Reviews of Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna, and Western Samoa are not included in this issue because of unforeseen circumstances.

**AMERICAN SAMOA**

The continuing government financial crisis, failure of the administration and *fono* (legislature) to effectively implement measures to rectify the problem, and incumbent Congressman Faleoavavega Eni Hunkin’s impressive reelection to the US Congress were the highlights of the period under review.

The territory’s recovery from Cyclone Ofa of February 1990 proved only a temporary respite, as the budget deficit continued to mount. By mid-1990 the executive and *fono* were again gridlocked over Governor Coleman’s proposed 5 percent excise tax. The tax bill was passed by the House of Representatives, but delayed in the Senate. Senators expressed strong opposition to its potential impact on consumers, and concern that public hearings on the tax had not been announced. Extensive lobbying by the administration combined with threats of layoffs, salary cuts, and reduced department budgets turned the senate vote in favor of the excise tax, which went into effect in early October 1990.

The government’s apparent inability to make good on revenue saving and generating measures (the governor’s financial recovery plan was issued in October 1989) was exacerbated by unauthorized spending, while the *fono* continued to pass appropriation bills for which there were no funds. The revenues generated by the new excise tax fell short of projections by almost US$2 million. In March 1991, the *fono* passed a bill increasing the personal expense funds for legislators from US$5000 to US$10,000. In April, the governor sought *fono* authorization for a US$10 million loan from the government retirement fund. Government Treasurer Ace Tago, one of three challengers to Congressman Hunkin in the recent elections, announced that huge layoffs could result if the *fono* failed to approve the loan request. With the government payroll account US$1.8 million dollars overdrawn, the government workforce was saddled with yet another reduction in wages, which became effective on 29 April.

The loan was approved by the *fono* and signed by Acting Governor Galea’i Poumele during the first week of June. The amount was reduced to US$5 million, with the office of communications responsible for making annual payments of US$600,000 dollars over a ten-year period to pay it off. The bill requires that the loan be used for payroll only, allowing the government workforce to be restored to normal working hours. With the overall government deficit greater than US$18 million, the government disbursing office closed since the first week of May, and local businesses owed nearly US$4 million, the Coleman administration was no closer to a solution to the financial crisis than it was three years ago.

Overshadowing the stopgap measures of the administration and *fono* was growing public doubt regarding
the government’s credibility. The Concerned Citizens for Honest Government committee, formed in 1991, together with numerous public outcries in the local media over government corruption, waste, and fiscal abuse, brought unprecedented criticism to bear on the government. The simple fact remained that the government of American Samoa had not demonstrated a sound policy of fiscal responsibility, and continued to spend more than it earned.

Incumbent Congressman Hunkin’s resounding reelection to the US Congress in November 1990 was widely viewed as a popular statement of dissatisfaction with the Coleman administration and the candidate whom he openly supported, government treasurer Ace Tago. Hunkin garnered more than twice the votes of Tago, sweeping the majority in all seventeen districts except Tago’s home district. Immediately following the election, the governor was quoted as saying that Tago “would have made a better and more effective delegate . . . because of his respect for the Governor and the Fono leadership” (SN, 9 Nov 1990).

Although the governor asked for the congressman’s cooperation in a televised address one week after the elections, his personal clash with Hunkin resurfaced in a letter to the Samoa News in February. In it he concurred with former congressman Fofo Sunia’s observation that “Eni has not accepted the reality that American Samoa has but one governor who heads the system that provides services directly to the people” (SN, 20 Feb 1991). Despite the repeated efforts of Hunkin to “bury the hatchet” and work in a “spirit of reconciliation” with the administration, the administration continued its attempts to publicly discredit him.

Prior to the November elections, there was notification of an official US General Accounting Office investigation of the territory’s finances as requested by Congressman Hunkin. The representative has expressed his concern over the government’s financial problems and, due to the lack of cooperation from Interior Department officials, requested the investigation.

Significant malfeasance could come to light under General Accounting Office scrutiny. Interior Department officials have declared illegal the use of US$700,000 of federal grant monies for the purchase, transport, and repair of a government vessel instead of for a harbor project in Manu’a. Illicit, no-bid contracts, such as a US$885,000 award to Creative Design Consultants to evaluate and renovate the public school bathrooms, also require careful consideration.

Governor Coleman’s allusions to the “Pacific Way” of cooperation through consensus among island leaders could prove the political undoing of his administration in light of the demoralized workforce and mounting deficits. Many American Samoans feel that honesty, public responsibility, and moral leadership have been sacrificed by a cadre of leaders who have done well for themselves at the expense of the territory’s present and future well-being.

BILL LEGALLEY
COOK ISLANDS

The ruling Cook Islands Party strengthened its political position during the period under review. The defection of the member of parliament for Manihiki, Ben Toma, from the opposition to a government ministry, gave the government the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution. The first changes were made in May 1991, and included provision for one more cabinet minister (to fit Ben Toma in) and one more electorate (in Arorangi, where the ruling Cook Islands Party holds the seats). For a national population of 17,000, the eight ministers, six assistant ministers, speaker, deputy speaker, and leader of the house, among the twenty-five members of parliament, all with comprehensive support services, constitute a significant tax burden. More constitutional changes are expected later in 1991.

Provision was also made for the further politicization of the public service, by making more posts the prerogative of the ruling party rather than of the (at least nominally) independent Public Service Commission. The case for this is that some long-serving staff suffer from inertia, or political incompatibility, and hiring personnel on contract assures the government that its policies will be implemented. Implementing the philosophy creates enough problems in a country like the United States of America, where the proportion of the population who depend for employment on the persons they elect is quite small. Even there, critics allege that the purpose is not to improve efficiency, but to enhance political leverage. In a very small country in which the government is by far the largest employer, and on most islands almost the only employer, it gives a government the potential to retain tenure by intimidation—a technique used by Premier Albert Henry in the 1970s.

The opposition fell further into disarray. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs Norman George, who has been the most active member of his party since the ousting of Sir Tom Davis in 1987, is seeking party leadership at the forthcoming party congress. If he succeeds, it remains to be seen whether he can command public support. Yet another of the remaining eight opposition members of parliament is rumored to be preparing to cross the floor.

 Fallout from the election of early 1989 continued, with supporters of the opposition weeded out of government-funded posts and government supporters phased in to those or other newly created posts. This process is most noticeable on the outer islands where employment is very limited. Many who are on the losing side leave the country, a process facilitated by the free access Cook Islanders have to both New Zealand and Australia. For example, most opposition supporters on the isolated atolls of Pukapuka and Penrhyn are reported to have lost their jobs, and many have emigrated. Many Pukapukans who remained at home found themselves reclassified for a time as "children" (and thus not entitled to participate or share as adults in various activities)—a customary Pukapuka method of disciplining those who deviate.

Despite the tensions between supporters of various political factions (and tensions within the factions),
there are generally effective working relations with those of other persuasions. And love can surmount all political barriers—as when the daughter of the prime minister fell in love with the son of the leader of the opposition.

Administratively, the country heard a rhetoric of less government (and more private activity), but saw a reality of government taking more power. The concentration is in the hands of the prime minister, whose ministerial portfolios include finance, planning, customs, foreign affairs, tourism, law, public works, the legislative service, and arts and culture.

The Cook Islands News (circulation 1500) was privatized, but at the same time the government established a vastly larger, more influential, and more costly medium—the country's only television channel. Broadcasting is a responsibility of the prime minister.

A special tax was levied to help meet its operating losses.

A national advisory board was set up, with full-time staff, a licensing authority, a ministry of culture, and a new division of the ministry of planning, all directly under the prime minister. (The ministry of planning and economic development has a staff of about two per thousand of the national population—a higher ratio than in the Soviet Union at the height of communism.) In March 1991 it was announced that a local government was to be established for the main island of Rarotonga (population 9000), where the central government and its staff of nearly 2000 are already located.

When the Cook Islands Library and Museum Society was formed in 1961, it was given land by Makea Ariki, and a structure was built. As is common in cultural matters, the society provided the structure, books, minor funding, and a voluntary elected executive, while the government paid for the full-time staff. This operated for many years to the satisfaction of the community, but early in 1991 the prime minister announced that he wanted the facility placed under the ministry of culture, of which he is minister. There was no point of contention other than that of control by government or community. When the society disagreed, the government withdrew the staff to office jobs in the ministry of culture. The Library and Museum Society plans to try to keep the facilities open using volunteer workers. The government will build another library and museum on government land if the society does not yield its land, buildings, and assets to government control.

Cable and Wireless Ltd's fifteen-year contract to operate the external telecommunications service was due to expire in 1995. In June 1991, however, the government passed emergency legislation to compulsorily acquire the service, having given the company one day's notice, with handover at the end of the month. A new corporation was set up with 60 percent government and 40 percent overseas shareholding. There are concerns that investor confidence may be impaired by the government's forced breaking of a major agreement.

The economy was reasonably buoyant, in contrast to that of many neighboring countries. Tourism, the main source of national income, increased by 4 percent in 1990 over 1989. The first half of 1991 saw further growth.
Hong Kong decided to accept companies registered in the Cook Islands for listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange—a privilege granted to only two other countries. It will bring considerable additional business to Rarotonga (now worth perhaps US$6 million in fees, taxes, services, salaries, and so on).

Pearl culture at Manihiki Atoll reached its first marketing season, which was successful, although prices were lower than expected. It is expected to bring in about US$8 million. United States government aid is funding research on pearl culture at Suwarrow Atoll. The making of the film The Other Side of Paradise, starring Jason Connery, was expected to pour US$1 million into the economy. The number of registered vehicles grew to 4534 for Rarotonga's 9000 people, although most “new” vehicles are reconditioned Japanese imports.

As with New Zealand's Think Big policy of the 1970s, which generated euphoria at the beginning and anguish at the end, some of the Cook Islands growth is based on government borrowing for the next generation to pay back. The per capita level of government debt, minimal five years ago, is now among the highest in the world and rising. Even though much of it is on concessional terms, it has to be paid back if the country is to retain international credibility. Many countries have found that borrowing can become addictive, and once it gains a certain momentum, it becomes difficult to keep under control.

Direct government involvement in the hotel industry has never been encouraging. The government paid US$17 million to a failing Italian construction company before a contract and performance bond were finalized. The contractors walked out leaving a hole in the ground and piles of deteriorating construction materials. New contractors were commissioned and another US$12 million borrowed.

Various attempts to sell off other government hotel assets failed to materialize. The new “owners” of the Rapae Motel were given possession and ran the hotel for nearly a year, but contrary to the commitments, paid nothing. The two other government hotels remain unsold. The government was negotiating purchase of a long-abandoned hospital in New Zealand as an investment.

The French loan to upgrade the electricity supply has come to much more than the planned US$8 million. The Asian Development Bank loaned US$4.9 million for telecommunications upgrading, and are considering US$3 million for education and more for other fields. Further loan funds have been negotiated from Export Credit Finance of Australia for telecommunications developments, and US$12 million is being sought for a major cultural center, to be ready for the Festival of Pacific Arts in 1992.

The government is banking on repaying the loans from bonanzas that may or may not materialize. The largest is the exploitation of minerals on the sea floor of the exclusive economic zone. At present world prices, the volume there could bring in enormous wealth. But once seabed minerals come onto the market, they may depress the prices drastically. Also, the technology to retrieve the minerals is exceedingly expensive, and nobody knows what it
will bring to countries like the Cook Islands. Other countries also have minerals in their exclusive economic zones (but the Cook Islands concentrations are particularly promising), and investors will look first at possibilities outside the exclusive economic zones.

In international relations, the Cook Islands continued to maintain a high profile, and the prime minister to play a prominent role, relative to the size and bargaining power of the nation. Relations with France improved, with French navy jets helping to patrol the Cook Islands exclusive economic zone in cooperation with the Cook Islands patrol vessel *Te Kukupa*. In addition, patrols by Australian and New Zealand aircraft continued. The real cost of patrolling is far beyond the income the nation earns from fisheries licenses. The viability of patrols is hampered by internal political influences on the location of fuel depots. A draft treaty with France will include such patrols, as well as economic and cultural cooperation. French navy jets continue to fly mercy missions from the Cook Islands to Tahiti—which has the closest major hospital.

Of the many international meetings held in Rarotonga during the year, the one that could have the greatest long-term impact was the United Nations meeting for the Pacific region on the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Women have advanced tremendously in business, the professions, education, and land matters. But in religion and politics they remain “in their place,” with the leaders in both fields constantly reminding them that God gave these two fields for men alone. If it was His will, Cook Islands women may now be ready to help Him rethink His position! This meeting, attended by women ministers, senior executives, academics, community leaders, and a senior judge, led many Cook Islands women to review their positions, and could affect national politics from the next election.

Transport, always a difficult area for a nation so small and scattered, continued to present obstacles to service and development. Government-ship charters remained expensive and unreliable. Private shipping also had many problems—the new *Maritalina*, on its delivery voyage from Europe, was confiscated in Sri Lanka for carrying a cargo of rocket motors; the *Edna* was wrecked on the Atiu reef—uninsured; and the *Intrepid* sank off Rarotonga. In 1990 Hawaiian Airlines, which had earlier withdrawn from the Auckland-Rarotonga service, withdrew also from the Honolulu-Rarotonga route. It was persuaded to continue for a time. In June 1991 Air New Zealand decided to withdraw from internal services in the Cook Islands (it owned 90 percent of Cook Islands Air).

Overall it was a year of economic growth and political stability, but with some seeds sown that could create more difficult social and economic conditions in the future.

RON CROCOMBE
MARJORIE TUAINEKORE CROCOMBE

**French Polynesia**

There was much speculation in the latter half of 1990 regarding likely alliances in the territorial assembly after
POLITICAL REVIEWS

the 1991 elections. The Léontieff government had lost much electoral ground when Emil Vernaudon was dropped from the coalition, and Gaston Flosse’s Tahoeraa party was expected to make a major comeback. The key question was who its partners would be. Speculation concentrated on the middle-of-the-road Ai’a Api party, lead by Emil Vernaudon, and Oscar Temaru’s independentist Havini Huiraatira party.

Tahoeraa won 18 of the 41 seats in the Territorial Assembly in the elections held on 17 March. Léontieff’s Union Polynesian coalition emerged with 14, Ai’a Api received 5, while Havini Huiraatira captured the remaining 4 seats. Many of the small parties, including those led by the quite capable Jacqui Drollet, Quito Braum Ortega, and Jean-Marius Raapoto, disappeared completely. The most surprising result was the decline of Drollet’s Ia Mana party, which held three seats in the previous assembly. Local observers agreed that Ia Mana’s loss was primarily due to the shift in Drollet’s political position while he was in the Léontieff government.

Drollet’s loss was Temaru’s gain, with the number of seats controlled by Havini Huiraatira increasing from two to four, a considerable achievement for a radical fringe party. Temaru was increasingly being perceived locally as one of the few politicians with long-standing ideological integrity. Observers also credited Temaru’s remarkable gain to the increasing number of Polynesians who have completed higher education, and to rising dissatisfaction with the economic and social situation.

In the face of an apparent post-election rapprochement between Emil Vernaudon and the Léontieff coalition, Flosse made some unsuccessful overtures to Oscar Temaru, who refused to alter his position on independence. Fortunately for Flosse, however, Vernaudon had second thoughts about rejoining the Léontieff coalition, and accepted a partnership with Tahoeraa. This gave them the majority of the assembly seats (23 out of 41) and the opportunity to form a government.

The program of the new Tahoeraa–Ai’a Api coalition was based on proposed reforms in the territorial statute, including an enlargement of local competences; continuation of French economic aid and the (associated) nuclear testing program; support of local industries and private enterprise; creation of new growth poles in Tahiti and revitalization of the outer archipelagoes; and rigor in the management of public affairs, including an audit of public expenditures and budget cuts.

After he was elected president of the Territorial Assembly, Vernaudon made reference to an anticipated evolution in the relationship between France and the territorial government. He stressed the need for a “territorial patriotism,” in which the Polynesian culture is regarded as a fundamental long-term vision rather than in terms of “local particularities.” He urged solidarity with the many other branches of the Polynesian tree in the Pacific. Concerning relations with the metropolitan government, he suggested that the age of paternalism was over.

Flosse became the president of a new, leaner, government. As promised, he reduced the number of ministers from twelve in the previous govern-
ment to nine. In response to a comment by Temaru in the territorial assembly administrative session, Flosse suggested that the pro-independence advocates visit other Pacific islands that have achieved independence. In French Polynesia, said Flosse, at least one has the freedom of public expression; this is not the case in the other systems, from which “God should preserve us.” Flosse’s discourse stressed loyalty, credibility, economic initiative, and careful management.

Flosse and Vernaudon made a trip to Paris toward the end of April 1991. Although they were not able to meet with President Mitterrand, they did meet with Prime Minister Michel Rocard and Minister of the DOM-TOM (overseas departments and territories) Louis Le Pensec. Their discussions concerned funding for government salaries, expanded territorial competences, and the demographic implications for Tahiti of the evolving European Community. Their inability to meet with Mitterrand was viewed locally as a snub (Flosse is a Chirac supporter) and as an indication of problems in obtaining future aid.

Soon after the elections, Flosse rapidly conducted his promised fiscal audit and disclosed that there was a deficit of seven billion Pacific francs (about US$70 million). To make up a deficit of this size, he announced a series of new taxes, increased budgetary slashing, and sales of government lands and enterprises. The new taxes, particularly taxes on fuel, were quickly criticized by Oscar Temaru. He cautioned that they would lead to an inflationary cost spiral that would be particularly difficult for low income households. Instead, he suggested taxes on banks and overseas capital transfers.

In protest of both the fuel tax and a new lotto, Temaru organized a road barricade in Faaa, completely blocking the major commuter route to Pape’ete. Soon afterward, Temaru was joined by a united group of local labor unions, demanding immediate cancellation of the fuel tax. The continued blockade brought work in Pape’ete to a standstill. Flosse attempted to negotiate with the unions, but he charged that their aim was more political than economic. Flosse was forced to repeal the fuel taxes. To avoid further problems, aid was promised by the high commissioner. The barricade was called off, but the unions insisted on further revisions of the government program.

Flosse had promised in a pre-election speech that earlier mistakes would not be repeated. He promised that he would be less autocratic in his new government—more willing to deal with his party members as well as the opposition. But postelection events are leading Tahitians to wonder whether future political decisions will be accomplished by careful forethought and political compromise, or rushed through under pressure from strikers.

France continued its atomic testing program in Moruroa in spite of international concern. Greenpeace announced in December 1990 that a team on board the Rainbow Warrior had found traces of radioactive cesium and cobalt in the plankton near Moruroa, which they credited to the underground nuclear testing. In response, French military spokesmen said that plankton cannot fix cesium, as sug-
Native Hawaiian Issues

In my last summary of Hawaiian news in these columns, the massive theft of Hawaiian trust lands called the ceded land deal between the state of Hawai‘i and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) was exposed. Although Hawaiians are beneficiaries of half of the ceded lands in Hawai‘i (nearly 750,000 acres), they were being dispossessed of their claims by a deal that would give OHA (a state agency) a flat monetary settlement in lieu of returning land to Hawaiians. Such an arrangement allows the state of Hawai‘i continued use of our trust lands while transferring monies to OHA trustees for individual OHA projects. At this writing, the expected monetary settlement to OHA is a single payment of more than $100 million, with $8.5 million annually thereafter.

In the latter half of 1990 a private development group called Uhaele began working with the chair of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Moses Keale, to obtain an exclusive development agreement from OHA. It seems Uhaele linked up with American financiers in Nevada and elsewhere to secure seed funding so that the group would be fully functioning and able to receive monies from the ceded lands settlement. On 14 December 1990 a contract was signed between OHA and Uhaele, including the signature of OHA Chair Moses Keale. The contract gives all decision-making and investment power to Uhaele for eight years, plus 20 percent of the profits from development.

By February 1991 the American financiers of Uhaele began to suspect fraudulent behavior by the Hawai‘i members of the group. The full OHA Board of Trustees was eventually informed by one of these financiers that OHA had been misrepresented by Uhaele, including Keale. The OHA board confirmed they had not authorized any contract with Uhaele, while Keale began saying publicly that his signature was forged. By early May, vigilant members of the Hawaiian community began demanding Keale’s resignation as OHA chair as well as a full investigation and accounting of OHA involvement in the affair. The day after the story hit the Honolulu dailies, Keale resigned. Eventually, the state’s attorney general, the US attorney general, and the State Ethics Commission began separate investigations into criminal misconduct.

While OHA continued to bungle its way through the first half of 1991, reeling from the public humiliation of their chairman’s dealings and confirming the worst fears of the Hawaiian community that OHA was determined to spend native monies on development rather than on Hawaiian needs, the “Hawaiian” governor, John Waihee, planned his “Hawaiian Package” for the 1991 legislature. Included in the package is...
his proposal to have a Hawaiian nation under the control, and subject to the laws, of the state of Hawai‘i.

Waihee’s proposal is in direct contradiction to US federal policy regarding native nations, of which there are some three hundred within the territorial boundaries of the United States. As “nations within a nation,” Indian peoples have a quasi-sovereign status resulting in independent relationships with the states within which they reside. This status allows Indian nations to deal on a government-to-government basis with states and with the federal government. In political and economic terms, this status gives Indians tremendous power, including the power to tax and administer projects on Indian land, as well as the ability to choose their own form of self-government.

Given that the Hawaiian push for sovereignty is now in its twentieth year, Waihee’s action is predictable. In the hope of circumventing federal recognition of Hawaiians as native nations eligible for the kind of land control Indians now possess, his move is critically timed to coincide with OHA’s ceded land settlement. For the last two years, OHA has been arguing that it should be recognized as the government of the Hawaiian nation, despite the fact that OHA was not created by Hawaiians but was set up by a state constitutional convention in 1978. This creature of the state has adopted a strategy of seeking federal recognition as the governing body of the Hawaiian nation. Such recognition would co-opt the Hawaiian community’s demands to be independently organized as a nation, would give the appearance of fairness and equitable treatment of the native people of Hawai‘i, and would avoid the question of true self-determination. If OHA succeeds in its quest, a state agency will be able to masquerade as a native government (with millions of dollars at its disposal) and to circumvent any semblance of democratic native representation. Most important, Hawaiian lands will remain under state control, while a portion of revenues will end up in OHA’s pet projects.

As predicted by myself and other activists some ten years ago, OHA itself has become a land development corporation, unfortunately confirming our worst fears about its intended purpose. Far from reestablishing Hawaiian nationhood, OHA has moved with other American institutions to maintain Hawaiian dispossession and disenfranchisement.

This move within the state of Hawai‘i has been paralleled by a similar move to dispossess Hawaiians by President George Bush. Flush with the slaughter of the Gulf War, including thousands of Iraqi children, Bush has turned to the current federal funding of Hawaiian programs. Following the passage of the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, he issued a statement challenging two provisions in the Bill that provide federal funding for affordable housing projects on Hawaiian Homes trust lands, and, via capital improvement projects, infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) on Hawaiian Homes trust lands.

Bush stated that these sections were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution because “Native Hawaiian” is a racial classification. He directed his attorney
general to draft remedial legislation to address this "racial discrimination."

In practical terms, this move by Bush endangers all federal funding for Native Hawaiian projects, which at present amounts to millions of dollars in aid. Although the congressional delegation from Hawai'i is opposed to such reclassification, the fight ahead will be strenuous. It is also possible that the question of federal recognition of Hawaiian nationhood will be raised as an alternative to continued federal funding. But such a movement toward justice for the native people of Hawai'i would be out of keeping with the Bush administration's policy of dismantling liberal restorative programs like affirmative action, family leave, and child-care funding.

In sum, the year was a bad one for Native Hawaiians. While the state of Hawai'i continues to abrogate its trust responsibility to Hawaiians, a sinister force moves toward funneling native trust assets into developments unrelated to Hawaiian needs. As we move closer to the one-hundredth anniversary of the American military overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893, the Native Hawaiian demand for justice is resisted in ever more devious ways.

HAUNANI-KAY TRASK

MAORI ISSUES

The 1990 sesquicentennial celebration of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi began in spectacular fashion with the remarkable display of tribal mana in the form of twenty waka taua 'carved war canoes' escorting Queen Elizabeth II to the landing at Waitangi. There the pageantry ended when Anglican Bishop of Aotearoa Whakahiuhi Vercoe told the Queen that promises entered into under the treaty had been dishonored. The Maori had been marginalized in their own land (NZH, 7 Feb 1990).

The marginalization alluded to by Vercoe was contemporaneous as much as historic. The Labour government had sensed that the path it had taken in giving retrospective power to the Waitangi Tribunal to settle Maori land and fisheries claims was an election loser in 1990. It distanced itself from its earlier policy by turning away from the treaty itself, and focusing on the "principles" of the treaty, which it proceeded to define unilaterally. In the document Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi, primacy was given to the principle of kawanatanga 'government' and its right to govern and make laws (Dept Justice 1989, 7).

This interpretation of the first clause of the treaty was in effect an assertion of sovereignty. It promulgated unequivocally the hegemony of the state over the second principle of tino rangatiratanga, the sovereignty of chiefs guaranteed under Article 2 of the treaty. This assertion of principles indicated that the government would not be fettered by the treaty in its allocation of resources and pursuit of economic goals.

While the Maori Council and individual tribes had resisted corporatization of Crown lands and the Individual Transferable Quotas fisheries management regime in the preceding three years, there was a felt need by tribes not party to these events for a more
concerted opposition to the hegemony of the state. On 7–8 July 1990, at the behest of Sir Hepi Te Heuheu, the paramount chief of Tuwharetoa, the tribes assembled at Ngaruawahia Marae for a *hui whakakotahi* 'assembly of unification'. There the National Congress of Tribes was formally constituted. The thirty-seven member tribes asserted the independence of the congress from government funding and manipulation by agreeing to an annual levy of NZ$5000 (*Proceedings of the Hui Whakakotahi 1990*). The test for the congress as a new political force will be the willingness of the tribes to fund its operations in the national rather than the parochial arena of politics.

The advent of the tribal congress to supplement the political efforts of other long-standing national organizations, such as the Maori Women’s Welfare League, the Maori Council, and Te Roopu Whakawhanaunga i nga Haahi (Maori Ecumenical Council of Churches) is timely. In November the conservative National party swept back into power with 67 seats to Labour’s 29 in the 97-seat house, the other seat going to the splinter New Labour party.

The National Government’s Maori policy is one law for all New Zealanders and mainstreaming of Maori social and economic development. The colonial dream of resolving the Maori problem by assimilation would be achieved by abolition of the ministry of Maori policy, which replaced the department of Maori affairs under the previous administration, and eliminating the Iwi (tribal) Transition Agency before it ran its five-year course. In anticipation of these changes, incoming Minister of Maori Affairs Winston Peters appointed a Maori planning group of three members in January 1990 to produce a report as a basis for Maori policy.

On 5 March 1991, Mr Peters convened a national assembly of Maori leaders in parliament for the official launch of his planning committee’s report, *Ka Awatea* ‘it is dawn’. The report found that both past and present government policies have failed to deliver equity to Maori. In education for example, it revealed that 36.8 percent of Maori students leave high school with no formal qualifications compared with 12.5 percent of non-Maori. Adverse Maori health statistics were also cited. Three times as many Maori women die of lung cancer as non-Maori. In 1990, Maori, who constitute 10 percent of the population, made up 20 percent of the unemployed.

To address the identified problems, *Ka Awatea* proposed the establishment of a new ministry of Maori development to replace the existing ministry of Maori policy and the Iwi Transition Agency. There would be four units within the ministry responsible for Maori health, education, training, and economic development. Although *Ka Awatea* signaled the jettisoning of Maori policy from the previous administration, Maori leaders endorsed *Ka Awatea*. Despite that endorsement, Prime Minister Jim Bolger was said to be lukewarm to the report, saying it was not government policy.

The day *Ka Awatea* went before cabinet for approval, it was described in the press as being “controversial”
and causing "tensions" within cabinet (NZH, 13 May 1991). There were rumblings that it was a "separatist" policy contradicting mainstreaming, and opposed by Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson (NZH, 14 May 1991). At the heart of the matter was the NZ$239 million budget needed to proceed with the Maori development plan laid out by Ka Awatea. Mainstreaming would mean the dispersal of the Maori Affairs vote to other departments. Although Mr Peters kept the Maori Affairs vote from previous years intact, a belated attempt was made to undermine his position by a leaked report of a government write-off of NZ$90 million of bad loans on Maori land development schemes. "Anger in caucus" over the write-off was reported in the press, but it was ill conceived (NZH, 18 May 1991). Before the loans were written off, the minister sought advice from the Crown Law Office. It turned out that the government itself was liable, because the loans had been incurred over a thirty-year period by government officials within the old department of Maori affairs, and in more recent times by the outgoing Iwi Transition Agency. Many of the loans had been made without reference to the landowners. But the constructed reality in the media of Ka Awatea as being controversial was epitomized by the editorial headlines "Ka Awatea Kerfuffle" (NZH, 14 May 1991), and "Not another Maori Loans Row" (NZH, 16 May 1991). The views of the client minority of the government's Maori policy, and the media construction of it in the press and on television, hardly figured at all. They were merely the victims.

Mr Peters, who has staked his political future on Ka Awatea, now has only two years to implement it and resolve issues whose etiology is steeped in one hundred fifty years of colonial history. Although the obstacle of Pakeha hegemonic domination is formidable for a Maori of Mr Peters' political skills, the challenge is worth meeting.

RANGINUI J. WALKER

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NZH (New Zealand Herald)

NIUE

The year 1990–91 was one of limited recovery. In the aftermath of Cyclone Ofa the New Zealand and Niue gov-ernments decided to extend the Niue Concerted Action Plan (providing funding through March 1991) to June 1992. The two governments also committed themselves to reviewing priorities for future planning and expenditure.

New Zealand financial assistance remained critical. Funding levels in 1990–91 were around NZ$10 million, of which 70 percent went for budgetary support (principally public service salaries). Pressures for greater efficiency and reductions in expenditure expressed during the New Zealand Labour party's term of office continued following the election of a National party government in October. In Janu-
ary New Zealand's deputy prime minister and minister for external relations and trade, Don McKinnon, stopped briefly in Niue to advise the government to use aid revenues to develop the island's private sector.

In March it was announced that aid reductions for 1991–92 arising from New Zealand's own economic difficulties would necessitate the loss of up to 120 public service positions, about 20 percent of those employed. Cost-of-living adjustments sought by public servants were ruled out.

Hopes for at least a modest economic revival, centering on tourism, brightened in July when a private company, Niue Airlines, renewed air service to the island with a leased Boeing 737. Airport and runway lights, permitting night service, were commissioned in October.

Plans were also announced for construction of a new hotel and golf course, but despite government offers of tax concessions and work permits for key personnel, international investment was not forthcoming. Additional tourist accommodation is to be provided by Niuean residents, who have been encouraged to apply for licenses to host visitors in their homes. The state-owned Niue Hotel, badly damaged by Cyclone Ofa, was reopened at the end of May. Revenues generated by an expanded tourist industry would complement Niue's other major sources of finance, aid grants and remittances from Niueans resident in New Zealand.

The cabinet's decision to award the lease of the Niue Hotel to New Zealand interests provoked criticism from local business interests, while the costs of reconstruction (NZ$1.5 million, most of it from the New Zealand government) sparked a ministerial rebellion that threatened the political survival of Premier Sir Robert Rex.

In September, only five months after the assembly's reelection of Sir Robert following legislative elections, Finance Minister Sani Lakitani called for a change of leadership. A petition calling for the premier's resignation circulated among Niue's twenty legislators, and attracted eleven signatures, including that of another cabinet minister, Frank Lui. Sir Robert responded by inviting the two disaffected ministers (half the cabinet) to resign, and when they refused, their ministerial warrants were revoked.

A motion of no-confidence criticized unauthorized spending on the hotel, government support for a local canning company, and the failure of Niue's Development Finance Committee to produce audited accounts. When the vote was taken on 24 October, many of those who had signed the petition defected, and the government survived by a 15–5 margin. Opposition leader Young Vivian, who has not signed the petition, was brought into the cabinet as minister of finance and another member of the assembly, Fisa Pihigia, acquired the Works portfolio.

These events strengthened Young Vivian's position as heir-apparent, as there was sympathy for the view that the long-serving Rex should be permitted to complete his final term. Young Vivian's inclusion in the cabinet coincided with a revival of initiatives focusing on Niue's constitution, adopted in 1974. A Constitution Review Committee was established in October while
Recovery from February 1990’s Cyclone Ofa was a major priority for policymakers during the year 1990–91. Government-sponsored programs other ventures, was also begun, with New Zealand support. It commenced with Vaiea, Niue’s most lightly populated village (around 14 people).

Other recent initiatives have a bearing on the Niue Concerted Action Plan’s objective of maintaining “a living community in Niue.” A French telecommunications project completed installation of a satellite dish and a facsimile service, and the French government is expected to assist with further upgrading of Niue’s telephone system. Niuean’s reliance on videos was reduced when a one-channel television service was introduced with assistance from Television New Zealand, which provided equipment, technical assistance, and programs and will be responsible for building transmission facilities.

The various matters noted in this review suggest some progress with respect to ongoing challenges. Following international trends efforts are being made to privatize various state-run activities, and alternative ways of strengthening the island’s economic base are being explored. The new government, less a coalition of parties than a realignment of personalities within the Niue Assembly, brings additional contacts and experience while beginning Niue’s transition to new leadership.

STEPHEN LEVINE

Tokelau

Recovery from February 1990’s Cyclone Ofa was a major priority for policymakers during the year 1990–91. Government-sponsored programs
focused on both reconstruction and preventive measures.

The early warning system on the islands was upgraded (through funding from the World Meteorological Organization and the New Zealand government) with the establishment of a new automatic weather station on the central atoll of Nukunonu. Efforts were also being made by New Zealand’s ministry for the environment and the Office for Tokelau Affairs to develop an environmental policy for Tokelau.

A special NZ$1.2 million grant made possible New Zealand Army reconnaissance visits to Tokelau to assess storm damage, followed by discussion with Tokelauan officials about cyclone rehabilitation measures. Operation Gabion (named after an Australian-manufactured basket used to stabilize sea walls), launched in September, dispatched three fifteen-man teams from the army’s Engineer Squadron, one to each of Tokelau’s three atolls. The units built new sea walls, repaired public buildings and storage facilities, and provided skills training to members of village work forces. Machinery was brought to each atoll to assist in reconstruction activities.

The cyclone devastation to Tokelau’s environment was reported easing, with breadfruit trees sprouting and a new crop of green nuts on the coconut trees. There remains little scope for economic development, however, due to the islands’ size, isolation, and lack of land-based resources. Tokelau’s public revenue continues to come almost exclusively from New Zealand budgetary support and development assistance, augmented in 1990 by special grants to reverse Ofa’s worst effects. New Zealand’s aid allocations were expected to increase by about four percent during 1990–91, and to remain at that level in 1991–92.

The September 1990 fono at Nukunonu was preoccupied with the aftermath of the cyclone and preparations for reconstruction. The April 1991 fono anticipated the relocation from Apia of Tokelau’s public service, a move designed to promote greater efficiency and closer liaison between the public service and the islands’ elected leadership. The move was brought closer by the construction in Auckland (at a cost of NZ$1.3 million) of a twin-hulled interatoll vessel due to be commissioned in late 1991. Preparations for the relocation of the public service also involve construction of offices and staff housing, as well as completion of improved telecommunications links. Studies have been undertaken by the International Telecommunications Union and New Zealand’s Telecom, and a commitment has been made to install an earth satellite communications system. These moves parallel an ongoing program of institution building, begun as part of the United Nations Development Program, designed to strengthen Tokelau’s decision-making processes while clarifying relationships between the fono, village councils, and the Tokelau Public Service.

A moderately detailed five-year plan for the Office of Tokelau Affairs relocation, scheduled to be completed in 1996, was agreed to by the fono, subject to discussion with Tokelau’s administrator. Questions about New Zealand citizenship, affecting a small number of residents of non-Tokelauan
ancestry, were also discussed at the April fono.

In July 1990, the chief executive officer of New Zealand's ministry of external relations and trade, Graeme Ansell, replaced Neil Walter as administrator for Tokelau. His appointment was made by the minister in consultation with the three faipule. In May 1991, following the April fono, discussions about reconstruction, aid, and Office of Tokelau Affairs–related issues were held in Apia between Ansell, Tokelau's faipule and pulenuku, officers of the Tokelau Public Service, and Wellington-based support staff.

The United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four, responsible for implementing the United Nations Declaration on Decolonization, adopted a resolution in August 1990 recording the wishes of the people of Tokelau to maintain their current relationship with New Zealand. This followed statements by special representative Falani Aukuso to the small territories subcommittee in May (Levine 1991, 207), and by Casimilo Perez (Tokelau’s official secretary) to a United Nations–sponsored seminar in Vanuatu, emphasizing that Tokelau had no wish to alter its present political status. The committee also noted Tokelauan concerns about nuclear testing, toxic waste dumping, and driftnet fishing practices in the Pacific, and the impact of a rise in sea level as a consequence of global warming.

An important step in recording Tokelau’s history and traditions was taken in April 1991 with the release of Matagi Tokelau (“Northerly [Tokelau] Wind/Spirit/Life/Vigor/Memories”), a work written in Tokelauan by Tokelauan authors, translated into English. Published by the Office for Tokelauan Affairs and the University of the South Pacific’s Institute of Pacific Studies, with funding from the United Nations Development Program and the South Pacific Commission, the manuscript was assembled by a committee of contributors from each atoll over a decade beginning in 1982.

The work’s cultural importance—as a book of, by, and for the Tokelauan people—was given due recognition in a launching at the General Fono, and subsequently at a ceremony in New Zealand. Matagi Tokelau also draws inadvertent attention to a lingering international issue that resurfaced in late 1990 when the New Zealand news media, covering the army’s reconstruction activities, rediscovered a Tokelauan claim to a fourth atoll, variously known as Olohega or Swains.

The Treaty of Tokehega (the first four letters are from Tokelau, the last four from Olohega), signed in December 1980 by the three faipule and Ann Martindell, the United States ambassador to New Zealand, was intended to resolve maritime boundaries between American Samoa and Tokelau. The treaty confirmed America’s claim to the island, which the United States annexed in 1925, while removing residual American claims to Tokelau’s three atolls of Atafu, Nukunonu, and Fakaofo. Although the treaty appeared to relinquish Tokelauan claims to sovereignty over the island, having been signed by the islands’ leaders “with the concurrence of the people of Tokelau,” some Tokelauans now assert that its full implications were unclear, and that in any case their relationship with New
Zealand hampered their capacity to adopt a different negotiating position. While the New Zealand and United States governments consider the matter closed, United Nations scrutiny of Tokelauan affairs gives Tokelauans access to an international forum. The faipule of Atafu, Kuresa Nasau, born on the island, indicated a resolve to raise the matter at a future fono, but has yet to do so. Matagi Tokelau, assembled before the advent of this territorial issue, includes songs and stories of Olohega in its compilation of Tokelauan traditions.

STEPHEN LEVINE

Reference