MĀLAMA ‘ĀINA, KALO, AND HO‘OPILI: GROWING A THIRD-WAY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

During the first six months of 2006, ‘Ōiwi Maoli activists in Hawai‘i protested three patents issued to the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and the College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources ("CTAHR") for "new" kalo plants. I use this controversy as a vehicle to explore the hidden assumptions held by CTAHR and the ethical principles contained within the ‘Ōiwi Maoli notion of Mālama ‘Āina. Through the methodology of a critical narrative genealogy, I explore both the narrative genealogy of the Western-trained scientists at CTAHR and the resulting deepened assumptions that occur after this narrative interacts with the social force of capitalism. I also explore the cosmogenic and the narrative genealogy of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, revealing the ethical principles that undergird their defense and protection of the ‘āina as encapsulated in the movement of Mālama ‘Āina. I then return to the intellectual tradition of CTHAR and identify an alternative narrative genealogy that would result in the recognition of very different assumptions giving rise to ethical duties and obligations owed to Earth Others. These ethical obligations demand care and standing-with or ho‘opili relationships (the Third-Way relationship) with both ‘Ōiwi Maoli and their kin, the ‘āina, and mandate a careful recognition of the limited kuleana of non-‘Ōiwi Maoli and the need for constant self-reflection and experimentation as embedded within the notion of pono. The Third-Way relationship also allows non-‘Ōiwi Maoli to make better and more fruitful use of the space of conflict, turning the space from one of destruction of ‘āina and culture to one of respect.
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I believe that knowledge is created in a community and this work is no exception. The fact the dissertation exists at all is testament to those who have given so much of themselves both to the making of this work and the making of the person I am today. One would not have occurred without the other. For, as I mention elsewhere, this work arises directly from the activism I have been fortunate to share in and for which I am deeply grateful. Mistakes I have and no doubt will make are my own and bear no reflection on the gentle hands that have guided me here.

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This is the point where I acknowledge my other dissertation co-chair, Jonathan Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio. This is the point where I wish I were half the wordsmith he is for then, perhaps, I could use this unwieldy language to convey just how truly grateful I am to him. Without his kindness and seemingly unshakable faith, even in the face of some fairly serious deficiencies, this work would not have been completed. Without his generous donation of time, time in far too short supply, and patience, the work would not have turned out as it has. His constant promotion of me as a scholar and as a thinker and his willingness to share his ideas and his friendship, are all treasured gifts and I am humbled to have them bestowed upon me.

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I hope that this work and the future work I do, repays, in some small way, at least part of my obligations. My journey is just beginning and I am so very honored to have taken the first steps standing—with countless amazing subjects, humans and non-humans alike.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... i  
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii  
Chapter 1: Ka Moʻohihia .................................................................................................................. 1  
  Introduction and Chapter Goals ................................................................................................. 1  
  I. The Timeline .......................................................................................................................... 3  
  II. The Arguments ..................................................................................................................... 7  
    UH-Mānoa Administrators and CTAHR .................................................................................. 7  
    ‘Ōiwi Maoli ........................................................................................................................... 11  
  III. Identification of the Moʻohihia ......................................................................................... 17  
    Rejection of UH-Administrators’ Tradition ........................................................................... 18  
    Problematizing the ‘Ōiwi Maoli Tradition ............................................................................. 23  
  IV. Chapter Summary and Transition .................................................................................... 30  
Chapter 2: Hoʻomoliolelo ............................................................................................................... 35  
  Introduction and Chapter Goals ............................................................................................... 35  
  I. The Method ............................................................................................................................ 37  
    Comparative Philosophy ........................................................................................................ 38  
    Critical Narrative Genealogy ............................................................................................... 45  
    Defining the Terms ................................................................................................................ 45  
    ‘Ōiwi Maoli Intervention ....................................................................................................... 49  
    Standpoint Epistemology ....................................................................................................... 51  
  II. Assumptions and Implications ......................................................................................... 53  
    Defining Assumption and Implications ................................................................................ 54  
    General Scientific Assumptions ............................................................................................. 57  
    Kalo Controversy-Specific Assumptions of CTAHR .............................................................. 59  
    Implications of CTAHR Assumptions ................................................................................... 62  
  III. Chapter Summary and Transition ................................................................................... 82  
Chapter 3 Ka Moʻokahuna .............................................................................................................. 84  
  Introduction and Chapter Goals ............................................................................................... 84
The Error: The Knowledge Commons as Free ..........................................................163
Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop.................................................................166
III. Deepened Assumptions and Implications......................................................167
   Deepened Assumption C1’: Science and capitalism are axiomatically moral (C1’).167
   Deepened Assumption C2’: Subject/Object Dualism (C2’)..................................171
VI. Chapter Summary and Transition.....................................................................174
Chapter 5 Ka Moʻokahuna.....................................................................................176
Introduction and Chapter Goals............................................................................176
I. Axiology...............................................................................................................180
   Cosmogenic Genealogy: The Kumulipo..............................................................180
   Moral Obligations to Mālama ʻĀina.................................................................183
      The Ethical Principle: Mālama .......................................................................187
      Ethical Principle: Kuleana ..............................................................................189
      Ethical Principle: Pono ..................................................................................190
      Mālama ʻĀina and Care ..................................................................................194
II. Praxis: ʻĀina-based Activism.............................................................................201
      Ka Papa Kū‘auhau Ali‘i o Nā Ali‘i Hawai‘i and Hale Nauʻa—
      Rejecting the Privileging of Western Thought..............................................203
      Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop..............................................................206
      Kahoʻolawe—Challenging the Assumption that Nature is an Object .............207
      Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop..............................................................210
      Makeʻe Pono Lāhui Hawaiʻi—Rejecting Privileging in Pursuit of Pono..........211
      Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop..............................................................216
III. The Contingent Present: A Clash of Assumptions .........................................219
      ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumptions and Implications...................................................220
         ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumption 1: No one method is exceptionalised ....................220
         ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumption 2: There is no subject/object dualism .................221
      The Clash: A Deeper View ............................................................................223
      CTAHR’s Perception of Opposition to the Kalo Patents...............................224
      CTAHR’s Characterizations of Its Own Actions............................................229
Chapter 1

Ka Moʻohihia

. . . for learning is not merely a matter of applying what one already knows to additional cases, but of making conceptual leaps, of projecting oneself imaginatively into new ways of thinking.
- Putnam, Representation and Reality

Our imagery is never just surface paint, it expresses, advertises and strengthens our preferred interpretations. It also usually carries unconscious bias from the age we live in; and this can be tricky to ditch no matter how faulty, unless we ask ourselves how and why things go wrong, and start to talk publicly about how we should understand. . . .
- -Mary Midgley

Ua mau ke ea o ka ʻāina i ka pono. 2
-ʻŌlelo Noʻeau, No. 2829

Introduction and Chapter Goals

This is a work in environmental ethics. Its purpose is to explore the possibility of a new and different relationship between humans and non-humans. The dissertation begins and ends with a discussion of the 2006 controversy that arose between the ‘Ōiwi Maoli (indigenous

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1. The series of difficulties or problems. Translation: Jonathan K.K. Osorio. There is some consternation in writing a term like moʻohihia. According to ʻŌlelo ‘Ōiwi Scholar Molly Summers, directly negative terms like difficulty or problem are avoided because of the recognition of the power of language. Instead, kaona, metaphor, and other terms are used. Molly Summers, email message to author, October 20, 2015. In this case, I retain moʻohihia because of its utilization of one connective thread moʻo. That being said, one wonders at my commitment to respecting and standing-with a culture if I can so easily set aside its tenets for stylistic purposes.

2. "The Life of the land is preserved in harmony and goodness."

3. Throughout this work, Native Hawaiians will be referred to as ‘Ōiwi Maoli. The term is taken from ‘Ōiwi Maoli scholar Kanalu Young’s work, Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1998), xi. Young discusses his use of the term as follows:

It is important to note that the word ‘Ōiwi is used to denote Native person and thus relates directly to genealogy. The ‘O embedded within the word ‘Ōiwi is a subject marker, commonly used to preface mention of a proper name. In this case, it precedes the term iwi, which means "bones." This intentional personalization indicates the link between bones and ancestors. The bones define what it means to be
people) of Hawai‘i and the administrators of the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa (UH or UH-Mānoa) over the patenting of three strains of kalo (taro). Initially, the controversy is used to explore the assumptions that underlie two differing views of the relationship with nature exemplified by the positions of the UH Administrators and of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli and their notion of Mālama ‘Āina. Through the use of the Foucaultian tool of narrative genealogy, this dissertation explores the history and social and political forces that influenced CTAHR's response to ‘Ōiwi Maoli concerns over the patents, including CTAHR's failure to see the opposition to the kalo patents as opposition to their science (despite the fact there were scientific questions raised) or as opposition to the validity of the patents (despite the fact there were such patent validity questions raised) but as opposition rooted in religion, ethics, and politics, all of which CTAHR argued lay outside of its kuleana. Chapter 3 and 4 will demonstrate that CTAHR's response was rooted in the exceptionalising of a specific set of thinkers and social forces. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, these are not the only thinkers that we, as children of the Enlightenment, have access to.

After revealing the assumptions supported by this exceptionalising, the work moves on to explore alternatives that can be used to structure a new ethical relationship with Earth Others and, necessarily at least for Hawai‘i, ‘Ōiwi Maoli. The work ends by returning to the controversy and using it as a test case for application of the new Third Way relationship. While the work is

Native. They are the point to which each Native Hawaiian descendant connects, ancestors who rest beneath the honua (earth) as physical remains we cherish and revere in the deepest spiritual sense. Consequently, the choice in this work is to define Native Hawaiian in terms of the connection to the bones by using my term ‘Ōiwi Maoli instead of the more commonly used phrase “Kanaka Maoli.”

4. Mālama ‘Āina, or Aloha ‘Āina as it is also known, is a difficult notion to translate. The most direct translation is care (mālama) for the land (‘āina). However, this care must be seen within the context of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli world view and values. With that in mind, the care is much more like the care one gives to a sibling or family member, a relational care, and much less like the care one gives to a car or even a pet. Mālama ‘Āina will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
book-ended by the controversy, the goal of the project is not so much to find a resolution to this particular controversy, but to find a new paradigm relationship.

This work is firmly planted in comparative methodology, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Moreover, it is rooted in an assumption that our actions and practices express how we see the world, the types of things in it (metaphysics), how we know that world (epistemology), and how we treat those things in the world (ethics). As such, throughout, words used and actions taken will be interpreted to discover their philosophical underpinning. While the following does demonstrate that, as currently positioned, the ʻŌiwi Maoli world view and the non-ʻŌiwi Maoli world view are rooted in oppositional philosophies, it also demonstrates that both sides have options: the haole or Western view has the option within its own tradition to recognize and engage with other theories of the world and the ʻŌiwi Maoli have the possibility of engaging more fully with haole in order to achieve their goals in better caring for the land. The purpose of this dissertation, ultimately, is to open a space for both those options to begin to come to fruition.

I.

The Timeline

In the early 1990s, the taro leaf blight pathogen, *Phytophthora colocasiae*, attacked Sāmoan taro and resulted in a ninety-seven percent reduction in taro production in that country. The same disease completely decimated the Puerto Rican taro crop within two years of its introduction in that country. In response to the threat, Sāmoa sought assistance from Dr. Eduardo E. Trujillo of the UH-Mānoa College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources

5. *CTAHR and Taro: Taro Research by the College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources, Background Paper, (Honolulu: College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources, 2009), 9.*
(CTAHR), who had been working on kalo issues for decades. To solve the problem, Trujillo decided to cross-breed *Ngeruuch*, a Palauan cultivar that would resist or tolerate leaf blight, with Maui Lehua, a member of the royal Lehua family of Hawaiian kalo, which allegedly were once reserved for ali‘i (royal or ruling class of Hawai‘i). The research resulted in three new cultivars: Pauakea, Pa‘lehua (sic), and Pa‘akala.

On October 22, 1999, Dr. Trujillo, as "inventor" and UH-Mānoa, as "assignee," filed patents for the three plant varieties. The patents described the plants as being a "new variety" of taro with resistance to taro leaf blight, tolerance and/or resistance to root rot, very good flour quality, and good poi and/or eating qualities. The patents identified Maui Lehua as an unpatented taro cultivar of "unknown ancestry" and *Ngeruuch* as an unpatented Palauan taro cultivar. In January and July of 2002, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued patents on the three plants. After the patents were issued, UH-Mānoa required mahi‘ai (farmers) purchasing the huli (breeding stock) to sign a licensing agreement. By 2006, thirteen licensing agreements had been signed by local kalo mahi‘ai. Under the agreement, mahi‘ai gave UH-Mānoa a 2% royalty on all sales of the corm and the right of entry onto land and/or buildings where the plants were being grown. The agreement also prohibited mahi‘ai from "experimenting" with breeding the plants.

6. Ibid., 10. Maui Lehua is considered to be the most extensively grown poi (starchy staple made from the tuber of the kalo plant) taro and is susceptible to blight.


8. The "corm" is the kalo root or tuber and also is referred to as "kalo."

9. Taro Licensing Agreement, University of Hawai‘i.
Beginning in early 2006, a number of ‘Ōiwi Maoli protested against the patents and the licensing agreements. On February 23, 2006, ‘Ōiwi activist and Moloka‘i kalo mahi‘ai Walter Ritte and Hanalei kalo mahi‘ai Chris Kobayashi signed a letter addressed to Interim UH President David McClain protesting the patenting of the plants.  

A week later, on March 2, 2006, approximately six hundred people gathered in front of the offices of the UH President and UH Board of Regents at Bachman Hall on the UH-Mānoa campus. The protesters sang, chanted, and asked the UH Administrators to relinquish the patents. UH Mānoa Interim Chancellor Denise Eby Konan and Vice Chancellor for Research and Graduate Education Gary K. Ostrander represented the UH Administration. Andrew Hashimoto, Dean of CTAHR, and other CTAHR representatives, including an ‘Ōiwi Maoli, also were present. Hashimoto told the crowd they needed to step into the "modern" 21st century as "We live in a changing time. Patents are necessary. If we didn't patent it, who's to say some more powerful force wouldn't patent it and abuse it?" Frustated at UH President McClain’s continued absence and the resistance on the part of UH Administrators to recognize the legitimacy of their concerns, protestors dismantled a stone garden in front of Bachman Hall. Sometime later, an ahu (altar) was built from some of the stones fronting the main thoroughfare past the University. Later, the ahu was moved to Kamakakūokalani Center for Hawaiian Knowledge.


12. One week earlier, protestors held a candlelight vigil outside of McClain’s home, which sits on a hill in the center of Mānoa Valley. McClain allegedly did not return home that evening.

13. On April 10, 2015, the stones were passed hand-to-hand via a human chain of students, faculty, staff, and community members that stretched approximately a quarter mile from Kamakakūokalani to Bachman Hall, where they were restacked. The human chain was created to protest the University’s handling of the Thirty-Meter Telescope, set to be built on Mauna Kea.
On May 16, 2006, Konan and Ostrander issued a press release stating that the University had "only recently come to appreciate the significance of taro as the embodiment of the most sacred of the Hawaiian Gods" and assured a timely resolution.\textsuperscript{14} On May 18, 2006, Ritte, accompanied by ‘Ōiwi men wearing malo (traditional loincloth), chained closed the front door to the UH Board of Regents meeting room at the UH medical school. Ritte intended to keep the Board of Regents in session until the issue regarding the kalo patents was resolved. Board members exited through another door, although a conversation with the Chairman of the Board of Regents did occur before the activists left the building.

On June 2, 2006, UH announced its intention to assign the kalo patents to the "greater Native Hawaiian Community."\textsuperscript{15} On June 12, 2006, Ritte and Kobayashi signed and sent a letter to Ostrander commemorating a telephone conversation between Ritte and Ostrander in which Ritte asked that "UH abandon the patents." Addressing the Vice Chancellor of Research’s expressed uncertainty over the ability to abandon patents, Ritte provided contact numbers for patent specialists, a memo from a patent expert explaining how to abandon the patents, and partially completed disclaimer forms. Ritte also offered to pay the filing fees to abandon the three patents. In closing, Ritte stated that while he appreciated Ostrander’s "willingness to respect the wishes of native Hawaiians in this matter . . . [i]n the future, we request that UH consult with the native Hawaiian community before claiming or obtaining intellectual property rights over living organisms of these islands."\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{16} Letter from Walter Ritte and Christine Kobayashi to Dr. Gary Ostrander, June 12, 2006.
On June 16, 2006, UH filed documents with the USPTO and disclaimed any rights it had to the kalo patents. On June 20, 2010, Kobayashi, Ritte, and Dr. Jonathan Osorio, then director of the UH Hawai‘inuiākea School of Hawaiian Knowledge, ceremoniously tore up the patents at a press conference held at the Kamakakūokalani Center for Hawaiian Knowledge. Ostrander, who also attended the press conference, stated: "I hope this is an opportunity to continue to develop our existing relationship based on mutual trust and respect, as undoubtedly we will face other issues as we go forward." Ostrander further reported that "he had come to appreciate the Hawaiians’ point of view on the issue." Following this "resolution," ‘Ōiwi volunteers helped to create a culture garden comprised of native plants in front of Bachman Hall.

II.

The Arguments

A deeper understanding of the kalo controversy, as it will be referred to from here on out, begins with the arguments made by both sides and how those arguments are portrayed and perceived.

UH-Mānoa Administrators and CTAHR

UH made the following arguments in support of its position. First, the administrators argued the union faculty contract required UH-Mānoa inventors to apply for intellectual property protection and assign invention rights to UH-Mānoa. Consequently, UH was compelled to protect the patents and Trujillo’s failure to file for a patent and UH-Mānoa’s failure to fight for the protection of that patent could be seen as a breach of the labor contract.

Second, in a world where patents and bioprospecting are the norm, patenting is the only way to protect natural resources and indigenous knowledge. CTAHR was concerned that its experience with macadamia nut cultivars would be repeated. Between 1960 and 1990, UH scientists developed more than ten nut cultivars that helped to turn Hawai‘i’s macadamia nut industry into a competitive and thriving agricultural industry. However, these cultivars were not patented and were subsequently "borrowed" by outsiders who used them to compete with Hawai‘i’s nut industry. CTAHR did not want to see the same thing happen to kalo. For UH, patenting meant the ability to protect.¹⁹

Third, kalo farming was (and is) in danger and expansion of the kalo genome was the only way to save the genetic line of the "heritage plant." UH had the resources to travel to Palau and Sāmoa and find the cultivars and breed them, whereas mahi’ai did not.²⁰ Fourth, because of CTAHR’s long-standing commitment to and involvement with kalo, UH researchers were asked to undertake this research by the indigenous people of Sāmoa and for the protection of Hawaiian kalo. Thus, UH-Mānoa Administrators felt they needed to "simultaneously be responsive to . . . faculty, the[ ] union, potential predatory commercial patents, and of no less importance, our greater Native Hawaiian community."²¹

As Ostrander summarized:

¹⁹  CTAHR and Taro, 18. In CTAHR’s view, patents "protect efforts devoted to development of new products by allowing a period of competitive advantage to recoup investment made and allow continued research and development for introducing new materials into the marketplace, eliminating the need to protect prior patented materials in perpetuity." Income from the licensing agreement funded additional research and development and the patents allowed CTAHR to "secure Hawai‘i’s accomplishments and protect them, for a time, from piracy."

²⁰  What is not entirely clear is whether UH felt the mahi’ai did not have the knowledge to gather the cultivars or simply did not have the resources and/or means to get on a plane and get the cultivars.

²¹  "Taro patent discussions advancing," May 16, 2006. According to CTAHR, its century long research and work has resulted in the devotion of "countless years of faculty time to taro and [the production of ] . . . hundreds of journal articles, theses and dissertations, and research and extension publications on the crop" CTAHR and Taro, 5.
UH filed for a plant patent on the three taro strains to prevent other people from reproducing them without permission. We offered what we thought was a generous licensing agreement. . . . The patents were approved by the U.S. Patent Office in 2001 [sic]. Five years later opposition arose. Demonstrators said these strains would go out and selectively kill Hawaiian taro. This was simply untrue. No taro plant that we know of can kill another taro plant. They also objected to UH "owning" taro. They viewed it as tantamount to owing an ancestor.22

ʻŌiwi Maoli opposition to the patents deeply wounded CTAHR. Indeed, three years after the 2006 dispute the bitterness and sense of betrayal felt by CTAHR was palpable. CTAHR’s 2009 Background Paper entitled CTAHR and Taro, which was written in direct response to the kalo controversy and aimed at the general public and the legislature, states: “The emergence of the idea that the improvement work is detrimental to taro as a Hawaiian heritage plant has been distressing to those in CTAHR who carry on this tradition of applying science for the benefit of Hawaiʻi’s crops and farmers.”23 CTAHR argues that the opposition to its genetic research and fell into the following three categories:

(1) Those ʻŌiwi Maoli that regard kalo as a revered ancestor, who see "manipulations of the taro genome as a desecration of their legendary heritage." This opposition, CTAHR argued, may be linked to the Overthrow and the ʻŌiwi Maoli sovereignty movement. As a state and federal institution, CTAHR believes it is seen as "a proxy for entities responsible for the


23. CTAHR and Taro, 6-9. In CTAHR’s words, the purpose of the paper was to "dispel rumors and allow citizens and their elected decision-makers to assess the controversy over [kalo] and come to informed conclusions about CTAHR’s efforts to support Hawaiʻi’s agriculture and economy."
historical intervention that ended the Hawaiian monarchy, resulted in the annexation of Hawai‘i by the United States, and led to Hawai‘i becoming a state."

(2) Those who believe the ‘Ōiwi Maoli kalo varieties are "superior to any others." For this group, "problems affecting taro production in Hawai‘i today are due not to introduced pests but to restrictions imposed by government on access to land and, particularly, water resources"; and

(3) Those who oppose globalization and its spread of biotechnology, in general, and the use of that biotechnology in agriculture, specifically.24

CTAHR defends itself against these claims by arguing cross breeding is necessary to expand the kalo genome and to help the plant fight introduced diseases. Hawai‘i’s agricultural economy relies upon such introductions for its existence. CTAHR notes that kalo is not an indigenous plant of Hawai‘i, but likely was brought to the Pacific from the Indo-Malayan peninsula. CTAHR researchers acted in good faith to broaden the kalo genome by crossing Hawaiian cultivars with those of other regions in the Pacific.25 Further, sharing the improved plant materials developed from breeding efforts in Hawai‘i with researchers in other countries could be considered "a reciprocal, collaborative advantage that may yield unanticipated future benefits."26

24. *CTAHR and Taro*, 5. According to CTAHR, members of this last group "are suspicious of genetic engineering biotechnology and fearful of its possible negative consequences for the 'natural order' of life on Earth." CTAHR goes on to characterize this group as part of a larger group that holds that "'organic agriculture'" is a more efficient form of food production and its methods are more conducive to both human health and the environment. While this section is devoted to the UH-Administrators' viewpoint, the exclusion of two other key groups from this list should not be lost on the reader. The first is the group that holds that humans and all other life are descended from the same ancestors, which means filial obligations are owed. The second is concerned with agricultural corporations having control over small farmers and small land-holders.


26. Ibid., 4.
In sum, CTAHR argues that its kalo research faculty "pursued their professional objectives in line with their ethics, the principles of academic freedom, and their obligations as scientists and members of a land grant university faculty." CTAHR argues that these efforts have resulted in solutions for the kalo as well as increased grant funding for UH. Moreover, the indigenous community has favorably received and appreciated CTAHR’s work. In fact, some of the breeding work has been done at the request of the mahi‘ai in Hanalei (Kaua‘i), Ke‘anae (Maui) and other areas. From CTAHR’s perspective, its work on kalo has been inappropriately hi-jacked "by some individuals and groups who desire that their beliefs and agendas gain broader attention. This situation is not unusual in context of the many seemingly intractable controversies that plague the U.S. body politic and strain national unity."

ʻŌiwi Maoli

The ʻŌiwi Maoli arguments fall into two large categories: those that attacked the patents from a Western legal perspective and those based on the ʻŌiwi Maoli’s world view. With regard to the first category, ʻŌiwi Maoli argued the patent applicants did not provide proper validation for claimed "new" properties. In order for a patent to be issued, the patented object must have demonstrated and verified "new" properties that are not otherwise found in the plant. U.S. patent law requires an invention be novel or new, and not anticipated by other inventions. Moreover, the properties "discovered" cannot be inherent within the item. Kobayashi and Ritte argued that the claimed properties had not been scientifically proven, but were based on observation and probability. In addition, "Maui Lehua," including its inherent characteristics that Trujillo found so valuable, was derived from varieties introduced to Hawaiʻi in the fourth to fifth century A.D.

27. Ibid., 6.
by early settlers. Through extensive breeding, ʻŌiwi Maoli generated over 300 types of kalo, specifically developed for different micro-environments, growing conditions, and pests. Approximately sixty-three varieties are still in existence today, with Maui Lehua being one of those. Therefore, Maui Lehua was the "result of many centuries of breeding efforts by native Hawaiians." To paraphrase, UH-Mānoa "has done nothing more than recognize properties inherent in certain prior art [kalo] . . . while [UH-Mānoa] may have recognized something quite interesting . . . it simply has not invented anything new."\(^{28}\) Or, as Kobayashi argued: "How can anyone claim ownership of plants that have evolved and been selected or bred by farmers for specific environmental conditions and desirable properties over generations?"\(^{29}\) Ritte added: "The Hawaiian people have been modifying and growing taro for 1,000 years, and probably 5,000 years before that in Polynesia. What seems counterintuitive now is that a faculty member can make an improvement now and patent it."\(^{30}\)

Third, the collection of royalties from tax-paying mahiʻai was "abhorrent" and the granting of unrestricted access to kalo mahiʻai property gave UH-Mānoa "police-like powers to conduct intrusive inspections of farmers’ private property." Moreover, prohibitions on selling, breeding, or conducting research on the licensed plants would inhibit creative breeding and research on the part of the ʻŌiwi mahiʻai.\(^{31}\) Kobayashi expanded on this argument in a January 12, 2006 press release by saying: "As a farmer, I strongly object to patents on taro or any other crop. Why should farmers have to pay for huli? Our taxes have helped to fund UH. Some of us


\(^{29}\) "University of Hawaiʻi to give up taro patents," Center for Food Safety, January 12, 2006.


\(^{31}\) Ibid.
have been cooperators with UH on different taro research programs including breeding, cultivation and diseases.” ʻŌiwi Maoli, through taxes and "loans" of the land, water, and labor it takes to grow plants, contribute more than their fair share to UH’s kalo research activities.

Moving into the second category of arguments, ʻŌiwi Maoli argued that not only did they breed the ancestors of Maui Lehua and Maui Lehua itself, the ʻŌiwi Maoli are those ancestors. As will be discussed in greater detail below, ʻŌiwi Maoli owe ancestors, including kalo, filial obligations of protection and care. Once patented, the kalo cultivars would be removed from ʻŌiwi Maoli protection and care and placed in a controlled monopolistic market setting, where exchange value would replace intrinsic value. In short, the relationship between the ʻŌiwi Maoli and their ancestors brings with it certain responsibilities that would be rendered impossible should the patents be allowed.

This argument reflects two important concepts structuring the ʻŌiwi Maoli understanding of reality. The first is genealogy. As ʻŌiwi scholar Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa argues,

Hawaiian identity is, in fact, derived from the Kumulipo, the great cosmogonic genealogy. Its essential lesson is that every aspect of the Hawaiian conception of the world is related by birth, and as such, all parts of the Hawaiian world are one indivisible lineage. Conceived in this way, the genealogy of the Land, the Gods, Chiefs, and people intertwine with one another, and with all the myriad aspects of the universe. Part of the genealogy of all ʻŌiwi Maoli is the moʻolelo (story or history) of Wākea and Papa, who were half-brother and half sister. As told by Kameʻeleihiwa, Wākea and Papa are the

32. See pages 80–81 for a discussion of intrinsic value.
parents of the islands of Hawai‘i and Maui and are the ancestors of the nation of Hawai‘i. Hoʻohōkūkalani (to generate stars in the sky) was their first human offspring and she grew into a beautiful woman. Wākea seduced Hoʻohōkūkalani, who in turn told her mother. Papa left Wākea and had a number of other lovers, before returning to Wākea and bearing the islands of Kaua‘i, Ni‘ihau, Lehua, and Ka‘ula. Wākea and Hoʻohōkūkalani had a child of their own, who was born prematurely. The couple named the unformed fetus "Hāloa-naka (quivering long stalk)" and buried him. From the spot of his burial grew the first kalo plant. The couple’s second child, whom they called Hāloa in honor of his older brother, "was the first Hawaiian Ali‘i Nui and became the ancestor of all the Hawaiian people." Kalo, the main food staple of ʻŌiwi Wale (pre-contact ʻŌiwi Maoli), is therefore the elder brother of all ʻŌiwi Maoli and demands the respect and care that one owes to an older brother.

The importance of this connection between the ancestors of Hāloa-naka and Hāloa can be seen in the basic social patterns of the culture, at least according to Handy, Handy, and Pukui in Native Planters. The authors note that

the terms used to describe the human family had reference to the growth of the taro plant:

‘ōha, the taro sprout, became ‘ohana, the human extended family. The term for land had reference to subsistence: ‘aina, ‘ai to feed, with the substantive suffix na. The people who

34. Ibid., 23.

35. This term comes from Prof. Kanalu Young’s work Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past, and in his words, "is my phrase to define that time period from first settlement of these islands to the moment before James Cook or the actual first foreigner sailed into Nā Kai ‘Ewalu" (4). Nā Kai ‘Ewalu or The Eight Seas is the ‘Ōiwi Wale way of referring to their homeland and represents the "traditional consciousness that ocean is an extension of island. From shoreline to horizon, ocean is definable as ‘homeland’" (20).

36. Ibid., 24.
dwelt or subsisted on the land were the ma-ka-‘ai-na-na, "upon-the-landers." And a native in his homeland was a "child of the land," kama-‘aina.37

The genealogical link between Hāloa-naka and Hāloa raises the second important concept contributing to the ‘Ōiwi Maoli argument against the patenting of kalo: ‘Ōiwi Maoli, as the ancestors of Hāloa, owe respect and care to Hāloa-naka, their older brother; Hāloa-naka, in turn, reciprocates to his younger siblings by feeding and nourishing them. Accordingly, for ‘Ōiwi Maoli there is reciprocal respect and care between the ‘āina (land)38 and all things in it, including kalo and ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Kalo is a gift given from the ancestors, an elder brother, and consequently, ‘Ōiwi Maoli have "a kuleana or responsibility to honor, respect and protect Hāloa, so he in turn will sustain [them]."39 While ‘Ōiwi mahi‘ai cross-bred kalo and created new varieties, this breeding was not done for commercial purposes, but to ensure the perpetuation (feeding, nourishing and caring) of both kalo and the ‘Ōiwi Maoli.

The ‘Ōiwi Maoli were and continue to be concerned about more than who has the right of ownership of kalo. The question is not only who has a right to own, but also who has a right to care, maintain, and preserve the kalo genome as well as who may claim an exclusive right to and


38. Although a paper in "Environmental Ethics," the use of the term "environment" is troublesome. As Val Plumwood noted in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, the use of the term "environment" is problematic because it is a "backgrounding" term. By this Plumwood means that instead of having its own identity and value, the term "environment" is merely the background against which we live out our daily lives. In other words, when we speak of "environment" we speak of our environment, our tool, our background. Another difficulty that arises by using such generalized term, as Plumwood also points out, is that of homogenization. The same criticism cannot be made of the term ‘āina, which means not only land and earth, but that which feeds or food, as well as to rule. Ruling, however, does not just mean enjoying all of the rights and privileges of a ruler, but also means exercising the responsibilities and duties of that ruler. The word itself involves a reciprocal relationship, as do many ‘Ōiwi Maoli words. Reciprocity is a far different position than background. In an attempt to avoid such backgrounding, the terms "Earth Others," "non-humans," "nature," “‘āina," or "land" will be used to signify all that is found in the natural world, excluding humans. As such, the terms refer to water, land, animals, plants, rocks, the earth and all other features of nature.

39. "University of Hawai‘i to give up taro patents," Center for Food Safety, January 12, 2006.
make a profit from that genome. Patenting would remove the ability to care for, protect, and control, including preserve, the kalo genome from those who share that genome—the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Abandoning the patents, as opposed to giving them to someone else, including the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, is consistent with the position that kalo is the elder brother of ‘Ōiwi Maoli and cannot become property. The responsibility for and care of kalo must ultimately remain with the ‘Ōiwi Maoli in order for both to continue to grow and survive. In the words of Walter Ritte: "They do not have the right to buy, sell, or manipulate our mana. . . . They cannot claim us. We are not a commodity." 40

Notably, both sides focused on the notion of protection. Based on the letters and public discussions, neither Ritte nor Kobayashi were arguing that only ‘Ōiwi Maoli scholars and researchers may work to protect the kalo genome. In fact, Kobayashi had assisted UH with kalo research in the past. The concern is that ownership allows UH to exclude others from their rights and responsibilities to their ancestor. Further, there was a sense of injustice at the idea that the ‘Ōiwi mahi‘ai’s work with kalo, the centuries of cross-breeding and painstaking selection of kalo for properties fit to grow in specific regions and microclimates, could be so casually ignored, referred to flippantly as "unknown origin." That the result of this contrived "unknown origin" was that UH-Mānoa would now own the kalo, which gave them rights to exclude the very originators of that kalo from future use, added to the injustice. In the classic bioprospecting scenario, ‘Ōiwi Maoli knowledge was disregarded and the fruit of that knowledge was taken for the gain of others.

40. Ing, "Hawaiian groups voice opposition," Ka Leo O Hawai‘i.
For Ritte and other ʻŌiwi Maoli, the controversy was the result of UH’s failure to listen to and respect the ʻŌiwi Maoli culture. In his June 7, 2005 Letter to the Editor of The Honolulu Advertiser, Walter Ritte wrote: "It is no small matter when an indigenous people share the importance of their traditional knowledge and genealogy, and the dominant culture refuses to listen."

III.

Identification of the Mo'ohihia

The positioning of the two sides indicates that something more than cultural awareness or listening needed to occur to resolve this dispute (and future ones). Indeed, the fact that CTAHR positioned Ritte and other ʻŌiwi Maoli who oppose kalo patents as members of one of three groups—ʻŌiwi Maoli sovereignty activists, ʻŌiwi Maoli ethno botany-centrists, and/or members of a global anti-GMO movement—indicates just how deep the divide may be. This is not to say that the ʻŌiwi Maoli opposing kalo patenting are not sovereignty activists or anti-GMO; it is to say that such designations do not provide a complete picture of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. Nor is it enough to say that the UH Administrators are acting solely from the position of an exploitive colonizing culture, refusing to listen to the ʻŌiwi Maoli. This is not to say the colonizer mentality did not play a role in the controversy, only that it was not the only actor. The story of the kalo controversy is far more nuanced than such black and white, dualistically opposed distinctions suggest.

The underlying premise of this dissertation is that while the controversy was based, to some degree, on the haole’s (foreign, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli) refusal to listen and/or inability to understand, and to some degree on the ‘Ōiwi Maoli’s struggle for sovereignty, of greater
philosophical weight and significance is the idea that the controversy was rooted in a clash of unspoken assumptions. Because of these hidden assumptions, UH-Mānoa Administrators could not understand the ‘Ōiwi Maoli position in any way other than "ownership" and residual anger over the Overthrow. Exploring the clash further, one key question arises: Can these unspoken assumptions, especially those relating to a relationship to the land, be re-constructed to be more open to other views of a relationship to the ‘āina that may well be more sustainable than our current one? The answer to this question is "yes" and the way forward is to find a third way option for, as the following demonstrates neither the UH Administrators’ view of the human / non-human relationship nor the ‘Ōiwi Maoli’s view of the human / non-human relationship will provide the needed philosophical underpinning to forge a new third way relationship.

Rejection of UH-Administrators’ Tradition

Sole reliance upon the tradition of the UH-Administrators must be rejected, as the tradition does not allow for a sufficiently expansive ethical standpoint that would include non-humans in a meaningful relationship. The reason for this inability is three-fold. First, as CTAHR noted, "[a]ssertions of values or cultural values, which may have religious connotations, do not readily find common cause with the principles that motivate the professional activities of CTAHR faculty, activities that are (and, constitutionally, must be) secular." The kalo controversy was, under the world view of CTAHR, an issue of subjective religion not objective science; it was a clash of values, not a clash of facts. The UH-Administrators' world view not only prohibits subjective values from interfering with "objective" science and fact but also

41. The idea that the issue was one solely of religion was repeated in the press, both here and on the mainland, which referred to the relationship between ʻŌiwi Maoli and kalo in religious terms, such as "sacredness" and "embodiment of gods." Similar characterizations with regard to other resource management and ethical issues, including the Thirty-Meter Telescope continue to occur.
dismisses such subjective values as beyond rational discussion. Thus, under this world view, ‘Ōiwi Maoli arguments must be disregarded and their concerns rejected, as both arguments and concerns are beyond rational discussion. Generally, this type of stance does not lend itself to solving controversies.

Second, the notion that kalo is something more than an inanimate object to be manipulated, managed, and used as a commercial product is difficult to accept for the haole administrators at UH-Mānoa. For UH, the relationship between kalo and humans and the relationship between humans and nonhumans or property—intellectual or otherwise—is rooted in a Western capitalist understanding of labor and ownership and a mechanical understanding of nature as discrete elements or parts. Nature is a means to human ends. Such a conception provides no real flexibility with which to engage an ‘Ōiwi Maoli philosophical view, which is forged, in part, on the holistic and organic notions of genealogy, responsibility, and care.

Third, and related to the understanding of property, the UH administrators and scientists do not possess a notion of value that is sufficiently malleable to include non-humans as intrinsically valuable, thus giving the ‘āina a position at the so-called moral table. As a result, where the ‘Ōiwi Maoli see the value of kalo as intrinsic and deserving of dignity, UH sees the value of kalo as economic (and/or biological) and deserving of use. For UH, value is simply one of many human-assigned factors given to (or taken away from) kalo.

In sum, the tradition of privileging a certain view of science, economics, and ethics limits the ability of UH and its administrators and scientists to consider meaningfully the ‘Ōiwi philosophical viewpoint and moral obligations to kalo. This privileged "scientific" tradition, which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, divides the world into subjects
and objects. Objects have value based on their usefulness to subjects, and, in some instances, their use to a biological community. Such objects can be managed, á la stewardship, but, as Australian eco-feminist Val Plumwood argues, such objects are treated as "externalities" to the human world.\(^42\)

This view informs UH’s position that land in general, and kalo specifically, have no intrinsic value. Granted, the scientific community can understand the value kalo may play in an ecosystem as a whole, but this is objective value and is not intrinsic, subject-like value. This understanding reflects a false dichotomy between humans with intrinsic value and non-humans with economic or exchange value. Under this view, subjects determine the viability of action involving objects based on the costs and benefits accruing to the subject. One need only peruse journals and magazines devoted to capitalism to see this theory in action. We should care about forests because they consume carbon and create water—both useful for humans. Furthermore, we are encouraged to come up with some method to value forests adequately because, in the words of The Economist, "Forests are disappearing because they are [economically] undervalued."\(^43\) In short, only those subjects that possess intrinsic value can have moral obligation and responsibility. The non-human world has no intrinsic value, and accordingly, we owe it no moral obligation or moral responsibility.

The relevant difficulty of such a world view, at least for the purposes of this work, is that valuing in this way contributes to the impossibility of extending the realm of ethics and moral responsibility to the non-human world. Usefulness does not mandate moral obligation and responsibility, although it may allow for factoring and management. Nor does this position allow

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for meaningful engagement with the ‘Ōiwi Maoli position, which is viewed as religious or
cultural, but in any event not relevant to science or patenting or agriculture, and not amenable to
rational discourse.

This is not to argue that conservation and preservation efforts based on economic value,
such as stewardship, will not succeed and should not be promoted. However, the value of nature
in these discussions is again not inherent value, but value placed on the object determined by a
community’s preferences. In such cases, "nature" is replaced with words like "ecosystem
services" or "natural capital," connoting interchangeability and replenishability. The difficulty
with this notion of value is that it is based on the willingness of a community to consider such
things valuable only in this way, and even further, demonstrably more or less valuable than other
"preferences." Since humans give nature its value, nature’s importance shifts in accordance with
the whims of its human masters. Such flexibility, while beneficial to markets, is harmful to non-
humans and leaves such vulnerable to a community’s determination that nature is not as
important as jobs, infrastructure, economic benefits, or, in this case, union contracts and market
dominance.

A final reason to support the rejection of the UH Administrators' tradition lies in the
ecofeminist/feminist arguments made by Plumwood, among others. Plumwood contends that our
relationship to nature, as our relationship to women, is based on a master-slave hierarchical and
oppositional dualism. Man/woman and human/nature are defined in hierarchical opposition to

one another. Woman and nature become the other against which man and human are defined. This oppositional dualism is possible only if the master denies his dependency upon the slave.\textsuperscript{45}

Because of this structure, if we simply affirm nature and decide that perhaps it should have standing or rights, but remain within this master-slave hierarchical dualism, we cannot resolve the problem, because this notion of nature is not, in Plumwood's words, "an independently constituted nature," but remains as something that is defined against what it means to be human. The master-slave domination of nature remains.\textsuperscript{46} Nature continues to be nothing more than an instrument and a tool. While we may treat it better for a time, until we shift our conceptual view of nature, it will continue to be viewed as subordinate to humans. The practical result of this conceptual view is that when economic times are good, we take action to protect nature; when economic times turn bad, nature protection and value fail as we turn to protect and foster the growth of the master human.

Pervasive evidence of the difficulties in extending this tradition can be found in the current literature in environmental ethics and environmental law. Practitioners in both fields are struggling to find ways to extend the umbrella of moral responsibility and obligation to include land, trees, rocks, animals, and insects. Highly prolific contemporary utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, for example, attempts to extend moral considerability (the right to sit at the moral table and demand moral consideration, duty, and responsibility) to all things that can feel or may suffer. Animal Rights philosopher Tom Regan extends moral considerability to all things that "are the experiencing subjects of a life," but withholds an opinion on whether rivers, rocks and

\textsuperscript{45} Plumwood, \textit{Feminism and the Mastery of Nature}, 41.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 31-32.
trees also experience life. As early as 1971, Christopher D. Stone argued that legal rights should be extended to non-humans, although not necessarily the same rights as humans have and not necessarily to all non-humans. The discussion is not limited to the fields of philosophy and law, as even science has attempted to expand its understanding of value—to wit, integrative biology. The attempts for the most part have not succeeded. Protection of the environment remains in the realm of (laudatory) non-obligatory charity and not in the realm of compulsory ethics or law.

Perhaps most telling for this work is that this tradition failed to resolve the kalo controversy impasse. What ultimately succeeded in winning over the UH-Administrators was exhaustion, not understanding.

**Problematising the ‘Ōiwi Maoli Tradition**

Reliance solely upon the ‘Ōiwi Maoli tradition to negotiate future ‘āina issues also is problematic. As an initial matter, the tradition does not allow for those not genealogically linked to the ‘āina to be included in the genealogical relationship with the land. Recall the story of Papa and Wākea, which demonstrates how genealogy serves to link humans and non-humans in a relationship of reciprocal responsibility and care. No matter how sympathetic, or how much aloha (love, care) or understanding of the culture a haole may have, she can never have the requisite genealogical connection. She can never be ‘Ōiwi Maoli.

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49. In 2011, Bolivia passed the law of the Rights of Mother Earth, granting equal rights to nature and humans. See World Future Fund, Law of Mother Earth, [http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Projects/Indicators/motherearthbolivia.html](http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Projects/Indicators/motherearthbolivia.html).
Second, while the requirement and responsibility that ‘Ōiwi Maoli care for their older brother and the reciprocal duties that ensue from that understanding of the relationship are taught as ‘Ōiwi values, these values are subject to the lens of a colonized people living in a foreign political, economic, and ethical system. Although the type of political and economic system employed by ‘Ōiwi Wale is not entirely known, most agree it was neither feudal nor capitalistic. As ‘Ōiwi Maoli have assimilated into the new system brought by the colonizer, words, phrases, and meanings have changed with the passing of time and the tragic loss of indigenous knowledge. ‘Ōiwi Maoli Historian Noelani Arista notes that "[e]ven for Hawaiians . . . studying the language is a challenge, since it is still devalued in our homeland and we have had to live with a colonial historiography that marginalizes the oral and literary production of our kūpuna (ancestors)."50 Language, the way of preserving knowledge and the screen through which values are filtered, has shifted with time. This is not to say that ‘Ōiwi Maoli have lost their values or that those values are no longer relevant; it is to say that the impact of colonization and a foreign economic and political system has taken its toll on both language and knowledge.

Returning to Plumwood, part of the assimilation into the dominant Western culture of the vast majority of ‘Ōiwi Maoli is an acceptance of the predominant master/slave hierarchical dualism. As with the UH view, ‘Ōiwi Maoli may truly seek to protect the ‘āina. However, until, as ‘Ōiwi Maoli scholar Manu Meyer argues, all truly hear and feel what it means to be related to the ‘āina,51 until there is a conceptual shift in how the ‘āina is viewed, ‘Ōiwi Maoli, like the dominant Western culture, also will succumb to capitalism and a shifting of priorities. To be


clear, this is not a criticism of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli world view, but a statement of what happens when world views held by those with unequal power clash.

A third and closely related issue stems from the fact that so much of the indigenous knowledge base has been hidden from view by the effects of colonization. Three examples further demonstrate the barriers and obfuscation the colonist lens creates. The first example involves the current understanding of the ahupuaʻa (land division) system. As Andrade notes, we do not, at this time, have a complete understanding of the cooperative work and trade agreements that existed in and among the various ahupuaʻa. Nevertheless, many have co-opted the ahupuaʻa notion to create a romantic version of pre-contact Hawaiʻi with the hopes of using this "mountain to the sea" environmental understanding to promote their versions of self-sustainability, despite the fact it is highly unlikely the ahupuaʻa were, in fact, wholly self-sustaining. According to Andrade, for example, the entire northwestern part of the island of Kauaʻi contained one ahupuaʻa. However, more recently, that one ahupuaʻa has been divided into 10 to 15 smaller ahupuaʻa. Andrade contends that contemporary divisions follow not the ahupuaʻa system, but a watershed system, the latest environmental paradigm for land and resource management. The ahupuaʻa system is situated within a larger philosophical understanding of the world. However, without fully understanding the political, economic, and social system that constituted the world view of pre-contact Hawaiʻi, components of that view, including the ahupuaʻa system, can be and have been co-opted and changed.

52. "Land division usually extending from the uplands to the sea, so called because the boundary was marked by a heap (ahu) of stones surmounted by an image of a pig (puaʻa), or because a pig or other tribute was laid on the altar as tax to the chief. The landlord or owner of an ahupuaʻa might be a konohiki." Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, 1986 sv. v "ahupuaʻa"
A second example involves the term "konohiki." Konohiki has consistently been interpreted in legal parlance, as well as in general speech, as "the designated person having charge of the land in behalf of the king or chief or other person to whom the ahupua’a had been assigned." The konohiki was the "head man" or manager or chief’s agent, who controlled the land and the fishing rights of an ahupua’a assigned to him by the chief.

Kame‘elehiwa and Andrade have a different understanding of konohiki that, if adopted, would place the protection of resources in far different hands from where it currently resides. Kame‘elehiwa and Andrade argue that the word "konohiki" does not mean "resource manager" or "head man of an ahupua’a" as it is generally interpreted. Instead, the meaning should come from the two verbs that constitute the word: "kono" means "to invite, ask in, entice, induce, prompt" and "hiki" means "to be able, ability, possible." Placing these two words together, Kame‘elehiwa and Andrade contend that konohiki was not the "head man," but the one individual in the community or ahupua’a region who could get people to come together to do things, whether that be plant, repair a wall or waterway, or determine and implement the best and most effective way to share water. This does not mean that the konohiki was not a member of the ali‘i (ruling class). It does mean that the konohiki position was not given for solely political purposes.

Large projects were a common occurrence in pre-contact Hawai‘i. As Handy, Handy, and Pukui write in *Native Planters*,

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54. See also Pukui and Ebert, *Hawaiian Dictionary*, s.vv. WHAT’ S A VV.? kono and hiki.
the making of terraces and ditches and their maintenance, and the regulation of water, entailed much cooperative and communal labor. . . . In all the Polynesian islands, there was some organized work and some direction in canoe building, house construction, fishing, preparation of food on a large scale for feasts, in war making, and other communal activities. But there was nowhere the continuous organized enterprise comparable to that which was essential to the systematic gardening operations of Hawaii. 55

Whatever the task or large project, the konohiki knew each community member’s talents and how to motivate the community into action. This understanding of a konohiki as a community organizer, motivator, and general go-to person is far different from the legal definition or understanding of a konohiki as a land manager who owned and/or controlled water and other resources and could compel action. Under a haole world view, the idea of some individual having a rank in a governmental system because he or she can "get things done" by mobilizing people to cooperate is nonsensical. The term was thus translated using ideas familiar to a haole political-economic system. In the competitive self-interested, profit-maximizing market system familiar to the haole, cooperation would be an insufficient notion upon which to rely in order to complete tasks. Instead, the individual would need to use threat and actual force to coerce, for it is that threat of coercion and force that compels the citizens to follow the konohiki’s decisions. Further, as the McBryde court argued, the konohiki could and necessarily did own the resources under his care; otherwise he would have no interest in managing and

55. Pukui, Handy and Handy, Native Planters, vii.
preserving these resources.\(^{56}\) Thus, a term that made perfect sense in a cooperative world view has been modified to fit the competitive market view of the colonizers.

This notion of economic and social paradigms affecting translation is not a new one, nor is it limited to Hawai‘i. Hilary Putnam uses the example of "melekh" to support his claim that we subjectively, not objectively, understand the world. He notes: "The beliefs of an Israelite two thousand years ago about the properties of a "melekh" were undoubtedly very different from the beliefs of a typical present-day American about the properties of a king; yet we translate "melekh’ as ‘king.’"\(^{57}\) So too, the difference between the ‘Ōiwi notion of "ali‘i" and the missionaries’ view of "king," or the difference between "land agent" and "konohiki."

A final example is demonstrated (appropriately) by exploring the word "kaona." Arista explains,

the *kaona* of a *mele* was a veiled message directed at a particular audience of listeners. In more recent times a generalized understanding of *kaona* has entered common usage among Hawaiians. For those enjoying linguistic and cultural fluency, as well as for scholars interpreting Hawaiian-language source material, *kaona* has come to mean double, multiple, or hidden meanings in individual Hawaiian words. No longer is the target audience of *kaona* specific, nor is *kaona* the inspiration behind couched meaning; rather, *kaona* is something of a hidden package waiting to be unwrapped by the deserving, knowledgeable listener or reader.\(^{58}\)

\(^{58}\) Arista, "Navigating Unchartered Oceans," 665.
The difference seems to be that often times today when someone ('Ōiwi Maoli or haole) speaks of kaona, it is often in the context of metaphor, referring to each individual and discrete word as containing some hidden meaning. Whereas for ‘Ōiwi Wale and ‘Ōiwi Maoli who study the language, kaona was not discrete but was a whole, a story under the story. Moreover, part of kaona involves not only the linking of many independent meanings, but also the linking and interconnecting of stories and meanings across time and place. As Arista notes: "Paying attention to kaona in my translation of Hawaiian texts, I was especially moved by the way in which Hawaiian composers actively selected their words, reaching for the interconnected meanings and contexts evoked by words across a spectrum of Hawaiian oral traditions and handwritten and published texts."59 Time and space were not seen as discrete parts or events, but as a connected whole. This makes kaona something much more than mere metaphor, yet that is its definition under a colonizing language system.

The example of the changing meaning and/or understanding of the words "ahupua‘a," "konohiki," and "kaona" demonstrate a shift in the ‘Ōiwi philosophical understanding of the world. Through suppression of language and culture, through the indoctrination found in foreign schools and economic and political systems that prioritize individual property and ownership, the ‘Ōiwi Maoli of the kalo controversy see their culture, values, and mo‘olelo through a lens of capitalist colonialism; a lens that cannot easily be removed. This phenomenon is not isolated to Hawai‘i. Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, in Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature, writes of a similar occurrence across colonized Africa. Ngũgĩ argues that colonial alienation results in a distancing of the colonized people from their culture, their world, and their

59. Ibid., 666.
‘āina. As a result, language, that which bears culture for Ngugi, becomes separated from the very culture it is meant to reflect and embody.\(^6^0\)

Thus, while we can speak of pono (harmonious, right, good) action and of Mālama ‘Āina, those words do not carry the same intent they did before colonization. All languages change and develop over time. However, the fear is that if we continue to function within our current economic, political, and ethical system, ‘Ōiwi words will not reflect the traditional ‘Ōiwi environmental ethic. Such a project, pursued under the current exceptionalised view held in the West, will result in nothing more than incorporating notions of capitalism disguised as ‘Ōiwi Wale values. The same problems encountered with the capitalist understanding of the world mentioned above will be encountered under the ‘Ōiwi system, leaving the ‘Ōiwi Maoli open to the criticism that their system was no better or no different from the system of the colonizers.

IV.

Chapter Summary and Transition

As noted above, the UH administrators’ tradition is insufficiently broad to encompass or entertain an ‘Ōiwi Maoli valuing of the ‘āina, nor can it be expanded sufficiently to encompass a view of non-humans other than that of a tool or property: intrinsically valueless objects to be used by and for humans. Since the ‘Ōiwi tradition calls for notions of care and responsibility, a view assuming objects that have intrinsic value, the two views cannot be integrated. In other words, we can owe no duty to land under a tradition that holds land to be just property—something that can be owned. We cannot be compelled to care morally for and be responsible to intrinsically valueless objects. Those objects, pets for example, may receive our kindness and

love out of charity and perhaps even justice, but ultimately, they cannot demand moral obligation and respect.

Further, without significant challenge to the world view of oppositional dualisms that sets-up humans as value-laden subjects and non-humans as value-less objects, we run the risk of morphing ‘Ōiwi Wale values to fit the UH administrators’ world view. Which is to say, we may utter the words, but without a change in philosophical assumptions, the outcome remains the same. A third way is the only option. This third way will synthesize aspects of both traditions, relying on ‘Ōiwi scholars and their work in reclaiming their past and using Western philosophical traditions. Nor is this Third Way entirely new to either tradition. Instead, it relies upon an understanding of an organic nature, coupled with a rejection of subject/object and fact/value dualisms, augmented by ‘Ōiwi Maoli understanding of the ‘āina and its attendant ethical principles. The key to the Third Way is a reconceptualizing our relationships.

No doubt, the question will arise as to why we need such a deep philosophical reworking of our views of the world. Our relationship with the environment surely will improve as we develop greener technologies, better recycling programs, and enlightened resource management regimes. While all of this will no doubt be helpful in preserving resources, a key notion contained within this dissertation is that this is no longer an issue of increased technology but is an issue of ethics. As Val Plumwood writes, "the problem is not primarily about more knowledge or technology; it is about developing an environmental culture that values and fully acknowledges the non-human sphere and our dependency on it . . . ."61 In other words, no amount of know-how or technology will be sufficient.

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In his seminal and oft-quoted article, "Is there a need for a new, an Environmental, Ethic?," Philosopher Richard Sylvan argues that human interests, wants, and desires are far too "parochial" to provide a solid basis upon which to make environmental decisions. This work agrees with that statement and argues that we need something more than simply the charity and good will of individuals to rest a moral system that addresses environmental concerns upon. While Sylvan seems to be arguing we can achieve this within the context of traditional Western culture, in fact, Sylvan off-handedly and rather condescendingly rejects any views that do not fall in line with the predominant Western view, rooted in a Baconian-Cartesian-Lockean Enlightenment tradition, e.g., only pantheists are committed to trees having rights in the way that humans do, "[b]ut pantheism is false since artifacts are not alive," presumably in the same way humans are alive. This dissertation, focusing on environmental resource management issues specifically related to Hawai‘i, demands that we go further than working within the current exceptionalised philosophical structure. This does not mean, however, that we must reject all of our Western tradition. In fact, it is key thinkers in the Enlightenment, who have not been exceptionalised by the current generally accepted philosophical canon, who will provide an alternative set of metaphysical beliefs from which new ethical beliefs can arise. We need to change the way we view the environment for any real changes to be made. We need to understand a broader notion of value and admit our dependency and vulnerability before we can truly live sustainably on this planet.

63. Ibid., 19.
Plumwood, in *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, argues that "[r]ejection of the western treatment of nature implies a careful, critical and political look at the category of nature." This dissertation takes Plumwood’s statement seriously, and in some respects, the following is as much a work in environmental ethics as it is in ecocriticism. The goal is not to disregard all things in the traditions of philosophy developed in the geographical West, but to understand the root of how it is that we have created such a separation between humans and non-humans, and to formulate a way to bridge that gulf. The work is, in part, a critical reconstruction of the way we see and speak about humans and non-humans.

To achieve this goal, Chapter 2 explains both the methodology of this work and CTAHR’s assumptions. Chapter 3 reveals the narrative genealogy that contributes to and supports those assumptions. Chapter 4 further explores this narrative by unveiling the role of the ideology of capitalism in deepening CTAHR’s operating assumptions. Chapter 5 turns to the cosmogonic genealogy and the critical narrative genealogy of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli to reveal the ethical principles underlying Mālama ‘Āina. Chapter 6 returns to the question at hand and outlines the key components of the Third Way, including an alternative Western narrative genealogy. Chapter 7 addresses objections and applies the Third Way to the kalo controversy.

On a final introductory note, ‘Ōiwi Maoli Scholar kuualoha ho‘omanawanui argues that from a "Native perspective" non-natives (haole) "don’t have—and can never have—kuleana in Native realms of scholarship, knowledge, and experience." I take this statement seriously and

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64. Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 37.

65. kuualoha ho‘omanawanui, "This Land is Your Land, this Land was My Land: Kanaka Maoli versus Settler Representations of ‘Āina in Contemporary Literature of Hawai’i," in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai’i*, eds. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 140.
to be clear, the following does not assert my understanding of Mālama ʻĀina, but sets out ʻŌiwi Maoli thinkers’ view of the concept. My role, as a member of a colonizing and occupying settler population, is necessarily limited to finding connections, uncovering assumptions, and unveiling deeper understandings for haole. That being said, it is hoped that that which is uncovered will be useful for ʻŌiwi Maoli as well.
Chapter 2
Hoʻomoʻolelo

. . . we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question--and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison . . . .)

-- Nietzsche

The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body.

-- Foucault

Introduction and Chapter Goals

The next three chapters use the methods of comparative philosophy and critical narrative genealogy to uncover and reveal the present assumptions and implications that fueled the kalo controversy from both the perspective of CTAHR and of ʻŌiwi Maoli. This chapter further defines what is meant by both comparative philosophy and critical narrative genealogy. The chapter also discusses the key assumptions and their operationalized implications that CTAHR held during the kalo controversy. Chapter 3 will explore the narrative genealogy and Chapter 4 will explore the social force of capitalism that supports these assumptions and implications. Chapter 5 will use the critical narrative genealogy to explore the descent of the ʻŌiwi Maoli

66. To make a story, tradition, history.
position during the kalo controversy, a descent that includes a reaction to and a stand against many of CTAHR’s assumptions and implications.

One further caveat, before beginning: the following is not a condemnation—moral or otherwise—of science or CTAHR or CTAHR employees or scientists. The following also is not a proposal to return to superstition. Nor should it be taken as an attempt to discredit science and all the good it has done to benefit humanity. In the current vernacular, I am not "anti-vaccine." I am a physicist’s daughter and share in the delight and wonder of science and its potential. Instead, the purpose of the following is to isolate and reveal the underlying assumptions that inform day-to-day beliefs about science in general and the role those assumptions play in the kalo controversy. This is not an issue of what I think about the content of science, but more an issue of how it is that scientific practice today supports hidden assumptions that contribute to conflicts like the kalo controversy. We neither recognize such assumptions and their operationalized implications nor critically reflect upon them, which is why we need to use the critical narrative genealogy as a tool. Despite or maybe because of this lack of critical reflection, the assumptions discussed in this chapter do affect how we engage with our world and how we deal with those who operate under a different set of assumptions. That the kalo controversy even occurred is evidence of these affects; that we are not doomed to repeat the kalo controversy is evidence of the power of critical narrative genealogy and our ability to learn from our past mistakes and do better.
I.

The Method

A key point to remember throughout is that a genealogy is not history, causal, or exclusive. We must resist the desire, born in part out of our academic attachment to canon, to become too enmeshed in the search for a direct linear causal connection between assumption and event. There is not just one set of assumptions, one set of thinkers, one set of doers, and one genealogy. As will be discussed below in greater detail, the purpose of these chapters is not to provide an absolute monolithic truth for how it is we came to the kalo controversy but to explore one route of that journey. The value in this exercise is that it provides us with space to achieve different futures. We are not doomed to follow one historical road of cause and effect. Moreover, since the underlying assumption of both a critical narrative genealogy and comparative philosophy is that there is no monolithic truth, attempting to find one would seem to be at best a futile effort and at worse a prevarication. Rather, as Philosopher Colin Koopman describes in his book, *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity*:

Genealogies are concerned . . . with submerged problems. The problems of genealogy are those problems found just below the surface of our lives—the problems whose itches feel impenetrable, whose remedies are ever just beyond our grasp, and whose very articulations require a severe work of thought. These submerged problems are those that condition us without our fully understanding why or how. They are depth problems in that they are lodged deep inside of us all as the historical conditions of possibility of our present ways of doing, being, and thinking.⁶⁷

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The kalo controversy is the outward manifestation of the coalescing of just such impenetrable
itchy problems. This dissertation floats those problems to the surface through the use of critical
narrative genealogy. Comparative philosophy plays a key role in contributing to the critical
aspect of the genealogy that will demonstrate the contingent nature of the present, and in
providing the possible conditions for the future. Both of these tools—comparative philosophy
and critical narrative genealogy—will be discussed in greater detail below.

**Comparative Philosophy**

For this work, comparative philosophy is as important as the critical narrative genealogy
to tearing down a monolithic view of both what philosophy is and what is the appropriate way to
think and access truth and morals. Philosophy, both generally and locally, has a tarnished
reputation when it comes to dealing with other traditions. Even in a department as committed to
comparative philosophy as UH-Mānoa’s, off-the-cuff remarks such as "Surprisingly, Hawaiians
even had metaphors" or "Hawaiians have no epistemology" are still heard in corridors and
colloquia.

According to philosophers Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, comparative
philosophy can be analyzed in stages. The first stage of comparative philosophy is rooted in a
sense of universalism that argues that each tradition shares similar concepts, ideas, theories, and
traits. The second stage of comparative philosophy searches for "context-dependent culture-
immanent peculiarities" with the goal of identifying "specific lacks compared to the Western
tradition." Third stage comparative philosophy engages in a type of "criss-cross interpreting" that
looks both outward to the tradition being compared and inward to the tradition of the comparer.
Thus, I might use Spinoza to critique ʻŌiwi Maoli philosophical positions on free will, but then,
in turn, use those same ʻŌiwi Maoli positions to critique Spinoza. This third stage Chakrabarti argues is a "critical conjunction between universalism [Stage 1] and localism [arguably Stage 2].”

In their proposal for a fusion comparative philosophy—a fourth stage of comparative philosophy—and in their attempt to rid philosophy of the pesky and troublesome borders it creates between traditions, Chakrabarti and Weber use the word "appropriation" to define the project:

It would amount to just doing philosophy as one thinks fit for getting to the truth about an issue or set of issues, by appropriating elements from all philosophical views and traditions one knows of but making no claim of "correct exposition," but just solving hitherto unsolved problems possibly raising issues never raised before anywhere. Under fusion philosophy, the focus is less on the tradition used and more on the creativity of the thinker.

The use of the word "appropriation" and the idea that one can choose whatever one "thinks fit" for solving the philosophical problem at hand seems to imply that all in the world is freely available for appropriation and that as the consummate problem solvers, we philosophers have the right to free use of whatever comes our way. No doubt we need to do that in a respectful manner by not claiming our interpretation is exceptionalised in any way ("correct

69. Ibid., 28.
70. This notion echoes the arguments made by CTAHR that its researchers were justified in their research as they were pursuing principles of academic freedom. Are we scholars free simply by virtue of a PhD to take any action we choose so long as it is under the umbrella of academia and we don't claim "correct exposition"? This seems to be another hidden assumption: that academia works for the good of humanity and, as such, the actions of an academic are inherently moral, just, and good. This raises further questions when academic projects are funded by outside, arguably non-humanitarian, sources.
and no doubt we need to do that in a way that does not turn the tradition we are borrowing into our own tradition. Even so, this idea directly raises concerns regarding the imperialistic nature of appropriation itself and the thin line all of us who are either colonizers or settlers and who live in an occupied nation must walk.

Notably, the concerns over appropriation also directly implicate the long-held tradition of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli of discourse, dialogue, and sharing. Knowledge in ‘Ōiwi Maoli philosophy is not held by one field or one group but debated and shared and created in a community. Appropriation implies that we, as Western philosophers, can access that community whenever we choose. At least one ‘Ōiwi scholar, Kanalu G. Terry Young, would deny us that access. Young argues that while non-‘Ōiwi Maoli may learn to understand the traditions of ‘Ōiwi Maoli, we can never access them as deeply or as fully as an ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Young also finds problematic the use of "haole analysis" to explore indigenous traditions. Notably, non-‘Ōiwi Maoli do not have access to ‘Ōiwi Maoli analysis. I cannot avoid this criticism for I am haole and using a modified Foucaultian method, whom Young specifically criticizes. I do not take Young to be saying, however, that we must stop and retreat from each other. I do think he would find the notion of appropriation highly problematic. My hope is that he would sanction a dialogue. Perhaps that is what comparative philosophy should do, and how it can be useful in a socio-political or practical philosophy piece such as this one.

This work will use the ‘Ōiwi Maoli tradition to deepen an understanding of the world around us, creating space for us to engage with and see the viability and richness of other traditions and other standpoints. This space provides us with a weapon to fight the assumptions that our views are exceptionalised and exceptional. As will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 6, we cannot give or remove borders. To be clear, maintenance of borders is not because ‘Ōiwi Maoli refuse to remove borders, it is because we haole cannot forget we are dealing with a colonized tradition that has been far too damaged by our "appropriation" no matter how benevolent it all may have seemed at the time. This is an interesting comment to make in a work that argues for the removal of a subject/object distinction. However, simply because I reject the notion that we can or even should remove borders does not mean we should create dualisms. Dualisms result from privileging and this I soundly reject. This refusal to remove borders may mean that I have not progressed past the third stage of comparative philosophy. It does not mean we should not engage. It does mean we should engage carefully, honestly, and with respect and recognition that our understanding, no matter how practiced our language skills, no matter how much we hula, will always be from a different perspective.

While appropriation is troubling, it also comes from a place of perhaps liberation. Unlike a great deal of the philosophical field today, appropriation is rooted in the notion that all philosophical traditions are on the same footing. This equal footing does not lead to the conclusion that we can appropriate without concern, but to the fact that each tradition is worthy of appropriation. In other words, it is not the case that a specific Western Enlightenment view on rationality should be exceptionalised over another and that one should not even consider ‘Ōiwi Maoli philosophy. Rather, it is the case that each philosophical tradition is available in that its content is worthy.

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71. As I read Chakrabarti and Weber, their use of the term "stages" seems to imply that we progress from one stage to the next, improving and advancing, which is what progress means, as we move. This is troubling, for it implies that so long as a thinker like myself refuses to treat all the intellectual traditions of others as open to all of humankind, in the Western notion of "commons," and thus available for appropriation, I am unable to progress and remain somehow less advanced as a mere third-stage philosopher.
This latter view of appropriation that positions all traditions as equally philosophically viable is akin to Philosopher Kristie Dotson’s call to increase our standards for judgment and legitimacy in the field of philosophy to include multiple, diverse, and sometimes competing canons and methodologies. This acceptance, she hopes, would eliminate one of the primary problems with philosophy today, namely, the fact that what we "exceptionalise" traditions and methodologies. By exceptionalism, Dotson refers to the belief that there really is only one way to understand the world and that is the "Western way." Appropriately for this work, Sandra Harding defines exceptionalism as it relates to science as follows:

Exceptionalism assumes that the West alone is capable of accurate understandings of the regularities of nature and social relations and their underlying causal tendencies. There is one world, and it has a single internal order. One and only one science is capable of understanding that order. And one and only one society is capable of producing that science: our Western society!

Exceptionalism blocks external challenges, holding that only those within the proverbial "club" have a right to claim their actions are philosophy or science or even knowledge.

Exceptionalism arises from and is perpetuated by what Dotson refers to as a culture of justification, which is one where the field, in this case philosophy, is focused on whether the work or issue in question meets certain justifying norms necessary to be called "legitimate."

Philosophers have a set of standards and practices that they look to in order to judge whether something is or is not philosophy, and this focus is really the key touchstone of whether

something is philosophy. We are too concerned as philosophers, Dotson argues, that what we are
doing looks like philosophy and is done in a specific way. Notably, this exceptionalism also is
self-perpetuating. If nothing else looks like philosophy except the philosophy we do, then
nothing else can be philosophy and we are the only ones who do it. Through exceptionalism,
other traditions are effectively blocked from challenging the artificial supremacy of Western
philosophy.74

In line with Dotson and fusion philosophy, this dissertation uses that space of discord as a
creative space that allows for experimentation with different methods. To this end, this
dissertation does not view the kalo controversy as a "bad" thing but as providing us with the
opportunity to explore further and critically self-reflect upon the philosophical systems in
conflict. Moreover, future conflicts over resource management issues in Hawai’i should not be
avoided but should be embraced as opportunities to explore further traditions to find a viable
way forward for all parties involved.

To be successful and make good philosophical use of this discord, we must abide by
Dotson’s call to engage meaningfully with multiple traditions and methodologies to combat
exceptionalism. This, in many ways, is what Chakrabarti’s and Weber’s fusion philosophy asks
us to do as well. As such, this dissertation uses the method of fusion comparative philosophy
with one caveat: philosophy of the traditions in question cannot be appropriated without
permission. To achieve this, everyone who enters the creative space must enter into a
relationship of vulnerability and trust with the culture whose philosophical system we are


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appropriating. This standing-with or hoʻopili relationship will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

This respect comes, in part, from actively engaging with the ʻŌiwi Maoli position on the kalo controversy, which lays bare the incongruence between the two parties of the conflict and provides us space to explore the differences with a minimal of interference from our own view of what philosophy is. We are not looking for one right answer. We are looking to understand another world view. This position of the comparer will minimize exceptionalism. Moreover, viewing CTAHR’s position from within a philosophical tradition of the ʻŌiwi Maoli provides valuable insights into that position. Philosophy itself is designed to call into question everything and is tasked with providing new ways to respond to what shakes out of the above-referenced questioning. But questioning is difficult for us so deeply entrenched in an exceptionalised view of how things ought to work. Herein lies the benefit of comparative philosophy.

The Third Way uses Western philosophy and ʻŌiwi Maoli philosophy to arrive at a new way to position us in the world. Along with that it rejects that there is a monolithic right way to be in the world just as it rejects the idea that the critical narrative genealogy discussed below provides the only option for how it is that the past animates our present in a contingent manner. The Third- Way provides one of many options for engaging with the conflicts that necessarily arise and that we should welcome as arising in Hawai‘i. At most, we accept; at the least, we see other viable options that open new doors and help us to engage more deeply and critically with each other.

Taking the notion of fusion one step further, coupled with the critical narrative genealogy below, the use of ʻŌiwi Maoli philosophy in this work provides a constant critique of what it is
we as philosophers do, and the impact of those actions. In this case, we have alternatives within our system. Those alternatives, when augmented with an understanding of ‘Ōiwi Maoli philosophy, will help us to maximize the benefits of the space of conflict. Thus, the intervention of ‘Ōiwi Maoli challenges our notion of what it means not only to do philosophy, but more specifically for this work, what it means to live in the world in a good and moral way.

**Critical Narrative Genealogy**

**Defining the Terms**

The term "critical narrative genealogy" was chosen purposefully as it combines key ideas necessary for this work to succeed. With regard to "genealogy," this is neither the objective chronicle of descent, such as the tracing of ancestors, nor is it a reaffirmation of our views of the world as supported by the history of ideas, although history in the form of narrative genealogy certainly plays a role in this discussion. The decision not to rely solely upon a history is rooted in the recognition that a history, as a social construct, tends to reveal itself as "the fact" of events in the world. Historians along the E.H. Carr school, tend to believe they are above bias and simply recounting events in the world or are midwives to the fact.

Genealogy goes further for we are explaining not only how the house was built, but also how it is that we came to believe this is the only house on the block; how it is we came to exceptionalise some views over others; how it is we continue to exceptionalise those views in light of evidence to the contrary. In Foucault’s words, the goal of genealogy is not to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues
secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes. Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people.\(^\text{75}\)

In this looking to the past, a critical narrative genealogy shares with ‘Ōiwi Maoli a respect and recognition of the power of where we come from in our quest to understand who we are. The ‘Ōlelo No‘eau\(^\text{76}\) "I ka wa mamua, ka wa mahope," which literally means "the time in front, the time in back" expresses just this sentiment. Kame‘eleiwa explains: "It is as if the Hawaiian stands firmly in the present, with his back to the future, and his eyes fixed upon the past, seeking historical answers for present-day dilemmas."\(^\text{77}\) Similarly, genealogies provide space for us to question what we thought we knew—our history—our identity—our perceived foundations. In doing so, genealogies reveal the generalities and archetypes that we "find" in order to support our assumptions about the world.

As a narrative, the second part of the term, a genealogy tells a story of a set of ethical ideas or theory that underlie actions. Stories are immensely important for both ‘Ōiwi Maoli and non-‘Ōiwi Maoli. We are taught, through children’s fairy tales and fables, that dark is bad and full of monsters and day is good and full of hope and hard work. We are taught through these same tales that girls become complete women when they find their Prince Charming. These tales


\(^{76}\) A word about ‘Ōlelo No‘eau or "traditional sayings" may be appropriae here. ‘Ōlelo No‘eau are more than simply pithy or quaint sayings from a quaint and picturesque people. They reflect the way in which ‘Ōiwi Maoli viewed the world and viewed each other. They are invaluable insights into the epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics of a people. ‘Ōiwi Maoli valued and loved their language. The ho‘opa‘apa‘a is one example of that commitment to and enjoyment in the power of words. Ho‘opa‘apa‘a was a game of skill where contestants battled, at the highest levels to the death, in displays of kaona, metaphor, analogy, allegory, personification, irony, pun and repetition. For ‘Ōiwi Maoli one does not carelessly throw out words; one does not do "trite."

\(^{77}\) Kame‘eleihiwa, Pehea Lā E Pono Ai? 22-23.
contrast sharply with ‘Ōiwi Maoli stories where night and day are equally important, equally generative, and monsters lurk in neither. Or, where girls are complete women when they meet the duties of their society, which may be a duty to their family (as a whole) as much as a duty to their mōʻi, whether that be male or female.

Stories provide models and guides, which inform how we live in and engage with our world and all things in it. Just as the stories of darkness and the Princess waiting for her Prince inform the praxis or actions of women in the Western tradition, and just as stories of night and day and pono theory informs the praxis or actions of women in an ‘Ōiwi Maoli tradition, the stories in our narrative genealogy inform how we act, including how we engage with nature and differing epistemologies. In a true philosophical and critically reflective spirit, it is the stories of both the CTAHR and the ‘Ōiwi Maoli tradition that the next three chapters seek to make transparent.

The narrative aspect of a genealogy explores the use of these stories, while the genealogy and the critical aspects help us to understand when and how the stories were used to define and support our beliefs. In this work, the exposition of certain thinkers will be referred to as a narrative genealogy and is to be contrasted with other parts of the work that focus on the when and how of the stories. A critical narrative genealogy is not interested in causal evidence in part because it is not seeking the one place ”where we went wrong” in order to fix it. "Critical," in the context of this work, refers to explaining "How we came to be here?" and, more importantly, "Need we remain?" This notion of a contingent present that could have been otherwise lies at the heart of the notion of critical.
There are a number of ways that we can see the use of critique in this work. First, as Koopman contends, the idea of critique is "etymologically linked to a confrontation with moments of crisis (which we today colloquially refer to as 'critical moments') that call forth cleavages, cuts or divisions in our thought. . . ."\(^78\) The critical moment for this work is the kalo controversy, providing a perfect opportunity to explore the past narratives that gave rise to that contingent clash of assumptions.

Another use of the notion of critical is as a tool, like that of analytical philosophy, that is designed to problematize our current view of the world. One sees the connection to crisis with this plank of the definition as well, since oftentimes it is a crisis that opens up the space for us to examine the viability of our relationship to the world. That being said, we do not explore our contingent present simply to pass judgment but to use what we have learned in the critique to intervene and change the world in which we live.

Finally, it is in controversy that the true notion of critique as linked to genealogy occurs. In many ways, it is the taking of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli position seriously, as one that should not be dismissed simply because it is not Western, not of the Enlightenment, and thus tautologically not rational under the parameters of the Western Enlightenment view, that provides the notion of critique with depth and with efficacy. CTAHR can come to critique its traditions through the eyes of ‘Ōiwi Maoli, just as ‘Ōiwi Maoli come to understand better their role as brothers and sisters to the land through the conflicts and obstacles placed in their path by the exceptionalised and hegemonic tradition. This is not to justify or rationalize but is to demonstrate what we can make use of.

\(^78\) Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 15.
ʻŌiwi Maoli Intervention

The above outlines the European or *haole* sides of a critical narrative genealogy. But the notion of a genealogy as used in this work is further modified by the intervention of the ʻŌiwi Maoli concept of genealogy, moʻokūʻauhau, which I refer to as an onto-cosmogonic genealogy. The most well-known moʻokūʻauhau for our purposes is the Kumulipo, the 2100+ line mele koʻihonua (birth lineage song or chant) cosmogonic chant that sets forth how all things in the universe came to be, through which is revealed a metaphysical rendering of the nature of things. In ʻŌiwi Maoli philosophy, the nature of things is necessarily rooted in interdependence and interconnectedness of all things. In the words of ʻŌiwi scholar Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio, it is the "many with." In ʻŌlelo ʻŌiwi (Hawaiian language), this onto-cosmogonic relationship is referred to as a moʻokūʻauhau.

The critical narrative genealogy used in this dissertation accepts the intervention of the ʻŌiwi Maoli moʻokūʻauhau and its themes of interrelatedness. As we look to the past, narratives, concepts, intellectual ideas, and social forces will come together to influence assumptions and implications. Moreover, the idea that a narrative (words) of past thinkers influences through use is thickened by looking to the ʻŌiwi Maoli understanding of words. ʻŌiwi Maoli traditionally were and remain connected to the word. Words have power: "I ka ʻōlelo no ke ola, i ka ʻōlelo nō ka make," which literally translated means "In the language is life. In the language is death." The stories those words were used in gave insight into the most harmonious way to be in the world: how best to fish; how best to treat one’s wife or husband; how best to plant; how best to revere the earth. In the words of ʻŌiwi Maoli, an oral tradition prior to contact, centuries of knowledge
was passed down from generation to generation. Metaphysical, epistemological and ethical theories are found in these stories, as moʻolelo provided the theory for right and good action.

Evidence of this relationship and its profound effect on shaping both the metaphysics and the epistemology of the ʻŌiwi Maoli can be found in a linguistic analysis of the very word, moʻokūʻauhau. Borrowing from Young, the first three letters of moʻokūʻauhau, "moʻo," are also a stand-alone word that refers to a lizard or ridge or series of bumps. The short word "moʻo" is used in the names of tracks on the ridge of mountains, such as "Kuamoʻokāne," which is the ridge or path Diamond Head of Hanauma Bay leading to the two craters of Ihiʻihilauākea and Nonula on the island of Oʻahu. Other examples include the use of the word "moʻo" in the Ōlelo ʻŌiwi word for "story"—"moʻolelo," which is a string or a series of events—and in the Ōlelo ʻŌiwi word for "grandchild"—" moʻopuna," referring to the progression from elder to younger.79

Notably, moʻo jumps metaphysical categories, finding a place in nature, environment, and human culture. The wide use of moʻo is not because ʻŌiwi Maoli have a limited vocabulary, nor does it evidence some form of faulty reasoning that indicates an inability to distinguish between metaphysically different items. Instead, the use of the word "moʻo" in all of these differing contexts reflects the interconnectedness of the ʻŌiwi Maoli world, one where each thing, whether of human-culture (genealogy or history) or nature-culture (lizard or mountain) is related to the next. For ʻŌiwi Maoli the interrelated nature of their language reflects the interrelated nature of their world, with each part related to the next, as the lizard is connected to a mountain, which is connected to the stories of a people, which is connected to the people, who in turn are connected to the mountain peaks. Unlike Bacon who, as we will see in the following

pages, seems to be arguing that language shapes reality, the ʻŌiwi Maoli would argue that reality—and importantly, ʻāina—shapes language. Thus, the critical narrative genealogy assumes an interconnected, mutually-creating world of space and time that stands in sharp contrast to the notion of a causal relationship.

**Standpoint Epistemology**

The intervention into this critical narrative genealogy by exploring the ʻŌiwi Maoli position as an active co-creator of the kalo controversy is not only that of relatedness, but also that of standpoint epistemology. As noted by scholar Steven Russell, "[g]enealogy involves an uncovering of painful conflicts between exceptionalised, erudite knowledges and suppressed, disqualified, marginalized, local popular knowledges." Why that uncovering is important and necessary and in many ways key to our ability to be better knowers is rooted in the notion from standpoint epistemology that the position of one in society, either by virtue of race or sex or socio-economic background, or in this case philosophy, sets limits on what a person can know. In some instances, these limitations can limit not only general knowledge but also how well a person can critically reflect upon his/her own views and beliefs.

An example of this positioning used by Philosopher Sandra Harding is that of a white supremacist, who can only see the world one way because his/her theory does not allow him/her to see others as being able to participate in the world and because his/her actions prohibit that participation. Locally in Hawaiʻi, an example of this might be the stereotype of Micronesians as not being willing to work. Missing from the picture is the recognition that racist beliefs place

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limits on the ability of Micronesians to find work. The limited standpoint of the racist or supremacist theory about the world is self-perpetuating, partially because the empirical evidence seems to confirm the theory: Micronesians are lazy because they do not work; Micronesians do not work because they are lazy. However, explanations of alternative stressors are ignored, as they do not neatly fit into the primary racist or supremacist theory.

Another example of this, related more directly to the work, might be our backgrounding of nature. Plumwood argues that, due to the subject/object hierarchical dualism, we background or minimize the importance nature plays in our lives and all the ways it makes life in general possible. If we only see nature as a backgrounded object, we will not have the conceptual tools to see alternatives. We are limited in how we can understand the world by an exceptionalised central position in that world, whether that be an androcentric or an anthropocentric one.

ʻŌiwi Maoli do not remain in the center of the epistemological circle, where they are blinded by the limitations of that self-perpetuating center, but travel back and forth from the marginalized outer edges to the inner circle. This is why ʻŌiwi Maoli share CTAHR’s assumptions; through school and living in a capitalist society, they have been trained to hold these assumptions. They also, however, have their own assumptions rooted in a history and tradition and philosophy not shared by CTAHR. ʻŌiwi Maoli see many sides of the equation. If our goal is truly to find knowledge and not simply to perpetuate a certain understanding of the world, then we need ʻŌiwi Maoli to open up space for us to see our limits from outside of ourselves. The indigenous critique, either of our theory or our actions, is what forces us to look more closely at ourselves, explore more deeply our relationships, and question the assumptions we have come to take as axiomatic. The kalo controversy was an intrusion of politics, religion,
culture, philosophy, and a host of other social forces into not a pristine and "objective" world of
science, but into a world very much informed by politics, religion, culture, philosophy and a host
of other social forces. Thus, this critical narrative genealogy in many ways assumes the validity
of standpoint epistemology because it assumes that there are other valid ways of knowing. By
exploring how it is we came to be where we are, it assumes that it might have been possible for
us to have come to be somewhere else. We might choose differently. There are somewhere elses
to go. That being said, this cannot be a project that simply replaces the exceptionalised version of
the Enlightenment or CTAHR’s view with that of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. The idea is not to question
what group holds the center but to question the existence of the center itself.

The notion of a standpoint is applicable here on an ethical level as well. Just as we need
to look to the margins to understand how to thicken, nuance, and broaden our understanding of
knowledge claims in the world, we need to look to the margins to thicken, nuance, and broaden
our concept of our relationship to nature and the moral obligations that arise from that
relationship. We are, in many ways, trapped by our own moral and ethical limitations. This
critical narrative genealogy, informed by the understanding of interdependence derived from
moʻokūʻauhau, and placed squarely within the theory of standpoint epistemology, will allow us
to take just that action.

II.

Assumptions and Implications

All genealogies have a starting point. For Nietzsche, it was the concept of morals. For
Foucault, it was varying notions of power as depicted in our treatment of criminals and those
who deviate from generally accepted behavior. For Williams, it was the concept of truth. In each
case, the thinkers sought to use the genealogical method to articulate the contingent present’s position on the respective concepts. In this case, the starting point is a series of assumptions and their attendant operationalized implications. Before exploring the specific assumptions and implications, a word about what is meant by the terms "assumption" and "implication" may be useful.

**Defining Assumption and Implications**

An assumption is that which we take to be true almost without question. The early meaning of "assumption," which is rooted in the Latin word for "a taking, receiving," comes from Catholic theology, where it refers to the taking of the Virgin Mary to and the receiving of the Virgin Mary by Heaven. In paintings of the Assumption, the Virgin Mary is taken directly from the Earth to Heaven. She does not stop at the pearly gates where her life is judged. No questions are asked if she belongs in or deserves to be received by Heaven. In fact, very few, if anyone, questions the rightness of the Assumption. The general agreement seems to be that birthing and raising a prophet/son of God, by all accounts, should gain one unquestioned entry into Heaven.

That notion of the "rightness" of a concept or idea has been carried by the word through its development. During the 17th century, the word took on the meaning of an action laying claim to some thing or claim as well as the idea of taking things for granted as a basis for an argument. Assumption also played a role in the logical notion of argument as early as 1588, when it began to be used as a minor premise for a syllogism. This history lends to the

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83. Ibid.
contemporary use of the word to indicate something that is taken for granted and whose legitimacy is not questioned, similar to the legitimacy of Mary going to Heaven is taken for granted.

All assumptions share one resemblance or more that help to identify the concept as an assumption. First, assumptions are so axiomatic to how we view the world that the thought of their falsity is unfathomable. In this way, assumptions are a reflection of an unquestioned ideology. Since we are so embedded in that ideology, we find it difficult to see our way past both the ideology and the assumptions it raises. For many, \(2 + 2 = 4\) is one such notion. The idea that the equation is only correct in a certain agreed-to formal system is not something the average person can or wishes to easily contemplate. In fact, \(2 + 2 = 4\) is often the short hand way of stating that science and math are based on the "facts" of the world, despite the fact that "2," as a thing or an object in the world, does not actually exist.

Second, assumptions are repeated so frequently and in such a manner as to quash opposition so successfully that continuing to raise questions about the assumption’s veracity is seen as political and social, not to mention more relevantly, scientific and philosophical suicide. The repetition of \(2 + 2 = 4\) makes it true, and only certain types, e.g., theoreticians not engaged with the "real" world, can allowably question its veracity. The fact these theoreticians are so disengaged limits the impact of their questioning. The third way in which assumptions share a familial resemblance is that their belief makes our lives easier and more manageable. Taken as a whole, assumptions give us stability; a solid bedrock beyond which we never need venture. To question them is to question what we take to be a fundamental notion: there are certain immutable facts in the world.
Attending assumptions are implications, which are the assumptions in action or operationalized assumptions. The early definition of "implication" in the 15th century Latin was the "action of involving, entwining, or entangling" and being "intimately connected or combined." As such, an implication engages the world through the assumption and results in a certain, to use its definition from 1581 onward, implied but not expressed84 viewpoint. Like assumptions, implications are not discussed but are an accepted end result of the tacitly agreed-to assumption. Even if one were to address and eradicate the implication, while the assumption remains, so too does the possibility of its engagement with the world via an implication. Returning to the example of the assumption of 2 + 2 = 4,85 the implication that necessarily arises is that anyone who disagrees or challenges the assumption of 2 + 2 = 4 is irrational or so rooted in theory as to be irrelevant to the world because there can be no other viable way to see the world.

Notably, this system of assumption and implication is a self-perpetuating one. Assumption, as defined above, leads to an implication that effectively closes off other options. This solipsistic rejection of other possibilities leads to privileging and exceptionalism that supports the notion that the assumption is axiomatically correct for the three reasons noted above. In order for there to be a bedrock foundation—to our knowledge, our ethics, our world—our assumptions and implications must be so tightly bound so as to become one consolidated strata.

84. Ibid., s.v. implication.

85. I do recognize that under an alternative analysis, this is not an assumption but an implication of a certain accepted formal system. However, the example still serves its purpose and that ambiguity supports the notion of the interconnectedness of assumption and implication.
A possible objection to this discussion is that there are other types of assumptions that do not lead to the privileging I am suggesting. In fact, in many ways, a critical narrative genealogy is or at least operates under certain assumptions. The difference is that the critical narrative genealogy does not unquestionably accept its starting point, or any point along its way for that matter. For a critical narrative genealogy, all concepts are open to question and critique, including the very method of the critical narrative genealogy itself. Thus, the critical narrative genealogy rejects the very resemblances that serve to identify certain ideas as belonging to the family of assumptions. There is no bedrock. There is no shovel turned.

*General Scientific Assumptions*

Science accepts a certain set of assumptions that it does not question. Economics and philosophy also share these assumptions, as will become clear in the next chapter. These assumptions, as listed in the website, "Understanding Science," which was created and is maintained by the University of California at Berkeley through a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF), are, according to the website, "important and not controversial," which is to say axiomatically true and impossible to question (Resemblance 1). In fact, the website notes that these assumptions are accepted as key to the purpose of science, which is to build "reliable knowledge about the natural world," i.e. to be rational. Moreover, we know these assumptions work because we see it every day in what the assumptions have allowed science to achieve such as the creation of planes that fly, antibiotics that protect us from disease, batteries that light our way and so forth, which is to say, our lives are easier and our world more manageable through discoveries made possible by these assumptions (Resemblance 3).

Although these three assumptions could have as easily been distilled from any first year physics text, the location is important because it demonstrates that these assumptions are not some set of extraordinary notions understood by a limited set of experts. Rather, these assumptions are the very ones that the NSF, the premier agency for supporting the sciences, wants the layperson to understand about science. These assumptions are not only repeated for and by experts but also repeated for and by non-experts such that they become a part of how we see science, specifically, and the world, generally. To that end, this work does not seek to demonstrate that CTAHR abides by these assumptions, for to the extent CTAHR engages in science, it must accept these assumptions as valid.

**Assumption 1: There are natural causes for things of the world (S1)**

As the website notes, we may not know for sure what causes gravity, but, rejecting the very father of physics’ (Newton) claim that it is God, we assume that there is an explanation, that the explanation is rooted in natural, not supernatural causes, and that one day we will figure it all out. More directly relevant might be the idea that while we may not know for sure what might cause a plant disease, science can and will figure it out.

**Assumption 2: Use empirical data to identify natural causes (S2)**

This assumption translates directly into the practice of constructing experiments and collecting empirical data based on our observations to determine how it is that things in the world act and the natural causes of things around us. This data is gathered and then either supports or changes a theory. Using the plant example, one way science will solve the problem of plant disease is by setting up an experiment to test for traits that might be combined to create a

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87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
disease-resistant plant strain.

**Assumption 3: Consistency in Causes (S3)**

This assumption means that there are certain laws of nature that apply consistently to everyone in all places and in all times.\(^89\) Thus, the laws of gravity, in principle, will affect a ball or a bat in the same way. Returning to the plant example, a successful combination of disease resistant traits would be successful across the plant species and in every environment.

*Kalo Controversy-Specific Assumptions of CTAHR*

In addition to the above, there are two assumptions that are evidenced by CTAHR’s actions and words that both grow out of and add to the above assumptions. These assumptions mark the starting point of the critical narrative genealogy in both Chapters 3 and 4.

**CTAHR Assumption 1: Science is Moral (C1)**

The first assumption is that science is a moral project. The purpose of science is to do good and since doing good (whatever "good" means) is the quintessential definition of what it means to be ethical, it stands to reason that science is moral. This assumption is so deeply ingrained as to be axiomatic, which is to say, a given or a statement that needs no proof. We see this assumption at work in how CTAHR sees its mission and its role in the kalo controversy, as described below.

The University of Hawai’i is a land grant institution and it first came into existence as an early version of CTAHR. UH was originally created to use scientific research to develop "successful communities" through education and outreach.\(^90\) CTAHR sees itself as effectively and beneficially shaping agriculture in Hawai’i and, by extension, the people of Hawai’i, by

\(^89\) Ibid.

\(^90\) *CTAHR and Taro*, 5.
"improving the health and quality of life of Hawaii’s people, and finding ways to work with and prevent deterioration of the environment and natural resources of the state." This work includes extension outreach, which touches individual members of the community, as well as providing guidance to the government in creating social programs and policies. The end goal for CTAHR is "to help the people of the State lead happier, more productive lives." 

This "helping the people of Hawai‘i" trope is echoed in CTAHR’s version of the events that surrounded the kalo controversy. CTAHR argues that the lead researcher on the kalo patenting project, Dr. Eduardo Trujillo, began working on the new kalo species in response to a call for help: Sāmoa’s kalo crop had almost been completely obliterated by leaf blight. Sāmoa turned to CTAHR and Trujillo came to the aid of kalo mahiʻai everywhere. From this standpoint, CTAHR’s actions are above reproach: responding to a plea for help by using science to save a food source that has viable commercial potential is a good and moral thing to do and is what an exceptionalised and wealthy society should do for others who are needy.

Moreover, CTAHR has been doing good and moral acts for kalo for decades. CTAHR contends it saved the kalo species by maintaining a collection of kalo plants, and that plant collection is, according to CTAHR, the reason many kalo cultivars still exist today. CTAHR states it encouraged farmers to return to traditional practices, thus addressing issues that arose as a result of stressors placed on kalo cultivation due to increasing population and decreasing resources. Thousands of human hours and hundreds of publications have been devoted by

92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. CTAHR and Taro, 8. CTAHR does not mention or credit the ‘Ōiwi Maoli who created these species.
CTAHR researchers to the effort to support kalo and to make "major improvements in production opportunities for this Asian-Pacific staple crop." CTAHR, through the use of science, helps people. Science is axiomatically moral.

**CTAHR Assumption 2: Nature is a Machine or is Machine-like (C2)**

The second assumption held by CTAHR is that nature is a machine, or, more generously, machine-like, and can be controlled as a machine would be controlled. Linking this assumption to the first, it should be noted that the machine that is nature is controlled and manipulated by science for the benefit of humanity. Indeed, it is the benefit to humanity that in many ways drives this notion, for in order to protect and benefit through manipulation and control, that thing which can be controlled and manipulated cannot be a living thing or subject with rights á la a human but must be an object without rights and without the ability to claim moral treatment from others.

That control and manipulation, recalling the control of the plant disease through the manipulation of the plant traits, can occur because as a machine the parts of nature can be revealed by use of experiment: the plant is reduced to its parts and its pieces observed. In addition, machines are all the same regardless of their context. The basic particulars of an internal combustion engine, whether that be the Model T Ford or the Ford Escort, are essentially the same. Machines operate under certain principles that remain consistent across time and space and are considered to be universal laws of nature (S3).

That nature is a machine or machine-like stands in contrast to the knower, the human being, who is the subject. Regardless of whether or not humans are only machines, the

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assumption is that we are metaphysically different from that which we use the scientific method to come to know. Humans are subjects that are knowers; nature is an object, which is known.

*Implications of CTAHR Assumptions*

As noted above, implications invariably attend assumptions, as they operationalize assumptions by engaging everyday life through the assumption. The following implications arise when the above assumptions engage with the world around us.

**Implication 1: Science projects are moral and cannot be questioned (I1)**

The first implication that arises from the above assumptions engaging with the world is that the projects scientists choose are axiomatically moral and cannot be questioned. This implication makes a subtle but important shift as it no longer focuses on the idea that science is done to benefit society, but focuses on scientific projects and by default the scientific method (since this is the only real way to do science). This implication means that all science projects, generally, and CTAHR’s projects specifically, benefit and help humanity and are moral.

Whether this is true or not, the end result is that because both science and the projects of science, in this case CTAHR and its projects, are assumed to be axiomatically moral, we cannot question them. CTAHR’s response to the kalo controversy evidences this implication. The sense of anger, betrayal, and hurt in the *CTAHR and Taro* report is palpable, even though the report was written three years after the kalo controversy. As the authors of the report freely note, "The emergence of the idea that the improvement work is detrimental to taro as a Hawaiian heritage plant has been distressing to those in CTAHR who carry on its tradition of applying science for the benefit of Hawai‘i’s crops and farmers."96 That distress arose because CTAHR believed its

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project was axiomatically moral and above all questioning. The questioning that did occur was seen as an accusation that CTAHR scientists were immoral, their work suspect, and their commitment to the community debatable.

Notably, the reaction of CTAHR to opponents was not one of a scientist responding to a question of methodology, finding, or laboratory protocol, despite the fact a number of the questions raised by ‘Ōiwi Maoli were focused on just these methodological issues, but instead was a deeply personal reaction of an institution that was cut-to-the-quick by ‘Ōiwi Maoli questioning and rejecting of CTAHR’s efforts. This deep, personalized injury evidences the operationalized implication that all science projects are good and moral. As the report further argues:

faculty working with taro have pursued their professional objectives in line with their ethics, the principles of academic freedom, and their obligations as scientists and members of a land grant university faculty. At their best, these efforts have combined innovation with practical application, attracting grant funding for discovery and demonstration, while minimizing the timeframe for developing solutions to real-farm problems.97

This language indicates that for CTAHR, the kalo controversy was about a group of people questioning whether the scientists involved were being morally good citizens and scientists in their attempt to help people with their knowledge. This was personal and that injection of a personal story had everything to do with the unquestioned belief that CTAHR’s project of patenting kalo was good and moral, which is rooted in the assumption that science is good and

97. CTAHR and Taro, p. 6, emphasis added.
moral. In CTAHR’s mind, there simply is no reason to question the morality of a project of science, especially in this case when the CTAHR scientists were attempting to help.

Linking the research to the notion of academic freedom added further nuance. Academic freedom is vital to the mission of an institution of higher learning, and specifically to this institution with its land grant mission. The implication deepens in a reinforcing manner and not just science but all academic research and projects are, at root, moral in nature and must be freely allowed. Questioning such axiomatically moral projects is met with confusion and taken as a personal attack upon the researchers themselves. As a result, no fruitful discussion can be held, and none really was, as to whether CTAHR’s patenting, as a scientific project, was appropriate. We cannot and should not ever question that the work scientists choose is morally good work that will help humanity, nor for that matter, should we question their methods, which are not value-laden but objective-based in nature.

This prohibition on questioning is played out in any number of resource management and control issues in Hawai‘i, including the argument over the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT). The TMT is set to be built on Mauna o Wākea on the Moku o Keawe (Hawai‘i or the "Big" Island), which is not only the tallest mountain,98 but also one of the most fragile and unique ecosystems in the world. The mountain also has a deep cultural significance for the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. ‘Ōiwi Maoli activist and scholar, Kaleikoa Kaeo tells a story of an exchange between himself and an astronomer working with the telescopes on Mauna o Wākea. Kaeo asked the astronomer how the TMT would provide practical, useful knowledge to help the people upon whose land it was being

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built. The astronomer responded that the TMT would have no practical use for ʻŌiwi Maoli, but would allow us to see space far better than any other telescope we currently have.

To place this in context, Kaeo was arguing that the expenditures of money and potential permanent and irreparable environmental damage to Mauna o Wākea did not contribute to the improvement of the material conditions of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. In fact, the astronomer was less than clear that the new TMT would have any real-world benefits for humanity at large. What is certain is that the TMT will contribute to the degradation of the conditions of humanity for the ʻŌiwi Maoli. The astronomer, drawing on the axiomatically moral nature of science and its attendant implication that all projects of science are moral, was arguing from the position that the search for knowledge, whatever the utility and potential harm, is a fundamentally moral act and should be unconditionally supported. This implication is further evidenced in the notion that the environmental damage that has occurred on Mauna o Wākea, and to which the TMT will contribute, is but a small price to pay for increasing the knowledge base of humanity; the project is a moral one in spite of its costs.

The public framing of this issue also reflects this implication, as press report after press report adopts the UH position that the issue is one of the cultural and religious beliefs of a few versus the benefits of science and economics for the many. The clear implication of a culture-religion versus science-economics argument is that proponents of the former are being selfish, anti-progress, and "backwards," and proponents of the latter are being altruistic, pro-progress, and forward-looking. The moral high ground goes to those who are trying to benefit humanity, even if that benefit has no on-ground application, because all scientific projects are moral.99

Implication 2: The scientific method is exceptionalised (I2)

In addition to the projects of science being moral, the scientific method, which is to say
the method by which science engages with the world, is exceptionalised. By "exceptionalised," I
mean to echo Dotson's and Harding's views that "exceptionalised" refers not just to the belief that
one method has primacy or power over all others, but that no other method is viable. This
implication, then, holds that the scientific method is the only way to understand and engage with
the world around us.

Before defining the "scientific method" itself, it should be made clear that I am not saying
there is one monolithic thing called the "scientific method," as each field of science has different
ways of defining and conducting an experiment. However, there are certain common threads
regardless of the sub-field. To begin with, all scientific method is rooted in the three assumptions
of science: nature operates in a causal manner (S1), causation can be observed through empirical
methods and data collection (S2), and findings will be consistent regardless of time and place
(S3). The scientific method that arises from these assumptions is one that develops a hypothesis
of a causal link or connection based on earlier obtained empirical data. This link or connection is
then put to the test in a controlled experiment. The data from this experiment is collected and
either supports the hypothesis or necessitates a change. When this method is combined with the
assumption that nature is a machine (C2), the scientific method reduces or isolates the thing it is
observing in order to test and control aspects of that thing. In this way, the scientific method is
necessarily reductionist.

Sophia V. Schweitzer, "The Fight to Build the Earth's Most Powerful Optical Telescope," Science, April 29,
hawaii-telescope.html.
Further, a mechanistic-reductionist nature meets the needs of a capitalist economy, which must contain discrete parts, each concerned with its own success measured through efficiency and profits. As such, there can be nothing "extra," "vital," or "organic" about nature. If an experiment cannot be created for a hypothesis, how can we test? How can we test a hypothesis relating to a "vital" nature if we cannot set-up a reductionist, empirically-based experiment? Our experiments and now our models are limited, and thus what we can test and know is limited. The result is that we cannot include in our hypothesis inputs that are unable to be empirically verified, for we can only know that which can be empirically verified.

The way we shape our science, with its reliance on a mechanistic and reductionist experimental method, limits the way we can think about the world. The possibility that there is something more to the environment than the laws of physics and chemistry is excluded by the way in which the scientific method sets up and subsequently verifies hypotheses. There can be nothing extra—whatever that extra may be—added to the equation. In other words, evidencing the self-perpetuating nature of this assumption, if we assume that we can gather data about natural causes via experiment, any other information that cannot be gathered via experiment does not help us to understand natural causes.

This understanding allows us not only to control, but to maintain nature. Through science and the scientific method, nature will always be available to provide us with the resources we need. Moreover, this was the goal of science, as Prussian-born scientist Jacque Loeb argued:

We cannot allow any barrier to stand in the path of our complete control and thereby understanding of life phenomena. I believe that anyone will reach the same view who
considers the control of natural phenomena as the essential problem of scientific research.\textsuperscript{100} Control means the ability to manage in order to bring good things to all of humanity.

Even if scientists recognize a thing has an ecology or is part of a greater whole, the scientific method still isolates that thing to its most narrow function in order to test and control that function. Thus, although the recognition may be there that organisms are not machines, the scientific method still seeks to manipulate the things in nature to behave like a machine.\textsuperscript{101} Notably, the assumptions are self-supporting. To conduct the scientific method, nature must be a machine so that she can be reduced and her specific pieces of interest isolated so that we can use the scientific method on her. Because the scientific method is verified and works, e.g., planes that fly, nature is a machine.

A final imprimatur of the scientific method is its objectivity. "Objectivity," in this dissertation, refers to the requirement that the scientific method and its outcomes be unbiased, which is to say the outcome would occur regardless of context. This context-free methodology evidences a commitment to the notion that "good" knowledge must be universal. As a result, the knower becomes someone who is cut off from her body, her culture, and her history; metaphysically different from the objects which she seeks to know. This latter requirement is necessary because objects exist in space and time, but a good knower, one that is disembodied, is in Harding’s words, "a universal" in that she "transcends space and time." Arising from this notion of disembodiment, a good knower also is one that is "homogenous and unitary." This

\textsuperscript{100} Garland E. Allen, "Mechanism, Vitalism, and Organicism in Late Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Biology: The Importance of Historical Context," in \textit{Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences} 36 (2005): 273.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 280.
latter requirement is necessary because in order for knowledge to meet the consistency and coherency requirements, it must be repeated and the results reproducible, as noted above. If the subjects knowing these universal laws were different, coming from different backgrounds and different points of view, "heterogeneous" in Harding’s language, knowledge could become "multiple and contradictory and thus inconsistent and incoherent."102

This requirement is necessary in order to meet assumption three of science, that the way the world works is consistent, which is to say it commits itself to universal laws and principles. These laws and principles are accessible to any person who properly uses the scientific method, but also accessible to "any person" as someone who is not a separate individual, but someone who represents all things and nothing, for the knower cannot be an individual. Essentially, everything that makes us human must be disregarded in order for the scientific method to work. As a result, knowledge is "discovered" not by societies or cultures or classes, genders or races, all necessarily embodied and contextualized, but by autonomous, independent, and disembodied individuals and groups of individuals.103 Consistency of the scientific project, which leads to the acceptance of universal laws that operate the same in every location, leads to the notion that there is only one correct methodology to arrive at the same understanding of the way the world works.

Objectivity also is key to ensuring science retains its status as moral. If the causes of science are consistent, the scientists must be able to arrive at the same conclusions regardless of who they are (context). Losing the assumption of consistency may result in questions being raised about other scientific assumptions, including that all things have natural causes and these

103. Ibid.
natural causes can be found by the scientific method. If the knower has context and approaches problems from the standpoint of his unique position, he may well challenge the consistency assumption. Losing consistency might call into question the moral status of science and science would well return to days when it was based in superstition and when it was used for personal gain to control and manipulate people. Thus, in an act of self-preservation, science holds that all views that differ are either false science, superstition, religious knowledge, cultural knowledge, or "folk theory." That which is not rooted in a Western-style scientific method is equated with that which keeps humanity in chains, i.e., "superstition, mysticism, metaphysics, and the belief in vitalistic, non-physical non-chemical forces." Whatever the name, the idea is the same: this "knowledge" is false because it not only fails to follow the exceptionalised method of knowledge but also fails to arrive at agreed-to universal conclusions. Inconsistent, science becomes immoral.

Because universal laws exist and define the world that is really-real, what this objectivity discovers is non-controversial and value neutral. In other words, we confirm "facts." All people who are using their reason, i.e., the Western scientific method, must agree with these facts. Therefore, if one disagrees with the facts or if one argues about them, you either are not behaving rationally or are arguing about something else.


105. While there has been movement afoot to recognize alternative knowledge bases, including a move to recognize what is frequently referred to as “traditional knowledge,” "Indigenous Knowledge,” or "Indigenous Environmental/Ecological Knowledge,” the sectors that promote this are limited to those working in the areas where traditional knowledge is still used, e.g., economic development. Certainly, traditional knowledge is not recognized in the area of intellectual property protection, as can be seen by the ongoing battles over protection of traditional knowledge at the World Trade Organization. Moreover, while aid workers are admonished to seek out and where possible incorporate traditional knowledge, this is far different from recognizing traditional knowledge as a viable and legitimate method for acquiring knowledge.
The assumption that all things have a natural cause (S1) and the assumption that we come to know these natural causes through empirical evidence (S2) implies that there really is only one way to "do science" and to come to know the world: the scientific method described above. Moreover, since the exceptionalised knowledge is one rooted in reductionism (and mechanism), other ways of understanding the world, such as those that may be more ecological and holistic and focus on the interconnectedness of the world as opposed to its discreteness, are rejected. As physicist and environmental activist Vandana Shiva argues, "modern science is projected as a universal, value-free system of knowledge, which has displaced all other belief and knowledge systems by its universality and value neutrality, and by the logic of its method to arrive at objective claims about nature."\textsuperscript{106} The universal and value-free nature of knowledge is part of the assumption of its amoral method (standing in contrast to its moral project); the displacement of other belief and knowledge systems is the implication of that assumption.

Thus, the scientific method walks humans out of a world of the occult and mystery, superstition and magic, and into an ordered world that is completely revealed by the scientific process. Not only then is the scientific method the only natural way to view the world, it also is the only way we will continue to progress and advance as a species. This superiority arising from our rationality excludes not only those who do not share in rationality in general, but also those who do not share our exceptionalised version of rationality.

Implication 3: Only that which is verifiable by empirical data is knowledge (I3)

The first part of this implication holds that the only certain knowledge we have is objective knowledge, which we can only acquire through the project of science. If science is

removed or disconnected from the world’s moral claims and moral messiness, then when one
does decide to believe in or act upon a moral claim, one does so for some other reason than
rational knowledge. That action on the moral claim lies outside of rational knowledge because if
it were rational knowledge, it would be science. A further implication of this is that we do not
need to justify rationally our ethical/moral commitments, as they lie outside of rational
knowledge and cannot be so justified. Nor do we need to listen or even acknowledge others who
have differing moral and ethical commitments. The exceptionalising of the method means that
any knowledge that does not sufficiently comport with universal principles—i.e., contextual
knowledge—and any knowledge that is unable to be objectively determined by the scientific
method, such as emotional or value knowledge, is simply not knowledge. Not only, then, is there
only one way to do science, but also there is only one type of knowledge. Anything else is not
knowledge, does not need to be justified, and really cannot be discussed in any meaningful
manner.

Under this implication, we cannot question the morality of science because we have no
meaningful language to do so. We can question methodology or parameters, but any questioning
of the morality of the science project means we are discussing morals, which lie outside of what
is rational. As Bacon will argue, we come to know ethics and morals differently than we come to
know the knowledge of natural philosophy. The two different types of knowledge cannot be
mixed.

Part of this resistance to engaging with ethical and moral discussions is, at least
according to Putnam, rooted in a lack of certainty. We do not know how we know values or why
they compel us to act, i.e., there is no natural cause of our values excepting physicalist theories,
and so we dismiss them as cognitive nonsense so we can stop turning in philosophical circles looking for reasons. As Putnam argues,

it is much easier to say, ‘that’s a value judgment,’ meaning, ‘that’s just a matter of subjective preference,’ than . . . to examine who we are and what our deepest convictions are and hold those convictions up to the searching test of reflective examination.\(^\text{107}\)

The problem then, is that all too frequently, conversations are terminated most effectively with the words "you have your opinion and I have mine." Or "no one person has the same moral beliefs," as if the entire goal of engagement is the coming to agreement on a certain set of moral beliefs. As Putnam argues, "[t]he worst thing about the [refusal to engage with ethics] is that in practice it functions as a discussion-stopper, and not just a discussion-stopper, but a thought-stopper."\(^\text{108}\)

A second consequence of this implication is the inability to engage with those who have views that do not track the scientific method. An excellent example of this dilemma can be found in the 20\(^\text{th}\) century Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s response to the acclaimed, and still often used treatise on world religions, \textit{The Golden Bough}.\(^\text{109}\) In \textit{The Golden Bough}, Sir James George Frazer referred to many indigenous practices as "magic" and contended they were the result of mistaken or even sloppy reasoning. However, as only members of the educated aristocracy (and arguably only those of an English aristocracy) seem capable of doing, Frazer condescended that these notions were excusable for the "primitive man."

\(\text{107}\) Hillary Putnam, \textit{The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 44.

\(\text{108}\) Ibid.

\(\text{109}\) Sir James George Frazer was a Scottish anthropologist who published this survey of religion and magic in 1890. The book consisted of twelve volumes. His attempt, arguably, was to show the relationships among all the religions of the world. Some of his theories apparently remain in vogue even to this day.
A ceremony intended to make the wind blow or the rain fall, or to work the death of an enemy, will always be followed, sooner or later, by the occurrence it is meant to bring to pass; and primitive man may be excused for regarding the occurrence as a direct result of the ceremony, and the best possible proof of its efficacy.\textsuperscript{110}

Frazer argued that primitive man continued to engage in these rituals because sooner or later the superstition does come true and it does appear that prayer affected nature.

Wittgenstein takes Frazer to task for thinking that indigenous people are this rooted in superstition and removed from observance of their everyday world. Wittgenstein wrote in his commentaries on *The Golden Bough*:

I read, amongst many similar examples, of a rain-king in Africa to whom the people appeal for rain when the rainy season comes. But surely this means that they do not actually think he can make rain, otherwise they would do it in the dry periods in which the land is "a parched and arid desert." For if we do assume that it was stupidity that once led the people to institute this office of Rain King, still they obviously knew from experience that the rains begin in March, and it would have been the Rain King’s duty to perform in other periods of the year. Or again: towards morning, when the sun is about to rise, people celebrate rites of the coming of day, but not at night, for then they simply burn lamps.\textsuperscript{111}


\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 12e
The point of these two contrasting views is that if we assume the only way to understand the world around us is through the knowledge given by the scientific method, then praying for rain or praying in thanks for the coming of day can only be understood in the context of cause and effect. These peoples must clearly believe that their prayers cause rain or cause the sun to rise. Since the scientific method has demonstrated that whether humans pray or not, rain will come and the sun will shine (Hume's fallacy of induction excepted), these peoples are trapped in superstition, magic, and all things not objective science. To "free" the superstitious lot from this belief and to help them progress requires Western science and Western scientific method, which will allow for the analytical dissection and control of nature. That these people are actually using ritual to recognize the interconnectedness of all things in the world is nonsensical. The world is mechanistic and reality is found in objectivity. Any notion contrary to this must be superstition or "bad knowledge."

Implication 4: Humans are exceptionalised; Nature is purposefully nullified (I4)

Causation and philosophy have a long historical relationship beginning no doubt well before Aristotle’s prime mover. Its importance for this work is the idea that natural causes are foundational in that we know what causes things to occur in the world around us, or, in the worst case scenario, we don’t know now, but we will be able to find out. This creates a distinction, which through exceptionalising has resulted in a dualistic hierarchy between things we can know—facts—and things we cannot know—everything else, which we call "values." This distinction becomes metaphysical and philosophically, there are two things in the world: subjects, which are the makers of value statements, the finders of fact, and the holders of knowledge; and objects, which are the referents of fact statements and about which we can
As a result of the exceptionalising of this knowledge and its knowers, a kind of human-centeredness occurs and results in a type of "epistemic remoteness," which makes it difficult, if not impossible to "situate ourselves as part of" nature\textsuperscript{112} and makes it next to impossible to extend moral consideration. In Plumwood’s words, "[w]e dissociate ourselves from nature in order to manipulate it, but then cannot empathise with it or relate to it dialogically." As we separate, we treat our relationship to nature in the most abstract of terms. Nature, as a highly functioning machine, becomes something that can and should be manipulated by the "experts"—those most skilled in abstract thinking—who study it.\textsuperscript{113}

When we stop recognizing the importance of nature, we begin to background it, in Plumwood’s word, or purposefully nullify it, in my words. While we rely upon nature, we deny that we have any relationship with it. Humans rely upon and benefit from the existence of the non-human, but deny any relationship with the non-human. For example, human life would be next to impossible if we did not have air to breathe and soil to walk upon. And yet, we fail to recognize the importance of either to our daily existence, thus nullifying nature’s existence. One result of this purposeful nullification is that the human’s view is set up as the universal view, since it is really the only one in existence, and all other views are peripheral, less important, and even anomalies. Purposeful nullification buttresses the exceptionalising of the human. As a result of purposeful nullification humans become insensitive to nature and to the needs of nature itself as well as the limits that those needs impose on our plans and use for nature. Plumwood writes,

\textsuperscript{112} Plumwood, \textit{Environmental Culture}, 98.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 120.
An anthropocentric culture rarely sees animals and plants as individual centres of striving and need, doing their best for themselves and their children in their conditions of life. Instead nature is conceived in terms of interchangeable and replaceable units, (as resources) rather than as infinitely diverse and always in excess of knowledge and classification.114

An example of this nullification and its attendant exclusion from moral considerability can be seen in an article written for the June 1911 edition of the Mid-Pacific Magazine, entitled "Hawaii is for the White Man." The author, Van Norden, begins the piece with the following sentence: "Hawaii is the one land within the tropics created by Nature for the white man."115 Norden’s article is designed to entice white American men to come and settle in Hawai‘i in order to ensure that the islands are settled by whites and not those from the "Orient" or other countries. As he writes, "Hawaii is today the land of opportunity for the quick, courageous white man, and everyone, from President Taft down, wishes to see it conquered for and by Anglo-Saxon Americans." According to Norden, "Hawaii holds in her soil more wealth than does any country of equal area in all the world,"116 and it is up to the "energetic white man" to take advantage of that wealth. Although Norden does note that these economic opportunities are open to "the Hawaiian," mentioning Sam Parker and the Parker ranch,117 the focus of the argument is that Nature has made Hawai‘i for the white man and all it takes is for a white man with "a backbone" who does not fear work to show up on the shores of Hawai‘i to make his millions. The idea that

114. Ibid., 108.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., 630.
there might have been others, operating as "ecological agents," to use Plumwood’s words, who
deserve consideration—both moral and otherwise—never enters Norden’s mind. Nor does the
idea that there might be other legitimate and more sustainable ways of determining and acquiring
wealth that would take into consideration the plans and desires of others already on the land,
including the land itself. There is but one world view for Norden and any other world view,
regardless of how important and necessary to Norden’s project, is simply not considered. The
rich tradition of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli and the needs of the fragile ecosystem of these islands are
purposefully nullified for the naturally superior "Western" white man.

The world is human-centered and that human-centeredness is the end goal of the natural
progression of humans into the modern age based in science and reason. Because non-humans
and those who disagree with this progress have not made or refuse this natural progression and
do not share in our rationalism, as the case may be, these non-humans are inferior.118 As such,
we can use, misuse, and exploit this non-human world without restraint,119 as a natural
consequence of human exceptionalism.

Implication 5: Only objective facts of the world have import

If facts determined via the scientific method are the only knowledge we can have, then
other things in the world that we know that are non-observable, which we call "values," might be
interesting, but they are distinct in both kind and impact from these facts. As the 20\textsuperscript{th} century
logical positivist Rudolf Carnap argued, "[a]ll statements belonging to Metaphysics, regulative
Ethics, and (metaphysical) Epistemology . . . are in fact unverifiable and, therefore, unscientific.
In the Viennese Circle, we are accustomed to describe such statements as nonsense’ (after [early]

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118. This also would apply to those who do not share our rationality and our scientific method.
119. Plumwood, 

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Arguably, Carnap’s views are outdated and represents the thought of an earlier Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, these views have residual impact in that they continue to support the notion that we cannot really know (nor argue about, nor engage with others) values, as these are subjective and linked to an embodied, contextualized experiencer, as opposed to knower. These values stand opposed to facts, which are objective, the same regardless of one’s context, and what we can know. This further solidifies a subject as knower and the object as that which knows one knows divide. We observe objects and acquire facts, which are a means to our end of discovering how it is the world works.

Implication 6: Paternalism is mandated

Because science projects are moral, scientists have a moral duty to share their knowledge with those less fortunate. Moreover, because of the assumptions of consistency, the scientific method will apply to all. Since this is the case, those with greater and more progressive tools are more advanced and should instruct those made less equal because of less technology. The more advanced as a result of science must help those who are more primitive so as to make all equal, and thus help to better all lives. Thus equality, when coupled with the exceptionalising of scientific method, also gives rise to paternalism. The project of science becomes even more (if possible) axiomatically ethical since it exists both to better the human condition and to bring equality to all through knowledge-sharing.

An example of this paternalism is the following. Beginning in 2009, through grants provided by the National Institute for Health, researchers began DNA projects on indigenous

peoples of Oceania. A number of those researchers were interested in projects in Hawai‘i, where they would gather and analyze DNA from ‘Ōiwi Maoli. The list of benefits of this research presented by the non-indigenous researchers included better and earlier diagnosis of disease and clearer and more accurate genealogical information. In other words, the scientists believed that definitively telling ‘Ōiwi Maoli where they came from would be a benefit to them.

The DNA research and its associated biobanking met with both support and opposition in the ‘Ōiwi Maoli community. Many wanted to help and wanted to be screened for diseases. Many also, however, were concerned that the results could be used to maintain stereotypes, as was the case with a 2006 genetic study done on Maori, which "identified" a so-called "warrior gene" that was linked to "risk taking" behavior, gambling, and excessive drinking. ‘Ōiwi Maoli also objected to the notion that these scientists could "tell" ‘Ōiwi Maoli where they came from. From the ‘Ōiwi Maoli point of view, they know their genealogy. They know whether they are descended from Pele or some other line. They know the Kumulipo. They do not need a Western scientist telling them what their genealogy is.

The point ‘Ōiwi Maoli were raising was that, ultimately, it did not matter where science thinks ‘Ōiwi Maoli came from. What matters is the ‘Ōiwi Maoli cosmogonic relationship to the world. The causal links between one people and another that may be found through DNA testing and the scientific method are less important than the interconnectedness of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli and their world. What matters is the Kumulipo. In light of past abuses of genealogical tracing, the risks far outweighed any advantage such information gleaned from DNA testing might provide.
Implication 7: Nature has only the value humans give it and deserves no moral consideration (I7)

Starting with the assumption that nature must be controlled and manipulated as if it were a machine, and building on the implication that nature exists for our use, it follows that a further implication is that nature is not intrinsically valuable. Philosopher John O'Neill defines three different versions of intrinsic value. The first is when intrinsic value is used in lieu of the term non-instrumental value, which is to say that the object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself and instrumental value if it is the means to some end. The second is in the G.E. Moore sense, where intrinsic value refers to the "'intrinsic properties'" of the object, which O’Neill defines as non-relational or those properties that exist either "regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects," or those properties "that can be characterized without reference to other objects." The third definition refers to intrinsic value as an "objective value," which is to say, it exists independently of the opinions of other valuers. O’Neill argues that this last definition is really a meta-ethical claim in that it denies that subjects (humans) are the source of all ethical values.121

This dissertation leans towards the third understanding of intrinsic value. All things—subjects and objects—can be means to an end, therefore the first definition does not apply. The 'āina, as will be discussed later, exists in relation to the ʻŌiwi Maoli, therefore the second definition is not an option. Under the first two readings of intrinsic value, only humans, the exceptionalised rational lot, can have intrinsic value. Thus, non-humans/Nature, as our instruments, have value only to the extent that they are useful to humans. Further, the justification for nature’s existence is solely related to its value for humans. If we have no use for

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some object of nature, it has no purpose and need not exist. All things then must be subsumed under the penumbra of human use and importance and nothing can have autonomy or value outside of what humans give it.

Moreover, the combination of the exceptionalising of the human with the exceptionalising of the scientific method means that only certain humans can place value upon things: those that follow the exceptionalised tradition. An example of this can be seen in a May 1957 publication by the University of Hawaii Agricultural Extension Service Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry entitled Common Weeds of Hawaii, which was sponsored by the Hawaii Weed Conference. This publication listed the following as weeds, defined as "any plant that persists in growing where it is not wanted": maʻo, kākalaioa, kūmakua, hau, ʻilima, pāʻūohiʻiaka, kāmole, and guava, just to name a few. Each of these was viewed as pests to be eradicated by the haole sugar planters. However, at the same time, the ʻŌiwi Maoli viewed each of these plants as highly valuable. For example, ʻilima was used to help reduce birthing pains, and hau was used in canoe and shelter building, floats on nets, and cordage. The key here is, however, that ʻŌiwi Maoli were not the exceptionalised voice. While human, their view of nature and planting was far different than that of the sugar planters, who saw fields as commodity-bearing mechanisms to be stripped of everything but sugar. Only one voice/opinion/need was counted in the determination of what should stay and what should go. As such, nature has no moral standing and deserves no moral considerability.

III. Chapter Summary and Transition

This chapter delineates and explores the method of this dissertation, which is a comparative philosophy work that uses the tool of critical narrative genealogy to reveal hidden
assumptions and their operationalized implications. Comparative philosophy gives us space to explore those assumptions from the position of respect, liberating Western philosophy from the choke hold of exceptionalism.

The chapters are an explanation, then, of, in British Philosopher Bernard Williams’ words, how an idea "came about, or could have come about, or might be imagined to have come about." As such, narrative also contains some fiction as it is "an imagined developmental story" explaining how might it be that we arrived at a certain concept and what might have happened for us to have chosen the theories to exceptionalise in the way we did. Causal relationships need not be quantified in a critical narrative genealogy; it is enough for our purposes to explore the way in which we arrived, even if there were other ways. Our goal is to shed light upon, not definitively identify and dissect.

In her article, "Interpretation and Genealogy in Feminism," political scientist and feminist scholar Kathy E. Ferguson writes, "The deconstruction of gender entails stepping back from the opposition of male and female in order to loosen the hold of gender on life and meaning." In keeping with this thought of using genealogy to deconstruct, and if not completely eliminate, at least loosen boundaries, this work relies upon a type of critical narrative genealogy that gives us space to step back from the oppositions of subject and object, "Western science" and "indigenous knowledge," and praxis and theory, and open our selves to perhaps a different life and a different meaning, ultimately rejecting these dualisms as viable options for how to live in this world.

Chapter 3

Ka Moʻokahuna

But so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man. We can ask, "Why do animals exist?" But to ask, "Why does man exist?" is a meaningless question.

--Kant

There exist no occult forces in stones or plants. There are no amazing or marvelous sympathies or antipathies, in fact there exists nothing in the whole of nature which cannot be explained in terms of purely corporeal causes totally devoid of mind and thought.

--Descartes

I maikaʻi ke kalo i kaʻohā

--ʻŌlelo Noʻeau No. 1232

Introduction and Chapter Goals

Chapter 2 set forth the proposed method for exploring how it is that CTAHR and the ʻŌiwi Maoli opposed to kalo patenting arrived at the point of controversy. The chapter identified the following three general assumptions held by all scientists as part and parcel of their scientific project:

(S1) There are natural causes to things in this world;

(S2) Empirical data can identify those causes; and

(S3) There are no occult forces or phenomena in nature.

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124. *Hawaiian Dictionary*, Pukui and Elbert, s.v. moʻokahuna The genealogy of high priests.

125. "The goodness of the taro is judged by the young plant it produces. Parents are often judged by the behavior of their children." Mary Kawena Pukui, *ʻŌlelo Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs and Poetical Sayings* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1983), 133.
The causes we identify will be consistent, i.e. nature acts according to universal laws or principles.

In addition, Chapter 2 identified two assumptions that were evident from CTAHR’s history in general and its position on the kalo controversy:

(C1) Science is moral; and

(C2) Nature is a machine.

When those assumptions engage with the world, they are operationalized into the following seven implications:

(I1) Science projects cannot be questioned;

(I2) The scientific method is exceptionalised;

(I3) Knowledge is that which is verifiable by empirical data and only objective facts have import;

(I4) Humans are exceptionalised;

(I5) Nature has no intrinsic value and, consequently, deserves no moral consideration; and

(I6) Paternalism is mandated.

This chapter explores, through the use of a critical narrative genealogy, one possible reading of the contingent past that both gave rise to and further deepened these assumptions that so shaped how CTAHR reacted to ʻŌiwi Maoli concerns regarding kalo patenting. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these assumptions also played a role in the ʻŌiwi Maoli formulation of counter-assumptions. This chapter examines the intellectual archaeology that has been by and large favored in the Western Academy, that of Plato, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Kant. This by no means is a definitive study of all the ideas proposed by each philosopher, but focuses only
upon concepts that helped to create and further emboldened the above-noted assumptions and implications. Chapter 4 will explore the second part of this critical narrative genealogy, the social force of capitalism.

I.

Ka Hā\textsuperscript{126}

*Plato (c. 428BCE – c. 348BCE, Athens, Greece)*

Two aspects of Plato’s thought are important for this chapter. The first is his theory of Forms and the second is his theory of how things in the universe came to be. As for the Forms, Plato proposes a dualism where what are real and true and perfect are called "Forms," which exist in a realm above us. We reach this realm at the end of our lives and only if we use the rational part of our soul to overcome and dominate the other two parts of our soul: the appetitive and the "spirited." It is the rational soul and its activity of reasoning that makes us truly human, truly different from animals, and closer to "god." Reason also is the only way to see what was really real—the Forms.

Therefore, for Plato, true knowledge can be found only in an abstract "rational" world, that is devoid of physical objects and the messy emotions—feelings of the breast—that attend the physical.\textsuperscript{127} Indeed, the world of nature is not the real world but one of chaos, shadows, and lies that we must spend our time ordering, presumably because nature cannot order itself as it has no rational part of its soul, assuming it has a soul at all.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{126}{Hawaiian Dictionary, Pukui and Elbert, s.v. "hā." Hā is the "stalk that supports the leaf and enfolds the stem of certain plants, as taro, sugarcane."}
\footnotetext{127}{Val Plumwood, *Environmental Culture*, 20.}
\end{footnotes}
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave epitomizes his belief that our day-to-day world is nothing but shadows of what is true and certain. Until we recognize the falsity of our everyday lives and the things that surround us, we will remain chained in a cave. In the _Phaedo_, Plato argues that the earth and all the animals that roam it are diseased and corrupt. In the world of the Forms, however, everything from trees to flowers to fruits to stones are better, fairer, smoother, more transparent, more valuable—and the list goes on. The world of forms, in Plato’s words, is pure and not "infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and plants."¹²⁸

Why Plato would choose some other-world that we can never truly access until we die, one that, in Eco-Feminist Philosopher Val Plumwood’s words, is "lifeless," over the truly "living world of nature" has puzzled philosophers and, most specifically, feminists. One argument posited by Plumwood, borrowing from the work done by Feminist Philosopher Nancy Hartsock, is that the social context of the time in which Plato wrote—a burgeoning intellectual class, a system built on slave-master relationships and unending war designed to maintain a fairly substantial material life—required society valorize death and the willingness to give one’s life on the battlefield in order to sustain itself. Someone needed to die in those battles fought for wealth and prestige, and since soldiers were not all slaves, there needed to be some incentive to the soldiers to give up their lives willingly. But, why live at all if one were merely going to die? Death was feared, for it ended connections to the world and to society. What overcame this fear of death and allowed soldiers to fight on was not the Homeric values of honor and reputation, but the Platonic values of reason. In reason, which is to say the otherworldly Forms where reason

resides, men \(^{129}\) could overcome their emotional fears of death and create a continuity to the world as we know it. Yes, one lived and then died, but death was not the end. There was a better and more perfect place after death, a place rooted in reason, not emotion or appetites, and one should prefer that place over the current one in which we live. What connected this current life and the life beyond was not our bodies or nature, but reason and the continuance of the soul in a realm where everything was pure and free from brine. What centers and provides importance for living a human life (and fighting), what ended the fear of death and the break in that continuity, is the soul and its ability to continue on to a purer place. \(^{130}\) Life is devalued (and thus more easily given) and reason elevated.

The way to this place of Forms was fraught with danger and difficulty. Our appetites, our hubris, all things that come from our bodies, stand in the way of achieving victory. Those bodies, the representation of nature, become something we must struggle to overcome, an obstacle, before we can recognize the significance of our life. Nature and all that connects with it impedes our progress as humans, which is to say our progress to attain our own immortality and continuity. To be human is to overcome life, our bodies, and nature through reason.

The second aspect of Plato’s work that is relevant for this dissertation is his view of the relationship of humans to non-human others (or in Plato’s terms, man and everything else). This view is set out in the *Timaeus*, written by Plato either during his so-called middle or his late period. Plato argues that to be a moral and good human is to live a life of harmony and order.

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129. Sexist language will be used in this dissertation in the following instances: (1) It is used in the original quoted material; (2) It captures the intent of the original author; and/or (3) It captures a distinction between feminist philosophy and non-feminist philosophy.

130. Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 100.
This order is one that mirrors the order of the universe and the world, which is revealed to each soul before it is born.\textsuperscript{131}

The soul can see the harmony of the world because it is animated via the Demiurge or Craftsman, which, through its infusion of the world with soul, has turned everything into a living creature.\textsuperscript{132} While all things are animated, not all creatures are equal. In fact, all creatures that are not male are the consequence of punishment for man’s wrongdoing. According to the \textit{Timaeus}, man is a "composite living creature" with body and three kinds of soul. The most important type of soul lives in a male’s head so that men raise their head up towards heaven and away from earth. This is an indication that males are more closely aligned with heavens than with the "soil-bound plants," and that men’s souls originally came from heaven, where the Craftsman placed them in men’s heads, set their bodies upright, and put them on earth (89d-90d).

In the \textit{Timaeus}, Socrates explains how it is that other creatures came into existence. Women are men who on the first go around lived unmanly and immoral lives; these men were reincarnated as women (91a). While women still walk upright, we have other flaws, namely, lack of reason. Birds are a "mutant tribe" that grew feathers instead of hair. Birds are not considered immoral and there is no "badness in them." However, in an almost prophetic critique of empiricism, Socrates argues birds are "lightweight, in the sense that although they studied the heavens, they were foolish enough to think that their arguments would never be perfectly secure


\textsuperscript{132} Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, 30.
unless they personally witnessed the phenomena" and so this tribe grew feathers in order to fly into the heavens for personal observation (91d-91e).

"Land animals," which Socrates refers to as "a brutish race," are reincarnated men who did not properly apply themselves to philosophy and failed to think about "the nature of the heavens." As a result, they stopped using the soul located in their heads and began using the soul located in their chest. Due to their way of life, their heads and their upper bodies bowed towards the ground and they began to walk on all fours. Their heads also became elongated or oddly shaped. Each species is shaped a bit differently as a direct result of the extent of disuse of their minds. The worst offenders, those that were the "most mindless," ended up with their entire bodies on the ground, where they were forced to crawl along since the gods decided they no longer needed their feet (92a).

The fourth and final type of animal is made up of aquatic creatures, and I take the liberty of quoting this passage in its entirety for comparison purposes:

Aquatic creatures make up the fourth kind, and they are reincarnations of especially stupid and ignorant men. In transforming them into these creatures, the gods decided that they no longer deserved even to breathe pure air, since their tasteless behaviour had sullied their souls with impurities, and so, instead of letting them breathe fine, pure air, they forced them down into the murky depths of water, to do their breathing there. This is how all aquatic creatures came into existence, such as fish and shellfish, and they have been assigned the lowest realm as a penalty for having plumbed the lowest depths of ignorance. (92b)
The relationship, then, between man and all other creatures is a punitive one: women and animals are those men who failed to sufficiently use their reason. That which fails to use reason becomes nature.

**Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop**

Perhaps one of the most important contributions Plato makes to this genealogy is his mind/body and nature/human split.\(^{133}\) This split has both epistemological and metaphysical impacts. For Plato, what is real is that which is rational and ideal and removed from the physical—the Forms. True knowledge is disembodied knowledge that seeks to understand the universal principles of the world on a purely decontextualized basis. Any invasion of the body, of emotion, of context, of values removes the knower from the realm of knowledge.\(^{134}\) While contemporary scientific assumptions reject Plato’s rationalism (and, arguably, his idealism), the body is similarly devalued, as the disembodied, decontextualized knower is the model scientist.

This split also has metaphysical impacts that result in a hierarchical dualism that begins to impede our ability to enter into a relationship with the non-human others and to affect our ethical positioning vis-à-vis these Earth Others. This hierarchical dualism begins with Plato’s pairing of all things, according to Plumwood. For example, there are two kinds or sorts of love, equality, beauty, being, knowledge, art, music, and causation. The kind on the lower side of the hierarchical pair is linked to nature, the body, and the realm of becoming, while the kind on the

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133. Plato, however, also contributes to the notion of the world as inter-related, which is taken up by the neo-Platonic Ficino and Anne Conway, taught by Henry Moore, the Cambridge Neo-Platonist. The view of an animated and inter-related world ascribed by Ficino and Conway will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

134. But see Lorraine Daston and Peter Gallison, *Objectivity*, (New York: Zone Books), 2007, 56–60. Daston and Gallison put forth a different view, arguing that the truth-to-nature objectivity that occurred around the time of Linnaeus held that it was imperative that observers mediate between nature. For only in doing so, only by inserting the scientist into the interpretation, could one see the true archetype of the plant, which is to say, its form.
higher side is linked to reason, timelessness, universality, and abstractness.\textsuperscript{135} The higher side is superior to the lower. Moreover, the lower side is the result of the higher side failing: nature is a punishment for not being human enough.

Plumwood argues that Plato views the body and all things linked with nature as "a hindrance and a distraction, an alien and essentially evil other which is as externally and accidentally related to the true self as a coat."\textsuperscript{136} The only way to avoid this hindrance, distraction, and evil is to use our reason in a battle of hierarchical domination over nature. Using Plato’s own chariot metaphor, should the charioteer not be successful in reining in the more base elements of our soul—elements linked to appetite, emotion, growth, and all things natural—the end result would not be human. To be human is to use our reason and this requires us to dominate nature and the body by use of that reason.\textsuperscript{137} This need to control and dominate nature by our reason is central to what it means for us to be human.

\textit{Francis Bacon (1561–1626, England)}

The next stop in our intellectual archaeology is with Francis Bacon, the "father of modern science," who promoted a scientific method rooted in empiricism and experiment. Bacon also helped to form the Royal Society, which would play a key role in funding Captain Cook’s voyages to Hawai‘i as well as the publication of various versions of Captain Cook’s journals.

Bacon argues the sole goal of the natural philosopher\textsuperscript{138} is to endow "human life . . . with new discoveries and powers" so to improve "the material conditions of life" and augment human

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} Plumwood, \textit{Feminism and the Mastery of Nature}, 84–86.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 90.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{138} The term "natural philosophy" is roughly equivalent to our contemporary term "science." The two will be used interchangeably where their differences are unimportant.
\end{itemize}
dignity—both necessary tasks if we are to fulfill our potential here on earth.\textsuperscript{139} In the \textit{Novum Organum}, Bacon distinguishes natural philosophy from all others by the nature of the ambition that motivates each. The first kind of ambition is one where scientists seek to increase their own reputation in their own country, which he refers to as "a vulgar and degenerate kind." The second kind of ambition is that which focuses on increasing the power and "empire" of the scientist’s country over others, which is "more dignified but not less covetous." The final type of ambition is one a scientist should aspire to, as it is sounder and more noble than all others, as it endeavors "to renew and enlarge the power and empire of mankind in general over the universe." Notably, one difference between all three is that the most noble of ambitions seeks to benefit humankind as against everything else in the universe as opposed to benefiting one person or one nation over another.\textsuperscript{140} The natural philosopher must never seek personal gain, political power, or commercial profit; to do so renders the natural philosopher a false scientist or, in the vernacular of the time, an alchemist.

While the goal of science is a moral one, science itself must lie outside of the realm of religion and ethics. This was a pragmatic requirement for Bacon, for he needed his natural philosophy to rest outside of the control of the "Church," in all its guises during this tumultuous time in England, so that he could have the freedom to question traditional doctrines. To achieve this, Bacon argued the greatest loss of human dignity in history, the fall of Adam and Eve and their exile from Eden, occurred not because they sought knowledge, but because they presumed to know the difference between good and evil. As such, the human project for knowledge must


\textsuperscript{140} Bacon, \textit{Novum Organum}, Book I, CXXIX, pp. 105-106.
be limited to the mysteries of nature, a.k.a. science, which we achieve through the use of the senses and rational faculties. Religious and ethical knowledge—that knowledge of good and evil—cannot be attained through the senses but can only be realized through inspiration and revelation from God.\(^\text{141}\) Therefore, the two areas of knowledge—science and religion/ethics—must be kept separate, for the ways of coming to the knowledge of each are so vastly different as to be obstacles to one another. Bacon argued his project was solely rooted in the former and must be allowed to benefit humanity through his science without interference from the Church.

*The Idols*

A key and relevant part of Bacon’s scientific method involves natural philosophers mitigating damage from the influences that are part of the human condition. Bacon referred to these influences as "idols" in reference to those things which offer false promises, prejudices and fallacies.\(^\text{142}\) True to his own method, Bacon grouped these influences into four separate categories. The first, the Idols of the Tribe, are rooted in the very nature of humans, hence Bacon uses the term "tribe" to refer to the human tribe. Bacon argued that the human understanding of things "distorts and discolours" that which we observe because we mix our own nature with the thing we are observing.\(^\text{143}\) Examples of this include tending to believe there is more order in the world than what there really is, ignoring anomalies or exceptions to accepted principles, being influenced by emotions, and continuing down a certain path of thought even in the face of


\(^{143}\) Bacon, *Novum Organum* I, XLI.
Bacon encouraged the collection of all objects that deviated from our expectations—anomalies, monstrosities, oddities—into large atlases as a method of warding off our tendency to over-generalize. Bacon’s second set of influences, Idols of the Cave, are the product of specific and unique circumstances that play a role in how we think and what we are willing to accept and/or believe. These influences include personal biases that arise from biology, psychology, and socio-historical location of the person observing the world. Bacon argues our opinions, conclusions, and even our methods are in large part determined by our education, our histories, and our culture. While individual biases need to be set aside, we should embrace the differences in how we see the world. Presumably, the idea for Bacon is that somewhere in the mix of biased views lies the "truth" about the world.

The third set of influences, the Idols of the Market Place, are the most problematic because they lurk in our language and the way humans identify and talk about things. While humans think we control our words, words also have the power to mold and govern the path of our thoughts. Humans certainly need language to record and communicate and to create and maintain our relationships, but our language is expansive and includes both knowledge and myth, fact and opinion. As Bacon observed, "[w]ords plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies." Notably, many of these examples come to us today as fallacies, e.g., the fallacy of sunken costs. Daston, *Objectivity*, 67. Bacon, *Novum Organum* I LIII. Ibid., I XLIII.

144. Notably, many of these examples come to us today as fallacies, e.g., the fallacy of sunken costs.
146. Bacon, *Novum Organum* I LIII.
147. Ibid., I XLIII.
This leading "men away" occurs because of two errors that arise from our language. First, words dupe us into believing if there is a word, there must be a "thing" the word refers to, e.g., the Prime Mover, the Element of Fire, Fortune. Bacon argues that while there are words for these ideas, none of these ideas actually exist as a thing, even though some of us think they must since they are named. Second, because words are ambiguous and imprecise, we tend to class things together that are really wholly unrelated. To avoid error, Bacon argues we must ensure that the words we use to identify and label refer to real things in such a way as to indicate real differences. Agreeing to certain definitions is one way to limit the impact of this influence.

The final set of influences, the Idols of the Theater, are rooted in dogma and philosophical systems. Bacon recognizes that how we see and think about the world is colored by the canon of our field, our traditions, and those to whom "authority" is given. In the words of contemporary feminists and post-modernists, our thinking is socially constructed. The problem with these influences, for Bacon, is that we see the world through the lens of our canon, which shapes how we identify and characterize a thing, and fail to see nature as it really is; we anticipate instead of observe and experience.\footnote{Tiles and Tiles, An Introduction, 40.} The question Bacon’s theory raises (or begs) is whether we can do anything without a world view. Bacon seems to think we can if we limit our knowledge to that derived from experience, which is to say, empirical data.

\textit{Induction: The Method of Science}

Despite this prohibition on interpreting via a pre-existing lens, Bacon himself uses the lens of reductionism. The rise of mechanical clocks and other machines demonstrated that what we see on the outside of an object is far different from the internal mechanisms operating on the
inside. To understand the world we could see, Bacon argued we need to reduce the world down to her internal mechanisms and understand what we could not see.\textsuperscript{149} In his \textit{The Great Instauration}, Bacon argued that "by reasoning and true induction, with experiments to aid; and by a comparison with other bodies, and a reduction to simple natures . . . . which meet and mix in the compound," true knowledge could be attained.\textsuperscript{150}

This method, which would later become the scientific method of today, flatly rejects scholasticism and its attendant method of stylized disputation so characteristic of the Medieval and early Renaissance times. Bacon’s natural philosophy is conducted by going out into and studying in a systematic way the natural world, the object of natural philosophy.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, for our bank of knowledge to grow and for life to be improved, we must understand the principles by which nature is governed so as to control her and coerce her into working for us and not against us. Harkening back to Bacon’s argument for the separation of science from religion, if we cannot confirm knowledge or the truth or falsity of a claim through experience, then it cannot be knowledge.

The path to this knowledge is induction, which, for Bacon, has two parts. First, we must gather everything we have observed on a given topic, recording our observations as we go along in an orderly fashion and supplementing where necessary. Second, after observing and recording, being careful to note both when things do and do not happen, we create a hypothesis and an experiment to test that hypothesis. For Bacon, science can no longer be simply natural history

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 63.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Francis Bacon, \textit{The Great Instauration}, from \textit{The Works}, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. VIII (Boston: Taggard and Thompson, 1863), 84–93.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Tiles and Tiles, \textit{An Introduction}, 40.
\end{itemize}
where we observe natural things and natural processes, but must include experiment.\textsuperscript{152} In Bacon’s words,

those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course; it gathers its materials from the flowers of the garden and field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own.\textsuperscript{153}

Bacon’s new scientist must be like a bee. The bee identifies its test subject (the flower), mines its offerings (takes the pollen and nectar), and returns to its lab (the hive) to further modify the subject and creates new and beneficial knowledge (honey). Experimentation becomes the key to achieve our final goal of mastering, dominating, and controlling nature, which allows us to coerce her to behave in the way most beneficial to humans. However, this quest for knowledge is limited to an exploration of the laws of nature that indicate the way things are and how things work. To go further would place us in speculative metaphysics, which is beyond true knowledge, as it is beyond what can be determined and proven by empirical methods.\textsuperscript{154}

Finally, in order to overcome the limitations, prejudices, and biases of the Idols, we must question nature in such a way that perception plays a smaller and smaller role. Tools should be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 31-34.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} Bacon, \textit{Novum Organum} I XCV. An excellent example of this may be the recent study conducted by the Bedford Institute of Oceanography in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia regarding the movement of radioactive material from Fukushima Japan to the Western shores of Canada. Instead of passively observing debris, or testing waters for radiation, or reasoning how radiation might flow on the ocean’s currents, nature was "prepped" by having a dye that traces radioactivity added to the water. This dye was monitored as it made its way across the ocean and from this experiment, scientists are revising their calculations regarding the relevant ocean currents. "Tracking Fukushima Radiation Across the Pacific," \textit{Earthsky}, January 6, 2015, http://earthsky.org/earth/tracking-fukushima-radiation-across-the-pacific.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Tiles and Tiles, \textit{An Introduction}, 199.
\end{itemize}
used to supplement our senses, observation, memory, and reasoning that will minimize or correct
the distorting biases from which we all suffer. For example, the microscope, invented in 1590,
could be used to enhance our sensory observations; careful notes, published and shared widely
via the printing press, augment our memory and ensure observation free of biases once vetted by
a greater community;¹⁵⁵ and tables and other organizational tools help us to reason by
demonstrating similarities and differences. The use of these supplements would further
universalize and spread science, for even those with limited knowledge ability should still be
able to use science to improve their world.¹⁵⁶ Science would be the great equalizer.

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

Bacon’s greatest contribution to the assumptions and implications that we began with in
Chapter 2 comes from his view of the purpose and method of science. Bacon’s argument for
removing science from Church authority while still retaining the idea that science is a worthy
project was rooted in the notion that "real" science benefits all of humanity. Thus, science is
moral (C1).

However, the ability of science to achieve its benefits for humanity is rooted in the
adequacy of its scientific method. As noted above, the only way to achieve knowledge is through
the experimental method, which is to say using objective data (S2) to gain real knowledge about
the world (I3). The "knowledge" of ethics and religion is actually revealed by god. Combining

¹⁵⁵. This notion, argue the Tileses, has morphed from Bacon’s idea that it would be public authority that
would ensure accuracy to the authority of "individual-independent minds." See, An Introduction, 144–146. Science
today is very much not public but private, and often protected as intellectual property, as was the case with the kalo
patents and as will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

the two types of knowledge would call into question whether we were actually achieving true knowledge and might challenge the moral nature of the project of science itself.

Notably, while Bacon does think we should attempt to mitigate the influences of our human condition, such as context, he does not believe the Idols can be completely overthrown and achieve the contemporary gold medal standard of objectivity: the view from nowhere. Instead, we must recognize we are all subject to bias and influence and we must address these influences when we see them. Idols are part of what it means to be human, and understanding what it means to be human is part of Bacon’s project. Bacon’s view certainly contributes to the contemporary notions of objectivity and the experimental method, but less directly, perhaps, than what is generally thought.

Finally, Bacon’s work does contribute to the exceptionalising of humans and the divide between humans and nature. The notion that the earth exists solely for humans (I4) and that good scientists treat nature in a machine-like manner (C2) so as to control her, thus benefiting humankind (C1), is a key tenet of Bacon’s utopia, Bensalem. As the leader of Bensalem explains:

And we make by art, in the same orchards and garden, trees and flowers, to come earlier or later than their seasons, and to come up and bear more speedily than by their natural course they do. We make them also by art greater much than their nature; and their fruit greater and sweeter, and of differing taste, smell, color and figure, from their nature.  

Bensalem was the most advanced of all societies precisely because of its ability to control nature

and make her better, at least from the perspective of humans.\textsuperscript{158}

\textit{René Descartes (1596–1650, France and the Dutch Republic)}

Like Bacon, French philosopher René Descartes, who was born some thirty years after Bacon and published after Bacon’s death, sought to remove bias, prejudice, and dogma from our thinking in order to arrive at knowledge. However, Descartes rejected empiricism, arguing instead that reason would lead us to certain knowledge.

As certainty informs his project, Descartes begins by noting that there are conflicts between the various opinions that he holds and between his education and what he perceives or experiences. He simply is not certain of the information he has before him, and his quest is to find some method to achieve such certainty. Descartes begins this quest by announcing four rules he must follow in order to achieve his goal of certain knowledge. The first rule is that only those things that come "so clearly and distinctly to mind that there was no occasion to doubt it" can be taken as true. Descartes argues this rule will help him to avoid just those biases and prejudices that may arise from our schooling or from dogma. The second rule demands the thinker divide all problems into their many parts since the smaller the problem the easier the solution. Dividing a problem into its parts dovetails with the third rule, which requires thinking in an orderly fashion. For Descartes, this means beginning with the simplest of things and moving slowly and

\textsuperscript{158} Bacon’s belief in the extent of this control is less than clear. Bacon wrote: "Now the empire of man over things is founded on the arts and sciences alone, for nature \textit{is only to be commanded by obeying her}" (emphasis added). Accordingly, while we can experiment and seek to control nature, it appears that Bacon believed there were limits as to how far we could push her. This interpretation has some traction. Bacon’s quote was used in a speech given to the United Nations’ General Assembly on April 20, 2011 by Ambassador Pablo Solón, permanent representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations, during a dialogue on harmony with nature.
methodically towards the more complex. Descartes’ final rule is to be thorough in one’s analysis so as to insure completeness.\textsuperscript{159}

Descartes settles himself in to begin his quest for certain knowledge, telling the reader that he was holed up in a warm room as a result of a winter storm, had no one to bother him with conversation, and was "untroubled by any care or passions." In other words, Descartes sought the solitude and seclusion of his room, isolated from all company that might place demands upon him, as our relationships always do, to begin his solo exploration of knowledge. This solitary situation was not simply fortuitous but a necessary part of the knowledge acquisition process, for Descartes believes that it is more likely that an individual will discover certain facts from mere opinion than a group.\textsuperscript{160} Truth-finding is a solo effort.

Isolating his physical self—that which can be burdened by care and passions—Descartes turns to the part of him that will do the heavy lifting as it were in his search for certainty: his soul or brain or reason—that part of him that thinks. Descartes’ process begins with the \textit{cogito} and then moves methodically through reasons why he can only trust his thoughts: senses are often mistaken, he could be dreaming, he could be mentally ill, or an evil demon could be funneling false information to his senses. Looking beyond his senses, Descartes determines two things are certain: (1) There exists a benevolent God and (2) there exists the "I"—"cogito ergo sum." Thus, Cartesian knowledge begins with the isolated individual, looking into him/herself, who discovers


\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 11.
that both his/her own existence and the idea of a perfect Being rest within his/her own mind,\textsuperscript{161} isolated from the external world that necessarily includes others—human and non-.

While Bacon argued that we must turn to experimentation (more sense data) to overcome the limitations of our senses, Descartes will turn to critical, inward reflection and the use of reason (less sense data) to minimize the potential for sense error. In the "Sixth Meditation," Descartes applies his rules for certainty to the world at large. In doing so, he observes that there are two types of things in the world. The first "thing" is an extended substance, meaning it has an outline or limits. This thing passively perceives and receives data, can see, touch, hear, and taste things. This physical object also can change locations and positions but is nothing without its substance. The other "thing" in the world is that which has ideas and thoughts but no substance. In a human being, these two things are united but distinct. Descartes applies his first rule and discovers the following:

\ldots nevertheless, since on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a thinking and not an extended being, and since on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body in so far as it is only an extended being which does not think, it is certain that this "I" [--that is to say, my soul, by virtue of which I am what I am--] is entirely [and truly] distinct from my body and that it can [be or] exist without it.\textsuperscript{162}

The only part of a human that is truly "the person" or "the I" is the soul; the body is but a house, or, to use Plumwood’s helpfully descriptive term "a coat," which, as a piece of clothing, at least in Descartes’ and Plumwood’s traditions, has no real connection to the person who wears it.

\textsuperscript{161} Tiles and Tiles, \textit{An Introduction}, 108

Moreover, the body is divisible, while the mind is not. This latter statement makes sense in light of the fact that the place where "I" am located is not my body, but my mind. To divide my mind would be to divide me, to divide my identity—something that simply would not be possible if there is a "me" that continues to exist.\textsuperscript{163}

Not only is the body separate from the mind, but in Part V, "Some Questions on Physics," of his \textit{Discourse on Method}, Descartes contends that God added a rational soul only to the human body. While God created animals and the body of humans in similar ways, with no real difference between the two, the addition of the rational soul, a distinct and substance-less part of the human body, is what allows humans to think and separates them from animals.\textsuperscript{164} Descartes further discusses the difference in his letter to Cambridge Platonist and Lady Anne Conway’s teacher, Henry More, on February 5, 1649 as follows,

I came to realize, however, that there are two different principles causing our movements. The first is purely mechanical and corporeal, and depends solely on the force of the spirits and the structure of our organs and can be called the corporeal soul. The other, an incorporeal principle, is the mind or that soul which I have defined as a thinking substance. Thereupon I investigated very carefully whether the movements of animals originated from both these principles or from one only. I soon perceived clearly that they could all originate from the corporeal and mechanical principle, and I regarded it as certain and demonstrated that we cannot at all prove the presence of a thinking soul in animals. I am not disturbed by the astuteness and cunning of dogs and foxes, or by all the


\textsuperscript{164} Descartes, \textit{Discourse}, 30–38.
things, which animals do for the sake of food, sex, and fear; I claim that I can easily explain all of them as originating from the structure of their bodily parts.\textsuperscript{165}

While both humans and non-humans move, only one, the human with a soul, is moved because of the soul. The others are moved because of instinct or nature. Moreover, because mind and body are separate and because only mind has rational thought, all things which are "body" have no thought but operate as if machines. In writing to the Marquess of Newcastle, three years earlier, on November 23, 1646, Descartes argues that animals act "naturally and mechanically, like a clock. . . ." Any action of an animal or plant can and must be attributed to instinct. For, if bodies, i.e., animals and plants, "thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul like us."

Resurrecting the Platonic dislike of sea creatures, Descartes continues by arguing that the possibility of animals having an immortal soul as humans do "is unlikely, because there is no reason to believe it of some animals without believing it of all, and many of them such as oysters and sponges are too imperfect for this to be credible."\textsuperscript{166}

As a result, only humans have the ability for rational thought, thus allowing them to act free from mere impulse and instinct. Only humans have the ability to make choices. Animals and the rest act without choice according to the laws of nature. All non-humans, then, are machines, and these mindless mechanisms, unable to move themselves or to initiate action, can only react to either another body or something else that had the power to move it.\textsuperscript{167}


\textsuperscript{166} René Descartes, \textit{The Philosophical Works of Descartes}.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
While Descartes’ theory of rationalism did not carry the day as far as scientific method goes, his views on the metaphysical divide between humans (subjects) and non-humans (objects) and his epistemological arguments regarding the nature of objectivity continue to have force and inform the assumptions and implications discussed in Chapter 2. With regard to the former, Descartes, is very clear that there are fundamental metaphysical differences between humans and nature. While humans, like animals, have a body or corporeal component, they also have been given a soul that provides them the ability to reason, to make choices, and to generally govern their lives. This stands in sharp contrast with nature, which is a machine (C2). For Descartes and his dual-substance theory, all things which have no soul are inanimate, dead, and must be moved by some external cause. All things that have a soul are animate, living, and are self-moved and not subject to the mechanical laws of nature.

The implication that humans are exceptionalised arises from an assumption rooted in an intellectual genealogy that placed all of nature in a hierarchy with those closest to "god" or the Demiurge at the top of the hierarchy. For Plato, humans were superior because we used our rational gifts, which brought us closer to perfection. For Descartes, that which is animate is superior to that which is not: "the soul . . . is more noble than the body . . . ."¹⁶⁸ The fact that humans are the only entity that has both soul and body allows humans to be placed in a position superior to the rest of nature. Further, Descartes’ two-substance theory eliminates any possibility of any sort of shared identity between humans and non-humans. We simply are metaphysically of two different substances and humans are superior.

¹⁶⁸. Descartes’ letter to Princess Elisabeth dated September 15, 1645.
However, it is not enough that humans are metaphysically different than nature, for that
difference translates into a certain power over nature. Descartes believed that "knowing the
nature and behavior of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens and all other bodies which surround us,
as well as we now understand the different skills of our workers, we can employ these entities for
all the purposes for which they are suited, and so to make ourselves masters and possessors of
nature." 169 Descartes’ method would allow humans to take their position as "masters" of non-
humans (and workers) (I4).

Descartes’ contribution to contemporary notions of objectivity begins with his isolated
and disembodied thinker. A good knower is one that removes him/herself from all context,
including his/her environment, and allows his/her reason to be unencumbered by role or context.
Once this removal is complete, a good knower will come to know, like other knowers before her
and those after her, the immutable and unchanging laws of the universe (S3), the hallmark for
certainty and good knowledge. Notably, this isolation includes isolation from the body, for it is
the body—the senses—that contribute to uncertainty. The body not only distracts us, it also is the
source of error.

Descartes’ metaphysical subject/object divide combined with his isolated and disengaged
knower means that the knowing subject comes to understand the objects of the world (everything
not human) through limited engagement. That engagement is on a wholly rational, passive
observation level (although the intellect and critical reflection are active) and good engagement

Inc. 1956), 39–40. Although read many different ways, what precisely Descartes meant by the last phrase in the
above quotation—"masters and possessors of nature"—is far from clear. Whether Descartes is limiting himself to
nature, or intended to include all who work for us, whether human or nature, is uncertain. The latter interpretation
could have far greater ethical implications than if it were limited to nature; however, the key for this work is that
Descartes did see scientific activity and the sharing of that activity as an ethical obligation.
eliminates the context of the knower. In other words, a good subject knower is one who does not allow his/her context, beliefs, biases, subjectivity, or others, to enter into the passive examination of some object. For Descartes, the mind, when focused on ideas, creates truly objective knowledge via the use of our reasoning intellect, which is what brings us closer to God. This method is the only method, according to Descartes, that will accomplish all of these important tasks. Moreover, the best way to reach these immutable laws is to divide things of nature as well as tasks into smaller and smaller parts.

Feminist philosopher Naomi Scheman argues that Descartes’ new epistemological character—the disembodied knower—is revolutionary in many ways and supports the notion that we are all equal; or at least, our intellect is equal. This radical equal individuality is inextricably linked to the notion that, assuming we are using our reason well, we will all see the world that is different from us the same. Thus, according to Scheman’s take on Descartes, the inequality arises when we fail to sufficiently control our bodies and our wills and we allow that inappropriate context to color the world we see. Reality is objective in that it is separate and independent of us and we can all access the same world if we only remove the muddying factors of our individual subjectivities.¹⁷⁰

While Descartes’ emphasis on reason as the primary source of knowledge has been rejected as the paradigm for the scientific method, his theories still contribute to the exceptionalising of one method that sees nature as machine-like that can be reduced to component parts by a disembodied knowing mind. Descartes, then, contributes to the notion of reductionism as a viable way to engage with the world. That the fact with which we engage—

nature—is a machine and machines can be taken apart and reduced to their components, further solidifies the key role reductionism plays in objectivity and the scientific method.

Finally, Descartes, despite his self-imposed isolation, also realized that his project was a moral one, and, tellingly, axiomatically so. In Part Six "Some Prerequisites for Further Advances in the Study of Nature" of the Discourse on Method, Descartes wrote that at first he did not feel compelled to publish his work, believing that it was enough for him to regulate his own behavior. However, as soon as he recognized the principles he had arrived at in the realm of physics and "noticed how far they might lead" and how different they were from what was commonly accepted at the time, he could no longer "keep them hidden without gravely sinning against the rule that obliges us to promote as far as possible the general good of mankind." Descartes, then, felt compelled to share his knowledge with others so as to help them improve (I7).

John Locke (1632–1704, England)

Seeing nature as a machine that can be controlled still limited our use of nature, for it is one thing to be metaphysically different than and in a superior position to objects, but quite another to own these same objects. This missing piece of ownership is supplied by John Locke in his 1690 Second Treatise of Government, which addresses how it is that humans come to own property. Locke’s story of ownership begins with the "State of Nature," which is not one of war or unrest, but one of peace and shared common resources where all were equal and no single person has more power than any other. The State of Nature is governed by a Law of Nature, which demands that no one can harm another in his "Life, Health, Liberty, or Possession." This Law of Nature implies that those living in a community will have sufficient access to all the raw

materials they may need for the necessities of life. Since all will have access to sufficient food, clothing, and shelter, the community will be stable.\textsuperscript{172}

Although "God gave the World to Men in Common" so that they could live from it, God did not mean that "it should always remain common and uncultivated." Man was to subdue the Earth, i.e., to improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in Obedience to this Command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his Property, which another had no Title to, nor could without injury take from him.\textsuperscript{173}

Humans must mix their labor—the one thing they own—with the land, by cultivating that land. For, that which we mix our labor with we own. Labor is the one and only thing that each individual person has and owns and hence the one thing those who own nothing can still sell.\textsuperscript{174}

This mixing of labor and land results in benefits not only for the individual, but the community as a whole. For, mixing labor with nature increases the wealth of the "common stock of mankind."

This domination and subjugation cannot be done in a willy-nilly fashion, as humans also must be aware that any waste of nature is deemed offensive to God, "the Great Property Owner." "Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy."\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, one cannot simply own property without working that property. Since cultivating and working property not only improves the individual but the community as well, a community could seize private property if

\textsuperscript{172} Robert Markley, "Land enough in the World": Locke's Golden Age and the Infinite Extension of "Use," \textit{The South Atlantic Quarterly} 98, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 828.

\textsuperscript{173} Locke, \textit{Second Treatise}, 332–333.

\textsuperscript{174} This notion will later become a key tenet of wage labor.

\textsuperscript{175} Locke, \textit{Second Treatise}, 332.
it was not being used in such a way as to benefit the larger society. Property rights for Locke, Economist John F. Henry argues, are not absolute but are limited by the rights of those in the community, as the individual’s right to own property existed only in so far as that property advanced the greater welfare of society.\footnote{176}  

This increase in wealth is based on the notion that labor gives land its value. While land has a use when it is held in common, it has value when it is mixed with labor because that which is useful to man is, for the most part, the result of labor.\footnote{177} When we mix labor with land, we increase the valuable part of that land, and subsequently benefit all of humankind with the increased wealth. If it is the addition of labor to the land that gives it value, then it is a short step to the idea that how much land produces is its value, because the amount of labor is directly reflected in the amount of goods that the land produces. An acre of land that bears twenty bushels of wheat in England and another acre of land that bears twenty bushels of wheat in America have the same value.\footnote{178} Locke argues that

\begin{quote}
[t]is Labour then which puts the greatest part of the Value upon Land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: ‘tis to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful
\end{quote}


\footnote{177. Locke, \textit{Second Treatise}, Chapter 5.}

\footnote{178. This notion continues to echo to present day. At one time, land was considered unique and one could seek the remedy of specific performance for breach of a land contract, which is to say, if you sold me a specific parcel of land and then breached the contract, I could ask the court to force you to give me the contracted-for piece of land, since land was special and irreplaceable. That notion has changed. Currently, in Hawai’i, the Department of Land and Natural Resources, the steward of ceded Hawaiian lands, will "swap" Hawaiian lands for others. An example of this was its attempt to swap a large parcel of agricultural lands on Maui for a city square block in Wailuku, Maui, arguing that the fair market value of each was the same.}
Products: for all that the Straw, Bran, Bread, of that Acre of Wheat is more worth than the Product of an Acre of as good Land, which lies waste, is all the Effect of Labour. Earth and Nature only furnish "the almost worthless Materials." As an example, Locke points to the "Nations of the Americas," which are well endowed with nature, but where the rulers of that place have less "Conveniences" than those enjoyed in England. For Locke, the measure of value and importance is the number of those "conveniences" one has, and it is human labor mixed with land that provides these conveniences, not nature herself. In point of fact, nature has very little to do with the creation of conveniences, which is why Locke refers to land that does not have labor mixed with it as "waste"—a thing that adds nothing to the overall wealth of mankind. Since, from Locke’s point of view, the "indian" does not produce anything on his land, land in the Americas is not worth anything.

Locke’s characterization of the Americas is disingenuous in that he knew the situation in the Americas was not as he described. As the secretary for the Carolina colonies, he was well aware of the help the colonists received from the so-called "Amerindians" living on Turtle Island and their stable societies’ close relationship to nature. These indigenous peoples not

180. Ibid.
181. Ibid. Scheman takes this argument one step further and contends that in light of Cartesian notion of equal intellect (see discussion at page 108 above), those that found themselves in unequal positions due to birth or some other chance circumstance could move themselves to a new place where they could be equal. Scheman refers to this as "self-defining," and points out that this self-defining only works if one has a common ground from which to control who belongs and who doesn’t. In the case of the so-called New World, those already there, those who had unquestionable and inalienable connections to the environment, that thing which Europeans saw as inert and outside of the human intellect and which was to be controlled, received little or no consideration. In other words, because these "knowers" saw the world differently through a position of deep and unavoidable attachment, their ways of knowing and being could not be taken seriously. The very point of the "new intellectual," was lack of attachment. Anything that ran contrary to this notion could not be valid, from a European point of view. See, Scheman, "Though This Be Method," at 154.
182. "Turtle Island" is the name given to the North American continent by a number of the indigenous people living there.
only provided food stuffs but knowledge of how to grow food in an environment that was very
different from that of England. The indigenous peoples may not have had the "conveniences" of
England (whatever they may be), but they kept the English from starving and through sharing
their knowledge made it possible for the English to establish successful colonies.

To be fair, Locke’s views on ownership were more normative than descriptive. Reacting
against the idea that only the monarchs or those titled could have property, Locke sought to
develop an egalitarian method of property acquisition—labor. We cannot all come together and
enter into a contract society if we are not standing on equal footing with equal bargaining power.
We need to be contracting from the same or at least a similar position and we need to be able to
excel from that point based on something that each of us has; that something is labor. If the
whole of the natural world is available to every person, and if every person can labor, then every
person has the ability to profit from that labor. Labor and its attendant property rights, not birth,
can become a person’s social and political identity. "Thus in the beginning, All the World was
America," with all the world open to the possibility of cultivation (mixing of human labor with
land) and ownership. This construct meant, however, that the land was not already occupied.

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

Thus, Locke took a notion of equality and rooted it in labor, such that all who labor can
share equally in a social contract, since everyone, by virtue of only their labor and not their
heritage, can own property. To achieve this, Locke’s theories began with the assumptions that
humans are exceptionalised (God gave Nature to humans to subdue and dominate (I4)) and that
nature is a machine (C2) (having no intrinsic value (I6)). Humans, under Locke’s theory of

183. Locke, Second Treatise, 343.
ownership, are free to sally forth and take ownership of land that would ultimately provide resources for the private production of goods and services. Land that is not properly used, i.e. privately owned which is the necessary result of mixing labor with land, is being wasted.

In order for Locke’s theory of mixing labor and land to be operationally successful, however, nature’s goods could not be in the same metaphysical category as the goods of humans, i.e. labor. If they were, Locke’s theory of ownership could not exist and we would have to buy or barter with nature to get the resources we needed. As Plumwood argues, if nature were not an empty and null, non-agentic object, it would necessarily have a say and would not "be placed entirely at the disposal" of humans. In fact, once we recognize that nature is not simply an object, free and open for us to labor upon, its acquisition becomes "either . . . [an] unjustified seizure or a form of coverture" and in either event is illegal. Further, acknowledging the agency of land requires the concept of property be changed from that of ownership to that of guardianship or partnership with land or nature as an active collaborative partner. One potential impact of this situation could be the questioning of human equality and the human ability to enter into a social contract and self-govern. Nature had to be metaphysically different than humans.

Humans do not live in harmony with that land. Nature must be forced to give up her wealth under the labor of humans, she cannot simply provide it as a result of some harmonious relationship. For, if she simply provided her wealth, how could we own nature?

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804, Germany)

Whereas Locke provides humans with an empirical method of owning property, further solidifying the subject-object divide, Kant provides us with arguments for the necessity and

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inevitability of such ownership. For Kant, the relationship between humans and non-humans must necessarily be rooted in one of use or else humans lose their metaphysical distinctiveness. For Kant, ownership of objects by subjects is mandated by the reason-based *a priori* laws of autonomy that distinguish humans\(^{185}\) from all others.

Kant’s discussion of property begins with the link between freedom, reason, and morality. Adults, for Kant, are autonomous, which is to say there is nothing outside or external to the individual that demands he/she behave a certain way. In the moral sphere, we know what we ought to do because of the moral laws or maxims we impose upon ourselves through the faculties of our reason. Our ability to follow those laws or self-govern, again through the faculties of reason, is what makes us both human and moral. This autonomy or freedom has a number of social and political ramifications. The first is that we must be given the space to be autonomous, which is to say to freely determine our own actions in accordance with our morality and to identify and meet our freely chosen ends.\(^{186}\)

The second ramification comes from the fact that we do live with others, even though we are autonomous individuals. Thus, somehow, we need to limit our freedom and autonomy so as not to impinge unnecessarily upon others in society; however, we need to do this without an external force or control demanding that we give up our freedom. We need to willingly acquiesce to limitations on our freedom. The only way to do this is to have "universalizable maxims," which is to say rules that every rational being agrees to. The two universalizing categoricals that

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185. Kant does not include all humans under his term "man." Women, people of color, and others who have questionable rational faculties due to their natural inferiory are excluded. Since it does not appear, at least superficially, that including Kant’ marginalized others in the designation "human" is antithetical to Kant’s theories, "human" will be used throughout.

Kant proposes are the Categorical Imperative for the moral realm, which holds "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law";\textsuperscript{187} and the Universal Principle of Justice for the justice or rights realm, which holds that "Every action is just [right] that in itself or in its maxim is such that freedom of the will of each can coexist together with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law."\textsuperscript{188}

Thus, under the Universal Principle of Justice, I can limit my freedom if it allows for the coexistence of others’ freedom, only in such instances when that limitation could be made a universal law. Since the right to acquire those items necessary to help me achieve my end goals is part of my freedom, and since it cannot be that I share, for to benefit from a sharing would place me in a position of obligation to others and limit my freedom (or theirs), making me less of a human, it must be that I am able to limit others’ freedom to possess items if they can limit mine to do the same. We can make it a universal maxim that all humans should have the right to ownership (something more than custody but the right to exclude others from items not in direct custody) of objects in order to achieve our ends.

The right to own property (the right to exclude) is not an inherent right, since the only inherent right Kant provides for is the right to external freedom. Therefore, the idea that things that are external to me can become mine must come into existence by a "juridical act," which gives rights where none had existed before.\textsuperscript{189} The only way this system works is if there is


\textsuperscript{188} Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property," in \textit{New Essays on Kant}, ed. Bernard den Ouden (Bern and New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 228, quoting the \textit{Metaphysical Elements of Justice}, 35.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 234.
another *a priori* law, which Kant calls the "Juridical Postulate of Practical Reason," which states: "We have an inherent right to acquire anything for our use insofar as the right is in accordance with the condition of the external synthetic unity of the will."190 As formulated in the *Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, the law goes like this: "It is a duty of justice to act toward others so that external objects (usable objects) can also become someone’s [property]."191

The root of the Juridical Postulate lies in the notion that humans must necessarily be free from external constraints to be human at all. For us to be free from those external constraints, we must be able to pursue our chosen ends, which again is tied up with our human dignity and distinguishes a subject (human) from a mere object (everything else in the world). Part and parcel of pursuing our chosen ends is our right to use the things of the earth to help us achieve those ends. If we could not use these physical objects, then the right to be free from external constraints would not exist. We would presume to be free, but not really be free because something external to us would be limiting our right of freedom to achieve our own ends.

In short, for us to be free, we have to be able to pursue our own ends. To pursue our own ends, we have to be able to manipulate objects and transform them. For me to be able to manipulate objects and transform them, I need to possess them, which is something greater than simply having custody, and I need to be able to exclude others from using these things that I need for my life project. That possession exists when I have authority over some object regardless of whether I have a custody over the object.192 The reason why I must be able to exclude is that I cannot rely on someone else to give me what I need to meet my end goals, for to

190. Ibid., 228.
do so would be to lose my freedom and autonomy. I must have a right to own—either objectively via custody or subjectively via a relationship with the thing so to exclude others—if I am going to be human. As a result of "anchoring" private property "in an innate human right," Kant can argue that property and ownership are a necessary right, because our ability to be free is rooted in our ability to own property. Every human must be able to own something merely by virtue of the fact that he/she is human and thus has an inherent right to freedom.\(^{193}\)

While the above demonstrates why ownership is possible and articulates the very important role it plays in ensuring freedom, and thus, humanity, we still need to understand how it is that an individual can come to own stuff that he/she did not own before and that was not gifted or exchanged. This additional element is necessary because, at one time, no one owned anything. So the question now becomes, relevantly for our purposes, how is it that a previously unowned thing becomes private property.\(^{194}\) In other words, what is the act that reserves something as private property and that imposes limits on others’ freedom such that they recognize the obligation not to take or use that property. In the terminology of Kant, what is the mechanism that allows for a singularly individual act to create "universally valid legislation"\(^{195}\)

Kant argues that there was a hypothetical primitive community wherein individuals came together and gave up their rights to property they held in common and established law and justice, which is a product of history and which he is not concerned about, since being a product of history, it is empirical. More importantly, there was an original community of rational beings,

\(^{193}\) Wolfgang Kersting, "Politics, Freedom, and Order: Kant's Political Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, edited by Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 348–349. If this is true, the one sure way to ensure someone does not have a right to property is to render them inhuman—as Kant does to women and the "brown people" of the Pacific.

\(^{194}\) Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property," 234.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.
which necessarily existed, in which the community members held everything in common. No private property was held and everyone was free to use whatever he/she pleased as there also were no laws. This original pre-juridical community is not something that happened in history, but is a concept or idea and is validated by the fact that there are rational beings who use means to achieve ends who are inherently free and who do live together.\textsuperscript{196}

As noted above, the inherent right to external freedom means that humans have a right to use things to meet their ends. Thus, if someone is in a place that they had not chosen to be—if they were thrown into the wilderness say—they would have a right to use whatever was around them to meet their needs, including land. At this point, there is no exclusive ownership, since others are thrown into the wilderness as well and we all share rights in common. The only way we can make land our own is if everyone has a right to seize or occupy unowned land.\textsuperscript{197} Because we have all been "thrown" into this land or wilderness, we all have the right to ownership over it. In what arguably contributed to the origination of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" concept used today to justify exploitation of resources outside sovereign nation territorial limits, Kant writes:

\textit{All Men are originally and before any juridical act of the Will in rightful possession of the soil; that is, they have a Right to be wherever Nature or Chance has placed them without their will. Possession (possessio), which is to be distinguished from residential settlement (sedes) as a voluntary, acquired, and permanent possession, becomes common possession, on account of the connection with each other of all the places on the surface of the Earth as a globe. . . . The possession of all who live on the Earth precedes all their juridical acts,}

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 236.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 237.
being constituted by nature itself, and is an original common possession . . . . This concept of an original common possession is not empirical and not dependent on temporal conditions, as is the hypothetical and unproven primitive common possession. . . . Now that Possession proper to all men upon the earth which is prior to all their particular juridical acts, constitutes an original possession in common (communio possessionis originaria). The conception of such an original, common Possession of things is not derived from experience, nor is it dependent on conditions of time, as is the case with the imaginary and indemonstrable fiction of a primeval Community of possession in actual history. Hence it is a practical conception of Reason, involving in itself the only Principle according to which Men may use the place they happen to occupy on the surface of the Earth, in accordance with Laws of Right.198

As noted earlier, the only way an individual can bind him/herself is if he/she chooses to do so willingly. Thus, in order for a statement "this is mine" to bind others, it must be that others have agreed to accept that statement as a legitimate maxim. Kant argues that since we believe in ownership, we must believe in original ownership. Otherwise, how would we get to the point where we are now with people owning things? If we believe in the right of first acquisition, we also must believe that everyone in the community agreed to that first claim of "This is mine." As such, my claim on unowned objects must impose obligations on others because those others, including myself, have already agreed to be bound by such claims.199


199. Buck, 235, citing Philosophy of Law, 89–90 [374].
Our right to own, use, transform, and manipulate the things of the world arises from the fact that all things in the world exist solely for us. We could not own other humans nor could we own other things that were of the same metaphysical type as us. We can only own means. In Section 2 of the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant argues that

the things of the world possess no rights, but rather that everything that the human will can ever possess and employ for any end whatsoever is subjected to it. The human being is the lord of the world; the world as the totality of usable nonhuman things is at his disposition.\(^{200}\)

This notion that all things exist for us and that we have a right to manipulate and own them is rooted in a further metaphysical distinction between those things with price and those with dignity. If something has a price, there is something that can be put in its place, it is substitutable, and there is an "equivalent." The thing is said to have dignity if "it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent." Those things that many humans need or want can have a "market price," and those things that are not a need, but that some may wish for because they have a certain taste for a thing, have what is called a "fancy price." All things that are valued via market or fancy price have relative value and are means to an end. The only condition under which something can be an end in itself is if it has intrinsic value, which is what Kant means by dignity.\(^{201}\)

Humans have dignity not only because they are the only "thing" that has morality and freedom, but also because humans have no equivalent:

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\(^{201}\) Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 102–103.
their worth consists not in the effects which result from them, not in the advantage or profit they produce, but in the attitudes of mind—that is, in the maxims of the will—which are ready in this way to manifest themselves in action even if they are not favoured by success. . . . For nothing can have a value other than that determined for it by the law. But the law-making which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity—that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth—for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word ‘reverence’ is the only becoming expression. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and every rational nature. 202

Humans with their ends that give value to means must exist to give value to things; consequently, there must be things to which humans give value. The world must necessarily contain value-giving subjects and value-given objects.

Moreover, we owe no duties to non-human others or objects. That being said, we cannot treat non-human others wastefully or disrespectfully, as Kant argues how we treat things are a reflection on how we treat humankind. We must remember, as masters and rulers of all, that destructiveness is immoral. One cannot "mar the beauty of nature; for what he has no use for may still be of use to someone else. He need, of course, pay no heed to the thing itself, but he ought to consider his neighbor." 203

Kant’s notion is that what it means to be human arises from the fact that humans have a priori autonomy, and the attendant idea that the only way to express that autonomy fully is to

202. Ibid.

allow humans to have the freedom to own things. Indeed, for Kant "[t]he end . . . for which man is destined is to achieve his fullest perfection through his own freedom." Nature and animals and all things that are not human exist solely to be made use of by humans, and this making use of is what enables us to achieve our freedom and our fullest human perfection. To question, then, the notion of ownership and related arguments against what type of direct duties we have to non-human others is to question the very heart of what it means to be human, and relatedly, what it means to have the highest moral perfection.

**Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop**

In Kant we see the culmination of one ancestral line of thought, beginning with Plato, that sees the world as object, something separate and distinct from humans as subject. This is not our only choice, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. However, Kant’s thought is paradigmatic and undergirds much of how we see nature today. In Kant, nature is firmly identified as something that is not human (C2) but whose only purpose in existing is to serve humans (I4). Moreover, Kant’s distinction between dignity, as that which has intrinsic value, and price, as that which does not, builds upon Locke’s notion that land receives value only from humans. Under Kant, nature exists to serve humans, and that which does not serve us seems to really have no value (I5). Moreover, Kant’s circular reasoning makes it all but impossible to seriously question his theory, further exceptionalising a specific view of the world (I2 and I4). The following section further explores Kant’s contributions in the context of deepened assumptions and implications.

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II.  

**Deepened Assumptions and Implications**

In Chapter 2, this dissertation explored initial starting assumptions and the implications that arose as a result of their engagement with the world. Those assumptions and their operationalized implications were based on a cursory view of the contingent present rooted in no small part in CTAHR’s own position on the kalo controversy. After this chapter, which uses the prescribed critical narrative genealogy, we can begin to see these initial concepts changing. True to its promise, this analysis provides us space to question our initial assumptions and implications and delve deeper into their present forms. To that end, there have been two major changes or deepening to the earlier assumptions and implications. First, the assumption that nature is a machine (C2) has deepened into the assumption that subjects stand opposed to objects in a hierarchical dualism (C2’). This deepening of the assumption results in a further deepening of a number of implications, as the following will further demonstrate.

Our way of acquiring knowledge about that object world also has deepened. While our original assumption was that the scientific method, which includes a commitment to consistency (S3), reductionism, and objectivity, is exceptionalised, the foregoing thinkers have given new importance to these requirements and new definitive arguments for the importance of exceptionalisation. If we are ever to reach certain knowledge, then the scientist/knower must be a disembodied individual that takes every precaution to overcome the obstacles of his/her body (nature) (I2’).
Subject/Object Dualism

The assumption that has been significantly deepened by the foregoing has serious ramifications for how CTAHR and those who share CTAHR’s tradition see and relate to nature. Indeed, the importance of each of the above thinkers is rooted in how their philosophies contributes to both a contemporary view of nature, the ‘Ōiwi Maoli assumptions and implications and positioning in the kalo controversy, and the ability of those who follow the tradition, CTAHR, to engage with other traditions. Perhaps the biggest impact has been the further separation of human from non-human, which makes it all but impossible to have a relationship of meaning with that set of objects of the world.

The roots of this separation lie in a need to distance ourselves from nature in such a way that nature becomes a necessary foil to our being human. We are subject; nature is object. We are autonomous; nature provides us with evidence of that autonomy. We are reason; nature is punishment for failure to use that reason. We are cogito; nature is evidence of the failure of that cogito when it relies too much on senses. In short, we are subject and we know we are subject because of nature. The object provides us with the necessary means and contrast (the foil) to demonstrate as much. Ironically, this creates a type of dependency upon and vulnerability to nature that is ignored. For that which dominates and uses cannot be placed in a weaker position of vulnerability by definition. Our domination of nature is complete and the question of what should happen, were we forced to define ourselves without this "Other," is not raised by this particular line of thinkers because such a notion is simply inconceivable.

We see this deepening of a separation between nature and humans in Plato’s cosmology that depicts us, as humans, striving toward reason (the forms), by overcoming the body and
nature. Plato’s split enables us to see nature as something that is metaphysically different from
the subject (humans) thus rendering nature as an object (non-human). Humans and human reason
are not only superior in their ability to control the inferior nature, but this theory becomes
exceptionalised: we can see no other way to relate to nature and still retain our humanness other
than through domination via reason. Bacon adds a moral element to this notion by arguing that
the control and domination of the object via science is done for the benefit of humanity. In this
way, the division, which enables science is axiomatically moral, just as science is.

Descartes further fortified the split by arguing for a mind-body dualism and rendering
nature as machine-like. For Descartes, it is impossible to conceive of nature as akin to humans,
which is to say, as having reason. This difference is deepened by the world of Locke and Kant,
bifurcated into that which owns and that which can be owned. That which owns gives value to
that which can be owned and is the only moral actor/player in this scenario. That which can be
owned lies outside the realm of moral considerability and is, for all intents and purposes, useless
without humans to provide it value. Not only is nature a machine with human-given value and no
moral considerability that humans are exceptionalised to use, but that use necessarily means
ownership.

Kant further deepens this assumption by making it an *a priori* law that we must own to be
human. Because we cannot be beholden to any other thing with dignity (subject), for to be
beholden means we would lose our freedom and take away the one thing that makes us human—
autonomy—it cannot be that nature is a thing like us with dignity. For humans to be human, we
must have nature to use as we wish, which means, nature cannot have needs, wants, desires, or
ends of its own. Nature must be viewed as an object that exists solely for our use. This idea
further deepens the implication that humans are exceptionalised above all other things of the world.

Kant solidifies this implication by creating an argument where there are only two choices: either we are human, are free to own things, and we all have agreed to that; or we are not human. If someone were to disagree with this notion, then that person would not be seen as rational and would fall-out of the "club," otherwise known as the "Kingdom of Ends."

Dissected, the argument goes something like this. If we do not agree with this principle that everyone has a right to own an unowned object, and thus impose an obligation on us, then we do not agree that we have the right to own things (because we were not created owning, but had to have gotten unowned things first). If we do not agree to having the right to own things, then we cannot agree that we, as humans, have the right to use and manipulate (exploit) things to meet our own ends. If we cannot meet the ends that we choose, then we are not free. If we are not free, we cannot be moral and we cannot be rational. If we cannot be rational, we cannot be human. If we are not human, we have no dignity and since there are only two objects in the world, the only thing we can be is an object with a price. We make ourselves the objects for others to use as a means to their own ends. By not agreeing to these views, we essentially remove ourselves from the Kingdom of Ends and subject ourselves to be used as a tool for others.

By extrapolation, this means that those who do not agree choose to be used by those who do, and as such, can have no complaint when they are exploited, for they have placed themselves in the position of being nothing but a tool or means to an end. They have opted out of the Kingdom of Ends. Kant has established a self-perpetuating no-win situation for those who wish to oppose his views of property: either we are human and acquiesce to ownership or we are non-
human and acquiesce to being owned. Not only is private ownership beyond question, but it cannot be questioned, for to question private ownership would mean we step outside of what it means to be rational.

Both Locke’s and Kant’s view offers a further deepening of the implication that nature has no intrinsic value (I5'). For Locke, value is given to nature via humans, who mix their labor and capital with inert nature to create usable and worthy goods. Land produces nothing on its own because production can only occur when humans mix their technology with nature. As Shiva argues, "[a] stable and clean river is not a productive resource in this view: it needs to be ‘developed’ with dams in order to become so."205 Unless worked, land is waste. Worked land gives rise to owned land, which in turn gives rise to value. All things in nature can be commodified as things without intrinsic value; they have no dignity and are the very things humans must own in order to meet their ends and to be free, which is to say, human.

Finally, not only does Locke contribute to the subject/object divide, he also contributes to the exceptionalising of an Anglo-Saxon view of relating to nature. For Locke, not just any labor would meet the requirements of ownership. Locke opined that because the Amerindians were not properly "using" their lands in a way recognizable by the English, the English had free reign to mix labor with land via cultivation that looked English and thus own land. Furthermore, this mixture of labor with land in a specific way was the only way to advance the greater welfare of society. Relevant to this work, Plumwood argues "indigenous people were seen as ‘nature,’"

205. Shiva, Staying Alive, 4.
‘nomads’ or ‘parasites on nature’ who were incapable of effective ecological agency or the kind of agricultural labour that was held on the European model, to be the true mark of humanity.”

Captain Cook, writing about the Australian aborigines, had a different view. He found the aborigines to be "far happier than we Europeans . . . they live in a tranquility which is not disrobed by the inequality of condition. The earth and sea of their own accord furnishes them with all things necessary for life.”

Cook is depicting a relationship with nature that is not one of subjugation and domination, not one of subject coercing an object, but one of two entities being in harmony. Such a view was soundly rejected in England at the time.

Scottish Enlightenment leader Lord Kames opined on the "cultivating" habits of Pacific Islanders, as follows: "Need we any other excuse for their inferiority of understanding compared with the inhabitants of other climates, where the mind, as well as the body, is constantly at work procuring necessities." In other words, the warm climates of the Pacific Islands and the bountiful lands meant these people did not need to be "constantly at work procuring necessities." However, it is this constant effort, the constant activity of actively producing and "procuring necessities" that leads to an enlightened and superior mind and reason. Thus, those who do not need to constantly work in a good English sort of way by tilling large tracts, engaging in animal

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206. Plumwood, *Environmental Culture*, 215. The "true mark of humanity" being use. The irony of the current situation, where those same humans are turning to indigenous peoples to aid in sustaining that land, should be noted.


208. Ibid., 315–316. This position is ironic: since Kames was gentry, he probably relied upon the labor of others to procure his necessities.

209. Unfortunately, the belief of inferiority remains entrenched today. ʻŌiwi Maoli and currently Micronesians are viewed as lazy, slow, and always late. Academics, including philosophers, opine that no great thinking can occur in Hawaiʻi because the climate is too warm and makes one indolent. No doubt, the $241 million in research grants UH brought in during 2013 was the result of haole scientists of decidedly Northern European descent working in air conditioning.
husbandry, and so forth, but can live off of the land in a more harmonious fashion, suffered both in their ability to reason and in their ability to be human.

This exchange demonstrates a tension between an assumption that there is a fundamental difference between nature as an object and humans as a subject whose relationship is rooted in control and dominance and a relationship of a "one of the many" where the relationship is rooted in sharing. The problem seems to stem in part from a belief that letting the "earth and sea" furnish one with goods "of its own accord" is a different relationship than that created by a solid English tilling of the soil and cultivating of the land. Labor must be expended in a certain way and land must be brought under cultivation following a specific method. Living in harmony with nature, recognizing when to fish so that the ocean will continue to provide, is not mixing labor with the land and does not give rise to ownership, in part no doubt because it is not sufficiently of the model of domination and control. Living with and recognizing land as living and having needs does not comport with the notion that land is an object. The appropriate (and exceptionalised) relationship of human to non-human is not one of harmony, but one of a certain type of labor designed to dominate and control.

*Individual as epistemic and moral agent exceptionalised*

While the deepening of the subject/object dualism has far reaching ramifications, the above thinkers also deepened what the scientific method means. As noted earlier, knowledge is acquired by an individual, and in the kalo controversy, the relevant knowledge type is one that is acquired by an individual working with an object to benefit subjects. This stands in sharp contrast to ʻŌiwi Maoli traditions that will hold knowledge is accumulated across people (space) and time and who work with nature for the benefit of both people and nature – there is no split.
Communal ways of knowing are exempt from the realm of knowledge because they are not sufficiently scientific and/or similar to the exceptionalised and accepted view of knowledge. These ways of knowing, and more importantly, their conclusions, can be freely taken or ignored as the case may be because they are not really knowing at all. Traditional ways of selecting, breeding, and crafting new species, for example, are ignored or characterized as chance or luck, but in any event not scientific since the creations were not carried out under scientific and controlled conditions.  

Descartes further contributes to this deepening of the scientific method by contending that certain knowledge is acquired without context and so evident that it is almost impossible not to believe. Philosopher Hilary Putnam refers to this notion as non-controversiality and notes it is one of the hallmarks of the scientific method in general and objectivity specifically. Non-controversiality holds that if the science is suitably objective, there will be a "final word" that can "be established beyond controversy." Putnam rejects this idea, and for support, points to the age of the universe, which has changed and likely will again. Pluto’s loss of identity is another example. Not only are things changing, science needs that change and controversy in order to be science. The implication is that only knowledge found through the scientific method and objectivity has meaning and can have import (I3). Putnam argues we could not function if only those statements that are objective are cognitively meaningful and everything else is subjective and cognitively meaningless.

The reality of both our everyday world and science itself is that we often believe statements not proven in Descartes’ terms—not certain or evident—simply because they are

reasonable. For example, at the time of the writing of this thesis, scientists posit the existence of something called dark matter. The dark matter hypothesis is based on observations of galaxies but has yet to be empirically proven. In fact, the words "dark matter" are viewed as a "place holder" until scientists can better determine the precise nature of this "thing" they posit exists. Yet, this hypothesis is seen as a viable hypothesis for most educated and unbiased people. If the implication is that only verified knowledge has import, then knowers must wait for physics—the purest of sciences—to tell us what is in the world before moving forward and absolutely knowing our world. And yet, Putnam argues, we move forward anyway. No one waits for the final word from science in part because there may never be a final word from science. The idea that statements of fact are absolutely true by nature, and that we rely on that absolute fact, simply does not seem to be how the world works.

III.

Chapter Summary and Transition

The goal of this chapter was to begin to use the tool of a critical narrative genealogy to explore the assumptions and implications held by CTAHR. As the above indicates, the philosophical canon that is for the most part exceptionalised, that of Plato, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Kant, support the CTAHR assumptions and deepen many of them. Most importantly, each thinker provides support for a rift between humans and nature via a subject/object divide. The importance of this metaphysical difference cannot be overstated, for this is not just about categories of things in the world, but how we relate to that world and to each other.

Under Locke and Kant, the exceptionalised intellectual tradition, private ownership provides us what we need in order to be human, which is to say, equality and autonomy. Locke’s
theory provides a way for all humans to stand on equal footing and thus enter into social contracts and a myriad of other rights and privileges given to those individuals who are equal. Kant’s theory provides us with the ability to maintain our autonomy by freely achieving our ends. It is, in Kant’s words, "autonomy [that is ] the ground of the dignity of human nature," and it is the ability to own objects in the world that gives us that autonomy. No ownership, no humans—or at least none that are rational, and thus none who have any real meaning.

This deeply entrenched assumption about nature as not only a machine but something metaphysically and fundamentally different from us will meet head-on an ‘Ōiwi Maoli tradition that requires a caring relationship with a nature that is not seen as fundamentally different, but as a relative. The seeming intractability of this assumption also will shed light on why it is so difficult for CTAHR to relinquish the notion of nature as metaphysically different, for to do so may call into question the very nature of what they have been taught it means to be human.

How these deeply entrenched assumptions and their attendant implications came into play during the kalo controversy will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The next chapter, Chapter 4, explores one other key piece of the critical narrative, that of the social force of capitalism. For it is capitalism that inculcates the ideas produced during the Enlightenment—subject/object dualism; individual, disembodied nature of the scientific method; primacy of rational behavior; nature sans intrinsic value—into the capitalist project, which as we shall see, results in an even further deepening and expanding of these assumptions.
But the "environment" is where we all live; and "development" is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable.

--Gro Harlem Brundtland

There have been no engines of human progress that have been nearly as effective as freedom, markets and technological-progress. People today live longer, richer, safer and more fulfilling lives than they did hundreds of years ago, and they did three hundred ago, and so on. The reason for this is the progress that has been inextricably intertwined with market-based systems.

--Lawrence H. Summers

. . . Ruling classes living off natives first land then women now hearts cut out by our own familiar hand.

--Trask

Introduction and Chapter Goals

This chapter takes the critical narrative genealogy one step further by exploring the connections between Enlightenment rationalism, capitalism, and science, and how each of these has come together to create the contingent present of the kalo controversy.

211. The long sticks on a canoe, reaching fore and aft, across the ‘iako or arches connecting the canoe to the outrigger. Loren Andrews, A Dictionary of the Hawaiian Language, rev. Henry H. Parker (Honolulu: Board of Commissioners of Public Archives of the Territory of Hawai‘i), 1922, s.v. mo‘o wa‘a

I.

**Rationalism, Colonization, Progress and Science**

At the same time Descartes was arguing for the use of his rational certainty principles to control both nature and workers, the imperialist nations of Europe were "exploring" other lands in the Americas for ways to accumulate nature’s resources, through the control of the indigenous populations, to fuel their growing capitalist production needs. Marx makes a direct connection between colonization and the rise of capitalism:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren of commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.²¹²

Colonization itself received a mixed reception during the Enlightenment throughout Europe. While Locke and others are said to have developed their theories on government, property, and ownership in large part to support their financial investment in colonizing activities, other thinkers decried colonizers as "usurpers and thieves."²¹³

The problem for those who opposed this "extirpation, enslavement, and entombment" was how to construct an argument against it. According to Historian Jonathan Israel, there simply was no socio-political, economic, or moral theoretical construct for making an argument against the exploitation of non-Europeans. There was, however, a construct for the opposite. Israel argues that since the 15ᵗʰ and 16ᵗʰ centuries, the imperialist nations of Spain, Portugal,

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135
France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Britain, and Russia relied on ideology, the mystique of monarchy and aristocracy, religion, racial hierarchy (supported by the former), and the myth of national prosperity to support their actions.\textsuperscript{214} Imperialism was a God-given right, granted to the monarchy, to promote the economic well-being of chosen nations. Explorers acted under the imprimatur of the "only true God" and were thus given authority to plunder and pillage at will, all in the name of civilizing the world and saving the heathens from themselves.\textsuperscript{215}

Israel credits the "Radical Enlightenment" thinkers with providing the tools to critique and create an anti-imperialist construct or "anti-colonial thesis" that was based on the rejection of an \textit{a priori} hierarchical order and the affirmation that all humans, regardless of religion, political system, or race, were equal. All humans "are the people of God."\textsuperscript{216} This universal equality was based in no small part on the notion that reason is a fundamental component of what it means to be human. One has reason if one is human and must be treated accordingly.

The imperialists countered that while reason may be the indicator of what it means to be human, not all humans possess equal parts or types of reason. Those who are European are more civilized and clearly more rational than those non-Europeans with darker skin and less of the trappings of a European civilized life, which is to say Locke’s "conveniences." The Empiricists generally supported the less equal view by presenting empirical data on the differences between

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{215} An excellent example of this is the "Privileges and Prerogatives Granted by Their Catholic Majesties to Christopher Columbus," available at \url{http://avalon.law.yale.edu/15th_century/colum.asp}.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Israel, \textit{Enlightenment Contested}, 591–594.
\end{footnotes}
human types, and opining that the differences resulted in varying grades of development along the primitive/less rational to civilized/more rational scale.217

The vast array of other beings on earth, knowledge of which increased as "explorers" went beyond the confines of the European content and "discovered" new and different worlds, like Moana Nui, whether human, animal, or plant, added yet another dimension to the equality/hierarchy debate. For if everything was created and ordained by God’s design, then the hierarchy of beings was "natural" and ordained by God. Thus the relationship between creatures, including the relationship between males and females, was part of a divine ladder of being and could not be altered. The world was not contingent nor socially constructed. Therefore, the functions and roles of all species and the inter-relationship between species was the result of the machinations of the divine ruler and should not be trifled with by mere mortals. Under this ideology, God is the owner of the Earth, which "he" created for humans. Humans are placed here to use the Earth wisely. If, however, species came into and out of being not by the hand of God but by the basic operation of nature, as Darwin would argue, or if all things are the result of blind coincidence, then hierarchies are not fixed and could be changed. Each species has an equal chance to survive to the extent that species meets the needs of nature herself. Nature has no owner.

In 1748, twenty years before Cook’s first voyage to the lands of "brown people," Hume wrote: "I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or

217. Ibid., 592-740. The hierarchical ranking of races mirrors the hierarchical ranking of all of nature. Locke, for example, contends that because humans are rational they have a special status that places them "above other material beings." White Europeans are above all other human races and humans are above all other beings on the earth.
speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts no sciences.’” Thus, according to Hume, there was "an original distinction between these breeds of men,” some being without "any symptoms of ingenuity." Hume argued that differences were fundamental and "rooted in environment or climactic conditions, religious traditions, or else innate racial differences.”

Notably, in making this empirical observation, Hume called upon both progress in capitalism and science to justify his determination of unequal distribution of reason.

The connection between reason and economic and scientific progress continues to this day. Economist John Grey of the London School of Economics argues the United States sees itself as "the world’s last great Enlightenment regime," one that believes all the world will eventually reject their own cultures and traditions and move in the direction of a "new, universal community founded on reason" and centered on a U.S. version of market-based capitalism that separates economic life (rational maximizer) from social and political life (morals/ethics/justice).

This connection between progress as moving forward from the past by embracing a certain type of reason found in capitalism and the scientific-method also is a key part of the context of the contingent present that is Hawai‘i, UH-Mānoa, and the kalo controversy.

CTAHR Dean Andrew Hashimoto was standing firmly in this context on March 2, 2006 when he told the crowd of ‘Ōiwi Maoli protesters in front of Bachman Hall that they needed to step into

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220. The 2003 Palapala Kūlike o ka ‘Aha Pono or the Paoakalani Declaration specifically points to the "threat of theft and commercialization" of ‘Ōiwi Maoli traditional knowledge. As the Declaration notes: "Commercialization has profoundly and adversely impacted Kanaka Maoli spiritual practices, sacred sites, and associated objects. . . ."  http://www.papaolalokahi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Paoakalani-Declaration-05.pdf
the 21st century. His less than veiled point was that the protesters needed to leave their traditions behind and step into this new universal community founded on reason, where science and technology work to better humanity and preserve market share. More will be said about this positioning below and in Chapter 5.

Plumwood refers to this connection between reason, capitalism, and science as "economic rationalism," which she contends ensures that science is limited to the "instrumental and productivist goals of corporations, rather than by broader and more integrated knowledge agendas." That being said, many, including Plumwood, argue that it is this very notion of reason and its privileging by both capitalism and economics, that have led us to the brink of our current ecological crises. Plumwood argues this form of rationalism "sees life as a march of progress," which is defined as controlling and "subjugating" nature to humans for the benefit of all human-kind. As such, the environmental crisis, for Plumwood, "is ratiogenic damage," and is rooted in a science that, in response to capitalism, is driven to increase production with little regard for the effect those increases might have on the world as a whole. Such impacts need not be considered since increasing technology will ultimately save us from ourselves.

We see echoes of this idea of science as saving us in Locke’s notion of the State of Nature. According to scholar Robert Markley, Locke’s idea of the "Law of Nature" is rooted in a fiction that we can use nature's resources to raise our standard of living, but we can never use

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221. Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 39.
222. Ibid., 19.
223. Ibid., 38.
224. This thought process is very much in evidence today in dealing (or failing to deal) with the impacts of global climate change. From economists to policy makers, there is a sense that we need not take immediate action since technology will provide answers to issues of adaptation and we will not need to change our lifestyles. Ironically, the call not to rely on technology seems to be coming most clearly from scientists themselves.
them up. Without this fiction, Locke cannot guarantee that the "Law of Nature"—of essential physical needs met and good neighborly relations maintained—will triumph over unchecked desire." In other words, we do not have to fight because we can never use up all of the world's resources, especially if we are limited in what we use to what we can use and what we can desire. This fiction is both solidified and maintained by the joining of capitalism and science. In our laboring on the land, in a scientific way, which necessarily results in ownership, we will never run out of our natural resources. Science will always find a way to overcome nature's limitations, and the market will always limit and effectively manage resources. Moreover, other nations can, through globalization and adoption of a market-based system of capitalism, achieve the same progress and standard of living as other market-based economics, like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, because we will never run out of resources. Ownership and good management practices rooted in good science will help us to maintain Locke's fiction and enable us to achieve lasting peace and prosperity, so long as we follow the principles of capitalism.

II. 

Capitalism

Before moving forward, a note about capitalism itself is in order. "Capitalism," in general, refers to an economic system wherein wealth accumulation through surplus sold on a market is a primary goal of the economy. The system rotates around two key principles. The first is the market as a central determiner of value, which is to say price. Capital and inputs are valued by the price they can capture on the market. The second is the private ownership of the

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means of production, which is anything that goes into the production of an object such as land, natural resources, labor, company assets, and so forth. Generally, when the term "economics" is used without a modifier in the following pages, it refers to the study of the market-based capitalist system, which is how it is used in common vernacular today.

The capitalist system stands in sharp contrast to a subsistence economy, for example, which generally does not have a market where goods are bought and sold in exchange for money or some other object that stands in for the thing itself. A subsistence economy also maintains surpluses only to the extent necessary to weather periods of shortages. In other words, shortages are not driven by the market and the need to acquire a higher price in order to accumulate wealth (or stuff), but instead are driven by the realities of the environment.

In the context of this work, capitalism refers to market-based capitalism, which is prevalent in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, many of the same countries that exceptionalise empiricism and its philosophical cousin, analytical philosophy. Market-based capitalism has ideological roots in the notion of *laissez-faire* free markets where consumers, as profit-maximizing, self-interested individuals, freely choose goods and services. These consumers are price-takers, meaning no corporation or entity sets the price, but instead, prices are set by consumer demand and manufacturing scarcity and the interaction of these two factors in the marketplace.

Further, market-based capitalism is characterized by having deregulated product markets

226. Bruno Amable, *The Diversity of Modern Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 173–174. In addition to the market-based model, Amable identifies the following: social-democratic model (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), Continental-European model (Switzerland, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, Germany, France, Austria), Mediterranean model (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), and Asian model (Japan and Korea).
evidenced by low barriers to entry, which results in increased entrepreneurship and the large variety of products. The latter is demonstrated in the United States by our average grocery store, which carries over 35,000 different products on its shelves. Market-based capitalism also generally has minimal government intervention, evidenced by few administrative regulations and limited state control and public ownership of companies. The labor market is generally seen to be flexible, which means employees have limited protection and there is little coordination of wage bargaining. Finally, the financial system and corporate governance are market-based, meaning there is dispersed ownership and a relatively high number of large and medium-sized publicly traded companies and some family-controlled firms, and a high share of GDP going to venture capital, which tends to emphasize projects in the early stages and technology.\(^{227}\) Notably, these characteristics are comparative. Despite angst over unions and government regulations, the power of unions and the number of regulations in the United States are comparatively small compared to other capitalist systems.

At the heart of capitalism, regardless of its specific type, is the notion of production, which, according to Marx is really a type of relationship between humans and nature. Production occurs naturally; humans are producers in that we make things by shaping nature, and that in the making of things, our own nature is changed.\(^{228}\) Capitalism modifies this relationship by adding a third party that owns nature, labor, the product, and the process, including the instruments of manufacturing and the raw materials (nature modified, e.g., ore once removed from the ground), which is to say the third party owns the means of production.

\(^{227}\) Ibid., 173-174.
\(^{228}\) Marx, *Capital*, 302-303.
Markets

As noted above, capitalism is centered on the notion of a market where goods are bought and sold. The price or what these goods are sold for is the economic value of the good. Thus, in general, only those things that can be sold on the market can have value. This notion that markets determine value via the price of the good is linked to the Marxian concept of exchange value, which refers to the substitute for any given market item, i.e., money for some good. Thus, the only locus for value is the market, where goods and services are bought and sold. These goods, "commodities," are, in Marx’s words, "an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another." 229

While markets are successful in determining the value of commodities, they are less successful when it comes to valuing the environment, both with regard to environmental degradation caused by our manufacturing processes that transforms the environment into a consumer good and with regard to environmental goods or services. Environmental degradation has been considered an "externality," which is something recognized as being a cost of production but not included in costs and, thus, not included in the price of a good or its value. Until recently ecosystem services have not been priced at all, which means, they have had no value.

As the recognition of the importance of ecosystems has increased, economic theory responded by expanding the notion of value. Ecosystems are valued based on either their direct or indirect use to humans, which is referred to as "use-value." Systems also are valued, even when we are not using them, which is referred to as "non-use value" or "existence value."

229. Ibid.
Existence value is designed to capture not only ecosystems that may be used in the future but also those that have value to humans by their very existence and the impact of the existence of that "environmental good" on the welfare of a human.

Some environmental economists, often in response to criticisms arising out of environmental ethics, will refer to this existence value as intrinsic value, since the value of the environmental good arises not from its economic use, but from its very existence as a thing. In this way, the usage seems to be much closer to Philosopher John O’Neill’s characterization of one type of intrinsic value, used in lieu of the term non-instrumental value, which is to say that the object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself and instrumental value if it is the means to some end.230

The attempt by environmental economists to incorporate the ethical notion of intrinsic value is problematic. Many argue that the economic notion conflates the views and misunderstands the criticisms since the valuing still remains an anthropocentric one.231 Moreover, how to calculate the value of these items—whether existence or non-use—also is problematic. Since the goods cannot be bought or sold on the market, other artificial tests need to be created. For example, economists will conduct willingness-to-pay surveys, where individuals are asked how much they are willing to pay to preserve the environmental good, and/or preference studies, where individuals are tested as to what they would give up in order to

230. John O’Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," 119–38. O’Neill argues that this last definition is really a meta-ethical claim in that it denies that subjects (humans) are the source of all ethical values. See pages ___YOU NEED THE PAGES above for a more detailed discussion

maintain a certain environmental good. Shadow pricing is a correlative of preference pricing, where a proxy price is given to an item, often based on what a person must give up in order to get one extra unit of the good. So, for example, the shadow price of steel is actually higher than the price of steel on the market because the latter does not take into consideration externalities, such as pollution caused by the manufacturing of that steel.\textsuperscript{232} Travel cost studies, which measure how much people are willing to spend to visit the environmental goods, and production approaches, which calculate the impact of the service on economic production—for example, increased beef yields and prices from access to increased range lands—also are used. So-called "hedonic methods" are another option. Hedonic methods extrapolate the value of an ecological service from what people are willing to pay for that service in another market. For example, if people are willing to pay more for a house along a clean waterway, that price differential, all other things being equal, can be used to determine the value of that clean waterway.\textsuperscript{233} All these non-direct methods are aimed at attempting to capture the value of environmental goods and services, even if that value is aesthetic or some other subjective quantity.

The above is a neo-classical view of the role of markets in supporting the environment, but there are others. For example, in social economics, the economy is viewed as an "open-system relationship with nature, or more broadly, the biosphere, which is a closed system." While one would think the use of terms like "relationship" would place the analysis on a different level, nature is still referred to as something that provides "inputs" or "ecological stock flow." How we manage our ecological stock is addressed via an equation, which includes numbers for Gross Domestic Product, the trade balance of material consumption, the price of

\textsuperscript{232} See CBA Builder at \texttt{http://www.cbabuilder.co.uk/Quant2.html} for other examples.

\textsuperscript{233} Liu, "Valuing ecosystem services," 56.
domestic extraction of resources, net imports of material resources, combined with population growth and consumption per capita.\textsuperscript{234}

Although far beyond the scope of this work, economics struggles with value in much the same way ethicists do in questioning where value comes from. Locke, as noted in the earlier chapter, along with classical economists, like Adam Smith and Karl Marx, argued that the value of an object arose from the labor that went into creating the object. Other theories argue that the value of an object is derived from the value of the labor’s product, which is determined by the market.\textsuperscript{235} In many ways, this reflects a Euthyphro-type problem: is a thing good because the gods love it (the thing is in demand) or do the gods love the thing because it is good (the object itself has value from the labor that went into it).

\textbf{Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop}

There are three consequences from relying upon markets to provide value for things in general and for environmental goods specifically that contribute to a deepening of the assumptions and implications at issue in this genealogy. The first is that in order for the market and its proxies’ valuing to work, nature must be reduced to one or two inputs. Shiva argues that complex eco-systems like that found in a forest are reduced to a single valued commodity—trees of a certain type, height, and width that fit into a paper pulp machine. The ecosystem of the forest is thus manipulated to maximize its production of that one "useful" and "valued" component—trees. The decrease in water output, the reduction of the diversity of plant and animal life, and the reduction of other food sources, are either ignored or not even seen because

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{234} Irene van Staveren, "Nature," in \textit{Economics After the Crisis: An introduction to economics from a pluralist and global perspective} (New York: Routledge, 2015), 234.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{235} Gary North, "The Fallacy of ‘Intrinsic Value,'" \textit{The Freeman}, June 1 1969, republished at http://fee.org/freeman/detail/the-fallacy-of-intrinsic-value}
the sole purpose of a forest under this view is to furnish trees of a certain type, which in turn furnishes pulp in order to make paper. Nothing else in the system has value.  

Second, not only is it the market that provides value, but it is humans who provide the demand for those goods. Goods are useful and can command a price only to the extent they are useful to humans. Capitalism, then, views nature as a thing that provides humans with much needed benefits. Finally, nature’s "environmental services" must be adequately priced on the market if they are to be efficient and managed effectively so that we never run out of resources, as the following from an EPA paper on shadow pricing of environmental services states:

The "Holy Grail" for environmental economists would include objective prices for environmental services. Such prices are warranted because the environment contributes to economic well-being in ways that extend well beyond aesthetic amenities. Contributions include the production of natural resources, the dilution and detoxification of wastes, the provision of a hospitable climate, and biodiversity. These services usually are not provided through the market and therefore, rarely are assigned a price. Without a price, the market cannot allocate environmental services efficiently. Such inefficiency leads to environmental degradation. Much of this degradation could be avoided using economically efficient market based mechanisms if prices were available for environmental services.  


237. Robert K. Kaufmann, Amy Richmond, and Ranga B. Myneni, "Valuing Environmental Services: A Shadow price for Net primary Production," found at http://yosemite.epa.gov/SAB/sabcypress.nsf/e1853c0b6014d36585256dbf005c5b71/bdb75dd4fafa75ae28525709a005dbf74/$FILE/Valuing%20Net%20Primary%20Productivity.pdf, internal citations omitted. (emphasis added)
In other words, the only way to manage, and subsequently protect nature is through the market. The best way, indeed perhaps the only way, to manage all these useful services is to own them privately, since communal ownership will be (and has been) unsuccessful because humans are self-interested, profit-maximizing individuals that will take as much as they can unless we privately own that which we need to take.

**Property**

The second key principle around which capitalism is centered is the necessity of private ownership of capital and resources. Capital may be money, land, machinery, even labor. Resources are the inputs used in the production process. Thus, the key relationship between humans and non-humans under capitalism is that of ownership. This relationship, however, was not original to either Europe or America but was crafted to support the burgeoning capitalist system. In order to support a shift to private landownership, however, two things needed to happen. First the land and its attendant natural resources held in common needed to be placed in private hands, and second, private ownership needed to be justified philosophically in such a way that it could not be called into question. The latter requirement was fulfilled by both Locke and Kant, as described in Chapter 3. Both men began their "story" with the idea that land was held in common. For both, the management of these commons relied upon the altruism of humans. For both, society progressed by moving out of land held in common and moving into a more advanced—more equal for Locke, more human for Kant—space of private ownership. To be equal and human, we must own land and resources that we can use at will, to aid us in meeting our ends. In contemporary times, this philosophical basis is rooted in legal notions and in "empirical" evidence that land and resources cannot be effectively managed if held by everyone.
The former requirement was accomplished, at least in England, through Enclosure and continues to this day in the related notion and use of intellectual property rights.

**The History: Enclosing the Commons**

The story, for our purposes, of enclosing land began in the 1500s in England and lasted until at least 1914. During this time, referred to as "Enclosure," government policies exceptionalised private land ownership over the common rights of the people of England legally, by removing land from common use and placing it under the ownership of one individual, legally and literally by enclosing the land with hedges or ditches. There were two types of enclosure. The first was the enclosure of open and arable fields that surrounded villages. The second was the enclosure of "the commons and waste," which often were referred to simply as "wastes." Wastes were not actually "wastes" but were often wetlands that provided a plethora of food sources to those who shared them. Under enclosure, these wetlands often were drained and turned into dry land and planted in crops to be sold at market. Forests also were cleared and vegetation, often, again sources of food for a subsistence-based economy were replaced with crops to be sold at market.

The purpose of enclosure, ostensibly, was to consolidate land into large farms so to bring economies of scale, or commercial agriculture, to England, thus making farming both more efficient and more productive. Moreover, the "reclaiming" of the wastes meant an increase in arable land under regular cultivation. In short, enclosing land meant it could be put to more

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239. See Michael Williams, "The Enclosure and Reclamation of Waste Land in England and Wales in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 51 (1970). The belief, one that continues to this day, was that through technology, we could encourage greater production of food from the same acre of land, and private ownership supports this moral project of producing more to feed the world, or so the capitalist tale goes. Bacon’s Bensalem leaders surely were smiling on England.
profitable which meant increased production and increased supply of food sold to meet growing market demand. Subsistence farming gathering all but disappeared.

Enclosure had its critics, however, in 1833, Political Economist William Foster Lloyd, published his work, "On the Checks to Population," which argued that the grazing of common lands in medieval and post-medieval England resulted in the destruction of those resources. Lloyd’s essay supports a finding that when things—whether land or resources, like a plant genome—are held in common, individuals will not take the full burden of their adverse decisions, but will reap the full benefits of those decisions. Because "[p]rudence is a selfish virtue," if "the prudent man" has to decide what his conduct should be based on a comparison of present pleasure, which he gains the full force of, or future pain, which he shares with others, he will choose the pleasant pleasure. This is not the case, however, where an individual is solely subject to the full burdens and full benefits. In such a case, the individual will forego present benefits so that future benefits also may accrue.240

Lloyd uses the differences that he sees (his "empirical" evidence) between cattle grazing on enclosed land (land held in private ownership) and those grazing on common lands to support his argument. According to Lloyd, livestock on common lands are "puny and stunted" and the lands themselves are "bare-worn," where such is not the case with privately-held (enclosed) lands. He reasons that since the "point of saturation"—the point at which land can handle no more cattle—is no different from private land to common land—the difference must lie in what the cattle owner does about the saturation. Private landowners will not over-graze their land for it will immediately and directly hurt them. For those who use land in common, overgrazing will

occur because any detrimental effects from an individual’s actions will be shared by all in
common, thus minimizing the "pain" any single over-grazer feels. In other words, according to
Lloyd, when a resource is held in common "the motive for economy entirely vanishes," as
common land users have no incentive to protect and preserve the land, since they will receive
full benefits from not preserving it and will share the burdens of destruction with the community
at large.241

The Myth: The Necessity of Managing the Commons

In 1968, Ecologist Garrett Hardin wrote a paper entitled "The Tragedy of the Commons."
Hardin, indirectly in this work but more directly in others, used Lloyd’s work to support his
proposal for increased regulation and government management of natural resources held in
common. According to Hardin, humans are inherently selfish and will use resources held in
common to promote their own self-interests, caring little for the ultimate destruction of these
resources. In Hardin’s now famous and oft-repeated words,

the rational herdsman. . . is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.242

The idea that humans are unable to control their greed and maintain the common natural
resources of the world, which are often referred to as the "earth’s environmental heritage" or
natural commons and include water, air, organic and non-organic material, biodiversity, and

241. Ibid.

added.
genetic variability, is a common one held by many resource management professionals, economists, and academics. These commons are referred to as public goods. In response to the belief that commons must be privately owned, some of these public goods are held in a type of quasi-private ownership in that they are managed by local collectives and referred to as common-pool resources (CPRs). CPRs include land, buildings, "cultural heritage," parks and other natural areas that may or may not have public use rights. Commons, as it is used in this context, can be anything from a neighborhood-owned playground to "a protected cultural heritage maintained by indigenous peoples, to vast forests and natural wildlife reserve governed by its inhabitants." Presumably by "inhabitants," the author means humans.

Even those commons not protected as CPRs can be considered to be valuable, as discussed in the section above on market, as they are part of the "system earth." As Pluralist Development Economist Irene van Staveren contends, such resources are viewed as "our common heritage, and that of future generations, and of Earth itself; they are not owned by people. This recognition turns the environmental heritage into commons. Without this recognition, it is just nature." Thus, through its usefulness to humans, present and future, nature is removed from the environment and placed into a new space referred to as "the commons." Commons now become not only a place where all is "free," but it becomes a place where objects in the world that are useful to us reside. All other objects, those not useful to us,

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243. "Public goods" refers to those goods that are non-excludable, which is to say individuals cannot be prohibited from using the good, e.g., air, and non-rival: my use or consumption of the good will not impede another from using/consuming the same good. Another way to view non-rival goods is that adding one more person to those who may benefit from the good will not greatly increase the marginal cost of the good.

244. van Staveren, "Nature," 183.

245. Ibid., 184, emphasis added.
are simply "nature." Based on earlier discussions, only that which is useful receives value. Nature, then, becomes further removed from humans in that it now has even less value, if that is possible.

The notion of the commons remains strong in contemporary times and Hardin’s work has been characterized as seminal. The idea of the "Tragedy of the Commons," indeed the phrase itself, permeates academia, government agencies, and the general public. The contemporary "Economic Human" is a self-interested, profit-maximizing, autonomous individual who is unable to control his/her greed when standing face to face with common resources without some monitoring from others in a community or the government. Because these humans are rational, they will not damage that which is privately owned for fear they will not be able to achieve their ends and/or maximize their profits, which is the very definition of rational for the Economic Human. They have little or no compunction, however, when it comes to community resources.

Another story of the commons also plays a role in contemporary resource management paradigms. In the late 1960s, Maltese diplomat Arvid Pardo argued that the ocean floor specifically should be considered as part of the "Common Heritage of Mankind." This concept is used today and is the basis for the International Seabed Authority’s (ISA) work and claim to jurisdiction. Whether van Starven is referring to this particular concept in her work is not clear, but the idea remains the same: there are resources that humans want to use that no one currently owns but that are still important enough to be distinguished from "the rest of nature."

The Common Heritage of Mankind\textsuperscript{246} is generally thought to be rooted in the notion of \textit{res communis}, which holds that all humans (and only humans) are members of a large

\textsuperscript{246} As jarring as it may be, as recently as April of 2015, the ISA referred to the seabed as the "Common Heritage of Mankind." The name will be retained to reflect the organizations attachment to the notion.
community and the things of the world (res) cannot be appropriated by one single group or individual but must be made available for everyone. Therefore, we should all be able to use these resources with the limitation, which could have come directly from Kant’s Doctrine of Right, that we not interfere with someone else’s ability to use the same resource. Thus, all resources that are useful but not currently owned by someone are the Common Heritage of Mankind. Res communis is opposed to res nullis, which implies that the res is open and available for appropriation by anyone. Once someone appropriates the res, however, it is no longer available for use. In Lockean terms, once I mix my labor with a resource it is mine, for there was no prior owner.

The Error: The Commons as Free

The assumption perpetuated by the above notions of the commons is not only that humans are selfish but also that the commons belongs to no one but are free and open. In making this determination, the theories above assume that the resources are not currently "claimed" by others because there is no private property ownership visible. In large part, this is because the only way humans can have a relationship that involves management and control is through private ownership and private ownership looks a certain way. In the U.S. legal system, ownership is referred to as a "bundle of rights." The U.S. Supreme Court through a long line of cases, including Kaiser Aetna vs. the United States, which involved the dredging of the marina at Hawai‘i Kai, has held that there are essentially five distinct "sticks" in the property rights bundle:

right of possession, right of control, right of exclusion, right of enjoyment, and right of disposition. The commons—whether it be resources, property, or knowledge—are believed to have none of those rights, thus making them the very antithesis of private ownership.

Because the only viable relationship with land can be that of use and the only viable valuing of land is that of the market, a capitalist system fails to see that there are other ways to relate to the land, and, thus fails to see that the commons are not a free for all. Nor, in point of fact, do commons refer to only those objects that are useful to us. Political Scientist Susan Buck-Cox’s response to Hardin’s work and indigenous people of Moana Nui’s response to the ISA’s claim of the Common Heritage of Mankind will provide examples of alternative views of the commons.

Cox argues that Hardin’s Tragedy is based on a Tonypandy, which is something historically inaccurate but repeated so often it is taken to be true. The Commons simply were not "open to all" as Lloyd and Hardin describe. Instead, the Commons system was open to a few, usually as the result of a pre-private property rights or as payment for services rendered. These rights were considered an encumbrance upon the land and honored until Enclosure. The right of use likely predated the modern understanding of private property\textsuperscript{248} that arose in connection with the hegemony of capitalism. The "commons" system was, in short, part of the indigenous people of England’s right to the land.

Moreover, the Commons were not unregulated but were very much controlled by regulations agreed to by the community that shared the resources. Use of the Commons also was regulated by the very nature of at least one type of common use—the common appendant.

Common appendant rights opened the unused, usually the poorest, land of the manor to grazing during the summer months when the villagers’ fields were under cultivation. During the winter months, the villagers fed their livestock with the grains and hay grown in their fields in the summer months. The amount of livestock one could have was limited to how much food one could grow to feed that livestock over the winter months. Thus, there was a natural limitation to livestock grazing since one could not simply add more livestock if one had no way of feeding it during the winter months.  

That being said, there were problems with the system, but these arose often times because the wealthy manor owners or squatters over-grazed or when regulations in place governing the encumbrances went unenforced. Often times, the latter occurred to support Enclosure as a response to the failed Commons. The "puny livestock" that Lloyd referred to was empirically correct; however, the reason for the difference in livestock size was not the result of selfish humans. Lands that were enclosed were usually better lands and owners used improved methods of agriculture. In addition, selective breeding of farm animals began in earnest in 1760 and the result of such experiments meant that livestock were bigger. Lloyd was seeing almost 100 years of improved husbandry. Those animals living on enclosed lands no longer had to be moved, and nitrogen-fixing crops, such as clover, improved soils and increased the nutrient value of livestock feeds, thus increasing livestock size. This was not the case for cattle that shared the Commons, which did not actively participate in selective breeding and were required to continue to move for feed according to the seasons.

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Cox argues that the Commons were not a tragedy but were a great success story, providing a basis for communal living and land sharing for centuries. That they could not survive the onslaught of private property has less to do with the concept of communal management and more to do with the drive to acquire private property to fuel a growing capitalist economy. As Cox summarizes: "Since it seems quite likely if ‘economic man’ had been managing the commons that tragedy really would have occurred, perhaps someone else was running the common.”

The notion that resources are held in common because no one else owns them or manages them also is contested by the indigenous peoples of Moana Nui, who question the ISA’s jurisdiction over the seabed floor that is considered to be part of the Common Heritage of Mankind. Peoples of Moana Nui contend that these resources are not part of the Common Heritage of Mankind, rejecting that they are part of either res communis or res nullis because, while they do not own these resources, Moana Nui peoples have a relationship to these resources. That relationship, which in most cases is genealogical and which is maintained through cultural practices, removes these resources from the community of mankind and places them squarely within the "heritage” of the people of Moana Nui.

This notion of a genealogical and cultural relationship to the land is difficult for those raised under the principles of private ownership to comprehend, as demonstrated at a recent conference on Seabed Mining held at UH-Mānoa and sponsored by the ʻŌiwi Maoli indigenous group, KAHEA. During a roundtable discussion, a Moana Nui scholar rejected the idea that Moana Nui is the Common Heritage of Mankind and part of the res communis. A UH-Mānoa

250. Ibid., 60-61.
scientist working on seabed issues immediately responded: "Well, who owns the seabed?" When he was told no one owns Moana Nui, he then asked, "Who decides who gets to use the resources? Where does the boundary of your country end and theirs begin?" When he was told that everyone has a relationship to the resources that includes use and that there were no boundaries, he then stated both with incredulity and dismay: "You mean you claim the entire ocean?" When the answer was affirmative, he shook his head and changed the subject. The point of this story is not to criticize the scientist but to demonstrate what happens when two very different views of the relationship one can have both to nature, in this case the ocean, and to the community meet head-on.

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

The idea of private ownership of land and resources standing opposed to a Commons contributes to the assumptions and implications at issue in this critical narrative genealogy. First, the idea of private ownership and control solidifies the divide between subject and object. We control and own the means (nature) to our human ends. We do not own and control the human ends themselves, for, to use Kant’s arguments, human ends have dignity and by their very nature as free and autonomous cannot be owned (C2’). Second, this project of ownership is a moral one, as the predominant story is told since the more we control nature the better we can minimize its vagaries. Excepting (or ignoring) the dust bowl and other horrors, private ownership, as was seen during Enclosure, enables the owner to use technology and science to increase production and yields. Enclosure took "wasted" land held in common and turned it into useful land for the benefit of all. It did this through the tool of private ownership. Thus, private ownership benefits humanity in that it ensures land is put to its best and highest use. As such, both science and
capitalism become mutually reinforcing and key to the moral project of benefiting humanity (C1’).

Moreover, private ownership necessitated by capitalism tames the selfish beast that is the human. In Hardin’s words, “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” and, therefore, we must find a way to manage effectively that part of us that results in this ruin. Rather than fighting our natural tendencies to maximize our self-interests at the expense of others, the narrative holds that private ownership mitigates that desire by ensuring humans feel the full brunt of both benefits and burdens. Private ownership makes us better humans and more responsible members of a community.

**Intellectual Property**

**The History**

While property and markets are key to capitalism, another form of property plays a key role both in the context of the kalo controversy and in the capitalism in general. Intellectual property, which is the realm where science and markets meet, is the notion that certain ideas should be protected by law. This protection comes in the form of property rights over certain individual intellectual creations. Such rights can include the right to exclude, the right to share, and the right to give away. The key here is that one person has the right to determine who can use and how something he/she "created" is used, at least for a limited amount of time. This concept reflects a Lockean251 view of labor as the determining factor in ownership coupled with a capitalist notion of monopoly and a Kantian view of commodification.

251. See also Lander, "Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges."
Protection for intellectual creations was first officially promulgated in the United States around 1788 with the adoption of Article I Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which states that "The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."252 That being said, since about the time of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), the notion that intellectual property rights, which create a de facto monopoly for the creator, should be extended seemed to fly in the face of the idea of open market competition.253 This all changed with the advent of the computer and high-tech industry, including patenting of seeds and plants, that many saw as the future of the U.S. economy. As a result, International Political Economist Susan K. Sell argues that a number of U.S. businesses, including Monsanto, pressured the U.S. Government to lobby for expanded intellectual property protections in the form of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property or TRIPs Agreement, that was negotiated as one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) side agreements in 1994.254 During both the TRIPS and NAFTA negotiations, the arguments made centered on the idea that in order for U.S. companies to remain competitive, which is to say maintain their market share, their inventions must be protected and notorious infringers must be punished for the economic health of the nation.


254. Sell, Private Property, 1.
There are many types of intellectual property protections available for the would-be inventor and creator; however, the one relevant to the kalo controversy is that of a patent. A patent is a grant given by the government to the inventor for the invention of or the "discovery of any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." Thus, items which are "new and useful" may be patented. The newness or novelty of a thing is an important benchmark for the issuance of a patent. Even new inventions might not be patentable if the difference between that which is new and that which has already been known "is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent." Up until 1980, whether a plant could be patented was unclear. In the seminal case, *Diamond v. Chakrabarty*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that patent laws applied to plants. The Court argued that while "Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope," it also recognized that there was a difference between "products of nature" and "human-made inventions." However, that difference was not rooted in whether the end "invention" or "product" was living or inanimate. Echoes of both Locke and Kant can be heard in the court’s ruling, whether or not that was the intention. For, the distinction between that which is deserving of patent protection and that which is not rests in a determination of whether an individual mixed a sufficient amount of his/her labor with nature in order to create something

255. 35 U.S. Code § 101.


that was sufficiently new. Accordingly, laws of nature, the way plants appear in nature, and abstract ideas about such laws cannot be patented.\textsuperscript{258}

The second requirement for a patent is that it be useful, which is derived from the U.S. Constitution’s wording "useful arts." What was meant by "useful arts" and what is currently meant by "useful" is not entirely clear, although one may recall Bacon’s use of the term by the leader of Bensalem in describing the work done in that country to control nature. While the U.S. Supreme Court has used the term "useful arts" repeatedly, they have rarely defined it. The first attempt came some 100 years after the adoption of Clause 8, in \textit{The Telephone Cases}, where the U.S. Supreme court found that only those "arts which may be used to some advantage" can be protected.\textsuperscript{259} Almost one hundred years later, in \textit{Nelson v. Bowler}, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found that "[p]ractical utility is a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter," which is to say, according to the court, that the invention or discovery can be used in some way that "provides some immediate benefit to the public."\textsuperscript{260} This requirement does mean that the patent applicant must demonstrate that the benefit is credible and not so hypothetical as to be merely whimsical, which is to say, there has to be some evidence that the thing in question can be produced and will have the attributes alleged. Generally "useful" has not been taken to mean commercial usefulness or viability. Many an inventor has patented an invention that consumers will never see. However, there have been calls to narrow the notion of "usefulness" to require a demonstration of commercial viability before issuance of a patent.\textsuperscript{261}


\textsuperscript{259} \textit{The Telephone Cases}, 126 U.S. 1, 533 (S. Ct. U.S. 1888).


The Error: The Knowledge Commons as Free

As with land and resources, there also exists a knowledge or intellectual commons. Indigenous knowledge is the *res* of this commons, which is seen as the product of centuries of culture and tradition. Often this knowledge is oral in nature and reflects continued modifications and innovations of the lived experiences of the people who share it. As with the natural commons and the Common Heritage of Mankind, the content of the knowledge commons is seen as free and available to all. Knowledge, like land, can be removed from the commons through ownership, which in the case of knowledge is intellectual property protections which grant ownership and control to an individual. Relatedly, it is individual labor that gives rise to ownership, not communal labor. Intellectual property, one specific kind of ownership, also deepens this notion of what the appropriate or at least meaningful labor is. As discussed above, intellectual property only covers individual discoveries and does not include communal creations. The only human that is recognized is an individual human, free from community attachments.

One of the consequences of this view is that the many indigenous communities that have collective and communal epistemologies and knowledge bases are on the outside of the ownership regime. Because the precise author and the precise moment of invention, both requirements for the Western intellectual property protection, are difficult if not impossible to

262. There are a host of incidents where indigenous knowledge, whether it be the acai berry or indigenous music, has been used by Western companies to achieve market advantage, often to the economic harm of the indigenous people whose knowledge was "borrowed." For example, Enigma’s "Return to Innocence," used Ami traditional music, in fact, two specific singers, without notice, compensation, or attribution. See also, the 2003 Paoakalani Declaration, a statement resulting from the "Hawaiian Intellectual Property Rights Conference," sets out the organizers’ response to the threat of capitalism ("theft") to their traditional knowledge. The declaration attributes the exploitation of their collective knowledge and conversion of that knowledge and property into individual property owned by others to "state and national governments, international agencies, private corporations, academic institutions and associated research corporations." *Paoakalani Declaration*, "Preamble."
pinpoint, indigenous knowledges do not count as "owned," but are free for the taking.\footnote{Lander, "Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges," 259.} The new "America" that all the world is can be found in the wealth of indigenous knowledge, which is free and open for anyone to mix their labor with and own. Tellingly, such knowledge is considered to be commons, for all to use.

Like the commons that contain land and resources, the idea that knowledge commons are free and open for the taking is rooted in a philosophical construct that holds only individuals may know, may labor, and, consequently, may own the products of their intellectual labor. Moreover, as with land and resources, only that which is useful is considered valuable and whenever possible, the commons must be placed into private control or else the selfish humans will take the knowledge and use it for their own purposes. This mentality, and one reflected in CTAHR’s concern for market share, is that we must protect knowledge lest someone else, not us, use it to their benefit and our detriment. Knowledge is power in a highly competitive and individualistic world.

As with land and resource commons, knowledge commons do not stand as the antithesis of intellectual property; knowledge commons are not unregulated and free and open to all. An example of this is ʻike (knowledge) in the ʻOlelo ʻŌiwi tradition. According to Historian and ʻŌiwi Maoli scholar, Kanalu G. Terry Young, ʻike is shared as it is passed, through practice, from one generation to the next.\footnote{Young, Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past, 13.} Notably, Young does not contend that this knowledge is available for anyone to appropriate, but is limited to those in the community. Even within the community, knowledge access is limited, as expert knowledge is reserved for those who show themselves worthy, and given only after a commitment to the perpetuation of the skill is evident.
Young also argues that some knowledge is simply inaccessible to non-ʻŌiwi Maoli, regardless of how committed they may be. Young argues that without the requisite perspective of an ʻŌiwi Maoli, even though there may be some who, through their study of the language and work with ʻŌiwi Maoli can both receive and, in Young’s words, be "nurtured by" ʻike, they will not be ʻŌiwi Maoli. Some doors or "trails" to use Young’s metaphor, will be opened, but not all and not all deeply.

These points are important and in many ways return us to the concerns raised in Chapter 2 over the notion of a fusion philosophy that sees all the world as open to appropriation. Instead, the Commons, in the context of knowledge, are created, maintained, and cared for by a people. The problem arises in a capitalist context because of a failure to see the rights of those people to that knowledge because unless one has property rights, one cannot manage and control. Just as there can be no other relationship to the earth than that of ownership, there can be no other relationship to knowledge than that of an individual to his/her labor.

While the United States continues to both teach and base its resource management policies off of Hardin’s "Tragedy of the Commons," accepting its conclusion as axiomatic, the international community, particularly the United Nations, continues to call for greater use of (necessitating respect for) what is commonly called Indigenous Knowledge (IK) or Indigenous Environmental (sometimes "Ecological") Knowledge (IEK). The UN repeatedly recognizes in its policy reports and directives that indigenous communities, when not colonized and when functioning outside of the pressures of global markets, tend to be more sustainable and are a valuable resource for methods to better and more sustainably use resources. Notably, many of

265. Ibid.
these traditional systems hold land in common and do not use a capitalist notion of ownership.

Almost as often as it promotes the use of IEK, the UN laments the lack of progress in respectfully engaging with the knowledge source. This resistance is due in part to a belief that while IEK may complement scientific knowledge, it can never replace or supplant that knowledge.266 The resistance also likely is due to a resistance on the part of capitalist countries to release their commitment to privately owned land and intellectual property rights.

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

Intellectual property combines both the elements of property and market and applies them to the rather nebulous realm of knowledge. Value, which again is the amount one can garner on the market, occurs when an individual human mixes his/her labor with nature and then seeks protection to exclude others. Only when an individual uses his/her knowledge can there be ownership and protection. That this intellectual property protection is applied for and received by those involved in science and technology further links science with capitalism. Good science is that which results in a protectable piece of intellectual property, the rights to which can be used to bargain for increased market share. What is useful to science is what is market viable.

Importantly, just as enclosure both fenced in the commons, removing it from the use of those who had ancestral, pre-property rights to it, and commoditized it, so too do intellectual property rights act as another form of enclosure, removing knowledge from access by everyone and commoditizing it.267 Again, thinking about the kalo controversy, one of the issues raised and

266. For examples, see the UN Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous People’s Issues, “Thematic Paper towards the preparation of the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous Peoples,” and the UN Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.

apparently ignored was the requirement that kalo mahiʻai would pay royalties, the prohibition on huli (the taro top, used for planting), and the necessity of open access to farms under the licensing agreement for the new kalo strain. From an ʻŌiwi Maoli point of view, taking a plant that ʻŌiwi Maoli created, slapping a patent on it, and barring the very creators from using it unless they pay for it, limit access to it, and prohibit sharing, all traditional aspects of kalo production, removes intellectual property rights from the control ʻŌiwi Maoli.

III.

Deepened Assumptions and Implications

The assumptions and implications that began this exploration, as outlined in Chapter 2, have been deepened by the influence of the social force of capitalism. Part of that deepening is a folding of the implications into the assumptions. As such, implications, or operationalized assumptions, will be listed within their related assumptions.

Deepened Assumption C1': Science and capitalism are axiomatically moral (C1')

As discussed in Chapter 2, CTAHR’s first assumption was that because the purpose of science is to benefit humanity, and because benefiting humanity is what it means to be moral, science is axiomatically moral. This assumption was further solidified in Chapter 3 with the demonstration that both Newton and Descartes soundly grounded their projects in the morality of benefiting humans. In this chapter, we see that the mixing of science in the capitalist project deepens the assumption so that it now includes capitalism as axiomatically moral.

Shiva, supporting this reading, contends that the focus on progress, science, and development so evident today is the result of the rise of what she refers to as "the sacredness of two categories: modern scientific knowledge and economic development." As a result, today we
see a focus on progress, science, and development\(^{268}\) steeped in an assumption of moral superiority and righteousness that further validates the notion of paternalism. Implication 6, which held that paternalism is mandated, now becomes firmly rooted in the moral project of science and capitalism. The mixing of capitalism with science will enable those who are less well off to achieve the same level of modernization and wealth as those more developed countries. We can all be equal (because we all can labor and are all human and have autonomy), but only if we rely upon capitalism, which provides an avenue for us to use our labor, exercise our autonomy, and control the flow of environmental goods and services.

Notably, this new deepened assumption also incorporates the implication that the projects of science cannot be questioned by extending that same prohibition to capitalism. In order for us to progress, we must adopt the above understanding of capitalism and science, and these two projects cannot be questioned (I1\(^{'}\)). No other view allows us to be fully Human (Kant). And we must go out and proselytize. Paternalism is mandated for those who, like ‘Ōiwi Maoli are too rooted in backwards traditions (I6\(^{'}\)). Our goal as moral beings is to help even those who fail to see the benefits of our way of viewing the world.

Capitalism and science are axiomatically moral for the further reason that when joined together, the result is a rational human who can control nature and is able to "banish all those medievalisms that had held humanity back for so long: superstition, mysticism, metaphysics, and the belief in vitalistic, non-physical, non-chemical forces."\(^{269}\) This notion that science and capitalism will not only propel us forward but save us from slipping backward can be found in the March 2009 CTAHR Background Paper, "CTAHR and Taro," which identified those who

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opposed the kalo patents on the basis of a concept of organic nature as anti-progress and anti-science. Progress, then, comes to be inextricably linked to the moral project of science and capitalism, while all other views of the world come to be linked with anti-progress, superstition, and primitiveness. Thus, capitalism and its attendant private ownership of resources and property is a moral project designed to help all of humanity. From Enclosure to Monsanto’s proprietary and patented Round-up Ready soybeans, private property aids science in its mission of aiding humanity. This mission is axiomatically moral, as are the methods and projects it chooses.

What enables this progress and allows for axiomatic morality, drawing upon Bacon, is a revised scientific method whose focus remains on objectivity but expands to include a new type of rational knower. Implication I2 operationalized science as a moral project by exceptionalising the scientific method. After Chapter 3, this implication deepened and the scientific method came to include a single, disembodied individual. After the influence of capitalism, this implication is further deepened to now read that the exceptionalised knower is an individual who is disembodied and rational in a certain specific way.

The rational human, or the economic human under the influence of capitalism, is a self-interested, profit-maximizing entity whose selfishness is kept in check by private ownership and market forces. Those who are not self-interested and profit-maximizing are not seen as using their reason. Kant’s Juridical Postulate of Practical Reason supports this idea that what it means to be human is to own objects, and to recognize the right of others to do so, in order to achieve their ends. Reason becomes that which an economic human does in a capitalist system rooted in private ownership.
Plumwood argues that the disembodied reason that so characterizes Western culture continues to maintain a hierarchical distinction between humans and nature. Moreover, because we think, as did some during the Enlightenment, that those of us with a certain type of reason are superior to others, we fail to not only recognize the damage we do, for how can "progress" damage?, but also we fail to provide non-human others with access to the goods they need to survive in the world.

A third and final deepened implication related to the notion that science is a moral project is the implication that private knowledge is the only knowledge with value (I3′). This implication began with the notion that only empirically verifiable knowledge or objective knowledge has import. Augmented by Plato, Bacon, and Descartes and further deepened by capitalism, this implication changes into the notion that only that knowledge which is worthy of protection—knowledge that an individual has—has value.

As noted earlier, knowledge is acquired by an individual, and in the kalo controversy, the relevant knowledge type is one that is acquired by an individual working with an object to benefit subjects. Since the only way to value an item is on the market, only that knowledge which is protected by intellectual property, i.e., that knowledge which is owned, can be sold and exchanged on the market, is valuable. This stands in sharp contrast to Ōiwi Maoli traditions that will hold knowledge is accumulated across people (space) and time and who work with nature for the benefit of both people and nature—there is no split.

As a result, communal ways of knowing, including traditional ways of selecting, breeding, and crafting new species, for example, are not really "knowing" at all, and can either be appropriated without impunity or ignored completely. Only creations carried out by an
individual and using the scientific method in controlled conditions can count as knowledge.\footnote{270} Moreover, only knowledge that is so carried out can be protected, and only protected knowledge can be bought and sold on the market and have value. What is knowledge now becomes that which is market viable, which is to say, privately owned.

Not only, however, is it communal ways of working and communal ways of knowing that are not "seen" as valid, but communal ways of owning are simply bad for everyone. Capitalism teaches us that because humans are self-interested and profit-maximizing, they cannot be trusted to share communally in resources in any self-sustaining way. The only way to control the economic human is to allow for private ownership. Tellingly, however, the one thing that justifies private ownership is the economic man. Privileging begets the exceptionalised.

Deepened Assumption C2‘: Subject/Object Dualism (C2’)

The original CTAHR Assumption 2 held that nature was a machine. All of the thinkers in Chapter 3 aided in shifting this notion. While retaining much of the original idea that nature is a machine, the assumption morphed into the idea that nature is an object, that is machine-like in nature. This object nature stands opposed to the subject human, which has not only agency but action. Humans have souls and minds and are the ones that control nature. Under the social forces of capitalism, this revised understanding of the subject/object divide combines with the notion that humans are exceptionalised. The result is an even firmer divide between nature and humans that makes it impossible to see the world, such as nature and knowledge, as anything other than an object that can be owned, which is to say an object over which we can exert property rights.

\footnote{270} Lander, "Eurocentricism, Modern Knowledges," 260
The primary contribution capitalism makes to this deepened assumption is commodification. Plumwood argues that this hierarchical, polarizing, and deeply metaphysical dualism between person and that which a person owns is "basic to the commodification of nature." The commodification of nature, in turn, is basic to the capitalist project, which demands that there be interchangeable inputs that can be used to produce goods to meet human demands a.k.a. ends. Indeed, it is commodities that in Kant’s terms have a price and are substitutable. In a recurring theme, the goal of science becomes ensuring that technology will always be there to find some substitutable good for a commodity we have used up. Nature, as a machine, can be rebuilt in new and different ways to serve us better through our science and scientific method.

This scientific method that views nature as machine-like, which is reducible for independent study, fits nicely with the capitalist notions that nature is something that can be bought and sold as inputs to the manufacturing process. Inputs need to be a different metaphysical thing than say, labor, which comes from humans. Humans have the freedom to sell that which is theirs. But nature’s resources or inputs needed to be accessible to all. Nature could not own her resources if we are to accept the notion that it is accessible to all. This idea is supported by the lexicon of economics, which refers to nature as an "ecological flow" or an "environmental service" that exists to detoxify and clean our wastes, among other things. With the help of Kant, we are irrevocably separated and fundamentally different from nature, which we can buy and sell, and which exists to service our ends.

272. Ibid., 26-27.
In this service, the assumptions come to subsume Implication 4 that humans are exceptionalised. Capitalism sees nature as there for our use. Under capitalism, the division between the human (subject) and nature (object) becomes insurmountable. As such, there is only one way to relate to nature and that is as a subject with intrinsic value to an object that has only instrumental value, and, in the context of capitalism, exchange value. The difference is both metaphysical, as the difference between a knowing, agentic, live subject and a known, passive, dead object, and axiological, as the difference, as demonstrated above, is rooted in value.

The intellectual property regime solidifies this concept. That which is patented is owned, which is to say all of the bundle of rights given to property (land) holders are given to those who patent an item. This position assumes that the invention in question is of a metaphysical nature where ownership is valid. In Kant’s terms, the implication is that thing which is owned has only the value humans give it. This implication is operationalized in the requirement that things created be useful; no use, no value. While this may seem viable for human-made materials, it continues the assumption that nature is a machine and supports the implication that nature only has human-ascribed value. As noted above, this must be the scheme we use, for items that have intrinsic value are not to be owned. The notion is self-perpetuating: that which we create is owned by us and has only the value we give it; value is given by us to things we own. Thus, this assumption further deepens the assumption that nature only has the value given to it by the market (I5’). Moreover, only that part of nature which is useful to us is considered the "commons" and considered accessible to us. The rest is "just nature." This valuing is not a bad thing, since only that which has a market value can be protected from degradation. Central to our
relationship then to those things which we use to meet our ends is the notion that those things have value to us as dictated and demonstrated by the market.

VI.

Chapter Summary and Transition

Capitalism, the social force this genealogy focuses upon, both deepens and thickens the assumptions and implications from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Not only is science a moral project, but so too is capitalism, which, when working hand and hand with science, will help people progress and develop, so long as they choose a certain economic model. This project should not be questioned, for the improvement of the human condition, whether that be through better disease control or seeds that produce more crops per acre, or the preservation of the kalo genome, is always morally good. In addition, in the world that we know, humans are self-interested profit-maximizing beings, and the best way to progress is to harness that self-interestedness through private ownership. Intellectual property protection is a perfect example of how enticing individuals to create through the promise of monopoly-causing economic benefits will result in better technology and a better world.

Markets, the lynchpin of capitalism, will eventually correct themselves, offering the best solution for economic stability and the truest indicator of value. Market players act rationally, which is to say that market players will act in such a way as to maximize their profit or, in non-economic terms, their own self-interests. This commitment to the market and its rational players means that we must continue to maintain markets, which is to say, we must continue to exert private property rights over objects so that they can be bought and sold as opposed to simply
given away. This commitment also means that we do not question whether individuals will act in any way other than their own self–interest, for to do otherwise is to act irrationally.

The positioning of the human and what it means for the human-nature relationship described above stands in sharp contrast to that of the ʻŌiwi Maoli, who will argue that it is precisely their embeddedness and dependence upon others, including the ʻāina, that places demands upon them (kuleana) and necessitates certain moral and socio/political actions (pono) in the care of that relationship (mālama). Chapter 6 explores this relationship of Mālama ʻĀina and the clash that occurred as a result of two different metaphysical views of the world.
Chapter 5

Ka Moʻokūʻauhau

‘Aʻohe ola o ka ʻāina i ke aliʻi haipule ʻole.

--ʻŌlelo Noʻeau No. 198

Hānau ka ʻāina, hānau ke aliʻi, hānau ke kanaka.

--ʻŌlelo Noʻeau No. 466

He Aliʻi ka ʻĀina, he Kauwā ke Kanaka.

--ʻŌlelo Noʻeau No. 531

Science has developed a way of looking at the world and being in the world which is not the way indigenous people view the way we are in the world.

--Lorna Williams

**Introduction and Chapter Goals**

ʻŌiwi Maoli arrived at the kalo controversy not only with the critical narrative genealogy explored in Chapters 2 and 3 that they share with CTAHR by virtue of being educated in a Western system and living in a capitalist society, but also with another critical narrative genealogy. This second critical narrative genealogy is one they do not share, but is a reaction to as well as against that of CTAHR in general, and the two primary assumptions of CTAHR that science and capitalism are axiomatically moral projects and there is a hierarchical dualism between subject and object. A key part of the ʻŌiwi Maoli response was its own cosmogenic genealogy, which mandates ethical obligations and responsibilities to the land. For the ʻŌiwi

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273. Ancestral genealogy of an ʻŌiwi Maoli.
274. "The land cannot live under an irreligious chief."
275. "The land, the chiefs, and the commoners belong together."
276. "The Land is a Chief, Man is its Servant."
Maoli, activism is both an action-based response to the critical narrative genealogy of CTAHR and a way of cultivating their own moʻolelo and creating their own contingent present. To that end, it is both a cosmogenic genealogy (axiology) and land-based activism (praxis) that must be explored by a critical narrative genealogy in order to understand better ‘Ōiwi Maoli assumptions (OM).

This chapter explores that narrative by delving into the notion of Mālama ʻĀina as it evolved in the context of colonization and continued occupation. Whereas the end result of CTAHR’s narrative genealogy is a world of two metaphysical things—a subject which owns and objects that are owned—for ‘Ōiwi Maoli, the end result of their narrative genealogy, woven through with ethical values, is that nature and non-human others, the ʻāina, are not two separate metaphysical entities, but one among many, all solidly within the realm of moral considerability. These assumptions are as follows:

- ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumption 1 (OM1): Science and capitalism (both as defined in the Enlightenment context of Chapters 2 and 3) are not axiomatically moral, as there are multiple ways to view and explore the world, including one that sees humans as dependent upon their environment;
- ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumption 2 (OM2): Nature is a subject in that it is the older brother of ʻŌiwi Maoli, and therefore has intrinsic value, and demands and is entitled to receive a certain level of care.

Thus, for ʻŌiwi Maoli, all things have intrinsic value and are part of an interconnected shared relationship revealed in an ancestral genealogy. Moreover, the way to care for that relationship, since all relationships worth their while need care, is to behave in a pono manner. This pono
manner is not the following of a set series of rules. The ‘Ōiwi Maoli cannot and do not pretend that they can simply return to the times of old and pick up resource management practices. They recognize that they must address the care of the ʻāina in the context of the contingent present.

The methodology in this chapter is slightly different than that of the prior two, and some philosophers may find this chapter lacking important philosophical elements. It may come across as "preachy" or simply a regurgitation of what other scholars have said. To some extent, both these criticisms are valid. While this chapter continues to use the critical narrative genealogy, its primary purpose is to reveal and expose. To do this, I rely upon the spoken voice of ‘Ōiwi Maoli. There are two reasons for this. The first borrows from the recognition in feminist philosophy that women must be the ones to elucidate the theory of themselves. As Political Scientist and Feminist Kathy Ferguson writes: "Efforts to give voice to a women's perspective sometimes emphasize the need to speak with and listen to women, and other times go on to call on women's perspective to provide direction for political change."277 In other words, it is women who must revel and expose their experiences, through their voices. So too, should it be ‘Ōiwi Maoli who step into any critical space and elucidate a theory of themselves. It should be ‘Ōiwi Maoli voices who use a critical narrative genealogy to unearth whatever is hidden within their own contingent present, not a member of the colonizing and occupying class.

All this being said, I do acknowledge Young’s concern with ‘Ōiwi Maoli using a non-ʻŌiwi Maoli analytical tool, such as Foucault’s genealogy, to analyze ‘Ōiwi Maoli philosophy.278 I also acknowledge his argument for the limitations of non-ʻŌiwi Maoli in understanding the traditions, as discussed in Chapter 4. While not perfect, the hope is that by using the voices of

277. Ferguson, "Interpretation and Genealogy in Feminism," 333.
278. Young, Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past, 15-17.
ʻŌiwi Maoli to the extent possible and in the spirit of respect, at least some of Young’s concerns would be alleviated.

The second reason for my reliance relates to a concept coined by Indigenous scholar Scott Richard Lyons called "rhetorical sovereignty." Rhetorical sovereignty describes "the inherent right and ability of peoples to determine their own communicative needs and desires . . . , to decide for themselves the goals, modes, styles, and languages of public discourse." Lyons contrasts rhetorical sovereignty with "rhetorical imperialism," which attempts to set "the terms of the debate," by determining how and what will be discussed and mandating this discussion occur in certain ways.279 Rhetorical sovereignty demands that it be the voice of the colonized that sets the terms of the debate. Looking at the rhetoric of indigenous people will more accurately reflect how those peoples have responded to imperialism, and importantly for this work, can counter the exceptionalising of the Anglo-Saxon/European/Western world views.280

As such, allowing ʻŌiwi Maoli to speak of their tradition aids in the goal of a critical narrative genealogy to reveal or shed light on dissonance. Under the assumptions of rhetorical sovereignty and rhetorical imperialism, the views or terms used will be different. Accordingly, the ʻŌiwi Maoli voice, like their activism (as we shall see) forces non-ʻŌiwi Maoli to explore more deeply our own concepts and theories. As Foucault argues, the purpose of a genealogy is not to "discover the roots of our identity. . . . It does not seek to define our unique threshold of


emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; *it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us.*

The following then reports on an understanding of Mālama ʻĀina as an ethical obligation rooted in the ʻŌiwi Maoli’s ancestral genealogy as well as the development of Mālama ʻĀina as influenced by ʻŌiwi Maoli ʻāina-centered activism in Hawaiʻi. Arguably, all ʻŌiwi Maoli activism in Hawaiʻi is ʻāina-centered, since as will be discussed, ʻāin—its care, management, and control—is an integral and inseparable part of ʻŌiwi Maoli identity. The final section of the chapter re-examines the kalo controversy as a clash of two narrative genealogies: that of CTAHR and that of the ʻŌiwi Maoli.

### I. Axiology

As noted in the introduction, there are two pieces of the ʻŌiwi Maoli critical narrative genealogy that contribute to the formulation of the assumptions that both initiated and fueled their opposition to the patenting of kalo. The first piece can be referred to as an "axiology," and is meant in the traditional philosophical sense of the word as the study of what is good and what has moral value. In this section, the dissertation will explore the foundations of the ʻŌiwi Maoli ethical obligations to the ʻāina.

*Cosmogenic Genealogy: The Kumulipo*

The beginning of the axiology for ʻŌiwi Maoli, indeed, the beginning of all things for ʻŌiwi Maoli, is the 2102 line cosmogenic genealogy, the Kumulipo. According to Indigenous scholar Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, the Kumulipo is key to understanding the ʻŌiwi Maoli world

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view, including their cultural practices and patterns and their relationships with all things in the world.

The Kumulipo sets out the connection of the high-ranking chief to the entirety of the world, from the very beginning, to the time he was born. In this way, the Kumulipo establishes both the identity of ʻŌiwi Maoli and their relationship to the rest of the world. As ʻŌiwi scholar Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa explains,

Hawaiian identity is, in fact, derived from the Kumulipo, the great cosmogonic genealogy. Its essential lesson is that every aspect of the Hawaiian conception of the world is related by birth, and as such, all parts of the Hawaiian world are one indivisible lineage. Conceived in this way, the genealogy of the Land, the Gods, Chiefs, and people intertwine with one another, and with all the myriad aspects of the universe.

Notably, genealogies in general are important as they connect present to past, carry mana from one generation to the next, and are "the history of the Hawaiian people." In Kameʻeleihiwa’s words, "genealogies are the Hawaiian concept of time, and they order the space around us."

The order of that space is not one of discrete entities, nor are things in the world related through punishment, as is the Platonic sense; rather, all things on earth and in the sea are related to one another through their pairing in the Kumulipo. To begin with, all things come from the same place:

At the time of changing the earth was hot

At the time of changing, the heavens unfolded

283. Ibid., 2.
284. Ibid., 19-21
At the time when the sun appeared in shadows

Causing the moon to shine

At the time when the Pleiades were seen in the night

It is the slime that establishes the earth

At the beginning of the deep darkness, darkening

At the beginning of the night, only night

In the unfathomable darkness, dark blue and bottomless

In the darkness of the sun, in the endless night

Indeed it was only night

The night gave birth

Kumulipo [foundation of darkness] was born in the night, a male

Pōʻele [the dark night] was born in the night, a female . . .

From this point the chant progresses to name all things on earth and in the sea, listed in pairs. Some of these pairs bear similar names, and at least in Indigenous scholar Rubellite Kawena Johnson’s version one species watches over or is "kept" by the other. Examples of this relationship between sea and land plants are: "Born the Kakalama seaweed; Living in the sea. Kept by the moamoa plant; Living on land (lines 71–72). This relationship between land and sea continues, and sea animals are linked to land life. For example, "Born the ‘o‘opu living in the sea; Kept by the fresh-water goby, living on land" (lines 191–192) or "Born the sperm whale living in the sea; kept by the sandalwood living on land." (lines 253–254).  

The last part of the Kumulipo lists the major genealogies of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. Included in this list is Hāloa, whose story was originally told in the first chapter of this dissertation. In brief, Papa (the Earth Mother) and Wākea (the Sky Father), the parents of the islands of Hawaiʻi and Maui and the ancestors of the nation of Hawaiʻi, had a daughter, Hoʻohōkūkalani (to generate stars in the sky). Wākea seduced Hoʻohōkūkalani and the couple’s first child was born prematurely. The couple named the child "Hāloa-naka (quivering long stalk)" and from the spot where he was buried came the first kalo plant. The couple’s second child, whom they called Hāloa in honor of his older brother, "was the first Hawaiian Aliʻi Nui and became the ancestor of all the Hawaiian people." Thus, all things—subject and object, humans and non-humans, plants and gods—are linked in the ʻŌiwi Maoli understanding of the world. This linkage arising from the genealogy set out in the Kumulipo is the basis of the ethical obligations ʻŌiwi Maoli owe to the ʻāina.

*Moral Obligations to Mālama ʻĀina*

Mālama ʻĀina (or Aloha ʻĀina, as it is sometimes referred to) is the reciprocal relationship of care that arises from a sibling relationship as set forth in the Kumulipo and the story of Hāloa. While Mālama ʻĀina may incorporate resource management techniques, at its root, it is an environmental ethic whose normative duties and obligations stem from reciprocal relationships between ʻŌiwi Maoli and the ʻāina rooted in a shared ancestral genealogy.

To understand Mālama ʻĀina, we should begin with the term ʻāina. ʻĀina was described in *Native Hawaiian Planters*, a study of agricultural and land practices in Hawaiʻi by cultural expert Mary Kawena Pukui, E.S. Craighill Handy, and Elizabeth Green Handy, as follows:

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183
ʻĀina also conveys the sense of arable land. It is essentially a term coined by an agricultural people, deriving as it does from the noun or verb ʻai, meaning food or to eat, with the substantive na added, so that it may be rendered either "that which feeds" or "the feeder." ʻĀina thus has connotations in relation to people as conveying the sense of "feeder," birthplace, and homeland. 287

ʻŌiwi scholar kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui argues that this definition does not capture the complexity of the term ʻāina, noting that the root word for ʻāina, ʻai, means food, especially fruits and vegetables, but also means "to rule, as over land or people," and to eat. This root word also is related to "ai (sexual reproduction), aina (sexual intercourse), and ʻaina (meal)" as well as ʻāina (land). This interconnection means the relationship between humans and ʻāina is more intertwined than what the above might imply. 288 Moreover, included in the notion of ʻāina are almost all the environments in Hawaiʻi, from ocean to mountaintops, as the meaning of "to feed" is not limited to humans. 289

ʻĀina also provides identity and connection. This connection, arising out of the Kumulipo and individual family genealogies, is linked to the idea that land and nature are members of the ʻŌiwi Maoli extended family and are loved and revered. 290 Edward Kanahele, long-time ʻŌiwi scholar, describes this connection and locus of identity as follows:

As a Native Hawaiian, a place tells me who I am and who my extended family is. A place gives me my history, the history of my clan, and the history of my people. I am able to

288. hoʻomanawanui, "ʻThis Land is Your Land, This Land Was My Land," 150.
289. Ibid., 124.
look at a place and tie in human events that affect me and my loved ones. A place gives me a feeling of stability and of belonging to my family. Those living and dead. A place gives me a sense of well-being and of acceptance of all who have experienced that place. Terms used to identify ‘Ōiwi Maoli also reveal the connection between place and person. For example, "maka‘āinana" refers to those who work the land or watch (maka) the land. Kama‘āina refers to those who are born on the land; thus, despite contemporary use of the term by businesses to promote their goods and services, no non-ʻŌiwi Maoli can ever be kama‘āina. The word "papa" refers to "one who is Native born, ‘especially for several generations’." Papa also is the short-hand term for the Earth Mother and grandmother to Hāloa, Papahānaumoku.

More specific to the focus of this dissertation, Native Planters notes the connection between kalo and the ‘Ōiwi Maoli family system: "The fundamental patterns of the culture were determined by the habits of growth and cultivation of taro. The terms used to describe the human family had reference to the growth of the taro plant: ‘oha, the taro sprout, became ‘ohana, the human extended family." This duplicate use of words is not the result of an unimaginative (or overly imaginative, i.e. superstitious) people with too few words to choose from, but represents a world view that mandates connection and interrelatedness. That connection arises from genealogy.

In addition, this direct ancestral connection is reflected in the names of places, which are often times personal names and which were carefully chosen to identify a specific region or

292. ho‘omanawanui, "This Land is Your Land, this Land was My Land," 125.
293. Pukui, Native Planters, 18.
place. These names incorporated by reference the accumulated traditional knowledge of ‘Ōiwi Maoli about the place. Since knowledge also is passed through action, the names and their attendant mo‘olelo provided valuable information on how to manage and use the resources of this area. The names and the stories that went with them provided ‘Ōiwi Maoli with the necessary information to adapt to the land upon which they lived, including types of soil, plants and animals, and changes from season to season. Thus, as ‘Ōiwi Maoli scholar and activist Davianna Pōmaika‘i McGregor states, places and their names "not only provide a profound sense of identity with the ‘āina or land and natural resources, they also convey a sense of responsibility" to protect where one lives.294 As Kame‘eleihiwa notes:

The complexity of the Hawaiian agricultural system is reflected in the naming of each ‘Āina parcel, lo‘i, and fishpond with personal names as well as definitive terms. Furthermore, all of these names and terms were known, understood, and accounted for by all of the Ali‘i, which is no small feat in a preliterate society. In traditional Hawai‘i, memorization and a keen mind were invaluable tools.295

‘Ōiwi Maoli, moreover, have different names for flora and fauna depending upon the stage of life, location, and sex. They identify winds, rain, and even their "nature spirits," as ‘Ōiwi Maoli cultural expert, Mary Kawena Pukui refers to them, with different names to indicate the unique context and place of each. For example, in the region of Kaʻū on Moku o Keawe, Pele’s younger sister, Hiʻiaka, has many different names, depending upon when and where she is seen. When she is seen in the sky, she is Hiʻiakanoholani (Hiʻiaka-dweller-in-the-sky). When she is seen in the sky, she is Hiʻiakanoholani (Hiʻiaka-dweller-in-the-sky).


the rain, she is Hiʻiakaikamakaokaʻopua (Hiʻiaka-in-the-face-of-the rainclouds). When she is seen in a short red rainbow standing at sea level, she is Hiʻiakamakolewawahiwaʻa (Hiʻiaka-the-red-eyed-who smashes-canoes) and comes to warn fisherman of danger from inclement weather, which she is about to bring. While each of these names identify the woman seen in nature as belonging to the category of "Hiʻiaka," the words also specifically identify and define each member of the category to indicate context and acknowledge differences. The three women may all be Hiʻiaka, but, as the names reflect, each woman comes with a different context and intention.

In other words, names are not a simple taxonomy, but rocks, plants, mountain peaks, winds, rains, all elements of nature are given personal names and cared for, as is befitting of a personal relationship, which is rooted in a common and shared genealogy. From this shared genealogy and this familial relationship arises the mandate for reciprocal care between elder and younger siblings and gives rise to the concept of Mālama ʻĀina. While consisting of a number of complex and inter-related ideas, for purposes of this dissertation and the limited analytical context within which it sits, I will focus on just three of those ethical principles: mālama (to care and protect), kuleana (duty or responsibility), and pono (right, just or


297. It does not go beyond notice that Bacon likely would argue that Hiʻiaka does not exist, and therefore the naming of her is an example of Bacon’s first error: words that dupe us into believing things that are named actually exist, even when the objects are nonexistent. That being said, a response from the ‘Ōiwi Maoli of Kaʻū might surely be that they have seen her, and she is therefore empirically verified. All this goes to the argument regarding the lens through which we see the world. A world that is only object can never be seen as a subject, unless one is overcome with superstition or somehow behaving irrationally.

298. hoʻomanawanui, "This Land is Your Land, this Land was My Land," 124. In response to those who argue that Mālama ʻĀina is a new construct, and all the attendant implications that go along with that argument, hoʻomanawanui argues Mālama ʻĀina, which has been practiced by ʻŌiwi Maoli for millennia. Mālama ʻĀina is a fundamental part of what it means to be ʻŌiwi Maoli.
harmonious actions).

The Ethical Principle: Mālama

The word "mālama" means "to take care of, tend, attend, care for, preserve, protect, beware, save, maintain; to keep or observe, as a taboo; to conduct, as a service; . . . preservation, support, fidelity," and "loyalty." As an ethical principle, mālama demands that one cares for and acts in service of, in this context, the ʻāina. This ethical obligation arises from the familial relationship of ʻŌiwi Maoli to the ʻāina that was discussed above. This familial relationship mandates that one not ignore or treat the ʻāina as if it exists solely as a means to an end, but that it be treated as if it were an end in itself. Mālama, in many ways, means doing what is necessary to ensure that the ʻāina is able to flourish, not only in the productive sense of the word but in the meaning of flourish as achieving what it can; meeting its own ends.

Enclosure provides a useful contrast to care and flourishing. As discussed in Chapter 4, increased productivity was one of the reasons used to support Enclosure, i.e., removing the right to land from the community and placing that right in the hands of one individual. The very term "productivity" stands in sharp contrast to the term "flourishing" in that in the former, the land is a tool or an object that we can manipulate to increase its yield. We only care about the land itself to the extent it will or will not provide for us goods. Productivity views nature as a means to an end.

On the other hand, the concept of flourishing, as used here, refers to providing the ʻāina with what is needed in order for it to reach its full capacity. While humans certainly benefit from a flourishing nature, that benefit is secondary to the concerns of nature itself. Flourishing views

299. Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, s.v. mālama.
nature as an end deserving of its own well-being. Importantly, ‘āina which is enclosed or fenced off cannot flourish, and in the long run, its productivity would decline as well. For no family member can grow or flourish if he/she is left alone.

**Ethical Principle: Kuleana**

This direct familial relationship demands that one accept the duty to or responsibility for the ‘āina. This notion of duty and responsibility is referred to as kuleana. For ‘Ōiwi Maoli, kuleana "encompasses both the rights and corresponding sacred responsibility with accountability to maintain, conserve, protect the Akua [gods, especially those who have kinolau (bodily form) in the forms of the earth], the ‘āina, and the kanaka in perpetuity."\(^{300}\) As related to kalo, educator Kū Kahakalau analyzes the responsibility this way:

> When we talk about ‘plants,’ we use the word poʻe, "kēlā poʻe kalo, kēlā poʻe maiʻa."
> And "poʻe" means "people." So the plant people, the taro people, the banana people . . . .
> All of those poʻe have mana and are part of our extended ‘ohana. So . . . we need to protect one another. They impact us in a positive way, not in a negative way. So it is a *kuleana* to reciprocate that and impact them in a positive way and that would be protecting them from changes that could be their end literally and physically or a change that is so dramatic that we can’t recognize the original species. I feel very strongly that to mess with any of those parts is not our kuleana. It is not our right or our responsibility.\(^{301}\)

Kuleana, then, is not simply responsibility to, it includes the notion of accountability and protection, which requires control. Those who fail in their kuleana will be held accountable by

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other ‘Ōiwi Maoli and by the ‘āina itself. Thus, kuleana implies duties not only to the land, but duties to the community at large.

Using the comparison to a U.S. legal concept of property rights provides additional insight. As discussed in Chapter 4, the legal concept of ownership relates to the rights one has over land. If one owns land, one may do what one will with the land, and have no obligation to that land. The bundle of property rights—right of possession, control, exclusion, enjoyment, and disposition—eliminates any duty or responsibility we may have to others and to the land itself. Land, as an object is ours for use and enjoyment, assuming we do not trespass in some way or interfere with other individuals’ rights.

The concept of kuleana, then, mandates that one properly and responsibly care for the ‘āina. What that caring for looks like, or how one properly meets one’s duties under the concept of kuleana, is not set but is emergent. While ‘Ōiwi Maoli can and do look to the past for suggestions and guidance on executing their duties, they are not rooted in that past. How to properly meet one’s responsibilities is rooted in context. That proper behavior is the subject of the final element of Mālama ‘Āina, pono.

**Ethical Principle: Pono**

Pono refers to the balance or "rightness" of the world that occurs when all individuals in a society meet their duties to each other and to the land.\(^3\)\(^0\)\(^2\) Kameʻeleihiwa places pono soundly in the context of a relationship of relatives. In the tradition of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, the younger siblings have the duty of loving, serving, and honoring their elders. In return, the older siblings have the responsibility of loving and protecting their younger kin. ‘Ōiwi Maoli do not conquer or own

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\(^{302}\) Haunani-Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 141.
their elder female sibling, the ‘Āina. Instead, their responsibility is “to take care of her, to cultivate her properly, and to make her beautiful with neat gardens and careful husbandry.” If that responsibility (kuleana) is done with care (mālama), the ‘āina will reciprocate. In Kameʻeleihiwa’s words, “it is the duty of Hawaiians to Mālama ‘Āina, and as a result of this proper behavior, the ‘Āina will mālama Hawaiians. In Hawaiian, this perfect harmony is known as pono. . . .”

Key to understanding pono as harmony is the notion of service, which ‘Ōiwi scholar Kanalu Young describes in his work, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*. The responsibility to care and the accountability that goes together with that care create duties to perform. These duties, however, are undertaken in the context of a greater community and society, whose ordering principles are duty and service, not rights and privileges as is found in the Western liberal tradition. From konohiki to mahī’ai, from mōʻī to makaʻāinana, everyone in the pre-contact ‘Ōiwi Maoli society had a role to play that came with duties to serve the ‘āina and their society. Proper fulfillment of these roles, proper service to the community, which included the ‘āina, was encompassed in the notion of pono.

Service for Aliʻi Nui meant they had the duty of determining the correct use of the ‘āina, which would ultimately mean that ‘āina would flourish and, in the long run, be more productive. For example, Māʻilikukāhi, a Mōʻi (head chief of an island) of Oʻahu elected by the Council of Chiefs (circa 14th century), was famous for ensuring that the island was accurately surveyed with definite and permanent boundaries between different divisions of land. Accurate land boundaries

304. See generally, Young, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*. 

191
meant fewer disputes between chiefs and landholders, which meant more time could be given to producing foodstuffs.  

Similarly, a mōʻī (head ruler, usually of an island) was not considered pono if all he/she did was seek war, because constant war meant fields were trampled, farmers could not plant, and crops could not be grown, harvested, and stored in preparation for the inevitable drought. ‘Ōiwi Maoli did not understand nature to be bad or good, moral or immoral. Instead, they understood that events in nature occurred: storms rose up, rains stopped, rains came, volcanoes erupted. None of these events in themselves were problematic. The problem occurred when rulers failed in their duty to their people and did not properly allow for adequate preparation for these events. The Aliʻi Nui are tasked with protecting the people from "unnecessary death" coming from "terrible unseen forces." Aliʻi Nui who neglected their duties or who were cruel would lose favor, the world would no longer be in harmony, and famine or other such disaster might occur.  

A good or pono mōʻī was one who provided opportunities for people to prepare for events in nature which inevitably would occur. Rulers who were not pono would be deposed, usually by the people they are tasked to protect. Aliʻi Nui could not simply live off the largesse of their people, but had to act in such a way as to ensure that largesse existed for everyone. While there may have been rights—right to rule, right to be treated in a certain way—these rights were attendant and secondary to one’s duty to the community, which includes the ʻāina.  

The moʻolelo of ‘Umi, the mōʻī of Moku o Keawe, is an excellent example of pono and is often used to explain the power of the term. ‘Umi was born of a union between a lower

ranking aliʻi and Līloa, the then mōʻī of Moku o Keawe. ‘Umi was accepted by his father and given fairly significant tasks, but because of his inferior rank was placed second to Liloa’s other son, Hākau. After Līloa’s death, Hākau, who was selfish and cruel, did not rule well, resulting in hardship for his people. ‘Umi remained pono throughout and where he could, tried to offset his half-brother’s cruelty. As time went by, other aliʻi came to ‘Umi and asked that he depose his brother, and with their support, become mōʻī. ‘Umi did this and had a long and prosperous reign.

In this story, ‘Umi was able to become mōʻī, despite his low birth because he met his responsibilities to his people and the ʻāina. Hākau, on the other hand, was selfish and did not recognize his duties that arose from the inter-related dependent nature of his relationship to people and ʻāina, and the vulnerability that inter-relatedness placed him and all mōʻī in. No aliʻi in Hawaiʻi ruled unconditionally or absolutely. Every aliʻi was subject to the reciprocal relationship between ʻāina and people. Because Hākau was more concerned with his right to reign than he was with his duty to his people, the people suffered and eventually Hakau was replaced. ‘Umi, on the other hand, recognized the importance of service to his people and to the ʻāina and, as such, behaved in a pono manner.

Pono is not rule-based, which is to say, there is no set listing of commandments that one must always do in every case in order to be pono. Rather, pono is context-based: what will result in harmony in any given situation is dependent upon the situation itself. If there is any piece of this that is permanent and unchanging, it is the overarching notion that duty to community, which includes ʻāina, is paramount, and in every case supercedes personal rights. This does not mean ‘Ōiwi Maoli are not autonomous or free in a Kantian sense; it does mean that they
recognize their dependence and vulnerability to others in their society and that they treat the interconnectedness that this position creates with respect.

*Mālama ʻĀina and Care*

That an ethical obligation can arise from a familial tie or even a relationship is a post-Enlightenment revelation. Relationships require a body existing as a subject in a context, and thus in many ways prioritize all the elements of what it means to be human that Descartes, Bacon, Kant, and others tried to minimize or reject. And yet, Mālama ʻĀina is rooted in this very recognition of body existing in the context of a society that includes nature. Care or care ethics is a theory of ethical obligation that begins from the recognition that being in a relationship is fundamental to what it means to be human: all humans have been cared for. From this recognition of care as central to what it means to be human comes reciprocal ethical obligations between the cared-for and the one-caring, as the two are referred to.

Notably, and as the following will more fully demonstrate, ethical caring is not simply caring for someone in the natural course of our lives. The care I give to my pet is not ethical caring. Depending on the context, while I may care for my students, and I may even sacrifice for them, this does not mean I am engaging in an ethical framework of care in regards to them. As a generally caring person, I may be concerned about their futures and concerned about whether they are learning, but this is not the same as engaging in an ethical relationship of care with them. Although care is limited to what Philosopher Vrinda Dalmiya refers to as "centers of consciousness," the idea is increasingly being used in indigenous literature. With some caveats, the theory can be useful here to provide a bridge between a non-ʻŌiwi Maoli and an ʻŌiwi Maoli view of ʻāina as an object. Through care, in other words, we may be able to understand better the
moral and ethical obligations ʻŌiwi Maoli have to the ʻāina, and why those obligations are not the natural caring I may have for a pet or my favorite plant. In other words, seeing the markers of care ethics in Mālama ʻĀina can help us to understand that these ethical principles are moral obligations that demand reciprocal duties.

The version of care that offers the greatest breadth of analysis for this dissertation is that set out by Dalmiya, who breaks care into five key components or steps, which are:

(1) **caring about** means that "people are made valuable in a special way." The one-caring shapes his/her life, actions, and decisions with the cared-for in mind because that person being cared for "is important or matters for someone (the one-caring)."307

(2) **caring for**: means that the ones caring reorient their interests so that they can care adequately. This process may require imagination and empathy, but also requires that the one caring "enter" the world of the cared-for. Thus, the one-caring must shift his/her view of the world and his/her interests to those of the cared for by becoming involved in the projects of the cared-for.

(3) **taking care of** means that the one-caring must freely "take up the fight" of the cared-for to ensure that the caring is real and not simply a type of transference of the one-caring’s own project.

(4) **care reception** brings the cared-for into the caring relationship and turns that relationship into a reciprocal one by requiring the cared-for to communicate with the one-

307. Ibid., 35.
caring about the care being received. This step is crucial to the underlying core of care ethics, which is the making of oneself vulnerable to rejection without martyrdom.\(^{308}\)

(5) caring about caring means that the one caring is constantly exploring and examining not only the reasons to care, but the appropriateness of the relationship that caring creates.\(^{309}\)

Two contrasting examples will help to see how the first three steps of Dalmiya’s care are incorporated in Mālama ʻĀina. The first example comes from George Helm, leader in the Protect Kahoʻolawe movement (which will be discussed in greater detail below). On January 30, 1977, in response to the continued bombing on Kahoʻolawe, Helm presented the following Personal Statement to the Hawaiʻi State Legislature:

I have my thoughts, you have your thoughts, simple for me, difficult for you. Simply . . . the reason is . . . I am a Hawaiian and I’ve inherited the soul of my kupuna. It is my moral responsibility to attempt an ending to this desecration of our sacred ‘aina, Kohe Malamalama o Kanaloa, for each bomb dropped adds further injury to an already wounded soul.

The truth is, there is man and there is environment. One does not supercede the other. The breath in man is the breath of Papa (the earth). Man is merely the caretaker of the land that maintains his life and nourishes his soul. Therefore, ‘aina is sacred. The church of life is not in a building, it is the open sky, the surrounding ocean, the beautiful soil. My duty is to protect Mother Earth, who gives me life. And to give thanks with

\(^{308}\) Vrinda Dalmiya, "Why Should a Knower Care?" *Hypatia* 17, no. 1 (Winter 2002), 37.

\(^{309}\) *Ibid.*, 41. See also, Colin Danby, "Lupita’s Dress: Care in Time," *Hypatia*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Fall 2004), 24. Adding to the fifth step is Danby’s argument that relationships are necessarily long-term. In other words, I need to think about my caring for someone in the context of that relationship spanning across time. The question perhaps that Dalmiya raises is that we need to be aware of our contributions to and viability of those relationships.
humility as well as ask forgiveness for the arrogance and insensitivity of man.

What is national defense when what is being destroyed is the very thing the military is entrusted to defend, the sacred land of (Hawai‘i) America. The spirit of pride is left uncultivated, without truth and without meaning for the keiki o ka ‘aina, cut off from the land as a fetus is cut off from his mother. . . .

. . . This continued disregard of our seriousness, this refusal to give credibility to the Hawaiian culture based on Aloha ‘Aina, forces me to protest.310

The second example comes from another public presentation at the State Legislature, this one from Carleton Ching, vice president for community and government relations for the developer Castle and Cooke. At his nomination hearings for the position of chairman of the Board of Land and Natural Resources, the agency responsible for resource management in Hawai‘i, Ching, referred to the ‘āina as "our brand." He further noted that it is this "brand" that people come to Hawai‘i for, thus making the ‘āina "invaluable."311 Already facing opposition from a number of ‘Ōiwi Maoli over his connection to a developer, the characterization of the ‘āina as a "brand" resulted in immediate outcry from a number of ‘Ōiwi Maoli as well as non-‘Ōiwi Maoli.

The examples are not meant to demonize Ching, especially by contrasting him to George Helm, but are meant to demonstrate two different ways to relate to the ‘āina for ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Helm’s position is firmly rooted in Aloha or Mālama ‘Āina. Helm views the ‘āina as a relative


(Papa, Earth Mother) who is valuable to him in the way that only a mother can be. His commitment to her shapes his life (as we shall see below) and he has made her interests his own. He is compelled to take up this fight for her by virtue of his relationship and by his commitment to that relationship. In his words, he is forced to protest.

Ching, on the other hand, rejects the notion of the ʻāina as a subject but sees it as an object, available for productive use, market valuing, and sale. There is no relationship between Ching and the land because the land is not an object. To be fair to Ching, he does not stand alone in this view of the ʻāina. While ʻŌiwi Maoli have access to a relationship to the ʻāina that non-ʻŌiwi Maoli do not, not all ʻŌiwi Maoli have the requisite caring for, caring about, and taking care of to turn their relationship from one of caring for a pet or a favorite plant or a particularly useful brand into one of ethical caring. In the present context, the effects of certain Western traditions, including capitalism, have shifted world views and made it difficult to access the ethical principles of the relationship. In addition to Ching’s characterization, the discussion in Chapter 1 of konohiki, kaona, and ahupua‘a are further examples of the problems faced by ʻŌiwi Maoli who operate within two contexts.

However, ʻŌiwi Maoli, unlike non-ʻŌiwi Maoli, do have the ability to re-establish their Mālama ʻĀina relationship and reconnect with a world view that sees the ʻāina as one to be cared-for. Action, reclamation of culture and attention to language, and the continued singing of mele, chanting of oli, and dancing of hula, and work on and with the ʻāina all serve to reconnect ʻŌiwi Maoli to their genealogical older sibling and remind them of the shared project. As ʻŌiwi scholar Kalani Meinecke states in his essay, "Aloha ʻĀina,"

Aloha ʻāina Love for the Land. The Native Hawaiians’ deep and enduring love for their
ʻāina, land, is manifest in the entirety of their being—in their philosophy of life, in their religion, in the fascination with places and place names, and in their brilliant musical heritage.

Literally thousands of Hawaiian songs exist which extol the overwhelming presence and beauty of nature, and its powerful effect upon human affairs. So close is the association of man with land that the basic terms of human kinship identification spring from the land and the plants grown in the soil. The basic Hawaiian family unit is called the ‘ōhana, a term derived from ‘ōha, root offshoot of the parent taro plant. The terms for alternate generations, kupuna, grandparent (as well as ancestor), and moʻopuna, grandchild (as well as descendant), echo the term puna, spring of life-giving water, a term symbolizing the assurance of human continuity and life itself.312

Accordingly, not only do music, language, and resistance act as evidence of the connection and the adoption of another’s (the ‘āina’s) project, they act as a mechanism that reminds ‘Ōiwi Maoli of their genealogical link and the moral obligations that arise from that link to ‘āina.

Despite these reclamations, it would appear that the ‘āina in Hawaii is not satisfied with the care it is receiving. ‘Āina has suffered significantly since the onslaught of the missionaries. The ‘āina in many places no longer grows food. Rivers and streams have dried up. Species have become extinct. Foreign and invasive species have overtaken endemic and indigenous plants. Within the context of care, it would appear that Mālama ‘Āina is being rejected by the one cared for.

The response to this must be given in the context of a larger understanding of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli contingent present. Just as maka‘ainana were kept from storing foodstuffs for drought by ali‘i nui who were not pono, ‘Ōiwi Maoli have been kept from properly caring for land by colonization and occupation and the resulting loss of population, culture, and ability to manage and control those resources. Through colonization and rhetorical imperialism, including the banning of ‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi in schools and the general denigration of their culture, ‘Ōiwi thought, including their ethics, has been pushed to the farthest margins.

In the context of ‘Ōiwi Maoli, this step can be found in their continued reflection upon their care for the ‘āina. Contrary to popular belief, care for the ‘āina is emergent, as ‘Ōiwi Maoli struggle with how best to meet their ethical obligations to ‘āina in a changing world that both metaphysically and ethically sees the world very differently. Each day, year, and decade, ‘Ōiwi Maoli must reflect on the best ways to mālama the ‘āina. This means discussion and sometimes disagreement among the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. An excellent example of this can be found in the protest occurring in 2015 over the building of the thirteenth telescope—the Thirty Meter Telescope—on Mauna a Wākea. Originally, a number of ‘Ōiwi Maoli leaders rejected the plan to protest on the mountain, arguing the protests would desecrate the mountain and were not the best way to mālama the mountain. Through discussion and assessment of a number of factors, that position changed and leaders agreed to on-mountain protests. In other words, there is no one perfect way to mālama the ‘āina; instead, that way must be negotiated both among ‘Ōiwi Maoli and the ‘āina itself. This constant negotiation, this constant attention to the last two steps of Dalmiya’s care—caring reception and caring about caring—can be seen in the actions of ‘Ōiwi Maoli and their struggle to Mālama ‘Āina since contact.
For some ‘Ōiwi Maoli, their axiology may be lost. This break down in Mālama ‘Āina was not the result of a failure of ‘Ōiwi Maoli, but the result of colonization and occupation that kept ‘Ōiwi Maoli from their ethical obligations to the land.\(^{313}\) The resistance and protest of ‘Ōiwi Maoli today in an effort to meet their ethical obligations are in direct response to the social forces of colonization and occupation and are the topic of the next section on praxis.

**II. Praxis: ‘Āina-based Activism**

Praxis, as used here, is defined as the action we deliberately choose to take, and falls into the realm of ethics since it can be judged as moral or immoral.\(^{314}\) Praxis also is that action we take for another, which in Young’s analysis solidifies and cements our relationships to one another and to ourselves. Who we are as moral agents acting in the context of a relationship, the nature of our identity, is tied up in how we perform actions owed to others, which is to say, how we perform the services that we are obligated to perform.\(^{315}\) In the context of ‘Ōiwi Maoli philosophy, praxis or action is how ‘ike is shared and passed from one generation to another.\(^{316}\) Thus, it is appropriate for this work to explore not only the words of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, but their actions, for it is in their actions, taken by contextualized bodies, that we can glimpse their philosophy.

This praxis or service to the ‘āina, arguably, is not an option for ‘Ōiwi Maoli; it is not something they do when they have time or feel like volunteering or need to feel "Hawaiian." The commitment to an ethical relationship such as Mālama ‘Āina mandates accepting responsibility

\(^{313}\) Osorio, private email, April 18, 2015.


\(^{315}\) Young, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*, xi-xii.

\(^{316}\) Ibid., 13.
(kuleana) for the care (mālama) of the ʻāina in an appropriate manner (pono). In the context of an ethical care relationship, it is in action that ʻŌiwi Maoli embody their ethical obligations to the ʻāina; it is in action that the ʻāina moves from a loved pet (object) to an ethical entity (subject). To paraphrase Helm, as long as ʻŌiwi Maoli are blocked from fulfilling their ethical obligations under Mālama ʻĀina, they cannot not take action, often times in the form of activism, to protect and support their older sibling.

What Mālama ʻĀina looks like in the contemporary world of the kalo controversy and how it manifests itself in a democratic system is part of ʻŌiwi Maoli’s own critical narrative genealogy of Mālama ʻĀina that stands opposed to that of CTAHR. This critical narrative genealogy for ʻŌiwi Maoli—for our purposes only—begins, aptly, in conflict with the arrival of Captain Cook and continues through today. This moʻolelo (story), because of its location within the context of colonization and occupation, often is one of resistance. As ʻŌiwi scholar Noenoe K. Silva contends, "[t]he Europeans and Euro-Americans sought to exploit the land and subjugate the people, and the people fought back in a variety of ways." A complete rendering of the ʻŌiwi Maoli struggle against colonization and occupation is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the three stories of resistance discussed below demonstrate the narrative genealogy of the ʻŌiwi Maoli developing as a reaction to the assumptions and implications of the Western narrative genealogy discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The ʻŌiwi Maoli narrative genealogy discussed in this dissertation is a reaction to the assumptions and implications of the "Western" traditions that found their way into the country through colonization and occupation.

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Papa Kūʻauhau Aliʻi o Nā Aliʻi Hawaiʻi and Hale Nauā – Rejecting the Privileging of Western Thought

The first stop in the critical narrative genealogy of the praxis of ʻŌiwi Maoli is 1880. In that year, at the request of King Kalākaua, the Hawaiʻi Kingdom legislature formed the Papa Kūʻauhau Aliʻi o Nā Aliʻi Hawaiʻi, which was tasked with gathering genealogies, mele, and chants as well as recording customs of moʻi (high chiefs) and aliʻi (ruling class). Because of the importance of the genealogies and their deep connection to ʻŌiwi Maoli identity, such a collection served to define and strengthen the nation. In addition to the genealogies, the group gathered information related to all aspects of ʻŌiwi Maoli life, compiling a written ʻŌiwi Maoli epistemology and knowledge base.318 One report, for example, included information on ocean measurements, which was part of the ʻŌiwi Maoli project of verifying migration patterns so to verify genealogies. This project of collection and use of ʻŌiwi Maoli-based science threatened the missionaries because it demonstrated a progressive and flourishing culture and philosophy that was not European-based. As Silva argues, the collection "functioned to interrupt the discourse that said that ‘progress’ meant becoming more like the United States—that is, ruled by Euro-American immigrants."319

The genealogical work of Papa Kūʻauhau was continued by a private organization called Hale Nauā, established in 1886 and dissolving in 1891, which focused on genealogical studies but also sought to carry out the mandate of Kalākaua "to further the humble and careful way of

318. This work continues to the present in a slightly different form and in a slightly different context. ʻŌiwi scholar Jonathan Osorio points out that works like Kameʻeleihiwa’s Native Lands set out a genealogy of past scholarship, bringing those who wrote of genealogy and kinship into the context of her scholarship and reclamation of ʻŌiwi Maoli Mālama ʻĀina. Like the oli of a genealogical chant, each successive work on Mālama ʻĀina pulls form the sources before it. As discussed by Young, continued use, not blind repetition, increases the mana of the ideas, and helps to shape those ideas to address the current contexts.

319. Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 95.
life as nurtured by our ancestors from the beginning of time, so that it will never be
forgotten."

The first officers of the organization were predominantly women, with one man
serving in that capacity. As time went on, women continued to play a vital role in the
organization, consisting of over 25% of the membership slots. The degrees of membership in the
organization, which included astronomy, meteorology, agricultural science, and mechanical
sciences, indicated that science was included in the culture-gathering project.

Hale Nauā met with almost immediate outrage by the missionaries, who were excluded
from the organization because of their genealogy. As the Pacific Commercial Advertiser opined,
The membership appears to be presently limited to native Hawaiians. . . . [This] is a
retrograde step. . . . For its constitution, the country has a right to expect that any
attempt to revive and vitalize the customs and usages of the barbarous and savage past
would be promptly put a stop to. . . . No country can afford to abandon the light of
contemporary civilization for the gross darkness and ignorance of a brutal and degraded
past.

The Hawaiian Star, another non-ʻŌiwi Maoli newspaper, whose owner and editor was Lorin
Thurston, a key player in the Overthrow, and which frequently engaged in attacks on ʻŌiwi
Maoli culture, went further in condemning the collection of traditional practices: "The[se]

320. Ibid., 104.
321. Ibid., 106. The mystique of Hale Nauā is both interesting and telling. According to an entry in The
Exhibits of the Smithsonian Institution and the United States National Museum at the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific
Exposition, Seattle, Washington, 1909, page 72: "The meetings of the Hale Naua were mostly at night, and, if one
may accept report, under circumstances favorable to the adoption of the fig-leaf order of garb worn by the ancient
Gods and our forebears in the Garden. These fig leaves are represented by the bits of apparel . . . . " Although
unclear, the entry appears to indicate that non-ʻŌiwi Maoli believed the meetings were held in near naked state and
perhaps even in a Dionysian, the other famous fig leaf wearer, fashion, with all the attendant activities of a
Dionysian "meeting," no doubt.

https://books.google.com/books?id=FmASAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA72&lpg=PA72&dq=hale+naua+fig+leaf&source=b
l&ots=PxeBqk29ms&sig=tAAZ9RcQXsDhUPhPX47EE1vok&hl=en&sa=X&ei=wYw9VffgE47joASeyIHoDg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hale%20naua%20fig%20leaf&f=false
practices of sorcery are intimately connected with the worship of heathen deities . . . they are also allied to political tyranny. . . ."

The actual work of the organization ran counter to the characterization of pre-Missionary Hawaiʻi as somehow savage and backwards. In fact, one annual report of the Hale Nauā directly attacked the missionary characterization of them as follows:

The historian [as representative of the West] had reached a point which he considered far in advance of the state of the Islanders. Upon comparing these conditions it was natural for him to express and emphasize his self-congratulation; but it would have been far better if his utterances . . . carried more of a spirit of philanthropy, than that of ignorance and bigotry. Such being the spirit in which the character of the people was measured[,] we can dismiss the reverend historian and look upon his comments as coming from a source irreverently ignorant.\footnote{322}

To place this in context, the Hale Nauā was formed at a time when non-ʻŌiwi Maoli were attempting to argue that the traditions and customs of ʻŌiwi Maoli were barbaric and superstitious. To paraphrase the language from Chapter 3, this was a time when the West was arguing that, through science and enlightened government policies, it could banish superstition, mysticism, metaphysics, and the belief in a vitalistic and organic nature that had held humanity back for so long.\footnote{323} There were other forces at play here, however, including a prolonged and engaged political battle between ʻŌiwi Maoli and those loyal to the monarchy, and haole and those wishing to take control of Hawaiʻi’s natural resources. Thus, instead of recognizing both the viability and legitimacy of the ʻŌiwi Maoli, the colonizers resorted to referring to ʻŌiwi

\footnote{322. Silva, \textit{Aloha Betrayed}, 104-107.}
\footnote{323. Allen, "Mechanism, Vitalism, and Organicism," 273.}
Maoli epistemology as "sorcery," or as part of a "brutal and degraded" or "barbarous and savage past" filled with "gross darkness and ignorance."

**Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop**

Hale Nauā called into question the colonizing narrative that pre-contact Hawaiʻi was full of savagery and superstition as well as the implication that Western thought was somehow superior to all other systems. And yet, in contemporary times, those in the West would see the knowledge gathered by the members of Hale Nauā to be traditional or folk knowledge and thus part of the knowledge commons and free to anyone who wishes to engage with it. This contrasts sharply with the actual facts of the existence of Hale Nauā, which, much to the dismay of the missionaries and colonizers, had a closed membership. The knowledge commons maintained by Hale Nauā simply was not free and open to anyone. The tension between the characterization of the ʻŌiwi Maoli knowledge as barbarous and savage and the anger at not being included, while no doubt political, also foreshadows a contemporary tension today between objective science and the acknowledgment of the importance of Indigenous Knowledge (IK) in solving environmental issues, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. Arguably, the fact IK or Indigenous Environmental (sometimes "Ecological") Knowledge (IEK) is even acknowledged as important is the result of the so-called Science Wars waged between scientists and post-modernists regarding the objectivity and universality of scientific findings.

ʻŌiwi Maoli certainly saw the exceptionalising of a Western, post-Enlightenment worldview when they wrote that colonizers were acting out of "intolerance and bigotry." The point, however, is that also at this time, ʻŌiwi Maoli as irritated as they were with the presence of the missionary families, did not reject outright all of their ways, characterizing them in a way to
make it almost impossible to take their position seriously. ‘Ōiwi Maoli adopted a written language and at one time had a higher literacy rate than the United States. Honolulu saw electric street lighting before a vast majority of the urbanized U.S. ‘Ōiwi Maoli did not then, and do not now, wish to exceptionalise their philosophy and epistemology. ‘Ōiwi Maoli life, from politics to philosophy, was and is very much an emergent one, operating side-by-side with other diverse theories in an attempt to find a pono way to negotiate a changing world.

*Kahoʻolawe – Challenging the Assumption that Nature is an Object*

The next stop in the ‘Ōiwi Maoli critical narrative genealogy is the activism that arose around the U.S. military bombing of the island of Kahoʻolawe, as this was one of the key turning points in the reclamation of Aloha or Mālama ‘Āina. The island plays an important role in ‘Ōiwi Maoli history and was a central point for navigation and exploration of the peoples of Moana Nui. In approximately 400 A.D., the first ‘Ōiwi Maoli came to Kohemālamalama o Kanaloa, or Kahoʻolawe as it is now generally known.

In 1941, when the U.S. military declared martial law, it took control of the island and began using it for bombing practice. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave title to Kahoʻolawe to the U.S Navy with the imperative that the Navy return the island to a condition of "suitable habitation," when they had finished with it. In the mid-1970s, members of the Molokaʻi-based group, Hui Aloha (later to become the Protect Kahoʻolawe ‘Ohana or PKO), which included George Helm, Walter Ritte (of the kalo controversy fame), and Dr. Emmett Aluli, began organizing protests and island occupations in an effort to stop the bombing of

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This initiative included meeting with a number of cultural practitioners and kūpuna (elders) in an effort to gather and learn the traditional moʻolelo and traditions of Kahoʻolawe.

On January 3, 1976, nine people landed on Kahoʻolawe, including Helm, Aluli, and Ritte. Everyone except Ritte and Aluli were caught by the Coast Guard just minutes after landing. Aluli and Ritte spent two days on the island before giving themselves up. It was around this time that the group began referring to their project of reclaiming Kahoʻolawe as "aloha ʻāina," a term often seen as synonymous with "Mālama ʻĀina." The group later learned that "aloha ʻāina" was used frequently during the overthrow of Queen Liliuʻokalani in 1893. Lawyer and Kingdom legislator Joseph Nāwahī in 1895 started a newspaper entitled Ke Aloha Aina, and aloha ʻāina was the password spoken by the counter-revolutionaries who attempted to restore the Hawaiian monarchy. Although the meaning of Aloha ʻĀina was slightly different during Nawahi’s time, the reclamation of the term was seen as an important step in reclaiming the ethical principles of Aloha or Mālama ʻĀina.

The landings continued, as did protests, letters to the Navy, and other actions all done in an attempt to stop the bombing and begin to heal the island. Not all ʻŌiwi Maoli supported the actions. In one story, Helm and Ritte went to Keʻanae, a traditional taro growing community on the Hāna side of Maui. When the two first entered, the ʻŌiwi Maoli elders viewed them as "hippies" and "radicals" and spoke in Hawaiian, excluding the two who were not fluent. After a song or two, Helm said to the group: "You put us down for not being able to speak Hawaiian. You are the reason we cannot speak Hawaiian and have to go buy it at the university." When they

326. Hoʻi Hoʻi Hou, 19.
were done, the elders said: "You boys are not radicals, you are hui o hoʻoponopono, those who will put things right."\textsuperscript{327}

On January 30, 1977, another group landed on Kahoʻolawe, including Helm, Ritte, and another activist named Richard Sawyer. The idea was for Ritte and Sawyer to remain on the island indefinitely. The remaining three allowed themselves to be picked up by the Coast Guard and began a final push to get the military to stop bombing. The bombing continued, despite the fact the Navy knew there were two men on the island. Helm and others made trips to the Hawaiʻi legislature and to Washington, D.C. in an effort to stop the bombing and get Ritte and Sawyer off the island. Finally, in early March, 1977, Helm, along with Kimo Mitchell and Billy Mitchell (unrelated) landed on Kahoʻolawe. They could not find Ritte and Sawyer and were unaware that the pair had been taken off the island by a Coast Guard helicopter. When their pick-up boat failed to arrive, the trio headed into water in the early morning hours to make the long and dangerous swim to Maui or Molokini. Kimo Mitchell and George Helm went into the water together, sharing an eight foot surfboard. They were never seen again.\textsuperscript{328}

The loss galvanized the movement. PKO filed suit in U.S Federal District Court seeking an injunction to stop the military bombing due to verified findings of numerous historical and cultural sites. Later that year, the court ordered the Navy to conduct an environmental assessment and cultural inventory. In 1980 a consent decree was signed that required the Navy to begin soil conservation, revegetation and goat eradication programs. In 1981, the island was listed on the National Register of Historic Places. In 1993, the island was conveyed back to the State of Hawaiʻi and the U.S. Congress authorized $400 million for ordnance removal, a project that

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid., 22.  
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., 29-31.
ended in 2004. Approximately 75% of the island was cleared and 10% of that area was cleared to a depth of four feet. Twenty-five percent of the island has not been cleared and remains too dangerous for even short unescorted visits.329

Due to the military bombing, the fresh water lens that provides each of the main Hawaiian islands with a source of fresh water was cracked, and the land no longer has viable or significant fresh water. To date, thousands of people, ʻŌiwi Maoli and non-ʻŌiwi Maoli alike, have traveled to the island to spend time on its restoration and healing.

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

The story of Kahoʻolawe is important in that it represents just one in a long line of ʻŌiwi Maoli political protests compelled by their ethical obligations of Mālama ʻĀina against powerful forces. This compulsion is what George Helm referred to in his "Personal Statement" quoted at length above. In that activism, George Helm and Kahoʻolawe helped to resurrect the name for the ethical obligation for the land; a name that had been buried under the forces of "the light of contemporary civilization." In that revival, the movement contributed to revitalizing and further defining Mālama ʻĀina by reconnecting ʻŌiwi Maoli and the land and by helping to further re-establish their reciprocal relationship of care. Kahoʻolawe also synthesized a rejection of the Western assumption that land was an object and the attendant implication that land deserves no moral consideration and has no intrinsic value.

The use of the term Mālama ʻĀina by ʻŌiwi Maoli is literal even as it is shaded by kaona. As with all words and phrases in the Hawaiian language, repeated use increases the mana (power) of the words. Thus, when ʻŌiwi Maoli today say or write "Mālama ʻĀina," they are

calling upon the power of all the times the words were used in the past, and the idea of care for land grows and becomes stronger. The sacrifices made by ʻŌiwi Maoli—sacrifices of time to demand people and government appropriately care for the land, sacrifices of freedom as is the case of the Thirty Meter Telescope protesters on Mauna Kea, and sacrifices of life, as was the case with George Helm—all contribute to the strengthening of the relationship between ʻŌiwi Maoli and the ʻāina, all of which is encompassed within the notion of Mālama ʻĀina.

Notably, Mālama ʻĀina is not a set of specific actions that must be taken. As with any activism, negotiations and discussions must occur to determine what is the most effective way to reach an audience. "The fact that Aloha ʻĀina was understood and articulated by different classes of individuals within the Hawaiian community is evidence of either a cultural link or an overwhelmingly compelling idea. Perhaps it was both," writes Osorio.330 Kahoʻolawe catalyzed ʻŌiwi Maoli in many different ways, and that fact, that the ethical obligations of Mālama ʻĀina can be met in many different ways, is key to the notion of pono and its connection to the ʻŌiwi Maoli culture and how to appropriately live one’s life in general.

Makeʻe Pono Lāhui Hawaiʻi—Rejecting Privileging in Pursuit of Pono

The first of these stops in the critical narrative genealogy focused on ʻŌiwi Maoli responsibilities (kuleana) to and engagement with their knowledge and actions necessary to protect or mālama that commons. The second involved the ʻŌiwi Maoli responsibilities to care for and protect (mālama) land. At each place in time, ʻŌiwi Maoli continued to explore and enhance what it means for them to Mālama ʻĀina in the context of their changing world. In this third and final stop, the focus is on the last ethical principles of Mālama ʻĀina, pono, as it relates

to the land, to people of that land, and to the very action of Mālama ʻĀina itself.

In 1990, on UH-Mānoa campus, a group of undergraduate and graduate students came together to form the Makeʻe Pono Lāhui Hawaiʻi or Hawaiian Student Liberation Union (HSLU). The group was organized with the aim of eliminating "any and all forms of colonialism and vestiges of oppression and exploitation being suffered by all native Hawaiian students" on the campus. The impetus for the group was a 1989 report entitled "Teaching and Learning," which was prepared for the Office of Faculty and Development and Academic support at UH-Mānoa. The report found that 70 percent of the tenured faculty at UH-Mānoa were Caucasian and the majority of those were men. Only 26 percent of tenured faculty were people of color and of that 26 percent, only 1.5 percent of tenured faculty were ʻŌiwi Maoli. On the other hand, the UH-Mānoa student body at the time was comprised of 67.5 percent of people of color. This research contributed to a larger study, the Kaʻū University of Hawaiʻi Hawaiian Studies Task Force Report, which ultimately recommended the creation of a Center for Hawaiian Studies and a Hawaiian student services program, both vital parts of the campus today.331

Although early Makeʻe members tried to rally students, it was not until September of 1990 that events on campus raised student awareness and catalyzed the group. In its September 5, 1990 issue, the UH-Mānoa student newspaper, Ka Leo, ran an op ed piece by a white philosophy major by the name of Joey Carter. Carter began his article by asking whether he was a "haole," arguing that the term was derogatory and brought with it "baggage" that gave rise to racism. Carter, a Caucasian from Louisiana, felt white people are stereotyped in Hawaiʻi as being selfish and arrogant, among other things, and that he himself had been "chased and beaten" by

"locals" who had "been taught that I am the cause of their problems." Carter believed this was racist and that it would be far better if we as a society looked at people as individuals, not as members of a group because, in the end, everyone is an individual and racism is racism, whoever does it.332

On November 15, 2002, Ka Leo published a response to Carter written by Haunani-kay Trask, then Director of the Center for Hawaiian Studies. Trask clarified for Carter that indeed he was haole. She argued that Carter’s letter demonstrated one problem with Americans: they tend to see themselves as being outside of history, and therefore not taking a role in either that history or the current situation created by that history. Trask pointed out that as a white male, Carter was a part of the exceptionalised class in America, and that privilege was won on the backs of people of color and discrimination. The hostility Mr. Carter may have felt is not "haole-bashing"; it is a "smart political sense honed by our deep historical wounding at the hands of the haole." When ‘Ōiwi Maoli do reach out in trust and friendship, it is their choice to make that "exception," not those to whom it is extended. In other words, Carter could not and should not ask for better treatment; the implication being that he needed to earn it. Trask ended by telling Carter that if he did not like being called "haole," he could return to Louisiana, where he came from.333

The furor over Trask’s response was immediate. Trask and the members of Make’e, who rallied around her, received threats of bodily violence and death. Few focused on the kaona of Trask’s directive: Carter had a home to return to; ‘Ōiwi Maoli, like Trask, did not. Carter was a visitor in the home of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. In defense of their student, the Philosophy Department responded, admonishing Trask for misusing her power as a professor and attempting to

333. Ibid.
intimidate Carter. Some UH-Mānoa faculty argued Trask should resign or be terminated. The
members of Make‘e published another op ed piece, reiterating Trask’s statements and letting
Carter know that he could certainly go home, again pointing out the fact that ‘Ōiwi Maoli were
home and Carter was visiting.

This one event motivated students into action. Make‘e, many of whom were students of
Trask and studying critical theory and post-colonialist authors like Edward Said, used the event
to bring greater awareness of colonialism and oppression to the campus. One of their movements
was to encourage Ka Leo, the student newspaper that was at the center of the op ed exchange, to
print at least one article per issue completely in ‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi. Ka Leo’s response is illustrative of
the context within which the Trask-Carter event took place. First, Ka Leo’s editors argued that
‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi was a "foreign" language, and that Ka Leo was an "English-medium paper."
Make‘e pointed out that the Hawai‘i state constitution had been amended in 1978 to establish
‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi as an official state language, along with English. Moreover, Ka Leo’s name was
‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi. Second, Ka Leo argued that they could not privilege one language over another
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.334 Make‘e pointed out that privileging
English over ‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi was equally discriminatory. In the end, Ka Leo agreed to print a
‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi article as part of a weekly column with an English synopsis available upon request
and to print an unrelated article in English about some ‘Ōiwi issue. The campaign took a year.
Today, Ka Leo continues the publishing of both types of articles and every Saturday, the main
newspaper in Hawai‘i publishes an article written in ‘Ōlelo ‘Ōiwi and has begun to use

334. Whether or not the intent was there, one can hear clearly the Pacific Commercial Advertiser’s
admonition that "For its constitution, the country has a right to expect that any attempt to revive and vitalize the
customs and usages of the barbarous and savage past would be promptly put a stop to."
Diacriticals in ʻŌlelo ʻŌiwi words.\textsuperscript{335}

Makeʻe went on to organize rallies that brought to light numerous social justice struggles. They based their theories on "past revolutionaries" like Malcolm X, Walter Ritte, and Edward Said. They thought deeply about the nature of their organization, the nature of activism, and how to avoid the harmful effects of power. As Kekailoa Perry remembers, the movement was in many ways about lessons: the lessons of actions, of inactions, of managing movements, of organizing, of finding new tools for social justice. "The Makeʻe experience teaches us that actions of the present moment will be judged and valued by their impact on the next generation," Perry writes: "It is a recognition that life is cyclical and if the lessons are taught well, the young ones will do much better the next time around." Perry goes on to note that "courage in the face of so much change is the greatest lesson for Makeʻe."

The members of the organization, one of them being Kanalu Young, took seriously their mandate of pono and cultural self-reflection as a key part of Makeʻe. As Perry reflects, "it’s not enough to just belong to an organization designed to assist Hawaiians. Part of the group’s representation is the willingness to reexamine the actions of the group and make changes necessary to secure methods". Part of this examination was an active and concerted effort to engage with disagreement within the organization and to recognize that nothing—not people and not ideas—should be above criticism and critical and reflective examination. As Perry writes: "Though not perfect, Makeʻe worked hard to keep our thinking fresh by establishing an environment that would allow criticism to exist within the ranks." In the end, Perry notes,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{335} Perry, "Makeʻe Pono Lāhui Hawaiʻi," 274-276.
\item \textsuperscript{336} Ibid., 279-280.
\end{itemize}
Makeʻe was not about specific students; it was about "the lessons we learned by our actions and inaction."\footnote{Ibid., 279, emphasis added.}

**Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop**

The work of Mālama ʻĀina continues, but for the purposes of this dissertation, the conflicts that Makeʻe Pono addressed culminate in the key ideas of this section on praxis in the following ways. First, the group’s commitment to constant self-reflection and re-examination of actions a group takes is a key part of understanding how one should appropriately serve the community. As I read him, Young expands upon this notion of appropriate service to the community in his work, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*. In discussing the evolution of duties in ʻŌiwi Maoli society, he writes that "ancestors . . . began to create complex strategies for survival here nearly two millennia ago. Definitions for the quality of life emerged from their successes and failures as did perspectives about how pono should be defined." These successes and failures were told through moʻolelo from generation to generation and "conveyed lessons" about the past, teaching the importance of the past\footnote{Kameʻelehiwa, *Pehea Lā E Pono Ai?*, 22–23. As noted in Chapter 2, "ka wā mamua, ka wā mahope," means "the time in front or before, the time which comes after or behind," and is a saying of old that indicates how ʻŌiwi Maoli refer to past and present. In regards to resource management issues, ʻŌiwi Maoli will look to ways of doing things in the past in order to inform, but not necessarily dictate, ways to address the present and the future.} as a way to "define what was pono (proper, good true)," in service to those to whom one was obligated.\footnote{Young, *Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past*, 4-5.}

Putting these two moʻolelo together, we see that pono is not one specific prescription. Nor does it identify one exceptionalised way to understand, to think about, or even to move forward in the world. Pono is both organic and ongoing, active and changing. It epitomizes the rejection of the idea that there is only one foundational reality accessible by humans. In the
context of this work, it rejects the assumption of science and capitalism as axiomatically moral, for nothing can ever be axiomatic. Our world is one of context and of change. Certain values, like proper and good service, may remain constant, but the actions for properly carrying out that service, what is pono thought and action, will and should shift. This notion of self-reflection also links to Dalmiya’s final step of a care relationship in that the one caring must constantly reflect upon, question, and engage with the cared-for. Dialogue must be open and must occur even, and perhaps most importantly, in spaces of conflict.

Second, the work of Make’e Pono demonstrates the link between ‘Ōiwi Maoli and the ‘āina. In the context of Mālama ‘Āina, "land issues" cannot be separated from "people issues," as both need each other; just as I am inseparable from my parents, so too are ‘Ōiwi Maoli inseparable from the ‘āina. In the terms of care, the cared-for is not just land, it must be the entire genealogical chain. Osorio captures this in the following reflection on the importance of Kanaloa (Kaho‘olawe): "In the end, this is one aspect of ea; sovereignty, life, spirit, and breath emanate from Kanaloa and touch us. The island lives because of us, and we live because the island lives."340

Finally, the Carter issue demonstrates the false concept of the commons in practice. Carter viewed his position in Hawai‘i as that of an equal to everyone else. Hawai‘i is a U.S. state and is not "owned" by anyone. U.S. citizens, as with other states, have the freedom to come and go as they please. U.S.-citizens have a "right" rooted in the Constitutional notion of equality, to engage with the general "commons" that is the state; a right to share in the common natural resources of the state, to walk the streets unmolested, to express our opinions and to generally be treated fairly.

and with aloha. This is the very concept of *res communis*: this space is shared by everyone in the community, equally.

As has been a common theme throughout this dissertation, the commons are not free and *res communis* is a fallacy, at least in this context. Trask likely would agree that Hawai‘i is a commons, but it is not open to Carter nor to any non-‘Ōiwi Maoli. Non-‘Ōiwi Maoli do not get to claim a part of something they are not genealogically connected to. I can not claim Kanaloa as "my god," any more than I can claim someone who is not related to me as my biological mother. Carter has no relationship to this land, and he therefore has no right to claim a relationship and all of the aspects that go along with that relationship.

One particularly vexing demand Carter was making was that he essentially be treated as if he were "local" or ‘Ōiwi Maoli, which meant that what he was really insisting on was to be treated with aloha. Contrary to efforts by the tourist industry, "aloha" is not something that can be demanded. The word is both "familial and genealogical." Trask argues that

[i]t is nearly impossible to feel or practice aloha for something that is not familial. This is why we extend familial relations to those few non-Natives whom we feel understand and can reciprocate our aloha. But aloha is freely given and freely returned; it is not and cannot be demanded or commanded. Above all, aloha is a cultural feeling and practice that works among the people and between the people and their land. 341

"Aloha" is not a brand, not a trademark, not a catchy saying to promote tourism. It should not be expected or demanded.

341. Trask, *From a Native*, 141–142.
In pointing this out, Trask was caring for and protecting her people and one part of her larger family that includes the ‘āina. In responding to Carter, she was engaging in Mālama ʻĀina by pointing out the dangers of assuming a close relationship that does not exist. Arguably, Carter was doing no harm. He was expressing an opinion, an uneducated and ignorant one, but discourse and dialogue have been and continue to be a key part of ʻŌiwi Maoli culture. The problem is that the sentiment Carter was expressing, a sentiment of res communis, provides for no ethical obligation to the land. Trask, and the other members of Makeʻe Pono, have an ethical obligation to protect and serve their older sibling. Part of that protection is ensuring that those who are on this land recognize their duty to the land. Carter, from his standpoint of a haole U.S. citizen sees the world as his for the taking by virtue of his equality. Trask, from the standpoint of an ʻŌiwi Maoli, sees her islands as an older sibling, necessitating protection from the taking of others. Whereas Carter sees a right, Trask sees a duty. This does not mean that Carter or other haole might not be able to recognize the ethical obligations of Mālama ʻĀina. But to do that, those of us rooted in the Enlightenment traditions, including Ching, an ʻŌiwi Maoli, need to begin to break down the assumptions that block us from seeing those ethical obligations of ʻŌiwi Maoli as arising from a relationship to ʻāina.

III.

The Contingent Present: A Clash of Assumptions

These forces, along with the ancestral genealogical understanding of Mālama ʻĀina, are the narrative genealogy that ʻŌiwi Maoli brought to the kalo controversy. That narrative includes a mistrust rooted in history of non-ʻŌiwi Maoli, especially those in positions of power and academia, going back at least as far as the Hale Nauā, if not farther. This mistrust was heightened
by the events that occurred on UH-Mānoa campus during the lifespan of the Make‘e Pono movement. Not only do these events demonstrate a backgrounding of ‘Ōiwi Maoli and their culture, but an outright hostility when ‘Ōiwi Maoli attempt to assert their responsibilities. These movements helped to articulate assumptions and implications that oppose those of non-‘Ōiwi Maoli, as will be addressed in greater detail below. They also provide context for the reactions of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, including Ritte’s frustrated claim that non-‘Ōiwi Maoli refuse to listen. This section explores the contingent present through the assumptions and implications that have been revealed by use of the critical narrative genealogy and its application to the kalo controversy.

ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumptions and Implications

ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumption 1: No one method is exceptionalised

The above critical narrative genealogy reveals a key assumption of the ʻŌiwi Maoli position: acceptance of diverse ways to know and be in the world. From Hale Nauā to Makeʻe Pono, ʻŌiwi Maoli are open to engaging with other traditions. This engagement, however, necessitates careful reflection and criticism in order to be pono. While science and capitalism can be useful, they are certainly not axiomatically moral, and the methods of both need to be questioned and applied in the context of ʻŌiwi Maoli mandate to Mālama ‘Āina. Moreover, there is not one way to view the world and not one type of knowledge.

One possible objection to this position could be the spectre of Joey Carter and the argument that Trask and Makeʻe Pono were not "open" to the diversity that Joey Carter represents. If ‘Ōiwi Maoli do not exceptionalise, then they must accept everyone and their ideas. This objection, however, rests on the fallacy of false dichotomy, one that has plagued the relationship between ‘Ōiwi Maoli and haole. Being "open" to other systems does not mean one
must accept them, it only means one must consider the opportunities these systems present. Carter was not open to recognizing there are other ways to be in the world; he focused solely on his right as a U.S. citizen to be treated "equally," and failed to see his duty to the land and the people. Trask, in her response, was pointing out that the world view of Carter was neither historically nor ethically justified. Because she did not accept his position does not mean that she did not consider it. Her response demonstrates that she did engage in critical reflection of the position, and that she responded at all meant she was engaging Carter and those who stood with him in dialogue.

ʻŌiwi Maoli Assumption 2: There is no subject/object dualism

The ʻŌiwi Maoli reject a subject/object dualism. ʻŌiwi Maoli cosmogenic genealogy teaches that ʻāina is not a fundamentally different metaphysical category but is an elder sibling, a family member and like ʻŌiwi Maoli, a subject with intrinsic value. As such, ʻŌiwi Maoli are not exceptionised above nature, but both exist interdependently and inter-relatedly. As a younger sibling, ʻŌiwi Maoli must care for nature, which is the duty of all younger siblings. The relationship ʻŌiwi Maoli have with nature is not one of ownership or use but one of family. With that relationship comes a series of attendant ethical obligations summed up by Mālama ʻĀina. Appropriately returning to the Kumulipo, the things of the world are "kept" by other things in that they are watched over and protected. Any obligation or duty arises from this familial relationship, and is in many ways not a construct.

In rejecting a subject/object divide, ʻŌiwi Maoli reject all of the attendant implications, including the notion that ʻāina is a machine or machine-like, that she can be understood by

342. I am fairly certain Joey Carter did not want to be treated the same as ʻŌiwi Maoli. I think his point was more one of equal access to a closed commons, or perhaps he just wanted to "belong."
reducing her to her parts, and that the way to "know" her is through empirical fact finding. ‘Ōiwi Maoli also reject the Cartesian split and do not place mind over body in a hierarchical fashion. Tellingly, for ‘Ōiwi Maoli the seat of knowledge is not in the brain or soul but in the gut, where one feels knowledge. Perhaps, it will be useful to note that the relationship of things in the world as described by the Kumulipo stands in sharp contrast to that of the Platonic world view in two key ways. First, in the Kumulipo, there is the creation of the world into night and day. All life, including gods, were born at the time of night in pairs: male and female, ocean and land. Each plant or creature of the land is "guarded by" a creature or plant of the ocean. Denizens of the sea are not created as a result of punishment, but are from whom all ‘Ōiwi Maoli come. Women are not man’s punishment, nor is being born a limu kala (brown seaweed used to drive away sickness and obtain forgiveness) or its land counterpart, an ‘akala (raspberry bush) some punishment for not thinking rationally. Male and female of all species are revered for their participation in the creation and perpetuation of their species. The notion in the ‘Ōiwi Maoli cosmological chant is not of one species over and above another, but of all species existing together, one in the ocean and one on land, and connected in a familial relationship.

Second, ‘Ōiwi Maoli do have a world, like Plato, that lies outside of this earth-bound one. For Plato, this world is perfect and contains the Forms. The ‘Ōiwi Maoli version of the "other world"—Kānehūnāmoku—are the islands where the gods reside that we often see off in the distance at sunset. These islands did not contain items that were purer, but contained a world of plenty and abundance. There is no famine and no scarcity on these islands. ‘Ōiwi Maoli recognize the cycles of the earth as having both dry and wet times. Famine and scarcity occur,

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343. The Kumulipo, 37.
however, not because of nature being in some way impure or evil, but because of poor rulers who do not protect their people from war during growing seasons and do not properly manage and maintain natural resources. Kānehūnāmoku is not a place where the earth perfectly meets human needs and wants, but a place where humans act perfectly and in harmony with the earth.

Both of these ideas, the inter-related nature of all things and the recognition that "perfection" lies in living in harmony with the earth, will help to contribute to assumptions that instead of denying connections between humans and non-humans affirm those connections. One area of similarity between the ʻŌiwi Maoli view and CTAHR’s is that what nature is, its metaphysical property as either a subject or an object, provides identity for both the ʻŌiwi Maoli and CTAHR. ʻĀina, as a subject, is part of a family that includes ʻŌiwi Maoli. Membership in this family, and location (which is to say the place one is from) provides further identity for ʻŌiwi Maoli. Nature, as an object, stands as an "other" to humans. Humans use those objects as part of the project of humanity, which is to say that in my ability to use nature I am human. In the former, who an ʻŌiwi Maoli is arises out of his/her familial relationship to subject; in the latter, who I am as a human arises out of my use or commodification of nature.

The Clash: A Deeper View

The clash of the assumptions in the context of the kalo controversy can be seen in how CTAHR and the ʻŌiwi Maoli characterized each other’s positions and themselves. Although this work first presented these characterizations in Chapter 1 and then again in greater detail in Chapter 2, having explored the critical narrative genealogies that inform the assumptions applied by both sides, we can now understand these positions in a new, and hopefully more meaningful way.
CTAHR’s Perception of Opposition to the Kalo Patents

CTAHR characterizes the Hawaiian resistance under the following categories. The first group of opponents as

members of a segment of the Hawaiian community that regard taro as a revered ancestor. They perceive manipulations of the taro genome as a desecration of their legendary heritage. This objection may, with some justification, be related to a broader resentment about usurpation of Hawaiian hegemony over the islands by Euro-American foreigners, and it also may be related to the current, diverse movement toward Native Hawaiian sovereignty. CTAHR, as a state and federal institution, may in some sense be a proxy for entities responsible for the historical intervention that ended the Hawaiian monarchy, resulted in the annexation of Hawai‘i by the United States, and led to Hawai‘i becoming a state.

CTAHR’s wording is important because it demonstrates the assumptions arising from CTAHR’s critical narrative genealogy. First, CTAHR alleges that only a few ‘Ōiwi Maoli regard kalo as an ancestor, implying that for some ‘Ōiwi Maoli kalo is not an ancestor. This sense that ‘Ōiwi Maoli cosmogenic genealogy is somehow optional is reinforced by CTAHR’s choice to refer to the genealogy as a "legendary heritage," meaning that it is a story that some ‘Ōiwi Maoli believe and others do not. This does not acknowledge the existence of a direct relationship between ‘Ōiwi Maoli and ‘āina in general and kalo specifically. For CTAHR, moʻolelo of Hāloa and all

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344. CTAHR makes a point that "such strong cultural traditions are not unique to Hawai‘i," although it is unclear why that is relevant other than to perhaps call into question that heritage, since it is not unique to Hawaiians. If many peoples of Polynesia are related to kalo, how can just one group "claim" (read: "own") that relationship? The relationship is really nothing more than a shared story with no metaphysical or ethical implications.

345. *CTAHR and Taro,* 5.
the ethical obligations—mālama, kuleana, and pono—that flow from that ancestral line are optional, a story one can choose to believe or ignore.

The connection of this opposition to those who "have resentment about the usurpation of Hawaiian hegemony" also politicizes the Ōiwi Maoli-kalo relationship, rendering it an optional tool that a group of people, who have residual anger about the overthrow or, in CTAHR’s words, "the historical intervention." Opposition to CTAHR and its patenting of kalo was simply a means to advance an Ōiwi Maoli sovereignty agenda. This politicization denies Mālama ʻĀina as an ethical obligation and fails to see kalo as the subject it is. It also implies that the Ōiwi Maoli who protested the patenting had a choice, as if they could choose to be related to kalo or not, much the same way a Catholic or Lutheran might choose to believe in God or the Pope or not.

There is no recognition by CTAHR of an assumption that kalo is a subject that demands moral consideration from Ōiwi Maoli. To be clear, the opposition to kalo patenting was definitely political in the sense that it took place in a social and highly public realm. But this is not to say it was only political. As with much of Ōiwi Maoli philosophy, politics and ethics "are in the many," which is to say interconnected.

CTAHR depicts a second group of opponents as those who believe Hawaiian taro varieties to be superior to any others. They believe that the problems affecting taro production in Hawai‘i today are due not to introduced pests but to

346. We see this same argument in response to the Thirty Meter Telescope protests today.

347. This analogy is not made lightly. UH-Mānoa Vice Chancellor of Research Gary Ostrander was heard to liken the Ōiwi Maoli view of kalo as an ancestor to his belief, as a Catholic, that the eucharistic bread is changed into the body of Christ during communion.
restrictions imposed by government on access to land and, particularly, water resources.\textsuperscript{348}

Again, CTAHR’s wording is instructive. For CTAHR, rooted in a narrative that sees nature as a machine-like object, the problems facing kalo can be addressed by manipulating kalo—the plant—to operate more efficiently. Opposition to this scientifically-grounded view must fall outside of science because science, in its objective reason rooted in universal laws, is exceptionalised; there can be no other meaningful way to talk about the problem. Thus, those who argued the problem was with the entire ecological picture, i.e., water resources, had to be arguing something nonsensical, which CTAHR heard as a type of kook-science rooted in ethnocentric botany.

CTAHR’s position on this second group of opponents was discussed in Chapter 2, and yet, remains confusing. Scientific data certainly exists to support the idea that reduced flow of water, one of the concerns raised by this second group, impacts the health of certain wetland taro. CTAHR very likely was involved in these experiments and ‘Ōiwi Maoli have been aware of this issue since they began growing wetland taro and monitoring water usage, i.e., pre-contact. Thus, the decision to characterize this group of opponents in the way CTAHR did makes one wonder if the deepened assumption that both science and capitalism (read, increased housing that pulls water from streams) are moral. One must deal with economic progress not by taking steps to eliminate it, but by taking steps to work within its framework. For CTAHR, exploring such issues as water diversion is futile since these are restrictions imposed by the government as a result of axiomatically moral economic growth and outside of science. This is a political

\textsuperscript{348} \textit{CTAHR and Taro}, 5.

226
problem. CTAHR scientists needed to take what they are given and fix it within that scientific context within the parameters they could control. Recalling that part of CTAHR’s narrative genealogy is that only objective reason is meaningful, a discussion of politics is meaningless and lies outside of CTAHR’s mandate. Under these assumptions, nature and issues involved in managing nature occur in the autonomous lab and/or in the marketplace driven by self-interested, profit-maximizing individuals (recall the EPA paper in Chapter 3), and lie outside of ethical or political or social or activist mandates.

The final group of opponents were part of a movement that opposes globalization and the use of biotechnology in agriculture and other areas. In particular, some adherents of this movement are suspicious of genetic engineering biotechnology and fearful of its possible negative consequences for the "natural order" of life on Earth. This anti-GMO (genetically modified organism) activist segment is a subset of a broader group which believes that "organic agriculture" produces foods more conducive to human health than do other forms of production, and that the methods it involves are more favorable to sustaining a "healthy" environment. 349

In this depiction, not only CTAHR’s use of words, but its use of punctuation evidences its views on those who would oppose the patenting of kalo. CTAHR positions this opposition as arising from an "activist segment" who are anti-GMO, anti-globalization, anti-industrial agriculture, and anti-science, and by association, anti-progress, and potentially even "anti-moral." This description is rooted in CTAHR’s assumption that science and capitalism are axiomatically moral projects.

349. CTAHR and Taro, 6.
CTAHR is arguing that this group of protesters is essentially speaking nonsense when it talks about "natural order," "organic agriculture," and "healthy," for they do so outside of the rational Western framework of science. CTAHR fails to recognize that there may well be legitimate opposition. Any opposition to genetically modified organisms, biotechnology, globalization, and the current industrial agricultural complex, which no doubt CTAHR knows exists, has no place in the science lab and is akin to "superstition" in the context of an assumption that science and capitalism are moral and their projects are above question.350 We simply cannot question that globalization—as a capitalist project—and genetic-modification, or biotechnology—as scientific projects—are morally good. They axiomatically are.

CTAHR, rooted in its assumptions, could only see the opposition to its patenting of kalo as the work of individuals who appeared to be more committed to their personal cultural and spiritual views of the world than to benefitting humanity—people who did not understand science and who rejected the "historical intervention" of the United States. This was a group of people, rooted in some legendary past, who used CTAHR for political purposes of advancing their sovereignty cause, or, to paraphrase CTAHR, to advance ʻŌiwi Maoli hegemony in Hawai‘i.

350. In June of 2015, UH-Mānoa faculty rallied around CTAHR Assistant Professor Hector Valenzuela, who allegedly had projects and outreach programs cut and been denied the necessary tools, such as transporation, to meet his job requirements. Valenzuela allegedly also received abusive emails and was verbally abused by colleagues and administrators. According to an unnamed CTAHR administrator, the reason for the treatment was that Valenzuela was "criticizing CTAHR faculty and programs with intellectually dishonest arguments and actively supporting the poisonous activities of groups basically opposed to CTAHR, science and progress." Valenzuela and his supporters argue that he was simply providing farmers and others with information about organic farming methods and expressing his concerns about some of the methods employed in biotechnology. In a letter sent to a number of UH-Mānoa Administrators in June, 2015, the faculty supporters of Valenzuela argue that "[f]ar from his position being 'opposed to science', we can cite hundreds of scientific articles that are equally critical of certain aspects of biotechnology. In other words, controversies involving biotechnology are not the single, simple conflict between pro-science/pro-biotechnology and anti-science/anti-biotechnology that CTAHR administrators have claimed, but a series of legitimate scientific arguments." From Letter to Dasenbrook et. al. dated June 18, 2015.
CTAHR’s Characterizations of Its Own Actions

CTAHR’s understanding of what it was doing likely went something like this. CTAHR was trying to do the right thing and bring the ʻŌiwi Maoli into the 21st century, saving them from themselves in the good paternalist fashion. This belief can be seen in CTAHR’s reaction to the controversy: "The emergence of the idea that the improvement work is detrimental to taro as a Hawaiian heritage plant has been distressing to those in CTAHR who carry on this tradition of applying science for the benefit of Hawaiʻi’s crops and farmers."

The planks of CTAHR’s position, then, are as follows.

- CTAHR’s moral obligation was not to kalo, but to the ʻŌiwi Maoli, and that duty meant both modifying kalo to protect the genome—protecting market share by creating a monopoly over the new plants. The duty was to the people—the only ones in the realm of moral considerability.

- CTAHR’s application for ownership of the kalo plants occurred in the context of a narrative genealogy that states that since nature is an object, it can be manipulated and that manipulation can be owned. Not only can that manipulation be owned, it is owned because ownership, under a Lockean view, occurs when one individual mixes labor with nature.

- This mixing of labor is good and moral and it is what was intended when God put humans and nature on the earth together. Setting aside the religious connotations, this mixing of labor helps to increase the "common stock of mankind," as Locke refers to it.

351. CTAHR and Taro, 9.

229
• Juxtaposing this notion of ownership, the result of mixing labor with nature, as being morally good in that it increases the "common stock of mankind," with the idea that science and capitalism are axiomatically moral, it makes perfect sense for CTAHR and its scientists to be confused, hurt, and betrayed at the reaction of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli to the patents. Everything in CTAHR’s narrative genealogy pointed towards the patenting of kalo as a good and moral action.

Kant also provides some insight into CTAHR’s motives. Under the Kantian theory, as discussed in Chapter 3, all unowned objects are available to be owned by others, which is to say, if I do not claim an object as a means to achieve my personal ends, that object is available to others to claim. The Juridical Postulate of Practical Reason, which all rational humans necessarily agree to, says that I have a duty to allow others to have external objects in order for them to meet their ends. Of course, this only applies if I do not already have property rights in the external object in question. In market terms, if a commodity is not owned, it is part of the commons—intellectual or otherwise—and therefore subject to use, ownership, and possibly even exploitation to the point of exhaustion, by anyone.

CTAHR had experience with working to save a commodity in Hawai‘i and having it "stolen." Between 1960 and 1990, CTAHR developed 10 varieties of macadamia nuts and claimed that these varieties turned the macadamia nut industry in Hawai‘i into a growing and thriving one. None of the cultivars were patented and were "‘borrowed’" by "outside competitors." The result, CTAHR wrote, was that "foreign macadamia nuts compete strongly for a market that was once primarily Hawai‘i’s." The implication from this story is that had CTAHR patented (which it would not have been able to do in 1960) these macadamia nut varieties and
thereby taken ownership of these plants, the macadamia nut industry in Hawai‘i would be a thriving one today. In CTAHR’s words: "The impetus to pursue patents on plants developed by UH faculty has come about in recognition of the value of patents as a tool to secure Hawai‘i’s accomplishments and protect them, for a time, from piracy." Thus, patenting removes resources from the "commons" and protects them.

Given this narrative, CTAHR believed it was using the tools at its disposal to protect a natural resource and industry of Hawai‘i, both of which would be subject to the vagaries of the commons. This notion of property rights was available to CTAHR because it saw kalo as a plant, as an object, as something that existed in the commons for anyone else in the world to take and possess and use towards their own ends. CTAHR wanted to exert its property rights over the kalo in order to keep it, to control its use, and to make it available to meet the ends of the ʻŌiwi Maoli.

ʻŌiwi Maoli Response to the Kalo Patents

The problems with CTAHR’s mo’olelo for the ʻŌiwi Maoli are as follows.

(1) First, kalo is a subject and cannot be owned. ʻŌiwi Maoli opposition was rooted in Mālama ʻĀina and its three attendant ethical obligations: pono, mālama, and kuleana. ʻŌiwi Maoli opposed the patents because they take it as their responsibility as ʻŌiwi Maoli to protect the natural resources of their lands. This responsibility comes not from a need to manage, but from a deeply held ethical principle that is rooted in their cosmogenic genealogy. Simply, ʻŌiwi Maoli opposed the patents because a relative cannot be owned.

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Placing this argument over ownership in a larger context, CTAHR’s actions in first owning and then licensing the kalo obstructed and prohibited Ōiwi Maoli from Mālama ‘Āina. This was not a denial or limitation of some political or social right, such as the revocation of a driver’s license. This was a denial of identity and personhood. Because, as noted earlier, Ōiwi Maoli identity—who they are as a people—is bound within the notion of Mālama ‘Āina and proper service and protection to the ‘āina, denial of that ability to serve by removing kalo from the community and by denying control of that resource was tantamount to denying the very existence of the Ōiwi Maoli as a people. To be fair, Ōiwi Maoli can choose to turn their back on Mālama ‘Āina, they can choose to serve a different community, one that contains only subjects and one that operates under the assumptions of the tradition as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. That choice, however, cannot be made for them. To do that, to remove choices, is to enslave and make inhuman. To use Kant, to deny humans their autonomy (and I recognize the dangers of raising Kant here, but it may be we can have autonomy within a context of service and not ownership) is to deny they are human. This is the project of colonization that continues in occupation. So, CTAHR was in some ways correct: the kalo controversy was about the Overthrow. But, CTAHR’s actions were reminiscent of Joey Carter’s op ed piece, when they argued they stood outside that history of colonization and were being impermissibly used as a "proxy." Through patenting of the kalo CTAHR, directly acted, whether with good intentions or not, to deny the ability of the Ōiwi Maoli to Mālama ‘Āina.

(2) Second, by arguing, as CTAHR accurately stated, that the issues with disease in kalo were directly related to water diversion from kalo to housing developments and golf courses, Ōiwi Maoli were questioning whether CTAHR needed to modify the genome. In many ways,
this challenged the CTAHR assumption that the projects of science (kalo patenting) and
capitalism (housing developments and tourism) were axiomatically moral. Moreover, for ʻŌiwi
Maoli, care for a sibling meant one looks at the environment in which that sibling lives, so it
made perfect sense to explore the entire ecology of taro, including where it grows and the
amount and speed of flowing water through the loʻi.

(3) A final argument raised by ʻŌiwi Maoli not directly or even indirectly addressed by
CTAHR in its Background Report was that the kalo patents violated the new and novel
requirement in that the new traits alleged were actually already in existence and being used and
had been used in the past by ʻŌiwi Maoli (ʻŌiwi Maoli also argued the traits were not proven).
In other words, as noted in Chapter 1, CTAHR relied upon certain traits found in the local
variety of kalo, Maui Lehua. Those traits were specifically bred into the plant by ʻŌiwi Maoli
and were already in use by the community. In short, CTAHR did nothing new when it cross-bred
the two plants; the only "novelty" was that it attempted to own them. Under the legal concept of
"prior art," patents will not be issued on discoveries that are either known or used or owned or all
three. The ʻŌiwi Maoli argued that the plants were known, used, and while not owned in a
Western-sense, certainly previously crafted by ʻŌiwi Maoli in conjunction with Hāloa.

As such, ʻŌiwi Maoli found it difficult to understand how CTAHR and its researchers
could claim the creation of a plant whose parent had been finely crafted, cross-bred, controlled,
and protected by the ʻŌiwi Maoli community for centuries. Within a Western understanding of
property, however, a community cannot own collectively. Labor, via Locke, is an individual
endeavor, and mixing labor with other things to create ownership is done on individual basis.
The notion that a community can take claim for centuries of communal activities and mixing of labor does not resonate within a Western system.

The refusal to engage with the ‘Ōiwi Maoli argument that Maui Lehua was not an accident of nature but a calculated creation is further evidence of the prioritizing of the scientific method and its attendant objectivity. Maui Lehua was listed in the patents as "an unpatented taro cultivar of ‘unknown ancestry.’” CTAHR apparently did not know who or how the Maui Lehua plant was cross-bred to have the traits it had. As noted above, the reason for this, in large part, is because the practical know-how of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli in crafting and creating Maui Lehua was not considered "scientific." This is despite the fact ‘Ōiwi Maoli took thirty-some varieties and through careful and selective cross-breeding created over three hundred varieties, each with its own special and unique characteristics. Nevertheless, even if credit was given for selective cross-breeding, the end result really was an accident because it was not scientifically orchestrated. The hundreds of years of kalo cultivation in Hawaii and the hundreds of varieties created are not seen. The UH Administrators and others need not give credit to the cross-breeding efforts of ‘Ōiwi Maoli because these cross breeding efforts were the result of either luck or skilled artisanship.

I am not by any means saying that CTAHR took the steps to disassociate and minimize ‘Ōiwi Maoli involvement in the creation of Maui Lehua on purpose or with any type of malicious intent. In fact, my guess is that they felt they were helping the ‘Ōiwi Maoli by demanding a certain objectivity. To borrow from Feminist philosopher Naomi Scheman’s characterization of Descartes discussed in Chapter 3, a key part of Enlightenment reason is that it be both individual and universal. We can only know as individuals, with equal intellect and free
of compulsion, but what we know turns out to be universal in that we all know the same way. However, this equality can only occur if we all have the same intellect and that can only occur if we all divorce ourselves from context. The idea that some knowledge is acquired by a special positioning, one not chosen but one nevertheless real, to the objects of the world, such as the ‘Ōiwi Maoli have with regard to kalo, renders this epistemic equality impossible. The idea that some may know differently and in ways not equally accessible to all implies that knowledge is not a view from nowhere, but is the result of a situated and contextual community of knowers. Thus, as a result of a certain type of commodification of thought, namely an intellectual property regime, and an expectation of a certain scientific method rooted in disembodied objectivity, CTAHR simply could not recognize the role ‘Ōiwi Maoli as a community played in the creation of the Maui Lehua strain.

IV.
Conclusion and Chapter Transition

In any genealogy, whether it be an ‘Ōiwi Maoli cosmogenic genealogy or a critical narrative genealogy, there is always something more than simply a recitation of history. For ‘Ōiwi Maoli one’s familial history brings with it a genealogical line back to the time of the Kumulipo (the source of darkness, before time was time, from where all things came). However, that genealogy also brings with it family traditions, values, stories, amakua (family gods), kuleana (responsibilities), and pono (proper service). Genealogy centers ‘Ōiwi Maoli in the world. In the end, narrative and ancestral genealogies merge into one for the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, and in many ways, it is care that causes that.

Patenting to protect, the argument made by CTAHR, is rooted in another implication arising from the assumption that nature is a machine that private ownership is necessary to
protect. In cases where we simply cannot own privately—for example, in cases where lands are held in trust for the community, or even in cases where lands are privately held but ecologically important—the predominant Western belief, in light of the discussion in the paragraph above, is that it behooves the stakeholders (those humans who have an interest in the land or resources in question) to work together to manage those resources.

But under CTAHR’s view of the world, nature remains a commodity—one that should be preserved and maintained and managed for future generations, no doubt—but a commodity nonetheless. As a commodity, kalo’s value is rooted in human valuing and it has no moral status. Mālama ʻĀina clearly holds that ʻŌiwi Maoli owe ethical duties to the ʻāina, including kalo.

For the UH Administrators and CTAHR researchers, kalo was but a plant—an object—an Other with no value other than that given to it by a human—a subject. Accordingly, kalo could be used and manipulated, bought and sold, or owned, and therefore access to it could be controlled, a private good as it were, by CTAHR. This view stands in sharp contrast with the views of the ʻŌiwi Maoli, who reject the objectification or instrumentalization through commodification of kalo and who give it subject status and subject needs and interests that demand attention and care.353

Thus ʻŌiwi Maoli opposition to patenting was also an affirmation of their assumption that science and capitalism are not axiomatically moral and that there are any number of ways to

353. Kanehe, "Kūʻē Mana Māhele," 349 quoting Kamuela Enos. "If it’s in the Kumulipo, then it is older than us and we have kuleana to preserve it. . . . We can’t say this is just a kalo issue. . . . The way to frame it all up is that we have to use the word “ʻāina.” ʻĀina doesn’t mean land. ʻĀina means “that which feeds” and ʻāina means relationship. All of these different things had a part to play in the system, the ecology, in which Hawaiians survived. Yes, kalo is very prominent and is reflected in its standing in our cosmology, but [it doesn’t exist] without all the other parts, like the flora and fauna that was within the ‘auwai that flowed down to the muliwai that created this life. You didn’t just have kalo and Hawaiians. . . . If you only talk about kalo, then you are neglecting all of the other kūpuna that were part of kalo's moʻokūʻauhau."
think about the world. There are multiple ways to view the world and it is in this multiplicity that we move forward, and craft more effective relationships with that world. This is the emergent aspect of ‘Ōiwi Maoli thought, and one we can see going back to the time of the Hale Nauā.

Chapter 6 has its own assumptions. The first is that while non-ʻŌiwi Maoli may not be able to fully understand the Mālama ʻĀina, they can begin to grasp it via Western concepts. This will require the transformation of the current "Western" narrative genealogy by exploring different intellectual histories and opening up the possibility of new and diverse assumptions about nature. The goal of Chapter 5 is not for non-ʻŌiwi Maoli to become ʻŌiwi Maoli. The goal is to begin to position both sides so to avoid kalo controversy-like conflicts in the future.
Chapter 6
Ka Moʻohele

We have no sort of right to speak in any way as if the inner experience behind any fact of nature were of a grade lower than ours, or less conscious, or less rational, or more atomic. . . . [T]his reality is, like that of our own experience, conscious, organic, full of clear contrasts, rational, definite. We ought not to speak of dead nature.

--Joshiah Royce

Aloha ʻĀina, the sacred love between the land, all of its offspring including Kanaka; Aloha ʻĀina which binds us into this relationship and obligation to care for our islands and our seas. It is Aloha ʻĀina which we have branded into our souls and which we continue to teach with fervor and conviction to our children and grandchildren. And this is the message, this is the story we must now release to those around us who do not share our ancestry but will most certainly share our fate if we fail to confront and defeat the empire.

--Jonathan Kay Kamakawioʻole Osorio

ʻAʻohe pau ka ʻike i ka hālau hoʻokahi.

--ʻOlelo Noʻeau No. 203

Introduction and Chapter Goals

This dissertation began with ʻŌiwi kalo mahiʻai and activist Walter Ritte’s exclamation of frustration during the kalo controversy: "It is no small matter when an indigenous people share the importance of their traditional knowledge and genealogy, and the dominant culture refuses to listen." The premise of this work has been that it was not so much that CTAHR and non-ʻŌiwi Maoli refused to listen, but that they held hidden assumptions that set up obstacles to their understanding the ʻŌiwi Maoli message. The problem was rooted not in a lack of care or

354. The road or path
355. All knowledge is not learned in just one school. [One can learn from many sources.]
concern, or possibly even respect, but in a lack of conceptual resources. Chapters 3 and 4 explored the critical narrative genealogy of CTAHR, which included both a certain exceptionalised view of the world and the social force of capitalism. Chapter 5 explored the critical narrative genealogy and cosmogenic genealogy of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli to reveal the moral and ethical obligations raised by Mālama ‘Āina and the attendant assumptions that informed the ‘Ōiwi Maoli position on the kalo controversy.

The purpose of the early chapters and the overall goal for this work was to arrive at a new Third-Way relationship with Earth Others. Originally, the thought was to arrive at Third-Way assumptions that could replace the ones currently in use and that would better guide future resource management discussions. This chapter, indeed this entire dissertation, began with an organizational assumption that the way to counteract assumptions is to find counter-assumptions. For example, the antithesis to an assumption of privileging and exceptionalising is to assume no privileging and exceptionalising. The antithesis to an assumption of subject/object divide is to assume no subject/object divide.

That being said, one of the implications of this labor has been to question the efficacy of antithetical analysis, especially in the context of ‘Ōiwi Maoli. For example, the preceding chapters should raise concerns regarding whether the land commons is the antithesis of land enclosure, whether the knowledge commons is the antithesis of intellectual property rights, and whether res communis is the antithesis to private property rights. As a result, it is not that great of a leap to question whether searching for antithesis assumptions is the appropriate way to move forward in the formulation of a Third-Way relationship.
Moreover, if my discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the resemblances for the family of assumptions is correct, then regardless of the assumption, whether more "favorable" to my outcome or not, it will still share one or more resemblances, either being (1) so axiomatic to the way we view the world that their falsity is unfathomable and as such, are reflections of an unquestioned ideology; (2) repeated so often so as to quash opposition, making it impossible to question underlying ideology; and/or (3) problematic to release since belief in the assumptions makes life easier. Therefore, even if my assumption is that we reject exceptionalising and accept pluralism, as an assumption it retains all of the familial resemblances and all of the familial flaws, which is to say, we find it difficult to question those assumptions or the ideology that lies underneath those assumptions. Like the Liars Paradox, an assumption that promotes pluralism in an attempt to minimize privileging is still an assumption that privileges.

This questioning of the project itself, not simply its subject matter, comes in the context of using the tool of critical narrative genealogy and the space of conflict to reveal hidden assumptions and a way forward. That space, aided by the notion of pono as an ongoing meta-notion of how to be in the world, reveals that it is not necessarily the content of the assumption that is the problem but the holding of assumptions themselves, at least those that bear the familial resemblance discussed in Chapter 2 and above. Something more than a new set of assumptions is needed if we are to truly heed Ritte's call.

That "something more" or Third-Way is a set of values (axiology) that arises from our own tradition and that are espoused by the action (praxis) of a relationship of standing-with or ho‘opili. This relationship is informed by the Mālama ‘Āina ethical values of mālama, pono, and

357. The Liars Paradox centers around how to determine whether the statement "I am lying" made by a liar is true or false.
kuleana in that the relationship demands care, self-reflection, and a recognition of both its vulnerability and its limitations. However, the ethical support for this form of a relationship does not come from appropriating an ʻŌiwi Maoli philosophy, but from using that philosophy as a guide to seek support in a non-ʻŌiwi Maoli tradition. As the following demonstrates, by recognizing a different intellectual archaeology than the one generally exceptionalised, one that promotes interconnectedness, recognition of context, and responsibility to all things in nature, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli have access to the requisite values to undergird a new relationship with ʻŌiwi Maoli and Earth Others. Through hoʻopili and the critical self-reflection, care, and vulnerability that goes with it, we can thoughtfully engage with Mālama ʻĀina and other traditions, combating exceptionalising and the CTAHR deepened assumptions that limit our ability to know the world. The Third-Way is not a rejection of our own tradition, but a recognition of the plurality, diversity, and vitality of that tradition.

A Word of Caution

Recalling and echoing the concerns raised in Chapter 2 regarding the use of the word "appropriation," non-ʻŌiwi Maoli have a less than stellar track record when it comes to using ʻŌlelo ʻŌiwi terms, which are all too frequently "prostituted" (to use Trask’s word) to benefit a world view that is very much not that of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. In addition to the discussion of konohiki and ahupuaʻa in Chapter 1, Trask adds the use of the term "Mālama ʻĀina," itself, which she argues government and developers appropriate "to sell new projects and to convince locals that hotels can be built with concern for ‘ecology.’" Or the word "aloha," which graces everything from travel ads to a stand-up paddleboard shop in Charlotte, North Carolina. In

reality, "aloha" refers to the "unstinting generosity" that helped to create relationships between ‘Ōiwi Maoli, who, as discussed earlier, shared resources.\textsuperscript{359}

Trask, in writing about identity politics, also notes the dangers that come with non-‘Ōiwi Maoli believing they "understand" the culture:

In my experience, \textit{haole} who brag about believing precisely what we Hawaiians believe are using our culture to advance their own cause. In other words, when I hear such seemingly sympathetic rhetoric in a meeting at the beginning of a struggle, I am certain of impending \textit{haole} takeover of the group, of the swift backgrounding of Hawaiian ways of framing and arguing the issues at hand, and of \textit{haole} leadership with a token Native for public relations purposes. Over time, Hawaiians will drop out of the group, not because they possess few organizing skills or are unable to understand the issues, but rather because of the racism and individualism of \textit{haole} members who presume their views and strategies should take precedence over those of Hawaiians.\textsuperscript{360}

With this in mind, when I use terms like Mālama ‘Āina, kuleana, and pono, I am not using them lightly or to somehow indicate my "Hawaiian heart," if I believed I had one. I am using them to inform and deepen non-‘Ōiwi Maoli concepts and as markers of an idea and a space where peoples of two different narratives and cosmogenic genealogies can come together. I attempt to use them in ways as close to their meaning as defined by ‘Ōiwi Maoli as it is possible for a non-‘Ōiwi Maoli to do. To be sure, I am using this to advance my cause and while that cause is not identical to that of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, it hopefully can be useful to ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Finally, one way

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{360} Haunani-Kay Trask, "Coalition-Building Between Natives and Non-Native," \textit{Stanford Law Review}, Vol. 43, No. 6 (July 1991), 1207.

242
to avoid exploitation and appropriation of the language is through the ho‘opili relationship discussed below, which relies upon the constant feedback from ‘Ōiwi Maoli and constant critical self-reflection of non-‘Ōiwi Maoli. The standing-with relationship, with its attendant focus on non-‘Ōiwi Maoli dependence upon and vulnerability to ‘Ōiwi Maoli, should mitigate the centering and privileging of the non-‘Ōiwi Maoli agenda that Trask refers to above.

I.

**Third-Way Axiology**

The proposed Third-Way axiology is a set of values that can be found in the Western tradition. These values include the recognition of the importance of context, which stands in stark contrast to a disembodied scientific method: an understanding of the world that does not require a hierarchical, polarized dualism of subject and object, but allows for the interconnectedness of the world and a recognition of the intrinsic value of all things. That interconnectedness and the coherence it demands results in the formation of a moral and ethical responsibility to take actions that result in the least amount of opposition possible. That interconnectedness trickles down to how we talk about the world (facts/values) and the recognition that there is no one superior set of propositions but rather a plurality of viable options. These values arise from a narrative genealogy, as the following demonstrates.

*Ka Hā*[^361]

**Nehamas on Plato and Context**

As noted in Chapter 3, Plato and his forms can easily and most certainly have been read to support a hierarchical dualism between body (nature, things of the earth) and soul (reason, forms, things not of the earth). Philosopher Alexander Nehamas argues that the idea that the

[^361]: The stalk that supports the leaf of kalo, sugar cane, and other plants.

243
forms promote disembodiment and exceptionalise a view-from-nowhere is a misreading of the purpose of the split between the sensible world and the Forms. According to Nehamas, the language surrounding the Forms as perfect and their sensible embodiment as imperfect has to do with a recognition that we do see certain sensible objects in a context and it is that context which changes their meaning.\textsuperscript{362}

According to Nehamas, there are two types of predicates in the world. His examples for the first, a complete predicate, are "... is a finger" or "... is a human." Regardless of context, a "finger" will be a finger. We can change the use of the finger, e.g., to point or to eat, but we can never change its identity. There will never be something that is more a finger than a finger already is. However, there are other predicates like "... is just" or "... is beautiful" that are incomplete in that they are context-based. For example, the Form for beauty is beautiful in itself regardless of its context. All other things in this class or set, subjects to the "... is beautiful" predicate, are beautiful only when they participate in that beauty at a certain point in time.\textsuperscript{363}

Nehamas notes that it is not that sensible objects are imperfect forms in that they have imperfect properties, it is that they possess the perfect form properties imperfectly; their possession of certain properties of a specific Form may be imperfect. Imperfection, according to Nehamas, is not a denigrating term but refers to the fact that the objects possess some properties only temporarily, or incompletely, or accidentally, which is to say, contextually. Plato is simply acknowledging context and change, which also is a recognition of the complexity of the world.


\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.
We cannot capture all the nuances of sensible things in our world for all times.\footnote{Ibid., 185.} Context also indicates a recognition that things are relational and at different times, depending upon their surroundings, may participate in different Forms. None of this, in Nehamas’ mind, indicates that Plato believed sensible objects were somehow inferior to Forms in such a way as to promote subject/object dualism.

\textbf{Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop}

Nehamas demonstrates that a certain reading of Plato is not mandated. Disputes can, should, and do arise over narratives, even philosophical ones. Moreover, if we read Plato as Nehamas does, Plato contributes to a recognition of context, a recognition that things do change based on their surroundings, and as such, we cannot negotiate the world from nowhere because things are always somewhere. Reason must include some element of the subjective in the sense of recognizing the contextual nature of our world. Thus, our understanding of the world is rooted in context and its corollary, the subjective, in two ways: one content and one meta, which is to say a discussion about how it is that we read that content as disembodied or rooted in context.

Moreover, that Plato can be read in this way means the narrative genealogy of Chapter 3 does have space to question the exceptionalising of the views within its own tradition. That space can be expanded to include a questioning of not only the content of the tradition but also the very exceptionalising of the tradition itself (a type of meta question). Just as there are different ways to interpret Plato's theory of forms, there may be different ways to interpret the system within which that theory is found. While we philosophers sometimes forget the key role critical analysis plays in philosophy with the pressures of teaching and a rather conservative academic canon and
community, philosophy does not mandate exceptionalising of one view within our own tradition or of one tradition in general.

This openness to alternative readings and traditions has an interesting corollary in science. Putnam argues that contrary to popular belief, there is no one monolithic scientific method and no method—whatever it may be—arrives at some ultimate form of truth. Putnam points out that there are many different sub-disciplines within the broader field of science—e.g., physics, biology, ecology—and each has a different paradigm and different form of inquiry.\textsuperscript{365} There simply is no certain, one, right "science" with one shared vision and paradigm. Moreover, science itself (like philosophy) is done in a context of difference and discord and it relies on counter-arguments and critical attacks to determine which theories are better, based on what we know at that time. Thus, just as philosophy has no one correct way to read Plato, neither does science have one correct way to understand the world.

In addition to not having one specific and absolute scientific method, science also does not arrive at set and absolute answers to questions; there simply is no objective, final-for-all-time answer. Putnam rejects the idea that through science and its attendant objectivity we can achieve non-controversiality, i.e., that there is a final, "established beyond controversy," truth or word.\textsuperscript{366} For support, Putnam points to the age of the universe, which has changed and likely will again. Pluto’s identity crisis is another example. Not only are things changing, science needs that change and controversy in order to be science.

\textsuperscript{365} Hillary Putnam, \textit{The Many Faces of Realism: The Paul Carus Lectures}, (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 72. Putnam likely would agree that the scientific method loosely defined does mandate objectivity, but his overall argument is that facts and values are entangled so there is no view from nowhere.

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 64.
Furthermore, we recognize not only that things are constantly changing, but also that we believe in things that we do not have absolute and incontrovertible support for.\textsuperscript{367} For example, at the time of the writing of this dissertation, scientists posit the existence of something called dark matter. The dark matter hypothesis is based on observations of galaxies and mathematical computation, but has yet to be proven. In fact, the words "dark matter" are viewed as a "place holder" until scientists can better determine the precise nature of this "thing" they posit exists, which along with another unknown referred to as "dark energy" makes up about 75\% of the stuff of the universe.

The crucial point of all of this is that there are many different competing interpretations of the world and this is key to how both science and philosophy work, which is by testing and pushing those interpretations. That there are many competing interpretations does not stop us from being in or taking action in the world. No one waits for the final word from science, in part, because there may never be a final word from science. The idea that statements of fact are absolutely true by nature and that we rely on that absolute fact simply does not seem to be how the world works.\textsuperscript{368} Neither philosophy nor science, then, has "one absolutely true" way of viewing not only their canon, but also their world. Exceptionalising should have no role either in science or in philosophy.

\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., 67.

\textsuperscript{368} Putnam, \textit{The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy}, 41–42.
Ficino on Subjectivity and Interconnectedness

While Plato begins to open the door to a type of subjectivity, or at the very least a recognition of context, Neo-Platonist Renaissance philosopher Marsilio Ficino flings that same door wide open by providing an argument for the necessity and interconnection of subjectivity and objectivity. That argument begins with a recognition that among its many duties, Ficino’s soul provides humans with the means by which we know the world. This way of knowing the world is one that, in Philosopher Tamara Albertini’s view, conflates the objective and subjective. For Ficino, according to Albertini, we come to know the world through our rational minds by relating the particular aspects of a thing, which we come to know through the senses, to the universality of the world, which the thing must participate in. Albertini relates Ficino’s theory of knowledge acquisition to "[t]wo spherical lights [that] touch." One of these spheres depicts "the transition from the universal to the individual," the other sphere goes in the opposite direction, from the individual to the universal. The place where the two spheres meet is symbolic of the rational soul, which not only links the individual or particular to the universe, but also contracts the universe to the particular. The universal forms residing in the mind compare the images of the sensible objects to determine if they match the universal. The mind takes the universal and the particular and creates its own images (species), thus matching the world to

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369. Born in 1433 outside of Florence, Ficino is often credited with almost single-handedly bringing Plato and other Greek philosophers to the late Middle Ages and Renaissance period. Ficino’s benefactor in Florence, Cosimo de’ Medici, provided Ficino with land to start the Platonic Academy of Florence, and Ficino was the first to translate the Platonic dialogues into a Western language. Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Ficino, Marsilio" The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc & The Free Press, 1967), 197.
itself. This is not a single step process, however, as the mind continually tests its match and makes corrections as needed.\textsuperscript{370}

Philosopher Paul Oskar Kristeller has a similar view in that he interprets Ficino’s theory of knowledge as recognizing that the "thinking subject" and the object being thought about are part of that same well-ordered and inter-connected universe. Thus, "the act of thinking is a relationship between the thinking subject (the thing that thinks) and the thought object (the thing that is thought)." All thinking then is really "the result of an original affinity between the mind and its objects"—an affinity that arises because of the inter-relatedness of all things in the hierarchy of the universe via the Soul’s extension of love.\textsuperscript{371}

For Ficino, this way of coming to know the world is a matter of the intellect, which "draws the objects to itself" and understands the object in its own way. However, the will also plays a role in knowledge-formation. Unlike the intellect, which draws objects to itself, the will, which is an appetite, is drawn to objects. As such, the will understands the objects as they "are in themselves." The will does not modify objects to fit that which it already knows, but the will "itself is changed." Ficino differentiates the will and intellect through their differing functions. According to Albertini, the intellect focuses on truth and the universal, separating itself from objects in an inner enfolding motion. Words Ficino uses to describe intellect include visual metaphors like "seeing." Intellect stands opposed to will, which Ficino describes as good,


\textsuperscript{371} Kristeller, \textit{The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino}, 109.
focused on the particular, and that involves a union with objects. The movement of will is one of outer (unfolding) motion and desiring. The process of knowledge, then, is as follows:

The intellect separates, interiorizes, "sees," and preserves the necessary optic distance from the objects; its mode of knowledge is presented by means of optic constructions. The will is the exact opposite of this: it unites, it moves outward, it "desires," it overcomes the distance from the objects. . . .

When we come to know a particular thing in the world, we are really re-connecting with that thing because we are already connected to it via the Soul. But we come to know it in a particular context that is our own. Knowing is not done by separating ourselves from the object and all context, but by reconnecting with the object and recognizing our shared context. As Ficino wrote,

What does the intellect ask for, except to transform itself into everything by drawing everything unto itself? What does the will attempt to achieve, except to transform itself into everything by enjoying everything?

Thus, while there are two things in the world, subjects and objects, these two things are in a dependent and interconnected relationship, not a polarized dualistic and hierarchical relationship. As Albertini notes, "[a] subject aware of an external world will always exist [for Ficino], and there will always be a world of objects awaiting its interpretation.”

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375. Ibid.
Ficino’s theory of knowledge can rely upon the affinity between subject and object that results from their interrelatedness because, for Ficino, there is a "great world-organism" that pulsates through and connects all things.\(^{376}\) All things fit into one of five (sometimes twelve) categories: God, the angelic mind, the rational Soul, quality, and body. All things were further divided into two classes: substance and attributes. All objects, both corporeal and incorporeal, are substance. Substances, which can exist by themselves and have "capacity for existence," are contrasted with attributes or properties of things. All substances are limited and qualified by their attributes. Each substance shares the general attribute of Being and it is in this sharing that all things exist in a closed-system, reciprocally related, with each object having a specific place and Being superior to all.\(^{377}\)

When individual things, which are different aspects of Being, share certain attributes and are considered equal, they are referred to as a species. The hierarchy of the entire universe is constructed on the ordering of these different species and the attributes and qualities of these species. There are rational and immortal animals, rational and mortal animals, and irrational and mortal animals, all ordered on a hierarchical ontological series. To change the qualities of these objects would change the objects themselves.\(^{378}\)

For Ficino, the entire structure of species, substance and attributes, and First Being is more important than individual parts, and it is the living nature of the parts that create the living nature of the whole:

The body of the world is a whole body . . . of which the bodies of all animals are the

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376. Tamara Albertini, "The Aesthetic of the One in the Soul."
378. Ibid., 79–82.
parts. . . . Just as the whole is more perfect than the parts, so the body of the world is more perfect than the body of the individual animals. It would be absurd that the imperfect body should have a Soul and the perfect body should not have a Soul or live. . . . Consequently, the whole body of the world lives, since the bodies of the animals that are parts of it live.\textsuperscript{379}

Ficino connects his world in a number of ways, including the transference of action,

In Ficino’s (translated) words: "‘Anything that produces something must be more excellent than anything that is produced by it.’"\textsuperscript{380} Because Being is the ultimate actor and the creator of all and the originator of all forces, that which is more active is closest to Being and higher on the hierarchy. However, all things that are more active give some of their activity to less active objects right below them on the hierarchical chain, with more active objects transferring action to less active objects. Instead of action and inaction separating the world into two metaphysical categories, as Descartes argued, transference of action links the entire hierarchy together. Ficino argues that "‘When a higher degree approaches a lower degree, it does not receive from it, but gives to it.’"\textsuperscript{381} All species are related in some way to those species above and below on the chain.

Another way of linking the world together is through the will or desiring of the soul. As Ficino explains,

If the soul agrees with both [that is with the higher and the lower beings], it also desires both. In other words, by a natural instinct it ascends to the higher beings and descends to

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 88, translating and quoting Ficino’s \textit{Opera Omnia} at 1342.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 87, translating and quoting Ficino’s \textit{Opera Omnia} at 181.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid., 77, translating and quoting Ficino’s \textit{Opera Omnia} at 347.
the lower. In ascending it does not leave the lower things, and in descending it does not leave the higher things. For if it should leave one of them, it would be inclined to the other extreme and no longer be the true juncture of the world.\textsuperscript{382}

The Soul binds all things together because it possesses "images of the divine things" as well as ideas of those things that exist below it. Because it is positioned in the center of the universe, it has the force of all things in the universe flowing through it. "'Therefore,'" Ficino concludes, "'it may be rightly called the center of nature, the middle term of all things, the series of the world, the face of all, the bond and the juncture of the universe.'"\textsuperscript{383} This bond is created through the Soul’s extension of love and thoughts to all things.\textsuperscript{384}

Ficino’s Soul, as the ultimate mediator, loves all things and attempts to participate in and with all things. As Ficino argued in the \textit{Opera omnia}:

It [the human Soul] lives the life of the plant when it yields to the body by abundant nourishing; the life of the beast when it flatters the senses; the life of man when it reflects through its reason on human affairs; that of heroes when it inquires into natural things; that of demons when it considers mathematics; that of angels when it contemplates divine mysteries; that of God when it does all for God's sake. Each man's Soul experiences in some way all these possibilities in itself, but different Souls in different ways. \textit{And so the human species strives to become all things by living the lives of all things.}\textsuperscript{385}

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{382} Ibid., 115, translating and quoting Ficino’s \textit{Opera Omnia} at 119.
    \item \textsuperscript{383} Ibid., 120, translating and quoting Ficino’s \textit{Opera Omnia} at 121.
    \item \textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 198–199.
    \item \textsuperscript{385} Ibid., 118, translating and quoting Ficino’s \textit{Opera Omnia} at 309, emphasis added.
\end{itemize}

253
Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

Ficino provides us then with a very different way to see the world than that of Bacon or Descartes or even Kant. Through Ficino’s eyes, we see a world in which the human soul is connected to all things. Of equal importance is the idea that the human soul does not eschew, avoid, or attempt to separate itself from those things lower on the chain than itself, but rather strives to become all things. This striving is linked not only to Ficino’s metaphysics but also to his epistemology. For at least according to Albertini, Ficino did not prioritize intellect and/or will, but instead harmonized the two. If this is true, it would be one step closer to a recognition that subjective and objective and the attendant subject and object need not be dualistically polarized, as they presently are in contemporary Western thought.

Ficino provides us with a way to understand the importance of both objective, context-less thought and subjective context-laden thought through his theory that both are necessary to understand the world. Moreover, that knowing of things in the world, the knowing of the "object," is really a recognition of the interconnectedness of the world. We recognize the objects that we see as being a part of an interconnected "family" that we share.

Conway on Shared Vitality

Lady Anne Conway, the English Enlightenment Philosopher,386 also provides support for thinning the bright line between subject and object in her criticism of the Cartesian view that the

386. Conway, although not allowed formal education as was the custom of the time, was incredibly gifted and had been educated by tutors in Latin, Greek, French, and possibly Hebrew as she was growing up. Her brother was tutored by the famous Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, who, encouraged by Conway’s intellect, tutored her as well. Unfortunately, Conway suffered from debilitating headaches and became much better known for her ailment at the time than for her intellect. The traveling physician/philosopher Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont came to attend her and it is through him that German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz came to know of her work and her proposition that all things were monads. Leibniz would later use this unattributed concept as the centerpiece for his own work. Indeed, Conway’s only treatise, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Concerning God, Christ and the Creatures, was originally attributed to Leibniz.
world was a machine and animals were machine-like in that they had no soul. For Conway, the world of nature was not dead, as all things in the earth have spirit which they receive from God: "every Body is a certain Spirit or Life in its own Nature, and that the same is a certain intelligent Principle, having Knowledge, Sense, Love, Desire, Joy, and Grief." Moreover, all things in the world are bound by a type of universal love: "there remains yet something of Universal Love in all Creatures, one towards another. . . ." Conway rejected the Cartesian notion of nature as nothing but a mechanical thing that moves "according to Rules and Laws Mechanical":

But yet in Nature, and her Operations, they are far more than merely Mechanical; and the same is not a mere Organical Body, like a Clock, wherein there is not a vital Principle of Motion; but a living Body, having life and Sense, which Body is far more sublime than a mere Mechanism, or Mechanical Motion.

Conway sought to heal the divide created by Descartes’ mind/body dualism by arguing that all things—humans and non-humans alike—were of the same substance and shared a "spiritual essence." This spiritual essence gave all things vitality. For Conway, the whole of creation was alive and vital. Bodies could "receive and transmit vital action" as they were "not only locally and mechanically but vitally moveable." Further, all of the creatures under God were interdependent, which stood opposed to Descartes’ understanding of the subjects in the world as the only things independent. All things existed in a "certain society of fellowship . . . whereby

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388. Ibid., 222.

they mutually subsist one by another, so that one cannot live without another.” Conway in many ways viewed the world as a contemporary ecologist might: the world is a web of interdependent relationships that included humans.

**Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop**

Conway aids in the project of challenging the subject/object divide by providing us with a new understanding of what nature is. Unlike Descartes, Conway argues that nature is a living body that has motion and life. Perhaps of equal importance is the idea that all things, whether they be human or non-human, share a "spiritual essence" that gives us vitality. This vitality not only means we all have the capacity for action, but also means we all share a community. We live with and cannot live without all things in the earth.

Conway then contributes not only to the concept of interrelatedness but also to the notion that all things have value. Under Conway’s theory of interdependence, all things share a vital essence and are in fellowship with one another. This sharing means that we each have the capacity to engage in action, which means while we may be on a hierarchy, it cannot mean that some things only have value or are only important to the extent other things (humans) find them useful. We must be on a similar agentic plane in order to share.

**Spinoza on Communal Responsibility**

The final thinker in this intellectual archaeology is Enlightenment Philosopher Baruch Spinoza. Rejecting a Cartesian dualism and arguing against relying solely upon empirical...
findings, as proposed by Bacon, Spinoza posited that there is only one substance in the universe and that substance is God or Nature (Ethics, Part I, Prop. 14). This substance—God/Nature—has an infinite set of attributes, two of which apply specifically to humans: extension (body) and thought. 392 Human thought is a mode of the infinite attribute of thought, and the human body is the mode of the infinite attribute of extension. Thus, the human mind and the human body are not of two distinct substances (Ethics, Part II, Corollary to Proposition 13), but are the same substance with different attributes. The human body is part of Nature, but so too is the human mind, which is part of the infinite power of thinking (that attribute of Nature) that can apprehend the whole of Nature. Spinoza, in a nutshell, argues that all is one substance with two (known to us) attributes. Because all things share in the two attributes of thought and extension, all things are caused by God/Nature. Just as the idea of us and the cause of us is part of God’s idea of us, so too is the idea and cause of all things found in God (Ethics, Part II, Scholium to Proposition 13). As Spinoza wrote in a letter to Hague physician G.H. Schuller, whether it be stone or human, we are all a part of Nature. 393

Unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not argue for an exceptionalised position of the mind, rejecting the Cartesian belief that only our minds are animate and active, while bodies are inert, dead, and must be acted upon. Both the mind and body are unified and as one is active, so too is the other. As he explains in the Scholium to Proposition 2 of the Ethics:

"Spinossime" or "Spinozisterey" was frequently used to reference the entirety of those who disagreed with either the empirical or the Cartesian project, including naturalistic and aesthetic belief systems. Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13.


mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of
Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. Hence it comes about that the order or
linking of things is one, whether Nature be conceived under this or that attribute, and
consequently, the order of the active and passive states of our body is simultaneous in
Nature with the order of active and passive states of the mind.

All things in nature also are connected not only because we are of the same substance, but also
because there is a necessary (and desired) coherence among each of the parts of Nature. Spinoza
writes, "[h]ence it follows that every body, insofar as it exists as modified in a definite way, must
be considered as a part of the whole universe, and as agreeing with the whole and cohering with
the other parts." Spinoza explains this concept of coherence as follows: "[b]y coherence of parts I
mean simply this, that the laws or nature of one part adapts itself to the laws or nature of another
part in such wise that there is the least possible opposition between them."394 This notion of
coherence is a fixed and immutable law of nature.

Another universal law is the law of conatus, which Philosopher Michael L. Morgan
interprets as a "view that each thing exemplifies an inherent tendency toward self-preservation
and activity."395 Spinoza writes in the Ethics, Part III, Proposition 7: "The conatus with which
each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing
itself." In other words, all things are driven to self-preservation by their very essence. The
question that arises is how far can we, as humans, go in this preservation project? An initial
answer seems to be: as far as we would like to. Spinoza writes:

394. Ibid.
395. Ibid., 283.
Whatsoever in nature we deem evil, that is, capable of hindering us from being able to exist and to enjoy a rational life, it is permissible for us to remove in whatever seems the safer way. On the other hand, whatever we deem good, that is, advantageous for preserving our being and for enjoying a rational life, it is permissible for us to take for our use and to use it as we please. And as an absolute rule, it is permissible by the highest natural right for everyone to do what he judges to be to his own advantage. (Appendix to Part IV of the Ethics)

Continuing on in that same section,

Except for mankind, we know of no individual thing in Nature in whose mind we can rejoice, and with which we can be united in friendship or some kind of close tie. So whatever there is in Nature external to man, regard of our own advantage does not require us to preserve it, but teaches us to preserve or destroy it according to its varying usefulness, or to adapt it to our own use in whatever way we please. (Appendix to Part IV of the Ethics)

Taking these excerpts in isolation, it would seem that humans have the right to dominate, control, and use nature in whatever ways necessary and to their liking. Humans also appear to be exceptionalised in that they are different from nature; we cannot be "friends" with nature, and therefore, nature can be preserved or destroyed by us depending on its usefulness to us.

This original notion is tempered, however, by two key ideas found in Spinoza’s theory. First, humans are related and connected to the rest of nature, and second, coherence demands that we live in harmony with nature. As noted above, humans are part of nature and follow the same rules as the rest of nature. We are not eligible for special treatment nor should we demand it by
forcing the rest of the things in nature to meet only our demands. Moreover, our connectedness leads to coherence, whereby the laws or nature of things in the world have adapted so that there is the least amount of opposition between all things. Coherence implies that humans cannot overstep because we must act to preserve harmony (least possible opposition) between us and all things. We are, in Spinoza’s words, "bound to be part of Nature and to follow its universal order." That universal order includes the notion of coherence and its attendant harmony. Spinoza argues that acting in harmony is circular—the more we act in harmony, the more powerful we become, the more powerful we become, the more we act in harmony. In other words, if we act together to promote coherence and harmony then we will achieve self-preservation.396

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

While not without its difficulties, Spinoza’s one-substance theory aids in the further lightening of the subject/object divide that is so key to CTAHR’s assumptions. Not only are we all one substance, but all are part of nature and humans are not exceptionalised in that sense that all things exist solely for us. Our mandate to act with coherence with other things on the earth is an immutable universal law that we must follow as creatures of the world. For Spinoza, humans are not exceptionalised over nature and are not the sole locus of value, since all things have a right to use all other things in order to self-preserve.

Putnam on the Scientific Method

Contemporary Philosopher Hilary Putnam has written extensively on the false divide between facts and values or objectivity and subjectivity, both with regard to epistemology and ethics. As a reminder, one of the reasons Bacon gave for avoiding Church intervention in his

science project was the very different way in which we come to know scientific knowledge as opposed to how we come to know ethical and religious principles. Simply, science and its facts are so different from values and its ethics or religion that the two should not and must not ever meet. This commitment to a division between empirically verifiable facts of science and values is reiterated in the scientific method and its commitment to a view from nowhere, which is to say, objectivity. Science demands disembodied individuals whereas ethics and its attendant values are context and often community-based.

Putnam argues that facts and values in reality are entangled, and the concepts by which we empirically "know" the world are as dependent upon our social environment as are our values. On the fact side of the equation, for example, even though our eyes see yellow, we still need to have a concept of yellow before the perception in order to ascertain that the thing we are seeing is yellow. "Perception is not innocent" writes Putnam, "it is an exercise of our concepts . . . ." On the value side of the equation, words like "cruel" and "crime" act as both descriptive terms as well as normative terms. Similarly, the term "kua'ana" in ʻŌlelo ʻŌiwi describes not only the "fact" of an elder sibling, but also the "value" or normative obligation of reciprocal care between elder and younger siblings.

A possible response to Putnam’s argument might be to raise the spectre of Hume, who asked: "Where is that matter of fact that we call crime?" Hume wants us to point to an observable descriptive part of nature that stands for "grievous wrong" (Hume’s "crime") and if we cannot, then we must recognize that "grievous wrong" is, at least in our terms, nothing but a value. However, simply because there is no object or thing called "grievous wrong" in existence,

this does not mean that there is no "'fact'" that corresponds to this notion of grievous wrong. Many facts have no objects, but that does not stop us from acting on these "facts," and making moral judgments—no doubt much to Bacon’s chagrin. Part of the reason we can and do act on these object-less "facts" is because we all understand that being cruel to someone describes not only a fact or description but the type of person someone is; the use of the term "cruel" makes a normative (value) judgment and a descriptive (factual) statement.

Every day of our lives we make judgments about what values we are justified in holding and what values we are not. In order to do this, we must share certain values with a community. We are not operating in a vacuum of individuality either when we describe or when we value but are identifying with a community that has a specific "evaluative point of view." That evaluative point of view is one that links words to the meaning that the members of a community share. Knowledge is not isolated, reason is not the realm of an individual, and values and facts are entangled. As Putnam writes: "[t]here is no recognition of transcendent truth here; we need no better ground for treating ‘value judgments’ as capable of truth and falsity than the fact that we can and do treat them as capable of warranted assertibility and warranted deniability."

The notion that ethics and its broader corollary of value judgments are nonsense and outside of the exceptionalised rational discourse of science and economics is based on a socially constructed view of the world. Moreover, according to Putnam, there are things we believe or seem to know to be true and we are not sure why. Instead of labeling that for which we do not have support for but still believe as meaningless, we need to recognize, quoting Wittgenstein,

398. Ibid., 40.
399. Ibid., 110.
that "I have reached bedrock and this is where my spade is turned." Which is to say, my understanding is limited, but I can still go on. We have to recognize that even for things we believe we understand now, that could change (as was the case with Pluto). Nothing is "permanently fated to be ‘bedrock,’" and no "belief is forever immune from criticism." When we talk about justifications and explanations, when we say we prefer or value one thing over another, this does not mean that forever and always these are the values we must have. We may, but there is nothing to indicate that these values are "exclusively and exhaustively correct." As with our science, our values and morals "are in a process of development and reform," and that is the way it should be.

Critical Narrative Genealogical Stop

Putnam’s usefulness for this dissertation lies in his challenge to the exceptionalising of objectivity and the scientific method. Once we subject objectivity and the scientific method to challenge, we open the door for there to be other viable ways to know the world. In fact, Putnam will argue that we ignore those other ways to view the world at our peril, for in doing so, we cut ourselves off from key aspects of our life. The key is not absolute knowledge but to question and critique our options robustly. Once we recognize that our bedrock moves, we can begin the very exciting project of pushing ourselves to consider new ideas. The end result is a deeply understood and creative world and a rejection of exceptionalising. This recognition of the viability of multiple ways to know the world supports plurality as an alternative to exceptionalising science and market-based capitalism and the short jump to finding these views

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axiomatically moral. Views that limit who we are as humans by ignoring one whole side of that human-ness—values, ethics, subjectivity—simply cannot be axiomatically moral. Nor, according to Harding, can they truly be objective.

*The Values*

As the above demonstrates, Plato, Ficino, Conway, Spinoza, and Putnam provide us with foundations for a new, Third-Way axiology. From Plato, we see a new way to look at disembodied reason as being only useful when we have a context within which to operationalize it. From Ficino, we see not the exclusive use of the objective or universal as a way towards knowledge, but a comingling of my subjective particular nature with the objective universal world. We know because we see things from a spot; in Putnam’s words, an "evaluative point of view." All things—science included—are seen through this evaluative point of view and we value what we value because of the community we are in.

From Ficino, we also see a world that is interconnected through action and through the desire of a soul "to live the lives of all things." In many ways, this would mean that actions a human might take to destroy other lives on the chain would begin to destroy the human, whose soul strives to be that thing which is now gone. Loss at one part of the chain would mean that one life to which I strive would no longer be. Conway reinforces this notion of interconnectedness by arguing that we are more than simply connected: we are community, and that community shares an essential essence of being alive. The interconnection then is something more than will or striving but is a part of who I am as a person, which is to say, my shared essence makes me part of all things in the world.
While Conway and Ficino provide for us a deeply interconnected world, one that directly challenges the notion of dual metaphysical categories, it is really Spinoza who, in addition to completely eradicating the subject and object divide by arguing for one substance, provides the ethical obligation to this community. Under Spinoza’s theory, all things are subject to the same universal laws, and one of those laws is *conatus*, which means that we all tend toward self-preservation. This tendency towards self-preservation is really what it means to be the thing that I am. *Conatus* is tempered, however, by the recognition that I am a part of a whole universe and the rules of that universe demand coherence, which is to say, all things adopt actions that will result in the "least possible opposition between them." I may strive towards self-preservation, as do all things in the world, but because I am a part of all of nature, I also must act so as not to completely deny other things from fulfilling their own *conatus*. *Conatus* supports a self-interested, profit-maximizing economic-human, but is tempered by the recognition that there are other things in the community that seek to self-preserve. I must act in such a way as to minimize my opposition to them by allowing them what is needed to self-preserve.

**II.**

**Third-Way Praxis: Standing-with (Ho‘opili)**

While the above supports a Third-Way axiology, a Third-Way praxis also is needed. A central focus of that praxis is entering into a new relationship with ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Such a relationship is not rooted in paternalism in that it recognizes that our kuleana as limited: all the world is not *res communis* and ours for the taking. Such a relationship also demands the adoption of a self-critical and highly self-reflective mandate of pono to constantly check ourselves for bias
towards exceptionalism, a move Bacon would, no doubt, approve of. Part of that self-checking and self-reflectivity demands that we listen openly and respectfully to other world views.

**Defining Standing-With (Ho’opili)**

In order to understand more fully what this standing-with relationship is, it might be helpful to discuss what it is not. Currently, in many cases, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli stand-by ʻŌiwi Maoli. In English, use of the term "by," indicates that one is acting "through the agency or means of," that one is "near to, beside, past and beyond, subordinate, incidental, or secondary." In ʻŌlelo ʻŌiwi, there are a number of words to express "by," which usually connote possession, as in nāu, which means "belonging to you" or "for you," and naʻu which means "mine" or "belonging to me." The characteristics of this standing-by relationship, then, are those that are spatial (standing beside, subordinate, secondary, by product of) and those that are temporal, which is to say they exist for a time as in "pass by."

Both the ʻŌiwi Maoli meanings and the English meanings indicate some form of possession, which in English translates into ownership. Standing-by has the further connotation that I am spatially but temporally here in an ownership relationship to you. The ability to pass by also means standing-by is done without obligation. "I stand-by you" means I choose when to walk away or pass by you. Nothing binds me to the ʻŌiwi Maoli and I can move away from (pass by) and return with ease and without loss of conscience. In the context of the Mauna a Wâkea protest, I can stand-by the ʻŌiwi Maoli protectors, until the handcuffs come out or the temperature drops and then I can "pass by," all without any sort of moral claim or obligation being placed upon me. In fact, the final characteristic of standing-by is that I will move away from the one-I-am-standing-by when my own self-interests make it expedient to do so. In the
case of the above example, I move away in order to avoid arrest or in order to warm myself. Thus, what motivates me to stand-by is that it somehow helps me to meet my own ends. I remain an autonomous and free individual who is appropriately, at least in the eyes of Kant, using a situation to meet my end goals.

This standing-by relationship means that sometimes ‘Ōiwi Maoli and non-‘Ōiwi Maoli share street space in protest. CTAHR contends it stands-by ‘Ōiwi Maoli by patenting and seeking to protect and steward the natural resources of the islands in the hopes of bettering the lives of everyone. But as long as CTAHR continues to exceptionalise the deepened assumptions of the Western narrative, as long as non-‘Ōiwi Maoli continue to see land as an object that behaves in machine-like manner that should and must be exploited, controlled, and managed through science and capitalism, then all non-‘Ōiwi Maoli can do is stand-by. Holding onto these assumptions means that non-‘Ōiwi Maoli can only be spatially and temporally located next to ‘Ōiwi Maoli. We may write slogans on our bodies to support ‘Ōiwi Maoli causes, but without a deeper relationship, we soon move on to the next issue and next problem. This is not to denigrate the support that has been shown by many in the world for the Mauna a Wākea/TMT protest. Nor is it to belittle those non-‘Ōiwi Maoli who do stand in the streets. Rather, the point is that standing-by is not enough because standing-by does not require the one-standing to set aside and modify assumptions about how the world works. Standing-by has no moral hold, and as such runs the risk of becoming opportunistic, exploitive, and self-serving.

In English, "with" means that "one is accompanied by," or that one is "going in the same direction." "With" also means "possessing" and "having an instrument to perform an action." It further indicates "the manner or attitude of a person," "responsibility," and the notion of
relationship as in "in relation to." 402 In ʻŌlelo ʻŌiwi, "with" can mean the preposition "me" as used in "went with him," or it can mean "pili" which means to "cling, stick, adhere, touch, join, cleave to, associate with, be with, be close or adjacent, close relationship, relative." The phrase "hoʻopili," hoʻo being causative/simulative, means "to bring together, stick to, attach oneself to a person, united, as friend, to imitate, to claim a relationship, to put together as parts of a puzzle." "Pili" itself can refer to the first stage of poi pounding when the kalo begins to stick. 403 These notions of "with" and pili are key to understanding the Third-Way standing-with or hoʻopili relationship.

Standing-with also is not identity politics in that it is certainly not the case that non-ʻŌiwi Maoli and ʻŌiwi Maoli share similar injustices. The idea of standing-with is closer to the notion of political solidarity, although there too there are differences. Political solidarity generally refers to the idea that people come together who have a mutual commitment to justice and to fight against injustice and its attendant oppression. In this context, political solidarity is a type of decision-making model that conscientiously recognizes differences in societal positioning and knowledge. One can be unified with others in fighting against a certain oppression as one becomes increasingly aware of that oppression. As a result, the fight to end that oppression becomes "my fight" and I possess it. 404 Some political solidarity theorists, German Philosopher Kurt Bayertz for one, argues that key to understanding the unity of political solidarity and the moral obligations that arise from this solidarity is seeing those in political solidarity as being in a reciprocal relationship. As such, there is, in Bayertz words, "a fundamental equality . . . between


those involved, giving them the mutual right to expect help as it may be required.\textsuperscript{405} For Bayertz then, moral obligation and the attendant right to demand action arises from a reciprocal relationship based on a shared recognition or awareness of injustices and equality between the participants in that relationship.

Ho’opili differs from political solidarity in that the ‘Ōiwi Maoli and non-‘Ōiwi Maoli, while joining together to fight oppression, are not equal in this fight. No matter how epistemically aware a non-‘Ōiwi Maoli may become of the oppression, the two groups will never be equal. The root of the inequality lies in the cosmogenic genealogical connection ‘Ōiwi Maoli have to the land that haole simply do not share. For ‘Ōiwi Maoli, environmental issues are deeply personal and their reaction to those issues comes from "deep cultural wounding of an ancient love for the land."\textsuperscript{406} For non-‘Ōiwi Maoli, the motivation frequently centers on preservation and conservation so that we can sustainably use these resources into the future. Even with a Third-Way axiology that allows haole to see the interconnectedness with land, we still are not kin to that land. We stand in a different relationship to the land as do ‘Ōiwi Maoli; we are not equal. Returning to the discussion in Chapter 2, there are borders between ‘Ōiwi Maoli and non-‘Ōiwi Maoli, and recognizing those borders is important to respecting the plurality and diversity of ideas that is key to the ho’opili relationship.

\textit{Characteristics of Ho’opili}

Standing-with or ho’opili has a number of key characteristics, which can be explored in a shared space of the Third-Way axiology and the ethical values of Mālama ‘Āina.


\textsuperscript{406} Trask, "Coalition Building," 1208. PAGE 1208?
Maintaining Attitude, Embracing Perseverance, and Fostering Care (Mālama)

The first characteristic arises from a recognition that we are interconnected and that this connection mandates actions that demonstrate conscious awareness of the interconnection, others to whom we are interconnected, and the need to promote harmony. Those of us from the Western tradition can begin to understand this relationship through the notion of context, interconnectedness, and harmony provided by the alternative narrative genealogy discussed earlier in this chapter. Our own tradition allows us to recognize that all things have intrinsic value and that we owe these things a moral duty. Thus, standing-with someone is a manner or an attitude that demonstrates a commitment to stick with or to something, like poi sticks to the papa kuʻi ʻai (the poi pounding board). Tellingly, pili occurs only after time has been spent and effort expended working the poi with the pōhaku kuʻi ʻai (poi pounder) on the papa kuʻi ʻai. Pili is not a state of affairs that comes easily or without effort and commitment to an end product. Pili cannot occur if one leaves halfway through the process. Nor is it something that can be done carelessly or without attention or in isolation, as many things must come together to co-create pili: kalo, a person, the pōhaku kuʻi ʻai, the papa kuʻi ʻai, water, and time. As such, standing-with also necessitates a relationship. As pili is sticky and binds itself to the implements or tools that have shaped it for the one doing the pounding, so standing-with is a binding relationship created through effort, action, time, and perseverance.

Trask seems to acknowledge the importance of this effort, time, and perseverance when she speaks of those non-ʻŌiwi Maoli that she is willing to work with; those activists that ʻŌiwi Maoli have come to trust:
We trust these people implicitly because they have endured over the years in struggle after struggle. *Haole* who honestly support us do so without loud pronouncements about how they feel what we feel or how they know just what we mean. Hawaiian activists trust these *haole* precisely because their behavior over the years speaks louder than any sympathetic public statements they could ever make.\(^{407}\)

In addition to commitment and action, standing-with demands care. This commitment requires a respectful acceptance that there are other ways to talk about and understand the world than an objective, science-based method. To understand successfully, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli need to recognize, in their naʻau,\(^{408}\) the deeply rooted nature of Mālama ʻĀina and its intractability. Mālama ʻĀina is not a slogan or bumper sticker. Nor is the concept one that can be set aside, much like we change out our technology or our resource management paradigms. Non-ʻŌiwi Maoli must recognize that Mālama ʻĀina mandates protection and that ʻāina needs ʻŌiwi Maoli. Mālama ʻĀina is not a choice for ʻŌiwi Maoli; it is their identity. Assuming we do not want to exterminate the ʻŌiwi Maoli identity, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli need to give credence to the deep importance of Mālama ʻĀina.

**Relinquishing control and equality (Limited Kuleana)**

While hoʻopili does pull on some ideas of political solidarity, it also recognizes that this solidarity is not completely within non-ʻŌiwi Maoli control. Part of that recognition is

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407. Ibid., 1207.

408. "intestines, bowels, guts; mind, heart, affectations," Mary Kawena Pukui and Samuel Elbert, *Hawaiian Dictionary* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986) s.v. naʻau. ʻŌiwi Maoli believe that that true seat of wisdom is in the gut, where the heart and mind reside. Thus, naʻauao, whose root is naʻau, means "learned, enlightened, intelligent, wise, learning" and naʻauʻauʻau means "intense grief." The idea behind my statement is that non-ʻŌiwi Maoli must find a way to understand Mālama ʻĀina not as an intellectual, academic concept, but as a concept that is as much a part of a human as one’s heart. That being said, ʻŌiwi Maoli cannot ever truly access Mālama ʻĀina, because we do not share the genealogical connection that creates it; however, we can come to understand it better and recognize the imperatives it creates for ʻŌiwi Maoli.
understanding of limitations. In the context of this dissertation, these limitations are analogous to a recognition that the notions of *res communis* (either in property or thought) and equality are fictitious. In other words, just as I do not have equal access to land not subject to ownership, because there are alternative relationships with land other than ownership and its antithesis (non-ownership), I do not have equal access or rights to the ‘āina in Hawai‘i and how to care for it by virtue of my status as a U.S. citizen living in a U.S. state or some other general principle of equality. Simply, we are not equal and land is not free and open and my actions need to reflect that recognition.

Part of this understanding means recognizing that non-‘Ōiwi Maoli are not part of the genealogical ancestry that gives rise to Mālama ʻĀina, that the English words used to describe "land" do not capture Mālama ʻĀina, and that liberal thought and environmentalism, while sometimes helpful, do not address the problems raised by the deepened assumptions of a Western narrative genealogy. As ho‘omanawanui argues,

[ʻāina is not landscape] because landscape implies a pristine, panoramic view of the land devoid of human beings; by being ‘land that feeds,’ ʻāina automatically includes humans—at least Natives—because, first, we are the ones being fed, and, second, we are descended from the land and are related to and not separate from elements of ‘nature’: taro, seaweed, fish, rocks. By extension, mālama ʻāina does not equate to environmentalism because the mandate to the ʻāina is the same as mālama/aloha ʻohana (care for, cherish the family); we care for/love the land in the same way we care for our elders, our siblings, our spouses, and our children, and by doing so, we maintain our relationship with those we are caring for, whether it be our human family, earthly family
(Papahānaumoku, Hāloa the taro) or spiritual family (through the presence of our 'āumākua, or spirit guardians who physically manifest themselves in nature).\textsuperscript{409}

Part of our recognition of context requires haole to accept as meaningful the 'Ōiwi Maoli personal relationship with the land.

For Trask, the role of non-'Ōiwi Maoli can only be that of working to educate our own communities;\textsuperscript{410} for other 'Ōiwi Maoli, non-'Ōiwi Maoli may play a different role. The key is that it must be up to the 'Ōiwi Maoli to designate roles. The problem with standing-by, then, is that non-'Ōiwi Maoli fail to see that they are not equal, not in control, and that they should not be in control. Just as Joey Carter could not demand equality and aloha, non-'Ōiwi Maoli cannot demand that they be allowed to stand-with 'Ōiwi Maoli. Neither nature nor protest is \textit{res communis}. We must recognize that we are both dependent upon and vulnerable to 'Ōiwi Maoli. The key for Trask and for the notion of standing-with is that non-'Ōiwi Maoli recognize that how to help the struggles and how to stand-with 'Ōiwi Maoli must be defined by the 'Ōiwi Maoli themselves.

Trask and others may argue that reliance, even in a standing-with relationship, on non-'Ōiwi Maoli is not a long-term goal and should not be the 'Ōiwi Maoli end game. Perhaps this is true. However, for at least the immediate future, we all share this island, despite the illegality of that action, and we share this earth. As Osorio argues:

\begin{quote}
Like Malcolm X, I believe white people should not join our cultural and political organizations. We must assert ourselves in our own way. And this means organizational separatism. The role of supportive white people—this is almost a weary truism—is to convince other, non-supportive white people. In Malcolm's own words, "sincere white people" need to be "out on the battle lines of where America's racism really is—and that's in their own home communities; America's racism is among their own fellow whites. That's where the sincere whites who really mean to accomplish something have got to work."
\end{quote}
We must share our stories with those who are not native because we cannot win this struggle alone and also because the solution to the ugly and brutal economic inequalities in the world is not simply a class warfare that replaces one elite, one profiteer for another. We must raise the consciousness of those around us, as we have raised our own, to understand the full sacredness of our world and our relationship with it. . . . [W]e should . . . teach other oppressed people in the world the possibilities for this earth and all its sacred life forms, and the need to very intentionally remove ourselves from a path that has no hopeful destination.411

The idea that we are interconnected to all things and of the same substance seems to run counter to the idea that we are not interconnected here in Hawai‘i. This raises a possible objection that I am demanding humans recognize an interconnectedness every place but here. As an initial response, this objection reflects the deeper assumption of a view-from-nowhere-objectivity that all things must operate in the same way in all places. Moreover, simply because we are in the same metaphysical category does not mean we are the same. Calling upon Nehamas’ interpretation of Plato, it may be that the predicate " . . . is connected," or the predicate " . . . is the same substance" is like the predicate " . . . is just," or " . . . is beautiful." Each member of this class of predicates needs context to define it, which is to say, humans will not be connected to nature in the same way at every place and at every time. Thus, while this interconnectedness may engender an internal moral obligation, the way in which that moral obligation is implemented in this specific place, with this specific genealogy, is what non-‘Ōiwi Maoli need to understand from those who are genealogically, not metaphysically, connected. In

this context, the interconnectedness I have to all things may give rise to my responsibility to those things, a kuleana, but how best to meet that responsibility here in this place, the pono way to act, is for the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, as the younger sibling of this place, to say.

**Embracing Self-Reflection and Responsibility to Community (Pono)**

A key part of this ho‘opili then is pono, which demands that as we stand-with ‘Ōiwi Maoli, we are constantly reflecting on our roles and our actions. This type of reflectivity is what Harding argues is the necessary component of stand-point epistemology and what makes it a rigorously objective knowledge acquisition theory. Instead of assuming the non-‘Ōiwi Maoli way is exceptionalised, we recognize the contextual nature of knowledge and allow for open and frank engagement of other world views. This does not require that non-‘Ōiwi Maoli agree with ‘Ōiwi Maoli on every issue. But we must support their right to be heard and recognize our moral obligation to listen. Disagreement does not terminate the relationship. Instead, it allows each party the opportunity to discuss possible ways around the impasse.

What this means for a Third-Way praxis is that we must recognize that there are multiple ways of knowing the world and that our conclusions about the world are made in the context of a community. That community includes both nature and the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. Accepting the value of pono, we must recognize that not one type of reason should be exceptionalised and everything should be subject to critical questioning. Our choices of what is and is not the best way to move forward and help humanity are communal and organic. Moreover, these decisions are conducted in a forum that accepts and welcomes controversy and conflict in the sense of disagreement. Following the lead of Hale Nauā and Make‘e Pono, through disagreement, through inactions, through mistakes, we come to learn the best way forward.
This is where the work, perseverance, and commitment that is necessary for pili comes in. Non-ʻŌiwi Maoli must recognize that ʻŌiwi Maoli have been colonized and occupied. The limits of their trust have been pushed. Some have been jailed, accused of environmental destruction, or worse, apathy. Therefore, in order to move forward out of the entrenched views that continue to lead to intractable natural resource management conflict, in order to truly progress, this hoʻopili must be undertaken with humility and an openness to the possibility of error. The Third-Way use of pono, rooted as it is in the possibility that "our bedrock" shifts, strengthens both the need for and the acceptance of this vulnerability. We do not know the absolutes of the world. The best we can do is move forward, be open to the possibility of error, and embrace the freedom to fail. In entering the standing-with relationship, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli make themselves vulnerable to rejection and, in doing so, acknowledge the gift we receive when that relationship is not rejected.

This vulnerability should not be marginalized, as it is necessary if we are to truly receive feedback from ʻŌiwi Maoli. Moreover, that vulnerability signals to the ʻŌiwi Maoli that we are serious about the standing-with relationship. This element also recognizes that we cannot accomplish our goals of a new Third-Way relationship without each other; non-ʻŌiwi Maoli need feedback to ensure we are heading in the right direction and to protect against exploitation and appropriation: to be pono. Echoing Trask’s concerns, one possible problem with a standing-with relationship is that non-ʻŌiwi Maoli will not "see" ʻŌiwi Maoli, but will see and adopt our own understanding of what we think ʻŌiwi Maoli interests should be. Attention to pono should mitigate the possibility of this. At least at a minimum, ʻŌiwi Maoli have to keep on critiquing, instructing, informing, and showing their frustration when we disappoint.
But the work to be done cannot be solely at the hands of the non-ʻŌiwi Maoli. ʻŌiwi Maoli need to recognize the connection Kant makes between ownership and property and what it means to be human. The non-ʻŌiwi Maoli cannot easily set aside their ideas of a subject/object distinction, for to do so would call into question what we think it means to be human. The Western narrative commitment to ownership is not just a commitment to capitalism, power, or colonization—it is tied up in who we think we are as humans. Educating and sharing, as much as ʻŌiwi Maoli feel is appropriate, aids those who do want to be more aware and who do reject exceptionalising. I am definitely not saying that ʻŌiwi Maoli should take these steps as the sole way to resolve the problem, only that it is one part of a standing-with relationship and will take time and patience and trust.

This final characteristic of hoʻopili incorporates fully the notion of pono as set out by Makeʻe Pono and Young. Both parties to the standing-with relationship must accept fully the idea of critical engagement and the often-attendant conflict or controversy that it might create. The standing-with relationship uses this space of reflection to explore lessons from the past and to guide future actions. For this engagement to be effective, we must consistently reflect upon not only on the reasons for standing-with, but also on the appropriateness of the relationship that standing-with creates. We must recognize that our relationship is a long-term relationship that will have its conflicts. We must also recognize those conflicts provide us with the opportunity to reflect on the role we are playing, its viability, and how we can continue to be engaged and supportive.

All this is not to indicate in any way that I do not take seriously Trask’s insight into the legitimacy of non-ʻŌiwi Maoli, especially haole, demanding certain behavior from ʻŌiwi Maoli.
We, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli, do not get to choose if ʻŌiwi Maoli trust us, just as we non-locals do not get to choose when we can claim locality. None of us (non-ʻŌiwi Maoli) get to be kamaʻāina, no matter what the tourism industry says. Exception from and acceptance of are gifts bestowed on us. This raises an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, I am asking Trask and others to trust me, to make an exception, to enter into a relationship with me so that I can truly listen. On the other hand, I recognize this is a choice for ʻŌiwi Maoli, and each must come to that decision independently. But, if Ritte wants us to listen, to really hear, we need help, and that help must come from ʻŌiwi Maoli, for it is the only place from where it can come.

III. Chapter Summary and Transition

The palpable feeling of mistrust and anger that resulted from the kalo controversy, as set out in Chapter 4, provides an opportunity to recognize just how deeply both sides believed in the morality and general "rightness" of their respective projects. As this chapter closes, the hope is that the 2006 controversy appears both less like an obstacle and more like an opportunity. That recognition can come about if CTAHR recognizes the options available to it from its own narrative genealogy. This intellectual history includes Plato, Ficino, Conway, Spinoza, and Putnam, all of whom contribute to a new narrative genealogy and to an axiology that sees the world as interconnected and as humans having a responsibility to the others who exist in that interconnected web: humans have a moral obligation to non-human others. This moral obligation is further extended to, and as a response to the social force of living with the ʻŌiwi Maoli, augmented by the values of Mālama ʻĀina: pono, kuleana, and mālama. When mixed with the social force of the ʻŌiwi Maoli and their culture and traditions, including their present day activism, CTAHR can create a new critical narrative genealogy that can be used to transform its
present by shifting its relationship with Ōiwi Maoli and Earth Others to one based on standing-with.

The key to standing-with or hoʻopili is that it will be difficult, that it demands perseverance, and that it demands a certain vulnerability. On the part of the Ōiwi Maoli, it asks for feedback. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the hoʻopili relationship acknowledges and embraces the valuable space conflict creates as a location for self-reflection and change. This new way forward does not demand that the Western trained UH Administrators leave their tradition behind; only that they look more deeply at that tradition to identify alternatives to viewing and consequently relating to the world. This chapter provides the reassurance that the Western tradition contains the philosophical concepts and ideas to create a different way to relate not only to Earth Others, but also to those whose genealogies are different from our own. This recognition provides space to question and ultimately reformulate the predominant contemporary Western view of the human relationship to nature. There are options—not only from seeing how others successfully and sustainably live, but also from reviewing Western history. The future is contingent, not causal, and non-Ōiwi Maoli of the Western tradition have the tools to make different and hopefully better choices.
Chapter 7
Hoʻo Moʻo412

Aloha ʻĀina, the sacred love between the land, all of its offspring including Kanaka; Aloha ʻĀina which binds us into this relationship and obligation to care for our islands and our seas. It is Aloha ʻĀina which we have branded into our souls and which we continue to teach with fervor and conviction to our children and grandchildren. And this is the message, this is the story we must now release to those around us who do not share our ancestry but will most certainly share our fate if we fail to confront and defeat the empire.

--Jonathan Kay Kamakawioʻole Osorio

The problem is not with the empirical data of science but with the contention that these data alone constitute the legitimate ground for developing a comprehensive or an adequate means for responding to the world’s problems. There is more to human existence and to reality itself than current science can ever give us access to.

--His Highness the Dalai Lama

E kanu i ka huli ‘oi hāʻule ka ua.413

--ʻŌlelo Noʻeau No. 316

Introduction and Chapter Goals

This dissertation began, seven years and hundreds of pages ago, from the intersection of many different functionalities. One of those was the mandate that this should be a work in practical philosophy. To paraphrase philosopher Bryan Norton, this work is not one where I toss from my ivory tower chair unsullied theories and as they float blissfully on the fair winds of

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412. to follow a course

413. "Plant the taro stalks while there is rain. Do your work when opportunity affords." Pukui, ʻŌlelo Noʻeau, 39.
isolation, yell down to those bruised in the trenches: "Try this! It will work." Instead, this work comes from the trenches, the place where I feel most comfortable and where my ideas ultimately begin, and perhaps subsequently end. As a result, the ideas in this dissertation need, at least on some level, to work; they need to be useful. Although the use of objections is generally a way of bolstering one’s work, in this case, the use of objections is a beta test to determine whether all that has come before has been a waste. If, in other words, the Third-Way can withstand serious objections, then perhaps the work will not have been completely in vein. After engaging with the objections, the final chapter, as all good final chapters should do, looks forward to what a Third-Way future might look like.

I.

Ka Moʻōhihiia

The Difficulties

While no doubt there are many more, the following are four objections that will challenge the efficacy of the third-way relationship:

Objection 1: Why?

This objection begins from a place of power and asks, quite simply, why anyone—ʻŌiwi Maoli or non-ʻŌiwi Maoli—would do the work to implement this Third-Way relationship? Science and capitalism and their methods work, so why would we stop exceptionalising them? CTAHR has done "good work" in the 150 or so years that it, or some version of it, has been in existence. Yes, there are disagreements and conflict, but that is the way of the modern or post-modern world and part of the price of "doing business" in Hawai‘i. So why change? Why, to

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paraphrase Richard (Routley) Sylvan, do we need a new environmental ethic in Hawai‘i, or anywhere for that matter? Yes, there are minor obstacles along the way and yes, the ‘Ōiwi Maoli "won" the kalo fight, but in the end, they will lose as their kalo succumbs to disease and their market share is lost. Moreover, science and capitalism are exceptionalised because they are objective, which is to say, reflect the way the world is. Other ways are either superstition or bad science. We have progressed beyond that. Bacon’s Bensalem is within reach.

There are three ways to respond to this objection. First, our current methods are not working, and even technology will falter for we do need resources. Second, the power of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli will continue to grow. Third, at their core, CTAHR are scientists who are committed to helping people and understanding the world. Taking this as the raw motivating concept of why people go into science in the first place, then standpoint epistemology demonstrates that the best way to help people and the best way to understand the world is to be open to plurality.

**Inadequacy of Current Methods**

If we assume biodiversity is important, which for most scientists and even some economists is a safe assumption, we lose between 200 and 2000 species on an annual basis, depending upon the number of species we take as currently existing. These losses are due primarily to habitat destruction, resulting from economic pressures. Sixteen percent of the world’s population, which includes the United States, Europe, and Japan, consume 80% of all natural resources. In the late 20th century, the U.S. population as a whole consumed twenty-five

tons of raw materials. Here in Hawai‘i, we continue with the 1970s political mandate that inextricably ties Hawai‘i’s prosperity to tourism and construction, both of which result in more bodies on the islands, all the while ignoring the stressors that are going to make shipping in food, which is the way 85-95% of our food arrives, more expensive and more vulnerable. To add to this picture are the looming impacts of global climate change that will place additional stressors on Hawai‘i’s natural resources as ocean levels rise, land for housing development and food becomes even more scarce, and the economic policy of build-it-and-they-will-come comes face-to-face with fresh water, land, and waste disposal site shortages.

Of course, all of the above are resource management issues and do not demonstrate that we need to change our ethics or our metaphysics. It would seem that all we really need to do is change our management paradigms. Hopefully, the preceding pages have demonstrated that there is no divorcing metaphysics and ethics from how we treat nature, even when we are talking "science." If we see things in the world as objects that we must own in order to be human, we will treat them as such, recognizing only a duty to ourselves, regardless of the impact on the rest of the non-human world. Staying the course of the Western science-market-based capitalist critical narrative genealogy as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 will keep us mired in the same solutions that seem to have only minimal impact on the problems.

To summarize, the philosophical standing of CTAHR as revealed through the kalo controversy does not work. Hawai‘i will continue to face resource management conflicts. World-
wide we face one of the greatest threats to the existence of our kind, which was brought about by the belief in market-based consumer consumption and that natural resources could continually be manipulated and controlled and never run out. Even Nobel Peace Prize Economist Robert Solow, to whom has been attributed the notion that economically it does not matter if we run out of forests as we can build houses out of something else, warns that there will come a time when the failure of natural resources will lead to catastrophe. In other words, the idea that nature is a machine that can be rebuilt through the use of science and technology in new and different ways to serve us better is simply wrong.

A related response to the objection is that if we can live better, why shouldn’t we take that opportunity to do so? If humans are smarter than anything else on this planet, if a sign of that intelligence and reason is our ability to change or control our environments and do so in order to improve the condition of humanity, and that improvement in the condition of humanity is the moral injunction of both science and capitalism, then why would we not explore the epistemological and ethical resources of indigenous people, who have survived far longer than our system has? Why would we not work to make things better? Why would non-ʻŌiwi Maoli continue to exceptionalise one system that is not meeting our needs or our potential? We are a country that founded a philosophy rooted in a notion of pragmatism; why would we not look up every possible avenue to find new keys to live better?

Growing Power of ʻŌiwi Maoli

A second response to the "Why bother" objection is that ʻŌiwi Maoli do not view Mālama ʻĀina as a passing fad that will eventually fade from consciousness. Mālama ʻĀina is part of who they are, and as the trajectory in Chapter 5 demonstrated, they will continue to define
both Mālama ʻĀina and their activism. With repetition, their mana (power) will strengthen. This is not some spiritual nonsense but a political fact demonstrated by the changed reality of what it does mean to "do business" in Hawaiʻi. Opposition to use of farm land to plant GMOs, haole housing expansion in Envision Lāʻie, and the continued environmental degradation of Mauna o Wākea demonstrate that businesses (and universities), who just a few years ago were assured easy victory, are spending thousands if not millions on public outreach, press, attorneys, and court cases to counteract the grass-roots based activism of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. While it is important to "win," for ʻŌiwi Maoli the issue is less about winning and more about taking action to preserve and protect their family. That "battle" will not end with a Supreme Court ruling, a district judge decision, or a fence.

This situation does not, however, demonstrate why it is that the Third-Way is necessary. That response lies in the political reality that, as painful as it may be, ʻŌiwi Maoli do need non-ʻŌiwi Maoli, at least for now. As Trask stated in response to a question as to why she engaged in coalitions, especially with those who were "either ignorant of, or hostile to" an understanding of the history and occupation of Hawaiʻi:

The answer, simply is that my people comprise only 20 percent of the resident population in Hawaiʻi. If Hawaiians were dominant numerically and culturally, that is, if we controlled our islands, we would have no need for coalitions. But my people are both oppressed and exploited as an indigenous minority, and thus we must join with other activists to achieve common ends. 418

Again, even if we continue to hold onto the implication that science and market-based capitalism mandate paternalism, our benevolence mandates we turn to the community most marginalized to aid it. The standing-with is the best way to come to achieve that goal within our current context.

**Plurality Required by Standpoint Epistemology Achieves the Goals of Science**

The final response returns us to the basis for all science, which is to benefit humanity. Given the moral position of science, given the fact its existence is rooted in the notion of "doing good," the only choice for a good scientist is to recognize the position at the center of the epistemic circle is not a view from nowhere, thus an objective and accurate view of the world, but is a view from an exceptionalised center that exceptionalises certain key ideas, ignoring others that have in the past and will lead in the future to improved ways of understanding the world. As Harding argues, the center is simply not objective enough. If we want to do good science because in good science lies the chance of benefiting humankind, we must allow those outside the center to help direct our research agendas, the questions we ask, and the answers we give. Failure to do so does not lead to good science, and may, in the long run, be immoral.

As those rooted in a particular Western tradition continue to dig into their position of subject/object dualism, ‘Ōiwi Maoli continue to reclaim a certainly not-perfect but definitely more sustainable view of the world and the things in it, exploring many different theories used in an attempt to find new-old pono ways, to address the issues the earth faces and Mālama ‘Āina. To borrow from the work of ‘Ōiwi scholar Kamaoli Kuwada, this constant searching for new and better theories is dynamic and emergent in its nature, and stands opposed to those rooted in assumptions and their attendant exceptionalising implications of progress that rarely truly move
us forward and, when they do, extracts a price we ultimately cannot afford.\footnote{419. Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, "We are not warriors. We are a grove of trees." \textit{Ke Kaupu Hehi Ale}, July 6, 2015, https://hehiale.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/we-are-not-warriors-we-are-a-grove-of-trees/.} This exceptionalising makes it difficult, if not impossible, to explore other ideas about the world and cuts off possible solutions for the problems that we face.

As an example, ʻŌiwi Maoli claims of connection to kalo were seen as standard religious ritual, like the Eucharist, and not seen as an innovative and metaphysically different way to see the things of the world. Similarly, ʻŌiwi Maoli opposition to the Thirty-Meter Telescope is viewed only as a religious issue, something that should have no role in our public forums, rather than as part of the responsibility of ʻŌiwi Maoli to mālama the ʻāina. That religious issue is pitted against economics, making ʻŌiwi Maoli either hopelessly backward looking, an immoral agent, or both. As Trask contends,

\begin{quote}
When Hawaiian land is destroyed by development, by resort complexes, by military installations, it is \textit{our} family, \textit{our} history, \textit{our} past, and \textit{our} future that are destroyed. No non-Hawaiian can understand this. Nor do most non-Hawaiians acknowledge that we suffer a horrific grief and anger, because they do not feel these emotions themselves. To our colonizers, this familial sense is nothing but mixed-up romanticism, a yearning for the past that is a kind of convoluted nostalgia. Even to a sympathetic haole, our people seem strangely focused on that which is lost.\footnote{420. Haunani-Kay Trask, "Feminism and Indigenous Hawaiian Nationalism," \textit{Signs} 21, no. 4 (Summer, 1996): 912–913.}
\end{quote}

In marginalizing ʻŌiwi Maoli in this way, those who stand closed to their calls miss out on the environmental management options ʻŌiwi Maoli are proposing. Missed are alternatives for articulating and studying the problems at hand, and with those alternatives, the possibility of

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\footnote{419. Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, "We are not warriors. We are a grove of trees." \textit{Ke Kaupu Hehi Ale}, July 6, 2015, https://hehiale.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/we-are-not-warriors-we-are-a-grove-of-trees/.}

\footnote{420. Haunani-Kay Trask, "Feminism and Indigenous Hawaiian Nationalism," \textit{Signs} 21, no. 4 (Summer, 1996): 912–913.}
better understanding and being in the world. ʻŌiwi Maoli are not anti-science; they are anti-exceptionalising. As discussed in different places throughout this work, opening ourselves up to plurality in science does not mean, to paraphrase Passmore, that we must adopt some anti-rational, anti-science, "new-agey" stance. Within our own reason-based intellectual tradition we have theories like those of Ficino, Conway, and Spinoza, which call for less distancing between humans and non-humans.

In the end, the only axiomatic moral principle that science should adopt is to make things better for all of us. How to do this is what science itself has struggled with as it engages in differing theories and ideas of how the world works. The responsibility of science is not to promote one theory over another, but to heed Bacon’s call and be open to the possibility that the way we have generalized the world may not be entirely correct. Engaging with ʻŌiwi Maoli, resisting the urge to find principles that do not exist, being open to a dialogue that may not be carried out entirely in the language of the scientific method, is the best way for CTAHR and science to meet their moral obligations to benefit humankind.

Finally, regardless of one’s politics, non-ʻŌiwi Maoli are visitors here. And, if we are to be good visitors, if we are to avoid or at least minimize future conflict, we do need to heed Walter Ritte’s call to listen. So in the end, we search for better ways to address these issues, and we question our assumptions and the exceptionalising that attends them, because ʻŌiwi Maoli asked us to, and like all good guests, we take our host’s requests seriously.

Objection 2: Plurality Promotes Relativism

The method of this dissertation is that of a critical narrative genealogy, which is very much a deconstructive process that explores how it is we have arrived at the axiomatic holding of
certain assumptions. Where did these assumptions come from? What social forces created and continue to maintain them? Some in the field of philosophy view deconstructive postmodernism as unsavory as it is assumed that once we deconstruct, we will be mired and trapped in "abject relativism."

Perhaps more than any other objection, this one has cut most deeply and required the most self-reflection. Teaching introductory courses in philosophy and ethics, one is frequently beset with the student version of relativism: you have your view and I have mine. We struggle for ways to address this with a sort of knee-jerk litany of the perils of relativism. However, the difficulty does not lie in the recognition of other viable theories, the difficulty lies in the refusal to engage with those theories. The power of plurality is that it embraces the possibility of multiple truths as an opportunity to learn and know differently and more objectively, for in a plural context the "view from nowhere" really is a view from everywhere.

This dissertation rejects monism and the idea that there is one truth, one universal law governing everything for all time. As a result, all moral and political principles are embedded in a place, time, society, and culture that is relevant to them. We have not fallen into chaos as a result, nor will we, so long as we continue to engage with each other in a respectful manner.

Again turning to standpoint epistemology, limiting ourselves to the dominant discourse means a loss of knowledge in the best case, and in the worse case we are deeply wrong about our world. Allowing that there may be more than one way to interact with the world and that the world may contain more than two sets of dualistically and hierarchically opposed categories does not mean we have failed in our quest to understand the reality of the world because the world really is plural. That we acknowledge this diversity gives us an opportunity to be in that world in
A related objection is that because my focus is Hawai'i and issues involving ‘Ōiwi Maoli, it proposes no universal rule applicable outside of Hawai‘i. Why then, should anyone else care? The response to this sub-objection is that the Third-Way relationship does not simply propose that we behave in a specific ethical manner. Instead, by acknowledging our commitment and responsibility to an enlarged community (kuleana) and caring with that community (mālama) in an appropriate way (pono), it also provides a meta-ethical marker for judging the health and viability of all our moral relationships, namely the idea of pono itself. There is a universal principle embedded in my rejection of universal principles and that is the mandate, the responsibility, and the obligation we have to reflect critically upon our decisions and the nature of our relationships constantly. We can no longer exceptionalise one solution, one reason, one way to look at the world. Instead, in the spirit of pono, we must explore all options and critically reflect upon those options and the tensions they sometimes create. What the political struggles of the ‘Ōiwi Maoli, including the activism surrounding kalo, can teach us is to listen and become self-reflective. In order to achieve this goal, however, we must embrace the idea of disagreement and conflict as a way to provide space to reflect critically, strategize, and then move forward in our relationship both to the land, and at least in Hawai‘i, to the land's siblings, the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. We must ask if we serving those with whom we are in a relationship in the best way possible to meet the needs of both that relationship and the community at large. Part of this service demands that we recognize and acknowledge the vulnerability and dependence, and the resulting interdependence, that comes from being in service to a community.
The response to the objection that the Third-Way provides no single-universal principle is to reply that this is correct: it provides no mandate or outline for how one should act in each specific situation. The Third-Way is based on a recognition of the importance of relationships— with humans and non-humans alike. No relationship looks exactly the same. My relationship to each member of my family is different from my relationship to each of my students, and it should be that way. What the Third-Way does provide, and I am deeply aware of the irony in this, is a type of categorical imperative or universal marker of what a moral relationship should be, and that is pono. The content of that relationship, what it looks like, its definition and identity will change, but we must strive that it always be pono, whatever that may look like at a specific place and time.

**Objection 3: This is Deep Ecology with an Indigenous Twist**

Before responding to this objection by arguing what is not Deep Ecology, it may be beneficial to describe what is Deep Ecology. Arne Naess, the founder of Deep Ecology, characterizes the concept bundle as more of a social or political movement and less of a philosophy. To that end, he has an eight-plank platform, which states as follows:

1. The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value.
2. Diversity has value and contributes to both human and non-human life.
3. Humans have no right to reduce diversity except to meet some "vital need."
4. Human interference in the non-human world is excessive and is worsening.
5. Flourishing of human and non-human life requires a substantial decrease in population.
6. Significant changes in life conditions require changes to economics, technological and ideological structures.

7. Ideological change should be one of appreciating life quality.


Deep Ecology is often referred to as an "ecosophy" because of its combination of ecology and philosophy. Thus, its tenets are not only theoretical but practical in the sense of mandating real world change. A key part of this ecosophy is what Naess refers to as gestalt thinking which, operationalised, serves to switch or open up world view instantly. This gestalt occurs once we accomplish three things, all of which (including the above action-plan) are incorporated in Naess’ Ecosophy T. The first is that through our expanded empathy and understanding of the non-human world, we begin to identify with, which is to say recognize, that all human and non-human life forms have common interests and have intrinsic value. The second is that we begin to expand our narrow notion of self from ego to Self, which includes all things with which I share interest. This is a transformative event and is one reason that Naess focuses on the use of Asian philosophies, which he views as less ego-based and more transcendent. This transcendence of self to achieve Self, in Naess’ words, requires that we begin to identify "with greater wholes, we partake in the creation and maintenance of the whole. We thereby share in its greatness."\footnote{Arne Naess, \textit{Ecology, Community and Lifestyle}, trans. David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 86.}

Through this expansion we come to see ourselves so that all the earth is part of the Self. Thus, the example goes, when we defend the earth we are actually acting in Self-defense. The third principle is related to this notion of expanded self in that it motivates action not through some...
notion of moral considerability, but through the fact that we are all interconnected. Naess argues against his theory being one of environmental ethics; it is instead one of ontology.\footnote{423 Eric Katz, "Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentricism," in Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, eds. Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 26-28.}

One of the biggest differences between Deep Ecology and the Third-Way is that the Third-Way does not call for a shared ontology. While the ethical obligation to care and act appropriately does arise from and is rooted in a notion of interconnectedness and rejection of a dualistic metaphysics, this is not to say we are ontologically the same. In fact, part of kuleana is to recognize non-‘Ōiwi Maoli’s limited access to a genealogical relationship to the land. Simply, non-‘Ōiwi Maoli cannot rise in self-defense of the land in the way Naess proposes because ‘āina is not related to us in the same way ‘āina is related to ‘Ōiwi Maoli. As has been pointed out in Chapter 5, and as Trask points out again below,

Hawaiian land—this land that all of us in Hawai‘i enjoy—is not the mother of haole. . . because haole are not born of this land. Culturally, Papahānaumoku is not the mother of Americans. So haole may see Hawai‘i as beautiful, or exploited, or crowded, or expensive, or hostile, or even a haven for racism, but they cannot ever see our land as familial. This is to say, haole can never know what we know or feel what we feel, about our mother, the land. Thus does history—and genealogy—separate our politics, and our analysis.\footnote{424 Trask, "Feminism and Indigenous Hawaiian Nationalism," 912.}

As with other Western theories, there is a sense of both entitlement and appropriation within Deep Ecology. Those of us non-‘Ōiwi Maoli are entitled to claim kalo, ulu, and the ‘āina as our own so long as we are defending it. While we can stand-with ‘Ōiwi Maoli and their brother, the
‘āina, we cannot make either ownership or shared cosmogenic claims. The non-‘Ōiwi Maoli moral obligation to land arises from a different place than that of ‘Ōiwi Maoli. The differences needs to be respected and acknowledged, not collapsed into some universal whole.

A second way in which the Third-Way differs from Deep Ecology is the focus on non-interference, which contradicts the ‘Ōiwi Maoli understanding of nature as a sibling. In reality, non-interference is based on the subject/object metaphysical divide where the two sets of entities humans and non-humans can be harmful to each other. While non-interference does appear to be a key part of environmental ethics in the traditional sense, as characterized by Richard Sylvan (Routley) who argues for the preservation of some parts of the earth's surface as key to the issues of environmental ethics, this is not what the Third-Way argues or calls for. As discussed in Chapter 5, the ‘Ōiwi Maoli and the ‘āina are inextricably linked as family. One cannot isolate or separate family members, for each needs the other. This, again as noted above, is one reason why ‘Ōiwi Maoli and environmentalists clash, even when it would seem they should be on the same side. Environmentalists will frequently argue for eliminating all human contact with the land, while ‘Ōiwi Maoli argue for limiting access to only ‘Ōiwi Maoli.

**Objection 4: Is this not Appropriation?**

In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I take Chakrabarti and Weber to task for claiming that they can "appropriate" any philosophical tradition of their choosing. So long as they do not claim "correct exposition," this appropriation is justified in the name of knowledge acquisition. One possible objection to the work, then, is that I myself am appropriating by incorporating kuleana, mālama, and pono into this Third-Way theory. While the line is narrow, I would respond to such an objection very much the way I did in Chapter 2: exploring traditions gives us space, tools, and
the freedom to explore and to question our own. Viewing other traditions with care and with respect for their legitimacy means we can use these tools to view our own traditions and protect them against exceptionalising, which when done in a hegemonic fashion, eliminates whole systems of thought. I am not then recreating these ethical notions but using them to challenge my tradition's thought. Moreover, because I remain in constant dialogue with the keepers of the tradition and learn as allowed, the possibility of appropriation will be minimized.

II.

Ka Moʻohele

The Road or Way

The Third-Way is a blueprint of action and a recognition of the fecundity of conflict. Revisiting the kalo controversy under a Third-Way relationship, CTAHR likely would never have patented the kalo plants in the first place. Instead, they would have been working closely with ‘Ōiwi Maoli, not just as test farms, but as true contributors to their research project. CTAHR would have recognized that it has a limited kuleana and that the appropriate action would be to engage ‘Ōiwi Maoli as early as possible. CTAHR also would recognize the multitude of concerns, market share being just one of many. Even had the kalo plants been patented, instead of admonishing the ‘Ōiwi Maoli to come into the 21st century, CTAHR would have sought Ritte and others out and engaged in a discussion of options. The ‘Ōiwi Maoli activists would have engaged CTAHR as well, and both sides would have thoughtfully and respectfully provided options and ideas on how to meet the agreed upon goals. This does not mean conflict, anger, tears, and protest would have been avoided. It does mean such disagreement would have occurred against a deeper background of understanding committed to a
hoʻopili relationship. In short, had the situation reached conflict stage, the conflict would have been viewed as a place to engage in critical self-reflection with the end goal of a pono solution.

In the end, then, perhaps the kalo controversy would not have been averted, but it would have been more productive for both parties. In the end, we might have judged our ways of viewing and relating to the world, and asked if they were pono in the sense of whether they allowed for discussions, growth, different views, service, and duty to the community. This should be a guide in Hawaiʻi, because we are uninvited guests. This should be the guide in other places, because in the vein of standpoint epistemology, it enables us to see our varied options, because it answers calls for a new environmental ethic, and because it addresses the problems raised by a subject/object divide discussed in earlier chapters.

Philosophy’s task, as Putnam argues, is to provide "meaningful, important, and discussable images of the human situation in the world." 425 One such image must be that of the ʻŌiwi Maoli. We cannot continue to argue that these traditional beliefs are cognitive nonsense, for the basis upon which we have relied to make this determination is rooted in privilege, convenience, and the perpetuation of a system that is no longer sustainable or viable. The ultimate goal of the Third-Way relationship is not to perpetuate conflict, but to use that conflict more effectively.

As with so much of the ʻŌiwi Maoli philosophy, culture and language, pono, kuleana, and mālama are interconnected and share vitality, to paraphrase Conway. Thus, kuleana is guided by but not prescribed by pono, and all must be done against a backdrop of mālama. In the context of a Third-Way, pono demands that we learn from the lessons of the past, in service to

our community, which includes nature and the ‘Ōiwi Maoli. In many ways, it is the infusion of pono and kuleana that helps to move the Western tradition from one that is reactive and residual to one that is proactive and emergent. The rejection of privileging that pono necessitates and that kuleana requires opens the way for a more vibrant exchange of ideas. But this will not be easy, as again, there may be no one absolute answer, and it requires that both parties recognize conflict as an opportunity to reflect on how it is we have arrived at this point. The space this reflection creates will provide the opportunity to think of alternative ways to move beyond the same old characterizations of "Hawaiians who protest anything" or who are angry about the Overthrow vs. economic and scientific progress that are always focused on improving the plight of humanity. That improvement eventually will mean replacing conflict with discussion and exceptionalising with plurality.

Kant has high hopes for humans: we are rational, we self-legislate, we can create arguments that seem impossible to counter, we can be good to each other even when we do not want to be. We should and must use some of these skills to create a better way to exist not only with the environment, but also with indigenous peoples. While we can use science and maybe even capitalism in the service of finding those ways, these are but tools and do not define us or our world. What does define us and our world are interconnections and the duty to care and act appropriately that arises from these interconnections. The kalo controversy allows us the critical space to re-examine our interconnections, and provides us with an opportunity to look deeply at the imagery we exceptionalise, to question our world view, and to seek to ho‘opili with all those

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426. See e.g., Chloe Fox, "Everything you need to know about the viral protest against a Hawai‘i Telescope," Huffington Post, April 13, 2015, esp. comments, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/13/hawaii-telescope-protests-tmt-mauna-kea_n_7044164.html.

427. CTAHR and Taro, 5
with whom we share land, oceans, and the future.

...ʻĀmama ua noa

428. "Now the prayer is free; now the prayer has flown." Mary Kawena Pukui, E.W. Haertig, M.D., and Catherine A. Lee, Nānā I Ke Kumu (Look to the Source), (Honolulu: Hui Hānai, 1972), 124.
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302

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