Fuel on the Fire:

The Case Against Arming Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts

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*Dataset 1 is included as an appendix solely as a convenience for the reader, it is identical to the dataset found on pg 35.

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Introduction and Significance

The wave of nonviolent campaigns known as the Arab Spring had come to Syria in March of 2011. In spite of 50 years of violent government repression under the state of emergency law, protesters opposed to the government remained, by and large, peaceful in their pursuit of change for the first three months of opposition. In June 2011 groups of soldiers who refused to continue firing upon citizens began defecting to join the protesters, fleeing or taking up arms against the government. Small arms and light weapons were beginning to flow into Syria from abroad both through overt means and covert sponsorship by foreign governments. Defected soldiers and some protesters utilized these weapons to engage in hostilities against the Assad administration. Using at various times both covert and overt means, the United States was among the nations which supplied these militant opposition groups, providing the necessary means to perpetuate the civil war which has now lasted for, at the time of writing, six years and claimed no fewer than 400,000 lives by February of 2016.\(^1\) In July of 2017, headlines declared that the United States had announced that it would discontinue its program to train and arm Syrian rebels.\(^2\) Whether this discontinuation will end all US funding to Syrian rebels, or push them into covert program is questionable, since the similar announcements were made in 2013\(^3\)

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and again in 2015. The Syrian civil war is the deadliest civil war thus far to begin in the 21st century. The Syrian civil war prompts the question, what causes the onset of civil wars in the 21st century, especially when nonviolence has been proven to be an effective tool for enacting political change in the face of tyranny?

Since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of interstate conflict has been in decline, while the instance of intrastate conflicts have been on the rise. This has led many academics who focus on international relations to address the question, “What causes the onset of a civil war?” Within international relations, this problem is typically framed as “Why do nonstate actors choose to engage in violent conflict with state actors?” Through this framing, we understand the political, social and economic instabilities which lead groups to oppose the government. What if the question were framed differently, and instead of focusing on the relationship between the nonstate actor and the nation state which they oppose, the question examined the relationship between the nonstate actor and the international community? There are other ways that this initial question, “What causes the onset of a civil war?” can be reframed. I propose reframing the question to “Does a foreign state providing military aid to nonstate actors increase the probability of onset of violent intrastate conflict?” Within this reframed question, I hypothesize that, other factors being similar, the presence or absence of foreign military support from regional or global powers competing to dominate regional power structures are a decisive factor in whether or not intrastate violence will occur, and the extent of that intrastate violence. More specifically, I hypothesize that as foreign military support increases, the probability of onset, duration, and intensity of civil wars will also increase.

Initially it may seem curious to focus on the relationship between foreign state actors and nonstate. There are, however, two compelling reasons to reframe the question as such. The first of these reasons, is that the initial emphasis on the relationship between the nonstate actor and the state in which it operates has, in addition to being examined with relative thoroughness, fails to account for the fact that the onset of violent intrastate conflict has many of the same root causes as the onset of nonviolent intrastate conflict, e.g. protests, sit ins, boycotts, and general strikes intended to force the state to concede to social economic or political change. Both violent and nonviolent intrastate conflict are rooted in economic, social and political instability and inequality, and it is vital to understand what prompts the nonstate actor to choose violence instead of nonviolence when it has resolved to oppose the state.

The second key factor which is important to consider is that foreign states make policy decisions around the idea that they can cause a civil war in another state. Acting under this assumption, state actors will fund groups of militant nonstate actors in order intrastate conflict in nations with which they have adversarial relationships. In a highly publicized modern example, the United States offered several arguments for arming Syrian rebels opposed to the Assad administration. Some of those arguments which became the official reasoning behind supplying and training violent opposition groups in Syria include the providing the Syrian people the means to defend themselves from the government,\textsuperscript{5} to allow the nonstate actors to depose the state actor which is allied with various states with which the United States has an adversarial relationship.\textsuperscript{6}

and that proven military strength would translate into strength at the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{7} In spite of these arguments, the official policy of the Obama administration was to provide a sufficient armament and training for rebels to engage in hostilities, but not sufficient to defeat the Assad regime, and thus force all parties to negotiate a peace treaty from a position of stalemate.\textsuperscript{8} This raises the question of whether or not providing military support to nonstate actors achieves these goals. However, before these long term goals of defense, destabilization and negotiation can be assessed, it is important to undertake a the study of the preliminary topic which has yet to be satisfactorily studied by the academic community: does arming nonstate actors cause civil wars, or are these policy decisions made on faulty logic?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Support: Opposition Tactics Binary</th>
<th>Opposition Utilized Nonviolence</th>
<th>Opposition Utilized Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Support Absent</td>
<td>19 (42%)</td>
<td>8 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Support Present</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18 (40%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Military Support and Dominant Opposition Tactics: Binary

Figure 1: Military Support and Dominant Opposition Tactics: Binary, found above is derived from Dataset 1: Violence, Fragility, Military and Diplomatic Support in Intrastate Conflicts, examines intrastate conflicts from 2000 to 2015. From this table, two things are evident. First, that in 70\% (19/27) of intrastate conflict in which foreign military support was absent, the nonstate actor elected to utilize nonviolent conflict. More strikingly, in all cases in which a nonstate actor received military aid. While this does not necessarily prove causation in


and of itself, the fact that all not a single nonstate actor who received military aid committed itself to nonviolence, and that a strong majority of nonstate actors which did not receive such aid waged nonviolent campaigns suggests that close examination of the the relationship between military aid provided to nonstate actors, and the incidence of violent intrastate conflict is warranted.
Literature Review

Initially it would seem that the study of violent and nonviolent intrastate conflict should constitute a single, unified body of literature, as they both deal with intrastate revolutionary conflict, and in fact, there is some small level of crossover between the two fields of research. However, by and large the two are considered to be wholly separate fields which infrequently draw upon one another. Due to the separation of these two bodies of research, the section in the following literature review devoted to intrastate conflict will be divided into two separate portions, one portion addressing the work which is primarily about civil wars and other violent intrastate conflict, and the second portion which predominantly deals with non-violent intrastate conflict.

The final segment of the literature review will not address intrastate conflict directly. Rather, it will examine the literature surrounding state fragility, that is, the susceptibility of states to fall into or fall back into an intrastate conflict. There are two reasons for this inclusion. First, many factors, including social, economic, and political instability have been determined to correlate to the onset of both violent and nonviolent intrastate conflicts. The second reason for the inclusion of state fragility is that a fragility index allows an approximation of a controlled variable, where a true control would be both impossible and unethical to create.

Literature on Civil Wars and Other Violent Intrastate Conflict

There are some factors that are generally accepted as contributing to violent civil conflict; political instability, economic instability, ethnic and racial tensions, and competition for resources due both to necessity and greed. There are several hypotheses as to what precisely the underlying causes of civil war are. Laitin and Fearon found that the major factors associated
with intrastate violence by promoting or permitting the recruitment and training of insurrectionists include: extreme poverty, political instability, large populations, rough terrain, and external financing.\textsuperscript{9} Azam and Mesnard data suggest that that although ethnic tensions are correlated with the occurrence of civil war, these tensions are more symptomatic of the problem. The primary underlying factors, their data suggest, are economic inequality, the relative fighting forces of the government and the rebels, the level of integration of ethnolinguistic minorities in the government military force, and the lack of credibility of the government.\textsuperscript{10} Critically, Azam and Mesnard’s model uses the factionalism of the excluded ethnolinguistic group as a proxy for fighting power, and does not directly assess the group’s access to foreign military aid. Regan and Norton in contrast, in studying the onset of protest, rebellion, and civil war, found that a combination of economic discrimination, heterogeneous ethnolinguism, and past government repression of political expression, including repression of action, are the key indicators of civil war.\textsuperscript{11} They found further that extractable resources decrease the likelihood of of civil war’s onset, but once a civil war has begun, tend to extend the duration, which is directly in contrast to the findings of Fearon and Laitin. Although they do not include foreign military aid in their study, Regan and Norton’s data do seem to suggest a valid alternate hypothesis as a possibility, given that some economic and political indicators proved statistically significant in determining rebellion, some in determining civil war, and some in determining protest, especially that while significant levels of discrimination increased the likelihood of civil war dramatically, similar

levels of discrimination did not appear to impact the likelihood of nonviolent protest. Ted Gurr offers another hypothesis in his book *Why Men Rebel*. He posits that “relative deprivation” that is the difference between what individuals and groups perceive they have received or will receive, in proportion to what “they think they are rightfully entitled to receive,” as a key driving factor in determining where collective violence will occur. Essentially, the claim is that a sense of injustice is what causes men to react violently, and this makes sense from Gurr’s standpoint, as he was specifically examining urban American race riots, and trying to determine why violence was occurring.

**Literature on Nonviolent Conflict**

Literature on nonviolent conflict is largely drawn from the interdisciplinary field of peace studies which draws from political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, theology and history. In spite of having roots in political science, political scientists rarely draw upon the discipline’s body of literature. Nevertheless, the field of peace studies has made several theoretical and practical contributions which assist in the framing of the problem. For the purposes of this research, the most useful insights drawn from peace studies address the reasons for conflict, the effectiveness of conflict, and the some theoretical framing devices which will allow us to examine the factuality of the claims which justify providing military support to nonstate actors.

Unconvinced of the monolithic power of the nation state, economist Kenneth Boulding proposed that there are three main types of political power by which actors can seek to bring about change: threat power, or the power to coerce, exchange power, based in economic

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exchanges, and integrative power, or the power to cooperate based on respect, love, legitimacy and community building.\textsuperscript{13} While it is not of specific import to this essay’s examination of the onset of violent intrastate conflict, the sunk costs fallacy, which Boulding terms the “sacrifice trap,” seems to be of particular importance in examining the long term effects of militarily supporting nonstate actors in an intrastate conflict begins, it is unlikely to diminish or be halted due to the preceding sacrifices made by the conflict parties.\textsuperscript{14}

While in international relations, conflicts are often thought of as being zero sum, that is that either one side is victorious and the other is defeated, the conflict parties negotiate a compromise which will not please either side, or the conflict will continue, sociologist Johan Galtung proposed that there can be another outcome: a mutually beneficial agreement under which both conflict parties are in a better position through cooperation, and in which human lives and necessities are necessarily respected on all sides. Furthermore Galtung pioneered systematic peacebuilding efforts and advocated for such efforts to be undertaken by the United Nations and other international organizations, as well as focusing on positive peace, or systemic justice, equality and satisfaction. Lastly, although Galtung has published widely in economics, peace, nonviolence and peacebuilding, the strongest direct contribution to this research made by Galtung’s legacy is the founding of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), whose dataset is heavily utilized in this research, and cited later.

While Boulding and Galtung were among the academics and activists who largely worked to alter the existing systems from within, sociologist Gene Sharp is an academic renowned for his work on nonviolent campaigns. \textit{The Politics of Nonviolent Action}, divided into


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
three parts, is arguably the single most influential document in modern nonviolent thought, and from this work several theories critical to nonviolent campaigns are drawn. In Part I, *Power and Struggle*, Sharp posits two theories. First, the Pluralistic-dependency theory, contrasts the typical monolith theory of power by claiming that political power is derived inherently from the consent and cooperation of the governed, granted for a variety of reasons, an inherently capable of being withdrawn. The second key idea is that nonviolence is one of seven possible types of action which can be utilized in a power struggle. These are: Inaction, verbal persuasion, peaceful institutional behavior with threat of violent or nonviolent action, violence against persons, violence against persons and material destruction, material destruction, and nonviolent action. He also offers various historic case studies which illustrate the use of various active nonviolent techniques, including those employed during the early Russian Revolution, in Gandhi’s opposition to British rule, the American Civil Rights movement, WWII anti Nazi movements, among others. While this first part is arguably the strongest contribution to academic theory, parts two, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, and three, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, are arguably the more important contribution to nonviolent campaigns in practice. Part two lays the functional methods by which nonviolent campaigns can be waged, including methods of social, political and economic noncooperation. Part three explains the organizational structure of waging nonviolent conflict. Sharp emphasizes turning the state’s military strength and

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16 Ibid.
violent repression into political leverage against the state through both cohesive opposition and garnering external condemnation has earned him special distinction as a scholar whose work has been directly disseminated to and utilized by nonstate actors as a training material to train nonviolent opposition groups. His 1993 pamphlet *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* further refines the arguments made in *Power and Struggle*. From Dictatorship to Democracy has thus far been translated into 30 languages, and widely circulated as a practical guide intended to guide nonviolent activists in attaining political change. Included among the activist groups which utilized Sharp’s works as training material were the anti Mubarak revolutionaries in Egypt, and the Serbian resistance group Otpor!, the leadership of which later formed the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), who went on to educate several other nonviolent opposition groups in my dataset.

Political scientist Peter Ackerman has written extensively on nonviolence, authoring several works on the matter, including *Strategic Nonviolent Tactics: the Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, coauthored with Christopher Kruegler in 1994, as well as editing *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* with Jack Duvall in 2000. In these works, Ackerman and his coauthors examine the tactics and strategies which are utilized by nonviolent campaigns which lack access to credible military power, to disempower governments, enact political change, and operate nonviolently when faced with violent repression. Ackerman notes specifically that not all campaigns are successful, and that even successful campaigns tend

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to experience violent repression. In *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*, coauthored by Adrian Karatnycky et al. published in 2005, examined nonviolent campaigns from 1970 to 2000, examining whether those campaigns were carried out by popular dissent or by powered elites, as well as the level of political and civil freedoms present in the country both at the time of the campaign and in 2005, a minimum of five years after the campaign. This study found that a statistically significant proportion of states which experience nonviolent political transition will also experience greater levels of freedom, and that this effect is especially pronounced in cases where civic engagement and not opposition parties within the ruling elite are the primary opposition to the state.24

Many of the same factors which are associated with the outbreak of civil war are also commonly associated with the outbreak of nonviolent political action. These sources of conflict include: social and economic inequality, political and economic instability, and ethnic and racial tensions. Making these general associations requires a somewhat broader familiarity with the body of literature on nonviolent intrastate conflict compared with the body of research on violent intrastate conflict. This is due to the fact that, in general, the study of civil wars and other forms of violent intrastate conflict tends to be dominated by statistical analysis, while the study of nonviolent intrastate conflict heavily leans toward qualitative analysis, with an emphasis on case studies and historiographies. Since these studies are not generally rooted in quantitative analysis, it is more difficult to do statistical analysis on nonviolent conflicts.

This trend may be changing. In 2011 Chenoweth and Stephan published *Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, which is among the first serious

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efforts to statistically analyze nonviolent conflict generally.\textsuperscript{25} Chenoweth and Stephan’s research is particularly pertinent in this research, because their data suggests that where nonviolent conflict establishes change, civil war is less likely to erupt. Their findings also indicate that violent and nonviolent conflict have different relative success rates, dependent upon what type of outcome is sought by each party, with nonviolent forms of conflict being generally more successful than violent conflict. Vitally, they found that the larger proportion of the population that opposes the state, the more likely that that campaign is to succeed, with the critical mass needed to topple a government being 3.5% of the total population.\textsuperscript{26} Their data shows that nonviolent campaigns, being inherently less physically demanding than violent campaigns, are also more inclusive of the general population, and therefore more likely to attain this critical mass and more likely to become a successful campaign than a violent campaign.\textsuperscript{27} Chenoweth and Stephan’s Data also demonstrate that popular civil resistance campaigns are more likely to produce a free democracy than a violent campaign.\textsuperscript{28}

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\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. See especially Figure 2.1 on pg. 40. See also Chenoweth, Erica. \textit{My Talk at TEDxBoulder: Civil Resistance and the “3.5% Rule.”} Rational Insurgent. 4 November 2013. Accessed 15 November 2017. Accessed at https://rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04/my-talk-at-tedxboulder-civil-resistance-and-the-3-5-rule/#_edn5  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. See also NAVCO 2 Dataset.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
on violent intrastate conflict. This is due to the fact that, in general, the study of civil wars and other forms of violent intrastate conflict tends to be dominated by statistical analysis, while the study of nonviolent intrastate conflict heavily leans toward qualitative analysis, with an emphasis on case studies and historiographies. Since these studies are not generally rooted in quantitative analysis, it is more difficult to do statistical analysis on nonviolent conflicts.

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**Literature on State Fragility**

There are many databases on state fragility. These include the CIFP State Fragility Index, the Fund For Peace (FFP) Fragile States Index (formerly the Failed States Index), the World Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (Formerly the Low-Income Countries Under Stress), the Marshall-Goldstone State Fragility Index, and the Brookings Institute’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World are the most renowned internationally. Each of these indexes, and many others, attempt to do roughly the same thing: assess where states are in danger of the outset of intrastate conflict, and inform policy decisions to prevent such conflicts. To do

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so, they take examine and quantitatively rate individual components which correlate to political, economic, and social instability and inequality. From these individual ratings, a composite rating for each state is made to determine the state’s susceptibility to collapse, civil war and mass protest. The various organizations behind these datasets publish not only their databases, but also some reports detailing situations and areas of special concern to which their evidence points.

In spite of being quantitatively valid, that is, the various formulae are internally consistent, and statistically sound in their reasoning, there has been much critique of the utility of a state fragility dataset. The CIA, citing all of the above datasets as well as internal datasets, and other datasets conducted by the United States government, claimed that “quantitative approaches have helped to sound alarms, but not to develop policies, plans, or strategies to address potential crises.”

Elaborating that this is due to an inability of quantitative models to predict intrastate conflict, claiming that “The best (fragility model) among them predict instability; the rest measure vulnerability.” The CIA’s analysis further notes the failure of these models to predict actual state instability, such as that which swept through the middle east in 2011’s Arab Spring, and the fact that these indexes score all state types in a uniform manner, and fail to take into consideration unique governmental, social and economic makeup of individual states.

Governmental agencies and policy leaders are not the only groups with serious criticism of these models. Claire Leigh, head of Great Britain based Overseas Development Institute, notes that the quantitative model utilized by the Fragile State Index lacks the ability to draw causal

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31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
conclusions from the data.\textsuperscript{33} Although this critique was made of the Fragile State Index specifically due to the dataset’s international prominence, it is equally valid most similar existing quantitative models. Further refining the critique of this model, Beehner and Young note that these models fail to consider fragility of regions within a state, at a province or city level, a bias against non-western states, the weight of individual components within the formula of the dataset, and the inability of the model to predict both violent and nonviolent intrastate conflict.\textsuperscript{34} Beehner and Young are also among the many to notice the fact that models of state fragility recognize violent intrastate conflict as being a measure of state instability, thus making them tautologically consequential.\textsuperscript{35} Essentially, this model says that fragile states have civil wars, and states in which a civil war is currently occurring is fragile.\textsuperscript{36}

With these serious, well founded critiques of the weaknesses of quantitatively predicting intrastate conflict through this sort of dataset, it may seem curious that this research nevertheless elects to utilize indexes on state fragility. While these weaknesses are legitimately well founded, the simple truth is that this research is not attempting to utilize these datasets in the predictive, policy informing manner for which they are ostensibly intended, but instead as a method of examining the condition of various states prior to the outset of conflict, and attempt to find conditions as closely resembling that of other states as possible.


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
Databases Utilized for Quantitative Research

Databases on Violent Conflict

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database

Housed at Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is actually an aggregation of several datasets. The datasets vary in their level of granularity, with several related datasets differing only in whether they deal with conflict in terms of years, months or days. Two of UCDP’s datasets are of special interest to my research. The first dataset is UCDP/PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016, which compiles data on violent conflicts in which at least one belligerent was a state’s government, and which details, among other things the duration and intensity of violent conflict, as well as what outside countries supported each side of the conflict, though again they do not divide this support into strictly military support or nonmilitary support. The second dataset, UCDP External Support - Primary Warring Party Dataset, includes each primary warring party in a violent conflict by year, the nations which offered those groups support, and the types of support that were offered. Vital to my research, these divisions include, among others, a level of support given in the forms material, logistics, and training; and in the form of troops provided as a secondary combatant. There are three major difficulties in utilizing this dataset meaningfully in terms of this research. First, the dataset is current only until 2009,

meaning the past 8 years are absent in this report. Second, this dataset only utilizes disclosed, overt support. This is understandable, since the researchers likely do not have access to or are prohibited from disclosing classified data on covert actions. This limitation is highly problematic for understanding the real level of support, as much military support given by state actors to nonstate actors is covert in nature.

**Correlates of War Project**

Another valuable source is the Correlates of War Project. Before the UCDP/PRIO Datasets on conflict, the Correlates of War Project was the gold standard for tracking global conflicts. In regards to interstate conflict, this is largely still the case. The Correlates of War Project examines data on violent militarized conflict beginning in 1816 on interstate, extrastate, intrastate and nonstate wars, with sustained fighting and a minimum threshold of 1000 combat fatalities over a 12 month period.41 There are several limitations to using the data of the correlates of war. First, the most recent 2016 dataset only includes conflicts as recent as 2007, and data accurate as of 2010. Secondly, with its much higher threshold for fatalities, small scale conflicts and rapid coups will inherently not be evaluated by the Correlates of War Project. While the emphasis on large conflicts is not an inherent shortcoming, its emphasis on large scale conflict and especially the limited availability of data from conflicts occurring in the past decade have prompted the decision to use the Correlates of War Project’s as a corroborating database, instead of the primary database for this research.

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41 Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman “Intra-State War Data (v. 4.1). Resort to War 1816 - 2007. CQ Press. 2010.
Building upon Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey’s original dataset, version 5.0 of the National Military Capabilities dataset, does fairly examine the national military capacities of all recognized nation states, examining their level of industrialization, urbanization, troops, and production of iron and steel for heavy industry. The National Military Capabilities dataset, however, fails to take into account the availability of troops, arms and logistics to nonstate actors, or external military support granted to either state or nonstate actors. For these reasons, the National Military Capabilities Dataset is highly suited to examine the capacity of states in violent interstate conflicts, which is the dataset’s intended purpose, while making it unsuitable to approximate the ability of nonstate actors to engage in violent conflict against states.

**HIIK Conflict Barometer**

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research Conflict Barometer, examines the elements of political conflict, specifically the personnel, casualties, refugees, destruction, threat to existence, including personal destruction, and the means, consequences and intensity of the conflict. The Conflict Barometer distinguishes into five types of conflict; disputes, nonviolent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and war, and studies how these conflicts evolve over time. Of particular note, the Conflict Barometer differentiates between interstate, intrastate, substate and transstate conflicts. Where substate conflicts involve only non state actors, “transstate conflicts involve both state and non state actors and meet the criteria of political conflict for at least two sovereign states.”

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note in conducting this research for two reasons. First, the conflict barometer has been published annually since 1991, which makes it the most consistent source of data which examines conflict which is both violent and nonviolent in nature, and which is both interstate and intrastate in nature. Many years of its first decade were published only in the German Language, however, including the years 2000 and 2001. The second point of note concerning the Conflict Barometer, is that in examining both nonviolent and violent conflict, it emphasizes concrete actions and has no minimum number of casualties in a conflict, which allows it to be utilized to examine small conflicts, and also significantly increases the number of conflicts which appear on the Conflict Barometer compared to other conflict indices. This does, however lead it to bear more violent conflicts than does the UCDP-PRIO databases. This paper will utilize the quantitative limits of the UCDP-PRIO databases in determining which violent intrastate conflicts to examine.

Plowshares Fund

The Plowshares Fund is an international think tank dedicated to encouraging disarmament of chemical, biological, radiological, and especially nuclear armaments. While they do fund research, they focus primarily in the advocating and researching, prevention, disarmament and decommissioning of nuclear armaments. While the Plowshares Fund does incidentally address nonstate actors in its concern for groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda obtaining weapons grade fissile material, the fund generally isn’t going to be highly useful in addressing intrastate the the relationship between military aid and violent intrastate conflict. This stems largely from the fact that no state is permitted to provide nuclear grade weapons or fissile material to any non-state actor under any circumstances, and all states have every reason not to
provide such materiel to nonstate actors. This renders the bulk of the Plowshare Fund’s data to be of highly limited use for this paper.

SIPRI

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has a broad body of research. Among its databases are two which are of particular interest to this research. The Arms Transfers Database shows all international transfers of international armaments between 1950 and 2016 (the most recent calendar year.). This data includes transfers to some non state actors, including Hamas, and unfortunately this data is limited to official arms transfers, and excludes arms transfers to almost all non-state transfers, which leaves large gaps in the SIPRI’s dataset. This renders this dataset particularly useful for determining the relationship between military aid to a state which is amid a crisis and the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict. However it does require that another resource be acquired in order to determine the relationship between military aid to non state actors and the incidence of violent intrastate conflict.

The other major database which will be useful is SIPRI’s database on arms embargoes, which has information, including their scope and aims, on all multilateral arms embargoes enacted by all international organizations or groups of nations since 1998, and for the majority of arms embargoes between 1950 and 1998.

**Databases on Nonviolent Conflict**

**NAVCO**

The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project examines the success rates of major violent and nonviolent resistance efforts from 1900 until 2011.46

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Especially pertinent to my research, the NAVCO Dataset examines a wealth of variables, including official foreign support for both the existing regime and the opposition forces and level of relative peacefulness or violence utilized during the resistance. What the NAVCO dataset fails to do is distinguish between military and nonmilitary support to the resistance group, although they do distinguish between support from states, diasporas and NGO’s. A major issue with working with the NAVCO 2 database in my selected timeframe is the fact that the NAVCO 2 Database only includes conflicts until 2006.

**Databases on State Fragility**

**Fragile State Index (FSI)**

Formerly called the Failed States Index, the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index details the indicators in which a state is unstable politically, militarily, economically and socially.\(^{47}\) This is broken down into several subcategories including: Poverty and Economic Decline, and Human Rights and the Rule of Law; which are then broken into distinct indicators such as Unemployment, and Political Freedoms. This data will be especially useful in identifying and controlling for the similar levels of instability between states when selecting states for case studies. In addition to being limited in the means common to fragility indexes already discussed, this data is further limited, because in spite of being compiled annually, the FSI began in 2005.\(^{48}\)

**Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (Formerly Low INcome Countries Under Stress, also Formerly Fragile States List)**

The World Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations defines a state as being fragile if that state has a rating on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment of 3.2 or less, or if it


has had a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission within the preceding three year period.
Consequently, the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations can not be utilized to predict fragile
states in any real sense of the term. Rather, it provides a supporting opinion on the status of states
listed in the Fragile States Index. For practical purposes related to this essay, the Harmonized list
is only capable of ensuring that the research is not examining “new intrastate conflicts” in active
war zones, or regions which were recently active war zones. The Harmonized List of Fragile
Situations only has data available beginning in fiscal year 2006.49

Country Indicator for Foreign Policy

Founded in the late 1990’s upon the earlier Canadian project GEOPOL geopolitical
database, The Country Indicator for Foreign Policy(CIFP) is a joint effort led by Carleton
University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and the Canadian Government
dedicated to studying the effects of state fragility and assessing the best policy alleviate such
problems. While generally the Fragile States Index is in wider international use today, the CIFP
continues to produce well researched indices in state fragility with the aim of affecting research
driven policy for enactment both among the international community in regard to states at risk
of violent intrastate conflict, and for domestic implementation within those at risk states, as well
as serving to inform Canadian foreign policy through the Operational Research and Analysis
Establishment of the Department of National Defense.50 The CIFP is especially useful for this
research due to having been established just prior to the period of examination (2000 - 2015).

https://carleton.ca/cifp/about-cifp/#history
However, the CIFP does not give exact publication dates on its website for any document prior to 2008. There are primary shortcomings about the CIFP Data. First, it is largely similar and less frequently recent than that of the FSI. Second, for the period of the early aughts (2000-2005) the data still available through the CIFP website is not as comprehensive an index as the current CIFP and FSI indices are, as this early data focuses on the nations which were considered most at risk of a intrastate conflict but in which there was not currently a conflict. In spite of these shortcomings, the CIFP Data is still well researched, and by utilizing the early forms of it, it can be gleaned whether or not a country was considered to be among the most fragile nations which needed immediate domestic policy change and attention from the international community.
Methodology

Fully answering the question, “Does a foreign state providing military aid to nonstate actors cause the onset of violent intrastate conflict?” requires the utilization of a multidisciplinary mixed methods approach to research rooted primarily in the fields of international relations and nonviolent studies. Quantitative analysis is both necessary to establish a statistically significant relationship between the provision of military support and the onset of violent intrastate conflict. Qualitative comparisons between case studies are used to both support for and to provide context to the quantitative evidence. Lastly, a multidisciplinary research is necessary due both to the similar contributing factors which lead to violent and to nonviolent conflict, as well as the fact that the study of nonviolent campaigns is inherently an interdisciplinary field, spanning the disciplines of political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, philosophy and theology.

The quantitative aspect of this thesis involves the statistical analysis of data on the indicators of intrastate conflict, levels of military support and diplomatic support offered to groups opposed to the state. Originally the levels of military support were intended to be in concrete and quantifiable terms of standardized US dollars, in order to determine the extent that quantity of support can influence the onset, duration and intensity of intrastate violence. However, these concrete values are often closely guarded state secrets, and proved to be impossible to locate in all but a few cases, and when they were located, their veracity was difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, no single existing database sufficiently examines any single variable, let alone all of the variables utilized in this research during the entire period under consideration, and even all of the available datasets taken together fail to fully address the time
frame. Nevertheless these sources, when taken together do establish a functional framework from which to begin a new database.

Since the existing data was insufficient for this research, this thesis utilizes an original database which incorporates and builds upon the several existing databases with original research. This thesis is drawn from a number of scholarly datasets, governmental archives, reputable nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies or credible news outlets, which are explained in greater detail in the subsection entitled “Sourcing the Data.” From these sources, the presence or absence of military support was determined. The fact that military support can only be only be verified with certainty to a binary prevented this research from examining the relationship between quantity of military support and the intensity of conflict, as well as quantity of military support and duration of intrastate conflict. While this approach worked well in creating a Dataset which identified campaigns which were violent, and those which were nonviolent, as well as for identifying areas where military support had been provided to nonstate actors, identifying states with similar levels of economic, social and political stresses was more difficult, as it involved comparing several datasets which were highly disparate in nature. Ultimately, this only allowed the research to avoid examining cases in the extremes. This information informed the selection of specific case studies, which were examined for focused analysis of the hypothesis in conflicts which occurred in similar circumstances, but differed in the level of foreign military support and level of violence of the conflict.

Once selected for focused qualitative analysis, the cases were examined carefully in order to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between military support to nonstate actors and the decision of those actors to utilize conflicts. The secondary purpose of this qualitative analysis
is to determine whether there existed additional significant factors which contributed to the nonstate actors’ decision to engage in violent rather than nonviolent conflict against the state. Each case study is divided into four sections, background information, foreign support, onset of conflict, and conclusion, and each case study specifically examines the factors which went into a nonstate actor’s decision to commit to either a violent or a nonviolent campaign of opposition. These case studies are primarily drawn from a combination of investigative journalism in English, Russian and Ukrainian, published recorded interviews with state and nonstate actors who had participated in the conflicts, as well as, to a lesser extent, official publically available government records. All Russian and Ukrainian language sources were translated into English by the thesis author. This focus on the use of investigative journalism allows this thesis to examine the day by day changes in situations, and the to determine the timing of the decision to commit to either nonviolent or violent methods of conflict.

It is important to note that this research examines specifically whether or not the nonstate actors in an intrastate conflict received military aid, and specifically does not examine whether or not the state actor received foreign military aid. There are several reasons for excluding this data from the dataset. First, in the discipline of international relations, it is generally accepted that state actors have a legal and factual monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Furthermore, it is both normal and generally acceptable for states to provide military aid to their allies, and states regularly have military alliances, joint exercises, contractual agreements for sale of weapons, or aid funds dedicated to providing weapons, munitions, logistics, information or training of soldiers, or other long term forms of foreign military aid which have no bearing upon the presence or absence of intrastate conflict. Due to these two facts, typically states vastly outpace
nonstate actors in terms of military might, and are generally assumed to be capable of mobilizing a military capable of fighting threats both foreign and domestic. Lastly, as is apparent from the NAVCO dataset, state actors frequently utilize their militaries in intrastate conflicts regardless of whether the nonstate conflictant was violent or nonviolent in nature. For all of these reasons, this research does not measure whether or not the state actor in an intrastate conflict receives foreign military aid as a primary independent variable.

**Establishing a Control**

This research seeks to have an element of control over which conflicts it examines more closely by controlling the level of political, economic and social instability which existed before the outset of intrastate conflict. Ideally, this would be done by examining violent and nonviolent conflicts which occurred in otherwise identical countries. Unfortunately, in the real world there simply are not two nations with identical sets of political, economic and social tensions which can be studied to determine the relationship between foreign military aid and the onset of intrastate conflict, and it would be logistically and financially infeasible, not to mention highly unethical to create such nations upon which to experiment. Admittedly, due to these limitations, this research lacks a true control. To work within these limitations, this research necessarily approximates a controlled set of circumstances by utilizing data on state fragility in order to select states for examination with similar combined levels of social, economic and political instability. State fragility is a collective measure of political, security, economic, and social stability. Most state fragility indices are published annually by credible intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, which makes them suitable for comparing the general stability

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of nations. However, it is important to note that annual data on levels of state fragility released in the same year in which a conflict begins will indicate a drastically higher level of fragility. Taking this data trend into account, this research examines the level of instability present in the states present in the year prior to the onset of intrastate conflict in order to avoid biasing the data. This precaution is taken because these indices of state fragility justifiably rate a nation experiencing nonviolent intrastate conflict considerably less fragile than one experiencing violent intrastate conflict. Furthermore, states are recognized by these indices as no longer being fragile much sooner after a nonviolent conflict than after a violent conflict.

**Establishing Variables**

Quantitative data for this project examines three main variables, the presence or absence of foreign military aid to a potentially violent resistance group, the onset of a violent intrastate conflict, and the level of state fragility, which is utilized as an estimator of the state’s socio-economic turmoil, and thereby the state’s probability to have some form of violent or nonviolent intrastate conflict. This research also examines the presence or absence of diplomatic aid to nonstate conflict groups, as well as the presence or absence of diplomatic and military support to the existing regime as secondary indicators.

The primary independent variable in this research is to what degree nonstate actors opposing their domestic government received military aid from a foreign power. This research’s definition of military aid includes all forms of overt or covert aid both direct and indirect. Direct military support in this context includes all providing troops, weapons, munitions, training, logistics, intelligence, and even acting as an allied warring faction against the same state with which the opposition group is in conflict. Indirect military aid, on the other hand, includes all
means by which a state can indirectly grant military aid to a conflict group, including the placement of arms embargoes, no fly zones or naval blockades against the state actor against which the nonstate actor is in conflict.

The secondary independent variable which this research examines are the presence or absence of foreign diplomatic support to the nonstate actors involved in the intrastate conflict. Diplomatic support includes any nonmilitary support overtly granted to a nonstate actor by a foreign state to legitimize or strengthen the claim, position, or standing of the nonstate actor. This includes publicly endorsing the nonstate actor’s actions, supporting the nonstate actor’s legitimacy within the international community, including within intergovernmental agencies, lending credibility to the group in negotiations, and and providing intelligence or direct material assistance which is nonmilitary in nature.

There are two different dependent variables which this research could examine given the constraints of data. The presence or absence of intrastate conflict, and the violence or nonviolence of those intrastate conflicts. Most publically available data on groups opposed to state actors typically documents nonstate actors who participated in intrastate conflict. For this reason, this essay examines the choice made by the nonstate conflictant of the use of either violent or nonviolent tactics as its dependent variable.

Establishing a Timeframe for Analysis, and Its Consequences

Clearly, a single paper is incapable of examining all violent and nonviolent revolutionary conflict which has occurred in the past century, let alone in the history of human civilization. For this reason, a considerably shorter period of 15 years has been selected as a reasonable timeframe which will allow for examining a statistically significant sample size of conflicts, while
remaining a viable research project to be carried out by a single individual in less than a year. Furthermore, this research aims to be relevant to living researchers and policy makers in the modern world. For this reason, conflicts beginning in the most recent fifteen year period for which UCDP-PRIO’s Armed Conflict database, those beginning from 2000 until 2015 will be included. This is also a particularly interesting period of time for a second reason. This period saw two major sets of nonviolent revolutionary conflict, the Color Revolutions of the early 2000’s and the Arab Spring movements of the early 2010’s, as well as several incidences of violent conflict, in which occurred in similar regions, including the civil wars and coups, which evolved from some Arab Spring movements, which allows this research to contrast outbreaks of violent revolution to outbreaks of nonviolent revolution which occurred in geographically, politically and economically similar conditions in an effort to isolate variables which may contribute to the decision in selecting between the use of violent or nonviolent struggle.

This decision also allows the question of the choice between violence and nonviolence to be examined outside of the frame of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. This does exclude the wave of nonviolent movements in the Soviet Bloc, such as those in Poland and the Baltic States, the American labor protests, and civil rights movements, as well as the Tiananmen square protests, of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, which may alter the factors in deciding to pursue nonviolent conflict instead of violent conflict. Arguably the factor that is altered to the greatest extent is form of conflict which is examined in predominance. Had this research examined any time prior to the 1990’s, it would be examining significantly higher proportion of interstate conflicts between the 1960’s and 1990’s, while prior to the mid 1970’s this research would examine extrastate conflicts, or wars of colonization and and anti-colonial independence there
was also a sharp increase in intrastate wars between 1975 and 2000, peaking in the late eighties and early 1990’s, just prior to and immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{52}

**Limitations of the Data**

It is important to honestly assess the limitations of the data utilized by this research. This segment is not intended to imply that any organization has not done its due diligence in presenting rigorous and verifiable data. Rather, this segment is simply an assessment of the areas where either data conflicted between sources, or there was insufficient data, and the steps taken within this research in order to work within those limitations. Broadly speaking there are three key limitations to the data used by this research: covert data unreleased to the public leaving a gap in data, databases beginning or ending, leaving a gap in data, and data conflicting between datasets due to use of differing indices.

The most obvious limitation, and the only one which could not be circumvented is the absence of covert data. This research simply does not utilize covert data unreleased to the general public or academics. The second greatest limitation of data is the lack of data due to the nonexistence of datasets. This is easily visible in the data. While this was covered in the each individual dataset’s entry, a summary follows for the sake of the reader. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset has no data after 2006, Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP-PRIO) datasets’ most current year is 2009, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) technically exists from the 1990’s to current, but was only really considered top the best database for state fragility until the advent of the Fragile States Index (FSI) and Harmonized List of Fragile Situations in 2006. This limitation

is being worked with in multiple ways. First, in the case of the FSI and Harmonized List
beginning in 2006, the admittedly much less robust CIFP makes an appropriate stand in, as it will
allow this research to avoid selecting for its case studies, two states which are grossly dissimilar
in terms of stability. While the CIFP is an acceptable estimate of state stability or lack thereof, it
fails to qualify the many nonviolent campaigns which occurred after the publication of the
NAVCO 2 dataset, or the violent conflicts which occurred after either the most recently available
information through the various datasets. In this situation, this research begins examining for
both existence of intrastate conflict and foreign support in a similar manner to the process
undertaken by the compilers of these datasets. By reading reports from various governmental and
nongovernmental agencies, reputable news sources, and individual specialist scholars who are
publishing on the conflict in question.

The last place where data became difficult to work with is in places wherein the various
primary datasets conflict. This is most apparent between the various datasets on violent conflict,
and most significant between the various datasets on instability. The difference between
databases is significant mostly in their granularity, that is, the level of detail and numeric
thresholds which they utilize to determine conflicts. UCDP-PRIIO databases track violent
conflicts with a minimum of 25 battlefield deaths, caused by direct violence per year, while the
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s (HIK) Conflict Barometer, in an effort
to be able to examine small conflicts, utilizes no minimum fatality threshold, and the Correlates
of War (CoW) project examines only conflicts with a minimum of 1000 combat fatalities per
year. For the purposes of this research, any conflict meeting the UCDP-PRIIO minimum
battlefield death threshold is is considered to be a violent conflict, This is because conflicts with
a minimum of 25 fatalities are more likely to have received foreign support than those with only 5 or 10 battlefield fatalities per year, and are less likely to be the result of a single small skirmish or act of retaliation for police brutality.

**Constructing the Database**

Due to the fact that currently extant datasets proved insufficient to conduct this research, this thesis constructed its own dataset. Though the dataset constructed for this thesis is admittedly of a somewhat simplified format, the primary structure of the database, as well as much of the information contained therein is derived from the NAVCO 2 database, the UCDP/PRIO and the Fragile States Index. Nonviolent conflicts were added based on journalistic reporting from reputable sources, such as al Jazeera, the New York Times, or the Guardian. Information concerning state sponsorship of nonstate actors, both militarily and non-militarily, was verified with a minimum of one document issued by the state or by a public-private organization such as the International Republican claiming support for a nonstate actor or public-private organization, or two agreeing and credible journalistic sources, though generally than this minimum threshold of sources were utilized to ensure accuracy. Over 100 governmental and journalistic sources were were utilized to construct this dataset.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Prev. FSI (0-good-120-bad)</th>
<th>World Bank fragility*</th>
<th>Diplo Support to Opposition</th>
<th>MIl Support to Opposition</th>
<th>Dominant Opposition Tactics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Settles vs Oppor</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ukraine vs Ukrainians Without-Kuchma</td>
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<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
</tr>
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<td>Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan vs BHU, lat</td>
<td>Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Guinea vs FPDD</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Macedonia vs Nato Liberation Army (UDC)</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>India vs People’s United Liberation Front</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>Cent. African Rep.</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>State of Ione vs MPLO, LPMDF</td>
<td>State of Ione</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>Libyan Women’s mass action for peace</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Nigeria vs Al Fatahjamin</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>Afr, S. Africa vs. Pol.</td>
<td>African, Southern, Africa</td>
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<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>Violent</td>
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<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Lebanon vs Protesters</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mauritania vs AQIM (al Gasba)</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>Myanmar vs Myanmar Nat! Dem Alliance</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Tunisia vs Anti-All opposition</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>India vs Geni Naf! Liberation Army</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Maldives vs Maldives protesters</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>USA, US Corporations vs Occupy Wall Street Protesters</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Oman vs Oman protesters</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Jordan vs Jordenian protesters</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Syria vs various opposition groups</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Syria vs Anti Regime</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Egyptian Coup d’etat</td>
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<td>Intrastate</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Umbrella Protest</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Ukraine vs Horiz. People’s Republic, Luhansk Peoples Rep, Novorossia, Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Mali vs PLM</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Afghanistan vs.</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Cameroon vs IS</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Chad vs IS</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Egypt vs IS</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Lebanon vs IS</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Libya vs IS</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dataset: 1 Violence, Fragility, Military and Diplomatic Support in Intrastate Conflicts. Compiled by the author
Primary Sources: NAVCO 2.0, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, Fragile States Index, World Bank Fragility Index
Dataset 1: Understanding the Data and Sources

Dataset 1: Violence, Fragility and Military Support is attached. Dataset 1 is intended to be easy for the reader to read and understand. Variables and fields are labeled in plain English rather than in a codified manner, and each horizontal row is filled in either red or blue, indicating that the dominant tactic utilized by the opposition was either violent or nonviolent, respectively. This is not strictly necessary, but is done for the reader’s convenience. This section will give a brief definition of the parameters of each column, and where the information for each column, or where necessary, each individual field was sourced.

The in the first section, which contains basic information, the categories are fairly self-explanatory. Year of Onset is the year in mass nonviolent action or violent hostilities began. Conflict parties lists the actors participating in the conflict, with the state’s legal government being represented by the name of the country. Thus, Syria vs. Islamic State(IS) indicates that the government of Syria was in conflict with the Islamic State. Conflict Location indicates the national territory in which the conflict occurred, separated by commas when necessary. All conflict types in this research are intrastate; a state actor in conflict with a non-state actor within its territorial borders. A conflict is typed as being international intrastate, abbreviated Int’l Intrastate on Dataset 1, under one of two conditions: either one or more states is proven to directly participate as a conflict party on either side, or the conflict also takes place in territory not under the legal jurisdiction of the state actor. This basic data, as well as the dominant conflict type of each conflict is derived from one of several sources. For nonviolent conflicts which began in or before 2006, this data as well as data concerning foreign aid is taken from the
NAVCO 2 Database.\textsuperscript{53} For all violent conflicts which began before 2009, this basic data as well as the data on foreign military support is derived from the UCDP-PRIO conflict databases.\textsuperscript{54} Basic information for all violent conflicts beginning in or after 2009 and nonviolent conflicts beginning after 2006 is taken from the HIIK Conflict Barometer from the corresponding year: 2007,\textsuperscript{55} 2008,\textsuperscript{56} 2009,\textsuperscript{57} 2010,\textsuperscript{58} 2011,\textsuperscript{59} 2012,\textsuperscript{60} 2013,\textsuperscript{61} 2014,\textsuperscript{62} or 2015.\textsuperscript{63}

The second section of categories are those on state fragility, and is utilized to establish relatively equivalent stability in order to select a case study. The first of these categories, Previous FSI, lists the nation state's Fragile States Index score from the previous year (e.g. If the conflict began in 2009, the FSI score for 2008 is displayed). The previous year’s FSI score is utilized to ensure that the outset of the conflict is not included in the FSI score. FSI scores range from a score of 0, indicating that the state is absolutely stable in all aspects, to 120, indicating that the state has no semblance of stability in any area. Countries at or above 100 points are typically in the height of a full civil war. FSI data is available beginning in 2006.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{53} Chenoweth and Lewis \textit{et. al.} NAVCO2..
\textsuperscript{54} Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér. “External Conflict.”
\textsuperscript{60} Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research “Conflict Barometer 2012.” Conflict Barometer Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 2012.
\textsuperscript{63} Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. “Conflict Barometer 2015.” Conflict Barometer Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 2015.
World Bank Fragility, is drawn from the harmonized list of Fragile Situations: FY6-FY9,\textsuperscript{65} FY10-FY13,\textsuperscript{66} FY14,\textsuperscript{67} and FY15.\textsuperscript{68} While the World Bank also assigns numeric values to these unstable situations, this research uses the word based analysis categories of fragility. These categories of fragility are, in descending order of severity, severe, core, and marginal fragility, though countries are automatically added to this harmonized list if they have had either peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions within three years. If a country is included on the Harmonized List for these reasons, Dataset 1 reflects this fact by listing the country as peacekeeping, or peacebuilding. Finally, if the nation was not listed on the Harmonized List in the year before the conflict began, Dataset 1 will read “No”. The final category in state stability is the CIFP medium term conflict risk which was attained through the CIFP website.\textsuperscript{69} This is a simpler assessment, in that all the calculations were done behind the scenes, and it is a prediction of whether or not there would arise a conflict in a nation within three years, based on its fragility.

The last section, highlighted in green for reader convenience, are the independent variables of the report. This section consists of two categories Military Aid to Opposition and

Diplomatic Aid to Opposition, where opposition indicates the nonstate actor in the conflict. This is going to be the most carefully documented data in Dataset 1, due to being largely original research, rather than available information from existing datasets. Data about the presence or absence of military support and diplomatic support for nonviolent campaigns between 2000 and 2006 is derived from the NAVCO 2 Dataset, as is data regarding the diplomatic support provided to nonstate actors in violent conflicts during this time frame. During this timeframe, any field with a value of “-“ instead of a number indicates that the insufficient data was available to make a determination about whether or not support existed, and is copied directly from the NAVCO 2 dataset. All data concerning the level of military support for violent conflicts from 2000 until 2009 is derived from the UCDP-PRI External Support in violent conflicts dataset. All data in these categories concerning nonviolent conflict from 2007 until 2015, and concerning violent conflict from 2010 until 2015 is independently done by the researcher. For these fields, a 1, indicating confirmed foreign aid is utilized only if peer reviewed or official state documentation or statements are cited. A 2 is utilized if these documents are not available, but a minimum of two credible news agencies report that the state is in fact providing aid. A zero indicates that either peer reviewed article or two credible news agencies agree that there is no foreign aid in the category to the nonstate actor. -0 or -2 indicate that there are credible sources, but that this research has found contradictory data, or has found with more sources indicating either absence or presence of aid respectively.

Sourcing the Data

70 Chenowith and Lewis, et al. NAVCO 2.

Data regarding the violent conflict between India and the Garo National Liberation Army, which began in 2010 is fairly well documented. However, this conflict seems not to have significant foreign investment, and is generally small scale, with only an estimated 250 fighters, who largely fund their militancy with resource extraction and smuggling of coal, as well as extortion of mining operations and transportation workers.\footnote{Sharma, Sushil Kumar. “Garo National Liberation Army: An Emerging Threat in Meghalaya.” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. 18 March 2016. Accessed 12 September 2011.} Another method of funding the Garo National Liberation army was extortion of oil field workers and companies. Furthermore, it seems that the Garo National Liberation Army and other similar tribal armies in the isolated
provinces of India operate with some level of success, largely due to the lack of physical and communications infrastructures in these regions.\textsuperscript{78}

The diplomatic support received by the Tunisian revolutionaries during the 2010 protests which caused President Ali to abdicate his position is both abundant and well documented. Foreign Policy Chief of the EU, Catherine Ashton, stated “The European Union is Committed to supporting Tunisia economically and to Supporting civil society in order to have free elections”\textsuperscript{79} Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament both supported the protests while condemning Western ties to the Ben Ali administration,\textsuperscript{80} and President Obama, British Foreign Secretary William Hague, and the Foreign Ministry of Qatar all explicitly expressed respect and support for the popular nonviolent uprising.\textsuperscript{81} Further evidence suggest that pro-democracy civil society organizations received support of an undisclosed amount from American backed organizations, including the International Republican Institute, for the purpose of training activists in new media.\textsuperscript{82} No evidence has been found suggesting any form of military aid was given or received by these nonviolent protesters.

International diplomatic and military support for the Libyan conflict of 2011 is also well documented in news articles. Reuters reported that Libyan rebels, mostly gun owning civilians

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
and defected military personnel, were receiving weapons and training from the US either prior to or shortly after the onset of hostilities. Furthermore, Foreign Affairs reported that significant support was provided to the rebels by Qatar. While these documents were published after the onset of conflict, due to the covert nature of the supply of rebels and the fact that the most experienced Libyan rebels were defected Libyan soldiers, it is difficult to tell if efforts to arm and train the rebels occurred prior to the onset of hostilities or shortly thereafter. The document which takes precedent in this research is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution SC/1973(2011) “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions.” After being authorized by the UNSC to act militarily in Libya, the NATO led coalition not only engaged in direct combat, blockades, and an arms embargo and air strikes against Gaddafi’s military, but also provided financial assistance, weapons and armor to anti-Gaddafi rebels. In addition to this UN sanctioned military intervention, it is reported that both Qatar and the UAE violated the arms embargo to provide arms for Libyan rebels. Clearly, UN sanctioned military

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intervention into the Libyan conflict began after the onset of conflict, but it is important to
consider in this case because the conflict’s intensity dramatically increased after this point with a
greater use of heavy weapons.

Data concerning armament of rebel forces in Syria in 2011-12 were largely the result of
investigative reporting, as these armaments were of a clandestine nature. While some weapons
were already in possession of soldiers who defected from the Syrian army, most weapons are
believed to have been supplied from international aid from both private individuals and the
following nations: the United States, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The UAE, Croatia, Libya, and
Turkey, as well as private donors in Arab nations, including Lebanon, and Iraq. As the Syrian
Civil War intensified, and the Islamic State (IS) became a dominant military power in Syria, the
military aid to nonstate actors became more overt in nature. In 2013, coalition forces led by
NATO and the Arab League served as secondary combatants, in addition to providing arms,
logistics, and training to rebel groups. Additionally, the United States has funding and building

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89 Ibid
91 Ibid
92 Ibid
93 Nicoles, Michelle. “Libyan Arms.”
95 BBC News. “Who is Supplying Weapons…?”
96 Ibid
97 Ibid
the communications infrastructure of anti-Assad government civil society and nongovernmental organizations in Syria since at least 2005.98

Information on the diplomatic statements made by the African Union,99 the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany100 the Arab League,101 and Brazil,102 calling for political and economic reforms and for democratization of Egypt, is readily available from journalistic sources. Additionally Iran called for Mubarak to step down in solidarity with Egyptian anti-Mubarak protesters.103 While western states refused to overtly support the opposition by leveraging military aid or levying sanctions against the Mubarak administration,104 there is significant evidence to suggest that the United States funded105 and trained opposition groups, as

well as pressuring the Mubarak government for the release of those activists who were arrested. It should be noted that, in spite of being labeled as dominantly nonviolent on the side of the opposition, there were many reports of opposition utilizing low levels of violence against security forces, including throwing stones and molotov cocktails. Regarding the 2013 Egyptian military coup, there is strong evidence that the United States funded anti-Morsi protests, and the Guardian reported that publically, the United States supported Morsi through military aid, while lending their political support to the anti Morsi protesters, even going so far as to take great pains to call the coup a coup. The fact that the United States gave $1.5billion in military aid to Egypt in 2013 would be quite typical of US-Egyptian affairs, if not for a US Law which prevents the United States from funding any government which seized power through a coup. Despite the allegations that the United States supported anti-Morsi protests, and openly provided $1.5billion in military aid to Egypt, no credible source has suggested that the United States actively promoted military aid directly to the Egyptian military for the purpose of committing a coup. Due to the typical nature of providing military to allies, in Dataset 1, the Egyptian coup will be noted to lack military aid, but to have diplomatic aid

111 Ibid
Data concerning the Yemeni protests of 2011, Yemen vs Yemeni opposition, mostly comes from news agencies. Once more, although the conflict is coded as predominantly nonviolent by the opposition, the protesters did commit acts of violence, including bombing a mosque utilized by the highest state officials.\textsuperscript{112} While many states condemned the Yemeni government individually, nothing demonstrates this more clearly than UN Security Council resolution 2014 (2011), which condemned the government’s use of force, and called for Saleh to accept the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered peace deal.\textsuperscript{113} Before the onset of protests and violent clashes, the United States funded, trained and educated leading members of democracy and reform minded movements.\textsuperscript{114} Additionally, available evidence suggests that Iran, with Hezbollah’s aid, was training Yemeni Houthis as fighters, as well as providing modest financial aid and political aid to the Houthis.\textsuperscript{115}

There is little evidence of direct foreign influence in the 2011-12 nonviolent protests of the Maldives which led to the resignation of President Nasheed. However, there existed groups in the Maldives which had been trained Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), an NGO founded by former Otopr! leaders specializing in popular nonviolent revolution, which trained opposition groups which had opposed the Gayoom administration, and supported Nasheed’s presidency leading to the 2008 elections.\textsuperscript{116} Aside from that link, little data concerning foreign support to opposition groups has been found.

NGO’s including the International Republican Institute\textsuperscript{117} and National Democratic Institute\textsuperscript{118} have been training nonviolent activists and political candidates in Jordan since at least 2005. From the International Republican Institute’s press releases, it seems that foreign democratizing aid, which began no later than 2008, was targeted at existing lawmakers, and not at activists.\textsuperscript{119} This lack of information seems confirmed by the York Times’ failure to include Oman on its list of nations in which activists had been trained by American backed organizations.\textsuperscript{120}

It is difficult to find credible reports concerning the finances of the Occupy Wall Street protests which began in New York City, Reporting by Reuters\textsuperscript{121} and CNBC\textsuperscript{122} suggest that a hedge fund manager, George Soros is the primary financier of the protests with indirect contributions to the Canadian anti-corporate magazine \textit{Adbusters}, and the financial backing of individuals pledging small donations through the online finance service Kickstarter. Furthermore, while CANVAS publicly claims to have worked in the US, it does not claim to have trained activists specifically of the Occupy Wall Street movement prior to the initial protests.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120} Nixon, Ron. “Nurture.”
\textsuperscript{123} CANVAS. “About US”
The activists in Bahrain protesting against the al Khalifa government and economic protests are reported by the New York times to have been trained and funded in part by the American Government, through IRI, NED and the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative. The International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, and National Endowment for Democracy, have no public documents of this aid. However, the US department of State document has the draft language of the National Endowment for Democracy’s 2010 budget available, in which the organization justifies its appropriations request by listing Bahrain as among the nations in which the National Endowment for Democracy will “assist activists in working in the available political space.”\textsuperscript{124} Between The New York Times reporting, and official document, it follows that the United States was funding the same forms of activism in Bahrain which evidence suggests was funded in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, etc.\textsuperscript{125} Although this research attempted to access files from the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative, all of the organization's documents have been deleted from the internet, and are unavailable.

In the highly internationalized intrastate conflict of Syria vs IS vs opposition forces, in which IS became a contender in 2013, in addition to the existing and expanded foreign support for the various opposition groups already mentioned, IS received military support from regional actors. The organization receives weapons, money, training, and safe haven from regional actors including Turkey,\textsuperscript{126} and private individuals and businesses in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia; nations which have been notoriously permissive of funding nonstate military

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.  
forces by private individuals.\textsuperscript{127} Similar reporting by Reuters suggests that both Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey funded rebel groups nonstate combat forces opposed to the Assad regime.\textsuperscript{128} In addition to military support, the Syrian opposition group Free Syrian Army received significant diplomatic support from the United States, which officially recognized the group as the “legitimate representation of the Syrian people.”\textsuperscript{129}

Data on the Black Lives Matter protests is derived predominantly from news outlets. Although it seems that the group is predominately a domestically funded organization, the Washington Post\textsuperscript{130} and CNN\textsuperscript{131} each reported that the Russian Government purchased advertisements in the groups favor. However, the sources indicate that the advertisement began its airing towards the end of 2015 or beginning of 2016, which may place this support outside of the timeframe of this research. However, this initial reporting does leave the possibility of previous foreign funding of the organization, for this reason, military support is going to be rated

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
as 0, and diplomatic support is to be rated as a -, indicating insufficient evidence to be conclude a level of aid present.

Data regarding foreign support for the Ukrainian conflict is derived from several news agencies. Beginning with Data about the Euromaidan protest section of the conflict; the United States department of state is reported by the Christian Science Monitor to have strong ties with Euromaidan opposition leadership, to the point that they were involved in planning how a Maidan controlled government would be structured. Additionally, Forbes reported that in 2015 a combination of various European, Canadian and American governments funded Hromadske.TV, a pro-European, anti-Russian, anti-Yanukovich news agency based in Kiev, whose own 2013 financial records show significant funding from the United States and Dutch governments. After Euromaidan protests had secured a pro-European government in the Poroshenko administration, and in addition to annexing the Crimean peninsula, Russia financially and militarily backed separatist groups in the Donetsk region with small arms, light weapons, and even tanks, armored personnel carriers, and BUK antiaircraft missile systems.

This research has found no evidence suggesting that the foreign channels funding the Islamic State either stopped completely or drastically altered as the organization spread to

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nations outside of Iraq and Syria. Rather, it seems that the resources gained through military successes allowed the organization to expand beyond its initial area of influence. For this reason, the conflicts involving IS in 2015 shall be coded identically as the 2013 Syria vs. IS conflict.

Evidence suggests that al-Shabab receives state funding for military operations, training and armament from Eritrea, and from other international jihadists groups, but that funding seems to have begun after their initial military successes.  

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Analyzing the Data in Dataset 1

Between 2000 and 2015 there began 45 major intrastate conflicts, in 26 (58%) of which opposition to the state was predominantly violent, and in 19 (42%) of which opposition to the state was predominantly nonviolent in nature. This analysis will examine these conflicts systematically by variable. It will begin with the primary independent variable, support of military aid, and then proceed with an assessment of the secondary variable, receipt of diplomatic aid. Finally, it will assess trends of both variables taken together.

Analysis concerning receipt of military aid by nonstate actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received Military Aid***</th>
<th>No Mil Aid</th>
<th>Inconclusive Level of Mil Aid</th>
<th>Special Circumstances*</th>
<th>Total Violent Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 (65%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>6 (23%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>26 (99**)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Military Aid to Nonstate Actors in Violent Intrastate Conflict.

*The one special circumstance is Egypt’s Military Coup, in which the military received normal military aid to a state actor, and the military overthrew the civilian government

** Percentage does not equal 100% due to rounding to nearest whole percentage point

*** No campaign received military aid and remained nonviolent, thus Figure 2 includes only violent campaigns.

In 18 (69%) of the violent intrastate conflicts, the nonstate conflict parties received foreign military assistance prior to the onset of violence. In two of the violent intrastate conflicts (7%), the nonstate actors received no foreign military aid. Both of these were smaller scale conflicts conducted by localized nonstate actors. India’s Garo National Liberation Army never exceeded 500 combatants and self funded through extortion, and only succeeded in holding portions of the most distant province with among India’s harshest terrain. The Macina Liberation Front was another relatively small, self armed rebel group which, unlike the Garo National Liberation Army, joined under the banner of a larger international terrorist organization,
al-Qaeda, as a method of gaining foreign support. Drawing from the NAVCO 2 Dataset, there were six conflicts (23%) for which there existed insufficient data to determine conclusively whether or not the nonstate conflict party had received foreign military support prior to the engagement. However, since my research could find no verifiable evidence indicating that these nonstate actors in these conflicts received foreign military support, these conflicts were counted as having no military support in Figure 1. It is possible that these groups received covert aid. The reason for this is simply to allow Figure 1 to remain binary in nature. Being a coup, Egypt’s deposition of Morsi is a special case in this dataset. Since the coup was an intrastate conflict in which the state military deposed the civilian government, The military didn’t actually need foreign assistance to seize power, but technically received a considerable amount of military support from foreign sources in the form of regular state to state military aid. Due to this special circumstance this coup appears in the received military aid column in Figure 1, and comprises the special circumstance in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Support (Mil): Opposition Tactics Non-Binary</th>
<th>Nonstate Opposition Utilized</th>
<th>Nonstate Opposition Utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Mil Aid to Nonstate Actor</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil Aid to Nonstate Actor</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>18 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Mil Aid to Nonstate Actor Inconclusive</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total All Levels of Mil Aid</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
<td>26 (99%)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Level of Military Support and Dominant Opposition Tactics: Non-Binary

*Total Percentage not equal to 100% due to rounding to nearest whole percent.

While Figure 2 demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between a nonstate actor’s receipt of military aid and its utilization of violent methods of conflict, Figure 3 indicates that
this relationship is in fact causal. There are three reasons to claim that this relationship is causal. First, in every single instance in which credible evidence indicates that foreign military support was provided to a nonstate actor, the nonstate conflict party utilized violent tactics against the state actor. This invariability of this fact use of violence upon receipt of foreign military aid occurs regardless of the level of instability in the state and the level of diplomatic aid to nonstate actors. Furthermore, in more than two thirds of all violent intrastate conflicts the nonstate actor received military support from a foreign nation. Finally, there was credible evidence of foreign military funding in only two out of 21 nonviolent conflicts, Syria and Yemen, both of those nonviolent campaigns began using violent tactics within six months of receiving military support, all but abandoning nonviolent conflict. Keeping in mind that this data examined military aid granted to nonstate actors prior to the onset of conflict, this data, taken together indicates that a foreign state arming and training a nonstate actor in military tactics is causal to the onset of violent intrastate conflict.

**Analysis of Diplomatic Aid on the the onset of Violent Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomatic Support</th>
<th>Nonviolent Campaign</th>
<th>Violent Campaign</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received</td>
<td>13 (62%)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>18 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Receive</td>
<td>6 (29%)</td>
<td>11 (42%)</td>
<td>17 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive**</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>10 (38%)</td>
<td>12 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21 (101%)*</td>
<td>26 (99%)*</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Diplomatic Aid to Violent and Nonviolent Campaigns
* Totals do not equal exactly 100% due to rounding to the nearest whole percent

Out of 21 examined nonviolent conflicts, 13 cases (13%) showed credible evidence indicating that state actors had provided diplomatic support to the nonstate opposition, 6 cases
(29%) demonstrated evidence that no state had provided such support to the opposition, while 2 cases (10%) lacked sufficient credible evidence to conclude whether such support was provided. Of all violent conflicts, in 5 cases (19%) the nonstate actor received diplomatic support from foreign states, in 11 cases (42%) the nonstate actor did not receive diplomatic aid, and in 10 cases (38%) there was insufficient or conflicting evidence which prevented certain conclusion about whether or not the nonstate actor received foreign diplomatic support. In both absolute terms, and in relative terms, violent conflicts were significantly less likely to receive diplomatic aid than were nonviolent campaigns. Counterintuitively, in only half of all intrastate conflicts in which the nonstate actor had received military aid from a foreign military aid, that nonstate actor failed to receive diplomatic support offering the nonstate actor political legitimacy.

This research did not begin by differentiating types of diplomatic aid, thus public statements of support, economic sanctions against the state actor in the conflict and financial backing equally qualify as diplomatic aid in Database 1. When a differentiation is made between types of diplomatic aid, aid for activism training and propagation of ideas, compared to simple public statements intended to legitimize opposition groups or initiate negotiation on behalf of the opposition, a distinct pattern emerges. In Serbia, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and political crisis beginning with Euromaidan, Tunisia, Georgia, Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, Maldives, Egypt, and Yemen nonstate actors received diplomatic aid intend to train popular activism prior to the onset of conflict. In each of these case the society was strongly destabilized, in spite of having a wide variety of fragility indices, as low as Bahrain’s score of 58.8, fairly stable, or as high as Yemen’s score of 100, highly unstable, with a median FSI rating of 79.6, indicating a moderate level of instability. Each of these states countries experienced waves of mass popular
demonstrations seems to have had a destabilizing effect on the conflict area following the receipt of diplomatic aid intended to train political activists. Of these countries, only those who received military aid experienced the onset of violent conflict, save for Egypt, which experienced a military coup, and whose unique position within the data has already been mentioned. Though far from being definitively conclusive, this data certainly seems to suggest that such diplomatic aid has the potential to foment a fertile environment for revolutionary movements; violent and nonviolent alike. If this data is indicative of larger trends, it suggests that access to weapons and training are the typical limiting factor among groups which have the option to utilize either violent or nonviolent tactics. In all instances in which foreign military aid and foreign activism training was provided, the nonstate actor elected violent means of conflict. This relationship between training of political activists and the onset of intrastate conflict, and the long term repercussions thereof are worthy of further study.
Selecting Case Studies

In selecting paired case studies intend to examine the relationship between military aid and the onset of intrastate violent conflict, this research seeks to limit the effect of state instability in order to examine similar cases, and examine cases in which the level of military support was significantly different, and the level of diplomatic support was similar. In order to limit the role played by state instability, case studies will not be selected from any conflict which had a FSI rating of 90 or higher, any state listed as being of Core Fragility by the World bank, or any conflict which the Country Index for Foreign Policy deemed to be at risk of violent conflict in the medium term. Of course this does not hold constant all factors, government type, presence of public infrastructure, stability of economy, factionalism, etc. It does however, eliminate from consideration states which were expected to have a conflict develop. Generally speaking a score of 90 or higher indicates that some degree of violence has already erupted, and a score of 100 or higher typically indicates full fledged civil war is in process, and severe degradation of social, economic, political and infrastructural stability have already occurred. This places significant constraints, but there are still several candidates. Due to shared cultural history of being in the Soviet Bloc, and history of successful nonviolent movements, especially in Ukraine, the nonviolent Ukrainian, Serbian and Georgian conflicts would be interesting comparisons against the violence in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine. However, allegations exist claiming that Russia is acting as a secondary combatant in this conflict, and has been since the outset of hostilities.\textsuperscript{137} If these allegations prove to be substantiated, then this conflict would in fact be an interstate conflict and not an intrastate conflict, due to this significant possibility this conflict will

not be selected as a case study. However, there is another set of conflicts which occurred towards the end of the studied period and which provide a suitable example for studying: the Arab Spring of the early 2010’s. The Arab Spring was not a single conflict, but a series of violent and nonviolent conflicts throughout the Middle East and northern Africa beginning with widespread protests in Tunisia and the ouster of President Ben Ali. The parties opposed to the states in these conflicts typically began as nonviolent activists. In the cases of Tunisia, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman and Kuwait the opposition remained largely nonviolent in nature. In contrast, Yemeni opposition had a strong violent faction, Syria collapsed into a multiparty civil war, the situation in Libya rapidly devolved in a civil war which demanded the UN Security Council to intervene militarily, and Egypt’s initial nonviolent regime change was followed by a military coup 14 months later.

From these cases two particular cases offer a unique insight into the effects of military aid to an opposition forces, Egypt and Syria. These two nations are highly similar in terms of economic and social stability, with highly aggrieved citizenry, factionalized elites, highly uneven economic development, poor access to public services and relatively little respect for human rights and the rule of law.¹³⁸ Both nations had long sitting, nominally democratically elected presidents who demonstrated no intention to allow power to pass to another. In each state the opposition groups began as nonviolent activists whose leadership had received training in nonviolent activism and leadership from foreign democratically leaning institutions. Most importantly to this research, each state’s opposition received different levels of military support at different times.

¹³⁸ Fund For Peace. “Failed State Index”
Case Study On Egypt

Background information

Hosni Mubarak ascended to Egypt’s presidency in 1981. Bolstered by the United States’ significant military and economic support, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) the Mubarak administration held a secure position internationally. Domestically, the NDP also held a monopoly of legislative and judicial power. Since Mubarak became president, the NDP never controlled fewer than three fourths of parliamentary seats. Furthermore, Mubarak personally had the authority to appoint or remove the cabinet, prime minister, all governors and mayors, as well as to dissolve parliament or veto legislation approved by parliament. Legislative control was exercised through the State of Emergency Law, enacted in 1981. This law gave Mubarak’s administration broad judicial powers by empowering with the right of warrantless search, seizure, and communications monitoring, as well as prohibiting meetings of more than five persons, restraining free movement and permitting civilians to be tried in military tribunals.

Economically, the privatization of previously state run utilities companies, and end of farming subsidies resulted in a sharp increase of both urban and rural poverty as well as acute concentration of wealth. This problem was exacerbated by de facto debtors prisons, and an increasing use of child labor in rural communities, with a correspondent and proportional decrease in primary school attendance. Contrasting this crushing poverty, public lands, and land which were poor villages were regularly sold cheaply or given away for private

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141 Lesch, Ann. “Egypt's Spring.”
142 Ibid
development of luxury properties, and embezzlement and credit fraud were commonplace.\textsuperscript{143} These problems compounded after the 2000 election, as Mubarak’s cabinet became a full fledged plutocracy under the supervision of his son, Gamal, who was appointed as general secretariat of the NDP.\textsuperscript{144}

The 2005 election brought further restrictions on democracy. Opposition leader Ayman Nour was arrested, charged of forging the necessary signatures to create the al-Ghad political party. Furthermore, the elections, though monitored by judges, were rigged. When the judges appointed to oversee elections pointed out the unjust democratic practices and appealed for independence in executing their duties, they were relieved of their duty to monitor elections, and all future judges were appointed directly by the executive branch.\textsuperscript{145} Following these moves to consolidate power, the 2010 elections were rigged, and the NDP received 97 percent of parliamentary seats.\textsuperscript{146} Following the 2010, the government exercised much greater control over media, implementing censorship and arresting journalists critical to the administration.\textsuperscript{147} Finally, the government exercised broad control over universities, determining everything from the rectors and deans, to which students were permitted to live on campus housing. Through these political appointments in education and posting undercover secret police in universities, the Mubarak administration was able to arrest activists, and preventing the criticism of the Mubarak administration.\textsuperscript{148}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
In response to these extreme circumstances, various student and labor unions began to
strike in 2003, demanding better wages, and conditions, but these groups failed to coalesce into a
unified. These individual strikes and protests occurred with increasing frequency throughout the
2000’s. However, these strikes were neither unified nor successful, and were harshly repressed.149

Foreign Support to Opposition Prior to Conflict

In spite of supporting the Mubarak administration, the United States with over a billion
USD annually, has been attempting to covertly influence the Egyptian political system through
democratization projects since at least 2002.150 Since at least 2008 the US was training activist
leaders to oppose the Mubarak government through nonviolent action.151 No later than 2008,
these activist organizations with US support plotted to organize nonviolent protests which would
force Mubarak to resign in 2011, and prevent his son from attaining the position of president.152
This support continued throughout the 2011 protests, and included not only training, but also
leveraging diplomatic pressure in order to press the Mubarak administration to release key
activists from imprisonment when they were arrested for their dissent.153

Onset of 2011 Conflict

149 Ibid.
151 Ross, Tim, Mathew Moore and Steven Swinford. “Egypt Protests’ America’s Secret Backing for Rebel
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-America
s-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html
152 Hill-Herndon, Catherine. “Subject: April 6 Activist On His US Visit and Regime Change in Egypt Ref: A.
On 6 June 2010 Khaled Said, a 28 year old Alexandrian man, was beaten to death by the police in an internet cafe.\textsuperscript{154} Although police brutality of this caliber was an accept norm in Egypt, Said’s broken face and the falsified official cause of death became the symbol of the Mubarak administration’s violent repression behind which the previously disunified activist groups found common ground around which to collectively oppose Mubarak’s administration: police brutality.\textsuperscript{155} On 9 June, small protests began in Alexandria, with the slogan “We are all Khaled Said.”\textsuperscript{156} In response to these protests, the police claimed that Said had been a wanted criminal who had suffocated while smoking a drugged cigarette, however photos of his broken body were circulated through social media.\textsuperscript{157} That would likely have been the end of the issue, but the US, EU and various human rights NGOs pressured Mubarak’s administration into trying the officers for brutality.\textsuperscript{158} Another set of protests occurred in Alexandria when the officers went on trial that september.\textsuperscript{159}

These would likely have remained isolated protests if not for the widespread protests in Tunisia which deposed Tunisian president on 14 January 2011 after less than a month of popular nonviolent activism. The rapid success of the Tunisian activists bolstered the convinced the Egyptian activists that their cause could see success.\textsuperscript{160} Suffering under crushing poverty, violent

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Lesch, Ann. “Egypt's Spring.”
repression, and lacking civil and legal protections, unwilling to see the reelection of Mubarak or the election of his son, and bolstered by the Tunisian protest protest on 25 January 2011, an Egyptian national holiday honoring the police the Egyptians took action. On the appointed day, tens of thousands of Egyptians openly protested across the country, demanding Mubarak resign. The protests lasted for four days before, on 28 January, President Mubarak’s administration ordered security forces to fire upon protesters, resulting in no fewer than 1200 casualties nationwide. Protesters in Cairo set fire to the NDP’s party headquarters, and the entire cabinet was forced to resign, including Gamal Mubarak, though President Mubarak refused to abdicate his position, and appoints former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman to the post of vice-president. The Whitehouse pressures Mubarak administration to address the protesters’ demands, and Suleiman agrees to hold talks with opposition leaders building towards constitutional reform.

On 1 February, President Mubarak promised not to run for another term; this promise was met with over a million protesters demanding his immediate resignation

Nationwide, the protests grew in size over the next two days. On 31 January 250,000 people demonstrated in Tahrir Square in Cairo alone, prompting the EU to call for free elections in Egypt. On 2 February, government forces again fire upon protesters, resulting in another 1500 casualties. Over the next week, the protests grow and are joined by a general strike; by 11 February, millions of individuals are protesting, demanding Mubarak to resign. Initially

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162 Lesch, Ann. “Egypt’s Spring”
163 Al Jazeera. “Timeline”
164 Ibid
165 Ibid
166 Ibid
167 Ibid.
168 Lesch, Ann. “Egypt’s Spring”
Mubarak refused to step down, though he had lost the support of the military. His generals gave him an ultimatum: abdicat the presidency or be tried for high treason. Mubarak immediately turned executive power to the military. Over the next 18 months, the military council dismantled the remains of the Mubarak administration, ended the state of emergency law, organized parliamentary elections, a constitutional convention and a presidential election. During this time, the Egyptian populace feared the military would attempt to seize power, and there were frequent protests against the military council. On 30 June 2012 Muhamed Morsi, an Islamist and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, ascends to the presidency. During his brief tenure, Morsi attempted to consolidate power for Islamism and the executive branch, prompting more widespread protests. Both Al Jazeera and the Guardian reported that the United States supported anti-Morsi activists during his administration. On 3 July 2013, amid mass protests, the Egyptian army once more seized power from the president. This time it was future president Field Marshal Abdel Fatah el-Sisi who ordered the arrest of the president. After detaining Morsi, Sisi’s military government violently repressed dissidents, detaining tens of thousands of people and killing thousands. After a year of violent repression and having dissolved the constitution, Sisi was elected to office.

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169 Ibid.  
170 Al Jazeera. Timeline.  
172 Ibid.  
173 Ibid.  
with 97% of the vote on 8 June 2014, though the fairness of the election results were dubious at best.\textsuperscript{177}

In the face of this coup against the democratically elected president, the United States went out of its way to avoid calling the extrajudicial usurpation of power by the military a coup, which would require the US to discontinue the $1.5 billion worth of aid to the Egyptian military.\textsuperscript{178}

Conclusions

Although Egypt’s anti-governmental protesters did in fact occasionally utilize violence against persons and destruction of property as tactics, by and large both the anti-Mubarak and the anti-Morsi protests were predominantly nonviolent in nature. Activist leaders in both movements received training and continuing support from the United States, a major world power, and benefactor of former president Mubarak. While the Egyptian populace would not have had a necessary cause to oppose their government if common Egyptians had a higher standard of living, or if the government under Mubarak had shown a greater commitment to human rights, this training provided to activists by the United States afforded activist leaders the necessary experience to organize and lead a direct nonviolent campaign against their government. Although the activist leadership remained dedicated to nonviolence, it is important to recall that they were also average, unarmed civilians who generally lacked access to military grade small arms, light and heavy weapons, armored vehicles, and training necessary to lead even a small scale military


campaign relying on guerrilla tactics. The fact that Egypt did not become a violent intrastate conflict is in line with the expected outcome if the hypothesis of this paper is correct, specifically that foreign military support to nonstate actors increases the onset of violent intrastate conflict.
Case Study on Syria

Background

Hafez al-Assad assumed Syria’s presidency 12 March 1971, and filled the role until his death on 10 June 2000. His son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed the Syrian Presidency on 17 July 2000, and as of the time of this writing, has begun his 18th year as Syria’s president. Eight years before even Hafez al-Assad’s administration began, Syria was placed under a state of emergency law which gave the government sweeping powers to indefinitely enforce martial law, suppress dissent, limited the rights of people to gather publicly, and allowed the government to indefinitely detain civilians without charges in addition to the right to try civilians in military tribunals or secret courts. Under this law, Syrians generally lack for rights of assembly, press, religion and privacy.

Intellectual elites opposed this law and issued a petition demanding an end to the state of emergency, the attainment of political and civil freedoms, and the release of political prisoners in the September 2000 issuance of the Statement of 99 Syrian Intellectuals, and again pressed for these freedoms in 2005’s Damascus Declaration.

Since the 1970’s Syria has long had disputes over water rights with Turkey and Egypt, with whom Syria shares the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. These tensions were severely

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exacerbated between 2006 and 2009, when Syria experienced a severe drought.\textsuperscript{183} This four year drought caused a famine, which then caused an exodus away from rural regions to the nation’s main cities.\textsuperscript{184}

Although lack of access to water was a significant political, economic and environmental factor which fostered the conditions necessary for the fomenting of civil unrest, it should not be believed that the economic and social troubles facing Syria were all to blame on drought and struggles with her neighbors. When the drought began, residents of the mostly rural eastern Syria were already suffering high levels of unemployment and poverty, as well as poor education.\textsuperscript{185} The drought did destroy about half of Syria’s annual wheat harvest, dramatically increasing the cost of basic foods; compounding the existing social problems.\textsuperscript{186}

Syria is also home to a significant population of Kurds, a stateless people who reside in southern and south-eastern Turkey, northern and eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. The Kurds had the misfortune of living in near the borders of these states, and since the beginning of the Turko-Syrian water conflict in the 1970 and at various times Turkey and Syria have each armed Kurdish opposition in order to apply political pressure upon the state, though the bulk of this support was provided by Syria to Turkish Kurds in order to ensure that the threat of Kurdish insurgency, and thus the water rights which were conditional upon Syria’s assistance to quell


\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
Kurdish insurrection, on the Turko-Syrian border.\textsuperscript{187} These domestic and international problems would all go on to fuel the conflict in Syria.

**Foreign Support**

As early as 1945, the United States and Britain began testing and practicing covert operations in Syria, both perfecting the skill and attempting to build oil pipelines.\textsuperscript{188} Although it is uncertain whether or not other clandestine operations were undertaken in Syria between 1958 and the early 2000’s, no later than 2005 the US began covertly funding nonviolent activists and broadcast media stations opposed to Assad.\textsuperscript{189} This funding continued through 2010, when the United States provided an undisclosed quantity of funds for training nonviolent activists and civic leaders to pursue national civil rights and democracy in Syria.\textsuperscript{190} This covert action drove Syria to seek close ties to the USSR, bonds which would remain even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{191}

Prior to the onset of violent military action in Syria, rebel forces were covertly supplied with arms, ammunitions, and training by both regional and global foreign powers. Military aid to these various nonstate actors was provide by, at a minimum, the following nations: the United

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States, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The UAE, Croatia, Libya, and Turkey, as well as private donors in Arab nations, including Lebanon, and Iraq. As the conflict intensified, foreign governments' involvement also intensified, as competing foreign powers vied for regional power by supporting competing militant groups.

No later than 2012, the United States and its allies began covertly arming the Free Syrian Army. In addition to providing light weapons, including antitank and antiaircraft weapons, the CIA and US special operations teams trained the Free Syrian Army in secret bases in Jordan and Turkey. Logistics and nonmilitary material support including “uniforms, radios and medical supplies” were also provided. Other factions in the Free Syrian Army are funded and trained by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and private foreign donors.

This form of disunified sponsorship also extends to the Army of Conquest, a militant group with competing factions sponsored by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

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193 Ibid
195 Ibid
196 Ibid
197 Nicoles, Michelle. “Libyan Arms.”
199 BBC News. “Who is Supplying Weapons…?”
The United States began aiding the Syrian Kurdish political and military groups collectively known as Rojava. Weapons, supplies and air support were provided to the Kurds in order to permit Rojava to engage against both IS and the Assad administration.\textsuperscript{204}

In 2013 the Islamic State joined the conflict. Turkey provided safe haven and funding for arms and training to IS, prior to the Syrian civil war, with the intent to allow IS to fight against the Assad administration.\textsuperscript{205} Qatar and Saudi Arabia also helped to fund the Islamic State, and began doing so prior to the engagement of hostilities by IS.\textsuperscript{206}

\textbf{Onset of Conflict}

On 15 March 2011 hundreds of activists gathered in Aleppo and Damascus to demand expanded civil rights, the end of government sponsored torture, the immediate resignation of Bashar al-Assad and the release of political prisoners.\textsuperscript{207} The protest continued, growing modestly for three days before the Syrian military fired on activists in Daraa, inciting in a wave of protests across Syria\textsuperscript{208} As the nation wide protests grew in intensity over the following

months, so did the severe violent repression of dissent.. As a result of being ordered to fire upon unarmed crowds, many military personnel defected, with the first high level officers defecting in June of 2011. Some of these soldiers fled Syria, while others remained, choosing to remain and fight against the government. By October those who stayed would go on to form the Free Syrian Army, the militant branch of the formerly non violent Syrian National Council With various militant organizations receiving funding from competing foreign interests the violence rapidly escalated into a multi-faction civil war which is ongoing as of time of this writing, six and a half years later. Arguably, the conflict had an opportunity to end through negotiations in 2012. The only time in the nearly seven year conflict which Russia agreed to Assad’s resignation as a condition of a peace deal. The US led coalition was, at the time, certain that the various anti-Assad coalitions would force the president from power eventually, and refused, prompting Russia to commit its support behind Syria.

With so many conflict parties with internal factions and intricate webs of opposition, the Syrian civil war is complex. Both the complexity and intensity grew when, on 21 August 2013, Assad’s administration was alleged to have killed no fewer than 1400 Syrians in a chemical weapons attack. With the threat of direct US military intervention, Russia assumed the role of negotiator on behalf of the Assad administration and negotiated the Framework for the

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Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, and aided Syria in destroying its caches of chemical weapons.

While this delayed direct military action in Syria by global military powers, on 23 September 2014, the United States led a coalition of NATO and NATO allies in conducting airstrikes against Assad’s forces and against the Islamic State. Within a week Russia, a Syrian ally, began conducting airstrikes against IS and against foreign backed militant opposition.  

While it would be difficult to call the conflict after this point an interstate war, due to the fact that no two nations were engaged in direct military conflict against one another, it is also difficult to justify the claim that at this point the conflict was any longer a true intrastate conflict.

Conclusion

This case also conforms to the hypothesis that, given a necessary level of economic instability and a lack of civil and political rights, increased foreign military aid to nonstate groups has the capacity to trigger the onset of a violent intrastate conflict. The reason which this case seems to conform to the hypothesis is not simply due to the fact that a civil war erupted, but that there was a conscious choice to engage in violent conflict rather than nonviolent. The initial conflict in 2010-11 took the form of direct nonviolent activism. This choice to participate in activism was replaced with the choice to engage in a violent military campaign as weapons and the training in their use became more abundant throughout the nonstate opposition. The major

\[\text{213} \quad \text{The Russian Federation and The United States of America. “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons.” OPCW. EC-M-33/NAT.1. 17 September 2013.}\]
concern which prevents this case from being exactly what would be expected if the hypothesis were correct is that the military assistance was given to many factions which opposed not only the state actor, but also one another, making it difficult to determine to what degree the intensity of the military conflict was caused by the quantity of weapons, and to what degree the intensity of the conflict can be attributed to the quantity of ideologically opposed opposition groups.
Case Study on Ukraine

Background information

Ukraine attained its independence upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and became one of the most impoverished nations in the developed world. Throughout the 1990’s, Ukraine’s currency experienced severe hyperinflation, and the economy was so destabilized that barter and foreign currency were more commonly accepted than the Ukrainian hryvnia. This severe economic depression gave rise to strong unofficial economies and seriously limited the tax base of the Ukrainian government and significantly weakened the legitimate government while also fostering a culture of corruption in the public and private sectors alike. This political and economic instability allowed Ukrainian public infrastructure, which had been relatively strong upon declaring independence, to degrade significantly throughout the 1990’s.

Although the Ukrainian economy began to improve at the turn of the millennium, Ukrainians continued to suffer widespread political corruption, and a general lack of political and civic freedoms. In 1999, the Ukrainian communist party leader President Leonid Kuchma was reelected, although independent analysis of the election found that it was widely criticized for the media and violence towards journalists critical of the Kuchma administration, intimidation of opposing candidates and their supporters, as well as illegal campaigning methods. Nowhere was this level of political corruption more evident than on 28 November 2000, when Oleksandr

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217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
Moroz released cassette tapes on which President Kuchma is heard ordering the extrajudicial killing of journalists and political opponents.\textsuperscript{221}

In spite of this hostile environment, Yushchenko’s opposition party, Our Ukraine (\textit{Nasha Ukraina}), gained several seats in the Ukrainian parliament in the 2002 elections. In spite of these modest gains by opposition parties, several thousand people participated in massed protests, claiming that the election results were unfair, though to limited effect. These gains by opposition parties and peaceful protests led Freedom House to note Ukraine’s strengthening of democratic forces and causing Freedom House to rate Ukraine as having moderate levels of freedom, and moderately strong civil liberties and political rights.\textsuperscript{222}

Members of Parliament began to form opposition parties which coalesced into a temporarily unified voting bloc. Among the most important of these parties were the All-Ukraine Union “Fatherland”\textit{(Bat’kyvshchina)} formed in 1999 with Yulia Tymoshenko as the founding leader.\textsuperscript{223} Viktor Yushchenko, in spite of having been elected as an independent formed the voting bloc Our Ukraine \textit{(Nasha Ukraina)} which included among others, Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party, the Socialist Party of Ukraine led by Oleksandr Moroz and “Forward, Ukraine!” headed by Serhiy Sobolyev.\textsuperscript{224} Our Ukraine opposed Kuchma’s administration through legislation, and procedure.

Foreign Support

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid.
The status quo was maintained in regards to political and civil liberties, however, Ukrainian opposition groups were being formed in Ukraine.\(^{225}\) At least some of these opposition groups, including the youth movement *Pora!* (It’s Time!) began receiving training in effective means of waging nonviolent intrastate conflict from the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), a Serbian NGO founded by former leaders of the Otpor! Resistance who had also trained Georgian revolutionaries in 2003. In addition to this training, the Ukrainian opposition groups, like the Georgian, Belarusian, and Serbian counterparts before them, received significant support from the United States. The Guardian reported that US directly provided approximately $14 million to in direct support to groups opposed to Kuchma.\(^{226}\) These opposition groups were also aided by American political and media consultants and polling agencies. Furthermore, Freedom House and the National Democratic Institute funded the training of over 1000 poll observers in Ukraine prior to the 2004 elections.\(^{227}\)

**Onset of Conflict 2004 (Orange Revolution)**

As Ukraine prepared to for a presidential election to be held at the end of 2004, President Kuchma made it clear that he would not campaign for a third presidential term, instead opting to support then prime minister Viktor Yanukovych’s presidential bid. Kuchma’s voting bloc joined him in supporting Yanukovych, as did the Russian government and president Vladimir Putin.\(^{228}\)

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\(^{227}\) Ibid.

In spite of continued corruption and political intimidation, 25 opposition candidates ran against Yanukovych.

When the ballots of the first round of elections was held on 31 October 2004, no candidate had a majority of votes required by Ukrainian law. A second round of elections between the two front runners, Yanukovych and opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko was held on 21 November. Ukrainian suspicions about election fraud first surfaced when Russian President Vladimir Putin made a personal visit to Ukraine and publicly congratulated Yanukovych on his victory before the official tabulation of the second ballot had been fully tabulated.229 Once the second ballot was counted, Yanukovych was declared the victor, though the poll observers reported that the results had been rigged in Yanukovych’s favor.230

Protesters began to assemble on the Independence square by thousands. Within a day, the protesters had managed to close the political center of Kiev. Both the protesters and the police maintained nonviolence, though Yushchenko was and remains certain that Ukraine was on the verge of civil war during the ensuing protests.231 His sense of foreboding is easy to understand: rumors of that protesters had stockpiles of weapons, though unsubstantiated, abounded, and the activists were organized in their efforts to prevent the Kuchma administration from acting, having surrounded both the presidential and the parliamentary buildings and blocked the roads to the Maidan.232 In the coming weeks millions of Ukrainians would protest

229 Ibid.  
232 Wilson, Andrew. “Paradoxes.”
against the election results, and although they were occasionally tempted to use force, neither the state nor the activists were willing to be the first party to resort to violence.

For his part, Yushchenko used his contacts abroad to put pressure on Kuchma, and engaged in negotiations with Kuchma, and other Ukrainian elites. Most significantly for the safety of the average activist, Yushchenko contacted the Chief of Staff of the Interior Troops, Lt. Gen. Sergei Popkov. Convinced that Kuchma would only be willing to use unofficial channels, spoken commands over the telephone in place of the official written order to Popkov, Yushchenko made an arrangement with the Popkov. Unless the Kuchma gave direct, official, written orders, the Interior Troops would not use violence to disperse the protesters, however Popkov was unwilling to violate the official written orders if they arrived. Additionally, high ranking members of Ukraine’s intelligence community, military and Security Services of Ukraine (the successor to the K.G.B.) worked within the government to ensure that the military and police forces refused to fire upon peaceful protesters or impede the movement activists going to Kiev from around Ukraine, threatening prosecution to any soldier who fired upon nonviolent crowds. These steps worked to severely limit the spread of violence on the part of the protesters and security forces alike by ensuring that neither side had a reason to violently retaliate against the other.

Conclusions (Orange revolution)

The Ukrainian Orange Revolution continued for a mere six weeks. On 3 December 2004, the Ukrainian Supreme Court declared the second round of elections to be invalid and ordered a

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233 George W Bush Institute. "
revote to be held on 26 December of the same year. Yushchenko defeated Yanukovych in the recast second round election by 8 percentage points and was inaugurated on 23 January 2005. In addition to being an example of successful nonviolent conflict, the Orange revolution was surprisingly free of violent repression by the state. This is due in part to the fact that the military did not comply with President Kuchma’s informal order to engage civilians, and partially due the fact that the government was highly divided throughout the legislative, intelligence and security apparatuses.

For the purposes of this research, the Orange Revolution is a strong case supporting the data found in Dataset 1. Although the level of foreign support was significantly less than that received by opposition groups in Serbia, Georgia and Belarus, the various activists and established political leaders who were parties to the conflict had both domestic and foreign diplomatic and nonmilitary financial support. Although activists received foreign financing, and opposing politicians were well connected oligarchs in their own right, the nonviolent activists and political opposition leaders received no foreign military aid while successfully convincing significant portions of the Ukrainian military to either actively oppose the Kuchma administration or else stand down and take no actions against the activists. These unarmed groups both ensured the disciplined exercise of nonviolent tactics and fraternization with the state military and security forces to demilitarize the situation.

There is one surprising find in studying the Orange Revolution, that the initial hypothesis did not take into account. And that is the ability for domestic actors to diffuse a situation before it becomes violent. In this case, there were several nonstate actors who received nonmilitary

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235 Wilson, Andrew. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.”
funding by foreign agents who had not yet chosen to utilize violence against the state, but there was an understanding of the certainty that the country was on the brink of civil which Yushchenko later discussed in interviews. While the data has not found any instance in which a nonstate actor received military aid, and did not engage in violent conflict against the state, this case raises the question if a similar period of rapid deescalation is possible in cases where the nonstate actor is on the verge of choosing violent resistance.
Case Study of Ukraine (Euromaidan and violent intrastate conflict)

Background information

After gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in an economically and politically tenuous state. Although dependent on Russian energy imports, Ukraine has had strained and ambiguous relations with the Russian Federation over maritime and land borders. Furthermore, Ukraine is positioned in the spheres of influence of both the EU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and has spent the past twenty-five years finding its place between these two political and economic zones. Domestically, Ukraine continued to suffer many of these same institutional problems after the Orange Revolution which it had experienced prior to the nonviolent deposition of Yanukovich.

Following the success of the Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko and Prime minister Tymoshenko, failed to effectively execute their offices. The two made modest gains towards equalizing the access for minority opinions to be given a voice in the political media, but worked poorly together, especially in regards to Ukraine’s relationship with Russia, and failed to pass meaningful institutional reform, curtail corruption or effectively invest surpluses during a boom economy. On 8 September 2005, Yushchenko relieved both Tymoshenko and the Petro Poroshenko, the Head of National Security and Defense, of duty.236 In response, Oleksandr Moroz left Yushchenko’s voting block for Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions. In the process, Moroz became the Speaker of Parliament, and provided Yanukovych the parliamentary majority necessary to rise once more to the position of prime minister. In 2007, Yanukovich and Tymoshenko’s Fatherland voting bloc passed a law severely limiting the powers of presidential

appointment, prompting Yushchenko to dissolve the Parliament.\textsuperscript{237} Parliamentary election in September saw the Party of Regions and Fatherland reestablish themselves dominant parliamentary parties, which resulted in Tymoshenko once more being inaugurated to the Prime Ministership, and Yanukovych as the speaker of the Parliament. Continued efforts to curtail the presidential powers led Yushchenko to dissolve the parliament again in 2008, triggering third parliamentary election in as many years.\textsuperscript{238} Lacking the funding for yet another early parliamentary election, Yushchenko was forced to work with Tymoshenko. These divisions created the coalitions necessary for Viktor Yanukovych, who had been legally prevented from attaining the Presidency by the Ukrainian Supreme Court in 2004, to be elected in the 2010.

A large part of the division among the voting bloc formed during the Orange revolution was Ukraine’s foreign policy. Do to being a vital transit route for Russian petroleum products traveling to Europe, Ukraine’s economy throughout the early 21st century was both dependent on having access to the European markets to the west, and to the Russian energy products to the east.\textsuperscript{239} In February of 2008, the Yushchenko administration began the negotiation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.\textsuperscript{240} This agreement was from the perspective of Russo-Ukrainian relations, since Ukraine had in 2004 ratified the Common Economic Space (CES), an Eurasian Economic Union between former Soviet states, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, modeled after the European Common economic zone and allowing the free movement of capital, goods and labor, as well as unified tariffs and taxes, and a common

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
currency. There was also a growing uneasiness about the manner in which Russia and Ukraine would share the Sea of Azov, which has been a contentious point for Russo-Ukrainian relations since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 2004, it was agreed in the Kerch Agreement that the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait would be treated as an inland sea shared between Ukraine and Russia, however in 2006, Ukraine began to advocate for the Sea to be recognized as international waters. Furthermore, a proposed bridge spanning the Sea of Azov was unilaterally suspended by Ukraine in 2008 until such a time as the demarcation of the Russo-Ukrainian border and the rights on the Sea of Azov are settled. One final issue of contention which was concerning to Russia, was access to Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula on which the city of Sevastopol is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and has been since Soviet times. Were Ukraine to join NATO, Russia would potentially lose its position as a naval power on the Black and Mediterranean Seas, and Russian access to the Atlantic would be severely hindered. Balancing Ukraine’s interests towards Europe and Russia began under the Yushchenko administration, which began negotiations for an the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the first steps towards entering into the EU. This problem was strained even further as the Yanukovych administration began the negotiation process or acceding to the European Union in February of 2010.

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243 Ibid. Pg
Foreign Support

Ukrainian political activists, civic groups, elections observers and investigative journalists continued to be funded by western powers after the Orange Revolution.\textsuperscript{245} Russian and European powers backed differing legislators, and Russia and the EU each courted Ukraine in hopes of bringing the nation into their economic zone. Reliable evidence shows that Russia supported Eastern Ukrainian separatists as both a financier and supplier of armaments, and as a secondary combatant. This combination of forces fighting for control of Ukraine pulled apart both domestically and internationally.

Onset of Conflict 2013 (Euromaidan)

Ukraine’s process of European integration was moving in a timely manner until on 21 November 2013, when after talks between Prime Minister Mykola Azarov of Ukraine and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, Yanukovych unilaterally suspended the Ukraine-EU agreement just weeks before it was to enter into force.\textsuperscript{246} Opposition party leaders and youth and civic organizations in support of the association with the European Union began to rally on Kiev’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), where nine years prior protesters had forced a new round of ballots in face of corruption. The same day that the Yanukovych announced the turn towards Moscow, between 1,000 and 2,000 protesters gathered in Independence Square.\textsuperscript{247} By 25 November the protests had grown to between 50,000 and 200,000


persons in Kiev alone.\textsuperscript{248} On 30 November Yanukovych declared that a prohibition on public demonstrations would take effect immediately.\textsuperscript{249} When the protesters refused to disperse the Euromaidan protest diverged from the pattern set by the Orange Revolution, as the Berkut riot police armed with less than lethal weapons, batons, concussion grenades and pepper spray, dispersed the protesters.\textsuperscript{250} Riots erupted the next day in response to the police crackdown, with protesters using bricks and molotov cocktails, and even a bulldozer in attacks against police forces.\textsuperscript{251} Although these initial riots lasted only a single day, the protests after that point utilized a combination of violent and nonviolent tactics, marked by alternating periods of tense calm, outrage and periods of improvised weapons, though the violence tended to be of low intensity, using predominately improvised weapons such as bricks and improvised incendiary devices. Over the next month, the activists constructed a fortified encampment on Independence Square, as Ukrainians protested in the street Kiev negotiated with Moscow over economics and joint endeavors. Most notably, Putin agreed to purchase $15 billion worth of Ukrainian debt and lower prices of exported gas to Ukraine by $1 on 17 December 2017.\textsuperscript{252} This was a means of drawing Ukraine back towards Moscow, and met with renewed protests from opposition leaders. On 15 January the Ukrainian parliament passed new legislation restricting public assembly and on 16 January, the police moved to disperse protesters once more, this time using less than lethal

\textsuperscript{251} Evropeiska Ukraina. “Euroaidan.”
ammunition (rubber bullets) in addition to batons and concussion grenades against the

demonstrators.\textsuperscript{253} The Demonstrators retaliated by burning tires, and utilizing bricks, fireworks, 
improvised incendiary bombs\textsuperscript{254} clubs and even using a makeshift catapult against police forces. 

\textsuperscript{255} This use of violence, though sensational for its use of archaic weaponry, was noted to be being executed by a small percentage of activists, even by RT.\textsuperscript{256} This exclusive use of improvised weaponry once the opposition had determined to utilize violence against the state strongly suggests that opposition forces did not receive military support either from the Ukrainian military of from abroad. After this point, the violent clashes between Ukrainian security forces and protesters become both more frequent and more intense, ultimately forcing Yanukovych to flee Kiev to Russia on 22 February.

\textbf{Onset of Conflict (Violent Intrastate Conflict in Eastern Ukraine)}

In the week following Yanukovych’s escape to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament set to work appointing an interim president and prime minister, disbanding the Berkut riot police unit, and limiting Russian influences on Ukrainian politics by banning russian as a recognized official second language.\textsuperscript{257} Although this later act was later overturned, it caused much concern for nearly $\frac{1}{3}$ Ukrainians whose native language is Russian.

On 28 February 2014, pro-Russian groups of armed individuals seized key Crimean infrastructure, including the regional administrative building in Simferopol.\textsuperscript{258} Russian sources

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257} BBC. “Ukraine Crisis”
\end{footnotesize}

87
claimed that the gunmen were a militia composed of local Russian speaking minority, while western sources claimed that they were professional Russian soldiers and sailors.\textsuperscript{259}

Citing the need to protect Russians abroad, the Russian parliament approved the use of force in Ukraine the next day.\textsuperscript{260} On 15 March 2014 Crimea held a secession referendum of questionable integrity which resulted in the region’s official secession from Ukraine and accession to the Russian Federation, though western states refuse to recognize the referendum vote or its results as legitimate.\textsuperscript{261} The US imposed economic sanctions against Russia for the later state’s support of the Crimean secession, first 6 March 2014 and many several times later as the political crisis fails to end.\textsuperscript{262}

Even at this early stage of the political upheaval in Eastern Ukraine, it would be difficult to classify the conflict as being only an intrastate conflict. Strong evidence suggests that active Russian military personnel\textsuperscript{263} as well as inactive volunteers participated as direct combatants, and that Ukrainian separatists were armed by the Russian government.\textsuperscript{264}

Conclusion

The Ukrainian political crisis demonstrate the difficulty of drawing the line between what constitutes an intrastate conflict and what constitutes an interstate conflict. Throughout the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{260} BBC. "Ukraine Crisis."
\end{enumerate}
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conflict, Ukraine experienced both internal political strife and strong competing influences from foreign states. This foreign influence was aimed both at causing dissent against the government, and at influencing the government.

In spite of the difficulty of differentiating between domestic and international affairs, the case conforms to the hypothesis. Ukrainian activists and civil society, funded by western countries and NGO’s, worked together with domestic political opposition leaders to force the government to continue negotiations to integrate into the European economic zone. Although the protesters in these demonstrations did utilize violence against state security forces, the activists did not have access to military grade weapons and the use of violence was limited in both intensity and duration. By comparison, the conflict which began almost immediately after Euromaidan concluded had considerable support from the Russian military, continues to be waged as of time of writing, three years later, and as of 8 December 2016 had resulted in between six and seven thousand fatalities.265

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Findings Of the Study

Both the quantitative data found in Dataset 1 and the individual detailed case studies confirm the hypothesis that foreign military aid granted to nonstate actors will encourage those nonstate actors to elect to use violent over nonviolent tactics. During this 15 year period there was not a single nonstate actor which had access to arms through foreign funded military aid and elected to use direct nonviolent action instead of violent action. This data trend is keenly exemplified in the comparison between the Egyptian and Syrian conflicts, each of which began in 2011 as part the Arab Spring movements. The trend is also evident in the Ukrainian case studies, though those are less cut and dry than the Arab Spring cases.

In the Egyptian conflict nonstate opposition did not receive military aid and only limited violence was utilized against state actors; thrown rocks, and occasionally improvised incendiary bombs or firearms were used, but these were the exceptions. This limited use of violence, even in the face of severe repression, was true not only of the campaign to force president Mubarak out of office, but also of the popular campaigns against the military council which took power after Mubarak stepped down and against presidents Morsi and Sisi when they rose to the presidency. By comparison, several Syrian opposition groups were provided with extensive military support from multiple nations. These opposition groups had access to small arms and light weapons up to and including man portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry and the training necessary to utilize these weapons effectively through these foreign aid programs. With this military support, what began as a nonviolent activism campaign quickly escalated into the deadliest civil war to begin in the 21st century.
In analyzing the two cases together, it is important to take into consideration the similar socio-political conditions in each case. Both Syria and Egypt were facing severe economic problems with striking levels of economic inequality; most notably there was a sharp rise in the cost of food in both countries prior to the onset of conflict. Politically, each nation was faced with exceptional levels of corruption, and had presidents who maintained power without democratic processes. Both nations faced police brutality and torture, and lacked fair judicial processes. In both Syria and Egypt, dissent was raised not only through the existence of these dire social, economic and political realities, but also through foreign propaganda campaigns and the foreign training of activist leadership. These conditions gave rise in both Syria and in Egypt to a populace which chose to engage in nonviolent conflict.

In both instances the populace had made the decision to oppose the existing regime. With that decision made, there was one stark difference between these two cases: only the Syrian opposition received foreign military aid. While the absolute quantity of military aid to Syrian opposition groups is not publically available, the aid was sufficient to arm multiple militias opposed to the Syrian government. Equipped with the capacity to wage war, the Syrian people chose to conduct a war against the Assad government.

By contrast to these relatively simple cases, at least in terms of this hypothesis, the Ukrainian cases have a stronger interaction between state, political parties in power, opposition political parties and non governmental opposition groups. A constant throughout the Ukrainian conflicts was that foreign support was available to both state actors and nonstate actors as the US, EU and Russia each vied for regional political primacy. In the Orange Revolution violent confrontation was avoided in spite of many Ukrainian leaders believing that the country was on
the verge of civil war. Although no foreign military aid was supplied to nonstate actors during this period it raises the question of whether or not a concerted effort at negotiating peace can diffuse a conflict after actors have committed themselves to violence, but before the conflict grows into a full civil war. Aside from this question, the Ukrainian cases all call the division between intrastate conflict, interstate conflict, and proxy war into question much more sharply than even the Syrian case study.
Questions for Further Study

Despite having answered our initial questions, there remains much to be done to fully understand this relationship, which could not be ascertained within the constraints of this research, but which will be useful for policy makers, and academics alike. I propose three questions which follow from this research, and will be of value to further understanding the relationship between military aid to nonstate actors and violent intrastate conflict.

Are there circumstances in which providing military aid to nonstate actors either cannot or has not lead to a violent intrastate conflict? In order to study this, it would be necessary to find a case in which military aid was provided to a nonstate actor, and that actor either chose nonviolent tactics, chose not to engage in conflict at all, or the conflict was successfully mediated before hostilities occurred. This research dealt solely with conflicts that occurred, and of those conflicts all of the nonstate actors which received military aid utilized violence against the state actor.

Is there a minimum level of aid, in terms of either quantity (e.g. dollar amount, number of weapons) or quality (e.g. type of weapons, armored vehicles, etc.), which must be granted before a nonstate actor will elect to utilize violent methods of conflict rather than nonviolent conflict? It would seem that this would be the case, as even without military aid; Egyptian protesters had access to small arms, but lacked access to antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Thus any violent campaign they could have mounted would have paled compared to the might of the Egyptian military. Due to the covert nature of granting military aid to nonstate actors, acquiring the quantitative data necessary to answer this question may prove impossible.
Lastly, can military aid be provided to nonstate actors such that it prevents or limits the eruption of violent conflict? This question arises due to the fact that after less than a year of violent campaigns, there was briefly a period in which Russia, a staunch Syrian ally and key negotiator in the Syrian conflict on Syria’s behalf, offered Assad’s resignation in a peace deal, suggesting that providing military aid to nonstate actors can be a means of quickly forcing a state actor to negotiate with a nonstate actor. Before determining if there is a relationship between the two, or if this was an anomalous case, it would be necessary to identify and study more cases of states being willing to negotiate with armed nonstate actors.
Conclusion - Policy Implications

I would like to conclude this thesis by considering the policy implications inherent in the findings of this research. In the introduction I touched upon some of the rationale that state actors have utilized in arming nonstate actors with the intent that those actors waged war against the state. These reasons mentioned were: to permit the nonstate actor to defend itself from a repressive state, to destabilize or remove a government which is adversarial to the state actor supplying arms, and to provide a stronger negotiating position through military capabilities. The question then is have the case studies demonstrated evidence suggesting that these goals are attainable by arming nonstate actors?

Does providing arms to nonstate actors allow them to defend themselves? Assuming that defense means avoiding being killed crippled or maimed, and then providing arms to nonstate actors has proven to be counterproductive to self defense, and to the defense of civilian bystanders. The only case in which there were no fatalities was the Orange Revolution, which adhered to disciplined nonviolence and in which nonstate actors had strong support from elites in opposition political parties. If allowing civilians to defend themselves from violence and repression is the goal, the data suggests that it is more prudent to empower existing opposition within the established state organization, and especially to target high ranking members within the military and police forces, and actively work to sway them to the side of the nonstate actor, or at least to refuse using violence, including less than lethal means of violence, but especially lethal forms of violence, against nonviolent dissidents. From this data it can be concluded that, if a foreign state’s goal in funding a campaign is legitimately to permit a popular oppositional campaign to vye for political change while preserving the lives and safety of civilians, then every
dollar spent providing a nonstate actor with the tools of war is a dollar spent counter to that stated goal.

Does providing military support to nonstate actors improve their negotiating power? The answer to this question very much seems to depend on the level of diplomatic support provided to the nonstate actor. In spite of being the dominant military power for a period of time, the Islamic State nevertheless failed to attain political legitimacy through diplomatic support. The group was universally labeled as a terrorist organization in spite of its military victories and significant territorial holdings, and was intentionally excluded from all negotiations in the Syrian conflict. They were thus unable to attain mediated peace of any sort, indicating that the foreign supporters of the Islamic State had failed to improve their negotiating power. Similarly, in spite of military victory against both the Islamic State and against the Syrian Government, the Syrian Kurds which make the de facto but unrecognized state of Rojava, have, on multiple occasions, been forced to negotiate jointly with other anti-Assad groups, in spite of having vastly different political goals, which all but ensures that they will not attain their goal of becoming an independent republic freely confederated with Syria. Part of the reason for this is that the group is recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey and Russia, and a significant threat to Turkey’s national interests. This is important because the Syrian Kurds receive significant levels of foreign military support and limited diplomatic support. In spite of fielding one of the most powerful local armies, having a de facto civilian government, and substantial territorial holdings, the Kurds nevertheless are prevented from turning these means of political and military support into a strengthened position at the negotiating table. These examples demonstrate that so long as regional and global actors refuse to recognize the legitimacy of nonstate actors in intrastate
conflicts, even in cases where those powers have aided the nonstate actors against the state actor, the nonstate actor cannot attain a status of political legitimacy. Without this political legitimacy, the nonstate actors’ negotiating position seems to be unaffected by potential or proven military strength, or by territorial control.

Lastly, does providing military support effectively destabilize foreign adversarial governments and can it lead to installing of friendly governments? Yes, absolutely. Both Syria and Eastern Ukraine have experienced extended civil wars because foreign states are attempting to exercise regional control, and providing military support to nonstate actors. From Ukraine, it can be asserted that this can in fact be turned to political advantage of the foreign power if that power intervenes directly, as is the case with the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its incorporation into the Russian Federation. Additionally, whether or not the United States intended for Sisi to seize power in Egypt via coup, evidence indicates that the US was attempting to destabilize Morsi’s administration by financing political activism, and Sisi’s coup removed President Morsi, of whom the United States disapproved. Moreover, the United States was very careful not to admit that the Egyptian military’s seizure of power was in fact a coup, so as not to be bound by US law to discontinue financing the Egyptian military, suggesting that either Sisi is more favorable to American interests, or that American support to Egypt is vital to US national interests regardless of who governs Egypt. However, it is not always the case that a more favorable government can be installed through this destabilization, because once a nation has been destabilized by conflict, especially by violent conflict, the legitimization of a new government requires the assent of multiple regional and global powers. This isn’t so much a matter of formally asking permission as a matter preventing foreign powers from providing
military support to different actors in order to extending the conflict. While international coalitions quickly deposed Gaddafi in Libya’s civil war and installed a nonstate actor as the legitimately recognized state government, the Libyan civil war did not conclude upon the installment of the National Transitional Council, and factional struggles continue to this day. This has prevented foreign powers from allying with a stable Libyan regime, and thus prevented them from enjoying the benefit of installing a friendly government. This problem is also seen in Ukraine, though the matter is less simple. This concept is most easily noticed in the Crimean region, which allies of the Russian Federation acknowledge as being a part of Russia after the 2014 referendum. However, supporters of the Euromaidan revolution, which would have seen Ukrainian integration in the European Economic Zone, continue supporting the government in Kiev in combatting the rebelling regions of Ukraine, and refusing to acknowledge the separatist groups independence. The ability to destabilize a nation through military support of nonstate actors is especially evident in Syria, as has been discussed. This multitude of cases demonstrate that military support to nonstate actors can most certainly be a means of destabilizing an adversarial government, and under certain circumstances can be utilized to install a more friendly government. However, for this to be successful, the government installed must be recognized as legitimate by the international community, and if it is too unfavorable to other regional and global powers, they are likely to fund adversaries of the new government, and the conflict is likely to continue. For these reasons, evidence suggests that diplomatic support politically legitimizing the nonstate actor, or fledgling government is at least as important as military support.
Thus far, the policy implications of findings of this thesis has questioned only the current justification for providing military support to nonstate actors in current conflicts. There remains one more fact that leads me to conclude that it is likely inadvisable for a state to arm nonstate actors, even in situations in which their national interests can be advanced through the destabilization of the adversarial state. Nonstate actors which receive state sponsorship tend not to fully disband, and have historically damaged the national interests of the funding state in the decades after the conclusion of the initial conflict. While there are several examples of this problem, the most noticeable is the US funding of the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War. America provided arms and training in “bomb making, sabotage, and urban guerrilla warfare in Afghan camps the CIA helped set up.” The Mujahideen grew into al-Qaeda, a foe which the United states continues to fight to this day, nearly thirty years after the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan War.

With this information in mind, the policy implications for providing military support to nonstate actors is clear. If this support is provided, it is important for the funding state to accept that the likelihood of instilling a puppet government is not particularly high, and the region may be thrust into conflict for decades, making it difficult to directly benefit from this destabilization economically or politically. Furthermore, states considering arming and training nonstate actors for warfare should be made aware of the fact that this will not lessen the dangers faced by the civilian population, as civil wars have not been free from human rights abuses, and living in a

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267 Ibid.
region experiencing a civil war compounds the human rights abuses of a repressive regime with the human rights abuses and possibility of death as collateral damage that is inherent to living in a war zone. Providing this support to nonstate actors will further endanger the civilian population for whose defense the state provided military support to a nonstate actor. Finally, there seems to be no basis to the claim that providing military support to nonstate actors improves their position to negotiate; even if that nonstate actor can stand against the military of the nation in which it acts, it is highly unlikely to be prepared to contend against a multinational coalition, and in fact its ability to negotiate at all will be contingent upon receiving strong diplomatic support and recognition of political legitimacy from the international community as a whole. For these reasons, the only circumstance in which it may be politically advisable to provide military support to a nonstate actor is if the funding state wishes for the legitimate government to be deposed, the adversarial state to be destabilized, and the funding state is either willing and able to provide the necessary political legitimization to the nonstate actor it funds to establish a secure government, or the funding state’s goal is served by the simple act of destabilization. However, even in this extreme situation, it is evident that state actors are still jeopardizing their future national interest by providing military aid to nonstate actors.

In light of this research, the most rational, and indeed the most moral policy a state can implement in regards to providing military support to nonstate actors, is never to provide military training, overt or covert, to nonstate actors. Rather states which seek to legitimize nonstate actors, strengthen their position in negotiations, end human rights abuses, or preserve human rights, should provide those nonstate actors with political support in order to strengthen their claims of legitimacy and negotiating power, while promoting adherence to nonviolent action on
the part of the nonstate actor. If this proves insufficient, then targeted economic sanctions intended to magnify the efforts of the nonstate actor are advised over military support. Even if the supporting state seeks to destabilize the existing administration in an adversarial state, it is highly advisable that the supporting state adhere to a policy similar to the one described above, and abstain from supporting nonstate actors militarily, for the supporting state’s short term victories can damage its long term national interests in ways that are not immediately predictable. Even with all of this information readily available, it is likely that state actors would still act in their short term national interests by providing military support to nonstate actors. Therefore, it would benefit the international community to condemn the military support of nonstate actors in all circumstances. It would be impractical to implement a law prohibiting the covert funding of nonstate actors, due simply to their covert nature states are unlikely to report on these activities to international bodies. Nevertheless, a strengthening of international norms and laws on the prohibition of providing military support to nonstate actors should be strongly considered.
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