THE OPEN DOOR: EARLY MODERN WAJORESE STATECRAFT AND DIASPORA

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Kathryn Gay Anderson

Dissertation Committee:

Leonard Y. Andaya, Chairperson
Barbara Watson Andaya
David A. Chappell
Jerry H. Bentley
Jonathan Okamura
Abstract

This study focuses on the relations between Wajoq, a confederative Bugis polity in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, and overseas groups of Wajorese migrants in Makassar, western Sumatra, the Straits of Melaka and eastern Kalimantan during the century following the Makassar War (1666-1669). It argues that these outlying communities interacted with the center in ways similar to those of the local constituents, and that the diaspora can therefore can be seen as part of the state. The ability of the Wajorese government to incorporate these groups rested on a long-standing mechanisms for holding its various components together and on its definition of membership within the state.

Wajorese migrants exhibited remarkable versatility in adapting to local conditions in the areas where they settled. While each community developed along its own lines, they employed similar strategies. Foremost among these were intermarriage, diplomacy and warfare. The various communities also cooperated with each other by sharing intelligence, establishing a commercial code of law and providing military assistance. Such cooperation was facilitated by the Bugis concept of *pessè* meaning solidarity or commiseration. *Pessè* was the cultural and emotional glue that bound the migrants to the homeland. It was therefore key to the maintenance of links between the constituents of Wajoq.

Relations between Wajorese migrants and their homeland intensified in the early eighteenth century when successive rulers in Wajoq deliberately sought to harness the military and commercial potential of the migrant communities. This effort culminated in the 1730s when the exile La Maddukelleng returned from eastern Kalimantan, assumed the leadership of Wajoq, rallied the support of the Wajorese communities in Makassar and Sumbawa and attempted to expel the Dutch from South Sulawesi. While ultimately unsuccessful, his campaign exemplifies the manner in which the overseas Wajorese remained an essential part of Wajoq well into the eighteenth century.
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................iii
List of Maps ......................................................................................................vii
List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................viii

Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................1
  Concepts of States .........................................................................................3
  Bugis Statecraft .............................................................................................8
  Wajorese Political Structure .........................................................................12
  Sources ...........................................................................................................20
  The Study .......................................................................................................32

Chapter 2: Wajorese History and Migration ..................................................35
  Physical and Social Geography ......................................................................35
  Early Wajorese History .................................................................................40
  Shifting Balance of Power ...........................................................................43
  The Makassar War .........................................................................................46
  Wajorese Impressions of the War .................................................................51
  Attack on Wajoq ..........................................................................................53
  The Torment of Wajoq ................................................................................58
  Chapter Conclusion .......................................................................................60

Chapter 3: Wajoere Society and Entrepreneurship in Makassar .......................62
  Kampong Wajoq ........................................................................................64
  The Wajoere Administration in Makassar ....................................................66
  Commerce ....................................................................................................69
  Wajoere Commercial Law ...........................................................................72
  The Commercial Practices of To Anko and To Uti ........................................77
  The Flowering of Wajoere Commerce ..........................................................82
  Chapter Conclusion .......................................................................................86
List of Maps

Map 1: Wajoq.................................................................18
Map 2: South Sulawesi......................................................36
Map 3: Western Sumatra..................................................90
Map 4: The Malay World..................................................119
Map 5: The Makassar Strait.............................................142
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>ANRI</td>
<td>Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BKI</td>
<td>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRL</td>
<td>Center for Research Libraries (Chicago)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIC</td>
<td>(English) East India Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>De Indische Gids</td>
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<td>JAS</td>
<td>The Journal of Asian Studies</td>
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<td>JM BRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</td>
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<td>JS BRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</td>
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<td>JSEA H</td>
<td>Journal of Southeast Asian History</td>
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<td>JSEAS</td>
<td>Journal of Southeast Asian Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBRAS</td>
<td>Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIMA</td>
<td>Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Tijdschrift van het Aardrijkskundige Genootschap</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBG</td>
<td>Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie</td>
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<td>SFR</td>
<td>Sumatra Factory Records</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWK</td>
<td>Sumatras West Kust</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United Dutch East India Company)</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

A number of nineteenth century observers noted the tendency among the people of Wajoq, a Bugis polity in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, to migrate. Among them was B. F. Matthes, one of the leading Dutch philologists of South Sulawesi languages upon whose pioneering efforts virtually all subsequent textual research has been based. He described the people of Wajoq as “born traders [who] wander around everywhere in the archipelago and settle in those places where they can find the most advantage and at least be guaranteed some protection by the local ruler against piracy, which at home leaves much to be desired.”

This statement implies that Wajorese emigration resulted from a lack in the Wajoq system of government, specifically the absence of protection from piracy. What I would like to suggest in this study is that Wajorese emigration resulted not so much from a lack but rather from particular features in Wajorese government and society that encouraged migration. Figuratively speaking Wajoq had an open door that allowed people to come and go as they pleased. This facilitated the establishment of a far-flung network of Wajorese migrants and merchants across the Southeast Asian archipelago.

When I began this study I intended to investigate the development of the Wajorese diaspora as an aspect of change in Wajoq from the Makassar War (1666-69) until the Wajorese repatriate La Maddukelleng attempted to expel the Dutch from South Sulawesi in the 1730s. While I have remained consistent in terms of subject matter during the long course of its preparation, my understanding of Wajoq as a polity and its relationship with the Wajorese overseas settlements has changed. Five years ago I saw Wajoq as an insular agrarian community and Wajorese migration as a result of changes in the Indonesian Archipelago during the early modern era, especially the advance of the United (Dutch) East Indian Company (VOC), and I intended to study them separately. During the course of my research, however, it

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2 Throughout this study “overseas” is used loosely to describe areas at a distance from a given reference point. Thus the Wajorese community at Makassar is referred to as an overseas settlement even though it is technically not overseas from Wajoq.
became apparent that the Wajorese homeland and overseas communities were linked by a sense of community, family ties, commercial relations, a representative council and a legal code. Family relations, money, leaders and weapons crossed Wajoq’s territorial boundaries to such an extent that these boundaries appeared irrelevant. This is not to say that the boundaries were not important to Wajorese politicians because quite the opposite is true. Rather, it is that the Wajorese people within and outside these boundaries were significant to the state and its goals.

In an attempt to understand the relationship between Wajoq and outlying communities of Wajorese migrants, I sought parallels in existing literature about mobile social formations including diasporas, semi-diasporas, deterritorialized nation states, transnations and ethnoescapes. I generally found these concepts restrictive because of their tendencies either to describe a basically apolitical social formation, such as a cultural or religious diasporas, or to regard spatial dispersal as a feature of late modernity. Indeed, much of this discourse positions diasporas squarely in the late modern era. While I use the term diaspora to denote a social formation consisting of dispersed migrant groups that both maintain contacts with each other and retain a collective sense of identity linked to an ancestral homeland, I reject the presentist connotations common in present-day discourse.

The literature about Southeast Asian statecraft is more accommodating. While the analytical framework regarding statecraft is based largely on the European experience of bounded states, a number of works incorporate a wide variety of political processes and elements and consequently suggest a broader definition of states. Tony Day’s recent book *Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast Asia* emphasizes the need to view statecraft as human practice. He argues that statecraft does not occur in a vacuum, nor is it superimposed from above; rather, it involves constant negotiation between those who govern and those who are governed. A number of Day’s forerunners have examined this negotiation in detail. For example, Jane Drakard’s *A Kingdom of Words* demonstrates how power relations among the Minangkabau were constructed on the basis of letters and documents expressing the widely respected spiritual authority of the

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royal court in central Sumatra. Another illustrative case-study is Luc Nagtegaal's work on the early modern Javanese state that he defines as a flexible, personalized "network kept together largely by self-interest and coercion." These and other such models convinced me that the Wajorese diaspora I sought to study separately was actually part of the state.

This study of the Wajorese shows how certain elements that unified the state of Wajoq were transferred to outlying Wajorese communities and continued to function at a distance during the early modern era. It considers the mobility that was and is a pronounced feature of Wajorese society and challenges the rigidity of the state/diaspora dichotomy implicit (and sometimes explicit) within our conceptual framework. Furthermore it contributes a diachronic case study to the discourse concerning diaspora, the overwhelming emphasis of which has been on the contemporary period.

Concepts of States

Seventeenth century states were very different from the system of nation-states that currently encompasses the globe. Although this system maintains a powerful hold on our Andersonian imaginations, the critical conceptual link between nation and territory upon which nation-states rest did not develop until the eighteenth century. Prior to that the European political landscape consisted largely of absolutist monarchies such as France and Spain whose sovereigns often claimed divine right to rule. It was only during the eighteenth century that Enlightenment ideals such as political equality, popular sovereignty and liberty inspired political reform that, particularly but not exclusively in France, was accompanied by the rise of nationalism. Whereas there had previously been communal sentiments based on a wide-variety of cultural, religious and ethnic factors, there now developed nationalism, which was a revolutionary political plan for the construction of a homogenous, politically and spiritually unified nation.

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The historiographic tendency\(^9\) has been to view this development as an exclusively European phenomenon fueled by exceptional developments such as print-capitalism (Anderson) and industrialization (Gellner.) Recently, however, this approach has come under fire. Victor Leiberman argues that localized societies across Eurasia coalesced politically, culturally and commercially from about 1450 to 1830.\(^{10}\) While he notes that such integration was less significant in certain areas, especially insular Southeast Asia, he argues that even during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, this development transcends any East-West divide.\(^{11}\) Yet the concept of a bounded nation-state developed along exceptionally rigid lines in Europe. A critical shift around the sixteenth century in which the public good became increasingly associated with the state pushed European states towards nation-states.\(^{12}\) Gradually, the concept of a nation-state developed as a sharply delineated, territorial political unit, with uniform institutions and authority throughout, that is supposedly contiguous with the ancestral lands of a single people sharing a common heritage, language and culture. This conceptualization was eventually exported to other parts of the world via European colonialists and later European-educated bilingual elites, which led to the development of the nation-state system that currently encompasses the globe.

In the process, the nation-state system, with its boundaries of contiguous lands, standardized languages and educational systems, butted heads with indigenous systems all over the world. Misunderstandings between European and Asian officials over the question of boundaries exemplify this clash perfectly. Thongchai Winichakul recounts the stunned, confused and annoyed responses of the Siamese government and people to British attempts at marking boundaries in the nineteenth century. Whereas Siamese concepts of political sovereignty included boundaries, these were much more flexible than the European system in which a state's sovereignty was coterminous with its borders.\(^{13}\) Another

\(^9\) China, where the relationship between sovereignty and territory has long been recognized, is the most notable exception.


\(^{11}\) Ibid, p. 52.


example comes from South Sulawesi where Dutch officials tried to learn the precise borders of two
countries from their respective rulers. When asked to which country certain mountains belonged, the rulers
replied that they have much better things to fight about than scruffy hills. Clearly political systems in
Southeast Asia and their relations to territory confused colonial officials who were accustomed to the
European system.

In efforts to understand these systems, scholars have developed a variety of models of statecraft
and applied them to Southeast Asian states. A number of these models account for physically disparate
constituents within a single state. The so-called cosmic polity models are of particular interest because they
do not require a state to be physically contiguous.

The most widespread cosmic polity model is that of the mandala. Literally meaning circle, a
mandala is a painted, engraved or carved configuration consisting of a central divinity encircled by other
divinities. It was first applied to politics in the fourth century Sanskrit political treatise *Arthasastra*. With
reference to Southeast Asia, it is most commonly used with reference to Indianized societies on the
mainland and in the western archipelago. O. W. Wolters, Benedict O’G. Anderson and S. J. Tambiah have
all used this concept in different ways.

Wolters describes the mandala as

a particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed
boundaries and where smaller centers tended to look in all directions for security. Mandalas would expand
and contract in a concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several tributary rulers, some of whom would
repudiate their vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to build up their own networks of vassals.

Thus his model is characterized by flexible polities consisting of multiple centers and multiple rulers that
look for security in a variety of directions, all underneath a mandala overlord. It aptly describes the late 7th

15 O. W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*. Singapore: Institute of
Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972; Stanley
Jeyaraja Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action An Anthropological Perspective*, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1985; S. J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of
Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background*, Cambridge: Cambridge University
to early 11th century political situation in which Srivijaya from its center on the east coast of Sumatra near Palembang exerted influence over a variety of harbor principalities and hinterland chiefs on the Malay Peninsula and the north and northeastern coasts of Sumatra. Wolters also applies the mandala concept to Angkor, Ayudhya and Majapahit.

Anderson’s version of the mandala polity, which relies heavily on Soemarsaid Moertono’s study of early Javanese statecraft, emphasizes the importance of the center. He uses the image of light from a reflector lamp as a metaphor for Javanese political influence. He equates the manner in which the lamp’s brightness gradually and evenly diminishes with increased distance from the light source to the manner in which a ruler’s power diminishes towards the periphery until it merges with the nearest neighbor’s sphere of influence. Anderson applies this to both Majapahit, which had widespread tributaries on diverse islands, and to the Republic of Indonesia. His approach differs from Wolters’ in that the periphery does not replicate the center nor have its own brightness, but rather is subject to the center’s diluted authority. While such an emphasis on the center may obscure politics and society on the periphery, the value of this image is that it clearly represents the diffuse nature of political influence. Anderson argues that the uneven application of authority stems from the Javanese conception of power as constant. Because there is a fixed amount of power in the universe, its concentration in one area results in dilution in another.

Tambiah’s galactic model draws on the concept of mandala, defined here as a core with an enclosing element, to describe a traditional form of statecraft that encodes political, economic, topographical and cosmological features. A galactic polity has a complex of satellites surrounding a spiritually important center. The satellites are small-scale replicas of the center that are created by the polity splitting into independent components through succession disputes, rebellions and shifting capitals and territories. The outlying territories are not firmly controlled, rather they are joined through a tributary

20 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
21 Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action, p. 252; Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 115.
22 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, p. 123.
and spiritual relationship, which is reified through oaths of loyalty, marriage and messengers. Tambiah argues that this model was pervasive in Southeast Asia.

While not a cosmic polity, the segmentary state is another model of statecraft that allows for physically discontiguous constituents within a single state. The main features of a segmentary state are a pyramidal social structure in which very similar powers are exercised at several different levels. In any segment at any given time there is “a certain degree of monopoly of political power, development of administrative staff and definition of territorial limits...” While Aidan W. Southall developed this concept with reference to the Alur in highland East Africa, several scholars have used it as a means of understanding statecraft in Asia. Richard Fox has applied it to the Rajput polities in North India and Burton Stein has applied it to the Cholas of South India. In Southeast Asia, Thomas Kiefer and James Warren have applied it to the Taosug of Sulu. The political systems of these societies are composed of constituents that are structurally similar, the authority of which differed in extent rather than kind. In a sense, the segmentary state combines several important aspects of statecraft found in Southeast Asia such as the gradual diffusion of power from the center to the periphery (as seen in Anderson’s concept of mandala) and the replication of the center’s political system among its political constituents on the periphery (as seen in Wolters’ concept of mandala or Tambiah’s galactic polity’s satellites).

The most striking feature that emerges from all of these models is the emphasis on the center rather than the periphery. This differs from the European emphasis on borders which stems from the concept that sovereignty and territory are coterminous, at least in theory. The relationship between territory and borders also differs fundamentally from that of a European state because the total territory included

23 Ibid.
within the borders of a given traditional state in Southeast Asia are not necessarily contiguous. While there have been strong objections to the application of models based on Indian political concepts to the unIndianized29 states of South Sulawesi,30 the cosmic polity models demonstrate that the idea of a state consisting of outlying communities linked to a center is not uncommon in Southeast Asian historiography. A number of other studies document this phenomenon on the basis of empirical data rather than Indian-based models. Thongchai points out that Siamese boundaries were determined at the local level and that they may or may not adjoin another boundary or segment of the Siamese state.31 Similarly, parts of other Southeast Asian states were located at a distance from their centers. Leonard Y. Andaya’s work on Maluku has shown that Ternate included Buton of the southeast coast of Sulawesi, Loloda on the northeastern coast of Halmahera and Bacan off the southeastern coast of Halmahera, among other areas.32 Elsewhere in the world there are other examples of widely dispersed states. In western Polynesia, for example, the outliers of Niuatoputapu and Niuafou are located 375 miles (600 kilometers) north of Tongatapu, yet academic discussions still refer to these distant areas as part of Tonga.33 Thus it appears that a state’s peripheral constituents can still be considered part of the state regardless as to whether they are located close at hand or far away from the center.

Bugis Statecraft

As the preceding discussion has shown, the idea that a state can consist of physically discontiguous constituents has a prestigious pedigree in Southeast Asian historiography. However, given the emphasis on territoriality in the political systems of South Sulawesi, the idea does not appear readily applicable to Bugis statecraft. It is only when the actual interaction between the overseas Wajores

29 While there are numerous Indian influences in the languages, belief systems, and technologies of South Sulawesi, the region did not undergo the profound social transformation of Indianization that, according to Coedes, is “characterized by Hinduist or Buddhist cults, the mythology of the Puranas, and the observance of the Dharmasastras” as expressed in the Sanskrit language. (G. Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968, pp. 15-16.)
31 Thongchai, Siam Mapped, pp. 75-76.
communities and the homeland is examined that the communities appear united. Any analysis of this interaction requires an understanding of Bugis statecraft.

Traditional Bugis states are kingdoms consisting of a single-ethnic group and characterized by their confederative nature, their paramount rulers and their territorial boundaries. They were generally confederations of smaller polities (limpo\textsuperscript{34}) that joined together for mutual advantage or for the prestige of being associated with a certain lineage. Bone, for example, was originally a federation of seven communities, as is reflected in the name of its ruling council, Matoa Piut, meaning the “Seven Elders.”\textsuperscript{35} The constituent polities were local communities, often united around a sacred object known as a gaukeng in which the community’s guardian spirit was believed to reside.\textsuperscript{36} Both the gaukeng and the local rulers were of heavenly descent or ascent and commanded respect accordingly. Thus, even when participating in the political life of a kingdom and recognizing its paramount ruler, the constituent polities maintained their own customs and territorial integrity. They did not generally conduct foreign policy with other kingdoms as equals, but they could and did switch their allegiance from one kingdom to another according to their own self-perceived best interests.

A second important characteristic of traditional Bugis states was territoriality. Whereas states in other parts of Southeast Asia often were based on trade and/or control of manpower, land was a primary political concern of in South Sulawesi. The importance of territory is clearly reflected in the fact that the main states of South Sulawesi occupied roughly the same area in the sixteenth century as the modern kabupaten (regencies) that now bear the same names.\textsuperscript{38} It is also reflected in the treaties that kingdoms concluded with each other. For example, Bone and Wajoq both gave land to Soppeng so that the three countries could conclude the Treaty of Timurung as brothers or relative equals. Furthermore, as Macknight

\textsuperscript{34} Limpo literally means “surround” and it is also used to mean “people” or “village.” (B. F. Matthes, Boegineesch-Hollandsch Woordenboek, Amsterdam: C. A. Spin & Zoon, 1874, p. 563.) As no plurals exist in the Indonesian or Bugis languages, I have not attempted to pluralize Indonesian or Bugis words.


\textsuperscript{36} In the case of Wajoq, there also may have existed a gaukeng that represented the spirit of the entire Wajorese community. One historical text also refers to a gaukeng that belonged to the arung matoaship in Wajoq. Unfortunately, no description is given. (Leiden Cod Or 1923 Vl, f. 14.)

\textsuperscript{37} In Bugis cosmology, the Earth is perceived of as a middle world in between two supernatural worlds.
points out, two of the seven offenses for which Boné charged La Maddukelleng (see chapter seven) hinged on claims of territorial possession.  

However, the emphasis on territory in Bugis statecraft differs significantly from that in the West. Because the gaukeng were often part of nature, such as a stone or a tree, communities had spiritual attachments to the land. Consequently when a community switched alliances, the population did not generally move into the territory of their new overlord. Instead the boundaries of Bugis kingdoms were fixed according to the groups that were loyal to a specific state at a given time. Thus the boundaries were in a constant state of flux. However, border disputes did not threaten the state; rather, they were an innate part of the hierarchical political system in South Sulawesi. 

The third characteristic feature of Bugis kingdoms was the existence of a paramount ruler. The titles of paramount rulers varied from country to country. Although the paramount rulers in Boné and Luwuq held essentially the same office, their titles, Arumpone and Payung ri Luwuq, respectively, were specific to their countries. The role of the paramount ruler also differed. For example, the Arumpone was generally more authoritarian than the Wajorese Arung Matoa. Such variations, however, were subject to the desire and capacity of particular rulers to enforce their authority. Despite such variations and a few notable exceptions, autocracy was generally not permitted among paramount rulers in South Sulawesi. 

There were numerous obstacles to despotism, not the least of which was adat or customary law. A ruler would lose his or her authority if he or she did not rule according to adat that stipulated that the autonomy

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41 Boné is generally considered more autocratic than Wajoq. This was especially the case during the late 17th century during the reigns of Arung Palakka and La Patauq. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the influence of the Arumpone had declined. (See Leonard Andaya, “The Nature of Kingship in Bone,” A. Reid and L. Castles, Pre-colonial States Systems in Southeast Asia, pp. 124-125; and Christian Pelras, The Bugis, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, p. 180.)
of local communities be respected. The state and the adat existed independently of the ruler, and he or she was expected to serve the state's interest, not vice versa.

The fact that paramount rulers of Bugis kingdoms were almost universally from the upper echelons of society reflects the absolute centrality of status as a social concern within the societies of South Sulawesi. The basic model for the status systems of societies in South Sulawesi is a hierarchy of nobles and commoners in which an individual's status is ascribed, or determined by birth. Chabot contends that the origins of the hierarchies of nobles and commoners prevalent in South Sulawesi are "beyond historical observation" but Petras points to its origins in the I La Galigo texts and in the origin myths. In the former, there are two types of mortals: the so-called "white-blooded" people of divine ancestry and the so-


43 This is a sharp contrast to concepts of statecraft in the Malay world where the ruler and his lineage justified the existence of the state and the hierarchy of nobles. Matheson points out that there is "no evidence for the existence of the state as a concept, as abstract ideal above and beyond the ruler, which was to be sustained and protected . . ." in the Malay Tuhfat al-Nafs. (Virginia Matheson, "Concepts of the State in the Tuhfat al-Nafs [The Precious Gift]" in A. Reid and L. Castles, Pre-colonial States Systems, p. 21)

44 As such, status has long attracted the attention of social scientists working in South Sulawesi, such as Friedericy, Chabot and more recently Millar and van Mens. (H. J. Friedericy, "De standen bij de Boeginezen en Makassaren," BKI, 90 (1933), pp. 447-602; H. Th. Chabot, Kinship, Status and Gender in South Celebes, Leiden: KITLV, 1996; Susan Bolyard Millar, Bugis Weddings: Rituals of Social Location in Modern Indonesia, Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1989; Lucie van Mens, De Statusscheppers: Sociale Mobilititeit in Wajo, 1905-1950, Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1989.)

45 The mythological epic I La Galigo relates how the gods of the upperworld and the gods of the underworld decided to populate the earth with people to pay homage to them. Batara Guru, the first tomanurung (descendant from the upperworld), and Sinaungtodja, the first totompto (ascendant from the underworld), married and began populating the earth. Their grandson, Sawerigading, travelled extensively, trying to dominate the seas and take over other lands, fighting numerous battles along the way, and his adventures constitute the most important part of the I La Galigo cycle.
called “red-blooded” people of common ancestry. The higher echelons of society, namely the white-blooded and the ruling nobles, inherited power as a result of their status rather than vice versa. Among the Bugis, then, status preceded political authority, and it would have been difficult if not impossible for someone of low birth to attract a substantial following. Even in instances where the paramount ruler was elected rather than hereditary, the selection was still made from a limited pool of high-status individuals.

Wajorese Political Structure

Wajoq is now a kabupaten or regency of the Indonesian province of South Sulawesi. Politically independent until 1906, it was effectively a federative ethno-nation consisting of three main limpo, namely Talotenreng, Tua and Bétëmpola. The paramount ruler, known as the Arung Matoa, was elected and was assisted by thirty-nine other officials. Whereas other Bugis kingdoms had ruling councils, Wajoq’s was particularly extensive. The Petta Ennengngé consisted of six offices, two each for Bétëmpola, Talotenreng and Tua. Each of these three limpo had its own regent known as a ranreng and its own army chief called Pabbate Lompo or Baté Lompo or simply Baté, which literally means banner. Their titles originate from the color of the banner that they carry: Pilla (scarlet), Patola (multi-colored) and Cakkoridi (yellow).

References:
49 Interestingly enough, whereas the Wajorese are proud of their democratic and egalitarian heritage, Wajoq has evolved into one of the most hierarchical societies of South Sulawesi. Lineton suggests that this results in part from migration functioning as a conservative force. (Jacqueline Andrew Lineton, An Indonesian Society and Its Universe: A Study of the Bugis of South Sulawesi (Celebes) and Their Role within a Wider Social and Economic System, unpublished PhD dissertation submitted to the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1975, p. 3.) This argument is reminiscent of Chappell’s observation that the resiliency of traditions in the Pacific is linked to emigration. (David A. Chappell, “Transnationalism in Central Oceanian Politics: A Dialectic of Diasporas and Nationhood?” The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 108, no. 3, (1999), p, 28.) Alternatively, Van Mens argues that colonialism actually decreased social mobility in Wajoq. (Van Mens, De Statuscheppers, p. 117.) On pride of egalitarianism, see chapter one concerning the Lapadeppaq Treaty.
51 Wajorese historical sources record that these banners were made at the suggestion of Luwuq when Wajoq and Luwuq concluded an alliance. (Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, p. 42. J. Noorduyn, Een Achttiende- Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo’. Buginese Historiografie. ’s-Gravenage: H. L. Smits, 1955, pp. 168-169.) In some Bugis polities, the banners themselves were elements of the state regalia and referred to accordingly as “tanra-tanra limpo” meaning “signs of the polity.” (Leonard Y. Andaya, “Nature of War and Peace among the Bugis-Makassar People,” unpublished paper presented at the International Workshop on Indigenous Warfare and Pre-colonial Monsoon Asia, SOAS, London, January 2003, pp. 11-12) Esther Velthoen provides us with a fascinating example of the use of banners to signify a community’s identity. When, in 1695, a group of nomadic Bajo fishermen arriving in Mondono were asked to show their VOC passes, they produced flags that showed their relation to two princes. (Esther J. Velthoen, Wanderers,
Although the Wajorese chronicles state that the rulers of the three divisions had the same rank, it appears that in practice the Petta Pilla was the chief commander during war, and the Petta Bēttēmpola was the highest ranking during peace time. These six lords were at least as powerful as the Arung Matoa and together with him they constituted Wajoq's highest ruling council, the Petta Wajoq. The Petta Wajoq is described in Pau Pau Rikadong, the most-widely known of Wajorese origins stories, as being sufficient for purposes of government, yet in practice there were still more officials. Each imoto had a courier for conveying messages, four Arung Mabbicara or deliberating judges, charged with solving problems relating to adat, and six Arung Paddokki-rokki, or deliberators. Ideally, this made for a total of forty lords known as the Arung Patampulu. The representative nature of this council facilitated cohesion within the Wajorese state while the system of messengers allowed for cooperation among its constituent polities. It did not, however, provide for equal representation of each division within Wajoq. The lands to the north, known as Pitumpanua (“The Seven Countries”) were not formally represented in the Arung Patampulu. Other constituents were only indirectly represented, such as Paria, which had its own government and own arung underneath the jurisdiction of the Ranreng Bēttēmpola. Furthermore, the various positions within the Arung Patampulu could be left vacant. Indeed, in the nineteenth century James Brooke recorded that even the office of Arung Matoa was vacant and that there was little haste to fill it.

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52 Noorduyn, Een Achtsteente-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo', pp. 164-165, and B. F. Matthes, Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, Makassar: P. van Hartrop, 1869, p. 5. This practice is defended in certain lontaraq, specifically in stories about To Taba’s contract with the Wajorese. (See Noorduyn Een Achtsteente-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo’, p. 62.)
54 Pelras, The Bugis, p. 178, and Pelras, “Hiérarchie et Pouvoir,” pp. 171-172. The Council of Forty Lords only convened on certain occasions, such as when the need arose to select and pay homage to the Arung Matoa. (Matthes, Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, p. 6.) Although it was difficult to reach consensus in such a large council, its decisions were final, with no appeal from them except in the conclusion of peace or declaration of war. (Notice of Cornelis Speelman in Makassar to the High Government in Batavia, 1670, VOC 1276, ff. 874, 882.)
The various constituent polities of Wajoq were also joined to the center by bilateral agreements as established by treaties concluded at various times throughout its history. Common throughout South Sulawesi, such treaties outlined the rights and responsibilities of both ruler and ruled, or determined the status of a polity in regard to another polity. These relationships were generally expressed in terms such as mother and child, or in even more metaphorical ones such as wind and leaves; the metaphor being that the people’s direction is dictated by the ruler as leaves are blown by the wind. In this manner, treaties established a hierarchy of polities both within Wajoq and among the states of South Sulawesi that allowed each to maintain its sovereignty. One such treaty was the Majauleng Treaty that was concluded between the population of Wajoq and their ruler La Tenribali when Cinnotabiq changed its name to Wajoq. It stipulated that all polities within Wajoq respect each other’s sovereignty, adat, judicial processes and property and that they help each other to remember and to do the right thing if confused. An example of a treaty concluded between kingdoms is the Treaty of Timurung that stipulated that the three participating kingdoms were “brothers,” albeit unequal brothers, and that they would support and respect each other. It compared the three lands to a rope in which a single string did not break but rather reinforced the others.

The traditional Wajorese political system was extremely flexible. Not only did the constituent polities of Wajoq have their own adat, but also some of them had their own regalia and origin myths. Indeed, Speelman referred to Wajoq as “a number of small kingdoms or lands, bound to each other . . . but with their own freedoms since time immemorial.” Despite the existence of a paramount ruler, the emphasis of Wajorese kingship was to obey the will of the people as voiced by their representatives. Whereas other Bugis-Makassar kingdoms had councils of nobles, they were not generally as powerful nor as numerous as the Wajorese Forty Lords who represented the various constituents of Wajoq. Similarly,

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57 The ceremonies through which treaties were concluded and the treaties themselves were considered sacrosanct in nature, thus treaties were never abrogated. Instead they could be set aside and later resurrected as seen fit, and through this continuous process, they expressed the balance of power in South Sulawesi, both within and between the various states. (L. Y. Andaya, “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions: A Case Study from South Sulawesi.” *BKI*, 134 (1978), *passim*.)


59 Abdurrazak, *Sedjarah Wadjo*, pp. 31-34.


other kingdoms had a hierarchy leading to the top, but the Wajorese community was looser and less stable. Despite the minute gradations of status in the Wajorese hierarchy, there was greater opportunity for achievement-based advancement in Wajoq than in other Bugis-Makassar kingdoms. Thus social flexibility and freedom for the constituent polities appear as hallmarks of traditional Wajorese society.

A number of systems served to promote unity within Wajoq. Among the most important of these were kin networks. Although the Bugis make a distinction between blood relatives (rappeq) and relatives by marriage (siteppang or sumpunglolo), both provided an enduring network of trusted persons who could be called upon for support. Both sorts of relations also provided a source of followers who were essential to the maintenance of power. Family relations were therefore pivotal to a state’s foreign and domestic relations, not only among the Wajorese but also in other parts of the archipelago. Indeed, states were even conceived of as family members, as is reflected in the use of kinship terms to express varying levels of relationships in treaties. Such designations were descriptive and meaningful expressions of the relationship between communities.

Marriage was thus a key mechanism for consolidating the state. As David Bulbeck’s research on marriage politics in Goa has shown, alliances cemented by marriage generally lasted longer than alliances

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63 While historical evidence is lacking, modern anthropologists have noted that these minute gradations themselves were a source of flexibility in Wajorese society. So complex was the system that its implementation proved difficult. Acciaioli notes “in Wajo’ distinct status levels intermediate between pure nobility and commoners are generated. By such means the entire system is open to more variant interpretations, as the exact boundaries where nobility has become so diluted so as no longer to warrant the title are rendered more obscure. As divisions multiply in systems like that of Wajo’, the boundaries between gradation are obscured. The possibility of status mobility is thereby entrenched more firmly in the entire system.” Gregory L. Acciaioli, *Searching for Good Fortune: The Making of a Bugis Shore Community at Lake Lindu, Central Sulawesi*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, June 1989, p. 34.
64 Matthes notes that among the Wajoese “a fortune earned through diligent industry is worth more in their eyes than prestige and birth. For example, in Boné and other Bugis lands, marrying with a man of lower descent would cause a princess great shame; but in Wajoq, a man, even though not of royal birth, can marry a queen without compunction.” (Matthes, *Over de Wadjaoren met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek*, p. 30.)
established by a treaty alone. The same was true among Bugis polities. One Wajorese example of this practice is found in the strategic marriages of Arung Matoa La Galigo To Suni (r. 1703-1711) and his children. La Galigo To Suni himself married Petta Wé Maddanaca, the daughter of Arung Bětěmpola. She then became the ruler of Bila. They had two children named La Sangaji Dongkongé and Wé Tenrilawa Bessé. The former became ruler of Pěněk and the latter became ruler of Bila. Such family relations fostered cohesion within the state and facilitated La Galigo To Suni’s plans to strengthen Wajoq during the early eighteenth century.

A second means of promoting unity within the state was requiring constituent polities to provide contributions to state projects. One such project was the construction of a baruga (meeting hall) during the reign of Arung Matoa La Matoneq To Sakkeq (r. c. 1702-1703). Like the central mosque, the baruga itself had the potential to promote unity within Wajoq. It served both as a location for state assemblies and as a hall for the recital of sacred texts. However, the requirement that constituent polities of Wajoq contribute to its construction was also key because the contributions functioned as a sort of tribute to the over-arching Wajorese state. Sanctions were imposed upon those who refused to formally recognize the center in this manner. More common than the construction of edifices was the expectation that the people contribute to state ceremonies or feasts in celebration of high-ranking individuals’ marriages, ear-piercings or the like.

As an ethnonation, there were also cultural and psychological elements to Wajorese cohesion. Like other ethnic groups, the Wajorese have a distinct myth-symbol complex that distinguishes them from other Bugis. This entails their landscape, their origin myths and their history that, when taken together, form a Smithian mythomoteur. The myth-symbol complex is augmented by concepts of shame, self-worth and community that are particular to the cultures of South Sulawesi.

An important element of any ethnic group’s myth-symbol complex is their homeland. Among the Wajorese, two features of the landscape are particularly important. The first of these is the trees after

68 Lontaraq Sukkuna Wajoq, Proyek Naskah Unhas No. 01/MKH/1/Unhas UP Rol 73, No. 1-21, f. 228.
which Wajoq and a number of its constituent polities were named. Trees, especially those with more than forty branches, are revered among the Bugis. Wajoq was purportedly established near a bajog tree. The precise variety of this tree is unidentifiable yet it served as a symbol of unity and bequeathed its name to the state. A number of Wajoq’s constituent polities are named after trees as well, specifically Awoq, Belawa, Kaluku, Pénrang, Paria, and Rumpia. Another feature of the landscape that spiritually unifies Wajoq is the hill known as Patiro Sompe on the edge of Sengkang. Van Mens describes how elderly people climb this hill on the edge of Sengkang from the top of which one can see out over Wajoq. According to legend, the founders of Wajoq are buried there and they still help the Wajorese population. People who are sick, cannot resolve personal disputes, or cannot conceive a child climb up the hill and leave an offering, such as sticky rice in banana leaves, and after they are helped, do this repeatedly throughout their lives.

At the heart of the Wajorese myth-symbol complex are the origin stories. (See Appendix A.) While there are numerous versions of these stories, they all present Wajoq as a land of settlement and accord high status to the founding figures. Origin myths according different, higher origins to rulers than to commoners exemplify what Bellwood calls a “founder-focused ideology” in which kin-group founders are revered and sometimes deified. Their very nobility is a source of pride for the community. Furthermore, family linkages legitimized by such origin myths and loyalty to this lineage are important cohesive forces within the state.

While Smith has noted the universal enduring emotional appeal of origin myths and legends

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72 Van Mens, De Statuscheppers, p. 27.

Map 1: Wajoq
evoking a golden past, historical literature, the most common form of Bugis texts, may have had particular unifying powers in South Sulawesi. Among the Bugis, written texts were and are considered sacrosanct. While most of the population did not have direct access to these texts, they could nevertheless develop an understanding of traditional literature through the palontaraq or passureq, scribes who guarded, reproduced and recited these texts for the public. Their recitation was also accompanied by certain rites that promote the sacredness of the texts, a sense of community and the community’s links to its past. The content of these texts is also significant. For example, state chronicles generally describe the conclusion of social contracts between the ruler and the people, outlining the rights and responsibilities of both parties. The recitation of these histories in a sacred sphere would have had tremendous psychological impact on the population.

The community’s spiritual unity was also enhanced by pre-Islamic priests known as bissu. Considered to contain both male and female elements, bissu served as intermediaries between the mundane and spiritual worlds and, in some instances, as keepers of the regalia. Intimately linked to the traditions of the Bugis cosmogonic myth /La Galigo/, they read and guarded these and other texts, thereby promoting these texts’ sanctity. Their participation was vital to certain cyclical rituals intended to assure the prosperity of the land and the perpetuation of ruling house. The bissu also served as spiritual advisors to the rulers and in this manner could wield considerable influence. They promoted tradition, respect for the spiritual realm, and reverence for the rulers, thereby serving as a cohesive force within the state.

Among the peoples of South Sulawesi, notions of identity and community are also linked to the indigenous concepts of siriq and pessé. The concept of siriq incorporates the ideas of both shame and self-worth. The combination of the two does not pose an inherent contradiction because it is believed that one

cannot feel shame without possessing a sense of self-worth. So valuable is this sense of self-worth that people will risk their lives to restore it. The term pessé literally means both pain and commiseration with one's community. Pessé is linked to siriq because the feelings of shame create the pain. The concepts have the potential to unify a community in several ways. First of all, the idea that a community can feel pain as a whole reinforces its spiritual unity. Secondly, both siriq and pessé can be relieved through action that can be undertaken by the community as a whole. Finally, the concepts serve to remind individuals of their place within the community because an individual's self-worth is closely linked to his or her position within the community, particularly in the status-conscious societies of South Sulawesi. Thus the linked concepts of siriq and pessé can generate a particularly strong sense of community. Although pessé can be strengthened by a gaukeng in which reside the guardian spirits of the community, it can also be felt outside of the homeland. The homesickness that the soldiers in western Sumatra felt, and the sense of community that inspired the Wajorese residing in Makassar to repay the debts of a merchants whose house had burned down, both described in the following chapters, are examples of pessé.

From the above examination of the Wajorese political system and its cultural bases, it appears that the idea of Wajoqness is conceptually linked to the land, to the founders, to the governing council, to specific adat requirements, and to certain South Sulawesi wide concepts such as siriq and pessé. The system was quite flexible and it allowed for essentially autonomous communities to participate in the federation despite being located at great distances from the center. As this study will show, this participation was not limited to the three main constituent polities and their subdivisions. Overseas communities participated as part of the state as well. Indeed, the links between the polity and the overseas Wajorese communities resemble the links within the polity among its numerous individual parts. Particularly during the eighteenth century, Wajoq depended heavily on its overseas communities to advance political goals of the homeland. Family relations, leaders, money and weapons all crossed Wajoq's boundaries to such an extent that the overseas communities appear as constituent polities of the state. Physically separated from Wajoq by vast expanses of ocean, Wajorese migrants had the option of

79 On the influence of the bissu as advisors in Wajoq, see Mundy (ed.), Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, I, p. 83.
severing all ties with Wajoq and adopting a new identity. Undoubtedly a number of Wajorese chose this and their histories have been absorbed by their host communities. Yet numerous other communities opted to maintain their ties with Wajoq and their Wajorese identity. Their history remained entwined with that of Wajoq. This involvement did not preclude acting in their own best interest as dictated by local circumstances, but it did entail participating in Wajorese networks and, on some occasions, contributing to Wajoq. While such contributions are more readily apparent in sources from Wajoq than in sources from the overseas communities, the maintenance of a Wajorese identity and participation in Wajorese networks is a prevailing theme in the histories of Wajorese overseas communities.

Sources

The sources for this study consist of Bugis historical texts, contemporary European documents, secondary historical works and anthropological literature. The written sources for history of South Sulawesi consist of both rich indigenous traditions and foreign sources. The former consists of manuscripts written in indigenous scripts on European paper. The latter consists of scattered references in Javanese, Chinese and European documents that only become detailed after the arrival of the VOC in the archipelago. Both groups of texts are used here within.

There are two main collections of Bugis language texts. The Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap's (Dutch Bible Society) collection consists in large part of manuscripts that were collected by B. F. Matthes or copied by hand under his commission. It is housed at the Leiden University Library and is described in Matthes' Kort Verslag aangaande alle mij in Europa bekende Makasaarsche en Boeginesche Handschriften. Numerous excerpts are also published in his Boeginesche Chrestomathie. The other main collection consists of microfilmed copies of more than three thousand privately owned manuscripts. It was assembled by a team from Universitas Hasanuddin in Makassar with funding from the Ford Foundation and is now available on microfilm at a number of research libraries around the world, including the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago, the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV)

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80 Caldwell, "Power, State and Society Among the Pre-Islamic Bugis," p. 394.
81 Amsterdam: C. A. Spin & Zoon, 1875.
in Leiden, and the Australian National University in Canberra. Smaller collections of Bugis documents are held in London, Washington and Berlin.

Bugis historical sources are rich and varied. They are commonly known as *lontaraq*, which originally appears to have referred to the leaves of the *lontar* tree (*Borassus flabellifera*) upon which early manuscripts were written, but eventually came to mean any written work. *Lontaraq* exist in a wide variety of forms, including genealogies, legal texts and medical treatises. There are even *lontaraq* about Western concepts of reckoning time and the production of firearms. The largest single category, however, consists of notes on historical figures and events. Written in the indigenous script, they are best examined within the context of the advent of writing.

The Bugis script is derived from an Indian prototype, the Pallava script of southern India that spread to Southeast Asia in the fourth or fifth century. The script was modified and used to write indigenous languages; in Java this resulted in the development of the Kawi script which is named for its association with texts in Old Javanese or Kawi. The so-called “ka-ga-nga” syllabaries, of which the Bugis syllabary is one, seem to have originated with the Kawi script. In South Sulawesi, two different “ka-ga-nga” syllabaries developed from a common source which was related to Kawi but which now is extinct. One of its derivatives, the Makasarese script, also known as Old Makasarese, is now obsolete. The second syllabary, the Bugis script, also called Bugis/Makasarese, is now used to write Makasarese and Mandarese as well as Bugis. The precise origins of the forerunner script are impossible to trace. It is likely to have originated from trading contacts with the north coast of Java, or from Javanese trading.

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83 The manner in which texts were written on such leaves is exceptional. The leaves were cut into strips and sewn together to make a long band which was inscribed and then wound onto a holder with two reels. The text was read by turning the reels to make the band advance, not unlike a cassette tape.
contacts in the Lesser Sunda Islands. The date of its introduction is likewise uncertain, but qualitative and quantitative shifts in historical data allow for an approximation.

Written historical records for South Sulawesi apparently date back to around 1300 but those for the fourteenth century are much more sketchy than those for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Records for the fourteenth century do not allow for the cross-referencing of individuals, nor do they contain the same type of biographical and anecdotal information that is found in records for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This marked increase in the details of historical records suggest that writing arrived on the scene around 1400. Yet this assumption is based on counting generations and reigns and assigning these with an average lifespan, which is not a reliable measure for dating. Therefore, the precise date when writing reached South Sulawesi cannot be determined with certainty, especially given the lack of attention paid to chronology in Bugis sources.

A. A. Cense has classified the vast body of diverse Makasarese and Bugis historical records into several main categories. Among these are diaries, treaties and adat registers. Cense, J. Noorduyn and Andi Zainal Abidin have all highlighted the preoccupation with objectivity and almost scientific precision of the Bugis and Makasarese historical texts. Hindu influence is minimal and the mythological elements are contained in the beginning in an origin myth. It has been suggested that the mythical elements are designed merely to justify the nobility’s status, rather than to explain creation. Generally speaking, if anything sounds incredible, the writer denies responsibility for its veracity. Thus documents are punctuated with phrases like “According to legend . . .” When no sources are available on a particular subject, the writer will state just that.

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Historical lontaraq are almost always written in a period later than the one they describe. For example, the eighteenth century diary referred to in chapter six exists today in a notebook copy that was made at a later date. Thus lontaraq can only be considered a certain record of what the author thought, that is his or her perceptions of what happened. While often accurate, they are historical perceptions and should be used with the same caution as any historical source. Because they are not contemporary records, they cannot be used to understand contemporary perceptions. In the case of Wajorese historical documentation, it is likely that the Wajorese chronicles were rewritten after La Maddukelleng's campaign in the 1730s. As such, there is a likelihood that their historical descriptions reflect eighteenth century concerns rather than concerns contemporaneous with the events they describe. This becomes all the more probable with respect to proclamations about freedom and the rights and responsibilities of the rulers and ruled. 96 Thus the tendency to exaggerate the democratic nature of the Wajorese government, which so often appears in foreign accounts and historical studies, presumably appears in indigenous records as well.

Each Bugis polity had its own chronicle, or several versions of its own chronicle, and a number of characteristics are common among them. First, Bugis chronicles are based on a variety of sources, such as diaries, legends and genealogies. It is organized around a kings list to which is appended important events such as wars or the conclusion or renewal of treaties. Second, chronicles generally employ a relative notion of time. For example, event B is said to occur however many months or years after event A. Third, chronicles also have particular stylistic conventions. They often use dialogues to relate how a decision was made or what public opinion was. A ruler, for example, may converse with his or her subjects. Fourth, Bugis chronicles sometimes also personify political entities. For example, the Wajorese chronicles describe what Wajoq says and what Wajoq does, which lends credence to the idea that the state existed as a concrete entity, distinct from the ruler.

Wajorese historical sources for the period between the Makassar War and the return of La Maddukelleng are scanty. Most lontaraq provide little more than lists of Arung Matoa and some of their accomplishments, and there is little difference between the various versions. I suspect that, after the

Makassar War, Wajoese historiography suffered much the same decline as Makasarese historiography. The fall of fortress Sombaopu to the Dutch was such a humbling event in the history of Goa and Talloq that the scribes, who sought to record the greatness of Makasarese rulers, essentially abandoned recording their history following this event. In the case of the Wajoese, however, the decline was temporary. After the return of La Maddukeleng, the information becomes copious. The period covered in this study is thus the most poorly documented period of Wajoese history.

Fortunately, there is a notable exception to the period of Wajoese historiographical silence. The Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq (hereafter LSW) provides far more information concerning the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries than any other source. At least two copies of the LSW remain. One is owned by the Wajoese noble Datu Sangaji. Even though he reportedly will not allow his own family to see it, he permitted the Manuscript Project (Proyek Naskah) team from Hasanuddin University to microfilm it. Another copy, owned by Andi Zainal Abidin, has not yet been microfilmed but at least part of it was made available in the 1970s to Leonard Andaya who then provided me with a copy of the pertinent sections. The examined sections of the two copies differ considerably in format and handwriting, but not in language or detail.

The LSW is apparently an attempt at all-inclusive history. In contrast to typical Bugis lontaraq which are generally quite short, the LSW is extremely long: 698 pages long. It includes a great many details that are not found in any other Wajoese lontaraq, including dates, songs, oral legends and the articles of contracts made with the VOC. It also includes events that were taking place in other parts of Sulawesi. While some of these details appear nowhere else, many others are verifiable using Dutch sources. For example, the exact date of the famous Bonean ruler Arung Palakka’s death is given. Certain episodes also appear to have been inserted to make a point rather than to relate factual information. For

98 A length of fifty pages is already considered long. (Noorduyn, “Origins of South Celebes Historical Writing,” p. 140.
example, in the LSW there is an account of a Wajorese victory in the early stage of the siege of 1670. It describes a conflict that occurred in the enemy's camp. Since it seems unlikely that the Wajorese would have clearly heard the words of songs and conversations behind enemy lines, this episode may have been inserted as an interpretive element later on, perhaps to illustrate the incredible odds which the Wajorese were facing. Another example consists of a conversation between Puanna La Gelleng and Petta Wajoq about the war, which might very well reflect the attitudes of the writer, not the people whose conversation he describes. Alternatively, these episodes may stem from oral traditions or another now lost source.

An exceptional work, the LSW was ostensibly written by Ranreng Bêttempola La Sangaji Puanna La Sengngeng based on all the available lontaraq during the reign of Arung Matoa La Mappayung Puanna Salowang (1764-1767). However, there are two reasons to suspect that it may have been written later. First of all, its inclusion of so many historical events that are not found in other lontaraq suggests a desire to elevate Wajorese historiography to a new level. While such a desire could have stemmed from Portuguese sources that influenced South Sulawesi's historiography from the sixteenth century, it could also have stemmed from a familiarity with Dutch historiography achieved much later. Given the LSW's inclusiveness, the latter is more likely. Secondly, it is rumored in Sulawesi that there is a copy of the LSW in the Leiden University library, but no such copy exists. The claim, however, represents a desire to accord antiquity and authority to the manuscript which may have also been produced much later than other Wajorese chronicles.

Much of the information contained in the LSW can never be verified. For example, there was no Dutch expedition to Wajoq that coincidentally recorded the presence or absence of shooting ranges during the reign of Arung Matoa La Saléwangeng To Tenirua Arung Kampiri (1715-1736). Yet Dutch records and evidence from other parts of the archipelago suggest that there was indeed a conscious effort to refortify Wajoq and to seek riches overseas as described in the LSW. Furthermore, the text is reliable in a number of other cases, such as the conditions of the treaty made in between Wajoq and the Dutch in 1670.

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100 Lontaraq Sukkuna Wajoq, f. 216.
101 Zainal Abidin, Wajo Abad XV-XVI, p. 32.
102 James Brooke did, however, comment on Wajorese rifle practice in 1840. (Mundy (ed.), Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, I, p. 101.)
Another distinctly different lontaraq is Leiden Cod. Or. 1923 VI, pp. 10-46, the writer of which is unknown. It deals primarily with events from the period from 1735 until 1742. A variety of events in Makassar up to 1775 is recounted and dated with a high level of accuracy, except for Muslim dates which are generally off by a couple of days. The details that it provides concerning the Wajorese internal conflicts are without equal. While some of them are confirmed or contradicted in other sources, others are difficult to verify. In J. Noorduyn's opinion, this document deserves publication on its own merits, and this may have been his intention prior to his death, as his papers contain an almost complete romanization and Dutch translation of the text. Aside from the detailed accounts of internal disputes within Wajoq, a distinguishing feature of this lontaraq is its emphasis on the role of La Maddukelleng in rallying the Wajoarese. It exaggerates this role by specifically and repeatedly stating that Wajoq was on Bone's side when La Maddukelleng returned from Borneo, yet there is adequate evidence elsewhere to show that this was not entirely true. The lack of mention of Wajoq's defeat in 1740 and problems in Wajoq thereafter shows that the author intended to emphasize the heroism and boldness of La Maddukelleng.

A number of important studies using Wajorese sources have already been made. These include the dissertations of J. Noorduyn and Zainal Abidin, as well as a popular history written by Abdurrazak Daeng Patunru. Noorduyn's dissertation, Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo: Buginese Historiografie, consists of a linguistic description of the Bugis language, an outline of the history of Wajoq, and a transcription and translation of the Wajorese chronicles. Noorduyn provides extensive details comparing the differences in various versions, but his published version is based primarily on one text, no. 127 of the former Lembaga Kebudajaan Indonesia in Jakarta that was temporarily in the Netherlands when Noorduyn wrote his dissertation. This groundbreaking study not only presented the Wajorese chronicle as

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103 Noorduyn suggests that the writer moved to Makassar with the Wajorese traders in the mid-eighteenth century. (Noorduyn, Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo, p. 138.) He or she might also have been residing in Makassar prior to the return of La Maddukelleng and therefore taken an increased interest in the story of this repatriot.
106 Nagelaten papieren van J. Noorduyn, box I, KITLV Historisch Documentatie. I have relied heavily upon this for my understanding of the text.
107 Leiden Cod Or 1923 VI, ff. 10, 12.
an example of Bugis historiography but also paved the way for further textual research, both philological and historical.

Zainal Abidin’s dissertation, *Wajo Abad XV-XVI: Suatu Penggalian Sejarah Terpendam Sulawesi Selatan dari Lontara*, also compares different versions of the Wajorese chronicles. Instead of providing one translation, however, he publishes a few versions of texts pertaining to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Zainal Abidin offers fewer foreign cross-references and more judgments (not always sound) concerning the veracity of the *lontaraq*. His emphasis on the early period is particularly interesting in that it provides detailed information about how the origins of Wajo are understood in indigenous terms.

*Secijarah Wajo* was written in 1963 by Abdurrazak Daeng Patunru. This work is based primarily on Noorduyn’s dissertation and the *lontaraq* owned by Andi Makkaraka, apparently not including the *Lontaraq Suktuqna Wajoq*. Intended as a popular history, it is essentially an Indonesian translation of Bugis language sources, romanized excerpts of which are included. Its content strongly reflects the information contained in most of the *lontaraq*; thus there is little information over the period of this study. The majority of contemporary Wajorese people who are interested in Wajo’s history have not read more than this, and those who have read it are considered exceptionally knowledgeable.

Another main source of the history of Wajo is the extensive archives of the United East India Company (VOC) from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The most advanced capitalistic organization of the seventeenth century, the VOC developed a remarkable information network for its operations. All of the company’s outposts filed regular reports on local circumstances. With the exception of documents from Gamron, the Cape of Good Hope, and after 1665 Ceylon, these reports were first sent to Batavia. Scriveners worked from six in the morning until six at night (and often later by candlelight) copying the voluminous records. These documents now form one of the most valuable contemporary sources for the study of Asian history. Although primarily concerned with the company’s own affairs, they also contain contemporary records of the letters, speeches and comments of local rulers and nobles. The vast majority of the indigenous documents were translated from Bugis or Malay into Dutch. Yet even in translation, these constitute a valuable source of information; indeed, often they are the only contemporary
records describing the thoughts, words and deeds of local leaders. Court transcripts of trials held in Makassar provide some of the most detailed information available about individual Wajorese merchants.

A substantial part of the VOC archives were repatriated by the Dutch and are now housed in the Nationaal Archief (of the Netherlands) in The Hague. Other documents remain in the countries where they were produced. While these documents are generally not as well preserved nor as accessible as those in Dutch collections, they consist of many documents of local concern, such as criminal proceedings. While the Dutch did not consider them sufficiently important to send to the Netherlands for preservation, they are exceptionally important to local historical studies. Although Wajoq is included in a number of historical works about South Sulawesi, to my knowledge, there are no historical studies specifically about Wajoq based on Dutch sources. However, Lucie van Mens’ anthropological study De Statuscheppers: Sociale Mobilititeit in Wajo, 1905-1950, does make use of Dutch archival material located in both the Netherlands and Indonesia in addition to her fieldwork.

Unfortunately, much of overseas Wajorese history has been lost, and what remains is largely impressionistic. Although Bugis migrants, Wajorese included, played a large role in the history of the Malay world, it is difficult to identify correctly and name the Bugis people appearing in Malay historical texts. Indeed, Noorduyn argues that the mistakes and shortcomings in Malay texts suggest that the role of the Bugis was often poorly understood when it was recorded.109

Two Malay texts in particular deal with the role of Bugis immigrants. These are the Salasilah Melayu dan Bugis110 and its more famous sister text the Tuhfat al-Nafis.111 The Salasilah Melayu dan Bugis was begun by Raja Ahmad and completed by his son Raja Ali Haji ibn Ahmad who also wrote the Tuhfat al-Nafis. The former provides a more detailed account of a shorter period than the latter, but both texts are primarily concerned with the history of the relationships between the Malays and Bugis communities in the western Malay Archipelago, particularly in Johor-Riau-Lingga from the early eighteenth century until the

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mid nineteenth century. A widely respected Bugis scholar and an influential figure within Riau’s political and religious spheres, Raja Ali Haji’s main concerns were defending Bugis involvement in the Malay world, specifically that of the influential sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga, and recording Riau’s history as a lesson for posterity.\(^{112}\) While these two documents are an invaluable source for the history of Bugis immigrants in general and the areas into which they migrated, they offer precious little information about Wajorese immigrants in particular.

One of the main obstacles to understanding Bugis overseas history is that of identifying individuals and the precise ethnicity of individuals or groups. Countless Malay *hikayat* and genealogies refer to Bugis immigrants indiscriminately. For example, an Acehnese historical text describes a Bugis man who was washed up on shore and eventually founded a dynasty, which is even referred to as the Bugis dynasty.\(^{113}\) Yet in this text it is impossible to tell from which Bugis land this individual came. Indeed, he might not have even been Bugis at all, since “Bugis” is often used in a very general way to describe anyone from Sulawesi. The imprecise manner used to describe migrants reflects the concerns of the writers who were not so much interested in where the newcomers emigrated from as what they did as immigrants.

Documents from South Sulawesi offer little relief. The emphasis on lineage in Bugis historical documentation obscures the emigrant. Since genealogies were often kept to determine rank, the emphasis was on ancestors who occupied high-ranking social or political positions. Those who emigrated and whose descendants became established abroad were of little interest to genealogists in the homeland. Furthermore, the history of people who led their lives abroad were of little interest to chroniclers of the history of the homelands. Thus very few of countless Bugis migrants mentioned in the history of areas outside Sulawesi during the early modern period can be clearly identified.\(^{114}\) Even the sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga who appear in numerous Malay *hikayat* cannot be absolutely positively identified. The *Tuhfat al-

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\(^{114}\) Noorduyn, “Sisilah Bugis dari Keluarga Raja Muda,” p. 4.
Naflis records that Opu Daeng Rilaga was the second son of a king of Luwuq, but Dutch and Bugis sources suggest that he was a nephew of the Arumponé.\footnote{Leonard Y. Andaya, “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas,” JMBRAS, 68, (1995), pp. 125-126.} In one remarkable case, Christian Pelras has established the identity of a certain Makasarese emigrant, Daeng Mangalle, who came into conflict with the Ayudhyan king Phra Narai (r. 1656-1688) in 1686. Although Pelras did not examine the royal genealogies of Talloq, he was able to verify that Daeng Mangalle was the nephew of Karaeng Karunrung, the prime minister of Goa (1654-1687) and the son of Karaeng Pattingalloang, prime minister of Goa (1639-1654).\footnote{Christian Pelras, “La conspiration des Makassar à Ayuthia en 1686: ses dessous, son échec, son leader malchanceux. Témoignages européens et asiatiques,” Archipel, 56 (1998), pp. 187-192} This case is exceptional because Daeng Mangalle was from one of the most esteemed families in South Sulawesi. Furthermore, he traveled to an area (Ayudhya) where there were numerous foreign observers who took an interest in his fate.

European sources from areas where large numbers of Bugis settled also provide information about migrants from South Sulawesi. These include the aforementioned archives of the VOC as well as the archives of the English East India Company’s establishments in western Sumatra. Rarely, however, do these sources distinguish between the different types of Bugis. Furthermore, especially in western Sumatra, there was a tendency to use the term “Bugis” in reference to native soldiers from any island in the service of a European company; indeed, Hobson-Jobson likens the term “Bugis” with “sepoy” and “Telinga.”\footnote{Henry Yule and A. C. Burnell, Hobson-Jobson, A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, and of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical, Geographical and Discursive, London: John Murray, 1903, p. 124.} The limited statistical information available confirms that the term “Bugis” was not consistently used in reference to the ethnic group of this name, but rather to denote those natives who performed a military function.\footnote{Leonard Y. Andaya, “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas,” JMBRAS, 68, (1995), pp. 125-126.}

There have been two major works on twentieth century Bugis migration. Jacqueline Lineton’s dissertation, An Indonesian Society and Its Universe, which remains the main work on contemporary Bugis emigration, focuses in particular on Wajoq. Gregory Acciaioli’s dissertation, Searching for Good Fortune, complements Lineton’s study by focusing on Bugis immigrants in Central Sulawesi. Both of these studies...
are anthropological and the data are not always applicable to a historical study. Yet the value of their insights into Bugis migration underlines how the fields of both history and anthropology increasingly complement each other.

Lineton and Acciaioli’s studies both emphasize status as a prime cause of migration. While such issues are not as readily apparent in historical sources as they presumably are in anthropological fieldwork, status has long been a key feature of South Sulawesi societies, and undoubtedly motivated migration in the past as it does in the present. Both Lineton and Acciaioli carefully highlight this motivation in their dissertations. In my view, however, their analyses become problematic when they point to tension between achieved and ascribed status as the main reason for Wajorese emigration. They provide detailed descriptions of the peculiarities of the Wajorese system of social stratification and carefully marshal anecdotal evidence about the disproportionate number of Wajorese among Bugis migrants, but ultimately do not establish a causal relationship between the two. Status should be seen as but one element of a multi-faceted explanation for emigration; other elements include flexibility within the Wajorese system of government, the geography of the homeland, the aftermath of the Makassar War, enhanced opportunities abroad, and, for the twentieth century, gerombolan.¹¹⁹

The Study

This study describes Wajorese migration to Makassar, western Sumatra, the Straits of Melaka and eastern Kalimantan, and the links between them and the homeland during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It argues that these communities were an integral part of the state of Wajoq. As an ethno-nation, rather than a nation-state, Wajoq was flexible in terms of membership. People could participate in Wajoq from a distance while simultaneously participating in other communities because there was not the sense of exclusivity that is part and parcel of the system of nation-states.

¹¹⁸ In one instance British records even specify that there are more non-Bugis than Bugis among the Bugis soldiers. (Alan Harfield, Bencoolen A History of the Honourable East India Company’s Garrison on the West Coast of Sumatra (1685-1825), Hampshire: A and J Partnership, 1995, pp. 100-101.)
¹¹⁹ Gerombolan refers to a social rebellion lasting from 1950 until 1965 in which a revolutionary organization, consisting in large part of disenfranchised soldiers, sought to impose a form of Islamic socialism which included land reform, social equality and Islamic law. For details, see Barbara S. Harvey, Tradition, Islam and Rebellion: South Sulawesi, 1950-1965, unpublished PhD dissertation, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1974.
Chapter two deals with the history of Wajoq until 1670, providing the necessary background to the period of intense emigration that is the study's primary focus. It discusses migration as an important feature of Wajoq society since its earliest history, and argues that the events of the seventeenth century injected new meaning into this process. Chapters three through six then look at the Wajoq communities abroad and compare their different environments and strategies. Chapter three deals with the history of the Wajoq community in Makassar, and shows how the Wajoq adapted to Dutch and Bonean restrictions. In the late seventeenth century, Makassar was the headquarters of Wajoq overseas commerce, as is exemplified by the council of overseas Wajoq representatives that convened at Makassar and established a commercial code of laws. As political and commercial situations changed, however, the Wajoq redirected their commerce to bypass the tariffs and restrictions imposed by the VOC. The manner in which a different combination of indigenous and European powers affected Wajoq migrants is then discussed in chapter four. It is argued that loose systems of indigenous power and competing European regimes in western Sumatra created exceptional opportunities for Wajoq migrants. Crossing to the other side of Sumatra, chapter five then shows how Wajoq functioned in a commercial world dominated by other Bugis. Migrants in the Straits of Melaka had to cope with both the longstanding political traditions of the Malay world and pre-existing animosities between the Wajoq and other Bugis that were carried over from Sulawesi. Chapter six concentrates on the Wajoq in east Kalimantan, looking at the violent manner in which Wajoq emigrants tried to make themselves masters of this area, and comparing their varying degrees of success in different areas on the east coast of the Makassar Strait. The links between the various Wajoq communities become particularly clear in chapter seven in the episode involving the Wajoq exile La Maddukelleng. His attempt to oust the Dutch from South Sulawesi can be seen as further evidence that diasporic communities continued to be involved in the activities of the center. Finally, chapter eight revisits Wajoq political structure in light of the information about emigration and the repatriates. It examines the interaction between Wajoq and the various Wajoq communities and its implications for the study of diaspora and statecraft in Southeast Asia.

A number of recurring themes appear within the history of these communities. Like all histories of migration, this is a story of adaptation. The communities of Wajoq migrants in different areas
adapted to their respective new environments with varying degrees of success. As one might expect, they used every tool at their disposal. Yet a number of strategies appear repeatedly and form the arsenal of the migrant. These are marriage, force and diplomacy. These tactics are represented in traditional Wajorese accounts of La Maddukelleng as the points of his penis, his kris and his tongue and this analogy forms an important element of contemporary historical consciousness.

The second theme is *siriq*. The history of the Wajorese has frequent reference to *siriq* situations. Not only did the humiliation of the Wajorese after the Makassar War encourage many people to emigrate, but it also influenced their activities abroad. This is particularly evident in the Straits of Melaka where the people of Boné and Soppéng constituted the most powerful and prestigious group among the overseas Bugis.

This communal sense of honor was essential in maintaining links between the overseas settlements and the homeland. These links, in turn, are the third theme of the study. While essentially independent, overseas communities of Wajorese migrants retained both a sense of Wajoqness and a psychological or physical connection to the homeland. Such connections included commercial cooperation, long-distance political participation and family relations. These factors enabled the diasporic communities to remain as an integral part of the Wajoq state.
Chapter 2

Wajoese History and Migration

This chapter provides a description of Wajoq and an outline of Wajoese history through the time of the Makassar War. This overview reveals that migration had been a part of Wajoese society long before 1670. The abominable conditions prevalent in Wajoq after the Makassar War and the inability to obtain Dutch protection then added new urgency to migration, resulting in an exodus during the late seventeenth century. Wajoese experiences of the war and its aftermath also created memories that migrants carried with them abroad and, particularly in the Straits of Melaka, fueled Wajoese rivalry with other Bugis groups.

Physical and Social Geography

Wajoq is located in the Cenrana river valley on the southwestern peninsula of the island of Sulawesi, also known as Celebes, situated between Kalimantan (Borneo) and Maluku (the Moluccas) in eastern Indonesia. The island consists of four peninsulas of differing geologic origins, the northern one being particularly long, centered around a mountainous nucleus. The southwestern peninsula, now referred to as South Sulawesi, consists of a mountainous area in the north and agricultural plains in the south that are bisected by a cordillera of two mountain ranges running from north to south. In the north of the peninsula lie two important lakes, Lake Sidénréng and Lake Témpé. This area is believed to have once been an inland sea, separating the southern part of the peninsula from the rest of Sulawesi. As late as 5000-500 BC the area was still a maze of rivers, lakes and swamps and the watershed is still low today. Of the numerous rivers now threading across the peninsula, the most important is the Walenna/Cenrana River. The Walenna River runs from south to north through the center of the peninsula. At Lake Témpé its name changes to the Cenrana River and it sharply turns towards the southeast before finally emptying into the Gulf of Boné. It is the only river in South Sulawesi that is navigable by ocean-going vessels along its entire course and has long been an essential transportation route. Since at least 1300, it has served as an

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1 Pelras, *The Bugis*, p. 41.
Map 2: South Sulawesi
important link between the interior of the peninsula and the coastal trading networks criss-crossing the
*Indonesian archipelago.*

Wajoq is bordered on the east by the Gulf of Bone, on the north by the foothills of the Latimojong
mountains, on the west by Lake Tempe and Lake Sidemang, and on the south by the Cenrana River. Its
immediate political neighbors are Bone to the south, Soppeng to the west, Sidemang to the northwest and
Luwuq to the north. The importance of Wajoq's location as well as that of the Cenrana River cannot be
overemphasized. The seventeenth century Dutch general Adriaan Smout observed how the fresh water lake
Tempe, the clean and deep Cenrana River, and the proximity of the sea provided the Wajorese with various
opportunities for existence and encouraged them to go into commerce, an opinion echoed by modern
anthropologists. Although the lower part of the Cenrana River valley is especially prone to flooding, the
upper part is bordered by exceptionally fertile raised lands, eminently suitable for wet rice cultivation.
Indeed, some of the peninsula's most fertile agricultural lands are located in this area.

The peninsula possesses a variety of natural resources. Oral tradition tells of vast virgin forest, but
extensive deforestation has occurred since the fourteenth century. In the late twentieth century forest
covered about 38 percent of the province of South Sulawesi with much more of it concentrated in the
mountainous north than in the south. Aside from the resources of these forests, such as beeswax, honey,
resins, rattan and sandalwood, South Sulawesi also produces maritime products such as mother-of-pearl,
giant clams and tortoiseshell, as well as valuable metals such as gold dust and iron and copper ore. It
should be noted, however, that these natural resources are not available in particularly large quantities.
During the period under study, South Sulawesi's main export was apparently rice.

There are four major ethnic groups in South Sulawesi. Having long occupied the most fertile
regions of the peninsula, the Bugis are the most populous. Second largest in population is the Makassarese
who live in the southwestern and southern parts of the peninsula, and third most populous group is the

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2 David Bulbeck and Ian Caldwell, *Land of Iron: The historical archaeology of Luwu and the Cenrana
valley*, Hull and Canberra: Center for South-East Asian Studies and School of Archaeology and
Anthropology, 2000, p. 5.
3 Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 242.
Toraja living in the mountainous areas to the north. Finally, the Mandarese inhabit both the coastal and mountainous areas in the northwest of the peninsula. In addition to these four, there are numerous smaller ethnic groups.

Despite recent advances in archaeology, it remains difficult to pinpoint the arrival of humankind in South Sulawesi. It appears, however, that *Homo sapiens* first reached South Sulawesi around 50,000 BC and that the Austronesian ancestors of the present inhabitants arrived in South Sulawesi during the latter part of the so-called Toalian (or Toalean) culture which flourished most clearly between c. 6000 BC - c. 1000 BC. Recent archaeological work suggests that the Bugis were settled in the southern peninsula and organized into numerous independent, small chiefdoms by about 1200 AD. In the thirteenth century the Bugis politics on the shore of Lake Témé then developed trading relations with Java via the Makassarese polities on the southern coast.

The widely-held port-polity interpretation of maritime Southeast Asian history, that explains the rise of Southeast Asian coastal states in terms of commerce, needs some modification for South Sulawesi. What appears instead as a repeated theme in the history of the South Sulawesi peninsula is the expansion of agrarian powers and their capture of critical entrepôts. The most spectacular example of this pattern is Makassar, whose rise was clearly linked to the productivity of its extensive wet rice lands. Another similar example dates from 1300 when West Soppéng controlled the port of Suppaq. This pattern also accounts

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for the rise of Luwuq, a nominally Bugis kingdom which experienced a brief yet impressive period of supremacy in the fifteenth century.  

Located on the northeastern coast of the peninsula, Luwuq was long thought to be the cradle of Bugis civilization. Philologists viewed Luwuq as the oldest kingdom in South Sulawesi because of its mention in the Majapahit literature and because of its brief but impressive paramountcy in South Sulawesi. However, while Luwuq claimed suzerainty over large parts of western South Sulawesi and Central Sulawesi by the turn of the seventeenth century, there is no textual evidence of its existence as an organized polity prior to the early fifteenth century. More recent archaeological and textual research points to the earliest Bugis polities being located in the valleys of the Walenna and Cenrana rivers. The Lake Tempe Bugis apparently established trading settlements there by the mid-thirteenth century, including Sengkang, Tempe, Wagé and Tampangeng. They had commercial contacts with Javanese traders en route to the Moluccas with whom they traded rice, iron and forest products for Southeast Asian and Chinese ceramics and Indian textiles. Rice came from Cina, a polity south of Sengkang, and iron was probably obtainable from small non-Bugis polities along the northern and western coastline of the Gulf of Bone. The Lake Tempe Bugis went to these areas to acquire iron which was plentiful throughout Central Sulawesi and which was important to international trade, the manufacture of krisses and deforestation. By the late thirteenth century, some Lake Tempe Bugis settled at Malangke on the northeast coast of the Gulf of Bone.

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16 These appear in the indigenous literature of South Sulawesi. (Bulbeck, *A Tale of Two Kingdoms*, pp. 478-479.)
17 Bulbeck and Caldwell, *Land of Iron*, p. 103. While local tradition points to an “iron mountain” in the vicinity of Luwuq (L. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka*, p. 18) shallow deposits of iron are actually plentiful throughout central Sulawesi and were mined by breaking off outcrops, by panning in rivers, or by digging in shallow ground. Iron mines are thus holes in the ground rather than mountains. (Ian Cladwell, personal communication, 27.11.02.) On iron mining see, B. Bronson, “Patterns in the Early Southeast Asian Metals Trade,” Ian Glover, Pornchai Suchitta and John Villiers (eds.) *Early Metallurgy, Trade and Urban Centres in Thailand and Southeast Asia*, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1992.)
There they maintained mutually advantageous trading relations with the indigenous populations farther upstream and eventually united the various ethnic groups of the Luwuq region. As the Bugis assumed a position of commercial and presumably social leadership, Luwuq emerged as a Bugis polity and gained a wide-spread reputation for the production of iron.

As the manufacture of iron farming implements facilitated agricultural intensification, it became increasingly important for rulers to control both land and people for the production of rice to be exchanged for trade goods for redistribution. New political systems developed consequently. According to Bugis and Makassarese historical traditions, these were generally based on a social contract between the ruler and the ruled in which both parties had rights and responsibilities towards the other. Although this system of social obligations was also used in inter-polity politics, from the very beginning there does seem to have been a dynamic system of competition through which stronger polities tried to dominate weaker ones. Wajoq was one of the stronger ones that grew to have influence over other neighboring polities, eventually incorporating them into its federation. Presumably because of Wajoq's early history, the Wajorese government was particularly able to accommodate basically independent communities linked to a center.

Early Wajorese History

Migration is a pervasive theme of Wajorese history from earliest times until the present. A range of evidence suggests that Wajoq was originally settled by a variety of people. Furthermore, early political history records that the right to migrate was encoded into the Wajorese legal system.

Bugis prehistory, as reconstructed from linguistic evidence, suggests that the ancestors of the Bugis migrated from Kalimantan. The Tamanic languages, spoken in the upstream regions of the Kapuas river in western Borneo, bear a striking resemblance to the languages of South Sulawesi, and to Bugis and Toraja in particular. The similarities were observed as early as 1850, and more recent research by K. Alexander Adelaar suggests that the Tamanic languages should be sub-grouped with the languages of

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South Sulawesi instead of with the Malayic languages. Although Adelaar is rather noncommittal in his conclusions, the evidence suggests that the Tamanic speakers and the proto-South Sulawesi speakers lived together or near each other in the past. Another linguist, Roger Mills, believes that the earliest settlements of Austronesians on South Sulawesi were close to the mouth of the Sadang River, just across the Makassar Strait from two possible points of origin: southeastern Borneo around Pegatan-Pulau Laut and eastern Borneo around Kutai Samarinda. Pelras suggests that formerly both the proto-Tamanic speakers and the proto-South Sulawesi speakers resided in southeastern Borneo and that they then moved in different directions. A migration, or waves of migration, from one of these areas would help explain the linguistic affinity between the Tamanic languages spoken by the Maloh peoples (Embaloh, Taman and Kalis) in the northeastern part of west Borneo and the languages of South Sulawesi. It has also been suggested that the Tamanic speakers and the proto-South Sulawesi speakers lived together or near each other in southeastern Borneo before migrating in opposite directions. Other suggestions are that there was a very early migration of Bugis peoples from Sulawesi to Borneo and that proto-Maloh was an outlier of proto-South Sulawesi.

The early Wajorese histories and origin myths, of which there are numerous versions, are stories of exile and settlement. (See Appendix.) There exists a multiplicity of origin stories that depict various arrivals, suggesting that there were numerous early settlements. A pervasive feature of these varied myths is that the Wajorese ruler never comes from Wajoq itself. While the concept of a stranger-king portrayed in these tales is common among Austronesian societies, what is striking about the Wajorese origin myths is that the land itself is portrayed as a frontier. They often present Wajoq as a rather inhospitable land into which renegades and exiles migrated. The LSW, for example, describes the region as an area with wide fields, thick forests with wild boars, deer and buffalo, and numerous lakes replete with fish. Although the

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26 Zainal Abidin, Wajo’ Pada A場 XV-XVI, p. 65.
establishment of a settlement by roaming pioneers is a common feature of Bugis chronicles, it is particularly conspicuous in the Wajorese case.

Migration is also prevalent in the Wajorese legal system. The Cinnatabiq Treaty explicitly guaranteed the people the freedom to enter and leave as they please for their livelihood and welfare. A later treaty, the Lappadeppaq Treaty, does not specifically mention the right to migrate yet the ceremony in which it was concluded nevertheless reiterates this right. After burying a stone to solemnize the treaty, La Tiringeng To Taba spoke to all of the people attending, promising them freedom to leave, enter and reside in Wajoq at will. He is recorded as saying “the door of Wajoq shall be open when they enter; the door of Wajoq shall be open when they leave; they enter on their own feet and they leave on their own feet.” When asked why he did not promise that before burying the rock, he replied that this freedom was simply Wajorese customary law. So engrained was this right that La Tiringeng To Taba found it unnecessary to mention it.

Although Wajorese migration is best known for a later period, an examination of Wajoq’s early history reveals that migration has always been an important feature in the society. As mentioned above, linguistic evidence suggests that the Bugis might have migrated from Kalimantan. Archaeological evidence points to an early migration from the Cenrana River valley to the northeast coast of the Gulf of Bone. Migration is also a central characteristic of the Wajorese, as is reflected in the foreign origins attributed to Wajorese leaders in the origin myths and the freedom of migration encoded into the Wajorese

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27 Pelras, *The Bugis*, p. 96. Another example comes from the Chronicle of Sidenreng in which brothers left their homeland and formed new settlements. (Caldwell, *Ten Bugis Texts*, p. 187.)
28 The Cinnatabiq Treaty between Arung Cinnatabiq La Rajallangi To Patiroi on the one side and the Matao Pabbicara with the people on the other side was one of the formative treaties of Cinnatabiq, Wajoq’s predecessor. In it, La Rajallangi agreed to protect the people from trouble, listen carefully to their concerns, correct them when they were wrong, support them when they are right and ensure that the customs of the country are upheld for everyone’s benefit. The people, in return, are promised guidance and support from the ruler who bears responsibility for Cinnatabiq’s welfare. Furthermore, the ruler could not act arbitrarily towards the people, nor could the people assume or abuse the powers of the ruler. (Abdurrazak, *Sejarah Wajoq*, pp. 27-28.) In essence, this was a social contract between the ruler and the ruled, establishing the foundations of the Cinnatabiq polity.
29 The Lappadeppaq Treaty between the Wajorese people and Arung Bettempola La Tiringeng To Taba was concluded following a leadership crisis in Wajoq. It clarifies the position of the ruler, stating that wherever he went his people surrounded him, that when he called they would come, and that what he ordered they would obey.
system of government. It is therefore not surprising that Wajorese migration continued into the early modern era. Precipitated by shifts in power within South Sulawesi, Wajoq's fierce allegiance to Goa eventually created a situation that gave new meaning and urgency to Wajorese migration.

**Shifting Balance of Power**

The main thread running through early historical Bugis political history is the struggle of states to improve their position in a hierarchy of states. As Luwuq declined during the sixteenth century, a new balance of power emerged. Luwuq's profitable production of iron and iron tools contributed greatly to the clearing of land for crops. This in turn led to the rise of agricultural kingdoms in South Sulawesi that eventually challenged Luwuq's supremacy.

Wajoq emerged as one of the major Bugis polities around the turn of the sixteenth century during the reign of the energetic Arung Matoa La Tanampareq Puang ri Maqgalatung.\(^{32}\) He is remembered for being a just, ambitious, clever, wise and patient ruler.\(^{33}\) During his rule, Wajoq conquered Paria, Rumpia, Sakuli, Gilireng, Macanang Loa and Anaqbanua; and Akkotengeng, Kera, Pammana and Timurung voluntarily joined Wajoq.\(^{34}\) Also during the reign of Puang ri Maqgalatung Wajoq refused an emissary bearing gifts as a token of brotherhood from the Datu of Luwuq. Shortly thereafter Wajoq conquered Témpé, Singkang, Tampangeng and Wagé, which were Luwuq's vassals in the region.\(^{35}\) Thereafter Luwuq's relationship with Wajoq was more egalitarian, and Luwuq sought Wajorese military support in a campaign against Sidénreng. Wajoq obliged and the campaign was successful.\(^{36}\) Thereafter Luwuq launched an unsuccessful attack on Boné during which the royal standard of Luwuq, a red umbrella, was captured. The peace concluded following Luwuq's defeat, known as the Breaking of Weapons at Unnyi, marked the beginning of Bone's eclipse of Luwuq as the paramount power on the eastern half of the peninsula.\(^{37}\) Meanwhile, the twin kingdoms of Goa and Talloq expanded into one of the most powerful

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\(^{33}\) Abdurrazak, *Sedjarah Wajo*, p. 44.


After Goa and Boné launched a combined attack on Luwuq and forced it to sign a treaty with Goa, Wajoq became a vassal of Goa.39

Wajoq proved to be exceptionally loyal to its new overlord. When asked to join an alliance with Boné and Soppéng in 1582, Arung Matoa La Mangkaceq To Udama specified that Wajoq was a slave of Goa and that this would not change, even if they concluded a treaty of brotherhood among the three of them. The Bonéan ruler La Tenrirawe countered this argument by saying that Boné had a treaty of brotherhood with Goa, but that Boné could still conclude a treaty with Soppéng and Wajoq. Furthermore, such an alliance would be to Wajoq’s advantage because then, if Goa mistreated Wajoq, it would also have to deal with Boné and Soppéng. The three Bugis kingdoms then agreed to the Treaty of Timurung or Lamumpatué ri Timurung (“the burying of stones in Timurung”) which was essentially a defensive alliance against Goa. Its member states became known as the Tellumpocco, or “The Three Peaks.” The alliance served its purpose temporarily and Goa’s attacks on Wajoq in 1582 and 1590, and on Boné in 1585 and 1588, were all repulsed or otherwise foiled.40

Goa nevertheless succeeded in assuming a paramount position in the peninsula. Goa expanded its sphere of influence along the western and southern coasts and adopted another tactic for aggrandizement: international trade. Using the substantial quantities of rice at their disposal,41 the royal families of Goa and its twin-kingdom Talloq made international trade a conscious goal. This commerce brought considerable wealth and fame to Makassar. When the rulers of Goa and Talloq converted to Islam in 1605,42 the prestige of the twin kingdoms grew. Although there is evidence to suggest that Luwuq converted to Islam a year before Goa, Goa played a more important role in its spread, and championing the new faith increased its

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38 For a discussion concerning the rise of the twin kingdoms of Goa and Talloq, see Bulbeck, A Tale of Two Kingdoms, pp. 113-174.
40 L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, p. 31.
41 High quality, exceptionally white rice was grown in South Sulawesi and enjoyed an excellent reputation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and is praised in both English and Portuguese sources. See Armando Cortesão (trans. and ed.), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, I. p. 156 and 227, as cited in John Villiers, “Makassar: The Rise and Fall of an East Indonesian Maritime Trading State 1512-1669” in Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers (eds.), The Southeast Asian Port and Polity, p. 145; and “Materials for a history of the company’s factory at Macassar from the year 1613 to 1667 with some resulting incidents until the year 1674,” f. 36, “Celebes Factory Records,” 1826, (India Office Library, London), Microfilm, the University of Malaya Library, Kuala Lumpur.
prestige and influence. Goa waged a series of wars between 1608 and 1611 to convert the other kingdoms of South Sulawesi. In 1609 Goa forced Sidènèng to convert. Soppèng followed suit later that same year, as did Wajoq in 1610 and Boné in 1611.\footnote{L. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palakka}, p. 33.} Goa also continued its aggrandizement following the so-called Islamic Wars and conquered areas extending southward to Sumbawa, westward to Lombok and western Kalimantan, eastward almost as far as Ternate, and northward as far as Menado.\footnote{Bulbeck, \textit{A Tale of Two Kingdoms}, pp. 120-121.} The Tellumpocc surrendered control of its external affairs to Goa. This arrangement was actually an acknowledgement of Goa's overlordship but the Tellumpocc was allowed to continue to preserve its pride.\footnote{L. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palakka}, pp. 37-38.}

Goa's new role as effective overlord of the entire peninsula and champion of the Islamic faith was challenged during the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The Arunponé La Maddaremjang (1626-1643) forced a new, stricter version of Islam onto his people. He antagonized his nobles by deposing the bissu and forbidding palm wine, superstitions and gambling. Then, when he tried to export this version of Islam to neighboring kingdoms, Goa grew concerned. No longer was this just a religious issue, but one of sovereignty. Thus, when La Maddaremjang's emancipation of all non-hereditary slaves provoked his own mother, Datu Pattiro Wé Tenrisolareng, to lead a rebellion against him, Goa was prepared to assist the rebels.\footnote{L. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palakka}, pp. 39-41; Pelras, \textit{The Bugis}, pp. 142-143.}

As tensions between Boné and Goa intensified, a conflict developed between Boné and Wajoq. Whether for religious or political reasons, La Maddaremjang attacked Pénéki in Wajoq. When the Arun Matoa demanded restitution of the goods seized in Pénéki, La Maddaremjang refused, and war broke out between Boné and Wajoq.\footnote{L. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palakka}, p. 40.} In this conflict, Goa sided with Wajoq and criticized Boné. Sultan Malikkusaid asked La Maddaremjang if his actions were based on Islam, adat or just on his own whim. When he did not respond, Goa, Wajoq and Soppèng attacked Boné at Passémpe in October 1643. Boné was soundly defeated and punished with unusually harsh and humiliating peace conditions. While normal procedure would have been to demand the payment of a war tribute and the signing of a treaty placing Boné in a subordinate position, Goa insisted that the new regent To Balaq be made accountable to the
Makassarese lord Karaeng Summana. Bone then revolted, and was once again soundly defeated at Passempe. Thereafter, Bone was again harshly punished. With the exception of To Balaq, who had remained neutral and was allowed to keep his position, all of the Bonean nobles were exiled to Goa to prevent further rebellion, and Bone was reduced to the status of Goa's slave. Bone also lost a number of "disputed" territories to Wajoq, and many Boneans were forced into corvee labor for Wajoq. Bone was humiliated like never before and its resentment towards both Goa and Wajoq grew.

Goa emerged from this period as the region's most formidable political and economic power. In an attempt to check Goa's power, Bone and Soppeng sought to revive the moribund Tellumpocco, but the third peak, Wajoq, declined. Although Wajoq had previously suffered Goa's overlordship in a master slave relationship, in the mid-seventeenth century Wajoq's recent experiences with Goa were much more positive than those with Bone. Wajoq enjoyed the status of Goa's ally. Furthermore, the Wajorese still remembered La Maddaremmeng's brutal attack on Peneki, and feared the extreme version of Islam that he advocated. It is thus not surprising that Wajoq wished to align itself with Goa. Despite promptings from Bone and Soppeng to renew the Treaty of Timurung, Wajoq allowed this Bugis alliance to lapse. Instead, Wajoq became, for all intents and purposes, a part of Goa. Wajoq submitted legal questions to the ruler of Goa, helped with Goa's foreign expansionism, and even accepted Goa's intervention in internal affairs. Wajoq's fierce loyalty to Goa was to have far reaching consequences during and after the Makassar War.

The Makassar War

The Makassar War was the culmination of the long-standing conflict between the VOC, which sought to monopolize the world spice trade, and Goa, who wanted to maintain its position of paramountcy in eastern Indonesia. Founded in 1602, the VOC was the most advanced capitalist organization of its time. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch had already gained control of many of the spice producing areas of the Moluccas, such as Ambon; and had destroyed other areas, such as Makian, so as to ensure their monopsony. They also blockaded trade routes and enforced a system of cartazes, requiring all vessels in Moluccan waters to carry one of their passes or risk seizure of both ship and goods.

44 Ibid, pp. 40-42.
Goa had its own system for extracting wealth from the Moluccas. As part of its deliberate policy to expand its international trade, Goa had established a tributary relationship with many of the smaller states in eastern Indonesia. Although Goa exerted no effective political control over these vassals, Goa did expect them to pay one tenth of their produce in tribute to Goa. Thus when the VOC tried to extract produce from Goa’s vassals, and restrict Makassar’s trade, Goa viewed it as a political threat. Goa assisted rebels against the VOC in Ambon and in South Seram with both material and moral support. Furthermore, Goa’s aggressive open-door commercial policy threatened the VOC’s monopolistic aims. Goa steadfastly refused to enter restrictive trading agreements with the VOC. So successful was this policy of free trade that Moluccan spices were sometimes sold more cheaply in Makassar than in the Moluccas.

Eventually, the VOC and Goa reached an impasse. In April 1660 the Dutch proposed yet another commercial treaty, which Sultan Hasanuddin eloquently rejected. His refusal prompted the Dutch to attack Makassar. Two months later, the Dutch under Johan van Dam captured fort Paqnakkukang. Although the Dutch celebrated their occupation of the fort, it turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. Sultan Hasanuddin isolated the Dutch in the fort and fined anyone who tried to sell them rice. Contaminated drinking water, lack of food and serious illness then weakened the Dutch force. Their presence undermined, the Dutch abandoned the siege.

Meanwhile, Hasanuddin tried to strengthen his own position by building fortifications using corvée labor from Goa’s Bugis vassals. Although a distant overlord, Goa’s treatment of its vassals was harsh, and its subjects were ill-inclined to build fortifications. In 1660, when asked to build a huge canal to sever Fort Paqnakkukang from the Goa mainland and thereby further isolate the Dutch, the Bugis under To Balaq and Arung Palakka, among other leaders, refused. They returned to their homelands where they

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51 L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, pp. 46-47.
54 The Makassarese ruler is recorded to have said that trading restrictions were against the will of God “who created the world so that all people could enjoy its benefits, or do you mean that God has reserved these islands, so far away from your own land, for your trade only . . .” (Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, p. 62.)
formed an alliance with Soppeng and rebelled against Goa. In a series of battles, Goa’s forces were able to quell this rebellion within half a year. Although To Balaq was arrested while retreating from a battle in northern Bone and killed, Arung Palakka escaped to Buton via Palette. According to Speelman’s report and the Diary of Goa, he then fled to Buton in late 1660 or early 1661, vowing to return and liberate his homeland. Some Wajoese documents state that he first acknowledged defeat by the Karaeng and threatened Wajoq by saying “Our war is over, Karaeng, but my war with Wajoq is not. Later, I am going to attack them from the rear.” He then attacked Wajoq and set it aflame. Only then did he flee to Buton. However, the varying accounts concur as to Arung Palakka’s fierce determination to oppose Goa. Likewise, his subjects and allies did not soon forget the harsh manner in which Goa treated the prisoners from this war, including the Datu of Soppeng who was brought to Makassar under duress. Resentment towards Goa grew both among the people of Soppeng and Bone, and their exiled leaders, who left Sulawesi for Batavia.

Despite the rebellions of some of its vassals, and the assistance that the Dutch were providing them, Goa tried to hold its own in the face of Dutch pressure. Tension between the two powers was exacerbated by cultural conflicts regarding Goa’s sovereignty. When, in 1662, the lives of fifteen Dutchmen came into question, the VOC evacuated Makassar.

57 Ibid, pp. 49-50.
58 Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajo) I, Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan, May 1985, p. 82.
61 Noorduyn, Een Achtziende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjoe, p. 121.
62 Skinner, Sja’ir Perang Mengkasar, p. 5.
63 In late 1662, the Dutch ship De Walvis sank off the coast of Makassar. Part of the crew drowned, and the cannons and cargo were seized according to local custom. The Makassar lord Karaeng Sumanna claimed that, since he had fished the cannons out of the sea, they were now rightfully his. The Dutch were only able to regain some of the cannons after paying 4000 reals to Sultan Hasanuddin. (Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, pp. 74-77.) A more serious incident involved another Dutch ship, Leeuwin, which was wrecked on the Don Ducang Island off the coast of Makassar, in December 1662. Forty people drowned, but 132 were rescued and brought to Makassar. Sultan Hasanuddin then refused to allow Verspreet, the head of the Dutch factory at Makassar, to send a boat to the Leeuwin. Hasanuddin also arranged for the ship’s money chest to be brought to him. The Dutch viewed both of these acts as piracy, and sent a party to investigate. When the entire party of fifteen men was murdered, Karaeng Sumanna offered Verspreet 528 rijksdaalders in compensation. Verspreet refused and insisted that Karaeng Sumanna make a public declaration of his intentions to execute the murderers. When Karaeng Sumanna refused, the Dutch evacuated Makassar. (L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, pp. 62-63, Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag, pp. 81-83.)
In late 1666, the VOC returned under the leadership of Admiral Cornelis Janszoon Speelman. The official intent of this mission was to show the strength of the VOC and its readiness to wage war against Goa. Yet Speelman exceeded his authority and essentially conquered Goa in what became known as the Makassar War. The Dutch found allies in the exiled Bugis leaders, in particular Arung Palakka who had a deeply felt ambition to redeem himself. Goa’s harsh treatment of its Bugis vassals had caused widely felt shame. Arung Palakka’s desire to restore his own honor inspired him to acts of exceptional bravery during the Makassar War. Furthermore, the desire to restore siriq resonated with the peoples of Bone and Soppeng who rallied around Arung Palakka who, in turn, became the linchpin of the campaign. There was a great deal of anti-Goa sentiment in Bone and elsewhere, and people were quick to rally around Arung Palakka.

Unable or unwilling to conclude peace with the Makassarese, Speelman and Arung Palakka began bombarding the city of Makassar, burning villages and ricefields along the coast, destroying the city of Bantaeng and attacking the Makassarese forces at Buton. The Makassarese offered stiff resistance, but Dutch naval capabilities provided them with a critical edge. After the fall of Galésong, where much of the Makassarese nobility resided, the Dutch attacked Makassar itself on 26 October. Although darkness fell before they could take the royal citadel, Goa’s situation was clearly desperate, and they requested a ceasefire.

After a few weeks of negotiations, the Treaty of Bunagaya was signed on 18 November 1667. Highly disadvantageous for Goa, and unusually harsh within the indigenous political context, it demanded that Goa make twenty-six concessions. Among these were payment of a war indemnity; destruction of fortifications; renunciation of overlordship over the Company’s Bugis allies; expulsion of non-Dutch nationals; termination of the Company’s monopoly on the export of cloves; and the payment of a sum of money equivalent to one-sixth of the value of the East India Company’s assets in Asia. Speelman had personal reasons for wanting to achieve more than was expected of him. Having begun his career with the VOC in 1645 at the age of 17, he had quickly risen through the ranks. In 1663 he became Governor of Coromandel on the southeast coast of India but was suspended for private trading in 1665. He was subsequently acquitted and reinstated; and in 1666 he was appointed as “Superintendent, Admiral, Commander and Commissioner to the Eastern Quarters,” and sent on this mission to South Sulawesi. Wanting to vindicate his tarnished reputation, Speelman conducted a dangerous campaign that far surpassed what he was commissioned to do. (L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, 68-70; F. W. Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1936, pp. 34-35.)

Europeans from Makassar; the surrender of control over the port of Makassar and the northern fort of Ujung Pandang; and abandonment of Goa’s loyal vassals who had fought against the Company, namely Wajoq, Bulo-Bulo and Mandar. Dutch sources record that shortly after the signing of this treaty, refugees started leaving South Sulawesi.

Yet the Bungaya Treaty did not put an end to the war and fighting recommenced in April 1668. Despite a shortage of food and the outbreak of an epidemic that also affected the Bugis and the Dutch forces, Goa tenaciously maintained their position at Fort Sombaopu, a symbol of Goa’s greatness. Even after Speelman detonated explosives in a secret tunnel constructed underneath Sombaopu and thereby blew a massive hole in one of its walls, the Makassarese tried to block the hole and hold the fort. Finally, however, Bugis forces penetrated through the hole and set a fire that resulted in the fall of Sombaopu. The Bugis then demolished Sombaopu’s arsenal and pillaged the citadel. Following the abdication of Sultan Hasanuddin five days earlier, the fall of Sombaopu on 24 June 1669 symbolized the complete economic and political demise of Goa.

During its long struggle to resist Dutch encroachment, Goa lost most of its allies. As it became apparent that the balance of power in the peninsula had shifted, most of Goa’s vassals gradually deserted. When Goa’s fall was imminent, Karaeng Bangkala and Karaeng Layo of Turatea pledged their loyalty to Arung Palakka and the Company in exchange for the Company’s protection, and gold kris and silk cloth.

Then, while peace negotiations were in process, influential members of the Goa court, including Karaeng Lengkese, offered their allegiance to Arung Palakka and the Company.

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69 Leonard Y. Andaya, “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas,” p. 120. Dutch sources make special reference to the Wajoese who are recorded as having departed for Jambi and not returning. (Report of Cornelis Speelman in Makassar to the High Government in Batavia, 1670, VOC 1276, f. 878v.)
70 Both the Dutch and the Makassarese blamed the other side for each other for the resumption of hostilities. It appears that on or around 10 April 1668, the Dutch attacked the town of Sandrabané. Then, on 12 April, Makassar prepared for more violence by stationing troops near Fort Rotterdam. Speelman then decided to attack them before they attacked the VOC. (Skinner (ed.), *Sja’ir Perang Mengkasar*, pp. 18, 292-293.)
72 Ibid, p. 96.
73 Ibid, pp. 102-103.
Wajorese Impressions of the War

Wajoq was among the few vassals that remained loyal to Goa throughout the war. The intense loyalty that the Wajorese people felt to Goa was a matter of siriq for the Wajorese thus Wajorese historical sources therefore present the Makassar War in a manner that glorifies Wajoq’s faithfulness. By glorifying the bravery of the Wajorese, these histories foster pessé, thereby promoting unity within the community.

The LSW records how the Arung Matoa La Tenrilai To Sengngeng (1658-1670) opposed signing the Bungaya Treaty. Although Dutch records do not specify if the Arung Matoa was present at the signing, according to LSW, To Sengngeng attended the ceremony. At one point he told the Karaeng

The word is that you want to make an agreement with Malampéqé Gemmeqna, but what I think is better, O Karaeng, is to tell him that there will be an agreement made after he completely finishes the war with Wajoq. . . . It would be good if Malampéqé Gemmeqna and I could fight alone because the war is not truly over until I am dead.

The Karaeng then proposed a duel with the Arung Matoa to Malampéqé Gemmeqna, but the latter declined. This seems out of character for Arung Palakka but is certainly possible. There was a day of negotiations during which the Makassar delegation was “uncommonly friendly” with Arung Palakka, thus there might very well have been an opportunity for the Karaeng to bring up the Arung Matoa’s proposal, and Arung Palakka might have declined not out of cowardice, as the Wajorese lontaraq implies, but rather simply because he thought it unnecessary.

After the Bungaya Treaty had been signed, Arumpone La Maddaremmeng had tried to get the Arung Matoa La Tenrilai To Sengngeng to abide by their mutual treaty, but the latter rejected these overtures in favor of Goa’s (Sultan Hasanuddin’s) pleas for support. The Wajorese residing in Makassar appear to have joined the conflict and fought on the side of Goa. According to the LSW, when To Sengngeng himself arrived in Makassar, they fought all the more courageously. At one point, the Wajorese were attacked and “2370 heads were made to dance in front of Arung Matoa To Sengngeng’s

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74 Others were Lamuru and Mandar.
76 Malampéqé Gemmeqna is another name for Arung Palakka La Tenritata. Literally meaning, “the long-haired one” it refers to his oath not to cut his hair until after he had liberated Bone from Goa’s oppression.
77 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 218.
79 Ibid., p. 124.
80 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 218.
face, 1300 heads of Soppengers were hacked off by Wajorese. 504 Wajorese died. Yet Wajoq still refused to give up. As late as May 1669 Wajoq and Cenrana sent two or three thousand men to Goa as reinforcements. Yet Wajoq still refused to give up. As late as May 1669 Wajoq and Cenrana sent two or three thousand men to Goa as reinforcements.

The story of the Arung Matoa’s refusal to admit defeat is widely known, but different lontaraq contain slightly different versions. When Arung Matoa La Tenrilai To Sengngeng learned of the fall of Sombaopu and the need for Wajoq to attend now to its own welfare, “... tears came into La Tenrilai’s eyes, his upper arm became tense as he pressed down upon the handle of his keris and said: ‘Ten thousand men from Wajoq accompanied me here [to Makassar]. Let them all die before Goa is taken’.” This exchange is related similarly in other lontaraq yet the version quoted by Andaya is the most picturesque; no other version portrays the Arung Matoa as being so emotional. The LSW goes on to relate the exchange between the Karaeng and the Arung Matoa in a similar manner, and then goes on to describe the position of Pammana. To Sengngeng sent some of the people of Pammana under his command to the Datu Pammana Petta La Tenrisessu To Timoqé saying that it would be a good idea to take back the properties north of the river. To this the Datu Pammana reportedly replied, “Oh Puanna La Gelleng, I make no demands; it is only the magnanimity of Wajoq which I await to return my lands to Wajoq.” A different lontaraq tells the same story in a slightly different manner which suggests that Goa was indebted to Wajoq for its loyalty. In this version, the Karaeng said to the Arung Matoa, “Sombaopu has fallen and Goa is desperate. Return to your village, and look after your own fields.” The Arung Matoa replied, “I brought a thousand Wajorese to Goa to fight this war. Only after they are all dead can Goa be defeated.” The Karaeng then said “Makassar owes Wajoq a debt of a thousand souls. Return and look after your lands. Hopefully there are still Wajorese who can be seeds.” Only then did To Sengngeng depart. It is almost as if these episodes were included to help Wajoq maintain its dignity.

82 Stapel, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman, p. 56.
84 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 218.
85 The metaphor is either that there would be people who could restart Wajorese society as seeds, when planted, grow or a reference to semen or a reference to men able to procreate and hence restore the population of Wajoq.
Bone and the Dutch both sought reconciliation with Wajoq through their own channels. One
lontaraq goes into particular detail about Bone’s attempts to sway Wajoq. Arung Palakka went to Lamuru
where he met with Boneans and Soppéngers and they decided to remind Wajoq of the Treaty of Timurung.
They went to Solo where they instructed To Sawa to go to the Arung Matoa. To Sawa told the Arung
Matoa and the Wajorese “I bring a message from your family Malampéqué Gemmeqna. Bone, Wajoq and
Soppéng can only prosper if we adhere to the Tellumpocco, with each of us administering our own laws
and each of us minding our own business.” Wajoq replied:
You are exactly right, but you Bone, are the one who strays, to the point of going together with Soppéng
and calling the Dutch here. Wajoq greatly fears God. Wajoq is very ashamed to abandon its agreement
with the Karaeng, ashamed to turn its back on its agreement with Karaeng Goa. The death of Goa is my
death, the life of Goa is the life of Wajoq.

To Sawa replied:
Your family holds fast without slipping, as is witnessed by God and known by God, the death of Goa is
your death, Goa’s life is your life. Your family is only trying to guide you to goodness and brightness, but
you do not want [to listen], because Goa’s death is your death. Go then to your death and we will go to our
life.

To Sawa then concluded by reminding Wajoq about various aspects of the treaty, such as reminding each
other in case of forgetfulness, not coveting each other’s gold, and not abandoning the treaty.66

Attack on Wajoq

For its steadfast loyalty, Wajoq paid a particularly high price. In August 1670, Arung Palakka set
out to subdue Wajoq. First he attacked Lamuru which surrendered voluntarily. A force of 3,000 men from
(presumably repentant) Lamuru then joined in the punitive expedition against Wajoq.87 Upon hearing of
the impending attack, Pammana and Pénéki both deserted Wajoq and joined Arung Palakka, and so when
the contingent finally invaded Wajoq, it consisted of some 40,000 men. The invasion itself presented no
problem, because much of the population had fled to the walled city of Tosora, the seizure of which proved
to be the real challenge.

After To Sawa’s warning, the Wajorese began to prepare in earnest for an attack on Tosora. The
attack lasted four days and four nights without any respite. Both sides fought earnestly without either

66 Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I, Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan, May 1985, p. 83. See
also Matthes, Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Schoepswetboek, p. 23.
87 L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, pp. 138-139.
defeating the other. So many Wajorese people died that they were not able to recover and assemble the corpses. The Baté Lompoe (Pillaqé, Patolaé and Cakkuridié) requested a ceasefire, which To Sawa granted, saying that this was what fighting a war against Malampéqé Gemmeqna was like. The Wajorese were given three days to bury their dead who numbered 997.88

One lontaraq provides a story about a Wajorese victory in the early stage of the battle. It describes a conflict that occurred in the enemy’s camp. Since it seems unlikely that the Wajorese would have clearly heard the words of songs and conversations behind enemy lines, this was probably inserted as an interpretive element later on, perhaps to illustrate the incredible odds facing Wajoq. The story goes as follows:

The Bonéan camp was captured. Then Arung Tanété La Mappajanji Daéng Matajang came up behind the Wajorese. When he realized that he was followed, he and his troops immediately retreated with the Wajorese following them. The Bonéans under Arung Tanété then took a stand, and chased the Wajorese away. Following this Arung Palakka called for Arung Tanété, at which point the Tanétéan troops sang this song:

The assam tree in Boné isn’t pruned, its stem is not cared for and its leaves are not massaged
Later La Bolong from Tanété will prune it, care for its stem and massage its leaves

Angered, Arung Tanété drew his sword and chased the Tanétéans, urging them to fight. When the Arumponé saw this he said, “Run and tell Arung Tanété not to kill the Tanétéans. They are singing and I feel happy and light hearted.” Then Arung Tanété appeared before the Arumponé. The Arumponé said, “Do not prohibit the Tanétéans from singing because I allow it. Suppose that the Tanétéans were not willing to attack the Wajorese from behind, that would surely result in the defeat of the Bonéans.” The story concludes by saying that 2307 Bonéans and the Bonéan group were shown to the Arung Mataa To Sengngeng. 997 Wajorese were shown to the Arumponé.89

88 Lonlarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I, Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan, May 1985, p. 84.
89 Lonlarak Sukkuaqna Wajoq, f. 216. (997 is the same number which other sources give for Wajorese casualties and 2370 is the number given elsewhere for heads shown to To Sengngeng in Makassar. (Lonlarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I, Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan, May 1985, p. 83.)
In spite of the fact that Tosora had only recently been founded sometime between 1660 and 1666, and had recently been damaged in a fire, it nevertheless was well defended. There were a number of skirmishes in which the Wajorese were easily defeated. After four days and nights, the Wajorese asked for a cease-fire to bury their dead. An estimated 1300 Wajorese died in this siege, including the Arung Matoa himself. This was about three months into the siege. La Tenrilai To Sengngeng was given the posthumous names Mpelaié ngngi musuqna (“he who left the war”) and Jammenga ri lao-laoa (“he who died by his cannon.”) Apparently, he misloaded a cannon, having forgotten to close the place for the fuse. He was replaced by La Palili To Malu Puan Na La Gellang (1670-1679).

After To Sengngeng’s untimely death, a number of Wajorese vassals switched loyalty and sided with Boné. One lontaraq describes a meeting of Wajorese politicians to discuss this. Limpoé seWafoq (the Wajorese people) pointed out to Arung Matoa La Palili that all of the Wajorese vassals to the north of the Cenrana River, as well as those on the eastern extreme of the land, had become Bonéan vassals; that Limampanuaé as well as half of both Gilireng and Bélawa had become Boné’s slaves. Wágé and Totinco were also made slaves, and only Sompe remained free. After the death of To Sengngeng even more vassals had switched sides, including Pammana and Tua, because the Ranreng Tua was related to the Bonéans. Puanna La Gellang then pointed out that the people of Tua could indeed not be trusted, and even accused them of having intentionally let the enemy into Tosora. He asked Limpoé se Wafoq what Wafoq should do. They replied that there were at least 10,000 men who could still bear arms, and that there remained a number of loyal vassals. Furthermore, there were still Wajorese slave-polities who could be ordered to run amuk. Arung Matoa Puanna La Gellang agreed, but pointed out a number of things that he thought could result in the defeat of the Wajorese. First was their lack of ammunition. He pointed out that the Bonéans

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90 Noordhyn, Een Achtiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo’, p. 120. According to lontaraq it was built in the reign of La Tenrilai To Sengngeng 1658-1670. (Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I, Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan, May 1985, p. 83, and dates of the reign on p. 84, and Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, p. 60.)

91 More than 280 houses and the city’s gunpowder magazine were destroyed. (Report of Cornélis Speelman in Makassar to the High Government in Batavia, 1670, VOC 1276, f. 882.)

92 Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, pp. 60-61.

93 Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I, p. 85.

94 In this version, a more complete list of vassals which went over to Boné is provided than in most versions. The mention of vassals of the extreme edge of the land, probably referring to Timurung, suggests
were much better supplied because of the Dutch. Second was the infidelity of the many vassals who had deserted Wajoq. He suggested that eventually all of Wajoq’s vassals might follow suit. Finally, he mourned the loss of To Sengngeng. According to Puanna La Gellang, no one in Wajoq matched the bravery of their former leader.95

The situation was indeed desperate. So many Wajorese perished that they were not even able to bury them all.96 The Wajorese were forced to abandon Tosora’s outer fortifications, but the city itself held out longer. The siege of Tosora actually lasted four months, but numerous sources claim that it lasted longer.97 Over-estimations of Wajorese tenacity reflect the sirig attached to this resistance. Tosora actually fell on 1 December 1670.98 Arung Palakka and his forces continuously received reinforcements from the Dutch, and were eventually able to subdue the Wajorese.

According to Dutch reports, the Wajorese had shown great bravery.99 Several reasons have been suggested as to why they held out for so long. First of all, Mandar and Goa had pledged their continued support. Secondly, the Wajorese likely feared that, given their prior refusal to reaffirm the Tellumpocco, Bone’s retribution would be excessively harsh.100 This indeed turned out to be the case.

The entire government of Wajoq, consisting of the signatories Puanna Gellang, Cakkuridi Wajoq La Pedapi, Patola Wajoq La Pangngambong, Pillaq Wajoq La Lakkiqbaja101 as well as lesser officials went to Fort Rotterdam in Makassar to “humiliate themselves”102 and formally surrender to the Dutch. The vast majority of chronicles make no mention of it, but this surrender still entered Bugis historical consciousness. It is recorded separately as a treaty,103 and it appears in the LSW. This even provides the dates of the fall of Tosora, the conclusion of the agreement and its signing, as well as name of the Dutch Governor Maximilian
It describes how they swore upon the Koran, surrendered their weapons and drank “weapon water” and signed a written treaty that was to apply to their grandchildren as well as themselves. These ceremonies are also described in Dutch accounts.

The articles of the treaty as they appear in the LSW are the same as they appear in Dutch records. They state that 1) Wajoq was now a vassal of the VOC and that the Wajorese were permitted to reside in Wajoq but must accept Dutch mediation in their external political affairs; 2) after the death of the Arung Matoa, the Wajorese were not to appoint another ruler independently according to their custom but instead to have their choice approved by the VOC; 3) all fortifications in Wajoq were to be destroyed and new ones could be built only with the approval of the VOC; 4) the Wajorese were not permitted to admit any Europeans or Indians (including Malays, Javanese and Moors) into their land; 5) the Wajorese were forbidden to trade anywhere besides Bali, along the Javanese coast to Batavia, and on Borneo without first obtaining passes from the Company; 6) any European seeking refuge in Wajoq must be returned to the Company; 7) the Wajorese were to uphold the Treaty of Bungaya in so far as it applied to them; 8) the Wajorese are to pay a war indemnity of 52,000 rijksdaalders over a period of four monsoons in gold, silver or jewels; and 9) the conditions of this agreement were solemnly sworn on the Koran and by the drinking of kris or weapon water, and were to apply to all the people of Wajoq.

Harsh as this treaty was, the actual treatment of the Wajorese following their surrender was much harsher. Under Goa’s overlordship prior to the Makassar War, Wajoq was able to conduct its own internal affairs with minimal interference. Goa’s overlordship was even sufficiently distant to enable Wajoq to enter the Tellumpocco. As the official new overlord in South Sulawesi after the Makassar War, the VOC theoretically sought a similar degree of control. In practice, however, the VOC delegated much of its authority to its Bonean allies, and Wajoq was left to the not-so-tender mercies of its Bonean subjugators.

The new effective overlord of South Sulawesi, Arung Palakka, carried a grudge against both Wajoq and

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104 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 219.
105 Water which is stirred with a kris (a wavy double bladed dagger) and thereby given supernatural powers.
106 Letter from Maximilian de Jongh in Makassar to the Board in Batavia, 10.4.1671. VOC 1281, ff. 737-737v.
107 ANRI Makassar 274/14, Contract between the VOC and Wajoq, Makassar, 10.1.1671. Also, Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum II, p. 426-430.
Goa. He employed his best soldiers to attack Wajoq\textsuperscript{108} and induced a state of misery previously unknown in Wajoq.

The Torment of Wajoq

Arung Palakka's campaign against the Wajorese was extremely severe. One aspect of this campaign was kidnapping. Countless slaves were seized from the Wajorese. Women, children and lower-ranking men were also kidnapped and presumably enslaved. Although the nobles suffered less, they were affected.\textsuperscript{109} Another aspect of this campaign was Bonean harassment of the Wajorese, which was carried on to such an extent that the population in Wajorese areas bordering Bone declined. If a Bonean wanted something belonging to a Wajorese, he would simply seize it without asking. Fishermen were forced to transport Boneans across Lake Tempe. If a Wajorese tried to resist the demands of the Boneans, he would be slapped or even killed. In the face of such continuous torment, there were incidents of Wajorese people running amuck,\textsuperscript{110} in spite of the known severity of the punishment, including death.

The territory of Wajoq was also dismembered. After To Sengngeng's untimely death, all of the Wajorese vassals north of the Cenrana River switched loyalty and sided with Bone, as did half of both Belawa and Gilireng.\textsuperscript{111} Technically, Pammana remained under Wajoq but its devotion to Bone was greater.\textsuperscript{112} Among the vassals that in theory were left to Wajoq were Sompe, Kalola, Bila, Ugiq Beruku, Boto and Otting.\textsuperscript{113} After the war, however, these were under Bonean control, and Arung Palakka further diminished Wajoq's territory by seizing Timurung and Pittampanua. The loss of these last two territories was particularly significant because it entailed the loss of Wajoq's access to the sea via the Cenrana River. In Wajoq's greatly reduced territory, the people were forced to undergo a further humiliation by being forbidden to use metal farm implements.

Already in 1671, the Wajorese were forced to turn to the Dutch for help. The Dutch admonished the Boneans to cease their oppressive practices but this had little effect. Finally, they asked Arung Palakka,

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Lontarag Sukkuqna Wajoq}, f. 222.
\textsuperscript{111} Noorduyn, \textit{Een Achtste-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjoe'}, pp. 276-277.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Lontarag Sukkuqna Wajoq}, f. 222.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Lontarag Sukkuna Wajoq}, f. 221.
who wielded tremendous influence among his people, to prevent the Boneans from harassing the Wajorese.\textsuperscript{114} The Dutch, however, were well aware of Arung Palakka’s animosity toward the Wajorese, and so the sincerity of their request is suspect. Indeed, Dutch records say that the Wajorese should have expected nothing less than their punishment and that they actually deserved Arung Palakka’s harsh treatment.\textsuperscript{115}

The war indemnity was a substantial burden. According to the contract of January 1671, the Wajorese were required to pay 52,000 rijksdaolders within four monsoons. They paid 7,800 mas of it promptly in gold and slaves. In June, the Dutch sent an envoy to collect more, but he received only 700 rijksdaolders. The Wajorese government said that they could not obtain more than that from their impoverished people.\textsuperscript{116} By the end of 1671, the Wajorese had only paid 8800 mas, or about a third of the indemnity. They again complained about their inability to pay, and requested that this debt be pardoned. There was some Dutch recognition of Wajorese poverty, and officials thought that the Wajorese should not be taxed beyond their means. Yet it did not appear to the Dutch that the Wajorese had lost their money and gold, and thus the request was denied.\textsuperscript{117} In 1675 the debt was still not settled and the Wajorese promised to pay 1500 rijksdaolders by the end of October.\textsuperscript{118}

In 1678, Wajorese again sought the assistance of the Dutch. The Arung Matoa went to Makassar and appealed to the Company for the restoration of the Wajorese lands of Pammana, Timurung, Wage, Totinco, Wugiq and Sengkang that Bone had seized, ostensibly according to the treaty of 1670. The Dutch president, Jacob Cops verified that the treaty did not stipulate any cession of lands to Bone and assured Wajoq that he would seek some sort of resolution to the problem. A year later, when the Arung Matoa came to Fort Rotterdam again, Cops asked him about the state of affairs in Wajoq. The Arung Matoa replied by covering his mouth with one hand and sliding the other across his throat, thereby indicating that he would lose his life if he said anything. He then said that since the Company and Arung Palakka were one, and Wajoq was defeated by the Company, that the Wajorese were considered Arung Palakka’s slaves.

\textsuperscript{114} L. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palakka}, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{115} Coolehaas (ed.), \textit{Generale Missiven}, III, p. 752.
\textsuperscript{116} L. Andaya, \textit{The Heritage of Arung Palakka}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{117} Coolehaas (ed.), \textit{Generale Missiven}, III, pp. 752-753.
\textsuperscript{118} Coolehaas (ed.), \textit{Generale Missiven}, IV, p. 56.
Cops responded by explaining to the Arung Matoa that Arung Palakka and the Company were not one and the same, and that according to the treaty Wajoq was not a slave of Bone but rather a subject of the Company, and that as such, should report to the Company any abuses suffered at the hands of Bone. A few days later, a Wajorese delegation presented the Dutch with a list of grievances, among which were the seizure of 3,000 Wajorese people together with their buffaloes and possessions; the kidnapping of many Wajorese who were in Luwuq at the time of the Luwuq-Bone War in 1676; and the forced relocation of many skilled Wajorese and their families to Bone.\textsuperscript{119} Cops was sympathetic but did not act because the Dutch were counting upon the support of Arung Palakka and his troops in an expedition against Java. When the expedition left, the Arung Matoa demanded restitution of the seized goods and people, but the Bonean leaders argued that they could not do anything while Arung Palakka was absent.\textsuperscript{120} As the Dutch were too dependent upon Arung Palakka to risk alienating him, they left the Wajorese at his mercy.

Chapter Conclusion

An examination of Wajoq’s earliest history reveals that migration has always played a role in the lives of its people. All of the Wajorese origin myths attribute foreign origins to the first Wajorese leaders, and the chronicles present Wajoq itself as a land of colonization. Furthermore, the right to migrate is encoded in the Wajorese system of government. These factors reflect the centrality of migration in the constructed reality of the Wajorese people. Furthermore, recent archaeological research suggests that the foundation of Luwuq, once believed to be the cradle of Bugis civilization, was likely influenced by migrants from the Cenrana valley. Clearly, then, migration played a central role in Wajoq’s pre- and early history.

Wajorese emigration during the early modern era did not constitute a radical break from the past, but it became much more intense following the Makassar War. The abominable conditions in Wajoq after the Makassar War and the inability to obtain Dutch protection forced many Wajorese to emigrate. The LSW specifically states that it was after the fall of Tosora and the signing of the treaty with the Dutch that

\textsuperscript{119} Letter from Jacob Cops et al in Makassar to Gov. Gen. van Goens et al in Batavia, 20.7.1679, VOC 1347, ff. 392-394v.

\textsuperscript{120} L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, p. 192.
many Wajoqese emigrated. While the Wajoqese were not alone in emigrating, their feelings of siriq and pessé were intensified during the Makassar War and its aftermath, as is clearly reflected in Wajoqese lonlaraq. In Smithian terms, the Makassar War is a classic example of the manner in which warfare can strengthen a community's identity. Given the state of affairs in South Sulawesi, migration was virtually the only way of redeeming themselves. Indeed, while individual migrants may not have realized it at the time, their contributions were to become essential in Wajoq's plans for refortification in the early eighteenth century.

121 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 222. Such explicit statements are not universal in Wajoqese lonlaraq as Lineton claims. (Lineton, An Indonesian Society and Its Universe, p. 17.) The most obvious example of a Wajoqese chronicle which does not refer to emigration at this time is Noorduyn, Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wajoq.

122 Many other Bugis, as well as Makassarese and Mandarese, opted to leave South Sulawesi at that time. So massive was this exodus that Dutch records mention encountering at sea "floating cities" of such refugees. (L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, p. 210.)

Chapter 3

Wajorese Society and Entrepreneurship in Makassar

Turning now to an examination of different communities within the Wajorese diaspora, the first to be examined is that in Makassar. Not technically overseas, the Wajorese community in Makassar was more responsive to the political climate in South Sulawesi than other communities of Wajorese migrants. Due to the presence of the VOC, however, the Wajorese community in Makassar was less vulnerable to Bonean depredations after the Makassar War than their countrymen in Wajoq. While Wajoq itself was under the rule of Boneans, the Wajorese community in Makassar was less restricted and developed into the logistic center of the Wajorese diaspora. This chapter examines its commerce, its organization, and its relationships with other Wajorese communities.

The Wajorese settlement in Makassar was unique among the Wajorese overseas communities in several ways. Not only was it more influenced by the politics of South Sulawesi than any other Wajorese immigrant community but also its proximity to Wajoq facilitated contact with the homeland. Even the reigning Arung Mataoa of Wajoq traveled to Makassar frequently enough to merit the construction of a second residence there. Furthermore there is a fundamental difference in the amount of information available about the Wajorese settlement in Makassar compared with those elsewhere. For the last quarter of the seventeenth and first quarter of the eighteenth centuries, the Wajorese community in Makassar is more thoroughly documented by Wajorese sources than the history of Wajoq itself. A list of matoa, Wajorese community leaders in Makassar, provides much more detail than the lists of Arung Mataoa in the homeland. A set of laws was also codified around 1696 by Amanna Gappa, the Wajorese leader in Makassar, and it has been published both in Bugis and in translation. Information about the legal changes implemented in Wajoq by Arung Mataoa La Saladweng La Toq Tenirua Arung Kampiri (1715-1736) is slight by comparison. Another important difference in

1 A Bugis manuscript, NBG 106 in the Leiden University Library, lists a total of twenty mataoa who served from 1671 until 1913 and provides details about some of their administrations. This is a copy that Matthes ordered his clerk La Siri to make of a manuscript owned by a former mataoa La Useng Daeng Matoneq. J. Noorduyn’s summary and analysis of this has recently been published as J. Noorduyn, “The Wajorese merchants’ community in Makassar,” BKI, 153, 3, (2000).
2 See, for example, the history of Wajoq published in Matthes, Boeginesche Chrismathie, I, pp. 502-520, which is in large part a list of rulers; or Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I.
3 La Saladweng expanded the Wajorese administration and left a long treatise about government (Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I, p. 87.) A new government position was created in each limpo and in
sources concerning the Wajoese community in Makassar and those concerning the overseas Wajoese communities is that the former more frequently distinguish between different types of Bugis than do the latter. Close to the Bugis homelands, distinct Bugis ethnicities were not assembled into a single category as in other parts of the archipelago. Thus Wajoese and even Mandarese who might have been referred to as “Bugis” in sources from the western archipelago are generally more specifically described in sources from Makassar.

Cosmopolitanism was a key characteristic of early modern Makassar. In his memorandum written immediately after the Makassar War, Admiral Speelman outlined his vision for Makassar as a company town. He envisioned “a merchant town with the houses of foreigners and strangers” and advocated organizing settlements according to ethnic lines, with “each nation under its own headman.”

Although there were significant discrepancies between what Speelman envisioned and the realities of late seventeenth and eighteenth century Makassar; there did exist a variety of different communities in Makassar, including the Chinese, the Malays, the Wajoese and other Bugis. Instead of being hermetically sealed from each other and therefore easy for the Dutch to control, however, the various ethnic communities in Makassar interacted extensively. They defied Dutch commercial restrictions and undercut Dutch trade so effectively, that the VOC establishment in Makassar was itself a financial liability.

Although there were Wajoese settlers in Makassar prior to the Makassar War, many of them departed during the war and kept away thereafter for fear of persecution. Only in 1671, after “peace”
had been concluded between Wajoq and the Dutch and Bonéans, did they return to Makassar in any numbers. It was a particularly attractive place because rice was cheap and because Makassar remained an important port in eastern Indonesia.

**Kampong Wajoq**

*Speelman estimated that more than 1000 Wajorese resided permanently in Makassar prior to the war and that 300 still remained even in 1670.* The Wajorese in Makassar were concentrated in the so-called Kampong Wajoq (Wajoq Village) in the northwestern section of the town. Kampong Wajoq was located on the coast and in time came to extend eastwards to Jalan Yos. Sudarso (formerly Lajangweg), northwards to Jalan Satando (formerly Coehoorenweg) and southwards to Jalan Banda (Bandstraat). It appears that there was once a thick forest to the north of Kampong Wajoq, so the northern part of Kampong Wajoq was named Malimongan. According to Noorduyn this name, meaning “desiring,” was given in the eighteenth century. There were also Kampong Buton and Kampong Banda, named for the sailors who resided there.

In Kampong Wajoq, the Wajorese had their own house of worship (*langgar*) which was replaced with a mosque during the administration of Amanna Gappa (1697-1723). A palace was then built during the administration of matoa Amanna Monring (1723-1729) in Kampong Wajoq for the Arung Matoa La Salewangeng To Tenrirua, as well as a village meeting hall (*baruga*) during the administration of matoa To Daweq (1732-1735). The construction of facilities to accommodate the Wajorese Arung Matoa suggests that he frequently visited Makassar.

Living in a close-knit community offered obvious advantages, such as mutual assistance, and therefore the Wajorese in Makassar might have voluntarily opted to live together. According to the information in the list of Wajorese matoa in Makassar, however, there was also pressure from the Wajorese leaders in Tosora for the Wajorese in Makassar to reside within Kampong Wajoq. During the

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8 Sutherland, “Eastern Emporium and Company Town,” p. 113.
13 Or. 545 No. 219 Stukken uit de Japanse tijd, h Hikajat Pendek District-Wadjo, f. 2. The source is ambiguous as to whether these were Wajorese sailors.
reign of Arung Matoa La Tenrisessuq To Denra (1699-1702), the Wajorese leaders decided that the Wajorese in Makassar should all live in Kampong Wajoq. Considering that the Dutch also wanted the residents of Makassar to inhabit ethnically organized villages, this may have been inserted in the lontaraq as a Wajorese explanation for what were actually Dutch demands. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Boneans also demanded that the Wajorese live in Kampong Wajoq. Whatever the exact reasons for residence in Kampong Wajoq, its existence gave the Wajorese in Makassar a sense of autonomy. There even appears to have been a limited degree of territorial sanctity in Kampong Wajoq. In the event of a royal visit to Makassar or Goa, the Boneans would send a messenger to summon the Wajorese rather than enter Kampong Wajoq themselves.

Yet Kampong Wajoq was not a safe haven, nor was it the exclusive preserve of the Wajorese. On the contrary, the proceedings of the trial of Morro of Makassar reveal that Kampong Wajoq, like other districts in Makassar, was fraught with violence. Morro, a migrant farm worker and a follower of the Bonean noble Arung Kaju, was put on trial for murder and theft in 1732. When his trial began he admitted that many people in Kampong Bugis and Kampong Wajoq were frightened of him, and that whenever there was a murder or a robbery, he was always wrongly accused. He said that people expected this of him because Arung Kaju was unpopular his followers had a reputation for committing crimes. Whereas Morro originally denied knowing anything about Arung Kaju’s followers murdering or stealing, he was repeatedly questioned under torture over a period of two months, each time confessing more until he finally confessed to murder. Morro’s own statements suggest that Arung

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15 Ibid.
16 This was during the administration of La Madeq (1757-1772) who had particular problems with the tyrannical character of Bonean rulers. The datu of Baringeng made it clear to the Wajorese that it would be desirable if they lived more in one place. There were objections about the cost of relocating, as well as about the excessive corvée labor demanded of the Wajorese. Out of fear for Boné, La Mada often brought cases which he should have resolved himself to the Ranreng Tna. (Matthes, Over de Watijorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, pp. 34-35.)
18 Crimineel Proces van Morro van Macasser en Cormantoly C:S, ANRI Makassar 314.1, ff. 1-52. It should be noted, though, that his confession was obtained under torture and its veracity is therefore suspect.
19 As Sutherland points out, fires were common in the kampons built largely of bamboo and thatch and criminal elements regularly took advantage of the resultant chaotic conditions. (Sutherland, “Eastern Emporium and Company Town,” p. 111.)
20 Migrant farm workers do not appear to be common but in his testimony, Morro clearly stated that he “goes around with his friends planting and harvesting rice.”
Kaju’s followers constituted a feared gang, an image that is corroborated by the evidence presented by two Wajorese witnesses, Amanna Java and Amanna Lema, on 27 October 1732. Both Amanna Java and Amanna Lema attested that Morro was well known as a thief and murderer in the Bugis and Wajorese kampongs, and that everyone was afraid of him and his gang. While the fact that Morro was a Makassarese who opted to ally himself with a Bonean noble underlines the possibility of trans-ethnic alliances, this group’s reputation for criminality shows that inter-ethnic interaction was not always peaceful.

The Wajorese Administration in Makassar

The office of Wajorese matoa in Makassar appears to have been created in 1671, when many Wajorese returned to Makassar after the war. It bore numerous similarities to the office of Arung Matoa in Wajoq. Like the position of Arung Matoa, this office was not hereditary, but appointed. The matoa were chosen for their personal qualities such as fairness, sociability, eloquence and wisdom. Ancestry also played a role. The Wajorese matoa in Makassar originated from various limpo in Wajoq, but none of them is recorded as originating in Makassar. It is possible, however, that a matoa’s family’s origins is meant and not his birthplace. If this were the case, then it testifies to the strength of the Wajorese affiliations with a particular limpo or village of their ancestors.

The Wajorese matoa in Makassar was invested in a ceremony very similar to that of the Arung Matoa in Wajoq, which stated the ruler’s fundamental dependence on the population. Just as the first Arung Matoa of Wajoq Petta La Paléwo To Palipu originally declined his appointment, so did the most famous matoa in Makassar, Amanna Gappa. He denied the compliments paid him by the community.

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21 Amanna Java claimed that Morro and an accomplice tried to rob him at kris-point during the last fire in Kampong Wajoq. This attempt was foiled when Amanna Java’s brother To Saira then came to the rescue, but it was not Morro’s only crime during this fire. Morro supposedly tried to steal a chest from the hands of a certain Puanna Ibi’s hands and killed him when he would not surrender it. He was also rumored to have stolen and absconded with another box from the houses of the Wajorese To Abu.


23 According to Noorduyn the Wajorese in Makassar resided according to the same divisions as they did in Wajoq, which consisted of three limpo each subdivided into four parts. (J. Noorduyn, “The Wajorese merchants’ community in Makassar,” p. 496.)

24 Ibid, pp. 491-492.
when they tried to persuade him to act as their leader, but eventually he was persuaded to accept the appointment.23

At the inaugural ceremony, the community pledged its loyalty to the new matoa26 and outlined the matoa’s privileges as well as the community’s responsibilities towards the leader.27 These were that the matoa could not be outbid; that the matoa may participate in other peoples’ purchases;28 that the matoa might commission the captain of a ship29 to sell goods worth up to 100 reals for him; that the community would provide for the matoa’s housing; that the matoa would receive a portion of the meat and food from the kenduri (ritual meal) held for a deceased Wajores trader; that the matoa would have priority in chartering; and that the matoa would receive a duty of one real for each Wajores ship arriving in Makassar from overseas. Although the ceremony did not specifically outline the duties of the matoa, other descriptions of the various matoa and their administrations indicate that the matoas primary functions were to settle trading disputes, and to represent the Wajores community vis à vis higher authorities, such as VOC governors and the Arumponé.30

Although the Wajores matoa in Makassar was not limited in his powers by thirty-nine other lords as was the Arung Matoa in Wajoq, he was subject to the influence and demands of the Bonéans. This stemmed in part from the influential position that Arung Palakka had secured with the Dutch and in part from family relations between Boné and Wajoq. The VOC’s victory in the Makassar War was due to a large part to Arung Palakka’s participation, and after the war the Dutch continued to rely heavily upon the rulers of Boné for advice about the politics of South Sulawesi. Thus, after the 1667 Bungaya Treaty, the Bonéan rulers took up residence in Bontuaq, close to Casteel Rotterdam. From there, they assisted the Dutch in local political affairs. From the signing of the Bungaya Treaty to the death of Arung Palakka in 1696, Boné was paramount among the polities of South Sulawesi. This was

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26 Matthes, Over de Wadjorezen mel hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, p. 31.
27 These were agreed upon during the administration of the first matoa To Pabukiq (c.1671-1676/1681), and were formalized after his successor To Pakkalo (1676/1681-1697/1702) had served for three years. Only during the inauguration of the third matoa Amanna Gappa (1697-1723) were they incorporated into the actual ceremony.
28 It was later added to this that they must share their profits with the matoa even if they sale takes place quickly, without his knowledge.
29 Later this pertained specifically to ships traveling to Batavia or Tana Barea = Pulau Pinang.
demonstrated time and time again, most notably in the Luwuq-Bone War of 1676 and in the Toraja Wars of 1683.31

The Boneans came to exert particular influence upon the Wajorese community because, beginning with Arung Palakka's successor and nephew La Pataq (1696-1714), the king of Bone also bore the title of Ranreng Tua. The office of Ranreng Tua was unique among positions in the Wajorese government in that it was often held by two people simultaneously. This practice had begun in the early seventeenth century when two brothers, To Appamadeng and To Pasawe, had jointly held the office of Ranreng Tua. The former's son To Appamolé and the latter's grandson To Ali were the thirteenth and fifteenth Arung Matoa, respectively. Perhaps because of this legacy, the tradition of sharing the office of Ranreng Tua lasted into the eighteenth century. Yet it assumed quite a different character. The great-grandson of To Ali, La Pataq inherited the title of Ranreng Tua from his father Pakoko who in turn had inherited it from his mother Khadijah Da Salleq.32 After La Pataq's appointment, the Wajorese matoa in Makassar was required to formally swear his loyalty to adat and to his inaugural pledges in front of Bontualaq.33 In the meantime, other Ranreng Tua were being appointed in Wajoq.34

Presumably, the longstanding tradition of two persons holding this office made Bonean intervention easier to accept.

Within the official structure of the Wajorese government, the Ranreng Tua's jurisdiction was limited, as s/he was just one of the seven most powerful lords. However, this interdependence did not hamper the dual function Arumpone/Ranreng Tua, who resided far from the other Wajorese lords yet close by the Wajorese in Makassar.35 The Boneans exacted corvee labor from the Wajorese; influenced the election of a new matoa and demanded that it be they who confirmed his appointment; required the Wajorese to live within Kampong Wajoq; and restricted Wajorese navigation by refusing to allow them to set sail before a new matoa had been appointed.36

The control that the Arumpone/Ranreng Tua had over the Wajorese is also reflected in the hierarchy for settling disputes. If there were a problem that

could not be resolved by the individuals involved, it would be referred to a taroanang, a meeting of prominent (rich and wise) members of the community who were to discuss the case impartially and try to interject reason. If this failed, they would go to the matao. If their own matao proved unable to resolve the dispute, it would then be sent to the ruler of Bone as Ranreng Tua.37 Thus even the matao was subject to the Bonean leader. While Bonean interference in Wajoq itself was also strong during the last decades of the seventeenth century, nowhere else in the diaspora were the Wajoqese subject to such rigid controls as in Makassar. However, this control did not last indefinitely. After the reign of Arung Palakka’s nephew and successor La Patauq, Bone’s influence in the peninsula declined considerably.

**Commerce**

Unlike other places in the archipelago, residence in Makassar offered little reprieve from Bonean or Dutch suppression. Thus the main reason the Wajoqese had to immigrate to Makassar was commerce, but this was apparently incentive enough. Under the Dutch, Makassar’s emporium had declined, yet the city still maintained an important position in regional trade with numerous networks converging at Makassar. The city’s residents were largely immigrants38 and there was considerable commercial cooperation between the different ethnic groups,39 factors that created attractive commercial opportunities for the Wajoqese.

A variety of different Wajoqese merchants conducted business in Makassar. Some sailed large ships to far away destinations, whereas others confined their business to Makassar and Tosora.40 A tripartite division of those engaged in commerce into wholesalers, retailers and peddlers was established to protect the rights and business of each group. Wholesalers were the only ones who could purchase from the Dutch and the Chinese, but they could not participate in retail trade. Retailers had to purchase their goods from wholesalers, but could not act as peddlers. Peddlers were then required to buy from retailers, not wholesalers. Repeated violation of this division could result in being banned from trading, but repentant offenders could be pardoned.41

38 Sutherland, “Eastern emporium and company town,” p. 106.
39 Sutherland, “Mestizos as Middlemen?” p. 251.
41 Ibid, p. 480; KITLV, Or. 545 No. 182 Stukken van Intje Moehammad, f. VIII.
The main destinations of Wajorese shipping are clear from the freight costs listed in lontaraq about the Wajorese community in Makassar and its leaders. These were Johor and Kedah on the Malay peninsula; Aceh and Palembang on Sumatra; Sulu in the southern Philippines; Kutai, Banjar, Pasir and Sukadana on Borneo; Gresik and Batavia on Java; the islands of Bangka and Belitung in the South China Sea; as well as Bali, Buton and Flores. Because these destinations all appear in Amanna Gappa's code (see below), it appears that this far-flung network was established around the turn of the eighteenth century or shortly thereafter.

The Wajorese were commercially very successful in Makassar and their presence expanded alongside the presence of foreign traders, such as the Chinese. According to the lontaraq, by the administration of the second Wajorese mataa To Pabukiq (c.1671-1676/1681), some Wajorese in Makassar had grown rich and by the time of Amanna Gappa (1697-1723), Wajorese commerce was more profitable than that of either Boneans or Soppengers. Dutch records confirm this success and report that by 1715, the VOC's trade in textiles had declined as a result of Wajorese competition. Furthermore, Wajorese captains dominated the official non-VOC trade recorded in the harbor master's log for 1722 to both Java, and east and southeastern Borneo.

One reason for the success of the Wajorese community in the early eighteenth century, was the energetic, capable leadership of Amanna Gappa. This native of Pallekoreng in Talotenreng served as mataa for twenty-six years, from 1697 until 1723. His commercial and diplomatic skills gave the Wajorese a commercial advantage not only in Makassar but also throughout much of the Wajorese diaspora. He urged the Wajorese to extend beyond their existing commercial arrangements, both geographically and logistically, and the trade of the Wajorese in Makassar expanded considerably during his administration. Emblematic of Wajorese leaders, he was so well respected as a leader that he is described in terms that are comparable to those used in state chronicles to describe rulers. He was

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42 Noorduyn, "The Wajorese merchants' community in Makassar," p. 481.
43 Ibid, pp. 478-479.
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also well respected by the Dutch who asked him to serve as the chief of all Bugis traders, regardless of their sub-ethnicity.  

As was the case with Wajoese migrants elsewhere, diplomacy was a key element of Amanna Gappa’s success. Under Amanna Gappa the Wajoese in Makassar entered into long-lasting commercial relations with the Malays and Chinese. To facilitate these, Amanna Gappa made an agreement with the then captain of the Chinese, I Wak Ko. It was agreed that if a Wajoese conducted trade in Kampong Cina (the Chinese village) and came into conflict with Chinese traders there, then the problem would be resolved by the Chinese captain with the help of the Wajoese maloa. Similarly, a dispute arising between Wajoese and Chinese merchants in Kampong Wajoq would be resolved by the Wajoese maloa with the help of the Chinese captain. Amanna Gappa also made a similar agreement with the then captain of the Malays Encik Jukka. These jurisdictional agreements were consistent with the Wajoese saying: “Wherever there is fire, near or far, there is also the extinguisher.”

Amanna Gappa’s most famous accomplishment was the codification of laws pertaining to the commerce and navigation of the Wajoese. The precise date when these laws were codified is uncertain but it was most likely during the early eighteenth century. The code established a framework for establishing and regulating business relationships that expanded the commercial potential of the Wajoese, thereby giving them an advantage over their counterparts. Its codification also promoted unity among the disparate Wajoese communities because Wajoese leaders from at least

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48 KITLV, Or. 545 No. 182 Stukken van Intje Mohammud, f. VIII; Matthes, Over de Wajoese met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, p. 34.  
49 Abdurrazak, Sejarah Wajo, p. 64.  
50 Eighteen copies of this legal code were held in the manuscript collection of the Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan, which no longer exists as such, and numerous copies are held in the NBG collection held at the Leiden University Library. It has also been published in the original Bugis, Indonesian, Dutch, and English. (B. F. Matthes (ed.), lyanaé sure powada-adaangi Undang-undangna sinina toWajo, iya nawirué matowana to-Wajoé ri Junpandang riyasengé Amanna Gappa, Makassar, 1869; O. L. Tobing, Hukum Pelajaran dan Perdagangan Amanna Gappa, Makassar: Jajasan Kebudajaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, 1961; C. H. Thomsen (ed.), A Code of Bugis Maritime Laws with a Translation and Vocabulary, giving the Pronunciation and Meaning of Each Word, Singapore: Mission Press, 1832; and Leonardus Johannes Jacobus Caron, Het Handels- en Zeerecht in de Adatrechtsregelen van Rechtskring Zuid-Celebes, Bussum: Van Dishoeck, 1937. This analysis is based on Matthes, 1869.)  
Makassar, Pasir and Sumbawa convened at a conference and agreed upon this code of laws. This conference exemplifies the importance of consensus among the Wajorese and may have strengthened feelings of pesse among Wajorese migrants.

**Wajorese Commercial Law**

Amanna Gappa’s code of laws consists of twenty-five chapters, each dealing with a different aspect of commerce and navigation. If not unique, such a law code is highly unusual for early modern insular Southeast Asia. It was also very effective. The text detailing the administrations of the Wajorese *matoa* in Makassar says “it ended badly for violators [Amanna Gappa’s regulations]” implying that the code was actively upheld. So effective was this code that, while Wajorese did sue members of other ethnic groups, there are no surviving court records of cases contested between two Wajorese parties. By regulating the trade of the Wajorese, it gave them an advantage over their competitors.

The code begins with a chapter about freighting charges. It provides an even more extensive list of destinations where Wajorese traders called than the *lontaraq* about the Wajorese *matoa*. They include Mandar, Kaili, Selayar, Buton, Muna, Wowoni, Tombuku, Lohiya (east coast of the island Muna), Bingkoka, Benongko (island to the southeast of Buton), Mandonu (island on the east coast near Tombungku) on the island of Sulawesi; Pasir, Sukadana, Mempawa, Sambas, Brunei, Banjarmassin, Berau on Borneo; Aceh, and Palembang on Sumatra; Banda, Ambon, Seram, Kei, Aru islands in the Moluccas; Selangor, Melaka, Kedah, Johor, and Terengganu on the Malay peninsula; Bima (in eastern Sumbawa), Manggarai (in western Flores) in the Lesser Sundas; as well as Cambodia, Batavia and Lombok. This extensive list is provided for the costs transporting goods. The number of trade items listed is comparatively small, and certainly not comprehensive. It includes salt, gambir, rice and tobacco. A different chapter (22) devoted entirely to the fares for transporting slaves suggests that this traffic in humans was a very important “item” of trade for the Wajorese.

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52 Noeroeddin Daeng Magassing, “Pegatan,” *Sinar Selat Selo*, 1, 1 p. 9; Matthes (ed.), *Iyanae sure powada-adaengi Undang-undangna sinina to Wajo*, pp. 1, 42.


54 This was particularly true during the administration of the matoa To Tangnga (1730-1732).

55 Other sources verify extensive Wajorese and other Bugis involvement in the slave trade. The Bugis captured people from Sulawesi, the southern Philippines and elsewhere and sold them as slaves in the markets of the Malay archipelago. (Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p. 13; Pelras, *The Bugis*, p. 119.)
Since the laws were codified to prevent conflict, it is not surprising that they are primarily concerned with fair business practices. Eight chapters (3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21) relate to borrowing and lending money and goods; whereas three (2, 7, 12) relate to the sharing of profits and losses. One chapter (9) relates to inheritance, and another chapter (15) relates to who exactly was to be held responsible for goods that are mishandled or damaged. There are regulations promoting transparency, such as one stating that creditors have the right to make debts publicly known so that part of any money that the debtor earns will go to the creditor. Others refer to protecting private property, such as the stipulation that captains must assume responsibility for any mishandled goods that they confiscate from slaves, unless they have received prior authorization from the owners.

Chapter 7 of Amanna Gappa's law code provides a detailed framework for commercial cooperation. It defines five different types of loans. Bagilaba pada (equal sharing of profits) refers to a loan where the borrower and the lender share the profits or losses. If the principal is repaid and only the profits are shared, the loan is called bagilaba samatula (sharing profits with an agreement). The third type of loan, where there is no interest or loss, is called inreng pettu (loan without interest or loss). Fourth, inreng réweq (loan of goods) refers to a loan of merchandise in which the unsold portion is returned. The fifth type of loan, called laboang (commission goods), refers to when people sell goods on behalf of the Wajorese matoa, in Makassar or elsewhere, and do not profit from the sale themselves. The law code also lists circumstances in which the transporter or borrower must take complete responsibility for loss of the goods. These are if he loses them through betting; if he lends them; or if he spends them in order to commit adultery, buy opium or pay for a wedding. In addition, less formal loans were made with the understanding that the money or goods lent would be returned after a commercial voyage. Loans were also made for non-commercial purposes, often with collateral. Chapter 10 then outlines the procedures for the settlement by legal means of disputes over loans.

The existence of a framework for loans was particularly significant. In early modern insular Southeast Asia, local traders were generally at a disadvantage when compared to Chinese, Indian and European merchants because of the relative absence of investment capital and because of their enduring
preference for personalized, kin-based trading relations. While the range of relatives considered trustworthy included "milk relatives" and in-laws, it was nevertheless limited. The establishment of a framework for loans therefore expanded the commercial potential of the Wajoese.

Amanna Gappa's code (particularly chapters 2, 5 and 23) also provides information about the various types of crew members and merchants who made commercial voyages. The variety of positions open to people with different skills and amounts of investment capital facilitated Wajoese trade. In addition to the captain there was a class of traders known as kalula (lit. inseparables). Kalula were akin to apprentices to the captain who were commissioned to trade and convey goods on behalf of the Wajoese matua. There were generally four main sailors, two jurumudi (helmsmen), and two jurubatu, who were responsible for casting the anchor and taking soundings. The jurumudi and jurubatu were also responsible for the ship's rigging.

While precise statistics are unavailable, it appears that the most numerous category of people on boards were the sawi. Sawi were traders who worked as sailors but did not receive a salary. There were different categories of sawi based on the extent of their freedom and the amount of goods that they were permitted to bring on board. Sawi manumpang were almost like passengers whereas sawi puli were almost like slaves. While not unique among the Wajoese, this arrangement may have stimulated the economy by allowing people with very little money to get involved with trade. It also may have promoted solidarity or pessé within the community because the captain was once a sawi and he looked after their well being, offered them advice and lent them money. Amanna Gappa's code required that the captain treat the sawi justly without threatening them, let them choose from the purchased goods, and share his own food before allowing them to go hungry. If modern relationships can be used as any sort of a guide for understanding the past, then this solidarity might have been felt on land as well. In

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57 Otherwise unrelated people who shared a wet nurse were considered to have a special bond. They were known as "milk relatives" or saudara susuan. (B. Andaya, To Live as Brothers, p. 35.)

58 Although its meaning has changed, the term sawi is still in use. In eighteenth century Dutch documents, it was defined as indigenous trading passengers. (Abrah: Franzs contra Tombo Inlandse vrouw, 1728, ANRI, Makassar 333.2.) In the nineteenth century, it meant crew member and is now used in a variety of fields to denote clients who are dependant upon punggawa or patrons. C. Pelras, The Bugis, p. 332.
contemporary South Sulawesi, the wives of the sawi have a close relationship with the wife of the
captain, seek her advice on personal matters and borrow money and supplies from her.59

Amanna Gappa's code outlines the numerous requirements for being a captain (chapter 6). They include patience, alertness, and the willingness and ability to speak for the entire group. He was also required to possess weapons, ammunition, a sturdy ship and capital. Furthermore, he was required to have money on hand to invest for the maintenance of the ship, even though this money was later to be reimbursed later by the ship's owner. The captain was naturally the supreme authority on board, but there were limits on his authority, as was typical of all Wajorese leaders. For example, chapter 4 describes how the captain might change the destination of a vessel at the last minute without the consent of the sawi, even though they had paid in advance for passage to another port. In such a case, however, the captain was required to provide the sawi with passage aboard a comparable vessel to make the agreed upon voyage. Chapter 11, which describes the procedures for settling disputes on board, once again shows that the authority of the captain was not absolute. It stresses the desirability of the captain settling all shipboard disputes immediately, or at least before the ship arrived in port. If this proves impossible for him, however, then the issue must be adjudicated by the leaders of the land where the ship calls. While at sea, the decisions of the captain cannot be challenged unless all of the sawi, together with the jurumudi and jurubatu, agree to oppose him. This, it might be noted, was in marked contrast to the practices of most Western nations, where such organized opposition to the decision of a ship's captain would have been considered mutiny. It underlines the importance of consensus among the Wajorese.

Chapters 21 and 25 of Amanna Gappa's code contain advice to merchants provide insight into what the Wajorese considered fair and wise business practice. Chapter 21 consists of Amanna Gappa's personal advice regarding lending money and goods, profit sharing and debt collecting. It includes his suggestion that it is better to let someone work or trade in order to pay off his debt than to enslave him; and his advice that it is inadvisable to go into business with influential people because they may try to bend the rules. Chapter 25 provides the four dos and the four don'ts of maintaining a fortune, such as

treating communal business affairs with the same respect and care as private ones, and not taking on too much business at once.

The dangers and risks inherent in overseas commerce are apparent at various points in the text. The necessity of weapons on board ships clearly implies that voyages were dangerous, as do the chapters about dealing with emergencies such as the death of a merchant on board (16) and the rescue of shipwrecked persons (20). Furthermore, the requirement that the captain share his provisions with the sawi before allowing them to go hungry suggests that voyages sometimes entailed hardships.

The law code also reflects a high degree of awareness of market conditions. Chapter 3 specifies that if transported goods were not sold, then only half of the freight costs of all of them could be charged. Clearly, then, those involved in transportation were involved in negotiation and in decision-making processes. Although there were ship owners and capitalists who did not make voyages themselves, there was no clear distinction between the businesses of transportation and selling. In the court proceedings of Abraham Franzson vs. Tombo (discussed below), it is clear that while not traveling on the same ship, shipowner Abraham Franzson was considered to have made the same voyage as his business associate Nakoda To Anko.

Amanna Gappa's code of laws also tells us something about the links between different Wajorese communities. Except for pure passengers (to manumpeng), people were expected to make a round trip voyage on the same vessel; and unless prior arrangements were made, they were always required to pay the round trip fare. This shows that Wajorese traveled extensively to and from Sulawesi, perhaps even more so than they emigrated. Given the transsocietal nature of Wajorese business contacts (see the case of To Anko below) it is likely that there were passengers of many different ethnicities on board Wajorese ships. There is, however, no indication of this in Amanna Gappa's code. The fact that the code of laws was agreed to by the Wajorese matoa in Sumbawa, Pasir, Kutai and Pontianak clearly shows that the various Wajorese communities cooperated for mutual benefit. It also shows the importance of the trading connections with these places in particular. The code also suggests that Wajorese commercial shipping was regulated in a manner similar to the general affairs of Bugis states. In some ways, the code resembles a conventional Bugis treaty. For example, it
was agreed upon by various community leaders, and it contains similar, albeit much less metaphorical, language about warning each other and helping each other remember.

The Commercial Practices of To Anko and To Uti

While Amanna Gappa's law code provides an overview of how the Wajorese conducted business, Dutch court transcripts offer a rare glimpse into the practices of individual merchants. The cases of Abraham Franzson versus Tombo⁶⁰ and To Uti versus Towaris⁶¹ illustrate the extent and range of Wajorese long-distance traders. To Anko and To Uti, the two Wajorese businessmen whose affairs are described in these cases, might be described in today's terms as an "umbrella capitalists" because they worked in a variety of different fields such as finance, transportation and sales. The cases also show that, while Amanna Gappa's code provided an effective guideline for commerce among the Wajorese, commercial transactions with other ethnic groups did not always proceed as smoothly.

The case of Abraham Franzson versus Tombo⁶² illustrates Wajorese business practices in two ways. First of all it provides a fascinating glimpse into the affairs of the Wajorese captain To Anko. Secondly, it highlights some of the differences between Wajorese practices and those of other communities in Makassar. While Amanna Gappa's code provided guidelines for several elements of this dispute, the conflict was not resolved according to Wajorese customs. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was Wajorese and the case was brought to trial in a Dutch court.

In 1728 the shipowner Abraham Franzson sued the Makassar woman Tombo for money that her deceased husband, the Wajorese nakoda To Anko, owed him. When Toanko's estate was examined, various people came forward and detailed their transactions with him, showing how he conducted business. No fewer than sixteen people are mentioned.⁶³ Considering that this is only a partial list, To Anko's business contacts were clearly extensive. The image of To Anko that emerges from the proceedings is multifaceted. He helped organize the business affairs of the sawi, collected money, and delegated authority. In the matter at hand, he served as the intermediary between the sawi, who made their own investments and took their own risks, and the boat owner Abraham Franzson. The

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⁶⁰ Abraham Frasz contra Tombo Inlandse vrouw, 1728, ANRI Makassar 333.2, unpaginated.
⁶¹ Proces Civil van Diogo Tawaris Senior contra Tohoeti Wadjorees, 1742, ANRI Makassar 332.1, unpaginated.
⁶² Abraham Frasz contra Tombo Inlandse vrouw, unpaginated.
sawī entrusted To Anko with shipping loans. According to Abraham Franzson, the shipping loans amounted to 408 rijksdaalders, whereas according to Tombo and Carre Mangale they amounted to 240 rijksdaalders. To Anko and the sawī traveled together to Batavia on Abraham Franzson's ship Sulena, which was then sold in Batavia for 30 rijksdaalders. Another ship then was purchased for 170 rijksdaalders. This ship in turn required new sails and rigging, which cost an additional 50 rijksdaalders.64 Also while in Batavia, To Anko bought goods that Abraham Franzson and To Anko agreed he would sell in Sumbawa and then return the money to Abraham Franzson, but To Anko died on Sumbawa before completing this transaction.

That To Anko conducted business on Sumbawa was not a coincidence. Sumbawa was home to an important Wajorese community, but unfortunately little is known about this island's early modern history. From the available materials regarding Sumbawan history it is clear that the island had long-standing relations with South Sulawesi. According to Speelman and the Diary of Goa and Talloq, Sumbawa was conquered by a Makassarese in the mid-1620s.65 Forces from Sumbawa assisted Goa during the Makassar War,66 and a large number of refugees, both Makassarese and Wajorese, fled to Sumbawa after the war. By the mid-1670s they were not only firmly established but had also begun exerting tremendous influence in that island's affairs and were presumably linked to the forced abdication of the Sumbawan ruler Karaeng Mas Goa.67

Following To Anko's death on Sumbawa, Abraham Franzson approached Tombo about her husband's debt. She claimed that his papers were with his Wajorese associate To Koa and refused to settle the debt in a friendly manner. Abraham Franzson therefore brought the matter before the VOC court. His case against Tombo was based on his claim that she possessed money that he had lent her husband. Because the court did not believe the plaintiff's statement that the sawī's loans amounted to

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63 This figure excludes the nineteen slaves which he sold in Batavia who, while very much a part of his business, were not business contacts.
64 While Karre Mangewai claimed that To Anko paid these expenses out of his profits from the sale of slaves, the court favored Abraham Franzson's testimony that To Anko paid them with part of the sawī vragtloons as they had agreed. Either way Abraham Franzson was to reimburse To Anko; but using the sawī's money is not in accordance with the spirit of Amanna Gappa's law code that states that a captain must have money to invest in the maintenance of the ship.
66 L. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka, p. 60.
67 Ibid, pp. 163-164.
408 rijksdaalders, and because To Anko had accrued numerous expenses on Abraham Franzson behalf, the plaintiff was unable to adequately substantiate a claim for more than 60 rijksdaalders. The court ruled that the defendant must reimburse him for that amount.

Had the Abraham Franzson and Tombo’s case been settled according to Wajorese custom as outlined in Amanna Gappa’s law code, the outcome might have been very different. Chapter 15 provides guidelines for what was to be done with the goods of a trader who died on a voyage. The main goal was to see to it that his heirs did not suffer damage. The prescribed policy was to sell the deceased person’s wares, record the profits, and place the receipt in the coffin with the deceased. If someone then used the deceased’s money for further business ventures that failed, that person was then bound to recompense the deceased’s family for the money lost. If the ventures were profitable, on the other hand, the gains were to be divided with the heirs. Apparently, nobody did these things on To Anko’s behalf; indeed, the VOC court did not believe Tombo that To Anko’s papers were with To Koa.

Amanna Gappa’s law code also provided guidelines for the division of property and debts in the event of a merchant’s death. Chapter 12 states that in such an event, the merchant’s family could only be held responsible for half of his debts. If the spirit of this principle had been applied in the VOC court, then Tombo would only have been required to pay 30 rijksdaalders. Indeed, according to Wajorese practices, Tombo might not have been liable for any of the money. Chapter 9 specifies that debts from a previous marriage are not be carried over into another marriage. Had the dispute been decided by the Wajorese matan, Tombo might have been excused on these grounds, because when she was brought to trial she was already in a new relationship and residing with a certain Karre Mangewai.

The commercial practices of a second Wajorese businessman appear in a different court case. The dispute between To Uti and Towaris exemplifies the difficulty of determining the length of time in which a loan was to be repaid that was one of the most problematic aspects of debt-credit relationships in Southeast Asia. To Uti, a Wajorese trader, lent 300 rijksdaalders to Diogo Towaris, a Makassarese burger, in the early 1710s in Batavia. No mention of interest was made, but it was agreed upon that To Uti would be able to transport goods back to Makassar on Towaris’ ship. According to To Uti, the loan was to be repaid within five months, but Towaris maintained that no time limit was set. Then, for

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reasons that do not appear in the court transcripts, Towaris was imprisoned for five months and was unable to complete his side of the bargain. According to To Uti, he sought Towaris out, presumably visiting him in prison. Since Towaris was unable to return the money or fulfill his side of the bargain, he promised to repay the 300 rijksdaalders with appropriate interest in Makassar. Towaris, on the other hand, reiterated his claim that he never agreed to repay the loan within five months.

The case of To Uti versus Towaris also shows how debts incurred in one part of the archipelago could be litigated in another part. Several years after the loan was made, the two met again in Makassar. Towaris then gave To Uti 100 or 120 rijksdaalders worth of goods (rasamala, a type of fragrant wood) and transferred to To Uti a debt of 30 rijksdaalders owed him by the Bugis To Minta. Believing that he was entitled to interest, To Uti considered this payment as part of the interest, and the Wajorese Amanna Tale and To Budaela supported this claim by testifying that they had seen Towaris pay To Uti 130 rijksdaalders 26-28 years before as part of the interest. Towaris, on the other hand, claimed that this payment was part of the principal. To Uti then further contended that the prosecutor\(^6\) Van der Anker (deceased at the time of the trial) agreed with him that Towaris should pay 100% interest. Although Wajorese Puanna Budu testified as to the prosecutor’s position, the court found that advocating such a high rate of interest was uncharacteristic of a prosecutor and dismissed the claim.

Towaris then went to Ternate, returning in 1724. When To Uti was again in Makassar in 1725, he went to Towaris’ house and met with his son Adriaan who, curiously enough, was not called on to testify. According to To Uti, he was offered nothing but excuses and pretexts to avoid payment of the debt and ended up being chased out of the house with a bamboo stick. According to Towaris, To Uti threatened Adriaan and asked that he tell his father to come to his house the next morning to settle the matter once and for all. Towaris testified that he was anxious to do this but that To Uti ran away, probably fearing that Towaris would complain about the bad way in which he had behaved. Towaris and To Uti then did meet again in 1741, but once again were unable to resolve their dispute. Following this, To Uti sued Towaris in 1742, arguing that since Towaris did not transport his goods from Batavia to Makassar as agreed, he no longer had the right to an interest-free loan. The court ruled in favor of the defendant.

\(^6\) The prosecutor (Fiskaal) was a core member of the Council that, together with the Governor General, was responsible for preserving order and administering justice within the VOC’s establishments. (John Ball, *Indonesian Legal History 1602-1848*, Sydney: Oughtershaw Press, 1982, p. 9.)
Although it ordered Towaris to repay the remaining 150 *rijksdaalders* of the original loan, he was not required to pay any interest, despite the length of the loan’s term. Furthermore, the court found that To Uti had intentionally misled it and ordered him to pay court costs.

The court transcripts also provide information concerning Dutch perceptions of the Wajoerese community. To understand these perceptions, it is important to consider the time frame. Whereas the loan was made in the 1710s, the suit was made in 1742, after the Wajoerese under La Maddukelleng had tried to expel the Dutch from South Sulawesi. The recent armed conflicts with the Wajoerese apparently influenced the court. The trial proceedings contain numerous disparaging descriptions of To Uti, such as unchristian. The Wajoerese witnesses Amanna Tale and To Budaela are even referred to as “vagrants and unbelieving enemies.” Indeed, no credence is given to the testimonies of any Wajoerese witnesses. The Wajoerese Puanana Budu’s testimony was dismissed on the grounds that no prosecutor would ever support such a high interest rate. As a result, To Uti was accused of trying to disgrace the name of a high-ranking person for personal gain. The court also took issue with the discrepancy between To Uti’s and Towaris’ recollections of the year in which the loan was originally made, 1712 and 1713, respectively. Even though the court acknowledged that misremembering a date was common among natives, it was concluded that nothing that To Uti said could be believed. The same argument was also used to disregard the testimonies of the Wajoerese witnesses Amanna Tale and To Budaela who located events within a time frame of 26 to 28 years ago. There is also a chronological irregularity in Towaris’ testimony, because he claimed to have returned to Makassar in 1715 and to have made a trip to Ternate from 1714 to 1724, but this discrepancy was not held against him. Towaris accused the Wajoerese witnesses of lying in order to help To Uti because they would receive part of the money he would win in the case. Whether the court believed this or not, they were clearly unsympathetic towards the cause of a Wajoerese businessman. The final verdict denied To Uti any interest, even the Dutch standard ¾% per annum.

The result of the case and the derogatory references to the Wajoerese made in court reflect social attitudes prevalent in Makassar about the Wajoerese. It appears that, at least in the eyes of the Dutch, a migratory lifestyle and opposition to the Dutch were characteristics that helped identify a Wajoerese ethnicity. The domicile of the litigants is emphasized at various points in the proceedings.
Towaris’ statement stressed that he had lived in his house ever since returning from Ternate, but that To Uti was an enemy of the state and had a horrible reputation. Furthermore, the court disparaged not only To Uti, but also Amanna Tale and To Budaela, the witnesses he called on his behalf, because they had no fixed domicile. Indeed, this was one of the reasons offered for dismissing Amanna Tale and To Budaela’s testimony. The implication is that people without fixed residence were not only of lower status, but also had fewer legal rights, which certainly would have complicated business for Wajorese migrants. Yet it appears that there must have been advantages to not having a permanent residence, too, such as fewer expenses, freedom of movement and the ability to take advantage of distant opportunities as they arose without having to worry about such matters as a fixed home or place of business. The irony of the negative attitude that the Dutch had towards migrants like the Wajorese is that the Dutch themselves were foreign merchants.

The Flowering of Wajorese Commerce

While the careers of To Anko and To Uti exemplify the commerce of Wajorese entrepreneurs who cooperated with members of other ethnic communities, there was also a significant sector of Wajorese commerce that did not involve outsiders. Indeed, there was a remarkable degree of pessé or solidarity among the Wajorese. Smout relates the story of a Wajorese who owed more than 20,000 rijksdaalders to a creditor in Makassar. When the debtor’s village was burned, and he lost everything, the Wajorese went together to the creditor and stood up for the unlucky man so that his credit would not suffer and eventually, the debt was repaid in full. Most stories of Wajorese cooperation, however, are lost. Because of trading restrictions that the Dutch attempted to impose and the Wajorese did their best to avoid, the records of much Wajorese commerce do not appear in the archives of the VOC. Thus as indigenous trade, including that of the Wajorese, expanded during the first half of the eighteenth century, it gradually came to threaten Dutch commercial enterprises in Makassar. While described in unfavorable terms in Dutch records, this threat actually represents a flowering of Wajorese commerce.

An important factor contributing to the rise of Wajorese commerce was a change in the balance of power in South Sulawesi. Both Dutch and Bugis records from the first quarter of the eighteenth century attest to the manner in which political instability within Boné weakened that

70 Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, ff. 246-247.
kingdom, and it no longer exerted the tremendous political influence over the rest of South Sulawesi that it had under Arung Palakka. Instead, there are Dutch references that describe Wajoq as “a mighty realm.”  

Furthermore, the records of the Wajorese matoa in Makassar state that “The king of Boné also said to the governor that the Wajorese were not slaves and neither was their country.” Governor Cops had made a similar statement before, but this time it was true.

Although he had considerable Dutch support and simultaneously held the office of both Ranreng Tua of Wajoq and Arumponé, Arung Palakka’s successor La Patauq was unable to maintain Arung Palakka’s effective rule over the various polities of South Sulawesi. In 1710 there was a war between Boné and Goa, caused primarily by the latter’s unwillingness to submit to the demands of the former. Boné still exerted considerable influence in Soppeng, however, and with Soppeng’s help, was able to defeat Goa. Boné also still exerted some influence in Wajoq during the 1710s, as is clearly illustrated by the flight of La Maddukelleng. (See Chapter Six.) Boné’s influence, however, declined further after La Patauq’s death.

La Patauq was succeeded by his daughter Batari Toja who reigned from 1714-1715, and again briefly in 1720, and yet again from 1724 until 1749. The non-continuous dates of her reign suggest political problems and instability, which were indeed prevalent in Boné at the time. In 1715 and 1720, Batari Toja resigned the government first to her half-brother La Padani Sajati who was deposed for tyranny, and then to another half-brother Sappuale Madanrang, who was similarly deposed. During her third reign, she tried to share the throne with her husband, but he tried to usurp her authority and, when this was discovered, was forced to flee. Significantly, Batari Toja was also at odds with the VOC over Bantaeng, and could therefore not depend on the same unfailing support from the Dutch as Arung Palakka had enjoyed. Furthermore, there were other contenders for Batari Toja’s throne, specifically

[71] Letter to Gov. Gen. van Swoll from Sipman, ff. 20-71, 24.10.1717, VOC 1894, f. 34.
[75] Despite Batari Toja’s explicit request that Boné’s special position with the company be maintained, (Letter from the ruler of Boné and Soppeng to Gov. Gen Durven, received 21.11.1729, VOC 2133, ff. 228-229) the Dutch felt it was unlikely that they could maintain such a good friendship with Boné as before because of the succession of rulers. (Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737,
Arung Tanété La Oddang and the Goan princess I Dernia Datu. (See Chapter Seven.) Her control over 
Boné therefore was nominal at best, and this being the case, she was in no position to extend her 
influence to the Wajorese. Thus by 1730 it appeared that the relative power of Wajoq and Boné had 
reversed. Wajoq had now regained a considerable amount of its strength whereas Boné, Wajoq’s 
former tormentor, was suffering from political turmoil. 76

In his Outgoing Report, Governor Sautijn stated explicitly how Boné’s decline helped facilitate 
the rise of Wajorese trade. He wrote that this benefited Wajorese trade:

When the Bonéan government was in its prime and not bastardized, this sort of thing (clandestine trade) 
did not usually happen, because if any Bugis or Wajorese should attempt it, the king of Boné knew how 
to discover the transgression, and the transgressors or adventurers were stripped of everything they had 
in the world, even their wives, children and slaves, and the king of Boné became master of these, which 
served as an example. 77

Yet as Sautijn lamented, those times were long since over, and he went on to point out that the VOC’s 
cloth trade had declined each year during his presence in Makassar. 78

Since the Dutch were unable to exert their authority in place of the Bonéans’, “illegal” trade 
flourished. Dutch officials, such as the harbormaster and the prosecutor, were charged with combating 
evasions of the VOC’s monopolies, but their attempts were futile. 79 “Illegal” trade was endemic; 
furthermore, it was highly profitable. Faced by this formidable combination, neither the VOC nor the 
burghers were able to compete effectively with Asian traders. 80 The Wajorese traded both within and 
without the Dutch system and therefore were able to take advantage of the same opportunities available 
to any traders. They also benefited from the special opportunities afforded to them by their own 
networks through which information was exchanged and commercial partnerships were established.

“Legal” trade required both obtaining a pass from the Dutch and the payment of outgoing and 
incoming tolls. Whereas Smout considered the Wajorese to be skilled and trustworthy merchants, 81 one 
of his predecessors had a very different opinion. Governor Gobius avoided giving passes to the Bugis in

VOC 2409, f. 183) It should be noted, however, that the Dutch provided Batari Toja with considerable 
support during the conflicts of the late 1730s. 76 In 1737, Governor Sautijn reported that during the past 25-30 years, Boné had declined into a weak 
state. (Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, f. 178)
77 Ibid, f. 244.
78 Ibid.
80 Ibid, p. 122.
general and "especially to the Bugis and the Wajoorese who were driven out of their homes by the
Boneaos, I refuse to give them passes unless there is a citizen who will faithfully guarantee that they'll
come back." Yet the Wajoorese were still able to obtain passes. Dutch shipping records from 1714
reveal that the Arung Matoa of Wajoq had his own ships for trade with Johor. In 1722, Wajoorese
captains figured prominently in the official non-VOC trade recorded in the harbor master's log to both
Java, 8 percent, and east and southeastern Kalimantan, 3.7 percent. Although there was a sharp
decline in official Wajoorese trade in Makassar during the period from 1722-1786, this does not
include the trade occurring outside Dutch purview.

Wajoorese merchants played a major role in the 'illegal' trade. The imports of this trade
consisted mainly of goods, particularly textiles, from the Straits of Melaka and Kalimantan. Exports
also included textiles and are likely to have included slaves and rice as well. Here again the Arung
Matoa appears to have participated. According to one lontaraq, La Saléwangeng himself led an
expedition to Java (or unspecified points west) in order to purchase firearms. So successful was the
Wajoorese trade that by 1715, the VOC's trade in textiles had declined as a result of Wajoorese imports.
Sautijn also noted that the VOC's cloth trade declined from year to year during his administration.

By the mid-eighteenth century, the declining trend in the VOC's textile trade had reached such
an alarming extent that an influential burger, J. H. Volt, was assigned to investigate. His report
provides a fascinating description of Wajoorese trading networks. He reports that Wajoorese traders
transported local textiles to Riau where they exchanged them for Spanish reals. They then proceeded to
Kedah and Selangor where they used the reals to pay for "English textiles," meaning Indian textiles
purchased from the English. They made excellent profits because of a higher exchange rate for reals in
these parts. They then brought these textiles to various places along the western coast of Sulawesi such

81 Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 259.
82 Memorie of Gov. Gobius for his successor van Arrewijne, 20.5.1728, VOC 2100, ff. 92-93.
84 Sutherland, "Trade in VOC Indonesia," p. 58.
85 Heather A. Sutherland and David S. Brée, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to the Study of
Indonesian Trade," in T. Ibrahim Alfian et al (eds.), Dari Babad dan Hikayat sampai Sejarah Kritis,
89 Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, f. 244.
as Mandar, Bacukiki, Soreang and Laboso or to any of a number of other places along the coast of Sulawesi that afforded them the opportunity to sail upstream. After reaching the furthest point inland possible, they then would transport the textiles overland to Wajoq. What they could not sell there they traded in other places eastwards, such as Ternate, all the time being careful to avoid Makassar and the Dutch.90 Thus, despite the aforementioned decline in Wajoqese participation in the "legal" trade of Makassar during the mid-eighteenth century, the Wajoqese traders were still competing effectively.91 Despite Dutch efforts to curb their trade, the Wajoqese were outperforming the VOC.

Chapter Conclusion

The Wajoqese outpost in Makassar was an extremely important community within the Wajoqese diaspora. First of all, the Wajoqese community was significant in terms of population. Although concrete statistical data are unavailable, La Side suggests that the largest community of Wajoqese emigrants was in Makassar.92 Secondly, Makassar’s proximity to Wajoq allowed for close relations with the homeland. Not only did it enable the Arung Matoa to visit Makassar and even construct a residence there, but it also enabled the Wajoqese community to assist the homeland when necessary. Thus the links between Kampung Wajoq in Makassar and Wajoq were very strong, perhaps even stronger than the links between Tosoana and the northern Wajoqese constituents of Pitumpanua.

While neither the Wajoqese in Makassar nor the Wajoqese in Pitumpanua were formally represented in the Arung Pattapulo, Makassar functioned as the logistical center of Wajoqese overseas enterprise during late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

It is as the logistical center of Wajoqese overseas enterprise that the Wajoqese community in Makassar played its most significant role within the Wajoqese diaspora. Immediately after the Makassar War, Wajoq itself was in many ways moribund. Arung Palakka’s decision to establish his capital at Cenrana and his construction of a fortress on an island in this river that enabled him to control traffic along this river restricted Wajoq’s foreign trade.93 No longer did Wajoq enjoy unhindered access by water to the Gulf of Boné and the world beyond. While there were also restrictions in

90 Report from J. H. Voll to Governor David Boelen, Makassar, 11.4.1768, VOC 3243, unpaginated, document 16.
91 Sutherland and Brée, “Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches,” pp. 397-400.
Makassar, this port city served as an outlet for Wajoese trade and as a center for overseas Wajoese commerce. It was in Makassar that the mataa of various overseas Wajoese communities met and a system of laws was codified in order to deal with commercial matters. When the obstructions in Wajo waned, Wajo reasserted itself as the center by launching a variety of commercial and financial campaigns as explained in Chapter Seven. Accordingly, Wajoese trading routes shifted away from Makassar as is apparent in the Vol report.

Despite its decline in importance as the logistical center of Wajoese overseas enterprise, the Wajoese community in Makassar retained their Wajoese identity. Furthermore, commercial, political and familial ties between Wajo and the Wajoese community in Makassar continued. This continuation is exemplified in the participation of Wajoese from Makassar in the attack on Béla around the turn of the nineteenth century.94 Thus, like other Wajoese communities within the diaspora, Kampong Wajo in Makassar remained part of Wajo.

Chapter 4

The Wajorese in Western Sumatra

The second community within the Wajorese diaspora to be examined is that of western Sumatra. Located on the extreme western edge of the Southeast Asian archipelago along a notoriously inhospitable coastline, this community of Wajorese settlers was the most isolated among overseas Wajorese communities. There was some contact between its members, the homeland and other Wajorese communities, but it was comparatively slight. Indeed, Amarna Gappa's code does not mention a single toponym in western Sumatra. Thus, while the Wajorese community in Makassar can still be seen as part of Wajoq, its commercial, emotional and familial ties to the center were weak.

As a result of both geography and the particular political climate, the Wajorese community here developed along radically different lines. In contrast to the Wajorese of Makassar, whose lifeblood was trade, the Wajorese and other Bugis in western Sumatra never traded enough to cause either the VOC or its English counterpart and competitor, the English East India Company (EIC), serious concern. Instead, it was here that the Wajorese most fully exploited their diplomatic skills.

The political climate in western Sumatra provided unique opportunities to immigrants. Two European companies competed for the same resources in this region but there was no coercive indigenous authority with which they could collaborate to obtain these resources. Consequently, the English imposed a system of forced pepper cultivation and sought to establish alternative local authority to effectuate it. It is within this context that the descendants of the Wajorese migrant Daeng Maruppa came to exert considerable influence serving the EIC as soldiers, intermediaries, surveyors and adjudicators. The brother of a leader in Wajoq, Daeng Maruppa married into the royal family of Inderapura. Five generations of his family played a leading role in the Bugis community in Bengkulu and the surrounding areas. Although this community consisted of both Wajorese and non-Wajorese elements, its leaders were of Wajorese origin. In 1808, the acting British resident W. B. Martin outlined their history and their relationship to the EIC. This comprehensive statement deserves quoting at length:

The Officers of this Corps [the Bugis Corps] are men of the first consideration and influence in Bencoolen whose families for a long series of years have been distinguished by their attachment and
fidelity to the Company's Government and whom it has been the invariable policy to employ in the capacity of intermediate Agents between the Government and the aboriginal inhabitants of the Country. The Ancestors of these families were Chiefs of some of the Eastern Islands who having fled from the persecutions and oppressions of the Dutch were invited by the English Government to settle at Bencoolen and were vested with an authority which was destined to counterbalance the ascendancy of the native Chieftains with whom they had no union of interest and whose conduct was therefore subject to considerable restraint from the interested vigilance of strangers who were supported by the whole weight of the Company's influence, and who foreigners were indebted for the consideration which they enjoyed exclusively to the countenance and favour of the English Government. Although their opposition of interests has long ceased to exist and successive inter-marriages have established an intimate connection and union between the heads of the respective families, yet the descendants of the Eastern chieftains still consider themselves as the Guardians of the Company's interest and pride themselves upon being employed as Agents of the Company on all occasions of difficulty and importance. The peculiar disposition, habits, manners, prejudices and customs of the natives render the employment of them in that capacity not only expedient but in many cases absolutely necessary to the successful issue of such arrangements as respect the internal Government of the Country, and especially of any changes in their established institutions, or of any alterations in the ancient privileges and modes of Government.

Martin's statement highlights a number of characteristic features about the Bugis community in western Sumatra, such as their flight from oppression in eastern Indonesia and their intermarriage with the Sumatrans. Martin also appropriately stresses the intermediary role that the Bugis played between the English Company and the inhabitants of Sumatra. Their role as intermediaries was not, however, limited to mediating between the Europeans and the Sumatrans. Daeng Maruppa's descendants also mediated between the various Asian migrants in western Sumatra, including Ambonese and Madurese. Furthermore, Martin's statement exaggerates their loyalty to the EIC. They actually looked out for their own best interests that, at times, were served best by working for the Europeans.

While there were Wajores and other Bugis in the service of the Dutch, they were not nearly as prominent as their counterparts serving the English. As such, the bulk of this chapter focuses on the family of Daeng Maruppa and the role of the Bugis in the activities of the EIC. Limited information about the Bugis in the service of the Dutch is also provided to underline the manner in which the presence of rival companies created opportunities for the Bugis and to help illustrate the living conditions of the Bugis in western Sumatra.

Map 3: Western Sumatra
The Political Geography of Western Sumatra

Situated on the extreme finge of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, Sumatra straddles the commercial worlds of India and Southeast Asia. Its eastern coast borders the Straits of Melaka and its southern coast the Straits of Sunda, thereby placing it along a route taken by travelers between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea since the early centuries before the Common Era. A chain of volcanic mountains runs along the entire length of the western coast. Known as Bukit Barisan, these mountains contain a variety of different ores, including gold, silver, copper and iron. On the eastern side of these mountains lie the Barisan highlands and the alluvial lowlands which consist of rich agricultural lands and tropical forests, respectively, that in places extend for 150 miles (240 kilometers). Numerous rivers flowing from the mountains to the Straits of Melaka link the highlands and plains to the coastal world to the east. On the western side, where the mountains run very close to the sea, the coastal plain is never wider than twenty miles (32 kilometers) and is non-existent along numerous stretches of considerable length. Replete with jungles, cliffs, narrow rivers and dangerous surf, the western coast is notoriously inhospitable. Thus, whereas the eastern coast has been at the heart of the Malay world from the days of Srivijaya, the western coast has been comparatively isolated.

The Minangkabau have long exerted considerable influence in western Sumatra. The Alam Minangkabau, or Minangkabau world, consists of both the inland region, which is known as the darat, and the outer regions and the coast, which are known together as the rantau. As Jane Drakard has shown, the rulers expressed their authority from the darat through language and royal signs. Although these means were dismissed by the Europeans as being mere verbiage, in actuality the Minangkabau rulers exerted considerable influence by their use. The darat received taxes and homage from rantau and exerted ritual and symbolic authority that was more important than coercive power.

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4 As Drakard points out, it is difficult to determine if the term Alam Minangkabau was already used in the seventeenth century. (Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 261.)

5 The darat consists of three districts known together as the Luhak nan Tigo, or Three Districts, which form the nucleus of the Alam Minangkabau. The Minangkabau in the highlands deliberately encouraged a fear and awe of this inland region called the darat in order to protect their gold mines. (Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 72; Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, pp. 104 and 119.)
Although the mobile and scattered communities of the Alam Minangkabau did not allow for a centralizing ruler, courts in the rantau still publicized their connections with the darat.\(^6\) While it appeared to seventeenth-century European observers that there was no clearly defined authority in southwestern Sumatra, in fact, authority was just expressed in terms that were difficult for Europeans to understand.

Western Sumatra exported a number of valuable commodities, including gold, camphor and pepper. Gold was of primary importance in the long term development of the coast’s commerce\(^7\) and the Minangkabau in the highlands deliberately encouraged a fear and awe of the darat in order to protect their mines.\(^8\) Camphor was also an important export from western Sumatra, most notably from Barus. Because of the high quality camphor exported from this kingdom, this resin is associated with its name and is known in Indonesia as kapur Barus.\(^9\) An imported crop, pepper cultivation probably began when navigation along Sumatra’s west coast increased during the mid-sixteenth century following Portuguese attacks in the Straits of Melaka. Until the seventeenth century, it was apparently confined to Inderapura where it facilitated that polity’s emergence as an independent sultanate.\(^10\)

Located on a flat, marshy area along the Airhaji and Batang Inderapura flood plains, Inderapura was well suited for pepper cultivation and it soon became the basis of Inderapura’s economy. Inderapura also consolidated friendly relations with regional powers such as Aceh and Banten through marriage alliances. Thus, by the mid-sixteenth century, Inderapura was economically and politically strong enough to resist Acehnese encroachment. Then in the seventeenth century, to avoid Acehenese interference, Inderapura shifted its commercial focus southwards, selling its pepper to Dutch and British traders at Banten and Silebar. It was not long, however, in 1633 when Aceh under Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) sent a punitive expedition into Inderapura because of the latter’s continued

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defiance. Inderapura was subdued but remained uncooperative, and when Aceh declined as a regional power in the mid-seventeenth century, Inderapura experienced a political and commercial resurgence.  

The demise of Aceh and the arrival of European powers in the region inaugurated a new era in the history of Inderapura. Whereas Acehnese policies had discouraged autochthonous political activity in order to better control the west coast's commerce, Dutch policies under the VOC Resident at Aceh, Johan Groenewegen, sought to support local authorities so as to minimize external interference. These circumstances gave ample opportunity for Raja Muzzaffar Syah to consolidate his authority in Inderapura and to designate his son Muhammad Syah as his successor. Assuming the title of sultan, Muhammad Syah did not accord the *menteri* (traditional ministers) their traditional position in the government and attempted to extend his control into Menjuto. He met with considerable resistance from both the *menteri* and from Raja Adil, the ruler of Menjuto. Muhammad Syah and his father thus sought assistance from the Dutch at Sallida. At the time, a number of west coast leaders were about to depart for Batavia to sign the Treaty of Painan that rejected Achenese suzerainty. The Muhammad Syah's son Mansur Syah joined the mission and signed this treaty on Inderapura's behalf. In his absence, Sultan Muhammad Syah and the *menteri* were appeased. Yet Raja Adil retained control of Menjuto and resisted Dutch attempts to reconcile him with Muhammad Syah. Instead, he forged a commercial and political alliance with Banten, and Menjuto prospered under his rule. When the Wajorese arrived in western Sumatra, there was still considerable discord between Sultan Muhammad Syah and Raja Adil. Eventually the Wajorese would capitalize on this conflict to advance their own position with the EIC.

**The Arrival of Daeng Maruppa**

The circumstances surrounding the arrival of Daeng Maruppa in Inderapura and his foundation of a Wajorese “dynasty” in western Sumatra are not entirely clear. Two different accounts have been published. The first appeared in “De familie Daing Mabell, volgens een Maleisch handschrift” (The

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13 Ibid, pp. 72-74.
14 Ibid, p. 74.
15 Ibid, p. 76.
Family of Daeng Mabela according to a Malay Manuscript.) 16 In this article, Winter provides a Dutch translation of Daeng Mabela’s 17 history of his own family, a copy of which was owned by the Pengeran of Belfimbing. The second account of the Wajorese at Inderapura appears in the Adatrechtbundels. 18 This second article by the Dutch commissioner O. L. Helfrich cites Winter, but differs in some of the details that it provides. These two articles are the only known sources pertaining to the arrival of the Wajorese pioneer Daeng Maruppa.

These accounts differ with respect to the exact origins of Daeng Maruppa. According to the tradition recorded by Helfrich, Daeng Maruppa was the brother of the ruler of Wajoq. 19 He fled out of shame after an attack on Tosora, sirig being a common motive for migration among the Bugis. He sailed without a particular destination, until his ship came by chance to Inderapura, where it was wrecked. Many of his followers drowned and the rest were imprisoned. Their goods were confiscated and they themselves were brought to the ruler of Inderapura to be his slaves. When Daeng Maruppa explained to the ruler who he was and what he had endured, the ruler gave him a position in his court and returned his people and possessions to him, purportedly out of gratitude to the Bugis traders who were already settled in his land. After Daeng Maruppa had served the ruler of Inderapura for a while, the latter adopted him and married him to his sister. 20 Winter’s account differs slightly in some of the details. It states that Daeng Maruppa was the brother of the ruler of the village Benteng, who attempted but failed to conquer Tosora. When Daeng Maruppa then suggested an aggressive tactic to attack Tosora, his brother rejected his advice, which led Daeng Maruppa to emigrate with his family. His original plan was to go to Java, but on the high seas, he changed his mind and decided to go to Bengkulu. A heavy storm, however, forced him to Inderapura, where he established himself with his family. 21

17 The author of this manuscript bears the same name as his great grandfather, Daeng Maruppa’s son.
19 There is no evidence in the Wajorese chronicles to support Daeng Maruppa’s claims of royal blood. (Lontarak Akkarungan (Wajoq) I; Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq.) His claims are likely to be a instance of inflating genealogy so as to impress the host society, a practice which was common among Bugis migrants. (See Chapter Eight.)
Neither document specifies a year, but it appears that Daeng Maruppa arrived in western Sumatra during the 1670s. Although the military defeat which preceded Daeng Maruppa’s departure is not specified, and Wajoese historical sources do not record an attack on Tosora by Benteng, the reference is presumably to the Makassar War or the subsequent attack on Tosora. Another detail that points to the 1670s is the birth and military service of Daeng Maruppa’s son Daeng Mabela. Daeng Maruppa married a sister of the Sultan of Inderapura and they had a son named Daeng Mabela a.k.a. Sultan Selan.22 Daeng Mabela’s brother Sultan Endey, presumably another son of Daeng Maruppa and the sultan’s sister, entered the service of the English East India Company as Chief Captain of the Bugis Corps in 1688.23 Presuming that he was a teenager at this time, this would date his birth between 1670 and 1675. The identity of Daeng Maruppa’s wife is similarly obscure. Helfrich’s account states that she was a sister of the ruler of Inderapura. Although no name is given, the ruler is referred to by the title “Tuwanku Sultan.” This is presumably a reference to Sultan Muhammad Syah. That Daeng Maruppa married the ruler’s sister is significant within the context of western Sumatra. Matrilineal traditions among the Minangkabau make marriage to the ruler’s sister an exceptionally high honor.

Helfrich’s account states that Daeng Mabela was raised alongside the Sultan of Inderapura’s own son, presumably Raja Mansur a.k.a. Sultan Mansur Syah (1691-1696). When Daeng Mabela was still young, Daeng Maruppa returned briefly to Wajo, leaving his wife and children behind. While Daeng Maruppa was away, the sultan of Inderapura died. In consideration of the fact that Daeng Mabela was raised alongside the sultan’s own son, the two were appointed as joint rulers of Inderapura. Their reign is remembered as a prosperous period for Inderapura, during which they were reputed for their fairness and wisdom.24 This joint reign is difficult to corroborate with other sources, especially since Raja Mansur did not rule Inderapura until after Daeng Mabela began serving the English. However, the idea that the Sultan’s sister’s son would assume an important position certainly resonates with western Sumatran society. Whether the relationship was consolidated by blood, marriage or

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22 Sultan Selan does not appear to be an indigenous title. Rather, as Daeng Mabela later informed the Dutch, it was given to him by the English. (Malay letter from Daeng Mabela, head of the Bugis in Bengkulu, to Batavia, received 3.8.1719, VOC 1926, f. 121)
23 Ball, Indonesian Legal History, pp. 26-27.
milk, it exemplifies the manner in which the Wajoese often tried to secure their position in their new homeland by establishing family relations with prominent members of the host community.

Family connections on the Wajoese side were also important. When Wajoese traders learned that Daeng Maruppa had established himself in Inderapura and that he was well respected there, the trade between Wajoq and Inderapura increased. According to tradition, the ruler of Wajoq was devoted to his brother and sent gifts and letters. Although this trade could have by-passed Makassar, it is unlikely to have been of great significance as Inderapura is not mentioned in Amanna Gappa’s law code. Yet it is clear, however, that the Wajoese did conduct some profitable trade in western Sumatra, where they had detailed knowledge of local conditions. According to British records, the Wajoese, specifically Sultan Endey, were regarded with “the greatest awe upon the natives as best acquainted with the country and [were] able to pierce [penetrate] it when Europeans cannot.” Indeed, the EIC from the outset became extremely dependent upon the Wajoese community under Daeng Maruppa and his family because of the latter’s knowledge and experience with local circumstances, and because of the EIC’s lack of adequate manpower.

Sultan Endey, Daeng Mabela and the Bugis in the Service of the EIC

Political instability during the last quarter of the seventeenth century created opportunities for the Wajoese. Aside from the aforementioned conflict between Inderapura and Menjuto, there were changes in the government of the Minangkabau. Polities on the west coast which had previously been under Acehnese influence voluntarily revived their ties with the Minangkabau darat, the prestige of which increased as a result of unwittingly-made Dutch compliments. The threat of Dutch encroachment also loomed menacingly on the horizon and facilitated the process by which the EIC obtained invitations from local chiefs to establish a settlement in western Sumatra. Thereafter, there

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25 The fact that Daeng Mabela was raised alongside the Sultan of Inderapura’s son suggests that they may have shared a wet nurse.
27 See Chapter Two.
28 SFR, Volume 3, York Fort Diary and Consultations Book, June 1695 to February 1696, f. 28.
29 On changes in Minangkabau politics during the late seventeenth century, see Drakard, Kingdom of Words, pp. 126-127; Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 66; and Leonard Y. Andaya, “Unravelling Minangkabau Ethnicity,” Itinerario, Vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 28-36.
were rival European interests in western Sumatra. The Dutch and the English competed for the same natural and human resources while the local powers struggled to maintain their authority. The rivalries created opportunities for migrants which the Wajoese readily exploited. Eventually, the Wajoese came to fill an intermediary position between the English and the Sumatrans.

Having been expelled from Banten in 1682, the English sought an alternative settlement from which to maintain their participation in the Southeast Asian pepper trade. Their plans to establish a fortified settlement at Aceh and Pariaman had been foiled by the objections of the Acehnese Queen Zakiatud-Din Inayat Shah (r. 1678-1688) as well as by the VOC's reestablishment of its settlement at Pariaman. The English therefore accepted in 1685 a last minute invitation to establish an outpost in Bengkulu from the chiefs of Bengkulu, anxious to safeguard their realm from Dutch encroachment. With this outpost the English could control the export of Silebar's pepper. That same year they also signed an agreement with Sultan Muhammad Syah of Inderapura who sought their help to reestablish his authority in Menjuto.

Almost immediately, the English encountered difficulties because the local chiefs lacked strong leadership to prevent the numerous rebellions that arose from the unstable political situation in western Sumatra. The English therefore sought a mediator to reside at Bengkulu and help them establish an alternative authority. English archives relate how they extended an invitation to an influential individual in Inderapura known only by his title, Orangkaya Lela, but that Daeng Marappa arrived instead. Accompanied by a force of Bugis and Ambonese troops, he restored order to the area and thereafter his family gained influence in Bengkulu. Then in 1688, Daeng Mabela's brother Sultan Endey entered the EIC's service as "Chief Captain" of the Bugis corps. This specially constituted body of Bugis troops served the East India Company as guards, soldiers and explorers, and eventually came to play a very important role. Sultan Endey then went to Menjuto to persuade his brother Daeng Mabela to join him in this enterprise. In time Daeng Mabela replaced his brother as Captain of the

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33 Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Inderapura Sultanate," p. 77; Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, p. 129.
35 British records assert that Sultan Endey and Sultan Selan were serving the Dutch prior to the British, (Letter Hamon Gibbon (in Inderapura) to Benjamin Bloom and Council in Bengkulu, 1689, SFR Vol. 2,
Bugis and assumed the title Sultan Selan. According to Helfrich's account, however, the English Company wrote directly to Daeng Mabela and asked him to fill this position. The ministers of Inderapura gave Daeng Mabela their blessings to go see the English, on the condition that he return as quickly as possible. After restoring order in Bengkulu, Daeng Mabela returned to Inderapura, but the English East India Company persuaded him to go once again to Bengkulu and enter their service. Certain details of this arrangement are recorded in Daeng Mabela's family history. According to this account there was a formal contract, as well as an arrangement that the Bugis contingent serve as the first line of defense in the event of an attack by an inland enemy. However, if an enemy attacked from the sea, the Bugis were to serve as the rear guard.

Sultan Endey and Daeng Mabela, a.k.a. Sultan Selan, served the EIC in a wide variety of capacities extending beyond their formal role as captains of the Bugis Corps. Sultan Endey sold a house to the EIC and provided passage to the Deputy Governor on his boat. The EIC held him in great esteem and in at least one instance requested his testimony when determining the guilt or innocence of a European, who was in this case accused of robbing a sloop. By 1696, the English Company had grown extremely dependent on Sultan Endey and found it “almost impossible to carry on our affairs here and more especially at Trijamong without him.” Like his brother, Daeng Mabela served the EIC in a variety of important positions. Sultan Selan is also referred to as “the King of the Buggesses” and appears to have commanded considerable loyalty from his Bugis followers. He was accepted as the EIC's representative by local rulers. He was asked both to call upon local leaders for a public discussion (bicarao) and to encourage pepper cultivation among the Sumatrans.

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ff. 42-43. Although the Dutch in western Sumatra certainly employed Bugis at this time, confirmation of Sultan Selan and Sultan Endey's service is not conspicuous in the Dutch records. Furthermore, their service with the VOC is not mentioned in the Malay language family history translated by Winter.

37 Winter, “De familie Daing Mabella,” p. 117.
38 Diary and Consultations, Fort York, 30.1.1695/6, SFR Vol. 3, f. 229.
41 Diary and Consultations, 8.7.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 27.
43 Letter from Dato Rajah Quasso to Joseph Collet, received 16.9.1712, SFR Vol. 8, f. 54.
44 Diary and Consultations, 10.8.1702, f. 133. (The volume in which this document is contained is not clearly noted in the CRL's copy of the SFR, yet it is presumably vol. 5.)

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While Sultan Selan was deeply involved in affairs in western Sumatra, his interests and connections extended to other parts of the archipelago. He traveled personally to Sulawesi in order to recruit soldiers, who, given his own origins, were probably Wajorese. Whether or not he did this at the request of the EIC is unknown, but the EIC did ask “the Sultan of the Bugge[s]es] to send for bugs: from Java . . .”\(^47\) Although the request was withdrawn, the connection between the Wajorese or other Bugis communities on Java and in western Sumatra is documented by English reports of Bugis arriving from Batavia in 1695.\(^48\) Given Daeng Maruppa’s original intention of settling there, the existence of such connections with Java is not surprising. In the eighteenth century a certain Daeng Mabela, who may or may not have been Sultan Selan, later served the VOC on Java, as will be described below. Thus it appears that, while more isolated than Wajorese communities in other areas, the Wajorese in western Sumatra still maintained contacts with Wajorese elsewhere. These contacts not only served their own interests such as commerce but also facilitated European recruitment of soldiers.

The need for Bugis recruits stemmed in part from a shortage of Europeans. Despite the numerous pleas of the EIC agents in western Sumatra, the EIC was never able to send as many Europeans as they requested. Among those it did send, there was a great deal of illness and a high mortality rate. Bugis personnel were thus sought to fill the ranks. That the Bugis came to assume a particularly influential position within the English administration is due as much to the EIC’s imperfect understanding of indigenous politics and their desire to force their commercial and concomitant agricultural goals upon the locals as to the personal abilities of the Bugis leaders.

As is typical of European chartered companies, the EIC’s primary aim was commerce, and they wished to limit their involvement in local affairs. Yet the EIC did see it fit to involve itself in local politics insofar as was necessary to maintain peace in the pepper-producing areas. This involvement, however, was based on a faulty understanding of the power structure in western Sumatra. Much of the population of western Sumatra was organized into fairly independent tribal communities, the members of which submitted voluntarily to their leaders. If the leaders were oppressive, they would lose their


\(^{47}\) Letter to Joseph Marshall at Silebar from Richard Watts et al at Fort York, 28.1.1703. (The volume in which this document is contained is not clearly noted in the CRL’s copy of the SFR, yet it is presumably vol. 4.)
followers. Not understanding that the heads of these communities did not have sufficient authority to enforce control of the land and manpower needed for enforced pepper cultivation, Europeans in western Sumatra attributed the local leaders' lack of coercive power to personal weakness. Consequently, the English sought to establish alternative local authority. Believing that the Bugis were more trustworthy and capable than the local leaders, the English asked them to assume increasingly important mediating, surveying and adjudicating duties. It is within this context that the descendants of Daeng Maruppa eventually came to exert considerable influence.

European attempts to establish control in pepper producing areas resulted in considerable interference in indigenous politics. This is perhaps best exemplified by the case of Anak Sungai. Anak Sungai consisted of the Menjuto and Airdikit flood plains and Mukomuko. Indigenous historical documents trace the origins of Anak Sungai's first sultan to the Minangkabau capital Pagarruyung. The area was theoretically organized and administered according to Minangkabau traditions, and so the ruler and chiefs were considered to be the guardians of customary law. Originally a subordinate region of Inderapura, Anak Sungai emerged as an independent sultanate in 1691 under Raja Adil. He died later the same year and was succeeded by the young Sultan Gulemat (1691-1716). Wanting to ensure peaceful trading conditions, the British were instrumental in establishing the new sultanate's governmental framework. Yet despite, or perhaps because of, British tutelage, the Sultan maintained only superficial authority that did not differ significantly from the influence of traditional leaders in the region farther south. When chiefs in Anak Sungai tried to assume new duties in order to meet the quotas of the compulsory cultivation agreements that the British made with Sultan Gulemat, their followers objected and withdrew their support, thereby disturbing the power structure. The new sultanate appears to have been in an almost continuous state of unrest.

It was during a civil war in Anak Sungai that the Bugis Corps first made itself indispensable to the EIC. The war in Anak Sungai stemmed largely from an institutional conflict between two forms of traditional authority: one maintained by the Sultan and the other by the Bugis Corps.

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49 Diary and Consultations, 1.8.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 51.
50 Ball, *Indonesian Legal History*, p. 6.
52 Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Inderapura Sultanate," pp. 81-82.
government, represented by opposing succession principles. Favoring local traditions of symbolically expressed spiritual authority and fearing the assertive tendencies of the sultan, the ministers at Menjuto supported strict matrilineal succession. In contrast, Sultan Gulemat supported patrilineal succession. This dispute led to political unrest that plagued the region for a number of years. Eventually, when this unrest disturbed the pepper trade, the English launched a military offense in which the Bugis proved themselves invaluable allies.

The immediate cause for direct English involvement in the conflict was a 1713 report from the resident at Bantal stating that political troubles were interfering with the pepper trade. The British Deputy Governor Joseph Collet, who generally followed a strict policy of non-involvement in local affairs, felt justified into promoting war "with the utmost vigour..." He then sent reinforcements in the form of a Bugis contingent and three ships to Bantal and helped Sultan Gulemat retake Mukomuko and Menjuto. The Bugis contingent was absolutely essential to this expedition. Indeed, Collet remarked that "we could not have made the Bantall Expedition without them." Clearly Bugis soldiers constituted an important military force. Their services were a valuable commodity for which both Sumatran rulers and European companies were willing to pay. During the political turmoil of the late 1680s, Sultan Muhammad Syah asked the English to advance several hundred dollars, which he promised to repay, to Sultan Endey for his maintenance. A century later, the Tengku Panglima, Raja Tuan, also paid for the maintenance of a Bugis force himself. Similarly, when the English recruited Bugis soldiers in the 1680s, the Dutch raised the pay of those in their service at Air Haji in order to retain their services. Such a pay increase is remarkable in the context of the

56 Harfield, *Bencoolen*, p. 66.
57 Letter from Sultan Muhammad Syah to Hamon Gibbon, received 12.10.1689, SFR Vol. 2, f. 39. His desire to retain Sultan Endey's service, and his belief that the English would assist, stemmed from the usefulness of the Bugis in expelling the Dutch.
VOC, which did not raise the basic pay of its common sailors from 1602 until 1799. By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, an experienced reserve officer in the service of the VOC could earn eight rijksdaalders a month; this was the same amount that was paid to the head of the Bugis corps. It should be noted, however, that Sultan Endey himself served the EIC for years without being paid.

When, in 1695, he applied to the British for a license to trade pepper in lieu of his salary, the request was denied. Recognizing the importance of his services, the EIC planned to give him valuable presents in an attempt to "smooth him up" and retain his loyalty. Whether or not the gifts were made, Sultan Selan and Sultan Endey later complained that it was disgraceful to receive pay from the EIC. Presumably this complaint stemmed from their desire to receive a pepper license instead of a salary.

Apparently, however, it was common for the EIC to award presents to loyal Bugis soldiers. Later the same year a present was made to the "Sergeant of the bugresses" in order to reward his diligence and fidelity and to encourage similar loyalty among others. Despite the long period that Sultan Endey served without pay, salaries were eventually provided for him and the other Bugis. Indeed, Sultan Selan's wife was even able to obtain an advance on her husband's salary for her own maintenance in 1699. So essential was remuneration that Bugis soldiers threatened to leave the EIC's service if they were not paid in silver.

Despite the services that Daeng Maruppa's family provided for the English East Indian Company, it would be a mistake to assume that they were steadily faithful allies. Rather, the Bugis

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62 Diary and Consultations, 27.6.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 14. About a decade later, however, an arrack license was sold to a certain "Inche Zelone," presumably none other than Sultan Selan. (Diary and Consultations, 14.8.1704, SFR Vol. 5, f. 11 of Beccoolen Diary.)
63 Diary and Consultations, 8.7.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 27.
64 Diary and Consultations, illegible date.8.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 66.
65 Diary and Consultations, 17.10.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 143.
66 Letter from Robert Broughton at Fort York to Nathaniel Eyton et al at Triamong, 9.5.1699, unpaginated. (The volume in which this document is contained is not clearly noted in the CRL's copy of the SFR, yet it is presumably vol. 4.) While this presumably appeared odd to the EIC officials, it was not unusual within the context of Sumatra where women were central to the domestic economy. (Barbara Watson Andaya, "Women and Economic Change: The Pepper Trade in Pre-Modern Southeast Asia," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, 38, 2 (1995), p. 172.) Unfortunately there is no information available as to the origins of Sultan Selan's wife.
community looked out for its own best interests. In the early years of the British establishment in western Sumatra, there were instances of combined Bugis, Makassarese and Dutch attacks on British settlements. Furthermore, the well-manned Bugis contingent at Inderapura was found to “very much impede and hinder the commerce and trade of this place so neither great or small proas can come in or go out of the river with provisions et cetera but they immediately seize and make prize of that which strikes amazements into their tembourous people.” There were also complaints regarding the Bugis who were actually in the service of the English company. The English sometimes found the Bugis to be unreliable and neglectful of their duties. For example, in 1712, half of Sultan Selan’s men were on watch, but only one was awake, which the English found negligent. British factors also complained that the Bugis making “embroyls with the Countery People.” A letter to the Court of Directors from factors in western Sumatra suggests that even in instances where the Bugis seem to have cooperated very closely with the English, they still put their own interests first.

The Buggeses both here and att the Northward continually making Partys in the Country Government purely to put your Hon to the expense of employing many ordinary men as the expedition requires, and then instead of executing our ordres, they take bribes [from] the country people, declare our intentions to them, and so keep us in constant embroils, which certainly is detrimental to your Hon Interest.

There were also several instances of Bugis murdering Europeans, including the English resident at Silebar.

Not surprisingly, then, the British began to debate the wisdom of maintaining Bugis forces. The British at York Fort weighed the costs of maintaining Bugis soldiers compared to their trustworthiness and found “them rather dangerous than usefull . . .” In 1712, the English under Deputy Governor Collet initiated a secret plan to reduce the number of Bugis soldiers by allowing them to die off without replacing them. Yet the plan was not effectively pursued. Although he continued to

69 Letter from Hamon Gibbon at Inderapura, 7.11.1687, SFR Vol. 1, f. 48.
71 Letter from John Daniell and John Hunter, York Fort, 6 February 1711/12, f. 91, SFR Vol. 7.
72 Letter from John Daniell and John Nunler at York Fort, 4 February 1711/12, f. 36v, SFR Vol. 8.
73 Harfield, Bencoolen, pp. 34, 37.
74 Letter from Jospeh Collet et al at York Fort to the Court of Directors, 22.10.1712, SFR Vol. 8, f. 86 verso.
75 Harfield, Bencoolen, pp. 53-54.
distrust them, in 1714, Collet wrote that "... The Buggesses ... are necessary and will always be so."

The overriding opinion was that Bugis soldiers were necessary for the safety of British establishments. Despite orders from Fort St. George in Madras, the Council at York Fort refused "to reduce the number of their soldiers, not being willing, as they said, to have their throats cut." Thus the Bugis, and Daeng Maruppa's descendants in particular, continued to play important roles within the EIC's establishments in western Sumatra.

Daeng Maruppa's family's prominence within the EIC did not hinder them from serving its adversaries, both European and Asian. When the English temporarily evacuated Bengkulu in 1719, Daeng Mabela immediately offered his services to the Dutch company. He apparently entered the VOC's service and departed for Java while his son Daeng Makkulle, grandson Daeng Maruppa and great-grandson Daeng Mabela a.k.a. Oenoes a.k.a. Raja Bangsawan continued to serve the EIC.

The EIC's evacuation of western Sumatra in 1719 was preceded by a deterioration in the condition of its military force and in the quality of relations with local rulers. Its immediate catalyst was an insurrection resulting from a dispute between the dipati (village head) of Bentiring, a hamlet located six miles from Bengkulu on the Bengkulu River, and a Chinese community leader who raised sugar and distilled alcohol nearby. When the Kapitan China killed some of the Dipati's buffaloes that had wandered into his sugar plantation, the Dipati's brother, avenged the loss by killing one of the Kapitan China's slaves. When this was reported to the commander he sent five Bugis soldiers to apprehend the murderer who then was made to sit in shackles. Although he was set free after two or three days, the Dipati viewed this imprisonment as an insult and set fire to the sugar mills of both the EIC and the Chinese Captain. The English then sent a contingent of 20 European and 50 Bugis soldiers to attack Bentiring, but they retreated to Bengkulu after only three hours. A number of local leaders who had previously sided with the EIC then joined the Dipati of Bentiring and launched a counterattack on Fort Marlborough. The English, unable to defend themselves, withdrew from Bengkulu.

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76 Ibid, p. 66.
77 F. C. Danvers, "The English Connection with Sumatra," *The Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 1, 1886, p. 418. This source is ambiguous regarding the type of soldier.
In this conflict, the Bugis sided with the Dipati of Bentiring. Daeng Mabelè and his followers tried to provide the Sumatrans with guns, powder, bullets and money, and lost the trust of the English in the process. Daeng Mabelè then wrote to the Dutch in Batavia, and informed them of these events. He offered his services to the VOC and referred to himself throughout the letter as “your High Honors’ servant.” He also demonstrated the flexibility of overseas Bugis allegiance by writing:

Next to God, the highest is the Company and the Governor together with the Council at Batavia with whom I take refuge and to whom I have given my life because whom else could I serve? According to me and the opinion of all the Bugis in Bengkulu, we do not have any other ruler besides the company in Batavia. In the land of the Bugis, our king is our ruler, but overseas the Company is our ruler.

Daeng Mabelè and his followers’ willingness to switch allegiance and serve the EIC’s arch rival exemplifies their adaptability and resourcefulness. They were not loyal to the EIC as an institution. Rather, not unlike communities in South Sulawesi, they sided with the power with whom they believed their best interests lay.

Daeng Mabelè’s letter to the VOC is also of interest because it provides a rare first-hand description of the Bugis community in western Sumatra. At the end of his letter, Daeng Mabelè makes a point of introducing himself and his three captains, Karaeng Biasa, Bapa Opu and Lokéya. He also states that he and his captains have about 120 followers, 80 in Bengkulu and 40 in Silebar. Furthermore, from Bapa Opu’s full name, “bapaope Zumbawan,” it appears that Bapa Opu had ties with Sumbawa or Bugis communities there. The English in western Sumatra are known to have employed soldiers from Sumbawa and these were, of course, categorized under the general rubric of Bugis. While the sources do not reveal further information about links between the Wajorese communities in Sumbawa and western Sumatra, Bapa Opu’s name and the recruitment of Bugis soldiers from Sumbawa attest to this community’s position within the Wajorese diaspora.

Daeng Mabelè and the Bugis in the Service of the VOC

The VOC’s response to Daeng Mabelè’s offer is not apparent in the records, but a certain Daeng Mabelè later served the VOC in Java as a regimental commander in Semarang. He assisted the

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80 Letter from Daeng Mabelè to the Dutch in Batavia, received 3.8.1719, VOC 1926, SWK f. 119.
81 Ibid, f. 120.
82 Ibid, f. 122.
83 Letter from Josia Child at the East India House to the Council at Priaman, 26.6.1686, SFR Vol. 2, f. 60.
Dutch in the rebellion of the Chinese in 1740 by leading a company of 164 Makassarese and was wounded in an attack on 21 October 1740. His participation is recorded in the Syair Kompeni Belanda Berperang dengan Cina, a Malay epic poem about the conflict. In June 1741, he fought in the rebellion at Semarang. He also appears to have served the Temmengong of Demak Wiera Lestra. It is difficult to definitively conclude that the Daeng Mabel in Java was the same Daeng Mabéla who offered his services to the Dutch after the English fled from Sumatra. If so, then he would have had to have been more than sixty years old in 1741. Although this is an unlikely age for a soldier, Daeng Mabéla is said to have reached the age of 80, thus it is possible that he did indeed serve the VOC from 1719 until 1741. In a society where the average life span was short and elders were revered, such longevity, or even the legend of such longevity, is considered the mark of an individual in possession of particular powers, status and integrity.

Daeng Mabéla aside, there were certainly many Bugis soldiers in the service of the VOC in western Sumatra. They did not, however, come to assume as important a role within the Dutch administration as within the English administration primarily because the former never espoused the policy of forced cultivation that required extensive mediation with the local leaders and cultivators. Nevertheless, they comprised an important section of the VOC’s military establishment that, like its English counterpart, was perpetually short of manpower. By some estimates, actual Bugis constituted more than half of the VOC’s force on the west coast of Sumatra. They were well respected as soldiers, and the Dutch in western Sumatra asked Batavia to send more recruits from Sulawesi. Bugis generally do not appear by name in the Dutch records, except when they have done something exceptional, such as apprehend salt smugglers or fight a duel. Even in these instances, the precise

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84 Dagregister van het gepasseerde in den optocht van de Compagnies krijgsmacht, onder kaptein Jan George Crummel, Verzameling van verscheide echte stukken, van Batavia herwaards gezonden: concebreerende den opstand der Chinezen . . ., n. p., circa 1741, pp. 32, 43.
87 Letter from Demaks Eerste Regent Tommoegong Wiera Lestra aan d’ Inlandse Capitains Daing Mabéla en Inje Boeijong, 5.11.1741, VOC 2548, f. 1787.
ethnic origins of the soldiers usually cannot be identified. Only in rare instances does a name like “To Ani Témé” or “To Wajoq Wajoq” clearly identify an individual as Wajorese.90 However, a number of episodes about Bugis soldiers recorded in the VOC archives can help illustrate the nature of their community.

The presence of two rival companies on the west coast of Sumatra often worked to the advantage of Bugis soldiers who were dissatisfied with their employer, or were otherwise threatened. On numerous occasions, there were Bugis soldiers who deserted from the English company’s service and fled to Dutch controlled areas, as well as vice versa. In many cases, this was because they had accumulated debts which they were unable to pay.91

The story of a group of Bugis deserters from the EIC illustrates the suspicion in which their employers often held them, as well as the sort of opportunities available to migrants in western Sumatra. In 1718, a Bugis captain named Silvius, a.k.a. Anthony, a sergeant, two corporals and five soldiers, together with five women, deserted the English Company and fled to Padang.92 The English resident at Bantal had threatened the Bugis captain with imprisonment if he did not capture one of the mightiest penghulu of Menjuto. The Bugis captain did not feel capable of carrying out this task which had tremendous potential for causing him siriq. Thus the captain, who also was suspected of conspiring with Sultan Gulemat and Raja Mansor93, then deserted. Some of those accompanying him then settled in Sungai Pisang, about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) south of Padang, where they fished and grew, among other things, rice. The sergeant and one of the corporals also requested passage to Batavia, but this was denied and they were rumored to have gone southwards with the intention of traveling over land to Jambi and Palembang. A number of the others were rumored to have enlisted as sailors.94

92 Two of the fourteen, it later appeared, were Malays. (Letter to Gov. Gen. van Swoll in Batavia from A. Patras et al in Padang, 13.12.1718, VOC 1911, SWK I, f. 35.)
Another story illustrates the mistrust that the Dutch had of the Bugis despite their dependence on them. On a voyage from Batavia to Nias and Barus in September 1727, the second mate Barnevelt left seven Bugis VOC employees stranded on Nias. He justified abandoning them because he suspected them of conspiring against the VOC. Fearing for his safety and that of the ship, Barnevelt left the Bugis behind and sailed away. The Bugis remained on Nias until April of the following year at which point they returned to Padang on a local boat with all of their weapons. When examined, the Bugis said that Barnevelt had treated them badly. Although such treatment presumably caused them sirig, they maintained that even despite this mistreatment it had not been their intention to desert the VOC’s service. Since they had returned on their own, and missed their salary during their absence, Graswinkel suggested that no disciplinary action be taken against them. The VOC was not in a position to refuse the service of demonstrably loyal Bugis soldiers.

It is also clear from Dutch records that Bugis soldiers suffered from homesickness, just as their European counterparts did. A letter from the Bugis Lieutenant Panganting reported that his reserve officer and sergeants complained about being away from their women and children and that Bugis soldiers daily came to him weeping from homesickness. He requested a written reply from the Dutch as to whether or not they might be permitted furloughs. Given the early date of this letter, 1690, it is likely that Lieutenant Panganting and his subordinates were themselves migrants. Their request testifies to the strength of relations between the Bugis in western Sumatra and their families elsewhere.

Daeng Mabela’s Descendants and Their Legacy

Whereas Daeng Mabela served the VOC, Daeng Makkulé, and his son and grandson in turn, continued the legacy of serving the EIC. After the English returned to western Sumatra in 1720 or 1721, they renewed their efforts to implement alternative systems of local authority. As they tried to force pepper cultivation among the Sumatrans, they found it increasingly necessary to meddle with local

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95 Extract of the journal kept by Willem Barnevelt, 17.9.1727-20.9.1727, VOC 2074, SWK II, ff. 149-155.
96 Letter to E. Buijck and Board from H. Graswinkel in Padang, 23.7.1728, VOC 2101, SWK II, f. 150.
97 Letter to E. Buijck and Board from H. Graswinkel in Padang, 14.5.1728, VOC 2101, SWK II, f. 149.
98 Letter to E. Buijck and Board from H. Graswinkel in Padang, 23.7.1728, VOC 2101, SWK II, f. 151.
99 Letter from Lieutenant Panganting et al in Bantajin etc., to Jacob Snickers at Pulau Chincio, recorded 8.1.1690, VOC 1462, f. 483 verso.
100 Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency, p. 39.
administrative and judicial systems. The Wajorese participated in all of these endeavors up into the
nineteenth century.

Daeng Makkulle rose to exceptional prominence in western Sumatra. His and his family's
good relations with the local rulers enabled him to marry the daughter of Pangeran Mangku Raja of
Sungai Lemau, who publicly recognized Daeng Makkulle as his own son. The Pangeran of Sungai
Lemau and the Pangeran of Silebar agreed to make Daeng Makkulle head, or penghulu, of all non-
European foreigners from Ujung Pulu to Sungai Lemau. Daeng Makkulle also came to exert judicial authority within the English settlements. Since
early on, the EIC had tried to involve local leaders in the administration of justice. In 1710 the acting
Deputy Governor Robert Skingle created a court, consisting of four datok, the Captain of the Bugis
and the Captain of the Chinese, to settle legal questions among the locals. At the time, however, it had
met with considerable resistance because it deprived the pengeran of their judicial privileges, and it was
disbanded. The British continued, however, to intervene in disputes between the various pengeran,
as well as in other disputes when the Sumatrans requested their arbitration. After returning to
western Sumatra, the British once again tried to establish a court. They asked Daeng Makkulle to
appoint four datok to represent the four districts of Bengkulu. These four datok were given judiciary
powers to settle any disputes arising between the residents in these four districts. In the event that they
were unable to settle a dispute among themselves, Daeng Makkulle was asked to intervene personally.

102 "that part of the country between Bencoolen River and the Sea within the Country of Tanjong
Augong and a depth of the Seashore bearing the name Tappa Tuddah, situated between Mount
Edgecomb and Muaro Duo" H. R. Lewis, "A Commentative Digest of the Laws of the Natives of that
part of the Coast of Sumatra, immediately dependent on the Settlement of Fort Marlborough and
282.
103 Ball, Indonesian Legal History, p. 27.
104 Winter, "De familie Daing Mabella," p. 118.
105 Although unspecified in the source, this was almost certainly Daeng Mabela.
106 Ball, Indonesian Legal History, pp. 39, 43; Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran
Presidency, p. 100.
107 Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency, p. 100.
If the case was still unable to be resolved, it was referred to the pengeran of Balai Buntar, and finally to the EIC. Although Daeng Makkulé and the EIC would not have been involved in all of the disputes, the hierarchy of appeals nevertheless established an important precedent of both the Bugis captain’s and the EIC’s mutual involvement in the local judicial system.

The imposition of the EIC’s judicial authority went hand in hand with the expansion of its system of enforced pepper cultivation. As it became blatantly obvious that the local leaders did not have sufficient authority to coerce their followers into doing arduous labor for only nominal remuneration, the EIC tried to create the requisite authority by superimposing their legal system upon that of the indigenous people. This interference was based solely on custom rather than on any formal legal privilege, yet it still undermined indigenous authority. Ultimately the EIC’s policy of preserving traditional rights and native institutions was irreconcilable with its economic exigencies.

To carry out its enforced cultivation system, the EIC employed Bugis soldiers to supervise cultivation in the pepper-producing areas. This practice dated from at least the second quarter of the eighteenth century. The English thought that the Bugis were “disinterested people among the Mallays, & will not offer nore dare they to impose any false [account] . . . upon us, because we are able to detect them, if they do, & then they know the consequences will be their ruin, which they will infallibly take care to avoid . . . “ Of course, the Bugis were not completely disinterested; on the contrary, they sought to use their supervisory role for their own benefit. As a result, the Sumatran pepper planters grew suspicious of the Bugis. Yet when the British themselves became increasingly involved, by dictating cultivation methods and more stringently applying the harsh requirements of the enforced cultivation system, their interference was strongly resented. Eventually, the Bugis Captain

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110 It should be noted that during this period, there was a decline in the actual number of Bugis serving in the Bugis corps. British records from the 1740s mention that there were “. . . no recruits of true Buggesses for many Years . . . ” and that a number of Bugis repatriated. (Harfield, Bencoolen, pp. 100, 102.)
112 Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency, p. 56.
113 Ibid.
became the sympathetic ear to whom the Sumatrans turned. These changes took place over a period of several generations.

Although the careers of Daeng Makkullé's son and grandson fall well outside the period under study, they still merit further discussion. From Daeng Makkullé's marriage with the daughter of the Pangeran of Sungai Lemau, at least three children were born: Daeng Maruppa II and two daughters. Given Daeng Makkullé's influential position in the region, two Madurese princes who had settled in Bengkulu, Raden Temenggung Wiradiningrat and Raden Sengata, sought the daughters' hands in marriage. The status of the Wajorese community in western Sumatra had risen so high that they were now regarded as suitable partners for royalty. Indeed, within a century, the Wajorese had become so entrenched in the local society that they were able to help more recent foreigners assimilate.

Daeng Makkullé's popularity and influence endured the French occupation of the British settlements in western Sumatra in the early 1760s. As Captain of the EIC's Bugis Corps, Daeng Makkullé was imprisoned by the French for six months during this occupation. When the English reoccupied their settlements, Daeng Makkullé's loyalty was questioned. The country trader Joseph Austin, who had temporarily assumed charge of the British settlements in western Sumatra, tried to transfer the title of Captain of the Bugis Corps to Daeng Makkullé's own son-in-law, Raden Temenggung Wiradiningrat. Objections from the populace, however, persuaded him to re-appoint Daeng Makkullé instead.

Daeng Makkullé's son Daeng Maruppa eventually replaced his father as Chief of the Bugis Corps and as head of foreigners in Bengkulu. As such, Daeng Maruppa served the EIC in both military and mediating capacities. In 1763, he led an expedition to Manna to help quell the rebellion of Mass Panjee. They chased the rebels into the hills, but could not apprehend them. The following year Daeng Maruppa was sent with a certain Lt. Cook to Pasummo in order to adjust matters with

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114 Ibid, p. 120.
115 Raden Temenggung Wiradiningrat was a son of the former ruler Cakraningrat of Bangkalan in Madura. When, after a dispute with the Dutch in 1745, the ruler was exiled to the Cape of Good Hope, his son Raden Temenggung settled in Bengkulu under the protection of the EIC. (Kathirithamby-Wellls, “A Survey of the Effects of British Authority in Southwest Sumatra,” p. 249.)
118 Winter, “De familie Daeng Mabella,” p. 119.
119 Harfield, Bencoolen, pp. 195-196.
the inhabitants . . . .\textsuperscript{120} The Syair Mukomuko, a Malay epic poem which chronicles the history of the royal court at Mukomuko, also praises the courage and ability of Daeng Maruppa for serving alongside Captain Hamilton in an expedition in 1790. Daeng Maruppa is referred to as “the mighty chief . . . Captain of the Bugis at [Fort] Marlborough.”\textsuperscript{121} Furthermore, Daeng Maruppa was issued a license to trade in opium,\textsuperscript{122} an important commodity within the Bugis community.\textsuperscript{123} This license doubtless enhanced his opportunities for personal financial gain and can be considered as a mark of the EIC’s favor.

Daeng Maruppa also continued his father’s legacy of participation in the judicial system. As the Bugis chief, he had an important voice in \textit{pengeran’s} court at Fort Marlborough. In part because of his sympathetic mediation, these courts gradually gained the confidence of the Sumatrans who regularly appealed the decisions of their local \textit{pengeran} to the higher authority at Fort Marlborough. When they were displeased with their chiefs for enforcing the stringent regulations of the EIC’s enforced cultivation system, pepper cultivators would appeal to Daeng Maruppa to help them escape its burdens. This eventually began to undermine the very authority that the British had established to assist in the enforcement of stringent cultivation regulations. In fact, the resident at Seluma, John Hay, attributed the defiance of the pepper cultivators to their ability to gain access to Daeng Maruppa, and tried to disband the local court and settle all disputes himself.\textsuperscript{124} Viewing this attempt as a violation of the local chiefs’ rights, the Council at Fort Marlborough condemned it and reinforced the existing hierarchy of appeals. Thus the Bugis captain retained an influential position in the judicial system.

When Daeng Maruppa died in 1792, his son Unus a.k.a. Raja Bangsawan and Daeng Mabela (II) succeeded him as Captain of the Bugis\textsuperscript{125} and head of all non-European foreigners. Daeng Mabela

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{121} Kathiritamby-Wells and M. Yusoff, \textit{The Syair Mukomuko}, pp. 20, 30, 52-53.
\textsuperscript{122} Winter, “De familie Daing Mabella,” p. 119.
\textsuperscript{123} The use of opium was common among the Bugis. When, in 1780, the Bugis stationed in Cawoor were unable to obtain the opium (and white rice) to which they were accustomed, they marched back to Bengkulu on their own. (Harfield, \textit{Bencoolen}, p. 249.) Marsden commented on the effects of opium in the eighteenth century that “The bugis soldiers, and others in the Malay bazars, whom we see most attached to it, and who use it to excess, commonly appear emaciated; but they are in other respects abandoned and debauched.” (Bastin, \textit{The British in West Sumatra}, p. 47, n. 231.)
\textsuperscript{124} Kathiritamby-Wells, \textit{The British West Sumatran Presidency}, pp. 90, 105-106
\textsuperscript{125} Winter, “De familie Daing Mabella,” p. 119.
also controlled the Malay bazaars in Fort Marlborough and like his father and grandfather before him, Daeng Mabela participated in the judicial system. The influence of Daeng Mabela was tremendous. He received an eighth of all of the revenues collected by the court and was responsible for distributing another eighth among the datuks of Pondok Tuadah, Pasar Malintang, Pasar Baru and Pasar Marlbro'. Although Daeng Mabela was officially third in rank after the pengeran of Subgai Lemau and Sungai Itam, in practice he was the most important member of the court. The long-standing influence of his family was important to the Sumatrans and the EIC alike.

So prestigious and powerful was Daeng Mabela, that the Pengeran of Krui believed that the "Tooan-toan de Buncouloo" (the gentlemen at Bengkulu) were the EIC Magistrate H. R. Lewis and Daeng Mabela. Yet his position was not guaranteed. In 1807 the British resident Thomas Parr found Daeng Mabela guilty of embezzlement from money that he had been commissioned to transport to an out-lying district. Daeng Mabela was discharged from both his position as Captain of the Bugis Corps and adjudicator in the Fort Marlborough pengeran court. Caused tremendous siriq or humiliation, he seemingly withdrew from the public sphere.

Meanwhile, the British grew unpopular for enforcing coffee cultivation and attempting to disband the Bugis Corps. Signs of dissatisfaction were everywhere, and a mob finally descended on the residence of Resident Parr and murdered him in December 1807. This led the British to recall Daeng Mabela to help deal with the rebellion. A combined Bugis and Arab force ruthlessly attacked the villages of Surukami, Dusun Luggun and Dusun Besar from where the insurgents were believed to have come. Ironically, however, when the British conducted investigations into the causes of the uprising, the Adipati of Sukurami reported that Daeng Mabela had instigated the rebellion in order to avenge Parr. Although the chief of Sukurami did not explain Daeng Mabela's grudge in Bugis terms, such a killing resonates with the siriq killings of South Sulawesi. Since there was not sufficient

129 Ibid, p. 252.
130 Ibid, p. 256.
131 Harfield, Bencoolen, p. 386.
133 Ibid, p. 258.
evidence to convict Daeng Mabela, he was given the benefit of the doubt and re-employed. When the British surrendered their possessions in western Sumatra to the Dutch in 1825, Daeng Mabela was still recognized as chief of non-European foreigners in Bengkulu. The Wajorese family thus outlasted the EIC.

Chapter Conclusion

While there were some similarities between the Wajorese community in western Sumatra and its counterparts in the Straits of Melaka, eastern Kalimantan and Makassar, the differences are more pronounced. Indeed, the Wajorese community in western Sumatra was an anomaly within the Wajorese diaspora in several ways.

The most distinctive feature of the Wajorese community in western Sumatra was its function as intermediaries between the English Company and the inhabitants of Sumatra. Wajorese and other Bugis soldiers were essential to English efforts at establishing authority in Anak Sungai in the early eighteenth century. As the EIC expanded its system of enforced cultivation, Bugis surveyors, patrollers and adjudicators became ever more important. The opportunity to mediate with the local population arose from peculiarities in the indigenous system of government. In western Sumatra, spiritual authority expressed verbally was more important to government than coercion. Allegiance to leaders was also voluntary, and followers were at liberty to abandon an oppressive leader. As this authority structure was ill-suited for the demands which the English EIC in particular made on the indigenous population, it became necessary to enlist the help of intermediaries to establish alternative systems of authority. Sultan Endey was sent “to guard the country and secure the pepper trade . . .” and his great-nephew Daeng Maruppa was sent “. . . to adjust matters with the inhabitants . . .” It is within this context that the Wajorese “dynasty” established by Daeng Maruppa made its mark on society in western Sumatra.

Another distinctive feature of the Wajorese community in western Sumatra was relative unimportance of commerce. The Wajorese were clearly involved in trade, as Daeng Maruppa’s opium

134 Helfrich, “De Adel van Bengkoelen en Djambi,” p. 319. Daeng Mabela II was, however, the last of the daengs. (Bastin, The British in West Sumatra, p. 173, n. 420.)
136 Harfield, Bencoolen, p. 205.
license and Sultan Ende's ability to survive without his salary attest. Similarly, lower ranking soldiers who were sometimes hired for short periods of time needed to have an alternative means of supporting themselves. Most likely they did so through trade. Yet Wajoese trade to western Sumatra was not significant enough to merit mention in Amman Gappa's law code. In contrast to Wajoese trading communities in Makassar, the Straits of Melaka and eastern Kalimantan, the main occupation of the Wajoese in eastern Sumatra was not trade but rather company service, the best example of which was the involvement in the colonial government of Daeng Maruppa's family. Whereas the Riau Bugis, particularly Daeng Maréwa, had a very friendly relationship with the Dutch and even came to their rescue in times of need, the Riau Bugis and the Wajoese in the Straits of Melaka did not participate extensively in the administration of the VOC. Instead, they set up a Bugis-style diaspora government and competed fiercely with the Europeans for the region's tin and other resources.

As a result of its relatively minor involvement in trade, the Wajoese community in Sumatra had less contact with the center in the homeland and with other Wajoese groups in the archipelago than did its counterparts elsewhere. Yet it still bore some similarities to the rest of the Wajoese diaspora, such as the use of intermarriage as a means of assimilation and the maintenance of a distinct identity. Intermarriage with Sumatrans was a critical factor in the assimilation of Wajoese migrants into west Sumatran society. Daeng Maruppa's marriage to the sultan of Inderapura's sister set this precedent early on, and it continued for generations. Daeng Maruppa's great-great-grandson Daeng Mabela II may have been more Sumatran (and Madurese) than Bugis. On the other hand, his mother and great grandmother, whose identities are not known, may have immigrated from Sulawesi more recently than Daeng Maruppa I and helped to preserve a distinct Bugis identity.

In the case of the Wajoese community in western Sumatra there do not appear to be significant obstacles against assimilation. According to tradition, Daeng Mabéla I, the first generation

137 Diary and Consultations, 11.11.1695, SFR Vol. 3, f. 167.
138 Although the period examined in this chapter does not fall during the period of so-called high colonialism, use of the term colonialism is justified by the EIC's territorial annexations and its restrictions on the movements of Sumatran pepper planters.
139 For example, in 1727, Daeng Maréwa offered the Dutch assistance, and even lent them money, when the VOC ship Risdam wrecked. (Letter from the Ministers in Melaka to Daeng Maréwa in Riau, 13.2.1727, VOC 2074 , ff. 21-22, f. 22)
140 In the case of the Riau Bugis, the word "government" is appropriate because of the recreation of Bugis offices in the diaspora, such as sulléwatang. See chapter four.
born in Inderapura, was treated like a son by the local ruler. Yet a distinctly Bugis identity was
preserved because it entailed certain political and economic advantages that actually increased over
time. Whereas Daeng Mabela I had authority over other Bugis in the service of the EIC, his son and
grandson had judicial authority within the EIC settlements. Indeed, Bugis identity was so prestigious
that by the late eighteenth century, Sumatrans even imitated their style of dress.\textsuperscript{141} To further inspire
the Sumatrans admiration and respect, the Bugis used the Bugis title \textit{Daeng}, not just for the captain of
the Bugis Corps but also for his male descendants. Female descendants used the Arabic title \textit{Siti} as a
female equivalent in order to distinguish themselves from the Sumatrans.\textsuperscript{142} The maintenance of a
distinct Bugis identity was reinforced by a longing for the homeland. A form of \textit{pesse}, homesickness
was an aspect of Bugis character often commented upon by Europeans.

In addition to maintaining a distinct identity, the Bugis in western Sumatra appear to have
preserved characteristically Bugis political elements. Daeng Mabela's statement that he and the Bugis
of Bengkulu have no other ruler by whom to take refuge than the company, and their willingness to
switch allegiance resembles the politics of the homeland. In South Sulawesi, groups of people or even
vassal polities would often switch loyalties according to where they perceived their best interest to be.
Such a switch does not necessarily entail the dissolution of the community. Rather, Daeng Mabela's
shift in loyalty is a reflection of the geographic flexibility inherent in Bugis politics.

The most isolated community within the diaspora, the Wajoese community in western
Sumatra was unable to interact readily with Wajo. Nevertheless, it was not completely disconnected.
The exchange of letters and gifts between Daeng Marrupa and his brother in Wajo indicates contact
with Sulawesi as do recruitment and repatriation of soldiers. Despite its position on the fringe of the
archipelago, the Bugis community still related to both their ancestral homeland and their compatriots.
Furthermore, the distinctly Wajoese identity of the community's forefathers is preserved in the family
history of Daeng Mabela. Albeit only loosely connected to the center, the Wajoese community in
western Sumatra was still part of Wajo.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[142] Helfrich, De Adel van Bengkoeien en Djambo," p. 321.
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Chapter 5

The Wajorese in the Straits of Melaka

The history of the Wajorese in the Malay world, delineated roughly here as the Malay peninsula, eastern Sumatra and western Borneo, is embedded in the history of other Bugis groups in the region and their rivalry with the Malays, Minangkabau and Dutch for political and commercial control. After the long-established contacts between the Malay world and South Sulawesi were intensified in the late seventeenth century, many Bugis settled in sparsely populated areas in the Malay world that offered freedom and commercial opportunities. Eventually they assumed important positions in regional politics and commerce, so much so that a previous generation of historians of Malaysia termed the eighteenth century “the Bugis period.”

While much of the Malay world was under-governed, the governments that were in the region had long-standing political traditions with which migrants had to cope. The most famous Bugis migrants, the five sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga, coped with these traditions magnificently and their success somewhat overwhelmed their Wajorese rival Daeng Mareko. Fueled by memories of the animosity between Bone and Wajoq in Sulawesi, the rivalry the two camps endured for generations.

Whereas there exists more information about the Bugis migrant communities in the Malay world than in any other part of the archipelago except Makassar, the rivalry between different Bugis factions is only subtly portrayed in the sources. Both Malay and Dutch language sources tend to portray the Bugis as a monolithic group. Even the works of the eminent historian Raja Ali Haji Ibn Ahmad, such as the Salasilah Melayu dan Bugis and its sister text the Tuhfat al-Nafis, exaggerate Bugis cohesion in the Malay world. Raja Ali Haji Ibn Ahmad has been praised for his historical accuracy, but he had a definite aim in justifying Bugis presence in the Malay world. To this end he overemphasizes the role of the Bugis and of Opu Daeng Rilaga’s son Daeng Marewa in particular, while minimizing the tension between the Malay and Bugis elements in Johor’s court. Only a few passing references in these and other texts such as the Hikayal Siak divulge the animosity between the different Bugis groups and the strength of their respective identities.

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Political Geography of the Malay Peninsula and Surrounding Areas

Statecraft in the Malay world was closely related to the control of trade in the region's specialized produce. Like the polities of coastal Borneo, the states on the Malay Peninsula had a limited agricultural base. Rather than producing surplus rice as did the states of Java and Cochin-China, they imported foodstuffs paid for by exported luxury goods. To obtain these products, it was essential for the Malays to maintain links with orang asli\(^2\) and orang laut\(^3\). The former could locate aromatic woods, camphor, beeswax, birds' nests, dragons' blood and the like, and the latter could maneuver the dangerous waters and reefs to obtain such products as pearls, edible seaweeds, tortoise shell and mother of pearl. The orang laut also formed the most important component of the ruler's fleets. Equally important was the enticement of foreign merchants by providing them with favorable and safe trading conditions. Given the importance of trade, Malay polities were typically located in commercially strategic locations along rivers and at river mouths.

What mattered more than a polity's specific location, however, was its ruler and his lineage. So important was the ruler that Milner characterized Malay statecraft as the condition of having a raja.\(^4\) The ruler's illustrious lineage justified the presence of the nobles and existence of the kingdom itself. The kingdom could survive foreign invasions, physical displacement, natural disasters and other calamities as long as the ruler or a member of his family survived to continue the line.

The most prestigious line in the Malay world was that of Melaka-Johor which traced its ancestry back to Alexander the Great and three of his descendants who magically appeared on a sacred hill in Palembang. This exalted, quasi-sacred nature of this lineage was of tremendous political and cultural significance because it was instrumental in securing a population's political loyalty. A link to this line accorded cultural legitimacy to rulers in the Malay world.

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\(^2\) The Malay term orang asli, literally meaning 'indigenous people,' refers to the indigenous non-Malay peoples residing on the Malay peninsula.

\(^3\) The Malay term orang laut, literally meaning 'sea people,' refers to peoples residing along the rivers and coasts of the western Malay-Indonesian archipelago.

Map 4: The Malay World
Malay ideas of statecraft were shared by numerous states in the Straits of Melaka and along the southern shores of the South China Sea. They included Palembang, Jambi, Johor, Kedah, Siak, Sukadana and Brunei, among which there was considerable interaction. The Malay system of government is described in the *Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals)*, whose earliest recension dates from 1612. This text details the power structure and attitudes of the Malay courts. It clearly reflects the need to maintain links between the various segments of the society and stresses *muafakat* or consensus and the need for rulers and ruled to work together. It also views *derhaka*, or treason, as the most terrible of crimes. The ruler is considered as the shadow of God upon Earth, who should therefore command the complete loyalty of his followers. Were he to fail as a ruler, he is to receive his punishment only by supernatural means or in the afterlife. In this life, however, even a bad ruler is regarded as preferable to anarchy. For this reason, the assassination of Sultan Mahmud (1685-1699) of Johor had a tremendous impact on the Malay world.

After the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511, Melaka's prestigious court relocated to Johor. During the seventeenth century, Johor experienced a commercial renaissance and assumed a position of supremacy in the Malay world. Throughout the sixteenth century, Johor had been subject to devastating Acehnese and Portuguese raids, and for a brief period, to Acehnese sovereignty. It was only after the Portuguese defeat of Aceh in 1629 and the death of Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1637-1641) in 1641 that Johor began to prosper once again as the Melaka-Johor Kingdom had done prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in 1509. These events coincided with the rise of the VOC, with which Johor maintained extremely cordial relations, much to Johor's advantage. In appreciation of Johor's assistance in seizing Melaka in 1640-41, the VOC granted it certain trading privileges and promised it protection from Aceh, thereby freeing Johor to develop commercially. In 1679, it reconquered Jambi, and in so doing regained control of that area's valuable pepper exports. From this time until the regicide in 1699 that Johor experienced its commercial zenith.

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Johor’s rise as an entrepôt can be attributed in large part to the able leadership of the Laksamana8 Tun Abdul Jamil (c. 1642-1688). He took effective control of the government after Johor was attacked by Jambi in 1673 and Sultan Abdul Jalil (1623-1677) fled to Pahang. So paramount was Tun Abdul Jalil’s role in Johor’s rise to commercial dominance in the straits that the illustrious royal title Paduka Raja, reserved only for persons of high rank, was conferred upon him.9 When Sultan Abdul Jalil’s successor Ibrahim Syah (r. 1677-1685) attempted to take control of affairs at Riau himself and lessened the power of the Laksamana,10 he died prematurely under suspicious circumstances. Afterwards, the affairs of the state continued more or less undisturbed under control of the Laksamana who succeeded in attracting an increasing number of foreign traders to Johor, including the Bugis.

The Riau Bugis

Among the most prominent Bugis in the region were the descendants of Opu Daeng Rilaga. Because of the stronghold they eventually established on Riau, they are commonly referred to as the Riau Bugis. Their use of the Bugis title opu, which is given to the sons of reigning rulers in Luwuq, suggests that this family came from there, and indeed the Tuhfat al-Nafis claims that Opu Daeng Rilaga was a son of the ruler of Luwuq. However, conclusive evidence as to their precise origins is lacking. The royal genealogies of Goa, Talloq, Bone, Wajoq, Luwuq, Pammana and Lamuru do not reveal a clear connection with the genealogies contained in the Tuhfat al-Nafis and the Salasilah Melayu dan Bugis.11 An examination of both Bugis court documents and Dutch records suggests that Opu Daeng Rilaga was more likely a cousin or nephew of the Arumpone and that he held Pammana in Wajoq and Lamuru in Soppeng as apanages,12 or that he originated from a royal family in one of these small kingdoms.13 It also appears that Opu Daeng Rilaga was in the service of the Arumpone.14 Their Bonean affiliation and memories of conflicts between Bone and Wajoq in Sulawesi fueled animosity

8 The Malay term Laksamana is often translated as “admiral.” His position was important in this context because he commanded the orang laut.
between the Riau Bugis and their Wajoese relative Daeng Matekko. For generations the descendants of Opu Daeng Rilaga and Daeng Matekko took opposite sides in conflicts across the Malay world.

As is common among Bugis migrants, a sirlaq situation precipitated Opu Daeng Rilaga’s emigration. Accompanied by his five sons, he fled to the western archipelago because of a scandal in South Sulawesi about which there are numerous and varied accounts. The *Tuhfat al-Naqis* relates that Opu Daeng Rilaga went first to Batavia to visit his brother Opu Daeng Biasa, who was in the service of the Dutch. He and his sons then proceeded to Siantan where the oldest son Parani married Fatimah, the daughter of the Makassarese Nakhoda Alang. They then continued to Johor, Melaka and finally to Cambodia. When they returned to Siantan, Fatimah had given birth to Daeng Parani’s son who was named Daeng Kamboja (the Malay word for Cambodia) in commemoration of his father’s visit there. Rilaga died shortly thereafter and Parani assumed his role as head of the family and proceeded to fortify their settlement on Siantan. His younger brother Daeng Marewa established a locus of Bugis power in Linggi on the Malay peninsula which coexisted alongside another locus of Bugis power under the Soppeng prince Daeng Manompoq, both loosely under the control of Johor, the preeminent power in the region.

By 1715, Daeng Marewa had assumed leadership of the Bugis groups in Linggi and Selangor and he was asked by a prince in Kedah to assist him in a succession dispute with his brother. The Bugis under Daeng Marewa obliged on the condition that, if successful, the prince would reward them with tin. When, after defeating his brother, the prince failed to fulfill his promise, the Bugis plundered Kedah, taking with them everything of value. Upon learning of their spoils and viewing himself as their overlord, Sultan Abdul Jalil (1699-1719) of Johor demanded half of it, which was customary in the Malay world. According to Bugis custom, however, the portion of booty due an overlord was a mere ten percent, and so the Bugis refused to meet Sultan Abdul Jalil’s demand. This disagreement resulted in a war that positioned the Malays of Johor against the Bugis of Selangor and Linggi who were

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15 The *Hikayat Upu Daeng Menambun* states that Daeng Matekko was a second cousin of the five Opu. (Fritz Schulze (trans. and ed.) *Die Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah: Einheimische Quellen zur Geschichte West-Kalimantans*. Heidelberg: Julius Groos Verlag, 1991, p. 46.)


17 Daeng Manompoq appears to have been the son of an official in the court of Soppeng who had had his lips cut off for verbally offending Arung Palakka. Because of this, both Opu Daeng Manompoq and
assisted by Bugis from VOC areas such as Tangga Batu. After a protracted conflict, the Bugis in Linggi and Selangor were able to free themselves from Johor's overlordship and thus from Malay authority. Thereafter, the Bugis controlled much of the peninsula's richest tin-producing areas, which enabled them to negotiate directly with the Dutch.18

The Dutch at Melaka tried to remain neutral in the ensuing conflicts between Johor and the Bugis. In 1716 when Daeng Marewa requested VOC protection from an impending Johorese attack, the Dutch flatly refused. Indeed, when Daeng Marewa came to Melaka in person to appeal to the governor, he was not even granted an audience.19 Yet the Dutch desire to remain neutral was undermined by their willingness to sell munitions and other supplies to the Bugis at Linggi. Were it not for the Dutch at Melaka, Johor easily could have brought the Bugis to submission by blockading the mouth of the Linggi river and denying them access to the imported foodstuffs on which they were dependent. Overland access to the port of Melaka, however, gave the Bugis at Linggi both an outlet for their tin that was in high demand in Melaka and access to food and military supplies from across the archipelago.20

Daeng Matekko

Around the same time Daeng Marewa and his followers were carving out a Bugis kingdom in the area of Selangor, Linggi and Kelang, two of the most famous Wajoese migrants, Daeng Matekko and La Maddukelleng, left Wajoq. While Daeng Matekko's departure from Sulawesi is not recorded in Wajoese historical sources, his older brother La Maddukelleng's departure resulted directly from a conflict with the Arumpone.21 The two brothers would have carried vivid memories of the animosity between Bone and Wajoq with them into exile. Thus it is no coincidence that Daeng Matekko sided with anti-Bonean elements in the Straits. He came into conflict both with the Riau Bugis and with To Passarai, the uncle of the reigning Arumpone Batari Toja.

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20 Lewis, Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca, p. 47.
21 Ibid, p. 46.
22 The history of La Maddukelleng is discussed at length in chapters five and six.
Daeng Matekko first opposed the Opu in the early 1720s. He settled in Matan in southwest Borneo where he married the daughter of the Pangeran Agung who was the younger son of the ruler Sultan Muhammad Safi al-Din. Here he enjoyed the companionship of other Wajorese migrants, most notably Haji Hafiz who was married to a different daughter of the Pangeran Agung. When Sultan Muhammad Safi al-Din’s older son succeeded his father and became Sultan Muhammad Zain al-Din, the Pangeran Agung was very jealous. Banten also exerted a certain degree of influence in the region, and it was on Banten’s behalf that Sultan Muhammad Zain al-Din was dethroned and his brother Pangeran Agung took control of Sukadana. Sultan Muhammad Zain al-Din then took refuge in a mosque in Matan from where sought assistance from the five Opu to regain his throne. The Opu obliged and went upstream to attack Pangeran Agung. Pangeran Agung received word of this before they arrived and ordered his sons-in-law Daeng Matteko and Haji Hafiz to repel the attack.

The encounter between the Opu and the Wajorese illustrates the tension between the two groups of Bugis. Presumably because of the Opu relations with the royal family of Pammana and with Daeng Matekko, Haji Hafiz felt conflicting loyalties to both the Opu and to Daeng Matekko. In an impassioned speech, however, he blamed the Opu’s family for ruining his own family, thereby making an indirect reference to Bone’s ruin of Wajoq.

I am a Bugis and Daeng Matekko is like my lord and the five brothers Opu Daeng are like my lord as well. I fear committing treason, and if I commit treason I will return to Bugis lands. And my family in the Bugis lands that I miss and love has probably been destroyed by the family of the five Opu Daeng.

Despite his fear of derhaka, Haji Hafiz ultimately took Daeng Matekko’s side and urged him to escape. Daeng Matekko heeded Haji Hafiz’s advice and fled to Siak, taking one of the Opu’s boats and a brass.

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22 In the early eighteenth century, the polities of Simpang, Sukadana and Matan in southwest Borneo formed a single united kingdom which was known according to the names of its successive capital cities: Sukadana, Matan, Muara Kajung and Tanjung Pura. (Matheson and B. Andaya, *The Precious Gift*, p. 327, folio 58, note 1.) Like Brunei and the other coastal polities of western Borneo, it fell very much into the political sphere of the Malay world.


cannon with him. The five Opu then proceeded to depose the Pangeran Agung and reinstall Sultan Muhammad Zain al-Din in 1721. 25

In Siak, Daeng Matekko allied himself with the charismatic Raja Kecik who had made his appearance in the Malay world during the 1710s. Although the origins of Raja Kecik are obscure, he was most likely a Minangkabau prince who was sent from Pagar Ruyung to lead migrant Minangkabau on the eastern coast of Sumatra. He differed from other such princes, however, in that he appealed to orang asli and Malay concepts of leadership. 26 Claiming to be the son of Sultan Mahmud, the last ruler descendant from the prestigious Johor-Melaka line, Raja Kecik also claimed the daulat (sovereignty) and provided a means by which it could be perpetuated. Although the veracity of his claimed origins was easily disputed, he had wide-ranging appeal and he gained the loyalty of diverse groups in the Straits, especially the peoples of eastern and upstream Sumatra, as well as the orang laut. Eventually, he gained enough of a following to enable him to attack Johor, demote Sultan Abdul Jalil to his former position as bendahara, and, in March 1718, claim the throne for himself and his line.

Among Raja Kecik’s supporters were numerous Bugis warriors. Outnumbering the Bugis elites whose deeds are recorded in the Malay and Dutch sources, such unnamed warriors are an important category in the history of the overseas Bugis. A Portuguese account describes Raja Kecik’s Bugis followers in detail. His captains, who were reportedly all Bugis, were said to have the appearances of “Amoucos” (possessed of the same determination as the Roman Decimvirs who sacrificed their lives but at the cost of the deaths of many of their enemies). They wore tunics of blue damask, allowed their hair to grow long and untied, reaching to the waist. They were girded with three krises, which is the usual arm of these people, and their eyes were terrifying on account of the drink they imbibe on such occasions. 27

According to this description the Bugis were as terrifying a force as they were formidable. Their appearance alone was apparently sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of the residents of Johor. Another noteworthy aspect of Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho’s account is “the admiration of the Englishmen who were moored nearby and who could not understand how and why the frigate should be

so well equipped." Previously Albuquerque Coelho states that Raja Kecik had robbed "any vessel he could seize" in the Straits and captured vessels may have accounted for some of his force. It is also possible that some of his strength originated with his Bugis following. Indeed, the sentiment expressed by the Englishmen is very similar to that expressed by the Dutch in describing the forces of the Wajores in South Sulawesi. (See Chapter Seven.)

A likely reason why Daeng Matekko opted to ally himself with Raja Kecik is because of the pre-existing animosity between Raja Kecik and the sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga. Prior to Raja Kecik's invasion of Johor, there had been the potential for cooperation, but Raja Kecik deceived them.

According to the Hikayat Siak, Daeng Parani and Daeng Cellak went to visit Raja Kecik in Bengkalis beforehand and agreed to help him on the condition that Daeng Parani would be made the new Yang Dipertuan Muda if the invasion were successful. Daeng Parani and Daeng Cellak then left to prepare their own troops and Raja Kecik tricked them by proceeding to attack Johor without them. Their sirig damaged, the Opu were quick to ally themselves with the Malays in Johor. Another source of tension between Raja Kecik and the Riau Bugis was an engagement scandal that occurred while Raja Kecik ruled Johor. In an effort to gain the support of Abdul Jalil, Raja Kecik had reappointed him as bendahara and promised to marry his daughter Tengku Tengah. When he came to Tengku Tengah's house and saw her younger sister Tengku Kamariah, however, he was so smitten by her that he took the ring from his betrothed's hand, gave it to Tengku Kamariah and took her as his wife. In order to avenge this insult, Tengku Tengah enlisted the help of Daeng Parani and Daeng Cellak to help her brother Sulaiman overthrow Raja Kecik. Although it is uncertain if Raja Kecik already had Daeng Matekko's

28 Ibid.
29 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim (ed.), Hikayat Siak [by Tengku Said], Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992, pp. 124-125. This account, however, is at odds with that of the Tuhfat al-Nafis according to which Raja Kecik's attack on Johor occurred before the Opu had the opportunity to choose sides. (Matheson and B. Andaya, The Precious Gift, pp. 49-50.) Based on Dutch records, Barnard suggests that the alliance between Raja Kecik and Daeng Parani and his brothers actually occurred, but that it was as short-lived as Raja Kecik's control over Johor. (Barnard, Multiple Centers of Authority, p. 114.) In that Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-Jalil later granted two of the Opu high-ranking positions in the government of Johor in appreciation for their help restoring him, the episode regarding their offer to Raja Kecik may have been inserted later to make him look careless, or against the sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga.

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assistance when the Malays and Riau Bugis attacked in 1722, he was easily defeated and driven back to Siak.

After their mission succeeded, the Riau Bugis assumed an important position within Johor. Although Sultan Abdul Jalil died in the conflict, his son took his place and assumed the title Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah (1722-1760). According to the *Tuhaft al-Nafs*, the new sultan was conscious of his debt to his Bugis supporters and appointed Daeng Manompoq as Raja Tua (“Old King”) and Daeng Marewa as Raja Muda (“Young King.”)31 Given the similarity of these offices to the positions of Tomarilaleng Matoa and Tomarilaleng Lolo within the Bonean government, however, it is more likely that the Bugis demanded such positions and that Sultan Sulaiman acquiesced.32 Sultan Sulaiman also “permitted” the Bugis to establish an independent government on Riau. Technically speaking, the Riau Bugis were under Johor’s overlordship, but in actuality their leader Daeng Marewa exerted a very strong influence on Johor’s government. As occurred elsewhere in the archipelago, the Bugis established an uneasy partnership with their Malay hosts. Malay rulers needed Bugis industry and enterprise to advance their kingdoms’ commerce and the Bugis needed the sanctity of the ruler since the kingdom was held together by his person.

Meanwhile, in Siak, Raja Kecik reassumed his position as Sultan Abdul Jalil Rahmat Syah. He made peace with the Riau Bugis in 1727,33 but apparently had no intention of maintaining it and tried to collaborate with the Dutch to expel them from the Straits.34 Daeng Matekko was also able to

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32 Whereas in traditional Malay political culture, the title “Raja Muda” referred to the heir to the throne, in Bone the title “Tomarilaleng Lolo” is the official closest to the ruler who handles the affairs of the state. While using Malay terminology, the Johor government followed the Bonean model after 1722. (Leonard Y. Andaya, “Bugis Diaspora, Identity, and Islam in the Malay World.” Unpublished paper presented at the conference on “The Bugis Diaspora and Islamic Dissemination in the 20th Century Malay-Indonesian Archipelago,” in Makassar, 6-8 June 2003, p. 5.)
34 By exchanging letters with the VOC and providing needed goods to their outposts in Melaka and Batavia, Raja Kecik temporarily won Dutch support. The Dutch were concerned about Raja Kecik’s actions, but considered him a much better ally than the Bugis of Johor, and believed that Raja Kecik wanted to expel the Bugis from Johor. Dutch support, however, weakened in 1727 when the VOC began questioning his ability to control the Minangkabau settlers near Melaka and when it appeared that his rule might pose a threat to Johor. Raja Kecik wrote to the Dutch arguing that the Bugis had no right to be in Johor and that they made the sea unsafe. He then asked the Dutch for artillery to assist him in a war against the Riau Bugis, but the Dutch refused. Instead they wrote to Raja Kecik, saying that they had always trusted him, and wanted him to call the pirates home and make them stop their hostilities, and restore the stolen goods to their rightful owners. (Letter from Raja Kecik to Pieter du Quesne,
restore relations with the Opu in Riau. He even married a certain Engku Tengah, who may have been
the widow of Daeng Parani. But this reconciliation was short-lived and Daeng Matekko soon found
himself in opposition to the Opu once again.

In 1731 Daeng Matekko established himself as ruler in Selangor. He was, however, unable
to safeguard it from the designs of other Bugis groups. Later that same year, he was challenged for his
position in Selangor by another Bugis leader, To Passarai, also known as Raja Baru of Linggi.
Although To Passarai and Daeng Matekko were both opposed to the Opu, they were never allies. In
fact, To Passarai mounted an expedition against Daeng Matekko in Selangor and succeeded in
expelling him after a couple of skirmishes. Daeng Matekko fled to Siak where he asked Raja Kecik for
assistance. The latter provided him with 14 well-armed ships and they succeeded in driving To Passarai
out of Selangor. Yet shortly thereafter, the Riau Bugis under the Daeng Marewa then launched an
attack against Daeng Matekko, expelling him definitively from Selangor and forcing him once again to
retract to Siak. In the spirit of pessé, Daeng Matekko’s brother La Maddukeleng eventually sought
revenge on Daeng Matekko’s behalf, but this was later in Tobonio on the southeastern coast of Borneo.
While this helped restore Daeng Matekko’s sirig, it did not advance his position in the Straits. The
emnity stemming from disputes in Sulawesi followed the Bugis into the western archipelago and made
it difficult for a Wajorese migrant such as Daeng Matekko to coexist peacefully with other Bugis
groups.

undated, VOC 2074, f. 70; Letter from Raja Kecik in Siak to Gov. of Melaka, undated, VOC 2074, f.
62; Letter from Pieter du Quesne to Raja Kecik, undated, VOC 2074, f. 68; Netscher, *De Nederlanders
in Djohor en Siak*, p. 64; Barnard, *Multiple Centers of Authority*, pp. 128-129.)
35 R. O. Winstedt, “A History of Selangor,” *JMBRAS*, 12, 3 (1934), pp. 4-5. Andaya also mentions
Daeng Parani’s marriage to Tengku Tengah. (L. Andaya, “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas,” p. 127.)
37 To Passarai was the brother of the former Arumponé La Patauq, and thus the uncle of the reigning
Arumponé Baturi Toja. Following a dispute with Arung Mampu concerning women, To Passarai fled
Bone around 1695 with a following of about 300 people. After brief stays at Mandar and Pulau Laut,
he went to Banjarmasin where he and his followers remained for two years while earning their living
mining diamonds. Then, because of a dispute with La Patauq, he had to flee again. This time he went
to Riau where Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompoq were already established. He followed their
orders for about two years, but they eventually grew suspicious of him and feared that he would try to
take over their positions. As it was dangerous for him to stay in Riau, he relocated to Linggi with
Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompoq’s approval. (Legal examination of Prince Topassarai, Batavia,
27.7.1735, VOC 2327, ff. 1250-1252.)
38 Letter to Governor General Diderik Durven from Pieter Rochus Pasques de Chavornes, Melaka,
28.1.1732, VOC 2194, ff. 7-8.
After having been driven out of Selangor, Daeng Matekko was brought by Raja Kecik to Riau to ask for Daeng Marewa's forgiveness and for the return of Daeng Matekko's wife. The first request was granted but not the second because of the enmity that still existed between Raja Kecik and the rulers of Riau. So fierce was this enmity that the *Tuḥfat al-Nafis* records "The Raja Tua no longer believed Daeng Mattekuh [Daeng Matekko], because he had come in the company of Raja Kecik." Daeng Matekko was so enraged by this that he began planning with Raja Kecik to attack Riau. In 1735, they were finally prepared to launch their offensive, but it was foiled by advance warning of the attack. This enabled Sultan Sulaiman’s forces to take the initiative and launch a pre-emptive strike that caused considerable damage to the invading fleet commanded of Raja Kecik and Daeng Matteko. During this engagement, the two of them were separated, but they both managed to escape.41 Thereafter Raja Kecik ordered his son Raja Alam, Daeng Matekko, and his naval commander Raja Emas to attack Riau again. In this battle the aggressors converted a boat into a mobile fortress but they were nevertheless defeated and retreated to Siak.42 Raja Kecik never again threatened Riau.

**Commerce and Conflicts with the Dutch**

The drama of the power struggles between the various factions of Bugis and the Malays obscures the fact that many Wajo were coming in and out of the region, trading peacefully without becoming involved in local politics. According to Amanna Gappa’s law code, at the time when Daeng Marewa, Daeng Manomboq and their followers established themselves at Linggi, Wajo had been conducting trade in the Straits for decades. The Wajo relied upon their archipelago-wide trading networks to obtain products for international trade. While most of this commerce was conducted beyond the purview of the Dutch, a VOC inquiry provides information about the manner in which the Wajo traded.

Suspected of trading in spices, two Wajo merchants named To Palla and To Adang were interrogated in Makassar in 1716. While carrying load of rice and slaves belonging to Arung Timurung, To Palla’s pass was controlled by a Dutch gatekeeper whom he had known for several years and addressed as Toontje (Anthonij van Aldorp). After checking his pass and trying to purchase young

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40 Ibid, pp. 81-82.  
41 Ibid, pp. 81-85.  
42 Ibid, pp. 84-85, 137.
boys, the gatekeeper asked To Palla if he had any spices, saying that he needed some for medicinal purposes. To Palla replied that his people did not even have spices for their own use, much less any to sell, and suggested that he ask the other captains. Later, To Palla himself made inquiries and purchased 100 pieces of nutmeg from the captain of the Chinese Encik Bieouw which he then sold to the gatekeeper without making any profit for himself or Encik Bieouw. 44 A conflicting account of these events was offered in Van Aldorp's report. He stated that To Palla's companions delivered cloves and 10,000 pieces of nutmeg in Bugon boxes, that these spices were from Ambon and Banda, and that they were bought by European burgers and Chinese in Makassar. Furthermore, Van Aldorp maintained that To Adang had refused to show his pass to him, and that To Adang had brought a quantity of spices to Johor and sold him a gantang of cloves for two Spanish dollars or 2 ½ Dutch dollars. 45 Because of the conflicting testimonies, and because of reports of company servants engaging in illegal private trade, To Palla and To Adang were not punished. However, it is entirely plausible, if not probable, that To Palla and To Adang traded in spices from Maluku and were simply careful to conceal this from the Dutch.

The inquiry also provides information about the empowerment of representatives and the handling of debts. When Van Aldorp was preparing to return to Melaka, he suggested that he collect debts there for To Palla. To Palla declined because Van Aldorp did not know the debtors, and so he sent one of his men named To Patti with Van Aldorp to Melaka to collect the debts. In this particular instance, however, Van Aldorp accused To Palla of using this trip to illegally deal in spices and imprisoned his agent To Patti. 46 While this case has no great significance in and of itself, it does show that the Wajorese captain tried, in this instance, to abide by Dutch restrictions. The Wajorese were not always antagonistic in their dealings with the Dutch. It also shows the manner in which a Wajorese captain empowered his servant to represent him on a trip that he could not make himself. Using a representative allowed the Wajorese captain to conduct business in more than one place at a time, thereby extending his trading network. Finally, the case also underlines the manner in which commercial debts were preserved despite geographical distances, a practice that is likewise illustrated.

43 The text implies that they are Wajorese on f. 139.
by the case of To Uti described in the chapter on Makassar. While not unheard of among other ethnic
groups, these sorts of arrangements gave the Wajorese a commercial edge.

The Riau Bugis and the Dutch in the Malay World

Having successfully ousted Daeng Mateko from Selangor, the Riau Bugis became an
increasingly powerful force in the Malay world. Their successes, as well as they enemies they made in
the process, influenced Wajorese enterprise. The Wajorese had the most success in areas where the
influence of the Riau Bugis was minimal.

While subduing Raja Kecik and Daeng Mateko, the Bugis under Daeng Marewa and Daeng
Manompoq were also engaged in a conflict with the Dutch. After having gained power in Johor, the
Bugis were less in need of Melaka's port and consequently showed less respect for the Dutch. They
cruised Melaka's shoreline and ruined the trade of the city's freeburghers, inciting Governor
Moerman to demand that they return to their homeland in 1718. Within a couple years, however, their
boldness had increased. By 1721 the piratical acts of the Bugis so terrified the residents of Melaka that
they dared not go out to sea or attend to their gardens outside of the city, and the community began to
lack fresh food. To remedy the problem, Batavia sent a sloop to police Melaka's waters. It
encountered three of Daeng Marewa's vessels, and sank them when their crews refused to submit to an
inspection. Although Daeng Marewa protested this action, the Dutch were not well inclined towards
the Riau Bugis. They became even less so when they learned that the Riau Bugis maintained contact
with the Arumpone, and had sworn their allegiance to this ruler and sought reinforcements from
Sulawesi.

When the Riau Bugis formally aligned themselves with Johor in 1722, the Dutch grew even
more concerned, for now it appeared that the Bugis had legitimized their position in the Malay world.
Yet the Dutch took no action, even after they had heard rumors of a Bugis attack on Melaka. Meanwhile, the Bugis developed their trade at different ports in the region, extended their influence into

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47 Former VOC servants who had established themselves as free citizens in areas under Dutch control.
On Melaka's freeburghers see Lewis, *Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca*, pp. 140-141.
48 Lewis, *Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca*, pp. 50-52.
49 Ibid, pp. 52-53.
50 Ibid, pp. 53-54.
Perak, and expanded their enterprises to include the cultivation of gambier. Despite a temporary split between the Yang Dipertuan Muda and Sultan Sulaiman of Johor, on the whole the Bugis prospered. Consisting of both immigrant and locally born Bugis, their communities exerted tremendous influence throughout the region. Thus when the Dutch then became increasingly involved with local affairs in Siak and Perak, they came into conflict with the Bugis who then besieged Melaka in October 1756. Batavia sent reinforcements in February 1757, but the Bugis and Dutch were still unable to negotiate terms of peace. Finally Daeng Kamboja’s forces withdrew to Linggi, whereupon the Dutch launched a counter-attack. In January 1758 the Bugis finally submitted and ceded Linggi and Rembau to the VOC. A treaty was signed in which Daeng Kamboja and his followers agreed to cease all plundering of Melaka and the surrounding areas, return any captured subjects of the company, sell all of Linggi, Rembau and Klang’s tin the Dutch exclusively, obtain Dutch passes for all of their maritime traffic passing Melaka, and swear friendship with the company and with Johor. Whereas the Dutch appeared victorious, they later had difficulty enforcing this treaty, especially given the rise of English country trade in Asia.

The Riau Bugis now came to assume a more important position in the archipelago than ever before. They married into and thereby formed political alliances with the royal families of numerous polities in the Malay world, including Johor, Kedah, Perak, Jambi, Inderagiri, Matan, Pontianak, Sambas and Mempawah. With the establishment of a number of Bugis settlements, they were ready to become involved in each other’s disputes. Many such examples are recorded in the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* and the *Salasiyah Melayu dan Bugis*. The center of this extensive network was Riau where the Bugis had established their base with the blessings of the Johor government. Under the leadership of the third Raja Muda Daeng Kamboja (1745-77) Riau was an important port, particularly for the trade between China and India. Yet the Bugis conducted significant trade at other ports as well, such as Selangor.

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53 Lewis, *Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca*, pp. 74-77.
55 Lewis, *Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca*, pp. 81-82.
Kedah, Terengganu and even Melaka. Their far-flung networks allowed them to compete with both the Malays and the Dutch. The Malays, however, had a critical advantage over the Bugis, namely, the legitimacy that came with indigenous rule. It was in an attempt to gain such legitimacy that Bugis migrants married into prominent families and that Raji Ali Haji Ibn Ahmad produced pro-Bugis Malay chronicles.

When Riau Bugis re-assumed control of Selangor, they instituted a government resembling that found in South Sulawesi. Considerable authority was accorded to small groups of elders as in Bugis tradition, rather than to a large group of nobles as in Malay tradition. Furthermore, the Bugis military title suléwatang was used for an important position in Selangor's government. Although the Bugis heritage continued to be important in Selangor, the new government eventually opted to become a Malay state. This was clearly demonstrated when Selangor declared its independence from Johor-Riau in 1766 and sought sanction from the ruler of Perak, who was a descendant of the prestigious Melaka dynasty. Based on a variety of political, economic and cultural concerns, this pragmatic decision was an attempt to downplay Selangor's relationship with Riau and establish it as a Malay sultanate. This exemplifies the speed with which the Bugis were able to assume a Malay identity.

When the Bugis again came into armed conflict with the Dutch in the early 1780s, the Bugis strongholds of Selangor and Riau came under Company rule. The loss of these areas, the former rich in tin, the latter pivotal to Bugis commerce, undermined the position of the Bugis in the Straits. The Dutch, particularly Governor P. G. de Bruijn (1776-88), had long blamed the Riau Bugis for Melaka's economic problems. When the Bugis refused to abide by the Dutch restrictions on commerce with the English, tensions between the Bugis and the Dutch escalated. The Dutch attempted to blockade Riau, and the Bugis attacked Dutch Melaka. The ensuing battle lasted eighteen months and only ended with a VOC victory upon the timely arrival of a Dutch fleet in January 1784. Thereafter, the VOC installed a resident at Riau in order to regulate the region's trade. It was in the midst of this power struggle that Daeng Matekko's family struggled for power in neighboring Siak.

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56 Ibid, pp. 88-89.
The Wajorese in Eighteenth-Century Siak

While the sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga carved out their niche in the Malay world from their base in Riau, the descendants of Daeng Matekko did so on the other side of the Straits at Siak. The Riau Bugis controlled the valuable tin-producing areas on the peninsula from 1743 until 1784, but there were other opportunities for accruing wealth and power in the Straits. Daeng Matekko's family was among those who pursued these alternate opportunities. Because of intermarriage with the family of Raja Kecik and the political advantages that this association afforded, Daeng Matekko's descendants related closely to their Malay heritage. While information regarding Daeng Matekko's daughter is lacking, it is known that she married Raja Kecik's son Tengku Mahmud. Their son Raja Ismail parlayed his prestigious Malay ancestry into political power in the Straits, a tactic that the Riau Bugis could not similarly employ.

Raja Kecik's attacks on Riau having failed, his mental state deteriorated and he gradually lost control of Siak. Civil war ensued between his two sons Raja Alam and Tengku Mahmud. Again in this instance, there was rivalry between the Bonean and Wajorese Bugis. Through his marriage to Daeng Khatijah, the daughter of Opu Daeng Parani and the sister of Daeng Karnboja, Raja Alam was affiliated with the Riau Bugis. Tengku Mahmud, on the other side, was married to Daeng Matekko's daughter and received support from him and his allies during the conflict. Tengku Mahmud eventually forced Raja Alam to retreat and, upon his father's death, assumed the title Sultan Mahmud. His rule was short-lived, however, because it was not long before Raja Alam returned and ousted Sultan Mahmud, forcing him and Daeng Matekko to retreat to Lawan. From there, Tengku Mahmud and Daeng Matekko traveled from place to place trying to seek support for their cause, an attempt that the unsettled character of the region during the first half of the eighteenth century encouraged.

The expulsion of Tengku Mahmud was not the end of his involvement in Siak's affairs. He regained Siak only to lose it again to Raja Alam in May 1753. In an attempt to end the strife between him and his half-brother Tengku Mahmud, Raja Alam then married his son Raja Muhammad Ali to

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60 Precisely when this marriage occurred is uncertain. (Netscher, De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, pp. 77-78; Schulze, Die Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah, p. 40.)
61 Netscher, De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, p. 79.
Tengku Mahmud's eldest daughter, Tengku Embung Besar. Although the marriage initially infuriated Tengku Mahmud, he sought the support of Sultan Sulaiman and the VOC, and eventually regained control of Siak yet again, at which point he accepted Raja Muhammad Ali as his son-in-law and accorded him the position of Yang Dipertuan Muda. When Sultan Mahmud died on 23 November 1760, his son Raja Ismail, who was the grandson of both Raja Kecik and Daeng Matekko, assumed leadership in Siak. His rule was short-lived, however, because the following year, Raja Alam formed an alliance with the VOC and attacked and subdued Siak. Raja Alam reassumed paramount leadership in Siak and his son Muhammad Ali retained his position as Yang Dipertuan Muda.

After fleeing from Siak, Raja Ismail sought his fortune in the greater Malay world. In doing so he exploited the advantages afforded by both his Malay and his Wajorese ancestry. His grandfather Raja Kecik claiming descent from the prestigious Johor-Melaka line, and his father Tengku Mahmud having made numerous alliances in the Malay world, Raja Ismail related to and drew considerable support from the Malay community in the Straits. He also established connections with Wajorese communities, such as the one in Mempawah. He tried to exploit various niches and alliances in the Malay world in order to exert his own conception of power and authority that transcended traditional land-based politics.

Claiming not to want to rule Siak, Raja Ismail sought to become “Prince of the Seas.” The sea-based polity that he tried to establish was constructed on a combination of alliances and coercion, loyalty and raiding. He and his brothers committed numerous acts of piracy along the coasts of eastern Sumatra, western Borneo and the Malay Peninsula. Eventually they settled in Trengganu where they were very well received. The ruler of Trengganu, Sultan Mansur Syah, was a long-standing enemy of the Riau Bugis, and as such he was prepared to ally with another enemy of the Riau Bugis. Raja Ismail even was married to Tengku Tipah, Sultan Mansur Syah's daughter, in 1763. After the marriage Raja Ismail and his followers demonstrated their loyalty to their host community by assisting in an

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63 Barnard, *Multiple Centers of Authority*, p. 155.
65 Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Johor en Siak*, p. 111.
66 Ibid, p. 132.
attack on Kelantan. Raja Ismail then used Sultan Mansur Syah as an intermediary to reestablish contact with his cousin Muhammad Ali and to propose an alliance. Raja Ismail also obtained the loyalty of certain groups of orang laut because of his prestigious ancestor Raja Kecik, and secured this loyalty through riches obtained by raiding and through an alliance with the orang laut leader Raja Negara. With Raja Negara by his side, Raja Ismail gradually built up a network of supporters in the region. He secured the support of the ruler of Palembang by assisting him in subduing a rebellious cleric in Mempawa. He then conducted a raid in southern Thailand where he captured more than a hundred people whom he presented to the Sultan of Palembang. In exchange for these services, he was granted numerous gifts and permanent residency in Palembang, complete with a monthly allowance.

Eventually Raja Ismail felt strong enough to reassert his authority in central east Sumatra and he established a base in Rokan. He and his cousin Raja Muhammad Ali then developed a strategy for sharing authority in the region, where environmental diversity allowed for multiple rulers. Raja Ismail then returned briefly to Trengganu where he married his daughter Tengku Karnaria to Said Umar, a prominent Arab trader, thereby bolstering both his prestige and his commercial power. Although Raja Ismail had claimed not to want to rule Siak, with the support of his new son-in-law he felt confident to challenge his cousin’s authority. In 1779 he launched an attack, and took control of Siak. Although Muhammad Ali initially fled, the two cousins later shared authority in Siak, and Raja Muhammad Ali was reinstalled as Yamtuan Muda. Although the presence of a deposed ruler in the court created tensions, Siak prospered during their joint rule. Inevitable tensions, however, led to the replacement of Muhammad Ali with Raja Ismail’s son Yahya in 1781. Raja Ismail died shortly thereafter.

The grandson of both Raja Kecik and Daeng Matekko, Raja Ismail related to both his Malay and Wajorese heritage. Because of Raja Kecik’s alleged ties to the prestigious Melaka-Johor line, it was often in Raja Ismail’s political interest to emphasize this ancestry. The Tuhfat al-Nafis records that

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68 Barnard, Multiple Centers of Authority, p. 218.
70 Matheson and B. Andaya, The Precious Gift, p. 141.
71 M. Yusoff (ed.), Hikayat Siak, pp. 171, 177.
72 Barnard, Multiple Centers of Authority, p. 226.
73 Ibid, passim.
74 M. Yusoff (ed.), Hikayat Siak, pp. 181-182.
after a defeat at the hands of the Riau Bugis, Raja Ismail went to the grave of his paternal grandfather Raja Kecik and danced, presumably as an expression of loyalty. Emphasizing this prestigious ancestry apparently was an effective political tactic because the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* also records how orang laut in Siantan were influenced by the fact that “the royal blood of Johor flows in his veins.” Yet Raja Ismail did not deny the Wajorese heritage.

That Raja Ismail maintained a conceptual connection with the home of his maternal grandfather Daeng Matekko is suggested in the proposed exile of Raja Ismail’s brother Raja Daud. Raja Daud and his half-sister Tengku Saliah were accused of incest. For this crime, Tengku Saliah was ritually executed. When Tengku Abdullah, another brother of Raja Ismail, sought permission to execute Raja Daud, Raja Ismail suggested that he be exiled “to the Bugis lands” instead. In light of the fact that Raja Daud could have been exiled to any number of lands in the western archipelago, Raja Ismail’s proposal of “the Bugis lands” suggests that he and his brothers maintained a sense of their Bugis heritage. While their loyalty to their Malay heritage may have been greater, clearly they had not forgotten from where their maternal grandfather originated.

The *Hikayat Siak* also provides clues as to the importance of Raja Ismail’s Wajorese connections in western Kalimantan. It relates how Siak and Palembang launched a joint attack on Mempawah and successfully defeated the Penembahan of Mempawah who then ran away. Thereafter the Wajorese in Mempawah approached Raja Ismail. While no further details are given, there must have been not only mutual recognition of their shared heritage but also a feeling of *pessé*. The *Hikayat Siak* also recognizes Raja Ismail’s Wajorese origins in this passage, referring specifically to his Wajorese ethnicity. While these references are made only in passing, their inclusion indicates that

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75 Barnard, *Multiple Centers of Authority*, pp. 230-236.
76 Matheson and B. Andaya, *The Precious Gift*, p. 134. The exact nature of the dance is not specified in this text but it resonates with a Bugis arug, a dance of allegiance that involves jumping with a kris and shouting about one’s devotion.
78 By her aunt Tengku Tih according to the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Matheson and B. Andaya, *The Precious Gift*, p. 144) or by a wife of Raja Ismail named Tengku Enid according to the *Hikayat Siak* (M. Yusoff (ed.), *Hikayat Siak*, p. 175.)
80 The Bugis community on Borneo’s west coast was primarily Wajorese. (E. A. Francis, “Westkust van Borneo in 1832,” *TNI*, 4, 2, (1842), pp. 18-19.)
82 Ibid, p. 169.
Raja Ismail must have emphasized his Wajorese heritage. There would be no mention of Wajoq in the Hikayat Siak, which is essentially a Minang text, were Raja Ismail and his followers not making an issue of their connections to Wajoq.

Chapter Conclusion

During the eighteenth-century, the Malay world was in a state of flux. In the wake of the regicide of Sultan Mahmud in 1699, Johor’s influence declined and a number of its former vassals emerged as independent states. They competed to advance their own economic and political goals in the absence of any strong authority. Various groups of Malays, Bugis, Orang Laut and Minangkabau participated in the ensuing power struggles, exploiting their respective strengths to their best advantage.

While political authority in this area was minimal, Malay political traditions were strong and the Bugis had to cope with centuries of tradition. The Riau Bugis did so exceptionally well. They grafted numerous aspects of Bonean political culture onto Malay statecraft and wrote histories to justify their important position within Malay governments.

Their rivals, the Wajorese, pursued a different tactic. By marrying a putative descendant of the most prestigious line of Malay rulers, they were able to claim legitimacy on the basis of this ancestry. This tactic was particularly effective in gaining the support of the orang laut. Furthermore, it was a tactic that the Riau Bugis could not employ. Despite its effectiveness, however, the Wajorese in the Straits did not forget their Wajorese ancestry. On the contrary, because the Wajorese in the Malay world were in contact with other sorts of Bugis, a specifically Wajorese identity was more important here than in other parts of the archipelago.

The importance of a specifically Wajorese identity is apparent in the careers of Daeng Matekko and his grandson Raja Ismail. Because of memories of the conflict between Wajoq and Bone in Sulawesi that the migrants brought with them, Daeng Matekko and Raja Ismail had to seek their fortunes in areas where the other Bugis were relatively uninvolved. Even then, however, tensions remained. It is no coincidence that Daeng Matekko was chased out of Selangor by the Arumpone’s uncle and then by the Riau Bugis, nor is it a coincidence that Raja Ismail allied himself with the Sultan of Trengganu, an enemy of the Riau Bugis.
The strength of this Wajorese heritage is exemplified in the case of Raja Ismail. The grandson of both Raja Kecik, Raja Ismail had the opportunity to exploit his purported descent from Raja Mahmud and the prestigious Johor-Melaka line in order to garner support for his enterprises. This tactic proved effective on numerous occasions. However, embracing his prestigious Malay lineage did not entail rejecting his Wajorese ancestry. From passing references in Malay texts, it appears that Raja Ismail maintained both a Wajorese identity and connections with Wajorese overseas communities.

On the opposite side of Sumatra from Siak, Raja Ismail’s counterpart Daeng Makkullé pursued a different strategy. He maintained a much more rigid Bugis identity. Like Raja Ismail, Daeng Makkullé was a second generation immigrant, and between 25 and 50 percent Wajorese. Also like Raja Ismail, Daeng Makkullé could trace his ancestry to a local royal family. Yet Daeng Makkullé opted to downplay his link to the royal house of Inderapura and instead to emphasize his distinct Bugis identity among the Sumatrans and the rival European powers. There were no special barriers to assimilation in western Sumatra, but the local society offered special opportunities to the community of Bugis immigrants. The potential financial gain of serving as Kapitan Bugis was a powerful incentive for the descendants of Daeng Maruppa to maintain their Bugis ethnic identity. The contrast between Daeng Makkullé and Raja Ismail’s choices highlights the different strategies that Wajorese migrants employed in different areas. Furthermore, the contrast between Raja Ismail and the sons of Opu Daeng Rilaga, who could not claim a prestigious Malay ancestor, highlights the importance of lineage in Malay statecraft.

Strategic emphasis on ancestry is closely related to another tactic employed by the Wajorese in the Malay world: the establishment of family ties with local elites. To this end, the Wajorese intermarried with varying degrees of success. Daeng Matekko pursued this strategy enthusiastically, first by marrying the daughter of the Pangeran Agung of Matan in western Kalimantan, then by marrying the widow of the Bugis leader Daeng Parani in Riau, and finally by marrying his daughter to Raja Kecik’s son in Siak. Only the marriage of his daughter formed any sort of lasting alliance. In turn, Daeng Matekko’s grandson Raja Ismail also used marriage as a political strategy, most notably by marrying Tengku Tipah, the daughter of Sultan Mansur Syah of Trengganu. This marriage helped him secure a prestigious place in Trengganu society and provided him with the support of this kingdom. It
is clear, however, that marriage was not always sufficient to insure assimilation. Daeng Matekko's marriage to Daeng Parani's widow did not afford Daeng Matekko any significant advantages.

That these marriages were conducted in a variety of locations highlights another important feature of Wajorese and other Bugis enterprise in the western Malay archipelago, namely its transnational nature. The enterprises of Daeng Matekko, Raja Ismail and their Riau Bugis counterparts all spread across the region. Daeng Matekko tried to establish himself in Matan, Selangor and Siak. His grandson Raja Ismail sought to create a sea-based polity that was not confined to any one land base, but relied on the resources and the support of people in various areas. While the traditional Malay political landscape was always fluid in nature, it was exceptionally so during the eighteenth century, and this facilitated Raja Ismail's attempt to extend political boundaries beyond a single geographic region. In the Straits of Melaka there was no need and no advantage to be gained by limiting oneself to a particular location. Thus Wajorese migrants in the Straits of Melaka spread their enterprises throughout the region, not limiting themselves to the western archipelago. Amanna Gappa's law code, shipping records, the Vol report and Raja Daud's proposed exile to Bugis lands all attest to the maintenance of ties between the Wajorese in the Straits and the Wajorese in Sulawesi.

While it was in the best interest of Daeng Matekko and his descendants in Siak to identify with and seek security from their host community, doing so did not require that they sever all ties with their ancestral homeland. On the contrary, Wajoq's sphere of influence could and did overlap those of the host communities, and this overlapping allowed individuals to turn to one or the other as needed. Therefore, even though Raja Ismail identified more strongly with his Minangkabau-Malay ancestry than his Wajoq ancestry, he never fully severed ties to the latter. As is typical of Wajoq overseas constituents, the Wajoq in the Malay world both participated actively in their host community and retained links with Wajoq.
Chapter 6

The Wajorese in Eastern Kalimantan

Of all the areas where the Wajorese settled, their influence is felt most strongly in eastern Kalimantan. Just across the Strait of Makassar from Sulawesi and largely outside the purview of Europeans, the Wajorese built their strongest overseas communities. They established close connections with the royal families in a number of sultanates in eastern Kalimantan, set up independent communities within these sultanates under their own leaders and in some instances with their own priesthood, and even founded the kingdom of Pegatan. One mid-eighteenth century Dutch observer noted that there were enough Wajorese people living in this area to justify referring to Pasir and Kutai as “Little Wajoq.” Similarly, one anthropologist has described Samarinda as a “true Bugis aristocratic republic.”

There are a number of works that describe Wajorese presence in eastern Kalimantan. These include Malay language salasilah, a Bugis language diary and locally published history books. These histories are rich in detail but the events described therein generally cannot be corroborated with outside sources. Nevertheless, they provide valuable insights into the kinds of relationships the Wajorese established with their Malay hosts. They also portray regular contact between Wajorese communities in eastern Kalimantan and in Sulawesi. Presumably, these sources depict the foundations of the powerful, well-connected Wajorese communities in this region that are depicted in early nineteenth century sources.

The Political Economy of the Eastern Coast of Kalimantan

Eastern Kalimantan is distinguished by its rivers and the mountainous terrain through which they flow, lands that even in the twenty-first century remain heavily forested. The various products of this forest, ranging from wood, resins and other tree products to internal animal secretions such as bezoar stones, and in some places gold have always been valued on the world market. The region’s

1 Extract from Dag register 12.6.1728; Makassar 291.11 Compendium op de secrete papieren 1759, ANRI, Makassar 145a, f. 5.
Map 5: The Makassar Strait
agricultural base, on the other hand, is extremely limited. Although swidden agriculture was practiced in the interior, its produce was not regular. Furthermore, the swamp-forests and heavy peat of the coastal belt were not conducive to intensive agriculture. As a result, the coastal economies were based largely on trade.

In such a coastal state, the ruler's power lay not in the control of the population or agrarian enterprises, but in the revenues generated by international commerce. These revenues were linked to both the interior populations and the mobile seafarers, between which the state and its ruler served a mediating role. It was in the state's interest to control but not to incorporate the island's interior tribal societies because any changes in their ideological, political or economic structure risked reducing the state's supplies of forest products, thereby undermining the ruler's position as a trade intermediary.

Furthermore, the coastal states were too weak militarily and politically to control the interior even if they had so desired. Although the peoples of the interior had the manpower needed to establish dominance over the coastal states, they lacked the organization and the inclination to do so. Similarly, the rulers of the coastal polities of Borneo were also dependent upon the mobile seafarers such as the Bugis and the Bajau. These populations exported the products from the hinterland and imported such indispensable goods as salt. They also imported textiles, porcelain, brassware and other products from China, India and mainland Southeast Asia that were desired by the interior populations. Both groups, the tribes of the interior and the seafarers along the coast, naturally wanted to trade their goods in the manner that was most commercially advantageous for their own party. Furthermore, both groups differed from a more reliable, sedentary urban population because they could easily shift their commercial interests and activities according to market conditions. Thus state interests, such as security and continuity, were subordinated to the commercial interests of the individual factions. The precariousness of these relations must be kept in mind when considering the actions of the Wajorese.

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7 Healey, "Tribes and States in 'Pre-Colonial' Borneo," p. 13.
immigrants and Malay host societies. It was this unstable situation, as well as the use of violence, that
enabled the Wajorese to gain considerable power in the societies of eastern Kalimantan.

Prior to the arrival of the Bugis, the states of southeastern and eastern Kalimantan had different
experiences with foreigners. Although the first recorded evidence of foreign involvement was in
Kutai, it was more strongly and consistently felt along the southeastern coast. During the fifteenth
through seventeenth centuries, Banjarmasin consciously struggled against Javanese and European
incursions. For example, since the sixteenth century, Sultan Surian Syah had taken measures to prevent
the Portuguese from dominating the pepper trade. During the particularly prosperous reign of Surian
Syah's son, Sultan Rachmat-Illah (a.k.a. Panembahan Bata Putih; reigned until at least 1590), overseas
traders from Java, China, Celebes, Arabia and Europe called at Banjar with increasing frequency.
Banjarmasin itself also exerted varying political influence over other polities in Borneo, including
Sambas, Pasir, Sukadana, Kutai, Landak and Kota Waringin. Banjar's extensive experience with
foreigners presumably equipped it to stave off Wajorese encroachment better than the states of eastern
Kalimantan. Only with the advent of western influence in eastern Kalimantan did Bugis influence
decline.

The Earliest Histories of the Wajorese in Eastern Kalimantan

The differences between the various polities in eastern Kalimantan were to have profound
effects on the experiences of the Wajorese who immigrated to these lands. In Kutai and Pasir, the
Wajorese exerted tremendous economic and political influence, but the Malay structure of these states
was essentially maintained. In Banjarmasin, on the other hand, the Wajorese acted mainly as a
predatory external force. In contrast the Wajorese in Berau married into the royal family and the two
peoples developed an exceptionally close affinity. Finally in Pegatan the Wajorese established their
own settlement and expelled all the Banjarese residing in the area.

Although the exact date when migrant communities from South Sulawesi were first established
in eastern Kalimantan is not known, it is certain that there were already groups of them there during the

8 See King, The Peoples of Borneo, p. 107.
9 J. J. Meijer, "Bijdragen tot de kennis der geschiedenis van het voormalig Bandjermasinsche Rijk,
10 W. A. van Rees, De Bandjermasinsche Krig van 1859-1863, Arnhem: D. A. Thieme, 1865, p. 3.
first half of the seventeenth century. In 1635 Pangeran Sinum Panj i Mendap ing Martapura of Kutai signed a contract with the VOC in which the VOC promised to help him expel the Javanese and Makassarese traders.\textsuperscript{12} Also around this time, Karaeng Pattingalloang sent an emissary to Pasir to secure trading concessions for merchants from South Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{13} "Bugis" soldiers are also on records as having served the English EIC during their unsuccessful attempts to establish a factory in Banjarmasin. The Makassar War led to a further inflow of refugees and migrants from South Sulawesi. Samarinda was established in 1668 by a Wajorese named Daeng Sitobba,\textsuperscript{14} and by 1674 Negeri Purnegara was inhabited mainly by Makassarese immigrants.\textsuperscript{15} The law code of Amanra Gappa also shows that there were Wajorese communities at Pasir and Kutai already during the early eighteenth century and an active Wajorese trade with Banjarmasin and Berau.

\textbf{Kutai}

Tracing the early history of the Wajorese in Kutai is difficult. Although Kutai boasts the oldest inscriptions in Indonesia, nothing is known of its history from the time of their writing, about 400 A.D., until Kutai is mentioned in the \textit{Nagarakertagama} in 1365. According to the \textit{Salasilah Kutai}, the Kutai dynasty began around this time. The \textit{Salasilah Kutai} then proceeds to trace the history of this royal house into the seventeenth century. Islam was introduced around 1606 by Tuan Tunngung Parangan, after which Kutai apparently expanded from its original four regions to incorporate Markaman, Kota Bangun and Pahu.\textsuperscript{16} The Dutch visited Kutai only in 1635, 1671, and 1673, and so very little information was gathered to contextualize the fragmentary local records pertaining to the arrival of the Wajorese.

The early history of the Wajorese in Kutai is described in two documents. One is the so-called \textit{Salasilah Bugis}, which is the history of an agreement between the Malays and the Wajorese settlers.

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\textsuperscript{14} Hamonic, “Les réseaux marchands bugis-makassar,” p. 257.
\textsuperscript{15} Report of Francis Prins regarding his voyage to Pasir, 31.10.1674, VOC 1312 f. 2000.
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Tromp published a copy of it with a Dutch translation and a commentary, but he provided nothing about the provenance and date of the document, nor any information on its whereabouts. The same document appears in translation in another journal, but again without references or other pertinent data. The original document appears to have been lost. A second document, known as the “Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang” (A Short History of the Arrival of the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang) by H. A. Demang Kedaton relates the history of La Maddukelleng and his descendants. Although not widely circulated in Samarinda, this document forms an appendix to Waris Husain’s *Lamaddukelleng sebagai contoh teladan dalam membina semangat patriotisme bangsa* (La Maddukelleng as a Model in the Construction of National Patriotic Consciousness). It is also described at length in Gilbert Hamonic’s article “Les réseaux marchands bugis-makassar” (Bugis-Makassar Merchant Networks). This second document will be discussed later in the context of La Maddukelleng’s legacy.

The *Salasilah Bugis* describes the arrival of the first Wajorese migrants in Kutai and how their lack of knowledge regarding local customs generated conflict between them and the host community. Referring to the migrants as both Wajorese and Bugis, it relates that a few boats arrived at first, followed by more and more until they established a *kampung*. Kutai asked the Bugis about their intentions, and the Bugis replied that they wished to remain in Kutai, during both prosperous and difficult times. Kutai then asked them to establish a permanent place of residence, which they did, and to choose a leader. The Bugis elected a man named Adu, or Pua Adu, who then chose a wife. Unfortunately, his choice was a woman of royal lineage whose participation in a royal ceremony was needed.

The ceremony was conducted for likely successors to the throne of Kutai. When such an individual was born he was not allowed to walk on bare ground until this ceremony was completed. It entailed dragging the prince over the head of a living person, a cropped human head, the head of a

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19 Hamonic refers to this text as *le Manuscrit de Samarinda* but confirms that it is the same as H. A. Demang Kedaton’s *Sedjarah Ringkas*. (Gilbert Hamonic, personal communication, 18.11.2002.)
living buffalo, the head of a slaughtered buffalo, a piece of old iron and a rock so that the prince touched all of these objects with his feet. Only then was he allowed to walk freely on the ground. The living human participant was always selected from the same family who traced their origins to war captives and whose role continued for centuries. Until at least the late nineteenth century this family resided at the mouth of the Tengarong River, enjoying certain privileges in exchange for providing this service.

When the Kutai leaders learned of Pua Adu's choice, they tried to persuade him to change his mind. Pua Adu said that he would not be bothered by his wife's participation in the ceremonies and so they were permitted to marry. In the event, however, Pua Adu was deeply shamed by his wife's participation in this ceremony. Designed to exalt the prince, it was denigrating to the living participant and as a Bugis Pua Adu would have felt this particularly keenly. Among the Bugis, women are important status markers. Marriage itself is seen as a means of determining one's status. Thus Pua Adu's wife's participation was an insult to his sirig. As a result he packed up and left Kutai with his wife, children and followers and went to Sulu. His grievances against Kutai clearly lingered, because he later joined forces with the Suluans in an attack against Kutai. They were defeated and withdrew, but took prisoners of war from Kutai.

A second group of Wajorese arrived after the government of Kutai moved from Kutai Lama to Pemarangan Jembayan. They established a trading center that came to be known as Samarinda. Eventually, they were summoned before the ruler of Kutai, Ratu Pemarangan. He required the Bugis to appoint a leader, and they chose Anakoda Latuji. Ratu Pemarangan then asked Anakoda Latuji if he had the same intentions as Pua Adu, to which Anakoda Latuji replied that he, his children, his grandchildren and further descendants would all be loyal to his majesty. Ratu Pemarangan was pleased by the reply, and said that the Bugis would be like the left hand of the kerajaan. The remainder of the text provides the details of the agreement, which are given in the very allegorical style characteristic of the Bugis. It emphasizes the mutual benefits of co-existence, and creates a somewhat tenuous alliance

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21 On the status of women among the Bugis, see Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm, chapter 8.
22 On Bugis weddings, see Millar, Bugis Weddings.
between the Bugis settlers, who essentially constituted an independent republic, and the government of Kutai that extended hospitality to them.\(^{23}\)

While the *Salasilah Bugis* does not contain any dates, it does contain a number of chronological clues. First is its mention of when the Kutai seat of government moved to Pemarang Jembayan, which is presumably named after the twelfth ruler of Kutai Pemarangan Jembayan, a.k.a. Pengeran Dipati Tua Jembayan (1700-1710.) Second is its mention of the thirteenth ruler of Kutai, *Ratu Pemarangan*, a.k.a. *Pengeran Anom Panji Pemarangan* (1710-1735). Yet these names are mentioned only halfway through the text, after the events surrounding the establishment, withdrawal and re-establishment of the Bugis in Kutai. There are only vague indications of how much time all of these events took; so there is really no telling how long before the reign of Pengeran Anom Panji Pemarangan the Bugis arrived in Kutai. Unfortunately, the events recorded in the *Salasilah Kutai*, which might have been able to resolve the question of chronology, end sometime during the first half of the seventeenth century.\(^{24}\) External evidence, however strongly suggests that the Bugis must have arrived in Kutai no later than the second half of the seventeenth century. Wajorese *lontaraq* specifically mention emigration to Borneo after the Makassar War,\(^{25}\) the rulers of Kutai and Pasir are known to have visited Sulawesi in 1686,\(^{26}\) and there is known to have been a Wajorese leader in Kutai at the time of Amanna Gappa (1697-1723).\(^{27}\) Furthermore, VOC archival sources state that the ruler of Kutai in 1693 was the son of a Bugis prince. His age at the time, fourteen years, would seem to indicate that the Bugis had been in Kutai since at least 1679.\(^{28}\)

The chronological ambiguity of the *Salasilah Bugis* is not surprising since it is in keeping with the aims of such documents. It was probably intended to justify the role of the Wajorese and other Bugis in Kutai society, hence its emphasis on the formal relationship established between the two groups. When the Wajorese were numerous enough to form a community or village, the government of Kutai approached them, asked them to choose a leader and attempted to incorporate them into the local

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\(^{25}\) For example *Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq*, f. 222.


\(^{27}\) Matthes (ed.), *Iyanae sure povada-adaengi Undang-undangna sinina toWajoq*, pp. 23, 67.

society. That the leader of the Bugis was elected by the Bugis rather than appointed by the local ruler attests to the independence of the Bugis within Kutai. The establishment of a working relationship based on mutual cooperation is even more explicitly stated. The statement that the Bugis would be like the left hand of the kerajaan implies that the local Malays were the right hand and that the two groups together formed the basis of Kutai's society. This arrangement is very similar to other arrangements made between Malay rulers and Bugis migrants in the western archipelago. The Bugis formed an important core in the royal court of Johor, and their position was ceremonially formalized in a similar manner to the Wajoerese in Kutai. 29 Formal agreements apparently were desired by Bugis overseas communities because it helped secure their position in the host society.

Pasir

The early history of the Wajoerese community in Pasir is only slightly better documented than that in Kutai. In addition to the history of Andi Mappanyuki, discussed below, there are early eighteenth century records indicating the presence of Bugis merchants at Pasir and Pulau Laut who traded in rice and Spanish reals. 30 It appears, however, that the Makassarese established a settlement in the region a quarter century before the Bugis made their presence strongly felt. In 1674 the Dutchman Francis Prins reported that Negeri Purnegara was inhabited in large part by Makassarese immigrants. 31 Evidently Karaeng Karunrung, the first minister of Goa 1654-1687 was among them. 32 He married into the royal family of Pasir during his exile. 33 Around the turn of the century his daughter Bontoramba a.k.a. Daeng Matene, who must have been quite young, lay claim to the throne of Pasir. 34 Goa naturally supported this claim. Complicating the situation further, Bontoramba also married the ruler of Kutai, thus bringing that kingdom into the conflict. 35 The Dutch offered to mediate in the dispute in order to avoid a disruption to their profitable trade in wax, resin, tortoise shells and birds nests. 36 Their attempts failed, and about 1711 the ruler of Pasir Sultan Dipalli Anom reported to the Dutch that Bontoramba's

29 Raja Ali Haji, Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 63-64.
30 Interview with merchant returning from Banjar, departing 24.2.1702, VOC 1663 Makassar, ff. 198.
33 Mees, De Kroniek van Koetai, p. 17. Presumably Mees means Karaeng Karunrung, the prime minister of Goa, 1654-1687.
34 Letter from the King of Pasir to Gov. Cornelis Beemink, received 2.10.1701, VOC 1663 ff. 39-40.
35 Mees, De Kroniek van Koetai, p. 17.
forces had attacked him and the inhabitants of Apar Talake and Ade, taking 300 hundred captives. He sought help from the Dutch and the Arumponcé to reclaim these people and insure the safety of traders from Pasir in Makassar.\textsuperscript{37}

Bontoramba's claims to the throne of Pasir are key to understanding the manner in which the Wajorese gained a foothold there. According to a letter that she wrote to Gov. Beemink, her only opposition was the Wajorese and other Bugis whom the ruler of Pasir incited against her.\textsuperscript{38} Thus it appears that the Wajorese established good relations with the local population and that Pasir looked to the Wajorese for help defending itself from the Makassarese.

While curiously omitting both La Maddukelleng's enterprises in eastern Kalimantan and Wajorese-Pasir alliance against the Makassarese, A. S. Assegaff's and M. Yusuf's histories of Pasir relate how friendly relations between Pasir and Wajoq were established at the turn of the eighteenth century. Like the early relations between the Wajorese in Kutai and their hosts, the start of this relationship was complicated by a dispute over marriage. According to these texts a group of Wajorese from Pénéki came to Pasir to establish a friendship and trading relations around 1700. Their leader Andi Mappanyuki fell in love with the ruler of Pasir Penambahan Adam's daughter Aji Rainah at first sight and asked for her hand in marriage. When she refused him, Andi Mappanyuki's mother Andi Riajang screamed "Laoni sirigta!" meaning "Your honor is gone!"\textsuperscript{39} Andi Mappanyuki was so offended that he went to Pénéki and assembled a force of about 1000 armed men to attack Pasir and restore his sirig. When they arrived on Borneo and established a camp in the jungle, Penembahan Adam sent the Bugis fisherman La Palattui to uncover their intentions. Because of his ethnicity, he was eventually well received by Andi Mappanyuki's troops but ultimately proved his loyalty to Penembahan Adam by reporting the intentions of the Bugis. He was not, however, able to stem the tides of war. Violent conflict ensued in which Pasir's forces prevailed because of their numerical superiority, but the Bugis were able to flee to safety because of their faster boats and they returned to Pénéki. The Bugis assembled a larger force and a hundred buffaloes and returned a year later. During the following battle,

\textsuperscript{36} Letter to Gov. Gen. Van Outhoorn from Isaacq van Thije in Pasir, 30.9.1697, VOC 1595, f. 215.
\textsuperscript{37} Letter from Raja Pasir to Gov. Gerrit van Toll in Makassar, undated, VOC 1808, ff. 393-394.
\textsuperscript{38} Letter from Crain Bontoramba and the Pongawas of Pasir to Gov. Bernink and Council, delivered 10.3.1701, VOC 1663, f. 42.
Penambahan Adam and most of his family lost hope and killed themselves by burning down their palace. Andi Mappanyuki's beloved Aji Rainah was among those who died, and so he abandoned his cause, and offered his buffaloes to Pasir as a symbol of his condolences. Although he had come to wage war, ultimately he did not return to Pénêki without first requesting leave from Penambahan's younger brother Aji Geger.40

La Maddukelleng

From both Dutch archival sources and local histories of Pasir, it appears that friendly relations were established between Pasir and Wajoq in the early eighteenth century. Indeed, by Bontoramba's own admission, the Wajorese were Pasir's ally against Bontoramba's designs. Thus it is ironic that it was the Wajorese La Maddukelleng who eventually drove the ruler of Pasir out of his land.41 La Maddukelleng was, however, a powerful figure, beholden to no one. His career differs from those of all other Wajorese migrants.

La Maddukelleng, the older brother of Daéng Matekko, apparently fled from Wajoq during the 1710s, at the very end of Bone's dominance. According to Noorduyn, La Maddukelleng evidently came from the royal house of Wajoq but that there are no details available about his early life.42 Typically, the Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq fills in many of the gaps. As previously discussed, this lontaraq has a high level of accuracy with regards to such matters as the dating of important events, such as the death of Arung Palakka La Tenritatta, and the contents of the 1670/71 treaty between the Dutch and the Wajorese. The story of La Maddukelleng's early life, however, is not as clearly depicted.43

40 Assegaff, Sejarah Kerajaan Sadurangas, pp. 56-76. Almost the exact same story and the same pictures are also found in M. Yusuf, Awal Kerajaan Pasir, [Tanah Grogot]: Kanwil Dep Dikbud, 1993, pp. 87-134.
43 Thus this episode begins by recounting a ceremonial event critical to La Maddukelleng's early life and describes it as having been held during the reigns of both Arung Mataa La Saléwangeng (1715-1736) and Arumpone La Patauq (1696-1714), which do not coincide. Since this story of the youthful La Maddukelleng and why he fled Wajoq is not included in the vast majority of Wajorese chronicles, it is therefore likely that the author of Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq simply included the legendary background of this historic figure.
According to the *Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq*, La Patauq held an ear piercing ceremony in Cenrana for his daughter I Waleq, at which there was also a cockfight and a deer hunt. La Maddukelleng, who just recently had been circumcised and therefore presumably was in his early teens, was charged with carrying Arung Matoa La Saléwangeng's beetlenut box. During the cockfight, a Bonean threw the head of a dead cock that hit the Arung Matoa. La Maddukelleng was so offended by this act that he stabbed the offending Bonean. A brawl ensued in which 19 Boneans and 15 Wajorese were killed, forcing the Wajorese to swim across the river to safety. After they returned to Tosa'a, a messenger of the Arumponé arrived asking for the person who started the stabbing to be brought to Bone for judgment. Wanting to protect La Maddukelleng, the Arung Matoa replied that that person had not returned to Wajoq. At first the Arumponé was not satisfied with this reply; but when the Arung Matoa reminded the Arumponé that, according to the Treaty of Timurung, they were not supposed to doubt each other, the Arumponé acquiesced.

Fearing that the Boneans might attack Wajoq in order to find him, La Maddukelleng decided to flee. When he went to pay his parting respects to the Arung Matoa, he was asked what his provisions were. He replied "I am prepared, my lord. The good fortune of Wajoq is with me because its population wishes me well. My supplies are three: the gentleness of my tongue, the sharpness of my weapon's point, and the curve of my penis." Referring to diplomacy, military prowess and marriage, these supplies are the arsenal of the migrant. La Maddukelleng employed them all, as did other Wajorese migrants. The Arung Matoa was satisfied with La Maddukelleng's typically cryptic Bugis response and gave him his blessings. The Arung Bénténg then told La Maddukelleng not to forget Wajoq. La Maddukelleng paid his respects at the grave of Petta Cinnotabi, said a silent prayer, and departed. Aside from the typescript *A Short History of the Arrival of the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang*, there is no further mention of La Maddukelleng until 1726.

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44 Interestingly enough, *A Short History of the Arrival of the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang* records La Maddukelleng making the same speech not when he departed Wajoq, but rather when he departed Samarinda to return to Wajoq.
45 *Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq*, ff. 230-231.
46 According to Andi Zainal Abidin, from 1723 to 1727 La Maddukelleng roamed with his (father) in-law Sultan Sumbawa Aman Madina who fought a war against the Balinese in Salaparang in Lombok (Andi Zainal Abidin Farid and Andi Alam, "La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak keron menjerah," *Bingkisan*, I, x, p. 30) but Dutch records describe Karaeng Bontolangkasa, rather than La
The Violence of La Maddukelleng's Conquest

The Dutch first became aware of La Maddukelleng's presence in Kalimantan in the 1720s. Apparently he settled first in Pasir where the Wajorese were already on good terms with the local rulers, and quickly became involved in regional trade and politics through both strategic marriages and commercial maneuvers. He married a daughter of the ruler of Pasir, Aji Patti, and his growing influence attracted increasing numbers of Wajorese who placed themselves under his protection in Pasir. La Maddukelleng used the immigrants to strengthen his own power base by creating what amounted to his own private army and navy. La Maddukelleng's ambitions led to a war in which his force drove Aji Patti and his Malay followers out of Pasir to Baja Baja and Kutai. La Maddukelleng then assumed the title of Sultan Pasir himself and demanded the Malays who had fled from Pasir be returned to face his justice. The ruler of Kutai refused to comply, and so La Maddukelleng sent his Pongawa named Pangalima To Assa under the title of Capitain Laut, together with his younger brother Gusti, in six well-manned ships to Kutai to seize the Malays by force. Upon hearing of this impending attack, the ruler of Kutai and almost all of the inhabitants fled into the mountains. La Maddukelleng's force then captured the remaining inhabitants, sold the men and kept the women and girls as wives, and burned Kutai down.

In 1728 after the attacks on Kutai and Pasir, To Assa was reported sailing back and forth at the mouth of the Banjarmasin River. This alarmed the Banjarese who feared an attack on Banjarmasin. They appealed to the VOC for help in defending themselves, but the company would agree only to build a lodge in Banjarmasin, and this only if it received an exclusive pepper contract. The Company did its best to convince the ruler of Banjarmasin that such an arrangement would prevent To Assa from attacking Banjarmasin. Thus it was that the VOC, at but minimum expense to itself, was able to turn the rapine of La Maddukelleng, To Assa and their followers to its own interests. Rumors of To Assa's

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50 Dag register kept by Arent van Broijel et al on their commission to Banjermassin, 5.10.1729, VOC 2133, f. 316.
impending attack scared the uplanders thereby enabling the king to buy all of their pepper at very low
prices, a deal from which the VOC presumably also profited. Then again in 1730, To Assa spent a
month and ten days cruising the Banjar river with sixty ships manned with five or six hundred people.
When this force approached Banjarmasin, the Banjarese attacked and after a small skirmish To Assa
fled. Some of the refugees from La Maddukelleng’s attacks on Kutai and Pasir came to Makassar.
Among them was the ruler of Pasir who appealed to the VOC for help. The VOC could not see
sufficient reason for getting involved and denied his request. There was no way that the company, or
anyone else, could foresee how influential La Maddukelleng would later become in the affairs of South
Sulawesi.

La Maddukelleng’s Legacy: Views from East Kalimantan

Local histories from eastern Kalimantan accord La Maddukelleng, his family and followers a
very prominent position and describe frequent contact between Wajorese communities in eastern
Kalimantan and Wajoq. While the details of these histories are somewhat garbled, they describe the
establishment of a network of Wajorese spanning the Strait of Makassar and beyond, the later existence
of which is verifiable in other sources. What is remarkable about all of these views is that La
Maddukelleng is never portrayed as a ruthless conqueror.

The most detailed account, H. A. Demang Kedaton’s typescript “Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan
Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang” (A Short History of the Arrival of the Bugis in Samarinda
Seberang) comes from Samarinda. It is a salasilah in the true sense of the word (lit. genealogy) in that
it portrays La Maddukelleng as the progenitor of an extensive network of Wajorese dynasties.
Although it contradicts the Salasilah Melayu dan Bugis, the Tuhfat al-Nafis and Dutch sources, it

51 Letter from Arent van Broijel and Joan Matthijs de Brou in Banjermassining, to the Gov. Gen, De
Haan, 25.7.1729, VOC 2133, f. 272.
52 Letter to Gov. Gen Durven from P. V. der Snippe et al in Banjermassining, 8.4.1730, VOC 2163, ff. 2-3.
Whereas To Assa and La Maddukelleng were not able to install themselves in Banjarmassin, their
rival To Passarai was. The brother of Arumponé La Patauq and thus the uncle of Arumponé Batari
Toja, To Passarai fled his homeland around 1695 because of a dispute with Arung Mampu over a
woman. After a six month stay at Pulau Laut, he and his following of about three hundred people went
to Banjar. They spent two years there mining diamonds. His business was lucrative to support him and
his following and to arouse the jealousy of his brother La Patauq. Fearing for his life, To Passarai
proceeded further east. (Legal examination of Prince To Passarai, 27.6.1735, VOC 2327, ff. 1250-
1251.)

154
testifies to the magnitude of La Maddukelleng's legend in the Wajorese society in eastern Kalimantan, a legend that is still held dear by local aristocrats.

The typescript "Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang" provides a somewhat different account from the Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq of La Maddukelleng's departure. One such difference is that in the typescript, unspecified Bonean offenses prompt La Maddukelleng to stab a Bonean noble. The typescript then continues where Wajorese lontaraq leave off, and recounts the history of La Maddukelleng and his entourage overseas. According to this typescript, La Maddukelleng left Sulawesi with three of his children, eight devoted members of the nobility and two hundred other people in his entourage. They remained in Pasir for a month during which thousands of refugees from Soppeng and Wajoq arrived with news of Bone conquering Wajoq and assuming control of its government. La Maddukelleng then decided to send his followers to establish communities in different localities. The establishment of a diaspora is thus portrayed in this text as a conscious decision.

The text relates that La Maddukelleng's design was executed effectively. One of the eight accompanying nobles, La Mohang Daeng Mangkonaq, went to Kutai where he became the effective ruler of Samarinda. Another of the accompanying nobles, La Pallawa Daeng Marowaq, resided in Pasir where he intermarried with the local aristocracy. Yet another, Puanna Dekkeq, a nephew of the ruler of Soppeng, went to Bumbu. He was joined there by his own nephew, who in time became ruler of Pegatan and founded the La Paliweng dynasty. This tradition is echoed in the oral historical research conducted in Pegatan, in the extreme southeast corner of Borneo, across from Pulau Laut. (See below.)

A fourth companion, La Sirajeq Daeng Menambong, went to western Kalimantan where he supposedly married the sister of the King of Matan and founded Mempawa. The Tuhfat al-Nafs also states that Daeng Menambun married the daughter of the King of Matan, but identifies Daeng Menambun as a son of Daeng Rilaga, not a follower of La Maddukelleng. A fifth companion, La Manjaq Daeng Lebbiq, went to Penyengat (Riau) where he married the bendahara's daughter. Their son, Ahmad Daeng


56 According to legend, one of Daeng Menambong’s descendants then founded Kubu near Pontianak and one of his daughters married the first Sultan of Pontianak. (Hamonic, "Les réseaux marchands bugis-makassar,” pp. 258, 265, note 16.)

57 Raja Ali Haji, Tuhfat al-Nafs, p. 28.
Kamboja, became Raja Muda. Again, the Tuhfat al-Nafs confirms that Daeng Kamboja became the Yamtuan Muda, but relates a different background for him as Daeng Parani’s son.58 Another of La Maddukelleng’s companions, La Manripiq Daeng Punggawa, participated in Javanese commerce and called repeatedly at Pasir, Kutai and Tuban. The last two nobles, Puanna Tereng and La Sawedi Daeng Sagala, stayed with La Maddukelleng and accompanied him on his travels.

The typescript “Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang” also provides information about La Maddukelleng’s children. One of the three who accompanied him, a son named Petta To Sibengareng married one of the daughters of the ruler of Pasir. The oldest daughter of this couple then married Sultan Muhammad Idris of Kutai, and her son Aji Imbut replaced his father as Sultan Kutai. Another son of La Maddukelleng, Petta To Siangka, went to Donggala where his descendants became incorporated into the royal families of Donggala, Banawa, Tawaeli, Biromaru (Palu) and in Bulungan. The third, Petta To Rawé, went to Berau and Sulu, became friends with the ruler of Sambaliung, and developed the Bugis communities at Tanjung Redeb and Banjarmasin.59 It is said that La Maddukelleng’s son Petta To Rawé was instrumental in erecting the posts, known as prasast tiang, planted in front of the Sambaliung palace.60 These display rules of conduct in the Bugis language for anyone entering the palace.

“Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang” locates the origins of the more prominent Bugis families throughout the archipelago in La Maddukelleng’s entourage. The flight of La Maddukelleng is thus seen as the sole catalyst for Wajorese, indeed for all Bugis, migration. While such an extravagant claim cannot be justified, it shows how important La Maddukelleng is in local historical consciousness. Furthermore, like the Salasilah Bugis, “Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang” is a history intended to justify the prominence of the Bugis in eastern Kalimantan.

In another history from Kutai it is not La Maddukelleng himself but rather his descendants who migrate to eastern Kalimantan. Published in 1981, D. Ahdam’s Salasilah Kutai omits La

58 Ibid, p. 92.
Maddukelleng’s violent intrusions into eastern Kalimantan. Instead it records the marriage of La Maddukelleng’s descendants into the royal family of Kutai and provides a justifying myth for Bugis presence in Kutai.

The text relates the manner in which La Maddukelleng’s son Petta Sebengareng settled in Kutai from where he ordered the kidnapping of Andin Ajang, the daughter of the ruler of Pasir. They were married and had a daughter named Andin Duyah, later known as Aji Putri Agung, who then married the ruler of Kutai’s son Aji Muhammad Idris, later known as Sultan Aji Muhammad Idris. After a long sojourn in Kutai, Petta Sebengareng grew remorseful for having kidnapped the princess and for not having visited his own parents, so he, his wife Andin Ajang, their daughter Aji Putri Agung and her husband Sultan Aji Muhammad Idris all traveled first to Pasir and then to Pénéki. They were feted in both places and stayed for more than a year in Pénéki where Aji Putri Agung gave birth to Aji Imbut. Born in Bugis lands, he would later have the support of the Bugis community in Kutai. When he reached the age of one, he and his parents returned to Kutai where Sultan Muhammad Idris resumed his rule. Meanwhile Petta Sebengareng and Andin Ajang remained in Pénéki.

Family relations firmly established, the royal families of Kutai and Pénéki remained close. After a few years, a messenger from Pénéki came to Kutai with a request from Petta Sebengareng that Sultan Muhammad Idris return to assist Pénéki in a war. Aji Putri Agung could not accompany him because she was pregnant, so Sultan Muhammad Idris went alone to Sulawesi where he was victorious in battle but died while hunting. His followers did not want to return to Kutai so Raja Pénéki granted them land in Akkotengeng. Sultan Muhammad Idris’ kris and headband were returned to his wife Aji Putri Agung who fainted when she learned of his death and all of Kutai mourned for forty days. Aji Kado, who had been ruling in Sultan Muhammad Idris’ absence then assumed the title Sultan Aji Muhammad Aliyeddin, and married Aji Putri Agung. Fearing for the safety of her late husband’s three children, she sent them all to Pénéki. Believing that Aji Imbut was the rightful ruler of Kutai, the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang did not accept Sultan Aji Muhammad Aliyeddin and they refused to assist him defend the country from an attack from Sulu until after his reputation had been irreparably damaged by his inability to defend the land. The Bugis then sent for Aji Imbut. Aji Kado a.k.a. Sultan Aji Muhammad Aliyeddin was executed and Aji Imbut was installed as Sultan Aji Muhammad
Muslihuddin. Owing his reign to the Bugis, Sultan Aji Muhammad Muslihuddin concluded an agreement with them that safeguarded both his rule and the position of the Bugis in Kutai's society. D. Adham dates Sultan Aji Muhammad Muslihuddin's reign with a letter he purportedly wrote to the V.O.C. in 1739 requesting the establishment of trading relations.61

While D. Adham's account cannot be corroborated with Wajorese sources that claim To Sibengngareng died assisting his father in battle,62 nor with Dutch sources regarding the V.O.C. commerce in eastern Kalimantan, it provides clues regarding the legacy of the Wajorese. It points to the power of the Bugis community in Samarinda and implicates their lack of support in Sultan Aji Muhammad Aliyeddin's demise. By presenting the Bugis as the restorers of Sultan Aji Muhammad Muslihuddin to his rightful throne, it serves as a justifying myth for Bugis presence in Kutai. In this sense, it resembles the works of Raja Ali Haji such as the Tuhfat al-Nafis, which was written in the nineteenth century. Salasilah Kutai's recent publication date, 1981, suggests that the need to justify Bugis presence in Kutai is still strongly felt.

The Pasir view comes from A. S. Assegaff's history of Pasir, previously described in relation to Andi Mappanyuki's unrequited love and the early contact between Wajoq and Pasir. The details differ somewhat from the Kutai Malay view but this account also describes family relations between the rulers of Wajoq, Pasir and Kutai. The text records that commerce flourished in Pasir during the mid-seventeenth century, thereby attracting many foreign traders. Among them was La Maddukelleng's son, referred to here as Andi Sibengngareng, who fell in love with Sultan Sepuh Alamsyah's daughter Aji Doyah at first sight. Too shy to speak of his desires, he returned to his homeland where his family grew concerned about his moods until they realized it was lovesickness. Although Andi Sibengngareng was engaged to a noble woman from Akkotengeng, another suitable partner was found for her, and Andi Sibengngareng returned to Pasir to ask for Aji Doyah's hand. The couple was married with great pomp and had a daughter named Andi Riajeng. Then, about five years later, Andi Sibengngareng received a letter from La Maddukelleng asking him to return and succeed him as ruler of Wajoq. Sultan Sepuh Alamsyah and his wife accompanied their daughter, son-in-law and grandchild to Wajoq where Andi

62 Leid Cod Or 1923 IV, f. 13.
Sibengngareng was instated as ruler of Wajoq. Thereafter Sultan Sepuh Alamsyah and his wife returned to Kutai bringing their beloved granddaughter Andi Riajeng with them. She later married Sultan Muhammad Idris of Kutai, and had a son, Aji Imbut a.k.a. Sultan Muhammad Muslihuddin of Kutai.63

Like D. Adham’s history of Kutai and H. A. Demang Kedaton’s history of the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang, A. S. Assegaff’s history of Pasir conflicts with Wajorese historical records in some respects. The most glaring discrepancy is between To Sibengngareng replacing his father as ruler of Wajoq in Assegaff’s account and the numerous Wajorese historical records that list La Maddanaca as La Maddukelleng’s replacement. When viewed together, however, these local histories offer clues as to the role of La Maddukelleng’s descendants in the history of eastern Kalimantan. In all three accounts, La Maddukelleng’s son, rather than La Maddukelleng himself, marries a princess from Pasir. Furthermore, they all claim that Aji Imbut a.k.a. Sultan Muhammad Muslihuddin is a direct descendant of La Maddukelleng. That the ruler of Kutai during the nineteenth century was of Bugis descent is also recorded in contemporary records.64 Furthermore, the prominent social position of Wajorese migrants described in these accounts matches the prominent economic and political position of the Bugis described by contemporary observers.

Pegatan

A third area with local historical traditions about the Bugis is Pegatan in the extreme southeast corner of Borneo, across from Pulau Laut. Pegatan has ties with both Wajoq and Soppeng and is a stronghold of Bugis tradition in eastern Kalimantan, as is exemplified by the presence of bissu well into the twentieth century.

While not prominent, La Maddukelleng’s entourage also appears in histories about the foundation of Pegatan. The story in “Sedjarah Ringkas Kedatangan Suku Bugis di Samarinda Seberang” of the founding of Pegalan by Puanna Dekkeq resonates with local historical traditions in the

63 Assegaff, Sejarah Kerajaan Sadurangas, pp. 91-120.
area. Noeroeddin’s field notes,\(^6^5\) and his ensuing article about Pegatan,\(^6^6\) record the results of his field research in December 1939. According to his informants, many Bugis and Banjarese already resided in Pegatan when in 1729 Puanna Dekkeq, a companion of La Maddukelleng, came to Pegatan after they had defeated Pasir.\(^6^7\) They expelled all of the Banjarese residing at the mouth of the river, and established a community there that subsisted on farming, fishing, and cultivating rattan, and presumably international trade. The community wanted to make Puanna Dekkeq their leader but he refused.

Instead, he returned to Sulawesi and fetched his nephew La Pangewa, son of the Datu Lompulleq, and installed him as ruler of Pegatan. This summons testifies both to the strength of family ties and to the maintenance of a viable connection between the homeland and the overseas communities. Because La Pangewa had the rank of captain in Sulawesi, he was known as Kapitan La Pangewa in Pegatan. Under his leadership the Wajorese settlers pushed the Banjarese upstream to Kusan, and the Wajorese themselves resided at Karama and Kampong Baru.\(^6^8\)

La Pangewa married a woman named I Waleq Petta Coa, but it is not known if she was from Pegatan or Sulawesi. They had three children, La Palebbiq, La Paliweng and Besseq Pegatan. When La Pangewa died he was replaced by his son La Palebbiq. His other son, La Paliweng, then went to Singapore (Riau?) with his wife I Romba Petta Ambaq. Assuming that La Paliweng was the second son, he must have been married at a very young age, which is certainly not unheard of among nobility. Because La Palebbiq was too young to assume his duties, Pegatan was administered by La Paliweng’s aunt Petta Mabbowongngé. This administration lasted for five years and then La Palebbiq died. Upon the death of La Palebbiq, his brother La Paliweng was summoned from the western archipelago to

\(^{65}\) KITLV Or. 545, Nagelaten papieren en manuscripten van Prof. Dr. Anton Abraham Cense, XI Collectie Noeroeddin Daeng Magassing, 156 Borneo, Aanteekeningen en bijlagen, stambomen in 3 blocnotes, No. VI, ff. 28-35.

\(^{66}\) Noeroeddin, “Pegatan,” pp. 42-47.

\(^{67}\) While verifying that Pegatan was indeed founded by Bugis migrants, Dutch sources and Noeroeddin’s field notes date this event in 1750. (J. Eisenberger, *Kroniek der Zuider- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo*, Bandjermasin: Liem Hwat Sing, 1936, p. 14; Or. 545 No. 112 Schrijfbloc met aanteekeningen Noeroeddin, VI, f. 34.) Because of its obvious desire to link all Bugis overseas groups with La Maddukelleng, *A Short History of the Arrival of the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang* is at odds with Dutch records regarding this matter. A Dutch investigation in 1850 revealed that the Bugis in Pegatan and in Samarinda originated from completely different families. (J. G. A. Gallois, “Korte Aanteekeningen gehouden gedurende eene reis Langs de Oostkust van Borneo,” *BKI*, 4 (1856), p. 232.) The residents of Pegatan whom Noeroeddin interviewed might have felt a similar desire to link themselves and their founder Puanna Dekkeq with La Maddukelleng as he is the most famous of Bugis migrants in eastern and southeastern Kalimantan.
succeed him as ruler of Pegatan. His wife I Romba Petta Ambaq was the sister of Puanna Sidong who was married to the son of an unidentified Wajorese ruler. Because he married another wife or other wives, Puanna Sidong moved to Pegatan with all of her property and slaves, as well as her rich aunt I Wale Puangnge Macuaé with her property and slaves. By this time, many Wajorese were residing in Pegatan. This example very clearly demonstrates the importance of family connections in migration among the Bugis.

Pegatan was apparently every bit a "true Bugis aristocratic republic," to borrow Hamonic's phrase, as Samarinda. When Pegatan made a treaty with the Dutch on 19 June 1838, it was signed by the Bugis ruler Arung La Paliweng Abdul Rahim bin Hasan. When his son I Sengngeng Daeng Mangkauq sought a marriage partner, advice was sought from the Wajorese noble Arung Kera. The strength of Bugis traditions in Pegatan is also exemplified by the presence of bissu who existed in Pegatan into the twentieth century. They promoted both traditional Bugis beliefs and respect for rulers. It appears that the people of Pegatan tenaciously maintained Bugis, specifically Wajorese, customs and language (specifically the northern Wajorese dialect) into the twentieth century.

According to Noeroeddin, in their customs and language resembled those used in Sulawesi two centuries previously.

A Wajorese Itinerant in Eastern Kalimantan

While histories from eastern Kalimantan provide valuable information about Wajorese presence there, one of the most interesting texts comes from Wajoq itself. This is the diary of a Wajorese man who visited eastern Kalimantan. It is one of two Wajorese diaries known to exist, and one of three Bugis diaries that record the lives of Bugis overseas. Although catalogued under the dates 1711-1732, the diary actually records events from during the reign of Sultan Sulaiman of Pasir

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69 Ibid, p. 10.
70 Ibid, p. 11.
71 Ibid, p. 42.
72 Ibid, p. 11.
74 The other one is Catatan Harian Kerajaan Wajoq, 1832-1835 dan 1842-1848, No. 01/MKH/28/Unhas/UP.
around the turn of the nineteenth century. Owned by Petta Ballasari and copied into a modern notebook, presumably by her mother, the diary was written by a Wajorese man whose identity unfortunately is not known. That he was an official within the Wajorese government, perhaps one of the Forty Lords, is suggested by the fact that he participated in Wajorese governmental meetings.

One of the most striking features of this diary is its record of the diarist’s marriages to women in eastern Kalimantan. Cense describes how Bugis and Makassarese diaries depict the king as an “exalted family head of a great multitude of prominent people in the land who are bound together by many ties of marriage, ties which are not restricted to the regions, but also stretch far outside it.” The diarist appears to have forged or strengthened some of these alliances himself through his own marriages. Another striking feature is the apparent ease with which the diarist traveled. In one instance he traveled from Wajoq to Makassar twice within two weeks. He also traveled regularly between the various Wajorese communities in eastern Kalimantan, including those in Pasir, Berao, Pegatan and Kutai, where he appears to have associated with elite groups. This movement suggests the ease with which the Wajorese traveled in the Makassar Straits. Because it was not difficult to traverse the Makassar Straits, the Wajorese communities in eastern Kalimantan could maintain close ties with Wajorese communities in Sulawesi. In this sense, they resembled the Wajorese community in Makassar and differed from the Wajorese communities western Sumatra and the Straits of Melaka that could only reach the homeland after an arduous voyage.

When the diarist arrived in Kutai from Sulawesi, there apparently was a sort of formal reception that unfortunately is not described. Three months later he married a woman named Wé Apa, about whose identity nothing else is known but whose name clearly indicates that she was Bugis. Seven months later he went to Pasir where he was received in Sultan Sulaiman’s court. According to his diary entry, the two parties agreed to maintain the tradition of friendly relations between Pasir and

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76 Sultain Sulaiman was the fourth sultan of Pasir. The first sultan for whom dates are readily available is the sixth sultan, Sultan Adam (1844-1861.) (H. M. Noor, Perlawanan Terhadap Imperialisme dan Kolonialisme di Kerajaan Berat, Kutai dan Pasir, Samarinda, 1997, p. 68.)


78 Lontaraq Bilang Wajoq, p. 15.
The diary also records the appointment of La Riga as matoa in Pasir. This appointment confirms the fact that the Wajorese in Pasir lived under their own leaders and formed a distinct community, much in the way the Salastlah Bugis describes for the Wajorese community in Kutai.

The diary is especially rich in detail about the relations between the Wajorese community residing in Berau and their hosts. Berau is located north of the equator on the Berau River. Amanna Gappa's code specifically mentions Berau, thereby establishing that there were already Wajorese connections with Berau during the late seventeenth century or early eighteenth century. Unfortunately, information for the ensuing period is very sketchy. According to the respected local historian Muhammad Nur, many Bugis, and specifically Wajorese, people resided in Berau from the beginning of the eighteenth century, especially at Sambaliung and Talisayan. They were not the only foreigners active in the area, however. The Bajau, who had also established communities in eastern Kalimantan, plundered Berau in 1715. Taosug traders from the Sulu archipelago in the southern Philippines also frequented this area, occasionally competing with the Bugis for political influence.

The diarist proceeded from Pasir to Berau and two weeks after his arrival he fought a battle with a Bugis noble named La Kamsa and sank his boat(s). Although the diary does not reveal the reason for this conflict, in context it appears that it was a punitive action in response to some act or acts of piracy or pillage by La Kamsa and his forces that resulted in many people being killed. Following the encounter with La Kamsa, the diarist had an important meeting with the Sultan of Berau, and shortly thereafter married Wé Isa, the daughter of a Pengeran in Berau. Both the marriage to the Bugis woman Wé Isa and the position held by her father clearly indicate that the Bugis were not only
established in Berau but also that they had already assumed a role in its government. The exchange between the Wajorese diarist and the Sultan of Berau over the wrongdoings of the Bugis La Kamsa, and their effect on the relations between Berau and the Bugis is further evidence of the influence of the Wajorese in Berau affairs.

In his diary, the Wajorese diarist referred to a previous agreement between the Berau and the Bugis in which it was agreed that the people of Berau were Bugis. He questioned how such a conflict could arise leading to Bugis being burned and hacked to death. Had this been the work of the Berau government or of an individual? The Sultan of Berau replied confirming the Wajorese man's statement that the people of Berau were like Bugis. But he also countered that many Berauans also died in the conflict. He offered to banish La Kamsa and thereby distance himself from the evil that the latter had perpetrated. The Wajorese diarist replied by stating that La Kamsa's guilt had not yet been established, and that therefore he should be given an opportunity to defend himself. His desire to protect his fellow Wajorese denotes *passe*. The diarist then threatened that if Berau were to refuse to cooperate in such a trial, he would join forces with La Kamsa and wage war against Berau.

The Sultan of Berau, however, was not confident that the problem posed by La Kamsa could be resolved. He said that he was ashamed of the whole situation and that it might even ruin him. Solving the crisis was seen as a way of securing Berau's future, which suggests that Wajorese presence was economically very significant. Furthermore, the Sultan of Berau expressed his desire to bring the wrongdoers to justice, but added that he was disappointed that the Bugis did not appear to wish the same. Following this he asked the Bugis to withdraw to Kutai and Pasir. The Wajorese diarist replied that the Bugis would willingly do so as long as the Sultan of Berau granted them their rights, presumably referring to their right to collect debts from Berauans. The Wajorese diarist threatened to wage war against Berau if the Wajorese were to withdraw and then those rights were not granted. The Sultan of Berau replied that peaceful conditions had to be reestablished before the debtors would feel safe to come forward and pay, and asked for an extension of the deadline for repayment. The Wajorese diarist agreed to this as long as no more Bugis blood was spilt.

The Wajorese and Berauan communities had close relations with each other, but these relations were frail. Furthermore, both communities maintained their distinct identities as is evidenced
by the manner in which their respective leaders referred to the two communities. Both leaders refer to the earlier agreement in which it was specified that Berauans were like Bugis, and they refer to each other as family, which may be metaphorical and/or literal. However, both leaders also refer specifically to deaths within their own communities, suggesting that no matter how they addressed each other or who married whose daughter, the members of both communities considered themselves distinct from those of the other. This distinction is most obvious in the Sultan’s request for the Bugis to leave and the Wajoese leader’s compliance. The exchange between the two leaders in his diary occupies the spaces that he had originally allotted to recording his activities for five months. In the midst of his record of their dialogue, the diarist recorded his departure for and arrival in Kutai. He remained in eastern Borneo for more than four years longer, but he did not return to Berau within this time, nor within the following seven years for which the diary is kept.

Whereas this diarist left Berau, his departure did not mark the end of Wajoese or Bugis influence in the area. On the contrary, through their involvement in a succession dispute, the Bugis played a significant role in the political history of Berau. Berau remained a unified kingdom until after the reign of Aji Dilayas. His sons Pangeran Taca and Pangeran Dipatti formed the two royal houses of Gunung Tabur and Tanjung respectively and worked out an agreement by which they and their descendants would alternate ruling the kingdom. The sharing arrangement worked smoothly until the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin of the Gunung Tabur branch. He had lost his ability to speak as a result of a childhood illness and was considered unfit to rule. The son of the former ruler of the Tanjung branch therefore seized the opportunity to declare Tanjung independent and assumed the title Sultan Raja Alam. In doing so, he received considerable support from the Bugis settled in Berau. The Bugis were related to Sultan Raja Alam, presumably by marriage, but the exact nature of this relationship is unclear. The two royal houses exist to this day, but the Tanjung house has changed its name to Sambaliung.

Despite the importance of the Wajoese community in Berau’s trade, and the intermarriage between the two communities, it is clear that relations between the hosts and the hosted were fragile. While this may have been exceptionally true for Wajoese communities in eastern Kalimantan, where
statecraft was very precarious to begin with, it was certainly not untrue for Wajorese communities elsewhere. In Makassar, western Sumatra and the Straits of Melaka there was always a certain element of tension between the Wajorese and their hosts. In the case of Berau, the tension between the Bugis migrants and their Malay hosts was exacerbated by the crimes of La Kansa and by the factional involvement of the Bugis in the conflict between Gunung Tabur and Tanjung. Choosing sides in a local political dispute was not uncommon for the Wajorese, either, and it could influence the outcome. The assistance that Tengku Mahmud received because of his relationship to Daeng Matekko certainly facilitated his Tengku Mahmud's initial victory in the civil war in Siak.

The Rise to Power

As seen in the foregoing sections, the Wajorese formed intense relations with various polities in eastern Kalimantan. Yet in spite of the long-standing practice of intermarriage between immigrants from South Sulawesi and Malays from eastern Kalimantan, the communities remained distinct. This is clearly apparent in the diary of the Wajorese traveller, as well as in the unwillingness of the Wajorese to deliver wrong-doers from their own community to the local authorities. Furthermore, nineteenth century accounts document this separation endured and that the Bugis and the Wajorese in particular dominated the economies in eastern Kalimantan. While it is erroneous to project the nineteenth century situation onto the eighteenth century, the later scenario can provide insights as to how the Wajorese communities in the region developed. Certainly, some of the commercial success that the Wajorese experienced stemmed from the establishment of Singapore, but not all. As is clear from the preceding sections, the Wajorese trading networks had much older antecedents.

Nowhere is the nineteenth century political and economic power of the Bugis as clear as in Kutai, where the community was predominantly Wajorese. Whereas the Salasilah Bugis stated that the Wajorese would be like the left hand of the Kutai government, the violence of La Maddukelleng's forays into Kutai during the eighteenth century show that the two-pillar concept was more of an ideal than a reality. Similarly, nineteenth century accounts portray the Bugis as a distinct community within Kutai rather than an integral part of it. The two parties were on uneasy terms at best and often openly

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89 Tromp, "Eenige Mededeelingen omtrent de Boeginezen van Koetei," p. 186.
With their commercial base established at Samarinda, the Bugis came to monopolize the trade of Kutai and the surrounding coast. After the Malay royal house moved their capital upstream to Tenggarong, the Bugis were able to control the flow of trade entering and leaving the Mahakam River. Indeed, the early nineteenth-century English merchant adventurer J. Dalton even went so far as to describe the Bugis as being commercially omnipotent in Kutai. They exported the forest products of eastern Kalimantan such as birds nests, beeswax, agar-agar, sea cucumbers, tortoise shell and gold-dust to Sulawesi, Sulu, Java, the Malay peninsula and elsewhere, and imported salt, cloth, beads and tobacco. According to Dalton, the entire country’s trade went through Samarinda where all imported cargoes were “immediately purchased by the Bugis and sent up the river in small boats to agents who they have in every part of the country.” There the presence of their own agents alleviated the need for the Bugis to enlist the intermediary services of the Malay rulers. The Bugis also sold imported goods directly to the Dayaks. Dalton reported that the natives were “so robbed by the Bugis in their journeys up the country that they plead poverty on all occasions.”

The Bugis were able to translate their prominent economic position into political power. Dalton reported that the trade of the east coast was almost entirely in Bugis hands and so they were able to influence the local rulers. So influential were the Bugis that local rulers used marriages with prominent Bugis women to enhance and safeguard their own position. Furthermore, because of their effective monopoly on salt imports, the Bugis were able to exert considerable control over the Dayak chiefs. They imported this salt from Makassar, and presumably from Sulu as well. Since there was never more than a few months’ supply of this necessity on hand, the Bugis role in the trade was critical. This enabled them to set their own prices for the forest products they purchased and to keep the Dayak

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91 Tromp, “Eenige Mededeelingen omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetei,” p. 185.
94 J. Dalton, “Mr. Dalton’s Journal of a Tour up the Coti River,” Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago, p. 36.
96 Given that the salt trade in Kutai was in Bugis hands (J. Dalton, “Remarks on the Bugis Campong Semerindan,” p. 69) and that at least some of the salt traded in Berau came from Sulu (Gallois, “Korte Aanteekeningen,” p. 245) it is likely that the Bugis carried salt from the southern Philippines to eastern Kalimantan.
leaders at their mercy. The power that the Bugis exerted over the Dayaks is also exemplified by their distribution of cloth. According to Dalton, prior to the foundation of Singapore and the consequent quickening of the region's trade, Bugis leaders prohibited Dayaks from wearing clothes and presented them with a sarong and a piece of red cloth with permission to wear them as a token of favor.

According to one early nineteenth century observer, the Dayaks were nominally under Bugis control. When the Malay ruler at Tenggarong had a dispute with the Bugis, the Dayaks sided with the latter. Fearing that the Bugis would cut off their salt supplies, the Dayaks joined them to drive the Malay ruler from his realm and force him to turn to the Bugis for protection.

Chapter Conclusion

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Bugis, and in particular the Wajoese, established themselves along the eastern coast of Kalimantan. According to one early nineteenth century observer "There is scarcely a river or creek on the south and the east coasts of the island which is not occupied by a settlement of Bugis." From these settlements, the Bugis conducted a great deal of trade with Sulawesi and other places in the archipelago. Their dominant commercial position enabled them to exert a tremendous amount of political power without actually being assimilated into the local communities.

The delicate nature of statecraft in eastern Borneo apparently permitted the maintenance of the division between groups and may have even fostered it. Based largely on evidence from Brunei, Healey has argued that it was not in the interests of coastal Malay rulers to assimilate the overseas and ulu trading groups. Instead, it served them best to maintain these groups as intermediaries. The ruler's power lay not in the control of the population or agricultural production, but in the control of the river mouths that served as entrepôts for international trade.

The pattern that Healey describes in Brunei is certainly not unknown in eastern Kalimantan, but in several cases it does not fit the Bugis. In Kutai, for example, they wedged themselves into the local political economy, essentially usurping the economic power of the local ruler. They took the

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process a step further in Pegatan by literally expelling the Banjarese and setting up their own
government. Whereas in other parts of the archipelago European interference kept Bugis political
dominance in check, the physical isolation of eastern Borneo and the malaria endemic there, as well as
other dangers, kept the region outside the realm of direct European influence until the nineteenth
century. This allowed the Bugis the freedom necessary to establish a quasi-empire. Their commercial
and political dominance within this realm explains why the Dutch referred to Pasir and Samarinda as
little Wajoq.

So successful and influential were the Bugis settlements in eastern Kalimantan that the Strait of
Makassar might well be thought of as a Bugis sea. On the eastern side of the strait were numerous ports
frequented by the Wajorese, such as Soreang, Laboso and Bateukiki,\textsuperscript{102} as well as Kaili, which was
known as “the grand emporium of the Bugis.”\textsuperscript{103} According to nineteenth century observers, the entire
trading population of Kaili was Bugis. It was estimated that Kaili could raise between 700 and 1000
boats within twenty-four hours. The settlement was extremely well armed and there were reportedly
 arsenals along the entire coast where rulers from various countries in South Sulawesi could purchase
arms.\textsuperscript{104} Bugis military strength also contributed to their influential position in Kutai. Whenever the
Malay sultan became involved in a military dispute with a Dayak community or with a foreign power,
his most powerful source of support was the Bugis, many of whom served in his military. Their
assistance was contingent upon the situation, however, and they gave their services only when it served
their own interests. Despite the Malay rulers’ efforts to assimilate them and secure their loyalty through
the bestowal of titles,\textsuperscript{105} the Bugis were their own masters and their community remained distinct.

Aside from their power in this sparsely populated region, a significant feature of the Wajorese
diaspora communities in eastern Kalimantan is the closeness of their ties with Sulawesi. Their
commercial networks criss-crossed the Strait of Makassar. Family ties between Wajorese on the two
islands were also cultivated and maintained. While much of this contact is evident from the Amanna
Gappa’s law code and Dutch records, it comes out even more strongly in the locally produced histories

\textsuperscript{101} Healey, “Tribes and States in ‘Pre-Colonial’ Borneo,” p. 11.
\textsuperscript{102} Report from J. H. Voll to Governor David Boelen, Makassar, 11.4.1768, VOC 3243, unpaginated,
document 16.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, pp. 26-27.
that relate family sagas occurring on both sides of the Strait. Although the documentation on which these histories are based is obscure, these sagas testify to the legendary status of ties between the homeland and the overseas communities and feelings of *pessé* that are critical in the maintenance of a Wajoreal identity.

165 Tromp, "Eenige Mededeelingen omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetel," pp. 185-186.
Chapter 7

The Repatriate Arung Matoa

The previous chapters have described the Wajorese communities in four different areas of the archipelago and shown some of the interaction between them and the homeland. This interaction was intensified during the early eighteenth century when successive arung matoa deliberately encouraged expatriates to contribute assistance to the homeland. It culminated in the 1730s with the return to Wajoq of the exiled La Maddukelleng. After being tried and acquitted by the Tellumpocco, he attracted a huge following and freed Wajoq from Bonean interference. Thus after a long period of subordination to Luwuq, then Goa and then Boné, Wajoq assumed a position of paramountcy in South Sulawesi. It did not last. After his unsuccessful attempt to unite the peoples of South Sulawesi and expel the Dutch from Makassar, La Maddukelleng's actions caused a period of turmoil in Wajoq that culminated in a civil war and his eventual "impeachment."

The political situation was extremely complex but it reveals long distance political participation on many levels. By the eighteenth century, many Wajorese had been overseas for a generation. Nevertheless, they still participated in the affairs of the homeland. Their contributions and repatriation exemplify the bonds that they still felt with Wajoq. While such participation was a widespread phenomenon, involving communities from Sumbawa, Makassar, eastern Kalimantan and elsewhere, La Maddukelleng's return and campaign against the Dutch are the clearest example of the argument that diasporic Wajorese communities continued to regard themselves as part of the homeland: La Maddukelleng's interference directly at Wajoq's center was not "external" intrusion but part of the politics of the Wajorese state.

The Role of Expatriates in Wajorese Society

Even before the 1730s and the return of La Maddukelleng, overseas Wajorese and repatriates played an important role in Wajorese society. A string of arung matoa deliberately tried to use overseas Wajorese connections to fortify Wajoq. Many Wajorese people also returned to Wajoq during La Galigo To Suni's reign (1703-1711). These as well as other repatriates and migrants were significant

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1 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 228.
in terms of both their military and economic contributions to the homeland. Their repatriation and contributions exemplify the bonds that migrants felt with Wajoq.

Weapons were a key element of Wajoq’s refortification. As described in chapter two, immediately after the Makassar War, Wajoq had been both disarmed and dismembered. In the early eighteenth century, numerous arung matoa encouraged their people to purchase arms overseas. La Tenriessuq To Timoè Puanna Denra (c. 1699-1702) ordered the leaders and people of Wajoq to purchase as many weapons as possible in Java, Sumatra and elsewhere, a policy that was continued by his successor La Mattoneq To Sakkeq Daèng Paguling Puanna La Rumpang (c. 1702-03). This weaponry was a continual source of friction and strife with the Boneans. During La Galigo To Suni’s reign (1703-1711) many Wajorese people suffered from the authoritarian and arbitrary acts of Boneans, and some of them ran amuck and killed Boneans. Because of this, the ruler of Bone forbade the people of Wajoq to bear arms.² La Galigo To Suni nevertheless continued the policy of fortifying Wajoq by purchasing arms.³ When La Tenriwerrung Puanna Sangngaji Arung Penéki (1711-1713) pursued this same policy, it brought him into conflict with the ruler of Bone.⁴ The Arumpone knew full well that the Wajorese were trying to procure weapons, and this angered him so much that he forbade the Wajorese in Cenrana from wearing their krisses while walking.⁵ Within the Bugis cultural context it was demeaning to be forbidden to carry a kris, thus this prohibition would have insulted Wajorese siriq. Puanna Sangngaji’s successor, however, La Salèwangeng To Tenriuq (1713-1736) was able to obtain certain concessions from the Boneans regarding weapons. He obtained permission to establish a target range for shooting practice within each limpo. This led to the Wajorese becoming proficient in handling weapons, with the people of Témpé in particular gaining the reputation for being very skilled marksmen.⁶ Puanna Sangngaji also continued his predecessors’ efforts to procure weapons, and constructed an arsenal in which to store them.

The procurement of weapons and ammunition from abroad was made possible by international commerce, another field to which La Salèwangeng devoted considerable attention. His predecessor

² Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, p. 62.
³ According to the LSW, he began this practice. (Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 228.)
⁴ Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, p. 62.
⁵ Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 234.
⁶ Matthes, Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, pp. 24-25.
Arung Matoa La Tenriwerrung Puanna Sangngaji had also tried to strengthen the Wajoese economy by advocating the philosophy that the Wajoese could not stand upright unless they sought riches. La Saléwangeng, on the other hand, encouraged international commerce in very real and practical terms.

La Saléwangeng specifically ordered people to trade overseas. He facilitated their endeavours in a variety of ways, thereby seeking to harness the power of overseas commerce for the benefit of Wajoq. He appointed La Tiringengeng Daeng Mangngapasa (the son of Arung Matoa La Tenrisessu To Timu) to organize commerce. La Saléwangeng collected money from people in Wajoq and lent it to traders. The profits from their endeavors then were split between the traders and the Wajoese government. There were certain conditions under which traders could borrow money: they were not allowed to lessen the main body of capital and they were not allowed to harm it. The lontaraq record that there were many of these traders and captains in Wajoq during the reign of La Saléwangeng.

La Saléwangeng also improved Wajoq’s waterways by dredging the river Topaceddo, thereby providing boats with easy access to Tosora by way of Lake Seppangngé and Lake Talibolong. In addition, he encouraged the organization of traders and fisherman and required that they appoint representatives. One of his most famous accomplishments was the establishment of a fund for the common good, an endeavour that depended heavily on pessé. Immediately after harvest, he would go from house to house, collecting rice for storage in a granary, the rice then being used both to feed the poor and to guard against hunger in the event of crop failure. During prosperous times, he also went from house to house collecting money for a number of different reasons. Some went to support the poor, and, in the event of their death, to pay for their burials. Money collected in this manner was also used for the advancement of agriculture and especially trade. Loans were made to entrepreneurs, who then had to return the principal along with one third of the profits. The government’s share of the profits was then used for the purchase of weapons, gunpowder and ammunition. Profits from state-

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7 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 228.
8 The lontaraq (Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 229) refers to “Java” but this actually refers to the western archipelago. (Cense, “Eenige aantekeningen over Makassaars-Boeginese geschiedschrijving,” p. 49, n. 23.)
10 Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, p. 63.
funded commercial enterprises were used to construct an arsenal and remodel the mosque. In all of these ways, La Saléwangeng facilitated the international merchants’ business and their contributions to Wajorese society.

Wajoq’s reliance upon its overseas communities became most obvious when the expatriate La Maddukelleng was recalled. According to the LSW, La Saléwangeng anticipated a war with Boné and thus wrote a letter to La Maddukelleng in Pasir asking him to return and help. Arung Taq La Dallé took the letter to La Maddukelleng in Pasir. Although it would have been impossible for the author to know the contents of a letter kept confidential, according to legend this was La Saléwangeng’s letter to La Maddukelleng:

It would be good if you returned to Bugis lands. Later if you return to Wajoq, your pardon will be requested from Boné. If Boné does not want to pardon you, then let Boné attack you because there are already much ammunition in Wajoq, as well as lead, guns and funds. The guns in Wajoq number more than 1500, excluding those in Wajoq’s liliq. When you get this letter, after you have read it, do not show it to anyone else. Do not tell this to anyone else, either, just show up suddenly in Bugis lands.

When La Maddukelleng read the letter, he immediately started gathering weapons and tools of war and he reportedly assembled a force of forty ships loaded with arms and troops. He returned to Sulawesi with Arung Taq La Dallé, Kapitan Laut To Assa and Puanna Pabbola, as well as people from Pasir who wanted to accompany him.

The Return of La Maddukelleng

At the time of La Maddukelleng’s return, the Tellumpocco alliance was already considerably weakened. As Boné’s power had declined, the balance of power in South Sulawesi had not adequately adjusted. No one had been able to replace the charismatic Arung Palakka La Tenritatta as lord of South

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12 The mosque was improved with lime, the well was deepened and a menara was built from which to make the call to prayer. (Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 236.)
13 Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 236. Zainal Abidin also writes about this missive. He writes that La Saléwangeng sent a secret letter to La Maddukelleng in 1735 via La Dallé Puanna Pabbola. La Saléwangeng asked La Maddukelleng to return home and promised to request pardon from the Arumpone on his behalf. But then in the same paragraph, Andi Zainal Abidin writes that the Arumpone did not want to pardon La Maddukelleng when she did anyway, albeit grudgingly. He goes on to say that La Saléwangeng had already succeeded in purchasing arms from the British, and assembling 2000 carbines and tens of cannons and wanted to liberate Wajoq from the oppression of the Bonéans. (Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah,” p. 31.) H. A. Demang Kedaton’s A Short History of the Arrival of the Bugis in Samarinda Seberang also states that a messenger from Wajoq came to Kalimantan to ask La Maddukelleng to return and rule Wajoq.
Sulawesi, and the Dutch were still not firmly enough entrenched to rule the peninsula independently. La Maddukelleng took advantage of this power vacuum, further undermining the Tellumpocco alliance. Many of Wajoq's former vassals returned to Wajoq to join La Maddukelleng, thereby helping Wajoq to grow in strength.

La Maddukelleng's violent career, particularly his acts of piracy during the reign of La Saléwangeng, was widely known. There was a song about La Maddukelleng that went like this: "The buffalo eats at sea. Its tail is so heavy that it does not move. Its horns don't butt. If it moves its tail just once, Wajoq will be troubled, Soppêng will be made to sit lost in thought and Bonê will lose its perspective." This song, which may have been composed at a later date by the writer of the lontaraq, emphasizes the impact that La Maddukelleng had on the politics of South Sulawesi in its prediction that his return would be a troublesome burden to Wajoq, paralyze Soppêng and disenfranchise Bonê.

As La Maddukelleng began making his presence felt in South Sulawesi, the Dutch also grew concerned. In 1735, he set fire to houses on an island across from Fort Rotterdam. The Dutch Governor Sautijn reported that La Maddukelleng and To Assa, with a fleet of about 19 double masted-genabs and a few other smaller ships, were seen in broad daylight going from one island to another setting all the houses on these islands on fire. In early March 1735, the Dutch tried to blockade La Maddukelleng and his followers but the latter managed to escape. Rumor then had it they were headed for Sumbawa, but instead they invaded Sabutung, burning part of it. The Dutch then grew alarmed by the prospect that La Maddukelleng and his followers might do the same in Vlaardinghen, a residential section near the fort. On 12 March at 8 a.m. La Maddukelleng and To Assa appeared within sight of Castle Rotterdam, about four or five miles from the wall with a considerable fleet of about 27-28 boats, 14 of which were double-masted. Dutch allies in Bontualaq, an area in Makassar, and Gou swore that they had advised their people to be on guard, and to make sure that La Maddukelleng and To Assa were

\[15\] One lontaraq specifies that La Maddukelleng's followers were not Wajorese, and would most likely have been local people from Pasir. (Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 11.)

\[16\] Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, ff. 235, 238.

\[17\] Matthes, Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek, p. 25.

\[18\] Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq, f. 241.

\[19\] Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, f. 192.

\[20\] Bugis lontaraq also record La Maddukelleng attacking Sabutung. (Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 10.)
not permitted in any rivers or on land, and that they should not be given even the slightest assistance.\(^{21}\)

In March 1736, Sautijn ordered an attack on La Maddukelleng and To Assa but it did not proceed as planned, and the two leaders were able to escape under cover of darkness.\(^{22}\)

The Dutch also tried to get the Boneans to help them deal with the problem. On 12 March 1736, the VOC interpreter Jan Vol was sent overland with a letter to the Bonean ruler in which the Boneans were urged to destroy the enemy with a promise of compensation for any expenses incurred.\(^{23}\) The Boneans, professing to doubt La Maddukelleng’s capabilities, promised to cooperate with the Dutch and to surrender the pirates to the company.\(^{24}\) The Makkedangng Tana of Bone advised the Dutch that “this rabble will not be able to stay here long, but will return to Pasir, because they are like birds.”\(^ {25}\)

The Makkedangng Tana’s analogy hints at the flexibility of Wajoese statecraft and echoes a statement recorded in the Wajoese chronicles. To explain Wajoq’s willingness to breach its alliance with Luwuq, the revered Arung Bettêmpola La Paturusi To Maddukelleng also compared the Wajoese to birds. “We are like birds sitting in a tree. When the tree topples, we leave it and wander in search of a big tree where we can settle.”\(^{26}\) While the Makkedangng Tana was well inclined towards the Wajoese\(^ {27}\) and may have been familiar with Wajoese legends, the precise choice of words is presumably coincidental. Nevertheless, both statements suggest that the mobility of Wajoese statecraft was widely recognized.

**Acquittal by the Tellumpocco**

The Dutch did not suspect that Wajoq would support La Maddukelleng or even allow him to take shelter.\(^{28}\) Indeed, when La Maddukelleng returned to Bugis lands, he was not immediately well received. Within a short period of time, however, he gained tremendous support.

In late 1735 La Maddukelleng appeared on the coast of Mandar with Arung Taq La Dallé,\(^ {29}\) Puanna Pabbola, To Assa and forty ships. According to one lontaraq, the ships were exceptionally

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\(^{21}\) Letter from Sautijn to Board in Batavia, Makassar, 29.7.1736, VOC 2381, f. 34-35.

\(^{22}\) Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, f. 193.

\(^{23}\) Letter from Sautijn to Board in Batavia, Makassar, 29.7.1736, VOC 2381, f. 34.

\(^{24}\) Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, f. 194.

\(^{25}\) Letter from Sautijn to Board in Batavia, Makassar, 29.7.1736, VOC 2381, f. 41.


\(^{27}\) Letter from N. Steinmetz in Cenrana to J. Sautijn et al in Makasar, 26.10.1736, VOC 2409, f. 718.
large and mounted with heavy cannons that the Mandarese could not withstand. Coincidentally, La Pasonriq Arung Lipakasi (Tanété) was also there with a force from Magindanao in the southern Philippines. Armed conflict ensued. Some lontaraq relate that To Assa seized a ship from Mangngaranancang and then was surprised in Binuang. Other lontaraq say that La Maddukelleng went southwards along the coast and moored at Sabutung, then he attacked two islands near Makassar. Perhaps both are true but the latter attack is confirmed in Dutch records and the Diary of Goa. The Tellumpocco considered attacking him, but then had second thoughts about doing so when they realized that they were likely to lose any naval engagement with this famous pirate. La Maddukelleng then went to the coast of Bone where he was refused entrance to Wajoq, and from there proceeded to Doping on the coast of Wajoq. He was not permitted to land there, but instead was forced to wait on board his ship for forty days. Finally a messenger arrived bringing him permission to land on the condition that he submit himself to trial by the Tellumpocco.

Once on land, La Maddukelleng went to Sengkang. According to most lontaraq, his progress thereafter was marked by the acquisition of a larger and larger following at every turn. He disembarked at Doping with forty men; by the time he reached Lawesso they had increased to at least a hundred, and more and more continued to join him as he proceeded to Pénrang and Sengkang. When he reached Sengkang, his command had swollen to more than five hundred, or, according to one account, almost a thousand. Such incredible popularity might be attributable to a widely-felt social desire to undermine Bonean paramountcy or possibly to the manner in which the Wajorese population was able to relate to a repatriate. This instant popularity is not, however, depicted universally in the lontaraq.

28 Letter from Sautijn to Board in Batavia, Makassar, 29.7.1736, VOC 2381, f. 53.
29 Arung Taq was a messenger of the reigning Arung Matop La Saléwangleg. (Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah,” p. 28.)
30 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 10.
32 Letter to Abraham Patras from W. Bloom, 24.2.1736, ANRI, Makassar 282a, ff. 2c-2d.
34 Zainal Abidin and Alam, La Maddukelleng, “Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah,” p. 29.
37 960 according to Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah,” p. 31. In contrast to these accounts, the Leid Cod Or 1923 VI does not mention La Maddukelleng attracting a following as he proceeded to trial. On the contrary, it states that he was refused entrance to Tosora because Wajoq was on Bone’s side. (Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 12) This is in accordance with its
Leid Cod Or 1923 VI de-emphasizes La Maddukelleng’s initial popularity, making his eventual acquisition of entire Wajoq’s support all the more striking.

In Tosora, there was a conference of the Tellumpocco in which Boné accused La Maddukelleng of seven different crimes. Different *lontaraq* name different crimes, but their number and general nature are in all cases the same. In an article specifically about La Maddukelleng and this trial, Noorduyjn analyzes the various Bugis texts and translates one in its entirety.\(^{38}\) According to this text,\(^{39}\) these crimes were: murdering a Bonéan noble named To Passarai in the village of Tobonio on the southeastern coast of Borneo; killing a Bonéan messenger; frightening the ruler of Mandar, a Bonéan ally, by cock-fighting and threatening Mandar with his artillery; setting Baranglompo on fire; firing on Fort Rotterdam in Makassar; frightening the ruler of Boné by entering the River Cenrana aboard strange ships; and ordering six assassinations in Kera, a village in northern Wajoq.\(^{40}\) He was then called to trial to account for his actions.

La Maddukelleng made a seven point argument in his defense. He claimed that he was justified in killing To Passarai because he had murdered a Wajoese man in Pasir. He then argued that it was not he but his subjects who killed the Bonéan messenger, and that because this occurred at sea, they could not be held accountable. He explained that by positioning his guns in Mandar, he was only trying to protect himself from the possibility that the ruler of Mandar would unjustly claim victory in a cockfight; and that when his subjects burned houses in Baranglompo and Balangcaddi, they did so for religious reasons because the houses were empty. He justified firing on Fort Rotterdam by saying that he was only returning fire. He also claimed that he did not change ships before entering the River

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\(^{39}\) Ms, No. 126 of Nederlands Bijbel Genootschap’s collection in the Leiden University library.

\(^{40}\) In *Lontaraq Wajoq*, Vol. III, the crimes are listed as follows: killing a Bonéan messenger; robbing To Passarai in Tobonio; punishing Mandar; burning the islands of Ujung Pandang; killing fishermen in Makassar; firing cannons on the Dutch Fort Rotterdam and chased a ship in Mandar; and bringing strange ships to the lake. Leid Cod Or 1923 VI lists them as robbing To Passarai in Tobonio; waging war against Pasir; killing the messenger of Boné in Kail; killing La Cellaq, a noble from Luwuq; setting fire to the houses on Berrang and Kodingareng; aiming his weapons at Boné and thereby destabilizing the Tellumpocco. (f. 12)
Cenrana; and that he killed people in Kera for the sake of revenge. Either La Maddukelleng’s replies were sufficient to satisfy the court, or his armed followers swayed the court’s opinion, and he was acquitted of the charges brought against him and permitted to leave Tosora.

Following La Maddukelleng’s acquittal, the power shift within the Telumpocco accelerated. For a long time, Bone had been the most powerful of the three united lands. The Treaty of Timurung, which created this alliance, specified that Bone was the oldest of the three brothers. Following the Makassar War, Bone under La Tenritatta and La Patauq was certainly the most powerful. This state of affairs began to change after the rule of La Patauq, however, as has been recounted in the chapter on the Wajoese in Makassar. This new power balance was reflected in the acquittal of La Maddukelleng. His arguments in defense of himself were far from indisputable. Indeed, according to Zainal Abidin, they actually angered the Tellumpocco but it acquitted him nevertheless. Thus it appears that his acquittal may have been dictated more by the power that La Maddukelleng now wielded rather than by the persuasiveness of his defense.

Following his trial, La Maddukelleng went to Sengkang, but departed almost at once because the city was surrounded by the forces of the Tellumpocco. He then went to Peneki where he was inaugurated as Arung Pénéki. The authority of his new position gave La Maddukelleng the means to force the Boneans to leave Peneki, thereby precipitating a war with Bone. The Boneans first

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41 Noorduyn, “Arung Singkang,” pp. 66-67. In Lontarak Wajoq, Vol. III, he explains killing the Bonean messenger by saying that people in the West just kill each other all the time; explains robbing To Passarai in order to seek revenge for his brother Daeng Matekko; explains burning Mandar by saying that he was just passing by when he was fired upon, so he returned the fire; explains burning the islands because there were no people there, only Satan; he explains killing fisherman because he was just passing by and they ran; said that he fired back at the Dutch Fort out of self-defense; and that when he took strange boats up the river, he was only trying to get home on the only boats he had. In Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, La Maddukelleng defends himself by saying that he only seized the property which To Passarai had robbed from Daeng Matekko; that his wife was rightfully entitled to rule in Pasir; that he killed La Cellaq in self defense as is justified by the law of the fishes; that he burned the islands off the coast of Makassar because he thought the people there were hostile; and that he is not turning his weapons against the Tellumpocco if only the Tellumpocco will agree to be allies. (f. 12) That La Maddukelleng attacked To Passarai in the Tobunio river as revenge for having attacked Daeng Matekko in Selangor is attested to in Dutch records, specifically, the trial of To Passarai. (Legal examination of Prince To Passarai, 27.6.1735, VOC 2327, ff. 1250-1251, f. 1256) According to Sautijn, La Maddukelleng allowed the murder of a messenger who was sent to the Bonean queen’s uncle To Passarai, and had it been in his power he would not have spared To Passarai, either. (Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, f. 192.)

42 Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan yang tak kenal menjerah,” p. 27.
43 Noorduyn, Een Achtiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wajo’, p. 129; Noorduyn, “Arung Singkang,” p. 64. Whereas some lontaraq state that the people of Pénéki asked La Maddukelleng to be their ruler and that
retaliatory act was to invade Pénéki, following which they made the strategic mistake of burning other places in Wajoq. The population was enraged by these acts which are described in the lontaraq as Bonén aggression, with the result that many of its members rebelled and joined forces with La Maddukelleng. Boné was no longer fighting a pirate but the Wajorese population.

The Tellumpocco’s unity suffered tremendously as a result. Eventually, La Maddukelleng would assume leadership of the Tellumpocco, but first he waged war on Boné. The Wajorese were able to seize the Bonén fort south of Pénéki, but there was dissent within the ranks. Several of Wajoq’s constituent polities, such as Pattampanua, Wágé and Gilireng, opted to side with Boné because at this early stage in the conflict they perceived their best interests as lying with Boné. Their switch exemplifies the manner in which politied within Wajoq could choose their allegiance according to the manner in which they perceived their best interests.

Word of the conflict between Boné and Wajoq reached Makassar on 5 July 1736. Although the Dutch sided with their traditional ally Boné, their attention was focused on Maros where the Makassarese Karaeng Bontolangkasa and Arung Kaja were leading a rebellion against them. They nevertheless supported the Bonén queen Arung Timurung with weapons, powder and supplies and even sent a small contingent to Cenrana under the command of Captain Nathanel Steinmetz. Steinmetz’ efforts to assist the Bonéans against the Wajorese met with resistance from Wajorese-inclined ministers within the Bonén court. He reported that the queen Arung Timurung had at first been determined to fight the enemy but had lost some of her resolve because her ministers advised against it. Eventually he realized that three of the principal Bonén ministers, the Makkedang Tana, the Maddanrang and the To Marilaleng, were all conspiring with the Wajorese. One example of their treachery was postponing the bombardment of Tosora on the pretext that they were not yet fully prepared, though they were actually giving the Wajorese time to prepare their defenses.

the Bonéans left voluntarily (Leid Cod Or 1922 VI, ff. 12-13), Dutch records suggest that La Maddukelleng may have captured Pénéki by force. (Police Council Resolution, Makassar, 30 August, 1737, VOC 2409 f. 157.)

46 Noordyn, Een Achtste-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo”, p. 129.
47 Letter from N. Steinmetz in Lageür to J. Sautijn et al in Makasar, 13.10.1736, VOC 2409, ff. 677-696.
48 Letter from N. Steinmetz in Cenrana to J. Sautijn et al in Makasar, 26.10.1736, VOC 2409, f. 718.
launched, the To Marilaleng falsely reported that they had run out of powder. Steinmetz tried to keep this information from the Bonéan queen, but at this point Sautijn recalled him to Makassar in order to avoid further calamity. Seeing that the war was going badly, the queen herself also took refuge in Bontualaq with the pretext that things could be better resolved from there.49

In his outgoing report for his successor, Sautijn expressed his amazement that the Wajorese could resist without help and weapons from the Company. Part of their ability stemmed from their overseas connections. Besides the support that La Maddukelleng had brought with him from Kalimantan, the Wajorese also received help from allies in Sumbawa. La Maddukelleng’s staunch ally Karaeng Bontolangkasa had lived in Sumbawa following his exile from Goa and had married the daughter of the Sumbawa ruler Amas Madina (b. 1688-d.1725).50 The queen of Boné reported that there were Wajorese allies in Sumbawa who supplied them with large quantities of gunpowder, shot and provision. To this end 10 ships stood ready to go to Sumbawa in 1736.51 The importance of this connection is also documented in certain lontaraq which state that the Wajorese from Sumbawa provided Wajoq with guns and blunderbusses.52

That the Wajorese from Sumbawa were able to provide such assistance attests to their commercial success in their new homeland. As mentioned in chapter three, the Wajorese had longstanding trading relations in Sumbawa. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Wajorese community on Sumbawa was firmly entrenched and numerous Sumbawan nobles were half-Wajorese. When the Wajorese community had a dispute with their hosts in 1787, the resultant mixed loyalties became apparent. When one Sumbawan faction encircled and attacked the Wajorese kampong, a group of Wajorese-inclined nobles reportedly sent ammunition and provisions to their relatives.53 Furthermore, the Wajorese apparently tried to play different factions of Sumbawans off of each other so as to advance their own interests by forming an alliance with a group of disgruntled Sumbawan nobles while secretly accepting the support of their adversary Lalo Muhammad.54 Given their instrumental role in the provision of weapons for La Maddukelleng’s campaigns during the late-1730s, and the manner in

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49 Memorie van Sautijn aan Smout, Makassar, 14.10.1737, VOC 2409, ff. 196-197.
50 Ibid, ff. 176, 200-201.
51 Letter from Arung Timurung in Cenrana to J. Sautijn et al in Makassar, 9.5.1736, VOC 2409, f. 771.
52 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 15.
53 Noorduyn, Bina en Sumbawa, p. 22.
which they continued to lend Wajoq support during the Pénerti War during the mid-eighteenth century,\textsuperscript{55} it is odd that the Wajorese on Sumbawa could not obtain outside help during its own hour of need. Yet according to a letter from the ruler of Sumbawa, the Wajorese were left to their own devices during the conflict of 1787.\textsuperscript{56} Whether or not the ruler of Sumbawa’s report was accurate, ties between the Wajorese on Sumbawa and on Sulawesi remained close during the 1730s.

While waiting for reinforcements from Sumbawa, La Maddukelleng assumed Wajoq’s leadership. Shortly after the confrontation with Bone, he replaced La Salewangeng as Arung Matoa. The lontaraq describe how La Saléwangeng resigned. At a meeting in Tosora, he suggested that he was old and tired and that Wajoq should find a new ruler. The people replied that as long as he was alive, they did not want him to go because Wajoq had prospered under his rule. But La Saléwangeng persisted, and so the people suggested that he select one of his grandchildren to lead Wajoq. La Saléwangeng replied, “I do not see anyone who could lead the Wajoese in fighting as well as La Maddukelleng.”\textsuperscript{57} Arung Bénteng then went to speak to La Maddukelleng at Paria, which he was helping to defend. La Maddukelleng agreed to accept the appointment, and on 6 November 1736\textsuperscript{58} became the thirty-first Arung Matoa Wajoq.\textsuperscript{59} La Saléwangeng, whose rule had already lasted for twenty years, remained an advisor until his death eight years later.\textsuperscript{60} VOC archives, however, suggest that the transition might not have been so peaceful. Letters from Datu Baringeng and Arung Timurung report that La Saléwangeng was in fact dethroned.\textsuperscript{61} Given the record of La Maddukelleng’s previous and subsequent activities, this version is more likely accurate.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{56} Letter from Brugman in Pénerti to Gov. Cornelis Sinkelaar in Makassar, 4.3.1762, ANRI, Makassar 280, Stukken handelende over den Pensekischen Oorlog, unpaginated.
\textsuperscript{57} Noorduyn, Bima and Sumbawa, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{58} While more succinct, Leid Cod Or 1923 VI also recounts how La Saléwangeng resigned because he did not consider himself fit to wage war. (f. 14)
\textsuperscript{59} Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan jang tak kenal menjerah,” p. 29. Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 14, says 2 Rajab 1148 = 18 November 1735
\textsuperscript{60} Lontarak Wajo, Vol. III, pp. 381-382.
\textsuperscript{61} Thereafter he became known as La Essoë ri Pattujunna, or Salaiennge Pattujunna. (Lontarak Wajo, Vol. III, p. 382.)
\textsuperscript{62} Letter from the Bonean prince Datu Baringeng in Cerrana to J. Sautijn in Makassar, Wednesday 8 Saban 1736, VOC 2409, II. 748-749,
As arung matoa, La Maddukelleng took a vow to free Wajoq from all of its oppressors. He encouraged all the Wajorese to take up arms against all those attacking Wajoq. He also sought reimbursement of the money, people and goods seized by Boné in 1670 and repeatedly launched attacks on northern Boné. He was not, however, immediately successful. In March 1737 the Makkadangang Tana reported to the Dutch that the Bonéans attacked the Wajorese and won over ten negeri. 900 Wajorese perished in that battle, which led them to seek a ceasefire from the Bonéan queen Arung Timurung which she granted. Wajorese lontaraq describe other conflicts in which the Wajorese were more successful against Boné and its allies, such as their numerous attacks on northern Boné and Sidénréng, and when Soppeng requested a ceasefire. They also describe how, during these engagements, La Gauq Datu Pammana, only recently installed as Pillaq Wajoq, proved himself to be particularly valiant and loyal to La Maddukelleng during this war. In the summer of 1737 an agreement was finally reached in which Boné and Soppeng reimbursed Wajoq for the goods, people and money that were seized by Arung Palakka and Arung Bélo in 1670. The fact that such payments were demanded more than fifty years after the offense testifies to the strength of Wajorese resentment and pride. Boné and Soppeng began recompensating Wajoq in installments and Wajoq grew in strength.

Yet La Maddukelleng’s ambitions extended beyond the restoration of Wajoq’s lost people, territory and goods. He sought to mobilize Wajoq and its allies, especially Boné, which he viewed as having brought the Dutch to Sulawesi, to expel the Dutch from Makassar. At a meeting of the Tellumpocco in Timurung in October 1737, he stated this explicitly. “Wajoq wants Boné to force the

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64 Resolutions from Fort Rotterdam, Makassar, 19.3.1737, VOC 2409, ff. 300-301. This information was reported by the Makkedang tana.
65 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, ff. 14-16. Some of these attacks, such as the 1736 attack on Sidénréng, are confirmed in Dutch records. (Letter from Arung Timurung in Cenrana to J. Sautijn et al in Makassar, 21Ramadan, 1736, VOC 2409, f. 765.)
68 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, ff. 21-22.
69 Terms of peace of 11 June 1737 are found in Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 253.
Dutch to leave, for as long as they’re here, the Tellumpocco will be in decline.”

Plans for expelling the Dutch were delayed by a political crisis in Boné. When Arung Bénténg, the Cakkuridi and La Maddukelleng all went to Timurung to incite the Tellumpocco to oust the Dutch, Boné dallied and refused to reply as long as Daéné Manjepe was absent. Upon his return to Timurung, the Bonéans sent La Using to Wajoq with the message that they would prefer not to force the Dutch to leave before Boné had a ruler according to adat. Wajoq countered by demanding that they install an Arumpone soon.

In the late 1730s there were three contenders for the throne of Boné: Batari Toja, La Oddang Riuq and I Denra Datu. Batari Toja, also known by her title Arung Timurung, claimed the throne as the daughter of a former ruler, La Patauq. She was an opponent of La Maddukelleng even before he returned to Sulawesi because she considered him a threat to Bonéan paramountcy. She was not, however, either forceful or effective in wielding power, and repeatedly lost her position to other nobles; this time, to La Oddang. La Oddang Riuq Daéné Mattiri was Karaeng of Tanété. He was an eager participant in war and had a reputation for being of so strange character that he acquired the nickname “the Mad Duke.” In September 1737 he deposed Batari Toja, and in November assumed the Arumponéship himself. A week after he was inaugurated as Arumponé, La Maddukelleng instructed him to go to Makassar and rid it of the Dutch. In Makassar, however, La Oddang was not acknowledged as Arumponé and therefore could secure neither the support of Goa nor that of the Bonéans who resided there. In response to La Oddang’s usurpation, Batari Toja, along with Datu Soppéng and Payung Luwuq, evacuated to Bontualaq from where she still commanded the loyalty of many Bonéans in Makassar. As part of the cosmopolitan port-city of Makassar, Bontualaq was home to numerous, constantly intermingling groups. Whereas rulers like Batari Toja could use these groups as commercial allies, they could not always count on their unwavering support.

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71 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 24.
73 Stavorinus provides us with an interesting, albeit unbelievable, anecdote concerning La Oddang’s personality: “Of this Aroe Tanete it was related that, like the ancient inhabitants of Celebes, he was a cannibal, and remarkably fond of human flesh, so that he even used to fatten his prisoners, and cutting their heart out alive, he eat it raw, with pepper and salt, esteeming it the most delicious morsel of all.” (Stavorinus, *Voyages to the East Indies*, p. 221.)
74 Batari Toja assumed the throne of Boné in 1714 after the death of her father La Patauq. Over the next decade, she abdicated and was reinstated twice. (Stavorinus, *Voyages to the East Indies*, p. 218.)
At this point, the third contender for the throne entered the picture. I Denra Datu was a nine-year-old Goan princess who based her claim to the throne of Bone through her mother's side. In May 1738, she came to Tosora, where she expressed sympathy for La Maddukelleng's cause and requested his help in pressing her claim to the throne. A few months later, in July, Soppeng asked Wajoq for permission to appoint Penna La Omo Arung Menge as Datu, because they disliked La Oddang. A month and a half later, La Omo Arung Menge was inaugurated in Soppeng. Having lost influence in Soppeng, La Oddang then lost his influence in Bone. La Maddukelleng then took control of this confused situation. He obliged I Denra Datu by supporting her claim to the throne, and in December 1738 she and the flag of Bone, Samparajaé, left Tosora and went to Bone with his instructions to the Bonéans that they accept her as Arumpone. In addition, he required that La Oddang renounce his claim to the throne and return the regalia to I Denra Datu. 76

These events make it clear that the politics of both Soppeng and Bone were under La Maddukelleng's sway. Had it not been for the pocket of Batari Toja's supporters in Makassar, he would have had effective political control over the Tellumpocco. His inability to control Batari Toja's supporters, however, was to prove crucial. Ultimately it would ruin his plan to expell the Dutch.

Having heard rumors of a possible attack, 77 and aware of the increasingly large role that Wajoq was playing in the affairs of South Sulawesi, the Dutch grew concerned about what these events might portend for them. 78 Their response therefore was an attempt to establish a lasting, albeit unequal, peace with the Wajorese. On 7 October 1738, Smout received a communication from Wajoq brought him by the Wajorese messenger La Using, to which he replied that he would like Arung Matoa La Maddukelleng to come to Makassar. Smout further stated that he wanted to promote peace in Celebes and to improve the situation so that the Wajorese merchants could once again prosper commercially. 79

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77 In 1737 the Makadanatana reported that the Makassarese together with Daeng Mamaroe had plans to move against the Dutch. (Resolutions from Fort Rotterdam, Makassar, 19.3.1737, VOC 2409, ff. 302-303.)
78 Letter to Governor General Adriaan Valckenier from A. Smout et al, Makassar, 26.10.1738, VOC 2466, f. 3.
79 It is interesting to note that Smout had a high opinion of the Wajorese. In his memoirs he wrote that the Wajorese flourished because of their firmly established reputation of upstanding honesty in their affairs. He relates the story of a Wajorese trader in Sandrabone who owed a few hundred rijksdaalders to a shopkeeper named Sterner. The Wajorese trader asked one of Smout's spies to transport a couple
Finally he expressed the hope for a reliable report from Wajoq since the Governor was trying his best to rectify the problems in Celebes.  

The Wajorese messenger returned to Makassar on 25 October bearing the message that the Arung Matoa had never considered the Company as an enemy but rather as a friend, and that he had always had love for the Company and had adhered faithfully to their treaty. The governor’s response was that the Company first and foremost wanted to restore peace to Celebes, which was the reason he had sent the letter to the Arung Matoa. He added that the Dutch wanted to understand the reasons for the troubles between the rulers of Bone and Wajoq. The messenger quickly answered that the differences between Wajoq and Bone were settled and that they were now friends. He also informed the governor that it was necessary for a European envoy to be sent to Wajoq to meet the Arung Matoa, and that if this were done, there could be little doubt that the Arung Matoa himself would then come to Makassar.

The Dutch thought that it would be very beneficial if the Arung Matoa were to come to Makassar, and so they decided to send Lieutenant Philip Lodewijk Figera, and senior interpreter Jan Hendrik Vol to Wajoq. They were instructed not to complete negotiations with the rulers of Wajoq but instead simply to announce their presence to the Arung Matoa. In order to show the Company’s willingness to receive the Arung Matoa in Makassar they were to inform him that they had come on the advice of the Wajorese messenger. They were expected to remain for one to six days in order to see how their message was received, but they were instructed to avoid staying for eight to ten days. In the event that they were not admitted or that the Arung Matoa could not decide if he would come to Makassar or not, then the expedition was instructed to return to Makassar forthwith. Under all circumstances, however, they were to try and ascertain exactly how large Wajoq was and how the conflict with Bone had developed.

...
Dutch records relate that Figera and Vol departed for Wajoq on 3 November. On 10 November, they reached Cempaga where they were hospitably greeted by To Assa, La Maddukelleng’s collaborator. Figera’s report, however, describes him as the head of Cempaga, suggesting either that To Assa had a political function within Wajoq or that Figera and Vol misunderstood who he was. The next day, 11 November, they arrived in the capital of Tosora. There they had an audience with the Arung Matoa, together with representatives from the Tellumpocco and the lesser nobles of Wajoq.

They delivered the Company’s letter, and the Arung Matoa promised to consider it and inform them of his decision. Two days later they were told that the Arung Matoa and four of the forty Wajorese rulers would indeed go to Fort Rotterdam. The Arung Matoa made it clear, however, that he was not aware of any binding contract between the Wajorese and the Company later than the one signed when the Wajorese went to Fort Rotterdam after the attack on Tosora in 1670. He added that he was prepared to come to Makassar in person to meet with the Dutch as long as the Tellumpocco was permitted to maintain its sovereignty.

The Dutch emissaries also gathered information outside official channels and learned from the messenger La Using that the Arung Matoa wanted to nullify the old contract between the Wajorese and the Dutch. Indeed, had the Dutch not brought a copy of it with them, he would not have known that it even existed. The emissaries found it difficult to give credence to this account, and so they asked their confidant Daeng Mangili to learn more about La Maddukelleng’s intentions. He spoke confidentially with La Using, who informed him that the Arung Matoa intended to restore the ruler of Goa to his former authority and glory. Furthermore, in order to satisfy the Tellumpocco, the Arung Matoa wanted the Company to restore all of the territories that it had acquired from the Goan ruler. Figera’s commission also learned from the Bonéan Tomaratia that troubles with the Bonéans could be expected to continue, as long as the Bonéans were not united with the Tanétans. In his opinion, however, the Arung Matoa’s courage would vanish if Boné and Tanété were united. On 16 November, they had another audience with the Arung Matoa and were given a letter. The latter explained that this

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84 Translation of a letter from the Arung Matoa to den E.E. Agtb. Heer, 15.11.1738, VOC 2466, f. 45.
letter was just a formality and that it contained no other information than what they had already been
told. That same afternoon, they left Tosora.⁸⁵

When Figera’s expedition returned to Makassar, they brought with them a Dutch sailor named
Jan Lambregts who had been residing in Tosora. The story of his kidnapping attests to the power and
bravery of the Wajorese in the 1730s. He said that in July 1737, while trying to procure provisions for
their ship (De Goswiena), he and one of his mates were abducted in a place he identified as the Bay of
Baukela. They were immediately stripped of their clothing and taken to Bata Putih where they were
held captive for three months without any hope of escape. Then one night Lambregts was forced onto a
ship, where he was blindfolded until the ship was on the open sea. When the ship landed, he could not
say where he was, but from there he was brought over land to Tosora. There he was given by his
captors as a present from Daeng Mamaru to the Arung Matao. He was kept there for four or five days
before he was forcefully brought to a temple where he was shaved and circumcised, indicating his
conversion to Islam. He was then forced to remain in Wajoq for eight months, during which time he
observed that the Wajorese twice received shipments of gunpowder, but from whom or where he could
not say.⁸⁶

Bugis accounts of these events differ substantially from those of the Dutch. According to
Lontarak Wajoq III, the Dutch sent a messenger with greetings from Makassar, together with the
promise that the Dutch were willing to supply the Wajorese with anything they needed. The Arung
Matoa replied that Wajoq did not want to ask the Company for presents, but only sought security and
peace for the Tellumppocco.⁸⁷ The Leid Or Cod 1923 VI, on the other hand, describes an exchange of
letters, after which the Dutch sent an interpreter asking if Wajoq remembered its friendship with the
Company. It goes on to record that La Maddukelieng replied “Wajoq denies being friends with the
Company. To Unru only acquainted Wajoq with the Company, but To Unruq is now dead. We do not
know each other anymore. If the Company wishes, then we will renew our mutual acquaintance; let

⁸⁵ Report of Lt. Philip Lodewijk Figera and Interpreter Jan Hendrik Vol concerning their expedition to
Wajoq, 20.11.1738, VOC 2466, ff. 43-44.
⁸⁶ Relation of the sailor Jan Lambregts concerning his imprisonment by the enemy, 27.11.1738, VOC
2466, ff. 49-52.
them come here or we will go to Makassar.' According to the lontaraq, the interpreter returned to Makassar on 16 November 1738, which is confirmed in Dutch records.

Regardless of what transpired between the Dutch and the Wajorese, any attempt at reconciling their differences was too late. The Wajorese had already begun sending weapons to their allies in Goa. No matter what he said or did not say, clearly La Maddukelleng was more determined than ever to force the Dutch out of Makassar. In February 1739 he and his allied army departed for Makassar to attack the Dutch. Almost immediately there was dissent among the ranks. An unspecified member or members of the Tellumpocco suggested that they reconsider attacking the Dutch. La Madukelleng replied "Fine, Tellumpocco, go back to your village if you do not want to go to war. The Dutch in Ujung Pandang only have 500 soldiers and I also have 500. So I'll go alone to fight them. Hopefully I can get them to leave Ujung Pandang (Makassar)." The Tellumpocco accepted this suggestion, and many of their people did indeed retreat, but La Maddukelleng remained steadfast.

La Maddukelleng arrived in Makassar on 5 April 1739. There he found more unrest and considerably less support than he had expected. When he and Karaeng Bontolangkasa approached the rulers of Goa asking for their support, they were told that they must consult their ministers before granting this request. La Maddukelleng apparently rejected this temporizing, saying that they did not know exactly who their friends were. This led the minister, the Karaeng Matoa named J Mappasanreq, to defect to the Dutch, absconding at night with the Sudannga (a sword, the regalia of Goa) and storing it with the Dutch. Another minister, Karaeng Garassiq also went over to the Dutch. Karaeng Bontolangkasa was then made ruler of Goa, but only four ministers gave him their support.

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88 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 30.
89 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 23.
90 Noorduyn's published version of the chronicle also mentions hesitation to attack the Dutch, but it does not specify exactly who hesitated, simply that La Maddukelleng was warned. Noorduyn, Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo', pp. 290-293. Zainal Abidin and Andi Alam say that it was both Soppėng and Wajoq. (Zainal Abidin Farid and Alam, "La Maddukelleng, Fahlawan jang tak kenal menjera,", p. 31.)
92 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, ff. 31-32.
Many Boneans also opted to side with the Dutch. This led Wajoq to launch a punitive expedition against Boné under the command of Arung Bénténg La Conkkang Daéng Situju. The Boneans were waiting for the Wajorese at their fortress in Timurung, and a battle ensued forcing the Boneans to abandon their stronghold. Thereafter the Wajorese established a fort at Macanang, from which base they attacked Palakka and Watamponé along with the small paliliq surrounding them. Then the chief Islamic official in Boné, Kadi Daéng Mallengu, offered 40 black buffaloes as tribute to the Wajorese, saying that he considered the Boneans who sided with the Dutch to be Dutch, and asking Arung Bénténg for mercy. Arung Bénténg did not accept the buffaloes, but persuaded the Kadi to swear that he would continue to consider the Bonean who sided with the Dutch to be Dutch and not Bonean even after they return from Makassar. Arung Bénténg then went to Soppeng and reaffirmed his friendship with Datu Soppeng La Passawung and Wajoq’s alliance with Soppeng. He then proceeded to Tanété.

While some Wajorese lontaraq provide information about Arung Bénténg’s attack on the Boneans, most of them provide precious little information about La Maddukelleng’s attack on Makassar. The exception is Leid Cod Or 1923 VI. It relates that during the first half of May, La Maddukelleng tried to negotiate the return of the Sudannga. The Dutch response was to claim that they had to consult with Batavia before taking any such action and that they continued to uphold the provisions of the Treaty of Bungaya. Frustrated, the Wajorese and Karaéng Bontolangkasa marched on Makassar on Saturday 16 May 1739 but were repulsed. Thereafter the Makkadangng Tana fled to Kampong Berru with the Bonean flags, the Samparaja and the Pajumpulaweng, and I Denra Datu fled to Bontualaq. It was thus clear to the Wajorese that the Boneans were on the side of the Dutch. During the next three weeks they launched three more attacks on the Dutch at Makassar, all of which were repulsed. During the campaign, Karaéng Bontolangkasa was injured by a bullet from within his own ranks. He called for La Maddukelleng, and blamed their failure on the lack of unity between the Makassarese and Bugis. He therefore advised his friend to withdraw because he believed that Goa was

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96 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, ff. 32-33.
Yet La Maddukelleng refused to accept defeat. On the night of 20-21 July 1739, there was a total eclipse of the moon that darkened the sky for two hours and allowed the Wajorese forces to move about without detection. They invaded Goa but were unable to achieve the total victory for which they were hoping. When they also failed to expel the Dutch, they retreated to Wajoq to await a Dutch counterattack. Meanwhile, Karaeng Bontolangkasa died in Bontopan on 8 September 1739. The Bugis lontaraq explain that he refused to let his wounds be treated because of shame (siriq) at the demise of Goa.

La Maddukelleng’s mission failed in large part because he was unable to secure the total loyalty of the Goan and Bonean people. The Goan rulers in Kampong Berru and the Boneans under Batari Todja all sided with the Dutch. The dissent among the various factions stemmed in part from personal disagreements, and in part from different interpretations about who was responsible for bringing the Dutch to Sulawesi in the first place. One lontaraq blames Goa for treating its vassals too harshly and thereby forcing Arung Palakka to seek assistance. Other lontaraq blame Arung Palakka entirely and thus justify La Maddukelleng’s deeds.

After retreating from Makassar, La Maddukelleng joined Arung Bénténg and attacked Tanéité. The Wajorese lost the ensuing battle in part because the Soppéng contingent deserted on the battlefield. The Wajorese were desperate and had to retreat. After seventeen days in Tosora, the Wajorese launched an attack on Soppéng. According to one source this was to punish Soppéng for having deserted in the middle of the battle in Tanéité.

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98 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 33.
101 Lontarak Wajo, Vol. III, p. 403, provides an interesting encounter between a Wajorese messenger representing La Maddukelleng and Boné. When La Maddukelleng perceives that the Arumpone and Karaeng Talloq are joining forces against Goa, he sends a message to the Arumpone saying “Greetings to my child Arumpone. I truly know the words of the Tellempocco from the meeting at Cenrana, and I know that the Tellempocco is ruined because of the arrival of the Dutch. Before they arrived we helped each other, and did not destroy each other’s glory. That is why I want to drive them out of Makassar.” To this, the Arumpone replied that Arung Palakka had gone to Java and asked the Dutch to come here because of the bad things that Goa was doing (i.e. treating its subjected lands harshly.)
102 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI f. 26 and KTILV Or. 545 No. 219 Stukken uit de Japanse tijd, h Hikajat Pendek District-Wadjo, f. 1.
103 Lontarak Wajo, Vol. III, p. 403. There is, however, evidence that La Maddukelleng also used cannons mounted on ships.
104 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 34.
subduing Soppeng in a single day.\textsuperscript{105} La Pacau was then reinstated then as Datu.\textsuperscript{106} Twenty months later, La Maddukelleng married Datu Lompulleq We Tompi, the sister of a prominent noble in Soppeng,\textsuperscript{107} thereby reaffirming Wajoq's alliance with Soppeng.

**Counterattack**

One year after La Maddukelleng married Datu Lompulleq, the Dutch under Admiral Smout, aided by people from Bone, Buton, Luwuq and Soppeng, launched an attack against Wajoq. They departed on 3 December 1740 and arrived at Cenrana on 24 December 1740. Many of Wajoq's *liliq* immediately switched loyalties and sided with the Dutch and the Bonéans.\textsuperscript{108} The Wajorese tried to buy them off, but the Dutch would not accept either redemption money nor a *pappasoroq*, a gift consisting of buffalos, rice, fruits et cetera that, it was hoped, would make the Dutch turn around and go home.\textsuperscript{109} Prior to the Makassar War, Speelman had said that Dutch lives could be repaid only in blood and not in money. Smout apparently felt the same way, because he rejected the Wajorese offer of a peaceful settlement.\textsuperscript{110}

Fighting began in January of the following year. Wajorese *lontaraq* say that the Wajorese took numerous Bonéan heads and that they drove away both the Bonéans and the Dutch.\textsuperscript{111} Smout's outgoing report states that the Dutch did not press this first attack against the Wajorese. They had just received news of the Chinese rebellion in Batavia, which caused a commotion and distracted them from the affair at hand. The Dutch were also disheartened by lack of provisions. They went hungry for almost five days because the surrounding land had been laid waste, and because a resupply ship was detained.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, they suffered from illnesses. Smout's report mentions a second battle in which the Bonéans torched southern Wajoq.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, there appear to have been numerous other

\textsuperscript{107} Noorduyn's version says that her name was Wé Togeq. Noorduyn, *Een Achttiende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo*, pp. 296-297.
\textsuperscript{109} Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 36; Matthes, *Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek*, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{110} The Wajorese attempts to pay redemption money are not recorded in Smout's memorie. He does, however, write about this desire to resolve the conflict peacefully.
\textsuperscript{111} Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 36.
\textsuperscript{112} Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 250; Matthes, *Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek*, p. 26.
skirmishes that did not involve the Dutch directly. Described in the Wajorese lontaraq, these encounters include a battle in which the Wajorese were defeated because their allies ran away before there was even any bloodshed; an attack at Patila and Patampeng where the Wajorese chased the Soppengers back home;\textsuperscript{114} and Wajorese attacks on northern Bone.\textsuperscript{115} Smout's report also mentions how the Boneans attacked Tosora against his orders.\textsuperscript{116} Thus the conflict turned out to be as much a war between Bone and Wajoq as it was a Dutch reprisal against the Wajorese.

With the exception of Leid Cod Or 1923 VI,\textsuperscript{117} most of the lontaraq do not mention the rather lengthy negotiations that took place between the Wajorese and the Dutch. For twenty-five days, messengers went back and forth between the two camps. According to Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, the Dutch demanded that Wajoq return Bone's cannons, provide compensation for the people from Maccongkiq who had been killed or kidnapped, and reimburse the Company for its expenses. Wajoq, however, would not agree to these terms.\textsuperscript{118} Both Wajorese lontaraq and Dutch records describe numerous other Dutch attempts to resolve the conflict by negotiation, but record no success in these efforts.\textsuperscript{119}

Dutch records describe how, while the negotiations were at a standstill, Arung Tanete La Oddang had requested Dutch assistance in mounting an attack against Lagusi. The Dutch were very happy to oblige because this would enable them to leave the swamps of Cenrana which were making them sick. After this village had been captured, Smout expressed his desire for a Dutch withdrawal. The Boneans strongly objected, saying that if the Dutch left them today, the Wajorese would attack them tomorrow. Furthermore, the Boneans emphasized how they had attacked Tosora at their own peril and that the Dutch therefore should not desert them now. Smout agreed to provide them with six soldiers and three cannons. Then the Dutch moved their camp to Lagusi in Pammana where they built a number of fortifications from which to fire upon Tosora. Lagusi was just across from Tosora and it was possible to fire upon the capital with cannons and mortars. Smout records the consternation of the Wajorese when they saw the Dutch so close to their capital. Yet the fortifications which the Dutch built

\textsuperscript{115} Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 37.
\textsuperscript{116} Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 251.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, ff. 37-38
\textsuperscript{118} Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 37.
in Lagusi did not serve their purpose as well as they had hoped. They were struck by fierce storms and tempests and then flooded by torrential rains and floods that destroyed the encampment. The Dutch therefore were forced to withdraw.\textsuperscript{120}

With no secure base of operations, and provisions running low, the Dutch were now in danger, and Smout therefore wanted more than ever to end the conflict peacefully. Presumably, however, the Wajorese understood this and were in no hurry to conclude a peace treaty that would limit their freedom.\textsuperscript{121} When negotiations were resumed, the Dutch proved to be much less demanding than before. \textit{Lontaraq} say that the Wajorese objected to the idea of an alliance or \textit{assobakeng}.\textsuperscript{122} According to Smout's report, the Wajorese stated that they were not anyone's slaves.\textsuperscript{123} They said that they would never be slaves of the Company but that if they were free, rather than subservient allies, like Bone and Goa, then they would have no objections to signing the treaty. The Bonéans, on the other hand, said that if the treaty made the Wajorese their equals, then they would not sign either. Smout assured the Wajorese that subservient ally could never mean slave in the Dutch language, but was still unable to get their agreement regarding this point.\textsuperscript{124}

The \textit{Leid Or Cod 1923 VI} records that the Wajorese and the Dutch both became bored and dissatisfied with the unsuccessful negotiations and that the Dutch simply walked away from them.\textsuperscript{125} Dutch records, on the other hand, state that an oral agreement was finally reached on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of March 1741. The agreement was recorded by the Dutch as follows: 1) The contract, made in Ujung Pandang at Castle Rotterdam on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} December 1670 between the president Maximiliaan de Jong of the Company and the Arung Matoa, ruler of Tosora with the name La Palili together with the other rulers and nobles of that country who are included, is completely renewed, as if it were inserted here word for word. 2) The Wajorese agree to restrict their travels, and in particular not to travel in the Bay of Tomini. 3) Wajoq promises Boné to leave Timurung to the Boneans, as the Arung Matoa agreed with

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Leid Or Cod 1923 VI}, ff. 37-39; Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 252.
\textsuperscript{120} Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, ff. 255-257.
\textsuperscript{121} Matthes, \textit{Over de Wadjorezen met hun Handels- en Scheepswetboek}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{122} Noorduyn, \textit{Een Achtienste-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wadjo'}, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{123} That such a reference is made in a contemporary source, as opposed to just in the \textit{lontaraq} which were written and recopied later lends credence to the antiquity and historical validity of the Wajorese motto.
\textsuperscript{124} Memorie van Smout aan Loten, Makassar, 1.6.1744, VOC 2628, f. 258.
the Queen in 1737. 4) Wajoq will restore any Bonean goods that are now being held in Tosora. 5)
Henceforth Bone and Wajoq shall be equals and shall not interfere with each other’s internal affairs.
Although they may comment on each other’s administrations, they will let each other’s rulers reign
peacefully and undisturbed, without exceptions. 6) In reverence for this treaty, both Wajoq and Bone
shall ask the Company to mediate in any dispute between them rather than independently take revenge
upon each other. 7) All acts of war and enmity will cease, and be forgiven and forgotten on both sides.
Peace will be fully restored as if there had never been any problem.126

The Dutch punitive expedition did not achieve the results they had hoped for it. In practical
terms the verbal agreement, which that Wajorese refused to sign, was nothing more than an honorable
retreat for the Dutch.127 Though the Wajorese Bone’s cannons and regalia, they had already been
reimbursed for many of the goods and people that Bone and Soppeng seized after the attack on Tosora
in 1670. Furthermore, in December 1742, the Wajorese merchants, who had fled from Makassar with
La Maddukelleng, were allowed to resettle there.128 Never did the Wajorese limit their travels as
agreed upon in the second article. On the contrary, as described in chapter three, their enterprises
blossomed to the detriment of Dutch trade. Thus, in sharp contrast to the defeat of 1670, the Wajorese
emerged from the conflict of 1739-1741 relatively unscathed.

Civil War

The departure of the Dutch did not mark the end of violence in Wajoq. On the contrary, a civil
war ensued that ravaged the country for more than a decade. The arbitrary behavior of La
Maddukelleng during this conflict challenges assumptions about his role as Wajoq’s great freedom
fighter as well as those about the democratic nature of Wajorese society.129

125 Leid Cod Or 1923 VI, f. 40.
126 F. W. Stapel, Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, Vol. V, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,
1938, pp. 314-316.
129 Notions of Wajorese democracy have been popularized by James Brooke (Rodney Mundy,
Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes,) Anthony Reid (“Merdeka: The Concept of Freedom in
Indonesia,”) and most vociferously by Andi Zainal Abidin (Zainal Abidin and Alam, “La
Maddukelleng, Pahlawan yang tak kenal menjerah,” Bingkisan, 1, 9; 1, 10; 1, 15; Andi Zainal Abidin,
“Beberapa Perbaikan Karangan Berjudul “La Maddukelleng, Pahlawan yang tak kenal menjerah" dan
“Pahlawan2 Bugis-Makassar di perantauan,” Bingkisan, 1, 22 (1968); A. Z. Abidin, “La Ma‘dukelleng
Menggalang Persatuan Sulwesi Selatan Menguair VOC,” Prisma, 9, 8, (8.8.1980.)
La Maddukelleng’s failure to expel the Dutch from South Sulawesi had not exhausted his power or ambitions. Just three days after the departure of the Dutch from Tosora on 29 March 1741, La Maddukelleng sent out his personal guard of pirates (paggoraq) to punish the vassals who had been disloyal and gone over to the Dutch side as soon as Smout approached. A number of them were all fined ten kati while others were shown pity and regarded as a “child” of Wajoq. Yet there remained internal dissent in Wajoq as well as among its vassals. Sidénréng’s loyalty was questioned, and it was threatened with an attack if it did not install Petta I Kaluwa as ruler. All negotiations to resolve this dispute failed, leading to an eight-month war in which Kapitan Laut To Assa was killed.

The most serious conflict arose out of a dispute between Arung Matoa La Maddukelleng and Pillaqé La Gauq. When La Maddukelleng first became Arung Matoa, La Gauq Datu Parnmana, Pillaq Wajoq, displayed particular valor and loyalty in La Maddukelleng’s campaigns. Now, however, La Maddukelleng turned against La Gauq. He tried to expel him for having incited Sidénréng, which La Gauq had done because the Addaluang of Sidénréng La Wawo was La Gauq’s brother-in-law. But La Gauq did not want to leave and countered by accusing La Maddukelleng of having acted arbitrarily, by attacking Sidénréng without first getting the approval of the Wajoqese council.

There was a meeting to discuss La Gauq’s crimes that resulted in a fine of ten kati being imposed on him. Yet La Maddukelleng was not satisfied. He insisted that La Gauq’s actions were inexcusable and that according to adat, he should either be beheaded or else be exiled until he redeemed himself by proving his worth. For the following two years, the populace objected to this demand and instead requested clemency on La Gauq’s behalf. La Maddukelleng then took matters into his own hands and shot La Gauq. The wounded La Gauq and his supporters fled to Sekkanasu where La Maddukelleng attacked them. The conflict escalated, spreading throughout Wajoq. According to the lontaraq, this was when the Wajoqese started wearing chainmail armor and gave preference to soldiers who could do so while riding horses.

132 Ibid, pp. 385-386.
Eventually, the conflict attracted the attention of the Karaeng of Goa. The Wajorese people were also dismayed by the conflict which affected the whole kingdom. Troubled by the deteriorating conditions, La Gauq and his wife discussed their mistakes and how they could end the strife in Wajoq. La Gauq then organized a strategic marriage between his brother-in-law and Arung Bénténg’s sister, thereby consolidating his relationship with Arung Bénténg. Later the two agreed that La Gauq should apologize again and that if La Maddukelleng would not accept this apology, they would attack him together. La Gauq then went to Tosora and once again asked La Maddukelleng for forgiveness, and this time his apology was accepted.

Although the long conflict between La Gauq and La Maddukelleng was finally resolved, peace was not restored. La Maddukelleng sent announcements of war to Wajoq’s liliq, and then attacked Sidénréng. In this effort, however, he failed to secure the support of the Ranreng Tua and the Pillaq. This led him to abandon his cause and, apparently in disgust, to resign his position as Arung Matoa. He said that he was made Arung Matoa on the battlefield, but that since Wajoq did not want him to lead them in battle anymore, it was fitting that they take back the Arung Matoaship on the battlefield. The Wajorese people accepted his resignation and La Maddukelleng retired to Pénéki.

La Maddukelleng is generally remembered as having restored some of the greatness and power that Wajoq lost during the Makassar War. He is also commemorated for never having surrendered to the Dutch, and for this reason in 1998 he was made a National Hero. Yet La Maddukelleng has not escaped criticism. Certain lontaraq are very critical of La Maddukelleng’s leadership. Although they recognize that he did indeed increase Wajoq’s strength in the beginning of his reign, they catalogue the hardships that he brought to Wajoq, such as loss of dependencies and impoverishment. Furthermore, he is accused of not following adat. He not only changed the manner in which the various lesser nobles

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135 Lontarak Wajo, Vol. III, pp. 436-437 and 442-443. Different lontaraq provide different versions of how this conflict was resolved. According to Noorduyn’s published chronicle, the Pillaq went to Boné and asked Boné to plea his case with Wajoq. Boné did, but the Arung Matoa would not pardon Pillaq La Gauq and the conflict lasted for four years, with both sides standing ready to fight. Finally there was a month of negotiations and peace was concluded. (Noorduyn, Een Achtien-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wado’, pp. 306-309.)
were represented on ceremonial occasions, and the costumes that they wore, but also acted arbitrarily without consulting the Wajorese government.\textsuperscript{137}

Indeed, La Maddukelleng is accused of ruining the very foundations upon which Wajoq was established. The statement of the first Arung Matoa Petta La Paléwo To Palipu that Wajoq was brave, rich, clever, strong and capable has legendary status among the Wajorese. But one anonymous \textit{lontaraq} accuses La Maddukelleng of thinking that he alone had these five characteristics, thereby leading him to act to Wajoq's detriment. This \textit{lontaraq} goes on to level other charges against him: he stripped Wajoq of its bravery by always declaring war without following the custom of first consulting with the three \textit{Bate}. He put an end to Wajoq's cleverness because he independently corresponded with the Dutch, and he weakened Wajoq's capabilities by judging \textit{liliq} very harshly and attacking those he thought were misbehaving, without even consulting Wajoq. By acting independently without consultation, he undermined Wajoq's strength. When questioned or criticized by part of Wajoq, he simply replied that if they did not want to participate, then they were not needed.\textsuperscript{138} This arrogance was condemned by his critics.

\textbf{Chapter Conclusion}

The interaction between Wajoq, its overseas communities, and its vassals in South Sulawesi during the first half of the eighteenth century shows that Wajoq's various constituents functioned in a similar manner, regardless as to whether they were located in South Sulawesi or not. At times they willingly provided assistance to the center, but at other times, they changed their focus according to how they perceived their own needs. Within Wajoq itself in South Sulawesi, this is exemplified by Pattampanua, Wage and Gilireng switching allegiance according to their own interests. On the transnational level it is exemplified by the overseas Wajorese communities that were equally autonomous and participated with the Wajoq center whenever that served their interests. Both South Sulawesi and overseas constituents were free to seek their own security in a variety of directions. In comparing the Wajorese to birds, La Paturusi To Maddualeng and the Makkedangang Tana anagogically refer to this freedom.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Lontarak Wajo}, Vol. III, pp. 447, 450.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, p. 451.
La Maddukelleng’s return and assumption of the arung matao ship can best be seen as the culmination of overseas participation in the Wajoese government. From around the time of La Maddukelleng’s birth, expatriates began playing an increasingly large role in Wajoese society. Successive arung matoa actively encouraged entrepreneurship and overseas commerce in particular as a means of strengthening Wajoq. State-supported entrepreneurs were expected to give back to Wajoq and in this manner Wajoq not only recovered from the traumatic aftermath of the Makassar War but also attained a paramount position within the hierarchy of states in South Sulawesi.

However brief, this paramountcy would not have been possible without the cooperation and contributions of Wajoese overseas communities. La Salewangeng’s refortification policies depended upon the purchase of arms overseas, a process which the overseas communities could facilitate. Similarly, La Maddukelleng’s campaigns depended upon the involvement of the Wajoese diaspora communities. He returned from eastern Kalimantan with both ships and people. Having arrived in Sulawesi, he then depended upon the cooperation of the Wajoese communities in both Makassar and Sumbawa for weapons and other support. Whereas such cooperation pre-dated La Maddukelleng’s return, his attempt to oust the Dutch from Makassar is still a prime example of how the Wajoese diaspora functioned. By the mid-eighteenth century, many Wajoese overseas communities had begun to identify with their host communities, but they remained involved in the activities of their homeland. It is this factor that made the diaspora communities an indispensable part of Wajoese statecraft.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

As stated at the outset of this study, one of the main features of Bugis statecraft is its confederative nature. Many of the kingdoms in South Sulawesi are actually conglomerations of smaller polities. While Goa and Boné are perhaps the most famous examples, the most revealing is Limaé Ajatappareng, the very name of which means “The Five States West of the Lake.” Constituent polities in such confederations usually have their own rulers, customs, origin myths and regalia. Joined together for mutual benefit, they separate when the relationship no longer appears advantageous. This dynamic is applied to inter-kingdom relations such as the Tellumpocco between Boné, Wajoq and Soppêng, as well as to relationships among the constituent parts of a kingdom, whether in South Sulawesi or beyond its shores.

Wajoq is a prime example of such a confederation, and has been described as “a number of small kingdoms or lands, bound to each other... but with their own freedoms since time immemorial.” What has not previously been recognized is the manner in which the Wajoqese confederation included not only constituent polities within the immediate vicinity but also Wajoqese migrant communities located overseas. These constituent polities of Wajoq could ally themselves with Wajoq or look elsewhere for affiliation as they saw fit. Only occasionally did they suffer military retribution from the center. Relationships were maintained through commercial links, family networks, representation, contributions to Wajoqese enterprises and cultural concepts binding each individual to the whole community. The Wajoq “diaspora,” therefore, was not an external factor but very much a constituent part of Wajoq.

Unifying the Constituents

Commerce was one of five principal means through which links among the Wajoqese were maintained. Wajoq’s location at the juncture of the peninsula’s main waterways made it particularly well suited for trade, which formed an important part of the Wajoqese economy. Cooperation among merchants served to unify the Wajoqese. Merchants had representatives whose appointment was required by Arung Matao La Saléwangeng to encourage cooperation and facilitate the profitability of trade. A similar dynamic existed among the overseas Wajoqese traders. The most obvious example of this is the convention
of matoa from the Wajoese communities in Sumbawa, Pasir and Makassar who agreed upon Amanna Gappa’s law code.

Trade was also significant because it was the primary source of income for many Wajoese. Even in western Sumatra, where commerce was a relatively unimportant part of the Wajoese community’s activities, Sultan Endey’s private trade apparently provided him with sufficient income that he could serve the English for years without pay. In contrast to the Wajoese community in western Sumatra, trade was the lifeblood of the Wajoese communities in eastern Kalimantan and Makassar. In eastern Kalimantan they gained control of the trade in such essential commodities as salt, and in Makassar they dominated the official VOC sanctioned trade in the early eighteenth century. In response to the rise in opportunities from English country trade, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, and to the restrictive Makassarese commercial climate, the Wajoese shifted their trading networks so as to avoid Dutch restriction. Instead of trading through Makassar, they brought Indian textiles directly from the western archipelago to Wajoq and points farther east, avoiding Makassar. This network functioned as one by sharing intelligence and efficiently responding to changes in the commercial climate. It also included many other places besides these four areas described in this study. The Wajoese traded in Nusantara Timor, Southeast Sulawesi, Batavia, Bali, Lombok and Maluku as well and indeed formed a commercial web spanning the entire archipelago.

A striking feature about Wajoese commercial practices was the extension of credit across the archipelago. In the case of To Uti’s loan to Towaris, collecting the outstanding portion of the debt was only made possible by the Dutch judicial system. Yet the fact that To Uti willingly made the loan in the first place suggests that debts were generally repaid in a more amicable manner, even across vast distances. The ease with which debts were collected is also illustrated by To Palla’s sending his agent To Patti to Melaka to collect debts on his behalf. Although the result of this mission is not certain, the fact that To Palla even empowered a Bugis agent in preference to a Dutch one to represent him implies an expectation of success. The ease with which loans were made and repaid suggests that there was a great deal of financial cooperation between the different communities. Even money that was owed to a dead man or that

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1 Report of Cornelis Speelman in Makassar to the High Government in Batavia, 1670, VOC 1276, f. 873.
a dead man owed was expected to be repaid. Distance and borders seemingly had little effect on loans; they could still be collected a thousand miles away.

A second means of uniting the constituents of Wajo was through family relations. In many Southeast Asian states, family networks constituted a state-like mechanism reflecting power relations. This is clearly evident in South Sulawesi where families were very important to both state cohesion and international politics. Strategic marriages were often contracted to cement alliances between the paramount ruler and the ruler of a constituent polity or to improve a troubled political situation. Marriages could also be negotiated between the rulers of two kingdoms, and bonds established in this manner endured. Indeed, throughout Southeast Asia, dealing with one's relatives was considered preferable to dealing with strangers, a consideration that became even more important for the overseas Wajorese. In order to establish putative family ties, host communities adopted foreigners, often consolidating the relationship with either marriage or at least the provision of a sexual partner. Marrying therefore facilitated assimilation for both the host community and the migrants. It was also a means of renewing ties with the homeland. By marrying people from Wajo, migrants could renew their bonds with the homeland and reaffirm their Wajorese identity.

Politicians and migrants alike used marriage as a strategy for extending their spheres of influence. For example, Arung Matoa La Galigo To Suni used his marriage to Petta Wé Maddanaca and their resultant offspring to strengthen his relations with Béttémpola, Bila and Pénéki. Similarly, Daéng Maruppa used his marriage to the ruler of Inderapura's sister to consolidate relations between his family and the host community. As a result of this close relationship, Daéng Maruppa's son was raised together with the son of the ruler. Several generations later, when the Wajorese were firmly entrenched in western Sumatran society, newly-arrived Madurese princes married Daéng Makkulle's daughters to facilitate their own assimilation.

Daéng Matekko's career is a particularly interesting example of family politics. His repeated attempts to forge alliances through marriages, and his lack of success with this strategy illustrates that it did not guarantee either success or assimilation. The political usefulness of his marriage to the daughter of the

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Pangeran Agung of Matan was thwarted by the overthrow of Pangeran Agung and the reinstallation of Sultan Muhammad Zain al-Din in 1721. When Daeng Matekko later married Engku Tengah, it was not sufficient to maintain good relations with the Riau Bugis. Indeed, the Raja Tua said he could not trust Daeng Matekko because he kept the company of Raja Kecik, the arch-enemy of the Bugis in the Malay world. Apparently the only case in which Daeng Matekko successfully established a lasting marital alliance was when he married his daughter to Raja Kecik’s son Tengku Mahmud. This marriage allowed Daeng Matekko to remain in the good graces of this branch of Siak’s royal family. Tengku Mahmud also benefited from this relationship because he gained support of many Bugis on account of his wife’s ethnicity.

Daeng Matekko was not alone in attempting to establish a network of marriage alliances. The anonymous diarist in East Kalimantan also married at least three times, presumably as a means of solidifying relationships and extending his own influence. His marriages were to members of different Bugis, presumably Wajoese, communities. In Kampiri he was married to Wé Giling, in Kutai to Wé Apa, and in Berau to Wé Isa. Although her name indicates that she was Bugis, Wé Isa was also the daughter of an influential official in Berau, and so this third marriage may have been an attempt to reinforce Wajoese presence in Berau during a politically unstable period. This is the same strategy that La Gauq employed when he arranged a marriage between his brother-in-law and the sister of Arung Bénténg, a steadfast ally of La Maddukelleng, in order to promote peace within Wajo during the civil strife of the 1740s and early 1750s. La Maddukelleng also relied on strategic marriages for political advantage, as is evident in his words. Upon departing from Wajo he described his provisions as follows: “the gentleness of my tongue, the sharpness of my weapon’s point, and the curve of my penis.” The three points are references to diplomacy, military prowess and marriage which can be considered the arsenal of the migrant. La Maddukelleng later used his marriage with a princess from Pasir to justify his political intervention in that land.

4 Raja Ali Haji, The Precious Gift, p. 82.
5 Ibid, p. 87.
Relations between siblings were also politically significant among Bugis migrants. The best example of this is the bond between Opu Daeng Parani and his four brothers who repeatedly came to each other’s aid. The Wajorese brothers Daeng Matekko and La Maddukelleng also illustrate the significance of this relationship. Despite the physical distance between them, they looked out for each other. As brothers, they were obliged to seek vengeance for any abuse that the other suffered. Thus after To Passarai attacked Daeng Matekko in Selangor, La Maddukelleng sought revenge on his behalf by attacking To Passarai in southeastern Kalimantan. Another example of the significance of sibling relationships among the Wajorese consists of the traditions surrounding Daeng Maruppa in western Sumatra. These point to the maintenance of ties between him and his brother in Wajoq and to the quickening of trade between Inderapura and Wajoq because of this connection.

A third means by which the various Wajorese constituents were united was through representation. Given the formalized structure of the Arung Patampulu ("the Forty Lords"), participation in this council would appear to be the baseline for representation, but the reality was more complex. In theory, the elaborate structure of the Arung Patampulu accorded representation to the various constituents of mainland Wajoq but in practice these offices were not always filled. The number of representatives in this council, forty, was auspicious within Islamic cultural context. It was an ideal that was not always met. Indeed, as noted in the introduction, even the office of arung matoa could remain unfilled. Furthermore, because of the Arung Ennengng’s emphasis on the three main limpo, even constituents within the immediate vicinity, such as Plumpapanua, were excluded from formal representation in this council. Thus, while an elaborate system of representation existed, it did not include all of the constituents within Wajoq itself.

Meanwhile there were opportunities for “outside” participation in the Wajorese government. While there is no evidence concerning the specific origins of most of the Arung Patampulo during the period under study, Pelras notes the possibility of outside participation in the council. He writes that the Arung Matoa was “chosen by a council of notables both outside as well as within Wajoq itself among a large range of candidates, with no other pertinent conditions other than belonging to the highest rank of the

*Lontaraq Sukkaqna Wajoq, ff. 230-231.*
hierarchy of nobles and being able to count at least one Arung Matoa among their ancestors.”

Mattulada also points out that the most important requirement of the Arung Matoa of Wajoq was not proper origins but possession of the traditional measures of leadership. La Maddukelleng’s assumption of the arung matoaship is based on this understanding. When he returned from eastern Kalimantan, he was not viewed as an outsider. On the contrary, the LSW records that he was specifically asked to return to Sulawesi and to participate in the affairs of the homeland. The fact that he had spent his entire adult life overseas was not problematic; rather this sojourn was valued for the military and diplomatic experience it afforded him.

Contributions to state projects constituted another means through which ties between the constituent polities of Wajoq were maintained. The Wajorese polities in South Sulawesi were required to contribute to state projects, such as the construction of the *baruga* (meeting house) during the reign of La Mattoneq To Sakkeq, and they could be penalized or chastised for non-compliance. For example, Arung Parigi was denied entrance to the *baruga* because he did not contribute materials for its construction. Overseas communities were also asked to contribute to state projects, such as stocking the state arsenal during the reign of La Suléwangeng. The overseas Wajorese communities complied, and Wajoq accumulated such an impressive supply of weapons that the Dutch were amazed. The overseas Wajorese communities are also known to have assisted the homeland during the attacks on Wajoq in 1670 and 1741. The pattern then continued into the second half of the eighteenth century when the Wajorese communities in Pasir and Timor came to Wajoq’s assistance in a dispute with Bone.9

The fifth way in which the Wajorese constituent polities were linked was through cultural concepts which established a bond among all those belonging to the Wajorese community. In addition to strong familial bonds, the Wajorese were linked by a sense of community based on their own myth-symbol complex. This was augmented by the Bugis concept *pessé* which could be felt regardless of a community’s or an individual’s physical location. One example of this is the humiliation that La Maddukelleng felt when To Passarai forced Daeng Matekko out of Selangor. So great were La Maddukelleng’s feelings of

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9 Letter from Brugman in Pénéki to Gov. Cornelis Sinkelaar in Makassar, 4.3.1762, ANRI, Makassar 280, *Stukken handelende over den Panekischen Oorlog*, unpaginated.
commiseration that he sought vengeance on behalf of his brother long after the event. Other examples of 
*pessê* include the homesickness felt by soldiers in western Sumatra and the sense of community that Raja 
Ismail shared with the Wajo rese in western Kalimantan.

Feeling *pessê* and remaining part of Wajoq did not vitiate adopting a second identity. In Wajoq 
people commonly had both a Wajo rese identity and a local identity such as Belawan or Anaqbanuan. The 
same dynamic functioned overseas. The nature of the ethnonational bond was not exclusive and it allowed 
migrants to retain their Wajo rese identity while adopting the identity of their host community. This is best 
exemplified by Raja Ismail who simultaneously related to both his Wajo rese and Malay identities and 
exploited the advantages that both of these identities afforded.

Closely related to the concept of *pessê* was the concept of *siriq* meaning both shame and self-
worth. *Siriq* facilitated the maintenance of ties between Wajoq and its overseas communities because it 
motivated people both to emigrate and to return. Emigration provided a means to escape scandals or 
humiliation or to improve one’s social standing and repatriation provided a means to restore one’s honor in 
one’s community of origin, particularly if one had acquired status or wealth abroad. It was easier to 
improve one’s status in the diaspora than in the homeland for several reasons. One way that migration 
could enhance one’s status was through the establishment of relations with overseas communities, through 
marriage, treaties or other means. Relations with foreign rulers and notables could expand one’s clientele 
and therefore one’s status. While Daeng Matekko’s marriages to the daughter of the Pangeran Agung of 
Matan and to Engku Tengah, who may have been the widow of Daeng Parani, did not help his position in 
the long run, his marriage to Raja Kecik’s daughter secured his position within Siak’s royal family.

Secondly, overseas there was less access to genealogies. Given the inconsistencies surrounding the origin 
traditions of many migrants, such as Daeng Maruppa, it is likely that they claimed elevated genealogies 
overseas so as to enhance their status. Finally, migration provided alternative ways of earning money, 
which could be translated into power and status. As a Bugis notable, Sultan Endey was able to acquire 
considerable wealth and influence even though his only known genealogical claim was being Daeng

206
Mabela's brother. He used the title "sultan," but over what land he ruled as sultan was apparently not a question. Despite the importance of ascribed status, in practice there was no easy distinction between wealth, nobility and rank in Wajorese society. In the diaspora, moreover, ascription often gave way to achievement as a basis for status.

**The Open Door**

In that the same sorts of ties that existed within the Wajorese homeland also functioned between the homeland and the diaspora, the diaspora can be seen as part of the state. Certain features of Wajorese political culture facilitated this intense relationship. In this respect, the Wajorese government can be seen as an open door.

The federative nature of the Wajorese government facilitated the establishment of a diaspora and its inclusion within the state. Wajoq was formed from three main constituent polities, Talotrenreng, Tuaq and Bétémpepla, which in turn had vassals and constituents of their own. Incorporated into the federation was a system of messengers that could accommodate geographically-separated constituents. Each of the three limpo had a messenger whose job it was to transmit decisions within the kingdom. These three messengers were included within the governing council of Wajoq. The central government also respected the sovereignty and the adat of the constituents, which was typical in Bugis politics. Indeed, guaranteeing mutual respect for the autonomy and customs of contracting polities was of paramount importance in the conclusion of treaties. Thus the incorporation of autonomous communities into the Wajorese state was not alien to Wajorese politics.

Another aspect of the Wajorese government that allowed for flexibility was the Arung Patampulu. Whereas other governments in South Sulawesi had councils of seven or nine representatives, the Wajorese council ideally consisted of forty members. Such a large council is unheard of elsewhere in South Sulawesi and its size alone is suggestive of various groups of people struggling to get along. Presumably, however, the ideal of forty was not always met. While forty is an auspicious number, it is sometimes used

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10 Presumably he was also Daeng Maruppa's son, but this is not certain.
imprecisely to denote many. Thus there could have been more or fewer members of this council according to circumstances, such as the six-year period during the nineteenth century when Wajoq was without an arung matoa.\textsuperscript{14} Such an unusual degree of flexibility facilitated the political participation of different groups both within and outside South Sulawesi.

There were also specific provisions to facilitate not only emigration but also the utilization of the resources of overseas communities. Governmental provisions for emigration extended back to the time of Cinnotabiq, Wajoq’s predecessor. Both the Cinnotabiq Treaty and the Lappaddeppaq Treaty guaranteed freedom of movement. Upon concluding the latter treaty, Arung Saotanre La Tiringeng To Taba explicitly declared that the doors of Wajoq shall remain open. He considered this freedom to be so ingrained in Wajorese customary law that he omitted to mention it before burying the rock that signified the conclusion of the treaty. When questioned he then explained this omission by saying that such freedoms were already customary law and were therefore not appropriate for inclusion.\textsuperscript{15} Thus from its earliest days, the government of Wajoq had legal provisions for emigration and repatriation.

During the early eighteenth century there were not just provisions for emigration but also incentives for overseas enterprises. A series of arung matoca deliberately encouraged international commerce as part of a plan to strengthen Wajoq. La Tenrisessuq To Timoe Puanna Denra and his successor La Mattoneq To Sakkeq Daeng Paguling Puanna La Rumpang are recorded to have ordered the leaders and people of Wajoq to purchase as many anns as possible in Java, Sumatra and elsewhere. This policy was continued\textsuperscript{16} by La Galigo To Suni and by his successor La Tenriwerrung Puanna Sangngaji, who then intensified efforts to strengthen the Wajorese economy. La Tenriwerrung Puanna Sangngaji said that the Wajorese could not stand upright unless they sought riches (overseas). Such a statement adds a moral imperative to the quest for financial gain and implicitly glorifies international trade. La Saléwangeng To Tenrirua provided even stronger stimuli for overseas trade. In fact, he ordered the Wajorese people to trade overseas,\textsuperscript{17} and then he provided funding, improved Wajoq’s waterworks and

\textsuperscript{14} Mundy (ed.), \textit{Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes}, I, pp. 71-72.
\textsuperscript{16} The \textit{Lontaraq Sukkuqna Wajoq} says that he instigated it.
\textsuperscript{17} LSW ff., 228-229.
instigated legal reforms so as to facilitate their endeavors. These legal reforms included appointing an
official to organize commerce and encouraging traders to appoint representatives and write down their
commercial agreements. The government deliberately sought to harness the economic and military
potential of its overseas constituents.

Despite the Wajoqese state's involvement with overseas Wajoqese communities, it did not try to
exert influence abroad. In Makassar, a palace was constructed for the arung matola but, according to the
records of the Wajoqese matola in Makassar, he did not interfere with the affairs of the local Wajoqese
community. In western Sumatra, the Wajoqese community came to exert considerable influence in local
affairs. This influence, however, was the result of a single family's ambitions and not the result of any sort
of directives from the homeland. Eastern Kalimantan is the only area of overseas Wajoqese settlement
where there is reason to suspect that Wajoq might have tried to exert direct influence. This is evident in a
diary written by a Wajoqese traveler who may have been a spokesman for the Wajoq government. While
there is no conclusive evidence that he was sent to negotiate with Berau in an official capacity, this is
essentially what he did. On the other hand, the length of his sojourn in eastern Kalimantan and the absence
of any record of letters sent to Wajoq during this time suggests that he was there in a private capacity.

The Wajoqese government's tendency to avoid interference in overseas communities is in keeping
with its loose political structure. In the commercial field, however, regulations were necessary to assure the
profitability of trade. Amanna Gappa's law code was intended to govern the commercial activities of
Wajoqese traders overseas and was agreed upon by their representatives. Whereas direct representation in
the Arung Patampulu was limited to the three main constituent polities, representation in the commercial
council of the diaspora was not. Nevertheless, there was a reliance on the Wajoqese concept of government
where constituent polities do not lose their rights nor their adat when they join a federation. Reinforcing
this concept is the Wajoqese saying: "Wherever there is fire, near or far, there is also the extinguisher,"18
which encouraged overseas Wajoqese to resolve their conflicts according to the traditions of the area where
they were.

18 Abdurrazak, Sedjarah Wadjo, p. 64.
Conclusion

In the case of Wajoq, the state and the diaspora were not conceptual oppositions. Whereas much of contemporary diaspora discourse positions diasporas against nation-states, the early modern Wajorese diaspora communities functioned as constituent parts of Wajoq. Formed as a confederation, Wajoq always possessed mechanisms for holding the various components together and to enable the inclusion of new units. With the exodus of people from Wajoq following the Makassar War, the state started accommodating overseas groups into its confederation. While the overseas Wajorese were not accorded formal representation in Wajoq, they were encouraged, and in some instances formally invited, to participate in Wajorese politics. The inclusion of overseas constituents to the Wajoq polity may not have resulted in their inclusion among the formalized Arung Patampulu, but they nevertheless functioned as members of the polity and appear to have been accepted as such.

Whereas the various overseas communities functioned in their own ways according to local circumstances and the personalities of the people involved, as a whole the diaspora groups were not opposed to but rather part of the state. Family ties and representation were characteristics present in both the constituent polities of Wajoq within Sulawesi and overseas. Despite the emphasis on territorial boundaries in Wajoq, there was an acceptance of constituent polities located in distant lands as long as they fulfilled the obligation associated with such membership in the Wajorese confederation. Although Wajoq lacked the ability to coerce these overseas constituencies, the support that they provided voluntarily was enough to alter the course of Wajorese history in the eighteenth century.
Appendix

The Wajoese origins myths

Not available elsewhere in English, the Wajoese origin myths are pertinent to this study in that they present Wajoq as a land of colonization. This exemplifies the centrality of migration in the constructed reality of the Wajoese people.

The best-known origin myth, Pau Pau Rikadong, tells the story of a Luwurese princess with an incurable skin disease.¹ Her parents are desolate about her condition, but they are eventually forced to choose between their only daughter or their people. The princess is then exiled along with an entourage of servants and they wander aimlessly for forty days and nights. Finally they establish themselves under a big bajog tree. Then one day, the princess encounters a buffalo near a heap of rice in front of her house. She tries to send him away but he chases her around until she falls down, and he licks her entire body. After the buffalo goes into the forest, the princess goes to bathe in the river, then she goes back into her house, and falls asleep. When she wakes up, she is overjoyed to discover that her skin condition has improved. She meets the buffalo every day until she is completely recovered. Then one day the son of the ruler of Boné, who has been out hunting deer for seven days, and whose provisions are used up, comes across the princess' settlement. When he lays eyes on the princess, immediately falls in love with her. After his hunting expedition, he returns to visit her, and is so struck by her beauty that he faints. He returns once again to Boné and cries himself to sleep because he is so lovesick. The Bonéan court is puzzled by his distress and his loss of appetite. When they finally realize that he is in love, and not sick with the flu, the ruler of Boné sends an armed delegation to ask the princess to marry his son. Eventually, they are married and beget children who become their subjects and who govern the different parts of Wajoq.

The Wajoese origin stories involving La Banraq, of which there are several, all have an element of migration in them as well. In one story, La Banraq is a descendant of the Datu of Soppéng, and he and his dog are chased out of Soppéng by his jealous brothers. When they reach Akkotengeng, the dog refuses to go any farther, so La Banraq settles there and begins cultivating crops. One night, he finds a wild pig in

¹ This traditional story was first published in Bugis by Matthes in 1864, and it is on this version that the following summary is based.
his plantation, and stabs it with a lance given to him by the ruler of Akkotengeng. The pig runs away but
La Banraq must recover the lance because it is an heirloom. His dog then finds the pig under the bajaq
tree(s) to the north of Sekkanasu with the lance still in his body. When the pig runs away, La Banraq
chasés it to a bajaq tree. No longer wanting to live under the ruler of Akkotengeng, La Banraq establishes
residence by the bajaq tree(s) and his settlement flourishes. Hungry people from Sinrinjameng then
migrated into the area with La Banraq's consent.2 In another story, La Banraq is the son of the ruler of
Taoni and the son-in-law of the Datu of Soppêng. He is expelled from Soppêng because of the unrest he
creates by magically producing excessive quantities of palmwine. He meets an extraordinary dog in
Mampu and an extraordinary crocodile in Welado and then settles in Paria, Rumpia and Macanang. In
another story, La Banraq is a son of the Pollipu of Soppêng, an officer under the Datu. Through his skills
at producing palmwine, he brings new life to a settlement founded by La Matanawa, the son of the ruler of
Takalasi. La Matanawa had angered his father by not participating in a war, left with his wife and
established Wajoq. When a certain population was attained, he was appointed chief ruler; and when he
died, La Banraq replaced him.3 A fourth story involving La Banraq describes how Wajoq grew out of a
settlement called Majawuleng. During a poor agricultural season, people migrated from Paria, Sekkanasu,
Rumpia, Penrang and Kading to Majawuleng where the harvest was still very good. Many of them opted to
stay, so Majawuleng grew. The name of the expanded settlement was then changed to Wajoq after the
bajaq trees that were cleared to establish it.

The origin story contained in the Wajorese chronicles, as translated and edited by Noorduyn,
relates the story of La Matatikkaq, a totompo (an ascendant from the Lowerworld), who founds Cinnotabiq
and marries Lingeqmanasa, the daughter of a tomanurung (a descendant from the Upperworld). Their
greatgrandsons, the brothers La Tenriba and La Tenritippek, eventually rule Cinnotabi together as equals.

After a year of this dual kingship, the population becomes dissatisfied which makes La Tenriba angry. His
three nephews La Matareng, La Tenripekka and La Tenritauq then leave Cinnotabiq and establish three
settlements in Boliq. La Matareng ruled Tua, La Tenripekka ruled Tarotenreng and La Tenritauq ruled

2 Noorduyn, Een Achtste-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wado', p. 35.
3 Ibid, p. 37.
Bettémpola. Two years later, La Tenriba and La Tenritippeq evacuated Cinnottabiq as well, and established Penrang. The people of Boliq then went to Penrang and asked La Tenriba to be their ruler. La Matareng, La Tenripekka and La Tenritauq followed and their uncle appointed them as Paddanreng in the new settlement that was named Wajoq.⁴

The origin story “The Beginning of Cinnottabiq” in LSW is sometimes considered more credible because the founder of Cinnottabiq is not a totompo or tomanurung,⁵ yet such divine characters are still present. The story relates how a descendant of the ruler of Cina (the old name for Pammana) named La Paukkeq who went hunting with other toCina in a suitable area with wide fields, thick forests with wild boars, deer and buffalo, and numerous lakes replete with fish. He and his followers establish a settlement there and name it Cinnottabiq. La Paukkeq becomes the first ruler and marries I Patola from Mampu.⁶ Eventually, their granddaughter Wé Tenrisui becomes queen of Cinnottabiq and marries La Rajallangiq who is the descendant of tomanurung. Their grandsons, La Tenriba and La Tenritippeq then rule Cinnottabiq together,⁷ as in the chronicle.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 65-70.
## Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>customs and traditional practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arumpone</td>
<td>paramount ruler in Boné</td>
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<tr>
<td>arung</td>
<td>lord, ruler</td>
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<td>Arung Matou</td>
<td>paramount ruler Wajo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arung Pattapoloo</td>
<td>Forty Lords comprising the government in Wajo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bagilaba pada</td>
<td>equal sharing of profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bagilaba samatula</td>
<td>sharing of profits with an agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baruga</td>
<td>meeting house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bendahara</td>
<td>principal official in a Malay polity, second to the sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bicara</td>
<td>process of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bissu</td>
<td>traditional Bugis priests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cartazes</td>
<td>commercial passes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>darat</td>
<td>Minangkabau heartland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datok</td>
<td>non-royal leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datu</td>
<td>paramount ruler in Soppeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daulat</td>
<td>sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derhaka</td>
<td>treason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freebrughers</td>
<td>former VOC servants entitled to trade in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gaukeng</td>
<td>sacred objects that encourage communal spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gerombolan</td>
<td>mid 20th century social rebellion in South Sulawesi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijayat</td>
<td>historical chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inreng pettu</td>
<td>loan without interest or loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inreng réweq</td>
<td>loan of goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jurubatu</td>
<td>sailors responsible for casting the anchor and taking soundings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jurumudi</td>
<td>helmsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabupaten</td>
<td>regency (division of modern Indonesian provinces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalula</td>
<td>apprentices to the captain who traded on behalf of the matou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Translation/Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kampong</td>
<td>village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kati</td>
<td>measure of weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kenduri</td>
<td>ritual meal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kerajaan</td>
<td>kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kris</td>
<td>dagger or short sword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laksamana</td>
<td>official in charge of the orang laut and the navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laloang</td>
<td>commissioned goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limpo</td>
<td>people or village (lit. surround)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lilq</td>
<td>vassals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lontaraq</td>
<td>manuscripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matoa</td>
<td>head, ruler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>menteri</td>
<td>ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orang asli</td>
<td>non-Malay peoples residing on the Malay peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orang laut</td>
<td>peoples residing along the rivers and coasts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payung riLuwuq</td>
<td>paramount ruler in Luwuq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>penggeran</td>
<td>prince, governor, chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>penghulu</td>
<td>head or chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petta Wajoq</td>
<td>Wajoq's highest ruling council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pessé</td>
<td>solidarity or commisertation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rantau</td>
<td>areas outside the Minangkabau heartland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>real</td>
<td>Spanish silver coin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rijkdaalder</td>
<td>Dutch silver coin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salasilah</td>
<td>genealogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawi</td>
<td>traders who worked as sailors without receiving a salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siriq</td>
<td>a single concept encompassing shame and self-worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tomanurung</td>
<td>a descendant from the Upperworld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totopmo</td>
<td>an ascendant from the Lowerworld</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Archival Sources

The archival sources used for this study are from numerous collections. Bugis lontaraq from the microfilm collection assembled by a team from Hasanuddin University were viewed at ANRI Makassar, the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV) in Leiden and in Honolulu on inter-library loan from the center for Research Libraries in Chicago. These sources are cited using the projects name, Proyek Naskah Unhas. Use was also made of lontaraq from the Dutch Bible Society’s collection housed at the Leiden University Library and the Manuscript Collection at KITLV. Dutch archives were in both The Hague and Jakarta. Those from the National Archives of the Netherlands in The Hague are cited as VOC and those from the National Archives of Indonesia in Jakarta are cited as ANRI. English archival sources from the India Office Library in London were viewed in Kuala Lumpur at the University Malaya library and in Honolulu on inter-library loan from Chicago. Documents from the (English) Sumatra Factory Records are cited as SFR.

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229