RE-EDUCATING THE JAPANESE: THE U.S. OCCUPATION AND POSTWAR JAPAN'S FIRST MINISTER OF EDUCATION

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Defeat of Imperial Japan and the Allied Occupation

On the early morning of 7 December 1941, the Empire of the Rising Sun launched a spectacular attack on Pearl Harbor and, as if dreaming of its own glory, began the conflagration of the Pacific and Asia. On 26 July 1945, the Allied powers, certain of the victory over Japan, issued the Potsdam Declaration, with explicit Allied demands: (1) punishment for "those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"; (2) complete dismantlement of Japan’s war-making powers; and (3) establishment of "freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights," all under Allied military occupation. The Allied powers urged the Japanese to surrender unconditionally or face "utter destruction."\(^1\) Because the declaration never specified the fate of the emperor, the Japanese government feared that surrender might terminate the emperor system. So, the Japanese chose to "mokusatsu," a deliberately vague but fateful word that literally means "kill by silence,"\(^2\) until the Allied powers guaranteed the life of the emperor.

Because of the Japanese government’s silence, the Allied Powers concluded that Japan had rejected the Potsdam Declaration. President Harry S. Truman gave the order to drop the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Two hundred thousand

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died.³ On August 8, the Soviet Union, which had maintained the neutrality pact with Japan, declared war on Japan,⁴ and at the same time Soviet troops crossed the border into Manchukuo and began massacring Japanese soldiers and citizens who failed to escape.⁵

On August 9, Nagasaki received a more powerful atomic bomb than did Hiroshima.⁶

One hundred twenty thousand died.⁷ On 15 August 1945, the Emperor's proclamation to surrender was broadcast over the radio throughout the nation. The "Great Empire of Japan" (Dai Nippon Teikoku) lost the Greater East Asia War⁸ (Pacific War). Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro, while resigning, assured the nation that Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration with one condition, that there would be no change in the national polity; that is, the emperor would still rule the nation. Suzuki deliberately ignored the terrible reality of unconditional surrender in the Potsdam Declaration.⁹ Vanquished Japan was to be occupied by the Allied powers "until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved."¹⁰ On August 11 President Truman designated U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

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⁶ Ibid., 246.


⁸ Japan used the term "the Greater East Asia War (Dai Toa Senso)" to refer to the war with the Allied power until SCAP banned using the term in a directive, "Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto)" issued on December 15, 1945, in SCAP, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, vol. 2 (1949), 468. For a general history of the Pacific War and the Occupation, see Duus, *Modern Japan*, 231-273.


MacArthur received a directive from Washington about his authority: SCAP had supreme power in the hierarchical relationship with Japan and would indirectly control Japan by using the Japanese government. The Potsdam Declaration would be the basic policy of the occupation.\(^\text{12}\)

Although the Allied Powers in principle occupied Japan, in reality, the United States monopolized the occupation of Japan by formulating policies until inter-allied policy machinery was established in 1946, several months after occupation began.\(^\text{13}\) Britain and the Soviet Union wanted to participate in the occupation as they felt that they too contributed to the Allied victory. So, their foreign ministers met with the American Secretary of State in Moscow, and on 27 December 1945, they agreed to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan.\(^\text{14}\) The Far Eastern Commission met regularly in Washington to guide MacArthur in matters of basic policy. The Allied Council for Japan, composed of representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth, met regularly in Tokyo to supervise MacArthur.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{11}\) James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State to Max Grassli, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland, 14 August 1945, official letter, in Appendix A: 8, "Secretary of State Byrnes' Reply of August 14, 1945" in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 418; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 32.


\(^{13}\) Mark Taylor Orr, "Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1954), 59 and 261.


Neither of the bickering multinational policy-making bodies could act effectively without the agreement of the United States, and neither was allowed to function as intended.\textsuperscript{16} The United States government remained the direct transmitter of policy decisions of both bodies and could issue interim directives whenever "urgent matters" arose without the consent of the committee.\textsuperscript{17} The U.S. government in Washington and MacArthur in Tokyo welcomed the chaos among the Allied powers as an opportunity to monopolize control of Japan.\textsuperscript{18}

MacArthur claimed that the United States should have the exclusive right over Japan because it had defeated Japan. The U.S. government wanted to avoid an annoying situation with Allied powers over zonal military occupation.\textsuperscript{19} In essence, the United States government independently decided on the most critical policies of the occupation during the war, and eventually Allied powers accepted those policies.\textsuperscript{20}

The Occupation's Reforms

On 2 September 1945, in Tokyo Bay, on the U.S. battleship Missouri, the Japanese delegates signed the terms of the surrender.\textsuperscript{21} The Allied Occupation officially

\textsuperscript{17} "Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing Far eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan,” December 27, 1945, Appendix A; 10 in SCAP, Government Section, \textit{Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948}, vol. 2, 421.
\textsuperscript{18} Orr, "Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan," 261.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 261.
began. The subsequent political and educational reforms under the Occupation changed Japan forever. During the six years and eight months of occupation, Japan underwent drastic changes, unprecedented since the 1868 Meiji Restoration.  

The Americans were determined to transform Imperial Japan into a democratic and peace-loving country. The United States’ wartime enmity toward Japan developed a desire to make sure that Japan would never again threaten the national security and interests of the United States and its neighboring countries. U.S. officials believed that for Japan to become a peace-loving member of the world community, it had to be transformed into a democratic country. Thus, under the banner of democratization, the United States’ intention was to disarm Japan both physically and mentally. SCAP quickly took steps to erase any military influence within Japanese society. Nearly all soldiers and civilians were repatriated from Japan’s overseas colonies and territories occupied during the war. The Tokyo Military Tribunal tried Japanese war criminals between 3 May 1946 and 12 November 1948 for alleged crimes against humanity and peace. One million Japanese, judged as supporters of militarism during the war, were forced to resign from public posts.

MacArthur believed that the Meiji Constitution of 1889 was the blueprint for Japanese aggression and deification of the emperor and therefore had to be replaced.

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immediately. MacArthur ordered SCAP’s Government Section to prepare a draft of a new constitution of Japan. Officials in the Government Section wrote the draft in one week. After only minor changes, the Japanese Diet passed this American draft as the new constitution and put it into effect on 3 May 1947. The new constitution laid the foundation of democratic Japan, whose sovereign powers rested not in the emperor as in the Meiji Constitution but in the people. The emperor, deriving his position from the will of the people, was reduced to “the symbol” of the State. Notably, the new constitution embraced the American ideal of the "bill of rights," such as the separation of religion from the state; suffrage for 20-year-olds, including women; equality under the law of all family members; and an independent judiciary with the power of judicial review.

The reconstruction of Japan required not only dismantling Japan’s prewar political system but also reorienting people’s thinking. MacArthur and the staff of the General Headquarters (GHQ)--the term used in postwar Japan to refer to the military headquarters in Tokyo--understood the immensity of their task; numerous significant reforms in the areas of politics and economics would not survive if Japan’s future generations failed to comprehend and appreciate them. To do this, the United States first had to destroy what was considered Japan’s source of militarism--a strong patriotism supported by loyalty to the emperor and a belief in the divine origin of Japan--and replace

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28 *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol. 6, s.v. “occupation,” 52.
these beliefs with new democratic ideas. Educational reform was the key to this grand scheme.

Education in occupied Japan was fiercely political; to the U.S. government, it was the best instrument for achieving basic ideological change. Prior to and during the war, Japanese education had played a crucial role in enhancing and fortifying militant Japanese totalitarianism; it had been nurtured not only by the imperial government’s physical oppression, but also by the government’s effective mental conditioning of the Japanese people. The “reeducating” or “reorienting” of Japanese mores in favor of democracy called for an equally effective, systematic reconditioning. So, SCAP skillfully used Japan’s well-organized school system to reform the Japanese from militaristic to democratic citizens.

In charge of Japanese education at GHQ-SCAP was the Civil Information and Education Section (CI & E). Established on 22 September 1945, CI & E advised MacArthur on education policies for democratizing future Japanese generations and ensuring, through the mass media, that the Japanese people understood “the true facts of their defeat.” CI & E was also to eliminate “militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine

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32 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese” 8 January 1946, SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, p. 4 in United States, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the
and practice, including military training from all elements of the Japanese educational system." Further, it was instructed to disseminate "democratic ideals and principles through all media of public information" and "keep the supreme commander factually informed of public opinion." The Education Division in CI & E dealt daily with the Japanese Ministry of Education.

The new Japanese education, MacArthur ordered, must teach and practice the sanctity and supremacy of the people and not of the state. The American authorities demanded that there be no nationalism and militarism in Japanese education. CI & E rapidly issued directives to the Japanese government to eliminate militaristic and nationalistic elements in teaching personnel and in learning materials. SCAP suspended wartime indoctrination, especially the inculcation of patriotism through morals (Shushin) and Japanese history; its new contents were changed to the democratic ideology of the United States. This bold American experiment with the Japanese future made the Japanese people feel insecure, for it required the denial of everything the Japanese believed in and lived by. The largest paradigm shift was the denial of the emperor's divinity. On New Year's Day in 1946, the emperor declared that he was not sacred anymore, and that the Japanese people should abandon their racial superiority complex

Far East, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T1204, Roll 4); SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1948), 136.
33 SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol.2 (Tokyo: May 1948), 58.
34 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Reorientation of the Japanese" 8 January 1946, SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, p.4
35 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 143.
36 See Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 143 and 288.
37 Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, s.v. "educational reforms of 1947."
because there was no basis for it. The emperor became an individual just like anyone else. Now the Occupation was ready to proceed with reforms.

In early March 1946, MacArthur invited twenty-seven education specialists, headed by Dr. George D. Stoddard from the United States. This so-called U.S. Education Mission investigated the Japanese system and wrote recommendations for reforms.

On 30 March 1946, at the end of their short three-week stay, the mission submitted The Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan, to SCAP. The report recommended numerous reforms: the decentralization of educational administration, the adoption of co-education and equal access to educational opportunity, the establishment of an American style elementary-middle-high school system, an emphasis on learning through experience, and the revision of textbooks to emphasize principles of democracy and peace. This report became the all-powerful map for a massive reform.

The change in the political structure that ensued from the new democratic constitution altered the nature of public education, changes that not everybody welcomed. In the old regime, under the Meiji Constitution, the Imperial Rescript on Education established the purpose of education as strengthening the whole ideological
system centered around the emperor.\textsuperscript{45} However, the new constitution destroyed the validity of the Rescript.\textsuperscript{46} The ruling conservative party, who favored the Rescript, claimed that it should remain regardless of the character of governance, for it contained moral values that transcended space and time. Others argued that a new Rescript on Education should be issued to keep the indigenous Japanese morals such as loyalty and responsibility of the individual to the society.\textsuperscript{47} The harder the Japanese conservatives argued for retaining the Imperial Rescript on Education, the more determined SCAP was to remove it.\textsuperscript{48} In March 1947, the Diet passed the Fundamental Law of Education, which, retaining not a word from the Imperial Rescript on Education, proclaimed education as the right of the people, not some precious gift from the emperor. With the new constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education in force, the Imperial Rescript was declared dead by the Diet in June 1948, forever changing postwar Japan’s educational philosophy.\textsuperscript{49} The change imposed by MacArthur was intended to destroy Japan’s wartime semi-theocratic imperial government ideology. As a result, in postwar Japan, the Japanese people experienced sudden cultural severance. Japan lost some aspects of its cultural and spiritual heritage in the name of democratization. What SCAP considered as the source of militarism contained positive elements too. Selfless loyalty and love of one’s country are universal and natural sentiments. The United States tried to

\textsuperscript{45} Kobayashi, Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan, 54.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} See, Nishi Unconditional Democracy, 289.
\textsuperscript{49} Kobayashi, Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan, 56.
replace the indigenous ideology with an ideology of democracy.\(^{50}\) Ironically, the purpose of education did not change: education remained a tool of indoctrination.

**Purpose of Study**

Scholars differ about the source of the fundamental change in Japan’s postwar educational system. On the one hand, scholars tend to emphasize the Japanese government’s originality and initiative regarding education reform.\(^{51}\) Gary H. Tsuchimochi, in *Education Reform in Postwar Japan: The 1946 U.S. Education Mission*, discusses the significance of Japanese independent reforms under the occupation. He argues that the Japanese government initiated the postwar education reforms in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, which specified "the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."\(^{52}\) Studies by Tokiomi Kaigo and Shuichi Katsuta support this view. In *Nihon no kyoiku no shinenten*, Kaigo examines the reform proposals of the Kyoiku Kaikaku Doshikai, a prewar educational reform society, as evidence of the continuity of a prewar movement advocating education reform in Japan.\(^{53}\) Shuichi Katsuta, in *Nihon kindai kyoikushi*, maintains that the seeds for postwar education already existed in prewar Japan.\(^{54}\) Edward R. Beauchamp, in “Reforming Education in Postwar Japan: American Planning for a Democratic Japan, 1943-1946,”

\(^{50}\) See Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, 143 and 288.


\(^{52}\) Tsuchimochi, *Education Reform in Postwar Japan*, 6-7.


states that Japan had a reform movement even before the occupation and it formally began in the occupation. On the other hand, Kazuo Kawai, in Japan’s American Interlude, states that in postwar Japan there was not consensus as to what changes there should be in education among Japanese, so “it was natural that the initiative for proposals for educational reforms would come entirely from SCAP.” Kawai indicates that although some of SCAP’s proposals were inappropriate to the actual state of education, Japanese were “in no position to propose anything better.” Marlene J. Mayo, in “Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943-1945,” reveals that education reforms were well planned ahead by the United States and implies that the U.S. intentions were imposed on the Japanese government, which reluctantly changed its educational system. Mark Taylor Orr, in “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” discusses the United States’ well-organized and planned policies and indicates that SCAP executed its policies on an unwilling Japanese government. Some scholars stand in the middle, concluding that postwar educational reform was a combination of American initiative and Japanese self-motivated reforms. Eiichi Suzuki, in Kyoiku Gyosei, analyzes the original reform plan of the Ministry of Education and its relationship to the Occupation’s plan. Suzuki

57 Ibid., 186-187.
states that the Japanese initiative played a large role in the accomplishment of educational reform.\textsuperscript{60} Robert E. Ward, in his analysis of U.S. wartime planning for the occupation of Japan, concludes that the new leadership in Japan had already been motivated to reform, and the occupation further stimulated the reform movement.\textsuperscript{61}

Some scholars have viewed the reforms of the first postwar Minister of Education Maeda Tamon (1884-1962) as purely Japanese. Maeda served the office from 18 August 1945, before the Allied Occupation officially began, through the initial period of the Occupation, until 13 January 1946. He initiated educational reforms without interference of the occupation for the first two months after the occupation began. Hidefumi Kurosawa depicts Maeda as a liberal reformer. Kurosawa analyzes Maeda’s educational philosophy and concludes that it was nascent democratic thinking that began in prewar Japan.\textsuperscript{62} Eiichi Suzuki, on the other hand, describes Maeda as a conservative vanguard of prewar educational philosophy by citing Maeda’s statements emphasizing preservation of the national polity, the emperor system.\textsuperscript{63} Toshio Nishi also portrays Maeda as a conservative defender of the Imperial Rescript on Education.\textsuperscript{64} These divergent interpretations are not surprising because Maeda’s reforms were a combination of the old and the new. While he emphasized preserving the emperor as the source of moral

\textsuperscript{60} Suzuki, \textit{Kyoiku gyosei}, 3.
\textsuperscript{63} Suzuki, \textit{Kyoiku gyosei}, 126-132.
\textsuperscript{64} Nishi, \textit{Unconditional Democracy}, 147-148.
education, he also advocated liberal changes, such as abolishing regimental teaching, developing critical thinking, and strengthening scientific education.

By placing Maeda’s reforms in comparison to those of the United States, my study clarifies how the Japanese government and occupation administrators viewed the democratization of Japan differently. Maeda assumed that his reforms met with SCAP’s demands. However, SCAP thought differently.

Limitations

This study examines the period from just before Japan surrendered in August 1945 to January 1946 when Maeda resigned, so it does not discuss the rest of the period of the Allied Occupation, which ended in 1952. Furthermore, this study does not examine other reforms, such as economic, legal, and political.

Methodology

To understand the U.S. plan for educational reform and its reaction to Maeda’s reforms, I use the minutes from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and Intelligence Reports of the State Department. To understand MacArthur’s General Headquarters’ reform plan, I use the Bonner F. Fellers papers archived in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. For Maeda’s

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66 United States, Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender” Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119 December 9, 1946, File 097.3 Z1092.No 4119S, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc., Reel 3, Item 28).
educational and career background and his educational philosophy, I use Maeda’s reminiscence, *Sanso seishi*, and *Maeda Tamon: sono bun sono hito*, which is a compilation of his writings and his friends’ recollections about him. To discuss the interaction between the Civil Information and Education Section, GHQ and the Ministry of Education, I use the Joseph C. Trainor papers archived in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University and intelligence reports of the United States agency. Important secondary sources include John W. Dower’s *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*; Toshio Nishi’s *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952*; Marlene J. Mayo’s "Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943-1945"; and Mark Taylor Orr’s “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan.”

**Note on Japanese names & Translation of Japanese documents**

Throughout the paper, I have followed the Japanese convention in which the family name precedes the given name (thus, for example, Education Minister Maeda’s full name is Maeda Tamon). This rule is reversed in identifying the authors of publications: I followed the Western order for authors of all publications both in English and Japanese. Translation of Japanese documents is indicated in footnotes.

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Chapter II
Prewar Japan: Religion and Education

The Occupation’s efforts in the field of education cannot be properly evaluated except against the background of Japan’s earlier system. Prewar Japan’s education system mirrors the intentions and purpose of the country’s efforts to build a modern nation state. This education system was specifically designed to transform a feudal state into a unified, modern nation-state.¹ The original aspiration for its modernization was to defend its country from the military menace of the Western powers. Fear of foreign military powers guided Japanese leaders to build up its newly established state. However, the real fear was the spiritual and religious encroachment of the West. To understand the role of education in prewar Japan, it is necessary to understand this religious aspect of Japan’s modernization. In this chapter, I discuss Japan’s religious and ideological beliefs in premodern Japan (the Tokugawa period), then introduce the dilemma that freedom of religion brought in modern Meiji Japan, and finally discuss the role of education in prewar Japan.

Japan’s Seclusion against Christianity

Catholic missionaries introduced Christianity to Japan in the middle of the 16th century. Until then, Japan had a polytheistic spiritual tradition based on its indigenous religion, Shinto, and foreign religions—Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. The

¹ See Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 183
Japanese people regarded nature itself, such as mountains, rivers, rocks, trees, as manifestation of gods. In fact, it was said that in Japan there were over eight million deities, including those of foreign origins. According to the Japanese ancient history classics, Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters, 712 A.D.) and Nihon Shoki (Chronicles of Japan, 720 A.D.), kami (divinity) created the Japanese islands to be ruled by an emperor who was a descendant of Amaterasu Omikami, the sun goddess. This indigenous myth and other legends were crystallized as a religious system, Shinto (the way of kami), in a dynamic interaction with foreign-origin religious and philosophical systems.

The Japanese have been tolerant of foreign religions as long as the religions have been flexible enough to adapt to the indigenous beliefs. The Japanese tendency to adopt or reject a foreign idea has not been an either-or exclusivity, but rather a both-and inclusivity. As a result, no single religion or philosophy has dominated; rather, each religion has contributed its concepts of ideal behavior. Shinto emphasizes ritual purity and sincerity and inner purity of thought and action. Buddhism promotes a personal conduct of self-liberation from gross desires such as greed and lust and encourages compassion toward all forms of life. Confucianism encourages loyalty to the family and state and benevolence toward those of lower rank than oneself. Taoism embraces an implicit “ethic” of harmony with the natural world. Depending on preference and

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particular situation, a Japanese individual can draw on one or more of these ethical notions.\textsuperscript{4}

In the middle of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, Portuguese merchants, who were trading with the ruling warrior regimes, brought Christian missionaries in their trading vessels. Christianity introduced teachings that differed radically from the flexible patterns of Japanese thought. Christianity demanded fidelity to one supreme deity, God; the gods in Japan’s polytheistic theology were deemed false.\textsuperscript{5}

Christianity was generally tolerated in Japan until the beginning of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, when the Tokugawa Bakufu (Warrior Administration) (1603-1867) banned the religion and persecuted its adherents. In 1614 the Tokugawa Bakufu ordered the missionaries to leave the country. Most of the missionaries sailed to Manila and Macao. Some managed to remain and continue their work undercover. For a few years, no concerted action was taken against Japanese Christians and they were able to practice their religion unobtrusively; some missionaries were even smuggled into Japan in Portuguese vessels. However, the Bakufu eventually brought pressure on the regional daimyo (local territorial lords) to eradicate Christianity.

The anti-Christian campaign was based more on social and political concerns than on religious ones.\textsuperscript{6} The Tokugawa Bakufu was always on the alert for any possible coalition of dissatisfied elements that might threaten its hegemony; a union of Christians was regarded as a potential danger. The Christian insistence on the primacy of the individual’s conscience as the ultimate norm of moral behavior was viewed as subversive.

\textsuperscript{4} H. Byron Earhart, “religion” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
in a society that attached such overwhelming importance to unquestioning and absolute obedience to the commands of superiors. The Shimabara Uprising of 1637-38 affirmed the danger of Christianity. It took place in the western part of Kyushu, where the influence of Christianity was highest. Undercover Christians revolted against the domain daimyo; the revolt was put down with unexpected difficulty, and the insurgents and their families, numbering about 40,000, were massacred. 7

The following year, to prevent further intrusion of Christian missionaries, the Tokugawa government banned trade with the Portuguese in Macao. Contact with the West was completely severed except for merchants of the Dutch East India Company, who were confined on a manmade islet in Nagasaki Harbor. In addition to these extreme measures, the Tokugawa regime required every household to belong to a Buddhist temple. Buddhism, introduced in the 5th century AD, had adapted its teachings over the centuries to be more in accord with the indigenous outlook and had become a part of Japanese spiritual tradition. Its teachings emphasized enlightenment through cultivating inner purity.

However, the Tokugawa regime’s guiding ideology was Neo-Confucianism (Shushigaku). Confucianism, introduced in the 5th century AD, has religious aspects, but is mainly a set of philosophical, ethical, and political teachings. During the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in China, Confucianism underwent a revival known as Neo-Confucianism, which shifted much of the emphasis of the tradition from institutions and formal education to the individual’s spiritual and ethical concerns; it was this form that

became widely studied in Japan from the 14th century. The teachings of Neo-
Confucianism were consistent with the feudal order of Tokugawa Japan because they emphasized social order supported by individuals' observance of the norms of conduct appropriate to the status they occupied. Confucianism's source of morality lay in filial piety, children's respect for and obedience to their parents. The teachings encouraged virtues such as loyalty, uprightness, moderation, and benevolence. The samurai (warriors) followed the ethical and moral code, known as bushido, (literally, "the way [do] of the warrior [bushi]). Based on Confucian and Buddhist teachings, bushido included not only martial spirit and skills with weapons, but also absolute loyalty to one's lord, a strong sense of personal honor, devotion to duty, and the courage, if required, to sacrifice one's life in battle.

These spiritual and moral traditions developed as Japan remained in its secluded cocoon. At the same time, the Western world was undergoing dramatic change. The British Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century precipitated state-supported capitalism in Europe. The American independence from the British Empire and the French Revolutions brought further changes. The Western industrial nations, believing themselves enlightened, considered it their obligation to propagate their new perspectives throughout the world. The Western superiority complex, supported by Western military superiority, served to justify imperialistic expansion. Many Japanese intellectuals in Tokugawa Japan were well aware of the British exploitation of India and China. The

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Japanese knew that they had to resist the West in order to avoid a debacle similar to the one their neighbors had suffered.\(^{10}\)

**The End of Isolation and Unequal Treaties with the Western Powers**

In July 1853, Commodore Mathew C. Perry, special envoy of U.S. President Millard Fillmore, arrived at the Japanese port of Uraga with his imposing naval squadron—so-called “Black ships.” With Perry’s arrival, Japan’s isolation from the outside world came to an end. At gunpoint Perry demanded trade concession from the Tokugawa Bakufu. The Bakufu, frightened by its own inability to fight back, asked Perry to return in a year for a formal reply. Perry returned in January 1854 and successfully ratified the Treaty of Peace and Amity. Two ports were made accessible to American ships for fuel and provisions. England, Russia, and the Netherlands soon acquired the same privileges. Four years later, Townsend Harris, the first American consul, skillfully concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Bakufu.\(^{11}\) This treaty introduced the concept of extraterritoriality—foreigners in Japan were immune from Japanese laws—to the Japanese people. England, the Netherlands, as well as France, and Russia, followed suit and passed similar treaties.\(^{12}\) The Bakufu did not fully comprehend the practice of extraterritoriality. The differential treatment of foreigners in Japan, and the resulting conflicts between Japanese and Westerners, soon caused bitter resentment.

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\(^{10}\) Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, 6.


among the Japanese. The Bakufu felt that the Western powers, by capitalizing upon
Japanese ignorance of foreign affairs, had cheated.\textsuperscript{13}

The series of concessions to the foreign powers revealed the Bakufu’s
incompetence. Such signs of weakness in turn encouraged the rebellious activities of
young low-ranking samurai who advocated the “restoration” of imperial rule. The rebels
regarded the unequal treaties as a national disgrace. They recognized, however, the
frightening difference in military might between Japan and the West. The Japanese
rebels insisted that only a new imperial regime could remedy the disgraceful situation.
However, the Imperial House during the efficient Bakufu administration possessed no
political power; rather, it retained only the “sacredness” associated with the continuity of
“the original Japanese family.”\textsuperscript{14}

While the Bakufu was compelled by Western pressure to abrogate its isolationist
policy, young samurai rebels demanded the continued maintenance of national isolation.
The rebels’ frustration at their unanswered demands frequently exploded in the murder of
foreign officials and merchants. Western naval forces retaliated by bombarding cities.
These sensational incidents revealed the Bakufu’s impotence; it sat paralyzed. In the
final stage of the transition of power, the Bakufu and the rebels waged a civil war. The
Bakufu’s surrender to the Imperial House signified the “restoration” of imperial
governance. The new regime was named “Meiji” or Enlightened Reign. The Year was
1868.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 7.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{15} For general history from the late Tokugawa period to 1868, see Peter Duus, Modern Japan, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 61-81; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 7-8.
This “restoration” of imperial rule contained contradictory objectives: renovation (ishin), which implied a rejection of the past; and restoration (jukko), which implied a reversion to theocracy, which was the unification of religion and the state (saisei icchi). The newly established government attempted to develop a modern nation-state by seeking technology from the West without losing the religious and cultural traditions of Japan.  

Young, ambitious, and oligarchic leaders of the Meiji government faced two major tasks: 1) rapid Westernization to ensure national independence and to revise the unequal treaties with the Western powers, and 2) the legitimatization of political rule by strengthening the imperial institution.  

Imperial Japan’s slogans, “Enrich the Nation! Strengthen Its Arms!” (Fukoku Kyohei) and “Civilization and Enlightenment” (Bunmei Kaika), revealed that the Japanese were intimidated by the Western superior industrial and military technology, and at the same time admired the seemingly advanced culture of the West.  

To match the West, the oligarchic leaders said that Japan must adopt the Western pattern of national development.  

Meiji leaders suspected that the culture of the West might contain some vital secrets that were responsible for its superior technology. Various missions and many bright students were sent abroad to search them out. Anything that suggested Western civilization was imported under the banner of “modernization,” especially during the early Meiji period. With Westerners again allowed to enter the country, Christianity was once more introduced into Japan. In 1873, largely as a result of the intercession of

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18 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 9.  
19 Ibid.
foreign diplomats and popular indignation abroad, the Meiji government formally withdrew religious sanctions.\textsuperscript{20} With Christianity identified with the West, missionary teachers were regarded as the representatives of a new and superior civilization.

The inevitable reaction to excessive enthusiasm for Western civilization eventually set in. Meiji leaders came to recognize that a mere imitation of the West would only undermine Japan’s ability to supersede the West. More than that, the Western powers’ reluctance to abrogate the unequal treaties raised widespread indignation.\textsuperscript{21} As the Japanese became increasingly disillusioned with the West, many people began to see Christianity with suspicious eyes.

An inferiority complex toward the West made the Meiji leaders seek ways to develop national pride. The intellectuals developed the concept of \textit{kokutai}—national polity—to bolster the legitimacy of the imperial government and at the same time to highlight the uniqueness of Japanese civilization. It emphasized Japan’s distinctive history as evidence of its superiority. The most important elements of \textit{kokutai} were rule by an unbroken imperial line and the concept of the family state, in which the relationship between the emperor and his subjects was like that between a father and his children. Proponents of the \textit{kokutai} concept argued that there were two types of state: one that evolved naturally and the other that was manmade. The evolution of the natural state took the following course: the family grew to become a clan, the clan became a tribe, and the tribe expanded to form a state. The ideal example of the natural state, they claimed, was Japan: the emperor was a direct descendant of the sun goddess, Amaterasu Omikami,

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
the emperor’s family—the imperial house—was the head family of the nation, and the Japanese people were the emperor’s children. The foundations of imperial Japan, they claimed, were firmer than manmade Western democratic nations.

Oligarchs tapped into Japanese pride and devised the notion that the “Japanese spirit” was superior to “Western materialism.” They wanted to combine the best of the West, its modern political, economic and legal systems and its technology, with the best of the East, its spiritual legacy. Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), a former rebellious samurai who later became Japan’s first prime minister, proclaimed in 1909 that *bushido*, the samurai’s moral code, was Japan’s moral standard that was steeped in the hearts of the educated classes.

*Bushido*, offered us splendid standards of morality, rigorously enforced in the everyday life of the educated classes. The result...was an education which aspired to the attainment of Stoic heroism, a rustic simplicity and a self-sacrificing spirit unsurpassed in Sparta, and the aesthetic culture and intellectual refinement of Athens.... We laid great stress on the harmonious combination of all the known accomplishments of a developed human being, and it is only since the introduction of modern technical sciences that we have been obliged to pay more attention to specialized technical attainments than to the harmonious development of the whole.

Japan had developed spiritually but needed to become more adept in technology, an area in which the West excelled. Yamaoka Tesshu (1836-1888), a master of swordsmanship and respected as a teacher of *bushido* among Meiji leaders, said:

Considering religious education in Japan, even if there is one fit to the other [the West], the same one would not fit to us, whose human feelings and customs are

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22 See *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol.4, s.v. “kokutai.”
25 Ibid.
different from the West. If we try to implant theirs to us, it would be as if we try to implant bamboo to the other kind of tree. 26

Meiji leaders wanted to import modern technical sciences while keeping out Western religious and philosophical influences.

Freedom of Religion under the Meiji Constitution

The 1889 Meiji Constitution codified the concept of kokutai by stating in Article 1 that “the Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.”27 It clarified the sanctity and inviolability of the emperor. In order to mobilize popular support for the emperor as the spiritual and political head of Japan, the government utilized Shinto, which embraced the sanctity of the emperor and became the source of the new national identity.28 The new government removed Buddhism from the favored position it had enjoyed under the Tokugawa regime and in its place initiated a campaign to establish Shinto as the primary religion.29 However, in the process of drafting the Meiji Constitution, the oligarchs later decided against idea of establishing a state religion. The Meiji Constitution was framed under considerable foreign influence exerted by foreign governments and German constitutional scholars.30 As a newly established modern state interested in cooperating with Western powers, Japan needed to include the provision of freedom of religion, a concept derived from the

modern Western concept of the separation of religion and state, something very alien to
the Japanese. Generated from the long history of strained relations between state and
religious authority, the concept of separation of religion and the state is rooted in a
fundamental distinction between secular political power and the sacred moral dignity of
religious authorities. This separation necessarily leads to the proposition that because the
state is a secular entity, it must neither possess nor attempt to inculcate religious doctrines
and dogmas. Japan, with its religious heritage, could not easily adopt this separation.
By placing the emperor as the head of the government, the Meiji government had
restored the unification of symbolic spiritual authority and government (saisei icchi).
The emperor had been the source of legitimacy to rule Japan. The Tokugawa regime had
used the title of Shogun to control Japan. Shoguns ruled Japan as the deputy of the
emperor. However, to be considered a modern nation, the Meiji oligarchs shrewdly
concealed the government’s theocratic nature by adopting freedom of religion in its
constitution. Thus, the Meiji Constitution of 1889 included Article 28, which guaranteed
freedom of religion, but only “within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not
antagonistic to their duties as subjects.” It stressed the duty of subjects toward the
emperor. This qualification was later to be invoked against Christians and religious cults
in times of extreme nationalism.

Even though Shinto was technically not a state religion, most Shinto priests were
considered to be state officials and attendance at Shinto shrines was seen as a patriotic

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32 For full text see Article 28 of “Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*. 

duty. This public-nature status of Shinto, called State Shinto (Kokka Shinto), was bolstered by the government’s declaration that “Shinto is not a religion.” The status of Shinto remained ambiguous, with a growing tendency to separate it from the sphere of religion and to align it instead with custom and patriotism. The people participated in State Shinto rituals as national ceremonies with a sense of duty, not necessarily from personal belief.

The steadily increasing spirit of nationalism during the 1930s raised difficult problems for Christians. Because of its “foreign” nature, Christians were persecuted when demands for national identity were strong. In May 1932 the “Yasukuni Incident” occurred: three Christian university students refused on religious grounds to bow at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo—a State Shrine which enshrined all those who died in national wars, and the rite of enshrining was an apotheosis symbolically changing the soul’s status to that of a national deity. The Yasukuni Shrine had special status derived from the fact that the emperor himself paid tribute there to the souls of the war dead. This incident gave rise to accusations of Christians’ lack of loyalty and patriotism. After prolonged negotiations between the Japanese government and Christian authorities, a compromise was reached and in 1936 Catholics were informed by Rome that such ceremonies constituted “a civil manifestation of loyalty” and “reverence toward the imperial family” were permissible. The National Christian Council of Protestant

34 Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan, 119.
35 For detailed discussion on the relationship between state and Shinto, see Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 1868-1988, 120.
38 Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 90.
Churches concurred with this interpretation. Despite these declarations, attendance at shrines during the 1930s and the subsequent Pacific War caused a dilemma for many Christians.\footnote{Michael Cooper, “Christianity,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*.} In 1939 the Religious Bodies Law, which stated that the government could control all aspects of religious organizations, was followed two years later by the formation of a Religious League composed of Buddhist, Christian, and Shinto sects. The League’s goal was to provide a spiritual bulwark for the nation in wartime.\footnote{Joseph M. Kitagawa, “religion and society,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*.} The war produced widespread dislocation in the Christian community; many members were killed in action or in air raids. Ironically, the United States killed large number of Christians and destroyed churches by dropping the atomic bomb at Nagasaki, where Christianity had prevailed.\footnote{Michael Cooper, “Christianity,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*.}

**Education**

Using education as an instrument for ideological reorientation was nothing new for the Japanese.\footnote{See, Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, 3,12, 141.} Indeed, throughout modern Japan’s nation-building, the Japanese government used education as a highly effective tool for ideological indoctrination.\footnote{Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, 12, 141; Yoshimitsu Khan, *Japanese Moral Education Past and Present* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1997), 207.} For the imperial government, compulsory education was the most effective means of generating nationalism and was especially important while the nation was struggling to stabilize its still fragile government and cope with intimidation from Western powers. Fearing incursions by foreign powers, the Meiji oligarchs wanted to enrich the nation and
strengthen its army as soon as possible. In order to realize this goal, the government imported aspects of different Western educational systems. In 1871 the Ministry of Education was created, and the following year, the imperial government issued its first educational law, the Education Order (gakusei) of 1872.\footnote{Shimbori Michiya, “modern education,” in \textit{Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan}, vol. 2; Nishi, \textit{Unconditional Democracy}, 13; and Noboru Ito, “The Reform of Japanese Education,” \textit{Japan Quarterly} 3, no. 4 (1956): 425-426.} The school system followed the American model: three phases of primary school, middle school, and university were created, and practical, utilitarian educational objectives were promoted.\footnote{Shimbori Michiya, “modern education,” in \textit{Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan}, vol.2} The American educator David Murry (1830-1905) contributed to this development of a modern education system. A graduate of Union College in New York in 1852, he taught at Rutgers College. In 1872, Mori Arinori (1847-1889), the Japanese charge d’affaires and acting minister to the United States at that time, sought the opinions of prominent American educators about what Japanese education should be like. Murry submitted a written opinion and was invited to Japan as an adviser to the Ministry of Education. As a top-ranking foreign adviser, he directed the implementation of the Education Order of 1872.\footnote{Terasaki Masao, “Murray, David,” in \textit{Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan}.} While traditional education during the Tokugawa period had aimed at inculcating proper behaviors,\footnote{Noboru Ito, “The Reform of Japanese Education,” \textit{Japan Quarterly} 3, no. 4 (1956): 425.} this new education emphasized practical learning (i.e., vocational education). The preamble of the Education Order conveyed the new purpose of education:

\begin{quote}
Language [reading], writing, and arithmetic, to begin with, are daily necessities in military affairs, government, agriculture, trade arts, law, politics, astronomy, and medicine; there is not, in short, a single phase of human activity which is not
\end{quote}
based on learning.... Learning is the key to success in life, and no man can afford to neglect it.49

The preamble denounced the useless learning of the samurai because they “indulged in poetry, empty reasoning, and idle discussions.” The government ordered that “a guardian who fails to send a young child, whether a boy or girl, to primary school shall be deemed negligent of his duty.”50 The Education Order outlined the principles of the new school system with the intention of developing its national aspirations through compulsory education.51 The administration of education followed the French: a district system was introduced and school education was put under the strong central control of the Ministry of Education.52

Strict government control soon faced opposition from the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (Jiyu Minken Undo). This nationwide political movement in the early part of the Meiji period (1868-1912) was led by dissident groups composed of former samurai and commoners (heimin), and its primary goal was to reform the new Meiji government along Western democratic lines.53 A new education order was issued in 1879 that decreased central control. However, in the following year this education order was reversed and central control was again strengthened.54 The 1879 issuance of the Outline of Learning (Kyogaku Taishi) caused this shift of the pendulum. Motoda Nagazane (Eifu) (1818-1891), Confucian scholar and tutor to Emperor Meiji, wrote this Outline, in

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49 The preamble of the Education Order, quoted in Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 13.
50 Ibid.
51 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 13.
which he advocated education theories emphasizing Confucian values of humanity, justice, loyalty, and filial piety. His ideas served as a guide for conservative reform. As a leader of the conservative faction in the court he helped to establish an educational ideology for the Meiji government centered on patriotism and reverence for the emperor.55

In 1885 the cabinet system was created, and Mori Arinori became the first Minister of Education. He created a unified educational framework. In 1886, he issued in quick succession the Elementary School Order, the Middle School Order, the Imperial University Order, and the Normal School Order. Elementary schools were considered as training centers for loyal subjects of the emperor; Middle Schools, especially Higher Middle Schools that became Higher Schools in 1894, were designed to prepare students for the Imperial University. Imperial Universities were intended to create capable leaders who would absorb advanced Western learning necessary for the modernization of the nation. Normal schools imbued teachers with nationalistic morality based on “loyalty to the emperor and love of country.”56 This comprehensive school system was established for the purpose of modernization on one hand and the spiritual unification of the people on the other.

The seamless fusion of education and politics characterized prewar Japanese education.57 The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education made the Japanese educational

system the means by which the people’s loyalty to the throne was nurtured. 58 Meiji intellectual leaders argued that Western nations provided a moral foundation of Christianity and that Japan had no equivalent religion to unify the people. 59 Ito Hirobumi, the author of the constitution, 60 observed European states while he was preparing Japan’s constitution and held the view that Buddhism could not unify the Japanese populace. He argued that loyalty to the emperor was analogous to European devotion to Christianity. 61 Thus Meiji leaders decided to make the emperor the foundation of a new national morality. They secured an imperial statement that served as the basis of public morality, 62 and it was issued as the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890. The government hoped that the Confucian emphasis on duty and order would curb the Freedom and People’s Rights movement, which threatened the stability of the fragile oligarchic government. 63

The Imperial Rescript on Education provided a foundation for all educational policies and practices and served as a powerful instrument for political indoctrination. 64 The Ministry of Education distributed certified copies of the Rescript to every school in Japan. Schools hung it alongside the emperor’s portrait. School principals were

58 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 146.
59 Teruhisa Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan, 68.
60 Duus, Modern Japan 2nd ed. 172.
61 Helen Hardacre, Shito and the State, 1868-1988, 118.
62 Helen Hardacre, Shito and the State, 1868-1988, 121; Teruhisa Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan, 68.
instructed to read it to students. Throughout society the Rescript was treated as a holy thing, symbolic of the spiritual unification of the Japanese people. Anyone failing to uphold it as sacred was stigmatized as traitorous and unpatriotic. The Rescript stated:

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arises, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to hear in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue.

October 30, 1890

After 1890, all moral instruction, known as "shushin," was based on the Rescript. Shushin was a compulsory subject taught at all primary schools. Japanese schools also began emphasizing the importance of Japanese history in the curriculum. History provided the students with a sense of the imperial household’s continuity. Japanese

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66 Helen Hardacre, Shito and the State, 1868-1988, 121.
67 Quoted in Ryusaku Tsunoda, William Theodore de Barry, and Donald Keene, Source of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2, 139.
68 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 20.
history textbooks described the imperial family as descendants of the founding goddess of Japan; the textbooks defined Japan as a divine nation and stressed that it was the people’s supreme duty and honor to serve the emperor with loyalty. Thus emperor worship—Shinto supported by Confucian ethics—was taught in elementary school in morals (shushin) and national history (kokushi) classes.

Wars and Education Reform

The Meiji government’s effort to become a modern industrialized military power began to pay off. In 1895 Japan thoroughly defeated China. Japan’s new position as a military power was confirmed when in 1905 its troops humiliated Russia. Japanese confidence, supported by world recognition, grew. Japan’s participation on the victorious side in World War I placed the Japanese empire firmly among the top-ranking nations of the world.69 The attitude of the Western nations reflected general admiration for the stunning performance of the Japanese military, accepting Japan as a diplomatic equal. In 1894 England and other Western countries finally agreed to end the “unequal treaties.” Beginning in 1899 extra-territorial privileges of foreign residents were phased out, and all the treaty powers agreed to restore tariff autonomy to Japan by 1910.70

The Russian Revolution of 1917-1918 and worldwide demands for democracy exerted an influence on Japanese politics and education. New currents of thought considered dangerous for the Japanese imperial regime, entered Japan, including the advocacy of socialism, communism, anarchism, liberalism, and democracy. In the

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educational world, some prominent Japanese educators advocated a new liberal education. Tanimoto Tomeri was one of them. He spent three years (1900-1903) in Europe and the United States and studied child-centered pedagogy and other educational theories. These new ideas culminated in the New Education Movement, which advocated the individuality and initiative of the student, in opposition to the standardized education of the state-controlled school system as it had existed since the early Meiji period (1868-1912). These ideas were first put into practice in Japan in the early Taisho period (1912-26), and the movement was centered in the elementary schools attached to normal schools and at private elementary schools. Along with pedagogy, the organization of the teachers' union was also introduced. Student movements arose in latter half of the 1920s, with the deepening of economic crisis and political confrontation. The government responded with political repression and attempted to counteract the influence of leftist ideology by promoting the so-called "Japanese spirit." In 1917 the government created an Extraordinary Council on Education (Rinji Kyoiku Kaigi), which was attached to the cabinet, and tried to establish general educational expansion for the purpose of "training faithful and loyal people filled with the spirit of service to the country." The influence of the New Education Movement waned under the conservative educational policies in the 1930s and lost much of its vitality by the time that the Pacific War began.

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73 Ibid.
After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, in which the Guandong Army (Japan's field army) attacked the Chinese garrison in Mukden (now Shenyang) and inflamed Sino-Japanese animosities, educational policy emphasized more patriotism. After the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war of 1937 through the Pacific War in 1941-1945, the contents of education was geared to support the war effort. In May 1937, the Ministry of Education issued a text, *Kokutai no Hongi* (The Cardinal Principles of the National Entity). The Japanese government regarded the text as a statement of the fundamental principles of the *kokutai* (national polity), the state structure unique to Japan as embodied in the imperial institution. The avowed purpose of the text was to “combat internal turmoil, social unrest, and doubts, which were largely seen as stemming from Western influence.” The text stressed the duty of the Japanese subject “to create and develop a new Japan by virtue of the Way of the Empire which stands firm throughout the ages at home and abroad, and thereby more than ever to guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne which is coeval with heaven and earth.” The fundamental thesis of the text was that Japan prospered because it was blessed with a divine origin, divine leadership, and divine characteristics. The text was used in upper elementary and middle schools. In addition a history text published in 1940, “Divine Message” (*shinchoku*), portrayed the emperor as the descendent of god. After Japan entered Pacific War in 1941, military drills were introduced in schools. Elementary schools were

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75 Mark R. Peattie, “Manchurian Incident,” in *Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol. 5.
76 Robert King Hall, “Kokutai no hongi,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol. 4.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
then called National People’s Schools (*Kokumin Gakko*), which were to train subjects for the empire, and graduates were required to go on to youth schools (*Seinen Gakko*) to acquire vocational skills. As the war situation turned negative for Japan, student mobilization and the evacuation of schoolchildren to the countryside became common.\(^{80}\)

The schools encouraged students to sacrifice themselves for the emperor’s wishes and taught that to die for the emperor was the most honorable thing for a Japanese to do.

\(^{80}\) Shimbori Michiya, “Modern education,” in *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol. 2.
Chapter III

United States Education Reform Policy for Postwar Japan

Policy Documents

Two documents prepared by the United States gave direction to MacArthur's occupation of Japan. One, *The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan*, stated the United States' basic policy toward Japan and was made public by President Truman on 22 September 1945 in the first weeks of the Occupation.\(^1\) This document was prepared by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which was established in December 1944 in order to coordinate the action of the State Department, the War Department, and the Navy Department. This committee formulated the postwar policy on both military and political matters.\(^2\) The other document, *The Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper*, was issued in November 1945, almost three months after the start of the occupation\(^3\) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advisory committee for the President on military matters.\(^4\) It contained top secret military directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Because of the nature of military occupation of Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the direct

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commanding line for MacArthur. This directive defined the authority of Supreme
Commander in specific terms and outlined the policies that would guide him in the initial
period after surrender. The basic objective of the Occupation was to “give the greatest
possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security
of the world.” To accomplish this, militarism and ultra-nationalism would be abolished.
By applying the principles of democratic self-government, democratic tendencies and
processes would be strengthened.5

The U.S. Plan of “Reorientation of the Japanese”

The American government paid special attention to Japanese education. It
recognized the direct relationship between political structure and education and believed
that educational reform was key to democratizing Japan.6 However, educational reform
was only part of a grand scheme of “reorientation of the Japanese.”7 The United States
believed that the attainment of the ultimate objectives of the Allied Powers could not be
assured without changes in Japanese ideologies.8 Since the end of August 1945, the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee had been preparing a policy paper on the

5 See “Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS 1380/15, 3 November
1945),” in Appendix A:13 in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September
6 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the Field of Education
in Japan since the Surrender,” Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, 9 December 1946, p.57, File
097.3 Z1092 No. 4119S, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar
Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of
America, Inc., Reel 3, Item 28).
7 See State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese” 8 January 1946; SWNCC
162/2 Copy No. 7 in United State, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far
East, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy
T1204, Roll 4).
8 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, “Reorientation of the Japanese” 8 January 1946; SWNCC
162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix “B”.Discussion” p.14; also see SCAP, CI & E, Education Division,
reorientation of the Japanese in order to implement Allied objectives.9 The outcome was the policy paper, “Reorientation of the Japanese,” dated 8 January 1946 and reviewed and approved on 9 February 1946 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.10

According to this policy paper, the Japanese ideologies that needed to be changed included the following:

a. The persistence of feudal concepts, including class stratification, the glorification of the military, and a habit of subservience to authority.

b. A belief in the superior qualifications of the Japanese for world leadership, closely connected with the cult of emperor-worship fostered in recent years by the military to serve their own purposes.

c. Extreme racial consciousness, and an antiforeign complex, which, however, is often combined with great admiration for foreign achievements and learning.11

The process of reorientation included information control, and educational and religions reforms. For this purpose, the Civil Information and Education Section (CI & E) was established in General Headquarters (GHQ) to advise the Supreme Commander regarding policies “relating to public information, education, religion and other sociological problems of Japan and Korea.”12 The United States intended to use every available

10 A.J. McFarland, Brigadier general, U.S.A., secretary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff “Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subject: Reeducation and Reorientation of the Japanese people,” 9 February 1946, SM-4968 in United State, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far East, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T1204, Roll 4). This final version was a result of many revisions since August 1945.
channel such as radios, books, and movies, to reach the minds of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{13}

Educational reform was seen as the primary method to prevent the youth from harmful prewar ideologies. The United States wanted to use Japan's faith in education to promote ideological change.\textsuperscript{14} Unlike other aspects of the Occupation, the United States predicted that control of information and reform in education and religion would be a long-range project. Nevertheless, the United States determined that the ground work for a reorientation program must be laid within the first few months of occupation, when the Japanese were still reeling from defeat and suffering from a loss of faith in their leaders.\textsuperscript{15}

Major policy statements regarding the reform of Japanese education were contained in policy papers issued by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in accordance with the general terms of the Potsdam Declaration.\textsuperscript{16} Basic policies were presented in the document, \textit{The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan}. The following provisions related to education:

The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press.

Militarism and ultra-nationalism, in doctrine and practice, including paramilitary training, shall be eliminated from the educational system.

\textsuperscript{13} State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Reorientation of the Japanese” 8 January 1946; SWNCC 162/2 Copy No. 7, “Appendix “B”-Discussion,” p.15.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp.15-16.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.17.
\textsuperscript{16} Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, 9 December 1946, p.iv, File 097.3 Z1092 No. 4119S, in \textit{O.S.S./State department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia} (Washington DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc., Reel 3, Item 28).
The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies.  

The President added to the introductory statement, “Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.” The earliest complete policy paper on education was the so-called Bowles paper, dated 30 July 1945. Gordon T. Bowles, a Harvard trained anthropologist and a Japan specialist in the State Department, was born in Japan and grew up there until completing high school. After finishing college in the United States, he returned to Japan as an English teacher for two years in the mid-1920s at the First Higher School (Dai Ichi Koto Gakko), a prestigious higher school in Tokyo. The Bowles paper was a summary of U.S. government understanding of Japanese education up to that time. In the fall of 1945 the paper served as the general framework for SCAP’s basic initial educational reform.

The United States understood that Japanese education had been used as an instrument of political indoctrination. In his paper, Bowles defined Japan’s educational system as “one of the most important instruments in molding the minds of the people to

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20 Ibid., 44.
21 Ibid., 62.
accept authoritarian controls with unquestioning obedience.” The purpose of Japanese education was to instill a spirit of willingness to serve the state as an end in itself.\textsuperscript{22} In order for the United States to meet its goal of democratization, Bowles suggested that objectionable courses such as history, morals, and geography be suspended and the contents of texts be changed. Teachers and school personnel who supported the military regime had to be removed, and the government’s controls on education had to be removed because they had prevented the free exchange of information and the development of diverse educational philosophies.\textsuperscript{23}

The United States posited that under a democratic system, there should be ample room for differing purposes and methods of education. It declared that “Japanese attitudes [had] in the past prevented the development of such differing concepts,” and that education in a democratic society should not be committed to any single ideology, whether it be of church, party, or state.\textsuperscript{24} To accomplish these goals, the United States advocated the idea that Japan develop respect for the rights of the individual, emphasize diversity rather than uniformity, and prohibit the intervention of the government.\textsuperscript{25}

The U.S. government emphasized the importance of Japanese initiative in reform measures, but it wanted to supply the ideas and incentives.\textsuperscript{26} The thinking was that if the

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\textsuperscript{23} Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 64-65; Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, 9 December 1946, p.57.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp.57-58.

United States imposed its reforms on the Japanese, the Japanese might merely adopt superficial forms of alien attitudes and ideologies without any real understanding of their fundamental philosophies. Bowles stated that changes in the educational system could become permanent only if they were carried out by the Japanese themselves. However, Bowles admitted that the Occupation would have to initiate reforms through cooperative Japanese to a point where they could be continued without external assistance. The U.S. government anticipated that there were many Japanese who, through prior contacts with Americans and earlier education in the 1920s when Japanese education was more liberal, would be disposed to accept and assist in the development of Occupation objectives. Therefore, the first task of the Occupation in Japan would be to seek out such “liberal” persons and to ensure that they would be placed in key positions and to offer them counsel, guidance and support.

MacArthur’s Advisor, Bonner F. Fellers

MacArthur was well informed about U.S. policy. MacArthur’s decision during the actual Occupation, however, was largely based on study and advice by his staff. The most trusted advisor and expert on Japanese psychology was Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers (1896-1973). Since 1943, Fellers had been MacArthur’s military secretary and the chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch. Fellers’ Psychological Warfare Branch

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27 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” Intelligence Research Report R&A OCL-4119, 9 December 1946, p.59.
led the strategy to condition the minds of the Japanese armed forces and the homeland population to accept surrender.\textsuperscript{31} Fellers was awarded an Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a second Distinguished Medal for contributing "in marked degree to Japan’s surrender."\textsuperscript{32}

Fellers’ perceptions of Japanese traits during the war directed the planning of postwar Japan’s reform.\textsuperscript{33} When Fellers attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth as an army captain in 1934-1935, he was interested in the Japanese psychology. Fellers studied Japanese behavioral patterns and psychological traits to weaken the Japanese soldier’s morale and entice their surrender. His study culminated in a paper, “Psychology of the Japanese Solders.”\textsuperscript{34} When MacArthur’s command began promoting Japanese surrender in the summer of 1944, Fellers’ “Answer to Japan,” a revised version of his “Psychology of the Japanese Solders,” was used as “the necessary preamble” to a plan of “psychological warfare” operations\textsuperscript{35} and as an orientation guide for Allied intelligence personnel.\textsuperscript{36} Lt. Colonel Ken R. Dyke, then an Information and Education Officer in MacArthur’s wartime headquarters, and would be the first head of the Civil Information and Education Section of GHQ in occupied Japan, praised “Answer to Japan” as “one of the clearest, most graphic and interesting summations of

\textsuperscript{31} For objectives and actual activities of the Psychological Warfare Branch, see Bonner F. Fellers, "Forward" to United States, Army Forces, Pacific, Psychological Warfare Branch, OMS, GHQ, \textit{PWB: Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area} (1945), Pacific Rare Folio, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa; \textit{The Standard-Times} (New Bedford, Mass.) 7-13 July 1958; box 1, Bonner F. Fellers papers, Hoover Institution.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{The Standard-Times} (New Bedford, Mass.) 7-13 July 1958; box 1, Bonner F. Fellers papers, Hoover Institution.


\textsuperscript{34} Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, 280.

\textsuperscript{35} Ken R. Dyke, Information and Education Officer, Headquarters USAFFE to G-1, GHQ, “Check Sheet - Subject on Psychological Warfare” 28 May 1944; box 3, Bonner F. Fellers papers.

\textsuperscript{36} See Office of the Military Secretary (Bonner F. Fellers) to Lt. Col. Ken R. Dyke, Information and Education Officers, Headquarters USAFFE, 11 December 1944; box 3, Bonner Fellers papers, Hoover Institution.
the emotional and religious fervor which activates the Japanese.” 37 Without an understanding of these “psychological axioms,” Dyke opined, successful planning of tactical operations would be difficult and any peace settlements and permanent postwar plans would not be possible unless Fellers’ analysis was widely accepted as the truth.38

In “Answer to Japan,” Fellers stated, “The real Japan is understood only by a study of her religious patriotism.” Accordingly, Fellers emphasized Japanese indigenous religion, Shinto, as the foundation of the Japanese psychology.39 Fellers traced Japanese history from ancient times to the present to explain how the Japanese myth about the emperor’s direct descent from the sun goddess influenced the psychology of the Japanese. He explained that the myth was the source of their belief in their destiny to rule the East. He argued that the samurai’s moral code, bushido, became the base of Japanese thinking. According to Fellers, “Samurai teachings became the vehicle for the national faith” and that loyalty unto death was “the keystone their code.”40 This loyalty to the emperor was instilled in the youth through Japan’s school education, Fellers explained. He called “The Way of the Subjects” (Shinmin no Michi)—a policy book used as a text book in schools—“the national bible,” and indicated that “loyalty [was] the very life and spinal nerve of the Japanese subject,” concluding that moral training created an “abysmal disregard” and ignorance of other peoples.41

37 Ken R. Dyke, Information and Education Officer, Headquarters USAFFE to G-1, GHQ, “Check Sheet - Subject on Psychological Warfare” 28 May 1944; box 3, Bonner F. Fellers papers.
38 Ibid.
39 Bonner F. Fellers, General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area, “Answer to Japan,” 1 July 1944, p.1; box 1, Bonner F. Fellers papers, Hoover Institution.
40 Ibid., p. 3 and 7.
41 Ibid., p. 10.
Patriotism and Shinto were inseparable, said Fellers. He further pointed to dangerous elements in Shinto. “Under the spell of Shinto,” people became “innocent but devilish” tools of gangster militarists to plot world conquest. Shinto was the most compelling force in Japan, Fellers argued, a spiritual force capable of controlling the people. He concluded, “Outwardly modern, psychologically, Japan is mediaeval. Thus for forty years Japan frantically developed her industry and intensified the moral training of her youth.”

Despite his characterization of the Japanese, Fellers suggested Christian tolerance:

There are those among us who advocate slaughter of all Japanese, a virtual extermination of the race. The Asiatic War has brought so much suffering and taken so many lives that no fate seems too awful for the Japanese. However, once Japan’s armed forces are destroyed, the military clique wiped out and the people thoroughly acquainted with the horror of war, it will be safe to stop the slaughter. The more civilians who are killed needlessly, the more bitter and lasting will be the feeling of those who survive. It would dislocate the mental equilibrium of our youth who performed the slaughter. It would belie our Christianity.

Fellers persuaded the reader to use emperor worship to help redirect Japan’s future:

The mystic hold the Emperor has on his people and the Spiritual strength of the Shinto faith properly directed need not be dangerous. The Emperor can be made a force for good and peace provided Japan is totally defeated and military clique destroyed.

Less than one month before Japan’s surrender Feller’s Psychological Warfare Branch published a report on Japan’s education entitled “Youth: Pawn of the Militarists.”

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43 Ibid., p.11.
44 Ibid., p.20.
45 Ibid., p.11.
46 Ibid., p.23.
47 Ibid., p.23.
This report reveals how MacArthur’s staff, which would actually operate the Occupation, understood Japan’s prewar and wartime education.

According to the report, Shinto was the spiritual foundation that caused people to worship the emperor. The report critically described Japan’s education:

In Japan...the school system had been geared to serve the military, political and economic ambitions of the military caste, the self-appointed guardians of millions of Shinto-worshipping subjects...[It] had been geared to...weld the people as a whole into a nation of robots, ready to die for the perpetuation of an anachronism—the system of Emperor worship.48

The report quotes Daniel C. Holtom, a prominent expert on Shinto:

Psychological disarmament of Japan will be confronted by the fact that in the schools and other agencies of official propaganda there exists a definite Shinto education inimical to the peace of the world.49

Daniel C. Holtom was the first to give serious attention to State Shinto.50 He concentrated on the connection between Shinto and Japanese nationalism and imperialism. He tended to interpret the wartime rhetoric of Shinto as the engine of war.51

Holtom explained that Shinto, originally a cult lacking political significance, had been perverted by militarists and imbued prewar society with chauvinistic patriotism and unswerving loyalty to the emperor.52 Holtom’s view was highly influential in the

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50 Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 1868-1988, 6
51 See ibid.
52 See ibid., 135.
Occupation’s understanding of Shinto. The Occupation hoped to secure Holtom’s services but his ill health prevented this.

In accord with Fellers’ interpretation of the connection between Shinto and bushido, the report explained that the purpose of Japanese education was “the creation of the samurai mind in the millions of Japanese boys and young men” through inculcating the principles of bushido and teaching military tactics and technique. The report discussed the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 as the “Bible” or “Magna Charta” of the national cult. The Rescript was promulgated in order to place education on a firmly Shintoistic basis and to “clarify the moral foundations for the empire itself.” This analysis was based on Willis C. Lamott’s ideas in Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan (1944). Lamott’s analysis of the role of the Rescript was quoted:

In any reconstruction of Japan, following a disastrous defeat, the Rescript will be the first obstacles to be overcome. Because of the religious sanctions thrown about it, the document itself, as well as the ideas it contains, is so deeply rooted in the loyalty patterns of the people, as to make difficult if not impossible a reinterpretation of it, or the substitution in place of it of another document of a more liberal content.

The report scathingly criticized curriculum subjects of morals and history as “the primary school medium for indoctrination,” and said that “[i]n the reading books…the myths of Japan, silly and ridiculous as they are, are taught as sober and uncontestable

55 Ibid., p.3.
56 Ibid., p.4.
history, and the divinity of the emperor is proclaimed in no uncertain terms." 58 The report noted "The Minister of War leads the nation. The Minister of Education makes a nation that can be led. [Underlined in original]." 59 The report recommended the use of the Ministry of Education to disseminate Allied aims. It would be most convenient to use the school system because "[i]t guides the principal activity of nearly 16 million students, some 400,000 teachers and about 190,000 priests, and controls... the principal means of indoctrination, not only of Japan’s intense nationalism, but also of civil obedience." 60 The report ends with a closing statement:

Deeply imbedded in the Japanese character, the continued existence of the samurai attitude can only serve to impede reconstruction....Whether it can be eradicated, once better days have come, will be one of the most pressing problems that will face those whose duty it will be to reorganize Japan following military defeat. 61

Fellers’ analysis became the basis for MacArthur’s action in executing reforms in Japan. 62 MacArthur relied on Fellers, an amateur psychologist, to understand the position of the emperor in the psychology of the Japanese. 63

59 Ibid., p.9.
60 Ibid., p.13.
61 Ibid., p.16.
62 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 280.
63 Ibid., 281.
Following the surrender, the Japanese government attempted to maintain social cohesion by advocating a prewar ideological slogan: Preserve the sacred, kokutai--national polity. On 15 August 1945, resigning Prime Minister, Suzuki Kantaro, announced to the nation that Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration with one condition: that there be no change in the national polity—the emperor would still rule Japan.

Accordingly, on August 16, resigning Education Minister Ota Kozo issued special instructions to prefectural governors and school principals: “With profound regret for not having been able to serve the country as we had hoped, due to lack of strength and ability we must hereafter forge straight ahead to perform our duties as faithful subjects of His Imperial Majesty.” Then the Minister emphasized that the people should continue devoting themselves to “guarding the fundamental character of the Japanese Empire [i.e., national polity]” for such an attitude was a proper response of loyal subjects to the emperor’s wish.

The first postwar Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko organized a cabinet on 17 August 1945. He appointed Maeda Tamon (1884-1962) to be the first

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1 See Prime Minister Higashikuni’s press interview in Asahi Shimbun, 30 August 1945; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 146.
2 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 147.
postwar Minister of Education.\textsuperscript{4} Maeda served the office for five turbulent months, from 18 August 1945 to 13 January 1946.

Born in 1884, Maeda graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1909 with a degree in German law; he served in the Ministry of Home Affairs and then was deputy mayor of Tokyo from 1921 to 1923.\textsuperscript{5} Before the war until 1941, he was the Director of the Japan Institute and of the Japanese Cultural Library in New York.\textsuperscript{6} During the war, he served as Governor of Niigata Prefecture from August 1943 to February 1945.\textsuperscript{7}

The American B-29 air raid on 25 May 1945 burned Maeda’s house in Tokyo, forcing him to move to his second house in Karuizawa, Nagano Prefecture, a well-known summer resort. On August 15, he heard the emperor’s speech broadcast on the radio and thought that “Everything former generations had constructed since Meiji totally collapsed.”\textsuperscript{8} On August 17, in the middle of the night, he was aroused from sleep by unexpected visitors, a few policemen who told him to go to Tokyo immediately. Once he arrived in Tokyo, new Prime Minister Higashikuni asked Maeda to become Minister of Education. Maeda explained that he accepted because:

\textsuperscript{4} See “Mr. Maeda Tamon, as Education Minister” (my translation), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, 19 August 1945; Kyoko Inoue, \textit{Individual Dignity in Modern Japanese Thought: The Evolution of the Concept of Jinkaku in Moral and Educational Discourse} (Ann Arbor, MI: the Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, 2001), 82.
\textsuperscript{5} Department of States, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of the Shidehara Cabinet,” 12 October 1945, pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{7} Tamon Maeda, \textit{Sanso seishi} [Maeda Tamon’s reminiscence](Tokyo: Hata shoten, 1947), from a summary of his biography; Department of States, Interim Research and Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of the Shidehara Cabinet,” 12 October 1945, File 097.3 Z1092. No. 3274, p. 5 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Washington DC: A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Inc. Reel2).
\textsuperscript{8} Tamon Maeda, \textit{Sanso seishi}, 213-214. (My translation).
This [Higashikuni] cabinet was just a transitional cabinet. [I thought that] if my job was to clean the road for the following, I [could] do it. [After Japan’s defeat] there was no pressure from militarists, so I hoped that I would materialize educational ideals that Dr. Nitobe Inazo had advocated.⁹

Maeda had spent three years at the First Higher School, (the Dai Ichi Koto Gakko)¹⁰ under Nitobe’s tutelage. Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933), a Christian who married Mary Elkington, an American Quaker, was one of the most cosmopolitan Japanese of his generation. By the time Nitobe became the head of the First Higher School in 1906, he was already a renowned international scholar with advanced degrees from the United States and Germany. In addition, he was internationally well-known for his book, *Bushido: the Soul of Japan* (1905), which introduced bushido as the secret of Japan’s strength to the Western world. In Japan he was a popular writer on individual moral cultivation.¹¹

After Maeda heard Nitobe’s lecture at the First Higher School, he became Nitobe’s devotee. He came to think that “[I]t [was] the most meaningful thing to follow Nitobe.”¹² When Maeda was a student at Imperial University of Tokyo, he sought advice from his mentor about his future career. Nitobe said that “[w]hat is lacking in Japan is social education. You should become a social educator. But first, as a preparation, you should enter to the official world.”¹³ Accordingly, Maeda began his career as a bureaucrat in the Home Ministry. After he assumed many responsibilities under

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¹⁰ For discussion on school culture of the First Higher School (Ichiko) including Maeda’s activity and Dr. Nitobe’s influence as principal of Ichiko, see Donald Roden, *Schooldays in Imperial Japan: A Study in the Culture of a Student Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
¹³ Ibid., 155. (My translation).
numerous positions, his aspiration for a social educator came true: he was appointed Minister of Education.

Prime Minister Higashikuni had announced the importance of maintaining the Japanese character, *kokutai*, while faithfully complying with the Allied demands in the Potsdam Declaration, and he had also declared that his cabinet’s mission was to observe the spirit and letter of the Imperial Rescript on Surrender.\(^\text{14}\) The Imperial Rescript on Surrender that Higashikuni had referred to was issued by Emperor Hirohito on 14 August 1945 and was broadcast on the radio on the following day. The emperor said:

> [I]t is according to the dictate of time and fate that [w]e have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable. Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial state, [w]e are always with ye... Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial state and keep pace with the progress of the world.\(^\text{15}\)

In a form of the emperor’s wish for his subjects, this rescript served as the fundamental policy for the postwar Japanese government.

At a press conference on August 18, on his inauguration day, Education Minister Maeda declared, “The foundation of Japanese education can not exist without the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education and the 1945 Imperial Rescript on Surrender. I would like to solve Japan’s future educational problems by translating these imperial rescripts

\(^{14}\) Prime Minister Higashikuni’s press interview in *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 August 1945

into concrete policies. 

"With dauntless bearing," Maeda said, "we should defend the national polity and international peace."

MacArthur’s Plans for Spiritual Disarmament

At MacArthur’s Headquarters in the Philippines, Bonner Fellers submitted a memorandum dated 15 August 1945 concerning the establishment of an Information Dissemination Section. This section was 1) to encourage cooperation from the Japanese, 2) "to assist in orderly transition from war to peace," and 3) to assist in removing the influence of militarism and "Japanese concepts which oppose democratic principles."

This section was to be run by "trained personnel" of Feller’s Psychological Warfare Branch. On 27 August 1945, before leaving for Japan, MacArthur authorized the establishment of the Information Dissemination Section. This section had been converted from the Psychological Warfare Branch, and would later become the Civil Information and Education Section (CI & E). Bonner Fellers was its Chief.

A New York Times editorial on 27 August 1945 commented on the prospects of the occupation of Japan. The editorial indicated that the Japanese during the Meiji period diligently learned and adopted the whole material civilization of the West; however, "[w]hat was completely overlooked or openly repudiated were all the moral and

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16 Asahi Shimbun, 19 August 1945, quoted in Eiichi Suzuki, Kyoiku gyosei, 160. (My translation).
18 See Bonner F. Fellers, "Dissemination of Information in Japan" 15 August 1945; box 13, Bonner Fellers papers, Hoover Institution.
spiritual values of the West.” The editorial closed with the statement that “Whether the Japanese can be taught to appreciate not merely the material but also the moral and spiritual values of the [W]est will depend to a large extent not only their fate, but also the ultimate fruits of our victory.”\textsuperscript{20} On the same day in Japan, a \textit{Nippon Times} editorial advocated that the Japanese should follow the samurai spirit of bushido to cope with the humiliation of being occupied by the former enemy. The editorial quoted a Japanese master swordsman, Hiromichi Nakayama:

In olden times the samurai never mouthed what was finished. He fought for all he was worth against the enemy, but once he owned defeat, the way of a true samurai was to love his enemy with greater love than before the fight. ...We must greet the Allied Army with just such a spirit.\textsuperscript{21}

The American troops approached Japan with its grand mission of destroying this very bushido from the psyche of the Japanese people. On August 28 at 8:28 am the first U.S. troops landed on the Atsugi Airfield in Kanagawa Prefecture.\textsuperscript{22} General MacArthur arrived on August 30 and began setting up his Headquarters in Yokohama.\textsuperscript{23} On September 2 on board the U.S. battleship \textit{Missouri}, Japan and the Allied Powers signed the instrument of surrender; the Allied Occupation had officially begun. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers MacArthur made a speech on board the \textit{Missouri} addressing the American people:

We stand in Tokyo today reminiscent of our countryman, Commodore Perry, ninety-two years ago. His purpose was to bring to Japan an era of enlightenment

\textsuperscript{21}“People Urged to Display Great Spirit of Bushido: Must face coming of Allied Troops with Dignity and Broadmindedness,” \textit{Nippon Times}, 28 August 1945.
\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Nippon Times}, 29 August 1945.
\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Nippon Times}, 29 August 1945; Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” 76.
and progress, by lifting the veil of isolation to the friendship, trade, and commerce of the world. But alas the knowledge thereby gained of Western science was forged into an instrument of oppression and human enslavement. Freedom of expression, freedom of action, even freedom of thought were denied through appeal to superstition, and through the application of force. We are committed by the Potsdam Declaration of principles to see that the Japanese people are liberated from this condition of slavery.\textsuperscript{24}

Concerning the attainment of peace, MacArthur said that the problem was "fundamentally theological" and involved a "spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that [would] synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature and all material and cultural developments of the past two thousand years."\textsuperscript{25} During the Occupation, MacArthur revealed his strong religious beliefs through his frequent expression of his Christian faith.\textsuperscript{26} The Occupation was, according to MacArthur, "the opportunity" for the Japanese, "a race, long stunted by ancient concepts of mythological teaching," to be uplifted by "practical demonstrations of Christian ideals."\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, from MacArthur's point of view, "[a]voiding vengeance, intolerance, and injustice," the Allied policy on the occupation of Japan was "squarely upon the fundamental concept which finds immortal exposition in the Sermon on the Mount."\textsuperscript{28}

MacArthur's rule of Japan was obviously colored by his evangelistic fervor. The U.S. government also stressed the spiritual component of disarming Japan. On the

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 276.
occasion of Japan’s official surrender, U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes announced, “[T]he physical disarmament of Japan is now proceeding…. [T]he second phase, spiritual disarmament of the people to make them want peace instead of war was difficult…. [W]e shall have to eliminate ultra-[n]ationalistic and totalitarian teachings in schools.”

Maeda Begins His Reforms

Religious matters were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. On the day of formal Japan’s surrender on the Missouri, the Ministry of Education requested the heads of recognized religious bodies to instruct their local temples and churches to realize the emperor’s “profound intention,” and to give assistance in connection with preparations for the arrival of the occupying force. Maeda gave a talk on religion and showed his concern about newly active religious activities resulting from the “freedom of religion” that the Potsdam Declaration required. He said that “foreign-origin religion, particularly Christianity” had “a mission to coordinate diplomatic relation[s].” He said that “all missionaries would be welcome who showed sympathy and understanding toward the people in their distress.” At the same time, he pleaded to missionaries not to come with the attitude that this was a God-given opportunity to “reform the bellicose barbarians.”

Analyzing U.S. officials’ statements and MacArthur’s speech, he must

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29 Nippon Times, 5 September 1945; Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 1945, p.1.
31 Kunrei (instruction) 4, 15 August 1945 #1598; Subj: Matters concerning obedience to the Imperial Rescript (terminating hostilities), quoted in Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions, 39.
32 Asahi Shimbun, 3 September 1945 quoted in Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions, 218. (Translation is Woodard’s)
33 Ibid. (Quoted part is Woodard’s translation).
have predicted an insurgence of foreign Christian missionaries under the auspices of the Allied Occupation.

During the first few months of the Occupation, the United States observed the Japanese government as it prepared to implement its own reform polices. MacArthur permitted the Ministry of Education to take the initiative in reforms "unless and until this prove[s] to be ineffective or insincere." Maeda recalled:

For about a month following my appointment as Minister of Education, we were permitted a comparatively free hand, with a minimum of restraints being employed, due largely to the fact that the Occupation authorities themselves had at this time not yet completely established their own policy.

According to Maeda, soon after the Occupation began, Bonner Fellers, who was in charge of education as the Chief of the Information Dissemination Section, requested a meeting with Maeda. Maeda recalled the interview:

He [Fellers] asked me where attention ought to be centered in the field of education. I replied that I wished to give most attention to establishing Civics education throughout the period of compulsory education and throughout the higher schools, and added that unfortunately there was in the Japanese language no word exactly suitable for translating "Civics."

Fellers replied, "I agree with you. Please proceed with it." The meeting ended. Maeda assumed that his reform policy was approved.

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34 Arundel Del Re and M. A. Piacentini to SCAP, GHQ, CI&E, "Preliminary Report on Measures Pertaining to the Cultural Re-education of Japan" 3 October 1945, p.1; box 20, Joseph C. Trainor papers, Hoover Institution; CI & E report stated that "directives are used only when it is judged that Japanese efforts are out of line with or controvert general Occupational policies." in SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1948), 136.
36 Ibid., 417.
37 Ibid.
38 Tamon Maeda "Seiji to minshushugi [Politics and democracy]" in Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito [his writings and personality] (Tokyo: Kanko sewanin daihyo Horikiri Zenjiro, 1963), 100-101. (Original phrase was quoted in Japanese("sorede kekko da. Dozo sorede yattekudasai"). (My translation).
On 15 September 1945, Maeda issued the first comprehensive policy on the future of Japanese education, “Educational Plan for Building the New Japan” (*Shin Nippon kensetsu no kyoiku hoshin*). Maeda declared it “my own.” It preceded not only all SCAP directives on Japanese educational reform but also the birth of the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) in GHQ. This policy reflected both the Japanese government’s administration policy and Maeda’s own ideas on what should constitute the new education for postwar Japan. The main points were as follows:

1. Compliance with the Imperial Rescript on Surrender
2. The creation of a peaceful state by wiping out all militaristic thoughts and measures
3. The maintenance of the structure of the Imperial State
4. Elimination of all military training
5. Revision of all textbooks to eliminate militaristic and ultra-nationalistic material
6. The re-education of teachers
7. The promotion of scientific education
8. The improvement of morality and culture through a broad program of adult and worker education
9. The reorganization of youth associations on a decentralized basis
10. The promotion of world friendship through participation in sports
11. The construction of a new moral Japan through the cultivation of religious sentiments.

In this policy statement, Maeda stressed the importance of preserving the national polity:

“[E]fforts will be made for safeguarding and maintaining the structure of the Imperial

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42 See “Big Education Reforms Are Decided by Ministry: Wide Reconstruction Plan Contemplated to Promote Peace and Knowledge,” *Nippon Times*, 16 September 1945; Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” 199.
Earlier, on September 9, Maeda gave a speech broadcast on radio specifically addressing the youth. Entitled “Message for Youth” (seinen gakuto ni tsugu), the Minister of Education said that “the real strength of Japan’s national polity was revealed at the end of the war: Once the emperor called for stopping the war, the Japanese followed the emperor’s order despite differences in opinions. Thus, the most important thing we have to keep in mind was to guard our kokutai.”

Maeda also emphasized scientific education. In his inaugural address on 18 August 1945, Maeda announced the creation of five new committees in the Ministry of Education. They would upgrade and expand scientific education, he said, because future educational policy would be based “on the advancement of scientific education.” One reason for such an emphasis was Japan’s recognition of the need for advancement in science and technology as an “immediate and obvious reaction to the introduction of atomic bombing” by the United States. Japan criticized the United States’ use of atomic bombs; the Emperor spoke of the “most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is...”

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44 *Asahi Shim bun*, 10 September 1945.
45 See *Asahi Shim bun*, 10 September 1945. For the full text see *Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito*, pp.67-74. (My translation); Mieko Kamiya, a daughter of Maeda and a secretary of Maeda stated in her diary on 3 September 1945 that “last night when I and my father [Maeda] was on a train, seeing students’ appearance of fatigue and spiritless, my father said that he had to cheer them up. So, he was writing a draft of “seinen gakuto ni tsugu [message for the youth]” until two in the morning,” in Mieko Kamiya, “Monbusho nikki [diary on ministry of education],” in *Henreki* (Tokyo: Misuzu shobo, 1980), 213. (My translation).
indeed incalculable taking the toll of many innocent lives." At the same time, Japan was forced to admit that the nuclear attack exposed the scientific gap between Japan and the United States. Hiding the pragmatic reason, Maeda urged that science "should root its foundation in an eternal search for truth, in purely scientific thoughts."

His high standards for science education were matched by those he had for religion. The policy stated that "[t]he construction of a new moral Japan shall be assisted through the cultivation of the religions sentiment of the people." In the message for youth on September 9, Maeda said that "[a]long with securing the freedom of religion, [we have to] cultivate religious sentiments such as to feel awe to the invisible, to be humble, to yearn for higher and greater matter." He wrote an essay, "Nitobe Inazo," in which he introduced Nitobe's life and his teachings. Nitobe's teaching about relating oneself to a supreme being influenced Maeda's ideas concerning new education. Maeda conveyed Nitobe's teachings as follows:

Dr. Nitobe stressed the importance of cultivating the mind. Dr. Nitobe said that humans need to cultivate both vertical and horizontal relationships. A horizontal relationship is among people in secular society. A vertical relationship is between a human being and transcendent being, or God, or truth. Dr. Nitobe said that man's life would become meaningful when he deals with worldly affairs by

49 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 161.
50 Tamon Maeda, "Seinen gakuto ni tsugu [Message for the youth]," in Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 73, quoted in Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 162. (Nishi's translation).
51 "Big Education Reforms Are Decided by Ministry: Wide Reconstruction Plan Contemplated to Promote Peace and Knowledge," Nippon Times, 16 September 1945.
52 Tamon Maeda "Seinen gakuto ni tsugu," 9 September 1945, in Maeda Tamon sono hito sono bun, 73. (My translation).
54 For Nitobe's influence on Maeda, see Hidefumi Kurosawa, Sengo Kyoiku no genryu o motomete: Maeda Tamon no kyoiku rinen, 4-11.
listening to his inner voice, which is a communication with the supreme being that transcends humans.\textsuperscript{55}

Maeda told the youth that “Love of truth, that is what students should have in their mind.” Maeda stated that “one of the causes for Japan’s failure was ... the people’s spiritual life in which there was inconsistency in what they thought and what they acted. From now on, students should search for truth and act on the truth.”\textsuperscript{56} Maeda further stated that “[e]ven if we lost the war, what we should never lose is self-respect. Based on this belief in self, you have to stand for what you believe in.”\textsuperscript{57} According to Maeda, new Japan needed educated and independent individuals who could act according to their own convictions, which were generated from self-remorse and salvation through religious faith.\textsuperscript{58} He regretted that prewar and wartime Japanese schools discouraged critical thinking; teachers ordered children to memorize what the teachers and texts told them. According to Maeda, this restrictive teaching style developed blind obedience in people, hampered healthy development of democracy, and created militaristic Japan.\textsuperscript{59} In order not to repeat this mistake again, students should cultivate true individuality. Maeda’s policies were innovative compared to the restrictive and regimented wartime education.

Maeda’s emphasis on the cultivation of religious sentiments in students, however, was not incorporated in the school curriculum because the Minister of Education’s “Order No.12” of 1899 prohibited the teaching of religion in all officially recognized

\textsuperscript{55} Maeda, “Nitobe Inazo” in Nitobe Inazo, 50-51. (My translation).
\textsuperscript{56} Maeda, “Seinen gakuto ni tsugu,” 9 September 1945, in Maeda Tamon sono hito sono bun, 74. (My translation).
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 72. (My translation).
\textsuperscript{58} Maeda, Sanso seishi, 44. (My translation).
schools, both government and private. His policy emphasizing religion was intended to appeal to the Allied Powers about Japan’s aspiration for a morally upright nation. The policy stated that “[i]n order to promote international friendship through religion all religious sects and organizations will be urged to effect further close collaboration and manifest the honesty of the religion of Japan.” Maeda added, “[A] conference of superintendent priests and heads of religious sects will be held in the near future to convey the religious policy of the Education Ministry.”

On 20 September 1945, the first religious conference after the war was held in Tokyo. At the conference, delegates representing 43 denominations of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Christianity formulated practical plans for religions activities. According to their plan, religious organizations would help Japanese household with religious teachings and activities. Through religion, they said, “the home life of the Japanese people [would] be further stabilized, religious sentiment [would] be instilled in the minds of students and youths, [the] spirit of labor [would] be enhanced, [and] proper guidance [would] be given to the demobilized servicemen and war-bereaved families.” They declared that “[t]hrough religion, international relations [would] also be enhanced.”

Just before the conference started, Prime Minister Higashikuni invited 20 influential Japanese Christian leaders and 16 foreign missionaries to his official residence. During the gathering, Higashikuni “expressed his desire of constructing a new and peaceful

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61 “Big Education Reforms Are Decided by Ministry: Wide Reconstruction Plan Contemplated to Promote Peace and Knowledge,” *Nippon Times*, 16 September 1945.
Japan, high in morality and culture, through Christianity.” Higashikuni thanked the foreign missionaries in particular for their untiring religious work during the war.

“Words cannot express my gratitude,” the Prime Minister said, “for the brilliant work you have done here. Although handicapped by numerous difficulties and unpleasant incidents during the war, you have successfully performed your duty as missionaries by determining to remain in Japan and carry on your endeavors.” He then pleaded with the Christian missionaries “to remain here and help the Japanese people build a new Japan, high in culture and morality.” Prime Minister Higashikuni appealed Japan’s tolerance for Christianity.

The Occupation Education Officer’s Early Approach to Maeda

The State Department officials trusted Maeda Tamon as a “liberal” person in Japan and expected him to carry out radical reforms in line with U.S. objectives. Charles A. Beard, a prominent historian, wrote a letter dated 19 August 1945 to President Truman’s White House secretary. In this letter, Beard mentioned that he met Maeda in Japan in 1922 and praised Maeda “as a friend of the United States.” Beard suggested that the liaison officer between MacArthur’s staff and the Ministry of Education obtain information about Maeda’s character and history. The White House forwarded the letter

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64 Maeda reminisced on his acquaintance with Dr. Beard in Maeda Tamon, “Beard hakase o shinobu” [Reminiscence on Dr. Beard], Amerika Kenkyu 3, no. 12 (1950): 4.
65 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 116, note 79 (Mayo quoted Beard’s letter that Maeda “had been converted to Christianity by a Quaker missionary in Japan and was active in Christian work” (p.116). However, I have not encountered any documents which substantiate the fact that Maeda converted to Christianity.)
to the State Department and the War Department. It turned out that SCAP’s first chief educational officer, Harold Henderson, was already well acquainted with Maeda.

During the war, Lt. Colonel Harold Henderson had been a specialist in propaganda leaflets and a member of Bonner Fellers’ leaflet executive committee in the Southwest Pacific campaigns. Bonner Fellers selected Henderson, a professor of Japanese at Columbia University before the war, as a member of the Information Dissemination Section and assigned him to the mission of re-education of the Japanese. Henderson’s first task in Japan was to make contacts with his prewar Japanese friends.

On September 15, the day Maeda issued his “Educational Plan for Building the New Japan,” Henderson visited Maeda in the Ministry of Education. Henderson explained that he was newly appointed as the chief of the Educational Section of GHQ and would be a liaison officer between the Ministry of Education and GHQ. Henderson was holding a newspaper in which Maeda’s educational policy was announced; he pointed to the newspaper accounts and said that “GHQ was satisfied with your plan” and asked Maeda to continue to carry on his work in the same direction. Henderson also told him that GHQ did not intend to issue directives pertaining to education but rather to handle everything by means of personal conferences between Henderson and Maeda.

Maeda was pleased with such a proposal. Maeda later recalled that “I agreed completely

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68 Maeda Tamon, Sanso seishi, 216; Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 84.
69 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 84.
71 Maeda, Sanso seishi, 216; Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415.
with these intentions and proceeded to get on with my work in an easy frame of mind, basing my actions upon my own decision.”

In the meantime, education officers of GHQ made a preliminary study of the status of Japanese education and of the voluntary reforms already undertaken by Maeda. On 22 September 1945, the Civil Information and Education Section (CI & E) replaced the Information Dissemination Section. Colonel (soon Brigadier General) Ken Dyke, who had been the Chief Officer of Information and Education Officer in MacArthur’s wartime General Headquarters in the Philippines, replaced General Fellers as head of CI & E. On October 2, the General Headquarters was established in the Daiichi Sogo Building in Hibiya, Tokyo and the CI & E was formally established within the General Headquarters. CI & E’s new head Ken Dyke put Henderson in charge of the Division of Education, Religion, and Monuments. Initially, Dyke and Henderson preferred to work behind the scenes with Maeda, whom Henderson trusted to take the proper initiative as a Japanese liberal. Henderson told Maeda and other like-minded educators about what SCAP and the U.S. government wanted to be done in the schools and asked them to make appropriate decisions.

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74 Mark T. Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” 200. For detailed discussion on education officer’s study and analysis, see Mayo “Psychological disarmament,” 91.
76 Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” 77; Asahi Shimbun, 18 September 1945, p.1.
77 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 85.
78 Ibid., 91.
Maeda continued with this freedom until the first directive on education was issued on 22 October 1945.79

Differences Emerge

Meanwhile the New York Times reported on the re-education of Japan. The article stated, “[T]o convert this nation... from a totalitarian war machine to a peacefully-inclined democracy is not an overnight step.” The article discussed activities that Henderson had implemented. It reported that “little essays and parables” that had indoctrinated Japanese youth “with the Bushido spirit” were removed. Henderson, who had been interviewed, stated, “Our job is not to tell the Japanese what to do.... We hope that democratic re-education of Japan will be an indigenous growth on a new soil of freedom and liberalism.” Henderson noted what he believed to be the difficulty for the Japanese to adjust to new democratic concepts:

Japan now lacks many things that we take for granted. They had no foundation in Greek logic, therefore they don’t think logically. They have had no Roman law, therefore the contract that would mean one thing to the American means something else entirely to the Japanese. They have never had either Christian philosophy or democratic practice.81

Henderson, while critical of Japanese lack of understanding of American ways, showed hope. “They are capable of absorbing these things, as witness our own Nisei.”82

80 “Re-Education of Japan Said Long-Term Project,” Nippon Times, 28 September 1945; Asahi Shimbun, 26 September 1945.
82 Ibid.
On 4 October 1945, SCAP issued the so-called Civil Liberties Directive, entitled “Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties,” which ordered the Japanese government “to abrogate and immediately suspend...restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.” The Japanese government’s willingness to tolerate Christianity without changing its laws must have had an adverse effect. The directive specifically noted that the Religious Bodies Law of 1939, which had been used in mobilizing religion for the war effort and was now used to construct the new Japan, should be abrogated.

The next day, the Higashikuni cabinet resigned. The official reason was that the “Surrender Cabinet’s” mission was over with the signing of the documents of Japan’s surrender to the Allied Powers, and the demobilization of the Japanese Army and Navy. However, it was no secret that the direct cause of the resignation was the receipt of the Civil Liberties Directive, which demanded a sweeping change in Japan’s legal and political system to provide for the guarantee of personal rights and civil liberties. Also there was “public dissatisfaction and impatience with the Cabinet’s functioning.”

At its formation, the Higashikuni cabinet had admitted the evils of the old order and had promised full respect for civil liberties, freedom of thought and speech, abolition

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84 Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions, 51
87 Department of State, Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of Shidehara Cabinet,” 12 October 1945, p.1, File 097. 3 Z1092. No. 3266.
of the "thought police," and other much needed reforms. However, the cabinet was not able to fulfill these promises as promptly or as effectively as expected. Moreover, the cabinet was not able to comprehend completely some of the Allied desires, and it became advisable to set up a new cabinet which would be able to fathom the demands of the SCAP.88

The next day, an imperial command to form a new cabinet was given to Baron Shidehara Kijuro, a 73-year-old former foreign minister (1929-1931).89 Maeda Tamon remained the education minister. In an administrative policy, Shidehara declared that democratic politics (minshu shugi seiji) be established.90 This was the first use of the term "democracy" by the Japanese government. The Shidehara cabinet used the term based on its understanding that there had been "democratic tendencies" in Japan. In the Potsdam Declaration, the Allied Powers mentioned "the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."91 The Japanese government managed to read into this an acknowledgment that the United States recognized the existence of "democratic tendencies" in the Japanese government.92 Shidehara stated that Japanese politics had been based on the principle of respecting people's will as a whole, as stated in the first provision of the Charter Oath of 1868, which the Emperor Meiji

88 See “The Cabinet Resignation,” Nippon Times, 7 October 1945; U.S. intelligence report said that Shidehara Cabinet was “apparently designed in part to facilitate good relations with Allied authorities” in Department of State, Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of Shidehara Cabinet,” 12 October 1945, p.3.
89 Department of State, Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of Shidehara Cabinet,” 12 October 1945, p.1, File 097.3 Z1092. No. 3266; “Baron Shidehara Gets Imperial Command To Organize Cabinet,” Nippon Times, 7 October 1945.
90 "Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies" (my translation), Asahi Shimbun, 10 October 1945.
92 See Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 163; Suzuki Eiichi, Kyoiku gyosei, 13.
declared as the basic policy of the newly established nation. The first provision declared that “[d]eliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion.” Shidehara said that “based on this spirit of the Charter Oath, the Japanese government aimed to establish democratic politics by respecting people’s basic rights and recovering completely freedom of speech, assembly and association.”

Accordingly, Maeda started to use the word “democracy.” However, Maeda’s concept of “democracy,” (minshu shugi, literally, “people-master principle,”) was, in his own words, “Japanese-style democracy” (Nihon-shiki minshu shugi). He emphasized that “[e]stablishing democracy in Japan means... establishing “Japanese-style democracy.” So, “democratic educational policy would be based on Japanese indigenous culture.” While Maeda declared that professors who had been removed from teaching positions because of their “dangerous thoughts” during the war would be allowed to return, he insisted on an important restriction. Maeda said that “in academic debate on the Japanese constitution, the freedom of inquiry for the truth would be allowed as long

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93 See “Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies,” Asahi Shimbun, 10 October 1945. (My translation).
95 See “Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies,” Asahi Shimbun, 10 October 1945. (My translation); U.S. intelligence report pointed out that Shidehara Cabinet had policy of “Reestablishment of the government’s respect of the will of the people” in Department of State, Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of Shidehara Cabinet,” 12 October 1945, p.2, File 097.3 Z1092. No. 3266
96 See Comments of Education Minister Maeda in “Education Minister Maeda advocates ‘Japanese-style democracy” (my translation), Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 11, October 1945, p.2
97 See ibid. (My translation).
as the first article [the emperor’s sovereignty] was not violated.”

Maeda stated, “I definitely do not want anybody to touch the first article of the Meiji Constitution.”

Maeda clarified the meaning of “Japanese-style democracy” in a speech on October 15:

Under our polity, sovereignty resides in His Majesty. We, subjects, have been allowed to participate in the governing of the Empire. This political structure called for “service” rather than “power” from us. This is a feature of the Japanese-style democracy.

Maeda also prohibited a debate by educators about whether the emperor system was good or bad. Furthermore, in Maeda’s “Japanese-style democracy,” loyalty and patriotism were still encouraged. Maeda stated:

We have to respect our indigenous values: loyalty and patriotism. But these values will be truly fulfilled with the development and perfection of democracy, which is based on respect for individuality. It seems loyalty, patriotism and democracy are incompatible, but they are actually supportive of each other.

Maeda’s concept of democracy was a desperate attempt to hold on to the imperial rule while complying with the Allied demand of “the revival of the democratic tendencies.”

On 11 October 1945, MacArthur demanded specific reforms from the Shidehara cabinet in a “Statement to the Japanese Government Concerning Required Reforms.” MacArthur stated that “the traditional social order under which the Japanese people for centuries [had] been subjugated [would] be corrected.” MacArthur specifically demanded educational reform:

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99 Tamon Maeda in Shukan shinbihon, 17 November 1945, no.9, quoted in Suzuki, Kyoiku gyosei, 128. (My translation).
100 Maeda’s speech on October 15, in Sengo nihon kyoiku shiryo shusei vol.1, Haisen to kyoiku no minshuka (Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1982), 123. (My translation).
102 Tamon Maeda, Sanso seishi, 40. (My translation).
The opening of the schools to more liberal education—that the people may shape their future progress from factual knowledge and benefit from an understanding of a system under which government becomes the servant rather than the master of the people.\textsuperscript{103}

It was becoming apparent that Maeda's “Japanese-style democracy” and MacArthur's American democracy were fundamentally different.

Chapter V

The U.S. Evaluation of Maeda and SCAP's Four Directives on Education

U.S. Evaluation of Maeda's Reforms

The Research and Analysis (R & A) Branch of the State Department scrutinized Maeda’s educational reforms and wrote a report entitled “Japanese Post-War Education Policies,” dated 5 October 1945. R & A’s analysis was the first American critique. It summarized Maeda’s reforms as having three areas of focus: “preservation of the national polity, expansion of scientific education, and elimination of military training and wartime doctrines.”

R & A paid special attention to the Japanese government’s insistent defense of the national polity (kokutai) and explained it as follows:

While national polity (kokutai) means the structure of the State, to the average Japanese it also connotes a complex pattern of philosophical doctrines which have been deeply ingrained in him in recent years. These doctrines include such concepts as Japan’s divine origin, the divinity of the Emperor, the Emperor as father of his people, and the Japanese mission to bring the world under Imperial leadership.

The report noted that Maeda emphasized defense of the national polity in his inaugural speech on August 18, and it predicted that “underlying philosophy” of the national polity

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1 Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, 163.
would be "tacitly assumed in further discussions of textbook revision and of youth movements."\(^4\)

The report explained that Maeda’s emphasis on scientific education derived from a reaction to the development of the atomic bomb by the United States: “The implied threat to the Allies in this emphasis on science was recognized.” However, the report added that Maeda denied any dangerous intention when he stated in his press interview that “(The) expansion of (the study) of science does not necessarily involve counteraction against atomic bombs.”\(^5\)

Regarding Maeda’s elimination of military training and wartime doctrine, the report explained that Maeda promised “voluntary complete elimination of military training and military influence as quickly as possible.”\(^6\) Also it reported that Maeda ordered as the first step for the revision of textbooks that the wartime propaganda, which was inserted “in an effort to foster distrust and dislike of the Allied powers,” be removed.\(^7\)

Although Maeda’s reform policy was infused with such appealing words as “science,” “non-military,” and “peace,” R & A dismissed Maeda’s gesture as being “only the use of other expressions to describe the same situation.”\(^8\) If the Ministry of Education truly intended to change education, the R & A Branch wondered why it had not yet come up with a proposal to “revise the courses in Japanese ethics and history” by eliminating

\(^{5}\) Quoted in ibid., p. 2. (Insert of phrases in parentheses were in original).
\(^{6}\) Quoted in ibid., p. 2.
\(^{7}\) Ibid.
\(^{8}\) Ibid., p. 3.
doctrines that had been “the backbone of nationalist education.” According to the R & A, Maeda’s proclamation seemed to be a shrewd attempt to protect the doctrine of imperial supremacy.

The R & A concluded that Japanese policymakers would continue “to consider that defense of the national polity include[d] [the] perpetuation of the philosophy of militant nationalism,” to the general detriment of American policy. R & A feared that such a conservative view would be a formidable obstacle to the attainment of complete freedom of education as well as to the elimination of the “religio-nationalist interpretation of Japanese mythology and the glorification of militarism” from educational curricula. Therefore, in order to liberate Japanese education, R & A recommended the use of “external pressures” or the “force of combined student-faculty demands.” Otherwise, it foresaw no real change except an improvement in scientific training.

Another intelligence report, “Reactions to Monbusho Reforms,” dated 2 December 1945, also indicated the necessity of direct interference by Occupation authorities. This report described that the reaction of private institutions such as Catholic universities, Waseda University, and Japan’s Women’s University to Maeda’s reforms was “on the whole favorable.” Educators in these private schools felt that Minister Maeda was willing to carry out educational reforms and to listen to private institutions’ proposals. The report, however, expressed suspicion of the Ministry’s sincerity because the Ministry’s statements were “attributed to the desire... to ‘acquire merit’ in the eyes of

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9 Research and Analysis Branch, “Japanese Post-War Education in Japan,” p. 3.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
12 SCAP, GHQ, CI&E, Education Division, “Reactions to Mombusho Reforms” 2 December 1945, p.1; box 43, Joseph C. Trainor papers, Hoover Institution.
the American Authorities." The report noted that some educators feared that in the long run, conservative ministry officials--"well known for their incompetence and passive resistance"--might stultify any serious attempt to put radical reforms into effect.

While fully recognizing that Maeda’s reform was a distinct improvement over the old system and appreciating Maeda’s “understanding” and friendly attitude, the report stated that educators felt that there was insufficient guarantees that at some future time a minister might not repeal the present progressive measures, as had often occurred in the past. Educators also feared that the reform policy initiated by current authorities might be interrupted before it had reached a satisfactory conclusion. In addition, they desired to see that the principle of freedom and non-interference by the government would be firmly established by legislative measure. The report claimed that in order to “extirpate” the present abuses and errors, not only advice but direct action from the GHQ was required.

The U.S. Government Forbids State Shinto

On 7 October 1945, the U.S. State Department announced that Shintoism was to be abolished as the state religion. John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Far Eastern Section in the Department said, “Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with....Shintoism...as it is directed by the Japanese Government...as

13 SCAP, GHQ, CI&E, Education Division, “Reactions to Mombusho Reforms” 2 December 1945, p.1.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., pp.1-2.
16 Ibid., p.2.
a state religion—National Shinto, that is—will go.” 17 Vincent added, “[T]here will be no
place for Shintoism in their schools.” 18 It was U.S. policy that Shinto be separated from
public education in Japan. In response, Prime Minister Shidehara commented, “It is
questionable if Shinto can be defined as the state religion. It has been a controversial
question whether Shinto could be regarded as a religion in the Western sense.” 19 But
such evasive remarks could not save State Shinto.

Considering the U.S. demands for freedom of religion specified in both the Civil
Liberties Directive of 4 October 1945 and the U.S. government’s ban of State Shinto,
Maeda decided to abolish “Order No. 12” of 1899, in which the Japanese government,
apprehensive about the spread of Christianity, prohibited formal religious education in all
government and public schools, as well as in private elementary, middle, and girls’ higher
schools during school hours. 20 On 15 October 1945, the government officially announced
that it would permit private schools to give religious education and rites outside the
regular curriculum. 21

Unaware of the American policymaker’s suspicions, Maeda continued to instruct
governors and educators on his policy. On 15 October 1945, the Central Seminar for
New Educational Policies was held at Tokyo Woman Teachers’ College to give guidance

in Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions, 55; Nippon Times, 9
October 1945.
19 “Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies,” Asahi Shimbun, 10 October 1945. (My
translation).
21 See Asahi Shimbun, 15 October 1945; Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and
Japanese Religions, 39 and 105; “Hatsu Gaku No.94 (Digest), Subj: Concerning Religious Education in
Schools,” 20 December 1945 in SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2
(Tokyo, 1948), 154
to educational leaders on the new principles of postwar Japan. The Ministry of Education instructed that the following guiding principles should be integral to Japan’s educational system:

1) Elimination of militarism and radical nationalism
2) Elimination of uniform education
3) Cultivation of the idea of respecting the will of the people
4) Development of personality and cultivation of moral sense
5) Civic education and social morality
6) Scientific education as cultural assets
7) Reinforcement of labor education and promotion of physical education, and
8) Improvement of women’s education.

The Ministry encouraged educators to use “spontaneous and original teaching methods that exemplified the scientific approach” and indicated that the goal of education should be “to enrich the personalities of their students and promote a high standard of moral character.” Maeda said that “recent moral decay had to be remedied by our sincere obedience to the spirit of morals in the Rescript on Education” for its most precious virtue was the harmonious relationship it prescribed among the people and their loyalty to the emperor.

At about this time Henderson again visited Maeda. Henderson, “in a state of high excitement,” told Maeda, “The other day...we agreed to let everything connected with education be carried out by conferences between us, but Washington now says that such a...
casual arrangement will never do.” 26 With apologies, Henderson showed an outline of
the directive “Administrative Measures Concerning the Japanese Educational System” of
22 October 1945.27

From October 22 through December 1945, SCAP issued a series of four directives
on education, the primary purpose of which was to eradicate sources of "ultra-
nationalism" and "militarism" in thought and action of the Japanese people.28 The first
directive of 22 October 1945, informed the Japanese government of “the objectives and
policies of the Occupation with regard to education.”29 It directed that educational
content, personnel, and facilities would be critically examined based on policies in this
directive. SCAP ordered the Ministry of Education to submit reports “describing in detail
all action taken to comply with the provisions” of the directive.30 The second directive
of 30 October 1945, "Investigation, Screening, and Certification of Teachers and
Educational Officials," established the procedures for purging undesirable teachers.31

On 1 November 1945, Maeda invited back the university professors who had been
forced to resign during World War II for their “dangerous thoughts.” He instructed

27 Ibid.
of the First Hundred Years, 228; Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, s.v. “educational reforms of 1947.”
29 Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers “Memorandum for Imperial Japanese
Government, Subj.: Administration of the Educational System of Japan” 22 October 1945, Ag 350 (22 Oct
45) CIE, p.1 in United State, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee for the Far East,
Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East (National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T1204, Roll 4); SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1948), 26-
28.
30 Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers “Memorandum for Imperial Japanese
Government, Subj.: Administration of the Educational System of Japan” 22 October 1945, Ag 350 (22 Oct
45) CIE, p.2.
31 For a full text, see SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo,
1948), 29-30; Ministry of Education, Japan’s Modern Educational System, 229.
presidents of universities, colleges, and high schools to reinstate “liberal teachers.” The following day, Maeda addressed a group of prefectural governors on the changes in education in Japan. Maeda explained the aims of education in the new Japan:

1) Fulfilling the Allied demands in the Potsdam Declaration
2) Building a peaceful, cultural and moralistic state by abolishing militarism and ultra-nationalism,
3) Securing equal educational opportunity
4) Breaking down uniformity of instruction
5) Advocating respect of individuality
6) Promoting morality
7) Fostering the idea of assumption of responsibility in rendering service to the state and society.

More important to him than the reforms per se, was what he called “the present deplorable state of moral degeneration,” which he believed stemmed from the people’s disregard for the Imperial Rescript on Education. “I should like to promote morality,” he told the governors, “by attaching great importance to moral education and encouraging the cultivation of religious sentiment.” He was determined to maintain Japanese social cohesion by preserving the Japanese sense of morality that focused on being loyal to the emperor. Maeda believed that his emphasis on morality was in keeping with the SCAP directive. Unfortunately, however, his actions brought him into direct conflict with SCAP.

32 GHQ, SCAP, CI&E, Education Division, “Digests of the More Important Ministry of Education Orders and Directives Issued Since the End of the War” 10 May 1946, p. 1; box 43, Joseph C. Trainor papers, Hoover Institution.
33 Ministry of Education to CI&E, “Digest”, 2 November 1945; box 43, Joseph C. Trainor papers, Hoover Institution.
34 Ibid.
The U.S. Launches the Spiritual Disarmament of the Japanese

In November 1945, MacArthur received *The Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper*, dated 3 November 1945, a secret military directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington identifying the basic objectives of the Occupation. One section directly referred to education:

> As rapidly as possible, all teachers who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression and those who continue actively to oppose the purposes of the military occupation will be replaced by acceptable and qualified successors. Japanese military and para-military training and drill in all schools will be forbidden [Part I, paragraph 10a].

The directive also ordered a ban on the government’s support of Shinto:

> The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form will be prohibited and completely suppressed. You will require the Japanese Government to cease financial and other support of National Shinto establishments [Part I, paragraph 9a].

Based on these directives, Brigadier General Ken R. Dyke, Chief of CI & E, submitted a memorandum, “Shinto Directive Staff Study,” dated 3 December 1945 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In it Dyke stated that unless Shinto was not separated from the state and instruction in Shinto was eliminated from the education system, Shinto would be used for

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37 MacArthur had received a draft version of this directive in August 1945. See Mayo, *Psychological Disarmament*, 76.
39 *Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military government in Japan Proper (JCS 1380/15, 3 November 1945)*, in ibid., 432.
“disseminating militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology.” On 15 December 1945, MacArthur ordered State Shinto to be abolished in Japan “to destroy a religious ideology which he asserted led the country into war and defeat.” MacArthur condemned “the doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other states because of ancestry, descent, or special origin.” The SCAP directive laid down a program of broad revision, calling for

1. Withdrawal of all government control and support of State Shinto
2. Purging of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology from the doctrine of the cult which preaches ancestor worship and deifies the Emperor
3. Removal of Shinto teachings from schools
4. Banning of all God shelves-(Kamidana) before which Shintoists pray and all other symbols of State Shinto from publicly supported institutions.

The intent of the directive was “to separate religion from the state, to prevent misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faiths, and creeds upon exactly the same legal basis.” SCAP ordered that the dissemination of Shinto doctrines and other religions “in any form and by any means” in any educational institution supported by public funds is prohibited. Also MacArthur banned the circulation of “The Cardinal Principles of Kokutai” published by the Ministry of Education in

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45 SCAP Directive, “Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto),” paragraph 2a; SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1948), 31-35.
1937, which defined the fundamental principles of the national polity. Maeda had not stopped the circulation because he believed in the supremacy of imperial sovereignty and also because the maintenance of the national polity was the government’s most important policy.  

Brigadier General Dyke, chief of CI & E, which drafted this Shinto directive, said in a statement to the Japanese press that this order liberated the people from compulsory support of an ideology “which has contributed to their war guilt, defeat, suffering, privation and the present deplorable condition.” Dyke also indicated that additional measures were planned to adjust state Shinto into purely a religion. To a question about whether steps affecting the Japanese conception of the emperor’s divinity were contemplated, he avoided responding. However, his next statement indicated what the Occupation authority had in mind for the status of the emperor. The emperor, he claimed, had “the privileges of a private citizen,” including religious worship, so the emperor could continue to worship at the Grand Shrines of Ise to which the emperor recently went to report the end of the war to his ancestors. Dyke continued “The Emperor [was] still the spiritual head of Japan,” but state officials would not be able to accompany him in appearing at Ise or other shrine in the future. In closing, he said that

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47 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 172.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
the Shinto directive would assist the Japanese people “in a rededication of their national life to building a new Japan based upon ideas of peace and democracy.”

Accordingly, on 22 December 1945, the Ministry of Education dispatched the order “Abolition of Shinto from the schools” to prefectural governors and heads of the schools. It included the following directives:

1. Forbids the dissemination of Shinto doctrine in all schools (except private schools), conduction of Shinto rites or ceremonies, and sponsorship of visits to or paying homage to Shinto shrines by schools (paying homage to the Imperial Palace will be permitted).
2. Physical symbols of Shinto, such as god-shelves, sacred ropes, etc., will be removed from schools.
3. Teachers or officials of government schools will not visit shrines while acting in their official capacities.
4. Teachers, students, and educational officials will not be discriminated against because of their failure to profess and observe Shinto or any other religion.
5. All passages associated with Shinto doctrine will be deleted from textbooks and teachers’ manuals. Circulation of the “The Cardinal Principles of Kokutai” (“Kokutai no Hongi”) and “The Way of the Subject” (“Shinmin no Michi”) are prohibited. The terms “Greater East Asia War” and “The Whole World under One Roof” will not be used in teaching.
6. Private schools for training in or dissemination of Shinto may be maintained but will receive no state grants or subsidies.

The Ministry of Education faithfully complied with the Shinto directives from SCAP, with one exception. The prohibition on shrine worship did not explicitly include the Imperial

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53 Ibid.
Palace, so pupils and teachers continued to line up neatly and bow deeply in the palace’s
direction.54 This deliberate flouting of SCAP’s directives only accelerated the severity of
American reforms.

On 31 December 1945, SCAP issued the fourth directive, entitled "Suspension of
Courses in Morals (Shushin), Japanese History, and Geography," which prohibited
teaching these subjects in school until SCAP granted a resumption.55 The directive stated
that “the Japanese government [had] used education to inculcate militaristic and ultra-
nationalistic ideologies, which have been inextricably interwoven in certain textbooks”
and imposed on students.56 This directive intended to make sure that the Shinto doctrine
would be completely eliminated in schools.

On New Year’s Day in 1946, the so-called Declaration of Humanity of the
Emperor was issued.

We stand by the people and we wish always to share with them in their moments
of joys and sorrows. The ties between us and our people have always stood upon
mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and
that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the
world....Love of the family and love of the country are especially strong in this
country. With more of this devotion should we now work towards love of
mankind 57

The people’s belief system began to crumble. The emperor’s divinity and the sacred
mission of Japan to rule the world were denied by the emperor himself.

54 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 171.
55 Ministry of Education, Japan’s Modern Educational System: A History of the Fist Hundred Years, 229-
230; For a full text see, SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo,
1948), 36-39
56 “SCAP Suspends 3 School Courses,” Nippon Times, 4 January 1946.
57 “Imperial Rescript,” of January 1st 1946, Nippon Times, 1 January 1946; See for a full text, “Emperor’s
Imperial Rescript Denying His Divinity,” 1 January 1946, in SCAP, Government Section, Political
Maeda Tamon had been involved in preparing the statement. On Sunday morning, 23 December 1945, Prime Minister Shidehara had called and asked Maeda to come to the Prime Minister’s Office. In this meeting Shidehara said that he had been urged by an influential American to have the emperor issue a statement disavowing the emperor’s alleged divinity. Shidehara passed over to Maeda “two or three sheets of Western letter paper,” on which Maeda saw draft sentences handwritten in English. Then Shidehara said, “If you agree that this is a good idea, as the Minister of Education, please prepare a draft statement based on this draft.” Maeda said to Shidehara that after the surrender, people were lethargic and did not know what they should do, so it would be good for the emperor to sweep away the mysterious clouds about him and declare that he was with the people. Maeda added that on this occasion, it would be good that the emperor indicate the path Japan should take. Maeda prepared a draft in secret.

Two days later, Maeda handed a draft to Shidehara, who then wrote a final draft on December 25. The next day, Shidehara became ill and entered the hospital, leaving the rescript in Maeda’s hands. In place of Shidehara, Maeda requested an audience with Emperor Hirohito to show him the rescript. Maeda later recalled, “What impressed me

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58 See Akira Iriye “Maeda Tamon,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 5. Whether the emperor’s statement on denial of his divinity was imposed by American or Japanese initiative has been controversial. For detailed discussion, see Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions, 250-268. The principle source here is Tamon Maeda “Ningen sengen no uchi soto”[Inside and Outside the Human declaration] in Maeda Taman sono bun sono hito, 75-87.


60 Maeda Taman sono bun sono hito, 76.

61 Ibid., 77.

62 Maeda Taman sono bun sono hito, 75-85; Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 265.

63 Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan, 266.
deeply was the fact that the Emperor received it calmly and examined it carefully as if he had been waiting for it. I remember that he read it in a low voice.64 According to Maeda, Emperor Hirohito told the story about Emperor Gomizunoo (reigned 1611-29), who had abdicated his throne in order to have a moxa treatment to cure chicken pox. Even the court physician had not been allowed to touch the emperor’s body, so it had been unthinkable to burn moxa on the divine body. Emperor Hirohito said, “There were some inconveniences to be treated as a living divinity.”65 During a Diet session at the beginning of December 1945, one diet member asked Education Minister Maeda whether or not the emperor was “kami” (divinity). Maeda answered:

There is a difference between “kami” in Japanese and “god” in English. [Although normally “kami” is translated into “god”,] I think that Japanese “kami” is not equivalent to the Christian concept of “God” as the Almighty and the Creator. Although Japanese “kami” includes divinity, its emphasis is more on having the highest position. If you ask me if the emperor is “god” in the Western sense, I have to say that the emperor is not. But if “kami” is strictly interpreted in Japanese concept from ancient time, I have to say that the emperor is “kami.”66

According to Maeda, Emperor Hirohito, who was in the audience, said that as Emperor Meiji proclaimed in the Charter Oath of 1868, the idea of respecting the will of the people already existed in Japan. Emperor Hirohito suggested to Maeda that some sentences be added to the rescript in order to make that point clear. Maeda added the five provisions of the Charter Oath of 1868 as the first part of the rescript.67 He showed the revised rescript to Emperor Hirohito, who approved of it.68 The Cabinet approved the

64 Maeda Taman sono bun sono hito, 81; Quoted in Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions, 266, in footnote. (Translation is Woodard’s).
65 Maeda Taman sono bun sono hito, 81-82.
66 Ibid., 82.
67 For a full text of the rescript see, “Imperial Rescript,” of January 1st 1946, Nippon Times, 1 January 1946
68 Maeda Taman sono bun sono hito, 83.
rescript on the morning of December 30 and in the afternoon an English translation of the rescript was carried to the GHQ for SCAP approval.\textsuperscript{69} There was no objection from MacArthur. After the release of the rescript on New Year’s Day, MacArthur commented:

The Emperor’s New Year’s statement pleases me very much. By it he undertakes a leading part in the democratization of his people. He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines. His action reflects the irresistible influence of a sound idea. A sound idea cannot be stopped.\textsuperscript{70}

MacArthur was pleased to rectify what he thought was a pagan belief system. In the fall of 1945, MacArthur had said to Protestant leaders then visiting Japan that “Japan is a spiritual vacuum. If you do not fill it with Christianity, it will be filled with Communism. Send me 1,000 missionaries.”\textsuperscript{71} On 29 December 1945, MacArthur sent a cable to Washington stating that his policy was “to permit the return of missionaries to Japan to the maximum extent practicable.”\textsuperscript{72} MacArthur’s “practical demonstrations of Christian ideals” were thus made evident.

On 4 January 1946, Maeda issued a directive to all prefectural governors and heads of all schools:

On the first New Year’s Day of this peace-loving country, his Majesty, the Emperor, graciously issued an Imperial Rescript and earnestly indicated the direction whereto Japan should advance for her reconstruction....From ancient times, love of family and love of country have been the characteristic moral principles of our people, but hereafter we shall have to amplify them to include love of mankind. The unique relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects on our country does not consist in imaginary myths and legends, not in a monomaniac sense of superiority of our people. I cannot help being filled with trepidation when I think that the Emperor graciously teaches us that by cleansing

\textsuperscript{69} Woodard, \textit{The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952}, 267.
\textsuperscript{70} “General MacArthur’s Comment on Imperial Rescript of January 1, 1946,” in SCAP, Government Section, \textit{Political Reorientation of Japan}, vol. 2, 471.
\textsuperscript{72} Quoted in Woodard, \textit{The Allied Occupation of Japan}, 219.
ourselves from this mistaken idea we may realize the close relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects; that is, the Sovereign and his subjects belong to one family. I am deeply impressed by the magnanimity of His Majesty's will and our desire to serve him devotedly cannot but be augmented ever more.\textsuperscript{73}

The new morality of Japan was to love not only its own "family nation," but also all mankind. Maeda thought that Japan's exclusive morality that respected only its own was expanded to include a concern for other countries and a desire for peace. Even though the divinity of the emperor was denied, his position as the father and head of the nation was still valid. Maeda still emphasized loyalty to the emperor, not based on "mistaken idea" but based on family relationship.

\textbf{Maeda is Purged from Public Office}

On 4 January 1946, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to dissolve "militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations" as well as to remove all elements undesirable for the growth of democracy from government and other public offices.\textsuperscript{74} This directive was the "biggest bombshell since the surrender"\textsuperscript{75} and hit the Shidehara cabinet badly since some cabinet members came under the categories mentioned in the directive.\textsuperscript{76} Maeda Tamon was one of them. While Governor of Niigata prefecture during the war, he also held the post of branch chief of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (\textit{Taisei Yokusankai}), which in the directive was categorized as "militaristic

\textsuperscript{73} SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, \textit{Education in the New Japan}, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1948), pp.157-158.
\textsuperscript{74} "SCAP Orders Removal, Exclusion From Public Offices of Those War Responsible; Existence, New Formation are Banned of Ultra-Nationalistic Bodies, Affiliate," \textit{Nippon Times}, 5 January 1946, p.1.
\textsuperscript{75} "Nippon Bureaucrats Suffer Mortal Blow: "Housecleaning" Directives Sweeping and Strict-Cabinet Seen as Tottering," \textit{Nippon Times}, 5 January 1946.
nationalism and aggressive influential terroristic or secret patriotic society.' The Occupation authority wanted to "throw out" Maeda from government office. Although some U.S. officials in the Department of State were critical of the decision to purge him, Maeda had to go. Recommending Abe Yoshishige as a successor, Maeda resigned on 13 January 1946. He was forbidden from holding public office for five years.

79 Mayo stated that Gordon T. Bowles, the author of the U.S. educational reform plan, had "confidence in Maeda's essential liberalism and was critical of the later decision to purge him" in Mayo, Psychological Disarmament, 116.
80 See Mieko Kamiya, to Hidefumi Kurosawa, 15 September 1974, letter in Hidefumi Kurosawa, Sengo kyoiku no genryu o motomete, 228.
Chapter VI

Conclusions

Commodore Mathew C. Perry’s arrival in 1853 and Japan’s concessions to U.S. demands at gun point marked the beginning of a pattern in the relationship between the United States and Japan: the United States threatening Japan with advanced science and technology, and Japan unwillingly yielding to the United States with mixed feelings of fear and admiration.

Fear of militaristic and imperialistic Western powers drove Japan to build a modern nation state by quickly and efficiently importing technologies from the West. At the same time, Japan searched for its identity, part of which was to unify its people against the West. The Meiji leaders located the nation’s identity in the emperor, who had existed as the source of political and spiritual authority throughout Japan’s long history. The Meiji leaders constructed a unified nation by placing the emperor as the nation’s political and spiritual head. The emperor system, which was at the core of the Japanese polity, kokutai, became integral to the “Japanese character.” In this political structure, the Japanese people were subjects, and loyalty to the emperor was the most important aspect of their moral code. Any thoughts and beliefs that were not compatible with loyalty to the emperor, particularly Christianity, were suspect.

In August 1945, ninety-two years after Perry’s arrival on black ships, Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, came to Japan. As Japan’s conqueror, the United States demanded that Japan accept spiritual aspects of the
West—democracy based on Christian ideals. Its demands highlighted the deep divide between the two countries, not only after, but also before the war.

The Pacific War has been characterized as “a clash of ideologies”—between “U.S. universalist principles and Japanese particularism.” The United States believed that its vision would be universally appealing: its insistence on the inviolability of territorial integrity; equality including the equality of commercial opportunity; and reliance on conciliation to resolve international controversies under the new United Nations. On the other hand, the Japanese vision was exclusive: not only were the Japanese superior to other races, but also only Asian countries were part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With the divine status of the emperor at the center, “beneficence and light were to be spread to the four corners of the world,” and “the moral obligation of Japan” was “to unite all Asian people under the banner of Pan-Asianism to throw off the yoke of Western imperialism.”

Japan’s intention to drive the Western colonial powers out of Asia, however, was not only a threat to the interests of the Western Powers, but also unattractive to its Asian neighbors. Japanese arrogance and contempt toward Koreans and Chinese in the Japanese homeland and in its colonies were as bad or worse than Western attitudes toward indigenous people in their colonies.

Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor reinforced America’s growing antagonistic feelings towards Japan. Fueled with mutual racial and ideological enmity, the United States and Japan fought for almost four years.

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2 Ibid., 4.
The United States characterized the war as an ideological battle between democracy and totalitarianism. According to MacArthur, the U.S. occupation was based on Christian love “without vengeance.” The Japanese would be “saved,” provided that they converted from “militarism” to “democracy.” MacArthur came to Japan with a military that functioned as missionaries of a new ideology: American democracy. It was in this context that the re-education of the Japanese took place.

This paper, which discusses the initial period of the Occupation, focuses on the educational reforms of the first postwar Minister of Education Maeda Tamon (1884-1962), and the U.S. reactions to them. During the first few months of the Occupation, the United States observed the Japanese government-initiated reforms as it prepared to implement its own policies. Those initial months were a probationary period to see whether the Japanese government could change Japan without interference from SCAP, and in a way that was consistent with U.S. government views. In turn, the Japanese government attempted to preserve the old regime while showing its willingness to comply with Allied demands.

The United States regarded Maeda as a “liberal” who was a “friend of the United States.” Maeda was a touchstone for the United States to see what “liberal” Japanese could do. The United States expected Maeda to change education radically. However, Maeda’s addresses and reforms revealed that his concept of democracy was far from that of the United States. His reform plans showed how Japan wanted to develop “democratic tendencies” while preserving the emperor system. Maeda hoped that the position of the emperor, the source of Japan’s political culture and morals, would remain intact. While
protecting Japanese “national character,” he wanted to adjust people’s thinking to the new world order of peace and “Japanese-style democracy.”

What Maeda wished to keep, however, was what the United States wanted to remove from the psyche of the Japanese people. Maeda’s concept of democracy, different from that of the United States, caused a rift between the two countries over the direction that the new Japan should take. The United States objected to Maeda’s appeals that strengthening moral and religious education would foster “democratic tendencies.” The United States saw moral education as the source of Japanese militarism and believed that no religion should be taught in public-funded schools. Judging that the Japanese government could not understand what democracy was, and that the Japanese could not change from within, SCAP gave directives that intended to destroy what Maeda wanted to keep intact.

After Maeda resigned as the Minister of Education on 13 January 1946, SCAP proceeded with more thorough political and educational reforms. MacArthur directed his Government Section of GHQ to draft a model constitution as a guide for the Japanese government under the Shidehara cabinet. Reflecting liberal democratic ideals of its American authors, the Government Section’s draft stated that sovereignty reside in the people and that the emperor was the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people; it also renounced war and arms. On 13 February 1946, Government Section officials delivered the SCAP draft to the Shidehara cabinet with the warning that failure to adopt its basic principles would make it difficult for SCAP to protect the emperor from trial as a
war criminal. This warning was a shrewd American strategy to force the Japanese government to adopt the draft.

By that time MacArthur had already decided to keep the emperor untouched and use him for effective management of Japanese reforms. On 2 October 1945, Bonner Fellers, the military secretary, had submitted a memorandum to MacArthur on the emperor. In the memorandum, Fellers explained that emperor was "the living symbol of the race" and the Japanese people's "homage" to the emperor amounted "a self abnegation sustained by a religious patriotism the depth of which [was] incomprehensible to Westerners." He stated, "In effecting our bloodless invasion, we requisitioned the services of the Emperor. By his order seven million soldiers laid down their arms and are being rapidly demobilized." Fellers proposed the use of the emperor for the effective management of the occupation orders. Furthermore, Fellers warned:

If the Emperor were tried for war crimes the governmental structure would collapse and a general uprising would be inevitable.... Although they are disarmed, there would be chaos and bloodshed. It would necessitate a large expeditionary force with many thousands of public officials. The period of occupation would be prolonged and we would have alienated the Japanese.

On 25 January 1946, MacArthur sent a secret cable to the War Department to warn of detrimental consequences if the emperor were indicted as a war criminal. MacArthur's nightmare description of Japan without the emperor in greater elaboration than that of

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4 Bonner F. Fellers to MacArthur, "Memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief," 2 October 1945; box 3, Bonner F. Fellers papers, Hoover Institution.
Fellers convinced officials in Washington. The United States decided to leave the emperor untouched.⁵

Based on the SCAP draft with minor changes, the new constitution was passed by both houses of the Imperial diet. Promulgated by Emperor Hirohito on 3 November 1946, Japan's new constitution became effective on 3 May 1947. With the new constitution in place, the validity of the Imperial Rescript on Education became precarious. The rescript remained as the Japanese government's last vanguard for preserving imperial supremacy; moreover it was a vital source of Japanese educational philosophy. The Japanese government desperately tried to save the rescript and to revitalize it. The Japanese minister of education hailed that the rescript's primary virtue was that of providing Japanese society with a model of vertical loyalty and horizontal harmony. Such loyalty and harmony, the education minister declared, ought to remain the foundation of the new peace-loving Japanese nation and of education.⁶

Frequent public affirmation of the rescript's relevance to democracy by Japanese officials alerted American officials' suspicions. A harsh consensus emerged from the American authorities: the Imperial Rescript on Education was definitely unfit for the new democratic education and had to go.⁷ In October 1946, the Ministry of Education so informed the nation through the press.

In March 1947, the Diet passed the Fundamental Law of Education, which retained not a word from the Imperial Rescript on Education and proclaimed education as the right of the people, not some precious gift from the emperor. To make sure that the

⁵ See Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 54-55.
⁶ Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 289.
⁷ Ibid.
rescript remained on the shelf, the Government Section of GHQ pressured the Japanese Diet to pass a resolution in June 1948 that formally terminated the active life of the rescript in Japanese society. With the abolition of the rescript, Japan’s prewar purpose of education—to inculcate loyalty to the emperor—was removed.

The Japanese government had never wanted to change its polity nor its purpose and philosophy of education, but the uncompromising Americans forced a change that targeted the “Japanese character.” In the name of peace and “genuine” democracy, the conqueror imposed its ideology on the vanquished. In his reminiscence, Maeda noted, “The Japanese were forced to convert from militarism to democracy by the Allied Powers.” Attempting to make the best of the situation, Maeda continued, “This conversion, though forced by an external force, was not bad. We have to admit that there is permanent truth in democracy.”

Assessing the American Occupation of Japan

Throughout the occupation, the U.S. definition of the term “liberal” Japanese was not clear. Immediately after the surrender, all Japanese still accepted the emperor as the head of the nation, except communists who had criticized the emperor system and were imprisoned. If the United States had wanted real “liberals,” they would have had to free the communists from prison.

For the imperial Japanese government, communism was the archenemy of the emperor system and of its capitalist economy. More than that, it was an infectious

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8 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 289.
9 Tamon Maeda, Sanso seishi, 36. (My translation).
10 Ibid., 36-37. (My translation).
ideology of the “treacherous” Soviet Union. Before the surrender, the Japanese
government desperately sought a guarantee from the Allied powers that the emperor
would be saved not only because the emperor was integral to Japan’s “national
character,” but also because the Japanese government feared that the removal of the
emperor would degenerate Japan into a communist country. Japanese ambassadors in
Europe tried to convince the United States that the retention of the emperor was the only
way to avoid communism in Japan and that the United States and Japan shared “common
interests” to be against the USSR. 11

Although the United States had begun to realize the “menace” of the USSR and
communism while working with Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the
United States had regarded the USSR as an ally. In October 1945, in order to implement
its “freedom of thought” policy, MacArthur released communists from prison against the
will of the Japanese government. 12 However, when antagonism arose between the United
States and the Soviet Union, MacArthur came to see communists as more dangerous than
the “conservative” Japanese. Transformed in American eyes as real “friends of the
United States,” “conservative” Japanese were allowed to return to official posts while
MacArthur purged radically “liberal” elements. 13

While the United States had some misunderstandings about Japanese religions
and miscalculations on the treatment of communists, the Japanese government had no
strategies of how to protect its interests. The United States had painstakingly studied
Japanese psychology and the country’s educational system and used this knowledge

12 Ibid., 94.
13 See ibid., 242-267.
effectively not only to defeat Japan but also to change the people’s mentality. The Japanese, however, did not have the same understanding of American culture and way of thinking. The Japanese government did not realize or refused to admit that they had been conquered and had surrendered unconditionally. The Japanese government hoped or wanted to believe that even though Japan lost, the emperor system should not and would not be changed. Japan failed to admit the basic purpose of the occupation: to destroy the source of Japan’s physical and mental strength.

The Japanese government’s attitude revealed its naïve logic that if the Japanese government sincerely expressed the importance of the emperor and the Imperial Rescript on the Education, the United States would protect these values. Instead the reverse happened: the more the Japanese government emphasized their importance, the more the United States determined to destroy them. Materially and technologically confident, the United States wanted to destroy a key source of Japan’s strength—the strong patriotism and unity of the people under the emperor. The United States seemed to believe that everything old had to be removed in order to implant the new. Re-education of the Japanese was equivalent to removing the “Japanese character” itself.

This effort to purge the “old” Japan was contrary to Japanese history of cultural development. In the past Japan had adopted elements of other cultures, seemingly needing a new stimulus from the outside to maintain its vitality. Even during the self-seclusion under the Tokugawa Bakufu, Japan kept a tiny window to the outside world through restricted commercial activity with Dutch merchants. The pattern of Japan’s cultural interaction with outsiders was that while keeping its indigenous culture, Japan
adopted elements of foreign cultures.\textsuperscript{14} For the Japanese, it was not necessary to discard the old in order to develop the new.

Thus Maeda sought to maintain the “Japanese character” while developing new ideas and practices from the West. In his “Japanese-style democracy,,” the will of people could be respected while keeping sovereignty in the emperor.

In contrast, the U.S. government maintained an either-or attitude. The re-education of the Japanese meant the removal of all that of seemed to be a source of “ultra-nationalism” and “militarism.” Maeda told the youth just after the surrender, “Even if we lost the war, what we should never lose is self-respect. Based on this belief in self, you have to stand for what you believe in.”\textsuperscript{15} However, ever since the Occupation, when this self-respect has bordered on patriotism, it has been stigmatized as rekindling Japan’s wartime militarism.

The United States seemed to believe that by denying the old, the new would be born. However, once they were denied everything old, the Japanese may have lost the seedbed to intake the new and grow. Both people and nations have their own histories, their memories with which to identify themselves. If the memory is lost, there is no wisdom that comes from having experienced both successes and failures.

Japan’s history was “lost” in the sense that it was rewritten from the victor’s perspective. To ensure that the Japanese understood the “true” causes of the war and their defeat, GHQ-SCAP compiled a \textit{History of the Pacific War} and distributed copies to

\textsuperscript{14} For interesting discussion on Japan’s pattern in adopting elements of foreign culture, see Hugh Keenleyside and A.F. Thomas, \textit{History of Japanese Education and Present Educational System} (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1937), 3-5.

elementary and middle schools.\textsuperscript{16} By learning "history" from the victor's perspective, Japanese students lost part of their national memory and identity. Only Tojo Hideki, the former Prime Minister who had started the Pacific War by attacking the Pearl Harbor and was arrested as a war criminal in the Tokyo Tribunal, could voice the Japanese perspective or "the loser's justice": "Peoples of all the nations of the world absolutely should not abandon the right to initiate wars of self-defense."\textsuperscript{17} His words challenged the victor's premise that Japan's road to war had been its conspiracy to conquer the world without legitimate national security concerns.\textsuperscript{18}

MacArthur said that the Japanese, who had lost their spiritual core, were ready to accept Christianity, the source of American superiority of science and morality. In the "spiritual vacuum"\textsuperscript{19} created by the destruction of faith in the emperor and of the Japanese national identity, the Japanese people had to swallow many alien ideas and practices that were hard to digest.\textsuperscript{20} While Japan admitted U.S. superiority in scientific technology, it doubted U.S. superiority in morality. On 10 August 1945, the day after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki, the Japanese government protested the American use of a "most cruel"\textsuperscript{21} weapon to "indiscriminately massacre the defenseless civilians," which was against international law.\textsuperscript{22} The Japanese government

\textsuperscript{17}Quoted in Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, 461.
\textsuperscript{18}Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, 460-461.
\textsuperscript{20}Nishi, \textit{Unconditional Democracy}, 297.
\textsuperscript{22}See Asahi Shim bun, 11 August 1945; Quoted in Nishi, \textit{Unconditional Democracy}, 31. (Quoted part is Nishi's translation).
reminded the world that the United States had preached against the use of gas or its equivalent in war. The Japanese protest had little impact outside of Japan; in fact, the rest of the world was celebrating the end of the war, and the U.S. government and its people felt that Japan deserved horrific consequences because of its own cruelties against neighboring countries and, most of all, because it had attacked Pearl Harbor.

Since 1945, religion has not been taught in the public-funded schools. As a result, contemporary Japanese education has lacked spiritual and moral teachings that had been essential in the past. The Meiji government had placed the emperor as the source of morality just as Christianity offered moral strength to the West. By removing the source of morality from school education, the United States also removed teachings that were an integral part of Japan’s rules of conduct, morality, and cultural and spiritual identity. Nothing has come in its place to fill the vacuum. In this sense, the spiritual disarmament of Japan was complete.

The Fundamental Law of Education states that the objectives of postwar Japanese education is to construct a democratic and peaceful nation. Thus, postwar Japan’s school education has advocated “peace education” (Heiwa Kyoiku). In addition to spiritual disarmament, the United States sought Japan’s military disarmament and codified Japan’s renunciation of war and possession of military force in the constitution. By teaching the war–renunciation article of Japan’s constitution to youth in postwar education, psychological disarmament had an ever-lasting effect on the Japanese minds. Children learn about article nine in Japan’s constitution, which prohibits the possession

23 See Asahi Shimbun, 11 August 1945.
and use of military force as a means of settling international disputes. All children learn in school that the constitution of Japan is the first one in human history that sets forth in writing the prohibition of military force to realize the world peace. I attended school in Japan, from the elementary level through college. I learned that this ideal constitution was the result of the deep regret of the Japanese about its aggressiveness during the war. I also learned that denying military force and becoming a democratic nation was the best way for Japan to be accepted as a member of the world community. For the Japanese, peace and democracy are a coupled concept.

Ironically, the very force that demanded that this constitution be written and enforced is the most powerful military power in the world. During the war, while "totalitarianism" and "militarism" were considered a pair, the Allied powers had proclaimed the idea that democracy was the source of world peace. In reality, however, "democracy" and "peace" are separate matters. Moreover, the United States has used the banner of democracy to wage war, both before and after World War II.

Because of Japan's peace constitution, along with a postwar education that emphasizes peace, the Japanese have been allergic to anything indicative of "war" and the "military." When the United States wanted Japan to fight against communism or more recently against terrorism, Japan was reluctant. After all, they had been taught not to use military force.

This study reveals the powerful role that education can have as political indoctrination. The vestige of a "re-educated" Japan has been profound: anything

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25 *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, s.v. "constitution."
indicative of “patriotism”--such as “the emperor,” the “national flag,” and the “national anthem”--has had negative connotations because each refers to the old militaristic Japan. Most of all, ever since the Japanese lost the values for which the Japanese risked their lives, there have been no values Japan stands for except “peace” and “democracy.”

The Japanese, however, have realized that even “peace” and “democracy” are not absolute values that Japan wholeheartedly embraces in volatile international situations. There has been no deep discussion of what “peace” means for Japan. “Peace” as the absence of military combat is an idea that the Japanese hold, but there have been wars around Japan after World War II. Japan’s postwar ideology, “democracy,” has made Japan position itself with the United States and against Communism, represented by the former USSR and mainland China. The Japanese government has had to be realistic about the vulnerability of its international position and has decided to allow the United States to station its military bases in Japan. This reality betrays Japan’s postwar ideals of “peace” and “democracy.”

Postwar Japan seems to be without a rudder. For all its faults, imperial Japan had at least a vision and a reason to wage war: to protect the country from the menace of other countries. Since its reason to wage war was proclaimed a crime against peace, the Japanese have concluded that in the past the Japanese were wrong and having a military was the cause of the war and miserable defeat. The Japanese have learned to see their soldiers who died in World War II as having wasted their lives for the imperial Japanese military regime’s conspiracy. This Japanese way of thinking is devoid of the notion that wars have been fought to fight for justice. While the United States has claimed to have
fought for justice in the name of “democracy” and “freedom,” Japan has criticized the U.S. use of force, based on the idea that using military force as a means of settling international disputes is bad.

Now, six decades after the Occupation, Japan is wandering aimlessly without an anchor or a vision. This country is the home of a people who lack pride in their country's past and present. While Japan has been economically successful and has gained political freedom and a diversity in ideas from its democratization, the losses that accompanied the introduction of these changes have been profound: their pride and dignity supported by a natural and healthy patriotism have been lost.
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