning, and inexplicably failed to share that knowledge with his close supporters. They, smelling victory, became arrogant and alienated potential supporters.

15. BOH, I, 1.
16. Ibid.
17. BOH, I, 2.
Matsuo Takabuki remembered that while Burns held on to his usual ILWU support, there was a decided "last minute . . . swing of the AFL-CIO . . . to Quinn." Burns had declined to make commitments on appointments "and various other things" but Quinn made commitments to AFL-CIO representative Jack Reynolds, Takabuki claimed. 18

Whatever the contributing factors, it seems obvious that a major reason for Burns's loss was the factional infighting in the party. 19 His support for the coalition Democrats in the House and the unfortunate congratulatory messages to Cravalho and Kauhane early in the year were fresh in the minds of the "independents." Understandably, they weren't anxious to help Burns, and certainly not until he asked for their assistance. Many resented Burns's heavy-handed slate making. As Robert Oshiro, who was to become the architect of Burns's later victories, recalled, the candidates were so competitive among themselves in the primary that they failed to push the party ticket in the general election. 20

Burns was not the only loser. Fasi, who had beaten Heen in the primary, ran up against powerful opposition. Hiram Fong was one of those Republicans turned out of the territorial legislature in 1954 by the Democratic sweep. In the interim he had established a statewide network of finance companies and set about amassing a considerable personal fortune. The 1959 U.S. Senate campaign was his return to the political wars. With strong support from the ILWU, he easily defeated Fasi.

18. BOH, II, 2.
19. Meller and Tuttle, p. 82.
20. BOH, II, 3.
With the offices of governor and lieutenant governor linked in the general election, Kido was also out, and a well-known part-Hawaiian from the Big Island, Jimmy Kealoha, came into office with Quinn as lieutenant governor. Of the Burns faction's original slate, only Inouye and Long had survived.

To make the debacle even worse, the Republicans recovered control of the new state Senate, electing fourteen of the twenty-five members. Burns went home to Kailua and the leadership of the Democratic Party passed to the state House.

Burns accepted his loss stoically enough. In a post-election interview he told a reporter in typical enigmatic fashion he had lost because:

If you want to go back to first causes, there was a shortage of honesty in all fields of communication. 21

Whatever that meant, the fact remained that Burns was a politician out of power and his party had suffered a devasting defeat. The promise of 1954 had run into the hard wall of political factionalism.

His close supporters, certain of an easy victory, were astounded. Twenty years later Turk Tokita, chief organizer and patronage dispenser for the Burns machine on Kauai, expressed the consensus view when he was asked why Burns had lost. Said Tokita: "I still can't figure it."

22. BOH, II, 1.
CHAPTER V

THE LESSON LEARNED

The impact of the 1959 defeat was sobering on the newly-elected members of the first state House of Representatives, despite their thirty-three to eighteen majority, and signaled a turn toward cooperation and away from the factional struggles of the 1959 session. Voting by secret ballot in the party caucus, they elected Cravalho as speaker, Howard Miyake as majority leader and Gill as floor leader. As Gill recalled:

The House members were so shaken by the bloodshed in 1959 . . . they had enough sense not to get into [a new] . . . fuss, so we had a reasonably good-working mechanism. Cravalho was . . . a good speaker. He would do what was practical, and he was not adverse to program. . . . There were many people that had a lot to do with it, but the three top leadership positions kind of ran the House as long as they could get together, or two of them could get together. 1

Republican Problems

While things smoothed out in the Democratic House, the Republicans ran into their own factional problems. Quinn's administration had the large task of establishing the machinery of the new state government, and in this the Republican-controlled Senate proved to be of little

1. BOH, I, 1.
help. The members—many GOP old-timers heady with regained power—battled each other and challenged the governor over his appointments. It quickly became obvious that Quinn's biggest problems were not with the Democrats in the House, but with his own party in the Senate. "I got more done when my legislature was two-thirds Democrats," Quinn later lamented.²

The lieutenant governor, James Kealoha, also proved to be a thorn in the governor's side. He began building a power base of his own and gave obvious indications he intended to run for governor. Quinn sent his "second mahele" to the legislature as a plan to sell surplus lands to Hawaii's citizens for $50 an acre. It got bogged down in legislative infighting and was killed by the Republican Senate.

Quinn was a strong administrator and was able to get the new state bureaucracy functioning successfully. But the infighting by the Republicans was destroying the party's image and countering his successes. In some ways, the 1959 defeat was turning out to be a blessing in disguise for the Democrats.

Under the provisions of a law passed by the last territorial legislature, the first state legislature elected in 1959 was to remain in office until 1962, as were the governor and lieutenant governor. Fong's term in the U.S. Senate was to run to 1964, Long's to 1962. However, to get Hawaii synchronized with the rest of the nation, Inouye was required to run again in 1960 for his U.S. House seat. He won an overwhelming 74 per cent of the vote.

The Lesson of 1959

The smooth running of the House and possession of two-thirds of the congressional delegation could not erase the Democratic defeat. The debacle of 1959, costing the party the chance to consolidate the breakthrough of 1954, rankled. In early 1961 the first step toward bringing fire out of the ashes was taken by the Oahu county committee.

Something must be done, the committee members decided, to avoid the factional fighting which had cost the party so dearly in 1959. Somehow a formula must be found to get the full support of all factions of the party behind the top five positions on the ticket in 1962—governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. Senate, and the two seats in the U.S. House. 3 No longer could the party afford the luxury of fratricidal battles carried out in public if it was to regain and hold power.

These thoughts were put into a formal resolution to the state central committee on June 19, 1961, asking that a group of impartial Democrats be formed into a "committee on state-wide offices." This group would try to find "the strongest combination of candidates and the best means of winning the 1962 elections." 4

Party Chairman William Richardson turned to a freshman member of the House, Robert Oshiro of Wahiawa, to chair a group of nine other well-known party members who were formed into a steering committee. This group began a long and complex process to select the best

3. The second seat had been added after the 1960 election. Both seats were elected "at large."
4. Robert C. Oshiro, Partial Report (a document of the Hawaii State Central Committee, February 1, 1962), Exhibit A, n. pag. The report with exhibits may be found in Appendix A.
possible ticket for the top five party positions and--more importantly--to bring all of the party factions behind the ticket selected.

First the steering committee assembled a list of twenty-five probable candidates for top office in 1962. Those included were then asked for their views on how a permanent committee to make the ticket selections should be chosen. Following the guidance of the potential candidates, individuals in leadership positions in the party--majority leader in the House, the minority leader in the Senate, president of the Young Democrats, chairman of the state central and Oahu county committees, chairman of the city council of Honolulu, and the representative to the national Democratic committee--were all asked to nominate individuals to what was to become a fact-finding committee. These names were then sent back out to the twenty-five potential candidates and they were given the opportunity to exercise a "no" vote on any of the individuals. Out of this process came a committee of nineteen members, with, presumably, the blessing of the leading potential candidates in the party, and with a charter to "pursue all possibilities towards arriving at the strongest combination of candidates" for the top five offices for 1962. 5

The fact-finding committee began work in earnest, laboring through the fall and winter months of 1961 and early 1962. Of the twenty-five potential candidates, nine eliminated themselves from consideration. Concentrating on the remaining sixteen, the committee conducted personal interviews, analyzed biographical records, commissioned a sample canvass, and surveyed party members throughout the state. They even made an attempt to conduct "group interviews" with the leaders of

the major party factions. This effort, however, failed due to the unwillingness of the factional leaders to make commitments.

As the work progressed the committee made further decisions which in effect eliminated from their deliberations the positions of U.S. senator and of lieutenant governor. Critical to the committee’s efforts, the group decided, was the designation of the gubernatorial candidate. Once this individual was known, he should then have a voice in selection of the lieutenant governor candidate who would be his running mate. Hence, a determination was made to take no action on the lieutenant governor position.

Problems surrounding the senatorial seat were more complex. In 1959 Daniel Inouye, after having announced his candidacy for the Senate had been asked to withdraw by the slate-makers of the Burns faction who supported party senior Oren Long. Inouye had agreed, with the promise that the faction would support him for the same seat in 1962 when Long was to retire. Long, however, had given some indication that he wished to run for another term, and this problem was being thrashed out within the Burns faction.\(^6\) The fact-finding committee—probably wisely since their main goal was party harmony—chose not to become involved. Determination of the senatorial candidate, they said, "is primarily a personal issue between incumbent United States Senator Oren E. Long and incumbent United States Congressman Daniel K. Inouye."\(^7\)

\(^6\) Tokunaga, BOH, II, 3.

\(^7\) Oshiro, Partial Report, n. pag.
By February of 1962, the fact-finding committee was ready with a preliminary report, dealing now only with the candidates for governor and the two seats in the U.S. congress. After analysis of the material which they had developed over the months, the committee members voted for the various potential candidates. A single ballot was conducted for the office of governor, with John Burns receiving twelve of the sixteen votes cast. 8 Long received two, and Herbert K. H. Lee and Richard K. Sharpless each received one.

In somewhat more complex voting for the congressional positions, involving five separate ballots, those chosen in order of strength were Thomas P. Gill, Lee, Nelson K. Doi, and O. Vincent Esposito. Others considered on the different ballots were Patsy T. Mink, Spark M. Matsunaga, and Frank F. Fasi. The balloting indicated very limited support for Matsunaga, and virtually no support for Mink and Fasi.

On March 9 Long bowed out and the committee then issued a second partial report concluding that Inouye was the strongest candidate for the Senate seat. No final report was ever issued. 9

The degree of factional influence on the efforts of this fact-finding committee is difficult to determine. Certainly, in the nature of politics, there was some. Oshiro was already a Burns supporter, though certainly not a member of the faction's inner circle. In May

8. The three neighbor island members of the committee apparently did not participate in the voting.
9. The second partial report is included in Appendix B. The information that no final report was issued is contained in a letter from Robert C. Oshiro, April 4, 1979, in the files of the author.
of 1962 he succeeded Burns's lieutenant Richardson as chairman of the state central committee. 10

At any rate, the committee's efforts did not eliminate contests in the primary election—one of their major goals. Richardson, a part-Hawaiian, was ultimately selected as the Burns faction's candidate for lieutenant governor to provide racial balance to the ticket. As Mike Tokunaga recalled,

[we were] looking for a part-Hawaiian candidate because we found in 1959 that Kealoha did so well we better find the same kind of candidate. It came down to Richardson. 11

Obviously, the desire for racial balance was not the only factor in Richardson's selection. The ILWU was supporting part-Hawaiian Ernest Kai, a prominent attorney and long-time Democrat, for the same post. Kai, however, was independent with party service going back to the days of the Old Guard. He had no close ties to the Burns faction.

A minor threat to Burns himself was raised when David McClung porposed the candidacy of Oren Long, the retiring U.S. senator. McClung actually set up a Long-for-Governor committee, but the effort failed to catch fire. McClung was no Burns partisan in 1962. He remembered that he was "turned off" by some of Burns's closest supporters, particularly Dan Aoki. Aoki had approached him as early as 1958, McClung recalled, and asked him to join with the Burns faction because "we need some haoles. That turned me off." 12

10. Oshiro was opposed by Aoki and Tokunaga, Burns's closest lieutenants, because they wanted a member of organized labor as party chairman to insure labor's support of Burns. Oshiro, BOH, II, 2.
11. BOH, II, 3.
12. BOH, I, 1.
The most formidable threat to Burns, however, would have been the gubernatorial candidacy of Tom Gill. The first state legislature was unique, serving from 1959 to 1962 and with two special sessions due to catastrophic events on the Big Island. Gill, as floor leader, had played an important role in the House and had gained considerable prominence. Newspaper speculation centered upon his future and the possibility of his candidacy for governor. As Oshiro remembered, Gill had become a formidable political force and the question for the fact-finding committee, if a bloody primary fight was to be avoided, was "how can we accommodate Tom Gill's ambition?" 13

The problem was the same, of course, for the Burns faction of the party. In the fact-finding committee's efforts and Gill's agreement to run for congress, the mechanism was found.

Labor Unity

Most significant of all was the support of labor for the unified ticket. For the first—and last—time in Hawaii's modern political history, all major labor organizations came together behind the top five Democrats. When Oshiro briefed Jack Hall and the ILWU leadership on the party program to support the top five candidates—calling it the "umbrella concept" with the leaders carrying the rest of the ticket—Hall told Oshiro: "I understand. I get the picture. We're with you." 14 Because the ticket offered something to every major faction in the party, leaders of the A.F. of L. and of Unity

14. Ibid.
House (teamster and hotel workers) also fell in line in an unheard of display of labor unity.

The candidacy of Herbert K. H. Lee had also provided difficulty for Oshiro. Lee, a member of the Old Guard faction, had been in political retirement, but in 1962 ambition stirred anew and he indicated a desire to run for governor.\(^\text{15}\) How much support Lee might have gained is difficult to know. At any rate, his candidacy was seen as a potential threat to the sought-for party unity, and he, like Gill, was diverted to the congressional contests.

As the filing date for the primary election approached, the ambitions of others could not be contained, despite the best efforts of Oshiro and his committee. Long's McClung-sponsored candidacy fizzled out, but token opposition to Burns was offered by Honolulu attorney Hyman Greenstein.\(^\text{16}\) Kai decided to contest the lieutenant governor race, along with four other lesser candidates. Kai led Richardson on the outer islands, but Richardson managed to pull out the victory by his vote on Oahu. A bitter Kai later declined to support Richardson in the general election, despite a plea by Jack Hall, maintaining that the Burns faction had broken a hands-off pledge in the primary.\(^\text{17}\)

Matsunaga, true to his past record of defying the slate-makers, decided to run for one of the two U.S. House seats, as did Frank Fasi. When Matsunaga came in first in the field of four—proving that the slate-makers of the fact-finding committee had been somewhat less than

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15. Oshiro, BOH, II, 6.
16. Greenstein polled 7,700 primary votes to Burns's 71,000.
one-hundred per cent successful in reading the pulse of the electorate—the effect was to push Lee out of the race. Gill came in a close second, and Fasi trailed in the fourth position.

The result of the primary was a party slate which would appeal to the mixed ethnic bag of Hawaii voters, and behind which the party's major factions could rally—Burns for governor, Richardson for lieutenant governor, Inouye for the U.S. Senate, and Gill and Matsunaga for the U.S. House. There were two haoles, one part-Hawaiian and two Japanese. It was a "very attractive ticket."  

General Election

In the general election Burns, once again tackling Bill Quinn, faced the most difficult race of the five. But many things had fallen into place by 1962. The unity within the Democratic Party, with all factions pushing the party ticket, was by far the most important. But Quinn's strength had fallen into disarray by 1962. His personal popularity was still high, but the factional wars in the Republican-controlled Senate had alienated the independent voters so essential to victory for either party. Quinn's lieutenant governor, Jimmy Kealoha, had run against him in the Republican primary and the battle had split the party badly. The "second mahele," the gimmicky keystone in Quinn's 1959 victory, had become an albatross around his neck.

Besides, Republicans were still looked upon by Hawaii's voters as the party of the Big Five. An Aloha poll in September of 1962 found

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sixty-two per cent of the 1,076 respondents thought this to be true. Forty-four per cent also thought Republicans spent vast sums of money on their political campaigns, while only nine per cent felt Democrats did. Democrats, on the other hand, were looked upon as friends of small businessmen (forty-four per cent to fourteen per cent) and as supporters of programs designed to help all the people (thirty-two per cent to eleven per cent). The statehood issue still had some mileage left. Thirty-four per cent of the respondents credited Democrats with a long history of support for statehood, while only fifteen per cent gave credit to the Republicans.19

The campaign took interesting twists. Television had come into its own as a political tool, and following the Nixon-Kennedy example of 1960, efforts were made to bring Burns and Quinn together in a televised debate. Burns was an effective campaigner with individuals or in small groups, but on the platform before a large audience he projected an image of cold aloofness. Quinn, on the other hand, was a warm-hearted Irishman, known to raise his tenor voice in an Irish lullaby during a campaign appearance if it suited him. Quinn was quick-witted and eloquent. Burns was slow to speak. The contrast between the two was obvious, and Quinn was anxious to lure Burns into a joint televised appearance. Burns, pushed by the Republican's challenges, finally agreed to debate, despite the considerable concern of his supporters. 20

20. Takabuki, BOH, II, 1.
Memories of the ensuing debate vary, but the consensus seems to indicate that there were few fireworks and that it could probably be considered a draw. To Burns's supporters, expecting their candidate to be badly outclassed by the eloquent Quinn, a tie was as good as a win. Matsuo Takabuki, running the Burns campaign, thought his candidate won by surprising Quinn with a first question on dock tie ups, an issue which should have been the Republicans'. The Honolulu Advertiser, however, noted that the big surprise of the night was Quinn asking his first question about the "second mahele," an issue which should have been the Democrats'. One-upmanship was apparently the tactic of the night.

Despite the innovative use of television, the campaign seemed to hark back to earlier themes. Burns was still running against the Big Five, attacking them in rhetoric reminiscent of 1954. The people's rights and privileges, he said,

continue to be blighted by the antiquated economic-political self-appointed ruling group which too long has dominated Hawaii.

The Republicans tried to breathe new life into that old corpse, the Communist bogey man. It is doubtful if many at this late date really believed in it. Kenneth Brown, a Republican who later became a converted Democrat and a close Burns supporter, had impeccable credentials as a member of Hawaii's predominantly haole social and business elite. As he recalled the 1962 campaign, Burns was looked upon in his circles as a God damn radical, gonna do us all in." Most of his friends did not, however, believe Burns was a Communist. They just liked to say he was.

21. Ibid.  
24. BOH, II, 1.
Burns responded to the red-baiting by citing Jack Kawano's testimony before the HUAC in which Kawano had thanked Burns and others for showing him the light about the Communist conspiracy. Large newspaper advertisements featured Kawano's statement, and demanded "Let's play fair with Jack Burns." 25

Almost 27,000 more voters went to the polls to vote for governor in 1962, than had voted in 1959. Quinn, however, polled almost five thousand fewer votes. The result was an overwhelming landslide victory for Burns with 114,000 votes to Quinn's 82,000. Gill, Matsunaga and Inouye won even more impressively, and control of the state legislature was returned to the Democrats with convincing margins in both Houses.

If ever a party had received a mandate from the people, Hawaii's Democrats had one in 1962.

**The Mandate**

There were a number of reasons for the overwhelming Democratic victory. The disarray of the Republicans was of major importance. However, the unity effort had been an obvious success. The minor skirmishes in the Democratic primary were tame indeed compared to the bitter battles of 1959. The unified support of all labor was vitally important. The chief factions in the party had been accommodated on the ticket, and the racial balance had approached the ideal in a state

where racial considerations were always of at least secondary importance with the voters. 26

Oshiro estimated that in 1962 ninety per cent of the Japanese voted Democratic. They supported the party as they had since 1954. But, in addition, the large block of Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian voters, pulled away by Kealoha's candidacy in 1959, swung back to the Democrats, and the newest immigrant group in Hawaii, the Filipinos, also supported Democratic candidates. 27

The unity theme got full party support behind all the candidates, from whatever faction. Past disputes were, for the moment, put aside. David McClung recalled that when he opened his campaign headquarters Jack Burns showed up to have his picture taken with McClung—who had recently pushed Long for the gubernatorial nomination—and with 0. Vincent Esposito. 28 The arrogance of Burns's close supporters, so costly in 1959, was submerged under the intense desire—and need—to win in 1962 to get back into power.

Money was as always a problem for the out-of-power Democrats. In a rare display of unity, each House member contributed a week's per diem, about $225, to a campaign fund of $20,000 designated specifically for support of the top five races. Top employees of the House also contributed to the fund. 29

27. Oshiro, BOH, II, 3.
28. BOH, II, 1.
The size of the victory was a mandate to the Democratic Party. But a mandate for what? Obviously the voters were ready once again to turn away from the Republicans and toward that moderate social and economic change with which the Democrats had been identified since 1952. Burns, in his campaign, had stressed three major objectives: the equal and just administration of the tax laws, open and free business competition, and home rule for Hawaii's counties. 30

Not very surprising, any of them. Tax law revision went back to the Democrats' 1952 and 1954 platforms, and legislation revising the tax structure had been passed in every Democratic-controlled legislature. As to business competition, even Republicans believed in free enterprise (or were forced to say that they did), and home rule was (and remains) a perennial motherhood issue in Hawaii, appealing to the neighbor island voters.

In his inaugural address Burns added three additional points: fullest and best use of land, making Hawaii the center of Pacific trade, and improving education. Again, with the exception of the Pacific trade point, all were old standbys in the Democratic platforms. 31

Were these things then the reason for the overwhelming mandate which the Democrats had been given? It seems unlikely.

Analysis of the Victory

Specific issues have rarely played a significant role in Hawaii's elections. In 1954 the Democrats had convinced the people

who had been at the bottom of the social and economic pyramid throughout the territory's history that they could stand up and take control. The result was overwhelming defeat of the old, tired, entrenched Republican powers. In 1959 voters turned away from the Democrats, offended by the factional infighting which had paralyzed the legislature and by the obvious every-man-for-himself attitude of the party candidates. Personality was more important than party program, and charismatic figures like Quinn and Hiram Fong were elected.

In 1962 with the Democrats displaying an unheard of unity and with the Republicans in disarray, the independent voters returned to the Democratic fold. But it was doubtful that they returned only because of the issues of the campaign. They supported Democrats once again because they were the Democratic Party's natural constituency. The huge number of voters who had entered the electorate after the war and who had their roots in the plantation immigrant system one or two generations back were natural Democrats. With the Republican Party—hidebound, inflexible, still displaying the haole racism of the pre-war period—the new voters could find no point of identification. Their logical area of self-interest was with the Democrats.

The surprise was not that the Democrats won such an overwhelming victory in 1962, but that they could have fallen into such factional disarray as to lose the election of 1959. The 1959 loss was a divergent election in the pattern which began in 1954. With the 1962 victory, political competition in Hawaii moved out of the realm of two-party politics and into the realm of single-party factionalism. There it was to remain for the foreseeable future.
CHAPTER VI

FACTION INTO MACHINE

Government, whether by party, president or bureaucracy must have a basis in some combination of group interests. These interests can be rationalized in various ideologies. . . . The dominant combination at any one time can claim that its program expresses the public interest. Yet, such a power combination is always contingent.

---Edward Pendleton Herring
The Politics of Democracy

It had been a long hard struggle, but the Democrats had finally achieved almost total political control of government in Hawaii. Even on the neighbor islands they had swept into power. A lone U.S. senator, Hiram Fong, and the mayor of Honolulu, Neil Blaisdell, were the only major survivors from the fifty year reign of the Republicans.

The long-standing factional differences among the Democrats were put away for the moment, and a euphoria enveloped the party. It couldn't last, of course. The powerful contending forces were still there. Opposing views of Hawaii's future would soon, if anything, diverge even further. Unity would be replaced by division. But for the moment, Burns and his faction were in control of the

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state government. The patronage machinery was in their hands, and they set about using it to turn the Burns faction into the Burns "machine."²

Burns and Business

Republicans and Merchant street business interests were dismayed. Maybe they didn't really believe Burns was a Communist, but they had been listening to their own rhetoric about the threat of a Democratic takeover for too many years to feel comfortable now that it had happened. Some of them "reacted . . . with emotion and dismay comparable to that expressed by eastern leaders when frontiersman Andrew Jackson entered the White House."³

Burns, despite his long years in public life, was still an enigmatic figure. How well did anyone really know him? What would he

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2. The usual view of the machine in American politics—most often associated with city governments—is of a monolithic structure which controls the administrative, legislative and judicial functions and can exercise its will in every area within its political jurisdiction. Such machines gain their power through political favors, the careful distribution of jobs and contracts to gain wide support, and various other means, many of which have often been found to be illegal. The Burns "machine" as it developed took on a peculiarly Hawaiian character, due largely to the political philosophy of Jack Burns. Burns always maintained that he was a firm believer in the separation of powers, and in most of his tenure he respected that idea. This led him to diverge from the traditional pattern of machine building. Burns used the patronage inherent in the governor's office to build the strength of his faction. State jobs were handed out with an eye to future loyalties. Through the power of appointment Burns gained considerable influence within the judiciary. But he never exercised any significant control over the legislative branch of government. In addition, he always faced strong challenges from other factions within the party which rendered his power less than absolute. It is in these areas that the Burns "machine" would fail the test of a classic American political machine. Nonetheless, the popular perception of the Burns faction in power was of a political machine in operation and the term is used here in the popular context.

3. Tuttle, p. 430.
now do? His initial staff and cabinet appointments were made with an eye to that racial balance which he always favored. And, of course, old friends were not forgotten. Probably the most important cabinet appointment was that of his younger brother, Edward Burns, to head the Department of Taxation. Equitable tax assessment had long been a major issue with the Democrats. Edward Burns was given the job of overseeing the state's tax machinery.  

The state's economic condition was the biggest worry of the newly-elected governor and he recognized that steps were needed to make business feel secure with his administration. The stories of Burns the left-wing radical had to be overcome.

As soon as the election results were in, Burns began putting out lines to Merchant street. He told an interviewer immediately after the election:

We need [the Big Five] in our community and they are entitled to their voice. I welcome their advice and counsel. . . . I represent them as I do everyone else.  

Burns's true colors quickly began to show. For the good of the community, Burns believed, labor and business had to cooperate and not fight each other. Labor had thought they were supporting a left-wing liberal. Had it all been political rhetoric? They quickly learned that Burns was much more conservative than they had believed.  

4. Tokunaga, BOH, II, 3.  
5. Oshiro, BOH, II, 6.  
7. BOH. Tokunaga, II, 3, and Beppu, II, 2.  
8. Tokunaga, BOH, II, 3.
A new view of Burns began to emerge in the business community. "It didn't take very long for people to see how conservative he was," Kenneth Brown remembered.9

The problem of business confidence reached beyond Hawaii. Tourism, now called the "visitor industry," in recognition of its growth and economic potential, had begun to rival Hawaii's traditional agriculture as a major contributor to the economy. With the advent of the jet-powered passenger plane, Hawaii was only a short distance from the west coast of the U.S., and mainland business interests were watching developments in the islands closely. Already one of Hawaii's second generation Oriental entrepreneurs, Chinn Ho, had begun the construction of a major hotel on Waikiki beach, the Ilikai. Ho's close associate was Matsuo Takabuki, Burns's long-time confidant, supporter, and campaign manager. When the Wall Street Journal took editorial note of the election in Hawaii of a radical governor, a shock wave went through those island businessmen who were anticipating closer ties with the mainland financial community. Takabuki, in New York with Ho to arrange a Chase-Manhattan bank loan, found himself explaining to the bankers that on fiscal and land policy Burns would be even more conservative than his predecessor, Quinn. But the bankers were skeptical. Something, Takabuki told Burns, had to be done, or mainland investment in Hawaii would dry up. Takabuki asked Edward Palmer, a senior vice-president of the First National City Bank in New York, to set up a personal meeting in New York between Burns and leading figures in the banking community.10 Burns convinced them he was no radical.

9. BOH, II, 1.
10. Takabuki, BOH, II, 2. See also Aoki, II, 1 and Oshiro II, 4.
Slowly a pattern of consensus government began to emerge. The rhetoric of the campaign trail was one thing, but the realities of governing were another. For the sake of the economy and the fiscal health of the state, business and labor must see that their interests were the same. The role of government was to bring them together. 11 This became the foremost concern and primary goal of the Burns administrations.

Obviously both his enemies and his supporters had misread Burns. He was neither the red-tinged radical Merchant street liked to paint, nor was he the social reformer which some of his supporters had believed. He was in fact an economic conservative, considerably under the influence of members of his own entourage like Takabuki who wanted an economic climate in which rapid expansion and development could take place.

Burns had campaigned on the 1952 and 1954 platforms and had come into office on the achievements of the post-1954 legislatures. But the degree of reform which he personally would support was limited and would become progressively less as he remained in office.

Legislative Leadership

Land ownership and use was still the single most important issue in Hawaii. From 1952 on, the Democratic platform had called for reform in the state's land tenure system. Awesome legislative battles had been fought over the issue. The 1962 legislative session had

11. Former newsman Tom Coffman, who observed the governor closely for three years as a political reporter, has written that Burns's primary concern in government was always the state's fiscal position and the vitality of the economy. Catch A Wave (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1973), p. 26.
approved a comprehensive land use act which provided a mechanism for the lease and sale of state-owned lands. However, the major problem of taking land out of the hands of the large trusts and getting it into the hands of individuals--particularly small farm and residential lots under lease--remained to be dealt with. The 1962 party platform vowed that the Democrats would pass laws "so that condemnation may be effectively used to make residential lands available in fee simple to low and middle income groups," and would tax land "according to its best use. . . . Each citizen [will have] reasonable opportunity to own the land upon which he lives."\textsuperscript{12} Now, with the mandate from the voters, surely the governor would turn to the legislature with a comprehensive program for restructuring land ownership patterns in the state.

If the newly-elected Democratic legislators were looking to the governor for leadership, they were doomed to disappointment. Burns was a strong believer in the separation of powers. It was up to the legislature to make the laws, he often said, his role was to administer them. This attitude was reflected throughout Burns's tenure as governor in his relationship with the legislature. Burns rarely proposed specific programs. His messages were couched in the most general philosophical terms. His style was to avoid specifics and to talk philosophy. "He wasn't one to carry the banner," for issues.\textsuperscript{13} If the 1962 landslide was a mandate, Jack Burns was not the one who would carry it out.

The governor's style meant a void in leadership. There was no administration program in the legislature. Asked how much leadership and direction Burns provided in developing the legislative package,

\textsuperscript{13} Oshiro, BOH, II, 3. See also Tokunaga, BOH, II, 4.
veteran Speaker Elmer Cravalho remembered, "just about zero. We
developed it within the legislature."\textsuperscript{14} Cravalho himself filled much
of the void. Under his guidance the House, in most sessions, was
quickly and effectively organized and operated efficiently.\textsuperscript{15}

Nelson Doi, a hard-working young senator from the Big Island
of Hawaii, was elected president of the Senate after a relatively minor
power struggle in which the factional division was between neighbor
islanders and senators from Oahu. Initially, the eight neighbor island
senators had divided the key committee assignments among themselves,
causing a walkout by the seven Oahu senators. Memories of the disastrous
House coalition of 1959 were still fresh, however, and fences were
quickly mended without either group turning to the Republicans. Oahu
Senator George Ariyoshi was given the chairmanship of the powerful Ways
and Means committee in the compromise, and the in-fighting was well over
by the opening day of the session.\textsuperscript{16}

The apportionment of the legislature under the 1950 constitution
gave the neighbor islands a fifteen to ten seat edge in the Senate. The
neighbor islanders guarded this power jealously, and until the final
accomplishment of reapportionment in 1968, most of the internal party
fights in the Senate were rooted in this inequity.

The House, on the other hand, was apportioned according to
registered voters and Oahu delegates outweighed neighbor islanders
by thirty-two seats to nineteen. Cravalho was careful how the power
was divided. In the House organization in 1963, all committee

\textsuperscript{14} BOH, II, 1.
\textsuperscript{15} Oshiro, BOH, II, 4.
chairmanships were given to neighbor islanders, but the majority of members on each committee were from Oahu. The committee chairman could be outvoted on legislative questions by members of his own committee, but the apparent sharing of power contributed to party unity.  

Maryland Land Bill

By opening day the Democrats had agreed on a list of eighteen measures which should receive top priority in the session. Oddly enough, a land reform measure was not on the list. However, House members set about fulfilling the party platform's promise. A land reform bill patterned on the Maryland Ground Rent Act, and called the Maryland Land Bill, was introduced and made its way through the lower chamber with strong Democratic support.

The Maryland Land Bill provided that under certain conditions the owner of a home on leased land could buy the fee simple title to the land after five years tenancy. The bill was opposed by the big trusts, the banks and the large landholders. But it was opposed most vehemently by the Hawaiians who saw it as a threat to the land holdings of the Bishop Estate. Torch light protest parades were held around Iolani Palace, and the bill was denounced from the pulpit of the Kawaiahao church in Honolulu.

Land reform, however, was a fundamental and long-standing principle of Democratic philosophy, and the party leaders in the legislature were determined to push it through. In the Senate, the

bill was extensively revised, and the Bishop Estate trust was specifically exempted from its provisions. Despite this, the controversy in the community continued. The Senate Democrats had agreed in caucus to operate under a unit rule—that is, if ten Democrats favored any measure, all members of the party were obligated to support it. Two Democrats, however, had already announced their opposition to the Maryland Land Bill—Mitsuyuki Kido of Honolulu, and Harry M. Field of Maui. Since the ten Republicans were certain to oppose the bill, the vote would be close and would turn on the decision of one man, Senator Ariyoshi of Honolulu.

Ariyoshi announced on April 22 that on the land bill he would refuse to be bound by the unit rule, and would "vote the way my conscience dictates."19 Ariyoshi was under great pressure to follow the leadership of the party, but when the bill came up for final reading on May 3, he cast the critical dissenting vote, killing the measure thirteen to twelve. The lobbyists for the trusts and banks joined hands with the representatives from the Hawaiian organizations to celebrate. Once again, a major promise in the 1954 Democratic platform remained unfulfilled.20

Reapportionment

In 1964 the U.S. supreme court sent down their one-man one-vote decision in Reynolds vs. Sims21 and it became obvious that reapportionment of the Hawaii legislature, particularly the Senate, was required. The

first of a series of suits was initiated in the state courts, and in July, Governor Burns called a special session of the legislature to deal with reapportionment. The governor's action was not universally popular. Many members were not convinced that the legislature should reapportion itself without reference to the people. In fact, the body proved to be incapable of doing so. As one political analyst noted:

The major bills introduced at the behest of Governor John A. Burns called for a reapportionment of both Houses to go into effect immediately without prior popular approval. . . . The cumulative effect of the administration measures would have been to strengthen the governor's political position as leader of the state's majority party.

Because of Burns's tactic, "the special session ended disastrously." After weeks of dispute, opposing proposals of the House and Senate found their way to a conference committee. The factional division was along strict geographical lines with neighbor islanders fighting to keep the added representation which they enjoyed. The House proposed that representation be based solely on registered voters in each district. The Senate, however, wanted to allocate one senator to each neighbor island, and then apportion the balance based on registered voters. The numbers weren't too far apart, but the principle was absolute, and the conference committee failed to reach agreement. The legislature adjourned with recriminations all around.

The 1964 elections in Hawaii were conducted under a cloud, and litigation continued over the reapportionment issue until the matter

24. Ibid.
found its way to the federal courts. With the political leadership of the state unable to resolve the matter, the three-man federal district court took control. The court enjoined the legislature from doing any business beyond organizing until action had been taken to propose a 1965 constitutional convention to the voters. The legislature offered the court a provisional reapportionment of the Senate and asked that the constitutional convention be put off until 1966. The court responded by throwing out the provisional reapportionment, saying that it was based on gerrymandering. On May 21, with the session running out, the U.S. supreme court, at the governor's request, granted a stay against the prohibition on legislative action other than apportionment. The question remained in litigation and was finally resolved when the voters approved a constitutional convention which Burns opposed. The convention met in 1968 and established multi-member senatorial districts based on voter registration.

Doi vs. Abe

As the focus of attention continued on the reapportionment dispute, intra-party factional battling again broke out in the Senate. In the party caucus after the 1963 elections, a faction led by Maui Senator Nadao Yoshinaga managed to defeat Doi's bid for reelection as Senate president, replacing him with his fellow Big Islander, Kazuhisa Abe. One Honolulu newspaper saw this as a grab for power by neighbor island senators since the caucus had also voted to give the Ways and Means committee to Yoshinaga and to expand the leadership committee to

seven members with four coming from the neighbor islands. The other
daily decided the fight was simply "an outgrowth of factionalism in
the majority group based on personalities." Both saw a bit of the
truth, neither saw it all. The fight was rooted, at least in part,
in the view the two men—Doi and Abe—had of their own futures. Abe
and Doi were both Hilo lawyers; both mainland trained, both veteran
members of the legislature. With reapportionment, depending upon the
formula arrived at, a head-to-head battle between the two for a Senate
seat was probable. The fight for the Senate presidency was the opening
round. Abe was close to Burns. Doi was an independent. But at this
point, the fight was personal, not doctrinal.

In the 1964 elections, fifth district Senator Patsy Mink had
been elected to the U.S. congress in the middle of her state term. To
the irritation of some Democrats, Burns appointed a political novice,
Taylor A. Pryor, to Mink's seat. The governor made the appointment
to bring new blood into the faction, a tactic he used routinely in
building the political machine. However, in Pryor's case, he was also
interested in bringing in expertise in the new area of aquaculture.
This was Pryor's business.

For many reasons, the experiment was not successful. Pryor
was an outsider in the Senate with no way to get in. He had no
political experience and no power base. His fellow senators knew this
and ignored him. Pryor was on the Ways and Means committee, and the

30. Ibid.
Senate leadership traditionally appointed all Ways and Means members to conference committees on finance measures. Despite the tradition, Pryor was bypassed on three successive conference committees. Stung, Pryor took to the floor to charge the Senate leadership with cronyism. Abe's leadership, he said, resulted in

a Senate run by strong arm tactics and back room negotiations. All too often I've seen the Senate recess to discuss out in back what should be discussed on the Senate floor. Only then is a vote taken. ... Negotiations include threat, abuse and ridicule ... I came here looking for an education—and I got it.31

The Senate was filled with strong men with personal ambitions. Add to that the cross fire which existed as the result of the reapportionment dispute, and it is surprising that Abe could run the body at all. As it was,

on numerous occasions ... the Democratic majority in the Senate was split and the leadership was forced to rely on Republican cross-over support.32

With the Senate Democrats fighting each other, leadership came not, as might have been expected, from the governor, but from the House. Cravalho's power and influence within his own body was pervasive, and was growing elsewhere. The Senate, "faced with a rebel faction within its own ranks," had to be coerced into acting. Cravalho coerced the senators by setting "legislative and parliamentary traps." More than that, a newspaper commentator noted, "Cravalho is credited ... with pointing the direction of the state administration in legislative programs."33

32. Meller and Tuttle, p. 83.
Gill in Congress

In 1962 Tom Gill went off to Washington filled with enthusiasm and anticipation. The Kennedy administration's New Frontier fit well with Gill's own political philosophy, and he foresaw a productive and successful congressional career. There was much initial satisfaction. Gill had committee assignments which he liked, had a chance to write legislation, and was given a role as floor manager for some of the more progressive measures in the Kennedy-Johnson package. As he remembered:

The 88th congress was . . . one where things began to break loose. That's when the civil rights bill was first passed. I wound up being on the right committees, for the first time in twenty years . . . people who had just arrived could do something because the old ducks didn't want to do anything in this area. Labor and Education [committee] carried a good deal of the heavy civil rights legislation, including the Fair Employment Practices Act.34

But it didn't take long for disenchantment to set in. Being a member of the House had certain problems, Gill recalled:

In the House you're always running for reelection which is a process that doesn't appeal to me too much, frankly. And I found out real early that if you told a lobbyist group to go to hell, because they were doing something wrong, they would immediately go back and poison your roots, all over town. . . . If you're in the House you've got to keep flying all the time. Well, it's one thing to go from Washington to Trenton, New Jersey, or New Haven, Connecticut, but it's a hell of another thing to go to Honolulu.35

In 1964 Republican Hiram Fong's term in the U.S. Senate was ending, and Gill decided to challenge him. "I decided if you're going

34. BOH, I, 1.
35. Ibid.
to be anything in Washington, you might as well take the six-year term and be one of the hundred idiots instead of one of the 435 idiots," Gill recalled. 36

The party unity which had swept the Democrats into power in 1962 had begun to come apart by 1964. The Burns faction, firmly in power and building the machinery to remain in power, had resumed their old mantle of arrogance. Gill, despite 1962, was a member of another faction. Much of the unity effort had been directed at containing his ambitions toward the governorship, but he posed no threat to the Burns faction in 1964.

On the other hand, Hiram Fong had always worked well with Burns, and the governor respected him. 37 They had both started out in the Kalihi slums and they spoke the same language. Fong had the complete support of the ILWU and of Jack Hall. Burns might well defy Hall in what he saw as his own interests, or in the greater interests of the state, but it was doubtful if Gill's campaign fell into either category.

Burns and his faction were securely in office with two years before they would face an election campaign. The Republicans had been relegated to a minority party in 1962, and didn't appear to pose much threat in the future. There were, of course, occasional dissident rumblings from within the Democratic Party. Those who were "disappointed with the governor's seeming lack of interest in the organizational party," would "occasionally complain and threaten revolt." 38

36. Ibid.
37. Aoki, BOH, II, 1.
38. Meller and Tuttle, p. 83.
But they were the powerless in the party—the Young Democrats and the remnants of those independents who had once joined with Esposito and Gill. The Old Guard was gone, retired from the political wars by age. Rapprochement had been accomplished with the ILWU, and Jack Hall had become respectable enough to serve on the board of directors of the Community Chest. Business had abandoned the Republicans once they discovered they could work with Burns. Consensus government was the order of the day. It would work to the benefit of the state and simultaneously enhance the power of the Burns machine.

**Gill vs. Yoshinaga**

Gill's 1964 campaign for the U.S. Senate was complicated by the surprise entry into the Democratic primary by state Senator Nadao Yoshinaga from Maui. Yoshinaga's candidacy became the subject of speculation and controversy. His chances against Gill were poor at best. Why, then, was Yoshinaga in the race? There were many possibilities.

The Maui senator had long been a member of the ILWU faction of the party, and the ILWU was firmly behind Fong's candidacy for reelection. Obviously, if Gill could be wounded by Yoshinaga in the primary, Fong would be benefited. Fong, it was rumored, was financing Yoshinaga's campaign. Thus, the conventional wisdom. Another version: Masaru "Pundi" Yokouchi, later a Burns appointee as state director of

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40. Francine du Plessix Gray, Hawaii: The Sugar Coated Fortress (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 93. Gray quotes Republican Sam King, son of the former governor, and later a gubernatorial candidate against Burns: "We lost our power base when it became more profitable for big business to go with labor than to buck it. The way they play ball here, there's an even greater collusion between labor and big business than there is on the mainland."
41. BOH. Tokunaga, II, 3, and Gill, I, 1.
the Foundation on Culture and Arts, was Yoshinaga's closest political confidant in 1964. He recalled his astonishment when Yoshinaga revealed his plans to run against Gill. Yoshinaga ran, Yokouchi claimed, because none of the Oriental members in congress--Fong, Inouye or Matsunaga--were making an issue of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He also wanted to push for U.S. recognition of Communist China, Yokouchi maintained. 42 The campaign was run out of Yoshinaga's headquarters on Maui, and financed with small contributions. Yokouchi remembered asking Big Five business leaders in Honolulu for contributions and receiving small donations. In this campaign "ten dollars was really appreciated." 43 Yoshinaga admitted campaign expenditures of $30,000, a considerable about for a primary in 1964. 44

Yoshinaga claimed he ran because "I was ready for the national scene." It was his own idea, he maintained, and the "Burns people, Jack Hall and ILWU people were shocked when they heard my announcement." 45

The role of the Burns organization is unclear. All of Burns's chief lieutenants deny any active support for Yoshinaga's campaign. But they also admit giving no help to Gill in the primary. Burns lieutenant Mike Tokunaga, one of the most experienced political observers of the period, believed the ILWU was responsible for Yoshinaga's candidacy.

Nadao was put up by the ILWU . . . to create enough opposition so that Tom will certainly get defeated in the general. . . . If the ILWU was out to beat Tom, they sacrificed Nadao. But it was a terrific political strategy. 46

42. Masaru "Pundi" Yokouchi, BOH, II, 2. 45. Ibid.
43. Ibid. 46. BOH, II, 3.
44. Nadao Yoshinaga, BOH, II, 1.
At least one additional possibility has been suggested. Yoshinaga was preparing, for personal and professional reasons, to relocate from Maui to the Oahu community of Waipahu. Since he intended to continue his political career, what better way to insure name recognition in a new community than a controversial statewide contest, win or lose. 47

There are problems with each version. Fong has denied making any monetary contributions to Yoshinaga's campaign. 48 But the Chinese business leader was well known for his go-for-the-jugular instincts and his alley fighter tactics. Yoshinaga's view of himself as ready for national office was not realistic. He had never run in a statewide campaign of any sort, and had no political base outside of Maui and his traditional ILWU support. If his motive was to call attention to the racist overtones of the Vietnam conflict, he was free to do that as a state senator, and, in fact, later did so. Further, by challenging Gill he was attacking the one member of the Hawaii congressional delegation who had spoken out in opposition to the Vietnam war. If he was seeking name recognition in view of his impending move to Waipahu, a $30,000 campaign would seem to be a heavy expenditure, particularly since he was assured of his Senate seat from Maui until 1966.

Whatever the reasons for Yoshinaga's candidacy, there is little doubt that it damaged Gill's efforts to unseat Fong. Yokouchi said that the primary campaign so polarized the Japanese voters that

47. Cravalho, BOH, II, 1.
they identified with Fong in the general election instead of with the haole Gill. 49

Burns and Gill

While the Burns machine ostensibly supported Gill in the general election as the candidate of the Democratic Party, it appears that their support was limited. William Richardson, Burns's lieutenant governor in 1964, recalled that the ILWU support of Fong made it difficult for the Burns group to go all out for Gill. 50 Other Burns insiders felt that the faction gave Gill adequate support. 51

Gill credited Inouye with helping, but his view of the other members of the Burns faction was that "they sort of spent their time apologizing for being in my favor." 52

At any rate in the final days of the campaign, Fong introduced an issue which seemed to be telling with the electorate—the issue of Gill's absenteeism in congress. Whatever the merits of the charge, it was effective. 53 Fong, with the support of the ILWU, and able to call on his own considerable financial resources, defeated Gill by 14,000 votes. Fong spent between $250,000 and $500,000. Gill reported expenditures of $75,600. 54

49. BOH, II, 2.
50. Richardson, BOH, II, 1.
51. BOH. The issue is discussed by Tokunaga, II, 3; Oshiro, II, 4; Hajime "Scrub" Tanaka, II, 1; and Yasuki Arikaki, II, 1.
52. BOH, I, 1.
53. BOH. Tokunaga, II, 3; Gill, I, 1; and Oshiro, II, 4.
Gill's defeat was one more step in the ascendance of the Burns machine. With Gill out of office, the focal point for any opposition to Burns was without a political base. The young, the disenchanted, the outsiders wanting in, those who failed to share Burns's vision of a Hawaii growing fat on development and tourism, had no place to turn. For the Burns faction it was a further opportunity to consolidate their power. By 1966, they were virtually unassailable.

Gill, though out of office, was still a potential danger to the machine. He was the magnet for any anti-Burns feeling within the party. Oddly, Burns either failed to see or chose to discount the danger. Gill's career rejuvenated quickly when Burns, confident that he could control any political threat from Gill, appointed the former congressman to head the state's economic opportunity program.

It was a strange decision by the governor. Political considerations aside, the contrast in style between the two men at this point could not have been sharper. Burns, the cold, distant father figure in public, was, in private, a classic politician in the mold of Lyndon Johnson. He was fond of saying "it's the game, not the name," meaning that accomplishments were more important than credit. He would talk politics with his cronies all night, but rarely addressed himself in public to political issues. He made people feel secure and comfortable. As a political organizer and the builder of a political machine, he had no peer in Hawaii. He approved every government appointment from cabinet member to janitor, and each was made with the view of widening his ever-expanding orbit.

Gill was the contrast. He understood, but genuinely disliked the negotiations and trade-offs so necessary in politics. Nothing about him was subtle. He believed strongly in certain things and felt they should be brought into the sunshine of public discussion. Issues were important. He appealed to the outs, the young, the disenchanted. He was an activist and an idealist who believed that he could tell people what was wrong and they would support his efforts to change the society. If big business—or big labor—were too powerful, it was the role of government to knock heads and bring them into line. Only then would the people's interests be protected. Burns was for consensus, the middle way, give and take. Few issues could not be compromised. Gill saw the world in black and white. Some things were right, some were wrong. He was impatient with delay, with compromise, with bargaining—the practice of politics. He drove people who worked with him hard, and himself harder. Burns, with his own brand of charisma, was content to pose as the father figure—patient, understanding, willing to listen, certain that most things were right in the world.

Both men had a vision of Hawaii's future and in many ways it was a shared vision. Both subscribed to The Dream. Hawaii could become an egalitarian society, its many races working, living and playing together in harmony and peace. The keys were education, jobs, economic opportunity, decent housing, the right to own land. But how to achieve The Dream was the question, how to move from a Hawaii which still had many vestiges of the pre-war exploitative economic system to the bright new future. The end goal might be shared, but the two men's views of the means to achieve it were poles apart.
Burns wanted consensus government for Hawaii because that way lay peace and cooperation between business and labor. Mainland capital would flow in, the economy would boom with new land development, more houses, more hotels, more jobs, and more tourists coming to enjoy the beauty of Hawaii and to leave their dollars behind. The economic pie would continue to expand. There would be plenty for everyone. Wasn't that part of The Dream?

But, warned Gill, if we exploit the present we destroy the future. There are better ways to provide homes for people than turning our lands over to rapacious developers. Tourism is fine, but too many tourists can fray the delicate fabric of Hawaii's society. We risk becoming a community of haves and have-nots with local people filling jobs at the bottom of the economic scale, and profits siphoned off into the hands of mainland bankers and a few local entrepreneurs.

If there are problems with economic growth, said Burns, then "bold endeavors must be undertaken, answers must be found." We should be "confident in our own potentialities and in our ability to meet each new obstacle with wisdom and courage." And the clarion call: "Let us not be timid."

Wait, cautioned Gill, "affluence alone is not the ultimate end of human existence." There were great dangers for Hawaii's people in that rapidly expanding economic pie, dangers which were becoming more apparent. The costs were poorly perceived and little considered. They might be too great. After all, said Gill, "it will avail us little if

we produce great amounts of material wealth and sophisticated gadgets if in the process we destroy our humanity."\(^59\)

There were others in the party and in the community who shared Gill's doubts. Some, even, who were early enlistees with Burns in the pursuit of The Dream began to wonder if the path had not been lost. Leadership of these opposing views fell naturally to Burns and Gill. They became the spokesmen and their political rivalry was the natural outgrowth.

Yet in all their differences, their contrasting styles, the two men shared many of the same goals. They both wanted the best possible future for Hawaii's people. They both wanted a free and open, egalitarian society. Both recognized that a strong economy was necessary to provide jobs and opportunity for a young and growing population.

But in the understanding of the means to these ends they parted. That parting would become the central political issue in the party and in the community at large for the next ten years.

\(^59\) The Thoughts and Hopes of Tom Gill (Honolulu: Gill Campaign Committee? n.d.), p. 4.
Our present party system provides the opportunity for both points of view to compete. Adjustments and compromise are the primary product if not the primary objective of our party system. This displeases both the idealist seeking a much better world, and the stand-patter resisting all change.

—Edward Pendleton Herring

The Politics of Democracy

In many ways Tom Gill was the prototype of the post-war Democratic politician in Hawaii. In others he posed an interesting paradox.

Gill might well have become a member of the haole elite. His father was a well-known architect who came to Honolulu in 1898. His grandfather had been a doctor and a friend and neighbor of the Roosevelts in New York state. But in growing up Gill bypassed that training ground for Hawaii's elites, the expensive private school system, and instead attended public schools. Along the way he began to pick up political ideas which were a far cry from those common to the kamaaina professional families of the time.

"I grew up during the depression," Gill remembered.

1. Herring, p. 422.
I used to wonder about the way things were in Hawaii. It never made much sense to me. You could see a stratified class society. There was a feeling in some circles that people whose forebears cut cane were not as good as those whose forebears did not. It just didn't seem to fit the American pattern.\(^2\)

Gill got his own early glimpse of The Dream. "In the course of going to public schools with children from all walks of life I found that maybe what the lords and masters thought was true was not true."\(^3\)

When the war broke out in 1941, Gill was a sophomore at the University of Hawaii. He watched in disbelief at the injustice as a suspicious military government disarmed his friends and fellow ROTC students who happened to be of Japanese ancestry.

Gill served with the Territorial Guard as a lieutenant for nine months, and then volunteered as a private in the 24th Division of the 21st Infantry, an organization which battled its way through the New Guinea and the Philippines campaigns. While the AJAs of the 442d Infantry were in Europe establishing an unequalled record for valor, Gill fought his war in the Pacific. He was awarded a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart and came home in 1945 a sergeant, having twice refused a battlefield commission.

Like many of the veterans of the 442d and the 100th Battalion who were later to become his political allies and enemies, Gill headed for the mainland to finish his college education on the GI bill. In June of 1951 he completed a law degree at the University of California at Berkeley and returned to Hawaii. He had been involved in Democratic Party politics at the precinct level in Berkeley. When he came home


\(^3\) Ibid.
to Honolulu he immediately joined the party and became active in the Oahu county committee.

Gill went to work as an in-house attorney at Unity House, the teamster-hotel worker amalgamation run by veteran labor leader Arthur Rutledge.

During the 1952 battle for control of the Oahu county committee, when Burns was deposed as chairman, Gill gravitated to the faction headed by Ernest Heen and John Akau. They were, he recalled, "the independent Democrats, not the Burns machine Democrats, or the ILWU flunky Democrats." In addition to the Burns and ILWU factions and the independents, in the party at that time,

there were some right wingers and people that hung around the then-governor, Stainback, or people who had been appointed judges and what-not under territorial status, who had connections nationally, but not very strong connections locally. And Fasi was floating around in there someplace.

**Party Role**

At the 1952 county convention which was controlled by the independents, Gill was elected a vice-chairman. He worked actively on party organizing and recruitment in Honolulu for the next two years, and in 1954 was elected county chairman, defeating another independent candidate, but over the efforts of the Burns faction to regain control. Burns in 1954 was the chairman of the territorial central committee, a position to which he had been elected in 1952. In 1956, the Burns faction made an all-out attempt to unseat Gill, and was badly defeated. As the morning newspaper accounts noted:

4. BOH, I, 1. 5. Ibid.
Thomas P. Gill smashed the John A. Burns faction of the Democratic Party last night with a surprising 102-57 victory over Tadao Beppu, the Burns-supported candidate for chairman of the Oahu county Democratic committee. The election had been billed as a showdown between Mr. Gill and the Burns forces. The big margin of victory surprised even Mr. Gill.  

Gill's years at the head of the county committee were building years for the party. He directed registration drives in Oahu's precincts which brought thousands of new voters into the party fold. These efforts paid off in the overwhelming victory in 1954.

He was also one of the "brains trust" led by Robert Dodge who enunciated the goals and directions of the party in the platforms of 1952 and 1954. In each term of the legislature he served on the staff of either the House or Senate, and was credited with much of the work on the 1955 and 1957 legislative packages.

By 1958 when he first ran for elective office he was a widely-known party figure with extensive experience in party affairs and in the legislature, and with a well-established leadership role. It was not, therefore, surprising that he played a major part in the bloody factional battle in the House in 1959, nor that he was elected floor leader of the House in the 1960 session. By 1962 when he became the party's candidate for the U.S. congress he had a solid background of ten years of political involvement and party service.

First Burns Approach

The effort had not been without cost. The Burns faction of the party, many of them other young returned war veterans who might

7. Dodge, BOH, I, 1.
have found common ground with Gill, marked him for an enemy early on. Both Gill and Burns's supporters have confirmed a story long in circulation in Honolulu that Gill was once approached by the Burns faction to join with them. As Gill remembers the event, it was in early 1952 when he first became active in the county committee:

[I] was working with the teamster bunch, the Heens, [the independents]... I think it was Takabuki and probably Aoki, and one of the inner hatchet men, got wind of the fact that I was active over there, and they had never contacted me one way or the other, and they showed up one day... the pitch was that I should cast my lot with the Burns machine, and double-cross the guys I was working with, whereupon I told them 'I could make the same offer to you. Why don't you come across yourself?' And they got very huffy and left.8

Dan Aoki's recollection of the incident is similar. His interpretation, of course, is different. Aoki remembers Burns being present.9 Gill does not.

Fights between the various segments of labor were not uncommon in the 1950's, and Gill's association with Unity House, and with the A.F. of L. unions brought him into opposition with the ILWU. More importantly, Gill was independent. In Jack Hall's classification he was one of those "liberals" like Esposito whom Hall so despised and distrusted. The relationship was abraded further during Gill's term in congress. At one point, he was approached by ILWU lobbyists, acting on behalf of the teamsters. They wanted him to insert in the Congressional Record a speech which they had written, attacking Attorney General Robert Kennedy for his attempts to prosecute teamster leader Jimmy Hoffa on

8. BOH, I, 1.
9. BOH, II, 1.
jury-tampering charges. Gill told them that first, he wrote his own speeches, and that second, he thought probably Kennedy was correct.
Hall marked him for political extinction. Fong, Gill's subsequent opponent for the U.S. Senate, cooperated by inserting the speech in the record and further cemented his ties with the ILWU.¹⁰

THE O.E.O. Role

As has been noted above, Gill's congressional career, while interesting, soon grew wearying. His decision to challenge Fong in 1964 and his subsequent defeat left him in that most tenuous position, a politician without a political office. He had returned to Honolulu and reestablished his law practice when the surprising call came from Burns, asking if he would take over the state's Economic Opportunity program.

Ralph Miwa, a second-tier Burns confidant, claimed that the idea for Gill's appointment came from Alan Saunders, a long-time Democrat who, like Miwa, was a member of the University of Hawaii faculty. Gill had helped write the O.E.O legislation in congress and was a natural for the job, Saunders said. Miwa agreed and carried the message to Burns.¹¹

The first approach to Gill was made by Lieutenant Governor Richardson who had already been working on the program. O.E.O. was one of the big guns in Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty." It was evident that if the program was organized and run correctly, there

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¹⁰ Gill, BOH, I, 1.
¹¹ Ralph Miwa, BOH, II, 1.
would be vast amounts of money available to help those in Hawaii at
the lower end of the economic scale. The job required a strong,
full-time leader.

Gill met with Burns, whom he found "supportive" of the program,
and, after checking with social agencies and others who would be
involved in the community, agreed to accept the appointment.

Most observers, on whatever side of the factional fence they
fall, agree that Gill did an excellent job administering the program. 12

As Gill recalled:

There was lots of money. This was before LBJ started
shoving it down the Vietnam chute. In fact the first
year was sort of crazy. You knew you had some kind of
general allocation of money, but if you asked for more
you'd get it. It was just a matter of taking programs
back, laying them on the desk and saying 'this is what
we need,' and they'd write you a check. It was simple.
... We got in there right on the ground floor and
probably had one of the better programs in the country.
We had less trouble. That isn't necessarily the sign
of good administration, it just means that there were
less problems. We got the money real fast and didn't
spend it all studying how to get it. 13

By the nature of the position, Gill made contacts throughout
the community. He spent lots of federal money, and he got lots of
publicity. Again Gill:

I was doing some things that I like to do. You know,
you can get very fond of working with little kids,
hard learners and Job Corps people. And doing things
that are going to help people ... At that point
it was fairly easy to do ... people responded well.
... You had to pump them out of the woodwork, had
to go out to Kalihi-Palama, Nanakuli, and get them out
and have them start doing things. Found some very
interesting leaders, many of whom are very active today. 14

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12. BOH, Burns, I, 8; Richardson, II, 1; and Tokunaga, II, 3.
13. BOH, I, 1.
14. BOH, I, 1.
To the men who surrounded Jack Burns, every headline with Gill's name, every new program he initiated, each time he made a well-reported trip to Washington and came home with new federal money, was a red flag. The close-in followers had not approved of nor understood the appointment in the first place. Mike Tokunaga told the governor that sooner or later Gill would challenge him for the governorship. Gill was building a political base, they charged, a political machine, and doing it right under the governor's nose using the patronage potential in the O.E.O. job.

The relationship between Burns and Gill was never close. But, obviously, Burns had sufficient confidence in the former congressman in 1964 to appoint him to the O.E.O. position. He had demanded no *quid pro quo* of loyalty to the Burns machine. Had he done so, Gill would have declined. Burns had simply given Gill the job and promised his support.

Now, the tenuous ties between the two were being poisoned, as the cohorts carried the word into the governor's office that Gill was using the job to rebuild his political base.

As an ill and petulant-sounding Burns remembered in 1975:

You'd have thought that he was the only guy that had anything to do with this. It was all his doing and nobody else's. The fact that he was working for the state administration of Jack Burns, uh, uh. This was Tom Gill's program straight from Washington. Well, before too long those things reach back, because I've got plenty ears in the community.

The problem of perception enters into the equation. To Burns and his close followers, Gill was using the opportunity they had given him to mount a threat to the power of the machine. As Gill saw it, he was doing his job and any political gains were ancillary.

Gill remembered:

I suppose that [developing community leaders] would be looked on by the Burns guys as being a political thing, because that's what they would do. And to some extent, I think it had that effect, because I was pretty well known to start with, and developed a fair amount of rapport, a wide number of the people in the lower income groups, in many of the hard Democratic areas, in 1966 stuck up for me in spite of all the attempts by Takabuki and everybody else to cut my throat. So I suppose it was successful. But that wasn't the end of it. That wasn't the aim. If it had been it wouldn't have worked. . . . if you're playing a political game, the people you're working with are not dummies, . . . they know what's going on. If they figure they're being used for something political for somebody else's benefit, their cooperation quotient drops like crazy. . . . the whole thing turns sour.17

A realistic assessment of the period would indicate that Gill, an active political figure for twelve years, would naturally accrue supporters while administering an extensive, well-funded program designed to benefit a large segment of the community. That political supporters from this period adhered to him later is undeniable. Equally undeniable, however, is the fact that Gill was immensely successful in the job and had, as he noted, one of the better programs in the country.

Burns had given Gill the job, convinced that he could "handle Tom Gill politically," and that there was no significant threat.18

But to the members of Burns's inner circle, loyalty was the principal

17. BOH, I, 1.
18. Tokunaga, BOH, II, 3.
virtue, any disloyalty a cardinal sin. Even on the part of one-time close supporters, any wavering in the faith, any questioning, any veering from the path of blind loyalty, was enough to bring down the wrath of the insiders and bring attempts at retribution. To the true believers who hung on Burns's coat tails, and even to some who stood on their own two feet a handsbreadth away, Gill had committed the unpardonable.

New Horizons

With the O.E.O. program firmly established and the 1966 political year approaching, Gill began to reassess his opportunities. The lieutenant governor's office became vacant in March of 1966 when Richardson was appointed chief justice of the state supreme court. Burns made a temporary appointment to fill out the term, and began to cast about for a replacement running-mate for the 1966 campaign. Burns first approached House Speaker Elmer Cravalho, and observers felt his intent was that Cravalho should run for lieutenant governor in 1966 and be groomed for the governor's office in 1970. Cravalho, however, was not responsive. He remembered:

I never said I would, neither did I tell anybody no. I believe by my silence I misled the governor. . . . My gut feeling was, "no." Jack never forgot that . . . never forgave me . . . like a dissatisfied parent. 21

Overtures were made to other party figures, City Councilman Herman Lemke, and Burns's attorney general, Bert Kobayashi, but both eventually declined.

21. BOH, II, 1.
Gill, however, was interested in running. He approached Burns:

I went to him and said, 'listen, I'm thinking about it, what do you think?' He said, 'I'd rather not.' I said, 'well, I know you'd rather not, but if I do, you going to break out in hives?' and he sort of looked sour. ... He made it very clear that he'd prefer somebody else. 22

As Burns remembered the conversation:

He gets bright and comes in and says, 'do you think you'd get hives if I was your lieutenant governor?' ... I said, 'hives?' ... I said, 'no, it wouldn't bother me any because there's quite a distance across the hall, across the building.' But, I said, 'the big question is can you work for me? Because there is only one decision maker around here in the final analysis. It's not a Burns-Gill administration, it's a Burns administration.' 23

Despite the governor's hostility, Gill decided to go ahead. It was at this point that Burns, in a move which astounded even his closest inner circle, attempted to drop the mantle on a political unknown who lacked any credentials as a Democrat.

Part-Hawaiian Kenneth F. Brown was a member of a wealthy old kamaaina family in Hawaii. In the tradition of such families and like many of his peers, Brown was educated in east coast prep schools and at Princeton. In Honolulu he moved in the upper circles of the moneyed business establishment. He was a nominal Republican. He was, in fact, the archetype which Burns and the early Democrats had campaigned against.

But Burns's horizons had widened considerably since the days when he was just an ex-cop scrambling to rebuild a down-and-out political party. Burns regularly played golf at the Waialae country club, and it

22. BOH, I, 1.
23. BOH, I, 8.
was there that his acquaintance with Brown began. Burns had asked Brown to direct the Canada Club golf tournament on Maui, an event in which the state had an interest because of tourism. It had been a success. That was the extent of Brown's "track record." A political survey indicated that fewer than ten per cent of the people recognized Brown's name. But Burns was convinced he could be sold, and the word went out to the party faithful that Brown was the governor's choice for lieutenant governor.

Kenny Who?

The response was a stunned shaking of the collective heads. Most of the machine members hunkered down to do what they could, but some rebelled. Few had any enthusiasm for this "instant Democrat" who had been sold to them.

Hajime "Scrub" Tanaka, the Burns machine's chief lieutenant on the Big Island, remembered being called to Honolulu for a special meeting. There, he was told that Burns wanted Brown for lieutenant governor. When Tanaka returned to pass the word to a quickly-called meeting of thirty-two machine workers, none of them knew who Brown was. "We knew we had our work cut out for us," he recalled.

Reluctantly, the faithful fell in line. Seichi "Shadow" Hirai told Burns that Brown was an unknown who could never be elected but that he would support him. Turk Tokita on Kauai had no idea who Brown was, but agreed to support him because Burns asked. The ILWU

26. BOH, II, 2.
27. Hirai, BOH, II, 1.
agreed, not because they knew Brown, but because of Burns's support, and their long-standing opposition to Gill. 29

Some of those not so close to the inner circle fell back. Recalled Ralph Miwa: "I didn't like Kenny Brown. He was a hapa-haole Hawaiian ali'i type. I didn't identify with a man like that." 30 Tadao Beppu had never met Kenny Brown and didn't know what he stood for. He threw his support behind Gill. Later Burns "let him know about it." 31 David McClung aptly summed up the view of party members who were not closely tied to Burns:

There was a whole passle of us who resented [Burns] picking someone who had no attachment to the Democratic Party over someone who had devoted a goodly number of years . . . of hard work. 32

Nadao Yoshinaga called Burns's move "one of the few political blunders of a master politician. . . . I told him it was going to be a blunder." 33

But Burns was stubborn. His mind was made up, and he was ready for a fight. The people of the state were soon treated to radio and TV spots in which the governor announced that Tom Gill was definitely not his choice for lieutenant governor.

In Gill's view, "he lowered himself. He should not have been doing this. It was a bad thing for a governor to do." 34

The campaign reflected the ambivalence of the Democrats—even those tied to the machine—toward Brown. As Brown recalled:

I don't believe that the people from the Burns camp ever got wholly involved in my campaign. . . . They were going through the motions. They weren't that

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29. Tom Yagi, BOH, II, 1.
30. BOH, II, 1.
31. BOH, II, 2.
32. BOH, II, 1.
33. BOH, II, 1.
34. BOH, I, 1.
convinced that I was the guy. . . . I just
don't think he [Burns] was ever able to
turn them on to pull off a minor miracle. 35

Burns himself had only token opposition in the primary. When
his old friend Lyndon Johnson called on him to represent the United
States at an independence ceremony in the African Republic of Botswana
a week before the election, he agreed. Thus, it was in Africa over the
telephone that he got the word that his hand-picked candidate had been
overwhelmingly defeated. More shocking was the news that Gill had
outpolled Burns, and that primary voters had given unknown eccentric
George Fontes 22,000 votes to demonstrate their unhappiness with the
governor's dictatorial tactics.

Burns received 86,826 votes to be easily renominated, but
the 22,406 votes which went to Fontes were a warning. Gill beat Brown
by 90,891 votes to 38,416. 36 The results were an obvious slap in the
face for the governor. When he heard the news in Botswana, according
to a member of his traveling party, his mood turned "pensive." 37

Gill had run a smart campaign. In the face of Burns's attacks,
he had held his well-known acerbic tongue. When the barbs were thrown
he had figuratively turned the other cheek and the strategy had paid
off. 38 He had been able to convince Democratic voters that the

35. BOH, II, 1.
36. Figures used throughout are those issued by the Office of
the Lieutenant Governor in Results of Votes Cast (Honolulu: Office
of the Lieutenant Governor), following each election. It should be
noted that they vary slightly with those quoted in Robert C. Schmitt,
Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu: The University Press of
Labor Director Alfred Laureta from Botswana in a telephone conversation
with his wife.
governor should not be able to "dictate" the choice of lieutenant governor.  

**Why Brown**

Though the primary was over, questions lingered. Why had Brown been chosen in the first place? Why had the "master politician" fallen into the trap of throwing all his prestige behind a man who obviously had no chance?

The answers were as complex as the mind of John Burns. First of all, the election of Brown would reestablish that always-sought-for racial balance. Part-Hawaiian Richardson had left the lieutenant governor's office for the high court. Part-Hawaiian Brown would bring back the magic ethnic mix. But there were other interesting probabilities. Brown's bona fides with the business establishment were of the first order. Burns, always worried first about the state's economic development, was anxious to dispel any lingering distrust of his administration in the minds of the bankers. Brown would be the liaison. Brown agreed that, in part, that would have been his logical role in the Burns administration.

Yasuki Arikaki, one of Burns's earliest and closest supporters on the Big Island, highlighted this idea in his view of the Brown candidacy. Burns, Arakaki, maintained, was pushing for more mainland investment money to come into Hawaii, and supported Brown because

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40. Takabuki, BOH, II, 2.  
41. BOH, II, 1. Brown, a successful architect and businessman, was later appointed a special assistant to Burns and performed well. He was also subsequently elected to the state Senate. He no doubt had the ability to serve as lieutenant governor, he simply didn't have the ability to get elected.
"Brown was Princeton and Princeton was Wall street." Arakaki maintained that Republican Senator Julian R. Yates, a part-Hawaiian from the Kona district on the Big Island, had advanced Brown's candidacy with Burns. Negotiations for the exclusive Mauna Kea Beach hotel to be built with Rockefeller money in the Kona district were underway. But Richard Smart, owner of the huge Parker ranch which controlled the land, would not negotiate with Burns. Brown would be able to work with Smart and gain approval for the hotel, Yates maintained. The story has some credence. Yates was Arikaki's father-in-law.

The General Election

At any rate, the primary was over, the Democratic ticket was Burns and Gill, and the Republicans were making hay out of the split in the Democrats' ranks. Burns was slow in returning from Africa. The governor's wife and his key supporters, concerned about his reaction to Brown's defeat, asked Brown to meet Burns in New York on his way home. The party went on to Washington, and then suddenly disappeared from contact. Brown recalled: "He didn't want to go home. I hid him out at Burlingame country club (in San Mateo, California) for four days." There Burns and Brown were joined by Takabuki and Party Chairman Robert Oshiro.

Burns was depressed. The people of Hawaii had let him down by denying him his choice of lieutenant governor. He also felt he had

42. Arakaki, BOH, II, 1.
43. Ibid.
44. BOH, II, 1.
45. Takabuki, BOH, II, 2.
"used Brown for a sacrificial lamb." His appearance, Robert Oshiro recalled, was very strained:

I learned how deeply the governor felt about the primary results. It took us more than half a month to get him back mentally on the track.

Takabuki assessed the governor's mood and then told Burns:

You gotta come home. . . . You can't sit here and sulk, you gotta come home. . . . There's a lot left to be done, and if you believe you're still right you gotta come back and work for it.

In Hawaii, only thirty days separates the primary and the general elections. With Burns out of touch, things in Honolulu were becoming hectic. Gill, plugging a figurative finger into the dike, told a campaign rally on October 8:

You can expect our campaign to get off the ground next week. . . . Much of the groundwork has already been laid. We only await John Burns's return to work out the final details. This will be a joint, cooperative effort.

On October 10, a United Press story from Washington reported rumors Burns might withdraw his candidacy. Inouye was quickly drafted to deny any such possibility.

To Gill and his advisors things were becoming critical. Their polls indicated the campaign was in trouble. They made numerous attempts to communicate with Burns, but couldn't break through the wall of silence thrown up by the palace guard. As Gill remembered those days:

46. Oshiro, BOH, II, 5.
47. Ibid.
48. Takabuki, BOH, II, 2,
He was someplace. And his henchmen would not let on where he was. They knew—Horio knew, Takabuki knew, Aoki knew, Tokunaga knew—but they weren't telling anybody. And they wouldn't talk to us...we told them 'It's going to be tough. This general is not a walk-away. Burns is not a push-over. He's not going to get by on his own steam. He's going to have to work at it, and we're going to have to put both our backs into it.'

The Gill people eventually discovered that Burns was on the west coast and Gill offered to fly over to see him and "talk it out" before Burns's return. But, "they wanted no part of this." 52

Burns finally got back to Honolulu on October 10. Despite attempts by the governor's office to keep his arrival secret, he was met at the airport by an entourage of supporters, by Gill, and of course by reporters from the newspapers and television stations. 53

The first question put to Burns by the newsmen was about how he liked Gill as his running mate. The governor was surly and terse. He responded indirectly, but the overall impression was so negative that the videotape of the event was later used by the Republicans as a campaign commercial.

Burns was obviously in no mental state to carry on a difficult political campaign. His advisors recognized that extreme measures were called for. Oshiro recalled:

We even called in the priest who was Jack Burns's parish priest from childhood. [He] sat down with the priest at Iolani Palace for four or five hours. The purpose was to cleanse him of all human weaknesses...to bring about that humility again...He was in a depression [that] lasted for fifteen days. 54

51. BOH, I, 1.
52. Gill, BOH, I, 1.
54. BOH, II, 5.
Eventually, it began to dawn on some of Burns's supporters that the election could be lost unless some sort of party unity was developed. Burns himself was convinced that Republicans just could not beat Democrats in 1966, despite polls taken by Gill's people which indicated the contrary.

The Republicans continued to play on the disunity, buying television and radio time to replay tapes of Burns's anti-Gill comments during the primary and of his remarks upon his return from Africa. They also used footage of Burns's son, James, commenting negatively about Gill. Eventually the Democrats cried dirty tactics and called off a scheduled television debate between Burns and Republican candidate Randolph Crossley.

After a few days at home, the governor began to rally and made his first appearance with Gill before a small group of supporters and Democratic candidates. During his remarks he was "openly and obviously warm toward Gill," probably, a newsman noted, to forestall criticism from the group about his earlier coolness and the ineptness to date of his campaign. A Burns-Gill steering committee was appointed, and the two made a number of appearances together, including a one-day swing around the neighbor islands.

The campaign finally, as Gill noted, "staggered to a photo finish." The Burns-Gill ticket won by 4,500 votes, 108,840 to 104,324. But they lost on Oahu, and only managed to pull it out on

55. Takabuki, BOH, II, 2.
56. Gill, BOH, I, 1.
59. BOH, I, 1.
the neighbor islands. It was a far cry from the overwhelming mandate of 1962. Once again the Democrats had managed to dissipate their natural strength among Hawaii's voters by factional fighting. The party actually made gains in the House and held its own in the Senate. But the gubernatorial contest was a warning. Burns, surrounded by sycophants, had badly misread his personal popularity. The independent voters still held the key to elections, and they would not be dictated to.

Gill as a Threat

The chances for harmony on the executive floor of the new state capitol were not bright. To those surrounding Burns, Gill was a serious political threat. His ability to rebound from his 1962 loss and to then defeat the hand-picked candidate of the machine in 1966 made him doubly so. Somehow, Gill must be contained. If he could be brought into the machine and converted to a loyalist, fine. If not, he must be isolated.

Edward Burns, the governor's brother and a member of the cabinet, remembered:

There had been an attempt to feel out Tom on participating whole-heartedly in the administration, and his attitude as reported to us, was that he was going to be his own man ... In other words, within one month after the election we knew already that this was going to be the kind of situation that developed.60

The "seeds of distrust" were there on both sides. Gill was deeply resentful over Burns's outspoken support of Kenny Brown. Burns remembered that Gill had "used his O.E.O. position to gear up for the '66 election."61

60. BOH, I, 1. 61. Oshiro, BOH, II, 5.
If Gill wanted to work with the machine he would have to demonstrate loyalty, but instead, in Oshiro's view, he wanted to "infringe upon the . . . governor's powers." Gill's personality was the problem, according to Mike Tokunaga, because "he could never be second fiddle to anyone." And Takabuki thought a reconciliation impossible because "what Gill wanted to be was half governor and Jack Burns to be half governor. No way."

So the policy became one of isolating Gill. Both Gill and Oshiro agree that Myron "Pinky" Thompson was brought into the position of director of administration for the state in 1966 to serve as a liaison between Gill and the Burns people. Gill liked Thompson and they worked well together for a few months, until, as Gill recalled:

He came over . . . after hours with a sort of hang-dog expression on his face. And I asked, 'Pinky, what's eating you?' and he said . . . 'Well, I don't know how to say this, but if you could assure me that you will never run against Burns I think we would be able to do a lot of work together.' . . . I told him, 'look, I'm not running against anybody at the moment, but I don't know how I'm supposed to commit for the rest of my life in this type of situation. I don't think you want me to do that do you?' 'Well,' he said, 'there are difficulties.' What he was saying, of course, was that . . . the only way that I would become effective was to become one of the spare parts, which I wasn't about to do. I didn't see much of Pinky after that.

Gill became the subject of constant concern and speculation on the governor's side of the capitol. Eventually, the relationship

62. Ibid.
63. BOH, II, 4.
64. BOH, II, 2.
65. BOH. Gill, I, 1; and Oshiro, II, 6.
66. BOH, I, 1.
became so strained that Burns's staff would not even let Gill know when the governor was out of the state—a situation in which Gill was legally the acting governor. 67

**Senate Fight**

Factional division was not confined to the state capitol. When the newly elected legislature began to organize, many of the same old problems which had plagued the party since 1959 erupted again in the Senate. The factional division found neighbor islanders opposing Oahu delegates, but there were also overtones of the state's continuing labor struggles with ILWU supporters on one side and those close to the A.F. of L. unions on the other. And in the aftermath of the 1966 election, one faction owed its loyalties to Burns, the other to Gill. 68 As in 1959, the Republican senators sat back and waited for the best offer from either side.

The struggle was primarily one of personality and for power rather than over issues. At stake, however, was the manner in which Burns's various appointments to state agencies and to the courts would be treated. Putative leaders in the fight were Yoshinaga, the ILWU loyalist sympathetic to Burns, and Doi, the independent who leaned toward Gill. Eventually the fifteen Democrats divided evenly, seven to seven, with only George Ariyoshi standing aside and refusing to make a commitment to either group. 69

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67. Gill, BOH, I, 1.
69. McClung, BOH, II, 2.
Finally, eight days after the opening of the legislative session, a compromise was reached. It gave important posts to both factions, but was interpreted as a victory for the Yoshinaga side. Oahu Senator John Hulten, a Yoshinaga partisan, became Senate president, but the important Ways and Means committee went to freshman Senator Vincent Yano, a Doi supporter. Yoshinaga was relegated to head the Labor committee, and Doi fared no better, getting only the Education committee. More importantly, and probably the best indication of the winning side, was the assignment of the Judiciary committee to a Yoshinaga supporter and Burns loyalist, John Ushijima from the Big Island. As part of the agreement, Doi was banned from membership on the Judiciary committee. That meant that Burns's nomination of Kazuhisa Abe, Doi's old nemesis, to the state supreme court could proceed. Ariyoshi, who had tried to straddle the middle, was punished by both sides. He was demoted from floor leader to the chairmanship of the insignificant Public Utilities committee.

When it was all over, the Star-Bulletin noted in an editorial, that, "we have had to suffer through a party power struggle that was largely selfish on both sides, petty and highly personal." It was a shameful waste, said the writer, of time and talent.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHALLENGE--1970

Admiring Friend: 'My, that's a beautiful baby you have there.'

Mother: 'Oh, that's nothing—you should see his photograph.'

--Daniel J. Boorstin
The Image

Hawaii's lieutenant governor has only a single duty assigned by statute, the supervision of the state's election laws. The position was created by the 1950 state constitution, and, despite, the obvious, subsequent conventions have failed to modify or eliminate it. It is a position in which an activist politician rapidly becomes frustrated. Such was the case with Tom Gill.

Gill quickly completed a revision of the election process, establishing a computerized voting system, but his energies and ambitions far outran the job. He proposed to Burns that he assume a liaison role between the administration and the legislature, but Burns rejected the idea. Other proposals met with a lukewarm response and subtle resistance. The strategy of the Burns machine to isolate Gill was apparent.

Changing Times

But Gill was hard to hold down. Change was in the air in Hawaii in the late 1960's as in the rest of the land. Again, the differences between Burns and Gill were telling. As America struggled with her collective conscience over the Vietnam war, the two men came down on opposite sides of the issue. Burns, loyal to his old friend Lyndon Johnson, echoed the Johnson line on the war. But his support of the conflict ran deep. Even after Johnson left office, Burns continued his role as a hawk. Oshiro remembered coming to Burns's office in 1969 to find the governor personally typing a letter to Richard Nixon, supporting Nixon's position on Vietnam. The governor's attitude was "who are we to second guess our president?" Gill, on the other hand, was an outspoken opponent of the war, attacking U.S. policy in Asia as "outdated" in early 1967. The revolt of the young came to Hawaii from the mainland, and found in Gill a champion who would defend their right to dissent.

People were beginning to question the rampant development and growth which had taken place in Hawaii asking if it was not too costly in terms of environmental destruction, crowding, and the highest cost of living in the nation. Gill agreed, and they turned toward him for leadership.

Burns decried those who would slow the pace of growth. They were, he said, guilty of "myopic thinking which must be discouraged." He urged that Hawaii's people turn away from the "cries of alarm" of those of lesser spirit and faint heart.

2. Oshiro, BOH, II, 6.
But change was in the wind, and Burns could read the signs if he would. In 1966 his old friend and long-time supporter, Mitsuyuki Kido, the last of The Five still active save Burns himself, was defeated for reelection to the state Senate. Then in 1968 Honolulu voters dumped Burns's closest political advisor, Matsuo Takabuki, from the city council seat he had held for sixteen years. In the same primary election, the Burns-supported candidate for mayor, Herman Lemke, was beaten by Frank Fasi, long a burr under Burns's saddle blanket. Fasi won the general election with a campaign assist from Tom Gill, to become at long last, the mayor of Honolulu.

Gill to Run

The lines were being drawn. Gill obviously wanted to be governor, and a natural constituency was forming about him. He appealed to the young, the disenchanted, the poor, the newcomer to Hawaii who saw the Burns machine as a closed political club.

Gill himself had decided years before that the only way to bring about effective change in the community was to hold the reins of power. Laws put through the legislature ten years before remained unenforced. Said Gill:

Burns had no interest in land reform . . . it was anathema to him. The anti-trust law was sitting there, never been used . . . the whole mechanism of administering fairly forward-looking laws, like the land use law . . . was just sitting. And it was being misused by some of Burns's people. And probably by himself. He had Jim Ferry [chairman, state Land Use commission] over there giving away chunks of the conservation zone to his friends.6

6. BOH, I, 1.
The Burns machine, Gill believed, had been taken over by forces which rendered the Democratic mandate for progressive change impotent. The search for The Dream had become a runaway race for the fast buck.

Said Gill:

It seemed to me fairly clear that the henchmen had gotten control of the situation, that Burns was . . . the factotum, and certainly a moving factor in all this, [but] was really just a front man to some extent. . . . the factors, plus the subdividers, plus the ILWU, and a few other fast-buck operators were pretty much the moving force in the administration. 7

Burns, in Gill's view,

was being held there, as the front man, to preserve the interests of the folks that had control of the state and control of the economy. And he's locked it up pretty well by that time. . . . They were playing the game. The more you made, the better it was, and the more concrete you poured, the better off everything was going to be. It was just running wild, like cancer. And the boys were making money hand over fist. The fast-buck operators were rife, laying in subdivisions. 8

Gill's resolve to run for governor in 1970 was beginning to harden. "It struck me that maybe that was all I could do, or at least what I should do," he recalled. 9

To the Burns machine, the threat was obvious. Gill had somehow to be contained if possible. "They sent emissaries," Gill recalled.

The message was that if I would just stick around for lieutenant governor one more term that everything would be alright. They would anoint me. The ILWU even sent this message. Well, I figured if I stuck around as lieutenant governor in that kind of a situation, I wouldn't have anything to anoint. I'd be a fink like the rest of them. 10

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
Pressure on Burns

But containing Gill was not the only problem the machine's operatives had. As 1970 approached, it was obvious that Burns was tired. He was sixty years old, and had been totally involved in politics for almost twenty-five years. Perhaps the governor would retire. Some of the members of the team thought he should. Ed Burns opposed the 1970 contest. The governor, he remembered, had become "an old man" in eight years in office. "He was tired," and "was going very fast." Mike Tokunaga also thought Burns was through. "I thought he was going to retire. He told me in 1968 he was getting tired," Tokunaga remembered.

Burns delayed his final decision until the summer of 1970, but the pressure on him was intense. Gill had pre-empted all other potential candidates, and if the machine was to preserve itself the only hope was to convince Burns to run for a third term. Ed Burns recalled that the anti-Gill move "was one of the strong arguments used to convince" Burns to run.

Slowly, the arguments of the faithful began to prevail. Turk Tokita remembered: "The consensus was he had no choice but to run ... the [problem] was there was nobody else but Tom Gill." And Hirai: "He had to run. Who else was going to run? ... I just assumed he was gonna run. The boys wanted him to run." And Tom Yagi: "He was under the influence of many of his friends. His friends begged him to run. I asked him to run." And Yokouchi: "All the people around him said

11. BOH, I, 1.
12. BOH, II, 4.
14. BOH, I, 1.
15. BOH, II, 1.
16. BOH, II, 1.
17. BOH, II, 1.
'you gotta run. Can't let Tom Gill disrupt the business community, the labor community.' So, reluctantly, he ran."\(^{18}\)

There were some dissenters. Kenneth Brown who had been appointed an administrative assistant in the governor's office after his 1966 defeat by Gill, thought Burns was tired and probably sick. He told the governor that a 1970 campaign would be a "major mistake," and thought Burns "didn't want to do it, I know."\(^{19}\) "Scrub" Tanaka went to see the governor and "told him not to make the 1970 race."

The response was volatile. "He ... pounded on the desk and ... [said] 'Okay, I won't run and we'll give the government to Tom Gill. Okay?'"\(^{20}\)

If there was any other motive for Burns's candidacy in 1970 than to pre-empt Gill, it was not apparent. Some of the faithful maintained Burns felt his dream was not fulfilled, that there were still things to be done.\(^{21}\) The evidence does not bear that out.

The program of the Democratic Party from 1965 on had been outlined in a document called "The New Hawaii." It was couched in the highest terms of making life better for Hawaii's people through education and various forms of economic opportunity. Burns occasionally made reference to the program, particularly in the 1966 campaign, but, in fact, the document had been written by Cravalho and university professor Tom Dinnell, a Democrat with no links to the Burns faction.\(^{22}\)

Burns continued to couch his annual messages in high-sounding philosophical terms, but, in fact, the Burns machine had no specific program of legislative action. Burns had built a system of consensus

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18. BOH, II, 2.  
19. BOH, II, 1.  
20. BOH, II, 2.  
21. BOH. Oshiro, II, 6; Horio, II, 2.  
22. Cravalho, BOH, I, 1.
government and the beneficiaries were big business, big labor, and the new establishment Democrats. It was this consensus which Gill threatened, and it was this the Burns machine wished to protect at any cost. Burns became convinced that Gill, with his strong labor bias, would so disrupt the community that the gains of the past eight years would be lost. And so he decided, reluctantly, to run for a third terms.

The Campaign

Robert Oshiro had lost his position as state party chairman in 1968. But, as early as 1967 he had begun to plan for the 1970 Burns campaign. The effort started with small coffee hours, meetings between Oshiro, Aoki and others with three or four of the party faithful. It was slow going, but Burns's patronage policies over the years had spread his influence outward from that close inner circle of AJA supporters like ripples on a pond. Now the machine had a carefully preserved list of 10,000 to 12,000 partisan workers who would rally to the cause when called.

But a simple grass roots campaign, important as it was, wasn't going to do it. Not this time. Polls taken for the Burns people in 1969 indicated the governor's popularity was at rock bottom sixteen percent. Even members of the cabinet were telling Oshiro that Burns could not be reelected. If Burns was to be sold to Hawaii's voters, an extensive mainland-style campaign would be needed. Money would

23. BOH. Oshiro, II, 5; and Tokunaga, II, 4.
26. Ibid.
apparently be no problem. When Oshiro mailed out a "prospectus brochure" to 2,000 members of the business community in August 1969, contributions of approximately $150,000 poured in from "contractors, engineers, developers, architects." 27

Oshiro and the governor's press secretary, Don Horio, began casting around for a mainland firm which could conduct a "Kennedy style" image campaign. 28 The media campaign and the grass roots efforts would have to do the job, Oshiro decided. Burns's involvement would be kept to a minimum due to his age and obvious exhaustion. 29

Eventually, a mainland advertising agency--Lennen and Newell--with considerable experience in image-building campaigns was hired. They in turn brought in political consultant Joseph Napolitan, a man with a reputation for campaign wizardry.

The result was a three-phase campaign designed to humanize Burns and to link his terms in office in the minds of the voters to the state's economic prosperity. 30 The keystone in this effort was a lavishly produced half-hour film designed for television presentation. Entitled "To Catch A Wave," it pulled out all the emotional stops in selling Burns as the warm, open-hearted father figure of modern Hawaii.

Gill, in the meantime, was beating the bushes, speaking from any platform he could find, developing issues, and attacking Burns for cronyism. Gill decried the excessive development, the ridiculously high cost of living, the inadequacies of housing for Hawaii's people.

27. Ibid.
But he didn't just attack, he offered solutions. Gill identified the problems and told people what should be done about them. He challenged Burns to do the same. In a campaign booklet put out in July called *Issues and Answers for the Seventies*, Gill dropped the gauntlet. The booklet, Gill said, "should be considered as an outline of major problems which should be thoroughly discussed in the 1970 elections by all candidates for state offices--from governor on down." The efforts of all the candidates were needed, he noted, to find the right answers.

Many of the issues Gill identified had been around for a long time, many, in fact, dated back to the 1952 and 1954 platforms. But there were some new ones. Traffic, for example, was just a word to the platform framers of 1954. But by 1970, the simple act of getting around Oahu in an automobile was becoming a major irritant. In the single decade following statehood vehicle density had increased by fifty percent and Oahu's 1,170 miles of streets and highways were plugged with 302,000 cars. Worse, much worse, was ahead if something wasn't done. The answer, said Gill, was a mass transit system which would be "modern, fast, frequent, and comfortable." It would probably take ten years to build and cost half a billion dollars. But the alternative, choked roadways and the air befoiled by automobile exhaust, was unthinkable.

The time to act was at hand. Said Gill:

> As a crowning touch we have anointed our civilization with the disaster of the automobile. What was originally designed to be an efficient and relatively inexpensive mode of transportation has become our civilization's crown of thorns—it not only destroys the air we breath and fills it with lethal lead, but it gets in its own way

31. (*Honolulu: Gill Campaign Committee, 1970*), p. 3.
32. *Issues and Answers*, p. 29.
so that the free movement it promised is largely lost. Finally, it dies in ever increasing heaps of rusty unsightly metal. 33

Industrial pollution and smog, once thought to be plagues which afflicted only poor suffering mainlanders, had arrived in Hawaii by 1970. On days when the normal tradewinds failed, an ugly yellow haze could now be seen hanging over the city. The streams and canals which ran from the mountains were filled with trash and the waters were dangerously high in bacteria count. Along the coastline—even on famed Waikiki beach—dangerous levels of pollution from the fifty million gallons of raw and untreated sewage dumped off shore each day were noted. Favorite swimming areas were posted as dangerous because of bacteria in the water.

It was a sensitive issue and one of great concern to many people. Gill attacked the inadequacy of state health department regulations and the ineffective enforcement which had allowed the conditions to develop. A firm commitment to clean up the environment, not just lip service, was needed, said Gill. He promised improved regulations, stiffer enforcement, and the construction of new sewage treatment plants. It wouldn't be easy. "Our way of life will change to some extent if we are to win the battle to protect the environment," said Gill. But there was really no choice. Salvation, he said, lay "in the carefully planned use of our land, air and water so that we do not completely destroy the delicate ecological balances peculiar to our islands." 34

33. The Thoughts and Hopes of Tom Gill, p. 7.
34. Issues, p. 6.
The perennial issues came in for their share of attention. Land use, the continuing housing crisis, and public education, were all subjects of Gill's speeches.

Land and housing were linked in many ways. With 14,000 new houses needed each year, the private building industry was putting up about 9,000—mostly aimed at the affluent, luxury-seeking buyer. The lesser needs of the great middle group were being ignored. Land, held by the large estates and controlled by the trusts, was a major factor in driving up the cost of housing. Gill proposed that state lands be used to establish a "second" housing market. If state land wasn't available, private land should be condemned. The state could then contract with competent developers to build 5,000 to 10,000 units per year. Key to this plan was the retention by the state of re-purchase rights to stop any speculation. Laws were already available to permit such a program, Gill pointed out. Most of them had been on the books for over ten years. They had been pushed through the last territorial legislature by—Tom Gill. "If we cannot depend on the private market," said Gill, "it is then up to the state to move." The housing crisis could become a "social disaster" and "the longer we delay, the more difficult the crisis becomes and the greater the danger of social disruption."³⁵

The Burns administration was working hard to defuse the housing issue. A "housing fair" had been organized on state land in Nanakuli and a group of homes built to demonstrate the state's interest in the

³⁵. The Thoughts and Hopes of Tom Gill, pp. 9-10.
problem. Gill branded it a fraud and pointed out that the costs cited by the state were for house without land and were misleading in the extreme. The people, said Gill, were being deceived about a critical problem.

The commitment to education for Hawaii's children was a long-standing part of The Dream. And huge amounts of public money had been put into the school system. In the ten years following statehood, in fact, spending for education had gone up 230 per cent, while the number of students in the schools had increased only 27 per cent. What the increased expenditure had bought, was not entirely clear, Gill pointed out. For one thing there was still too much variance in the quality of the schools. Some had excessive drop out rates and performance was poor on standard tests. Many parents, teachers and students were frustrated by the "lock step rigidity of the system." The elected state board of education was unconstitutionally apportioned, and operated without a clear definition of its authority and its relationship to the governor and the legislature.

The single state-wide system, Gill said, had become over-centralized and too rigid. The answer was to continue the centralized purchasing and administrative functions which made the system unique, but to move decisions about education of the child back down to the community and school level.36

Gill also challenged the teachers to take a new look at what they were doing:

36. Issues, pp. 15-17
The developing areas of scientific technology move with such rapidity that they will soon outrun even the most conscientious teachers. Would it not be better to train in a method of thinking and learning? . . . If you can create this frame of mind isn't it more important than the ability to regurgitate a periodic table or a series of chemical formulas? Once the ability to analyze for oneself is created in a young person and the natural curiosity is turned loose . . . your main problem is to get out of his way so he can grow.37

When Gill formally announced his candidacy on July 9, 1970, he laid the groundwork for a continuing attack on Burns as the figurehead of a political machine. Burns, he told a large gathering of supporters, was a "very decent human being," and personally honest. His major fault lay in his "deep sense of duty and loyalty to his friends." And Gill pointed out, "Jack has some most alarming friends. Too many of them are doing too well to risk the uncertain winds of change. Even if the governor had no personal desire to serve a third term, I doubt very much if his associates would allow him to retire."

But before this, Gill invited his audience to look back to the decade of the sixties. "It was, he said, "a decade of great promise," which "ended with the rumblings of disaster." The high hopes of the young John Kennedy, the surge of humanitarianism reflected in the civil rights act, and the pledge to end poverty in America had all "turned sour under the crushing weight of Vietnam." Fund cuts as money was diverted to the war killed the social programs,

the president lost credibility, the campuses fell in disorder and the ghettos convulsed with despair. . . . The sixties were like a song that starts with a paean of hope and young courage, turns to a martial air, then slowly dissolves in a dirge with dissonance and discords.

37. The Thoughts and Hopes of Tom Gill, p. 8.
All of this had its counterpart in Hawaii, Gill said. The statehood era began with "high hope and confidence." By 1962 the Democrats had gained control and could "make things happen."

Growth burst out all over. Development was progress and progress was good. Some of our people became rich beyond their every expectation. . . . But things began to happen to us. . . . Some of our poor and struggling public servants became less poor and struggled less. Some of the crusaders for change decided that change wasn't so important after all.

The society, said Gill, lost momentum. The forms of social change remained, but the reality was something different. In Hawaii as on the mainland the decade of promise had proven false. "The sixties," said Gill, "came in with a shout and crept out with a shudder." In Hawaii,

there was refusal to recognize the growing crisis of housing and pollution until the election was upon us. Those who sold tourism spoke of the "golden people of Hawaii" but turned Waikiki into an overbuilt bog.

The Dream which the Democrats had chased for so long had been sidetracked. But there was still hope. Now, said Gill, "we must recapture the human concerns of the 1950's and recast them in modern form." It wouldn't be easy. The hangers-on clustered around the Burns machine were frightened, Gill said.

Can it be that I have alarmed them by saying that government should be run without influence or favor; that all citizens of this state are entitled to fair and equal treatment; that the government should belong equally to all of our people, both the humble and the mighty; that these fair islands are ours to treat with reverence and pass on to our children, and they are not to be destroyed by greedy and thoughtless men?

There was hope. Attention to the problems of the society and an active pursuit of solutions could turn things around. The Dream was
still possible. And, Gill promised, he would "struggle with all the fiber of my being, against whatever odds fortune seeks to impose," to make it happen. "The time has now come," he told his followers, "to commit ourselves to the stormy task ahead."  

As the campaign continued, a series of revelations about Burns's appointees sharpened the focus of the charges of cronyism. Shiro Nishimura, a Kauai chicken farmer appointed by Burns to the Land Use commission, had been caught in a compromising situation. Nishimura had, with partners, bought up a parcel of land on Kauai and then led the Land Use commission into rezoning it. The land had then been sold for a profit of $575,000. When this sleazy piece of business was revealed by the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Burns announced that he had already investigated Nishimura, who had resigned, but had not made it public because of the fear of destroying the man's reputation. He later conceded improprieties and ordered an investigation by the state attorney general.

Other obvious violations of ethics were revealed: Wilbert Choi, chairman of the Land Use commission, was discovered to have voted on the rezoning of land he owned to get around problems with a city zoning ordinance. On the Big Island board member Alex Napier had voted to rezone land on the Kahua ranch, which he managed, to urban status, vastly increasing its value.

Gill attacked with each new revelation, reiterating the charges of cronyism, and pointing out that here, indeed, were some of the

39. Coffman, pp. 144-146.
"alarmng friends." Burns, for his part, refused to be lured into battle. The campaign strategy dictated that the governor remain above the fray, and Burns was doing just that. He became almost impossible to contact personally, and even his spokesmen were largely unavailable to newsmen.  

If the voters wanted to see the governor, they could find him nightly on television—but in his paid advertising, not on the evening news. In the Burns campaign, the "pseudo-event" had over taken reality.  

Polls disclosed after the election indicated that Gill may have badly overplayed the corruption issue. People recognized the improprieties in the Land Use commission scandals, and were offended by them. But they were not willing to connect them with Burns. The image created by Burns's expensive media campaign left no room for doubts about the governor. Newspaper revelations were one thing, but "To Catch a Wave"—seen by an estimated eighty per cent of all voters—was visual and real and right there on the home screen. Could that nice old man be guilty of anything unethical or illegal? It was unlikely. The governorship of the state of Hawaii was merchandised like a box of soap flakes—and the voters bought.

The Victory

Burns polled fifty-four per cent of the primary votes and beat Gill by a little over 13,000. Lieutenant governor candidate George Ariyoshi, hand-picked by a committee of Burns insiders to run as the

40. Coffman, p. 152.
41. The pseudo-event is discussed in Boorstin, p. 11.
42. Coffman, pp. 148-149.
43. Claimed by the advertising agency. Horio, BOH, II, 3.
machine candidate, also won handily over Senator Vincent Yano, identified with Gill.

Television-oriented media politics, prevalent on the mainland from 1960, had come to Hawaii at last. The costs, compared to earlier campaigns in the state, were astronomical. The Burns machine had the dubious distinction of waging the first million dollar political campaign in Hawaii. In the Democratic primary, Burns outspent Gill by a huge margin, putting out $697,000 for the media campaign to Gill's $205,000, a three-and-a-half to one ratio. General election expenditures by the Burns machine pushed the total to an admitted $980,000.

The Burns machine appeared invincible. Gill, the only significant threat within the party, had been not just beaten, but smashed by the 13,000 vote victory margin. The attacks of the dissidents, the party outsiders, the conservationists, the young and disenchanted, had been repelled. The majority of Democratic voters obviously believed they were better off than they had ever been and wanted the prosperity to continue. Gill was crying in the wilderness. The future could take care of itself.

Nobody gave the Republicans much chance in the general election, but just to make sure, Burns made the long walk across the capitol's fifth floor to see the lieutenant governor and ask his support.

As Gill recalled the meeting:

44. McClung, BOH, II, 2.
45. Both Horio and Oshiro are offended by the term, and point out that it includes both primary and general election expenditures, as well as those of the lieutenant governor candidate in the general. Nonetheless, the distinction remains.
46. Coffman, p. 201.
I said 'look, what are you going to do? What is your program? If you'll come out and support a few things, then I can say that's a good idea. Finally I wrote up an ad for him. . . . And they ran it. 47

The advertisement laid out a program of action which came directly from the Gill campaigns of 1966 and 1970. Gill announced his support of the program, but then, "a few days after that he [Burns] got a poll. . . . showing that he was way ahead, and he absolutely lost interest in the whole thing," Gill remembered. 48

The poll was right. In the general election the Burns-Ariyoshi ticket swept to a landslide victory, defeating Republican Sam King by 137,812 votes to 101,249. Again, Burns had a mandate. But again, a mandate for what? Hawaii's voters had endorsed a flickering television image and a belief--based largely on myth--that past wrongs had been made right. No one knew from the 1970 Burns campaign what the next four years might bring. There was only one certainty: Hawaii was solidly in the column of one-party states in the American system and the divergent political aspirations of Hawaii's people would continue to be expressed through the factions of the Democratic Party. The Gill faction was at its lowest ebb, but the Burns machine, strong as it was, still could not command unanimous support within the party. In four years, the Burns magic would be gone for good, and looming on the horizon was a new threat, the growing popularity of Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi.

47. BOH, I, 1.
48. Ibid.
CHAPTER IX

THE OUTSIDER--FRANK FASI

I would say that a malahini was more distrusted then. . . . Frank Fasi brought a new style of politics to Hawaii, a mainland style.

--Dan Aoki

One of the surest signs that the winds of political change were blowing in Hawaii in the late 1960's was the 1968 election of Frank F. Fasi as the mayor of the City and County of Honolulu. To the establishment Democrats Fasi was the gadfly, the untrusted spoiler, the bad penny who always turned up where he wasn't wanted. And he was, forever, the malahini (newcomer).

Fasi, like most of the AJA's who rose to power in the Democratic Party after World War II, was the first generation son of immigrant parents. But Fasi was a transplanted mainland haole in Honolulu. Fasi's parents had immigrated from Sicily, settling in Hartford, Connecticut. Fasi grew up fighting his way out of the Hartford slums, just as many of Burns's supporters had fought their way up from Kalihi or Palama, or Chinatown.

It was World War II and service in the U.S. Marine Corps which brought Fasi to Hawaii. Separated from the Marines at the end of the

1. BOH, II, 1.

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war, he married a young nisei (second generation) AJA from Kauai, and began a business dealing in surplus materials of all sorts—a business which later led his political opponents to label him a "junk man."

Enters Politics

Fasi's first local notoriety came in 1948 when he defied feather-bedding practices requiring him to hire off-duty traffic policemen when his company moved houses through the Honolulu streets. The defiance led to a court battle which Fasi lost. When he told his attorney that justice was blind, the lawyer told him to get into politics and change the system if he didn't like it. He took the words to heart.

Fasi brought something new to Hawaii politics from the very beginning. His aggressiveness—particularly toward fellow Democrats—far exceeded what was locally considered in good taste. He was acerbic. He was opportunistic, and he was a pragmatist. But most of all, in the provincial atmosphere of Hawaii politics in the 1950's, he was the malahini, and some Democrats were determined to set him apart.

Fasi's political career—just as did Jack Burns's—began with a series of losses. He ran for the 1950 constitutional convention, interestingly, in the same district with Burns. Both of them lost. Later in the year he won the Democratic nomination for the territorial House in the fifth district, but then lost in the general election.

In the 1950 territorial party convention which split the Democratic Party, Fasi joined with the "walkout" Democrats. He spent
the next year attacking the ILWU, and publicly labeling the "stand-pat" Democrats Communist dupes—in a word, red-baiting. As the 1952 territorial convention approached with the promise of, if not harmony, as least a merger of the two wings of the divided party, Fasi began campaigning for election as national committeemen.

A frequent target of Fasi's red-baiting attacks was Jack Burns, then the party's Oahu county chairman. In the mixed political bag of 1952, the Burns faction, moving for control of the party, was determined to make a show of strength against the ILWU faction. The ILWU supported Honolulu Mayor Johnny Wilson, "Mr. Democrat," for election as national committeeman. For this and other reasons—Fasi's promise to stop attacking Burns as a fellow traveler, and his agreement not to run against Wilson in the coming mayoralty primary—the Burns faction threw their support behind Fasi and he was elected. Within months, citing God's will, he announced that he would run against Wilson in the Democratic primary for mayor.²

The campaign was bitter. Old Guard Democrat Arthur Trask, speaking in support of Johnny Wilson, called Fasi "a junk dealer." The young ex-Marine became so combative in response, that the Democratic campaign committee threatened to ban him from party rallies if he didn't stop attacking fellow Democrats.³

Fasi's response was to turn to newspaper advertising, and to schedule appearances on radio. The day and night before election he spent twenty-four hours straight in a "talkathon" seated in the front window of a radio station answering phoned-in questions.

². Burns, BOH, I, 8.
Despite those efforts, Fasi lost, and Wilson echoed the sentiments of the majority of party insiders in commenting on the campaign when he said:

The way I size things up is there's enough level-headed people in Honolulu without letting a malahini haole come here and make wild statements without being able to prove it.4

Fasi hardly broke pace with the defeat. He spent the next two years campaigning, and kept himself in the public eye with a weekly radio show, "Unreported News," which he used to attack Wilson, Governor Samuel Wilder King, and others.

Defeats Wilson

In 1954 Fasi again challenged Wilson in the mayoralty primary, calling the long-time Democrat--then past eighty and ill--too old to continue in the job. Wilson was the grand old man of the party and Fasi's attacks won him few friends with the faithful. The Burns faction had pulled away from any association with Fasi after 1952, and Burns in 1954 downplayed Fasi's candidacy saying,

I feel sorry for poor Fasi. He hasn't even got the virtues of a Don Quixote to help him along.5

The ILWU leaders despised Fasi and he was a routine target on their nightly radio broadcasts. The script of the ILWU program of September 14, 1954, prepared for delivery by the union's public relations man, Robert McElrath, said:

How to make enemies and lose an election could well be the slogan of Frank Fasi. He has attack [sic] Johnny Wilson, Governor King, Harold Rice, E.Z. Crane, the two major daily newspapers, Mrs. Marguerite Ashford, Jack Burns, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the ILWU and all of its leaders. He has been acting like a political bull in the proverbial china closet.5

Fasi's chances in the primary looked poor with most major factions in the party arrayed against him. But Fasi was an eloquent and charismatic speaker, and he wasn't afraid of a fight. He again made use of radio and also the new medium, television, which had come to Hawaii in December 1953. The night before the election he appeared in the "Frank Fasi Talkathon," a combined radio and television appearance which had him answering questions telephoned in from the audience from four p.m. until 11:45 a.m. the next day.

Fasi fielded all telephone questions and took stands on a variety of issues, some of which he has supported through much of his political career. He backed home rule for the counties, opposed a retail sales tax, and supported a "room tax on tourist hotels," with the funds earmarked to build up the tourist industry. He acknowledged his long-standing differences with the ILWU, and castigated McElrath as guilty of "pitting class against class and race against race," in the ILWU radio broadcasts. A caller asked his opinion of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, whose power as the U.S. Senate's arch red-baiter had begun to slip after the Army-McCarthy hearings. Said Fasi:

I think that McCarthy is a disgrace to the United States Senate. I'm against McCarthy for everything he stands for.7

Fasi won the primary election, surprising the experts, and ending Johnny Wilson's long political career. In the general election he came up against a popular part-Hawaiian with no ties to the old Republican-Big Five coalition, Neil Blaisdell. With most of the Democrats sitting on their hands, if not, in fact, supporting Blaisdell, Fasi lost. His enemies rejoiced. McElrath, in the script of the ILWU broadcast for November 3, 1954, wrote:

Attributing his victory over Fasi in part to the ILWU, the mayor-elect [Blaisdell] said [he] believed his ILWU support was more anti-Fasi than it was pro-Blaisdell. We'll buy that.8

There is some evidence that Republicans crossed over to support Fasi in the primary election and then deserted him in the general. The tactic, common enough in the days before the closed primary was adopted in Hawaii, was used by both parties to bring the weakest candidate into the general election. At any rate, even in 1954, the year of the great Democratic takeover, Fasi could not win in the face of so much bi-partisan opposition. Interestingly enough, the other big loser in the year of the Democratic tide—by an even narrower margin—was John A. Burns, running for delegate at the head of the ticket.

7. Tapes of the 1954 Fasi Talkathon, recorded by the ILWU, have been made a part of the Burns Oral History project.
Perpetual Candidate

Despite his losses, Fasi remained a significant figure in the party. He was not without a voice because he still held the position of national committeeman and he continued his radio commentary. He attacked Burns and other Democrats for advertising in the Honolulu Record, the weekly newspaper edited by Koji Ariyoshi, which had close ties to the Communist Party. As a member of the Democratic national committee, Fasi said, he wished to apologize "to all loyal Americans, for the recent distasteful acts of eighteen registered Democrats. It is evident that Mr. Burns, seventeen Democrats and three Republicans in the state of Hawaii . . . seek . . . the support of Communists." 9 Most observers felt Fasi was positioning himself for another campaign for mayor. However, in a surprise announcement of August of 1956 he revealed that he would not be a candidate for any office that year because of his wife's health. 10

In 1958 Fasi returned to the political wars and this time he hit pay dirt. He won nomination to the territorial Senate in the Democratic primary, and only narrowly missed leading the ticket in the general election, coming in a handful of votes behind the popular Patsy Mink as Democrats took four of the five fifth district seats.

10. Advertiser, August 22, 1956, p. 1. Fasi's wife's illness was attributed to his political activity. The couple were later divorced, and Fasi was periodically subjected to a vicious whispering campaign about his marital relationships. In the fall of 1960 an advertisement appeared in the Star-Bulletin, the Hawaii Hochi, and the Hawaii Times over the signature of Fasi's former wife, Florence Ohama Fasi, listing the various rumors of the whispering campaign and denying them all. See Star-Bulletin, November 1, 1960, p. 17 for the advertisement.
But Fasi's legislative career was short-lived. In 1959 came statehood, and with it the special statehood elections. The slatemakers of the Burns faction of the party decided that long-time party faithfuls Oren Long and William H. Heen should run for the two new seats in the U.S. Senate. Fasi, no Burns partisan, disagreed. He challenged Heen in the primary election and won, upsetting the strategy of the Burns faction, and setting off waves which would echo for years to come. 11

In the general election Fasi ran into the usual opposition of the ILWU and got only lukewarm support from the majority of Democrats. His opponent was Hiram Fong, the self-made Chinese millionaire and long-time Republican, who was the darling of the ILWU. Fong easily won the election.

Fasi was gaining a reputation as a man who could win in the primary, but couldn't beat Republicans in a general election.

However, despite the opposition of the Burns faction and the ILWU, Fasi was not without support among party independents. In April of 1960, the Oahu delegation to the state Democratic convention met to try to agree on a mayoralty candidate for the 1960 election in hopes of avoiding a party primary fight. The Burns faction opposed the idea, but they had little power within the Oahu county committee. Ed Burns appealed to the meeting to disband because it was not properly formed under party regulations. His motion received only eight votes. The only candidates for mayor were party theoretician Robert Dodge, and Fasi. When the votes were counted, Fasi got the support of the majority of the delegates, 103 to 82. 12

11. Aoki, BOH, II, 1.
As often happened with the Democrats, the unity movement was not successful. Dodge ran against Fasi in the primary anyway. Fasi won, but then, once again, he lost to Blaisdell in the general election.

**Fights Unity Slate**

With the Democratic debacle in the statehood elections fresh in mind, 1962 was the year for unity. The fact-finding committee of the state central committee under the leadership of Robert Oshiro went through the process of selecting the strongest candidates for the five slots at the top of the ticket. Fasi, like other potential candidates, had been consulted along the way and had agreed at one point to "abide" by the committee decision. However, nothing was ever that simple for the Democrats. The top five candidates were chosen, with Tom Gill and Herbert K. H. Lee designated as the strongest candidates for the two seats in the U.S. House. Fasi then denounced the entire process and decided to run for one of the House seats. When Spark Matsunaga, with considerable less fanfare, also entered the race, the House contest became a four-way affair. When the primary votes were counted, Matsunaga and Gill led the ticket. Fasi came in last.

Fasi was often criticized by his opponents for turning minor problems into conflicts of major proportions. His conduct in the 1962 campaign was cited as illustrative. When Kennedy administration cabinet member Morris Udall stopped in Honolulu in the summer of 1962 on a trip

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to the South Pacific, he was drafted by local Democrats for a television appearance. Four of the designated top five—Burns, Richardson, Gill and Lee—appeared with Udall for an innocuous half-hour of questions and answers. Fasi, incensed, demanded an explanation of this "endorsement" from Party Chairman Oshiro. He then escalated the problem by calls to the White House and Kennedy press secretary Pierre Salinger. A considerable flap ensued which died down only when Udall, returning from the South Pacific, announced that he had no intention of endorsing anyone and was just appearing as a good Democrat. In the meantime, of course, a great deal of publicity had been generated in which Fasi figured prominently.14

Fasi's relations with the Burns faction of the party were always a running battle. In November of 1961, with Democrats preaching unity for 1962, Fasi publicly labeled Burns a loser. In an interview with Advertiser political columnist Brian Casey, Fasi attacked both Burns and the ILWU, and maintained, "the Democratic Party can't afford a candidate who can't win, and Burns can't."15

After the election, with the Burns Democrats victorious, Fasi didn't let up. He told a Rotary club meeting that labor had played an undue part in the Democratic victories, and that, as a result, Jack Hall, Arthur Rutledge and Charles Kendall of the Hawaii Government Employees Association would have great influence in the new Burns administration. They would, he said, be "paid off" by having a voice in certain government appointments.16

To City Council

In 1964 Fasi readjusted his political sights slightly and ran for the city council and was elected. He quickly became a one-man faction on the Democratic-controlled council. His special target was Burns's long-time confederate, Matsuo Takabuki, whom he attacked often and viciously:

If his [Takabuki's] concept of an effective councilman is measured by his ability to serve his own private interests profitably ... there is no doubt that he is probably the most effective councilman in the history of the city .... Takabuki is not fit to sit as a member of the council ... since ... he places personal gain above public service and public trust. 17

When the councilmen voted themselves a pay raise, Fasi first refused to accept it, and then filed an unsuccessful lawsuit to halt payment of the extra money to any of the councilmen. 18 He consistently espoused populist issues, attacking, for example, the fee charged for the city's Summer Fun youth program, the inadequate bus service provided by the Honolulu Rapid Transit company, the lack of fluoridation in the water supply, and the favoritism shown to entrepreneur Chinn Ho in getting zoning code exceptions to build his Makaha tourist complex. A planned city athletic stadium to be built at Halawa became a special target. Mayor Blaisdell, the local newspapers, various legislators, and his fellow councilmen all came under his guns at one time or another.

Runs For Mayor

In 1966, with the Burns Democrats and Gill tied up in the Kenny Brown fiasco, Fasi flirted briefly with the idea of running against Matsunaga or Patsy Mink for the U.S. House. He decided instead to hold off and run for mayor two years later in 1968. That decision was bolstered when, in early 1968 as a candidate for the state constitutional convention, he led the ticket from the Manoa-Makiki-Waikiki district. That vote, claimed Fasi, was a mandate for him to run once again for mayor. 19

The Burns establishment Democrats were little concerned. Fasi had no grass roots strength in the party organization. What support he had in the community was much like that of Gill, the poor, the disenchanted, the newcomers. Even if he should sneak through the primary, he could never beat Blaisdell in the general, and Blaisdell, with Fong, was one of Burns's two favorite Republicans. 20 Such was the conventional wisdom, when Blaisdell startled Republicans and Democrats alike revealing that he would not run for reelection as mayor, and then announcing his candidacy for one of the two seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The Burns machine quickly found a new candidate, Herman Lemke, a popular part-Hawaiian who was chairman of the city council. Kekoa Kaapu, a young part-Hawaiian whose ambitions far outran his possibilities, also entered the campaign. In a surprising primary victory, Fasi out-polled both Lemke and Kaapu, winning fifty-two per cent of the vote.

The Burns machine, such was their hatred of Fasi, reacted by throwing their support to the Republican candidate, state Senator D.G. Anderson. The tactic angered many Democrats.21

Both local newspapers opposed Fasi. Their opposition was long-standing and they had come out against him editorially. This opposition slipped to a surprising level, however, when the *Star-Bulletin* published a contrived photograph of an automobile junk yard on the shores of Pearl Harbor overlooking the Arizona Memorial, and in an accompanying editorial tied this eyesore to Fasi. It was a cheap shot. The land had once been Fasi's under lease, but the wrecking yard was not his and the newspaper knew it.22 It was the old "junk man" charge all over again.

With the Burns machine in active opposition, Tom Gill announced that he would support Fasi with speeches and campaign appearances. Democrats, said Gill, should support Democrats.23

The general election campaign was illustrative of the polarity in the community in 1968. Fasi had established an image of himself as the spokesman for the underdog, the poor, the disenchanted; for conservationists, and those opposed to the booming development of the state's land and natural resources. His constituency on one level was much the same as Gill's. Arrayed against him were the establishment, the ILWU, the Burns machine, the developer-oriented city council, the daily newspapers, big business and the Republican Party. Fasi beat

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them all, easily routing the hapless Anderson, to finally win the oft-denied prize.

**Controversial Mayor**

A nervous [Honolulu Advertiser](https://www.honoluluadvertiser.com) editorially turned an eye to the future:

For a decade and a half Fasi has attacked and alienated virtually every political figure of any prominence from Governor Jack Burns on down. Now, if he is to provide the type of government he has promised, he must work with men who in the past have felt the lash of his sometimes intemperate tongue. 24

If the editorial writer hoped a new Fasi would suddenly appear, he was, to say the least, naive. Fasi had taken many controversial stands over the years, and to a surprising degree, he had remained consistent on the major points. During the 1968 campaign he denounced the plans of the Blaisdell administration to build the Halawa stadium. It was, he said, too expensive. The city could not afford it. After the election, but before Fasi took over as mayor, Blaisdell held a meeting at city hall for members of the university Board of Regents and members of the Citizens Stadium Advisory committee to review the stadium plans and admire a mock-up which had been built. Fasi, also present, ruined Blaisdell's show by announcing that he would not release any funds for the stadium. 25

Fasi never ran from controversy. In the first ten months of his administration, major battles erupted over tearing down the Queen's

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Surf, a popular beach restaurant oriented toward local people; moving the commercial Kodak hula show off city-controlled property; the stadium; and a plan of the city council to establish its own research bureau.

In early 1969, Fasi declared his neutrality in the looming clash between Gill and Burns. But then Burns signed a bill passed by the state legislature permitting the Honolulu city council to establish their own legislative research bureau over the mayor's objections. When the governor also signed an executive order withdrawing the land where the Kodak hula show was held from city control, Fasi erupted. Gill, said Fasi, had better start acting like a candidate and get going, or perhaps Fasi would consider the governor's race himself. Commenting on Burns in a moment of candor he said, "I am probably just as happy with Mr. Burns's conduct as governor as he is with my conduct as mayor."

Fasi did not, however, support Gill in the 1970 primary. Quite the contrary, he appeared to move closer to Burns as the campaign progressed, and just before the primary the two even made a joint appearance to announce future cooperation between city and state on plans to solve the housing crisis. It was a pragmatic decision. Fasi was eyeing the governor's office in 1974 and an incumbent Tom Gill would be very hard to dislodge. If, however, Burns served four more years, at the end of the term the machine would be leaderless and in disarray.

28. Ibid.
When a west coast dock strike began to have a negative impact on Hawaii's economy in late 1971, Fasi attacked Burns for being "derelict in duty." Burns, Fasi claimed, should charter ships to supply Hawaii if necessary, but would not for fear of offending the ILWU. 29

When the state supreme court appointed Burns's old cohort, Matsuo Takabuki, a trustee of the Bishop Estate, outraging the Hawaiian population, Fasi labeled the appointment cronyism. In the Honolulu News, a publication of the Fasi campaign committee, the mayor said, "the political system produced this appointment. Those who object can retaliate in only one way with success--at the ballot box." 30

As political commentator Tom Coffman noted in January 1972:

It can be safely said that Fasi has neither sued for a political truce nor been offered one. . . . Generally Fasi has continued to cross swords with the political establishment, [believing] first, that his cause is right, and second that he is pitted in long range battle against a small-minded and, in spots, badly tainted power structure. 31

The 1972 Challenge

The establishment hunted anxiously, but in vain, for a major political figure to challenge Fasi in 1972. Finally, State Senator Mason Altiery, well-known from his days as a television news personality, agreed to run. Altiery was heavily financed by the tourist industry--frightened by Fasi's recurring proposals for a hotel room tax--and strongly supported by the Burns machine. Despite this, Altiery was

swamped by the mayor with Fasi winning fifty-two per cent of the vote. Fasi promptly announced that he had beaten the "political syndicate." 32

In the general election, Anderson was once again the Republican candidate. He was backed by the Burns machine and heavily financed by the tourism and real estate lobbies. 33 This time, the race was much closer. Fasi won, but a post-election analysis indicated that he was rescued primarily by blue collar voters in Honolulu's poorer districts. 34

Money Problems

Following his election in 1968, Fasi had begun a series of annual "birthday balls," which had been tremendously successful. They provided an opportunity for the faithful and for supplicants who did—or wished to do—business with the city to contribute to the cause. Money poured into the coffers of the Fasi machine which established a permanent campaign headquarters.

There were rumbles of alarm in the state capitol. A post-mortem analysis of the financing of Burns's million dollar campaign against Tom Gill revealed that large amounts of money came from architects, engineers and contractors, many of whom did non-bid work

33. The efforts of the Burns machine to beat Fasi were far greater than in 1968. Burns cohort Donald Ching formed an organization called "Democrats for Anderson" which carried the fight, and Kaapu actually endorsed Anderson. *Star-Bulletin*, October 12, 1972, p. 1.
for the state government. Fasi was tapping the same pool. If it can be assumed that the amount of money available in the community at any time for political contributions is finite, then Fasi's birthday balls were pulling in money which might once have gone to the Burns machine. It was an ominous development.

Fasi's fund raising became the subject of a series of continuing investigations by his opponents, particularly the newspapers and various Burns-appointed agencies of the state government. In 1970 anti-Fasi elements in the state Senate even tried to push through a law which

35. Following Jack Burns's million dollar campaign in 1970, Star-Bulletin reporter Tom Coffman began a lengthy and difficult investigation of the sources of Burns's financing. The results of the investigation, conducted in the face of active opposition by Burns's associates, were revealed in a series published in the spring of 1973, entitled "High Priced Politics." Coffman found that Burns's operatives had systematically extracted funds from the architects, engineers, contractors and builders who did work for the state; from construction industry unions whose members had a stake in state work; from newly-formed political action committees in the tourism and real estate industries; and from employees of the state government. Coffman cited as an example of the fund raising tactics a meeting held at Washington Place [the governor's residence] at the end of July, 1970 to which over 250 contractors, architects, engineers, developers, real estate operators and finance people were invited. The point was made that those in attendance were all real estate development oriented, and that they had all done well under Burns. Pledge cards were passed out, and "later there was a follow-up." Coffman also cited as an example, a meeting at the Wisteria restaurant to which representatives of all firms working on the crash-basis project to expand Honolulu airport were invited. A strong pitch for contributions was made by Robert Oshiro. Host for the breakfast and the man who issued the invitations was Fujio Matsuda, Burns's director of transportation, who controlled airport contracts. "I couldn't sit back and tell the governor I wouldn't do anything," Matsuda told Coffman.

One Honolulu architect whom Coffman interviewed summed up the system: "Let's not kid each other. Contribution is not the right word. It is an investment."

36. Coffman's series also dealt with Fasi's fund-raising birthday balls, and noted that most who bought tickets were reluctant. Said one ticket buyer: "You can see 3,000 people singing happy birthday to Frank through clenched teeth."
would have cut short the mayor's term of office by two years, forcing him into a 1970 campaign. The move failed due to its obvious political overtones, but it was attributed, at least in part, "to a desire to bleed Fasi's campaign funds." 37

To the Burns machine, heavy-duty fund raising was something to be carried out behind closed doors, quietly but effectively. If arms were twisted—and they were—it was done without publicity. Fasi's public display of avarice offended them. As one astute political observer noted:

Although Fasi was by no means the only politician who busily fleeced the local community for campaign contributions, he did his shearing with less self-consciousness and more publicity than any of his rivals. . . . Governor Jack Burns . . . raised one million dollars for his 1970 gubernatorial campaign, but he would have been horrified if the fund-raising effort on his behalf had been ballyhooed in the manner of Fasi's birthday parties. 38

Following the 1972 mayoralty election, the Honolulu Advertiser scrutinizing Fasi's campaign contributions, turned up a $1,000 check from teamster union President Arthur Rutledge. The check had apparently not been reported, a violation of the state's campaign spending law which required reporting of all contributions over $500.

State attorney General George Pai, a Burns political appointee, began attempts to gain access to the Fasi campaign's financial records.

Key in this effort were the subpeona powers given to the attorney general's office under Act 33, a controversial 1972 law which gave wide investigatory powers directly to state attorneys. Using this power either directly or through a grand jury, but without approval of a court, the state collected accounts of the "Good Guys for Fasi" committee from three major Honolulu banks. That action, Fasi maintained, violated the rights of the individual contributors to his campaign.

Eventually, the attorney general made a grand jury presentment asking for indictments of the Fasi campaign organization. When that attempt collapsed, misdemeanor charges were filed in state district court charging twelve incidents of campaign spending law violations. This move also failed when Judge Ronald Grieg ruled that such charges could not be pressed against an unincorporated political entity such as "Good Guys for Fasi," but only against individuals. 39

Central to the Fasi defense was the argument that the campaign was not required to report contributions made before the date Fasi actually filed as a candidate for mayor. That was the case with Rutledge's check, and that interpretation would have eliminated most of the birthday ball money.

The Fasi side counter-attacked with suits in federal district court challenging the campaign spending law and the use of subpeona.

powers under Act 33. Judge Sam King, Burns's 1970 Republican opponent for governor and now on the federal bench, agreed with the attack on Act 33. He was, he said, "galled" by the state's mis-use of such powers. Act 33, he said, should be repealed as soon as possible.  

The battle continued in the courts with charges and counter charges but also moved into a new arena. The city ethics commission, at the request of Councilman George Koga, a Fasi adversary, began an investigation of reports that on-duty city firemen had been detailed to sell Fasi birthday ball tickets. The commission eventually cleared Fasi of any connection with the incident. With investigations and legal battles continuing Fasi, obviously not intimidated, held a $30-per-person fund-raising cocktail party in October. It was, he said, to replace the birthday balls. It netted approximately $225,000.

Then, in December, Fasi announced that as a result of the "ethics crisis" in politics, he had adopted a new fund-raising policy. No longer, said the mayor, would he "accept political contributions in any amount from any land developer or from any firm doing business with the city." 41

The Give-Away

That didn't end the money wars, of course. As the 1974 gubernatorial campaign loomed on the horizon, Fasi topped all his previous surprises. He announced that he was donating to the city of Honolulu all campaign funds left in his political war chest at the end of 1973 when he adopted his new policy--a whopping $365,046.

That, he said, would leave him with only $10,000, all collected after January 1, 1974, with which to begin the 1974 campaign. 42

It was a masterful political stroke, designed to halt debate on the sources of the funds. That, said the mayor, was now a closed book.

But not quite. When environmental activist Tony Hodges complained to the state Campaign Spending commission, a group of Burns's appointees, about the donation, a new inquiry was undertaken. Eventually, the commission decided that Fasi's contribution to the city was a political expense which would have to be counted in his expenditures in 1974, and that names of donors would have to be revealed. The decision would have put Fasi well over the then-in-effect campaign spending limit for the gubernatorial contest of approximately $160,000. Fasi responded with an announcement that he considered the spending commission a "political arm of the state administration," and indicated that he would not comply. 43

By mid-September, however, a bargain was struck. In response to an agreement by Fasi attorney William Barlow to provide all records which could be recovered on previous contributions, the commission agreed to scrap their "preliminary" finding that the donation to the city was a campaign expense. 44 They then issued a report censuring the mayor, and released a massive list of names of contributors which had been retrieved from the Fasi campaign bank accounts. The list revealed only what Fasi had already admitted, that much of his money had been collected from individuals who "are doing business with the

44. Advertiser, September 14, 1974, p. 1.
city, or want to do business with the city." Many of the larger contributions came from "local builders, contractors, engineers and architects.\(^4\)

They were, of course, the same groups who had supported the Burns machine. The sum of the revelations, as the Honolulu Star-Bulletin had noted editorially about the earlier exposures of contributions to Burns, "starkly sketch a political system in which the public would have to be rated moronic if it didn't distrust its elected office holders.\(^5\)

It is probable that Fasi's tactic of donating his war chest to the city had been dictated, in part, by the knowledge that a new state law limiting campaign spending would hold expenditures in 1974 far below the million dollars Burns spent in 1970. The mayor would not need all the money he had collected, and the donation would clear the air on the fund and simultaneously polish Fasi's image. There were also federal tax questions which could be resolved.\(^6\)

The Honolulu city council grumbled a bit, but in the end they decided to take the money and run.

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As Tom Gill and Jack Burns squared off in the 1970 gubernatorial contest, the appearance of George Ariyoshi as the Burns machine's candidate for lieutenant governor was a considerable surprise. A less prepossessing choice could hardly have been found.

Ariyoshi had spent sixteen colorless years in the territorial and state legislatures. He had been swept into the House on the 1954 Democratic wave, had served two terms, and had then moved to the Senate where he had remained. In 1970, though associated with the Burns faction, he was by no means a Burns machine insider. In some ways he lacked the basic credentials. He was slightly younger than the tight coterie of AJA's who had emerged from the 442d and 100th clubs after the war. Ariyoshi's military service had been as an interpreter with the U.S. occupation forces in Japan, and he had no entre' into the associations of combat veterans which, in the early days, were quite closed.¹

Early Career

Ariyoshi was born of poor Japanese immigrant parents in Honolulu in 1926. He went through the local school system, attended the University of Hawaii for a year before his military service, and then went off to

¹ Oshiro, BOH, II, 2.
the University of Michigan for a law degree. Back in Honolulu, he was encouraged by Burns to run in the 1954 elections, did so, and won.

In the legislature Ariyoshi led a career of relative obscurity, usually gaining attention only when he broke with the party leadership on a major issue. The best known example was the 1963 Senate vote on the Maryland Land Bill. Passage of the measure, already cleared by the House, was defeated in the Senate by one vote—Ariyoshi's. Land reform had been a keystone in the reformist program of the Democrats since 1954, and Ariyoshi was castigated for that vote. In an earlier session when the party backed a bill to raise the minimum wage in Hawaii to one dollar per hour, Ariyoshi was one of two Democrats who voted no.

Despite his reputation in the Senate as a "lone ranger" he became majority leader in 1965. In the 1967 organizational fight, however, he attempted to walk a narrow line between two opposing factions. With factions lined up behind Nado Yoshinaga and Nelson Doi split seven to seven, Ariyoshi's became the swing vote. David McClung, a member of the Doi faction, recalled urging Ariyoshi to support Doi. "He told me that as soon as we got the eighth vote he'd come over," McClung recalled. "Obviously when we got the eighth vote we didn't need George." 3

When that particular dispute was finally resolved by a compromise between the two factions, Ariyoshi was severely punished

2. Aoki, BOH, I, 3.
for his neutrality. He was dropped from his position as majority leader to the chairmanship of an obscure committee.

**Machine Candidate**

When Ariyoshi announced for lieutenant governor in May of 1970, he left no doubt that he was tying his candidacy to that of Burns. "I'm running," he said, "in the firm belief that I can be of help to Governor Burns in continuing to carry out his far-reaching program." 4

Burns had apparently learned his lesson in the Kenny Brown fiasco of 1966. He avoided a specific endorsement of Ariyoshi's candidacy. There was little doubt, however, in the minds of the public about where Ariyoshi's loyalties fell, and he was looked upon as the Burns machine candidate.

In fact, according to David McClung, Ariyoshi was at least the second choice of the machine insiders to run with Burns. "Everyone assumes," McClung recalled, "George was Jack Burns's selection for lieutenant governor. That isn't true." Instead, McClung said, Ariyoshi was picked by a committee of insiders, "about eight or ten," including Matsuo Takabuki, Eddie DeMello, Lowell Dillingham, McClung, and others. The group first settled on state Supreme Court Justice Bert Koboyashi, but when he declined, turned to Ariyoshi. McClung was rejected because the insiders felt Burns needed an AJA on the ticket for racial balance. 5

At any rate, there is little doubt that Ariyoshi was not highly regarded by most of the key figures close to Burns. "He rose from relative obscurity . . . largely because none of the more forceful members of the Burns entourage viewed him as a serious threat to their own ambitions," according to one astute observer. 6

The Ariyoshi Myth

A widely-accepted myth has arisen, created largely by journalists reporting the 1974 campaign, that Ariyoshi was the anointed choice of Jack Burns in 1970 to take over the Burns machine. This flies in the face of political reality. There were powerful political figures interested in preserving the machine, but in the spring of 1970, their eyes were not on 1974, but on the campaign at hand. If Burns—who was badly trailing Gill in the early polls—could not be re-elected in 1970, then there wouldn't be any machine to worry about. Ariyoshi became the lieutenant governor candidate, almost in passing, and because of his neutral coloring, not in spite of it. Robert Oshiro, running Burns's campaign in 1970, does not even recall any of the circumstances of Ariyoshi's candidacy. 7 And Burns once told his first sergeant, Dan Aoki, that "if George is thinking of running for governor, he made a poor choice of becoming lieutenant governor." 8

7. Oshiro, BOH, II, 5.
8. Aoki, BOH, I, 3.
In The Shadow

Ariyoshi won the primary election handily, easily overcoming Senator Vincent Yano, the AJA candidate for lieutenant governor linked with Gill. When he and Burns won the general election, Ariyoshi resigned a number of corporate directorships, the product of his private law practice, and settled in for an anticipated four years in Jack Burns's shadow. The cross-capitol sniping of Burns and Gill was over. Ariyoshi would be, if anything, a Burns team player.

At the end of the first year of the Burns-Ariyoshi administration, the Star-Bulletin surveyed political figures around the capitol. Ariyoshi, they found, was viewed as a lightweight, striving to make himself known as a policy maker, but not succeeding. He was commonly known in the capitol corridors by a name which Burns himself, in a regretted moment, had given him—the "boy-san."10

Ariyoshi worked to overcome his image, but it was hard going. In a June 1972 interview, after eighteen months in office, he claimed that the governorship was becoming a teamwork effort. Burns had gone to a national governors conference and left Ariyoshi behind to veto seven bills left over from the legislative session. The governor had "discussed the . . . bills," with him, Ariyoshi admitted. "He gave me his views . . . but he left the decision entirely up to me,"11

To the inevitable questions about his political future, Ariyoshi admitted an interest in the governor's job. But, he said, he would have to see the polls before making any decision and did not

anticipate one before mid-1973. A spokesman did say, however, that while Ariyoshi had been operating in the governor's shadow for two years, he should "emerge within the next six months."\(^{12}\)

Six months later, he was still asserting his independence with questionable success. Noted an interviewer:

In nearly an hour of questioning, Ariyoshi cited only a single issue on which he and Burns significantly differ. Ariyoshi opposed a bill to ban highway political sign waving. Burns signed the bill anyway. That hardly qualifies as a major policy feud.\(^{13}\)

Ariyoshi was, another interviewer noted, "a man on a political tightrope, groping for a way to thrust forth a new identity, yet still ruled by a personal caution that binds him to his old one."\(^{14}\)

**Burns's Illness**

In the normal course of events, Ariyoshi might simply have served out his four years as lieutenant governor, struggling unsuccessfully to shed his image as the "boy-san." But that picture changed dramatically in October 1973, when Burns was suddenly stricken with cancer. Within a few weeks Ariyoshi became first the acting, and then the de facto governor of Hawaii.

It was already accepted that Ariyoshi would be a candidate for governor in 1974, but with Burns side-lined by illness, he was offered the opportunity to demonstrate that he could, in fact, administer the state. The chance to try on Burns's shoes had been presented, and

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political observers watched to see how well Ariyoshi would perform. His first solo steps were almost a disaster.

Gas Crisis

In the early days of 1974, Hawaii, like the rest of the nation, was caught up in a fuel shortage of crisis proportions. Drivers formed overnight lines to buy gasoline and sometimes found themselves arriving at the pumps only to find the tanks dry. Tempers flared, drivers fought with police and with each other, and service station windows were blown out by shotgun blasts. The crisis demanded strong leadership and immediate action. Ariyoshi, temporarily at the helm of state, moved timidly and cautiously. He formed an advisory energy task force which chose to proceed behind closed doors "to avoid confusing the public."\(^{15}\) The appearance was one of inactivity and indecision. With the administration silent, and the crisis mounting, proposals came from other sources. Mayor Elmer Cravalho on Maui acted on his own and adopted an alternate-day gasoline sales plan which was already working in the Pacific northwest. Fasi jibed at the state administration and offered two different plans. McClung offered his ideas. Gill attacked the secrecy and urged that the problem be handled "in the open, to inspire public confidence."\(^{16}\)

Eventually, the Ariyoshi task force decided on the alternate day sales plan, and asked the federal government for a million additional gallons of gasoline to make the plan work. Ariyoshi mistakenly put his prestige on the line, saying that the plan couldn't work unless the

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extra fuel was forthcoming. When it was denied, the lieutenant governor had to backtrack. Eventually, using alternate-day sales, the plan which had been available from the first, the crisis was alleviated. But Ariyoshi's first opportunity to display his abilities had been less than a glowing success. He had acted cautiously and timidly in the face of an urgent demand. "It was a low point for Ariyoshi's helmsmanship." 17

The Candidate

Even without a fuel crisis, Ariyoshi faced many problems in trying to run the state. He had to

lead a bureaucracy set up by another man, make decisions without being a real governor, and carry out policies he had no role in creating. . . . He must somehow let the public know exactly how he differs from the Burns political 18 machine which he needs to win the governorship.

By April, it was obvious that Ariyoshi's campaign for governor was stalled dead center. If he was to be elected, he needed help. He turned to Robert Oshiro, the architect of Burns's 1966 and 1970 victories. Oshiro had worked himself into the hospital by the end of the 1970 campaign and he was, at first, reluctant. But finally, with the promise of a free hand in running the campaign, he agreed to take over. 19

From the point of view of the machine insiders, there really was no choice. No matter what the intent—or lack thereof—in 1970, by 1974 Ariyoshi had emerged as the only logical candidate the machine

17. Ibid.
could back. His role as de facto governor made him virtually an incumbent and no other potential candidate was positioned so well. If the machine was to survive it would have to be upon what some saw as the frail reed of George Ariyoshi's candidacy. With Oshiro pulling the strings, slowly the faithful began to gather round.
CHAPTER XI

THE 1974 ELECTIONS

It may look like the administration and management and labor are all together. I don't think that's true.

--John A. Burns

I think back to 1954. Some of the things we were saying were amazing. When you become the majority and responsible for decisions, then you find that you have to consider everything so that change will not be so drastic as to create major dislocations.

--Matsuo Takabuki

Once I wanted socialism but I don't anymore. It isn't practical. . . . Most Americans want to be millionaires and engage in free enterprise. Success is measured in dollars.

--Jack Hall

... a bunch of would-be Babbits.

--Tom Gill

It is comfortable to think that the people's votes in an election reflect conditions in the society in which they live. It would be pleasant to find in Jack Burns's 1970 victories over

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Tom Gill and Sam King a reaffirmation that, in Hawaii at least, all was right with the world. It would also be badly self-deceiving. Few observers would deny that in 1970 Hawaii faced many of the same difficulties that had forced much of mainland America into polarized camps. Why, then, Burns's 13,000 vote margin over Gill, and his 36,000 vote landslide over King?

Economic Gains

Gill had campaigned by telling people about the problems in Hawaii, and about those down the road ahead. Many listened, became convinced, and formed the hard core of his support. But many others were made uneasy by Gill. They felt an occasional twinge of concern about the future, they recognized that the rapacious development of the state's finite resources could not always continue, but they weren't convinced that things were as dark as Gill painted them. Many of them, particularly the older AJA's who stayed with Burns, had seen tremendous changes in Hawaii. They and their parents had moved off the plantations and into the middle class during the preceding twenty years. Sure, Hawaii's population had grown by half, but employment had doubled between 1950 and 1970. Per capita income had climbed from $1387 in 1950 to $4530 in 1970. Inflation was part of that, but the cost of living index had gone up only seventy-two per cent, so there had been a big gain in real income. People, despite some misgivings about the future, voted for the social and economic gains they could see.

Problems Remain

The election didn't change anything. All the problems remained. The Vietnam war ground on, leading to recurring protests on the campus of the University of Hawaii. A young Hawaiian nativist movement became surprisingly vocal, demanding native Hawaiian land rights, and even a return to the monarchy. The housing crisis grew, untouched by the feeble efforts of Burns's housing program, largely ignored in the post-election period. Tourists continued to pour in and a subtle antagonism toward the visitor industry on the part of local people became more overt. High rise development continued to blight Waikiki and began to spread like a rash over the landscape of central Oahu. Some of Hawaii's people began to suspect that their heritage was being destroyed to line the pockets of greedy developers and to maintain a booming construction industry, an industry which was, in turn, one of the financial mainstays of the Burns political machine.

In the face of all this the Burns administration seemed frozen in place. The governor had made few cabinet changes and those in office were tired and stale. Any thrust or drive which might have existed in 1966 was gone. The special interest advocates were in the ascendancy and even some of Burns's long-time associates were concerned. Oshiro wrote Burns that some of the criticism in the 1970 campaign of the "alarming friends" was real and genuine. From his perspective on the Big Island "Scrub" Tanaka thought that labor leaders and lobbyists like

7. BOH, II, 6.
Edwin Tanji and David Trask were beginning to have far too much influence with Burns.\(^8\) To House Speaker Tadao Beppu, the quality of absolute loyalty which had once been one of the Burns machine's great strengths had now become a weakness. Too many of the loyalists "had extended their stay [and become] like an albatross" around the governor's neck.\(^9\)

Newspaper investigations of the million dollar campaign revealed the alarming connections between the Burns machine and the development-oriented institutions and agencies in the society. The legislature debated laws limiting campaign spending. And some of the professionals, caught in the middle, began to complain and talk about reform. The *Hawaii Architect*, voice of the profession, noted editorially:

> Not all of Hawaii's architects are participants in the political pay off system, but those of us who have known about the practices and remain silent share the guilt with the actual participants.  
> . . . There is no question but that the situation [the press] . . . documented is merely 'the tip of the iceberg.'\(^10\)

Architects, the magazine later noted, should "put an end to the pattern of political contributions to buy work."\(^11\) At least one member was listening. Lewis Ingleson announced that his firm, EDW/Architects and Planning Consultants, would no longer contribute money, or materials having monetary value, to any candidate or political party. He was, he told the *Hawaii Architect*, amazed at the resulting furor and media coverage.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) BOH, II, 2.  
\(^9\) BOH, II, 2.  
\(^10\) March 1973, p. 3.  
\(^12\) February 1974, p. 19.
The Burns machine, pressed on the source of the million dollar campaign fund, adopted tactics which in a later day would be called "stonewalling." Oshiro told newsmen he would release the list of "more than 30,000" contributors to Burns campaign only if the newspapers would print it in its entirety. Ariyoshi declined to reveal the sources of his support, telling newsmen, "there is no requirement for me to this this." When asked if it wasn't the people's right to know who bankrolled candidates, he responded that "we have election laws that govern this, and to the extent that one meets the requirements of the law I think that is sufficient." Ariyoshi appeared before the Hawaii Interprofessional Commission on Environmental Design, an organization of architects, planners and engineers; and was asked what he would do as governor about the "spoils system" in the selection of architects and engineers for state projects. How, his questioner asked, would Ariyoshi end the "buying of political favors." A nervous and defensive Ariyoshi responded: "I'm telling you frankly that I don't know of such a situation."

The publicity was threatening to the machine. But the issue could cut two ways. Fasi, through his birthday balls, had milked the public openly and blatantly since 1969. The state cranked up the investigations of Fasi's funds and public attention turned away from the past practices of the Burns machine to the current ones of the

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
Fasi machine. The threat was diverted, and, in fact turned into a weapon against the mayor.

McGovern Campaign

The factional divisions in the party were as wide as ever. The 1972 presidential campaign of George McGovern was illustrative. A McGovern committee was formed largely by people associated with the Gill faction. Burns only just avoided outright opposition. He told reporters that his designation as honorary chairman of the McGovern campaign was only because he was titular head of the party. He refused even to attend a campaign fund raising luncheon until pressed by old friend Jean King, and then his support was slight. The campaign finally got help from some of the establishment Democrats, most notably House Speaker Tadao Beppu and later Fasi and McClung, but limped to a disastrous defeat. Burns never did come around. "We did not deliver because the McGovern people wanted to run it," Oshiro remembered. Perhaps, but central to McGovern's campaign was his opposition to the Vietnam war. Burns was an unreconstructed hawk on the war. McGovern's rather confused plans for the military establishment might have reduced the military presence in Hawaii. Burns, concerned above all about the state's economy, didn't want that.

Precinct Fights

Gill's 1970 defeat had been a stunning surprise to most of his supporters. The young idealists who played a major role in his campaign

17. Jean King, BOH, I, 1.
18. BOH, II, 5.
momentarily retreated to lick their wounds and to reconsider their roles in the society. But it was a time of activism and soon splinter groups began to form. Directly identified with Gill was an organization called Citizens for Hawaii, established to keep alive the issues Gill had focused on in 1970. Gill was the first president of the group, with day-to-day operations in the hands of Fumi Ige, a labor activist, and a member of the Gill camp dating to the 1966 campaign. Another organization, the Democratic Action Group, appeared, headed by an articulate activist from the University of Hawaii faculty, George Simson. Still a third organization, Coalition '72, was created from the younger members of the Gill faction.

In January 1972, the Democratic Action Group, Coalition '72 and the Young Democrats joined forces to try to gain control of the Democratic party machinery in the Oahu precinct elections. A registration drive for Democratic precinct members ensued which quickly became a three-way contest between the Fasi, Burns and Gill factions. Fasi offered to join with the Gill supporters in an anti-Burns move, but Gill's people remembered Fasi's failure to support their candidate in 1970, and they were wary of the mayor. Eventually, however, after some initial jockeying, an uneasy partnership was formed.

The results in the precinct elections were revealing. Alarmed by the coalition's obvious plan to seize control of the party machinery, the Burns faithful turned out to dominate the election of delegates to the state convention by a margin of seven to five. The loyalty which the machine could always command in the face of any threat still held. Surprising, however, was the failure of the Fasi half of the coalition
to produce any significant number of votes. Even in the mayor's own Manoa precinct, he mustered only "Honolulu's first lady, a city government secretary, and a sign saying 'Good Guys/Coalition.'"\textsuperscript{19} In other precincts sampled, the Gill forces in the partnership outnumbered Fasi voters forty-four to one, forty-four to four, and fifty to three.\textsuperscript{20} Both Gill and Fasi were elected delegates to the state convention, but the overall results demonstrated that control of the party machinery would remain in the hands of the Burns faction. They also revealed a continuing weakness in Fasi's plans to become governor, his failure to develop any solid base of support among registered party members.

After 1970, Fasi had moved to center stage as the principle threat to the Burns machine, and the 1972 mayoralty contest, with all the Democratic establishment arrayed against Fasi, was in reality the opening gun in the 1974 gubernatorial campaign.

The Alignments

To the outsider getting his news from the daily press, the political waters were anything but clear. Fasi was a candidate for governor, that much was obvious. But Ariyoshi, despite his best efforts, had yet to emerge as other than the governor's "boy-san." Within the Burns machine, Senate President David McClung was sounding like a candidate, and there were even recurring rumors that Jack Burns might run for a fourth term in 1974. Gill had returned to his law practice, but remained in the public eye as the counsel for Hawaii's aggressive teacher's union and as the president of the activist Citizens

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
for Hawaii. Despite occasional hints that he might run again for governor, it was not until April of 1973 that he publicly committed himself. 21

Gill's 1974 candidacy was not always a certainty. As a politician out of office, he had no recognized political base from which to campaign, as had both Fasi and Ariyoshi. But Gill had a hard core of supporters who, in the words of one, felt they had been "jobbed" by Jack Burns's million dollar campaign. 22

By early 1973, an informal Gill committee had organized and began meeting regularly to plan for 1974. Members of this group included state Senator Sakae Takahashi, once a close-in Burns confederate; Royce Higa, Gill's 1970 campaign manager and once a deputy director of the state Department of Social Services under Burns; Daniel Park, an employee of the city personnel department, and brother of Arthur Park, one of Gill's closest confidants; former newsman Tom Coffman; attorney Tom Pico who in 1971 had resigned as an assistant state attorney general with a blast at the Burns administration for failing to enforce environmental protection laws against big business; and a number of others, mostly young Democrats who had cut their political teeth in Gill campaigns.

Takahashi's support of Tom Gill was significant. Takahashi had been one of Burns's earliest backers and a member of the inner circle. His considerable prestige as a former captain in the 100th Batallion had helped recruit many of the returning AJA veterans to the ranks of

22. Tom Coffman interview.
the Burns faction in the early days. He had, with the early members, shared the vision of a new Hawaii.

But by the mid-1960's Takahashi began to question the direction the party was going. The pursuit of The Dream seemed to have become just the pursuit of power. He became disenchanted.

I didn't feel the Democratic Party and its leadership was going in the right direction. . . . There comes a time when you have to draw the line. . . . I wasn't going to be a rubber stamp.23

The machine, Takahashi could see, had been too long in power by 1970. The governor was surrounded by friends who had to be taken care of, even if it meant the compromise of principle. The early idealism had fallen victim to cronyism.

As he began to put distance between himself and the machine, Takahashi recalled, he naturally moved toward Gill. Gill still represented the idealism of the early Democrats. He continued to address the issues and to seek solutions. "Tom," Takahashi said, "reflects many of the things I believe should be done."24

In 1974, Takahashi was willing to leave the Senate seat he had held for twenty years to guide Gill's campaign.

The Plan

Sample polls indicated that Gill would do well against any of the potential candidates, and that he had a base of support among independents outside the Burns machine. In a particularly interesting

23. BOH, I, 2.
24. Ibid.
finding, a hard core of supporters indicated that if Gill was not a candidate, they would not vote for any Democrat in 1974.

Park and Coffman drafted a campaign plan which was basically a reaction to the 1970 defeat. Burns had won in 1970 with his media campaign, and the lesson was clear. That was the wave of the future for politics in Hawaii. The Gill campaign would start early, raise more money, and call in the services of first class media experts from the mainland. 25

The committee recognized the political realities of Hawaii's voting patterns. They sought a lieutenant governor candidate to run in tandem with Gill who would provide that always desirable racial balance to the ticket. Their sights turned toward former senator Nelson Doi, now serving as a Burns appointee on the state district court in Hilo. Not only was Doi an AJA, he had always been a powerful vote-getter on the Big Island and would command important neighbor island support. Overtures were made to Doi, but he at first failed to respond. The Gill group was about to turn to Takahashi as their candidate, when, at the last moment, Doi agreed to run and to join his campaign with Gill's. 26

Fund raisers were scheduled, the services of mainland campaign experts Charles Guggenheim and Matt Reese, as well as pollster Pat Cadell were arranged for, and Takahashi became, formally, the campaign manager. By the end of 1973, Gill was off and running, focusing, as always on the issues.

25. Coffman interview.
26. Ibid.
Three Factions

With the lines drawn for the 1974 campaign, Democrats were split into three major factions. Ariyoshi commanded the support of the Burns machine by default. Fasi had built his own support, much of it among blue collar independents, on populist issues and by representing himself as the champion of the little man. Gill appealed to many independents, to the young, and to the intellectuals in the party. 27

There were striking similarities as well as major differences in the three candidates. All three were World War II veterans who had spent their active adult lives as political figures in Hawaii. Two were haoles, one Japanese. Two (Ariyoshi, Fasi) were first generation Americans born of immigrant parents. Two (Gill, Ariyoshi) were attorneys, one a businessman. One (Fasi) was born on the mainland, the other two in Hawaii.

Their positions on many issues were similar. All three wanted more houses at lower prices; reduced inflation, crime and pollution; better job opportunities; and improved public education. They differed primarily on transportation and future planning. Ariyoshi supported the construction of the TH-3 highway, a trans-island link between the north shore and leeward Oahu which both Fasi and Gill condemned as out of date and unnecessary. Alternatively, Fasi and Gill wanted a fixed

27. An interesting but perhaps uniquely personal perception of Gill by a strong Burns supporter was that of Ralph Miwa: "Manoa [university campus] has always been the intellectual wing of the Democratic Party. . . . always had people that identified with Tom Gill. . . . by 1970 a lot of young people from the mainland identified with Tom Gill as the saviour. . . . the white saviour, of the Democratic Party." Miwa, BOH, II, 1.
guideway system which would carry traffic through the heart of Honolulu's population center. Ariyoshi opposed the fixed guideway. On the other hand, Fasi opposed any attempt to control population growth, while both Gill and Ariyoshi talked of measures which would hold down growth, at least on Oahu. Fasi was consistent. Since growth would inevitably continue, he wanted to plan for it, not to stop it.

Ariyoshi's support of both controlled growth and the TH-3 highway illustrated the trap in which he was caught. The highway was a holdover from the old philosophy of unlimited growth. It was, by 1974, an anachronism, outdated and widely opposed, the subject of a number of lawsuits to halt it. But the Burns machine had invested great energy in perpetuating the highway idea. Egos and reputations were at stake. The highway had the strong support of the construction industry. It meant jobs for years to come and large chunks of federal money. A fixed guideway might mean the same, but the highway was on the drawing boards and ready to go now, the guideway somewhere in a nebulous future. The construction industry was a financial mainstay of the machine. For Ariyoshi, the machine candidate, to desert the highway would have been too great a risk.

Gill and Issues

From Tom Gill's perspective the issues hadn't changed much. The problems which had plagued Hawaii in 1970 were still there in 1974. Pollution levels were higher and traffic was heavier. The yellow cloud of smog appeared along Honolulu's central highway corridor more often. Tourists continued to flow into the state in ever-increasing numbers,
and Waikiki—the tourist gateway—continued to deteriorate. The state's economy—reflecting conditions on the mainland—was in poor shape and unemployment statistics climbed to new post-depression records each month. The housing crisis remained undented by the feeble efforts of the Burns administration, and the construction of a fixed guideway transportation system for Oahu was no closer than it had been four years before.

Gill, lacking a public office in which he could make news, took to the road. He spoke to any group which would listen, often making two major speeches in a single day. At the same time, his campaign headquarters busily cranked out an exhaustive series of issue papers and programmatic reports on tourism, taxation, land use, housing, education, the Halawa stadium, employment, women's rights, the status of senior citizens, and much, much more.

The goal of all this, Gill told his audiences, was to bring the issues to the surface and make all candidates for office talk about them. "We have no shortage of brains in Hawaii," Gill said. "But to come to grips with our problems we have to first identify them. Then we have to struggle for the best answers." And those answers, he said, "must meet the needs of all the people and not just special interest groups."28

Gill hit hard at the unemployment issue. Again and again he recited the growing unemployment statistics to his audiences. A job, he said, was a basic human right. Opportunities to develop new jobs

for Hawaii's people were being ignored in the tourist industry and in agriculture. In a Gill administration, he promised, the full resources of the state government would be brought to bear on developing new and clean industry—"think tanks," computer software production, and communications and research activities. If the economic decline should continue, the state would become the employer of last resort. He promised a statewide program of public service jobs, "cleaning up the parks and beaches, and rebuilding the roads."29

Fasi, in a break with a long-held position, proposed increasing the state's four per cent excise tax by one per cent with the additional revenue going to Honolulu city government. That, said Gill, would be a sales tax. It was regressive and would fall hardest on those least able to pay. Instead, said Gill, a tax should be imposed on tourists, preferably in the form of a hotel room levy. That way Hawaii's visitors would begin to pay their fair share for the services they received.

Gill carried the tourist tax argument into the lion's den when he addressed members of the visitor industry and told them they were in danger of killing the goose which laid the golden eggs. Package tours—almost half of Hawaii's tourist business by 1973—were bad for Hawaii and in the long run would be bad for the visitor industry. Increasing numbers of visitors on cheap guided tours put too heavy a strain on the facilities paid for by local people—parks, highways and water and sewage systems. The industry should turn away from this mass production tourism and concentrate on quality. Upgrading facilities and standards would bring fewer people who would be better heeled, stay longer, and spend more.

A tourist tax—which could bring in revenues up to $60 million per year—could be earmarked in part for the rehabilitation of Waikiki and the general improvement of tourist facilities. Many in his audience, Gill knew, would not agree. He had, he said, heard their arguments that a tourist tax would hurt the industry. "The facts," he said, "don't bear that out." Hawaii's hotel rooms were priced fifteen per cent below the national average, he pointed out. Surely, the slight increase a room tax would mean would not drive people away. Additionally, the industry was making tremendous profits—twenty-one per cent as an average on each dollar earned, "about the highest in the nation." That meant, he complimented the group, they were good managers. But it certainly weakened their arguments against a room tax. "We need a room tax," he told the group, "to balance the needs and aspirations of our own people against what our visitors receive." 30

The housing issue was largely a replay from 1970. The solution to the perennial shortage of affordable homes was state involvement. The private market could not or would not produce "gap group" homes, so the state must take the responsibility. The laws were on the books—had been for many years. But, said Gill, he would add one new element, an Urban Development Corporation with authority to build, sell and rent homes. Sales prices would be close to cost, and resale would be to the corporation to halt speculation. After years of talk, Gill noted, "the housing crisis is a disgrace to the state." The solution demanded something more than "talk and half measures." 31

31. "Housing: A Program for Hawaii" (Honolulu: Gill Campaign Committee, 1974), n. pag.
The issues program was a basic part of Gill's attempt to recast the idealism of 1954 into a 1974 mold. If people understood the problems and were offered solutions, surely they would act in their own—and the state's—best interests. But much had changed in Hawaii in the twenty years since 1954. Many of the issues remained unresolved, recurring in every election campaign like a Chinese water torture. By 1974 the voters and their involvement in the political process had shifted drastically. If issues had ever been important—and perhaps in 1954 they had—by 1974 they were at best of secondary significance. Television had introduced a completely new dimension. Truth, as the advertising industry had long ago discovered, was always relative. Perception and reality need not be the same—particularly in a political campaign. To a few voters, issues and answers might still be important. But to the great majority, it was the image of the candidate which counted. Jack Burns and "To Catch a Wave" had proven that in 1970.

Media Campaigns

Nobody in any camp believed that the election would be decided on issues. Gill, the most issue-oriented candidate of all, was the first to turn to an intensive media campaign. Gill's slogan in 1970 had been an aggressive "You Can Trust Tom Gill," with the subtle contrasting implication that you couldn't trust Jack Burns and his alarming friends. This time the sell turned much softer. Television commercials featured Gill with his aged mother, his wife and his six children, in the setting of the family home. When he talked about issues on television the emphasis was on the future, not on the problems of the past. The goal was to present Gill
as a man who had been mellowed by his experience, who had become more tolerant, who had learned to curb his harsh tongue and his caustic wit. He was, it emphasized, a keiki o ka aina, a child of the land. For the first time Gill's Hawaiian birth and his military record were brought into a campaign.

Ariyoshi also mounted a heavily-financed media effort. He was generally seen as inexperienced and indecisive, and the media campaign was designed to overcome that image. His television spots portrayed him as the loyal acting governor, busily running the state for the ill Jack Burns.

One observer noted:

'To Catch a Wave,' the magnificently produced and lavishly financed half hour commercial which helped to sell governor John A. Burns to the electorate four years ago has had a visible impact on two of the . . . gubernatorial campaigns. . . . the lesson . . . that slickness sells . . . is being applied to the Gill campaign, and less effectively, to the Ariyoshi campaign.32

Surprisingly, Fasi, the man who had pioneered the use of television in Hawaii politics, had the least appealing television campaign. The negative aspects of Fasi's image were his aggression and his combativeness. The television commercials, done by a local agency, instead of softening these characteristics, seemed to reinforce them. Fasi appeared in most spots in a traditional "talking head" pose, seated at a desk, often blasting away at his opponents. The mayor's effectiveness as a speaker and his charismatic qualities fared badly in the chosen format.

As the campaign wound on there were diversions. They began early when Fasi took umbrage at the remarks of an employee of the advertising

agency running the Ariyoshi campaign. The man reportedly told guests at a cocktail party that Fasi was a member of the Mafia. Fasi, characteristically, leaped to the attack, demanding that Ariyoshi disavow the charge, the man and the agency. 33 There were headlines for a few days, but eventually the incident blew over.

Gill stepped on Fasi's toes when, in a magazine interview, he indirectly referred to Fasi as a "Mussolini." 34 "Racism," the mayor charged, wrapping himself in his Sicilian heritage. In the same interview Gill had referred to Ariyoshi as "a dummy," but the lieutenant governor chose not to enter the fray. Gill muttered some words about a misunderstanding, and this incident, too, went away.

The Race Issue

There was a more serious introduction of race, always subtle in Hawaii politics, in this campaign. Oshiro had written a speech to be delivered to primarily AJA groups. The speech emphasized that the goal of Jack Burns's long stewardship in the Democratic Party had been to create a society of equals, and that the culmination of that goal was George Ariyoshi's candidacy. Ariyoshi's election as the first AJA governor of Hawaii would mean that "your sons and daughters," too, can aspire to grow up and be governor, the speech said. The speech, though it contained an unusually direct appeal to race consciousness, was relatively mild as written. However, as delivered by Burns's long-time factotum, Dan Aoki, it became something else. Aoki had suffered the

discrimination of the plantation system, before World War II, and he
never forgot it. On this subject he was a harsh and bitter man. When
Aoki made the speech to members of Club 100, the organization of the
100th Battalion, a young Gill supporter, a university student, was present.
A few days later he took the opportunity of Ariyoshi's appearance at a
University of Hawaii question and answer session to challenge the
lieutenant governor. The speech, the student said, was a blatant appeal
to race prejudice, and he, as a young AJA, was offended by it. He asked
if the candidate supported the tactic. A flustered Ariyoshi diverted
the question by responding that in his view, most of the racism in the
campaign had been directed at him. He got a round of applause, but he
hadn't heard the end of it. Gill supporters dogged his footsteps for
the rest of the campaign, asking the same question.

Doi Defects

The Gill campaign suffered a blow in May when Doi suddenly
announced that he was splitting his campaign away from that of Tom Gill. Gill met the defection with humor, maintaining, in a paraphrase of
Mark Twain, that reports that the Doi split meant his political demise
were premature. But there is little doubt that the defection damaged
the campaign and badly disrupted the campaign strategy. Much of the
campaign media effort, for example, had focused on the joint candidacy
of the two men. Many feet of expensive film had to be scrapped. The
reasons for the defection were never clear. Doi has since maintained

37. To a meeting of supporters at his campaign headquarters
on May 24, 1974.
38. Coffman interview.
that he was given insufficient voice in campaign planning, that Gill felt threatened by Doi, and that Gill turned to Takahashi instead of Doi, because Takahashi "could raise money." 39

In the Gill camp the picture was somewhat different. When rumors of Doi's dissatisfaction reached Gill and Takahashi well before the defection, efforts were made to placate Doi. Meetings were scheduled, appointments were made, but invariably, Doi failed to show up. Finally, the statement of his defection was given to the press without Gill or Takahashi being informed. 40 Royce Higa, a long-time Gill associate, had become close to Doi, and he left at the same time to become part of Doi's successful campaign effort.

The news wasn't all bad for Gill. Senator McClung had entered the race, even though denied the support of the Burns machine. 41 Short of funds and with little grass roots support, McClung eventually recognized he had no chance to win. He continued his campaign, but offered a semi-endorsement of Gill. At an appearance at Hawaii Loa college, he was asked who he would support if not running himself. He named Gill. He doubted, he said, Ariyoshi's abilities as a leader. 42

Fasi's Problems

Fasi's campaign, taking a leaf from Oshiro's book, concentrated on a series of skillfully organized coffee hours. Meetings of twenty

39. Doi, BOH, II, 1.
40. Byron Baker interview.
to thirty people were scheduled in homes or schools. Fasi workers Paul Devens or Robert Way, or the mayor's charming AJA wife, would warm the group up. Then Fasi would appear, make a few brief remarks and answer questions, and be off to the next stop where the process was repeated. Using this system he could make a large number of appearances each night.

The campaign was not the only focus of Fasi's interest. He was also fighting the long-running battle with the state over his campaign funds. That dispute, regularly generating negative headlines, continued right down to the last days before the primary election. Surprisingly, in the face of this Fasi held a slim lead among the three candidates in polls conducted by the daily newspapers.43

As the campaign moved toward a climax, Oshiro orchestrated what had become a patented Oshiro tactic, a hugely-attended rally designed to demonstrate overwhelming grass roots support for his candidate. This one was held at McKinley high school on a Sunday afternoon and 10,000 of the faithful came out to be entertained, eat the food, and listen to brief comments by Ariyoshi.

The Gill organization held a similar rally in Ala Moana park. The turn out was significant, but far smaller than the Oshiro extravaganza.

Ariyoshi Wins

Primary election day was bright and clear throughout the islands and early voter turnout was heavy. It was a good sign for Ariyoshi.

A strong vote by the faithful was essential if the Burns machine was to survive.

With Hawaii's computerized voting system, all ballots cast up to mid-day were collected early and ready to run through the computer when the polls closed at 6:00 p.m. Within minutes the first results were in and the election was all but over. Ariyoshi took a significant early lead on the island of Kauai. To the astute that meant that the machine would run well in their traditional stronghold, the labor-dominated neighbor islands. With the three candidates running very close on Oahu, the neighbor islands would, as they had so many times in the past, decide the election.

When all the votes were in, Fasi did, in fact, lead the ticket on Oahu, beating Ariyoshi by 308 votes and Gill by 884. But in the statewide returns, Ariyoshi was almost 9,000 votes ahead. He polled 35.6 per cent of the votes cast, Fasi 31 per cent and Gill 29.6 per cent.

In the last days of the campaign Daniel Akaka, a part-Hawaiian former state school official, had linked his campaign for lieutenant governor with Ariyoshi. Once again the old magic balance was created to bring the Japanese and Hawaiian voters into the same camp. It didn't work. Doi was far better known and was widely respected for his years in the legislature and on the state bench. He easily swept the lieutenant governor contest. With Ariyoshi and Doi, for the first time in history two AJAs would lead the Democrats into a general election.

In November almost 60,000 people who had voted in the Democratic primary defected to the Republicans or stayed home. It didn't matter.
The Republicans, moribund and twenty years out of touch, fielded a team of two haole millionaire businessmen, Randolph Crossley and Ben Dillingham. Both were tired faces the voters had rejected before. Ariyoshi and Doi beat them by 23,000 votes.

Machine Victory

Once again the election results showed that Hawaii's political future would continue to be worked out within the factional divisions of the Democratic Party. But this election had a significance far beyond that simple fact, and beyond the Burns victory of 1970. With Burns gone, and with an obviously weak candidate, the machine had still won handily. The machine obviously was no longer the tool of one skillful politician, if it ever had been. Jack Burns had operated with a consensus of the most powerful elements in the community, big labor, big business, big government, and a majority of the preponderant racial group, the AJA's. He had sensed the direction of that consensus, and better than anyone else had been able to flow with it. But he did not lead, he simply marched in front. The political machine, as a product of the consensus, transcended the power of any single individual. It had a life of its own. With Burns gone, this became apparent for the first time. The machine was far more resilient than many observers had believed. By winning without Burns, it had weathered a critical transition.

What had been widely perceived as Ariyoshi's greatest weakness, his colorless personality and his lack of dynamism, may, in fact, have
been a strength. Many of the voters who turned out to support the machine saw the same qualities in Ariyoshi that they had seen in Burns. As one observer noted:

He understands their needs and aspirations. He understands what kind of changes they are ready to accept and what kind they are not. He is only going to lead them where they are already prepared to go.  

The Machine

If this view is correct, then Gill could not have won in 1970 or 1974, even given equal financial resources. The consensus was based on trade-offs, accommodation, a piece of the pie for everyone. Gill offered hard choices and promised decisions and action. Some of the pie, he said, had to be saved for the future.

In 1974 the coalition which supported the Burns machine emerged clearly. It was made up of those who had always stood at the peak of the economic and social pyramid, and those who had battled their way up in the last twenty years. They were the ins, the elites, the power-brokers, the establishment, and those, who for whatever reasons, saw their interests best protected by the status quo.

And there were, of course, the faithful—those 12,000 grass roots followers in Robert Oshiro's files who would always come when called, and their friends and relatives. Many of them had once shared with Jack Burns a dream of the future, a dream of a society in which they and their parents and their children would stand as tall as any other man. They remembered the old days and they knew things were better.

44. Tuck Newport, "The Transition to Ariyoshi," Hawaii Observer, November 5, 1974, p. 3.
much better. For them, the Democratic revolution of 1954 was no myth. They believed in it. It had brought material gains, things they could see and touch and feel. But it had brought other things too, things known only in the heart. And so they supported, unquestioningly for the most part, the political machine which they believed had made it all happen.

To these people Gill was the malcontent, the naysayer, the threat. Fasi was still the malahini, not quite trustworthy, too likely to turn up on the opportunistic side of any cause.

In 1970 this coalition of voters had rallied to Burns because that was where they were comfortable. In 1974 they turned to the Burns machine candidate for the same reasons. Gill and Fasi were left to divide a mutual constituency of those on the outside.

In 1960 John Kennedy challenged the American people to join with him to make a better world. The country responded and the turbulence of the late 1960's was, at least in part, a result. In 1970 and to a lesser extent in 1974, Tom Gill offered the people of Hawaii a similar challenge, the chance to vote for a positive program of action to insure a better future. The majority indicated that they were satisfied with things as they were.

**Long Range Impacts**

There were other ramifications. The 1974 victory meant that the Burns machine would hold power for at least sixteen years—years in which the rapid growth of the population and tremendous economic
expansion in Hawaii would bring on enormous problems. Solving those problems would demand strong and positive leadership—a leadership which the machine, as a product of the consensus, could not provide.

As Gill told the thousand or so discouraged followers who gathered at his headquarters on election night, the islands had "harkened to an uncertain trumpet." He didn't mean George Ariyoshi. He meant the siren call which made people willing to mortgage the future for the comforts of the present. It was hard to see where that future might lead on that October night in 1974.
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

Our system will work as long as men with widely differing views can content themselves with a middle ground for action.

—Edward Pendleton Herring 1

The Politics of Democracy

It is necessary at this point to return to the postulated alternatives discussed in Chapter I; (1) government which functions in response to pluralistic pressures, or (2) government with decisive and strong leadership. Our review of Hawaii's post-war political history has revealed a pluralistic society with government maintained in balance through its responses to the power sources in the society. Certain things, however, emerge.

One Party Dominant

Hawaii, from territorial days, has always been dominated by a single political party. In the territorial period until 1954, the Republican Party was the tool through which a powerful business establishment directed the society. Following World War II, militant organized labor shouldered its way into a co-equal status with business and in

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1. Herring, p. 422.
the pattern of pluralistic societies, gained a share of the governing power. The resultant new consensus was forced to adapt to tremendous sociological changes brought about by the emergence of lower-class agricultural workers and their descendants, mostly Orientals, into a better educated, affluent middle class.

In 1954 this newly-risen middle class flexed its political muscle and shattered the fifty-year hold of the Republican Party on Hawaii's government. Between 1954 and 1962 a momentary possibility of a two-party political system existed. The chance was lost by the failure of the Republicans to correctly perceive the forces of social change which had developed in Hawaii and the party's inability to shed its past. After 1962, the new business-labor consensus turned to the Democratic Party as its vehicle for political control. Single party rule continued. Only the labels had changed.

Lowi's criticism of pluralism is appropriate here. All of the points he makes in decrying "interest group liberalism" can be seen operating in Hawaii's government after 1962. (See page 6 above.)

The Burns Machine

The political machine developed in Jack Burns's name which had been in office since 1962, was a product of the consensus in the society. The machine had not led, it had administered the state. It had been remarkably successful in remaining at the center of the ebb and flow of contrasting forces—at the point of balanced tension. There are few examples of the Burns machine taking the lead in dealing with Hawaii's
problems through a specific plan of action. That was not Burns's style, nor would it be that of Governor Ariyoshi. That is not surprising. The consensus relied upon compromise and equivocation for survival. The role of government was not to lead, but to maintain the balance. A strong leader could not have remained in power long in the conditions which have existed since 1962.

The Electoral Mandates

Burns, in his 1962 and 1970 elections received overwhelming electoral mandates. But they were of no value in exercising power once he was elected. In neither campaign did he go to the people with a specific plan of action. In 1962 he campaigned on the record of the post-1954 Democratic legislatures and promised a continuation of the social and economic changes which were already inevitable in the evolving post-war society. In 1966 through bad judgment and personal petulance he destroyed his vote of confidence and was barely reelected. In 1970 he didn't campaign at all—a neutral, all appealing, media image was created and, never appearing from behind that image, he was again overwhelmingly reelected. At no time did he ask for a mandate for action, or even, in other than the most general terms, tell the people what he proposed to do. His elections were popularity contests. The huge personal capital which he obviously had with the electorate was never

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2. The exception to this statement would be in the area of education. Burns was deeply interested in the university and is credited with the impetus which created the law and medical schools and the extensive statewide community college system. He also did all he could to bring the university winning athletic teams seeing that as a means to win the support of the greater community.
cashed. It could not be. Burns did not have that kind of popular support because he had never asked for it.

When he did attempt to invest his personal capital in the selection of a lieutenant governor running mate in 1966, the result was the fiasco of the Kenny Brown candidacy and an overwhelming personal rejection for Burns. A better example is the Magic Island controversy. Magic Island was a state-built land fill on the reef off popular Ala Moana park in Honolulu. The land had been idle for a number of years, but late in the 1969 legislative session a Burns-backed move was made to pass enabling legislation to turn the property over to private industry for development of hotels and tourist facilities. Burns abandoned his traditional hands-off policy and twisted legislative arms all over the capitol. He became the most aggressive of lobbyists. The legislation was rammed through at the midnight hour before adjournment, but the ensuing public outcry forced the next legislature to recant and the area is today a public park. Burns's personal popularity was of no value when he moved in opposition to the will of the people.

Legislative Leadership

In the vacuum of leadership in the administration, various members of the legislature moved into powerful positions. To the legislative leadership must go credit for the far-reaching and sometimes visionary laws which were passed after 1954. In the early legislatures Esposito, while in the House, and Dodge and Gill on the staff of House and Senate were moving forces. In the Senate, Doi, Yoshinaga, and later McClung, deserve credit. But they all pale in comparison with
Elmer Cravalho. From the time he became speaker of the House until he left the legislature in 1966 to head the Maui county government, his influence was pervasive. Beyond any other individual he deserves credit for shaping the legislative programs of the state.

Factionalism

With the consensus of economic and political power which controlled the state resident in the Democratic Party, factionalism was inevitable. There had, of course, always been factions among the Democrats. But with the attainment of the position of majority party, the out-of-power factions took on a new role, replacing the Republicans as the voice of the minority. Dissenters in the society had only one channel through which they could create political pressure. That was through the "out" faction in the Democratic Party.

It would have been interesting if this had resulted in the development of a loyal opposition, a shadow government, within the opposing Democratic faction. Such a development might have been expected from an opposition party. It was not to happen. The "out" Democrats continually formed and re-formed loose alliances based more on personality and the pursuit of temporary power than on ideology. Only at the focal point of territorial and state or county party conventions did the loose alliances form into momentarily cohesive groups.

The exception of course was the Burns machine. Once in power after 1962, the machine demonstrated a remarkable cohesiveness and unity. Absolute loyalty—not to party, but to machine—was the key.
No wavering was permitted. Alternative ideas were never entertained. The questioner quickly became the apostate and was driven from the inner circle.

The factionalism had both positive and negative values. The "out" factions took over the traditional watch-dog role of an opposition party. The spotlight of publicity had the effect of limiting and taming the power of the machine. The relative degree of success was, of course, arguable.

There were also negative results, particularly in the relations between the Burns and Fasi machines which often resulted in measures destructive to the best interests of the people. Recurringly the state meddled in the business of the City and County of Honolulu, eroding the minimal degree of home rule which the county had achieved. Special legislation was passed or defeated not because of merit, but because it was identified with Fasi. Examples abound: the failure of the state to support a fifty-cent county automobile registration fee earmarked to clear Oahu of abandoned, rusting derelicts; the passage of a state law allowing the city council to create its own legislative reference staff after Fasi had vetoed a similar city council-passed measure; the unequal distribution of state tax revenues to the counties, severely short-changing Oahu's taxpayers.

There were other less measurable results. The need to constantly defend itself from within the party made the machine monolithic and closed. Good people who may have had much to offer were, no doubt, excluded from effective participation in the political process. And, of course, with such new talent as appeared identifying with one of
the factions in the Democratic Party, the Republicans were robbed of
the new blood which might have brought them back from the dead.

In Summary:

- Hawaii has been governed since 1962 by a consensus of big
  business, big labor, and more recently, big government, creating a
  roughly balanced power structure.

- The resultant government fits the classic Madisonian model
  in which contending forces in a pluralistic society create, to their
  mutual benefit, a continuing balance of power within well-defined
  limits.

- Despite recurring electoral mandates, the Burns faction of
  the Democratic Party failed to exercise strong leadership in the
  community. It could not have done so and remained at the center of
  the balance of power.

- A momentary opportunity for a traditional two-party political
  system existed between 1954 and 1962, but was lost by Republican
  incapacity to shed the past and change into a party which could command
  broad community support.

- Democratic factionalism was exacerbated by the failure of the
  Republicans to remain a significant minority party. Factions became
  necessary to provide a voice to those opposed to the consensus.

- Factionalism has had both positive and negative results, but
  the preponderance appears to have been negative.
The hope of the people for a better future which resounded from those 1952 and 1954 Democratic platforms was not fully achieved. While life greatly improved for large numbers of people in Hawaii, huge problems remained in 1974. The shortage of affordable housing was a growing crisis, untouched by the feeble efforts of the administration. Unemployment was at critical levels. The highway transportation system was choking to a standstill. A huge public welfare burden was challenging the ability of the society to support it. A two-tier education system had reappeared, this time in the form of excellent private schools and poor public schools. And large numbers of people in the state—particularly part-Hawaiians and recent immigrant groups—remained alienated from the mainstream of the social structure.

The pursuit of solutions to these problems demanded strong political leadership. But that leadership was non-existent in 1974, a casualty of the factional struggles of the previous twenty years. The ultimate costs of that factionalism will only be known as the future reveals itself.
APPENDIX A


February 1, 1962
February 1, 1962

State Central Committee
Democratic Party of Hawaii
Room 300, Liberty Bank Building
Honolulu, Hawaii

Gentlemen:

Re: Partial Report

Your Committee on Candidates Selection for State-Wide Elective Offices for the 1962 election submits its partial report as follows:

INTRODUCTION: The State Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Hawaii adopted a resolution entitled "RESOLUTION OF THE OAHU DEMOCRATIC COUNTY COMMITTEE" on July 12, 1961, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "1", after it had amended the deadline for its work from March 31, 1962, to October 31, 1961.

Due to the nature, scope and depth of the resolution, particularly in the light of its deadline date of October 31, 1961, it became apparent at the outset that there would be many problems before the program embodied in general terms in the resolution could be determined. To formulate basic policies and directions, a Steering Committee was established initially with the Chairman of this Committee as its Chairman to resolve some of the problems of mechanics, methodology, procedures and other related problems, as well as to arrive at some conclusion as to the "intent" of the resolution. The members of the Steering Committee, who were appointed by the State Chairman on July 12, 1961, are listed in Exhibit "2".

The Steering Committee had its first meeting on July 25, 1961, and at the first meeting, several factors became apparent. Some of these were: (1) That we have no "power" except that of numbers or persuasion and the probability of having the general public support; (2) That we have the competence of this program by the known potential candidates, who were selected at this meeting on the basis of whether or not we can get their names on the community. On this basis, initially sixth or seventh persons were selected to form the slate list was increased to 25 persons whose names are as set forth in Exhibit "3". It was unanimously agreed by the members of the Steering Committee that the first group to meet with would be the potential candidates. A meeting was scheduled with this group by call of the Chairman by mail as shown in Exhibit "4".

At the first meeting with the potential candidates on August 3, 1961, various suggestions were made by the group particularly as to the method we should select to determine the members who are to sit on the Fact Finding Committee, and that the committee should be representative of the Party organizations and groups, with the number members being limited in number so that it would be a workable group. It should be noted that at this meeting, of the 25 potential candidates named, 18 of them were present either in person or by their representatives or observers as particularly shown in Exhibit "5". Of those absent from the meeting, 4 were neighbor island persons.
On the basis of the suggestions made by the potential candidates, the Steering Committee adopted the number of members to sit on the Fact Finding Committee and the method of selecting them. The form of a letter which was mailed to the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, the Minority Leader of the Senate, the Chairman of the City Council of Honolulu, the Chairman of the Oahu County Committee and the President of the Young Democrats is attached hereto as Exhibit "5". The National Committeewoman as the only active National Committee representative became eligible as well as the Chairman of the Young Democrats and the County Chairman of Oahu County Committee by virtue of their official positions.

At the second meeting with the potential candidates, the committee circulated the names of proposed members to be recommended to the State Chairman for appointment to the Fact Finding Committee. There being no objection to the proposed members by majority vote, the State Chairman appointed the persons listed in Exhibit "7", with one change having been made in the interim as noted therein. The Chairman of the City Council of Honolulu thereafter resigned.

At the same meeting, the discussions were on the basis of an Agenda, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "8".

DIGEST OF PROGRESS: The Fact Finding Committee, herein after referred to as "FFC", began its work by having five sub-committee's established as follows, to wit: (1) Biography; (2) Personal Interview; (3) Group Interview; (4) Canvassing; and (5) Vote Analysis. The Chairman and members of each sub-committee are shown in Exhibit "9", which were circulated to the committee members and thereafter to potential candidates, together with a covering letter as shown in Exhibit "10". Once the operations were established on Oahu, the Chairman then made a tour of Hawaii, Maui and Kauai on October 6, 7 and 10, 1961. The primary purpose of the trip was to initiate operations under the chairmanship of each sub-committee chairperson, explain procedures and practices established by Oahu sub-committees, and to have a deadline established for the completion of their fact finding work. On the basis of my conferences with the sub-committees on said Islands, it was agreed that each Island would perform two tasks—that of Canvassing and the other of Vote Analysis. The deadline was established to be November 8, 1961 for their reports to be submitted to the Chairman of the FFC.

On September 30, 1961, the list of potential candidates then remaining on our list was made available to each sub-committee chairman. It should be noted here that from the beginning of our operations to the time the Biography and Personal Interview Committees completed their work, we did not have any indication by any potential candidate as to his aspirations to any particular office. We had merely accepted them as being interested in any of the five state-wide elective offices in 1962. The covering letter is attached as Exhibit "11".

The sub-committees on Oahu completed most of their work in October, 1961, and during this period, we had our first expressions of "interests". As a result of a major leak from one of the sub-committees, the Chairman authorized the release of the 9th District Council Report to the Canvassing Committee of which the potential candidates were informed of in my letter of October 19, 1961, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "12".
Thereafter, on October 30, 1961, the Executive Committee met with the potential candidates for the purposes as set forth in Exhibit "13" and to supplement our letter progress reports. At this meeting, they were informed of our inability to complete the report by October 31, 1961, and the reasons for our inability were discussed with them. With luck, we were then of the opinion that we might be able to have a report ready by December 15, 1961. They also indicated that we should await the results of the poll which was then being made by Dan Tuttle.

The evaluation process was started with our first meeting on November 24, 1961, with the FFC as a whole acting in that capacity. The meeting was based primarily on a chart prepared by the Chairman, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "13". On the basis of the reports from the Chairman and the Committee on Personal Interview, those who had indicated themselves as not being interested in an uncertain term by various methods were identified and from then on, these persons were no longer considered by the FFC in its deliberations thereafter.

The Chairman had prepared the Chart prior to the above meeting with the thought of categorizing the various persons into three categories, to wit: (1) Not Interested; (2) Will Withdraw, and (3) Others. However, on the basis of the reports submitted, it became clear at the meeting that the term "Will Withdraw" did not accurately reflect the expressions of the potential candidates. By unanimous agreement, the term for the second category was amended to "Will Abide" as accurately reflecting the intentions of the potential candidates. For those who did not fit into these two categories, "Others" was listed. This Chart is reproduced in Exhibit "14".

The second evaluation meeting, which was scheduled on November 24, 1961, for November 27, 1961, was cancelled since it conflicted with the cocktail reception for Senator Wayne Morse.

The second meeting was then held on November 29, 1961, as originally scheduled on November 24, 1961. The various canvassing results, together with the vote analysis results in consolidated form were reflected in a Chart prepared by the Chairman prior to the meeting and for the first time, all canvassing results were shown. Not knowing the desires of the committee members as to whether or not Dan Tuttle's public report should be included in our findings or not, a space was provided and the actual inclusion of the figures reported in the papers were incorporated into the Chart upon unanimous agreement by the members of the Committee. The figures shown on the Chart are only those concerning the 14 potential candidates we had remaining after our first meeting. This chart is shown as Exhibit "15".

At this meeting, the tentative position of the Committee was discussed with reference to the offices of Lieutenant Governor and the United States Senate. After some discussion, the Chairman stated in essence the tentative position of the Committee in summary form which was not objected to by any member of the Committee present at the meeting.
The Committee also reviewed, analyzed and discussed the basic resolution to determine the objective of the FFC. It was unanimously agreed that the objective of the Committee is as follows, to wit: "PURSUE ALL POSSIBILITIES TOWARDS ARRIVING AT THE STRONGEST COMBINATION OF CANDIDATES".

The meeting ended with the unanimous agreement that the results of the Committee as reflected in Exhibit 15 together with Exhibits 14 should be made to each potential candidate as to the progress of the Committee since the last meeting with them. The Chairman also indicated that on the basis of the suggestions made by the potential candidates and as he had planned in the beginning, he would make a second and probably final circuit of the neighbor islands to review with each sub-committee chairman and his committee our results and to receive any suggestions they may have.


Except for those who had cancelled their appointments, or with whom we were not able to make arrangements due to earlier departure for the mainland before rapport could be re-established, and one where a brief review was made by telephone for expediency, the Chairman met with all potential candidates in person to review the developments of the Committee and to report to them as to the progress of the Committee individually.

During this period, on the basis of recommendations by some of the potential candidates, the Chairman conducted a canvass of our own Committee members. The form of the ballots used together with the covering letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "16".

A FFC meeting scheduled for December 23, 1961, was cancelled since the Christmas mail delayed the return of the above ballots, and a December 27, 1961 meeting was scheduled in place thereof. At this meeting, the Chairman gave a progress report as to the program since the November 29, 1961 meeting. Thereafter, considerable discussions were had on various matters, phases, and aspects of the program which ended with the adoption of certain ground rules for the operation of the Committee as it neared its selection process. The meeting ended with the adoption of a motion unanimously that the next meeting be held on January 4, 1962, with this first item of discussion to be that of the Office of Governorship.

On December 28, 1961, the Chairman set a reminder letter to the Committee members of the January 4, 1962 meeting together with the form which is attached hereto as Exhibit "17".

The Committee met at the Armory Conference Room on January 4, 1962, and the meeting started at 7:30 P.M. with 16 members present.

Upon motion duly made and seconded, the Committee—unanimously agreed that in regard to the candidates for the Office of the Governor, if there is a "clear-cut" indication by the Committee the selection would be limited to one, with all ballots to be counted by August Aguirre, Tom Tagawa and the Chairman.
The results of the first and only balloting for the Office of Governorship are shown in Exhibit "18".

Considerable discussions were had in the area of balloting for the Congressional Candidates. Thereupon, on motion duly made and seconded, it was unanimously agreed that the balloting would be on the basis of first choice in the first ballot with the understanding that if there is a clear-cut majority indication by the Committee, the balloting would proceed to the second choice. This method was selected due to the concern of the Committee that selection on the basis of top three, four, five or any number more than two or more would not properly reflect the strength of the candidates.

On this basis, the balloting was conducted for three balloting. The Committee indications were "clear-cut", and the results are shown in Exhibit "19". Thereafter, on the balloting for the fourth preference, the votes were for several potential candidates and rather "scattered", with two potential candidates remaining on the list having eight and five votes respectively as shown in Exhibit "19". The Committee, by unanimous agreement, then decided to have a run-off on these two potential candidates. By this method, the Committee's fourth choice, at its fifth balloting, was selected as shown in Exhibit "19".

Thereafter, on motion duly made and seconded, the committee unanimously agreed to terminate all balloting and to limit the selection to the four persons selected on the order of strength as evaluated by the Committee.

On motion duly made and seconded, the Committee unanimously adopted the following as the official position of the Committee with reference to the Office of Lieutenant Governor, to-wit:

The Governor Selectee shall be consulted as to his "running mate" with the ultimate selection to be made by the Committee.

On motion duly made and seconded, the Committee unanimously adopted the following as the official position of the Committee with reference to the United States Senate, to-wit:

It is primarily a personal issue between incumbent United States Senator Oren E. Long and incumbent United States Congressman Daniel K. Inouye.

The meeting was adjourned with the understanding that the Chairman of the Committee would draft the report which would be circulated among all Committee Members for their signatures prior to submission to the State Central Committee, and that the recommendations would be the position of the Committee as of the date of this report as submitted to the Central Committee.

WORK OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES: Very briefly, the work of the respective sub-committees can be described as follows, to-wit:

...
State Central Committee
Democratic Party of Hawaii
Page 6
February 1, 1962

(A) BIOGRAPHY: The Chairman of this committee and
the Personal Interview committee agreed after some deliberations
that it is imperative that the questionnaire be sent to all
potential candidates and that the personal interview process
commence after these questionnaires are returned.

On this basis, the committee on Biography prepared
a questionnaire, a sample copy of which is shown in Exhibit "20". The work of the committee was finished after the questionnaires were mailed out and those that were returned were turned
over to the Chairman of the Personal Interview committee.

(B) PERSONAL INTERVIEW: To a great extent the
success or failure of this program depended upon the work
of this committee, and with this realization, your Chairman
of the FFC selected a man who had the experience and background
in depth to chair this committee.

The work of this committee was based upon personal
interviews with each potential candidate remaining on our list
with the thought of exploring together with various facets of
each candidate's potential, the 1962 campaign in general and
to receive constructive suggestions from each of them.

(C) GROUP INTERVIEW: The Chairman of this committee
had one of the most difficult tasks under the circumstances.
This committee was established to discuss with various "power
blocks" in the community the 1962 campaign in general and their
attitudes towards candidates in general or in particular. However,
as we had anticipated, most organizations were reluctant
to discuss these matters for several reasons, such as: (1) It
was too early to have any concrete or specific ideas as to
campaign in general or individual candidates in particular;
(2) That many organizations wanted to have the Budget Session
of 1962 over with before taking any action on their overall
campaign plans; (3) Most of them were reluctant to discuss
particular candidates, especially with the committee.

(D) CANVASSING: The Chairman of this committee
started immediately to implement its objective to "sound out"
the grass roots sentiment of the Democrats by two methods:
(1) Canvass by ballots, and (2) District Council and District
Meetings, resulting in reports being submitted to this committee.
The form letter, together with sample ballots mailed by this
committee is shown in Exhibit "21". To avoid "jockeying" or
"campaigning" by potential candidates, this committee set a
very short deadline for the ballots to be returned. The committee
also used the facilities and records available at the Oahu
County Committee office for mailing the ballots.

Because some of the potential candidates strongly
expressed a desire to be informed as to the attitudes of the
elected democrat officials throughout the State, a canvass of
the elected officials was made. Fifty-nine (59) ballots were
issued to 59 elected democrat officials, State Senators,
Representatives, County Councilmen and Supervisors, with a
covering letter as shown in Exhibit "22". Thirty-four (34)
ballets were returned. The results are shown in Exhibit "15".
(E) VOTE ANALYSIS: The function of this committee was to analyze the votes in the past three elections, particularly with reference to those who were on our list of potential candidates and who had run before for elective offices. The objective here was to evaluate the "vote getting" ability of each potential candidate and the trend in voting by party wherever possible. The applicable results of this committee are shown in Exhibit "15". The Maui Sub-Committee's work in this area with reference to Maui County is specially included as Exhibit "23", since it shows the analysis of votes down to the precinct level.

SUMMARY: Certain factors were deduced from the work of the various sub-committees. Some of these are as follows:

1. Financing will be a major factor for all of the potential candidates. For example, congressional aspirants who expressed any idea as to the cost of a campaign for United States House of Representatives indicated a range from a low of $15,000.00 to $75,000.00 with most of them agreeing that $50,000.00 being a realistic estimated cost. In this area, we have received reports that the gubernatorial campaign for 1959 ranged from $75,000.00 to $350,000.00, and those who expressed any figures to this Committee seemed to indicate that a minimum cost would be $150,000.00.

The rising costs of campaign seem to indicate that Hawaii, with the advent of statehood, is now shifting to mainland standards and methods of campaigning, such as television, radio, newspapers, and professionals.

2. Most, if not all, potential candidates desire sincerely to avoid the pitfalls of the 1959 election and to unify the party for the election with the thought that differences can be settled after the party is victorious in 1962. The candidates showed realistic analysis and maturity that can properly be identified as "enlightened self-interest", but probably, it would be far more accurate to state that these potential candidates properly reflect the "revolutionary" concepts that Hawaii is having in the political area resulting from statehood. The attitude of the potential candidates in general is reflected in Exhibit "24".

3. The total votes cast for the general elections in the past three election years indicate a growing trend as follows, to-wit: 1958 - 154,293; 1959 - 171,383; 1960 - 188,206, as shown in Exhibit "15". It is reasonable to expect total votes cast in 1962 to be 200,000 votes plus. On this estimate, the successful gubernatorial candidate must anticipate in winning 100,000 plus votes and the successful house candidates for the United States Congress will probably require 40-45% of the total votes cast or 75,000 to 85,000 votes to be successful.

4. On the basis of the Tuttle-Polk, the percentages there indicate that the support of the party is essential for any person to be successful in any of the five state-wide offices.

5. That the Congressional area is the primary area where the FFC came across imponderables such as the following: (1) The Budget Session of 1962 is a factor in that the Legislature may adopt legislation in the area of (a) Districting and (b) Seats for men to man basis.
In the area of districting, there is considerable merits to the idea of having our congressional candidates run from two separate districts divided into two districts based upon agricultural and urban areas.

In the seats for man to man basis, the same method would be used as was used in the 1959 United States Senatorial election where candidates were required to apply for either Seat A or Seat B.

6. Personal Problems of Candidates. Some of the potential candidates who showed relative strength from this Committee's results, indicated they had considerable personal imponderable factors that remained to be resolved before they could make definite commitment as to actually running for the Congressional seats. Accordingly, they were not able to provide definitive guidance to this Committee.

7. Most, if not all, potential candidates indicated that the "key" to the selection by this Committee would revolve on the disposition of the Governorship question; that the selection of any person for that position would affect the other races. On the other hand, it is also clear that the persons ultimately selected by this Committee for the Congressional races would affect the Committee's selectee for the gubernatorial office.

8. That under our current election laws, any person has the right to run under the label of the Democratic Party regardless of his true and realistic relative association with the party up to the closing date for filing, and it would be improper for the Party to endorse, recommend or preclude others from seeking their aspirations through political processes. On the other hand, on the assumption that our two-party system is sound, it is incumbent upon each political party to provide candidates from the party so that the voters can select between the two parties to further the objective of having a responsible government.

9. That in fairness to all potential candidates, their families, friends and supporters, it would be desirable to have the Committee's selection for the office of governorship as soon as it would be feasible under the circumstances to prevent having some of them extend themselves "on the limb" beyond a point of no return where human considerations, other than reason, would prevail.

10. Politics has been known to bring the best and the worst in human beings. All Committee Members were particularly impressed with the sincerity of the potential candidates to cooperate fully with this Committee to participate in striving for the objectives sought by the resolution. Many of them have helped the party by their constructive criticisms and assistance during this long process and the Committee is of the opinion that most of the potential candidates should be recognized for their participation in their contribution to the party in this manner.

11. The 1959 fiasco deprived the people of the State of Hawaii of many public spirited citizens of this community who are members of this party from contributing their talents.
abilities and efforts toward a better Hawaii. A primary election, with all its merits, principles and theories, does not properly serve the people of the State when such men are "left home" without opportunities to utilize their talents. In this area, it is incumbent upon any political party in assuming its proper responsibility, to enable men of such talents and abilities to have opportunities to be of service to the people of the State, without being "left home" or to shut the doors to further their ambitions that can and does hurt their families, friends and supporters, but more important, the State as a whole. The party must also provide avenues to these potential candidates to enable them to prepare themselves for greater service in the years to come through proper channels.

Political elections are merciless and can properly be said to be the "cruelest" contest of all contests, in that, there is no recognition for second place.

CONCLUSIONS

OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF THE CANDIDATES SELECTION COMMITTEE FOR STATE-WIDE ELECTIVE OFFICES IN 1962 IN SUMMARY AS OF JANUARY 4, 1962, IS AS FOLLOWS:

GOVERNOR: JOHN A. BURNS is the strongest potential candidate that the Party can select.

LT. GOVERNOR: The Governor Selectee shall be consulted as to his "running mate" with the ultimate selection to be made by the Committee.

U.S. SENATOR: It is primarily a personal issue between incumbent United States Senator OREN E. LONG and incumbent United States Congressman DANIEL K. INOUYE.

U.S. HOUSE: The selection by the Committee in the order of strength are as follows:

1. THOMAS P. GILL, incumbent State Representative from 15th District, House Majority Floor Leader.

2. HERBERT K. H. LEE, former Territorial Senator and President of the Territorial Senate.

3. NELSON K. DOI, incumbent State Senator from 1st Senatorial District.

4. O. VINCENT ESPOSITO, incumbent State Senator from the 4th Senatorial District.

FUTURE EFFORTS: As indicated by the title of this report, your Committee has made this a partial report for the reason that it has finished its work with reference to one office but has left others in a state of flux due to varying factors mentioned above.
State Central Committee
Democratic Party of Hawaii
Page 10
February 1, 1962

Many avenues, directions and aspects of achieving the desirable objective as set forth above by the Committee have not been explored nor attempted due to imponderables. Accordingly, your Committee shall continue to function and exert its efforts in the directions as set forth in the resolution.

Your Committee recommends the adoption of the foregoing report.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman

SAKAエ TAKAHASHI, Member

HOWARD Y. MIYAKE, Member

JOHN C. LANHAM, Member

TADA0 BEPPU, Member

JAMES Y. SHIGEMIRA, Member

HARRY A. ALBRIGHT, Member

REVOCATO MEDINA, Member

KIMIE MATSUI, Member

RON BENNETT, Member

DOLORES MARTIN, Member

TADA0 OKIMOTO, Member

TOM TAGAWA, Member

AUGUST AGUIAR, Member

J. RALPH BROWN, Member

ROBERT C. GILKEY, Member

EDITH DeMATT, Member

HUNG LECNG CHING, Member

D. E. STURDYVIN, Member
EXHIBIT "1"

RESOLUTION OF THE OAHU DEMOCRATIC COUNTY COMMITTEE

WHEREAS, success for the party in the 1962 election depends on a widespread acceptance in the party and community of our candidates for state-wide offices, and the minimization of primary contest for such positions; and

WHEREAS, such results can best be facilitated by the careful and impartial exchange of ideas between party members, potential candidates and their backers, and interested members of the community;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Oahu Democratic County Committee that the State Central Committee, after consultation with this body, other official branches of the party, known potential candidates, and interested members of the party, appoint a Committee on State-Wide Offices, made up of impartial members of the party who are acceptable to the various groups mentioned above, to carry out the following functions;

(1) Conduct informal discussions with interested members of the party and community as to the potential and acceptability of various possible candidates for state-wide office,

(2) Meet informally with various possible candidates for state-wide office to discuss ways and means of winning the coming elections, and

(3) Attempt to arrive at a consensus of feeling within the party and between the possible candidates for state-wide office, as to the strongest combination of candidates and the best means of winning the 1962 elections; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that such committee attempt to complete its work by October 31, 1961, and that it make no public statements or formal report until and unless requested to do so by action of the Central Committee;

BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED that copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Central Committee forthwith.

Dated at Honolulu, Hawaii, this 19th day of June, 1961.


/s/ Earl Sturdyvin, Chairman

Adopted by Central Committee as amended on July 12, 1961.
E X H I B I T " 2 "

STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

1. AGUILAR, August
2. BROWN, J. Ralph
3. CHING, Hung Leong
4. DeMATTA, Edith
5. GILKEY, Robert C.
6. MARTIN, Dolores X.
7. OKIMOTO, Tadao
8. OSHIRO, Robert C.
9. STURDYVIN, D. E.
10. TAGAWA, Tom
**EXHIBIT "3"**

**LIST OF ORIGINAL POTENTIAL CANDIDATES**

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<td>TAKAHASHI, Same</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>TAH, Eddie</td>
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EXHIBIT "A"

STATE SELECTION STEERING COMMITTEE

P. O. Box 958
Wahiawa, Hawaii

July 28, 1961

Dear

Realizing the grave responsibility placed upon the Steering Committee, the Committee took action at its first meeting that we should have a meeting with all potential candidates, announced or unannounced, who are interested or who have expressed interest in being a candidate for any state-wide office as soon as possible. The names suggested at the meeting, including yours, is not all inclusive nor is it meant to be final or that the persons are in fact interested. However, so that we may begin someplace as early as possible, we decided to have such a meeting this coming Thursday night. The time, place and date are as follows:

TIME: 7:30 P.M.
PLACE: Lanai Conference Room,
       Iolani Palace
DATE: August 3, 1961 (Thursday)

For your information, various matters were discussed and considered but in the absence of any contributions from those who would be affected by the functions of this committee, we decided to meet with you and others before definite plans are adopted. I am certain you are aware of the responsibility placed upon this committee and that constructive contributions from all interested parties would be necessary for any effective work to be done.

Should there be any question, please call me or any of the committee members: Gilkey, Hung Leong Ching, Sturdyvin, Ralph Brown, Dolores Martin and Edith Demalta.

I'll try to get you a copy of the resolution which was adopted by the Central Committee within the next few days.

Very truly yours,
STATE SELECTION STEERING COMMITTEE
/s/ Bob

Robert C. Oshiro, Chairman

RCO:hh

P.S. This is a form letter being sent to others.
### EXHIBIT "A"

**POTENTIAL CANDIDATES MEETING**

August 3, 1961

First Meeting

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<td>20. MINK, Patsy T.</td>
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<td>25. TAM, Eddie</td>
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</table>
August 14, 1961

The Honorable Howard Y. Miyake
House Majority Leader
1010 Alakea Street
Honolulu, Hawaii

Dear Howard:


The Steering Committee adopted officially the method of selecting members to the State Fact Finding Committee of the Democratic Party of Hawaii which will have as its function the obligations as set forth in the enclosed Resolution.

From the very beginning, the Steering Committee recognized the grave responsibility placed upon it as well as the Fact Finding Committee. I am certain that you also recognize the great responsibility now being placed upon you as the leader of your organization to submit names for the purpose of having 3 of them selected as a member of the Fact Finding Committee from your organization.

So that the Fact Finding Committee may be established as rapidly as possible, we would appreciate having you submit 5 names from members of your organization with 3 to be selected to the office of the undersigned on or before August 24, 1961. It would greatly help us in ultimate selecting if you would submit a brief biographical sketch of each nominee. This is not necessary nor mandatory but I am sure you will agree that we must have some basis of selecting. Furthermore, we are vitally interested in having persons who will strive for objectivity in their determinations as a member as well as those who can and will devote time and effort to the work of the committee. Please remember that persons who have been mentioned as being interested in being a candidate for a state-wide office are not eligible.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Bob

ROBERT C. OSHIRO

Enclosure
A) NATIONAL COMMITTEE:
   1. Dolores Martin

B) STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
   2. J. Ralph Brown
   3. Hung Leong Ching
   4. Edith DeMatta
   5. Robert C. Gilkey
   6. Robert C. Oshiro
   7. August Aguiar *
   8. Tadao Okimoto *
   9. Tom Tagawa *

* They will head similar committees on their respective island.

C) OAHU COUNTY COMMITTEE:
   10. Earl Sturdyvin
   11. Harry A. Albright
   12. Revocato Medina

D) HAWAII STATE LEGISLATURE:
   13. Sakae Takahashi
   14. Howard Y. Miyake
   15. Tadao Beppu
   16. James Y. Shigemura

E) CITY COUNCIL OF HONOLULU:
   17. Masato Doi

F) YOUNG DEMOCRATS:
   18. John C. Lanham
   19. Kimie Matsui

NOTE: The above persons will be recommended to the State Chairman for appointment to the Fact Finding Committee unless majority objects to any one person.
EXHIBIT "G"

AGENDA

A) CALL MEETING TO ORDER

B) PROGRESS REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE

1. Make-up of the members of the Fact Finding Committee adopted by Steering Committee on 8/9/61.
2. Letters written to proper persons on 8/14/61 to submit names by August 24, 1961.
3. Names passed upon by Steering Committee on August 26, 1961.

C) BUSINESS OF THE MEETING.

1. PASS ON NAMES FOR FACT FINDING COMMITTEE.

D) DISCUSSION ON FOLLOWING MATTERS:

1. Dossier: Biographical-racial background, family, education, business experience, governmental and political experience, reputation, contacts, activities in civic and community affairs, popularity, finances, etc.
2. Analysis of Votes of Prior Elections
3. Candidate Interviews
4. Major Groups' Views & Attitudes
5. Canvassing
6. Poll
   a) Free Choice: Who would be your choice for our Governor.
   b) Forced Choice: Which person of these would be your choice for our governor.
7. Expression of Interest in particular office by priorities.

E) OTHER MATTERS

STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING WITH POTENTIAL CANDIDATES, AUGUST 30, 1961.
EXHIBIT "2"

FACT FINDING COMMITTEE

Members of Sub-Committees

BIOGRAPHY:
*1. J. Ralph Brown
2. James Y. Shigemura
3. Masato Doi
4. Dolores Martin
5. Harry A. Albright

GROUP INTERVIEW:
*1. Tadao Beppu
2. Earl Sturdyvin
3. Edith DeMatta
4. Hung Leong Ching.
5. Sake Takahashi
6. John C. Lanham

PERSONAL INTERVIEW:
*1. Earl Sturdyvin
2. Robert C. Gilkey
3. Howard Y. Miyake
4. Kimie Matsui
5. J. Ralph Brown
6. Harry A. Albright

CANVASSING:
*1. Robert C. Gilkey
2. James Y. Shigemura
3. Kimie Matsui
4. Masato Doi
5. Revocato Medina

VOTE ANALYSIS:
*1. Revocato Medina
2. Tadao Beppu
3. John C. Lanham
4. Harry A. Albright
5. Dolores Martin

*Chairmen

Robert C. Oshiro, Chairman: Ex-officio member of each committee.

9-21-61
EXHIBIT "10"

STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE

P. O. Box 958
Wahiawa, Hawaii

September 30, 1961

Gentlemen:

Re: Progress Report

I have enclosed mimeograph copies of my letter to the members of the Fact Finding Committee as well as a list of the sub-committee members. We have under advisement the matter of a professional poll at this time. I have written to a mainland firm inquiring as to the cost of a poll similar to the Harris Poll taken in 1959 as well as the time it would require to have such a poll. If you have any suggestions on this matter of poll, I would appreciate hearing from you. The cost factor is another matter that we must resolve at due time.

Sometime in the first week of October, I am planning to visit the neighbor islands to have the committees on each island operating on the pattern set by Oahu.

Should there be any suggestions you may have as to the various aspects of our operations, I would appreciate hearing from you.

Very truly yours,

STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE

/s/ Bob

ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman.

RCO: bh
Enclosures - 2
STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE

P. O. Box 958
Wahiawa, Hawaii

September 30, 1961

Gentlemen:

I have enclosed a list of the current potential candidates with the suggestion that it should be kept confidential within your committee as you deem appropriate and discreet. It has been my opinion that we can only have confidence of the potential candidates in our endeavor so long as we keep such matters as these in confidence within reason to provide any embarrassment to individual candidates and also to avoid "jockeying" at this stage of the game.

It should also be noted that to this date, we have not had any indication as to the preferences of offices from each candidate and we have been operating on the assumption that they are interested in one of the five statewide elective offices.

If you have already established the mechanics of your sub-committee operations, I would appreciate having a copy in writing since I would like to take them with me to the neighbor islands to have them use it as a basis of operation.

Very truly yours,

STATE FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE

/s/ Bob

ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman.

Enclosure - 1 (List of potential candidates)

Note: To Chairman of each sub-committee only.
October 19, 1961

Gentlemen:

I was asked this morning for my consent to have the 9th District Council Report to the Canvassing Committee released by a Reporter this morning after he had informed me that he already had the results of the 17th District meeting. To my knowledge, these are the only two districts that have met as requested by the chairman of the canvassing committee.

Since these meetings were not restricted and experience indicates that oftentimes reporters will report as truth misinformation based upon what they can uncover by various means, I authorized the release of the 9th District Report with the specific request that it be printed in full since statements out of context may mislead the public as well as you which is what we have been valiantly trying to avoid. Furthermore, these reports are merely one of the many factors that must be taken into consideration when the overall evaluation process begins.

In regard to the recent announcement by a candidate on our list, from the very beginning, we recognized the fact that the success or failure of our committee would depend to a large degree on your participation and cooperation. Since we started, your patience with the committee and the courtesies extended to the various sub-committees have been deeply appreciated by the committee since we recognize that despite your personal evaluation of your own strength for a particular office, your concern is greater for an overall evaluation of a winning combination to win all five seats in the 1962 election which is the basic objective set forth in the resolution and of all democrats. Despite the one announcement, it is still the hope of the fact finding committee that you will give us the chance to achieve the objectives set forth in the resolution.

The Committee fully recognizes the fact that we cannot stop any candidate from taking actions that he believes best in terms of his personal campaign strategy to achieve his personal goal. However, I am sure you agree as a Democrat that this program deserves the support of all democrats, regardless of whether he is a rank and file democrat or a leader and a candidate.

In the very near future, a meeting will be called to give you a progress report from each sub-committee chairman. The notice as to time and place should be determined by October 24, 1961.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Bob

ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman.

P.S. When Mr. Phil Bird made his announcement, we tried to establish contact with him and to this date, we have not been able to contact him to place him on our potential candidates list.

This is a form letter being sent to all potential candidates.
October 25, 1961

Gentlemen:

Re: NOTICE OF MEETING
October 30, 1961 (Monday)
Time: 7:30 P.M.
Place: Lanai Conference Room
(Iolani Palace)

The various sub-committees are just about completing their work, including those on the neighbor islands, but it is certain that we cannot have our report ready by October 31, 1961, as stated in the resolution.

Now that we are finishing phase one of the project, we are about to enter into phase two which is basically the evaluation phase. Before I have the fact finding committee meet to discuss methods and other matters of evaluation, I would very much like to discuss the problems we see and probably you can also bring up those we should cope with or avoid. With this purpose in mind, I have called a meeting of all candidates remaining on our list to meet with our executive committee. We can also give you a progress report at this time.

In the meantime, we would appreciate having you give some thought as to how we should proceed evaluating the findings of the sub-committees, and especially, the factors we should take into consideration as standards or guides in this process.

Very truly yours,
STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE,
/s/ Bob
ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman.

RCo: bh
Form letter to Potential Candidates and members of Executive Committee.
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G = Governor
C = Congressman
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EXHIBIT "16"
STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
P. O. Box 958
Wahiawa, Hawaii
Telephone: 223-458.


Dear Members:

Re: Canvassing of Fact Finding Committee Members

As Chairman of the Committee, I want to thank each of you for your compassionate understanding, participation, and helpfulness in working towards the goal that may initiate the beginning of a new spirit within our Party. I am particularly grateful to all of you since my nerves have been "getting raw" at this stage and my patience has been taxed longer than I had ever anticipated when we first started. I am sure each of you feel the same. Nevertheless, because so many rank and file democrats look to this committee for an answer to our perennial problems, each of us must tax our own resources to the limits during this most critical and delicate period so that we may well achieve the goal we seek. The ballot I write of herein calls for our best efforts.

Now that you have seen or heard the reports from the sub-committees, and you have participated in some of the preliminary discussions concerning the various phases of this critical evaluation phase, I have determined, on the basis of my interviews with various potential candidates to date, that it would be desirable to have a canvass of the committee members.

For this purpose, I have enclosed a ballot to be filled in by you. When you do fill the ballot, please keep the following in mind:

1. Our goal: "To pursue all possibilities towards arriving at the strongest combination of candidates".

2. To avoid a primary, if at all possible, due to the factors we discussed such as finances, hardship on candidates and families and friends, and others;

3. The strongest probable combination of the other party;

4. Your selections will be confined to the fourteen names remaining on our list;

5. That this canvass among ourselves is not conclusive but preliminary towards our goal and to be used as basis for our own discussions.

6. Evaluate your choices and be prepared to discuss your choices, which will be known only to you, on the basis of facts available to the committee and the reasons and factors we have discussed to date in our various meetings. In short, you should evaluate the candidates yourselves for this purpose.

Since this Committee's tentative position on the United States Senate is to... is primarily a personal item between United States Senator Daniel K. Inouye and incumbent Senator Emmet E. Long, I have filled in their names in that position. Therefore, you will see a blank and not a name.
With reference to the Lieutenant Governor's office, the committee's tentative position is that the Governor nominee of the committee, if we ultimately end up with one person, should have a say as to his "running mate" subject to final selection by the committee. For this reason, you will not select anyone for that office also.

With reference to the Congressional Office, which will be the area where we will have varied opinions, the ballots are prepared so that you will select three persons in the order of preference based on your own objective evaluation as to the persons you feel and think will provide the strongest combination.

To avoid identification, PLEASE TYPEWRITE THE NAMES OF YOUR CHOICES and return the ballots to me in the self-addressed envelopes on or before December 21, 1961.

Should there be any question, please call me.

Very truly yours,

STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE,

/s/ Bob

ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman.

Enclosures - Ballot
Self-Addressed Stamped Envelope

BALLOT

State Fact Finding Committee
P. O. Box 958
Wahiawa, Oahu

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On the basis of my own personal thorough analysis of the situation based on your letter of December 16, 1961, I believe the following named individuals would make the strongest combination of candidates for the Democratic Party in the 1962 state-wide elections.

GOVERNOR: ________________________ (Select One)

LIEUT. GOVERNOR: X X X X X X X (Do not Select)

UNITED STATES SENATE: LONG - INOUYE (Do not Select)

UNITED STATES HOUSE: (Order of your preference)

1. ________________________________

2. ________________________________

3. ________________________________

Deadline: December 21, 1961
Dear Members:

Re: NOTICE OF MEETING
Date: January 4, 1962 (Thursday)
Time: 7:30 P.M.
Place: Lani Conference Room
(Iolani Palace)

At the meeting held at the Lani Conference Room on December 27, 1961, at 7:30 P.M., certain ground rules were adopted and informal discussions had on various phases of our program. We finally adjourned the meeting after having adopted a motion that the next meeting be held at the same place, same time, on January 4, 1962, THURSDAY NIGHT, with the first discussion item to be that of the governorship office.

I do not know the "intent" of the motion that was adopted in regard to the governorship. However, it is an indication as to the committee's thinking that we should resolve the governorship question in some manner since the consensus is that it will be the key to the whole program. Consequently, I especially ask now that each of you condition your own thinking so that we can have discussions that are constructive, critical if necessary to be constructive in depth, and to weigh all factors in proper perspective removed from personal biasness or prejudices. I recognize it is difficult to be human without certain personal feelings but I stress this at this time since we should recognize our own individual preferences so that our evaluation can be as thorough, constructive and proper in fairness to all potential candidates now and hereafter. The course and pace we set may or may not help the party or the candidates. Furthermore, I think each person's convictions should be based upon reasons that stand the test of inquiry or deliberate search.

All of us should search of our thoughts as the progress of our program from its inception on July, 1961 to the present. I think we have come farther than we all had anticipated at the outset and it is my conviction that we have come as far as we have due to the participation by the members of the committee who have given their best efforts. Now, in particular, I think we should all recognize that each member of the committee is a member who should be accorded proper respect and courtesies regardless of whether that person's views and expressions are in accord with your own thoughts and analysis.

I have enclosed a form or guide for your own use and information which may be of some help in assisting you in formulating your own thoughts prior to the meeting.

Should there be any question, please call this office.

Very truly yours,

STATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE,

/s/ Bob

ROBERT C. OSHIJO, Chairman.

RCO: bh
1. Democratic Party unity.

2. Democratic Party stature in the community generally.

3. More apt to get stronger between now and November, 1962.

4. More apt to get all-round (all Unions) labor support.

5. More apt to be able to raise money from more sources.


7. More help to others in top 5 where help needed.

8. More apt to win.

9. Better equipped (training, experience, temperament) to be Governor.

10. Will be better Governor.

11. If elected, more apt to have better relations with Kennedy Administration.

12. Less affected by loss.
EXHIBIT 18 - BALLOT RESULTS FOR OFFICE OF GOVERNOR
(Total Votes Cast - 16)

1. BURNS, John A. 12
2. LEE, Herbert K. H. 1
3. LONG, Oren E. 2
4. SHARPLESS, Richard K. 1

* "clear-cut" ruled by Chairman.

EXHIBIT 19 - FIRST BALLOT RESULTS FOR U.S. HOUSE
(Total Votes Cast - 16)

Each ballot

A) FIRST BALLOT RESULTS:

1. DOI, Nelson K. 3
2. GILL, Thomas P. *
3. LEE, Herbert K. H. 4

* "clear-cut" ruled by Chairman.

B) SECOND BALLOT RESULTS:

1. DOI, Nelson K. 3
2. ESPOSITO, O. Vincent 1
3. LEE, Herbert K. H. 10*
4. MATSUNAGA, Spark M. 1
5. MINK, Patsy T. 1

* "clear-cut" ruled by Chairman.

C) THIRD BALLOT RESULTS:

1. DOI, Nelson K. 11*
2. ESPOSITO, O. Vincent 3
3. MATSUNAGA, Spark M. 1
4. MINK, Patsy T. 1

* "clear-cut" ruled by Chairman.

D) FOURTH BALLOT RESULTS:

1. ESPOSITO, O. Vincent 8 #
2. FASI, Frank F. 1
3. MATSUNAGA, Spark M. 5 #
4. MINK, Patsy T. 1
5. No preference 1

# Chairman ruled no "clear-cut" indication.

E) FIFTH (RUN-OFF) BALLOT RESULTS:

1. ESPOSITO, O. Vincent 11*
2. MATSUNAGA, Spark M. 5

* "clear-cut" ruled by Chairman.
EXHIBIT "20"

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE

CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

In order to provide the Fact Finding Committee statistical data and personal information on each candidate we are asking you to complete this form and return it before October 9 to J. Ralph Brown, 1001 Bishop St., Honolulu 13. Please be frank in your answers and feel free to give other information if you wish. Replies will be confidential to the Fact Finding Committee and will be used as a basis for a personal interview later in October.

PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Name ___________________________ Age ______________
Address ________________________ Bus. Phone ________ Res. Phone ________
Place of Birth ____________________ How long in Hawaii ______________________
Business or profession ____________________________

Education:
High School
College
Other Training
Degrees:

Racial & family background (including parents, brothers & sisters)

Briefly relate business or professional experience:

Marital status, full name of spouse, names and ages of children:

Have you ever been divorced?

Have you ever been convicted of a felony? If so, explain circumstances:

Have you ever been garnisheed? If so, explain:

Give any other personal background data you feel helpful to the Fact Finding Committee:

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

For what office do you prefer to run? ____________________________

How many years have you been a Democrat? _______ yrs. If you have ever
been a member of another political party, give date: ______________________

What positions have you held in the Democratic Party?

Detail elective and appointive public offices held, if any.

While holding public office, how close did your voting on key
issues parallel the Party platform?

What civic, fraternal or other organizations could you count on to
support your candidacy?

Organization Would it actively help in door-to-door work Would it mobi-

lize its own votes
Would it contribute financially

What organizations might work toward your defeat?

How large a campaign fund for both the primary and general do you
feel you would need to assure your election? _______________________

Do you have resources available to you to conduct such a campaign
with only moderate financial help from the Party?

Approximately how much? $ ______________

how many campaign workers (canvassers, sign workers, etc.) could you
personally muster? On Oahu _______ Kauai _______ Maui _______ Hawaii _______
Do you have access to a fulltime (or nearly fulltime) campaign

manager? __________. How many months could you devote fulltime to your
campaign prior to the general election? ______________

Do you have access to endorsement by a newspaper or radio station?

if so, which?

Do you have good personal relationships with the working press and
others who help mold public thinking?

Give any other pertinent information:
Dear Fellow Democrat:

You are possibly already aware of the existence of the Democratic Party's official Fact-Finding Committee, which has been set up "to arrive at a consensus of feeling within the party and between the candidates for statewide office, as to the strongest combination of candidates and the best means of winning the 1962 elections."

Only through a united party effort can we hope to achieve maximum success in 1962. To this end, the 19 members of the Fact-Finding Committee are working diligently and objectively to try to determine which combination of candidates would give us the strongest ticket for the five statewide offices which are up for election.

Essential to the success of our efforts is an expression of "grass-roots" sentiment within the Democratic Party. Who do Democrats themselves feel would provide the best chance for victory? For this reason, we are contacting all currently registered Democrats on Oahu (the neighbor islands are conducting their own canvass) to try to obtain an indication of party preference.

We do not claim this to be a scientific poll or an actual endorsement vote. What we do hope for is sufficient response to provide a general guide to rank-and-file Democratic opinion. Taken with other factors, this can be of great help to the Fact-Finding Committee in submitting its recommendations to the State Central Committee by the required deadline of October 31, 1961.

We therefore ask that you fill out the form below indicating whom you feel would be the strongest Democratic candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. Senator and two U.S. House seats. Please return the form to Democratic Headquarters at 90 N. King St., Honolulu, today if possible but no later than Monday, October 9th.

Feel free to include on a separate sheet of paper any additional comments which you consider pertinent to the committee's objectives. It is not necessary to sign your name either to the form or to any comments you submit.

We sincerely ask your cooperation in making this canvass a meaningful one. ONLY WITH YOUR KOKUA CAN WE HOPE TO DO OUR JOB PROPERLY.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Robert C. Gilkey
Robert C. Gilkey
Chairman, Canvassing Sub-Committee
Democratic Fact-Finding Committee

Canvassing Committee
c/o Democratic Headquarters
90 N. King St.
Honolulu, Hawaii

I believe the following named individuals would make the strongest possible combination of Democratic candidates for statewide office in 1962.

GOVERNOR
LIEUT. GOVERNOR
U.S. SENATOR
U.S. CONGRESSMAN 1) 2)

My representative district is (circle one): 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17.
Gentlemen:

Re: Elected Officials Ballot.

As many of you may be aware, the Fact Finding Committee of the Democratic Party has been working since July, 1961, to achieve the objectives as set forth in the resolution which was adopted, a copy of which is enclosed for your information.

In making an overall assessment of our progress, I have noticed that comments are being asked for all elected Democrat officials on certain islands and not on others; furthermore, it does not seem to be standardized. Accordingly, I am now asking for your assistance and cooperation in answering the enclosed questionnaire and ballot if you desire to indicate your opinion as to the strongest combination we can have for the top five state offices in the 1962 election. It is my opinion that it would be best not to be identified although some have expressed willingness to identify themselves. Therefore, to avoid identification, I would appreciate having you use the forms enclosed, filled in by using a typewriter. The only identification made in these forms is the island you represent.

The major reason for this "canvass" of elected officials is that the potential candidates themselves recognize that your thinking would be a strong factor in the overall assessment since you are "professional politicians"—the ones who have grassroots contact to solicit votes. Because of your importance, I am sure that you also recognize your responsibility to render an objective report to this committee.

We would appreciate your replies as soon as possible but no later than November 6, 1961.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Robert C. Gilkey

ROBERT C. GILKEY, Chairman
Canvassing Sub-Committee.
Democratic Fact Finding Committee
P. O. Box 958
Wahiawa, Hawaii

Gentlemen:

As my first choice, I believe the following named individuals would make the strongest possible combination of Democratic Candidates for statewide elective office in 1962.

GOVERNOR ________________________________

LIEUT. GOVERNOR __________________________

U. S. SENATOR ______________________________

U. S. CONGRESSMAN 1) _______________________

2) __________________

As my second choice, I believe that the following named individuals would make the strongest possible combination of Democratic Candidates for statewide elective office in 1962.

GOVERNOR ________________________________

LIEUT. GOVERNOR __________________________

U. S. SENATOR ______________________________

U. S. CONGRESSMAN 1) _______________________

2) __________________

Kauai Maui Hawaii

REASONS OR COMMENTS: (We are particularly interested in your analysis of the factors we should consider in arriving at combinations to elect all five candidates and not just certain individuals.)

(Attach Sheet if necessary) XXI
Dear Sir:

Your Committee on Vote Analysis to which was assigned the task of submitting a report on candidates who are now being considered by the Fact Finding Committee of the Democratic State Central Committee, in an attempt to determine the strongest combination of Democratic candidates for the Statewide offices in the election of 1962, after having carefully studied the official returns of Maui County, submits the following:

CANDIDATE: JOHN A. BURNS, SEEKING THE OFFICE OF DELEGATE TO CONGRESS

Year 1954, Received 7,680 votes out of 14,847 votes cast or 51.7%  
  " 1956,  " 8,557 "  " 14,702 "  " 56.2%  
  " 1958,  " 8,570 "  " 15,181 "  " 56.4%

CANDIDATE: JOHN A. BURNS, SEEKING THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR OF HAWAII

Year 1959, Received 8,029 votes out of 15,652 votes cast or 51.3%

In the year 1959, there were 471 more votes cast than the year 1958, however, John A. Burns received 541 votes less in 1959 as compared to the votes he received in 1958.

Weak precincts in 1959 for John A. Burns were: 7th (Iao School), 8th (Piihana), 9th (Pepohaku), 10th (Wainee), 12th (Kahului), 13th (Puuhele), 15th (Makawao), 27th (Keokea), and 1 (Lanai).

Precincts where comparative returns for the year 1958 and 1959 resulted in 25 votes or less were not considered.

CANDIDATE: DANIEL K. INOUYE, SEEKING THE OFFICE OF U.S. HOUSE

Year 1959, Received 9,547 votes out of 15,552 votes cast or 60.9%  
  " 1960,  " 11,666 "  " 16,237 "  " 71.8%

Returns for Daniel K. Inouye proved him a strong candidate in the 1960 returns in every precinct, except Nahiku on Maui and Halawa on Molokai, however, the total votes cast were negligible in these two precincts.

CANDIDATE: FRANK F. FASI, SEEKING THE OFFICE OF U.S. SENATE, SEAT "A"

Year 1959, Received 5,700 votes out of 15,652 votes cast or 36.4%

CANDIDATE: OPEN E. LONG, SEEKING THE OFFICE OF U.S. SENATE, SEAT "B"

Year 1959, Received 7,808 votes out of 15,652 votes cast or 49.9%

Returns for Frank F. Fasi and Open E. Long were not compared by precincts as both candidates had no prior voting record in Maui County.

Candidates Spark M. Matsunaga and Patsy T. Mink ran in the 1959 Primary Election, but both were unsuccessful in their bid for nomination, so your committee was unable to analyze their vote getting strengths, except for the compilation of the votes received by each.

The foregoing is more or less a sketchy statistical report of the candidates whose names have been in the possession of your committee for study, and for whom your committee has been able to obtain data as contained in the official election returns of Maui County.

Attached to this report is an exhibit containing data used by your committee in submitting this report.

Thom S. Ogata, Member  
John G. Dueitt, Chairman  
Yoshinao Yoshinaga, Clerk  
R. C. Higa, Recorder  
Wailuku, Maui, Hawaii  
November 7, 1961
Dear Bob -

I am very sorry that I will not be able to make the meeting on Wednesday at Iolani Palace. I will not be returning to Honolulu until next week. I also apologize for not immediately designating a representative to represent me during absences. I had not expected to be away from Honolulu so soon.

I feel that there are sufficient good minds working on the problems of the Fact Finding Committee so that the objectives of the Selection Committee will be achieved. My regret is that I will not be there to participate in the discussions. For whatever it is worth, however, it is my feeling that fundamentally the Committee should (1) gather all possible material and data on each potential candidate, and (2) evaluate and appraise such material and data, and (3) make its recommendations on the potentiality of each candidate for the several available elective offices.

The gathering of information and data can be accomplished by questionnaires to each candidate, to be followed up by a personal interview and meeting of the Committee with the candidate. Every bit of information on the candidate should be obtained - racial background, family, education, business experience, government and political experience, reputation, contacts, activity in civic and community affairs, popularity, finances, etc. etc.

Once the above information is obtained, the evaluation and appraisal follows. In this process, two things, in my opinion, must be borne in mind. One - the qualifications of the candidate for the position, and, two - the ability of the candidate, with proper promotion, publicity, campaigning etc., to get the votes! This latter is most important as sometimes the most qualified person for the job cannot attract the necessary votes to win.

The third and last step, the recommending of potential candidates, calls for what I would like to term "positioning". A person might be no. 2 for a particular position, but in combination with another, might be no. 1; or the same person might be no. 1 for several positions but is stronger or weaker depending upon the balance of the ticket etc. Various combinations of candidates can be worked out, if of course the Committee feels it appropriate to do so.

The above are just some of my thoughts, for whatever they are worth. I am sure that others will come up with perhaps better ideas. In any event whatever the majority approves should govern.

Sincerely,
APPENDIX B

Partial Report No. 2

March 16, 1962
March 16, 1962

State Central Committee
Democratic Party of Hawaii
Room 300, Liberty Bank Building
Honolulu, Hawaii

Gentlemen:

Re: Partial Report No. 2

Your Committee on Candidates Selection for State-Wide Elective Offices for the 1962 election submits Partial Report No. 2 as follows:

On February 3, 1962, a chronological report in detail and depth supported by numerous exhibits together with the Committee Conclusions was submitted to and adopted by the Democratic State Central Committee.

This partial report is primarily concerning the Committee Conclusions relating to the United States Senate seat.

In that initial report the Committee unanimously adopted the following as the official position of the Committee with reference to the United States Senate seat, to-wit:

It is primarily a personal issue between incumbent United States Senator Oren E. Long and incumbent United States Congressman Daniel K. Inouye.

The Honorable Oren E. Long, United States Senator, recently issued a prepared statement in which he announced his retirement from the United States Senate effective upon the expiration of his present term and his support of Daniel K. Inouye for that office if and when he becomes a candidate. His prepared statement as quoted in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of March 9, 1962, pages 1 and 1-A is as follows:

"I will not be a candidate for re-election to the U.S. Senate from Hawaii for the term beginning January 3, 1963, and ending January 3, 1969."

"In making this announcement I wish to express my appreciation to my fellow citizens of the Aloha State for the privilege of serving as one of their first United States Senators.

"It is my intention, if and when Congressman Daniel K. Inouye announces his candidacy for the Democratic Senatorial nomination, to support him in the campaign."

"Even though I do intend to leave the United States Senate at the end of this term, I also intend to continue my interest in public affairs and in political developments in Hawaii."
Upon motion duly made and seconded, the Committee unanimously agreed that in view of the retirement of United States Senator Oren E. Long that the Committee make a selection for the office of United States Senator.

Thereafter, on motion duly made and seconded, the Committee unanimously agreed that Daniel K. Inouye is the strongest candidate that the Democratic Party can select for the office of United States Senator.

It is again to be noted that "All Committee Members were particularly impressed with the sincerity of the potential candidates to cooperate fully with this Committee to participate in striving for the objectives sought by the resolution. Many of them have helped the party by their constructive criticisms and assistance during this long process and the Committee is of the opinion that most of the potential candidates should be recognized for their participation in their contribution to the party in this manner." 1 Your Committee recommends that the Party recognize the many talents and abilities of these persons who can properly contribute to a better Hawaii.

CONCLUSIONS

OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF THE CANDIDATES SELECTION COMMITTEE FOR STATE-WIDE ELECTIVE OFFICES IN 1962 IN SUMMARY AS OF MARCH 16, 1962, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

GOVERNOR: JOHN A. BURNS is the strongest candidate that the Democratic Party can select.

LT. GOVERNOR: The Governor Selectee shall be consulted as to his "running mate" with the ultimate selection to be made by the Committee.

U.S. SENATOR: DANIEL K. INOUYE, incumbent United States Representative from Hawaii, is the strongest candidate that the Democratic Party can select.

U.S. HOUSE: That the strongest candidates that the Democratic Party can select, in the order of strength, are as follows:

1. THOMAS P. GILL, incumbent State Representative from 15th District, House Majority Floor Leader.

2. HERBERT K. H. LEE, former Territorial Senator and President of the Territorial Senate.

3. NELSON K. DOI, incumbent State Senator and Minority Floor Leader from 1st Senatorial District.

4. O. VINCENT ESPOSITO, incumbent State Senator from the 4th Senatorial District.

U.S. HOUSE: There was considerable discussion as to the four (4) selectees for the Office of U.S. House of Representatives.

Since this Committee has taken its position as to the strongest single candidate for the Office of Governor that the Democratic Party can select, and as to the strongest single candidate for the Office of U.S. Senator that the Democratic Party can select, the objective is to select two (2) from the above four (4) selectees as the strongest candidates that the Democratic Party can select as "the best means of winning the 1962 elections". All due and proper consideration will be given to all selectees, including the order of strength and the element of time.

FUTURE EFFORTS: As indicated by the title of this report, your Committee has made this a partial report for the reason that it has completed its work with reference to the Office of Governor and the Office of United States Senator. Your Committee has likewise indicated its position, in order of strength, on candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives.

Believing that time is almost of the essence, your Committee will accelerate its activities in all areas to the conclusion of the intent, spirit and purpose of the basic resolution to "Pursue All Possibilities Towards Arriving At The Strongest Combination of Candidates".

Thereupon, on motion duly made and seconded, it was unanimously agreed that the Committee, through its Chairman, continue its efforts towards arriving at the strongest combination of five (5) persons for the five (5) State-Wide elective offices.

Your Committee recommends the adoption of the foregoing report.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. OSHIRO, Chairman


APPENDIX C

Letter from Office of Mayor Frank F. Fasi.

April 9, 1979
April 9, 1979

Mr. Paul C. Phillips  
P. O. Box 21  
Volcano, Hawaii 96785

Dear Mr. Phillips:

The theme of your doctoral dissertation sounds interesting although controversial, to say the least.

Mayor Fasi will be happy to answer all your questions but only by a lie detector test if it is also administered to the Burns' people who made those statements. Otherwise, the Mayor says "forget it."

He does appreciate your effort to get his side of the story, and since you're interested in the truth, his suggestion seems the fair way to go about it.

With kind regards and aloha.

Sincerely,

EILEEN K. LOTA  
Administrative Assistant to the Mayor
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