BEYOND RECOGNITION:
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS AND CHANGING LANDSCAPES IN INDONESIA

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To all the families that took me in, and most of all, to my own:

To my mother: Thanks for the unwavering moral compass;

To my sister: For believing;

To my father: Anything did happen to us;

And to Wiwik and Renaya: May you continue to be driven by what matters and by what might be, with passion, joy, and a sense of humor for it all
Acknowledgements: The magic of learning new languages

I always liked reading acknowledgements. In my imagination, most people skip them. But for me there is always something really personal and vulnerable about reading them. Similarly, writing this is a humbling reminder, realizing just how much help I had along the way. When I first began to undertake this dissertation, I had no idea what I was in for. In a way I knew what I was getting into, but there’s so many elements that range from the logistic to the conceptual, that fitting all the pieces together seems in hindsight more like magic than anything else. In a lot of ways, it begins with a leap of faith knowing I’d be able to hack it out in a small patch of wilderness and not get lost. Some days I really felt I was onto something, other days I felt really lost. But as lonely as writing a dissertation can feel at the best of times, getting to this stage for me has always depended on, and been guided by the magic of learning languages with the people that help you navigate them. It’s about coding, no – learning to code-switch – and all the generosity of the people that help you to learn to listen and to speak. As an acknowledgement section I divide these languages as follows: the language of theory, the language of bureaucracy, the language of languages, and the language of partnership and relationships.

First, *the language of theory*. Even if I never finished, I could at least walk away having learned how to think and I don’t think I could have had any better group of people to help lead me along. For this, I thank my committee: Krisna Suryanata, Reece Jones, Jeff Fox, Jonathan Padwe, and Ehito Kimura. I feel so lucky to have had the opportunity to work with such a breadth of knowledge, experience, and backgrounds, all preparing me to deal with my greatest shortcomings in manifold ways. The comprehensive exams first opened up entire new worlds for me. And sure, overcoming that hurdle may have stated that I was now on my way; that I had the language to engage, to begin to ask the right questions. But this required a great deal of patience from a committee willing to smile at my naivetes at first, believing that I could eventually get there. I always felt, and still do feel the extreme weight of the antecedents; under the thumb of giants that came before, always reminding us how little we know. As if so-and-so already did that decades ago, and has since uncovered so many new layers on the topic that, well, what’s the point? But then, there’s the privilege of being able to reflect and engage on those same issues in slightly different ways, in ways that inspire a truly unique sort of excitement, a pulsating glimmer of possibility, reminding us that well, there are still many important and timely
questions to ask. For providing me the confidence and the tools, guiding me through the right approaches, I thank my committee profoundly. But a special thanks goes to Krisna. There’s a reason she’s won the top mentoring award at the university and that so many have turned to her. She has a way of providing steadfast support while intellectually opening up entire new worlds of possibility as I moved along.

Then there’s the language of bureaucracy, which at first feels like fighting a mosquito in the dark, one that was buzzing in my ear, and over time the voice in the back of my head began to question whether this one carried malaria. My research permit process began as a major setback. Although initially supported by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), I was required to re-apply due to a processing error, meaning I had to engage with a dizzying number of institutions. Although at first it felt like nine months of frustration, it turned out to be a valuable lesson not just about doing research, but also about the research topic itself. Learning to enjoy this aspect of research meant a change in mindset, in which I learned not to swat the mosquito, but to befriend her. In the end what this taught me was the importance of the language of the state, its ubiquity in the lives of everyday politics. Undergoing the process was instructive not only in eventually getting me a permit, but also taught me about the key terms of access and exclusion. I could more easily appreciate how large a hurdle it would be for a rural Indonesian without connections to get access to basic services.

Dealing with the four ministries and the national police in Jakarta, as well as making trips to embassies in D.C. and Singapore on several occasions was complicated enough, but that was only the beginning. I thank the great staff at the American Institute for Indonesian Studies, Annas Bentari and Johan Purnama for helping me see the layers of the state and walk through the right halls to follow the right procedures. I also thank Professor Pujo Semedi at UGM’s Fakultas Ilmu Budaya for his patience and support. The subsequent roadblock I encountered in the Immigration office in South Sulawesi resulted in creating three crucial partnerships, ones that would go well beyond the administrative. I thank all of the staff at Balang Institute, Oase, and Hasanuddin University that provided tremendous support.

Moving down a layer I found myself with new challenges at the district(s), Kajang subdistrict, the villages and hamlets, and the security apparatus that always invariably showed themselves at strange junctures along the way. I thank Ibu Misbawati Wawo former head of the Forestry Agency for all her support. She indeed helped ease the logistics of doing research, but
also became a close friend and gracious host, opening her office and assigning staff to work with me at every turn. I have profound admiration for her pioneering approach to make government more responsive to local people’s needs. I also thank her intrepid cadre of forest rangers that were fortunately always having fun on the job, making even the work of setting up tables for a meeting full of laughter.

Then there’s the work of learning the actual language of languages. I was lucky to speak Indonesian before I began fieldwork, but little did I know of the pre-requisite of learning Coastal Konjo. After two months thinking I was learning it patiently with friends from Bantaeng, it turned out that I had put together a rather thick dictionary of a dialect from a neighboring region, one that in Kajang would only reinforce alliances that I had thought I was breaking down. Key components of language structures changed with surprising regularity over a small geographic region. Dih!?

Then there’s the wonderful and revealing language of history. In peeling back the stories of family generations I found myself going further and further back. Learning the importance of history was perhaps the most instructive part of my learning experience. The more I learned the more it seems as today could not be explained without somehow decoding the 17th century, followed by learning the different periods of Dutch colonial policy, the promises of national liberation and independence struggle, and the contestations of nationalist ideology from Islamic movements. In the current revival of adat for example, Willem van der Muur at Leiden University showed me a language of liberation that was profoundly similar to colonial welfare policies of a century ago. Overall, across the centuries, I was moved by how the gentlest scratching of the surface revealed shuddering incidences of violence. So quickly forgotten; so important to remember. On numerous occasions I read about and listened to stories reinforcing the thinness of the scars that cover these wounds, and so are equally thin the narratives that stitch together liberation ideologies, nationhood, and the state. Going around Amsterdam, Leiden, Tanjung Gusta, and Bulukumba mostly on motorbike or bicycle with Willem always revealed new insights into the past that contextualized the present moment. Working with Willem, Jacqueline Vel, and Kathryn Robinson on the adat special issue for the Asia-Pacific Journal of Anthropology gave me tremendous insight about what Indonesia is today.

But most of all, the most important language I’ve learned along the way was guided by the language of partnership and relationships. That’s not just where I found my most profound
and humbling discoveries, but also encompasses the spaces that I believe we can mutually continue to cultivate for a long time to come. This, no doubt, has been the greatest lesson of them all for me.

In Bogor, I was adopted by both Agus Mulyana and his family, as well as Moira Moeliono. They gave me a place of refuge, offered reflection, challenged me, and provided constant opportunities for learning. I also benefitted tremendously from the sages, colleagues, and staff at CIFOR, including: E. Linda Yuliani, Hasantoha Adnan, Putri Lubis (Pugit), Tuti Syukur, Sinta Lestari, Ani Nawir, James Roshetko, Terry Sunderland, Timothy Workman, Miguel Piñedo-Vasquez and Christine Padoch’s (particularly at Miguel’s warteg), and with Carol Colfer and her support far away in Ithaca. I am grateful to have been a part of the ICRAF and CIFOR CIDA-funded AgFor project and the USAID-funded PEER project on integrated watershed management, as well as the Global Land Forum event in Citalahab, West Java. This network of scientists and professionals committed to multi-stakeholder collaboration for improved natural resource management also opened up opportunities to engage on comparative issues with organizations from across Indonesia, including Teras in Southeast Sulawesi, Samawa Center in NTB, and Riak Bumi in West Kalimantan.

In Jakarta, Justin Snyder, Tiara Sianturi, and their daughter Kinara provided a steadfast home away from home, providing crucial friendship and support. In Makassar, Urban El-Fatih Adam, Dewi Lestari, and their daughter Lailani took me in as family. Muhammad Alif K. Sahide at Hasanuddin University has been a tremendous colleague, providing me an institutional home that has fostered much growth for me. I am eager to see where our common project – the Forest and Society journal – will take us. In Bantaeng, I thank the staff at Oase and Balang Institute. Specifically, Andi Adriadi (Ardi) and his family became another place that felt just as comfortable as being home, enriched by brother- and sister-hood of Junaid Judda, Kamaluddin, Marina Umar and their vision in building the organization Oase. Ardi, Junaid, and Kamal were my bridge and made fieldwork such an exciting and rewarding experience. The good friends Habir (Abi), Dimas Pangestu, Adam Kurniawan, Hasri Asri, and other close colleagues from Balang Institute are also a source of great gratitude for me in conducting my research, including Saleh, Reza, Tobo, and the numerous others that began with the vision and taken it elsewhere. I also thank some of the audacious activist representatives from across South Sulawesi, especially my friendship with sombaku Muhlis Paraja in Pattallassang. In Bulukumba I thank the Multi-
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I would not have been able to support my field work without the generous contributions of the Matsunaga Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the wonderful people there, including Anne Smoke, José Barzola, and especially Maya Soetoro-Ng. Grants from the Nobumoto Tanahashi Fellowship and the David and Susan Chandler Fellowship. East-West Center Graduate Degree Fellowships sustained me four years and provided tremendous opportunities in engaging in education and development in unique ways. Additional travel grants from the East-West Center and research support from the UH Foundation, as well as the Geography Department supported me at crucial times, including support from the Paul S. Honda Scholarship and the Ann Dunham Scholarship.

On the North Shore, Bob Leinau taught me about the ways that the land and ocean are interconnected, and importantly the many languages to understand land- and sea- scapes. The mentorship was made complete by a nurturing family home with Agnes and all the Leinaus near and far. Beginning this journey in Aunt Ruth’s home with her love and support, and all the wisdom imparted by my grandfather, Harold Hill, certainly feels like a great void as I write this. My father Larry was always supportive, particularly offering some profound insights along the way. Hopefully I’ve been able to move the conversation a long at least a little bit, from “beyond the berugaq” to “beyond recognition.” My mother Lucy always challenged me to think from farmer perspectives and also constantly pushed me to remember that the outcomes matters, that there are solutions. Between me and my sister Kiva I know we will always be each other’s greatest supporters, and there’s no greater gratitude than that.

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partnership from Wiwik and Renaya, challenging me in their own ways to keep at it, and
providing the most profound insights throughout.
Abstract

This dissertation examines the applications of transnational movements advocating for indigenous land rights recognition as a solution for addressing rapid land use change taking place across Indonesia. Such initiatives are also framed as part of a growing and increasingly powerful discourse around the world on the possibility of indigenous land rights to support decolonization and social justice, that at once assumes environmental benefits. This research applies a political ecology approach centered around the Kajang community in South Sulawesi, the first community to gain indigenous land rights recognition since the landmark constitutional court decision that stated historical indigenous land enclosures were unconstitutional. The research took place over a period of 21 months by combining geospatial analysis with ethnographic engagement among policymakers, advocacy organizations, village development authority, and farmer groups. By following the processes of how certain crops are fixed, legitimated, and reproduced on the landscape, and contextualizing indigenous recognition with land relations, this research finds that the way social movements connect with local authority to secure land rights serves to reinforce and accelerate the terms of dispossession among those most in need of land.
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List of abbreviations and key terms

A note on language, where relevant: [i] indicates translation from the Indonesian language while [k] indicate translation from the Coastal Konjo language of the Kajang.

All names and identities have been changed, except in situations in which individuals were acting in their formal capacity in a public setting.

*Adat*: Indigeneity /custom / customary law

*Atta’ / Kambasahaya [k]*: Historically the caste of slaves across regions of South Sulawesi

*AMAN*: The indigenous people’s alliance of the archipelago *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* – an NGO / advocacy network

*Ammatoa*: The spiritual and cultural leader of the Kajang

*Ara [k]*: A unit of land in which 100 *ara* equals one hectare

*Bappeda*: The planning agency (district/province level) [*Badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah*]

*Baroga [k]*: A structure where public meetings are held

*Bagi hasil [i]*: Division of yield after harvest

*BoschWezen*: Boundary markers from the dutch era commonly pointed to as a legitimating boundary

*BNP*: The Land Agency [*Badan Pertanahan Negara*], merged in 2014 with a newly created ministry on Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning

*BRWA*: The Agency for Registering Adat Regions [*Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat*]

*BUMDes*: Village Enterprises [*Badan Usaha Milik Desa*]

*CBNRM*: Community Based Natural Resource Management

*CBF*: Community Based Forestry

*CIFOR*: Center for International Forestry Research

*CSR*: Corporate Social Responsibility
DGM : Dedicated Grant Mechanism
DI/TII : Muslim rebel movement of the 1950s and 60s [Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia]
DPRD : Regional Parliament [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah]
Dwifungsi : Literally of “dual function,” which described the role of military in civil affairs during the New Order period (1966-1998)
FMU / KPH : Forest Management Unit [Kesatuan Pengelolaaan Hutan]
FPIC : Free-prior-informed-consent
Galla : Indigenous leadership in Kajang
Gapoktan : Ketua gabungan kelompok tani [head of the farmer groups]
Gillirang : Private rotational tenure across kin groups
GNRHL : National reforestation and land restoration program [Gerakan Nasional Rehabilitasi Hutan dan Lahan]
Gotong royong / Kasihiang : Voluntary work parties – the latter is the forced labor during the Dutch colonial period in South Sulawesi
HA : Indigenous forests [Hutan adat]
HD : Village Forests [Hutan Desa]
HKM : Community Forestry [Hutan Kemasyarakatan]
Ilalang embaya : “Inside the gate” – the inner area of Kajang where traditional law is strictly followed, also called the enclosed area [rambang seppang]
Jagung [batara] : Corn
Kabupaten / Bupati : District / Head of District
Kalomba : Coming of age ceremony for young children in Kajang
Karaeng : Aristocrats in Kajang
Kecamatan / Camat : District / Head of Subdistrict
Limited Production Forest: The previous formal land category of the Kajang sacred forest
[Hutan Produksi Terbatas]

MK35/2012: The Constitutional Court ruling stating that enclosure of indigenous lands by the state are unconstitutional

MOEF: Ministry of Environment and Forestry

National forests: Also described as the Forest Estate (Kawasan Hutan) amounting to 2/3rds of Indonesia’s territory (126 million hectares)

NGO: Non Governmental Organization

Pa’bassing [k]: A song played on the flute in Kajang, important for funeral events

pa’bitte passapu [k]: A Kajang dance performance

PAK: Zoning area for a concession

Pare [k]: Rice

Pasang [k]: The “message” or oral code of law in Kajang

Penyuluh [i]: Extension worker

PIAPS: Indicative map of social forestry areas [Peta indikatif areal perhutanan sosial]

PNPM: National community empowerment program now part of the village law [Program nasional pemberdayaan masyarakat]

PT Lonsum: A large corporation that owns a large rubber plantation concession in Kajang and other neighboring subdistricts of Bulukumba

Racun: Literally “poison” but in Kajang is intended to mean herbicides and pesticides

RECOFTC: The Center for People and Forests, an NGO

REDD+: Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the plus indicates a biodiversity and sustainability component

Reformasi: The period of political upheaval and change beginning in 1997/98 that guided the transfer of power from the New Order era
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<thead>
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<th><strong>Saukang / Matang [k]</strong></th>
<th>: Ritual sites and objects in Kajang</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sawah [i]</strong></td>
<td>: Irrigated rice fields</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social Forestry</strong></td>
<td>: A policy intended for joint land management arrangements with local communities in, but not limited to national forests</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Songkolo</strong></td>
<td>: A glutinous rice cake in Kajang</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SPPT</strong></td>
<td>: Land tax receipt used in many instances in Indonesia to claim rights of access and ownership [Surat pemberitahuan pajak terhutang]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tesang [k]</strong></td>
<td>: A way to generate capital from land without losing ownership</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TGHK</strong></td>
<td>: An effort to re-delineate and designate forest lands in the 1980s [Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TORA</strong></td>
<td>: Lands identified for title to local claimants as part of the land reform initiatives [Tanah Objek Reforma Agraria]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ulayat</strong></td>
<td>: Reserve and communal lands associated with adat communities</td>
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<td><strong>UNHAS</strong></td>
<td>: Hasanuddin University</td>
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Chapter 1 – Re-mapping people back into the political forest

I. Research Context

The Ammatoa and our secrets

Throughout my time in Kajang I observed this conversation unfold again and again. Researchers, activists, staff from national and local government offices across Indonesia, regional and international study delegations, had all come to ask the same questions. How did the Kajang become the first site to gain indigenous recognition and land title to a piece of Indonesia’s political forest? Furthermore, after this victory in Kajang, they would go on to ask in national and international forums: how can we support the recognition of indigenous people’s land, and expand rights for joint land management rights through social forestry? Moreover, the motivation of such inquiries also implied bigger questions: How can we temper the rapid land use change taking place across Indonesia, and by extension, all over the world? They all sought out answers to confirm the seemingly confounding secrets of Kajang, all arriving at the gate of the inner areas of the sacred forest and inner territory, turning off and putting away their phones respecting the rules of entry, walking barefoot and gingerly on the cobblestone pathway towards a non-descript wooden home with thatched roofing, raised on stilts, without one piece of furniture inside. Albeit modest, the Ammatoa’s home received a flood of visitors every day for various reasons. Most sought local customary arbitration or came to request blessings. But more recently, visitors began coming from further afield, intrigued by the political dimensions and implications of recognizing indigeneity and conferring land title.

On my first visit to the Ammatoa’s home in 2014, I arrived with the policy making taskforce, a multi-stakeholder team of local government agencies, local NGOs, and activist groups. We were seeking guidance from the Ammatoa on the mechanics of drafting the local regulation that would eventually recognize Kajang indigeneity and confer local management authority through land title of the sacred forest. The triumph of this regulation across Indonesia represented a symbolic victory against systematic historical enclosures in administering the state’s vast national forests. Kajang recognition therefore not only represented a symbolic triumph of placing people back into the political forests, but meanwhile provided the first concrete victory in protecting forests amidst some of the fastest changing landscapes in the world.
Upon my first visit, I found myself unexpectedly in line of those consulting the Ammatoa. I learned that my turn had come when the Ammatoa motioned to me to sit cross-legged facing him to introduce myself. I described myself as a researcher and explained my interest in the multi-stakeholder Taskforce efforts to formalize the first policy of recognition to gain local title for the sacred forest. But I also found myself asking what would eventually become the research question that drives this dissertation, namely: what happens after recognition? Once the land is titled, how will it affect local governing institutions and land relations?

To this, the Ammatoa decided to answer my question with a question. Through a Konjo Indonesian translator he began: “you’re a learned man, a man of higher education. What do you think are the biggest challenges facing humanity today?” I found myself rehashing much of the social and environmental justice narratives driving land use and climate change, dispossession and conflict. I also presented the case for land rights recognition, the reason for being here and the opportunity to provide precedence elsewhere in Indonesia. The question may have been rhetorical given that the Ammatoa quickly interjected to share his own answer.

He began systematically, to explain what he believes are the four main challenges facing humanity today. First, is a resource problem, he says. Simply put, “the people increase, while the land stays the same [Ka’tambaang tau, tang katambaang tana?]” a phrase that I would hear repeated often throughout my next three years in Kajang. But this was not simply an overpopulation narrative, as he clarified through a corresponding second problem, describing a growing sense of greed and entitlement. “Individual success,” he explained, “is now measured by the accumulation of material wealth. It is what our children learn to value and emulate.” Over the many times I thereafter sat in the Ammatoa’s home, I would become aware that much of the complaints heard in this room related to the legitimate access to land. “A third problem,” the Ammatoa continued, “is of the competing ideologies between nationalism and religion. Although the basic values uphold the same principles of governing harmoniously, Christianity, Islam, and the government are increasingly driven into conflict against one another.

“The fourth,” leaning forward, he whispered for dramatic effect but concluded with a loud glottal “dih’” – a verbal suggestive in South Sulawesi commonly accompanied by eyebrows raised – “is a deep secret I cannot reveal at this time.” He let out a deep guttural laugh and
motioned to the next person waiting in line, on what I was later told involved a case of stolen chickens.

Writing this dissertation feels like I am divulging a well-known secret. But the secret is the fact that the answers lie in such plain sight. On the one hand this research is about the first set of outsiders that converge with a place like Kajang and the Ammatoa, the notion that this place represents a blueprint for re-contesting the place of rural people back into the vast political forest enclosures of Indonesia. In engaging with Kajang to support recognition efforts, advocates imagine, and have mobilized a movement against rapid land conversion, to protect against greenhouse gas emissions, and empower rural populations against land dispossession and resolve resource conflicts. On the other hand, however, my research is about the day-to-day political ecologies reshaping landscapes among communities identified as sites of triumph in the context of dramatic land use changes taking place the world over. What are such communities envisioned to represent, and in what ways do they fulfill the imaginaries amidst the expectations of maintaining longstanding customary beliefs while continuing to protect increasing pressures on natural resources? As the answers to these two strands of questioning converge, a third becomes apparent: how do these external visions of protection connect with local interests, and thereafter reshape material outcomes of landscape production and reproduction? In juxtaposing these inherently global questions amidst local realities, in my view, brings to light the unsurprising difficulty of assigning hope to sites like Kajang, who are themselves interacting with global forces from afar.

**Global land grabbing**

The post-2008 financial crisis saw a large-scale acceleration of land enclosures taking place globally. Spurred by price shocks and scarcity narratives, land investments began to expand, led by multi-national corporations and foreign state interests. Researchers and media outlets have evocatively described this trend as the global land grab. This is what initially caught my attention to write this dissertation, decisions that could begin in one place and yet affect distant locales. Research on land grabbing have sought to explain these distal phenomenon in various ways, examining the role of the state (Wolford et al., 2013), the expansion of neoliberalist policies (White et al., 2012), complemented by perspectives ‘from below’ (Hall et al., 2015; Borras and Frando, 2013), examining labor dynamics (Li, 2011), incorporating gender
and youth (Park and White, 2017), as well as sectoral work on particular commodities (e.g. palm oil McCarthy and Cramb, 2009), and various clusters of regional engagement (e.g. Hall et al., 2011; Schoenberger et al., 2017 on Southeast Asia). These studies have delivered nuance and depth, refocusing attention away from the land grab, and redirecting inquiry towards grabbing as a process; thus highlighting how projects materialize to enclose land and exclude in contemporary ways.

When I began to look for sites to study, Indonesia incurred the label as the fastest deforesting country in the world, confirmed in much cited global research on remote sensing (Hansen et al., 2013). In the next decade following the 2008 financial crisis, the global narrative on Indonesia described forests repeatedly ablaze (World Bank, 2015), ‘exploding’ carbon (WRI, n.d.), and more violent land conflict (KPA, n.d.). In this context of research that have thoroughly examined land grabbing, my research turns to the much lesser studied but corollary emerging phenomenon, namely the imaginaries, practices, articulations, and applications of projects that seek to materialize land outcomes in defense against land grabbing. Thus, my study refocuses literature on land grabbing by centering around the forces of counter-movements, those touted as the solutions; the concerted efforts at grabbing back on behalf of local authority. I do so by examining the forces and practices that lead to such outcomes and juxtapose them with the land relations taking place at the sites described to have succeeded through recognition and land title.

**Solutions to land grabbing?**

The acceleration of land grabbing has resulted in powerful mobilizations of opposition, identifying and redirecting outcomes among unfair practices across state boundaries. Well-funded international alliances and multinational organizations have come to track land grabbing processes in interactive global maps supporting human rights and environmental goals. The land matrix, for example, currently catalogs large scale land investments by sector, country, and region on information about up to 50 million hectares of land deals covering 1,600 projects worldwide.¹ Meanwhile, groups like the Global Forest Watch identifies “eye-in-the-sky” monitoring of land conversion, classifying the different culprits of commodity change and their environmental effects, further including crowd-sourced platforms allowing opportunities for

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¹ www.landmatrix.org
users to tell stories about these changes. Their promotional video in 2015 claimed: “Now if a tree falls in the forest, everyone can hear it.” Although this characterization is still a far cry from what these technologies are capable of, they are part of a growing call for accountability, fairness, justice and environmental stewardship. Global regulatory responses and concerted policy agendas are emerging as a result.

International monitoring tools like these examples are supported by networks that help to cry foul at violations, and consequently develop corresponding guidelines for international best practices. They help to address unfair and exclusionary business deals by multi-national corporations. Lenders like the International Finance Corporation, for example, famously began to cancel large scale agribusiness loans due to complaints raised by community groups around concerns of “customary lands, displacement, compensation and security issues.” The private sector has also embraced voluntary accountability mechanisms, expressions of good will embodied by FPIC consultations and Corporate Social [and environmental] Responsibility (CSR) programs for local service delivery and development support (Welker, 2014). Unilever, as one of the largest consumer goods corporations in the world, is a main proponent, with a large CSR portfolio and in Indonesia, has promoted forums for certification schemes and more stringent sustainability standards.

On the other hand, states are also proactive in advocating the recognition of land, emergent through political negotiations and populist messaging reinforced by global commitments for human rights. More formal regulatory contestations have taken place in three main ways: on the premise of identity as representative of global indigenism, environmental stewardship embodied by discourses of community-based natural resource management, and agrarian movements advocating land access for rural populations (Brosius et al., 1998; Niezen, 2003; Dove, 2006). Since the 1980s, from Canada to New Zealand, settler colonies and industrialized nations created commitments allowing native and indigenous rights to claim rights to land and natural resources. More recently still, indigeneity has also found footing in countries with diverse populations in a variety of contexts in the global south. From Paraguay to Colombia, Cambodia to Indonesia, policies are emerging to support and expand opportunities for indigenous rights recognition. Meanwhile, corresponding commitments are also emerging to advocate formal possibilities in defense of peasant rights, and mixed-use arrangements under

2 http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=177
programs broadly described as community-based forestry. Some of this is due to international pressure from global policy reforms for social and environmental justice, and also a testament to the increasingly powerful ability among foreign states and non-state actors to pressure governing bodies to incorporate particular reforms.³

A large group of civil society and multilateral organizations are tied together in advocating indigenous recognition, land rights, and joint resource management. At various scales, they have learned and incorporated tools of the state to make counter-claims to land. They justify claims through institutional processes to formalize land rights by applying the tools of the state, contesting regulatory and bureaucratic processes in courts and active involvement in drafting legislation, through approaches made available by the greater accessibility of mapping and survey technology, and flooding communication mediums with advocacy campaigns. They draw sophisticated maps, apply survey tools, utilize state-sanctioned official documents, identifying sites of dispossession and marginalization, and seek to empower through recognition and title, or provide some form of joint access. In sum, although land grabbing enclosing lands from afar are taking place across the world, so have efforts concomitantly grown to counter such practices by preempting enclosures and initiating practices that support claims in defense of the local. My research is a political ecology of these counter-movements at the sites of triumph. How do sites get selected, in what ways do they gain recognition and achieve land titles, what rights are conferred to whom and by whom, how do they interact with existing land relations, and how do people see the implications of recognition and title for the future?

A politics of erasure and discovery

Indonesia provides a unique example between the convergences of land grabbing and counter-movements seeking to grab back, creating a perplexing contradiction of most’s: most deforestation (Hansen et al., 2013), most land degradation, most wildland fires (World Bank, 2015), most plantation expansion (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009), and most carbon emissions (WRI, 2018); while also the site of the most indigenous peoples (Perkasa and Evanty, 2014), with the most progressive indigenous rights legislation (AMAN, n.d.), most ambitious

³ Political scientists Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe this as the boomerang effect whereby international advocates and local claimants can pressure national governments to expose and reconsider policies. It is also important to note that a backlash against local and indigenous rights in these ways has also emerged in recent years, cf. Duterte’s policies in the Philippines, Bolsonaro’s policies in Brazil.
implementation of spatial monitoring systems (Samadhi, 2014), and most number of carbon sequestration projects for REDD+ (Miles, 2015). But to further present the context of these development changes I must first turn to the broader political economy of development and transition in Indonesia.

Indeed, in many ways the very DNA of the Indonesian state is premised on the primary sector consisting of extractive industries in mining and logging, accompanied by plantation concessions (Anderson, 1983). The state is therefore administratively structured by the vast land areas set aside as political forest by the state, either for supporting development through land concessions or through the protection of other natural resources and species (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001). Meanwhile, as global attention centers on Indonesia as a site of dramatic land-based emissions as a priority for climate mitigation among peatlands with high carbon-content, combined with the concomitant attention calling for social justice, the moment seems to have arrived at the opportunity to consider the place of rural people in these vast landscapes. As a result, Indonesia is at once a site of longstanding primary sector land investments for natural resources and plantations, as well as an attractive site for defending against land grabbing, drawing notable attention and resources for both.

Indonesia’s historical political economy: Erasure by designating political forests

In the pre-colonial era, early states in Southeast Asia at once highlighted parallels to early European state formation, while also embodying a uniquely vibrant interconnectivity and system of exchange (Reid, 1988; Tilly, 1992; Winichakul, 1994; Lieberman 2003). State formation emerged in what is often described in an oversimplified notion of riverine-upland interactions (Hutterer, 1977), but which provides a window into what Anderson (1983) describes as dynamic inward-looking states of the archipelago. Territorial imaginings of the pre-colonial era saw a great deal of mobility across the region, and state rule and authority were not imagined in terms of territorial extent but rather through the ability to control labor. The South Sulawesi political economy of this era, for example, was indicative of a racialized upland – lowland binary, which was premised on slave trading and the different fluctuations in markets of that time, particularly defined by global trade in pepper, coffee, teak, and others, with regional trade in rice (Bigalke, 2005). The coastal and seafaring communities connected a vast geographic region and eventually consolidated in part under Sriwijaya reign that lasted until the 13th century, thereafter reorienting
to the regional Javanese empires, and eventually making way to the control of trade by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British fleets, and finally establishing colonial regimes.

In the 18th century Dutch primacy took shape through VOC traders engaged in an ‘indirect policy,’ a hands-off, but highly coercive approach to local affairs. The policy efficiently, and often violently, extracted resources by traders partnering with those willing to do their bidding, structuring political patronage in hierarchical ways with regional vassals (Vickers, 2013). Once the VOC declared bankruptcy at the turn of the 18th century however, the Dutch state formally intervened and laid down the foundation for administrative and military affairs in the East Indies, especially as exports from the Indies had come to shape such a major part of the Dutch and European economy. Commodity production expanded further into rural areas, by Governors-general policies based in Batavia reorienting new mechanisms of rule across the vast archipelago. In the 1830s, for example, Van den Bosch instituted the Culture System obligating rural communities in Java to set aside a fifth of their land to fulfill a vast array of products for the export market (Fasseur, 1986; Van Vollenhoven et al., 2013). By the turn of the 20th century, Java had a highly complex administrative system, one of the most sophisticated infrastructure networks in the world outside of Europe, and a complex legal system that ordered populations into separate categorizations including natives, Europeans, Indo-Europeans and foreign oriental (Arabs, Indian, and Chinese), each with their corresponding courts and legal systems (Stoler, 1989). Alongside establishing a common administrative language for the region, the Dutch instituted a singular currency, and instituted land and economic relations that would later provide the unifying foundation of nationhood (Nasution, 1992; Ricklefs, 1993; Djalins, 2015).

Albeit a site of sophisticated economic activity in the early 20th century, populations remained poor as much of the wealth was extracted and sent off to the Netherlands. These conditions led to a period of Dutch reckoning, described as the “ethical policy,” which promoted welfare programs for Indonesian development. The hallmark of the ethical policy were embodied by the recognition of adat (native) rights, alongside the protection of ulayat (reserve lands) (Von Benda Beckmann, forthcoming; Van Vollenhoven et al., 2013). On the one hand, late colonial period administrators saw native rights as a way to appease local actors, divide and rule, and as a tool for social control. On the other hand, more socially progressive administrators viewed legal recognition as having emancipatory potential by honoring and upholding more locally-appropriate governing systems. This notion of adat would provide the basis for connecting to
discourses of international social movements on indigeneity that I will discuss in the subsequent section.

Although colonial administrators may have genuinely sought to create welfare policies and improve livelihoods in the colonies during the late colonial period, such reforms also took place amidst the economic primacy of the colony as a revenue generator premised on natural resources, of which Anderson (1983) contextualizes as follows:

In 1928, the last good year before the Depression, the state derived roughly 10 percent of its income from state monopolies in salt, pawnbroking, and opium (which it sold to its customers at 10 times the open-market Singapore rate) … 20 percent [were derived] from the profit of state-owned mines, plantations, and industries; 16 percent from import duties; 10 percent from corporation taxes; 6 percent from land-rent; and 9 percent from income taxes. Various excise and other regressive indirect taxes made up the remainder … If we remind ourselves that this was an economy that then produced 90 percent of the world's quinine, 80 percent of its pepper, 37 percent of its rubber, and 18 percent of its tin-to say nothing of petroleum—it is clear that, like the old VOC state, the late colonial state derived its financial strength largely from its own monopolistic operations and an efficient exploitation of local human and natural resources. (Anderson, 1983: 479)

When Indonesia finally and formally wrest away control from the Dutch, the post-independence era ushered in some of the most dramatic land conflict of the region, eventually further entrenching dependence on the primary sector economies (Bigalke, 2005; Kimura, 2012). The consolidating powers of the state took shape amidst much violence and sought to maintain land management regimes in Java under pre-existing administrative mechanisms, but further extended control to the outer islands by delineating vast territories as national forests (Barr et al., 2006). Anderson’s (1983) apropos description called these changes an “Old State, New Society;” and the New Order era (1966-1998) would go on to intensify the duality of land administration categories, placing larger areas under the control of particular management regimes. The state delineated between national forests and areal penggunaan lain (land for all other uses). The category of national forests set aside two thirds of Indonesia’s territory by delineating them through more sophisticated technologies. They applied emerging survey capabilities to set aside sites for their precious resources, both for extraction and protection (Lucas and Warren, 2003). The second land category instituted a western style of land ownership hierarchies (Bedner, 2016). The Basic Forestry Law (1967), and the Basic Agrarian Law guided administration in each, which were accompanied by foreign investment laws that could help to extract resources.
justified for the good of national development (Tsing, 2005). For three decades this duality guided state development regimes under Suharto’s centralized management approach, backed by coercive military involvement. Nearing the turn of the 21st century, however, the political oligarchy of the New Order era re-ordered under a new political system (Aspinall, 2005) opening up opportunities to contest land rights, particularly amidst these long-controlled and enclosed political forests.

Adat Deployments and Social Forestry Policy: Re-discovering people in the political forest

In the wake of the fall of Indonesia’s authoritarian regime that controlled heavy handed development policy for much of the second half of the 20th century, a surprising dynamic had emerged, namely through approaches of contesting land and political authority in national forests on the basis of tradition and indigenism. Scholars have described this process as “adat revivalism” (volume by Davidson and Henley, 2007; Tyson, 2011). Such research perspectives explained how a concept that was formalized as part of the late Dutch colonial welfare period had re-emerged as a powerful deployment for contesting political legitimacy, particularly in the political forest.

Davidson and Henley (2007) provide four main reasons. First, a global indigenism movement had formed, connecting environmental and social justice political activism with international development priorities and safeguard policies. Second, the very origins of Indonesia’s sovereign ideology emerged out of colonial welfare policies under the rubric of adat, and thus presented the opportunity to claim the highest legitimating authority of the newly reforming Indonesian state. Third, the language of protest of the New Order era was incubated within more nonpolitical environmental terms that connected to global priorities on community based natural resource management, and by extension, legitimated cover for human rights injustices for rural communities (see also Li, 1999). Fourth, in the era of Indonesia’s political reform at the end of the 20th century, referred to as reformasi, adat provided a way to claim local legitimacy amidst global movements, and also allowed outlets of local authority long suppressed under Suharto’s authoritarian regime.
A decade after reformasi, adat’s influence had been expected to wane, but on the contrary, intensifying logging and plantation development, wildland fires with destructive geopolitical and climate impacts, resulted in a further expansion of networks connecting with environmentalism narratives in support of global indigenism, thus reinforcing the political legitimacy of adat (Afiff, 2016). The expanded coalition of what some had termed “environmental adat” expanded influence that ushered in landmark legal decisions contesting state lands through a “one map” policy for spatial transparency and a series of constitutional court decisions ruling that state enclosures of indigenous land were unconstitutional. This coalition connected national and international political realms, including: the Indonesian president’s office, key cabinet members, well-financed donor organizations, parliament, and activists intent on advocating for a national law on adat (Rachman and Siscawati, 2016). There was a sense that a consolidated map provided the basis for accountability, and finally, a legal basis could be made for making claims to land for rural and the marginalized.

This period of adat revivalism has indeed empowered in various ways. It has provided a site of struggle by drawing attention to local concerns and connecting to global narratives of environment and social justice in regions experiencing rapid land use change to land expropriation for primary resource extraction and plantation agriculture. In this light, Davidson and Henley describe adat as a deployment, stating that: “in many modern contexts adat refers not so much to a concrete body of rules and practices inherited from the past, or even to a coherent discourse concerning history, land, and law, but rather to a set of loosely related ideals which, rightly or wrongly, are associated with the past. These ideals can be summed up as: authenticity, community, harmony, order, and justice.” Thus, its political power is that it “represents a vaguely defined but powerful set of ideas or assumptions regarding what an ideal society should be like” (2007: 3-4) The coalition of networks sympathetic to adat revivalism also saw momentum from drawing attention to indigenous community rights on environmental terms, allowing opportunities to demand state accountability. Hall et al. (2011) for example, highlight that counter-movements, both for peasants and indigeneity, such as those unfolding with adat in Indonesia, do not so much as seek to make claims to national sovereignty, but rather demand that the state legitimately respond to their concerns within the framework of the common project of

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4 This was revealed in a statement presented by adat scholar David Henley at Leiden University on May 22nd, 2017.
the state. In other words, it was a grievance not against the nation, but rather for the legitimate decision-making discourse of the nation.

Meanwhile, scholars also highlight the unintended consequences of such deployments, pointing to its exclusionary effects and the new injustices that emerge once policy ideals are translated into local politics. *Adat* deployments show that its many interpretations and the goals it is used to promote do not necessarily match with the broader imaginary of social justice supported by proponents among global movements and national actors. Indeed, these deployments show numerous reactionary applications, ranging from a further entrenchment of inequality, land conversion, non-inclusivity, evictions, and violence. One of the more gruesome experiences was the movement to expel migrant Madurese and their locally born children by indigenous Dayaks in West and Central Kalimantan. In other places awkward outcomes include the sultanates of the Maluku’s, reviving an old class of leadership representing the antithesis of movements promoting greater equality, and rather, calling for a return to old hierarchical patronage systems based on local aristocracies (Van Klinken, 2007). In Bali, adat revivalism emerged in several contexts, surprisingly dissociating with international movements of indigeneity because of the local control that the *banjar* already commanded. On the one hand, *adat* in Bali served as a tool to extract additional state resources by creating mirror village institutions, and on the other, served to drum up nativist sentiment against migrants and foreign investment to exact extortionist fees. In a case from Tapanuli, Sumatra, *adat* claims took place in the context of plantation booms, particularly for oil palm and pulpwood ventures, in which local leaders invoked adat land claims as a way to gain rights to forests for oil palm conversion that clashed awkwardly with activist notions of an environmental *adat*. Finally, adat claims for conservation also have their own contradictions (Fisher, 1999). In Central Kalimantan (Astuti and Macgregor, 2016) and Papua, such claims initiate their own exclusionary effects, couched in mechanisms for green grabbing, promoting a narrative of forest-dwelling actors that present a narrow definition of the type of people that can benefit from such claims.

Nevertheless, adat as a national policy initiative and as a claims-making instrument has expanded markedly in Indonesia. The Indigenous People’s Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) a national NGO made up of prominent environmental adat activists that formed in the late 1990s, fashions itself as a network organization of regional offices across Indonesia. As of 2019, AMAN consists of 21 regional offices [*pengurus wilayah*], and 117 local offices [*pengurus*]...
daerah] consisting of 2,366 adat communities, representing what they claim as approximately 18 million people, making them the largest indigenous rights organization in the world. They also have a sister organization, the Adat Registration Agency (BRWA), which fashions itself as a quasi-governmental agency to register lands. They have surveyed over ten million hectares of potential land claims, listed claims into online interactive maps, and otherwise state that claims amount to over 40 million hectares of national forest.

AMAN, and the coalition of environmental adat organizations have had a significant influence on the past two presidential administrations (Afiff, 2016). President Yudhoyono’s (2004 – 2014) main taskforce (UKP4) helped to convene the international donor community for key reforms of accountability in mapping and indigenous rights recognition alongside prominent climate change policies. Then came national legislation, first in the form of a national law on geospatial mapping centralizing mapping authority under one agency (Law 4/2011), followed by a series of constitutional court decisions – MK35/2012 being the most prominent – which presents the opportunity to justify concrete mechanisms to reclaim land by indigenous communities to national forests (Myers et al., 2017). The election in 2014 subsequently ushered in a populist president that was strongly backed by environmental adat organizations. AMAN lobbied for inclusion in President Joko Widodo’s Nawacita – a guiding manifesto of campaign promises – and formalized adat policy interests as part of the administration’s key objectives. The victory also ushered in activists into formal positions in the presidential cabinet and recruited as key advisory staff positions and had a direct line to lobby the president to follow through on adat commitments.

By 2016, formal commitments by the highest office in Indonesia had translated into material efforts for recognizing adat. Although still a powerful tool for contestation against corporate land enclosures, the focus of the adat movement at the national level transitioned to making claims for formal recognition sanctioned by bureaucratic and government processes (see Chapter 2). Activists themselves stated that at the AMAN congress of 2016 that the period of contesting the government had shifted into a phase of partnership with formal institutions. What has emerged are a concerted effort to define, map, and legislate adat through state supported mechanisms, thus providing a site for “institutionalizing” adat.

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5 www.aman.or.id
Amidst the coalition of environmental adat organizations also came a set of corresponding reforms to contest land in the political forest under the headings of social forestry and agrarian reform (See chapter 6). Unlike claims made by activists that adat land recognition would remove authority from national forests, social forestry policy suggests mechanisms for joint management responsibilities between the state and local communities. Indeed much of the policy discourse of adat has blended with, and shifted into policy negotiations on social forestry. Social forestry is discursively strategic in the current policy enabling environment for its populist ideals to empower rights, support livelihoods, and partner for conservation outcomes. President Widodo has hence promised a total designation of 12.7 million hectares under social forestry schemes, a dramatic increase from the approximately 1 million hectares currently under such designations. Finally, the Widodo administration has also promoted a land reform policy that includes another 9 million hectares of the national forest to be distributed as land title to rural Indonesians, specifying site selection for those under intense conflict.

Up to this point, much of the research on reclaiming people’s rights to national forests has focused on adat and its revivalism, examining origins, deployments, discourse, legal interpretations, and activism (Davidson and Henley, 2007; Hauser-Schäublin, 2013; Vel et al., forthcoming). Policy attention furthermore has largely focused on the legal considerations for making land claims based on adat, social forestry and agrarian reforms. Advocacy has required a host of elements that legitimates claims into official regulatory processes and implementation mechanisms. This includes building the networks to support recognition, the maps to make the claims, the formal institutions, and the awareness and interest of local governing bodies to interpret and apply them. In this context, as formal recognition and land titling initiatives are still relatively new in selecting and legitimating sites – as indigenous communities, social forestry farmer groups, and as land reform title claimants – this research engages on the local implications of succeeding in achieving the outcomes of recognition and title.

II. Method and Research Setting

Finding Kajang

Selecting a representative site was a matter of fortuitous timing. In 2014, I received an opportunity with the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) to support a participatory action research initiative for joint policy drafting in Kajang, Bulukumba. At that
time, the MK35 Constitutional Court ruling had just been decided in 2013 and advocacy groups were eager to put the ruling into practice by recognizing indigenous rights to land in national forests. I was able to observe and participate in developing the policy with the Bulukumba multi-stakeholder policy making taskforce while reflexively engaging in the broader ideals of the movement being discussed in national forums. On the one hand, I gained insight into the day-to-day aspects of meeting the practical considerations of implementing a policy locally. Meanwhile, central government agencies across Indonesia were eager to understand the implications of such precedence, and to gauge the extent to which the site in Kajang might affect titling efforts elsewhere, which also allowed me access into national policy discussions.

The site involved a unique situation of an indigenous community in Kajang and their sacred forest. In chapter 2, I detail how Kajang strategically became an icon as a precedent-setting site. Briefly, the forest included a small uncontested area of 331 hectares (later designated as 314 hectares). Local government agencies had long supported Kajang rights to their sacred forest. Designating Kajang was thus seen as an easy win, one to provide a model for regulatory mechanisms elsewhere so that other indigenous communities could also follow a legal precedence to make a similar claim. Kajang was also symbolic for its historical memory as a site of land conflict against a large rubber plantation that still occasionally flares up. Violent clashes peaked in 2003 when security forces claimed three casualties amidst protest in rubber groves. Although, more recent protests also took place in 2019, these lands were not part of the discussion for recognition of land title. Furthermore, the distinct outward appearance of the Kajang as a traditional community following their custom of strictly wearing black made it a convincing case of an indigenous group staking legitimate claims to national forest land. Having participated in drafting a policy I was eager to learn what happens after land is recognized and returned. In this context, I began my research in May 2014 as part of the policy making taskforce. After making periodic scoping visits I relocated to the research sites between October 2015 – April 2017, continuing to follow along in policy-making discussions through early 2019. The phases of my research approach took place at several governing scales, in the following phases:

- **Phase 1**: Participating in the district policymaking taskforce to draft and pass a legislation on the Kajang recognition.
• **Phase 2:** Partnering with village governments across the Kajang adat region on their local development planning processes, mapping out administrative boundaries, key infrastructure and natural resources (7 formalized partnerships for spatial planning). Also engaging with indigenous leadership on land governance considerations and priorities for land management.

• **Phase 3:** Working with farmer groups on the production and reproduction of the landscape using a follow-the-thing approach on key crops and mapping out land cover in 2016-7. The land cover maps were used as a basis for conducting interviews with local farmer groups on land use change.

• **Phase 4:** Comparative analysis of social forestry in neighboring regions and national level engagement in policy forums.

**Research across scales**

As the research question revolves around what happens after rights recognition and post-land title, I needed to both understand the framing of recognition at various governing scales while also situating the existing land relations at those targeted sites. I therefore spent time among national policy-making forums, conducting interviews with key government offices at the national level. I also joined in several national forums convening multinational corporations, engaging with multilateral agencies on policies of reform such as one map and indigenous rights safeguards, as well as joining in various events by advocacy organizations like AMAN, Walhi, Huma, and Epistema. I also attended various gatherings at the provincial capital of South Sulawesi in Makassar, as numerous events have taken place there in the past five years regarding indigeneity and social forestry across Eastern Indonesia.

The bulk of this research however, took place among Bulukumba district agency staff, with village and indigenous institutions, and among the households of local farmers in Kajang.

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6 With the President’s office (Kantor Staf Presiden), in key national ministries including the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning, the Geospatial Information Agency, and the Peatlands Restoration Agency

7 I attended several forums on community engagement and conflict resolution strategies by the wood fiber corporation *Asia Pulp and Paper* and a series of facilitations put on by the Meridien Institute

8 Specifically involving the World Bank’s support of the Dedicated Grant Mechanism – Indonesia to support small grants to local and indigenous communities

9 I also supported planning and joined the South Sulawesi delegation in attending the National Congress (KMAN-V) held in Tanjung Gusta North Sumatra in 2017.
Doing this required a strategy to develop institutional partnerships with various partnerships, particularly engaging with those influencing landscape production and reproduction. I call this a *landscape political ecology*, which involved incorporating remote sensing analysis, ground-truthing of individual land plots using GPS, mapping out jurisdictional boundaries, incorporating a follow-the-thing methodology across commodity supply chains (Cook, 2004), following the full cycles of production and re-production on the landscape, and incorporating historical analysis through archival materials and oral histories of land use change. Indeed, my analysis was not bounded to the titled sites, but rather following Dove et al. (2012) “beyond the sacred forest” I have sought to analytically explore broader dynamics of the landscape.

**Building landscape partnerships**

*The Bulukumba Policy Making Taskforce*

As I will describe in Chapter 2, interpretations about “stipulation” or the release of land title to national forests is still contested. Nevertheless, due to the decentralized governing authority of the Indonesian state, the policy onus falls upon the district government to prove recognition prior to national agencies relinquishing land titles. The Bulukumba *bupati* therefore created a Policy Making taskforce, which uniquely included multi-stakeholder representation, extending membership to advocacy organizations and NGOs that provided support through facilitating local data collection, policy drafting, legal interpretation, and participatory mapping.

I was embedded in the Taskforce and joined their regular meetings. Attending their planning meetings in Bulukumba, and being based in Kajang, allowed me to conveniently support Taskforce teams in the field. I regularly joined NGO and agency teams assigned to collect data to fulfill the rigorous guidelines of drafting a highly politicized regulation about recognition and title. I helped to train Taskforce staff on the use and consolidation of geospatial data, which also allowed me to collect spatial data such as shpfiles helpful in conducting a landscape analysis. I helped design and implement surveys delivered across 150 households in a purposive random sample of Kajang villages. I attended, supported, and conducted Taskforce interviews and focus group discussions, and supported numerous other initiatives deemed a foundational component for policy drafting. I collected hundreds of pages of minutes from meeting, which I coded and analyzed to get a better sense of how these actors engaged in supporting recognition, envisioned its outcomes.
Village planning

I also sought to develop partnerships with local village and indigenous institutions. To ensure that I was understanding the broader terms of authority as initiatives for indigenous rights recognition and land title were formalized, I partnered with the local governing systems. My main interlocutors consisted of village governments, the elected heads and their staff. Of the 19 villages in the Kajang subdistrict, I created formal partnerships with seven of them, selecting strategically to map out villages at the upstream, midstream, and downstream areas. During my time in Kajang, villagers were busy trying to fulfill the regulatory mandates of the new village law (Law 6/2014). In this way I was able to support villages conduct their planning processes. We examined the thick planning books about how to conduct village planning processes and learned how to apply the policy. We then worked together to undertake the various steps of village planning. We walked village boundaries with GPS units cataloging official village boundaries. We facilitated and convened the mandated bottom-up village planning processes [musrenbang], and also went to the district and subdistrict capitals to advocate for certain mechanisms to ensure that regulations had been met and disbursements could be made. I completed full maps to national standards and provided complete drone imagery for seven villages. Throughout, we had vibrant discussions about village development priorities ranging from health to education, infrastructure to resource management. As plans shifted into disbursement programs, I went around with village staff supporting construction of water towers, and went around monitoring road development and irrigation contracts, and also became friends with local leadership. We went to the seaside together for fishing and barbecues, and I often attended family ceremonies. Although this level of engagement provided insight into the official governing processes and development approaches, it still created a distance between the official elements of governing with the realities of landscape production and reproduction. This would require getting my hands and feet dirty.

Working with farmers, living among households

Much of the analysis and the data provided in this dissertation is presented as an ethnography through the lens of local farmers in Kajang. As virtually everyone in Kajang takes part in farming one way or another, gaining trust in the community also came concomitantly with
my willingness to take part in people’s lives and livelihoods in the fields. I hoed, planted, sprayed, fertilized, harvested, brought yield to markets, engaged with middlemen, and undertook a follow-the-thing approach for the five key commodities on the landscape. On occasion I would print out satellite imagery maps and conduct focus group discussions with farmer groups to ask more specific questions about land use change and the land relations that govern them.

Finally, I also participated in local youth organization activities. This began by connecting among a group of young men through our mutual love of playing soccer in the afternoons at the local schoolyard. Over time, these young men were eager to invite me in their own youth organizations. I attended several planning meetings of local organizations that young college students were putting together and often discussed issues late into the night with them while playing the popular game of dominoes. Several young women, on the other hand, approached me as part of their interest in learning English, often at the encouragement of their mothers, and I was able to gain insight into lives of a group of girls in their late teens that consistently came over to the family home that was my residence for much of my stay.

III. Theoretical engagement: Counter exclusions, capitalist relations, and landscapes of potential

A political ecology framework

My research draws on a political ecology tradition that examines the nexus of development, environment, and social justice (Peet et al, 2010; Robbins, 2012; Forsyth, 2013). This means I emphasize three key components to approaching my analysis by focusing on (i) historical antecedents, that are grounded in (ii) political economy, and viewed through the lens of (iii) discursive political legitimation.

First, I place a strong emphasis on historical factors, particularly by identifying key moments that set new trajectories in motion. In this way I contextualize how the landscape has come to be as it is today, and the terms of authority that legitimated such outcomes. These include reaching as far back as the pre-colonial period of the Gowa polity in South Sulawesi, the subsequent periods of colonial encounter that reshaped and reinforced terms of authority among the political elite, the arrival of larger plantation commodity projects such as rubber, the
Indonesian state-making project, influence of political Islam, as well as the more recent invocation of *adat*, tourism development, and village planning.

Secondly, I see the nested political economy and the reflexive influence of global markets and national policies interacting with decision-making processes at multiple scales as affecting local practices and shaping ecological outcomes. My political economy approach centers on a classical agrarian change methodology, which I implement through a follow-the-thing method (Cook, 2004). The agrarian change questions follow a tradition of research engaging on land dilemmas of Southeast Asia (Scoones et al, 2011; Hall et al, 2011), examining both formal aspects of property and authority (Sikor and Lund, 2010), and less formalized processes of access and power (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). My line of inquiry thus follows framings formulated by Henry Bernstein, and taken further by Borras et al (2011: 211) to include these six overarching questions: “i) who owns what; ii) who does what; iii) who gets what; iv) what do they do with the surplus wealth that has [or has not] been created; v) what do they do to each other; vi) how are political changes shaped by dynamic ecologies, and vice versa?” I also bound these questions by asking them in relation to land decisions that are taking place in and around the sites slated for recognition and land title. Cook’s (2004) follow-the-thing approach provides a guideline for following a particular commodity by examining the sites of engagement throughout the supply chain. In Kajang I followed the phases of production and reproduction of five commodity supply chains, including: rice, corn, cloves, pepper (*Piper nigrum*, as opposed to chili peppers), and rubber. I also engaged with other commodities but not as extensively, including timber species, coconut (and what is locally called “hybrid coconut”), cacao, and other agroforestry planting systems as they fit into overall household livelihood strategies.

Thirdly, although the understanding of local commodity production is central to my analysis, I also identify the discursive legitimating factors associated with notions of land relations. Why are particular practices allowed over time, and how does that then legitimate new possibilities taking shape on the landscape, and under what terms? The landscapes in Kajang that I examine at the comparative social forestry sites all embody certain meanings of sacred power and ancestral legitimacy. With the arrival of *adat* and social forestry policies as a new process for legitimating land, new visions of the landscape emerge, get redefined, recoil, and are contested in ways that invoke tradition while creating new possibilities for the future. Particularly with a community as distinct as the Kajang, incorporating how knowledge and meaning are generated is
essential, whether invoked internally by cultural leaders or influenced externally by overarching discourses about land. This in turn mobilizes and justifies particular territorializing effects.

Counter exclusions: Powers of exclusion in counter-movements

I introduced the topic of land grabbing as a dichotomy between the land grabbers and those grabbing back. But research on land dilemmas in Southeast Asia have theorized a more comprehensive notion of the powers that exclude, pointing to the false dichotomies of external grabbers and internal defenders (Hall et al., 2011). Hall et al. discuss the powers of exclusion and the processes of enclosure as a double-edged sword in which decisions governing land benefit some at the expense of others. Defining exclusion as the *inability* to benefit from land resources presents a heuristic that emerges across four different inter-related powers that help to explain and foreground my analytical framing.

The first of the Hall et al. (2011) power heuristic is *regulation*, which describes powers that exclude through formal regulatory processes sanctioned by the state and upheld by actors that define its enforcement. A second, the power of *markets*, excludes through the inability to afford access, which usually take place through increasing land prices or barriers to meeting the costs of production. A third power, *force*, excludes through the threat of harm. Finally, a fourth power that they describe under the broader heading of *legitimation*, excludes based on relational notions of meaning, namely the determination that it would not be appropriate to do so. Each of these factors are mobilized in varying capacities in different, but often overlapping ways, but that when taken together, help to explain the widespread land dilemmas taking place in Southeast Asia, whether it is in the name of land reform, urbanization and tourism projects, plantations and extractive industries, or increasingly environmental (and carbon) enclosures. Across all of these very different projects, these powers of exclusion are at work in some capacity or another.

Therefore, although counter-movements for land recognition are presented as antithetical to land grabbing by external forces, when seen from a perspective of the powers of exclusion, the powers themselves orient the focus of analysis influencing changes on the landscape. Indeed, as the discursive goals among proponents for land rights for rural communities might be different than, for example a plantation or a mining project, the actors, outcomes and effects on who gain access and who gets excluded can be surprisingly similar (cf. Zerner, 1994; Scoones et al., 2011;
Astuti and McGregor, 2016). In the remainder of this introductory chapter I highlight the particular theoretical engagements by chapter.

**Indigeneity as the leading strategy of counter-movements and its many sharp edges (chapter 2)**

Indigeneity has found footing as one of the most powerful ways for making counter-claims to land grabbing amidst the realities of the contemporary state political systems (Niezen, 2003). Indeed, I have illustrated the current moment leading to Indonesia’s formalized approaches to indigenous land rights recognition, social forestry, and land reform policies. Upon sharing my early findings on the main thesis of chapter 2 with an activist friend during AMAN’s 2017 national congress – stating my argument about the double edges of recognition – one activist cautioned me about the dangers of sharing such a conclusion. In urging me to reconsider, he stated “It is the only policy mechanism we have standing in the way of the large-scale development plans proposed by the state and corporations.” He then went on to describe the long list of planned developments, vividly explaining the backroom trading among contractors that have carved up much of the outer islands for major investments. Seen from this perspective, the achievements of the movement to be able to obtain a regulatory mechanism to make land claims are clearly notable. My intent in this dissertation is not to undermine these achievements and I take seriously the implications that indigenous rights recognition can provide a defense of the local against powerful external interests. Nevertheless, the strategies promoting recognition require closer scrutiny about who benefits and who loses when the imaginaries of global indigenism and the strategies of rights recognition are deployed. Hall et al.’s heuristic describes the powers of exclusion as a double edge. In this chapter I extend this conceptualization beyond a double edge, but rather when seen from the perspective of various interests, are more akin to multiple sharp edges.

In chapter 2 I am particularly interested in taking a closer look at what factors determine the selection of sites, why they are singled out for recognition, the implications locally, and the initiatives that can emerge elsewhere as a result. Indeed global indigenism has long been critiqued for the leaky policy umbrella that it shields (Dove, 2006), its vulnerabilities to neoliberal cooptation (Hale, 2006), and the increasingly limiting ways it defines inclusivity (Niezen, 2003). Other have also shown through Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation, how deploying indigeneity are contingent upon powerful networks to fulfill and defend particular
imaginaries of the traditional (Li, 2000; and Hirtz 2003). Meanwhile more recent political ecology analysis (Yeh and Bryan, 2015) suggest that indigeneity presents new decolonizing future, or what Anna Tsing (1999) once described as a “room for maneuver.” Amidst the current policy moment to invoke indigeneity and reclaim authority premised on the local, chapter 2 takes these debates one step further by seeking to explain what unfolds after recognition.

In this chapter, I present these debates amidst the newly formed “institutional” or “reified” indigeneity as an official state policy to be proven and fulfilled through regulatory and bureaucratic means. I thus highlight how the various actors came together to strike the terms of recognition in Kajang, how they viewed its outcomes, and the implications for the forest and surrounding landscapes. Using a framing of the powers of exclusion I present empirical findings in terms of exclusions double edges, orienting the discussion towards who benefits, while considering a comparative lens for what might be possible elsewhere.

**Capitalist relations: Development authority, tenure institutions, and landscape production (Chapter 3 and 4)**

In a similar line of analysis engaging with the powers of exclusion, I also take on the notion that activists seem to promote, that gaining land title and rights recognition is of utmost importance. Activists like to invoke the popular phrase that *the long arc of history bends towards justice*. Amidst this viewpoint proponents work to catalyze efforts that secure title and recognition, believing the foundation of legality secures subsequent institutional rights and initiates management responsibility. In chapter 3, I keep the focus on land relations after the triumph of securing victories of recognition and land title. To what extent does recognition and title affect, and interact with, existing land relations post-recognition, post-title?

In order to do so, I engage with Li’s (2014) notion of capitalist relations. In her example from neighboring Central Sulawesi, she describes a scenario whereby indigenous highlanders eagerly embraced the promise of capitalism, incorporating tree crops into the landscape and enclosing the frontier. As a result, a process of accumulation and dispossession ensued, compelling highlanders into particular market relations, structuring wealth among successful elites, relegating others to sell their labor at the margins, and in the worst scenarios, leaving some
destitute and completely outside of the market. The latter, unable to access markets, found themselves no longer able to grow or produce food.

Following Li’s approach on capitalist relations, I foreground the historical notions of authority in Kajang amidst the terms of landscape change. To do this, I examine tenure relations in agricultural production systems and the intensifying priorities to plant tree crops. The types of tree crops and terms of production followed price booms that initially challenged the historical aristocracy and landed elite. In more recent years however, particularly as the frontier was fully enclosed, capitalist relations began to accelerate among an emergent landed elite. Indeed, amidst the overwhelming attention in formal negotiations regionally concerned with recognition and title to Kajang’s sacred forest, similar processes of accumulation and dispossession as described by Li in Central Sulawesi are also unfolding in parallel, yet distinct ways in Kajang. Although her work focuses mostly on the arrival of cocoa – a singular tree crop commodity – I also incorporate analysis which highlights the corollary entry of capitalist relations through seasonal agricultural production systems. This chapter also points to discoveries about what happens after the boom subsides, and the frontier is enclosed, the shift to new commodities and intensifying capitalist land relations that consolidate among those that succeeded with profitable harvests.

Landscapes of potential (chapter 5)

In chapter 5, I follow the implications of recognition described in chapter 2, combined with the historical analysis and capitalist relations that foreground sites of recognition in chapters 3 and 4. Taken together, I am able to further consider how youth view their future place in the landscape. I call this landscapes of potential, and describe the imaginaries of future land relations by delineating trajectories between two ideal types of successful young men poised to fill an outsized leadership role in the two main tenure categories in Kajang. Although these imaginaries are not yet fully materialized, nor will they necessarily come to be, youth visions nevertheless represent the broader priorities, desires, and possibilities in Kajang.

One story revolves around Aco, who having firmly situated himself in rice production, finds himself amidst increasingly contested and protectionist practices among a certain network of families controlling access to land. He thrives as a result of his reliability to perform and coordinate labor, but which he recognizes are contingent upon the exclusionary practices of family relations. Regardless of his privilege in rice production, household demands still require
him to coordinate labor teams to migrate regionally seeking out employment harvesting rice, rewarded in yield. As rice has found a firmer stronghold in rules of reciprocity and ceremonial function so has its capital value risen in surprising and exclusionary ways.

The second story revolves around Baso, who will someday inherit the vast landholdings that his father, a prominent local leader, has accumulated through successful rubber and clove harvests. As a young man attending college in the provincial capital of Makassar, Baso also aspires to be a politician, which as he explains, led him to study political science. Baso actively participates in youth organizing at his university, and on regular visits home applies the formal skills he has learned to create his own youth-led organizations in Kajang. The bureaucratic capabilities learned from forming and establishing local organizations not only prepares him to establish the network and legitimacy to run for future office, but also creates the necessary types of institutional structures that can connect with social movement initiatives that have come to Kajang to support recognition. The creation of such relational networks also highlights an inherent contradiction among the imaginaries of social movements that come to support indigenous communities rooted in communal land relations. In other words, those with the capabilities and institutional know-how to connect with social movements supporting the recognition of indigeneity further reinforces the very institutions that stand for the local landed, and accumulating elite.

**Rights, livelihoods, and conservation in social forestry: A comparative perspective (chapter 6)**

Given that Kajang is often described as an unusual site, that some might say is unlikely replicable elsewhere, in the final empirical chapter I incorporate a comparative analysis on the processes of recognition at social forestry sites. Indeed, social forestry has emerged as part of a broader strategy among social movements to formalize land rights for rural populations in national forests. Moreover, much of the policy attention by 2018 had shifted from indigenous land designations to opportunities for administering social forestry, as President Joko Widodo reinforced commitments to expand social forestry schemes from less than 1 million hectares in 2014 at the start of his administration, to a sharp increase of 12.7 million hectares by 2019.

In chapter 6, I apply a common policy framework in social forestry to juxtapose policy imaginary with implementation reality. The attractiveness of social forestry across numerous stakeholders is no doubt indicative of its ability to capture multiple discourses and fulfill
overlapping goals across numerous actors. Maryudi et al. (2012) categorizes these multiple
interests in social forestry under a three-legged stool consisting of rights recognition, livelihoods
empowerment, and conservation outcomes. In other words, social forestry encapsulates multiple
discourses: not only do communities regain opportunities to reclaim formal legitimacy to their
ancestral lands, development programs can also support livelihoods assistance, and meanwhile,
the broader environmental goals can be met through local forest conservation efforts.

In these early phases of indigenous recognition and social forestry implementation,
Bulukumba and neighboring Bantaeng had some of the first approved schemes. I provide a close
examination of designation across three different social forestry mechanisms, including a village
forest scheme in Patteneteang, Bantaeng; a community forest designation in Borong Rappoa,
Bulukumba; and the indigenous forest claims in Kajang. The broader comparative analysis
highlights some new revelations about the promises and applications of mapping and boundary
setting processes, as well as the new approach to administering institutions. On the one hand,
setting boundaries and creating management plans created confusion in ways that undermined
trust-building between local community members and formal institutions. More specifically,
the new bureaucratic means for achieving social forestry designation outcomes not only undermined
the legitimacy of local and customary institutions, but furthermore, created new barriers to
access its benefits, privileging the creation of new hollow institutions that functioned as
intermediary bodies to access resources.

IV. Beyond recognition and the new Kajang frontier

I conclude the dissertation by returning to the initial research questions encapsulated in
the discussion about the open secrets with the Ammatoa. I provide two short examples about
how social movements advocating for indigeneity and social forestry designations continue to
intensify their lobbying. Indeed, these advocates continue to push for a broader law on
indigeneity, and to do so they highlight the landscape analysis that I conducted but changed the
narrative to an economic valuation of the wealth of indigenous communities. Tried as I might, I
was unable to get across that the tree crops at the basis of their analysis was the very source of
inequality emerging from intensifying capitalist relations. Indeed the politics of recognition,
when seen from among the Kajang landscapes highlight a politics of advocacy that are beyond
recognition.
The second examines the rupture of local land tenure relations unfolding in Kajang by following migrants to new frontiers of land conversion elsewhere. What happens after land’s end in Kajang? Does the march of accumulation compelled by capitalist relations continue its exclusionary trajectories after every spike of each new crop boom? Here my analysis is incomplete and would be the logical entry point for were I to continue a new phase of research. The frontier has indeed moved beyond the Kajang region. As some leave in search of labor, others have followed streams of opportunity about what they know best, through the networks of possibility creating opportunities to convert forest lands in the neighboring province of Southeast Sulawesi to plant cloves, the tree crop boom taking place there. Indeed, some of the recent village elections in Kajang have been contested based on capital obtained from lucrative harvests from there.
Chapter 2 – The multiple edges of indigenous recognition: Dilemmas in the room for maneuver

On my way to the National Palace this morning I am filled with mixed feelings. Moved, joyful, and blessed. It is indeed very personal and emotional for me. But this was not predetermined. I allow tears to fall. The recognition of Indigenous Forest claims taking place in just a few hours holds so much meaning for our friends and family of the indigenous communities of this nation. For us, in this brief time, we are able to share this moment with them. This is a struggle of decades, or even centuries if we reach back to the colonial era. Going forward the challenges loom greater. Indigenous forests are the stakes for which we can prove our responsibility to the environment, community, and for this nation.

– Myrna Safitri

When a project attains the status of a model or icon, one touted as a success and worthy of study and emulation, its portrayal is informed by the rhetorics, needs, debates, and plans of project-building contexts and purposes (i.e., development, conservation, state power). Multiple stories develop as the model is fitted into new contexts and used in different ways. What is the process by which one project comes to be held up as an exemplary model of community-based natural resource management? How do such community-based natural resource management icons work their way into institutions that then seek to replicate that model? How does the idea of a "model" create or restrict opportunities for experimentation in the face of local contingencies?

– Brosius et al., 1998

I. Movements for recognition

As the leading epigraph above illustrates, recognition of indigenous lands in national forests has come to symbolize so much. It at once represents decolonization from the Dutch origins of the Indonesian state as well as reparations against the breached promises of nationhood that saw generations of evictions and land enclosures (Davidson and Henley, 2007).

Furthermore, indigenous land rights recognition also represents something more forward

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looking, suggesting a new path into the future, one premised on both downward state accountability and environmental sustainability.

Indeed, around the world, similar policy pronouncements have taken place, shaping international ideals and national polices. The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established in 1982, followed by the UN ILO Charter 169, the UN declaration of the decade of indigenous people in 1995, the UN Declaration for the Rights for Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2008, among other global initiatives all seeks to legitimate and ensure rights to land for indigenous people, supported across international development organizations like the World Bank (Hale, 2002; Niezen, 2003; Muur, 2019). In turn, numerous country contexts have passed, and continue to pass legislation recognizing and formalizing indigenous rights to land. These policies of indigenous rights recognition are premised on a set of assumptions: that recognition will help to address land conflicts by providing access to land for rural dispossessed and marginalized communities, and that land recognition will furthermore lead to better conservation of land and natural resources. As a result, the policy ideals and approaches to recognition now translate into particular strategies and practices at transferring land rights for new forms of management control.

Such notions of social justice and environmental stewardship through indigenous land rights are not without critique. In many cases, trends towards indigenous land rights recognition results in some uncomfortable outcomes and unintended consequences. This chapter engages with these debates through the most recent push for implementing policies on indigenous rights recognition in Indonesia. Through a close analysis of land rights recognition of the Kajang community in South Sulawesi, a precedent-setting case, I examine how indigenous land rights recognition results in its multiple sharp edges when examined from below. Furthermore, the analysis also shows emerging complications from the effects of formalizing recognition that are beginning to take place elsewhere in Indonesia. This chapter addresses the following question in the dissertation:

i. In what ways are sites for land recognition and title – in this case on indigeneity – selected and gain legitimacy as a potential site?

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11 See forthcoming special issue in the Journal of Peasant Studies on post-titling for empirical cases from Cambodia, Malaysia, Paraguay, and Indonesia (Wenk et al., forthcoming)
ii. How do various actors understand the implications of land recognition and how does that influence their roles promoting, or tasked with implementing, its outcomes?

iii. In what ways are the terms of authority at the sites of implementation being contested?

iv. To what extent do precedent setting sites shape outcomes elsewhere?

The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I provide a broad overview of the tensions and experiences among broader movements, narratives, and mobilizations of indigeneity. In section 3, I describe the Indonesian context by exploring the origins of adat as indigenous rights policy, which in turn shape the current administrative approaches to designating indigenous land rights. In section 4, I describe the Kajang case through its strategic discovery and selection as an iconic site. My analysis then turns to section 5, which focuses on the final public consultation in Kajang, which brought together the key stakeholders from across various governing scales to support recognition and land title of national forests as indigenous lands. This political conjuncture,\(^\text{12}\) highlights the different perceptions, interpretations, and imagined implications of recognition and title, particularly among those involved in promoting its success. The approach to analysis through this juxtaposition of perspectives provides the basis for section 6, in which I point to some of the multiple sharp edges that emerge from indigenous land rights recognition. I conclude by presenting a brief set of comparative experiences emerging from Sumatra, Kalimantan, and other sites in Sulawesi.

II. Engaging indigeneity

The notion of indigeneity is becoming an increasingly powerful political approach in negotiations over land claims. Indigeneity has seen an expansion into the realm of identity politics (Niezen, 2003), symbolizes and convenes a strategy for decolonization (Hale, 2008), and seeks to protect against the “delocalizing impacts” of modernization and globalization (Appadurai, 1996; Dove, 2006). Indigeneity is at once a call for greater local authority silenced by influence from external forces and a challenge to the broader development discourse transforming rural spaces around the world (Dove, 2006). Indigeneity is a complex idea

\(^{12}\) I mean conjuncture in the way described by Stuart Hall, namely a convening of key actors that come together at a particular time and struggle, of which set distinct new trajectories for the future through their ability to articulate ideological and discursive entanglements become possible (Li, 2000; Bennet, 2016).
however, embodying multiple lines of thought and imaginaries, defined and applied in various contexts, understood, interpreted, and mobilized in perplexing and inchoate ways.

 Political ecologists have especially noted the rise of indigeneity as a reaction to the blame assigned to rural people against land degradation. The classic example, among many, is Piers Blaikie’s (1985) examination of soil erosion in Nepal, in which rural farmers incur blame for soil erosion after being pushed to the very margins of economic opportunity. Similarly, Fairhead and Leach’s (1996) exploration of deforestation in West Africa, directly confronts the blame assigned to rural villages, showing that in fact wooded groves are a result of, rather than a relic of community management.

 Although such narratives have redirected attention to more inclusive approaches to development, political ecologists have also pointed to the problematic mobilizations of indigeneity in its essentializing forms. These critiques highlight the strategic omissions of the contextual political economic dynamics that shape natural resource management. Systems theory analysis in particular described how rural places are rarely exempt from engagement with global market forces, and that in fact, such factors indelibly shape local identity and power relations (Wolf, 2010). Indeed, early critiques of the limits to indigeneity highlighted the imaginary of green primitivism, narratives such as the “noble savage” or the “fallen angel,” and the notion that indigenous people were somehow independent from global market influences (Ellen, 1986; Berkes, 1999).

 Other critiques also highlight the limiting potential of mobilizing indigeneity for the marginalized groups that are left out of its narrative, and worse, that can leave some groups more vulnerable. Gupta (1998) for example, shows these limits by pointing to the reification of indigenous politics and the resultant omission of vast populations of the marginalized as they do not fit the elements that define indigeneity. Examples of the excluded are categories of groups such as urban squatters, migrants, and frontier colonists (Dove, 2006).

 Indeed, a particular defining characteristic and a new cultural concept around indigeneity has emerged, which Niezen (2003) ironically describes as ‘international indigenism.’ This new form of indigenism has created a presupposition of a set of common cultural practices, actions, and simplifications that make up distinct embodiments of the indigenous. In some cases, local wisdom is redefined to fulfill an international perception of an indigenous community, thus changing local practices to fit imaginaries created among international forums (Zerner, 1994;
Dove, 2006; Astuti and MacGregor, 2016). Meanwhile, these redefined cultural practices also serve to reinvent community attitudes, transforming into disciplining narratives that redefine what is acceptable and allowable with respect to land and resource access (Agrawal, 2005). Nevertheless, indigeneity continues to encapsulate various political ideals that demand greater attention, particularly for its commitment to defend local people against land dispossession from external powerful actors.

Other examinations of indigeneity pay closer attention to the processes, networks, and possibilities from invoking indigeneity. Tania Li’s work (2000) from Central Sulawesi, for example, points to the relational factors that shape indigeneity through particular conjunctures, employing Stuart Hall’s framing of articulation to more systematically explain dynamics from below. Her analysis shows that some sites and certain characteristics are privileged over others by directing her analysis at two distinct communities. The comparative of the Lauje and the Lindu of Central Sulawesi shows that one site, the Lindu, is privileged over the other, the Lauje, even if the latter more closely fits with the international imaginary of indigenism as an agrarian community. This example thus shows that sounding claims to indigeneity that can be heard are contingent upon narratives and networks, whereas others are unable to advocate for themselves due to their lack of alliances and inability to draw attention. Frank Hirtz (2003) has further extended the framework for the contemporary articulation of indigeneity, explaining that success is contingent on three enabling factors being present, which are i) strong external advocacy, ii) committed facilitation by intermediary NGOs, and iii) supportive local governments. Achieving such alliances and support for making indigenous claims thus requires significant resources, sophistication, and partnerships, to which has led him to famously declaring that “it takes modern means to be traditional.”

Further analysis on the effects of recognition also highlights the precarity of its outcomes, such that once obtained, can render a community defined in static ways. Recognition as indigenous invites external judgment of distinct characteristics, requiring people to walk a fine line of being considered either too primitive or inauthentic (see also Dove, 2006). This can influence the expectations of how indigenous people dress, judgement over their cultural and religious beliefs, as well as the subsequent decisions made about land. Furthermore, the potential implications of the narrow definition by external powerful actors about indigeneity also exposes
them to sanction, for which deviance to strict norms could render their status, legitimacy, or land stripped away.

Amidst these critiques, however, Anna Tsing (1999) points to the potential power that some deployments of indigeneity can succeed in, often in unexpected ways. She describes this as a messy process that provides “room for maneuver.” From a case among the Meratus Dayaks of Kalimantan for example, she discusses how environmentalist interventions and local desires for autonomy converged to create new possibilities amidst restrictive bureaucratic and administrative processes, by proving the imperative of implementing global sustainable development agendas. Such interventions can thus create new priorities in unexpected ways amidst formal processes, blurring administrative requirements and introducing new forms and approaches to prioritization that opens up room for increasing local legitimacy and authority.

This room for maneuver coined by Tsing (1999), which political ecologists have more recently described as a politics of possibility amidst indigeneity (Yeh and Bryan, 2015) underpins the strategy of a broader global network of advocacy against large-scale land expropriation by external actors discussed in the introduction to this dissertation. The policy outcomes of such advocacy coalesce as support for the formalization of recognition within state contexts. During the past two decades in Indonesia, the struggle amongst advocacy groups is embodied by indigenous land rights recognition. As I will detail in Section 2, AMAN\(^{13}\) and their partner NGOs made it their foremost priority to contest land categories in the courts, advocating in high-level national government institutions, drafting regional regulations with local governments, facilitating the creation of local indigenous organizations, and more recently, succeeding in formal transfer of land to indigenous communities.

As a result of these policy successes for indigeneity and formalizing recognition, in Indonesia the state has accommodated incorporation of a reified and formalized approach to indigenous rights and land recognition with its own contingent processes of identification, selection and approval (Erb, 2007; Dhiaulhaq and McCarthy, forthcoming). This research thus shifts the focus beyond articulation to the effects after formalization. Do these new forms of recognition and approaches to conferring local authority facilitate the “room for maneuver?” Or conversely, does the new administrative rules being placed on communities undermining local

\(^{13}\) AMAN (\textit{Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara}) stands for the Alliance of Indigenous Communities of the Archipelago. AMAN-Sulsel, which will also be discussed in this chapter as the regional branch in South Sulawesi.
indigenous authority? If one way or the other, in what ways and under whose terms? Furthermore, does recognition, in the current ways it is being imagined and materialized, still help to temper the march of land expropriation by external actors in the sites identified for recognition? Is it indeed a stand against land grabbing? Or, rather, do the justifications for recognition allow for greater legitimacy for enclosures elsewhere, focusing on one site as a gesture of goodwill while externally driven enclosures entrench elsewhere? To what extent are these processes creating unforeseen pathways and shaping new trajectories? As such, I turn my attention to the Indonesian case and begin by historically foregrounding the emerging conventions resulting in formal approaches to recognition and indigenous land title.

III. Approaching formalization

A modern history of indigenous recognition

Across Indonesia, *adat* holds various meanings, but overall invokes local authority over land, history, and culture (Davidson and Henley, 2007). As a policy however, *adat* was initially shaped as a Dutch colonial construct. In the 19th century Dutch officials used *adat* – of Arabic origin and meaning *custom* – as a way for colonial authorities to understand and negotiate with regional polities and practices across the diverse East Indies (Van Vollenhoven et al., 2013). In the late colonial period however, *adat* became part of a distinct Dutch colonial welfare policy that sought to acknowledge local legal systems and protect against land expropriation. These welfare policies included intensive codification systems that were never fully realized, but its effect also embodied a sense of collective sovereignty for Indonesians to frame a language of independence for drafting an independent Constitution and convening ideology to unite a diverse and vast archipelago (Djalins, 2015; Burns, 1989).

In the Suharto era (1966-1998) *adat* maintained an important role for Indonesian identity, but development of the primary sector economy largely overshadowed any formal policy to recognize regional identities as *adat* (Anderson, 1983). Cultural difference was thus relegated for its extent as a unifying ideology of Indonesian-ness or otherwise for its potential cultural development in song and dance geared towards tourism development (Li, 2001; Davidson and Henley, 2007). Indeed, forest dwelling, upland, and rural people were defined as “primitive” and “isolated” [*terasing*] relegated to social welfare policies to “enlighten” [*penerangan*] them into the modern Indonesian state, resettling communities into patterns codified in the Java-centric
village law. As indigenous rights gained international attention in the late 1980s however, bolstered by narratives of community-based natural resource management and indigenous knowledge, linking indigeneity to *adat* helped serve as a vehicle for claiming political difference. Differentiating Indonesians as *adat* communities akin to indigeneity elsewhere was rebuffed in the Suharto era. The Suharto administration’s official stance responded that either all or no Indonesians were indigenous (Kusumaatmadja: in Li, 2001). *Adat* as indigeneity, which is now a presumed translation, only occurred through a concerted effort by activist organizations, a struggle that cultivated some of the strongest challenges to Suharto’s rule; and upon his ouster, sought to redefine the state by invoking *adat* the original social contract of the Indonesian state (Moniaga, 2007; Bettinger et al., 2014).

The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the subsequent democratic decentralization project that reshaped the state allowed for an expanded role of civil society organizations (Aspinall, 2005). Harking back to *adat* in the Constitution as the pure foundational ideology of the nation provided a convening narrative for a network of NGOs to advocate for social justice and began to reinforce of *adat* as indigeneity. Advocacy organizations like AMAN succeeded in raising the profile of land use change, expropriation by state agencies and corporate actors, and violent land conflict between rural communities and plantations. Rapid rates of land conversion in Indonesia’s lowland peatland forests also became linked to high levels of carbon emissions, which resulted in widespread attention internationally. These combined factors provided further legitimacy for NGOs to demand land access to enclosed national forest lands. Specifically, they began to demand the recognition of indigenous communities on the basis that not only was recognition reparation for past injustices, but that furthermore, local authority among indigenous communities could act as more sustainable environmental stewards (Afiff, 2016). Such a message resonated across increasingly influential policy makers, and numerous former activists sit in high level policy advisory positions (Rachman and Siscawati, 2016). This further facilitated the opportunity to contest indigenous rights to land in legal terms, successfully bringing cases in front of the highest courts in the land. The landmark decision at the Constitutional Court (case MK35/2012 decided in 2013) ruled that state enclosure of *adat* forests were unconstitutional and thereupon meant that national forest land authority could be challenged on the basis of indigeneity.
As the MK35 ruling provided legal authority to make claims to the vast state lands controlled by the forestry ministry, the policy questions shifted to discussions around how to recognize indigenous land. Proving \textit{adat} forests has been subject to various interpretation and intense deliberation. As of June 2018, 24,379 hectares of \textit{adat} forests are, or are close to being formally stipulated\footnote{\textit{Stipulated} [terms by the Forestry Ministry as written in their English reports] is used to describe the handover of national forest land authority.} (MOEF, 2018 – see Table 1). Although this is far from activist demands implicating mapping of close to 10 million hectares, these formally recognized sites provide precedence for making additional claims.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Designation Stage} & \textbf{Area (hectares)} \\
\hline
\textit{Adat} forests in the pipeline & 10,627 \\
\textit{Adat} forests in the process of being stipulated & 2,174 \\
Formally stipulated as \textit{Adat} forest & 11,578 \\
\textbf{TOTAL} & \textbf{24,379} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Area of Adat Forests}
\end{table}

So how does \textit{adat} land get stipulated? Due to associated policy interpretations related to decentralization laws, institutionally, the burden of proof is placed upon regional governments (districts) to act as the main proponent for recognition. This is done through a variety of mechanisms, the strongest of which is a regional regulation passed by the district legislature (Mancayo and Firmansyah, 2014). Stipulation must first fulfill a specific definition of \textit{adat} and land uses, which is often taken from the precedence of \textit{adat} forests in article 67 of the 1999 Basic Forestry Law (UNORCID, 2013). The regional regulation must first prove a bounded territorial area of the \textit{adat} community. Second, the regulation must prove the \textit{adat} community is governed by \textit{adat} law and that \textit{adat} communities still adhere to their customs. Third, the regulation must also show that their cultural and livelihood practices are connected to the territory. Once these elements are proven and legislated by the district government, these claims are proposed to the Forestry Ministry for recognition. The Ministry thereafter conducts an evaluation of the site and reviews the claim, either approving or rejecting the proposal. The Ministry also maintains that this is not a full transfer of rights, requiring management plans similar to other land concessions that must strictly follow existing land use designations (MOEF,
2018: 90-91). These interpretations are still contested however, and hence, I now turn to the processes and strategies undertaken to achieve recognition at various scales.

*Map 1. The Kajang Indigenous Region, Plantation Land, Saukang, and the Inner Territory*

**IV. The making of an icon in Kajang: Four key reasons**

The leading epigraph taken from Brosius et al. (1998) shows that we have much to learn from a movement’s icons. At that time, notions of recognition and indigenous knowledge were often embodied amidst and complemented by policies of community based natural resource

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15 The notion of connecting indigeneity to icons was a joint analytical framing that I engaged in with Willem van der Muur, to which I am thankful for highlighting this connection. We also published Fisher and Muur (2019 forthcoming) that more explicitly takes on the analytical framing of “misleading icons,” which is also based on research from this chapter.
management (CBNRM), which have since been complemented by, and subsumed into other programmatic priorities (e.g. adaptation, resilience, social forestry, and indigeneity). Although CBNRM is still prominent as a mobilizing narrative in and of itself, Brosius et al.’s framing helps to point to some of the antecedents among current trends in formalizing indigenous land rights policy and social forestry recognition (see Introduction to the dissertation for more on this). Following Brosius et al.’s approach, a closer examination of the icons of a movement proves instructive.

In this section, I highlight how Kajang became one of the most prominent cases of indigenous rights recognition at the national level in Indonesia. The site provided among the first examples of proving recognition and stipulation to state land under Forestry Ministry authority. The site met all the highest procedural standards and subsequently became a precedent-setting example. National and international proponents envisioned that the successful stipulation in Kajang could serve as a model to be replicated elsewhere for contesting national forest land on behalf of local and indigenous communities. In this section I discuss four key reasons how Kajang became an icon.

**History of violent conflict, symbolic victories, and articulating indigeneity**

In 1906, Harrison’s and Crossfield received *Erpacht* land cultivation rights for a plantation concession in the upland hills of Bulukumba (Tyson, 2011; Muur, 2019). As a British holding company working in Dutch territory, they sought to support commodities trading by partnering with the colonial government and officials in South Sulawesi to set aside land in Kajang to initiate potential cultivation. The plantation began by planting rubber and kapok in 1918. Plantation operations stalled however with the political volatility during the periods of struggles for independence, followed by a regional Islamic rebellion that brought the supply chains to a standstill (1938–1965). As the New Order re-established political primacy in the mid 1960s, by 1968, plantation operations began anew focusing entirely on rubber.

The area initially delineated as the plantation concession in the early 1900s marked sites of under-utilized land, which were approved by local Kajang officials, appointed under Dutch colonial control. Plantation officials often point to the rights conceded from original approval by local Kajang authority for land access. The concessionaire, currently PT Lonsum, have subsequently renewed this original concession under the HGU category with state agencies.
Today this amounts to approximately 5,200 hectares. Lonsum has always viewed local Kajang expansion of settlement and cultivation areas into the previously demarcated underutilized zones as encroachment on their concession areas, labeling trespassers illegal squatters encroaching on formal claims negotiated with state offices. Various local Kajang interpretation however, considers these lands as ancestral frontier areas available for future cultivation and settlement based on local customary rules governing land relations. Further bolstering Kajang frontier territory claims are the numerous ritual sites dispersed throughout the HGU concession. In the 1970s and 80s, the Lonsum plantation began to expand operations, cultivating new areas that they considered within the formal boundaries of their HGU concession. As a result, they began forcibly evicting anyone standing in their way, burning settlements and taking over smallholder cultivation plots.

These aggressive advances of plantation expansion were challenged in court in a series of proceedings in the early 1980s. In the first challenge, the courts awarded land parcels to local Kajang plaintiffs. The plantation subsequently appealed in higher courts and the decision was overturned. A final appeal to the Supreme Court however, ruled in favor of the Kajang plaintiffs. This ruling represented a unique victory at the height of the Suharto era’s control, in which challenging a large plantation rarely sided with local plaintiffs. This decision thus made Kajang a symbolic site of victory for local land rights in Indonesia (Muur, 2018). Nevertheless, as with many legal decisions and law enforcement at that time, local plaintiffs complained that enforcement of the ruling remain unfulfilled. The process stalled due to problems of interpretation, such as inaccurate data, a common strategy that concessionaires cite allowing them to ignore elements of the rulings or only partially return land authority. Although some land was in the end returned to Kajang claimants, they noted that the land area was reduced or unfulfilled, and the benefit sharing outcomes led to further horizontal conflict in the community.

In the early 2000s, Lonsum staff again began to repossess land and expand operations, evicting local settlements and increasing the presence of security forces to patrol the plantation areas. They also sought to control the rising incidence of theft within rubber plantation groves during periods of high rubber prices. In response to these aggressive tactics, local community members also began to organize and occupy lands, supported by a large network of NGOs in the region, and threatening to cut down rubber stands to lands they claimed as their own. On July

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16 see Map 1 for sites labeled sau kang that overlap the area delineated as plantation areas
21st, 2003, 243 security personnel convened in Bonto Mangiring from three different regional offices. Amidst varying accounts of provocations, shots were fired and ended in four casualties and dozens of other injuries. Up to 21 villagers were apprehended and a human rights commission reported abusive practices among the detained.\footnote{For a detailed description of the conflict, see the SNUB report (2003) and two varying accounts from studies by Tyson (2010) and Muur (2019).}

On a national scale, the plantation conflict received notable attention, and was symbolic for various reasons. First, it was the site of a significant legal victory in the 1980s at the Supreme Court, an unusual outcome siding with local plaintiffs. Secondly, violence in 2003 also highlighted various coercive practices that continued in the post-reformasi era, enacted by a plantation corporation that had partnered with the state to forcibly remove local people from their ancestral lands. Muur (2018) shows that the post-2003 violence also converged with the increasing articulation of indigeneity taking place at a national level. Local plaintiffs therefore began invoking the unique cultural difference of the Kajang, citing their local cultural leadership as holding distinct authority to land claims. AMAN, and a regional network of NGOs, began to support local Kajang to assert territorial claims through participatory mapping efforts, articulating local customary leadership authority and areas of territorial sovereignty. Thirdly, critics of the violence also highlighted the financial situation of Lonsum as receiving repeated state bailouts to remain solvent. These critics, forcefully noted that the Indonesian state in the post-Suharto period continued to violently punish indigenous and rural people, meanwhile supported the culprits among the plantation corporation that were not being disciplined, but rather rewarded through continued financial support.

Overall, the history of plantation presence and conflict matched closely with the national and international narrative of land expropriation by powerful state and plantation actors. The violence also received notable media attention and mobilized investigations by the National Commission on Human Rights. Furthermore, the coupling of the narrative of land dispossession of rural communities with the presence of a distinct indigenous community also resulted in greater attention to the site. The Kajang, dressed in their unique traditional black 

\textit{sarong} and \textit{passapu}, articulating indigenous forms of authority and ancestral claims, and armed with new alliances presented an iconic symbol of struggle against the violence enacted by a plantation corporation backed by the state security apparatus.
A large region amidst a small land area: Shifting focus to the sacred forest

The violence in 2003 led to a participatory mapping effort to remap claims. Several NGOs mobilized, including support by AMAN to remap Kajang ancestral lands (Fisher, 2017). AMAN provided support through the purchase of satellite imagery and participatory mapping teams that redrew boundaries using GIS coordinates based on Kajang interpretations of the *pasang* moral code. The map included a total area of 22,593 hectares, which crossed into two districts, covered four different sub-districts in Bulukumba, and in Kajang subdistrict alone, included 19 village administrations.\(^{18}\) As district and provincial governments intervened with mediation efforts for settling the plantation conflict, attention began to shift to broader recognition of Kajang for their unique cultural practices and claims to indigeneity.

The forestry agency in particular became a local champion of formalizing recognition. In 2008, the agency began to partner with Hasanuddin University to work out the administrative and practical elements to reclassify Kajang sacred forests. The sacred forests are at the center of the Kajang ancestral area, and entry into the forest follows strict rules that also prohibit cultivation and harvest. The original state classification of Kajang sacred groves took place in 1992, designating 331 hectares as Limited Production Forest (HPT). As a result of formal forestry agency authority, agency officials had also recruited local forest rangers to help police the forest boundary. The rangers began to partner with indigenous authority, coordinating directly with the Ammatoa to ensure adherence to strict rules of forest access. After the plantation clashes and subsequent mediation interventions of the early-mid 2000s, the new forestry agency approach sought to reclassify Production Forest designation as an *Adat* Forest. At that time however, *adat* forests were still part of national forest administration authority, and although the forestry agency supported efforts to convene local villages and *adat* leaders to provide input for drafting legislation on the recognition of the sacred groves, recognition efforts stalled due to what formal authorities described as unclear guidelines for administering *adat* forests.

This changed in 2013, after Constitutional Court decision MK35 ruled that if local governments could prove *adat* status on national forest land, authority would be returned to

\(^{18}\) Due to poor spatial data on villages it is difficult to determine how many villages actually fall within the mapped area of Kajang ancestral domain.
indigenous claimants. The early preparation of adat forest designation in Kajang was again revived by the forestry agency. Joint agreement about the strict rules of non-disturbance of the forest, its small area and uncomplicated land tenure distinctions also meant that the site became a strategic one nationally as one of the most advanced cases to be considered. Indeed, Kajang would go on to be the first site recognized for indigenous recognition of national forest land.

In this way, attention pivoted from the plantation conflict and access to land among rural farmers to the goodwill of local government agencies supporting formal recognition of Kajang indigenous land authority. An area initially described for its historical land conflict of rural peasants contesting vast plantation enclosures of ancestral land shifted focus to recognition of uncontested land. This uncontested land, though designated as Production Forest, had already long received support for its preservation among formal authorities. In sum, the land area of participatory mapping that took place after the plantation conflict became redefined as a symbolic region of influence, but the focus of land rights authority narrowed to a much smaller area of forest. Redefining Production Forest to Indigenous Forest became the common project.

Close facilitation among powerful external actors

In 2012, the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) began working in Bulukumba as part of a larger development project grant from the Canadian government for sustainable livelihoods and governance of land and natural resources in Sulawesi. The governance aspects of the project aimed to work with sites to support development of policy arrangements on social forestry. The project followed principles of adaptive collaborative management (Adnan et al., 2007; Colfer et al., 2011) and in South Sulawesi began working with the Bulukumba and Bantaeng district governments. Both of these districts were significant for their progress on social forestry designation permits, and in particular, the Kajang case had the potential for engaging on policies for indigenous rights recognition.

In Kajang, CIFOR governance scientists were initially interested in facilitating conflict resolution efforts over plantation clashes. However, policy momentum for recognition redirected discussions to fulfilling land recognition to the sacred forest. These narrowed interests sought to fulfill broader national policy imperatives of proving precedence to the MK35 ruling that would open up mechanisms for indigenous communities across Indonesia to do the same. In Bulukumba, CIFOR continued to facilitate and shape the values and membership of the multi-
stakeholder policy drafting team, formalized in a regulation by the Bulukumba district head.\textsuperscript{19} This ‘Taskforce’ included formal government agencies headed by the Tourism Agency, and included membership from the Forestry Agency, Legal Bureau, and local subdistrict and village leadership representative of Kajang membership. NGO representatives included CIFOR, Balang Institute, OASE, and AMAN-Sulsel.

CIFOR scientists facilitated meetings and introduced principles of mutual learning and cooperation, guiding joint fact-finding initiatives as part of the policy drafting process. CIFOR also helped to convene meetings and continued to maintain presence through sub-contracts with two local NGOs, Balang and OASE, that would support data collection in Kajang villages. The NGOs collected information on local livelihoods, conducted interviews, and worked with local community groups to produce detailed participatory mapping efforts on sacred sites and water resources. These multi-stakeholder fact-finding missions were then presented in a total of four community-wide public consultations to encourage broader community input.

In the final stages of policy drafting, two key questions remained to fulfill the draft policy for recognition. The Taskforce convened a set of joint fact-finding teams including broad membership from the different member-agencies to identify remaining questions that were deemed necessary to strengthening the draft policy (Fisher et al., 2017). The first priority sought to ensure greater accuracy on the spatial extent of recognition, which resulted in field verification of boundaries and other areas of interest (see Map 1). The second included a household survey, developed by CIFOR to help guide questions for understanding the broader livelihood dynamics across communities that identified as Kajang. The questionnaires were delivered across a set of purposively sampled villages to also clarify the extent to which communities living in the region still adhere to Kajang values. These two priority issues corresponded directly with national laws for stipulating forest lands as indigenous local authority.

CIFOR scientists closely involved in high level national networks and policy forums also advocated for the Kajang case. Their close partnerships with key staff in the Forestry Ministry also allowed for a reflexive policy-drafting process, ensuring that local practices fulfilled national policy and legal interpretations. CIFOR scientists could raise the local issues experienced in Kajang, highlight the progress they had achieved in their policy drafting efforts,

\textsuperscript{19} Bulukumba Bupati Decision Letter No: 760/VII/2013 to form “The Taskforce for the designing and drafting of the local regulation on recognition of the Kajang indigenous communities of Bulukumba district”
and in turn could support data collection to fulfill strict interpretations of policy drafting. They provided significant funding for convening key actors, developed frameworks for data collection, and supported mechanisms for collaboration across various institutions. CIFOR, as an international research institution, furthermore, provided legitimacy to the data collection process as experts upholding the highest standards. During the invitation of Kajang representatives to attend the recognition ceremony at the presidential palace, CIFOR representatives also joined as advocates and attended preparation meetings with the Forestry Minister.

As an activist group included in the policymaking Taskforce membership, AMAN also played an important legitimating role. They provided support by guiding the legal drafting process and ensuring the draft regulation had met the standards set forth in the MK35 Constitutional Court ruling. AMAN also provided legal drafting support through their experts, mobilizing human rights lawyers and providing legal interpretation of policies in ways that would be deemed acceptable among the activist community during national review. In other words, they legitimated that language as a process that was not seen to be coopted by government agencies. They helped to shape the discussion about what formalization was about and engaged at various levels to influence formal government staff about their interpretations around the intricacies of legal recognition. AMAN’s partner organization, HUMA, also followed up by conducting field level verifications, as well as accompanying Forestry Ministry officials on site visits.

In all, legitimacy was triangulated and reinforced in several ways, buttressing the success of Kajang as the first site of recognition and land stipulation. CIFOR scientists both provided intellectual legitimacy over process and data collection, meanwhile advocating behind the scenes through their well-connected governance experts. They applied a system of adaptive collaborative management that promoted inclusiveness, mutual learning and respect, and all parties involved could attest to the deliberative process that took place in Kajang. They also provided significant funds for local NGOs to conduct facilitation and data collection that provided the basis of drafting the policy. Meanwhile, AMAN’s role and close involvement in drafting legal language of the policy draft provided legitimacy among activists to meet the high standards of scrutiny of the policy. Although the land area was small, the priority shift to proving precedence so that sites elsewhere could also submit similar claims. High-level visits by the
Forestry Ministry were also accompanied by these legitimizing external actors, which also helped to redefine the terms of recognition within official ministerial procedural mechanisms.

Local government support: Tourism, forestry, and the legislature

Although the multi-stakeholder Taskforce was shaped by the support of powerful external actors and experts, the foundational legitimation took place through the administrative authority among the district government. The Taskforce was created by the District head, who assigned lead Taskforce convening authority to the Tourism Agency. The selection of this leading role is significant for several reasons. The first is that Bulukumba has well-known tourism assets, including Bira and Kahaya. The Southeastern part of the district has the historical Phinisi ships and the long stretches of white sand beaches, which is already established as a popular tourism destination. The district spatial planning document (inscribed as Law 21/2012), designates Kajang future development for particular uses. In the spatial plan, the Kajang Ammatoa site is listed as a strategic region [kawasan strategis], which also receives special attention from the provincial government. The spatial plan also lists the Kajang Ammatoa as a site for cultural tourism [parawisata budaya]. Therefore, as Kajang had received national attention for recognition, district government interests justified establishing the Taskforce under the rationale of allocating resources for potential future tourism development due to the unique cultural practices of the Kajang.

Throughout the policy drafting efforts however, the more actively involved, and de facto convener of the Taskforce became the district forestry agency. As the administrator of the 331-hectare Production Forest that consisted of the Kajang sacred grove, the main issue became the re-designation of forest management authority. Misbawati Wawo, who had served an unusually long tenure as head of the forestry agency (2008-2016) was especially aware of the national efforts for indigenous forest designation and openly promoted the Kajang site as an opportunity to be among the first to showcase recognition to the Ministry. Indeed, her formal advocacy led to distinct national attention, including numerous invitations to national forums, repeated visits from ministerial staff, and culminating in a high-profile visit from the Minister.

The district head also became aware of the national and international attention supporting the recognition process. This became especially apparent in 2015 when the newly elected head of the district sought to promote the Taskforce. Even after designation was completed, the
Taskforce was re-established to address the management aspects of post-recognition. Involvement also extended to the district legislature, who had the final authority to pass the law. They had a special committee to deliberate the final draft of the policy, and also took study tours to other provinces to consult on the final implications of the law. Far from a policy engaging with land rights and access as part of a legacy of plantation enclosures, recognition had been redefined as a potential opportunity across various incentives in formal government planning processes. This included tourism development planning and justifications for new policies to create subsequent projects that garner attention among powerful external actors.

**A Win-win-win situation**

Overall, the win-win-win propositions made Kajang an icon. It was a win for advocacy organizations, for national, and local government institutions. *Win 1*: National activists and international observers were eager to see formal handover of land rights to an indigenous community. This victory connected to a deeply emotional struggle around the narrative of historical plantation expropriation and violence, thus representing a change of authority in favor of downward accountability. Formal recognition further provided the blueprint for a local regulation that could be followed by other communities across Indonesia. The Dedicated Grant Mechanism (DGM), a partnership fund between the global Climate Investment Fund, The World Bank, and Conservation International has subsequently visited with international observers to showcase the case of first recognition in Kajang. *Win 2*: Meanwhile, recognition was a win across local government agencies. The Taskforce provided attention and benefits to the district head and became an exemplary case nationally, showcasing specific local government agencies. The subdistrict head was extended an invitation to attend the UNFCCC as a formal delegate of indigenous communities. *Win 3*: Finally, both the Forestry Ministry and the President were able to highlight their fulfillment of a national policy mandate for recognizing indigenous land rights to national forests. The activists, formal local Kajang representatives, and national and local government officials could thus all get behind recognition.

And yet, recognition did not require changing land relations in any direct and meaningful way. Herein emerges the main catalyst for analysis, an examination of the effects of recognition. I thus turn my analysis toward the main event that convened various stakeholders, leading up to the last administrative requirements of formal approval embodied by the final public consultation.
in Kajang that took place in November 2015. In the subsequent section, I bring together the various stakeholders of the recognition process. I juxtapose their main viewpoints to showcase the multiple sharp edges of recognition.

V. “We never asked to be recognized:” Positions at the public consultation

Officials of various agencies, from the central government to the village, gathered at the main entrance of the Kajang traditional area, taking photos under the signs of the lontaraq script adorned underneath the large sago-thatched roofing. “Welcome to the inner-gate of the Kajang Ammatoa” the sign read. To the left of the gathering there were two additional signs. One black and green sign indicated that “the forest is the source of life,” and that “conserving the forest protects the Kajang indigenous community.” An adjacent green metallic sign also indicated that this is 331.17 hectares of “limited production forest.” In other words, the size of this forest is just over a square mile. Changing the wording of limited production forest however, was the reason for this event: a public consultation to finalize the Local Regulation to “acknowledge, empower, and protect” [pengakuan, pengukuhan, dan perlindungan] the Kajang and return their rights of forest management. A two-and-a-half-hour flight from Jakarta, and a six-hour drive from the provincial capital of Makassar, this gathering had come to encapsulate the current discourse of social justice and forest protection efforts in Indonesia: formal recognition of indigenous community rights to national forest land.

The last cars with official plates arrived at the main gate. The public officials included a director from the Ministry (MOEF), the head of the district (bupati), the head of the subdistrict (the camat, who also serves a dual role as adat leader), the head of the district police, the local Military representative, Kajang village representatives, the head of the provincial forestry agency, forest rangers, local legislators, and various other heads of agencies from the district of Bulukumba. AMAN-Sulsel — the lead indigenous rights advocacy group for the region — had assumed the role of convener as this was the most prominent national case of indigenous community land rights recognition. Ministry officials and the bupati received gifts from traditional leaders, offerings of Kajang customary black cloth, and several local administrators helped dress the dignitaries with black sarongs and fitted them with passapu head coverings. The group posed for the media outlets that had made the long trip to the event. Away from the clicks of the cameras, school girls dressed in white shirts and matching jilbab (Islamic headscarves) looked on at the pageantry. Between the schoolgirls and the officials, a lone Kajang farmer
walked past, heading home, seemingly unaware of the event. He wore muddied black shorts and black shirt, walked barefoot, presumably returning from the typical work of this time of year: plowing rice fields prior to planting. Neither he, nor the young schoolgirls, knew that land was being returned, and if it was, they knew it was not for their families.

After the photos, the officials prepared to enter the main gate. They removed their shoes and put away any sign of modern technology as prohibited by custom in these inner Kajang areas. They walked 200 meters toward the Baroga, a large wooden structure on stilts down the footpath. Those unaccustomed to the uneven stones walked gingerly. Arriving at the Baroga, a bucket sat at the base of the wooden stairs compelling those that entered the stilted structure to wash your feet before approaching. Black cloth draped the walls and kretek cigarette smoke filled the air. Women busied in the back, preparing the customary snacks and food for the event. As the crowd of observers settled and seated themselves on the floor, a man entered in a colorful shirt. The subdistrict head immediately scolded the man, ensuring this disciplining act a spectacle to shame any others in violation, to reinforce that strict Kajang customary rules would be enforced here. The official demanded the man in violation vacate the premises and return only when he could respectfully follow the rules of the Kajang by wearing black colors.

The moderator, an AMAN representative, opened the event with the increasingly common welcome of an Islamic greeting, and presented the forestry ministry official the honor of speaking first. The official spoke in a heavy Javanese accent noting his delight at having the opportunity to see an “intact” indigenous community protecting its forests [masyarakat adat masih utuh, yang melestarikan hutannya]. He also expressed his excitement to share about this event with the Minister upon return to Jakarta, and in the current national policy mood he suggested the possibility of a visit by Indonesian President Joko Widodo. One after another, the officials spoke about this momentous regulation, acknowledging the importance of local communities as partners, stating their concerns about deforestation across the country, and even noting the global importance of such protections for social justice and climate change. After allowing the dignitaries opportunities to speak in turn, the legal bureau introduced the main agenda: the public consultation of the draft regulation. The head of the legal bureau then proceeded to read and explain each article of the draft regulation in Indonesian. Late into the

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20 South Sulawesi is one of the more conservative Islamic provinces in Indonesia. The District of Bulukumba was also one of the first districts in Indonesia to pass a local regulation on Sharia Law (Buehler, 2008).
public consultation, the moderator opened the floor for public comment, switching to speaking in the local Konjo language and motioning to the Ammatoa to respond.21

**Kajang cultural leadership: “The Adat is important, not the regulation”**

The Ammatoa first noted the importance of the forest for regulating the climate and protecting water sources. His explanations cited the *pasang* — the orally interpreted legal code passed down from the ancestors — sayings like “The forest is the blanket of the world. Without the forest, there is no Kajang, and without the Kajang, there is no forest.” Then surprisingly however, the Ammatoa changed his tone in addressing the regulation. He insisted that neither he nor the Kajang community had sought recognition, but that they had responded to government initiatives to do so. As always, he noted, the Kajang will respect the will of formal authorities.

The Ammatoa continued by expressing disapproval should the regulation change any territorial designation of areas where custom must be closely followed. It seemed odd to me that amidst the narratives of local recognition and empowerment against historical dispossession described by advocates from Jakarta and Makassar, one described as a return to local indigenous authority, that the cultural leader of the Kajang was expressing disapproval in this way. Although he seemed to agree to go along with the initiative, his tone expressed a request for assurance that the regulation would not make any further changes to territory and authority.

During the public consultation there was no further explanation about how recognition, an act of recognizing local institutions, might reduce the extent of territory and authority. At a later date, I sought to consult with the Ammatoa and his top advisor [Galla Puto] what he had meant by the request that territorial area not be redefined. I discovered that finalizing the district regulation had meant clarifying and reinforcing administrative boundaries previously under various interpretations. As the Taskforce had worked with village heads to map various boundary designations, new distinctions emerged over the extent of governing authority where strict customary rules applied.

The head of the subdistrict, and the heads of villages in Malleleng and Bonto Baji (all of whom also hold indigenous leadership status) took the opportunity of the policymaking Taskforce to redefine boundaries for residents in their administrative areas. These elected village

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21 The Kajang speak a Coastal Konjo as distinct from upland Konjo, which are part of the family of Makassar languages of South Sulawesi (Friberg, 1995).
leaders also constructed new gates of entry into the inner Kajang seeking to redirect visitors through their village. Gates further redefined the boundary of inner Kajang authority, extending and strengthening village authority relative to informal indigenous authority. The new entrance gates and re-delineated village boundary not only justified development projects to construct the gates, it also suggested potential tourism attraction through these villages in the future. Extending the boundary of village authority created new rules for residents that were now redrawn outside of the inner territory. This act in turn expanded village administration authority to deliver road building projects, introduce electricity, and propose other various forms of development. These elements on the rising authority of the village are further discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

For now, the reactions by the Ammatoa on the regulation for recognizing his and other cultural leadership authority, prove instructive. Although official forest land boundaries remained relatively unchanged in the verification and recognition process, village administrators took the opportunity to redraw boundaries of their cultural and formal authority as part of the Taksforce’s designation process. Such concerns were particularly evident during a study tour from Boven Digoel, Papua. When the representatives from Boven Digoel came to learn from the Kajang about drafting a regulation, they asked the Ammatoa about the keys to gaining recognition. The Ammatoa responded by saying “it’s not the regulation that’s important, but the adherence to adat that determines the outcome.” If your communities follow the adat, then the regulation will be of no consequence.

Farmer groups: Threats to the forest from within, and the need for land

Besides the Ammatoa, only one other local community member had the opportunity to provide input during the public consultation. Speaking in Konjo, cross-legged and rocking back and forth as he spoke in the tone of an impassioned plea, Sembang directed his comments to the Ammatoa. He proceeded to give a spirited rebuke against the regulation. He began by noting his disagreement with the idea that the forest was somehow threatened from the outside and needed to be ceded to local authority for protection. He spoke of the changing practices taking place in Kajang. He said: “these days numerous people are quick to reprimand others for breaking the rules while they themselves do not follow them. People freely break norms like bringing
cellphones into sacred and prohibited areas. The inner territory gets smaller and smaller. As the forest loses its sacredness, the more likely it will be destroyed from within.”

Although Sembang’s message focused on the changing cultural norms affecting Kajang settlement areas and forests, my subsequent discussions with him revealed a more serious dynamic unfolding governing local land relations. Sembang is most active among farmer groups, especially on the important role of rice cultivation. My discussions with him highlighted a focus on the decreasing access to land in Kajang. His comments about changing cultural norms were also situated within one of the more common refrains that I heard during my research in Kajang: katambaang tau tang katambaang tana (people are increasing, but the land stays the same). In chapter 3 I provide a detailed description of the tenurial dimensions governing land relations in Kajang. At this juncture, the important issue to highlight is that the increasing land pressures among local Kajang create increasing challenges to enforce forest management protection. From a local perspective this was obvious. I did not come across any local perspectives in Kajang that believed recognition and devolution of sacred forest authority was somehow an act of local empowerment or reparations against past injustices. On the contrary, local perspectives found it unsurprising that ceding sacred forest authority to local authority would only embolden various local interests, more likely accelerating conversion of areas in and around the sacred forest. Indeed, Sembang described the various types of encroachment already taking place around the sacred forest boundaries, including slow processes of removing timber stands and introducing tree crops as a symbolic act to claim ownership.

During Sembang’s input at the public consultation, a local legislator motioned to interject. He explained that they had come too far in the process, and that any further negotiation of the draft local regulation would be procedurally too onerous during this late stage. The AMAN representative, as moderator, resumed the discussion speaking in Indonesian, and deferring to ministerial and district officials presented them one final opportunity to speak. It is unclear whether the national and regional officials, or the NGO and other advocacy groups in attendance understood the interjections delivered in the local language. Closing pronouncements among officials were self-congratulatory, reinforcing positive elements about the regulation. Ironically, the stated goal of the public consultation sought to garner final input prior to the passage of the regulation, to address any further concerns among the broader local publics. Sembang, who I learned in numerous subsequent public settings is an outspoken voice in the
community, telling me that he always speaks at least once in a meeting, was the only individual at the public consultation without a position of authority that had an opportunity to provide input. Amidst the pronouncements of four years of public engagement by the Taskforce, one noted as the most participatory regulation ever conducted in Bulukumba, even Sembang’s very clear concerns went unheeded. Too many alliances across formal agencies and external organizations wanted this to happen.

**The provincial forestry agency and rights activists: “Keep it a forest or have it taken away?”**

Nearing the close of the public consultation, the provincial forestry agency moved to speak. He expressed his gratitude for all those involved in the pathbreaking initiative in Kajang. He was also encouraged by the opportunities to expand tourism to this unique, and using the language of planning documents, “strategic region.” However, he also noted that the work of maintaining the forest is also critical. Using the legal language of land concessions to describe the change of forest status – in this case from production to Indigenous Forest – he also invoked the possibility of the state to repossess land authority should the forest be converted to other uses. He noted that now local indigenous authority had the responsibility to maintain the land as a protection forest [kewajiban mempertahankan sebagai fungsi lindung]. The Subdistrict Head moved to respond assuring that the Kajang sacred forest is at the center of their cosmology stating that as long as there are Kajang, there will always be the sacred forest. The moderator thanked those in attendance and formally closed the consultation.

Plates of food were served in the customary manner for all in attendance. I joined a discussion among AMAN activists that had taken up the provincial forestry official’s point for further discussion. They contested the legal language by the provincial official on the land category of rights to forest [hutan hak] relative to the authority of a legal indigenous community [kewenangan Masyarakat Hukum Adat]. Using the two categorical differences, they began to undermine the argument made by the provincial official. They noted that perhaps at the province, classical perspectives on forestry had not fully understood the implications of the MK35 ruling.

Upon finishing our meals, we walked back to the main gate. Officials returned to their vehicles, removing the black sarongs and passapu head coverings, putting on their shoes, and began the fifty-kilometer drive back to the district capital of Bulukumba, and for the officials from further afield, began the long trip back to Makassar and Jakarta. The forest rangers,
assigned by the head of the agency to attend the event and several of whom ethnically identify as Kajang had planned a gathering at one of the homes of the local staff. I was invited to join.

**The forest rangers: “Who will protect the forest?”**

The forest rangers gathered cross-legged on the floor sipping coffee and eating fried bananas on the porch of one of the officer’s homes. Now that recognition meant they would no longer have a role in patrolling the Kajang forest, they discussed potential reassignments to other forests in Bulukumba, such as some of the more contentious sites at the Community Forestry site in Borrong Rappoa (see chapter 5) or policing the increasing encroachment among merchants in Bira catering to the emerging tourism market along the borders of the Tahura [*Taman Hutan Raya, Forest Park*]. They also debated the potential effects of new structural changes taking place in the forestry ministry around a 2014 law recentralizing natural resource management functions to the provincial level, thus abolishing forestry agencies in the district. Once the law is in place it would mean they will either report directly to the provincial capital in Makassar or to the new forest management unit in Bantaeng (Sahide et al., 2016). They discussed how recentralization would impact each of them, especially those still working under contract arrangements, wondering whether the new law would help or hinder them obtaining in obtaining formal civil servant positions. They also discussed their status with irony, frustration and humor. One, reflecting on their role as the lowest of the hierarchy in the forestry agency stated: “we get none of the credit for success but all the blame for failure.” This was in response to all the on the ground work they had done to facilitate the regulation in the community, while agency officials make intermittent visits from district offices in Bulukumba, 50 kilometers to the South. At the same time, the rangers also noted their pride in their work and enjoyed having the freedom to work in the field.

Then the conversation shifted to the implications of indigenous land recognition to the Kajang sacred forest. Three among the rangers present patrolled the sacred forest since 2009. They began to work closely with the Ammatoa on enforcing violations to protect the sacred forest (Workman et al., 2015). The *pasang* states that someone in violation cannot be subject to double jeopardy: once a person is punished for a violation by one set of rules they cannot be punished by another. For example, if a fine is determined by local customary law, they cannot receive additional sanction by the state, and vice versa. As a result, the forestry agency, through
the locally recruited rangers, had developed a close relationship with the Ammatoa coordinating the most appropriate course of action. These forest rangers would report any infractions to the Ammatoa to seek guidance on how to address a particular issue, while also reporting to the head of the agency. They would then jointly discuss the corrective course of action, whether sanction would be enforced locally, or taken up through formal means at the district level. This arrangement also provided effective enforcement of those attempting to encroach on the forest boundary.

The forest rangers in recent months had reported to the Ammatoa on the increasing violations of chainsaw usage in prohibited areas near the borders of the sacred forest. I was present at one of these formal enforcement patrols in the field. At the discussion after the consultation at the home of the local forest ranger, they raised this case of enforcement on the use of heavy machinery. They surmised that without anybody to enforce the ban on power tools to fell trees on the boundaries of the sacred forest, that chainsaw usage will likely encroach further among and within sacred forest areas.

They also raised a more serious case under investigation of illegal logging taking place on the Western areas of the sacred forest. The forest rangers had confiscated logs and equipment and stored them for safekeeping at the forestry agency offices in Bulukumba. Now that the forest status had changed to local authority, how would the case proceed? They took up different positions on whether the court case would be subject to the laws during the time of the violation or whether the new customary laws would apply. If the latter, they noted that Kajang leadership authority would be powerless to respond to violations, especially as the case involved those that are most emboldened to log in the forest. These individuals systematically refuse to attend customary hearings by the Ammatoa to discuss violations. They also remarked on the increasing incidence of girdling taking place on several forest boundary areas, a common practice to slowly kill large trees and clear a forest area. Once the larger canopy is removed, farmers will begin planting fruit trees, timber stands, and cash crops, which they can later claim as their property. The forest rangers active in enforcing boundaries stated that during their tenure, boundary areas shrunk by about one meter per year. Since the regulation was passed the rate of conversion has accelerated.

The three forest rangers assigned to patrol the forest were all from Kajang, and thus closely integrated as a part of the community. They had developed a sense of responsibility for
protecting the forest and had come to enjoy the position of helping to uphold customary law through their working relationship with the Ammatoa. They also knew that the threat of state authority and enforcing formal laws were especially persuasive in disincentivizing potential encroachers and violators, especially in cases where local influence determines outcomes.

**Former activist: “Indigeneity is just another fishpond”**

Some months later I began to seek out former activists, those once active in protesting the plantation. They began their involvement in broader movements in support of peasant rights, and also helped engage on the early articulation of indigeneity to promote land rights recognition. They had traveled to regional and international meetings and conferences, ones highlighting culture (like traditional Kajang instruments *pa’bassing*, and dances like *pa’bitte passapu*), others on plantation evictions and environmental conservation, and others on the formal processes of indigenous land rights recognition. These former activists described those times as an era of struggle, exciting times of speaking truth to power, meeting like-minded activists facing power imbalances, traveling and learning about other sites of dispossession and contestation, and developing pride in their identity as Kajang.

The former activists I spoke to had moved on to an array of new professions as they took on greater household responsibility, including: staff of the civic police, an electrician, a local elected officials, a community development facilitator, and others. All were engaged in planting tree crops to some degree. One former activist however, Hama’, also noted how activism had changed since his involvement. He specifically highlighted the public consultation and described several features of how outside organizations have come to interact with the Kajang. In turn these interactions also shape the motivations among local people interested in activism work. He says those that become active in NGOs promoting indigenous rights recognition today are driven not by defending something local but rather for interests in achieving some personal gain, usually for rising within those organizations to move to regional or national offices, or as a pathway for gaining support for local political influence.

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22 Six individuals locally from Kajang, and numerous others from across South Sulawesi that were involved in protesting the plantation.

23 It is important to note that activism against the plantation was also rife with its own dynamics of corruption, often garnering support by promising unrealistic promises. The purpose is not to essentialize activism of the past but to describe the nostalgic renderings of former activists in the context of current practices among land rights activists.

24 I address the new activism of local organizations in more detail through youth perspectives in Chapter 5.
Hama’ expressed even greater frustrations at the motivations among outside organizations and the way they engage locally to provide support. They arrive and connect with a local administrator, fill out their worksheets, and rarely ever engage on local issues. I also experienced this project-style approach on several occasions whereby regional NGOs call together a focus group discussion among community members. Attendance seems forced, with local representation skeptical of the motives of such gatherings, and indeed geared towards filling out reports without any clear purpose save to submit documentation and disburse funds. According to Hama’, they do not make an effort to understand the problem, and then try to educate local people about how they are supposed to act. The end goal is then geared towards procurement and disbursement, in which benefits are divided amongst local administrative alliances to justify the project. Hama’ expressed that the culture of their engagement had become no different from the proposal development strategies among formal bureaucracies. He summed up his frustrations as follows:

What bothers me so much is that there are so many organizations that don’t want to understand what’s going on and they take the Kajang story for their own purposes. Trust me. We are just like another empang. [What do you mean by that?] A fishpond, you know. The place where people fatten fish and once they mature, they harvest again [panen lagi]. They make money again and again, and they make it on the Kajang name [atas nama masyarakat adat Kajang]. I am from here. Those NGO representatives, and all those people that go to Jakarta to speak for us, they are not us. They are not the lineage of our ancestors. These organizations now have us surrounded. You are adat for the practices of adat. What do these people who speak on behalf of us know about our adat?

VI. Multiple sharp edges of recognition and title

Outwardly the message of community resource management and rights to indigenous communities are often simplified into a dualism between the greedy corporations supported by the bureaucrats versus what Berkes (1999) describes as the indigene, represented by the fallen angel or the noble savage. Other scholars have long examined the motivations and strategies of these narrative simplifications (Li, 2002; Ellen, 1986; Sylvain, 2014). These scholars have shown that local conditions rarely fit the imaginary of the broader movement narrative. In the case of South Africa, Sylvain has also shown the growing tension between scholars and academics, or what she calls essentialism versus constructionism. The former seeks to gain recognition as a prerequisite to achieving social justice, while the latter opt to complicate the local conditions to
highlight the vulnerabilities that communities face. As per my initial intent in this research however, I sought to take into consideration the implications of recognition one step further. I have thus extended the line of inquiry to examine perspectives of various stakeholders about the implications after recognition.

The previous section closely examined actors and institutions at the public consultation, describing the messiness of recognition when seen in light of the pre-conceived notions about what recognition is imagined achieving. In this section, I shift to a set of categories that rest upon the multiple sharp edges of recognition by focusing on what was given, what was taken away, and the new emergent terms of engagement. I must note however, that each of these outcomes remain inchoate, that although clear new courses have been set by indigenous land rights recognition, new conjunctures can certainly reorient them in altogether new trajectories.

The double edge of rights and responsibilities: Gaining, maintaining, or losing the forest?

For those not from Kajang, the incidence of a concrete case recognizing national forests as indigenous land remains a major symbolic victory. In terms of the area recognized in Kajang, maps developed by activists more liberally present a much larger area than the title conferred. These NGO maps tend to highlight the broader cultural Kajang region mapped as 22,593 hectares. At this time however, this larger region has not undergone any meaningful changes of leadership authority outside of the 314 hectares of national forests formally transferred and ceded to Kajang authority. Regardless, the re-interpretations about formal and indigenous authority have undergone changes in some perplexing ways. Scholars on land relations focused on land access, authority, property, and exclusion have long engaged on the notion of a bundle of rights to more fully understand implications of land management responsibilities (Schlager and Ostrom, 1990; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Hall et al., 2011). In this way the multiple sharp edges of ‘returning’ the sacred forest come into clearer focus around what is gained, maintained, or lost.

First, at the national and international level, the momentous event of formalizing recognition in Kajang, redefining a part of national forests under indigenous authority represents a victory that activists have struggled to achieve for generations. Therefore, the precedence signified by recognition in Kajang, and the opportunity it opens up for contestations elsewhere provides a significant boost for the movement of indigenous rights in Indonesia and beyond. Recognition is therefore discursively described as legitimation to contest national forest lands
elsewhere. In this way, the Kajang regulation represents a significant gain, emboldening contestations elsewhere. How this is translated at other sites is a topic I take on in a subsequent section. For now, in keeping the focus on Kajang not only do implications matter locally, they also define the terms that recognition can take elsewhere. In this way, the multiple sharp edges of recognition represent a situation unchanged, or a loss of resources to protect the forest.

Second, for some policy observes, those eager to gain material victories for land rights see Kajang recognition as an opportunity missed, and merely an extension of existing governing systems. The assumption in this perspective is that the sacredness of the forest will ensure its protection. Before designation the forest was a limited protection forest under state authority. Meanwhile de facto forest management indicated that the forest had always been a sacred forest. Recognition meant a change in status, not a change of rule or access. This is still debated however, as I noted that point of friction between the head of the provincial forestry agency and activists. The former noted that the forest must remain a forest or be subject to repossession, while the latter believed this a misinterpretation, that local customary law would prevail without the coercive involvement of the state. I thus turn to the final edge, a third perspective that recognition comes with the responsibility to protect forests without the resources to do so.

A third perspective, focused on rights and responsibilities conferred in the recognition process, suggest more severe implications of not being able to move beyond a simplified discussion of recognition. Due to the political interests guiding the discussion of indigenous recognition of national forests, concrete mechanisms for management responsibility were never meaningfully considered. How would the void of forest rangers affect the forest? Who would take on these responsibilities given that a co-management arrangement had developed over many years between formal and informal institutions? As I (and others, Workman et al., 2015) have shown, the co-management arrangement between the forestry agency and indigenous leadership helped to dissuade those seeking claim to forest land for personal uses. For those previously involved in land management interested in maintaining the sacred forest in its current form, recognition represented a loss, weakening an effective mechanism for protecting its boundaries. Indeed, since recognition, I have received several calls by local Kajang informing me that several hectares of the forest have been converted in ways that were anticipated with recognition: a section was subdivided for paving a small cement pathway, and local village plans seek to
contest parts of the forest for development purposes, justified for a community center and a soccer field.

Across these three perspectives, the multiple sharp edges come into focus in between the desires to achieve political victories at broader governing scales versus the material political contestations taking place locally. In gaining recognition to set national precedence, local management considerations guiding future land use discussions superseded the more practical discussions of land management responsibility. For the increasingly emboldened movement on indigenous rights across Indonesia, Kajang did represent the legitimacy to contest political forests elsewhere. For others, recognition only took place in name only, without any meaningful changes to a land category that had already long upheld the sacredness of Kajang no matter state classification. For others still, the unstitching of co-management responsibility between formal state and indigenous leadership represented a loss to effective longstanding forest management responsibility, thus threatening its protection from emboldened local forest encroachers. Next, I turn to a new perplexing set of multiple sharp edges that emerges from around the sacred forest, namely the emergence of decision-making authority among village officials that are increasingly emboldened in their authority as holding indigenous leadership authority.

**The double edge of redrawing boundaries: In, out, and who gets to decide?**

In Indonesia, the map is a main site of contestation, particularly amidst a long history of land enclosures to the political forest (Peluso, 1995). Detailed data is tightly controlled by government institutions and line agencies, and although participatory mapping has made strides in exposing territorial inaccuracies, such maps generally do not present pathways for ensuring accountability (Fisher et al., 2018). The Taskforce was unusual in that agency representatives openly shared their maps.

The mapping process that the Taskforce undertook to draft the regulation recognizing Kajang indigenous land rights had two major effects. The first is that it provided a visual representation of territorial considerations of recognition. The various layers of the map assured signatories that land authority would remain unchanged beyond the sacred forest. In other words, although transparency of mapping data provided openness in the policymaking effort, the political effects of this data transparency and exchange resulted in very limited outcomes affecting existing institutional authority. The maps provided a semblance of authority without the
corresponding mechanisms to provide access of means for contesting its continued validity. The remapping process did have one unanticipated result whereby village heads eagerly participated in the boundary delineation surveys. The boundary areas of the inner territory – the area called *ilalang embaya*, where customary practices are strictly followed – actually shrunk through the opportunity of village heads to access and redefine spatial data, justifying the need for spatial corrections and presenting the basis for expanding their management authority.

These boundary changes took place under the purview of village heads that claimed indigenous leadership authority. The village heads thus used the opportunity to remap boundaries by guiding the GPS data collection process, and reducing the area of traditional customary authority in *ilalang embaya*. Specifically, the Malleleng village head, closely involved in the Taskforce, redrew 48 households in the Sapiiri hamlet outside of *ilalang embaya*. In neighboring Bonto Baji the village head similarly redrew 80 households out of the boundary areas of *ilallang embaya*. They both used their status as Galla, conducting the ceremony of burning the *passaung* to legitimize these new boundary changes, while administering the boundary areas into the Taskforce local regulation. Being within the boundaries meant that the Ammatoa could provide his blessings for a virtuous life fulfilled through the *pasang* moral code. However, once taken out of *ilallang embaya*, all modern amenities are suddenly allowable. This means that village heads can extend road construction, electricity, and other development projects into those areas. Some households implicated by these changes wished to remain within the boundaries of *ilallang embaya* to maintain the full blessings of the Ammatoa, while others were happy about the opportunity to access development projects. Regardless, the Taskforce local regulation and titling initiative created a scenario whereby justifications by formal government offices, especially village heads using their status as indigenous leadership, and creating a scenario where boundaries had to be redrawn resulting in undermining traditional customary authority in order to change the rules for accessing government assistance. At these new boundary sites, the village heads also subsequently received assistance for constructing new entrance gates further reinforcing the new boundaries, explaining that they were anticipating potential future tourism initiatives that could pass through their jurisdictional areas.
The double edge of local authority: Undermining or in support of contesting plantation land?

The regulation acknowledging Kajang as a distinct in the region covered an area of cultural influence of 22,593 hectares. The Taskforce, and most would argue that the only land rights transferred to this region included an area of 314 hectares, applying only to the sacred forest. On the other hand, some have suggested that recognition for the region provided regulatory justification to contest land rights in the future. This is particularly politicized in regards with the upcoming renewal of the PT Lonsum rubber plantation concession set to expire in 2023. Therefore, activists have noted the possibility of legitimating authority from recognition to propose reclaiming areas to the plantation concession. Indeed, some protests have taken place regarding the concession, highlighting the territorial area of Kajang influence relative to the plantation concession, and suggesting the possibility for reclaiming those overlapping areas.

Although a compelling argument, viewpoints among the multi-stakeholder Taskforce suggest the opposite. The Taskforce had always maintained that any efforts at recognition to fulfill MK35 not breach the issue of the Lonsum conflict. In other words, recognition would not have been possible if the outcomes implicated lands beyond the sacred forest. Rather, those involved in the recognition process point to the titling of forests as a major concession in support of local authority and a gesture of good will by the government to support titling of the sacred forests. Furthermore, the increasing power that formal authorities obtained through the recognition process, especially the subdistrict and village heads that also hold dual posts as indigenous leadership, are also those more closely aligned to regional political dynamics. In other words, the negotiations to attract and maintain large scale capital investment like the Lonsum plantation, follow the set of constellations that structure the power relations with the district capital in Bulukumba, which to a large degree decide what is acceptable among these formal positions. As a result, these authorities are much less likely to challenge district level politics, and in fact, contacts I spoke to from the local government and several NGOs indicate the plantation extension approvals were already underway.

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25 In chapter 3, I discuss the origins of the layered forms of authority across formal government positions with indigenous leadership authority
In December 2016, the Indonesian President invited nine indigenous communities to attend a ceremony at the national palace. The indigenous communities consisted of those that were to receive recognition and title to their land. The Kajang was among the first candidates for selection. Internal plans from the President’s office had initially sought to conduct the ceremony in Kajang. Indeed, in legal terms, Kajang met the highest standards for gaining recognition and making the case for land title to the sacred forest by fulfilling a district regulation passed through the local legislature. The language of the Kajang regulation was drafted and vetted through close support and partnership among AMAN’s human rights lawyers, facilitated by CIFOR scientists, cross checked by local NGOs, and received close scrutiny by the legal bureau and forestry agency. The regulation made the unimpeachable case that the Forestry Ministry had to sign a Decision Later to “stipulate” 314 hectares of Forestry Ministry lands to the Kajang. In this sense, Kajang was an exemplary case in fulfilling administrative standards. At this juncture, I want to briefly examine emerging cases elsewhere to highlight whether the effects described herein are unique to Kajang, or whether similar sharp edges are taking place elsewhere.

Although I have noted other examples in section 2 above (and in chapter 1), here I look to three recent examples that are applying the same framework to recognition as in Kajang. These apply to the distinct approaches emergent in the post MK35 Court (2013) ruling era. In Sumatra, Dhiaulhaq and McCarthy (forthcoming) conducted a comparative analysis of making claims to land. The research examined a site of agrarian reform claims in Jambi with a second site in Riau claiming indigeneity. Both sites involved land enclosed by wood fiber plantations. The authors conclude that the comparison of the two sites highlights some exclusionary and limiting outcomes from an approach of indigenous land rights recognition. Calling the indigenous claim a “reified adat,” or similar to what Erb (2007) describe as “adat formalization,” the Riau case shows that alliances between indigenous and migrant communities presented opportunities by the plantation to undermine the claim based on an impure notion of indigeneity. Although the migrants and indigenous communities had long worked together on land dispossessed by the plantation, the plantation used the indigenous framing as a means to delegitimize the authenticity of their claims. Although land was indeed returned to local claimants, it involved a more limited area than the initially sought by the claimants, undermining the rights of migrant to join claims.

26 For other mechanisms for gaining recognition see Mancayo and Firmansyah (2014)
In a case presented by Astuti and MacGregor (2016) from Central Kalimantan, the opposite was true. In this case, there was no outside authority undermining indigenous claims. Rather community members themselves actively sought to redefine what constituted indigeneity internally by creating new terms to prove oneself indigenous. In this case, a successful claim supported by the regional AMAN organization led to exclusionary practices taking place between families. The terms of recognition sought to identify a very narrow definition of indigeneity so that only certain members with particular characteristics from the community could benefit from claiming indigeneity, effectively excluding alternative interpretations even among those with legitimate local claims.

Van der Muur (2018) has also compared Kajang with a case in a neighboring district. In his analysis, local farmers in Sinjai were encouraged by the regional AMAN organization to pursue opportunities for recognition by following the momentum and precedence from Kajang. They thus began to articulate indigeneity extending rights by enclosing and cultivating land. As certain individuals began to make these land claim however, local authorities responded by apprehending them. An individual I spoke to from this community noted that his father had served over a year of jail time from their failed attempts at claiming land as indigenous lands, expressing disappointment at the inaccurate information that had put them at risk.

Relative to the precedence set by Kajang, these three cases from Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi highlight the multiple sharp edges of recognition, each in different ways. The cases also show that the effects of an iconic example from the Kajang can both empower a claim or undermine it in distinct ways. In Sumatra, the wood fiber company challenged indigenous claimants for their loose definition of indigeneity that welcomed migrants into their alliance. Local claimants initially anticipated that the broader alliances would only strengthen their claims. On the other hand, In Central Kalimantan, community members themselves actively used indigeneity as a wedge to exclude their neighbors, enforcing particular subjectivities as prerequisites for access. Finally, in South Sulawesi, a community near Kajang, inspired by activist NGOs pointing to the success of Kajang, sought to make similar claims. However, due to their lack of alliances and political influence, the outcomes labeled them illegal and landed them in jail.
VII. Room for maneuver?

This chapter demonstrates the multiple sharp edges that come along with recognition. These multiple sharp edges manifest in various ways both at the site of recognition, as well as the ways that policies are being interpreted elsewhere. I initially began by laying out the broader issues in the literature on indigeneity and indigenous rights recognition, particularly those associated with making land claims. I thereafter highlighted the historical antecedents in Indonesia that eventually led to the coupling of *adat* with the international movements on indigeneity. Rights advocates strategically connected indigeneity to the symbolism and existing policy possibilities embodied by *adat* that was taking place during a period of contentious political upheaval reshaping the Indonesian nation-state. The empirical material herein thereafter culminated in the exemplary icon of the Kajang, which has further created new trajectories for indigenous politics in Indonesia.

The first sharp edge highlights varying degrees of wins and losses at different scales. For rights activists, the Kajang precedence to make land claims and stipulate land out of national forests allowed for the possibility to propose similar claims elsewhere. However, I have also shown the other side of the implications of this victory, namely the negotiations necessary to make similar claims. I have shown that the goal for recognition and land title create very rigid ways of defining land access from within and without. Although many activists and policymakers point to Kajang as a precedent-setting case, the type of precedence it sets takes place in bounded and particular ways, necessitating exceptional scenarios through powerful external actors. For plantation conflict in Sumatra it was a justification to reduce claims. For locals in Kalimantan, it was a wedge to exclude by saying that some people were not indigenous enough. In Kajang, the multiple sharp edges for recognition also weakens opportunities to claim land for imagined beneficiaries that social movements support, namely those that are in need of access to land. The standards for recognition therefore, become a technical bureaucratic exercise that strengthen administrative rule and do not provide any new pathways for local claimants to gain access to land.

I have also shown a distinct set of sharp multiple edges over a set of issues taking place in Kajang, in ways that actually rebalance power away from local cultural authority. Depending on the perspective forest land recognition could be considered a gain, a loss, or maintaining the status quo. For example, in the participatory mapping process different agencies come together
to transparently share spatial data, an unusual collaboration across institutions. However, I have also shown that these efforts were used by local formal authorities to extend their political influence and undermine notions of indigenous spaces. The change of village boundaries further into parts of *ilallang embaya* show that the formal actors eager to expand opportunities to exert influence, were able to shape outcomes. The multiple edges also raise tensions between local demands for land among farmer groups and the responsibilities placed on local institutions to provide stronger protection of forests, with diminished resources and enforcement power.

Therefore, although Tsing has described indigeneity as strategic for its “room for maneuver” among local authority, I have shown that this maneuvering is contingent upon which interests are able to determine outcomes. Empowering local authority to administer indigenous rights and land title based on their positions in formal state-sanctioned elected office – particularly positions that are accessible largely to those that have accumulated land and capital – does not serve to support more equitable terms to land. It is this dynamic that I turn to next, to highlight how local authority negotiated local development, amidst agricultural change, and the introduction of tree crops.
Chapter 3 – Genealogies of development authority in Kajang

I. Coming home with indigenous title and entering the landscape

Among the nine groups to receive the first Decision Letters of indigenous land rights recognition and title,27 five Kajang representatives were invited to attend the ceremony at the Presidential Palace on December 30th, 2016. Their invited delegates included two elected village heads,28 a district-appointed subdistrict head of Kajang,29 a local representative of the NGO AMAN who was previously a longtime local legislator (DPRD), and the daughter of the Ammatoa, at that time an aspiring politician running for a DPRD seat in the 2019 elections. In other words, each of these representatives invited to attend the ceremony at the presidential palace were either elected officials, aspiring ones, or appointed to formal state positions. As I will show in this chapter, these formal positions have always been relationally contingent. In many cases formal positions are also indigenous leadership positions, and vice versa. If these actors are imagined as the representation of authority formalizing indigeneity and receiving the material title of land transfer, how are they situated as part of local development authority? What are the roles do such positions play in shaping landscapes and negotiating access to land? Finally, what does it mean for social movements to support these actors?

This chapter (3), and the two subsequent chapters (4 and 5), seeks to address these questions. The series of chapters follows along the heels of the last, namely after the dust settles, the lights turn away, and upon completion of the ceremonious events of public consultations, ministerial site visits, and presidential recognition. I thus seek to situate indigenous recognition and land titling beyond the national policy forums and attention of international news media. Chapter 2 already examined the translation of policy into a material possibility in the form of a regulation and land title. Therein I highlighted the various justifications, the approaches to site selection, the mechanisms for implementation, as well as the negotiations among actors that came together to set the terms. I thus already presented the multiple sharp edges that emerge as a

27 Kajang received the key first step of indigenous rights recognition through a Bulukumba district regulation (9/2015) passed by the local legislature, which provided the possibility for the Forestry Ministry to release the land title for local authority in a Decision Letter (SK.6746/MENLHK-PSKL/KUM.1/12/2016).
28 The two village heads were Kepala Desa Tanah Toa, or Galla Lombo’; Kepala Desa Malleleng, or Galla Malleleng
29 The head of Kajang subdistrict, or Labirinya (the first of the Karaeng Tallua)
result – the benefits, contradictions, and drawbacks – of current approaches to policy advocacy, and the new potential trajectories initiated by recognition and land title. The discussion in the previous chapter also described the differences at scale between other national mobilizations and at comparative sites, as well as some of the immediate implications unfolding locally in Kajang. But why was a policy framed as an approach to supporting rural populations and empowering those in need of access to land unable to accomplish these goals in Kajang? Indeed, as surprisingly as the question of land access was ignored in the recognition and titling processes, was it equally obvious that there would never be any discussion about land relations. I thus transition from the broader political dimensions of recognition and titling presented in chapter 2 by entering into the landscape to understand the extent to which recognition and title re-shaped tenure relations and might continue to do so in the future.

In order to provide a more deliberate discussion on land relations, I separate the narrative into three distinct chapters. This chapter historically situates the ways that power and authority are negotiated in the Kajang region by foregrounding the antecedents of more recent political economic dimensions governing land uses. Chapter 4 thereafter engages literature on capitalist relations on indigenous frontiers (Hall et al., 2012; Li, 2014) to make sense of the more immediate land relations unfolding in Kajang in the last generation. Rather than following the literature on a singular crop boom however, I examine the two main land tenure categories across the five main crops in Kajang. These include rotational private tenure amongst kin that governs agriculture (rice and corn) contrasted with the expanding primacy of private individual landholdings, which must be secured as a pre-requisite for planting tree crops (in Kajang these tree crops include rubber, cloves, and black pepper). In this way, chapter 4 shows how development authority presented in this chapter (3) connects with the day-to-day dynamics that produce and reproduce the landscape. Many global land rights activists, however, also point to the longer-term objectives of recognition. Indeed, it is difficult to determine the effects of recognition and title if the policies are still so new. Therefore, in chapter 5, I extend the analysis to consider future land imaginaries by engaging youth in what I describe as landscapes of potential. I present a framework for analysis that seeks to place youth visions into the broader realities unfolding on the landscape. Taken together, by focusing the analysis in these three chapters on tenure relations, I am able to further contextualize how the formal approaches to indigenous rights recognition and land title – as they are currently being approached and
supported – gain traction and legitimation locally. I thus am able to provide a fuller picture governing the arrival of formal land rights recognition based on indigeneity. Indeed, the findings herein highlight that recognition and title, do not present a challenge to exclusion among the few, but rather reinforce the actors consolidating land in the first place.

This chapter (3) is based on an examination of archival materials, secondary research on Kajang (particularly ethnographies), sustained engagement with local leadership, and oral histories among individuals that experienced turbulent periods of change on local leadership authority. Chapters 4 and 5 are rooted in my day-to-day participation with local farmers to produce and reproduce the landscape and I present the approaches to data collection in each chapter accordingly. The analysis of these three chapters are also premised on the three subsequent maps that highlights how development, agriculture, and tree crops are spatially situated on the landscape. Although the maps visually appear as a simplistic and static set of polygons portraying land cover categories, the way the landscape looks at one point in time provides entry into describing the spatial patterns – the rules of access and acts of exclusion – as they have taken shape over time. In short, the maps paint a dynamic picture when read through the eyes of local development authority and land tenure institutions, contextualized by historical antecedents, government policies, and emergent economic strategies. Contextualizing these factors sets the course for understanding the authority that emerges to negotiate recognition and title, particularly as subsequent chapters will describe how decisions are made about how landscapes are produced and reproduced.

II. State formation in Kajang: From pre-colonial polities to the modern Village

From forests to tree crops, the powers that change landscapes

“In the past there were lots of forests here.” Sattu begins to list them “Batu Panoang, 10 hectares; Pangi-pangi, 20 hectares; Campaga Puang, 10 hectares. They all had different functions and uses: protecting water sources, foraging for firewood, seedling cultivation, ceremonial and ritual sites. Those forests are all gone. Sure, parts of them still remain, like Tama’dohong, where a sacred site and water sources are still protected, but the remaining forest around the site is now less than a hectare.” Sattu worked in village governments since the mid 1980s, in several different villages and under a series of village heads. He likes to share his encyclopedic
knowledge of local place names and the decisions that either changed or sustained them. He then turns his attention to the last remaining forest.

“The Ammatoa already lost out with the Production Forest designation in the early 1990s.”

“The one that they now say they are giving back?” I ask.

Nodding he responds, “The forest was split up by the Forestry Ministry and a lot of it has already been sold off.” I think about my own experience joining the boundary-setting teams to take GPS points of the forest boundary, the meandering boundaries repositioned around recently converted small tree plantations. Not only did re-designation projects legitimize past takings subsuming them into past administration systems, formal initiatives provided opportunities to redraw shrinking boundaries, and for administrators to make new claims to land.

I gained further insight into the administration of these initiatives a few weeks later. Sattu and I walked the boundaries of the sacred forest. I learned about the small fire that spread in the western boundaries, which provided justification for government intervention in the form of a reforestation [reboisasi] program. “To replant the forest, they said they were planting kayu bitti,” Sattu explained. Bitti was justified as a native tree species customarily important for building houses in Kajang. “The local farmer groups planted some of the Bitti, but you can also see what else they did here,” he said. “In between the Bitti stands, they planted cloves. Since the ten years of that government program you do not see much Bitti. There are some individual trees here and there, but it is almost all cloves now.”

Sattu then conceded, “You see, even I have claims to a plot here. I was a member of the farmer group for the reforestation program, and I joined them planting cloves.” We were standing in his carefully lined rows, but I did not see any cloves remaining. He pointed to a patch of subsided dirt, remnants of missed opportunity. “The cloves died during the long drought of 2015.” Crouching down he looked for any signs of fungal disease at the stalk of the pepper vines just beginning to take hold and said, “I’m hoping that I can begin harvesting this pepper next year.”

He openly acknowledged this would have once been part of the old sacred forest. The designation of indigenous land title to Kajang forests helped to take this land out of its boundaries. “The forests used to be connected all the way down to Bulukumba and Ujung Loe,” he continued. “But they won out with money.”
“What do you mean with money? Who?” I ask.

“First, the plantation came and bought the forests. They bought it from the government, which are the powerful people from here. For the plantation, they called it the HGU.” — he expands the contraction saying each word: “*hak guna usaha*, [the rights to use]. Then when the HGU nears expiration, they invite the District Head from Bulukumba and renew the lease. Then they get another 10 or 20 years.\(^\text{30}\) The Bupatis work with the Subdistrict and village heads. If you are in those positions, you benefit. It’s been that way for a hundred years.”

We walk back out of what used to be part of the sacred forest towards the main road.

Sattu explains further, “In the past it was the *Karaeng* that benefitted, collecting benefits in the form of land and money by facilitating transactions. It is the same way they built these roads. One of them still owns about 20 hectares in a nearby village from that legacy. Now we use the same approach at a smaller scale. When a government project comes in, those with formal authority help themselves by dividing the margins up for their own benefit. If you have family connections to the village heads, or helped to elect them, then you can get something too.” He gestured back to the pepper fields. “For us, if we have relationships to those positions, we can get into the farmer groups, then we can also benefit in the same ways when they implement a project. That’s when we can try to stake a small claim.”

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This conversation embodies the processes of land use change over time in Kajang. It specifically highlights the institutional and patronage systems that tie together large-scale development projects like plantation expansion and road development, but also that connects with the mechanisms of formal authority embodied in the State that legitimate smaller scale development projects through the common practice of administrating and creating farmer groups. These terms of authority in a place like Kajang reach back several centuries.

To get us to the present, I begin with the pre-Dutch polities of regional Kingdoms and describe how the Kajang maintained independent authority in the South Sulawesi region in what Usop (1978) describes as “cultural diplomacy” amidst Kajang’s political submission to the kingdom of Gowa. Gowan influence initiated the integration of the *Karaeng* aristocracy, instituting caste-like hierarchies into Kajang’s culturally egalitarian system. As the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century saw the arrival of Dutch colonial rule, the latter periods of colonial administration also gave way

\(^\text{30}\) HGU leases are generally for 35 years
to the first industrial scale plantation agriculture in Kajang. The political economic conditions to negotiate such projects strengthened the position of Karaeng as local administrators. Although Kajang cultural authority still remained, it was again challenged in the post-independence era by the counter-insurgency of an Islamic rebellion that had an indelible impact on shaping local systems of authority, ones which are still very much contested today. Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998) thereafter consolidated power across Indonesia instituting new governing mechanisms and development practices under the oversight of military rule. This period redefined village institutions, and the Karaeng began to occupy posts in the security apparatus and as village administrators. Much of these institutions and their practices are still in force today and I conclude this section with the reflections of current administrators as they see their role in enacting development. This descriptive historical explanation provides the context for leadership authority and the way it is invoked and legitimated in Kajang, which thereafter allows me to turn to the productive land systems and the way access and exclusion are unfolding today.

**Ancestral claims to authority**

Prior to Dutch colonial rule across the Indonesian archipelago, Kajang was under the broader influence of the regional polities of Gowa and Bone. These constituted some of the larger kingdoms of Southeast Asia, areas with vast rice-growing valleys that fit the model of being able to fix populations and accumulate wealth and influence (Hutterer 1977; Scott, 2009).

As one of these great kingdoms, Gowa extended political and cultural influence across South Sulawesi by re-appropriating regional origin stories (Cummings, 2003). They expanded their power by destroying kalompoang31 of communities that claimed distinct autochthonous origins, requiring them to submit to Gowa’s sphere of influence. First, they introduced and expanded the written word. These texts served as symbolic power, replacements of the local origin stories in the absence of the destroyed Kalompoang, thus archiving their unequivocal legitimacy of regional dominance. Second, they also legitimated cultural expansion by claiming their role as the first to introduce Islam to the region.

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31 Local artefacts, symbol of sacred power, also known in Kajang as matang
Kajang’s origin stories also reflect Gowa’s influence, albeit singularly being able to maintain authority from the spiritual and cultural power of the Ammatoa (Usop, 1978). Indeed, Kajang is described as the last of the patuntungs, adherents to an oral tradition passed down by ancestors embodied by egalitarian ideologies of the upland priests from a pre-Islamic era (Rössler, 1990). Kajang survived by formally accepting Islam and incorporating Gowan princes into their local leadership authority. I encountered elements of these power dynamics in the remaining symbolism of the cosmographies of Kajang’s past, including the sulappa appa’ (the four directions), the setting of gravestones, and the siting of ritual functions. The clearest evidence I encountered however, were in the markers present in the various versions of Kajang origin stories, which I heard during my time there. These origin stories presented particular interpretations of local power and authority. They often came footnoted with the phrase lalang minjo (too deep), forbidden stories reserved for discussion only in certain settings and among particular people.

It is not my intention to divulge local secrets as I recognize the power of interpretation important among the Kajang. Indeed, there are often markers that indicate forbidden acts of capturing images and documenting local moral codes. I have been careful to maintain anonymity of individuals and protect sensitive information. Without going into too much detail about the various origin stories, of importance to the analysis herein is that these origin narratives situate the power of rightful authority of the Kajang on the landscape. A couple of common recurrences in these stories are of note. First, authority centers around the creation of land alongside the arrival of the first human, the Ammatoa, at the sacred forest of Tombollo. Thereafter, various renditions among origin stories also include additional elements that indicate the contested terms of legitimate authority over territory and decisionmaking processes. Notable are the influence of the regional kingdoms and the arrival of Islam. For example, one origin story places the Ammatoa alongside the arrival of the first woman, emerging from the bamboo groves that would go on to shape the great kingdoms of neighboring regions. This narrative presents a

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32 Ammatoa translates literally as eldest father and is also affectionately called Bohe Amma (grandfather). He is the cultural and spiritual leader of the Kajang, to which Kajang seek guidance, and communities throughout the region also often visit to request his blessing. The selection of the Ammatoa follows an elaborate process as described in Maarif (2012).
33 Winichakul’s (1994) Siam Mapped describes pre-modern maps as cosmographies that describe the way local populations thought about space and power.
34 I also encountered collected versions of origin stories in the following studies (Cense, 1931; Usop, 1978; Rössler, 1991; Maarif, 2012).
corresponding claim to rightful justifications of authority among the *galla* and *karaeng* detailed below. A further distinction is made with the arrival of Islam, which describes a shift from the arrival of the first human (the Ammataoa), to the first gravestone. This crucial distinction embeds the identity of Kajang authority with the influence and arrival of modernist ideals and Islam, reconstructing space and legitimacy in modernist ideals and embedding Islamic authority.

Although cultural and spiritual authority in Kajang centers around the Ammataoa, buttressed by Islam and modernization narratives of South Sulawesi, another set of family lineages emerge from the origin stories that also determine political authority and legitimate land management claims. The five *Galla* [*Galla Limayya*] hold positions of authority to regions encircling sacred sites and take on different societal functions and cultural responsibilities, hosting purification ceremonies at regular intervals. The *Galla* also in the past held key societal responsibilities, guiding for example agricultural time schedules by reading the constellations and other indicators. As the Gowa kingdom expanded authority in the 17th century however, another layer of authority was introduced alongside the *Galla*. These were the *Karaengs* (i. *Bangsawan*), which are common as the aristocratic caste across South Sulawesi. In Kajang, *Karaeng* positions assigned emissaries of Gowa princes to occupy administrative affairs with the Kajang. Overtime three *Karaeng* were incorporated into Kajang positions of authority (the *Karaeng Tallua*, consisting of the *Labirriya*, *Sulehatang*, and *Moncongbolloa*). This is how, for example, although the Kajang moral code professes egalitarian ideals and a modest life – one that social movement activists often point to as the inherent ideology of local identity – meanwhile the legacy of emissaries assigned as local administrators came to occupy distinct hierarchical castes through bloodlines. It is also how a cultural system premised on egalitarian ideals in Kajang also changed to incorporate the broader political economic conditions of South Sulawesi’s past, one that was influence by the incorporation of slaves (*atta’,* *kambasahayya*), both as a caste and a system of trade.  

**The Dutch colonial state**

As the Dutch came into power and formalized colonial rule in the wake of the VOC’s Bankruptcy of 19th century Indonesia, their administrative influence also expanded beyond the

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35 See Bigalke (2005) for a description about one of the most lucrative industry of the 19th century: trade of humans.
main locus of Java and the eastern spice islands. In Kajang, the *Karaengs* welcomed expanded Dutch authority through their strengthened negotiating powers. These aristocratic positions also consolidated greater wealth and authority in their relations with the Dutch by moving into the logical negotiators and administrators of Dutch indirect rule, tasked with generating taxes and mobilizing labor.

The first formal descriptions of the Kajang in the historical record that I was able to identify are among surveyors seeking to expand Dutch plantation interests describing conditions in which the local *Karaengs* were eager to reciprocate. Donselaar, in 1851 expressed Dutch colonial designs to expand teak, kapok, and coffee into new regions. He notes the ideal conditions of the vast rice valleys, the calm coastlines, and fertile soil in this part of South Sulawesi. Although Donselaar describes ideal ecological and geographical conditions, he anticipated that organizing labor would present a much more difficult challenge however. His descriptions cite the difficulties of mobilizing a reliable labor pool locally or getting local populations to accept the arrival of migrants from elsewhere. In his words: “The coffee grows very luxuriantly, and although treated with little care, does very well because of the favorable condition of the soil. It would be amenable to great expansion. However, labor scarcity and the unwilling nature of the population make it difficult to overcome barriers.” (Donselaar, 1855: 179). Extending his observations more specifically to Kajang, Donselaar notes that “At a short distance from Wero is the capital of Kajang, a kind of free state, which is, however, subordinate to the Bone empire. This landscape, which contains a large population, is notorious for the bad nature of its inhabitants. It is the refuge of thieves and murderers from all around, who find a safe stay there. They continue out their shameful business in the neighborhoods. The area of the Bulukamba division, which borders it next to this landscape, suffers a lot from this bad scum by stealing cattle and goods and not infrequently by killing. The people of Kajang are known to have strong amphibious abilities, a forest-dwelling people that are enthusiasts of dice and cockfighting.” (Donselaar, 1855: 177)

Over half a century later, by the early 1900s, early designs for plantation-scale rubber production began with a British trading company purchasing a large tract of land, negotiated with the *Karaengs* of Kajang and through the Dutch Governor in Makassar for areas described as vast savannah, underutilized fallow, and unproductive tracts of forestland (Muur, 2019). As described in chapter 2, plantation land claims would not become a source of conflict until much
later. Indeed, the local Kajang administrators at that time – the Karaengs and the Galla – eagerly facilitated these investment plans, believing that plantations would provide wealth and opportunity to their region. In 1909 rubber plantations began to establish limited operations.

In 1931, a Dutch anthropologist A.A. Cense arrived to catalogue Kajang language and adat systems. The context of the envoy’s arrival is poignant for three key reasons. First, Cense was invited to investigate the Kajang region for the plantation economy’s strategic role in Dutch colonial policy. Although not explicitly stated in Cense’s reporting, these economic interests and the understanding of troublesome populations amidst and around the plantation concession were of strategic informational value. Secondly, Dutch policies of the time began to reflect concern for the welfare and rights of native populations. Amidst reports of land and plantation expropriation in the colonies, a sense of shame entered Dutch parliamentary discussions, resulting in passage of social welfare policies to protect native rights by recognizing their distinct legal systems and protecting ulayat lands (Burns, 1989; Davidson and Henley, 2007; Van Vollenhoven et al., 2013). Third, Dutch envoys like Cense were tasked to extend missionary work alongside the concern of a rapid spread and deeper conservatism of Islam. Detailed explicitly throughout Cense’s 1931 account include descriptions of the Kajang as a native community that although self-identifying as Muslims, in fact rejected core Islamic teachings in favor of their animist and ancestral practices. He provided assurances that Islam practiced in Kajang was an interpretive one not to cause worry, describing local customs of the sacred grove at Tombolo as their Mecca.

During this early period, Cense noted the rifts of authority between the Ammatoa’s cultural and spiritual influence with the development authority among the Karaeng and Galla. Cense’s account concludes by noting the Ammatoa’s displeasure of the destruction of the Tamparang forests, converted for roadbuilding and plantation expansion, causing him to retreat deeper into the sacred forest, unwilling to accept any visitors at that time (Cense, 1931: 32). Even close to a century ago, or especially so, the distinction between the Ammatoa’s rule and the political-economic authority commanded by the Karaeng were intertwined, but already fraught. Furthermore, under the Dutch, the Karaengs gained additional access to the terms of authority by gaining sole access to the formal schooling systems, a condition that would extend well into the years of the sovereign Indonesian state.
Islamic rebels in South Sulawesi: A continuing ideological battle in Kajang

The Muhammadiyah movement began in 1915 and spread to South Sulawesi where it gained a strong following. The movement promised a modern Islam free from the restrictive cultural system that allowed for limited upward mobility. Indeed, Gibson et al. (2005) has gone as far as describing the nobility in South Sulawesi as one of the most hierarchical in Southeast Asia. The Muhammadiyah movement thus offered escape from the entrenched caste systems of aristocracy and slavery, promised egalitarianism in the eyes of god, and promoted a compelling vision of modernist meritocracy. Islam also gained significant strength in the late Dutch colonial period as one convening ideology for national sovereignty. However, the Muhammadiyah vision excluded some key constituents across the archipelago, namely the Christians and Balinese Hindu, and also represented a radical break from syncretism ubiquitous across Indonesia. Nevertheless, although the more hardline Muhammadiyah initially allied with the eventual victors for independence in their struggle against the Dutch, disgruntled freedom fighters among them in the post-independence era continued to fight for an Islamic ideology of the nascent state. Prominent splinter groups formed under the banner of Sharia, allying West Java and South Sulawesi to form the Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) [the Islamic Army of Indonesia]. In the late 1950s and early 1960s these movements – labeled rebel groups [pemberontak] – gained considerable strength in the regions. They cut off economic supply chains, terrorized and converted rural regions, and handed out especially heavy punishment on Kajang cultural practitioners.

I spoke to several Kajang elders that experienced the period in different ways, each recalling horrifying memories of violence. A former legislator I often met, Rizal, now in his eighties and a self-proclaimed local historian, described the Islamic insurgency as a period where “We lived in fear. The roads and bridges were broken, the economy was at a standstill. It also took a serious psychological toll among those growing up during this period.” Sunia, a young girl living through that time period, and now in her early 70s, told me about the three years of terror: “The Islamic guerrilla army came here. They came to destroy saukang and matang [holy sites and objects of worship for the Kajang]. They would also force us [the women] to pray and wear the jilbab, even while we were working in the hot fields. If they thought that there were any

36 Burns (1989) suggests that adat eventually provided the foundational ideology of the nation, but this thesis is also debated among Dutch scholars.
matang or black sarongs in our homes, they would break in and burn them. If they found out people were baca doang [reciting pasang or other Kajang prayers] and practicing traditional ceremonies, they identified them as people of influence and took them away. The military that eventually came up from Java to fight the Islamic rebels, although they drove away the rebels, they were not aligned with us either. They bothered us. They were suspicious. They routinely killed people from here. The Javanese military division [tentara 710] were also the worst because they would go after the girls.” This history continues to shape Sunia’s notion of being Kajang. She spends much of her time at home weaving the black cloth sarongs but when I see her tending the family stall of sembakau [basic foods] at the market, she continues to wear all black, but in public spaces presents herself with the additional attire of the jilbab covering.

The legacy of this history of violence is still expressed in local ideas of powerful alliances on how one relates as Kajang, Muslim, and Indonesian. Pak Haji, as he is commonly referred – identifying him as someone that had taken the pilgrimage to Mecca – told me he enlisted in the Islamic rebel army after he had seen them line up Kajang leadership that refused to comply, and one by one they were beheaded. He has been a strict practicing Muslim ever since. I was surprised how openly he shared this history, that he was at once compelled by the ideas of Islamic liberation, but also as a strategy for aligning himself through pragmatic survival instincts.

On the opposing side, Bassi’, now in his mid 90s joined the Dompe army, a Kajang uprising that banded together to drive out the Islamic rebels. Gibson (2000) says “the Dompe Army was armed only with swords, spears, and magic,” and local legend describes them as weaponized with swarming bees. The Dompe army were initially successful in suppressing the Islamic rebels. But when the leader of the rebels, Kahar Muzakkar heard of this small uprising, he mobilized forces in a swift elimination of the Dompe. Bassi explained to me “everyone was suspicious of each other at that time. If you met someone in the forest or on the road that you did not know, you had to quickly decide which side they were on. If you got it wrong, they would kill you. I had misjudged a member of the Islamic rebel army officers as one of us,” Bassi said. He turned gingerly to show me the scar leading from his neck far down to his back, “I don’t know how I escaped alive.”

The accounts among those that experienced these turbulent and violent times are still engaged in similar ideological contestations that shape local terms of authority. On the one hand,
Kajang today are viewed as a mystical community, dressed in their all black robes following a secretive oral ancestral code under the cultural guidance of the Ammatoa, who conjure up spirits from their sacred forest and once stood up fiercely against the Islamic rebels. Meanwhile the Kajang are insistent in their Islamic identity as well, and very conservative Islamic movements continue to expand through missionaries assigned to decry local practices, accusing the Kajang of blasphemy, and extending investments in the form of mosque-building projects. Relational historical lineages among Kajang with regional kingdoms of South Sulawesi also reinforce local terms of authority, particularly as these legacies have shaped political economic considerations. Although established before the Dutch era, the colonial period also served to renegotiate alliances of power and local terms of authority that still very much are in place today. Layered upon these forms of identity are also the modernist development promises of the Indonesian state, which has in recent years had the most profound influence. I next turn to this period.

**Village development in the New Order and its legacy**

The mid 1960s saw a new form of governing authority arrive in Kajang as part of Suharto’s centralized military state, also known as the New Order regime (1966-1998). The hallmark of Suharto’s development agenda was based on the continuation of the colonial policies driven by the primary sector and backed by close oversight among military personnel. The early New Order regime, short on resources, enacted extortionist practices under the guise of security services to capture wealth while also facilitating development of the national economy by expanding large-scale primary sector industries in natural resource extraction and plantation development (Barr et al., 2006). This was commonly known as dwifungsi, or literally the ‘dual function’ that the police/military state approached governing.

Meanwhile, the New Order enacted nation-building through the institution of the village (desa) and the 1979 Village Law had an indelible effect across Indonesia (See Vel and Bedner, 2015). The Law instituted a set of programs, including resettlement of communities into the idyllic imaginary of the Javanese village, complete with new spatial orientation and positions of authority. The law at once restructured villages as the final administrative node of the statemaking project, in the way that James Scott (1998) might have described as making legible

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37 See Benedict Anderson’s (1983) work entitled “Old State, New Society,” which highlights how the Dutch colonial state was repurposed under the rhetoric of nationalism
diverse populations across the archipelago. Regimented categorizations to join men’s, women’s, and youth groups were required, and rural, illegible populations were coaxed out of the uplands into settlement patterns around planned village patterns that connected to broader road networks. National reform programs remapped lands into two distinct categories, those within the political forest, and those outside. Land administrations split into categories of protection, production, and conservation forests, large land concessions, and these new village administration systems. Meanwhile the state’s standardizing processes, the new institutions, currency, and state propaganda converged to create a sense of an imagined community around a distinct idea of Indonesian-ness (Anderson, 2006).

With the defeat of the Islamic rebels and a new national government in power, in Kajang this translated into a new phase of consolidation and reinforcement of institutional power among the Karaeng. The Karaeng actively pursued and secured police and military posts, and subsequently occupied village administrative positions. They thus claimed legitimacy in the new wave of enacting development policies. By the early 1980s, carrying out Suharto’s dwifungsi mandate, the Karaengs creatively sought ways to conduct development with little funds, relying heavily on extortion and the threat of violence. While those from Tanah Toa village and surrounding areas acknowledge the benefits from development that came during this time, they also describe it as an oppressive one. The nation building concept of gotong royong – envisioned as an idyllic system of mutual support for village development – in Kajang felt to most as a return to the forced labor of the Dutch era [Kasihiang], in which certain quotas of road needed to be built per individual in the village. Sallasa, described village gotong royong as follows: “People would be required to gather and then be given a quota.” He gestured with his hands mimicking two blocked squares. “You have to work two meters of this road, or you have to compile one cubic meter of rock. You couldn’t go home until it was done. If you didn’t show up the military would come find you at your house.” Under the roadbuilding projects conducted by village heads in the 1980s, those that refused to take part were punished and intimidated. Sallasa also described instances among those that had foregone participation, as they were lined up on

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38 Political forest is a term used by Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) to describe forest management areas that are not necessarily covered with forest. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, 2/3rds of Indonesia (126 million hectares) is under Forestry Ministry management authority.
the ground and the children of local administrators were invited to walk on them alongside other acts of public humiliation.

Over time, the Karaengs profited handsomely – in capital and land enclosures – in their role as the extension of the state. They helped to negotiate Lonsum rubber plantation operations and undertook efforts to expand road networks throughout the region. Haking, who I will introduce later as a rubber smallholder explained the way that Lonsum and development came hand in hand: “In the past there was a good reason to be afraid of Lonsum. But there were only specific people that would come around and intimidate people. It was the District Head [Bupati] and his alliances to be afraid of back then. It wasn’t really Lonsum. It was the people here of influence. Just like in the villages of Bonto Biraeng where the demonstrations took place; also over in Sangkala. The leaders of the communities were friends with the powerful people in Lonsum. It was the village heads that signed up the lands to be included in the plantation. And they were the ones that legitimized taking people’s land. That’s why they then went to demo in Bulukumba and then people tried to sue the plantation because they could not turn to their local leaders. Lonsum was able to take a lot of land that way. But for Lonsum, they always said it was your village heads that sold it to us. The village heads were the liars [i. pembohong]. It wasn’t Lonsum.”

In parallel, the state moved further into Kajang as part of increasing village budgets translating into roadbuilding and other development initiatives. Larger village administrations splintered into smaller ones, further distributing fund allocations and increasing the number of local state representation that could mobilize resources. In 1985 the former police officer-turned-village head of Tanah Toa relocated from the much longer circular route to Malleleng and repositioned his office in the heart of Kajang territory. They dug a 15 meter well, a practice still prohibited in the Kajang inner areas, built a school, a local clinic, and cut down one of the most sacred forest sites at Kajapoa to build a local market. A mosque followed closely thereafter. As a part of the Karaeng families and their lineage, a village head of that time openly boasts about how he civilized their primitive ways, bringing them education and religion from their drunken and backwards practices. Ironically, these descriptions were not much different from the ones documented by Donselaar, the Dutch colonial administrator more than a century prior.

Aside from applying development in this way and the associated disciplining tactics, local administrators also benefitted in other ways. To overcome the high cost of roadbuilding,
beyond forced labor, the routes also followed the most valuable pathways. Justified by the aims of development, a strategic form of eminent domain guided the directions of roadbuilding. Sallasa, who so vividly described the public humiliation by those that refused forced labor assignments, also explained why the road unexpectedly turns up a hill at one section. The route, he explains, “was built at that location because there were lucrative timber stands of Biti. To build the road, they would choose the routes with the best potential harvests. Unclaimed or communal land were also registered as private property for the administrators that implemented these projects, thereafter securing and registering those lands as their own under official legal titles.”

Indeed, mixed feelings accompany this fraught history of development, ones that drove a painful wedge between families. There were those that embraced the rapid pace of development once the roads opened up, and there were those that retreated behind the spiritual and cultural protection of the Ammatoa. A current village staffer, Bahri, at once saw the opportunity and privilege of his personal gains from that period, but also lamented the losses, the permanent cleavages dividing right through his own family. “These changes tore my family apart,” Bahri recalls. “Those working in the village used to bother my mother. She retreated deeper into the inner Kajang, splitting with my father and later remarrying. After 1987, my life was never the same. I was in the third grade at that time and if I had chosen to live with my mother, I would not be sitting with you now. Instead I chose school and walked the eight kilometers to cappa gatta (literally, “edge of the rubber”) to the nearest primary education facilities. I boarded there and returned here once a week. As I grew older I saw that every new development plan moved the Kajang boundary further in. One was justified as extending the roads as part of a visit by important state officials, another to bring electricity for school construction, for a tourism homestay, another as part of an irrigation project, yet another for a mosque.39 Working for the village, I now get to direct where the roads go. Although much has changed since I was younger, that’s still the main thing we do as a village government: build roads and bring development.”40

One of Bahri’s staff, contracted to help build roads, ironically chimes in with his own family story, a word of caution from his grandmother. “She used to tell me about the black snake

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39 See Maarif (2012) for the political dimensions of boundary changes in Kajang
40 Maarif (2012) also provides additional descriptive analysis of the politics of boundary changes that take place alongside road development.
that would come into our communities and divide us. When I asked her when the snake would
arrive, she responded by saying it’s already here: it is the asphalt that splits our communities and
changes our way of life.” These current village staff members, describing experiences that
ushered in dramatic changes during the long and coercive era of the New Order era, still define
their role as village administrators in similar ways. Their official apparatus and function are still
most equipped to build roads and to implement projects that benefit the implementers, be it
through individual contracting or in other ways. They certainly express guilt in conducting
projects that undermine Kajang traditional authority, but also see their responsibility to enact
such development policies.

However, the benefits of village governance today differ in distinct ways from the
Suharto era. Now village elections are lively and bitterly contested affairs, often secured by the
highest bidder, which is commonly described in Kajang as in many parts of Indonesia as “money
politik”. The authority of the village head, in securing their position by purchasing it in this way
still structures the expectations of conduct and its benefits. One major difference however, is that
in contemporary times, it is not only the Karaeng that have come to fill these positions. Although
still holding much power, a new aristocracy have emerged, those not necessarily of Karaeng
lineages but who have succeeded in different ways, namely through the structuring of capitalist
relations that I will detail in chapter 4 and 5.

III. Seeing landscapes amidst development authority

In sum, this chapter has shown how the contested terms of authority continue to play out
in ways that support a distinctly Kajang identity, but one that is situated in the history of South
Sulawesi, which over time changed due to new trajectories of governing systems across periods
of Dutch colonial rule, shaken and contested by political Islam, and subsequently redefined
during the New Order regime. As a result, these layers of memory and identity are still invoked
in various ways. The 1979 Village Law introduced new forms of political administration that
provide the blueprint for local governance today. With the further consolidation of power of the
Indonesian state, the Karaeng aristocracy initially controlled the posts among security forces,
while others began to move into civil service positions as village administrators. The Karaeng
thus interpreted and applied the state mandate, benefitting handsomely through the control of
development projects and its material benefits, including the enclosures for land. Indeed the
civil-military relations delivered the Indonesian development agenda through coercive practices common across the state system of that era.

I concluded the narrative in this chapter by highlighting how the expectations for governing in Kajang remain rooted in the delivery of development through the state agenda as established by the *Karaeng*. They brought the state and Islam closer to Kajang, by extending ideologies through the construction of schools, mosques, and *Pancasila*. The *Karaeng* established the road networks, structured settlement patterns, and supported plantation expansion. In this way, expectations about the overall function of the state and role of those occupying formal positions were established and, in many ways, continue. However, in the 1990s village units splintered into smaller units, presenting opportunities for a new emergent landed elite to challenge leadership positions.

*Map 2. Development in the Kajang region from built-up areas and road infrastructure*

Indeed, what I have shown thus far are the precursors that created the polygons listed in Map 2, namely the capillaries of road networks and settlement areas that connect Kajang. In
chapter 4, I will explain how the remainder of the landscapes are managed, which in turn allowed for a new class of elite to emerge, at once contesting the power and authority of the *Karaeng* but also enacting a new process of enclosures and exclusions compelled by capitalist relations. I will thus enter into the broader landscape by highlighting land relations through changes in agricultural practices. This includes the production of corn and rice, as well as the rise of private individual property and the enclosure of the frontier through the expansion of tree crops.
Chapter 4 – Land tenure, commoditizing agriculture, and the volatility of crop booms in Kajang

I. Introducing land tenure institutions

Back from a tiring morning in the fields preparing rice fields, Sattu turns to me and says “In the past we just had corn. The people of influence back then were the Karaengs and the Gallarang. They controlled the rice fields and collected rents from our fields. They were powerful and could tell people what to do. Otherwise, there was plenty of land to live on and we practiced a system of shifting cultivation planting many different things. But that is long gone. The only lands that had title in the old days were the flat lands with accessibility or the rice fields [sawah] that were located with access to water sources. They called these lands the C(P)1 because of the land title. Otherwise, at that time you could have as much land as you wanted so long as you could work it. But it was a lot of work and you needed to work together with a lot of people for the planting and harvests … [Once land became more scarce], you could make a claim to land if you could prove your ancestors worked to clear those areas. Today all lands are titled and owned. There is gillirang [where multiple family claims are recognized] and there is private land.”

This chapter covers these two tenure categories: gillirang and private property. Indeed, these tenurial institutions structure land relations across most of the Kajang landscape. Gillirang and private property therefore not only determine terms of land access, also define what type of crops can be planted on a particular parcel of land. It is the explanatory factor to the mosaic of the landscape described in Maps 3 and 4. Understanding these two land categories therefore are fundamental to contextualizing the implications of land rights recognition in Kajang. In other words, any effort at titling lands and recognizing indigenous land rights are likely to be interpreted through the framework of these two tenure institutions.

Not only are the rules to these two tenure institutions different, they also determine what can be planted on a parcel of land. Gillirang lands almost always means agricultural production, and private property means tree crops. In Kajang, agriculture [pertanian] means crops planted and harvested multiple times a year. This specifically refers to rice and corn cultivation. Other crops – those that require multi-year management, such as tree crops – are categorized as plantation [perkebunan] crops. Support for cultivation practices across Indonesia also follow
along different ministry support programs implemented by a distinct set of agency staff and extension workers along the lines of agriculture and plantation categories. To implement programs, target communities form pre-requisite farmer groups for disbursement and implementation. The process requires accounting proof that the programs went to local beneficiaries, administered by extension workers collecting signatures among farmer group membership. As described in chapter 3 on local development authority, those that get to occupy farmer groups are contingent on relations to local village heads, formed by networks among family relations. The type of tenure category thus structures the crops that can be planted, and furthermore structures the networks of support programs from the government. These dynamics as I describe the particulars of crop production in each commodity.

_Gillirang_ lands are often described as communal lands by indigenous land rights activists. In fact, _gillirang_ is more restrictive in that access is limited to kin negotiated on a rotational basis through claims of inheritance. Plantation crops on the other hand, fall into the category of individual private ownership. There is intense pressure to break _gillirang_ arrangements however, which can only be achieved by buying out other claimants rights to secure private ownership. Only upon land privatization can an individual convert land uses to tree crops.  

Land privatization occurs when one sibling can buy out the rights of other claimants, which I will show in several cases in the empirical sections below. The broader objective of this chapter is to connect local authority as described in chapter 3 to the land relations that determine crop production, thus further contextualizing the overall implications of indigenous land rights recognition in Kajang.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part one steps back to contextualize my broader framework and approach to analysis by engaging reflexively on land dilemmas from across Southeast Asia. In particular, I focus on the notion of capitalist relations, namely how particular changes compelled commoditization and accumulation. A framing of capitalist relations showcases the implications of land tenure changes independent from indigenous land rights recognition, but also in ways that structures the very possibilities of recognition and title.

In part 2, I detail the innerworkings of _gillirang_ as a tenurial institution in rice and corn. I begin by providing a description of gendered labor relations in corn cultivation and harvest. As the frontier has long been enclosed in Kajang, and populations increased by a factor of four in

41 The exception is for housing construction.
the past three decades, *gillirang* land claims are more crowded and contested. Meanwhile, the increased demand for land also creates changes in the rules of access and exclusion, redefining cultural understanding of labor and reciprocity. The full enclosure of the frontier and corresponding population increases also interacts with the introduction of new agricultural technologies and production systems – in the form of chemical fertilizer, herbicides, and mechanization – reducing labor requirements. Finally, the increasing importance of rice as staple and as a cultural commodity for ritual has also added a new dimension of household responsibility to fulfill the increasing quotas onset by the local system of social debt. In this way, I will show how intimate exclusions take place between kin, vis-à-vis the capitalist relations prioritizing particular outcomes in Kajang agricultural practices. These exclusionary practices are deployed through the forms of authority that legitimate land claims, combined with emergent forms of labor and reward, and the changing price ratios of crop production, as well as the overall demands to fulfill gift-giving practices in rice.

In part 3, I shift to the increasingly coveted strategies in Kajang to secure private land for tree crop production. In contrast to the surprising processes of commoditization taking place in agriculture and systems of reciprocity described in part 2, land conversion to tree crops is more closely related to processes of capitalist relations. These capitalist relations are commonly associated with factors that compel farmers into the treadmill of accumulation or dispossession. In Kajang however, the pace of conversion highlights a much more frenzied process not around one crop like cacao, but rather production that follows spikes in prices in a series of tree crops. In part 3 I focus on one transition from rubber to black pepper. I show one farmer, Haking, has waited five years to begin harvest and his current anxiety about future prices. This stands in contrast to the beginning of the subsequent boom, as Haking watches some of his neighbors march towards black pepper. They have foregone the years leading up to rubber harvest in favor of replanting their individual plots as black pepper, hedging their bets to be on the leading edge of the boom. Furthermore, I also focus on a village administrator that has actively pushed farmers into the boom, encouraging them to convert agricultural plots of corn into individual property to pursue what at the time of my research looked like handsome rewards.

Across the three parts in this chapter, I bring together a more nuanced perspective of land relations taking place within and around the site of recognition in Kajang. Throughout the chapter I pinpoint the emergence of capitalist relations through the processes that compel
accumulation and the pitfalls that lead to dispossession, situating them amidst markets and
cultural practices. The positions of authority emergent alongside increasingly contested
agricultural land access, combined with intensifying enclosures from planting tree crops,
highlights a more surprising effect that foregrounds indigenous rights recognition. As social
movement actors in Indonesia and their support networks internationally place hopes in
recognizing indigenous communities and formalizing their lands as a challenge to inequitable
land enclosures from afar, herein I show how such strategies might look like from within the
landscape. To illustrate this point, I end the chapter by conducting a rough calculation of the
number of households in a given village relative to the amount of land available. I first define
what Kajang consider enough land to succeed per household (in terms of agriculture and tree
crops) and contrast this value with the number of households and total village area. This estimate
further helps to contextualize that even in what activists consider a model case such as the
Kajang, recognition only serves to reinforce processes of accumulation and dispossession guided
by a select few.

II. A framework of capitalist relations and intimate exclusions

Tania Li’s (2014) work introducing the notion of capitalist relations in the context of
indigenous frontiers provides a key area for reflexive engagement in this chapter. Exploring a
case in the neighboring province of Central Sulawesi, Li shows how indigenous highlanders
eagerly embraced the promise of capitalism by incorporating tree crops into their landscapes.
With the benefits of two decades of longitudinal engagement, she demonstrates how processes
over time resulted in a totalizing enclosure of the frontier through the arrival of cacao and
concomitant land privatization.

*Land’s End* tells a story of how markets shifted from one of opportunity, to one of
compulsion, a process Li describes as *capitalist relations*. Li shows that Lauje highlanders had
long engaged in the market, growing tobacco as far back as to Dutch colonial times. In the past,
claims to land and rights to resources were based on personal initiative and sweat equity.
Households could choose to engage in markets on their own terms. Those that took the initiative
to cultivate a plot of land for example, could claim legitimacy of its outputs. Rules about the
commons were not required, because she argues they never needed to. There was always a
frontier to exploit when households needed land. The notion of the absence of a frontier was thus
foreign to local customary systems, which Li describes is not uncommon among rural indigenous
communities with access to nearby forest lands. Therefore, as households rushed to plant cacao, the landscapes solidified into place, structuring how highlanders could set their terms of engagement to that market. Engaging in cacao in this way also place the farmer on the treadmill, without an exit option. Those that succeeded had to continue to accumulate, or else risk their own futures against the market.

Those that did not have enough land to be on the leading edge of these capitalist relations, or misjudged their risks, found themselves relegated to selling their labor. Lacking access to land took away their ability to grow food. Over time cacao’s low land and labor ratio also shifted reciprocity and reward mechanisms, leaving those that did not have access to cacao plots without anything to do. The few, those with strategic family relations and were healthy enough might still find opportunities to sell their labor. Others, as Li forcefully shows in her opening vignette, leaves those pushed to the margins without a safety net in ways that can render them destitute.

Elsewhere, also as part of Li’s work, Hall et al. (2011) describes these processes of enclosure in terms of intimate exclusions amongst kin. They describe these intimate exclusions as “the ways in which processes of accumulation and dispossession work at close quarters, among neighbors and kin who share common histories and social interaction” (2011:145). They described these as “everyday,” ones that do not capture broader attention but that over time can result in dramatic landscape changes and also reorient governing authority over tenure relations.

In Southeast Asia, intimate exclusions take place through the expansion of commoditization (also see Nevins and Peluso, 2008), and are particularly poignant in cases such as smallholder crop booms. Amidst these intimate exclusions that occur as commoditization finds new sites of entry, Hall et al. (2011) further explains that “it takes human agency—socially situated practice—to create and sustain the conditions necessary for a market to operate, and to insinuate “the market” into intimate relations to the point where it overrides other considerations.” They continue that “…markets are mediated by social calibrations of many kinds, and discourses that attempt to legitimate exclusion are routinely contested” (147). These intimate exclusions are what I highlight in this chapter. These intimate exclusions form a larger process of what Li defines as capitalist relations, a shorthand for the way that market as opportunity makes way to market as compulsion. However, different from Li’s cacao example in
Central Sulawesi, capitalist relations in Kajang take place unfold within agricultural and tree crop production in a much more variegated landscape.

In the story of *Land’s End*, cash crops existed amongst food crops and amidst agroforestry shifting cultivation fields. However, over the past two decades these agricultural systems transformed into singular cacao plots, resulting in a loss by many in the means of production and thereafter reducing labor possibilities on the landscape. In this chapter, I describe a similar but more chaotic process, one that includes an increasingly contested land category of agricultural tenure designed to sustain staple foods and fulfill ritual responsibility, alongside different tree crop trials. These tree crops are not just a singular commodity fixing their roots into the landscape, but rather consist of waves in a series of transformations, trials and failures that accelerate capitalist relations.

Finally, *In Land’s End*, the implications of land enclosures are also tied to two additional elements that connect to the political dimensions I have described in the preceding chapters. On the one hand, Li challenges those that suggest that the uncritical promotion of capitalism provides the solution for development and progress. On the other, Li also critiques the simplistic ideals promoted by social movements about uncritical attempts at recognizing indigeneity, namely the view that empowering indigeneity through recognition of community land rights recognition will protect them from the market, translating further into forest conservation. This chapter extends this argument in the context of emergent strategies of formalizing indigenous land rights recognition.

III. Agricultural relations: *Gillirang* in corn and rice

*Gillirang*

It is worth restating that rather than what indigenous rights advocates like to describe as communal land relations, *gillirang* is actually more like a private land ownership category divided amongst kin that follow ancestral lineage. *Gillirang* can be a confusing concept, and I again return to Sattu, who so clearly captures the tenure relations as follows:

“In the past you had to get your water buffalo, head down to the field, pull out the weeds by hand and it could take over ten days to get all the work done. *Gillirang* is the way it works here. There is a specific structure to it. Some *gillirang* lands these days can take up to 20 years before your get your turn again. Imagine you have three siblings and you each have three
children. You and your siblings still have rights to claim *gillirang*, and each of your children, as cousins, also gain *gillirang* rights. This means that after one *gillirang*, accounted as one year where you usually get two harvests, it will be another twelve years before you ever get a chance to plant again on that same plot of land. I have one hectare of *sawah* [irrigated rice] that I am always planting, but on a good *gillirang* year, I have two hectares.

*Map 3. Agriculture based on areas of rice and corn cultivation*

“99% of everyone who lives here are farmers …” But here’s the trick with *gillirang*. The smart ones know how to keep count of which *gillirang* lands they have a right to. You make a claim to land based on your ancestors that first cleared that land. The big problem for most

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42 In the longer exchange of this discussion, we also discussed land ownership. I wanted to understand how many people owned land and how much. I also have quantitative data of summary statistics that describe land ownership across five villages. However, the important additional point to highlight on *gillirang* is that Sattu also explained that most farmers [*petani*] are working other people’s lands [*penggarap*].
people is that they don’t know their rights to the land. But if you know who you’re 10th cousin is for whatever reason then you know how to say I have 1/6 right to this, for example.

“My father did not do a good job of this. This was back in the 1940s when it was still the colonial era. Over time I figured out which lands I had a right to. So the way it works is at the farmer forums we will meet and ask who is your ancestor [Kallabini/Nenek] and which lands do you claim? How many years do you have a right to those claims and which ones have you worked? If you do not know this information you miss out on gillirang.

“These lands are not just claimed without permission either. If there are disagreements, lower level discussions take place first – like court proceedings – before it arrives at the Ammatoa. If and when it does go to the Ammatoa they do not mess around [tidak main-main]. He knows exactly all the ancestral connections and how the rules should be settled. But in reality, it is behind the scenes how we work it all out. We have a good sense that goes back all the generations but it gets fuzzy and so we get together and decide beforehand — which years do you want, and you, and you? Some get paid out because they do not want to work the field that year. That is the calm way of doing things and also the most effective. Some people try a much more heavy-handed approach and bring their machete [parang] to the field to demand their land. When they take this approach, they usually get it, but they will be sorry down the road because they have marginalized themselves from the process in the way that it really works, during the forums.”

This longer passage from Sattu highlights a few key elements about gillirang. First, are the obvious conflicts emergent from the increasing number of claimants every year. The four-fold increase in population in Kajang over the past three decades indicates increasing pressure to access the same amount of land as previous generations. Second, Sattu also describes the terms of authority in which gillirang lands are claimed. Sattu shows that although gillirang is based on ancestral claim, in fact, there are gatekeepers to the process that legitimate claims. Terms of authority are controlled as an internal process among what people in the community have come to describe as a mafia gillirang, but they attain their legitimacy by articulating inheritance claims. Therefore, in the rice valleys that I worked in, Sattu and a network of farmers control the process of who can gain access to sawah. If those from outside these networks makes a claim, they present their gillirang inheritance rights to the farmer groups. Often other farmers will make claims to the same land. There are other ways to make claims, as Sattu notes through acts of
intimidation or taking claims to arbitration systems to the Ammatoa. They may gain access here and there in the short term as Sattu notes, but more often, his network of rice farmers decides who gets access. To highlight the more day-to-day factors that restructure exclusionary practices on gillirang land, I next enter into the landscape through the process of corn and rice production.

**Land and labor relations in corn**

I participated in every phase of rice and corn cultivation, mostly as a field laborer. I first approached the farm economy from the top of the village authority, by engaging with the coordinating head of the farmer groups, the Gapoktan [kepala gabungan kelompok tani]. I then scaled down to the smallholders and the laborers, and up to the suppliers and buyers. With corn, this included engaging with extension officers as well as their bosses at the agriculture agency, joining in various farm labor assignments, participating in harvest and yield distribution, and taking yield to market.

When I first arrived in Kajang, I noticed on the Gapoktan’s porch a set of cardboard boxes labeled Dekalb 85, prominently printed with the green leafy Monsanto logo on the packaging. When I began to ask about seed origins, the Gapoktan explained the Agriculture Agency requested each packet be sold for 2,000 rupiah (USD 0.12). He knew farmers would never accept this arrangement however, and began distributing the seed packets for free, mostly through family networks. He knew that if he asked for reimbursement for the seed packets, the farmers would first get suspicious about his personal involvement in collecting the funds, a risk he was unwilling to take. Second, the Gapoktan mimicked an anticipated farmer response, saying “this is a government subsidy program [literally bantuan, or help] so why would we pay for the government trying to help us?” The Gapoktan also knew that the agriculture agency would be in a difficult position to demand payment/reimbursement, especially if the alternative were that the seeds did not get distributed. The farmers noted the superiority of the Dekalb seed in comparison to a second iteration of seed subsidy program. The latter seeds were distributed by the local police department’s community relations department, which surprised me, but to which the Gapoktan responded in the language of CSR that it was the police department’s version of seeking goodwill among the community. Pointing to the police department-sponsored seed packets he whispered to me as if divulging a widely known secret that they do not grow very well.
The Gapoktan was surprised when I asked him if I could join him to plant corn, to which he responded by saying he does not plant corn anymore. Then he mentioned that he had made arrangements to plant some of the Dekalb seed in the near future and I would be welcome to join the farmers working his land. He seemed amused at the thought of my joining as a corn field laborer. Pointing to the Dekalb packets distributed by the extension agents, the Gapoktan told me this is what the Kajang call yellow corn \(i.e.\) \textit{javung kuning / k. batara didi}. Yellow corn is grown as a cash crop and not grown for food. This is different from white corn \(i.e.\) \textit{javung putih / k. batara pulu or puteh}, a traditional variety in which seeds are obtained locally, and which are stockpiled primarily for food. For those with limited land, white corn provides the cheapest access to staple food, with the most nutrition. The type of corn planted depends on the season and household need. During the first rotation [January/February] those with limited land will plant white corn to meet their food supply for the year, selling excess rations for additional foodstuffs at the market. This is followed by a second rotation for income generation, in which I am told farmers will make a go at the slightly higher yielding and better priced yellow corn.

The Gapoktan explained that livelihood strategies for those with limited land are as follows: “For the majority of people, corn is most important. Rice is also important, especially for ceremonial responsibilities. But corn is, at least historically, the main staple. If you have half a hectare of corn, that can ‘keep alive’ \(menghidupkan\) six people in one home for an entire year. That’s just for food consumption. That is why nobody around here sells their white corn, except in very small volumes enough to buy fish at the market to put food on the table. Excess income is obtained when they plant again [the second rotation around July/August]. They can predict what they need based on existing supply, plan for the second rotation, and then sell through the next harvest. In January, those dependent on corn as food, plant white corn. The only ones planting yellow corn are those that have made their family food quota for the year in white corn, or those that have access to rice as a staple. In the subsequent crop rotation they seek to benefit from yellow corn as a cash crop. This occurs on \textit{gillirang} land because after an annual rotation of two harvests, another family member will gain access to that land. If, however, the land can be privatized by buying out other family member claims to \textit{gillirang}, they will immediately shift over to a tree crop.” During my research, numerous patches along the corn landscape transformed into Pepper \(merica\), breaking \textit{gillirang} arrangements as I will further describe in section 3.
**Sharecropping**

We were preparing to plant yellow corn, the cash crop, financed as a business venture led by the Gapoktan. He provided the land. In preparing to plant the Dekalb “yellow” corn from the boxes on his porch, the Gapoktan described to me his sharecropping arrangement with a distant cousin, Bolong. Bolong had come to him with plans to plant corn on a neighboring plot of land and asked whether he could also plant the Gapoktan’s land in exchange for bagi hasil [division of yield]. In this arrangement, the Gapoktan would finance the venture by providing seed and a certain quota of chemical inputs. Bolong on the other hand, was responsible for labor and then calculates who he can call together, mostly among family members.

Labor is gendered. Citing a man’s “muscle strength” versus a woman’s “dexterity and concentration,” the Gapoktan explains to me that the men use a hand hoe to dig the hole while the women follow behind, select the seed, and place them into the hole. In the double pocketed sacks that women carry, they select two seeds of corn from the large pocket and a bean seed from the small pocket to place in the hole. As a legume, the bean fixes nitrogen into the soil, and also provides additional food to harvest.

This sharecropping arrangement also sets the terms of compensation between the land owner (or gillirang claimant), the land manager, and laborers. The Gapoktan had private property rights to the land in this scenario, which Bolong combined with a neighboring plot of gillirang which he currently had access. The Gapoktan put up the capital for his two hectares and Bolong managed the land and labor. Bolong had gathered a team together of family members – eight women in total to plant the corn and seven men to dig the holes. In the scenario between the Gapoktan and Bolong, after all expenses for labor were covered, they split the remaining profits. Therefore, for the 50 sacks harvested on two hectares 16 sacks [karung] would go for women’s labor, measured based on a full day of work either planting or harvesting. An additional labor exchange commitment goes to the men at a future date, which amounted to seven total labor days to those that helped dig holes. The remaining 34 sacks then get divided.

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43 This arrangement is also described in old colonial texts as tesang, which is still the common term used across South Sulawesi that describes a division of yield in thirds – a third to the landowner, one third to the land manager, and the final third spread across the labor (Scheltema, 1931).

44 Corn per kilo in 2016 averaged approximately IDR 2,000 in Kajang measured in fertilizer bags that weigh approximately 25 kilograms per sack.
evenly between the landowner (in this case the Gapoktan) and the manager (Bolong). “For failed crops,” the Gapoktan concluded, “there is no reward [for anybody]. Bolong and I lose the investment and the women lose the yield. With agriculture there are always so many risks. So many things can go wrong: the weather, pests, seed, inputs, and price.”

This sharecropping model I am describing – between the Gapoktan, Bolong, and Bolong’s family relations that support labor – also highlights the divisions between the winners and losers when it comes to land. In particular, the divisions between these roles point to how land accumulation and dispossession takes place between those with limited land against those that can cover the risk. The increasing importance of cash to support certain cultural activities plays a particularly important role in land relations. For example, often a landowner will put up their land as collateral in moments when they most needs cash, which I am told usually takes place to support the parental responsibility for financing their son’s wedding. Land as collateral, or i. gadai [literally, to pawn] k. tesang, allows for the opportunity to borrow capital while continuing to work that same piece of land in Bolong’s role, as the land manager. Upon harvest, the yield theoretically affords the opportunity to repay the loan and regain full control of the land. This is a common practice throughout Southeast Asia and a way to keep land rights in the community, particularly during times of need for cash collateral.

This tesang scenario however, can mean more precarious financial concerns, particularly with changing relations with the role of the cash economy. While we were planting, Bolong pointed out a neighboring plot of land. A man named Bungko had put up the tesang for 2/3rds of a hectare at a price of 10 million rupiah (~$700). Unable to pay back the loan for an unspecified reason, and requiring more capital after two seasons, Bungko requested an additional loan under the same arrangement. Still unable to pay the loan, Bungko finally ceded the land to the lender for a total of IDR 50 million (~US$3,500). This scenario is not uncommon, and although tesang is designed as a safety net, indeed a way to maintain land rights within the community, proceeding with this option indicates a vicious cycle. The cycle can leads to a buyout and loss of future access, relegating owners as laborers to land that once belonged to them.

Managing the fields: The introduction of chemical inputs

I also joined in the preparation and maintenance phases of crop production in Kajang. Surprised by the dependency and amount of chemical inputs, the Gapoktan replied that
everybody sprays. Hearing my interest in the role of chemical inputs, Samsul, eagerly shared his
own experiences. A man in his early fifties, Samsul, with calloused hands from a lifetime of
alternating between fieldwork in Kajang and working construction in regional cities, and hoarse
from smoking two cartons a month, began a version of a story that I repeatedly heard described
in a very personal way by many others. In the numerous times I heard this same story, the
scenario always placed the storyteller as the innovator. Samsul’s version is as follows:

“In the past our ancestors [nenek] were very suspicious of fertilizer and racun [literally,
poison – the term used in Kajang to describe herbicides and pesticides]. I remember a time in the
1980s when my parents used to just dump the fertilizer sacks into the river to get rid of them. But
one year I went to Makassar to do some work and when I returned to Kajang I did not have
eough time to prepare my fields and plant corn. I figured I only had four days remaining to get
seeds in the ground. The winds were changing, and I knew if I did not time the rains correctly, I
would lose an opportunity for an entire harvest. The fields were full of weeds and it would have
taken weeks and numerous people to be able to clear the overgrown plot for planting. I had heard
what the extension officers [penyuluh] said, that by spraying the herbicides I could clear an entire
hectare and plant my fields. I decided to try it. I used the herbicide mix and sprayed. Within two
days, the cover had died back enough to plant. I planted and then just before the corn shoots
sprouted, I sprayed again to weed out the competition. Within ten days I had the best-looking
plot of corn. Others who saw this transformation described it like magic. They asked me how I
was able to do it so fast. I then thought if the racun could do this, what could the fertilizer do? I
decided to try it and I probably had the best corn yield of anyone that season and also did far less
work than everyone else. Ever since, I’ve never gone back, and now everyone uses racun and
fertilizer. We can still get the same yield we used to, if not more, and we can also use the time
we save to look for work elsewhere. Look at how we’ve been able to develop [maju, literally
move forward] ever since. But [laughter] now we are all addicted to poison [kecanduan racun]!”

As I inquired further about Samsul’s experience with chemical inputs he tells me that
these days he typically uses various concoctions. “The insecticides (seppeng) take care of the
ants,” he said, confirming my experience with the Dekalb seed. Without it, I am reassured, the
ants would devour the entire crop before any shoots sprouted.

I also often stopped in at the market stall at Kajapoa to see the numerous mixtures of
pesticides on display. Most popular are the herbicides for their ability to reduce labor during field
preparation for weeding. As I speak to Samsul further, he tells me that these pest-management strategies, combined with the three recommended applications of fertilizer on a hectare of land for one rotation of corn cultivation prove an “expensive part of the addiction.” Samsul continues, “Most of us only apply fertilizers twice these days because of the cost, but if you only apply once, the corn may flower, but no ears will grow.” The relative stability of yield prices against the increasing costs for inputs are a common complaint in Kajang. Others also describe increasing awareness of pest resistance, soil degradation, water pollution, and health effects. When I press Samsul why he continues such practices amidst awareness of all these factors, Samsul responds “Nobody has time to go back to the way it used to be.”

The Increasing primacy of rice: Staple and social debt

I could have stayed my entire time in Kajang and not eaten any of the corn-rice mix [k. *kanre batara*] or the cornmeal [k. *kampo ’do*]. People were surprised I wanted to eat it, at once suspicious at my request that I perhaps knew something I should not, or amused that I was interested in their secret. Not having enough rice symbolizes poverty and shame. I also began to recognize some of the pressure I brought on local families by visiting them in their homes, which always comes with the customary responsibility of providing a meal and proving their dignity by serving rice to their guest. On the other hand, although I was aware of this dynamic, refusing a meal can also be seen as a very disrespectful act, making engaging on household level interviews more challenging. In this sub-section I take a closer look at rice, mostly under *gillirang* land arrangements. Although I will provide a more detailed account of rice production in chapter 5, this section introduces the various land contestations related to *sawah*, as well as the role of rice as a staple and its ceremonial importance. The changing contestations for rice, the cost and labor dynamics of production, and the increasing responsibility to provide rice as a form of gift-giving highlights the intensifying intimate exclusions through the commoditized values of the price of rice and the central function it holds in daily life.

The primacy, and symbol of status associated with rice is nothing new. According to Boomgard (1999, 48) the Dutch had “prejudices against maize: it was regarded as a crop for lazy people, and civil servants were always trying to make the indigenous population grow rice on *sawahs.*” Throughout Dutch rule, followed by a brief period heightening rice production during Japanese occupation, the Indonesian sovereign state also framed its foundational role in terms of
rice production and provision. This legacy continues today, an indicator measuring food security and pulse of prosperity for the nation, a topic commonly heard in everyday conversations assessing the efficacy of the state. The question is often posed throughout rural Indonesia: Did the state produce enough rice to feed the country this year? Although this question directs attention to national level production figures and state subsidies, when scaled down to the landscape level of rice growing communities, this question of rice production also has parallel connotations about local capacity, access, wealth, and dignity. Inadequate rice supply means that you are not only poor, but also unable to fulfill your status as an Indonesian.

As noted in the previous section, corn still plays an important role in Kajang, but in the past three decades rice has gained a much more important role as part of daily consumption, for its ceremonial role, and as a crucial symbol of reciprocity. In the late 1970s, Usop’s (1978) account in Kajang states that “only 10% of the population in Kajang eat rice, whereas 30% eat a corn-rice mix. Most of the people of Tanah Toa,” he also notes “eat cornmeal” (37). Usop also writes that state-led efforts have not been able to “convince people in kajang to follow extension program and form farmer groups [mem-Bimas-kan]” for their sawah. They prefer to plant corn twice a year” (Usop: 1978).

In contrast, Sattu explains that today “Wherever there is water, there is sawah.” He also suggests that sawah is more valuable than cash crops, because without rice harvests one would be required to buy rice quotas to bring to family events, a prospect that many describe could bankrupt you. Several state-supported irrigation projects since the time of Usop’s writing have extended the area of sawah. However, area under rice cultivation still fall short of local demand, and furthermore, irrigation networks do not always assure adequate water supply for sawah irrigation infrastructure.

Although home consumption is predominantly white rice, and the quota for gift giving at ceremonies can be delivered in white rice, other local varietals are also very important, particularly for their role in ceremony. I initially discovered four broad categories of rice varietals, but in actuality there are more complex sub-categories among traditional and family strains. The first among the rice varietals are those devoted to home consumption. This usually

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45 This was part of the Suharto era movement for swasembada pangan [food self-sufficiency] to meet rice quotas nationally. It was also a large program for introducing chemical inputs and increasing crop rotations as part of the green revolution
consists of government subsidized rice, in which seedlings are distributed by extension officers peddling the latest national program. Farmers are eager to enroll into farmer groups for the various benefits from government subsidies. In these groups they have opportunities to gain access to the fast-growing seeds selected from national research laboratories, which also tend to come alongside occasional fertilizer and pesticide handouts. Farmer groups are especially keen to gain access to the larger development programs that might distribute hand tractors to till the soil. These are commonly given out through political patronage networks from legislators seeking political support. Sattu explains that “In the past three years everyone has been asking for tractors. We’ve gotten one.” I point out there are 15 farmer groups in this village alone, to which he responds “everyone wants access and we try to share by only a few people get to use it. But it is difficult to share because everyone has to prepare the fields for planting at the same time.”

The three additional cluster of varietals include black, red, and white glutinous rice [K. *pare pulu le’leng*, *pare sahe eja*, and *pare pulu putteh*]. These local varietals take a longer time to grow – from four to six months – but play a crucial role in local ceremonies. A family plants these traditional varietals to coincide with an upcoming ceremony. Rice from these glutinous varietals are ubiquitous at every family ceremony or ritual event, wrapped in coconut leaves, steamed, and symbolize sharing in the abundance of harvest. As the Gapoktan explained to me: “Everything here is songkolo [the prepared version of traditional varietals] and that’s why sawah is so important. Think about all the different rituals we must prepare for here...” He begins to list just the wedding process that we attended together during the past weeks. “Remember Nengah’s wedding: the wedding proposal [i. *lamaran*]; the dowry [k. *mahar*]; the parties [i. *pesta*; k. *jaga*] at each of the homes for about a week. The actual wedding. Each one of those gatherings all must use songkolo.”

Rice also enters the family ceremony in an additional way. Rice has begun to symbolize household responsibility for your role in reciprocity amongst kin and peers. If one is invited to attend a ceremony, like a wedding, they are required to bring a certain quota of gifts. For the man of the household this is in cash, and in 2016, the common rate was IDR 50,000 per man. The

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46 I also came across a village in the Kajang region with rice planting technology. However, after several trials the head of the farmer group that manages the machine told me that they are reluctant to use it because it makes labor obsolete on the landscape. He noted that he does not like to use it because he feels bad [kasihan] that people will not have work.
woman, on the other hand, must provide a minimum equivalent of 30-50 liters of rice (~35 kg). For closer kin the expectation is a higher amount. This is because a family ceremony – a wedding, *kalomba*, or others – is also part of a cultural practice to help a family stockpile resources to invest in their future. However, each of these gifts also demand a return, which for the future host of an event compel reciprocation at the same level or higher. Indeed, many complain of the numerous family gatherings they are required to attend and the extreme pressure these expectations place on households for both cash and rice.

In chapter 5, I provide a more detailed and ethnographic description of landscape relations governing *sawah*. For now, there are a couple of key factors that highlight the intimate exclusions that are taking place amidst various dynamics governing land relations. The first is a mere quantitative observation around the common phrase in Kajang “the people increase but the land stays the same [k. *katambaang tau, tang katambaang tana*].” This phrase points to the greater difficulty among many to gain access to the same amount of land in the same ways as previous generations. Access to land is increasingly scarce and contested by more and more claimants. As a result, people in Kajang are willing to sell their labor for yield in seasonal migration patterns to neighboring regions. Villagers from the Tanah Toa area are especially noted for their aggressive purchase of any available *sawah* throughout the region. In neighboring Possitana for example, the village head that administers land states that those from Tanah Toa control 60-70 percent of the *sawah* in their village. These purchases are also conducted in the application of *gillirang* arrangements elsewhere, a practice whereby a group will get together to pool funds and purchase periodic access to that land. For example, four individuals will get together to buy rice land in outer areas with the hopes that they can access it once every four years. But these slow rewards can also raise tensions among these ventures as the investments can take a long time to materialize. Secondly, although crop production may have increased due to green revolution technologies, and individuals are planting more rotations of rice (generally two per year as opposed to one in the past), there are also concomitant challenges. Farmers complain of the rising cost of inputs alongside stagnant prices, and also the negative long-term effects of reliance on chemical inputs. Farmers express more challenging production conditions due to soil degradation and pest resistances. These higher production costs combined with lower yield and less demand for labor are increasing the need for cash amidst a growing demand for rice. Third, the role of rice in ceremony is also increasingly associated as a local commodity that
accelerates capitalist relations in a unique way. As rice is a required household gift to attend a ceremony and an even heavier burden to host one, reduced access takes place alongside increased demand, which in turn has placed a higher monetary value on rice. Capitalist relations in this way extends not only in the process of rice production but also through acts of ceremony and reciprocity.

IV. Capitalist relations and crop booms at the margin: rubber and pepper

In Li’s Land’s End she describes capitalist relations as a process that compels involvement, a trajectory of a new structured system that no longer allows one to opt out. The stakes are high as loss of land also means loss of opportunity, and when combined with lack of labor opportunity, one can find themselves outside of any livelihoods system. This system is totalizing, and even among those successful, opting out for instances of generosity can lead to being susceptible from the vulnerabilities of not accumulating. In Kajang, the process is chaotic and there is no one culprit like cacao to highlight the processes that compels a farmer’s terms with the market. Rather, as I have shown in previous sections, they enter through various cultural system around rice and reciprocity for example. In this section. As Rizal, the former legislator and self-proclaimed local historian, describes the moment as such: “Our communities, they are all welcoming this new economy, and we are all in a race to plant these crops. We are growing them alongside rice, which we need for daily life, but now you can already see all the corn disappearing.” Alongside Sattu’s earlier observation, so have all the forests. But the crops that initiate these changes are by no means singular, and the variegated processes of land use change makes it extremely difficult to track dynamics in Kajang. In the lowlands, coconut groves were established from extension programs in the early 1980s alongside waves of cashew extension programs. Cacao then came in the 1990s, alongside rubber, cloves, and others. It is these waves of change that I describe as crop booms at the margin, or the wake that further deepens engagement in the market and initiates dispossessory land relations.

In this section I contrast a set of interactions between the dominant changes taking place during my research, namely the switch from rubber to pepper. I begin with Haking’s experience inheriting converted forest lands that were subsequently cultivated as corn fields during his parent’s generation, and which he has since privatized and planted with rubber. He planted in 2011 but is currently dealing with the reality of low rubber prices in 2016. The second example is Ahmad, a village head actively promoting corn conversion to pepper. He got in early and made
windfall profits from pepper, allowing him to finance his election campaign and become village head. Pepper prices remained high in 2016, and Ahmad was aggressively promoting pepper cultivation for all of his villagers. He is helping them switch out of their rubber stands, decrying corn as a poor man’s crop and providing services to those interested in planting rubber.47

Map 4. Tree crops and privatizing lands

Making a go at rubber

Sitting on his porch looking at the boundaries of the sacred forest, Haking and I discuss the various species in the groves across the street along the boundaries of the sacred forest: langsat, biti, rambutans, and other fruit and timber trees. I told Haking I thought such land uses were extremely productive and these seemed to be the last remaining ones.

47 Ahmad was not specifying between white and yellow corn. He believed that corn required too much labor overall, requiring large cultivation teams every season, whereas tree crops were much easier to manage on an individual basis. Furthermore, during these discussions, the prices for corn had remained low for quite some time.
“We call this *baro’bo,*” Haking explained. Confused I clarify if he means like the porridge. *Baro’bo* is a gruel-like dish with corn and mixed vegetables. It basically just means lots of things mixed together. Pointing to the mixed grove Haking continues “I don’t like *baro’bo.* If I owned this land in front of us, I would cut it all down and plant pepper.” I protest saying that the *langsat* fruits also taste good, to which Haking quickly responds: “Ah, there’s no price for that.”

I had spent a lot of time with Haking, playing dominoes late at night with him and a group of his cousins. Although staying up late, Haking was determined to make it to his rubber groves early every morning. This was the month he was beginning to tap. He had waited five years for this grove to come to maturity and he was anxious to begin tapping. His earlier comment about wanting to plant pepper ties directly to his unease about low rubber prices, particularly having waited so long to begin harvest.

I woke early with Haking. We put on our boots for snake protection and headed for the rubber groves, a kilometer walk behind his house to the relatively graded ridges that cut downward towards the rice valleys. Among the groves, I walked ahead of him collecting and clearing the dried sap and noticed hardened from the previous cut. His growing confidence making the diagonal cut, careful not to graze the cambium, but stripping just enough bark allows the milky sap to percolate. We rested in the understory of the rubber forest, noting my surprise that at five years the canopy already provided so much shade. Seated at the edge of the ride we looked out at the valleys. It was noticeable how much corn was turning to pepper, also indicating that *gillirang* land arrangements had been broken. With the private land parcel he inherited from a claim his parents had made by opening up the forest some decades ago, I asked why he chose rubber.

Haking started in, “Before I planted this rubber my father planted corn. I am too lazy to plant corn. You have to guard it at night from the pigs. Also, if you are looking to make money and you plant corn you won’t even get one million rupiah for it. So basically, for the past four years nothing was planted here. Because of this we call it empty [i. *istilah kosong*]. I paid the taxes, about IDR 60,000 (~US$4.50) per year. In 2011 our local legislator [a family connection] promoted a rubber program. I submitted my SPPT [land tax receipts] and they gave me high quality rubber seedlings. At that time rubber prices were very high but there was also competition from other crops. It could have been anything – cloves, cacao, pepper, or oil palm. I
took what they gave me. The people that refused to sign up they were stupid [i. *bodoh*]. They were afraid that Lonsum would also come up this way and take away our lands from us.”

At first all the rubber was Lonsum plantation rubber. The plantation tried several times in the past to develop the nucleus-plasma model, whereby smallholders submit proof of land in exchange for the plantation to run professional operations on those lands. Then the landowners waited until the trees were mature enough to harvest. Plantation workers were then assigned to tap, while landowners received a share price of harvest based on yield. The profit divisions were 70-30% [plantation to landowner]. But when rubber prices started to rise, smallholders also began to feel that the arrangements were unfair, noting that their incomes were not increasingly accordingly. Indeed, a local rubber collector stated that if the rubber prices never reached IDR 14,000 (~US$1) per kg, nobody would have planted rubber. The collected also noted that prospectors came from all over to try to collect rubber quotas and developed a parallel market to the plantation to factories in Surabaya. Prices peaked in 2011 and as smallholder programs to manage their own lands became possible, Haking eagerly began to plant the inherited land he had secured.

Haking’s work ethic watching the rubber come to maturity suggested no amount of laziness to me, but rather anxiousness and pride, hopefulness from his ability to grow these stands to maturity mixed with emotions of uncertainty from what his optimistic gamble might someday yield. We ran through the calculations again. We began with the scenario of the existing price, a boost to his spirits given the recent bump up to approximately IDR7,000 per kg. This brings a smile to his face, a relief that this will earn a passable income. The mediocre amount comes alongside the justifications of an easier life with lesser labor requirements and the pride of working for oneself. With his 80 *are* he would only need to work every other day, and only in the morning. We then talk about the rise to IDR10,000 per kg, going through the cost of inputs deciding on a conservative amount of yield, a reminder that better management also yields better income. For fun, we kick it up to the IDR14,000 per kg and the smile gets larger, a wistful return to the memory and impetus for initially planting in 2011. But then we also calculate the stubbornly low prices at 4,000 rupiah that had been the norm in the past few years, and those numbers no longer make rubber a worthwhile venture.

In the event that Haking succeeds in his strategy to profit from rubber, his plan is to purchase more land and go for the next boom. Indeed, seated back on his porch looking out at the
**baro’bo** lands across the street from his porch, he describes a vision of succeeding in rubber and buying another plot of land to plant pepper. The returns he had heard about pepper were too enticing. I also sensed that he was facing the increasing pressure of rubber, and the reality that had already set in among his neighbors. Alongside Haking, they had also privatized their lands, and submitted the tax receipts as proof to gain access to the rubber seedling programs five years previous. They were chasing the boom of IDR14,000 per kg. They all imagined the same windfall profits that would allow one to expand landholdings. But after waiting five years to maturity, and as Haking persistently trudged through his hillside patch of rubber, “teaching” his the trees to begin producing sap in these early periods of initial harvest, his neighbors were already giving up, pessimistic about the price calculations and enticed by the pepper boom. They did their own scenarios in their heads of IDR 4, 7, and 14 thousand and considered the short time to maturity for pepper harvests (3 years). They did not want to be late to the pepper boom.

*A pepper village*

We were drinking *tuak* again, as was the custom on most evenings at Ahmad’s home. Earlier in the afternoon, Ahmad had proudly shown me the pepper groves down by the river. He had gotten elected as village head on these bulbous vines, cherry red fruits beckoning harvest. On the way back he introduced me to his cousin who had a pepper nursery. “IDR5,000 per seedling,” he noted. We calculated a small plot of maybe 150 seedlings for the regular buyer to consider the initial investment. We talked about the cost of inputs and he described to me that pepper and cloves are more difficult than rubber. They require closer attention. But the yields are much better. He also explained how he was telling his neighbors to switch away from corn. “With corn, you might make a million rupiah here and there. With pepper you do not wait as long as rubber or cloves. In three years, you can pull in 130 million in your first harvest.”

Passing around the next plastic glass of the milky palm wine harvested from earlier in the day, I asked how pepper arrived. Among those taking turns at the *tuak*, the consensus decided that it had always somehow been around, but the recent boom came from the neighboring district that had a buyer. When the prices kept climbing, they planted a few trials. They were among the lucky ones. There are no seedling programs or extension work so they have built their own pepper production systems connecting to the supply chain through emergent middlemen.
Ahmad is convinced that pepper is the way to solve low incomes for the people in his village. He aggressively encourages people to switch over, and the results are profound. Pepper has quickly spread across the landscape, evident from the drone imagery I have collected as well as the polygons in Map 4. Figure 1 also shows the extent that pepper has found a place, crowding out an ancestral gravestone to find any excess land.

*Figure 1. A gravesite in Kajang surrounded with stakes from gliricida with pepper vines*  

I wanted to find someone just beginning to plant pepper in Ahmad’s village to better understand the considerations among those following the pepper boom. That’s how I met Uppa. Uppa’s family had just hosted a major *Kalomba* party (a ceremony and a blessing for a child), which came with all the requisite invitations compelling gifts from family members. The cash allowed Uppa to purchase a 60 *are* plot of land. When we arrived to dig the holes that morning, the field looked crisp, as it had gotten the double dosage of herbicides and a torching to clear the vegetation. Straggly burnt corn stalks remained, which I am told represented a final harvest for food as the previous landowner tried to make use of his land prior to making the transaction. I saw remnants of the previous owner hedging his bets. He had kept his rubber and tried to grow
pepper on the same plot of land, diminishing returns on both that clearly never materialized in the way he had imagined. The rubber stands still remained, hacked away at a height of five feet to allow light to enter for the final corn harvest. He failed and decided to sell, and Uppa’s kalomba ceremony was strategically timed to generate enough capital to purchase the land and make a go at pepper. We spent two full days digging 120 holes between us, joined by two nephews that had come to help. I know they would get paid in reciprocated labor, as Uppa also promised me the same reward. We had fun considering what form that might take, as I have no land. Maybe it would be a family ceremony someday he suggested. As we resumed digging these holes of potential reward, I was surprised anything could grow on such a rocky surface.

Some weeks later, playing dominoes with Haking and his cousins, we discuss the pepper-rubber consideration. A cousin of Haking’s, holding out a card he wants to play offers an explanation. “We plant black pepper and now the prices are starting to fall. What’s next? Are we going to wait until it’s time to harvest and lose all the years of waiting again, and then fool ourselves into planting rubber again? I’m lucky because I didn’t follow along, or maybe I’ve just been lazy,” he says as he slaps down another card.

V. Calculating accumulation and exclusion

After collecting all the maps of household land production at the village level and collating them to a regional scale for the total area of the Kajang Adat Region as presented in Maps 2, 3, and 4, I began to calculate the overall availability of land. Without naming a specific village I put together a rough estimate to understand the ratio of land per household. In village A, let’s call it Tanah Beru, there is a total of 600 hectares. Approximately 5% is for settlement areas, whereas about half of the land (300 hectares) are covered by tree crops. The remainder are agricultural lands, corn and sawah. There are 500 hundred households in the village, meaning that divided evenly between all households each can access roughly 3/5ths of a hectare. However, by no means are tree crop lands divided evenly, and it is not uncommon to find people with more than 5 hectares.

Indeed, I often engaged with the village secretary in Tanah Beru this very question. How much land do you think it would take to make it sejahtera? He responded, “maybe 3/4 hectare

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48 Some of this is mixed groves, especially for timber crops, which I have not covered as a land use category. This often falls into the category of agroforest because they are generally planted as hedges / boundaries for tree crop areas.
of tree crop land, and 1/4 hectare sawah.” He stopped to re-calculate in his mind briefly. “If it’s rubber, 70 ara is not enough.” Trying to get a sense of how many people could gain access to land for such a scenario I then asked how many households have more than five hectares. He had been reluctant to share his data on individual tax receipts with me, though we often went through the data together. I understood this was sensitive data and so I asked for general responses. He responded with a surprisingly specific answer: 37. In other words, a large percentage of these lands with commodity crops are controlled by a handful of people. It is also important to acknowledge that household-land ratios are imperfect given that people who live in a village can own lands outside of that village, and vice versa. That said, there is a clear trend in land consolidation among a group of emergent elite, indicative of those succeeding during crop booms. In this chapter I have also shown the precarity of these crop booms, and the potential for people like Haking and Bungko to fall into a cycle where land sale is the only option.

This analysis must also be contextualized amidst the fact that tree crops are not the only way to make a living. There are a rare few among the local elite that have jobs as civil servants, though they tend to also be the landed elite. There are also a limited number of collectors [pengumpul, or middlemen], and many also protect their livelihoods through livestock. New industries, such as working as local electricians, also come alongside new developments.

On agricultural land, quantifying how land relations accumulate and dispossess are more difficult. White corn is still the easiest way to grow food, and rice is a critical part of being Kajang. However, I have shown that the ways gillirang is contested and the entry of capital into the costs of production (agricultural inputs) alongside the increasing demands on accessing yield (for ceremonial purposes), while also restructuring labor relations through more individual ventures onset by other factors like mechanization, showcase the surprising ways that capitalist relations find a way into Kajang.

These terms of exclusion through capitalist relations are certainly a modern phenomenon, made possible by changes in governing systems and the expanded opportunity to engage in markets. In the past land management practices were premised on household production systems based on networks of reciprocity to prepare and harvest fields. Administrators acted coercively to deliver development and the aristocracy benefited handsomely in these positions. Though this legacy remains in part, more contemporary changes have had a redistributive effect on power relations away from the historical landed elite and aristocracy. However, when viewed from
perspective of capitalist relations, as I have shown herein, an emergent landed elite are also engaged in new forms of exclusion.

Capitalist relations and development authority join together to shape powerful outcomes in village offices. Positions of village heads are increasingly defined by those securing windfall profits from clove, pepper, or rubber harvests that help to finance their election campaigns. Indeed, this trend extends beyond Kajang, as recent political analysis in Indonesia have called this phenomenon as “democracy for sale” (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019), which in Kajang is called in the vernacular “Money Politik.” Those that succeed in occupying these positions of power also extend their influence through these positions to guide development decisions that in the case of the pepper village also reinforce the accumulation of capital among a particular network. The new village authority also uses their positions to seek new opportunities for capital, or as Sallasa explains to me as follows: “The infrastructure projects fill the pockets of those in positions of village power. This is how they do it. There are three ways. First, they set up their own contracting companies and then pay themselves to do the work. Every single village has a construction company to pay itself. Maybe they don’t register under their own name, but they will do it through a cousin or something. I don’t know one village that does not do this. Second, they use it to justify the same projects under various budgets. In the past it was PNPM and village funds. It was easy to structure the disbursement to collect a lot of the money for the same projects. Third, they skim on all the standard material unit prices [sand, gravel, etc.] and pocket the rest.”

In sum, this chapter has built upon the terms of development and authority and shown the way capitalist relations take place in different ways, as well as the concomitant effects imprinted on the landscape. Chapter 3 highlighted the way that different historical political-economic relations shaped authority, and how that authority shapes contemporary elected leadership positions and expectations. In part 2, I showed how the increasing layers of gillirang are creating new mechanisms of exclusions among the farmer networks that negotiate and prioritize claims through the local cultural and normative systems of authority. These agricultural systems also highlight how capitalist relations are not contingent on private land and tree crops alone, but that commoditization arrangements creep up through surprising means of cultural reward and reciprocity, namely through increasing financial value equated with the ceremonial role of rice.
Finally, in part 3 I highlighted the more unsurprising avenue compelling capitalist relations amidst the volatility of crop booms at the margin.

The broader research question however looks at any changes in the tenurial rules and property institutions in Kajang as a result of recognition. In short, did recognition make a difference in a particular way to these existing land and tenure relations or would the changes described herein would have occurred irrespective of recognition? The current discussion points to the limited impacts that recognition has had on much of the capitalist relations that are taking place. However, the formalization of adat as negotiated by village heads and their alliances with indigenous rights activists show that recognition has only further reinforced authority among the historical and emergent landed elite thus supporting outcomes that accelerate capitalist relations. Nevertheless, recognition is still new and in order to shift my frame of analysis to the future, I engage youth on the notion of landscapes of potential. Therefore, in the next chapter I continue the analysis at the nexus of development authority, tree crops, and agriculture, but do so by situation how the next generation of emergent leadership see themselves inheriting these landscapes.
Chapter 5 – Landscapes of potential: Youth, changing land relations, and connections to recognition

In the past during the time of the harvest people would all get together and sing [kelong] in the fields. These were big events that no longer take place. Those were also times of the greatest feasts as well. This generation no longer knows how to sing.

– Bahri

I. Studying future land relations

While land claims are made based on an ability to define the past, change is made by articulating visions of the future. As previous chapters have noted, successful land claims are inherently a process of historical articulation supported by networks of power and legitimation (Tsing, 1999; Li, 2000; Hirtz, 2003). Future possibilities however, are also shaped by these land relations that refract through the visions of emergent local leadership that come to fill roles of authority. As youth grow into these positions by inheriting, claiming, and articulating new visions amidst existing political economic conditions, they express potentially new terms of land relations to shape material outcomes on the landscape. Therefore, exploring some of the early imaginaries among youth as they see themselves move into, or see their peers take on positions of authority and leadership, presents a window into understanding what I call landscapes of potential.

This chapter extends the analysis from chapter 3 and 4 on village development planning and land and agricultural tenure relations. In this chapter I revisit these land management categories through youth perspectives. The framing of the chapter thus follows a research tradition from studies on agrarian change that overlap with youth studies (White, 2012; Bernstein et al., 2018). Although such research still has a lot of unanswered questions given the complexity and variability of youth and rural spaces, I focus on a “generationing” approach (Ansell, 2016; Huijsmans, 2016; Park and White, 2017) by examining the processes that youth transition into their foreseeable roles of authority. I therefore seek to describe how Kajang youth imagine

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49 These unanswered questions was the topic of the keynote delivered by Ben White at the 25th Agrofoods conference hosted by Institut Teknologi Bandung in December 2017
someday filling their roles in land management and Kajang leadership posts, as well as their desires for future change.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I *first* begin with a brief engagement of the intersection of youth studies and agrarian change, focusing on a *generationing* approach. *Second*, I provide a broad categorization of future possibilities as expressed from the viewpoints of Kajang youth. This section reflects on what youth aspire to be, the opportunities available to them, the constraints that guide their potential trajectories, the strategies they plan to pursue, as well as their parent’s notions of desirable and acceptable pathways.

*Third*, I shift my attention to two young people, both men, who are well respected in one cluster of villages. These individuals are poised to command a central role in shaping future land relations in Kajang. Following on the analysis from the previous chapter, I separate the two leadership roles by tenure category. These two categories are private collectives based on kinship groups [*gillirang*, explained in detail in chapter 4] and private land ownership. I select one crop among each category, rice as indicative of *gillirang* tenure relations, and rubber as representative of private land ownership. In each land category I situate the two young men, both successful, well-respected, and admired among their respective peers.

One is Aco, a young man 21 years of age, who has come to command a central role in coordinating rice cultivation in Kajang. He never went to school and has worked in the rice fields since he was nine years old. He knows the different roles that are available for work and is increasingly entrusted to coordinate work parties in two important valleys across a cluster of villages. He recently married into an alliance of families that have long controlled rice cultivation in the region, securing future rice land claims through kinship alliances. The contrasting ideal type is in the context of the private land category, indicative from the expansion of rubber as a smallholder crop. The corollary example, 20-year-old Baso, is the son of a former elected official. Baso’s father found much success from timely tree crop harvests, accumulating land and capital, and thereafter consolidated authority by occupying government posts that could direct subsidy programs. This success ensured that Baso would attend university in the provincial capital of Makassar. Upon completion of his political science degree, Baso plans to return to inherit his father’s land and take over control in rubber production, which he says will prepare him to someday run for local elected office.
Fourth, I draw out the notion of landscapes of potential, situating visions of future possibility from each viewpoint. I describe how the national politics of indigenous rights recognition unfolds amidst these two positions of emergent leadership anticipated to have an outsized influence on the landscape. As such, I connect the mobilization of indigenous rights and land recognition schemes to the stories of Aco and Baso.\footnote{As with elsewhere in this dissertation Aco and Baso are not their real names. Aco and Baso actually are slightly different versions of the same name, given to a first-born male. Aco is a more localized version whereas Baso connects more with the Bugis-Makassarese version of the same name.} I show how the values of indigeneity recognized by formal bureaucratic and governing processes, and the lands that are titled as a result, invariably get redirected through the interpretations of people like Baso, the landed elite. These are the families that have been successful in expanding their landholdings through well-timed tree crops booms, accumulating land and capital, and securing posts in formal government positions. More broadly, young people who are likely [and would like] to stay in Kajang that have the means to do so, will look to Aco and Baso as models of success, thus shaping the discursive and material imprints on the landscape of potential.

II. Placing youth in the agrarian question

Research on land grabbing has more recently incorporated considerations of gender and generationing (Park and White, 2018). Their volume shows that although land grabbing may benefit a handful of people in the short term through buyouts and cash payments, more drastic differentiation takes place over periods of generational change. In such conditions, as youth come of age at sites of enclosure, and customs of inheritance no longer apply, or only apply to a limited area of existing cultivation, expectations of obtaining the same opportunities as past generations are no longer possible.

Generational dynamics and future opportunities to land are just beginning to emerge as a concerted analytical focus, although Bernstein et al. (2018) point to longstanding interest in the household that included elements of age and generation in studies of peasant political economy and agrarian change that reach back to the 1960s. The more recent iterations of the agrarian question, Bernstein notes, revolves around issues of [re]defining peasants, smallholders, and family farms; situating them within state-centric systems and capitalist relations; evaluating the opportunities for peasant organizing; as well as the broader possibilities from processes of production and reproduction. The generational succession sits centrally amidst these theory and
praxis considerations. How will such political, economic, and cultural convergences play out amidst the current dynamics of globalization, land grabbing, and initiatives at titling and recognition?

White’s keynote at the 25th Agrifood’s Conference on “Food, Youth, and the Future of Farming” argued for the continuing primacy of smallholder agriculture and bases his viewpoint on the inherent productivity advantages among smallholders in comparison with large scale agriculture. He also shows how 98% of the world’s farm units remain smallholders, located on over half of the world’s land, and at least 80% of which are on plots less than two hectares. Li (2018) further highlights the dramatic generational effects that result with the arrival of the plantation. Using a case of plantation expropriation in Kalimantan, she shows the limited opportunity youth have to fill the role and authority of previous generations, relegated as cheap labor or displaced by migrant workers. The only remaining option for the great many is migration, forced into unequal conditions in precarious new locales of uncertainty.

Meanwhile, in many places around the world, particularly in the global south and those graduating into status as middle-income countries, farmers are aging, and young people are both waiting longer to transition into similar roles or drawn to the possibilities of seeking opportunity elsewhere. There is also a growing trend and perception that the current generation of aging farmers also encourage their children to escape the life of hardship as a farmer to pursue opportunities in other industries. Young people also develop their own perspectives by these mixed messages of staying and migrating, reacting to the forces that allow them to stay or compel them to leave. These include narratives that farming is dirty work, low-wage, and undignified. Such ideas are also reinforced by societal norms and echoed on billboards and through TV screens, as well as reinforced in formal institutions and in schools. On the contrary, there are also instances where smallholders are experiencing a resurgence, part of alternative capitalist futures, interests in reinvigorating localized markets, and a desire to develop more sustainable agro-ecological food systems (Mostafanezhad and Suryanata, 2018).

White thus provides us with a broad categorization for future farmers. The first are the replacement farmers: those that grow up on the farm and take over the farm. The second are the U-turn farmers: those that grow up farming, go away, then return to farming. A third category consist of the potential new entrants to farming, those that are actively drawn to the idea of farming or in some unusual cases, like government programming for rural Japan, actively seek to
support training to support entrants into farming. What then, will become of the next generation of smallholders that not only makes up a large portion of the world’s workforce, produces much of its food, and defines the way of life for many people in the world? In this context, a generationing approach provides explanatory and research potential.

**III. The generationing approach and intersectionality**

The question of intergenerational land and rights transfer, as well as opportunities for youth to define the future are challenging and the generationing approach provides pathways for engaging with the idea of youth as a socially constructed process, and one that requires collaboration between those that consider themselves or each other as youth (Ansell 2016; Huijsmans 2016). First, defining youth is a contested and confusing concept. Overall, youth is relational, but also occupies very real categorizations. On the one hand youth exists because one defines oneself as such, but on the other, that it also orders populations on census forms, shapes development projects in particular ways, and compels certain roles in society. The very experience and definitions of youth are also changing as people are living longer, marrying later, spending longer time in educational institutions, and waiting longer to enter the labor market. A focus on youth as a social construct and as a lens for analysis has emerged as part of the growing analytical commitment that arose with gender studies, and particularly intersectionality.

Collins and Bilge (2016) provides a broad engagement with intersectionality, as both a theoretical and practical tool for thinking. The link that brings the many strands of usages and applications of intersectionality convenes around its ability to uncover the various layers of inequality which other frames might not be able to accommodate. They show that advocacy mobilizations in the 1960s and 70s were not able to incorporate the many layers of inequality experienced in, for example, first being black, second being a woman, and meanwhile being a worker also demanding rights. Youth studies therefore fits through the broader lens of intersectionality, providing another way to extend our understanding of inequality and refocusing attention around the potential forces of empowerment. A generationing approach does not therefore overshadow the other foundational elements of the agrarian question but rather complements them. In the research presented herein, youth that grew up as descendants of slave classes structuring their economic opportunities, are not just judged through the lens of their Kajang and more broadly Bugis-Makassar identity, but also through their experience of being a woman, facing stricter interpretations of Islamic law, and citizens of the Indonesian state.
Conversely, a male descendent of Karaengs with large landholdings and opportunities to attend college, enlisting as leadership in increasing powerful local Islamic organizations situates a very different experience of being young in Kajang.

**IV. Engaging youth: Arriving at visions of the future in Kajang**

My research in Kajang took place between 2014-2017. In this timeframe, I spent one full year living in Kajang villages and spent an additional year in jurisdictional capitals and at comparative sites of land rights recognition and agrarian change. The research began with participatory mapping to determine land cover as a proxy for engaging on discussions of land use change. I then followed up with collaborations by engaging with regional and local institutions, as well as informal groups (See chapter 1 for a more detailed description of methods). This led me to form various policy drafting partnerships with district level agencies and village governments. Farmers however, were my main interlocutors, as my approach sought to contrast the benefits of land recognition with other land use considerations.

Engaging local farmers on land relations required persistent and direct engagement, and due to the long contentious history in Kajang, many were initially suspicious of my presence. In my early times in Kajang, I came to learn that one local resident thought I was looking to purchase land for a future development project. Another individual thought I was a rubber plantation representative in disguise seeking to survey lands for plantation expansion. And one cryptic story circulated by an individual noted that I fit the description of a Dutch descendent fulfilling a prophecy from colonial times, in which a balanda [meaning Dutchmen but locally used for a foreigner] would arrive to steal the most sacred and secret artefacts.

In part to counter these suspicions, I elected to embed myself in the community by making myself useful. Meanwhile, aligning this bottom up engagement with my research interests, I participated in every aspect of the crop management cycle, by helping out along all phases of production from seed/seedling collection to crop maintenance to harvest and also joined in efforts to deliver harvests to markets. I focused on the main seasonal crops of rice and corn, and three longer-term tree crops rubber, black pepper, and cloves. I also inquired into other agroforestry management systems when relevant (e.g. ginger, langsat, bananas, rambutan, coconut), following along the production and supply chain for each crop. Most of the time making myself useful meant participating as a day laborer, helping to hoe irrigated rice dikes, plant seed and seedlings, dig holes, cut chutes for pepper vines, spray herbicide, spread fertilizer,
and other menial labor activities with the objective of experiencing all aspects of farm and household production.

Throughout this process of engagement however, I realized it was not always easy to engage with older generations on agrarian change. A lot of this also had to do with the gap in our communication abilities. Although my Indonesia language fluency allowed me to communicate freely in most contexts, my mediocre Konjo speaking and comprehension presented some communication challenges, particularly with older generations. In these situations I often felt it difficult to fully express themselves. Older farmers also often saw me interacting with formal authorities and interviewing them, which lent to the initial unease about my presence, particularly as my interests pursued questions about land and land uses. Responses often gave way to common essentializations of the Kajang, described through a common set of generalities among respondents. Over time I tempered these suspicions by putting away notepads and recording devices, engaging on questions of family responsibility and inheritance, seeking to understand how younger generations moved into similar positions in the community. Farming in the fields also helped to build a sense of trust, inverting the power dynamic and relegating me to the most inexperienced and incompetent. Many found it amusing as I agreed to take on menial tasks commonly assigned alongside young children.

Although everyone in Kajang says that farming is easy [it’s finding money that’s difficult, they say], I often felt like I had two left feet in the field. On one occasion, invited to spray herbicides to clear a row of weeds growing up through the rice fields I had been too heavy on the handle using up an entire pump-pack in just a few passes. The owner of the fields was clearly upset by my incompetence, having to spend time dealing with me and also for the loss of pricey chemical inputs, which I offered to reimburse. His son intervened, helping translate both the language and the intent. On another occasion, I hoed [abingkung] rice pathways for a week and got a full hand of 23 blisters. People in the village found this hilarious and went out of their way to ask me to see my hands. My early incompetence may have seemed a burden for those with time constraints and responsibility to meet targets of getting seed in the ground or coordinating a full harvest, but the younger generations were at least amused by the opportunity of telling an outsider, a foreigner [bulek/balanda], and a researcher nonetheless, what to do as a farm laborer while working together on rice plots, fertilizing clove trees, or digging holes to
prepare pepper plantings. Over time as I became just another member working in the fields, this level of engagement allowed for meaningful exchanges on lives and livelihoods.

It is in this context that young people gravitated to me and I very much benefited from their insights and support. They had a better command of the Indonesian language and would often step into the role of interpreters when I interviewed their parents. I also began to make friends with several groups of young people in the village. At various stages during my stay, four different college age students would accompany me to interviews, for example making introductions, interpreting, and listening in to talk story with former village heads, guerilla fighters and Dompe from the 1960s, as well as other Kajang leadership in various settings. I also had seven students that sought me out to study English, regularly visiting me throughout the week. They were all eager to learn about where I was from, hear about the outside world, what I was doing there, or talk about global happenings in the news like international soccer matches, particularly during the height of the 2016 European Championship. Hearing of my interests in soccer a group of youth that had formed the village soccer team also sought me out to join their practices and kickarounds at the local schoolyard on afternoons when the rains did not make the fields too muddy. Through these interactions, local youth began to invite me to attend their planning meetings and events, teaching me how to be competent at dominoes, and teaching me speak and act more appropriately.

None of the direct respondents herein are below the age of 18, and if youth of those ages are discussed, it is in the context of general encounters about positions on the landscape, or as other generalized descriptions among parents about potential futures. Overall, those I have identified as emerging leaders among youth were indicative of youth that were either taking on, or likely to inherit notable land management responsibility. It is these positions that I explore through the stories of Aco and Baso to further examine the implications of indigenous land and rights recognition relative to landscapes of possibility. I next turn to the process of becoming an adult embodied by the marriage ceremony, followed by categorizing youth perceptions of possibility and desire, followed by placing Aco and Baso in the landscape.
V. Ideal types of possibility among Kajang youth

Becoming an adult: Of weddings, gift-giving, and inheritance

As a young person matures into the responsibility of taking care of their own household, the wedding\textsuperscript{51} ceremony serves as an initial safety net for newlyweds to begin a new life. Therefore, the ceremony functions to generate initial capital through gifts from other families in their community in a system of social debt and reciprocity. For a wedding, invited guests must bring a certain quota of gifts. Gifts are provided in the form of cash and rice. The men bring cash, and the women bring a certain quota of rice.

Determining gift-giving obligations to a *pesta* [party/ceremony] is based on reciprocity and inflation. For example, in 2016, a guest will present a gift of 50,000 rupiah (US$ 3) in cash provided by the man, while the woman provides a gift of 30-50 liters (up to 35 kg equivalent) of rice. The gift comes with future reciprocity. When the one providing the gift has a ceremony in their family, the receiver will return an amount equivalent to or greater than the amount provided. This custom extends beyond family weddings. Close family have a greater responsibility and the numerous gift-giving responsibilities are a common point of conversation in the community. Stories about gifts between certain immediate family members also gain notable attention for the heavy burden of family gift giving responsibilities. The most commonly shared story was of one family presenting over a ton (1,000 kg) of rice to their immediate sibling. This example, often discussed in Kajang, at once instills a strong sense of family bonds and mutual responsibility, but also highlights the overwhelming cases of social and material debt that families incur and must someday repay. Indeed, the *pesta* is viewed as one of the largest burdens in the community, and people often quip that the numerous *pestas* in the community will bankrupt them.

With the initial stockpiling of wealth from the wedding ceremony in the form of cash and rice, the newlyweds compile a comfortable safety net for beginning their new life. The cash is imagined as a way to cover major costs like purchasing land or constructing a home, while the rice provides food security before future opportunities at accumulating harvests. As noted in chapter 4, rice not only provides the main staple food but also holds a price in the local market

\textsuperscript{51} Weddings are a much more complex affair only addressed for the extent to which it relates to youth and land relations. Otherwise, there is also another dimension of weddings requiring dowries, a transfer of wealth in the form of cash and buffaloes, and a long list of negotiations that are not discussed here. For more on this topic see Maarif (2012)
used to buy fish to put food on the table. In the past, land-short families could move into the frontier by staking out forest areas to access lands. However, as the frontier in Kajang ended in the 1990s, cash and inheritance have become an extremely important factor determining access to land and a home. The ideal scenario, therefore, is to access enough land to build a home, gain regular access to *gillirang* land for rice cultivation, and plant an area with a plot of tree crops to generate enough cash.

**Imagined trajectories**

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<tr>
<th>Table 2. Categorizing Youth Options in Kajang</th>
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<td>1. Compelled, or wish to stay in the village</td>
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<td>2. Opportunity to attend university, and plan to return</td>
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<td>3. Migration</td>
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Kajang land inheritance systems are for the most part equally divided by gender, and to some extent by order of birth. One exception is that the youngest daughter will inherit their parent’s home, explained as a household strategy for elderly care. For the most part however,
field labor is conducted by men, and the perception of land cultivation are associated with men.\textsuperscript{52} This is why I have chosen two well-respected young men as my case studies. Prior to examining these two individual cases, however, I want to first foreground the broader imaginaries and possibilities on coming into adulthood and individual ideas about a productive life.

Table 2 is indicative of ethnographic material and does not reflect quantitative distribution. The categories situate different pathways of possibility as described to me among youth and their parents. The categories are by no means comprehensive, and rather, reflect local perceptions on desires, capabilities, possibilities, and constraints.

\textbf{VI. Emergent leadership on the land}

\textbf{Aco: On becoming an influential rice farmer}

Aco’s\textsuperscript{53} family is known as one of the hardest working families in the village. While trying to keep up with him in the rice fields one morning, he pointed at a 12-year-old boy herding cattle towards a new patch of grass amidst a rubber grove. Aco explained to me that his nephew was missing school to work in the fields. The reference was not about the boy but rather Aco’s way of explaining his own upbringing. Although his nephew attends school several times a week, Aco never went to school. Most young boys are introduced into agricultural work at an early age. The apprenticeship begins by herding cattle, Aco explains, and keeping them healthy enough to be ready for the plowing seasons twice a year. It instills a sense of personal responsibility. Aco ends by explaining that the boy was still reeling from losing one of the cows, killed by a venomous snake bite.

For as long as he can remember, Aco practically lived among the paddies [\textit{sawah}], sleeping in the field houses [\textit{bolla-bolla}] and making himself useful in every part of cultivation. Like his nephew, he tended cattle, helped with weeding, repaired the embankment dikes. During the planting season, the busiest season of the year, he perfected his technique. The approach

\footnote{\textsuperscript{52} This does not mean women do not play an important role in land management. In other sections of this dissertation I provide more complex interactions of gendered land relations. This includes specific parts of planting and harvest. For corn women plant the seed. For rice, women for the most part conduct the harvest, especially among traditional rice varieties with a hand cutting tool in a process called \textit{masangki}. For the traditional black dye so important to the Kajang, women also gain access to land plots to cultivate indigo, usually around among home gardens.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{53} Both the names Aco and Baso selected for this paper are pseudonyms. They are also variations of the same name, usually given to first born sons. The latter, Baso, is an aristocratic name throughout South Sulawesi and Aco is the local pronunciation.}
involves taking a clump of seedlings, carefully separating three or four seedlings so as not to tear the roots, and swiftly pecking them into the softened mud. The depth and angle must be accurately positioned to ensure seedlings will thrive, not too deep to drown the plant, and not too shallow that it lodges. Planting also involves a dance, spacing between neighbors, calculating distances as far as your arms can reach, retreating as each row is planted, staking out lines relative to nearby planters and distances to dike plots. Your speed and quality determines your utility as a worker.

Although merely 21 years old, Aco commands authority in these sawah. He maintains the sawah with herbicide spray, pulling weeds where necessary, fixing eroding footpaths, and allocating water through the irrigation system. He is entrusted by various land claimants making arrangements of responsibility and reward across family alliances. He knows many of the intricacies of these plots, as he has helped reshaped smaller irrigation divisions and redirected numerous embankment plots and pathways. He knows that without constant supervision, a rice plot can be repositioned out of existence through redirecting new embankments. In one village I mapped, the village boundaries effectively disintegrated amidst the sawah embankments, identifiable through those making payments in the tax code, and thus leaving much up for administrator interpretations. In this system, Aco plays an important role coordinating labor roles during times of field preparation and harvest. During peak labor periods, the village always seems busier, part of seasonal migration of family members returning both as an excuse to visit family and support fieldwork, re-establishing future claims so as not to be forgotten.

Last year, Aco married the daughter of an influential rice farmer, a village elder well-versed in local interpretations of local indigenous law [pasang], particularly as they related to sawah inheritance claims. Aco’s father-in-law was the son of a village administrator that had constructed several sawah plots through irrigation construction projects in the 1970s. As a result, Aco’s father in law also inherited numerous cultivation rights, which overtime were split through annual rotational [gillirang] claims amongst kin groups. Aco tells me that his father-in-law knows all the family lineages, inheritance rights, as well as all the lands formerly set aside for ritual cultivation. Knowing rights to claim makes him one of the more powerful presences in these rice valleys. He knows how plots were inherited, divided, and fought over among various sibling groups, and how others were put up for sale. Conversely, he knows how to make new claims or exclude others from making one.
Making a claim to a plot of *sawah* involves an ever-changing institution of rules, interpreted through a mixture of ancestry and sweat. Absence in the fields through migration, or inadequate alliances could render a claim forgotten or ignored, as new interpretations renegotiate legitimating claims. Aco’s father-in-law is always involved in farmer groups, gaining access to government subsidies such as fertilizer, seedling, and even getting allocation to hand tractors. He also actively pushes the boundaries of *gillirang* land claims and is part of a group that some in the village describe as the rice mafia, due to their powerful control and expanding authority over *sawah*.

Alongside his father-in-law, Aco clearly commands authority over a vast area of these *sawah* during peak times. While his father-in-law is outspoken, Aco commands a quiet but firm authority, as they coordinate preparation of *sawah* fields by plowing and irrigating, in his quiet but firm authority. Together they direct planters into prepared plot areas. He taught himself how to use the intricacies of the recently introduced hand-tractors, which his father-in-law was able to access through the farmer groups, and Aco is among the few that get to operate it. Meanwhile his father-in-law works the remaining areas plowing with cattle. He is more comfortable plowing behind the cows, and together they can operate a larger area in a shorter amount of time. His father-in-law plows by singing to the cattle, in what he describes as a language [*a’doyong*] to guide them to shift direction, go faster, and turn around. *Laaiiiiiiiiiii Loooooooot Hala hala hala hala hala. Hai!* [name of the cow] *Eh! Eh! Eh! Kiri, kiri, kiri! Oh! Hala hala hala.*

*Yappaadoooiii. Ha Haaaaaa Hala hala! Wooo!* When I ask Aco if he knows how to *a’doyong* like his father-in-law, he scoffs, replying that he prefers the mechanized, trustworthy feel of the hand tractor.

Shortly after completing the planting season, I went looking for Aco but was told that he was away for a few weeks. Rice harvest in South Sulawesi does not occur at the same time. Therefore, instead of watching the rice grow, Aco later explained to me, groups of families will get together to seek out opportunities as laborers elsewhere. The nearby Bone region to the North has vast rice valleys that can always accommodate additional labor during harvest periods. Aco’s family were preparing for an upcoming wedding and therefore took the opportunity in Bone to be paid in yield to support putting on the ceremony. In Kajang, the primacy of rice as an increasingly important staple replacing corn, combined with the required varieties to host or attend family ceremonies, will continue to carve out a central place on the landscape. Aco has
found an influential place in the opportunities to shape and claim land, as well as structure labor relations associated, which will likely remain unchanged as long as rice plays an important role in these landscapes of potential.

**Baso: Private rubber groves**

Attending a ceremonial event at Baso’s house, we began discussing his involvement in a local youth organization. Their mission, he tells me, is to support Kajang indigenous rights and the environment. He also explains their approach to creating the organizational structure, modelled after an influential Islamic youth group he joined at his university in Makassar, where he is currently studying political science. During school holidays, he and other friends make the trip home to Kajang and like to get together to plan the local youth organization, discussing organizational structure, membership, and responsibility. Shaping this local youth organization, joining a well-known Islamic chapter, and his choice of field of study are all part of his strategy to someday run for local office. Affable and gregarious, and knowing my interests in land, he invites me to join early the next morning to see his father’s rubber groves. Although rubber has been in Kajang as a plantation for more than a century, access among smallholders was a much more recent phenomenon, one in which his father had an important role in facilitating.

During the New Order era (1966-1998), the military and police acted as extortionist intermediaries for government projects, and in Kajang, facilitated the expropriation of land through the promise of development and the threat of violence (see chapter 3). The police were also embedded into local leadership structures occupying administrative posts. These positions were aligned with the Karaeng aristocracy of an earlier colonial era, layered on to the polities of the spheres of influence by the Gowa kingdoms. Acting as a colonial administrator, and subsequently as part of the Suharto apparatus helped to facilitate the expansion of plantation concessions, gaining personal wealth through land consolidation and financial gain. Embedded patron-client relations emergent from historical positions amongst the aristocracy, followed by the New Order layering of military personnel that occupied civil-administrative positions to this day make it difficult to disentangle the land grabbers from the grabbed. It is indeed difficult to point to some outside culprit, as plantation interests were legitimated through state offices along the vertical hierarchy all the way to the village level, ordered by the local elite that coordinated labor to make development projects possible. Even in the unique cases that successfully
mobilized against the plantation supported by national NGO’s contesting Lonsum heavy-handed rubber plantation expansion were thereafter undermined in the process of re-administering the land. In other words, when land was successfully wrested from the plantation, the local administrators re-grabbed land claims for a select few (Personal communication, interview, and addressed in much more detail in Muur, 2019).

In 2003, Baso was just six years old when the largest demonstrations took place in the Lonsum rubber plantations. State security forces mobilized at the behest of the plantation resulted in the killing of three Kajang protesters. Dressed in their iconic black traditional clothing they were shot and killed in the plantation zone of Bonto Biraeng village, less than ten kilometers from Baso’s home. The timing of the demonstration was in part due to land contestations taking place all over Indonesia as part of a weakened state after the fall of Suharto. The other reason was due to the high price of rubber, which led to increased theft among the plantations, and community organizing to demand greater access to land occupied by Lonsum. Although nucleus-plasma relations between the plantation and smallholder did exist among some community members, the high rubber prices made smallholders feel as though they were missing out on potential earnings. As a result of the plantation conflict, high prices of labor, and emboldened smallholders, an entirely parallel supply chain for rubber began to emerge. One rubber collector described this juncture as the beginning of his career as a local businessman, and since he says, large-scale buyers have come from Japan and China to survey potential rubber production capacity.

Baso’s father, although having the family lineage of local aristocratic families did not attain a leadership post as part of the military apparatus of the New Order era. He successfully ran for an election during the unraveling of that period and consolidated power through a set of political alliances. His success was facilitated by widespread smallholder entry into tree crops as part of the new parallel market for rubber. Successful in both clove and rubber harvests, occupying an elected leadership post also helped Baso’s father benefit in additional ways by accessing government subsidy programs. In addition, he also helped to register numerous land certificates [or the more common land tax receipts to prove land ownership] to qualify households for government programs to access seedlings and fertilizer. He supported extended family networks and those that followed the schemes early benefitted handsomely from the rubber boom, taking the opportunity to expand landholdings. Rubber prices did especially well
during 2008 – 2012. Seeing their neighbors succeed during peak prices of 14,000 IDR/kg resulting in windfall profits, neighbors also sought to join in. By the time I was in Kajang in 2014, rubber prices hovered around 4,000 IDR/kg and I watched families painfully cut down pre-maturing rubber stands to plant black pepper and catch the wave of that boom. This is a crippling investment, given that land is effectively taken out of production waiting 5-7 years to begin tapping. Those late to the game, waiting to harvest, experiencing a setback and needing cash, seeing rubber prices bottom out, and without safety nets were forced to sell lands to families like Baso’s that could afford the setback or still had enough landholdings to make a profit from rubber. As a result, households like Baso’s began to accumulate considerable landholdings. The high price of rubber as Baso entered high school ensured that he and his siblings would have the opportunity to attend university.

Home from a school holiday, Baso told me to come by early in the morning to visit one of their plots. We sat and chatted for a while, drank coffee, and I wondered why we were wasting the day as I knew that tapping has to be completed in the early morning prior to collecting the cups later on that day. When we arrived at Baso’s father’s groves I immediately understood the reason. Baso and his father do not tap, but rather this was a supervision visit to oversee the contract tapper at work and to collect the dried rubber stock for measuring and taking to the market. The family contract worker had been tapping for the last two hours, making his final rounds on this plot. The contractor learned to tap during his time working at Lonsum, but resigned due to family issues and inflexibility of worker hours and the competitiveness of the plantation quota system. Baso’s father hired him on a steady salary as a favor to a distant relative and saw an opportunity to receive professional quality rubber collection. As we walked through the mono-cropped rows, talking with the contractor, we discussed all the technical and economic aspects of rubber. Like his father, Baso had the same entrepreneurial air facilitating the conversation with the contractor and myself, detailing all the elements of production. His father, at first busy at their weighing station, would jump in to complete Baso’s sentences, describing production volumes relative to potential yield and income. “With this plot here,” Baso’s father joked, exaggerating the effects of the stubbornly low rubber prices, “it gives us enough to eat.” We walked over to the drying vats collected from earlier in the week and I heard the common phrase about drying rubber, this time from Baso: “it sure smells bad, but money from rubber can really taste sweet.” Baso is first in line among his siblings to claim a sizable portion of these
groves, and unlike the gillirang rice fields, these plots will undergo a direct transfer when Baso inherits the deed, which he foresees will take place when he plans to marry.

**VII. Landscapes of potential**

*Preserving tradition while cultivating science and technology*

Home from another college break, Baso and his friends from the youth organization had planned an event at the village office, supported by a small amount from the village development budget. They became accustomed to convening in these types of forums to discuss plans for their organization. Formal village staff and other local officials attended and opened the event. Speeches began in the formal Indonesian way, and customarily across South Sulawesi, layered with various Islamic greetings. The village head provided introductory words supporting the initiative, followed by a local police officer in attendance to deliver a public service announcement. The officer noted that helmet enforcement will begin taking place on the main roads as a response to the high number of fatalities among youth. Furthermore, the level of drug use [sabu] and abuse had also reached alarming rates, and the policeman implored youth to stay away.

Finally, the speeches began among the youth leadership and other invited speakers from the community. They highlighted three main themes, beginning with the grand history of the Kajang and the importance of maintaining their name, followed by fulfilling development programs of the Indonesian state and acting as good Muslims, and concluding with high hopes of a future made possible by cultivating science and technology.

The idea of being Kajang as described in this setting is different from those promoted by indigenous rights recognition. They draw from a very different set of pasang than those commonly selected by indigenous rights activists that seek to highlight local environmental stewardship. On the contrary, the speeches at this youth organization event describe the distant envoys that proved historical and cultural influence of the Kajang. From Kaili in Central Sulawesi, to East Nusa Tenggara and the Malukus, crossing into modern day Philippine territory, as I am told in various renditions, the Kajang once travelled and claimed some form of authority amidst these distant sultanates. In one speech, citing a historical colonial text about the Kajang, the speaker passionately rendered the passages as follows, invoking colonial texts in Dutch libraries: “during Dutch colonial times, in 1824 our ancestors lost in a battle, which resulted in
our colonization by the Dutch. We were not colonized by the Dutch for 350 years like we often learn about Indonesian history. It was only 120 years here [of colonial rule]. The Dutch came here and brought their systems of government only in 1824. These books are available in [the Dutch archives] in Leiden. There are 149 different books just about Kajang, far more than anything written about Bulukumba. This shows how great our ancestors were.” The overall intent of this message is that Kajang ancestors had a large influence across the archipelago, and even the Dutch struggled to exert their influence on such a powerful people. The line of argument follows that the district government in Bulukumba, which administers Kajang as a subdistrict did not receive nearly as much attention or significance in the past, thus suggesting the need to re-establish Kajang authority for the future.

The message thereafter pivots from the greatness of Kajang’s intrinsic identity to the opportunities that young people have to redefine the future. The prescription is presented as holding on to one’s Kajang identity while becoming exemplary Indonesians and Muslims. For a community like the Kajang however, which are best known for their traditional identity and ideology that explicitly shuns modern forms of technology in favor of a modest agrarian lifestyle, watching this group of educated youth re-articulate this identity was an interesting discursive switch. To re-establish the greatness of the Kajang name requires doing it through modern means the argument proceeds, through technology, education, and cultivating local business opportunities.

After the formal speeches concluded and the smaller groups began to break up into more relaxed conversations over coffee and packaged snacks procured for the event, I joined in and inquired further about what they had meant by science and technology. How would that look like in a place like this? The first response was a simple and practical one. One of the biggest barriers at the moment, one earnest college student described to me, is the limited telecommunications services. He noted their collective interest in inviting cellular tower construction into the area. Once they have reliable signal, I am told, they would like to build a small coffeeshop with WiFi service whereby customers could access the internet. He continued by explaining that it could be a potentially attractive site for tourists as well, especially if the café were located with a nice view of Lompobattang mountain in the distance. I knew the site they mentioned, where gillirang corn fields dominate the hillside, horses regularly graze, and on the plots recently privatized, are quickly being filled in with pepper vines.
I inquired further about how their plans could support the main economies here, namely how could these initiatives help existing livelihoods here for the future of everyone in Kajang? The answer from the chorus, of course, lay in the promise of technology. They noted that they wanted to invite surveyors from agriculture and agribusiness departments to test the soil and identify which crops were best fit for cultivation. They described the droughts that killed immature clove trees, the rubber trees experiencing low prices. Technology could help farmers find the right balance of soil fertility, crop varietal, inputs, and harvest. They also described rice planting and harvest machinery that they had heard about in the engineering departments at one of their universities. This technological fix was not merely a utopia among youth, but also a message I heard from numerous village heads, to which they all described would help them to overcome poverty.

Finally, a grander plan emerges from the discussion, one indicative of their desires to think of even more systemic change. One of the college students mentions a plan by a local legislator to construct a vocational college. Responding to my disbelief he assures me that plans were already underway. I ask: where will the college be located and who would attend? Another jumps in to the conversation to help me understand. He explains there is a large plot of land along the main road into Kajang, on the buffer zones of and partially within the boundaries of the sacred forest. They speculated of the different ways that enough land could be consolidated to make way for construction, and further considered who might attend. For others that did not have the opportunity to go to college in Makassar, another added, they could enroll here.

Plans for constructing a local university I later learned had indeed been proposed, but realization of such a project was still far from being approved. What this discussion highlighted however, was their knowledge of how land control management decisions worked, particularly the ways in which local administrative forces can create the opportunities to realize landscapes of potential. For example, in other discussions with members of these youth organizations they also began to coalesce on a large plot of land to build a soccer field in the formerly state-administered sacred forests. They had attended the village development planning meetings to propose potential budgets for allocating the field and coordinated with village administrators sympathetic to these plans to try to find ways to incorporate its construction as part of the village budgeting process. They cleverly coordinated closely with the new village administration’s plans to construct a village hall to make the procurement simpler. Even if these plans do not succeed
now, they push the boundaries of possibility, hardwire the administrative means for developing proposals, and someday may guide its realization.

Landscapes of potential among these youth who have made it to regional universities from successful family harvests in cash crops mean several things. First, as they experience time in cafés in the provincial capital, they interact with the state and development in particular ways. The way informational technology is transforming space presents attractive opportunities and inspires utopian ideals about what may be possible in its application when they return to their communities. They are certainly inspired by visions of grandeur that connect to notions about what their unique identity of the past can be for the future. As national attention has also put the spotlight on their community for indigenous rights recognition, they seek to define what this may mean on their own terms. Indeed, cellphone towers will have already been installed by the time this chapter goes to publication, as numerous plans to do so indicated construction was imminent. The longer term implications however, are shaped by the engagement of these youth in formal administrative processes and institutional building that help them learn the language of bureaucracy and determine how their ideas of the future can become real.

Meanwhile, the terms of land access for young people that come into leadership roles as anticipated of individuals like Baso are still rooted in the broader political ecology of tree crops, which I have shown previously to be accumulating among families of these landed elite. If Baso one day does end up running for office, the rubber groves he will inherit provide the capital to fundraise for an election, as well as the capital to expand his landholdings. Perhaps then, soccer fields and local colleges may in fact become reality.

**The private land and gillirang squeeze: Risky opportunities and increasing claimants**

Aco, having never attended school and busy with fieldwork responsibilities, has no time for, or interest in participating in youth organizations, especially those that demand sitting in long meetings drafting up charters for organizational articles of responsibility; and not that he would be welcomed – or know what to do – at these gatherings anyway. His father-in-law and brother-in-law had gone in together to buy a small lot (70 ara), formerly planted with cornfields and converted to rubber five years ago. The landowner missed the rubber boom, cut down and burned the five-year rubber stands, and planted with one final corn rotation to harvest and stockpile food. The cost calculations for rubber made sense during high rubber prices, but after
five long years of waiting – even though the rubber was nearing maturity for tapping – an upcoming family ceremony reordered the cost calculations in favor of selling the land, which Aco’s father-in-law gathered enough funds to purchase. Aco’s father-in-law wanted to make a go at the pepper boom on this lot, hoping the prices would remain high in three years, when peppercorns mature enough for harvest. It was a shorter wait than rubber or cloves, and pepper prices were impressively high in 2016.

With Aco’s rice responsibilities all taken care of that morning, helping prepare the pepper plantings made the most sense to him. He also knew that his labor would be reciprocated through labor commitments in the rice fields, or as cash from the harvests. He also knew that this might be part of his wife’s inheritance and could in part become his someday. We dug holes together a foot and a half deep and of the same width, a grueling task on the rocky terrain of this plot of land. Aco’s father-in-law knew that the increasing number of claimants to gillinrang rice meant that another strategy was imminent, and a successful cash crop harvest might present opportunities to increase cash income and eventually expand landholdings. Seeing if they could strike their luck on a potentially lucrative cash crop like pepper could be a game changer for their families. Otherwise, as they already know too well, the only other option is migration. They all had numerous family members working in Malaysia on the oil palm plantations, or in the neighboring province of Southeast Sulawesi chasing frontier lands in national forests that might provide income in the short term, and maybe get privatized for their ownership in the long term. Aco’s father-in-law also knew that a successful harvest and expanding landholdings could bring some of his children that had migrated, home.

Even with the high incidence of migration in Kajang, not only are the private lands to plant tree crops difficult to access without excess capital, the gillinrang rice lands are also increasingly contested. Aco at only 21 years of age already views the councils that determine conflict over rice fields with cynicism. He uses the common phrase of “makelar kasus” [using the Dutch word for broker to indicate their role as middlemen able to fix outcomes] to describe the hearings that have the authority to resolve conflicts over ancestral claims that determine gillinrang rights. These hearings once functioned as a forum for determining rituals and civil conflicts, but in the past generation are increasingly a site of resolving land conflicts to gillinrang. Invariably those that are found to be in the wrong end up paying a fine, and the spoils are distributed among those in attendance. He equates both the formal and indigenous leadership as
buttressing a corrupt system, saying that they are only in it for the money. Although he has such a negative view of these forums and processes, and eschews involvement in them, he also knows how much he depends on them. The village and formal institutions uphold the private property claims through the material evidence of the tax receipts that prove formal land administration. Meanwhile, the indigenous councils determine ancestral claims and determine which years you have the rights to claim *sawah*. His father-in-law is especially expert at making such claims and Aco is pulled into a network of families that quickly take up claims to rice land every year, ensuring that they always get access. Aco knows that this legitimates his position as a person of authority in the everyday production of rice.

When I raised the point to Aco and his father-in-law about the recent policy of Kajang indigenous recognition and land titling to the sacred forest he reacted indifferently. Aco explained one unusual perspective explaining that legislating around the forest was a strategy to keep Kajang from developing. I was unclear what was meant by development in this context, but I pressed further, saying that now the forestry agency no longer has the authority to the forest, allowing local Kajang to maintain rightful protection of that land. Aco was surprised by my description and indeed from his perspective this explanation makes little sense. Aco responded that if it is a devolution of power, local elites will probably begin taking pieces of it for themselves as they have done in the past. He and his father-in-law both described how certain people enclosed lands as part of their involvement in government projects to convert forest lands. Devolving local authority would not protect the forest, they explain, but only serve to accelerate those that are already enclosing areas along its boundaries. He further describes the subtler practicing taking place in and around the sacred forest to try to seek claims. I ask why they could not make the same type of claims, to which they smile. They explain that you can only get away with it when the village and indigenous leadership cannot stop you.

**VIII. Limiting visions**

Realizing landscapes of potential, as I have shown, are contingent on family background and networks. They structure available opportunities to access land for livelihoods. In rice, this is contingent on making historical claims, a contentious process controlled by indigenous councils but structured by a network of rice farmers to determine access and production, one which is experiencing an increasing number of claimants every year. On the other hand, the Baso’s that put land into longer periods of production for singular household benefits, present the
opportunity to reap larger rewards under the right conditions of crop booms. Successful harvest allows for expanded landholdings and also to finance coveted positions in administrative offices. The effect however is that it structures a much smaller number of people that can benefit from land, one no longer with a frontier to expand access into unless they migrate to seek out opportunity elsewhere. In conclusion, the irony of course is that although the indigenous rights movement discursively supports the ideals of harmony and communal lands, Aco and Baso’s stories highlight how the alliances for recognition schemes end up supporting the very actors that embody capitalist relations and the very forces accelerating privatization, accumulation, and exclusion. Meanwhile the notion of *gillirang* as an institution of harmonious communal land relations, is a tenure category increasingly fraught with conflict and coercion.
Chapter 6 – Assessing the new social forestry project in Indonesia: Recognition, livelihood and conservation?54

I. Introduction

Indonesia is undergoing major policy changes to expand social forestry designations of national forests. Expanding designations is at once a landmark reform and a call for caution, raising questions about policy intentions, and practical concerns about legal, technical, and implementation mechanisms. Social forestry literature highlights three key tenets, namely efforts that: confer rights to local communities, support livelihoods, and achieve conservation outcomes. This chapter shifts to a comparative approach, to examine social forestry implementation from a cross-section of sites in South Sulawesi by reflecting on sustained action research between 2012–2016. The approach critically juxtaposes social forestry policy intent with implementation at three different sites. Findings indicate social forestry implementation suffers from historically problematic state enclosures and flawed land administration processes, entrenched political economic interests among local actors, and lack of institutional engagement beyond the permitting process. Shortcuts to addressing entrenched conflict will only heighten tensions or further marginalize the most vulnerable, without guarantees to conservation outcomes.

According to FAO’s 40-year review of global Community Based Forestry (CBF) published in 2016, Indonesia only has 0.84 million hectares of social forests (Gilmour 2016). Official government data as of November 2017 places this figure at just under 1.1 million hectares (see Table 1) accounting for a rapid increase in social forestry permits since 2014. Nevertheless, less than 1% of formally recognized forests are under social forestry management. This comparatively low number falls well behind FAO’s analysis of the Asia-Pacific region, which averages 34% of forests under CBF arrangements. From this perspective, Indonesia has an enormous potential to expand social forestry programs, which the current administration acknowledges and is actively pursuing. President Joko Widodo and his administration’s national development plans now support mechanisms to achieve goals of designating a sharp increase to 12.7 million hectares, essentially setting aside an area equivalent in size to the island of Java.

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54 A version of this chapter was published in the International Forestry Review in 2017.
Almost two thirds of Indonesia’s land area are managed under the Forestry Ministry (now the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, henceforth MOEF), a legacy of historical natural resource enclosures that began during colonial administration rule and lasted through the end of centralized governance practices of the late 1990s (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Vandergeest and Peluso, 2006). The legacy of this history remains, in that the national forests amounts to an area of 126 million hectares (MOEF, 2014; Siscawati et al., 2017). Although instituting democratic decentralization reforms in 1998 promised a new development trajectory, forest management practices in Indonesia are still shaped heavily by land-intensive primary sector extraction and cultivation (Lucas and Warren, 2003; Resosudarmo, 2004; Barr et al., 2006). As a result, rapid land use changes continue to take a heavy toll in the forms of deforestation and land degradation, resulting in rural land dispossession and violent conflict. These trends were most evident from the fires that burned 2.6 million hectares in 2015, resulting in a public health disaster, amounting to US$16 billion in losses, and high levels of carbon emissions (World Bank, 2015).

**Social Forestry’s discursive power: Land for people**

Social forestry as a policy priority emerged in the context of past enclosures about who has rights to land. Government and advocacy groups have found common ground in social forestry because of the various goals it represents. Multiple stakeholders now promote social forestry as an attractive win-win-win solution, stating that the policy can recognize communal rights, improve rural livelihood opportunities, support conservation, and overall, solve Indonesia’s complex land conflicts (Maryudi et al., 2012). Current policy objectives aim to achieve over 10% (i.e. 12.7 million of 126 million hectares) of social forestry designations within the total national forest area. As these policies seek to meet designation targets however, there has been less emphasis on more critical questions about social forestry for whom (Moeliono et al., 2017).

Proponents support social forestry policy for three main considerations. First, advocates note that social forestry discursively acknowledges the increasing number of people without land access and the growing number of land conflicts in Indonesia. For example, McCarthy and Robinson (2016) indicate 48 million people in 41,000 villages live within or bordering national forest lands. Social forestry allows for one approach to compromise, maintaining management
authority while negotiating terms to already occupied land. Meanwhile, deregulatory priorities of neoliberal policies favor corporate concessionaires, indicative of 70% of Indonesia’s total land area under commoditization arrangements, albeit some of them ‘virtual,’ or yet undeveloped (McCarthy et al., 2012; McCarthy and Robinson, 2016). Although Siscawati et al. (2017) present a much lesser formal figure of 35 million hectares under corporate control, nevertheless, such enclosures indicate decreasing land available to support rural community livelihoods (Li, 2014). Social forestry thus provides common ground between state interests and communities interacting with national forest boundaries, whereby access to land rights are provided amidst a reluctance to devolve full management authority. The second attractive notion of social forestry in Indonesia is the idea that formalizing terms of access could incentivize community empowerment programs and provide economic development opportunities. Social forestry programs could therefore support rural livelihood initiatives and economic growth. Third, proponents believe that given certain conditions, communities can act as more effective managers of forest resources, and incentivize better conservation practices (Larson, 2004; Shrestha and McManus, 2007; Maryudi et al., 2012; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012).

Table 3. Social Forestry Mechanisms, Total Area, and Change Since Jokowi

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<td>7,035</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>449,104</td>
<td>642,554</td>
<td>1,091,658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter outline

This chapter explores these three policy priorities of rights, livelihood, and conservation, by examining a cross section of case studies from long term engagement in South Sulawesi. At these sites, we ask: Does social forestry, in its current form in Indonesia, provide for greater acknowledgement of rights to people in the national forest? Or conversely, does social forestry indicate that communities acknowledge the rights of the state to designate forest areas? Similarly, does social forestry also help to reduce the incidence of land conflict? If so, in what ways? How does social forestry, as it is formulated today, help empower communities to access
new economic opportunities? And finally, in what ways has social forestry supported conservation goals? Overall, in the complex history of land use policies in Indonesia, this chapter asks to what extent does social forestry fulfil the goals of its proponents: does it indeed present opportunities to defend and restore the commons, landscapes, lives, and livelihoods? Or, on the other hand, does social forestry designation, in its current manifestation simply indicate a reformulation of past policies in defense of business-as-usual?

The chapter is divided into sections that also underpin the methods employed. First, the approach examines the global literature on social forestry, contextualizing a broad range of studies with social forestry origins in Indonesia. Next, the chapter highlights several case studies on the emergence and implementation experience of social forestry programs at each case study site in South Sulawesi. Data collection took place over four years through sustained action research initiatives at each site, which reflects direct participation in facilitating interests among various stakeholders to undertake social forestry policy implementation. The analytical approach in this chapter takes action-research one step further by more critically analyzing the stated goals of current social forestry policy efforts in Indonesia and contrasting them with the overall implementation experience at the case study sites.

The chapter concludes that in its current form, although social forestry has discursively raised the profile and interests of community rights to land, none of the three core goals of social forestry have yet become a priority in policy implementation for reasons described herein. The chapter also concludes by suggesting some key principles which could set a different course for more meaningful policy engagement among relevant stakeholders.

II. Social forestry – A broad concept

The FAO forty-year review offers a broad definition of the family of social forestry schemes as “initiatives, sciences, policies, institutions, and processes that are intended to increase the role of local people in governing and managing forest resources” (from RECOFTC, cited in Gilmour, 2016: 2). The definition goes on to highlight the milieu of social forestry forms,

55 FAO (Gilmour 2016) uses the definition community-based forestry. We view the umbrella term as broadly interchangeable, whether it is community based natural resource management, community-based forest management, community forestry, social forestry, adaptive collaborative management and others. We understand that the term is contested among its proponents and variants. In this paper, we select the term “social forestry” because it follows the Indonesia policy context (perhutanan sosial).
56 The Center for People and Forests (RECOFTC) is an international organization working on community forest management across the Asia-Pacific region.
ranging from indigenous, to government led practices and policies, as well as different partnership schemes that involve public and private enterprises, and cases of sacred protection. Social forestry emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, when state-centric schemes for scientific management were criticized for the absence of distributive economic effects and the lack of capacity to protect forest resources. The notion of rights gained policy attention through the compelling work of Elinor Ostrom (1990), critiquing the “tragedy of the commons” narrative and convincingly arguing that providing sufficient tenure arrangements to communities could set up the rules to sustainably manage common pool resources. Social forestry has also become attractive for other reasons, however. For example, neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization that intensified in the 1980s viewed social forestry as an opportunity to reduce the role of the state, conferring land management responsibility without providing the corresponding resources to local communities (Lake, 2002). In the global south, land degradation and fuelwood crises provided the impetus for social forestry and suggested very different origins to community-based involvement (Gilmour, 2016: 7). In other policy circumstances, Indonesia included, Indigenous rights have merged with social forestry ideals by challenging the processes of dispossession initiated by the colonial state or wrought by settler colonies.

Across the rich social forestry literature, core definitions support a commitment towards devolution to local actors (McDermott and Schreckenberg, 2009; Gilmour, 2016). Three central tenets are rights, livelihoods, and conservation (Charnley and Poe, 2007; Maryudi et al., 2012). Critiques however, challenge some of the premises and experiences of social forestry in practice. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) state that notions of social forestry contain too simplistic a view of ‘community,’ while Li (2002) describes the overall policy approach as a ‘strategic simplification’ that necessarily overlooks local socio-economic concerns among diverse communities. Furthermore, a critical examination of success stories has suggested the provocative notion whether social forestry is created, or whether pre-existing conditions are found. Glasmeier and Farrigan (2005: 62) describe this as the chicken versus the egg in social forestry, asking: “was community forestry the source of change itself, or did the adoption of community forestry as a practice require that those changes first be made?”

As the popularity of social forestry ideas moved into policy applications, research also helped to identify gaps between rhetoric and implementation. Research in Malawi
found the effects of social forestry as doing “more harm than good,” undermining existing institutional arrangements and substituting them with ‘hollow’ administrative processes (Kamoto et al., 2013). The study also highlighted the importance, or rather the negligence, of incorporating flexible mechanisms based on locally trusted institutions. Behera and Engel (2006) in another case uncovered that disingenuous attempts to transfer property rights undermined social forestry programs in India. In a systematic review, McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009) also found that although social forestry programs tended to fulfil commitments to devolve decision-making powers, many failed to meaningfully support the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, in numerous cases, the poorest were unexpectedly worse-off because of social forestry. The review also highlighted some pre-requisites to effective implementation, namely initiating capacity building from the outset for facilitators and government intermediaries.

Finally, Sikor’s volume (2006) more critically examines the experience of social forestry in terms of local, political, and agrarian perspectives, which are constituted dialectically between communities, states, and markets. Findings highlight that social forestry policies are shaped by the nodes of power that implement them, which in turn interact with broader political or economic forces. For example, one case in Maluku highlights how debt bondage for clove harvests determined outcomes for agroforestry sites beyond social forestry policy (Salampessy et al., 2017). States and markets shape the rules about property and access to the forest, determining who has rights, what resources are valued, and form resultant social forestry initiatives (Sikor, 2006: 346). In the next section, the paper turns to the social forestry experience in Indonesia, juxtaposing with the global experience to gauge existing conditions and foreground the cases studies.

**Social Forestry in Indonesia**

Although social forestry is a small percentage area of Indonesia’s national forest, programs have been around for a long time. The origins of social forestry ideologies and logic behind implementation are significant. The historical evolution in Indonesia took place in several key stages (Lindayati, 2002). The pre-social forestry phase of the 1960s–80s highlighted an era in which the central government enacted sovereignty by appropriating as much land into the national forest as possible. This took place through the systematic expansion of the “political
forest” in which land surveys unscrupulously identified the most valuable species (for extraction and protection) as a rationale for enclosure under the responsibility of state forest management (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001). During this early period, social forestry schemes were awarded in locations that had high levels of conflict, forcing government actors to make concessions on community demands. A discursive shift also occurred after the 8th World Forestry Congress, which was hosted in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Congress, entitled “Forests for People,” brought centre-stage the role of forests for rural livelihoods.

In the 1990s the broader rhetoric of community-based resource management became a global ideal and compelled governments worldwide to begin implementing social forestry schemes (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003). Formal village and community forestry offices and provisions were developed by the forestry ministry with objectives of providing economic benefits to local communities. A nationwide network of NGOs also emerged during this time, albeit carefully because any challenge to tenure within the state system was not possible until the fall of President Suharto in 1998. Once the centralized state unraveled and repurposed itself under a democratically decentralized governance regime, new opportunities for social forestry emerged.

The 2000s set in motion a new era of forest management under a revised Basic Forestry Law (from 5/1967 to 41/1999). The emergence of human rights organizations, especially calling for the recognition of indigenous people and the title of their forests (coalescing in the network called AMAN) presented a coordinated voice to promote discourses for contesting land in the national forest. Little changed in the Forestry law however, beyond acknowledgement of stewardship rights to indigenous forests that did not materialize in legal mechanisms. A social forestry network (FKKM) also emerged and had a growing influence on the Forestry Law. At that time however, there was still little willingness by formal authorities nor the mechanisms to hand over forestland to communities, although numerous groups across the country were forcibly staking their claims (Lucas and Warren, 2003). Legal forestry policy negotiations did however ensure that social forestry became the most acceptable means for negotiating access to the vast national forests. The current legal definition of social forestry under MOEF ministerial decree 83/2016 is as follows:

“social forestry is a sustainable management system implemented in state forests or forest rights concessions/indigenous forests, undertaken by local communities or legal indigenous communities as the main stakeholders, in order to increase their prosperity,
ensure environmental balance and social cultural dynamics, in the form of Village Forests, Community Managed Forests, Community Plantation Forests, Community Forests, Indigenous Forests, and Forestry Partnerships.”

As of 2016, the procedures for obtaining social forestry permits were complicated and expensive and follow similar procedures as large concessions. Permits for village and community managed forests typically had to pass 29 desks in at least 4 offices taking 180 days. To adjust to a more rights-oriented approach and simplify the regulatory process, MOEF passed a new decree, further streamlining the process (83/2016) – see figure 2 for permit licensing process. Although permit proposal processes are simplified by the decree, preparing permits is still onerous for local communities, requiring intervention by external actors to prepare necessary documentation.

Between 2011–2016, policy commitments amounted to 2.5 million hectares for social forestry. Since president Joko Widodo was elected in 2014, the targets have grown more ambitious, suggesting even greater commitment. In response, MOEF facilitated the creation of an indicative map for social forestry (PIAPS), allowing for local governments to propose potential sites that would amount to a total of 12.7 million hectares.57 The PIAPS map was developed with formal institutions and coordinated with NGOs that have made headway in the participatory mapping movement. The PIAPS maps are available online, and are revised every six months.58 One main challenge for social forestry implementation are processes of re-centralization taking place from Law 23/2014, in which the institutional structure shifted from the district to the provincial level with the creation of Forest Management Units (FMU) (Sahide et al. 2016, Fisher et al. 2017), realigning bureaucratic networks, and raising broader questions about social forestry policy trends across Southeast Asia (Fisher et al., 2017a). Key staff-members at MOEF have yet to be migrated to their new positions at the provincial level creating bottlenecks to the already complex permitting process.

57 MOEF is increasingly aware of the difficulty in meeting targets of 12.7 million hectares of social forestry area. They have hence lowered the target of 12.7 million hectares to 4.3 million hectares, making up for additional land areas through a qualifying partnership scheme. Examining these political dynamics are beyond the scope of this paper.
58 PIAPS are a combination of centralized approaches that indicate community management areas and bottom up proposals by NGOs submitted through the Working Group for Social Forestry. These are facilitated by the Directorate General for Social Forestry and Environmental Partnerships. The indicative map is published at the MOEF website and is available at: http://webgis.dephut.go.id:8080/kemenhut/index.php?id/peta/petapiaps
As of November 2017, the Directorate General on Social Forestry and Environmental Partnerships at MOEF presented their progress on achieving social forestry targets (See Table 3 above). Village forests (HD) achieved the greatest expansion and consists of the single largest category at 494,600 hectares. Other notable categories include the new scheme of indigenous forests (HA), which although remain limited in total area, highlight a major political victory for activists in Indonesia (Fisher et al., 2017b). In sum, the total area of social forestry at the close of 2017 amounts to almost 1.1 million hectares, close to 1% of total national forest area. Adding an additional 11.6 million hectares to achieve targets by 2019 indicate a significant policy and implementation undertaking.

This paper picks up on program implementation between 2012–2018, examining existing examples that can highlight the challenges of the rapid expansion of targets in social forestry policy. The questions to be explored are, to what extent are social forestry efforts fulfilling the core definition of social forestry, namely a devolution of power to local communities? What are the mechanisms of social forestry implementation and what can be learned from existing social forestry programs? Does social forestry expand livelihood opportunity? What does this mean for local forest health? This paper analyses experiences at three multi-year action research programs from Sulawesi, including: Community Forest in Borong Rappoa, Bulukumba; Village Forest in Patteneteang, Bantaeng; and, Indigenous Forest designation in Kajang, Bulukumba.

*Figure 2. Social Forestry permitting process*
III. Methods

Researching the impacts of social forestry requires an understanding of complex socio-ecological dynamics, particularly the formal and informal institutional arrangements that govern land management practices. This research took place as part of a series of ongoing action research programs in three provinces on the island of Sulawesi. Action research allowed for a deliberate process of developing partnerships with key stakeholders and responding to local good governance initiatives as they emerged (Evans et al., 2006; Adnan et al., 2008; Colfer et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2017b). This helped the research team to critically analyze national social forestry efforts and contextualize findings from site-level perspectives.

In 2012 the project began supporting programs in South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, and Gorontalo provinces. These programs sought to improve livelihoods through agroforestry initiatives, address tenurial considerations of rural communities, and support good governance efforts by improving participation in natural resource management. Research teams therefore collected baseline materials on land cover, mapped land uses and tenure relations, and sought to support local policy initiatives that responded to multi-stakeholder concerns. As social forestry became a policy priority for these sites, and received national attention for their initiatives, the research team was well placed to contextualize social forestry implications. The case studies herein are purposively selected from action research engagement in South Sulawesi. Three sites were selected to provide comparative cases between social forestry designation types, and comparisons across district jurisdictions.

Sustained data collection

As an action research program, research teams worked at each of the project sites to build trust and improve participation in natural resource management by engaging in a landscape scale adaptive collaborative management approach (Colfer et al. 2011). This included stakeholder mapping, cataloguing interest groups, convening regular forums, and conducting targeted baseline information. Stakeholders were identified as farmers, community groups (both formal

59 The first project took place between 2011–2016 under Contribution Arrangement No. 7056890, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), Government of Canada. Action research in these communities were followed up by a consecutive program to work with local partners in Sulawesi under a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) grant by the Partnership for Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER) program.
and informal), NGOs, government agencies, and vulnerable communities. Baselines were conducted on livelihoods (such as detailed data collection on local productive systems), on the regulatory environment (such as development programs, forestry policies, water policies, and the village law), and overall historical political economy dynamics (elements that shaped the landscape and precursors influencing local power relations). Interviews with key stakeholders were conducted regularly at sites, as well as focus group discussions, policy research, field data, and other intensive engagement as deemed necessary by the participatory forums. The NGOs Balang Institute and OASE conducted regular site visits to all sites and reported quarterly, while the lead author spent one full year at the Kajang site over a period of 4 years. This reflexive approach responding to site-specific land and resource governance considerations sustained over several years provided a deep appreciation of local concerns.

*Action research for sustainable landscape governance*

To initiate action research, stakeholder analysis was first conducted. Key stakeholders were thereafter convened to engage in discussions about level of participation in landscape scale governance. These regularly held “learning forums” (Mulyana et al. 2008), and follow-up interviews with stakeholders, focused on issues concerning access to land and natural resources, and environmental services across upstream-downstream relations. Key priorities and decision-making powers were raised, followed by trainings on facilitation and environmental conflict resolution (Fisher and Sablan, 2018). Learning forums were also conducted between sites, whereby multi-stakeholder groups were convened to share issues and challenges from elsewhere.

Action research principles were instituted through the identification of key issues and discussions about priority fact-finding interests. For example, jurisdictional boundaries quickly became a major question among stakeholders at each site, which led to the consolidation of official district and national forest boundary maps, and complemented by field data collection initiatives through participatory mapping (see for example, Maps 5, 6, and 7). Overall, these learning forums emerged in different ways at each of the sites depending on local priorities. Each were convened around the principles of increasing livelihoods and improving landscape scale conservation initiatives, identifying technical support opportunities and policy gaps.

As social forestry became a more concerted national policy effort, each of these sites presented ideal comparative empirical cases to understand the broader implementation
considerations at three different types of social forestry schemes, across different geographies, with unique histories and land management interests. Detailed, local perspectives provided in the case studies herein thus present sustained data collection to address the broader research questions described above. In particular, this research was able to discern from local cases the extent to which social forestry policy fulfilled implementation expectations.

In each of the sections below, this paper examines background for three site-specific designation schemes. Each case study is explored by providing a brief overview of the social forestry scheme, followed by historical political economy considerations of the landscape, and the designation process. Next, the paper transitions to institutional mechanisms – both formal and informal – that negotiate management within the designated social forestry area. Third, this paper evaluates the three tenets of social forestry devolution, which include rights recognition, livelihood and empowerment programs, and conservation efforts (as illustrated by Maryudi et al. 2012). It is important to note that the action research efforts reflected in this paper include sites that already obtained social forestry designation and may be ahead of the curve of current policy reforms. It is also important to critically examine the role of external actors in promoting policy schemes, in which this action research team also certainly had a role in facilitating developments. Recent but unsubstantiated social forestry research is also beginning to show that policy imperatives to achieve social forestry designation targets across Indonesia are being rushed, another area that should be considered in evaluating other cases. Therefore, future examinations of social forestry policy implementation should evaluate the extent to which distinct practices are taking place at each site. That said, the principles that emerge from the examination of this chapter are likely to apply across other sites in Indonesia.

Case 1: Community Forestry (HKM) in Bulukumba (Borong Rappoa)

**Background on Community Forests (HKM)**

Community Forests (Hutan Kemasyarakatan, HKM), are primarily targeted for community empowerment objectives, especially to provide new livelihoods opportunities. Permit proposals are possible on production or protected forest, in special zones defined by the forest management unit (FMU), and on State Forest Management Corporation (Perum

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60 MOEF Decree 83 / 2016
A ministerial decree provides the permit, but the 2016 decree now allows for provincial governments (the Governor) to accelerate designation by including sites in their development plans. A permit is first proposed by a community group, farmer group, or cooperative, which must include institutional structure. MOEF Decree 83/2016 Article 19 describes further requirements on accurate mapping and descriptive management plans. The FMU must also include the permit as part of their long-term forest planning.

Designating Community Forests in Borong Rappoa

During the Colonial period, the Dutch government demarcated boundaries that local communities still describe as the BoschWezen boundaries. From early on the steeper upstream slopes of Bulukumba were set aside as conservation forest. Forestry ministry efforts in the 1980s conducted renewed demarcation efforts (TGHK) formally designating 1,900 hectares along the slopes of Bawakaraeng mountain under conservation schemes, followed by a national land and reforestation program (GNRHL) in the 2000s. Such boundaries are still visible from the sparse pine forests that were part of the reforestation programs implemented along the slopes. In 2001, community groups sought to establish the first community forestry permits with support from Hasanuddin University (UNHAS) and a development project that helped to pass provisional permits. Community forestry efforts waned through the mid 2000s but by 2011 a decree was finally issued (MOF 363 / 2011), designating 2,265 hectares of forest under the then HKM designation (AgFor final report).

According to local residents, land surveys in the early 2000s expanded the reach of the national forest to include community cultivation lands. Settlement areas of Borong Rappoa village were then included in the expansion areas of the conservation forest zone. The communities firmly state that they never agreed to this more recent demarcation and when community forestry arrangements began to emerge within these expansion areas, community members were surprised. There are two hamlets in Borong Rappoa – which are Borong Rappoa (same name as the village) and Bonto Manai. There are also historically distinguished settlement areas called kampung Na’na and Asayya that border the national forest located in the Bonto

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61 Specific for Perum Perhutani lands, there are two new schemes: i) IUPHPS-Permits on social forestry management; and ii) forestry partnership recognition and protection. Both of these schemes are developed from pre-existing Forestry Partnership schemes with distinct ministerial decrees.

62 Surat Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan nomor 363/Menhut-II/2011
Manai Hamlet, which are often referred to in land claims. The community continues to plant cloves, passion fruit, and coffee, and some live in the expansion area of the conservation forest.

The local forestry agency supported the formation of a farmer group in the early 2000s. The group was created to undertake replanting efforts. Plans to formalize HKM began in 2007. The communities claim they were never informed about HKM expectations. They were under the impression that regular meetings were like any other government seedling disbursement mechanism. They formed their community group like other agrarian subsidy projects and began planting agroforestry plots with cash crops expecting to one day harvest. The farmer group listed 118 people over an area of 450.81 hectares under HKM management, from several sections, called: Asayya, Na’na, Kayu Birangang, Katimbang, Senggang, and Bontoa. The forestry agency facilitated the formation of the farmer group in coordination with the member listed as the head of the group. Tensions arose between the group leader and its members however, especially over the uneven distribution of program benefits. Support programs did however distribute seedlings for patchouli and timber crops, but forestry officials told farmer group members they would never be able to harvest timber products. As a result, the farmer group stopped agreeing to plant any trees. Farmer group members planted under the assumption of ancestral, private, and usufruct rights, and in many cases, were also supported by the existence of formal documents such as land tax documents (SPPT) and the highly regarded C(P1) historical evidence.

Local historical perspectives also noted the mobility of settlements in the area. During the 1950s intimidation tactics by the DI/TII rebellion forced people to resettle in Balang Didi hamlet, but over time they returned to reclaim lands. A company, PT Sulawesi, also moved in and established clove plantation operations in 1975. Local community members also planted around the site, hoping to benefit from the presence of the company, but thereafter resettled further downstream because of the steep terrain.

During the TGHK re-designation of 1984, the community participated in setting boundary markers. The stakes were placed in areas that enclosed their earlier planting efforts, stakes which community members acknowledge later removing. As a result, there are two sets of

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63 It is also important to note that groups were formed for national reforestation and degradation programs (GNRHL) that were then later repurposed for HKM. Group members were often not informed of their involvement in such groups.

64 SPPT are proof of tax payments on a piece of property and formally sanctioned by the village head and approved by the land agency (BPN)
claims to the land now designated as HKM. The communities contend that it is ancestral land, and that the additional 450.81 now designated as HKM, should not be within the boundaries of the national forest. Meanwhile, the forestry agency maps were updated with geographic coordinates from boundary making operations that officially included these areas. Statements among officials also indicate that local leaders were complicit in implementing projects for demarcation, receiving salaries to designate these lands and thus formalizing them as national forest. Furthermore, now that the site has received HKM designation, the forestry agency has continued to develop extension and outreach, implementing programs, assigning budgets, and other means of disbursing funds for community support further justifying claims of national forest designation.

*Map 5. Borong Rappoa and the various versions of jurisdictional boundaries*

Conflict began when community members began to harvest their *suren* (*Toona sureni*) wood plots, invoking land and labor as justification to their claim. The forest police, in turn, were required to respond to such ‘vandalism’ and enforce regulations. Community members do not dispute areas beyond the BoschWezen boundary. In fact, the community supported sanctions of
two people that tried to claim land in those areas by planting coffee, which the forest police cut down.

The areas within HKM designation are noted to include three sections: Senggang, Katimbang, and Bontoa. Bontoa is dominated by cloves, while Katimbang and Senggang mostly cultivate coffee. The community is preparing to harvest all remaining Suren wood located at those sites further increasing tension with forest police. Some of the land in the HKM area also have SPPT land claims that further complicate negotiations. Such complexity and lack of accountability is also illustrative in Map 5, in which the jurisdictional maps present inaccuracies. Not only do the administrative boundaries of the national forest (the BoschWezen, TGHK, and social forestry designations) highlight inconsistencies, the village and district boundaries also present alternative jurisdictional authority. Such administrative inaccuracies also lead to competing claims and increase tensions.

During the research period, discussing forest status continued to cause problems due to the conflict between the community and forest police. Discussion in the learning forums, shifted to protecting the critical watershed functions in upstream areas, complemented by riverbed restoration efforts, and potential non-invasive cultivation possibilities. Participation in these ways led to common ground around the construction of a micro-hydro power plant, which received enthusiastic support by local communities for the potential electricity generation in the area. Anytime the discussion returned to the issue of HKM status however, community members refused to be involved. Under such program justification, community members declined to plant tree crops, and in instances that replanting was conducted, community members would sabotage seedlings. Any discussion around HKM therefore, would stall efforts at collaboration, but micro-hydro allowed for sidestepping the contentious issue over rights on forest protection, empowerment and livelihood support. The local NGO facilitator at the site noted that:

I don’t think that HKM is a strategy that should be implemented to address natural resource challenges. They have difficulty accessing electricity there, and that was a great way to build partnership and common ground. They are absolutely willing to work together on conservation efforts if it is based on genuine mutual needs. But we see social forestry systems that exist today as too rigid to address any sort of flexible adaptive management system responsive to the community.
Case 2: The Village Forest in Bantaeng (Patteneteang)

Background on Village Forests (HD)

Village forests (Hak Pengelolaan Hutan Desa, shortened to HD) are management rights to protected or production forests (without existing permits) that are given over to authority overseen by a village organization. Similar to HKM sites, HD are included in the indicative maps (PIAPS), designated in provincial level development plans, and receive final approval by ministerial decree. Village forests are proposed by a village organization, either a cooperative or a village owned enterprise (BUMDes). In general, the location cannot exceed the area of village authority but there are certain stipulations whereby villages may partner with neighboring jurisdictions for broader ecosystem landscape planning efforts. Permit proposals are prepared with the following documentation: i) village regulation or decision letter by the village head; ii) descriptive planning information for the HD; and iii) a map at 1:50,000 scale. Once the village fulfils these requirements, there are options for administration verification through the provincial government and MOEF in a series of steps (Article 11–15).

Designating Village Forests in Patteneteang

Village forest permits began in earnest in 2009, supported by the NGO RECOFTC and UNHAS. These organizations worked with the Bantaeng district forest agency and began preparing necessary documentation. Local communities were only loosely involved in the planning process at that time, mostly by setting up institutional documentation of the BUMDes and passing the necessary village decrees. The zoning areas (PAK) were finalized in 2010. Throughout the planning process, the main concern was mapping potential activities at the site. The site was divided into two different sub-sections (blok): Tasa’la and Daulu. The Daulu section experienced problems similar to the HKM case described in Borong Rappoa above, whereby existing land tax receipts (SPPT) indicating land claims overlapped within areas also designated as national forest jurisdiction. Like the HKM case, mapping inconsistencies have caused differing perceptions of institutional role and authority, also causing conflict. Based on the PAK data from MOEF, the official area of the village forest in Patteneteang is 339 hectares, and the management organization includes 101 village members.

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65 Also articulated in Ministerial regulation 83/2016
In 1993, boundary areas were designated throughout the district of Bantaeng, including the village of Patteneteang. At that time, the village administration was a small settlement area called Bonto Tallu. In contrast to the HKM case described above, local communities were more successful in contesting formal jurisdictional authority over their claims to land. Community members protested boundary demarcation and succeeded in influencing local parliament in Bantaeng to mediate disagreements. The community brought evidence of land rights, such as their SPPTs, and clearly outlined evidence of land claims dating back to the 1950s (i.e. C(P)1 forms).

The mediation resulted in the head of the local parliament visiting the site and evaluating conditions. Community members described the boundary of the BoschWezen, which helped with the negotiation. With this intervention, claims by community members were recognized and parties agreed to conduct a joint boundary setting process. Significant political changes were underway at the national level in 1997–8, which also influenced uncertainty about the political authority for making claims. Measurements proceeded jointly by various stakeholder representatives, overseen by: Subdistrict head (camat) of Tompobulu, military representatives based in Bantaeng (KODIM), district (kabupaten) office staff, and the village government. The process took place over three months and measurements were jointly conducted between local community members and the land agency office (BPN) in Bantaeng. The mapping process is what provided formal provision of SPPT lands in 2000/1 that are still in use today.

When HD efforts began, one group in Patteneteang took the lead in demarcating areas within the national forest administrative area. On the one hand this privileged those that had access to decision making authority. More generally however, as re-mapping efforts for HD proposal got underway, new concerns emerged about overlapping SPPT land claims designated as national forest in MOEF databases. Therefore, getting the boundaries designated as HD meant that SPPT land claims among certain residents would also be rendered moot. Several villagers implicated were not informed, creating new tensions when they learned that their claims were no longer valid. Like in Borong Rappoa, the current jurisdictional maps highlight these inconsistencies (see figure 3), namely the differences between MOEF data, participatory mapping data, and village boundary maps. The paper further details these implications in the discussion section.
Much of what emerges from Patteneteang are the institutional challenges for creating, administering, and managing HD as they are currently being set up. Patteneteang village actors followed the common approaches to prove management responsibility by creating a BUMDes. However, BUMDes as an institutional structure to administer HD presented challenges. First, BUMDes are envisioned as revenue generating enterprises that are to be productive in the near term. Secondly, the BUMDes neither understood their position about HD management plans, nor their management responsibility in executing the objectives drawn up in the permit plans facilitated by RECOFTC and UNHAS.

The sub-zones intended for various management functions also did not match field conditions. For example, areas indicated for range protection of the Anoa, the largest endemic mammal to Sulawesi, was already being managed as coffee development areas. The Tasa’la zone, neighboring the Borong Rappoa HKM site, places the management area as overlapping

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66 Similar findings were also true in nearby village forests (Campaga and Labbo) that are not discussed in detail herein.
with areas also claimed by Bulukumba district. These missteps occurred due to unclear verification standards by the ministerial and district teams that mistakenly administered these competing territorial overlaps.

**Case 3: Indigenous Forest in Bulukumba (Kajang)**

*Background on Indigenous Forests as Social Forestry*

From a national perspective, Indigenous Forest, or Hutan Adat (HA), has received much more controversy and contentious legal interpretation over the designation process (see chapter 1 and 2). This is because policy interests of rights recognition suggests that designation equates to removal from the national forest. A series of legal decisions and policy efforts, particularly constitutional court decision MK35/2012, and subsequent recognition of nine indigenous communities (Kajang included), as well as concerted efforts among activists to challenge adat community land rights involves a more complex political contestation embodied by recent social movements in Indonesia. It is not the intention of this research to discuss various aspects of policy interpretations, save for the approaches and implications from designation (for a more complete legal and policy discussion, see e.g. Davidson and Henley, 2007; Butt, 2014; Rachman and Siscawati, 2016; Myers et al., 2017).

In this light, the Kajang case is significant for its precedent-setting status, as it was the first to successfully assign a full local regulation to designate HA out of the national forest. The designation process received widespread attention in a ceremonious event convened by Indonesian President Widodo, which acknowledged central government support of recognizing indigenous authority (Gaol and Dahlia, 2017). Social movement advocacy groups contend this could legitimize indigenous land claims across millions of hectares in Indonesia (McCarthy and Robinson, 2016). Early guidance on the administrative mechanisms to return rights to indigenous communities shifts the burden of proof on local (district) governments to both demonstrate the extant of indigenous territorial claim and continued customary practices on those lands (UNORCID, 2013; Mancayo and Firmansyah, 2014). National government actors suggest that HA is one of the strategies to achieve the social forestry goal of 12.7 million hectares, and therefore including a complementary site in this analysis provides further comparative potential on the various implications of social forestry schemes.
Designating Indigenous Forests in Kajang

The Kajang are indeed a unique community, known for continuing to practice strict definitions of local customs (Rössler, 1991; Tyson, 2009; Maarif, 2012; van der Muur and Bedner, 2016; Fisher et al., 2017b). Kajang cosmology is also closely linked to their sacred forest, which in 1997 was designated as limited production forest (HPT). Although Kajang forests in the past had multiple uses and different access zones (Mahbub 2013), the forest now represents a protected area, in which harvest, collection, or planting is prohibited without explicit permission by the Ammatoa, the Kajang cultural leader. Kajang leadership and the local forestry agency have developed a mutual support system in which both partner to enforce management responsibilities (Workman et al., 2015; chapter 2).

The district regulation recognizing the Ammatoa Kajang made it the precedent-setting HA case. The district regulation was drafted by a multi-stakeholder Taskforce* led by the district tourism agency and convened by the district forestry agency. Representation also included the legal bureau and other agencies, and uniquely extended representation to local NGO partners, including AMAN-South Sulawesi, Balang Institute, and OASE. To determine the extent of territorial claims to the national forest, a participatory mapping exercise and joint questionnaires were conducted across villages throughout the Kajang area of influence. This helped to expand the scope of the district regulation beyond the boundaries of the sacred forest, including a broader definition of customary sites into the district regulation (Fisher et al., 2017b). After numerous public consultations and community input, district regulation 9/2015 was signed into law. One account described the policymaking effort as “the most participatory regulation” for its emphasis on multi-stakeholder collaboration in the Taskforce (Kemitraan, 2015).

In December 2016, President Widodo invited the Kajang and eight other indigenous communities for the official handing over of the decision letter* that effectively acknowledged their indigenous lands independent from the national forest.

Although acknowledgement of rights for indigenous communities to national forests represents a tremendous political victory and symbolic achievement among national level actors and international activists, the designation process proves a more nuanced experience. First, the

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*Forestry Minister Decision 504/KPTS/-II/1997 designating 331.17 hectares as HPT

*The Taskforce was created under Bupati Decree 760/2013

*SK.6746/MENLHK-PSKL/KUM.1/12/2016
acknowledgement of land to the national forest only confers *de jure* land rights of a system that had in fact already had a strong co-management partnership between state and Kajang indigenous leadership institutions (Workman et al., 2015). Indeed, conferring rights out of the national forest suggests that the forestry agency no longer has the authority to conduct enforcement patrols to support the Kajang community, a fact that local Kajang leadership laments. This key aspect about continued forest management mechanisms was overlooked by the singular policy objective of achieving the goals of designation. The more day-to-day management aspects are currently under discussion in a Taskforce re-established after the passage of the district regulation.

*Map 7. Jurisdictional and management of Kajang indigenous forests and areas of strict adherence of the pasang code*
context of historical land dispossession in Indonesia. However, the Kajang case, as seen from the lens of social forestry implementation does not address the core interests of local community members, which revolve around livelihood opportunity. In one sense, the fact that the tourism agency spearheaded the Taskforce indicate a broader effort at developing economic opportunity. But developing tourism also comes along with the corresponding question about the benefits for whom. The policy promise of social forestry seeks to address smallholder access to land, an element that HA in Kajang does not address. If viewed from past tourism initiatives in Kajang, efforts have tended to be piecemeal, without much attention on integrating new economic opportunities for the community more broadly. New efforts from the re-established Taskforce could prove otherwise, as discussions are coordinating a tourism master plan with mechanisms for forest management authority in Kajang.

IV. Discussion

This chapter is not intended to undermine the overall discursive and symbolic progress made by social forestry in Indonesia, but rather to examine existing social forestry experiences in light of key questions around rights, livelihood, and conservation. Indeed, the emergence of social forestry as a way to engage with local communities would not have otherwise been possible in the past. At each site however, findings uncovered a gulf between policy imagination and implementation experience. In response to the research questions of this chapter, the discussion below focuses on two major barriers to achieving the three-part policy imperative. From each site, the research identified that accountability mechanisms, particularly spatial (boundaries and mapping), continues to be a major stumbling block on implementation. Delineating boundaries suffers from poor data management and integration, which leads to a violation of rights and rules in the field, and results in conflict that undermines collaboration efforts. Second, land management considerations are not attentive to capacity building of local institutions, but rather, currently privilege bureaucratic mechanisms that focus on administrative procedure, undermining agreements on co-management roles. After exploring these two issues in more detail from each site, I conclude the chapter by highlighting how social forestry mechanisms as they are currently administered act as barriers to achieving broader interests in rights recognition, livelihood empowerment, and conservation outcomes.
Rethinking boundaries

At each of the sites described in this paper, fundamental problems emerged from inconsistent boundaries. This is a legacy of past approaches to boundary designation, lack of participation in administering boundaries, poor data accessibility and accuracy, and overall accountability uncertainty. Implications of poor spatial data management today cripple social forestry intentions, because as sites get slated for designation they invariably run up against competing claims by individuals, communities, or other agencies; a dilemma common in most land conflict across Indonesia. At all three sites described herein, inaccurate mapping information and differing perceptions of boundaries created misunderstanding and resulted in some of the most difficult elements of policy negotiation. In Borong Rappoa local viewpoints of unjustified state enclosures and prohibiting timber harvest amidst social forestry designation broke down any potential for building trust in mutual management responsibility. In Patteneteang, improper placement of boundaries on community lands and incorrect zoning of coffee plantations undermined land management authority and further eroded mutual trust. In Kajang, after years of joint collaboration on joint forest boundary protections, agreement on boundaries were mostly secured, but recognition thereafter undermined the joint management arrangements between the forest agency and local indigenous leadership.

At a national level, PIAPS consolidation efforts acknowledge these challenges, and efforts now seek to integrate national mapping database reforms under the One Map Policy. The forestry agency seeks to achieve a clean and clear policy on maps and jurisdictional authority. In this light, the way remapping efforts are undertaken could provide a first step in transparency and accessibility over administering social forestry sites. Indeed, numerous opportunities to develop joint agreements on spatial authority emerged in these cases but were undermined by regulatory and protocol concerns. At the very least, synchronizing the dizzying lines on the maps as portrayed in this paper could reduce confusion over the jurisdictional frames of reference among key institutions.

Beyond jurisdictional agreement however, synchronizing maps will still face the challenge of addressing historical claims. Reassigning an overlay of social forestry on a map with clean boundaries does not overcome the central complaint at these sites. As yet, social forestry mechanisms have been reluctant to explicitly acknowledge competing claims, although new mechanisms (e.g. Tanah Objek Reforma Agraria, or TORA) are being proposed for sites of
competing claims in Indonesia. In both Borong Rappoa and Patteneteang however, community members are vehemently opposed to any policy that takes away rights they once assumed, especially sites where labor, or labor of previous generations, go along with the expectations of future harvest. Furthermore, claims of having paid taxes on these lands proved through SPPT receipts and other documentation only embitters community perceptions of social forestry.

The role of institutions

Literature from Malawi proves an ominous warning, in that social forestry efforts requiring new administrative institutions could supersede and weaken existing social relations and informal institutions (Kamoto et al., 2013). The current social forestry conditions in Indonesia are at risk of similar outcomes. Each of the three cases herein showed that new institutional forms compelled by social forestry policies either created new organizations to prove implementation, pitted community groups against each other (Borong Rappoa and Patteneteang), or actually undermined existing institutional arrangements (Kajang). On the one hand, a lack of capacity, flexibility, and commitment among administrators to support local (often informal) institutions are the culprit, particularly at sites which could differ dramatically from one location to the next. On the other hand, like most development and subsidy programs in rural Indonesia, projects are geared towards formal bureaucratic justification and disbursement interventions rather than influencing any meaningful changes in land management functions (cf. Li, 2016 on the “project system”).

The example from Borong Rappoa proves salient. Opportunities for collaboration emerged there out of plans to build micro-hydro electricity generation. The community already had a conservation ethic, articulating important environmental services that come from upstream forests. The micro-hydro initiative provided opportunities to build common ground and discuss conservation outcomes with community members. However, any discussion of social forestry designation in relation to local land claims and cultivation rights had become too contentious. Therefore, formal government interests to pursue social forestry policy may not match community interests, but evidence from Borong Rappoa indicates that mutual outcomes for joint land management arrangements could have succeeded nonetheless.

The three cases presented herein show that outside facilitation was essential for drafting designation plans because of the challenging permitting hurdles. The plans were indeed
comprehensive but there was minimal attention to support local institutions with the knowledge or authority to implement them. In Patteneteang in particular, support by external actors (an NGO and local university) helped to make the case for HD designation. However, a learning forum in 2017 reviewing approved plans indicated that none of the management outcomes were achieved, nor was there much awareness among villagers or the BUMDes about their role in fulfilling such commitments. Intermediary NGOs played a major role in mapping, designating, and drafting plans for social forestry permits; but without meaningfully incorporating local management practices into the plans unfortunately undermines the intent of social forestry. The Patteneteang experience also highlights a lack of attentiveness on empowering local institutions with the support and authority to monitor and manage conservation areas. Lastly, in Patteneteang the BUMDes were designed as revenue generating institutions, expected to make annual returns on investment from its inception. The income imperative meanwhile, puts undue pressure on the BUMDes to generate income, income most likely generated from natural resources, and thus run counter to the intended conservation goals of social forestry.

Overall, the stated objective of social forestry, at its most basic level, is to confer greater authority to local communities. None of the cases presented herein showcase increased capacity in this light, and rather the evidence points to the creation of bureaucratic hurdles that privilege new institutional mechanisms and undermine existing local management systems. McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009) also warned of such means, noting that social forestry could prove detrimental and exclusionary to the poorest local communities, a consideration that needs to be taken seriously in future research as new interventions are administered.

V. Conclusion

So how does the implementation of social forestry projects fare, considering the experiences across three different designations across two districts in South Sulawesi? And furthermore, to what extent does social forestry present opportunities for recognizing rights, empowering livelihoods, and forest conservation? First, and most plainly, the experience highlights the continued legacy of problems over historical boundary setting processes. Jurisdictional maps, such as village maps, national forest maps, and differing perceptions over the meaning of boundaries vary greatly among stakeholders. Across Indonesia, in the worst instances, such differences cause violent conflict and further entrench mistrust within communities, particularly in their relations with formal authorities. These cases showed that
boundary setting and expansion of claims by authorities, combined with poor mapping databases across agencies continue to serve as a major barrier. Social forestry does not magically solve these disagreements, and furthermore, using social forestry to reinforce these claims can only result in further erosion of trust. This was the case in Borong Rappoa, in which collaboration was made possible by micro-hydro and conservation discussions, but ultimately broke down when the forestry agency tried to re-stake boundary claims and enforce new rules through social forestry programs. No matter the name of the program, such fundamental differences will prove difficult to overcome without the explicit acknowledgement and authority to come up with mutually agreeable solutions. Although formal actors may believe they are fulfilling their mandate, from local perspectives, livelihoods and decision-making rights are being challenged or stripped away. Boundary disputes are extremely destructive for initiating any sort of collaborative partnership.

Second, the current efforts at social forestry implementation are heavily skewed in favor of meeting administrative fulfilments, often creating new institutions and undermining local authority that have the natural resource management memory, knowledge, and experience. Administering agencies rarely conduct meaningful visits that carefully assess local considerations, and risk reinforcing obvious contentious issues like the boundary disputes highlighted above. In chasing national bureaucratic targets to meet social forestry designation and expansion, authority is taken away from local management practices. Social forestry policy implementation thus reflects another iteration of what Tania Li (2016) has called the ‘project’ system, built around administering procurement processes. As a result, based on the sites examined herein, the hope of social forestry to recognize local authority, support livelihood development, and assist conservation initiatives in their current form have missed opportunities at building mutual capacity for collaborative management arrangements. Implementation thus highlights a neglect in the devolution principle of social forestry, forgetting to honor the local practices that can help yield conservation outcomes. This was even true in Kajang, a case celebrated for its recognition of local authority, which resulted in the unintended consequence of formalizing rights that actually undermined the longstanding co-management authority protecting sacred forests.

Finally, the livelihoods programs designed for social forestry are also reflective of other agrarian subsidy programs that create alliances with certain stakeholders in communities, at
times creating new divisions among them. Seedling distribution programs highlight the power relationships among those in formal posts that divide livelihood empowerment programs among networks of local elites. Economic empowerment programs for local institutions are also poorly designed with unrealistic targets. The BUMDes experience in Patteneteang shows requirements for return on investment that would be difficult to meet in any scenario, highlighting another missed opportunity to create more equitable and realistic economic ventures.

Are social forestry policies addressing local land management concerns, providing opportunities to local institutions and individuals based on need, and supporting co-management arrangements in support of forest conservation? This important question should rise to the forefront of any assessment of social forestry implementation and set the agenda for meeting policy targets. Unfortunately, although each of these cases showed promise in affirming this central question, ultimately implementation reinforced hollow policies that erode trust between institutional and local authority. At the moment the cases herein show that administrative objectives do not differentiate social forestry outcomes from other government initiatives, whereby the shell of administrative requirements are created to mobilize a project, not to contribute to the broader longer-term land management goals and capacity building interests for supporting devolution of authority. Following this course of events, social forestry risks becoming just another project with lofty development and societal goals, reinforcing the institutional arrangements it purports to challenge.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion: Beyond recognition

Beyond recognition seeks to take the overwhelming focus on the act of gaining recognition and extend our understanding to the implications of what happens as a result. As I have shown in the precedent setting case of Kajang, alongside comparative sites elsewhere, there are some uncomfortable realities of how recognition is articulated, applied, translated, and redefined. Therefore, although indigenous rights recognition has gained global attention for its power to temper the dispossessory effects of land grabbing, there are also exclusionary outcomes that occur as a result of recognition. Indeed, as I have shown throughout, land and rights recognition on the basis of indigeneity are not immune to cooptation by local elites. Recognition, therefore, certainly does not automatically provide access to whom external proponents imagine to be the beneficiaries: the landless, vulnerable, and rural poor.

In Indonesia, the recent history of rapid land conversion in the form of aggressive logging in its forests, followed by the expansion of large-scale plantation agriculture, created conditions of dramatic environmental change and land conflict. The Forestry Ministry has overseen and been responsible for administering this legacy of change, evident from the fact that today they maintain authority to almost 2/3rds of Indonesia’s land area. Decision MK35/2012 has redirected the Ministry’s mandate, and by stating that enclosure of indigenous lands is unconstitutional, has resulted in initiatives to devolve land authority on the basis of local cultural authority. Activists and governments have forged unique partnerships that seek to operationalize this mandate, and Kajang provides an instructional first case that provides immense analytical potential. From a detailed examination of the Kajang case, this dissertation presents four main takeaways to bring greater clarity to initiatives of land rights and recognition.

The first is that recognition is not an act that universally empower indigenous people. Across Indonesia local cultural systems are shaped by a colonial legacy that was further interpreted by many of the coercive practices of the Suharto era. The positions of cultural authority in the past are often represented by the sanctioned intermediaries responsible for delivering a coercive development agenda. The notion of indigenous land rights recognition, at least discursively, has sought to challenge the inequitable outcomes of that past. Therefore, given this context, it is unsurprising that in Kajang, the very terms of formalizing recognition, as undertaken by the old and new landed elite (Karaeng and village heads), sought to do so by
asserting their indigenous cultural authority alongside their formal state-sanctioned positions to interpret recognition. In other words, the assumed relationship between recognition and redistributing access to land in Kajang was certainly never the case. As a result, some perplexing outcomes emerged.

In particular, the average Kajang, never viewed recognition as an act of empowerment. On the contrary, recognition was locally understood as a government initiative only accessible to the elites that could benefit from its interpretation. They did this by elevating recognition initiatives and establishing networks with government agencies and NGOs that offered support through procurement projects justified as development. Local Kajang saw limited benefits from such acts of recognition and certainly saw little opportunity to access land as a result. On the other hand, Kajang cultural authority interested in protecting the sacred forest lamented the fact that indigenous rights recognition actually undermined partnerships with the forestry agency. The forest rangers had long served an important role in policing the boundaries of the sacred forest, formally stopping encroachers that are no longer afraid of cultural sanctions. The highest spiritual authority in Kajang, the Ammatoa, expressed concern when forest rangers explained to him that upon recognition, they no longer had jurisdiction to help protect infractions within its borders. Recognition had been interpreted in such a way that the forestry agency was no longer required, nor allowed to support land management functions in areas recognized as having indigenous land title.

In this regard, the politics of land rights recognition in Indonesia are still contested over who gets to maintain authority and how that authority is legitimated. For example, at one governing scale suggested by the provincial level forestry agency, indigenous forests could be repossessed if the land uses were changed. This interpretation points to recognition conferring the burdens of land management in a particular way defined by outsiders, sequestering a static interpretation of forest and land management even under indigenous authority. In opposition, land rights activists have proposed that recognition confers even broader rights to the area of Kajang influence and thus increases their rights to decide land management outcomes. This perspective speaks to demands to reclaim land enclosed from the large Lonsum rubber plantation. However, at the current political juncture, challenging the plantation are quickly silenced on the basis that land rights were already recognized for the sacred forest, suggesting
that significant goodwill had already been given to the Kajang. Meanwhile, regional elites have already indicated that the land concession to the plantation have already been extended.

In sum, although recognition is framed as a tool for empowerment, and indeed presents a powerful tool of legitimation, it should not be presumed that such outcomes are in any ways automatic. In the current context of Indonesia’s political moment, the focus is on formally establishing as much recognition as possible, securing formal recognition, and quickly moving on to the next site.

The second main takeaway that emerges from this dissertation, is that any form of rights recognition must be contextualized in the longstanding political economic factors that shape and reproduce the landscape. In this way I have sought to contextualize how recognition is situated alongside land relations in Kajang. Does recognition somehow affect the existing land contestation that are taking place, and if yes, in what ways? To answer this question, I described the two main features of land tenure in Kajang. The first is gillirang, a system of individual ownership of annual rotational tenure on the basis of kin and ancestry. Gillirang tenure is associated with the two main seasonal crops grown in Kajang, rice and corn, which get two rotations per year. In the past, the main staple food was corn; and, the first priority was to plant a traditional variety locally called white corn. In recent years however, the increasing emphasis on cash crops has made way to prioritizing the production of yellow corn. Rice, on the other hand, is the other main crop grown on gillirang land. Rice has become the main staple food in the past two decades, which has resulted in increasing contestations to accessing gillirang claims for rice production. Meanwhile, less and less people have access to sawah for two reasons: the mechanization of agriculture; and, the increased dependence on agricultural inputs that reduce labor for production and in turn decreases the distribution of yield. Rice has also become “capitalized” beyond its uses for producing food. The increasing importance of the ceremonial value of rice, as well as rice as a gift and means of social exchange, has heightened demands for access and thus increased its value. Every ceremony demands an increasing quota of rice, and without being able to access sawah, households have to spend more to purchase it. The terms of access for gillirang are also being negotiated by increasingly coercive practices among a shrinking cadre of gatekeepers that are described as the “mafia gillirang.” This group claims authority of interpreting ancestral claims and uses such knowledge to provide access or exclude land rights.
But the most dramatic impacts related to land are taking place on what used to be the frontier. The frontier once provided a safety valve for new households to access land. This frontier was also the site of shifting cultivation that included more diverse species and uses. This frontier has now been enclosed however, identified as individual private lands that are the sites tree crop cultivation for cash crops. These tree crops create a longer permanence on these lands, and the labor required to manage a rubber, clove, or black pepper grove are increasingly limited. Although at first cash crops first challenged the old landed elite, more recently, the rapid expansion of tree crops transitioned to processes of land accumulation among a new emergent landed elite. Success from these crop booms help local influential decision makers to run for local village offices. Becoming a village head thereafter translates into the opportunity to access formal decision-making powers of the state and the opportunity to negotiate development projects. The alliance between the old landed elite, namely the longstanding aristocracy of the Karaeng, with the new landed elite representative among these village heads, are the very actors that have actively taken up the cause of indigenous rights recognition. It is also clear that the projects that have emerged from recognition serve to support the notions of development among these influential actors.

The third key takeaway is the approach to generationing agrarian change. In what I call landscapes of potential, I position two influential youth within the key land tenure categories of the landscape. Youth that imagine a future in gillirang, are increasingly distressed about their ability to fulfill a role on the landscape. Even the exemplary cases of youth successful in participating in the means of production on the gillirang landscape, are concerned about their future prospects, seeking out prospects to acquire private lands. They also coordinate groups to migrate to nearby areas undergoing rice planting and harvest seasons, willing to be paid in yield. They are also increasingly distrustful of formal institutions, pessimistic about the benefits of recognition, which they sense only benefit the local elite. Meanwhile, those that have been successful in accumulating private lands as part of crop booms have welcomed recognition, creating local organizations that serve to implement future programming. They are fortunate to have the opportunity to go to college in the regional capital of Makassar, and describe a future Kajang that has cell towers, cafes with wifi, and a place with “smart” agriculture. They propose the development of a local college and a soccer field, a new village hall, and want to attract initiatives for soil testing that can help them identify the best commodity to plant in the region.
They plan these futures with a sense of pride about what it means to be Kajang. In all, an intersectional examination of youth and their place on the landscape, as well as exploring their visions and possibilities on that landscape, provides unique analytical potential. Connecting the most prominent voices among the local landed elite with a broader transnational movement that discursively evokes land access to the poor and dispossessed farmer, also poses some awkward contradictions on the outcomes of recognition.

And the fourth, and final key takeaway relates to the methodological approach of a landscape political ecology. The participatory approaches to doing research at various scales, mixing land cover analysis contextualized by participating in the production of the landscape presents powerful analytical possibility in examining issues related to land dilemmas and landscape change. Methodologically my landscape political ecology approach combined remote sensing and GIS with land classifications of a set period in time. This land cover information was used to engage existing land relations and also to better understand the dynamics associated with change. My static approach to land cover analysis provided a facilitation tool to explore change. Complemented with the archival and historical research, I identified the broader genealogies of land relations and authority in Kajang, as well as how access to state systems are still being redefined by local indigenous leadership authority that claims to negotiate formal policy as Kajang representatives. The scale of my analysis reflexively engaged on household land holdings across various land categories and spatial representation of crop production, but further incorporated village planning initiatives and regional scale analysis across subdistricts, presenting a picture that maintains relevance when seen from a national lens of what might be possible from recognition policies.

In conclusion, the findings of this dissertation are not limited to indigenous rights recognition, nor are they limited to Indonesia. But it is to say, that as evident from other cases of agrarian change, that recognition is unevenly distributed. Social movements in Indonesia advocating for conflict resolution through acts such as land rights, gained much momentum and legitimacy by invoking indigenous land rights. However, due to the unevenly distributed benefits that are unfolding in the ways I have described herein, the anticipation that decolonization, and environmental and social justice will follow, are not automatic. I have shown that various actors involved in governing landscapes have very different ideas about recognition, what it represents, and what it is intended to achieve. Maintaining focus on Kajang as I have done throughout this
dissertation highlights what is lost when social movements make the case for recognition and quickly turn away. Although advocacy to defend the local has historically been on the basis of defending against large scale plantation enclosures, the ability must consider that its outcomes can also reproduce and reinforce the same outcomes. Thinking about land rights must be able to get beyond the assumed benefits of regulatory initiatives, and highlighting this key blind spot can perhaps open up the possibilities for what different strategies can achieve.

Simply put, in this dissertation I have sought to explain what happens when land is given back to local indigenous authority, or at least how land is imagined to be returned to communities through a formal regulatory process. The recognition process of the Kajang, and titling of Kajang sacred forests, was indeed a significant event given that it represented a material and legitimate challenge to Indonesia’s vast national forests, and for some, symbolized the opportunity to contest historical enclosures and increasingly aggressive land grabbing behaviors. I thus sought to explain the broader phenomenon encompassed by first understanding the processes of recognition and titling itself, and second, the way that recognition and title are experienced locally. In this way I have shown what happens when land is given back, and more specifically what the effects are more broadly for the movement contesting such rights, as well as what the expectations of such recognition looks like locally.

When I raise these awkward outcomes among the most vociferous supporters of contesting national forests based on indigeneity, activists tend to respond by saying that indigeneity is the strongest, most effective, and indeed among the few remaining options for contesting land against powerful global land grabbing practices transforming landscapes across Indonesia and beyond. Nevertheless, I have shown that the imagined outcomes of empowering land scarce communities to gain access to land for their livelihoods did not occur in Kajang. This does not preclude that the symbolism of Kajang victory has not helped to contest land elsewhere, as activists suggest. In parts of chapter 2 and in chapter 6 I take on this notion of defending local land rights by examining available examples from sites elsewhere across Indonesia. I compared with other sites of land recognition available in the literature and conducted field research at sites that suggest a transfer of authority to local community control. Even in the best-case scenarios, the approaches to administering redistributive policies for land access in national forests seems necessarily half-hearted in their transfer of authority, burdened by bureaucratic systems that require adding new layers of administrative requirements to make claims. The outcomes lead to
similar ones as I have described in Kajang, reinforcing local elites in formal posts, and unsurprisingly exacerbating longstanding land conflicts.

The applications of this research not only points to these methodological elements of entering the landscape but also highlights the practical and strategic implications for those that promote policy through the imaginary of what such victories set out to, and can, achieve. As social movement actors work with the state to formalize indigeneity it might be timely to reconsider the strategies that to better capture the viewpoints and strategic direction that might be advocated by communities from below. Without considering such a vision, the movement in Indonesia, one that considers itself the largest and most diverse network of indigenous communities in the world, might undermine its many strides by forcing regulatory successes that quickly look away upon achieving recognition. Hence, rather than focusing a great deal of its efforts on pursuing such formal outcomes, a more strategic approach might be to build a bottom up coalition that connects the mutual concerns of rural Indonesians – ones that look beyond recognition to supporting those in need of land access.

I thus conclude with two issues, one that looks upwards to the movement and its global alliances, and second, one that re-examines the land relations unfolding in Kajang. The first is in relation to an encounter with a well-known scholar-activist that traveled to Kajang to further highlight the Kajang as a model for replication and regulatory success. The researcher, a part of AMAN’s policy team building a case for a formal law on recognizing indigenous people and their land rights, sought to highlight the economic values of an indigenous community. This researcher approached me because he had heard of my spatial analysis and land cover categories of each commodity. I shared all the raw data and also presented a table of the numbers that categorized hectares by land cover category. I requested further updates about the utilization of this data. I found out later that the land cover data was monetized with a financial value to make the case that there is great wealth in Kajang. In short, the strategies being employed by the social movement advocating for indigeneity continue to highlight simplifications and misrepresentations to create a narrative that uncritically reinforces power relations among local elite in these communities.
Secondly, some of the emerging developments relative to local land and capitalist relations in Kajang examine the mobility of Kajang beyond its ancestral area of territorial influence. As the frontier was fully enclosed decades ago, Kajang have developed a large network of migration in search of new frontiers. Indeed, people from Kajang have developed powerful networks to access and control land in a nearby national forest. These forests have a completely different set of meaning from the sacred forests that are protected by local custom. These forests are categorized as new frontiers that one might have moved into in the past had they had the capacity to open up new land. Such a frontier in a neighboring province, one that requires several hours of travel over land and sea, points to a changing spatial representation of place among the Kajang. Rates of land conversion unfolding in the forests of Southeast Sulawesi province have also cause alarm among administrators. Therefore, the narrative of Kajang as forest protectors is also giving way to a narrative of Kajang forest destroyers when seen from a perspective beyond the local. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to hear about a Kajang family owning tens of hectares of land in this emergent frontier of Southeast Sulawesi. When I ask them what they are growing, they describe this new opportunity through opportunities of a clove rush unfolding there. These migrants are not the land poor of Kajang however, although they may assign landless family members to protect their claims in Southeast Sulawesi while they are able to continue living in Kajang. Therefore, although a new frontier has been discovered, it is certainly with the intent of protecting the forest, nor is it perceived as an opportunity to redistributed access to those that have the greatest need for land.
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