Community and Prosperity: 
Social Movements among the Kwanga 
of Papua New Guinea 

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You don't have respect in those heads of yours. There is no respect—our thoughts are all full of bad thoughts. That's all. The way of talking nicely, the way of talking nicely with each other, the way of straightening out the talk between two groups, and the way of living together in harmony . . . We don't do those things. No.

A KWANGA MAN CHASTISING HIS FELLOW COMMUNITY MEMBERS IN A COMMUNITY MEETING

Scholars who have studied social movements in many areas of Melanesia have noted that the local people seem to be preoccupied with social order and harmony. Many Melanesians (including the speaker in the opening quote) complain that they and their fellow community members do not seem to be able to get along and work together to achieve common goals. They also say that villagers do not follow the directives of leaders; instead, everybody wants to be in charge, and fights within the community are endemic. Furthermore, in many areas, Melanesians think that it is because they cannot work together and follow orders that they cannot close the gap in wealth and power between themselves and Europeans.¹ Brunton (1989, 112) recounted, for instance, a Tannese myth that attributes the relative powerlessness and poverty of the Tannese people to the fact that they ignored Moses' orders and worshipped false idols when he ascended the mountain to commune with God. Their punishment was to be divided into many small and warring groups and to be denied the wealth and

¹ Brunton (1989, 112) recounted, for instance, a Tannese myth that attributes the relative powerlessness and poverty of the Tannese people to the fact that they ignored Moses' orders and worshipped false idols when he ascended the mountain to commune with God. Their punishment was to be divided into many small and warring groups and to be denied the wealth and
power that the more cooperative Europeans received. Failure to obey leaders resulted in their being condemned to a life of divisiveness, where people would never be able to work together to achieve material and political parity with Westerners.

In this paper, I examine Melanesian notions about the link between "community" (or social relations within the community) and "prosperity" by focusing on social movements among the residents of two villages, Inakor and Asanakor, of the eastern Kwanga language group in the Dreikikir district of the East Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. I argue that the Kwanga, like many other Melanesians (see, for instance, Brunton 1989; Errington 1974; Stent 1977; Tuzin 1980, 139–141), are preoccupied with social harmony because they think that prosperity depends on it. They believe that if everyone works together, lives in harmony with their neighbors, and follows a set of prohibitions for a short period, this will generate a collective ritual power that will bring good harvests and success in warfare and hunting. In short, a few months of intense communal effort may effect diffuse and generalized improvement in the quality of life. This model applies to traditional endeavors like hunting and gardening, as well as to modern ventures like cargo cults, Christian revivals, and cash cropping schemes. Although these ventures are superficially dissimilar, they all share a common feature: villagers expect that if they can get the whole community to work together for a few months (or even a few years) their efforts will bring general and "wondrous" results (Gesch 1984).

I also argue that beliefs about the link between community and prosperity tend to create the characteristically short life cycle of many Melanesian social movements, including those found among the Kwanga. People adopt a project or a movement enthusiastically, seeing it as a possible "road" to broad improvements in their lifestyles; but because they believe that the project can only succeed if everyone cooperates, participants put a great deal of pressure on their more skeptical neighbors to go along. In turn, this pressure creates resentment and dissension within the community. When participants in a new project realize that they face considerable opposition, they tend to abandon their programs.

Moreover, the communal effort model has survived despite repeated failures of modern ventures to produce the expected results because the model is self-reinforcing. When projects fail, people do not question their intrinsic merit but instead blame the failure on lack of cooperation (see
Stent 1977). There is usually a grain of truth in their interpretation. Beliefs about how fighting and disagreement undermine communal endeavors tend to become self-fulfilling prophecies; as a result, experience continually reaffirms these beliefs.

Finally, I suggest that beliefs about the link between prosperity and communal effort may underlie recent outbreaks of Christian revival movements and the resurgence of tribal warfare in many areas of Melanesia. Melanesians believe that the superior wealth and power of Europeans stem from a greater ability to work together (see Brunton 1989; Errington 1974); consequently, faced with continual failure to get what the Europeans have, many Melanesians have concluded that they will never be able to emulate European standards of social harmony and cooperation and so must pursue “the good life” in their own way. Some turn to ecstatic communion with the Holy Spirit in Christian revival movements as a means of changing the fractious and uncooperative nature of Melanesians; others turn in the opposite direction and glorify, as a uniquely Melanesian strength, the very “roughness” that appears to undermine business ventures, by returning to activities that capitalize on this “roughness,” such as warfare.

After briefly summarizing the history of postcontact innovation in Inakor and Asanakor, I explore the influence of traditional beliefs about how to survive and prosper on modern Kwanga projects.

The Kwanga

Inakor and Asanakor are located in the southern foothills of the Torricelli Mountain range, and the residents are subsistence gardeners whose chief crop is yams (supplemented by sago, taro, bananas, sweet potatoes, and a variety of leafy greens). The villages are relatively large by Papua New Guinea standards: Inakor had a population of 390 when I took a census in 1984 and Asanakor had a population of 310. I lived and worked in the area for two years from 1984 to 1986.

The Inakor and Asanakor residents possibly first saw white people when an Australian patrol (operating from its coastal headquarters at Aitape) visited their villages in 1929 (Allen 1976b, 66). After 1929 the Australian colonial administration banned warfare and homicide and started to patrol the region sporadically. Labor recruiters came to Inakor and Asanakor about the same time and took young men to work in gold mines
in the Morobe district. Since that time, going away for stints of plantation labor, often of several years, has become virtually a tradition among the men, although plantation labor became much less popular after the introduction of coffee in the 1960s made it possible to earn cash locally.

World War Two also brought dramatic changes. Japanese soldiers took refuge in this and other inland Sepik areas toward the end of the war, and the Australian army set up local bases and recruited local men in an effort to rout the Japanese.

The Australian colonial government extended its control over the area after World War Two, and Christian missions also came to the eastern Kwanga villages. The South Sea Evangelical Mission (SSEM—now the South Sea Evangelical Church) received permission to expand activities to the Sepik in 1948 and by 1951 had opened a station about ten miles to the east of Inakor. An airstrip and mission center were established in Brugam (about a two-hour walk to the west of Inakor) in 1958, and in the same year another station was opened in a village three or four miles south of Asanakor. The mission selected a few promising young men to attend Bible study courses and told them to return to the village and “spread the good news” in weekly church services. Only a handful of people were baptized in these early years. Most conversions and baptisms occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s in waves associated with “revivals.”

The missionaries held weekly “afternoon schools” that Inakor and Asanakor villagers attended, and as a result many of the men and women between thirty and forty-five are at least partly literate in Tok Pisin. In 1973, the Yubanakor Community School opened, and Inakor and Asanakor children now receive six years of primary schooling there. A handful of people went on to high school and got good jobs as schoolteachers in other areas of the country. However, more recent graduates have found few employment opportunities and have returned to the village to live much as their parents do.

There have been various changes in the local and national government systems since colonization. The Australian colonial administration appointed village headmen and, as Papua New Guinea was moving toward independence (achieved in 1975), this system of indirect rule was replaced by a democratic system of local government in which each village (or sometimes a few small villages together) elected a councillor who attended meetings of a local government council and conveyed information about laws and programs to villagers. Some years later, the government created
the village court system. Several neighboring villages are grouped together in a “court area.” Five local men serve as magistrates who hear cases from all of the villages concerned.

These experiences have produced a widespread, but by no means universal, desire for social and economic parity with Westerners; since World War Two, in attempts to attain these goals, Inakor and Asanakor villagers have participated in a number of projects and movements—few have had much long-term success. While these programs are superficially dissimilar, they all share a number of common features that I shall outline later.

Some of the movements seem at first glance to have entirely pragmatic goals. In the early 1950s, local men led a movement to encourage people in the region to plant rice. The returns were disappointing, and most people became disillusioned rather quickly (Allen 1976b, 197). In the 1960s the government encouraged people to plant coffee, and local big men led the campaign to get everyone in the area involved. Coffee was somewhat more successful than rice, and when I lived in Inakor most villagers had coffee gardens from which they reaped an average annual income of about one hundred fifty kina per family (about US$160). Village leaders sometimes urged people to plant more coffee, but most of my informants were unenthusiastic and said that coffee required a great deal of work for the money it brought. Many families had planted cocoa gardens, believing that cocoa required less work than coffee and brought higher returns.

Villagers also pooled their money to form cooperative marketing societies that bought local cash crops and sold them to a regional board at a slightly higher price. The profits were supposed to be used to fund local businesses like trade stores, but because the profit margin was slim and the cost of transportation high, none of these societies had much success in Inakor (although they were somewhat more profitable in villages located near better roads).

Inakor and Asanakor residents belonged to two cargo cults. Like many people in the Dreikikir region who were disillusioned with rice growing, they joined the Kirapkirap cult in 1956. Its leaders said that all aspects of customary life were sinful and stood between Papua New Guineans and the good life of the white men. Customary ritual and magical items were destroyed (Allen 1976b, 257–261), but people quickly lost interest when the cargo did not materialize. Some Inakor and Asanakor villagers joined the Peli Association (Mount Hurun movement), a cargo cult that gained
many adherents in the Sepik region in the early 1970s (Allen 1976b; Gesch 1985; May 1982b; Roscoe 1988; Stent 1977). People paid membership fees to the regional organization in the belief that the cargo would come after the removal of a cement survey marker from Mount Hurun. Peli Association members also performed various rituals designed to produce money. Again, when the cargo failed to materialize many people lost interest. Villagers also took interest in a national election campaign and joined the Friends of the Pangu Pati, the support group of a national political party, in the 1970s (Allen 1976a).

Starting in the late 1960s, and continuing through the 1970s and 1980s, many Inakor and Asanakor residents were involved in several revivals associated with the SSEC. Revivals are periods of intense Christian activity; people attend frequent church services, sometimes twice daily. In all-night hymn singing and prayer meetings, people (usually women) fall to the ground in faints, and wake sobbing and moaning (sometimes continuing for days), claiming that they have been possessed by the Holy Spirit. These “prophet women/men” have visions and dreams in which the locations of secret male cult paraphernalia and sorcery implements are often revealed to them.

In the 1970s and 1980s, those possessed by the Spirit led campaigns to rid the area of all types of magic, and in 1984 they revealed male cult secrets to women and children in many villages in the region. People believed that when they had cleansed the community of all sin, including that of worshipping false idols associated with the men’s cult, Christ would return and usher in a new age of peace and prosperity. Many of the ideas involved in the revival were similar to those from the earlier Kirapkirap movement in which people had also tried to cleanse the community of sin, had thrown out traditional magical items, and had undergone spirit possessions (Allen 1976b, 260, 261). Revivals brought great increases in church attendance and mass baptisms. I witnessed two periods of intense revival activity, one from August to November 1984 and the other in March–April 1985. In each case non-Christian villagers grew skeptical of the Christians’ claims after a few months, and recent converts stopped going to church, leaving a small core of committed Christians, many of them elderly.

Changes in national and local government structures, introduced first by the colonial and then by the national government, also stirred people’s desires for a transformation of their lifestyle. As I show later, both courts
and councils were expected to bring much wider changes in the local lifestyle than was probably intended by those who introduced these institutions (see Allen 1976b; Gerritsen 1981 on unrealistic expectations of councils in Papua New Guinea).

Although these various projects and movements seem at first to have little in common, they all share several features. Scholars have noted similar patterns in social movements in other areas of Papua New Guinea, and I shall note these later and suggest that my analysis of Kwanga ideas about change may have more general implications.

First, as McDowell (1988) suggested, the local people seem to expect all development projects and social movements to bring about dramatic (even "cataclysmic") changes in their lives. This certainly seems to be the case in Inakor and Asanakor. For instance, Bryant Allen (1976a, 139, 148) found that many people thought that coffee buying cooperatives, the Peli Association, and the Pangu Pati had roughly the same goal—to give the Papua New Guineans a lifestyle similar to that of white men. He also found that people's expectations of cash cropping (particularly rice) were vastly inflated. This may be true in other areas of the country as well. May (1982c, 421) argued that in many areas of Papua New Guinea people tend to see self-help development projects and other types of modern movements as "roads" to the same package of "broad, ambitious, and ill-defined goals," which they previously pursued by joining cargo cults, and that participants often expect "radical transformations in village economy and society when, by their nature, the most that the movements [can] offer [is] a modest improvement in village conditions" (1982c, 432).

Second, participants' understanding of the relationship between means and desired ends tends to be rather unclear in all of the programs. As Allen said of Dreikikir area movements, "the adoption of Peli Association membership demonstrates clearly an established trend. People joined the movement, although frequently they did not understand what it was trying to achieve, or how it was going to achieve it. They heard other men say it was good, and they projected their own desires into it, as they had done earlier with rice, Kirapkirap, the Pangu Pati, and to a lesser extent, with the missions" (1976b, 281). Similarly, Allen commented that people seemed confused about how rice growing would improve their lives. Some of his informants thought that if they grew rice Europeans would be pleased and would reward them with money (Allen 1976b, 181–182).

Again, the confusion about how programs will bring about the desired
ends seems to be typical of social movements in other areas of the country as well. May commented that cargo cults, business ventures, and national politics alike are viewed by local people as ritual that will somehow bring about change. He stated that it requires a certain amount of ethnocentricity to believe that because the behavior of recent movements corresponds more closely than that of cults to economic and political norms familiar to Western trained observers, there is necessarily a greater “rationality” on the part of the mass of supporters, to whom the rituals of business organization and parliamentary politics may be no less exotic than those of “money houses” and “memorial gardens,” and for whom the expectations about material returns may be no less unrealistic. (May 1982c, 442)

In other words, participants in most movements do not seem to understand very well how their actions are supposed to bring about the desired results.

Third, participants in almost all of the various projects and movements try to get everyone to join and often believe that the movement will not succeed without universal support (Stent 1977). This may explain why almost all of the movements involve purges of traditional magic and challenges to the men’s cult: leaders of projects want to ensure universal participation by doing away with competing claims to people’s loyalties and activities, like sorcery, that could frighten people away from new projects. I will give other examples of the stress on universal participation later.

Again, such beliefs are apparently common in cargo cults and in other sorts of projects and movements across Melanesia. Brunton (1989, 174–175) suggested that Melanesians abandon religious complexes when they think that a significant proportion of the community is not following the associated prohibitions because they believe that these complexes can only generate power and bring material results if everyone participates. Ryan (1969, 116) said that Elema cargo prophets generally claimed that their cults would only bring material wealth if everyone believed. Participants in the Paliau movement in Manus Province also blamed the failure of some techniques to produce money on the fact that some people had not participated (Schwartz 1962, 350).

Fourth, all of the various types of projects tend to have a short life span. They produce short-term bursts of communal enthusiasm, followed by rapid disillusionment when inflated expectations are not met (Allen
Allen characterized this cycle as one of “over-enthusiastic adoption, trial, crisis and discontinuation” (1976b, 281). People enthusiastically plant a particular cash crop, contribute money to form a cooperative, or join a Christian revival movement or a cargo cult for a few months or even a few years. But they quickly lose interest when dramatic rewards do not materialize and soon latch onto some new scheme. Sometimes, as in the case of coffee growing, people continue an old project. But they do so with little enthusiasm, realizing that it will have limited results, and at the same time they seek another road to more wide-sweeping change (see Gerritsen 1981). Again, May (1982c, 431) suggested that this pattern is common in Papua New Guinea where few self-help development programs sustain people’s interest for more than three or four years. Brunton (1989) made a similar observation about religious complexes, saying that many areas of Melanesia were characterized by “religious instability”: people adopted new complexes enthusiastically and then abandoned them after a few years in favor of new complexes or in order to return to old ones.

All of these features suggest that cults and other types of movements, among the Kwanga and perhaps in other areas as well, are shaped by similar ideas about how to bring about change. I examine these beliefs later.

**Community and Prosperity**

Many of the characteristics of cargo cults and other projects I have just outlined are the product of a traditional model in which a short-term burst of communal cooperation and harmony was supposed to produce a generalized improvement in the quality of life.

This model is perhaps most apparent in male cult initiations. Political authority among the Kwanga is closely tied to a male initiation cult. Since World War Two there have been only three initiation ceremonies, but before that men were initiated into six grades of the cult, starting as boys and finishing as old men, and gained knowledge of, and the necessary ritual heat to empower, magic necessary for success in hunting and gardening. Certain lineage headmen also received magic to control weather, famine, and success in warfare after they were initiated into higher grades in the cult.

Successful initiations were believed to produce a generalized ritual power that brought about broad improvements in the quality of local life:
people could grow better yams and succeed in hunts and warfare (Tuzin 1976). Gesch (1984) suggested that initiates believed they would learn the magical and ritual knowledge that would allow them to understand, and thus control, a previously mysterious world; consequently they believed that initiations would produce unexpected and "wondrous" results.

But people thought that this would only be possible if everyone participated, lived in harmony with their neighbors, and cooperated by observing an elaborate series of prohibitions. For several months before and during an initiation, everyone in the community had to work hard to grow food, and had to observe prohibitions on eating certain kinds of food, on having sexual intercourse, and on washing. One uncooperative person could spoil everything. For example, several men told me indignantly about one man who had violated a prohibition by sleeping with his wife during a male cult initiation and had thereby lessened his whole moiety's ritual heat. As a result, it had been impossible to decorate that moiety's initiates very well since the body paint was "cold" and would not stick to their skins.

Similar ideas were apparent in other endeavors. The Kwanga believed that in order for communal endeavors such as hunting and yam gardening to succeed people had to observe a series of prohibitions on eating certain kinds of food and on contact with the opposite sex, and had to avoid fighting with each other before and during the activity. Scaglion (1976) found a marked decrease in disputes among the Kwanga's neighbors, the Abelam, in the yam-growing season, indicating that people took these ideas seriously (see also Stent 1977). Even one person who failed to observe the prohibitions could ruin the whole endeavor. In Inakor, for instance, people blamed the (frequent) failure of communal hunts on fighting within the community. Similarly, Stent (1977) said that among the Abelam unsuccessful harvests led to a witch hunt for those who had spoiled everything by violating prohibitions.

People had various ideas about how cooperation and harmony were related to good fortune and prosperity. In some cases, people seemed to believe that fighting in the community would lead to sabotage. For instance, if someone fought with a hunting magician or a sorcerer, he could express his displeasure by using his magic to sabotage a communal venture.

People viewed sorcerers and magicians as an impartial moral force that disapproved of bickering and fighting and would sabotage communal ven-
tures or kill people in order to remind the whole community of the importance of living in harmony. Sorcerers and other kinds of magicians were believed to act as a “police force” that helped the leaders of the community (men who had been initiated into the penultimate grade of the cult) to preserve law and order. Informants said that if there was a great deal of fighting in the community, magicians would be displeased and would sabotage the hunt in order to teach the whole community a lesson about how to live together properly. Similarly, people often said the sorcerers sometimes killed people just to stop fighting in the community.

People also seemed to have a vague idea that fighting or violating prohibitions would make the whole community “cold,” and would neutralize magic, as was evident in the earlier example of my informants’ interpretation of the consequences of a man sleeping with his wife during an initiation. The Kwanga had an elaborate set of beliefs about ritual “hotness” and “coldness.” Briefly, avoiding certain kinds of food and contact with females, and eating other kinds of food was supposed to generate ritual heat, which empowered an individual’s magic. People never explicitly said to me that one person’s ritual heat was linked to that of another (unless the two shared the same food), but they clearly thought that magic would fail if the observation of prohibitions was less than universal, indicating that they did have some unarticulated notion of collective ritual heat. Scaglion (1976) noted that the neighboring Abelam people believed that fighting during the yam-growing season would reduce the potency of yam magic, indicating a similar notion that collective ritual heat depended on harmony and cooperation.

The idea that dramatic and general improvements in life could result from short-term, but universal, cooperation and harmony was also apparent in some form or another in virtually all of the programs to promote social and economic change. Leaders always tried to get everyone to participate and they discouraged fighting in the community. People usually seemed to expect dramatic improvements in their lives in the near future. For instance, the leaders of the Peli Association said that their objectives would be achieved only after everyone joined (Allen 1976b, 269), and at one stage the prophet Yaliwan tried to get everyone to live in harmony to pave the way for the return of Jesus (Allen 1976a, 146). As well, people seemed to expect the cult to bring about a generalized improvement in their lives in the short run.

The influence of the traditional model was apparent in the Christian
revival movement. For instance, Abel, the Inakor pastor, referred to the revival as the work of the Holy Spirit and said, “The work of the Holy Spirit is just like performing a male cult initiation: everyone has to cooperate.” The Christian revivalists often insisted that the revival could not eliminate sorcery and improve community life if some people remained “in the dark” and did not believe in God and the Bible. Some people also said that Jesus would not return until everyone believed in the Bible and stopped sinning. One man said in a public meeting:

Some men say: “Each man should do what he wants. Whoever wants to be [Christian], alright then he will go to Heaven when he dies.” But that’s not right. Jesus didn’t die for just one man. He died for all the men of the earth. We didn’t come up out of nothing. God made all of us. He didn’t die for just one man, that only one man should believe and then He’ll come and take just that one man to heaven. Jesus didn’t die for just one or two men. . . . He’s waiting for all of you to believe before he comes.

Here again the speaker suggests that, like traditional endeavors, the revival will only work if everyone follows the rules.

People stressed the need for communal harmony. They said that the revival would only succeed if the whole community was wanbel, the Tok Pisin term for being in agreement. The revivalists seemed to think that such goodwill would produce a generalized spiritual power and that, conversely, fighting would diminish this power. For example, the Christians often said that communal hymns and prayers seemed heavy, ugly, and ineffective if there was discord in the congregation. When they prayed to God to cure sick people, the Christians would first ask if everyone was wanbel, believing that their prayers would be ineffective if someone was harboring a secret grievance. Similarly, in a community meeting the Inakor pastor once urged people not to fight, saying that God would be displeased by bickering in the community and would take away the power of the Holy Spirit: “This power comes from God. It’s not something you can buy with money. People made a lot of trouble and God wanted to take his power back again. . . . The power of God has slackened and now we’re in a mess. God makes this power. If we argue and fight he will take his power back.” Fighting was also supposed to diminish individual ritual power. George, the Asanakor pastor, for example, claimed that after he had fought with his wife, his spiritual powers had been lessened and he had been unable to divine and ward off a sorcerer’s attack.
There was some difference of opinion about what this universal participation and communal harmony would produce but, as in the case of male cult initiations, everyone anticipated broad improvements in their lives. Some people, like the speaker just quoted, thought that communal harmony and universal belief would eventually bring Jesus back to earth. Others thought that Christianity would help everyone to get along and to behave well, and thus would create a suitable environment for communal business ventures to flourish. These people also thought that God would bless business projects, and as a result they would be much more successful. One young Christian man expressed this view in an interview:

If we all think of ourselves our business won’t work out well. It will breakdown. If we think of God first then our business will run well. We can’t just think of business. We must think of God too. Then He can bless us and our business will work out well. I think if we run a business and believe in God it will turn out well. We won’t steal or ruin things. We will run it the Christian way. If people who aren’t Christian run the business they will steal some of the money or food. A man who believes will run the business well and won’t pilfer the money.

In other words, just as traditionally success was thought to depend on a combination of hard work, good organizational ability, and help from the ancestors, so this young man believes that profitable business enterprises depend on work, cooperation, and God’s blessing. More generally, the revivalists apparently believed that a short-term burst of communal cooperation and harmony would produce a dramatic and general improvement in life.

Scholars often attribute ideas about harmony and communal work to Christian influence, or to the fact that Europeans appeared to the Papua New Guineans to be highly orderly and peaceful people with an extraordinary ability to cooperate with each other (Allen 1980; Errington 1974). But I suggest that there is also traditional precedent for these beliefs and that some of the revivalists’ beliefs owe more to traditional models than to missionary influence. This traditional influence was evident in the behavior of Christian “prophets” who had been possessed by the Holy Spirit: just as people believed that sorcerers and other magicians had to avoid contact with women to preserve ritual heat, so the Christian “prophets” believed that their ritual powers would be diminished by contact with the opposite sex.
It was evident that people's ideas about God's response to fighting in the community were shaped by their beliefs about sorcerers (see also Eyre 1988). People saw both God and sorcerers as a sort of impartial moral force that would punish the whole community if a lot of people were fighting. The Inakor pastor suggested that God would take his spiritual power away from the village if people fought. In another meeting, a man voiced similar ideas about sorcerers, saying that sorcerers watched over the village and noted all the little fights and would punish the whole community by killing people if there was too much bickering and dissent:

All the little problems from before, all the little fights over land and sago and water, they kept adding these things up. . . . So sorcery started. You can’t just go and think: “I haven’t done anything. Why do we have sorcery?” You must think of all the trouble you have made before. I tell you all the time . . . that you shouldn’t fight over little things. But you fight and look, the village is in a mess now.

Similarly, the belief in the ritualistic power of communal harmony to render prayers more effective could stem from earlier beliefs about the necessity for communal harmony to empower hunting and gardening magic—which were reported by Scaglion (1976) and Stent (1977) in neighboring language groups not influenced by SSEC revivals.

The influence of beliefs in the efficacy of a short-term burst of communal cooperation were less obvious in other endeavors, but there was still evidence that this traditional model had an impact on people's approaches to such things as cash cropping and cooperative societies. For instance, people in the Dreikikir region apparently thought that these ventures could potentially bring about broad changes in village life but would only work if everyone participated. Bryant Allen (1980) said that while people in many areas of the country resisted the idea of communal gardens, people in the Sepik area planted communal rice gardens of their own accord, even though agricultural officers discouraged it. He also noted reports of leaders trying to force their fellow villagers to plant cash crops and slapped those who refused, or who would not weed their gardens (1976b). My informants thought it was important for everyone to plant cash crops. The Inakor magistrate once forced all of the young men in the community who had not yet planted coffee gardens to stand up in front of the whole community while he lectured them. People told me that individual coffee gardens could only give people a little private spending money; only com-
munal gardens and cooperative societies could "lift up" the whole village. As in other activities, people expected communal effort in cash cropping to produce a generalized improvement in the quality of their lives: they anticipated that the village would be "lifted up," or, in other words, village life would be better.

The influence of traditional models was evident in people's ideas about the village court and local government council systems. In an interview, Ronald, the Inakor magistrate, revealed that he equated the power of magistrates and councillors with the power of male cult initiates. Ronald characterized magistrates, councillors, and business leaders as having an almost mystical power to keep order in the village. He said that after he took a short magistrate-training course he returned to the village determined to root out sorcery. When I asked him why he was not afraid for his life he replied:

Because I had gotten this kind of power from God, ah, the government. I didn't think they could defeat me. I could defeat them. When the government gave me this kind of power, when I got this kind of training, I thought . . . the government had given me a certificate and gave me the power and I became like a lawyer and they appointed me and gave me power over the men here . . . [When we graduated from the training course they said:] "You have this kind of power so you will win. If you were just an ordinary man they would defeat you right away."

Q: What kind of power did the government give you?
Ronald: They wrote my name in the government gazette and [gave me] this knowledge I have now. This is justice now.

Ronald's understanding of the power of modern leaders appears to be colored by his assumptions about traditional leaders. Traditional leaders had secret ritual knowledge through which they controlled nature and society. Possibly, Ronald is equating the modern magistrates' knowledge of justice with this sort of ritual knowledge; this interpretation is supported by Ronald's slip when he first says that the magistrates' power comes from God—a religious and mystical source similar to the ancestors and spirits who were believed to empower traditional knowledge or magic—and then corrects himself and attributes the magistrates' power to the government. This slip might indicate that Ronald believes that modern leaders have a generalized power derived from God similar to traditional leaders' ritual and magical power, which was derived from the spirits. And, just as tradi-
tional leaders could only help the community survive and prosper if everyone cooperated, so the councillors and magistrates often warned their fellow villagers that the "new law" would only work if everyone in the community cooperated and followed orders. The village magistrate, for instance, explained in a community meeting that the courts could only replace sorcery as a system of justice if everyone cooperated and obeyed court orders. Again, communal cooperation and ritual power to improve village life (in this case socially, by stopping sorcery and keeping order) were linked in people's minds.

In short, there is some evidence that ideas about the relationship between the community and the environment shape people's approach to modern ventures. Just as traditionally people followed rules, tried to live in harmony with their neighbors, and pressured everyone to participate in order to create a generalized ritual power that brought prosperity, security, and the good life, so they apparently use the same model to pursue modern goals.

While the emphasis on harmony and cooperation in modern movements undoubtedly stems at least in part from comments made by Europeans, there is considerable traditional precedent for the idea that prosperity and well-being depend on communal cooperation and harmony. There are indications that this is true in other areas of the country as well. Brunton (1989) and Lawrence (1964) both noted that communal observation of prohibitions was thought to be necessary for magic to work in many areas of Melanesia.

Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising, as Brunton (1989) has suggested, that conditions in relatively egalitarian communities, often comprising rivalrous subgroups, would foster a preoccupation with problems of cooperation and harmony. It is always difficult to make and enforce decisions in a large group without strong leaders. This situation is exacerbated in Kwanga villages, and other Melanesian communities of a similar type (see Lawrence 1969), by the division of the community into rivalrous subgroups. Kwanga villages comprise two cross-cutting moiety sets, and a number of lineages; each of these subgroups guards its autonomy jealously and resents interference from other groups. In this situation, it is very difficult for anyone to lead the whole community effectively since anything the leader does will arouse virtually automatic resentment and resistance from members of other subgroups. In short, many things make coordinating communal ventures difficult in Kwanga villages and create
fights and hard feelings between fellow community members. Consequently, it might be expected that Inakor and Asanakor villagers (and other Melanesians) have devoted a lot of thought to the problems of persuading everyone to get along with each other and work together.

Ideas about the link between “community” and “prosperity” could account for the characteristic features of cargo cults and other movements I outlined earlier. First, people expect both cults and other schemes to produce dramatic results over the short run because, according to their ideas about how to prosper, short-term bursts of communal effort were supposed to create a generalized power that had wide-ranging results. I differ from McDowell (1988) here in suggesting that people do not expect a “cataclysmic” or total transformation in their lives but only expect projects to bring about broad improvements. The Kwanga, for instance, did not expect coffee-buying cooperatives to raise the dead or transform the earth, but did expect them to bring both dramatic wealth and other improvements in the quality of life.

Second, people do not have very clear ideas about the relationship between means and ends in projects because they are operating on a model which suggests that following rules and working hard will generate a generalized power that will be felt in various, not entirely predictable, ways.

Third, perhaps people want everyone to join in projects and movements because they think that ventures will only succeed if pragmatic actions are empowered by ritual heat generated by communal cooperation.

Finally, movements are generally short-lived because people are operating on a model in which short-term communal effort is supposed to be all that is necessary to generate the communal power that leads to prosperity. Consequently, they expect projects to produce immediate results and lose interest if these do not materialize.

**Consensus and Strife**

Among the Kwanga, traditional beliefs about the relationship between the community and the rest of the world seem to have a self-perpetuating quality. People believe that communal cooperation is necessary for success, but harmony and universal participation are very difficult to achieve. It is almost inevitable that there will be differences of opinion in large groups of people, and so it is difficult to get everyone to cooperate in
societies, like Kwanga villages, where there is no strong central leadership to make decisions and force people to comply. Because people believe that projects will only succeed if everyone in the village cooperates, project leaders put pressure on skeptics to participate. This pressure, however, creates resentment and eventually produces the very disharmony and bad feeling that are believed to defeat communal projects. As a result, people can always, with some truth, attribute failure to bickering in the village and do not question their underlying beliefs about how to prosper. In short, experience tends to suggest over and over again that social failings stand between Papua New Guineans and the good life.

These processes were evident in a series of public meetings to look into deaths that took place during my two-year stay in Inakor and Asanakor. The Kwanga usually held meetings after deaths to find the sorcerer responsible. Interestingly, these discussions also provided rare glimpses into people's ideas about current communal projects. Villagers were particularly interested in the Christian revival movement in the 1984–1986 inquests. The revivalists had attacked sorcery directly by divining the presence of sorcery implements and by having the owners jailed on charges of possessing sorcery paraphernalia. They had also persuaded many sorcerers to convert to Christianity and to renounce their evil ways. Consequently, each death indicated to the villagers that the revival was failing, and people spent a great deal of time in inquests trying to figure out what was going wrong. The discussion of sorcery often led to a more general debate about why the revivalists had failed to persuade Jesus to return after so many months of fervent worship.

In the 1984 and 1985 meetings many people stressed the need for universal cooperation and blamed the apparent failure of the revival to eliminate sorcery and bring back Jesus on non-Christians who were being uncooperative. Speakers, including several non-Christians, exhorted everyone to do as the Christians asked. An Asanakor man suggested that people would continue to die in Inakor until the whole village had converted to Christianity and stood united in the effort to get rid of sinful magic. As it was, Christians and non-Christians were always bickering with each other, and this diverted energy away from their common interest in eliminating sorcery. The Inakor pastor suggested that such bickering was likely to displease God and cause him to take away the Christians' prophetic powers.

This pressure initially seemed to work: vocal opposition to the revival ceased and non-Christians often voiced support for the Christians in meet-
ings. But beneath the surface, resentment against the Christians apparently increased and eventually undermined the revival. When, after several months, the Christians failed to stop sorcery and bring back Jesus, the revival leaders themselves were willing to continue and to wait indefinitely for these rewards. Even when the death of the young daughter of the Asanakor pastor, George, seemed to prove that the Christians could not stop sorcery, staunch supporters did not lose faith in the revival. George told me privately that the revival must go on, as it was the only way to end fighting and improve village life. He said that it did not matter if sorcerers had killed his daughter since he would be reunited with her in heaven. But others in the community threatened to withdraw their support, or even to prosecute the Christians, unless they produced immediate results.

Most of these demands came from people who had had doubts about the revival and resented the pressure that had been put on them to conform. They said that they had been forced to abandon the men’s cult and the associated magic against their will and spoke resentfully of the Christians’ autocratic attitudes. Several people, for instance, said that they had heard people in Apangai, a nearby village where Inakor and Asanakor Christians had revealed cult secrets and magical items to women and children, demand that the revival produce “fruit” (in other words, bring back Jesus) soon to justify the loss of their magical paraphernalia. Apangai people were alleged to have said: “You’ve done it so now this [revival] must come true and bear fruit. You can’t destroy my things and then let this work [come to nothing]. If you do that I will deal with you some time in the future.” People also claimed they had heard people in Apangai say:

Alright, you Inakor and Asanakor. You are big men and came and threw out all of our [men’s cult and magical paraphernalia]. You are out of reach now. We are your black men [Tok Pisin: kanaka]. You have become white men now and we are just black men living in the bush, and so you do this. You are real men and came and threw out our things. We are rats or black men. We can’t do anything to you now. We are from the bush. You are white men now.

In these speeches, people linked the demands for dramatic rewards, and vague threats of retaliation if these rewards did not materialize, with being forced to act against their will: “You’ve done it so now this [revival] must come true and bear fruit. You can’t destroy my things and then let this work [come to nothing].” The quotes reveal that people resent the revival leaders for trying to boss other people around and showing no respect for
others’ opinions. The leaders are characterized as acting as if they were “real men” and “white men” and thus were much too grand to consult a bunch of “bush people” before destroying cult paraphernalia. Now, the skeptics demand that the leaders produce proof of the efficacy of their grand schemes—probably in the expectation that the leaders will not be able to “pay up” and they will be publicly humiliated, a just punishment for their disrespectful treatment of others a few months before.

Such resentment is a virtually inevitable result of decentralized Kwanga social structure. Villages are led by a group of initiates of the penultimate grade of the men’s cult who are supposed to agree on matters of communal concern. When one of this group tries to claim paramount authority, as the revival leaders did by throwing out cult paraphernalia without universal consent, the others resent it. As well, as I have already noted, Kwanga villages comprise two cross-cutting moiety sets and several lineages, and each of these subgroups resents it when a member of another group tries to lead them. Thus, any attempt to coordinate the whole village meets almost automatic opposition.

Ironically, according to local ideas about the need for universal participation, the revival leaders were almost forced to act in this autocratic fashion: they, like other movement leaders, believe that no venture will succeed unless they can get everyone to cooperate—and it is virtually impossible to get everyone to agree on any new project, particularly because community leaders are jealous of each other’s prestige. When one gains prominence by introducing a new project, his rivals are likely to oppose it on principle.

Thus, movement leaders are in a double bind: they must try to force everyone to cooperate but when they do others resent the autocratic behavior and try to humble the leader by making vague threats or by looking for the first excuse to withdraw their support and declare the movement a failure. Similarly, Ryan (1969) said that cargo prophets among the Toaripi Elema inevitably meet opposition from other community leaders who fear the prophet is getting too powerful.

Rivals undermine movements like the revival in two ways. First, like the Apangai people, they make veiled threats that probably frighten some of the less staunch supporters away from movements. They fear they may face sorcery or court if the movement does not produce results soon and so they abandon it. Unfortunately, because I left Inakor and Asanakor shortly after the death of George’s daughter, I am unable to comment on
the effect of this death on the Asanakor revival. But the Inakor revivalists had ceased their efforts in face of opposition as I show later. Second, when the skeptics use current failures as an excuse to stop cooperating, other, more committed, participants abandon projects just because they believe that nothing can succeed without unanimous support. This is a consequence of the traditional beliefs about the importance of consensus and universal cooperation. For example, the Inakor pastor announced in a community meeting in May 1986 that the Inakor Christians had decided to temporarily halt their revival activities because several non-Christian men had decided to stage large commercial parties, against the explicit wishes of the mission. The pastor commented that the revival, unlike normal Christian activities, could not proceed without universal support. (Interestingly, informants said very similar things about men's cult initiations—illustrating the close conceptual link between initiations and other activities in peoples' minds. People said that they had planned to stage an initiation but had, at least temporarily, abandoned their plans when the revival came to Inakor because they knew that the Christians would not support the initiative, and might even undermine it by revealing key secrets in public. But non-Christians said that they would wait until people lost interest in the revival and might take up their plans for the initiation some time in the future.) Consequently, from the local point of view, projects are never shown to be inherently unsound since they are never given a fair chance to succeed; instead, what people see proven again and again, is that communal ventures cannot succeed because Papua New Guineans are unable to cooperate and work together.

In speaking of past failures, people often refer to social factors rather than to external factors or intrinsic deficiencies in a program. For instance, when the latest coffee-buying cooperative went broke, few people attributed the failure to the factors that seemed most obvious to me, namely, poor roads that raised transportation costs, and low coffee prices. Instead, many villagers blamed the failure on the fact that followers had been uncooperative and had fought amongst themselves. One man summarized these views in a public meeting:

We are always angry and are always fighting. When we all contribute money or bags of coffee, if someone wants to start a project with these contributions, and then something goes wrong then everyone, all the men and women will really complain, and criticize him and talk behind his back. At their houses, in their gardens, when they have community meetings, they will complain about
this man. They will complain and complain and this man will hear what they are saying and be sick of it and leave this work. Then the work will come to nothing. They won't think: "Oh, we have given our money to him so we will leave it with him to run it as he wishes, according to his knowledge. We won't tell him what to do. We will just watch him and see what he does." If we did that the work would go well. But they give money and when he tries to run the project and he runs into just a little trouble, sorry! All the men, all the women, will really say awful things. They do it like that and none of our projects go well. . . . It's our own fault.

In this case, as in others I witnessed, people attributed the cooperative's failure to social problems. They thought that villagers were unable to work together and to follow the directives of leaders. Instead, each man wanted to be his own boss and, consequently, villagers were always fighting with each other and with their leaders. They could not get along, and so the projects were doomed to failure. But because people focused on social problems they were willing to try out another cooperative scheme that differed very little from one that had already failed.

In other cases, people blamed the leaders for failures. They thought that leaders were singularly lacking in community spirit and always pursued their own interests at the expense of their fellow villagers. Bryant Allen’s interviews with leaders in other parts of the Dreikikir region reveal similar themes. Leaders of two cooperative societies, for instance, said that the participants in the society blamed the leaders when local rice failed to bring vast material wealth (Allen 1976b, 362, 373). This reveals a similar kind of thinking: people do not question the intrinsic merits of programs but instead blame failure on uncooperative members of the community who put their own desires above the interests of the collectivity.

Ryan made a similar point about the Toaripi of the GuHProvince:

The failure of any one prophet does not shake people's belief that at some time a leader with the right message will appear and show them the way to a new life. The failure of a particular prophet is generally ascribed to the wickedness and blindness of his opponents, who spoiled the movement with their scepticism; or to the fact that he did not really have the true message but was building up his own position at the expense of his fellows. (1969, 100)

Furthermore, as is already evident, among both the Kwanga and the Toaripi there is a certain truth to these conclusions since political rivals and others do resent innovators’ autocratic attitudes and try to humble
them by undermining their projects. In short, objective difficulties in coordinating communal endeavors in small egalitarian communities like Kwanga villages reinforce people’s ideas that divisiveness stands between them and the good life.

Order, Harmony, and the Good Life

Kwanga villagers seem to be unusually preoccupied with themes of community harmony: they believe that the good life is within their reach if only they can get everyone to cooperate, and they blame failures on fighting within the community.

I have traced these beliefs to a traditional model under which a short-term burst of enthusiasm produces a generalized ritual power with broad results, and have further argued that experience never contradicts (and, indeed, usually reinforces) people’s underlying assumptions about change. When movements fail, people can always point to dissension in the community as the source of the trouble, thus reinforcing their basic belief in the importance of consensus for success. This creates a vicious cycle: the more people blame things on social problems, the more they pressure others to participate in projects against their wills. This pressure creates the resentment and discord on which participants can always, with some justice, blame the failure of their projects.

The repeated (perceived) failure of projects was apparently leading villagers to the conclusion that Papua New Guineans are intrinsically different from Westerners and that the Papua New Guineans fractious ways stand between them and the good life. Speakers in meetings often contrasted their fellow villagers’ contentious and unruly behavior with the harmonious and obedient ways of the Europeans. People argued that “black men” would never get ahead and prosper because they were always bickering and fighting among themselves. The opening quote of the paper, for instance, illustrates this sort of discourse. That particular statement was made by the village magistrate during an inquest.

Similar conclusions have led some people to look for a way to change the Papua New Guinean character. The young man quoted earlier, for instance, said that faith in God would help people cooperate and allow ventures to succeed. Other people told me that they found it very difficult not to fight with others, and that only strong faith in God, and particularly receiving the Holy Spirit, had allowed them to overcome their own natures. The Asanakor pastor, for instance, described his conversion
experience by saying it was as if God had wrung out all his old blood and old ways like water from a towel:

The way of envy and fighting and brooding—it started to leave me and another kind of thought came. . . . I told you before, God was turning my blood just like wringing out a towel. . . . It's like this, the water, I am speaking metaphorically now, the water is like the bad thoughts from before. The ways of my father, mother, and the blood of my father and mother, were in me. Some of these things I myself did when I was young and when I was married.

Others, however, express despair at the prospect of ever being able to get people to change. One man described the failure, in turn, of village headmen, a succession of councillors, village court magistrates, and the revivalists to subdue the villagers:

Before I was afraid of the [village headmen appointed by the Australian colonial administration]. Then I watched his ways and put him behind me. Then I was afraid of the Councillor, then I learned his ways, and put him behind me. Then another came up: the village magistrate. I was afraid of him and behaved but then I saw his ways and wasn't afraid. Now look, I am walking all over the magistrate now. Then the revival came up. I threw out all of my [magic] but no—I know and am holding onto my things now. I am not afraid.

Similar thoughts have led some of the villagers to conclude that they should abandon attempts to pursue prosperity through Western ways altogether and should seek solutions which capitalize on Papua New Guineans’ unique strengths. Bryant Allen (1980) said that a prominent Dreikikir man who had taken the lead in introducing cash crops and cooperatives and had participated in the local government system had, by the end of his life, concluded that these things would never work for the Papua New Guineans, who should seek wealth their own way through cargo cults and initiations. Similarly an elderly Asanakor Christian (who had also been a village headman) suggested that submitting to the law and the church had only made Papua New Guineans into weak and dependent “women” in a white man’s world. He said that his village, Asanakor, had been “rough” and able to defend themselves against sorcerers until “the law and the mission” came and “beat” them “down”:

Inakor village you are all just women—lots of time I’ve come up here because men have died. . . . I, Asanakor, have another kind of head: whoever does anything to me, I finish it right away—I, Asanakor, I am another kind: I am a
rough village. Before, I was really really rough. You, Inakor village, no. You are just women. It is just now that the law and the mission have come and beat me down.

He spoke again later of earlier times when people had been rough and able to defend themselves:

If I was still in charge we would have gotten rid of sorcery a long time ago. Look when Japan came to Wewak [during World War Two] the natives there were protected by white men. But when they came here to the bush it was just us. We ourselves, we bush people [Tok Pisin: bus kanaka], killed and threw out the Japanese, then we threw out all of the sorcerers. Now the council and the magistrate are weak.

Thus, people's beliefs about the link between community and prosperity have a far-reaching impact on their approach to change. In turn this could have serious consequences in the future, perhaps in the form of a resurgence of such activities as warfare which capitalize on the (perceived) fractious nature of Papua New Guineans, or, alternatively, in increasing popularity of such activities as revival movements, which seem to promise release from this nature.

There are indications of similar patterns in other areas. The ideas that everyone in the community has to cooperate for magic to work and that fighting within the village is inimical to prosperity are quite common in lowland and insular Melanesia. For instance, Lawrence (1964, 225), suggested that people in many areas of Melanesia believe that the whole community must follow prohibitions for magic to work, and ethnographers have noted that people in many areas believe that fighting or suppressed anger causes illness and can sabotage communal activities like fishing (Schwartz 1962, 307; White & Watson-Gegeo 1990). Likewise, in many areas, bad weather, droughts, deaths, and poor harvests always led to an examination of conflicts in the community (see Brison 1988; Young 1971; Young 1983).

As among the Kwanga, such beliefs may lead to the common emphasis on the necessity for cooperation, harmony, and universal participation in order for cargo cults to succeed. For instance, just as traditional activities were thought to depend on everyone getting along and observing a complex set of prohibitions, so cargo cult leaders often said that the cargo would not come until people lived in harmony and followed an elaborate code of behavior (Lawrence 1964, 80). Lawrence noted (1964, 82) that in
the Madang area people thought that the cargo would only come if everyone converted to Christianity and followed the ten commandments. Yali, the leader of a Madang movement, also attributed Papua New Guineans' poverty to their lack of social organization (Lawrence 1964, 123).

The parallels are particularly striking between Kwanga analyses of their social movements and those of participants in the Paliau movement in Manus. Manus villagers frequently stressed the need for everyone to cooperate and to follow the directives of leaders. One of Paliau's followers, for instance, stressed that Jesus' chief message had been that people should not fight among themselves (Schwartz 1962, 255, 259). Paliau himself also said that the movement would never succeed unless people stopped fighting among themselves and obeyed their leaders (Schwartz 1962, 263). Cult participants were supposed to avoid doing things like gossiping and boasting, which could cause trouble in the group (Schwartz 1962, 264), and people were encouraged to reveal all their hidden grievances in public so that the community could attain a state of perfect harmony (Schwartz 1962, 285).

As in Inakor and Asanakor, the belief that success required universal cooperation resulted in a great deal of public badgering of skeptics. Leaders frequently exhorted their followers to be more cooperative and chastened those who did not obey leaders (Schwartz 1962, 298, 303). As the cult progressed people began to complain more and more about dissension within villages (Schwartz 1962, 303), perhaps indicating that, as in Inakor and Asanakor, the pressure to conform actually increased opposition to the movement. Finally, as in Inakor and Asanakor, when one phase of the movement failed, the Manus people retrospectively said this was because villages had been divided in their support (Schwartz 1962, 350). Thus, in the Paliau movement, a belief in the need for cooperation seemed to have produced dissension that caused participants to abandon the movement, but then to later conclude that they might have succeeded if only everyone had cooperated.

There are also indications that people all over the country are reaching similar conclusions about the nature of Papua New Guineans and their society. For instance, Paliau complained that his followers were not like white men who "could make a group decision and carry it out" (Schwartz 1962, 263). Paliau scolded his followers for being unlike the people of other countries where: "if [leaders] were men with good ideas who gave their ideas to the rest, [they] are obeyed by their followers. Whatever they
say is listened to and carried out” (Schwartz 1962, 352). Paliau also urged his followers to try to maintain unity and harmony within the group (Schwartz 1962, 264) in order to become more like the white men. Errington (1974) suggested that Karavar Islanders seem to be as much enamored with Europeans’ ability to live in harmony and to cooperate with each other as with their wealth.

In concluding, examining the beliefs that seem to inform both cargo cults and the local people’s approach to other types of projects and movements has revealed an obsession with social harmony that seems to shape a wide range of behavior. Modern movements seem always to fail in local eyes, and each new failure proves to people that they cannot do something they traditionally prided themselves on, that is, to transcend petty bickering in the community and launch magnificent and empowering communal endeavors like male cult initiations.

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Notes

1 See, for instance: Allen (1976b, 200–201) on Dreikikir district people; Brunton (1989) on the Tannese; Counts and Counts (1976, 295–297) on the Kaliai of East New Britain; Errington (1974, 258, 263, 264) on Karavar Island; Lawrence (1964, 123) on the Yali movement in Madang.

2 I refer to “the Kwanga” for convenience, but the statements in this paper apply to eastern Kwanga villages (speakers of the “Kwanga Two” dialect) and not to the western, “Kwanga One,” villages.

3 Errington (1974), McDowell (1988), and Scaglion (1983) also argue that Papua New Guineans approach cargo cults, new religious movements, and more pragmatic development projects with similar ideas and expectations. They all
suggest that Melanesians have an “episodic” view of history that shapes their expectations of all kinds of social movements. People expect programs designed to bring about specific and limited sorts of changes to have much more dramatic results. On the similarity between expectations of cargo cults and other sorts of projects and movements see, on the local government council system and national politics: Adams 1982, 66; Allen 1976a; Gerritsen 1981; Kaima 1989; Schwartz 1962; on various kinds of self-help development schemes: Adams 1982, 66; Calvert 1976; Counts and Counts 1976; Allen 1976b, Allen 1980; Errington 1974; Gerritsen 1981; Gesch 1984, 8; Leach 1982; May 1982a; Ogan 1972, 162.

4 Allen (1976b, 174–5) noted at least one cargo cult–like movement among the Wam and Urat people to the north of the Kwanga prior to World War Two.

5 Scaglion (1983) stated that changes such as Papua New Guinean independence provoked a great deal of anxiety and fear, since people thought that this would lead to an apocalyptic transformation of their world.

6 Tuzin (1980, 141) also argued that male cult imagery among the Ilahita Arapesh emphasizes social harmony. He said cult rituals stress that “complete unanimity of purpose and of action will enable men to achieve the great works of which men in groups are capable.”

7 Gesch (1984) also argued that people seek this same kind of initiation into the secrets of Western wealth from associations with schools, church, and business ventures and conclude that these activities are failures when they do not produce the excessive and wondrous results that were traditionally believed to follow cult initiations.

8 This highly sarcastic comment pointed to the arrogance displayed by the Inakor and Asanakor Christians when they revealed men’s cult paraphernalia to women and children in Apangai without the permission of the village leaders. The members of the Inakor-Asanakor team had acted as if they were so much more powerful and knowledgeable than the Apangai people that they need not bother to respect local wishes. The statement also contains a veiled threat against the revivalists who are characterized as foolishly acting as if they were “out of reach now” and need not fear retaliation.

9 I owe this insight to Stephen Leavitt. Brunton (1989) made a similar observation about religious movements. He said that when villagers begin to suspect that some people are not following the requisite prohibitions, they will abandon religious complexes fearing either that these complexes will become weak and will not provide adequate power to fend off outside attack or that they will lose control over the power generated by the movement and it will prey randomly on community members.

10 Brunton argued that people will return to past religious complexes, thinking that these only failed in the past because of dissension in the community.
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