CONFUCIAN CULTURAL EDUCATION ON THE CHINESE PERIPHERY: HONG KONG'S NEW ASIA COLLEGE, 1949-1976

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This dissertation is dedicated
to my parents, for bearing patiently innumerable delays and failures to show up at family gatherings, and especially for loving me enough to hang onto me but believing in me enough to let me go-
and in memory of my three grandparents who departed during the course of dissertation production, especially my mama, whose last clear questions to me were about the progress of my research, and my yeye, whose last clear smiles at me were over the future fun of calling me “Dr. Chou”—
this dissertation is for them.
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Abstract

Confucian Cultural Education on the Chinese Periphery: Hong Kong's New Asia College, 1949-1976

In 1949, a group of anti-communist Confucian intellectuals left mainland China and established a New Asia College in Hong Kong. This school was to represent a re-creation of the traditional Chinese academy, the shuyuan of Sung and Ming times. The founders believed that, by actualizing the curricular content, structural form, and educational principles of the Confucian shuyuan, the core of Chinese culture could be effectively promoted and preserved. Preservation was of paramount importance, for they believed that the eventual revival of Chinese culture on the Chinese mainland depended upon their keeping it alive in the Hong Kong periphery during the tenure of communist control in China.

The purity of the Confucian shuyuan vision, however, proved difficult to maintain, for the requirements of the British colonial government's educational policies, the anti-communist orientation of American funding organizations, and the market needs of the industrializing port of Hong Kong combined to make the Confucian character
of New Asia ever more complex and ambiguous. This matrix of contending interests meant that increasingly New Asia, which was itself established as a living cultural symbol, became a site of contesting symbolic representations and interpretations of the meaning of Confucian educational values for modern Chinese people. Face with such contestation, New Asia's determined fidelity to the shuyuan ideal ended in an ironic competition over conceptions of Chinese culture that would transform the New Asia dream into both much more and much less than its founders originally envisioned.

This dissertation examines New Asia College as a case study in cultural education. By tracing the history of the college from its founding in 1949 to its incorporation into The Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1963, this study analyzes how New Asia sought to enact its mission and educational philosophy. The ultimate subsuming of New Asia's program in 1976 under the University's centralization scheme, and the broader notions Chinese education that implied, reveals not only the cultural predicament of New Asia's founders but the complexity of the Hong Kong environment in which they sought they revive and promote Chinese culture.
# Table of Contents

Dedication...........................................................................iii
Acknowledgments.................................................................iv
Abstract................................................................................vi

Introduction.............................................................................1

Part A. The Center of New Asia.............................................24
Chapter 1.
Cultural Education at New Asia College.........................30
   a. The Philosophy of Cultural Education .....................30
   b. The General Curriculum .......................................41
   c. Departmental Structure and Values .......................52
   d. Curricular Structure and Worldview ....................65

Chapter 2.
Expanding the New Asia Community.................................82
   a. Student Initiatives and Activities .........................82
   b. The Research Institute .......................................96
   c. The Cultural Open Forum ................................115

Part B. Contextual Contentions.........................................137
Chapter 3.
American Non-Governmental Support for New Asia........140
   a. The Communist Threat to Education ....................141
   b. The Site of Hong Kong .......................................152
   c. Cultural Education and Spiritual Renewal............160

Chapter 4.
Chinese Education under British Colonialism...............183
   a. Chinese-medium Higher Education ....................184
   b. Chinese Education in a Colonial University ........197
   c. The Question of a Chinese University ...............207
   d. A New University ..........................................227

Part C. The Clash of Expectations...................................233
Chapter 5.
The University Dream Turned on its Head.....................238
   a. Cultural Symbolism and University Control ..........238
   b. The Struggle Over Curriculum .........................250
   c. The Last Show-down ......................................270

Conclusion............................................................................293

Bibliography.......................................................................305
Introduction

On an evening in October of 1949, about thirty students sat in a small assembly room on the third floor of a high school in Kowloon, Hong Kong. The students, all strangers to each other, sat waiting quietly in a circle. The circle was open at one point with empty seats, seats awaiting the entrance of the teachers.

The students, in their silence, felt somewhat ill at ease: most were only recently arrived from mainland China, some forced to flee in haste, others having greater luxury of time to choose their actions and their destinations. But all felt the tumult of the age which had brought them together - the success of communism in China, and the strange refuge that was the British colony of Hong Kong, so close to yet so distant from their Chinese homeland. All had worried and wondered how, faced with such uncertainty and chaos, they would continue their own education and in what manner. And all had been drawn to this small room by the reputation and ideals of a few men, men whom they had come to acknowledge as teachers and to whom they would trust
their minds and persons as students for as much future as they could foresee.¹

The teachers, when they entered, collectively posed quite a formidable picture, particularly against the unimpressive backdrop of a dark and narrow schoolroom. They included the famed historian Qian Mu 钱穆, then aged 54. He had taught Chinese history at Peking University 北京大学 in the 1930's until the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) necessitated flight, and his Chinese History course, the notes of which would become the textbook An Outline of Chinese History 国史大纲, had roused much interest and controversy.² Also present was the German-educated economist Zhang Peijie 张培基, the political scientist Cui Shuqin 崔书琴, Chinese literature specialist Liu Shangyi 刘尚义. Unable to attend that day but very much part of this group was also the forty-year-old philosopher Tang Junyi 唐君毅. Educated at Central University 中央大学 in Nanjing, he

¹ Tang Duanzheng 唐端正, “Yazhou wenshang xueyuan de huiyi 亚洲文商学院的回忆,” [Recollections of the Asia School of Humanities and Commerce], Xinya xuebao 新亚学报 [New Asia Journal] 1 (1952): 18. For the first year of New Asia's existence, it was called the Asia School of Humanities and Commerce. In the Fall of 1950, upon moving to better quarters, it was renamed New Asia College 新亚书院.

had returned to teach there and head its Philosophy Department in the post-war years.³

Many of these teachers knew each other or had worked together previously. Particularly, the two who would become the leaders of the new college through its formative period, Qian Mu (1895-1990) and Tang Junyi (1909-1978), already had considerable professional experience together. Both had taught at Central University in the 1940’s, as well as contributing to many of the same journals then published in the central coastal region. In 1949, both journeyed to Guangzhou in Guangdong province for employment at Huaqiao University 华侨大学. Suspicious of the advancing communist forces in mainland China, Qian responded to the vague invitation of a friend interested in starting a school in Hong Kong. After assessing the situation there, he summoned Tang Junyi to join in establishing the new school in the relative safety of the British colony.

The school, to be named New Asia College 新亚书院, was to represent, promote, and sustain Chinese culture in Hong Kong while China was undergoing a phase of rejection of

³ Ibid., 302.
Chinese culture. The name "New Asia" was to represent the values of the college itself, the goal of rejuvenation of Asian peoples and revitalization of Asian culture. Those at New Asia, while coming from different backgrounds and beliefs, shared a common dislike for cultural iconoclasm, of which they considered Chinese communism to be the most dangerous sort. Believing that communism betrayed the most fundamental principles of Chinese culture, the New Asia founders held to Confucian ideas and values as constituting the principal essence of Chinese culture. They saw it as their duty to keep this Confucian essence alive on the periphery of China while the core was in a state of cultural denial, to return to the core with this preserved Chinese culture as soon as it proved friendly to its own cultural roots once more. In order to carry out this cultural preservation, New Asia as an educational institution would not only teach but embody the ideals and form of Confucian education so that Chinese youth, stranded on the Chinese periphery, could become prepared for the future work of resurrecting and rebuilding Chinese culture in China proper.

4 The English term "college" was not intended as a translation of the Chinese term shuyuan 书院 but was the then-accepted designator in Hong Kong for post-secondary institutions not granted university status.
This dissertation analyzes Hong Kong's New Asia College as a case study in Confucian cultural education. In tracing the history of the College from its founding in 1949 to its incorporation into The Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1963, this study highlights the efforts of a group of scholars in creating an educational institution and community that would reflect the principles and values of Confucian educational philosophy specifically and of Chinese culture more broadly. In particular, they wished to revive the traditional Chinese academy, the shuyuan 书院 of Song and Ming times, as a site and an embodiment of the Confucian educational experience. Thus, they sought through their educational endeavor of New Asia to maintain the curricular content, institutional structure, and teacher-student relationships which they believed constituted Confucian educational values. While focusing their energies primarily on college-aged youth, they sought also to extend their educational work to children, advanced students, as well as the broader Hong Kong intellectual community. By educating Chinese at all these levels, they hoped to revive a shuyuan that would, by its very existence, preserve and perpetuate the Chinese culture they held dear. New Asia's fidelity to its educational ideal was of paramount importance, for its
founders believed it was only through education that they could both enact and transmit, as well as nurture students who would henceforth both enact and transmit, the essence of Chinese culture.

This problem of defining and protecting China's cultural essence was, by the time of New Asia's establishment, a half-century old. Since the turn-of-the-century and China's devastating defeat at the hands of the Japanese, Chinese intellectuals had been forced to reconceptualize the nature of China's cultural core in light of the cultural challenge posed by technologically-superior foreign powers. Though the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century and its subsequent setbacks vis-à-vis the Western presence were certainly humiliating, China had not felt its cultural value and self-sufficiency to be fundamentally threatened; the famous adage, "learn from the barbarians in order to beat the barbarians," while conceding barbarian technological prowess, nevertheless suggests an attitude of supreme cultural condescension. The Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent turmoil of reform and revolution, however, made a mockery of this condescension and brought to light the piercing question of how and whether Chinese culture and
learning were to face the problems brought by external threats and internal unrest.

In this context, the famous *ti-yong* 体用 formula, articulated by scholar-statesman Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), was meant to bring some sense of order to the culture-education nexus. By keeping Chinese learning as the essential *ti* 体 while permitting Western learning for the functional *yong* 用, both Chinese culture and Chinese learning would be protected at the innermost, and hence most fundamental level. In this way, the Chinese cultural essence would be vaulted in a sanctum that the learning of Western practical techniques could neither disturb nor dislodge. The *ti-yong* formulation, while satisfying the need to protect an essential core even while acquiring foreign knowledge and skills, produced a tension which would henceforth plague Chinese thinkers: once allowing the input and injection of outside learning, the question of exactly what and how much should be permitted through those newly-permeable boundaries would arise repeatedly. This tension, moreover, had the potential to intensify until the very
differentiation between ti and yong became ambiguous and problematic.⁵

Protecting Chinese culture by garrisoning Chinese learning from barbarian Western learning, then, did not halt the questioning of the self-sufficiency or viability of Chinese culture. When the doubts increasingly were voiced by Chinese themselves, culminating in the vast sweep of cultural iconoclasm of the May Fourth movement, the entire edifice of Chinese culture and Chinese learning, as well as the interdependence between them, became subject to fundamental and overarching attack.⁶ The wall that the ti-yong formula had tried to erect between Chinese and foreign learning was now ignored, in fact purposefully dismantled, so as to welcome wholesale the importation of Western knowledge. With the end of the civil service examination system and the building of modern national universities, educational mottos such as “Select the Best from East and West” rendered irrelevant both the agony of dividing ti from

yong and, more importantly, the faith that ti was something worth identifying and preserving.

The demise of such faith and the subsequent rush to trade in China’s cultural tradition for foreign ideologies was painful to witness for those still invested in the values and interests of China’s traditional cultural order. The emergence of communism as the most politically powerful force, then, sounded the final death-toll, for it signaled the usurpation of the homeland of Chinese culture by a force unmistakably hostile to that culture. China’s cultural crisis, impelled not from an external aggressor but from an internal official adoption of a foreign ideology fundamentally antithetical to the basic premises and values of Chinese culture, could now be resolved only by those removed from the site of the cultural treason. If Chinese culture were to have any chance of survival in the face of a regime which had every intention of destroying it, those who kept faith in it must assume the responsibility of its perpetuation and promotion from beyond its borders. Preserving and promoting Confucian values on the Chinese periphery of Hong Kong hence became an urgent concern. The New Asia effort to not only provide an education about
Chinese culture but to actually re-create a Confucian educational institution, then, stemmed from the founders' need to respond to the exigency of a Chinese culture which seemed in every danger of being extinguished on its homeground by its own people.

However, this effort at recreating a cultural education that would be Confucian in content, structure, and style, was far from straight-forward. The endeavor itself was fraught with tensions and limitations, for while the New Asia founders were certainly Confucian at heart and the College they created unambiguously Confucian in its style and orientation, they also sought to broaden their message and their image by championing and invoking Chinese culture in the abstract. This broadening, while potent in its very vagueness and inclusiveness, would lead to an increasing uncertainty over the exact scope and nature of the Chinese culture they aimed to preserve. Furthermore, their vision of eventual return to mainland China, armed with a fortified Chinese culture, meant that their attempt to simultaneously address their new Hong Kong context produced a rising sense of tension and ambivalence as to the import and significance of their cultural education program.

The contextual issues obtaining in post-1949 Hong Kong would prove crucial in shaping New Asia's development, for the Hong Kong site and the actors converging on it responded with their own perceptions of the significance of New Asia as a cultural education institution. American non-governmental organizations became attracted to New Asia's persistence in preserving traditional Chinese culture, and saw in this effort an avenue by which they might protect Chinese youth from the corrupt influences of Chinese communism. The British colonial government in Hong Kong, bent on using its Far Eastern colony to spread Western learning and civilization through Asia, regarded Chinese educational efforts at New Asia as a launch-pad for the advancement of progress. The convergence of these American non-governmental and British governmental interpretations of New Asia's symbolic and strategic meaning both helped and hurt New Asia's development. Certainly, the financial support and policy initiatives of these two parties were indispensable to New Asia's survival. At the same time, contending with others' expectations and demands also meant a continual renegotiating, redefining, and ultimately a diminishing of the purity of New Asia's original cultural vision. When in 1976 The Chinese University of Hong Kong
required a systemic change which would pervert the very core of New Asia's educational ideal, the founders saw their original dream as sullied beyond recognition.

Such sullying, while certainly unwelcome to the New Asia founders themselves, was nevertheless central to their process of defining and redefining their identity and their values. Because the interaction and intersection of the Confucian founders' own intentions with the interpretations of others made New Asia into a site of contesting cultural representations, the college, which had itself been established as a sort of living cultural symbol, became also a battleground where symbols of cultural identity and cultural imagery came to assume multiple meanings. This battle, enacted on the peripheral colonial territory of Hong Kong, would become an important component of the 20th-century discourse on the changing meaning of Chinese culture and its multi-faceted role in defining China itself.

Those familiar with the history of 20th-century Chinese thought will recognize that New Asia's two key founders, Qian Mu and Tang Junyi, are generally associated with the philosophical movement known as New Confucianism. This movement, an attempt to revive Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism in the face of modern trends of cultural and intellectual iconoclasm, is generally depicted as having developed in three generations. The first consists of figures such as Liang Shuming (1893-1988) and Xiong Shili (1885-1968) who sought to argue the virtues of Confucian thought and values in an intellectual environment which had roundly and thoroughly denounced Chinese culture. Xiong's three famous students, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), and Xu Fuguan (1903-1982), are collectively known as the second generation, continuing to carry the message of Chinese cultural revival but now in the peripheral areas Taiwan and Hong Kong after 1949. Those influenced by them, including most notably Tu Wei-ming (1940-) and Liu Shu-hsien (1934-), represent the third and contemporary generation of New Confucian torch-bearers, ringing the bells of Confucian values not only to Chinese but to the whole world.

In studies on New Confucianism, the founding of New Asia College is often cited as being one of the principal

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7 Mainland Chinese scholarship on New Confucianism has resulted largely from the atmosphere of intellectual opening in the 1980's and the official decision in December of 1986 to include Contemporary New Confucianism as a major theme on the national research agenda. Leading mainland scholars of New Confucianism include Fang Keli, Li Jinquan, Luo Yijun, and Zheng Jiadong. In Taiwan,
activities of this philosophical movement and, subsequently, as its central meeting-place. Not only was New Asia established by Qian and Tang but later, in the 1960's and '70's, both Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan also came to teach there. This convergence of New Confucian thinkers on one institution, when coupled with the general orientation of New Asia's scholarly output, has supported the general image of New Asia has being the principal bastion and institutional voice of New Confucianism.

The New Confucian rubric, when applied to New Asia, illuminates the central orientation and problematic of New Asia's founders and the educational institution they established. New Asia's efforts at cultural education were inextricably linked to the impulse to preserve and promote scholarship has been done principally by those with some personal connection to the New Confucian movement, thereby resulting in a significant overlap between those who are scholars of New Confucianism and those who might be considered third-generation New Confucians themselves. These include Cai Renhou, Wei Zhengtong, Liu Shuxian, and Li Minghui. In English, only two book-length studies on New Confucianism have been published, both recently: Umberto Bresciani's Reinventing Confucianism: the New Confucian Movement (2001) and John Makeham's New Confucianism: A Critical Examination (2003). Short surveys of the New Confucian movement include Chang Hao's classic account, "New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China," in Charlotte Furth (ed.), The Limits of Change: Essay on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China (1976), Liu Shu-hsien's "Postwar Neo-Confucian Philosophy: Its Development and Issues" in Charles Fu and Gerhard Spiegler (eds.), Religious Issues and Inter-Religious Dialogues: An Analysis and Sourcebook of Developments Since 1945 (1989), and Arif Dirlik's "Confucius in the Borderlands: Global Capitalism and the Reinvention of Confucianism" boundary 2, 22 no.3(1995).
the core of Confucian culture in a context which did not always understand or accept their program. In this sense, they were very much part of New Confucianism as a modern cultural movement aiming to revive and revitalize Confucian values and institutions in a modern China that has repeatedly rejected Confucianism outright. More broadly, the alliance of New Asia with New Confucianism situates the college within the reactive forces of cultural conservatism which have met every wave of iconoclastic radicalism in the story of modern China.

The New Confucian framework thus locates New Asia in a tug-of-war between the dichotomies of tradition vs. modernity and of China vs. West which characterize accounts of modern Chinese thought. These polarities, with all their attending issues, were certainly part of the thinking, rhetoric, and even teaching at New Asia, and this study shows the explicit and implicit ways in which these

\[^{8}\] Amongst scholars of New Confucianism there is some dispute as to the definition and delineation of New Confucianism as a movement. Qian Mu’s Qian’s most famous student Yu Ying-shih 余英时 argues that the style and content of Qian’s thinking so distinguishes him from the central tenets and assumptions of the New Confucian philosophers that he should not be conceptualized under that rubric at all. Because New Confucian thought revolves principally around the question of what aspects of Sung Neo-Confucianism to adopt and revive in modern times, Qian’s distance from these debates and his historical approach to analyzing China’s cultural heritage separate him from the New Confucian philosophical concern for forging intellectual continuity between modern China and its past. See Yu Ying-Shi, "Qian Mu yu xinrujia 钱穆与新儒家 [Qian Mu and the New
conceptual bifurcations condition New Asia's work and ultimate effectiveness. Yet, these dichotomies also fail to capture the lived reality of the College and its community in its entirety and, in fact, obfuscate the subtleties of New Asia's vision and the complexity of contextual factors that were at play. Thus, this study shows the pervasiveness of the tradition vs. modernity and East vs. West dichotomies in New Asia and in those interpreting and interacting with the College, on the one hand, and the irony these concepts produced when combined with the clustering of other facets and concerns which characterized the New Asia context and problematic, on the other.

In this sense, incorporating New Asia into the narrative of New Confucianism leads to an incomplete and somewhat misleading portrait of that institution and its significance. First, analyzing New Asia through the lens of New Confucianism ascribes greater clarity and cohesion to the founders of New Asia than they would have acknowledged themselves. Recent scholarship by John Makeham argues that New Confucianism as a movement is actually a "retrospective creation" on the part of scholars: while there is little doubt that "New Confucianism" now has currency as a term to
denote certain ideas and people, it is not at all clear that, prior to the 1980’s, the thinkers in question actually thought of themselves as a movement or sought to advance themselves in distinction to others through this title.⁹ This study shows that, in fact, those at New Asia during its first quarter-century operated under a high degree of ambiguity and fluidity as to the exact definition and boundaries of the Chinese culture they wished to preserve. Regardless of the degree to which individual New Asia founders were sympathetic to the tenets of philosophical New Confucianism, they chose to present and to develop New Asia such as to both embrace basic Confucian concepts and include notions of culture and education not originating with Confucian or even Chinese thought. While their ultimate and most significant point of self-definition entailed an issue quintessentially Confucian in its nature and conviction, the very difficulty of demonstrating their intellectual stance through the institution they created speaks to the ambiguity of their definition of Chinese culture and the role of the Confucian tradition in it.

Using the New Confucian grid to analyze New Asia can be misleading also because of the general intellectual orientation of most scholars of the movement. Because a preponderance of work on the New Confucians is being carried out by scholars who have some affinity to or at least sympathy for the movement, their portrayal tends towards optimism in its perspective on the development of the New Confucian program. The generally-agreed-upon characterization of the movement as territorially advancing through its three generations, from mainland China to Greater China and now to the geography-blind entity Tu Wei-ming terms “cultural China,” implies a steady growth of the movement towards culmination in a world-wide triumph for Confucianism. Not only is the veracity of such a conclusion questionable, but it obscures the nature of the vision and context of earlier thinkers. Regardless of the current or future scope of New Confucianism’s influence, the New Asia founders were clearly intent on preserving a very specific version of Chinese culture in the very specific context of a recently-communized China and a commercially-oriented colonially-run Hong Kong. While they certainly

believed that the West could learn from Chinese culture, the aim of their work was not global domination but the cultural revitalization of China. This study shows that the New Asia founders had their inner eye constantly turned homeward, not outward. The New Confucian location of their efforts in a storyline that glorifies cultural expansion thus obscures the specificity of New Asia's notion of cultural preservation.

By focusing my analytical lens on the institution and context of New Asia, I acquire an angle on its Confucian founders generally hidden by studies on New Confucianism. Because most of those classified as New Confucians are philosophers and those studying them similarly occupied, scholarship on New Confucianism has principally been concerned with dissecting the ideas of its thinkers. In Chinese, a number of works have been published in the last two decades that outline the biographical information, principal scholarly works, and intellectual orientation of the New Confucian philosophers.¹¹ In English, the only two book-length studies on New Confucianism, Umberto Bresciani's Reinventing Confucianism: the New Confucian Movement (2001) and John Makeham's New Confucianism: A Critical Examination
(2003), similarly focus on analyzing the philosophy of various New Confucian figures. While both of these works make some mention of the activities of the New Confucians, that coverage is extremely cursory relative to their emphasis on philosophical analysis. The significance and role of New Asia College has thus been very little explored.

This lack of attention to the activities of those associated with New Confucianism is problematic not only because it neglects an important aspect of their individual and collective lives but, more importantly, because it ignores what was perhaps the most central motive and point of their thinking. The basic New Confucian concern was with making the values and concepts of the Confucian tradition relevant and meaningful in the modern world. Hence, their

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12 Bresciani's work offers an overview of the movement by allocating one chapter to each thinker and his principal works and ideas. His presentation, while generally sympathetic to the movement's philosophy, deals little with the overall identity and orientation of the movement, except in Chapter 2 where he delineates the central tenets of New Confucianism by analyzing in detail the 1958 Manifesto published jointly by Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai 張君勉 (Carsun Chang), entitled 为中国文化敬告世界人士宜言 [A Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World]. Makeham's edited volume assembles essays that reassess the identity and development of New Confucianism as a movement through reexamining the central tenets of several New Confucian thinkers and questioning their classification as New Confucians in past studies as well as the construction of the whole notion of New Confucianism as a coherent philosophical movement.
philosophical writings were not merely attempts to revive or revise the metaphysics of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism but transform it into a viable and substantiable nexus of cultural theory and practice. Thus the scholarly prioritization of philosophy over culture in conceptualizing the New Confucians in fact ignores both the centrality of culture to their philosophy as well as their pivotal conviction with regards to the nature and meaning of culture.

On the other hand, analyzing New Asia as an institution brings to the forefront not only these thinkers' essential concern for matters cultural but also the character of their construction of culture as an entity. What New Asia College makes abundantly apparent is that culture, in the minds of its founders, was a dynamic entity and, as such, requires not only faith but action in order to keep it vibrant and make it real. Preserving and promoting culture, then, consisted of writing, talking, and studying about it, not only as forms of contemplation but as forms of action. Furthermore, these acts, while extremely important and indispensable, were in themselves insufficient and

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13 Most of the Chinese works as well as the book by Bresciani give just a paragraph to the outlining of New Asia's formation; Makeham's compilation mentions New Asia not at all.
incomplete. The bedrock faith of the New Asia founders lay precisely in the embodiment of Chinese cultural values, for ultimately they believed that it is only in personifying the values of a culture that that culture can truly live. Thus, the founding and development of an educational institution which would not only enact Confucian principles but transmit them to students, thereby equipping them to become embodiments of true Chinese values themselves, was a cultural act of the utmost significance.

This dissertation tells the story of such cultural enactment through the educational institution of New Asia College. By examining the way in which New Asia sought to effectuate and substantiate its faith in Chinese culture through adherence to certain curricular and structural elements, this study demonstrates the struggle involved in balancing temporal change and cultural continuity in the Hong Kong context. The process by which New Asia’s founders sought to actualize their cultural ideals through education reveals not only their own explicit principles and implicit assumptions, but also highlights the ways in which they reacted to and interacted with the contextual forces which influenced them. This process of reaction and interaction was key to the development of New Asia, for it was through
this process that New Asia was forced to continually remake its identity and redefine its priorities. Faced with various limitations and expectations, the decisions New Asia’s founders made as to what they were willing to relinquish vs. what they were not, what was negotiable vs. what was not, reveal at once both the rigidity and the fluidity of their ideas and the institutional embodiment of those ideas.

This dissertation is organized into three parts. Part A analyzes New Asia College and its attending institutions and community in order to understand how its founders sought to actualize their cultural ideals through education. Part B takes the opposite and external perspective, examining New Asia through the eyes of the American non-governmental organizations and the British colonial government who supported and influenced New Asia’s development. Part C joins the perspectives of Parts A and B by demonstrating how, when the intentioned efforts of New Asia collided with the assumptions, expectations, and requirements of outside funding and political forces, New Asia’s program of cultural education in Hong Kong became at once much more and much less than that originally envisioned by its founders.
Part A: The Center of New Asia

Cultural education is a social cause, is the life of the history and culture of a nation and race. . . . Chinese people must truly understand Chinese culture, and must nurture talent that is suitable for us to use to build ourselves. . . . One must possess knowledge of Chinese culture, and at the same time must understand the different cultures of the world. One must foster Chinese culture, and also must connect the cultures of China and the West.¹

With this speech, given at the opening ceremony of New Asia College on October 10, 1949, college President Qian Mu spelled out clearly the mission of the school. New Asia would make its primary goal the provision of cultural education for Chinese students in Hong Kong. This cultural education, absolutely crucial to the identity and existence of a people, would serve to give China a base from which to rebuild and grow, while also allowing it to forge stronger connections to other cultures. Such cultural education, while an important component of the life of any people at any time, was particularly significant for those establishing New Asia because of their interpretation of their context. The age in which the New Asia founders found themselves seemed to them to be particularly in dire

¹ Qian Mu, "Yazhou wenshang xueyuan kaixue dianli jiangci kangyao 亚洲文商学院开学典礼讲词摘要 [Summary of the speech given at the opening ceremony of the Asia School of Humanities and Commerce],” October 10, 1949, in Xinya yiduo 新亚忆祥 [Remembrances of New Asia] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1998), 1-2.
need of cultural education. From their perspective, culture generally and Chinese culture specifically had never been more threatened. Thus the New Asia philosophy and program of cultural education had a special note of urgency in its intent commitment to provide the sort of cultural education they believed was needed in Hong Kong, in China, and in the world at large.

Their sense of cultural crisis, of course, was neither new nor unique to them. By 1949, Chinese intellectuals had been debating the issue of Chinese culture and its meaning and relevance relative to Western power and modernization for over a century. The problem for Asia, in fact, ranged even farther back in time. For New Asia co-founder Tang Junyi, the crisis of culture in Asia, instigated by Western aggression, was at least a couple of hundred years old. The superior technological prowess of the West had brought colonization of varying types and levels to most Asian peoples, including the Chinese. In Tang’s view, however, the responsibility for this oppressive circumstance could not be laid solely at the door of the aggressors. Rather, Asian people generally and Chinese people specifically should seek to understand the nature of their colonial circumstances as a way of taking responsibility for what
has happened to them. Moving from passive suffering to
active learning and working could be achieved through
education. In Tang’s words:

For the decline of Asia’s position over the last
two or three hundred years, the Asian people must
assume responsibility. For the weakness of China
over the last hundred years, Chinese people must
assume responsibility. Ancient Asia and ancient
China need new students. We believe that, only
when ancient Asia and ancient China acquire new
students, will salvation come to China, to Asia,
and to all future humanity.²

The task of education, then, of producing students who
understand the needs of their contexts and work
intelligently towards their solutions, was of paramount
importance in the revitalization of China and of all Asia.

The threat to Chinese culture in the twentieth century,
however, came not solely in the form of explicit external
aggression. Instead, Chinese culture and culture the world
over were severely threatened by the rise of various forms
of totalitarian control. Totalitarianism, the New Asia
founders felt, was repugnant in its usurpation of human
freedom. Of particular concern to them was communism,
which they categorized as a form of totalitarianism for its
control over every aspect of a society’s life and for its
antagonism towards Chinese culture specifically. The way

² Tang Junyi, "Wo suo liaojie zhi xinya jingshen 我所了解之新亚精神 [My
Understanding of the New Asia Spirit]," Xinya xiaokan 新亚校刊 [New Asia
to contend with such an assault on freedom was, for New Asia’s founders, education. Only education would give students the knowledge necessary for them to build roads for their people. In the words of Qian:

In the midst of today’s struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, Chinese youth should, in their thinking, have correct knowledge in order to avoid mistakenly entering a wrong path and misunderstanding their own futures, thereby doing harm to country and race and to the peace of the whole world.  

Education, then, was to address the “struggle between democracy and totalitarianism” by giving students the means to recognize and thereby avoid treading “a wrong path”.

The necessity and significance of education was even broader in the sense that culture in general might be threatened by a lack of understanding between different peoples. In the shadow of the World War II and its terrifying atomic conclusion, the New Asia founders saw the globe as being in imminent danger of self-destruction. Living in genuine fear that any further challenge to world peace would result in the world’s end, the issue of communication and interaction between peoples of differing cultural background seemed of paramount importance. The New Asia answer to this problem was a cultural education

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3 Qian, “Xinya shuyuan yange zhiqyu gaikuang 新亚书院沿革旨趣与概况 [The goals and general circumstances of New Asia College’s development],” 1952, in Xinya yiduo 新亚忆粹, 6-18.
program constructed on multiple levels. Students should be educated not only about their own culture and that of others but also learn to appreciate human culture on a cross-cultural level and understand the commonalities between peoples that define the essential humanness of all. On this point also the New Asia founders objected strenuously to communist thinking, for in claiming reality to be located only on the level of the material, communism denied the basic humanity of all. The cultural education conceptualized by New Asia, then, was also a human-centered humanist education. They saw their role as working, "through the mission of humanist education, to connect the Eastern and Western cultures of the world for the sake of peace in the world and benefit to society's future."4

In pursuit of the goal of cross-cultural understanding, Hong Kong was a particularly significant site, for its nature and location made it precisely a space in which Eastern and Western cultures could interact and further their understanding of each other. In their words:

Hong Kong, in terms of geography and culture, is an important contact point between East and West, the two major civilizations of the world, and as such can serve as an educational site for pursuing the ideals of connecting the cultures of

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4 1952 Student Recruitment notice, reproduced in Qian, “Xinya shuyuan yange...”
By locating Hong Kong at the crossroads between East and West and between China and "the outside world", the New Asia founders made their Hong Kong site the ideal location from which to promote their goal of building understanding and connections across cultures. From this locale they were to create and provide a program of cultural education which would not only serve cross-cultural interests but also rebuild and refortify Chinese culture specifically.

\[5 \text{ Ibid.}\]
The Philosophy of Cultural Education

Recognizing and defining the need for cultural education was crucial for the founders of New Asia in establishing the orientation of the College. However, even more important was the delineation of the meaning of cultural education and the process by which it would mold students to become positive actors for culture. Cultural education, in Qian's conception, involved three stages: learning and understanding, acting, and being.

The first stage involves simply learning about Chinese culture. At the most basic level, this entails attaining "knowledge" in the sense of information acquisition. This level of learning, though basic, was particularly important because of the refugee status of most of New Asia's students and the wartime uncertainties under which these students had passed their schooling years. As many of them were lacking in various educational fundamentals, the New Asia founders thus saw that basic knowledge in any subject, including and in that of their own culture, could not be assumed. Thus, providing foundational knowledge about China and Chinese
culture was the ground-level goal in New Asia’s program of cultural education.

However, the simple provision and acquisition of knowledge was only the first step, for the New Asia vision of cultural education involved not just knowing but, even more importantly, understanding. The transition from knowledge to understanding moved the student from acquisition and possession to interpretation and empathy. New Asia’s most fervent wish was for Chinese students, and all Chinese people, to come to "truly understand Chinese culture." Believing as they did that departure from one’s cultural roots was not only undesirable but fundamentally impossible, they regarded cultural iconoclasm as being based on an incorrect understanding of culture generally and Chinese culture specifically. Their mission at New Asia, therefore, was not to provide neutral academic information about Chinese culture but to perform a corrective function, expunging any inaccurate or uncharitable interpretations of Chinese culture in students’ minds and replacing them with “true” perspectives on Chinese cultural meaning.

1 Qian Mu, "Yazhou wenshang xueyuan kaixue dianli jiangci kangyao [Summary of the speech given at the opening ceremony of the Asia School of Humanities and Commerce]," October 10, 1949, in Xinya yiduo 新亚忆录 [Remembrances of New Asia] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1998), 2.
The first stage of cultural education thus entailed learning and understanding Chinese culture. However, even developing a true understanding of Chinese culture was insufficient, for such understanding is significant not only for individuals but at a broader social level. It is in this sense that cultural education becomes a "social cause" for, according to the New Asia founders, cultural understanding is prerequisite to cultural rebuilding. As the founders objected on principle to any wholesale adoption of foreign solutions for Chinese problems, they believed it imperative that China build answers for its future on the foundation of its own cultural past. This is true for the specific issue of education, hence Qian's admonishment that China not "randomly copy" other university systems but rather to build on China's own educational institutional past. However, Qian's point is broader than the single matter of educational system and structure, for he goes on to state that the point of giving Chinese students a true understanding of Chinese culture is to "nurture talent that is suitable for us to use to build ourselves." The New Asia founders wished to ensure that students learn to think in terms of culturally "suitable", not just expedient, answers. Only then would their "taking up responsibility for
culture“ be enacted in a culturally appropriate and culturally meaningful way.

Preparing to “take up responsibility for culture” constitutes the second stage of cultural education. Students must be provided with learning that is specific to a central area of interest and talent on which they can focus their efforts thereafter and in which they will work their studies. Identifying and developing such a focus, of course, would not be merely for the purpose of future bread-winning and personal gain but rather for the maximization of one’s capability to serve culture. Only in so doing would one’s learning find fruition and purpose. In their words: “the goal of all learning and knowledge is to find how to make a real contribution to the nation, to society, and to all humanity.”

In order to find their individual focus of interest, then, students must receive considerable learning in a specific field of their choosing. The process of choosing, however, must be well-grounded in general knowledge, for one cannot understand the significance of one's specialty except

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2 1952 Student Recruitment notice, reproduced in Qian, “Xinya shuyuan yange zhiqu yu gaikuang 新亚书院沿革旨趣与概况 [The development purpose, and general circumstances of New Asia College].”
within a broader totality of scholarship and of life. If students chose too early their field of focus, they would lack the overarching understanding required to interpret and integrate knowledge, instead perceiving only the details of their own specialty and regarding separate fields of knowledge as unrelated. Thus education at New Asia was to emphasize first the general and only secondly the specialized. By laying a foundation of general knowledge, students would acquire true comprehension of the significance of their specific studies and future work both in the terms of well-rounded scholarly pursuit and well as in the context of the broader needs of the society to which they will contribute.

Enacting cultural responsibility, however, requires much personal preparation. This preparation, while consisting of the learning process of the first stage of cultural education, involves a much deeper goal. In order to fulfill one's duty of taking up responsibility for culture, students need to "first develop oneself into a complete person." Becoming "a complete person" was in fact both the beginning and end point, both the foundation and the purpose of education. Being is hence the summation of

3 Ibid.
both previous stages of cultural education, the learning and the acting, for being entails both learning and acting and in fact depend upon them for meaning and for completion. Only through developing cultural understanding and fulfilling cultural service can one become complete person.

The reliance of being on learning and the acting that comes from learning implies particularly an interweaving connection between being and learning. This principle of being-learning inextricability is expressed succinctly in New Asia’s two-character motto: cheng ming 诚明. Literally, cheng 诚 refers to honesty and integrity, while ming 明 means understanding and comprehension. In the context of the motto, Qian explains the meaning of the two characters thus:

The word cheng belongs to the arena of moral action. The word ming belongs to the arena of knowledge and understanding. Cheng is a matter of fact, a matter of truth, while ming is a kind of knowing, a kind of comprehension. Our taking of these two words as our school motto reflects what we have always said, our spirit of taking the pursuit of learning and being a person as part of the same matter. 4

Students must learn, then, to both develop their moral character as well as acquire formal knowledge and understanding. Qian further explains the inter-relation of
these two by positing that, in order to be cheng, one must develop one's ming such as to understand how to be cheng. Cheng, he argues, is manifest on four levels or steps; executing each relies on the performance of the last. The first is unity of word and deed; the second is unity of others and self; the third is unity of things and self; the fourth is unity of heaven and earth. According to Qian:

The first has to do with the truth of character, with moral truth. The second has to do with social truth, with humanistic truth. The third has to do with nature's truth, with scientific truth. The fourth is a religious truth, a spiritual truth.  

Human beings live within all these levels and therefore must be cheng in all of them and to see them as being integrated and inter-dependent. Ming is the understanding of the meaning of each of these levels and the way in which to enact all of them together. "Thus, not cheng will bring about not ming, and not ming will bring about not cheng."  

The inextricably of learning and being was also emphasized in several of the New Asia School Principles. These included: "You must, in the process of seeking

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4 Qian Mu, "Xinya xiaoxun cheng ming liangzi shiyi 新亚校训诚明两字释义 [Explanation of the two words cheng ming of the New Asia school motto]," Xinya xiaokan 新亚校刊 7 (October 1955): 1.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
knowledge, complete your personal character;"7 "You must treat your daily life and your studies as one, and your inner cultivation and your scholarship as one."8 However, the development of character and the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, while each being indispensable to the other, are nevertheless unequal in importance, for ultimately a person will be judged not by the latter but by the former. The purpose of school learning, then, is less about ming than about ming for the sake of cheng.

Students are thus cautioned to remember the final goal and meaning of their learning, for while learning seems of utmost importance while one is in school, after entering society one will realize that it is one’s character that is most important. Qian admonishes:

If you have sound character, even if your scholarship is less good, you will still be respected and trusted and your profession and status will advance. But if your character is not good, even with great scholarly ability you will be ill-regarded and lose trust and your position and career will not give you satisfaction.9

Ultimate meaning, then, is determined by one’s being and one’s character, not by one’s level of professional or

8 Ibid., #20.
scholarly attainment. Yet, because character reaches its completion precisely through learning and acting, all three are bound together in a triangular relationship where each requires both the others to reach fruition.

The significance of cultural education, then, lies in its unification of the three facets of learning, acting, and being under the encompassing rubric of culture, and the necessity of learning is proven by its indispensability to both acting and being. Thus the process, form, content, and structure of learning assume paramount importance, for only when these are properly constructed and balanced will students in fact become the cultural actors and complete persons which cultural education aims to produce. For this reason, the New Asia founders believed the traditional Chinese shuyuan 书院 of Sung and Ming times to be the most ideal institutional educational form, for its goal is precisely the fostering of "well-rounded talent" and the unity of learning and being as one process.

The shuyuan would accomplish this particularly by its nurturance of students not only as students but as people by providing close student-teacher relationships. In such relationship, teachers were to serve not merely as dispensers of information but as personal mentors and moral
guides. In performing this latter function, teachers would lead students not only through advice-giving but through moral character-modeling in their own lives.\textsuperscript{10} That teachers would thus perform also the roles of mentor and guide would ensure that students received individual attention equally in their process of character development and in their quest for a specialization suited to their interests and talents. In their words: "courses and grades are dead and divisive, but teachers and elders and human character are alive and integrative."\textsuperscript{11} Thus teachers were themselves to embody the union of learning and being which students were to learn and execute.

The institution and philosophy of the shuyuan would also serve as New Asia’s distinguishing feature. As the dire situation of refugee youth in Hong Kong became increasingly obvious, a number of other post-secondary institutions were concurrently being established. However, New Asia sought to provide a different kind of education than other schools offered as its founders objected to prevailing trends in education. New Asia’s founders particularly disliked what they saw as the tendency of other schools to emphasize “learning for the sake of personal

\textsuperscript{10} 1952 Student recruitment notice.
profession or learning purely for the sake of learning."\textsuperscript{12} They believed their joining of learning with acting and being would stand out as an educational attitude that nurtured personhood instead of only professions.

New Asia also disagreed with the orientation of other schools over the structure of course-taking and the attainment of grades and credits. Although New Asia certainly employed the apparatus of coursework and curriculum, this was to be secondary in significance to the building of character and the teacher-student relational form. In their words: "the shuyuan of China’s Sung dynasty took people as its core; modern university education is centered on curriculum."\textsuperscript{13} Only by using the intellectually and personally integrative approach of the shuyuan could the splintering of knowledge and the faulty purposes of learning be avoided. The cultural education at New Asia, uniting learning, acting, and being in the humanist education of the shuyuan, would give students the necessary grounding to prepare them for cultural service for China and for the world. Thus their proclamation:

This school takes the promotion of the Chinese traditional humanist spirit and philosophy of

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{11} New Asia School Principles, #13.
  \item\textsuperscript{12} 1952 Student recruitment notice.
  \item\textsuperscript{13} New Asia School Principles, #14.
\end{itemize}
world peace as its responsibility, thereby leading young students, by these correct principles, to pursue the goal of saving the world.14

Laying a Foundation of Knowledge: The General Curriculum

Paramount amongst New Asia's educational values was the provision of a general well-rounded education. As we saw in their statements of mission and principles, they believed that only when students had acquired a sound base of general knowledge would more specialized learning have meaning. In the unstable environment of 1950s Hong Kong where many students were unable to complete a post-secondary degree, the determination of a general curriculum that would apply to students immediately upon enrollment was particularly significant. Thus, the New Asia planners carefully crafted a required General Curriculum-- or, in the literal translation of the Chinese, "The Curriculum Common Across Departments"-- to ensure a common foundation of learning for all students failing into the New Asia realm of influence.

The content of the General Curriculum was quite wide-ranging in its coverage of academic fields of study. As the New Asia planners desired students to attain basic

14 Qian, “Xinya shuyuan yange zhiqu yu gaikuang [The development purpose, and general circumstances of New Asia College],” 1952, in Xinya yiduo 新亚忆録, 6-18.
comprehension in as many different areas of learning as possible, they determined the courses of the general curriculum accordingly. The table below lists all the courses offered in the General Curriculum under their respective categories and fields:

**General Curriculum Course List**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Chinese Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
<td>College English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>General History of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>History of the West</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Chinese History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outlines of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction to Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Relations and Organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Western History</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>General Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Math</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Geography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variety and range of courses offered in the general curriculum was quite impressive. In particular, the relatively large number of courses under the social and natural science categories is striking, as introductory-level courses were offered in most of the major disciplines.
of the social sciences and in all three hard sciences. In fact, more courses were offered in the social and natural sciences than in the humanities. The course list also reflects the New Asia principle that one must learn one's own culture as well as the other cultures of the world. In language and history studies, courses were offered in both Chinese and English and in both Chinese and Western history. Not only does the course list show an interest in different cultures but also a concept of the world as a whole. In the social and natural science areas, broad theoretical courses in sociology, economics, law, politics, and geography indicate an assumption of the globe as interconnected system. A course such as "International Relations" particularly reveals this global orientation and a need to understand the relationships between various countries. Thus, the general curriculum course list reflects a broad and balanced distribution of courses across the academic fields.

While the variety of general education courses represents the New Asia commitment to a broad-based foundational education, the school planners could not ignore their more primary calling to provide an education focused on humanities subjects and informed by their humanistic
worldview. Their faith in the power of a humanities-oriented education to solve the troubles of China and the world compelled them to infuse this belief into the general education course structure. The New Asia prioritization of humanities study is revealed by the distribution of credit amongst fields and by the rules for choosing general curriculum coursework. The following table indicates the credit hours accorded to each subject area and the stipulations for choosing from amongst courses offered.

**Credit Distribution of the General Curriculum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Credits</th>
<th>Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>16-28</td>
<td>Chinese (2 yrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>English (2 yrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>General Chinese History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Chinese History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World History OR Western History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Introduction to Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logic OR Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sociology OR Economics OR Law, AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Relations &amp; Organizations OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Western History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>General Science OR Biology OR Chemistry OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physics OR Math OR General Geography OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This credit distribution makes apparent a number of the principles and precepts of New Asia. First, New Asia's interest in primarily providing a literary text-based
education is revealed by the fact that language training assumes by far the greatest number of credits assigned to any single field of study. All students were to take two full years of both Chinese and English, accounting for 42% of their general curriculum time. Students were required to devote this portion of their time language study regardless of their level of ability. For instance, some students may not reach the sophomore level of training in their second year as they must first take remedial courses during their first year for no credit if they did not test into the freshmen level in one or both languages upon admission.15 Regardless of what portion of their language coursework was credit-bearing, though, all students were required to take 8 credit hours each of Chinese and English courses during their freshman year, and 6 credits of each as sophomores.16 This total of 28 credit hours represents exactly twice as many credits as is assigned to the field second in line for the students’ time. Nurturing language facility was thus a top priority in New Asia general curriculum requirements.

Second, New Asia’s faith in the importance of a humanities-based education is revealed by the volume of

16 Ibid., 3.
credit accorded to the humanities subjects. The traditional humanities subjects of history and philosophy claimed the second and third priorities in the hierarchy of courses in the general curriculum. With 16 credits for history and 10 for philosophy, they together were appointed 26 total credit hours, close to the 28 that language training is accorded. If one broadens the definition of humanities as they did to mean all human-focused studies, thereby including social science in the humanities category, then the total credits for humanities subjects amounts to 32 credits, or 48% of total general curriculum time. With nearly half of students' general curriculum time devoted to humanities subjects, the great significance attached to humanities education is obvious.

Language and humanities studies thus were to occupy the bulk of students' attention in their first two years. As courses in these two fields together total 60 credits, or 91% of the general curriculum time, the time remaining for studying the sciences was clearly minimal. Although there were seven science courses to choose from, in fact more than in any other single field, students earned only 6 out of 66 credits in Science as they were required to choose only one of the seven courses to fulfill the science requirement.
Furthermore, the composition of courses in the "natural science" category allowed students not scientifically-inclined to avoid the hard sciences altogether. While the category included the hard sciences of physics, biology, and chemistry, it also included math, geography, and psychology. This meant that students, being required to take only one of the seven courses, could fulfill their natural science requirement without in fact having any exposure to the hard sciences. In fact, some students did not have opportunity to receive training in the hard sciences at all. For example, students who were interested in enrolling in the Department of Philosophy and Education had to take Psychology during their freshman year. Having fulfilled their Natural Science requirement with the psychology course, they not only were not required to but in fact would not have time to take any courses in the hard sciences. Thus both the amount of credit accorded to the natural science requirement and the construction of the category itself reveals that the New Asia emphasis on its significance was minimal.

Although the distribution of course credits reveals clearly the great bias of New Asia towards language and

17 Ibid., 20.
humanities over science, that they did clearly aim to emphasize balance is evident in their distribution of the general curriculum requirements over the first two years. If they were to actualize their ideal of providing a broad-based education, they were compelled to stipulate exactly which courses were to be taken the first year and which the second because of the high student attrition rate during the first decade of the school's existence. Because of the general uncertainty then of Hong Kong and the transience of its population, the early years of New Asia saw an attrition rate of over 40% after the first year. Thus New Asia administrators determined the curriculum of the freshman year with the understanding that that first year might be all the post-secondary education many students would receive.

The following table indicates the freshman curriculum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Credits</th>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Credits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>General Chinese History</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction to Philosophy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 8-9.
This coursework, accounting for 40 of the 66 total credit hours of the general curriculum, was to occupy freshmen completely. While students would have opportunity to begin exploring a major field of interest in their sophomore year, the first year was to be devoted solely to general curriculum courses. The New Asia planners were determined to ensure the students’ general training in the first year, whether or not they continued their studies at New Asia.

The curriculum for the freshman year is therefore the broadest in its coverage. As explained by the planners:

"The courses for the Freshmen are all general requirements designed to give the students a grounding in the languages, Humanities and Sciences."\(^\text{20}\) That balance between different areas was considered highly important in this first year is evident by the fact that all six social science and all six natural science credits of the general curriculum were to be taken in the freshman year. Students need not touch these subjects again after their first-year overview encounter with them, but they must receive some training in both social and natural scientific modes of inquiry as a base. In the language training category; freshmen were required to take both Chinese and English and for equal weight of

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 3.
This makes evident their strong priority for students to improve their skills both in their native language and also in English. Together, the combination of language and humanities and social and natural science courses were to provide all students, whether transient or long-term, with a cross-disciplinary foundation of learning.

New Asia's strict emphasis on the procedure of learning is indicative of the school planners' commitment to their principle of attaining general knowledge first and specialization later. By dictating that all general curriculum courses be completed within the first two years and the bulk of them in the first year, the school made certain that its students attained a general education. While New Asia's production of graduates was unstable and uncertain, its aim was to ensure that any student entering its domain would first, without fail, immediately receive the general knowledge that they believed to be so essential to the building of human character. Because character development was primary on their agenda, they were willing to allow the pursuit of specialized knowledge and skill to be secondary, if not neglected altogether. The student

21 In fact, students spent more time in English class than in Chinese -- 6 hours each week for English to their 4 hours for Chinese -- though both awarded 4 credits per semester.
attrition rate meant that the total population of juniors and seniors would remain at less than half that of the freshman-sophomore population over New Asia's first decade, many students would not even reach the point of choosing a major field of concentration.\(^{22}\) Clearly, the New Asia planners believed that education was important in aiding students in discovering and defining their professional futures and that studying a major field was instrumental in this process. However, they were willing to let this come second in the procedure of learning on the belief that a general education would give students the grounding necessary to discover their professional occupation independently if need be. In a situation where they could not be certain how long they could retain their students, they created a structure and procedure of learning that indicated their preference that students leave with no specialized training than without broad knowledge.

This emphasis on a general, common, required curriculum is significant particularly in that they pit it against what they regarded as the job-specific training that other schools were then offering. Their argument reminds one of the discussions about "liberal arts" core curricula in

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 8-9.
universities in the United States. However, whereas American debates over the purpose of such core curricula often revolve around specific issues of polity and economy—such as, that a democratic system requires citizens who can think broadly and critically, or that today’s marketplace demands from its laborers less specialization than transferability of skills—the New Asia justification for establishing a required general curriculum is much more abstract. By emphasizing that education in general, and especially general education, exists primarily for the reason of developing character, they cast the development of economically and socially-useful skills as secondary in both the importance and the procedure of learning.

Departmental Structure and the Prioritization of Values

During the course of their sophomore year, students were to choose a major field of study which would subsequently occupy them fully for their junior and senior years. At no time during the first decade of New Asia’s existence was there a full range of departments in which students could choose to concentrate their studies. However, as the school developed, students’ options increased as did the degree of specificity of the departments.
Initially, the New Asia founders intended to establish three faculties. These are shown in the table below along with the departments categorized under each.

**Initial Plan for Faculties and Departments, 1949**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculties</th>
<th>Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>Literature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophy and Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Farming and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horticulture and Ranching</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Economy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Initial Plan shows a fairly even divide between the various basic humanities and business subjects. The Faculty of Agriculture was considered to be particularly important as means to understanding and ultimately influencing the agriculturally-based society of mainland China. In addition to classroom knowledge about agriculture, New Asia deemed it crucial that students gain practical training. Thus they determined that they would establish an experimental farm so that students could do fieldwork and professors could conduct research. However, the establishment of this experimental farm being outside their financial capabilities, thus rendering practical training impossible, the Faculty was shut down within the first year.
With the failure of the Faculty of Agriculture to be fully established, only four departments were sustained through the first five years of New Asia’s existence. As of 1954, students could choose amongst the following four departments and subcategories:

**Departments and their Sub-Groups, 1954**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Sub-Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literature and History</td>
<td>Chinese Language and Literature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Languages and Literature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese History</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Foreign Histories</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philosophy and Education</td>
<td>Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Business Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountancy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1954 and 1956, the departments were restructured so as to emphasize the scope and significance of the humanities at New Asia. The total number of departments rose from four to six, an increase that resulted not from the addition of any new areas of study but from the division of the History and Literature Department into three departments. First, the subgroup Foreign Languages and Literature was made into an independent department in 1955. The following year, Chinese Literature became a department, leaving the Department of History to cover both Chinese and
foreign histories. Thus, by 1956, New Asia had established six departments in which students could enroll:

1. History
2. Chinese Literature
3. Foreign Languages
4. Philosophy and Education
5. Economics
6. Business

This rearrangement of departments tilted the balance strongly towards the Humanities over the Business faculty. By replacing the History and Literature Department with three separate and specialized departments, the New Asia administrators were able to funnel more energy and expertise into the humanities subjects of greatest concern to them.

By 1958, two more departments were added which revealed New Asia's development both in the direction of practical application of knowledge, on the one hand, and further learning in matters strictly cultural, on the other. The establishment of the Department of Industrial and Commercial Management represented a transformation of the Business Management subgroup into a department, with the specific supplement of Industrial Management. This last addition marked an impressive expansion of the Economics Faculty, as it stemmed not from the division of existing departments but

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23 Ibid., 7.
from the introduction of the entirely new and very significant element of industry into the school structure. Such expansion revealed a willingness to emphasize the arena of practical application of knowledge as well as an acknowledgement of the Hong Kong situation. Whereas the Faculty of Agriculture, with its attending dream of return to an agrarian mainland, had been dismantled within the College’s first year due to lack of funds, by the late 1950’s the fact of industrial growth and the importance of commerce in Hong Kong prompted the formation of such a Management Department in answer to local needs.

In quite another vein, a new Fine Arts Department was also established in 1958, fulfilling a wish long in the hearts of the New Asia administrators.25 In a Short-Range Plan they promulgated in 1955, they articulated their desire to “add a department of Chinese Fine Arts, to promote the study of Chinese music, painting, calligraphy, writing and carving, and train our youths along these lines.”26 They regarded the study of the arts as crucial in developing the

25 Ibid.
26 Xinya Shuyuan Fazhan Jihua 新亚书院发展计划 [Development Plan of New Asia College], 1956: 18.
students' sense of Chinese culture specifically and of cultural refinement generally. In their words:

Chinese fine arts not only have their significant place and definite meaning in the Chinese cultural system, but can also exert deep influences in shaping group mind, changing manners and popularizing culture. . . . The realization of the educational ideal of our College must lie through the increasing appreciation of Chinese arts and understanding of Chinese culture. 27

New Asia sought to improve students' understanding of Chinese culture through enhancing their appreciation of Chinese arts. Such appreciation was significant not only on the level of the individual but also for the collective. Increasing appreciation of Chinese arts could thus exert positive influence over cultural identity and behavior and as such should assume priority as a departmental subject at New Asia.

New Asia also sought in the late 1950's to revive their Department of Journalism. Insufficient resources had prevented its continuance during the school's first year. 28

When planning school development in 1955, however, New Asia declared its intention to restore the department by 1958 because of the extreme social significance it attached to

27 Ibid.
28 Qian, "Xinya shuyuan yange...," 18.
the journalistic endeavor. The New Asia administrators believed it their duty "to train young journalists in a Chinese cultural background in order that they may help in social education and the spread of Chinese culture." The attitude that journalists must have adequate knowledge of Chinese culture so as to use their work to promote Chinese culture reveals unambiguously New Asia's sense of cultural education as both learning and acting, both knowledge and service.

The departmental structure of New Asia in its first decade contained some very notable absences. With the exception of the Economics Department, which was classified under Social Science, none of the social or natural sciences was represented on the departmental level. In fact, no courses in these areas were offered beyond the introductory ones of the general curriculum. The New Asia administrators were not unconscious of this lack. Knowing their departments did not represent the complete range of modern academic disciplines, they declared in 1955 their intention to become "a full-fledged college of arts and sciences

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29 Xinya Shuyuan Fazhan Jihua 新亚书院发展计划 [Development Plan of New Asia College], 1956: 7.
30 Ibid., 18.
someday". In view of this, they petitioned for donations specific to the construction of three laboratories for Biology, Physics, and Chemistry. However, their ability to develop in these capital-intensive ways depended entirely on receiving donations that would permit them to use funds for these ends. Their own annual budgets during the first decade contained no funding allocations for developing in the natural or social science areas.

While this lack of facilities and courses in the natural and social sciences clearly resulted from their highly limited finances, it also represented a hierarchy of values. Certainly the New Asia administrators regarded some training in the sciences as indispensable and therefore included both social and natural science coursework in the first-year required general curriculum. Yet, such attention to the sciences was not only lower on the hierarchy of importance but in fact only a means to an end. This statement reveals their motives and priorities:

According to the educational ideals of our College in the establishment of departments and planning of courses, we must always place emphasis on the study of the Humanities, especially Chinese history and literature, and the study of Chinese culture. However, in order

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31 Ibid., 2.
32 Ibid., 16.
33 Ibid., 12-16.
to realize such ideals, a general knowledge of Natural Sciences is also necessary.34

In casting scientific knowledge as an element which was to help students attain the loftier goal of learning Chinese culture, they acknowledge that monetary concerns alone did not account for their lack of emphasis on institutional development in the science disciplines. Rather, the absence of science departments on the one hand and the increase of arts and humanities departments on the other hand resulted at least as much from New Asia’s priorities and values as from financial constraints.

That all learning was ultimately for the purpose of better understanding and promoting Chinese culture was apparent also in their explanations of the necessity of instituting other subjects for study. For example, their establishment of the Fine Arts Department and rationalization for the study of art resulted not only from their sense of aesthetics or culture but also from their faith that art generally and Chinese art specifically could act as a positive societal influence. As they hoped their “graduates [would] exercise good influences on society,”

34 Ibid., 16 (E). The English (E) version of this document is not an exact translation of the Chinese (C) one. In general, I have used the Chinese version. However, in cases where it is more revealing to use the wording of the English version, I so designate the citation with (E);
they believed their learning of the arts would aid them in becoming proponents of Chinese culture specifically and civilizing forces generally. A similar line of reasoning was evident in their discussion of the need to revive the Journalism Department. Their depiction of journalism not as a objective reporting on peoples and happenings but rather as a form of “social education” and cultural promotion is striking, for it reveals the extent to which the New Asia planners believed that all learning is for the ultimate purpose of learning and propagating Chinese culture. Even for such subjects as journalism or natural science, which generally aim towards neutrality and objectivity both in content and process, they regarded the learning and mastering of them as significant only in light of the service they might render to their final cultural goals.

In light of this, the learning of subjects oriented towards practical application became doubly important. As discussed in the previous section, the New Asia leaders believed in the power and importance of education in helping students identify their calling. While the primary purpose of education was not preparation for any particular job, neither was it to be solely for the sake of attaining
knowledge. Because of their faith that school learning was to mold students into contributing citizens of society, they created departments which would answer specifically to this goal. As noted earlier, the formation of a Faculty of Agriculture was amongst the earliest plans of the school. Although that effort failed, their reason for establishing such a faculty was precisely for the purpose of training students with practical abilities to "take on the responsibility of building China's agricultural economy." The degree of specificity the planned departments—Horticulture, Ranching, Forestry, etc.—speaks to their seriousness in seeking to ensure that students received advanced-level knowledge and skills. Although the Faculty closed soon after opening and the planned experimental farm was never even started, New Asia continued with its emphasis on economy-related matters by building its Economics Department and expanding its business departments. Establishing the Department of Commercial and Industrial Management in 1958 particularly indicated an investment in producing students who would be able to contribute to economy and society in very concrete ways. Although New Asia was clearly dedicated to a humanities-heavy education,
their commitment to also providing practical knowledge and skills was evident in the departmental structure they set up.

Other departments also included in their curricula elements geared towards training students in the knowledge and skills they would need to make a concrete contribution after leaving school. The Economics Department, while offering primarily theoretical courses, also required their majors to take "Accounting", "Statistics", and "Money and Banking".36 Departments less concerned with questions of livelihood also offered real-world-oriented course. In the Foreign Languages Department, "Translation" was offered as an elective course by 1955,37 and by 1958 was billed as a requirement for all departmental majors.38 The department also offered a course on "Business English".39 In the Department of Philosophy and Education, students majoring in education were required to take not only more abstract courses like "Philosophy of Education" but also practical ones such as "Educational Administration" and "Psychological and Educational Testing".40 Indeed, many students were attracted to the study of more practical subjects. In fact,

35 Qian, "Xinya shuyuan yange...,” 17.
36 Short Range Plan, 25 (E).
37 Ibid., 22 (E).
38 Gaikuang 1958: 63.
during the first four years of the school's existence, the Business Department enrolled more students than either the Economics or the Philosophy and Education departments and was second only to the History and Literature Department.\textsuperscript{41} During the first decade, the Economics Department generally enrolled more students than the Philosophy and Education Department.\textsuperscript{42} Clearly, both administrators and students felt a need for learning and training in the practical realm.

Yet, departmental development and departmental statistics also show that, ultimately, the overall student body commitment was to the humanities education constructed for them by the New Asia administrators. For example, though the Business Department enrolled a greater number of students than the Philosophy and Education Department over the first eight years, by 1957 the former had only a total of 6 graduates to the latter's 17. Thus there was a higher degree of transience in Business than in other departments. The core of committed students enrolled in other subjects, and the numbers for the Literature and History Department in particular reveal indubitably where the school's heart lay. Enrollment in that department consistently far exceeded any

\textsuperscript{41} Tabulated according to cumulative student listings in Xiaokan 3 (July 1953), 56-59.
other, and the department also graduated the most students. Clearly, student interest and enrollment supported the school's division of the History and Literature Department into three separate departments even while other existing departments were shut down and plans for new departments remained unexecuted. The synchronicity between student and administrator values in this regard reveals the undeniable prioritization of humanities study at New Asia.

Curricular Structure and the Forging of a Worldview

Beyond the general required curriculum, the advanced-level courses across the various departments also reveal New Asia's values and assumptions about the world which they aimed to save. In particular, their goal of teaching students both about their own Chinese culture and about Western culture is everywhere in their construction of departmental curricula. By examining their casting of these two cultural spheres, we can better understand their ultimate purpose of increasing cross-cultural communication between the two and how they conceived of this process and its participants.

42 Student enrollment statistics compiled from Xiaokan 3 (July 1953), 4 (February 1954), 5 (July 1954).
Just as the general curriculum embodied the goal of teaching students about the West and the world at large, the coursework of the individual departments indicates even more clearly this effort and priority. The determination of required courses for each department particularly reveals the effort to expose students to things Western. For example, in the History Department, all majors were required to take the basic courses of "History of Chinese Dynasties", "History of Chinese Culture", and "Western National Histories". In addition, students were required to choose one specialized Chinese history and one specialized Western history course before they could choose other electives. 43 Other departments had similar requirements compelling students to study both China and the West. In the Department of Philosophy and Education, all students were required to take four overview courses: "History of Chinese Philosophy", "History of Western Philosophy", "History of Chinese Education", and "History of Western Education". In addition, they were to take either "History of Chinese Literature" or "History of Western Literature", and one of "History of Chinese Classics, History of Chinese Culture, History of Western Culture", "Social Political History" or

43 Fazhan jihua, 17-18(C), 23(E).
"History of Economic Thought".44 Students majoring in language and literature were likewise required to take courses outside their focus; thus, the Department of Chinese Literature stipulated that its majors take either "Western Historiography" or "History of Western Literature",45 while students of the Department of Foreign Languages were required to take "History of Chinese Literature".46 Requirements for Economics majors included "Economic Problems of China" and "Social Economic History of China" but also "Economic History of the West".47 In Economics as in History, more credits were assigned to learning about China than the West. Nevertheless, the stipulation that all students, regardless of their chosen field of concentration, learn their subject with both Chinese and Western foci shows New Asia's earnestness in ensuring that students be trained to think beyond Chinese boundaries.

As learning about "the West" was so central to the New Asia agenda for education, exactly what constituted "the West"? "The West" that was learned by the students was overwhelmingly that of English-speaking countries. As discussed above, all students were required to study English

44 Ibid., 19-20(C), 24-25(E).
45 Ibid., 15-16(C), 20-21(E).
46 Ibid., 16-17(C), 21-22(E).
for two years as part of the general curriculum. Not only was English the only foreign language classified under the general curriculum but no other language was even offered. The emphasis on English was even more apparent in the Department of Foreign Languages. While majors were required to take two terms of French, students could not study the language further as no advanced courses were offered. Furthermore, no other languages were taught in the department. The Foreign Languages Department was in reality a department of English Language and Literature, and in fact in the early years occasionally this name was used for the department instead.\textsuperscript{48} Certainly the curriculum of that department follows standard expectations for an English Language and Literature department: required courses for majors included "English Romantic Poets", "Shakespeare and Elizabethan Drama", "19\textsuperscript{th} Century British Novels", "English Bible", "Contemporary British and American Literature" and the like.\textsuperscript{49} That Britain and the United States were the primary Western countries of concern to New Asia was also reflected in the History Department courses. While majors were required to take two or more courses in Western

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 20-21(C), 25-26(E).
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 7(E).
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 16-17(C), 21-22(E).
National Histories, the only countries taught as of 1953 were England and the United States.\textsuperscript{50} Though others such as Russia were later added,\textsuperscript{51} clearly the English-speaking countries were at the forefront of concern.

In fact, most of the courses taught about "the West" treated the West as a single unit. Certainly the basic general curriculum courses dealt with the West on a general global level. Thus the foundation Western history course aimed to introduce students to "the development of Western politics and culture from antiquity through the Middle Ages to the present."\textsuperscript{52} More advanced courses divided the subject of the "West" by specific periods of Western history or specific aspects of Western life but, with the exception of the aforementioned National Histories courses, not by the specific countries of the West. Thus the course "History of Western Culture" did not deal with the plurality of ethnicities and cultures that might be classified as Western but rather examines "Western Culture" as a single holistic system with contributing social, political, economic, religious, academic, and artistic components.\textsuperscript{53} The course description for "History of Western Philosophy" mentioned

\textsuperscript{50} Xiaokan 2: 34.
\textsuperscript{51} Fazhan jihua, 18(C), 23(E).
\textsuperscript{52} Xiaokan 2: 38.
nothing about significant differentiations between Anglo-American and Continental philosophical traditions or the like, but claimed to search for "the spirit" of Western philosophical inquiry from ancient Greek times to the present day. The courses "Economic History of the West" and "Educational History of the West" likewise consisted of temporal sweeps emphasizing the formation of Western "spirit" or "culture".

This generalized global way of dealing with the West is significant in light of New Asia's overall vision. Their interest in the West, as indicated in their mission statements, clearly resulted from their sense that understanding and developing better relations with the West is a prerequisite to world peace. Thus their study of "the West" as a unit is situated within their broader study of the world as a system. The general curriculum, as we noted above, contained courses in social sciences which indicated a systemic conceptualization of the globe and global dynamics. Most interesting in this regard is that the course "Modern Western History" is listed parallel to "International Relations and Organizations" such that

53 Ibid., 39.
54 Ibid., 40.
students are required to take one or the other.\textsuperscript{55} Because this parallel classification makes "Modern Western History" a kind of political science course, it is placed under the category of Social Science while "Modern Chinese History", which would be its more natural parallel course, is in the History category. Such a classification scheme indicates their sense that the West's significance lies in its effect on modern world relations. Thus "Modern Western History" considered its primary goal the explanation of the role of the West in global relations: its course description states that the course would examine specifically the development of "the standoff between democracy and communism since the French Revolution" and, more generally, the West's influence on "political, economic, social, and cultural transformations in the world over the last century."\textsuperscript{56} In this sense, the need to study the West was defined by identifying it as the birthplace of major political and intellectual movements whose impact subsequently spread beyond the West itself.

If the significance of the West and hence the need to study it derives from its global role, then "the West" as a concept is born because of its interaction with other areas

\textsuperscript{55} Fazhan jihua, 19(E).
of the world. It would seem to follow, then, that a comparable emphasis would be placed on studying the entities with which the West is interacting. Yet the curriculum addresses this only on the broadest of levels. Courses such as "International Relations and Organizations" are matched in other fields with courses such as "World Economic Problems" and "International Trade", revealing a generalized sensitivity to global interactions. The only course offered that identifies more specifically the entity with which the West is interacting is "History of East-West Relations". This course title represents the only appearance of the term "East" in the entire curriculum. Given the large number of courses that focus on the "West" one might expect that there be parallel courses that concentrate on "the East" as the mirror image of "the West". However, there are no such courses as "Eastern Economic History" or "History of Eastern Culture". Even more conspicuously absent are courses dealing with Asia. For a school that, by definition of its name, was to impel the birth of a new Asia, it is striking that there is not a single course with the term "Asia" in its title. While courses on the West made use of the textbooks focused specifically on Europe as a continental

56 Ibid., 39.
no comparable effort to delineate the nature and characteristics of Asia. While the country names “China”, “Japan” and “India” appear in course titles, there is no course that aims to define the boundaries or name the constituent members of “Asia”. Clearly, then, neither “Asia” nor “the East” was conceptualized as a coherent holistic unit as was “the West”. Only in the context of global relations does “the East” enter as an entity, and then only in a vague and amorphous sense.

The ambiguousness of this sense of “the East” or “Asia” may stem from the priorities of New Asia. While the Asian unit certainly bore some symbolic significance to the founders, it was their homeland China that was really at the core of their concern. Thus, not only was there no evident effort to teach about Asia as a whole but very minimal attention given to any area or aspect of Asia other than China. In fact, only two courses in the entire curriculum specifically emphasized other Asian countries: “History of Japan” and “History of Indian Philosophy”. While these were general overview courses, the courses offered on China were as specialized as “Methods of Ancient Chinese Classics”, “Chinese Historical Geography”, “Economic Problems of China”,

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57 Xiaokan 2: 39.
and so on. Thus, the name and the grand vision of "New Asia" notwithstanding, the only part of Asia of serious interest at New Asia was China.

In this framework, China was most significant or most representative of "Asia" or "the East" while "the West" served as the counterpart to which China was relating and could be compared. For this reason, the two entities in the world most deserving of study were China, on the one hand, and the West on the other. The large number of coupled courses on China and the West betrays this notion of parallelism between China and the West: "History of Chinese Philosophy" and "History of Western Philosophy", "History of Chinese Literature" and "History of Western Literature", "History of Chinese Education" and "History of Western Education", etc. Because of this depiction of "the West" as China's counterpart, the West was interpreted both more narrowly and more broadly than was justified. Since understanding Western power and influence was of primary concern, the English-speaking nations of England and the United States were selected as most necessary to study; this selection made "the West" more specific and hence smaller. On the other hand, because no other part of the world was

studied seriously besides "China" and "the West", "the West" was made to embody the entire relevant remainder of the non-Chinese world, thereby magnifying the scope and power of "the "West" as an idea. Thus the required general education course "History of the West" used solely two textbooks entitled "History of the World," and "General History of the World,"59 as though studying the world meant studying the West and vice versa. This conceptual slide between thinking of the West as a contained coherent unit and as the world at large, when coupled with their quest to define the "spirit" and "culture" of a generalized "West", made the West into a sort of vague but perpetually-moving target.

Concluding Thoughts

The vagueness of "the West" in the New Asia curriculum, juxtaposed to the specificity of "China", is striking for it implies that the primary global relationship of concern was not in fact between the East and the West but rather between China and the West. This lopsided equation which takes "China" and "the West" as parallel entities has certain historical echoes. Almost a century earlier, the famous ti-yong formula – "Chinese learning for essence, Western

59 Xiaokan 2: 38.
learning for function" — had also set China and the West as the two entities which were to be compared and negotiated. The coupled courses mentioned above where each subject matter has a Chinese-specific and also a Western-designated focus similarly sets up a conceptual structure in which China and the West are the relevant units to be weighed against one another. In this sense, the requirements that stipulate that students study both China and the West in their general curriculum and major field courses create a mental framework in which the two are constantly compared to each other.

There is another sense in which their emphasis on China as opposed to Asia or the East is noteworthy. If they had wished to promote a sense of region equal and parallel to "the West", they might well have pointed out the widespread regional influence of Confucian values and institutions and thereby highlighted a regional identity. In the Middle East, for example, Islam was and continues to be very much regarded as a unifying force that both justifies and buttresses a regional identity. Yet, as seen in their articulation of the New Asia mission, the New Asia founders did not bring a comparable emphasis on Confucianism to their students. To the contrary, nowhere in the curriculum is
Confucianism even mentioned. While there are courses in the Chinese classics and in Chinese philosophy in the Department of Chinese Literature and the Department of Philosophy and Education respectively, in neither is there even an introductory level course that focuses specifically on Confucian texts or thought. While there were many courses on China that examined quite specific aspects or issues, as noted above, in the cultural realm Confucianism was not highlighted distinctly from any other Chinese intellectual tradition. For a group of people whose orientation was very much a Confucian one, this glaring lack of any explicit curricular attention to Confucianism is striking. In this sense, New Asia's focus on China far surpassed its emphasis on Asia on the one hand or Confucianism on the other.

This focus on China undoubtedly results from their unwavering faith that Chinese culture could provide the inspiration students would need in their future and individual collective lives. On the basis of this faith, the architects of New Asia aimed to resurrect, on the one hand, the classical shuyuan and yet reconstruct it, on the other hand, by infusing new and literally foreign elements into it. The social and natural science courses clearly represent concepts of learning not included in the Sung-Ming
academies. Their emphasis on practical skills and knowledge also speak of a markedly different orientation than that of their centuries-old inheritance. Indeed, the New Asia administration intentionally created an educational system that would help students in their post-schooling professional service in a way that the traditional classical Confucian education did not. After all, one of the severest critiques levied against the Confucian educational system by reformists in the late Qing and Republican eras was that the memorization of ancient texts and the perfecting of eight-legged essay-writing did nothing to prepare officials-to-be for settling inter-county squabbles or overseeing the construction of waterworks. Thus the New Asia planners regarded as a historical imperative the need to provide an education that was transferable to the world outside the classroom. At the same time, they could not neglect their primary mission of providing the humanities-based humanistic education which they believed indispensable to the future of China and the whole world. Because they regarded such an education as the most worthwhile legacy of the Confucian educational system, the act of re-establishing it was itself the definition of its meaning.
In this sense, the need to define precisely the nature or parameters of Chinese culture was obviated, for the learning process New Asia created was to itself prove the value of the culture to which they were devoted. The founders' faith in a humanist education undoubtedly rested on what they saw as its origins in Chinese culture generally and Confucian philosophy specifically. Yet, by arguing that its virtues and benefits were applicable to all humankind by definition, they propelled its significance to the level of the universal without perceiving the imperative to defend their assumption that Confucian, Chinese, and human interests must coincide. Their specific desire to promote Chinese culture is thus reified into an abstraction in which the Chineseness of their humanistic education is painted casually as incidental in the greater cause of global salvation.

Cultural education at New Asia, then, had three separate but inter-related meanings: education about culture, education for culture, and education in culture. The first entailed learning about various "cultures" in the sense of separate peoples, societies or civilizations. The primary concern in this sense was providing students with accurate
knowledge and empathic understanding of their native Chinese culture, but genuine effort was also invested in learning broadly about Western culture so as to enable students to act for culture. Service to and assumption of responsibility for culture involved students identifying and performing a central task that would serve to revitalize China, on the one hand, and bridge China to the world, on the other. In order to prepare for service for culture, students must not only learn about but actually experience a correct grounding in culture. At New Asia this meant a classical Chinese humanities curriculum and, even more, the totality of the environment and relationships that constituted the structure, style, and purpose of the shuyuan.

Because of their faith in the institution of the shuyuan and its power to induce true cultural understanding, the possibility that knowledge about Chinese culture might not necessarily lead to a sympathetic loyalty to Chinese culture did not occur to them. Their notion of cultural understanding being an experiential over an intellectual one, they believed that the creation of a quintessentially Chinese educational experience would ensure that students, having undergone it, would be natural adherents to Chinese cultural faith and convicted enactors of it. Their sole
concern was with providing a true cultural education that would induce a true understanding of Chinese culture specifically and culture generally, for once that was granted, all else would follow.
Chapter 2:  
Expanding the New Asia Community

By the end of its first decade, New Asia had become not only a College but also a community and a collection of institutions. These institutions were created by the College's founders to meet various needs of the College as well as to address the broader needs of Hong Kong society in the 1950's. By reaching a world beyond the College walls, New Asia sought to serve all Chinese people through their transmission and sustenance of Chinese culture and its educational forms and values.

New Asia Student Initiatives and Activities

The early years of New Asia College witnessed tremendous commitment not only on the part of the administrators and teachers but also from the students. Certainly, many of the students who attended New Asia regarded the school as a transitory spot during amidst uncertainty. Indeed, one of the major problems during the first few decades was the high degree of transience in the student population. However, a core group of students came to coalesce around New Asia, students who not only persisted in continuing their studies at an institution whose future
was not always certain but who also put much effort into consolidating the college community and in reaching out to people beyond the college boundaries. In particular, their formation of the New Asia Student Academic Research Organization and its most enduring products - namely, the school journal the *Xinya xiaokan* 新亚校刊 and the New Asia Night School 新亚夜校 - reveals the level of their commitment, the orientation of their convictions, and the nature of the community they sought to build.

In August of 1950, sixteen core students of New Asia College established a New Asia Student Academic Research Organization. They founded this group entirely on their own initiative in order "to establish a positive academic atmosphere and develop a proper attitude of pursuing truth, especially emphasizing the maintenance of a pure academic stance, not becoming involved in any political activities."¹

The organization set out six avenues of work for itself:

1. Creation of a school newspaper
2. Holding of academic seminars
3. Organizing of professorial lectures
4. Circulation of library books
5. Establishment of a popular adult night school or a free school for impoverished children
6. Holding various activities²

² Ibid.
However, soon after beginning, the student group received notice from the Hong Kong police department informing them that all organizations of any type must undergo government registration. As they wanted to avoid this hassle, they disbanded as an official group after only one semester.

Despite this setback, however, they continued to work to carry out the tasks they had set out for themselves on an informal basis. Between August of 1950 and June of 1952, the students issued 11 newspapers, organized two seminars/conferences, held two professor lectures, organized many activities and outings, and set up a night school for children. Some of the tasks changed in nature as they developed; for example, the seminars were replaced by student-given talks, of which over 30 were held to give students the opportunity to improve their speaking skills. The professorial lectures were soon replaced by the weekly Cultural Open Forum lectures. However, these changes did nothing to diminish the vision of the students; neither did their dissolution as an official organization significantly undermine their commitment to work together towards their goals. To the contrary, the six-fold mission of the New Asia Student Academic Research Organization performed the
very key function of articulating the orientation and the developmental goals of New Asia.

Two of the six goals were especially emphasized by the students. One of them, the publishing of a school periodical, involved a high level of coordinated effort on the part of the core group of students from 1950-57. During the first couple of years, a newspaper was issued sporadically. However, beginning in the summer of 1952, the students produced the *Xinya xiaokan* biannually, publishing nine issues over the next six years in the spring and summer of each year. Particularly in the first few years of its existence, the *Xiaokan* represented a student effort, as the articles were written almost entirely by the students themselves, and the editing and compiling was also a student responsibility. The students, in the foreword to the first volume of the journal, demonstrated their deep conviction and commitment to the New Asia spirit:

In today's world, where humanity has been plunged into distress, we raise high the banner of humanism; in today's world, where Eastern and Western cultures have so provoked each other as to cause extreme international insecurity, we promote mutual understanding between world cultures for the sake of the future peace and prosperity of humankind... We believe that the problem of today's world is a cultural problem; the problem of today's China is also a cultural problem. The life of a people is founded on the continuance and development of the culture of
that race; the life of world is founded on the continuance and development of world culture. Thus, establishing culture is China’s greatest task today, and promoting understanding between world cultures is the world’s greatest task today.3

The students’ statement reveals their alliance with the New Asia philosophy on a number of fronts: (a) their sense of existing at a moment of crisis; (b) their conviction that culture and lack of cultural understanding is at the core of both national and global problems; (c) their faith that fortifying humanism and cross-cultural understanding is the solution for both China and the world.

The early Xiaokan also showed clearly the sense of New Asia as a small community, and the ideal of unity between scholarship and life manifest itself concretely in the Xiaokan content and construction. For the first few years, the Xiaokan contained not only scholarly articles written by the students and professors but also school news, academic rules and requirements, activities announcements, course offerings, listings of graduates, professor descriptions, etc. This union of community news, administrative information, and intellectual content, however, was broken in stages as the school grew and created different types of publications. In 1955 New Asia began publishing a yearly

3 "Fakanci 发刊辞 [Foreword],” Xinya xiaokan 1: 1.
Xinya Shuyuan gaikuang 新亚书院概况 [General Situation of the College], which took over the administrative information-giving function from the Xiaokan. In 1958, the Xiaokan was succeeded by the Xinya shenghuo shuangzhou kan 新亚生活双周刊 [New Asia Life, Bimonthly], focusing principally on providing community news and information on upcoming activities. The academic function of the former Xiaokan was assumed by Xinya shuyuan xueshu niankan 新亚书院学术年刊, New Asia’s new Academic Annual. While the division of these various functions meant a development of increased specialization, which marked New Asia’s growth and maturity, it was the early years of the Xiaokan which revealed most clearly the commitment of New Asia’s core students, the closeness of that community, and especially the union of all aspects of life and study which was the hallmark of New Asia’s mission and philosophy.

A second major area of student work, one which also had been defined as one of the original six goals of the New Asia Student Academic Organization, was the establishment of a night school for impoverished children. 4 The school was initially set up to perform the dual function of giving students of the Education Department practical training in
teaching, while also filling the stark and widespread need of immigrant and refugee children then in Hong Kong. Low-cost evening schooling for poor children was clearly badly needed in the early 1950’s, as many kids either could not afford regular schooling or had daytime jobs or both. Overwhelmed with the refugee problem, the British colonial government was slow to meet the educational needs of poor children; though, by 1955, the government had begun offering some financial aid to children who could not afford tuition, it was yet ill equipped to understand or deal with the unique problems of children who were compelled to work to support themselves and even their parents. New Asia thus felt it important to establish a night school for the purpose of "promoting popular education", with New Asia students serving as volunteer teachers and with minimal to no tuition charged.

The school began in 1952, with six years of elementary split into three grades. Though small-scaled initially, the school very quickly became indispensable to the children in the community. Within half a year of its inception, the

6 Qian Mu, “Xinya shuyuan yange...,” Xinya xiaokan 1: 25.
7 “Xinya yexiao 新亚夜校 [New Asia Night School],” Xiaokan 1: 29.
school had over 80 students enrolled.\(^8\) By 1955, far more students wished to attend than the school could possibility accommodate.\(^9\) When policy changes threatened the school’s continuation, many of the kids simply could not find other schools to accept them.\(^10\) Thus the need that New Asia sought to fill by creating a night school for poor children was undoubtedly real and great, and the contribution of New Asia Night School to the resolution of this problem significant. The New Asia Night School, however, was not simply to provide basic education to underprivileged children who might not otherwise have access to it. The Night School was also an explicit expression of New Asia’s fundamental mission and philosophy. Aside from teaching fundamentals, the Night School sought to provide moral guidance and nurturance as well as cultural knowledge about China for its students.

The New Asia Night School student recruitment notice states explicitly the orientation and objectives of the school:

The mission of this school is to lead students, while still in their early years, to gradually understand that learning and being a person are

\(^8\) Qian, “Xinya shuyuan yange...,” 25.
part of the same matter. . . . This school especially promotes 'filiality to one's father and mother', 'honoring of teachers and elders', 'love of fellow students', and 'diligence in study' as its four school mottoes.  

The clear statement on the importance of recognizing the inextricably of learning and being is, as we saw in the last chapter, fundamental to the New Asia philosophy. The presentation of their mottos further underlines the idea that learning in school largely entails moral training: the first three mottos are relationship principles, exhortations to treat various categories of others in certain ways; only one of the four, and by order placed last, concerns studying as such. As with the College, the emphasis on moral nurturance was meant to be a distinguishing mark of the school, setting it conspicuously apart from other schools which emphasized only "the acquisition of knowledge and skills".  

Rather, as in the College, students of the Night School were groomed in the philosophy of learning for the sake of being.

Very early in the school's history the administrative structure was altered to reflect the importance of moral guidance and instruction as a central function of the school. Initially, the school ran as two sections: teaching and

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guidance, and administration. However, within a year the section "Teaching and Guidance" was split into two separate sections for the explicit purpose of emphasizing the centrality of moral guidance as a goal and function of the school. The school scheduling was also continually adjusted to assign additional time to the teaching of moral principles. One such change, occurring in 1955, was described by a student teacher thus:

Aside from constantly, during regular class-time, explaining to the students the principles of living, encouraging them towards the right and leading them into the correct path, this semester we especially spend 20 minutes after every Monday class, with various teachers rotating this responsibility, to teach students various ethical issues.

The Night School consciously aimed to correct the improper influences of other living and learning environments to which the children might have previously been exposed. In referring to the school's constant and constantly increasing emphasis on teaching moral matters, a student teacher explained: "Although this may be old-fashioned, in our night school we cannot neglect this nurturing of student character; immersing them in this type of environment will at least have some effect on previous

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corruption and bad habits." The Night School organizers felt that, as poor children such as their students generally lived with little adult supervision, they were particularly susceptible to bad influences. Thus, the provision of moral guidance was both urgent and crucial so that the students would not fall into evil ways. Much personal attention, on the level of parental governance, was given to the children. For example, the children's clothing and bodily cleanliness were inspected before they were allowed inside the school for class. The student teachers also sought to emulate their own experiences at the College of personal guidance under a mentor-scholar by in turn serving as personal guides to the children. In the words of one teacher, "outside of class we do our utmost to understand the individual personalities of the students, to see their strengths and interests, to execute individualized guidance."

The Night School thus sought to perform the role of a surrogate family which was to provide not only the caring and belonging of a real family but also give the children a

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15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
morally upright community in which to grow. Thus, the Night School placed great emphasis on community-building and cohesion amongst the students and between students and teachers, and the children were encouraged to regard the Night School community as a "warm family." Students were constantly admonished to ai tongxue 爱同学, to love their fellow students, and a zizhi hui 自治会, a self-governing society, was established for the children to learn leadership and social organization skills. The children put much effort into organizing various activities for themselves, such as competitions in speech, essay-writing, and calligraphy. These friendly contests were not only to improve their skills in these areas but also to enhance the sense of camaraderie amongst the children. These efforts to involve the children deeply in their school community, despite school hours being relatively few, appeared to be successful, as the young students of the Night School displayed much earnestness and enjoyment. When school threatened temporary closure in 1955, most of the students insisted that they would rather wait for re-opening than go to other schools. Though they had barely enough money for

basic necessities, they nevertheless pooled resources on their own initiative to decorate the facilities for their graduation ceremonies.\textsuperscript{21}

The moral education of the students was intermingled with the cultural education the New Asia Night School also sought to provide. Deepening knowledge and understanding of Chinese history and culture for these refugee children was clearly a central task of the school. Yet, the school did not so much set out to teach about China as a subject in itself as to incorporate cultural learning into moral learning. For example, students were taught about Chinese historical figures both to increase their knowledge of China as well as guide them in shaping their own values and behavior. According to one teacher's account

\begin{quote}
We often use the method of story-telling about our cultural sages and national heroes, such as Confucius, Mencius, Wen Tianxiang, Yue Fei, etc., to inform them of the doings of these figures so they have a basic conception of our national sages and heroes and to put into their little minds much knowledge about the moral nurturing of human character.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Studying these figures was to help the young students "understand that life does not consist simply of the pursuit and enjoyment of material things but rather that one should

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21} "Our Growing New Asia Night School," 58.
\textsuperscript{22} "Our Night School," 28.
\end{flushright}
have a lofty spirit of contributing to humanity and to society." By positing China's historical figures as examples for students to follow, cultural learning was made to serve the lofty goal of moral learning.

Despite this blurring of lines between cultural and moral education, however, cultural education at New Asia was clearly a goal and a value in its own right. Certainly the work of educating these impoverished children was construed as a cultural duty. Student teachers were admonished to volunteer their time beyond the requirement for their training not only on the grounds of the children's exigent need but, more importantly, for the much broader purpose of spreading New Asia values. As explained by the administrators, "We hope that students will willingly take this up as cultural workers (文化工作者) and that by this the New Asia spirit will be fostered and the seeds of humanism spread." In this sense, the New Asia Night School was much more than a training ground for future teachers; it was also a foothold into the community and a site for cultural service. While the children's cultural sensibilities were tapped via the route of moral admonishment, the student teachers served culture via moral education. Furthermore,

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23 Ibid.
because the teaching about culture was done by way of teaching morals, they were able to collapse moral and cultural values and thereby defined them simultaneously.

**Research Institute**

At the opposite end of the advancement spectrum, New Asia built a institute of advanced studies and research for the best of its graduates. Like the Night School for children, the New Asia Research Institute 新亚研究所 arose in part as an outgrowth of New Asia College as an answer to certain of its needs. Whereas the Night School was set up to give students in the Education Department teaching experience, the Research Institute was established to give College graduates the opportunity for further study. The linkage between the College and the Research Institute was articulated thus:

In accordance with our educational ideals, we expect to encourage graduates of the four-year program of the College to carry on research work on a higher level. Therefore, the Research Institute and the College must work hand in hand towards this goal. The Research Institute, limited at present to a two-year course of study, merely provides the first step for those who wish to do advanced research.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^\text{24}\) "New Asia Night School", 29.
\(^\text{25}\) *Fazhan jihua* (1955), 17.
However, the provision of an outlet for College graduates was only one of the reasons for establishing the Institute. As with the Night School, the Institute was really created out of a much broader long-range vision and a conviction of values which made it crucial to develop an institute of research as part of the New Asia family of institutions.

In their 1955 Five-Year Plan, the New Asia planners set four functions and objectives for the Research Institute:

1. to glorify Chinese culture and to make richer contributions to the field of Chinese studies;
2. to facilitate the research work of our teachers;
3. to promote a general atmosphere of scholarship for the whole College; and
4. to train teachers of Chinese history and literature for universities and secondary schools of good standing.26

In their minds, they saw the second and third of these functions as being directly linked to the development of the College. The third function, more general, was to heighten the overall level of intellectual inquiry of the College by virtue of the close connection between the College and the Research Institute and the defining of the latter as a desirable post-graduation destination for students of the former. The second function was the addressing of the specific research needs of teachers of the College. This

26 Ibid., 17-18.
meant library development and the organization of source materials, but especially the building of a research community and research environment. In fact, the goal of the Research Institute was to function adjunctly to the College such that, not only would it train students in research inquiry, but it would also engage full-time researchers who could supplement and enrich the research experience and overall research production of the College teachers, as well as conduct research in a wide variety of areas.\(^2^7\) Thus, the Research Institute was constructed as both the graduate school as well as the research resource and research arm of New Asia College.

The first and fourth listed functions of the Institute were to serve a broader base of people and needs than that of the College alone. These two, they explained, were intended to be "helpful to Free China and to Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia."\(^2^8\) The function of providing teachers versed in Chinese studies to universities and high schools was specifically aimed not only at the Hong Kong community but Chinese communities everywhere. The first function, operating even more broadly and at a level of intellectual abstraction, aimed at contributing to

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 17.
Chinese studies and, beyond that, glorifying Chinese culture. Promoting both Chinese studies and Chinese culture meant that their efforts would have influence not only in the Chinese world but also beyond it.

Of these four functions, the two that were to connect the Research Institute closely to the College - research facilitation and promotion of a scholarly atmosphere - are expected and straightforward for any institute focusing on research. The other two, however, are more complex in their motivation and construction. The fourth, the training of teachers, is vague in that the nature of the teacher training one would receive at a research institute is not immediately obvious. The first function, the promotion of Chinese studies and culture, is even more ambiguous, as "Chinese studies" and "Chinese culture" are not co-terminus and the reason for joining them into one function is unclear. Their complete mission statement, however, offers some insight into the reasoning behind their conceptual overlapping of Chinese studies and Chinese culture and the further addition of teacher training as a goal. The mission statement is worth quoting in its entirety:

In China, during the War of Resistance when times were difficult, educational standards fell, and

\[^{28}\text{Ibid., 18.}\]
afterwards because of the political transformations, the nature of education changed. In Taiwan and Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, because of the scarcity of teachers and books and various other reasons, the success of schools was far from ideal. What was most worrying was that our country's youth lacked any understanding of the history and culture of our fatherland; those scholars exiled abroad who have deep cultural understanding were few and, after a few years, when they will have retired or passed away, there will be no one to continue [the tradition]...and so the legacy of the great Chinese culture will be wiped out; this is not only a serious problem of the current educational world but also a great danger for Chinese culture. Seeing this need, this academy developed the ideal of starting a research institute for the study of history and culture, broadly recruiting the most talented of graduating students and those who are committed to researching the history and culture of our fatherland and giving them the opportunity for deeper study so that, when they graduate, some of them can stay in the Institute for further study and thus become teachers of history and culture in various universities as well as scholars who transmit and assume the historical duty of Chinese culture, while the rest become quality teachers of culture and history at mid-range schools.29

The New Asia planners began the Research Institute mission statement with commentary about the effect of politics on education. The threat to education from political change and unrest in the 1940s they regarded as

29 This introduction appears first in the Research Institute's first self-explanatory publication, entitled Xinya shuyuan yanjiusuo gaikuang 新亚书院研究所概况 [General Situation of New Asia College's Research Institute], published in 1955. It appears at the beginning of every self-introductory publication thereafter, with only very minor variations to be found from one edition to the next and no discernible significant pattern of change. I have translated from the first one.
two-fold: first, the chaos resulting from the Asian front of World War II, and second, the subsequent alteration in the nature and purpose of education with "political transformations." Though they did not name these "transformations," they were clearly referring to the communists' rise to power and the demise of intellectual and educational freedom they associated with communist rule. Outside the geographical realm of communist control, deficiencies in education were also apparent in the lack of material and human resources for schools. However, it was the nature of this lack which was of particular concern to the New Asia planners. The "most worrying" factor was not the concrete "scarcity of teachers and books" but that "our country's youth lacked any understanding of the history and culture of our fatherland." Thus the primary unacceptable result of the political unrest and change was not a depletion of resources but a depletion of understanding and of true historical and cultural knowledge about China.

The New Asia planners, faced with this educational crisis both within mainland China and without, saw themselves as playing an indispensable role in rectifying this situation. Indeed, they saw themselves occupying a watershed moment, one in which Chinese culture was in actual
danger of extinction, so that if they did not step in and provide knowledge of that culture to the younger generation, the culture itself would disappear with the deaths of those still in possession of cultural understanding. It is particularly important to note their conviction that “this is not only a serious problem of the current educational world but also a great danger for Chinese culture.” Their worry over the disappearance of cultural knowledge was much more than an academic one in the sense that they were not primarily concerned with the maintenance or transference of information. Rather, they saw cultural understanding and cultural existence as overlapping such that the demise of the former would necessarily lead to the ending of the latter.

Researching Chinese culture was thus set as the highest priority for the Research Institute. That emphasizing research output was of paramount importance can be seen in the proportion of space devoted to the first full description of the Institute in the *Xinya shuyuan gaikuang* 新亚书院概况, in 1955: two of the three pages were devoted to describing the research projects of the Institute in detail, including the titles of articles in their journal, while the remaining one page is introductory and provides no other
specific information. Their concern with research production was clear from the inception of the Institute. The first volume of the Institute’s academic journal, the Xinya xuebao 新亚学报, was published in 1955 and was to be produced biannually. 1955, in fact, was the year the Research Institute achieved formal institutional status and openly recruited students, so the immediacy of its publishing of the Xuebao reveals its eagerness to prove its capacity for research output. In addition to the Xuebao, the Research Institute was to publish very specialized academic books, such as Qian Mu’s Lao Zhuang tongbian 老庄通辨 [Analysis of Laozi and Zhuangzi]. However, the Research Institute also set out to publish books that were of high scholarly quality but “suitable for general audience.” In this vein, in March 1955 the Institute published Tang Junyi’s Renwen Jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之重建 [The Re-establishment of the Spirit of Humanism].

Aside from being a research production center, the Research Institute also aimed to train the next generation of scholars. Thus the writing of a thesis was a central requirement of the program. In order to graduate, students must work in close conjunction with a thesis advisor to
complete a work of original research. They began their thesis work in the second semester of the first year, with the advisor helping the student frame the parameters and themes of the thesis topic. The research and writing of the thesis itself were to occur in the second year, and be reviewed and passed by a committee by the end of that year.

However, research was only one of the requirements for the Research Institute students. Students were also required to undergo a two-year framework of courses and readings, consisting of three parts. First, students were required to earn 36 credits in the core curriculum, which consisted of four lecture courses. The courses, with their corresponding textbooks, are listed below: 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Textbook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Thought</td>
<td>Zhongguo sixiang shi 中国思想史 [History of Chinese Thought]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese History</td>
<td>Guoshi dagang 国史大纲 [General Outline of Chinese History]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Language and Literature</td>
<td>Guwen cilei zuan 古文词类纂 [Anthology of Classical Literature]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>No set textbook</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These four courses were each two-year sequences, such that all students took all four courses for both years of their study at the Research Institute.

30 Xinya shuyuan gaikuang (1955), 31.
31 Xinya shuyuan yanjiusuo gaikuang (1955), 3.
The second and third components of the non-research curriculum consisted of two types of reading sequences. These two entailed some choice on the part of the students as to their interests and reading preferences. The first component, called “Guided Readings,” consisted of student participation in reading groups which convened weekly with a professor to discuss the readings covered that week. Three groups were constructed, each with a pre-determined reading list, and each student chose to be part of two groups. As the reading list for the groups was set for the two-year time frame, students were to stay with their groups once they chose them in order to complete the reading curriculum of those groups. The contents of the reading lists are listed below:32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester 1</th>
<th>Group A</th>
<th>Group B</th>
<th>Group C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semester 2</td>
<td>Laozi 老子, Zhuangzi 庄子</td>
<td>Tong Jian 通鉴</td>
<td>Chuci 楚辞 [Songs of Chu]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semester 3</td>
<td>Sung Yuan Xuean 宋元学案</td>
<td>Shiji 史记 [Records of the Grand Historian]</td>
<td>Zuozhuan 左传 [Commentary of Mr. Zuo]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semester 4</td>
<td>Mingru Xuean 明儒学案</td>
<td>Hanshu 汉书 [History of the Former Han]</td>
<td>Liji 礼记 [Book of Rites]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Ibid., 4.
Though the groups were not named according to their thematic orientation, in fact the three groups essentially corresponded to the three central areas of study in the Research Institute, namely Chinese Thought, Chinese History, and Chinese Language and Literature, respectively (although Group C is constructed more broadly). It was thus in the context of the Guided Readings that students were able to demonstrate and nurture their particular interests and talents. However, because students were required to choose two of the three groups, they nonetheless read broadly, covering two-thirds of the total reading list.

The third component, entitled "Supplementary Readings", required students to choose four of six books to read on their own over the course of their two years. The "Supplementary Readings" component was the least-supervised and least-controlled activity of the students, as the only requirement relative to the readings was to submit a book report on each of the four works read. No stipulations were given as to the order or the pacing of the reading, nor were any meetings with professors involved in the completion of the requirement. The six works from which four were to be chosen were:33

33 Ibid.
Reading these works was to give students grounding in Confucian intellectual developments in the Sung, Ming, and Qing eras. The Guided Readings, on the other hand, primarily represented an in-depth exposure to the foundation classics. Thus, between the Guided Readings and the Supplementary Readings, students were to become familiar with the full range of the Chinese classics.

The very specific orientation of the Research Institute towards researching Chinese history and culture is thus seen in the very classical content of the curriculum. This orientation also manifested itself in other aspects of Institute policy and productivity. For example, the entrance requirements tested strictly Chinese-specific knowledge. The entrance examination for the Institute consisted of the following subjects:\(^{34}\)

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\(^{34}\) Ibid., 7.
Required subjects:

1. Chinese (国文)
2. English
3. History of Chinese Literature
4. Chinese History
5. History of Chinese Thought

Elective subjects: (choose one of the following):

1. Linguistics
2. History of Chinese Historiography
3. History of Chinese Society and Economy

With the exception of the English section of the test, all required subjects to be tested concerned Chinese culture exclusively. Not only was there no assessment of a student’s abilities or knowledge in other areas of the world, but even other aspects of China’s past or present were considered to be of secondary importance. For example, “History of Chinese Society and Economy” was only one of three elective subjects on the test. The triumvirate of history, philosophy, and language and literature was thus upheld by the requirements of the test.

The research production of the Institute also centered around Chinese history and culture. For example, in the first volume of the Xuebao, the articles included Qian Mu’s “The Concept of Spirits in the History of Chinese Thought” and Tang Junyi’s “The Six Meanings of Li in the History of Chinese Thought and Philosophy”. The other articles dealt
with other aspects of intellectual development during the Tang and Sung. The first books to be published by the Institute, mentioned earlier, by Qian and Tang, were also humanities and history-focused. Thus it is evident, from entrance requirements to program curriculum to research products, that the Research Institute was focused entirely on Chinese history and culture.

The foreign language requirement was the sole element that was outside the China-focused study structure. All students were required to take a full two years of foreign language. In the early years, the only language on offer was English; later, when other languages were added, English coursework was still required of all students for a minimum of one year. The emphasis in foreign-language learning was on reading ability and translation. The rationale behind this was to expand students’ reading exposure and ability to research. However, their lack of stress on developing speaking skills reveals also a certain lack of interest in communicating with foreigners in a more concrete practical way, as well as a clear disengagement with the colonial environment of Hong Kong. Not only did they not consider practical English skills important to develop, but they also did not promote Cantonese learning, despite their being
situated in Hong Kong. Instead, all lectures were conducted in Chinese guoyu 国语, excepting the English courses.\textsuperscript{35} The issue of language will be analyzed in depth in the following chapter, but here it is important to note that the lack of emphasis on either Cantonese or English speaking contributed to the sense of a pristine cloistered academy world, separate from the concerns and dynamics of the external environment in which it was situated.

The sense of being a world- unto-itself was magnified by the strong affinity between the College and the Research Institute. Of the first group of professors for the Research Institute, four out of six were concurrently faculty of the College.\textsuperscript{36} Of the four, Qian and Tang were most prominent figures in the Research Institute, as they were in the College. Not only did they oversee administrative and institutional direction, but they were central to the learning process as well. For example, two of the four required courses at the Institute used as their basic textbook the works of Qian: for “Chinese Thought” and “Chinese History”, students learnt from Qian’s texts “History of Chinese Thought” and “Outline of Chinese

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Cross-referenced between the Xinya shuyuan yanjiusuo gaikuang (1955), 5 and the Xinya shuyuan gaiguang (1955), 85-93.
History”, respectively.\textsuperscript{37} The continuity between the College and Research Institute was cemented also by the students: between 1952 and 1958, 16 of the graduates of the College became students at the Research Institute, while another 14 became staff members of either the College or the Institute, so that together 27\% of graduates remained within the New Asia world.\textsuperscript{38}

The productivity of the Research Institute also showed its close-knit relationship to the College. Certainly initially, the Research Institute largely served as the site for New Asia scholars to gather and focus their research as well as providing an official vehicle through which research could be funded and published. The early publications of the Research Institute reflected in fact not work started by or at the Institute itself but past or ongoing work of New Asia personnel. The content of the \textit{Xinya xuebao} thus depended on the ongoing research of the key figures of the New Asia community, both at the administrator/faculty level as well as at the student level. The institutionalization of the Research Institute provided the vehicle for the publication of the \textit{xuebao}, even while its content was created by the community that preceded the establishment of

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Xinya shuyuan yanjiusuo gaikuang}, 2.
the Research Institute. The speedy publishing of the major works by Tang and Qian likewise did not depend on or result from the establishment of the Research Institute as an institution; rather, it was the vehicle through which the research was published. This pattern underlines the role of the Research Institute as the research arm of the College.

On the other hand, the Research Institute, somewhat ironically, resembled the traditional Chinese shuyuan or academy more than did the College which bore the name of shuyuan. While the Research Institute was to be an institute of research, in fact the content and style of learning at the Institute seems quite clearly to be a reproduction of the Confucian academy. The Readings system at the Institute most resembled a shuyuan, as it mandated the study of the standard classical cannon and prescribed the small group method of reading intensely under a professor’s guidance, neither of which were characteristics of the College, the nominal shuyuan. Thus New Asia College, with its general education system and its lecture courses, bore many more of the characteristics of a modern school, while it was the higher-level Research Institute which took on more fully the mantle of the classical shuyuan.

The teacher training function of the Research Institute must also be understood in this light, for the preparation for teaching that was to occur at the Institute clearly was quite different from that provided by the College Education and Department and its offspring the New Asia Night School. They saw as absolutely critical the need to breed young scholars who would be willing to take up the responsibility of both studying and subsequently transmitting Chinese culture. Otherwise, there would "be no one to continue [the tradition]. . . and so the legacy of the great Chinese culture will be wiped out." Being that the existence of Chinese culture depended on the true understanding of that culture, the attaining and transmitting of cultural understanding took on paramount importance.

Studying, researching, and teaching thus served to continue Chinese culture on two levels: first, to sustain the knowledge content embedded in Chinese culture, and two, to sustain the life and growth the culture itself. The second level entails a more subtle attitude toward culture than the first in that it was aimed not only at cultural continuity in the sense of carrying cultural essence forward from one point to the next but also implies a cultural continuance in the sense of embodying an active interest in
and living out of the values of the culture. Thus, studying and researching culture not only enables cultural continuity but is itself an action of cultural continuance. Culture stays alive both because its essential knowledge is transferred and transmitted from one age to the next as well as by virtue of studying it and transmitting this study to others.

The linkage between studying and transmitting study is therefore created out of the linkage between cultural continuity and cultural continuance. The assumption embedded in the mission statement - first, that researchers will become teachers and second, that they will make good teachers - is more complex than the parallel assumption generally made in contemporary academia that scholars can also teach. To understand fully the depiction of teaching and teachers' role in the Research Institute context we must recall the mission statements spelled out by the College. Since teachers' significance lay not only in imparting knowledge but even more so in mentoring students and in modeling moral personhood, the role of teachers in both cultural continuity and cultural continuance was constructed as a tri-partite act of researching, teaching, and being. Researching would lead to teaching, and teaching assumed
research, but both come from as well as result in being. This is so because, on the one hand, they do not recognize as valuable any form of being-ness that does not entail study, and on the other hand, require both teaching as cultural continuity and being as cultural continuance.

**Cultural Open Forum**

The Research Institute was a small and highly specialized endeavor. In order to affect Hong Kong life at a broader level, the New Asia community established a public lecture series, the Cultural Open Forum. Like the Night School, the Cultural Open Forum resulted in part from the initiative of the New Asia Student Academic Research Organization, which set as one of its six goals the organizing of professorial lectures. The Cultural Open Forum, however, went beyond the original concept of professorial academic lectures to include both broader content and a broader audience. Offering free weekly lectures on the New Asia premises, the founders of the Forum aimed to meet the intellectual needs of their contemporary Hong Kong environment. The concept of the Cultural Open Forum was described by the founders in their mission statement thus:
Ever since the year 1949 there has been a sudden change in Hong Kong. Right in this commercial center with very scanty cultural atmosphere, intellectuals have arrived here from various places. As most of these people have served as the backbone of different social classes, they are more anxious than ordinary youths in their desire for ideas and knowledge. In accordance with this demand, the Cultural Open Forum of our College has engaged specialists in various fields to give weekly lectures on academic subjects, i.e. Social Sciences and studies on humanism. . . . As the ideals and attitudes of these lecturers have a deep influence upon general society and youths, it is estimated that the extent of its significance can never be represented by statistics.\textsuperscript{39}

This mission statement begins with their observation that Hong Kong, prior to the massive influx of migrants from mainland China around 1949, was a culturally-impoverished place. This comment shows clearly the perception and perspective of the New Asia planners arriving in Hong Kong, who felt themselves to have arrived in a cultural and intellectual wasteland. They thus felt it imperative to create a life of thought and culture in Hong Kong, not only for themselves but also for their fellow migrant intellectuals. The Cultural Open Forum was created as a site for education and intellectual exchange for the community of displaced Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong, to fulfill the needs of these extraordinary persons who were

\textsuperscript{39} Xiaokan 1 (1952): 32.
"more anxious than ordinary youths in their desire for ideas and knowledge". By establishing the Forum, they posited themselves as intellectual and organizational leaders for this community. Fulfilling and leading this community of the intellectually-inclined was particularly important because of its capacity for broad and deep social effect through the positive force of "its ideals and attitudes". By influencing the intellectual sector of the new Hong Kong, they believed they could reach the society at large.

In establishing the Cultural Open Forum, they also defined publicly their stance with regards to culture itself. Thus it is interesting to note that their first mention of culture in their mission statement is in contrastive reference to Hong Kong as a "commercial center". In this sense, culture is defined quite vaguely as an indirect cure for over-emphasis on matters commercial. Their conception of culture as all-encompassing is evident also in statements made by Tang Junyi on the vision of the Cultural Open Forum:

Our original intent was not to have a purely academic-style lecture but to enlighten the listeners as to questions of Chinese culture, give them general knowledge as to world scholarship, and develop their concern for the future of humankind. . . . From the wide scope of the lectures, and that the lecturers included Confucians, Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims, and spoke from various specialties, it can be seen that the interests and vision of those
Here, culture is again cast in the broadest of terms. The phrases "the future of humankind" and "the whole of human culture" suggest an all-embracing consideration of humanity and human concerns in the Forum. Though Chinese culture is mentioned specifically as a subject in which the planners wish to "enlighten" their listeners, the inclusion of speakers of so many backgrounds and creeds is meant to convey the all-encompassing vision they had of "human culture". Their specification of what culture was to include, then, was not limited by geography or philosophical persuasion, as speakers included non-Chinese Christians and Muslims. Rather, the scope of human culture was curtailed principally by its contrast to the commercial. Both Tang's statement and the general mission statement highlight this breadth, emphasizing "the wide scope of the lectures" and the specialists "from various fields". However, the specification of the subjects discussed as "Social Sciences and studies on humanism" reveals that their fundamental orientation towards "human culture" was to underline the human, or rather, to define culture in reference to the

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strictly human. This Forum, then, was not to be a site of
discussion about practical business matters or technological
innovations; though these might be important aspects of
human activity, their notion of "human culture" encompassed
not the full range of human activity but rather only those
centered on humanity itself.

The creation of an environment that was as open and
broadly inclusive as possible was especially significant
given their situation and motivation as migrant
intellectuals. The naming of the lecture series as Cultural
Open Forum was meant particularly to emphasize and cement
the free atmosphere of intellectual exchange that was to
classify the Forum. In Chinese, the phrase ziyou de
xueshu jiangzuo 自由的学术讲座, or "free academic lectures",
was often used to describe the Forum, emphasizing the
freedom aspect of their work and discussion. Establishing a
free and open Forum was critically important both because
they regarded their separation from the Chinese homeland as
resulting from issues of intellectual freedom, as well as
because they saw this as a central aspect of the Chinese
tradition they were aiming to carry forward. In the words
of the editor of the Forum's lectures:
Our country's atmosphere of free academic discourse in society comes from Confucius. Its further promotion by Confucians of the Sung and Ming caused the fine tradition of Chinese culture... As for today's exile overseas, no one knows when it will end... but the holding of the New Asia Cultural Open Forum has re-established a space of free academic discourse.\footnote{Sun Dingchen 孙鼎宸, "Zhengli xinya wenhua jiangzuo jilu jingguo 整理新华文华讲座记录经过 [The Process of Arranging the Records of the New Asia Cultural Open Forum]," in Records of the New Asia Cultural Open Forum, Appendix 3: 14-15.}

The ability to meet freely for intellectual exchange was thus defined as an indispensable element of the Chinese Confucian tradition which the Forum was reproducing while its participants were in exile from their homeland. The significance of continuing such open meetings was a point of both principle and pride for the Forum planners, a success which set them apart from other organizations. They pointed to the fact many other cultural and educational organizations then in Hong Kong were also attempting to hold lecture series shaped according to their respective orientations, but most were unable to sustain this activity for long. "Only New Asia Cultural Open Forum, over four years, excepting winter and summer holidays, was held every Sunday night, with many shi士 coming together under one roof."\footnote{Sun Dingchen 孙鼎宸, "Zhengli xinya wenhua jiangzuo jilu jingguo 整理新华文华讲座记录经过 [The Process of Arranging the Records of the New Asia Cultural Open Forum]," in Records of the New Asia Cultural Open Forum, Appendix 3: 14-15.} That they were able to maintain their lecture series over the course of years on a weekly basis was a mark,
for them, of their influence and conviction in carrying forth cultural meaning in Hong Kong. The usage of the term shi [traditional Chinese scholar-gentry] in this context doubly emphasizes the significance they attached to their act of meeting and gathering as an intellectual and cultural community.

The success of the Cultural Open Forum depended on the dedication and passion of both audience and speakers. Though the lecturers for the Forum were drawn from the Hong Kong intellectual community at large, the pool of speakers for the Forum consisted primarily of New Asia’s own academic personnel.

Though the beginnings of New Asia College were difficult in the extreme, the founders’ passion was inexhaustible, so in addition to their daily lecturing, especially established a Cultural Open Forum on a weekend evening. Aside from those same people, other scholars in Hong Kong were also to contribute, with the general public as audience, and New Asia students also participating.  

The earnestness of the lecturers was matched by that of the listeners. The audience for the weekly lectures was eager to attend despite unfavorable conditions:

At that time, New Asia’s campus was at Guilin Street, in a narrow and dirty path, and above the winding spiral staircase there was hardly room to

42 Ibid.
43 Qian, "序 Preface", Records of the New Asia Cultural Open Forum, i.
step; the seats of the lecture hall had no arms or backs, and could hardly hold a hundred people. Yet in winter and summer, in the wind and rain, the listeners filled it, and New Asia students could barely stand on the side, while many never missed a lecture over the course of several years. 44

The Cultural Open Forum lasted from November 1, 1950 to January 9, 1955. In total, 122 lectures were held over 139 meetings (some lectures were 2-part series), with 59 speakers engaged. As intended, the speakers represented a wide constituency of the Hong Kong intellectual community. They came from various intellectual backgrounds and persuasions, including at least two Buddhist and one Christian clergyman. The speakers also represented significant diversity in terms of geographical origins. Of the 59 speakers, only eight claimed Guangdong as their native province. Most came from the southeastern provinces, but some also came from further north, as far as Shandong. Not only did the speakers represent a wide variety of native places, but many also came to Hong Kong from universities outside their home province. Thus most of the speakers were highly-respected and experienced scholars in mainland China prior to their migration to Hong Kong. In addition, the speakers brought considerable foreign learning and

44 Ibid.
experience. At least seven of the speakers held higher degrees from abroad, and several others studied and/or lived abroad. Most of those studying abroad went to the United States, to famous universities such as Harvard and Chicago and Columbia; European universities formerly attended by some speakers included Oxford and Paris. Thus, both national origins and international experience marked the community of Forum speakers as a special group of exiled intellectuals, with characteristics which made them collectively an atypical slice of the Hong Kong population.45

Because of this diversity in background on the part of the speakers, many of the lecture topics were quite unique and showed considerable awareness of the world at large. Below is a sample listing of lecture topics by field which dealt with foreign or global themes:46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Lecture Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Overview of the Doctrines and History of Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Scholarship in Medieval Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Ethical Principles of Catholicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>The Development of Humanism in the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Spirit of Kantian Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>The Tragic Consciousness in Western Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Poetry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 Compiled from "Zhujiangren jianli biao 主讲人简历表 [Schedule of Speakers and Topics]," Cultural Open Forum Records Appendix 2: 4-13.
The lectures also demonstrated an effort at cross-cultural comparison in topics such as "Christianity and Chinese Culture", "Comparison between Chinese and Western Medical Theory", and "Buddhism and Christianity."

Furthermore, there was considerable attention paid to what they saw as the most pressing issues of the day, namely peace and freedom. Their concern for these matters is reflected in lectures such as "The Function of Identity in Social Psychology and World Peace", "Theories of Nationalism in our Times", "The Position of Science in a Free Education", and "Discussion on Hu Shi’s Proposition of Free Economy". The totality of the lectures thus reflects considerable international awareness as well as involvement in issues of broad significance.

This sense of awareness and involvement, however, was qualified by the disciplinary distribution of the lectures and their orientation. As intended from their Mission Statement, the Forum was to concentrate on human culture, specifically "social sciences and studies in humanism." In fact, 68% of the total lectures were on humanities topics,
of which 52% were classified under the New Asia triumvirate of Literature/History/Philosophy. Social science topics, including economics, education, psychology, and politics, constituted only 30% of the total. That humanities topics numbered over twice as many as social science topics shows their emphasis on the human but also their essential faith in humanistic study. Furthermore, as humanities and social science topics together amounted to 98% of the lectures, there was clearly little attention given to exploration of other fields, such that over four years there were only three lectures in natural science subjects.47 The heavy emphasis on the humanities meant that discussion at the Forum stayed largely on the level of the abstract.

When lectures did cover relatively more concrete matters, they tended to nevertheless remain on an academic and theoretical plane of discussion. For example, though economics topics constituted 18% of the total lectures, all were given by academics in the field, none by practicing businessmen in Hong Kong. Thus, the topics tended to revolve around theories of past prominent economists, or agricultural issues in China, as opposed to issues relating directly to the Hong Kong situation. The few science

47 Ibid.
lectures were correspondingly theoretical and broad, with titles like "The Expansion of the Universe" or "The Concept of Life in Twentieth-Century Biological Science", rather than addressing practical issues of scientific change or current technology and its actual effect on people's lives. Political science lecture titles included "The Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle", and "Theories of Nationalism in our Times". Thus the Forum lectures, though originally meant not to be "purely academic-style lectures", in fact operated on quite an academic plane.

This may be in part because it was in fact New Asia's academic staff which bore the preponderance of the lecturing burden for the Forum. Qian Mu delivered the greatest number of lectures, totaling 21. The other two principal administrators of New Asia College, Tang Junyi and Zheng Peijie, gave 16 lectures each, so that the three together presented 53 lectures, over 43% of the total number of lectures. Only five other lecturers gave over two lectures each, and of these five three were New Asia lecturers. Of the 51 remaining speakers, most gave only one lecture each. Thus, though the Forum did bring in many diverse speakers from the Hong Kong intellectual community at large, the weight of the program was shouldered overwhelmingly by the
New Asia professors themselves, with others volunteering their time primarily on a one-time basis.

The Forum's heavy reliance on the New Asia academic staff themselves meant that it was shaped largely by New Asia's original vision and orientation both in terms of its strengths as well as its limitations. As noted above, although many of the lecturers had international experience and many of the lectures demonstrated global understanding, the two principle decision-makers at New Asia, Qian and Tang, were not educated abroad. Though both later did global speaking stints, at the time of the Forum neither had spent any significant time abroad. Given that Qian and Tang together were not only responsible for the overall nature and direction of the Forum but also collectively gave 30% of the total lectures, this characteristic is significant. Qian particularly had minimal English skills and thus could not communicate directly with foreigners. Tang did have significant training in German philosophy, and Zheng Peijie held a doctorate from Germany. However, taken as a whole, the considerable international experience and exposure of the overall body of speakers did not influence the general direction and nature of the Forum as much as it could have,
given that the key leaders of it were in possession of considerably less global consciousness.

Thus, given the background and orientation of the New Asia academic leaders, it is not surprising that, though the Forum lectures aimed to cover the "whole of human culture," the culture that was of greatest concern was clearly China. The tone was set by Qian's opening lecture, "The Spirit of Chinese Historical Studies," in which he delineates how the Chinese approach to historical studies differs from the Western approach and identifies what is valuable and preferable about the Chinese approach. This effort to search out the true spiritual roots of Chinese culture and to point out its virtues is the underlying message of the Forum, hence lectures like the "The Spirit of Chinese Historical Studies" and "The Role of the Confucian Spirit in the World of Thought." Because of this fundamental message, the lecture topics which were broader or comparative in orientation always referred back to China: "Christianity and Chinese Culture," "Transmission of Buddhism into China through the Guangdong and Guangxi," "The Inter-relationship between Historical Events of China and the West," "Comparison between Chinese and Western Medical Theory." etc. Aside from these lectures of a comparative nature, a
considerable portion of the lectures dealt directly with things Chinese. 44% of the lectures had "China" or some aspect of China directly in the title, and a great proportion of the rest dealt with China in context or in theory. Because China was really the central concern as well as the foundation of knowledge and experience for the principal organizers and speakers of the Forum, the broader background and orientation of the Forum speaker community as a whole was overshadowed by the force of the key figures' preoccupation with China and Chinese culture.

Concluding Thoughts

This focus on China and Chinese was the distinguishing mark of all the New Asia institutions. In the last chapter we saw that New Asia College, despite its name, was really not nearly as concerned with Asia generally as it was with China specifically. Both in its institutional structure and its curriculum, the College revealed its fundamental orientation to be Chinese. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the institutions which grew out of the College were similarly focused. The New Asia Student Research Organization, though claiming to include broad areas of academic concern, in fact organized lectures and seminars
that were almost entirely China-centered. The New Asia Night School, though aiming to teach children in general ethics, in fact principally upheld Chinese figures and principles as worth following. The New Asia Cultural Open Forum, with its grand vision of including people of all creeds and addressing problems of all humanity, remained also China-centric in both its lecture topics and its lecturer constituents.

The New Asia Research Institute, of course, was set up specifically to research China, so in its case there was no discrepancy between its stated goal and its reality. However, examining further their motives in establishing the Institute offers some insight into the concentration of the New Asia institutions on things Chinese even when they claimed to encompass much broader themes and areas. Qian, in discussing the establishment of the Research Institute with representatives of the Harvard-Yenching Institute in 1955, explained New Asia’s necessity as an organ devoted to research of things Chinese:

The best students of science and economy and such subjects can go abroad for further study; only for that which concerns China’s own cultural tradition - namely, the subjects of literature, philosophy, and history - Chinese cannot not assume responsibility for themselves. If we send [students] abroad to where ideals do not match those of us Chinese, we are afraid they
ultimately will not make much contribution to their own country.  

The New Asia priority thus lay with teaching Chinese about their own culture. The great significance the New Asia planners attributed to their own role in continuing Chinese culture was not only because they saw themselves standing at a watershed moment of crisis and instability. It was also because they felt that only they, being the true mantle of the true Chinese culture, were in a position to carry forth that same culture. While general awareness and education—learning about other parts of the world, learning subjects outside the classical humanities triumvirate—were important to them in the abstract, they felt it acceptable and even logical to allocate the job of such education to others, to foreigners, or to those less purely Chinese in their cultural learning. Just as the College saw the development of things such as modern science labs as being so low on the priority list as to not even appear in the budget, so too did the Research Institute and the Cultural Open Forum regard scientific or technological or commercial issues as being outside the domain of their essential concern.

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48 Qian Mu, "Xinya Shuyuan 新亚书院 [New Asia College]," Shiyou zayi 师友杂忆 [Memories of Teachers and Friends] (Taibei: Dongda tushu gongsi,
This attitude - that foreign subjects can be taught by foreigners but only true Chinese can teach Chinese about China - is comprehensible only in light of their conviction that learning is not really about knowing but about being. This learning for the sake of being was significant not only in the very direct sense advocated at the Night School, such that children were instructed and trained in a specific version of ethical behavior. It was important also on the more abstract level of cultural conception. The meaning behind the Research Institute, as noted earlier, was both cultural continuity and cultural continuance - while continuity was assured by maintaining transmission of cultural knowledge, it was the actual studying of and desire to study Chinese culture that ensured its continuance. Similarly, the significance of the Cultural Open Forum lay not only in the fact of the lectures themselves but in the occasion and the site the lectures provided for likeminded intellectuals - indeed, shi - to meet and be together. The pedagogical method in the Night School of story-telling about Chinese cultural heroes reveals a parallel assumption - namely, that culture stays alive by virtue of the telling of it, on the one hand, and the convincing others to live it,
on the other hand. All of New Asia’s institutions reveal a consistent attitude towards culture that weds the knowing and being of the culture into an inextricable whole. Certainly their great emphasis on cultural education shows their conviction that culture survives when people continue to have accurate knowledge and true understanding of it. However, what is equally if not more important is that culture is lived by its people. The survival of Chinese culture depended on the act of gathering in its name according to its principles. Thus it was not only the instituting of a classics-based curriculum but the resurrection of the shuyuan structure and relationships in the Research Institute that was to signify the reality and the thriving of Chinese culture.

This reliance on resurrecting meaningful cultural forms may explain also New Asia’s lack of explicitness in advocating Confucian doctrines. In the College curriculum we noted the conspicuous lack of teaching in Confucianism per se. In the Cultural Open Forum they were particularly anxious to avoid the appearance of aligning themselves with a particular creed. The Night School does not name Confucianism as the source of its ethical principles and models. Even the Research Institute, the most explicitly
Chinese-oriented of the New Asia family of institutions, did not tout Confucianism as its creed. Yet at every turn we see their Confucian convictions lived out in the structures they created. The shuyuan structure, rebuilt not so much in the College but in the Research Institute, was clearly a resurrection of the Confucian academy. The Cultural Open Forum, though not espousing Confucianism, was supposed to represent the notion of free intellectual discourse which they claimed as Confucian in origin. The heroes upheld as moral examples for the children at the Night School were principally Confucian ones, were in fact Confucius and Mencius above all. In each case, the New Asia administrators assumed that by erecting a proper Confucian institution, the structure would itself carry forth the meaning invested in it and that those living in them and through them would therefore naturally become true Chinese.

Such was their faith in the overall structure they were creating that they hoped their family of institutions would interlink to the point of becoming a world-onto-itself. Indeed, after both Night School and Research Institute had established firm footing in 1955, the New Asia planners announced their intention to establish a sub-freshman pre-College preparatory program, which in time would expand to
include even younger students and eventually become a middle school.\textsuperscript{49} With further development of the Night School into a full-fledged primary school, New Asia would be able to create a complete educational system that would nurture young people from age five to twenty-five. Qian, in fact, hoped that they could acquire enough land to also grow vegetables and chickens so that New Asia could become an entirely self-sufficient community.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, the New Asia community was to be both an enclosed family as well as a full range of schools. Together, these would provide a complete educational world in which youth would be trained in Chinese ethics and culture from childhood to adulthood.

In this sense also they revealed themselves to be Confucian at heart, for they had absolute faith in the power of education and learning to mold human beings and to consequently produce positive widespread moral and cultural effect in society. In the Night School, their stories and clothing inspections and surrogate-family activities were all enacted on the belief that a proper education could save the children from learning corruption on the streets. The shuyuan structure and curriculum of the Research Institute rested on the faith that the experience of such an education

\textsuperscript{49} Fazhan jihua, 2.
would itself be sufficient to train teachers, or torchbearers, of Chinese culture. The Cultural Open Forum, above all, functioned by the belief that impacting the intellectual sector of a society was sufficient to have widespread influence, for the thinkers and their ideas and knowledge will produce a domino effect wherever they plant themselves. Having elevated thinkers to this lofty level, and having further posed themselves as leaders of the thinking community in Hong Kong, the New Asia family of institutions felt itself to be in prime position to act as prime mover in the next chapter of the story of Chinese culture. The challenges they faced in seeking to fully enact their vision in the Hong Kong context is the subject of the next section.

50 Tang Duanzheng, Yazhou wenshang xueyuan de huiyi, 18.
Part B: Contextual Contentions

As a refugee institution, the existence of New Asia College during its first few years was highly precarious. Operating on minimal funds in scant quarters, the struggle to maintain the college and the community around it was immense. However, by the time the college reached its tenth birthday it had managed to secure the financial support of various American non-government organizations (NGO’s) as well as that of the British colonial government. This dual-sourced support brought New Asia from refugee status to a firm long-term footing in Hong Kong and the educational system developing there.

As the British and American investment of both money and energy into New Asia’s development was indispensable, the question of why and in what way the British and American parties chose to invest in New Asia becomes critical. American NGO’s, wishing to contain the possible spread of communism from the Chinese mainland to the periphery, found in New Asia a way to combat communism’s influence through supporting cultural education. Believing, as did New Asia, that communism was fundamentally incompatible with Chinese cultural values,
American NGO's came to regard the buttressing of traditional Chinese culture as translating into a weakening of communism's hold. Cultural education was central in this regard, for the positive shaping of youth would revive the Chinese cultural spirit in such a way as to empty communism of its appeal and power. Promoting such cultural education in Hong Kong was of especial significance, as Hong Kong could serve as the ideal space in which to both strengthen Chinese cultural identity and expand its boundaries.

While the American NGO's relished the opportunity to fight communism indirectly through New Asia's cultural education, the British colonial government in Hong Kong struggled to define the purpose and role of Chinese education in their colony. Like the American NGO's, the British colonial government wished to educate Chinese youth where the corrupting influences of communism could not reach them. At the same time, the British saw the convergence of Chinese refugees on Hong Kong as an opportunity to make Hong Kong the site at which all Asia could acquire Western learning. To accomplish both of these goals, the British sought to develop higher education
in Hong Kong so as to make it both the educational center of Asia and the cultural crossroads between East and West.

The issue of the motives and perceptions of both the American NGO’s and the British colonial government become crucial as the investment of these two forces would be determinative in shaping the development of New Asia as an educational institution. The convergence of such disparate forces on New Asia’s program of cultural education would, in fact, ultimately account for the extent and sphere of New Asia’s influence. As the American NGO’s and the British colonial government each brought to New Asia their own interests in New Asia’s identity and symbolism, they invested meanings into New Asia not intended by its founders, on the one hand, and ignored issues of profound significance to them, on the other. The tensions within and between these differing sets of interests, as well as New Asia’s reaction to them, ultimately both increased and decreased the significance of New Asia’s program of cultural education and of the Hong Kong site in which it was situated.
Chapter 3:  
American Non-governmental Support for New Asia

During the early period of New Asia's existence, the help of various American non-governmental organizations proved crucial in ensuring New Asia's survival. Indeed, before the British colonial government came forth with any material or financial aid, American NGO's were providing funds for human and physical resources which were absolutely necessary to New Asia's continuance. In particular, New Asia College received assistance from the Yale-China Association and the Ford Foundation, with crucial funding issuing from both organizations and direct on-site administrative help given by Yale-China. The New Asia Research Institute benefited from the donations of the Harvard-Yenching Institute as well as the Asia Foundation, with the former also aiding New Asia in forming academic exchanges with American universities. While this financial and organizational aid was indispensable to the survival of New Asia College and its community, the conceptions held by these American NGO's of Chinese education and the Hong Kong situation which motivated their giving proved also to later create tensions and conflicts.
Curtailing the Communist Threat through Education

New Asia College was rescued in 1953 from its precarious state of material existence by a funding package provided jointly by the Yale-China Association and the Ford Foundation. Yale-China, an organization devoted to the "development of education in and about China, and to the furtherance of knowledge, understanding, and friendship between Chinese and American people," had been based in Changsha in China's Hunan province since its founding in 1901.¹ However, with the occupation of their school by the Chinese communist government and the expulsion of their staff from the country in 1951, Yale-China's half-century of work in mainland China came to an abrupt halt. Yale-China in the early 1950's was therefore on the hunt for another avenue by which they could continue their educational work for the Chinese people even while removed from China proper.² At the same time, the Ford Foundation, an organization focused on the promotion of democratic values and international cooperation, had just raised its status in 1950 from a state organization to a national and international foundation.³ With this new broadened

perspective, Ford was searching for issues around the world towards the resolution of which it could contribute. New Asia College thus benefited from the fortuitous coincidence whereby both organizations were simultaneously undergoing periods of transition in orientation and thus availability of funding.

In order to gather the information necessary to make a sound funding decision for their project, the Yale-China Association sent a representative to Asia to scout the situation and return with recommendations as to a suitable funding object. Thus in the summer of 1953, Professor Harry Rudin made a trip to survey both Hong Kong and Taiwan in order to assess the relative need of the two places and the opportunities for Yale-China to contribute to programs or projects in both sites. Rudin's recommendation upon return to the United States was unequivocally in support of Hong Kong's New Asia College. So impressed was he by New Asia's leadership and spirit, Rudin suggested to the Yale-China Board of Trustees that Yale-China should not only grant financial aid to New Asia but also work to solicit additional funds from other American NGO's on New Asia's behalf.

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Yale-China looked particularly to the Ford Foundation for help. With promising negotiations with Ford in process, the Yale-China Board decided in March of 1953 to give US$25,000/year for the upcoming five years, totaling US$125,000, if Ford would contribute US$200,000 to the New Asia enterprise.\(^5\) Yale-China's money would be used for general operating costs, and would also cover the expenses of an on-site Yale-China representative who would oversee the funding allocations and assist in New Asia's administration. The Ford funds would be used to provide additional facilities for the College of which it was in dire need. The Ford Foundation accepted Yale-China's proposal in September of that year.\(^6\) The combined funding package of Yale-China and Ford would thus bring new buildings, an American on-site advisor, and US$225,000 to New Asia College between 1953 and 1958.

Prior to committing to New Asia, however, Yale-China had many decisions to make regarding its own funding priorities. The first decision involved whether to continue in the medicine-related work in which Yale-China had previously been involved. During Rudin's trip to Hong Kong, he had ample opportunity to witness the poverty and

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physical degradation occurring there. That medical services were in dangerously short supply was obvious. Former Yale-China representative Preston Schoyer also reported from Hong Kong that the refugee situation was extremely dire, with hunger and disease rampant. It would seem then that the most immediate physical problems should be confronted first, and certainly Yale-China had ample history and experience in aiding Chinese in this regard.

Despite this combination of Hong Kong's need and Yale-China's own background, the Board of Yale-China chose to invest not in medicine and physical relief efforts but rather in a campaign to protect the Chinese soul. Yale-China, at that time, was painfully aware that Hong Kong and other Southeast Asia students were enticed back to mainland China by the low-cost Chinese-medium universities open to them there. This meant that students living in the non-communist world were being sucked back behind the Bamboo Curtain simply because no educational opportunities were available to them elsewhere. Yale-China therefore decided that nothing was more important than ensuring that higher education institutions for Chinese were developed outside mainland China. While the physical needs of refugees in

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Hong Kong were undeniably great, the needs of the spirit were even greater.

Based on this prioritization of administering to the spirit over the body, the Yale-China Board formulated the following policy decision in the spring of 1953:

To assist in the post-secondary education of young Chinese men and women even though the medical needs of the people in the colony are overwhelming. . . . Unable to get the higher education they desire, young Chinese in Hong Kong, like many others from all over southeast Asia, go to Red China, where they can study without financial cost to themselves. The Trustees of Yale-in-China\(^7\) are eager to keep the Chinese Communists from winning a victory because of western default in this phase of the struggle for the minds and souls of men.\(^9\)

The Yale-China Board regarded the need to create alternative options for higher education as so urgent as to take precedence over providing medical help and basic relief to Hong Kong refugees. Supporting education became such a serious duty and responsibility in their minds that to neglect this task would be a considered "default" on the part of Western countries. Thus, they made higher education and "the struggle for the minds and souls of men" the first of their funding priorities.

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\(^7\) This issue is further developed in Chapter 4.
\(^8\) The Yale-in-China Association, formerly, the Yale Foreign Missionary Society, was reincorporated as the Yale-China Association in 1975.
That the path to winning "the minds and souls" should be through education was an assumption held also by the Ford Foundation. In negotiating with Ford Foundation representative Dr. Moyer over the decision to contribute to New Asia College, Yale-China reported that Ford also felt that supporting education was the best means towards combating the hold of communism over people's thinking:

It was Dr. Moyer's thought that the emphasis today should be on educational techniques which would recognize the Communist threat for what it is - a corruption of all the basic inalienable rights of man - and would meet this threat with definite answers and a definite program. Educationally he felt that an ostrich attitude towards Communism in the Far East would not be fruitful but that the Western world would have to build an educational backfire in order to combat the fire and zeal of recent converts to Communism. 10

Like Yale-China, the Ford Foundation felt that it was the responsibility of the West to provide alternative options for education - or, in their terms, "to build an educational backfire" - to deplete the spirit of those already converted to communist thinking, on the one hand, and to provide warning for those not yet lost, on the other hand, so that they might have the means to understand the fundamental folly of the communist conception of humankind.

10 Memo re: discussion with Ford, May 18, 1953; YC 232-29-214.
With specific reference to the situation in Hong Kong, the Ford Foundation ultimately chose to support New Asia because, like Yale-China, it felt that human traffic of students to mainland China for simple want of other educational options was unacceptable if at all preventable. When in September of 1953 the Board of the Ford Foundation formally decided to support New Asia College, it explained its decision thus:

The "overseas" Chinese, by which is meant the Chinese living outside China throughout Southeast Asia (e.g., Indonesia, Philippines, Malaya, Burma, etc.) dominate the economic structure of Southeast Asia to an extent out of all proportion to their number of twelve million. The Chinese Reds are well aware of the influence of this group and have conducted special propaganda campaigns to attract "overseas" Chinese youths to China by offering them scholarship, free transportation, allowances, etc. Over the past several years many thousands of young Chinese students have accepted the Communist offers simply because they would otherwise be denied a Chinese education. The situation is further aggravated by the large number of refugee youths in the area, particularly Hong Kong, who have a mainland orientation and a strong desire for a Chinese education. . . . "Overseas" Chinese youths traditionally returned to China for their education and there are now only very limited opportunities for a purely Chinese education outside the Communist-dominated universities on the mainland of China. Several small refugee-type colleges have been established in the last several years in Hong Kong. By far the most promising of such institutions is New Asia College, which was founded in Hong Kong in 1949 by a group of scholars to provide educational opportunities for Chinese youths, now refugees in
Hong Kong, and for "overseas" Chinese students from Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{11}

Ford thus clearly saw the urgency and extremity of the educational situation in Hong Kong and broader Southeast Asia region as requiring immediate attention. Ford wished to respond to this crisis by providing a "purely Chinese education" as an alternative to a "communist-dominated" one, and thus chose to invest in New Asia College as "the most promising" option for a non-mainland institution of Chinese higher education.

The Ford Foundation took as a given the idea that not only communism generally but a communist education specifically would be inherently threatening and, in this case, corruptive to any possibility of being "purely Chinese". Ford assumed that communism entailed a fundamental usurping of the mind such that a denial of the "inalienable rights of man" could occur. The issue of education thus became more than a problem of providing educational opportunities outside communist-controlled domains. Rather, as with Yale-China, who depicted education as the front on which the "struggle for the minds and souls of men" would be fought, the Ford Foundation wished to support an educational endeavor that would not be

\textsuperscript{11} FD Board Minute Dockets, September 1953: 1.
corrupted or controlled by communist influences for such influences, from Ford's perspective, would void education of its meaning altogether.

This fear of communist influence over intellectual life permeated Ford's policy during the 1950's. On the home front, for example, Ford established in the same year a "Fund for the Republic" whose goal was to protect liberties in the United States in light of communism. They felt the establishment of this fund to be a crucial aspect of the Foundation's overall agenda for the 1950's, as indicated in their Board of Trustees' September 1950 policy statement: "The Ford Foundation will support activities directed toward elimination of restrictions on freedom of thought, inquiry and expression in the United States". The specific impetus for concern over the civil and intellectual freedom in America clearly stemmed from what they regarded as the communist threat; in their words: "A major factor affecting civil liberties today is the existence of Communism and Communist influence in this country." The Fund was thus to ferret out the most threatened issues, of which one major one was defined as

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12 FD 1953 Project File: 3.
13 Ibid., 4.
"restrictions and assaults upon academic freedom".  

The general idea that communism endangers freedom particularly in the arena of civil and intellectual life was thus clearly behind the Ford Foundation’s specific sense that education would be instrumental in curtailing the influence of communism.

The "educational backfire" Ford had in mind would meet the communist threat with "definite answers and a definite program". The function of education, however, was not so much to spell out these answers as to create an open forum for the purpose of searching for answers. Ford believed that communism had had opportunity to succeed in China because it had the appearance of responding to certain needs and problems. What education and educational institutions must do in response, then, was to create non-communist solutions to those problems so as to nullify communism’s power. Education must have a purpose beyond itself and, in the context of Hong Kong, this meant drawing on knowledge from the world over to formulate new perspectives and solutions. Yale-China personnel described Ford’s attitude thus:

Dr Moyer was opposed to the expansion of New Asia into an ordinary college with the purpose of

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14 Ibid.
simply providing more and better higher education for Chinese students. He said Ford would not be interested. It would be interested, he thought, and the New Asia program seemed compatible with the idea, in an institute that became a gathering place for scholars, the student body no more than two or three hundred. The emphasis of the institute would be on scholarly examination, or re-examination, of eastern and western thought, cultural values, political philosophy and the like, looking towards the evolvement of new answers to Asia's problems other than Communism.\(^\text{15}\)

Ford's interest was thus in funding a small community of scholars whose express goal was the analysis of ideas and values from both "eastern and western thought" in order to find "answers to Asia's problems other than Communism."

Both the Ford Foundation and the Yale-China Association thus assumed the responsibility of supporting education outside mainland China such that Chinese students would not be enticed into communist domain. These American NGO's saw their effort as crucial not only because non-communist educational opportunities were in short supply but because they believed communism to be fundamentally antithetical to intellectual and academic freedom, on the one hand, and education to be the solution that would repel the communist influence, on the other. The only way to contain communism's expansion, then, was to buttress non-

\(^{15}\) Letter Schoyer to Holden, Mar 20, 1953; YC 232-29-215.
communist education from beyond China's borders, thereby fortifying the periphery against communist encroachment.

**The Site of Hong Kong**

Given the crucial significance of non-communist education, the choice of the site from which these American NGO's should launch their efforts was critical. In particular, the question of the relative merits of Hong Kong vs. Taiwan as sites in which to advance non-communist education was of particular importance.

For Yale-China particularly, Taiwan originally seemed an attractive option, and in fact many on the Board initially preferred Taiwan where America's presence and role was clear and welcome. However, Rudin concluded after his scouting trip that it was precisely because of the United States' involvement there that it would be better to support Hong Kong. The United States government was then giving much aid to Taiwan through the Mutual Security Administration.\(^\text{16}\) Rudin felt that the need for financial support was therefore not nearly as great in Taiwan as Hong Kong. Furthermore, it was precisely because of lack of American governmental involvement in Hong Kong that a non-
governmental organization like Yale-China would have greater flexibility and maneuverability there than in Taiwan. Thus, the decision was made to focus their funding attention on Hong Kong.

The idea that Hong Kong as a site would provide a greater degree of freedom was shared by New Asia's founders. While they had considered setting up the school in Taiwan instead, and in fact even after New Asia was established in Hong Kong contemplated starting a branch school in Taichung, they ultimately decided that Hong Kong provided a better context for the promotion of their cultural ideals. This choice of Hong Kong over Taiwan was quite striking: the Taiwan Nationalists, whatever their other shortcomings, were after all Chinese cultural promoters in a general sense, while Hong Kong was under British colonial control. It would seem, then, that Taiwan could provide a more amenable and even supportive environment for the New Asia promotion of Chinese cultural education, whereas a colonial government might well look unfavourably upon any movements towards the promotion of a native culture.

However, the idea of neutrality and freedom overrode all these other considerations. While the Nationalists certainly did support traditional Chinese culture after a fashion, they also exerted a considerable degree of political control over civil and intellectual freedoms. The New Asia founders did not object to having an informal relationship with Taiwan; in fact, Qian Mu was able to solicit funding for New Asia from Chiang Kai-shek's private presidential coffers. However, they felt that the political situation in Taiwan was such that intellectual and educational freedom had little chance of being steadfastly preserved. Thus they settled on Hong Kong as the most neutral and free site on which to propagate their ideas. According to Rudin's description of Qian Mu's thinking:

Reports stated that he refused to establish a college in Taiwan when asked to do so, preferring the greater freedom of British-run Hong Kong. This decision is a remarkable one in view of the fact that Chien Mu is the only college president receiving financial assistance from Taiwan, from the "personal funds" of Chiang Kai-shek himself.  

Rudin clearly found unique the position that New Asia had chosen to carve for itself: namely, to have Chiang's

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17 "Chien" is an alternative Romanization for "Qian" and hence both refer to the same person, namely Qian Mu.
18 Rudin Confidential Report, Oct 1, 1953; YC 232-88-606.
implicit support, on the one hand, but to actually operate outside the sphere of Chiang's control, on the other.

This position Yale-China found to be exactly in line with its own interests. Even though Yale-China had no ideological sympathies with communism or any actual sympathies with the communist government in China, they wished to remain as neutral a profile as possible. This was so in part because they did not wish to endanger the position of Chinese previously associated with Yale-China who were still on the mainland. Thus Hong Kong associate Preston Schoyer advised the Yale-China Board:

Any activity which appears to take sides in the cold war would create difficulties for our Chinese colleagues still at the old stand in China. . . . At present the communists are reported to be launching a new campaign of political investigation into the behavior and thinking of individuals. . . . This might be dangerous time to appear openly among the opposition.19

Aside from not wishing to cause trouble for the Chinese affiliated with their organization, Yale-China also had a vested interest in maintaining a neutral profile in the eyes of the Chinese communist government because of its own intent to return to the mainland. Though they were choosing to invest in Hong Kong while mainland China was

inaccessible, ultimately their heart lay on the mainland and they hoped to resume their work there as soon as was practicable. In fact, when they decided to support New Asia in Hong Kong, they articulated clearly that they saw this as a temporary measure, and that they would reroute their financial support back to the mainland if given the opportunity to do so. Thus the Board expressed: “It would also be our understanding that it would be the primary intent of Yale-in-China to return to the mainland, that is, Changsha, if the opportunity arises within the five-year period.”

With this intent to return to mainland China, then, Yale-China needed to find a neutral sphere of operation that would not rouse the suspicion of the Chinese communist government.

For this reason, Taiwan was a much less desirable investment site in comparison with Hong Kong. While investing in Taiwan would certainly put Yale-China on the side of the Nationalist regime along with the American government that supported it, Yale-China as a non-governmental organization wished for a space that would be relatively free from explicit pro-American and anti-

\[20\] YC Board Minutes, Mar 22, 1953; YC 232-5-30.
communist associations. Thus Yale-China came to regard Hong Kong in this light:

It would be incorrect to say that Hongkong is entirely neutral, but it is neutral enough as far as the Chinese and their activities here go to escape the name of anti-communism.21

Hong Kong, then came to assume the mantle of political neutrality relative to Taiwan. Yale-China sought to capitalize on this image of neutrality to secure its own future in mainland China.

So important was the image of Hong Kong's neutrality that Yale-China sought to ensure that, in its support for New Asia, it would not be seen as linked to Taiwan in any way. Before Yale-China would promise its aid to New Asia, then, it negotiated New Asia's relinquishing of Chiang's subsidy of US$500/month.22 Yale-China believed this move was necessary despite the relative insignificance of this sum of money and "even though Chien Mu (president of New Asia) reported that, in accepting the subsidy from Chiang Kai Shek, the latter had no control over the school."23

Yale-China, then, was clearly concerned not only about any influence Taiwan might be exerting over New Asia.

22 This negotiation occurred with the approval, in fact the prodding, of the British colonial government, who also wanted to maintain as neutral an image for Hong Kong as possible.
specifically but also about the general implications of being associated, however indirectly, with the Taiwanese government, for any such association would negate the symbolic value of Hong Kong as a political neutral zone.

Hong Kong's geographical position relative to mainland China was also an attractive characteristic of the colony. The Ford Foundation particularly considered carefully the spatial placement of Hong Kong and the probable effects of this placement on its mission. In their words:

In the course of considering this proposal, the question arose whether the action would represent a gamble in view of Hong Kong's proximity to Red China. The Officers regard support of the New Asia College as a calculated risk and one that is worth taking. They feel that Hong Kong for a number of reason - not the least of which is its very proximity to Red China - is the best place in which to attack the problem of providing trained Chinese leaders for Southeast Asia.²⁴

Initially, then, the Ford Foundation was concerned about whether Hong Kong and its institutions might be in danger of being unduly influenced or even taken over by the Chinese communist government. Hong Kong's role in the Southeast Asia region was, as seen above, of great significance to Ford, and it felt that China too was aware of its power and hence might be particularly hungry for it.

²³ Special Board Meeting, Sept 14, 1953; YC 232-5-30.
²⁴ FD Board Minute Dockets, September 1953: 1.
However, ultimately it was Hong Kong's very position of betweenness that made it so appealing. Ford came to believe that the very risk implied in the position of Hong Kong at the fringe of mainland China was simultaneously its greatest strategic advantage in serving as an educational center for Chinese in Asia:

Hongkong, situated as it is more or less on the bridgehead of the free world and communist China, may be an ideal vortex in which to carry out a project looking towards an evolution of a new integration of the East-West cultural and political problems.  

Hong Kong, as a kind of political neutral zone, thus came to be regarded as the ideal site for free education. While Taiwan's political controls would be oppressive and limiting, Hong Kong was the convergence point for all interested in promoting a non-communist education for all Chinese people. In the words of Rev. Charles Long:

[Hong Kong] is a microcosm of all China . . . , composed of all sorts of dialects and of all classes of Chinese. . . . Hong Kong has become a true Chinese city . . . , the largest concentration of Chinese people and Chinese culture anywhere in the world outside of China itself. It is the one place where we can work effectively and with complete freedom from political interference among Chinese people. . . . In Hong Kong the needs are far greater and the chances of an experimental approach to the

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problem of Chinese higher education are greater than elsewhere at present.\textsuperscript{26}

The need to provide education for Chinese in a free environment thus came to assume the highest priority.

Hong Kong's position in terms of political symbolism was therefore both ambiguous and ambivalent. While organizations like Yale-China and Ford clearly wished to support an institution like New Asia precisely because of its implicit symbolic potency in the struggle against communism, they also required the explicit political neutrality of Hong Kong in order to not incur negative political repercussions for their organizations and hence their work. Thus, they capitalized on Hong Kong's marginality politically to buttress their own positions.

\textbf{Cultural Education and Spiritual Renewal}

The emphasis placed on funding non-communist education in Hong Kong did not, however, assume explicitly anti-communist tones. Rather, as evident in their choice of Hong Kong, the American NGO's preferred to evince an image of relative political neutrality. Their focus in education, then, was ultimately less political than

\textsuperscript{26} Long report to Trustees, June 16, 1957; YC 232-83-489.
cultural. Nowhere was this more apparent than in their support for New Asia, for while New Asia’s founding had certainly been motivated by those disagreeing strongly with communism in mainland China, the emphasis at New Asia had always been on the study, embodiment, and fortification of Chinese culture rather than on preaching anti-communism per se. Similarly, the American NGO’s, while operating out of anti-communist concerns, chose to act for the strengthening of Chinese culture. Both took this stance because of their shared belief that such cultural strengthening would ultimately, in and of itself, solve the problems of ideology and identity in China.

The support given to New Asia’s Research Institute by the Asia Foundation and the Harvard-Yenching Institute is particularly revealing in this regard. In 1956, Harvard-Yenching decided to give New Asia a grant of US$17,200 to fund the purchase of books, cover research publication costs, support research fellows, and bring one student to

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27 The Asia Foundation partners with both the private and public sectors in projects that “foster greater openness and shared prosperity in the Asia Pacific region,” particularly in the areas of law and governance, and peace and stability. For more information, see http://www.asiafoundation.org/about/about_over.html.

28 The Harvard-Yenching Institute was founded in 1928 to expand East Asian studies at Harvard and to support scholars and academic institutions in East and Southeast Asia. For more information, see http://www.harvard-yenching.org/background.html.
Harvard for study.\(^9\) This grant was renewed the following year for the same amount.\(^9\) In addition, researchers at New Asia were welcome to participate in Harvard-Yenching's open grant application for specific research projects. New Asia's overall research output was helped through this avenue as well; for example, in the spring of 1958, two out of fifteen research grants given were to New Asia research projects.\(^3\)

However, issues regarding the sources and distribution of funds caused the Harvard-Yenching Board in 1958 to substantially reorganize its entire budget and reconsider its grant programs. During this process of reassessment, the allotment to New Asia was cut by half to US$8,600 for the 1958-59 academic year.\(^2\) As Harvard-Yenching's funding to the New Asia Research Institute was absolutely crucial to its survival, New Asia submitted a special petition to the Board of Harvard-Yenching in hopes that the latter would reconsider. In this petition, New Asia explained the scope of its work as follows:

We confine our work to training our students in the study of the period between the Eastern Han

\(^{29}\) Letter Serge Elissieff to Qian Mu, May 7, 1956; Harvard-Yenching Institute (HYI).

\(^{30}\) Letter Edwin Reischauer to Qian Mu, March 29, 1957; HYI.

\(^{31}\) HYI Board Minutes, China Council Budget, April 15, 1958; HYI.

\(^{32}\) HYI Board Minutes, November 24, 1958; HYI.
dynasty and the beginning of the Ch'ing. . . . Neither do we encourage the study of the modern period, because the problems of China, which require to be explained and set right according to modern concepts and by modern methods are too numerous, and if we do not being with a clear of the period that went before, we will lose ourselves in a maze. . . . We should like to train our youth to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of disinterested scholarship before they turn their attention to contemporary problems. If we allow them to be absorbed in the problems of the present they may fail to acquire the mental attitude and habit necessary of the pursuit of pure and profound scholarship."

New Asia, in this petition, justified their lack of explicit attention to contemporary problems and the limiting of the scope of their work to the pre-modern by articulating their belief that buttressing traditional Chinese culture and learning was a prerequisite to dealing with current events. Interestingly, Harvard-Yenching responded favorably to this petition, granting New Asia a renewal of grant money up to the amount of US$15,320.34

Apparently, Harvard-Yenching, supported the idea that directly facing contemporary issues was secondary in procedure, and perhaps also in importance, to the strengthening of traditional culture.

33 Letter Qian Mu to Edwin Reischauer, Director Harvard-Yenching Institute, Sept 13, 1958.
34 HYI Board Minutes, April 21, 1959; HYI.
This idea was taken further and made more explicit by the Asia Foundation. The Asia Foundation, as early as 1952, was showing significant interest in New Asia and its mission to promote traditional Chinese culture and learning. Asia Foundation staff member L.Z. Yuan particularly was struck by the efforts of this group of scholars in fighting the influence of communism in China through reviving traditional culture. Thus Yuan argued to the Asia Foundation Board for the support of New Asia and its “systematic study of Chinese culture”. Yuan explained that supporting the study of Chinese culture was the best method of dismantling Chinese communism because of the fundamental incompatibility between Chinese cultural concepts and values and communist ones:

Communism and the communist way of life are most un-Chinese. They are diametrically opposed to the traditional Chinese philosophies and ethics. Communism would not have had even its limited measure of success in China today had it not been for the long Sino-Japanese war and the subsequent dislocation of Chinese cultural and educational life.

By blaming wartime chaos for China’s official adoption of communism and further defining communism and Chinese-ness as being fundamentally antithetical to each other, Yuan

36 Memo from L.Z. Yuan, Sept 17 1953; The Asia Foundation (TAF) P-56.
posits the absolute importance of "systematic study of Chinese culture" such as offered at New Asia for the ultimate purpose of discrediting the possibility of Chinese communism as a viable concept or program.

Because of delays in official decision-making, Yale-China stepped in with its offer to New Asia College before the Asia Foundation had formulated a support package for the College. However, as New Asia's Research Institute, then at its inception, was greatly in need of funds, the Asia Foundation decided to give financial support to the Research Institute instead. In November of 1953, the Asia Foundation formally announced its support of the New Asia Research Institute.37 The Foundation described its vision of the work they were supporting as follows:

The research is to be aimed toward a renaissance of basic appreciation and understanding of Chinese history and cultural development as an alternative to Communist doctrines and interpretations and to increase the influence of these scholars and make it possible for them to take up the responsibility of intellectual leadership.38

Supporting "a renaissance" of Chinese cultural learning would, the Asia Foundation believed, simultaneously mean an exploration of non-communist possibilities for China's

37 Letter Brown to Qian, November 1, 1953; TAF P-56.
38 Announcement Nov 10, 1953; TAF P-56.
future. Fortifying scholarship on Chinese culture was to create intellectual leaders for China who would, by virtue of their grounding in Chinese history and learning, provide an "alternative to Communist doctrines and interpretations," thereby diminishing the strength of the latter through expanding the former.

The linkage between education and the fight against communism, then, was not simply a matter of providing educational opportunities for Chinese youth beyond communist China's border. Even more importantly, it meant that a direct correlation could be drawn between the strength of Chinese culture through cultural learning and the weakness of communism's ideological hold. This linkage had particular resonance in Yale-China's tradition given its roots as a missionary society: education had long been a strategy used by Yale-China by which to reach those both spiritually and politically "lost" in China. In the case of New Asia, however, the significance of Yale-China's efforts was a complex juggle between its anti-communist convictions, its missionary goals, and its investment in the significance of cultural education.

The relationship between Chinese cultural education at New Asia and Yale-China's goals of Protestant
proselytization was not initially very clear. In fact, many members of the Board of Yale-China as well as its donors wondered why Yale-China, as a Christian organization, was investing in a college which not only had no interest in or affiliation to Christianity but had made Yale-China promise non-proselytization an absolute condition of the funding arrangement. Many of Yale-China preferred to invest their resources in an institution which was either Christian from the outset or one in which they could be certain of exercising Christian influence and teaching Christian doctrine. In particular, those at home wondered about the possibility of giving to Chung Chi College, also in Hong Kong, whose name literally means "worship Christ". A school which was clearly Christian in orientation and would welcome further Christian guidance, Chung Chi seemed to be the most logical choice, allowing Yale-China to fulfill both its Christian mission as well as its interest in supporting education in Hong Kong.

The decision to invest in New Asia rather than Chung Chi was made in part because of the inter-organizational politics of American NGO's in Asia at that time. Because Chung Chi was then already under the auspices of the United
Board of Christian Higher Education in Asia, Yale-China representatives decided they did not want to work under a complex co-sponsorship situation with the United Board. It was decided by the Board that "Yale-in-China would retain its identity more if we go into the support of New Asia College, than if we cooperate with other boards in supporting Chung Chi College."\(^{39}\) Yale-China preferred to have more autonomous control and credit vis-à-vis their chosen institutional project in Asia.

More importantly, however, the reason for eschewing Chung Chi as a funding option resulted from Yale-China's sense that direct and outright Christian proselytization was not what was most needed at that time. Certainly, they still hoped fervently that the Chinese at New Asia who would be influenced by the Christian representative sent by Yale-China to oversee the funding allocations and participate in New Asia's development; they hoped that, by the example of Yale-China's Christian witness, they would ultimately come to see their own collective situation in Christian terms and be won over to Christian beliefs. However, in the context of Hong Kong, they saw conversion not to be the first aim of their work.

\(^{39}\) YC Board Minutes, Mar 22, 1953; 232-5-30.
The reasoning behind this decision was perhaps best expressed by representative Charles Long. Long was in fact a clergyman and at first was quite disappointed and confused by his role at New Asia, saying that he "never expected it to be so entirely secular in nature." Yet ultimately Long was convinced by the Yale-China decision to not make direct proselytization the foremost goal of the work in Hong Kong. In fact, he came to be one of the strongest advocates of this policy decision, justifying the change in tack to the Board and friends of Yale-China during a public speech. It is worth quoting extensively from this speech as it reveals much about the concepts informing Yale-China's attitude towards New Asia and its role in Hong Kong:

Yale-in-China is primarily concerned with the soul of China. What is to be the destiny, under God, of this great people and nation and cultural tradition? What can we do to help a people in exile and dispersed in many strange lands retain their identity as a people, hold on to their traditions, renew their ideals - so that in due time they may make that contribution to the community of all mankind which God for many centuries has been preparing among them - so that the thing that is "China" may not be entirely cut off by the twisting plough of revolution or entirely erased by a slow accommodation to Western customs or the need for a job? I am not ashamed to say that I hope and pray that the Chinese in this time of exile may become Christian, and that Yale-in-China may play some part in that process, for I believe that it is
only in this way that they will fully understand
the meaning of their history and especially of
their present suffering. But may our friends
become Chinese Christians — not rootless,
Westernized, English-speaking, superficial, and
uneasy converts. The Churches of Asia are too
full of such people. . . . Our primary task is to
strengthen a school where present and future
Christian leaders may learn what it means to be
Chinese — for it is only in this way that Chinese
Christians can continue to grow up in the Far
East. Hong Kong is full of churches, and we're
in the center of Hong Kong. There are over two
thousand registered missionaries in that tiny
spot. But there is only one New Asia College —
only one institution dedicated completely to the
preservation and renewal of the Chinese spirit. .
. . If this people is to gain a new faith, a new
sense of direction, it must come from something
that is called forth from within themselves,
something that grows up from their own roots —
new insights discovered and set forth by their
own intellectual leaders.

The Christian tone here is unmistakable: Long conceives of
China’s destiny as being “under God” and sees the history
and “present suffering” of the Chinese as acquiring meaning
only in light of God’s plan for China. That his ultimate
goal remains the religious conversion of the Chinese people
is incontrovertible. However, the significance and
uniqueness of his view lies in his conviction that, despite
this, religious conversion ought not to be the priority
emphasized most by Yale-China at that time.

[40 Long report, verbally delivered to public meeting on June 16, 1957; YC 232-83-489.]
Long takes this attitudes in part because he wishes to define a unique mission for Yale-China and, by his own account, Hong Kong is already full of missionaries and churches. More importantly, though, he explains that if religious conversion is itself defined as the top priority, and promoted without reference to the context in which the conversion is to take place, the conversion will itself be a shallow one. Those converted under such means he characterizes as "rootless, Westernized, English-speaking, superficial, and uneasy converts." His usage of words like "rootless" is particularly significant when followed immediately by "Westernized" and "English-speaking," for it reveals his sense that religious conversion can connote a sort of cultural superficiality or even betrayal. His accusation is not equal to that implied in the nineteenth-century title "rice Christians," referring to those who were willing to come under church auspices for the sake of the food being distributed by missionaries. Rather, Long worries that religious conversion can represent a sort of switching of cultural tracks without the converted themselves comprehending the meaning behind such switching. By indicating that conversion has the potential to be culturally inappropriate he does not, of course, then claim
Christianity to belong only to Western territory; in fact, he clearly cannot, lest he obviate his own mission to induce conversion in the long-term. His point, rather, is that religious conversion should neither come from or lead to cultural conversion but instead must be founded on cultural fidelity. He hopes for not "Westernized" Christians but "Chinese Christians".

How then to ensure that those who convert are also truly Chinese? By providing them a Chinese cultural education. Therein lies the importance of New Asia; in his words, "our primary task is to strengthen a school where present and future Christian leaders may learn what it means to be Chinese." This comment, "may learn what it means to be Chinese", is revealing: Chinese Christians not only need to remain essentially Chinese but need to learn, or perhaps relearn, "what it means to be Chinese". In this Long's attitude is much akin to that of the New Asia planners—he shares with them the nagging suspicion that Chinese either have forgotten or are in dire danger of forgetting "what it means to be Chinese" and therefore must receive an education by which they learn this. Not only must they learn it but also become it very fundamentally, such that by converting to a foreign religion they do not
become culturally "rootless" but rather true "Chinese Christians."

Rev. Long's attitude shares another similarity with that of New Asia, namely, the conviction that one's own cultural heritage and identity must be maintained strongly in order for changes to be meaningful. Their sense of what changes should happen are clearly divergent: the New Asia founders would never agree with Rev. Long that Western Christianity was the path by which China would find her true destiny. However, they too agree that Western learning is necessary, that some Western ideas are even useful, but that wholesale Westernization is fundamentally incorrect. The adoption of any elements of an outside culture, be it science or religion, can be adjunct and adjacent to the original cultural direction but can never replace it. Both New Asia and Yale-China thus converge at the point where staying true to one's original culture is of paramount importance.

Yet Long's attitude is difficult to assimilate in that the conversion he is seeking is of a spiritual nature. For New Asia, and those using the ti-yong formula before them, the incorporation of select aspects of Western culture was acceptable and even desirable precisely because they were
fundamentally committed to their ti, to the Chinese culture and learning that would remain their essence no matter what Western elements as yong were added to supplement and reinforce that essence. What Long was advocating, however, was quite different. He did not want simply for Christian beliefs to be grafted onto Chinese culture as a superficial supplement but that China would come to realize its true historical meaning under a Christian God. Long's conception of Christianity in China thus touches perilously on not a merely a functional yong but the essential ti.

Despite such blurring of ti and yong, New Asia was able to see the Yale-China program as non-threatening. Why? Certainly they were fearful of undue Christian influence, and their partnership was undoubtedly sustained only by much continuous negotiation and tactful diplomacy. Paradoxically, they were precisely able to cooperate despite the imminent threat of Yale-China's Christianity to New Asia's Chinese ti because Yale-China framed the mission in terms of fortification of China's essential spirit. Because the first priority of both was the strengthening of Chinese cultural education for the purpose of ensuring that Chinese people, despite the tumult and upheaval of their situation, understood "what it means to be Chinese," they
were able to cooperate on the level of spirituality despite the fact that their basic spiritual orientations were fundamentally divergent. New Asia's security came from the fact that, with Chinese culture strengthened at the level of essence, there would be no need to borrow foreign ideas or religions, thereby nullifying the threat. Thus, though their ultimate faith lay in entirely different spiritual traditions, both Yale-China and New Asia spoke the same language, the language of spirituality and spiritual revival and renewal.

Both Yale-China and New Asia, then, shared the conviction that change in a culture must be internally impelled, not externally derived. The spiritual metaphor of change coming from within leads both to the conclusion that education is the most important of enterprises. To affect a people's internal realm, to induce correct thinking and spiritual energy - these are the highest goals of both. Thus the significance of Long's statement: "If this people is to gain a new faith, a new sense of direction, it must come from something that is called forth from within themselves, something that grows up from their own roots - new insights discovered and set forth by their own intellectual leaders." Long evinces here a deep faith
in the necessity of cultural rootedness and in the need for change not only to be internally impelled but also engineered and executed by native cultural leaders. This, then, is not an image of outsiders, of foreign missionaries causing or creating change; rather the role of a missionary and a religiously-motivated organization like Yale-China would be to simply occasion change while championing the spiritual renewal of China's own spirit. Thus Long's central mission - revealed in his question "What can we do to help a people in exile and dispersed in many strange lands retain their identity as a people, hold on to their traditions, renew their ideals?" - makes Chinese cultural identity rather than religious conversion the primary problematic.

New Asia's significance and uniqueness, and hence also Yale-China's investment in it, therefore consists precisely of its commitment to the spirituality of Chinese culture. In Long's words, "there is only one New Asia College - only one institution dedicated completely to the preservation and renewal of the Chinese spirit." Why then did Yale-China decide that New Asia was the institution in Hong Kong most committed to and representative of the Chinese spirit?
Aside from wanting to invest in a school dedicated to Chinese cultural renewal, Yale-China wanted also for the object of their donation to itself be representative of Chinese culture. In surveying the various colleges in Hong Kong at the time, Yale-China felt that none of the others symbolized China as a whole as powerfully as New Asia. Most of the refugee colleges then in Hong Kong were composed of students and teachers primarily from the southern-Guangdong area, that is, the neighboring Cantonese-speaking region. Colleges such as these were regarded by Yale-China as being too localized, too little familiar with the West, too unstable. Above all, these Cantonese colleges, Yale-China felt, represented too small a portion of China. Because they wanted to invest in a broad and essentialized Chinese culture, they needed an institution that would symbolize not any particular region but China as whole. As explained by Yale-China representative Schoyer:

New Asia is special in that it is a "northern" school in its language and culture and general orientation. . . . In a national sense it represents traditional China, without localisms and outside influence, better than the other H.K. institutions, and better, I think, than the schools in Taiwan or Singapore do, or will. 41

New Asia was thus regarded by Yale-China as being the perfect symbol of traditional China but on a national scale.

Yale-China not only saw New Asia as an institution representing Chinese culture generally but also as a symbol of the half-century-old tradition of Chinese university education. Thus it was very important to claim New Asia's inheritance to Peking University, the symbolic representation of the best in Chinese education, as the progenitor of New Asia.

[New Asia] is in the tradition more than any of the other institutions of Pei Ta (Peking National University), China's leading educational center of the past. It represents Chinese intellectualism, old and new, in its highest, purest form, in purer form than Taiwan University in Taipei, which is hindered by political controls, which are likely to increase rather than decrease. 43

Yale-China detailed no specifications as to exactly what continuing the "Pei Ta" tradition meant beyond sustaining a high degree of quality in Chinese higher education. In fact, the comparison is a rather peculiar one, as Peking University developed under culturally iconoclastic rather than conservative impulses. New Asia, it turned out, would welcome the idea of being made in the image of Peking

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42 北京大学.
University for its own reasons. Thus New Asia was able to assume the fictionalized mantle of being in the Peking University tradition precisely because neither New Asia nor Yale-China specified what this would mean.

Because Yale-China believed that cultural renewal lay at the heart of China’s crisis, it relinquished even its proselytization mission for what it regarded as the more immediate and fundamental need of cultural fortification. Yale-China chose this path because, ultimately, they believed that Christian purposes would be best served in the long run by the strengthening of Chinese culture. Similarly, organizations like Harvard-Yenching and The Asia Foundation felt that supporting the study of traditional Chinese culture would, by domino effect, also aid Chinese in facing China’s contemporary problems. Such a chain of reaction would obviate the need to preach anti-communism explicitly, just as preaching Christianity was unnecessary. The support of American NGO’s for New Asia, then, signified a convergence of profound faith in cultural education and its capacity to revive China in exactly the way that all parties might wish.

\[45\] Ibid.
Concluding Thoughts

Amongst the refugee population in Hong Kong are thousands of young people of college age or approaching it. The Communist government puts great pressure on them to return for an education to be furnished wholly at government expense. Once enrolled in a Communist school or university, they are practically lost to the Free World. . . . There is a way out, if Americans like yourself will help. Yale-in-China, identified for fifty years with educational enterprise in the Far East, is sharing with New Asia College in Hong Kong the task of supplying an education in a Free World atmosphere to young Chinese... What happens in Hong Kong is keenly observed by the millions in Asia. The success of New Asia College will greatly strengthen the democratic and Christian influences throughout the Far East. Last week as Senator Fulbright was leaving New Asia College, he said to President Chien Mu: "If there is any hope at all for mankind in these troublous times, it lies with institutions such as New Asia College." May we count on you to help make this hope a reality?45

This sample letter from Yale-China soliciting funds for the further support of New Asia shows clearly the immense concern it had for the education of Chinese in a non-communist environment. As was common to the discourse of the day, the term "communist" was consistently pitted in direct opposition to the term "freedom," so that the education which organizations like Yale-China and Ford

44 See Chapter 5.
sought to provide was, by default, the education of the "Free World".

In elevating free Chinese education to the highest level of importance, Chinese culture became simultaneously raised to a reified stratum. Just as New Asia wished to provide its students an education in the very spirit of Chinese culture, so too did the American organizations desire to invest in a notion of Chinese culture that was pure and all-encompassing. Both sought to create an educational impetus that would revive the Chinese cultural spirit, and both wanted a way to preserve a pure Chinese culture on the margins of China while China itself lay inaccessible behind the bamboo curtain. Both believed that Chinese cultural education— the spiritual fortifying of Chinese from their cultural roots— could act as a shield against the vices and contamination of the communism just across the border. Both were investing in Hong Kong as the neutral convergence site that could nurture this Free Chinese education. And both intended to use the educational institution of New Asia as a cultural springboard for their own eventual triumphant return to China. The notions of political neutrality, educational freedom, and cultural purity therefore became the
triangular pillars that tied these American non-governmental organizations to a Hong Kong college committed to the promotion of Chinese culture. Thus Rev. Long could report to the Yale-China Board by 1957: "I am very confident now that New Asia College is needed in Hong Kong and has a long-range future, a permanent place in the life of the Colony and in the life of the free Chinese beyond the Colony." 46

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46 Ibid.
Chapter 4:
Chinese Education under British Colonialism

This chapter traces the development of British colonial policy on Chinese higher education in Hong Kong from 1949-59, and shows how New Asia fit into British policy as well as the broader Hong Kong educational context. In the early years of New Asia’s existence, the British colonial government in Hong Kong developed principles and policies regarding Chinese-medium education and Chinese studies which, on their face, were very much in line with the New Asia vision and program. When governmental execution of policy revealed their divergence from New Asia values and conceptions, the British remarkably conceded, elevating New Asia to the status of a university and thereby recognizing it at the highest level of learning. By the end of New Asia’s first decade of existence, British policy and support were aligned such as to greatly facilitate the growth of New Asia and other Chinese colleges in Hong Kong. Yet, within this paradigm of governmental support were also inherent tensions and discrepancies between the British and New Asia’s view on the meaning of Chinese education and on Hong Kong’s
educational role, such as would increasingly manifest themselves in divergent directions.

The Issue of Chinese-medium Higher Education

In 1951, the British colonial government in Hong Kong ordered the formation of a special commission, the Committee on Higher Education. This Committee was charged with the task of studying the sudden immense need in Hong Kong for Chinese-medium higher education. In particular, it was to assess the degree to which the demand for higher education was currently being met, and to recommend whether this demand could be better fulfilled by means of expanding existing institutions or creating wholly new ones. The Committee was to especially focus on the changing educational situation in Hong Kong given the political shifts in China and the consequent influx of refugees into Hong Kong. Based on this study the Committee was to determine the nature and extent of responsibility the Hong Kong government should itself assume for both native and refugee students then in Hong Kong.

1 "Medium" here refers to language, taken from the term "medium-of-instruction."

The impetus for the formation of this Committee was the realization that the demand for Chinese-medium education far exceeded the supply. This need was apparent at both the secondary and tertiary levels of education. At the secondary level, the number of available places in English-medium schools was greater than that of Chinese-medium schools, even though the number of Chinese primary schools graduates was many times higher than that of English primary schools. For example, in 1958, there were approximately 32,500 places for secondary students in English-medium schools, as compared to the under 22,000 places in Chinese-medium schools. However, in the same year, the number of students in Chinese-medium primary schools reached nearly 250,000, while those in English-medium primary schools numbered less than 30,000. In other words, while the number of students in Chinese-medium primary schools far exceeded that of the English-medium primary schools, the volume capability of the English-medium secondary schools was greater than that of the Chinese-medium secondary schools. Thus, many graduates of Chinese-medium primary schools either could not continue

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3 Statistics compiled from “Figure 1: The Educational Structure as at 31.3.58,” Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education,
with secondary schooling or were in the position of fighting for the limited number of available places in the English-medium secondary schools not taken by graduates of the English-medium primary schools. The chances of success in this endeavor were not only statistically slim, but required an ability to learn in English which many graduates of Chinese-medium primary schools simply did not have. Thus, throughout the 1950's and well into the 1960's, an inadequate provision of secondary schooling in Chinese marked the Hong Kong educational landscape.

The inability of Chinese secondary schools to meet the volume demand of the Chinese primary schools was paralleled by the inadequacy of Chinese-medium higher education relative to the demand from graduating secondary school students. The single university in Hong Kong up through the 1950's, the University of Hong Kong, was an English-medium institution, and as such only accepted those students whose English-language ability was at a sufficiently high level to handle university-standard work in English. This condition meant that the University of Hong Kong was populated largely by graduates of the English-medium secondary schools. In 1952, only three of
the 473 undergraduates at the University of Hong Kong who had studied at Hong Kong schools had graduated from Chinese-medium secondary schools. Thus, only the most exceptional of the Chinese-medium secondary school graduates had any chance of receiving a university education in Hong Kong.

Because of this paucity of opportunity, most students looked beyond Hong Kong for opportunities which would better match their language and other abilities. This student outflow, however, meant that Hong Kong’s deficiency in providing higher education for its Chinese-speaking student population did not reach crisis level until the 1950’s. Previously, many students who were qualified for university education but could not pass the Hong Kong University Matriculation examination in English entered universities in mainland China. In fact, a greater volume of students per year went to China for their university education than entered the University of Hong Kong. Furthermore, for those students particularly interested in Chinese studies, Hong Kong University was not regarded as offering as much prestige or quality in its programs as

Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1961-64: 9.
4 Keswick, 17.
5 Ibid., 5.
Chinese universities. Thus, students wishing to study not only in Chinese but about matters Chinese tended to prefer mainland Chinese universities over the University of Hong Kong. As an additional incentive, the financial burden of students in attending Chinese universities was much less than for the University of Hong Kong. The combination of linguistic, programmatic, and economic advantages made Chinese mainland universities an attractive option for hundreds of Hong Kong students graduating from Chinese-medium secondary schools.

With the change of regime in China in 1949, however, the volume of Hong Kong students going to China for tertiary education decreased dramatically. This meant that the need for continuing education in Chinese for secondary school graduates suddenly rose to an unprecedented level. This need was further augmented by the massive influx of students fleeing as refugees from mainland China into Hong Kong. By 1952, it was estimated that several thousand of these refugee students were residing in Hong Kong and seeking higher education opportunities. Thus, the combined

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. Exact figures re: Hong Kong students going to the Chinese mainland universities in the latter 1940’s are not available; estimates run between 200 and 800 students per year.
8 Ibid.
volume of students remaining in Hong Kong who formerly would have left, plus the addition of new refugee students in Hong Kong, made for a crisis situation in which the demand for post-secondary Chinese-medium education far exceeded the supply.

The Committee for Higher Education, faced with this immense problem, considered whether it might be best to rely on student outflow rather than develop more opportunities and institutions in Hong Kong. Given the fact that the refugee situation was an entirely unstable one, with no one being able to predict whether or how long the refugees then in Hong Kong might stay, the Committee felt some hesitation in recommending any large-scale investment in Hong Kong education lest the need for such investment soon disappear. The Commission discovered, with regards to the question of student outflow for higher education, that the closing of mainland China as a viable option caused many students to consider going elsewhere in Asia to continue their education. In 1951, 63 Hong Kong students went to Taiwan to pursue further Chinese-medium studies at the post-secondary level. Furthermore, many Hong Kong students were beginning to again become attracted to Japan as a study destination which, following the war,
was beginning to reopen its post-secondary Chinese-medium programs.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, a steady stream of top students continued to aim for universities in England such that in 1952, 131 Hong Kong students were enrolled in various higher education courses in England.\textsuperscript{10} One option available to the government, therefore, was to rely on a naturally-increasing outflow to Asian study destinations, while also allowing a rise in outflow to England for talented Hong Kong students.

Funneling more students from the colonies to the mother country, however, did not fall within the vision that the British had been developing for its colonies. To the contrary, policy was being formulated increasingly in the direction of solidifying and expanding the educational apparatus in the colonies rather than accepting a greater number of colonial students in schools and universities in England. In the 1949-50 report of the British Inter-University Council on Higher Education in the Colonies, this policy direction was re-emphasized:

\begin{quote}
It is agreed policy on educational grounds that a student should make the fullest use of the locally available facilities, and the situation is now developing in which it will be normal for a Colonial student to take his first degree at
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
his local university or college and proceed overseas only for post-graduate and specialist courses or for courses not provided locally.\footnote{Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, "Third

As this was the general policy direction of England towards its colonies, the option of feeding more students from Hong Kong secondary schools into English universities was not adopted.

Encouraging an outflow of students to other Asian countries for higher education seemed a viable alternative. This option would have absolved the British from the responsibility of providing education for Hong Kong post-secondary students on either colonial or mother-country soil. However, the committee studying these issues decided that investing in the development of the educational resources of Hong Kong itself was appropriate, important, and necessary. They reached this conclusion in part because of an overarching colonial policy directive which aimed to recognize local linguistic and cultural value in the colonies through developing local education.

Previously, the British Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, having made thorough investigation into the question of education based on local language and culture in 1945, concluded that:
In some of the areas with which we are concerned, the mother-tongue of students will be a well established language with a long history, assured standards and a wealth of literature. In some cases it may be the medium of at least part of the instruction.\textsuperscript{12}

The principle of honoring local language and culture seemed to apply to Hong Kong, for the 1951 committee felt that Hong Kong's "people have a more advanced cultural background than the peoples of most other Colonies."\textsuperscript{13} Expanding the educational structure in Hong Kong instead of encouraging students to pursue higher education elsewhere, then, would be in line with the general British policy of developing education in the colonies whenever linguistic and cultural resources seemed sufficiently rich to warrant such effort.

Even more importantly, the decision to expand higher education possibilities in Hong Kong resulted from the British colonial government's interpretation of the significance and role of Hong Kong in the Asian region and in the world at large. While developing education in the colony would indicate a respect for Chinese language and culture, Hong Kong was also an ideal site to introduce

\textsuperscript{12} Asquith, "Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, 1945," in Keswick: 54.
\textsuperscript{13} Keswick, 1.
Western culture and learning. By encouraging both Chinese and Western learning to develop alongside each other in Hong Kong, Chinese culture could become modernized while retaining its valuable Chinese characteristics. In the words of Hong Kong’s Director of Education:

Hong Kong may have a particular part to play in the development of higher educational courses in the medium of Chinese. What is needed are courses which will give due place to China’s own cultural and philosophical background; courses which will be modern in treatment and include the results of modern scholarship; courses which will be linked to the past but which will look to the future; courses which will enable Chinese to remain essentially Chinese, but at the same time enter into sympathetic relationship with the modern world.\(^{14}\)

The combination of Chinese and English higher education in Hong Kong, then, was to actualize a balancing act between Chinese and Western culture, to develop a way of being that would unify Chinese-ness and modern-ness. Students who were the product of this dual-faceted education would thus represent a unique blend of culture and learning. As explained by the Committee:

Because of the connexion with England [Hong Kong] should provide especially for English studies and for modern technical and professional studies of an English type and standard given in the medium of English. Because the people are Chinese and because of the close link with China it should

\(^{14}\) *Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58*: 3-4.
also provide for a variety of higher Chinese studies. Hong Kong students should therefore have the peculiar advantage of being influenced by the best of both English and Chinese thought. They should be of the East but have a sympathetic understanding of the ways of the West, and many of these should possess advanced modern knowledge of the techniques and standards of the West.  

The British were thus promoting, through education, a form of modernization that pays respect to and builds on existing cultural resources.

The co-existence and co-development of Chinese and English education in Hong Kong was to serve the further goal of promoting communication, interaction, and mutual inspiration between Chinese and English cultures:

The aims of higher education in Hong Kong are considerably influenced by the relationship of Hong Kong to England on the one hand and to China and the Far East on the other. It is in the field of higher education, as much as anywhere, that opportunity occurs for that interaction of English and Chinese thought which can stimulate and enrich both peoples and make for mutual understanding. . . . Hong Kong should certainly be a centre for the diffusion of English ideas and for interpreting the West to China. It should also be a centre for interpreting Chinese concepts to England and the West, a centre where Chinese and English thought can meet at all levels, and where comparative studies of language and philosophy can be developed. This bipolarity is essential. . . . To achieve this bipolarity it is necessary that both Chinese and

15 Keswick, 4.
English scholarship should be represented at the highest level.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus, Hong Kong would be made into a crossroads where the best of Chinese and English learning would meet.

The significance of Hong Kong's role was also in its position as a springboard by which to reach all of Asia. The British felt that, by making higher education in Hong Kong a regional model, they could influence education and culture in other areas of Asia as well. For this reason, they had chosen not to encourage student outflow to other Asian countries and instead invested in developing higher education in Hong Kong. By regarding the role of Hong Kong education in this light, they turned the potentially negative issue of Hong Kong's student transience into a positive. Instead of seeing the possible eventual departure of these refugee students as a wasted investment since they may not stay to work in Hong Kong after graduation, the British interpreted this as a means by which to spread their ideas of modern culture and Western knowledge. Thus the Committee suggested:

\textit{If Hong Kong really believes in the value of education and in the importance of its role in the Far East, it will go beyond a bare minimum, and will adopt a positive policy to assist these students. Should they prove to be only temporary}

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
visitors and finally return to China, they would provide a valuable means by which high standards and the best of Western and Chinese concepts might be diffused to wider areas; should they remain in Hong Kong, they would become Hong Kong residents fully entitled to all that can be provided. Many of these students will probably remain in Hong Kong; some will probably go to Taiwan, Borneo, Malaya and other Far Eastern territories; it is to be hoped also that future conditions will eventually enable many to return to China. They form a select group of intellectuals coming in the main from influential families, and it may be expected that their intellectual ability and advanced training will win for them influential positions. To neglect them would be to lack vision and to miss an opportunity to do what we know to be fundamentally right. 17

The Committee, then, hoped that students from all over Asia, after being educated in Hong Kong, would then return home as carriers of the modern Chinese education they had obtained and subsequently, having won "influential positions," would spread the fruits of their education as leaders throughout Asia.

Thus, the 1952 Commission Report and the policy decisions made subsequently in accordance to it all pointed in a direction favorable to the further development of Chinese higher education in Hong Kong. The British colonial government had made a clear decision to invest in developing Chinese higher education in Hong Kong, and to

17 Ibid., 5.
further make Hong Kong the model of enlightened modern education that forged together both Eastern and Western elements of learning and culture such as could be utilized in other colonies and in all of Asia. By combining an emphasis in Chinese-language studies, Chinese studies, modern Western education, and the improvement of East-West intellectual interaction, the British colonial government showed itself willing to invest in the growth of Chinese-medium higher education in its Hong Kong colony.

**Chinese Education in a Colonial University**

Having chosen to develop Chinese higher education in Hong Kong, the British colonial government had then to choose the method and form by which this development would take place. It decided that the best way to do this was to expand the existing University of Hong Kong in such a way as to both legitimize and increase higher education opportunities in the colony. The implementation of this plan at the university would follow a two-pronged approach by increasing general adult education in Chinese, on the one hand, and promoting Chinese studies in terms of research priorities, on the other hand.
First, the adult education program at the University of Hong Kong would be expanded through the combining of two existing programs. One of the programs was the adult education Chinese program then in operation at the university. The University of Hong Kong at that time provided some rather specialized academic courses in Chinese studies, such as "Civilization of the T'ang Dynasty" and "Modern Chinese Religious Organization." 18 The second program was the Evening School of Higher Chinese Studies. This Evening School was part of the matrix of institutions created and financed by the government which aimed to provide adult education of all types and at all levels to the working populace, both resident and refugee, of Hong Kong. The Evening School was distinguished from all the other night schools by virtue of its teaching in Chinese, its focus on Chinese studies subjects, and its level of academic rigor. Subjects offered at the Evening School of Higher Chinese Studies included Chinese Literature, Philosophy, Sociology, Philology, English Language and Literature. 19 It was the only public night school which offered a specific three-year program leading

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18 Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58: 11-12.
19 Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1958-61: 71.
to a government-issued academic diploma.\footnote{Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58: 10.} According the Hong Kong Education Department, "The Evening School of Higher Chinese Studies caters for more ambitious students who have already secured a Chinese School Certificate or its equivalent."\footnote{Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58: 10.}

While each of these programs had its own benefits and served the purpose of providing adult education to those working full-time, neither was flourishing. The courses in the adult education section of the University of Hong Kong numbered very few and had limited enrollment. Furthermore, they sometimes were taught not in Chinese but in English for the general education of British civil servants or others in the expatriate community. Thus they could not really serve the Chinese who wished further education in their own language regarding their own culture. The Evening School of Higher Chinese Studies also catered to a relatively small number of people. Being the most academic and most rigorous of the government adult night schools, requiring the highest level of pre-admission achievement, it remained quite small throughout its existence in the 1950's: by 1958, seven years after its founding, it still enrolled only 159 students, whereas other night schools
such as the Evening Institute, which offered more general courses, had 4,837 students and the Evening Government Technical School had 4,715. Furthermore, the fact that the program resulted in a diploma recognized only by the Hong Kong government in Hong Kong meant that the students' learning offered no official currency outside of Hong Kong. As many students were transient, the non-transferability of their diploma credentials outside Hong Kong considerably reduced the appeal of the Evening School program.

The low enrollment and limited capacity of both the University adult education program and the Evening School meant that the number of adults able to learn in Chinese about China was very small. The solution was therefore to pool the resources of the two programs to create a single, more broadly-based program. More importantly, the incorporation of the Evening Institute students under the University framework would allow the program to recast itself as one which could lead towards a university-level diploma that would have wider legitimacy and recognition. The government hoped that this strategy would increase the

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21 Ibid., 64.
22 Statistics compiled from “Figure 1: The Educational Structure as at 31.3.58,” Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58: 5.
23 Ibid., 32.
capacity of adult education offerings in Chinese as well as entice more students to enroll.

Aside from developing opportunities for adult education, however, the British colonial government wanted also to expand Chinese studies at the University of Hong Kong. Prior to the Committee's survey, the university did have a Department of Chinese Studies and an Institute of Far Eastern Studies. The Department of Chinese Studies offered specialized coursework in the traditional academic disciplines. However, even though the courses were offered in Chinese, admission to the university itself was only available to those with a high level of English skill, which meant that the department stayed rather small. Furthermore, the large number of required extra-departmental courses limited the degree to which students could concentrate on Chinese studies. The department also placed much emphasis on developing translation skills which, on the one hand, further narrowed the range of students who could major in the department by virtue of the difficulty of mastering both languages and, on the other hand, defocused study from China itself to the improvement of communication between China and the English-speaking
world. The Institute of Far Eastern Studies began with the grand two-pronged vision "to provide instruction in the Chinese language for officers of the Services and of the United Kingdom and Colonial Governments, and to provide facilities for distinguished scholars and research students from the United Kingdom and elsewhere." However, the second of these goals, that of convening people concerned with research on the Far East, had thus far not been met, so that the Institute had every appearance of catering only to the needs of British civil servants in the colony. Taken together, then, the Chinese education then existing at the University of Hong Kong seemed limited and British-oriented.

In order to improve the situation, the Committee recommended changes to both the Department of Chinese Studies as well as the Institute of Far Eastern Studies. First, the Department of Chinese Studies would be given priority in the hiring of new professors: three new professors were to be appointed in the traditional humanities fields of Chinese history, philosophy, and literature. In addition, the university was to make the

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24 Keswick, 17.
25 Ibid., 33.
26 Ibid.
development of research in the China-related fields a top priority. Of the top five areas of study denoted as most requiring further research, the first three were determined to be Chinese Language, Literature and Philosophy; Comparative Studies in English and Chinese; Far Eastern History. The latter two reveal the importance given not only to Chinese studies in and of itself but to studying China in broader and comparative contexts.

Second, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, which had primarily trained British civil servants, was to be recast as a major research center under the name of The Institute of Oriental Studies. Its objectives were:

... to provide facilities of research in Chinese and Oriental Studies for Eastern and Western scholars; to promote interest in Oriental Studies generally both within and without the University; to arrange for instruction in Oriental Languages and Literature; to provide a focus and meeting-place of students of all countries in the field of Oriental Studies; to promote good fellowship among such students; and to increase understanding and goodwill between the peoples of East and West.  

Emphasizing the international dimension of the Institute such that it would both attract people from all over the world as well as serve the central purpose of facilitating East-West communication and interaction reveals also the

27 Ibid., 19.
underlying desire of the British colonial government to make its Hong Kong colony a cultural and academic crossroads.

The British were also careful to plan the reorganization of the Institute such as to be considerably less oriented towards British standards and British civil servant training and more focused on the needs of Hong Kong itself. Both administratively and academically, the British policy sought to give autonomy and authority to the Institute. Thus the Committee recommended:

> We are concerned lest the objects of an institute controlled by universities in the United Kingdom should be too closely tied to the needs of overseas scholars and lest the research needs of the University and this Colony should be outweighed. Such an institute might appear in local eyes as a propaganda organization. We must urge that the direction of the Institute should be in the hands of the Hong Kong University. Only in this way could there be that easy linking of interests and projects with the research done under the direction of the professors of Chinese in this University.29

The British therefore designed the expansion of Chinese studies and research at the University of Hong Kong in such a way as to increase the sense that this expansion was genuinely meant to serve the interests

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28 Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1958-61: 41.
29 Keswick., 33.
of a changing Hong Kong rather than dictated by perspectives of the mother country.

However, in choosing to invest all their energy in expanding the University of Hong Kong, the government simultaneously chose to foreclose the option of establishing another university which would teach entirely in Chinese and focus heavily on Chinese studies. The reason for policy which expanded a single university rather than set up a new one with characteristics and specialties different from the existing university lay in the British vision of developing Hong Kong's identity as that of an East-West crossroads. The British colonial government believed that dividing universities along Chinese vs. English lines would serve neither the political nor the intellectual interests of the academic community. Rather, such a division would result in further distance instead of communion between the two sides:

Higher educational institutions which are purely English or purely Chinese in their organization and teaching cannot provide a proper meeting place of the exchange of Chinese and English thought. . . . We are convinced that the idea of a separate Chinese university must be rejected. To found such a university would be to deny the principles which, we believe, should govern all higher education in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's situation gives it unique advantages as a meeting place for Chinese and Western thought and ways of life, and it should be one of the first functions
of its University to bring them together. The University should provide the soil in which the seeds of Chinese and Western culture could come to full flowering side by side. This purpose can only be achieved within the walls of one university, for the emphasis must be on partnership and common purpose rather than on rivalry and delimitation of aim. Certainly it is difficult to see how a separate Chinese University could be founded on the basis of sound educational premises; indeed it might well lend itself to the furtherance of sectional or political views.30

The British saw the university, then, as a microcosm of society as whole: just as Hong Kong was to be the site of East-West meeting, so too must its university. By elevating Chinese studies within the university, both Western and Chinese learning could grow together and stimulate each other.

The British were thus willing to invest much effort in Chinese higher education. The full range of higher education, from adult continuing education to specialized research in matters Chinese, would be enhanced. Chinese-medium studies as well as Chinese studies and research would be expanded within and inserted into the University of Hong Kong such as to increase the quantity and range of opportunities available to students.

30 Ibid., 4, 25.
The Question of a Chinese University

While the policies formulated by the British colonial government, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Higher Education, provided for the development of Chinese higher education on multiple facets and levels, it failed to specify any action regarding those Chinese post-secondary schools already in existence in Hong Kong such as New Asia College. Although the British colonial government appeared willing to support the cause of Chinese education in Hong Kong and thus create an environment favorable to the further development of Chinese schools, the failure of the government to provide for any specific support for or define a clear role for these schools would lead to a great dispute between the schools and the government. This dispute, which would ultimately culminate in a victory for the Chinese schools, revealed both divergence and convergence between the perspectives of the schools and the government as regards Chinese higher education and its role in Hong Kong.

By the mid-1950's, there were in Hong Kong many private schools founded and administered by recently-arrived refugee intellectuals from mainland China. While some became part of the matrix of Chinese-medium secondary
schools already existing in Hong Kong, most were established at the post-secondary level. These schools were entirely private, following in a tradition of private education long established in Hong Kong. 31 These post-secondary colleges differed from private institutions in the past, however, in that they resulted from the specific refugee situation that suddenly brought both a significant student and teacher population into Hong Kong. 32 Representing a broad range of skills and interests, these colleges offered everything from general education to specialized professional or academic training. Because of the very Chinese nature of their constituent staff and student bodies, these colleges almost all taught in Chinese. They therefore played a highly significant role in meeting the immense need for Chinese-medium education in the 1950's which the British colonial government was seeking to address. 33

The government held a rather neutral attitude towards the post-secondary Chinese colleges like New Asia. On the

31 As of March 1949, 58% or 464 of 798 schools in Hong Kong were entirely private, while 289 or 36% were partially subsidized, with only 45 or 5.6% of schools being entirely or largely government schools. Thus, even before major influx of population, most initiative in education in Hong Kong was from private sources. Statistics compiled from Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58: 3-4.

32 Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1958-61: 45.
one hand, it recognized the important role these refugee colleges played at such an uncertain time: not only did they create additional educational opportunities for those who otherwise would have been denied the chance for further learning, but it also provided employment for refugee scholars and teachers. On the other hand, the government was hesitant to involve itself deeply in the affairs of these colleges, preferring instead to leave them to their own financial and administrative devices. It regarded this type of institution as providing education for the native and refugee Chinese population in matters Chinese, which would serve a useful foundation for further study particularly in English. The government described the Chinese colleges this way:

It is not surprising that many Chinese, having such a long history and a developed literature and philosophy, should wish to secure a good knowledge of their own culture before embarking on higher studies in the medium of English. The result has been . . . a considerable growth in the number of students seeking entry to the new post-secondary colleges which offer courses in a wide range of subjects in the medium of Chinese. These colleges, established in the first instance to meet the needs of refugee students, certainly have permanent place in the educational system of Hong Kong, and are increasingly meeting the needs of students from local Chinese secondary schools.

33 Hong Kong Triennial Survey by the Director of Education, 1955-58: 8.
who in earlier years entered Chinese universities on the mainland. 34

This statement, though acknowledging the importance and long-lasting value of the Chinese colleges, also appeared to subordinate them to the English higher education for which these schools seemed to be preparatory. The idea that these colleges, though clearly functioning as post-secondary institutions, were considered by the government to be operating at a level below that of any university, or the University of Hong Kong specifically, roused the ire of New Asia and the other Chinese colleges.

The Chinese colleges found particularly problematic the insinuation that they were somehow below par relative to the University of Hong Kong. They therefore found insincere the claim of the British colonial government that the reason for expanding Chinese studies at a single university rather than forming a separate Chinese university was to encourage mutual cooperation and stimulation between English and Chinese education within one institution. The position of New Asia and the other Chinese colleges was that the British colonial government's refusal to consider establishing another university where Chinese would be the medium of instruction was that the

34 Ibid., 3-4.
British in fact did not consider that a Chinese education could be truly worthy of a university degree. They took the phrase from the British statement "it is difficult to see how a separate Chinese University could be founded on the basis of sound educational premises" to mean that a Chinese-medium and China-focused institution of higher education could only offer a standard of learning less than that of a modern university.

The Chinese colleges pointed particularly to two aspects of the British attitude which they felt to be intolerably condescending as well as absolutely inaccurate. First, they found untenable the British doubt about the quality of available Chinese textbooks. The British believed that a lack of good textbooks in Chinese was seriously handicapping education at all levels in Hong Kong. At the post-secondary level, their suggested solution was to increase the usage of English textbooks, on the one hand, and to expand the work of translating English textbooks into Chinese, on the other hand. They did not propose that access to existing Chinese textbooks should be improved or that funds should be allocated to promote the further writing of Chinese textbooks. Interestingly, funds

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35 Keswick, 20, 39.
were allocated to the writing of new Chinese textbooks for the lower levels, as curriculum materials for primary and secondary education were regarded as needing to be tailored specifically to the local situation. However, as higher education was seen as an endeavor which must meet global, specifically Western, standards, the British were ever-concerned that existing Chinese textbooks were sufficient neither in quantity nor in quality to justify their principal use at the university level. Without sufficient quality textbooks, one of the fundamental tools of formal education, the British were wary of recognizing the Chinese as capable of offering a Chinese-medium education at the university level.

Second, and at an even deeper level, New Asia saw the British issue with textbooks as revealing a more fundamental disbelief in the depth and value of Chinese scholarship and learning. The British had made an effort to recognize the worth of Chinese as a medium of instruction and as a tool for learning. As explained above, the British had developed a general policy in the 1940’s regarding their colonies that allowed the native language of a colony to be used at least in part for

36 Ibid., 39.
education if deemed a "well established" one, and as Hong Kong was judged to be of strong cultural background, Chinese was determined to be appropriate as a language of instruction. The British also felt that allowing Chinese to be used in higher education was a way of honoring Hong Kong and its Chinese heritage, which would have an ameliorative effect on British-Chinese relations. As explained in the Keswick report:

The introduction of courses in the medium of Chinese implies a recognition of the prestige of the Chinese language and of Chinese thought which many Chinese will welcome. It should therefore serve as a further step towards the goal of mutual understanding.37

However, New Asia and the other Chinese colleges felt that, although the British were willing to recognize the worth of Chinese language and culture to a certain extent, their primary persuasion was still one of condescension. In other words, they felt that the British had some degree of respect towards them, but not enough to acknowledge the true depth and rigor of Chinese thought and culture. Therefore, they saw the British decision to not allow the establishment of a separate Chinese university as resulting from their belief that Chinese learning was not worth a modern university degree.
For example, the British attitude towards the Chinese and their learning of modern science indicated their sense that the Chinese were far behind the West in learning. The Keswick Report made this comment:

The Chinese have come late to the study of Western Science, and their progress has been further retarded by the difficulty of adapting their language to modern needs. In the early days, little attempt was made to attack the problem, and there was a general acquiescence in the view that instruction could be given only in some other language which had already acquired the necessary scientific vocabulary. It is not surprising, therefore, that the scientific attitude should have remained alien to the Chinese habit of thought and way of life.38

This comment betrays a sense of superiority on the part of the British on multiple levels. On the simplest level, it is stating simply that the Chinese are "behind" the West in progress as regards science. The implication on this level is least condescending in that it seems to imply rather neutrally that the Chinese are only less developed scientifically because they "have come late" to its study. However, the statement goes on to include evaluative commentary on issues of language and thinking. By stating that Chinese progress in and study of science was slowed by virtue of the incompatibility between the Chinese language

37 Ibid., 26.
38 Ibid., 29.
and scientific vocabulary, they make a judgment not only as to the ability of the Chinese language to accommodate "modern needs" but also the extent to which the Chinese have been able to become modern and scientific in their "habit of thought and way of life."

The British attitude was not, however, that Chinese were essentially incapable of becoming modern and scientific. In fact, they were very careful to advocate that more science should be taught in Hong Kong, immediately and at a high level and in Chinese, so as to advance the modernization of Chinese language and thinking: "The Chinese language can be used for the teaching of science; if the Chinese are to become scientifically minded, it must be so used." The British were therefore not denigrating the Chinese on the level of potential, for they clearly believed in the Chinese potential to become modern and scientific. However, they seemed to regard the Chinese as not yet having reached the standard of modern and scientific thinking which, when taught at the post-secondary level, would justify university rank.

Thus, the Chinese colleges read in the British statement of policy an underlying belief that the Chinese

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39 Ibid.
were far behind the West in general and Britain in particular. The government's willingness to improve and expand education was therefore, while generous, a manifestation of those regarding themselves as strong extending aid to the weak below them. For example, the statement explaining the necessity of expanding the University of Hong Kong rather than establish a separate Chinese university seemed particularly condescending:

Never before in its previous history has the conception of the University's mission in Hongkong been so clear: that mission involves a leading part in the teaching of western modern and scientific subjects to Chinese students.40

The British clearly believed that their educational role in Hong Kong was to teach its Chinese inhabitants to become modern and scientific in their learning, their language, and their thinking. Taken together with the goal whereby the British could use Hong Kong as a base from which to influence the intellectual modernization of all of Asia, the British attitude seemed to be a form of cultural infiltration.

The fundamental dissatisfaction of the Chinese colleges with the British attitude and policy directives came to a head in 1957, five years after the publication of the Keswick Report. In the preceding half a decade, the government had sought to implement the suggestions of the Report, namely to expand the mechanisms and resources of the University of Hong Kong in Chinese studies and Chinese-medium education. In 1957, one of the members of the Keswick committee, a professor of education at the University of Hong Kong, wrote a series of articles to assess this process of implementation, evaluate policy direction, as well as consider any new factors or issues which may have arose since the Committee formulated its suggestions. Professor Priestley published his articles in the *South China Morning Post*, the premiere English-language newspaper in Hong Kong. These articles essentially re-articulated and re-emphasized the principal attitudes and policy directives of the Keswick Report, but now in a public forum. New Asia and the other Chinese colleges, all of whom had had been stewing in their dissatisfaction with the Keswick Report for the previous five years, saw the newspaper publication of the principles of the Keswick Report, reincarnated in the form of Prof. Priestley's
articles, as an opportunity to also make public their own dissatisfaction. Thus, they published in the *South China Morning Post* a collective response to Priestley's articles which, by implication, simultaneously served as a critique of the British colonial government's policies on higher education in Hong Kong.

New Asia and the other Chinese colleges attacked the British position on three fronts. First, the implied assumption of Western superiority to Chinese in learning was attacked by the Chinese colleges. They argued their objection at both the practical and more abstract levels. On the most basic level, they disagreed with the position of the British that the Chinese colleges did not have sufficient quality tools to qualify them as universities. In addressing the particular problem of textbooks, the Chinese colleges found outrageous the implied suggestion that Chinese universities on the mainland would have been awarding degrees for the past half-century without quality Chinese textbooks. They pointed out that colleges in Hong Kong actually had an advantage in terms of access to quality textbooks from multiple sources. Being positioned in Hong Kong, New Asia and the other Chinese colleges could obtain textbooks from the mainland as well as from Taiwan,
thus having a wider selection than either place. Hong Kong was also ideally positioned to access a huge range of books translated from other languages, particularly English ones. In fact, Hong Kong colleges could obtain educational materials from any country due to its political neutrality.41 Therefore, the argument that university-standard textbooks and other educational materials were not abundant enough or available enough was dismissed by the Chinese colleges as a valid reason for denying them university status.

The Chinese colleges likewise disputed the British assumption that the standard of Chinese learning was simply not high enough to deserve university appellation. They pointed to British ignorance of the depth of the Chinese scholarly tradition, and accused the particular officials and professors who had been appointed to the Keswick committee, and Prof. Priestley in particular, as being fundamentally unknowledgeable about the Chinese intellectual and cultural tradition. In reference to Prof. Priestley, they countered: "Before deciding that Chinese cannot be the medium of instruction in university education of high standard, we should like to ask what Prof.

41 "Chinese Colleges Joint Council's Analysis of Prof. Priestley's
Priestley knows of the standard of graduates of Chinese Universities on the Mainland over the last 50 years. Is his own knowledge of Chinese language, history, and culture sufficient to judge?” The Chinese colleges also countered with statements about the quality of Chinese learning: “China has its own educational ideals and traditions, fully as ancient and as well tried as those of the west.” By pointing out that the British did not know enough about Chinese education to evaluate it, the Chinese colleges sought to discredit the British judgment of Chinese learning and the policy decisions they formulated based on that judgment.

Because the Chinese colleges felt that the British refusal to establish a separate Chinese university revealed their fundamental condescension to the Chinese colleges particularly and to Chinese learning generally, they dismissed the argument that both Western and Chinese learning had to be housed in the same institution, namely the University of Hong Kong, in order for East-West exchange to be optimized. The Chinese colleges saw such a union rather as a way to keep Chinese studies subordinate

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42 Ibid., 27.
43 Ibid., 28.
to Western learning. From the perspective of the Chinese colleges, the only way to ensure that Chinese and Western learning would be regarded as equal was to have them represented in separate institutions. They argued that the University of Hong Kong would remain centered on Western learning despite any proposed growth in Chinese studies. They further pointed out that the nature of the University of Hong Kong was fundamentally that of a colonial university and therefore would remain in essence a training-ground for civil servants and other contributors to a Hong Kong as envisioned by its colonial rulers.

The Chinese colleges thus argued that the British insistence that Hong Kong maintain only one university was founded on the need to protect colonial interests rather than on any consideration of local needs or the desire to create the best possible environment for East-West intellectual and scholarly exchange. They wrote:

Nearly everyone will agree with his persuasive argument to the effect that the United Kingdom does not need more than one University in Hongkong. But it is misleading, to say the least, to assume that any British university, however high its standards may be, can hope to meet the educational needs of a predominantly Chinese-speaking population....A colonial university does have an important and useful role to play: in giving education to the professional English-speaking minority; in training civil servants and other technicians who will reduce
the cost and other staffing problems of colonial administration, and in maintaining a model community of Western scholars who may find opportunity for cultural interchange with their Chinese equals, provided that a similar Chinese University is allowed to exist. In point of fact very little such interchange is now possible even at the University of Hong Kong, because it all takes places on Western terms.\textsuperscript{44}

The Chinese colleges thus clearly felt that the attaining of equal status for Chinese studies would be impossible so long as the University of Hong Kong was the only university allowed to exist in Hong Kong.

Because the Chinese colleges felt that all learning occurring at the University of Hong Kong was through a Western filter and on Western terms, the education Chinese students could obtain there would not appropriately prepare them for becoming contributing citizens of their own society. According to the Chinese colleges, only a Chinese-oriented university could train future leaders for Chinese societies. The University of Hong Kong, they felt, was still mired in older concepts of colonial administration and the preparation of students for service in that administration. This, they felt, was a negative form of inertia whereby the University of Hong Kong, instead of changing its fundamental orientation and

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 27.
strategy according to the broader changes in Hong Kong society, sought to maintain a colonial stronghold over Hong Kong people. Thus the Chinese colleges claimed:

The University, for all its freedom and all its wealth, has not been able to change as rapidly as the community it was designed to serve.... The changes in Hong Kong are not limited to the growth of population; just as significant are the changes in economics, politics and in the cultural sphere.... [W]hat has Hongkong become today? Are not modern ideas of Trusteeship coming to replace the aims of Colonialism? 45

Under a gradual move towards Trusteeship rather than total governance as a model for colonial rule, the Chinese colleges argued that education should keep pace with this move and allow an ever-greater degree of autonomy for Chinese to educate themselves rather than allow the University of Hong Kong to acquire even more range and power. Only when Chinese in Hong Kong could have their own university would they be able to develop self-governance and leadership for their own people:

The graduates of a Chinese university may not be able to read Chaucer, but they will be able to read the great classical writers of their own civilizations. They may not be able to pass examinations in English set by scientific and professional bodies in the United Kingdom, but they will be able to communicate and use the knowledge they have in a Chinese-speaking society....Cannot those who are trained in the medium of Chinese give more useful leadership to

their own people than those who are trained to think and work only in English?"\textsuperscript{46}

The Chinese colleges saw the question of training Chinese leaders as important not only in terms of self-governance but, more importantly, because they felt that only they themselves could understand the needs of Chinese scholarship and Chinese society and the relationship between the two. Particularly, New Asia and the other Chinese colleges felt that the University of Hong Kong could not understand the ideal of traditional Chinese education in nurturing the whole person rather than simply dispensing knowledge that would serve a professional goal following graduation. They also believed that only they could give students the cultural education they needed while severed physically from their mainland Chinese roots:

In Hongkong, it may be argued that there is still a greater need for general cultural education beyond middle school for Chinese young people who live in a rootless and over-commercialised environment. The development in them of a sense of social responsibility alone requires it. Furthermore, this is consistent with China's own tradition of higher education and the Chinese ideal of an 'Educated man.'\textsuperscript{47}

Thus, the Chinese colleges believed strongly that the British-run University of Hong Kong would be fundamentally

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 28-29.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 29.
incapable of understanding, and therefore of implementing, an education which would be in line with Chinese educational values, respond to local Chinese needs, and prepare Chinese students for leadership in Chinese society. They therefore objected to the British colonial government's "basic assumptions concerning the nature and function of a University in Chinese society." 48

The question of whether the University of Hong Kong could provide adequate and relevant education to Chinese students assumed added significance because of the Chinese colleges' broader vision of the purpose of Chinese higher education in Hong Kong. The colleges saw Hong Kong as playing a crucial role in Chinese higher education which could only be achieved if Chinese studies in Hong Kong did not become entirely incorporated into the University of Hong Kong. The migration of Chinese intellectuals to Hong Kong, combined with the extreme decrease of Hong Kong and Chinese students from elsewhere returning to mainland China for a Chinese university education, meant that Hong Kong was increasingly becoming a center for Chinese studies in Asia. Students from other Asian countries who previously might have entered mainland Chinese universities now were

48 Ibid., 25.
looking to Hong Kong for opportunities in Chinese higher education. This phenomenon, as discussed above, had already been noted by the British colonial government and was in fact one of their principal reasons for choosing to invest in Chinese higher education in Hong Kong despite student transience there.

However, whereas the British saw this as an opportunity to spread Western learning throughout Asia, the Chinese colleges wanted to take this chance to expand Chinese studies and make Hong Kong a meeting place for Chinese scholars and intellectuals. Thus, the Chinese colleges argued that, whereas the University of Hong Kong had a role as a colonial university in training civil servants and propagating Western learning, only a Chinese-run Chinese-medium Chinese studies-focused university could tailor to the cultural and intellectual needs of Chinese people, not only in Hong Kong but all over Asia.

Has not Hongkong become, in fact, a major centre of Chinese culture and education, providing literature, technical services, educational opportunities, and other forms of leadership for the whole of Southeast Asia? In Chung Chi College alone, there are more than 50 students from this region; at New Asia College, students have already enrolled from as far away as Korea in the north and Indonesia to the south. The need for Chinese higher education is one that is felt in a wide area of which Hongkong is only the centre. If the University exists to serve
Hongkong, the post-secondary Chinese colleges are one way in which Hongkong may serve the whole of Southeast Asia at a very critical time. We believe that Hongkong has had thrust upon it a responsibility entirely new in its history for the development and strengthening of Chinese University education.49

By addressing the need for Chinese education not only in Hong Kong but in all of Asia, the Chinese colleges countered the British need to propagate Western learning to Asia via Hong Kong with their own program for training Chinese leaders for Asia and educating Chinese in the Chinese tradition of the "educated man."

A New University

The proposed development of Chinese studies at the University of Hong Kong did not progress as much as was planned in the years following the Committee for Higher Education report in 1952. Problems with funding limited the expansion of both general Chinese-medium education and advanced Chinese studies and research at the University. Meanwhile, the Chinese colleges, over the course of the 1950's, became increasingly organized individually and collectively. Not only had they improved their individual internal administrations but also had together formed a

49 Ibid., 26.
Chinese Colleges Joint Council in 1957. This Council was meant to address issues and problems of common concern to the post-secondary colleges whose instruction medium was Chinese. In fact, by the time of the Priestley articles which they found so objectionable, they had already coalesced as a Council and were increasingly speaking as one voice. Thus the British colonial government was increasingly forced to deal with the Chinese colleges not as separate ad hoc refugee institutions but as a relatively permanent and cohesive force.\textsuperscript{50}

Faced with the relative strength of the Chinese colleges vs. the limited growth of Chinese studies at the University of Hong Kong, the British colonial government accepted the arguments the Chinese colleges made in response to the Priestley articles. In June of 1959, the British colonial government announced its intention to establish a new Chinese university. Not only was the university to teach in Chinese but was also to serve as a center for research in Chinese studies. According to the government policy statement, "the desirability of encouraging Chinese traditional scholarship and developing modern studies in the medium of Chinese had been

\textsuperscript{50} Lovett report, April 6, 1959: YC 232-83-498.
The university was thus to serve the two-fold purpose of both developing Chinese studies, on the one hand, and expanding higher education in Hong Kong by providing it in Chinese, on the other.

The new university was to be a federally constituted one, with the existing Chinese post-secondary colleges vying for incorporation into the university by proving they fulfilled the curricular and structural requirements laid down by the British colonial government. Once accepted under the university scheme, a college would obtain government funding for further development according to the principles and parameters of the new university. When the government made its announcement in 1959, New Asia College was regarded as one of the prime candidates for incorporation into the new university. The road for New Asia's development thus seemed paved in gold: as long as New Asia could access the resources of and cooperate with the British colonial government, the path to successful expansion seemed assured.

Although the quarrel over the position of the Chinese colleges in Hong Kong society ultimately resolved in favor...
of the colleges, the nature of the discrepancies between their views reveal much about the perspectives from which each were drawing their arguments. The fundamental issue of what constitutes a university education is one that would return repeatedly in the future as a matter to debate. Even at this early stage, though, it was evident that the ranking of Chinese learning was a point of contention. While the British colonial government was slow to acknowledge that Chinese scholarship and Chinese higher education might be worthy of university appellation, the Chinese colleges pronounced their unwavering faith in the value of both Chinese studies and of Chinese as a medium of instruction and learning. The British were intent on making the Chinese colleges conform to a standard of university learning which they considered to be global, whereas the Chinese colleges were much more focused on providing education that would answer the needs of the Chinese people and the Hong Kong locale. While the British wished to direct the development and the role of the Chinese colleges, the Chinese colleges sought to resist the colonial power and criteria imposed on them from above.

Of even broader significance were the conceptual constructions both government and colleges created with
regards to Hong Kong as a cultural and educational crossroads between East and West. Though both continuously referred to the importance of dialogue between East and West, both in fact emphasized the learning in which they had expertise and investment: the University of Hong Kong remained principally a British colonial university, while the new university derived its strength and identity from Chinese language and studies. While both continuously employed the terms “East” and “West” as general cultural designators, in fact each meant these terms to indicate their own specific cultural and educational traditions, namely Chinese and English respectively. And increasingly both focused mainly on using Hong Kong as a means to promote the educational culture to which each attached most intellectual and emotional faith.

The symbolism of Hong Kong as a crossroads became increasingly significant as the 1950’s went on. Whereas in the early years the refugee nature of the Chinese colleges was in many ways their most prominent characteristic, by 1959 when the British colonial governmental decided to form a new Chinese university, the fluctuation of the intellectual population had subsided considerably. In this sense, the decision to establish a university represented
an acknowledgement on the part of both the government and the colleges that the students and teachers of those colleges had transitioned from refugee to resident status in Hong Kong. The fact that these intellectuals would likely not return to the Chinese mainland in the foreseeable future meant that Hong Kong, instead of experiencing continuous "brain drain" whereby advanced students largely departed for higher educational opportunities elsewhere, became instead a symbol and a site at which varying cultures and educational forms converged. The position of the guardians of education in Hong Kong and, in turn, the educational position of Hong Kong in Asia, would therefore acquire ever more layers of meaning and symbolic power. The decision to form a new Chinese university in 1959, then, marked not the end of the struggle over these meanings and symbols but rather the beginning of a new phase whereby the gap between the Chinese colleges and the British colonial government would be continuously reassessed and the distinct nature of New Asia College would become absolutely apparent.
Part C: The Clash of Expectations

The decision of the British colonial government in 1959 to create a new Chinese university represented a major victory for the Chinese colleges. Not only did it signal a genuine and formal recognition on the part of the British colonial government of the quality and the significance of Chinese education, but also revealed the organizational influence the Chinese colleges could collectively exert. Their cooperative fight for the possibility of university status indicated too the relative power and permanence of their position in Hong Kong and signified the potential parameters of their influence in the Hong Kong's cultural, intellectual, and educational scene.

For New Asia College, the victory for Chinese higher education should have been especially sweet. Although the Chinese colleges benefiting from British support were potentially many, New Asia as an institution had particular significance on Hong Kong's cultural scene because of its image as an especially strong proponent of things Chinese. The strength of New Asia's faculty in Chinese studies, the community outreach programs of the Night School and the Cultural Open Forum, the promotion of Chinese studies
research at the Research Institute, the heavily-Chinese curriculum of the College - through the combination of all these factors, New Asia had created for itself an image of unwaveringly commitment to the promotion of Chinese culture and education.

Not only was this the perception of New Asia held by the general Hong Kong society, but the British colonial government too had come to recognize New Asia as a leader, and in fact a symbol, of Chinese education. The Hong Kong government’s Director of Education openly affirmed that it considered New Asia the best of the Chinese post-secondary schools, with the best qualified faculty generally and in Chinese studies specifically, surpassing those at the University of Hong Kong. In acknowledgement of this, the government had already given New Asia a land grant in 1955 to support its further development.¹ Also in 1955, when the University of Hong Kong conferred an honorary doctorate on Qian Mu, this was understood by Hong Kong society to be a public demonstration of the government’s support for the development of Chinese higher education in Hong Kong, with New Asia taken as the representative of that development.²

New Asia therefore had become, both for society and for the

government, the symbol of Chinese higher education generally and the Chinese colleges specifically. As "the most Chinese of the Chinese colleges," then, the government's 1959 policy decision should have signaled the supreme success of the New Asia enterprise in Chinese cultural education.

The sense of victory over the government's 1959 decision to create a Chinese university, however, was extremely short-lived; in fact, it was already tainted with tension at the moment of its inception. Having chosen to establish a new university, the British colonial government was also compelled to delineate the exact standards by which the university would be defined. Specially, this entailed laying out the criteria which the various Chinese colleges must fulfill before granting incorporation into the new university. The government had decided, after appointing a special Commission to study the issue, that the best format for the new university was a federal one by which qualified Chinese colleges could join a central university structure while retaining much of their original identity and autonomy as a college. The benefit of the federal system would lie in its ability to regulate and coordinate from a centralized administration without
forcing the colleges to give up their individual strengths and educational orientations. The retention of separate college identities, however, did not mean that they could each function completely on their own terms. To the contrary, government policy required that each college meet with certain specifications before it could be ensured incorporation into the new university scheme and the governmental financial support that entailed. Thus as soon as the plan was announced, the Chinese colleges that hoped to join the new university began to alter and "upgrade" their programs so as to meet government specifications.

While each of the colleges had their own struggles over the nature and extent of these changes, the battle between New Asia and the British colonial government was particularly fierce. So divergent were their conceptions of curriculum on the one hand and the Hong Kong site on the other hand that New Asia, more than once, came perilously close to withdrawing from the university incorporation process altogether. Although ultimately these battles were resolved sufficiently to allow New Asia to become one of the founding colleges of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

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Kong in 1963, the struggle over the degree to which New Asia could retain its mission and orientation continued to plague the development of New Asia within the university structure and ultimately produced an irreparable rift that would conspicuously mark the direction of New Asia's future.
Chapter 5:
The University Dream Turned on its Head

Cultural Symbolism and University Control

From the beginning, New Asia’s leaders were extremely anxious lest joining the university strip it of too much of its own autonomy. As soon as New Asia began to undergo the university incorporation procedures, the arguments over which issues could be assumed under centralized university authority and which must remain in the jurisdiction of the colleges mounted. New Asia steadfastly resisted any attempts by the government to over-standardize the colleges, thereby causing each to increasingly lose its unique identity. When the government sought to institute common external examinations for the students of all colleges, New Asia protested that a common evaluation system would “produce a ‘factory’ product and tend to destroy the special characteristics of the individual colleges.”¹ The government suggestion that the colleges pool their libraries to form one centralized university library was also met with resistance; Qian protested directly to the University Preparatory Committee with the

statement: "A centralized library . . . inconveniences the constituent Colleges in pursuing their specialization."\(^2\)

New Asia also tried to convince the government to keep all teaching and research functions within the colleges themselves such that the university central administration would only coordinate these between the colleges rather than manage them directly.\(^3\)

Thus New Asia made every effort to ensure that joining the new university would not diminish its unique characteristics. These efforts, however, represented more than a fight for general retention of power and autonomy. More specifically, New Asia wished to make certain that the College would continue to be administered in what they regarded as a "Chinese" fashion. For example, when the government insisted that faculty and administrative positions for the colleges be subject to open recruitment rather than be filled by personal connections, New Asia argued that such action would constitute a breach of decorum from the perspective of Chinese culture. As explained by Yale-China representative Schoyer:

Dr. Chien said he would be willing to advertise teaching posts but when it came to Deans, Vice

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\(^2\) Letter, Qian to University Preparatory Committee, July 8, 1962; YC 232-94-711.

\(^3\) Schoyer Report, June 1, 1963; YC 232-15-180.
Presidents and other high administrative officers he felt from a Chinese point of view that it was quite impossible, that first-rate Chinese simply wouldn't fill out an application, they would have to be invited.4

Issues of administrative management such as these were thus cast not only in terms of autonomy but in a framework of cultural praxis. By insisting that the very procedures and principles of educational administration were themselves points of cultural contention, New Asia made culture the abstract battleground on which concrete matters of administrative power and process were fought.

The issue of hiring and appointing key personnel was of particular concern to New Asia in that the loss of control over this process was feared to mean increasing difficulty in maintaining fidelity to the College's founding ideals. New Asia invested a great deal of importance in not only the scholarly merits but the personal quality of its personnel in view of the need to maintain people who would work to uphold the ideals of the college. Thus New Asia adamantly countered governmental attempts to ensure objective governance of the colleges by mandating that the council of each college be composed principally of people external to the college itself; they

feared that, "if the majority of Governors are externally nominated, they will not necessarily be sympathetic to the College’s views and aims." The right to define the principles and parameters of the College’s operations in accordance with the “views and aims” laid out in the New Asia educational and cultural ideal was thus of paramount concern as they faced various government demands for change.

The issue that proved most volatile in terms of cultural practice was a question of symbolism and representation. The degree of sensitivity attached to this issue was such that the College nearly withdrew entirely from the university incorporation program in protest. The problem began when the British colonial government suggested to New Asia in early October of 1959 that the College not fly the Nationalist flag of the Republic of China on the national day of October 10 which it had heretofore been in the practice of doing. The government request stemmed from its concern over the issue of maintaining a public stance of political neutrality in its educational system. This interest in sustaining an image of neutrality had already caused some conflict between the

5 Ibid.
government and New Asia. For instance, when the Yale-China Association was negotiating the terms of funding New Asia, New Asia was required to relinquish its funds from Chiang Kai-shek before the British would approve Yale-China's support of the College.\(^6\) Though reluctant to give up any funding generally and this Taiwan funding connection in particular, New Asia was forced to comply in view of the greater sum offered by Yale-China and the need to retain governmental approval.

The issue of the college's staff profile also caused the government to wonder whether New Asia was politically aligned with the Nationalists on Taiwan. Because New Asia's leaders, particularly Qian Mu, had many connections to Taiwan, the college had often filled its faculty and administrative posts with people from Taiwan. The government had chosen to largely ignore this issue in the years prior to its decision to form a new university. Having established the Chinese university scheme, however, it assumed control over the political positioning of the new institution and its constituent colleges. Thus in the fall of 1959 when Qian tried to fill the new Dean of Students and Dean of the Research Institute positions by

\(^6\) See Chapter 3.
his personal connections in Taiwan, the Hong Kong colonial government resisted these appointments out of fear that they indicated too strong a connection to Taiwan and potentially implied even direct political influence from Taiwan on New Asia’s curricular and cultural orientation. Qian refused so adamantly to allow the government to restrict New Asia’s hiring of administrative personnel that he won his way on these particular appointments. Yet the government remained highly attuned to the political implications of New Asia’s actions, for it maintained a strong suspicion that the college was generally identified with Taiwan and Nationalist politics and as such threatened the image of neutrality the government wished to maintain for its new Chinese university.

When the issue of flag-flying came to a head, then, there had already been other points of contention between New Asia and the British colonial government which indicated a divergence over the issue of neutrality. The government was primarily concerned about ensuring that Beijing could not accuse it of any overt expression of partiality to Taiwan. For New Asia, however, the connection to Taiwan was meant to represent a deeper

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7 Schoyer to Lovett letter, October 17, 1959; YC 232-94-705.
connection to Chinese culture. The New Asia leaders flew the Taiwan flag not out of allegiance to the Nationalist government or the Nationalist party; rather, they had appropriated the flag as a symbol of the true China. Mourning the mainland which had been usurped by the communists, living in a British-controlled colony, they saw Taiwan as the truest existing representation of China and Chinese culture. They certainly disliked the actual political reality of Taiwan and its excessive controls over society and culture; hence they did not choose Taiwan as the site for developing their cultural promotion program.\(^8\)

However, this did not prevent them from seeing Taiwan as the best of the available symbols of a true China. Their flying of the Taiwan flag, then, was meant as an indication of love for and loyalty to their concept of this true China and its culture.

So fervent were their feelings for this flag that, when the government requested that it not be flown, the leaders of New Asia threatened withdrawal from the university incorporation scheme if forced to comply. Yale-China representative Schoyer, attempting to help New Asia

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\(^8\) Schoyer to Lovett letter, November 8, 1959; YC 232-94-705.

\(^9\) For further discussion on New Asia's perception of Taiwan, please see Chapter 3.
negotiate with the government so as not to derail the university incorporation plan, described the feelings at New Asia with these words:

The Chinese countered that they flew the flag not as representatives of Taiwan or of political cliques or parties but as Chinese; it was the only living symbol they had and simply represented free Chinese, republican China and traditional Chinese culture. ¹⁰

In further explication of the perceptions of New Asia’s key personnel about the Taiwanese flag and the Taiwanese connection, Schoyer notes:

On Chien Mu’s part he considers the Taiwan link simply a Chinese, emotional tie, not a political one. To him the flag is the flag of the Republic of China and not the KMT flag (which is true) and therefore non-political. ¹¹

Qian and others thus conceptually separated the political from the cultural in their support for Taiwan generally and their flying of the Taiwanese flag specifically. Tang Junyi especially saw a clear division between politics and culture such as to make the flag a symbol solely of the latter:

And to Dean Tang who is [the flag’s] most emotional exponent, it is purely a symbol of principles; he has little use for politics and is against Nationalist politics. The flag stands for country, the good earth, the people and the way of life and culture of China, which these

¹⁰ Schoyer to Lovett letter, November 8, 1959; YC 232-94-705.
¹¹ Schoyer to Lovett letter, October 17, 1959; YC 232-94-705.
people dream about nostalgically and with broken hearts.\textsuperscript{12}

The Taiwanese flag, then, was embraced as a cultural symbol of China which tied them emotionally to the motherland while physically separated from it.

Yale-China Association personnel, particularly representative Schoyer, found themselves "sympathetic" to this type of emotional bonding with the Chinese mainland and Chinese culture. After all, Yale-China itself was principally interested in the promotion of Chinese culture in Hong Kong for the purpose of returning a fortified Chinese culture to the mainland. The emotional potency New Asia invested in the symbol of the flag resonated with Yale-China precisely because it recognized the significance of cultural symbols and viewed the college as itself a cultural symbol.\textsuperscript{13}

Nevertheless, Yale-China personnel found the reaction of New Asia to the governmental stance rather extreme.\textsuperscript{14} From Yale-China's perspective, the emotion accorded to the symbol of the flag should not override the importance of raising the College's status through its joining the new

\textsuperscript{12} Schoyer to Lovett letter, November 3, 1960; YC 232-94-707.

\textsuperscript{13} See Chapter 3 for discussion on the consonance between New Asia's and Yale-China's views on Chinese culture and Yale-China's perception of New Asia College as a cultural symbol.

\textsuperscript{14} Timothy Light (former Yali Bachelor), informal interview with author;
university. Withdrawal from the university scheme would seriously hamper New Asia's ability to develop further and possibility remove it forever from public consideration as an educational institution worthy of university status. Nothing therefore should be permitted to derail the college from the university incorporation process.\textsuperscript{15} Hoping also to decrease their financial responsibility for New Asia after its incorporation into the new university, and simultaneously hoping to increase the college's cultural capital in Hong Kong, Yale-China worked to encourage New Asia to stay in the university scheme. Frustrated with what he saw as the unjustifiably conservative attitude of those protesting at New Asia, Yale-China representative Schoyer noted:

Traditional China, as it grew older, became increasingly concerned with form and symbolic ritual with the result that the substance or reality the forms and symbols stood for almost disappeared. At least this was true of much in the old age of the civilization. I find this characteristic in the flag issue. That is, there are those who wish to give up grants in order to fly the flag on the Double Tenth which would be disastrous for the education the flag symbolizes.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Schoyer Report, Jan 11, 1960; YC 232-94-706.
\textsuperscript{16} Schoyer to Lovett letter, September 18, 1960; YC 232-94-707.
Yale-China thus clearly regarded the advancement of New Asia College into university status as being of paramount importance. Not only would the attending rise in the stature and increase in resources help the college in its overall development, but more specifically would allow New Asia to augment its promotion of Chinese culture and "the education the flag symbolizes."

The issue was finally resolved by a combination of British heavy-handedness, pressure from Yale-China, New Asia's teeth-gritting acquiescence, and sheer accident. A year after its initial "request" that New Asia not fly the Taiwan flag on October 10, the British colonial government issued an order that flag-flying on the Nationalist anniversary would henceforth cease. The reaction from New Asia was as heated as during the previous year, with various key personnel threatening resignation if forced to relinquish the flying of the flag. However, by some miscommunication, New Asia understood that it might fly the flag instead on the College's Founder's Day, which had always been celebrated on September 28th, Confucius' Birthday.17 The British government soon clarified that its order actually meant that there was to be no Nationalist

flag-flying at all again; however, for that year only, it would allow the flag to be flown on the Birthday of Confucius. As this compromise resulted from an accident rather than any real concession on the part of government, many at New Asia were still infuriated at being forced to give up their national symbol. However, with Qian Mu and the New Asia Board realizing that withdrawing from the university scheme over this point would ultimately be unwise, New Asia finally bowed to the government directive and flew the Taiwanese flag for the last time on September 28, 1960.18

The poignancy of this forced relinquishing both of the flag and of the October 10 anniversary was exasperated by their replacement, namely, the heightened celebration of the Birthday of Confucius. After 1960, the college took as its own birthday that of the sage it most revered. In so doing, it transferred its own symbolic representation from the political to the cultural sphere. Having been denied the right to hoist an explicitly nationalistic symbol on an explicitly nationalistic holiday, New Asia assumed an even greater association and identification with the symbols of Chinese culture. New Asia and the British colonial

18 Schoyer to Lovett letter, October 9, 1960; YC 232-94-707.
government were unable to agree on the nature of Hong Kong's political neutrality and the manifestation of this neutrality: whereas the government regarded any connection with Taiwan in political terms, New Asia interpreted its relationship with Taiwan in cultural terms. The relative importance of incorporation into the university vs. the significance of maintaining the cultural symbols of one's own choosing was also a contested issue, as Yale-China favored the former while New Asia leaned towards the latter. Out of these divergences in perspective, all three retreated to the further exaltation of a symbol that was at once irrefutably Chinese as well as apolitical. Faced with problematic state and university politics, the British colonial government, the American Yale-China Association, and the Chinese New Asia College intersected at the point of a retroactive grafting of Confucian imagery onto the educational institution of New Asia.

**The Struggle Over Curriculum**

The establishment of a university was troublesome too from the perspective of institutional rewards and social expectations. All abstract arguments about cultural education aside, the benefits of assuming university status
clearly included the recognition afforded to graduates. Previously, the government refusal to recognize the Chinese colleges' program as measuring up to university status had been a major point of contention between the colleges and the government. Now, with the government willing to acknowledge the existing level of quality of the Chinese colleges' programs as well as to invest resources in further developing their programs, the granting of university degrees to students upon graduation should have been one of the major victories of the colleges. Certainly the other colleges regarded such recognition as one of their main incentives for first advocating then joining the new Chinese university.

The reaction from New Asia, though, was not one of uniform delight. Certainly they saw the advantage the granting of university degrees would bring to the students and the status of the college. However, they also increasingly developed a deep fear that this very advantage would fundamentally alter the character of the college and the perspective on education they sought to embody there. Certainly they realized that, with an official university diploma in hand, their graduates would have a much easier time finding work after leaving school. Yet, they worried
that this advantage would then become the primary incentive and motivation of students in seeking a university education. In the days when the degree was non-official, students were indirectly forced to believe their education had value even if it did not readily or directly translate into a rise in status in the marketplace. With the formal institutionalization of the "university degree" as a prize to be sought, the New Asia leaders feared that students would become focused on the benefits that such a degree could afford them rather than on learning for its own sake.

This sentiment was perhaps best voiced by Tang Junyi in his 1960 article "Prospects for future educational policy:"

The difficulty that our school is facing today is the problem of the separation between the actual circumstances around us and our original educational ideal. . . . Our calling our school a shuyuan is different in meaning from other schools in Hong Kong who also call themselves shuyuan. The original intention for this school being a called a shuyuan was to carry forward the spirit of the Sung-Ming shuyuan. But today our school is very far from the ideal of the Sung-Ming shuyuan, for the education of a Sung-Ming shuyuan did not pay any attention to the students’ practical future. . . . It was something that transcended occupation and profession. Though the students of the time could subsequently take the civil service exams, the very best students saw the exams as being beneath them. Their hope was rather to become a first-rate personage in history. . . . But from our present circumstances, both those inside and
outside the school regard our original ideal as being too lofty. . . . Most of our students cannot not concern themselves with the question of occupation.¹⁹

Tang’s statement betrays his profound worry over the changing constituency of New Asia’s students and their environment and the impact this would have on the overall direction of the institution. As a descendent of the traditional shuyuan, New Asia was meant to be an institution concerned with learning for the sake of learning, which ultimately was to nurture being. Its students should accordingly be those for whom “practical futures” and career considerations were not a priority. In accordance with New Asia’s general mission and school principles, learning existed in triangular relationship with identifying a calling and with being a person. Occupation was something that would naturally emerge from the interaction of those three intertwined pursuits rather than being itself the prime object of pursuit. The truest and best students of the past, he argued, studied not for civil service placement but for the sake of the person they would become. In so elevating past students who “saw the exams as being beneath them,” he harnesses the cultural

resources of the *shuyuan* heritage to promote the importance of keeping New Asia a pure sort of educational enterprise and entity, unsullied by the concrete concerns that permeated the world outside the academy walls.

The importance of purity was particularly significant in that the New Asia founders felt especially unreconciled to the Hong Kong world in which they now found themselves. A decade earlier, they had founded the Cultural Open Forum to help fill what they saw as a deep cultural vacuum in the commercially- and materially-oriented Hong Kong. Their intent to affect Hong Kong at that time, however, had been premised on the idea that they might soon be able to go back to the mainland. But with the passing of the 1950's and the development of plans not to return home but to further cement their place in Hong Kong by incorporating New Asia into the new university, the possibility of returning to the mainland became increasingly dim. Thus, the New Asia administrators had to fundamentally alter their thinking from that of preparing students for imminent return to China for cultural reconstruction work there to one of preparing students for the Hong Kong social and labor environment. Tang’s article clearly reveals a deep
worry over this context for which they now must furnish an education for their students.

By 1960, the sense of gloom and concession amongst the New Asia faculty was clear. In fact, even irrespective of the plan to join the new Chinese university, the administration was then contemplating splitting the school into two streams, so that those who wished to learn purely for learning's sake would be in one stream, while those essentially preparing for an occupation would be in another stream. This plan remained only on the level of thought and talk, however, never assuming any concrete form, for ultimately those committed to a traditional shuyuan philosophy of education could not bring themselves to institute any such acknowledgement that some of their students might be primarily or even entirely orienting their learning towards strictly occupational purposes. To allow such a dual system would not only deconstruct the fundamental value system of the school but would also damage the image of the school relative to others in Hong Kong. After all, the characteristic of purity of motivation in learning was supposed to be the central distinguishing characteristic of New Asia as a shuyuan. In

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20 Ibid., 134.
his article Tang implies that other schools in Hong Kong then adopting the name shuyuan, including the other Chinese colleges intended for the new university, were in fact using the term falsely: tailoring their programs too much according to the market needs of the outside world, they could not possibly be following in the true Sung-Ming tradition of shuyuan learning. Accusing the other colleges of sullying their programs with considerations extraneous to pure learning, the New Asia administrators were loathe to then turn their own philosophy on its head by enacting any type of plan that would indicate a concession to the practical needs and considerations of the working world.

Tang and the other New Asia leaders also worried over the implications of submitting to the government plan for university incorporation because of their fear that that would mean government interference in their program orientation and content. In fact this fear was well-founded, for no sooner did New Asia begin the process of incorporation than the British colonial government sought to exert control, and in increasing degrees, over the shape of the New Asia curriculum in order to ensure that it matched the university standard that they had determined. The government reasoned that, if the granting of degrees
meant a concern for the post-graduation futures of the students, then the work leading to such degree should also be shaped by the same considerations. The government’s primary dissatisfaction with the New Asia program was precisely its lack of an adequate quantity and quality of “practical” courses. It increasingly insisted on the development of more courses in the sciences and in business, complaining that New Asia offered an inordinate number of what it alternately called “window-dressing courses” and “frill” courses.  

The government insisted on a greater volume of practical-oriented courses not because it did not recognize the value of the essential humanities orientation of New Asia. In fact, it welcomed New Asia’s promotion of humanities studies in general and Chinese humanities studies in particular. The new university was precisely set up to reflect the different characters of the constituent colleges. The British colonial government had decided that the new university was to be of a federal type, such that the particular strengths of each of the colleges would be maintained and further nurtured. In the

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governmental document that set up the university, the federal system was described thus:

It would also be entirely right in our view if each of the Colleges became associated with one major field of study for which it would come to be known in the schools as well as in the world of learning. In other words, we think that each of the Colleges should be encouraged through its teaching and the research associated with its teachers to develop its own character and 'personality' as fully as possible.\textsuperscript{22}

The federal university system, then, was to allow each college to continue advancing its own specialty.

Of the three founding colleges, New Asia was clearly regarded as the representative of expertise in Chinese studies. While the background of Chung Chi College lent towards religious, scientific, and musical training and United College was developing increasing focus on the social sciences, the British colonial government determined that New Asia was most committed to and equipped to pursuing traditional Chinese studies at a high level.\textsuperscript{23} In fact, government officials sent to survey the colleges praised the expertise of New Asia in Chinese scholarship, especially in the humanities fields of literature, history and philosophy. They were particularly impressed with the Research Institute and its resources, making special note

\textsuperscript{22} Fulton Report 1963, 35.
of its library and the importance of incorporating the Institute as well as the College into the new university. \textsuperscript{24} New Asia's strength in Chinese studies was thus regarded as its greatest asset as well as its defining characteristic in the institutional context of the new university.

However, the other requirement for incorporation into the university was that each college, apart from maintaining its own areas of specialty and hence unique identity, should also be a comprehensive college in itself, offering the full range of general education coursework. The allowance of each college to maintain its own identity was therefore to be balanced with the requirement of providing its students a balanced education.

We reject the idea that one College alone should teach science or classical Chinese civilization or social and modern studies. We also reject the idea that each should teach the whole range of subjects (including professional studies). We think it right that each should expect to cover in its teaching Chinese civilization and history, English, sciences . . . and should teach at least one other group of subjects (eg. social studies). \textsuperscript{25}

Thus the government requirement that all colleges cover all basic aspects of education meant that New Asia could not be

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 97-98.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 13, 108, 124.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 35.
so focused on humanities studies so as to exclude the social and natural sciences.

Yale-China agreed with the British colonial government's argument that New Asia should offer a more balanced curriculum. Yale-China's concern, however, was less with the curricular integrity of the colleges than with the issue of context and preparation of students for life after college. Despite Yale-China's own goal, which it shared with the New Asia founders, of returning to the mainland as soon as possible, increasingly the organization realized that this long-term hope should not blind it to the realities and needs of the Hong Kong site in which they were located then and for the foreseeable future. Thus, Yale-China worked with the University Preparatory Committee in pushing New Asia to acknowledge that its graduates would likely be working in Hong Kong rather than returning to mainland China, and that this fact should induce adjustments in the curriculum which would correspond to Hong Kong's social and economic requirements. In the words of Yale-China representative Sidney Lovett:

Today, few of New Asia's students are directly from mainland China. . . . Receding into the distant future is the prospect of return of refugees to the mainland, a lively hope in the

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26 Lovett report, April 6, 1959; YC 232-83-498.
minds and hearts of those who established New Asia College. Most of New Asia's graduates must be prepared to live and earn their livelihood in the Colony. This stark reality calls for the inclusion in the College curriculum of more rigorous requirements in the English language, more emphasis on present courses in economics, sociology, mathematics and business administration, and the additions of courses in the sciences, i.e., biology and the physics and chemistry. The present plethora of courses in Chinese philosophy, history and literature should be better balanced by studies in subjects more designed to prepare youngsters for teaching, business and industrial careers in Hong Kong. 27

Yale-China went further in pointing out that the ultimate purpose of education at New Asia be revised not only in light of changing circumstances but also in view of the change in the profile of the student population. Whereas students attending New Asia during its early years were primarily refugees from China with strong links to the mainland and thus, like their teachers, with strong hope for a speedy return, students by the end of the 1950's were no longer refugees but were raised in Hong Kong with either dim or no memory of mainland China. For these students, mainland China was not a homeland to which they longed to a return but a place politically and culturally remote despite its geographical proximity. These students likewise had little or no attachment to the idea of Taiwan.

27 Ibid.
as a symbol of a true China, and minimal sense of abstract cultural loyalty. What was relevant to these students was life in Hong Kong and receiving training for the marketplace there. Thus Lovett comments:

[Students] are becoming restive, under a curriculum that is geared to the preservation of a history and a culture they will never experience... When Dr. Chien launches on one of his hour-long addresses, I'm told that the students at the back of hall get very restless and that there is an undertone of ridicule at what he has to say about the Nationalist regime and its future return to power... Maybe I can feed slowly to him the importance of balancing NAC's orientation to old China with a concern for present day realities.\textsuperscript{28}

The Hong Kong origins of the newer students also meant that they were almost entirely Cantonese-speaking. While earlier refugee students and teachers hailed from all over China and thus found their linguistic commonality in the official Mandarin dialect, youth born and bred in the British colony of Hong Kong tended to have little if any ability in Mandarin. Yet the New Asia faculty had continued to conduct their classes entirely in Mandarin. This was due in part to the fact that most of the teachers, in view of their desire to return to the mainland, considered it unnecessary to learn the dialect of a place they considered only as a short-term refuge. They also,
however, persisted in teaching in Mandarin out of a sense that only Mandarin could represent China in totality and, in turn, further nurture a sense of connection in Hong Kong students to the Chinese whole. This attitude, while reasonable in the abstract, had the concrete effect of alienating students and even jeopardizing their learning. Thus Lovett lamented that "the students are mostly Cantonese and don’t understand much that is being taught them in Mandarin."29 He therefore sought to encourage New Asia faculty to reconsider their position regarding medium-of-instruction for the benefit of their students’ education. From Yale-China’s perspective, that the British colonial government had chosen to advance Chinese-medium education only to have that goal undercut by the dialect differential seemed ironic to the point of absurdity.

The New Asia administrators, however, objected to both governmental interference and Yale-China pressure with regards to the content and balance of the College curriculum as well as the spoken medium of instruction. As evident from the curriculum they had constructed, they considered their focus on China studies and, within that, their particular emphasis on the traditional humanities

triumvirate of history, literature, and philosophy, to be the essential feature of their values and identity. For the British, however, the issue was not only that learning in the humanities should be balanced by courses which would have more practical application. Because New Asia appropriated the Chinese humanities for itself and because the British likewise supported this image of New Asia as the center of Chinese humanities studies, the scientific and practical subjects became, by default, the province of "Western learning". We noted earlier the significance of scientific learning and thinking in the British assessment of the quality of Chinese education and whether this was of a level that deserved university status. In the context of university incorporation, the issue of curriculum became a battleground between New Asia and the British colonial government precisely because the forced decrease of "window dressing" humanities courses ones and the infusion of science-inspired courses translated into a lessening of the "Chinese" content of New Asia learning.

This lessening of the Chinese-studies portion of the New Asia curriculum was problematic also because of the hope the New Asia administrators had kept alive as to the

29 Letter Lovett to Vaill, October 21 1958; YC 232-83-495.
ultimate purpose of the educational system they had constructed, namely the return to the Chinese mainland as soon as was practicable. The very fact of institutionalizing New Asia into a component of the university already indicated that their investment might well result more concretely in benefits for Hong Kong than for mainland China. The further involvement of the government in shaping the content and the balance of the curriculum towards the sciences and business indicated even more starkly the problem of New Asia education as serving not the interests of Chinese culture in the broad sense but of Western learning in general and British needs in Hong Kong in particular.

Beyond this, the curriculum battle was significant also in that both the British and New Asia expected the education at New Asia to be someday influential in mainland China: the British hoped that students from the mainland returning home with a Chinese education from Hong Kong would become representatives of Western learning in China, while New Asia planners hoped that their graduates would be the prime movers in the future reconstruction of Chinese culture in China. Thus the struggle over the quantity and

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30 For analysis of the curriculum at New Asia College, see Chapter 1.
quality of Chinese humanities education at New Asia was regarded by both New Asia administrators and the British government as potentially having vast consequences for both Hong Kong specifically and China generally.

The struggle over curriculum thus revealed New Asia's divergence from the concept of The Chinese University in three respects. The new university was meant to promote and provide education for Chinese people in the Chinese language about Chinese matters; New Asia coincided with university planners on only the first of these three aspects. The 1950's debate over Chinese as a medium of instruction had ultimately been governed by the concern over meeting the needs of more Chinese people in the context of Hong Kong. To use Chinese but to insist on a dialect with cultural and practical currency on the mainland but much less so in Hong Kong was, from the perspective of the university planners, to subvert the very purpose of Chinese-medium education.

From New Asia's point of view, however, only Mandarin could represent China as a whole as well as voice the forms and formulations of classical Chinese texts; Cantonese was a localism which would not spur students' sense of the importance of returning to mainland China for cultural
rebuilding work there. As for the issue of curricular content, university planners wished to promote Chinese scholarship but juxtaposed to and balanced with Western, or what they saw as modern, learning. They did not intend, as did the New Asia formulators, to make Chinese learning generally and classical humanities learning specifically the overwhelming centerpiece of the institution. Thus, the college which had been regarded as "most essentially Chinese" ironically came to diverge most conspicuously from the whole notion of "Chinese" behind The Chinese University.

The battles over curriculum, medium-of-instruction, administrative policy, and cultural symbolism so sapped New Asia's hope and faith in the new Chinese University that, by the time the university was officially established in 1963, the position of New Asia College within it had become highly problematic. Qian could see clearly that raising the college to the status of university would greatly aid students when seeking further study or work after graduation. He therefore felt New Asia must join the new university out of consideration for the students' futures. He also saw that joining a publicly-funded university would
largely end the financial instability that had plagued New Asia since its inception. Thus his decision:

As Hong Kong’s government will mandate by law that all Hong Kong residents must help support this university, New Asia’s foundation can become relatively more stable, so that we do not have to spend most of our energy looking for outside sources to fund us; out of the long-term consideration for the school, we can only give this school to the public family to administer.  

Despite his belief that New Asia’s future was best secured by joining the new university, he was so troubled by all the concessions he felt he had made in order to complete the incorporation process that, as soon as the University had been formally founded, he submitted his resignation in frustration and protest. Publicly, he kept quiet about his motivations, claiming only that he wished to devote more time to his scholarly activities now that others more qualified in administration could take over the management of the college.  

However, he revealed his true feelings in a private letter to the Board of Yale-China in explanation of his action:

Since it received Government grant in 1959, New Asia College has gradually lost its freedom in administering internal affairs through many

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Government restrictions. The College was originally an institution born of ideals. Although it is small, what it cherishes as a goal is to contribute its efforts to the human culture of the world by educating Chinese youths in refuge to serve as a bridge between the East and West. . . . However, while financial support received by the College has increased steadily, its goals have continuously been frustrated and may undergo changes through obstructions and disappear eventually. So soon after the formal establishment of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, I tendered my resignation as President, as expression of my distress — my inability to help the College attain our goals.33

Qian thus felt that, though social requirements dictated the necessity of New Asia in joining The Chinese University, he himself could no longer be convinced that such a move in fact furthered the cultural ideals which had inspired New Asia's creation. Though popular pressure induced him to stay on another year during that transition period, the tension between himself and the university was such that the following year he resigned again, this time for good.

By insisting on inserting New Asia into The Chinese University even while himself withdrawing as soon as the incorporation was secure, Qian created for New Asia an ambivalent status whereby its institutional advancement was indirectly paid for by the removal of its central

personage. Though the College and the government had managed to cooperate to the extent that the incorporation of New Asia into The Chinese University was successfully accomplished, the leaders of the College clearly felt that this had been accomplished at the price of sacrificing many of their original ideals and goals. Thus the stage was set for an intensification of struggle over the development of New Asia and its role within The Chinese University system.

**Last Show-down**

New Asia's position within and relationship to The Chinese University was sustainable after the latter's founding largely because of the federal structure that had been set up as the university's essential form. While the government had enacted many requirements during the incorporation process, ultimately the colleges were to function with a high degree of independence even while tied together under a central university administration. The federal system as outlined by the government was to entail a balance between the authority of the center and the autonomy of the colleges. In the words of the government policy statement which set up the university:
The lesson of successful federal universities is simple. There must be a strong individual life pulsing through each of the colleges; there must be powers of regulation, co-ordination and control exercised by the university.34

The federal system would therefore involve a considerable measure of centralized control even while according the individual colleges their own administrative and philosophical independence. Thus, despite the concessions it had been forced to make over administrative, curricular, and symbolic issues in order to secure its admittance to the new university as a founding college, New Asia believed the federal structure would allow it to largely maintain its own identity, structure, and orientation after the university was formally established. The principle of collegial self-governance and strength relative to a limited university center was the foundation upon which New Asia joined The Chinese University in 1963 and was subsequently able to resolve any disagreements and disputes.

This delicate truce lasted for a decade until the early 1970's when questions about allocation of funding and manpower caused an overall reassessment of the efficacy of the federal system. Both external reviewers and internal

participants of the system increasingly saw the various colleges as duplicative in many respects. Because each college, in addition to having its own particular specialty, was required to also be self-sufficient and well-rounded, departments of the major academic disciplines existed in each college, causing duplication of human and material resources in the university as a whole. The university administrators from the center increasingly regarded this duplication as detrimental to the overall functioning and quality control of the university. They therefore appointed a Working Party on Educational Policy and University Structure to conduct a thorough reexamination, run jointly by university and collegial administrators, of the federal system. This Working Party was to assess the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the federalist university structure and recommend either its continuance with suggestions for improvement or its dismantling with suggestions for replacements.

The Working Party returned in 1974 a verdict that the federal system was entirely too burdensome and redundant and should be replaced by a centralized system of administration which would enhance the structure and increase the functions of the university center while
vastly diminishing the individuality and autonomy of the colleges. This change, the Working Party argued, would greatly improve the overall effectiveness of the university by reallocating resources duplicated by more than one college to new research and teaching arenas. The three colleges themselves, the Working Party made clear, should not themselves be dismantled; in fact, their existence represented a healthy diversity of interests and orientations according to the peoples and philosophies which had originally developed the various colleges. However, curricular content, faculty distribution, and academic administration should henceforth fall under the control of the university center. After further review and debate, the Working Party’s suggestions were adopted and made official policy by the British colonial government under The Chinese University of Hong Kong Ordinance 1976.36

This policy decision was met with general dismay on the part of the colleges. All three resented and resisted this move towards centralization as it would mean a decrease in autonomy for each. Although the Working Party had made certain to emphasize that the colleges themselves

still had both real and symbolic value, each worried that their particular historical and philosophical orientation would increasingly lose standing. As the college which had had the most difficulty acquiescing to central demands during the university incorporation process, New Asia now resisted most vehemently the suggestion of augmenting central power. Immediately upon the government announcement of its policy decision for university centralization, all the issues previously problematic became even more so. The hiring of teaching and administrative personnel, already a point of tension, now became a point of battle, as New Asia felt that centrally-appointed personnel neither could nor would sustain and promote the original New Asia spirit and ideal. New Asia particularly resented that curricular content and balance, as well as the distribution and development of departments, would now become subject not only to governmental overview and overrides but to centralized control and determination.

New Asia felt that, without the ability to control the nature and message of the students' learning, its essential cultural and educational orientation would be rendered effectively meaningless.

In addition to the intensification of previously problematic issues, the centralization scheme brought two new and ultimately insurmountable problems. The first involved a question of procedures and of rights. New Asia was extremely upset that the government broke the procedural agreement made upon the university's establishment to consult the founding colleges before making any major changes to the structure of the university. Thus the government injunction for change in the university's fundamental set-up without first securing the colleges' consent amounted, from New Asia's point of view, to a breach of contract. This transgression they regarded with utmost gravity not solely because it signaled a significant change in the power relations between the university and its constituent colleges to the detriment of the latter. The distress over the government's policy change despite the colleges' protests implied that the

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Note: The text appears to contain a reference to a source that is not visible in the image provided. The reference could be to a book or an article, but the specific details are not clear from the image.
government now held the right to influence and ultimately interfere with the internal workings of the university to an unprecedented degree. Such an increase in governmental power attacked New Asia’s foundations directly, for freedom from government intrusion into intellectual and educational life had, after all, been New Asia’s principal reason for locating itself in Hong Kong.

Furthermore, the government had itself claimed that intellectual freedom was to be a central defining characteristic of the new university. In describing the nature of the university to be established, the government had emphasized the significance of the constituent peoples and philosophies of the new university which would precisely enforce and further the cause of intellectual freedom:

The New Chinese University of Hong Kong will have a choice open to it, but all the signs are that the choice is made already. The personal history of the senior members of the Colleges makes it abundantly clear that they wish for no Procrustean bed of dogma (whether made by Left or Right, by Traditionalist or Modernist) on which to lie. They wish for themselves the freedom of rational men and must, therefore, secure it too for their pupils. 39

Being that the cause of intellectual freedom and the benefits of the site of Hong Kong were to join in the institution of the new university, the government's unilateral restructuring of the university amounted to a betrayal, from New Asia's perspective, of a faith shared by both New Asia and the government.

Such reversal represented not only a threat to New Asia but to all social, cultural, and educational institutions in Hong Kong: if the government now claimed for itself the right to interfere in the internal affairs of The Chinese University, then it could act similarly elsewhere. So angered was New Asia that its Board of Governors felt compelled to issue a general proclamation to the Hong Kong population in the form of a press release, warning all organizations that the freedom which they had heretofore been granted and had cherished should now be considered under siege:

The Board does not think Government should run a university. . . . Nothing less than the credibility of The Chinese University of Hong Kong as an independent academic institution is at stake. Nothing less than the integrity of all similar organizations — the Arts Centre, the Tung Hua Hospitals, and the University of Hong Kong — is at stake.40

Feeling that their own specific reason for being situated in Hong Kong had been rendered non-viable and the general circumstance of Hong Kong was not or was no longer what they believed, the New Asia founders were forced to question anew the import and feasibility of their educational enterprise in Hong Kong.

The second and most essential issue that roused the ire of New Asia was the government’s new formulation of the division of labor between the central university and the individual college administrations. Being that the preponderance of duties and functions would be shifted from the colleges to the university center, what was left for the colleges to oversee? The new government formula for the relationship between the university and the colleges divided functions into two groups which it termed “subject-oriented” and “student-oriented”. The former was to involve “subjects” in the sense of academic disciplines, entailing all matters related to curricular content and departmental development. The latter targeted “students” by focusing on extra-curricular activities, dormitory life, and personal guidance and mentoring. Under this scheme, students would receive intellectual training and academic knowledge from those units and processes run by the
university center while gaining personal attention for individual development from college-specific personnel and activities.

New Asia rejected outright this dichotomization of teaching and learning into subject vs. student-oriented functions. Their most fundamental objection to this formulation was precisely the dichotomization it demanded, the splitting of functions into academic vs. personal ones. Being that the shuyuan they sought to recreate was based on the integration of scholarly and personal development, the idea that these two aspects could be divided conceptually and administratively seemed absurd. Separating intellectual learning from individual cultivation would, they argued, cause a schism in both the learning process of the student as well as the guidance tasks of the teacher.

The New Asia Board thus protested to the British colonial Governor with a lengthy petition:

The Report has primarily recommended that teaching at the University should be organized into 'subject-oriented' and 'student-oriented' groups, the former to be undertaken by the University and the latter the Colleges. No one will deny that all kinds of education need to deal with these two aspects of teaching. But we are of the opinion that in order to enable the students to receive a whole and integral education, these aspects of teaching should be performed by the same teachers in the same institution. . . . One of the great advantages
that the Foundation Colleges enjoy because they are small liberal arts colleges is that the teachers are able to teach their students, each as a whole, within the same institution and that having intimate personal relationships between the teachers and the students can be easily established. . . . The Report has recommended a dichotomy between 'subject-oriented' teaching and 'student-oriented' teaching. . . . As the 'subject-oriented' teachers will be assigned to teach subject matter, they will have no concern about the character development of the students. Neither will they pay attention to the special talents of the students and teach them according to their natural abilities. The students and teachers would, therefore, keep one another at arms' length. Meanwhile the 'student-oriented' teachers who have been assigned to the Colleges would be offering tutorials to the students. Their position would be no higher than that of remedial course teachers. . . . Henceforth, an 'integral personality' aspect of university education would be replaced by a 'split personality' one." 41

According to New Asia, the division of duties between university and college suggested by the centralization scheme would render impossible an integrated experience of learning and growing, thereby destroying the ideal of educating students as whole people. It also substantively altered the nature of the teacher-student relationship whereby teachers, instead of serving as mentor and instructor both, would henceforth focus on acting as only one or the other. This change, New Asia argued, ran

41 "Petition: To His Excellency the Governor, The Humble Petition of the Board of Governors of New Asia College," Sept 25, 1976, in A Further
directly counter to Chinese cultural tradition. In their words, "the 'Tao shih', or the faculty advisory system in universities in China and at New Asia College, is to combine the 'teacher of classics' and the 'teacher of men' in one person."⁴² Taken together, these three inter-related points - education for the whole person, an integration of scholarly and personal development, and a close teacher-student relationship in which the former stood guardian over all aspects of learning for the latter - constituted the essential educational philosophy and shuyuan ideal of New Asia. The change desired by the government, in destroying of each of these points, would thereby cause the collapse of their collective meaning and import.

New Asia argued also that not only would the new scheme unjustifiably divide subject from student but would in fact subordinate the latter to the former. With the preponderance of material resources controlled by the university center and with all human resources appointed and apportioned by that same center, New Asia and the other colleges believed that little would be left for them to oversee and create. New Asia accused the government of formulating this dichotomous scheme just as a "red

Collection of New Asia Papers...: 24.
herring”, a means to pacify the colleges whilst in the act of usurping all their rights and responsibilities. This was problematic not simply in terms of hierarchical administrative power but, even more importantly, in the prioritization of values this revealed. Subordinating the colleges to the university indicated in parallel that the government considered the moral development of students to be less important than academic learning. Such a value hierarchy was absolutely unacceptable to New Asia for, as Tang Junyi had explained, the fundamental purpose of a shuyuan education was to produce morally stellar human beings. While scholarly learning was certainly important, it was in fact essential to individual character development, it was never conceived of as its own end. Therefore, New Asia saw the university centralization scheme as turning its entire value system on its head. The philosophical and relational issues of education were thus as critical to the New Asia concept and structure of the shuyuan as matters of curricular content. The decrease in the autonomy of the colleges spelled, for New Asia, the literal demise in the institutional structure which was the shuyuan. The

42 Ibid.
43 See Chapter 1 for further discussion on New Asia’s educational philosophy and notion of the shuyuan.
previous concessions that had been made, while painful, had nonetheless allowed New Asia to operate under the essential parameters of a shuyuan as they defined it. A structural change that would dilute the shuyuan institution beyond recognition, however, was more than they could accept.

It was on this point of structure that New Asia differentiated itself most from the other two colleges. Both Chung Chi and United Colleges also understandably had concerns about the sustenance of their own identity and orientation. For instance, Chung Chi was particularly concerned that it would be permitted to continue its teaching of religious subjects in general and courses on Christianity in particular. Yet once Chung Chi was assured that the teaching of these courses would continue, would in fact be enhanced by a centrally-appointed concentration of human and material resources on matters religious at Chung Chi, the voices of protest faded. Chung Chi, concerned about the moral shaping of their students according not to Confucian principles like New Asia but Christian ones, wanted only assurance that religious

44 "Statement of Protest re: The Fulton Report," Chung Chi College Board of Governors, in Xinya Shuyuan guanyu Daxue gaizhi wenti wenjian huikan [A collection of New Asia papers on the proposed change in the structure of The Chinese University of Hong Kong]. Hong
precepts and concepts could continue to be taught and fostered without disturbance by central regulation or censure. Chung Chi's moral and religious educational program hinged on curricular content and issues of moral guidance which could be enacted under a centralized university just as well as under a more autonomous college.

For New Asia, however, the assurance that Confucian philosophy and Chinese history would continue to be their special protected territory was not enough. The education envisioned by New Asia involved not only what was taught explicitly but the implicit context of the teaching and learning, the living environment of the college and the relationships that were to be enacted there. The ideals of New Asia could not simply be proclaimed in a classroom; instead, they were inextricably embedded into the very institutional principles and parameters of the College such that a dismantling of that institutional structure spelled the destruction of the ideal altogether.

That the shuyuan as a structure and as an experience was the point of ultimate significance for the New Asia founders was made apparent also by the divergence opinion between the New Asia Board and the new generation of New Kong: Board of Governors of New Asia College, The Chinese University of
Asia’s leaders in the 1970’s. The debate over the centralization scheme brought to light the fact that the younger generation attached considerably less importance to the shuyuan as such than had its teachers. In fact, one of New Asia’s earliest students in both the College and the Research Institute Yu Ying-shih emerged a supporter of the university centralization scheme. Returned to serve as New Asia’s head in the early 1970’s and in fact part of the Working Party’s investigation into the problems of university federalism, Yu believed that greater administrative streamlining would mean more resources for New Asia to further promote Chinese cultural education in both the college and the community at large.45 For him, developing increased capability for transmitting Chinese studies was the issue of paramount importance, not the preservation of any particular educational structure. The New Asia Board, however, could not agree with the stance taken by its former student. Whereas Yu was willing to concede the shuyuan structure for the sake of investing greater force in New Asia’s overall cultural message, the New Asia Board held unwaveringly to their faith that it was

Hong Kong, 1976.

45 Yu Ying-shih, tape recorded interview by author; Princeton, New Jersey, June 17, 2003.
the constituent relations and philosophies of the shuyuan ideal which absolutely could not be discarded.

The dismantling of the shuyuan structure also spelled, for New Asia, an unwelcome reconfiguration of its identity within The Chinese University. Being a shuyuan had been key to New Asia's positionality within the university structure because it saw itself as representing traditional Chinese culture simply through recreating the shuyuan idea. One of the meanings that had been attached to the term "Chinese" in the name "Chinese University" was that the university itself was to represent the joining of different types of universities in China.46 The coalescing of these different Chinese university traditions was to serve as a powerful symbol of pre-1949 mainland Chinese university education in the Hong Kong periphery. While Chung Chi College represented a revival of the Christian university tradition in China, reminiscent of famous universities like Yenching and St. John's, and United College emerged directly from the Southern Cantonese college tradition, New Asia was to represent the modern Chinese national university in the tradition of Peking University. Now in the context of the new university, with each founding
college meant to symbolize a particular strain of Chinese higher education, it became particularly important that each college preserve its original orientation not only for the sake of its own individual identity but, even more importantly, for the collective goal of producing a university that was entirely Chinese in its form.

The burden of New Asia in this regard was particularly strong, because it alone of the three founding colleges represented not only a form of modern university education in China but also the revival of traditional education, namely the shuyuan. This fusion of the traditional and the modern in the educational institution of New Asia was precisely its own goal as well as being the image of the college most compelling to the American non-governmental and British colonial forces which funded it. However, while the government and the American funding organizations were able to conceive of each college maintaining its symbolic representation of the three university traditions even while promoting centralized administration, New Asia saw the centralization scheme as so damaging to its own autonomy and philosophy as to dismantle its symbolic meaning entirely.

46 "Statement of the Board of Governors of New Asia College on the
The destruction of their shuyuan ideal, combined with their loss of faith in Hong Kong as a site of intellectual freedom, caused New Asia’s leaders to believe that it was no longer possible to enact their vision within The Chinese University structure. Faced with such irreconcilable differences, the New Asia Board was forced to make a policy decision and take a public stand. It was rather too late to withdraw the college itself from the University at that point, thirteen years after its official joining, as the college was flourishing in many respects. However, the board felt that it could not simply subjugate itself to the British colonial government on this point. Thus in December of 1976 the New Asia Board of Governors chose, as President Qian Mu had chosen over a decade earlier, to withdraw from the college. In their resignation letter, they accused the government of divesting the colleges of autonomy and identity, stating that "concentrating all power in the university center causes the colleges to retain only their name while having no independent reality." They particularly emphasized their objection to the division of "subject vs. student" with all concepts attending that division, arguing that "the 'subject-
oriented' vs. 'student-oriented' concept proposed by the Fulton Commission Report does not make sense in terms of educational theory and is impossible to carry out in terms of practicality". Thus, the Board collectively resigned with the assertion: "We find it now impossible to realize the educational ideal with which we supported New Asia College and its participation in the creation and development of The Chinese University."47

The en masse resignation of the New Asia Board, while doing nothing to alter the new realities of New Asia, was nonetheless meant to broadcast their extreme dissatisfaction with the direction in which the British colonial government had chosen to steer The Chinese university and the colleges within it. The poignancy and potency of this broadcasting lay in the context and the form of the resignation letter, for while the letter did contain specific arguments, ultimately its meaning emerged from the audience and the style of the letter itself. The letter, for instance, does not define the "educational ideal" which the Board felt could no longer be enacted, and

47 "Xinya shuyuan dongshihui dui yijiu qiliu nian xianggang zhongwen daxue xiudinghou gaizhi fa'an zhi shengming" [Declaration of the New Asia College Board of Governors on the 1976 Chinese University of Hong Kong Revised Bill for
furthermore nowhere in the letter does the term "Chinese culture" even appear. Yet the conspicuous fact that the letter was aimed at the British colonial government over an issue which New Asia clearly regarded as not an administrative but a cultural one gave the letter and its pronouncement an unambiguous tone of identity politics. And lest there be any doubt about New Asia's "Chinese-ness," the Board published its resignation letter not in both Chinese and English, as was standard for all public documents in Hong Kong, but rather only in Chinese and in unpunctuated classical Chinese style to boot. The bitter irony of protesting in a language which one knows one's audience does not understand could not be more pronounced. Angry that the British colonial government had taken away its ability to enact its Chinese cultural ideal, New Asia's Board chose to clothe themselves in classical Chinese textual form as a final announcement of the nature of its philosophy and position. This representation of traditional Chinese culture through classical Chinese form was, finally, perhaps their most potent symbol in an arena whose colonial controls and social currents no longer supported their conception of Chinese cultural education.

Systemic Change]," December 1976, in A Further Collection of New Asia
The significance of the *shuyuan* structure as the final unnegotiable point over which the relationship of New Asia's founders to The Chinese University broke down lies in the immense importance invested in the *shuyuan* ideal by them. Because New Asia's founders took the *shuyuan* to be the ultimate symbolic representation as well as the ultimate manifested reality of Chinese culture, the end of their ability to enact this marked also the end of their faith in Hong Kong and The Chinese University as sites and structures amenable to what they regarded as the true Chinese cultural orientation. Because of the way in which they intertwined the concepts of Chinese culture and Chinese education, they came to uphold the *shuyuan* as the central defining element of Chineseness. In so doing, they became marginalized through the very process of institutional legitimization that should have buttressed and popularized their program of Chinese cultural education. While they, by both image and action, began as the vanguard of the effort to create a Chinese university, ultimately their real identity and investment was incompatible with the structures and principles of the
university they helped to build. Although the British colonial government proved generally supportive to New Asia's program of Chinese cultural education and the promotion of East-West intellectual dialogue, their vision of the content and process of such an education proved to mesh with the agendas of neither the British nor their parallel Chinese educational institutions. Their true faith being in the shuyuan, they were essentially unable to accept the institutional requirements of a modern university in the Hong Kong context such that they could only maintain their faith by severing themselves from the very university that they had spurred to creation.
Conclusion

New Asia’s insistence on the shuyuan as their ultimate and non-negotiable point of identity reveals very poignantly the essential orientation of the founding generation of New Asia. For them, the Confucian cultural education they were seeking to recreate was a delicate balancing act between content and form. Certainly, the content of what was being taught was of great importance; hence the battles over curriculum content in the College, the repeated telling of certain types of moral tales in the children’s Night School, the emphasis on reading the Chinese classics in the Research Institute, the construction of specific profile of lecture topics at the Culture Open Forum. Yet, on another level, it was the form of the learning that was really of utmost significance – that kids are trained in discipline and cleanliness, that youth are guided step by step through a process of curricular learning and personal development, that advanced students experience the small groups of guided reading and discussion in their regimen of perusal of the classics, that a community gathers to listen to the broadcasting of a cultural message.
This emphasis on the form of learning was important because, for them, cultural education was ultimately an experiential matter. This experiential aspect of education was critical not only during its process but, even more importantly, in its result. Their ultimate purpose for their cultural education was to produce people of sound character who would henceforth act not only as spokesman but as embodiments of Chinese values. Thus, they could not accept any policy that would divide learning and being, for such division would undermine the essential thrust of their orientation and their goal.

The form of the education was important also because of the cultural symbolism the college entailed. Not only did specific aspects of the school, such as curriculum and administrative procedures, come to assume symbolic meaning, but the school itself was meant as a symbol by those who founded it and by those who interacted with it. For this reason, the shuyuan was of ultimate importance to the New Asia founders, for having chosen this institutional form as the quintessential representation of Confucian education specifically and, beyond that, of Chinese culture generally, they could not acquiesce to demands that it be abandoned.
Not all saw this absolute fidelity to the shuyuan as being the best way to preserve and promote Chinese culture. In fact, some believed that the all philosophical rhetoric regarding the shuyuan ideal and student character development were in fact a guise for the board's true concern, namely the preservation of its own power over the direction and administration of New Asia College.¹ Some argued that the New Asia had never really been able to enact fully its ideal of combining both great scholarly work and personal moral guidance, so it was pointless to make this the final non-negotiable issue.² Others felt that the board's rigidity and determination to keep power to itself made it blind to the increased capability and resources that would be accorded New Asia in its promotion of Chinese culture once The Chinese University was more streamlined and efficient.³ Yet, regardless of the real or apparent motives of the board, regardless of what their preconceptions allowed them to perceive or not perceive, regardless of whether or not the New Asia shuyuan had ever really lived up to their ideal of the shuyuan, the language

¹ Ambrose King, conversation with author, Hong Kong, April 16; 2003.
³ Ibid.
of the shuyuan and the symbols of its values and structures rang true for them.

Their fidelity to their conception of the pure shuyuan form was, of course, actually infused with tension from the moment they released it from the ideal into the real world. They themselves stepped away from the pure shuyuan when they sought to make New Asia's education somehow answer the needs of the temporal and spatial context in which they found themselves. The introduction of scientific courses into the curriculum, for example, occurred initially because of their own sense that some exposure to scientific knowledge and thinking was necessary for their students. However, they believed that, whatever scientific or practical courses they added to their offerings, this would not disturb the fundamental core and orientation of New Asia, namely, the humanities education they believed to be most central to the spirit and the continuation of Chinese culture. Like their ti-yong fathers before them, their faith in the essential core of Chinese culture was such that they felt no threat from the allowance of a small amount of function-oriented learning.

Yet, they were also unlike their ti-yong predecessors for, a century later and on colonial soil, they were two
times removed from the context in which their shuyuan could have had resonance. Not only were they no longer technically in China proper where the political and cultural symbolism of the shuyuan would have been better appreciated, but China herself had abandoned a half-century earlier the entire socio-political paradigm in which the Confucian shuyuan found its voice. Instead of facing a state composed of civil servants chosen for their mastery of the Chinese classics, they had to contend with the demands of a colonial government who wished to promote Western learning through Chinese-medium education. Furthermore, having themselves opened the door to the injection of forms and content of learning alien to the Chinese culture they were intent on promoting through education, it became increasingly difficult to reject and prevent further infiltration from the outside.

This mixing of influences originating both internally and externally to the Chinese culture they were aiming to promote was problematic in terms of the relationship between culture and education. Because the shuyuan education was to be an essentially Confucian one, any outside forces could potentially sully the purity of its educational process and its human product. Yet, the very
impossibility of maintaining an educational institution that was solely Confucian in its curriculum and style meant that the exact nature of the culture they intended to promote was at all times ambiguous. While they held steadfastly to an education form that was clearly Confucian in its symbolism, they also sought to broaden their identity by appealing to Chinese culture generally and constructing an education that they defined in abstract humanistic terms. This attempt to draw an absolute identification between humanism and Chinese-ness meant that, in describing the nature of the education they were offering, the designators of Confucian, Chinese, cultural, humanistic, humanities were largely used interchangeably.

Such conceptual sliding became particularly problematic when coupled with the way in which education was itself a battleground for cultural identity and territory. Thus, the more New Asia insisted on keeping its core orientation as a humanities one, the greater the perception that humanities was the province of Chinese culture while the West owned the scientific subjects. This entrenchment of a territorial dichotomization of learning, created by the ti-yong formula, meant that increasingly education assumed cultural overtones, with different
subjects becoming the property of different cultures and different styles of learning assuming the mantle of different cultural identities.

However, while the ti-yong formulators did not perceive the essential core of Chinese culture challenged, the New Asia situation was clearly much more precarious. Cultural education at New Asia did not mean the simple delineation of what aspects of learning should be classified under which culture, but was a concerted, even desperate, attempt to preserve Chinese culture when its continued existence was itself in doubt. The significance of cultural education in the New Asia conception of it thus stemmed entirely from the nature of the dangers which were threatening Chinese culture on every front and at every level, and in such a stage of siege the injection of external influences forced by external parties caused a sometimes-unwelcome blurring of the lines of cultural distinction.

Such blurring was perhaps an inevitable result of the convergence of different expectations of different parties onto the school. For example, while New Asia certainly wanted to recreate the traditional Chinese shuyuan in its orientation and relational components, they also wanted to
create for themselves the image of being a modern national university by inserting science and other courses into their curriculum and by adopting the general coursework and testing structure of a university. They made these curricular and structural adjustments not only out of a conviction of their merit but also because they aspired to assume in Hong Kong the prestige and symbolic mantle that Peking University carried in China. That the orientation of Peking University was largely culturally iconoclastic in contrast to New Asia's cultural conservatism was a point glossed over in the eagerness to cast New Asia as being both modern and traditional.

The image of fusing the modern and the traditional was created by the New Asia founders but found hearty support in the American non-governmental organizations which supported them. Because of the interests of organizations like Yale-China in buttressing a notion of a pure Chinese culture which, if sufficiently fortified, would somehow stand guard against the encroachment of communism, they wanted to support an entity such as New Asia as a symbol of that culture. In this sense, they needed New Asia to remain as a symbol of the past, of some pure entity before the contamination of communism, in order to argue that an
alternate path to China’s future could be built from China’s cultural roots than the one then ruling China.

Yet, the requirements of modern life and of Hong Kong in particular simultaneously meant that the American organizations and the British colonial government also wanted New Asia to represent modern education. For this reason, they pushed for the injection of science and other practical subjects into the curriculum and for the increasing bureaucratization of the college. When combined with their concurrent need for a symbol of the true China there in the Hong Kong periphery, this juxtaposition of expectations led them to accept and even encourage the image of New Asia as both a traditional shuyuan AND a modern university, as representing both China’s historic culture AND the twentieth-century Chinese nation.

This fusion of the modern and traditional had particular resonance in Hong Kong in the 1950’s and ‘60’s, for it was precisely at that time that the British colonial government was most intent on making Hong Kong both the springboard for reaching all Asia with Western education as well as the exemplary site in which Chinese and Western studies could coalesce. This image of Hong Kong as an educational and cultural crossroads between China and the
West served New Asia's own program as well, for it allowed New Asia a broader context in which to claim that it was aiming to promote cross-cultural understanding. However, while both New Asia and the British colonial government were sincere in their wish to provide some sort of East-West cultural fusion, each was principally intent on promoting their own cultures on their own terms.

Although New Asia College and Hong Kong's British colonial government could not come to exact agreement on what cultural education in Hong Kong should entail or what Hong Kong's role in the East-West dialogue should involve, the institution of New Asia in Hong Kong nonetheless exemplified the significance Hong Kong would have for Chinese culture and Chinese identity in the post-1949 period. Because New Asia, the government, and the American non-governmental organizations all wished to preserve a strong sense of Chinese culture in Hong Kong while the Chinese mainland was isolated by communism, all three invested much in the perpetuation and promotion of their own conceptions of Chinese culture through the institution of New Asia. This investment in New Asia signified a shift whereby the peripheral community of Hong Kong became, in some sense, the cultural core of China. This shift, in the
minds of New Asia's founders and of organizations like Yale-China, was crucial but temporary, as their hope lay always with mainland China and their work on the periphery was meant only to stage their return to the motherland. Yet, because the Hong Kong environment made its own demands as their stay in the colony lengthened and became, finally, indefinite, the conceptualization of core and periphery became increasingly cloudy, resulting ultimately in a broadened vision of the nature and boundaries of China.

This broadening, though not occurring in exactly the manner they had intended, was nevertheless in tune with New Asia's general orientation and conceptualization of China, for New Asia's notion of China had always been primarily a cultural one. Certainly, the New Asia founders had some sense of the political integrity of the Chinese nation; if this were not so, they would not have left the mainland in disgust over communism, nor would they have clung to the Taiwanese flag as the legitimate symbol of the legitimate China. However, what was of paramount importance to them was not any particular government or political representation of China, but rather the cultural values of Confucianism by which they defined China's cultural core. It was this cultural core that they sought to defend,
preserve, and promote. Because their efforts took place on British colonial soil and on the margins of China, with all the tensions and ambiguities these contextual aspects implied and produced, their original vision was sometimes obscured and even obstructed. Yet, the intersection of symbolic meanings overlaid onto the New Asia project also lent their program a greater poignancy and potency. Ultimately, it was the very contestation of these variant meanings of culture and education that would define the development of not only New Asia but the broader Hong Kong context in which it took root.
Bibliography

The college archives at New Asia consist entirely of published materials. Archival sources, such as private letters and the like, are not kept as one might find for American universities in their libraries. However, the school’s periodical publications are detailed and extensive in their coverage of the issues of concern to the New Asia community of the time (see A.1 below). As well, the compilations created by subsequent scholars include much material of an archival nature (see A.2 below). Unpublished archival material pertaining to New Asia can be found in the archives of the various American funding organizations, particularly those of the Yale-China Association (see B below). Official documentation produced by the British colonial government in Hong Kong, particularly the Annual Reports of the Education Department as well as reports submitted by special commissions appointed to address specific problems (see C below), is invaluable in providing general background on the social and educational situation in Hong Kong as well as specific information on issues and policies which influenced New Asia directly or indirectly.

My interpretation of New Asia’s development and significance is very much influenced by the two years I
spent living on the campus of The Chinese University while doing research. My first in-depth systematic exposure to New Asia's history and educational philosophy came with my attendance, during the Fall semester of 2000, in the course GEN2232 Xinya jingshen yu Xinya xianxian de wenhua jiaoyu lixiang 新亚精神与新亚先贤的文化教育理想 [The Spirit of New Asia and the Cultural Education Ideal of New Asia's Early Sages]. This course, taught by Lau Kwok-keung 刘国强, is listed under the General Curriculum of New Asia College and can be chosen by students to fulfill their general education requirements. The course examines the educational principles and philosophy of the New Asia founders, particularly their notion of cultural education, and also covers the biographies and scholarship of the founders. As attendance in this class constituted my first in-depth exposure to New Asia, it provided me with a strong foundation from which to explore issues of education and culture at New Asia. It should also be noted that, due primarily to the fact that the course is taught by one of Tang Junyi's students who is himself a professor of philosophy and education, the course today continues to aim at the personal development of the students and their formation of moral character and cultural ideals, as opposed to simply recounting the history of the
College and its key personages. Professor Lau also subsequently became my most important contact person in Hong Kong, and my understanding of New Asia is greatly shaped by his knowledge and connections.

[A] New Asia College, Hong Kong

1. School Periodicals

Xinya Xiaokan 新亚校刊 [The New Asia School Magazine], 1952-57.
This periodical, described in some detail in Chapter 2, represents the editorial efforts of New Asia's core students in its early years. Published biannually, the Xiaokan consisted of professorial and students essays, school news, academic rules and requirements, course offerings, listings of graduates, biographical descriptions of the professors, etc. These various forms of information, commentary, and scholarship would gradually be divided amongst more specialized publications as listed below.


New Asia College Calendar. 1964-77.
These constitute the college calendar of New Asia College, in which course offerings and academics rules and requirements were listed. Prior to 1963, New Asia published its own annual college calendar independently; these early editions were extremely detailed in providing information on the nature of the education offered at New Asia, including thorough course descriptions and their required textbooks, and also student and faculty listings and descriptions. After the founding of The Chinese University in 1963, the university's constituent colleges each continued to publish its own college calendar but under the university's name, as given above, and
gradually came to adopt a more general tone. Beginning in 1964, New Asia was mandated to publish also an English version of the calendar, which previously had been in Chinese only. After the university changed from a federal to a unitary structure, the colleges ceased to publish their own calendars as all were included under one university calendar published by the central administration.

Xinya shuyuan xueshu niankan 新亚书院学术年刊 [New Asia Academic Annual], 1959-present.

Xinya xuebao 新亚学报 [New Asia Journal], 1955-present. These two are the scholarly journals produced by New Asia College and New Asia Research Institute, respectively. The Research Institute’s Journal was published biannually during its first five years, then roughly biennially through the 1960’s, and without discernable pattern since then. Both publications include both student and professor writing. The topics overwhelmingly revolve around Chinese history, philosophy, and literature.


Xinya xuesheng bao 新亚学生报 [New Asia Student Newspaper]. 1964-present.

Xin Ya xiao xun 新亚校讯 [New Asia Newsletter]. 1973-present. These three publications provide community news and events announcements. While the Student Newspaper is published by the student union, the Life and the Newsletter are official College publications; the former is an annual with in-depth information on the year’s activities, while the latter provides a brief biweekly update.

2. Documents and Compilations on New Asia’s History

Lau Kwok-keung 刘国强 ed. Xinya Jiaoyu 新亚教育 [New Asia Education]. Hong Kong: New Asia Research Institute, 1981. This volume, compiled by one of Tang Junyi’s most dedicated students, includes many key essays written by the New Asia founders and the early students concerning the principles and philosophy of New Asia education.
Qian Mu 钱穆, Shiyou zaiyi 师友杂忆 [Remembrances of Teachers And Friends]. Taibei: Dongda tushu gongsi 东大图书公司, 1983.
Published in conjunction with Qian's Bashi yi shuangqin 八十忆双亲 [Remembrances of my parents at eighty], this volume includes a four-chapter accounting of the early history of New Asia College written by Qian himself, and is the single most comprehensive description of the early circumstances, people, and context of New Asia.

Qian Mu, Xinya yiduo 新亚遗铎 [Remembrances of New Asia].
This volume constitutes an extensive collection of documentation regarding New Asia, including transcripts of speeches and essays given or written by Qian himself, as well as significant statements of educational philosophy, explanation of school policy and principles, and interpretations of the significance and role of New Asia. Originally published in 1989 as an independent volume, it was reprinted in 1998 as part of a 54-volume compilation of Qian Mu's works.

Sun Dingchen 孙鼎宸, ed. Xinya Wenhua Jiangzuo lu 新亚文化 讲座录 [Records of the New Asia Culture Open Forum].
Hong Kong: New Asia College, 1962.
This volume includes approximate transcriptions of a portion of the 122 lectures given during 1950-54 at New Asia as part of its Culture Open Forum. The transcriptions were based on the notes of the editor, who attended most of the lectures during the Forum's four-year duration. His volume also includes the titles and speakers of all the lectures of the Forum, and gives the speakers' educational backgrounds, native place, professional affiliations, etc. As such, it provides extremely useful information both on the nature of the messages communicated through the lectures when taken altogether, as well as about the nature of the community surrounding this institution. Discussion of the Forum is found in Chapter 2.

Xinya Shuyuan Fazhan Jihua 新亚书院发展计划 [Development Plan of New Asia College]. 1956.
This document, published in both Chinese and English, outlines the five-year-plan for development drawn up by New Asia's leaders in 1956. As such, it includes not only detailed information on projected curricular and funding priorities for the near future but also gives a thorough picture of New Asia's first seven years and the developments that had brought it to the mid-1950's.

Published by the student union, this volume compiles essays by and interviews of contemporary New Asia students upon its silver anniversary.

Published by the College in commemoration of its golden anniversary, this celebratory volume includes many photographs and reflective essays written by former New Asia students.

3. Documents on The Chinese University of Hong Kong

The Chinese University of Hong Kong General Reports, 1963-78:
Vol. 2: "The Emerging University, 1970-74"
Vol. 3: "New Era Begins, 1975-78".
These three general reports were issued by The Chinese University administration to describe its development over its first fifteen years.


These two reports represent the two stages of work by The Chinese University in the mid-1970's in attempt to determine whether the federal structure adopted by the university at its founding should be continued and, if
not, with what it should be replaced. Discussion on this process is found in Chapter 5.

Xinya Shuyuan guanyu Daxue gaizhi wenti wenjian huikan
新亚书院改制问题文件会刊 [A collection of New Asia papers on the proposed change in the structure of the Chinese University of Hong Kong]. Hong Kong: Board of Governors of New Asia College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1976.

Xinya shuyuan dongshihui dui Fuerdun baogaoshu ji

These two collections of documents, regarding New Asia’s reaction to the suggested structural change of the university, contain many Board reports, press releases, letters to the government, alternative proposals, etc. The first was published in January of 1976 before the official decision on the proposed change was made, and was thus issued in hopes to deflecting an unfavorable decision. The second was issued in December of the same year after the policy decision had already been made and thus represented all the documents of protest issued by New Asia, including the Board’s collective statement of resignation.

[B] Archives of American Funding Organizations

1. Yale-China Association

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
Sterling Library, Manuscripts and Archives
Records of the Yale-China Association (RU 232)

The archives at Yale contain the most extensive collection of primary documents pertaining to New Asia, consisting of well over 100 boxes of materials. Because of Yale-China’s key role in supporting New Asia financially, as well as the influence exerted by their on-site representative, this
documentation is crucial in understanding the role played by Yale-China in New Asia’s development as well as the conceptions of New Asia’s significance held by Yale-China Board and staff which has motivated their continued support of the College to the present day. As Yale-China supervised the application of Ford Foundation funding at New Asia, important documentation can also be found here on the working relationship between Yale-China and Ford as well as the negotiation of their common interests in New Asia. The fact that archival material is not available at New Asia itself makes this collection all the more valuable, as items such as handwritten letters from New Asia personnel can be found here.

2. Ford Foundation

Ford Foundation, New York
Ford Foundation Archives
Files: Project Files; Board Minute Dockets

The Ford Foundation archives, located at their headquarters in New York, include complete Board Minutes and Project Files on applications received and grants given to specific institutions and projects. Unfortunately, the Project File on New Asia has been lost or is otherwise unavailable. However, the Board Minutes are thorough in their explanations of the reasons behind rejecting or accepting grant applications, and thus they provide information on the priorities and principles of the Foundation during any given time period. The reasoning with regards to New Asia in the context of larger Cold War concerns in the 1950’s was particularly interesting. Perusal of files on other projects supported by the Ford Foundation during this time period also reveals much about their thinking and principles.

3. Harvard-Yenching Institute

Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Harvard-Yenching Institute Archives
Files: New Asia College; New Asia Research Institute; The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The archives of the Harvard-Yenching Institute are kept not in the Harvard-Yenching library but in the Harvard-Yenching office. Their files on New Asia, though not extensive, contain useful information on the types of projects that Harvard-Yenching was interested in funding at the New Asia Research Institute, as well as correspondence between the two bodies. Minutes of the Harvard-Yenching Board meetings are meticulously kept and organized, and these also are very informative as to the reasoning behind the priorities and policies of Harvard-Yenching and their distribution of funds amongst various Asian universities and projects.

4. The Asia Foundation
Hoover Institution, Stanford, California
Hoover Institution Archives
Files: New Asia College; New Asia Research Institute

The archives of the Asia Foundation are kept at the Hoover Institution archives at Stanford, though access to them is permitted only through special arrangements with the Asia Foundation head office in San Francisco. The relevant documents are kept in a dozen or so boxes of materials dealing specifically with New Asia as well as more generally with the Hong Kong situation in the 1950's and '60's. As the Asia Foundation established a Hong Kong office in 1953, much of the material consists of correspondence or general reports from the Hong Kong representative to the San Francisco head office regarding the conditions of Hong Kong society and education and interpretations of the Asia Foundation's proper response to changing needs.

[C] Hong Kong British Colonial Government Documents

Hong Kong. Education Department. Triennial survey.

These are the official government reports issued by the Education Department. The Summary continues the Report with no discernable difference in nature; both give a thorough annual accounting of the activities of the department as well as of statistics and analyses relevant to the general educational situation in Hong Kong. The
Triennial Survey was instituted in 1955 and ran through 1973 for the purpose of conducting more thorough analysis of changes in Hong Kong society and hence the educational system during that time period.


These two reports together reveal much about the educational issues faced by the British colonial government in Hong Kong in the early 1950’s when the great influx of China refugees sparked new policies in every area. The first deals with the general educational situation on all levels, analyzing complex problems of distribution of resources and assessment of the long- and short-term needs of the refugee population. The second is an in-depth study of higher education issues in particular, and represents a thorough analysis of the educational landscape at the post-secondary level and the possible solutions to the problems at hand. The presence of a number of scholars on the committee that conducted this study perhaps accounts in part for the extent to which the report focused not only on observable phenomenon but also on contesting interpretations of the central cultural and educational issues of the day. As such, it provides an invaluable window onto the social, cultural, and intellectual issues than converged on education during the early 1950’s.


These two reports, submitted by Sir John Fulton, British government-appointed educational advisor, provides thorough information on the issues considered in the few years preceding the official establishment of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The conclusions of the first did much to convince the British colonial government that
a few of Hong Kong's post-secondary colleges were deserving of consideration for university status. The policy suggestions made in the 1963 Report, a sizeable document detailing thoroughly the plans for university establishment in all respects, were followed by the government such that federalism was the structure adopted by the new university. Of particular importance, the Report included thorough research and justification for federalism as the most appropriate structure for the new university, and would be subsequently quoted and appropriated by all who objected to any move away from the federal university structure.

Hong Kong. Special Committee on Higher Education. Interim report, 1966.
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These government surveys provide very useful background information on the broader dynamics of change in the 1960s and '70s in Hong Kong, their effect on higher education, and the principles by which public resources should be allocated to it.

[E] Other Sources of a Primary Nature


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