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From enemy to ally: American public opinion and perceptions about Japan, 1945–1950

Chiba, Hiromi, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii, 1990

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FROM ENEMY TO ALLY: AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT JAPAN, 1945-1950

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN AMERICAN STUDIES

August 1990

by

Hiromi Chiba

Dissertation Committee:

James McCutcheon, Chairman
Floyd Matson
Paul Hooper
John Stephan
Richard Immerman
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ABSTRACT

Japan's defeat in World War II resulted in the Allied occupation of Japan. During the occupation, the U.S. began building Japan as the "workshop" of Asia. By the time the Korean War broke out, Japan's position in U.S. policy was transformed from that of enemy to key ally. This study analyzes how American public opinion responded to the policy of rebuilding Japan only a few years after the war and how American perceptions of Japan shifted. The research is based on analyses of public opinion polls, various newspapers and magazines, political cartoons, statements made by officials and private organizations, and finally letters from Americans to MacArthur. It indicates that the public and the media opinion generally approved the official policy. Even during the first phase of the occupation (1945-46), a desire to make Japan a peaceful and democratic nation prompted Americans to allow her a peaceful economy. Later on, a series of events led American observers to support making Japan self-supporting. These events were the Cold War in Europe, the consequent increase in U.S. aid, the need for reducing the American taxpayer's burden in the occupied areas, and concern with the communist threat in Japan. With the official efforts to shift occupation policy and with the spread of the Cold War into Asia, American opinion came to strongly approve of making Japan not merely self-supporting but also the "workshop" of Asia. Other
factors such as MacArthur's popularity, business interests, Christianity, and personal contacts with the Japanese, contributed to the support of reconstructing Japan. Among these factors, the last two were less situational factors and provided a more solid basis for constructive attitudes than others. American perceptions of Japan softened accordingly, but the negative perceptions deriving from war experiences and deep-rooted racial and cultural biases were hard to change. Even those Americans with constructive attitudes tended to have negative perceptions of Japan and to be basically paternalistic. This study testifies to the idealism of the American way of life and its promotion around the world, while self-interest (particularly concern with the taxpayer's burden) often accompanied the idealism.
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50. "Harder to Fit," New York Times

51. "Why Don't You Play Ball with Him?" Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.


54. "U.S.A. Take Notice," Columbus Dispatch


56. "Worried about the New Neighbors," Houston Chronicle

57. "The Cat's Paw and the 'Chestnuts'," New York Times

58. "Stepping Stones," Nashville Tennessean
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>ACJ</td>
<td>Allied Council for Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIPO</td>
<td>American Institute of Public Opinion</td>
</tr>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DRB</td>
<td>Deconcentration Review Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Economic and Scientific Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far Eastern Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td><em>Foreign Relations of the United States</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORC</td>
<td>National Opinion Research Center</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>OCI</td>
<td>Overseas Consultants Incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPOS</td>
<td>Office of Public Opinion Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

Japan's defeat in World War II resulted in the Allied occupation of Japan, which lasted until April 1952. The American occupation forces headed by General Douglas MacArthur set out with the mission of transforming Japan into a peaceful nation. United States occupation policies thereby laid an important basis for postwar Japanese society and U.S.-Japan relationships. As historian Carol Gluck discusses in her essay, "Entangling Illusions - Japanese and American Views of the Occupation," the U.S. invasion of domestic Japanese history influences policy analyses of Japanese-American relations in the present, because the basic framework of alliance -- whether in its political, economic, or military aspects -- was established during the occupation period when the U.S. dominated Japan's decisions about its relations with the world.¹

Historical evidence and scholarship indicate that during the course of the occupation, Japan's position in U.S. policy was transformed from a defeated enemy to an anti-Red bulwark and a key ally in Asia, and the U.S. began to rehabilitate Japan as the "workshop" of Asia. This study is derived from two basic sets of questions regarding the change in U.S.-Japanese relations at that time. One of them deals with American public opinion of U.S. occupation policy toward Japan: How did the American public react to the U.S. policy of promoting the ex-enemy's economic resurgence and rebuilding her as a potential ally merely a few years after the war? Did public opinion generally come to accept the policy change? If so, what were the factors and the logic that had led it in that direction?


The other set of questions deals with perceptions and images. If the American people came to accept the official policy of reconstructing Japan's economy and rebuilding her as a potential ally, did their images of Japan and the Japanese also change accordingly, or did they remain unchanged? And if the images changed, in what ways? What elements of the American images of the Japanese remained unchanged and what elements changed? What factors, besides the official policy change, contributed to the change in the images?

This study explores these questions by examining the results of public opinion polls, mass media opinions, newspaper cartoons, letters from Americans to General MacArthur, and influential opinions such as were expressed in Congressional records and in the resolutions of major private organizations. In so doing, this study attempts to recreate the climate of opinion in the U.S. at that time.

One may question the significance of a public opinion study, since the relationship between the actual policy, (foreign policy in particular) and public opinion is not clear-cut. However, scholars have argued that the American public has an important though limited function in setting broad limits on political authorities. For instance, Gabriel A. Almond notes that while popular control of U.S. foreign policy is crude and primarily passive, its role is not insignificant. Almond contends,
Attitudes and opinions toward foreign policy questions are not only to be understood as responses to objective problems and situations, but as conditioned by culturally imposed qualities of character. These largely unconscious patterns of reaction and behavior strongly influence the perception, selection, and evaluation of political reality. At the level of mass opinion these "psycho-cultural" characteristics condition patterns of thought and mood on foreign policy problems. At the elite level they affect patterns of policy-making.\(^3\)

He also maintains,

The various policy and opinion elites are continually, and more or less freely, recruited from the rank and file and consequently share in its [the public's] prejudice and preferences. In addition, they compete with one another in the "opinion markets" for the "sale" of policies. In most cases the influential policy alternatives placed before the public, or its constituent parts, represent in more or less articulate form the vaguer impulses and preferences of the masses.\(^4\)

Thus Almond affirms that the generally accepted values in the society, which are broadly reflected in the public mood, can indirectly influence, though certainly not determine, American foreign policy. James N. Rosenau also argues that while the mass public lies virtually outside the opinion-policy relationship, and does not have detailed control of specific policies, it sets, through the potentiality of its more active moods, the broad outer limits within which decision-makers and opinion-makers feel constrained to operate and interact.\(^5\)

\(^4\)Ibid., 142.
\(^5\)James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961; repr., 1965), 36. See also
It may be argued that the mood of the public, which is essentially an unstable phenomenon, can be controlled by political persuasion. While this argument is valid to a large extent, it should be noted, for one thing, that the policy-makers themselves are a part of the value system, as Almond observes. Secondly, it appears that in the long run, shared images, especially those promoted by government at an earlier time, can return to constrain later options. When the U.S. government takes initiatives to alter the shared images, it needs, in order to obtain the public's consent, to employ effective measures of presentation and justification for the new policy, which would be colored by the climate of opinion at the time.


Discussing the American public's attitudes toward the Cold War, Milton J. Rosenberg makes a similar argument. He writes, "One must not conclude, as certain political scientists seem to have done, that lack of knowledge on foreign policy issues will always foster simple acquiescence to policy revisions. A persisting danger despite a general tendency toward such acquiescence, is that by virtue of the very incoherence and inconsistency that characterize the foreign policy attitudes of many persons, they are likely, when artfully aroused by right wing "brokers of indignation," to accept a promiscuous anti-communist militancy. The importance of this point is that passive, unprepared acquiescence is not to be expected, but that consent to conciliatory policy initiatives and responses can probably be obtained if these initiatives and responses are effectively presented, justified, and backed by prestige endorsements." See Milton J. Rosenberg, "Attitude Change
Almond adds that "even this degree of popular control over the opinion and policy leaderships [popular control by vague impulses and preferences of the masses] presupposes a measure of interest in, and awareness of, the issues on the part of the public," and that "the influence of elite and minority groups in policy-making varies with the level of public concern with the issue." Then, how much interest did the Americans have in Japan during the occupation? Although there is no clear-cut way to answer this question, there is an opinion poll regarding this problem conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in December 1946. When asked, "Do you personally take a great deal of interest, only a little, or no interest at all in our occupation of Japan?" 43 percent said "a great deal," another 43 percent said, "only a little," while 12 percent replied, "none at all," and 2 percent did not know. Thus, less than a half of the public seemed to have a great deal of interest in Japan at the end of 1946. On the other hand, the total of 86 percent seemed to have at least some interest, though those with only a little interest would hardly have strong opinions about the specific issues regarding Japan.

4Almond, American People, 142.
5Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Summer 1950): 379. This survey conducted in December 1946 was not released by NORC until March 15, 1950.
6Survey results in September 1950 and January 1951 taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO)
From these figures, and from the fact that Japan was America's most recent dreadful enemy, there is good reason to believe that at least vague interest in Japan remained in the consciousness of most Americans, though they probably did not have much interest in the details of the U.S. policy toward Japan. It is, therefore, conceivable that American policy-makers paid some attention to the public sentiment about Japan in the process of formulating, shifting, and presenting the occupation policies. More accurately, it seems that, in shifting U.S. occupation policy toward Japan as noted above, there was a need to pay sufficient attention at least to how to "sell" the policies effectively to the public in a way not to arouse the public's opposition. In other words, how the policy-makers tried to sell (or justify) the change in U.S. occupation policy reflects the values generally shared by the American people, even if the attitude of the general public toward Japan during the

suggest that the American people tended to be more concerned with the European scene than the Asian scene. The surveys asked: "Which do you think is more important for the U.S. to do (A) Try to keep the rest of Asia from falling under Russian control, or (B) Try to stop Russia from taking over Western Europe?" The results were as follows. See Public Opinion Quarterly 15 (Summer 1951): 398-99.

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<th>January 1951</th>
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<td>(A)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>(B)</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>Both equally important</td>
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<td>No opinion</td>
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occupation was that of mere acceptance of the "sold" official policy.

In addition, this study deals not only with the attitudes of the mass public, but also with the opinions and perceptions as expressed by the mass media and other segments of the public with relatively active interest in Japan, which could mean more to the policy-makers than vague mass opinion. The more structured and informed opinions of the attentive and opinion-making publics have stronger influence than mass opinion upon the context within which the opinion-policy relationship functions. According to Rosenau, members of the attentive public provide "a forum in which foreign-policy controversy among opinion-makers can occur openly and in specific rather than superficial terms." Thus, he argues, "as the stratum of society to which opinion-makers make special appeals for support, the attentive public introduces a more effective measure of democratic control into the opinion-policy relationship than does the mass public."¹¹

U.S. newspaper and periodical articles dealing with Japan decreased in number during the occupation as time passed, and this fact suggests the decreasing degree of interest in Japanese affairs among the American public at

¹¹Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 36, 39-41.
that time. However, a substantial amount of active public
discussion on Japan continued. The points of concern among
American observers came to be more complicated and
controversial in the second phase than in the initial phase,
as many began to discuss the U.S. policy of restoring the
economy of the former enemy. While many Americans tried
to forget the war experience once it was over and Japan was
no longer a paramount concern for most Americans, it appears
that interest in the occupation of Japan remained in the
minds of a sizable segment of the American public.

The study of American public opinion about Japan during
the occupation is thus justified. The purpose of the
present study, however, is not to show the detailed process
of how the public influenced U.S. policy toward Japan at

12 The space in the Reader's Guide to Periodical
Literature used to list articles on Japan may be an
indicator of how much interest in Japan the American press
showed. While the listing of articles under the main
headings of "Japan" and "Japanese" covered about seven pages
in the Reader's Guide for May 1945-April 1947, that for May
1947-April 1949 covered about four pages, and that for May
1949-March 1951 covered about three pages.

13 Coverage on Japan by the New York Times, for
instance, dropped off rapidly in November 1945. In 1947 the
same paper's coverage turned to the problems of Japan's
economic recovery, reflecting a change in occupation
emphasis. This trend continued in 1948 and 1949 with
numerous comments on the problems occasioned by communist
domination of the labor unions. With the outbreak of the
Korean Conflict in 1950, news about Japan in the paper
became scares except September 1951 at the time of San
Francisco Peace Conference. See Robert Ward and Frank J.
Shulman, ed., The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952; An
Annotated Bibliography of Western-Language Materials
(Chicago: American Library Association, 1974), item no. 37.
that time.\textsuperscript{14} It is to see the factors and the logic that
led the American people to accept the policy of rebuilding
Japan as the "workshop" of Asia and a key potential ally of
the U.S., and to examine the underlying perceptions of Japan
and the Japanese held by Americans during the occupation.
It is thereby to reconstruct the climate of opinion, or the
mood, values, and attitudes widely shared by the American
public at that time, especially with respect to Japan.
Moreover, the analysis of U.S. attitudes toward Japan during
the occupation should point to some of the basic historical
problems which have lain between these two nations. To
point out such problems, comparison will be made between
U.S. attitudes toward Japan and Germany, another enemy
nation of the U.S. in World War II and the nation also
occupied by her after the war. In a broader context, this
case study of American attitudes toward helping a recent
enemy's recovery should give a valuable insight into the
patterns of American people's attitudes toward foreign
countries. It should thus contribute to the understanding of
American culture, though no definite conclusion can be made
about it from this study alone.

Furthermore, while a considerable number of studies on
the U.S. occupation of Japan have been completed to this
\textsuperscript{14} Such a study of the detailed process would involve
the examination of how key policy-makers perceived public
opinion and of how their perceptions were actually
incorporated in the policy-making process. There is not
sufficient date available to me to examine such a subject.
date both in the U.S. and in Japan, few studies have provided a comprehensive analysis of American public opinion and perceptions of Japan at that time. Most works, when referring to public opinion or perceptions, have given only a fragmented analysis of the subject. This work sheds light on this less studied aspect of the American occupation of Japan.

Methodology and Sources

This study uses various sources including public opinion polls, the media (radio, newspapers, and major national magazines) and other influential opinions, including newspaper cartoons, and letters from American

citizens to General MacArthur. How these sources were selected and utilized is explained below.

Public opinion polls provide information on the overall trend of the general public. Despite their limitations and shortcomings, they still constitute the most valid quantitative evidence available on mass attitudes and opinions. Almond suggested four principal factors in the opinion and policy process: the "general public," the "attentive public," the policy and opinion elites, and the legal or official policy leadership (executives, legislators, civil servants).16 Data from public opinion polls is used to identify the attitude of the first factor. This study make use of the results of public opinion polls conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) under the direction of George Gallup, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, and Fortune magazine under the direction of Elmo Roper. Reference will be also made to some unpublished or confidential results of opinion surveys noted in the special reports on American opinion compiled by the U.S. State Department, Office of Public Opinion Studies, under the direction of H. Schuyler Foster. Those reports were prepared on a current basis for the information of State Department officers in Washington and their colleagues

16 Almond, American People, 138.
stationed abroad

(Many of the initially confidential results of the polls were published later.)

The mass media belongs to the third factor in Almond's categorization, namely, policy and opinion elites. Almond also divided foreign policy elites into four groups: the political elites, the administrative or bureaucratic elites, the interest elites, and the communication elites. The mass media constitutes the most obvious representative of the last of these four groups. The mass media also plays the role of transmitting the views of the influential political and interest elites to the public.

Analysis of the media opinion on a certain issue is important for the study of American public opinion, since it reflects the views of that segment of the total public which takes an active interest in the issue. Moreover, though the mass media opinion cannot be identified with the general public opinion, it can have strong impact on the public since the mass media transmits most of the information on which public opinion rests. Furthermore, as W. Lance Bennett points out, in the long run, because of the mass


18 Almond, American People, 139-41.
economic base for the media’s profits, most of the issues emphasized by the media tend to reinforce mainstream social values. "Even the political conflicts that dominate the news tend to be conflicts between equally legitimate positions whose implementation would be unlikely to change the social order." (This does not mean that the mass communication industry always rests on pleasing people or satisfying anyone’s tastes. It is rather organized on the principle of not offending anyone.) In sum, the media operate as "gatekeepers," transmitting "normal" or legitimate issues and ideas to the public and filtering out new, radical, or threatening perspectives. Some national periodicals with a relatively small circulation (e.g., The New Republic, Nation) may not reflect mainstream social values, but in order for them to continue to operate on a mass level, they would at least have to reflect values within an acceptable value spectrum in the U.S. In other words, the analysis of various opinions expressed in major newspapers, magazines, and radio commentaries provides a guide for the study of the social values widely shared or generally acceptable to the American people.

As a chief source for the examination of the media opinion and other influential opinions, this study uses the survey results compiled by the U.S. State Department’s

Office of Public Opinion Studies noted above. This office compiled fortnightly, monthly, or weekly reports. Its study covered a large number of daily newspapers throughout the nation, columns by leading writers, news stories and feature articles, magazines and periodicals, and transcripts of radio commentaries and debates, in order to examine press and radio opinions. This opinion survey series also took note of statements of political and other leaders, resolutions and publications of national private organizations interested in foreign affairs, and polls of national and group leaders to analyze leadership opinions. The aim of the analysis was to make the opinion reports "as objective as possible." Though these surveys were analyzed through the lenses of the State Department officials engaged in the public opinion studies, they are

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20 The number of the newspapers and periodicals surveyed by this office varied. For instance, for the September 20, 1945 issue of the Fortnightly Survey, the number of the newspapers surveyed was "some 300," for the December 4, 1945 and April 19, 1946 issues, it was "some 125," and for the March and April 1947 issues of the Monthly Survey, it was "some 225." Likewise, the number of the periodicals surveyed seems to have varied from "some fifty" to "some eighty." Foster, the head of the office, later wrote that an analysis based upon a dozen leading newspapers had often sufficed to indicate the main features of opinion across the country, additional editorials normally confirming or validating the observations. See H. Schuyler Foster, Activism Replaces Isolationism; U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940-1975 (Washington, D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1989), 13.

21 Foster, Activism Replaces Isolationism, 14. Foster was a public opinion analyst in the U.S. State Department from 1943 to 1975. He had a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, and had taught at Ohio State University and Harvard University before he joined the State Department.
extremely helpful for the study of opinion trends. They surveyed a wide range of materials, far beyond the capacity of any individual's research. The reports often noted viewpoints of various observers without indicating which segment of American opinion they seemed to represent. Despite this limitation, the survey series constitute the best available documents on the trend of American opinion. There is another positive reason for using the State Department's surveys. When public opinion seems nebulous, different observers can interpret it in different ways. However, these reports, because they were circulated among top State Department officials on a "confidential" basis, should provide the public opinion of the time as perceived by those department officials who were involved in the formation of foreign policy making.

By using both State Department's Fortnightly (or Monthly) Survey series (which reported American opinion on international affairs in general) and its special reports on U.S. occupation policy in the Far East (which focused on American opinion regarding Japan and Korea, mostly on weekly, fortnightly, or monthly basis), this study analyzes American media and leadership opinions on Japan, paying attention to the international context. Moreover, in contrast to the State Department's reports which were prepared on a current basis, focusing on short-time developments, and, therefore, often failed to provide the
observation of long-term developments of American opinion, the present study carefully reexamines information given by those surveys and provides a more solid, coherent historical observation of the major trends in American opinion on Japan, adding necessary background information on developments regarding the American occupation of Japan.

In addition, I use a number of articles published in the major U.S. periodicals to supplement the State Department's opinion survey. I selected popular magazines with mass appeal such as *Newsweek, Time, Life, the Saturday Evening Post,* and *Collier's.* Articles in business magazines such as *Fortune, Business Week,* and *Magazine of Wall Street* are also used for the examination of business viewpoints. I also chose more intellectually-oriented magazines such as the *New York Times Magazine,* the *Saturday Review of Literature,* *Harper's,* *Atlantic Monthly,* *Pacific Affairs,* and *Commonweal* (a Catholic weekly), which represent the segment of the press read by the attentive public. In addition, *Far Eastern Survey,* which carries various views of experts on Far Eastern affairs, is used for expert opinions. Moreover, liberal, progressive and explicitly political-oriented magazines as the *New Republic* and the *Nation* are considered as well. There was no overtly conservative major magazines at that time which counterbalanced the *New Republic* and the *Nation.* However, many of the periodicals noted above, other than the two liberal ones, occasionally carried conservative
articles. Harry Kern, foreign affairs editor of *Newsweek* from 1945 to 1954, for example, was a conservative. (In addition, the State Department's opinion survey often noted the views of conservative newspapers such as the Scripps-Howard and Hearst papers.)

As the State Department's opinion survey shows, major U.S. daily newspapers such as the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *Los Angeles Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Baltimore Sun*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, *Louisville Courier Journal*, and *Chicago Tribune*, provided comprehensive coverage of the occupation of Japan.22 The *Christian Science Monitor* was distinct in its frequently critical analysis of the occupation. It was usually closer than others to the liberal magazines, being very suspicious of the Japanese leaders with prewar experiences in government ("old oligarchy") and concerned with furthering democratic reforms in Japan rather than building her as America's ally.

In discussing American media opinion and other public comment, this study puts primary focus on the main trends among them, but it also takes note of minority opinions and special interest opinions.

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22 According to *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952: An Annotated Bibliography of Western-Language Materials* edited by Ward and Shulman, the *New York Times* provided the most extensive and comprehensive coverage of the occupation of Japan.
Moreover, political cartoons are used to examine the media opinion and the general sentiment. Most of the cartoons introduced in the present work come from the "News of the Week in Review" section of the Sunday New York Times, which carried a number of cartoons that had originally appeared in different U.S. newspapers, between Japan's capitulation in August 1945 and the end of the occupation.23

Best-selling books which reflected popular interest in Japan are also discussed in the present study. Sheila K. Johnson, in her book, The Japanese Through American Eyes (1988), listed all the books on Japan which appeared on the New York Times best-seller list for more than one week between 1940's and 1980's. For an examination of the best-

23 Though the New York Times also carried cartoons which originally appeared in British newspapers, they are not used for this present study. According to John W. Dower, the percentage of cartoons about Japan among the cartoons dealing with foreign affairs that appeared in the "News of the Week in Review" section of the Times drastically decreased in 1946. The percentage in 1945 (from August 12 to December 31), 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952 (till May 4) was 21.4, 2.6, 1.1, 0.2, 0.4, 1.1, 4.6, and 5.4 percent respectively. [See John W. Dower and Rinjiro Sodei, "Satire under the Occupation: The Case of Political Cartoons," in The Occupation of Japan Arts and Culture: The Proceedings of a Symposium at Norfolk, Virginia, 18-19 October 1984, ed. Thomas W. Burkman (Norfolk, VA: The General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, 1988),110.] These figures definitely indicate the decrease in American people's interest in Japan a few months after the end of the war. However, it seems that they do not necessarily mean Japan disappeared from American consciousness almost altogether, since only those topics which are paramount concern to the public would be depicted by newspaper cartoonists. It is possible that Japan, though no longer an object of paramount concern to most Americans, remained in the consciousness of many Americans.
selling books during the occupation, I rely upon that data supplied by Johnson and incorporates her analysis into the larger context of the general sentiment. 24

In addition, letters from Americans to General MacArthur are used for this study of American opinions and perceptions of Japan during the occupation. MacArthur governed the conquered nation until his dismissal by President Truman in April 1951. According to the Gallup poll, Americans considered MacArthur one of the most admired living people in the world at that time, 25 and many private citizens as well as officials wrote him. Those letters, now kept at the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, are extremely valuable historical resources for the study of

24 There were only a few best-sellers on Japan during the period studied by this author: John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, and John Gunther's *The Riddle of MacArthur*. (Though this study deals with the period up to 1950, and Gunther's book was a best-seller in 1951, it is briefly mentioned in Chapter VI, with regard to the evaluation of MacArthur's job in Japan.) See Johnson, *Japanese Through American Eyes*, 15.

25 The Gallup poll reported on June 16, 1946 that MacArthur was named the most admired personage in the world. He was mentioned over General Dwight Eisenhower and President Truman who completed the top three on the list. (According to the *Fortune* survey of the January 1946 issue, MacArthur was the second most admired American military officer. Eisenhower received 38.7 percent of the poll and MacArthur 36.5 percent.) Again in 1947, he was top among the "most admired," and in 1948 he was third. In early 1949, 81 percent approved of his job in the U.S. occupation of Japan. See *Public Opinion News Service* (Princeton, NJ), June 16, 1946, Apr. 15, 1949, box 17, RG 10, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA; *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (Spring 1946): 137.
American attitudes toward MacArthur and Japan at the time of the U.S. occupation.

One would naturally ask what segment of the American public the writers of those letters came from. It is a complex question. They obviously did not represent the whole American public. Some of them may have belonged to the segment of the public attentive to foreign policy. Others did not have much knowledge about the details of the occupation policy but had some interest in Japan. However, it seems safe to say that they constituted a segment of the American public that took relatively active interest in Japan, at least in some particular respect. There were those with personal interest in Japan, or those who had some particular say to MacArthur about his job, about U.S. occupation policy toward Japan, or about Japan herself. It is therefore meaningful to see what the patterns of their attitudes toward Japan were, and how and why those attitudes were transformed during the course of the occupation. A close examination of the language in the letters helps explain the psychology and the attitudes of many Americans with keen interest in Japan at that time, which could not be grasped by other measures of public opinion. The letters, therefore, provide an interesting glimpse of the climate of public opinion at that time.

In my analysis of the letters to MacArthur, the primary focus is on the language, not on the statistical
information. However, the sampling process and the range of the sampling used for this study should also be noted.

The number of the letters written to MacArthur during the time when he was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)\textsuperscript{26} in Japan is not known. Even the precise number of the letters kept at the MacArthur Memorial today is not known. -- There are simply too many to count, and there has been no personnel to conduct such a job. For this study, two record groups were used. One is the general's personal and official correspondence, 1945-51, in Record Group 5, and the other is his private correspondence in Record Group 10.\textsuperscript{27} In looking through thousands of items in those record groups, I carefully searched for key words such as "Japan" and "Japanese" and selected letters which expressed the writer's attitude toward or perception of Japan. Letters were also selected that showed the writer's interest in Japan, including American business interest, missionary interest, and interest by journalists.

\textsuperscript{26}The acronym, SCAP, was used to designate not only the Supreme Commander himself but also the whole bureaucratic apparatus that carried out the occupation policy in Japan. \textsuperscript{27}The entire RG (Record Group) 5 consists of 122 boxes (57 feet). For this study, boxes 1-62 that include MacArthur's correspondence, Subseries 1-4 (1. General, 2. Japanese Surrender, 3. Official Correspondence, 4. Office of Military Secretary) were examined. RG 10 contains MacArthur's Private Correspondence (207 boxes). This author used boxes 8-19 that covered the period from August 1945 to June 1950, after which date, with the outbreak of the Korean War, letters seldom dealt with Japan. Correspondence includes, besides letters to him, MacArthur's replies, newspaper or magazine clippings and brochures sent to him, and some bureaucratic memos.
MacArthur's replies, when attached, and newspaper and magazine clippings regarding Japan sent to MacArthur with the letters were also collected. Handwritten letters were for the most part skipped because of the time constraint for the research.

A total of about 730 items were finally collected, out of which 585 constituted correspondence between MacArthur and American private citizens, or officials (e.g., U.S. Senators) writing as or for a private citizen. (The rest was official correspondence between MacArthur and U.S. government or SCAP officials.) Out of the 585 items, replies by MacArthur or SCAP staff and articles that could not be treated as letters to MacArthur were separated. This selection process left 418 letters from American private citizens to General MacArthur. Out of the 418 letters, 109 were written during the first phase of the Japanese occupation (August 1945-46), 125 were written during the second phase (1947-48), and 184 were written during the third phase (1949-51). (For an explanation of these divisions, see the next section.)

Some general characteristics of those letters require particular mention. For one thing, about half of the writers (and the majority of those expressing positive

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28 Though this study deals with the period up to 1950 as noted below, a few letters written in 1951 are included in the sampling. Since there was no major development that drastically changed American attitudes toward Japan in 1951, their use is justified.
attitudes toward Japan) explicitly admired the general for his excellent job in the occupation of Japan, though the degree of praise and support for him ranged from courteous praise to enthusiastic support for and defense of MacArthur's position. Very few letters attacked him. This trend was hardly surprising in view of the public opinion polls that showed a similar nationwide trend. Of course, there existed in the U.S. criticism of his job by its close observers, but few letters from such people are found in this sampling.

The second point deals with the general trend in American attitudes toward Japan. Though the sampling of the letters is limited, it seems to support other components in the climate of opinion especially regarding the increasingly favorable view of Japan as time progressed. This trend is shown in Table 1. [Out of the letters from American private citizens in the sampling, those showing explicitly the writer's feelings toward Japan herself, were selected for Table 1. Letters merely expressing the writer's business interest, journalistic interest, Christian missionary interest, opinions on particular occupation policy, and letters on technical matters were not included in the figures (A) and (B).]
Table 1.--Attitudes toward Japan Expressed in the Letters to MacArthur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1945-46</th>
<th>1947-48</th>
<th>1949-51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Harsh attitude</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Positive attitude</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of letters to MacArthur in the sampling</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Harsh attitude" in Table 1 includes negative approaches to Japan and the Japanese people with an emphasis on vengeful measures, reflecting the writer's animosity against Japan. "Positive attitude" includes constructive approaches, with an emphasis on willingness to reeducate and help Japan and a hope for regenerated and peaceful Japan in the future. This does not mean that the letters in this second category necessarily showed favorable perceptions of Japan and the Japanese. A substantial number of the writers, while taking a positive attitude to the problems about Japan, still expressed their negative perceptions of Japan or its people, though in different degrees, and though their negative perceptions of Japan were usually less extreme than those held by people with a harsh attitude. This difference between "attitude" and "perception" is significant. It should be also understood that the division of the letters into the two categories ("harsh" and "positive" attitudes) is not always clear-cut.
A simple comparison cannot be made between this sampling of the letters to MacArthur and public opinion polls. The following observation, however, suggests that those who wrote MacArthur tended to represent more of the Americans who were friendly to the Japanese than those who were unfriendly to them, or at least that people tended to describe their attitude toward Japan positively in their letters to MacArthur. Among the letters written between V-J Day and the end of 1945 in this sampling, more letters showed a positive attitude (22 letters) than did a harsh attitude (15 letters). On the other hand, nationwide opinion polls taken in late 1945 showed 55.9 percent thought the majority of the Japanese people were naturally cruel and brutal, and only 20.2 percent thought Japan would learn a lesson by this war. Indeed, 63 percent thought she would wait for a chance to try again, and 42 percent thought Japan would not ever become a peaceful nation, while 39 percent thought she would. Moreover, while only one letter written in the third phase of the occupation in this sampling showed an apparently harsh attitude, an opinion poll reported that in 1951 (by which time the animosity had abated significantly), 25 percent of the American people

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took an "unfriendly" or "unfavorable" view toward the Japanese people (while 51 percent took a friendly or favorable view, and 18 percent were neutral.)

At best, the figures above provide only a rough, general trend. American attitudes toward Japan cannot be simply categorized as either "harsh" or "positive." Actual feelings and interests of American people about Japan are complex and need closer examination. A detailed analysis of the reasonings and psychology of each writer is to be presented in Chapters III, V, and VIII. To transmit the feelings of each writer vividly, many letters will be quoted in those chapters.

**Period to Be Covered**

Although the American occupation of Japan lasted until April 1952, this present study focuses on the period between August 1945 and late 1950. This periodization is based on the argument by historians that the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 marked a significant turning point in American postwar diplomacy. A fundamental characteristic of U.S. foreign policy during the 1950's and 1960's was the commitment to contain communism all over the globe without differentiating between peripheral and vital interests. This direction of U.S. diplomacy was largely set by the Korean War. A high degree of conflict with the Soviet Union

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and perhaps a significant perceived threat of war had existed before the war, but it took the outbreak of the war to bring about other features of the Cold War, namely, the clear perception of a united Sino-Soviet bloc, the belief that limited wars were a major danger, and anti-communist commitments everywhere. Accordingly, it was with the eruption of the Korean War more than any other event that Japan's key position in America's anti-Red struggles in the Far East became manifest to virtually all American observers. The United Nations military reverses in Korea in late 1950 reinforced this view of Japan. In order to see the repercussions of the outbreak of the war on American attitudes toward Japan, this study covers the period to late 1950. Thereafter until the end of the occupation in April 1952, there was no major change in American conceptions of Japan's strategic role in the Far East. Some data about the remaining occupation period (from 1951 till April 1952) is used so far as it seems useful for the examination of American opinion and perceptions during the period up to late 1950.


32 The Sino-Soviet pact in February 1950 presented the view of these two communist nations as a bloc, but it did not have such tremendous impact on American observers as the outbreak of the Korean War.
The period covered by this study, then, is divided into three main phases: the first phase (August 1945-1946), the second phase (1947-1948), and the third phase (1949-1950). During the first phase, democratic reform in Japan was actively pursued by both the occupation headquarters in Tokyo and Washington. During the second phase, SCAP's reform impulse declined, and it began to put more emphasis on economic recovery in Japan than in the earlier phase. Although SCAP did not abandon democratization as a chief objective, new SCAP-sponsored democratization initiatives were few during this phase. It began seeking social stability in Japan and attempting to consolidate the democratization that had been accomplished in the first phase, rather than seeking further reform. This changed atmosphere in SCAP was to a large extent due to a drastically changed political climate in the U.S., especially with the November 1946 U.S. Congressional elections when the Republicans and their allies defeated the New Dealers. The occupation authorities now had to defend their requests for funds for Japan before a Congress not partial to reform crusades in the U.S. or elsewhere. Further, key Washington officials began to cultivate actively the measures for speedy recovery of Japan's economy and its integration with the rest of Asia. However, in 1947 and most of 1948, SCAP, not Washington, had dominant control.

33 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 309.
over the occupation policy, and the occupation still largely remained committed to a liberal reform program in Japan. Then, during the third phase, marked by the austere economic stabilization program derived from the U.S. government’s nine-point economic directive in December 1948, Washington took the initiative in carrying out Japan’s economic recovery programs, and largely put aside its democratization effort. Japan’s strategic position came to be increasingly important as the communists won victories in China.

**Organization of the Study**

This study is divided into three parts in accordance with the division of the occupation period. In each part, an introductory section provides background information on major features of actual U.S. occupation policy toward Japan and significant moves by U.S. officials regarding Japan, especially her economic recovery. In the ensuing chapter in each part, public opinion polls, mass media and other influential opinions, political cartoons, and best-selling books are analyzed to examine the trends of American opinion and perceptions about Japan. (See Chapters II, IV, VI.) Another chapter in each part (Chapters III, V, VIII) is devoted to the discussion of the letters from American citizens to General MacArthur. In PART THREE a special chapter is provided to discuss official and media reactions to the tour of the Japanese delegation to the U.S. in early
1950. Chapter IX reviews the findings of the preceding
chapters and answers the questions raised by this
introductory chapter.

Collectively the chapters show that the mass public
opinion about Japan during the occupation generally followed
and accepted the main trend of media opinions, which tended
to accept the official occupation policy. American opinions
on the whole approved the policy of reconstructing Japan to
a reasonable level (though not yet allowing her to become
the dominant industrial power again in the Asian region)
soon after the war. Then in 1948, it came to approve the
policy of rebuilding Japan as a key anti-Red bulwark and the
"workshop" of the Asia. The following pages should unfold
the intimate analysis of how different factors contributed
to the changes in American opinion and perceptions about
Japan in each phase of the occupation. They should also
point to some persistent characteristics of the U.S.-Japan
relationship at that time.
PART ONE
THE FIRST PHASE, AUGUST 1945-46

INTRODUCTION
With Japan's surrender in August 1945, the U.S. embarked upon the occupation of Japan, and set out to engineer various reforms in Japanese society. General Douglas MacArthur headed the occupation forces as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The occupation was nominally an Allied enterprise, as MacArthur's title indicated, but was in effect almost exclusively American. As expressed in the "U.S. Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC 150/4) and the "Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan" (JCS 1380/15), which had resulted from extensive debate among and within the State, War, and Navy departments, the U.S. postsurrender policy was to go beyond mere demilitarization and the elimination of military potential. In order to prevent Japan from ever again becoming an aggressor nation, the Occupation would also seek to eradicate the structures of Japanese society that had impelled that nation to expand since the late nineteenth century, and to make her a democratic nation.¹

¹Schaller, Occupation, 24-25; SWNCC 150/4, reprinted in Appendix 6, Herbert Feis, Contest over Japan (New York: W.
Following the broad outlines of the Potsdam Declaration, the postsurrender policy ordered the Supreme Commander to disarm and demobilize enemy armed forces and establish a representative government. He was also ordered to remove and exclude the militarists and ultranationalists from public office and from any other position of influence. Moreover, the initial policy was to promote individual liberties, particularly, freedom of religion, assembly, speech, and the press, and to release political prisoners. The Supreme Commander was also to encourage a free labor movement and to carry out economic deconcentration (especially, the dissolution of the Zaibatsu). This initial reform plan was a product of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal era.

As to the Supreme Commander's relationship to the Japanese government, because of the desire of the U.S. to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, he, the top authority in Japan as

W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967); JCS 1380/15 (November 8, 1945), reprinted in Appendix C, Martin, 122-50. SWNCC 150/4 was radioed to MacArthur on August 29, and was made public on September 22, 1945. The first half of JCS 1380/15 was received by MacArthur on September 18, and its latter half was received on October 22, 1945. It was made public only in April 1948. See Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 4; Martin, Allied Occupation, p. xi.

2 The Zaibatsu (literally, money clique) means Japanese giant monopolies. The term usually refers to family-dominated combines. For a more detailed discussion of this term, see Eleanor M. Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970), 20-23.

3 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 4.
proclaimed by the postsurrender directive, was to use the existing Japanese governmental machinery and agencies (including the emperor) and exercise his authority through them to the extent that this satisfactorily furthered United States objectives. In addition, he was not to oppose changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies, as long as these changes did not threaten his forces and the attainment of all other objectivities of the occupation.4

Regarding Japan’s economic capability, the Occupation was to permit her a peacetime economy sufficient to meet normal requirements but place strict limits and controls on heavy industry. Moreover, it would "not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy." All Japanese foreign trade, foreign exchange, and financial transactions were put under the control of SCAP.5 Until the resumption of private trade in August 1947, all Japanese foreign trade was on a government to government basis. Distribution of Japanese exports in the U.S. was the responsibility of the U.S. Commercial Company, a corporate entity of the U.S. government.6

4Feis, Contest Over Japan, 169-70.
5Schaller, Occupation, 24-25; Martin, Allied Occupation, 135, 140-141.
6Martin, Allied Occupation, 94.
During the first phase of the occupation Washington, in accordance with the policy guideline, actually encouraged SCAP to focus on disarmament and democratic reforms along New Deal lines rather than on Japan's economic recovery. MacArthur was also committed to the reform agenda in carrying out his new task of liberating the conquered nation from the authoritarian oppression.\(^7\) In the postwar atmosphere, "distrust of the Japanese and faith in beneficent government economic activism combined to produce a national desire to punish the Japanese with one hand and improve their lives with the other."\(^8\) Moreover, the new Japanese constitution drafted in SCAP headquarters was promulgated in November 1946. It proclaimed that sovereign power resided with the people, and in Article 9, forbade creation of armed forces or the conduct of war as a national right.\(^9\)

The U.S. Reparations mission headed by Edwin Pauley made a tour of the Far East in late 1945. In his report to the President in December 1945, Pauley concluded that Japan retained an "excess capacity" of industry that depended on war-related orders and foreign raw materials, and that many secondary, war-related facilities could be transferred

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abroad without impairing Japan’s domestic standard of living in order to help raise the living standards of other Asiatic countries.\textsuperscript{10} In his view, Japan was not to be pauperized, but neither was she to be allowed to rehabilitate her economic life in a form which would allow her to gain control or to secure an advantage over her neighbors. Pauley’s report was approved by President Truman in December 1945.\textsuperscript{11} In the meantime, Japanese conservative politicians and business leaders sought to alleviate the effects of the U.S. attempts to carry out radical economic reform.\textsuperscript{12} In response, a mission to examine Japanese combines headed by economist Corwin D. Edwards was sent to Japan in early 1946. The Edwards mission labeled the Zaibatsu among the "groups principally responsible for the war and . . . a principal factor in the Japanese war potential," and argued that its

\textsuperscript{10} Schaller, Occupation, 37-38.
\textsuperscript{11} "Statement by Mr. Edwin W. Pauley, Personal Representative of the President on Reparations, Oct. 31, 1945," Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), 1945, vol. 6, 997 (hereafter abbreviated as FRUS, with appropriate year, volume and page); "Pauley to President Truman, Dec. 6, 1945," FRUS, 1945, 6: 1004; "Statement by Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, Dec. 7, 1945," FRUS, 1945, 6: 1007; "President Truman to the Secretary of State, Dec. 21, 1945," FRUS, 1945, 6: 1012. Pauley’s formal report was completed in April 1946 and was submitted to the Department of State for review by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee before presentation to the President in November 1946. It was released to the press on November 17, 1946. See "Recommendations by Ambassador Pauley on Japanese Reparations," Department of State Bulletin 15 (Nov. 24, 1946): 957-59.
\textsuperscript{12} Schaller, Occupation, 33-35.
dissolution was a key element in the "broad program of democratization and demilitarization."

Japan at the start of the occupation was economically prostrate. Wartime conversion of chemical fertilizer plants to plants producing explosives and the neglect of farm land due to the diversion of manpower into the armed forces and war industries, coupled with unusually bad weather, caused the reduction of harvests to an abnormally low level. Farmers were reporting a 30 percent decline in the rice crop and a 50 percent drop in spring wheat and barley. Imports from the Japanese Empire were no longer available to make up the shortage. Wartime destruction of boats, a shortage of motor fuel, and shortages of materials for nets also curtailed fishing. Official rations dropped to 1,050 calories per person per day, less than half of the Japanese prewar intake of 2,260 calories. Then 7 million repatriates started flooding back from all over East Asia to share in what little there was. Without massive help from somewhere, disaster lay just ahead. Japan's industrial production was also crippled due to bomb losses, attempted dispersal of

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13 Schaller, *Occupation*, 35, 39-40. The Edwards report was forwarded by SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) to the Far Eastern Commission for its approval on May 12, 1947, and then bore a new tag, FEC-230.

14 Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 142; Kawai, *Japan's American interlude*, 135. According to Japanese sources (a report from Livelihood Section, Tokyo Metropolitan government, noted in the Nippon Times, July 10, 1946, 3), by June 1946, each inhabitant of Tokyo received in his ration only 150 calories a day, while rural agricultural areas could be regarded as self-sufficient.
facilities, the unbalanced growth of particular types of capacity to meet war demands, conversion of facilities to war products, lack of adequate maintenance during and since the war, lack of fuel and raw materials, etc.\textsuperscript{15}

In this situation MacArthur sought to provide food relief for the Japanese. Mass starvation, that could have led to social unrest and crippled the achievement of the occupation objectives, had to be avoided.\textsuperscript{16} MacArthur saw Japan as his responsibility and a showcase to the world of his capacity as a political leader. Moreover, people who were preoccupied with their struggle to keep barely alive amid the wreckage of the war devastation were in no condition to appreciate the democratic reforms envisaged by the Occupation. The occupation forces then started bringing in food in the spring of 1946. MacArthur’s unexpectedly rapid troop reduction from 600,000 to 200,000 men in the fall of 1945 had produced a dividend in the food supplies left behind, and SCAP officials managed to obtain a total of 800,000 tons of all kinds of military-style food in the first year of the occupation to be distributed to the people

\textsuperscript{15} Martin, \textit{Allied Occupation}, 97.

\textsuperscript{16} In addition, international law required the occupier to maintain public order and safety. In the postwar negotiations leading up to the 1949 Geneva Convention, moreover, the U.S. fully supported the principle, embodied in Article 55, that "to the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population" even to the point of bringing in whatever was necessary "if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate." See Theodore Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 142.
by the Japanese government. For 1946-47, MacArthur
requested and obtained from Congress an appropriation of
$280 million in food, fertilizer, petroleum products, and
medicines, including 2 million tons of staples in wheat and
wheat flour.

With respect to labor rights, the SCAP civil liberties
directive of October 1945, SWNCC 92/1 of November 1945, and
a trade union law passed by the Japanese Diet that December
provided an expanded basis for collective bargaining
activity, and union membership grew rapidly.

On May 19, 1946, however, the so-called food May Day
demonstrations at conservative Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida's residence and in front of the Imperial palace
evoked an angry statement from MacArthur. On the next day
he issued a "Warning against Mob Disorder or Violence" that
decried a "growing tendency towards mass violence" and
"intimidation under organized leadership." Thus while
MacArthur was to encourage a free labor movement, he was
also disturbed by union militancy. Occupation labor policy
was to liberate Japanese labor from the repression of prewar
Japanese authoritarianism and foster a powerful trade-union
movement concerned primarily, like the American AFL and CIO,
with economic rather than political issues. Japanese

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17 Ibid., 143-44; Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, 137.
18 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 144-45.
19 Schaller, Occupation, 44, 49-50.
unionism, however, was almost from the outset primarily political, and its politics were anti-capitalist. During the first few years of the occupation, the communists proved among the most effective organizers of union members. This political orientation of Japanese labor and the unions’ desperate actions posed a serious challenge to SCAP.20

As to the Allied control of Japan, at the Moscow conference in December 1945, the Soviets accepted Secretary of State James F. Byrne’s offer to join a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, an advisory board of eleven (later, thirteen) nations, and a smaller Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) in Tokyo, which was a four-power commission consisting of Russian, American, British, and Chinese representatives. With these arrangements, General MacArthur remained the top authority in Japan and Russia’s role there was in fact nominal.21


21 Schaller, Occupation, 61. According to Schaller, Byrne accepted ambassador Averell Harriman’s proposal to engage the Soviets constructively by trying a compromise over Japan to a deal on the Balkans. In essence, the Russians accepted a nominal role in Japan with about as much influence as the Americans gained in the Balkans. For "Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan" dated Dec. 27, 1945, see Feis, Contest over Japan, Appendix 7.
CHAPTER II
OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT JAPAN, 1945-46

Initial Attitudes toward the Japanese and U.S. Policy of Democratizing Japan

In order to see change or continuity in American attitudes toward Japan in the early days of the occupation, its wartime attitude should be examined. During the Pacific War, the depiction of Japan as a deceitful and treacherous enemy was prevalent in the American media,¹ and most Americans entertained strong hostility toward Japan and the Japanese. According to a poll taken in late 1944, when asked, "What do you think we should do with Japan as a country after the war?," 13 percent favored "killing off" all the Japanese, 33 percent thought that Japan should be split up or destroyed as a political entity, 28 percent advocated supervision and control, and only 8 percent favored reeducation and rehabilitation. At about the same time 88 percent of those questioned were in favor of punishing the Japanese military leaders after the war; some of the suggested punishments went into excruciating detail.²

Public sentiment in the U.S. near the end of the war held the people of Japan responsible for wartime cruelty to prisoners. According to a Gallup poll released on June 11, 1945, when asked, "To what extent do you think the Japanese people approve of the killing and starving of prisoners - entirely, partly, or not at all?", 63 percent replied "entirely," 25 percent said "partly," 2 percent said "not at all," 4 percent thought Japanese people did not know, and 6 percent offered no opinion. When the same question was asked about the Germans, only 31 percent thought that the German people "entirely" approved of German acts of cruelty, 51 percent said "partly," 4 percent said "not at all," 8 percent thought the German people did not know, and 6 percent gave no opinion. This contrast suggests that Americans tended to have more negative views of the Japanese people than the German people in mid- or early 1945. In other words, less Americans made distinction between "good Japanese" and "bad Japanese" than they did between "good Germans" and "bad Germans." The Japanese people generally tended to be seen as cruel. This result was in line with

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3AIPO, June 11, 1945, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Summer 1945): 246. (Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, the date after the name of the polling institution indicates the date of release. It should be noted that some polling results were not released for long after the survey was conducted.) The exact date when this particular poll was conducted is not known to this author. Though its results were released in June 1945, it is possible that the poll was conducted when the U.S. was still at war with Germany as well as Japan.
the difference between the American media's earlier projection of the Germans and that of the Japanese when the U.S. was at war with both Germany and Japan.4

In accordance with the findings of the Gallup poll released on June 11, 1945, National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys conducted in the spring of 1945 also suggest that most Americans in mid-1945 held the people of Japan, as well as their military leaders, responsible for Japan's aggression or were at least suspicious of the people's desire for peace at the moment. When questioned, "Do you think that most of the people living in Japan would like to get rid of their military leaders now or not?", only 27 percent said "yes," while 45 percent said "no" and 28

4According to a study based on the analyses of Hollywood films by the Office of War Information (OWI) during the war, there was distinct differences in the way Hollywood treated the two Axis powers. The study shows that "OWI found the studios more receptive to a nuanced treatment of the German enemy than of the Japanese; despite all the agency's lobbying, the Japanese were shown primarily as the beast in the jungle." The OWI analysis in November 1942 told that "German soldiers were generally shown as being efficient and obedient, but rarely 'cruel and barbarous' like the Japanese. German officers were usually 'gentlemen with whom it would be possible to treat as an equal;' by contrast the Japanese 'can only be killed.' Many Germans were disaffected from Nazism; in turn, qualities of fanaticism and arrogance were ascribed and restricted to Gestapo or SS officials. In short, there were Nazis, and there were also good Germans." See Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to War; How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 248, 282. See also Dower, War Without Mercy, 34, 78-79.
percent were "undecided." In addition, according to another NORC poll conducted at the same time, when asked if "we should let the people in Japan vote in a free election to choose the kind of government they want," 42 percent said "yes," while 47 percent said "no," and 11 percent were "undecided." The notion of "a free election" may have attracted many respondents, but more people did not want to let the Japanese have a free election because they did not trust the Japanese people.

In addition, a NORC survey conducted in July 1945 showed the following results. When asked, "Do you think we should blame the Japanese people themselves, or the military leaders, or both the people and their leaders for the cruelty in this war?", 54 percent replied "Both people and leaders" and 3 percent said "Japanese people." This means that a total of 57 percent blamed the people for the cruelties in the war. That is to say, the majority of Americans had harsh views of the Japanese people in general. On the other hand, it is notable that 40 percent of those questioned blamed "Japanese leaders only," and 3 percent were undecided. These figures prove that a sizable segment

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5NORC, Aug. 26, 1945, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 386. This survey was conducted from Apr. 30 to May 19.
7NORC, Sept. 15, 1945, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 386. The most of the data for this survey was collected in mid-July, 1945.
(40 percent) of the American public near the war or immediately after the war did distinguish the Japanese people from their militarist leaders.

Another poll also showed that Americans had more negative perceptions of the Japanese than those of the Germans. A Fortune poll, released on June 1, 1945, asked the following question. "Aside from actual fighting -- in which of our two wars do you think our men are really having the most uncomfortable time?" Then, 68.7 percent said "In the war against Japan," while only 10.6 percent said "In the war against Germany. (14.7 percent said "No difference," and 6.0 percent "Don’t know."). The wider cultural and racial gap between the Americans and the Japanese than that between the Americans and the Germans seems to account at least in part for the far greater number of Americans feeling that their countrymen were having a more uncomfortable time in the war against Japan than against Germany, for the cultural gap and racial difference often cause misunderstanding and discomfort. Germans were more like Americans, and more Americans had German ancestors than had Japanese ancestors. Furthermore, as John W. Dower points out, there was a logical explanation for the perception that the Japanese were more brutal than the Germans. In other words, as the estimated death rate of

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\^Fortune survey, June 1, 1945, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Summer 1945): 250.
Anglo-American prisoners held by the Germans and that by the Japanese suggest, the Japanese were actually more brutal to their Anglo-American prisoners than the Germans were. It needs to be added, however, that the Germans seem to have been more brutal to other races and nationalities than they were to Anglo-Saxons. Thus, the more negative perception of the Japanese was "culture-bound and racially biased."9

Near the end of the war, according to a Princeton poll taken in July, 1945, 66 percent of the public supported the idea that "we should go on fighting until Japan is completely defeated — even if the Japanese offer to give up all lands they have conquered in Asia and the Pacific.10

Preliminary results of a confidential poll taken during the

9Dower, War without Mercy, 35, 48. Dower writes, "On the eastern front, it is estimated that the Germans took as many as 5.5 million Soviet prisoners, of whom at least 3.5 million were dead by mid-1944. Being more sensitive to the fate of their own countrymen, however, most citizens of the United States and the United Kingdom had a very different picture. Of 235,473 U.S. and U.K. prisoners reported captured by Germany and Italy together, only 4 percent (9,348) died in the hands of their captors, whereas 27 percent of Japan’s Anglo-American POWs (35,756 of 132,134) did not survive. No one had such numbers at their fingertips at the time, but the trend was clear" (p. 48). Dower obtained this data from B. B. A. Roling and C. F. Ruter, eds., The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 29 April 1946- November 1948, vol. 1 (1977: APA-University Press Amsterdam BV), 385, and Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War (Pelican, 1972), 256.

10 "Current Public Attitudes Toward the Unconditional Surrender of Japan," July 16, 1945, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter unless otherwise indicated, all of the Record Groups noted in this chapter are located at the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
same period showed that even when the cost of rejecting a peace offer was placed at "the loss of several hundred thousand American soldiers," 54 percent would "go on fighting."\(^{11}\)

Furthermore, according to a Gallup poll released in late August 1945, when asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of using the new atomic bomb on Japanese cities?," the overwhelming majority of 85 percent approved, 10 percent disapproved, and 5 percent gave no opinion.\(^{12}\)

As the war drew to a close American opinion continued to advocate strict control of Japan and punishment of war criminals. A survey released on August 22, 1945 showed 53 percent favoring such a policy, while 14 percent said "Treat with extreme harshness; a third (33 percent), however, advocated treating the Japanese people fairly and reeducating them, in contrast to only 8 percent in the late 1944 survey cited above.\(^{13}\) Thus, the public attitude in the U.S. near the end of the war was somewhat less harsh than in late 1944, though it was still predominantly negative.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) Ibid., 386.

\(^{14}\) It is conceivable that this shift of the public sentiment toward a more constructive attitude near the end of the war was partly because of some statements by public figures that made a distinction between Japanese militarists and the Japanese people. In his statement on V-E Day (May 8, 1945), President Truman said, "It [the unconditional surrender of the armed forces] means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought Japan to
Regarding the treatment of the Emperor, a Gallup poll released on June 29, 1945, showed that the great majority of the public demanded stern treatment for the Emperor: execution (33 percent), court trial to decide his fate (17 percent), life imprisonment (11 percent), exile (9 percent). Only 4 percent said "Do nothing - he's only a figurehead for war lords," and only 3 percent said "Use him as a puppet to run Japan."\(^{15}\)

\[^{15}\text{AIPO, June 29, 1945, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Summer 1945): 246. "Public Attitudes Concerning Japan" issued by the U.S. State Department on June 15, 1945 reported somewhat different findings referring to an unpublished Gallup poll taken in early June. According to it, 36 percent said "kill, torture, starve him," 24 percent said "Punish, or exile him," 10 percent said "Try him, punish if guilty," and 7 percent "Treat as war criminal," whereas 4 percent said "Do nothing" and 3 percent said, "Use him as puppet." Though presented in a different way, this finding shows basically the same result as the Gallup poll released on June 29.\]
Immediately after the termination of the war, namely, in late August and September 1945, the distrust of Japanese intentions lingered on. It was the prevailing theme among the American media dealing with Japan at that time, and negative perceptions were often expressed. While the public tended to have negative images of the Japanese people as well as their militaristic leaders, most American observers were particularly distrustful of the intentions of those Japanese who remained in influential positions of the government and other members of the old oligarchy. The Japanese delay in accepting the Allied surrender terms had produced fears of "Japanese trickery" which had been intensified by the subsequent broadcast by the Emperor and other "evasions" of Allied orders. Declaring that the Japanese were still "unregenerate," Hanson Baldwin and the editors of the Christian Science Monitor, among others, had warned that the Japanese were trying to perpetuate the institutions that helped to bring on the war.  

16 Following Japan's surrender, at Prince Konoye's urging, Prince Higashikuni, the emperor's uncle, became Prime Minister, and a government was organized around him by the old guard civilians. The new regime claimed that the real cause of Japan's suffering was not the emperor nor any other particular person or group but a "lowering of national morality." See Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 36-37. The Higashikuni cabinet resigned in October 1945, when SCAP issued a civil liberties directive in October 1945 that ordered the government to release political prisoners, abrogate limits on speech, assembly, and political parties, and abolish the Home Ministry, that had supervised police repression. See Schaller, Occupation, 29-30.  

17 Fortnightly Survey of American Opinion on International Affairs (hereafter referred to as the
Scripps-Howard press stated, "Washington, the Supreme Commander, and all occupation authorities must be alert to prevent a political Pearl Harbor." The reporters' attention was focused on the punitive or demilitarization measures to be taken against the conquered nation, which was natural only a few weeks after the termination of the war. An article in Time of October 1, 1945, also stated, "The U.S. Government intended - as it always had intended - to subject Japan to severe retribution and a thorough occupation." This atmosphere is well shown by Figures 1-9, all of which appeared in U.S. newspapers either in August or September 1945.

At the start of the occupation, this wide distrust of Japan's intentions also led a number of commentators to sharply criticize the Allied policy of accepting and utilizing the existing Japanese institutions as "too soft" and as tending to maintain the power of the Japanese oligarchy. On the other hand, others called it too early to judge MacArthur's policy or consistently supported MacArthur. As of mid-September, intense criticism of

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Footnote:
19 "Watch on Tokyo," Time, October 1, 1945, 27.
20 For instance, Scripps-Howard press, New York Sun, Washington Star and Post, Patterson Press, and Dorothy
Allied policy in Japan proper had been confined to a minority, but came not only from liberals but also from other sources such as the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune. These commentators included not only those who were somewhat dubious about the terms of the surrender, but also those who supported the Allies' position allowing the Emperor to remain. The New York Herald Tribune argued, "It is absurd to keep any Japanese in office in the country for a day longer than necessary." The Herald Tribune of September 11 also asserted, "It seems reasonably clear that nothing short of thoroughgoing social revolution is going to fit this singular primitive people for life in the modern world" (underline mine). The New York Times of September 11 similarly criticized the Allied policy of working "entirely through the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese Government," and asked for a review of the policy by Congress, the President, and the Council of Foreign Ministers.21

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Thompson were among the latter. See Fortnightly Survey, Sept. 20, 1945, 1, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.

21 Ibid. Similar criticism was also made by PM, Christian Science Monitor, Philadelphia Record, Lynchburg News, Hanson Baldwin, William Shirer, Royal Gunnison. Blair Bolles also stated that the problem of policy toward Japan was "complicated by the fact that the Allies took a hopeful and lenient attitude in the first stages of dealing with Japan, and expected that the departure of Joseph C. Grew and Eugene Dooman from the State Department and the appointment of Dean Acheson as the new Under Secretary of State and of John Carter Vincent as the Director of Office of the Far Eastern Affairs, would bring a sterner policy toward Japan. See Blair Bolles, "Will State Department Changes Stiffen Policy on Japan?" Foreign Policy Bulletin 24 (Sept. 14, 1945): 4.
Liberal magazines such as the New Republic and the Nation expressed strong distrust of the "old oligarchy" who remained in power and severely criticized the conservative elements of the U.S. policies in Japan that already existed at the beginning of the occupation. They attacked the Allied policy of retaining the Emperor, the State Department's preoccupation with "stability" in Japan, strong elements among the Allied leadership, especially those of the U.S, who would like to appease the "moderate" political leaders and the dominant, wealthy industrialists and bankers of Japan who "played as active a role as the militarists in planning Japan's bid for world masterly." An article in the Nation of September 15, 1945, also criticized the announcement of the Allied High Command that it would "use several thousand members of the kempei-tai, the Japanese counterpart of the Gestapo, to assist the regular police in maintaining order." It continued as follows: "The chief function of the Kempei-tai has always been the suppression of liberal and democratic groups within Japan. Only if the secret police are wholly suppressed and their documents destroyed can we expect the progressive groups within Japan

to gather courage enough to emerge as an effective political force."23

However, according to the Fortnightly Survey of October 5, the publication of the policy directive for Japan ["U.S. Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC 150/4)] on September 22 silenced most of those critics who had charged the State Department with failure to develop a sufficiently detailed policy to guide General MacArthur. The directive stressed that policy was to "use" the existing form of government in Japan, but not to support it. It also stated, "Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination."24 In marked contrast to the concern over a "soft" occupation policy, cordial approval of the official statements came from almost all of those who had discussed the provisions in late September and early October.25 In October, as General MacArthur's civil liberties decrees and assumption of control of Japanese banks were announced, and the State Department declared that state Shintoism would be terminated, press and radio comment continued to express approval of the Japanese occupation policies. In general, noted the State Department's

25 Fortnightly Survey, Oct. 5, 1945, 2, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59. Some observers felt that the directive should have been published earlier.
Fortnightly Survey, both "liberals" and "conservatives" had switched from a critical to a laudatory course. ²⁶

There were few exceptions to this general laudatory tone. An article in the October 1 issue of the New Republic introduced the main features of the U.S. policy directive and positively commented that it was "reassuring on several grounds." However, it also cautioned, "Much depends on the detailed interpretations given them and the skill with which they are administered. This is the challenge for MacArthur." ²⁷ Moreover, this magazine in the following week carried T. A. Bisson's review of Andrew Roth's book, Dilemma in Japan. Bisson's review was highly critical of the continued dominance of the Japanese government by the "oligarchy." ²⁸

According to the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," the ultimate objectives of the U.S. in regard to Japan were to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the U.S. or to the peace and security of the

²⁷ "Policy for Japan," New Republic 113 (Oct. 1, 1945): 419. Similarly, an article that appeared in the September 24 issue of the New Republic approvingly noted that General MacArthur had been getting tough with the Japanese. However, this article still cautioned against a "soft" peace, by arguing that MacArthur had done little as to the discouragement of anti-democratic forces in Japan, encouragement of those truly representative of the people's will, and accusation of the Japanese industrialists guilty of having led Japan to the aggressive war.
world, and to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government. In order to achieve these objectives, democratization as well as demilitarization of Japan was to be pursued by the U.S. As the policy directive declared, "The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations."29

As Edwin Martin discussed in his book, The Allied Occupation of Japan, though we knew very little about what would make for a peaceful nation, American policy-makers assumed that democracy would make for a peaceful nation. This assumption was based on their implicit faith in the decisions of the people, who would be against war, at least when war was unjustified.30 Sharing this assumption and with the understanding that Japan's feudalistic social order had led to the rise of militarism, commentators, both liberal and conservative, particularly after the publication of the policy directive, seemed generally to approve of the U.S. commitment to democratize Japan. It should be noted, however, that their main objective was to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the U.S. or to the peace

29 Feis, Contest over Japan, 168.
30 Martin, Allied Occupation, 46.
and security of the world. The comparison of defeated Japan to Germany's defeat in World War I and the fact of the latter's having risen again later as a menace was a device frequently used by those observers who feared the resurgence of Japanese militarism. Whereas in World War I the U.S. was determined to eradicate militarism, American leaders at the end of World War II were resolved to eliminate the "conditions that brought about militarism" as well. 31 Commentators generally accepted this enlarged goal and hoped to transform Japan into a peaceful and democratic nation, thus taking a constructive, rather than vengeful stance, though the primary objective, then, was total demilitarization. Their opinions were divided as to how thorough or how radical the reforms in Japan should be. 32

Regarding the overall approval of the occupation policy, and specifically the degree of sternness that had so far been shown by the occupation forces, the trend of American public opinion closely followed that of press and radio opinion after a short time lag. A confidential poll

31 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 7.
32 Regarding the American commentators' general acceptance of the enlarged international role of the U.S., H. Schuyler Foster noted that ever since the Pearl Harbor, the great majority of American newspapers devoting much attention to foreign policy have shared the "internationalist" outlook adopted by the U.S. government, while the "nationalist" approach was dominant in America before World War II. The "internationalist" point of view presumes, according to Foster, that the U.S. should pursue an active course in world affairs. See Foster, Activism Replaces Isolationism, 13. For this line of argument see also Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 7.
taken in the first week of September 1945 showed that only 21 percent said "Treatment was about right," while a majority of those questioned (68 percent) said "We are not hard enough," only 1 percent said "Too hard," and 10 percent gave no opinion. A month later, a substantial majority (61 percent) continued to regard U.S. treatment of Japan as insufficiently severe, while there was an appreciable increase in percentage of those evaluating it as "about right" (33 percent). However, according to the Fortune survey released in November, when asked the same question, 51 percent said "About right," while 37.6 percent said "Not tough enough," 0.5 percent said "Too tough," and 10.9 percent said, "Don’t know." A month later, the Fortune survey released in December reported that a large majority of 71.6 percent (20 points up from a month before) were well satisfied with the way the American occupation of Japan was going, while only 15.0 were not satisfied, and 13.4 percent did not know the answer.

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34 Ibid., Oct. 19, 1945, 2. This poll taken in early October was released by AIPO on Oct. 16, 1945. (AIPO reported that 32 percent said "About right.") See Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Winter 1945-46): 534.
35 "The Fortune Survey," Fortune, Dec. 1945, 303. See also Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Winter 1945-46): 534. According to the latter source, these survey results were released on November 30, 1945.
Provided that AIPO (or Gallup) survey results are comparable with Fortune survey results, the degree of the American public's approval of U.S. occupation policy in Japan rose very rapidly in late 1945 (from September to December 1945) from 21 percent to 71.6 percent. Even without including the AIPO survey results, the two Fortune survey results (51 percent and 71.6 percent, as released in November and December respectively) show increased satisfaction among the American public in late 1945.

With respect to the concrete means for the democratization of Japan, various articles in periodicals focused on such U.S. occupation policies as removing the militaristic influence, depriving the Emperor of his "divinity," establishing a Japanese Bill of Rights, abolishing the "thought control," creating the first labor-union law and a land-reform law, deconcentrating the economy (or breaking up the Zaibatsu), and providing the education that would stimulate the peaceful and independent thinking of the students.37 These reform programs suggested American

perceptions of a future Japan as a democratic state, and they provided examples of goals which reflected the American value system. As the State Department's opinion survey noted in June 1946, however, those articles discussing the occupation policies often failed to distinguish between those reforms that still existed "on paper" and those that had been, or were being, effectuated.38

In the period immediately after the war, the negative racial images, which had been prevalent during the Pacific War, continued to be expressed in many articles, though becoming less harsh in general. For example, an article in Newsweek of September 3, 1945 said, "The people of this world are timid and childish, arrogant and guileful. They profess a code of absolute purity and integrity and will descend to any depth of depravity to uphold it... His [the Jap's] curiosity and inquisitiveness are almost simian."39 Similarly, an article in the December 15, 1945 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, stated, "The average Japanese is a simple person not far removed from the savage -- as evidenced in the war."40 An editorial in the New York Herald Tribune of September 13, 1945, occasioned by the fact

38 "Public Opinion on U.S. Occupation Policy in Japan," June 26, 1946, 1, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. There were, of course, some article which tried to make a distinction between them (e.g., Edgar Snow, "Is Japan Drifting Toward Socialism?")
that an American sergeant provided blood to save Tojo's life when his attempt at suicide was unsuccessful, reported as follows: "In volunteering his blood, the sergeant was a bold man. . . . he was . . . making himself a symbol. The destructive and self-destructive impulses of ancient Japan can only be halted and turned to better expression in the modern world by a massive transfusion from the main intellectual and social blood stream of modern culture. . . . We find that in the act of destroying the savage and barbaric in Japan we must pour out [a] great transfusion of Western thought and institutions if our enemy is to be left neither a primitive danger nor a corrupting corpse in our own society."41 This statement shows the writer's view that the Western world, particularly America, represented a more advanced level of civilization than Japan had attained. It reflects his Social Darwinistic world view.

This kind of negative image of the Japanese as arrogant and cruel people was more explicitly and harshly expressed in *Newsweek* than in any other magazine chosen for this research.42 However, the *New York Times Magazine*, a more intellectually-oriented journal, also carried some articles


that expressed the image of the Japanese as arrogant and dangerous people, and showed a stern and punitive attitude toward them. These articles often emphasized the militaristic and feudal nature of the Japanese. For instance, Frank L. Kluckhohn in the magazine described Japan as a "nation with a feudal mind and customs, a nation that believed in its divine destiny and suffered a shattering shock." Kluckhohn wrote, "Many Americans have a real grudge against Japan and its people." He also wrote, "The presence of large numbers of American troops in Japan may well open the eyes of this insular people, most of whom never have been outside these islands . . . The mass of equipment we have brought with us almost certainly will impress the average Japanese with the strength and power of other nations. This is important because most Japanese have been taught that Japan is the greatest, most powerful nation in the world . . . but most important, they will have an opportunity to see how other people act toward the conquered." In another article in the New York Times Magazine, the same author described Japan as a "land of barbaric history stretching back thousands of years," and also referred to Japan's birth rate, which was higher than that of the U.S., "as a living proof that these are simple people." He concluded that "drastic changes in the social, 

\footnote{Frank L. Kluckhohn, "First Impressions of Conquered Japan," New York Times Magazine, Sept. 9, 1945, 49-50.} \footnote{Ibid., 49.}
political and perhaps the economic fiber of the country" were needed to create a new Japan that the world could live with. As Figures 10-14 show, in stressing the need for stern treatment of Japan, American observers, as members of the victor nation, often perceived the U.S. as a giant and rightful conqueror, and Japan as a tiny but still potentially troublesome annoyance.

Another American perception of the Japanese expressed frequently at that time was that of the Japanese as a people of mysterious, and remote traditions who were difficult for the Westerners to understand. Japan was regarded as a country of paradoxes and contrasts. The previously mentioned article in Newsweek of September 3, 1945 even described Japan as an "upside-down world." This theme is typically shown by Figure 15. In its February 18, 1946 issue, Life devoted a page of pictures and text to the Japanese tea ceremony, but its commentary was derogatory:

The Japs still preen themselves, as they did 500 years ago, on the studied etiquette with which they serve and drink tea. . . Perfected at a time when Japan was swept by civil war and was on the threshold of its era of total isolationism [circa 1550], it trained the Japs in introspection, meditation, frugality, restraint and poverty, the

isolationist qualities which made Japan the kind of nation it is today.48

These negative views about Japan and the Japanese people, which were prevalent in the mass media immediately after the war, and especially evident in such popular magazines as Newsweek and the Saturday Evening Post, were in line with the dominant trend among the general public. Public opinion polls indicate this point. According to a Fortune survey released on November 30, 1945, when asked, "Do you regard the majority of the Japanese people as being naturally cruel and brutal, if they have the chance, or do you think it is only a small part of the population that is like that?," 55.9 percent answered "A majority," 34.1 percent "A small part," and 10 percent said "Don’t know."

Thus, the American public’s estimate of the Japanese people at that time was predominantly harsh. The majority of the American public still did not see a big difference between Japanese aggressive militarists and Japanese ordinary people. On the other hand, compared with the Gallup poll released on June 11, 1945, which found 63 percent thinking that the Japanese people "entirely" approved of the cruelties (i.e., "the killing and starving of prisoners"), this survey shows a slight improvement in the American perceptions of the Japanese.


By contrast, when the same question was asked about the German people, only 38.9 percent, in comparison to 55.9 percent in the case of the Japanese, replied that a majority of the German people was cruel, and 53.7 percent said "A small part." This finding indicates that in the latter part of 1945, Americans tended to view the Germans more favorably than the Japanese. That is to say, more Americans then, as it was the case during the war, distinguished between "good Germans" and "bad Germans" than did between "good Japanese" and "bad Japanese."

Moreover, according to the same Fortune survey, when asked if Japan would learn a lesson by this war or wait for a chance to try again, only 20.2 percent said "Learn a lesson," while 63 percent said "Try again," 10.7 percent said "Depends," and 6.1 percent said "Don't know." Once again, a clear majority showed strong distrust of Japan.

The same poll about Germany found 36.4 percent saying "Learn a lesson," 46.0 percent saying "Try again," 10.9 percent saying "Depends," and 6.7 percent saying "Don't know." According to the December 1945 issue of the Fortune magazine, the relatively hopeful attitude about Germany had just developed during the previous four months. The August survey reported figures for Germany on this question almost identical with those found for Japan in the December

50 Ibid., 303.
survey. This fact suggests that the earlier termination of the conflict with the former was a partial reason for Americans' less negative views of Germany than of Japan in late 1945, particularly with respect to their war-making potential. At the same time, as discussed above, the greater cultural gap and racial difference between the Americans and the Japanese than the Americans and the Germans seem to have been a chief reason for the consistently more negative perceptions of the Japanese than the Germans during and after the war.

Being distrustful of the Japanese, a majority (64 percent) of Americans thought they would have to police the Japanese for many years, according to a Gallup's survey conducted in early October 1945. The median average of all replies as to just how long the occupation should be was 10 years. Dr. Gallup said that the average American then felt that "We cannot trust the Japanese; they have to be entirely reeducated." 52

Another poll result which may supplement our understanding of the American public sentiment about Japan was taken immediately after the war. According to the confidential results of a September 1945 survey, when asked, "During the next year, if the Japanese get to the point of

51 Ibid., 303.
52 "U.S. Opinion Concerning Policy Toward Japan and Korea, November 1-20," Dec. 1945, 4, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. See also Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Winter 1945-46): 534. These results were released on November 2, 1945.
starvation, do you feel that we should help them?", 55 percent replied "Yes," 36 percent said "No," 5 percent qualified their answers, and 4 percent expressed no opinion.53 On the one hand, it is rather remarkable that a majority of the American public, soon after the war, was ready to help feed the Japanese, if they should reach the "point of starvation." However, it should be noted that even this strongly-worded question failed to move over a third of the respondents. It means that over a third of them did not mind letting the Japanese starve at that time.54

As shown above, many articles in the early days of the occupation reflected American observers' predominantly punitive attitude toward Japan. They desired to impress the Japanese with America's overwhelmingly superior position and to insure that Japan would not ever again try an aggressive course, while accepting U.S. responsibility to remake Japan. The majority of the general public, retaining negative views of the Japanese, seemed to share this attitude of the opinion leaders. On the other hand, not very harsh, but rather paternalistic softer attitude was also expressed in

54 Cf. According to an AIPO poll released on June 18, 1945, 85 percent were "willing to continue to put up with present shortage of butter, sugar, meat and other rationed food products in order to give food to people who need it in Europe," 12 percent were not, and 3 percent gave no opinion. See Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Summer 1945): 248.
some articles soon after the war. These articles showed the problems that the Japanese people faced and emphasized America's role to help the Japanese rather than punish them for their dangerous proclivities. However, as the following examples show, articles of this kind still reflected a contemptuous or condescending attitude toward the Japanese, and negative perceptions of them, though the degree of the sense of superiority expressed was different in different articles. An article in Collier's in late 1945, entitled "Seventy Million Problem Children," stated, "Here is the world's biggest kindergarten - Japan, with millions of pupils, all problem children who now promise to behave if we can show them how. They confess having been bad boys and girls, 'but please don't blame us so much as the militarists and governmental crooks who led us astray . . . '." Admiral William V. Pratt, U.S.N., Ret., after mentioning that the U.S. occupation of the Philippines brought "such beneficial results to the inhabitants of those islands that now we are not looked upon as conquerors but as saviors of their independence," wrote in Newsweek in September 1945, "The Japanese masses have always preferred Americans to other foreigners." The same author also wrote in Newsweek of October 1, 1945, "When we forced the surrender of Japan and

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then occupied the home islands, we did more than end the fighting phase. We accepted responsibilities."\(^{57}\) Along this line, a *Life* editorial in February 1946 observed, "The U.S. . . . has acted somewhat like a mother hen. The Japs are our chicks." The author also referred to Japan as a "problem child."\(^{58}\)

\(^{57}\) Idem, "How to Educate a Jap: Bread or Pamphlets?," *Newsweek*, Oct. 1, 1945, 38.

\(^{58}\) "U.S. in Japan," *Life*, Feb. 18, 1946, 32. This image of the Japanese as "problem children" was still expressed not only by the popular press but also many intellectuals including anthropologists. For example, *Political Quarterly* in mid-1946 carried an article by Charles Fisher, titled "The Japanese as Problem Children." Fisher, who was ex-prisoner of war, claimed, "[while, due allowance should be made by both writers and readers for the mentality engendered by hardship and atrocities,] it remains true that we ex-prisoners have had an opportunity of studying the behavior of the Japanese from an entirely new angle." He then stressed the "inferiority complex" of the Japanese, and asserted, "Childishness has, indeed, often been regarded as a typically Japanese trait. . . . But equally it is misleading to compare them with normal youngsters. Rather, they should be regarded as a nation of problem children, irritable, unstable, and repressed." He also added, "Problem children need careful handling, unstinted patience, and unremitting forgiveness. But they are often exceptionally gifted, and capable of great achievements. And, given the right treatment, they sometimes make good" (Charles Fisher, "The Japanese As Problem Children," *Political Quarterly* 17, 3 [July/Sept. 1946]: 201-13). A year later, an article by Wallace R. Klinger, Dean of Hartwick College (Oneonta, NY), provided a historical explanation of Japanese national character. Though being free from the view that the Japanese were genetically inferior to the Westerners, he made the overgeneralization that the Japanese lacked emotional stability and self-control, arguing that this was due to the fact that Japan historically had lacked impacts from without and contacts with foreign groups, under which emotional control and self-discipline were cultivated. He then contended that the national disorganization following Japan's defeat had produced an opportunity to remake the Japanese (Wallace R. Klinger, "The Character of the Japanese," *Social Studies* 38, 6 [Oct. 1947]: 258-66). On the other hand, some scholars
A mild attitude toward the Japanese people was also expressed in an article in the *New York Times Magazine* right after the termination of the war. Its author, Henry C. Wolfe, thought that the Japanese common man was dangerous not because he was inherently bad but because the state policy-makers "indoctrinated him with mystical militaristic fanaticism." In other words, this author made a distinction between Japanese ordinary people and their wartime militaristic leaders, and chiefly blamed the latter.\footnote{Henry C. Wolfe, "Suzuki-San -- Our Major Problem in Japan," *New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 26, 1945, 5. Wolfe was a writer and lecturer on international relations, especially on European affairs, and a contributor to Harper's, American Mercury, Atlantic Monthly, Current History, Saturday Review of Literature, etc.}

such as John Embree and Fred N. Kerlinger criticized earlier works on Japanese character or personality by such anthropologists as Geoffrey Gorer, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Weston LaBarre, who argued that Japanese personality was neurotic-compulsive and aggressive because of harsh and restrictive child-training, particularly toilet-training, and the peculiarly restrictive and frustrating conditions of Japanese life. Embree criticized them for their overgeneralization about Japanese character, pointing out that in much of the character structure writing about the Japanese there was an ethnocentrism which had fitted in well with the social needs of the war period during which the "scientific" conclusions as to their character had been made. He maintained (though he did not deny that different social groups were characterized by particular culture patterns), "More attention should be given to objective fact when making generalizations about culture patterns" (John Embree, "Standardized Error and Japanese Character: A Note on Political Interpretation," *World Politics* 2, 3 [Apr. 1950]: 439-43). Kerlinger similarly pointed out the serious inadequateness of their data, and emphasized the errors and bias of those wartime psychoanalytical analysis of Japanese personality (Fred N. Kerlinger, "Behavior and Personality in Japan: A Critique of Three Studies of Japanese Personality," *Social Forces* 31, 3 [Mar. 1953]: 250-58).
Similarly an Army nurse in Japan wrote in her article for the *New York Times Magazine* in April 1946 that the Japanese common people were unaware of the true course of the war, and that even then the war news had not reached them with any degree of accuracy.\(^6\)

Somewhat favorable descriptions of certain aspects of the Japanese character or the Japanese life were also provided by the same writers. Wolfe noted some good points about the character of the Japanese people such as personal honesty, diligence, cheerfulness, and cleanliness. However, he also wrote, "He [the Japanese common man] is all the more dangerous because he has come straight out of barbarism into the machine age," and "We will have to be stern with them."\(^6\) These statements, combined with his emphasis on the Japanese common man's "slavish obedience" to authority, suggest the author's implicit perception of the Japanese as a somewhat inferior people. In addition, the Army nurse in Japan introduced above wrote that Japanese children were attractive, that it was "almost impossible not to be drawn to them," and that Japanese women, too, were attractive. Her writing suggests that she was more compassionate to the Japanese people than Wolfe, probably because she had lived

in Japan for some time after the war and had more personal contacts and interactions with them.\textsuperscript{62}

Moreover, an article in the \textit{Saturday Evening Post} of July 27, 1946, in describing the educational reform in Japan, stated as follows: "It is a pleasant surprise to find so many American officers and civilians working so hard to help our enemies to a more decent life."\textsuperscript{63} It also concluded, "If this change and revolution does come, then, in future years, Ikuo [a three-year-old Japanese boy the author met] can say not only that MacArthur is greater than the emperor because he gives him bread but that MacArthur's country has freed him in a thousand ways from the oppressions and restrictions and myths from which all the generations of his family before him have suffered."\textsuperscript{64}

Thus, in this article, America's benevolent role, and sense of mission to teach and help the Japanese, and the nation's pride in doing so were expressed. This attitude seems to reflect America's historic self-image as the torch of democracy and an inspiration to the world. Similarly, an article by Lindesay Parrot in the \textit{New York Times Magazine} in March and another by the Army nurse in Japan in April,

\textsuperscript{62} Schwartz, "Letters from an Army Nurse," 57.
\textsuperscript{63} Noble, "We're Teaching the Children to lead Japan," 52.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 56.
mentioned above, focused on the pleasant relationships between Americans and Japanese kids in Japan.\textsuperscript{65}

The non-revengeful attitude shown by these article was significant. At the same time, these articles with a paternalistic attitude, proclaiming America's superior role and showing confidence in her power, often sound even arrogant, especially to non-American readers. John W. Dower, in the last chapter of his book, \textit{War Without Mercy}, particularly focuses on the abrupt transition of American attitude toward Japan from a merciless racist one to a softer paternalism. This transition is described best by the following statement in an article by Harold Noble: "We need not forgive them, but we can afford the tolerance of great power and victory. It is our spirit that is high."\textsuperscript{66} During the war, America's energy had been concentrated on the imminent need for defeating the dreadful enemies. It seems, however, that her mission was now to build a peaceful world.

At any rate, many articles with a rather softer, paternalistic attitude, as well as those with a very harsh attitude, often emphasized the militaristic and feudalistic character of the Japanese (i.e., the blind obedience to the

\textsuperscript{66}Noble, "What It Takes to Rule Japan," 121.
authority and the lack of independent thinking) and the need to reeducate them.⁶⁷

Some cartoons of the day graphically illustrate the image of Japan as a problem child alien to democratic traditions (See Figure 17); its image as a militaristic nation sorely in need of reeducation (See Figures 16); and the theme of the U.S. role as teacher of democracy (See Figure 18). Others (Figures 19-20) depicted Japan as a weary, sick man. In comparison, Germany during the initial phase was most often depicted as a big but weary man suffering from severe punishment or the heavy burden of reconstruction (See Figures 24-28), and few cartoons projected Germany herself as a child or a baby. At the same time Germany, like Japan, was also perceived, in contrast to the big Allied hands, as a small figure who was demanded repentance (See Figure 29), and needed democratic reeducation (See Figure 30).

Although the existence of the element of racism cannot be denied in the negative images of Japan held by Americans, it seems that the depiction of Japan as a child in U.S. cartoons was not exclusively due to racism, as further pointed out in Chapters IV and VI. Rather, it was also related to the power relationship between the nations,

⁶⁷ E.g., Worden, "The G.I. is Civilizing the Jap"; Wolfe, "Suzuki-San"; "Educators Hope to Make Good Japs of Bad Ones"; Noble, "We're Teaching the Children to Lead Japan"; Morris, "Seventy Million Problem Children."
regardless of their racial differences. Germany, for instance, was depicted as a child or a problem child by some U.S. cartoonists in the second and the third phases of the occupation. Moreover, Figures 31 and 32 indicate that nagging problems in general tended to be symbolized by crying babies.

In addition, there were some, though not many, articles that provided hopeful views about the Japanese people. Articles of this kind described the existence of Japanese people who were willing to learn from and cooperate with Americans and make efforts to democratize Japan. For example, Lindesay Parrott, in his article for the New York Times Magazine in October 1945, remarked, "Perhaps a significant one [indication of what is going on in Japan] is the eagerness, particularly among the educated and liberal, with which the Japanese receive instructions from Americans regarding their future role in international life. . . . The Japanese seem much keener to seek our opinion regarding their future behavior than we are to give it."68 This author also emphasized the good-naturedness of the Japanese people, though admitting the difficulties in carrying out the democratization of Japan.69 A year later (in late 1946), the House Naval Subcommittee touring the Pacific also

68 Parrott, "We Bring a Revolution to the Japanese," 9.
69 For a comprehensive analysis of Japanese people's friendliness to the Americans after the war, see, Henry F. May, Jr., "MacArthur Era, Year One," Harper's 192 (Mar. 1946): 266-73.
unanimously praised the cooperative attitude of the Japanese as well as the "excellence" of the occupation.\(^7\)

Authors in liberal magazines such as the *New Republic* and the *Nation* (e.g., T. A. Bisson, Andrew Roth, Nataniel Peffer) seemed to be different from others introduced above in their conceptions of and stance toward the Japanese. In discussing Japan, they focused on who were oppressive leaders and who could be a democratic force, rather than on any cultural ideas about the people and their national character. On the one hand, they were very distrustful of the Japanese "old oligarchy" and big industrialists who remained in power, and demanded their harsh treatment. And yet, they believed in the existence of "progressive-minded," "liberal," and "anti-militarist" Japanese leaders, and thought they were the Japanese hope. According to the liberals, those Japanese who could form the core of liberal leadership would be found among the middle-level civil bureaucrats, intellectuals, the middle strata of professional and business men, prewar labor leaders, and the former political prisoners, including "democrats, liberals, and leftists who had dared to fight the ruling clique and its ruthless police." These liberal writers stressed the need for encouraging a broad popular democratic movement

embracing those Japanese leaders. While they may not have been free from negative biases about the Japanese, they seemed to recognize at least that the Japanese were human beings like other peoples who deserved to be free from severe oppression.

While a fair number of articles showing a rather paternalistic or mild attitude toward the Japanese, instead of a harsh, punitive attitude, appeared in the mass media, public opinion polls clearly reveal the slow and steady process of the abatement of hostility against Japan among the general public, and the improvement in the public’s perceptions of the Japanese at that time. For example, a NORC survey, published in June 1946, showed that, 54 percent in July 1942, 62 percent in June 1943 and December 1944 and 56 percent in July 1945 said the Japanese "will always want war." A few months later, in November 1945, 49 percent, and only 37 percent in May 1946 said so. Accordingly, while only 13 percent in July 1942, 11 percent in June 1943 and December 1944, and 13 percent in July 1945 said the Japanese were "potential good citizens," 17 percent in November 1945 and 21 percent in May 1946 (almost double the number of

December 1944,) said so. Thus, the number of Americans distrustful of Japanese peaceful intentions steadily decreased after the termination of war and the start of the Allied occupation.\textsuperscript{72} (See Table 2.)

At the same time, the percentage of the people who thought that the Japanese were "too easily misled" rose after the war, as the strong hostility gradually abated. According to the same poll cited above, while 33 percent in July 1942, 27 percent in June 1943 and December 1944, and 31 percent in July 1945 said the Japanese were "too easily misled," 34 percent in November 1945 and 42 percent in May 1946 (15 percent more than in December 1944) gave the same answer.\textsuperscript{73} Coupled with the findings discussed above that showed a less harsh perception of the Japanese by Americans after Japan’s defeat, these survey results suggest that in the postwar days, more American people were making a distinction between Japanese "common men" and Japanese militaristic leaders. In other words, it seems that more Americans began to attribute Japan’s aggressive policy during the war to its militarist leaders rather than its ordinary citizens, and to see the latter as an uninformed,


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. The respondents to this question were asked to choose one of the three answers; the Japanese "will always want war," they "could become good world citizens," or they were "too easily misled."
too easily misled mass, who needed to be taught democratic ways of thinking, but who were not necessarily warlike.

It should be remembered that the negative perceptions of the Japanese were still persistently held by the majority of the Americans in the early postwar days. As noted above, in May 1946 only one fifth (21 percent) replied that the Japanese were "potential good citizens," and 42 percent saw them as being "too easily misled." Thus a sizable segment of the American public was suspicious that the Japanese were susceptible to an aggressive course, depending upon the postwar leadership to emerge.

Table 2.--Public Opinion on War Potential of Japan and Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The People</th>
<th>Will Always Want War</th>
<th>Are Too Easily Misled</th>
<th>Could Become Good World Citizen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;June 1943&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;July 1945&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;November 1945&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;May 1946&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same question was asked about the German people.

The results, shown in Table 2, indicate that Americans
tended to have more negative perceptions of the Japanese than the Germans, though the gap was in the direction of narrowing.74

These figures confirm that the time lag in the termination of wars against Germany and against Japan was not the only factor for the more negative bias against the Japanese at that time. The greater social and cultural distance and the weaker historical ties between the U.S. and Japan than those between the U.S. and Germany account, at least in part, for it.75 In particular, according to Dower, the comparatively poor treatment by the Japanese of their Anglo-American prisoners (though it seems that the Germans treated other peoples even worse than the Japanese treated Anglo-Americans) seems to be an influential factor for the phenomenon.

With respect to the issue of democratizing Japan, commentators basically approved of U.S. policy to democratize Japan, as discussed above. Many, however, continued to express their reservations about the democratic intentions of the Japanese, or Japanese people’s capability to adopt democracy as their way of life quickly. In other words, many observers were reluctant to instantly interpret

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75 The American public was also generous about helping to rebuild Germany’s peacetime industries (72 percent) than Japanese peacetime industries (61 percent) in December 1946. See "Recent Opinion Polls on Occupation of Japan," Mar. 4, 1947, 4, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
Japanese cooperation or docility as evidence of their real internal change to a democratic nation. An article in the Saturday Evening Post in December 1945, for example, stressed the difficulty in teaching democracy to the Japanese. In addition, it asserted, "Nobody can say for sure that Japan is not thinking in terms of a new war and getting ready for it." This theme was well reflected in Figure 21. Summing up the public discussion on U.S. policy toward Japan from mid-January to the beginning of March 1946, the State Department's public opinion survey noted that an increasing number of commentators (e.g., Baltimore Sun, Florida Times-Union, Mark Gayn in PM, San Francisco Chronicle) feared that Japanese "cooperation" might lull Americans into thinking Japan could be democratized "overnight." Those commentators were concerned over the force of the "alluring arguments" for a short occupation provided by Japanese "surface cooperation" and the American desire to "bring the boys home." Some observers (e.g., Roscoe Drummond in the Christian Science Monitor, and Raymond Swing) called for an official U.S. commitment to maintain the occupation for at least 20 years.

In March the publication of the major provisions of the proposed Japanese constitution evoked a wave of public

76 Worden, "The G.I is Civilizing the Jap," 104.
78 Ibid. See also Fortnightly Survey, Mar. 6, 1946, 6, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.
skepticism. While almost all of the considerable number of observers commenting on it applauded the high principles expounded in the document, they (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, Detroit Free Press, Philadelphia Bulletin, Kansas City Star, Scripps-Howard, New York Times, Raymond Swing) felt that its practical realization would require 'long-term Allied occupation. 79 Half a year later, most observers continued to prefer reserving final judgment with respect to the draft constitution while applauding its principles. The Christian Science Monitor, which was often critical of the occupation, maintained its contention that the new constitution was "a bright bauble handed the Diet by American officials." It even asserted, "It has no real roots in Japanese life or thought. It is unlikely to outlast a relatively brief occupation." This cautious attitude, though not so strongly worded as in the Monitor, was also shown by the New Haven Register. 80 In addition, in a series of articles for the Monitor in the summer of 1946, Robert Peel, who had recently returned from a special assignment with the armed forces in Japan, presented to the public a sombre picture of the "many hurdles which bar the path to democracy." According to Peel, (1) The general Japanese concept of democracy is

either "anything that is new," or "doing whatever you want to." (2) There was "little sense of national guilt." The sense of individual moral responsibility so imperfectly developed in "advanced" democracies had hardly began to awaken in Japan. (The Hartford Courant was of the same opinion on this point.) (3) Japanese teachers had no knowledge of the democratic processes which they were now expected to pass on to their pupils. (This was also noted by Harold J. Noble in an article for the Saturday Evening Post.)

Similarly, while a number of observers were heartened by the high percentage of votes cast (approximately 72 percent) as well as the strong turn out of the women at Japan's first postwar election in April 1946, the majority of those commenting warned against any assumption that the Japanese had adopted democracy as their way of life. The consensus held rather that the winning parties were substantially the pre-war groups in new dress, and that this election was only a "milestone" on the long road to democracy. Some leftists (Daily Worker, Mark Gayn in PM, Time and Newsweek termed the election a "climax of an amazing experiment" and "the end of the beginning of Japan's political reeducation." See "Opinion Concerning Japan, April 1946," May 10, 1946, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
Nation) continued to hold that the election was "premature." In August 1946, looking back over the first year of the occupation, many observers such as the New York Times' Lindesay Parrot cautioned that Japan was "still a gamble," with many problems yet unsolved. In December 1946, while conceding that a framework for democracy had been set up, some commentators continued to caution against exaggerating Japanese cooperation. For example, the Wichita Beacon asserted that Japanese courtesy in defeat was "the purest camouflage," and that "the Japanese underground" was "plotting another Pearl Harbor." Conceding that "some notable changes" had "doubtless been made," the Ft. Smith Southwest American warned: "The most vital ones must be in the people's thinking -- and such changes simply don't occur quickly." While these two newspapers were less influential than major papers (e.g., the New York Times, Washington

\[\text{83} \text{Ibid. See also Fortnightly Survey, Apr. 19, 1946, 6-7, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.}
\[\text{84} \text{Lindesay Parrot, "Japan a Year After: Still a \textquoteleft Gamble\textquoteright, \textit{New York Times Magazine}, Aug. 25, 1946, 18, 45, 47-48. See also Fortnightly Survey, Sept. 4, 1946, 5, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59. Regarding reeducation of the Japanese people, the President of the University of Illinois, George D. Stoddard pointed out that "it might not be completed for 20 years or more." Don Bell of MBS thought that it would take more than a generation. Hessell Tiltman also wrote, "The plain fact is that Japan must vastly raise the quality of its legislators if it is to make any brand of democracy live and function. Too many of the present crowd shout democratic slogans but still think and vote according to the old thought processes." See Hessell Tiltman, "Letter from Tokyo -- Learning Democracy," \textit{New Republic} 115 (Aug. 26, 1946): 229-30.\]
Post, Los Angeles Times, St. Louis Post-Dispatch), their opinion, suggest that a sizable segment of other American local newspapers held similar views about Japan. John Rich of ABC in Tokyo and the Tokyo correspondent of the New Republic also warned against the possibility of Japan's aggressive course in the future. At the same time, it should be noted that many observers acknowledged the changes being brought by the U.S. in Japan, though they saw that the process of her democratization had only started, and that its realization would take a long time. Figures 22 and 23 reflected this view.

Thus, Japan was generally perceived by American observers as a student who had just entered the school of democracy, and was still on probation. In the eyes of most American observers, Japan was a recently defeated enemy who still needed to be carefully watched. The discussion on the new role of Japan as America's potential ally, as discussed below, was still largely noncommittal in 1946.

The attitude of the general public on Japan's transformation into a democratic nation seems to have been closely aligned to the media opinions, as indicated by the confidential results of a NORC survey taken in December 1946. It asked, "As you know, the occupation of Japan has been orderly, and the Japanese people have been cooperative.

Some people say this means they have changed their beliefs, and have made a good start toward a new way of life. Other people say the Japanese are only trying to make us think they've changed, and when they can, they'll go back to their old ways. Which would you say?" (Underline in the original question.) 35 percent answered, "They have really changed," 47 percent said, "They will go back to old ways," and 18 percent gave no opinion. Among the college-educated, the answers were 39 percent, 39 percent, and 22 percent respectively.86

As nearly half of the cross-section (47 percent) said the Japanese would go back to old ways, it seems that a substantial segment of the American public in December 1946 still regarded the Japanese with suspicion. At the same time, the above results also show that the strong hostility held by the American public earlier had been by then softened to some extent, for the earlier Fortune survey released on November 30, 1945 had reported that 63 percent of the American public thought Japan would wait for a chance to "try again." It is remarkable that more than a third of those polled thought that the Japanese had really changed.87

86 "Recent Opinion Polls on Occupation of Japan," Mar. 4, 1947, 3. Among high school-educated, the answers were 38 percent, 48 percent and 14 percent respectively, and among grade school-educated, 30 percent, 50 percent, and 20 percent.
87 It should be noted that about one fifth of the respondents hesitated to choose one of the two answers and did not express any opinion. The question was not clear
With respect to the process of the abatement of America’s hostility toward the Japanese, Sheila K. Johnson discusses the effects of John Hersey’s best-seller, *Hiroshima*. Hersey’s book was “a careful reconstruction of the atomic bomb’s explosion and its aftermath as it was experienced by six survivors,” five Japanese men and women and a German Jesuit priest. His account was first serialized by the *New Yorker*, and then published as a book, which was on the *New York Times* best-seller list for five weeks in 1946. A number of newspapers also reproduced the piece. Moreover, on the evenings of September 8–12, 1946, the American Broadcasting Company cancelled its regular 8:30 to 9 p.m. programming and ran a dramatic reading of the book by professional actors and actresses. According to Johnson, Charles Poore, who speculated in his *New York Times* review on the effect Hersey’s book would have on American thought, found that among its readers “there is very little evidence that many believe we should hesitate to use the bomb if anyone ever made aggressive war on us again.” At the same time, Johnson pointed out, “one immediate as well as long-range effect of the book was to elicit American empathy with the Japanese.” Hersey’s book was “the first enough and the notion of the Japanese "old ways" was quite vague.

According to Johnson, the Book-of-the Month Club distributed a hard-bound edition free of charge to its subscribers, and another hard-bound edition was on the best-seller list for a month.
postwar book that restored to Americans their sense of the Japanese as human beings rather than 'the enemy.' " Johnson argued,

In the wake of this individuation -- the awareness that Japanese had families, jobs, homes, ambitions -- there of course came feelings of American guilt; there is an enormous difference between dropping a bomb on an enemy target and dropping a bomb on Miss Toshiko Sasaki, Dr. Masakazu Fujii, and their friends.89

Thus it seems that Hersey's Hiroshima encouraged the process of modifying irrational wartime stereotypes about Japan.

Appraisal of U.S. Occupation Policy and Achievements in Japan

While many observers expressed skepticism about the quick change of Japan into a democratic nation and were aware of her unsolved problems, public comment on the U.S. occupation policies for Japan continued to be primarily favorable after the publication of the policy directives (SWNCC 150/5) in late September 1945, receiving much less criticism than those for Germany.90 U.S. moves in decreeing civil liberties, taking control of Japanese banks, breaking up the Zaibatsu, abolishing pre-war political societies, and banning all ultranationalists from public office, for instance, were warmly applauded.

89 Ibid., 45.
Especially in August and September 1946, considerable praise came from editorial and Congressional sources for the accomplishments achieved by General MacArthur and his staff during the first year of the occupation. A number of commentators contrasted the efficiency of "exclusive American control" with the "four-power confusion" existing in Germany.91 In November and December 1946, applause for the "excellent" progress of the Japanese occupation came from Congressional representatives touring the Orient and from a number of other commentators who contrasted the "inexpensiveness" of General MacArthur's occupation with the "high costs" of the German program.92

As shown by the results of the public opinion polls cited above, American public opinion of occupation policy

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closely followed that of press and radio opinion in late 1945. Moreover, according to a AIPO survey conducted in mid-May 1946, a large majority approved of the way the American occupation of Japan was handled. When asked, "Do you think we have done a good job or a poor job in handling our occupation of Japan?" 60 percent said "good," 15 percent said "fair" (thus the total of 75 percent approving), while 4 percent thought it was "poor" and 21 percent gave no opinion. A NORC poll taken in February 1946 showed similar results: 69 percent thought that the U.S. had made a good start in the job of turning Japan into a peaceful nation, 12 percent thought it was not doing a particularly good job, but so far they had not made any serious mistakes, while 4 percent thought that the U.S. was doing a bad job in Japan, and 15 percent did not know. It is noteworthy, however, that while 69 percent thought the U.S. had made a good start in the job of turning Japan to a peaceful nation, almost at the same time (December 1945), according to an unpublished survey, only 45 percent claimed to have an understanding of U.S.-Japanese policy. Thus, these figures suggest that some respondents answered the question

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95 "Opinion Concerning U.S. Policy on Japan," Mar. 11, 1946, 5. At the same time, more of the American people professed to have an understanding of U.S.-Japanese policy than of U.S. policy toward Germany (38 percent), Russia (37 percent), or Argentina (30 percent).
above on the basis of their general impression rather than any knowledge about the Japanese occupation.

In contrast to this increasing degree of public approval of the policy toward Japan, the opinion polls on the degree of the American public's approval of German occupation showed a different trend. According to a confidential poll taken by AIPO in the first week of September 1945, 43 percent said the treatment of the Germans was "about right," while 49 percent thought it was "not hard enough," 1 percent said "Too hard," and 7 percent were undecided.96 A month later, a similar trend continued.97 On the other hand, the Fortune survey released in November reported that 60.1 percent said U.S. occupation policy in Germany was "about right," while 26.9 percent said "Not tough enough," 1 percent "Too tough," and 12.0 percent did not know.98 A month later it reported that 60.7 percent were "well satisfied with it, while 24.3 percent were "not

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97Ibid., Oct. 19, 1945, 2. In fact, the percentage of those who thought U.S. treatment of Germany was "about right" decreased to 40 percent, while 52 percent saying it was "not hard enough, according to the Fortnightly Survey. This poll, taken in early October, was released by AIPO on November 19, 1945, but the figures published by AIPO were slightly different from those shown in the Fortnightly Survey. According to the AIPO release, 37 percent said "About right," while 50 percent thought it was "not tough enough," 2 percent said "Too tough," and 11 percent were undecided. See Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Winter 1945-46): 534.
satisfied," and 15.0 percent did not know. Thus, though there was a big gap between the results of the AIPO September and October polls and those of the Fortune survey in November, the two Fortune surveys released in November and December show that the American public's approval of German occupation remained at almost the same level in late 1945. As a result, at the end of 1945, it seems that Americans were more satisfied with the way U.S. occupation was going in Japan than in Germany.

Public Opinion in mid-1946 also held that the occupation of Japan was more successful than that of Germany. When asked by the AIPO in May 1946, "Do you think we have done a good job or a poor job in handling our occupation of Germany?" Only 31 percent said "good," 24 percent said "fair," 21 percent said "poor," and 24 percent gave no opinion (a total approval rate of only 55 percent), in contrast to 60 percent, 15 percent, 4 percent, and 21 percent respectively, regarding the Japanese occupation. People were most inclined to like about American job in Japan the "excellent" leadership of MacArthur. By far the largest number of comments in response to the opinion survey dealt with MacArthur and his personal leadership. The great personal popularity of General MacArthur among the American

public is evidenced by the results of the Gallup poll. Also mentioned were the lack of trouble in Japan, successful efforts at introducing democracy (for example, the enfranchisement of women), and the success of a unified command as opposed to the division of Germany into four occupation zones.

This popularity of MacArthur in the eyes of the general public was matched by the media and leadership opinions. In the mass media, successful handling of the Japanese occupation was often attributed to General MacArthur himself. In early 1946 strong approval of his efficient administration was expressed both by his supporters and by those critics who had admonished him for stepping out of his military role, and considerable praise was forthcoming for his decision to make the best of what he considered an unsatisfactory situation. In April 1946 a wave of praise for his "genius in peace as well as in war" was stirred up by his speech before the Allied Council for Japan. In mid-1946 his "masterful" administration of Japan continued

101 AIPO, June 16, 1946, box 17, RG 10, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.
103 "U.S. Opinion Concerning Policy Toward Japan, January 3-17, 1946," 1. For instance, a Life editorial in February 1946, though pointing out the lack of a long-range economic policy in Japan, affirmed, "All in all, the American occupation of Japan has so far been something to be proud of, and MacArthur deserves the highest credit for it." See "U.S. in Japan," 32.
to be a subject of great satisfaction to observers, while some criticism was leveled at the general's military advisers. The September 5 issue of the State Department's opinion survey on the occupation policy in the Far East noted that "unrestrained praise" had been accorded the general for his administration, though commentators had also soberly weighed the achievements of the first year of the occupation against the tasks remaining. In late 1946 Noel F. Busch, in his "Report on Japan" for Life magazine, acclaimed the "great success" of the occupation of Japan which he attributed to MacArthur's wisdom in utilizing the Japanese reaction to surrender "to the utmost." The New York Herald Tribune published a letter from the Right Reverend Patrick J. Byrne (a Maryknoll missionary who had been in Japan from 1934 to 1946) rebuking Robert Cochrane (Baltimore Sun correspondent) for his "astonishing conclusion" that General MacArthur had "made a mess of Japan." Byrne urged: "All we need to do is leave Gen. MacArthur alone. He is doing a magnificent job in administration." This point of view was echoed by William Henry Chamberlain and Cedric Foster (MBS). The Jackson (Mississippi) Daily News applauded the general for bringing

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to Japan "greater skill, firmness, determination and wisdom than Europe" had "experienced." 107

Regarding this trend of favorable public comment on the U.S. occupation of Japan, the State Department’s public opinion survey pointed out in June 1946 that comment on SCAP directives during the occupation had failed to draw a distinction between those reforms which still existed "on paper" and those which had been, or were being, effectuated." It also indicated that MacArthur’s statements and monthly reports as played up in the press had emphasized the bright side of the picture. Therefore, the survey concluded, the general public was in danger of assuming that the social, economic and political rebuilding of Japan was progressing more rapidly and with far less difficulty than had been anticipated. 108

However, this overall trend did not mean that commentators were not aware of the many problems yet to be solved in Japan. As discussed above, many observers continued to express occasional skepticism about the assumption that the Japanese could be democratized overnight, while alleging that a good start had been made in the transformation of Japan. Informed commentators,

108 "Public Opinion on U.S. Occupation Policy in Japan," June 26, 1946, 1. This survey also noted that the "exceptionally favorable" comment on U.S. administration in Japan might "account for a certain careless assurance on the part of the man in the street that all was going well and he needed not concern himself too much with the situation."
including moderates and liberals, were vexed by problems such as: the slow progress being made in reeducation, with emphasis on the shortage of eligible teachers and lack of appropriate books (e.g., Gordon Walker and Robert Peel in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Walter Simmons in the *Chicago Tribune*); how to encourage liberal democracy in Japan without encouraging, or at least permitting, the growth of more leftist opinions including communism (e.g., Owen Lattimore in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, the *New York Herald*, Audrey Menefee in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Burton Crane of the *New York Times*); the long delay in setting the problem of reparations (e.g., Neal Stanford in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Lindesay Parrot of the *New York Times*, Elmer Peterson of NBC, *Atlantic Report*, Edgar Snow in the *Saturday Evening Post*); how to assure the proper absorption of the democratic-styled constitution as an integral part of the Japanese people's political thinking (see the section 1. above); the persistent use of "moderates" in domestic affairs who were as guilty in Japanese eyes as those on trial (e.g., the *New Republic*, *Nation*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Baltimore Sun*); shortcomings about land reform (e.g., Gordon Walker, Ray Cromley of the *Wall Street Journal*, *Des Moines Register*); and the dissolution of the Zaibatsu (e.g., Margaret Parton
in the *New York Herald Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*,
Corwin Edwards in the *Pacific Affairs*).\(^9\)

Some of these commentators presented sharp criticisms of the way the Japanese occupation was handled. For instance, Margaret Parton in the *New York Herald Tribune* critically reported in August 1946 that there seemed to be "a growing tendency" to listen to the voices of Japanese industrialists who lobbied daily in the offices of Allied Headquarters buildings.\(^10\) A liberal and explicitly political-oriented magazine, the *New Republic* also carried an article in August 1946 which reported, "[Among the members of the occupation force] there is a growing tendency to deal gently with the forces of privilege."\(^11\) Moreover, the State Department's opinion survey for October 1946 noted that an impressive number of "liberals" and "internationalists" (*Amerasia*, *Nation*, Laurence K. Rosinger in *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, *Boston Globe*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, Joseph Harsch, Gordon Walker, Robert Cochrane of the *Baltimore Sun*, *St. Louis Star-Times*) had raised alarmed voices over what they perceived to be a "sharp change" in U.S. policy -- from


"passive tolerance to active support" of the "ultra-conservative" Japanese government (headed by Prime Minister Yoshida), and a general "modification" of the methods of enforcing directives such as those on the Zaibatsu dissolution and agrarian reform. For example, the Monitor warned: "The American people may soon be subjected to an intensive propaganda campaign to convince them that Japanese 'reactionaries' are their friends . . . The American people should demand the facts as to where their Far Eastern policy is leading them." Similarly, Laurence K. Rosinger felt that the "underlying realities of the Japanese problem" had been "obscured for American readers by constant newspaper stress on the adoption of reforms and by the steady stream of optimistic statements from SCAP headquarters."112

The assertion by George Atcheson, Jr., political advisor for the State Department in Tokyo and American representative to the Allied Council for Japan, that Japanese aims had become "virtually identical with Allied aims" also stimulated discussion along the lines of criticism shown above. And some commentators (New York Herald Tribune, Nation, Robert Cochrane) interpreted Atcheson's assertion as proof that the U.S. was learning too far to the Right in its attempt to build a "buffer" against

Russia. On the other hand, several editors (e.g., Oakland Tribune, New Haven Register) reassured by official denials that U.S. policy had undergone any change, saw "no reason to withhold approbation of the Japanese" if they were cooperating.

Furthermore, in November several editors (e.g., Columbia State, Birmingham Age-Herald, Sacramento Bee) questioned, after quoting at length from Rosinger's observations noted above, whether democratic developments in Japan had been exaggerated by SCAP reports. They concluded that progress toward democracy had also been more "limited" than commonly believed.

Despite this criticism of SCAP and the awareness by many observers of unsolved problems in Japan, U.S. media coverage of the Japanese occupation in the initial period was primarily favorable. The majority of the general public also continued to be satisfied with the progress of the occupation. Near the end of the first phase, according to a survey taken by the NORC in December 1946, 79 percent showed satisfaction about "disarming Japan and keeping her disarmed," 69 percent about "punishing the war criminals in Japan," 69 percent about "putting the Japanese militarists out of important jobs in government and private business,"

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113 Ibid., 3. See also Fortnightly Survey, Nov. 5, 1946, 7.
114 Ibid.
and 73 percent about "reeducating the Japanese people for democratic government." A sizable number, however, had no opinion on these specific questions - ranging from 15 percent to 24 percent. Some of those who did reply may also have had little understanding about these specific phases of the occupation program.\textsuperscript{116}

It is certainly conceivable that this favorable appraisal of the occupation policy and the achievements by American observers and the general public was at least partly due to MacArthur's own personal popularity, which then contributed to the improvement of American perceptions of the Japanese. It seems that the recognition of the occupation as being successful in remaking Japan led to the notion of an improved Japan.

Besides the lack of trouble in Japan in comparison to the "four-power confusion" in Germany and the popularity of MacArthur due to his wartime achievements, MacArthur's successful public relations contributed significantly to the primarily favorable coverage of the Japanese occupation in the American media.\textsuperscript{117} Letters written to MacArthur from important American journalists such as Roy Howard, President

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 2. See also Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Summer 1950): 379. This poll was released on March 15, 1950.

of Scripps-Howard Newspapers,\textsuperscript{118} Dennis McEvoy, General Manager for the newly founded Japanese edition of the Reader's Digest, evidence their support for MacArthur.\textsuperscript{119}

**Concern with Communist Influence in Japan and Discussion of Japan's New Role as a Bulwark against Russia**

The tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the postwar period was reflected in the public comment on occupation policy toward Japan and discussion about Japan's role in the postwar world. The impact of the Cold War on American attitudes toward Japan became more and more evident as the occupation proceeded, but in the initial phase there were not yet any major actual conflicts between the U.S. and

\textsuperscript{118} According to Theodore Cohen, Howard was "perhaps the most powerful press lord in America" at that time. Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 117.

\textsuperscript{119} These letters are kept at the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, VA. Later during the occupation, letters written from other prominent American journalists such as Frank Gannett, President of the Gannett Newspapers, Carroll Binder, editorial editor of the Minneapolis Morning Tribune and Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, R. E. Berlin, a staff member of the Hearst Corporation's President's office, Frank M. Folsom, and President of Radio Corporation of America also showed their support for General MacArthur. See Roy Howard to MacArthur, Oct. 12, 1945, Apr. 14, 1947, Aug. 23, 1948, Jan. 11, 1949, Aug. 25, 1950, Dec. 5, 1950, Jan. 22, 1951 (all in box 28, RG 5), July 2, 1947, July 7, 1947 (all in box 13, RG 10); MacArthur to Roy Howard, Apr. 24, 1947, Jan. 14, 1949, Aug. 21, 1950, Dec. 20, 1950, Feb. 1, 1951 (all in box 28, RG 5); Dennis McEvoy to General Frayne Baker (Public Relations Officer, GHQ, SCAP), Aug. 29, 1946 (box 12, RG 10); Carroll Binder to MacArthur, Mar. 13, 1947 (box 13, RG 10); R. E. Berlin to MacArthur, Apr. 10, 1947 (box 13, RG 10); MacArthur to William R. Hearst, Mar. 24, 1947 (box 27, RG 5); Frank Gannett to MacArthur, Jan. 5, 1948, June, 12, 1951 (box 23, RG 5); MacArthur to Frank Gannett, Jan. 14, 1948 (box 23, RG 5); Frank M. Folsom to MacArthur, Oct. 6, 1949 (box 37, RG 10). All the Record Groups (RG) noted here are located at the MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.
the U.S.S.R. over Asian matters that were discussed in the American mass media.

In the early days of the occupation, influential commentators hoped for Russian participation in a supervisory council for Japan, though most of them insisted on a decisive voice for the U.S. In October 1945 there was growing uneasiness among influential commentators concerning the exclusive character of U.S. occupation policy, particularly as it affected Russia. Attention was focused on the issue of whether the U.S. was strengthening the principle of equal control among the Allies by "insisting on it in Eastern Europe and denying it in Japan." A number of observers including "liberals" and "moderates" (e.g., Representative Mundt, Reston in the New York Times, Birmingham Age-Herald, Christian Science Monitor, Chicago Sun, Union of Democratic Action, Walter Lippmann, Raymond Swing, John Vandercook, Sumner Welles) expressed concern at the "unilateral, nationalistic" policy of the U.S., citing it as a major source of the troubled U.S.-Russian relationship. In early November many commentators (e.g., New York Herald Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Cincinnati Enquirer) also stressed the necessity for Russian cooperation in a supervisory council. Most of those commenting, however, continued to demand U.S. predominance

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120 Fortnightly Survey, Oct. 19, 1945, 2; Ibid., Nov. 5, 1945, 2.
under any control plan for Japan. Even "liberal" voices such as the *Nation* favored "wide discretion" for the American council member.  

Moreover, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' announcement of November 14, 1945 that Russia was insisting upon a control council for Japan on the Berlin model aroused considerable comment from editors deploring the present stalemate. A large majority agreed with the secretary that the ineffectiveness of unanimous rule in Germany precluded its application to a council for Japan, and reiterated the contention that MacArthur's authority must not be impeded (though several observers expressed "sympathy with Russia's interest in the imposition of peace condition.")  

It seems that there was a corresponding tendency among the general public on this issue of Allied control. In October 1945, when asked the broad question, "Do you think we should let England, France and Russia take an active part in helping to settle problems in the Pacific or should these problems be left up to us?," 46 percent took the former position, while 49 percent took the latter, and 5 percent gave no opinion. Thus, nearly half of the public seemed to favor some sort of the Allied "cooperation" in the Pacific, rather than a unilateral policy.  

\[121\] Ibid., Nov. 19, 1945, 6, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.  
\[122\] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1945, 5, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.  
\[123\] "U.S. Opinion, Recent Opinion Polls on Occupation of Japan," Mar. 4, 1947, 1. The similar results were obtained
asked the more specific question of whether to favor "rule" by an international council rather than continuation of the U.S. "rule" in Japan, only 27 percent in November 1945 favored the former. As the State Department survey noted, this trend had been affected by the difficulties encountered in the four-power administration of Germany.124

In December 1945, at the Moscow Conference, the Soviets accepted Secretary of State Byrnes' offer to join a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington and a smaller Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) in Tokyo. General MacArthur, however, remained the top authority in Japan, and Russia's role in these commissions was in fact nominal. According to a State Department's opinion survey in January 1946, approval for the Allied control arrangement for Japan mounted steadily (as expressed by the Chicago Times, Christian Science Monitor, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Des Moines Register, Nation, New Republic, Springfield Republican, L. K. Rosinger in Foreign Policy Bulletin, and Sumner Welles), though bitter criticism continued to be expressed by those who interpreted the arrangement as curbing General MacArthur's authority (Hearst press, Oklahoman Cincinnati Times-Star, Portland Oregonian).125 In

in July 1946, when 44 percent thought the U.S. should let others take part, 46 percent thought the problems should be left up to the U.S., and 10 percent gave no opinion. 124 Ibid.

125 "U.S. Opinion Concerning Policy Toward Japan, January 3-17, 1946," 1. Sumner Welles served as Assistant
early 1946, regarding the Allied Control Council,
commentators for the most part (e.g., Scripps-Howard,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Omaha World-Herald, Reno Gazette, San
Francisco Chronicle, Chicago Tribune and News) continued to
be extremely resentful of any attempt by the Soviets to
"interfere" with General MacArthur's administration, while
several observers (e.g., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, New York
Herald Tribune) held that MacArthur should not be "immune"
from questions and sharply reprimanded both MacArthur and
his deputy for "uncalled-for rudeness" at the Council
meetings.\textsuperscript{126}

In sum, in the early days of the occupation the
majority of press and radio commentators favored U.S.
"dominance" in the occupation of Japan at the same time that
many articulate and influential observers felt uneasy about
America's exclusive control of Japan and favored Russian
cooperation in the Allied Council for Japan. There were
different opinions as to how much Russian participation they
wanted.

After mid-1946, communist activities in Japan and
Russia's intentions toward that nation were a major source
of concern for American observers of the Japanese
occupation. The State Department's public opinion survey

\textsuperscript{126} Fortnightly Survey, May 3, 1946, 5, box 11, OPOS
Records, RG 59.
noted that the expanding role of communism in Japan dominated public discussion on Japan during May 1946, as Japanese unions led mass demonstrations in Tokyo and other large cities in April and May. Following Atcheson's statement before the Allied Council that "the U.S. does not favor communism in the U.S. or Japan," and the State Department's endorsement of it, many observers (e.g., Dallas News, New York Times, Montana Tribune, Washington Post, Watertown (New York) Times, Portland (Maine) Press Herald) expressed their unqualified approval of the government's "firm stand" on the subject. Some observers (San Francisco Chronicle, New York Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Morgan Geatty, NBC, Martin Agronsky, ABC), on the other hand, warned that the verbal clashes between Atcheson and General Derevyanko, the Soviet representative to the Allied Council, were "widening the ideological cleavage" between the U.S. and Russia.127

In June and July, observers such as Owen Lattimore in writing for the Louisville Courier-Journal, the New York Herald Tribune, Burton Crane of the New York Times and Max Hill of NBC expressed their concern over "how to encourage liberal democracy without encouraging -- or at least permitting -- the growth of more leftist opinions and movements, including Communism," and the flow of Soviet

propaganda into Japan. The New York Herald Tribune asserted that "mere denunciation of Communists in the Far East" was "a futile means of trying to prevent the growth of Red strength in that area," but had no suggestion to offer other than that MacArthur "encourage the development of a Japanese democracy" that would be "attractive to the Japanese people."

In addition, Edgar Snow, in his article for the Saturday Evening Post, asserted, "It is likely, in my opinion, that a left-wing coalition of Socialists and Communists will come to power in Japan within the five-year period our armed occupation is expected to last. If that happens, the United States Government, still loyal to capitalist doctrine, would find itself responsible for the behavior of a ward adhering to Marxism." He advocated "a set of integrated agricultural and industrial reforms" to prevent that danger, and also warned that while the Emperor system existed, the possibility of counter-revolution also did. Thus, in less than a year after the termination of the war, American observers were troubled by the problem of containing Japanese communist influence while promoting America's initial purpose of demilitarizing and

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129 Snow, "Is Japan Drifting Toward Socialism?" 129-30. At the same time, he admitted that it was doubtful if there had been a practicable alternative to retention of the emperor, up till then.
democratizing Japan to prevent her from becoming a menace to U.S. security and world peace again.

In September, following General MacArthur's statement on the anniversary of the Japanese surrender, most observers (Buffalo News, Green Bay Press Gazette, Hearst and Scripps-Howard press, Houston Chronicle, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader-News, Indianapolis Star, Cleveland Plain Dealer) were inclined to agree that the general was on firm ground when he warned of the danger of "some conflicting ideology which might negate individual freedom, destroy individual dignity." They declared that it was America's responsibility to encourage MacArthur's "great middle course of moderate democracy." A few, however, discounted the dangerous aspects of MacArthur's stand. For instance, the liberal reporter Mark Gayn (for the Chicago Sun and PM) contended, "MacArthur has simply been a hop and a step ahead of the great U.S. swing to the right." The Washington Post, after a study of the general's remarks and "of the even more unintentionally alarming observations of" the Congressional delegation which toured the Pacific, argued, "It is hard to see how this sort of talk can inspire confidence in the U.S. abroad or how it can contribute to our diplomatic efforts toward working out rational solutions of differences between

ourselves and Russia." In other words, the Post lamented that the outright condemnation of Russia and communism would only deepen the cleavage between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

As the spread of communist influence became a major source of concern for American observers and as the situation in China deteriorated in mid-1946, there was a corresponding increase in public statements describing Japan's role as a "buffer" for democracy in the Orient and, consequently, "a tendency now to permit a greater measure of Japanese industry to be restored." The State Department's opinion survey covering August 1946 reported that the earlier focus on communist activities in Japan had been diverted to a new theme -- Japan's role as a Far Eastern bulwark against Russia. In other words, in reviewing the first year of the occupation, a number of observers (e.g., Raymond Swing of ABC, Harold Noble in the Saturday Evening Post, Newsweek, Darrell Berrigan in the New York Post, World Report, Elmer Peterson of NBC, U.S. News, Gordon Walker, Robert Peel, Joseph C. Harsch, the Christian Science Monitor, and J. Alvarez del Vayo in Nation) discussed the "significant development" in U.S. policy -- i.e., the increasing tendency to be "conciliatory" toward

Japan for the purpose of building her up as a "buffer" or "ally" against Russia. 133

However, at this point, comparatively few observers took a stand on this issue, and those who took a stand disliked any such development. Some of them were concerned about the prospect of America's conciliatory treatment of those Japanese elements responsible for the war in its effort to build up Japan as its ally. For example, Gordon Walker of the Monitor wrote,

Somewhere along the line, U.S. international policy entered the picture. Japan, instead of being the object of American war aim, suddenly became something of a puppet of the U.S. in the growing struggle of world politics. SCAP was torn between two desires: one, to erase the remnants of Japan's prewar conservatism; the other, to prevent Japan from sweeping leftward and thereby possibly falling eventually under the orbit of Russian influence in the Far East. 134

Robert Peel of the Monitor also questioned,

Does the U.S. want to collaborate with an unregenerate element of aggressive feudal thinking ready at the first opportunity to poison the wellspring of understanding between nations? Or does the U.S. genuinely desire to see democracy take root and to guarantee the tutelage and the minimum economic basis which can alone assure its existence there? 135

133 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea -- August," Sept. 5, 1946. The terms, "buffer" and "bulwark" have different connotations -- the former more passive, and the latter more active. However, it seems that they were often used by observers interchangeably in discussing the communist tide.

134 Ibid., 1.

135 Ibid. The Nation showed a similar concern. See Ibid., 3.
These writers were distrustful of the Japanese conservative leaders.

Others displayed rather a general emotional reluctance to treat a defeated enemy as an ally. For instance, *Newsweek* briefly declared, "The idea of using a defeated enemy as a bulwark against a current ally, but possible future menace, was not one that appealed to the American nature." An ABC commentator, Raymond Swing, also commented, "We would end up backing the nation we despised most in all our history, having failed to keep the friendship of the nation we have most liked of Eastern peoples -- the Chinese." Thus, in mid-1946, while American observers did not favor communism in Japan, some influential observers were reluctant to support rebuilding Japan as a future ally of the U.S., and the discussion of this new role for Japan was still largely noncommittal.

In late 1946 the concern over a "Red menace" in Japan, namely, communist activities and the operations of the Soviet mission in Japan, was again evinced by some observers such as the *Houston Post*, the *Dallas News*, James Monahan (formerly on the staffs of *Cosmopolitan* and *Time*) in the *New Leader*, and Harold J. Noble in the *Saturday Evening Post*. The first two newspapers now suggested that the U.S.

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136 Ibid., 2
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid. See also *Fortnightly Survey*, Sept. 4, 1946, 5.
formulate new plans for Japan as well as for Germany to counteract communism there. Noble even asserted that the Japanese communists had the complete backing of Russia, while none of the other parties had the active backing of the Americans, and argued that the U.S. must help Japan get back into world trade with the manufacture and exchange of goods in order to prevent unemployment, hunger and "a dangerous mixture of nationalism and communism." He warned, "A Communist Japan would be another segment in the Soviet Empire."\(^\text{139}\)

At the same time, the possibility that occupation "alterations" had been slowed for the higher priority job of maintaining a bulwark against Russia continued to be a bone of contention.\(^\text{140}\) As noted above, a number of "liberals" and "internationalists" complained that the U.S. was leaning too far to the Right and actively supporting the Japanese "ultra-conservative" or "reactionaries."\(^\text{141}\)

\(^{140}\) Fortnightly Survey, Dec. 29, 1946, 5, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.
\(^{141}\) Ibid., Nov. 5, 1946. For example, Mark Gayn criticized, "The Big Story from Tokyo today is the story of how Japan has become a United State bastion in the struggle between the western powers and their Russian antagonist, and how, in the process, we have junked or sharply altered the goals and methods we published a year ago." See Mark Gayn, "Japan: Bastion for World War III?" Forum 106 (Oct. 1946): 329. Harold Strauss, who gathered information as a member of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP, noted the change of occupation policy since May 1946, and deplored "the degradation of occupation policy." See Harold
As to the Allied control of Japan, the American people remained predominantly in favor of keeping a dominant role for the U.S. in late 1946. NORC asked the following, "As you know, the U.S. now has the most to say about running Japan. Do you think we should let England, China and Russia have more to say in the occupation of Japan, or should we keep the same authority we have now?" To this question, 86 percent favored the latter policy, while only 8 percent favored the former, and 6 percent did not give an opinion.\textsuperscript{142}

**Discussion on Restoring Japan's Economy**

What discussions did American commentators and public figures have as to Japan's economy? Were they in favor of restoring it, or not? If they were, to what extent? What was the trend among the general public?

Paragraph XI of the Potsdam Declaration stated, "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war."\textsuperscript{143} Along this line, the State Department's "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC 150/4), made public on September 22, 1945, stated, "The

\begin{footnotes}
\item[144] "The Potsdam Declaration," reprinted in Appendix 3, Feis, \textit{Contest over Japan}.
\end{footnotes}
Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met." At the same time it declared, "The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living."

For the most part, public sentiment supported these policy statements. According to the confidential results of a survey in late September 1945, almost three quarters of the American public (78 percent) then believed that "the Japanese should be allowed to rebuild their peacetime industries" (underline mine). Only 17 percent said they should not be allowed to rebuild these industries, with 8 percent expressing no opinion. Thus, while the majority

144 Ibid., 168.
145 Martin, Allied Occupation, 93. "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan" (JCS 1380/15), a more detailed directive, which was made public only in 1948, also approved of making possible "the eventual readmission of Japan to the ranks of peaceful trading nations," and stated, "It is not the policy of the United States to prevent the eventual achievement by Japanese working effort and resources of conditions of living in Japan consistent with objects." At the same time it noted that SCAP would "not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. See Martin, Allied Occupation, 134-35.
of Americans at that time blamed the Japanese people for their cruelties during the war, and thought Japan would wait for a chance to try again, they also thought they could allow her to rebuild peacetime industry. It should be noted, however, that the question was asked without mention of "U.S. help" needed to rebuild it.

In the beginning of 1946, the critical food situation in Japan, reported by General MacArthur on January 2, aroused the concern of several observers who feared it might seriously impair the achievement of U.S. occupation objectives, namely, democratization. Those observers (Cincinnati Enquirer, Buffalo Courier-Express, Audrey Menefee in the Washington Post) urged that the U.S. ship surplus food stuffs immediately to offset the threatening famine. In March, Fortune editor John Galbraith also took a sympathetic attitude toward Japan's food problem.

147 "U.S. Opinion Concerning Policy Toward Japan, January 3-17, 1946," 3. Along this line, an article in the November 4, 1945 issue of the New York Times Magazine had also expressed a concern with the effect of food shortage on the Japanese average man's political orientation, since in Jones' view, he tended to think about political systems in terms of what system would "bring in more food and better shelter." See George E. Jones, "Suzuki San Learns the Meaning of Defeat," New York Times Magazine, Nov. 4, 1945, 9, 41.

148 "U.S. Opinion, March 1946," Apr. 9, 1946, 3. A few months before (September 1945), according to a confidential survey noted above, the majority (55 percent) of the American public had felt that they should help feed the Japanese during the next year, but this reply came out only upon condition that they should "get to the point of starvation." See "Opinion Concerning U.S. Policy on Japan," Mar. 11, 1946, 3.
On the other hand, in March some liberal observers (Owen Lattimore, Mark Gayn, New York Herald Tribune, George Thomas Folster) expressed more cynicism than concern over Japan's food problems, suspecting the Japanese of "playing politics" in this regard. For example, Lattimore, in a series of articles for the Louisville Courier Journal asserted that "the old gang" in Japan hoped for an eventual comeback as the most powerful trading and manufacturing nation of East Asia. He wrote, "They [the old gang] want to 'prove' that Japan cannot feed itself and that she must import the largest possible quantities of industrial raw materials to manufacture the largest possible line of export goods in order to buy food." Gayn in PM cited Japanese "inaccurate prediction[s]" and "false rumors" about starvation. 149

The divergence of these commentators on food relief can further be seen in their analyses of Japan's industrial potentialities. Several observers [Cincinnati Enquirer, Times-Star, Galbraith of Fortune, the Baltimore News Post (Hearst press), Philadelphia Bulletin and Human Events] alleged the devastated state of Japan's industrial plant, and favored repair of "civilian industry" (especially the textile industry) commending General MacArthur's "wise" provision for the rehabilitation of Japanese industry at about one-fourth of its prewar capacity. A Life editorial

149 Ibid.
in February 1946 also stressed the need for a long-range economic policy for Japan so that the occupier could "bring in the materials to start the manufacturing [in Japan] and thus alleviate the distress, unemployment and inertia now inflicted on all the East [thereby keeping this region in peace]."\textsuperscript{150} On the other hand, warning against "being misled into contemptuous underestimation of Japan's comeback potential," Lattimore averred that Japan's industrial economy could be "cut back to the grass roots and still the Japanese could in a few years make enough of a comeback to dominate the industry and trade of a large part of Asia. He thought that Japan still had a "great surplus of machinery and plants built up by the war industry."\textsuperscript{151}

Regarding Japan's textile industry, James R. Young in the \textit{Louisville Courier-Journal} disapproved of the plan to supply on credit to Japan 200,000 bales of cotton a month, fearing that the expansion of Japanese textile production and exports would threaten the sale of American textiles. In a similar vein, the President of the Textile Export Association advocated encouraging the hand-loom industry in Japan to supply "all local Japanese needs" and turning over

\textsuperscript{150} "U.S. in Japan," 32.
\textsuperscript{151} "Opinion Concerning U.S. Policy on Japan," Mar. 11, 1946, 3-4; "U.S. Opinion Concerning Policy Toward Japan, January 3-17, 1946," 3. Lattimore urged the allocation of Japan's "great surplus of machinery and plants built up by the war industry and never used for the peaceful needs of the Japanese people" to her Asiatic neighbors, to prevent Japan from becoming "a time-bomb set to go off 20 or 25 years from now."
"most of all the other spinning and weaving equipment" to China.152

Thus, opinion was divided in early 1946 with respect to whether or not the U.S. should help Japan recover light industry. The main body of public opinion in this regard is not clear. However, as reported in June by the State Department's opinion survey, current editorial opinion as of mid-1946 was substantially in favor of a policy which would hasten the restoration of the Japanese economy to a productive level (see the Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, New York Herald Tribune, Philadelphia Bulletin, Nashville Tennessean, Louisville Courier-Journal, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette).153 Earlier, in April, Sen. James Eastland (D., Mississippi) and Kermit Eby, Director of CIO's Education and Research Department and member of the U.S. Education Mission, had also asserted that educational reforms and the democratization of Japan were dependent upon that country's economic development. "We must permit prosperity, high living standards - if the Japanese can earn them - and freedom to work and prosper," Eastland declared. Eby warned, "If democracy becomes associated with hunger, with collapse, with mass unemployment, there will be no possibility of the 'word becoming flesh'."154 In other

words, the restoration of Japanese economy was advocated by these observers to promote Japan’s democratic development.\textsuperscript{155} It should be noted, however, that the majority opinion favored strict demilitarization of Japan and wanted to allow her only \textit{limited} production at that time.

Lindesay Parrott, in his article for the \textit{New York Times Magazine} in August 1946, expressed a similar view. Parrott, after describing the bad economic situation in Japan, wrote, "The physical well-being of Japan is, of course, a primary Japanese problem, and no one so far as this correspondent knows, has ever advocated such a degree of recovery for the empire as to permit her to rebuild her old military strength." He continued, "But it is an Allied problem, too. \textit{For economic collapse means chaos, and out of chaos in the past have been bred regimes of violence that head toward war.} Chaos in Japan today could mean a new war in the Pacific when the time came, just as chaos in Germany eventually produced Hitler"\textsuperscript{156} (underline mine). Thus, Parrott attested the need for a Japanese economic recovery, to avert the danger of economic chaos, a violent Japanese

\textsuperscript{155} Edwin Martin also argued, "The individual whose whole thought and energy must be applied to getting tomorrow’s food and clothing and housing his family has not time for, and little interest in, learning about democracy or participating in democratic institutions. And in times of economic crisis even the most democratic people have turned to autocratic procedures as necessary to self-preservation." See Martin, \textit{Allied Occupation}, 48.

\textsuperscript{156} Parrott, "Japan a Year After," 45, 47.
regime, and then to another war. His comparison of the economic chaos in Japan with the chaos in Germany that led to the rise of Hitler suggests that Parrott was, at this point, mainly concerned about the revival of fascism, not the rise of left-wing with Marxist ideology in Japan, though the extreme left and the extreme right seemed identical to many observers at that time.\textsuperscript{157}

In late 1946, renewed emphasis was placed on the importance of developing a "working economic system" which would allow the Japanese a "reasonable prosperity under controlled manufacturing and trade,"\textsuperscript{158} though the reestablishment of Japan's textile industry continued to be a matter of deep concern to American textile exporters.\textsuperscript{159}

Reparations Commissioner Pauley's sweeping program to reduce Japanese iron, steel and oil industries and drastically cut her merchant marine was accorded approval by a considerable number of observers (e.g., Drew Pearson, Wall Street Journal, Manchester Union, Los Angeles Times, Philadelphia News and San Francisco Chronicle), when his formal report was released to the press in November 1946. However, a number of other observers were chary, fearing that Japan would not be left with sufficient industrial capacity to be self-supporting. (St. Louis Globe-Democrat,

\textsuperscript{157} See also Lindesay Parrott "Can We Prevent a Japanese Hitler?" New York Times Magazine, Mar. 10, 1946, 12.
\textsuperscript{158} Fortnightly Survey, Dec. 6, 1946, 5, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.
\textsuperscript{159} "U.S. Opinion, Japan – October," Nov. 12, 1946, 5.
Greenville (S.C.) News, Kansas City Times.) William Henry Chamberlain was even violently opposed to a "wholesale stripping process in Japan" which would "serve no one's interests." In December some others commented on Pauley's reparations program. Most of them (Kalamazoo Gazette, LaCrosse Tribune, Christian Century, Frank C. Hanighen in Human Events Supplement) urged a cautious appraisal of his "drastic" proposals, while others (New York Sun, Seattle Times) gave basic approval.

Whether those commentators in favor of helping Japan's economic recovery were motivated by the potential Soviet

160 "U.S. Opinion, Japan - November," Dec. 16, 1946, 6-7. Cf. Martin, Allied Occupation, 48. Martin wrote in 1948, "It now seems probable that the actual impact of the reparations and economic disarmament programs on Japanese productive capacity will be confined to facilities that are surplus except in a war economy." According to him, the poverty of the Japanese could not be attributed to these programs. The disruptions due to those programs would be "nothing of permanent significance."

161 There are no public opinion polls available taken in late 1945 on the question of reparations. According to a NORC survey conducted in the spring of 1945 and released on October 20, 1945, however, 79 percent of those polled near the end of the war thought that they should try to make the people in Japan pay them in some way or other for their cost of the war, while only 14 percent opposed such an idea, and 7 percent were undecided. That is to say, the overwhelming majority of the Americans then demanded Japanese reparations. On the other hand, they (68 percent) would not be willing for the U.S. to accept any goods which could be sold cheaper than similar goods that were made in the U.S., even if the only way Japan could pay them would be in goods. Thus, most Americans did not want to receive cheaper Japanese goods, while demanding reparations. Is it because of their concern for the interest of U.S. manufacturers of the similar goods, or is it just an emotional, irrational response? - No clear answer can be drawn only from the poll results. See NORC, Oct. 20 and 27, 1945 published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Winter 1945-46): 534-35.
threat at this point is not always clear, for some seemed to think that Japan's reasonable economic recovery was needed primarily to make Japan a peaceful and democratic nation and thereby to keep her from becoming a menace to U.S. security and world peace again, rather than to shield her from the Soviet threat. However, even in the minds of those people, the prospect for economic chaos in Japan was not unrelated to the prospect of her falling under Soviet influence. Economic chaos could lead to the rise of the extreme left with some connection with Moscow, which would not be "democratic" in American eyes. In any case, the overall trend was that the editorial support for restoring Japan's economy came primarily from the practical consideration to stabilize Japan, rather than from purely humanitarian impulses.

It seems that the general public positively responded to this barrage of media comment in favor of helping Japan recover her peacetime industry. According to the confidential results of a NORC survey taken in December 1946, when asked, "Would you like to see our government help Japan get her peacetime industries going again, or not?," 61 percent said "Yes," while 25 percent said "No," and 14 percent were "undecided" or had a "qualified" answer. These results are in striking contrast to the survey results

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obtained during the war. When asked exactly the same question in April 1945, 65 percent said "No," while 25 percent said "Yes." (The remaining 10 percent expressed no opinion.) Thus, in April 1945, about two thirds objected to the idea of helping even "peacetime" industries in Japan. That is to say, by December 1946, U.S. opinion on the question of reviving Japan's peacetime industries had undergone an almost complete reversal since April 1945.

However, there seem to be at least some reservations here. 61 percent of the sample who said they would like to see us help Japan with her industrial problems were then asked: "People in charge of the occupation are asking Congress for more money so supplies can be sent for this purpose. Do you think Congress should vote the money or not?" Then, 39 percent of the whole sample said "Yes," while 15 percent said "No," and 7 percent did not know the answer. These figures indicate that those who were really willing to pay more for the recovery of Japan's

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163 "Special Report on American Opinion," July 23, 1948, 4, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. In this State Department report, the name of the institute that conducted the survey above is not noted. The Fall 1945 issue of Public Opinion Quarterly shows exactly the same question and the same results. According to it, this polling result was released by NORC on September 2, 1945. In addition, to the same question asked about Germany in February 1944, when the U.S. was at war with Germany, a majority (51 percent) said "Yes," while 34 percent saying "No." Though not questioned at the same time, this poll also suggests a sterner attitude of Americans toward Japan than Germany.

164 NORC, Mar. 15, 1950, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Summer 1950): 377. This question was asked in December 1946.
peacetime industry represented only about four out of every ten Americans.  

Moreover, the public at this time was again generally less generous about helping Japan than Germany -- When asked the same question about helping Germany get her peacetime industry going again, in December 1946, 72 percent said "Yes" (in contrast to 61 percent in the case of Japan), while only 15 percent said "No," and 13 percent gave no opinion.  

With respect to the resumption of Japan-U.S. trade, the confidential results of the same NORC survey taken in December 1946 showed that a large majority of the American public (72 percent) said that "Japan should be given the same opportunity as other nations to sell goods in the U.S.," while 20 percent opposed this idea and 8 percent expressed no opinion.  

In addition, regarding U.S. aid for reeducating the Japanese people, 58 percent of those polled in November 1946 opposed the idea of spending fifteen million dollars a year for several years, while 34 percent approved and 8 percent did not know. See NORC, Mar. 15, 1950, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Summer 1950), 375. Though this poll was taken in November 1946, it was not published until March 1950. "Popular Attitudes on Occupation Policy for Germany and Japan," July 23, 1948, 4. 

The State Department reporter of these survey results noted as follows: "This question focused attention on the treatment of Japan relative to other countries, and the survey contained no other questions dealing with U.S. trade policy. Had respondents been asked whether they favored the importation of "low-cost Japanese goods," the negative replies might have been more numerous ("Recent Opinion Polls on Occupation of Japan," Mar. 4, 1947, 4-5). The results of this December 1946 survey were eventually
One should remember that at this time, according to the same survey, nearly half of the cross-section regarded the Japanese with suspicion, predicting that they would go back to their old ways when they could.\textsuperscript{168} In sum, while being suspicious of the Japanese peaceful intentions, most Americans in late 1946 were ready to give Japan the same trading opportunity as other nations, \textit{as long as Japan did not threaten peace and U.S. interests}. It is conceivable many Americans saw the need to prevent economic chaos in order to carry out the U.S. objective of building a peaceful and democratic Japan.

Some journalists noted the need for resuming Japan's trade from the viewpoint of American businessmen. In December 1946, relatively minor but increasing interest was being focused on the question, "How soon will Japan be open to competitive trade?" For instance, Ray Cromley in the \textit{Wall Street Journal} reported that American firms were eager to do business, but that the Military Government favored a "go slow" policy until industry was on a "fairly even keel." According to Cromley, U.S. businessmen who wanted private trade then argued that Japanese business would remain

\textsuperscript{168} "Recent Opinion Polls on Occupation of Japan," Mar. 4, 1947, 3.
unsettled and that inflation would continue until Japan could get a few essential imports.\(^{169}\)

With respect to U.S. relief to Japan, the violent earthquake in Japan in December 1946 was widely noted, and commentators were considerably gratified by the well-organized relief assistance provided by SCAP Headquarters. This time, a strong wave of sympathy swept America, and a number of editors [Wilmington News, Baton Rough State Times, Des Moines Register, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Christian Science Monitor, Bluefield (West Virginia) Telegraph, Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Washington Star, New York Times] urged that the U.S. extend relief "in generous measure" to the sufferers. At the same time, the Cincinnati Enquirer observed, "Little is being done on a national scale to excite sympathy or solicit aid. We are still too close to the war for that." The Pueblo Chieftain, which had sent almost a trainload of materials to earthquake victims of 1923, declared, "Somehow our sympathies are not as great today as they were some 20-odd years ago. Not because we

\(^{169}\) "U.S. Opinion, Japan - December 1946," Jan. 20, 1947, 5, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. According to a letter from Benjamin H. Gordon, a field service officer, U.S. Department of Commerce, to MacArthur in December 1945, Gordon's office was making a survey among importers in the New York area of market possibilities for Japanese products, particularly silk, cultured pearls and handicraft items. Gordon noted, "From preliminary study, it would appear there is a great demand for such items here and no serious antipathy has developed against potential Japanese imports into this country." See Benjamin H. Gordon to MacArthur, Dec. 20, 1945, box 10, RG 10, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.
have grown callous to sorrow and trouble among other peoples. The reason lies in what happened between Pearl Harbor and August 14, 1945\textsuperscript{170}. These statements suggest that animosity against the Japanese persisted in the minds of many Americans, while the recent war experience did not prevent a sizable segment of American observers from taking a generous attitude about giving aid to the former enemy nation when it was hit by an earthquake.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 3-4.
CHAPTER III
ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN AS EXPRESSED IN LETTERS FROM AMERICAN
PEOPLE TO MACARTHUR, 1945-46

Harsh Attitudes (23)

As shown in Table 1, a number of letters (23 letters) expressed a harsh attitude toward Japan and the Japanese people in the first phase, though more letters in the sampling showed a positive attitude. 15 out of the 23 letters were written soon after the war, namely in late 1945, and the rest in 1946. They can be divided into three groups according to the degree of harshness expressed. The number in the parentheses after each subheading shows the number of letters in each group.

1) Extreme Harshness -- Demand for Mass Killing (5)

Among the twenty-three letters showing a harsh attitude, five letters showed extreme harshness toward the Japanese, even suggesting extermination of the Japanese race. All of these five letters were written soon after the war -- four in September and one in November 1945. For instance, a letter read, "Deeply stirred by the revelation of the terrible treatment being revealed of their treasonable way of dealing with prisoners, causes many to think that as a race they are not worth saving." The writer
then suggested, "One solution has been advanced that the males should be STERILIZED." He added, "Also the natural desire of Jap women to have children could be accommodated by artificial insemination, the males used for this purpose, should be virile blonde Americans of proven character and ability so that the race will be really improved and humanized."

In a similar tone, another man wrote, "If all under sixty years of age were sterilized [sic], in about seventy years the last Jap would have passed on because of old age. . . . And so in about seventy years the world would be free of A [sic] people who have not developed very much since they came out of the caves. You have saved mankind 'White' from the cruelest foe he has ever known. Why not help him further by quietly wiping out this menace to civilization. This would help mankind even more than the Great [sic] job You [sic] have just finished." This writer also described the Japanese as "the monkey Man [sic]." In the same vein, another letter in September 1945 demanded the cremation of at least a million "Japs" with the Emperor forced to witness the carnage personally. He wrote, "Let him see what the

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1 E.D. Washburn (San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, Sept. 7, 1945, box 8, RG 10, MacArthur Memorial. Unless otherwise noted, Record Groups (RG) noted in this chapter are located at the MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.

2 G.M. Reid (Randwick) to MacArthur, Nov. 27, 1945, 2, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
yellow Japs did to the American boys. Then put him in with
last lot and cremate him."\(^3\)

Moreover, a U.S. Senator from Mississippi, Theodore G.
Bilbo, in his letter suggested sterilization of the entire
Japanese.\(^4\) He also enclosed editorials from the Memphis
Commercial Appeal (a Scripps-Howard Newspaper, Frank R.
Ahlgren, Editor) of September 10 which his constituent asked
him to send to MacArthur. One of the editorials titled,
"Must Be Retribution," read,

> We thought Nazism and its tools had reached the
> lowest level of self-degradation through operation
> of its slave labor system and its brutal camps,
> but the Japanese, in their treatment of prisoners
> of war, appear to have found an even lower level.
>
> It concluded,

> We'll leave it to MacArthur to say when the job of
> exacting retribution is to begin, but when it does
> begin it must be carried on so relentlessly and
> thoroughly that the whole world will know, for all
time, that subjection of helpless American nationals to
such heinous treatment as was the practice in Japan
will be an offense from which there can be no escape of
swift judgment and sure punishment.

Bilbo commented on this editorial, "I think these editorials
voice the real feelings of the great majority of the people
of America."\(^5\)

The letters introduced above, showing an extremely
hostile attitude to the Japanese, reflect not only the

\(^3\) Michael J. Murphy to MacArthur, Sept. 11, 1945, box 8,
RG 10.
\(^4\) Theodore G. Bilbo to MacArthur, Sept. 14, 1945, box 8,
RG 10.
\(^5\) Ibid.
writers' hatred due to the war but also racism against the "yellow" race.

Another man strongly condemned the Emperor, Tojo and other wartime leaders, while mentioning the Germans were also bastards like the Japanese, thus not particularly showing racism against non-whites. He wrote in his poem, "A Funeral Pyre for the Jap Empire,"

And the Yamashitas, Horsishitas [sic], Tojoes
And all the rest of your lousy Japs,
At long last we've got you on the run, so do scram pell mell
And keep on running till you land where you belong straight in hell!6 (underline mine).

The strong language used in these letters is astonishing. The writers of these letters blamed the entire Japanese race for the cruelties committed by Japanese soldiers during the war. It should be remembered, however, that this sort of extreme harshness was expressed overtly only by a minority of the letters in the sampling.7

2) Demand for Stern Treatment of War Leaders (11)

Eleven other letters, though in less extreme ways, also demanded stern and tough treatment of the Japanese. They

6 Leo Weidhorn (Boston, MA) to MacArthur, Sept. 25, 1945, box 9, RG 10.

7 Those who favored this kind of extremely harsh treatment of the Japanese constituted a minority among the general public, too. According to a public opinion poll, 13 percent of those polled in late 1944 favored "killing off the Japanese. Another survey released in August 1945 showed that 14 percent favored extremely harsh treatment of the Japanese. See Feraru, "Public Opinion Polls on Japan," 101; AIPO, Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 385.
did not discuss the Japanese ordinary people (so the writers' attitudes toward the Japanese people in general are not clear), but focused their attention primarily on Japanese wartime leaders and militarists, who were to be tried as war criminals. Seven of the letters were written in late 1945, and three in February 1946. One, written in August 1945, advised, "They [the Japs] need a firm, stern hand." The writer also said of the Emperor, "I should like to see him sentenced to death and then have the sentence commuted by you to demotion and exile. Soak him!" (Only this letter in this group specifically called for the execution of the Emperor.) Another, desiring the execution of "ALL Japanese war criminals," wrote, "The wily, treacherous will be given cause to know that in future those who bring about a war of aggression will be called to account." He also described the Japanese as "the Hyde-Jekel [sic] natured Jap," emphasizing that not another living American knew the "Jap" for what he really was as MacArthur did.\(^8\)

In the same vein, one wrote, "It will be the greatest mistake to be soft with the Japanese. . . . Normally I am not a vindictive person, but I cannot help feeling that unless we really are tough with all the Japanese leaders

\(^8\)William Durward Connor (Major-General U.S. Army Ret., East Gloucester, MA) to MacArthur, Aug. 20, 1945, box 8, RG 10.

\(^9\)Louis J. Gates (The Dalles, Oregon) to MacArthur, Aug. 30, 1945, box 8, RG 10.
they will be able to build themselves up eventually for another war."10 One also wrote, "The tougher you are on the jap [sic] leaders the better the people [the American people] like you. Don't [sic] shoot the japs [sic] -- hang them!"11 Another insisted on being tough with "the Jap hordes of predatory fanatics."12

In February 1946, letters were written to MacArthur congratulating him for his decision affirming the sentence of death on General Tomoyuki Yamashita. One of them went on to say, "Now let's get the rest of the doity [dirty] rats."13 Another also wrote, "Japan must be made to feel the sting of defeat for as long as is necessary. They COULD pay for war; they MUST pay occupation, etc., regardless of length of time."14 Still another, in the enclosed copy of her letter to President Truman, wrote, "He [General Yamashita] was in brief the responsible Japanese military leader in an area where atrocities descended to a level scarcely ever before reached in the history of civilization."15

10 Dickie Thourittrotter (South East Asia Command Headquarters) to MacArthur, Aug. 16, 1945, box 2, RG 5.
11 R.D. McCain (Daingerfield, TX) to MacArthur, Sept. 28, 1945, box 9, RG 10.
12 Charles Dillon Perrine to MacArthur, Sept. 7, 1945, box 12, RG 10.
15 Miriam Stuart (Executive Secretary, The Society for the Prevention of World War III Inc.) to Truman, Feb. 14, 1946. This was attached to her letter to MacArthur of the
The writers of these letters emphasized their desire to make sure to keep the Japanese from waging another war by punishing their leaders and impressing on them that they were a completely defeated and conquered people. These letters stressed the cruelty of the Japanese military.16

3) Emphasis on Japanese Treachery (7)

There is another group of letters which did not particularly suggest what kind of treatment the U.S. should give to the Japanese, but which clearly expressed the writers' very negative feelings toward the Japanese. Unlike the letters introduced earlier, those of this group did not express a desire for mass killing of the Japanese nor particularly demand harsh treatment of the Japanese wartime leaders (at least explicitly). In other words, the writers of this group took a more detached, less emotional, and less punitive stance than the writers of the letters discussed above, and therefore were closer, in their attitude, to those in the category of "positive attitude." However, their attitude is not categorized as "positive," because these writers did not show their own willingness to help

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same date in box 11, RG 10. This writer did not use the word, "Japs," and instead wrote "the Japanese people." Her attitude toward the Japanese people in general, distinct from the war leaders, is not clear.

16 See also A.T. Rasmussen to MacArthur, Oct. 3, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10; Chas B. Colpitts (New York, NY) to MacArthur, June 5, 1946, box 11, RG 10; Roy G. Fitzgerald (Dayton, OH) to MacArthur, Dec. 2, 1946, box 22, RG 5.
Japan but rather emphasized the qualities of the Japanese unacceptable to them.\textsuperscript{17}

For instance, Dean Dickason, a radio commentator referred to "Japanese intrigue and treachery."\textsuperscript{18} In discussing the occupation and administration of Japan on August 19, 1945, only a few days after V-J Day (when the Allied occupation of Japan had not yet started), Dickason stated, as follows:

In fact, the task is likely to be fraught with grave hazards little short of actual war. There'll be constant bitterness and seething unrest among the Japanese. Though utterly beaten and humiliated at the moment, the Japanese are a vengeful people, with an irrepresible instinct for treachery. It's no ordinary policy job our occupying forces are undertaking. There are likely to be many casualties. For we're dealing with an implacable enemy that has never before known defeat\textsuperscript{19} (underline mine).

In praising MacArthur, he also said, "He knows how to deal with them practically, how to meet and master their [Japanese] psychology, their deceits and treacheries\textsuperscript{20} (underline mine). He concluded, "Much of what General MacArthur faces in Japan won't be pretty. That's why we're so very fortunate to have as a leader there a man who knows and can anticipate the crafty Japanese\textsuperscript{21} (underline mine).

\textsuperscript{17} Two of the five items in this group are radioscripts probably sent to MacArthur by the radio commentator himself. They are here treated together with letters to MacArthur.
\textsuperscript{18} Dean Dickason (San Francisco, CA), radioscript, Aug. 19, 1945, 2, box 8, RG 10.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 7. In his radioscript a week earlier, Dickason emphasized great distance between the Western
Similarly, a letter written in early November described Japanese soldiers as "those yellow rats," and "that egoistical foe." A transcript of Cedric Foster's broadcast sent to MacArthur, reporting the occupation of Japan in February 1946, also mentioned Japan as "a land whose people had a record of nothing but treachery and deceit." Other two letters also referred to Japan as "a barbarous enemy," or the Japanese as "the barbarous Japs."

While stressing the negative qualities of the Japanese, these writers highly praised MacArthur for his leadership. Consequently they either showed some hope for transforming the Japanese, because of his excellent leadership in Japan, or attributed the smoothness of the occupation so far to his successful job. For example, Dickason said, "It's quite

values and the Japanese values, asserting, "Oriental psychology is a puzzle to most persons who, in other matters, are experts on Japan. As one of our Army officers on Okinawa has said, 'The Japs are uncannily smart one day, and dumb as hell the next.'" At the same time, he explained that the Japanese were highly educated people and that they could be eventually freed of their blindness to enlightenment and progress through education for many years. See Dickason's radioscript, Aug. 12, 1945, box 8, RG 10.

22 Clarence Goodwin Neal (Los Angeles, CA) to MacArthur, November 9, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
23 Cedric Foster Broadcast (Cleveland, OH), radioscript, Feb. 5, 1946, 3, box 11, RG 10.
24 Margaret C. O'Dounell (Pittsburgh, PA) to MacArthur, Sept. 2, 1945, box 8, RG 10; M. Bayhunan (Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Brooklyn, NY) to MacArthur, Aug. 23, 1945, microfilm, reel 73, RG 5. See also D. Arthur Walker (Lawyer, Arkansas City, KS) to MacArthur, Apr. 17, 1946, microfilm, reel 73, RG 5. Walker wrote about the appeal of an American mother whose son had died as a result of cruel and inhuman treatment by the Japanese Army.
conceivable . . . that MacArthur may be able to infect the Japanese with the same spirit of cooperation [as he generated in the U.S. Army during the war]."25 Cedric Foster broadcast reported in February 1946 that during the five months of Japanese occupation, not a single untoward incident had occurred, and stressed that MacArthur had done remarkable job in Japan.26 Two months later, another wrote, "In that strangest of strange lands, notwithstanding seemingly unconquerable obstacles, you are bringing order out of chaos, and giving the benighted people of those pagan islands new hope, new courage and completely new outlook upon life."27

The difference between these writers and some of those in the next category ("positive attitude") was not big. The latter, however, did not use such expressions to stress the warlike qualities of the Japanese people as "treacherous," "vengeful" and "implacable"28; they rather focused on the hope for new Japan in the future.

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26 Cedric Foster broadcast, Feb. 5, 1946, 3.
28 One exception was a letter from W.D. Sumlin who lost his two sons in prisoner of war camps in the Philippines. His letter was categorized as showing a positive attitude, because of his desire to tell the Japanese of love and become their friend. See p. 161.
Positive Attitudes (39)

Table 1 shows that more letters in the sampling expressed a positive attitude (39) than did a negative one (23). Out of the thirty-nine letters in this category, twenty-two were written in 1945 after V-J Day, and seventeen were written in 1946. The writers in this group taking a constructive attitude toward Japan, saw a hope for a peaceful Japan in the future, while many of them still retained unfavorable perceptions of Japan. The letters can be divided into four main groups according to the emphasis or the characteristic of each writer. It should be noted, however, that each of these emphasized points are shared, to some degree, by many letters in other groups. In other words, the letters in different groups are not mutually exclusive in content, and the distinctions among them are relative ones.

1) A Hope for Japan in the Future, Mixed with Negative Perceptions (3)

The writers in this group, like many in the other groups, expressed unfavorable perceptions of Japan, while seeing hope for a peaceful and friendly Japan. For instance, in his script of September 16, 1945, prepared for the American Broadcast Company, which was probably sent by him to MacArthur, Raymond Moley stated, "Japan, unlike Germany, is a nation capable of rapid changes in policy. It turned suddenly from Oriental isolation to Western culture."
Japan turned just as suddenly from peace to imperialism and war. It can turn, once more to ways of peace, once its power of aggression is taken away."\(^{29}\) This was written in the context of Moley's defending MacArthur against American press criticism of the general's job in Japan. He said, "When MacArthur says he is satisfied with progress, we can rest assured that he has reason to say it."\(^{30}\) Moley emphasized that the occupation of Japan was proceeding more successfully than that of Germany. In doing so he also presented a somewhat positive view of Japan, the hope for a peaceful Japan as his words above showed. He stressed that Germany continued to be a greater threat than Japan: "Germany's poisonous ideas of world power were vastly more dangerous than Japan's." "Germany's ideas of military power were older and stronger than Japan's." "Prussia has never changed in any essentials since the days of the Teutonic Knights." "Moreover, this [World War II] is Germany's second offense against America and Britain. The second offense in a generation. Probation is over for Germany."\(^{31}\)

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\(^{29}\) Raymond Moley, script for American Broadcasting Company, Sept. 16, 1945, 3, box 41, RG 5. Moley was a professor of public law at Columbia University and an associate editor of *Newsweek* magazine. He was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State in 1933 and was a member of the so-called "brain trust," a Washington group to whom President Franklin Roosevelt is reputed to have turned for advice from time to time.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 3.
On the other hand, ironically his perception of Germany as a greater threat than Japan was in a sense based on his lower estimate of Japan's power and ability, not on his higher appraisal of the Japanese. He stated, "Japanese industries are poor copies of Germany's and America's... An industrial system rises from technical knowledge, and German technical knowledge is German brains. Germans originate. Japs copy. Germany is a source. Japan is a reflection."32 He also pointed out Japan's geographical isolation and her lack of natural resources as reasons for Japan being a lesser threat.

Another correspondent proposed to provide the conquered countries with "regular school education for living in a world of peace." He hoped that the former enemy nations could be reeducated, while still remaining suspicious of the current generation of those nations. He wrote, "This present generation of conquered peoples should be kept in constant check, but their children taught in school to rise above the Old World ignorance of their fathers, would eventually grow up to need no watching, but instead would promote once more the intelligent trade between countries both in commerce and culture."33

32 Ibid., 4.
33 Loyal Nichols (Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, Sept. 21, 1945. See attached article by Nichols, "Educational Peace Everlasting" 2, box 43, RG 5.
Another letter also expressed the hope that, because of General MacArthur's magnificent skills, the U.S. would successfully remake Japan into a friendly nation. Having been inspired by MacArthur's address on the Battleship Missouri at the time of the Japanese surrender, which he compared to Lincoln's Gettysburg address, he wrote, "You have handled an almost impossible situation since then [the time of Japanese surrender] with skill, firmness and justice. It may take a long time to remake the Japanese people, but because of you we can hope that they will be remade some day, with respect in their hearts for America instead of hatred." While being supportive of U.S. commitment to reeducate the Japanese and using no overtly negative words to describe them, his idea of the need for "remaking" the Japanese over a long period of time itself reflected his unfavorable perception of the current Japanese. 34

2) Emphasis on Distinction between Japanese Wartime Leaders and the Japanese Ordinary People (10)

Many writers with a constructive attitude toward Japan in this period made distinction between the wartime militaristic Japanese leaders and the ordinary citizens, seeing the latter as the victims misled and oppressed by the former. Here, letters are going to be introduced which

34 Clay Judson (Chicago, IL) to MacArthur, Nov. 8, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
stressed this distinction. The writers of these letters, while seeing the need for a firm hand in dealing with the militaristic leaders, emphasized the positive attitude to be taken to other people.

For instance, one who had been a Christian missionary in Japan for about fifty years suggested in late August 1945 "avoiding clashing with notions of people which are not harmful, while eliminating military evils" and "moderating evils of Government" (underline mine). He warned against the "needless subjection of the touchy Japanese" as well as against errors of "too kindly and gentle treatment of treacherous military leaders." Speaking of the Japanese people, he wrote, "They are not maniacs nor savage barbarians. Under wise guidance they do respond to treatment, and with surprising promptness. If undeceived and led to see that they are merely ordinary people; not descendants of the sun-goddess, but no better than other nations; they can quickly come out of the clouds of ancient pagan philosophy, and come into the light of truth, as other man." It was also stated: "Eliminate all emperor-worship and war spirit from the minds of the people; but dont [sic] crush the heart out of them."35

Similarly, the Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church who had lived in Japan saw the potential

35R.E. McAlpine (Roanoke, VA) to MacArthur, Aug. 26, 1945, box 8, RG 10.
for "educating the Japanese in democratic procedure," whereas he professed to get rid of the military leaders from influential positions in the national life of the Japanese. On the one hand, he thought that the Japanese people generally were "not as yet prepared for a really democratic set-up," but on the other hand, he believed that they were "perfectly capable of developing into a democratic nation."

"While I think we should deal with them very firmly," he added, "yet we should have faith in the possibility of their development." Moreover, he showed his concern for "a tremendous amount of suffering among the Japanese people, particularly among those who are least responsible for the war situation." He continued, "I hope they will not be excluded from our effort to help the victims of war in difference [sic] parts of the world. This is not only something that would seem to me to be a Christian obligation but also I think would be of tremendous help in our efforts to win the Japanese over to a recognition of the value of true democracy.36

Another also showed sympathy toward the Japanese people, by saying, "They never had a chance for free speech, freedom of thought or freedom from fear." Expressing her support for MacArthur's job in Japan, she wrote, "You

36 Sucker (Presiding Bishop of Protestant Episcopal Church, New York, NY) to James M. Thomson, Sept. 10, 1945, box 8, RG 10. Sucker probably enclosed this letter to Thomson in his letter to MacArthur.
[MacArthur] are firm but kind. Kindness goes far with those people [the Japanese people]." It seems that this writer, like the two discussed above, saw America's role in Japan as that of the benevolent "liberator" of the Japanese masses, who had been oppressed by their militaristic leaders. These writers assumed a paternalistic or teacher-student relationship between the two nations.

Alice Franklin Bryant, who had been a prisoner of war in Santo Tomas, Manila for two and a half years, also distinguished the Japanese people from the Japanese military caste, and saw the former in a positive light. In an article that she enclosed in her letter to MacArthur, she wrote, "Although many of them [Japanese soldiers] were led astray by propaganda, and some of them were brutalized by their years of compulsory military training and service, I cannot hold them individually responsible for the war or for what occurred during it." After referring to the goodwill shown by a Japanese officer when she was a POW, she wrote, "We had been told that we who were caught in isolated places could expect the worst, that the Japanese soldiers hated Americans with the greatest intensity. We never observed any evidence of such hatred, although we saw the soldiers a great deal. . . . I have heard and believed tales of brutality, but I never witnessed any. On the contrary, so

37 Sister M. Juventia, R.T. (St. Elizabeth Hospital, LaFayette, IN) to MacArthur, Oct. 17, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
far as my observation went, the Japanese soldiers were remarkably well-behaved." She concluded, "I cannot help thinking that a vengeful attitude toward Japan - especially in view of the admirable way that country has cooperated with our occupation forces - is unworthy a civilized and Christian country. Furthermore, from a purely selfish viewpoint, it is fatal, for it is the stuff of which war is made." To those who were nursing a desire for vengeance upon the Japanese people, she suggested that they "retreat for a week-end to meditate on what happened at Nagasaki and Hiroshima."38

She also suggested that "all countries not devastated by war should join immediately in sending relief supplies to the ravished countries, including those of our former enemies," to win peace. She expressed the hope that ways would be found to prevent starvation in Japan. Moreover, she stressed the need for promoting the cause of peace by mutual disarmament.39

Another letter focused on Japanese women as the victims. Having read of the rapes committed by Americans, (though the report claimed, "The Americans have committed amazingly few rapes") the writer wrote, "Why should there be

38 Alice Franklin Bryant (Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, Dec. 11, 1945, box 11, RG 5. See her enclosed article, "Let's Forget They Starved Us!" written in reply to an article in the Dec. 8 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, "Don't Forget They Starved Us."

39 Ibid. See her enclosed article, "If We Are to Save the Flesh," 3-4.
any rapes? Haven't the Japanese women suffered enough? They are helpless and powerless, as you know, the victims of the insane system hatched by the Jap militarists." She then asked of MacArthur that an order be given by him that not a single Japanese women be violated. She asserted, "That any man breaking that law will be severely punished. A life imprisonment is not too much to ask for such a crime."40 And there were also letters that took sides with the Japanese "common people," in supporting the economic deconcentration plan, and attacking the Japanese wealthy capitalists.41

Karl T. Compton, then the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, sent MacArthur a copy of his report on Japan, which he had written after observing the first three weeks of U.S. occupation first hand.42 Referring to the cynical American view about the "apparent friendliness" of the Japanese natives, he wrote he was personally "not worried about this." He explained one of the reasons for the Japanese friendliness as follows: "Very

40 Mrs. Anna M. Burgess (Port Blakely, WA) to MacArthur, Sept. 14, 1945, box 8, RG 10.
42 Compton visited Japan as an organizer of a Scientific Intelligence Mission to make a rapid over-all survey of high spots: key Japanese scientists, principal laboratories under military, industrial or educational auspices, Japanese organization of science for war. See his letter to MacArthur, Nov. 23, 1945 and his article, "Mission to Tokyo," 9-10, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
many of the best citizens have sincerely disapproved of the imperial policies of the last few decades, and have resented the assumption of dictatorial power by the military clique, but have been powerless to prevent it. These include many industrialists, scholars, and other educated people. They see in the present events . . . a chance, if they cooperate well with us, of creating a new era for Japan based on civil liberty, and peaceable achievement." Thus, Compton saw that the nucleus of a peace-loving Japan existed. Distinct from the militarists and from the indoctrinated masses, there was still hope, though he thought there remained "some plotting Japs." 43

As to other reasons for the Japanese peoples' friendliness, he observed the following factors: (a) The Japanese people were very disciplined, and very polite, (b) The Emperor had ordered cooperation in carrying out the surrender terms, (c) The Japanese had long lived as serfs under a military feudal system and were, therefore, accustomed to periodic changes of overlords, (d) There was a deep-seated admiration for many features of western civilization, mixed with an inferiority complex. 44

44 Ibid., 17-18. See also D.J. Byrne (Superior, Maryknoll Fathers, Japan) to MacArthur, Aug. 13, 1945, box 12, RG 5. Father Byrne supported the view that the cooperation by the Japanese was not a "camouflage." Referring to an editorial of the Kansas City Star that said, "There is no reason to believe whatever that Japan will come forward to collaborate with the United States on her own initiative in the near future," Byrne wrote, "With due
Compton also discussed the friendliness of the Japanese children who were "less complex and spoiled by indoctrination than their elders." He added, "The fine performance of so many of our own Nisei in this war proves that the Japanese problem is one of education, religion and culture, not one of race." It may be said, however, that his statement itself, denying racial interpretation of the Japanese problem, reflected the unfavorable perceptions of the Japanese shared by many Americas immediately after the war. In addition, Compton also discussed the difficulty for an Occidental to understand some workings of the Oriental mind.

Former Undersecretary of State, W.R. Castle, in discussing not the Japanese ordinary people in general, but politicians, noted in September 1945, those "Japanese people who might really be able to help" MacArthur "in rebuilding along sane lines," and "so many smooth spoken and apparently democratic minded Japanese that you need experts to separate

regards to the editor, I believe he is mistaken." According to the memo attached to Byrne's letter to MacArthur, which had been written by one of the Maryknoll fathers stationed in Japan, the cooperation by Japanese was not "camouflage," because a) military was absolutely discredited, b) there were spontaneous efforts of people to restore political parties, and c) cooperation with America was the main defense against bolshevism.  

46 Ibid., 16.
the sheep from the goats," thus denying the monolithic view of Japanese politicians.47

3) Emphasis on Rehabilitating Japan and the Perception of Japan as America’s Potential Friend (12)

The writers in this category viewed America’s job in Japan as rehabilitation or reconstruction of the country. They also envisioned Japan as America’s potential friend. Except for a few letters written in late 1945, most of these letters were written in mid- or late 1946. They can be roughly divided into two categories.

Building Friendship with the Japanese People

It is impressive that as early as September 1945, an ordinary American family wrote, "We try to realize that the Orient is awakening," and expressed their "wish to help" "the Japanese people." No negative words were used to describe the Japanese. This family, who was highly supportive of MacArthur (and defended him against Dean Acheson’s criticism), showed deep satisfaction with his job in Japan. They wrote, "There should be one part of the world where we may hold our prestige and you have certainly done a magnificent part in establishing it." This Christian

47W.R. Castle (Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Sept. 23, 1945, box 9, RG 10. He wrote this letter primarily to show his support for MacArthur against Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s criticism of the general’s announcement that he would need only 200,000 troops in Japan. Castle was sympathetic with Joseph Grew and Eugene Dooman who were among the "Japan hands."
family also wrote, "We do not feel that peace is anywhere near and we feel the need for immeasurable reparation to God for dropping those devilish atomic bombs." They begged "Wisdom from God" for those who were attempting to guide their country.\(^48\)

This letter was in line with Alice Franklin Bryant's letter discussed above. (See p. 143.) Admiring MacArthur for his "moderate, civilized, Christian methods in Japan," and referring to the "very harmonious relations between the occupation forces and the Japanese people (judging by accounts in the press and conversations she had had with returning servicemen), Bryant wrote, "We may end up by becoming good friends."\(^49\)

Having been inspired by MacArthur's address on the Missouri on September 2, 1945, one writer contemplated how to maintain world peace, and wrote an article entitled, "War is Inevitable -- Unless!" He concluded in this article, that the "workable methods" to achieve peace (which had already been in operation among individuals within a country) included: (1) to "get acquainted" and (2) to "develop mutual interests" among peoples of different nations. These measures were "prerequisites to all friendship." He added, "When people are separated by great distances or other barriers, special effort is required to

\(^48\) The P.W. Alston family (Berkeley, CA) to MacArthur, Sept. 20, 1945, box 9, RG 10.

\(^49\) Alice Franklin Bryant, Dec. 11, 1945.
accomplish this relationship." As the concrete means, he suggested the promotion of international cooperation with the sponsorship of the United Nations. He wrote, "The physical result - we will be building them a dam, installing a machine shop, equipping radio stations, and selling them everything from safety-pins to pianos and tractors, and teaching them how to use them and how to do for themselves, just as we trade among ourselves in the United States. They will be learning, from actual experience, the value in our democratic way of life." What was absent in this essay, however, was the author's attitude to learn from the outside world. In his mind, the U.S. was the teacher and all other nations were only the students.\(^{50}\)

In the same vein, a Michigan State police officer, who had briefly served under SCAP in Japan, expressed his willingness to contribute to the "future welfare of the Japanese people" and to assist MacArthur (which was more important for this writer) in the administration of Japan "with the objective of establishing permanent peace and a new way of living."\(^{51}\)

Winning Japan to America's Side

While the four letters above mainly focused on helping

\(^{50}\)Stocton E. Odom (New Orleans, LA) to MacArthur, Oct. 5, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.

\(^{51}\)Oscar G. Olander (Commissioner, Michigan State Police, East Lansing, MI) to MacArthur, Aug. 5, 1946, microfilm, reel 61, RG 5.
the Japanese "people," the letters below focused on Japan as a nation. Philip F. LaFollette, formerly the Progressive Governor of Wisconsin (1931-33, 1935-39) who had served as an Army Colonel in the Southwest Pacific during the war, also praised the "magnificent way" in which MacArthur had handled the problems in Japan and emphasized the contrast between Europe and Japan, in defending the general against Acheson's criticism. LaFollette wrote in October 1945, "In Europe, we are making enemies as fast as we know how," and "we are tilling the soil of the whole Continent of Europe for Communism." On the other hand, "we are pursuing exactly the opposite policies in Asia . . . especially in Japan." He went on to say, "Instead of indulging in hate, hypocrisy and revenge, we are dealing out justice and laying a foundation for a democratic Japan that will be our friend in the not too far distant day when we shall most certainly need friends." Apart from the three letters above (i.e.,

52 In September 1945 MacArthur announced that he would soon need only 200,000 troops in Japan, though he had previously estimated 500,000, then 400,000. In response to this announcement, Dean Acheson said at a press conference of September 19, "I am surprised that anybody can foresee at this time the number of forces which will be necessary in Japan," and "In carrying out that policy [the policy in regard to Japan], the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy." See "Excerpt from stenographic transcript of the Acting Secretary of State's press conference of September 19, 1945," box 9 or 10, RG 10; Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 13; "Watch on Tokyo," Time Oct. 1, 1945, 27-28.

53 Philip F. LaFollette (Madison, WI) to MacArthur, Oct. 15, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
letters from the Alston's, Bryant, and Odom), it seems that LaFollette was concerned primarily with winning Japan to America's side in the insecure and complex postwar world by taking a constructive approach to her (rather than a Christian or idealistic drive to help the defeated people and keep world peace.) In his view, this job had been done quite successfully so far.

Roy W. Howard, President of Scripps-Howard Newspapers also wrote to MacArthur in October 1945, and after noting "the Japanese genius for imitation," he stated, "It is conceivable to me that your over-all plan may be to sell them ["the Japs"] on the idea that a complete abandonment of the old technique [learned from Bismark] and a good copying job on American democratic practices, may not only get them back into polite society but out of it might come a rapprochement, which, with a truly democratized Japan, could run very much to our advantage. . . . A truly Americanized type of democracy deeply rooted in Japan would certainly give the Russians of the future something to think about"\(^5\) (underline mine). Thus, already in late 1945, the tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was a factor in setting the U.S. attitude toward Japan in the minds of some Americans. The same theme was also expressed by another writer in August 1946, who wrote, "It may be that Japan,\(^5\)

\(^{5}\) Roy W. Howard to MacArthur, Oct. 12, 1945, box 28, RG 5.
responding to just but magnanimous treatment by her conqueror, will be a firm friend of America."55

In October 1946, LaFollette again expressed basically the same theme in his address to an American audience. Again, stressing the contrast between America's record in Europe and that in Asia, especially in Japan, he stated, "Japan is on her way to eventual partnership among free nations and toward a high standard of living for her people," under the excellent leadership of General MacArthur.56 Moreover, in this address, LaFollette emphasized the American way of life as that representing "man's most successful effort" to give the good life to people, albeit with imperfection. He also said, "In our fathers' time our way of life was a constant challenge to the tyranny of monarchies. Today it is a challenge to the last great dictatorship: Soviet Russia. Make no mistake that the challenge is there. It springs from the irreconcilable conflict between freedom and slavery."57

Indeed, this statement reflected the Cold War (more clearly than his letter a year ago) and foreshadowed the Truman Doctrine four months later (though LaFollette suggested a resolution of the conflict not by military means

57 Ibid., 2.
but by setting a democratic example at home and taking moral leadership abroad. LaFollette thought that America should be the implacable opponent of imperialism in any form and the watchdog of freedom and tolerance). In his view, Japan was potentially an important member of the American camp.

Similarly, a letter to Mrs. MacArthur from a veteran (and probably her personal acquaintance) expressed gratitude "for the great job he [MacArthur] was doing in rehabilitating Japan," and wrote, "I personally feel that we are even more indebted to him for not letting the Russians run over him." In the same vein, Dennis McEvoy, general manager for the newly founded Japanese edition of the Reader’s Digest, stressed the need for helping Japan reconstruct her economy. In his address before a business and banking audience in August 1946, a copy of which he enclosed in his letter to MacArthur’s public relations officer, General Frayne Baker, McEvoy stated, "In the opinion of our highest military leaders the punitive phase of the occupation is over. The reconstruction phase has began. It is now our task to see to it that Japan ceases to be a drain upon our resources, that the aims of the Potsdam Declaration are carried out in full and that our former

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58 Ibid.
59 Alden H. Smith (Nashville, TN) to Mrs. MacArthur, Aug. 29, 1946, box 12, RG 10. For the mention of the "rehabilitation" of Japan, see also The Minute Men of America, Inc. to MacArthur, May 14, 1946, box 40, RG 5.
enemy, after a probationary period of as yet undetermined length, wins readmission into the family of nations." He added, "As long as Japan remains a political and an economic vacuum, she constitutes not only a costly experiment for us, but also a fertile field for the agents of a political philosophy which is hostile to our own."^{60}

Focusing his attention not on the Communist threat but on the rising importance of America's trans-Pacific relations (in comparison with her trans-Atlantic relations), Wilson Compton, President of the State College of Washington and a member of the U.S. Educational Mission to Japan, discussed the possibility of Japan becoming America's friend, in his address on May 15, 1946, "The West Looks West" (a reproduction of which he sent to MacArthur).^{61}

Stressing that the Orient was in ferment -- in a rising tide of economic, political and social self-consciousness, Compton professed that Japan already was "successfully

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60 Dennis McEvoy to General Frayne Baker, Aug. 29, 1946, box 12, RG 10. See the attached copy of McEvoy's address on Aug. 29, 1946, 1. This speech made at "the Biltmore Hotel" was addressed to the export managers of all important advertisers in the Reader's Digest international editions. In this address McEvoy stressed that the participation of American business was essential for the reconstruction of Japan.

61 Wilson Compton, "The West Looks West," Address delivered at the annual University of Washington Honors Convocation, May 15, 1946, box 1, RG 5. The U.S. Educational Mission left the U.S. in March 1946, and spent approximately one month in Japan. See also Compton to MacArthur, Apr. 29, 1946, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5.
experimenting with her first genuine chance for a democratic way of life."\textsuperscript{62}

Compton described Japan in early 1946 as follows: "humiliated, defeated, disillusioned; and yet cheerful, industrious, 80 percent repentant, and generally hopeful that the Allied Powers -- especially America -- will show toward them a generosity which they know and often say -- publicly -- that they do not deserve."\textsuperscript{63}

He discussed the amicable relationship growing between the two peoples. He referred to the American G.I.'s in Japan, whom he saw acting friendly to Japanese people, as "undoubtedly our best diplomats." On their part, said Compton, the Japanese showed the general spirit of "willing cooperation with the Americans," which, as MacArthur told him, was "genuine and sincere." Compton also noted the general's view that 80 percent of the people of Japan seemed to "regard the Americans as having \underline{liberated} them -- liberated them from something." (underline in original.) Whatever the Japanese thought the Americans had liberated them from, Compton was certain that "the interests and hopes of the thinking Japanese" were "directed toward imitating and so far as possible copying things American."\textsuperscript{64}

Compton also foresaw a close economic relationship between the U.S. and Japan. He forecast that Japan would

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 6-7.
eventually appeal to the United States for loans for industrial rehabilitation; that eventually the United States would make such loans; and that eventually such loans, if made, would be faithfully repaid. With the view that the Japanese people were diligent and resourceful, he affirmed that Japan, if given the opportunity, would gradually restore her place in international trade suited to her restricted natural resources. 65

Presenting a basically hopeful view of a future Japan that could contribute to world peace, Compton, however, was not forgetting Pearl Harbor. He concluded that the winning of the peace still remained. He agreed with MacArthur who had said, "Nowadays a nation does not really win a war until it has helped to pick up the fellow which it has just finished knocking down." It was mainly for the interest of peace, as Compton saw it, that the U.S. was working on this constructive job of helping Japan. 66

4) Letters from Christians -- emphasis on showing God's love to the Japanese (14)

Besides the few already introduced above, many letters were written to MacArthur that stressed the writers' desire

65 Ibid., 10-11.
66 Ibid., 12. In addition, Compton, who had met the Japanese Emperor, described him as a "amiable, harmless" "fidgety little symbol only." Ibid., 4. Regarding the Emperor, see also Marvin Sherwood Sadik to MacArthur, July 13, 1946, box 12, RG 10. Sadik admired the Emperor as a person who had tried to stop the war, and requested his autograph.
to show love to the Japanese people, by being friendly to them, in obedience to God's words and for the sake of world peace. This is not to say that all of the letters in the sampling from those who professed to be a Christian showed such compassion to the Japanese people, as I will show later.

Many of the writers whose letters are discussed in other categories might have been at least nominally Christian or have been brought up in Christian culture. However, it does not mean that all of them tried to apply Christianity to many aspects of their daily lives. It should be noted that the letters to MacArthur are here categorized according to their expressed themes rather than their writers. In the present category, the letters whose writers clearly identified themselves as Christians and stressed their desire to apply Christian principles to their dealing of the Japanese, especially, to show God's love to the Japanese, are discussed. It seems that most of the letters in this category were written by church leaders or active members of churches. In addition, in the present sampling, there were no letters in the category of "harsh attitudes" that clearly indicated the writer was a Christian.

For instance, as early as September 7, 1945, a minister, inspired by MacArthur's address on the Missouri at the time of the Japanese surrender, wrote to the general
about his plan (which he believed had been given by God to help preserve the peace of the world) to form an international movement to be known as the "A & J Boys and Girls Friendship, Inc." This plan was to promote correspondence between boys and girls of age 9 through 16 in American Bible schools and "no less than ten million boys and girls in Japan," under the supervision of the Bible school teachers. According to him, the purpose of this correspondence would be "to visualize for the Japanese boys and girls, and incidentally, also for their parents, "the American Way of Life," and "to develop a cominality [sic] of interest and build up a friendship on the basis of interdependence between them and us" that would "insure a generation of peace-makers and peace-preservers."68

There is no record available about whether this plan in any form materialized later. Although his emphasis on the value of the American way of life may be somewhat self-righteous, his friendly attitude was rather noteworthy in light of the fact that it was written only a few weeks after the termination of the war.

Most of the writers in this category regarded MacArthur as a Christian,69 admired him for conducting the occupation

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67 Willis Elmore Pierce (Minister in the Christian Church, Parkersburg, WV) to MacArthur, Sept. 7, 1945, box 8, RG 10.
68 Ibid.
69 There is no factual record which shows that Douglas MacArthur accepted Jesus Christ as his personal Savior, in other words, that he was a "born-again" Christian. It is
of Japan in accord with Christian principles such as righteousness, justice, mercy, forgiveness, and love, and prayed that he could continue to do so. For example, Noah Webster Cooper wrote in October 1945, "We are all rejoicing in your Christian life and in your Christian efforts to do what God would have you do as the best possible plan for the peace and prosperity of Japan and of America and of all nations." He also stated, "We rejoice that you have the wisdom to appeal to all the latent good in [the] Japanese, and to show them that forgiveness and mercy and helpfulness will only bring peace."

Admiring MacArthur's address on the occasion of the Japanese surrender, one also wrote, "There is... hope that under your guidance the occupation forces will proceed upon a nobler sentiment than animal passions which have engulfed the world, which would certainly perpetuate war, until, as you implied, humanity would all but destroy itself. I say this in the knowledge, as you know too, that in certain places where we have 'liberated' people, conditions are worse than they were under the preceding occupying forces." This writer also suggested "the service or counsel in some

obvious, however, that he grew up in the Christian (particularly, Episcopal) tradition, and that he valued Christian principles such as justice, righteousness and mercy, as he often professed in his public speeches.

70 Noah Webster Cooper (Counsellor, Nashville, TN) to MacArthur, Oct. 18, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
71 Noah Webster Cooper to MacArthur, Sept. 18, 1945, box 8, RG 10.
prominent way of Toyohiko Kagawa, one of the world's greatest Christian of this generation."

A Christian man, who had lost two of his sons in prisoner of war camps in the Philippine Islands, also stressed his desire for telling the Japanese people of God's love. Emphasizing that "Jesus saves SINNERS of all mankind" and that Christ's "SUPREME SACRIFICE on the cross for the sins of the world" should not be made no effect, he wrote as follows:

Will these more recent sacrifices [of American soldiers in the Pacific War] also be in vain? We hope NOT, but [they] will be a MEANS where by this message of LOVE and MERCY may be made known to our former enemies; but now friends. Not that they are our friends, but WE are their friends; because the love of God has been shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost; which has put a desire in us to tell them of the LOVE of Jesus who died for their redemption and SALVATION73 (underline mine).

He also warned against the conflicts among many church organizations of different denominations, that had proven a hindrance for carrying the gospel anywhere, and he called for basing the missionary activities on love.

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72 Charles W. Amlin (South Pasadena, CA) to MacArthur, Sept. 3, 1945, box 8, RG 10. For a similar attitude, see Louie D. Newton (President of the Southern Baptist Convention, Atlanta, GA) to MacArthur, Nov. 16, 1946, box 12, RG 10.

73 W.D. Sumlin (Pasadena, CA) to MacArthur, Apr. 6, 1946, box 11, RG 10. The Gospel of Christ meant, as Sumlin wrote, a change of a natural man to a spiritual man through repentance and forgiveness of all sins and Christ's transforming power in man, not just a teaching of civic righteousness and morality.
It seems safe to say that the Christian faith in these cases contributed to the softening of animosity against the Japanese, and brought about a friendly and constructive attitude toward the former enemy nation. The word "Japs" was not used by these writers.  

At the same time, it should be noted that these Christians, like others, often held negative perceptions of the Japanese people. Understandably, the last writer, who had lost his sons in POW camps, referred to the Japanese as "a most treacherous enemy" during the war and a "benighted enemy country." Despite this negative perception of the Japanese, he was trying to be friendly to them.

Moreover, he saw MacArthur's job in Japan as the transformation of the whole nation "from the bondage of brute heathenism and Shinto slavery, to the freedom of choice to determine the form of their own Government, even a possibility of a real democracy in time."  

Thus, while having a hope for improved Japan in the future, his perception of the current Japanese people could not be termed as "favorable."

Showing a friendly attitude to the Japanese, some letters from Christians reflected a paternalistic attitude toward the defeated nation, and they sometimes sounded

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74 See also President and Editor, The Progressive Farmer (Raleigh, NC) to MacArthur, Sept. 21, 1945, box 9, RG 10; F.G. Huling (Buena Park, CA) to MacArthur, Dec. 12, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.  
75 Sumlin, Apr. 6, 1946.
condescending or even arrogant. It was in this vein that Noah Webster Cooper described MacArthur's job as "trying to start Japan into Christian habits of thinking, and Christian habits of government."76

A few letters from Christians in the sampling suggested somewhat more favorable perceptions of the Japanese people. For instance, one writer referred to MacArthur's job (not as "remaking" but) as the "readjustment" of the Japanese people and admired him for taking "into such understanding account the Japanese folks' own human dignity, and their physical and cultural needs as well."77 Another approvingly quoted a former missionary's words, "The Japanese are a fine people and MacArthur is doing a good job."78

Some also showed their desire to help the Japanese by sending relief, though their limited relief was directed chiefly to Japanese Christians.79

Besides the fourteen letters from Christians mentioned in this fourth category (and a few others introduced

76 Noah Webster Cooper to MacArthur, Oct. 30, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
77 Wallace C. Speers (New York, NY) to MacArthur, Sept. 6, 1946, box 12, RG 10.
78 J.E. Rudisill (Pastor, Christ Lutheran Church, Harrisburg, PA) to MacArthur, June 10, 1946, box 11, RG 10.
earlier), there were eight more letters from Christians in the sampling for the first phase of the occupation. While not showing any particularly harsh attitudes toward Japan, however, these letters did not, at least explicitly, express the writers' willingness to be friendly to the Japanese people or to be helpful to them for their well-being, other than a desire to win the Japanese to Christianity. (They are, therefore, not included in the category of "positive attitudes," though it was likely that they had a constructive attitude toward Japan.) They rather focused on "an unparalleled opportunity to win the Japanese people to Christianity," or the need for turning Japan "from heathenism to Christianity" to keep her from becoming a threat again or from falling into communism, or "the need for recrudescence of theology as essential to a Christian peace."  

5) Conclusion

Factors behind the Positive Attitude toward Japan

The letters introduced in the preceding pages reveal

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80 University of Notre Dame, Department of Publicity (John V. Hinkel, Director), Release on May 26, 1946, box 11, RG 10; D.J. Byrne to MacArthur, July 8, 1946, box 12, RG 5; Arthur F. Ronz (Assistant General Manager, Youth Christian Workers, San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, Oct. 7, 1945, microfilm, reel 76, RG 5; John F. O'Hara (Bishop of Buffalo, Buffalo, NY) to MacArthur, Oct. 1, 1946; Idem, Dec. 16, 1946, both in microfilm, reel 61, RG 5.


82 Bishop of Rhode Island to MacArthur, Oct. 29, 1945, box 9 or 10, RG 10.
some of the important reasons for the positive attitudes toward Japan shown by many Americans soon after the war.

For one thing, it seems that the experiences of two World Wars, coupled with the invention of atomic bombs and other sophisticated weapons, left many people a sense of insecurity, and evoked among them a strong desire for maintaining world peace. This desire for peace led many people to realize the need for a constructive attitude toward their former enemy. They saw that, while a firm hand was needed in demilitarizing Japan, a vengeful attitude would not bring peace but sow the seeds of future conflict. They agreed with MacArthur, who said, "Nowadays, a nation does not really win a war until it has helped to pick up the fellow which it has just finished knocking down."

Behind this attitude to help the conquered enemy was a fundamental change in the role of the U.S. assumed by American leaders in the postwar world. As noted in the previous chapter, at the end of World War II, American leaders were resolved to eliminate not only militarism but also the conditions that brought about militarism. American commentators generally accepted this enlarged goal and supported U.S. policy to democratize Japan, though not all who advocated America's active intervention to democratize Japan had a sincere desire to be helpful to the Japanese people. Many of those who wrote MacArthur also endorsed
America’s international role. With relatively active personal interest in Japan, they were willing to take constructive steps toward Japan with the hope of establishing a peaceful and democratic Japan.

It should also be noted that a positive attitude was often expressed by those who had had direct contacts with the Japanese people, as shown in the letters from some missionaries who had lived in Japan for many years, from Karl T. Compton, who visited Japan as an organizer of a Scientific Intelligence Mission, and from Wilson Compton, who was a member of the U.S. Educational Mission to Japan. These writers saw that the Japanese were capable of becoming a peaceful and democratic people. Their letters testify to the scholarly finding that increasing foreign contact tends to increase favorable opinion about other peoples and to render more critical, one’s opinions about his own people.\footnote{Erich Reigrotski and Nels Anderson, "National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts," \textit{Public Opinion Quarterly} 23 (1959-60): 515-28. This study was the 1956-57 follow-up of a similar study done in 1948 by UNESCO in Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, and the United States. The authors added, about the stereotypes of the French and the Germans, that foreign contact before the war, during the war, or since 1945 in similar degree tended to encourage a favorable opinion of another people and more critical opinion of one’s own people. See also William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, \textit{How Nations See Each Other} (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1953; repr., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972), 100-101. Buchanan and Cantril conclude that attempts to work together to reach the goals of security, knowledge, health, faith, beauty, and self-respect will build up a body of experience and common assumptions in working together which will enable the individual to check with reality his pictures of others, and to be free from irrational...}
Moreover, the sense of insecurity after the war led some people to be concerned with America’s need to gain friends in the complex postwar world. It seems that this tendency became more evident in 1946 with the mounting conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Some people then began to see Japan as a potentially important member of the American camp, though the view of Japan as a potential ally was not yet dominant among American observers. As noted in the previous chapter, according to the State Department’s opinion survey about August 1946, while communist activities in Japan and Russia’s intentions toward her were major sources of concern for American observers of Japan after mid-1946, and while there was an increase in public comment with respect to Japan as "buffer" or "bulwark" for democracy, relatively few observers, took a stand on this issue, and those who took a stand disliked such development.

A contributing factor for the constructive attitude was Christianity. Many letters from Christians stressed such principles as mercy, forgiveness, helpfulness and love, which softened wartime animosity against the Japanese. However, when Christians fell into the trap of stressing the need for transforming the Japanese people without awareness of Americans’ own sins, there was a danger for them to be stereotypes of other peoples. They add, "To achieve this fully, contacts must be first hand, and they must involve cooperation toward a common objective."
self-righteous and arrogant. It seems that this danger was distinct among nominal Christians who generally valued Christian traditions in the U.S. but did not practice their faith in daily life.

In addition, while it seems that during the war the emphasis on Christian principles noted above and on the impulse to show God's love to the Japanese had been overwhelmed by the war effort to defeat Japanese militarism, the stream of Christian morality in the U.S. continued even during the war with respect to the treatment of the enemy nation. For instance, according to the State Department's survey on Christian church groups toward international questions, a group of missionaries who had lived in the Far East issued in January 1945 a statement opposing "drastic surgery of Japanese nationhood after the war." They urged creation of an international authority in which victories and vanquished should participate without discrimination. Moreover, later in 1945, sixty religious leaders, most of them Protestant clergymen, signed a declaration calling for a clear statement of U.S. war aims and conditions of surrender, and deploiring the mass bombing of Japanese civilians and "the current campaign of organized hatred" in the U.S. According to the State Department's survey, "this declaration was either ignored or condemned by most
newspapers, but it received strong support in church
circles.  

Similarly, an open letter signed by twenty-four
Christian citizens of the U.S. in attendance at the Mid-
Western Regional Conference of Executive Secretaries of the
Councils of Churches and Church of Federations, of June 22,
1945, read,

Both as Americans with great concern for our
nation's welfare and as Christians seeking to
place upon human life the God-given values
emphasized by Our Lord, we the undersigned feel
impelled to protest against the systematic
annihilation of civilian populations which appears
to be a part of American strategy in the war
against Japan. We find this policy of
obliteration and incendiary bombing especially
objectionable in view of our President's recent
statement that America does not desire the
"extermination and enslavement of the Japanese
people." Along with these inconsistencies we cite
the further confusion caused by the lack of any
clear-cut announcement to date of the war-aims and
post-war purposes of our government in the
conflict with Japan; and we believe that such
conditions serve to prolong rather than to
expedite the end of hostilities in Asia.

It continued,

On the moral aspects of these issues, we wish to
observe that wanton massacre not only destroys
innocent lives but inevitably impairs the
spiritual fiber of those who inflict such
brutalities. . . . Excesses in violence and
needless involvement in the internal affairs of
nations and peoples at war create hatred and
rivalries so widely spread, even among other

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84 "Current Attitudes of Christian Church Groups toward
International Questions," 8, Aug. 18, 1945, box 19, OPOS
Records, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
peoples and nations, as to make further warfare inevitable.85

Along this line, an article in the June 25, 1945 issue of Christianity and Crisis, a bi-weekly journal of Christian opinion, protested the lack of an adequate interpretation of the policy of unconditional surrender and the strategy of obliteration-bombing in the U.S. conduct of the war against Japan. This article, signed by nine Christians including Reinhold Niebuhr, concluded,

We believe that it is morally wrong and politically dangerous for any nation to ignore long-range considerations of policy by allowing military strategy alone to control its relations even with enemy nations. We therefore call upon our fellow-citizens, particularly our fellow-Christians who share this conviction and the apprehensions which we have stated, to express them to the President.86


Others who signed the article were: John C. Bennett, Charles C. Burlingham, F. Ernest Johnson, Henry Smith Leiper, John A. Mackay, Rhoda E. McCulloch, Edward L. Parsons, and Henry P. Van Dusen. This article was sent to Truman by Mrs. Endicott Peabody. See Official File 197, misc., Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, MO. Condemnation of mass bombing of Japanese civilians and a call for definition of peace terms came also from the Commission on World Order of the Disciples of Christ. A letter from the Commission was sent to President Truman on July 17, 1945. On the other hand, on February 1,
The State Department's survey noted in August 1945, "Because of the doctrines of their religion the leadership of the Christian churches tends to be more internationalist and pacifist than the general public. The church tends to tug the individual toward idealism."\(^{87}\)

Another factor contributing to the constructive attitude toward Japan seemed to be the popularity of General MacArthur in the U.S.\(^{88}\) In his address at the time of the Japanese surrender, which many people admired and some compared to Lincoln's Gettysburg address,\(^{89}\) MacArthur stated:

> We are committed by the Potsdam declaration of principles to see that the Japanese people are liberated from this condition of slavery [namely, the denial of freedom of expression, action and even, thought]. . . . The energy of the Japanese

1945 the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church rejected a resolution calling for a statement of peace terms that would go beyond unconditional surrender. See "Current Attitudes of Christian Church Groups," Aug. 18, 1945, 8.

\(^{87}\) "Current Attitudes of Christian Church Groups," Aug. 18, 1945, 1. This conclusion was based on the survey of statements by church leaders (both Protestants and Catholics), official pronouncements of organizations, and Christian journals.

\(^{88}\) Out of the 109 letters in the sampling written during the first phase of the occupation 57 clearly expressed the writer's praise for MacArthur.

\(^{89}\) There were ten letters in the sampling for the first phase that specifically showed the writer's admiration for MacArthur's address on Sept. 2, 1945. According to the writers, it gave "inspiration" to them. Among those letters was one from Louis Ludlow, a Congressman from Indiana, who, having been inspired by the address, had introduced in the Congress a bill (H.R. 4648) to establish the "Department of Peace and Goodwill" in U.S. government, in order for the U.S. to take a dramatic step to take moral leadership and promote peace abroad. See Louis Ludlow to MacArthur, Jan. 5, 1946, box 11, RG 10.
race, if properly directed, will enable expansion vertically rather than horizontally. If the talents of the race are turned into constructive channels, the country can lift itself from its present deplorable state into a position of dignity\(^{90}\) (underline mine).

Many people who admired him supported him with this commitment, and thought that the Japanese people could be remade because of MacArthur's excellent leadership.\(^{91}\)

Finally, as pointed out in some letters, a factor on the Japanese side, namely their willing cooperation with the occupation forces, seemed to have contributed to the lessening of the hostile attitude. As discussed in Karl Compton's report, however, the Japanese cooperation was initially received by many Americans with cynicism.

The factors noted above were not isolated phenomena but often interacted with and reinforced each other in bringing about a positive attitude toward Japan, namely, a willingness to help Japan with its reconstruction as a peaceful and democratic nation. It seems that factors such as the popularity of MacArthur, the strong desire for maintaining peace due to the experience of World Wars, and the invention of sophisticated weapons, particularly atomic bombs, and the conflict between the U.S. and Russia provided Americans with rather new situational factors for the constructive attitude toward Japan. On the other hand,

\(^{90}\) For a reproduction of this address, see Whan, ed., \textit{A Soldier Speaks}, 150-52.

\(^{91}\) Out of the 57 letters explicitly showing the writer's admiration for MacArthur, 21 belong to the category of "positive attitudes" toward the Japan.
direct personal contacts with the Japanese and the Christianity, where it put emphasis on principles such as God's love, forgiveness, and helpfulness, and was not utilized to justify personal desires, tended to provide more solid and lasting bases for the constructive attitude.

Perceptions of Japan

Among those who wrote to MacArthur, many with a constructive attitude still held unfavorable perceptions of Japan and its people. In the view of these Americans, the U.S. was a liberator for the common Japanese who had been indoctrinated and misled by their militarist leaders, was feudal-minded, did not yet understand democracy, and needed reeducation. The U.S.-Japan relationship tended to be viewed by these Americans paternalistically, as a teacher-student relationship, which implied their perception of Japan as a somewhat backward nation. Japan was on probation and the length of the probationary period was yet undetermined. Unlike those who stressed a harsh vengeful attitude toward Japan, however, these people at least saw a hope for reeducating the Japanese into a peaceful and democratic nation, though some thought it might take long to achieve it. This hope survived despite the widespread depiction of the Japanese as barbarians or savages during the war (as discussed in John Dower's book War Without Mercy).
Some people depicted the Japanese people rather favorably, though condemning their militaristic leaders. For instance, there are those who wrote, "the Japanese soldiers were remarkably well-behaved" (Alice Franklin Bryant, December 11, 1945), referred to "the Japanese folks' human dignity" (Wallace C. Speers, September 6, 1946), or affirmed that the Japanese were a fine people" (J.E. Rudisill, June 10, 1946).

One writer thought that, while the Japanese people did not yet fully understand democracy, they were at least "successfully experimenting with her [Japan's] first genuine chance for a democratic way of life" and were "cheerful," "industrious," "diligent and resourceful" (Wilson Compton, May 15, 1946). Or, according to another, "the Japanese people were not as yet prepared for a really democratic set-up" but were "perfectly capable of developing into a democratic nation" (Sucker, September 10, 1945). One saw the existence of the nucleus of peace-minded people among Japanese citizens who had "sincerely disapproved of the imperial policies" and wanted to create "a new era for Japan based on civil liberty and peaceable achievement" (Karl T. Compton, November 23, 1945). He also described the Japanese people, who had long lived under military feudal systems, as "very disciplined and very polite" (though excess of these qualities may have been seen unfavorably).
Some people also referred to the willing and friendly cooperation of the Japanese people with the occupation forces (K.T. Compton, W. Compton, A.F. Bryant, D.J. Byrne, August 31, 1945). One viewed that "under wise guidance" they could "respond to treatment with surprising promptness" (R.E. McAlpine, August 26, 1945).

Many others stressed rather America's or MacArthur's benevolent role and ability, to help transform Japan, or the superiority of the American way of life, instead of presenting favorable perceptions of Japan (e.g., Clay Judson, November 8, 1945, The P.W. Alston family, September 20, 1945, Samuel B. Pettingill, August 22, 1946, Philip F. LaFollette, October 13, 1946, W.D. Sumlin, April 6, 1946, Noah Webster Cooper, October 30, 1945).
PART TWO
THE SECOND PHASE, 1947-48

INTRODUCTION

During the second phase of the occupation, the emphasis of U.S. policy toward Japan shifted from democratic reform to economic reconstruction. As the Cold War intensified in Europe and the potential Soviet threat in Asia became more imminent, key officials in Washington began to conclude that the U.S. had little alternative but to promote Japan's recovery and its economic integration with the rest of Asia, and rebuild her as a key member of the American camp in the Far East. They came to drop many of their earlier assumptions about a reform plan in Japan.¹ Meanwhile in Tokyo SCAP's reform impulse also declined in 1947. SCAP during this phase began seeking social stability in Japan and trying to consolidate the democratization results that had been accomplished in the earlier period, instead of taking steps for more progressive reform. Economic control then exceeded democratization in importance.² At the same time, in the actual application of the occupation policy in Japan, the Truman administration and SCAP during this period

¹Schaller, Occupation, 26.
still remained committed to the legacies of liberal transformation.³ In addition, in 1947 and most of 1948, SCAP, not the Washington agencies, was still the master of Japan.⁴

The first significant sign of the change in U.S. plans for Japan’s economy occurring in the Washington policymaking circles was Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech in Cleveland, Mississippi, in May 1947. In this speech Acheson discussed the problem of the growing "dollar gap" in international trade. He stressed the staggering "disparity between production in the U.S. and production in the rest of the world," and pointed out that as a result, an extensive relief and reconstruction program abroad was needed not only for humanitarianism but also for America’s "national self-interest." Acheson also argued that until the various countries of the world got on their feet and became "self-supporting," there could be no political or economic stability in the world and no lasting peace or prosperity for anyone. He added,

Without outside aid, the process of recovery in many countries would take so long as to give rise to hopelessness and despair. In these conditions freedom and democracy and the independence of nations could not long survive, for hopeless and hungry people often resort to desperate measures. The war will not be over until the people of the

³Schaller, Occupation, 26.
⁴Ibid., 307-308.
world can again feed and clothe themselves and face the future with some degree of confidence. 5

Thus he contended that the world’s economic problems were closely related to America’s own economy and security. He then announced that America must go ahead with the reconstruction of Germany and Japan, the two "great workshops" upon which the "ultimate recovery of the two continents" so largely depended. 6

MacArthur also wanted Japan’s economic recovery to achieve a reasonable level. Though the initial U.S. policy directive instructed him not to accept responsibility for Japanese economic rehabilitation, he assumed that history would nevertheless judge his occupation by the shape in which he left Japan’s economy. 7 In March 1947 MacArthur proposed a peace treaty with Japan, believing that it would remove the obstacles to Japan’s recovery, namely, the tight control over Japan’s trade and unsettled reparations. 8 This assumption, however, was upset by the rejection by Russia and other Allied nations of the United States’ July 1947 proposal for a peace conference. Meanwhile, Japan’s economy staggered and her trade deficits increased. It was perceived by SCAP as well as Washington officials that the

7Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 403.
8Schaller, Occupation, 96.
U.S. could no longer afford to take a detached or incidental interest in Japanese recovery.9

From mid-1947 to early 1948, the State and the Army Departments came to agree that Japan needed a recovery program that included features resembling those of the Marshall Plan. They agreed on the need for giving Japan economic aid and industrial raw materials that would allow her to barter exports for future raw material supplies in the other Asian nations.10 Their plan also urged reducing Japan's reparations drastically and allowing her a higher ceiling on heavy-industry production levels. It was now believed that American security required "substantial U.S. assistance to our ex-enemy, rather than to our ex-Allies in the Far East." Moreover, Washington began to take steps to undermine MacArthur's pursuit of the economic deconcentration program in Japan that would delay Japan's

10 The economic report prepared by the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) of SCAP in 1947, "Possibility of a Balanced Japanese Economy," (informally known as the Green Book because of the color of its binding) became the basis for the request by Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper for funding from Congress in early 1948. According to the report, if the U.S. could invest a total of $950 million to $1.2 billion over the next five years -- an average of $190 million to $240 million a year -- Japan would attain economic independence at the end of that period or before. In contrast, continuing relief was currently costing the U.S. $250 million annually with no end in sight. The revised ESS report a year later ("Program for a Self-Supporting Japanese Economy," prepared in November 1948 and known as the Blue Book) stated the funds needed $1.4 billion, but it still promised an end to U.S. aid by 1953. See Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 409-410; Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 170-172.
recovery and alarm the Republican-dominated Congress against approving new aid to her. In order to carry out their plan, the Washington officials sought to curb MacArthur's power in Japan.\textsuperscript{11}

This new trend of thought found its formal expression in a U.S. statement to the FEC and press release of January 21, 1948, in which the U.S. Representative urged that the Japanese government and people, the FEC and its member states, and SCAP "take all possible and necessary steps, consistent with the basic policies of the occupation, to bring about the early revival of the Japanese economy on a peaceful, self-supporting basis."\textsuperscript{12} In his address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on January 6, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall had also discussed the need for a sound economy in Japan "for political stability to continue and free government to succeed in the future," at the same time affirming that the U.S. could not "forever continue to pour hundreds of millions of dollars annually into relief funds" for Japan. Regarding the dissolution of

\textsuperscript{11} Schaller, Occupation, 109-114. The Army and State departments initially clashed over procedural issue regarding Japan's recovery program. While the Army Department favored a unilateral program that excluded consultations with other nations, the State Department hoped for the cooperation of friendly Far Eastern Commission members for Japan's economic recovery program. Eventually the Army's position prevailed. The initial State Department proposal and the Army's later proposal submitted for interagency consideration were known as SWNCC 381 and SWNCC 384 respectively.

\textsuperscript{12} Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 124-25.
the Zaibatsu, he asserted that "deconcentration must stop short of the point where it unduly interferes with the efficiency of Japanese industry," while taking note of America's "dilemma" between its two purposes in Japan, namely, demilitarization and economic recovery. He concluded this speech by stressing that the U.S. needed to build in Japan "a self-sufficient democracy, strong enough and stable enough to support itself and at the same time to serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian war threats which might hereafter arise in the Far East."  

Within a few months thereafter George F. Kennan, Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and author of the "containment" policy, with a business delegation headed by Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper visited Japan to lay the groundwork for hastening Japanese recovery. In March Draper also released a report on Japanese industry prepared by "Overseas Consultants, Incorporated," a group of American engineers sent to Japan by the Army Department. This report contended that most heavy industry previously defined as "war supporting," should be exempt from reparations, thus rejecting the earlier Pauley reparations program. The formal report (the Johnston Report) of the Draper mission, completed in late

April 1948, presented an even more limited view of Japan's capacity to pay reparations. It also endorsed the goal of self-sufficiency by promoting Japan's access to Asian raw materials and export markets, and urged the elimination of most restrictions on production. Draper then released this report to Congress and the public. He at the same time dispatched to Tokyo a Deconcentration Review Board (DRB) to review the antimonopoly program in May. On June 20, 1948, following an extended debate, Congress funded a slightly trimmed down Economic Recovery in Occupied Areas (EROA) aid package, which would supplement the existing relief program and grant the army authority to finance industrial recovery and raw material imports.14

NSC (National Security Council) 13/2, which had been submitted to the NSC on June 2, 1948, proclaimed economic recovery the "primary objective" of U.S. policy in Japan,

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14 Schaller, Occupation, 122-132. Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 144. The Draper mission included Percy H. Johnston, chairman of the Chemical Bank and Trust Company, serving as nominal head; Paul G. Hoffman of Studebaker, who was soon to be appointed by Truman to administer the European Recovery Program; Robert F. Loree, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, and Sidney H. Scheuer, owner of a large textile firm. Draper was vice president of a prestigious Wall Street investment house of Dillon, Read & Co. He was appointed Under Secretary of the Army in August 1947, and stayed at this position for eighteen months. For a good overview of U.S. economic deconcentration program in Japan, see Eleanor M. Hadley, "Japan: Competition or Private Collectivism?," Far Eastern Survey 18 (Dec. 14, 1949), 289-94.
"secondary only to U.S. security interests".\textsuperscript{15} In October the NSC approved NSC 13/2, and President Truman endorsed it.\textsuperscript{16} By this time the shift in Washington's conception of Japan's role from a defeated and dangerous enemy to a potential major ally and a key bulwark against communism in Asia was all too clear. In December 1948 U.S. Representative to the FEC General Frank McCoy announced that the U.S. was abandoning the deconcentration program known as FEC-230 which it had submitted to the FEC in May 1947.\textsuperscript{17}

In the mind of Kennan, one of the principal figures in charting U.S. economic policy toward Japan during the second phase, Japan's recovery was the key element for successful containment of communism in Asia. It seems, however, that Draper, another principal figure in bringing about the "reverse course," was not primarily motivated by strategic or diplomatic concerns about the communist advance or ideological fears of the Soviet Union. Rather, the global economic issues and the need for relieving the American taxpayer of the burden of providing continuing aid to occupied Japan had the strongest influence on his policies for Japan, though these factors were not unrelated to the

\textsuperscript{15} NSC 13/2, Oct. 7, 1948, box 19, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This document was originated from a report by George Kennan.

\textsuperscript{16} Schaller, Occupation, 136-37.

\textsuperscript{17} FEC-230 derived from the report prepared by Corwin D. Edwards in 1946. See Schaller, Occupation, 40.
issue of the communist threat. The communist advance was surely detrimental to Draper's economic objectives.  

In addition, MacArthur grew increasingly alarmed at the political activism of the Japanese labor movement by 1947. In January 1947 the prolonged economic distress and the failure of the Yoshida government to deal effectively with this problem led to a projected anti-government general strike led by the Japanese communists. Plans for this strike had grown by the end of the month to a national protest of workers against the government. MacArthur then decided to step in, and banned the threatened general strike of February 1. At the same time, SCAP either sponsored or encouraged a series of new laws that limited labor rights.  

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19 Schaller, *Occupation*, 44; Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 277-300; Martin, *Allied Occupation*, 85-86; Fearey, *Occupation, Second Phase*, 77-81. MacArthur sent a public letter to Prime Minister Ashida recommending that the National Public Service Law be amended to withhold the right to strike from all categories of public employees. In December 1948, after extensive discussions between GHQ and the Japanese government, amendments to the National Public Service Law that suited MacArthur's recommendation were passed by the Diet.
CHAPTER IV

OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT JAPAN, 1947-48

Attitudes toward the Japanese and Appraisal of Japan's Democracy

The harsh image of the Japanese (i.e., "cruel," "barbarous," "savage," or "arrogant" people) expressed in the earlier period were much less frequently expressed, or tended to be at least less explicit in the American media in the second phase of the occupation, as the U.S. policy began to see Japan as a potential ally rather than a defeated enemy. This trend was particularly evident among those who advocated Japan's economic recovery. For example, in advocating the reconstruction of Japan's economy, Harry Kern in Newsweek of May 19, 1947, though mentioning "Nearly everything in Japan is done backward," stated, "Familiarity, however, does not sustain contempt. The Japanese system has produced an admirably simple, graceful, and happy way of living."1 A lawyer with long experience in Japan, James Lee

1Harry Kern, "Trouble in Japan: How the Struggle to Win the Peace . . . Now Threatens the Success of the American Occupation," Newsweek, June 23, 1947, 36-42. Kern was the principal organizer and leader of what was soon to become the American Council on Japan ("the Japan Lobby" in Howard Schonberger's words), which was led by old Japanese hands of the State Department and backed by major corporations with investments in Japan and friends among the Zaibatsu. See Howard B. Schonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," Pacific Historical Review 46, 3 (Aug. 1977): 327-59.
Kauffman (who was an active advocate of Japan's speedy economic recovery and who severely attacked the economic deconcentration program in Japan, FEC-230), in an article published in Newsweek in late 1947, referred to "Japan's real desire to be friendly and do our [American] bidding." He also wrote, "It [Japan] is still the leading Oriental nation in ability, respect for law and order, and desire to work. It is not Communistic and while Communism is growing, Japan will embrace it only as a last resort." Similarly a Newsweek article in October 1948 referred to the view of American businessmen that Japan had "the best industrial know-how, the widest trading experience, and the most skilled labor in the Orient." This emphasis on favorable aspects of Japan was in sharp contrast to the harsh images frequently projected in the early days of the occupation in the same magazine.

In a parallel manner to the Newsweek articles above, author and lecturer, Upton Close, in a speech before the Executives' Club of Chicago in October 1947, maintained, "Japan is the only place in the world where our going to war would be a mistake.

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has in any way helped democracy or civilization." He added, "It might become the model nation of the world, after the destruction, after the holocaust." Close also noted "the natural courage and unfailing thrift and energy of the Japanese people," and said, "You may have noticed one thing that has passed away from the Japanese people, and that is their arrogance and their faith in military supremacy." He thus depicted Japan as a nation that could be reeducated to a peaceful and democratic way of life.

Regarding the strategic importance of Japan to the U.S., close asserted,

I think it is generally felt, both in Japan and here, that in the growing antagonism with Russia, Japan will be a bulwark to us, and their sympathies are 90 per cent in our favor, and should the showdown come, the Japanese would be our most willing soldiers, and be a base for us even more willing, I think, than the English, when we flew from there to Germany (underline mine).

Moreover, as to U.S. policy toward Japan's trade, he said,

"We are going to have to do something very practical about Japan pretty soon. We are going to have to realize that here we are, a nation of 140 million people, who are ruling with absolute power a conquered nation of 90 million people, and that on how we do this job and how we turn it loose will depend the future of the Pacific Ocean, which is the ocean of future trade."

These statements, as well as the Newsweek articles noted above, suggest that the political and economic interests of the U.S. in the changing international scene, which will be
discussed below, contributed to the change in the projected image of Japan.

In addition, Close attributed the transformation of the Japanese from "a people so furious, so brutal, so insane in their emotions" to a "mild" and "spiritual" nation, and to the "sagacity, the tenacity and the patience" of General MacArthur. Thus, the support for and trust in MacArthur's leadership in Japan was a factor leading to the favorable and hopeful view of the Japanese.  

At the same time, while depicting Japan as a potentially important economic partner of the U.S. or a strategic ally, the writers introduced above retained unfavorable images of the Japanese. Close, for instance, negatively described the Japanese as "the most feminine-minded of all the forceful nations of the world," "a nation whose spiritual traits show a tremendous collection of contradictions," and a people with "a child-like mind." He also said, "His [MacArthur's] chosen men . . . were trying to make civilized Japanese out of the people who had been emotionally hysterical."  

As in the initial phase of the occupation, the perception of the Japanese as an undemocratic people who lacked independent thought, who had deep-rooted concepts of duty and obedience and "the directions-from-above

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{Ibid., 42.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}}\text{Ibid.}\]
prejudice," continued to be expressed. Kern wrote, "Since nearly everything a Japanese does is regulated by an unbelievably complex system of rules, there is no reason for him to think, to question, or to assume responsibility."7 Another article in Newsweek in February 1948, for example, stated, "So far as the individual citizen is concerned, he has never been taught to think."8 Along this line, a Catholic author who had taught university students in Japan for 14 years wrote in Commonweal magazine in April 1948, "We find in Japan a people who, in the varying circumstances of life, think alike, act and react alike, who seem to be lacking in all originality, and who have given hardly anything to the world in the way either of philosophy or creative thought. . . . Now it is the fact of this homogeneity that enables one to diagnose the psychological abnormalities of the Japanese as of no other race." The author went on to argue that Christianity, which could give the Japanese "the ideal," was the only remedy for Japan's troubles.9

Related to this image of the Japanese as an undemocratic, feudal minded people without independent thought was the judgment of democratic development in Japan

by American observers. Although, as discussed in the next section, the favorable evaluation of MacArthur's job in Japan and praise for him was expressed by many American observers who had visited Japan under the occupation, and most commentators admitted that significant progress had been made with respect to democratization of Japan, American observers generally remained skeptical about the matter of Japanese democracy throughout the second phase of the occupation. They agreed that it would be a long time before Japan was truly democratic, and some warned against the "excessively optimistic" picture of Japan being given to the American people from SCAP headquarters. For example, Clyde Farnsworth of Scripps-Howard wrote in the summer of 1948, expressing a fairly typical viewpoint, "The new way of life for Japan is still more promise than fulfillment, more blueprint than structure -- but the foundation has been poured, politically if not economically. It is up to the Japanese to build it." This view is illustrated by Figure

33. It shows that Japan was still a baby in a "democracy nursery." At the same time the baby seemed to have grown up since the first phase. Figure 34 reflects a viewpoint more distrustful of Japan's democratic intentions. In the summer of 1947, several observers warned that the "democratic skeleton" in Japan had "very little meat on it," and that "the ideologies of thousands of years" could "not be changed in a few years."\textsuperscript{12} Regarding the communist influence in Japan, \textit{Fortune}'s lead article in its March 1947 issue concluded "The danger of Communism in Japan arises from the still feudalistic mental habits of her people."\textsuperscript{13}

In May 1947, press and radio observers hailed the inauguration of Japan's new constitution as the start of a "novel and significant experiment in government" to prove whether democracy can be "achieved by legislative decree." However, as in the first phase of the occupation, the consensus of opinion (as expressed by such observers as the

\textsuperscript{12}This statement was made by Keyes Beech, Tokyo correspondent of the \textit{Chicago News}. Similar views were expressed by the \textit{Kansas City Star}, Maxwell Stewart in the \textit{Nation}, Elmer Davis of ABC, Arthur Gaeth of MBS, and Sumner Welles. See "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, July 16-August 31," Sept. 11, 1947, 4, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. In early 1948, similar views were also expressed by the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} and Hamilton Butler of the \textit{Detroit Free Press}. The former contended that there was scant evidence that the acceptance [of democracy by the Japanese] had been accompanied by any large change in Japanese thought." See "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, March-April, 1948," May 10, 1948, 5, box 39, RG 59.

\textsuperscript{13}"U.S. Opinion, Japan: Congressional, Press and Radio Comment during March," Apr. 30, 1947, 7. This \textit{Fortune} article was written by Herrymon Maurer.
Some observers, though they agreed that the Japanese common man was not yet democratic, were hopeful of Japan's democratic development. For instance, while admitting "Suzuki-san, Japan's man-in-the street," had not become "a full-fledged democrat" in the American sense, and the occupation should continue until U.S. sponsored reforms had had time to "jell," an article in Commonweal in September 1947 asserted, "Mr. Suzuki is on his way, and if the success he has already attained is any criterion, he will be living in a democracy before too very long." The author stressed that the Japanese could not obliterate the knowledge which they had learned at the high price of war and occupation. He also quoted the statement of Roger N. Baldwin, director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who had returned to the U.S. in June 1947 following an inspection trip to Japan.

and Korea. Baldwin termed the occupation of Japan "the greatest revolution I have ever seen." He declared that Japan was "an uplifting experience" and "a crusade."\textsuperscript{15}

It seems that though most American observers were aware that it would take a long time for Japan to become a truly democratic nation, the primarily favorable appraisal of the occupation in the mass media (as shown in the next section), besides the favorable depiction of Japan herself, gave the American public the impression that Japan was being remade at least in a generally right direction. It is also likely that this impression contributed to an improved perception of Japan as a potentially peaceful and democratic nation in the minds of many Americans.

A public opinion poll taken in mid-1948 suggests that the perception of Japan was being improved in the minds of the American public in general to that of a nation which could be remade and reeducated to become peaceful. According to the results of a nationwide survey of a cross section of the public taken in June 1948, when asked whether they thought Japan was likely to become a threat to world peace during the next twenty years, 55 percent answered "No" (not likely), while 32 percent said "Yes," and 13 percent gave no opinion. Although earlier polling questions are not strictly comparable, these results indicate some

modification of views held in September 1945, when only 39 percent thought the Japanese would ever become a peaceful nation, and 42 percent thought they would not. In June 1948 more people (55 percent) felt that Japan was unlikely to threaten would peace within twenty years than were willing to say in September 1945 (39 percent) that she might become a "peaceful nation."\(^{16}\)

In addition, according to this survey in June 1948, more people (43 percent) thought that Germany was likely to become a threat to world peace during the next twenty years than thought that Japan was likely to do so (32 percent).\(^{17}\) This was probably related to the higher degree of public satisfaction with the U.S. occupation of Japan compared to that of Germany. Moreover, it is conceivable that this result was partly due to the higher estimate by Americans of the potential industrial power and the war-making ability of the Germans than the Japanese. In other words, the Americans might have tended to feel that Japan was more manageable than Germany.

Regarding the media coverage of Japan, the paternalistic attitude toward Japan persisted in the American media in the second phase. As expressed or implied in some of the articles noted above, America was perceived

\(^{16}\) "Popular Attitudes on Occupation Policy for Germany and Japan," July 23, 1948, 4-5, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. These survey results were released by NORC on March 15, 1950. See Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Summer 1950): 380.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
to be the benevolent teacher of democracy and Japan was the student. (See also Figure 35.) A Fortune editorial in March 1947 noted the long-term aim of the occupation was "altering the Japanese way of mind so that it would never contemplate war." It also observed,

SCAP is essentially a missionary enterprise. It is often dynamic, not infrequently paternal and almost always evangelical. Its message is by no means imperial. . . . It preaches the good news of the United States of America -- with due deference to the equally good news of the British Commonwealth and the smaller democracies. It is interested in the conversion of Japan to democracy and in the basic reform of her way of life, and talks of representative government and of the equality of the sexes much as American men of religion have always talked in the Far East -- but on a much vaster scale (underline mine).

He also pointed out that many Japanese began to look to the occupation as a protector against their own government. 18

In the same vein, an article in Collier's in September 1947 emphasized American benevolence as follows:

Once the fighting ceases, Americans seem unable to continue hating and particularly unable to endure the untidiness of destruction. Throughout Japan and Okinawa the American civil government is busily engaged in cleaning up, making plans for the natives to rebuild their destroyed homes and seeking to devise ways of aiding the Japanese especially, because their need to feed themselves is so great. Generally, occupation authorities do whatever common sense and human compassion can suggest to make life as endurable as possible for a conquered people. 19

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This paternalistic and benevolent role of the U.S. is shown by Figure 36, whose title, "-- A Mighty Man Is He," was taken from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's popular poem, "The Village Blacksmith" (1840). This figure reflects a traditional image of American heroes.

However, it seems that this evangelical impulse or missionary solicitude, though persistent, was less frequently expressed in the American media dealing with the occupation in the second phase than in the initial phase, as the trend of American opinion came to stress the need for relieving the American taxpayer of the burden of providing continued aid to her rather than furthering democratic reforms in Japan. On the other hand, the basic "teacher-student" relationship seemed to continue, except now the lesson for the student was to become economically self-supportive, and to stand firm against the spread of communism. In terms of national power, the U.S. was a giant, whereas Japan was a tiny child.

Theodore Cohen, who worked for SCAP from 1946 to 1950, also points out the decline of the evangelical impulse among SCAP officials at that time, after the Under Secretary of the Army Draper's declaration in September 1947 that the new prime objective of the occupation of Japan would be "to reduce the costs to the American taxpayer." Cohen writes, "American policy was trivialized, when what was after all only minor American tax relief was held up as the new ultimate SCAP goal. No one in GHQ talked any more about a 'new society.' The Occupation as a source of inspiration for a better Japan, a cause that had brought such a sense of liberation to millions of ordinary Japanese in earlier years, just dried up. Their dreams were unsaddled, unbridled, and left for other riders." See Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 408.
At the same time, distrust of the Japanese and unfriendly feelings toward them seemed to remain in the mind of many Americans, though the strong wartime hostility had abated by the second phase, and harsh racial expressions against the Japanese were rarely used in public comment. The title of Sidney Shalett's article for the Saturday Evening Post in July 1947, "Why We're Trading With the Enemy," suggests this atmosphere. In this article, by quoting the statements of Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, Shalett explained the reason why "our reluctant War Department was going into business partnership with the Japanese and the Germans in an astonishingly big way," and stressed that it was for U.S. self-interest, not humanitarianism. According to Petersen, Shalett reported, the intertwined nature of the world economy, the consequent need for the restoration of the ex-enemies' economy for U.S. self-interest, and the need for building the walls "against the spread of world communism" in Germany, Korea, and Japan by keeping people there from hunger, coupled with the fact that the U.S. could not continuously support the economy of other nations by providing aid, led to the need for trading with ex-enemy nations.21

Furthermore, as in the initial phase, liberal-minded writers such as T. A. Bisson, in contrast to the active

advocates of Japan's speedy economic revival (e.g., Harry Kern, James Lee Kauffman), continued to express their strong distrust of the Japanese big industrialists, financiers, and conservative office holders with prewar experience in government. 22

As to the general public's attitude toward Japan, (though comparative survey results in 1947 or 1948 are not available) the following survey conducted in March 1949 suggests the attitude at the end of the second phase. According to this Gallup poll, when asked about their feelings toward the Japanese people, 34 percent of those questioned professed "friendly feelings," 30 percent said they were "neutral," while 29 percent felt "unfriendly," and 7 percent were "undecided." Of those who had attended college, 50 percent felt "friendly." A tabulation of answers from veterans of World War II followed almost exactly the same pattern as the cross section result. 23

Those questioned were also asked what they liked most and least about the Japanese people. Among Japanese virtues, the following were most often mentioned: the

22 E.g., T. A. Bisson, "Reparations and Reform in Japan," Far Eastern Survey 16 (Dec. 17, 1947): 241-47. He argued that the "Japanese strategy of sabotaging economic reconstruction to gain a soft peace" had brought the economic catastrophe in Japan.

Japanese are industrious and hard-working; they are cooperating with the occupation authorities; they have great manufacturing skill; and they are "clever" or "smart." The chief Japanese faults were thus described: the Japanese are "sneaky," "treacherous," "cruel," "barbaric," they cannot understand or appreciate democracy because they are too deeply imbued with Emperor-worship.\(^\text{24}\) These Japanese virtues and faults expressed by those polled were congruent with those discussed in the mass media as shown above.

Compared with the survey results in the initial phase, when the majority expressed harsh views of the Japanese people, these figures indicate a lessening of public hostility since the end of the war. On the other hand, about three out of every ten still professed "unfriendly" feelings toward the Japanese. Furthermore, a survey showed that 45 percent of the Americans already felt "friendly" to the German people two years earlier, that is, early in 1947 (in contrast to 34 percent feeling friendly to the Japanese people in early 1949). The American public thus tended to have a softer attitudes toward the Germans than the Japanese.\(^\text{25}\)

In addition, while the existence of the element of racism could not be denied in the more negative perceptions

\(^{24}\) Feraru, "Public Opinion Polls on Japan," 103.
of the Japanese than the Germans held by Americans, it seems
the depiction of Japan as a child in the newspaper cartoons
was not necessarily due to racism. As Figures 41-43 show, some American cartoonists in early 1947 also projected
Germany as a "problem child." This fact suggests that the
teacher-student relationship or the child image as expressed
in U.S. cartoons tended to be derived from the difference in
national power between the U.S. and its defeated nations.

Overall Appraisal of U.S. Occupation Policy and Achievements
in Japan

In the second phase of the occupation, as in the earlier phase, public comment on the occupation continued to
be primarily favorable, and General MacArthur, who seemed to
personify the occupation, was often praised for his job in
Japan, notwithstanding the criticism against certain
occupation policies. In February 1947, through the reports
of the nine editors and publishers who made a five-week tour
of the Orient, the occupation of Japan received more
detailed and prominent attention than usual. The newsmen
(e.g., Erwin Canham of the Christian Science Monitor, Wayne
Coy of the Washington Post, E. Z. Ditiman of the Chicago
Sun, Robert Reed of the Kansas City Star, Carroll Binder of
the Minneapolis Tribune, and Roy Howard of the Scripps-
Howard papers) unanimously lauded the achievements of the
occupation program thus far, and emphasized that the U.S.
public should know more about democratic progress in Japan.
They at the same time pointed out the problems to be solved such as the communist influence in the labor movement, reparation issues, and the slow progress toward economic recovery. In the following month, enthusiastic acclaim for General MacArthur's achievements in Japan came from a number of sources [e.g., Lansing State Journal, columnist Henry McLemore, Representative Van Zandt (R., Pennsylvania), the Ogden Standard-Examiner, Tampa Tribune, Patterson press, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mankato (Minnesota) Free Press, Roanoke Times, Baton Rouge State Times, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Harold Ickes, and Herrymon Maurer of Fortune], many of which urged MacArthur to come home to receive the tribute owed him by the nation. In mid-1947, the occupation continued to receive generally favorable treatment from American observers, and the second anniversary of Japan's fall drew renewed compliments for MacArthur's administration from many observers (e.g., New Orleans States, Baton Rouge Advocate, Louisville Courier-Journal, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, and William H. Chamberlin).

26 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, February 1947," Mar. 11, 1947, 3-4. Erwin Canham of the Monitor acknowledged that many of his "preconceptions of events and the situation in Japan had altered because of the trip."
Later in the year, MacArthur's administration of Japan was warmly commended by a number of observers -- members of the House Armed Services Committee [Representatives Cole (R., New York), Norblad (R., Oregon), and Clason (R., Massachusetts)] who had toured the Pacific, Roger Baldwin, and Philip LaFollette, the famous progressive and former Governor of Wisconsin. The Congressmen, after their tour of the Pacific, all agreed with Representative Cole that Japan was "the one bright spot in a dark world picture."30 Again in early 1948, enthusiastic praise for MacArthur's achievement in Japan came from Roger Baldwin, Representative Smathers (D., Florida), The Rev. Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, S. J. (Vice President of Georgetown University), the Patterson press, and the New York Times. Baldwin called the American record in Japan "one of the most revolutionary accomplishments in history," and Walsh commended the general's firm policy, which had made Japan "one of the quietest spots" in the Far East,31 though some commentators were more reserved about MacArthur's accomplishments, and,

30 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, October 1-November 15," Nov. 25, 1947, 4, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59; Monthly Survey, Nov. 1947, 7, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59. See also Close, "Japan Remade -- And China," for a favorable discussion of MacArthur's job in Japan. LaFollette was so touched by MacArthur's address on the Missouri at the occasion of Japan's surrender that he changed his lifelong low opinion of the general and became one of his warmest admirers. See Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 51.
31 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, March-April 1948," May 10, 1948, 5. Baldwin even declared, "Japan is already on the way to becoming one of the great democracies of the world and a spiritual ally of the American people."
as discussed above, many remained skeptical about the democratization of the Japanese, especially in terms of their way of thinking.

In August 1948, commentators assessing the three-year record of the occupation agreed that it reflected great credit upon the U.S. However, as the State Department's opinion survey noted, the tendency was to view the year ahead with some misgivings, due to Japan's complex economic troubles, communist agitation, and continuance of the "basic conflict" between the U.S. and Russia. As discussed above, many commentators were also skeptical about the view that Japan was already a democratic nation.

There was, of course, other occasional criticisms against the occupation from some observers. For instance, observers such as the New York Herald Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor continued to give occasional warnings against "over-confidence in the virtues of Japanese office holders" or America's allying with Japanese "feudalistic overlords" who had "geared the country to war" in order to build her as a bulwark against Russia. For example, in early 1947, the Christian Science Monitor maintained, "The past records and privately expressed sentiments of these Japanese leaders -- even many of those officially classified as liberals -- cast serious doubt on

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their fundamental conversion from authoritarian modes of thought." In late 1948, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch contended, "There can be no defense of a policy which would turn Japan back into the hands of the autocrats." These observers continued to stress their distrust of Japanese office holders with prewar experience in the government, and were primarily concerned with the internal democratic reforms in Japan, deemphasizing her strategic value against Russia. They continued to believe that an authoritarian Japan would again become an aggressive nation and a threat to international peace.

While these observers questioned SCAP's conservative bias, some conservatives, particularly Newsweek's foreign affairs editor, Harry Kern, and its Tokyo correspondent, Compton Pakenham, repeatedly criticized MacArthur's program for being too radical or harsh in 1947. They detested MacArthur personally, believing that his reform agenda as well as that mandated by Washington left Japan destitute and vulnerable to communism. (See the section on economic purge below.)

There was also some criticism regarding the censorship policies of SCAP. In February 1948, while MacArthur's administration was still "overwhelmingly" approved,

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according to the State Department's opinion survey the "running feud" between SCAP and Tokyo correspondents over censorship policies was widely noted by U.S. editors. This gave rise to the contention that the American public was not receiving a complete account of what was happening in Japan, and several commentators (e.g., the Baltimore Sun, Louisville Courier-Journal, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal) urged that an impartial investigation be conducted.\textsuperscript{35}

As to the general public, there are no results of any nationwide survey available that was taken in the second phase of the occupation. A poll conducted by the Minneapolis Tribune in late 1947, however, suggests an answer. When public comment on the occupation was primarily favorable, though there was some criticism as shown above, the Minnesota poll found that in the eyes of most Minnesotans, the U.S. had done a commendable job of handling the occupation since the end of the war. It revealed that eight out of every ten Minnesotans interviewed (86 percent) thought that the occupation had been "very well" (44 percent) or "fairly well" (42 percent) carried out. Only 5 percent thought that the U.S. had not done very well in the job, while the rest were undecided. Veterans tended to be

more enthusiastic - 91 percent saying they regarded the occupation as satisfactorily managed. The percentage of those who said that the occupation had been "very well" handled was particularly high among the college-educated (57 percent). 36

Of course, Minnesota did not represent the whole nation. However, this Minnesota poll, together with the similar national survey results in the third phase (which will be discussed below), suggests that the Japanese occupation continued to be regarded as successful by most Americans in this second phase.

Moreover, among the American public, General MacArthur remained in the top among the "most admired" in 1947, and he was third in 1948, according to George Gallup. 37

Concern with Communist Influence in Japan and the Impact of the Cold War on American Attitudes toward Japan

Russia's activities vis-a-vis Japan and Russia's position in the Pacific became a more prominent theme in the second phase of the occupation in public comments relating to Japan than in the first phase. The need for rebuilding Japan as America's bulwark against the Soviet bloc came to be generally approved in public comments in 1948, as the

37 George Gallup, "MacArthur Highly Popular Here as Japan Occupation Chief," Public News Service, April 15, 1949, box 17, RG 10, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.
Chinese Nationalist government was heading toward its collapse and the "communist peril in Asia" was spreading. While animosity against Japan gradually abated among Americans, the general public's attitude toward Russia was significantly hardened. According to public opinion surveys by NORC, three weeks after V-J Day a majority (52 percent of the total sample) said they felt that Russia could "be trusted to cooperate" with them now that the war was over. As early as October 1945, however, only a little less than 40 percent said that she could be trusted to cooperate. By the fall of 1948 this number had dwindled to only 16 percent, who felt that Russia could "be trusted to meet us halfway in working out world problems." The number of Americans who felt that Russia was "not willing to meet us halfway" had increased from 33 percent in September 1945 to 76 percent in October 1948. Thus there had been a large-scale reversal of popular opinion on the question of Russia's willingness to cooperate with the U.S.\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\) *Monthly Survey*, Dec. 1948, 6-7, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59. In addition, it is notable that according to a NORC survey released in July 1945, when asked, "From what you've heard, do you think the kind of government Russia has is as good as she could have for her people at the present time, or do you think a different kind of government would be better for the Russians?", as many as 46 percent said that the present kind was good, while only 26 percent said a different kind would be better, and 28 percent said they did not know. These figures suggest that anti-communism among the Americans at that time was not yet evident. Moreover, according to a *Fortune* survey released on August 31, 1945, when asked, "Do you feel that most of the common people in Russia are now pretty friendly toward the U.S., or not so friendly, or that most of them don't have any feeling one
As shown in the following pages, the public discussion of communist influence in Japan and that on the U.S. policy to build Japan as an anti-Soviet bulwark were often related to the issue of restoring Japan’s economy. It was generally considered that halting economic recovery would fuel communist propaganda about the obsolescence of capitalism and the ill effects of participating in the America-dominated capitalist bloc and increase the likelihood of leftist revolts and electoral victories. Building a sound economy, therefore, was the best safeguard against the communist advance. At the same time, since the U.S. could not forever support Japan’s economy by sending a large amount of relief, it was necessary to make her self-supporting. The Cold War in Europe in 1947 and the consequent increase in U.S. foreign aid to those areas also brought many American observers to recognize the need for restoring Japan’s (as well as Germany’s) economy, thus reducing American costs there. Moreover, the communist gains in Asia increased the importance of Japan as an anti-communist bulwark, which also led to the general acceptance

way or the other?,” a majority (52.7 percent) thought they were friendly toward the U.S., while only 7 percent thought they were not so friendly, 22.0 percent thought it was not one way or other, and 18.3 percent did not know. See Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 387.

39 For a convincing discussion of the close relationship between fears of communist gains and economic collapse, see Borden, Pacific Alliance, 12-13.
of the U.S. policy to build a economically strong, prosperous Japan as America's ally.

According to William Borden, the author of *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955* (1984), capitalist economic deterioration and communist ideological strength were mutually reinforcing, and to argue the primacy of either the communist threat or the internal threat of economic deterioration was to argue the primacy of the "chicken or the egg." However, Borden also argues that, while Congress and the public feared communism and supported the Mutual Security Program, in official policy papers the most sophisticated leaders primarily feared economic deterioration. In his words, "Anti-communism provided the emotional rallying point for Congressmen, editors, and the public, casting the economic struggles into the shadows and giving the State Department a magic wand to command congressional approval of foreign aid and public approval of American influence abroad."40 The findings of this present study do not generally contradict Borden's argument, though the need for relieving the burden of the American taxpayer, which was not unrelated to anti-communism (because it was considered that stopping American relief to Japan could leave her unprotected from the communist advance), as well as anti-communism itself, was an often stressed point in the

40 Ibid., 10.
public comment discussing the restoration of Japan's economy in the second phase of the occupation.\textsuperscript{41}

1) Concern with Communist Influence in Japan

In early 1947 the concerns expressed with communist influence in Japan rose in volume due to the projected general strike in Japan of February 1. The voluminous comment highlighted the role of "radical" or "communistic" labor leaders. Commentators expressed considerable concern over the "defiant" and "hostile" attitude of Japanese labor leaders toward the occupation.\textsuperscript{42} For example, Lindesay Parrot of the \textit{New York Times Magazine}, criticizing the communist leader, Kyuichi Tokuda, who had threatened, according to Parrott, that all Japanese production would be heavily affected soon and cease entirely by April if the conservative government of Premier Shigeru Yoshida was continued in office, asserted, "Should a popularly elected

\textsuperscript{41}As the key factors for the "reverse course" in U.S. occupation policy toward Japan (i.e., the shift of emphasis from democratization to economic recovery), Borden stressed the "tremendous imbalance in the world economy" -- a "dollar gap" -- and U.S. need for creating industrial centers in Asia and Europe to solve this problem. He wrote: "This 'reverse course' in Occupation policy has been attributed to the hardening of Cold War tensions and the success of the Chinese revolution. American officials, of course, opposed Japanese communists and were forced to abandon hopes of an alliance with China. Global economic deterioration, however, also made Japanese revival and conservative "stability" crucial to solving the Asian and global dollar gaps" (underline mine). See Borden, \textit{Pacific Alliance}, 63.

Japanese government within the next half-dozen years find itself forced to resign under the impact of illegal methods and threats of force, then the whole democratic, constitutional 'government of laws' which we are attempting to offer the Japanese people would be called in question."

Parrott also advocated allowing Japan to retain the machinery she needed to manufacture and giving her access to necessary markets, since denying them, in his view, would lead to economic chaos and create "made-to-order conditions for a new totalitarianism with the slogan, 'Democracy Means Starvation.'"43

MacArthur, who was increasingly alarmed at the political activism of the labor movement, banned the threatened strike on January 31. Following this measure, while conceding the legitimacy of the workers' protest against intolerable economic condition, most editorial opinions on this subject in February (e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Pawtucket Times) were unsparingly critical of Japanese labor leaders who "ignore[d] the welfare of their people and wish to produce catastrophe for their revolutionary purposes." On the other hand, a few "liberally minded" observers (i.e., L. K. Rosinger in Foreign Policy Bulletin, the Lincoln State Journal, and

Elmer Petersen of NBC) criticized the U.S. occupation for its continued support of a "do-nothing" government. 44

In April, many commentators (e.g., Cincinnati Times-Star, Fargo Forum, Hartford Times, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Boston Herald, Chicago Tribune, Philadelphia Bulletin, New York Times, Washington Star) hailed Japan's rejection of communism as shown in the results of the April elections (i.e., local, the House of Councillors, and the House of Representatives elections), and were gratified by the people's preference for a middle-of-the-road government. 45

In an article for the Saturday Evening Post in July 1947, Sidney Shalett wrote,

As Petersen [Assistant Secretary of War] says, "If we don't make it possible for them [the Germans and the Japanese] to earn the money to feed themselves, we have two broad choices. First, we can get out of Germany and Japan and lose what we fought for including the right to control the future warmaking potentials of those countries. In the case of Germany at least, this would open the country to communist domination. Second, we


45 "U.S. Opinion, Japan - April," May 26, 1947, 1-2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. With a tenfold increase in party membership since the April 1946, the Communists had looked forward confidently to at least 20 seats in the House of Representatives. They ended up with only 4, a loss of one. Their share of the popular vote remained slightly below 4 percent. See Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 297.
can (One) feed them ourselves from now on, (Two) shoot them" (underline mine).  

Since the U.S. did not want to feed ex-enemies by continuously sending a large amount of relief ($725,000,000 a year, according to Shalett), Shalett argued, the U.S. needed to trade with them to help them support themselves. He also quoted Petersen's statement, "Nothing breeds disorder, political instability and totalitarian regimes -- Fascism, anarchy and communism -- more rapidly than the empty lunchbox." In interpreting this statement, he added:

What Petersen really means is that the United States regards our mission in the occupied countries, particularly Germany, as another block in the wall we are attempting to put up against the spread of world communism. President Truman made this clear when he called for support of Greece and Turkey as bulwarks against communism. The same principle applies in Germany, in Korea and in Japan.  

Thus, though the author paid primary attention to the communist threat in Germany, he explained the need for trading with ex-enemies, including Japan, mainly from the viewpoint of preventing economic chaos, and thereby preventing the spread of communism there, at the same time relieving the American taxpayer of providing continued relief to those countries.

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46 Shalett, "Why We're Trading With the Enemy," 25.
47 Ibid., 145.
2) Discussion on Rebuilding Japan as America's Far Eastern Bulwark against Russia

In mid-1947, commentators showed a growing tendency to say that the U.S. was shifting its emphasis away from China, toward "reviving" Japan as the leading industrial power and the anti-Red strategic base in the Far East, as the situation in China was worsening in American eyes and the U.S. proposed an early peace conference in July.48 While the discussion for the idea of rebuilding Japan as America's Far Eastern bulwark or potential ally against Russia was still largely noncommittal in mid-1946, some observers in 1947, as well as a few in late 1946, approved of this idea. For example, concerning Japan's economic revival, several observers (e.g., Hamilton Owens of the Baltimore Sun, Lee Hills of Chicago News) concluded in mid-July and August 1947 that the U.S. must re-establish a kind of "Co-Prosperity Sphere" for Asia in which the Japanese factories would "play the essential role of fabricating much of the raw materials produced by the other countries."49 Harry Kern of Newsweek had advocated Japan's economic recovery earlier in 1947. He

48 Monthly Survey, July 1947, 10. For example, Harry Kern of Newsweek noted, "Already American policy tends to stress building up an orderly, hard-working Japan rather than a chaos-ridden China. The greater the menace of the Chinese-Soviet Reds, the more this trend would be strengthens. It might not be beyond the realm of possibility that the United States would then revive Japan not only as an industrial but as a military power as well. See Harry F. Kern, "The U.S. Answer to Russia: A Revived Japan," Newsweek, Aug. 4, 1947, 38.
denounced the economic purge program that would "cut off the most active, efficient, experienced, cultured, and cosmopolitan section of the nation" which had "always been the best disposed toward cooperation with the U.S." and leave the nation "as an eventual prize to the Russians."50

Another advocate of Japan's industrial recovery, R. C. Kramer, questioned in his article for Fortune magazine in June 1947,

Do we want a peaceful, prosperous Japan that looks to the U.S. as its best friend and ally, or do we want a disordered, resentful, embittered Japan dreaming of a day of revenge? (underline mine).

He also argued,

Japan's strategic position vis-a-vis Asia is very similar to that of England's position vis-a-vis Europe. . . . If we accept the fact that the Japanese are at present the most advanced people of the East in business and industry, can we deny the probability that they will again exert great commercial influence? And will that influence be exerted with the U.S. or against the U.S.?51

With respect to the security aspect, the World Report in late 1947 asserted that the U.S. could not afford to wait for China to become strong, unified and democratic, and that therefore it would have to "look to Japan to provide in the Far East those elements of stability and security considered vitally important by the western powers."52 An article in Collier's in September 1947 maintained,

51 R. C. Kramer, "Japan Must Compete," 112-13, 176, 179.
Nothing can be planned, undertaken or accomplished without taking into account the possibility of Russian aggression. . . . Whatever Russian intentions, everything that is done in Japan, in Korea, in China and in the island bases we hold in the Pacific, is carried on in the light of a possible unprovoked and sudden attack from Russia.

The author also argued that many Japanese people thought they were helpless unless the U.S. accepted responsibility for their defense.53

However, because the Cold War was still primarily a European matter, many American observers in 1947 did not show their active support for the idea of rebuilding Japan as a key anti-Red bulwark or a potential important ally in Asia, though they wanted to keep Japan from communist influence and supported the idea of making her economy self-supporting. Hastily reconstructing Japan for the purpose of making her the "workshop" of Asia and a chief anti-Red bulwark meant going beyond just approving the idea of making her self-supporting. It meant speedily rebuilding Japan into the principal industrial power in Asia which would check the expansion of the Soviet-communist power there. The State Department's opinion survey noted in December 1947 that "many felt that Japan should not be permitted to regain her dominant industrial role in Asia nor to infringe the American export markets," though "it seemed generally agreed that the peacetime standard must be tolerable, and that

there are limits to what can be done in curtailing Japan's heavy industry.\footnote{54 "Memorandum on U.S. Public Opinion on a Japanese Peace Treaty," Dec. 8, 1947, 4.}

It was in early 1948, after the transitional period in 1947, that the general trend of public comment began to approve of rebuilding Japan as a key Far Eastern bulwark against Russia. The U.S., it was now felt, should make Japan the "workshop" of Asia, as opposed to merely allowing her to be self-supporting by reviving her light industry (though the actual immediate goal was a self-supporting Japan and Japan at that time was still far from self-supporting\footnote{55 For a comprehensive analysis of Japan's economy at that time, see Jerome Cohen, "Japan: Reform vs. Recovery," Far Eastern Survey 17, 12 (June 23, 1948): 137-42.}). As the State Department's \textit{Monthly Survey of American Opinion on International Affairs} noted in March 1948, a complete revision in U.S. economic policy toward Japan was anticipated and "sympathetically" received by those commenting. In his speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on January 6, 1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall stressed the need for a sound economy in Japan.\footnote{56 See Jon Livingston, et al., eds., 116-19.} George Kennan's visit to Tokyo in early March touched off further speculation that a program was being formulated to develop Japan as a flourishing "ally" able to resist Russian expansion in the Far East.\footnote{57 Before Kennan's arrival in Japan on March 1, 1948, Army Under Secretary Draper's office leaked information to the United Press and the International News Service, which}
speculation increased following the Army's release of the recommendations by Overseas Consultants Inc. (OCI) that the U.S. scrap its present reparations policy and allow Japan substantial industrial regrowth. Finally, the Draper mission of industrial and governmental experts in March evoked forecasts of a fundamental revision in the basic post-surrender directive. While these developments had not stimulated discussion on a large scale in March and April, those commenting (e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, Business Week, Commonweal, Newsweek) generally envisaged -- with approval -- a blueprint for Japan's recovery based largely on the recommendations of Overseas Consultants, Inc. Although the recommendation of OCI "startled" some commentators, little criticism was offered. The changing world picture, including Russian expansionism and the deteriorating situation in China and Korea, had outdated earlier basic policy orders, in the opinion of those discussing this problem. Newsweek also praised Draper for put out reports under leads such as "Drastic Change in Policy of U.S. Envisaged -- Kennan Visit Seen as Move to Build Up Japan as Anti-Red Bulwark." Other headlines described Japan's vital role in countering Red infiltration of Asia. See Stewart Hensley, Feb. 27, 1948, United Press release; Theodore Koslow, Feb. 26, 1948, International News Service release, cited in Schaller, Occupation, 123.

letting "common sense and the vital interests of the U.S." dictate his course.\textsuperscript{60}

It was also noted by some observers that American opinion toward the Japanese had undergone considerable change since the occupation began. For instance, the \textit{San Francisco Chronicle} noted, "American policy and with it the American people's thinking has traveled far since the end of the war when the prevailing mood was a sort of 'let-'em-eat-rice' attitude."\textsuperscript{61} It then concluded, "We must abandon our old notions in favor of the 'new liberalized policy' foreshadowed in the Draper and OCI reports."\textsuperscript{62}

On the other hand, some warnings against a "too rapid revival" of Japan's economy were voiced by those who argued for an industrial "balance of power" in the Far East (i.e., Elmer Davis of ABC, I.F. Stone of \textit{FM}) and others who feared basic reforms may be set aside in the process of stepping up Japan's recovery (i.e., William Costello of CBS and the \textit{Christian Science Monitor}).\textsuperscript{63}


\textsuperscript{61} Though, unlike the \textit{Chronicle}, expressing uneasiness about the new trend of U.S. policy toward Japan, the \textit{Christian Science Monitor} agreed, "American opinion has been swinging around to the view that Japan should be made the 'workshop of the Far East' and the 'bastion against Russian influence in Asia.'" William L. Shirer in the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} also showed a similar view. See "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, March-April 1948," May 10, 1948, 2.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 3; \textit{Monthly Survey}, Apr. 1948, 9, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.
It seems that the public sentiment in mid-1948 accepted the prevailing media opinion in favor of rebuilding Japan's economy. When asked in June 1948, "Do you approve or disapprove of our government helping to build up Japanese industry," a majority of 59 percent said "Approve," while more than a third (35 percent) still said "Disapprove," and 6 percent expressed no opinion. It should be noted that this time, the question, unlike earlier ones in April 1945 and December 1946, simply said the "industries," instead of inquiring specifically about aid for "peacetime industries." This difference in question-wording may be a reason for the slight drop of favorable answers from the December 1946 poll, in which 61 percent approved of helping Japan rebuild her "peacetime" industries.

In the case of helping to revive German industry, 65 percent in June 1948 approved of it, while 30 percent disapproved and 5 percent gave no opinion. Thus, as in the past, there was somewhat greater support for aiding German industry (65 percent) than for aiding Japanese industry (59 percent).

In mid-1948, a number of commentators (e.g., Joseph Harsch, Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune) warned

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64 "Popular attitudes on Occupation Policy for Germany and Japan," July 23, 1948, 3-4. See also Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Summer 1950): 377. This poll was taken by the NORC in July 1948.
65 "Popular attitude on Occupation Policy for Germany and Japan," July 23, 1948, 3-4.
that Soviet communism "might be turning from presently unpromising fields in Europe to much more promising fields in Asia," pointing to upheavals in Malaya, Burma, Indochina, and other areas. Moreover, observers in general called upon the nations of the West, particularly the U.S. to give "more attention" to the problem.66 Under the circumstances, the trend of opinion remained strongly in favor of a speedy revival of Japan's trade and industry.67 The steady "deterioration" of conditions in China and Southeast Asia prompted several commentators (e.g., Walter Lippmann, Florida Times Union, New York Herald Tribune, Time, Washington Star) to urge "concentration of the American effort" in the Far East "at a few selected points from which its influence and example" could "be made to radiate" to counter the communist drive. Japan, it was argued, was a very logical spot to begin "intensive development." Revival of its industry and large-scale foreign trade were

66 Monthly Survey, June 1948, 7; Ibid., July 1948, 8, both in box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59. Owen Lattimore, though he opposed the idea of building Japan as American strongly, also called for more attention to U.S. Asiatic policy, and argued, "We must come out in favor of big and prompt concessions to colonial nationalism, or perfectly legitimate movements will turn to Communist leadership and the friendship of Russia." The Christian Science Monitor urged that the West make "determined experiments in the politics of attraction -- i.e., surrender of imperial privilege, cooperation with native reform, humanitarian and educational aid on a large scale." Regarding China, commentators remained divided on large-scale aid to the Nationalist government.

considered to be the prime requisites of such a program.\(^{68}\)

V. L. Horoth, writing for the *Magazine of Wall Street* in July 1948, explained that the U.S. should rebuild Japan’s trade because: 1) Japan could not remain "a constant drain on the U.S.", 2) "The prospects of rebuilding China into an industrial power in the Far East which would check the expansion of the Soviet-communist power" were "growing increasingly dim. On the other hand, a prosperous Japan would . . . not only be "safe" as far as communism goes, but would be an effective buffer to Russian expansion," 3) "Japanese manufactures are needed in the Far East and southeastern Asia" (underline mine).\(^{69}\)

On the other hand, there was also considerable emphasis in the summer of 1948 on the unfavorable reaction of Japan’s neighbors toward the rebuilding of Japan as "the workshop of Asia." Strong opposition to a U.S. policy whereby Japan (and Germany) would continue their dominant rule in the political and economic life of their neighbors was voiced by Congressman Sadowski (D., Michigan), the *Christian Science Monitor*, Harold Strauss (editor of Alfred Knopf, Inc.) and

\(^{68}\)Ibid.

\(^{69}\)V. L. Horoth, "Rebuilding of Japanese Trade under U.S. Occupation," *Magazine of Wall Street* 82 (July 31, 1948): 431. He thought that the Johnston Committee recommendations about rebuilding Japan’s heavy industry as well as light industry contained "a lot of common sense," but was also concerned with the reactions of U.S. former allies in the Far East, and agreed with an economist, Jerome Cohen who suggested "a policy of achieving economic cooperation in the Far East by consultation and persuasion." See Horoth, 433.
In addition, a small segment of influential opinion (e.g., Foster Hailey of the *New York Times* and Paul McNutt in May or June, Mark Gayn in the *New Republic* in August) expressed doubts about rebuilding Japan in the midst of a Far Eastern vacuum and concern with fostering a great hatred against the U.S. Commenting along corresponding lines, observers such as William Costello of CBS (in May or June), the *Atlantic Report* and economic specialists, Jerome B. Cohen in the *Far Eastern Survey*, and Eleanor Hadley in the *Harvard Business Review* (in July-August) warned that American policy alone could not make Japan a workshop without the consent of the neighboring countries which had the raw materials that Japan needed, while these observers recognized the practical need for getting Japan "off the American dole." Cohen stressed the wisdom of "an integrated and cooperative Far Eastern economic recovery program" rather than "an imposed unilateral policy."
and World Report affirmed, "Whatever U.S. policy turns out to be, it is clear that a high-powered selling job will have to be done to put it over in the Orient."\(^7\)

In addition, concerned with the future of democratic development in Japan, Maxwell S. Stewart of the Nation had also deplored the U.S. policy change a year before. He argued, "The threat of rising communism, though largely illusory, has led the American military authority to take a number of undemocratic steps and to seek the cooperation of forces which they set on to destroy." At the same time, Stewart admitted that "the record of the occupation to date" was "not on the whole a bad one." He wrote, "For the most part, the original goals of the occupation have been kept in sight. Despite many blunders, substantial progress had been made in most areas." He also rightly observed the U.S. was confronted with the supreme paradox of the occupation policies: The democratic objectives of the occupation could be achieved only if the Japanese economy was restored, and the necessary American financial aid was likely to be forthcoming only as a means of building up Japan as a bulwark against Russia. But if Japan was to be developed as an anti-communist outpost, the occupation authorities must seek support, not from labor and other democratic elements, but from the reactionary groups that they at first wished to

Thus, Stewart was cynical about the U.S. policy to build Japan as an anti-communist bulwark. At the same time, he wished a policy to restore her economy in order to build a democratic Japan.

In late 1948, the view that the real East-West battleground in 1949 would not be Europe but Asia was frequently expressed in the American media by observers such as William Philip Simms and Drew Pearson. Observers particularly pointed to the struggles in China and Indonesia as evidence for their contentions. According to Hanson Baldwin, "The importance of Asia needs no stress. Our objective is clear: we must try to restore the politico-economic and military health of Southeastern Asia; a balance of power in Asia must be created just as a balance of power is being created in Europe."

Public discussion of Japan in late 1948 was limited in scope and volume, but indications that the U.S. was accelerating Japan's economic revival continued to be welcome to most of those commenting, in view of the near-collapse of the Chinese Central Government, and the "Communist peril in Asia." For example, the Washington Star affirmed that the "Communist peril in Asia" seemed "to

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76 Ibid.
justify our Government's policy toward Japan's economic rehabilitation." AP analyst Relman Morin in writing for the Philadelphia Inquirer also speculated that "rebuilding Japanese industry might very well provide the counterpoise to the immense weight of a Communist China." In addition, Newsweek declared with approval that the "conceptions behind the new policy" [to revive Japan and turn it into an American bulwark in the Far East] were receiving "increasing Congressional support." The U.S. decision to abandon the controversial deconcentration program outlined in FEC-230 also met with general approval. In responding to Chinese criticism of current U.S. policy in Japan, Joseph W. Ballantine, former Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, argued in his article for Far Eastern Survey that the restriction of Japan's industrial potential could not be achieved without at the same time preventing her from achieving the self-support promised in the Potsdam Proclamation. He added, "No nation could be permanently held down by outside force, and the ultimate peace and stability of the Far East will depend upon a prosperous and progressive Japan, just as it will on a progressive and prosperous China."79

On the other hand, a few commentators (e.g., Louisville Courier-Journal, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Christian Science

Monitor) were troubled by the specter of a revived ultranationalist Japan and feared that some of America's "high-minded objectives" [i.e., democratic reforms] were being "junked in the process of creating an outpost of Western power on the other side of the Pacific." For example, the Monitor argued that "the ideal course originally planned to wipe out the concentration of irresponsible power" was about to be replaced by an "expedient course of leniency now suggested to American policy by the international situation," hoping that General MacArthur would "plot a path" between the two. In late October Donald Grant in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch averred, "In Asia no reasonable scheme for safeguarding a revived Japanese power has been proposed."  

In late 1948 a developing though as yet minor trend of opinion was concerned with the problem of Japan's security against the "enveloping Red tide." Approval of moderate rearming of the Japanese under close U.S. supervision came from several commentators (e.g., Newsweek, William Henry Chamberlin, the Patterson press).  

As some commentators noted, American media opinion concerning Japan had undergone a considerable change by the end of the second phase, since the occupation began. While

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in mid-1946 public discussion on the role of Japan as a Far Eastern bulwark against Russia was still largely noncommittal (though American observers in general surely did not favor communist advance in Japan), those commenting on this subject in the spring of 1948 generally approved of the new American programs (i.e., the recommendations of OCI and the Draper mission) for speedy recovery of Japan's economy, and of rebuilding her as the "workshop" of Asia and anti-Red bulwark. There was much more stress in public discussion on the need for rebuilding Japan's economy at this time than in 1946. As the conflict between the U.S. and Russia in Asia became more and more evident and intense in late 1948, the weight of American opinion remained strongly in favor of a speedy revival of Japan's economic power. A small segment of influential opinion (e.g., Christian Science Monitor), however, continued to be troubled by the vision of a revived ultra-nationalist Japan and was afraid that the initial plans for democratic reforms were being discarded. Some expressed their concern with the unfavorable reactions of Japan's erstwhile victims in Asia against the new policy for Japan.

3) Discussion on a Peace Treaty with Japan -- A Quest for a Self-Supporting Japan

In 1947, along with the issue of making Japan self-supporting, the feasibility of a Japanese peace treaty was
one of the most frequently discussed subjects regarding Japan.

In his interview with press correspondents in Tokyo on March 17, General MacArthur, without bothering to inform Washington, proposed a program for Japan including an early peace treaty, resumption of trade, and the transfer of the occupation to the United Nations. The general thought that Japan’s recovery would be impossible until a peace treaty stopped the "economic blockade" (i.e., the tight control over Japan’s trade and unsettled reparations) that inflicted even more damage than the atomic bomb, and until the treaty outlined her future and determined her economic structure.\(^{82}\) This proposal came as a surprise to most commentators. At this time, though substantially all of those discussing the UN proposal favored eventual UN control of Japan, only a

\(^{82}\) He claimed that Japan required neither an American military umbrella (though, according to his proposal, she would be surrounded, or buffered, by a ring of American naval and air bases on the mandated islands and Okinawa would be retained as a major base,) nor an expensive recovery program for her recovery. Occurring at the very moment when the President sought to rally the American public, Congress, and European allies against the Soviet threat (Cf. the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947), MacArthur seemed to dismiss both the security and economic base of the emerging containment policy. Virtually no officials in Washington shared his assessment. MacArthur had also stated in his message to the War Department on February 20, "Military occupations serve their purpose at best only for a limited time, after which a deterioration rapidly sets in," thus suggesting the need for an early peace. However, many officials in Washington suspected that he wanted to "get out" of Tokyo while the occupation still appeared successful and before a crisis tarnished his career or impeded his presidential aspirations. See Schaller, *Occupation*, 96-99.
minority felt that the UN would soon be ready to assume responsibility.

The great bulk of those commenting, including editors and Congressmen, insisted that: 1) an arrangement must be made which will prevent Russia from blocking the progress of the occupation through exercise of the veto; and 2) the UN must command greater military and economic power than at present. Some of these observers feared that if Russia prevented effective UN control by frequent application of the veto, the "well-organized" communist minority in Japan would speedily fill the "vacuum" created by the withdrawal of troops. Others, noting the absence of a world police force, contended that the U.S. could not withdraw from Japan until there was assurance of adequate "protection" for the country which had "renounced war forever."83

In April concern over Japan's deteriorating economy was considerably deepened by General MacArthur's request for Allied Council advice on the economic situation. In

83 A number of commentators believed these difficulties could be surmounted by Designating Japan as a "trust territory. See "U.S. Opinion, Japan, March," Apr. 30, 1947, 1-2, Appendix A, B. Unhesitating endorsement of MacArthur's proposal came from many editors such as St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Omaha World Herald, Louisville Courier-Journal, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle and several Congressmen, but many others showed only qualified approval. Flat opposition to any serious consideration of the UN proposal at that time came from another group of editors (e.g., New York Herald Tribune, New York Sun, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, St. Louis Star-Times, Chicago News, Kansas City Star) and Rep. Judd (R., Minnesota). See also "U.S. Opinion," May 26, 1947, 2.
discussing this issue, the New York Times expressed the need for an early peace. It argued, "The only way of averting a complete collapse is either increased American relief or increased Japanese production and trade. This production cannot get under way until Japan has made peace, until her obligations under the treaty have been determined, and until she is admitted to world trade. General MacArthur's recent plea for an early peace can be disregarded only at immense cost to ourselves." The Christian Science Monitor agreed that the solution "must wait on the peace settlement, as General MacArthur" had "justly pointed out."84

In May, while on the one hand the Cold War in Europe intensified and U.S. financial commitment to that area increased, the support for peace negotiations with Japan as soon as possible was mounting. In his memorandum to chairman Taber of the House Appropriations Committee on May 26, former President Herbert Hoover, then head of the Famine Emergency Committee, proposed a $725,000,000 food and collateral aid program for Germany, Japan, and Korea. He also asserted that the U.S. should not continue to bear 90 percent of the burden of world rehabilitation, and pleaded for speedy economic rehabilitation of Germany and Japan in order to relieve the load on the American taxpayer. In this context he suggested that the U.S. at once summon the peace conference with Japan and Germany by "as many nations as

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wish[ed] to adhere." This time, many influential commentators (e.g., Representative Taber, Scripps-Howard, Patterson press, New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Detroit News, Detroit Free Press, Human Events, Kalamazoo Gazette, Newport News Times-Herald, William H. Hessler of Cincinnati Enquirer, Chicago Tribune) warmly seconded this recommendation for a peace treaty. The Moscow Conference in March had convinced everyone of the difficulty of securing Russia’s cooperation on Germany, and much press and radio comment unhesitatingly asked that the U.S. proceed without Russia, if necessary, in drawing up the Japanese pact.85 It was widely assumed that the conclusion of a treaty would contribute to the reduction of Japan’s need for U.S. aid, and that its terms must promote achievement of this objective.86

At the same time, some observers (e.g., Philadelphia Bulletin, Hartford Courant, Petersburg Progress-Index, PM) felt that too many "risks" would be involved in any "separate" peace (i.e., peace treaty without Russian participation), which would amount to renunciation of further efforts to cooperate with Russia. A relatively minor group of observers (e.g., Barnet Nover, Foreign Policy

Association, New York Herald Tribune, Sacramento Bee, Kalamazoo Gazette, Mankato (Minnesota) Free Press) also contended that the occupation should continue for some time longer, chiefly because "anti-militarist elements needed more time to develop their strength" and Japanese democracy was "still in its formative stages." Regarding Hoover's argument about American aid for the rehabilitation of Japan, some influential observers (L. K. Rosinger in Foreign Policy Bulletin, Christian Science Monitor, Chicago News) urged that the U.S. proceed with caution in rebuilding Japan as "the workshop of Asia," though conceding that it was essential to put Japan on a self-supporting basis as soon as possible.

The feasibility of the U.S. summoning an early peace conference on Japan continued to receive steady increasing attention in 1947 since MacArthur's March 17 statement. In June and early July the bulk of public discussion was centered on this subject. Hoover's proposal vis-a-vis a prompt peace settlement received strong endorsement from editors and commentators throughout the nation (e.g.,

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88 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, May," June 9, 1947, 2-3. In the next few months, some (Christian Science Monitor, Paul McNutt, the Kalamazoo Gazette) also urged a "corresponding recognition of the total Asian problem" or declared that "a Marshall Plan for Asia was needed." See "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, June 1-July 15," July 17, 1947, 4, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.

It seems that the general public favorably received the proposal by Hoover and its subsequent endorsement by a large segment of editors and commentators. According to a Gallup poll taken in early July, a majority (56 percent) of those polled approved of a Japanese peace conference without

Russian participation, while 25 percent disapproved, and 19 percent gave no opinion.90

Further momentum for a treaty in 1947 came from within the State Department. On July 11 the State Department issued an invitation to all eleven Far Eastern Commission members to attend a mid-August preliminary peace conference. The U.S. decision to "by-pass" the Big Four -- and accordingly the Russian veto -- in favor of a multi-national conference then received virtually unanimous praise from American observers (e.g., Newsweek, St. Louis Star-Times, Philadelphia Bulletin, San Francisco Chronicle, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Kalamazoo Gazette, Edgar Mowrer, Erwin Canham and Baukhage of ABC, Kaltenborn of NBC, and Winston Burdette of CBS, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Indianapolis News). The majority sentiment (as expressed by observers such as the Washington Post, Indianapolis Star, Baltimore Sun, St. Louis Star-Times, Wall Street Journal, Louisville Courier-Journal, the Patterson, Scripps-Howard and Hearst papers, Washington Star, Denver Post, Des Moines Register, Charlotte Observer, New Orleans Item, New York Times, Toledo Blade, Kansas City Times, and Kaltenborn of NBC) favored prompt initiation of the treaty discussions, and the opposition to a "separate" peace diminished.91

91 Ibid., 1-3. Papers such as the Baltimore Sun, St. Louis Star-Times, New York Sun, and Washington Star modified their attitude to some extent on the question of going ahead
opinion survey of September, however, the public pressure for going ahead then was probably not so great as to force the government's hand if it wished to delay action.92

In late 1947 observers continued to discuss the merits of making an early peace with Japan, but because of China's unexpected stand in favor of a veto, there was some tendency to envisage the Japanese peace treaty as "indefinitely postponed."93 Then, in 1948 there was little public comment on a peace treaty.

In the meantime popular opinion, according to the results of a confidential survey in late 1947, continued to

without Russia, probably due to further evidence of Russian "obstructionism" -- in Korea, in the UN, and her rejection of a multi-nation conference proposed by U.S. Strong opposition to the "separate" peace formula was voiced by Sumner Welles. Liberal periodicals such as the Nation and New Republic largely confined themselves to predictions of Australian-British-U.S. friction at the peace table.

93 Monthly Survey, Dec. 1947, 10, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59. In October and November there was a sharp decrease in public comment on the Japanese peace conference. See "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, October 1-November 15," Nov. 25, 1947, 3. The American invitation conflicted with a planned British Commonwealth meeting scheduled for August 26 in Canberra, Australia, where questions about Japan appeared high on the agenda. The Russians insisted that any settlement should be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers, in which they had a veto, rather than by the Far Eastern Commission, where a two-thirds majority held sway. The Chinese suggested the Far Eastern Commission consider the treaty but that its rules be amended to grant the great powers a veto. As Schaller points out, "soon nearly every invited nation, not just the Soviet Union, raised some contradictory objection to matters of procedure or substance. Inconclusive debate raged for months, leading first to a postponement, then abandonment, of the proposed conference." See Schaller, Occupation, 100-101.
be in favor of "going ahead without Russia -- if all the other countries which fought the war against Japan agree on how to proceed" (60 percent). Only 29 percent believed the U.S. should "keep on trying to get Russia to join" the U.S., and 11 percent were undecided.

As discussed above, the growing tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was reflected in many aspects of the public discussion regarding a Japanese peace treaty -- i.e., concern with Russia's exercise of the veto in case of U.N. control of Japan, support for the U.S. decision to "bypass" the Big Four and accordingly the Russian veto, and growing approval of a "separate peace" formula.

Moreover, it seems that the intensification of the Cold War in Europe, as well as the perceived need for

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95 According to Walter LaFeber, the Truman Doctrine, which became a landmark in American postwar history, created a broad American consensus on the need to fight the Cold War aggressively. Truman convinced, not consulted, the Congress about the economic and military commitment to Greece and Turkey. He also worked systematically to convince radio spokesmen and newspaper editors. Consequently, while in December 1946 only 22 percent of the public thought foreign policy the most important of all issues, by late spring 1947 54 percent of those polled thought it was the main issue confronting the country. In foreign policy, Truman's tactics were so effective that public opinion became staunchly and heavily anti-Russian. LaFeber also argued that Truman perhaps oversold his doctrine. By mid-1948, the State Department noted new public concern over China -- both Congress and the public had apparently taken the Truman Doctrine at its word and now wanted its military parts extended to Asia. In sum, to obtain the necessary support at home, Truman sharply redefined the globe in ideological terms in March 1947. The nation responded. It indeed responded so fervently that opinion raced ahead of the administration on Asia and some military issues, although,
protecting Japan from communist advance by making her economically stable, prompted many American observers to support the initiation of peace negotiations with former Axis nations. The State Department's opinion survey for March 1947 noted, "In view of the increasingly heavy financial commitments being proposed for Europe and the Near East [as manifested by the Truman Doctrine of March 17, 1947], a self-supporting Japan is now more than ever an agreeable prospect to many [American observers]. So, too -- from the standpoint of reducing U.S. occupation costs -- is the idea of UN control." The opinion survey added, "And much stress has been given to the argument that an economically stable Japan is the best solution to the communist problem [in Japan]."

In June 1947, the Marshall Plan address of June 5 received nationwide praise. In the following month, greatly increased resentment at Russia's obstructionism and an increased determination to proceed without her in world reconstruction were evident in press and radio discussion, following the Soviet refusal to participate in the plans for


97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., June 1947, 2, box 11, OPOS Records, RG 59.
European economic recovery and the sharp conflict within the
UN on the question of Greece.\textsuperscript{99} In the meantime,
editorialists in mid-1947 generally viewed a peace
conference as a "logical move" to end the "unnecessary"
financial drain on the U.S. caused by unsettled reparations
and trade problems.\textsuperscript{100} Following the enactment of the Greek
aid program in late May, as noted by the State Department's
opinion survey, heightened interest in starting Japanese
peace talks had been shown by the strong support given to
Hoover's recommendation of May 26.\textsuperscript{101} In other words, the
Cold War in Europe and the consequent increase of U.S. aid
to those areas of conflict (e.g., Greece and Turkey) led
many American observers to perceive the need for reducing
the U.S. financial burden in the occupied areas, and to
approve of a peace treaty as a means of making Japan self-
supporting and thereby reduce the U.S. cost there. Figures
37-40 visualize this situation.

Later in the year there continued to be much emphasis
on the need for the relief of American taxpayers through the
conclusion of a "realistic, tough-minded and just" treaty
with Japan.\textsuperscript{102} In addition, it was generally anticipated by

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., July 1947, 1.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., June 1947, 7.
\textsuperscript{101} "Memorandum on U.S. Public Opinion on Japanese Peace
\textsuperscript{102} Monthly Survey, Sept. 1947, 8. The Under Secretary
of the Army William H. Draper, Jr. declared in Tokyo before
a full complement of reporters that the new prime objective
of the Occupation of Japan would be "to reduce the costs to
commentators that the Japanese treaty would provide for a continuation of "outside" controls for a number of years, and that continuing guidance would be needed for some time to keep the Japanese people advancing toward the achievement of democracy. Many commentators also demanded that the U.S. -- and preferably General MacArthur -- continue to exercise the primary control in post-treaty Japan.

During 1947 much less public discussion was then devoted to the actual contents of the treaty than to the desirability of starting work on it. According to the State Department Opinion Survey, however, in the limited discussion on specific treaty provision at that time, the problem of Japan's future defense became the most widely discussed topic. It was generally expected that the peace treaty would contain provision for international "protection" of Japan. Most commentators took the view that it was a strategic necessity for the U.S. to operate bases in Japan -- under the UN Charter in addition to participating in any international control arrangement. Restoration of Japanese policy authority to "protect" the Japanese people was then chiefly considered in unfavorable light.

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104 Ibid., 2-3.
105 Ibid., 1-3.
In sum, the public discussion of an early peace in 1947 reflected that there was a gradual shift of emphasis in American opinion regarding Japan from her demilitarization and democratic reform to her economic recovery, namely, to making her self-supporting, while the basic occupation aims (i.e., demilitarization and democratization of Japan) continued to be generally accepted and approved. This shift of emphasis in American public comment was, in 1947, largely due to the observers' perception of the intensification of the Cold War (still chiefly in Europe), and the consequent increase in U.S. aid to the focal areas of the East-West conflict.

It seems that the balance of media opinion regarding Japan's peace treaty was generally stimulated by and tended to follow, rather than lead, moves of U.S. officials such as the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, MacArthur's proposal for a speedy peace treaty, resumption of trade, and UN control of Japan on March 17, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson's Cleveland address on May 8 (advocating the reconstruction of Germany and Japan as "two of the great workshops of Europe and Asia"), Hoover's recommendation on May 26, Secretary of State Marshall's address at Harvard on June 5 (regarding aid to Europe), and the U.S. proposal for a peace negotiation on July 11. It was generally expected that the U.S. would favor some

106 Ibid., 1.
continuation of a controlled Japanese economy, "but on greatly relaxed lines." There were a few American journalists such as Harry Kern and Compton Pakenham of Newsweek who, even in early 1947, actively lobbied the policy-making circle to promote Japan's speedy economic revival. However, the American media on the whole did not initiate but follow the policy change.

Discussion on Restoring Japan's Economy -- Concrete Issues

As discussed above, as early as mid-1946 editorial opinion was substantially in favor of a policy which would hasten the restoration of Japanese economy to a productive level, to give Japan economic stability and thereby enhance her peaceful and democratic development (while the public comment on a policy to rebuild Japan as a Far Eastern bulwark was still largely undecided at that time). This line of argument continued to be expressed in the second phase. In 1947 the support for making Japan self-supporting as soon as possible, to keep her from communist influence, and to reduce U.S. financial load there, by resuming her foreign trade and seeking a final decision on reparations through the conclusion of a peace treaty, mounted in the public comment.  

108 The following articles, for example, argued the need for relieving the American taxpayer of the burden providing continued aid to Japan in 1947: Kauffman, "A Lawyer's
Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr. declared before a full complement of reporters in Tokyo that the new prime objective of the Occupation of Japan would be "to reduce the costs to the American taxpayer." By late 1947, little specific consideration had been made as to the future Japanese standard of living, but it seemed generally agreed that the peacetime standard must be tolerable, and that there were limits to what could be done in Japan's heavy industry. At the same time many continued to feel that Japan should not be permitted to regain her dominant industrial role in Asia.

In early 1948, official movement suggesting a fundamental revision of the U.S. economic policy toward Japan was "sympathetically" received by those commenting in general. In 1948, as the situation in China and Southeast Asia deteriorated in American eyes and the Cold War was spreading to Asia, American opinion came to strongly embrace the U.S. policy of promoting a speedy revival of Japan's trade and industry. In other words, it came to approve of making her not merely a self-supporting nation, but also America's Far Eastern ally, a chief anti-Red bulwark, and the "workshop" of Asia, though many observers were conscious


of the unfavorable reactions of her neighbors toward such a policy and some continued to cast doubts about rebuilding Japan in the midst of a Far Eastern vacuum. The public sentiment, as shown by the survey results in June 1948, was in favor of helping to build up Japan's industry.

The immediate goal of U.S. policy in Japan as often stressed in the American media not only in 1947 but also in 1948 was to get her back on her feet, thus relieving the American taxpayer of the burden of supplying continuing aid to her. Many articles in support of Japan's speedy economic recovery, emphasized this point without specifically referring to the Cold War affairs. An article in the Saturday Evening Post in August 1948, for example, asserted, "We must keep on asking why we should pay taxes to support defeated enemies who could come closer to supporting themselves if we would let them."¹¹⁰

While making Japan self-supporting was surely an essential component for the U.S. program for global economic recovery, it seems that in actuality American aid to Japan by itself was not such a tremendous burden on the U.S. as public comment at that time suggested. During the period from September 1945 through June 1948, the U.S. nonmilitary

¹¹⁰ "Who's Paying for Japan's 'Economic Democracy'?
expense of supplying food, fuel, medicine, and so on, to Japan reached nearly $1 billion, and seemed to be climbing even higher. The specter of endless costs and economic collapse certainly troubled policy-makers in Washington.\textsuperscript{111} On the other hand, in any one year during the occupation, Japanese aid never took much more than 1 percent of total American federal expenditures, or $3.40 per American, and by far the largest of that consisted of surplus grain that the U.S. government had already bought anyway to support domestic farm prices.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, although economic aid to Japan (a total of more than two billion dollars) seems large, it was a much smaller amount than the economic aid granted by the U.S. to any of the major nations of western Europe in the postwar period and also a much smaller amount on a per capita basis than the American aid granted to many of the smaller nations of Asia.\textsuperscript{113} These facts suggest that

\textsuperscript{111} Schaller, Occupation, 82. For the amount of U.S. aid to Japan, see also Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 144-45.

\textsuperscript{112} Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 407.

\textsuperscript{113} Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude, 177. In addition, Eleanor M. Hadley argues that the amount of U.S. aid to Japan during the occupation was not overwhelming, either by comparison with the costs of the war or with the foreign aid program the U.S. was proposing under the Marshall Plan in 1947. She contends, "World War II cost the U.S. some $330 billion, of which $100 billion is estimated to be attributable to the war with Japan. . . . By comparison . . . the expenditure of less than 500 million to secure the peace does not seem excessive. Nor by comparison with the U.S. aid extended to Germany, which totaled $1 billion in fiscal 1949 and $3.5 billion in fiscal 1950, does the expenditure of $74 million in fiscal 1949 or $165 million in fiscal 1950 in rehabilitation seem unduly burdensome. The Pentagon, in urging rehabilitation funds
the much debated issues of the increased amount of aid to Europe and the inflation at home (See figures 37-40) made American observers sensitive to U.S. costs abroad, and that they also provided the proponents of Japan's economic recovery, including U.S. government and business leaders, with ammunition for their arguments. The emphasis on the burden of the American taxpayer provided an easy way-out and gave them the means to promote their position.

Though there are no public opinion polls available on the question of economic aid to Japan that were taken in 1947 or 1948, a survey conducted in March 1949 suggests the public sentiment near the end of the second phase. This Gallup survey asked the following question: "Do you think the U.S. should or should not do more to help Japan get back on her feet?" (underlined mine) Of those polled, 31 percent favored more help, 57 percent opposed it, and 12 percent had no opinion. Of those who had already said that they felt friendly toward the Japanese (namely, 34 percent of all those polled), 49 percent thought that more help should be given, while of those who felt unfriendly (namely 29 percent of all those polled), 80 percent opposed further aid.\(^{114}\)

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\(^{114}\) Respondents of college level voted 43 percent for more aid and 48 percent against, while those with a grammar school education registered 25 percent and 62 percent respectively. AIPO, Apr. 16, 1949, published in Public Opinion Quarterly 13 (Fall 1949): 548. See also Feraru, "Public Opinion Polls on Japan," 103. This survey was conducted from March 19 to 24.
Thus, while the majority of the American public approved of the U.S. government helping to build up Japanese industry in mid-1948 (as shown in the previous section), the majority almost at the same time did not want to "do more" to help her economic recovery. The implication of this result is vague, for "doing more" could mean continuing to give aid at about the same level, or increasing the amount of aid. At a minimum, nevertheless, it suggests the general desire of the American public to be relieved of the continuous financial burden to give aid to Japan. In actuality, in order to reduce the long-term costs, the U.S. needed to continue to provide aid for several years for the purpose of making her self-supporting.\textsuperscript{115}

Having seen this overall trend of American opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Japan's economy, the present section now focuses on the concrete issues on Japan's economy which attracted the attention of American observers in the second phase of the occupation (i.e., U.S. relief to Japan, trade, reparations, economic purge, and economic deconcentration).

1) U.S. Relief to Japan

Japan's severe food shortage prompted General MacArthur to divert for the use of the Japanese people large quantities of Army food which had been stockpiled in the

\textsuperscript{115} See PART TWO, INTRODUCTION, footnote no. 10.
Pacific. Some members of the Congress questioned utilization of Army appropriations to feed former enemies. When he was asked for an explanation by the War Department, MacArthur justified his action on February 20, 1947, as follows:

Cut off from our own projected supplies in these circumstances, countless Japanese would face starvation -- and starvation breeds mass unrest, disorder and violence. Worse still, it renders a people easy prey to any ideology, however evil, which bears with it life-sustaining food. To permit such a condition to arise would be to repudiate those very ideals and principles on which our country has always stood and for which many of our countrymen selflessly have died (underline mine).

Thus he suggested that relief was necessary to prevent Japan from turning to communism as well as to right-wing radicalism, and to achieve the occupation objectives. He also argued,

It is not charity, nor have I found that the Japanese want charity. It is but a means to secure needed life-preserving sustenance until such time as we ourselves relax the restrictions which now prevent Japan from securing the same by the normal methods of trade and commerce with the other nations of the world. Nor, if reasonable precautions are taken, will the American taxpayer ultimately be out of pocket a single dollar as a result. At most it is but a temporary measure in discharge of a clear responsibility which victory has imposed.117

117 Ibid.
Warm support for MacArthur's appeal to the Congress came from a number of commentators who agreed that the general's arguments were "impressive" and that the Congress would be taking a "big risk" in making any drastic cut in the relief funds (e.g., Butte Montana Standard, Great Falls Tribune, Baton Rouge State Times, Hartford Courant, Charleston News & Courier, Philadelphia Bulletin, Detroit Free Press, New York Times, Patterson press, Washington Star).118 On the other hand, some commentators remained skeptical about the general's contention.119

As MacArthur's argument shows, it was in this context of the public discussion on Japan's economic distress and the need for U.S. relief to stabilize her that he proposed an early peace on March 17. There followed widespread support for freeing Japan from the "economic blockade" and thereby making her self-supporting and reducing the U.S. financial burden, as expressed in the public discussion on an early peace later in 1947. Thus in addition to the Cold War in Europe, the urge to stabilize Japan, prevent her from

119 Ibid. For instance, Jennings Perry (PM) alleged, "What the good General is telling the Republican brethren is, feed these people or communism will get them. Just where communism itself is going to get the life-sustaining food to bring, he does not tell; but doesn't matter. It is the one story calculated to stand tory hair on end -- and keep open the door of the American granary." George Thomas Foster of NBC complained that "not enough" was "being done by the occupation authorities to assure honest and efficient distribution of local food."
turning to communism, and at the same time to reduce U.S. costs there contributed to the increasing degree of support among American observers for restoring Japan's economy in 1947.

2) Trade and Investment

The resumption of Japan's foreign trade was approved by the majority of commentators in the second phase. In mid-1947 considerable encouragement was expressed by U.S. editors (e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, Washington Star, Baltimore Sun, New York Times, Baton Rouge State Times, Buffalo News, Providence Journal, Albany Knickerbocker News, Dubuque Telegraph-Herald, Washington Times) over the State and War Departments announcement that Japan would be open to international trade on a limited scale beginning August 15 of the same year. The common view seemed to be that any beginning is auspicious. "The pressure of economic necessity on both America and Japan will force expansion, and a major step will be taken in transferring Japan from the debit to the credit side of our international ledger." Business journals and journalists reporting business matters (e.g., Ray Cromley of the Wall Street Journal, Chicago Journal of Commerce, Ralph Chapman of the New York Herald Tribune, Time) tended to complain of the

120 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, June 1-July 15," July 17, 1947, 4. (The quotation is from the Watertown Times.)
"troublesome, and time-consuming red tape" involved. A Newsweek article also complained, "Japan has little to sell except goods reserved by occupation officials for government-to-government trading." While the need for restoring Japan's economy was often discussed from the viewpoint of getting Japan back on its feet and thus relieving the American taxpayer of the burden of providing continuing relief to occupied Japan, spokesmen for American private industry evinced considerable interest in activating prompt measures to stimulate Japanese industry from the viewpoint of business interest. For instance, in mid-1947 R. C. Kramer, a business man and former member of MacArthur's staff in Japan, wrote in Fortune magazine, "An alliance of American business and Japanese know-how might permit an expansion of American business in the Far East at a far more rapid and safer pace than would otherwise be possible. The Japanese will have financial help. From whom will it come? The source of the aid will be the beneficiary." In early 1948 Percy S. Brown, Vice President of the Nopco Chemical Co., who had recently

121 Ibid.; "Reopened Door," Time, Sept. 15, 1947, 92, 94. For the explanation of the procedure to get the permission to enter Japan for business purposes, see "Japan's Door Reopened," Business Week Oct. 18, 1947, 114, 116-17.
123 Kramer, "Japan Must Compete," 179. Kramer was Chairman of the Board of Belding Heminway Co., Interstate Department Stores, and LaFrance Industries, and partner of Gerli & Co.
returned from a 5-month industrial survey of the Far East, also asserted that Japan presented "vast potentialities for the profitable investment of American capital," but that if American industry and capital were to assist in the rebuilding of Japan, certain revisions (in the tax laws, patents, exchange rates) must be made. According to the New York Journal of Commerce of February 4, following the disclosure of FEC-230, the program for Zaibatsu dissolution, R. R. McManigal, Vice President of Westinghouse Electric International Company, urged that pressure be brought to bear on State and Army Department officials to see that Japan's "chances of recovery" were "not ruined by a lot of ideas imposed on its economy, which "Amerícans believe to be impractical, socialistic or statism [sic]." In mid-1948 the Republican Party Platform pledged, "We shall seek to restore autonomy and self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible in our post-war occupied areas." Some U.S. businessmen then confidently predicted "Japan will be again the most important producer and exporter of manufactured goods suited to the economy of the Oriental buyer" (O. C. Hansen, president of the San Francisco firm of Frazar and Hansen, Ltd.). Others emphasized the advantage of helping Japan to again become the "manufacturing center of the Far East,"

asserting that it could make a variety of specialty goods for both industrial and consumer use that would meet with a minimum of resentment in the U.S., while its mass goods could find markets in India and countries of the Orient" (K. Russell Knoblauch, vice-president of Brown Instrument, Co.)

As to U.S. export of cotton to Japan and the revival of Japan's textile industry, several southern papers commented editorially in April 1947 on the discussions in Washington relative to sending more cotton to Germany and Japan during the next year. "It is important to our own economy and to the needs of these countries" that the U.S. exports a "considerable amount" of cotton, said the Baton Rouge State Times. The protests of cotton-belt Senators against sharing the Japanese market with Brazil elicited praise for Senator Eastland's efforts from the Jackson Clarion-Ledger: "The Senator again proved that he is both vigilant and effective in protecting the South's interests," said the paper approvingly. "Post-war trade pacts as parts of a world peace-protecting economic program may require some sacrifices by American interests, and southern Senators will support such a program. But Senator Eastland also will make sure that the State Department won't discriminate against the south." The Dallas News and the San Francisco Chronicle also approved of reviving Japan's textile industry (though

the latter advocated only a "limited" resumption) referring to America's need for reducing its costs for Japanese relief.127

The $150 million revolving fund measure introduced on March 24, 1948 by Senator Aiken and 40 other Senators to enable the occupied areas to obtain cotton, wool and other raw fibers was warmly commended by the Dallas News, which stated, "Should this barter-type arrangement prove successful, both the Southwest and an economically distressed Japan would benefit." William P. Jacobs, the President of the American Cotton Manufacturers Association, also expressed his support for this arrangement.128

Understandably, protests against reviving the Japanese textile industry were expressed by spokesmen for the American textile industry. In March 1947, according to a New York Herald Tribune dispatch, a protest against the sale to Sweden of Japanese cotton textiles was made by J. H. Lippmann of Wells Fabric Co., Inc. Lippmann warned Secretary of Commerce Harriman that U.S. exporters were rapidly losing their markets "to our most recent and violent enemy," and asked what action the government was prepared to take "to correct a situation that threatened to damage the position of American textile exporters and the economy of the industry." John M. Morahan of the same paper also

reported the concern of the textile export circles about the resumption of Japan's textile industry. In May strong opposition to the revival of Japan's textile industry to prewar levels was voiced by William C. Planz, Vice President of the Textile Export Association, whose view was reported in the New York Journal of Commerce. And in mid-1948 Daniel Small, the textile editor of the same magazine, argued, "In addition to the direct harm to the American and British industries inherent in the rebuilding of Japanese spindles, there exists the fact that such rebuilding can only be done in opposition to the intention of many former customers of Japan to develop their own textile industries."

3) Reparations

As discussed in Chapter II, Ambassador Pauley's reparations program released to the press on November 17, 1946 met with considerable approval from American observers, while many others who commented urged a cautious appraisal of his "drastic" proposal, fearing that Japan would not be able to become self-supporting if such a program was carried out. In April 1947 the U.S. government, in order to get some equipment moving to areas attempting to repair Japanese

damage, after several weeks of consideration in the FEC without a decision, issued an interim directive authorizing SCAP to allocate and ship equipment not to exceed 30 per cent of the facilities made available by the interim removal program adopted in the spring of 1946.\textsuperscript{132} This directive was highly satisfactory to a number of commentators who expressed relief that the deadlock had been broken and hoped that the action might serve to speed recovery of devastated areas in the Far East (\textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer, Baltimore Sun, Philadelphia News, New York Herald Tribune, Washington Post, Washington Star, Los Angeles Times, Omaha World Herald, Billings Gazette}). On the other hand, a few observers (e.g., \textit{Birmingham Age-Herald, Chicago Tribune, Worcester Telegram}) were convinced that removal of reparations would, in the long run, be beneficial to no one. They feared that in the end Japanese industry might be "so greatly affected as to make the nation even more dependent on occupying powers -- particularly the U.S."\textsuperscript{133} In addition, Harry Kern of \textit{Newsweek} advocated in May and June that "no reparations whatever should be removed from Japan," arguing that "any reparations sent to China, the Philippines, Australia, and other countries" would

\textsuperscript{132} Martin, \textit{Allied Occupation}, 30.
\textsuperscript{133} "U.S. Opinion, Japan -- April," May 26, 1947, 3.
"eventually be paid for by the United States in the form of aid for stripped Japanese industry. "\[134\]

In the summer of 1947, the focus of public comment about Japan's economic condition was on the conclusion of a peace treaty to alleviate the critical situation by a final decision on reparations and restoration of virtually unlimited foreign trade. \[135\] In the absence of official assurance it had been hard to see Japanese industry making needed investments in threatened plants. In September, in the light of comment devoted to economic topics, reparations was the principal subject of discussion. For instance, Lowell Thomas of NBC wondered what effect the FEC directive for the elimination of Japan's industrial war potential would have on General MacArthur's plans for the reconstruction of Japan. William Henry Chamberlin, according to his article for the Wall Street Journal, was pleased to note "a steady rising curve of balance, restraint and common-sense in comment on Japan since the end of hostilities." "One hears very little now," he observed, "of the absurd suggestion that Japan should be reduced to a 'pastoral' economy." Moreover, the Washington Post gave considerable news play to Clifford Strike's declaration in the American Magazine that the Pauley reparations plan was

"too drastic" and must be canceled by the U.S. "even if it means overruling the FEC" and "making a separate peace with Japan."  

In late 1947, the public comment appeared to favor leaving Japan's non-military industrial plant intact, as a number of observers questioned the value of removing reparations -- and even feared that large-scale removals would make Japanese industry even more dependent on the occupying powers. In the brief comment on the allocation of reparations there was a singular point of emphasis, that is to say, that Russia should be the last consideration, and her share be minute -- if she should get any at all.

The OCI report released in March 1948 declared that most heavy industry previously defined as "war supporting," should be exempt from reparations, though still agreeing that "primary war industries" should be destroyed. The OCI group defended this change as required to achieve two essential ends: the reduction of "costs to the American taxpayer" and the "reconstruction and use as quickly as possible [of] the bulk of [Japan's] industrial capacity."

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136 "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, September," Oct. 15, 1947, 4. In January 1947 Secretary of War Robert Patterson had dispatched a Special Committee on Reparations to Tokyo, led by Strike, head of an engineering consortium. He made no secret of his own view that it was "neither essential nor desirable" to adhere to the 1946 program. See Schaller, Occupation, 108.


As discussed above, most observers approved of a blueprint for Japan's recovery based largely on the recommendations of Overseas Consultants, Inc. A small segment of opinion [e.g., Representative Sadowski (D., Michigan), Foten Hailey of the New York Times, Paul McNutt, Donald Grant in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch], however, expressed doubts about rebuilding Japan in the midst of a Far Eastern vacuum. T. A. Bisson, stressing the "Japanese strategy of sabotaging economic reconstruction to gain peace," argued that no relaxation of reparations demands and economic restrictions should be permitted until "democratically minded leaders" had "taken postwar Japan in charge." In addition, Martin Bennett, industrial consultant to the Pauley Mission, questioned a number of the OCI recommendations and declared in the Pacific Affairs, "Priming the pump in Japan will not produce an economic flow until the level of the well, which is the remainder of Asia, is raised. This appears to have been passed over very lightly by OCI." Helen Mears, while advocating the relaxation of the reparations program and Japan's economic recovery, asserted in an article for the Far Eastern Survey that "the weakness of the OCI report" was the assumption that "aid in revival emphasizes not consumer

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and export goods, but heavy industry." She criticized the commonly accepted reasoning for the U.S. policy to revive Japan's economy; namely, the argument that the impracticality of building up China and the deterioration of America's relationship with the Soviet Union made Japan's destruction strategically unsound. She was more concerned about "the economic plight of the average Japanese" than Japan's strategic position. 141

4) Economic Purge

The extension of the January 4, 1947 purge directive to government administrators, leaders of commerce and industry, and public media experts was welcomed by a few observers (e.g., Gordon Walker of the Christian Science Monitor, New York Herald Tribune). Its extension to economic leaders was, however, strongly criticized by Newsweek magazine. Citing reports from Newsweek's Tokyo bureau chief Compton Pakenham, Harry Kern, foreign affairs editor of the same magazine, charged that the recently decreed economic purge in Tokyo would destroy the "brains of the entire Japanese economic structure." Kern criticized, "The extreme left could capitalize on such a situation to the advantage of the ever-watchful Russians, the advocates of severe purges."

Thus Newsweek stressed the internal and external communist threat in Japan, and concluded that immature, untrained, and impractical officers in Government Section of the occupation forces were responsible for a program that would undermine American capitalist principles in Japan.142 Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R., Iowa) had this "very thought-provoking article" inserted in the "Congressional Record." In a rejoinder, carried by Newsweek two weeks after the article was published, MacArthur refuted Kern’s charges. He considered it utterly "fantastic" that anyone would question the purge of ultranationalist business leaders opposed to both peace and democratic capitalism. Kern, on the other hand, repeated his attack against the economic purge and other economic policies of the occupation, in support of Japan’s prompt economic recovery.143

A year later, the Cincinnati Enquirer was especially critical of the "absurd length" to which the purge of the Zaibatsu was carried out, and was even more distressed by

142 "U.S. Opinion, Japan -- January 1947," Feb. 11, 1947, 5; Kern, "Behind the Japanese Purge -- American Military Pivotalries," 40. Harry Kern had the encouragement of Secretary of Commerce W. Averrell Harriman, who was a founder, large stockholder, and former member of the board of directors of Newsweek and conveyed his concern that the occupation reforms impeded the rehabilitation of a self-supporting Japan as the fulcrum for American policy in Asia. He also approached the ex-President Herbert Hoover, head of the Famine Emergency Committee, and obtained encouragement. See Howard Schonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," 328-330.
the thought that an additional 50,000 businessmen were slated for early purging. "Great numbers of them" were, he noted, "among the best friends the U.S. ever had in the Japanese population. The *Saturday Evening Post* assailed the purge as "flagrantly in conflict with economic theories taken for granted here in the U.S."*144*

The economic purge actually resulted in the removal of a much smaller number of Japanese business executives than feared by these observers. By May 10, 1948, the screening of Japanese subject to the various purge ordinances had been virtually completed. Approximately 220,000 Japanese had been purged, out of which about 1,500 were purged because of their conduct of the bulk of the nation's industry and trade.*145* Moreover, purged business leaders often continued to exercise unofficial influence or moved into new jobs that paralleled their former positions.*146* An industrialist or financier could also join one of the approximately 200,000

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*145* Fearey, *Occupation, Second Phase*, 26-28; Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, 91-92. According to SCAP, the number of business executives directly removed from positions was 639 and those who had resigned in anticipation of removal or had earlier retired was 896, thus making a total of 1,535. In early 1949 "Purge Review Commission" was established by the Japanese government, but, according to Fearey, the end of 1949 saw the purge, completed in May 1948, substantially unmodified. Out of 220,000 on the purge lists, about 180,000 were former military officers.

*146* Schaller, *Occupation*, 44.
concerns not among the 161 enterprises listed in the purge directive. 147

5) Economic Deconcentration -- FEC-230

In its December 1, 1947 issue, Newsweek featured portions of the still classified document on the program for Zaibatsu dissolution (FEC-230), excerpts from a report by a New York lawyer, James Lee Kauffman, under the caption, "A Lawyer’s Report on Japan Attacks Plan to Run Occupation . . . Far to the Left of Anything Now Tolerated in America," and a leak that the State Department had ordered the suspension of FEC-230. 148 As senior partner in a Japanese law firm before the war, Kauffman had represented virtually every major American corporation there, including General Electric, Standard Oil, Libbey-Owens-Ford, and Dillon, Read. 149 He was also a founding member of the American Council for Japan, a lobbying organization. He went to Japan on behalf of his business clients in August 1947, somehow obtained a copy of the confidential document, FEC-230, and wrote a "Report on Conditions in Japan as of September 6, 1947," excerpts from which Newsweek published in its December 1 issue. In his report which quickly found its way to top Washington policy makers and the Japanese

147 Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 30.
149 Schonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," 332-33. Dillon, Read & Co. was a prestigious Wall Street investment house.
Finance Ministry, Kauffman claimed that FEC-230 imposed an economic doctrine on Japan approaching the "socialistic ideal" and, if fully implemented, would lead to economic collapse in Japan. The provision in FEC-230 that SCAP assist labor unions in acquiring Zaibatsu properties, coupled with progressive labor laws already on the books, particularly vexed Kauffman. He asserted that with respect to the economic policy the occupation to date had "not only been a failure" but it had "sought to impose on the Japanese an economic system" which was "distinctly un-American." He also argued that Japan was costing the American taxpayers millions of dollars a year. He then proposed "an end to the economic experiment being conducted in Japan," and replacement of "the theorists now there with men of ability and experience" who could "restore Japan's economy."  

Shortly after the publication of this Newsweek article on December 4, Senators Knowland (R., California) and Maybank (D., South Carolina) requested a copy of FEC-230 and subsequently joined in a demand for a "full dress inquiry" into "the policies which the U.S. government" was "advocating before the FEC." Knowland was quoted as complaining that FEC-230 was "another Mogenthau plan" and that the secrecy surrounding its contents was

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150 Ibid., 332.
In the House, Representatives Busbey (R., Illinois) and Shafer (R., Michigan) also sought on December 12, an "investigation of the secret rule of Japan by confidential State Department directives to the Far Eastern Commission," on the ground that these directives were "bringing socialism to the former enemy nation."153

Congressional interest in FEC-230 prompted some anti-administration papers [e.g., Chicago Tribune (December 19), Patterson press] to call for a thorough airing of this "attempt to reform Japan's economic structure to fit New Deal theories."154 William Henry Chamberlin in the New Leader and in the Wall Street Journal also contended that "Far Eastern Morgenthauism" should be "scrapped firmly and decisively."155 Less heatedly, the San Francisco Chronicle commented on December 20, "The concern of Senator Knowland and the Senate Appropriations Committee over the secrecy of

152 According to Schaller, Undersecretary of the Army Draper, who had been promoting Japan's prompt economic recovery, had cultivated Knowland by drafting a program for credits to make California's large cotton surplus available to Japanese textile mills. After receiving the technically classified FEC-230 proposal, Knowland took the Senate floor to denounce it. See Schaller, Occupation, 117.


154 Ibid.

FEC-230 is justified. There has been manifest of late a too great tendency to use 'security' as an alibi for withholding from Congress and from the American people information that Congress and the public need to know . . ." Thus the Chronicle was concerned with the secrecy of FEC-230 but not particularly alarmed over U.S. economic policy in Japan itself, as it discussed in its January 12, 1948 issue.\footnote{Monthly Survey, Dec. 1947, 10; "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, November 15-January 15," Jan. 21, 1948, 3.}

On the other hand, the New York Herald Tribune on January 2 defended American economic policies in Japan by pointing to MacArthur's New Year statement as "a vigorous and admirable" answer to the "absurd" charges that American policies are leading to socialization of Japanese industry. The Tribune argued that there would be more justification for inquiring whether the general had been "critical enough" in dealing with the Zaibatsu than for a charge that he had been "too severe."\footnote{Ibid.}

In his speech to the San Francisco Commonwealth Club on January 6, 1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall declared, "Deconcentration must stop short of the point where it unduly interferes with the efficiency of Japanese industry. Earlier programs [including FEC-230] are being reexamined."\footnote{For Royall's speech, see Jon Livingston, et al., eds., 116-19.} Responding to Royall's speech, Newsweek, in its January 19 issue, pointed to what it considered to be a
conflict in U.S. policy as enunciated by General MacArthur's New Year address and Royall's speech. "American foreign policy sometimes seems to be galloping off in all directions at once," said Newsweek, "particularly when it is being adjusted to new circumstances." The magazine found quite a gap between MacArthur's remarks in favor of continuing to break up the Zaibatsu (although he did not specifically mention such measures as FEC-230) and Royall's statements noted above.159

On January 19 Senator Knowland continued his attack in Congress (January 19) against FEC-230 and "certain other policies" which he alleged went "far, very far, beyond trust-busting." With the agreement of his colleagues Senators Hickenlooper (R., Iowa) and McMahon (D., Connecticut), he forwarded his remarks concerning FEC-230 to General MacArthur and requested his views.160

In February, MacArthur's reply, to Senator McMahon was published. In this letter, MacArthur refuted Knowland's attack on his economic policy and sought to shift any blame by charging that "the sources of origin, authorship and authority" of FEC-230 were "all in Washington" and that his responsibility was limited to the executive implementation

of basic decisions formulated there." He wrote, "I am hardly in a position ten thousand miles away to participate in the debate." At the same time, he justified his deconcentration program by maintaining that "tearing down . . . the traditional pyramid of economic power" that had "given only a few Japanese families direct or indirect control over all commerce and industry, all raw materials" was "the first essential step" in building a "free private competitive enterprise" system in Japan. If the U.S. abandoned this program, he warned, "there is not slightest doubt that its cleansing will eventually occur through a blood bath of revolutionary violence."161

Upon publication of this letter, articulate observers were willing to let the matter drop. However, Senator Knowland, according to the New York Herald Tribune of February 18, was not satisfied with the general's letter and said that it "confirmed his suspicion that the policy directives came out of Washington -- that they were not MacArthur's." Newsweek took issue with the general's warning against "a blood bath of revolutionary violence" in case the Zaibatsu dissolution were abandoned, and referred to reports from Tokyo of "almost complete indifference on

161 General MacArthur to Senator Brien McMahon, Feb. 1, 1948, RG 5, box 39, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.
the part of the Japanese masses toward the whole subject of big business."\textsuperscript{162}

Senator Taylor (D., Indiana) and Representative Sadowski (D., Michigan) demanded continuation of the Zaibatsu dissolution program. Taylor thought that "only half-hearted efforts" had been made at destroying the Zaibatsu. Sadowski averred: "Senator Knowland and American bid business interests would keep on top the Japanese warmonger families who misruled and enslaved their people. We must see to it that big business does not resume its prewar 'international cartel' ties with the industrial and financial combine of Germany, Italy, Japan and other nations."\textsuperscript{163}

In response to the considerable criticism in Congressional and business circles against FEC-230, and because of the many months elapsed since the program's submission, the U.S. early in 1948 suspended its participation in FEC discussions of the policy proposal, and undertook a resurvey of the policy proposal and the deconcentration program generally. The results of the resurvey were announced in a statement read to the FEC by the U.S. Representative, General Frank McCoy, and released


\textsuperscript{163} "U.S. Opinion, Japan and Korea, March-April, 1948," May 10, 1948, 4-5.
to the press on December 9, 1948. Noting that the major provisions of FEC-230 had already been carried out and that the paper had been overtaken by events and become outmoded, the U.S. announced that it no longer considered FEC-230 "a proposal upon which the Far Eastern Commission could act with benefit to the occupation." 164

This announcement was generally well received by American observers (e.g., Washington Star, Philadelphia Inquirer, William Costello of CBS, Tokyo). It seemed to them that "the Communist peril in Asia" justified U.S. policy toward Japan's economic rehabilitation.

The Christian Science Monitor, however, had some regrets. "The ideal course originally planned to wipe out the concentration of irresponsible power" was about to be replaced by an "expedient course of leniency now suggested to American policy by the international situation," said the Monitor, hoping that MacArthur would "plot a path" between the two. 165 Citing a report written by Miriam Farley, a former member of the SCAP staff, in the November 26 Bulletin of the Foreign Policy, and an article by Maxwell Stewart in the Nation of July 26, the Nation also doubted General McCoy's statement about "the daily growth of indications

that the Japanese propose[d] to enforce their fair-trade laws vigorously and effectively." 166 These voices resisting the U.S. policy of abandoning the deconcentration program represented the minority opinion.

CHAPTER V
ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN AS EXPRESSED IN LETTERS FROM AMERICAN PEOPLE TO MACARTHUR, 1947-48

Harsh Attitudes (7)

The number of letters showing a harsh or hostile attitude toward Japan and the Japanese people greatly decreased in the second phase of the occupation. Only seven letters in the present sampling fall into this category. (See Table 1.)

Four of these seven letters were written to protest the death sentence of Americans who had been convicted of crimes against Japanese people. For instance, in April 1947 an army court martial sentenced one American soldier to death by hanging and four others to life imprisonment after convicting all five of the murder of five Japanese. In reaction to this sentence, one wrote as follows: "I could never believe nor could thousands of Americans, you'd [sic] would permit our Boys [sic] to be put to death for killing a few more Japs." There was no indication in this letter that the writer was in any way related to the five convicts. He also cited the Pearl Harbor attack and described the Japanese as "murderous Japs" and "devils," and referred to their "sneakiness" and "barbaric treatment." He also wrote that the court president, Colonel Hobart R. Yeager, who had
pronounced the verdicts, "must be a moron." Similarly, two more writers protested this sentence showing sympathy for the convicted Americans and animosity against the Japanese.  

In the same way, in June 1947 one correspondent wrote to MacArthur about the sentencing to death by a general court martial of an American soldier from North Carolina for raping a Japanese woman. He wrote, "The sentence of a Pvt. Willie James to death is a travesty of justice. The death penalty of a white Anglo-Saxon for the rape of a yellow Japanese is an outrage. That is justice inverted." This writer was clearly expressing his racial bias. He added, "I ask you Hon. Gentleman to commute the sentence, to a jail sentence of ten years."  

Another writer sent a newspaper photograph of "a Jap officer" beheading an Allied flier in 1943. According to the enclosed newspaper article, the three Japanese officers who had committed that atrocity "only" went to jail. The writer protested, "such an outrageous decision of sending such brutes to prison instead of hanging or shooting them."

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1S. Scherb to MacArthur (St. Petersburg, FL), Apr. 18, 1947. See also attached clipping, "Death Sentence Given Soldier for Killing Jap," box 26, RG 5. Unless otherwise noted, all the Record Groups referred to in this chapter are located at the MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.  
3Dr. D. Aitchison (The Aitchison Clinic, Takoma Park, MD) to MacArthur, July 5, 1947, box 30, RG 5.
and appealed to MacArthur to vacate "such a unjustified sentence."  

In reply to the letters of protest against sentencing American soldiers to death, and those protesting the light sentencing of Japanese soldiers, Laurence E. Bunker, Colonel, Aide-de-Camp, wrote to the protesters for MacArthur that the general had no authority to intervene in matters of this kind.  

One letter was written by a father whose son had been on Bataan, made the Death March, and subsequently died on a Japanese prison vessel. Although he did not express a harsh attitude toward the Japanese people in general, he questioned why Emperor Hirohito's life should be spared and asked MacArthur to explain it.  

Another letter showed the writer's distrust of the Japanese. After quoting a passage from Samuel Munden's book, The Treasury of History -- History of Japan (1864) -- "Before you trade with these people, you should be very careful" -- he added, "It is unnecessary for me to draw your attention to this, as you realize what happened when the Japanese attacked Pearl

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4 A. D. Orvis (Los Angeles, CA) to MacArthur, Feb. 17, 1947, microfilm, reel 61, RG 5. According to the newspaper article, two of the Japanese officers got 25 year jail sentence, and one got life sentence.  
5 Laurence Bunker to S. Scherb, May 1, 1947, box 26, RG 5; Bunker to D. Aitchison, July 17, 1947, box 30, RG 5; Bunker to A. D. Orvis, Mar. 2, 1947, microfilm, reel 61, RG 5.  
6 Fred Sehmann (Wichita Falls, TX) to MacArthur, Sept. 17, 1947, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5.
Harbor and concentrated their fury on the Philippine Island." Thus, it seems that the Pearl Harbor attack symbolized to this writer the deceitful nature of the Japanese people in general. 7

As the letters cited above show, some of the writers had harsh attitudes toward the Japanese chiefly because of the Pearl Harbor attack and the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the war, and others did so because of their deep-rooted racial bias against the Japanese. It seems that the former, namely, those with war experience, reinforced the bias of the latter.

Positive Attitudes (49)

In the second phase, many more letters to MacArthur expressed a positive attitude toward Japan than they did a harsh attitude. As discussed in the following pages, the patterns of the positive attitudes expressed in this phase were different from those in the initial phase. Letters were found more frequently in the second phase which used the words, "rehabilitating" or "recovering" Japan, almost taking for granted that it was the mission of U.S. occupation there. Unlike the initial phase, there were no letters in this period that specifically emphasized the distinction between the Japanese wartime leaders and the ordinary people. As in the initial phase, most of the

7James B. Taylor (New York, NY) to MacArthur, Feb. 18, 1948, microfilm, reel 70, RG 5.
letters with a positive attitude toward Japan praised General MacArthur for his job in Japan. Out of the forty-nine letters in the category of "positive attitudes" in this phase, thirty-eight clearly expressed the writer's praise for MacArthur. As in Chapter III, the letters below are divided into several groups according to the emphasis or the characteristic of each letter, though each of these emphasized points are shared to some extent by many letters in the other groups as well.

1) Constructive Stance While Holding Unfavorable Perceptions of the Japanese (3)

The writers in this category explicitly showed their unfavorable perceptions of the Japanese, while taking a constructive positive attitude toward them. (Many letters in the other categories suggested the writer's unfavorable perceptions of the Japanese, but did not show them explicitly. Writers generally seemed to share the perception of the Japanese as a people still far from achieving a democratic way of life though progressing toward it.) For example, after referring to the contact of over fifty years with the Philippines "to establish friendship," one wrote that "a bitter war could result in a similar friendship" with the Japanese. He, nevertheless, described

\footnote{Cf. Out of the total number of the letters in the sampling written during the second phase of the occupation (125 letters), about a half (63 letters) clearly expressed the writer's praise for MacArthur.}
them as "the strange folk of Nippon" (underline in original). Another, who was an Episcopalian, showed a positive attitude by approving of a tolerant approach to the Japanese people and teaching them democratic living. She wanted to invite a Japanese bishop to the Episcopal Church's National Convention in San Francisco. However, she also stated, "the Japanese mind is inquisitive rather than critical, more clever than intelligent." In addition, while showing their negative perceptions of the Japanese, these two writers highly admired MacArthur's handling of the Japanese occupation.

A lawyer and former Congressman, Maury Maverick protested the trial of the "so-called 'war criminals' of Japan." He wrote, "It is my opinion that we are abandoning our principles of constitutional government [by conducting the trials]." He questioned the fairness of the trials, but his following statement also reflected his negative perception of the Orientals: "If . . . we adopt the policy of the Orientals to kill our enemies on capture, we thereby adopt the oriental principle ourselves. This means an abandonment of the principles for which we fought, and the

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9 Walter Leon Hess (New York, NY) to William Wadsworth Chance (Chicago, IL), Apr. 24, 1947. This letter was enclosed in the letter from Chance to MacArthur on May 17, 1947, box 13, RG 5.
10 Helen Gibbs Embrey (DeSoto Farish, LA) to MacArthur, Nov. 22, 1948, box 20, RG 5.
establishment of principles gravely dangerous to our system of government."\textsuperscript{11}

2) Emphasis on Rehabilitating Japan and the Perception of Japan as America's Friend (34)

The letters in this category can be divided into four sub-categories according to the emphasis of each letter. It should be noted, however, that the letters in the different sub-categories are not mutually exclusive. Letters in the last three sub-categories generally share the basic theme of the first sub-category. Some of those in the first sub-category suggest the theme of the second. The distinctions are relative ones.

**Support for MacArthur's Job of Rehabilitating Japan (20).**

The letters in this category highly praised MacArthur, like many in other categories, and endorsed rehabilitating Japan. For instance, one, who was a lawyer and Republican member of the Illinois State Legislature, praised MacArthur for his "good job attending to the business of rehabilitating Japan and making her a free Republic by instilling in them the principles of racial and religious harmony and understanding\textsuperscript{12} (underline mine). Similarly, \textsuperscript{11} Maury Maverick (San Antonio, TX) to MacArthur, June 30, 1948, box 38, RG 5. He was a Congressman from 1935 to 1939, and mayor of San Antonio from 1939 to 1941. He was on two special presidential missions to Europe during World War II, including all Allied Nations and Japan. \textsuperscript{12} Charles J. Jenkins (Chicago, IL) to MacArthur, Aug. 9, 1947, box 14, RG 10. He had been a member of the Illinois State Legislature for the past 17 years. According
one admired MacArthur for his "outstanding success in
teaching the people of a former enemy country the principles
of Democracy." A Baptist pastor admired him for his
accomplishments "in regenerating Japan." A Catholic
clergyman also referred to MacArthur's "profound interest in
the moral, intellectual and social well-being of the people
whom, in the designs of Providence," MacArthur had been
"called to guide and reform." After joining Pan American's
first passenger flight around the world, James G. Stahlman,
then the President of the Nashville Banner wrote, "I am
convinced that Japan is much better off than lots of other
spots, due largely to your own efforts to rehabilitate a

to him, he held the record among colored American Citizens
in this regard.

13 Guy B. Denit (Brigadier General, MC, USA, New York,
NY) to MacArthur, Apr. 5, 1948, box 14, RG 10. The writers
of the two letters above (Jenkins and Denit) supported
MacArthur to be a Republican Presidential candidate for the
1948 election. Roy W. Howard, the President of Scripps-
Howard Newspapers, also stressed "MacArthur's success in
transforming a feudal empire into a political and economic
democracy" in his two-minute statement that was broadcast on
June 30, 1947. See Roy W. Howard to MacArthur, July 7,
1947, box 13, RG 10. In addition, the Chairman of the
International Club of General Federation of Women's Club
seeking to promote women's cause in foreign nations
including Japan, also wrote, "We are most anxious to help
preserve our Democratic form of government and to help the
women of other countries to follow in our footsteps rather
than succumb to a totalitarian form of rule." See Mrs. John
L. Whitehurst (General Federation of Women's Clubs,
Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Mar. 22, 1948, microfilm,
reel 76, RG 5.

14 J. Frank Norris (Pastor, First Baptist Church, Fort
Worth, TX) to MacArthur, July 3, 1947, box 13, RG 10.

15 Rev. Patrick O'Connor (National Catholic News
Service) to MacArthur, May 1, 1947, microfilm, reel 61, RG
5.
conquered people. . . . May I assure you that the American people continue to watch the fine progress of your work, with the highest satisfaction."\textsuperscript{16} (underline mine). In the same vein a retired general wrote, "So far as I am able to judge, the situation in your domain is the only consistently bright spot in the general picture, an opinion that is shared by everyone with whom I come in contact."\textsuperscript{17} Alexander Stoddard, who was a member of the U.S. Education Mission to Japan in March 1946, wrote MacArthur in late 1947, and reiterated his interest in MacArthur's job of "reconstructing Japan" and "reorganizing the school system of Japan along more democratic lines."\textsuperscript{18}

In his strong support of MacArthur to be a Republican Presidential nominee, another even described the Japanese people as America's "best friends" in early 1948, merely two and a half years after the termination of the war. He stated in his talk, "The work he [MacArthur] has done in Japan has changed a people who were probably our most

\textsuperscript{16}James G. Stahlman (Nashville, TN) to MacArthur, Sept. 5, 1947, box 14, RG 10. This letter was written to express his appreciation of MacArthur’s courtesies to him in Tokyo.

\textsuperscript{17}Walter Kruegar (San Antonio, TX) to MacArthur, Jan. 12, 1948, folder 6, box 2, RG 5.

\textsuperscript{18}Alexander Stoddard (Superintendent of Schools, School District of Philadelphia, The Board of Public Education) to MacArthur, Dec. 17, 1947, microfilm, reel 62, RG 5. See also Herbert Bayard Swope (New York, NY) to MacArthur, Mar. 18, 1947, microfilm, reel 71, RG 5. Swope praised MacArthur’s statement on March 17 (in which he had proposed a peace treaty with Japan and restoring Japan’s economy), and also wrote that he was impressed by the "seeming sincerity of the Japanese Reformation."
dangerous enemy, who bitterly hated us, and who in defeat were sullen and revengeful, into a people who are rapidly recovering their normal economy and now probably our best friends among the nations of the world. He has done this with a policy of sternness and justice, but also with a wisdom no world leader has even shown in handling a conquered nation"\(^19\) (underline mine).

While the writers above did not specifically discuss promoting Japan's economic recovery, it seems that the general idea of "rehabilitating" Japan was accepted by them. On economic rehabilitation in particular one wrote in late 1947 in praise of General MacArthur, "From economic reports, it appears that while Europe is still in financial doldrums, Japan under your very able administration is working well toward recovery." He added, "I am quite sure if you had been at the 'helm' in Europe, the situation there would not be in the doldrums it is now."\(^20\) Thus, this writer approved of restoring Japan's economy. For him, it was the measure of how successful the occupation was. One retired general also showed interest "in furthering the plans for the recovery of Japan" in May 1947.\(^21\) In December 1948 another writer, who was a consulting chemical engineer and had been

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\(^19\) "Talk by Mr. O'gara, University Club, Milwaukee, Feb. 13, 1948," box 14, RG 10. This manuscript was prepared on Feb. 12, 1948.


\(^21\) Robert C. Richardson, Jr. (Bath, NH) to MacArthur, May 16, 1947, microfilm, reel 65, RG 5.
selected by U.S. Department of the Army to direct the activities of the Japanese pulp and paper industry under SCAP more than two years before, expressed his desire to present the details of his plan to improve Japan's trade balance. He wrote to MacArthur, "I came to Japan specifically in order to help you in improving the relations between the United States and Japan."  

It should be noted that while the writers above took a constructive approach to Japan, approving her reconstruction, the primary focus of their letters, except for a few, was on MacArthur's achievements or on their support for his policy in Japan, rather than on compassion, sympathy, or respect for Japan and her people. They emphasized that Japan had been transformed chiefly owing to the wise guidance of the general. For them, the relationship between the two nations was that between a wise teacher and a student with problems. The focus of these

22 Harold R. Murdock (New York, NY) to MacArthur, Dec. 28, 1948, box 42, RG 5. There was another writer in the sampling who showed interest in the economic recovery of Japan. However, since he explained his interest not from the viewpoint of a desire to help Japan, but from the viewpoint of relieving the American taxpayer of continued aid to Japan and, more importantly for him, utilizing Japanese cheap labor for gem industry for the purpose of securing employment opportunities for American disabled veterans, his letter is not included in this category of "positive attitudes." See George E. Ijams (Director, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, National Rehabilitation Service, Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Jan. 8, 1948, microfilm, reel 73, RG 5.  

23 For the exceptions, see letters from the following persons: Rev. Patrick O'Connor, Harold R. Murdock, Alexander Stoddard, Mrs. John L. Whitehurst.
writers' attention was not on favorable qualities of the Japanese but on the benevolent role played by the U.S. At the same time, they did not express any hostile attitudes toward the former enemy nation, either. It can be said that their admiration of MacArthur in transforming Japan led to their improved perception of the former enemy country.

Besides the letters above, there were also a few which showed the writers' concern with the hardship of the Japanese people caused by the shortage of food and other necessities. For instance one writer, who had heard from a Catholic missionary in Japan of the substandard living conditions in Japan, stated, "I am wondering if we back here in the states could not assist in alleviating this misery and want by sending articles of clothing or other desirable items." Another, who was concerned about SCAP's "efforts to sustain a large population upon an inadequate food supply," suggested the use of acorn to solve Japan's food problem, referring to its use by the California Indians. A letter from Carl Mydans of Time-Life International focused on a similar sincere desire to be helpful to the Japanese that had been shown by American officers in Fukui at the

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24 D. A. Sullivan (Chicago, IL) to MacArthur, May 2, 1947, microfilm, reel 70, RG 5. There is no clear indication in the letter that Sullivan was a Catholic.
time of the earthquake disaster there in 1948 and their constructive actions before it.\textsuperscript{26}

Gauging the prevailing attitude in America, one letter writer observed in August 1948 "the decreasing hate and growing harmony [toward the Japanese]" that MacArthur was "orienting," though she thought that it was difficult for people of different races to perceive they were all human beings.\textsuperscript{27} A year before this observation was made W. Davenport, the editor of Collier's magazine, focused on the sense of "Christian duty" prevalent among many Americans to help other peoples in need, including the Japanese. According to Davenport, Collier's had had reporters touring the country exclusively in buses from the Atlantic to the Pacific Coasts to learn what the so-called "little people" were thinking about matters national and international. One of their results was: "An impressive number of these bus riders told us that while they were not at all international-minded in a strictly political sense, they believed nevertheless that it was our 'Christian duty' to help foreign countries with 'food and maybe loans, too.'

\textsuperscript{26} Carl Mydans (San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, July 3, 1948, microfilm, reel 71, RG 5. See also Samuel D. Murble (President, Wilmington College, Wilmington, OH) to MacArthur, May 25, 1948, microfilm, reel 75, RG 5. Marble was the first chairman of Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia (LARA), and had also been responsible for the work of the American Friends Services Committee in Japan for the period immediately following the war.

\textsuperscript{27} Elizabeth Mathis Gunby to MacArthur, Aug. 10, 1948, box 16, RG 10.
Repeatedly they linked our international policy with our 'Christian duty.' They said that your administration of Japan 'was a fine example of firm Christianity as well as fine military rule.' This observation suggests that there was a vague approval based upon the Christian tradition among a sizable segment of Americans at that time for helping the Japanese with food and loans. However imprecise this survey might have been, the letter showed the writer's perception of the general approval in America for helping the Japanese. In this letter, Davenport requested MacArthur write an article on the application of Christianity to successful military government in defeated countries, or in Japan alone.

The Perception of Japan as a Potential Member of America's Camp against Communist Force (10)

The letters in this sub-category clearly reflected anxieties over the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and their writers saw Japan as a potential (though not yet mature in the eyes of most writers) member of America's camp. In high praise of MacArthur, one wrote in March 1947, "I . . . would like to express my admiration for the wonderful work you are doing in helping the Japanese people to govern themselves in a true Democracy, and for the stand you have taken in opposing the Communist minority."

stand you have taken in opposing the Communist minority."
She also wrote that Stalin was "equally evil" as Hitler or
Tojo. Another expressed his anti-communism even more
strongly. This writer, who claimed to "read everything
concerning Japan and the task of the General has before
him," wrote, "I am a deadly enemy of Communism having made a
study of their murderous schemes. They are the Devil's
Disciples who roam the world seeking whom they may devour in
their insane desire to destroy or change the world contrary
to God's law. I really believe Communists are planning to
encircle our country and if and when the General returns
home (if he does) Russia will take over Japan and China and
undo all the great work of our armed forces. I can't see it any other way according to the way I interpret the
moves made by Russia."

A year later another writer focused on "the Communists'
ardent zeal, conviction and faith in their so-called
ideology or plan for world mastery" and on the need for "the
free men and women of the world" to "discover an equally

29 El Vera Thomsen (Bothell, Washington) to MacArthur,
Mar. 12, 1947, box 13, RG 10.
30 Harry C. Fisk (Washington, D.C.) to Mrs. Arthur
MacArthur [the general's sister in law], Mar. 17, 1947, box
13, RG 10. (Fisk asked Mrs. Arthur MacArthur to remember
him in her next letter to the general, and she probably
transmitted this letter to the general.) According to
Fisk's letter, he was "a total stranger" to Mrs. Arthur
MacArthur, but enclosed his offering of ten dollars to a
certain association to which she belonged. He identified
himself as a member of the Eighth Grade, Force School on
Massachusetts Avenue, attended by Douglas MacArthur in the
1890's, and an admirer of him.
congratulated MacArthur on his "building the basis for a
democratic Japan" and wished him "every success in
preserving a freedom loving Japan." Similarly, in late
1948, when the Chinese Nationalist government was heading
toward collapse, one writer referred to "the Communists' 
subtle and diabolical scheme to add Greece and China to the
Moscow empire," and expressed hope that MacArthur would keep 
up his "excellent work of stunting the growth of the New 
Hitlers in Japan." He went on, "Every Japanese Communist
["red Fascist" in his words] is undoubtedly an arm or agent 
of the Soviet Foreign Office and his motto is 'Stalin Uber 
Alles'.'

Regarding the usage of U.S. foreign aid, W. S. 
Egekvist, a former staff member of the Economic Scientific 
Section, SCAP, wrote, "Business groups at home are becoming 
more and more critical of the Truman Administration for its 
handling of foreign aid, although they subscribe to our 
national policy of 'stopping the Russians,' . . . but 
Americans can certainly feel proud of the use SCAP has made 
of the supplies sent to Japan" (underline mine). Praising 
the American occupation of Japan, he also stated, "Everyone, 
including those inclined to be skeptical, are happy to be 
able to point to one area of the world where our dollars are

31 Mrs. Laurence E. Slater (Oakland, CA) to MacArthur, 
Mar. 22, 1948, microfilm, reel 69, RG 5.
32 Nathan D. Shapiro (Brooklyn, NY) to MacArthur, Oct. 
11, 1948, microfilm, reel 68, RG 5.
It is clear that in the minds of these writers Russia had replaced Japan as the prime enemy of America.

In August 1947, Bertrand W. Gearhart, a Congressman from California even described Japan as America's potential "ally." He wrote to MacArthur, "Because of your amazingly successful administration of the affairs of our former enemy, the conquered Japanese, the confidence and respect your wise leadership has bestirred among them, it would seem to the casual observer from this distant point that Japan would be an ally of ours in the event of trouble with any Nation [sic]."

Gearhart asked MacArthur to endorse a bill (H.R. 857) to eliminate the Immigration and Naturalization legislation that had discriminated against Japan and Korea since 1924. Speaking of the situation at the time he wrote, "Though much of the prejudice against the Japanese which arose out of our fear of them has faded from our considerations, some of it remains to vex those of us who have been striving for years to promote the principle of tolerance." He therefore sought MacArthur's support of this bill to strengthen his position in promoting it in Congress.  

Similarly, in April 1948, Congressman Walter H.  

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33 W.S. Egekvist (Minneapolis, NM) to MacArthur, Sept. 15, 1947, box 14, RG 10.
34 Bertrand W. Gearhart (Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Aug. 6, 1947, folder 6, box 2, RG 5. As Gearhart wrote, the bill had been already passed to free the Chinese, the Filipinos and Hindus from the Immigration and Naturalization discrimination, while H.R. 857 regarding the Japanese and
Judd from Minnesota requested MacArthur write a letter to be presented to the Judiciary Committee in support of H.R. 5004, a bill to eliminate racial barriers to naturalization and to provide small quotas for all countries of the Far East on the pattern now in force for China and India. Judd wrote, "It seems to us that passage of this pending legislation would have a most favorable effect in further strengthening those democratic elements in Japan which have responded so well to your magnificent leadership."35

In March 1948, in his "Douglas MacArthur For President Radio Speech," whose manuscript was sent to the general, Phillip F. LaFollette described Japan as "the one strategic area on earth where bickering, back-biting, and name-calling between Russians and Americans" was "almost non-existent." He added, "The Russians are not happy over the fact that democratic principles and American leadership are taking deep root in Japan." In strong support of MacArthur, LaFollette stressed the general's "extraordinary success in Japan in dealing firmly with the Russians." Moreover, he quoted a statement of Roger Baldwin, the head of the American Civil Liberties Union: "Never before has a conquering army turned enemies into friends and won their eager cooperation in transforming a military autocracy into the Koreans was still pending in the House Committee on the Judiciary at that time.

a democracy. I got in Japan a fresh faith in the power of our American democracy to lead peoples on the road to freedom. Japan is already on the way to becoming one of the great democracies of the world and a spiritual ally of the American people in their struggle for universal democracy"36 (underline mine). One may question the sincerity of LaFollette’s high admiration of MacArthur’s achievements in Japan, especially in the light that his remark above was a part of the presidential campaign. Still, this image of Japan as a nation reeducated and won to America’s side was the one projected by MacArthur’s supporters at that time.

This same image of Japan was shared by E. A. Hauser, an Associate Professor of Chemistry at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He was planning to invite foreign scientists to attend the 21st National Colloid Symposium to be held at MIT in June 1948, and had decided to "limit such invitations to all U.S. allied countries except Russia and . . . all neutral countries." According to him, the only enemy country which he felt should be included was Japan. (His usage of the terms, "enemy," "allied," and "neutral" countries, was based on the wartime relations of the countries with the U.S. Japan was still formally an "enemy" country, because the peace treaty had not been

36 Philip F. LaFollette, "Douglas MacArthur For President Radio Speech, March 30, 1948," box 14, RG 10. Baldwin’s remarks were quoted from his article in the February 1948 issue of Current History magazine, which he wrote after his visit to Japan.
signed yet.) He explained his reasons for that decision as follows: "My reason for this is that I not only admire more than can be expressed in words what you have done already to make Japan realize what democracy stands for and to help bring it into a brotherhood of nations. This being my opinion, I would like to add my share to it by obtaining permission to extend an invitation to attend this conference to two Japanese professors." It is possible to interpret his reasoning as merely a verbal justification to invite the Japanese scientists. However, his statement did show his judgment that the former hostile relationship between the U.S. and Japan which had lasted until only a few years before no longer mattered to the scientific fellowship between them. His invitation to Japan suggests his

37 E.A. Hauser (Cambridge, MA) to MacArthur, Sept. 19, 1947, box 38, RG 5. See also MacArthur to Hauser, Sept. 20, 1947. MacArthur replied that personally he was completely in accord with Hauser's concept of the desirability of permitting the interchange of visits by the Japanese and other nationals on cultural and scientific matters of this kind, but that the matter was still under consideration by the Far East Commission of eleven nations, several of which had refused to approve such a policy until the establishment of the peace treaty with Japan.

38 In the same spirit, the Pacific Division of American Association for the Advancement of Science made a resolution in September 1947 to request SCAP that "the embargo on the exchange of scientific publications between Japan and the United States be moved without delay." This resolution did not specifically refer to any matters relating to the Cold War, but declared, "The international character of science, and the fellowship of science, and the fellowship of scientists everywhere is a powerful instrument for international peace and good will" (underline mine). See Robert C. Miller (Secretary, Pacific Division, American Association for the Advancement of Science, San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, Sept. 10, 1947, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5.
understanding that the U.S.-Japan relationship had been considerably improved, because he decided not to invite scientists from other enemy nations and Russia.

Norbert A. Bogdan, Vice President of J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, evaluated the situation in March 1948 as follows: "I find that general interest in Japan has increased a great deal of late, partly because the deterioration of our relations with Russia has caused the public to re-assess the strategic importance of Japan in the Pacific; and partly of course because the announcement of your candidacy has stimulated nation-wide curiosity as to the problems of the occupation" (underline mine).

Close observers of the Japanese occupation, including Bogdan, were certainly aware of various problems in Japan and that the Japanese scene was not so rosy as some depicted it. However, it seems safe to say that the perception of Japan as a member of the American camp as opposed to the Soviet camp, was shared by many who were interested in Japan at that time. Whether they actually felt friendly toward the Japanese people or not was another matter.

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39 Nobert A. Bogdan (New York, NY) to MacArthur, Mar. 31, 1948, box 10, RG 5. In his attached draft of report on the Japanese situation to be sent out to some 2,000 clients and business connections in the U.S., South America, Europe and the Far East, he pointed out various problems in Japan, especially concerning her economic recovery. He welcomed that overall American policy toward Japanese rehabilitation was reported to be crystalizing toward a definite and more positive concept.
Favorable Impressions of the Japanese due to Direct Contacts with Them (3)

All the letters in this sub-category were written by those who had spent some time in Japan. While the writers in other sub-categories focused on America's, especially General MacArthur's benevolent role in Japan, and did not give an account of favorable qualities of the Japanese themselves, two of the writers in this group at least mentioned one favorable quality -- the spirit of cooperation among them. William L. Chenery of Collier's magazine wrote, "I wondered if the Japanese could really be as cordial to the occupation as they appeared to be. Conversations with a number of Japanese, but particularly with Admiral Nomura, the former ambassador whom I knew slightly before Pearl Harbor, convinced me of the reality of the change." It should be noted, however, that in giving this favorable impression of the Japanese, Chenery still attributed their cordiality to the achievements of the U.S. occupation in Japan under the leadership of MacArthur, thus emphasizing America's benevolent role in Japan. A Seventh Day Adventist theologian, Benjamin P. Hoffman, who had spent a number of years in Japan before and spent about two months there again in 1947, also wrote, "I was . . . very favorably impressed with the spirit of cooperation on the part of the Japanese in general," at the same time admiring "the spirit and

40William L. Chenery (Office of the Publisher, Collier's, New York, NY) to MacArthur, Aug. 15, 1947, box 14, RG 10.
manner in which the occupation program" was "being carried
on."\footnote{Benjamin P. Hoffman (Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur,
Oct. 5, 1947, box 14, RG 10.}

Another letter in this group was written by an American
resident in Kyoto, Japan.\footnote{This writer was in some way related to Doshisha
University in Kyoto, Japan, which was a Protestant
university founded by a prominent Japanese Christian,
Niijima Jo. See Mary Florence Denton to Mrs. MacArthur and
Mrs. Woodruff, Apr. 21, 1947, box 18, RG 5.} She was sympathetic to Japanese
boys who still remained in Rangoon, Burma, and their
families in Japan, with whom she was in contact. In her
letter, she made "a most earnest appeal" for MacArthur's
"kind advice and help" regarding their speedy return to
Japan. She wrote, "I, too, feel uneasy about their present
and future lives, and cannot help sympathizing with the
families in great anxiety whenever I see them."\footnote{Ibid.}

Although her letter did not particularly show her perception of the
Japanese people in general, it showed her soft and
compassionate feeling toward at least some of them, with
whom she came into close contact. She added, "Some one
brought us the news that the boys found their only
consolation in the occasional visits paid them by some kind
American Y.M.C.A. boys there. I firmly believe that there
is none so divine as the love that has no frontier. May God
bless the American[s]."\footnote{Ibid.} Whatever the truth of this news
was, it can be at least said that this writer's attention

\footnote{Ibid.}
was being paid to the friendly relations between the two peoples.

Desire for Doing Business with Japan in Anticipation of Being Able to Assist Rehabilitating Japan (1)

Though there are eighteen letters in the sample that show American business interest regarding Japan in the second phase of the occupation, only one of them belongs to this present category.\footnote{A category was set for this single letter, because 1) it does not properly fit in any other category, 2) it should be shown that among a number of letters from American business people, only one emphasized the writer's desire to help Japan's recovery, and 3) this letter suggests the existence of other American business people with a similar attitude toward the Japanese, though they constituted a small minority in the American business community.} This letter (from Lynn Atkinson) is distinguished from seventeen others because it stressed a constructive attitude toward Japan, explicitly stating his willingness to contribute to Japan's economic recovery, to help Japan, or more precisely, to help General MacArthur rehabilitate Japan, while the writer's desire to do business with Japan was also based on his company's self-interest. The seventeen other letters, though they generally seemed to approve of rehabilitating Japan's economy in pursuit of salvaging or developing their own interest, are not counted here as showing "positive attitudes" toward Japan, because those letters were rather technical in nature, and their primary emphasis was clearly on the writer's self-interest in pursuing business relations with Japan, not on the...
writer's wish to help her. It is difficult to determine the writer's personal attitudes toward Japan from those letters. 46

Lynn Atkinson of Atkinson Associates wrote to MacArthur in July 1948: "While in Japan and in conferences with yourself, General Marquat, Colonel Ryder, other representatives of SCAP and of the Japanese government, I had determined that we should immediately arrange to open offices in Tokyo, in anticipation of being able to assist and cooperate in the reconstruction and rehabilitation program, and recommended this procedure to my associates" 47 (underline mine). His company showed interest in the development of the iron ore supply for the furnaces of Japan, the promotion of a hotel and office building in Central Tokyo, heavy engineering construction, including irrigation, reclamation and hydro-electric construction, and

46 More letters were found in the second phase (18 letters) than the initial phase (5 letters) that showed interest in doing business with Japan. Some of the eighteen letters indicated interest of American corporations with prewar investments in Japan (e.g., the B. F. Goodrich Company, which had been associated with the Yokohama Rubber Company, International Standard Electric Corporation, which had a substantial stock interest in the Nippon Electric Company and Sumitomo Electric Industries, International General Electric, which had been associated with Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company) in salvaging their interests there. Others expressed interest in opening totally new industrial operations in Japan, resuming or newly starting trade with Japanese private companies or with U.S. administration in Japan.

47 Lynn Atkinson (Los Angeles, CA) to MacArthur, July 23, 1948, 1, box 6, RG 5. This letter was marked "Personal."
in assisting in the urgent housing program for American civilians in Japan. Although his company, according to Atkinson, determined to temporarily defer active participation in activities abroad due to the deterioration of the international situation as evidenced by the crisis in Berlin, he emphasized his company’s continuing interest in Japan and the reconstruction and rehabilitation program.  

It may be argued that business interests often seek to justify their economic activities not merely in terms of pursuing profit but in terms of contributing to larger social requirements. However, the point here is that only a few years after the war this American business man did not hesitate to describe the mission of his business in Japan as assisting its rehabilitation. His letter suggested his assumption that it was natural for him to support the policy of reconstructing Japan, especially in support of MacArthur.

Furthermore, Lynn Atkinson’s letter showed his improved perception of the Japanese people due to his business contacts there. He wrote, "Although prejudiced because of former hostilities, I learned, during my four weeks survey and contacts with SCAP and leading Japanese, such as Ashida, Yoshida and Nagai, of the great needs and possibilities of these people. Frankly, I like the Japanese and admire them as a people more than I thought possible and could look at."  

48 Ibid., 1-2. Atkinson’s letter and MacArthur’s reply to him also revealed that he had actively supported MacArthur as a Presidential candidate.
forward to living and working with them successfully."^49
This statement indicates that his business interest coupled
with his direct contacts with some leading Japanese led to
his improved attitude toward and perception of the Japanese
people.

3) Letters from Christians -- Emphasis on Applying
Christian Principles to the Occupation of Japan (12)

Besides the five letters already introduced above,^50
there were twelve more letters from those who identified
themselves as Christians in the sampling that showed the
writer’s constructive approach to Japan. There were
thirteen more letters from Christians which did not clearly
show the writer’s attitude toward Japan herself. Those
letters, which merely discussed interest in sending
missionaries to Japan, emphasizing Christianity as the
highest and most universal way of life, or writing about
technical matters, are not included in this category of
"positive attitudes,"^51 though it is likely that the writers
had a constructive attitude toward the Japanese.

^49 Ibid., 2.
^50 See Helen Gibbs Embrey to MacArthur (Nov. 22, 1948),
J. Frank Norris to MacArthur (July 3, 1947), Rev. Patrick
O’Connor to MacArthur (May 1, 1947), Benjamin P. Hoffman to
MacArthur (Oct. 5, 1947), and Mary Florence Denton to Mrs.
MacArthur and Mrs. Woodruff (Apr. 21, 1947).
^51 See George E. Worthington (President, University of
Wisconsin Alumni Association of the District of Columbia,
Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Dec. 17, 1947, box 14, RG
10; James L. Fieser (Committee for a Christian University in
Japan) to MacArthur, Mar. 10, 1948, box 14, RG 5; James F.
Boughton (Pastor, Wesley Methodist Church, NJ) to MacArthur,
Nov. 14, 1947, box 14, RG 5; Rt. Rev. Henry K. Sherrill,
Like many letters from Christians in the initial phase, nine of the eleven letters in this category praised MacArthur for his work in Japan, especially for conducting the occupation according to Christian principles such as justice and tolerance. They did not show any hostile or vengeful attitude toward the Japanese. For example, Noah Webster Cooper, who had written to the general in the initial phase, wrote, "We appreciate in the utmost your statement that your occupation policy has been based squarely on the immortal truths of Christ's sermon on the Mount." He also welcomed MacArthur's "very thrilling and most encouraging late announcement about the progress of peace in Japan" and "about the possible peace treaty with \[...\]"}

(\begin{itemize}
\item Noah Webster Cooper (Counsellor, Nashville, TN) to MacArthur, Sept. 5, 1947, box 14, RG 10. Stressing the same point, a member of a Lutheran church wrote, "We have been deeply impressed with the high spiritual tone of your messages. You have shown in an outstanding way, as a follower of the lowly Nazarene, that you can forgive and forget" (underline mine). See Oliver C. Wanglie (Minneapolis, MN) to MacArthur, Nov. 19, 1947, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5.
\end{itemize}
Similarly, Daniel A. Poling, President and editor-in-chief of Christian Herald, approvingly quoted MacArthur's statement, "While our course [in Japan] has been firmly charted... progress has rested more upon the application of those guiding tenets of our faith -- justice, tolerance, understanding -- which without yielding firmness have underwritten all allied policy, than upon the power or threat of allied bayonets." One writer also admired MacArthur's good work and thanked God for his "Christian integrity." This writer also cited an American missionary's remark that the Japanese had esteem for Americans, especially Christian soldiers in Japan and for the American way of life. Another Christian writer praised MacArthur's "record in restoring personal dignity to the Japanese people" and his belief in the "brotherhood of all men and the priceless worth of human individuality." An Episcopal

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56 William C. Black (M.D., San Diego, CA) to MacArthur, Sept. 13, 1947, microfilm, reel 64, RG 5.
pastor stated that "the mighty effort" MacArthur had put forth "in the interest of the Japanese people" had "its wellspring in the deep life of the Spirit." Referring to his church school's project to make an offering to the Episcopal Church in Japan, he wrote that the members of the church school were making "especial effort in understanding and giving," out of "Christian concern for their Japanese brothers." He added, "We are seeking to learn more about the Japanese people so that we can recognize them as basically no different than ourselves."57

Expressing missionary interest, the General Secretary of the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) wrote that the Board had foreseen the nature of the State Shinto question in the hands of the militarists and tried to warn American Christians before the war. He then stated, "Nevertheless this Board would like to repay to Japan the debt that all Christians owe to those who do not have a knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ [by sending missionaries to

57 Jack Malpas (Pastor, St. Bartholomew's Church, Baltimore, MD) to MacArthur, Jan. 14, 1948, microfilm, reel 66, RG 5. Similarly, a Catholic nun writing about a project to open up a school in Kyoto, remarked, "We are confident that God will bless our efforts for the cause of the Japanese people." See Mother M. Evangela, S.S. N.D. (Provincial Superior, School Sisters of Notre Dame, St. Louis, MO) to MacArthur, Oct. 9, 1948, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5. A Methodist pastor also commended MacArthur's "constructive" administration of Japan. See John R. Wilkins (Pastor, First Methodist Church, Burlingame, CA) to MacArthur, June 12, 1947, microfilm, reel 75, RG 5.
Japan]." In this letter, he thus described his wish to show God's love and tolerance to the Japanese people, instead of blaming them.\footnote{Rev. J. Gordon Holdcroft (General Secretary, The Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign missions, Philadelphia, PA) to MacArthur, Mar. 4, 1948, microfilm, reel 63, RG 5. For an expression of a friendly attitude shown by Christians, see also Harry T. Silcock (Friends' Center, Tokyo) to MacArthur, Apr. 28, 1948, microfilm, reel 69, RG 5.}

Another writer wrote to complain of the government rule prohibiting the wives of occupation personnel in Japan from conducting relief programs for the Japanese. This writer, a representative of "The Home Builders Club" of a Methodist church, asserted, "Our class is very much distressed over the way the government \textit{suppress the Christian conscience}. Anything that our soldiers' wives can do out there to promote goodwill and \textit{train the children} should not be prohibited. For these children will grow up and if they have learned by a few Americans they will always cherish all Americans as kind and as Christians. . . . We want to help our nation and want to sow seeds of kindness. As a Christian to Christian we ask you to help us to get this absurd regulation changed, give the Christian personnel a chance to help rebuild. The war is over" (underline in original). She insisted on "training" and "uplifting" the Japanese children "into more worthy citizenship."\footnote{J.M. Gibbs (The Home Builders Class, Methodist Church, Reidsville, N.C.) to MacArthur, Feb. 1, 1948, box
Thus, far from presenting a harsh or hostile attitude, the Christian writers in this group showed a constructive approach to Japan. At the same time, in stressing America's benevolent role for the Japanese, they, like others with positive attitudes, tended to perceive the relationship between the two nations as a paternalistic one. In their minds, the U.S. was the teacher, and Japan the student. While trying to be helpful to the Japanese, there was also the danger that they become self-righteous and condescending. In reply to a writer above, MacArthur affirmed this paternalistic role, referring to the "reformation of the Japanese," and stated that American soldiers were "bringing to the Japanese mind an

39, RG 5. According to the reply from MacArthur to Gibbs, the responsibility for administering relief to the needy people in Japan was carried out by the regularly constituted Japanese public welfare authorities under the overall policy guidance and supervision of occupation authorities in order to insure that relief was dispensed in accordance with need, without discrimination based on race, creed, or social position. Private participation was possible through LARA (Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia) and CARE (Credited Agencies for Relief in Europe and Asia). The attached memorandum by Government Section, SCAP, for General Whitney stated as follows: "Removal of all restrictions on the disposal of American goods to Japanese by occupation personnel would open the way to intensified black market activities by occupation personnel and their dependents under the cloak of relief giving -- since such persons could claim they were giving goods to Japanese individuals or organizations when they were in reality selling them." See MacArthur to J.M. Gibbs, Feb. 21, 1948; Memorandum for General Whitney, Feb. 14, 1948, box 39, RG 5.
exemplification of the fine human qualities" which found "their source and inspiration in the American home."  

4) Conclusion

Factors behind the Positive Attitudes toward Japan

As shown above, a much greater number of the letters in the second phase showed a positive, constructive attitude toward Japan than a harsh attitude. Moreover, most of the letters showing a positive attitude suggested that the writers almost took it for granted that the U.S. should help Japan rehabilitate herself, that it was America's responsibility to do so. In the initial phase of the occupation, as explained in Chapter III, such factors as a strong desire for maintaining world peace; America's need to gain friends in the complex postwar world, especially in the context of the mounting conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; the benign influence of Christianity; the popularity of General MacArthur and support for his commitment to liberate the Japanese people; direct personal contacts with Japanese; and the willing cooperation of the Japanese with the occupation forces were convincing many Americans with some interest in Japan to take a constructive attitude toward her and her people, and to accept the premise that Japan should be rehabilitated as a potentially

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important friend of the U.S. During the second phase, the elements discussed below continued to reinforce their positive attitude toward Japan.

For one thing, the intensification of the Cold War with the Soviet Union was clearly a factor in strengthening the perception that Japan was a member of the American camp in the minds of many Americans. Japan under MacArthur's leadership was surely in America's domain. For them, Japan was a bulwark against the Soviet bloc in terms of the ongoing ideological warfare against communism and was, therefore, of strategic importance. As Nobert A. Bogdan observed in March 1948, general interest in Japan had increased partly because the deterioration of America's relations with Russia had caused the public to re-asses the strategic importance of Japan in the Pacific.61 Then, it was deemed necessary and proper for the U.S. to help a potential "ally" rebuild herself and strengthen her economy. Thus the changing international situation contributed to the softening of American attitudes toward Japan, though it was questionable whether those who stressed the need for befriending Japan because of the Cold War had a lasting or heartfelt friendship toward the Japanese.

There was the same trend in the American mass media in 1948, namely, a general approval of rebuilding Japan as a key anti-Red bulwark in the Far East. But it seems that the

willingness to be helpful to Japan was even stronger among those who wrote MacArthur. It is also notable that only a few letters to MacArthur stressed the need for relieving the American taxpayer of providing aid to Japan as a reason to rebuild her economy, while this need was often emphasized in public comment.

The second factor was the continued popularity of General MacArthur among the Americans. In their support of MacArthur, many people supported his commitment as SCAP to reconstruct Japan, and stressed his success in transforming the Japanese.62

As in the initial phase of the occupation, Christian influence was also a contributing factor for positive attitudes. Those who professed to be Christians often emphasized in their letters such principles as justice, tolerance, understanding, and helpfulness in treating the former enemy nation, attributing these virtues to the Bible. Their desire to obey God’s words certainly led to a constructive attitude toward Japan, though there was also the danger that they would fall into the trap of being self-righteous.

62As noted before, 63 out of the 125 letters in the sampling written during the third phase of the occupation explicitly showed the writer’s admiration for MacArthur. Out of the 63 letters that showed the writer’s praise for MacArthur, 39 belong to the category of "positive attitudes."
As Collier's magazine survey suggested, the ideal of "Christian duty" to help others in need seemed to be widely shared among the American public, most of whom were only nominally Christians. Those who stressed Christian principles in their letters to MacArthur, however, showed more intense interest in applying those principles to their actual lives, particularly in their dealings with the Japanese.

Personal contacts with Japanese were also a factor in development of positive attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese people. A few writers who visited Japan as missionaries or as journalists noted that they were impressed with the cordiality or the spirit of cooperation evidenced by the Japanese. A long-time resident of Japan showed her compassionate feeling toward her Japanese friends. It seems that direct personal contacts often brought Americans to modify their wartime prejudices against the Japanese and develop intimate relationship with Japanese accompanied by heartfelt friendships. Each of other factors noted above alone could not always bring about such effects.

The passing of time since the end of the war was also a factor lessening hostility toward the Japanese. Now that the harsh wartime propaganda and frenzy against the enemy had been gone for a few years, hatred had also faded in the minds of many Americans.

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^63 See p. 284.
In addition, it seems that business interest was a factor for some American business people to approve of reconstructing Japan. In pursuit of the resumption of their prewar business ties with Japan or of developing new markets, these people affirmed at least the general premise that Japan should be rehabilitated. However, most of them in writing MacArthur did not stress their positive attitude toward Japan herself, or their wish to help Japan with her reconstruction. Their primary interest was to explore their business opportunities in Japan. At the same time, it seems that as in the case of Lynn Atkinson, business interest and the resulting business contacts with the Japanese brought some Americans to modify their prejudices against the former enemy nation and improved their perceptions of the Japanese people. It was also possible that business interest stimulated one’s interest in contributing to Japan’s recovery and thereby in being helpful to the cause of the Japanese.  

There were surely some segments of the American business community that objected to helping Japan’s economic recovery, but no letters from such business people are found in the present sampling.  

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64 Such examples can be found among the letters written during the third phase.
65 Producers of pottery, glassware, electric light bulbs, sewing machines, inexpensive notions, toys, and cotton textiles felt threatened by a return to American markets of cheap Japanese goods made by low-cost labor. These segments of the American business community were strongly anti-Japanese in their rhetoric in making public statements. However, the economic needs of these segments
Like those factors presented in Chapter III, the different factors above were not isolated phenomena but often interacted with one another in bringing about positive attitudes toward Japan. It should also be noted that the existence of the various factors above, of course, did not mean complete disappearance of animosity against the Japanese from American minds. There was a sizable segment of the American public still feeling unfriendly toward the Japanese, as a Gallup poll showed. Moreover, it seems that the situational factors such as the Cold War, MacArthur’s popularity, and business relations merely based on self-interest, without active interest in promoting mutual understanding, provided only a shaky ground for positive attitudes toward Japan. The negative views about her may have been merely driven latent.

Perceptions of Japan

As shown in the preceding pages, the relationship between the U.S. and Japan as perceived by the writers of the letters to MacArthur was largely paternalistic. Even though the perception of Japan as a member of the American camp as opposed to the Soviet bloc, that is, America’s were not a crucial consideration in the formulation of American policy for Japan. In quantitative terms, supporters of Japanese recovery outnumbered opponents among articulate business spokesmen, and they represented larger companies and more influential sectors of the economy. See Emily Fairchild Zimmern, "American Business Views toward Japan during the Allied Occupation, September 1945 to April 1952," (M. A. thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1978), 110-12.
potential "ally" or "friend," seemed widespread, her status was not yet perceived to be equal to that of the U.S. -- the U.S. was the teacher, and Japan the student. Japan, though being "reeducated" under the leadership of MacArthur, was still a student with many problems, far from mastering the American way of life. The writers tended to emphasize America's benevolent role in Japan, rather than any favorable qualities of Japan or the Japanese themselves -- except for their spirit of cooperation mentioned in a few letters.

At the same time, it can be also said that the emphasis on MacArthur's achievement in transforming Japan, especially democratizing Japan, influenced many writers to develop improved perceptions of Japan and the Japanese people. Japan, though still having many problems, was now seen as a student learning from the U.S. and making progress toward democracy.

A few writers explicitly showed their negative perceptions of the Japanese while supporting an overall positive approach. In their words, the Japanese were described as "strange" or "inquisitive rather than critical, more clever than intelligent." One thought that it was the policy of the Orientals to kill enemies on capture. The
perception of the Japanese as a feudal-minded people with remote traditions remained.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ See the section 1), "Constructive stance while holding unfavorable perceptions of the Japanese" (p. 276).
PART THREE

THE THIRD PHASE, 1949-50

INTRODUCTION

At the start of 1948 General MacArthur was still the master of the occupation of Japan. About a year later, however, he lost control over the direction of the Japanese economy. During the third phase, Washington, not SCAP, took the initiative in conducting economic recovery programs in Japan, largely putting aside former democratization efforts.\(^1\) As the communists won victories in China in 1949, U.S. policy-makers' concern rose about how to contain the communist threat in the Asian region. For both economic and security considerations, it was imperative for them to build a stable, pro-American Japan. Then, in February 1950 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed a thirty-year treaty of friendship and pledged cooperation to prevent, "the revival of Japanese imperialism and the repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or of any other State which might in any way join with Japan in acts of aggression."\(^2\) Furthermore, the outbreak of the Korean

\(^1\)Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 414.
War made Japan's strategic value as a U.S. military base more evident than ever. It also paved the way for a peace treaty.

Following Truman's approval of NSC 13/2 in October 1948, the State and the Army Departments issued on December 10, 1948 a nine-point directive to the Supreme Commander. It called for an effective economic stabilization program "calculated to achieve fiscal, monetary, price and wage stability in Japan as rapidly as possible, as well as to maximize production for export." Methods of persuasion were abandoned and SCAP was instructed to adopt "whatever measures might be required" for that objective. Truman also announced the appointment of a Detroit banker, Joseph M. Dodge, who had worked with Draper on German monetary reform before becoming head of the American Bankers' Association, as MacArthur's Financial Advisor to bring economic order out of the monetary and fiscal chaos. Moreover, to hasten Japan's economic recovery, the U.S. announced to the FEC its unilateral decision to terminate the reparations deliveries on May 12, 1949.

Agreements Registered or Filed or Reported with the Secretariat of the United Nations, vol. 226, no. 3103.


Schaller, Occupation, 137; Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 143. For the reprint of the statement by U.S. representative on FEC concerning Japanese reparations and
In 1949 and in the first half of 1950, Dodge's program in Japan (the "Dodge Line") applied "stringent doses of neoclassical economics and government control to transform Japan into a low-cost, high-volume industrial exporter linked to its Asian neighbors." His program ended deficit financing, brought a temporary halt to Japan's spiraling postwar inflation, and assisted large-scale enterprises producing for export. On the other hand, it also brought an increase in small business failures and rising unemployment. Dodge's austere attitude toward Japan was expressed in his press statements in the spring of 1949:

Any realistic view of the economic problem suggests a rough and rocky road which will severely test the strength, character, and loyalty of the people. The economy has travelled the early part of this road in a damaged and unrepai red vehicle but the vehicle and the passengers have been protected from road shocks by a cushion of U.S. aid. It is time the Japanese began to face up to the unalterable facts of their own life and to organize themselves to meet their own problems and regain their independence by their own efforts.

He also said,

There seems to be astonishingly little comprehension among the Japanese people of the real situation of their country. Nothing should have been expected as the result of the war but a long term of hardship and self-denial. The nation continuously has been living beyond its means.

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level of industry, see Appendix C., Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase.

5Schaller, Occupation, 145.
7Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 131.
8Ibid., 131-32.
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 halted the stabilization program. Due to American military orders, which reached nearly $800 million per year, and its technical assistance, Japan enjoyed an export boom during the war. This industrial boom raised the rate of capital formation in Japan to a new postwar high and permitted widespread replacement of obsolete equipment. It also raised employment and wage income to new high levels, which led to a domestic consumption boom.\(^9\)

With respect to labor rights, SCAP pressured the Japanese government in 1949 into revising the Trade Union Law of 1945 to follow more closely the example of the restrictive provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act rather than the liberal provisions of the Wagner Act, and into removing union leaders from positions of influence as a condition for receiving large scale American aid.\(^10\) Moreover, in June 1950 MacArthur initiated the "Red purge," banning from public activity all twenty-four members of the Communist Party Central Executive Committee. He followed that up the next day by purging seventeen editors of its daily paper, Akahata. This action led to the further "Red purge" of some 11,000 persons in private industry from July to October

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1950. This extensive purge dealt a crippling blow to the union movement in Japan.\textsuperscript{11}

The anti-trust program also diminished as the result of the new guidelines for deconcentration established by the Deconcentration Review Board in September 1948. By August 1949 when the deconcentration program was halted altogether, only nineteen of the 325 operating companies had been forced to reorganize structurally.\textsuperscript{12}

Meanwhile, the external threat from the Soviet bloc led to an increased stress on Japan's self-defense by American military planners. MacArthur, who had insisted that Japan be permanently disarmed and neutralized, came to accept Washington's concept of a Japanese self-defense force in June 1950, when Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Joint Chief of Staffs chairman, General Omar Bradley visited Japan, promoting the plan.\textsuperscript{13} The outbreak of the Korean War

\textsuperscript{11} Kawai, Japan's Postwar Interlude, 165; Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 449-52; Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 208-209; Schaller, Occupation, 267-68. On top of the 11,000 government workers who had lost their jobs previously in what had not yet been labeled a "Red purge," according to Cohen, the anti-communist discharges reached a total of 22,000 in all.

\textsuperscript{12} Hadley, Antitrust in Japan, 180; Idem, "Japan: Competition or Private Collectivism?" 292-93.

\textsuperscript{13} Schaller, Occupation, 65-66, 276-78. According to Schaller, MacArthur, despite frequent contradictions in his pronouncements, steadily objected to Japanese rearmament, the resumption of military production, and granting the U.S. extensive military-base rights in Japan, until shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War. He had believed that both American security and that of Japan could best be protected by creating a strong island defense perimeter off the Asian mainland.
accelerated the pace of Japanese rearmament and negotiations for a "separate peace" (a peace treaty without participation of the communist bloc). In early July, MacArthur authorized the establishment of a 75,000-man National Police Reserve and an increase of the corps of the marine safety patrol. Accordingly, the reluctant Japanese government passed a law in August creating the reserve corps. Though the new corps was formally not an army and a navy yet, it was expanded to a Constabulary in 1952, and then to the Self-Defense Forces in 1954.¹⁴

Attitude toward the Japanese and Appraisal of Japan's Democracy

As the communists gained power in China, spread their influence in Southeast Asia, and the Korean War broke out in the third phase of the occupation, public comment in the U.S. regarding Japan was accordingly dominated by discussion of her strategic importance and the need for her rearmament and for an early peace treaty. Most observers affirmed the need for building Japan up as the "workshop" of Asia and a key anti-Red bulwark in the Far East. In this situation, the harsh image of the Japanese, the emotional expressions, and strong animosity against them, which had been often expressed in the early days of the occupation, were seldom expressed in public comment. Japan was generally seen as America's important ally, taking the place of China. Favorable descriptions of Japan appeared more often than in the earlier phases.

A Time article in May 1949, for instance, stated, "The Open Door was closing fast in China. . . . The U.S. wondered: What next in Asia?" In praising General MacArthur, it continued, "No man knew the answer. But the
beginning of an answer seemed to be in the making." It argued,

While the U.S. labors on the dam that contains Communism in Europe, the Red tide has risen mightily in Asia and now threatens to engulf half the world's people. In all Asia, tiny, beaten Japan is the one place where the U.S. still has a firm foothold, where it still has a chance to redeem the West's sorry record of failure and confusion in the East (underline mine).1

Thus in pointing to the successful handling of the Japanese occupation by MacArthur, the writer expressed the view that Japan was America's only hope for a stable ally in Asia.

A few months later, with the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist government, a headline in Newsweek read, "After 4 Years: China Down, Japan Up." Japan was thus contrasted to China, though the writer also noted that Japan was "just beginning to be more of an asset than a liability," and it still had a "long, hard road to travel" before it recovered as a nation.2 In an article written half a year after the outbreak of the Korean War, Newsweek wrote, "One of Washington's chief preoccupations in the wake of the Korean defeat was what effect it would have on Japan -- chief United States base in the Far East and the most important country in Asia from the American viewpoint -- and on General MacArthur's prestige there." Chief of Newsweek's Tokyo bureau Compton Pakenham also asserted, "For the

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1"New Door to Asia," Time, May 9, 1949, 32.
present there in no fear of the Japanese turning against the Occupation. The same issue of Newsweek carried an article by Raymond Moley, who in advocating the creation of a Japanese army maintained, "Japan is a natural ally of the U.S. and England. All three of these nations have been maritime powers, industrially minded, and quick to learn." He argued that Japan could be "trusted," pointing to "Japan's cooperation since the beginning of the Korean War" and maintaining that "the great majority of Japanese fear[ed] and hate[d] Russia." In addition, Moley stated that there had been built up in Japan "a respect and friendship among the majority for America." He concluded,

This setting up of a Japanese bastion against Communism and the assurance of our lines of defense are matters of immediate American necessity and self-preservation. Further delay would be criminal neglect.

Similarly, in February 1951 the Milwaukee Journal, in the context of urging a prompt peace treaty, contended there was growing confidence that Japan was "a nation to be trusted." The Chicago News emphasized "intelligent self-interest" dictated "that we seek to build Japan into an ally," and it applauded the "unity and self-discipline of the Japanese people." These statements suggest that the

3"Japan: We Still Have Face," *Newsweek*, Dec. 18, 1950, 34, 36.
5"American Opinion, Japan, Feb. 16-23," Feb. 23, 1951, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. Unless otherwise indicated,
strategic need for building Japan as an ally due to the current international situation led the writers to project Japan in a favorable light, despite the fact that she had been America's dread enemy just half a decade before. More than likely, those observers who depicted Japan as a trustworthy ally were advocating the view that they wanted or needed to believe, or were seeing what they wanted to see in Japan. An article in *Time* magazine in January 1951 frankly stated, in discussing an early peace treaty, "Nobody can be certain that the Japanese have become trustworthy friends of the U.S. But they probably cannot be made more trustworthy by prolonging the occupation indefinitely." At the same time, the author admitted, "Certainly, the Japanese can, if given a chance, contribute to defending their country against Communist Chinese-Russian aggression," and "Japan may be the strongest anti-Communist force in Asia."6

Conversely Owen Lattimore, representing a minority opinion, argued in his article for the April 1949 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, "We must realize that nothing ties Japan down to be America's permanent ally in Asia. A Japan made strong enough . . . to be an America's ally . . . is automatically a Japan strong enough to double-cross America and make its own deals both with Russia and with the rest of

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In speeches at St. Louis and Minneapolis in February 1951, Lattimore reiterated his earlier warning that Japan could not be counted on as a trustworthy ally, but would, as soon as it became a "free agent," pursue a policy of "the power politics system of playing one country against another." Another liberal observer, Nathaniel Peffer, also argued against the policy of building Japan as America's Far Eastern ally in his New York Times Magazine article in May 1949, and questioned, "By what reasoning can it be concluded that after Japan gets strong again it will necessarily fight on our side?"

While there are no survey results available on public opinion in 1950 or 1951 about the prospect of Japan as a military ally, those published in the fall of 1949 suggest the trend of the general public. According to a Gallup poll released on November 16, 1949, when asked, "If there is another world war, do you think Japan will fight on the side of the U.S. or against the U.S.?," more than one third (36 percent) still thought she would fight "against us," but slightly more people (38 percent) thought she would fight "with us," 1 percent thought she would remain neutral, and

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25 percent expressed no opinion. It is rather remarkable that merely four years after the termination of hostility, about 4 out of 10 Americans thought that the Japanese could be counted on as a military ally in a possible future world war. In view of public comment on Japan's security and rearmament in the third phase of the occupation as discussed below, the same survey conducted in 1950 would have brought results more distinctive in foreseeing Japan as a military ally. At the same time, in 1949, though the majority of public comment saw Japan as an anti-Red bulwark, America's potential key ally, and the workshop in Asia, a sizable segment of the general public could not yet envision the recent enemy fighting on the side of the U.S. in a future war.

In addition, when the same question was asked about the new Western Germany, 43 percent said she would fight with the U.S., while 32 percent thought she would fight against

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10 Of those who had attended college, 45 percent believed that the U.S. and Japan would be on the same side in case of another war. "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Nov. 11-17," Nov. 18, 1949, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. See also Public Opinion Quarterly 14 (Spring 1950): 178-79.

11 Very few Americans thought Japan would remain neutral, despite the fact that Japan had been demilitarized after the war and that she had not been rearmed yet at that time. In addition, in March 1949 MacArthur had stated, "[In case of another war,] we do not want Japan to fight" and "All we want her to do is to remain neutral." See news by United Press in North and South America, March 2, 1949, box 17, RG 10, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.
the U.S. and 25 percent gave no opinion. Thus, it seems that the American public tended to be somewhat more trustful of West Germany than Japan.

As in the earlier periods, the perception of the Japanese as a feudalistic and authoritarian people who lacked independent thought persisted. For example, an article in *Commonweal* discussed some "fundamentals of Japanese behavior patterns" such as a deep-rooted sense of duty and blind obedience to persons of high rank and high class, and described Japan as "a society utterly alien in its basic thought patterns to those of the West." Another writer, in his article for the *Saturday Review of Literature*, argued that "in contrast to the Japanese with their herd-instinct and their blind obedience to discipline," the Chinese were more individualistic. Along the same line, an article in the *New York Times Magazine*, reporting on the military government work in Ibaraki, Japan, stressed the "feudal attitudes" of the Japanese, and stated that "many old customs and conditions" were unchanged.

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12 AIPO, Nov. 26, 1949, published in *Public Opinion Quarterly* 14 (Spring 1950): 178. This survey was conducted in late September 1950.


Except for the radicals, according to the writer, Japanese teachers, paid on the basis of length of service rather than ability or signs of improvement, were "devoid of almost all initiative and imagination."\(^{15}\)

General MacArthur declared at the fifth anniversary of Japan's surrender that democratization in Japan had been completed. Senator Claude Pepper (D., Florida) after a three-week visit to Japan, also stated in Congress in December 1950, half a year after the outbreak of the Korean War, "The Japanese people have learned the error of their ways and Japan is entitled to be called a democratic country."\(^{16}\) In a similar vein, Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R., New Jersey) had reported a year before to the Committee on Foreign Relations after his Pacific tour, "Japan stands out as a beacon of light and hope in an otherwise alarming picture." Although it was "too early of course, to draw any final definite conclusions," the senator affirmed, "a new Japan may well arise to be the spearhead of a revitalized Western Christian tradition in the Far East."\(^{17}\) In the mass media, too, furthering democratic reforms in Japan was then no longer the chief subject for discussion on Japan. This

evaluation of Japan's progress toward democracy by U.S. public figures was illustrated by Figure 44.

On the other hand, not all American observers agreed with such public declarations about the transformation of Japan into a democratic and peaceful nation. Given the perception of the Japanese as a feudal-minded people, a number of articulate, watchful observers, including liberal and moderate observers, pointed out that Japan still had a long way to go to achieve democracy. The Commonweal article in January 1949 cited above affirmed that "the democratization of Japan" had "only begun." In June a New York Times Magazine article, in stressing feudal attitudes of the Japanese, likewise asserted, "The Japanese are quick to change on the surface, but slow and stubborn at the core." In November 1949, Hessell Tiltman in his article for the Washington Post, urged a prompt peace treaty with Japan but warned, "We would do well to recognize ahead of time that we will be concluding peace with a Japan dominated by much the same elements that plunged the country into war." Half a year before, Nathaniel Peffer had noted, "If and when the occupation withdraws, the basic social structure of Japan will be what it was before." Similarly doubtful

20 Peffer, "Asia: Spiritual Challenge to Us."
about Japan's potential to be an effective ally, Owen Lattimore in his article for the April 1949 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* argued that the society of Japan was still "a sick society," adding that imperialism, like fascism, was "a disease that bites deep."21 In February 1950 Lindesay Parrott, writing for the *New York Times Magazine*, questioned how far Japan had been converted to democracy, and cautioned that it must not be forgotten that Japan was "an old country with a long tradition of which democracy was not a natural part," though on paper the occupation had given the Japanese "all the most modern democratic trimmings."22 In mid-1950 a few commentators who noted the fifth anniversary of Japan's surrender (e.g., *New York Times*, Hessell Tiltman in the *Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor*) expressed skepticism about any claims that the changes in the Japanese were more than superficial. The *New York Times* observed: "Some extremely important groundwork has been done . . . but it now appears our task in the Pacific is far from ended. It has only begun." The *Christian Science Monitor* argued, "The pressing need is still reeducation rather than rearmament."23

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21 Lattimore, "Japan Is Nobody's Ally," 56.  
In addition, in late 1950 Hanson Baldwin argued, "The American occupation has laid a new patina on Japanese customs, traditions and thinkings. But it is only a patina. For the most part our influence has been superficial." Raymond Swing likewise warned that it would be "naive" to expect Japan to be a bastion of democracy in the Far East. "If Japan grows strong," he asserted, "it will be the same Japan in most ways which the U.S. had to defeat in World War II." Furthermore, at the beginning of 1951, while advocating Japanese rearmament, the Los Angeles Times cautioned that "we must never underrate the fanatic nationalism of the Japanese" which was "not dead, but sleeping." This view was shared by some other observers. It should be noted that, though being suspicious of Japan's intentions, these observers did not express any irrational, emotional anti-Japanese feelings.

Thus while the general trend among American observers in the third phase of the occupation was to see Japan as America's important ally, there was sharp disagreement among commentators as to the extent to which Japan had been transformed into a democratic and peace-loving nation.

The outright negative characterization of the Japanese people (e.g., "arrogant," "childish") appeared less frequently in the public comment in the third phase of the

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occupation than in the earlier phases. This does not necessarily mean that those negative perceptions were no longer held by many Americans, but they were at least less evident in the American media than in the earlier phases. One of the few examples of the public expression of the unfavorable perceptions about the Japanese is found in a Commonweal article in January 1949, which discussed the difficulties in democratizing Japan. The author, in stressing Japanese "dishonesty," stated,

If the Japanese have any international reputation, it is for duplicity, cunning, and downright dishonesty in their social and political and international relations. The Russians were attacked without warning in 1904, and the United States at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Yet in terms of Japanese feudal practices, the dishonesty which we sense is the application of Confucian and feudalistic thought patterns in social relations (underline mine).

As to Japanese business practices, an article in Business Week in late 1949 contended in disgust, "War and occupation have not changed Japan's traditional tendency to dump poor-quality products on world markets." 27

Sheila Johnson in her chapter "The Legacy of the War" suggests the persistence of negative perceptions of the Japanese in the consciousness of many Americans. According to her, one reason for the derogatory tone in the portrayal of the Japanese in the postwar days was American

26 Deverall, "Democratizing Japan," 319.
unfamiliarity with and distaste for jungle warfare, in which American and Japanese soldiers had been engaged in the Pacific. This theme was particularly evident in Norman Mailer's war novel, *The Naked and the Dead*, which was on the *New York Times* best-seller list for 62 weeks from 1948 to 1949. As Johnson discusses, "the abiding atmosphere of that book is one of sheer physical misery -- the oppressive climate, the brutal terrain, the cruel exertions demanded of the soldiers." It seems that this popular book presented the image of the Japanese as just a faceless enemy.

A few authors suggested that direct contacts with Japanese people had contributed to the modification in their attitudes or perceptions regarding Japan. For example, a *Saturday Evening Post* correspondent, Nora Waln, wrote in April 1949, "I have found the Japanese people as varied in character as are the views of their mysterious mountain. And each Japanese whom I have met during my eighteen months here has given me a new view into the mysteries of his nation." Thus, though still using the word, "mysteries," she came to be free from irrational stereotypes about the Japanese. Norman Cousins also wrote in the October 1 issue of the *Saturday Review of Literature*,

> In fact, for the first few days after I arrived in Tokyo, I found it difficult to get used to the idea of seeing Americans walking and talking and

laughing with Japanese. You would talk to hardened American newsmen whose main complaint against the occupation was that it prohibited Americans from giving things to Japanese -- a prohibition, incidentally, which is fast going by the board. But after a while you stopped thinking of the Japanese as a nation, and you began to think of them as Mr. Tanimoto or Mrs. Nakamura or Mrs. Kato or Dr. Fuji or Mayor Hamai or a little girl with T.B. by the name of Nobuko Taguchi or a nine-year old boy pressing his nose against a window showcase displaying baseball equipment. You got to know them as individuals, as people with a vast though equal potential for evil or goodness, which qualifies them as authentic members of the human race. And the more you found out about their individual problems, the less conscious you were of the national entity into which they had been fused (underline mine).

The paternalistic attitude discussed in the earlier phases continued to be shown in some articles which focused on American efforts to teach democracy to the Japanese. The image of America as the teacher of democracy persisted, though the actual impulse for furthering liberal democracy in Japan declined in the mass media. For instance, a letter to the editors of the Nation in March 1949, emphasizing the need for supporting progressive forces in Japan, concluded,

No nation can free another, but the United States can play the part of a wise teacher in helping the new Japan to grow, recognizing that a wise teacher plans to make himself expendable (underline mine).

The Commonweal article cited above (that stated the democratization of Japan had only begun), cast the question,

"Will the Americans and their Allies have the courage and Christian charity to see the thing through?"  

Not surprisingly then, in the third phase there still appeared in U.S. newspapers some cartoons that depicted Japan as a child or baby (See Figures 44-46), but others now depicted the nation as an adult (See Figures 47-50). Absent from these cartoons was the wicked face of the Japanese that had been shown in many cartoons right after the war. The depiction of West and East Germany as little boys in Figure 51 reiterates the observation made in Chapters II and IV that the projection of a nation as a baby or child in cartoons was not necessarily due to racism, but often reflected the power relations between nations of the time. 

How did the general public respond to the trend of public comment on Japan in the third phase, namely, the prevailing theme of Japan as America’s key ally in Asia, the fading of harsh images about her people in public comment, occasional public declarations by influential leaders about the progress being made toward democracy in Japan, and, as discussed below, the flurry of favorable comment on the achievements of the occupation, though a number of articulate observers cautioned against too optimistic a view about her democratic development? The following survey results taken in 1951 suggest an answer. According to an 

32 Deverall, "Democratizing Japan?" 321. For a similar paternalistic attitude, see also Falk, "Teaching 'Demokratzi' To the Japanese."
unpublished survey made by the NORC in late March 1951, a majority (53 percent) said they had a "favorable" impression of the Japanese people, while 33 percent professed to have an "unfavorable" impression, and 14 percent could not answer. A Gallup poll also reported a similar set of figures in September 1951. According to it, 51 percent then took a friendly or favorable view toward the Japanese people, while 25 percent said they had an unfriendly, or unfavorable view, 18 percent were neutral, and 6 percent gave no opinion.

These indices of popular opinion denote a substantial shift from attitudes held by Americans in the initial phase, when a majority expressed harsh views of the Japanese people. Even compared with the Gallup poll taken two years earlier, the percentage of people having friendly attitudes toward the Japanese grew from 34 percent to 51 percent. This comparison indicates a considerable degree of improvement in American public's attitude toward Japan in the third phase of the occupation.

33 "Popular Opinion on Japan," Oct. 1, 1951, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. NORC asked, "Now I'd like to ask you how you feel about the people who live in certain countries -- as distinct from their government. In general, do you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of the Japanese people?" (underline mine).

34 The results also show that the better-educated are, as usual, more likely to have friendly attitudes. Ibid., 1. In addition, according to an AIPO survey in early February 1953, 56 percent felt friendly toward the Japanese, 14 percent felt unfriendly, 24 percent were neutral, and 6 percent gave no opinion. This information was obtained from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research in Storrs, CT.
On the other hand, a quarter to a third of the American public near the end of the occupation still held unfriendly views of the Japanese. Moreover, 6 percent out of 51 percent who professed friendly attitudes in replying to the Gallup poll above gave a qualified answer. The main "qualification" given with friendly replies, according to Gallup, was that "the Japanese are good people, but still have to be watched"\textsuperscript{35} (underline mine). Thus, it seems that many American people remained cautious about the possibility of the Japanese people being misled in an unpeaceful direction again, while believing that they were not by nature wicked.

\textbf{Appraisal of U.S. Occupation Policy and Achievements in Japan}

The occupation in the third phase, especially in 1949, was exposed to more criticism than in earlier phases. In other words, MacArthur's administration in this period received outright criticism not merely from liberal or leftist-oriented observers but also from many who were concerned with the slow pace of Japan's economic recovery, besides 	extit{Newsweek} which had attacked SCAP's economic policy in the second phase. In 1950, comments expressing praise or criticism of the occupation decreased in number.

On the one hand, a number of observers continued to appraise the U.S. occupation of Japan, General MacArthur, \textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 1.
and his staff favorably in the third phase. For instance, an enthusiastically approving article on the land reform program, written by Darrell Berrigan and W. I. Ladejinsky, was carried in the *Saturday Evening Post* in January 1949.³⁶ Likewise, in August 1949 the *New Leader* commended the general's administration of Japan as a "singular success," and the *Baltimore News Sun* described it as "without parallel in contemporary times and without precedent in history."

Both papers were critical of the State Department for not giving "appropriate attention" to MacArthur's analysis of the Far Eastern situation.³⁷ A not so enthusiastic but nonetheless generally favorable appraisal of the occupation came from *Time* in May 1949, which noted, "Many would agree that, in Japan, the U.S. and MacArthur have acquitted themselves creditably in spite of the basic mistakes made in the first phase of the occupation." It also stated, "Japan no doubt could use a more experienced economic administrator than Douglas MacArthur is. But such a gain might be offset by the loss of a leader who has shown that he can be a real inspiration for the muddled Japanese people."³⁸

Following MacArthur's statement on the fourth anniversary of Japan's surrender, a sizable number of

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³⁸ "New Door to Asia," 35-36.
observers applauded the comparative smoothness of the occupation in a turbulent Far East and paid tribute to the general's stewardship, though some found it difficult to agree with him that "the threat of Communism as a major issue in Japanese life is past." A month later, the *Kansas City Star* carried a report by Clarence Decker, President of Kansas City University, on his visit to Japan. He declared that U.S. occupation forces under MacArthur had done "an excellent job." In mid-October additional praise came from U.S. observers and Tokyo correspondents. Kyle Palmer, editor of the *Los Angeles Times* who was spending a month in Japan, wrote, "Constitutional government is working in Japan. Not as perfectly as its warmest supporters maintain, but assuredly far more effectively than its severest critics assert." Lindesay Parrot of the *New York Times* reported, "Even the smallest Japanese villages have begun to put into effect, at least in form, the practices of democracy," while David Stentner of Hearst press asserted that "the MacArthur administrative miracle in Japan" had "caused the Kremlin to junk its timetable for a postwar Communist Japan." Returning to Japan for the first time since the war, an INS correspondent, Clark Lee commended the "swift and bold progress" made in reforming Japan. Similar praise was expressed by the *Washington Star, Chicago*

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Tribune, and Dr. William P. Tolley, Chancellor of Syracuse University. 40

MacArthur's 1950 New Year's message was also followed by praise of his administration from the Milwaukee Journal and the New York Herald Tribune, though there were a number who thought he was "too optimistic" (e.g., Allen Raymond in the New York Herald Tribune, Birmingham Age-Herald, Jennings Perry in the New York Compass, Elmer Davis of ABC). 41 In April 1950 former Minnesota Congressman Richard P. Gale, in an article for Look magazine, termed the occupation "unique in world history for the good will and friendship with which it has carried out its hard job." 42

In addition, John Gunther's book, The Riddle of MacArthur, which was on the New York Times best-seller list for 18 weeks in 1951, gave a positive appraisal of the occupation. Gunther affirmed that MacArthur "of course" had done a good job. He argued that the seed of democratization had been planted, and that "stupendous progress" had been made toward democracy in Japan, at the same time contending that MacArthur had "not quite" done "the job he thinks he has done." 43

On the other hand, the occupation, especially its economic policy was under attack from many observers. In January 1949 a highly critical article by a Far Eastern correspondent and author, Hallett Abend, appeared in Look magazine charging that "the triumphant victor of a brilliant military campaign made a costly botch of the unfamiliar task of rebuilding the fallen Empire's shattered political and economic structure."44 In his book, Half Slave, Half Free: This Divided World that was published in the next year, Abend also asserted that the successes of MacArthur's occupation system had been greatly exaggerated.45

In an economic report on SCAP, while seeing "new hope" in the economic stabilization directive of December 10, 1948, Fortune in its April 1949 issue also assailed America's "two million dollar failure in Japan," charging that "bureaucratic experimentation," which had "unnecessarily interfered with and postponed" Japanese recovery, had "dissipated the good will of the Japanese" and "turned obedience into indifference, if not veiled

44 "American Opinion, December 16, 1948-January 31, 1949," Feb. 9, 1949, 4. In comparing the enthusiastic approval of the land reform by the Saturday Evening Post writers (See Darrell and Ladejinsky, "Japan's Communists Lose a Battle.") and Abend's criticism of SCAP, the Des Moines Register concluded, "Probably the soundest judgment would fall somewhere in between." The Baltimore Sun also noted, "Gen. MacArthur may have been too optimistic. But it is less than just to place on him the blame for a situation which is largely created by conditions over which he has no control whatever."

opposition." The report urged that the U.S. controls, other than those over rice, coal, and the expenditure of foreign exchange, be wiped out to improve the Japanese economy.46 Half a year later, the same magazine asserted that SCAP's "second-rate" team of economists "appears unable or unwilling to implement the whole Dodge plan" -- which had already been "moderately successful," and maintained that Japan's economy would be "better off when SCAPitalism comes marching home."47 In the same vein, Helen Mears in her article for the June issue of the Saturday Evening Post criticized the "conspicuous failure" of occupation economic policies, and deplored the U.S. moves to give Japan "democracy," when the Japanese people could "no longer earn even a prewar standard of living." She wrote, "Utopia is expensive."48 Mears launched the same attack in the following year, by asserting, "After four and a half years of our control and guidance, the Japanese are worse off than in a period of prewar depression. . . . Only an open-door policy, long-term loans, and release from all economic

restrictions and foreign guidance and control," contended Mears, "can start Japan toward recovery."49

Thus most criticism in 1949 was leveled at the slow progress of Japan's economic recovery, in contrast to the initial phase of the occupation when most of the sharp criticism was made against the conciliatory attitude of the occupation force toward Japanese "reactionaries" or "ultra-conservatives," including big industrialists, and virtually nobody criticized economic reform conducted by the occupation forces as being too radical. Most American observers commenting on Japan then were clearly more concerned with her economic recovery than economic reform, though several observers (e.g., Commonweal, New Republic) urged caution in shifting American policy on Japan from "repression to revival."50

Moreover, from March to mid-1949, much speculation was made about plans to turn the occupation over to civilian control and to relax some Allied controls over the Japanese government. Arguing that only a competent civilian administration could help the Japanese run things on a business basis, a number of observers (e.g., Christian


Science Monitor, Watertown Times, Whaley-Eaton Letter, Time, William Henry Chamberlin, Walter Lippmann, Stewart Alsop, New York Times, Louisville Courier-Journal, Detroit News, Americans for Democratic Action, Edgar Ansel Mowner, Kaltenborn of NBC) contended that while the occupation had been a success "as military occupations go," it had deteriorated into a "vast, cumbrous bureaucracy" which was impeding Japan's chances for recovery. U.S. troops should be retained, these commentators stressed, but solely for military purposes. 51 Tokyo correspondents, then, almost unanimously reported occupation officials "vigorously opposed" to any change. 52 In June Walter Winchell of ABC declared MacArthur was "in a fight with both the State Department and the Defense Department over his policies in Japan. They're trying to put him in Truman's dog house." Keyes Beech, in a dispatch to the Chicago News from Tokyo, maintained that "for the first time since the occupation began" MacArthur was on the defensive.

Furthermore, in July Hanson Baldwin in an article for the New York Times, contended that the general was now "working in fields in which he had no particular competence" and that "his usefulness in Japan -- great in the initial


phase of the occupation -- has come to an end. A new and
bold policy and a civilian governor to administer it are
needed." 53 Similarly, in a fourth-anniversary review of the
occupation, Hessell Tiltman, in an article for the
Washington Post, stated that "nine-tenths of Gen.
MacArthur's headquarters" could "pack up and go home
tomorrow without changing the trend," adding that "an
American Advisory Group of some 300 civilian experts could
give all the assistance now necessary to help the Japanese
run their affairs." 54 Thus by mid-1949, the authority of
General MacArthur in Japan was questioned by many
influential observers. In addition, in early 1950 the
Washington Post reported the statement of Joseph Ballantine,
former head of the State Department's office of Far Eastern
Affairs, that the U.S. had tried to democratize Japan too
quickly. According to the Post, Ballantine urged that
America let the Japanese make their own decisions and then
help them to carry them out. 55

Though there are no public opinion survey results in
1950 (or 1951) available on the appraisal of the Japanese
occupation, a poll in early 1949 shows that popular approval
of the occupation remained at a high level at the beginning

53 "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, July 8-14," July
15, 1949, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
19, 1949, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
55 "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Feb. 24-Mar. 2,"
of the third phase. When asked, "What kind of a job would you say General MacArthur is doing in the U.S. occupation of Japan?," 55 percent of a national cross section expressed "general" approval and 26 percent "enthusiastic" support, making a total of 81 percent approving the occupation. Only 5 percent disapproved, while 14 percent had no opinion.56 In contrast, when almost the same question was asked by the NORC in April 1949 about the way U.S. occupation of Germany was handled, only 58 percent approved of it, 12 percent disapproved, and 30 percent did not know.57 Judging from the continued flow of favorable views about the Japanese occupation in the third phase, it is likely that this trend of an overall favorable appraisal by the public continued in this period, albeit with possible modification in a negative direction.

Concern with Communist Influence in Japan and the Impact of the Cold War on American Attitude toward Japan

In the third phase, the Cold War continued to frame the American mind. President Truman's elucidation of the contrast between democracy and communism in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949 was accorded a strongly enthusiastic reception by the American media which found it an inspiring exposition of America's world objectives. A

56 "American Opinion, March --May 15," May 16, 1949, 3. These results were published on April 15, 1949 by the AIPO. See Public Opinion Quarterly 13 (Fall 1949): 553.
considerable number of editors cited the address approvingly as evidence that the Administration planned no "appeasement" of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, observing the deterioration of the Chinese Nationalist regime, almost all of those commenting agreed that communist domination of China would represent a "major defeat" for U.S. Far Eastern policy and would pose "serious new problems" for America in Asia. At the same time, the largest group of commentators continued to await developments, going along with what the press termed America's "hands-off" China policy. In mid-1949, the continuing communist success in China, coupled with the unrest in other parts of Asia, led to a growing demand for a more "positive" or "comprehensive" American policy for all of Asia, which would meet this "threat" to Western interests and security there. Such a U.S. policy would include, according to the observers, the encouragement of legitimate nationalist movements in Asia, providing economic and technical assistance to the free Asian countries, and the maintenance of a chain of defensive bases. In late 1949 the swift march of events in China, resulting in the virtual communist conquest of the Chinese

58 Monthly Survey, Jan. 1949, 1-2, box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59. Criticism of the address on the ground that it was too "belligerent" toward Russia came from a small group, most of whom had previously urged the Administration to move toward conciliation with Russia (e.g., New York Post and Star, Portland Oregonian, Henry Wallace, Walter Lippmann). 59 Ibid., 8; Ibid., Mar. 1949, 10. 60 Ibid., May 1949, 3-4; Ibid., June 1949, 5; Ibid., Sept. 1949, 7, all in box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59.
mainland, Mao Tse-Tung's proclamation of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and the isolation of the Nationalist government on Formosa, increased concern among American press, radio and Congressional observers over the "lack" of a comprehensive U.S. policy to halt communism in Asia.\(^{61}\) In early 1950 warning of the possibility of a communist expansionist drive in Southeast Asia, many commentators shifted their attention from China to Indochina and stressed the need for a U.S. policy which would strengthen the area against a Soviet-inspired thrust.\(^{62}\)

Then, the outbreak of the Korean Conflict on June 25 aroused almost unanimous support in the country for measures that would assure victory in Korea and enable the country to be prepared for other Soviet-inspired aggressions. The State Department's public opinion survey noted that while some warned against "overcommitting" American forces, most appeared determined to resist communist aggression wherever it appeared.\(^{63}\)

A public opinion survey in March by NORC also showed that 67 percent of a nationwide cross section registered approval of a statement, "We should be even firmer than we are today in our dealings with Russia." It also showed that 44 percent of the public favored U.S. action "to stop

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\(^{61}\) Ibid., Dec. 1949, 1; Ibid., Jan. 1950, 1, both in box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., Feb. 1950, 8; Ibid., Mar. 1950, 5-6; Ibid., Apr. 1950, 7-8, all in box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., July 1950, 1, box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59.
communism from spreading to other countries in Asia besides China," and 29 percent even favored arms aid, though the general public continued to show substantially less interest in "stopping communism in Asia" than in Europe at that time.64 Half a year later, according to a nationwide poll by the NORC in mid-September, 81 percent thought that the U.S. was "right in sending American troops to stop the communist invasion of South Korea."65

Under these circumstances, the concern with communist influence within Japan, though it already existed in the earlier periods, developed to a greater extent among those commenting on Japan, and discussion of the strategic importance and security of Japan came to dominate the public comment on the nation in the third phase of the occupation.

1) Concern with Communist Influence in Japan

The results of Japan's National Diet elections on January 23, 1949, which showed Japan's "swing to extremes" or "political polarization," disturbed some American commentators though they attracted much less comment than those of April 1947.66 The Communist Party's gains in the

64 Ibid., Mar. 1950, 3, 6. Arms aid to Western Europe received sustained majority approval of 53 percent.
65 Ibid., Oct. 1950, 5. According to the poll, 13 percent believed the step was "wrong," and 6 percent gave no opinion.
66 As the result of the January 1949 election, the Diet strength of the Democratic-Liberal Party headed by Shigeru Yoshida (which was the most conservative party) was increased from a minority of 152 to an absolute majority of 264, while Communist representation also rose from 4 to 35.
Diet were especially disturbing to those commenting on this development. Viewed against the enveloping "Red tide" in Asia, the emergence of the Communist Party in Japan as a solid political factor for the first time was adjudged "ominous" by some (Scripps-Howard press, New York Herald Tribune, Louisville Courier-Journal, Washington Star, Heatter of MBS, Moley and Kaltenborn of NBC, Sevareid of CBS). This prompted several of the more persistent advocates of Japanese recovery (e.g., Rochester Democrat and Chronicle) to urge that "high priority" be given to the problem of creating a self-sufficient Japanese peace economy.67 This concern over the Red encroachment in Asia at that time is illustrated by Figure 52.

Throughout 1949 the concern about communist influence in Japan continued to find its public expression.68 In mid-1949 communist activities were the chief topic of discussion on Japan, especially with the news of the repatriation of Soviet-indoctrinated Japanese prisoners. Life featured the repatriation as the return of "Japan's Red Army," while the New York Herald Tribune pointed out the marked contrast in

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On the other hand, the strength of another conservative party, the Democratic Party, fell from 90 to 68, and the Socialists' strength from 111 to 49, with minor parties and independents accounting for the remaining 50. See Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 109.

68 The Communist Party had 75,000 to 100,000 card carrying members and over three million supporters in the general election in 1949. See Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 207.
Japan between the growing strength of the communists in industrial areas and the weakness of the Reds in farming regions. The *Kansas City Star*, however, averred that it was "unthinkable that the Communists would ever be able to take over Japan as long as Gen. MacArthur and his forces continue[ed] in command," and Hearst's *Baltimore News-Post* argued that the Russian attempt to convert returning war prisoners into apostles of communism had been "futile."69

In August Nora Waln, in her article for the *Saturday Evening Post* entitled, "Is Japanese Youth Going Communist?" stressed the "sharp competition" between the U.S. and Russia in the reeducation of the Japanese.70 In early September, when MacArthur, in his report on the 4th anniversary of Japan's surrender, asserted that "the threat of communism as a major issue in Japanese life" was "past," several observers (e.g., Baukhage of ABC, Burton Crane of CBS, Tokyo, the *Christian Science Monitor*) considered the general's remark his "most debatable" statement. Later in the year Richard Deverall, in an article for *America* (Catholic Weekly), showed his concern over the flood of Red

propaganda in Japan and warned, "The Communist would continue to feed the Japanese mind as the American taxpayer feeds the Japanese body." He again expressed the same concern in his article for the New Leader in December. Allen Raymond, in his article for the New York Herald Tribune, even contended that if American food supplies and U.S. forces were withdrawn from Japan, it would be a "repetition of that naked struggle between Fascism and Communism which brought Hitler, Mussolini and Franco to power," and that this revolution would "inevitably be won by the Reds with Russian and Chinese backing." Raymond noted the "rise in Communist prestige" in Japan since 1946 and attributed it in part to the "American failure to grapple either frankly or effectively with two of the most important economic problems of the country: trade with the sterling areas and the soft-currency areas of Asia, and revival of Japanese shipping." Along this line of argument, Lindesay Parrott of the New York Times affirmed in November 1949 that

72 Fearey, a member of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs of the State Department, wrote in his book published in 1950, that by the beginning of 1948 probably half of all union workers in Japan were communist supporters or members of unions under communist domination, and that the Communist Party's strength was particularly great among the 2.5 million public service employees, especially in the strategically placed unions of railroad and telecommunications workers. See Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 111-12.
if the U.S. "now" abandoned Japan, she would be compelled to fall to the extreme Right or the Left. He wrote, "Japan, without U.S. aid, cannot afford democracy." Similarly, George Folster of NBC, Tokyo had stated two months earlier, "Asia is going Red, and right now there appears to be no future for Japan unless it becomes our subsidized ally. If Japan is set free to go her own way she must turn to Communist Asia for economic support and even for survival."75

In January 1950 the Japanese Communist Party's rebuttal of Cominform charges that its leader, Nosaka, was a tool of the "imperialist occupiers of Japan" was a heartening development to a number of observers (New York Times, Boston Herald, Washington Star, Dayton News, Time, Newsweek, Sevareid of CBS), as they speculated upon the possibility of "Titoism" spreading to the Orient.76 Nosaka's official bow to the Cominform and his confession of "errors" a few weeks later, however, disappointed some observers, while Stewart Alsop, in writing for the Saturday Evening Post, continued to believe that Titoism existed in Asia as well as Europe.77

74 "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Nov. 4-10," Nov. 10, 1949, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
The announcement of the Sino-Soviet treaty on February 14, prompted heavy comment, as many observers [e.g., Baltimore Sun, New York Times, Newsweek, James White (AP)] viewed the pact as a grim reminder of the expanse of Soviet influence, and most concluded that it was a great propaganda victory for Russian communism in Asia.\textsuperscript{78} Newsweek, for instance, interpreted the pact as setting "the new propaganda line in the struggle for Asia," which was designed "evidently to link the U.S. with Japan as the imperialist backer of renewed Japanese aggression." James White of AP believed it clearly sought "to stir Japanese nationalism and influence it in favor of Communist leadership."\textsuperscript{79} Lindesay Parrott in the New York Times Magazine pointed to the shallowness of Japanese democracy, and warned of the possibility that Japan itself might be taken over by the communists.\textsuperscript{80}

Three months later, General MacArthur's severe denunciation of communism and his suggestion that the Japanese consider the possibility of outlawing the Japanese Communist Party in his address on the third anniversary of the Japanese Constitution (May 3)\textsuperscript{81} evoked praise from some

\textsuperscript{78} Monthly Survey, Feb. 1950, 9.
\textsuperscript{80} Parrott, "The Touchy Issue of Peace with Japan," 10, 39-42.
\textsuperscript{81} For the reproduction of this address, see Whan, ed., A Soldier Speaks, 204-209. MacArthur did not use the word, "outlawing" but doubted in his address whether the Communist
observers (e.g., Hearst press, Dallas News, New York Tribune, Washington Star). The Christian Science Monitor, on the other hand, doubted the advisability of outlawing the Communist Party, although it agreed that the reduction of communist influence was desirable anywhere. The Louisville Courier-Journal also opposed outlawing it.\(^2\)

The fear of the deterioration of the Japanese situation was underscored by a statement by Joseph Grew, former ambassador to Japan, that was printed in the Baltimore Sun. According to Grew, conditions in Japan were "working in favor of the Communist cause" and Japan stood "at the crossroads between democracy and the deceitfully easy road to communism and totalitarianism," though there still was a

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chance to reverse the trend in Japan through voluntary American efforts. On June 6 and 7, alleging that the Communist Party had recently undertaken or advocated violent opposition to Occupation forces, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to ban the 24 members of the Party's Central Committee and the 17 leading members of the editorial staff of its daily paper, Akahata, from public office. Utilizing regulations originally designed to suppress ultra-Right militarists, this order forbade the party's leadership from carrying out any political activities. This "swift and dramatic pace of developments in Japan," according to the State Department's public opinion survey, prompted "unusually heavy comment" on Japan. The measures taken by SCAP met strong endorsement from a number of press observers (e.g., Philadelphia Inquirer, Ivan Peterman, Washington News, New York Times, Kansas City Star, Denver Post, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Polyzoides in Los Angeles Times, Royce Brier in San Francisco Chronicle, Newsweek). These observers described MacArthur's action as "sound," and a "long-considered, well-timed" action "in the interest of

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84 The offense by the Japanese communists was reported in the American media as the "Memorial Day incident."
85 Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 208; Schaller, Occupation, 267-68.
order and stability."86 This reaction from the American media reflected a sense of crisis over the "Red tide" in Asia at that time. This sentiment was shown by Figures 53-55. The first two of them also reflected McCarthyism back home.

2) Discussion on Japan's Security

The prominent feature of the public comment on Japan during the third phase of the occupation was the heavy emphasis on Japan's security questions, which had not been discussed to any significant extent in the American mass media in the earlier phases. In early 1949, with the communist victories in China, the problem of Japan's security assumed prominence for the first time since General MacArthur's recommendation in March 1947 that the UN take over the job of "protecting" Japan. In other words, increasing attention was given to Japan's value as a bulwark against communism not only in the economic or ideological sense but also in the military sense. Figure 56 well visualizes this concern. Some commentators even went so far as to suggest the wisdom of rearming Japan under close supervision (e.g., Jay Hayden, William Henry Chamberlin, Relman Morin of AP, Malcolm Hobbs of ONA, the Paterson press, Methodist Bishop Fred P. Corson of Pennsylvania),

and/or increasing MacArthur’s forces, though supporters of
the rearmament were not yet large in number. 87

At an off-the-record press briefing on February 6,
1949, Army Secretary Kenneth C. Royall stunned reporters by
expressing "grave doubts as to the strategic importance of
Japan." According to Royall, Japan was a backwater, distant
from the Russian heartland, difficult to defend, expensive
to support, and of little relevance in a new war. He made
it clear he expected the journalists to leak his remarks so
that all concerned would "begin considering" arrangements
for the "withdrawal" of the occupation forces. 88 The
statement, in fact, set off a lively debate during February
as to Japan’s importance as a Pacific "base." The arguments
pro and con for withdrawal "now" or "in the near future"
revealed that the prevailing view among those commenting

[Watertown Times, David Dallin in New Leader, James Lee
Kauffman, Senator Knowland (R., California), New York Times,
Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Newsweek, Constantine
Brown in the Washington Star, Detroit News, Kansas City
Times] was that the U.S. should remain in Japan "for some
time" for a number of reasons: strategically, Japan, which

87 "American Opinion, December 16, 1948-January 31,
1949," Feb. 9, 1949, 1-3. Several observers (e.g., Owen
Lattimore, Gabriel Hatter of MBS) warned against the dangers
involved in Japanese rearmament. Lattimore, for example,
cautioned, "It remains to be proved whether, when Japan (and
Germany) become strong enough to serve as strongholds or
beachheads they may not also be strong enough to double­
cross and make their own deals with Russia."
88 Schaller, Occupation, 164.
was at Russia's back door, was valuable; economically, Japan possessed the greatest industrial potential in the Far East, which had to be kept out of Russia's sphere of influence; morally, the U.S. was committed to genuine rehabilitation in Japan, and could not justify "pulling out" while Japan was economically paralyzed and defenseless. Moreover, some commentators [e.g., Gordon Walker of Christian Science Monitor, Scripps-Howard press, Detroit Free Press (Knight chain), Time] were sharply critical of the adverse effect of such "loose talk" about U.S. withdrawal on 1) America's Pacific Allies (i.e., the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand), who feared the U.S. was considering a "general retreat from Asia," and 2) U.S. attempts to encourage Asiatic peoples to resist communist pressures.89

On the other hand, several influential observers (e.g., Washington Post, George F. Eliot, Walter Lippmann, William Hillman of MBS) argued that, since the U.S. was unable to maintain a uniformly strong global defense line, primary emphasis must be placed on Europe. An extreme view was voiced by the Chicago Tribune, which advocated pulling out at once if Japan was "untenable."90

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90 Ibid.
Throughout 1949 the strategic importance of Japan for the U.S. and the need for retaining U.S. bases in Japan (even after the end of the military occupation) in the face of the "Red menace" in China continued to be stressed by American observers. In August General Robert L. Eichelberger, who had retired from commanding the Eighth Army in Japan and then was hired by Under Secretary of the Army Draper to work for his office, affirmed that Japan was the "key to the entire Far Eastern situation," for as long as Russia did "not control the island chain, and particularly the main islands of Japan, the further advancement of the Reds" was "to a very large extent stymied." Later in the same year, many observers (e.g., Hearst papers, Henry J. Taylor, Louisville Courier-Journal, Watertown Times) continued to agree on the importance of Japan for American defense plans in the Far East, though a minority opinion disagreed.

Expressing the minority opinion, Miriam Farley, in an article for the Foreign Policy Bulletin, contended that "in the strictly military sense," Japan was a "doubtful asset." She thought that "the loyalties of the Japanese" were "to Japan, not to the U.S. or to concepts of freedom and democracy." In the same vein, Nathaniel Peffer, in an

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article for the *New York Times Magazine* in May 1949, questioned, "By what reasoning can it be concluded that after Japan gets strong again it will necessarily fight on our side?" He argued, "If Japan becomes strong again and there should be a Russian-American war, the Japanese will play one side off against the other, accept bids from both sides and take the highest offer." He also emphasized the uneasiness and resentment of Japan's Asian neighbors about U.S. policy to rebuild Japan as its ally.93

The discussion of Japanese rearmament also continued, albeit on a limited scale. While many commentators [e.g., *U.S. News and World Report*, *Detroit News*, Hanson Baldwin, Elmer Davis of ABC, *Carroll Country Independent* (Center Ossipee, New Hampshire), Harold Noble in *Saturday Evening Post*, John B. Kennedy of *MBS*, Representative Poage (D., Texas)] in 1949 anticipated some rearmament of the Japanese,94 others (e.g., *Louisville Courier-Journal*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Christian Century*) pointed to the

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93 Peffer, "Asia: Spiritual Challenge to Us," May 1, 1949, 64, 66.
94 "American Opinion, March 1-May 15," May 16, 1949, 5; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, July 1-7," July 8, 1949, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. Hanson Baldwin, for example, argued, "We may sooner or later have to arm our former enemies in order to provide Japan with self-defense against both internal and external foes." See "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Nov. 4-10," Nov. 10, 1949, for Kennedy's statement. See also "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Dec. 9-15," Dec. 16, 1949, for Rep. Poage's statement, which advocated the recreation of "strong" German and Japanese military forces.
importance of first achieving a democratic and self-supporting Japan and obtaining the approval of a majority of "our friends on the FEC" before proceeding on this course. The Commonweal also warned of the risks in building up Japan as an ally that would involve rearming her.

In January 1950 the problem of Japan's "security" again came to the forefront of public discussion as a result of MacArthur's "cryptic" New Year statement that Japan had the "inalienable right of self-defense," despite its constitutional renunciation of war. In the mild controversy which ensued as to whether or not the general had thereby endorsed a Japanese defensive force, according to the State Department's opinion survey, opinion tended to favor the affirmative, those expressing an opinion [e.g., New York Herald Tribune, McCormick press (Chicago Tribune, Washington Times-Herald)] declaring that the U.S. could not "permit the Japanese islands to lie open and undefended before Russian aggression."

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97 Monthly Survey, Jan. 1950, 3; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Dec. 30-Jan. 5," Jan. 6, 1950, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Jan. 6-12," Jan. 13, 1950, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. The Boston Herald, however, alarmed by the possibility that Gen. MacArthur might be "considering restoring Japan as the armory as well as the workshop of East Asia," warned that this would be "very dangerous."
Against this background, most of those commenting emphasized that the occupation should continue "for some time yet." Elmer Davis of ABC observed, "If you end the occupation without letting the Japanese arm to defend themselves, Communists would be likely to walk in from the mainland. And if you do let them arm, some of the nations which they overran would begin to worry." Kaltenborn of NBC similarly believed that unless the U.S. allowed the Japanese "some measure of rearmament" before the occupation forces withdrew, "Japanese Communists, with hidden or open support from Russia, would take over the country." He speculated that perhaps the "best solution would be an early peace treaty" which would give "the U.S. air and naval bases at strategic points on Japan's home islands." Whether rearming Japan under U.S. supervision, stationing U.S. forces there in the post-occupation period, or taking both measures (as it was the case), most of those commenting in early 1950 seemed to agree that some definite measure must be taken to safeguard Japan against possible communist aggression. On the other hand, a minority opinion was

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98 Monthly Survey, Jan. 1950, 3; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Jan. 13-19," Jan. 20, 1950; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Jan. 20-26," Jan. 27, 1950, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. The San Francisco Chronicle, for example, asserted, "We have American and Japanese security to think of and we mean to engage in no adventurous folly that would permit 80 million Japanese to be taken over into the Moscow camp." The Miami Herald asked, "Does he think we're in Japan because we like it?"

expressed by the *New Republic*, which contended that the Secretary of State Acheson’s announcement that the U.S. would defend Japan made "settlement of the cold war with Russia more remote," and raised "grave issues of the course of action to be followed by America when the occupation ended and the Japanese reverted to some of their prewar ways."\(^{100}\)

During the following months some observers [e.g., General Eichelberger, Senator Eastland (D., Mississippi), William Henry Chamberlin] continued to call for limited rearmament in Japan under American supervision,\(^{101}\) and others stressed the need for retaining U.S. bases in Japan. The *San Francisco Chronicle*, for instance, argued, "American public opinion may be bored with the effort and cost of supporting the Japanese economy . . . but it is not bored

\(^{100}\) "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Jan. 13-19," Jan. 20, 1950. For Acheson’s speech on January 12 to the National Press Club in Washington, see Schaller, *Occupation*, 215. In the meantime, President Truman’s announcement on January 31 on the decision to build the hydrogen bomb met with strong approval in the initial reaction of press and radio commentators, members of Congress, and other public figures, feeling that in the present world situation the U.S. had no choice but to go ahead with work on the new super-weapon, though many expressed uneasiness about the dangers of an arms race and emphasized the need for renewed efforts to achieve an effective agreement on international control, and some observers registered outright opposition to it. See *Monthly Survey*, Jan. 1950, 4.

with the idea of holding an eastern bastion on the islands." This reflected, according to the State Department's survey, a widely held attitude among press and radio commentators. A Commonweal article also approved of the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan as long as "Communist imperialism" was "on the march," though wishing the early termination of the occupation. On the other hand, in its 1950 platform in April the Americans for Democratic Action rejected proposals to concentrate upon rearming the Japanese and making them America's military allies. The Christian Century, stressing Japanese opposition to granting military bases to the U.S., opposed the retention of U.S. forces in Japan. The Washington Post, while contending that American security had primacy, also warned against forcing bases upon Japan and emphasized the need for trying to "get bases voluntarily" without alienating Japanese sentiment.

Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of the general public (84 percent of a national cross section) favored keeping "some military bases in Japan" after the occupation.

was over, 10 percent disapproved, and 6 percent gave no opinion.\footnote{107}

It was the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 that brought a renewed emphasis in the public comment on the vital role of Japan in containing the communist advance in Asia. After June 25, while American observers commenting on the Far East paid primary attention to the Korean scene, and the comment on Japan was limited in volume, those commenting on Japan stressed the need for a vigorous, coordinated Pacific policy which would assign a vital role to Japan as an ally. It was widely assumed that Japan was to be one of America’s leading bases in the Pacific, and that the U.S. would retain substantial military forces there. For instance, Hanson Baldwin asserted, "This [the retention of U.S. bases in Japan] is important not only to help prevent the filling of the Japanese vacuum of power with communism [in view of the reported communist violence against the occupation forces in Japan], but because Japan’s geographic position is far closer to the Soviet centers of power in Northwest Asia than any other island base in the Western Pacific." Polyzoides in his article for the \textit{Los Angeles Times} agreed.\footnote{108} A \textit{Commonweal} article also argued, "The U.S. must hang on until the threat from without is tempered


and until Japan is politically and economically a great deal stronger." This emphasis on the role of Japan as a vital strategic base of the U.S. in its fight against the communist forces at the beginning of the Korean War is well illustrated by Figures 57 and 58.

Moreover, those commenting on Japan generally anticipated that "limited rearmament" under American supervision was inevitable. Baldwin argued that the retention of bases in Japan ought not to mean that the U.S. undertook the "sole burden of Japanese defense." The Japanese, he asserted, must assume "some of this burden." Walter Lippmann contended that the Korean affair argued "strongly for . . . recognizing frankly that the disarmament of Japan was an error, which should be reversed as soon as the matter" could "be negotiated with our friends in the Pacific." 110

In July, more support for rearming Japan was expressed by such sources as the Columbus Dispatch, the Scripps-Howard press, U.S. News and World Report, David Dallin in the New Leader, Elmer Davis of ABC, Constantine Brown, Washington Post. The Washington Post, for instance, argued, "Japan could manufacture specified munitions for her own defense, with little danger that she would again become a menace to peace in the Far East. By far the greater danger would come

from leaving her defenseless in this age of aggression."111

In addition Governor Dewey of New York, according to the New York Times, though he did not advocate forming German and Japanese armies, suggested the use of German and Japanese soldiers in a strong international army under UN leadership.112 On the other hand, Hessell Tiltman, in writing for the Washington Post, maintained that the U.S. was faced with a "crucial dilemma" in Japan. While stressing the need for U.S. bases, he expressed concern over retaining U.S. bases in Japan "in the face of a stubbornly unfavorable [Japanese] public opinion."113 Furthermore, Thomas C. Smith, in his article for the Nation in August, focused on "the rising popular demand [in Japan] to escape entanglement in the struggle between the United States and Russia," and the opposition by "a large faction" of the Japanese people to granting military bases to the U.S. Smith warned that "by creating a popular anti-American

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111 Some were of course less comfortable than others in supporting the rearmament of Japan, though admitting the need for it. For example, David Dallin wrote, "Bitter as the pill may be," the U.S. must permit her rearmament. Elmer Davis also declared, "Nobody likes the idea of recreating a Japanese army." See "American Opinion," July 7, 14, 21, 28, 1950, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. In addition, Constantine Brown's stress on the proven "warlike qualities" of both the German and Japanese people and his argument that they could "muster an important and effective force," under American control, "in much shorter time than our regular Allies" were doing it, suggest ambivalence in his perception of the Japanese. -- The Japanese had remained "warlike" in his mind but now she could be utilized for America's cause.


movement our insistence on bases" was "more likely to help
the Japanese Communists" (emphasis by Smith).\footnote{114}

In the following months, as the Korean Conflict
escalated, almost all of the public comment on Japan
centered either on the issue of her security (observers
advocating either building Japan's own self-defense force or
making the Japanese participate in an international army
under UN auspices) or on a peace treaty. Especially in
December, the UN military reverses in Korea provoked a
flurry of calls from Congress and in the press for the
rearming of Japan. A number of the commentators warned that
if the UN forces must evacuate Korea, it would not be long
before Japan became the main target of Soviet aggression,
and they urged the speed up of Japanese rearmament to meet
this threat.\footnote{115} American opinion in the third phase of the

\footnote{114}Thomas C. Smith, "Japan Won't Take Sides," Nation
Schonberger, State Department advisor John Foster Dulles
observed in the first weeks after the outbreak of the Korean
War the changes in the attitude of the Japanese toward the
prospect of American bases in post-treaty Japan. To his
eyes, the Korean War undercut some of the Japanese
opposition to that prospect, a "separate peace" formula, and
rearmament. Prime Minister Yoshida, however, still publicly
stated on July 29 that he opposed the leasing of military
bases to any foreign country, thus in effect withdrawing the
secret offer on base rights he had made in May. Schonberger
argues that this action of Yoshida was a gesture to gain
more bargaining power in reaching a settlement on the bases
question. See Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 251.

\footnote{115}The following observers (Congressmen and press and
radio observers) called for the rearmament of Japan during
December 1950, according to the State Department's survey:
Golden (R., KY), Ernest Lindley (Newsweek), the Oakland
occupation had run the gamut from strong support for disarming Japan in the earlier periods to a support for rearming her. American observers generally concluded that notwithstanding the risk inherent in a rearmed Japan, rearmament was required in the face of the much greater threat posed by the Soviet bloc. 116

Though there are no public opinion polls available that were taken in 1950 on the subject of Japan's rearmament, surveys in 1951 suggest that the general public followed the prevailing opinion among their opinion leaders. An unpublished survey taken in early January 1951 by the NORC showed the following results. When asked, "Do you think the Japanese should or should not be allowed to set up an army of their own to help strengthen the defense against Communism?" (underline mine), 61 percent of a national cross


116 Sen. McCarthy suggested that "to forestall the danger of an independent and remilitarized Japan," a Western Pacific Pact be established that comprised of the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and the Republic of China. Sen. Knowland also advocated Japan's participation in the "collective security system against aggression." See "American Opinion," Dec. 8, 1950. At the Beginning of 1951, some of the advocates of Japanese rearmament (e.g., Los Angeles Times) were troubled by the "risks" involved, and they cautioned that "we must never underrate the fanatic nationalism of the Japanese" which was "not dead, but sleeping." See "American Opinion," Jan. 5, 1951.
section said she "should be allowed," while 25 percent said she "should not be allowed," and 14 percent gave no opinion. The percentage of the support among the college educated was 76 percent. A Gallup poll on this question of Japanese rearmament reported greater support than the NORC poll. According to the Gallup poll, 76 percent of a representative cross section of the American public favored having the U.S. "take steps now to build up an army of Japanese soldiers to be ready to fight the Communists if Japan is attacked," while 14 percent opposed it and 10 percent gave no opinion. This higher support found by Gallup may have been due to his posing the question in terms of U.S. action in building up an army using Japanese soldiers instead of allowing Japanese to set up an army of their own and of a possible attack on Japan itself.

Nine months later (October 1951), popular opinion continued to show approval for a national Japanese army within the context of global defense against communism. According to a nationwide public opinion survey taken in early October 1951 by the NORC, when asked exactly the same

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117 The better-educated showed higher support for allowing Japan's rearmament. The percentage of the support among the high-school educated was 65 percent, and among the grammar school educated, 52 percent. See "American Opinion, Japan, Jan. 26-Feb. 1," Feb. 2, 1951, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.

118 "American Opinion, Japan, Feb. 2-8," Feb. 9, 1951, 2, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. This survey was conducted in early January and released by the AIPO on February 4, 1951. See Public Opinion Quarterly 15 (Summer 1951): 383.
question as in January, 67 percent approved it, while 24 percent disapproved, and 9 percent expressed no opinion. Among the college-educated, the percentage of those approving of Japanese rearmament was 82 percent. These figures suggest that better-informed Americans were generally more concerned about the communist threat and U.S. security interest in the Far East.

It can be concluded that there was a significant shift in the public's attitudes toward the issue of rearming Japan. Immediately after the war, the American people strongly favored Japan's demilitarization. One of the initial occupation objectives of the U.S. in Japan was to keep her from ever becoming a threat to world peace. As shown before, according to a survey in December 1946, 79 percent of those polled showed satisfaction about "disarming Japan and keeping her disarmed." Some of those who were dissatisfied may have been demanding even stricter control for Japan's disarmament. Half a decade after the termination of the war, however, the majority of American people favored allowing Japan to set up an army of her own.

This change seems to be closely related to the change in the international scene, that is, the spread of the Cold War into the Asian scene. To put it in another way, not all

\[119\] The percentage of approval was 71 percent among the high school-educated, and 57 percent among the grammar school-educated. U.S. Department of State, "American Opinion, Current Popular Opinion on Japan," Nov. 2, 1951, 3, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
of those who approved Japanese rearmament did so because they felt the Japanese were now trustworthy friends of the U.S., but because of the greater menace of the communist forces perceived by them. While two thirds (67 percent) approved of Japanese rearmament in 1951, about a half (51 percent) then professed favorable views of the Japanese people. These figures illustrate this point.

A Minnesota poll also supports this interpretation. Shortly before the San Francisco Peace conference in September 1951, pollsters asked if the peace treaty "should give Japan the right to rearm herself - to build up her army, navy, and air force again." The question mentioned neither the threat of communism nor the idea of Japan's "defense." Then, 49 percent of those questioned opposed to the idea, 27 percent approved, another 16 percent approved with the condition that the armed force be under limitations or supervision, and 8 percent gave no opinion.¹²⁰ That is to say, without the mention of the communist threat in Japan, this poll found a margin of opposition to Japanese rearmament among Minnesotans. This difference in the poll results because of the question's wording also suggests the shallow interest of the American general public in Japan's position in the Cold War.

3) Discussion on a Peace Treaty with Japan

Though there was much discussion in the American media on a peace treaty with Japan in 1947, there was a sharp decline in public comment on this issue in late 1947, following the hostile responses to the U.S. invitation to a preliminary peace conference not only from the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth nations, but also from Nationalist China and other concerned nations. According to the State Department's opinion survey covering the period from March 1 to May 15, 1949, the subject of a peace treaty with Japan was again noted at this time for the first time in many months. Troubled by Japan's slow recovery, several commentators (e.g., *Christian Century*, Catholic Association for International Peace, William Philip Simms) then advocated concluding "without delay" a peace treaty which would "liberate the Japanese" so they could begin the recovery the U.S. had been "unable to manage."¹²¹

Thereafter in 1949 discussion on a peace treaty continued on a limited scale. Many of those commenting urged it, while a minority expressed reservations or outright opposition. For instance, in mid-1949, the *New York Times* argued that a peace treaty should be discussed in the Far Eastern Commission and should define Japan's relations with "all her Pacific neighbors." Harold J. Noble in an article on China for the *Saturday Evening Post* urged

in July that peace should be made with Japan in 1949, regardless of Russia. On the other hand, the Boston Herald, stressing the failure of the Japanese people to "reform" their character, concluded that negotiation of a peace treaty at this time would be "dangerous."122 In September, in seconding General MacArthur's assertion on the fourth anniversary of Japan's surrender that the Japanese had earned the right to a peace treaty, several dailies (New York Sun, Los Angeles Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Hearst press) supported an early peace. Also in September the Acheson-Bevin discussions relating to the urgent need for a peace treaty with Japan evoked limited comment, and several prominent dailies (e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, Louisville Courier-Journal, Washington News of Scripps-Howard) reiterated their support of "an early peace treaty" with Japan -- even without Russian participation if it could not be obtained. On the other hand, others [e.g., the Milwaukee Journal, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Christian Science Monitor, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, America (Catholic Weekly)] felt there were still major problems to be solved before negotiating a treaty, such as her security and her role as a Pacific bastion (which seemed to be the main concern),

Japan's trade with China, and the possible emergence of anti-democratic leadership in post-occupation Japan.\textsuperscript{123}

From late 1949 to early 1950 the discussion on a peace treaty with Japan continued on a limited scale in the U.S. press. The report that the U.S. was working on the draft of a Japanese peace treaty in November 1949 was welcomed by observers who thought the crisis over China intensified the urgency of action on this matter, though some (e.g., Lindesay Parrott of the \textit{New York Times}) warned that the dangers of turning Japan adrift under current conditions (by terminating American jurisdiction there) were great in view of the communist envelopment of China.\textsuperscript{124} Among those supporting U.S. efforts to conclude a peace, many (e.g., Hearst press, Scripps-Howard press, Hessell Tiltman)\textsuperscript{125} advocated a separate peace (i.e., peace without the Soviet

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Monthly Survey}, Sept. 1949, 8; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Sept. 2-8," Sept. 9, 1949; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Sept. 16-22," Sept. 23, 1949, both in box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. \textit{Monthly Survey} noted that the editorial reaction to MacArthur's statement about a peace treaty was "extremely limited in comparison to that of March, 1947," when his call for it "stimulated a widespread debate in the U.S. press."

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Monthly Survey}, Nov. 1949, 4, box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59; "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Nov. 4-10," Nov. 10, 1949, "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Apr. 28-May 4," May 5, 1950. Parrott wrote, "If the U.S. now, through an ill-considered treaty or otherwise, abandons Japan, that nation would be compelled either to establish more stringent control over minorities than the occupation has ever done, or fall into a new totalitarianism of the Left. Japan, without U.S. aid, cannot afford democracy."

\textsuperscript{125} "American Opinion," Nov. 25, 1949, Dec. 23, 1949, Jan. 6, 1950. Tiltman wrote in the \textit{Washington Post} in November 1949, "Japan is as ready for peace as it ever will be, and further delay would help no one but Russia."
Union or communist China), while some continued to press for negotiating with all nations which had participated in the war against Japan (e.g., New Republic, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the Conference of International Relations Clubs), or saw "manifest dangers to Japan" in making a separate peace [e.g., Russell Brines (Tokyo correspondent)]. Many others, without clearly taking a side, discussed the complications in concluding a peace treaty with Japan due to the communist conquest of China, conflicting interests among other concerned nations (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, China, Russia, the U.S.), and the Sino-Soviet Pact of February 1950. In February 1950 the pace of developments in the Far East gave rise to speculation that Washington would "proceed again with peace treaty plans for Japan," and this was welcome news to most observers who commented [e.g., Dallas News, Senator Jenner (R., Indiana) as reported by Ray Henle of NBC, Newsweek]. The New York Times argued that "some of the feared obstacles to ending the present state of war with our former enemies

do not exist," and that "the move would bring substantial advantages." It maintained,

It [a peace treaty] would restore to the Western World the initiative in peace negotiations and facilitate the restoration of the vanquished countries to the community of free nations, without sacrifice of essential safeguards, including the continuation of necessary occupation.  

In May and June a flurry of comment on the Japanese peace treaty appeared in the press, prompted by the projected trip of Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and Joint Chief of Staff chairman, General Omar Bradley to Japan, the President's statement that he hoped a Japanese peace conference could be held soon, and his assignment of John F. Dulles to handle U.S. treaty policy. A sizable number of commentators (e.g., New York Times, Washington Post, Stewart Alsop, V. H. Horoth in Magazine of Wall Street, Joseph Harsch in Christian Science Monitor, Frank Kingdon in New York Post, Whaley-Eaton, Dallas News, William H. Chamberlin, C.L. Sulzberger, San Francisco Chronicle, American Peace Society, Washington Star, Chicago Sun-Times, Columbia Dispatch, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, New York Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Christian Century, Senator Taft) believed that the U.S. should "act now" in arranging a Pacific peace conference. The New York Times argued, for example, "It is painfully apparent that if we want any treaty at all we

shall have to go after it without the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite regime in China." This reflected a fairly general attitude.129

Editors during June generally agreed in principle with Senator Taft's observation that "there should be a quick Japanese peace treaty" because without one the situation within Japan might begin to turn against American interests. Such factors as the first overt communist action against American troops (reported as the "Memorial Day incident"), Japanese restiveness, and the formal Japanese "peace bid" strengthened this attitude. The Washington Post and Stewart Alsop asserted that the U.S. must "bestir itself and set out a policy," else the U.S. might "lose" Japan as it had "lost China" to the Russians. These two sources, as well as V. L. Horoth, pointed out that General MacArthur's early warning about a lengthy occupation -- "No matter how well-meaning, any occupation is bound in time to lose its usefulness" -- was proving only too true in Japanese dissatisfaction with the jaded occupation. As the State Department's opinion survey noted, uppermost in all minds was the question of

129 Monthly Survey, May 1950, 6, box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59; Ibid., June 1950, 3; "American Opinion," May 26, June 2, 9, 16, 23, 1950, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. In mid-June, support for going ahead with a Japanese treaty was expressed by such editors as Watertown Times, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Des Moines Register, Polyzoides in Los Angeles Times, Ivan Peterman, Christian Science Monitor, Philadelphia Inquirer. Only a small number of the observers (e.g., George Sokolsky) thought that it was not necessary at this point to have a peace treaty with Japan.
Japan's security. Most observers agreed that the U.S. must be prepared to commit itself to Japan's defense and must try to secure Japanese approval for U.S. bases in Japan, though this was expected to be the most difficult part of the negotiations because of the Russian propaganda. 130

Moreover, the launching of the Korean War on June 25 reinforced the recognition among American observers that in order to achieve maximum Japanese cooperation in the U.S. effort to contain the communist advance in Asia, the U.S. should make a treaty of peace with Japan as soon as possible. 131 From then on, in 1950, there were persistent appeals on a limited scale from the press, various organizations, and many Congressmen for the West to start peace talks. The paramount concern of those commenting was Japan's "exposed position" in the Pacific and her military weakness, which most felt could be alleviated only by a peace treaty allowing a sizable American force to remain in Japan. 132 The President's "go-ahead signal" for the negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan in September was welcomed by various commentators. 133 The UN reverses in Korea in late 1950 provoked a flurry of calls in Congress and in the press for an early peace treaty. 134

130 Ibid.
132 Ibid., Sept. 1950, 7, box 12, OPOS Records, RG 59.
By the beginning of 1951, according to the State Department's opinion survey, editors and columnists were in general agreement that Japan's security could be best achieved by: 1) restoring Japan to independent status; 2) making her strong militarily and economically under American supervision; and 3) bringing her again within the concert of nations.\(^{135}\)

**Discussion on Restoring Japan's Economy**

1) General Trend

During the third phase of the occupation, the subject of Japan's economy received less attention from American observers of Japan than her security problem. To reiterate, with the communist advance in Asia American opinion in 1948 came to strongly embrace the U.S. policy of promoting a speedy revival of Japan's trade and industry, thereby making her America's Far Eastern ally, an anti-Red bulwark and the "workshop" of Asia. As reflected in the limited discussion on Japan's economy, this trend continued and was even reinforced by the subsequent developments in the third phase.

\(^{135}\) A "separate peace" with Japan was advocated by such observers as Senator Magnuson (D., WA), Oakland Tribune, New York Times, the National Board of Americans for Democratic Action, the Portsmouth (NH) Herald, New Castle (PA) News, Washington (PA) Observer, William Draper, Jr. (former Under Secretary of the Army, Vice President of Dillon, Read & Co., Inc.), while a minority (e.g., Fred W. Riggs in the Nation, I. F. Stone in the New York Compass) warned against it. See "American Opinion," Sept. 8, 22, 29, Nov. 10, 24, 1950, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59.
such as the communist victories in China, the unrest in other parts of Asia, and the outbreak of the Korean War.

A Newsweek article, for example, approvingly noted in April 1949 that "in an effort to restore Japan's economy and reverse the trend toward Communism," Washington had reversed policies. Likewise, another article in Newsweek, welcoming the news that the U.S. had halted all reparations removal from Japan, asserted, "As communism has slowly inundated China, the United States has taken increasingly effective measures to shore up Japan's shaky economy and to remove the restrictions postwar policies imposed on Japan's industry." An article in the Magazine of Wall Street in April 1949 also argued, "The containment of Soviet Russia and Red China in Southeastern Asia will cost money, and unless the American taxpayer is to be saddled with an additional burden, this money will have to be saved somewhere. The logical place is Japan which is costing us about $1 billion a year in occupation costs, relief food and raw materials that we have been providing to Japanese industries." Business Week in late 1950 affirmed there

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was the belief [among U.S. officials] that Japan was needed "as the biggest industrial supplier, and an important financier, of U.S.-sponsored aid programs in Southeast Asia." It even maintained, "Now U.S. officials, including MacArthur, see Japan as 'the Britain of Asia' -- banker, processor of raw materials, and maybe arsenal for non-Communist Asia" (underline mine). Thus these observers ascribed the need for a speedy restoration of Japan's economy, largely due to the Cold War in Asia. In addition, as noted above, the communist gains as the result of the National Diet election in January 1949 had also prompted several of the more persistent advocates of Japanese recovery (e.g., Rochester Democrat and Chronicle) to urge measures to create a self-supporting Japanese economy. 140

Continuing from the previous phase, another factor that was often stressed in the public comment on the need for the speedy revival of Japan's recovery was the desire to lighten the American taxpayer's burden. All of the observers introduced above who focused on the Cold War factor also referred to the "burden of the American taxpayer." This factor was related to the Cold War factor as discussed earlier, and as shown in the Magazine of Wall Street article

introduced above: The U.S. did not want to see economic chaos in Japan, which could lead to the rise of the extreme Left (or Right), and which could affect prospects for economic recovery and political stabilization in other parts of Asia. At the same time, the American taxpayer did not want to provide economic aid to Japan continuously to prevent her economic chaos. Hence the need for reviving her economy, making her self-supporting, and making her contribute to the recovery of other Asian economies.

Helen Mears, in writing for Harper's magazine in July 1950, focused on another factor, that is, America's prestige. She wrote, "What happens in Japan will seem like an unequivocal test of American sincerity and American capacity for constructive leadership... Economic chaos in Japan will not be much of an advertisement for our American way, either among the Japanese or among the people of Asia in general." She also argued, "The job of helping the Japanese to become self-supporting again -- of getting them off the American taxpayer's shoulders and on to their own feet -- offers a major challenge to American leadership." She then concluded, "Our task is to gain international co-operation for a long-term program which will restore Japan to early independence, permanent
neutrality, and -- above all -- real economic well-being."\textsuperscript{141}

It is likely that this concern with America's national prestige was shared by many observers who advocated Japan's economic recovery. Many seemed to be concerned with American prestige in the context of the Cold War with Russia, though Mears desired Japan's permanent neutrality and did not advocate allying her with the American camp.

The results of a public opinion poll taken in October 1951 suggest the increased degree of the American public's approval of the policy to revive Japan's economy. According to an unpublished finding of NORC's October 1951 survey, the overwhelming majority of the public (82 percent, which was 10 points up from five years ago) replied that the U.S. ought to give Japan the same opportunity to sell her goods in the U.S. that it gave to other nations, while only 12 percent opposed to the idea, and 6 percent gave no opinion.\textsuperscript{142}

On December 10, 1948 the U.S. government issued a directive to the Supreme Commander calling for a comprehensive economic stabilization program "to be developed to meet a target date for the establishment of a single general exchange rate not later than three months

\textsuperscript{141} Helen Mears, "Japan: Challenge to Our Prestige," Harper's 210 (July 1950): 73-78.
after the initiation of the stabilization program by the Japanese Government. By this directive, the disagreement over priority of goals, democratization versus stabilization, was settled. Where they conflicted, economic stabilization and recovery had to prevail.

In response to the announcement of this directive on December 18, 1948, some observers (e.g., Burton Crane of the New York Times and Keyes Beech of the Chicago Tribune) were startled by the "tough" nine-point economic program, and noted that Japan's experiment in democracy had been suspended. Others (e.g., New York Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor) cautioned against neglecting past and present reforms in the process of making the Japanese "pay

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143 As an economist Jerome B. Cohen explains the theory of the stabilization program as follows: "To maximize exports, costs had to be brought down to the point where selling prices were in line with those in the world market. To bring costs down, inflation in Japan would have to be ended, payrolls trimmed, and rationalization achieved. To end inflation, the budget would have to be balanced, reckless uneconomic credit extension checked, and a single exchange rate established." See Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy, 87.

144 Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 127; Schaller, Occupation, 138; Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 426. As Fearey wrote, issuance of the stabilization directive involved certain risks. Already at an extremely low level of living, the Japanese were ordered to pull their belts in further, to work harder and longer, and to submit to more stringent wage controls and other requirements infringing newly won trade union rights. Popular understanding of the need for so drastic a program and appreciation of its ultimate benefits were bound to be small, and opportunities for communist exploitation of the inevitable resentment were thought to be great. In a series of angry cables during December, MacArthur denounced the form and substance of the stabilization directive.
their own way." The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* asserted, "Tact and persuasion will have to be tried in an effort to avoid questionable methods of enforcement." At the same time, many observers such as the *Washington Star*, *Watertown Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Newsweek*, and the *Washington Post*, while calling the directive "a disquieting development," added that it was undeniably justified due to the "darkening situation in the Far East as a whole and its ominous repercussions upon our position in Japan." In other words, in the minds of these observers, Japan's economic recovery was necessary to contain the communist advance in Asia. Furthermore, William Costello of CBS, Tokyo, and the Scripps-Howard press welcomed the stabilization program. Costello declared that "the U.S. as the world's banker," was "offering help not in terms of reckless charity, but on a hard-headed business basis." The Scripps-Howard press also affirmed Dodge's austere program by asserting, "The ABC's of economics should have been spelled out to the Japanese long ago. The Japanese must get to work."145 *Fortune* magazine, in its April article attacking SCAP's economic policy, described the stabilization directive concentrated on recovery measures as "the new hope for Japan."146

The strong support for promoting Japan's speedy economic revival and for the shift of emphasis in the

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occupation policy from democratic reform to economic recovery was also expressed by observers who denounced SCAP's inability to bring about Japan's quick recovery (e.g., Helen Mears, *Fortune, Newsweek*). The support was likewise reflected in the statements by many of those who supported turning the occupation over to civilian control because SCAP's bureaucracy was impeding Japan's chances for recovery. \(^{148}\) In addition, in June the *Chicago Tribune* sharply criticized the "purge" of Japanese militarists for retarding the "rebuilding" of Japan. It observed that "now, at last," there was "some prospect that this senseless system of depriving the defeated country of its best brains" was "on the way out," for a purge rescreening board was at work reconsidering cases. \(^{149}\) In November Joseph Ballantine, according to the *Foreign Service Journal*, stressed the necessity of a "vast expansion in Japanese industry and foreign trade to prevent Japan from turning to Soviet Russia." \(^{150}\) Ballantine, in responding to Eleanor Hadley's article which had pointed out that the deconcentration program had not been successfully completed, also

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\(^{148}\) See the section, "Appraisal of U.S. occupation policy and achievements in Japan," in this chapter.


\(^{150}\) "American Opinion, Japan and Korea, Nov. 4-10," Nov. 10, 1949.
maintained, "The objective of restoring a self-supporting Japan should be given **an absolute priority** over the objective of democratization wherever the means calculate to further the one objective impede furtherance of the other"\(^{151}\) (underline mine).

On the other hand, several observers in mid-1949 continued to urge caution in shifting American policy on Japan from "repression to revival," though they did not express outright opposition to restoring the Japanese economy. For example, The *New Republic*, while hoping for the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty, argued that unless there were continued reform and "economic and political acceptance of Japan among all nations" following a peace treaty, there was little chance for its democratization. Thus this writer stressed the importance of the continued effort for democratization in reconstructing Japan. Keyes Beech, in his dispatch from Tokyo, also reported that the American policy that dictated the speedy rebuilding of Japan was "being viewed with increased alarm by Uncle Sam's Pacific allies."\(^{152}\) Similarly, while seeing the need to restore Japan's economy, V. L. Horoth, in writing for the *Magazine of Wall Street*, pointed out that "the building of a

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strong, self-sufficient Japan ready to defend herself against communism . . . is bound to alienate our former allies in the Far East."153

The following are the points of concern often discussed in the public comment about restoring Japan's economy.

2) The Effect of the Communist Advance in China and Southeast Asia on Japan's Economy

In 1949 as the Chinese communists increased their territorial gains, a number of observers supporting expanded Japanese trade (e.g., New York Herald Tribune, Stewart Alsop, Army-Navy Journal, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, the Economic Council, William Costello) were wondering how the revival of a healthy economy in Japan could be accomplished if normal trade channels with China and Indochina were not also restored. They expected the establishment of Japan's normal commercial relations with Red China to be difficult, and judged that the loss of China as a trading partner was a forbidding prospect for Japan's recovery. Some also feared that if Japan were permitted to expand her trade with communist China and she made terms with China, she might be drawn to the Soviet bloc.154

154 Fearey also wrote, in his book published in 1950, "In spite of the Chinese Communists' announced policy to reconstruct China and the need for Japanese capital goods to achieve this purpose, the possibility that political policy dictated either by the Soviets or the Chinese themselves may lead to restrictive trade measures in an effort to force Japan into the Communist sphere could not discounted." See Fearey, Occupation, Second Phase, 170-71.
New York Herald Tribune, for instance, argued that the U.S. and other nations interested in preventing the spread of communism in the Orient must open up new trade channels for the Japanese. Alsop suggested that steps be taken to prevent communist domination of Southeast Asia, in order to promote Japan’s economic development. He wrote, "If Japan’s whole natural trading area, Southeast Asia as well as China, is allowed to succumb to a single, ruthless political authority, an economic danger will then be permanently pointed at Japan’s throat. It is nonsense to suppose that a non-Communist Japan could hold out indefinitely alone in a Communist Far East." At the outbreak of the Korean War, the Commonweal argued, "[With the ending of the occupation and a number of controls,] trade with Mao’s China would develop on a large scale, bringing with it increasing numbers of official personnel from the Asiatic mainland. Japan, which after defeat was completely disarmed, would be under pressures from within and without. Observers believe that it could not hold out for many months." Commonweal then concluded that the U.S. occupation and aid to Japan must continue until the threat from without was tempered and until Japan was stabilized politically and economically.

In a different vein, Owen Lattimore, writing for the Watertown Times in mid-1949, asserted that a communist China

156 "Hanging On," 283.
was "quite capable of blocking any American policy of making Japan the workshop of Asia." He suggested that "the biggest possibility of an American comeback in the Far East would be a settlement between America and the Chinese Communists enabling America to become the main factor in the industrializing of China."  

Some observers advocating Japan's rapid economic recovery stressed the importance of a cooperative regional approach in solving the problems of Japan's economy. They thought that a self-supporting Japan would be most difficult to realize in a poverty-stricken, communist-dominated Orient, because Japan needed free access to the markets and the sources of supply in Asia for her economic recovery. Some commentators also urged that the U.S. formulate a long-range development program in the Far East which would make effective use of Japan's productive energy for the benefit of all the peoples of the Far East (as well as the American taxpayer). That is to say, they recognized that the building of Japan as the industrial mainspring of the Far East would contribute to the economic recovery of the rest of free Asia, which would also stop the communist advance in

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158 "American Opinion, Sept. 23-29," Sept. 30, 1949; "American Opinion, Apr. 7-13," Apr. 14, 1950, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59. This need for the regional approach was stressed by such observers as Brooks Emeny, Dr. Sherwood Fine (a staff member of SCAP), and the New York Herald Tribune.
that region. As the *Birmingham Age-Herald* suggested in early 1950, "the desirable arrangement would be to work the industrial economy of a moderately-led Japanese nation into expanded commercial relations with Southeast Asia and India."\(^{160}\)

While many observers assumed that Japan should not depend on communist China as her chief economic partner, William H. Chamberlin questioned in an article for the *Wall Street Journal*, "Should trade or politics prevail? Should Japan be permitted, even encouraged, to work out some system of commercial exchange with Red China?" He asserted that it was not enough to "do away with restrictions on production," and that "both Japan and Germany must enjoy adequate access to foreign markets and sources of raw material" if they were to be self-supporting.\(^{161}\) Support for Japan's trade with communist China also came in early 1950 from such sources as George Kerr (*Foreign Policy Bulletin*), Owen Lattimore (*Atlantic Monthly*), Vera M. Dean (*Foreign Policy Reports*), and the *New Republic*.\(^{162}\)


\(^{162}\) "American Opinion," Jan. 13, 1950; Ibid., Jan. 20, 1950. For the detailed discussion on American policymakers' views on Japan's trade with China, see Schaller, *Occupation*, 187-94. Explaining the dominant view among them, Acheson argued in January 1950 that for the present, at least, China seemed Japan's only ready source of raw materials and its most appropriate market, but in the long run, he hoped, defending and developing the Southeast Asia
3) Reparations

Widespread approval was given to the U.S. announcement ending further reparations deliveries from Japan in May 1949. Observers, according to the State Department's survey, regarded such a move as one means of strengthening Japan economically against the communist advance in Asia. Time and Newsweek welcomed it as "the best and biggest news since the occupation," and many observers (New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, Washington Star, Washington Post, Boston Herald, New York Sun, Scripps-Howard press, Chicago Tribune, Detroit Free Press, Des Moines Register, San Francisco Chronicle, William H. Chamberlin in the New Leader) hailed it as "sound," "logical," "hard necessity," or "good news for the American taxpayer." Regarding Filipino protests against the U.S. measure about Japanese reparations, few commentators went beyond expressing sympathy for the Filipino's disappointment, though Elmer Davis, the New York Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle agreed that the U.S. should give as much consideration as it could both to the interests and to the sentiment of the Filipino.163

portion of the "Great Crescent" (the region that includes the Indian Peninsula, Australia, Southeast Asia, and Japan) might provide an alternative economic zone.

163 "American Opinion," May 20, 1949, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 5; Ibid., May 27, 1949; Ibid., June 10, 1949; Ibid., June 17, 1949, Ibid., July 29, 1949; Monthly Survey, May 1949; Ibid., June 1949. For the Newsweek article which declared the halting of reparations as "the most important step since the end of the war to help the Japanese restore
However, there were some misgivings that the U.S. had to act unilaterally on the matter. Particularly disturbed were the Louisville Courier-Journal and the Christian Science Monitor. The latter especially regretted the "cavalier dismissal" of the "deep-seated suspicion, resentment and ambition of the former victims of Japanese aggression." 164

4) Special Interests

While the general trend of American media and leadership opinions was in favor of promoting Japanese industry and trade and strengthening Japan economically, some interest groups felt threatened by the revival of the Japanese economy. For instance, as in the earlier periods, the protest against reviving the Japanese textile industry was expressed by spokesmen for the American textile industry. In mid-1949, according to Daniel Small who wrote for the New York Journal of Commerce, increasing textile imports from Japan aroused considerable alarm among U.S. producers, who presented to a Congressional, State, SCAP committee a "full-fledged argument which merited careful consideration by all official representatives." Senator McCarthy (R., Wisconsin) and Representative Kearney (R., New York) emphasized the adverse effect of such imports on "U.S.


employment and economic conditions in this market area."165
Bob Considine in the Washington Times-Herald also warned against U.S. purchases of Japanese gloves made with "cheap labor," citing the contention of the Gloversville (New York) Association of Knitted Glove and Mitten Manufacturers that U.S. imports from Japan of these products threatened the livelihood of 30,000 U.S. workers.166 A Business Week article in August 1949 also deplored, "For most U.S. business, ruthless redevelopment of Japan's export markets will mean a drastic limitation of their own Far Eastern market." It criticized the U.S. policy of supporting the conservative Japanese government headed by Yoshida and the breakdown of the plans for economic reform. It contended, "The drive to contain communism throughout the world has made any anti-Communist group, regardless of its aims, attractive and respectable -- especially to high ranking Army and Navy officers."167

In November the protest from the Textile Export Association of New York and various textile representatives against the removal of Japanese floor prices was sympathetically discussed by the New York Journal of Commerce. The San Francisco Chronicle, however, contended

165 Ibid., July 29, 1949.
that the protest "represents a superficial view of the
quality of American industry." According to the Chronicle,
America's economic advantage was that it could pay high
wages and still make goods in quantity better and cheaper
than low-wage countries. It asserted, "If American textile
industry cannot do that, the fact calls for self-
questioning."\textsuperscript{168}

Similar protests came from spokesmen for American
shipping interests. In late 1949 reports of "the
Government's willingness to permit Japanese and German
shipping to increase beyond the prescribed Potsdam and
similar limitation" (as reported in the New York Journal of
Commerce) stimulated concern among American shipping
officials and business journals. According to the New York
Journal of Commerce, Frazer Bailey, President of National
Federation of American Shipping, argued that it would be
"dangerous," [at least for the time being,] to allow Japan
to rebuild her merchant fleet to compete for the commerce of
other nations. Maitland S. Pennington, Vice President of
Pacific Transport Lines, also took issue with arguments that
the U.S. should aid restoration of the Japanese merchant
marine as a means of strengthening the Japanese dollar
position. Senator Magnuson, to whom Bailey had written,
said upon his return from a 3-week European shipping survey,
he was "definitely against" permitting Japan and Germany to

rebuild their ocean-going merchant marines. The New York Journal of Commerce suggested that "to alleviate growing apprehensions" about the relaxation of curbs on German and Japanese shipping "the U.S. and other Western powers [should] state with some degree of precision and finality just how far this Bonn-Tokyo shipping revival should go" before it was stopped.169 On the other hand, the Seattle Times expressed in May 1950 that city's desire for the revival of Japan's former shipping business.170


CHAPTER VII

OFFICIAL AND MEDIA REACTIONS TO THE TOUR OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION IN THE U.S. AND THE "BOSTON INCIDENT"

Introduction

From January 13 to March 13, 1950, fourteen representatives of the Japanese Diet — including ten Dietmen and four of the Diet's secretariat — toured the United States and Canada, spending forty-five days in the U.S. This delegation was sent by General Douglas MacArthur to witness the inside workings of American democracy in action. It was part of a project carried out by the Reorientation Branch of the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army in an effort to provide the Japanese leaders with an orientation to the legislative processes of federal governmental agencies, state legislatures, and political parties throughout the United States.¹

The delegation visited various parts of the country including California (Los Angeles, Sacramento), Louisiana (New Orleans), South Carolina (Columbia), Massachusetts (Boston), New York (Albany), Washington, D.C., and Minnesota (Minneapolis). They were received by political and other

¹The visit of the Japanese was authorized by Congress. It authorized the Army, with State Department cooperation, to bring the Japanese over and provided funds for visits by 250 national leaders, students and others. See "Boston Body Bars Tokyo Diet Group," New York Times, Jan. 31, 1950, 2.
leaders of each town, and press conferences were held in all
cities visited. The newspapers were generous with news
coverage, pictures of the delegation, and editorial comment.
The collection of the newspaper clippings on this tour kept
in the papers of Justin Williams, Sr., who accompanied the
delegation to the U.S., indicates that their visit to each
town occasioned large coverage by major local newspapers of
the areas visited. 2

In general, this tour proceeded smoothly and the
Japanese received cordial treatment. However, there was one
noteworthy exception. On January 30, when they arrived in
Boston, the Boston City Council voted 11 to 8 to bar a visit
of the delegation to the Council Chamber, and those
councilors who voted in the majority based their decision
primarily on their wartime memories and distrust of the
Japanese. This incident focused the attention not only of
Bostonians but also of the American public in other parts of
the country on Japan, and provided Americans with an

The newspaper clippings in Williams' papers included
articles of such U.S. newspapers as the Kansas City Times,
Minneapolis Tribune, Minneapolis Star, San Francisco
Examiner, New Orleans States, Christian Science Monitor,
Pacific Star and Stripes, and South Carolina and Missouri
newspapers whose names could not be identified from the
clippings, in addition to the Boston newspapers referred to
below. The collection also included clippings from the
Nippon Times, an English-language newspaper published in
Japan at that time. See the Justin Williams papers, folders
75-77, East-Asia Collection, McKeldin Library, University of
Maryland, College Park, Md. Williams served as Chief of
Legislative Division, the Government Section, SCAP, from
1946 to 1952.
opportunity to express their views about Japan. It aroused much public discussion, an analysis of which provides a valuable insight into American attitudes toward Japan at that time.

The purpose of the present chapter is to illustrate the American state of mind regarding Japan in early 1950 through the examination of American reactions to the tour of the Japanese delegation and the "Boston incident." More concretely, it will show the U.S. official attitude toward Japan, demonstrate the response of the American mass media to it, illustrate the dissenting views, and suggest public sentiment in the U.S. about Japan at that time.

The Overall Reaction to the Tour of the Japanese Delegation

As mentioned above, the Japanese guests received hospitable treatment by American leaders for most of their tour. Governor Earl Warren of California stressed America's hope for a peaceful Japan and for a lasting friendship between the two nations in the post-occupation era. The South Carolina legislature, by joint resolution, broke a 255-year old custom in order to give representatives from a defeated nation the "privilege of the floor," a precedent followed later by Massachusetts, New York, and the U.S. Senate. Governor Thomas Dewey of New York made it clear to the delegation that New York State was flattered to be selected as a model place where American democracy may be
observed. Moreover, according to Justin Williams, the greatest impression made upon the Japanese visitors by any U.S. public official was by House Speaker Sam Rayburn, who said to them on February 17, "[In the name of the House of Representatives,] I welcome you not as enemy nationals but as friends." U.S. Vice President Alben Barkley made the same statement to them a few days later (on February 20), though the President did not receive them. On February 14, the assistant secretary of the general staff, office of the chief of staff, Department of the Army, had written to General Harry H. Vaughan, military aide to the President, "By virtue of their [the Japanese delegates'] visit they are pretty much identifying themselves with the United States and it may be that the closer they can be made to feel with the United States the closer they will follow with United States policy."

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3Justin Williams, Sr., "American Reception of Japanese Parliamentarians, 13 January - 13 March 1950," Address to Military Government Association, Union Club, Tokyo, Apr. 19, 1950, 4-5, The Williams papers, folder 83. See also newspaper clippings in the Williams papers, folders 75-56. According to a clipping, Rayburn told the delegation that America looked upon the people of Japan as "friends and allies if democracy ever is attacked again." In reply, Takeshi Yamasaki, former speaker of the Japanese House of Representatives and leader of the delegation, said, "You have said you recognize us not as enemy nations but as friends from across the Pacific. This is an encouraging word."


5Secretary of Defense Johnson decided not to ask the President to receive the Japanese delegation. State Department also advised the President not to receive this group. See memorandum from John R. Beishline for Harry H.
As to the media coverage of the tour, the newspapers generally depicted the guests as eager to learn about democracy, and regarded with approval enterprises for giving groups of Japanese leaders a chance to see American democracy in action. Though the derogatory word "Japs" was still frequently used in headlines, the press otherwise showed little animosity toward the Japanese.6

The "Boston Incident" and the Reactions by U.S. Officials

After visiting Los Angeles, Sacramento, New Orleans, and Columbia, South Carolina, the Japanese delegates arrived in Boston. General MacArthur had sent a message to Mayor John B. Hynes announcing the visit. The message read, "A delegation of members of the Japanese national Diet will shortly visit Boston in the course of a broad survey of American democracy in action. Know that there will come from this visit to your great city, so long identified in the forefront of leadership in the evolution of American democracy, much wise counsel and inspiration and to such end I shall be most grateful for your personal assistance. Cordial Regard. Signed MacArthur. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Tokyo Japan."7 In response to this request, Mayor Hynes suggested that the Japanese group visit

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6 See the Williams papers, folders 75-77.
the City Council. However, on January 30, 1950, the Boston City Council voted to bar the visit.8 Two Council members who were absent later said they would have voted to admit the Japanese guests.9

A short time later, with the Council's "keep those Japanese the hell out of here" edict reverberating all the way to Tokyo, the Massachusetts Legislature, in an effort to atone for the Council's action, invited the Japanese officials to spend the next day at the State House. On January 31, they attended committee hearings, inspected the records in the state library, and saw the House and Senate in session. Waiving a rule of long-standing, the House even extended to them special permission to take pictures in the House chamber.

On this day, the State House of Representatives adopted by voice vote a resolution which referred to the

8Reports of Proceedings of the City Council of Boston, Jan. 30, 1950. The Council Minutes carry only the official motion and vote on roll call. (The Council Minutes as of 1947 discontinued carrying verbatim remarks of Council members at meetings for space and economy reason.) See also Boston Globe, Jan. 1, 1950. The councilors who voted for the ban were: James S. Coffey of East Boston, Julius Ansel of Dorchester, William F. Hurley of Roxbury, Vincent J. Shanley of Brighton, Michael L. Kinsella of Charlestown, John J. Beades, John B. Wenzler of South Boston, Francis P. Tracey, Roxbury, Robert J. Ramsey of Dorchester, Fabin, Sullivan. (The given names of the last two councilors were not noted in the Boston Globe article.) Those who voted against the ban included: Milton Cook of Roxbury, Walter D. Bryan of West Roxbury. (The names of six other councilors who voted against the ban was not noted in the Boston Globe article.)

9Boston Globe, Jan. 31, 1950, 1. These two were John E. Yerxa of Back Bay, and Edmund V. Lane of Brighton.
"regrettable incident at City Hall." Governor Paul A. Dever received the Japanese guests in his own executive chamber, and he said in his address of welcome, "Speaking for the great majority of citizens, including our valiant veterans who made a successful issue of arms with your fellow nationals, I want to extend to you the hand of friendship and a cordial invitation to examine closely the operations of our governmental machinery." State Senator Whittier, who officially received the Japanese, said he was sorry for the City Hall incident. House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neil said that the House was honored that the Massachusetts Legislature was one of the bodies selected for study. When he introduced the Japanese delegates, all the members of the House, except one, stood and applauded.10 Along the same line, Mayor Hynes said he was "disturbed by the unpleasant episode." Moreover, State Department officials also termed the incident "regrettable." American officials in Tokyo received the news of the incident with "astonishment," calling the action "absurd," and expressing fear that it

10 The one exception was Representative Daniel Rudsten, a former Marine combat captain whose company had been "practically annihilated by the Japanese," and whose brother was killed in the Pacific in World War II. He said, "The Japanese visitors deserve our protection and tactful treatment, but . . . I do not feel that I must applaud or show over signs of friendliness that I do not possess." See "Dever Hits 'Ban' on Japanese," Boston Evening Globe, Jan. 31, 1950; "Snubbed Japanese Offered Amends," New York Times, Feb. 1, 1950, 2.
would be used by Japanese communists to whip up anti-occupation feelings.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to these official efforts to atone for the Council's action, the Christian Leadership Group, a non-sectarian organization of professional and business men, entertained the Japanese at breakfast and apologized for the Council's action.\textsuperscript{12} The Boston Chamber of Commerce also invited them to a luncheon on February 3. The widow of Brig.-Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, son of the President of the same name, wired a Boston radio commentator, "Deeply resent this [treatment of the Japanese in Boston] as an American citizen," and invited the delegates to dinner at her house. The \textit{Boston Globe} on January 31, 1950 reported that protests against the action of the Council were received from as far west as Ann Arbor, Michigan, where two students at the University of Michigan called the Council's refusal to admit the Japanese "a most-bigoted and undemocratic action" and "an infantile attitude."\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, the Independent Businessmen's Organization of Delphi, Indiana, said it felt indignant at the way the Japanese had been treated by the Boston city solons and asked them to watch "a small town

council in action" and attend a meeting of the Delphi Rotary Club on February 14.14

In contrast to this hospitality shown to the Japanese guests and despite being urged to reconsider its vote, on January 31 the Boston City Council stood by its action of the previous day. Not one of the 11 who had voted against admitting the Japanese changed his mind. Councilor James S. Coffey of East Boston, who led the action to bar the Japanese visitors from the Council chambers, said he had received, by the morning of January 31, 181 calls congratulating him for his stand, including a call from the head of the Gold Star Mothers. He also asserted, "I still believe the Japs were here just as spies." Councilor Julius Ansel of Dorchester said, "The City Council of Boston has told the world where the average American stands. My home has been flooded by so many phone calls today praising my action that I stayed home to take them."15

The reasoning of those councilors against admitting the Japanese visitors needs to be examined here more closely. The published remarks by those councilors reveal the legacy of strong wartime hostility in some quarters of America -- hatred and distrust of the Japanese and fear of the conquered nation's potential threat to the U.S. once again,

like the earlier example of Germany. These feelings might usually remain dormant but could be awakened by some stimulation. Coffey said, "I saw a picture the other night on television which gave me the idea of keeping them out of here. It was called, 'The Great White Horse,' and it told how the Japanese Emperor once left Tokyo and went to Europe. There he did nothing but study all the fortifications and then he went back to Japan and put them into effect there. Why should we let them come here and learn things they can use to wreck us? One of my boys got malaria in Burma in World War II. I have two other boys, 13 and 12, . . . and I don't want it to happen to them." He also shouted, "They [the Japanese visitors] are probably here taking pictures of fortresses and trying to learn all they can about the A-bomb." Coffey said, "Will we forget the march on Bataan and the gasoline on the boys they burned? Bring them over here and educate them, and they will go back and do the same thing again. We are feeding them. That is enough. Keep them the hell out of here." 16

Councilor Ansel said, "As a combat veteran of World War II, I voted yesterday to ban them and tonight I am going on the radio to tell the people of my religion that I could not condone a hero's welcome to an ally of a nation that murdered 6,000,000 Jews." He added, "I can't forgive the

murder of American, Australian and British prisoners by the Japs, nor the treatment given women taken prisoners in the East. The Diet members should have been taken to the sands of Iowa [sic] Jima instead of here if they wanted to be shown democracy." Council President William F. Hurley of Roxbury said, "Many people in my district lost their sons in the Japanese attacks during World War II and also in many Japanese internment camps." Another councilor, Vincent J. Shanley of Brighton, stated, "If we permit these Japanese to do as they please, why not let 10 or 12 Communists do the same thing later on." These councilors agreed that the time was not ripe for receiving a delegation of this type from Japan. In Hurley's words, "The wounds are still too fresh." According to a councilor, the vote not to welcome the Japanese visitors included more war veterans than the vote to make them welcome.

Moreover, Councilor Michael L. Kinsella of Charlestown was annoyed by the government's changed attitude toward Japan. He said, "I am astounded that the government wanted to hate the enemy, in this case Japan, during the war and now that the conflict is over turn us into a lover of the enemy."

18 This comment was given by Councilor Milton Cook of Roxbury. See "State Welcomes Japanese Group, Council Stands by Guns," Boston Globe, Jan. 31, 1950, 30.
19 Ibid.
In addition, Councilor Shanley's comment suggests that the City Council was not adequately informed about the visit of the Japanese delegation in advance, and that this situation may have been a factor in its action. He said, "Why didn't whoever was handling the Japs' visit here inform the City Council of their approaching visit to the chambers or seek the courtesy of an invitation, rather than appear around 2:30 in the afternoon at a busy meeting?" This point, however, was made only by Shanley.20

Now, let us turn to the reasoning given by those councilors who favored admitting the Japanese guests. Councilor Milton Cook of Roxbury agreed with MacArthur that Japanese communists might use the incident to stir up feeling against American occupation troops. He also stressed his trust in MacArthur as a key reason for his voting for admitting the Japanese. He explained that "the Japanese delegation was here with full approval of General MacArthur, and MacArthur is entirely familiar with recent history." He concluded, "It was a highly-emotional incident, both absurd and, in a sense, tragic." At the same time, he expected that the City Council's action would be praised by some, while it would be criticized by many sources. Another councilor, Walter D. Bryan of West Roxbury, had hoped to teach the Japanese democracy. He said, "There certainly was no harm in allowing them to come

20 Ibid.
in. Certainly it did not show them democracy at its best. I am afraid the Japanese Diet members did not learn much about democracy from our City Council action." Councilor John E. Yerxa of Back Bay asserted, "I'm a veteran but the war is over. We should do everything we can to make people like us." Thus, though no favorable views of the Japanese themselves were expressed by these councilors, it seems that they were at least trying to set U.S.-Japan relationship in a more positive and constructive way than those who opposed them.

Comments criticizing the Council's action were also expressed by some other officials outside the City Council. Their points echoed those stressed by the councilors above. For example, Massachusetts Senate President Harris S. Richardson stressed his willingness to cooperate with MacArthur and hence to educate the Japanese. He said, "The emphasis is on General MacArthur's request and I'm certainly willing to be co-operative and hospitable and give them all the courtesy that is due them, but it is done primarily to co-operate with General MacArthur." Senator Chester A. Dolan, Democratic floor leader, agreed with Richardson adding, "One of the most important things we can do is teach them [the Japanese] the democratic way of government and that can best be realized by throwing open the doors of all

21 Ibid.
deliberate chambers." Ex-Mayor James M. Curley's comment reflected his concern about communism in Asia: "In view of the fact that the Japanese people are one of the last bulwarks against Communism in Asia and an unprecedented job is being done there, this action of the Boston City Council seems to be an unwarranted and flagrant insult to this group of Diet members."23

Press Reactions in Boston and Elsewhere in the U.S.

The "Boston incident" received a lion's share of the news coverage in Boston newspapers such as the Boston Globe and the Boston Traveler, both of which were very critical of the Council's action. This fact alone reflects the changed attitude of many Americans toward the Japanese. The Boston Globe reported on January 31, "The Council's action quickly became an international incident." The Boston Daily Record termed the incident as "unfortunate blunder." The Boston Post likewise emphasized that "the feeling was widely expressed that the Council had made the city an international laughing-stock."25

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23 A newspaper clipping in the Justin Williams papers. It was from either Boston Globe or Boston Traveler on either Jan. 31, Feb. 1, or Feb. 2, 1950.
An editorial of the Quincy Patriot Ledger, a local newspaper published in Quincy, Massachusetts, condemned the Council, saying, "It is dominated by a group of small minds." The Ledger also argued that, though Americans had "ample reason to dislike the Japanese," they "were the victims of an ancient and archaic form of government that was seized by the Japanese militarists." It went on to say that "the plain ordinary Japanese of the street, the ordinary people, are just like ordinary people in any other land." Moreover, it stressed that Japan could now become "a strong bastion for democracy in the Pacific," and that she was America's "last outpost" there against the Russians. . . . If we can hold the line in Japan," it continued, "we have stopped the Russians thousands of miles from our shores."

Thus, by drawing the distinction between Japanese militarist leaders and Japanese ordinary people and emphasizing the strategic importance of Japan, the writer stressed his perception of Japan as a potentially important ally of the U.S.26

The press in other parts of the U.S. also widely deplored the Boston City Council's refusal to welcome the Japanese visitors. Though small in space, the incident was reported on the front pages of both the New York Times and the Washington Post on January 31. Not surprisingly, it was

overshadowed by the much bigger news of President Truman's order to build the hydrogen bomb. On February 3, the Post carried a letter to the editor criticizing the Boston City Council's action: "With such implicit lack of faith, hope, or a sense of equality it is difficult to envisage practicable world comity, to see how just peace treaties can be concluded." The February 5 editorial of the Post, "Democracy In Action," also condemned the Boston City Council's action, pointing out that "every American has a direct personal interest in the success of the new Japan." The editorial argued that educating the Japanese for democracy was first of all "expected to be one of the effective checks to communism in eastern Asia." It added that "a degree of economic prosperity" would "be essential to the success of the new government and the stability of the new state," and that the success of the plans to permit the resumption and expansion of the Japanese export trade would "considerably reduce the drain on the American taxpayer." It concluded, "Thus the notion of giving those who will have the responsibility of guiding the political and economic destinies of the new Japan a better understanding of the world outside seems to us eminently reasonable."27 The San Francisco Chronicle also pointed out, "This mission is an important one, directed precisely

to what the U.S. wished for Japan," while the Louisville Courier-Journal promised that Kentucky would "do better by the touring Japanese." Protests against the Boston City Council were likewise made by other major U.S. newspapers such as the Hartford Courant, Providence Journal, Christian Science Monitor, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Chicago News, Chicago Sun Times, Kansas City Times, Dallas News, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 28

Furthermore, the February 10 editorial of Commonweal magazine criticized Councilor Coffey. Referring to Coffey's remark, "Feed them but don't educate them," the editor argued, "It was the sort of thing anybody on the street might have said five or six years ago. But now it was so unusual that it made headlines. Most of us were surprised." The editor wrote, "Most of us had almost forgotten the wartime Jap of the posters and the bloody movies, so dead was the old propaganda," but "Mr. Coffey, it seems, took his wartime propaganda a bit too seriously." 29

As mentioned above, the press generally approved of enterprises intended to provide Japanese leaders a chance to see the U.S. "in action." 30 A few, however, had some

30 The approval was expressed in mid-February by such observers as the San Francisco Chronicle, Washington Post, Columbus Dispatch, and Peter Edson of Scripps-Howard.
reservations about "unnecessarily warm" greetings. For example the Columbus Dispatch remarked, "It is desirable, and our responsibility, to educate the Japanese in the ways of democracy and civilized conduct... On the other hand, their offenses against decency and humanity are not easily forgotten. They are still on probation." Peter Edson of Scripps-Howard press, noting that the Japanese labor officials "were a pretty uncommunicative lot," was skeptical as to "what effect this indoctrination in democracy" would "have for the long run, if any." 31

As to the public's reaction, the Boston Traveler conducted interviews among Bostonians, and both the Traveler and the Boston Globe printed letters to the editors about the incident. No definite conclusion can be drawn, however, about the general trend of public opinion on this subject from these interviews and letters only, because the range of the interviews conducted was limited and the subjectivity of newspaper editors in selecting letters to publish must be taken into consideration. 32 Nevertheless, the interviews and the letters can be used to show how the Boston newspapers appraised local public opinion about the

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Ibid.

32 No nationwide public opinion survey was conducted regarding the tour of the Japanese delegation. It is possible that most Americans in the areas not visited by the delegation were unaware of the tour and the "Boston incident."
incident. In other words, they at least show the information those newspapers presented to the readers as an index of public opinion in Boston, though it is possible that they did not accurately reflect the actual trend among the Boston public.

Both newspapers emphasized that the Boston public was strongly against the Council's refusal to welcome the Japanese guests. Under the headline, "Poll Rebukes Council on Japanese; Bostonians Cool to Solons' Heated Action," the Traveler reported on January 31 that by a margin of 4 to 1 men and women interviewed disapproved of the Council's ban. Out of twenty-four comments printed in the newspaper, only five supported the Council's action, while nineteen disapproved of it. Similarly, among the letters to the editor that were printed in the February 2 issue of the Traveler, one supported the ban and four objected to it. Moreover, among the letters to the editor of the Boston Globe printed in its February 1 issue, only two sided with Council's action, while eleven letters disapproved of it. Many of those who wrote to the newspaper editors were

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"Poll Rebukes Council on Japanese; Bostonians Cool to Solons' Heated Action," Boston Traveler, Jan. 31, 1950, 1, 12. The sampling of 24 people consisted of salesmen, salesgirls, truck drivers, students, housewifes, a room clerk, a book keeper, etc. It included 8 World War II veterans, out of which only one approved of the Council's action.


indignant at the Council's action. One went so far as to write in an "Open letter to City Councilor James S. Coffey. I helped fight three battle campaigns against the Japs and I would be far more willing, for the sake of the future, for the sake of all of us, to vote one of those Japanese into your present job than to even advise anyone to vote for you." Another wrote, "May I say that for the first time in my life I am ashamed to call myself a Bostonian."36

The comments by Bostonians printed in the newspapers showed that those who applauded the Council's action in slamming the door on the Diet members cited the sneaky attack on Pearl Harbor and wartime atrocities as reasons for supporting the exclusion of the Japanese legislators. They retained a deep distrust of the Japanese. One of them commented, "I believe that today our relationship toward Japan is that of a just and merciful conqueror, but not a benign friend."37 He added, "But when representatives of the government with which we officially are at war are sent on a tour of this country and treated with the hospitality and friendship being accorded these persons, then I submit that their Oriental minds can only have a supreme contempt for our mental flabbiness and emotional flip-flops."38

On the other hand, the interviews and letters showed that a few points were frequently made by those who objected

36 Ibid. 1.
38 Ibid.
to the Council's action. In line with the statements made by some officials, most of them thought that the Japanese should have been given a chance to see how democracy worked, which was the objective of the tour. For these people, the spying charge was foolish. Many of the respondents also emphasized that the kind of the negative attitude shown by the City Council would never contribute to peace but merely alienate Japan further, making an enemy of her again. A good many respondents (eight out of the thirty-two39) specifically pointed out the fact that the Japanese delegation had been sent by General MacArthur. For instance one Pearl Harbor veteran said, "If MacArthur sent them over he must know what he is doing." Another person said, "I feel that MacArthur is doing a very good job and we should try to back him up."40 In addition, a few of the Boston respondents showed their concern about the spread of communism in Japan.41

There were different feelings toward the Japanese even among those who were willing to give the Japanese an opportunity to study democracy in America. A few of them clearly indicated a more positive view of Japan than that

39 Seven out of the nineteen interviewees who were against the Council's action, and one out of the four letters to the Traveler that were against the action, but none among the eleven letters to the Boston Globe against the action referred to this point.
they had previously held. For instance, one woman said, "After all the Japs were our enemies, but they are now a friendly people." Another said, "After all if the Japs are trying to establish democracy and are trying to see how it works here we have no right to impede them, but to help them."42 However, many others did not, at least overtly, show any particularly favorable perceptions of Japan herself. They emphasized the real and practical need for constructive attitudes toward Japan in order to maintain peace, as well as their trust in and respect for General MacArthur. The following statement by a World War II veteran sums up this line of reasoning: "I had no reverence for the atrocities they committed or any of their actions, but I do feel that we will never prevent things like that from happening if we do not teach and promote democratic thinking, which goes to the point of enabling their representatives to see it in action."43 In addition, one reader wrote to the Boston Globe that while the members of the Japanese Diet should have been shown democracy in the making, they should be also taken through several veterans' hospitals. He added, "Let's remember Pearl Harbor."44

44 Ibid.
Conclusion

As discussed above, the bulk of the reactions in the U.S. to the tour of the Japanese delegation and the "Boston incident" showed that the U.S. government, at both federal and local levels, and the American media in early 1950 were largely ready to welcome the delegation of the former enemy nation as their official guests and show them how American government worked. The fact that no overt opposition to treating them cordially was expressed in any other city visited by them also suggests that the American public generally followed official policy and media opinion, or was at least not so concerned about the policy as to raise an objection to it. Public opinion as reported by the American media accepted the need for building a relationship with Japan on constructive and friendly terms. This situation reflected a remarkable change that had taken place in American attitudes toward Japan in less than five years after the termination of the Pacific War. Distrust of Japan had substantially declined by this time. The predominant view expressed in public comment seemed to be that Japan had been in the process of reformation under the guidance of General MacArthur and his staff, and was now potentially an important friend of the U.S.

At the same time, public comment on the Japanese delegation and the "Boston incident" shows that, if we scrutinize the attitudes of the American people toward Japan
at that time more closely, not all Americans who favored showing American democracy in action to the Japanese did so because of their "genuine" friendly feelings for Japan. That is to say, while trying to see U.S.-Japan relationship in positive terms, many of them took a constructive attitude toward Japan because of their desire to prevent future conflicts between the two nations and for the sake of world peace, or because of their concern about the spread of communist influence in the Far East and recognition of the role Japan could play as an important bulwark against the Soviet bloc. As Justin Williams observed, newspaper articles based on press interviews stressed topics most closely related to the Cold War: communism, a peace treaty, U.S. bases, and MacArthur's opinions on these things. In addition, some of those who favored welcoming the Japanese visitors emphasized that they did so mainly because of their respect for MacArthur and desire to cooperate with him. Gallup and NORC public opinion polls suggest that one-third to a half of the American public had a friendly view of the Japanese people at that time. While showing considerable

46 There no polling results available on American friendliness toward the Japanese in 1950, but, as noted in Chapter VI, a Gallup poll reported in April 1949 that 34 percent of those questioned professed "friendly feelings" toward the Japanese. In March 1951, according to a NORC poll, 53 percent said they had a "favorable" impression of the Japanese. Similarly, Gallup reported in September 1951 that 51 percent took a "friendly" or "favorable" view toward the Japanese people. See AIPO, Apr. 17, 1949, published in
improvement in American attitudes toward them since the end
of the war, these polls indicate that a sizable segment of
the American people could not feel friendly toward the
Japanese, though they might have approved of teaching them
democracy.

As the polls showed, there were, of course, many
Americans who actually felt friendly toward Japan, but the
feeling may have been derived from practical considerations.
In other words, many, though they might have had negative
impressions of the Japanese because of their wartime
memories, believed that America should treat Japan as a
friend -- that America should be forward-looking now that
the war was over. It is also possible that many who favored
hospitable treatment of the Japanese delegation primarily
because of political and strategic considerations felt
friendly to ordinary Japanese citizens, apart from the
Japanese government, because the distinction between
Japanese militarist leaders and the ordinary people had been
widely drawn.

By those willing to teach democracy to the Japanese,
the relationship between the two nations tended to be viewed
as that of a mighty and wise teacher to a student with many
problems who was yet seeking help and trying to make
progress. In short, it was often a paternalistic

Public Opinion Quarterly 13 (Fall 1949): 551; "American
39, OPOS Records, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
relationship. Moreover, the friendly attitude toward Japan shown by those willing to teach her democracy was not free of suspicion, because Japan still had problems to solve to become a democratic nation like the U.S. She remained "on probation."

In sum, by early 1950, the foundation was laid among the American public to accept the government’s policy of basing the U.S.–Japan relationship on friendly terms and treating Japan as America’s potential ally. At the same time a minority openly professed strong distrust of Japan and the Japanese, and not everyone who approved the constructive policy actually felt friendly to the Japanese.
CHAPTER VIII
ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN AS EXPRESSED IN LETTERS FROM AMERICAN PEOPLE TO MACARTHUR, 1949-50

Harsh Attitude (1)

Among the letters in this author's sampling, which were written in the third phase of the occupation, only one letter showed a harsh attitude toward Japan. (See Table 1.)

In early 1950 one woman wrote that she did not mind letting all the Japanese starve. Having heard that in Japan, Japanese Episcopal priests were not given ration cards because they were not workers, she inquired about the truth of this statement, and remarked: "My understanding has been that General MacArthur is able to do just about what he wants, but to deny ration cards to the clergy sounds more like Stalin -- although as far as I'm concerned, all the Japanese could starve! -- but I suppose that wouldn't be good for trade or something."

1Mrs. H. P. Longley (Winter Park, FL) to the State Department, Jan. 11, 1950, box 35, RG 5. (Unless otherwise noted, the Record Groups referred to in this chapter are located at the MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, VA.) According to the reply from K. B. Bush, GHQ, SCAP, to Longley, she also sent a letter to General MacArthur, making the same inquiry on February 5, 1950. In his reply, Bush explained that all Japanese citizens were entitled to and were issued ration cards regardless of
It should be noted that even this writer admitted it was necessary in reality for some Americans (in her words, "for trade or something") to approve of giving food relief and other economic aids to Japan, even though she herself was not inclined to approve it. Moreover, while taking a harsh attitude toward the Japanese, she did not actually advocate any severe treatment of them in her letter.

**Positive Attitudes (87)**

While there was only one such letter in the third phase, there were eighty-seven letters in the sampling that showed the writers' constructive attitude toward Japan. These writers approved of providing Japan with further help for her reconstruction. Though not all of them showed a heartfelt friendly feeling toward the Japanese people, the desire to develop intimate relationship between the two nations was emphasized more often in this phase than in the preceding phases. Most writers in this group also very positively appraised the fruits of U.S. efforts to rebuild Japan so far. As in the preceding phases, the majority of these letters

their occupation and without discrimination, though "supplementary rations" were provided only for persons engaged in heavy labor, prospective mothers, mothers who are nursing infants, and hospital patients requiring special diets. See K. B. Bush (Brigadier General, Adjutant General, GHQ, SCAP) to Longley, Feb. 21, 1950, box 35, RG 5.
praised MacArthur for his job in Japan. Out of eighty-seven letters in the category of "positive attitudes" in this phase, forty-eight clearly showed the writer's praise for MacArthur.² Again, the letters are divided into several groups according to the emphasis or characteristic of each letter. It should be noted that, as in the case of the preceding chapters, each of these emphasized points was shared by many letters in other categories to some extent.

1) Constructive Stance While Holding Unfavorable Perceptions of the Japanese (2)

The writers introduced here referred to some qualities of the Japanese unfavorable to their eyes, while taking a constructive approach toward them and also admitting the relationship between the U.S. and Japan had much improved since the end of the war.

K. T. Keller, President of Chrysler Corporation, observed in September 1949 that the American people were "largely very well disposed in their feelings toward having Japan assisted to recover along peaceful and constructive lines." He also stated that the Japanese had "a great opportunity to become a useful nation if they can completely submerge some of the tendencies of

²Cf. Out of the total number of letters in the sampling written during the third phase of the occupation (184 letters), 78 letters clearly expressed the writer's praise for MacArthur's work in Japan.
pig-headedness they have previously displayed."³ Thus, while seeing a hope for Japan to become a "useful" nation, the latter part of his statement above indicated his negative perception of the Japanese.

Sol G. Levy, a representative of the Executive Board and the Headquarters of the Boy Scouts of America in the Far East, wrote to MacArthur after visiting Japan. Levy wrote he was "very favorably impressed with the Boy Scout Association of Japan," and stressed that he was "on a constructive basis of thinking" regarding the Boy Scout program in Japan. He even wrote, "We [his group of Boy Scout members] loved Japan."⁴ He enclosed his report to scout headquarters, from which it was clear that he wished to do his part to "help make democracy successful in the Far East." He also stressed Japanese receptivity to the American life style, by saying that the Japanese liked Americans so well that they would like to be the 49th state in the Union.

At the same time, discussing the superiority of the boy to the girl in the Japanese home, he wrote, "It is quite evident that this method of rearing boys had to be changed and that the people would have to be inoculated with our western way. Scouting is one of the basic

³K. T. Keller (President, Chrysler Corporation, Detroit, MI) to MacArthur, Sept. 29, 1949, box 14, RG 5.
⁴Sol G. Levy (The Commission Company; distributors -- wholesale grocers, Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, Mar. 9, 1950, box 10, RG 5.
programs that can do this" (underline mine). Regarding the U.S. effort to democratize Japan, he stated that, though the Japanese were "catching up with our western way" (in terms of "clothing and mannerism," for instance), it would "take time to reach and inoculate them [the Japanese]," because there were 80 million people there and they were scattered over quite an area. Levy also thought that the transformation of various aspects (e.g., finance, taxation, education) of Japan was necessary for General MacArthur to be successful in "making Japan an outpost and bulwark of democracy, a protection" to the U.S. in the future. These remarks suggest Levy's perception of Japan as a nation yet to be reeducated, though he was taking a friendly stance to the Japanese and hopeful of democratic Japan in the future. This perception was shared by many other letters showing a positive attitude toward Japan, as discussed below.

2) Emphasis on Furthering the Rehabilitation of Japan and the Perception of Japan as America's Important Friend (59)

As in the second phase, the letters in this category can be divided into four sub-categories according to the emphasis of each letter. The four themes below are

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5Levy to W. Arthur McKinney (Assistant to the Chief Scout Executive, Boy Scout of America, New York, NY), Mar. 6, 1950, box 10, RG 5. A copy of this letter was enclosed in Levy's letter to MacArthur of Mar. 9, 1950. 6Ibid., 2.
interrelated with each other. Letters in the last three sub-categories generally share the basic theme of the first sub-category.

**Support for MacArthur's Job of Rehabilitating Japan and Furthering It (37)**

The letters in this sub-category clearly endorsed the policy of reconstructing Japan, and most of them highly praised MacArthur's achievement there. For example, a teacher, who described herself as "a common American citizen," showed her appreciation of "the great work" MacArthur had done and was doing "in [the] reconstruction of Japan" and his "great contribution to World Peace." This writer, referring to MacArthur's address at the time of the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, also wrote, "You called on those present to rise above hatred in these great and significant words, 'To that higher dignity which alone benefits the sacred purposes we are about to serve.' Magnanimous are these words."7

Similarly, Joe J. Mickle, President of Centenary College of Louisiana, wrote that he had followed closely MacArthur's "constructive" statesmanship in Japan from the day of Japanese surrender, and had had "many

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7Naomi McElreath to MacArthur, Mar. 19, 1949, box 38, RG 5. She also wrote, "Your faith in God and man has made you, in my opinion, one of the greatest leaders of all time."
opportunities publicly to support and commend various steps" in the general's "reconstruction program in platform appearances." He thought that MacArthur, in his "historic" statement on the occasion of Japanese surrender, "placed the task in Japan for the American occupation army upon a high plane."  

A Catholic bishop likewise stated that he held in high esteem MacArthur's "sane judgment" and his "broad human policy" which had "accomplished so much in such a

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8Joe J. Mickle (President of Centenary College of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA) to MacArthur, Nov. 1, 1949, box 18, RG 10. His college was a Methodist-related, non-sectarian, liberal arts college, with an enrollment of approximately 1,800 students. His college wanted to confer upon MacArthur an honorary LL.D. (Doctor of Laws) degree. Mickle lived in Japan from 1921 till 1941. Prior to the ending of the war, he also worked with many of those in the State Department and other branches of government, "giving serious thought to the reconstruction program in Japan." For other examples of praise for MacArthur's address at the surrender of Japan and support for his plan for the rebuilding of Japan, see Homer Rodeheaver (Winona Lake, IN) to MacArthur, Dec. 5, 1949, microfilm, reel 66, RG 5; John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (Seal Harbor, ME) to MacArthur, July 21, 1949, microfilm, reel 66, RG 5; Samuel D. Marble (President, Wilmington College (Wilmington, OH) to MacArthur, July 5, 1949, microfilm, reel 75, RG 5. Marble had been the first chairman of LARA (Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia). For the expressions of willingness to help MacArthur with the reconstruction of Japan, see also Harold R. Murdock (Chemical Engineer, Robert & Co. Associates, Atlanta, GA) to MacArthur, Oct. 7, 1949, Nov. 30, 1949, Mar. 8, 1950, microfilm, reel 65, RG 5; Otto Schnering (President, Curtiss Candy Company, Chicago, IL) to MacArthur, Apr. 29, 1950, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5. See also Grace M. Wedge (Jamaica Plain, MA) to MacArthur, Nov. 21, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5. Wedge commended MacArthur "for the wonderful work" he had done and was doing in Japan, and wished it to continue to be "a blessing to the Japanese" (and an inspiration to the entire world).
short time for the rehabilitation of Japan" (underline mine). He also felt that MacArthur's "hope for a Christian democracy in Japan" was "nearer to realization" than many people thought. 9

While the letters above referred to the "reconstruction" of Japan in general, some letters in this sub-category particularly focused on teaching democracy to the Japanese. For instance, one praised "the magnificent way" MacArthur had "brought to the Japanese people a new meaning of freedom and democracy." 10 Another expressed interest in "the progress that is being made in the liberation of Japan and in the establishment of free and democratic government in Japan" 11 (underline mine). Similarly, one,

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10 Rex Romero (Napa, CA) to MacArthur, Sept. 20, 1949, box 17, RG 10. For a similar statement, see Ernest E. Irons (M.D., President of the American Medical Association, Chicago, IL) to MacArthur, Nov. 11, 1949, box 18, RG 10.
11 James A. Patrick (Teacher, Sunday School Class, Belmont Heights Baptist Church, Nashville, TN) to MacArthur, Nov. 13, 1949, box 7, RG 5. Patrick added, "We are especially interested to know what progress is being made in Christianizing Japan, especially what Missionary Baptists are doing." See also Charles F. Schwep, Jr. (Plainfield, NJ) to MacArthur, May 3, 1949, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5; Charles Stemppler (New York, NJ) to MacArthur, May 22, 1950, microfilm, reel 69, RG 5. Schwep praised MacArthur for "the remarkable progress in the physical reconstruction of Japan, and in the rehabilitation of her people into a democratic ideology." He was a representative of the visual education sections of the YMCA and several church groups including the Protestant Film Commission, and produced several films in
who had just visited Japan, wrote, "Such a good start has been made in the psychological reconstruction of the Japanese people that it would be a world tragedy not to give them the further guidance which is needed" (underline mine). In these writers' minds, America, especially MacArthur, played a messianic role in teaching American democracy to the Japanese. The relationship between the two nations was perceived to be basically paternalistic.

The following letter evidenced the effort by American educators to educate people in the U.S. occupied areas. Herman B. Wells and Harold E. Snyder, chairman and director respectively, of the Commission on the Occupied Areas of the American Council on Education, which had been appointed to advise American educational and cultural relations with the occupied countries and

Japan on the themes of teaching Christian morality and democracy to the Japanese. Stempler praised "the tremendous job" that MacArthur had accomplished to teach the Japanese the American way of life. For a similar attitude, with an emphasis on bringing democracy or light to Japan, see also Russ F. Tatum (Phoenix, AZ) to MacArthur, Aug. 18, 1949, microfilm, reel 70, RG 5; Dick Weise (Waseca, MN) to MacArthur, Apr. 12, 1950, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5; Oliver M. Wells (San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, May 7, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5. Edward W. Allen (International Fisheries Commission, Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, June 9, 1949, box 17, RG 10. For interest in teaching democracy to the Japanese, see also Edward C. Simmel (Beverly Hills, CA) to MacArthur, Mar. 4, 1950. Simmel, part owner of an educational film producing company, wished to work for the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP, for the reorientation of the Japanese.
stimulate voluntary effort, wrote to MacArthur in October 1949. They expressed their belief that "American educational aid" could "have a permanently salutary influence on future friendship between the two nations." They also wrote, "We congratulate you on the progress in this important aspect of your rehabilitation program" (underline mine). The Commission also agreed that ways should be developed for increasing the availability in Japan of American books, particularly in the fields of education and science. 13

Furthermore, according to Snyder's letter in March 1950, the American Association of School Administrators (AASA) and the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE) adopted the following resolutions in early 1950 at the suggestion of the Commission on the Occupied Areas. 14

13 Herman B. Wells and Harold E. Snyder (Commission on the Occupied Areas, American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Oct. 6, 1949, box 17, RG 10. Wells was President of Indiana University. This commission was composed of 26 members (including Wells and Snyder), who were at principal posts of major American universities, social, or educational organizations (e.g., American National Red Cross, National Education Association, National Gallery of Art, National Social Welfare Assembly, Workers Education Bureau of America, United Council of Church Women), professors in education, philosophy, theology, and political science, a lawyer, and an editor.

14 See Snyder to MacArthur, Mar. 6, 1950, box 15, RG 5. AASA was composed of approximately 10,000 educational leaders. AACTE was composed of all major teachers colleges and university schools of education in the U.S.
AASA: In the occupied areas of Germany, Austria, and Japan, the program of education and re-education should be given a high priority. We urge that responsible U.S. officials continue their friendly and constructive interest in these programs. . . . Educational institutions in the United States should grant leaves of absence wherever possible to personnel invited to serve in the occupied areas (underline mine).

AACTE: It is urgently recommended to the Departments of State and of the Army that education in the occupied areas be given high priority by our United States agencies in those countries; that American staff be maintained and strengthened; and that adequate financial support for educational and exchange projects be provided. 16

Some other writers commented on the economic rehabilitation of Japan. They agreed with the policy of recovering Japan's economy, and most of them affirmed

15 Ibid. This resolution was adopted at AASA’s Atlantic City Convention on March 2, 1950.
16 Ibid. This resolution was adopted at AACTE’s annual conference at Atlantic City on February 25, 1950. For other examples of American educators' interest in educating the Japanese or helping Japan improve its education, see Raymond B. Allen (President, University of Washington, Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, Apr. 20, 1950, microfilm, reel 64, RG 5; Donald E.J. MacNamara (Assistant Professor of Public Administration in Charge, Law Enforcement Program, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA) to MacArthur, Nov. 22, 1949, microfilm, reel 72, RG 5; Raymond Walters (President, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH) to MacArthur, Jan. 13, 1950, microfilm, reel 72, RG 5. (See also the attached copy of Walter's letter to President Nambara of the University of Tokyo, Jan. 13, 1950). The Washington Congress of Parents and Teachers were also "very much" interested in "doing something tangible toward helping with the rehabilitation program in Japan," and proposed to adopt a Parent-Teacher group in Japan and devote their energies "toward helping its individual members and their families in any way" that they could. See Gladys S. Puckett (Corresponding Secretary, Congress of Parents and Teachers, Tacoma, WA) to MacArthur, July 8, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5.
MacArthur’s success in that field. In August 1949, one writer, who read MacArthur’s letter to the editor of the Saturday Evening Post, congratulated him on it and wrote, "It is especially reassuring to know that Japanese industrial production has recovered decisively toward its average prewar level - a record that is equaled by few if any of the war-visited countries of the earth."17 P. W. Litchfield, Chairman of the Board of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, in his letter expressing his gratitude to MacArthur for the courtesies extended to his group in Japan, stated as follows in December 1949: "You have done a wonderful job in the way you have maintained peace and prosperity in Japan since hostilities ceased. You have gone a long way toward putting the Japanese people on their feet to take care of themselves in the future, and building up the friendship between their nation and ours."18 In the same vein, George Killon, President of American President Lines, who had just visited Japan, praised "the earnest effort being made to rejuvenate the people and restore the economy of that country to its

17 Edward S. Delaplaine (Associate Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland, Frederick, MD) to MacArthur, Aug. 22, 1949, box 17, RG 10. Helen Mears attacked SCAP’s policy regarding Japan’s economy in the June 18 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, and MacArthur made a reply to it. See Mears, "We’re Giving Japan ‘Democracy,’ But She Can’t Earn Her Living," 12; "General MacArthur Protests Post Editorial," Saturday Evening Post, July 30, 1949, 4.
logical place in world affairs" (underline mine). He hoped to do his part in the rehabilitation of Japanese trade and commerce. He was also hopeful that Japan might again become the major support of the American Merchant Marines in Asia.19 Likewise, David Sholtz, President of the Rountree Steamship Lines (whose name was later changed to the "Transport Steamship Lines") showed his willingness to be helpful to MacArthur's plan to rehabilitate Japan's economy.20

Similarly, President Earl B. Schwulst of the Bowery Savings Bank expressed his willingness to contribute to "what General MacArthur and his competent staff" were doing "in preparing Japan to take her proper place again among the prosperous, progressive, and free nations of the world."21 The President of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce also wrote in April 1950 that its members had "appreciated greatly" MacArthur's comments indicating

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19 George Killon (President, American President Lines, San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, June 16, 1949, box 32, RG 5.
21 Earl B. Schwulst (President, The Bowery Savings Bank, New York, NY) to MacArthur, Aug. 22, 1949, June 16, 1950, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5. He arranged the trip of his old friend, Yasuto Shundo, who had served in the capacity of a liaison official between the Japanese government and GHQ, SCAP, and wanted to negotiate with American bankers in the U.S. for the purpose of setting up an investment banking concern in Japan financed in part with American capital.
that their Chamber tour group in Japan had brought "encouragement to some of the Japanese business leaders." He added that they trusted that "mutual profitable trade and shipping" would result from their recent visit in Japan. Thus, he was willing to contribute to Japan's economic recovery. In the same vein, in proposing the development of hydro-electric resources in Japan that "would make available sufficient electric power on a comparatively firm basis to supply the industrial center of central Honshu," the President of Westinghouse Electric International Company stated that "the successful rebuilding and expansion of democratic Japan" indicated "the desirability of undertaking the Tadami [River] Project without delay."23

Thus, merely four years after the termination of the war these writers took it for granted that the U.S. should promote Japan's economic recovery and build close relationships with her. They did not express their favorable perceptions of the Japanese people, and their primary motive for supporting the policy of recovering Japan's economy might have been their perceived need for relieving the U.S. of the burden of supporting Japan by

22Thomas M. Pelly (President, Seattle Chamber of Commerce) to MacArthur, Apr. 5, 1950, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5.
making her self-supporting, the Cold War, or in many cases, a business interest in Japan, rather than humanitarian or idealistic consideration. It was clear from their language, however, that they were at least willing to put the relationship between the two nations on constructive terms.

The Perception of Japan as a Potentially Valuable Ally of the U.S. (13)

The writers in this group stressed the strategic value of Japan to the U.S. in the context of the Cold War, and saw her as potentially an important ally, though their perceptions of Japan and the Japanese were not necessarily favorable. Their main focus was on America's need to befriend Japan, rather than on their desire to be helpful to Japan for Japan's sake. At the same time they believed that being on America's side (i.e., being kept from falling into the communist camp) would be beneficial to Japan herself. Their letters also suggest that Japan's key position as a member of the American camp had become clearer than in the previous phases of the occupation, as the communist gained power in China.24

Henry J. Taylor, a radio commentator broadcasting from Japan "to San Francisco and into the network there,"

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24 Two of the nine items in this group are radioscripts probably sent to MacArthur by the radio commentators. They are here treated together with letters to MacArthur.
emphasized in his script of June 1949 the success of MacArthur's leadership in Japan. He stated, "It was doubtful if an achievement like this by an occupation leader has ever been recorded in the history of the world." Arguing against transferring the administration of the occupation from SCAP under General MacArthur to the civilian authority, Taylor asserted: "No matter how well meaning, even the appearance of weakening General MacArthur's prestige here [in Japan] would undermine the last single hope for a democratic peace and for any kind of American security in this vast area that now lies under the shadow of the Russian paw, so close to the Red claws sharpened and poised to rip at the piece of the world."25 Thus, Taylor emphasized the importance of keeping Japan on America's side and the general's role in that effort. A week later, he also stated, "Here in Japan is a firm foothold for America in the Far East, and the day may come when we will need it very badly when there is a war with the Soviet Union. For the ultimate problem here is the Red peril to Japan, to us, and to the world." Referring to the impact of the communist victory in China, Taylor insisted on America's "essential military need for Japan as an America base."26

While stressing the importance of allying Japan to America's side, Taylor's scripts did not suggest his personal friendly feeling toward Japan or the Japanese people, nor a favorable perception of them. He did observe that "by nature and by inclination" the Japanese people were "not Communist-minded" and that their democratic attitude had grown, thus describing the Japanese in a somewhat positive light. On the other hand, he sometimes used the word "Jap," and made the following statement:

Nothing pleases the Japs that is not big. This is one reason why they built enormous battleships. The battleships weren't any good, but they were big, and that is enough for a Jap. Our country, with its equipment, our country with its great power is a big country, and in this way impresses its value on the Japs as their one safeguard against the Soviet Union.

He also observed,

The atmosphere of Japan is an atmosphere so foreign to American thought and to American action that this is truly a place which seems like the end of the world. These great cities from one end of Japan to the other are so crowded with humanity, so few fields, so unfertile, so mountainous, and, at this moment [early July], so swept by rain and by wind that to see American men and women in this land standing up for our country, behaving well, setting a fine example ... is a stimulating thing \(^{27}\) (underline mine).

While seeing Japan as a valuable ally, Taylor focused on the fine work being done by Americans in Japan in

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 4-5.
rehabilitating the conquered nation, not on the favorable qualities of Japan or the Japanese. He perceived Japan as a culturally as well as geographically remote nation uncomfortable for Americans to inhabit.

Another writer, a former Lieutenant Commander, also argued in September 1949 that "the one value of Japan to the U.S., save for humanitarian considerations," was "its strategic military position in the Orient." Advocating the continued presence of American power in Japan, he wrote, "It is not that the Japanese would willingly choose Communism but, if we withdraw as we are doing in Korea, China and the Philippines, the islands must necessarily fall an easy victim to mainland Communism supported by Russia -- to become the rapidly re-militarized bastion of Eurasian expansion against expansion of American democracy." The only alternative was, he suggested, that MacArthur himself assume leadership, with the support by the Japanese people, in "defending American as Japanese interests in the Orient."28 In his enclosed article, "Japan, Friend or Foe," he concluded,

One nation in the world which might and can be our loyal ally is that nation which we have so devastatingly subdued, conquered and occupied - - and then, under the greatness of MacArthur,

28 Howard G. Brownson (Ph.D., Formerly Lt. Commander, Des Moines, IA) to MacArthur, Sept. 7, 1949, box 11, RG 5. See also his attached "personal and confidential" memorandum of September 7, 1949.
befriended in common sense as well as Christian charity -- JAPAN. For half a century, until our own expansion in the Orient in the Philippines in 1898, Japan was the loyal pupil and dependent of this nation and might have remained so had our statesmanship equalled our technical advance. . . . Now again, there is the opportunity that this island kingdom may be the eastern equivalent of England in the Atlantic as the outward bastion of American Democracy against the sweep of continental militarism [sic].

In the same vein, William Lemke, Congressman from North Dakota asserted, "As I see it Japan is the hope of America. If they can be directed to show the same energy and ability for peace that they did for war they will be friendly to us and this without sponging on us." Similarly inquiring of MacArthur's view about the re-establishment of his company's relations with the Mitsubishi Company in Japan (particularly the renewal of a technical assistance agreement), the President of Westinghouse Electric International Company wrote, "We feel that if the Japanese people are ever to cease to be wards of the American taxpayer, they must have help and

29 Brownson, "Japan, Friend or Foe." This article was enclosed in his letter of September 7, 1949, box 11, RG 5. Regarding Japan's strategic importance, a radio director, who had "intense" interest in the American occupation of Japan, wrote in early 1950, "As we profoundly feel that Japan is our first line of defense in the Pacific, we give a great deal of emphasis on the news from your command and adequate coverage to events elsewhere in the Far East" (underline mine). See Bob Shipley (KWKH News Director, Shreveport, LA) to MacArthur, Jan. 26, 1950, microfilm, reel 68, RG 5.

guidance on commercial levels. In addition, we feel that under your aegis, Fascist influence in Japan have been eliminated and if we withhold assistance, we will play into the hands of the Communists."31

While most writers in this sub-category stressed Japan's strategic importance to the U.S. or her importance as America's ideological ally, one writer focused on America's moral obligation to defend Japan in February 1949. Kenneth Colegrove, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University and a former officer in the Government Section of SCAP, wrote MacArthur regarding the controversy surrounding the press conference of Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall in Tokyo. Royall had reportedly said that the U.S. government would abandon Japan in case of war with Soviet Russia. Criticizing Royall, Colegrove argued, "In view of the fact that the Japanese people have fully complied with the Potsdam Declaration and have even included

31 W. E. Knox (President, Westinghouse Electric International Company, New York, NY) to MacArthur, Mar. 2, 1950, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5. Regarding the Mitsubishi's desire to send one or two of their officials to the U.S. to negotiate the proposed agreement, he also wrote, "In considering this matter we must take into consideration, the action of the Boston City Council in refusing to permit fourteen members of the Japanese Diet to visit a Council Session. In addition . . . a preliminary, unofficial check with certain union officials indicate that they [about 5,000 ex-G.I's to be employed at Westinghouse's plant at East Pittsburgh] would not look with favor on our receiving Japanese engineers at the Works" (underline mine). See the discussion on the Boston Incident in Chapter VII.
renunciation of war in their New Constitution, the American people have thereby assumed a moral obligation to protect them against aggression as long as we have a military establishment." Colegrove focused his attention on Japan's need to be protected by the U.S., rather than America's own interest in allying Japan.

In April 1949 Congressman Francis E. Walter reported to MacArthur the passing in the House of Representatives of H.R. 199 ("Judd bill"), which had the effect of erasing the vestiges of the oriental exclusion policy contained in the 1924 Immigration Act. He stated that it was a good legislation "as a means of giving a positive demonstration to the peoples of the Far East, in the American tradition." He also noted that he was "seriously alarmed to witness the deterioration of American prestige at Communist hands in China and elsewhere in the Far East," and that it appeared to him that "this legislation could be of material value in meeting this threat." He also attached a sheet that contained comments of Japanese leaders lauding the House approval of the bill. A United Press story from Tokyo on February 11, which was printed on the sheet, read, "Japanese sources said the U.S. House Judiciary Committee's approval of the Judd bill revising the

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32 Kenneth Colegrove (Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL) to MacArthur, Feb. 17, 1949, box 15, RG 5.
Oriental Exclusion Act is winning friends here for America at the time when the United States and Soviet Russia are engaged in a cold war to win support of Japan and other Oriental nations." These statements in the attached sheet and Walter's comment in his letter indicate his concern over anchoring Japan to America's camp.33

One letter was written to MacArthur regarding the incident in Boston in January 1950.34 Francis J. Daly, the head of Division of Juvenile Adjustment, Bureau of Child Accounting, School Committee of the City of Boston, wrote MacArthur in February 1950, criticizing the City Council's action, and enclosed his article "How Short-Sighted Policy of Hatred for Japan Can Retard Democracy" which appeared in the February 1 issue of the Boston Daily Globe. In this article he emphasized Japan's key position in the ideological warfare against communism and MacArthur's effective job in anchoring Japan to the side of "Democracy." He wrote, "I believe that through this sense of giri [Japanese sense of obligation to anyone in direct relationship for what he or she might have done for you], and through the wonderfully effective

33 Francis E. Walter (House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Apr. 27, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5. The bill was named after Congressman Walter H. Judd from Minnesota. Walter and Judd were central figures in "China Bloc."
34 See Chapter VII.
democratization policies of MacArthur, we can count on Japanese friendship throughout the war of Democracy vs. Communistic Ideas”35 (underline mine). In his letter to MacArthur, Daly stressed the receptivity in America to the story of “the magnificent way in which the basic mission” in Japan was “being carried out” and also wrote, “Always there are a few who are blinded with hatred or ignorance, but we can convert even some of them.”36

In the summer of 1950, a Japanese delegation consisting of sixty-two officials, business men, and labor leaders, was taken to the World Assembly for Moral Re-Armament at Caux, Switzerland. They also visited Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the U.S. The purpose of this mission was:

1. To acquire proficiency in an ideology which could give full content and effectiveness to the democratic framework provided for Japan by the Occupation; 2. To discover, through an examination of conditions in the democracies, the extent to which that ideology is bringing an answer to current economic and social problems; 3. To find in that ideology, for the people of Japan and other non-Communist peoples of Asia, a passion, philosophy and strategy

H. Kenaston Twitchell and Basil R. Entwistle, who reported to MacArthur on this mission, noted that the trip "coincided with a sharp realization in the Western Democracies of Japan's key position in the present crisis." As they noted, the U.S. had been "shaken into realism by the Korean crisis."38

37 H. Kenaston Twitchell and Basil R. Entwistle (Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, Aug. 18, 1950. See also the attached report on the Japanese ideological mission. The Assembly was called by official representatives of the manufacturers' associations and labor unions from the leading democratic nations. The air tickets for the Japanese delegation were eventually financed in the main by the payment in yen by the Japanese to the Philippine Air Lines. The necessary dollar expenses were met by contributions from individuals in Moral Re-Armament, by cities and industries in Germany, and by members of the Japanese communities in America.

38 Ibid. Commenting on this delegation's visit to the U.S., an editorial in the New York Times focused on a constructive attitude toward Japan. It read, "Chojiro Kuriyama, Member of the Japanese Diet, could have an attentive hearing as he told the Senate of his regret for Japan’s 'big mistake' and his recognition of American 'forgiveness and generosity.' All this in Washington, D.C., on July 28, 1950, a little less than five years after the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "One thinks back to 1945 and one thinks ahead to some date not yet unveiled. To befriend the Japanese now, to hope the best for them, is not to condone the crimes their leaders committed in their name and with their aid. It is merely to make clear that peace and good-will can return, even after the most terrible events. . . . For a moment one could see out of the present darkness into the years when all men may be brothers." See the report on the Japanese ideological mission, pp. 9-10. See also H. Alexander Smith (U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations) to MacArthur, Aug. 25, 1950, microfilm, reel 69, RG 5. Though Smith still used the word "Japs" in writing about the reception the Japanese delegation had got in the U.S., he expressed his hope to build up the good will between the two countries.
It was in line with this government-sponsored movement for "moral rearmament" that the private organization, World Brotherhood, proposed in December 1950 to hold "at the appropriate time, perhaps in 1952," its conference in Japan, inviting "influential business, industrial, labor, educational and community leaders of Christian and non-Christian religious affiliations" from "India, Burma, Siam, Indonesia, Indo-China, the Philippines, Formosa, Korea and Japan." Everett R. Clinchy, Administrative President of World Brotherhood, wrote, "The appalling and continuing struggle with the Kremlin makes a conference of free people dedicated to teamwork for freedom and peace of basic importance." This proposal to hold the meeting in Japan reflected this organization's view of Japan as a key nation in the American bloc.39

39 Everett R. Clinchy (Administrative President, World Brotherhood, New York, NY) to MacArthur, Dec. 6, 1950, box 42, RG 5. World Brotherhood was "established by men and women who believe in a spiritual interpretation of the universe to promote justice, amity, understanding, and cooperation among people varying as to religion, race, nation or culture." The President of the U.S. was Honorary Chairman of the national campaign for Brotherhood. D. R. Nugent, Chief of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP, replied to Clinchy, wishing the success of the project, but suggested "the possible complication which might arise out of the selection of Japan as its site, pending the conclusion of peace treaties and the resumption of normal diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations between Japan and her immediate neighbors." See Nugent to Clinchy, Dec. 29, 1950, box 42, RG 5.
A year later, one writer sent MacArthur an article in which he insisted that MacArthur should be present at the San Francisco Peace Conference to be held in September 1951. The article read, "With almost miraculous ability MacArthur, so far has secured Japan, military and psychologically, to the Western World. With consummate and constructive statesmanship he has converted 80,000,000 Japanese, once our most implacable and dangerous enemy, into a valuable ally." Thus, by the summer of 1951, it was clear in this writer's mind that Japan's position was changed from that of enemy to an ally. With the conclusion of the Peace Treaty and the Mutual Security Treaty signed by the U.S. and Japan, Japan's position as a U.S. ally became a formal one.

While the writers in this sub-category saw Japan as America's potential friend in an ideological or strategic sense, not in terms of personal compassionate feelings toward the Japanese people, it seems that their perception of Japan also evoked a softer and more friendly attitude toward the Japanese than that they held before the intensification of the Cold War in Asia.

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40 Charles Wellington Furlong (Colonel AUS, Ret., Cohasset, MA) to MacArthur, Sept. 20, 1951, box 23, RG 5. See also his attached article, "Hamlet With Hamlet Left Out." The date when this article was written was not noted, but it was clearly written before the San Francisco Conference was held.

41 In a resolution passed at its annual meeting in mid-1949, the U.S. Section of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom cast a warning against the
Favorable Impressions of the Japanese (7)\textsuperscript{42}

The writers in the preceding sub-categories did not make particular mention of their favorable impressions of Japan or the Japanese, focusing instead on U.S. efforts to rehabilitate Japan or keep her on America's side. On the other hand, those in this sub-category favorably depicted Japan, by positively appraising Japanese receptivity to democracy and their effort to reconstruct herself. These writers, though they may have held negative perceptions of the Japanese in other respects, at least did not express them in their letters to MacArthur.

For instance, in July 1949 E. J. Griffith, a trader from Seattle, Washington, who had been to Japan on the U.S. policy to build Japan as an anti-Red bulwark. This organization supported a U.S. policy to "initiate immediately the long delayed processes for concluding a peace treaty with Japan," "establish a fairer trade balance permitting an increase in exports," and "grant loans to Japan through the International Bank to relieve the present serious financial situation," thus endorsing the restoration of Japan's economy. At the same time it also expressed its protest against the U.S. policy supporting "reactionary elements in the government," which policy was "based on a frank expression of the desire to build Japan as an ally and bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia, at the expense of establishing conditions conducive to the growth of democracy." See Mrs. Clifford F. Valentine (Women's International League For Peace and Freedom, Washington, D.C.) to MacArthur, June 6, 1949, microfilm, reel 76, RG 5. (This letter was counted as a letter showing support for MacArthur's job of rehabilitating Japan, because the League evidently supported U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Japan and restore her economy to a reasonable level.)

\textsuperscript{42} Three of these seven letters were written by the same person (E. J. Griffith).
first plane that permitted private business men to enter Japan and had traveled across the Pacific eight times subsequently, stressed his impression that the Japanese were more fully employed and working harder than the Germans.\textsuperscript{43} In his next letter he requested the necessary military permit to enter Germany for the purpose of obtaining some firsthand comparisons between the situation in Japan and that in Germany. In summing up his impressions, he again emphasized that Japan had made more progress in her economic recovery than Germany. Though his impressions of Germany came from secondhand information, he also asserted, "It is very evident that the German people are skeptical about the virtues of democracy." On the other hand, he claimed, "In striking contrast, the Japanese people, after a momentary hesitation, largely induced by a fear of the unknown, have accepted democracy with enthusiasm."\textsuperscript{44}

It should be noted, however, that Griffith attributed the more favorable situation in Japan chiefly to MacArthur's successful leadership. He continued, "The reason is that General MacArthur went into Japan with the fixed purpose of establishing democracy, with all its benefits, including a restored economy, in the shortest

\textsuperscript{43} E. J. Griffith [E. J. Griffith & Company, Inc.; Importers and Exporters, Tokyo, Japan (General Offices in Portland, OR)] to MacArthur, July 6, 1949, box 25, RG 5.

\textsuperscript{44} Griffith to MacArthur, July 18, 1949, 2, box 25, RG 5.
time possible. There has never been any question about the objective," while Germany appeared to be "the victims of the indecision of the Allies." In Griffith's words, "Today they [the Japanese] believe wholeheartedly in democracy because democracy has been made to work."\(^{45}\)

His main point was his positive appraisal of MacArthur's job in Japan and business prospect there, which led him to have a favorable perception of Japan and depict her as a nation having been transformed toward democracy.

Griffith added, "If my visit to Germany is feasible, I plan to cable Mr. Roy Howard a brief outline of what I intend to write, informing him that I will release the statement to his papers upon my arrival in New York, if he is interested."\(^{46}\) Griffith was formerly a newspaper man. It seems Griffith was motivated to write an article on the comparisons between Japan and Germany by Fortune magazine's criticism of SCAP in its April issue. In his letter of June 7, 1949 denouncing the Fortune article and welcoming MacArthur's reply to it in the June issue, Griffith wrote, "I am returning to Japan next week for a short visit. I believe it is time that a business man with no axes to grind makes a statement to the American press about Japan's economy and its prospects as of today. I plan to prepare such a statement while in Japan

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\(^{45}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.
and will release it either in San Francisco or New York immediately upon my return to the United States."\(^{47}\) He also stated that his purpose was, as a business man, to inform the world of the real condition in Japan in the belief that by knowing the truth all business would benefit.\(^{48}\)

As his next letter to MacArthur indicates, Griffith actually went to Germany and wrote an article on the contrast between the situation there and that in Japan. In the article he wrote, "Japan is a shining example of what the bestowal of a free democratic government on a feudal and reactionary nation can accomplish. . . . By giving democracy an opportunity to function, he [MacArthur] has revived the economy and given spiritual hope to a misguided and broken nation." On the other hand, asserted Griffith, despite the far greater amount of U.S. aid to Germany than to Japan, "Germany awaits a definite and constructive policy of government by the allies before economic recovery is possible." He concluded that chances for prosperous trade relations with Japan were far greater than with Germany. Though Griffith's remarks suggest his unfavorable perception of pre-occupation Japan, he now depicted her as a nation that had been regenerated, a nation that was responding

\(^{47}\) Griffith to MacArthur, June 7, 1949, box 25, RG 5.
\(^{48}\) Griffith to MacArthur, July 18, 1949, 2.
Similarly, another writer, who had just visited Japan, wrote MacArthur, "I

49 Griffith to MacArthur, Aug. 30, 1949, box 17, RG 10. See also attached clippings: "Portlander Sees Japan Entering Prosperous Era, Germany Retrogressing Despite Greater U.S. Aid," Portland Oregonian, Aug. 28, 1949, 11; "Japs Beating Germans All Hollow in Comeback, Says U.S. Observer," New York World Telegram (date unknown); "Portland man Lauds Japan; Germany Lagging Importer Asserts," news from the Associated Press, Aug. 20, 1949 (the name of the paper unknown). Griffith's objective of his trips had been to "explore foreign frontiers of trade and investment on the theory that America's opportunity lies abroad." According to Griffith, the New York World-Telegram and other Scripps-Howard papers published his story first. The Associated Press followed "with an unusually long dispatch" which it sent all over the world. The third publishing appeared in the Portland Oregonian. While the Oregonian published his article without alterations, other two rewrote it.

Griffith exaggerated the gap between Japan and Germany in terms of the progress of their economic recovery. According to the material prepared by SCAP in accordance with Griffith's request of July 6 for information concerning various aspects of Japan's economic recovery, Japan’s exports rose from $103 million in 1946 to $258 million in 1948 and an estimated $525 in 1949, while exports from the Bizonia area of Germany rose from $143 million in 1946 to $599 million in 1948. This report also explained that Japan’s recovery in terms of industrial production, when adjusted for the inclusion of electric power, resembled very closely the progress realized in the Bizonia area in Germany, though precise comparisons of foreign trade, industrial activity and per-man output were difficult to make because of the inconsistency in statistical base periods and standards between the two countries, as well as the artificial economic divisions effected in Germany. The reporter added that the loss to Japan of her colonial empire had been a factor far outweighing any of the elements that the Bizonia are had had to combat. Moreover, Germany had remained an integral part of Western Europe’s economy, where foreign trade and industrial levels have uniformly transcended pre-war levels. On the other hand Japan had as her orbit an Oriental complex where trade, industrial, and agricultural levels remained considerably below pre-war levels and where military, political and social disruption surpassed those confronting Germany’s western neighbors. See the report on various aspects of Japan’s
was most impressed by the tremendous advance that the Japanese people have made under your guidance."50

In October 1950, William R. Eaton, the former Chief of the Cotton Branch of the Textile Division, Economic Scientific Section, SCAP, stressed the favorable qualities of the Japanese more directly than Griffith. In a manuscript which he wrote at the request of the All Japan Cotton Spinners Association, Eaton stressed that "the outstanding quality of the Japanese people" was "their desire to help themselves." He admired the Japanese people for their determination to "do their share to rehabilitate the shattered economy of the Japanese nation" and for "a cooperative spirit to other nations" (underline mine). Eaton concluded, "The Japanese have the will, the desire, and the ability to produce cotton yarn and textiles to supply the millions of people of Asia and, at the same time, earn foreign exchange with which to buy needed food for the 82 million Japanese people."51 In short, industry was the quality for which Eaton admired the Japanese.

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50 Thomas A. Mesereau (Major, Infantry, Assistant Graduate Manager of athletics, Army Athletic Association, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY) to MacArthur, Mar. 1, 1950, box 40, RG 5.

51 William R. Eaton (New York, NY) to MacArthur, Oct. 11, 1950. See also the attached manuscript, "Japan's Will to Help Themselves." Eaton sent this manuscript to MacArthur for approval before it was published.
Apart from economic recovery, a piano teacher, who was planning to go to Japan as a "missionary-teacher" for the Methodist Mission, wrote to 20th Century Fox Theaters in order to strongly protest the showing of its film, "Three Came Home" in May 1950. She thought the film made her fear and loathe an enemy to a greater degree than any other during or since the war; it was "a film that brings back the wartime lust for hate and revenge." She perceived Japan as a country that was now "trying harder than any other occupied nation to grow into something fit to inhabit the earth." In her view it was also "a country that, more than any other" was "trying to conform to American democratic ideals; where Communism as yet has not roots deep enough to undo all of General MacArthur's work," and "a nation in the throes of rebirth." She positively appraised the efforts of the Japanese to become a peaceful and democratic nation, and condemned the film because it hurt the "cause for peace and world brotherhood of man." She added, "And America is not guiltless: we should recall some of our acts to Japanese on the west coast, also our regrettable conduct in the South at the close of the Civil War." She then quoted a

52 Esther Shaw Gibson (Kansas City, KS) to 20th Century Fox Theaters, May 28, 1950, box 24, RG 5. A copy of this letter was sent to MacArthur by Gibson. See also Esther Shaw Gibson to MacArthur, May 28, 1950, box 24, RG 5.
verse from the Bible, "Let him without sin among you cast the first stone."  

The President of Phi Beta Kappa also showed his favorable view of the Japanese in his letter to MacArthur in mid-1949. According to him, among Phi Beta Kappa members, "a far larger percentage of the native Japanese" had "remained loyal to the humane tradition than in any other group," and he was hopeful of mutual understanding between the Americans and the Japanese. He wrote, "We already have accumulated evidence to indicate that in spite of differences of custom and language, the dangerous notion that 'Never the Twain shall meet' can be shown to be a fallacy. As such groups where discussion is carried on in the spirit of free enquiry multiply, the area of mutual understanding is bound to be extended. On this common ground, we believe there can be a meeting of East and West."  

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53 Ibid. The perception of the Japanese held by this writer and that held by Sol G. Levy, whose letter was introduced in the section 1. ("Constructive stance while holding unfavorable perception of the Japanese") were not very different. However, while Gibson focused her attention on Japanese people's effort to regenerate itself and she was well aware of America's sins in the past as well as Japan's, Levy's focus in that letter was on "inoculating" the Japanese with "the western way" in various aspects of life such as the way of rearing boys, clothing and mannerism.  

54 Christian Gauss (President, Phi Beta Kappa, New York, NY) to MacArthur, July 28, 1949, microfilm, reel 62, RG 5.
It should be noted that four out of the five writers in this subcategory had visited Japan or had direct contacts with Japanese people.

Promoting Friendship with the Japanese through Business Activities (2)

Though there are a number of letters (26) in the sampling showing interest in doing business with Japan in the third phase, only two letters among them also expressed active interest in promoting friendship with the Japanese through business activities. Moreover, out of the twenty-six letters, eight more belong to the category of "positive attitudes," because they approved of rejuvenating the Japanese and expressed the writer's willingness to contribute to Japan's economic recovery, to be helpful to Japan, or at least to help MacArthur reconstruct Japan. These eight letters, however, did not express active interest in promoting friendship with the Japanese through their business activities.\(^5\)

\(^5\)Five of them were discussed in the section, "Support for MacArthur's Job of Rehabilitating Japan and Furthering It" (p. 427), and three others were discussed in the previous section, "Favorable impressions of the Japanese" (p. 448). The first five are: a letter from George Killon (June 16, 1949), two letters from David Sholtz (Nov. 2, 1949, and May 11, 1950), a letter from W. K. Knox (Sept. 1, 1949), and a letter from Thomas M. Pelly (Apr. 5, 1950). All of the latter three were written by E. J. Griffith (July 6, July 8, Aug. 30, 1949). The letter from K. T. Keller, President of Chrysler Corporation, of Sept. 29, 1949 (See p. 424), the letter from Sol G. Levy of Mar. 9, 1950 (See p. 425), and the letter from P. W. Litchfield, Chairman of the Board of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company of Dec. 27, 1949.
remaining sixteen are not counted as showing "positive attitudes" toward Japan, because there were no clear expressions in them indicating the writer's willingness to be helpful to Japan in pursuing business relations with her.56

In December 1949 the President of the Pacific Northwest Trade Association who was a businessman in Seattle, Washington, wrote MacArthur, inviting him to address their general conference. In this letter he stressed the association's strong interest in the resumption of normal trade, and also stated, "They [the members of the Association] are anxious . . . to promote friendly and lasting relationships with the people of Asia."57

(See p. 433.) are not counted as showing business interest, because in these particular letters, the writers, though they were businessmen, did not discuss their own business interest.

56 In the present sampling, more letters were found that showed interest in doing business with Japan in the third phase of the occupation than the preceding phases, reflecting the improving economic conditions and growing business opportunities there. (The number of the letters showing American business interest regarding Japan in the first phase was 5, and that in the second phase was eighteen.) Some of them were written by the head of business associations, showing interest in promoting trade with and investment in Japan (the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., an organization of some 400 American firms, the Western Management Association, and the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan), and others indicated concrete cases of American business people actively seeking economic opportunities in Japan.

Sol G. Levy of the Commission Company (Distributors — Wholesale grocers), also in Seattle, who had written MacArthur with regard to promoting the Boy Scout program in Japan to help make democracy successful there, again wrote the general in February 1951 about the Japanese Trade Fair to be held in Seattle. According to Levy, this fair sought to bring American buyers to Seattle to meet the producers of Japan’s arts, crafts, and industry, and with it provide some cultural and entertainment opportunities that would intrigue every visitor into the interior of Japan. As to the objectives of the fair, he stated, "Above all, ... we are most anxious to improve trade relationships and friendships with the people of Japan and to further the understanding of them for us in our desire to be helpful." In this case, business interest provided the incentive for stressing the cause of friendship and mutual understanding between the two nations.

A clipping from a Seattle newspaper enclosed in Levy’s letter was entitled, "Our Charming Visitor: Japanese Trade Fair." This article read, "It is ... an

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58 Sol G. Levy (The Commission Company; Distributors — Wholesale Grocers, Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, Feb. 12, 1951, box 35, RG 5. Levy had visited Japan as chairman of the Overseas Friendship Group for the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. The Japanese Trade Fair was a continuation of the Overseas Friendship Tour mission by putting into action some of the things the group had promised to do while in Japan.
occasion of immense economic significance to Seattle, auguring as it does an early resumption of the mutually profitable commercial relations which flourished for so many years between the Pacific Northwest and the Orient."

It continued, "What is far more important, however, is the contribution which the State of Washington is making to international good will by demonstrating its desire to help the Japanese people help themselves. In this sense the Trade Fair transcends the stature of a local or regional event and attains national character as a manifestation of the whole country's sincere friendship for a nation with which it was at war only a few years ago."69

3) Interest in Promoting Mutual Understanding through Educational and Cultural Exchange between the Two Nations (9)

Some letters evinced interest in promoting mutual understanding between the two nations. For instance, according to a high school principal in San Francisco, California, the students of his school had been exchanging letters with the children of a Japanese school on Sado Island, Japan, for the last year, and several

69 "Our Charming Visitor; Japanese Trade Fair," a newspaper clipping, box 10, RG 5.
hundred letters and pieces of students' art and other school materials had been exchanged.\textsuperscript{60}

A letter was also written by the Assistant Director in Charge of the San Francisco Museum of Art, which was planning two exhibitions dealing with the relation of Japanese art to contemporary design in architecture, landscape architecture and the decorative arts. According to the letter, the exhibitions had the purpose "not only of educating the public by stimulating thought along the lines of the refinement and simplicity typical of the best of Japanese art, but also of renewing the cultural ties between the two countries." The writer assured MacArthur that these exhibitions would have "whole hearted endorsements from both sides of the Pacific."\textsuperscript{61} Similarly, one writer proposed a loan exhibition of Japanese art treasures to "help to improve mutual understanding between the cultures of the two

\textsuperscript{60} O. I. Schmaelzle (Principal, George Washington High School, San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, May 23, 1950, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5.

\textsuperscript{61} Richard B. Freeman (Assistant Director in Charge, San Francisco Museum of Art, San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, Mar. 29, May 12, July 1, 1949, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5. According to his letter of July 1, 1949, the exhibition of Japanese contemporary art was to travel, after the opening at the San Francisco Museum of Art, to the Portland (Oregon) Art Museum, The Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, the St. Louis Art Museum, the Cincinnati Art Museum, the Museum of Modern Art in New York, and possibly to the Seattle Art Museum and the Art Institute in Chicago.
countries. Another writer, who had been collecting posters from all parts of the world and organizing them into exhibitions at numerous department stores in the U.S., wrote about her on-going project to exchange posters with over twenty-four Japanese Chambers of Commerce and have exhibitions, for the purpose of creating "good will and good fellowship" and to acquaint Americans with "the manners and customs" of Japan.

A letter from the Mayor of Salt Lake City, Utah, referred to the city's project of building a Japanese garden in the International Peace Gardens there, and asked MacArthur for permission to acquire stone lanterns from Japan. According to the letter, the city had also established a "friendly working arrangement in an animal exchange with the Ueno Zoological Park of Tokyo." U.S. Senator Robert A. Taft also wrote expressing his support for a project to send Japanese scientists to attend the International Mathematical Congress to be held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, stating that he believed

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63 Lada C. Sykora (Director, The Cleveland Students' Poster Art Exhibit, Cleveland, OH) to MacArthur, May 3, 1950, microfilm, reel 71, RG 5.
64 Earl J. Glade (Mayor, Salt Lake City, UT) to MacArthur, Oct. 14, 1949, microfilm, reel 67, RG 5.
"projects of this kind" would "contribute to a constantly improving friendship between Japan and America."\(^{65}\)

4) Letters from Christians (17)

Besides several letters already introduced above,\(^{66}\) seventeen letters from those identifying themselves as Christians expressed their constructive attitude toward the Japanese. Those letters can be divided roughly into two groups. While they desired to practice Christian love or sought to spread the Gospel of Christ, they did not particularly express their perceptions of the Japanese people themselves. In addition, there were eighteen other letters from Christians in the sampling from the third phase of the occupation. However, these letters did not clearly express the writers' own friendly attitude toward Japan or the Japanese people themselves, or their desire to be helpful to them. They merely expressed interest in Christianizing Japan,\(^{67}\) wrote about matters pertaining to sending missionaries or going as a missionary to Japan,\(^{68}\) rebuilding a church or Christian

\(^{65}\) Robert A. Taft (U.S. Senator from Ohio) to MacArthur, Mar. 13, 1950, microfilm, reel 70, RG 5.


\(^{67}\) Peter J. Barone (M.D., Oakland, CA) to MacArthur, June 13, 1949, box 7, RG 5.

\(^{68}\) Robert D. Oman (Seattle, WA) to MacArthur, Nov. 14, 1950, microfilm, reel 61, RG 5; James C. Leeper (Presbyterian Social Union, Drexel Hill, PA) to
school buildings in Japan,\textsuperscript{69} distributing free copies of the Bible to the Japanese people,\textsuperscript{70} referred to a project of founding a Christian university or a Christian Center in Japan,\textsuperscript{71} the relationship between Christianity and

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\textsuperscript{69}William J. Robertson (Savannah, GA) to MacArthur, Jan. 12, 1949, microfilm, reel 65, RG 5; Mother Britt (President, International College of the Sacred Heart, Tokyo) to MacArthur, Apr. 19, 1949, microfilm, reel 66, RG 5.

\textsuperscript{70}Glenn W. Wagner (Foreign Secretary, The Pocket Testament League, Inc., New York, NY) to Col. Nugent (Chief, Civil Information and Education Section), May 14, 1949, microfilm, reel 63, RG 5; Alfred A. Kunz (Educative Director, The Pocket Testament League, Inc) to MacArthur, Mar. 23, 1949, microfilm, reel 63, RG 5; Mrs. C. B. Douglas (Versailles Christian Congregational Church, Versailles, OH) to MacArthur, Nov. 3, 1949, microfilm, reel 73, RG 5; Ruth J. Webb (Valparaiso, ID) to MacArthur, Aug. 8, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5.

\textsuperscript{71}James L. Fieser (Executive Director, The Japan Christian University Foundation, Inc., New York, NY) to MacArthur, June 15, 1949, box 30, RG 5; R. E. Diffendorfer (President, The Japan International Christian University Foundation, New York, NY) to MacArthur, Nov. 29, 1949, box 30, RG 5. According to Fieser, he visited Japan in December 1948 to make plans for the Christian University to be built near Tokyo, sponsored by Federal Council of Churches and the Foreign Missions Conference. Fieser also told that General MacArthur had agreed to serve as honorary co-chairman of the sponsoring committee along with former Ambassador Joseph Grew. See also Alfred P. Klausler (Walther League, the Lutheran Synodical Conference, Chicago, IL) to MacArthur, Nov. 15, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5.
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democracy or communism, or the celebration of the fourth centenary of the landing of St. Francis Xavier in Japan. These letters are not included in this category of "positive attitudes," because of the absence of clear verbal expressions about the writer's attitudes toward Japan herself, except for their desire to carry out missionary work for the Japanese, though it was likely that they had a constructive attitude toward Japan, or willingness to be helpful to the Japanese.

**Emphasis on Showing God's Love and Mercy to the Japanese (12)**

The letters in this sub-category especially stressed the writer's desire to show love and mercy to the Japanese people in obedience to God's words. For example, a clergymotion, Louise Brockman, appealed to

Klausler wrote about a project to help build a Youth Center at the University of Hokkaido.

Harry L. Dillon (President, Linfield College, McMinnville, OR) to MacArthur, Oct. 4, 1949, box 17, RG 10; Philip R. Foxwell (The Japan Mission, The Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions, Philadelphia, PA) to Colonel L. E. Bunker, Dec. 28, 1949, microfilm, reel 63, RG 5. Foxwell referred to the efforts by the International Council of Christian Churches "to stem the inroads of communism within the Christian Church." See also Gordon W. Diesing (Attorney for the Sacred Heart International Foundation Fund, Inc., Omaha, NE) to MacArthur, May 16, 1950, microfilm, reel 66, RG 5. According to Diesing, one of the Foundation's purposes was "to use all practical propaganda methods to combat Communism and to distribute anti-Communist booklets."

H. P. Longley, whose letter was discussed in the section A. "Harsh attitude," might have attended an Episcopal church. There was no clear indication, however, that she was a Christian.
MacArthur to release a Japanese lieutenant (Lieut. Kato) who had been sentenced for the death of her own son, Frank, in Niigata, Japan. She wrote, "His [Kato's] imprisonment will not help Frank. Frank was a Christian, nor would he wish an imprisonment which would help no one." she continued, "[I] am sending a New Testament to Lieut. Kato c/o of yourself [sic]. Perhaps, if we show mercy - we could so impress this jap [sic] and God could make him a missionary among his own people - where he could do more good than I could or any American. We as God's people, are to teach, and show love and mercy, and vengeance belongs to God. I am not financially able to assist with freeing this man, tho [sic] I really think that is done at your discretion, is it not? But, is there any way I can help him and help teach him love and mercy and God?"

74 Rev. Louise Brockman (White Salmon, WA) to MacArthur, Aug. 30, 1949, box 11, RG 5. (This letter was handwritten.) MacArthur replied to Brockman that the Allied nations in their imposition of punishment against Japanese war criminals had not sought vengeance nor mass reprisals, but the establishment of "a real deterrent to repetition of such heinous offenses" for the good of future generations. He also argued that to release one war criminal would require, in good conscience, that all of them be released, and that the respect for inviolability of law and justice, as well as for international social order under all circumstances and conditions, would be destroyed if those guilty of transgression were to be released. He wrote, "The tenets and concept of Christian justice are not inconsistent with this doctrine, nor in conflict with your worthy and understandable motives." See MacArthur to Brockman, Sept. 21, 1949, box 11, RG 5. (This reply was probably prepared by the Legal Section of SCAP and approved by
premise that MacArthur was a Christian, she also wrote, "I feel you will understand my feelings that God's people must forgive as they hope to be forgiven." While Brockman still used the word, "Jap," she wanted to forgive the Japanese man who killed her own son because of her Christian faith, and had a hope for him to be spiritually regenerated and do good work for God in Japan.

Three other letters were concerned with the treatment of Japanese war criminals. A Free Methodist missionary, Jacob DeShazer asked mercy for nearly forty condemned Japanese war criminals in December 1949. He had been captured by the Japanese after flying with General Doolittle on the first bombing mission to Japan in 1942, and had been sentenced to death by the Japanese military officials for "machine gunning and bombing innocent school children and women." However, according to DeShazer, thanks to the Japanese Emperor's intervention, he was kept in prison together with four of his companions, instead of receiving the death penalty, though three others in the corps were executed. In prison he was given a Bible and became a Christian, and later was "called by the Spirit of God, to come and give

MacArthur. See MacArthur's handwritten note on Brockman's Letter which read, "To Legal Section, Prepare reply my sig- [signature], MacA.")

the Christian message to the Japanese people." After expressing his gratitude for the Emperor's "merciful" act of sparing his life, DeShazer argued:

Now after five years of peace with Japan and a victorious conclusion of the war, could not America be merciful to the Japanese war criminals? The rules by which these war criminals were found guilty, where perhaps formed during time of war when feeling was antagonistic toward Japan. Why should our actions be tied down to such rules? Is it not the time to show mercy? The Japanese people have manifested a splendid spirit toward America, even though America dropped the Atomic Bomb on the Japanese people. God has given America the victory because America is the leading nation in acts of kindness and mercy. God loves mercy and will bless the people who exercise mercy.\(^76\)

He added,

God has given us His example of mercy in Jesus Christ, for we were all condemned to death but now God has made a way to escape the death penalty through faith in Jesus Christ.\(^77\)

He also advocated abolishing the execution of war criminals so that the people of other countries might see in that act "a great difference between democracy and communism," at a time when there were many reports of "the brutal killing of Russia."

In conclusion, he wrote, "Let us take the lead. We were on the tail end when it came to abolishing slavery. Let us not be caught napping this time, but let us boldly abolish the act of executing war criminals, that the

\(^76\)Rev. Jacob DeShazer (Free Methodist Mission, San Francisco, CA) to MacArthur, Dec. 12, 1949, box 18, RG 5.

\(^77\)Ibid.
whole world may see that the God of True Love does
exercise loving kindness, justice, and mercy in America
today."\textsuperscript{78} As his reference to the atomic bombing in
Japan and slavery indicated, he was aware of America's
own guilt as well as Japan's, and not self-righteous in
advocating mercy to the Japanese.

In the following month, January 1950, Byron S.
Lamson, General Missionary secretary of the Free
Methodist Church of North America, wrote to MacArthur
regarding DeShazer's appeal. According to Lamson, the
Free Methodist conference at Rochester, New York, from
January 5 to 8, had considered DeShazer's request, and
after consultation and prayer, had approved it. Lamson
then had been authorized to advise MacArthur to spare the
lives of the Japanese war criminals. Lamson wrote, "His
[DeShazer's] appeal is in line with the highest Christian
teachings and long-time political strategy." He
concluded, "We pray that heavenly wisdom may be granted
you in these important decisions."\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Byron S. Lamson (General Missionary Secretary,
Free Methodist Church of North America, Winona Lake, IN)
to MacArthur, Jan. 7, 1950, box 23, RG 5. See also C.
Hoyt Watson (President, Seattle Pacific College, Seattle,
WA) to MacArthur, June 17, 1950, microfilm, reel 74, RG
5. Watson was writing a book regarding Jacob DeShazer,
who was a graduate of Seattle Pacific College. Alleging
MacArthur's appeal to Americans to send Bibles to Japan
and his "confidence in the value of Christianity to bring
about a complete transformation in the thinking of the
Japanese," Watson requested him to arrange for a picture
to be taken of MacArthur welcoming DeShazer back to
Rev. W. Appleton Lawrence, a Bishop of the Diocese of Western Massachusetts made the same request by arguing:

It does seem to me that the time is long past when any good can be accomplished by carrying out these decisions, and that the time has arrived when much good may be accomplished by indicating our generosity and our fair-mindedness, in the realization that vindictiveness never accomplishes anything constructive, even what good it is hoped to accomplish is minimized as the time goes on between the date of punishment and the original crime.

He continued, "There also appears to be grave doubt as to the guilt of some of these condemned men, and as all of them have been in prison some five years or more, it would seem that they had suffered enough." Thus, with an emphasis on the passing of time since the war, Lawrence appealed to MacArthur to "exercise Christian mercy" on the condemned war criminals.

Apart from the treatment of war criminals, a union congregational church minister, Robert H. Midgley wrote in September 1949 that he was grateful to MacArthur for his "sincere and wise leadership of the rehabilitation of the Japanese people." This writer, who wished to raise money for the project of founding "the new Christian Japan. An article about DeShazer also appeared in the Christian Herald. See Grace M. Wedge to MacArthur, Nov. 21, 1949, microfilm, reel 74, RG 5.

80 The Rt. Rev. W. Appleton Lawrence (D.D., Bishop, Diocese of Western Massachusetts, Springfield, MA) to MacArthur, June 7, 1950, box 34, RG 5.
University of Japan" near Tokyo, also inquired, among other things, whether the average Japanese knew that the financial aid from American Christians for this project was being sent "in good faith as a living example of Christian forgiveness and concern for the future of the world." This remark suggests his desire to show Christian mercy to the Japanese through sending the aid.

Showing a similar spirit, an Episcopal Church Sunday school teacher wrote in January 1949 about his class project to make a poster to "help create a spirit of good will among neighboring nations," and of its decision to pick Japan for that project [because MacArthur was there and from their parents his students had learned to admire the general]. This writer added, "The idea is to proceed like the Christians God intended us to be." A year later, a Christian writer, after hearing a talk by a U.S. serviceman at her church about an "appeal for help in Japan," wrote, "I think each one of us felt like taking off our shoes then and there and send them to Japan. We expect to make up a box of clothes, etc., as soon as possible. I am inclosing a check to you to help in the

81 Rev. Robert H. Midgley (Minister, Union Congregational Church, Green River, WY) to MacArthur, Sept. 1, 1949, box 17, RG 10. He also inquired about the role of Christianity as a force opposed to communism in Japan and the progress in spreading the Gospel of Christ there.
82 Amalia T. Stetter (Milwaukee, WI) to MacArthur, Jan. 29, 1949, microfilm, reel 69, RG 5.
districts where you think it is most severe. This is a Xmas gift to me that I like so glad to pass on [sic]." Thus this writer expressed her willingness to help the Japanese in need. In a similar manner, another Christian woman wrote that she had sent to MacArthur "three packages containing soap and articles of clothing, thread needles and buttons," which had been given by some women in her church, and asked the general to arrange their distribution to the Japanese needy.

In addition, the May 1950 issue of the Bulletin of the Camp Furthest Out of the Washington Area, a monthly bulletin from a Christian fellowship group, had a section entitled, "Gen. MacArthur Is Prayer Subject: Opportunity to Send God's Love to Japan." The editor noted, "God shows no partiality, but welcomes the man of any nation who reveres Him and does what is right." The next section, "Our Prayer," read as follows:

Dear Father, thank you for the opportunity to bring your love to the Japanese people in this time of their great need. Create in your son, Douglas MacArthur, such a hungering for you that he will turn completely to you for understanding love and wisdom. Give him such power to inspire others that all Japanese people may be filled with the spirit of our

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83 Laura Kennedy Trexwell (A member of "St. Paul's church, address not noted on the letter) to MacArthur, Jan. 20, 1950, microfilm, reel 71, RG 5.
84 Mrs. C. F. Mann (Womans [sic] Society of Christian Service, High Point, NC) to MacArthur, Apr. 20, 1950, microfilm, reel 76, RG 5.
Lord Jesus Christ and help lead the world to brotherhood and peace. Amen.85

A Christian writer also described MacArthur’s contribution to Christianity in Japan as “bringing about the Brotherhood of Man on Earth.”86 Another remarked, “I have taken great comfort in the fact that, in your administration of Japan’s reconstruction, you are committed unalterably to the guiding principle of kindness to one’s neighbor as a bedrock of Christian behavior.”87

Desiring to practice the Christian faith, these writers focused their attention on sending God’s love to the Japanese people instead of expressing animosity to them. While it is not clear whether their missionary zeal was always accompanied by any real compassion for the Japanese people, their endeavor to do so itself was a notable fact in the light of the strong anti-Japanese campaign during the Pacific War.

86 Jo B. Regan (Pasadena, GA) to MacArthur, June 13, 1950, microfilm, reel 64, RG 5.
87 Mrs. Aleta Jessup (Women’s Auxiliary to the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Diocese of Arkansas) to MacArthur, Nov. 21, 1949, microfilm, reel 76, RG 5. This person also noted that Episcopal women of the Diocese of Arkansas would study about Japan during the coming Lenten season, and that the National United Council of Church Women had agreed upon this area as a particular point of 1949-50 interest and information concerning Christian activities.
Focus on Building an Intimate Relationship with the Japanese (5)

There were five letters from Christians in the sampling which did not particularly mention God's love or mercy but emphasized rather the writer's desire to build an intimate relationship with the Japanese people, in order to spread the Gospel of Christ.

In May 1949, Fred B. Trotter, Chairman of the Southern California-Arizona Conference of the Methodist Church, wrote to MacArthur that the Conference was considering the adoption of Japan as its special missionary interest in a program which would continue through 1952. He wrote, "It is our purpose to supply financial aid to church projects in Japan and also to build an intimate acquaintance with the Japanese people as far as possible, personalizing our gifts and encouraging correspondence between the people here and there." He continued, "We are investigating the feasibility of sending a plane load of experts in the field of Religion to stay long enough in Japan to make a worthy contribution, and to use these men when they return for promotional work here in California." 88

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88 Fred B. Trotter (Chairman, Southern California-Arizona Conference of the Methodist Church, Los Angeles, CA) to MacArthur, May 24, 1949, box 17, RG 10. According to Trotter, this conference was composed of a membership of approximately 300,000. Trotter wrote that this program would be proposed for adoption at the annual gathering of the Conference to be held on June 20, 1949. He requested a statement from MacArthur for this occasion, pointing out "the strategic importance of
Rolf A. Syrdal, Executive Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, asked MacArthur in March 1951 to write a greeting that could be included in the program folder prepared for the occasion of the Church's general convention, where it would dedicate its mission work in Japan as the official mission of the church body. Syrdal wrote, "We plan on printing greetings from some Japanese friends and from other friends in Japan, to be given to our people on the occasion of this big gathering." Thus, Syrdal wanted to stress Christian fellowship, or brotherhood, between the two nations. In addition, he expressed his church's "great appreciation" of MacArthur's work. He praised "the exemplification of the Christian spirit" through MacArthur's government "in its attitude towards the Japanese and their country." 89

89 Capturing Japan for Christ at that moment. Similar interest was shown by Mrs. Bertryce A. Marshall, President of the Woman's Council of Peachtree Christian Church (Atlanta, GA), which had about four hundred women at work. According to Marshall, their study subject for the first six months of 1950 was "Japan," and she requested MacArthur to supply some firsthand information on "the religious beliefs of the Japanese, their superstitions, social life, to become better acquainted with Japan's struggles to keep pace [peace]" and the Council's "responsibilities as Christians." See Mrs. Bertryce A. Marshall (Atlanta, GA) to MacArthur, Aug. 13, 1949, microfilm, reel 62, RG 5.

89 Rolf A. Syrdal (Executive Secretary, Board of Foreign Missions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Minneapolis, MN) to MacArthur, Mar. 21, 1951, box 22, RG 5. Four missionaries from this church group were then in Japan and more were preparing to leave later in 1951.
Similarly, Kenneth J. Johnson of the New Tribes Mission sought MacArthur's help to make it possible for some missionary personnel who were "very anxious to work among the Japanese people in Japan and Formosa" to enter these two countries.90 Brandt Reed, National Director of High School Evangelism Fellowship, Inc. also requested MacArthur's approval to set up a permanent long-range missionary program among the high school age youth of Japan. The brochure enclosed in the letter said, "By all the rich evidence of His grace in Japan it would seem that God is calling the Christians of America to give sacrificially of their prayers and their substance to evangelize the High School youth of this great nation while there is yet time."91

The five writers in this sub-category were anxious to promote closer communications and friendly relations between the two peoples in their effort to spread Christianity among the Japanese. Their letters suggest while there was a danger of American missionaries being paternalistic and condescending, their activities in Japan also provided opportunities to develop better

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90 Kenneth J. Johnson (Foreign Secretary, New Tribes Mission, Chico, CA) to MacArthur, June 14, 1949, box 43, RG 5.
91 A. Brandt Reed (National Director, High School Evangelism Fellowship, Inc., New York, NY) to MacArthur, Aug. 1, 1950, box 21, RG 5.
understanding of each other and constructive attitudes between the two peoples.

It should be noted that three of the seventeen letters from Christians with a friendly attitude toward the Japanese also reveal the writer's concern with the spread of communism in Asia. For instance, a brochure of the High School Evangelism Fellowship, Inc., that was enclosed in Reed's letter to MacArthur, stated, "For the rising [young] generation [of Japan] it [the religion] must be either Christ, Communism, or nothing."

Reflecting the difficulty in continuing mission activities in communist China, the brochure also said, "The doors are fast closing to American missionary activity in Asia. There is urgent need of a strong native Asiatic Christian witness to carry on when our day is done. TODAY is ours to build and establish that witness in Japan as a bulwark against the Asiatic tide of Communism." The author of this brochure defined communism as a godless belief that opposed Christianity, and was concerned with the loss of opportunities for missionary activities in communist countries. Trotter of the Southern California-Arizona conference of the Methodist Church, who asked MacArthur to send a message to the Conference on "the strategic importance of

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capturing Japan for Christ" (underline mine), seems to have held the same attitude toward communism. Midgley, a minister of a Union Congregational Church noted in his letter to MacArthur, "I have been under the impression from your previous statements that Christianity and Communism are the two forces competing for the newly discovered free thinking of the Japanese." Midgley, however, before reaching a simplistic conclusion about the relationship between Christianity and anti-communism in Japan, asked MacArthur, "Is Christianity actually the adversary of Communism in Japan?" 94

In replying to this question, MacArthur answered, "Christianity, of course, is staunchly opposed to Communism in Japan just as it is elsewhere. But it must be understood that here the Christian influence goes far beyond the scope of its gain through formal religious conversion, for the great concepts of Christianity underlie the entire program in the reformation of the Japanese people and their institutions. Indeed, they collectively pattern a new Japanese way of life equally subscribed to and cherished by Japanese of many religious beliefs." 95 Thus, MacArthur stressed the value of Christian concepts in reforming the Japanese and the

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95 MacArthur to Midgley, Sept. 8, 1949, box 17, RG 10.
spread of their influence as a force to oppose communism in Japan, though it seemed that his concern was not specifically with the formal conversion to Christianity, and he admitted the number of Japanese formally converted was very limited.

As shown in many of his messages, MacArthur embraced Christianity as a political ideology (but not necessarily a personal faith) which could serve as a barrier against communism. This idea was also shared by former Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, who became National Chairman of the campaign to raise funds in the U.S. and Canada for the purpose of establishing an International Christian University in Japan, and Ralph E. Diffendorfer, President of the Japan International Christian University Foundation. They thought that communism was "the open enemy of democracy and of Christianity," and that those who were sympathetic to communism must not be included in the faculty of the University in Japan, because the control over "subversive elements" was "far less sure" in Japan than in the U.S.\(^6\)

5) Conclusion

**Factors behind the Positive Attitudes toward Japan**

As discussed in Chapter V, most of the writers with

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a positive attitude in the second phase of the occupation almost took it for granted that the U.S. should help Japan rehabilitate herself, that it was America's responsibility to do so. This trend continued in the third phase. With the continued Cold War, particularly as the communist force gained power in China in 1949, Japan's position as America's important friend in Asia became more evident in the minds of many writers. These writers stressed the strategic value of Japan to U.S. security, or saw Japan as her potentially valuable ally in the ideological warfare against communism. They thus emphasized America's need to befriend Japan for her own interest, but they did not necessarily show heartfelt friendship to the Japanese. In addition, given their faith in American democracy, many seemed to believe that Japan's siding with America was beneficial to Japan herself as well as to the U.S. At the same time, it can be also said that their recognition of America's need to anchor Japan to America's side contributed to the growth of constructive and friendly attitudes toward the Japanese. But this factor, based on the emergence of America's new enemy, the Soviet bloc, was only situational and did not provide a solid basis for lasting friendship between the peoples.
The popularity of MacArthur and his policy to reconstruct Japan continued to be a factor fostering a constructive attitude toward Japan for some Americans. According to the Gallup Poll, 81 percent approved of MacArthur's job in the U.S. occupation of Japan in early 1949.77 As George Gallup discussed, because most Americans did not have detailed knowledge of conditions in Japan or of the policies initiated by the occupation authorities, this survey was in large part a test of reactions to the general's personality and character, both of which made a deep impression on the country during the late war.78 A considerable segment of those who wrote MacArthur were also explicit in their praise for him.79 In particular, MacArthur's supporters approved of reconstructing Japan chiefly because it was MacArthur's objective. Moreover, their view that MacArthur was successfully transforming Japan into a peaceful and democratic nation brought with it a somewhat improved perception of Japan, which led to their softened

77 Public Opinion Service (Princeton, NJ), Apr. 15, 1949, box 17, RG 10. 55 percent of a national cross section expressed "general" approval and 26 percent "enthusiastic" support, making a total of 81 percent approving the occupation. Only 5 percent disapproved, while 14 percent had no opinion.
78 Ibid.
79 Out of the 184 letters in the sampling written during the third phase of the occupation, 78 clearly expressed the writer's admiration for MacArthur.
and more friendly attitude toward Japan and the Japanese people. ¹⁰⁰

As in the preceding phases, Christianity was also a contributing factor for a positive attitude. In this third phase, some Christians leaders appealed to MacArthur to release Japanese war criminals in their desire to practice Christian forgiveness and send God's love and mercy to the Japanese people. Others, desiring to send missionaries to Japan, sought intimate and friendly relations with the Japanese in order to spread the Gospel among them. While Christianity was viewed by some people (e.g., MacArthur, Grew) as a political as well as religious ideology to oppose the force of communism, and there was also a danger for American Christians to be condescending to the Japanese, it did provide opportunities for the two peoples to develop better understanding and close relationship between them.

Moreover, as in the preceding periods, direct contacts with Japanese represented another factor promoting positive attitude as shown in some of the letters. The passing of time since the termination of the war was certainly another. As shown in section 3, educational or artistic interest in a foreign culture and

¹⁰⁰ Out of the 78 letters that explicitly show the writer's praise for MacArthur, 48 belong to the category of "positive attitudes" toward Japan.
academic fellowship also provided opportunities for mutual understanding between the two nations.

Business interest was also a factor for some American business people to approve of economic reconstruction of Japan, and to soften their attitude toward her. Americans interested in doing business with Japan welcomed the measures taken to resume private trade with Japan, and favored Japan’s economic recovery, because economic stabilization in Japan was necessary for their successful operation there. However, out of the twenty-six letters showing interest in doing business with Japan, only ten explicitly demonstrated the writer’s positive attitude toward her, that is, a willingness to be helpful to Japan or to promote friendship with her. Others merely expressed the writer’s business interest.

Again, as in the preceding periods, the factors noted above were not isolated phenomena but often interacted with one another in bringing about positive attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese people. While those factors provided valuable bases for a constructive attitude toward America’s former enemy, each of them alone could not have guaranteed friendly relations between the two peoples. For the lasting friendship between them, a sincere and conscious effort to establish mutual understanding was necessary. In addition some of these factors (i.e., the Cold War, MacArthur’s
popularity, and business interest) were situational, and therefore did not constitute solid or lasting bases for favorable relations.

Perceptions of Japan

As shown in the preceding pages, the relationship between the two nations as perceived by those who expressed positive attitudes toward Japan continued to be basically paternalistic in the third phase. However, as Japan’s key position in the Cold War against the communist bloc became more evident, some people began to recognize America’s self-interest in befriending her. They saw that the U.S. now needed Japan as Japan needed U.S. help. Though Japan still was a little brother or a student of the U.S. in the minds of most Americans, she seemed to have grown after going through a few years of reeducation toward democracy under the guidance of General MacArthur. Some writers even described Japan as "the last single hope for a democratic peace," "a firm foothold for America in the Far East," "one nation in the world which might and can be our loyal ally," or "the hope of America."

However, it should be also noted that even in stressing the transformation of the Japanese, most writers attributed it to America’s, especially MacArthur’s, benevolent and effective job of
democratizing and rehabilitating Japan. With a few exceptions, they did not mention favorable qualities of the Japanese themselves in their letters to MacArthur. Generally absent in the letters was the attitude of learning from Japan. Those who did focus on the favorable qualities of the Japanese people pointed out their receptivity to MacArthur's effort in democratizing Japan, and their industry, that is, their desire to help themselves. One sympathetic writer described Japan as "a country that more than any other" was "trying to conform to American democratic ideals" and "a nation in the throes of rebirth."

A few writers expressed their unfavorable impressions of the Japanese, while supporting constructive approaches to Japan. In their words, the Japanese had "the tendencies of pig-headedness," or the atmosphere of Japan was "an atmosphere so foreign to American thought and to American action that Japan was truly a place which seemed "like the end of the world."

Another disparagingly observed what he considered was the Japanese worship of anything big or powerful, suggesting their authoritarian tendency. Another writer observed undemocratic practices such as the superiority of the boy to the girl in the Japanese home, and thought it necessary to "inoculate" the western way into the Japanese. It is likely that these impressions, though
explicitly stated by only a few writers, were shared by many other Americans at that time. They saw that, notwithstanding Japan's reeducation under MacArthur, she still had many problems to solve before becoming sufficiently democratized.

Some writers stressed the transformation of Japan in discussing her as a potential ally. On the other hand, others focused on the persisting undemocratic tendencies of the Japanese. Overall, the former view seems to have been more often emphasized in the letters to MacArthur in the third phase.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

The preceding pages showed that the American media and other opinion leaders generally approved of U.S. policy to reconstruct the former enemy during the occupation. They supported the effort to teach her democracy and help her economic recovery, while there was always a segment that was cautious about reviving her economy too quickly. The media on the whole followed the official policy instead of initiating it, though there were a few American journalists who actively lobbied the policy-making circle. The general public roughly followed and accepted the trend among the opinion leaders. The degree of economic recovery approved and the factors accounting for the approval that were stressed in public comment, however, were different in different phases, though certain factors were continuously discussed. The factors considered in this study were the factors emphasized in public comment to justify the policy of promoting Japan's recovery to the American public. The present study, therefore, does not conclude that they were necessarily the actual principal motives controlling the activities of those engaged in the policy-making process regarding the occupation of Japan.
Immediately after the termination of the war, public sentiment toward Japan tended to be punitive and demanded the fundamental transformation of the Japanese society. At the same time, soon after the war (late September 1945), most of the American people thought the Japanese should be allowed to rebuild peacetime industries, and by the end of the first phase, the majority approved of U.S. government helping Japan rebuild its peacetime industries (though not everyone of this opinion was actually willing to pay more for that purpose.) The media opinion as of mid-1946 was also substantially in favor of a policy which would hasten the restoration of Japanese economy to a productive level.

The chief reasons for this largely constructive attitude as expressed in public comment were the desire to keep Japan peaceful, in other words, to keep her from becoming a menace to U.S. security and a world peace again, and along this line, the concern with the development of democracy in Japan. These were the objectives of the occupation as stated in the Potsdam Declaration and the U.S. initial post-surrender directive. With the understanding that economic collapse meant chaos, and that chaos could again lead to the nation's aggressive course abroad, as it had in the case of Germany after World War I, many American observers saw the need for allowing Japan a reasonable level of economic recovery. In addition, there was a general belief among Americans that democracy would make for a
peaceful nation. In order to promote Japan's democratic development, it was understood, the restoration of her economy was necessary to a certain extent, since democracy could not be taught to people who must struggle to survive in a chaotic economy, nor must democracy ever be associated with economic distress. Expressions of this concern about democratic development in Japan were often accompanied by faith in American democracy and a sense of mission to teach democracy to the Japanese, especially in the popular press.

It was also feared by observers concerned with the spread of communism that economic chaos might lead to the rise of the extreme left (or the extreme right), which was not "democratic" in American eyes. It seems, however, that during the initial phase, the concern with the revival of Japanese militarism was a stronger factor for the approval of Japan's recovery than the concern with the communist threat in Japan.

There was an increase in public comment in the summer of 1946 regarding Japan as a "bulwark" of democracy against Russia in Asia. American observers surely did not want communism in Japan. At this point, however, those commenting on the subject of rebuilding Japan as an anti-Red bulwark or a potential ally were still largely noncommittal.

In the second phase, however, particularly in 1947, intensification of the U.S.-Soviet conflict in Europe, the consequent increase in U.S. aid to those areas, and the
perceived need for reducing the U.S. financial load elsewhere, as well as the need to protect Japan herself from the communist threat, led to a new emphasis on the need for making her self-supporting with the early conclusion of a peace treaty. In this phase, the burden of the American taxpayer was a frequently stressed theme. At the same time, there were still many observers in 1947 who continued to feel that Japan should not be permitted to regain her dominant industrial role in Asia (or the role as the "workshop" of Asia), and hesitated to support actively the idea of speedily rebuilding Japan as a key anti-Red bulwark, while basically supporting the idea of making her self-supporting. On the other hand, some came to advocate reviving Japan’s economy speedily to make her a prosperous key anti-Red bulwark.

Then in 1948, with the further deterioration of the situation in China and Southeast Asia, and official U.S. moves to lay the groundwork for a speedy recovery of the Japanese economy, American opinion came to strongly approve of making her not merely a self-supporting nation, but also the "workshop" of Asia, a chief anti-Red bulwark there, and America’s primary Far Eastern ally, though the immediate goal was still a self-supporting Japan. As of mid-1948 the majority of the general public, as shown by an opinion poll, approved of the U.S. helping to build up "Japanese industry," which was all the more significant since this
time the polling question did not even specify "peacetime" industry.

During the third phase, the evident spread of the Cold War into the Asian scene was clearly a factor for the continued support of American opinion strongly in favor of building Japan as the industrial center of Asia. Another equally important factor repeatedly stressed by the media and other public comment was, as in the previous phase, the desire to lighten the American taxpayer's burden of supporting Japan's economy. These two chief factors were not unrelated, because it was thought, as noted above, that economic chaos in Japan could lead to the rise of communists in Japan, and could also affect prospects for economic and political stabilization in other parts of Asia. At the same time, the U.S. did not want to support Japan's economy continuously. Observers primarily stressed one or the other of those two factors, or both of them.

Moreover, concern with America's national prestige seemed to underlie the discussion on the need for restoration of Japan's economy. Especially in the context of the Cold War, America, as the leader of the liberal-capitalist bloc, could not allow her own occupied area to remain economically paralyzed and thereby become easy prey to Soviet propaganda. It also seemed to some observers that the plight of Japan would be a test of American capacity for constructive leadership, a challenge for the U.S. to prove
that the American way of life and its leadership were bringing well-being to her occupied nations.

As historian William Borden argues, the global economic issue, namely, the "dollar gap" problem, which Dean Acheson discussed in an address in May 1947, was one of the key factors behind the U.S. policy of reviving Japan's economy. However, few observers in the mass media discussed this issue in concrete ways. It seems that this was because the argument of the global "dollar gap" would be more complicated than the simple emphasis on the Cold War and on the burden of the American taxpayer, and therefore less appealing to the general public.

In addition, by the third phase the importance of Japan's strategic position was increasingly emphasized in public comment. In fact, while Americans immediately after the war had favored complete demilitarization of Japan, there appeared in this period public comment advocating rearmament of Japan. Especially with the outbreak of the Korean War, those participating in the debate generally came to approve Japan's limited rearmament.

In sum, among the American general public and the mass media, the majority of whom did not have personal active interest in Japan, the Cold War and the concern with the burden of the American taxpayer, which were prominent in the second and the third phases, were the most influential factors for the overall approval of rebuilding Japan into a
prosperous industrial power in Asia. The desire to maintain a world peace by building a peaceful Japan and the American sense of mission to help others develop democracy were also important underlying factors for the constructive attitude. The latter two factors, however, would not necessarily lead to the idea of quickly rebuilding Japan as the "workshop" of Asia and America's key ally.

Letters from various Americans to General MacArthur provide a glimpse of more personal feelings and motives for the growing constructive attitudes toward Japan. They evidence that a segment of the American public took great interest in improving the relations between the two nations. Unlike in the mass media, the burden of the American taxpayer was seldom discussed in the letters to MacArthur. Though many of the letters did not specifically discuss the need for reviving Japan's economy, they suggest several important factors for the positive attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese held by those who had a relatively keen personal interest in Japan. Among those factors were the intensification of the Cold War and the need for securing Japan on America's side, which became an increasingly strong factor as time progressed. With their faith in American democracy, many who stressed this theme believed that being on America's side was beneficial to Japan herself as well as to the U.S.
The popularity of General MacArthur and support for his job of rehabilitating Japan was consistently reflected in the letters throughout the three phases. Some letters also suggest that business interests could provide opportunities for furthering the cause for friendship and mutual understanding between the two nations. Most of those letters showing business interests, however, did not particularly express the writers' wish to help Japan or to be friendly to the Japanese. Moreover, especially in the initial phase of the occupation, the experiences of two World Wars, coupled with the threat of atomic bombs and other sophisticated weapons, evoked a strong desire for maintaining world peace, and, consequently, an awareness of the need for a constructive attitude toward the former enemy. The passing of time since the termination of the war was certainly an important additional factor abating animosity.

While these were important factors, they were situational. In other words, the positive attitudes due to those factors could change relatively easily along with the international situation (or in case of MacArthur's popularity, when his reputation declined or he died), because they did not involve the fundamental and substantial improvement in perceptions of the Japanese. For instance, if one came to have a positive attitude toward Japan because of the Cold War, this positive attitude might just evaporate
when the Cold War abated and there was no longer much need for keeping an anti-Red bulwark.

There were two more important factors shown by the letters which were less situational than others. One of them is personal contact with the Japanese people. It seems that direct contacts encouraged a view of the Japanese as human beings not unlike Americans struggling to live daily lives with joy and sorrow, instead of merely as faceless enemies or a people with an alien culture. Personal contacts, especially when they involved cooperation toward a common objective, tended to give hope that the Japanese, though they had been misled, could become peaceful citizens.

There is a situational component in direct contacts, too. In other words, unwanted contacts or contacts in a conflict-ridden environment can produce antagonism. It seems, however, that the overall effect of direct contacts on personal basis as opposed to collective basis is a positive one.¹

Another important factor for constructive attitudes toward the former enemy was the influence of Christianity that stressed God’s love, justice, tolerance, forgiveness, and understanding. As shown by many letters, it seems safe

¹As noted in Chapter III, scholars also have found that foreign contact and acquaintance (even those gained during the war) tend to encourage a favorable opinion of another people and more critical opinion of one’s own people. See Reigrotski and Anderson, "Nationals Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts"; Buchanan and Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, 100-101.
to say that the emphasis on those Christian values right after the war contributed to the softening of animosity toward the Japanese. Especially for those Christians whose faith had deep roots and tried to let those values exert influence on their lives (e.g., one who wanted to forgive the Japanese soldier who had killed her own son because of God's grace\(^2\)), the Christian values provided less situational factors than other factors for their constructive attitude toward Japan. Those values gave them a relatively stable attitude toward Japan even when they had personal experiences extremely detrimental to their perceptions of the Japanese. This point was also evidenced by some resolutions by Christian church leaders during the war (which were introduced in Chapter III) who protested against the lack of an adequate interpretation of the policy of unconditional surrender and the strategy of obliteration in U.S. conduct of the war against Japan.\(^3\)

\(^{2}\)See Chapter VIII.

\(^{3}\)Those Americans with this opinion constituted a minority among the American public at that time. 66 percent of the general public in July 1945 supported the idea that "we should go on fighting until Japan is completely defeated -- even if the Japanese offer to give up all lands they have conquered in Asia and the Pacific," and 54 percent would "go on fighting" even when the cost of rejecting a peace offer was placed at "the loss of several hundred thousand American soldiers." In addition, the overwhelming majority of 85 percent right after the war approved of the use of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities. See "Latest Opinion Trends in the U.S.A.," July 20, 1945, box 39, OPOS Records, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; AIPO, Aug. 26, 1945 published in Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 385.
At the same time, when stress on the Christian values was not accompanied by an awareness of America's own misdeeds and self-critical attitudes, and where the self-professed Christian values were utilized to judge others, one could become self-righteous, condescending, and arrogant toward the Japanese as well as toward other peoples. In such cases, constructive attitudes toward Japan due to Christian influence were more likely to be swayed by changes in the international situation involving conflict between the interests of the two nations. The same point can be made with respect to nominal Christians, who constituted the majority of the Americans and who generally accepted Christian values and culture but did not practice their faith in their daily lives. This observation leads to the point that the general acceptance of Christian values (or direct contacts between the peoples, or any other factor noted above) operating alone, though valuable and helpful factors, were not sufficient for lasting friendly relations between the two peoples. Consistent conscious effort for self-examination and mutual understanding was necessary for that objective.

Now let us turn to the images or perceptions held by Americans at that time. Japan's position was generally transformed from that of an enemy to an ally in the minds of most American people by 1950. As the public opinion polls showed, the percentage of the Americans who had friendly or
favorable views about the Japanese grew as time progressed during the occupation. The irrational and emotional expressions harshly characterizing the Japanese came to be much less frequently found in public comment during the third phase than in the period immediately after the war. With "reeducation" by the U.S., Japan seemed to be growing into a democratic nation. More Americans came to distinguish between Japanese militaristic leaders and the common people than during the war. These observations suggest the softening of American perceptions of the Japanese due to such factors as the passing of time and fading of the wartime propaganda against Japan; the media reports of the successful handling of the Japanese occupation by General MacArthur and the understanding that Japan was being remade in a generally constructive direction under his skillful and benevolent leadership; the reports on the cooperation by the Japanese; and public comment on the new role of Japan as America's important ally in the Cold War in Asia. In addition, those interested in promoting business with Japan sometimes stressed Japanese diligence. Among these factors, the most influential to the general public seems to have been the Cold War.

Though this improvement of the images during the occupation was significant, most of those factors, especially the Cold War, did not involve a fundamental change in the understanding of the Japanese by the American
public. Such superficially improved images were prone to crumble in accordance with the changes in the international situation. Certainly those who had personal contacts with the Japanese tended to develop more stable and favorable perceptions of them, but such people constituted a minority among the public. Some public figures and commentators during the third phase of the occupation proclaimed that Japan was a trustworthy ally, and stressed the progress made by the Japanese toward democracy. Some even contended that Japan was now entitled to be called a democratic country. It was likely, however, that those assertions by U.S. public figures primarily derived from the urgent strategic need for building Japan as an ally in the context of the Cold War in Asia, which required that they project Japan in this positive light.

In fact, many articulate observers at that time pointed out that it would be still a long way for Japan to achieve democracy. The perception of the Japanese as feudal-minded, undemocratic, and authoritarian people who lacked independent thought, persisted in public comment throughout the occupation period (and probably throughout the post-occupation era to a large extent), even after Japan began to be seen by most U.S. observers as America’s important potential ally.

The authoritarian tendency of the Japanese and the cultural gap between the two peoples cannot be denied. At
the same time, too much emphasis by American observers on Japanese authoritarian tendencies and on the observers’ distaste for the alien culture would reinforce negative perceptions about and attitudes toward the Japanese, especially in view of the professed faith in the regenerative power of American democracy. It could lead to a mood of intolerance to lifestyles other than the familiar "American way of life."

There were other examples of persisting negative perceptions of the Japanese in the U.S. The Boston incident provided an opportunity to demonstrate a predominantly constructive stance toward Japan of at least American officials and press in early 1950. The incident and the public’s reactions to it, however, suggested the existence of a minority still stubbornly inclined to profess harsh views of the Japanese openly. The harsh perceptions were largely based on the legacy of the war, particularly of the Pearl Harbor attack and the Japanese atrocities against Allied soldiers. Moreover, reflecting the tremendous gap between the relative power of the two nations and the victor-loser relationship, American people tended to view their nation as a powerful giant, and Japan as a tiny dwarf.  

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4 As pointed out in Chapter II, IV, and VI, while the element of racism could not be denied in the American public’s more negative attitude toward the Japanese that the Germans, the depiction of Japan as a problem child or a baby in political cartoons was not necessarily the reflection of
As a number of articles and letters to MacArthur showed, even those who had constructive attitude toward the Japanese tended to have negative perceptions of them and to be basically paternalistic. For those Americans, the U.S. was the liberator and teacher of the Japanese masses, who had been indoctrinated and misled by their militarist leaders and needed reeducation. The Japanese tended to be seen by them as problem students still on probation. It seems that this view reflected the America's historic self-image as the world's leading democratic nation and her sense of mission to foster the democratic ideal.\(^5\)

Moreover, the results of various public opinion polls during the occupation consistently showed the American public's more negative bias and attitude toward the Japanese than toward the Germans. The shallowness of the U.S.-Japan relationship, or the greater racial and cultural distance and more remote historical tie between the U.S. and Japan than between the U.S. and Germany seems to account largely for this phenomenon. There can be, of course, serious conflicts as well between nations sharing similar cultural traditions and intimate historical tie, when their interests

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collide. However, the relationship between two peoples with more distant traditions and weak historical ties, without the solid basis of mutual understanding, can more easily fluctuate and visit extremes, often in a negative direction. This observation leads to the conclusion that steady conscious effort for mutual understanding and promotion of cultural interchange for the purpose of enlarging the thin "pipeline" between the U.S. and Japan, is necessary for the lasting stable and friendly relationship between the two nations.

In sum, while drastic changes of the international environment can quickly transform our perceptions of other nations in a political and strategic sense, it seems that our negative perceptions deriving from shocking events (i.e., the Pearl Harbor attack in this case) or deep-rooted racial and cultural bias are hard to change. As Robert Jervis argues, the experiences associated with the last war "deeply influence the perceptual predispositions of most citizens," and "sudden events influence images more than do slow developments."6 Moreover, people "absorb many of the values and beliefs that dominate the climate of opinion at the time when they first begin to think about politics."7 The racial bias against the Oriental race was strong in the

7Ibid., 253.
early part of this century, and naturally many Americans absorbed it. Those perceptions were hard to change. Before changing their perception, as Jervis points out, people employ a variety of mechanisms to cope with information that contradicts their perception. When they are finally forced to change their view, "those parts of the image that are least central . . . and least important will change first."\(^8\)

This theoretical framework helps understand some aspects of American perceptions of Japan during the occupation. As shown in public comment, many observers were initially skeptical about the intention of Japanese cooperation with the occupation forces. Even when the news about Japanese cooperation and the smoothness of the occupation was accepted as valid, observers often attributed them to the successful guidance by the U.S., particularly MacArthur, instead of considering the indigenous dynamics. The mechanisms to avoid fundamental change of perceptions thus functioned.

\(^8\)Ibid., 291-97. According to Jervis, the various mechanisms are: a person's failure to see that new information might contradict his belief, the rejection of the validity of discrepant information, the discrediting of the source, the puzzlement with the information while acknowledging its validity, bolstering (seeking new information and considerations that support the original view), undermining (adding additional elements to weaken the discrepant information), differentiation (splitting the object by sloughing off the parts that are causing attitudinal conflict), and transcendence ("elements, instead of being split down, are built up and combined into large units organized on a superordinate level.").
At the same time, the considerable decrease of harsh descriptions about the Japanese in public comment at that time suggests that the persistent negative perceptions of another nation, even if the perceptions are not changed fundamentally, can become latent when there is no overt confrontation between the nations and threats from other nations or events overwhelm the pre-existing negative views. This is not to argue that the fundamental change of one's perceptions about other nations is impossible. Personal contacts in cooperative environment can bring about such change.

What insights into American culture does the present study provide? For one thing some of the factors for the American attitudes and perceptions about Japan during the occupation testify to the current of idealism in American psyche, which has been discussed by many scholars.9 It is

9For instance, according to Frederick Merk, American idealistic, self-denying sense of mission, which he claims as a true expression of national spirit, promoted programs of political, social, and economic change for the benefit of the underprivileged in the 19th century. He also maintains that after the Second World War the same spirit appeared in the Marshall Plan for rebuilding the devastated areas of the world, and in other U.S. programs to help the peoples of underdeveloped areas. See Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), Chapter XII. For a comprehensive discussion of various conceptions which have made up the American ideal of mission, see Burns, The American Idea of Mission. Chapter 16 ("Dollars and Idealism") of Bailey’s book, The Man in the Street, discusses the factors, examples, and the limitations of American idealism. For a discussion of the idealistic stream and world view that led to the justification of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, see Loren Baritz, Backfire (New York: William Narrow and Co., 1985), Part One.
significant that soon after the war, the policy of democratizing or teaching democracy to the Japanese, and thus reconstructing their nation appealed to the American public, even though there were practical considerations supporting that policy. With a faith in American democracy and the American way of life, the enterprise of the occupation of Japan appeared often evangelical, and paternalistic. This basic posture then tended to be lauded by American observers, and shared by both conservative and liberal observers at that time. This idealistic belief system in the U.S. has been called a "civil religion" by some scholars.\textsuperscript{10} While this current can contribute to American people's constructive attitudes toward others, it can also lead them to cultural arrogance and self-righteousness when its self-critical dimension is deemphasized. It can be likewise utilized to justify America's self-interest.

The rhetoric of the Cold War, which referred to the responsibility of America to resist the tide of communist aggression and oppression in order to defend the cause of freedom, also reflected the idealistic undercurrent and sense of mission in America. Its rhetoric was applied chiefly in describing the European scene in 1947, and later (particularly in the third phase of the occupation) came to

\textsuperscript{10}For a comprehensive overview of the civil religion debate, see Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds. American Civil Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
be often used in discussing the Asian scene as well. It is notable that the rhetoric largely appealed to and was accepted by the American people. This tendency of the public was stimulated and utilized by the Truman administration to promote its foreign policies. This belief in freedom and anti-communism deriving from the Lockean liberal tradition constituted a key political culture in the United States.  

However, it should not be forgotten that the logic of American realism, self-interest, and even cynicism were also functioning in America during the occupation. The need for relieving the American taxpayer of the burden of providing continuing relief toward Japan, along with the communist threat, was repeatedly emphasized in public comment arguing for the restoration of Japan's economy. In actuality, in any one year during the occupation, Japanese aid never took much more than 1 percent of total American federal expenditures, and it was a much smaller amount than the aid granted by the U.S. to any of the major nations of western Europe in the postwar period. Indeed, it was a much smaller amount on a per capita basis than the American aid to many of the smaller nations of Asia. A self-supporting Japan was surely an essential component of the U.S. program for global economic recovery and the specter of economic collapse and  

endless costs in Japan troubled American policy-makers. U.S. aid to Japan, however, was never back-breaking for the U.S. at that time. From these observations, it seems that the much publicized issue of the increase in U.S. aid to Europe, and concern about inflation at home (as shown by some cartoons) brought the American public heightened sensitivity to America's financial load abroad, and it provided the background for the emphasis on the burden of the American taxpayer in discussing the need for restoring Japan's economy. In addition, as polling results showed in late 1946 and early 1949, while the majority of the American people supported the idea of helping Japan's economic recovery, many of them were not willing to pay more for that objective. In historian Thomas Bailey's words, "The point is that when real cost and trouble enter into the humanitarian picture, our people instinctively tend to draw back. Many of us prefer a preach-and-run policy."12

Moreover, it is conceivable that the disproportionate stress on the taxpayer's burden reflected the opinion makers' concern for the persistence of unfriendly feelings toward the former enemy nation among a sizable segment of the American public, and hence the need for justifying the policy of rebuilding her in realistic terms to the people.

12 Bailey, The Man in the Street, 192. Bailey also quoted someone's words, "We are an idealistic people and we'll make any sacrifice for a cause that won't hurt business" (Ibid., 196).
The examination of whether the burden of the American taxpayer was likewise a stressed factor in justifying U.S. economic aid for the reconstruction of other nations may confirm the validity of this argument.

In defending the appropriation of U.S. relief to Japan in February 1947 General MacArthur stressed that it was not charity. Similarly, both Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, among other policy-makers, emphasized U.S. self-interest in justifying the policy of restoring the economy of ex-enemies (Japan and Germany). These public comments reinforce the current of realism in the U.S. While American idealism is significant, emphasis solely upon it, then, can be misleading. In discussing some aspects of American moral predispositions which may have consequences for foreign policy, Almond argues as follows:

Americans would appear to be happiest when they can cloak an action motivated by self-interest with an aura of New Testament selflessness, when an action which is "good business," or "good security" can be made to "look good" too. Similarly there is resistance among Americans over the straightforward expression of conscience-motivated behavior. What is "good" has to be represented as satisfying the criteria of self-interest. They are happiest when they can allay the Christian conscience at the same time that they satisfy self-interested criteria. 13

He also contends,

American generosity and humanitarianism is a tentative phenomenon. Along with impulses toward

13 Almond, American People, 60.
good will and generosity, there is a deep-seated suspicion that smart people don't act that way, that "only suckers are a soft touch."14

Thus Almond points out a "moral dualism" in America. The findings of the present study largely support his contention, though, as some letters to MacArthur suggested, there was a small segment of the Americans who wished to practice Christian conscience in a straightforward manner.

This study suggests that the promotion of constructive attitudes which do not rely upon situational factors, such as those based on direct personal contacts between the two peoples and on firmly set positive ideals, is necessary. This may be a hackneyed argument, and there is no short-cut to this process. It is the path for us to follow, however, if we wish to continue to take responsibility for mutual well-being and maintaining a peaceful world. As many letters to MacArthur suggest, there has always been a segment of the American public that has active interest in promoting a friendly relationship between the two nations. This group should be expanded. American people might transcend their often paternalistic stance, especially in this multipolar world today, at the same time retaining the supreme values that can guide them to positive attitudes toward others. Americans, as well as Japanese, need to proceed with the objective of mutual understanding, seeing that they do not fall into the trap of cultural arrogance.

14 Ibid., 61.
In addition, this study's focus on some of the problems in American attitudes toward Japan during the occupation does not in the least underrate the many problems on Japan's side at that time and her responsibility today for resolving causes of conflict between the two nations. An examination of Japanese attitudes toward the Americans during the occupation and thereafter would be another equally important and insightful subject.
FIGURES

The cartoons in the following pages were originally published by various U.S. newspaper publishers. Most of them were then reprinted in the "News of the Week in Review" section of the Sunday New York Times. For these cartoons, the name of the original publisher is first indicated along with other publication information. The date of publication by the New York Times is also noted following the abbreviation "NYT."

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Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

"THEY MUSTN'T SAVE THIS FACE"

"They Mustn't Save This Face." Butterworth in the Manchester Daily Dispatch. NYT, Sept. 16, 1945.
"Wonder If It's Really Dead."
Burck in the Chicago Times.

Figure 9
"DIRECTIVE IS TO BE COMPLIED WITH WITHOUT DELAY"

Figure 10

"AND REMEMBER—NO 'INCIDENTS'

MACARTHUR'S OCCUPATION ORDERS

Figure 11

"NEW U. S. TASK FORCE."

"WE MADE RESERVATIONS DEC. 7, 1941"

Figure 13

"A Handful But--."

Barrow in the Florida Times-Union. NYT, Dec. 9, 1945. Reprinted by permission of the Florida Times-Union.
"SOMEBODY HAS TO TEACH HIM A LESSON"

Figure 16

"IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME"

Figure 17

"It Will Take a Long Time." Thomas in the Detroit News. 
Figure 18

Figure 19

"NOW TO AWAIT THE REACTION"

Figure 20

"NEW SPECIES"

Smith in The Lynchburg News


Figure 23

Figure 24

"The Long, Hard Row."
Figure 25

Figure 27

"BREAD—NOT GUNS!"

Figure 28

Figure 31

Figure 32

Figure 33

Figure 34

"THAT GERMAN CLASS NEXT DOOR"

Figure 35

"That German Class Next Door." Barrow in the New Hampshire Morning-Union. NYT, June 1, 1947.
Figure 36

"-A Mighty Man is He." Holland in the Chicago Tribune, Mar. 21, 1947. Reprinted by permission of the Chicago Tribune.
Figure 37

Figure 38

Figure 40

"Enough Fence?" Fitzpatrick in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. NYT, Nov. 23, 1947. Reprinted by permission of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
Figure 41

Figure 42

"STILL A TOUGH BABY!"

Figure 43

Japanese Schooled Boy

Figure 44

Figure 45

Figure 48

"Stepping Stones." Messner in the Rochester Times-Union. 
NYT, Aug. 26, 1951. Reprinted by permission of the 
Rochester Times-Union.
Figure 49

Figure 50

"WHY DON'T YOU PLAY BALL WITH HIM?"

Figure 51

"Why Don't You Play Ball with Him?" Fischetti, Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc. NYT, Mar. 16, 1952. Reprinted by permission of Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.
Figure 53

Figure 54

"WORRIED ABOUT THE NEW NEIGHBORS"

Figure 56

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