Reviews of Tonga and Tuvalu are not included in this issue because of unforeseen circumstances.

**American Samoa**

The November 1988 elections for governor and for congress were the highlights of the year under review in the territory. The hotly contested elections resulted in an impressive victory for Peter Tali Coleman over incumbent governor A. P. Lutali, while Faleomavaega Eni Hunkin defeated a strong opponent in High Chief Tufele Li'a for the US congressional seat. Coleman's return for a second term after a four-year hiatus, and the subsequent election of Lutali as vice president of the senate, marked the beginnings of an unprecedented polarization between the executive and legislative branches. Relations between Congressman Hunkin, the new administration, and the legislature, also began on a tenuous note, tarnishing hopes for a cooperative effort to address issues affecting the territory.

In his first official act on assuming office in January 1989, the governor used an executive order to suspend the controversial 2 percent sales tax that had been introduced by the Lutali administration. In fulfilling this campaign promise, Coleman set the stage for conflict with the legislature (fono), which had not been consulted, and drew criticism from Congressman Hunkin, who voiced concern that the tax suspension might have negative repercussions in Washington. The governor's new proposal for a 4 percent excise tax met with vigorous opposition in the legislature, and the Office of the Legislative Council filed suit against the executive branch in the High Court. By the time the court dismissed the complaint, the 120-day suspension of the sales tax had expired, the tax had gone back into effect, and US$600,000 in potential revenues had been lost. The governor favored the excise tax as a more effective revenue-earning measure, contending that it would be more easily applied and managed. He planned to reintroduce the proposal in the second regular session of the legislature in July 1989.

A second point of contention between the governor and the fono concerned the confirmation process for directors of government departments. Under previous administrations, department heads faced the vagaries of the "spoils system" with its associated uncertainties. Despite public reassurances that personnel would not be removed because of their political affiliations, it was common practice for directors' positions to be filled by supporters of the administration. Several of Coleman's nominees for directors' positions were turned down during confirmation hearings in the fono, which began in February 1989.

The most surprising rejection was that of Paramount Chief Mauga Ioane, former Eastern District governor and traditional high chief of Ma'uputasi County, who was to head the Office of Samoan Affairs. The governor ex-
pressed dismay at the Senate’s unprecedented failure to approve a traditional high chief for this job, but ill feeling between Mauga and Senate members had predisposed a majority to vote against him. Mauga had made disparaging remarks during his confirmation hearings, apparently perturbed over the Senate’s violation of the customary process whereby county councils select senators. He had contested the Senate’s selection of one of its own members for a disputed Ma’uputasi County seat and supported another candidate for the position.

The rejection issue exacerbated existing tensions between the governor and the fono, and Coleman sought “official notification” from the fono of their reasons for rejecting his nominees (SN, 23 May 1989). For its part, the fono sought the removal of three directors, on the grounds that it was illegal for nominees rejected by the fono to continue to serve, even in an acting capacity (SN, 23 May 1989).

The political impasse raised the issue of whether senators should be elected by popular vote, rather than through Samoan custom. In an address in early May 1989, Coleman stated “senators should be responsible and responsive to the voters.” Alluding to the excise tax measure having “died in the senate,” the governor “indicated that voters are unable to influence senators because they are not accountable to the voters” (SN, 5 May 1989). A bill introduced in the fono calling for a referendum on senate election methods could have a dramatic impact on the existing balance between fa’a Samoa and Western political institutions. An interesting sidelight of the issue was Paramount Chief Mauga’s ardent opposition to popular election of the Senate, even though his own confirmation hearings had spurred Coleman to advocate reform.

The controversial visit of US Vice President Dan Quayle in April 1989 illustrated the divergent views of leaders in American Samoa. Congressman Hunkin was critical of Quayle’s visit, calling it “a slap in the face” to other countries in the region, because it failed to focus attention on “the unique economic structures and other problems facing such nations” (SN, 5 May 1989). The governor called Hunkin “out of order and out of place . . . an embarrassment to our people and ourselves” for acknowledging Soviet “efforts to be friends with other island countries in the region” (SN, 5 May 1989).

Conflict over budget priorities further widened the breach between the congressional representative, the executive, and the legislature. The governor was upset by financial difficulties inherited from the previous administration, but attracted criticism for his “adversarial” attitude toward the legislature. The legislature was admonished for its handling of confirmation hearings, and for stonewalling executive initiatives. It was an inauspicious beginning for the new administration.

BILLY LEGALLEY

COOK ISLANDS

The year was dominated by the parliamentary elections of January 1989. The important issues were not policy matters, on which there was little differ-
ence between the parties, but rather personalities and practices.

The ruling coalition delayed the elections until the very end of the five years between elections permitted by the constitution. There was so much dissension within the coalition that each faction had its own candidates standing in opposition to its coalition “partners” in several electorates.

The main parties contesting the 1989 election were the Cook Islands Party and the Democratic Party. The Cook Islands Party, set up in 1965 by Mr Albert Henry, held power until 1978 when a corruption scandal led to the conviction of Henry together with Finbar Kenny, a US stamp dealer who had financed some of the illegal activity. Since then Mr Geoffrey Henry, a cousin of the founder, has led the main wing of the party. The Democratic Party was founded by Sir Tom Davis, who headed the government from 1978 until 1987, when he was ousted by the members of his own cabinet ostensibly because he was restrictive with finance, swore at them, and did not consult them enough. Sir Tom claims that he was attempting to restrain his senior cabinet colleagues from action that he believed to be corrupt and unethical. He was replaced by Dr Pupuke Robati, but the leader of one faction of the party, Mr Norman George, sought the leadership right up to the election.

Two parties formed late in 1988—the Cook Islands People’s Party, led by S. M. (“Cookie”) Sadaraka, and the Labour Party, led by Rena Ariki Jonnassen—also contested the election but won no seats.

A government ban on “political” material on the radio and in the newspaper over the Christmas period kept the formal campaign brief. The two major parties published manifestos a few days before the election, but it is doubtful whether they had much impact. On the smaller islands the issues were even more personal and localized than on Rarotonga, the site of the capital, where over half the population live. The reelection of Dr Robati (of Rakahanga) and Mr George (of Atiu) was considered a foregone conclusion, as they had arranged government “employment” for at least one voter from each family on their islands before the election. Government wages were paid, but whether real work was done is debatable.

Travel allowances were a major political issue. The Democratic Party coalition leaders had been traveling very extensively and drawing allowances far in excess of costs. Some ministers reportedly made more money from their travel allowances than from their salaries. When the issue became public two months before the election, and seemed likely to cost votes, greatly reduced allowances were announced. A trip which would have entitled a minister to NZ$12,942 (in addition to the cost of accommodation) under the old system, netted him NZ$3,762 at the new rates (Petitioner, 10 Jan 1989). When Foreign Minister Norman George, who had just built a home for NZ$250,000, was asked whether he put such travel allowance surpluses in his pocket, he replied “Where else?”

Crime was a matter of concern at many levels. Theft has increased considerably on Rarotonga, but international crime was a much bigger issue. Was the Italian hotel project for the
benefit of the nation, as the government claimed, or a Mafia-linked investment involving payoffs to key figures associated with the Democratic Party, as its critics claimed? The new government commissioned an inquiry into the matter. Meanwhile, allegations of links between the leadership of the Cook Islands Party and Australian organized crime surfaced again when a convicted Sydney criminal visited party leaders several times during the campaign. The connection between drugs and politics was also a matter of much speculation on Rarotonga. A ship registered in the Cook Islands was seized by the US Coast Guard shortly before the election, and its crew was convicted in Honolulu of transporting drugs from Asia to the United States.

There was also much debate about the increased size of the police force, and about whether the Cook Islands needed, or could afford to run, an Australian-donated patrol boat.

In the election, the Cook Islands Party won 13 of the 24 seats and, with the support of the two-man Demo Tumu faction of the Democratic Party, was able to form a government. The former Democratic–Cook Islands Party coalition under Dr Robati won 10 seats. The election for the seat representing Cook Islanders temporarily resident overseas was declared void as the result of a court case, and a by-election was called.

Constitutional issues have been raised, but not acted on, in recent years. The associated-state relationship that the Cook Islands has with New Zealand is not reciprocal. Cook Islanders have dual citizenship, and twice as many Cook Islanders live in New Zealand as in the Cook Islands. New Zealanders, on the other hand, need permission to visit the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands can sever the relationship at any time, whereas New Zealand cannot. The last five New Zealand prime ministers have indicated privately to the Cook Islands government that they would be happy to see the Cook Islands adopt a status of complete constitutional independence.

Certain areas of ambiguity in the relationship are sometimes awkward for both sides. For example, although the Cook Islands has progressively taken over responsibility for its own foreign affairs since achieving self-government in 1965, the two countries are still supposed to consult on defense issues. But when New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange banned nuclear ships from New Zealand ports, Cook Islands Prime Minister Sir Tom Davis declared that nuclear ships were welcome in the Cooks. Cook Islanders in the Cook Islands, unhappy with government action they believed to be corrupt or unconstitutional, have appealed as New Zealand citizens to the New Zealand government to intervene, which it has been reluctant to do.

The prospect of complete constitutional independence was raised by Mr Makiuti Tongia during the 1989 election, but none of the parties has ever publicly advocated this step. This reflects a general preference for the present relationship, which gives access to higher salaries, old age pensions, child allowances, sickness benefits, and a level of services in New Zealand not available at home. Nevertheless, New Zealand has increased the pressure to
sever the constitutional tie by reducing the level of aid.

Shortly after the election a distinguished Cook Island civil servant, Mr Tamarii Pierre, published an article in the *Cook Island News* noting the progressive decline in New Zealand aid and advocating a carefully thought out, ten-year program leading to constitutional independence. By the end of June 1989, however, there had been no public response, and politicians seemed to be concerned with more immediate priorities.

The new government increased some welfare payments, postponed acceptance of the Australian patrol boat offer, set up an education commission to rethink educational policy, and replaced the chief administrative officers on the outer islands and the membership of various statutory authorities (these have been political appointments for some years). The government was also considering making Christian education a compulsory part of the school curriculum. The opening of Parliament was deferred to the last day permitted by the constitution (90 days from the election), and major new legislation was not expected until later in 1989. Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited the United States, French Polynesia, China (for the Asian Development Bank meeting), New Zealand, Australia, and New Caledonia in his first three months in office. For a very small nation with limited resources, seeking aid from abroad remained a high priority.

**French Polynesia**

Following the social unrest in Papeete in October 1987, and the subsequent defeat of Gaston Flosse's Tahoera'a Party, the new coalition government, led by President Alexandre Léontieff, managed to survive internal ideological divisions as well as challenges by opposition parties and the State Administrative Court. Léontieff maintained a careful balance between the often conflicting agendas of the state, the territorial assembly, the local clergy, business operators, labor unions, and the local people. The new government initially set the redressing of the social and economic issues as its first priority. But political issues preoccupied it so often during the year under review, that business, labor unions, and others were increasingly asking if it was indeed capable of dealing with these issues in the remaining years of its term.

Much of early 1988 was spent trying to achieve consensus and a unified platform. Ministers such as Jacqui Drollet, leader of la Mana te Nuna'a certainly have ideological positions quite different from others in the coalition. What really kept the group together was a willingness to set aside political differences in order to maintain stability and tackle important domestic issues. However, barely three months into the year, the government became involved in the politics of the national elections. Although most members of the coalition supported Mitterrand, Léontieff (like Flosse) backed Chirac in the presidential elections of April 1988. Not surprisingly, relations between the governments in Paris and Tahiti were not especially warm. State funding of over
a billion American dollars—almost twice the amount spent in New Caledonia—was allocated to French Polynesia, but this included a substantial amount for strictly military expenditures. Léontieff also lacked the extensive local and regional networks that Flosse had carefully built during more than a decade in power.

The first major government crisis occurred in June 1988, when Nicolas Sanquer and Enrique “Quito” Braun-Ortega resigned from their ministerial positions because of internal dissensions. Braun-Ortega created a new “Center Group,” Hotu Nui, which joined the Tahoera’a in opposition to the Léontieff government. Despite these events, Léontieff and Emile Vernaudon were elected as deputies to the French parliament, delivering a resounding defeat to Flosse, and confirming Léontieff’s acceptance by the local population. His confidence boosted by victory at the polls, Léontieff appointed Emile Vernaudon and Louis Savoie to the vacant ministerial positions and replaced minister Patrick Revault with Francis Nanai.

Following the combined city and territorial celebrations in Papeete, which lasted most of June and July, Léontieff finally began to tackle the mounting economic problems. It is widely acknowledged that many of the present difficulties arose out of the demographic and economic disruption caused by the establishment of the Centre d’Expérimentation du Pacifique (CEP) in the early 1960s. This led to artificially high salaries in the government sector, the progressive abandonment of agriculture and fisheries, urban slums, and general social disruption. As the initial construction activities were completed, unemployment mounted. Although a temporary boom resulted from state and territorial investment following the cyclones of 1982–1983, it became increasingly evident that a comprehensive economic recovery plan was needed.

In August 1988, Léontieff announced a plan de relance that stressed incentives for private investment, extensive public works programs, stimulating tourism, revitalizing the primary sector, innovative and aggressive marketing of local products, public housing developments, and long-term projects that included development of phosphate deposits in the Tuamotus and industrial fisheries. At the same time, an effort was made to strengthen regional ties weakened after Flosse lost his position as French undersecretary of state for the South Pacific. Partly to fill this void, Léontieff invited the Honolulu-based Pacific Islands Development Program to host its annual Standing Committee meeting in Papeete in November 1988. He also attended the twenty-ninth South Pacific Commission meeting in the Cook Islands in October 1988.

During the fall assembly session, US$670 million were allocated to the annual territorial budget. There was serious difficulty in obtaining majority approval because of the opposition of the new center group. The budget narrowly passed, but only by a stratagem in which three ministers resigned, resumed their territorial assembly seats, and voted in favor of the government. Shortly afterward, they were reappointed to their ministerial posts.

However, Braun-Ortega soon chal-
lenged the legality of the government, since the territorial assembly had not been consulted about the November and June ministerial resignations and dismissals. The Administrative Court annulled the appointment of the five ministers involved. Braun-Ortega then asked Léontieff to resign because the remaining five ministers fell short of the minimum of six required by the 1984 statute. Fortunately for the government, the high commissioner ruled that an assembly vote on the ministers would be satisfactory. During the following session, the assembly confirmed the presidential choice of ministers, narrowly preserving the Léontieff government.

Two important issues emerged during the administrative session of the territorial assembly in June 1989. First, the statutory constraints and ambiguities that had diverted the government from implementing its economic and social initiatives, led to increasing resentment between Léontieff, the administrative court, and the high commissioner. At the same time, mounting concern was expressed over an expected invasion by foreigners once the European Community opened its borders to free movement of people and capital in 1993.

If political problems interfered with the implementation of economic programs during 1988–1989, social issues were no less problematic. Concern was mounting over urban unemployment, drug use, crime, and widening ethnic and economic divisions. Many of these issues are linked to the profound destabilization of the traditional economy during the past two decades. Consequently, the administration directed a very serious effort at youth problems, particularly in Papeete. The programs being developed included specialized education, job training, short-term public employment programs, and cultural events.

Meanwhile, Paris continues to control international migration, defense, and other areas. French Polynesia is important to France, not only because of its role in the nuclear testing program, but also because it is a critical link in a strategic chain of departments and territories that stretches across the Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, and includes potentially valuable exclusive economic zones. Despite its small size compared to the superpowers, France remembers its vulnerability in past wars, feels that its international role has been insufficiently acknowledged, and sees no reason to confine its activities to mainland Europe.

Nuclear testing has continued in both Moruroa and Fangataufa, but opposition in both Tahiti and the region has been muted by increased spending on aid projects, a successful international relations program by the new socialist government, and scientific reports that identify no short-term environmental hazards. However, budgetary constraints have resulted in a decline in the number of nuclear tests in the Tuamotus.

MOSHE RAPAPORT

NATIVE HAWAIIAN ISSUES

Although community outrage over billion-dollar Japanese investments in residential, commercial, and resort properties throughout the Hawaiian Islands...
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attracted the most media attention during the year under review, the major political story was the push for sovereignty by Native Hawaiians.

A culmination of two decades of land struggles, the sovereignty movement can be traced to the 1893 American military invasion of Hawai‘i, the subsequent overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani and installation of an all-white puppet government, and forcible annexation by the United States in 1898. Since 1900, portions of the Native Hawaiian community have agitated for various forms of self-government ranging from an autonomous land base within the American system to complete secession. Statehood in 1959 seemed to end these dreams, but now, thirty years later, sovereignty is in the air.

Strong resistance to self-government has emanated from predictable quarters. State agencies and officials that manage or use Native Hawaiian lands and waters have been the most opposed, including the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the governor, and various other government departments with access to Native Hawaiian resources. The tourist industry, including the airlines and major resort developers, is opposed to Native Hawaiian control of land because hotel development might be endangered. Finally, the federal government has never admitted culpability in the nineteenth-century extinguishment of the Hawaiian nation, thus preventing an equitable settlement of the issue of self-government for Native Hawaiians.

Although the push for sovereignty has been consistently resisted in the modern period, the number of organizations seeking sovereignty has mushroomed. By the end of 1988 there were at least a dozen identifiable groups with varying positions on the land base of the future Hawaiian nation, the structure of its government, and strategies for its achievement.

What the mechanism of self-government will look like is still unclear, but the level of Native Hawaiian consciousness is so high that when Senator Daniel Inouye’s Indian Affairs Committee came to Honolulu in the summer of 1988 to hear testimony on reparations for the overthrow and annexation, Hawaiian groups argued for self-government, not merely reparations.

The most compelling argument for sovereignty was put to the senator in terms of an extension of current American policy regarding native peoples within its borders. In the 1970s President Nixon changed the central principle of native policy from wardship to self-determination. The policies of termination were to be replaced by a commitment to tribal self-government. Part of this policy meant recognition of tribes by the federal government. Today, the United States government recognizes over three hundred Indian nations. Under existing policy, relations between the federal government and these Indian tribes are described as “nation-to-nation.”

In the Hawaiian case, there has been no federal recognition of native claims to self-government. The trust lands of the Hawaiian people are controlled by the state and federal governments, not the Hawaiian people. Presently, Hawaiians do not even have access to state and federal courts to bring claims...
of land abuse because they are officially classified as wards of the state, without litigation rights. Recognized Indian nations, by contrast, have this right, among others.

Inouye was stunned by this argument. He could not fail to see the injustice of federal recognition of one group of native people but not another. Pressured by Hawaiians calling for self-government, and cornered by the press at the hearing, Inouye finally acknowledged that “if native American Indians have sovereignty, it’s difficult to argue Hawaiians do not.”

That he could make this statement was a recognition of how far the sovereignty movement has progressed. For years, the debate was stuck at the question of American restitution for the overthrow of the monarchy and illegal annexation. But a groundswell from within Native Hawaiian communities has changed that.

After Inouye’s hearings, a Hawaiian rights conference in August 1988 was followed by an unprecedented public forum on sovereignty at the Hawai’i State Capitol in early December. Six Native Hawaiian organizations presented positions on the structure and land base of the proposed Hawaiian nation. After two days of intense discussion, two major strategies emerged. First, there would be direct negotiations with Inouye for federal recognition; second, an effort would be made to prevent the Office of Hawaiian Affairs from assuming the role of sole representative of the Hawaiian people.

Predictably, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs attacked the sovereignty movement and claimed that it could become the governing structure of the Hawaiian nation. Negotiations involving the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the governor’s office, and Inouye’s staff were planned. In order to squelch the drive toward self-determination that has sprung up throughout Hawaiian communities, an obvious strategy would be to federalize the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, making it a Hawaiian version of the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Meanwhile, land struggles continued on every Hawaiian island: against resort complexes with golf courses, hotels, and marinas; against polluting geothermal developments on trust lands; against leasing of trust lands and waters for military and other illegal uses; against disinterment of Native Hawaiian burial grounds to make way for development; and against grotesque cultural commodification by tourism.

In modern Hawai’i, tourism has joined state abuse of trust lands to form the single greatest cause of Native Hawaiian land dispossession. Over the last year, Hawai’i was inundated by six and a quarter million visitors consuming precious water, clogging highways, crowding beaches and parks, and demanding all manner of services from fast foods to golf and ocean recreation. In their native land, Hawaiians find themselves outnumbered by tourists in a ratio of thirty to one.

In the context of this tidal wave of non-natives, the push for a land base and some form of self-government is the only sane response to loss of control. Beyond this, the terrible socio-economic profile of Native Hawaiians—highest unemployment, highest prison population, lowest educational attainment, worst health conditions, and
largest outmigration from the islands—confirms the need for a resumption of Hawaiian control. A land base under exclusive jurisdiction of Native Hawaiians is the most intelligent answer.

In the next year, public confrontations between the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and sovereignty groups will escalate. The governor, meanwhile, is likely to use this as a ploy to continue state control of native resources. The senator will probably be looking for an easy way out. Hanging in the balance are over a million acres of Hawaiian trust lands and untold millions of dollars in potential revenues.

HAUNANI-KAY TRASK

MAORI ISSUES

The attempt to settle tribal claims to New Zealand’s coastal fisheries was the most important issue affecting Maori interests during the year under review. The government agreed to concede 50 percent of the total fishery to the Maori over a twenty-year period, but withdrew the enabling legislation in the face of mounting public opposition. However, the tribes did regain control of 10 percent of the fishery, and the balance of their claims remained before the courts in June 1989. The nature and development of the Maori claim are discussed here.

Under Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840, the British Crown guaranteed the Maori people of New Zealand “the full, exclusive, and undisrupted possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries, and other properties which they may collectively and individually possess.” Within eight years of the treaty being signed, the Crown took steps to extinguish native title to the land by “fair purchase.” But no such measures were taken to extinguish the Maori property right to the fisheries that was recognized and guaranteed by the treaty. With the establishment of the New Zealand Parliament in 1854, the government simply arrogated to itself both the freshwater and marine fisheries, and controlled them by the issuance of licenses for domestic and commercial use. Exploitation of the marine fishery was small-scale and benign until the 1960s. Thereafter, government encouragement of joint ventures with transnational fishing corporations in the interest of economic growth put the inshore fishery under stress. In 1986 the government introduced the Quota Management System to reduce the number of fishers, and to control the level of catch. Fishers and fishing companies were issued Individual Transferable Quotas to catch specified amounts of designated species of fish. The quotas were treated as individual property, tradable on the open market.

In 1985, before the quota system became effective, the Muriwhenua Incorporation, on behalf of the Maori tribes in the far north, lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal that the individual quota fisheries management system contravened Maori fishing rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi (Norman 1988, 184). That guarantee was incorporated in Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act of 1983, which stated that nothing in the act shall affect any Maori fishing rights (Waitangi Tribunal 1988, 6). Since Maori fishing rights were not defined in the act, the tribes of Muriwhenua
adduced evidence of traditional fishing grounds, defined by landmark coordinates and extending 25 miles out to sea, as well as the species caught there. On 30 September 1987, while the tribunal was still sitting, the Maori Council and Muriwhenua Incorporation sought a High Court injunction against the ministry of agriculture and fisheries for issuing quotas for squid and jack mackerel. They claimed that the ministry was issuing a property right in a fishery that belonged to the tribes.

On the evidence put before the Waitangi Tribunal, Judge Greig was satisfied that the tribes of Muriwhenua fished at least 12 miles out to sea, and that the area of seas fished was property in the same way land was. He concluded that the issue of quotas for the two species named affected Maori fishing rights and was therefore contrary to Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act. Accordingly he issued an order of restraint on the Quota Management System within the area of the Muriwhenua fisheries claim (Greig CP 553/87).

A much more comprehensive injunction to suspend the Individual Transferable Quota regime over all tribal fisheries was lodged in the High Court on 30 October 1987 by the Maori Council, Tainui Trust Board, and Ngai Tahu Trust Board, the latter representing the entire South Island. On the basis of the evidence in the Muriwhenua case, Judge Greig accepted that the Maori had a highly developed fishery around the entire coast of New Zealand prior to 1840. The fishery was divided into controlled zones defined by tribal boundaries along the coastline. There was no evidence that the Maori had relinquished their fishing rights, which were recognized in Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act. He concluded that the Quota Management System must be stopped on an interim basis because it contravened Maori fishing rights (Greig J CP 559/87, CP 610/87, CP 614/87).

The government was advised to negotiate with its Maori treaty partner how best to recognize these fishing rights. Both parties were given until 6 June 1988 to resolve the matter, and a joint eight-member working party was established.

The four Maori members of the working party asserted 100 percent tribal ownership of the fisheries, but conceded a willingness to share 50 percent with their treaty partner. The Maori were playing for high stakes since the industry is worth over a billion dollars and the government receives NZ$21 million per year in license fees. But government negotiators were only prepared to concede a package giving 29 percent to the tribes. This consisted of all of the inshore fishery (19 percent of the total fishery), and 12.5 percent of the deep water fishery (10 percent of the total) (New Zealand Parliament Joint Working Group 1988). With neither side willing to compromise, two separate reports were issued, and the working party dissolved.

Reluctant to go back to court, Minister of State-Owned Enterprise Richard Prebble and Minister of Fisheries Colin Moyle entered into direct negotiations with the Maori members of the working party. The result was the Maori Fisheries Bill, introduced into Parliament on 22 September 1988.
The bill was designed to give effect to Maori fishing rights by conceding 50 percent of the Individual Transferable Quotas, but at a rate of 2.5 percent per year over a twenty-year period. Maori negotiators accepted this formula, but objected to Sections 17 and 21 of the bill, which would have denied recourse to the courts, or the tribunal, for a twenty-year period. The tribes filed their case in the High Court as a fallback position. Pakeha feelings over Maori claims, to land as well as to fisheries, were running high. The government was under intense pressure from the fishing industry as well, with fishers threatening to withhold quota documents and resource rentals. The government withdrew the Maori Fisheries Bill (NZH, 5 Oct 1988). Instead, it conceded 10 percent of the fishery immediately, with a grant of NZ$10 million to establish the tribes in the industry, leaving the issue of control of the remaining 90 percent to be decided by the court. This formula mollified Pakeha backlash, because it was in accord with the Pakeha mind-set that Maori people constitute only 10 percent of the population and are therefore entitled to only 10 percent of resources. At the same time it shifted the conflict out of the political arena and into the courtroom. The Maori Council and the tribes set about preparing their evidence for the hearing of the Maori Fisheries case in August 1989.

RANGINUI J. WALKER

Niue

Self-governing in free association with New Zealand, Niue is a raised coral island with an area of approximately 260 square kilometers. The Niue constitution, adopted in 1974, provides all Niueans with New Zealand citizenship and unrestricted access to New Zealand. Population figures record a steady drop in the number of Niueans resident on Niue and a corresponding rise in the number living in New Zealand. The population dropped from 3578 in 1979 to 2988 in December 1985. By December 1986 it had fallen to 2757, and by October 1987 the total was down to 2414.

The steady, dramatic decline in Niue's population is attributable, at least in part, to the introduction of a regular air service to New Zealand during the 1970s, initially run by Air New Zealand. Ironically, the disruption of that air service emerged in 1988–1989 as Niue's most urgent problem. The island lost its regular air service in April 1988, when New Zealand's ministry of transport banned Air Nauru for allegedly failing to comply with international safety standards. Niueans had to rely on ad hoc air charters after that. The results were a disruption in the conduct of government and business on the island, a devastating effect on tourism, and an adverse effect on communications between Niueans living in New Zealand and those on Niue.

A New Zealand-based firm of consultants, McGregor and Company, was selected to assist the government of Niue to reestablish a commercially viable air service that meets the requirements of the Niuean people. Discussions began with various air transport operators currently operating in the South Pacific region to assess their ability to supply air services to
Niue. Consideration was also given to the various operational requirements that air transport operators may need, including air traffic rights, provision for night operations at Niue, and an extension to the runway at Niue.

The New Zealand government, obligated under the Niue constitution to provide the island with necessary economic and administrative assistance, funded the study, and will no doubt be involved with associated infrastructural work on Niue. An interim report was expected to be submitted in mid-1989. Following the Niue government's choice of a preferred air service, the consulting firm will act to assist in the establishment of the air service.

Niue's population decline led to the scrapping of the island's second five-year National Development Plan, intended for the period 1985 to 1990. So disturbing had the trend become that the Niue and New Zealand governments felt moved to formally commit themselves to "the maintenance of a living community in Niue." A new national development program based on this pledge was adopted by both governments on 1 December 1987, providing for funding from April 1988 through March 1991. While the Niue Concerted Action Plan 1988–1990 asserted at the outset that "there is not the general enthusiasm for life in Niue that is necessary for a living community to thrive," it nevertheless identified ways to restructure services and redirect resources to make life on Niue more attractive.

The plan incorporated the traditional budgetary and capital assistance allocations provided by New Zealand, while earmarking additional funds for new projects and activities explicitly intended to further the goal of maintaining "a living community" on the island. While New Zealand budgetary assistance for 1987–1988 was NZ$7.5 million, augmented by capital assistance of NZ$682,000, funds for the new plan's first year of operation (1988–1989) were NZ$9.25 million. Of this amount, NZ$1.23 million was allocated for special economic development projects and "the creation of appropriate social conditions" for the maintenance of a living community.

While the Niue Concerted Action Plan involved an increase in financial support, it was seen primarily as an attempt to identify Niue's resources and develop ways to use them more efficiently. Particular stress was given to the public service, which not only was to be reduced in size but was to act as "the primary agent" for rejuvenating the Niuean community. It was a measure of the atmosphere on Niue, or at least among those concerned about its future course, that the goal of the island's economic development program was not so much to raise the inhabitants' standard of living, or to improve the quality of life, as to "provide the people with a sense of purpose."

The debate about Niue's economic and cultural future also raised questions about the constitutional relationship with New Zealand. Constitutional changes recommended by the legislature in June 1989 included a Niuean governor-general to replace the New Zealand governor-general as head of state, localization of the Public Services Commission, and a reduction in the
number of members of Parliament from 20 to 18. A referendum on the proposed changes is scheduled for January 1990, after they have been reviewed by the Constitutional Review Committee.

STEPHEN LEVINE

TOKELAU

A non-self-governing territory administered by New Zealand, Tokelau consists of three small atolls with a total land area of approximately 12.2 square kilometers. A census conducted in 1986 reported a total population of 1690, an increase of 118 over a five-year period. More than 3000 Tokelauans now live abroad, principally in New Zealand and Western Samoa, a result of population pressure and the constraints of atoll life.

Tokelau is administered by New Zealand, and Tokelauans are New Zealand citizens. Following the provisions of New Zealand’s Tokelau Act, a new administrator for Tokelau was appointed by the minister for foreign affairs and began a three-year term on 27 January 1988. The Wellington-based administrator made his annual visit to Tokelau in April 1988. Responsibilities for day-to-day administration are delegated to the official secretary, who heads the Office of Tokelau Affairs, located in Apia, Western Samoa.

New Zealand’s administration of Tokelau is scrutinized by the United Nations General Assembly’s Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A report to the committee was distributed on 14 March 1989, following the transmittal of information by the New Zealand government to the United Nations Secretary-General on 10 February.

In April and October 1988, New Zealand representatives made statements to, and were questioned by, the Sub-Committee on Small Territories, and the Fourth Committee. At these meetings New Zealand emphasized the Tokelauans’ expressed desire to retain a special relationship with New Zealand and to defer moves toward an independent political status. Nevertheless, on 22 November, the General Assembly reaffirmed “the inalienable right of the people of Tokelau to self-determination and independence,” supported measures to promote political and economic development while preserving social and cultural traditions, and urged New Zealand to increase its development assistance to Tokelau.

In October 1988 Tokelau’s General Fono—a principal policymaking institution consisting of representatives of each atoll—agreed on a proposal for Tokelau to adopt its own flag and anthem. The fono also supported a visit by the faipule (the fono’s three joint chairs) and pulenuku (village mayors) to New Zealand for consultations with the administrator and the minister of foreign affairs, which took place the following month.

Discussions at that meeting focused on political and economic development and on transport. The Tokelau delegation requested a delay in the construction of airstrips on each atoll, and a redirection of resources toward improving shipping services and widening the reef passages. The airstrip
program, intended to reduce Tokelau’s isolation, and authorized by the General Fono in April 1987, was postponed indefinitely. However, New Zealand undertook to begin construction if and when Tokelau considers it is ready to introduce air service in the atolls, with costs met by allocations over and above New Zealand’s annual budgetary grant.

New Zealand’s budget aid covers more than 80 percent of Tokelau’s requirements, with the balance raised through shipping and freight charges; the sale of handicrafts, coins, and postage stamps; customs duties; and radio and telegram excises. The main expenditures include education, transport and communications, and public service salaries and expenditures. With 346 Tokelauans employed as of 31 March 1988, the Tokelau Public Service remains the main source of regular income in Tokelau.

Additional New Zealand aid is devoted to particular projects, including the work on the reef channels. Tokelau receives further assistance from various regional and international organizations, particularly the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). A UNDP indicative planning figure of about one million dollars was set for the period 1987 to 1991, with the upgrading of Tokelau’s communications equipment (destroyed during 1987 storms) representing the single largest project. Plans were also underway for UNDP to assist in providing new power generators for the atolls.

**Wallis and Futuna**

The French territory of Wallis and Futuna has long been considered a trouble-free spot, forgotten in the middle of the Pacific, its people living under the paternalistic authority of customary law, the Catholic church, and the French administration. Gaulist Senator Benjamin Brial was regularly reelected with over 90 percent of the votes. In spite of a somewhat low standard of living, the people were free to migrate to New Caledonia where well-paying jobs could usually be found relatively easily. Remittances could then sustain a higher standard of living for relatives back home. Thus these islands drifted along, seemingly far removed from the great winds sweeping the world. However, the events of 1988–1989 have shown that some upheavals may be brewing below the calm surface.

But first some facts. Wallis, whose population today is approximately 9000, was settled three thousand years ago by a Polynesian people who were subsequently conquered by Tongan warriors over the course of long wars. Common historical ties were established between the island of Wallis (or Uvea in Polynesian) and the Tongan archipelago, especially in the cultural and linguistic spheres. On the other hand, the 4000 people of Futuna, located some two hundred kilometers from Wallis, speak a Samoan language and share many cultural characteristics with the people of the islands of Samoa. As a result, in spite of joint French administration and a mutual belief in the Catholic faith, the peoples of Wallis and Futuna do not share a
common identity. In fact, Futuna is reluctantly tied to Wallis and its leaders have often expressed the wish to form a separate territory.

The superior administrator of the territory resides in Wallis, where most of the main administrative services are located. Wallis has a more solid infrastructure than Futuna. There are roads and public services, almost every household has running water and electricity, and taped television programs are regularly sent over from Noumea. Some seven hundred residents are salaried employees of the administration, the territory's biggest employer.

Futuna is somewhat isolated and at a geographical disadvantage. There are no roads and no cars, and the island is one tall, abrupt mountain, with no coastal plain. The tiny airfield has been open for barely a decade. Administrative jobs are rare, and there are few signs of development. While conditions are relatively affluent in Wallis, life in Futuna is much harder. Customary law in Wallis has lost some of its power, and various forms of acculturation have occurred, while in Futuna it has remained relatively intact. Within this basic context a new internal political debate is taking place, and signs of structural change have begun to appear beneath skies which, though calm, are not devoid of unstable patches.

The election of the single representative in Paris of the approximately 14,000 Wallisians and Futunans has always sustained the interest of the political parties in metropolitan France, who fight for a majority in Parliament and sometimes scrape for a few votes. The June 1988 elections did not result in the usual overwhelming return of the incumbent candidate, Benjamin Brial. Instead the outcome was ambiguous. The Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) canceled the results and called for a new election, which the rival candidate won with a landslide 57.44 percent of the votes.

An official candidate of the Presidential Majority Party (which supports François Mitterrand), the new senator has little in common with his predecessor. While Benjamin Brial comes from a part-Caledonian and part-Wallisian family, and has a background in business, Kamilo Gata is a thirty-year-old Futunan living in Wallis, who studied law in France and later headed a department in the territorial administration.

Brial represented the status quo, the tie between custom and church authority. He embodied the traditional order and perhaps also power held too long with no sharing and little real opposition. This static image was rejected by voters in favor of Kamilo Gata's more modern image and capacity to initiate a real political debate. As a Futunan living in Wallis, Gata is also able to rally voters from both communities and to encourage them to overcome traditional antagonism.

Gata is associated with the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche, a small left-of-center political party in France that has always preferred compromise to confrontation. He expresses careful and moderate views. However, he also represents, on a deeper level and with his own distinctive "Oceanian" style, the will for political change prevalent among educated youth. Without doubt, Kamilo Gata and the young advisers who surround him represent
the emergence of a new political generation characterized by its desire for greater modernity.

Kamilo Gata's victory was also due to a set of favorable external circumstances. François Mitterrand's election in France enabled him to benefit from the "legitimist reflex" of the population of both islands, who are inclined to go along with the majority in France. Developments in New Caledonia also played a role. The Wallisian and Futunan population in Noumea numbers 15,000, slightly more than live in the islands. As a result, the continued prosperity of many families in Wallis and Futuna and the social stability of the islands depend on the existence of this migrant community. Its return to the islands would be considered catastrophic. Anything that affects the Grande Terre is bound to have important repercussions in these two isolated islands.

The dialogue between the Rassemblement Pour la Caledonie dans la République (RPCR) and the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) in New Caledonia, which led to the signing of the Matignon Accord in August 1988, was approved, if only because it brought peace. Nonetheless, it puzzled Wallisian and Futunan voters used to rather more Manichaean political patterns. In the face of a shifting political scene, the change in voting patterns is an indication that most Wallisian and Futunan voters have chosen to wait and see and to adopt a neutral position. The majority who supported Kamilo Gata did not support the pro-independence movement, but rather asserted their own identity and autonomy. They expressed the need to establish their own political framework in order to avoid remaining the unconditional followers of the RPCR.

In the same vein, a new party made up of Wallisians and Futunans was established in Noumea to compete in New Caledonia's provincial elections on 11 June 1989. The Union Océanienne kept an equal distance from both main parties, the RPCR and the FLNKS, and asserted the will of the Polynesian emigrant community to follow an "Oceanian" line, thereby reducing friction with Melanesian parties. The party captured 6.2 percent of the votes in the Southern Province, and gained two seats in the provincial legislature.

Kamilo Gata's election and the creation of the Union Océanienne in Noumea signal changes in a situation that has remained static for a long time. But what seems even more significant is the structural link that now closely ties the situation in Wallis and Futuna to events, whether happy or unhappy, in New Caledonia.

JOEL BONNEMaison

WESTERN SAMOA

On 26 February 1988, some 20,000 matai (chiefs) and 2000 individual voters (people of European and part-European descent) out of Western Samoa's population of 175,000 went to the polls (SMH, 29 Feb 1988). The usual mass creation of matai titles that precedes every election had taken place throughout the previous year. Matai voters increased from 16,500 in 1985 to almost 20,000 in the 1988 election (IB, April 1988). Outgoing Prime Minister Vaai Kolone and Tupua Tamasese Efi,
holder of a *tama-a-aiga* title (the highest titles) and leader of the Christian Democratic Party, were unopposed in their electorates. The rest faced the rigors of the campaign.

As in previous elections, the 1988 campaign featured the practice of *faatosina* (literally meaning to attract using all the means at one's disposal). In effect, this is an attempt to reconcile traditional gift exchange with the political anomaly of bribery. By 1988 it had come to mean the legal exchange of money and other gifts, such as carcases of beef, cartons of tinned fish, and liquor, between candidate and constituent up to twenty-one days before the election. Evidence of *faatosina* could be seen in Apia, especially in the RSA club at Beach Road where numerous *matai* enjoyed beer bought by the candidates.

There were allegations that thousands of *tala* (the Western Samoan currency) had been supplied by local and foreign companies for the campaign (*IB*, June 1988). Tofilau Eti Alesana, leader of the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), denied receiving large sums of money for his campaign but suggested an inquiry to investigate such allegations (*PIM*, Sept 1988).

Several weeks after the election, time enough for the independent candidates to be enticed by one or other of the major parties, it appeared that the result was a 23-seat tie between the outgoing coalition government and the HRPP. Then the coalition gained a one-seat majority when the court declared their candidate the winner in a Falealili seat tied on election night. However, when Parliament met on 7 April to elect a prime minister, an independent candidate, Tanuvasa Livigisitone, switched his allegiance from the coalition to HRPP, and the pendulum swung back in favor of the HRPP. Tofilau Eti Alesana was elected prime minister, and Tanuvasa was promptly rewarded with a cabinet portfolio as minister of economic development and tourism (*PR*, 14 April 1988). Meanwhile the coalition formed itself into a single political party called the Samoa National Development Party (SNDP) under the leadership of Tupua Tamasese Efi.

By May 1988, the HRPP majority had increased to six seats after three SNDP members lost their seats as a result of court decisions; one of them was the previous minister of education, Le Mamea Ropati, who was found guilty of "personation" at the polls (letting others vote on behalf of *matai* who were away on election day). The government’s majority increased to seven when Tupuola Siaosi, a former SNDP member, declared himself an independent. The four by-elections on 23 July gave two seats to each of the major parties. One of them resulted in the return to Parliament of Fiame Naomi, the only woman among the *faipule* (members of Parliament). Fiame had lost her seat at Lotofaga to Fata Siaosi on election night, but Fata’s subsequent loss of his *matai* title at the Lands and Titles Court had made him ineligible to be a *faipule* (*PR*, 28 April 1988).

Despite the clear majority, all was not well in the HRPP camp. The party was split over the question of cabinet positions, reminiscent of the situation in 1985 when Vaai Kolone and twelve others left to form their own party. The
issue was whether to favor the newcomers, with their impressive academic backgrounds, or the experience of the seasoned members. Party unity was saved when Toi Aukuso Cain, back for his fourth term and earmarked to be minister for public works, gave up his portfolio in favor of a newcomer (IB, June 1988).

In the absence of any clearly defined political ideology, the parties are loosely bound by personality ties and political expediency. To prevent its backbenchers from being enticed across the floor by offers of seats on the front benches, HRPP resorted to signed affidavits (PIM, Sept 1988). But without a common conviction, such pledges were as loose as a hat on one's head.

The new style of party politics has had an adverse effect on continuity. HRPP went to the polls with promises to halt certain developments instigated by the former coalition government. One of the crucial areas was education.

A complete facelift of the education system, formerly based on the New Zealand model, had been in motion for some years. The curriculum was to include more local content, and the schools outside Apia were restructured to become junior secondary schools. The elitism that grew out of the old selection process, with the cream of the students going to Samoa College, was to be alleviated by turning that school into a senior secondary school, with Vaipouli College developed as its equivalent at Savaii. Another secondary school, Avele College, renowned for its fine tradition of rugby and singing, was to be closed down and its students absorbed by other state and mission schools. The wonderful site of Avele, half a mile up the hill from R. L. Stevenson's former residence, was recommended for a university campus.

A petition to Parliament by the association of ex-pupils of Avele was taken up by HRPP and turned into an election promise. Educational developments in Samoa hinged on the outcome of the election. After its victory at the polls, HRPP duly carried out its promise. Avele College was reopened, and the old New Zealand model reinstated.

The National University of Samoa was also dealt a few blows by the new government. After losing Avele campus, the university had to face a review of its activities. The report of the review committee reflected ongoing disagreements among politicians, academics, and other interested parties over the aims and objectives of the University Act, 1984, and the ability of the economy to pay for such a venture. The prime minister's preference was for slow progress for the university (PIM, Sept 1988). By the end of June 1989, slow progress meant no library, no laboratories, and staff sharing substandard facilities with students. Furthermore, the report recommended changes in course components, an indefinite halt to one degree program, and abolition of a new course before it started.

Ever since the Public Service Association (PSA) strike in 1981, HRPP had appeared to champion the PSA cause. But when the prime minister announced that the PSA would be one of his portfolios, there were loud complaints from within the association. The president of the Teachers Association, Le'auala Tavita Amosa, con-
demanded the move as undemocratic and argued that it was a form of coercion designed to neutralize the bargaining powers of pressure groups. The two major newspapers, which had strongly supported the PSA in 1981, were equally loud in their protests. By the end of 1988, a new PSA executive had been elected, and the association’s independence from government control had been preserved.

A record budget of WS$134 million (US$67 million) was tabled at the end of 1987. Like all governments before it, HRPP faced the challenge of making the country economically self-sufficient. Without the WS$38 million in remittances from Samoans living overseas, the trade balance would be in substantial deficit (AFR, 9 March 1988). Up to 30 September 1987, exports were worth WS$8 million, while imported goods cost WS$48 million (SMH, 23 Nov 1987). However, statistics never truly reflect the standard of living in Western Samoa. With most of the food in the rural areas produced at little or no monetary cost, the bite of a depression is hardly felt. Church and traditional obligations are more demanding on the dollar than daily subsistence.

The government went ahead with a proposal tabled by the former coalition government for the establishment of offshore banking (AFR, 9 March 1988). The fish market, built with Japanese aid funds but later leased to a private company by the previous minister of economic development, was repossessed.

External and internal pressure for the government to review the suffrage issue was applied during the year, particularly by the women’s movement. One of their arguments was that a wider suffrage could decrease the amount of corruption in election campaigns. With only a small percentage of women matai, only a few women have the right to vote, let alone stand for Parliament. Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana supported the idea of a plebiscite to survey public opinion, but indicated his preference for a minimum voting age of thirty, and only matai candidates (PIM, Sept 1988).

IOANE LAFOA’I

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