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The conceptual background to the United States Institute of Peace

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THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

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This dissertation is dedicated to Senator Spark M. Matsunaga

l'homme incompris: without his tireless efforts there would be no United States Institute of Peace
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an investigation into the ideas that formed the United States Institute of Peace in order to ascertain how they fit into traditional American thought and belief. It uses primary source material, including interviews, letters, government documents as well as historical references. It traces the historical development and reasons for institutionalization of the concept of a Department of Peace and analyzes the institute that resulted from the federal legislative process, comparing it with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The role of peace education, peace research and peace action in shaping the institute is also presented. The author concludes that in the four years of its existence the United States Institute of Peace has made considerable achievements despite underfunding and the leadership of a largely conservative Board of Directors. If it can tailor its agenda to fit the needs of a new intellectual climate of opinion, the Institute should be a leader in the peace research field.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain how the concepts that motivated people to institutionalize peace education and peace research within the federal government are a part of the historic tradition of American thought and belief. The work is divided into three parts: Historical Heritage, Conceptual Background, and Analysis.

The first chapter considers America's religious heritage and the just war concepts that inform American thinking about peace and war. Chapter two examines Americans' propensity to codify their civic convictions by relating the saga of efforts to institutionalize American concepts of peace from George Washington's suggestion of a Department of Peace to the present United States Institute of Peace. The organized effort for institutionalization as a social movement organization is also considered.

The third chapter defines the terms of the debate that took place in federal government hearings on the establishment of a peace academy, and sets these terms in historical perspective. Ideas such as America's uniqueness and messianic vision are explored. The concepts leading to the establishment of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) closely parallel those that led to the founding of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was intended to satisfy the desires of peace proponents. Chapter Four traces the development of that agency and outlines
the caveats that informed founders of the USIP, which was originally envisioned as a peace academy. Accordingly, Chapter Five reviews the history of peace education in schools and colleges in the United States, and critiques some programs now in place. The role of the federal government in education is also examined. Similarly, Chapter Six traces the development of peace research, with special attention to conflict resolution, from colonial times to the present. The tension between strategists and critical peace researchers, which I call "the two culture debate," is probed.

The last part consists of an assessment of the first four years of the USIP in Chapter Seven and concluding remarks in Chapter Eight. I believe that, despite administration objections and the leadership of a largely conservative board of directors, the institute has been remarkably even-handed in its support of all forms of peace research. This raises the question of the role of intellectuals in shaping public philosophy and participating in social action, which is briefly considered. Finally, I suggest that the American peace movement is part of a global trend toward democratic participation in public affairs and commitment to nonviolent solutions to conflict, and this has implications for the fledgling institution.

My thanks to my numerous correspondents and interviewees; their help was invaluable. Interpretations of the information received are, of course, my own.
Ironically, the United States Institute of Peace was born on October 19, 1984, in the penumbra of the Defense establishment: legislation creating the Institute was an appendage (Title XVII) to the Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 98-525). The reason for this seeming contradiction was that from its conception the Institute was subject to the exigencies of political maneuvering.

Its long gestation process began in the Carter administration, but by the time it was ready to be shaped into legislative form, a new Reagan administration opposed the measure. Proponents of the legislation attached the provision for a peace institute to a bill the conservative President would not veto, thereby extracting a sort of rough poetic justice against an administration at that time given more to bellicosity than diplomacy in the practice of its foreign policy.

In this regard, the Institute joins the ranks of other institutions created by Americans to correct the disparity between avowed principles and empirical practices in our society: A Civil Rights Commission to safeguard basic citizen rights embodied in our Constitution and codified in our laws; an anti-trust division in the Justice Department to investigate violations of free market practices, the bedrock of our capitalistic system; an Environmental Protection Agency to monitor the way we husband our natural resources, hailed as
irreplaceable in numerous acts creating national parks, forests, landmarks and watershed areas.

As numerous witnesses testified during the Congressional hearings on the establishment of the USIP, there was a perceived dichotomy between the principles of a democratic, peace-loving nation and the practices of that nation in the form of three service academies and five war colleges to train young people to wage war, along with an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons and a huge peacetime military budget.

The movement for a peace institute began in 1976, when S. 1976, the George Washington Peace Academy Act, failed to pass out of the subcommittee on education of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. As a result, concerned citizens formed N-PAC (the National Peace Academy Campaign), and in 1978 they were able to convince legislators to create a Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution.

This commission, chaired by Senator Spark M. Matsunaga of Hawaii, carried out its mandate to investigate existing peace programs in higher education institutions and to consider the feasibility, practicality and possible structure of a Peace Academy. Twelve public hearings were conducted across the United States. After the commission completed its work, it recommended to President Reagan and Congress the establishment of a United States Academy of Peace (Commission Report 1980, 189).

Most of the 300 witnesses who appeared before the commission supported the establishment of a national academy of peace, but
there were dissenters who feared duplication of efforts of the private sector, opposed the creation of another federal bureaucracy, and distrusted any institution created by the federal government.

This distrust reflects an aspect of the American character that suspects government institutions as inherently prone to corruption and irresponsibility. In *Tales of a New America* Robert Reich labels this phenomena the "rot at the top"; it ranges from a healthy vigilance against the abuse of authority to occasional hysteria over the depredations of government authorities (Reich 1987, 201). Numerous private organizations, such as Common Cause and the Natural Resources Defense Council, monitor government agencies to make sure that they are fulfilling their legislative intent; and that same ethos has led Americans to create government institutions to combat perceived abuses of power in such fields as anti-trust, civil service and civil rights legislation. Nonetheless, a majority of witnesses managed to convince eight of the nine commission members to recommend establishment of a peace academy. Their testimony reveals a variety of motivations for endorsing a federal approach to the road to peace - an approach surprising in a post-Watergate, post-Vietnam, post-Iran-Contra era, when confidence in government solutions has been perceived to be at an all-time low. What prompted these citizens to petition for a peace academy? Was their trust simply the traditional American faith in institutional solutions, a heritage of the Progressive era, or
did it reflect deeper, ingrained tenets of the American credo? My opinion is that both causes prevailed, and also that the urge toward institutionalization was spurred by a deep longing among peace advocates for acceptance, respect, and a permanent place in mainstream American society.

The American Peace Movement

Chroniclers of the American peace movement disagree as to the influence of peace advocates on American foreign policy. While most would agree with Charles deBenedetti that "the organized peace reform has never approached the level of a genuinely mass movement in America" (deBenedetti 1984, 198) others would contend with Lawrence Wittner that the influence of the movement is growing: "by the early 1980s, the peace movement was no longer a marginal factor in American politics but an important participant, a serious contender for power" (Wittner 1984, 216-17). If creation of the United States Institute of Peace is any criterion, then the movement indeed has achieved some degree of leverage within the Establishment. Whether the USIP at present is fulfilling the goals of the peace advocates who urged its foundation is, however, open to question. It is the belief of this writer that a profound paradigm shift in American thought and belief would have to occur before the USIP could reflect the core values of peace activists. In a nation that celebrates individualism, competition and pluralism, the movement's call for teamwork, cooperation, and mutual understanding is only faintly heard, as deBenedetti states:
Most of all, however, the peace movement stands as a minority reform in America because it constitutes a subculture opposed to the country's dominant power culture and power realities. The peace subculture speaks of forbearance within a culture that has flowered in conquest. It speaks of reconciliation within a society that works better at distributing weapons than wealth. It speaks of supranational authority among a highly nationalistic people who dislike all authority. It speaks of a just global order to governing officials anxious for pre-eminence and profit (deBenedetti 1984, 199).

Perhaps this schism exists because the core value of peace advocates is a commitment to pacifism. As one travels from the center toward the periphery of this protean movement, the gradient becomes steeper until one is on the cutting edge, occupying the dizzy heights of power with strategic analysts and arms control planners, joined by the military establishment which solemnly declares "Peace is our Profession." These power brokers have no room in their lexicon for the words of those who stand on the slopes of the gradient: nonviolence, conflict resolution, world federalism, alternative defense.

Yet the pacifism of the "idealists" grew from the same religious roots as did the aggressiveness of the "realists." Various historic peace sects - Quakers, Moravians, Mennonites, Church of the Brethren - rejected Luther's dictum that Christians could participate in war at the command of the lawful magistrate. The tradition of nonviolence that they established included a pacifist refusal to retaliate, a belief in civil disobedience or the obligation to deliberately break the law in matters of conscience, direct action against injustice, and a vision of love
as an agent for fundamental social change. It was a tradition practiced by William Penn, John Woolman, Henry David Thoreau, William James, Jane Addams, and Martin Luther King, Jr., among others, and it helped to bring about great social changes in our society. Institutions such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Peace Corps and the depression-era Civilian Conservation Corps, can be directly traced to the tenets contained in William James's "The Moral Equivalent of War," in which he challenged Americans to devote the energies of military ideals, discipline, and patriotism to the service of their fellow men.

Modern peace groups such as SANE, The Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Committee for Nonviolent Action and the War Resisters' League are predicated on pacifist principles. In a society where such precepts are routinely denigrated, this is a radical commitment, not always shared by all members of the group and certainly not by all other peace groups. As one observer notes: "The philosophy of nonviolence was for the most part rejected by both the civil rights and peace movements of the middle and late 1960s, who were interested more in building a base of power than in cultivating a deep commitment to nonviolence." (Neil H. Katz 1974, 219)

In our culture, pacifists are usually dismissed as religious zealots, beyond the pale of mainstream America. If they have the misfortune to be maimed or killed while resisting injustice, they are labelled fanatics. But enough of these
dedicated people managed to sway public opinion in the 1950s and 1960s so that now the American civil rights picture is a very different one than it was a generation ago.

The gains of the civil rights movement are largely due to the courageous leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr. who led his followers in a pilgrimage of nonviolence against the forces of racism. King had no illusions about the difficulty of his struggle with the power elite. In his famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" he wrote: "History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily" (Oates 1982, 225).

Although pacifists argue that the potential uses of nonviolent power are still to be realized, they are also quick to acknowledge that a tremendous change in thinking would have to take place before these principles would be embraced by the American public:

Nonviolence simply cannot defend property rights over human rights. The primacy of human rights would have to be established within the United States and in all of its dealings with other peoples before nonviolence could defend this country successfully. Nonviolence could defend what is worth defending in the United States, but a badly needed social revolution would have to take place in the process (Lynd 1966, 528).

Just War Theory

Why are Americans committed to the concept of a garrison state, and why do they equate national security with military defense, thus obviating alternative security measures? This ethos also has religious roots. Although "turning the other
cheek" is a basic Christian principle, (Matthew 5:39) the concept of pacifism was never fully accepted by the mainstream churches: "Thus, Christian pacifism was excluded as a tenable doctrine for the faithful in the various churches that derived from Luther and Calvin, as well as the Church of England that was established as a result of the Anglican Reformation" (Brock 1966, 3-4).

Instead, the doctrine of the traditional churches was guided by just war concepts. These ideas, which can be traced to Aristotle and Cicero, were incorporated into religious dogma in the fourth century by Saint Augustine, who attempted to synthesize the sanction of holy war in the Old Testament with the pacific teachings of the New Testament and the just-war tradition inherited from the Greeks and Romans. He declared that the use of force to restrain violence was permissible as long as it was wielded under the aegis of competent authority (state or church), was undertaken as a last resort and for noble reasons, and conducted with consideration for noncombatants (Little, in Smith, 1985, 15). For Augustine, however, killing in order to punish heresy and unbelief was an act of Christian love, carried out for the eternal good of the unorthodox (ibid., 12). This thinking, congruent with the ethos of the holy wars of the Old Testament, served to justify the crusades of the medieval Church and, in America, those of the Puritan settlers in the New World. Equating Native Americans with the Amalekites of the Old Testament, the Puritans conducted the eradication of the aborigines as a crusade, and slaughtered the Pequot and
Narragansett tribes. Adhering to the code of the just war, they extended their holy wrath to the minions of the AntiChrist, the French Papists, and to fellow Protestants such as the Dutch (Painton 1960, 168).

In the thirteenth century, Saint Thomas Aquinas enunciated three important concepts regarding the justification of killing, which, for the Christian, is never justified. One concept is that the incidental effect of benefiting the community is just, even though this justice is difficult to guarantee. Another is that the Christian, endowed with free will, has the freedom to exercise the sovereignty of his conscience. From a Christian point of view, responsibility towards mankind must in any conflict override narrower national or political responsibility (Tooke, 1965, 177). It follows that an individual, acting as an agent of the State, may take life, as defense against public evil is obligatory, but that cause in which he enlists must be a just one. A third concept Aquinas offered to this body of thinking was the doctrine of invincible ignorance. This is the idea that certain deep beliefs are profoundly a matter of conscience and therefore not susceptible to any form of coercive alteration. Taking arms against them is senseless, so one must tolerate the religious convictions of dissenting groups (Little, in Smith 1985, 17). Needless to say, this last-named doctrine has been honored more in the breach than in the observance.

Theology and law were married in the writings of Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century jurist often called the father
of international law. Appalled by the slight causes for which men took up arms, and the lack of restraint in the conduct of war, Grotius called for a rule of law for both the undertaking of war (jus ad bello) and the conduct of war (jus in bello). His main purpose was to persuade the world that there were rules which all rulers of sovereign states could commonly accept and follow and thereby prevent anarchy, war and unnecessary bloodshed: "Least of all should that be admitted which some people imagine, that in war all laws are in abeyance. On the contrary war ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith" (Tooke 1965, 195).

His contribution was in his attempt to distinguish between volitional divine law and natural law: "What we have been saying could have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to him" (ibid., 197).

The code of the just war that has come down to us in modern times has certain basic precepts. In the initiation of war (jus ad bellum) six criteria prevail:

1. It must be declared by competent authority and serve the common good.

2. It must be employed in a just cause, such as danger to life or defense of human rights.
3. It must serve the right intention, such as the goal of limiting brutality.

4. It must be undertaken as a last resort, when all peaceful means of conflict resolution have been exhausted.

5. It must be proportionate to the cause or goal for which it is undertaken.

6. It must have a probability of success.

For the conduct of war (jus in bello) two legitimate criteria are identified: proportionality, or the use of weapons and strategy must not result in more destruction than the ends for which they are employed; and discrimination, or the prohibition of the direct killing of non-combatants (Jones and Griesbad 1985, ix). Many people argue that these last-named criteria rule out any use of nuclear weapons.

In the nuclear age, the just war code has enjoyed a renaissance of attention among Western theologians and political analysts and has largely served to justify the use of limited warfare (Johnson 1981, 327). The American doctrine of the just war recognizes armed aggression as the only justification for resort to arms, although, according to the Truman Doctrine and the many presidential pronouncements that have followed this ukase, it has not precluded the application of force in situations in which internal disorder or revolution are supported in varying degrees by an outside power (Tucker 1960, 42). Nor has an extreme reluctance to resort to war implied restraint in the manner of employing force once war has been thrust upon us.
as the dropping of the atomic bomb in World War II and the Cambodian bombings in the Vietnam War attest (ibid., 21).

In the United States, just war concepts are enunciated by certain leading Protestant and Catholic theologians and have served to reinforce the thinking of strategic analysts, deterrence theorists and cold warriors; to preclude acceptance of the principles of nonviolence into mainstream thinking; and to perpetuate an ideology of peace-through-strength as opposed to peace-through-social justice.

Three Theologians

Paul Ramsey

Speak Up For Just War Or Pacifism is the title of Paul Ramsey's latest book, and adumbrates the message he brings to the just war debate. A leading Methodist theologian, Ramsey takes issue with the 1986 report of the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church, In Defense of Creation. In this report, the bishops call for a compromise between just war theory and pacifism:

We believe the nuclear crisis poses fundamental questions of faith that neither the pacifist nor just-war traditions have adequately addressed. We invite pacifists and nonpacifists among our people not only to recapture their common ground, such as their moral presumption against all war and violence, but to undertake together a fresh inquiry into those transcendent issues that stretch far beyond private conscience and rational calculation (United Methodist Bishops, In Defense of Creation, 13).

Contrary to the rationale of strategic thinkers, the bishops do not equate national security with military defense: "There can
be no unilateral security in the nuclear age. Security requires economic strength and stability, environmental and public health, educational quality, social well-being, public confidence, and global cooperation" (ibid., 14).

Ramsey, however, staunchly maintains that the just war tradition is squarely within the parameters of modern Protestant thought, and that nuclear weapons can be used in a limited war. Early Christians, he states, were pacifists, but soon recognized the need for organization in social and political life in order to resist evil and changed over to the concepts of just war theory. In this regard, they recognized the "doctrine of two cities" which states that a Christian can maintain his loyalty to an earthly kingdom as well as to his religion (Ramsey, 1960). Thus, "Fighting a war has its obscure ratio only when the conduct is subordinated to the civil life and purposes of a nation, to its concrete civilization, values and policy objectives" (Ramsey in Thompson, 1980, 117). Modern Protestants, he maintains, must search their hearts to discover if "the moral underpinning of the just-war theory still remains intact, and whether there exists today any real moral limits upon the waging of war" (Ramsey 1960, 151). The problem is to sort out how a modern war can be conducted justly.

Ramsey resolves this dilemma by embracing the doctrine of counterforce strategy. This doctrine, which endorses a nuclear exchange between military targets, is morally justified because it rules out attack upon noncombatants, thus honoring the
principles of proportionality and discrimination in just war theory: "Counterforce nuclear war is the upper limit of rational, politically purposive military action" (Ramsey, in Thompson, 1980, 110). In choosing this strategy, Ramsey acknowledges the contribution of the pacifists: "Pacifists may have been wrong in the religious and political judgments they made in refusing direct participation in war; but they were certainly not wrong in discerning a significant distinction between civilian and combat status" (Ramsey 1960, 145). Of course, Ramsey recognizes the principle of "double effect" in which innocent civilians can be victims of an assault upon a military target, but is prepared to accept this collateral destruction "only if what is at stake in the encounter is great enough" (Ramsey 1988, 199).

Because of this necessity to distinguish between civilian and combatant status, Ramsey differs with most strategic thinkers in his refusal to accept completely the doctrine of deterrence. If wars can be morally justified, then the deterrence of war must be morally acceptable as well. "To put it bluntly, if counter-population warfare is murder, then counter-population deterrent threats are murderous" (ibid., 199). Although he endorses the views of many strategists such as Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling and Bruce Russett who embrace the principle of deterrence, Ramsey feels that in their hearts they also renounce the enormity of what deterrence has come to mean: "I know of no serious analyst of international affairs who does not endorse mutual riddance of this redundant, disproportionate, dangerous deterrence; or who
would not acknowledge in a quiet hour the shared responsibility of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the present disastrous overdevelopment of deterrence" (ibid. 56).

To the literature of deterrence, Ramsey offers his concept of a graduated deterrence, or deterrence from anticipated counterforce target destruction. This concept neatly subscribes to just war theory: "It is my view that a counterforce deterrent remains just according to the principle of discrimination; a countercombatant deterrent--if that is a feasible alternative or stress--may be required by the principle of proportion, or because it further minimizes destruction and risks" (ibid., 206).

Therefore, in spite of the fact that he renounces countervalue (counterpopulation) strategy, Ramsey, like other strategic thinkers, is prepared to accept the prospect of wholesale human destruction in a limited nuclear exchange. This raises a bifurcated paradox (which he acknowledges) in his rationale which he does not resolve successfully.

First, Ramsey concedes that graduated deterrence may go beyond the scope of proportionality, and therefore finds it necessary to clarify his position: "Graduated deterrence must, indeed, threaten something disproportionate, since its virtue entails a signal that one is willing to go to a level of destruction which is greater than what the cause is worth, politically, to oneself or to an opponent" (ibid., 210).
To this acknowledgement he offers three rejoinders: that not every threat of something disproportionate is itself a disproportionate threat, that the issuance of threats of disproportionate destruction is ever the nature of deterrence under any conditions of warfare, and that there is an obligation never to mean to do and accept damage disproportionate to political goals. The significance of these rejoinders is that "graduated nuclear deterrence based on the issuance of threats that might do disproportionate damage to an opponent's military forces can promise to escape the moral dilemmas" (ibid. 210).

The moral dilemmas surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, and the threat of the use of these weapons, are, of course, what prompted the bishops to draft their document, and for the U. S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops to compose their 1983 pastoral letter, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*, a study of nuclear issues and the moral challenges they raise.

A second dilemma, Ramsey concedes, is the fact that a threat to a nation's armed forces can be perceived as placing that nation's values and entire order of social life at stake. In that case, "There is good reason for any nation to regard the destruction of a great part of its armed forces as a more serious threat to the political society as a whole than the destruction of some part of the population" (ibid., 205). A threat to take away a nation's armed forces, which Ramsey asserts are essential to continued independence in our anarchal international system,
can be more serious to the integrity of a nation's life than the taking of hostage cities.

A nation needs its armed forces to pursue what Ramsey terms an "alternative to peace" in an uncertain age. Thus, just war theory is necessary to make the waging of war morally acceptable to the modern Christian: "War must be made morally possible, not only because it is not improbable at some distant time, but because, even now, a nation's purpose has no embodiment and no effect until a substitute has been found, not for war, but for the deterrent that deters no one so much as ourselves" (Ramsey 1960, 153).

John Courtney Murray, S.J.

Another theologian who sought a moral foundation for erecting the edifice of war was John Courtney Murray, S.J., whose ideas were a peculiar amalgam of Catholicism, Americanism and anti-Communism. He saw the determinism and ideology of Communist doctrine as inimical to Catholic faith and Western civilization. The official atheism of the Soviet state allowed it to subordinate the rights of the individual to that of the state, and to perpetuate the cult of Soviet patriotism. The basic postulate of the doctrine of dialectical materialism, that Communism is destined by history to replace capitalism, just as capitalism had replaced feudalism (Millis and Murray 1958, 31), made it necessary to marshall Catholic theology and American tradition to counter Communism.
Calling for a return to natural law as the way to restore America's self-understanding, he attacked the view of what he called "relative" Christian pacifism (as opposed to "absolute" pacifism) that war has become so destructive that it is now a moral absurdity, that the enemy is completely unprincipled and that opponents must be unprincipled to survive, and that the United Nations can act to make war illegal (Thompson 1980, 41). Like Ramsey, he thought limited war was a viable doctrine for Christians: "The Church does not look immediately to the abolition of war. Her doctrine still seeks to fulfill its triple traditional function: to condemn war as evil, to limit the evils it entails, and to humanize its conduct as far as possible" (Murray in Thompson 1980, 25). Just war theory was still valid in the nuclear age, and a defensive war to repress injustice was morally admissible both in principle and in fact (ibid., 18).

Murray thus allied himself with the "realist" school of strategic analysts who viewed force as the measure of power necessary to uphold the valid purposes of law and politics. Along with Robert Maynard Hutchins, Reinhold Niebuhr and A.A. Berle, he was a member of the Center of the Study of Democratic Institutions, and an influential figure in American intellectual life (Thompson 1980, 39).

Reinhold Niebuhr

The theologian who perhaps most influenced American thinking about war and peace was Reinhold Niebuhr. A prolific writer, excerpts from his seventeen books and more than fifteen hundred
magazine articles articles and speeches found their way into newspaper columns, government documents, and political texts. He developed his ideas through exploring the tension of opposing views, creating dialectical aphorisms that captured profound truths and lent themselves to quotation, such as "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (Niebuhr 1944, 170). His criticism of communism was also an admonition to self-criticism: "We must fight their falsehood with our truth, but we must also fight the falsehood in our truth" (Brown 1986, xxi). As Arnold Wolfers, consultant to the Army, National War College, and State Department stated: "None of us working in international relations on the outside can ever hope to be able to prove that a decision-maker would have acted differently if he had not heard or read what one of us brought to his attention. But at least in the case of Niebuhr, many prominent men agree that they have been deeply influenced by his thought and, therefore, probably influenced in their actions" (Bingham, 1961, 369).

And George F. Kennan, in 1947 chairman of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, created to consider problems of American national interest, acknowledged, "Niebuhr is the father of us all" (ibid., 368).

Niebuhr's contribution to the corpus of thought regarding American views on peace, war and foreign relations was in his "liberal realism" that recognized power as the basis for international relations, and accepted different ethical standards
for individuals and nations. As a young Protestant preacher, he espoused pacifism and briefly flirted with Marxism as he began to explore the relation of liberty and justice to social ethics in his early writings. By 1932, however, he was criticizing the "selfishness of nations" that caused them to always act in their self-interest, and therefore adopt a double ethical standard. The self-criticism that is necessary for the formation of ethics is rarely indulged in by nations, for fear of disunity. Therefore governments behave hypocritically, creating moral pretentions for their actions; super-patriots transmute individual unselfishness into national egoism which destroys a critical attitude and moral restraint. And until a growing social intelligence modifies national attitudes, international anarchy will prevail. (Niebuhr 1960). World War II solidified Niebuhr's views regarding human nature and politics. Taking issue with the liberal tenets that appealed to brotherhood, reason and morality to prevail in political affairs, he stressed the essential dualism, the good and evil, in man's nature. Suspended between the human and the divine, man seeks security and tries to overcome his human limitations. By extending his power over others he reduces the social anxiety created by fear of domination by others. This power struggle characterizes international as well as interpersonal relations (Thompson 1980, 29).

A biography of Niebuhr celebrates his break with pacifism and Christian liberalism in its title, *Courage to Change*. In his later writings, Neibuhr defends advocating the
use of force in opposing oppressive regimes: "It was certainly the mistake of Christian liberalism to believe that the law of love could and would be applied neatly to the collective as well as to the personal relations of men" (Brown 1986, 546). Although he did not frame his views in the context of classic just war theory, Niebuhr nonetheless adapted his political message to the exigencies of the nuclear dilemma: "Surely the fact that it is necessary for Christian nations to preserve their defenses against nuclear attack by the power of nuclear retaliation, hoping that in this way a nuclear war may be avoided, is merely the old problem of the difference between individual and collective morality in a new dimension" (ibid. 543).

As stated above, Niebuhr served with John Courtney Murray on the prestigious Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Kenneth W. Thompson states that the discussions and debates between Murray and Niebuhr provide one of the most fruitful dialogues in the history of American religious and political thought (Thompson 1980, 38).

Paul Ramsey, whose ideas were compared to Niebuhr's in a Newsweek article, wrote "I am honored to have my name linked with that of Reinhold Niebuhr, America's greatest twentieth-century political analyst" (Ramsey 1988, 206n).

Niebuhr was a leader in the Protestant movement between the world wars to disavow pacifism and create a religiously motivated political realism in its stead. Ramsey compares Niebuhr's views
with those of Thomas C. Schelling, calling them "mirror images of one another" (ibid., 189). Schelling, a professor of political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, is well known for his staunch defense of deterrence vis-a-vis arms control (Schelling 1985). Niebuhr's views, however, are probably closer to those of his disciples, George F. Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau.

Kennan, who also argues that the collective egoism of the group motivates nations in international society and therefore different moral standards apply to individuals and nation-states (Kennan 1985) allies himself with Niebuhr in criticizing the legalistic-moralistic approach to international relations, believing that a war fought on high moral principles is more destructive of political stability than a war based on national interest (Thompson 1980, 153).

Morgenthau is concerned with the relation between national interest and morality and power. Declaring that national interest defined in terms of power is the main tenet of realism, he states that the United States has been able to depreciate the role power plays on the international scene because of the libertarian, anti-militaristic intellectual climate of the nineteenth century and the circumstances that determined the relations of the United States to the rest of the world. This heritage has enabled the nation to behave as if it has a choice between power politics and other kinds of foreign policy not tainted by the desire for power, but, like Niebuhr, Morgenthau believed that the struggle
for power is the basis of international relations (Morgenthau 1954).

Niebuhr, Kennan and Morgenthau would agree that the United States has no right to impose its political and moral tradition on other nations. In this regard, these advocates of realism place themselves in opposition to American human rights activists who would impose standards of social justice on the rest of the world. Such standards would be impossible to enforce, the realists believe, and would disregard other national interests that should demand the attention of the United States (Thompson 1980, 89).

This dichotomy between realists and idealists is still the central debate of international relations theory in this country. A quarter of a century ago, Anatol Rapaport, in Strategy and Conscience, deplored the functional deafness developed by strategists to any discourse in other than the strategic mode, declaring that in order to reach the strategists one must gloss over the moral issues (Rapaport 1964, 194). He called for a discourse between strategists and people of conscience, but wondered if such a dialogue would be worthwhile. The realists, he argues, cling to a "normative theory of decision-making which claims to be 'realistic', i.e. purports to derive its prescripts exclusively from 'objective reality' but is likely to lead to delusion" because reality is not abstractionist or neo-traditionalist power politics but essentially a moral dilemma. [Recently, Rapaport learned that his book is enthusiastically

Strategic doctrine has dominated American foreign policy ever since the issuance of NSC-68, the "white paper" authored by Paul Nitze in 1950 that argued for the use of military power to protect national interest. Subordinating all other concerns to those of meeting the needs of national security, it advocated a buildup of armed forces to meet a perceived Soviet threat that became official American policy: "The essence of NSC 68 was its all-encompassing recommendation of a 'rapid and sustained buildup of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world'" (Rearden 1984, 24). That buildup was sustained for forty years, due largely to the efforts of Nitze and other strategists who formed the Committee on the Present Danger to enlist support for this policy. The fact that such a ploy to influence public opinion was needed would seem to endorse Morgenthau's observation that Americans are basically anti-militaristic. Nonetheless, this document helped to foster a Manichean view of the international scene. Ironically, "the idea that there was in fact a clear dichotomy in the world between a 'slave' society in the East and a 'free' society in the West could be misleading because [in 1950] very few countries outside the Soviet bloc were 'free' by American standards of democracy" (ibid. 25).

Thus, the intellectual climate of opinion that informed the formation of the United States Institute of Peace contained a
heritage of two philosophies: that of the realist, who advocated deterrence, peace-through-strength and power politics, and that of the idealist, who spoke for nonviolence, peace-through-social justice and accommodation. Cold warriors and pacifists disagreed on whether nuclear weapons exploded the theory of just war, and many "relative" pacifists, recognizing that 'inter arma silent legis' and the anarchy of the international system, agreed with historian Michael Walzer that "when one cannot count on a moral code, nonviolence is either a disguised form of surrender or a minimalist way of upholding communal values after a military defeat" (Walzer 1977, 333).

On initial examination these two philosophies would appear to be mutually exclusive, but in fact proponents of each have endorsed the concept of a federal institution charged with the mandate of seeking non-military means of settling international conflict. It must be conceded, however, that historically members of the American peace movement have been the strongest supporters of the concept. Most of the early efforts to establish such an institution centered around the idea of a Department of Peace, equal in status to the departments of state and defense.
CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE

The concept of an American institution devoted to the pursuit of peace is almost as old as the nation itself. In 1792 Benjamin Banneker (1731-1806), often called the "black Benjamin Franklin" printed in the first edition of his "Almanack" an unsigned article proposing an Office or Department of Peace within the federal government. It began:

Among the defects which have been pointed out in the Federal Constitution by its antifederalist enemies, it is much to be lamented that no person has taken notice of its total silence upon the subject of an office of the utmost importance to the welfare of the United States, that is, an office for promoting and preserving perpetual peace in our country.

Later, in 1799, Dr. Benjamin Rush (1745-1813), physician, educator and signer of the Declaration of Independence, wrote "A Plan of a Peace-Office for the United States" which was almost identical to the first essay.

Rush's plan had a strong moralistic motivation. The proposed Secretary of Peace should be "a genuine republican and a sincere Christian;" his mission would be primarily to educate Americans to abhor war. To assist him in this endeavor, Rush proposed the abolition of the death penalty, the repeal of militia laws, the elimination of uniforms because "military dresses fascinate the minds of young men, and lead them from serious and useful professions" and a sign for the new peace office on which the figures of a lamb, a dove and an olive branch should be painted.
with the inscription: "Peace on earth - good will to man. Ah! Why will men forget that they are brethren?" Rush even proposed certain pictures to be painted on the walls of the peace department quarters, depicting such irenic scenes as an "Indian boiling his venison in the same pot with a citizen of Kentucky." By contrast, he prescribed that the War Office should feature representations of "human skulls, broken bones, unburied and putrefying dead bodies" and other gruesome sights, along with the inscription "National Glory" (Runes 1947, 19). In spite of the fact that President George Washington was favorable to the idea, as he had stated in a circular to the states in 1783: "There can be little doubt but Congress will recommend a proper Peace Establishment for the United States" the proposal produced no tangible result.

The idea of a Department of Peace or a peace agency was proposed at various times during the 19th century by peace movement activists and legislators, but did not lead to constructive action, perhaps because of an intrinsic weakness in the American peace movement: when the nation faced going to war, peace proponents divided between patriots and pacifists. Thus, the American Peace Society, founded in 1828 as a consolidation of state and local peace groups, divided in 1846 over the Mexican War between anti-war protestors and fervent believers in manifest destiny and fell apart altogether with the outbreak of the Civil War as abolitionists righteously embraced the union cause. Even the most radical pacifist of his day, William Lloyd Garrison,
endorsed the necessity of anti-slavery violence (Curti 1936, 58). In the aftermath of that war, disillusioned peace reformers formed conservative organizations that sought to banish the specter of war from America through the leadership of an intellectual-spiritual elite (deBenedetti 1984, 60).

The Universal Peace Union, for example, was founded in 1866 on the principle of nonviolent resistance, but endorsed a legalistic means of dispute settlement - arbitration - and a legalistic means of removing the causes of war - disarmament. Americans participated in the formation of the Interparliamentary Union, committed to the maintenance of an international bourgeois order through a world court, and founded the National Arbitration League (ibid., 65).

As the twentieth century dawned with its optimistic promise of a better world based on rational order and materialistic progress, efficiency became the new watchword of the peace movement (Marchand 1972, 99). Business leaders, lawyers, clergymen and educators united in organizations that replaced the moral repudiation of war with objective proposals for research into the causes of war. Fueled by generous funds supplied by millionaires such as textbook publisher Edwin Ginn (World Peace Foundation, 1911) and steel magnate Andrew Carnegie (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1910), these new intellectual-economic elites pursued studies dictated largely by the power of the purse that supported them and enjoyed unquestioned Establishment status (ibid., 102). It was
inevitable, therefore, that such members of the entrenched social order would fail to criticize the fundamental institutional and behavioral assumptions underlying that order. As one writer stated, they "overestimated the applicability of American values and institutions, and underestimated the importance of national self-interest and power in international relations" (Patterson 1976, 259). Again, the peace movement divided between those who advocated the war to save the world for democracy and those who wanted an immediate, negotiated peace without indemnities.

After the First World War, postwar disillusionment again affected peace activists, but members of the lost generation rallied to support several Congressional proposals for departments of peace and related agencies. Along with the neutrality bills of the 1930s, these measures were in part a reflection of the reaction to the revelations in 1934 of the Senate Select Committee that examined charges raised in the book Merchants of Death (1934) that the United States was drawn into the First World War by an alliance of bankers and munitions manufacturers. Headed by Senator Gerald Nye, a Progressive Republican from North Dakota, the committee concluded that the United States had not been entirely neutral in the years before 1917 (Schulzinger 1984, 159).

Three bills calling for the creation of a Department of Peace were introduced by Senator Matthew Neely of West Virginia in the years 1935-39 (later, his successor, Senator Jennings Randolph, was to take up the peace department torch) and a bill
was introduced in the House in 1935 calling for a Bureau of Peace and Friendship devoted to sociological research in matters connected with war (Fletcher 1969, 1). Each of these measures was designed to counter-balance the influence of the War Department. The black clouds of war, however, gathered momentum and eventually rained on this parade of legislation and its peace advocate supporters who again divided on the issue of the morality of war.

Prominent pacifists such as Reinhold Niebuhr joined the chorus of those who denounced the excesses of totalitarian regimes and urged United States participation in the Second World War on moral grounds. The peace movement divided once more between radical pacifists, many of whom endured great hardships because of their conscientious objector beliefs, and relative pacifists who adhered to just-war theory. The concept of a Department of Peace was not forgotten, however, and between the years 1945-1968 more than 90 bills calling for a Department of Peace or a Division of Peace within the State Department or a National Peace Agency were introduced in the House or Senate (Fletcher 1969, 2-4). But none garnered enough support to pass both houses, and all were opposed by entrenched bureaucracy.

In 1955, however, President Eisenhower appointed Harold E. Stassen to a newly-created cabinet-level post of Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. Widely hailed as virtually a "Secretary of Peace" the new post reflected Eisenhower's concern for "the massive resources required for
modern armaments, the huge diversion of materials and of energy, the heavy burden of taxation, the demands for years of service of vast numbers of men, the unprecedented destructive power of new weapons and the international tensions which powerful armaments aggravate" (Lent 1968, 10). In that same year a resolution was introduced by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana to establish a Joint Congressional Committee on a Just and Lasting Peace which would "study all possibilities for achieving a just and lasting peace" (ibid., 11). And in 1959 the Democratic Advisory Committee proposed a National Peace Agency which would largely conduct research focused on disarmament, with no responsibility for the actual conduct of foreign relations.

Thus enjoying the backing of top-level Democratic leaders, proponents sponsored a flood of bills to establish a National Peace Agency and introduced a Disarmament Act for World Peace and Security. This activity eventually led to the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961, when President Kennedy prevailed upon sponsors of the peace agency bills to support the administration-backed ACDA.

This agency differed from previous national peace agency concepts in two significant ways: it was under the direction of the Secretary of State, and it had significant operating responsibilities in the field of disarmament negotiations, as well as duties of research, public information and policy recommendation (ibid., 16). Disenchantment with the lack of results that establishment of the ACDA promised and with the
progress of the VietNam war, however, motivated legislators and peace activists to revive the concept of an independent Department of Peace (Congressional Record 11 September 1968, S10522).

Several bills were introduced, but the ones gaining the most prominence and support were the identical 1968 proposals for a Department of Peace introduced into the 90th Congress by Representative Seymour Halpern of New York with 30 co-sponsors, and Senators Hartke, Hatfield, Yarborough and Randolph (Schuman 1969, 25). With some modifications, this legislation was reintroduced in three successive Congressional sessions, but with the attention of the nation focused on the Watergate affair and the diminished interest in the VietNam War, it failed to attract enough supporters to enact into law. The bills did create an impressive grass-roots following, however, and led directly to subsequent legislation establishing the United States Institute of Peace.

In sharp contrast to Benjamin Rush's moralistic Secretary of Peace who would educate Americans in the Christian virtues as well as the horrors of war, the Halpern-Hartke Secretary of Peace would be a consummate bureaucrat presiding over an omnibus agency with a wide-ranging mandate. The Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would be transferred to the new department, as well as those functions of the State Department that pertain to the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Included in its
jurisdiction would be an International Peace Academy charged with the functions of training people for work in the area of peace, performing peace research, and acting as a clearinghouse of information for voluntary organizations and other agencies. The Secretary would act as the President's principal adviser on peace and coordinate all federal activities affecting peace, at home and abroad. The bill also established a Joint Committee of Congress for Peace and International Cooperation, similar to the 1955 Mansfield proposal. (Congressional Record, 25 January 1972, H275).

Soon after the bills were introduced, a citizens' group was organized in May, 1969 by the bills' sponsors to support the proposed institution, calling itself the Peace Act Advisory Council, and setting for itself the task of building public demand for a Department of Peace. They attracted a diverse group of prominent sponsors, including psychologist Jerome Frank, former ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg, former undersecretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes, former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps David Shoup, writer Norman Cousins, feminist Gloria Steinem, and academics Kenneth Boulding, Theodore Hesburgh, Harold Lasswell, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Jerome Weisner. A curious blend of patriotic fervor and irectic ar dor united this group:

This is a nation, not of philosophers, but of inventors, engineers, builders; a working people. Through some terrible displacement of energy, a kind of cosmic computer error, a whole generation of Americans has been programmed to work for war and, being the kind of people they are, have produced the biggest and best
there is. It would strike DeTocqueville as typically American to perfect a doom machine and refer to it as 'hardware'. What are the chances of harnessing this innovative, pragmatic national genius, and the resources of the richest country in the world, on behalf of peace? (Pax newsletter, July, 1970).

In typical American fashion, the Peace Act Advisory Council reorganized into an incorporated, tax-exempt association. Renamed the Council for a Department of Peace (CODEP), it set about drawing up bylaws, electing officers and a board of directors. It placed advertisements in Saturday Review, Atlantic Monthly, and the Progressive, and sponsored scholarly conferences. At its most active time, it had a membership of 90 affiliated groups and individuals, a mailing list of 3000, and distributed 6000 copies of its newsletter, PAX (letter from Mary Liebman, 24 January 1974, to board members).

In order to keep its tax-exempt status, CODEP confined its activities to those of recruiting new members and educating the general public to the concept of a Department of Peace. It also broadened its scope to endorse other aspects of the "peace machinery" it thought the government ought to be building, including an Executive Peace Council in the White House, and a National Service Force in addition to the functions outlined in the proposed legislation. Not all of its members, though, were sympathetic to all of the goals of the organization.

There was considerable resistance, for example, to the conglomerate quality of the proposed Department of Peace. Supporters of the concept maintained that the departments of
State and Defense would continue to operate in the national interest, but the Department of Peace could assume a perspective transcending the narrow parochial interests of national security. Others, however, saw many jurisdictional problems arising between the three departments, and still others welcomed a possible internecine power struggle that would force the State Department to defend its positions. In an article in the *Yale Law Review* Gerald A. Sumida analyzed some of the anticipated problems, pointing out that the Agency for International Development (AID) administered foreign military as well as humanitarian aid, and was forbidden by Congress from extending that assistance to any communist country, thus furthering United States foreign policy objectives. Because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for management of U.S. participation in international negotiations, a clash of values concerning differing conceptions of national security would inevitably result. Regarding national security, Sumida questioned whether a distinction could be made between the routine conduct of foreign relations and the implementation of a "grand strategic policy" (Wu, 1970).

Because of these perceived problems, some CODEP members suggested separating the three areas of the proposal into separate bills, for a Department of Peace, a National Peace Academy, and a Joint Congressional Committee on Peace and International Cooperation (letter from George Kent, 7 January 1972 to Congressman Seymour Halpern). Accordingly, in 1975 Senators Vance Hartke of Indiana and Mark Hatfield of Oregon
introduced a bill "to establish an educational institution in the United States" to promote understanding of "the process and state of peace" and "to consider the dimensions of peaceful resolution of differences" (George Washington Peace Academy Act, S.1976). As they did with the Department of Peace legislation, citizens rallied to support this bill and in true American spirit formed yet another organization, which they called the National Peace Academy Campaign (N-PAC). Many members of CODEP joined this group.

The story of the formation of N-PAC is one of a confluence of forces, people, ideas and events merging to swell the tide that pushed the peace institute legislation forward. One such force was the Peace Ballot of 1975. Distributed by the National Committee for the Peace Ballot which was composed of three organizations, World Without War Council, CODEP, and World Federalists, USA, the ballot was a national referendum on peace issues. Member groups planned to use the results to formulate objectives and priorities into a peace platform for the 1976 elections, and thereby improve communication between the peace constituency and political leaders. Respondents were asked to prioritize nine issues in each of six categories: steps to reverse the arms race; support for universal human rights; provision for basic human needs; measures to protect the global environment; alternative approaches to international institutions and law; and re-organization of the U.S. government for a more effective peace-making and peace-keeping role. On the returns,
more than 23,000 people marked a National Peace Academy as one of their priority objectives.

Meanwhile, in the nation's capital, convinced that the Department of Peace proposal was doomed to the dustbin of lost causes, legislators were preparing to salvage sections of the Halpern-Hartke measure that would be politically palatable to their fellow lawmakers. Stephen Cloud, an assistant to the Veteran's Affairs Committee of the Senate, organized discussions between interested citizens and legislators. One of the people he sought out was psychiatrist Bryant Wedge, who had served in 1958 as an Eisenhower Exchange Fellow, traveling to fifteen countries in Europe, Africa and Asia. His experience convinced him that friction, distortion and misunderstanding contribute to conflict, with attendant costs and risks, and he decided to work for better understanding and management of human factors in international relationships. He subsequently left his post as chief of the psychiatric department, university health, Yale University, to go to Princeton where he founded and became director of the Institute for the Study of National Behavior, formed for the purpose of improving international understanding by research into the psychological characteristics of nationality (testimony, George Washington Peace Academy Act hearings). In that capacity, he gained experience in settling international disputes and developed a method for reduction of perceptual distortion in international conflicts (Wedge 1971, 735).
This concept of an impartial peace-making function was incorporated into the introduction to S.1976: "to further the understanding of the process and state of peace among nations and cooperation between peoples; to consider the dimensions of peaceful resolution of differences among nations; to train students in the process of peaceful resolution of differences; to inform governmental leaders of peaceful methods of conflict resolution."

Almost at once after this legislation was introduced, a mysterious network began to form as people interested in the concept of a federal peace academy contacted Cloud and Dr. Wedge. Mary Liebman, secretary of CODEP, offered the support of her organization; Frances Farenthold, then president of Wells College, volunteered to help organize support in the academic community; Rose and Dan Lucey, a California couple active in the Christian Family Movement had established a peace academy campaign some years before, and took on the task of publicizing the proposed legislation on the west coast. Political scientist Ralph M. Goldman of San Francisco State University drew up a detailed development plan for a U.S. Peace Academy (later used as a model for the Conflict Management program at George Mason University). In Cleveland, Ohio, banker Thomas C. Westropp, president of the Women's Federal Savings and Loan Association and a member of the campaign committee of Congressman Charles A. Vanik who had introduced a peace academy bill in 1969, in 1970 took out a full page ad in the Cleveland Plain Dealer which
asked: "there is a United States Military Academy, Naval Academy, Air Force Academy, and War College. What if there were also a United States Peace Academy?" He now joined prominent supporters of CODEP, including psychiatrist Jerome Frank and writer Norman Cousins, who offered to testify for passage of the proposed bill when Dr. Wedge and Cloud were organizing the witness list.

Despite the impressive list of witnesses who urged passage of the legislation, on a technical level lawmakers had some reservations about certain details of the bill and on a pragmatic political level, as Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell observed, supporters needed to build a constituency, both public and Congressional, to push for passage of the legislation.

Accordingly, in May, 1976, Dr. Wedge joined with Dr. James Laue, director of the Community Conflict Program, Center of Community and Metropolitan Studies, University of Missouri and Georgia Representative Andrew J. Young in organizing the National Peace Academy Campaign (N-PAC). They were aided by a dedicated young man, William J. Spencer, who attended a lecture given by Dr. Wedge at the University of Pittsburgh and subsequently volunteered to work on the campaign. In August, Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield offered an amendment to S. 2657, the Higher Education Act, calling for appointment of a commission to study the Peace Academy Act and alternative proposals. The amendment was subsequently eliminated, and so N-PAC had a clear legislative objective in addition to its basic task of proselytizing the public to the concept of a peace academy and organizing citizens
to support such an institution. The N-PAC campaign "turned on extraordinary personal acts from entirely unexpected sources" (letter from Dr. Wedge to this writer 28 January 1987). Money donations came mostly from people in modest circumstances. Staff personnel, which included Spencer and U.S. Naval Academy graduate Milton C. Mapes, Jr., as executive director, worked long hours in the Washington office for very little compensation. A two-day conference on educating for peace was held in March, 1978 at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. Public service ads were placed in mass-circulation periodicals. Peace proved to be non-partisan, as conservatives and liberals alike lobbied Congress. The House and Senate in October, 1978 approved a conference report on the Elementary and Secondary education bill which included a provision authorizing a U.S. Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution. By that time the campaign had been incorporated as a non-profit corporation and included 3600 individual members as well as institutional supporters. (Campaign Update Fall, 1978). At this juncture, through the offices of journalist Frank Kelly of the Santa Barbara-based Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, a west coast direct-mail company joined the campaign, and eventually N-Pac numbered 45,000 constituents and was the sixth largest registered lobby (Interview with Dr. Bryant Wedge, June 10, 1986). Thus, by adhering to the classic model of a modern social movement organization, N-PAC leaders were able to fulfill Senator Pell's directive and build a public constituency.
A social movement can be defined as "a set of attitudes and self-conscious action on the part of a group of people directed toward change in the social structure and/or ideology of a society carried on outside of ideologically legitimated channels or which uses these channels in innovative ways" (Ash 1972, 1). A reform movement is "one that is not aimed at changing the relations of production or at displacing the incumbent ruling class. It uses only methods that are fundamentally legitimate and, generally, it is aimed at manipulating or cajoling elites" (ibid., 9). A social movement organization is a formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement and attempts to implement those goals (McCarthy and Zald 1976, 1218). Furthermore, the most successful movements have been those that were created by elites (Ash 1972, 231).

N-PAC, which was created by elites, which used conventional fund-raising and recruiting methods and which identified a narrow goal (creation of a national peace academy) around which peace partisans could rally, fit squarely within these definitions. Furthermore, the story of N-PAC's development reads like a textbook case of social movement organization utilization of resources.

The first task of a social movement organization is to convert adherents into constituents and maintain constituent involvement. Second, once formed, much like other organizations, it operates as though organizational survival were the primary
goal, because only if survival is assured can other goals be pursued. (McCarthy and Zald 1976, 1226). N-PAC, through its newsletter, Campaign Update, kept the faithful informed. Much of its early activities involved organizing a board of directors and suitable list of prominent sponsors, and holding receptions for supporters and would-be Congressional constituents (including one held at the Mayflower Hotel in the worst snowstorm of the year!). One of its first acts was to incorporate and form a tax-exempt education fund. Next, it sought wider publicity through press releases, interviews, and advertisements in various magazines.

In this regard, the group was singularly unsuccessful in generating widespread press support. Its Washington office was its central, authoritative source, a factor generally regarded as essential in gaining access to the media (Keilbowicz and Scherer in Kriesberg (9) 1986, 89) and did manage to generate some favorable publicity during the course of the campaign. Its field representatives, however, were not so successful, as many witnesses at the Commission's hearings complained about lack of publicity regarding the hearings.

Social scientists like to argue about the relative merits of collective behavior versus resource mobilization in influencing the success of a social movement organization. Most agree with Oberschall that "The central problem in creating an enduring movement is not the development of novel beliefs and of opposition ideas, but the cementing together of an organizational network" (Oberschall in Kriesberg (1) 1978).
While outcomes can often be influenced by events (such as the disastrous February snowstorm) careful devotion to the tedious task of recruiting and keeping adherents and constituents can eliminate many of the risks encountered by a fledgling organization. For modern social movement organizations, this entails a certain degree of professionalism, and raises the question - does the organization flourish because of the convictions of its membership, or is its success due to its manipulation of the media, direct mail campaign, and scrupulous nourishing of constituents?

Early peace society members, who represented the intellectual aristocracy of their day, were bound together by their conviction that the United States was the hope of the world. Americans were therefore given the unique mission of persuading quarreling Europeans away from their wars toward the sweet reasonableness of democratic, rational behavior (Tyler, 1944 403). Modern peace activists, however, have a history of American imperialism, participation in two world wars, and numerous interventions as evidence to refute any notion of American innocence. They are nonetheless firm in their belief that peace can be achieved through peaceful means.

This belief seems to be the catalyst that attracted supporters to the N-PAC cause, as unreconstructed world federalists, religious leaders, academics, retired military, and antinuclear activists responded to N-PAC's direct-mail campaign. Each had his/her own peace agenda, but supported N-PAC
goals and were content to allow a small Washington-based cadre to speak for the group. As Olson (1971) observes, such a small group will further the common interest much more effectively than a large number. Professionalism, however, is a double-edged sword, and while it can facilitate the rapid formation of a campaign, it can work to hinder the capacity of the organization to take root and continue (Kleidman in Kriesberg (9) 1986). Some people who join as a result of a mass appeal will be "free riders" who contribute to collective action because they are self-interested and rational, but perceive that they have a low efficacy in bringing about the non-exclusive public good the organization seeks to achieve (Olson, 1971). Organization leaders, therefore, must keep the reform spirit of a quest for the holy grail alive in the hearts and minds of its members. Some observers of social movement organizations place great emphasis on the role of "conscience constituents" in American social movements, while others minimize their importance: "When the history of a social movement is written, advocate historians usually discover a retrospective continuity in the goals and ideology that would not have been found if history were being written as the movement developed" (Turner in Kriesberg (2), 1979). Interviews and correspondence with those who were active in the N-PAC campaign reveal a fairly united desire to establish some sort of federal institution devoted to peace learning, although there were some who supported N-PAC merely because its tenets of peace through peaceful means coincided with their own beliefs.
The intrinsic nature of American peace movements has created a peculiar dilemma for these groups and caused them to have difficulty in affecting government peace efforts. To begin with, in order to rally support, they must condemn the present situation and promise change, usually offering radical goals that are not easily effectuated. If they embrace safe proposals in order to win government support, however, they lose the respect of those who are committed to working on international peace. By raising and framing issues, they run the risk of repressive reactions, which initially happened to the VietNam War protestors. Their most effective ploy is to exert pressure for peace action by capitalizing on a popular trend, as N-PAC did with the concept of conflict resolution.

N-PAC, of course, was never a dissident group, but it nonetheless did criticize the status quo. When the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution was established, some of its members were selected to serve on the Commission. James Laue became vice chairman, and N-PAC members Elise Boulding and William F. Lincoln were chosen as commissioners, while William J. Spencer became staff director.
CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Introduction: Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution

Legislation to establish a study commission, sponsored by Andrew Young and Helen Meyner in the House and Spark Matsunaga, Jennings Randolph and Mark Hatfield in the Senate failed to pass the House, but in 1978 the Senate amended the House-passed Elementary and Secondary Education Bill with the provision for a commission to study the feasibility of establishing an academy of peace and conflict resolution. These last two words were added to the provision in order to add respectability to the enterprise. Peace by itself was suspect and conjured up images of long-haired peaceniks in drawstring pants; conflict resolution was a concept and method gaining cachet among academics and public administrators (Interview, Bryant Wedge, 1986). In the halls of government of a nation founded on the principles of equality, justice and freedom, the word "peace" had become a term that needed justification.

In 1979 an appropriation of $500,000 for the work of the commission was made and nine commissioners were appointed: United States Congressmen Dan Glickman and John Ashbrook, and William Lincoln by House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.; United States Senator Spark M. Matsunaga (chair), former United States Congressman John Dellenback, and hotelier John Dunfey by Senator Warren Magnuson, Senate President Pro Tempore; and Urban
Coalition president Arthur Barnes, and academics Elise Boulding and James H. Laue (vice-chair) by President Carter.

All of the commissioners except Ashbrook had a history of identification with peace-related causes. Senator Matsunaga had introduced numerous bills calling for the establishment of a Department of Peace. James H. Laue was director of the Center for Metropolitan Studies, University of Missouri at St. Louis and former director of program development for the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice; in both capacities he was involved in promoting conflict resolution techniques for domestic issues.

Arthur H. Barnes, the only black on the commission, was former vice-president of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution. Elise Boulding, the sole woman on the commission, was chair of the sociology department at Dartmouth College, a member of the U.S. Commission for UNESCO and secretary of the Program Advisory Council of the UN University's Human and Social Development Program. At Dartmouth, she was well-known for her program on visualizing peace. Her husband, economist Kenneth Boulding, was also well-known for his writings and lectures on stable peace. John R. Dellenback was president of the Christian College Consortium and Coalition and former director of the Peace Corps. John P. Dunfey, president of the Dunfey Hotels Corporation and an industrial developer in Maine and New Hampshire, was a member of the National Committee of Americans for Salt II.
Kansas representative Dan Glickman had, like Matsunaga, also cosponsored peace-related bills and was a member of the Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future. William F. Lincoln was co-director of the National Center for Collaborative Planning and Community Services and a professional mediator.

Given this background of the commissioners, it is no wonder that one of their major conclusions should be "The United States Academy of Peace should use both international and national peacemaking and conflict resolution experiences in designing its education and training and information services programs and should give priority to research on cultural differences in peace and conflict processes" (Commission report, 19). As the lone dissenter in the report, Ohio representative John Ashbrook declared that peace studies had not yet become a definable discipline and that proposals for a federal peace office had never been accepted by the mainstream of American political thinking (ibid., 209).

The Commission process encompassed research, public outreach and deliberation on findings, conclusions and recommendations. Its research included studies of peace-making theory and techniques, and the state of peace research, education and training in institutions involved in international peace. Its public outreach involved more than 50 private meetings with interest groups and educators from public and private institutions as well as the three federal military academies, and 12 public hearings held at various regional sites: Boulder CO.;
Portland; OR, St. Louis MO; Columbus, OH; Los Angeles, CA; Boston, MA; Dallas, TX; New York, NY; Atlanta, GA; Tallahassee, FL; Honolulu, HI; and Washington, DC.

Regional coordinators were engaged to organize attendance at these public seminars, and despite the assertion in the Commission report that the seminars were "well publicized and accessible" several participants at different sites complained about the lack of press coverage. At the public hearings, however, public participation was encouraged through small group discussions and "open mike" time for anyone in the audience.

After the hearings were over, the commissioners held two half-day and six day-long public meetings at which they organized their work, determined findings, and developed conclusions and recommendations, and on July 24, 1980, they voted to recommend establishment of a United States Academy of Peace.

The ideas expressed at the Commission meetings and hearings, at subsequent legislative hearings, and in interviews conducted by this researcher form the nucleus of this part. It is my intent to compare these ideas with those of traditional American thought and belief in an effort to trace their antecedents in that nebulous entity, the American ethos.

Ten Reasons for Institutionalization

During the Commission hearings, and at the Congressional hearings on the bill to establish a federal academy of peace, criticism of the concept came mostly from academics in institutions for the study of international relations. They
feared competition and cooptation from a strong federal presence in the field, and much preferred a system of federal grants for peace research to be parcelled out among their various institutions. Indeed, the president of the Naval War College testified that his institution was already fulfilling the role proposed for a federal academy of peace (Commission testimony 2 June 1980, 252-255).

The type of peace research these institutions were conducting centered mostly on strategic studies - a popular approach with grant-giving federal agencies. The type of peace research proposed for the new federal academy, however, was quite different, stressing analysis of the conditions of peace and resolution of conflict through use of certain techniques. In this regard the mainstream institutions fit squarely within the American tradition of anti-intellectualism: "leading anti-intellectuals are usually men deeply engaged with ideas, often obsessively engaged with this or that outworn or rejected idea" (Hofstadter 1967, 21).

Certainly the fear of cooptation, of the idea of a pervasive federal administration dominating peace research, had its roots in American distrust of strong central government. As Madison argued in Federalist #10, it was the very diversity of factions in American life that was seen to be at once the nation's bête noir and its salvation.

Why then, would citizens unite to support the concept of a federal institution dedicated to peace education and research?
Ironically, distrust of government "experts" in foreign policy was one motivation. The people who supported CODEP and N-PAC were mostly middle-class professionals who perceived peace as being too important to leave to government officials. They were confident that they could make well-founded judgments in the area of U.S. foreign relations and were not content to resign themselves to political passivity towards foreign affairs.

In this respect, the supporters of a federal peace academy were direct descendants of Progressive-era thinking. At the heart of Progressivism was the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means (Wiebe 1967, 165). Recognizing that social evils would not remedy themselves, they set about to spur government action to rectify perceived social ills. Although their vision of the inevitable progress toward a civilization beyond war were shattered by the realities of World War I, these sons and daughters of the nation's oldest families were nonetheless committed to institutional solutions, with the result that by the 1920s a bureaucratic orientation defined a basic part of the nation's discourse (ibid. 295). Most historians agree with Hofstadter that the alphabet soup bureaucracies of the New Deal and subsequent administrations owe their moral inspiration and administrative devices to the Progressive movement (Hofstadter 1963).

Coupled with this Progressive heritage is the perception of Americanism as a sort of civic religion, its creed the Declaration of Independence, its Bible the Constitution, its
pantheon of saints the founding fathers plus Abraham Lincoln (Edwords 1987). This perception avers that Americans can arrive at a public philosophy and can reify that philosophy in its institutions (Reich 1988).

The reasons given by witnesses before the Commission and Congress for institutionalization of the concept of a federal peace academy varied from the symbolic to the pragmatic, and addressed numerous perceived needs: e.g., to be a symbol to the international community; to raise public awareness of the issues of peace; to legitimize the fields of peace education and peace research; to balance the nation's commitment to its war colleges; to contribute to the national security; to create an example of positive cost/benefit ratio vis-a-vis expenditures on weapons; to set the pace for institutional change; to act as a catalyst for the "new paradigm"; to avoid politicization of peace research; and to identify the United States as a world leader in peace studies.

"We live by symbols," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes; and it was the symbolism of a federal peace academy that appealed to many proponents of the concept. As deForrest Whitston, a pastor and professional counselor in human relations, testified before the Commission: "the establishment of a peace academy would have symbolic powers to ourselves and to the world that we are as interested in waging peace as we are in waging war and it would create a new mythology by which we orient and conduct our lives" (Commission testimony 6 June 1980, 78).
Other witnesses echoed this sentiment. Their statements reveal a concern with the image of the United States as a bellicose power willing to use force before diplomacy for settling international disputes. The establishment of such an institution would epitomize national intent and symbolize the seriousness with which this nation considers peace. As a symbol of our national commitment, it would serve as a declaration to the world community that the United States intends to work out solutions to conflict in a peaceful manner.

No one, however, expressed any confidence in the efficacy of such an institution unless it could establish credibility with the grassroots domestic peace movement as well as in the international arena. That was seen to depend upon the composition of the board of directors and their actions. Nonetheless, the symbolic quality of a federal peace academy appealed to those who saw its campus as a concrete reminder of the national commitment and a beacon of hope to youth. The prestige of such a symbol also appealed to some who compared it to the "good offices" of the Secretary-General of the UN, to those who hoped other nations would emulate such an institutionalization, and those who saw the possibility of a sort of spiritual leadership: "The idea of peace as a rational concept just hasn't been in our development or our education particularly. We have had plenty from the military and the concept of war. To have a national symbol of a program devoted toward peace gives a new dimension to this country" (Commission testimony, Doris Allen 2 June 1980, 357).
The old dimension - that of a nation given to militaristic solutions - is really a relatively new one in U.S. history, based on a bipolar definition of the world informed by a "simplistic paranoid perceptual thread that runs throughout postwar American foreign policy" (Kolko 1976, 356). The nation that annually celebrates its own revolution and overthrow of tyranny had, it seemed, become suspicious of all other wars of liberation and had become identified with repressive regimes. Its preoccupation with a perceived Communist threat had turned the United States from a nation with a long heritage of antimilitarism into what some were calling a garrison state.

The strong antimilitarist sentiments of Americans had been recognized by Alexander Hamilton when he argued in the Federalist (Nos. 24, 28, 29) that the concept of civil supremacy over the military would prevail because Congress operated under a two-year limit on its appropriations to the military and its approval was needed to declare war. This emphasis upon civil as against military authority was regarded by framers of the Constitution as one of their finest achievements, and is still considered by many Americans to be an essential element of American freedom and democracy. It did not, however, prevent the nation from engaging in numerous wars, although some of them, such as the Mexican, Spanish-American, and Vietnam conflicts were extremely unpopular with the American public.

The fact that the nation did engage in so many military actions points up the fact that, despite a strong tradition of
antimilitarism, the American people never fully embraced pacifism, which is opposed in principle to all use of force. Antimilitarism, on the other hand, accepts the concept of a just war even while it regards a large military establishment and conscript armies as inimical to the civil institutions of government (Ekirch 1956, vii).

Throughout the Commission hearings and in the testimony before Congress on the enabling legislation, witnesses agreed with Commissioner John Dellenback who saw the establishment of a federal peace academy, not as an alternative or adversary of the military, but as "a significant symbolic step which will say clearly to the rest of the world that we believe not only in peace through strength, but also in peace itself" (Testimony S.564, 1983). Establishment of a federal peace academy solely for its symbolic value, however, was rejected by those who most fervently advocated institutionalization: "A solid justification, based on real need and likely performance, is prerequisite to congressional approval and to the expenditure of public monies" (Jennings Randolph in Smith 1985, 118). These people saw the institution as a means of raising public awareness of the issues of peace through serving as a sort of public information bureau, interfacing with other government agencies and international organizations.

Raising and framing the issues, as the peace movement did in the Vietnam debate, is one way to affect government peace actions, but can lead to an opposite reaction, warns peace
researcher Louis Kriesberg in "Peace Movements and Government Peace Efforts" (Kriesberg and Bronislaw 1988, V. 10, 57-75).

Peace movement advocates court this danger when they view a federal peace academy as an instrument to legitimate the fields of peace research, education and conflict resolution. A government institution that gave recognition to these fields would thus legitimate them for funding and for study. As stated above, funding for strategic studies was not difficult to obtain, but there were few funding sources for research into other areas of peace and conflict resolution. Witnesses testified to the need for more visibility and credibility in these other areas, in order to establish them as bona fide academic disciplines. In this regard, a curious dilemma is raised. Other nations question whether a federally funded institution for peace research could speak for itself or would be perceived as speaking on behalf of U.S. foreign policy; conversely, a private sector peace academy might not be taken seriously by its own or foreign governments. This has been the experience of peace researchers in the United States, where strategic studies academics work closely with government decision makers, while those who labor in the vineyards of alternative defense systems languish on the periphery of power. Giving government sanction to the field, however, runs the risk of recognizing only "approved" topics for research. (This avenue is further explored in Part III on the U.S. Institute of Peace).
Legitimizing the field would also meet the needs of students who want to pursue peace studies and negotiation skills, proponents argued. The UN does not have an office of mediation, yet depends on skilled practitioners to perform its good offices. Similarly, the federal mediation services depend on people who are trained in private institutions to fill its ranks. As General Omar Bradley remarked in 1948: "We know more about war than we know about peace - more about killing than we know about living." One of the leading advocates of training in negotiation skills, Roger Fisher of Harvard University, explained to the Commission that because it was difficult to obtain funds, he uses money generated from training sessions to pay for research (Commission hearing, 2 June 1980).

Fisher also pointed out that it was important to train military personnel in negotiation skills, and that this task was not being assumed by the military academies. In their meetings with the superintendents of the military academies, the Commissioners learned that such skills were not being taught in these institutions because their curricula were too full. Indeed, General Andrew Goodpaster at West Point urged that a national peace academy be established at a graduate level with courses available to military and naval officers as well as other government officials (Mapes in Smith 1985, 148).

Advocates of a federal peace academy argued that it was needed to balance not only the war colleges and military academies but also other war institutions such as the Department
of Defense and what former President Eisenhower referred to as the "military-industrial complex." What was needed was a federal institution with prestige equal to the military academies and war-making bureaucracies. Conservative proponents argued that such status could enhance the proposed academy and its graduates, fixing it in the firmament of national security measures - but only as an adjunct to military power. The report accompanying S.564 reflects this view: "The danger to national and international peace and security from violent escalation of political, economic, and cultural conflicts could be reduced by rigorous development of a range of effective conflict response options, in addition to military capacity" (Report S. 564 1983, 3).

Liberal advocates of the peace academy, on the other hand, maintained that deterrence was essentially a negative approach to peace based upon the threat of unacceptable violence, and that the establishment of a national peace academy would spell a change in the definition of the term "national security" (Mapes in Smith 1985, 134). The term was defined in just-war semantics, however, by a leading advocate of the institution: "National security includes maintenance of military might...national security also includes the ability to avoid armed conflict whenever possible" (Jennings Randolph in Smith 1985, 112).

Comparison of the cost of maintenance of the military establishment with the small amount proposed for allocation to a federal peace academy proved to be a powerful argument for
institutionalization. Pointing out that the training and research in how to handle conflict situations offered by the proposed academy would complement but not detract from existing programs in international affairs, area studies, and language training, Commissioner Laue noted that the $6 million proposed for the first year and $10 million for the year after was a paltry sum compared to the $500 million spent on the Falklands crisis, for example, which he believed could have been averted by proper use of conflict resolution skills (Hearing S 564 1983, 329).

Commissioner Glickman, ever conscious of his fellow Congressmen's reluctance to untie the public purse strings, also foresaw long-range beneficial economic effects from institutionalization (ibid., 172). The Commission report spelled out those long-range effects in terms of stable trade and cultural relations and less dependence on military contracts, which would permit localities to plan more civil economies through economic conversion (Commission Report 1981, 70).

Several witnesses compared the five-year 1.6 trillion-dollar military budget commitment of 1984, which computed to approximately $1,360 per year for each American, to a proposed authorization of $23.5 million for the first two years of operation of the peace academy, about 5 cents per year per inhabitant, citing it as the highest cost-benefit ratio in the world (Mapes in Smith 1985, 151-153). This high cost-benefit ratio anticipated to accrue to the peace academy was compared to that of the military academies, where Commissioners noted that
the nearly 50 percent third-year attrition rate at these
academies represented a considerable financial loss on investment
to the government (Commission hearing 12 May 1980, 95).

Financial considerations in creating the federal peace
academy also figured in the debate on duplication of effort
within the government and the need for institutional change.
Commissioner Spark Matsunaga argued that only the focus and
stimulation of the federal government could effect needed
on the need for federal leadership was peculiarly Jeffersonian;
for it had been Thomas Jefferson who foresaw the need for
institutional change as ideas changed:

I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and
institutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in
hand with the progress of the human mind. As that
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new
discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners
and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the
times. We might as well require a man to wear still
the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized
society to remain ever under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors" (Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12
July 1816).

In that vein, citizen witnesses criticized the government
agencies, such as the State Department, which were resisting the
idea of a national peace institute. Many agreed with
psychiatrist Joseph H. Herzberg who testified: "Government is
looked to by the people to fill institutional vacuums in their
lives when the private sector is unable to do so. But in the
area of diagnosing and intervening in social conflict prior to
the violence, we have an institutional vacuum - no private or
government agency provides this function" (Hearing H. 10192, 1978). And two retired generals lamented, for opposite reasons, the lack of institutional memory in federal government agencies. Retired general James Gavin favored the creation of a peace academy based on his experience with the State Department, where he had noted a dearth of diplomatic negotiation skills (Commission hearing 2 June 1980, 153). Retired general George Keegan, however, opposed the creation of a peace academy but favored establishing a new intelligence-gathering agency to forestall the inevitable war he predicted (Commission meeting 4 Feb. 1980, 63). As Hofstadter reminds us: "Truth and logic are less important criteria [for change] than suitability to the intellectual needs and preoccupations of social interests. This is one of the great difficulties that must be faced by rational strategists of social change" (Hofstader 1955, 204).

In effecting this institutional change, proponents suggested that the proposed peace academy would not necessarily be a definitive model, but would at least serve as a catalyst for change in the emerging field of peace studies: "Pure and simple, then, the institute is meant to be a catalyst. Grounded in respect for pluralism in education, the institute, through the national imprimatur of Congressional enactment and presidential endorsement of its founding legislation, will accelerate the process begun privately to develop the field of peace and conflict resolution" (Jennings Randolph in Smith 1985, 114).

The report accompanying S564 reflects this view:

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Many of the witnesses testifying suggested that the creation of a National Academy of Peace would serve as a catalyst for the establishment of computerized data banks and innovative thinking, congressional and governmental agency seminars in peacemaking, training techniques in conflict resolution and conflict dynamics, and increased financial and other assistance to doctoral and other post-graduate scholars in these areas. There was strong sentiment that the creation of a National Academy of Peace should in no way compete with the efforts of existing institutions with programs related to conflict resolution, diplomacy and peace research. Specifically, some representatives of existing educational institutions having relevant programs suggested that one of the goals in the creation of the Academy should be to fund and coordinate existing programs in these areas." (Report S.564 1983, 3).

And, of course, these existing educational institutions with relevant programs, many of which in fact had been quite critical of the creation of a federal agency, were first in the grant application line when the Institute came to be established.

The support of existing institutions working in peace research was said to be needed, however, because most funding was going to studies operating within a narrow interpretation of power politics. This was the view of a noted English peace researcher, John W. Burton of the Center of Analysis of Conflict, Rutherford College, University of Canterbury, Kent, England. It was Burton who defined the role of the proposed peace academy as a catalytic agent. The proposed academy would facilitate the acceptance of a new inter-disciplinary field of endeavor, which Burton called a "fundamental paradigm shift." Because the problems arising from international conflict were complex, Burton argued that they could not be addressed on the narrow
disciplinary basis existing in most universities. Even in those universities claiming to be interdisciplinary, Burton maintained, the faculties tended to stay within their disciplines although the students took varied courses. It was the student body, not the institution, that was interdisciplinary. Burton cited the need for a change-agent that could hasten the shift in thinking required to bridge the gap between knowledge and application in the fields of teaching, research and practice (Commission hearing 2 June 1980, 163).

This cognitive shift was already becoming accepted by practitioners in the field. Robert Coulson, president of the American Arbitration Association, noted that there was a growing need for Americans to be trained and experienced in the resolution of disputes in other countries. This training included foreign language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures as well as expertise in negotiation and mediation, such as the international commercial arbitration work performed by members of his agency. The catalytic role of a federally funded national center in the field that Coulson defined would surely focus attention upon the availability of constructive dispute settlement techniques and the need for further research in the field, and encourage federal agencies in the field of dispute settlement to share their experience with each other and with private agencies (Commission hearing 16 June 1980, 73).

Authorities in the field of international economics also cited the need for a new mind-set in American thinking. In an
increasingly interdependent world, negotiations that provide for the mutual benefit of all parties were seen to be preferable to competition over scarce resources wherein some nations must inevitably lose, creating conditions of discontent that can result in violent political upheavals. The proposed peace academy, by training people in mediation skills, would thus serve as a catalytic agent in the economic sphere as well as the political (Commission hearing 7 July 1980, 38).

While serving in this transformative role, however, the new agency had nevertheless to walk a fine line between promoting and opposing official government policy. Proponents and opponents alike expressed misgivings regarding the politicization of the proposed peace academy. These widespread concerns came from a broad geographical representation, varying from the Air Force Academy officer in Boulder, Colorado who questioned the ability of the new institution to keep itself "non-aligned," to the civil rights attorney in Columbus, Ohio, who envisioned the proposed peace academy losing credibility with the public simply because it was an arm of the government. A community activist in Dallas, Texas confessed to having a "terror but also a certain respect" for the power of government to enact reform, and a spokesperson for the conservative American Enterprise Institute, who opposed the creation of an academy, predicted the inevitable interference of the State Department and National Security Council in its research agenda.
In order to avoid such politicization, several witnesses offered specific proposals, such as the need to eschew organizational problems of control over research priorities. Autonomy and control were the core issues, according to Senator Jennings Randolph, who saw the institute's independence as the most important question once the institute was established. In this regard, selection of a responsible, politically balanced board of directors was regarded as essential (Randolph in Smith 1985, 117).

The importance of an intellectually free board of trustees was stressed by many witnesses, who also advocated an institution with a highly diversified funding base and decentralized institutional arrangements to ensure an optimal balance of freedom and accountability. Others argued that because any institution closely affiliated with the government of a world power would be viewed with suspicion by many nations, especially those in the Third World, the freedom to explore such critical issues as social justice and welfare must be maintained. Some witnesses also argued for a university environment, with a "protective family atmosphere" where peace researchers would be insulated from the depredations of political interference.

The enabling legislation submitted to Congress reflected all these views, but struck a curious compromise between granting political independence and ensuring government control. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Central
Intelligence were authorized to assign officers, on a rotating basis to be determined by the Academy's board, to the programs of the Academy; but the board was enjoined to "ensure that such assignment is not used as a springboard for covert intelligence actions" (Report S. 564, 23). (Subsequently, when interviewed in 1988, USIP staff insisted that no such persons had been so assigned.)

Congress also rejected an amendment in the nature of a substitute, offered by conservative Senator Jeremiah Denton, which would have provided for a research and training program to be conducted by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. By creating an independent, semi-autonomous agency without policy-making responsibilities, Congressional drafters hoped that the Academy's credibility at home and abroad would be enhanced (ibid., 36). This credibility was of utmost importance to many observers who viewed the United States as a world leader and therefore saw the step of institutionalizing the concept of peace research as one to be emulated by other nations. Several persons testified before the Commission and Congress as to the great leadership responsibility of the United States to ensure world peace. In this regard, they seemed not to recognize the irony of the fact that the nation was awakened from a prewar ambivalent isolationism to assume a global role, but that role was based on a military commitment (Ambrose, 1983). And at least one witness testified with evident fervor that the proposed peace academy could be a "moral energizer to which other nations would respond
with gratitude, relief and, most importantly, emulation" (Commission hearing 17 June 1980, 158).

This image of the United States as a moral leader was evoked by varied witnesses - such as the Ohio scientist who declared that America was the "conscience of the world" (Commission hearing 6 May 1980), and the Georgia civil rights activist who thought that the proposed peace academy could introduce "moral leadership, which is severely lacking in the country at this time" (Commission hearing, 23 June 1980, 104). Interestingly, even foreigners seemed to hold this view, one Canadian peace researcher expressing a concern for the international credibility of the proposed academy (Commission hearing, 17 June 1980, 30) and several Latin American visitors indicating that the establishment of a national peace academy would do much to shift the image they held of the United States (Mapes in Smith 1985, 150).

This theme that the U.S.'s tarnished image could be burnished by establishing a federal academy for peace was enunciated by several people, such as Commissioner John Dellenback who related his Peace Corps experience of having to disavow any connection with the CIA in order to gain the confidence of the people in the countries to which the corps was sent. (Commission meeting 6 July 1980, 137). Others cited the need for the nation to "regain the leadership in the area of peace that this country once enjoyed" (Commission meeting, July 24, 1980) and also for the U.S. to start "leading again by

That numerous witnesses, American and foreign-born, would recognize United States leadership in world peace as apodictic is not surprising when one considers what might be called the secular theology of American nationalism. More than one witness quoted the Bible, likening the American mission to that of the Israelites, and declaring that completing the task of establishing a peace academy was tantamount to carrying out a commandment. This attitude was anchored in history. Ever since Jonathan Edwards appointed America as the "principal nation of the Reformation," the notion of Anglo-Saxons who journeyed to the new world as a chosen people to save the world has persisted in American history, prompting such hyperbole as this nineteenth century declaration from Senator Albert J. Beveridge: "And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the redemption of the world" (Tuveson 1968, vii).

In fact, such sentiments abounded in a nineteenth-century America mesmerized by the ideology of manifest destiny. Harvard philosopher Josiah Strong, discussing the unique mission of the United States, acknowledged: "Surely to be a Christian and an
Anglo-Saxon and an American in this generation is to stand on the very mountain-top of privilege" (ibid, 137). Even Herman Melville had expounded on this myth of American millenarianism: "God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great things we feel in our souls. The rest of the nations must soon be in our rear" (ibid., 157).

In the twentieth century, however, social critics began to question this ethos, declaring that Americans broke their covenant with God when they abandoned their civic religion for a doctrine of personal gain (Bellah, 1975). Johan Galtung has pointed out that this concept of a national covenant with God implies a certain obligation to be God-like in word and deed, much as the Hebrews were admonished to follow the Ten Commandments, and is a direct result of isomorphism, or appropriating someone else's metaphor (Galtung, 1987). The consequence of such a conviction is that the nation assumes a moral mantle, with the conclusion that what is good for America is good for the world. Although the covenant may have been broken, and the image tarnished, many Americans in 1980 still believed in the myth, and hoped that a federal peace academy could help restore the nation to its true position as the moral leader of the world.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ACDA LESSON

Twenty years earlier, this same spirit inbued those who helped to establish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As mentioned above, this agency was born of a compromise between advocates of a Department of Peace and proponents of a means of building concern for arms limitation and control into U.S. foreign policy. The establishment of the ACDA and the USIP suggests many parallels, as Senator Jennings Randolph observed: "In a number of ways, the ACDA is the direct ancestor of the national institute of peace" (Randolph in Smith 1985, 117).

As early as 1959, an arms control agency was proposed in a report on the operational aspects of United States foreign policy prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University:

An appropriate institution within the total U.S. foreign policy complex, charged with responsibility for a continuing disarmament policy, might also devote its resources to thinking in advance about such matters as withdrawal from bases, when military technology indicates, and planning for readjustments in the U.S. economy and in U.S. overseas operations in the event of successes in disarmament negotiations.

The report also advised that analysis of the problem of inspection and measurement of modern weapons, development of new strategies for arms limitation and control and negotiation with other nations on these matters be a permanent part of the U.S. foreign policy complex (Study No. 6 11 Nov. 1959, 29).
Subsequently, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 was enacted, and charged the ACDA with four main functions: the conduct, support and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formation; the preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field; the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and the preparation for United States participation in such control systems as may become a part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

In addition, the agency was supposed to advise the President and the Secretary of State respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace. Among the ten research functions spelled out in the Act, studies were mandated on the economic and political consequences of arms control and disarmament, including the problems of readjustment arising in industry and the reallocation of national resources.

Unfortunately, institutional, political and conceptual factors worked together to undermine the high ideals on which the ACDA was founded, leading Randolph to conclude that "the lesson for the national institute of peace is that the ACDA is not an institutional model" (Randolph in Smith 1985, 118). Numerous witnesses before the Commission and the Congress repeated Randolph's caveat.

They saw an institution intended to be an independent research and informational arm of the government controlled by
whatever administration was in power. Housed in the State Department, the agency depended upon senior departments, especially the Department of Defense, for much of its technical data and policy reports. Fear of isolation from this information loop mitigated the ability and willingness of ACDA officials to articulate views which were in substantial opposition to the majority (Blechman and Nolan 1983, 1166). Nonetheless, the Pentagon was less than forthcoming in supplying data to the agency (Clarke 1979, 103). The effects of this lack of cooperation are compounded when one considers that many other government agencies and foreign countries depend on ACDA for accurate information regarding world military expenditures.

The vulnerability of the agency to political interference was pointed up in 1973, when, at the instigation of Senator Henry M. Jackson who opposed the 1972 SALT agreement, the agency's budget was cut by one-third and its staff by 25 percent, a move referred to in agency annals as "The Purge" (ibid., 50). Congressional supporters came to the rescue of the agency, and by 1975 its budget and personnel cuts were fully restored (ibid., 54). Its $20 million budget for the fiscal year of 1981, however, only represented about two-thirds the cost of one fully equipped F-14 jet plane (Commission testimony 22 July 1980, 21).

This example of Congressional influence revealed yet another institutional flaw in the composition of the agency. Just as it suffers from internecine bureaucratic tension, it also is sensitive to the jealousies arising from the power balance
between the executive and legislative branches of government. The intellectuals of the eighteenth century found great delight in the new laws of physics and mechanics and fashioned a government based on the principle of a balance of power. Human affairs, however, often do not adhere to physical axioms, with the result that an agency like the ACDA finds itself caught in the dilemma of trying to please two masters. On the one hand, it must jockey for position within the executive branch, often having to resort to strategems just to learn of and take part in meetings. On the other hand, as the chosen messenger for relaying information to Congress, it invites the suspicion and resistance of executive actors who perceive it as an agent of the legislative branch. For example, because the legislation mandates the agency to do background research on arms control issues, it can be an effective analytical counterweight to information disseminated by the Department of Defense (Clarke 1979, 125). But because it must walk a tightrope between the two branches, the agency often leans to one side or the other. When its view is sought on major executive arms-transfer decisions, it often creates a "paper trail" sufficient to assure Congress that the law has been obeyed, and when it reports each year on the effect of certain weapons programs on arms control policy and negotiations, it must be careful that its impact statements do not incur the wrath of those bureaucracies on which it depends for cooperation (Blechman and Nolan 1983, 1168).
This dichotomous position can also affect ACDA's reporting on foreign military expenditures. Its annual report on world military expenditures and arms transfers is widely used by researchers concerned with arms control. Yet at least one researcher has questioned its figures, charging that the agency has consistently underestimated the dollar value of French arms transfers. Because the French economy is heavily dependent on arms sales, encouraging that government's cooperation in arms control becomes a problem. The researcher raises questions about the arms transfers of other countries, pointing out that as the possibility of controlling military exports becomes hostage to the goal of economic growth, progress toward worldwide arms control cooperation is thwarted (Kolodzieg 1979, 227).

Still other political factors affect the functioning of the agency. When it was founded, liberal proponents wanted to create an autonomous channel to the President on arms control issues. The director of the agency was to have direct access to the President, but the history of the agency shows that this accessibility to the Oval Office depended in large part on the director's close personal ties to the President prior to appointment. In fact, with the exception of Paul Warnke during the Carter Administration, agency directors have only rarely had direct access to the President, nor have they been the principal formulators, negotiators, or even spokesmen for arms control (Blechman and Nolan 1983, 1163). For example, during the SALT I negotiations, agency head Gerard Smith was not told of Henry
Kissinger's backchannel negotiations with the Soviets, yet Smith was the U.S. official SALT ambassador and the agency was responsible for funding of the talks (Clarke 1979, 65).

Directors have generally reflected the President's support or opposition to arms control. President Carter had to defend his controversial appointment of Paul Warnke, yet no ACDA director during the Carter administration took part in Carter's weekly meetings on international issues with the heads of the departments of State, Defense, and the National Security Council (Blechman and Nolan 1983, 1164). President Nixon, who saw the ACDA as a sort of Environmental Protection Agency of national security, appointed Fred Ikle, who, along with Reagan appointee Kenneth Adelman, had little interest or experience in pursuing arms control agreements (Lall 1986, 32).

In addition to the burden of having to reflect the administration's commitment to arms control, the agency lacked a public constituency to champion its mission, probably due in large part to its lack of effort to acquire one. In 1971 the Arms Control Association, composed of former ACDA officials, was formed to increase public appreciation of the need for positive steps toward the limitation of armaments and the implementation of other measures to reduce international tensions on the road to world peace. In addition, the ACA seeks to influence Congress on arms control issues. Reluctant to identify itself with groups such as SANE-FREEZE and various quasi-populist disarmament groups, the organization identifies itself with the Washington
establishment, and receives about 40 percent of its funding from the Carnegie Endowment (Clarke 1979, 163).

One ACA activity in particular serves to point up a possible ideological divergence of this group of ACDA expatriates from that of the organization it was formed to support. Since 1976 ACA has cosponsored the annual publication of World Military and Social Expenditures under the direction of Ruth Sivard, a former ACDA economist who once had responsibility for the ACDA's World Military Expenditures. This publication is widely used among peace groups and in peace education courses, and points out the discrepancies between national expenditures on arms and funding for social measures such as housing, food production, and public health. It also criticizes the cost over-runs of U.S. defense spending and the highly technical, expensive, but often inoperable weapons systems of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Just as many retired military officers (such as General Gene LaRocque and Admiral Noel Gayler) have joined the ranks of the peace movement, so it would seem that ex-ACDA officers have formed a group for a more aggressive arms control policy than the agency to which they once belonged.

In addition to institutional and political obstacles, the agency has had to overcome conceptual ones as well. The feeling that arms control and disarmament were suspect, that they were somehow different from national security, pervaded the entire process leading to ACDA's formation and followed the agency in one form or another throughout its history (Clarke 1979, 18).
Former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett viewed the agency as a "mecca for a wide variety of screwballs" (Blechman and Nolan 1983, 1161). Former President Nixon considered ACDA people "woolly-headed," lacking the toughness to deal with the Russians (Clarke 1979, 64).

In order to bring the agency into being, supporters such as Senator Hubert H. Humphrey sought the support of those who favored general and complete disarmament, a concept that had inspired some 70 multilateral conferences under the rubric of the United Nations prior to 1961. This concept, however, was inimical to those who sought incremental disarmament through arms control and associated the term disarmament with the isolationism of the 1930s. The title of the agency was a compromise between these two groups, and has ever since created a conceptual schism between those on the left who criticize its policies as hypocritical compromises and those on the right who see ACDA personnel as soft-headed Kremlin sympathizers seeking arms control at any cost (Blechman and Nolan 1983, 1170).

This criticism has affected the scope of research sponsored by the agency, both inhouse and contracted. In its early years ACDA let numerous contracts to social and behavioral scientists, but because there was no immediate policy payoff, such research was sharply reduced and in 1974 the agency concluded that "no substantive knowledge from the behavioral sciences appears of immediate and unambiguous relevance to ACDA problems" (Testimony
Similarly, in the first ten years of its existence the agency produced annual reports on the impact of reduced defense expenditures on the American economy. In 1971 economist Kenneth Boulding of the University of Colorado conducted a major research project to obtain a factual and impartial analysis of the implications of reduced defense expenditures. The findings included a strong affirmation that U.S. prosperity is not dependent on military spending and that military spending is not unique, the same effects can be generated by alternative government spending programs or by private spending (Tenth Annual Report 1971, 24).

In fact, the more than thirty economic impact studies produced by the agency exposed the basic unreality of fears that arms control and disarmament would damage the economy. But although the economics of arms control and disarmament is referred to prominently in the statement of purpose of the act establishing ACDA, since 1973 the agency has not conducted research in this critical area. Conservatives and strategic analysts, who espouse a peace through strength philosophy, believe that a permanent military economy is imperative. Other researchers and peace activists, however, believe that economic conversion planning is a necessary precondition for significant political moves for peace (Melman 1985, 14).

Despite its weaknesses, the agency has assisted in producing
more than 18 arms control measures and deserves much of the
credit for the non-proliferation treaty of 1969 and the anti-
ballistic missile treaty of 1972 (Smith 1984, 13). The idea of a
hot line communications link between Washington and Moscow
originated with Gerard Smith, ACDA chief from 1969 to 1973
(Clarke 1979, 161).

Many suggestions have been made for strengthening the
agency, ranging from official integration into the State
Department and reviving the General Advisory Committee on Arms
Control and Disarmament, originally created as an interface
between the ACDA and a skeptical Congress, with John J. McCloy as
head, to abolishing the agency altogether.

The lessons for the proposed peace academy were clear, and
those who framed the legislation for the U.S. Institute of Peace
were careful to observe them. The institute has no policy-making
responsibilities, thus avoiding the hybrid quality of the ACDA
and allowing the possibility of conducting long-range social
science research. It is independent of any bureaucracy, which
frees it from interference from other executive branch agencies,
but invites an annual fight with the Office of Management and
Budget, and makes it dependent on the good will of Congress.
Its fifteen member board of directors meets regularly and, like
the GAC under McCloy, takes an active role in institute affairs.

The ACDA, charged with researching technical considerations
relating to arms control, can make a significant contribution to
the advancement of "negative peace" - the concept of peace as the absence of war. The USIP, on the other hand, is seen by its proponents as leading the way towards "positive peace" - peace with social justice. This definition of peace encompasses peace education, peace activism and peace research, including the concept of conflict resolution, embodied in the original title of the institute: the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution.
CHAPTER FIVE: PEACE EDUCATION

Those who came to testify before the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution seemed to have a normative concept of the word "academy" as a place of instruction and therefore their testimony was to a great extent architectonic, directed towards such concerns as curriculum, siting, funding, and constitution of faculty and student body. That the institute finally established was not at all cast in the image of this view is one of the ironies of the federal legislative process. Nonetheless, the field of peace education has burgeoned in the decade since the hearings were held, partly due to the increased interest in peace research and partly to the pressure of the peace movements (Bulletin of Peace Proposals 15.2 [1984]:1). As the scope of peace education has grown to include more areas of inquiry, it has also greatly increased in the number of institutions that have embraced peace education as a legitimate field of study, from the kindergarten through the college level. A semantic footnote is in order here: most academics in the field use the term "peace education" when referring to the pre-college level and "peace studies" for college-level inquires into curriculum and research.

In 1980, at the time of the Commission hearings, about eighty programs in peace studies or conflict resolution centers existed on college campuses, but, as James H. Laue, vice-chairman of the Commission noted, "I think one would say they are largely
not well established within the institution. They're generally not the mainline departments" (Commission hearing, 12 May 1980: 115). In 1983, however, the editors of Peace and World Order Studies received 12,000 responses to their questionnaire sent to persons involved in peace studies programs and by 1987 the World Policy Institute reported that 235 campuses had peace studies programs in place (Harris 1989, 43). Numbers, of course, do not necessarily indicate academic acceptability and the debate over whether or not peace studies is a bona fide discipline still rages in academe. Critics of peace education argue that it is a value-based field of inquiry and therefore not a legitimate academic discipline, free of intellectual bias.

Despite this arcane argument, the practitioners of peace education have continued to enlarge the scope of their inquiry. In 1984 the fourth edition of Peace and World Order Studies listed areas in which peace studies were being pursued in higher education, including teacher training, human rights and social justice, militarism and the arms race, international law, ecological balance, and alternative futures. In 1989 the fifth edition of this curriculum guide expanded the categories to add such areas as war and international conflict, the nuclear age, militarism and society, conflict resolution, a literature and media perspective, and research seminars.

On the pre-college level, courses of instruction vary from the study of world cultures, peaceful resolution of conflicts and concepts of peace in children's literature in the elementary
grades to environmental studies, learning about the Soviet Union, and nuclear war and the arms race in secondary schools (Reardon 1988, vii-ix).

Government officials opposed to the concept of a federal peace academy argued for support of existing public and private institutions, because of perceived Constitutional separation of powers problems. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" had traditionally been interpreted to reserve the area of education to the purview of the states and federal intervention in schools and colleges had always been resented by the states and local jurisdictions. They also argued that funding such an institution is contrary to the philosophy of federal aid to education, which is to give funds to the student, not to the institution (Testimony, HEW and OMB, George Washington Peace Academy Act S.1976, 138-141). The history of federal involvement in education, however, belies this argument.

Even before the Constitution gathered the disparate states into one union of united states, the land Ordinance of 1785 (initiated by Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe in 1784) and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed under the Articles of Confederation and later incorporated into United States law, provided for the sale of part of the public domain commonly known as the Old Northwest, the proceeds used to pay off the national
debt. A landmark provision of these laws was that the acreage should be divided into townships six miles square, each of which in turn was to be split into thirty-six sections of one square mile each. The sixteenth section of each township was set aside to be sold for the benefit of public schools, thus setting a precedent for federal involvement in education. The philosophy behind this measure is clearly stated in the legislation: "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged" (Reisner 1922, 384). Since then, it has been federal policy that five percent of the profits from the sale of federal lands be given to the states for education and/or public improvements (ibid. 362).

Although the role of the federal government in education was minimal during the nineteenth century, it was effective in two important areas. The first was the famous case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) in which the independence of private colleges from influence by the state legislatures was affirmed, vindicating the cause of academic freedom. Another was the extension of the principles enunciated by the Ordinance of 1787 in the establishment of land grant colleges. The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 ceded land to the new territories about to become states for the establishment of colleges of agricultural and mechanical arts and the Hatch Act of 1887 established agricultural experiment stations in connection with the land-grant colleges.
At the hearings before the Commission, many people testified that the establishment of a federal peace academy should be drawn along the lines of the land-grant colleges. These peace advocates apparently did not appreciate the irony of such advice, because the enabling legislation establishing the land-grant colleges also mandated inclusion of "military tactics" in the curriculum (Boyer 1972, 98). In fact, militarism of education prior to World War I was centered mostly in the state agricultural colleges receiving federal subsidies. The National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, however, ushered in an era of expansion of military education in the high schools and colleges.

By 1925 eighty-three of the one hundred and twenty-three colleges and universities offering an ROTC program had made it a required subject and 42,000 high school students were enrolled in the Junior ROTC (Ekirch 1956, 219). In that same year John Dewey and other liberal educators, religious leaders and pacifists formed the Committee on Militarism in Education to act as a lobbying group against federal funding of compulsory military training courses for ROTC units on campus (Howlett 1976, 55). However, sentiments of nationalism, equated with militarism, ran high during the 1920s and it was not until the 1930s when the revelations of the Nye committee reached the public that Dewey's message was heeded.

Dewey viewed the influence of militarism on the academic community as inimical to his philosophy of education, which endorsed the development of individual potential and the ideals
of democracy. Militarism preached chauvinistic intolerance through conformity rather than international understanding based on diversity of opinion. It pressured the student to conform to the status quo rather than encourage critical analysis of the existing social structure. And by allowing the military a foothold into academia, educational administrators sanctioned the inevitability of war instead of working for its abolition (ibid. 54). Dewey proposed an alternative school program designed to promote international peace and understanding. He was afraid that democracy could be destroyed from within by creating a totalitarianism similar to that of Germany and Italy, under the guise of promoting nationalism. But given the climate of opinion in the United States that arose in 1940 in reaction to the depredations of Nazi Germany, few people recognized the intrinsic anomaly of Dewey's message: that any program which fosters conformity and a nationalistic spirit is basically antidemocratic in nature (ibid., 57).

Dewey's pacifist values of cooperation and understanding were largely forgotten during World War II and the postwar period that followed, when the military lobbied intensively for extension of ROTC, especially, in some cases, to provide jobs for ex-officers and non-commissioned officers. By 1964 there were 254 Junior ROTC programs in the public and private high schools and Congress provided for up to 1000 more in the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 (Boyer 1972, 96). On the college level, there were 477 programs in 1967 prior to the rising student
antimilitarism during the Vietnam war. According to one researcher, the central issues surrounding the presence of the military on campus continue to be:

1. Compulsory instead of elective ROTC requirements for male students in the majority of colleges with ROTC programs.

2. An educational method stressing training and indoctrination in conflict with the central university commitment toward study and inquiry.

3. Centralized national control of ROTC programs violating the institutional autonomy of colleges and universities.

4. Sub-standard preparation of ROTC instructors in courses such as military history, geography and international relations.

5. The commitment toward violence and killing instead of a humane ethic.

6. The demands on student time which distract from what is considered legitimate college and university instruction (Boyer 1972, 100).

ROTC, however, is merely an overt manifestation of increased militarism and federal incursion into education. Through its manipulation of the purse strings, the federal government has managed to direct the course of intellectual inquiry and promote adherence to the normative values of the power elite in the nation's schools and colleges. As mentioned in Chapter III, the extension of the prerogatives of the federal government was accelerated during the Progressive era, when federal antitrust legislation, child labor laws and conservation legislation were enacted and the departments of labor and commerce were established. In 1908 bills were introduced in Congress to
establish a Department of Education and a national university at Washington but failed to pass (Reisner 1922, 481). The idea of federal aid to vocational education, however, was more favorably received and in 1917 the Smith-Hughes Act was passed, which specifically defined the purposes for which federal aid was to be used, a bold departure from traditional definition of federal participation in education. The education fostered under the act was to be vocational, for persons over fourteen years of age, and to be given in public schools or classes of less than college grade and a system of federal inspection of the schools operating under the act was established (ibid., 484). The principles embodied in this legislation have since been incorporated in subsequent federal aid to education, most notably the National Defense and Education Act of 1958 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

Indeed, the federal government has been shaping the parameters of education ever since 1957, when Sputnik alerted the educational establishment to the need for increased emphasis on the physical sciences, and most elementary, high school and college curricula and textbooks have been subordinated to the perceived national interest, that of keeping the United States ahead in the arms and space "race." This post-Sputnik academic reform affected all levels of the educational system. The federal Office of Education and the National Science Foundation gave extensive grants for the creation of new teaching materials and teacher-training, at first in the sciences, later extending

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its scope to the social sciences as well. The results of this reform were surprisingly sweeping and swift, given the traditional nature of the educational establishment: "The public school system is, after all, one of the most conservative of American institutions; it has a protoplasmic quality that combines a superficial sensitivity with a profound resistance to change" (Fitzgerald 1979, 190).

An examination of widely-used high school social studies texts reveals an inherent nationalistic bias and lack of intellectual inquiry, maintains Frances Fitzgerald in her seminal work, America Revised. Few of the texts she examined contained reference to the peace movement or to any of the political turmoil of the late sixties and early seventies. Similarly, American business abroad seemed to be a taboo subject. In foreign affairs, although a few texts raise questions about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, American children are given a view of the world in which a virtuous United States is beleaguered by a mass of countries intent upon making trouble. The essential premise of these texts is that the United States always acted from the highest motives and though beset by problems, it was still without peer and in all important aspects was still alone in the world (ibid., 139).

In contrast to the ethos of these textbooks, the philosophy of peace education speaks to a different premise, that of cooperation and international understanding, and educators are increasingly turning to this point of view. In 1973 the
prestigious Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development devoted its yearbook to the topic of education for peace. Its contributors questioned the dominant values of militarism and nationalism being fostered in the schools:

If we examine the characteristic response of the schools over the past two decades, we find that in the main they have followed a course laid down by policy makers in certain aspects of government, the military and industry. It becomes difficult not to conclude that through this period education was viewed by some as a major instrument of national policy which included support of the war system. Although always avowing 'academic objectivity' on controversial issues, historically the schools have tended to endorse the prevailing economic, political and military policies of the established order .... Without asking too many questions concerning ultimate goals, the schools tended to accept proposals for widespread reform which were heavily subsidized by powerful groups and offered in the interest of national defense (Monez in Henderson 1973, 20).

Organized and written at the height of antiwar sentiment during the Vietnam conflict, the yearbook reflects the concern of educators about the issues of war and peace and the need to address these issues in the classroom: "Viewed in this perspective, peace education is not so much an idealistic dream as a need to reduce the militarization of our economy and our educational system to the point where problems like poverty and pollution can receive the attention needed to improve man's chances of survival" (Becker in Henderson 1973, 109).

Implicit in this statement are the ethical and moral values of peace education: universal human dignity, social justice and ecological responsibility. These operational norms were consistent with the tenets of the "new" social studies of the
sixties and seventies, which stressed open inquiry and values clarification. In the eighties, however, both values education and peace education have been criticized as indoctrination by conservative critics in the educational establishment. Nonetheless, the popular nuclear disarmament movement of the early eighties spurred a broad-scale effort among teachers to introduce questions related to the arms race and peace into the schools (Reardon 1988, 9). Because of this trend, the focus of peace education in the United States has been skewed somewhat towards study of nuclear war issues and less towards the root causes of social injustice.

Abhorrence of war, however, has traditionally been the focus of peace education in the United States, fostered at first by the organized peace societies and informed by religious and moral motivations. The Massachusetts Peace Society, founded in 1815 by Noah Worcester, a Unitarian minister, published a quarterly journal, Friend of Peace, numerous peace tracts for adults and children and a statistical study on the causes and effects of wars (Fink 1980, 66). With the growth of militaristic influence on the public educational system following the Civil War, peace societies increased their efforts to affect the curriculum and teaching materials of the public schools. The American Peace Society published a list for debating societies of 200 peace-related topics with references, and a monthly magazine for children, Angel of Peace (ibid., 67).
Several advances in peace education were made before World War I, when Progressive enthusiasm for civic reform ran high. Publisher Edwin Ginn founded an International School of Peace (later called the World Peace Foundation) in 1909, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established in 1910 (Marchand, 128). The Intercollegiate Peace Association, which sponsored oratorical contests for students on peace-oriented topics, was founded in 1905, and the National Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs, composed of college campus clubs to promote international friendship, was formed in 1907. The American School Peace League (later the American School Citizenship League), focusing on the primary and secondary level, was formally organized in 1908 (Moritzen 1912, 150). These organizations distributed literature, supplied speakers, developed curriculum materials, held essay contests on peace questions for students and organized peace study groups for teachers (Fink 1980, 68).

The First World War diminished the hopes of the peace movement for a lasting peace among nations, but the interwar period saw a renaissance of antiwar sentiment and a resurgence of peace education efforts. Like the eighteenth century philosophes, peace educators believed that reforming corrupt social institutions would produce an enlightened citizenry. Unlike these Enlightenment thinkers who saw peace primarily as the byproduct of moral and institutional reform, however, modern peace educators emphasized the abolition of war as the path to
Because nationalism was perceived as the cause of World War I, the movement began to question the traditional dogma of national sovereignty.

In 1924 the Association for Peace Education published a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of typical school histories used in the U.S., and numerous other organizations joined in a demand for textbook revision. By the end of the 1930s, the literature on peace education had increased so much that special bibliographies were published which listed hundreds of books, journals and teaching materials (ibid. 1980, 69).

After the Second World War this literature continued to grow along with the institutional arrangements established to promote peace education and peace studies. The first undergraduate peace studies program was founded at Manchester College in Indiana in 1948 followed by numerous independent organizations to promote peace education, such as the Stanley Foundation, World Law Fund and Institute for World Order. The decade of the late 1960s to 1970s, during the civil rights turmoil and the Vietnam War, saw a burgeoning of college-level peace studies programs, focusing on social justice issues as well as anti-war sentiment. The Center for Teaching about Peace and War at Wayne State University and the Society of Friends Center for War/Peace Studies concentrated on developing curriculum materials at the primary and secondary levels. In 1970 the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED) was founded to promote the integration of peace research, education and action in North America. Within
that organization, a Peace Education Network (PEN) was formed in the early seventies as a networking mechanism for elementary and secondary school educators in the U.S. Many of these educators in 1972 helped form the Peace Education Commission, a transnational group of educators belonging to the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) founded in 1964. (Reardon 1988 5-8). On the college level, a Peace Studies Association was formed in 1987 to support the further development of the field (Stephenson in Thomas and Klare 1989, 17). Despite these efforts at networking and integration, however, there remains considerable disagreement among peace researchers and educators over the parameters and proper emphasis of peace education, even though most would agree that the intellectual core to the field centers on the causes and prevention of war (ibid., 18).

In the United States, recent emphasis has been on negative peace, the absence of violence, "nuclear age" education and conflict resolution. In Europe and the Third World, however, problems of underdevelopment, hunger, poverty and the lack of human rights, or positive peace, are stressed. (Harris 1989, 47). Both definitions of peace are legitimate areas of peace education, but the values of human dignity and social justice as well as the term "peace education" are denigrated by those who patronize the boutiques of common wisdom. The popular mentality buys the argument that peace education that delves into the structural causes of violence and questions the status quo must
therefore promote weakness in the American system and is synonymous with appeasement (ibid., 45).

Among the witnesses before the Commission, most testified that the proposed academy should focus on conflict resolution. Others advocated the study of human rights, structural inequality, cross-cultural studies, and the causes of war. Although many people spoke of the horrors of nuclear war, only a few suggested that the study of the consequences of living with nuclear weapons was a valid field of study for the new institution. That concept gained favor in the early 1980s with the publication of Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth* and the advent of the nuclear freeze movement. Since the movement was having little effect on the policies of the United States government, its leader, Randall Forsberg, argued for an educational strategy to change the attitude of the American public regarding the use of nuclear weapons (ibid., 41).

The impetus for nuclear age education was greatly aided by the influence of prestigious psychologists and psychiatrists who warned that the time had come for Americans to stop blindly following political and military leaders through the gloaming of the nuclear age and face the issue of the consequences of the nuclear arms race.

Perhaps the first to sound the tocsin was Jerome Frank of Johns Hopkins University in his book, *Sanity and Survival* published in 1967. Frank, noting that in the past more weapons meant a more secure nation, maintained that security through
military superiority was now meaningless. Survival in the nuclear age meant redistributing the drive for power and the impulse to violence to fostering countervailing drives toward fellowship and community. (Nearly twenty years later, this endorsement of the need for commitment to public life was reaffirmed by Frank's fellow psychologists at the University of California in the national bestseller, Habits of the Heart [Bellah 1985].) Meanwhile, psychologists, psychiatrists and educators were conducting numerous surveys to ascertain the effects of the nuclear arms race on children and young adults.

Milton Schwebel of Rutgers conducted studies in 1961-62 and 1979-82 of children in elementary, intermediate and high school grades and found that living with the nuclear threat engendered a variety of responses in youngsters, ranging from irrational optimism to denial. His later sample also exhibited an alarming narcissistic disregard for the welfare of others, a theme Christopher Lasch further expounds upon in The Minimal Self (1984). Schwebel found his subjects to be bitter about the price they felt adults were asking them to pay in the event of a nuclear war - denial of a chance to live, to love, to work, to bear children and raise a family. Like Frank, he concluded with a message for professionals in psychology and education. Despite the fact that some educators claim that explicit information would unduly arouse the anxieties of the young, Schwebel recommended programs in the schools on the basic facts about the weapons and the nuclear threat. Adults must be strong role
models, people who themselves don't deny the peril. They should educate youngsters to participate in public affairs and try to effect a change: "A limited nuclear war is as mad and immoral as a limited Nazi Holocaust. To say it forcefully again and again, and to give young children the opportunity to see that for themselves will validate their impulses and give them strength" (Schwebel 1982, 614). Other researchers agreed with this conclusion.

Harvard psychiatrists William Beardslee and John Mack, reporting for a 1982 American Psychiatric Association task force on the psychosocial aspects of nuclear developments, concluded that an adolescent must be able to rely on a stable and enduring future in order to build a healthy ego ideal. When the adult role models around the adolescent are perceived to be incompetent and can only assure a future contaminated by the threat of a nuclear holocaust, the ego ideal is damaged and planning for the future seems pointless (Task Force Report 20 1982, 90). Like Schwebel, these researchers believe that phenomena such as emphasis on immediate pleasures and the distrust of enduring relationships among many youth can be attributed to the seeming denial of the possibility of a future by the very adults entrusted with its preservation.

Beardslee and Mack conducted a three-year study from 1978 to 1980 of the impact on children and adolescents of nuclear developments. The intensity of the fears revealed in the answers
to their questions caused them to revise their hypothesis that young people were relatively isolated from the nuclear debate. They called for discussion of the implications of nuclear war by parents and teachers, urging adults not to enter into the compact of denial of the problem. Their study was based on responses to a questionnaire administered to 1,151 students in schools in urban and suburban areas of Los Angeles, Boston and Baltimore. Other researchers replicated their design to test for geographic and class-based variables.

Students in Massachusetts rated the chance of nuclear war as 50-50 or greater and more than a third of the high school seniors tested in Michigan saw nuclear annihilation as a distinct possibility within their lifetime. Students in Connecticut from middle class families rated nuclear conflict as their most important concern, while students from working-class backgrounds rated the economy and unemployment as more serious threats (Yudkin 1984, 20). An extensive Minnesota poll revealed a strange dichotomy:

The threat of nuclear war is of deep concern to young Minnesotans. They are agonizingly aware of the seriousness of this threat, and few believe that they could survive a nuclear war — or would even want to. Yet a strong majority insists that these fears have little or no bearing on their everyday lives and only a handful report any involvement in attempts to influence nuclear policy (Hedin et al. 1985, 30).

Despite these results, a survey by Educators for Social Responsibility found that adults were unaware of the depth of children's concern about nuclear war. The researchers, Chivian
and Roberta Snow, were told by the teachers they interviewed that
their children knew nothing about nuclear weapons, yet further
investigation showed a deep feeling of helplessness and an
awareness of the world-destroying potential of nuclear weapons
among the youngsters interviewed. The Snows concluded that
adults, particularly parents and teachers, must assure children
that they care and are working to prevent nuclear destruction
(Yudkin 1984, 25).

The Snows' conclusion that it was imperative for educators
to acquaint youngsters with the facts about nuclear weapons was
not shared by all researchers, however. Sibylle Escalona, for
example, found in her 1965 study that more than 70% of the
children she interviewed thought that a nuclear war was a likely
possibility. This threat, she concluded, weakened the process of
establishing a personal identity which is the important business
of adolescence. Her conclusion was that, while it was important
for children to know that adults whom they trust have thought
about the nuclear threat and what it implies, it nonetheless was
not wise to expose young children to overly intense adult
emotion (Escalona 1965, 171). Other researches agreed that
detailed knowledge about nuclear weapons and nuclear war was
perhaps not appropriate at the elementary school level (Jacobson,
Reardon and Sloan 1983, 475).

Escalona's advice, unfortunately, encourages an attitude of
denial which in turn exacerbates a feeling of personal
powerlessness, the theme of Despair and Personal Power in the
Nuclear Age by Joanna Macy. Macy's book is a blueprint for coping with the realities of the nuclear threat. In it, she describes three widespread behaviors in reaction to the nuclear peril: denial, disbelief and the double life. The last-named term, shorthand for the act of repression of "an anguish beyond naming" (Macy 1983, 6) was coined by psychologist Robert Jay Lifton who also described the phenomena of "psychic numbing."

This term, which is "an overall category that includes the standard psychoanalytic defense mechanisms of denial, suppression and repression" has also been used in peace education literature to explain the attitude of those who would prohibit the introduction of nuclear age education into the school curriculum. Lifton sees psychic numbing as contributing to young people's search for security in fundamentalist cults, although he calls the "worship" of nuclear weapons by those who contribute to their being perfected and used the "ultimate fundamentalism of our time" (Lifton 1983, 628).

Lifton was joined by humanist Carl Rogers who stated unequivocally that, contrary to received military doctrine and official United States policy, "there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war" (Rogers 1983, 9). Rogers urged a communicative process that leads toward peaceful reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Citing rising statistics of the incidence of suicide among adolescents, Rogers concluded that the possibility of a nuclear war plays a part in the feeling of hopelessness that leads to such a final act. Like former
President Eisenhower, he urged that "we have to make the young people see that they need not be the victims of a Third World War" by enlisting adults and young people to change the policy of the U.S. government (ibid, 19).

By 1982 Jerome Frank had come to this same conclusion. He urged a change from the policy of deterrence and from our image of the Russians: "Deterrence produces great emotional tension, and emotional tension tends to lead people to simplify alternatives, to see everything in black-and-white terms and to be unable to stand the pressure indefinitely" (ibid., 635).

Frank agreed with Lifton that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons was a "vain effort to achieve psychological security at the expense of actual security" (Frank 1982, 632) and suggested that Americans' perception of nuclear weapons was the same as the way in which they regarded conventional arms, a condition he called "habituation." Furthermore, Frank stated that since "there is no direct link between biological drives and learned, complex social behaviors such as war" waging war is "a complex social behavior that must be learned afresh by every generation" (Frank 1983, 403-404).

The implications of such research was clear for educators as well as psychologists and psychiatrists. The studies showed that youngsters who are more aware of the nuclear threat function better than peers who are unaware (Zuckerman and Beardslee 1986, 383) and that ignorance and lack of interest has dominated the
United States-Soviet relationship, an ignorance that our educational system has done little to correct (Mack 1982, 597). Further, they called into question two long-held assumptions of cold war mentality: that the Soviet intentions are unmitigatedly evil and that our nuclear weapons systems provide protection (ibid., 595). Investigators researching children's attitudes towards war discovered that "children were being taught to think of organized killing of human beings by other human beings as a natural and perhaps noble part of the human experience" (Task Force Report 20 1981, 70). Children who saw war as inevitable also tended to see peace as absence of war rather than an active process of conflict resolution (ibid., 71). Educators responded to these research findings by devising curricula that emphasized respecting and appreciating others in the early grades, thinking skills for the nuclear age in the upper grades, and conflict resolution and alternatives to violence in the senior high grades. Courses on the college level were concerned with war and international conflict as well as social justice and conflict resolution. Surprisingly, very few courses on Soviet studies were introduced. On the pre-college level, nuclear education dominated the scene and on the college level, programs in conflict resolution grew so rapidly that peace studies proponents feared it would overshadow their curriculum (Katz 1989, 15).

The results of the studies and of textbook analyses that revealed a dearth of information regarding the consequences of nuclear weapons in traditional world history and U.S. history
texts reinforced the resolve of educators to introduce nuclear weapons education below the college level (Fleming 1984, 75). The curricula they devised included several basic concepts, such as the possibility of the destruction of the planet, the idea of national security as more than military security, the policies of deterrence, arms control and disarmament, and alternative security policies. Subsumed within these concepts were the issues of the costs of the arms race vis-a-vis national priorities, the problematic question of civil defense, understanding the Soviet Union, and strategies for avoiding a nuclear holocaust (Jacobson, Reardon and Sloan, 1983). Most of the curricula was teacher-designed, and sponsored by peace-activist groups, although some, notably that of the Milwaukee public schools, were system-wide efforts. All were severely criticized by conservative groups and some leaders in the education establishment.

Crossroads, a curriculum for high schools developed in 1981 by teachers members of the Jobs with Peace National Education Task Force had a unique economic perspective. In addition to addressing students' fears and questions about nuclear weapons buildup and international conflict, it helped students explore the relationship between increased military spending and the decline in their employment and educational options (Greeley, Markowitz and Rank 1984, 343). But because it never fully developed the connections between nuclear and non-nuclear military policy, students may arrive at the unintended conclusion that relatively cheap nuclear weapons would require less
sacrifice from other areas of the national budget (Hemphill 1984: 361).

A curriculum for junior high school students developed in 1983 by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Massachusetts Teachers Association and the National Education Association called Choices: A Unit on Conflict and Nuclear War was widely used throughout the country. Predicated on two themes: the dangers posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the advantages of conflict resolution techniques for settling differences among individuals and nations, it was severely criticized for advocating pacifism. Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers (a rival organization to the NEA) called it "lopsided propaganda" and maintained that the lesson plans dismissed as irrational fears concerns that many felt were justified and prudent. (Mack 1984, 261). Official government reaction was given by Garry H. Bauer, a deputy undersecretary at the Department of Education, who accused the NEA of preparing "leftist indoctrination aimed at turning today's elementary students into tomorrow's campus radicals" (Fleming 1984, 71).

Educators for Social Responsibility was formed in 1981 for the express purpose of meeting the challenge of the nuclear threat:

At the heart of the discussion over the threat of nuclear war and the present course of the arms race is the challenge for each of us to take responsibility for creating a future that will be both safe and peaceful. It is the challenge of overcoming our powerlessness and becoming active participants in the process of democratic decision-making.
These issues must not just be seen as a problem, but as an opportunity to make a difference (Berman 1983, 501).

On October 25, 1982, ESR sponsored a "Day of Dialogue" about nuclear issues that attracted the participation of more than 500 schools and communities throughout the country. The various events of that day (some ESR chapters extended their activities into a week) revealed findings that correlated with the conclusions of the studies cited above:

Students had a clear image of the Soviets as "the enemy" and held deep prejudices based on little information; they expressed a strong sense of powerlessness and lack of inspiring models of individuals and organizations that have made a difference; their concept of peace was simply the absence of war; they expressed a cynicism about the possibilities for a better future (ibid., 503).

Accordingly, ESR set about devising curricula to meet the needs expressed in these responses, which it called Dialogue: A Teaching Guide to Nuclear Issues and Decisionmaking in a Nuclear Age. Intended for students in the seventh through twelfth grades, Dialog consisted of a collection of ideas for activities rather than student materials and teacher lesson plans but has been criticized for not providing enough background information to help students form their own views about the arms race (Hemphill 1984, 362). Decisionmaking, on the other hand, was designed for high school students and was considerably longer and more ambitious. It was unique in that it took a multidisciplinary approach in an attempt to prevent the course from becoming unduly partisan. It used a strategy called "methodological belief" to
teach the concept that truth is often complex and ambiguous by reconstructing the life experiences and value systems that have led others to differing conclusions. The curriculum has resulted in many projects, including television appearances by students, school assemblies, participation in local and national elections, and writing opinion articles for publication. As one student remarked, "I never used to think about current events much, and here I am making them" (Snow and Goodman 1984, 328). This curriculum has been criticized in the conservative press as brainwashing American public school students through teaching about disarmament and the nuclear freeze (Iserbyt 1983, 10).

All of these curricula could be criticized for having the same shortcomings as most social studies materials: adult moralizing, lack of balance, vagueness and oversimplification (Hemphill 1984, 363) but it is on their fundamental premise that the received opinion of the power elite is open to question that they are most often attacked by the Establishment. Thus, in addressing the American Federation of Teachers, former President Reagan attacked "curriculum guides that seem to be more aimed at frightening and brainwashing American school children than at fostering learning and stimulating balanced, intelligent debate." An editorial in the Washington Post questioned whether peace education materials involved teaching in a normally accepted sense or were intended instead as propaganda to advocate a particular position (Mack 1984, 261).
In view of the fact that the federal government has persistently set the parameters of public education since 1957 and social studies textbooks are distinctly nationalistic in tone, one begs for a definition of a "normally accepted sense." This is particularly compelling at the college level, where open inquiry and questioning of the status quo is traditionally encouraged. If nuclearism can be defined as the psychological political and military dependence on nuclear weapons and the basing of national security on the search for nuclear superiority and the readiness to wage nuclear warfare (Markusen and Harris 1984, 291), then this concept has become institutionalized in our society, aided by the efforts of a higher educational establishment dependent on defense-related research grants. Until recently, universities have tended to ignore the issue of nuclear war, and as a consequence, we lack a citizenry informed about nuclear issues. Citizen participation is indispensable for decision-making in a democracy: "Unless the educational institutions of democratic society provide citizens with opportunities to learn about the facts and issues of nuclear war, the society will be severely handicapped in its struggle for survival." (ibid., 301)

As mentioned above, at the university level, peace education and peace research, closely intertwined, are referred to in the literature as peace studies. Conflict resolution programs dominate this field to such an extent that, as noted above, some peace studies supporters fear the co-opting of their curriculum.
It was the popularity of the concept of conflict resolution that prompted the Commission to name its subject the "National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution" and most witnesses before the Commission addressed this aspect of the proposed federal institution's mission.

Unlike the traditional university discipline which is grounded in theory and rests on a supposedly value-free base, the field of conflict resolution (also called dispute settlement and conflict management) is distinctly instrumentally oriented and based on explicit values and ethical principles. Because it emphasizes the techniques of conciliation, mediation and negotiation, its place as a bona fide field of scholarship has been questioned. Nonetheless, programs in conflict resolution in universities and professional schools have grown at an enormous pace in the 1980s (Katz 1989, 15). Peace studies practitioners endeavor to combine the theories, principles and techniques of conflict resolution with more normative peace studies subjects, such as social change theory, international war and peace issues, and alternative security measures, arguing that conflict resolution is an effective vehicle for examining themes of peace, justice and nonviolent social change in the classroom (ibid., 19).

This attempt to harness the horse of conflict resolution to the cart of peace studies is also motivated by the fear of those in the peace studies field that, approached in an intellectual vacuum, conflict resolution programs will influence peace studies
to lean towards a less value-conscious and more nationally oriented strategic studies perspective. Like strategic studies, conflict resolution programs have been able to attract substantial operating grants (particularly from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation) prompting concerns that the field will become market driven rather than needs driven (Dugan 1989, 76).

The field of peace studies has developed from its early years during the civil rights struggle of the 1960s and Vietnam War of the early 1970s when it stressed a multidisciplinary approach to the problems of war prevention, social justice, economic well-being, ecological balance and the philosophical, psychological or religious bases that could inform individual action in the face of a violent world (Lopez 1989, 63-64). During the 1970s, when peace studies programs began to be institutionalized in university programs, emphasis was on future or world-order studies, a war/peace systems approach, conflict resolution, and non-violent values and life-styles. The present era seems to be dominated by nuclear education and specialization in conflict resolution (ibid., 65). Because the field is still developing and various trends in research seem to prevail, peace studies is viewed by some academicians as lacking academic rigor and there is a resistance to institutionalizing peace studies on college campuses. The dynamics of faculty politics, which usually resists interdisciplinary programs, also interferes (Mulch 1989, 83-84). In addition, foundations which fund peace research and training programs attempt to provide direction by
choosing to support some people and projects rather than others (Benedict 1989, 91). The MacArthur Foundation, for example, gave 69 percent of its grant awards from 1985 to 1989 to projects on U.S.-Soviet relations and issues of nuclear and military policy; only nine percent went towards global issues such as the development of an international economy (ibid., 93).

This trend away from the traditional social concerns of peace studies is viewed with alarm by long-term practitioners in the field. They feel that the issue of war-making must be examined within the broader context of the attitudes, values and skills which perpetuate racism, sexism and inequality (Haessly 1988, 4). Those who advocate disarmament education feel that changes in perceptions and world views should be a paramount concern. Peace studies should involve educating people about their own human values and about the fact of their equal social worth among other individuals and other groups (Reardon 1982, 141). This concept, intrinsic to the teaching of social justice, gained great attention from peace researchers in the early 1970s when first propounded by the Brazilian Paulo Freire, who worked among illiterate peasants in Latin America. Freire developed a method he called "conscientization" wherein he raised the consciousness of the oppressed through the use of dialogue, and helped them to see themselves as transformers of reality (Freire, 1972). North American peace studies educators were quick to adapt Freire's techniques to their classrooms in an effort to raise the consciousness of middle-class college
students to the plight of the oppressed. Through studying the nature of the social structure and the system of dominance within it and examining myths about the existing system, students are led to realize that working to invent new social structures and new courses of action are in the interest of the oppressor as well as the oppressed (Kent 1977, 38-39). The process is similar to that of "methodological belief" used in the Decision Making in a Nuclear Age course (q.v.).

Process, or form, is important not only to peace education on the pre-college level but also to peace studies in the university. Early in the history of peace studies, Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung pointed out the importance of maintaining a democratic milieu within the university classroom (Galtung 1975, 288). Students do not learn only through lectures, he maintained, but also through individual and group research, drama, games, and participation in class discussion. These techniques are all used in the five phases of content formation of a peace studies course: analysis, goal formation, critique, proposal making and action (ibid., 319).

In the nation's elementary and high schools, the advent of peace education coincided with a public perception of the failure of the educational system (Silberman, 1970). Challenging the "myth of institutional paternalism" critics reaffirmed the tenets of John Dewey, that education should prepare youngsters for living a humane life, that children should learn by doing, and that problem solving was the essence of learning (Perkinson
1986, 210). Educators began to study the environment of schools, and found that in low-income schools there was suppressive regulation of children and a low degree of child participation, while in middle-to-upper income schools a high degree of child participation resulted in a pluralistic, accepting, warm environment where children were free to pursue self-chosen goals (Haan in Henderson 1973, 52).

The pedagogy of peace education became the subject of much discussion in peace education literature. The Peace Education Network (q.v.) designed curricular materials that emphasized participatory learning, egalitarian classrooms and inquiry and problem solving rather than didactic methods (Reardon 1988, 8). Educators were warned that they should no longer perpetuate the dual morality that was typical of western capitalist countries: "In theory, values like fairness, trustworthiness, truth and solidarity are maintained. In practice, we educate according to the morality of achievement, competition, envy and individualistic assertion" (Burns and Aspeslagh 1984, 218).

The World Encyclopedia of Peace reported that "mounting evidence indicates that the content alone is not sufficient to maximize these programs' effectiveness, but that the traditional structures and processes within which university education occurs need to be transformed as well" (Hurst 1986, 274).

Educators discovered that students forget 98 percent of the material that they hear in lectures and are more likely to remember information if they make discoveries themselves (Frey,
College teachers who maximized student participation in their classes reported a high degree of student satisfaction and achievement: "All students made an 'A' on this course, based on their class presentations, papers and final exams" (Eckhardt 1984, 80). Instructors who strove to maintain a 'peaceable classroom' with such pedagogical techniques as peer inquiry and conferencing discovered that adversarial relationships between teacher and student and student and student, so often found in the traditional class, disappeared as the students learned that cooperation rather than competition spelled success (Frey 1984, 95).

This transformation from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship requires a paradigm shift in the thinking of school teachers trained in the Skinnerian techniques of behavior modification and of college teachers accustomed to regarding the professor as the font of all wisdom. Teacher training courses in colleges should stress the techniques of small group teaching. In 1984 a survey of peace, nuclear war and global teacher education courses in colleges concluded that "Peace education reform of teacher education, which includes emphasis on inquiry and the small group method, therefore, could have beneficial consequences for American education in general" (Finn 1984, 60). Increasingly, teachers of elementary and high schools are turning to methods that promote cooperative learning and group problem-solving (Slavin 1987). It is only in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation that true peace learning can occur. Immanuel Kant's
categorical imperative that advised that one must do only what one can will that all others should do under similar circumstances perfectly states the ethics of peace studies. (Hurst 1986, 277). If the aim of education as Alfred North Whitehead said, is to pass on a culture that is "an activity of thought and receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling... scraps of information have nothing to do with it" (Whitehead 1932, 1) then surely the pedagogy of peace education is the quiddity of its ethos.
The Two Culture Debate

Closely allied with peace education and peace action, peace research in the United States has suffered from what C.P. Snow once defined as the mutual exclusiveness of two cultures. Snow was lamenting the lack of communication between the literary intellectuals and the physical scientists, two groups "comparable in intelligence, identical in race, not grossly different in social origin, earning about the same incomes" who had a curious distorted image of each other (Snow 1959, 2). The future-oriented scientist ignored the literature of traditional culture, while the literary intellectual was a "natural Luddite" who never appreciated the importance of the industrial revolution. A wide gulf of mutual incomprehension, based on a lack of understanding, existed between the two groups.

Similarly, a gulf of mutual suspicion, hostility and dislike exists between the strategists - those who deal with the problems of how to wage war and how to assuage the fear of war - and the peace researchers who disavow the use of force in international relations, advocating the pursuit of peace only through nonviolent, peaceful means. (Somewhere in between the two are the traditional international relations researchers who espouse the concepts of power politics but do not necessarily subscribe to the use of force as a legitimate extension of diplomacy.) Like Snow's scientists, the strategists consider themselves hard
headed realists who recognize that the world is one of power politics, while the peace researchers cite cultural and ideological differences that need to be surmounted. Unlike Snow's literary intellectuals, however, many of the peace proponents consider themselves quite scientific, advocating what they term the "science of peace." Nonetheless, the two camps rarely meet to discuss their differences. As Commissioner Elise Boulding remarked, "My husband [peace researcher Kenneth Boulding] hasn't spoken to Thomas Schelling [a leading strategist] in more than twenty years" (interview, 1988).

Government-sponsored research

As stated in Chapter III, federal government agencies were generous in their funding of strategic studies research, which perpetuated the accepted notion of national security based upon peace through strength. In this regard, the government was pursuing a long tradition of financing scientific endeavors perceived to be in the national interest. In 1841 the Naval Observatory was established to conduct studies essential for the practical business of the Navy. Today it is a world center for time and star position standards and fundamental research on comets (Yarmolinsky 1971, 284). In fact, in every war since the Civil War new institutional mechanisms were created to serve the needs of military technology and after the war some of them continued as research institutions serving both civilian and military requirements. The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 to advise the government on practical matters.
of military interest, but quickly evolved after the Civil War into a prestigious institution of American science that dominates the scientific field today. The National Research Council was created during World War I; it was through its development of tests and procedures for selecting men for the specialized tasks required in an increasingly technological style of warfare that the foundation was laid for the recognition of psychology as an independent science in the United States. By bringing academic and industrial scientists together in a common effort the council also helped to establish the problem-oriented, coordinated interdisciplinary approach to large-scale problems that became a common experience for a whole generation of scientists and continues to operate through contracts with universities and industrial firms. The Office of Scientific Research and Development, established in 1941 and headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush, served as a center for developing and applying the results of scientific research to defense purposes. Its functions were taken over by the Office of Naval Research, which now conducts long-range basic research with only a relatively tenuous relationship to military requirements. It has become the mainstay of much of American science, especially in physics and engineering. Today, the National Institutes of Health conducts a military medical research program, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration develops new space technology under civilian management and over 30 percent of all academic research in the physical sciences is dependent on the Defense Department (ibid., 117).
287-306). Through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) the department finances research into a broad area of science, and by providing guaranteed forward funding over a period of several years enables a university to develop long-range plans for the growth of faculty, facilities and graduate student enrollment. Indeed, the agency has become the largest single source of funding in the field of computer science, supporting nearly half the nation's computer-science doctoral candidates. (Cook 1988, 94).

A parallel can be drawn between twentieth century funding for strategic studies and nineteenth century financing of exploration of the west. From the Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804 to the establishment of the U.S. Geologic Survey in 1870, the story of westward exploration showed a clear relationship to national political and economic aspirations (Goetzmann 1996, 232).

Ironically, it was Thomas Jefferson, the great champion of states' rights, who opened the door to federal financing of scientific endeavors. Determined to learn about the geography, population and extent of the newly acquired Louisiana Territory so he could bargain intelligently with France and Spain which laid claim to parts of the region, Jefferson financed a series of expeditions, with detailed instructions. Subsequently, Congress authorized surveys by the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers under the direction of John C. Fremont and government surveys of a Pacific railroad route under the command of Secretary of War
Jefferson Davis (ibid., 281). In fact, the Army dominated westward exploration until 1879, when the military explorer gave way to civilian control with the consolidation of the western surveys under Clarence King as director of the United States Geological Surveys (ibid., 488).

The triumph of the National Academy of Sciences over the Army was the result of a long struggle between civilian scientists and military explorers with conflicting visions of the development of the West. The experience of the great explorer of the Grand Canyon, John Wesley Powell, is a case in point. Powell was interested in the geology and ethnology of the West and did not subordinate his research to the national goals of settlement and development of natural resources. It wasn't until his research, funded by local sources, was nationally recognized that he received any funding from Congress, and even then he was required to report only to the Smithsonian Institution (ibid., 556). The scientific establishment of the mid-nineteenth century was unalterably opposed to Army-dominated science; scientists of the twentieth century, however, were divided on the question of participation in military-directed weapons and strategic policy research. The majority of these scientists, unlike their nineteenth century forbears, accepted and cooperated with the dominant paradigm that turned a traditionally anti-militaristic society into a postwar national security state.

Although some scientists, like Norbert Wiener, refused to participate in postwar military-related research on the grounds
that "to provide scientific information is not a necessarily innocent act, and may entail the gravest consequences . . . the scientist ends by putting unlimited powers in the hands of the people whom he is least inclined to trust with their use" (Weinberg 1963, 116-117), physical and social scientists alike were drawn into the Cold War debate after World War II. Physical scientists, many of whom had worked on the Manhattan Project, were encouraged by the specter of a rival Soviet Union that joined the nuclear club as early as 1949 to continue to work on more lethal weapons. Social scientists, many of them political scientists, subscribed to the idea of power politics and saw themselves as realists who relied on empirical evidence to justify their conclusions. They viewed the East-West rivalry in dichotomous terms, using evidence of Russian global adventurism, ideology and sense of historical determinism to support their views. Social scientists who opposed this view contended that realism was nothing more than the opposite of idealism, reasonableness and morality (Reisman and Maccoby in Roosevelt 1962, 27). Furthermore, a "realistic" theory of decision-making that purports to derive its prescripts exclusively from objective reality ignores the ethical orientations of the decision-makers (Rapoport 1962, 75).

The Strategists

The values of the decision-makers played a large part in the framing of NSC-68, the document that defined the Cold War and set the tone of the postwar debate regarding East-West relations.
Authored by Paul Nitze, the paper was sent to President Truman by way of the National Security Council and remained classified until 1975. Nitze's epiphany had occurred when he served on the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in the Pacific in 1945; he came away from this assignment convinced of the need for a larger role of the military in U.S. foreign policy (Talbott 1988, 39). When Secretary of State Dean Acheson, increasingly distrustful of the Soviet Union, appointed Nitze director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, the secretary and the director were agreed on the need to counter the perceived Soviet threat with tough measures (ibid., 54). Couched in emotional yet analytic terms, NSC 68 pictured the Soviet Union as an adversary with seemingly limitless ambitions, committed to an ideology that claimed the tide of history was on its side, and willing to allocate tremendous resources to carry out those ambitions (Rearden 1984, 27). The manifest threat to the U.S. and its allies was spelled out in Manichean terms: "There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin." (NSC 68, 2). To counter this threat, the report recommended a rapid and sustained buildup of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world: "A buildup of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a precondition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster" (NSC 68, 31). The North Korean invasion of South Korea
in 1950 gave impetus to the adoption of the report as official policy; NSC 68 provided a new rationale that effectively subordinated all other concerns to meeting the needs of national security.

In this regard, the document was a precursor of what came to be known as threat inflation. The Gaither Report of 1957, titled "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age" (authored by Nitze) warned of a looming specter of a surprise Soviet missile attack and urged extensive steps to protect the nation's retaliatory forces (Herken 1985, 113). The CIA-sponsored "B team" review of the Soviet threat in 1976 concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking superiority over United States Forces (ibid., 277). The Scowcroft Commission of 1982 recommended deployment of the MX missile in order to communicate to the Soviets that the U.S. has the will essential to effective deterrence (ibid., 335). All of these panels were peopled by those who subscribed to a conservative perception of Soviet capability and intentions, and this ideological orientation has cast doubt upon their interpretation of the facts. Their conclusions, however, determined American policy regarding nuclear arms and strategy and in turn largely framed the parameters of physical and social science research.

Many of the strategists, at one time or another during the course of their careers, have been associated with the RAND Corporation. Originally called Project RAND, it was founded in 1949 by the Air Force as a "think tank" to foster new ideas in
strategy. It later became the nation's leading center for intellectuals who based their careers on thinking about nuclear weapons - how to deter nuclear war, and how to fight a nuclear war if it could not be deterred. Their central tenets - that nuclear war could be calculated with precision, that Strategic Air Command (SAC) vulnerability was the central threat of our time, and that the U.S. had to build up a strong counterforce capability - became the conventional wisdom of Democratic as well as Republican administrations (Kaplan 1983, 382). In spite of their political influence, mathematical calculations and sophisticated war games theory, however, they could never resolve the dilemma of how to plan a nuclear attack that was large enough to have a terrifying impact but small enough to be recognized as a limited strike (ibid., 371).

Physical and social scientists alike were attracted to RAND. They included physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer, Freeman Dyson, Isidore Rabi, Herman Kahn and Edward Teller; mathematicians John von Neumann, Albert Wohlstetter and Daniel Ellsberg; political scientists Bernard Brodie and William Kaufmann; economists Thomas Schelling and James R. Schlesinger and hundreds of others who rotated through the revolving door of government-military-industry-academe described in Mills' The Power Elite. They enjoyed generous funding, access to powerful government officials, and their pronouncements appeared in prestigious journals such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and International Security. Some, like Oppenheimer, Dyson, Rabi, von
Neumann, Ellsberg, Brodie and Kaufmann later came to question the whole concept of nuclear strategy that they had helped to create. Others, like Kahn, Teller and Wohlstetter, never wavered in their devotion to the idea of a credible first strike capability and limited nuclear war. Some who did waver, such as Thomas Schelling, nonetheless clung to their conviction that peace was attainable only through strength, and that strength resided in a demonstrated nuclear capability (Schelling 1985).

Chroniclers of the strategists describe their subjects according to type and intellectual development. Harvard researchers Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., categorize them into "hawks, doves and owls." The hawks are those who view deterrence as a theological concept and argue that the Soviet Union has been cautious because deterrence has worked (Allison, Carnesale and Nye 1985, 217). Doves, on the other hand, worry that military strength and threat may not strengthen deterrence but cause it to break down under some circumstances. They believe in conciliation and accommodation in international affairs, but warn against ineffectual appeasement (ibid., 210-211). Both types assume an ability of leaders to maintain rational control of events, a criticism often levelled at realists by peace researchers. Owls, however, recognize that war can be caused by nonrational factors. Their dominant metaphor is the example of World War I, when events escalated beyond the control of political leaders and nations were unwillingly sucked into the vortex of war. The authors consider themselves owls and

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stress the importance of strengthened controls and maintenance of political stability (ibid., 211). They offer a list of ten principles for avoiding nuclear war:

1. Maintain a credible nuclear deterrent
2. Obtain a credible conventional deterrent
3. Enhance crisis stability
4. Reduce the impact of accidents
5. Develop procedures for war termination
6. Prevent and manage crises
7. Invigorate nonproliferation efforts
8. Limit misperceptions
9. Pursue arms control negotiations
10. Reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence over the long term

Although this list represents a departure from limited nuclear war thinking as advanced by Herman Kahn, Edward Teller and others, it nonetheless still advocates the concept of deterrence and the possible use of nuclear weapons. Emphasis, however, is on the principles of negotiation and increased understanding of others.

Recognition of these principles marked the metamorphosis of some strategists as they progressed from playing the role of missionaries, to crusaders and eventually to apostates, according to historian Gregg Herken. Physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer became an early apostate in his adamant objection to development of the hydrogen bomb (Herken 1985, 42). Mathematician and game theory guru Daniel Ellsberg broke away from orthodox thinking during the
Vietnam War (ibid., 218). Some, like Bernard Brodie, who later criticized the legitimacy of the entire profession of nuclear strategy, became pariahs among their former colleagues (Kaplan 1983, 53). Others, like Thomas Schelling, whose ideas about limited nuclear options and sending signals with force later became official U.S. policy, drifted away from the field of strategy into other endeavors. Schelling, once called "the father of arms control" (ibid., 313) later questioned the value of this mechanism, favoring a policy of deterrence based on "reciprocal vulnerability" (Schelling 1985, 233). Like others who left the field of strategy after the repudiation of their credibility during the Vietnam War, Schelling lost the access, the audience and the motivation to continue in the field (Herken 1985, 313).

A new generation of defense intellectuals, however, has taken the place of the apostates. They speak the arcane language of strategic analysis, replete with euphemisms such as "countervalue attacks" when speaking of obliterating cities; a nuclear missile is called a "damage limitation weapon"; attacks on military targets are called "surgically clean strikes" although unfortunate "collateral damage" may occur to nearby civilian population. A female researcher, who notes that these strategists are predominantly male, accuses them of membership in a priesthood that contains "strong currents of homoerotic excitement, heterosexual domination, a drive toward competence and mastery" (Cohn 1987, 24). She calls for the dismantling of "technostrategic discourse" and the substitution of "alternative
conceptions of rationality" (ibid., 24). During the Reagan administration, these voices of the strategic community prevailed and influenced the appointment of USIP board members, as we shall see in Chapter VII. They had not, however, solved the dilemma of how to fight a protracted or limited or coercive nuclear war, a fact that those in power seemed not to have grasped, but that the public understood, giving rise to a broad-based anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s (Kaplan 1983, 388).

Not many of the strategists testified at the Commission hearings in 1980. One who did, retired General George Keegan, opposed establishment of a federal peace academy. Keegan was "an early proponent first of the bomber gap and later of the missile gap, and remained true to his faith in the gap thesis long after most others had accepted it as chimerical" (Herken 1985, 277). The absence of strategists at the Commission hearings was questioned by Duncan L. Clarke, chronicler of the ACDA, who noted that none of the strategists on that agency’s staff had appeared before the Commission (testimony, HR 5088 7 July 1982, 88). Most of the witnesses who testified in support of the proposed academy were peace researchers opposed to the dominant paradigm of strategic analysis. Rejecting the concept of peace-through-strength, they advocated pursuing peace through peaceful means, which meant embracing alternative security measures, eliminating the causes of social injustice, and relying on conflict resolution rather than force to settle disputes. They regarded themselves as diametrically opposed to the strategists, but, as
Allison, Carnesale and Nye's list reveals and as one strategist who advocates arms control declares, "the opposite intellectual camp does not realize how much we are on the same side and how much has been accomplished" (Quester 1989, 105).

The Peace Researchers

Perhaps this estrangement persists because a two-culture debate also rages within the peace research camp. On the one hand, those who call themselves peace scientists advocate only one methodology, empirical research, and tend toward mathematical quantification to justify their conclusions. They define peace as the absence of war, and in many respects are the mirror image of the strategists in that the use of nuclear weapons forms the core of their research. The strategists endorse the concept of deterrence and the limited use of nuclear weapons; the peace scientists argue for arms control, a no-first-use policy and prevention of nuclear war. This point of view also prevails among North American international relations researchers, and is often called the "traditional-realist" view because it looks upon international relations as a game of power politics (Pardesi 1982, 3) or the "quantitative-behavioral" approach because of its emphasis on empiricism and quantification (Dedring 1981, 1).

On the other hand, those who advocate a more eclectic research methodology define peace as the absence of war coupled with the presence of social justice. Called the "critical peace research" approach (ibid., 1) this school of thought prevails among western European peace scholars and is personified in one
leading peace researcher, Johan Galtung of Norway. It was Galtung who captured the imagination of critical peace researchers when he defined the concept of peace as the absence of war as "negative peace" and peace with social justice as "positive peace." He also coined the term "structural violence" to describe unequal power, deprivation and unequal life chances that result in human beings being influenced "so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations." (Galtung 1969, 168). For example, in India the exploitative social system makes it virtually impossible to eradicate poverty and diseases such as tuberculosis and provide each person with at least the necessaries of life (Pardesi 1982, 16). It follows then that the institutional structure of society where structural violence occurs must be changed in order to achieve positive peace. (In this regard, Galtung's conception of social justice is congruent with that of American philosopher John Rawls.) At the Commission hearings, many witnesses used Galtung's terms in their testimony, urging the would-be peace academy to include study of the causes of structural violence in its curricula. Although Galtung's concepts are often quoted and widely admired for their keen insight, another leading peace researcher, Kenneth Boulding, criticizes the structural violence metaphor as being too static, and unequal to the challenge of describing a situation where randomness plays an influential role. Galtung uses the concepts of structural violence and positive peace to expand the concept of peace research into a general normative science, but Boulding
argues that change is not the result of normative evaluations (Boulding 1977, 77-85).

Other critics question the assumptions of the quantitative-behavioral approach, calling it a "pseudo-science" at best. One historian, for example, challenges the premise of J. David Singer's Correlates of War project that established a statistical basis for testing theories on the causes of war, declaring that perceptions are not as important as intentions in determining historical causality and urging a more humanistic approach (Kagan 1985, 51-53). Another unequivocally states that "peace research in the United States has degenerated in recent years into a futile academic exercise in mathematical model-building with very little practical value" (Pardesi 1982, 25). And economist Kenneth Boulding criticizes the quantitative-behavioral approach as "niggling scientism, with sophisticated methodologies and not very many new ideas" (Dedring 1981, 13).

Because of such criticism and the deep dichotomy within the field, some scholars question the legitimacy of peace studies. Because it is admittedly value-explicit, that is favoring peace over war; trans-disciplinary, employing many different disciplines in its research; trans-national, holding an holistic, or global, point of view; and action-oriented, these critics say that peace research, while perhaps qualifying as a field of endeavor, does not deserve the title of an academic discipline. Kenneth Boulding, however, maintains that peace studies has earned the right to be called an academic discipline.
because it has an extensive bibliography and numerous textbooks, one can give courses and examinations in it, and there are many journals and scholarly societies devoted to this protean field (Boulding 1978, 128-130).

Others who agree with Boulding point out that the two schools of thought within the peace research community are not mutually exclusive, and in fact, overlap. Sub-sets of peace research such as systems analysis, world order modelling and alternative security systems research employ methodologies from both schools of thought. In fact, at times the quantitative group takes the hypotheses from critical peace research and empirically tests them in the quantitative manner, and the use of quantitative tools has spread among critical peace researchers, epiphenomena which may narrow the gap between the two camps (Dedring 1981, 3). The internal tensions within the peace research movement can be resolved if one considers them as a healthy mix, states Harvard psychologist Herbert Kelman in an address to the Peace Science Society, International. Kelman views the mathematical models of the basic researchers and the humanistic and action-orientation models of the applied researchers as complementary (Kelman 1981, 102).

Unfortunately, Kelman also makes several observations that indicate the deep philosophical rift within the peace research community. In stating that "there may be justification at times in sacrificing peace for the sake of national survival or social justice" (ibid., 105) he seems to affirm the just-war theory
which is unequivocally rejected by pacifists. In maintaining that "it would be inappropriate for the peace research discipline to take a position in favor of peace as the supreme value" (ibid., 104) he alienates many peace researchers who take this normative view. Furthermore, he equivocates when he declares that justice should not be included in the definition of peace, but "peace is intimately linked to considerations of justice" (ibid., 109).

Nonetheless, scholars who have surveyed peace practitioners conclude that the field is more unified than it is divisive (Kemp 1985, 40). And funding agencies do not seem to distinguish between the two schools of thought, although scholarly preference, often restrained by foundation policy, is therefore directed more towards basic research than political activism (Lebow 1988, 523).

An attempt to explain the leaning of North American researchers toward the narrow conception of peace as the absence of war and therefore the emphasis on legalistic and quantitative approaches has been undertaken by some historians, who themselves by definition have a dual-personality, straddling the fence as they must between the social sciences and the humanities. The confluence of business and government interests largely shaped peace research and the modern peace movement in the 1920s, according to Charles deBenedetti: "the movement prescribed and agitated; the government directed and decided" (deBenedetti 1978, x). As noted in Chapter II, foundations such as the Carnegie
Foundation strongly determined the thrust of peace research through their funding policies. This research was heavily influenced by legalistic and positivist concepts. Then, too, the social progressives of the nascent peace movement were middle-class professionals whose achievements, in the larger perspective, were merely "chips and foam on the surface of American life" according to historian Merle Curti (Curti 1985, 13).

A present-day example of this phenomenon is the example of research on the conversion of a war economy into a peace economy. Researchers such as Seymour Melman have labored long and arduously on this problem with little financial support, and few of their prescriptions for reorganizing the economy in a disarmed world have been adopted by policymakers (Dedring 1981, 4). Yet, as stated in Chapter IV, economist Kenneth Boulding found that military spending was not essential to the economy and a Defense Department report stated that in at least 61 U.S. communities where military installations were closed or relocated, successful employment conversions were made within one or two years and in each case civilian industries proved to be more labor-intensive, by nearly two-to-one, than the defense industries they replaced (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1974). The "peace dividend," a reduction in the Pentagon budget and the freeing up of funds for civilian use, has long been the plea of peace researchers working in the field of economic conversion: "instead of military nonproductive activity
dominating public budgets, a concentration of public funds on reconstructing and improving vital areas of public economic responsibility" (Melman 1985, 299). Many people believe that this is an idea whose time has come, perhaps too belatedly.

Geo-political factors such as relative isolation and the Cold War have shaped American thinking about national security according to David S. Patterson. He cites the "legacy of free security" afforded by 150 years of physical security from hostile invasion as a decisive factor in the formation of an American ethos of antimilitarism and endorsement of diplomacy based on enlightened legal principles. This heritage was lost, however, with the advent of the Cold War when America, reared on the principles of neutrality, nonintervention and isolationism was suddenly thrust onto the world stage as a major actor (Patterson 1981, 9). At that point, the nation became a national security state, interdependent with other nations and fearful of Soviet support of revolutions in the Third World, and the emphasis shifted from a rejection of centralized power to an acceptance of a military definition of national security (ibid., 11).

The different motivations in various areas of the world for the rise of the peace research movement after the Second World War probably influenced the nature of the research undertaken, although all peace researchers were united in their rejection of the prospects of a protracted cold war and the traditional field of international relations that seemed to legitimate it. In Latin America, dependency theory prevailed; in Japan, the experience of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki dominated; in Europe, the consequences of the German occupation permeated thinking; in India, the turmoil of the independence movement dictated the thrust of research; in the United States and Canada, peace research developed under relatively violence-free circumstances (E. Boulding and Vayrynen 1979, 245). Similarly, witnesses at the Commission hearings reflected their geographical bias: scholars from Boston favored an international-relations-conflict-resolution approach; those from Atlanta urged study of civil and human rights issues; while midwestern peace practitioners stressed inclusion of domestic as well as international issues in the new academy's agenda.

In the United States, Theodore Lentz, sometimes called the "father of peace research" wrote Towards a Science of Peace (1955) which was the first clear statement of the problem of diminishing the incidence of war and increasing the incidence of peace in the international system. Prior to Lentz's study, Quincy Wright's systematic A Study of War (1942) pointed the way toward a scientific study of war and peace, and the mathematical theory of arms races and quantifications of history contained in Lewis F. Richardson's Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, (circulated in microfilm and later published in 1960) left an indelible imprint on peace research. Ironically, perhaps because he used the terms "science" and "technology" in the titles of his books, Lentz has been identified with the quantitative school, when in fact he argued for a humanistic
science of peace, in which ethical scientific principles prevailed, and values were as important as facts (Eckhardt 1983, 306-307). Defining peace as not only the absence of war but also a dynamic process which includes the absence of war preparation (Lentz 1955, 186) Lentz urged peace researchers to have a rigorous regard for the principle of relevance, holding that one goal of peace technology should be the establishment of new institutions as well as improvement of the old (Lentz, 1970, 17). In this regard Lentz is close to the thinking of Galtung, who states that peace research should be action-oriented and that peace researchers must refrain from committing structural violence themselves. The characteristics of structural violence are exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization, and Galtung sees evidence of all four in the manner in which peace researchers conduct their inquiries (Galtung 1975, 264-273). He argues for an alternative model in which explicitness, honesty and a questioning attitude prevail (ibid., 276).

The questioning attitude of the early researchers was dampened somewhat by the exigencies of the Cold War and the political tensions it caused in this country. For example, in 1952 a group of psychologists organized the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War and published the Bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War which they subsequently decided to transform into a more professional journal and in 1957 began publication of the Journal of Conflict Resolution: A Quarterly for Research Related to War and Peace. The term conflict
resolution was chosen because it "was less controversial (less blatantly normative) than the term peace" (Kelman 1981, 98). The type of research reported in the new journal focused on general systems analysis of war and peace, while in Europe emphasis was on a political economy mode of analysis. (E. Boulding and Vayrnen 1979, 253).

The concept of systems analysis, of course, originated in the field of electrical engineering, but has been adapted for use in the social sciences. Ever since the eighteenth century, scholars have attempted to use the immutable laws of the natural sciences to create order out of the chaos of human affairs. Newtonian mechanics inspired the founding fathers to frame a checks-and-balances system of government in the Constitution; social Darwinists interpreted the great naturalist's theories to justify discrimination, racism and manifest destiny; and the principles of cybernetics and systems analysis have been applied to theories of education, business and international relations. But human interaction is not the same as that of celestial bodies or DNA or electrical currents, and there is a danger of oversimplification when a social scientist chooses the variables for his study; as Boulding commented on Galtung's theories, the crucial principle of randomness is omitted from the equation. And the criterion of non-randomness is an important condition for the systemic quality of international systems (Dedring 1974, 36).

Nonetheless, some peace researchers have found that examining the systemic quality of international systems can be
useful since it stresses the mutual linkages among all actors of the global system and the international environment. Systems theory in this regard is defined as "a whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts is called a system and the method which aims at discovering how this is brought about in the widest variety of systems has been called general systems theory" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981, 135). For example, Morton Kaplan has studied patterns such as the bipolar and balance of power models to form tentative suggestions for the organization of a future system of world order; Charles A. McClelland's World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) shows that a few actors participate much more than the rest in international conflicts; J. David Singer's Correlates of War project suggests that, whereas in the nineteenth century international alliances strengthened the peace, in the twentieth century, owing to the collapse of autocratic regimes and the expansion of popular participation and expectations, this model no longer applies. Galtung's peace and conflict theory can be said to employ a systemic perspective when he posits that asymmetric patterns involve structural violence, while conflict in symmetric conditions amounts to personal violence (Dedring 1974, 38-48).

Closely allied with systems theory is game theory, a technique employed by peace researchers to replicate typical interaction conditions. One researcher describes it as symmetrically prescriptive research conducted by applied mathematicians and mathematical economists who examine "what
ultrasmart, impeccably rational, super-people should do in competitive, interactive situations" (Raiffa 1982, 21). Since the introduction of game theory into the field by RAND researcher John von Neumann, war games, decision-making exercises and conflict simulations have become routine with many government agencies as well as with peace researchers. Its popularity has waned in the 1980s, but recent research into resolving disputes between nations corroborates what game theorists have discovered, that in international negotiations as well as in non zero-sum games, a "tit-for-tat" strategy works best. (Allman 1984, 32). Nonetheless, Anatol Rapoport, who has written extensively on the merits of game theory and gaming, warns against exaggerated expectations from this technique (Dedring 1974, 197-202).

Another approach to peace research is world order modelling, which views the world in a value-oriented manner and formulates relevant utopias for a new world order based on a transnational perspective (Dedring 1974, 53). This approach is exemplified in the World Order Models Project (WOMP), under the direction of the World Order Institute in New York. It is a network of individuals and institutes throughout the world engaged in research, education, dialogue, and action aimed at promoting a just world order. The evolution of this project through three distinct phases offers a microcosmic view of the development of critical peace research thinking in the United States.

The first phase, a law-oriented, institution-building approach, took place in 1961-68 when a group of concerned
American scholars devoted themselves to establishing world order as a respectable academic undertaking. This approach looked forward to the formation of some form of world government. The most comprehensive example of this approach is found in World Peace Through World Law by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn. The authors suggest a restructuring of the United Nations and the creation of a World Security and Development Organization to supplement the work of the UN (Clark and Sohn 1984, 13). The key factor in their analysis is general and complete disarmament, and they propose an elaborate plan to accomplish this end. Their ideas to replace war as a legitimate means for resolving international conflicts are widely quoted in the literature, perhaps because they are articulated in a detailed and seemingly feasible plan. This approach, however, was criticized by other peace researchers for its elitist outlook because it appealed to the enlightened self-interest of the privileged to take the initiative in the transition toward a better world order, it wore the mask of world order to disguise the imperial face of pax Americana, and it thought of world order primarily in terms of world law in one form or another (Falk and Kim, 1982, 13).

The second phase of the project, Diverse Images of Preferred Worlds: WOMP I, took place in 1968-78 and was more ecumenical in its approach. Scholars from seven territorial groups (Europe, Latin America, India, North America, Africa and the Soviet Union) met in different parts of the world to discuss goals, trends, conditions, projections and alternatives based on
five core values: peace, ecological stability, economic well-being, social justice and participation (Lasswell 1977, 425-429). The project culminated in a six-volume study under the umbrella title of "Preferred Worlds for the 1990s," in which the research teams were asked to develop a model of world order for the 1990s. As might be expected, scholars carried their intellectual baggage with them to the task, and the report reflects their geographic biases, the African researcher emphasizing social justice, economic welfare and reduced violence, the Latin American scholar dwelling on self-realization and liberation, the Indian humanist stressing the values of autonomy, non-violence and justice (Lasswell 1977, 437). Although it generated considerable interest in academic circles, the study was rejected by mainstream international relations researchers because it assumed a cohesive political will toward normative goals of system transformation, an utopian premise that ignored what was real and feasible (Falk and Kim, 1982, 15-16).

The third phase of the project, Struggle of the Oppressed: WOMP II began in 1978 and sought to correct the shortcomings of the first two phases. Its framework distinguishes between three intersecting systems of politics: the state system and its infrastructure, international organizations, and people acting individually and collectively through voluntary social movements. Unlike the first two phases, it does not attempt to proseltyze but tries to show how transitional changes are actually taking place in the world system and how these may relate to the overall
quest for a new world order (ibid., 16). The study is reflected in a multivolume Studies on a Just World Order series.

World order modelling could be included in an emerging school of thought in the peace research movement called alternative security systems. Although a relatively new area of research, the basic concept was suggested in 1961 by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson in a speech to the UN in which he proclaimed that to achieve a world without war "inevitably requires an alternative system for coping with conflict." (Johansen in Stephenson 1982, 48). The UN subsequently affirmed that "knowledge of viable alternative security systems is a prerequisite to any form of disarmament" (Stephenson 1982, 33-34). A leading researcher in this field defines alternative security systems as a "group of methods which serve as alternatives to each other for the resolution or regulation of disputes which threaten the security of nations." Some of the methods investigated by alternative security systems scholars include "nonviolent civilian defense, regional organization, world government, international peacekeeping forces, economic cartels, conventional military power and nuclear deterrence" (Stephenson 1982, 203). One early scheme, the Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction (GRIT) was suggested by psychologist Charles Osgood to counteract the policy of deterrence, which he viewed as inimical to the American system of beliefs and democratic institutions (Osgood in Roosevelt 1962, 167). Osgood suggested a process of interlocking concessions and
commitments in a situation where each side expects the other to make the first move. One party must engage in a unilateral initiative, but one that does not involve abandoning the possibility of retraction and retaliation. In this regard, GRIT accepts the principle of just war theory: "Unilateral initiatives must not reduce our capacity to inflict unacceptable nuclear retaliation on an opponent should we be attacked" (Dedring 1974, 174). At a recent meeting of North and South Korean scholars at the University of Hawaii, unilateral initiatives (such as one side informing the other of its military maneuvers) which they called "transparency measures" were discussed and endorsed (Asia-Pacific Dialogue, 23-26 February, 1989). Harvard scholar William Ury suggests going "beyond the hotline" to establish crisis intervention centers in Washington and Moscow (Ury 1986). Recent "incidents at sea" agreements between the two superpowers, soon to be expanded to include incidents in the air, are examples of successful transparency measures in place.

Seven alternative approaches to national security outlined by Robert C. Johansen include nuclear war fighting capability, mutually assured destruction and a minimum deterrent posture as endorsed by strategists; a defensive weapons system based on conventional arms as suggested by former RAND analyst Freeman Dyson in his book Weapons and Hope; a peacekeeping federation such as the plan advanced by Clark and Sohn; civilian resistance; and a global security system that provides a rational way to avoid the unacceptable risks of escalating nuclear arms on the
one hand and the unacceptable political costs of acquiescing to
nuclear backmail on the other (Johansen in Stephenson 1982, 56).
The last two methods are currently the subject of considerable
research and merit further explanation.

The leading researcher in the field of civilian resistance
Nonviolent Action* published in 1973, is a seminal work and he has
established a Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and
Defense at Harvard. Closely based on Gandhian thought, the book
is a primer for groups seeking nonviolent political and social
change. Like Gandhi, Sharp advocates organization, discipline and
concerted action to achieve social and political change, but
unlike the great spiritual leader, he does not include principles
such as faith in God, "karma yoga" or spiritual realization
through social action (Iyer 1973) in his secular and pragmatic
philosophy.

The force of public opinion is the crux of Sharp's
argument. He postulates that political power, which he defines as
social power wielded for political purposes, has its roots in the
cooperation of the people. Thus, withdrawal of cooperation by the
majority results in loss of political power. This places Sharp
squarely in the tradition of Locke, Jefferson, Madison, and the
theory of social contract. Like Hannah Arendt (1972) Sharp argues
that violence used in the protection of power is evidence of
weakness, and escalates as those in power perceive a persistent
threat. It is important, therefore, for nonviolent strategists
to enlist public support for their efforts throughout their campaign. The recent events in the Philippines, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania and China would seem to affirm Sharp's precepts.

Public support is an essential factor in each of the three possible ways Sharp says success can be achieved: conversion, accommodation, and coercion. The sympathy, respect and pressure of third parties can lead to change, as the American civil rights movement has shown. Although historical evidence seems to show that successes born of nonviolence are more enduring than those hastened by violent action, Sharp invites more research into this area (Sharp 1973, v. 3, 813).

Certainly the subsequent wielding of power for nonviolent groups is a great deal easier than for those who have achieved a coup by military means. The organization, solidarity and broad-based leadership are in place for nonviolent strategists. Military leaders must maintain power through armed suppression, enforced by an elite. Unless they can effect a distribution of power among a people who feel they are working to change their own future, they are doomed to be challenged in turn. Nonviolent followers who achieve success, however, experience the exhilarating feeling of self-confidence, which gives them courage to shoulder the responsibility of shaping their own future. As developments occur in newly "liberated" countries, especially Poland and the Philippines, Sharp's theory will be tested in praxis.
Sharp also asserts that nonviolence is a technique to fight dehumanization. Culture critics - Montague and Matson in *The Dehumanization of Man*; Riesman, Glazer and Denney in *The Lonely Crowd*; Christopher Lasch in *The Culture of Narcissism* and *The Minimal Self* - all assert that it is centralized, repressant control that denies autonomy and reduces people to robot-like soldiers, to hedonistic consumers, to apathetic nonvoters, to individuals who would deny their own identity. If, as Galtung maintains, [structural] violence can be defined as anything that inhibits a person from developing his/her own potential, then many Americans as well as Third World peasants are subject to violence. Sharp offers numerous suggestions as to how a humanistic nonviolent world can be achieved.

Although 198 methods are listed, Sharp maintains that his list is not exhaustive, a challenge to the nonviolent practitioner. He offers practical methods of applying political "jiujitsu" - like Theseus who slew the Minotaur, rather than resisting the force of his opponents directly, he would step aside and turn their strength to his own ends - so the nonviolent peacemaker would not confront his enemies directly, but use the techniques of protest, persuasion, noncooperation and intervention. One method Sharp lists under the heading of symbolic public acts, processions honoring the dead, is widely used in Ireland and South Africa, but unfortunately this nonviolent technique often erupts into violence. Only strong, effective leadership, coupled with the perception of tangible
gain, seems to be able to control such mob action. Sharp emphasizes that it takes strong leadership and firm moral self-control to launch and sustain a successful nonviolent campaign. Methods such as social noncooperation, including withdrawal from the system, are valid only so far as people are willing to endure perceived sanctions. (Bartleby, after all, starved to death.) These methods invite swift repression, but may also work to effect conversion of the opposite side, as in the American civil rights movement. Conversion, however, Sharp acknowledges, is the most difficult avenue to successful achievement of nonviolent goals. Sharp states that a vast amount of research, analysis and problem oriented investigation is still needed; the experiences of eastern Europe should provide fertile ground in which peace researchers can toil for years to come.

Another peace researcher who advocates nonviolence is Glenn Paige of the University of Hawaii, where he is in the process of establishing a Center for the Study of Global Nonviolence. Paige's program is based on the goal of achieving a nonkilling society and his research is dedicated to exploring four areas: the causes of violence, including cultural, religious, psychological and social as well as geopolitical; the causes of nonviolence, as exemplified by leaders such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King; the transition from a violent to a nonviolent environment, studying historical examples to ascertain why people change; and the conditions of a stable, nonviolent society, constructing an operational theory based on research on
historical prototypes, imaging and utopias (Interview 11 September 1985).

Nonviolent civilian defense has been categorized as a social policy, while the concept of the global security approach is largely a political one. Johansen offers five distinguishing features of this last-named approach: First, it tries to present the desire for short-range advantages from dominating decisions at the expense of long-run interests. The recent INF agreement is an example of this tenet in praxis. Second, it emphasizes the importance of providing positive incentives rather than relying on negative military threats. Ury's crisis control centers, transparency measures and the incidents at sea agreement are examples of this concept. Third, it stresses a positive image of peace which includes more than war prevention but embraces human rights such as those advocated by Amnesty International and enunciated in the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the regional declarations that have been adopted: the right to peace and freedom from the threat of genocide and ecocide, the right to security against arbitrary arrest, torture or execution; the right to traditional civil and political liberties. It also includes the concept advanced by Galtung: the right to fulfill all basic needs essential to life. Fourth, the global security approach moves beyond the focus on security for one nation-state. In a nuclear-ecologically fragile age, a sense of species solidarity and global citizenship must be fostered, and, furthermore, nations cannot be secure and still be fully
sovereign. Fifth, this worldview recognizes that normative boundaries such as the political, legal and ethical boundaries for human behavior are at least as important as territorial boundaries. Johansen suggests a policy of demilitarization and denationalization that involve a reduced role for the military in domestic and international life, and transnationalization, which involves building representative institutions for the management of international conflicts (Johansen in Stephenson 1982, 60).

**Conflict Resolution**

The management of international conflicts in the literature of peace research is often called conflict resolution or conflict management. It was this concept, inserted into the name of the peace academy commission, that effected the establishment of the United States Institute of Peace. As with so many academic disciplines, a debate rages over the semantics of the field. Conflict management is perceived to refer to settlement of issues between conflicting parties, but not necessarily definitively addressing all areas of contention. Adjudication and alternative dispute resolution techniques such as negotiation, arbitration and some forms of mediation, are used in conflict management. Conflict resolution, however, implies addressing the underlying issues, the "hidden agenda" that negotiators bring to the bargaining table, as well as the manifest issues. It means that a new set of relationships will eventually emerge from the process which are self-sustaining and not dependent for their observance.
upon outside coercion or third parties (A.J.R. Groom in Azar and Burton 1986, 86). It is this second definition that critical peace researchers endorse.

Conflict resolution as perceived by peace researchers is a definitive concept, involving "win-win" situations where parties to a conflict resolve their dispute to their satisfaction, as opposed to a "zero-sum" situation, where one party wins and the other loses. Another normative precept of this school of thought is that, contrary to Freudian theory, aggression is not innate in human beings (Kriesberg 1982, 25), and rational discourse can resolve conflicts. It subscribes to the Gandhian tradition, in which conflict resolution is a joint process of seeking truth, or satyagraha (Wehr 1979, 57). Like most academic fields, it has its own esoteric lexicon and historical antecedents.

In the United States, conflict resolution has come full circle since colonial times. Colonists who faced a howling wilderness depended on each other for survival, and so formed tight communal bonds, with an enforced harmony based on religious tenets. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony of 1635, for example, no member of the congregation could litigate in the ecclesiastical court, which tried civil as well as religious disputes, without attempting a prior effort at arbitration. Mediation and arbitration were common methods of settling disputes in the Massachusetts colonies of Dedham and Sudbury and among the Quakers in Pennsylvania, the Dutch in New Netherlands, and the planters of South Carolina. Commercial arbitration, the oldest
form of dispute settlement in American history, was favored by merchants in the New York-Philadelphia area over litigation. It was only after large numbers of immigrants came to the colonies in the latter part of the seventeenth century, bringing with them a rich mixture of religious diversity, commercial activity and social mobility that legal norms came to be more widely used (Auerbach 1983, 15-43).

By the nineteenth century alternative dispute resolution methods were used only in utopian communities such as Brook Farm, Amana and New Harmony and informally among certain immigrant groups, such as the Swedes, Jews and Chinese. (A Chinese proverb states "It is better to be vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit.") In fact, working class people viewed devices such as industrial arbitration panels as a form of social control, staffed by a middle class that used its position to perpetuate circumstances of unequal wealth and power (ibid., 57).

By the twentieth century, however, court calendars became overcrowded and the legal profession endorsed the use of conciliation and arbitration in small claims courts and for certain commercial disputes. The social turmoil of the 1960s produced a plethora of neighborhood reconciliation boards and community dispute programs in an attempt to forge a citizen-based alternative to domestic violence. The goals of these centers were not only to relieve court congestion but also to enhance community involvement in the dispute resolution process, to facilitate access to justice and to provide more effective
dispute resolution (Goldberg, Green and Sander 1985, 5). Today, more than 400 public and private dispute resolution centers flourish in every state of the union (Lovenheim 1989, 233-278). Although some lawyers view alternative dispute resolution as a threat to their profession (Auerbach 1983, 136) others endorse the concept and see it as complementing their work (Goldberg, Green and Sander 1985, 488).

As the field of conflict resolution burgeoned, researchers endeavored to formulate testable hypotheses concerning the nature of conflict and possible means of regulating it (Wehr 1979, 18). Galtung defined conflict as a situation with incompatible goal states. Goals may be either subjectively defined values or objectively defined interests (Dedring 1974, 119). It follows then that an asymmetric relationship between "topdogs and underdogs" must always be one of conflict, involving structural and possible direct violence. Conflict in symmetric relationships between "top dogs," however, usually result in direct, or behavioral, violence. Therefore according to Galtung, it is not enough to prevent violent conflict; an effort toward the abolishment of the asymmetric patterns of interaction is indispensable (ibid., 43-44).

Other researchers provide similar definitions of conflict, but differ in their prescriptions for resolution. Kriesberg, for example, says a "social conflict exits when two or more parties believe they have incompatible objectives" (Kriesberg 1982, 17).
Furthermore, because social conflicts are social relationships, at every stage of conflict parties interact socially, each affecting the way the others act, not only as each responds to the others but also as each may anticipate the responses of others. Interaction may even alter the goals each party seeks (ibid., 21). This is especially true of interaction during the conflict resolution process, as Theodore W. Kheel of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution and one of the leading mediators in the country testified at the Commission hearings: "If you are prepared to accept mediation, then you are acknowledging that there is the possibility of a change in your position" (Commission hearing 16 June 1980, 52).

Kriesberg's definition of a social conflict becomes operational in the thinking of John Burton, the English peace researcher who now directs the Conflict Resolution Project at the Center for International Development at the University of Maryland. Burton based his early research on a conflict resolution through changed perception approach. He devised a technique which he called "controlled communication" in which a third party, ideally a panel of academic specialists, help in the transmittal of messages, checking them for their veracity, accuracy and seriousness. The academics would not propose solutions, but it is hoped that the parties in contention would see the problem from the behavioral point of view of the others and find alternate goals (Burton 1969, 60-72). The technique was "a direct challenge to the assumption that international society
is always in a condition of conflict because of irreconcilable differences in interests among states. It suggests by means of empirical investigation that there are alternatives to settlements traditionally arrived at by the intervention of other powers, by threat, or by third-party guarantees" (ibid., 180).

Burton has developed his theories of conflict resolution to include analysis of conflict situations and prefers to call his process problem solving, which goes beyond mediation towards analysis and decision-making by the parties in conflict (Azar and Burton 1986, 88). First of all, he calls for a philosophical "paradigm shift" in thinking that challenges the power-balance deterrence model. He acknowledges that such a paradigm shift is resisted because scholars and statesmen have a vested interest in the status quo, scholars clinging to an inductive framework of data manipulation in which data relating to persons and performance determine truth. He entreats his fellow scholars to adopt the "abduction" concept of American philosopher Charles Pierce, who recommended subjecting one's original hypotheses, conceptual notions and assumptions and prejudices to a searching analysis (Burton 1984, 22-23). Nonetheless, he believes such a shift is possible because of popular repudiation of warfare and the spread of knowledge beyond elite groups, the existence of an elite group that is ready to accept change, and the work of social scientists who question the methodology of dominant theorists, pointing up social and political problems that draw attention to inequality and the necessity for addressing basic
human needs (Burton 1979, 108-122). It is in observing the
development of this last-named event that Burton expands on
Galtung's theory of inequality to include consideration of the
"ontological and universal" human needs which include security,
identity, participation, recognition and control of the
environment (Burton in Kriesberg 1985, 9: 33-45).

In effecting conflict resolution, Burton suggests that
attention should first be directed toward addressing these needs,
rather than the ostensible issues at contention. Values and
interests, he maintains, are subject to change but needs are not
negotiable. In the problem solving mode, when conflicts are
broken down into their component parts it frequently develops
that the declared issues are not necessarily the real ones and
the resolution process must provide for underlying motivations to
be brought to the surface and revealed by the parties to each
other (ibid., 96-97). Psychologists corroborate these
observations, noting that there is such a thing as emotional
learning, that mere intellectual awareness of the facts does not
necessarily involve actual belief and the taking of appropriate
action. Cultural motives are frequently operant in international
negotiation situations, causing parties to adopt what might seem
as an unreasonable stance having nothing to do with the
achievement of peace (Gralnick 1986, 66-67). Burton outlines a
plan for institutionalization of his problem solving process in
which a panel of academics acts as facilitators who serve
impartially, clarifying issues and redefining the situation but
not suggesting solutions, as some mediators might do (Azar and Burton 1986, 104-107). To facilitate the adoption of his problem solving process, he has written a handbook for negotiators in which he explains 56 rules for resolving deep-rooted conflicts (Burton 1987). Eventually, he sees his scheme as the basis of a political system in which the processes of problem solving are substituted for elite rule and power politics (Burton 1989, 14).

Another peace researcher in the field of conflict resolution offers concepts that complement Burton's ideas. Edward E. Azar, a colleague of Burton's and director of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, believes that the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is the identity group - racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others. As a unit of analysis for the researcher, it is even more powerful than the nation-state (Azar and Burton 1986, 31). Psychologists who work in the field of collective behavior validate this view. For example, they have developed a theory of "paired differential bonding" that unites psychology and physiology with social, political and cultural forces. The theory explains why individuals tend to divide the world into polarities, with the result that opposites are devalued and frequently dehumanized (Mack 1982, 595-596). Others point out that the motive of self-esteem is a powerful force in individuals, and that members of groups regard a threat or injury to the group as they would a narcissistic injury, or hurt to the self. The need for

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recognition is rooted in the psychology of the self and in the extended self of the person to such an extent that when aggregated they lead to wholly irrational behavior drives (Wedge in Azar and Burton 1986, 57-60).

Researchers have expressed reservations about Burton's approach because of what is termed the "reentry" problem. When the representatives of parties to a conflict change their perception of the adversary and of the nature of the problem and return to their own milieu, they frequently experience difficulty in convincing their colleagues or superiors of the acceptability of the new world-view (Wehr 1979, 36). Burton counters this criticism by cautioning his academic facilitators that it is their responsibility to remind participants of their need not to compromise on key values and to maintain a close contact with those whom they represent (Azar and Burton 1986, 108).

Others differ with Burton over the role of the mediator. A leading practitioner in the field of domestic dispute resolution agrees with Burton on the necessity of addressing needs, but feels that mediators should "assist parties in assessing the cost of failure to consider another's need, in determining if the parties actually have a choice, and in deciding what the costs of impasse will be" (Moore 1986, 202). Similarly, Kriesberg views intermediaries as enforcers, factfinders and trainers as well as mediators. They have the job of helping parties formulate superordinate goals and encouraging innovative and integrative
outcomes, as well as facilitating communication (Kriesberg 1982, 285).

At the Commission hearings, numerous witnesses testified to the need to train people, especially midcareer foreign service officers, in mediation techniques. In view of the differing opinions as to the role of the mediator, it is understandable that the State Department would hesitate to undertake such a project. Nonetheless, in 1982 they created a Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Service Institute to focus on studies in conflict resolution, the prerequisites and techniques of successful mediation and the skills of negotiation. A one-week course, designed primarily for the mid-level foreign service officer, is given four times a year by a representative of the American Arbitration Association. (McDonald in Azar and Burton 1986, 142). Significantly, the department did not choose to consult John Burton, whose views on "Track II" diplomacy, or the participation of scholars in international negotiations, are not widely shared in the professional diplomatic establishment. As one diplomat observed, "the practitioners don't read about negotiation and the academicians don't practice negotiation." He thinks that each can help each other, and that Track II should be viewed as action taken in support of and parallel to the goals of Track I (ibid., 144). At a two-day symposium in international negotiations sponsored by the center, Roger Fisher and several other representatives from the Harvard Negotiation Project were invited to share their knowledge with department participants.
The views of this school of thought are more closely allied with the concept of conflict management, although Fisher and others acknowledge that it is important to expose the underlying issues in a conflict. Fisher, a lawyer, and anthropologist William Ury, pioneers in the field of negotiation, are authors of a benchmark book published in 1981 called *Getting to Yes*, which is widely used for training mediators and negotiators. It offers practical advice, such as the need to address interests, not positions, in a dispute, to separate relationships from the problem, and to recognize and acknowledge varying perceptions and emotions. Like Burton, it states that the most powerful interests are basic human needs, which include security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging, recognition, and control over one's life. One technique, which Fisher and Ury call the "single text procedure" was employed by President Carter during the Arab-Israeli deliberations: "The United States listened to both sides, prepared a draft to which no one was committed, asked for criticism, and improved the draft again and again until the mediators felt they could improve it no further" (Fisher and Ury 1981, 121). The Harvard project is also extremely influential in the field, offering numerous courses in negotiation techniques to businesspeople, lawyers, "think tank" researchers and others, and materials such as simulations and games in international conflict to university instructors.

Curiously, in a handbook on international conflict written for statesmen in 1969, Fisher advises negotiators on ways to
manipulate the process to one's advantage: "Our job is to so alter their perception of their choice that they will decide the way we prefer" (Fisher 1969, 11); and "The formulation and reformulation of the decision we seek is, I believe, the single most important element in the successful conduct of foreign affairs" (ibid., 75). Finally, Fisher advises that these techniques are also applicable to the person interested in lobbying his own government: "It turns out that influencing our own government is like influencing another government" (ibid., 196).

By 1981, however, his views seem to have altered and he was advising joint problem-solving and behavioral research: "We need not only to apply what we know, but to keep on learning about human behavior, how to affect our own behavior and that of others, not just manipulate it." (Fisher 1981, 59). In addition to striving to change an adversary's point of view, he also acknowledges the need to change one's own beliefs: "The solution lies right here: in changing our own assumptions and those of other people; in growing up; in abandoning our plutonium security blanket" (ibid., 59). Unfortunately, however, the 1969 edition is still on the shelves, presumably still in use in university courses in international negotiation.

University courses on conflict resolution usually focus on both domestic and international disputes; the literature of the field of international conflict resolution seems to be mostly descriptive and analytical, based on case studies of intervention
of third parties in international disputes. Most of the empirical research on conflict resolution in the United States has been based upon experiences in domestic conflict, such as environmental, land use, labor-management, business, divorce, and neighborhood disputes. At the Commission hearings, practitioners in the field of conflict resolution were repeatedly asked whether it was possible to combine domestic and international arenas of conflict, and whether the proposed peace academy should do anything about domestic conflict resolution, given its international responsibility. Most of them answered in the affirmative, agreeing with Ambassador Andrew Young that a distinction between domestic and international conflict resolution cannot be made, that it is all one body of specialty (Commission hearing 23 June 1980, 87). Several witnesses noted that the methods developed at one level were often transferrable to others, even if the social context of conflict had different characteristics, but warned that a peace academy that attempted to teach conflict resolution for all possible social settings risked superficiality and lack of focus. A discussion panel warned that conflict resolution carried on without citing the larger value frameworks that also take in consideration issues of economic justice, human rights and basic needs, is in the long run a self defeating strategy (Commission hearing 17 June 1980, 80-81). John Burton maintains that the two are inseparable, that system faults and failures to promote human needs in both the
capitalist and socialist systems lead to repressive policies that spill over into the international system (Burton 1984, 168).

In this regard he agrees with Galtung, that elites are seeking to preserve systems that require change, with Sharp, that authority is legitimised through popular support, and with Hannah Arendt, who speaks of the "impotence of power" that resorts to violence when popular support is withdrawn (Arendt 1972, 103-184). Burton postulates that each system blames the other for its internal deficiencies, creating a "system schizophrenia that gives rise to leadership paranoia" (Burton 1984, 10). For this reason, he concludes "that there is probably no such phenomenon as international conflict that is not a spillover of domestic problems" (ibid., 174). Interestingly, Burton does not entertain the obverse of his argument, that external conflict can affect internal struggles. Kriesberg states that external conflict may both increase and decrease internal conflict behavior, that the consequences depend upon the characteristics of the external struggle (Kriesberg 1982, 313).

In the decade since the Commission hearings, a great deal of research on conflict resolution has been undertaken, some of it sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace. In the peace research movement, the old argument of traditionalism versus behavioralism has been abandoned as researchers unite in pursuit of a general theory of how to build a constructive vision of the world as a whole (Azar and Burton 1986, 15). Feminist scholarship and topics such as ecology, human rights, economic conversion and
world order futures have become salient in the field and a much
closer relationship between peace activism and peace research has
developed as academics cum practitioners unite their efforts.

The USIP has supported these trends in part, although it has
ignored such topics as eco-feminism and given scant attention to
problems of conversion from a military-based to a civilian-based
economy. Although it has supported research into human rights
and conflict resolution, its emphasis seems to be on regional
conflicts, deterrence and arms control, all of which come under
the rubric of negative peace. That emphasis and the
conservative composition of its board of directors has subjected
the Institute to sharp criticism from critical peace researchers
and peace activists, as we shall see in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Introduction

For every action there is a reaction. Conservative critics attribute the recent flowering of freedom in eastern Europe to the "hard-line" policies of a Reagan administration that forced an intransigent Soviet Union into permitting democratic institutions and public participation in government as the only realistic answer to U.S. military strength and nuclear arms policy. Similarly, some observers say that it was public reaction to the Reagan arms buildup of the early 1980s that contributed to the tremendous growth of the peace movement (Kaplan 1983, 388). The negative response of the Reagan administration to the founding of the United States Institute of Peace produced a kindred backlash in its supporters, and a renewed determination to promote an effective institution.

A key provision of the legislation establishing the USIP was Section 1706, which set up a fifteen member board. At the Commission hearings, numerous witnesses agreed that it was the composition of this Board that would determine the character of the proposed Institute. In addition to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the president of the National Defense University, the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, was mandated to appoint eleven individuals no later than 90 days after January 20, 1985. When he failed to do so,
Congressmen and Senators protested. Both houses passed resolutions protesting the delay and the President's deferral of funds for the Institute. Meanwhile, the State Department proposed 17 amendments to the Institute's charter. If accepted by Congress, these amendments would convert the Institute from an independent national educational institution into a very small grant-giving agency under the control of the Department of State. None of the amendments was adopted.

It was October 24, 1985, before eight nominees, all white males, appeared before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources for their confirmation hearings. They were John Norton Moore, professor of law at the University of Virginia and chairman-designate; W. Scott Thompson, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Evron M. Kirkpatrick, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; Dennis L. Bark, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; W. Bruce Weinrod, director of foreign policy and defense studies at the Heritage Foundation; Sidney Lovett, senior minister of the First Church of Christ Congregational, West Hartford, Connecticut; Richard John Neuhaus, Lutheran minister and director of the Center on Religion and Society; and Allen Weinstein, professor of history at Boston University. As Senator Claiborne Pell remarked, the nominees were "all of a conservative cast" (Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Nominations, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 24 October 1985, 156). Two additional nominees, attorney Morris I. Leibman and professor
emeritus of political science, University of Pennsylvania, William R. Kintner, were subsequently appointed. Apparently the pleas of many Commission witnesses to appoint women and minority representatives to the Board fell on deaf Presidential ears. In September, 1987, however, President Reagan appointed a woman, Elspeth Davies Rostow, professor of American studies at the University of Texas, to the 11th private sector seat on the Board. Of all the nominees, only one, chairman John Norton Moore, was involved at all in the creation and establishment of the Institute.

At their confirmation hearings, Board nominees unanimously expressed a desire to avoid the ACDA experience, and keep the new Institute from making policy recommendations, as mandated in the legislation establishing the Institute. They were also in agreement on the need to ensure that the Institute's credibility would not be compromised by covert intelligence action or misuse of the Institute's access to classified materials, and determined that the best method of achieving this end would be through incorporation of certain provisions in the by-laws. (The by-laws prohibit Institute personnel from engaging in classified research.) A majority expressed a desire to involve the Institute in research in conflict resolution, through grants to existing programs and in initiating research of its own. Most expressed reservations about committing the Institute to other areas of peace research before conducting a thorough survey of the field, and most agreed that it was necessary to involve the
public in their activities. It is interesting to note that W. Scott Thompson, the lone nominee who felt the Institute should concentrate on building a "common ground between elites who have the capacity to influence the evolution of world order," disseminate information "to selective audiences at universities, civic groups, etc.,” and who believed it was essential "to obtain the highest approbation from the arms control and academic community at the start of the Institute's work," was appointed chairman of the information services committee. This committee was in charge of preparing an intellectual map of the international peace field which would, presumably, create a more refined understanding from which to identify priority emphasis for the Institute, as recommended at the nomination hearing; the map is scheduled to be published in 1990. In the meantime, the Institute operates under legislation that narrowly defines its role.

When the legislation was drafted, compromises in the Senate and House conference committee downgraded the academy concept to an institute; references to site, acquisition of property and establishment of schools and offices were deleted. The Institute was not permitted to accept funds from non-government sources, nor was it to broaden its scope from consideration of problems of a strictly international nature. Initially, Congress authorized $14 million for the Institute, but the administration budgeted only $4 million for 1985 and refused $10 million for the next year. Under these constraints, the Institute set up housekeeping
in a townhouse on Jackson Place, and in 1987 moved to more spacious quarters on M Street. In the first four years of its existence, with relatively meager funds, it has managed to make a place for itself in the peace community.

Funding the Institute

Although Congress authorized $6 million for 1985 and $10 million for 1986 for the Institute, because the administration did not comply with the law regarding the appointment of the Board, the Institute operated in 1986 on a budget of $4 million, carried over from a partial-year appropriation for 1985. In this regard the Institute is insulated from the usual bureaucratic deceit of "use it or lose it" regarding appropriated funds. Like the Smithsonian Institution, it can carry over funds from one fiscal year to the next. Unlike that institution, however, it does not enjoy the flexibility inherent in an endowment of funds from private sources. At the Commission hearings, many witnesses urged establishing the Institute along the lines drawn for the Smithsonian, especially its Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which operates on a mix of trust funds and public funding (Oehser 1983, 102). Fears of undue influence from non-government sources caused a provision for private funding to be dropped from the final legislation, however, and the Institute must periodically wend its way up Capitol Hill with its fiscal year budget request in hand, and curry favor with the holders of the purse strings, a situation which some critics say compromises Institute activities.
In addition, the Institute has a profound philosophical difference of opinion with the Office of Management and Budget. This administrative body does not recognize the Institute's independence from the executive branch, an independence which Institute supporters and staffers feel allows it to request a different appropriations level from Congress than the level included in the President's budget (Institute Board minutes, 12 January 1989). In 1987, Congress again authorized $6 million for the Institute, in contrast to an OMB budget request for $1.25 million. Thanks to a continuing resolution of Congress and a juggling of funds, the Institute received $4.3 million for 1987.

Compared with the average annual cost of $12 billion spent by the U.S. on fighting wars since World War II, this figure means that it cost $50 per American to wage war versus less than an investment of five cents per person to pursue peace. (USIP 1987 Biennial Report, 29). The operating budget increased to $5.4 million in 1988 and $8.69 million in 1989, in contrast to the three military service academies which operated on a $600 million dollar budget. Congress has appropriated $7.8 million for 1990; the OMB recommended that Congress limit the level of 1990 appropriations and pass legislation that would permit private funding of the Institute. Privatization is opposed by Institute supporters: "By necessity, the Institute would have to meet the interests of its donors. This loss of public accountability for an institute that would remain governmental in nature would not
be in the broader public interest" said USIP president Samuel Lewis. (National Peace Institute Reporter March 1989, 10).

In 1989 the Institute was authorized through fiscal 1993, with a cap of $10 million through 1991 and $15 million for 1992-93. Although this permanent reauthorization obviates difficulties with the OMB, it does not eliminate Congressional oversight, however; the Institute must continue to file biennial reports and justify its annual budget requests.

Given the above-named financial constraints, the many accomplishments of the Institute are remarkable and a tribute to the dedication of its 35-member staff. The Institute conducts its activities through five major programs: The Grants Program, which seeks to expand the field's knowledge base; the Education and Public Information Program, which sponsors an essay contest for high school students; the Research and Studies Program, which sponsors workshops, colloquia and in-house study groups; the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace which offers three levels of fellowships; and the newly established Jeannette Rankin Library Program. (A sixth program, on Religion, Ideology and Peace, is in the process of being formed and incorporated into the Institute.)

The Grants Program

The USIP has become a major funder in the area of peace education, peace research and conflict resolution, an indication of the level of support for these areas in the United States.
The Institute began its activities by first developing its
grantmaking component, with an initial concentration on research
and studies grants. By law it was mandated to spend 25 percent of
its funds in this area; for the last three years, it has allotted
40 percent of its budget to grants (USIP budget request, FY 1990,
13), awarding a total of more than 137 by 1989 (COPRED Peace
Chronicle 14.1, 1989: 9). The average grant award is for $25,000;
approximately 75 percent go to nonprofit organizations and
public institutions, and 25 percent to individual scholars (USIP
Biennial Report 1987, 19). The Institute has been the sole source
of funding in about 80 percent of the cases, awarding an average
of one-third of the funding originally requested by grant
applicants, or about five percent of the total dollar demand
(U.S. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Postsecondary
Education of the Committee on Education and Labor. Testimony,
John N. Moore, 27 April, 1988, 6). Approximately 25 grant
applications arrive at USIP offices each month; since 1986, the
Board of Directors has reviewed them almost monthly. (Although
the by-laws mandate only two meetings a year, the Board has met
on an average of 10 meetings per year since its inception.) The
formal grant review process involves examination of applications
first by Institute staff, then by the appropriate committee(s) of
the Board of Directors, and finally by the full Board, which
decides whether an award should be made. Outside review of an
application may also be sought as part of the review process.
Criteria for selection are similar to those established by the
National Endowment for the Humanities, former employer of grants
director Hrach Gregorian; critics maintain that these guidelines
permit the influence of subjective bias by the selection
committee.

At the outset, all the grants the Institute awarded were
unsolicited; in 1988 it initiated a solicited grants component,
with a different application deadline. At first, the ratio of
awards was 60 percent of funds awarded to unsolicited requests,
40 percent for solicited grants; by 1990, that ratio should be
reversed, with the goal of close to 100 percent of grant funds
awarded to solicited grants in the near future (Interview, Hrach
Gregorian, Washington, D.C., 8 June 1988). This is not a
reassuring trend; like Department of Defense funded research, it
signals the possibility of serious compromise to academic freedom
of inquiry.

Topics for grant proposals are chosen by the Board in
consultation with staff. The broad purposes for which the
Institute will consider unsolicited grants include, but are not
restricted, to ten categories:

* Research on the relationship between adherence to
international human rights standards and international
peace.

* Research on perception of peace across political
systems and ideologies, including the comparative
status of peace movements and their impact under
different political systems, and a comparative
assessment and survey of the teaching of peace.

* Research on negotiations, including lessons from the
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, lessons from negotiations between democratic and
non-democratic systems, and general lessons in the art of negotiation.

*Research on the relationship between domestic political systems and the aggressive use of force.


*Research on the mediation of political change.

*Developing curricula and materials for study of international peace and conflict issues from high school through post-graduate programs.

*Assisting media programming, including the development of materials particularly for television and radio, that will bring information about issues of international peace and conflict resolution to the broader public.

*Developing library programs, data-bases and bibliographies and implementing collection development.

The topics for 1989 and 1990 solicited grants are subsumed under the general theme of mitigation or resolution of regional conflict — lessons for negotiators and policy-makers. The Institute gives priority to proposals that use the case-study approach to examine specific historical incidents, particularly from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Suggested factors for consideration include the impact of East-West rivalry; methods for settling disputes short of armed conflict; the roles of unofficial emissaries in "Track II" diplomatic activity; the impact of the proliferation of nuclear and chemical/biological weapons; and intra-regional change (Federal Register 53.247: 51948, 23 December 1988).
Because of the ideological bent of the Board of Directors, one might expect the grant awards to reflect a conservative hue, but an examination of the grants awarded to 1990 show that, although the concept of negative peace is emphasized, this is not the case. About half could be categorized as strategic research, or traditional international relations theory; the other half as conventional peace research -- and this balance seems to hold no matter what the level of funding. Thus, Gene Sharps' Albert Einstein Institution received $50,000 to pursue study in nonviolent sanctions in confronting political violence, and the Hoover Institution was granted $40,000 to test a deductive theory of the implications of arms races. Herbert Kalman of Harvard University received $40,000 to research the interactive problem solving approach to international conflict and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University was awarded $40,000 for a study of the increasing national defense efforts of developing countries. The largest grant award was for $200,000 to the American Red Cross to develop resources for the promotion and advancement of public education on the principles of international humanitarian law. The largest amount of grants is given to studies on regional conflicts, which is not surprising, given the topic of the solicited grants. The lowest amount of grants is given to studies on pacifism and peace movements. In view of recent world developments where the use of nonviolence has played an important role in effecting social change, this seems to be a serious omission. If the trend toward solicited
grants continues, then innovative future-oriented projects such as the grant awarded to the University of the Philippines at Los Banos on how rebel-returnees can be functionally integrated into the mainstream of national development will have to seek funds elsewhere. Significantly, the Board recently decided to defer all proposals for television production until 1991 because of the "risks inherent in electronic media product development outside the control of the Institute." (Board meeting minutes, 26 October 1989, 5).

The results of the grant awards are already beginning to be seen. Newly created courses in international peace and conflict management are now being taught at Columbia, American and Mississippi State universities; articles generated by grant research projects have appeared in national publications; books, monographs, films and videotapes, and computer data bases are being produced (United States House of Representatives. Subcommittee on postsecondary education of the committee on education and labor. Testimony of John Norton Moore, 27 April 1988, 7). Although the Institute is prohibited from policy-making, it nonetheless hopes to have an influence on policymakers; as president Samuel Lewis remarked, "I don't want to have stuff just produced for the library. We need to make an impact." He would like to see the grant project results "boiled down into a form where busy people can use them" (Masters, 1989, A22).
One of the newest of the USIP programs, the Education and Public Information Program should grow rapidly, as its budget appropriation was increased from $600,000 in 1988 to over $1 million in 1989 (USIP Budget Request Fiscal 1989, 14). The increase is intended for programs in television and curriculum development for the secondary level. (Interview, John Richardson, Washington, D.C., 6 June 1988). At a recent Board meeting, members decided to encourage grant proposals for pre-collegiate education, including textbook production (Board meeting minutes 26 Oct 1989, 5). It is developing a television project which would entail the production of short segments in relation to peace and conflict resolution for broadcast on public or cable television, specifically for taping by schools (Board meeting minutes 16 March 1989, 5).

Until these projects are developed, however, the program's major activity is the National Peace Essay Contest for high school students; in this regard the Institute is following in a long tradition of essay contests for schoolchildren sponsored by civic and peace groups. The subject of the first year's essay was the connection between human rights and freedom, a theme continued in the second year's topic, the Helsinki Accords. In the 1989-09 contest, students are asked to comment on one instance when the United States' efforts made a significant contribution to the prevention or resolution of an international conflict. The Institute sends out more than 24,000 brochures and
posters to every public high school and 25-30 educational organizations, and mails more than 50,000 contest applications. Students are requested to have their essays published in their school newspaper or other school publication, a requirement that may have caused the poor response for the first year: only 350 entries from 46 states were received (ibid). State winners are brought to Washington for a two-day weekend and scholarships are given to the first, second and third place winners.

The Institute has also produced a four-part "Face-to-Face" video series for schools, colleges and civic groups, based on a one-hour television program produced in cooperation with South Carolina Educational Television on the subject of US-USSR summity. The programs weave archival material in with clips of an informal discussion on summity by eminent scholars from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Unfortunately, the "talking heads" format used is an extremely dull one for adolescent students; one hopes this series will be revised and updated to include recent INF, strategic and conventional arms reduction talks, and the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union.

The Institute has recently inaugurated a new series of regional meetings, to take place three or four times a year, in order to enhance public discourse about the complexities of international peacemaking. Senior Institute staff and fellows meet with representatives from local universities and public affairs groups for a set of seminars and workshops. Topics such as the moral considerations in the development and implementation
of U.S. foreign policy, conflict resolution theory and techniques, and the role of religion in war and peacemaking are discussed, and workshops on the grants and library programs are held with interested persons. Three programs, in Atlanta, Austin and Honolulu have been held as of February, 1990. One goal of the outreach programs is to enhance public awareness of the existence and work of the USIP, which has received little media publicity in its four years of operation (Interview, Gregory McCarthy, Honolulu, HI, 28 November 1989).

Research and Studies Program

Through a range of working groups and public workshops, the Research and Studies Program seeks to "get the best minds together, disseminate the results of their thinking and do this in a way that has the most impact" (Samuel W. Lewis in Peace Institute Reporter March 1989, 3). The Intellectual Map Project directed by Board director W. Scott Thompson is one of the first such projects undertaken by the Institute. A technique used in other disciplines, an intellectual map is an attempt that comes about at the second stage of development of a field, when research, teaching and publication has taken place but there may be overlapping and confusion as to the content and disciplinary boundaries of a field, a confusion some Board members confessed to at the time of their nomination. Board members approached the task by first attempting to identify categories of peace research and peace activism. They soon discovered the deep distrust between the traditional international relations researchers and
those who worked on conflict resolution, international law, and
the newer approaches. They identified eleven strands in the
tapestry of the map they wished to weave and from December, 1986,
to April, 1988 a series of seven colloquia was held on each of
the topics, culminating in a two-day conference in June, 1988.
Representatives from each of the camps - traditional
international relations researchers, strategists, critical peace
researchers, and international law advocates were invited to take
part in the discussion. Said Thompson, "I become dismayed when
conservatives working on deterrence or radicals working on
conflict resolution have really believed that the other groups
were not only not important, but even counter-productive or
disingenuous. We had people from the left and right debating
earnestly, and, I think most importantly listening to each other,
arguing that their own approaches were valid and legitimate"
(USIP Journal September 1988, 10). A lesson from the conference
was that the achievement of peace comes from a complementarity of
efforts; added Thompson, "I don't think we've just made a map. I
think we've made a statement that there are many approaches and
that we can all benefit from learning from each other" (ibid.,
12). The Institute plans to publish a book from the papers and
discussions at the colloquia and conference. The plan of the map
is as follows:

Group A. "The Traditional Approaches"

I. Collective Security and Deterrence
II. Diplomacy and Negotiation
III. Strategic Management and Arms Control
Group B. "The International Legal Approaches"

IV. International Law
V. Interstate Organizations
VI. Third Party Dispute Settlement

Group C. "The New Approaches"

VII. Transnationalism
VIII. Behavioral approaches
IX. Conflict Resolution

Group D. "Systems Approach"

X. Internal Systems
XI. Systemic Theories/World Systems Approach

Critics of these categories say that important areas are not considered, such as the role of economics and religion in promoting world peace; but mapmakers say they are included in the sub-categories. To this researcher, however, it appears that other categories such as alternative defense systems, ecology, feminist theory, dependency theory, and the interrelationship of domestic and international relations are also missing. Just as peace researchers are taking Burton's "paradigm shift" away from behaviorism and power politics, so are natural and social scientists realizing the necessity of a shift in thinking about the environment from a scarcity theory of value towards a "deep ecology" concept of environmental ethics (Capra, 1984). Recent feminist scholarship in archeology and anthropology suggests a new way of looking at human behavior (Eisler, 1987) and in psychology a new paradigm for social interaction (Gilligan, 1982).
Since the intellectual map conference, a series of public workshops, planned to take place monthly in different locations, have been held, including such topics as the historical and intellectual origins of arms control theology; pacifism and citizenship; the meaning of Munich fifty years later; the feasibility of negotiating chemical and biological weapons control; and U.S. peace efforts in recent years. Most of the workshops are about questions raised by current events and actors, especially where serious debate is going on. Information bulletins, titled In Brief, which summarize selected workshops, are periodically sent to members of Congress and other decision-makers. Critics consider the workshops to be the weakest link in USIP programs because of the peripheral quality of some topics chosen, the less than high level of expertise of some panelists, the unavailability to the audience of resource materials; and a discussion question and facilitation format which does not draw the participants into the type of basic discussion which could be more contributory to the field (Copred Peace Chronicle 14.1, 9-10).

A recent workshop on Francis Fukuyama's essay, "The End of History?" is a case in point. The essay was printed in the conservative journal The National Interest after Fukuyama, deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff, delivered it at a conference at the conservative John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago. The National Interest subsequently
published responses to Fukuyama by conservatives Allan Bloom, Irving Kristol and Samuel Huntington, which were reported in *Time, The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. The public "debate" in this case thus appears to have been contrived and one-sided. Nonetheless, the USIP quickly sponsored a workshop to discuss Fukuyama's theory that the ideological struggle between East and West is over because liberal democracy has triumphed, and printed the essay in its entirety in its journal (*USIP Journal* September 1989, 1).

In this regard, the Institute does stand accused of reflecting the ideological bent of its Board (Interview, James Laue, Fairfax, VA, 6 June 1989). A majority of the members of the Board are affiliated with conservative think tanks and similar organizations. Distinctly an American phenomenon, these private institutions have a tremendous influence on public policy debate, especially since the advent of the Reagan administration. For example, the Heritage Foundation claims that 60 percent of the recommendations in its *Mandate for Leadership*, a two volume tome containing an elaborate series of policy guidelines for nearly every federal agency, were adopted by successive Republican administrations (Easterbrook 1986, 72). Perhaps this thinking also influenced an Institute staffer in the Research and Studies program who told this writer that the Institute should be devoting more attention to collective security and deterrence theory (Interview, Richard Smith, Washington, D.C., 8 June 1988).
Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program

This program, named in honor of the senator from West Virginia who helped establish the USIP, assists the work of scholars and leaders in peace, from both the United States and abroad. Appointments are for two years or less, may be in-residence at the Institute or out-of-residence, and are made in three categories: Distinguished Fellows, eminent persons who have achieved national or international stature through widely recognized scholarly or practical accomplishments in international peace and conflict management or related fields; Peace Fellows, individuals who demonstrate substantial accomplishment or promise of exceptional leadership; and Peace Scholars, outstanding students in recognized American university doctoral programs who have demonstrated a clear interest in issues of international peace and conflict management and have completed all required work toward their degrees except their dissertations. In addition to their research, fellows participate in Institute workshops and outreach programs. In the first four years of its operation, the Institute has appointed 16 Distinguished Fellows, 26 Peace Fellows and 35 Peace Scholars. Selection of candidates is made by the Board with the help of review panels, which appear to be evenly balanced between traditional international relations theorists and strategists and critical peace researchers. Sitting on the Peace Fellow advisory panel, for example, are Colin Gray, president of the National Institute for Public Policy and an avowed believer in the
possibility of limited nuclear war (Gray and Payne, 1980) and Father Theodore Hesburgh, president emeritus of Notre Dame University, and member of numerous peace activist organizations. One can only imagine the colloquy that takes place at their panel discussions. Although a majority of the Distinguished Fellows come from a legal background, the list appears to be ideologically balanced, and includes critical peace researchers John Burton and Herbert Kelman. Of the Peace Fellows, several names are well known in the "new approaches" camp, such as Ted Gurr, Mark Katz and Paul Kimmel.

Topics chosen by the Distinguished Fellows vary, with work on books titled Aggression and Self Defense (Eugene Rostow) and Proxies in Low Intensity Warfare (Paul Seabury) juxtaposed with Burton's six-volume series synthesizing leading insights in the conflict resolution field and Kelman's work on mutual problem-solving techniques. Peace Fellows are at work on topics ranging from deterrence theory to the impact of culture on international negotiations, in a variety of modes, which include a nine-part television series (USIP Journal May 1989, 15). A problem seems to be the lack of social and intellectual interaction among the in-residence Fellows (Board minutes 6 July, 1989, 3).

Jeannette Rankin Library Program

Named for the only member of Congress who voted against U.S. entry into World War I and World War II (Cooney and Michalowski 1987, 78) this is the newest of the Institute programs. It was established in 1988 to provide resources for
research, develop archives of primary source material, conduct an oral history program, and develop outreach projects focusing on networking and support for libraries and other resource centers across the country. An important initial project is to create, in concert with the Library of Congress, a new category of conflict resolution within the national library's classification system. (Interview, Charles Smith, Washington, D.C., 9 June 1988). This effort involves development of a standard glossary of terms for peace and conflict resolution information. The thesaurus developed so far seems to be overly weighted to security and arms control categories, critics charge (Copred Peace Chronicle 14.1, 10).

**Summary Observations**

Many of the people who supported the efforts of the Committee on a Department of Peace (CODEP) and the National Peace Academy Campaign (N-PAC) were disappointed in the institution that resulted from the House-Senate compromise, which converted the original concept from a residential teaching institution to a public foundation. Some of them, like Allen Deeter, a Church of the Brethren minister who worked with N-PAC for three years, felt it best to allow the Reagan administration to simply not fund the institution, and hope for an administration more sympathetic to peace in future (letter from Allen C. Deeter, July 10, 1988). Others, like George Hill, pastor of Riverside Church in New York City, felt that the USIP is in a "survival mode" until a friendlier political environment emerges (Telephone
interview, George W. Hill, New York, NY 9 September, 1988). Hill and others give high marks to Samuel W. Lewis, President of the Institute. A former ambassador to Israel, Lewis was a key figure in the Camp David accords process.

Members of Congress who supported creation of the Institute seem to agree that much of the original debate over the founding of the Institute was about how to insulate it from political pressures and influence, but the appointment of a conservative Board demonstrates the difficulty of keeping the Institute as balanced and apolitical as possible (Interview, Dan Glickman Washington, D. C., 10 June 1988). These solons continue to support the Institute, however, and many of them, like Senator Spark Matsunaga, hope that eventually the Institute will become a bricks-and-mortar Peace Academy where conflict resolution skills will be taught. (Interview, Senator Spark M. Matsunaga, Washington, D.C., 10 June 1988).

Senator Matsunaga's vision of a peace academy on a par with the military academies is one that he cherished since his pre-World War II college days; in many respects, the successful founding of the Institute is due to his indefatigable efforts. He recruited 54 co-signers to S.564, and led the movements to attach it to the Defense Authorization Act, defeat the proposed State Department amendments, and challenge the President to appoint the Board. Matsunaga noted that the State Department devotes almost no time to training diplomats in negotiation and mediation (ibid.).
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

To the casual observer, the fact that the State Department does not train its diplomats in mediation and negotiation seems patently ridiculous. As recently as 1984, Ambassador John W. McDonald revealed at an international meeting on conflict resolution that he taught two courses in multilateral diplomacy at the department, and although "seventeen percent of the Foreign Service is engaged full time in multilateral diplomacy this is the only course offered, to date, to try to make officers better multilateral diplomats" (McDonald in Azar and Burton 1986, 143). Perhaps this sorry state of affairs can be traced to the twin legends of American exceptionalism and messianic vision.

The American character, according to historian Frederick Jackson Turner, was shaped by the experience of the frontier. At that point, where savagery met civilization, the values of rugged individualism, democratic suffrage and a new form of Americanism were forged (American Historical Association. Annual Report for 1893: 199-227). Turner's frontier thesis was essentially an agrarian one, argues historian Henry Nash Smith, a premise that militates against internationalism: "The agrarian tradition has also made it difficult for Americans to think of themselves as members of a world community because it has affirmed that the destiny of this country leads her away from Europe toward the agrarian interior of the country" (Smith 1950, 260). Implied in this agrarian convention is a distrust of industrialism,
especially among American intellectuals: "For the most part, commentators on the American character have refused to come to terms with modern industrial realities" (Hartshorne 1968, 190), a phenomenon that recalls C.P. Snow's two-culture thesis. In addition to belief in agrarian roots, other common values must define the American character, but historians disagree on the list. Thus, historian Michael Kammen can call his book People of Paradox and count liberty versus order, equality versus liberty, and order versus equality as irreconcilable ideals in American history; philosopher George Santayana could speak of the "collective individualism" of Americans, and social commentator David Riesman of the "lonely crowd" of American conformists (Kammen 1972, 279). What most historians seem to agree on, however, is the fact that the phrase "national character" has come to mean the character of the nation rather than the character of the individual citizen (Hartshorne 1968, 12). Enormous implications regarding the concept of patriotism stem from this notion. For example, social psychologist Floyd Allport believes that children can be conditioned to believe that the nation is an "over person" capable of willing and feeling, worthy of being honored, loved and protected (Curti 1946, 241). When this thinking is applied to American attitudes towards international relations, especially war and peace, a certain chauvinism inevitably occurs.

From the beginning, Americans have had an aversion to the internecine quarrels of Europe. Washington and Jefferson warned
against entangling foreign alliances and in his famous neutrality address (April 22, 1793) Washington stated "The duty and interest of the United States requires that they should with good faith and sincerity adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers." Many historians agree that Washington could issue such a pronouncement only because the United States enjoyed the free security of a continent separated by 3000 miles of ocean from the warring nations of Europe. Others, however, feel that the United States had always subscribed to the dominant paradigm of limited war: "The legend of Americans rejecting European attitudes toward war because of their wilderness experience and their idealistic ambitions is just that, built upon myth rather than reality. The legacy of the Revolutionary generation was the limited war mentality of western civilization in the mid 18th century" (Stuart 1982, 16). In addition, Americans have had a fear of a standing army, which is why the now highly controversial second amendment to the Constitution, providing for a civilian militia, was adopted; the Constitution also provided for civilian control of the military. Whether by accident of geography or intentions of ideology, the United States subsequently enjoyed a century free from wars beyond its shores, although it engaged in numerous skirmishes with its neighbors, native Americans, and a bloody civil war. In fact, the mood of Americans in the nineteenth century vacillated between the pacific and the bellicose, guided by a rejection of the European power game on the one hand and the ethos of manifest
destiny on the other. Ironically, once the nation was irrevocably
drawn into participating in the world scene in the twentieth
century, a secretary of state who fancied himself a latter-date
Metternich tried to establish the global equivalent of the old
Concert of Europe (Howard 1978, 130).

Although it is difficult to generalize about American
attitudes toward war, most historians agree that a deep-rooted
antimilitarism stemming from colonial times to the twentieth
century was compromised by American participation in world wars.
Historian Merle Curti traces this shift to World War I, when a
close tie-up of the concept of patriotism with military
preparedness changed the nature of patriotism; 100 percent
Americanism now meant fealty to a jingoistic ideal, rather than a
Wilsonian definition of patriotism as devotion to high ethical
ideals (Curti 1946, 230). Others state that the exigencies of
the Cold War caused Americans to equate nationalism with
militarism (Ekirch 1956, 290). The term "national security" was
invoked to justify American incursions abroad: "The Vietnam issue
was less a question of a handful of misguided leaders than the
clarification of the requirements of national security" (Thompson
in Booth and Wright 1978, 170). And, true to just war tenets, the
American propensity to turn its wars into crusades served to
validate the need to turn young American men into warriors (Booth
in Booth and Wright 1978, 30).

This American penchant for justifying its wars as idealistic
campaigns stems directly from its Puritan heritage. As God's
chosen people, enjoying divine grace, the nation need not genuflect before any other external authority, least of all international opinion. On the contrary, America, as God's chosen instrument, has an obligation to educate and improve the rest of the world in order to fulfill its sacred compact, a concept that informed former President Truman when he declared that under his administration America has "finally stepped into the leadership which Almighty God intended us to assume" (Burns 1957, 14). The fact that the rest of the world sees this mission as an excuse to dominate, or views the American interpretation of its legacy of free security as confusing geography with sanctity, is conveniently ignored, especially on occasions such as the Annual National Prayer Breakfast. Begun by former President Eisenhower in 1953, and attended by members of the administration, Congress, the judiciary and the military, the concept of holy nationalism is reinforced each year by prayers such as this one, intoned by an Army general: "Oh Lord, help us defend our freedom. Freedom is never free. It is the most expensive thing on earth. And it must be paid for in installments" (O'Brien 1988, 68).

Some observers of American culture, however, dismiss the religious motivation of American messianism. Max Lerner, for example, believes that the impulse is tempered by a certain national self-doubt:

The messianic element in American tradition is more complex than is generally understood. It is true that Americans believe in their characteristic institutions - free elections, free worship, free discussion, free market. Like others who believe in an idea, they don't understand why the rest of the world doesn't adopt it.
Yet they are pulled back by a self-critical censor that makes them fearful of all-out causes and disillusioned after they have succumbed to them" (Lerner 1987, 898).

Louis Hartz, taking his cue from de Tocqueville—"The great advantage of the American is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution"—sees America as a nonrevolutionary nation unwillingly thrust into a position of world leadership. The American dilemma, he posits, is that we have never experienced a social revolution, a lack of experience that produces a quality of absolute thinking and makes it difficult to understand the problems of others (Hartz 1955, 306). Had he written his book thirty years later, Hartz would perhaps have revised his premise. Americans of the 1980s are shuffling off the caul of a national solipsism and looking at the world as others see it. What they see is that we are not what we want ourselves to be.

A mere decade after Hartz's book was published, a social revolution of epic proportions did take place in the United States, and the nation has not been the same since. The civil rights revolution, the antiVietNam War, feminist and peace movements touched off a national debate that still rages, and Americans have adopted many forms to cope with the questions this debate has raised. Culture critics call for a new public philosophy, questioning the traditional myths that once guided American thinking. If one defines ideology as ideas which enable Americans to act politically, and myths as the ideas by which Americans understand what they are doing (Roelofs 1986, 32-45),
then political breakdown occurs when the myths no longer coincide with reality. Harvard political economist Robert Reich calls four myths into question, which he labels the Mob at the Gates, the Triumphant Individual, the Benevolent Community and the Rot at the Top (Reich, 1987).

The first-named myth refers to the "us against them" mentality fostered by the Manichean interpretation of the world engendered by the Cold War; the second myth, to American overemphasis on individualism; the third, to American treatment of its poor and underprivileged classes; the last to traditional American distrust of business and government leaders. Reich calls for a recognition of the need for cooperation, teamwork, compassion and an ethic of civic virtue (Reich, 1987).

Similarly, Robert Bellah and his team of Berkeley psychologists traveled the country interviewing people to ascertain whether they could draw a wider framework in which to define common values such as success, freedom, justice, and self-reliance. They found an almost inchoate longing for the satisfaction that derives from a commitment beyond oneself; for example, although most people defined success as the outcome of free competition among individuals in an open market, joy came from service to others, and was quite different from success. Americans' concept of government was changing, too, from that of Progressive scientific management to a system of ethical obligations and relationships (Bellah et al., 1985). Others who examine the recent peace movement agree with Reich that a deep
distrust of government is the legacy of VietNam, Watergate and Iran-Contra, and like Bellah's subjects they call for a return of civic ethics to the public arena (Loeb 1987, 216).

The peace movement that researchers will chronicle in the 1990s is distinct from its antecedents in many ways. First of all, it is part of a world-wide, nascent movement that encompasses civil rights and peace activists, feminists and deep ecologists, professional and labor groups working for social change. Although their agendas differ, these groups share common core values and goals, such as the four "pillars" of the ecologically-oriented Green movement: ecology, grassroots democracy, social responsibility, and nonviolence (Tokar 1987, 2).

These new movements, sometimes referred to as "the Movement" (Alger and Mendlovitz in Mendlovitz and Walker, 1987, 338) are emerging from a long tradition that includes the religious peace tradition, liberal internationlism, anti-conscriptionism and radical pacifism, feminist anti-militarism, socialist internationalism and nuclear disarmament (Young in Mendlovitz and Walker 1987, 142). They differ from the old movements in that they reject the bankruptcy of conventional ideas and methods and embrace radical new concepts. Thus, they break with the disarmament movement because of its failure to criticize NATO and the positivist state (Broughton and Zabaykevich 1982, 165); similarly, they reject arms control treaties as too simplistic an approach, stating that the level of arms can be reduced only when
they are no longer felt to be needed (Azar in Azar and Burton, 1986, 38). The Freeze movement, whose greatest power came because it broke with the dominant political discourse, is scored for bargaining away its principles for short-term political gain (Solo 1989, 8).

The Movement is a reaction against what peace activists perceive to be an obsolescent order of state power, technological determination, consumerism, and the prevalence of military and paramilitary modes of conflict resolution. Their agenda can be described as assuming five dimensions: denuclearization, demilitarization, depolarization, development and democratization (Falk in Mendlovitz and Walker 1987, 370). They are transnational, repudiating state power and therefore just war tenets, defining peace as more than the absence of war, but the presence of social justice as well. Furthermore, their definition of security goes far beyond the boundaries of individual nations, defining security as a collective good to be shared; the security of one is the security of all (Zsuzsa in Mendlovitz and Walker 1987, 208). Like the Greens, they tend to use a consensual approach in their deliberations that validates each person's unique contribution; they hope to effect broad social change from the local level, through individual community efforts (Tokar 1987, 149).

They believe that peace can only be realized through personal and social transformation. That transformation can be achieved through a variety of approaches that include the
ideological and political left, spiritual transformation, community organizing and neighborhood empowerment groups, lifestyle change, and interpersonal transformation (Alger and Mendlovitz in Mendlovitz and Walker 1987, 339). This transformation, a paradigm shift in one's world-view, extends to such areas as a conscious demilitarization of the rhetoric of discourse. Just as the ideas and images men hold about themselves and the world provide the essential key to their character and condition (Matson 1976, 32) so is the language used by a culture an expression of its values. The fact that Americans have expressed their challenges in militaristic terms—the "wars" on poverty, drugs, literacy, etc.—suggests a certain cultural mindset that needs changing. The Greens' slogan "Think globally act locally" and the motto borrowed from Schumacher followers "Small is beautiful" are identity buttons on the chest of this movement.

Through their experiences, feminist and civil rights activists in the Movement have come to endorse techniques of civil disobedience and non-violence, and to emphasize a non-hierarchal and non-sexist structure within their organizations, which are essentially grass roots groups. Traditionally, low-status groups do not participate in public affairs because of lesser income, lesser education, narrower perspectives and life chances (Lerner 1987, 637) but many of the new groups are enlisting members of the so-called "underclass" in their efforts. Conversely, many of the new alliances are composed of people from the professions. Two decades ago, Christopher Lasch noted that
among young professionals there was an unexpected devotion to public concerns: "Young architects are challenging urban renewal, young teachers stultified schools. Biologists and physicists are debating whether they have an ethical obligation to concern themselves with the uses to which scientific discoveries are put" (Lasch 1973, 132). He wondered what this activity would lead to. Today there are self-organizing groups all over the world, gathering around common causes, forming coalitions, spreading their messages through publications, symposia, and networks. (Ferguson 1980, 411).

It is perhaps too soon to assess the effectiveness of the Movement and several factors may militate against the achievement of their goals. Chief among them is the intrinsic parochialness of some of the groups, who see themselves working for social change at the local level, but have no concept of their efforts fitting into the larger framework of world peace. Nigel Young of Colgate University's Peace Studies Program lists several negative features of the new peace movement that include ethnocentrism and alignment to state-centered ideologies, limited, short-term pressure-group concepts of politics, gap between leadership and grass-roots base, and lack of a strong communal base resulting from superficial coalitions. He believes, however, that these shortcomings are being met through local networks, global, non-aligned transnationalism, autonomism within the groups, and direct action and unilateral initiatives (Young in Mendlovitz and Walker 1987, 165-166). The National Peace Institute Foundation
(NPIF), the organization that grew out of N-PAC, is an example of the use of these new techniques. Headquartered in Washington, it has established regional councils all over the country, where members hold symposia, work with other local organizations and engage in direct peace action. In addition, the foundation has recently formed a coalition with 70 organizations concerned with world order, disarmament, and peace and justice. Called "The Alliance" it plans to cooperate in the sharing of information and resources utilizing a computer network and in an action agenda that includes urging the government to pay its UN obligations, and support of an international comprehensive test ban and the global convention to eliminate the greenhouse effect (*Peace Institute Reporter* June-July 1989, 1).

Immensely implications for peace researchers emerge from this new climate of opinion. Most obvious is a need for peace activists, educators and researchers to work together to support each others' efforts (Eckhardt 1988, 182). Intellectuals who view themselves as leaders of the masses must become accustomed to a consensual approach to social change. Peace researchers have long criticized the traditional school of international relations scholars as being identified by position, class, culture and ideology with the dominant, status-quo elites of Western nations, but middle class and elitist charges could also be laid at the doorstep of critical peace researchers (Yarrow 1978, 289).

Since the eighteenth century, elites have served as interpreters and guardians of the social contract, a role they
will now have to share. Just as the peace movement in the United States developed from the pacifist principles of the historic peace churches to the legalistic norms of the secular humanists, so does historian Perry Miller see intellectual life in America as stemming from fundamentally Christian concepts in the eighteenth century, to the normative values of the legal profession in the nineteenth, although he feels Enlightenment thinking was not completely forgotten:

So, while the transformation of America into a nation commences with the shout of the Revival and then proceeds apace through a greedy appropriation of legal science to suit the native circumstances, for some time there lingered among the most self-conscious intellects a calm of spirit which was still of the eighteenth century (Miller, 1965, 270).

Those who assess American intellectual life in the twentieth century agree that the basic role of intellectuals should be "analysis, development, revision, representation and even sometimes the creation of basic values and opinions" (Kadushin 1974, 341) but disagree on the degree of influence intellectuals have had on societal values (ibid., 355). Hofstadter attributes this ambivalence to an "ingrained distrust of eggheads" on the part of the public, despite a "genuine yearning for enlightenment and culture" (Hofstadter 1970, 19). Although there is an increasing cultural articulation between the ivory tower and society, some intellectuals note that few of their peers are willing to acknowledge that genuine free-floating ideas can originate outside of academic institutions (Reiff 1969, 54).
Critical peace researchers who value relevance and social action reject the premise that the role of the intellectual is simply the disinterested pursuit of truth. They would agree with C. Wright Mills who contends that the "ideology and lack of ideology of the powerful have become quite relevant to history-making, and that therefore it is politically relevant for intellectuals to examine it, to argue about it, and to propose new terms for the world encounter" (Mills, 1958, 133). Mills also admonishes his fellow intellectuals to be conscientious objectors to the dominant cold war ideology: "We must cease being intellectual dupes of political patrioteers" (ibid., 144).

Just who are these pace-setting intellectuals is the overwhelming question. As we have seen in Chapter VI, the strategists have had considerable influence on policymakers to date. But a new class of intellectuals is rising to take the place of the humanistic intellectuals who are losing their exclusiveness and privileged market position, argues social critic Alvin W. Gouldner. Composed of intellectuals and technical intelligentsia whose roots are more egalitarian and sectarian than those of the old moneyed class they are replacing, this new class is also more cosmopolitan and technocratically oriented. Unfortunately, Gouldner also sees it as being elitist, self-seeking and morally ambiguous and urges it to engage in what he calls a "culture of critical discourse" which he believes "claims the right to sit in judgment over the actions and claims of any social class and all power elites" (Gouldner 1979, 59). Gouldner
sees the emergence of this new class as a world-wide phenomenon; perhaps it is this class that is transforming the face of eastern Europe today. In the United States, it is my opinion that this new class has fractionated into the Movement but also joined the status quo; persons fitting Goulder's ideal type description can be found in both the critical research, security studies, and traditional international relations camps.

Finally, some attention should be paid to the manner in which ideas are spread. A researcher in this field suggests that five attributes of innovations affect their adoption or rejection by a society: the relative advantage, or degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes; compatibility, or the degree to which an innovation is consistent with existing values; complexity, or the degree to which an innovation is relatively difficult to understand and use; trialability, or the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis; and observability, or the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others (Rogers 1983, 239-240). Effective change agents who introduce these innovations are characterized as having high social status among clients, participate in social life, are cosmopolitan and highly educated (ibid., 343). Coupled with this is the observation that change agencies have discovered the need to adopt goals and policies that ensure greater equality in the distribution of the consequences of innovations (ibid., 413).
The lessons for a would-be change agent such as the United States Institute of Peace are quite clear. First of all, its regional outreach program is designed to carry the message of Institute work and peace issues beyond the Beltway and into intellectual and activist circles throughout the country. One hopes it will use National Peace Institute Foundation regional councils in the planning of these two-day events. The message also needs to go into the living rooms of average Americans, however. Therefore the Institute decision to suspend television production because of lack of ideological control is regrettable. Its one-day workshop sessions on current topics are another way to reach the public, and the In Brief pamphlets that summarize these workshops an excellent method of disseminating workshop outcomes to decision-makers. One hopes that Institute planners will build more public participation into the structure of these sessions.

In the area of curriculum, it has supported several grants but so far has avoided the issue of textbook revision, concentrating instead on producing a series of television programs for high school students. One would hope that these programs are more exciting than the initial "Face to Face" series. Its new library program should help to provide information to academe, but a restrictive list of descriptors would by definition obviate much information that could be included under the rubric of peace studies. Although the Institute supports inquiry into a wide variety of subjects
through its grants and Jennings Randolph Fellows, most of the topics seem to cluster around issues of regional conflicts and violence, or "negative peace." Perhaps because of the dearth of women researchers, there seem to be no inquiries into feminist issues such as women and development and the influence of women peace activists. Missing too are topics of environmental concern. The Institute cannot ignore the UN-commissioned Brundtland report which concludes that environmental protection is inseparable from economic growth and argues for institutional change (Brundtland 1988). The interstices of the tapestry of its intellectual map of the peace field should be filled to give this document a more holistic view. Finally, the goal of restricting the Institute's scope of inquiry to 100 percent solicited grant topics is dismaying. Jurgen Habermas reminds us that the philosopher forms himself through mimesis; "What ultimately produces a scientific culture is not the information content of theories but the formation among theorists themselves of a thoughtful and enlightened mode of life" (Habermas 1971, 302). The area of inquiry in the peace field is constantly enlarging, not constricting.

When Congressional hearings were held on the establishment of a U.S. Academy of Peace, several conservative lawmakers (the present Vice-President of the United States among them) opposed the concept, arguing that "because it promises more than it can deliver, it diverts attention and efforts from more important tasks both in government and the private sector" (Report, S.B.
In my opinion, there is no more important task for the United States government and its citizenry than the pursuit of peace. As University of Hawaii political science professor Philip E. Jacob testified, "This after all is not our cause - it is not an American cause alone - it is the life and death of all people on our planet" (Commission testimony 7 February 1983). The United States Institute of Peace was founded by people with Jacob's vision and one hopes it can realize that perspective.
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